

Nationalism
and
Supranational Regional Solidarity

**The Case of Modern Japanese Nationalism and
Its Perception of Asia, 1868-2001**

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Abstract

Recently, there has been growing interest in the subject of supranational regionalism in East Asia among East Asian politicians and intellectuals. At the ASEAN+3 summit of 2001, the East Asian Vision Group, which consisted of representatives of the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and China, Japan and South Korea, recommended the development of an East Asian community as one of the common goals for the East Asian region. One of the difficulties in the transformation of the East Asian region into an East Asian community is that it required the formation of the concept of 'Asia' with which peoples of East Asia could identify themselves. The concept of Asia is a historical product. The problem is that the region has been deeply divided by nationally framed historical memories. Based on the hypothesis that national historical memories define, and are defined by nationalism and national identity, this thesis aims to examine the role of Japanese people's historical memories of their imperialist aggression, and of the Asia-Pacific War, in the lack of positive identification with Asia among the Japanese. To this end, the thesis examines such issues as the role of Japanese popular religion, the shame of Japanese memories of war, the official treatment of Japanese war victims and museum displays of victimhood. Since the formation of memory involves psychological processes, this study recognises the importance of psychological variables in addition to political, economic and social factors in the ideological process of nationalism. This will cast light on those aspects of Japanese nationalism which have been relatively neglected by other approaches. In the concluding section, I shall assess the prospects for supranational regional solidarity in East Asia using the findings of this study of the nature of Japanese nationalism and national identity.

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Preface

This thesis reflects the journey I have taken in discovering my own sense of national identity. Until I stepped out of Japan for the first time in my life in order to study in the United Kingdom in 1994, I had been hardly conscious of my nationality. My life in Japan, where ethnic variation within the population was suppressed by a myth of the single, homogenous Japanese ethnic nation, and tight immigration control provided only limited contact with foreigners, did not give me many opportunities to think and feel that I was Japanese, let alone Asian. However, in the UK I have been constantly reminded of my nationality by being seen by others and seeing myself as a foreigner or as Japanese. Naturally, I have become strongly aware of my national identity.

At the same time, I have also found inside myself a growing self-awareness of being an Asian. It may be partly because of perceived physical similarities between the Japanese and other Asian peoples in comparison with physical differences between the Japanese and European peoples. I have been aware that many non-Asian people cannot distinguish between the Japanese and other East Asian peoples in terms of appearance and thus they often simply categorise me as an Asian. Perhaps, I have recognised some cultural commonalities between the Japanese and other Asian cultures, for example in food or ways of behaviour. I have also found that the category of 'orient' still persists in the popular discourse in the UK, for instance in the form of admiration for so-called oriental natural health care methods as exotic alternatives to Western scientific methods. Moreover, seeing the process of European integration has made me think about the prospect for the development of a supranational regional identity in Europe and elsewhere. Thus, the combination of various factors have resulted in the development of an Asian identity within me, in parallel with that of a national identity.

Nonetheless, there are moments when my Japanese and Asian identities conflict with each other. Such moments are often related to historical contexts. For example, when one of my

Taiwanese friends casually mentioned that her grandparents could speak Japanese, I felt a little uncomfortable. She did not say anything about Japan's aggression against the Taiwanese people during the colonial period. Rather, she and her family seemed to have an affinity for the Japanese culture. Nevertheless, a sense of guilt aroused by my knowledge of why her grandparents had *had to* learn Japanese drew a boundary between her and me in my mind, a boundary between a victim and a perpetrator in a nationally framed historical context. This conflict between my Japanese and Asian identities on the personal level raised questions of whether East Asian people could ever develop a common identity which could become the basis of regional solidarity in East Asia.

As a first step towards finding an answer to this question, I aim to examine relationships between Japanese nationalism and the Japanese perception of Asia from 1868 to 2001. In Japan, people rarely talk about 'nationalism' in everyday life. They tend to think it is something far away from them, something which belongs only to fanatic ultra right-wing activists. Moreover, Japan's historical relationships with other Asian countries, especially in the modern, pre-1945 period, have been underrepresented in the Japanese public discourse. Thus, this study has been, to a significant extent, motivated my own desire to understand the ambivalence between my Japanese and Asian identities by rediscovering missing pasts in Japanese collective memories which have conditioned such ambivalence on the personal as well as collective levels.

Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to thank my parents who have always supported and encouraged me to pursue whatever I want to do throughout my life, even though they have had to sacrifice themselves in various ways in order to do so. I am also grateful to my supervisor Professor Anthony D. Smith who is not only a distinguished scholar but also a genuine, great teacher. Without his inspiring work, intellectual passion, dedication to his students and intellectual guidance, the completion of this thesis would not have been impossible.

Note: In this thesis Japanese names are rendered in the Japanese name order, that is, surname first, unless a person writes in English and adopts the Western name order.

Introduction

The subject of regional solidarity in East Asia has been receiving increasing attention in the study of international relations since the end of the Cold War. Although recently there has been no major military clash in East Asia and the region has become more and more economically interdependent, its stability is not fully guaranteed. Issues such as the occasional outbreak of hostility between China and Taiwan, and North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons suggest that the development of supranational regional partnership in East Asia is a matter of great significance. In this context, the question of Japanese nationalism and its attitude toward Asia, which has fuelled suspicion of Japan in neighbouring countries, has assumed great importance and deserves careful analysis.

- Hypothesis

Despite differences in their perspectives, there seems to be no disagreement between scholars on the point that the world has experienced rapid globalisation for the last few decades. Anthony McGrew (1992), for example, explains that a number of universal processes which cut across national boundaries are at work, generating interconnection and interdependence between states and between societies in political, economic, cultural and social domains. In similar vein, Andrew Hurrel (1995) maintains that the development of mass communication technology and the global flood of money, people, images, values and ideas have created popular arguments that territorial boundaries are becoming less important and that the traditional understanding of sovereignty is being undermined. Does this suggest that globalisation is the way to the formation of a global community and a global identity?

Immanuel Wallerstein (1984) and Ronald Robertson (1991) point out two opposite directions of forces, namely universalism and particularism within globalisation processes. This is supported by Stuart Hall (1991), who claims that in late modernity, localism often happens as a response

to globalisation. In the economic and political spheres, localisation has often taken the form of supranational regionalism. The existence of increasing numbers of regional, transnational institutions, such as the European Union (EU), Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), shows that localisation based on regions, in other words supranational regionalisation, has been taking place, at least, in the political and economic domains.

In the field of international relations, there have been lively discussions on the emergence of political and economic supranational regionalism, an ideology which calls for solidarity within a supranational region in order to pursue the shared interests of the region, within the process of globalisation. In this sense, regionalism is not an independent process but a complementary process to globalisation. It is important to note that the principal actor in international regional organisations is still the nation-state. That is to say, supranational regionalism has been used in order to promote the national interests of individual nation-states. This indicates that regionalism is a defensive reaction of nation-states to globalisation and therefore, nationalism and political and economic supranational regionalism are different sides of the same coin. In other words, supranational regionalism is tenable only when the political and economic interests of individual nation-states within a region converge. Therefore, it seems unlikely that globalisation and political and economic regionalism will lead to the dissolution of the existing inter-state system or of nationalism.¹ The question is whether the formation of supranational regional identity, which brings regional solidarity and can be the basis of peace and mutual prosperity within regions, can and will animate the mass of the population, alongside elite political and economic regionalism.²

In 1997, a Japanese group called Global Project 21 conducted a survey of six East Asian cities, namely Beijing (China), Hong Kong, Seoul (South Korea), Bangkok (Thailand), Khon Kaen (Thailand) and Jakarta (Indonesia) on the public perception of 'Asia' and Japan.³ Its results show that despite exhibiting some emotional difficulties, especially in Beijing and Seoul, the

majority of respondents in all these cities admit that they have a sense of belonging to Asia and they regard Japan as a fellow member of 'their' Asia. It is difficult to judge the degree of Asian solidarity from these results. Nonetheless, at least, it indicates that people in these cities have started to adopt the category of 'Asians' as one of many points of reference for self-definition and that they accept Japan as part of it. On the other hand, another survey conducted in 1996 by the same group shows that 61% of Japanese respondents feel that the Japanese are disliked by the rest of Asia.⁴ Only 18% of them feel that other Asians like the Japanese. According to David I. Hitchcock (1997), most Japanese respondents whom he interviewed adopt the point of view that Japan is a part of Asia in one sense but is also apart from Asia in another. This suggests that although there seems to be a gradual, positive change in other Asian people's attitude toward Japan (and Japan is a part of Asia in a geographical sense), the Japanese have a relatively weak positive consciousness of being Asian and feel emotionally isolated from the rest of Asia. What has held the Japanese back from Asia? Regarding the possibility for a European identity, both Philip Schlesinger (1994) and Anthony Smith (1992) suggest that the existence of well-established national identities and a lack of common historical memories among different nations make the formation of a supranational regional identity problematic and difficult. And this seems to be born out by the Japanese case.

For many Japanese people, interaction between Japan and other Asian countries, especially China and Korea, takes place in contexts related to their historical relationships during the period of Japanese imperialism, such as the issue of compensation for forced prostitutes in Japanese ex-colonies and the controversy over the interpretation of the Nanking Massacre in which many Chinese civilians were killed by the Japanese army. These negative representations of Japanese imperial history have been marginalised by a strong sense of Japanese victimhood in the Japanese historical discourse. Thus, there has been a gap between Japanese historical memories and their national attachments, on the one hand, and the negative representations of Japanese imperial history remembered by the victims of Japan's imperialist aggression, on the other hand. This has led to the Japanese failure to construct

common historical memories which can be shared with other Asians, and which is one of the conditions for the formation of a collective identity. As a result, this has prevented the development of an Asian consciousness in the minds of the Japanese.

To sum up, this study is based on the hypothesis that the Japanese memories of their imperialism and the Asia-Pacific War, as defined by Japanese nationalism and national identity, have contributed to the simultaneous universalisation and nationalisation of the Japanese people's identity, and this has been one of the main causes for the lack of a positive identification with Asia among them. In this study, I define nationalism as an ideological commitment to pursue the interests of a nation which is derived from a person's emotional attachment and identification with his/her national community. The emphasis on the psychological elements in my definition of nationalism is due to the fact that this thesis is concerned with the perceptual aspect of the ideological formation of nationalism as a social phenomenon in which widely shared images of Japan and Asia have been formed in the minds of the Japanese. The aim of this thesis is to examine the ideological processes through which such images have been redefined by Japanese historical memories of the Asia-Pacific War. Therefore, rather than simply displaying objective materials, I shall examine the ways in which these materials have been perceived by Japanese people and have become constituents of Japanese nationhood.

- Major Theoretical approaches to the study of nationalisms

The study of nationalism has never been dominated by any single approach. Since the word 'nationalism' can refer to a vast range of social phenomena, it is easy for scholars to criticise others' theories by pointing to cases which do not fit them. However, this does not mean that their theories should be dismissed simply because of the existence of examples to which they are not applicable. As different approaches may deal with different stages of the same nationalism and different levels of analysis, they are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Rather,

they can be complementary. In this section, I shall examine a few selected approaches and theories that are of particular relevance and shed light on the case of Japan and its nationalist ideologies before outlining my own social psychological approach. In this way I hope to situate my approach and the case of Japan within a wider comparative context and theoretical discourse on nationalism.

a) Economic approaches

The economic paradigm which regards the rise of nationalism as a product of distinctive features of modern, industrial, capitalist society is useful for understanding how capitalism and industrialism contributed to the spread of nationalist ideology. As Ernest Gellner (1983) argues, social changes accompanied by the advance of capitalism and industrialisation in modern times, such as the standardisation of education, language and culture, and individual mobility within society, have certainly played important roles in the dissemination of a particular set of ideas of a nation among the mass population within a politically demarcated territory. Among various economic theories, Walt Rostow's (1960:20) theory of economic growth, which regards a reactive nationalism forged against the threat posed by more advanced nations as a powerful driving force in the transition from traditional to modern industrial society, seems particularly useful in understanding the Japanese case. In Japan, a strong fear for a national security threatened by the expansion of Western imperialism strengthened a Japanese national consciousness based on the perception of a shared national destiny. This fear was one of the important factors which spurred industrialisation, which in turn was essential for the enhancement of military strength and national security.

b) Political approaches

While some modernists regard capitalism as the primary cause of the emergence of nations and nationalism, there are other modernists who link the latter more closely to the modern state system. Those political modernists, such as Anthony Giddens (1985) and Michael Mann (1993),

argue that the state exploits its political and military forces and institutional apparatus in order to mould people within its political territory into loyal nationals who are willing to co-operate with the state to pursue its interests. In the case of Japan, the political approach highlights the central role the state plays in the formation of national consciousness, based on popular emperor worship through its political, legal, educational and communicational apparatus.

The problem of the political modernist paradigm is its tendency to overemphasise unity between state and nation. As I discuss in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, Japan's modern nation-state building was accompanied by the development of ethnic nationalism in opposition to the state, and of national identity based on a sense of belonging to a distinctive historico-cultural national community. In this sense, John Breuilly's (1993 [1982]) theory, which regards the split between the state and society as the primary cause of the emergence of nationalism, seems to be relevant to the Japanese case. He argues that the distinction between the public domain of the state and the private domain of society, which has been reinforced by the advance of capitalism, turns politically-minded citizens who are excluded from political life to nationalism. He rightly describes the Meiji Restoration, which was led by the disaffected segments of the ruling class in their attempts to transform Japan from a feudal state into a modern nation-state in the mid nineteenth century, as a successful example of reformist nationalism.⁵

The important point is that Breuilly equates society, which he regards as the seed-bed of nationalism, with a political community of elites. As a result, in his eyes, ethnic nationalism and national identity which do not make a political claim are not essential to the development of significant nationalism as political movements. He maintains that 'an effective nationalism develops where it makes sense for an opposition to the government to claim to represent the nation against the present state'.⁶ The question is to whom nationalism has to make sense. If, as he argues, nationalism acquires legitimacy and mobilising power by claiming that it represents the nation, then it may be said that the idea of the nation and national identity widely shared by a large segment of the population give legitimacy and mobilising power to nationalist

claims. In the Japanese case, as ethnic nationalism has been playing a significant role in defining the concept of the nation and national identity, the nature of political nationalism cannot be fully understood without considering its relation to ethnic nationalism and to the national identity of the people which it claims to represent. This leads us to the question of the role of ideology in defining the popular concept of the nation.

c) **Ideological approaches**

Some scholars regard nationalism as an ideological phenomenon in which elites manipulate the masses in order to achieve their political goals. Among them, Elie Kedourie's (1971) explanation of the impact of colonialism on the rise of nationalism in colonial states seems particularly useful in understanding the Japanese case. According to him, the causes of nationalism lie in the discontent with their position in imperial institutions of the newly educated elites who enthusiastically embrace Western civilisation with its liberal ideas of equality and justice, and who are bitterly disappointed to find themselves excluded from these ideals and positions. In the case of Japan, as it was not under the direct rule of Western colonialism but forced to accept a disadvantageous position in international politics through unequal treaties, the level of comparison for Japanese elites must have been national rather than personal. That is to say, in the Japanese case, Kedourie's theory has to be modified in the following manner: a cause of Japanese nationalism lay in the discontent of the Japanese elites with the unequal position of Japan imposed by the Western powers in the international political context.

The value of Kedourie's theory is that it casts lights on the psychological aspect of nationalism by regarding 'discontent' as an internal, motivational force which stimulates the development of nationalism. This reminds us that the impact of a nationally felt sense of inferiority to the West on the development of Japanese nationalism should not be neglected. Furthermore, his emphasis on the need for nationalists to exploit traditional religions as an instrument to mobilise the mass of the population, and manipulate their emotions in nationalist movements, helps to explain the importance given to the role of religions in Japanese nationalist movements. The

concept of a divine national family built on the traditional practice of ancestor worship in Japanese popular religions provided the Japanese with a sense of national pride and helped them identify themselves with Japan as a nation-state. As a result, the fate and position of Japan in international politics were felt as their own. Thus, fear for national security and damaged national pride were strong internal forces for the development of Japanese nationalism. This suggests the psychological depth of nationalism.

Nationalism as an ideological movement among elites and intellectuals is also the main focus of the recent works on Japanese nationalism by Kevin M. Doak and Oguma Eiji.⁷ They pay careful attention to Japanese ideologues' personal backgrounds and identities threatened by cultural, economic and military hegemony of Western civilisation and their role in the development of their reactive nationalist ideologies. There is no doubt about the importance of the roles played by elites and intellectuals in the development of nationalism. Nevertheless, studies based on an unexplained, taken-for-granted assumption of the elites' capacity to manipulate the masses do little to help us to understand why a particular ideology has more appeal to the masses than others at a particular moment.

This is a common problem faced by many of those who adopt economic, political and ideological approaches, who can also rightly be regarded as modernists as they tend to believe that nationalism is a modern phenomenon and the nation is the product of modernity. Certainly, modernist approaches which place primary importance on the role of political and economic conditions in modernity as the cause of the rise and spread of nationalism are useful for understanding why it is only in the modern era that nationalism has become such a powerful ideology engaging the mass of the population. However, this does not prove that the nation was completely a modern creation. Benedict Anderson (1991[1983]) argues that print-capitalism has made it possible for a large number of people to become aware of the existence of others with whom they share the same language and culture, and imagine a community where they are united with those others. If, as Anderson suggests, nationalism consists of a sense of belonging

to an imagined national community, nationalism presupposes the existence of imagined communities to which people feel that they belong. A sense of belonging cannot be created without a community of which individuals feel that they are a part. So, in Japan, what is the kind of concept of national community that has had a strong appeal to the mass of the population?

d) Sociobiological approaches

Sociobiologists place primary importance on the role of biological kinship in the formation of collectivities. For example, for Pierre van den Berghe (1978) a nation is nothing more than one form of ethnic group. He explains the rise of nations and nationalism simply in terms of kinship and kin-selection. There has been a considerable amount of criticism of the sociobiological approach to nationalism, especially from modernists. It certainly ignores the impact of historical and modern political and economic conditions, which have made the nation-state the most successful form of political entity, on the rise of nations and nationalism in the modern era. Moreover, as Smith (1998:150) points out, van den Berghe's arguments may lose some of their persuasiveness given the fact that some successful common ancestry myths have references to various origins, and that the demographic composition within an ethnic group can change over time.

However, these defects in his theory seem less relevant to the case of early modern Japan, which did not experience a dramatic demographic change in its history, and whose territorial boundaries were relatively fixed through time and rather clearly defined by the sea. Taken together, these factors might have suggested the comparative stability of the genetic stock within Japan. Van den Berghe does not completely deny the role of *myths* of common ancestry as the basis of ethnicity. His point is that these myths can be effective, 'only if they correspond, at least partly, to reality'⁸; the reality of actual, biological common ancestry which he regards as a result of preferential endogamy. It is hard to prove that one's ethnic or national sentiment is based on extended biological kinship. The point is not whether the Japanese in the early

modern period shared a factual biological origin or not, but that there were enough historical and geographical conditions to allow them to believe in common ancestry as a reality on the basis of the practice of endogamy.⁹ This may explain the effectiveness of the racialised notion of a Japanese national family as a significant component of Japanese nationhood. In this way, van den Berghe's sociobiological approach can throw light on the pre-existing background which can partly account for the development of a particular nationalist ideology in Japan. The importance of such pre-existing historical conditions, and nationalist ideology which exploits them, tends to be undervalued by the modernist approaches. As I discuss in Chapter 2, a distinctive feature of pre-1945 Japanese nationalism was the unification of racial and cultural boundaries in the definition of Japanese nationhood. Thus, the study of Japanese nationalism requires a theoretical paradigm which can help us to understand the processes through which such a cultural boundary was drawn in the minds of the Japanese; the point that I turn to next.

e) Cultural approaches

An advantage of cultural approaches is that they recognise the formation of a national historico-cultural community as distinct from that of the state. This is an extremely important point which most modernist approaches fail to acknowledge. The equation of loyalty to the state to that of the nation as an ethnic community results in an overestimation of the state's capacity to mobilise the masses and reduces the role of the masses to passive objects of the state's manipulation. In consequence, it prevents us from comprehending the dynamics of the evolution of nationalism as a social phenomenon in which the masses participate as active agents. On this point, Walker Connor's (1994) theory of ethnonationalism has made a significant contribution to the understanding of the nature and psychological depth of popular nationalism by arguing that nationalism is based more on loyalty and emotional attachment to an ethnically defined nation than loyalty to the state. He is right to point out that the scholarship on Japanese nationalism has suffered from identification of nationalism with loyalty to the state.¹⁰ Nevertheless, he errs when he goes on to claim that for the Japanese who possess their own ethnically homogeneous

nation-state, the distinction between two different loyalties, to one's ethnic community and to the state, is of little consequence and 'they tend to blur into a seamless whole'.¹¹ As this thesis demonstrates, even in Japan the state and the nation as a historico-cultural community are different entities, and loyalty to the latter is often turned against the former.

This point has also been made by Doak (1996). He criticises a lack of distinction between political nationalism centred on the state, and an ethnic nationalism developed in opposition to it in the majority of studies of Japanese nationalism.¹² For instance, in his examination of approaches to Japanese nationalism, Kenneth Pyle (1971:6) defines nationalism as 'a process...by which large numbers of people of all social classes are psychologically integrated into active membership in, and positive identification with, the nation-state'. Doak argues that such a state-centred approach fails to explain adequately the strong appeal of nationalism to many Japanese people. Moreover, his definition of nationalism suggests that Pyle seems to confuse 'national sentiment' with nationalism as the ideological movement.

Kosaku Yoshino (1992) also identifies a Japanese cultural nationalism distinct from political nationalism in his study of postwar Japanese cultural nationalism. This is manifested in *Nihonjinron*; the idea which became popular in the 1970s and 1980s that Japanese people are culturally unique. As he points out, there has been a lack of study of post-war Japanese nationalism in the field of sociology. In post-war Japan, open manifestations of pre-war type nationalism based on emperor worship have been scorned in public life and nationalism has been associated only with extreme right-wing activists. However, this does not mean that Japanese national identity and the Japanese national community have ceased to exist. On the contrary, as Yoshino demonstrates, a new form of nationalism based on cultural symbols emerged. Moreover, the fact that post-war cultural nationalism gained its cultural resources from the symbols which had been used in pre-1945 Japanese cultural nationalism indicates the persistence of the idea of the Japanese nation as a cultural community in the minds of the Japanese, as well as a perception of a certain degree of historical continuity. Thus, Yoshino's study shows that the Japanese people's sense of belonging to the Japanese historico-cultural

community did not die out with the dissolution of the pre-1945 state institution and statist political nationalism. The popular concept of a depoliticised Japanese cultural community as a product of social and historical processes has become an important ingredient of Japanese nationhood and compensated for a lack of popular political nationalism in post-war Japan.

One of the useful theoretical tools of the cultural paradigm is the ethno-symbolic approach. John Hutchinson's (1987) emphasis on the role of historical memories and cultural symbols in defining the nature of the nation, and as the source of popular attachment to a particular concept of the nation, draws our attention to the role of the perception of the masses in the development of nationalism. However, in contrast to Eric Hobsbawm (1983), who argues that cultural constructs such as symbols and myths which imply the historical continuity of the modern nation are often recent in origin and sometimes invented, Hutchinson understands that elites cannot invent anything as they wish. Only those symbols and myths which are consonant with the pre-existing perceptions, attitudes and beliefs which have been widely shared among the masses of the population can exert mobilising power. The failure of the Meiji government's religious policies, which undermined the popular religious traditions and practices, clearly proved that this was the case.

In this way, cultural approaches can highlight those aspects of Japanese nationalism and national identity which modernists fail to acknowledge. Nevertheless, as noted above, the rise of nations and nationalism is a product of complicated political, economic, cultural and historical processes, and accounts which neglect any of these factors are incomplete. The value of cultural approaches will be better appreciated if they are combined with an understanding of those conditions that have made cultural factors more salient than others. Only by taking into account relations between the above factors, can we fully grasp the whole picture and the dynamism of the processes through which nationalism is produced and reproduced.

To sum up, all the approaches which I have discussed above can contribute to the understanding of certain aspects of Japanese nationalism. Throughout this thesis, I shall adopt

them whenever they are relevant to my discussions. This may make me sound intellectually eclectic. However, only such an approach allows one to construct a balanced picture of Japanese nationalism. The point that is central to the theoretical framework of this study is that each of the above theoretical paradigms can benefit by incorporating certain psychological variables. Leonard W. Doob (1964:5) argues that in order to understand nationalism as a phenomenon which involves human reactions to stimuli from the external world, it is crucial to take into consideration the role of people's predispositions, such as tendencies, traits, feelings, beliefs and attitudes which, to a significant degree, affect their reactions. In the next section, I shall introduce a social psychological approach and explain how it could contribute to the theory of nationalisms.

- Theoretical framework of this study

The main aim of this study is to examine how Japanese historical memories of its imperialist aggression and the Asia-Pacific War, which have defined and been defined by Japanese nationalism and national identity, have drawn a boundary between Japan and the rest of Asia in the minds of the Japanese. In this sense, it may be said that the approach of this study is similar to the boundary approach which suggests that the salience of group identities is not fixed but can change according to the relations between 'us' and 'significant others'.¹³ Moreover, since this study is concerned with boundaries which demarcate various levels of territoriality in the Japanese mental map, and the Japanese sense of belonging to communities defined by those boundaries, Anderson's (1991) concept of imagined communities provides a useful theoretical tool to explore the questions of this study. Nonetheless, these two approaches share a serious problem; that is, their overemphasis on the phenomenological aspect of the formation of nations and nationalism. New boundaries and images of communities cannot be drawn on a blank sheet. Our imagination of social boundaries and communities is based on our perception of objects surrounding us. Their existence cannot be confined to the arena of psychological phenomena because their meanings are, to a large extent, socially and historically constructed.

This phenomenological problem is also common to the social psychological approach of social identity theorists. For example, Henri Tajfel (1981:229) claims that 'a nation will only exist if a body of people feel themselves to be a nation'. Like the boundary approach, the theory of social identity also regards a sense of belonging to an 'ingroup' distinct from 'outgroup' which people acquire through the process of self-categorisation as an important determinant of group behaviour.¹⁴ Nonetheless, there is a critical difference between the boundary and the social identity approaches. That is, by introducing psychological variables in understanding the process of self-definition as a member of a particular social group, the social identity theory sheds light on motivational and affective factors which are operating in the production and reproduction of the concepts of social groups. For instance, Tajfel and John C. Turner (1979) point out links between people's evaluation of their own social group and their own self-esteem. According to Tajfel (1978), because of people's need for a positive self-concept, there is a tendency for them to judge their own group favourably. This implies that people are inclined to positively interpret their own group's past.

A serious methodological problem with the social identity theory is that it is largely based on results obtained from highly controlled experiments. Therefore, it is subject to criticism which questions the validity of its application to large-scale social phenomena such as nationalism. However, other studies which do not rely on experimental methods also support the finding of social identity theory by pointing to an inclination for members of a group to interpret their own group's past in positive ways. For example, the study of Roy F. Baumeister and Stephen Hastings (1997) shows that group memories are systematically distorted in a variety of ways in order to maintain a positive image of the group. They claim that an asymmetry in errors, which shows a strong tendency for the majority of errors to strengthen, rather than diminish, the group's desirable images, indicates that collective self-deception is not accidental but motivated. They argue that even though sometimes such collective self-deception might be initiated by

authoritarian regimes or nationalist groups, the significant role played by the people who listen, accept and transmit such biased views should be recognised.¹⁵

To summarise, the social identity approach tries to explain the formation of collective memories by using a shared identity and psychological needs as independent variables. Collective memories are defined by a shared identity based on a sense of belonging to a particular social group which guides its members' selection of historical materials, and which makes psychological needs within the group relatively consistent. The point is that all information obtained from society has to go through psychological processes to be remembered and forgotten by people. Without psychological reflection, people would be considered a passive receiver of information. In consequence, it would be impossible to understand interactive relationships between society and individuals, and the nature of ideological competition involved in the formation of collective memories. Social identity theorists do appreciate social influences on group identity formation because the group categories which people adopt in order to define 'self' and 'other' are social constructs. Nevertheless, their understanding of memory processes is still rather individualistic in the sense that these processes are explained mainly in terms of the ontogeny of the individual. Moreover, as Michael Billig (1995: 66) points out, the universalism of social identity theory ignores the particularity of social categories, and as a result, fails to explain why some categories are more durable than, and predominate over, others. In understanding large-scale social phenomena, social identity theory needs to be complemented by consideration for socio-political factors, such as ideology, which mediates between individuals and society.

Here, Serge Moscovici's theory of social representation offers a useful account of relations between objects and socially and historically conditioned subjectivity. According to Moscovici (1983), new, strange information becomes familiar common sense by being integrated into the pre-existing cultural network of social representations shared within society. Thus, when a person is born, he/she is integrated into this pre-existing cultural network and develops a shared

cognitive framework, which consists of common beliefs, values, ideas and political and social ideologies. The key concepts of Moscovici's theory of social representation are 'anchoring' and 'objectifying', two different mechanisms of a thought process based on socially and historically conditioned memory, which make the unfamiliar familiar.

Firstly, 'anchoring' is a process through which we integrate something unfamiliar and disturbing into the socially and historically conditioned existing system of representations by comparing it to the paradigm of a category that seems to be the most relevant, in order to make it appear familiar and make sense to us.¹⁶ As a result, he claims, 'memory prevails over deduction, the past over the present, response over stimuli and images over "reality".¹⁷ This does not mean that the social representation approach presumes static pasts and unchanging societies. This is because the integration of unfamiliar elements into the existing social categorical paradigm inevitably results in the modification of pre-existing representations. However, those unfamiliar elements have to go through even greater modification to acquire a new existence in the representation system into which they have been introduced.¹⁸ This idea of 'anchoring' implies a certain degree of restriction imposed by socially and historically constructed meanings of objects on the malleability of pasts, which is the basic assumption of modernist approaches. By regarding familiarity as an independent variable, the concept of 'anchoring' partly explains why some historical memories are more persistent than others.

Secondly, 'objectifying' refers to a process through which we turn something abstract into something concrete which possesses existential reality by transferring it to the physical world.¹⁹ It can be done by associating an abstract idea with an image of a physical object. As an example, Moscovici explains that by comparing God to a father, we transform what is invisible into a visible person in our minds.²⁰ This process of objectification is social because society, to a significant degree, affects the range of available choices of objects to be associated with a particular idea.

To sum up, people do not directly respond to exterior stimuli as such but to social

representations which have been framed by the pre-existing shared cognitive paradigm. They internalise concepts, values, memories, myths and symbols of the nation through this socially conditioned cognitive framework and these provide the contents of their national identity. Their established national identity reciprocally produces and reproduces them, if necessary, with some modifications. Since these processes are psychological as well as social, we also need to take into account psychological variables, as the theory of social identity claims.

Thus, for this study I shall adopt a social psychological approach based on the combination of social identity theory and the theory of social representations. My main concern is the way in which historical materials are perceived by Japanese people through their socially defined cognitive framework, in which their perceptions of these materials became part of the Japanese national community. For example, in the late nineteenth century, the concepts of 'the Japanese nation' and 'Asia' were relatively new to many Japanese people. Applying Moscovici's theory of social representation, I would like to emphasise the importance of examining how those unfamiliar ideas of the nation and 'Asia' have developed by being associated with pre-existing social representations of objects, such as cultural symbols, traditions and religious practices, and have acquired existential reality in the minds of people.

The important thing is that the process through which such new concepts evolve is social. For instance, there are a variety of potential social representations of the idea of war victims depending on the social group with which the idea is associated. However, as the examination of Japanese historical memories of its imperialist aggression and the Asia-Pacific War in this thesis demonstrates, the balance of power between the potential concepts of war victims has been determined, to a great extent, by the dominant ideology, values and beliefs within society. Therefore, I also acknowledge the importance of political, economic and social factors as they have significant influences on the composition of the dominant ideology that defines the nature of social representations of the nation. The emphasis of my approach on the socially and historically conditioned perceptions of objects as constituents of nationhood differentiates the approach of this study from more individualistic psychological approaches such as the social

identity theory. This also makes my approach less subject to the problem of overemphasis on the phenomenological aspect of the formation of nationalism and national identity. Moreover, this study recognises the role of psychological variables, such as guilt, need for self-respect, shame and fear in the formation of Japanese nationalism, national identity and historical memories. This separates my approach from the boundary approach.

Finally, the emphasis on social psychological aspects of the formation of nationalism and national identity enables me to illuminate the role of the masses as active agents in that process. Thus, the approach employed in this study offers an antidote against elite-centred approaches to the study of nationalism. That is to say, we should not automatically assume that nationalist ideologies among elites are shared by the masses. This reminds us the danger of equating popular nationalism and sentiment with state-centred nationalism of elites. In this way, I hope that the approach of this study will make a theoretical contribution to the general theory of nationalism by employing those variables and a level of analysis which have been missed by other approaches.

- Structure of this study

Although the main concern of this study is the relationship between Japanese nationalism and national identity on the one hand, and the Japanese perception of Asia in contemporary Japanese society, on the other hand, the present cannot be properly understood without an understanding of the past. This is especially so in the case of this study, as Japan's present relationships with Asia have been historically conditioned, and Japanese perceptions of Asia involve reference to the past historical relationships between Japan and Asia. Thus, I shall start with two chapters which examine different aspects of the development of pre-war Japanese nationalism.

Chapter 1 examines the dual process of Japan's nation building, one as a political community, and the other as a historico-cultural community, from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. Chapter 2 analyses the ways in which various sections of the Japanese people defined themselves as Japanese in relation to Asia and the West, seen as 'significant others' in the pre-war period. These two chapters on pre-war Japanese nationalism demonstrate that the Japanese masses were not passive objects of state manipulation, as is often believed, but active agents in the development of pre-war Japanese ethnic nationalism, which prevented the formation of a genuine sense of belonging to Asia among the Japanese masses. I shall not deny the influence of elites on the formation of attitudes and perceptions among the mass of the population. What these chapters attempt is to modify the assumed imbalance of power between the elites and the Japanese masses in the development of nationalism by rediscovering the masses as active players in the process of ideological formation.

In Chapter 3, I shall examine the ways in which war experiences affected the nature of nationalism and national identity in national reconstruction processes in post-war Japan and Germany, and what impact these processes had on their attitudes toward their respective regions, namely Asia and Europe. Although both Japan and Germany have negative pasts concerning the War, their post-war relationships with their neighbouring countries and their supranational regional policies show striking differences. This section is intended to examine both similarities and differences between Japan and Germany. Comparison between these two countries is expected to give us useful insights into relationships between nationalism, historical memories and the relationship between state and nation.

The theme of Chapter 4 is the prospect for the formation of a supranational regional collectivity. Considering the development of political and economic regionalism in post-Cold War East Asia, I shall evaluate the effectiveness of the 'Asian Values' discourse as a potential ideological basis of East Asian cultural regionalism. As this chapter is concerned with the present and the future,

some of the arguments it presents are inevitably rather speculative. However, in order to compensate for this weakness, I shall attempt to ground my speculations in theory and demonstrate a balanced picture of the possibilities and the options which Japan has for its future orientation.

In the 1990s, increasing external and internal pressures forced Japan to face the past of Japanese imperial aggression, which had been marginalised in the official discourse. This has resulted in a significant development of historical revisionism and attempts to restore the unity between the state and the nation in Japanese historical consciousness, a unity which had been severed by the post-war ideology of the Japanese nation as a victim of the military state. In Chapter 5, I will analyse how the growing presence of other Asian people as the victims of Japan's imperial aggression has affected the ways in which the state deals with the memory of the Asia-Pacific War.

Chapter 6 is dedicated to the examination of the memory of the Asia-Pacific War in the public domain. The growing awareness of Japanese imperial aggression against other Asian peoples has not only divided the Japanese political community and society but has also created a gap between state and nation. The impact of controversy over the memory of the War has been particularly significant in the exhibitions at war-related museums in Japan. In this chapter, I shall examine how the War is represented in major war-related museums in Japan. The examination of these museums will highlight the complexity in the relationship between state, local communities and nation in post-war Japan. It also shows that the concept of 'Asia' has started to play a significant role again in the definition of contemporary Japanese national identity.

In the concluding chapter, I shall discuss the kinds of impact the findings of this study of the nature of Japanese nationalism have on the prospects for supranational regional co-operation and solidarity in East Asia. Furthermore, I shall assess the contribution of these findings to the general theory of nationalism. My main concern here is the effects of nationally framed historical memories on the formation of supranational regional groupings.

Finally, the advantages and disadvantages of covering a long period of almost 150 years in this thesis need to be pointed out. The majority of existing studies of Japanese nationalism focus on the pre-1945 period and there has been relatively little literature which examines both pre-war and post-war Japanese nationalism. These have resulted in contrasting images of pre-war and post-war Japanese society and contributed to the development of the myth that Japan was reborn in 1945. However, by identifying the ubiquitous manifestations of nationalism in the ways in which Japanese people remember the War, this study highlights the persistence of Japanese nationalism in post-war Japan. Moreover, comparison between pre-war Japanese society (Chapters 1 and 2) and the post-war reconstruction of its image (Chapters 3,5 and 6) demonstrates aspects of post-war Japanese nationalism which cannot be effectively revealed by those studies which exclusively focus either on the pre-war or the post-war period.

Nevertheless, limited space and the long time span covered mean that the range of topics this study deals with has had to be rather selective. As a result, I cannot devote much space to the process of Japanese modernisation as such, although I do take into account its impact on Japanese people's perception. Japan's political, economic and military histories also fall outside this study's scope. Furthermore, the living conditions of Japan's former colonial subjects in Japan cannot be examined, even though this is an important issue in understanding the Japanese sense of themselves. Finally, in order to examine the prospects for the development of supranational regional solidarity in East Asia, we also need to look into the ways in which other East Asian peoples perceive Asia and Japan. However, this is a quite separate research project.

Hopefully, the combination of my social psychological approach, the long temporal framework employed here and the treatment of the nation as an entity distinct from the state, will enable readers to identify and understand aspects of Japanese nationalism and national identity which have been missed by most of the existing literature on Japanese nationalism. Here, I have sought to concentrate on neglected aspects of Japanese nationalism and national identity through a relatively novel type of analysis.

Notes

¹ For the persistence of the inter-state system in world politics, see, for example, James Mayall (1990).

² For discussions on growing political and economic supranational regionalism in East Asia, see, for example, Richard Higgott (1997).

³ Asahi Shimbun, 09 June 1997.

⁴ Asahi Shimbun, 09 November 1996.

⁵ John Breuilly (1993: 240-4).

⁶ Breuilly (1993: 398).

⁷ For example, see Kevin M. Doak (1994, 1996, 1997 and 2001) and Oguma Eiji (2002a and 2002b).

⁸ Pierre van den Berghe (1988:256).

⁹ The Ainu in Ezo and the people of Ryukyu, both of which were officially integrated into the Japanese territory in the early Meiji period, had had distinctive ethnic cultures. However, their ethnic distinctiveness was suppressed by the state's assimilation policy to transform them into loyal Japanese subjects. Therefore, they did not threaten the myth of common ancestry among the Japanese population.

¹⁰ Connor (1994: 98).

¹¹ Connor (1994:196).

¹² Doak (1996:79).

¹³ For example, see Frederik Barth (1969).

¹⁴ For Social Identity Theory, see, for example, Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg (1999).

¹⁵ Roy F. Baumeister and Stephen Hastings (1997: 292).

¹⁶ Serge Moscovici (1984: 29).

¹⁷ Moscovici (1984: 24).

¹⁸ Moscovici (1984: 37).

¹⁹ Moscovici (1984:29).

²⁰ Moscovici (1984:38).

Chapter 1. The Evolution of Nationhood in the Process of Modern Japanese Nation-State Building in the Meiji Period

The aim of this chapter is to give a brief, general picture of the processes by which modern Japanese nationhood was constructed in the Meiji period (1868-1912). In the first section, the nature of Japanese political nationalism in the context of state formation processes will be discussed. In the second section, I shall examine the formation of the modern Japanese nation as a historic-cultural community. Before examining the evolution of Japanese nationalism in its relation with the West and Asia in the next chapter, this introductory chapter aims to provide insights into the formation of modern Japanese nationalism within its domestic contexts.

Raymond Williams (1982:29) describes the ideological battlefield as a dynamic field of ideas and practices 'within which there are not only continuities and persistent determinations but also tensions, conflicts, resolutions, irresolutions, innovations and actual changes'. Therefore, what is required in the study of nationalism as a social phenomenon is not to examine the content of a specific dominant nationalist ideology, but rather to analyse the *ideological process* in which it becomes dominant.

Once the elites articulate their ideas, they become public property, and that the way they are disseminated among the masses is uncontrollable.¹ This does not mean that the elites have no control over the perceptions of the masses. Certainly, by monopolising the means of production of symbols and social representations, such as education and mass communication, the elites can affect the way people shape and reshape their attitudes and perceptions. However, mind control can never be perfect. Firstly, there are normally conflicting ideas and values within the elite circle itself as a result of differences in their interests. A lack of consensus among them makes it difficult to mobilise the masses in a single, uniform way. Secondly, the theory of social identities suggests that a person's identity consists of his/her sense of belonging to multiple

social categories. Each category gives people a particular set of values and ideas which affects their way of perceiving the world and guides their behaviour.² Thus, it is assumed that the farmers in the rural area and the industrial working class in the urban area will interpret and respond to the same information articulated by the elites in different ways according to their respective values and ideas, which they have acquired through social interaction and internalised as cognitive components.

The above indicates that the notion that the development of nationalism is simply a result of the manipulation of the masses by elites is an illusion. Ideological processes are far more complicated and dynamic. In order to understand the development of modern Japanese nationalism as a social phenomenon, I shall treat the masses as the active subject in the ideological processes through which the masses, with a multiplicity of identities, values and interests come to construct 'a shared ideological universe' which unifies and mobilises them for nationalist causes.³

1.1. The development of modern Japanese political nationalism and the construction of a modern nation-state in the Meiji period

In this section, I shall examine the way in which political nationalism developed as a part of the state formation processes in the early Meiji period. The modernist approach, exemplified by Elie Kedourie (1971) and Tom Nairn (1977), tends to suggest that the development of nationalisms in Africa and Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was a reaction to Western imperialism. It is true that fear about national security threatened by Western imperialism, and national pride undermined by unequal treatment of Japan by Western powers, had a significant impact on the course of Japan's modern nation-state building process.⁴ Nevertheless, it is wrong to regard confrontation with Western imperialism as the sole cause of the genesis of modern Japanese political nationalism.

In a sense, the transition from the feudal system to the modern nation-state system was part of inevitable historical processes. Well before Commodore Perry's squadron arrived in 1853, the mounting discontent of the *samurai* (warrior) class brought by social, economic and political changes had already started threatening not only the rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate but the system itself. For example, commercial development and advances in the use of money placed great strains on the lives of the *samurai* class whose wealth had been built on a rice-based economy. Their financial condition deteriorated as a result of sharp falls in the money value of rice. Thus, the privilege which their social status as *samurai* promised them became nominal, and many suffered from increasing financial hardships, while merchants were accumulating wealth.

Moreover, a lack of employment in official posts in time of peace, and corruption among those in higher ranks, further increased the level of dissatisfaction of lower to middle class *samurai* with the conditions of their lives and the political system. The diffusion of Neo-Confucian values among the *samurai* class, which stressed the ethical nature of government and meritocracy, undermined their respect for their corrupted, incompetent superiors. As George Sansom (1950:254) argues, the discontent and ambition of young *samurai* was one of the strongest driving forces for the loyalist movement which brought down the Tokugawa Shogunate.⁵

In addition to internal pressure for political reform, the Shogunate was also facing foreign pressure. In 1858, Ii Naosuke authorised the conclusion of a treaty with the United States, which was followed by the conclusion of similar treaties with other Western nations including Russia, Great Britain, and France. These treaties fixed unequal relations between Japan and the Western nations as they imposed a very low scale of import duties on Japan and exempted nationals of these countries from the jurisdiction of Japanese laws. For discontented *samurai*, especially from powerful clans such as Satsuma and Choshu, the inability of the Tokugawa Shogunate to maintain the seclusion policy and its inefficiency in dealing with the Western powers provided a legitimate reason to overthrow the Tokugawa Shogunate.

Shared discontent with the Tokugawa Shogunate, anti-foreignism and fear about national security united the enemies of the Tokugawa Shogunate under the slogan of 'revere the emperor and expel the foreign barbarians'.⁶ In 1867 the last shogun, Tokugawa Yoshinobu, formally returned political authority to the emperor. This marked the end of the shogunate system and the beginning of the new Meiji era was proclaimed in 1868. Thus, as Delmer M. Brown (1955:89) suggests, internal political rivalries played a significant role in the formation of a modern Japanese nation-state. Certainly, the threat of Western imperialism and anti-foreignism facilitated its process, and the modern nation-state systems of Western powers provided Meiji leaders with models for them to emulate in establishing a new Japanese government. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the transition to the modern state system could have been effected as successfully as it was without the existence of disaffected powerful lords and the decline of the Tokugawa Shogunate in its political and economic power, and its highly centralised political administration system.

The overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate marked the beginning of modern Japanese political nationalism as a mass phenomenon.⁷ This is evidenced by the fact that a large number of *samurai* were willing to endanger their lives in the Meiji Restoration in order to transform Japan into a new, stronger nation under the rule of the emperor, which could compete with the Western powers. Moreover, even though the Restoration was led by the disaffected segments of the ruling *samurai* class, it is important to recognise the active participation of the common people in the process.

For example, Marius B. Jansen (1961) emphasises the importance of the alliance between discontented low-ranking *samurai* and village headmen in the loyalist movement in Tosa clan. Albert M. Craig (1961) demonstrates that the participation of peasants, and their financial contribution, were crucial to the loyalists' victory in the civil war in the Choshu clan. As Thomas C. Smith (1988 [1962]: 155) argues, widely shared discontent with the existing social order and a strong desire for change strengthened the vertical ties across the classes and resulted in widespread support of the loyalist movement by commoners. Smith claims that the argument

that coercion forced peasants to co-operate with the *samurai* class cannot explain why these loyalist armies composed of a mixture of *samurai* and peasants, fought against the shogunate in such a spirited manner (1988: 150).

George M. Wilson (1992) also gives deep insight into the role of commoners in the Restoration, maintaining that widespread popular millenarian aspirations to redeem the world order, which was consonant with the imperial loyalists' romanticism to redeem Japan, was an important constituent of the vast energies that made the Restoration possible. The popular anxiety brought by financial hardships, poor harvests in 1865 and 1866 and political and social instability led to the development of millenarianism on a large scale and it was manifested in the form of the outbreaks of peasant uprisings and violent demonstrations in the cities, the rise of numerous religious sects, pilgrimages to various religious centres, including the Grand Shrine at Ise, and the popular phenomenon of the *ee ja nai ka* carnivals.⁸ It is difficult to judge to what extent these popular movements involved nationalist sentiments. It was likely that they were driven by commoners' discontent with their personal living conditions and their millenarian dream of salvation, rather than the nationalist cause. The interesting point is that through these popular movements with religious implications, the Grand Shrine at Ise which worshipped Amaterasu O-Mikami (the Sun Goddess), the ancestor of the imperial family in the Shinto mythology, came to occupy a significant position in popular religious consciousness.

Modernists may argue that imperial loyalists manipulated these popular religious sentiments to achieve their nationalist goal of overthrowing the Tokugawa Shogunate and rebuild a new political institution under the direct rule of the emperor. It is difficult to refute this argument. However, it is equally arguable that widespread worship at the Ise Shrine, and popular millenarianism, made the radical restoration of the emperor's political authority the most appealing and legitimate alternative to the shogunate system in the eyes of a large segment of the Japanese population. I shall discuss the role of religion in the evolution of Japanese national consciousness later in this chapter. Here, it is noteworthy that the ideology, values, sentiments and perceptions of both elites and commoners constituted the background of the Restoration.

Although it might appear that the *samurai* on the royalist side were united by shared discontent with the existing political institution and a nationalist aim to reform the nation, there was diversity within their nationalist ideologies. The nationalist ideology behind the transition from the Tokugawa period to the Meiji period consisted of contradictory elements. That is to say, there was a tension between those who looked back and sought to revive older Japanese traditions, including direct rule by the emperor, and those who looked forward and were ready to adopt Western values and technology in order to transform Japan into a strong modern nation-state.

In the early Meiji period, people who called for the revival of old Japanese traditions were mainly those whose social positions were undermined by political and social reforms such as dispossessed former *samurai* and Confucian scholars.⁹ Those who manifested 'forward looking' political nationalism in the early Meiji period were mainly political elites and intellectuals who were influenced by Western theories and were well aware of Japan's military inferiority to Western powers.¹⁰ The advocacy of 'wealthy country, strong army' by the government was a clear expression of political nationalism among the political elites who sought to secure the autonomy and security of the new Japanese nation-state confronting Western imperialism. In order to mobilise the population for national purposes, they sought to turn people in Japan into people of the Japanese nation through political centralisation, such as organisation of local governments responsible to the central authority (1871), the adoption of a modern centralised land tax system (1873), the introduction of a national conscription system (1873) and universal education system (1872).

An important point is that during the first decade of the Meiji period, political nationalism was formed at the expense of the development of cultural nationalism. During this period, the main political agendas were the revision of the unequal treaties and the enhancement of national wealth and military strength through the adoption of Western technology and cultures. For example, in the field of education, the translations of Western textbooks were initially used at school in order to promote mainly Western scientific knowledge, which was considered essential

for industrial development.¹¹ As Irokawa Daikichi (1985:51) explains, the promotion of cultural Westernisation by those progressive thinkers and political leaders was based on their conviction that it was a path which Japan should follow in order to cope with the urgent situation which the country was facing.

Certainly, the discourse of Japanese cultural distinctiveness as such might not have played a significant ideological role at the initial stage of modern Japanese nation-state building. Nonetheless, the prevailing values, ideas and traditions affected the ways in which people in the Meiji period perceived and made sense of the world and, therefore, their ways of thinking. The destruction of political systems is not necessarily accompanied by that of cultural systems which seem to be more durable. For instance, as Ronald P. Dore (1965:312) points out, even liberal ideas advocated by Japanese progressive thinkers were not merely Western imports. There is no doubt that they were inspired by Western liberalism, for example of John Stuart Mill and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. However, it should be noted that their liberal ideas were also derived from traditional Confucian political thought.

Fukuzawa Yukichi (1959 [1872]: 29), the most influential progressive thinker in the Meiji period, emphasised equality between individuals, claiming 'Heaven does not create one man above another nor does it create one man below another'. For him, the relations between the government and the people were based on social contract and he maintained that the government should act according to peoples' wishes. Moreover, the activists of the People's Rights Movement in the 1870s and the 1880s confronted the Meiji autocratic government and demanded the establishment of a constitutional, democratic government with an elected national assembly in order to realise their ideals of people's natural rights and contractual relations between the government and people.¹²

These seemingly Western liberal ideas had a significant degree of consonance with the Confucian political thoughts already prevailing in the Tokugawa period. For example, Matsudaira Sadanobu (1781) wrote 'Heaven orders what the people wish....what the masses wish is the will

of Heaven....If a ruler disregarded Heaven's will, he would eventually be destroyed and his state perish'.¹³ Here, one could observe the ideas that sovereign power resided with the people (but via Heaven's intervention), that the relations between the government and people were neither organic nor fixed, and that an unworthy ruler would be replaced. The social Darwinian concept of the survival of the fittest was in harmony with the idea of meritocracy in Confucianism. These imply that Meiji thinkers might have digested new Western ideas by interpreting them through the existing ideas and language. Ideological continuity sustained by the integration of new ideas into the existing thought system might have partly accounted for the widespread adoption of these Western ideas.

The People's Rights Movement can be regarded as a kind of voluntaristic political nationalism based on liberal ideas. Its strength lay in the common interests of the former *samurai* intellectuals and land-owning agriculturists. While the former were discontented with the new government, which was almost exclusively dominated by those from Satsuma and Choshu and was far from democratic, many of the latter opposed the government policy, which favoured the position of the financial oligarchy and prioritised industrialisation at the expense of the rural community.¹⁴ Both of them shared a dream of a revolution which would transform the world into a better place, and felt bitterly betrayed by the new Meiji government. While the former *samurai* intellectuals played the role of theoretical leaders, the landowners contributed to the popularisation of the Movement among the agricultural population.¹⁵ This movement became intense at the end of the 1870s and newspapers played a crucial role as an agent for promoting public opposition to the government.¹⁶

The question is to what extent this liberal political movement was a popular manifestation of political nationalism. One may argue that the bulk of the population, namely the Japanese peasants, was not familiar with such new concepts as liberty, equality and democracy. However, as discussed above, if those Western liberal ideas were integrated into traditional Japanese thought and expressed in familiar language, they might not have been as unfamiliar as Norman maintained. In fact, Irokawa (1985) shows that activists of the People's Rights Movement,

especially those lower intellectuals in rural areas, often expressed their revolutionary liberal thoughts in the form of Chinese poetry, which had been a literary tradition among Japan's educated population, using the vocabulary of Confucian thought.

Here, it is important to note that the peasant population was not homogeneous. There were educated villagers in the lower stratum of society who acted as middle men between the government and common people. They were concerned about national political affairs as well as the well-being of common people. Irokawa (1985) vividly describes how passionately those educated peasants devoted themselves to the People's Rights Movement, expressing liberal ideals in the language of traditional thought. These men had strong ties with local communities and tried to integrate fellow peasants into the Movement by addressing local issues as a part of the Movement.¹⁷ Thus, these educated wealthy peasants in rural areas were the basis of grass-roots liberal movements and contributed to the wide diffusion of the People's Rights Movement. The question is to what extent this liberal movement contributed to the development of national consciousness among the peasant population.

The Restoration gave the peasantry hope that they would be released from the burden of heavy taxation that they suffered from under the Tokugawa feudal system. However, their hope was betrayed by the new government. The Meiji leaders sought to secure a source of regular income and increase the government's financial gain in order to meet the task of modernisation by the introduction of a new tax system and the imposition of a high tax rate.¹⁸ The disappointment of the peasant class with the new government led to the first wave of agrarian revolts, which reached a peak in 1873 when the new tax law was introduced, and only started to decline after 1877 when the tax rate was reduced. However, as E. Herbert Norman (1940:70-80) points out, these revolts were the demonstrations not merely of the peasants' opposition to the new tax system but also of their discontent with many aspects of modernisation programmes such as the conscription and education systems.¹⁹

The peasants' opposition to the new government was consistent with that of the discontented former *samurai* class. As a result, the peasant movement in the 1870s developed under the leadership of the latter. Nevertheless, this peasant-*samurai* alliance did not last for long since differences in the interests between these two classes became apparent. Thus, in the 1870s class consciousness was a still dominant factor of mass movements. Neither nationalist nor liberal ideologies played a significant role in the peasant riots during this period.

In the early 1880s there was another wave of agrarian movement because of harsh economic conditions in the rural areas, and it was closely associated with the People's Rights Movement. In 1884 alone, about sixty riots took place throughout Japan. This agrarian uprising culminated in the Chichibu Incident of 1884 in which 5,000-8,000 armed peasants in the Chichibu district of the present Saitama Prefecture attacked usurers and local government offices and marched toward Tokyo, fighting against police and troops dispatched by the central government. The rebellion was put down at Mt. Yatsugatake 10 days later.²⁰

The Chichibu uprising was led by those educated peasants in Chichibu who had strong links with both local communities and the Liberal Party which had been taking a leading part in the People's Rights Movement. As a result, the leaders of the Chichibu uprising adopted the Liberal Party's revolutionary ideology and attempted to challenge the Meiji government. The co-operation between different classes, namely urban intellectuals and educated peasants, might, to some degree, have helped to dissolve the class conflict and resulted in the development of national consciousness among the peasant class.

However, it was able to weaken neither localism nor class consciousness to a significant degree. It was possible that the leaders of the movements, both the urban intellectuals and the local elites, who fought for the common goal of the establishment of a democratic government with an elected national assembly in Japan, possessed a shared sense of belonging to the Japanese nation as a political community. Nevertheless, it was also probable that many Chichibu peasants participated in the uprising because of their personal connection with their local leaders and their

interests shared by other peasants in the neighbourhood. For example, those peasants who were suffering from substantial debts and attacked usurers and local government offices in order to burn public tax records and certificates of loans kept there²¹ might have been motivated by their desire to ease their financial hardship, rather than the pursuit of liberal ideals.

Moreover, both the People's Rights Movements and the Chichibu Incident suffered from internal conflicts. As Dore (1959: 66) points out, proletarian elements in the peasant rebellion threatened the interests of the leaders of the Liberal Party who were predominantly landowners and contributed to the voluntary dissolution of the Party in 1884, just two days before the Chichibu Incident. The Liberal Party started losing its power when in 1881 the government promised the establishment of a national assembly in ten years time. The fact that so many peasant riots took place at the very time when the Liberal Party was dissolving clearly indicates that both the interests and energy of peasants could not be fully contained in the liberal movement of the Party. Nevertheless, the solidarity among peasants in the People's Rights Movement and the Chichibu Incident were undermined by fellow peasants who collaborated with the government.²² They raised doubts in the minds of those peasant participants about the rightness of their involvement in the liberal movements by appealing to their conventional morality, which valued social order and harmony and denounced disturbance and selfishness.

In conclusion, although some forms of political nationalism are identifiable among political elites, intellectuals of the former *samurai* class, and influential educated peasants, they failed to achieve national cohesion because persistent class consciousness and locality were still major determinants of collective identities in the 1870s and 1880s. For its wide diffusion and relative success in uniting different classes in a shared liberal political ideology, the People's Rights Movement contributed to the development of political national consciousness by producing and disseminating the narratives of a nation as a political community. Nonetheless, the liberalism in the Movement did not develop into a nationalism which could unite the whole population. This was because the movement was locally based and did not lead to the formation of an imagined national community whose boundaries transcended local ones in the minds of the peasants.

Benedict Anderson (1991), defining the nation as 'an imagined political community' which is inherently limited and sovereign, argues that the advance of print capitalism makes possible the mental construction of an imagined national community in the minds of the mass of the populations. According to Dore (1965:321), at the time of the Restoration, it seems that about 43% of all Japanese boys and about 10% of girls were receiving some kind of formal education. Thus, Japan already had a relatively high literacy rate for an underdeveloped country, which was further increased by the introduction of compulsory universal education systems. Moreover, the unification of the written and spoken styles of the Japanese language facilitated the expansion of Japan's literate community. In consequence, a large reading public was created within a few years after the Restoration.²³ Moreover, during this period, Japan saw the rapid development of modern printing technology, such as the introduction of the steam press in 1874, and as a result, the publication of popular newspapers, books and magazines multiplied.

Meanwhile, Anthony Giddens (1985:120) regards the nation-state as 'a power container', which is a set of institutional forms of governance maintaining an administrative monopoly over a territory. Given relatively clear geographical boundaries defined by the sea, highly centralised political administration systems, a modern national conscription system, and the development of print capitalism, it can be said that Japan in the first decade of the Meiji period had already met the conditions which Anderson and Giddens consider essential for the formation of the nation. As Brown (1955: 106-10) points out, significant political incidents such as the civil war which accompanied the Restoration, and the dispute of 1873 over whether or not Japan should invade Korea, stirred popular interest in public affairs and contributed to the development of print capitalism. This suggests a link between the rise of the literacy rate, the development of print capitalism and popular national consciousness through membership of the Japanese political community. In this sense, there was already a 'bordered power container' called Japan by that time.

However, without the development of national cultural and historical consciousness, it is questionable how clearly the Japanese masses in this period could have imagined a national

community. Not only historians and primordialists, but also modernists admit the importance of cultural and historical justification in the dissemination of the concept of the nation among the mass population. Without the discourse of distinctive national cultures and histories, for most Japanese their cultural identity was still locally based. In order to transform people in this political container labelled 'Japan' into the nation of Japan, it was necessary to accommodate local cultures and historical memories in the larger framework of national cultures and history and make them believe that they belonged to a Japanese national community which possessed distinctive national cultures and history. The conditions which Anderson and Giddens emphasise are necessary but not sufficient for the formation of the nation as one people. For a nationalism to be formed which could enhance national solidarity, Japan had to wait for the development of cultural nationalism, which could make it possible for the majority of the population to perceive that they belonged to a single national community within which all Japanese people could be accommodated regardless of their class or locality.

1.2. Development of the Japanese Historic-Cultural National Community

Japanese cultural nationalism gained force in the late 1880s. When Japanese attempts to revise the unequal treaties failed in 1887, not only the Japanese political elites and intellectuals but also the public began to show strong resentment against the Western powers for their unfair treatment of Japan. Consequently, it led to a revulsion against Western thought and values and brought a new interest in traditional Japanese values and ideals.²⁴ This situation led to intellectual movements for the preservation of Japanese national cultural uniqueness, and the Japanese government started promoting a distinctive Japanese nationalist ideology based on the combination of Shinto mythology and the emperor system.

In this way, Japanese nationalism came to have a cultural and historical character which Japanese political nationalism in the early Meiji period had lacked. It was this nationalist religious ideology which constituted the picture of the Japanese national community and turned people in Japan into the Japanese nation. However, the process of ideological formation could not be

monopolised by any single person or interest group. It was a dynamic interaction between various sections of society in particular social and historical contexts which determined the course of its process.

In pre-1945 Japan, the combination of Shinto mythology, the tradition of ancestor worship and Confucian ethics was exploited in the official propagation of a racialised nationalist concept of Japan as a family state. It claimed that the nation consisted of a single, divine national family with the divine emperor as its head, implying that every Japanese subject was related to each other and to the emperor by blood ties.²⁵ Although it might appear that the Japanese political elites successfully invented the notion of the Japanese national community by exploiting the above factors, they were not free from political, economic, social, cultural and historical constraints in their attempts to construct the national community.

For example, in 1868 the new Meiji government sought to separate Shinto from Buddhism in order to establish the former as the state religion. This resulted in a nation-wide anti-Buddhist movement led by government officials and discontented Shinto priests whose status had been undermined by the Tokugawa Shogunate's patronage of Buddhism. Many temples and Buddhist statues were destroyed.²⁶ To some extent, they won the support of the masses who saw Buddhism as part of the oppressive authority of the Tokugawa feudal control system. However, despite this initial revivalism of Shinto, the state's policy to separate Shinto from Buddhism failed for the following reasons. Firstly, the influential Buddhist priests from Choshu, who supported the restoration of imperial rule and had a strong connection with the government, organised a movement to protect the position of Buddhism in the religious policy. Secondly, the government ignored the historical confrontation between different schools within Shinto scholarship. This lack of unity within Shinto scholarship weakened the basis of the state's campaign to promote Shinto.²⁷ Moreover, the policy totally neglected the historical background of Japanese popular religion, which was a product of long-term interaction between Shinto, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism and folk religions. Therefore, it was difficult to distinguish Shinto sharply from the rest of the religious traditions on the popular level.²⁸ Finally, pressure from Western powers who

insisted that religious freedom should be respected in Japan prevented the Japanese government from officially establishing Shinto as the state religion and repressing other religions. In the end, the government abandoned the principle of separation of Shinto and Buddhism within a few years.

In this way, the social engineering of national religious tradition by the government was constrained by various factors. It was, thus, far from true that the state could exploit anything as a symbol of the Japanese nation. Once a concept was taken into the public domain, the way in which the public digested it was beyond the control of the state. The effectiveness of Shinto mythology, the tradition of ancestor worship and Confucian ethics as the ideological basis of a distinctive Japanese cultural, or more precisely religious, community relied much on the peculiar Japanese social, religious, cultural and historical conditions under which the ideological process took place.

While receiving the impacts of modernisation and industrialisation, people in villages maintained the Japanese traditional religious practices of ancestor worship, which were based on the myths of local deities, as an important part of their communal agrarian life. In Irokawa's words (1985:21), during the Meiji period 'the world of fantasy continued to live alongside that of modernity' in Japan. It was this tradition of ancestor worship practised by commoners through which a new ideology of the Japanese family state had to be channelled, in order to reach the minds of Japanese people. In this section, I will examine through historical perspectives how the elite discourse of Shinto mythology on the divine origin of the Japanese land and the imperial family was integrated into the localised popular religious tradition, and how they together came to compose the picture of the Japanese national community among the populace in the modern period.

1.2.1. The role of Shinto tradition among elites in Japanese cultural nationalism

The history of elite Japanese religious nationalism is long. Briefly by the fifth century, the Japanese islands which had been divided into various kingdoms came under the control of the

dominant Yamato kingdom. However, in the sixth century, the power of the Yamato kingdom started to decline and the political elites in the Yamato imperial court sought to enhance political stability by establishing a highly centralised political system in which the emperor was positioned as the symbolic head of the state, imitating the Chinese political system as the model.²⁹

Moreover, the extension of the military and cultural influence of the great T'ang dynasty (618-906) of China, which conquered the Korean peninsula and defeated the Yamato army which supported a Korean kingdom, stimulated the development of ethno-political consciousness among the Japanese political elites. As a result, the Japanese court elites were actively engaged in political and cultural interaction with China until the tenth century when the T'ang dynasty started to decline.³⁰

The *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki*, composed of mixtures of Shinto mythology, cosmology and chronicles, which clearly illustrated the divine origin of the Japanese land and the imperial family, were compiled in this cultural and political climate by the court elites in 712 and 720 respectively. Thus, their compilation can be interpreted as these elites' attempts to unify the Japanese islands by claiming the legitimacy of the governance of the Japanese land by the divine emperor who was regarded as a descendant of the Sun Goddess in Shinto mythology. At the same time, it was aimed at promoting an ethno-political consciousness against a background of enormous cultural and political influence from China. Therefore, it can be said that their compilation was a manifestation of ethnicism among the elites who sought to enhance ethnic cohesion through Shinto mythology in order to preserve the dominance of the Yamato imperial court, and to strengthen the solidarity of the Japanese islands against the political and cultural influence of the Chinese empire. In this way, the rise of Japanese elite ethnicism at that time lay in both internal and external pressure.

The recurrence of this Shinto mythology of Japan as a holy land and the divine origin of the imperial family can be found in pre-modern Japanese history. As another example, Shinto mythology was exploited in the fourteenth century when the imperial line was divided into the

Northern Court and the Southern Court.³¹ The division of the imperial court severely undermined the power of the imperial institution in contrast with the rising power of the Ashikaga Shogunate. Around 1339 a scholar of the Southern Court, Kitabatake Chikafusa, wrote a famous book entitled Jinno Shotoki (On the Legitimacy of the Imperial Line). The aim of this book was not only to explain the legitimacy of the Southern Court but also to claim the legitimacy of the governance of Japan by the emperor by referring to Shinto mythology. For example, when the emperor Kublai Khan of Mongolia attacked Japan in 1274 and 1281, a storm arose in both cases and a huge number of Mongol ships were wrecked. Kitabatake interpreted this as evidence that Amaterasu O-Mikami, the ancestor of the imperial family, sent the Divine Wind (*kamikaze*) to protect Japan.³² He wrote:

'...a Great wind suddenly arose and the several hundreds of thousands of enemy ships were all blown over and demolished....the righteous power displayed by the gods (*shinmei no itoku*) at this time was truly beyond comprehension. We can see in these events how unalterable is Amaterasu's mandate that the imperial line shall rule our country eternally.'³³

Since then, the word *kamikaze* came to symbolise the Japanese belief that the gods would always protect Japan in times of national crisis. During the Second World War, the pilots of suicide squads were called *kamikaze* pilots. In his book, Kitabatake used the word *kokutai* (national polity) to describe the uniqueness of the Japanese nation whose sacred land had been ruled by the divine imperial family and he emphasised the unity of the holy Japanese land, divine emperor and Japanese people. His concept of *kokutai* based on Shinto mythology constituted the ideological backbone of nativist and nationalist movements thereafter. It was especially exploited by the militarist government during times of war in the modern period.

Furthermore, at the end of the seventeenth century, *kokugaku* (the National Learning School) had become influential under the leadership of Motoori Norinaga and his successor Hirata Atsutane. Its aim was to restore an ideal, pure form of distinctively Japanese mentality and world view ascribed to the Japanese in the ancient times before Japan became 'polluted' by contact

with foreign cultures and religions such as Buddhism, Confucianism and Christianity.³⁴ The school considered Shinto Japan's indigenous religion and maintained that it represented the unique, divine spirit of the Japanese nation, referring to *kokutai*. By using Shinto mythology found in the *Kojiki* and *Nihon Shoki*, the school claimed the divine nature and unity of the Japanese land, the emperor and his people and the superiority of Japan to other nations. The School's theory inspired nativist movements among Shinto scholars whose positions had been undermined by the Tokugawa Shogunate's patronage of Buddhism, and by its support for Confucianism as the moral principles. However, although fief schools started to introduce Japanese studies promoted by the *kokugaku* movement into their curriculum as a response to intensifying national consciousness as a result of internal and external pressures in the early nineteenth century,³⁵ this did not result in the rejection of Buddhism and Confucianism. Rather, *kokugaku* was integrated with Buddhism and Confucianism and together they came to constitute the religious and political philosophy of the Japanese elites.

The Shinto mythology advocated by *kokugaku* scholars gave ideological support for the new Meiji government. Firstly, Shinto mythology legitimised the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate and the establishment of a new political regime in which the political position of the emperor was to be restored. Secondly, the promotion of Shinto as the Japanese indigenous religion was well suited to the anti-foreign atmosphere prevailing at the end of the Tokugawa period. Finally, Shinto mythology, which claimed the greatness of Japan and the unity of the Japanese land, emperor and his people, was expected by the elites to function as an instrument to counteract a sense of inferiority to the Western powers and to increase national pride and solidarity.

It may be true that the influence of ethnocentric politico-religious ideology based on the Shinto mythology outlined above was relatively limited to the elite circle in the pre-modern period, and national consciousness emerged on the mass level only in the modern period. Nevertheless, this does not deny the continuity between Japanese elites' politicised ethnicism in the pre-modern period and modern Japanese nationalism. The above historical examples clearly indicate that

the Shinto mythology of the divine origin of the Japanese land and imperial family was not a modern invention but started to emerge by the eighth century among the elites and evolved through Japanese history. This elite ethnicism might not have had a clear manifestation during times of political stability. However, it seems that when political stability was threatened by internal or/and external pressure, it often manifested itself.

John Armstrong (1982) emphasises the recurrent nature of the formation of ethnicity through history and the significant influence of a persistent 'myth-symbol complex' evolving over a long time-span on the formation of ethnic identities. The recurrent appearance of elite politico-ethnicism based on Shinto mythology in the pre-modern period, and the formation of modern Japanese nationalism based on Shinto mythology, seem to justify Armstrong's perennialist arguments. However, while his boundary approach suggests the flexibility of ethnic boundaries and the recurrence of ethnicity, the Japanese case indicates the rather fixed nature of ethnic boundaries and the 'continuity' of ethnic identity rather than its 'recurrence'.

Firstly, Japanese ethnic boundaries were closely linked with its geographical, territorial boundaries. As noted above, one of the main themes of Shinto mythology which served as the basis of elite religious nationalism for many centuries was the divine origin of the Japanese land. That is to say, the notion of the holy Japanese land in Shinto mythology was one of the main determinants of ethnic boundaries and thus, geographical factors played a significant role in the formation of Japanese national consciousness. It can be argued that Japan's rather clearly defined, stable geographical boundaries contributed to the consolidation of the idea of the divine Japanese land separated from the rest of the world.³⁶ Japan's defeat of the Mongol army in the thirteenth century with the help of storms further strengthened the notion that the holy Japanese land was protected by *Amaterasu O-Mikami* (the Sun Goddess). Thus, Japan's rather rigid geographical boundary defined the boundaries of the distinctive Japanese ethnic community in the elite perception. This indicates that the boundary of Japanese ethnicity was more fixed than Armstrong's phenomenological, boundary approach suggests.

Secondly, the fact that through history the imperial institution had been preserved and given nominal supremacy as the symbolic head of Japan, regardless of the change of political regimes, indicates that the Shinto myth of the divine origin of the Japanese land and imperial family always constituted an essential part of the picture of the Japanese national community in the minds of elites.³⁷ Certainly, the overt manifestation of religious nationalism based on Shinto mythology might have been recurrent. Nonetheless, we should not forget that there had always been Shinto mythology, ritualised and practised by the imperial court behind the political scenes, which could be called on when necessary.

To sum up, the picture of the divine Japanese nation based on Shinto mythology had been long established before the Meiji Restoration among the elites, while evolving by integrating new elements through Japanese history. Shinto rituals, which were promoted by the Meiji government, were not entirely a modern invention but an evolved version of the traditions which had been practised, sometimes rather silently, over many centuries in the imperial court. These facts show the continuity between the pre-modern elite concept of the Japanese ethno-political community and the modern picture of the Japanese nation propagated by the Meiji government.

But the formation of the national cultural community on the mass level was a result of mutual interaction between 'high' and localised 'low' cultures. Edward Shils (1981) is right to claim that the distance between the centre and the periphery is diminishing in modern society because of the expanding power of the centre over the periphery. Nevertheless, as Helen Hardacre (1989) points out, the expanding influence of the periphery over the centre should not be overlooked. In the following section, I shall examine how elite nationalist ideology based on Shinto mythology and popular religious traditions were integrated, and how they created the picture of the Japanese national community on a mass scale.

From the beginning, in order to legitimise the rule of the modern state in the name of the emperor, the Meiji leaders had in mind a plan to establish Shinto as the emperor-centred state religion, and unite the whole population through Shinto mythology, emperor worship and

Confucian ethics. In 1868 Shinto was proclaimed the sole foundation of the state, and the Department of Shinto which conducted the state rites based on Shinto mythology and practices was founded as the highest office of the new government. In the same year the government gave a series of orders to separate Shinto from Buddhism.³⁸ In 1869, a Shinto missionary programme was set up in order to propagate State Shinto ideology to the populace, and missionaries were sent throughout the country. In 1870, the government issued an imperial rescript which claimed the ideal of the unity of religion and the state through emperor-worship by using Shinto mythology. It reads:

'We solemnly announce: The Heavenly Deities and the Great Ancestress established the throne and made the succession secure. The line of emperors in unbroken succession entered into possession thereof and handed it on. Religious ceremonies and government were one and the same and the innumerable subjects were united. Government and education were clear to those above, while below them the manners and customs of the people were beautiful. Beginning with the Middle Ages, however, there were sometimes seasons of decay altering with seasons of progress. Sometimes the Way was plain, sometimes, darkened; and the period in which government and education failed to flourish was long. Now in the cycle of fate all things have become new. Polity and education must be made clear to the nation and the Great Way of obedience to the gods must be promulgated. Therefore, we newly appoint propagandists to proclaim this to the nation. Do you our subjects keep this commandment in mind.'³⁹

Furthermore, the Department of Shinto began to establish a centralised shrine system in order to put all Shinto shrines under its control, placing the Ise Shrine at the head of them. For instance, the traditional hereditary succession of priesthood was abolished and all shrine priests were appointed by the Department as government officials. By 1871, the government adopted a policy of using Shinto parishes for registration purposes. That is to say, the government required every Japanese subject to register at a local Shinto shrine.⁴⁰

In this way, the government sought to create emperor-centred Shinto worship as a link between the state and the people through the unification of religion and government in order to enhance

national solidarity. For this purpose, it was necessary to propagate to the populace the Shinto mythology of the ancestral link between the divine founder of the Japanese nation and the emperor and to present him as the symbol of the divine Japanese nation. Shinto rituals performed by the emperor were made known to the populace. A new annual calendar was made for imperial performance of thirteen Shinto rites, and these rites were observed as national holidays. In order to strengthen the link between the emperor and the people, the Emperor Meiji paid official visits throughout Japan, which had never happened before, and pictures of the emperor were distributed.⁴¹ Nonetheless, as noted before, the government's attempts to create Shinto as a state religion in the early Meiji period was rather unsuccessful. There were various reasons for the government's failure. Among them was a lack of popular appeal, which is the main focus in this section.

The important point is that Shinto had been practised differently by the elites and the commoners. Shinto had been associated with agricultural rituals in the daily life of farmers. It had been deeply interwoven with other religious traditions, such as Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism and local folk religions.⁴² On the other hand, at the elite level, Shinto beliefs and rituals had been used to legitimise the rule of the imperial family since the eighth century. This discrepancy between elite Shinto tradition and the popular religious tradition might account for the lack of popular support for the government's campaign to establish elite Shinto as the state religion in the early Meiji period.

In particular, the government's policy to separate Shinto from Buddhism was ineffective on the popular level. It might have been possible to distinguish Shinto from Buddhism on the intellectual level as the National Learning school in the late Tokugawa period tried. It was also possible to create different government offices for Shinto and other religions. However, popular religious beliefs could not be divided in such a systematic way. As Hardacre (1989:28) argues, Buddhist influence on popular Shinto practices was so deep that the attachment of the people to Buddhism was not seriously undermined. Thus, the separation of Shinto from Buddhism was very much based on an elite, bureaucratic concept of religion which could not be applied to

popular religious life. The attempts by the state to change the relations between Shinto and Buddhism made little difference to the popular religious practices which consisted of a mixture of various religious elements.

The government's inability to gain mass support for elite Shinto ideology, and the Western demand for religious freedom shifted the direction of its policy in the mid- 1870s. Treating the revision of the unequal treaties as their first priority, the political leaders temporarily put aside the promotion of Shinto as the state religion in its agenda. The failure of the government's early attempt to propagate elite Shinto ideology among the mass population clearly indicates that elite religious nationalism without popular support was doomed to fail and did not lead to the formation of the national community on the mass level. However, the situation started to change from the end of the 1880s. As mentioned above, after the government's attempt to revise the treaties failed in 1887, there was growing interest in Japanese native traditions and cultures among both the intellectuals and the public.

The Meiji Constitution (1889) and the Imperial Rescript on Education (1890) were announced in this political and cultural atmosphere. The Imperial Rescript on Education reads:

'Know ye, Our subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husband and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourself in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only be our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers. The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our

Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heat in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all thus attain the same virtue.⁴³

In the Constitution, the government granted Japanese subjects religious freedom to the extent that religion did not interfere with their duties to the state. Because of consideration for the principle of separation of religion and government, the Imperial Rescript of Education avoided any direct religious mentions. However, as Murakami (1982) argues, its content clearly indicated that the state centred cult of the emperor based on Shinto mythology was placed at the core of moral education. Moreover, in order to avoid criticism, the government claimed that Shinto was not a religion but a system of state rituals and their performance was the obligatory duty of every Japanese subject. In this way, the government started to attempt once again to unify the nation through Shinto mythology from the 1890s. In both documents, the family state ideology was articulated with reference to Shinto mythology of the divine origin of the Japanese nation, the emperor and the people of Japan, and a Confucian ethic of loyalty and filial piety was reinforced.⁴⁴

The government's efforts to unify the nation through beliefs in the state as a family based on a Shinto mythology which considered Japan a national family with the emperor as its symbolic family head, were highly successful. How was the state able to gain popular support this time? The reason for the difference in popular attitudes between the early 1870s and the 1890s can be found in the fact that by the 1890s the Japanese public had become more and more conscious of their sense of belonging to the Japanese nation as a result of political and economic centralisation, the adoption of the universal education system, the introduction of the national conscript army and the development of print capitalism.

That is to say, by that time a picture of the Japanese national community with relatively clear geographical boundaries had been developing in the minds of the populace. Nevertheless, its cultural content was unclear because of the lack of cultural nationalism and excessive

Westernisation since the mid 1870s. The family-state ideology based on Shinto mythology added historical and cultural dimensions to the concept of the Japanese national community, accommodating localised religious cultures as part of the national culture.

It should be noted that the Japanese commoners did not adopt State Shinto ideology blindly. Their traditional religious beliefs and practices were not completely replaced by State Shinto.⁴⁵ Certainly, the connection between Shinto and the emperor, which had been articulated in the elite community throughout history, might not have much significance in the Japanese popular religion. For example, the Meiji leaders, such as Okubo Toshimichi and Iwakura Tomomi, were concerned about the perception that the existence of the imperial house was unknown to people, especially in the remote areas.⁴⁶ In Irokawa's (1985:254) words, at the time of the Restoration, 'for the people the emperor seemed little more than an exalted personage in a play, a hazy figure who may have levied taxes but was somehow a person of great nobility'. In this sense, the diffusion among the mass population of emperor worship based on elite Shinto mythology might be regarded as the adoption of elite 'high' culture by the masses.

Nevertheless, it is questionable whether the origin of popular worship for the emperor lay simply in the adoption of elite Shinto ideology. It seems more likely that it was a result of a complex combination of both elite and popular Shinto, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism and folk religious traditions. The popular discourse of the divine emperor and nation was a product of their ideological interaction in the modern period and could not be attributed to any one of them. It is indisputable that nationalist ideology surrounding the concept of a divine Japanese nation emerged on the mass level only in the modern period. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the Japanese national community was a totally modern invention. According to theories of social representation, all new, unfamiliar information has to be accommodated in a pre-existing system of thought. At the same time, newly integrated information alters the pre-existing system.⁴⁷ Applying these theories, it can be said that the arena of ideological processes through which a picture of the Japanese national community was constructed in the minds of the Japanese masses had to be located within the pre-existing, locally-based cultural and historical framework

composed of a set of traditions, values, beliefs, memories and so on. That is to say, the image of the Japanese national community was not painted on a blank sheet. It had to be painted on the picture of the pre-existing local community with its own distinctive culture, historical memories and identity. This means that the nationalist ideology provided by the state had to be channelled through these pre-existing cultural and historical frameworks and identities. Thus, when State Shinto ideology was disseminated among the mass population, it had to negotiate with pre-existing, locally-based popular religious beliefs and practices. In the next part, I shall examine how official State Shinto ideology and popular religious traditions were interwoven, and how the latter contributed to the construction of the Japanese national community.

1.2.2. The role of popular religion in the formation of the Japanese national community

In the pre-modern period, Japanese popular religious life mainly consisted of a mixture of Shinto, Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism.⁴⁸ As mentioned above, each religious tradition did not exist in isolation but interacted with each other and mutually contributed to the formation of a distinctive Japanese religious life. While Buddhism, Confucianism and Taoism were imported from China and Korea around the sixth century, Shinto's origin can be traced back to the animism, shamanism, nature worship and ancestor-worship of the prehistoric period. That is why it has been regarded as an indigenous Japanese religion.

As Hori Ichiro (1968) explains, the roots of Shinto lay in the tradition of exclusive agrarian society. *Dozoku*, which was a family grouping composed of a main family and branch families linked by patrilineal kinship, was the basic social, economic and cultural unit of Japanese agrarian society. Each *dozoku* possessed its own family deity which consisted of the spirits of family ancestors, and in this sense *dozoku* was also the basic religious unit. However, as a particular *dozoku* group became economically prominent, its family deity gradually subsumed other families' deities and became the village deity. The village shrine was constructed for the village deity which was worshipped by all families within the village. This worship for the local deity became the basis of popular Shinto.

Traditionally, the economy of Japanese agrarian society was based on rice production in which irrigation systems requiring communal co-operation between families were vital. This meant that rice production was the business of the whole village and, for this reason, village life had a strong communal character. In order to maintain social stability and harmony within a community, a mentality which sacrificed individual interests in favour of communal interests was encouraged. The communal nature of rice production was extended to other aspects of village life, including religious practices.⁴⁹ Accordingly, Shinto practices based on worship for the village deity were associated with the agricultural rituals related to the growth of rice, and symbolised the unity of the village community.⁵⁰ In this way, Shinto contributed to the solidarity of the local community demanded by agricultural needs. Therefore, it can be said that in popular religious practice, Shinto became part of a locally-based communal religious tradition. Moreover, the localised practice of Shinto which differentiated a village from other villages suggests its relative inward-looking and geographically exclusive nature. That is to say, Shinto helped the development of group consciousness within a village by uniting the whole village through shared religious beliefs and practices and by acting as a symbolic boundary between villages.

Buddhism was imported from China and Korea around the sixth century and popularised in the thirteenth century. While interacting with Shinto, Confucianism and Taoism, Buddhism developed distinctively Japanese forms of thought, practice and organisation. Japanese Buddhist practices mainly consisted of rituals for the worship of family ancestors, derived from Japanese traditional folk beliefs about the influence of the spirit of dead members of the lineage on the life of the living. It was believed that through these rituals the souls of the dead would be guided to the ancestral world from which they would protect the living members of the family.⁵¹ Therefore, the basic unit of Japanese Buddhist practices was the family. In this sense it can be said that in Japan, Buddhism was a religion of the family, while Shinto was a religion of the community.

It should be noted that Shinto as a religion of the community, and Japanese Buddhism as a religion of the family, did not exist independently of each other. Between the late eighth century

and the eleventh century, Shinto and Buddhism had been gradually interwoven. In Japan, Shinto assimilated Buddhist doctrine into its belief in the local deity.⁵² 'The Buddha' came to be used as the generic name of the tutelary deity composed of the spirits of both the local deity and family ancestors, and worshipped by the individual families. Furthermore, Buddhist temples and Shinto shrines were constructed side by side (a temple-shrine complex) and functioned together as the centre of the religious life of the local community. It was not unusual for Buddhist priests to participate in the Shinto rituals.⁵³

To sum up, while Shinto strengthened the communal bonds within the village through worship of the common local deity, Buddhism in Japan enhanced the unity of the family through the worship of common family ancestors. Moreover, the mixing of the local deity and family ancestors in popular Buddhist practice meant the further enhancement of the bonds between families within the community.⁵⁴ All of this indicates the strong communal bond and local consciousness in traditional Japanese society, which was further reinforced by Confucian ethics, which emphasised the importance of social harmony and gave priority to the community over the individual. The question is how this traditional popular religious life affected the development of the Japanese national community in the modern period. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to examine the role of popular religious sects which emerged in the late Tokugawa period and spread over a vast area, transcending local boundaries.

In the late Tokugawa period, people suffered severely from political and economic instability. In these conditions, several religious organisations whose doctrines centred on the salvation of humankind through worship of Shinto deities or awesome spirits existing in nature were formed and spread throughout the country. Among them, *Tenrikyo* and *Konkokyo*, which were founded in 1838 and 1859 respectively, and were based on strong rural traditions, became especially popular among farmers.⁵⁵ Kishimoto Hideo (1956) points to the *Tenrikyo* doctrine's identification with the poor and its deep connection with folk religion as the main reasons for its popularity. Furthermore, while maintaining connection with locally-based religious traditions, these new popular religions also emphasised the universal nature of human beings and the problems they

faced, and called for salvation and peace.⁵⁶ As a result, they could attract a wide range of people beyond their class, gender and locality.

At the same time, pilgrimages to Ise shrine, which enshrined the imperial ancestors, became a popular phenomenon in the late Tokugawa era.⁵⁷ By that time Ise Shrine had established networks of confraternities which extended nation-wide. However, we should remember that the commoners regarded the Ise deities not as the imperial ancestors or the founders of the nation, but rather as harvest gods or as deities who could protect the faithful; and they paid visits to the shrine and its branch shrines to pray for abundant crops and personal well-being.⁵⁸ Thus, emperor worship played no role in the popular Ise pilgrimage in the Tokugawa period.

The significance of these popular religious sects and of the beliefs in the Ise deities for the formation of the Japanese national community lay in the fact that their religious beliefs and practices transcended local boundaries and were widely shared by a large number of people regardless of their class, gender and region. Locally-based religious traditions were not replaced by the new religions, however. It was common for the members of the new religions to maintain their affiliation with their local Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples. Rather, it can be said that new popular religions and beliefs in Ise deities existed in the extended continuum of locally-based folk religion. This suggests the emergence of a wider religious community in the late Tokugawa period. That is to say, people started to develop plural religious identities as members of a local religious community and of a wider religious community which were not independent of each other. Although neither *Tenrikyo* nor *Konkokyo* nor pilgrimages to Ise Shrine involved emperor worship, it seems possible that this expansion of the religious community on a large scale enhanced the common people's sense of belonging to a wider community and contributed to the development of national consciousness among them.

The state could not mobilise the masses simply by imposing on them an elite Shinto ideology which had little to do with popular religious beliefs and practices. However, the monopolisation of political and economic power by the state had a strong impact on the destiny of the new

religions. As a means of guaranteeing the survival of their organisation, the leaders of the new religions sought to establish close connections with the government. In consequence, they incorporated State Shinto ideology into their original religious doctrines and contributed to its dissemination among the wider population.⁵⁹

Furthermore, after the attempt to separate Shinto from Buddhism failed, mainly because of a lack of popular support and strong resistance from Buddhist organisations, the government was obliged to use Buddhist priests for the dissemination of elite Shinto ideology based on emperor-worship. The Buddhist priests might have been more efficient than Shinto priests for this purpose for the following reasons. Firstly, throughout the history of popular religion, highly developed Buddhist doctrines compensated for the theological underdevelopment of popular Shinto, and, as a result, Buddhist priests were more experienced and influential in popular preaching.⁶⁰ Secondly, as Kishimoto (1956) points out, since Buddhism had highly organised regional institutions which controlled local Buddhist temples within a region, the influence of Buddhism could transcend the village boundaries, while the influence of local Shinto tended to be limited to the village. Like the leaders of the new religions, those of Buddhism also needed state support for its survival. Accordingly, they co-operated with the government over the propagation of worship of the imperial ancestors. However, as Hardacre (1989:46) points out, the Shinto ideology which Buddhist priests preached was not the same as the pure Shinto ideology of the elite which the government wished to propagate, but was rather based on traditional popular religious beliefs composed of mixtures of different religious traditions. The same thing can be said for the Shinto ideology disseminated by the leaders of the new religions.

In conclusion, contrary to Murakami Shigeyoshi's (1970:18) claim that pre-existing Shinto sects did not have any direct causal relations with the establishment of State Shinto, each pre-existing religious group made its ideological contribution to the formation of the national religious community from its own standpoint and with its own interests. Despite its monopolisation of political and economic power, the government did not have exclusive control over the content of the national religious community. This is clear from the fact that the government had to adjust its

religious policies to be consistent with the pre-existing popular religious life in order to disseminate its unpopular, elite Shinto ideology among the mass population. Therefore, it can be said that the development of the Japanese national religious community in the early modern period was a product of negotiation between State Shinto ideology, pre-existing popular religious traditions and the new popular religions.

1.3. Conclusion: The road towards a family state

In the first section of this chapter, the development of political nationalism in the early Meiji period was examined. I argued that political nationalism without cultural nationalism could not enhance national solidarity. This is because class consciousness and locality were still major determinants of people's identity, and political nationalism alone could not form a picture of the national community with which all Japanese people could identify themselves, regardless of their class and locality. In the second section, the roles of elite Shinto ideology and popular religion in the formation of the Japanese religious community were analysed from a historical perspective. The section demonstrated not only historical continuity between pre-modern and modern elite religious nationalism but also the significant influence of the pre-existing traditional popular religion on the development of the modern national religious community.

In the late nineteenth century, social changes which accompanied industrialisation and urbanisation began to threaten the traditional family system, agrarian social structures and traditions. Responding to this situation, the government, agrarianists, local officials, the army and intellectuals started advocating ancestor worship as a means to maintain social stability and enhance national solidarity on the basis of the family system. As we have seen, Confucian ethics of loyalty and filial piety, and the familial relationship between the nation and its subjects, were emphasised in the Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890.

Irokawa (1985:23) argues that the Japanese tended to see themselves as 'a link in an unbroken flow of life that connects ancestors and descendants', rather than as self-contained independent

individuals. They worshiped their ancestors and expected to be worshiped by their descendants. That is to say, maintaining the continuity of the family was regarded as a duty of the living. This idea of the eternal life cycle of the family had been nurtured by the tradition of ancestor worship operating in the regular agricultural cycle of the agrarian communal life. Combining this with the Confucian emphasis on the benefit of society over that of individuals, it seems plausible that individuals felt that they were obliged to serve the interest of their family, community and ultimately, their nation. Thus, the concept of the family and the tradition of ancestor worship had strong potential as ideological weapons, and indeed came to play the central role in nationalist ideology. That is to say, the nation came to be seen as the 'natural extension' of the family and the community.

After the late 1880s, Japanese political and religious nationalism developed the concept of Japan as a family state with the emperor as its head by incorporating worship of the imperial ancestors into the popular religious tradition of family ancestor worship. In this way, popular religion functioned as the bridge between the emperor and his Japanese subjects. However, although the strong bonds between the emperor and his subjects were successfully created by the state's efforts, it did not necessarily guarantee the bonds between the state and these subjects.

The wars with China (1894-1895) and Russia (1904-1905) certainly strengthened nationalist sentiments among the masses and consolidated the bonds between the emperor and the populace. The role of Yasukuni Shrine in this process was essential. The history of Yasukuni Shrine began with the establishment of Tokyo Shokonsha in 1869. *Shokonsha* means 'a place to invite spirits'. Tokyo Shokonsha was built according to the wishes of the emperor, in order to enshrine with a Shinto ceremony the spirits of those who lost their lives fighting against the Tokugawa Shogunate in the Meiji Restoration. As Murakami Shigeyoshi (1986: 9) explains, at that time, although *samurai* had a strong sense of loyalty to the head of their respective fiefs, their sense of belonging to 'the emperor's army' was much weaker. The aim of Tokyo Shokonsha was to transform *samurai* from the soldiers of particular fiefs into the soldiers of

imperial Japan by recognising the death of those who died to restore the power of the emperor as a noble sacrifice for the country.

In 1879, Tokyo Shokonsha was renamed Yasukuni Shrine. Since then, Yasukuni Shrine became a place for both the emperor and his subjects to jointly worship the war dead as national deities. That is to say, in Yasukuni Shrine, the souls of the dead members of the family and the spirits of the imperial ancestors were united as the national tutelary deity. In this way, worship of imperial ancestors was integrated into the old tradition of family ancestor worship, and through this worship of the common national tutelary deity, unity between the imperial family and all the Japanese families as the members of the same national family was enhanced. That is to say, Yasukuni Shrine united the emperor and the Japanese people through the worship of the war dead. This meant the more war dead, the stronger the unity between them. In the Sino-Japanese War, about 14,000 Japanese soldiers died. Moreover, in the Russo-Japanese War, approximately 80,000 Japanese soldiers lost their lives. Acknowledging their death as a noble death, and embracing the pain of the bereaved families, Yasukuni Shrine came to be deeply rooted in the minds of ordinary Japanese people and to strengthen their national consciousness.

On 5 September 1905, a peace treaty between Russia and Japan was signed and the Russo-Japanese war was concluded. Despite Japan's victory, the treaty did not give Japan an indemnity nor much territorial acquisition. The news of the treaty was received with great indignation by the Japanese public and the government was accused of inefficiency. Public resentment against the treaty and the government resulted in a riot at Hibiya Park in Tokyo.⁶¹ The crowd of 30,000, many of whom travelled from the countryside in order to attend a national rally organised by a nationalist organisation, the *Rengokai*, clashed with the police. The crowd quickly spread to other parts of the city. The official residences of the interior minister were attacked. Mobs also stormed toward the official residence of the prime minister and the Foreign Ministry. At the same time, large numbers of people moved to the imperial palace in order to appeal to the emperor to reject the treaty. The crowd sang the national anthem and waved the national flags. They cheered for the emperor.

The Hibiya Riot was a clear manifestation of popular Japanese nationalism. What this incident indicates is that, by 1905, strong national identity had been formed among a large number of commoners, and a strong sense of unity between the emperor and the people had been established. On the other hand, the incident also suggests that popular Japanese nationalism was formed on the basis of loyalty to the nation and the emperor as its symbol, not to the state itself. To the public, the state was an instrument to enhance the greatness of the Japanese nation to which they belonged, and not the object of their worship and loyalty. That is why, when it failed to do so, the state could become the target of public attack.

In conclusion, the basis of popular Japanese nationalism was unity between the emperor and the people, and this unity was built on the extension of the continuum of old popular religious traditions of family ancestor worship. This incorporation of the deity of a wider social group into the concept of family ancestors was not the first such event. As mentioned above, throughout history the communal deity had been assimilated into the Buddha and worshipped by individual families as part of their family ancestors. This had strengthened the communal bonds between families within a community.

These things indicate the rather flexible, expanding nature of the concept of family in Japanese popular religion, and the strong communal bonds built on unity between the ancestors of the community and those of the individual families. Taking these facts into consideration, it is understandable why the ancestors of the national community, namely those of the imperial family, could be successfully assimilated into the concept of family ancestors. Ancestral assimilation on multiple levels consolidated the unity of the national community, local communities, the imperial family and all Japanese families.

According to Connor (1994), the nation has been more closely associated with ethnicity than with the state. He claims that 'To perceive German or Japanese nationalism as loyalty to the state is to miss the mark'.⁶² Given the fact that popular Japanese nationalism was based on the

unity of imperial ancestors and family ancestors, which created the myth of kinship between the imperial family and the rest of the Japanese families, it seems reasonable to claim that the basis of popular Japanese nationalism was loyalty to the ethnic nation as the extended family, rather than to the state. That is to say, popular Japanese nationalism had more of the character of ethnic nationalism rather than of state nationalism, which consisted of loyalty to the state. Thus, popular Japanese nationalism and emperor worship did not necessarily guarantee the unity of the state and the people.

While popular Japanese nationalism was more of an ethnic nationalism, elite Japanese nationalism was basically state nationalism whose aims were the survival of Japan as an independent state and the enhancement of its power in both the domestic and international contexts. In this way, the state nationalism of the elite and popular ethnic nationalism coexisted, interacting with each other. The important point is that although they were not independent of each other, they had their own respective trajectories. In other words, elite state nationalism could not completely subsume the dynamism of popular ethnic nationalism, as the Hibiya riot showed. Therefore, official state ideology did not necessarily represent the ideology of popular nationalism. Bearing this plurality of modern Japanese nationalism in mind, in the next chapter, I shall examine how various nationalist ideologies interacted with each other and determined the course of Japanese history in the years leading up to the Asia-Pacific War (1937-1945).

Notes

¹ For the process of ideological formations in Meiji Japan, see Carol Gluck (1985, Introduction).

² For Social Identity Theory, for example, see Henri Tajfel (1982) and Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg (1999).

³ Carol Gluck (1985: 07).

⁴ Tom Nairn (1977) regards the uneven development of capitalism brought by imperialism as the major cause of nationalism. Certainly, the unequal treaties gave economic disadvantages to Japan and this fuelled anti-foreign sentiments, which stimulated the development of modern nationalism in Japan. However, considering the fact that there had already been signs of

reformist movements and anti-foreignism, even before Japan actually experienced economic impacts of Western imperialism, the influence of Western imperialism on the formation of modern Japanese nationalism was, at least at the initial stage, psychological, such as a fear of national security, rather than economic. Despite the seclusion policy, Japanese leaders had been well aware of the threat of West imperialism since the late eighteenth century, through their contact with the Dutch, with whom Japan maintained a commercial relationship throughout the period of national seclusion. For the development of anti-foreignism in Japan, see Delmer M. Brown (1955, Chapter 4).

⁵ For the role of discontented *samurai* in the Meiji Restoration, see also Thomas C. Smith (1988, Chapter 6) and Ann Waswo (1996, Chapter 1).

⁶ Since 1192, when the first shogunate government was established, Japanese politics had adopted the dual system of rule by the emperor and the shogun. Although the emperor had been given nominal supremacy, real political power had belonged to the shogun. By demanding the return of political power to the emperor, radical *samurai* legitimised their action to overthrow the Tokugawa Shogunate.

⁷ According to Jean Pierre Lehmann (1982:80), the total population of the *samurai* class in the late Tokugawa period was about 30 million.

⁸ For the analysis of the *ee ja nai ka* phenomenon (dancing frenzies), see George M. Wilson (1992, Chapter 6). The mysterious descent of lucky charms from empty skies drove people to perform hysterical dancing and orgiastic behaviour, repeatedly shouting 'ee ja nai ka', which can be interpreted as 'why not!' or 'right on!'. This phenomenon, in which people flouted prevailing mores and expressed contempt for existing institutions of law and order, was observed between the late summer of 1867 and the spring of 1868 across a wide band of densely populated areas from Hiroshima in the west to Yokohama in the east.

⁹ By 1871, the four-caste system was abolished and in 1876, sword-bearing, which had been the symbol of *samurai* as the ruling class, was prohibited. They also lost the formal financial bond with their ex-lords. Although the government took over responsibility for the payment of *Samurai* stipends, from 1876 the former *samurai* were forced to have their stipends commuted for a lump sum, normally in the form of government bonds. Thus, the former *samurai* had been deprived of both formal status and income within a decade. Furthermore, the establishment of a national conscript army meant the loss of their profession as professional warriors. On the other hand, as a result of the strong emphasis on Western teaching by the new government in the national curriculum, and the popularity of Western theories among intellectuals, there was a decline in the influence of Confucian scholars at the beginning of Meiji period.

¹⁰ There might be some objection to considering their nationalism 'forward looking', since as most scholars agreed, nationalists normally exploit distinctive traditions and historical memories, in order to mobilise the mass of the population. However, as noted above, before the 1890s respect for traditions was undermined in favour of Western civilisation because of the necessity to enhance national strength. Although the restoration of the emperor system might be considered the revival of a tradition, as Gluck (1985:73) explains, the image of the young Meiji emperor was presented as the symbol of a new Japan and its bright future. Thus, it seems justifiable to regard political nationalism in this particular period as 'forward looking'.

¹¹ For the education reforms during the early Meiji period, for example, see Brown (1955:103-6) and Katayama Seiichi (1974).

¹² Irokawa Daikichi (1985, Chapter 2).

¹³ This translation is quoted from Smith (1988:171). For Matsudaira Sadonobu's original words, see Matsudaira (1928 [1781]).

¹⁴ E. Herbert Norman (1940: 167-74).

¹⁵ Wealthy, educated farmers formed various kinds of organisations which actively supported social and political movements. For example, many landlords owned domestic industries such as the making of *miso* (bean paste) and the brewing of *sake* (Japanese alcohol made of rice). In 1880, the Council of Sake-Brewers was founded, which attracted great numbers of sake-brewers throughout the country and gained great popularity in villages and towns (Norman 1940: 170-1). This organisation attacked the government, which undermined the interests of the agriculturists and participated in the People's Rights Movement, demanding the establishment of a truly representative assembly. Such co-operation between intellectuals and the agriculturist organisation, which had strong local connections throughout the nation, ensured the movement spread widely.

¹⁶ Many newspapers voiced their opposition to the government so outspokenly that the government resorted to censorship and strict press regulations in 1875 (Brown 1955: 108).

¹⁷ For example, activists of the People's Rights Movement in the Nishi Tama area promoted a movement to disseminate knowledge about hygiene among its residents as many died of diseases such as cholera, dysentery, typhoid fever and smallpox, and neither the national nor local government did much to improve the situation (Irokawa 1985: 147). Thus, by addressing those issues which directly affected the life of peasants, the local activists sought to enlighten their fellow peasants and turn them into the foundation of the local People's Rights Movement.

¹⁸ In order to regularise income, the new tax laws stipulated that taxes were to be paid according to the assessed value of the land, regardless of the actual amount of production. The government did not show any consideration for the effects of natural disasters.

¹⁹ The enrolment of all boys and girls in school became compulsory in 1879. However, many peasants could not afford to let their children go to school. Moreover, they often expressed their dissatisfaction with the government curriculum, which emphasised the moral and spiritual aspects of education, and demanded the learning of more practical agricultural knowledge. In addition, education imposed a heavy burden on the finance of the local government. See Gluck (1985: 165-166).

²⁰ For the details of the Chichibu incidence, see Irokawa (1985, Chapter 5) and Asami Yoshio (1990).

²¹ Irokawa (1985:164).

²² Irokawa (1985: 181-190).

²³ Brown (1955:107).

²⁴ For the development of Japanese cultural nationalism in the late nineteenth century, see Brown (1955, Chapter 6).

²⁵ For the racialised concept of the Japanese family state, see Bruce Armstrong (1989) and Chapter 2 of this thesis.

²⁶ For this movement, see Murakami (1980 [1968]: 22-26).

²⁷ Hardacre (1989:29-30). For the various sects of Shinto, see Murakami (1970: 37-75).

²⁸ H. Byron Earhart (1982, Chapters 4,6 and 8).

²⁹ For the development of Japanese ethnic consciousness among Japanese elites between the fifth century and sixteenth century, see Brown (1955, Chapter 2).

³⁰ An example of Chinese cultural influences on Japanese politics can be found in the adoption of Confucianism ethics and Buddhist doctrines in a document called 'Seventeen-Article Constitution' compiled by Prince Shotoku in 604. As Brown (1955:12-13) explains, it was aimed at enhancing social stability and consolidating the power of the Yamato court.

³¹ Since 1192, Japan had been governed by powerful *samurai* houses, and the imperial Court became the nominal head of the Japanese state without much political power. However, in the early fourteenth century, the power of the military government became weaker. The Emperor Go-Daigo took this opportunity to seize political power and attempted to re-establish the political supremacy of the imperial court over the military government. From 1334 to 1336, Japan was under the direct government of the Emperor Go-Daigo. However, in 1336, a new military regime was established by Ashikaga Takuji and he created a new imperial line called the Northern Court, against the imperial line of the Emperor Go-Daigo, called the Southern Court. In 1338, Ashikaga Takuji founded the Ashikaga Shogunate (1338-1573) and supported the Northern Court. As a result, there were two imperial lines from 1336 until 1392, when they were reunited through the mediation of the third Ashikaga Shogun, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu. The period between 1338 and 1573 is called the Southern-Northern Court era.

³² For this interpretation of Mongolian attempts to invade Japan, see Kitabatake Chikafusa (1980 [1339]: 233-234).

³³ Kitabatake (1980: 234).

³⁴ Hardacre (1989: 16-17).

³⁵ Dore (1965: 30).

³⁶ By the ninth century the greatest part of the Japanese islands, except Hokkaido and Okinawa, which were annexed in the Meiji period, had come under the control of the Japanese central government. Thus, Japanese territoriality was rather fixed over many centuries.

³⁷ In spite of the possibility that the imperial institution might challenge the military government, the latter let the former exist as the symbolic head of the state, and the nominal supremacy of the emperor was not questioned. Even if the emperor had little actual political power, the military rulers always needed to gain formal recognition from the emperor as the legitimate ruler of Japan. As another example, as Dore (1965:95) points out, during the Tokugawa period, it was customary for feudal lords to swear their oath of fealty to the Shogun by Shinto gods. These suggest that Shinto mythology, which gave the emperor his supreme position, had persisted from generation to generation, and its rituals had been well established and practised as the national traditions in the elite community.

³⁸ Since Buddhism was imported in the sixth century, it had been interwoven with native Shinto cults. However, the Meiji leaders thought that the purification of Shinto by separating it from Buddhism was necessary for Shinto to serve as the foundation of the Japanese nation-state. Moreover, the strong connection between Buddhism and the Tokugawa Shogunate was another reason for the derogation of the status of Buddhism by the Meiji government. See Murakami (1980:19-26). During the first few years of the Meiji period, Shinto priests, whose position had been undermined by Buddhist institutions, attacked major Buddhist temples and destroyed their statues, ritual objects and sutras.

³⁹ Daniel C. Holtom (1947:6)

⁴⁰ This policy was dropped in 1873 mainly because of the Western demand for the freedom of religion. In the same year, the ban against Christianity was also lifted. For this process of establishing a centralised system of State Shinto, see Murakami (1982, Chapter 2) and Hardacre (1989: 79-89).

⁴¹ For the Meiji Emperor's excursions, see Gluck (1985: 74-75). For the role of photographs of the emperor, see Sato Hideo (1994). The sacred pictures of the emperor were called *goshinei*, the word which originally referred to the sacred paintings of Buddha or of the founder of religious sects in Buddhist society. Unlike modern European monarchies, in imperial Japan the printing of the image of the emperor for coins and stamps was forbidden, and its use for newspapers and magazines was severely restricted. *Goshinei* were treated as a sacred object of worship in the public or school ceremonies (Sato 1994: 9).

⁴² For example, see Hori Ichiro (1968, Chapter 11), Earhart (1982, Chapters 5,6 and 8) and Toshio Kuroda (1993).

⁴³ Katayama (1974:7).

⁴⁴ Mark R. Mullins (1993).

⁴⁵ The term 'State Shinto' refers to Shinto practices, based on official nationalist Shinto ideology propagated by the state, which could be differentiated from the traditional popular Shinto practices. For the development of State Shinto, see Murakami Shigeyoshi (1970).

⁴⁶ Gluck (1985:74).

⁴⁷ For the theory of social representations see Serge Moscovici (1984).

⁴⁸ According to Taoism, there are two complementary forces, *yang* and *yin*, which must be balanced for harmony to be achieved in the universe. These forces interact with each other in space and time and their interaction is believed to affect the matter of the universe composed of wood, fire, water, earth and metal. It is believed that relations between these forces determine fortune and misfortune. This has led to popular beliefs in lucky or unlucky directions, numbers, time and so on. See, for example, Joy Hendry (1987:122-5) and Earhart (1982:Chapter 6). Although Taoism's influence on Japanese popular religious life was significant, it was absorbed into Shinto and Buddhist practices so deeply that its identity was almost lost. Therefore, Taoism will not be discussed in detail in this thesis.

⁴⁹ Fukutake Tadashi (1967:84-85).

⁵⁰ For the early development of Shinto, for example, see Murakami (1970: 19-26).

⁵¹ Ian Reader (1993:141).

⁵² Murakami (1970:37-56).

⁵³ Hori (1968:37-38).

⁵⁴ Under this circumstance, it became a common practice to offer the title of buddha or bodhisattva to Shinto deities (Hori: 37-38).

⁵⁵ For the development of *Tenrikyo* and *Konkokyo*, see Murakami (1965).

⁵⁶ For the role of these popular religious sects in the Meiji Restoration, see Wilson (1992). He regards Tenrikyo and Konkokyo as millennial cults and argues that they produced spiritual energy among the lower strata of society, which supported the Restoration from the bottom.

⁵⁷ By the eighteenth century, about half a million pilgrims visited Ise annually. In particular, the intimation that a festival year was at hand brought a huge number of pilgrims to Ise. For example, it has been said that in 1830, the number of pilgrims reached three to four million. (Jansen 2000: 219).

⁵⁸ Hardacre (1989:16).

⁵⁹ Murakami (1980, Chapter 4).

⁶⁰ For a summary of the Japanese tradition of popular preaching, see Jansen (2000:220-2).

⁶¹ For details of the Hibiya Riot, see Shumpei Okamoto (1982).

⁶² Walker Connor (1994: 41).

Chapter 2. Nationalism, Imperialism and Asianism in Pre-1945 Japan

In the previous chapter, I argued that the concept of Japan as a nation was not a modern invention but was rather constructed through pre-existing cultural systems, especially familiar religious beliefs and practices. What is missing in this account is the role of perceived others in the conceptual development of the Japanese nation. Both Fredrik Barth (1969) and John Armstrong (1982) place strong emphasis on the significant role of boundary perception which distinguishes 'us' from the 'other' in the formation of ethnic identities. That is to say, the ways in which people differentiate between 'us' and 'them', to a large extent, determine the nature of ethnic identities. Their perception of 'us' is based not only on their belief in who 'we' are but also in who 'we' are not. Therefore, it seems crucial to examine relations between Japanese perceptions of the significant 'other' and the self-definition of the Japanese nation in order to understand the nature of Japanese national identity and nationalism.

The aim of this chapter is to examine the ways in which various sections of the Japanese people defined themselves as Japanese in relation to Asia and the West as significant others before 1945. When Japanese attitudes toward Asia before 1945 are discussed in Western literature, it often focuses solely on the militarist, imperialistic aspects in Japan's expansion on the Asian continent. Certainly, the construction of a new Greater East Asia pursued during the Asia-Pacific War was intended to control the exploitation of raw materials in Asia, which was essential to Japan's national defence.¹ It is undeniable that the advocacy of a new Asia for Asiatics by the Japanese military government during the war period was nothing more than a justification for Japan's exploitation of other Asian countries for its national interests. Nevertheless, it is wrong to assume that the ideology which one segment of the population held represented the attitudes of the whole. As maintained in the previous chapter, in order to understand the ideological processes within a society which consists of a multiplicity of ideological formations, it is essential

to examine how different segments of the population with diverse identities and interests come to construct 'a shared ideological universe'.²

The existence of a perceived geocultural space called Asia came to constitute a reality in the minds of the Japanese in the late nineteenth century, and various kinds of perceptions of Asia in relation to the West developed among different sections of the population, which were sometimes conflicting. The important point is that no matter how diverse their perceptions of Asia and the West were, they became constituents of 'a shared ideological universe' which drove Japan towards imperialism and justified Japan's empire-building processes. As Louise Young (1998:8) points out, ministers and generals alone could not have made an empire. Both the state and society were engaged in Japan's imperial projects according to their own ideologies and interests. Thus, Japanese imperialism was not simply a result of the manipulation of the masses by the military leaders but rather a consequence of congruency of various nationalist ideologies and Japanese self-definition in relation to Asia and the West.

This chapter aims to examine the nature of Japanese nationalism, imperialism and Asianism and the ways in which these different types of ideologies together contributed to the development of Japanese imperialism. We should note that the Japanese perceptions of Asia were never independent of their self-perception and national identity. This was because the Japanese perceived Asia, and tried to define their relationship with Asia, through their eyes as 'the Japanese'. In this sense, Japanese perceptions of Asia on the one hand and Japanese national identity and nationalism on the other were interrelated. When the latter evolved, the former was transformed. In this sense, Japanese Asianism was a by-product, a rather lame one, of Japanese nationalisms. In the end, it became almost synonymous with imperialism, which was an extension of both state and ethnic nationalism, under the new international regime.

Some forms of Japanese Asianism were characteristic of what Krishan Kumar (2003:31) calls 'missionary nationalism' (2003:31), of which he regards the French Revolution as a typical example. Kumar defines it as 'a nationalism that finds its principle not so much in equating state

and nation as in extending the supposed benefits of a particular nation's rule and civilization to other peoples'. For those Japanese Asianists, the war they were fighting was a war between Western and Japanese civilisations. They believed that they had a mission to enlighten the peoples of East Asia with 'superior' Japanese civilisation and this sense of mission gave moral justification to Japanese imperialism. In this chapter I hope to highlight the roles which diverse perceptions of Japan, Asia and the West based on various nationalist ideologies played in Japanese imperialism.

2.1. Historical background for the emergence of Asia in the Japanese cognitive map

In Japan the conceptual development of Asia accompanied the revision of history and the construction of the myth of the shared cultural distinctiveness of Asia in contrast to Western culture. One of the Meiji elites' main concerns was how to accommodate Japan in Asia in relation to the West. The redefinition of Japan as a nation of Asia was not free from historical constraints. Given the political and cultural supremacy of the Chinese civilisation in East Asia throughout pre-modern history, the concept of modern Japan as an Asian nation had to be defined in terms of its historical connection with China. In the following part, I shall examine in what way Japan's relations with China had had an influence on the development of national consciousness among the Japanese elites in the pre-modern period. Moreover, I shall discuss how this pre-modern relationship between Japan and China affected the Japanese perception of Asia in the modern era.

In the pre-modern period, China and Korea had been the main countries with which Japan had interacted politically, commercially and culturally. Therefore, they were the main referents against which the Japanese elites compared themselves. Especially, throughout history the Chinese empire had had an enormous political and cultural impact on elite Japanese ethnic

consciousness. This had resulted in ambivalent attitudes toward China among the Japanese elites.

On the one hand, there was reverence for Chinese civilisation among the Japanese elites, and they imported and adopted many of its cultural elements such as Confucianism, Taoism, Chinese letters, literature and arts. This might indicate that there was a kind of cultural affinity with China among the Japanese elites. On the other hand, as a small island country located next to the giant Chinese empire, it was a political and psychological necessity for them to distinguish Japan from China in order to legitimise their sovereignty as an independent country and construct a positive ethnic identity.

Kojiki, which is one of the oldest Japanese historical records compiled in 712, explains that the islands of Japan had been born of sexual union between male and female deities.³ As Robert O. Ballou (1945:20) maintains, this myth of the origin of the Japanese islands attributed divinity to the Japanese land. It was a clear manifestation of Japanese ethnic pride among the elites. This indicates that strong territorial consciousness already existed among the Japanese elites by the eighth century. Because the geographical boundaries between Japan and China were clearly demarcated by the sea, and because of the existence of a centralised independent political authority in both countries, geopolitical territoriality had been the most prominent perceptual boundary which had distinguished the former from the latter in the mental map of the Japanese elites in early history.⁴ It was this territorial consciousness of the divine islands of Japan which constituted the stable conceptual foundation of Japan as an independent political entity.

The process of the formation of cultural boundaries was far more complicated. One may say that Shinto provided the Japanese elites with ethnic cultural consciousness. Certainly, Shinto mythology of the divine origin of the Japanese islands and imperial family became an essential constituent of elite perception of divine Japan by the eighth century. By claiming an ancestral tie between the deities who had created the Japanese islands on the one hand, and the ancestor of the imperial family on the other, Shinto mythology strengthened the unity of the Japanese land,

the imperial family and the people on the soil of Japan on the ideological level. Nevertheless, it is disputable whether this indicates the existence of distinctive cultural consciousness. Since its emphasis was placed on geographical and genealogical aspects, it might be said that what Shinto mythology brought was territorial and temporal notions of Japanese distinctiveness, rather than cultural ones. For the myth of a unique ethnic culture to develop, the separation of Japan from China on the level of elite cultural consciousness was necessary.

As Harry D. Harootunian (1980) points out, by the seventeenth century a Sinocentric view had become widely accepted among the Japanese elite class and China was regarded as the centre of civilisation. In fact, China was called *chuka* (the central florescence) or *chugoku* (the central Kingdom), which signified China as the centre of civilisation. During the early Tokugawa period, Chinese imports came to be associated with excellence and refinement.⁵ These indicate that there existed a strong consciousness of reverence for the Chinese civilisation among many Japanese elites. Moreover, the fact that Japan borrowed so much from Chinese culture, and that learning the Chinese classics constituted the central part of Japanese elite education⁶, would have undermined the independence of Japanese elites' cultural identity from the Chinese civilisation.⁷

It was during the eighteenth century that the scholars of *kokugaku* (National Learning School), a nativist school of philosophy, had started rigorously attempting to overthrow the Sinocentric view of the world by advocating the superior quality of a distinctively Japanese mentality and world view based on indigenous Shinto mythology. They claimed that through the adoption of Chinese philosophies and language, the Japanese had unconsciously accepted the Sinocentric world view, which had represented a false reality in which China had been regarded as the centre of civilisation and others, including Japan, as barbarians in the periphery.⁸ The aim of the nativist school was to reverse this centre-periphery relation between China and Japan by relocating Japan as the centre of civilisation. In consequence, in the eighteenth century what had been considered excellence and refinement about the Chinese civilisation came to be regarded as artificial and inauthentic. On the contrary, simplicity in Japanese culture came to be valued highly

as natural, authentic and pure.⁹ Thus, the perceived artificiality of Chinese civilisation was placed in opposition to the naturalness associated with Japanese culture. In this way, China was transformed to represent an 'other', not only in a geopolitical sense but also on the level of cultural consciousness.

The rise of this nativist movement was largely due to the nativist scholars' discontent with the intellectual leadership of the Confucianist school under the heavy protection of the Tokugawa Shogunate.¹⁰ Moreover, in the late eighteen century, Russia started approaching Japan by sending official expeditions to negotiate a trade treaty with Japan. This was followed by similar attempts by other Western powers. After a long period of national seclusion, this alarmed Japanese elites, and antiforeignism began to emerge out of growing concerns about Japan's national security. This created an atmosphere which was favourable to the nationalist claims of nativist scholars who advocated Japan's cultural independence. Their Shinto-based, emperor-centred ideology, which called for the return to the authentic form of Japan in its glorious time when it had not subject to foreign influences, became the ideological foundation of the Meiji Restoration.

China's defeat by Britain in the Opium War (1839-1842) symbolised the decline of the Chinese civilisation in the eyes of the Japanese elites. The advent of Western imperialism meant the appearance of a new significant 'other'. But this did not mean the replacement of China by the Western powers as Japan's significant 'other' and the disappearance of China's importance in the formation of modern Japanese national consciousness. Western imperialism brought to Japan a pair of opposite concepts of *toyo* (eastern seas) and *seiyo* (western seas).¹¹ While the latter meant the West, which consisted of the European powers and the United States, the former referred to the perceived geocultural area composed of East Asian countries. *Toyo* and Asia were used interchangeably. There is little point in discussing the validity of the objective existence of such a geocultural entity called *toyo* or Asia. What really mattered was the fact that Japanese people perceived and tried to make sense of the modern world through this '*seiyo* (the

West) versus *toyo* (the East or Asia)' comparative cognitive framework, in addition to the inward-looking ethno-centric framework.

That is to say, there existed not only national boundaries but also supranational cultural boundaries between the West and the East developing in the cognitive map of Japanese elites and intellectuals. As Stefan Tanaka (1993) explains, while China and Japan represented separate political entities, a broader geocultural notion of territoriality called *toyo*, which encompassed both of them, was formulated. Thus, in the modern period, a new concept of Japan as a nation of Asia emerged. Accordingly, some Meiji Japanese intellectuals sought to revise history through the perspective of Japan as an Asian nation. The introduction of the history of *toyo* as a new academic subject by Meiji historians can be regarded as an attempt to construct a history of Japan as an Asian nation in order to maintain historical continuity between pre-modern Japan and modern Japan as a nation of Asia.¹² As Tanaka (1993) argues, the concept of *toyo* or Asia as a geocultural entity brought the Japanese a new sense of self and redefined their relations with the outside. Since the dominance of Chinese civilisation in the history of Asia was unarguable, the rewriting of Japanese history as an Asian nation also required a new narrative of the historical relationship between Japan and China from a Japanese perspective. Therefore, it can be said that 'China' was reborn in a new discourse of Asia rather than that it disappeared.

Korea was also redefined in the Japanese discourse of Asia. During the Tokugawa period, although there existed official communication between Korea and Japan, their relationship was rather inactive since both countries officially adopted a policy of national seclusion. However, Korea's national isolation came to an end when Japan forced it to conclude a treaty unfavourable to Korea in 1876. Because of the strategic significance of Korea's geographical location to Japan's national defence against Western imperialism, Korea, whose existence had been rather insignificant to most Japanese people in the Tokugawa period, suddenly became the focus of their attention. In this sense, the development of the discourse of Korea as Japan's significant 'other' as well as their 'brother' correlated with that of Japanese nationalism.

Thus, relations between Japan on the one hand and China and Korea on the other, were redefined in a new context of 'Asia' in relation to the West in the minds of the Japanese. It is important to note that China and Korea should not be equated with Asia. The sum of elements is not the same as the whole. Asia had two different faces in the Japanese perception. One was as an idealised, timeless place where great civilisations had been born, which possessed great historical pasts and cultures, and from which Japan developed. The other was as a troubled place in the modern period which had been unable to adapt to the modern environment and fallen prey to Western imperialism.¹³ The former served to enhance the positive aspect of Japanese national identity as a member of Asia. To share the greatness of Asian pasts and cultures brought the Japanese positive identification with Asia. The Asia with which the Japanese identified themselves was a timeless, idealised cultural entity which was imagined in order to serve a positive Japanese national identity, not the peoples in Asia. Therefore it can be said that 'Asia' in this sense was rather faceless.

On the other hand, the concept of Asia as a troubled, backward place helped the Japanese to differentiate themselves from the rest of Asia. The Japanese perception of a sharp contrast between other underdeveloped Asian nations, which had been the victims of Western imperialism on the one hand, and Japan, whose successful modernisation brought Japan victory over Russia in the Russo-Japanese War on the other hand, gave Japanese people a sense of their distinctiveness and superiority to other Asian countries. In this sense, Asia also constituted an 'other' against which Japan was defined.

In this sense, it may be said that Japanese Asianism, which idealised the ancient Chinese culture as the origin of Japanese culture and recognised contemporary Japan as a leader of Asian civilisation, was similar to Western Orientalism. It defined the ancient Orient as the origin of European civilisation and the contemporary Orient as the object against which its progress could be measured, and which it was obliged to rule in order to enlighten it.¹⁴ As Tanaka (1993) argues, while seeking to release Asia from the inferior position of the Orient defined by Western

Orientalism, Asianism tried to confine Asia within another totality defined by a Japan-centred view of the world. This Japanese version of Orientalism was institutionalised by the development of *toyoshi* (the history of the East) as an academic discipline led by Shiratori Kurakichi at Tokyo Imperial University in the early twentieth century.¹⁵

In conclusion, Asia in the Japanese cognitive map had multiple boundaries. Firstly, geocultural borders which culturally separated Asia, including Japan, from the rest of the world, especially from the West. On the other hand, Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) produced a discourse of Japan as the place where Eastern spirituality and Western technology were harmonised.¹⁶ Therefore, in the Japanese perception, Japan as the mediator of the Eastern and Western civilisations could be culturally distinguished from the rest of Asia. Secondly, racial borders which not only differentiated between the yellow race of Asia and the white race of the West but also between the divine Japanese people and other inferior peoples in Asia. Thirdly, geopolitical borders which differentiated between dominated Asia and the dominating West, and between imperial progressive Japan and politically backward other Asian nations. Thus, in the minds of the Japanese, Asia with shifting boundaries constituted both a part of 'us' and that of the 'other'.

The balance of those multiple boundaries differed among various segments of the Japanese population. As noted above, the Japanese perception of Asia was interrelated with Japanese national identity and nationalism. Thus, differences in the balance of those boundaries reflected differences in the nature of national identity and nationalism which particular groups of the Japanese people possessed. In the following sections, I shall examine the ways in which various perceptions of Asia evolved in relation to the development of diverse Japanese nationalist ideologies.

2.2. Ideological evolution of Asianism among Japanese intellectuals and political activists

In Japan the split between the modern state and society, and a sense of alienation felt by discontented Japanese intellectuals and political activists, contributed to the development of ethnic nationalism based on loyalty to the imagined Japanese ethnic community. Elie Kedourie (1971) maintains that the new Western-educated classes in Asia and Africa who found themselves alienated from politics in the transition to modern society became antagonistic toward Western-centred enlightenment rationalism. As a result, they turned to romanticist nationalism as a solution to their discontents. This argument may help to explain the development of romanticist ethnic nationalism among dislocated Japanese intellectuals.

What many theories of Japanese nationalism have failed to take seriously is the growing sense of belonging to a geocultural space called Asia among Japanese intellectuals and political activists, which led to the ideological development of Asianism within the framework of nationalism. Asianism refers to an ideology which advocated the superiority of Asian civilisation and called for the unity of Asia against Western imperialism. It provided an alternative cognitive framework to understand international relations, based on the growing conviction that there was a fundamental incompatibility between the East and the West. When Asianism in Japan is discussed, in most cases it is treated as almost synonymous with imperialism. Nevertheless, this uni-dimensional treatment of Asianism leads to failure to recognise the complexity of ideological processes and prevents us from understanding the ways in which diverse national interests converged in the form of imperialism. In this section, I shall analyse the ideological processes through which Japanese ethnic nationalism among intellectuals and political activists developed the ideology of Asianism.

Dramatic social changes in the transition from the Tokugawa feudal system to the modern Western nation-state system were accompanied by large scale Westernisation in Japan. After

the Meiji Restoration in 1867, a large number of former *samurai* class elites lost their privileges and were dislocated from the central political power. Some of them called for military action against Korea in the 1870s. Several factors accounted for this rise of expansionism among those former *samurai* who were disaffected from the Meiji government and its modernisation programmes in the early Meiji period.

Firstly, some hoped to create a situation in which they could regain their lost status and military power.¹⁷ Their expansionism was also based on the conviction that expansion to the continent was a necessary means for Japan to defend its national security and improve its national strength.¹⁸ Moreover, the advocacy of expansionism became an ideological weapon for the discontented former *samurai* to criticise the Meiji government for its passive foreign policy.¹⁹ It should be noted that the expansionism of the rebels did not develop the discourse of Asianism. At this stage, their anti-Western feelings, stimulated by their opposition to the Meiji government which pursued Westernisation, did not develop an ideological framework of 'the West versus Asia'. This was because their primary enemy was the Meiji oligarchy rather than the West. Their minds were preoccupied by the restoration of their lost status within Japanese political society and their derogated class-based pride.²⁰ Their strong class-based interests in the internal political rivalry did not lead to the development of identification to a wider community beyond the national borders.

On the other hand, the People's Rights Movement between the 1870s and 1880s developed a type of Asianist argument. For example, Ueki Emori applied the principles of liberty and equality, which were the basis of his ideal of liberal democracy, to international relations. He justified the resistance of Asian people against Western imperialism according to these universal principles and insisted that an Asian alliance based on equal relationships was essential for this purpose.²¹ This Asianist ideology was called *ko-a-ron* (the theory of reviving Asia) and many young progressive, liberal reformers, such as Oi Kentaro²² and Miyazaki Toten²³, were engaged in activities to help the modernisation of Korea and China, which they considered essential for Asia, including Japan, to fight against Western imperialism.²⁴

However, it was universal values on which the Asianism in the movement was based, not something distinctively Asian which could serve as a differentiating marker between the West and Asia. Moreover, it was exclusively a political movement and there was no reference to historical or cultural elements in its advocacy of an Asian alliance. This suggests that the aim of Asianism in the movement was solely political and there was no indication of any sense of an Asian identity based on the notion of a distinctive Asian cultural community in the movement. Rather, their Asianism operated within the Social-Darwinist, Western-centred logic of civilisation which viewed the history of humanity as a linear progression from barbarism to civilisation and which placed the West at the highest stage of civilisation. That is to say, what these Asianists desired was to civilise Asia in Western ways in order to bring Asian people liberty and justice in the international community. The People's Rights Movement dissolved after its main goals of the establishment of a national constitution and an elected assembly were realised and internal conflict shattered its unity. In consequence, the Asianism which developed within the movement lost its energy. This indicates the fragility of political nationalism and a pan-nationalism which are not backed up by cultural identities. It was toward the end of the 1880s that modern Japanese cultural nationalism became powerful and the concept of Japan as an ethnic nation became prominent. An important point is that this redefinition of Japan as an ethnic community, with its distinctive history and culture, was accompanied by the redefinition of Asia as a geocultural community to which Japan culturally belonged.²⁵

The concepts of 'Japan' and 'Asia' as cultural entities evolved at the same time, influencing each other and developing the cultural ideology of Asianism, based on a belief in common distinctive cultural values within Asia. Those who believed in the universal laws of the progress of civilisation located Japan in the Western-centred universal framework. They were convinced that it was inevitable for Japan to follow the model of Western civilisation in order to survive. Among them, the most famous is Fukuzawa Yukichi's Datsu-A ron (Dissociation from Asia) published in 1885.²⁶ Claiming that Japan did not have time to wait for its neighbours to be modernised, he urged that Japan should dissociate itself from troubled Asia and endeavour to join the league of Western civilisation in order to achieve a status equal to the Western powers.²⁷

In contrast, while searching for Japanese cultural traditions which had been threatened by massive Westernisation, some Japanese intellectuals sought to create a new Japan-centred logic of civilisation founded on Asian cultural values, in order to free themselves from a perceived inferior status as the 'other' in Western hegemonic discourse. That is to say, they attempted to shift the centre of civilisation from the West to Asia and place Japan at its core by advocating the superiority of Asian civilisation, of which Japan was regarded as the best representative to a declining Western civilisation. In this sense, it can be said that cultural Asianism developed within the framework of Japanese cultural nationalism.

The cultural ideology of Asianism within Japanese cultural nationalism was not necessarily imperialistic. For example, while claiming that 'Asia is one', as a culturally and aesthetically unified place in contrast with the materialistic West, Okakura Tenshin (Kakuzo) (1970 [1903]: 07) also recognised diversity within Asia and denied Japan's political leadership in Asia. For him, Japan's role as 'the museum of Asian civilisation' was to revive Asian aesthetic and moral values threatened by Westernisation by reviving Japanese traditional culture in which various great Asian cultural heritages were integrated and best preserved.

The important point is that his Asianism was based on his strong cultural nationalism and national identity. Regarding the Westernisation of Japan as the pursuit of greed, he attempted to resist it by advocating traditional Japanese aestheticism. When he was appointed the head of *Tokyo bijutsu gakko*, the national academy of arts, in 1890, he chose traditional Japanese painting for its curriculum, despite the growing popularity of the Western over Japanese painting. In 1898 he left the academy because of pressure from a pro-Western group within the academy and founded *Nihon bijutsuin*, a private academy of arts, in opposition to the dominant atmosphere of pro-Westernisation encouraged by the government. However, in the end, his attempt to establish a new academy of arts which was critical of the official policy of Westernisation failed and he left *Nihon bijutsuin* in 1901. His Asianism came after these events.

Here three points need to be made. Firstly, his nationalism turned against the state which endorsed the programmes of Westernisation in order to join Western civilisation. This means that his national identity was based on his identification not with the modern Japanese state but with the traditional Japanese historico-cultural community. Secondly, his Asianism was an extension of his nationalism. He advocated distinctive Asian cultural values as universal values threatened not only by Western civilisation but also by the modern Japanese state. That is to say, he sought to use the concept of 'Asia' as a tool to rejuvenate the traditional Japanese cultural community. Thirdly, because of his appreciation of the spirituality of Asian civilisation in contrast to the materiality of Western civilisation, his Asianism was in principle against imperialism. These points demonstrate how far Okakura's Asianism was later mistreated and exploited by the military state in order to justify the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It is important to distinguish between different types of Asianism.

However, the domains of politics and cultural discourse were not independent of each other. This is because the way in which Western powers treated Japan in international politics was the main source of Japanese self-perception as an inferior 'other' in the international community, and facilitated the ideological development of cultural nationalism and Asianism. Moreover, the cultural ideology of Asianism provided the ideological basis for those Japanese nationalist activists who supported both national independence movements of other Asian nations and Japanese imperial expansionists. Their activities contributed to the politicisation of the cultural ideology of Asianism.

Because of the realism and rationalism in the thinking of the state elites, until the end of the 1910s the modern Japanese state was, at least officially, acting according to Western-centred rules in international politics, which were alien to Japanese society. Moreover, as a result of the state-led rapid modernisation programmes, which often undermined the existing social structures and traditions, signs of social disruptions started to emerge. In consequence, there was a growing sense of alienation between the people and the state by the turn of the twentieth century. In this condition, some discontented Japanese nationalist activists who were against

both the Japanese government and the West tried to unite the state and society by realising a Japanese ethnic nation not simply as a nation-state but as an Asian nation-state with a new Japan-centric logic of civilisation.

Right-wing nationalist groups, such as *Genyosha* (the Dark Ocean Society) and *Kokuryukai* (the Amur River Society), which were founded in 1881 and 1901 respectively, contributed to the development of the political ideology of Asianism. Many of these right-wing nationalist groups were led by the former *samurai* class disaffected both from the Japanese government and from the Western model of modernisation programmes. Advocating the virtue of Eastern civilisation, especially Confucianism, they urged its preservation and revival in the face of the Western onslaught under Japanese leadership.²⁸ They stressed the need to expand Japanese state power on the Asian continent for the survival of Japan and other Asian nations. *Kokuryukai* claimed to support the Asian ethnic nations and the establishment of Japan's position as the leader of Asia as guiding principles.²⁹

Japanese rightist nationalists regarded the liquidation of the feudalistic regime in Asia as a prerequisite for throwing off the yoke of Western imperialism, which was considered the main obstacle to the establishment of Japan's dominant position in Asia.³⁰ That is why they supported nationalist movements against Western imperialism in other Asian nations. Moreover, the victory of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) cast doubt on the belief in the absoluteness of Western superiority to Asia. There was a certain degree of expectation among Asian elites that Japan might play a leading role in the liberation of Asia from Western imperialism in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. After the war, there was a sharp increase in the number of Asian students in Tokyo who sought knowledge of modernisation, and Tokyo became a base for expatriate nationalist organisations of other Asian nations.³¹ *Kokuryukai* and other rightist nationalist groups were the main supporters of their activities. An important point is that those Japanese nationalists identified Japan's destiny with that of Asia.

In this way, Asianism came to possess a strong political character. It advocated the elimination of Western intervention in Asia and called for the self-determination of Asia. It claimed that 'Asia is Asia's Asia...it should be only Asians who make decisions on Asian issues'.³² This suggests that there was a geopolitical boundary between the West and Asia in the mental map of Japanese right-wing nationalists. Moreover, cultural Asianism consolidated the cognitive boundary between Asia and the West by supplying cultural elements to fill the geopolitically demarcated space of Asia. Thus, through the activities of those nationalists, the cultural and political ideologies of Asianism were combined and the political and cultural boundaries between Asia and the West were made consistent in their perception.

For Japanese rightist nationalists, Asianism was a solution not only to the alienation of Japan in a Western-dominated international political community but also to the split between the Japanese elitist state from which they were excluded on the one hand and the Japanese ethnic community with which they identified themselves on the other hand. That is to say, for those nationalists who felt alienated from the Japanese political community which was dominated by a small group of elites, Asianism provided the best means to gain political influence and serve their ethnic nation at the same time. In this sense, it can be said that political Asianism was formed on the continuum of Japanese political nationalism.

Asianism as a form of nationalism among alienated intellectuals and political activists was based on their beliefs that the Japanese ethnic nation could survive only by making it a powerful nation-state, and that this could be done only by establishing Japan's position as the leader of Asia. Their interests were shared by the Japanese military on the continent who were also alienated from the central political arena. In consequence, rightist nationalists worked in collaboration with the military in various forms of imperialist activities on the continent³³, which often caused uneasiness to the pragmatic Japanese central government, anxious about Western reactions to Japan's expansion in Asia. As a result, Asianism and military expansionism became interwoven on the ideological level. When the Japanese government came under the control of the military in the 1930s, imperialism backed up by both political and cultural Asianism as a disguised form

of nationalism became the official ideology which culminated in the advocacy of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. In this way, Asianism mediated between Japanese nationalism and military expansionism.

Moreover, Asianism as an extension of nationalism absorbed leftist ideologies in Japan. An early example of the integration of national socialism and Asianism can be found in the ideology of Kita Ikki. When he wrote *Kokutairon oyobi junsei shakaishugi* (Japanese National Polity and Pure Socialism) in 1906, he was influenced by national socialism and criticised the emperor-centred state system. However, after the national socialist movement started to decline, he joined *Kokuryukai* and in 1911 he participated in the Chinese revolutionary movement.³⁴ When his attempt to reform China failed, he shifted his attention to the reformation of Japan and wrote a highly influential book entitled *Nihon kaizo hoan taiko* (An Outline Plan for the Reconstruction of the Japanese State) in 1919. In this book, he advocated a coup d'état at the hands of a small number of uncorrupted low rank military officers as a means to initiate the reconstruction of Japan. According to Kita's plan, after the success of the coup d'état, the Constitution would be suspended for the next three years and the emperor would be in charge of the implementation of reform programmes. For example, Kita insisted the maximum private-property holding, including land, by individuals should be limited to a value of 100,000 yen. He maintained that any possession of land above this limit should be seized by the state and be sold to farmers who owned no land. Moreover, he advocated expansionism, claiming that Japan, which was a proletariat among nations, had the right to start a war in order to seize possessions from Western powers who possessed huge areas of land.

The important point is that he himself did not believe in the state-centred cult of the emperor. However, his awareness that the popular worship of the emperor was the basis of the Japanese nation and nationalism persuaded him to exploit the emperor-centred political system to achieve a socialist revolution. This adaptation of national socialism to the specific Japanese conditions worked well. Kita's book of 1919 became the bible of young right-wing military officers who actually attempted to carry out a coup d'état in the 1930s. It came to be regarded as the

scripture of Japanese emperor-centred fascism. Nevertheless, the equation of Kita's national socialist ideology with Japanese right-wing fascist ideology and its advocacy of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere misses the point.

Furthermore, in the 1930s, the mass conversion of leftist ideology into the dominant Asianist ideology took place in Japan.³⁵ Initially, Japanese nationalist socialists, who opposed the capitalist, imperialist Japanese state, adopted Western-born Marxism-Leninism in their attempts to revolutionalise Japanese society to transform it into a powerful nation-state. However, as Germaine A. Houston (1994) explains, they faced a dilemma between their national identity and their commitment as Marxists to the Comintern, the head of the international socialist organisation, which instructed the Japanese Communist Party to oppose Japanese imperialism and call for the abolition of the emperor system which was the very core of the Japanese nation-state. The intention of the Comintern clearly aimed to defend the Soviet Union, the fatherland of socialism, whose interests had been threatened by Japanese imperial expansion on the Asian continent. When Japanese socialists were forced to choose either their national identity or their Marxist ideology, many of them chose the former. When the Comintern prescribed a kind of social revolution which was meant to destroy the very core of the Japanese nation, Japanese socialists found internationally-organised Marxism just another form of Western imperialism.

The strong pressure from the Japanese government, and their realisation that Marxist ideology which contradicted the core of the Japanese value systems alienated them from the rest of Japanese people, forced them to create a Japanese version of Marxist ideology which could accommodate Japanese nationalist ideology based on emperor worship. It should be noted that the Japanese reinterpretation of Marxism, which repudiated its core ideals of universalism and statelessness in order to serve as a nationalist ideology, was no longer Marxism in a real sense. For a revolutionary ideology to successfully achieve its goal, it has to be able to appeal to the mass population who are the driving force of revolution. The popular concept of Japan as a distinctive ethnic nation forced universalist Marxist ideology to be absorbed into the dominant

Japanese nationalist ideology based on the particularism of the Japanese ethnic nation, which was also the basis of Japan-centric Asianism.

In 1933, Sano Manabu and Nabeyama Sadachika, the leaders of the Japanese Communist Party, issued a public proclamation repudiating their party and all other Communist affiliations. This was followed by the renunciation of Communism by hundreds of Japanese Marxists, and affirmation of their commitment to the Japanese ethnic nation. The ideological integration of Japanese leftist ideology into Japanese ethnic nationalism and ethnocentric Japanese Asianism can be found in Sano's claims that the war for the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere would bring national liberation for all the peoples of the Orient under the leadership of Japan where the essence of Oriental culture had been perfected.³⁶ In this way, by the middle of the 1930's the ideological integration of the rightist, leftist and militant nationalist ideologies based on the dominant concept of Japan as a distinctive ethnic nation of Asia had been completed.

Certainly, it is undeniable that the state's strict censorship and a fear of being tortured by the police and of becoming unemployed played significant roles in the conversion of a large number of Japanese Communists to ethnic nationalism. Nevertheless, as Yoshimoto Takaaki argues, it is possible that their conversion was also partly motivated by their attempt to overcome their sense of alienation from the masses.³⁷ Looking back to the wartime period, Maruyama Masao, a distinguished progressive thinker, maintains 'Bombs did not fall, avoiding those against the war. We shared the same destiny as the Japanese whether we liked it or not. I really felt that we belonged to a community of a shared destiny'.³⁸ Thus, the possibility that the national identity of intellectuals and the tense international relations at the time also played their parts in their joining the dominant ethnic nationalism, which also supported imperialist Asianism, should not be ruled out.

Another important aspect of Asianism was that it promoted a concept of Asia not only as an ethnic community but also a racial community. A racial concept of Japan and Asia entered the public discourse in the late 1890s. The Triple Intervention against Japan by Russia, France and

Germany in 1895 in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) was perceived as the bullying of Japan by the West.³⁹ In the same year Kaiser Wilhelm II coined the famous phrase the 'Yellow Peril' which referred to Japan.⁴⁰ These incidents contributed to the formation of a racial boundary between Asia and the West. For example, Konoe Atsumaro, an influential figure highly placed in the Meiji elite, called in 1898 for solidarity of the same race between the Japanese and Chinese, anticipating racial rivalry between the white and yellow races.⁴¹

After Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the idea of the 'Yellow Peril' was revived in the British Dominions and the US. Especially in the American West Coast, where there had been a strong anti-Oriental sentiment initially targeted at Chinese immigrants, anti-Japanese movements took place.⁴² The victory raised expectation among the Japanese that the world would finally accept Japan as a member of the premier league of Western civilisation. However, it also made it clear that there was a racial boundary between Japan and the West which could not be overcome even with the achievement of military strength that could match that of Western powers. This growing awareness of the racial boundary was exploited by the advocates of Asianism.⁴³ They combined the idea of racial difference between the yellow and the white races and the concepts of Asia as a distinctive cultural community, and as the political victim of Western imperialism, in their call for the unity of Asia. In this way, Asia came to be defined by political, cultural and more visible racial boundaries by the early twentieth century.

The formation of racial discourse surrounding the concepts of Japan and Asia and the expansion of the Japanese empire resulted in the development of a theory called *doso-ron* (a theory of common ancestry) which argued that the Japanese and other Asian peoples shared a common ancestry.⁴⁴ The development of *doso-ron* was accompanied by the development of a mixed nation theory which maintained that the Japanese nation was composed of a mixture of the Malay, Korean, Chinese, Mongolians, Ainu and 'the Tenson race' (the race of descendants of the gods) who had come to the archipelago from overseas and conquered others.⁴⁵ The combination of *doso-ron* and the mixed nation theory became the foundation for the advocacy of the political unification of Asian nations on the basis of their racial affinity, and justified Japan's

imperial expansion on the continent.⁴⁶ The concept of *doso-ron* had a significant influence on the nature of Japanese colonialism, which sought to establish a racially and culturally homogeneous Japanese empire by adopting a policy of assimilation of colonial subjects and ethnic minorities in Japan, such as people in Okinawa and the Ainu in Hokkaido, which officially became Japanese territories in the early Meiji period.⁴⁷ The crucial consequence was strong resentment against Japan among other Asian subjects of the Japanese empire whose cultural identities were derogated by Japanese assimilation policies. This fuelled national independence movements in the Japanese colonies.

However, in the late 1930s there was growing awareness among the elites that the biological concept of race was not sufficient to justify Japan's imperialist policy. Defining Japan in a biological racial manner imposed an ideological constraint on the advocacy of imperialist Asianism since the racial concept of the nation could highlight divisions between nations within Asia. For example, in the 1930s a group of scholars who espoused eugenics and developed the racialised concept of the Japanese nation strongly objected to a policy of assimilation, especially to intermarriage between the Japanese and other 'inferior' races.⁴⁸ Although an assimilation policy based on the theory of the common ancestry was adopted as the official colonial policy, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which had a close link with the Japanese Racial Hygiene Association founded in 1931, co-operated with eugenics scholars in the advocacy of a pure blood ideology, which argued that the Japanese nation consisted of pure blood since time immemorial. Moreover in the late 1930s Kiyono Kenji and Hasebe Kotondo, who were physical anthropologists with medical backgrounds, also came to argue that the Japanese people should endeavour to maintain the pure blood of the Japanese race, although they did not deny that racial mixing took place in ancient times.⁴⁹

In consequence, greater emphasis came to be placed on the cultural concept of the nation as an ethnic community in the official imperialist ideology. That is to say, the cultural concept of the nation, which could provide more flexible social boundaries than the biological concept of race, was exploited in order to justify Japan's imperialist activities as a means to liberate the East

Asian cultural community. In this process, the institutionalisation of nationalist ethnology played a significant role.⁵⁰ One of the important figures was Oka Masao. He studied in Vienna from 1929 to 1935 and was deeply impressed by the way in which German ethnology was playing a important role in binding the nation to the state ideology, which called for the establishment of a new order in Europe. After his return to Japan, he presented his idea for a national institute for ethnology to an influential circle of people, and the Ethnic Research Institute was established under the direct control of the Ministry of Education in 1943. Its aim was to find out how the ethnic national identity of the Japanese and other Asian peoples could serve the development of the Japanese empire in Asia. Thus, institutionalised nationalist ethnology contributed to the legitimisation of Japanese imperial expansion in Asia by linking the destiny of Japan with the destiny of Asia as a distinctive ethnic community of which Japan was part. As Kevin M. Doak (2001) points out, the influences of the activities of the Ethnic Research Institute were not confined to the elite, militant circle. Since it was under the supervision of the Ministry of Education, it played an important role in disseminating ethnological ideas and values inherent in imperialist Asianism in Japanese society.

In this way, by the 1930s diverse ideologies converged on ethnocentric nationalist ideology and together they constituted the ideological universe of Japanese imperialism. It might be said that cultural Asianism itself, based on a Japan-centric view of Asian civilisation, was a rather harmless fantasy in the search for lost identities among alienated Japanese intellectuals and political activists. Nonetheless, when it was combined with political Asianism in the process of Japanese imperial expansion, cultural Asianism resulted in a representational violence against other Asian nations by reducing their cultures to the idealised images necessary for Japan to create a geocultural Asia from which Japan's cultural greatness could derive.⁵¹ Furthermore, when cultural Asianism was put into practice as a form of cultural assimilation in the Japanese colonies, it entailed the destruction of indigenous cultures.

The concept of Asia in cultural Asianism as a timeless, cultural entity with which the Japanese identified themselves did not contain a notion of other Asian peoples, and therefore it was

represented as a rather faceless, passive object. On the other hand, the Asia which Japan encountered in the process of its imperial expansion was far from faceless. What they saw was an Asia where there existed different peoples with their own distinctive cultures and identities. They refused to accept the Japanese way of seeing the world and were willing to fight against Japan in order to protect their independence and national identities. In consequence, Asianism made Japan more emotionally isolated from the rest of Asia.

2.3. Japanese imperialism and the rise of inward-looking ethnic nationalism

As explained in the previous chapter, the national identity of the Japanese commoners was formed on the pre-existing religious identity which consisted of a mixture of popular Shinto, Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism. I have argued that Japanese Buddhism as a religion of the family and popular Shinto as a religion of the community, were interwoven in the popular religious practice. This enhanced the bonds not only within the family but also between families within the local community. In the modern period, these pre-existing strong communal bonds based on family ties were extended to the level of the national community. In this way, the concept of Japan as a national family was constructed.⁵² A question is how far the concept of family could be extended in the minds of the Japanese mass population.

Kokutai (national polity) theorists advocated the homogenous nation theory which argued that Japanese people had lived in Japan since time immemorial and that the Japanese nation consisted of a distinctive, racially and culturally homogenous divine national family.⁵³ However, facing the fact that the Japanese empire now included other nations, they shifted from the homogenous nation theory to the mixed nation theory. How could they reconcile the concept of the family state and the mixed nation theory without undermining the concept of *kokutai*?

As Oguma Eiji (2002a) explains, their strategy was to advocate the concept of a fictitious blood relationship as the basis of the family state, rather than that of a concrete blood relationship.⁵⁴ One good example is the transformation of Hozumi Yatsuka's concept of the Japanese nation.

In the late nineteenth century he maintained that the Japanese Empire consisted of a single race that shared a common history and the same pure blood.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, in 1910, the year of the annexation of Korea, he came to claim that the basis of a nation is the shared awareness of a common ancestry which was the product of history.⁵⁶ Theoretically, this meant that if people in Korea and Taiwan came to believe that they were descendants of the Japanese imperial house and they shared the same ancestry with the Japanese, they could be assimilated and included in the Japanese nation.

The question is to what extent this ideological engineering by intellectuals of the expanding concept of the Japanese nation capable of absorbing other nations could penetrate into the minds of the Japanese populace. If ordinary Japanese people had truly believed that the Chinese and Koreans were fellow members of the Japanese nation, how could we explain the murder of estimated thousands of Korean residents in the Kanto region in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923⁵⁷, and the Nanking massacre of 1937, in which an estimated twenty thousands of Chinese people in the city of Nanking, including many civilians, were killed by Japanese soldiers?⁵⁸ These incidents are clear evidence that many Japanese people did not perceive the Chinese and Koreans as part of 'us', the Japanese national family.

Oguma (2002a:337) links the acceptance of the mixed nation theory among many Japanese intellectuals with the ambiguity about lineage in the Japanese family system. The key concept of the family state ideology is the concept of '*ie*' (house) in the Japanese family system which signifies the family as a whole.⁵⁹ In his book published in 1935, Watsuji Tetsuro describes the Japanese *ie* system as follows:

'The house (*ie*) is given a substantial and distinctive character by the fact that its unity is understood in historical terms. The family of the present shoulders the burden of this historical house and undertakes liability for its unity from the past down into the future.....The house evinces most starkly the fact that the family as a whole takes precedence over its individual members'.⁶⁰

Oguma (2002a:336) argues that in the Japanese family system the maintenance and prosperity of the *ie* took priority over the continuation of lineage. Therefore, in the case in which there was no appropriate kin relation as the heir, the continuation of lineage was abandoned and a capable foster child was adopted as heir. Thus, in the Japanese family system individuals without lineage could become members of another family by adopting its family name, customs and traditions. Oguma maintains that this openness of the Japanese family system perhaps explains the widespread acceptance of the mixed nation theory which claimed that the Koreans were the adopted children of the Japanese family.⁶¹ However, as Oguma himself admits, the prevalence of this Japanese family system among the entire Japanese population was a modern phenomenon. When the Meiji government standardised the Japanese family system, which had varied according to region and class, it mainly adopted the family system which had been practised by the samurai class as the model. Most peasants had not even had family names before the Meiji period. Thus, it is questionable to automatically assume the general acceptance of the idea that the Koreans were the adopted children of Japan on the basis of a Japanese family system which was recently standardised. While the idea might have made sense to those from the former samurai class, it might have been more difficult for peasants to digest it.

After the annexation of Korea, a large number of Korean people came to Japan. By 1925 the number of Korean residents in Japan reached 187,102, and by 1938 it amounted to 881,347.⁶² The Korean people whom ordinary Japanese people encountered in Japan and its colonies were a group of people who spoke a different language and had different customs. They were different. They were 'others'. While the concept of the Japanese family nation was expanding in the official and intellectual discourses alongside Japanese territorial expansion, at the same time, there was a growing, more inward-looking nationalism in Japan. In the remaining part of this chapter, I shall examine the ways in which the government's domestic and colonial policy and inward-looking Japanese ethnic nationalism, which was gaining popularity, together resisted the inclusion of the Koreans and Chinese as part of 'us' in the minds of the Japanese.

Political elites who represented the state in the international community were regarded as being responsible for the management of Japan's national destiny in international political and economic competition. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the nature of their national identity could be distinguished from that of the commoners by the greater weight given to loyalty to the state. Consequently, their perception of Asia also differed from that of other Japanese people. The political elite's perception of Asia was defined by the extent and manner in which Asia could serve the political and economic interests of the Japanese state in the context of international politics. Although the encounter with the West, which aroused fear about Japan's national security, initially caused anti-foreign movements in Japan, it was shortly followed by the enthusiastic adoption of Western culture and technology. This was because the apparent difference in wealth and military strength between Western powers and Japan convinced Japanese statesmen that modernisation based on Western lines was essential for securing Japan's national independence.⁶³

From 1871 to 1873, a Japanese mission composed of future major Meiji leaders travelled to Europe and the United States in order to observe Western countries. What impressed them was not only their technological advancement but also the involvement of the masses in their national politics. They were convinced that the strength of Western powers derived from the modern political and economic systems which coalesced the energy of people for the interests of the state and that their national consciousness, enhanced by their modern educational systems, united people with the state.⁶⁴ Moreover, achieving equality with the Western powers was considered essential for Japan's national survival. It was believed that the revision of unequal treaties was imperative for improving Japan's national strength and upholding its national dignity. For this purpose it was thought to be necessary to make Japan appear in the eyes of Western powers a civilised country, in the Western sense. For instance, Inoue Kaoru, who was one of the principal negotiators for treaty revision, claimed that 'we must make the (Japanese) empire like the countries of Europe and our people like the peoples of Europe'.⁶⁵ Thus, the opening of Japan meant that Japan was integrated into an international system dominated by the Western

powers and their values. In order to survive within this system, Westernisation seemed to be inevitable.

The introduction of modernisation programmes on Western lines by the government did not mean the absence of, or a decline in, Japanese nationalism among political elites. On the contrary, Westernisation was pursued as the best means of securing state interests in both domestic and international politics and of restoring wounded national pride. In this sense, it was growing state nationalism and national identity based on loyalty to the state among the political elites which promoted the modernising programmes. Meiji leaders did not consider the West intrinsically superior to Japan. Their perception was based on their belief in the universal process of national development which was inspired by social Darwinism.⁶⁶ They believed that the modernisation which the Western powers had achieved was the universal recipe for national development and Japan would be able to become equal to them by adopting it.

This universalistic interpretation of national progress, which assumed that differences between nations were due to their different stages of national development, paid little attention to ontological differences between nations. This affected the way in which they perceived international relations. Cultural or racial boundaries were not clearly demarcated in the cognitive map of Meiji leaders before 1895.⁶⁷ In consequence, in their eyes Asia constituted not a geocultural or racially demarcated space but a geopolitical region whose nations had failed to modernise themselves, and this had therefore allowed them to suffer from Western imperialism. In this sense, the destiny of Asia represented the destiny Japan should avoid at all costs. Thus, before the turn of the century, a Japanese state nationalism among the Japanese political elites did not officially endorse the idea of Asian solidarity.

Furthermore, Meiji Japanese diplomacy was determined by its realism and pragmatism, not by moral ideals.⁶⁸ Given the shared cultural elements between Asian nations and the common threat of Western imperialism, the formation of an Asian identity might have been possible among the Japanese political elites. In fact, as discussed above, there were those Japanese

intellectuals and political activists who believed in a shared destiny of Asian nations and called for the unity of Asia in order to protect itself from Western imperialism. However, the significance of such cultural or moral factors was played down in the minds of the political elites. Their chief concern in Japanese diplomacy was to secure Japan's position in an international community dominated by the Western powers. As a result, relations with the Western powers were far more important than those with other Asian countries. Accordingly, the Japanese leaders were willing to co-operate with these powers in order to protect the Japanese state's interests. This suggests that the group which they wished Japan to join was not Asia but a prestigious international elite club composed of Western imperial powers. For those elites who were well aware of the military and economic strength of Western powers, antagonising them and allying with weak Asian neighbours to fight against them was unrealistic and irrational.

Nevertheless, developments in the international environment started to undermine the rationalism and realism of Japanese political elites in the 1910s. Because of their belief in the universal process of national progress, Japanese political elites thought that if Japan played according to Western rules, and if Japanese military and economic strength became equal to that of the Western powers, Japan would achieve an equal status in the international community. What perplexed them was the emergence of racial discourse in international politics. The case of the Californian Alien Land Law of 1913, which specifically discriminated against Japanese immigrants, caused grave concern to Japanese political elites in its implication of racial discrimination against the Japanese.⁶⁹

A turning point was the rejection of a Japanese proposal to include a clause on racial equality in the new League of Nations Covenant at the Versailles Conference in 1919.⁷⁰ For the Japanese political elites, this totally contradicted Wilsonian idealism, which advocated the establishment of an international system of peace based not on a balance of power but on the universal interests of justice and freedom for all nations. As Shimazu Naoko (1998) argues, the Japanese proposal seemed to be motivated by their practical self-interest in banning racial discrimination against the Japanese implied by the immigration policies of the US and the British Dominions, rather

than by genuine concern about equality among all the races. In fact, while Japan was negotiating with the US and Britain over the racial equality proposal, at the very same time its forces brutally crushed the Korean independence movement which took place in March 1919.⁷¹

The Japanese government's discrimination against people in Taiwan and Korea, which became Japan's colonies in 1895 and 1910 respectively was reflected in its colonial policies.⁷² In order to transform them into loyal Japanese subjects, the Japanese government adopted cultural assimilation policies. Nevertheless, they were denied political rights as Japanese citizens because of their assumed political incompetence.⁷³ Thus, while criticising Western racism against the Japanese people, the Japanese government did not hesitate to discriminate against the Taiwanese and Koreans. However, the rejection of this seemingly reasonable and justifiable demand for racial equality left a strong impression on the Japanese elites that however much progress Japan achieved, it would never be considered to be equal by the Western powers. Prince Konoe argued that the peace advocated by the West was nothing more than the maintenance of the status quo which served the interests of the Western powers.⁷⁴

This marked a departure from Western-centred universalism in Japanese elite perception. The enactment of an immigration law by the US in 1924, which explicitly prohibited Japanese immigration, further stimulated the racialisation of discourse in international politics. Theoretically speaking, the idea of universal civilisation allowed Japan to climb the ladder of civilisation and possibly overtake the Western powers. However, biological determinism in racism meant a dead end to Japan's future progress. In these circumstances, Asianism and the theory of common ancestry provided an alternative cognitive framework to understand international relations, based on the growing conviction that there was a fundamental incompatibility between the East and the West. Nevertheless, during the 1920s, the basic Japanese foreign policy remained that of economic rationalism, which claimed that the state's primary interest was the economic expansion of trade and investment through co-operation with the Western powers. This approach was in conflict with that of the military, which viewed the enhancement of national defence through territorial expansion as the first priority of Japanese foreign policy, even if it

meant that Japan had to confront the Western powers, because of their overlapping interests in Asia.

It was the worldwide Great Depression in 1929 which changed the balance of power between these two approaches. It undermined the whole structure of economic internationalism which regarded economic interdependence as the principal law of the international community, and on which Japanese economic rationalism was based. The Great Depression intensified international rivalry and the exclusionist views of the military became more influential. In 1932, the Japanese cabinet came under the control of the military. In the following year, Japan withdrew from the League of Nations as the latter disapproved of the establishment of an independent state called Manchukuo (1932) in the north-eastern part of China, which was Japan's de facto colony. Certainly, there were some people within the military who were opposed to the imperialistic treatment of Manchukuo. The most famous among them was Ishiwara Kanji. He promoted the idea of Manchukuo as an autonomous state, independent even of the Japanese government, and as the place where racial harmony among the various peoples of Manchuria was to be achieved.⁷⁵ Moreover, after the war with China broke out in 1937, he developed the idea of the East Asian League (*toa renmei*) as a federation of East Asian states united together on the equal term to fight against the West in the 'Final War' which would bring about a World restoration.⁷⁶ However, such arguments as his were in the minority, and ultimately defeated by the dominant imperialist Asianism.

Japan's separation from the Western-dominated international community, which Japan had taken so much pains to enter made it necessary for Japan to ally itself with other Asian nations in order to avoid national isolation, and to gain natural resources from them which were essential to Japan's national defence.⁷⁷ As Iriye (1997:87) maintains, the ideology of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was a culminating point of Japan's self-image: 'a nation with inadequate space and resources, a nation that nevertheless wanted to modernise itself, a nation suffering from the prejudice of Western countries, a nation that would emerge as the leader of Asia'.

The important thing is that the ideological transition of the Japanese political elites from Western-centred universalism toward Asianism and the ideology of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was not simply a product of Japan's international relations but also a result of the Japanese state's efforts to manage international relations while unifying the nation with the state. Despite the authoritarian nature of the Japanese state, it is wrong to assume that the nation was a passive object fully under the control of the state. The occurrence of mass protests and the development of democracy during the Taisho period (1912-1926)⁷⁸ indicated that the unity between the state and the nation was rather delicate and that the state had to be sensitive to public opinion. This meant that the state's policy of imperialist Asianism could not have been implemented without the support of, and collaboration with, the mass population.

During the Taisho period, there were many labour and peasant movements as reactions to the consequences of modernisation, especially industrialisation.⁷⁹ For example, in 1918, the rice riots, which were initiated by housewives in a rural fishing village of Toyama Prefecture who were angry about the unaccountable inflation in rice prices, quickly spread across the country. This led to the dissolution of Terauchi's non-party cabinet and the transition to a party cabinet system. It is important to note that, as Michael Lewis (1990) demonstrates, the rioters of the rice riots were not unified by a specific class consciousness nor any single ideology but acted out of mixed motives. While Allied demand for textile and industrial goods during the First World War brought a small segment of the Japanese population enormous financial benefits, the great majority of Japanese people were suffering from deteriorating material life conditions due to inflation. The spread of riots throughout the country in 1918 evidenced widespread discontent with the quality of life among the mass population. An important point here is the sharp contrast between the demands of rural riots and those of their urban counterparts. In rural areas, rioters' main concerns were the reduction of the rice price, the introduction of relief measures, and sometimes even the restoration of traditional paternalism in the social structure. On the other hand, urban rioters demanded political reform; a transition to a liberal political system which would distribute wealth and political rights equally among citizens.⁸⁰

Thus, in large cities, riots took the form of a liberal movement which demanded the replacement of authoritarian oligarchy with constitutional democracy. This indicated the development of a national political identity as citizens of Japan among a large number of city dwellers. The nationwide riots of 1918 led to the establishment of the first party cabinet, and liberals tried to promote the concepts of civil society and citizens as the basis of Japanese national identity. However, in Japanese these two concepts referred to 'city-people's society' and 'city people' respectively. Thus, these liberal concepts and the phenomenon of so-called 'Taisho Democracy' contained an urban bias.⁸¹ Despite the rapid progress of industrialisation, Japan remained predominantly an agrarian society until the late 1930s.⁸² In contrast to urban rioters, rural rioters' attempts to restore a more stable, traditional paternalistic communal order, which had been undermined by changes brought by industrialisation, especially the increasingly impersonal nature of landlord-tenant relationships⁸³, showed that liberal concepts played little part in the rural riots. Therefore, as Doak (1997:291) argues, these urban, bourgeois liberal concepts might have enhanced divisions between the urban-centred political community and rural society.

In spite of the establishment of a party government, the Taisho Democracy did not succeed in the cultivation of genuine democratic values in Japan. One of the causes for the decline of democratic movements in the Taisho period was their inability to engage solid support from the mass population. Major political parties which rose to power after 1918 were often neither democratic nor populist. Their main aim was to reduce the power of the oligarchy and increase their own political power within the government, not to improve the political rights of the mass population. The political parties were often accused of corruption. It is a well-known fact that Hara Kei, the first commoner Prime Minister who led Japan's first party government, resisted the introduction of universal manhood suffrage.⁸⁴ Even when the law for universal manhood suffrage was passed in 1925, it was coupled with the introduction of the oppressive Peace Preservation Law which was aimed at preventing the development of anti-state 'dangerous thoughts'. Moreover, so-called liberal intellectuals, many of whom lived in the city, enjoyed a high economic and social status and loved Western cultures, were alienated from the commoners and tend to

despise the less educated masses.⁸⁵ Their cosmopolitan liberalism was hard to sell to commoners in the countryside.

Instead of liberalism, what united various segments of the Japanese population was ethnic nationalism. In the 1920s and the 1930s, ethnic nationalism became dominant in the public discourse. Various social groups advocated the concept of Japan as a distinctive ethnic community for their own purposes. As Doak (2001) maintains, both the populist rightists who were discontented with the elitist, bureaucratic, Westernised state, and the leftists who opposed the capitalist state turned to ethnic nationalism in order to realise their own versions of the ideal nation. Leftist ethnic nationalism was closely associated with the proletarian literary movement which dominated Japanese literary society in the late 1920s and early 1930s. In the movement, proletarian writers idealised the pre-industrial, rural agrarian community. Thus, for the leftists, their ideal society, which they sought to build in their opposition to the capitalist state, was represented by the agrarian community.

In 1934, the Japan Romantic School was established.⁸⁶ It proclaimed 'Cultural Renaissance' as its aim and its members expressed their anti-modernism and anti-Western sentiment in essays and poems, which often contained the populism of the agrarianists.⁸⁷ They rejected what they regarded as the false history which was constructed by the modern state in order to create the identification of the state and the nation. They called for appreciation for classical Japanese aesthetics and a return to the authentic Japan. The Japanese romantics were deeply influenced by the German Romantic School. In the early nineteenth century, German romantics like Friedrich Schlegel called for a folk renaissance, in other words, a revival of the ancient German people through the rediscovery of the poetry of the Middle Ages. As Doak (1994:xxxvi) explains, the Japanese romantics considered the German romantics as heroic rebels who were struggling to protect their nation from the threat posed by foreign cultural influences. As a result, they identified themselves with their German counterpart and adopted their ideas in order to realise a Japanese cultural renaissance. The agrarianism expressed by romantics writers was also shared by some leading right-wing political activists. Combining agrarianism and Shinto

nationalism, these right-wing nationalists, such as Gondo Seikei, Inoue Nissho and Tachibana Kosaburo, hoped to reconstruct the nation as an agrarian society where the emperor and the people were to be naturally united.⁸⁸

Moreover, the notion of Japan as an ethnic nation was also promoted by Yanagita Kunio's folklore study.⁸⁹ Despite his rather successful career as a government official from 1900 to 1919, he adopted the anti-establishment, populist approach for his folklore study.⁹⁰ He was concerned about problems encountered by people in rural areas whose traditional ways of life were perceived to be undermined by the interest of developing cities, and by the government's policy to enhance the unification and administrative centralisation of the country. For example, Yanagita supported Minakata Kumagusu who led an opposition movement against the policy of shrine merger, claiming that it would destroy the established centres of folk religion.⁹¹

Yanagita dismissed the written history as the history of Japanese elites which did not represent the voice of commoners who had been active agents in historical processes.⁹² Instead, he tried to discover the history of the common Japanese people by examining non-literate traditions such as oral traditions, folk religions and customs.⁹³ He believed that true, distinctive Japanese traditions and culture were best preserved in Japanese agrarian communities which, compared with cities, had been less affected by the influence of foreign cultures and the impact of modernisation. His interest in restoring those endangered traditions and customs which were supposed to represent the authentic Japanese culture was shared by the members of the Japan Romantic Schools.⁹⁴

The important point here is Yanagita's focus on the common people as the foundation of the Japanese ethnic nation.⁹⁵ The fact that he rejected the official national history as a false history indicated that the Japanese nation which he tried to rediscover was distinct from the state.⁹⁶ Because of its strong emphasis on the idea of the common people, represented by people in agrarian communities, as a homogenous ethnic group which transcended class and regional

differences, and its anti-state elements, Yanagita's approach to the study of the Japanese ethnic nation appealed to Marxists who sought to use the ethnic nation against the capitalist state.⁹⁷

Some liberals also came to adopt the concept of the Japanese ethnic nation as the basis of national identity in the 1920s. In their attempts to free society from oppression by the capitalist, militarist state, social democrats, such as Oyama Ikuo and Hasegawa Nyozekan, abandoned the concept of civil society and citizens as the foundation of liberal democracy, which they considered suffering from urban bourgeois bias. Instead, they embraced the idea of an ethnic nation based on ethnic national consciousness, which transcended class and urban-rural divisions, as an ideal form of democratic society.⁹⁸

In this way, the idea of the Japanese ethnic nation accommodated various ideological streams, which together fuelled the development of the idea. In other words, the idea of the Japanese ethnic nation functioned as an ideological bridge among those who hated Western-centred modernity and the modern state as its symbol. In this process, traditions, customs and values of the agrarian community came to constitute Japanese ethnic nationhood. However, this idealisation of rural, agrarian society was not confined to ethnic nationalism advocated by intellectuals and political activists. It could be also found in popular discourse.

A good example of the popular idealisation of rural society is a song called 'furusato' which means a home, the native place where one grew up.⁹⁹ Its lyrics are as follows:

- 1 That hill side where I chased rabbits, that river where I fished for tiddlers,
And I'm still dreaming about them. My home is so difficult to forget.
- 2: How are you mother and father? Do my old friends live in good health?
When it rains and the winds blow, my home comes to mind.
- 3: After making my dream come true, I'll try to go back some day.
Home where the blue mountains lie, home where the clear waters flow¹⁰⁰

Despite the fact that the song was officially endorsed by the Ministry of Education, the huge popularity of the song cannot be explained solely by the effectiveness of the state's apparatus. There were many other songs recommended by the Ministry. But why did this particular song have such a strong appeal to the Japanese people? As Uchida Ryuzo (1999) argues, the answer seems to be that the specific image of home which this song invoked resonated with yearning for their lost home which was widely shared by those who left their native villages in order to live in cities, and by residents of newly developing areas who were experiencing rapid social transformation as a result of urbanisation. Certainly, the state's educational apparatus, and the state-owned radio broadcasting company, played an important role in the dissemination of the image of home represented by the song. Nevertheless, without a sense of dislocation and a nostalgic desire for home experienced by so many Japanese people in urban areas, which were described as unnatural, impersonal, and impoverished in popular songs, it is doubtful whether the song could have achieved such popularity.¹⁰¹

The abstract image of the home represented by the song enhanced its capacity to transcend the particularity of individual locality. Thus, Uchida maintained the song contributed to the spread of a standardised picture of home among the Japanese people with the technological support of the mass media and transportation, which stimulated the reproduction and circulation of universal images among a wider audience.¹⁰² It is arguable to what extent the image of the home which the song invoked in the minds of individuals was uniform. It seemed possible that the song invoked emotion, a sentimental, nostalgic feeling of missing one's home, and it brought particular memories and images of the home to the minds of individual people. Nonetheless, the strong appeal of the song to the mass audience indicated the wide acceptance of the image of the home composed of 'nature, abundance, beauty, purity, family, emotions of warmth and sense of belonging'¹⁰³ as the common denominator which linked the individual images of the home.

Thus, with the help of technological advance in mass communications, the idealisation of home villages from which people had originally come took place on a mass scale as a reaction to the

consequences of modernisation, especially industrialisation and urbanisation. Important in this context is the connection between this idealisation of the countryside among the urban population and a popular Japanese national identity. As the awareness of the idealised village as one's place of origin grew, the concept of an authentic national community had to accommodate it. As a result, among dislocated urban dwellers, Japanese nationhood came to be increasingly defined by the cultural, ethnic terms represented by the idealised traditional, natural village life, in contrast to the Westernised artificial urban life.

The idealisation of agrarian society can be traced back to the Tokugawa period. In the eighteenth century, Ogyu Sorai claimed that agriculture was the root of society.¹⁰⁴ The official Tokugawa ideology granted the peasant the second highest rank following the *samurai* in the social order defined in terms of social usefulness.¹⁰⁵ Encountering rapid social changes, various segments of the Japanese people resurrected agrarianism in the early twentieth century. The agrarianism in the Tokugawa period was part of the official ideology which was aimed at justifying the established rule by the *samurai* and marginalising the growing influence of artisans and merchants in the official political discourse. In contrast, agrarianism in the early twentieth century constituted a part of the ideological movements to challenge the existing ruler, the state. However, although the idealisation of the agrarian life among intellectuals, political activists and urban residents in the twentieth century was often closely linked with their discontent with the state and its policies of modernisation, ironically the state itself made a significant contribution to the development of agrarian idealism.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the government which was anxious to enhance national unification launched various programmes aimed at administrative centralisation and spiritual mobilisation.¹⁰⁶ In 1909 the Local Improvement Movement was formally initiated by the Home Ministry.¹⁰⁷ Its aims were to organise material and spiritual support for the state policy through the local governments, and to reduce the financial burden of the central government by promoting the self-government of local communities as the trusted executor of the state policy.

In this process, the government reorganised various indigenous local organisations to place them under the control of the central government.

For example, the *Hotokusha* were local societies founded mainly in the rural part of the Kanto region in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji period by progressive landlords who followed the teaching of the Tokugawa agricultural moralist, Ninomiya Sontoku. They were aimed at promoting technological improvement in agriculture and the virtues of honesty, diligence, social harmony, communal co-operation and moral obligation.¹⁰⁸ These values were useful to maintain social order and mobilise people to serve national goals as a social obligation. The Home Ministry encouraged the establishment of the *hotokusha* throughout the country and founded the Central *Hotokukai* in 1906 as a central body to supervise the local *hotokusha*.¹⁰⁹ As Kenneth B. Pyle (1973) argues, the Japanese government was eager to avoid negative consequences of industrialisation, such as the social disruption and national disintegration observed in Western industrial societies. Seeing industrialised cities as the origin of social diseases, the government officials regarded the countryside, where the majority of the population resided, not only as the provider of food but also as a source of healthy communal spirit and social stability, which were crucial for the enhancement of national military and economic strength.¹¹⁰

The army also found the countryside a vital source for Japan's military strength as it produced the majority of soldiers. In 1910, thousands of local reservist organisations were unified into a national association, the Imperial Military Reserve Association (the *teikoku zaigo gunjinkai*) under the leadership of Tanaka Giichi, an influential military man who became the Prime Minister in 1927. Its aim was to enhance military socialisation by using the existing local military organisations.¹¹¹ Furthermore, in 1915, in order to influence young men who completed formal education but were too young to join the army or reservist organisations, Tanaka established the unified reservist-dominated National Youth Association (the *dai-nihon seinendan*) composed of thousands of existing local young men's groups, which had originated during the Tokugawa period.¹¹²

Of importance here is the fact that those unified national associations exploited the existing autonomous organisations which were of local origin and had been deeply integrated into the local communal life and the community's internal stratification.¹¹³ Thus, the new national associations were intended to disseminate the state ideology through the firmly established local organisations. The unification of local organisations under the central government was an attempt by the state to extend an individual's loyalty to his/her local community to the national community. However, it is arguable to what degree this extension of loyalty was successful. The fact that reservist organisations and youth associations were often involved in rural riots in 1918 suggests that for them local interests were more important than state policy. When they came into conflict with each other, they were willing to act against the latter in order to protect local interests. As Lewis (1990:161) maintains, simply joining a national organisation did not transform villagers into loyal subjects of imperial Japan overnight. Thus, the Local Improvement Movement achieved only limited success in the unification of local communities with the state.¹¹⁴

While the government was struggling to secure unity between the state and the local communities, the army was gaining popularity with the peasants. The army's support of the peasants was based on its belief that as the main producer of food and soldiers, the life condition of the peasant population had a direct impact on the strength of the army.¹¹⁵ Thus, in 1934, when the northern districts suffered from a poor harvest, the army took the initiative in offering relief measures to ease their distress. In the same year, a joint deputation from the Japan Peasants' Union, the All-Japan Peasants' Union, the Peasants' Livelihood Protection Alliance and the Social Mass Party, which was the largest proletarian party, visited the Minister of War in order to ask him to take measures to save those peasant families who could not afford to eat the rice they produced.¹¹⁶ This was one of the examples which indicated peasants' reliance on the military, rather than the government bureaucrats and political parties, as their trusted supporter.

Moreover, as noted above, the army was able to disseminate its values and ideology among the peasants through the local reservist and youth organisations. In addition, in order to mobilise

women, the army helped with the establishment of the Greater Japan National Defence Women's Association in 1932.¹¹⁷ Although these locally-based, military-dominated organisations might not have necessarily enhanced unity between the state and local communities, they, nonetheless, helped the army to strengthen its ties with the latter. The fact that those organisations were deeply integrated into the social life of villages and hamlets meant that the military influence permeated throughout the rural communities.¹¹⁸

Furthermore, similarities between the values advocated by the army and those held by the agrarian community made their fusion relatively easy. In the traditional Japanese rice-producing agrarian society where the maintenance of an irrigation system required collective labour and strict communal control over its usage, social stability and harmony within a community were vital. As a result, a rigid status system developed in order to maintain social order from the early stage of Japanese civilisation.¹¹⁹ Rigid hierarchical ranking was established both between different social groups and within a social group including the family. Furthermore, Confucian ethics of loyalty and obedience to authority and filial piety consolidated the foundation of such hierarchical systems. In consequence, by the late Tokugawa period, Japan had become a highly hierarchical, vertical society where individuals' social roles were rigidly fixed by multiple vertical relationships and whose people were rather docile and obedient to authority and their superiors.¹²⁰

Moreover, the necessity of collective work in rice production processes led to the development of group-oriented attitudes, rather than individualism, in Japanese agrarian society. Individual interests were often undermined by social obligation. Conformity to group norms was itself a social norm and selflessness was considered a virtue. Thus, the peasants were bound not only by their vertical loyalty to authority or to social superiors but also by their horizontal loyalty and commitment to their own social groups and community. Governed by such vertical and horizontal ties, Japanese agrarian society developed a strong communal character and group-oriented values. These values cultivated in Japanese agrarian society, such as sacrifice of individual interests for the sake of group interests, group conformity, obedience to authority and

social superiors, were embraced by the army as the traditional virtues of the Japanese nation. Thus, the army sought to unify the traditional peasant values, which were convenient for producing obedient, loyal soldiers, and national values in order to enhance the social order and integrity of the rural society, and reinforce unity between the nation and the peasant community at the same time.¹²¹

In this process, the Japanese family (*ie*) system and folk religion played an extremely important role.¹²² The family was the most fundamental social unit in Japanese peasant society. The structure of the family consisted of vertical hierarchical relationships within a family and horizontal family bonds in relations with other families. This family mode of structure became the basis of various other social groups and institutions. This suggests that people in the rural areas where the family-based social structure and family mode of thinking still persisted might have been able to consume the ideology of the family nation as an extended family composed of many quasi-familial relations without much resistance, compared with the urban populace. Since the army's success in building popular support for its values and ideology relied on its effective use of the established local organisations, communal structure and traditional values, the rural society which preserved them constituted the basis of popular support for Japanese pre-war militarism.¹²³

Furthermore, as I have explained in the previous chapter, through the worship of the war dead enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine as national deities, people were gradually integrated into a national religious community which centres on the cult of the emperor, the traditional practice of ancestor worship and popular Shinto, a religion of the community based on communal worship of local deities. This enhanced not only vertical ties between the people and the emperor but also horizontal ties between the Japanese people. As Pyle (1971:11) argues, the fervour for adopting the nationalist doctrine came from pressure within Japanese society rather than from the government.

To sum up, while the Japanese empire was expanding, by the beginning of the 1930s most segments of the Japanese population came to accept the idea of Japan as an ethnic community. Although their definitions of the idea might have varied, Japanese nationhood was increasingly defined in cultural and historical terms and surrounded by the narrative of ideal agrarian society. In consequence, popular Japanese nationalism had more of the quality of ethnic nationalism than state nationalism, and it often turned people against the state. However, in 1932, when the prolonged economic recession and Japan's intensifying international relations brought a sense of national crisis, the military seized control over the government and strengthened the unity between the state and nation by presenting itself as the champion of the latter. Popular ethnic nationalism itself might not have been directly responsible for the rise of militarism and expansionism in Japan. Nevertheless, undoubtedly it would have been much more difficult for the military state to mobilise the entire population without a widely held popular ethnic nationalism which bounded different segments of the nation together around the concept of the Japanese ethnic nation.¹²⁴ It may be said that it was the combination of popular ethnic nationalism and the international political and economic environments, which granted the military a legitimate mission to protect the interests of the Japanese ethnic nation and a passport for war.

2.4. Conclusion

An important effect of popular Japanese ethnic nationalism on the perceptual national boundary in the minds of the Japanese was the exclusion of colonial immigrants from the Japanese ethnic nation. The idealised image of the Japanese nation as a natural, agrarian community did not accommodate those culturally different alien residents, many of whom were engaged in the modern textile, chemical and coal-mining industries as low-wage day labourers and led their lives under squalid living conditions. Moreover, reports by the government and the press on the radical political activities of Korean students in Japan, who demanded Korea's national independence, enhanced the Japanese perception of Korean hostility toward Japan and their 'otherness'.¹²⁵ The massacre of Korean residents in the aftermath of the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 provided clear evidence that there was a sharp boundary between the

Japanese and Koreans in the Japanese perceptions, despite the fact that the common ancestor theory was widely accepted within academic circles by that time.

The official colonialist theory claimed that, through assimilation projects, the peoples of the Japanese colonies would be incorporated into the Japanese national family. Nevertheless, as Bruce Armstrong (1989) argues, the racialisation of the Japanese as a divine race resulted in the racialisation of other Asian peoples as inferior races.¹²⁶ Furthermore, as Michael Weiner (1995) points out, at the level of common sense, the distinction between a biologically determined race and a culturally determined ethnic group became blurred and came to be used interchangeably. This led to the identification of race and culture and the racialisation of the Japanese nation as an ethnic family. Culture could be exported and imported and thus the drawing of a cultural boundary could be rather flexible in theory. However, the fusion of racial and cultural boundaries imposed a limit on the extent to which the boundary of the Japanese ethnic family could be extended. Certainly, a racial boundary could be drawn between the Western white race and the Asian yellow race and had the potential to unite Asian peoples. Nevertheless, 'cultural overdetermination'¹²⁷ in Japanese ethnic national identity made much clearer the racial boundary between the Japanese ethnic nation and other ethnically different Asian peoples who possessed cultural traits distinct from those belonging to the Japanese. In this way, the unification of racial and cultural boundaries created 'powerful images of the purity, and homogeneity of the nation, national family and the Japanese way of life' in the minds of the Japanese.¹²⁸ Moreover, it also naturalised the concept of the Japanese ethnic nation.¹²⁹

Certainly, the process through which the concept of family was extended to the nation was led by the modern state. Nonetheless, its success was largely due to the pre-existing family values, group-oriented moral values, the quasi-familial social structure of the local community, Confucian ethics and folk religion, all of which had been long established in pre-Meiji Japanese agrarian society. Therefore, the argument that popular Japanese nationalism was based on vertical relationships between the emperor as the head of the state and the masses, which were invented by the modern state, is wrong. It has to be supplemented by the concepts of horizontal

group ties between individuals and their significant social groups, such as their family, their village and the national community which was built up through the extension of the local two groups.

Here, the existence of the emperor was important not because of who he was but what he represented as a symbol. For many Japanese people, the emperor represented the nation, which in turn represented their familiar village, friends and family. A large number of Japanese soldiers lost their lives as members of suicide squads. Did they sacrifice their lives for a person whom they had never met? Did they crash their planes into the enemy's ships in order to obey imperial authority? For them to come home safely was considered shameful. Whose honour? Whose shame? They were the honour and shame of not only the individual soldiers but also their family, their quasi-familial local community and their nation as the most extended form of family. This may be indicated by the fact that most soldiers were fighting under the national flag and the name of their own family for what the nation symbolised, namely the 'family' on the various levels, rather than for the emperor or the state as abstract entities.

The Japanese perception of Asia had shifting boundaries. Asia could be both a part of 'us' and that of the 'other' to the Japanese. Certainly, some segments of the Japanese population adopted the 'West versus Asia' cognitive framework in order to understand international relations. For example, when Yokomitsu Riichi, a popular novelist, replaced his early modernist realism with cultural essentialism in the late 1930s, he regarded the construction of a 'new Asia' with military force as a means for the Japanese to overcome Western modernity, and sought to recover the lost native cultural ideals in the culture of the new Asian.¹³⁰ Thus, Asianism seemed to offer a solution to the problems of modernity for some of those intellectuals and political activists who had humiliating experiences, and a sense of inferiority in encountering the West, but at the same time could not identify themselves with the culture of the ignorant masses or with the modern state at home. Their idealised, static image of pre-industrial Asia still possessed what Japan had lost in the process of modernisation and accommodated their dislocated national identity. However, for the majority of the Japanese, an authentic Japan was to be found

in the narrative of naturalised, racialised nationhood built on the images of ideal, agrarian society in the countryside which preserved native cultural traditions. For them Asia was too far away and too abstract for them to identify as their home.

Notes

¹ Francis C. Jones (1954 :331).

² Carol Gluck (1985: 7).

³ See, for example, *Sankyo shoin henshubu* (ed.)(1935).

⁴ For the influence of geographical factors on the formation of Japanese civilisation, see, for example, George Sansom (1958).

⁵ Harry D. Harootunian (1980:11)

⁶ Stefan Tanaka (1993: Introduction). For Chinese studies as part of the traditional curriculum during the Tokugawa period, see Ronald P. Dore (1965: Chapter 4).

⁷ Certainly, there were times when the distinctiveness of the Japanese culture was emphasised in the elite discourses. For instance, the discontinuation of dispatching official missions to China in 894 was followed by the sophisticated adaptation of the Chinese culture which resulted in the development of religious systems and literary and art forms distinct from the Chinese ones (Delmer M. Brown 1955:20-21).

⁸ Harootunian (1980:16)

⁹ For example, see Kamono Mabuchi (1944 [1765]), Motoori Norinaga (1931 [1771]) and Hirata Atsutane (1931 [18??]).

¹⁰ Brown (1995:56-57).

¹¹ Stefan Tanaka (1993: Introduction). For an early example, the use of the contrasting concepts of *seijo* and *toyo* can be found in *Seiiki Monogatari*, written in 1798 by Honda Toshiaki.

¹² According to Tanaka (1993:48), most accounts consider that the beginning of *toyo-shi* (the history of the East) dates back to 1894 when Naka Michiyo proposed that world history should be separated into Occidental and Oriental history in the middle school curriculum.

¹³ Tanaka (1993, Introduction).

¹⁴ For Western Orientalism, see Edward Said (1978).

¹⁵ For Shiratori Kurakichi's contribution to the development of *toyoshi* and the concept of *toyo*, see Tanaka (1993) and Shiratori Yoshiro (1978).

¹⁶ In the mid nineteenth century, Sakuma Shozan emphasised the necessity of adopting Eastern morality as the base and Western techniques as means (Sakuma 1932 [1854]: 249).

¹⁷ As Norman (1940:86) argues, there were those former *samurai* who were resentful of the monopolisation of the new Meiji government office by those from the powerful former Satsuma and Choshu clans, and hoped to use a war against Korea as a means to break into the political scene from which they had been excluded, in order to restore their position as warrior leaders.

¹⁸ At an earlier time, this view was advocated by Yoshida Shoin, a prominent nationalist thinker in the late Tokugawa period, in the mid nineteenth century when Japan faced a threat of possible Russian encroachment. See Yoshida (1940) [1854].

¹⁹ Cautious Meiji leaders were reluctant to launch the military expansion to the continent in the early Meiji period. Rather, they first prioritised the internal reforms and the enhancement of its military strength. In 1877, Saigo Takamori led a rebellion against the government, demanding a more aggressive foreign policy, which was crushed by the government force. See Tamamuro Taijo (1966: Chapter 1).

²⁰ As Brown (1955:123) points out, they regarded their fight against the government as an act of showing loyalty to the emperor. This indicates that there was a nationalist dimension to their expansionism.

²¹ Takeuchi Yoshimi (1993:289). Sugita Teiichi, a member of the Liberal Party, also expressed a similar view in his article, 'Ko-A saku' (Policy for enlightening Asia). See Hashikawa Bunso (1980:331-333).

²² For Oi's Asianist arguments, see for example Hirano Yoshitaro (1988). In 1885 he collected weapons in Osaka in order to make a revolution in Korea and was arrested. The liberal expansionists tended to believe that a political reform in Korea would stimulate that in Japan.

²³ Miyazaki Toten and his liberal brothers devoted their lives to the revolution of China. Miyazaki was also engaged in the independence movement in Philippine in 1899. See Miyazaki (1943 [1902]).

²⁴ Even Fukuzawa Yukichi, an influential progressive thinker who insisted that Japan should dissociate itself from Asia in order to achieve a status equal to Western powers, initially made failed attempts to modernise Korea by dispatching some of his students for this purpose (Hashikawa 1980:330). Tarui Tokichi (1894 [1885]) was another example of liberals who advocated the union of Japan and Korea on an equal basis to form the country of *Daito* (Great East) and jointly defend themselves from mistreatment by the Western powers.

²⁵ During the 1880s *toyo* appeared in numerous publications, referring to the cultural entity of the East. (Tanaka 1993:4).

²⁶ For Fukuzawa Yukichi's idea of civilisation, see Fukuzawa (1962[1875]).

²⁷ It should be noted that Fukuzawa did not blindly admire Western civilisation as he compared the spread of Western civilisation to measles (Fukuzawa 1960 [1885]). His call for the adoption of Western civilisation came from his acute sense that there was no other way for Japan to survive, which clearly indicated his strong national identity.

²⁸ Hilary Conroy (1955:827).

²⁹ Kevin M. Doak (1996:82). For the official declaration of the aim of *Kokuryukai*, see Uchida Ryohei monjo kenkyukai (ed.)(1992:2-3).

³⁰ Savitri Vishwanathan (1975:159).

³¹ Yumiko Iida (1997). However, it is questionable to what extent those Asian students who came to Japan shared the Japan-centric ideology of Asianism. Firstly, what they sought to learn from Japan was the use of Western technology and knowledge in order to improve their own countries' strength. Secondly, it is hard to imagine they accepted the Japan-centric world view which placed their homelands in inferior positions. Thirdly, many pro-Japan nationalist activists in Korea and China, such as Sun Yat-sen, collaborated with the Japanese authority and political organisations in order to enhance their own national as well as personal interests, and they were often regarded as national traitors by the anti-Japanese public in their own countries. Therefore, it is unlikely that Japanese Asianism won the genuine support of other Asian peoples. For the collaboration between Chinese political leaders in the first few years of the Chinese Republic, including San Yat-sen's, and the Japanese army and nationalist societies, such as *Kokuryukai*, see Ernest P. Young (1980) and Brown (1955: 156-164).

³² Konoe Atsumaro's statement. Quoted from Takeuchi (1993:423).

³³ Doak (1996:82).

³⁴ For Kita Ikki's view of China, see Kita (1921).

³⁵ For the evolution of Japanese socialism, see Germaine A. Houston (1994).

³⁶ Houston (1994:351-355).

³⁷ Yoshimoto Takaaki (1968-1978, Vol.13:6-9).

³⁸ Maruyama Masao (1996 [1986], Vol.13:155).

³⁹ The joint threat posed by Russia, France and Germany forced Japan to give up the Liaotung Peninsula in China, a territory which Japan won as a result of the victory in the Sino-Japanese War and which was also Russia's strategic interest.

⁴⁰ Jean-Pierre Lehmann (1978: 149).

⁴¹ Konoe Atsumaro was the founder of *Toa dobunkai* (East Asia Common Culture Association), an organisation partly funded by the Foreign Ministry whose main activity was cultural diplomacy. It established offices in the principal cities of China and Korea and sent Japanese students there to make them learn about these countries. It also funded Chinese and Korean students to learn Japanese and sent some of them to Japan (Marius B. Jansen 1980: 107-123).

⁴² Shimazu Naoko (1998:75). For instance, in March 1905, the *San Francisco Chronicle*, the most influential West Coast Newspaper, launched a year-long anti-Japanese campaign. In May 1905, the Asian Exclusion League was founded as a form of labour union.

⁴³ For example, *Taiyo*, a prominent Asianist intellectual journal, published a special issue entitled 'The Clash of the Yellow and White Peoples' in February 1908 (Shimazu 1998:96).

⁴⁴ For the development of the concept of *doso-ron*, see Oguma Eiji (2002a). As Oguma points out, although *doso-ron* became the dominant ideology around the time of the annexation of Korea in 1910, in the eighteenth century some Confucian scholars argued that the ancestors of the inhabitants of the Japanese archipelago had originally come from Korea.

⁴⁵ Not only historians such as Kume Kunitake (1989)[1911] but also prominent linguists like Kanazawa Shozaburo (1910) and anthropologists like Torii Ryuzo also supported *doso-ron* and the mixed nation theory. See Oguma (2002a, Chapter 5 and 9). For Torii's theory, see Yawata Ichiro (1978).

⁴⁶ Racial ideology constituted dual boundaries in Japanese perception. On the one hand, it distinguished the divine Japanese race from peoples in other nations. On the other hand, the concept of *doso-ron*, which grouped Japan and other Asian peoples together, developed and became influential from the 1920s (Bruce Armstrong 1989:339). These dual racial boundaries justified Japan's colonisation of other Asian nations. That is to say, it was claimed that the superior Japanese race was destined to lead and rule its inferior Asian brothers, who were incapable of self-government, in order to protect Asia from Western imperialism.

⁴⁷ For the relation between the concept of *doso-ron* and Japanese colonial policy, see Oguma (1998).

⁴⁸ For the influence of eugenics on the racialisation of the concept of Japan, see Oguma (2002a, Chapter 13). Opposition to inter-racial marriage and the colonial assimilation policy on the basis of eugenics became strong in the 1930's.

⁴⁹ Oguma (2002a:226-236).

⁵⁰ For the contribution of ethnology to the development of ethnocentric imperial expansionism in Japan, see Doak (2001).

⁵¹ Iida (1997) and Tanaka (1993).

⁵² The concept of the family state was based on the idea that all the Japanese were a family in which the emperor was the parent and the people were his children. Inoue Tetsujiro (1899) and Hozumi Yatsuka (1896) were leading advocates of this family state ideology.

⁵³ As explained in Chapter 1, *kokutai* refers to the permanent, fundamental, unique essence of the Japanese nation whose sacred land had been ruled by the divine imperial family. The concept of *kokutai* emphasised the unity of the holy Japanese land, divine emperor and Japanese people.

⁵⁴ For the adaptation of the *kokutai* theory to the mixed nation theory, see Oguma (2002a, Chapter 8).

⁵⁵ Oguma (2002a:36-7).

⁵⁶ Hozumi (1910, Volume 1: 11).

⁵⁷ For the analysis of the murder of Korean residents in the aftermath of the Great Kanto earthquake, see Michael Weiner (1980). After the earthquake, numerous unsubstantiated rumours of uprisings, arson, rape, looting and poisoning of water supply by Korean residents spread throughout the region. Vigilante groups composed of common people were organised under the initiative of the local authority and their total number amounted to 3689. These groups which were initially formed as communal relief associations turned into armed mobs and attacked Korean residents. The precise number of Koreans who were killed at the hands of the vigilante groups, the police and army has not been agreed. While the government limited the number to only 231, some sources quoted a figure of four to five thousands (Weiner 1980:17).

⁵⁸ This figure is based on a document published by International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946: 49604-49612). There has been no clear consensus about the number of victims in the Nanking Massacre. The claimed figures range between 10,000 to 300,000.

⁵⁹ For the *ie* system in Japanese rural society, see Fukutake Tadashi (1967: 39-60).

⁶⁰ Watsuji Tetsuro (1961 [1935]:141)

⁶¹ For the mixed nation theory, which legitimated the inclusion of other nations as adopted children in the Japanese family, see Oguma (2002a: 119).

⁶² Weiner Michael (1994:122).

⁶³ Vishwanathan (1975:155).

⁶⁴ Akira Iriye (1997:2-3).

⁶⁵ Richard Storry (1979:17). For Inoue Kaoru's advocacy of Westernisation of the Japanese people, see Inoue (1934, Vol.3: 766-803).

⁶⁶ As Julia A. Thomas (1998) points out, social Darwinism, especially Herbert Spencer's social evolution theory, had great influences on the ways in which Japanese political elites and intellectuals understood the conditions of society and politics in the early Meiji period.

⁶⁷ The concept of race became a high profile issue in Japan's foreign policy debate in the late 1890s (Shimazu 1998: 95-96).

⁶⁸ Iriye (1997:8-10).

⁶⁹ The law limited leases of agricultural land to a maximum three years and prohibited further land purchases by the Japanese. Although the US government denied the law's racial implication, it was perceived in racial terms by Japanese officials (Shimazu 1998:74-78).

⁷⁰ For the details of Japan's proposal of racial equality clause, see Shimazu (1998). The original clause ran: 'The equality of nations being a basic principle of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties agree to accord as soon as possible, to all alien nations of States, members of the League, equal and just treatment in every aspect, making no distinction, either in Law or fact, on account of their race or nationality' (Stronach 1995: 43). After it was rejected, mainly due to strong opposition from the British Empire delegation and pressure from the American public on President Woodrow Wilson, Japan presented a tone-downed racial equality amendment as an insertion to the preamble of the covenant which read: '...by the endorsement of the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals...' (Shimazu 1998:27). Although the majority of the commission members, including France, Italy and China, voted in favour of this amendment, it was rejected by Chairman Wilson who insisted on a unanimity ruling.

⁷¹ It has been said that in this March First Independence Movement which demanded Korea's national independence, about 7,500 Koreans were killed and more than 40,000 were arrested by the Japanese force (Oguma 1998:215).

⁷² In order to understand how Japan's colonial policies defined and were defined by the shifting boundaries between the Japanese, Taiwanese and Koreans, see Oguma (1998).

⁷³ When the law for universal manhood suffrage was passed in 1925, the government refused to give the right to vote to people in Taiwan and Korea, claiming that their political capacity was not high enough yet. Nonetheless, the Taiwanese and Koreans who were residing in one place

within the Japanese mainland for over one year were granted the right to vote. See Oguma (1998, Chapter 14).

⁷⁴ Iriye (1997:46). For Konoe Fumimaro's essay (1918) entitled 'Reject the British-US-Centered Peace', see Konoe Fumimaro *denki hensan kankokai* (1952).

⁷⁵ For Ishiwaru Kanji's ideal of Manchukuo, see Mark R. Peattie (1975: Chapter 5).

⁷⁶ For Ishiwaru's concept of the East Asian League and the Final War, see Peattie (1975:Chapter 9).

⁷⁷ To see how Japan tried to cope with internationalism during this period, see Ian Nish (1992).

⁷⁸ Japan's first truly political party cabinet, headed by Hara Kei, the first commoner to be appointed the Prime Minister, was formed in 1918. Moreover, in 1925 a law providing for universal manhood suffrage was passed.

⁷⁹ Factory workers and miners suffered from harsh working conditions. Despite the introduction of legal protection for them, such as the 1905 Mining Law and the 1911 Factory Law, the high demand of the government and companies for increased production weakened the degree of enforcement of these laws and resulted in the neglect of workers' health and welfare. In consequence, many labour disputes, strikes and uprisings took place. For examples, in 1917 there were 398 incidents of labour protests which involved 57,309 workers (Michael Lewis 1990: 123).

⁸⁰ For the urban riots of 1918, see Lewis (1990, Chapter 3).

⁸¹ Doak (1997:290-291)

⁸² As late as 1935-1940, about 60% of the Japanese population lived in towns and villages, and more than half were engaged in fishing and farming (Richard J. Smethurst 1974:xix).

⁸³ After 1990, many wealthy landlords started investing in enterprises other than farm management, such as grain trading and money-lending. They became less involved in the actual cultivation of their lands and were often living outside of the village (Ann Waswo 1977: 66). Dore (1959:23-25) identifies two main categories of absentee landlords. The first one was the sons of landlords who had left their native village for jobs elsewhere but retained the family land after they inherited it from their parents. The second type of absentee landlords was the merchant or money-lender from a near-by town who had acquired land for commercial or financial purposes. Naturally, those absentee and non-farming landlords were rather indifferent to the concerns of their tenants and relationships between landlords and tenants became impersonal. This weakened traditional paternalistic ties between them which had obliged landlords to look after the welfare of tenants.

⁸⁴ Brown (1955:176).

⁸⁵ Oguma (2002b:190-6).

⁸⁶ For the Japan Romantic School, see Doak (1994) and (1996).

⁸⁷ Doak (1996:xxviii). Kamei Katsuichiro and Hayashi Fusao who played influential roles in the proletarian literature movement became leading members of the Japan Romantic School (Doak 1996:86). The romanticisation of the countryside can be found in earlier novels written in the 1890s and at the beginning of the twentieth century by writers such as Tokutomi Roka (1933)[1900] and Tayama Katai (1973-4)[1889], and poems by Ishikawa Takuboku (Gluck 1985:

182-183). However, it was in the proletarian literature movement in the 1920s and the Japan Romantic School in the 1930s that the romanticisation of the countryside in literary works became politicised, nationalised and absorbed by ethnic nationalism.

⁸⁸ Doak (1994:xxv). Gondo Seikei and Inoue Nissho were involved in the assassination of Inoue Junnosuke, former finance minister, and Dan Takuma, Chairman of Mitsui, which was one of the powerful financial combines (*zaibatsu*), in 1932. Both were accused of undermining the nation's finance, in the case of the former by putting Japan on the gold standard, and in that of the latter by exporting a large amount of gold to buy dollars. Industrialists and businessmen were regarded as selfish traitors to the country and became the common enemies of rightists and leftists. The fact that the assassin of Dan Takuma won a good deal of public sympathy (Ronald P. Dore and Ouchi Tsutomu 1971:205) indicated that their hatred of capitalists was widely shared among the Japanese.

⁸⁹ For the development of Yanagita Kunio's folklore study, see Ronald A. Morse (1990), J. Victor Koschmann, Keibo Oiwa and Shinji Yamashita (1985) and Irokawa Daikichi (1978).

⁹⁰ Yanagita started his career as a government official in the Agriculture and Commerce Ministry in 1900. In 1902 he was sent to the Legislative Bureau under the direct control of the cabinet. In 1914 he was appointed as Secretary General of the House of Peers. He left the government in 1919.

⁹¹ In 1906, the government announced a plan to merge existing hamlet shrines into a single, central shrine of each administrative village placed under the control of the local government. This policy was aimed at strengthening the government's control over shrines, the centres of people's communal and spiritual life, and enhancing the administrative centralisation of villages. Needless to say, such a policy completely neglected the traditional religious custom. By 1918, forty percent of shrines were abolished as a result of mergers (Kenneth B. Pyle 1973:60). For Minakata Kumagusu's statement against the policy, see Minakata (1971 [1911]). Yanagita printed his statement and distributed it among influential people (Tsurumi Kazuko, 1978: 347).

⁹² Yanagita criticised the conventional historical studies as they tended to focus only on the written historical materials which recorded the lives of elites, as if the history of illiterate people who had not left any historical documents did not exist. See Yanagita (1934:55-64).

⁹³ For the theory and methodology of Yanagita's folklore study, see Yanagita (1934). He argued that the selectivity of the conventional historical studies limited their ability to explain connections between the past and the present. He claimed that the aim of his folklore study was to discover the forgotten parts of human history which had not been studied by historians, especially the history of common people (pp. 59-60). Yanagita (pp.5) points out the similarity between his approach and German folklore studies (*Volkskunde*). Toshinao Yoneyama (1985:51) calls Yanagita's study 'Volkskunde fur Japanischen'. Yanagita's strong interest in folklore stories was said to be inspired by the role of Grimm's Fairy Tales in German romanticism (Suzuki 1991:139-143).

⁹⁴ Doak (1994:xxix).

⁹⁵ His emphasis on the common people in his folklore study became significant in the 1920's. According to Oguma's (2002a, Chapter 12) analysis, Yanagita's bitter and possibly humiliating experience in his trip to Geneva as a committee member of the League of Nations Mandates Commission contributed to the development of his own ethnic national identity, and this resulted in his increasing interest in the Japanese ethnic nation. In addition to this personal factor, the idea of self-determination of ethnic nations which was gaining acceptance in the international community and among Marxists might have also made Yanagita more aware of the nation as an ethnic community distinct from the state.

⁹⁶ The distinction between the state and the ethnic nation was clear in his rejection of State Shinto as a form of the state's intrusion into the native religion (Doak 1994: xxix). For Yanagita's critical view of State Shinto, see Yanagita (1943).

⁹⁷ Joseph Stalin's 1913 definition of a nation as 'a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture' (Stalin 1973: 60) encouraged Japanese Marxist scholars to use the force of ethnic nationalism as a means to bring down the capitalist state.

⁹⁸ For the adoption of the concept of an ethnic nation by Marxist and liberals in their opposition to the state, see Doak (1997).

⁹⁹ For the interpretation of the song *Furusato*, see Uchida Ryuzo (1999). *Furusato*, which came out in 1914, was one of the songs selected for musical education in primary schools by the Ministry of Education. These songs were not only taught at schools but also featured in a radio programme for children between 1925 and 1930.

¹⁰⁰ Uchida (1999:214).

¹⁰¹ The examination of Japanese popular songs between 1914-1932 by Christine R. Yano (1998) demonstrates the contrast between discontent with the urban life and modernity it embraced on the one hand, and a sense of nostalgia and longing for the idealised home on the other hand.

¹⁰² Yano (1998:250) also argues that the electronic media such as the radio played a crucial role in moulding a popular sense of nationhood.

¹⁰³ Yano (1998:258).

¹⁰⁴ Ogyu Sorai (1937:27-28).

¹⁰⁵ The order was *samurai*, peasants, artisans and merchants.

¹⁰⁶ The above noted policy of shrine merger was one of these programmes designed to strengthen the unity between the state and the people by enhancing the local governments' administrative control over people's everyday life. In 1907, all Shinto priests became subject to the regulations of civil government officials. However, as Pyle (1973:65) points out, in 1910 the enforcement of the policy of shrine merger was relaxed due to local resistance.

¹⁰⁷ For the Local Improvement Movement, see Pyle (1973).

¹⁰⁸ Pyle (1973: 61) and Gluck (1985: 190). For the details of the *hotokusha*, see Emori, Itsuo (1976).

¹⁰⁹ The values advocated by the *hotokusha* were also promoted by the Ministry of Education. The teaching of Ninomiya Sontoku had been featured in elementary school textbooks since 1910 and many schools built his statue in the schoolyard (Gluck 1985:191). See also Karasawa Tomitaro (1956:672-87).

¹¹⁰ As Pyle (1973:62) explains, the youth in the countryside were considered to be uninfected by un-Japanese harmful Western thoughts and to embody the traditional Japanese values such as diligence, filial piety and communalism. In contrast, the highly educated urban youth were often referred to as 'anguished youth' who were suffering from 'civilisation sickness'. For this view, see for example, Yokoi Tokiyoshi (1924-5), who was one of the leading advocates of agriculturalism.

¹¹¹ For the unification of local reservist organisations, see Smethurst (1974:11-21).

¹¹² For the establishment of the National Youth Association, see Smethurst (1974:25-43). Because of objection to excessive militarisation within the government, the army could not sufficiently control the Association. Thus, in 1926 the army issued orders which required local communities to found and run with their own budget youth training centres, which would provide military drill and ethical education over a period of four years to the local male youths who did not proceed to higher education after completing compulsory education. In the first year, as many as 800,000 male teenagers enrolled in the centres and the figure increased to 915,000 by 1934, about 40% of those eligible (Smethurst 1974: 41).

¹¹³ For example, the membership of local reservist organisations or youth associations normally overlapped with that of existing local organisations, such as the fire brigade and the festival committee (Lewis 1990:161).

¹¹⁴ Pyle (1973:65). He argues that the main achievement of the Local Improvement Movement was that it established links between local leaders and the state. He maintains that those leaders of local semi-bureaucratic organisations functioned as the middleman who interpreted national interests on the local level and disseminated them among the local population.

¹¹⁵ In the 1930s the army leaders expressed their concern about the poor health of conscripts, and the negative effect of soldiers' worries about their families suffering from poverty and distress at home on the morale of troops (Dore 1959:95).

¹¹⁶ Dore (1959: 95).

¹¹⁷ By the time the war against China broke out in 1937, the Greater Japan National Defence Women's Association had branches in every city, town and village across the county. In 1938 it enrolled almost eight million members. See Smethurst (1974: 41-49).

¹¹⁸ According to Smethurst (1974:xix), while in the agricultural community almost everyone eligible joined the army's organisations, largely because of social pressure, over two-thirds of the eligible urban population did not join. Therefore, it can be said that the army could exert stronger influence over rural areas than in urban areas.

¹¹⁹ For hierarchical relationships within Japanese agrarian society, see Fukutake (1967:213-215).

¹²⁰ Janet Hunter (1989:64-69)

¹²¹ Smethurst (1974:xvi).

¹²² Fukutake (1967:39) defines *ie* as 'the continuing entity, perpetuated, in principle by patrilineal descent, from ancestors to descendants, an entity of which the family group at any one time is only the current concrete manifestation.....The *ie* in this sense is the embodiment of a direct genealogical continuity'.

¹²³ The rural support of militarism is the main theme of Dore and Ouchi (1971) and Smethurst (1974).

¹²⁴ For popular support for the military expansion in Manchuria, see Louise Young (1998).

¹²⁵ Weiner (1994:63-65).

¹²⁶ For example, inferior images of the colonial and the other were contrasted with Japan's progress and civilisation in Japanese popular discourse and constituted a regular feature in novels and children's comic books (Weiner 1995:451).

¹²⁷ Harootunian (1990:125).

¹²⁸ Weiner (1955:447).

¹²⁹ The naturalisation of nationhood can also be found in the influential work of Watsuji Tetsuro (1961[1935]) who explained the uniqueness of the Japanese way of life in terms of its natural environment that included 'a given land, its climate, its weather, the geological and productive nature of the soil, its topographic and scenic features' (1961 [1935]:01).

¹³⁰ Seiji M. Lippit (2003:241).

Chapter 3. Nationalisms in Post-war Japan and Germany

One of the main purposes of this thesis is to examine the effects of Japanese historical memory on the development of Asian identity among Japanese people. In this context, a crucial question is how Japanese national identity deals with the negative national past of aggressive Japanese imperialism, which has divided Japan and its former victims in their historical consciousness. As T.G. Ashplant, Graham Dawson and Michael Roper (2000) argue, the approaches which predominantly focus on the national context largely neglect the influence of transnational power relations on the formation of the collective memory of war. One of the difficulties people face in dealing with the memory of international wars is that it involves other nations and, therefore, their versions of war memories.

The war-related memory process becomes more complicated especially when a nation is attempting to develop close political and economic partnership with its former enemies. That is to say, while it is politically and socially desirable to construct a positive national identity based on the positive interpretation of the nation's past, which can serve as the basis of political and social stability, international relations can place restrictions on the formation of positive national memory. The memory of war is often exploited by the state in order to consolidate the unity between the nation and the state in a relatively unproblematic way by officially enshrining those compatriots who lost their lives to protect the nation, and blaming their foreign enemies for their nation's sufferings. However, this is not the case for Germany and Japan. They are continually reminded by their victims of their atrocities, and the ways in which they try to deal with their recent pasts are under constant scrutiny by their victims, the international community and their own peoples. Their negative pasts have made problematic the memory of the Second World War and the development of history-based national identity in the post-war era.

Although both Japan and Germany have undeniably negative national histories concerning the War, comparison between them in their post-war relationships with their neighbours shows striking contrasts. Certainly, the differences in the ways in which they have dealt with their negative war memories may not be the sole cause of the differences in their post-war supranational regional relationships. Nonetheless, the facts that the sufferings from the War against the Nazi regime have been playing an important part in the national memory of Germany's former European enemies, and that they are highly sensitive to the ways in which Germany handles its Nazi past, suggest that the significance of the role which the memory of the War has been playing in European supranational regional politics.

The aim of this chapter is to examine post-war Japanese and German nationalisms and their influences on the development of supranational regional consciousness. In the first section of this chapter, the various forms of post-war Japanese nationalism which emerged between 1945 and the 1980s will be discussed in relation to Japanese perceptions of Asia. My particular interest is to analyse the processes in which diverse nationalist ideologies developed by Japanese intellectuals and political activists constituted the ideological universe in which post-war Japanese national identity was formed during the period of post-war national reconstruction followed by huge economic success. Contrary to the myth of the new beginning, which indicates that Japan was reborn in 1945 as a peaceful democratic nation, this chapter will demonstrate a great degree of continuity between pre- and post-1945 Japanese nationalisms. In the second section, I shall briefly look at how the collective memory of the Nazi past has affected the course of national reconstruction processes in Germany and its impact on the policy of European integration. The examination of the German case is expected to give a useful insight into the role of Japanese historical memory in Japan's relationship with Asia. Through this chapter it will become clear that the present is, to a great extent, a product of the past in both Japan and Germany.

3.1. Japanese Nationalism from 1945 to the 1980s

As soon as Japan surrendered in 15 August 1945, various forms of nationalist ideologies started to emerge.¹ The military state was harshly attacked by Japanese intellectuals and political activists who had been deprived of freedom of speech and forced to cooperate with the propagation of imperialistic nationalist ideologies under the military government. They accused the state of leading the Japanese people to a disastrous war and reflected on what went wrong. What was common to them, despite their ideological differences, was that their bitter war experiences drove them to search for a new direction for Japan. Thus, their war experiences shaped their post-war nationalist ideologies and these two were inseparable.²

Those who became prominent scholars in the aftermath of the war were a group of intellectuals who possessed a strong sense of war guilt and remorse.³ Unlike commoners and younger generations, who might claim that they were deceived by the military state and were totally ignorant of Japan's wrong doings, many of the intellectuals were well aware of the injustice of Japan's aggressive expansionism and did not believe that the war Japan was fighting was a war to liberate Asia. Nevertheless, for fear of imprisonment, the need for work or other reasons, most of them ended up cooperating with the state's imperialist projects in some ways.⁴ They gave up their duty to pursue the truth as scholars by yielding to the military authority. Despite their opposition to the War in their heart, they let the military state run the country. While many of their students lost their lives in the War, they survived. This generated a very strong sense of guilt and remorse, which led them to search for new political systems which would never allow the state to oppress the people and lead them to a meaningless war.

For example, Maruyama Masao, one of the most influential political scientists in Japan, thought that a lack of *shutaisei*, that is, autonomous, subjective, self-critical individuals who possessed a sense of responsibility for their public as well as personal actions, had resulted in the absorption

of Japanese people's identities into the state. In consequence, according to him, the Japanese masses had become passive subjects obedient to the state authority. He maintained that in this condition, the emperor, and the state as the agency executing his will, had been regarded as the embodiment of absolute morality, and identification with them had allowed Japanese people blindly to obey them, while uncritically justifying and moralising their own actions in the name of the emperor.⁵ In order for Japan not to repeat the same mistake, Maruyama insisted on the necessity of active political participation by individual Japanese nationals who possessed an autonomous, self-critical national identity.

It is important to note that Maruyama rejected statist nationalism, but not nationalism itself. Rather, he was critical of individualism, cosmopolitanism and the concept of global citizens.⁶ What he called for was the development of an autonomous nation as the bearer of national political sovereignty, which was ready to fight against the state when it threatened the interest of the nation. Oguma Eiji (2002b:103) points out that Maruyama's focus on the nation was based on his own nationalism and sense of national identity, which had been strengthened through his war experiences. Participating in the international war had made him feel that all Japanese people had shared the fate of Japan.⁷ Even if he detached himself from the military state, his national identity based on patriotism forged by his war experience continued to affect his political theory in his post-war academic life.

The popularity of Maruyama's theory among Japanese intellectuals, which was based on the combination of liberalism and nationalism, may have lain in their shared war experiences and knowledge of Western political theories. However, it is questionable to what extent it had any appeal for the Japanese masses whose nationalism was based more on their attachment to the nation as an ethnic community, rather than as a political community. Because of its lack of recognition of the nation as an ethnic nation, and of the masses and the popular culture as its foundation, the theory of liberal democracy, such as Maruyama's, did not seem to be able to help

the Japanese masses to envisage the future of the nation.

In contrast, in the early 1950s, some Marxist historians started promoting popular ethnic nationalism with the concept of Japan as an indivisible, single race nation. In the Marxist view, capitalism and its by-product, imperialism, drove Japan into the War. According to Ishimoda Sho (1952), the importation of Western cultures embraced by a minority of Japanese intelligentsia had divided Japan into cosmopolitan intellectuals and petit bourgeois on the one hand, and the masses on the other. He regarded ethnic nationalism as a legitimate force for Japanese people to overcome this internal class division and liberate themselves from the capitalist post-war Japanese state and the informal colonialism of the imperialist US.⁸ In order to transform the Japanese masses into active political agents who would carry out a progressive social revolution, a national historiography movement (*kokuminteki rekishi gaku undo*) was initiated under the leadership of Ishimoda in the early 1950s.⁹

Discrediting the elite high culture as the guardian of capitalism and imperialism, the movement aimed to turn commoners into active national historical agents, who would participate in national historical processes, by helping them to discover their own histories which had been repressed by the elite version of national history. At a meeting of the Japan Historiographical Research Association¹⁰ in 1952, folk tales and songs were praised as the basis of national popular culture and history. This Marxist historians' focus on the masses was partly derived from their belief that the alienation of the leftist intelligentsia from the masses was responsible for the Japanese people's failure to carry out a social revolution against the pre-1945 capitalist military state. Thus, the movement was intended to unite the leftist intelligentsia and the masses. However, there were also two external factors which turned leftist intellectuals to an ethnic nationalism based on popular culture and history.

Firstly, in 1950, Joseph Stalin's article in which he emphasised the role of the pre-modern *narod*

which is equivalent to *volk* in German as a prototype of a modern nation was published in Japan. At the same time, the Cominform commanded the Japan Communist Party to strengthen its ethnic independence movement in order to fight against the capitalist states of Japan and the US. These developments changed the Japanese Marxist concept of the nation from a product of modernity (the nation-state) to an ethnic community (*volk*) preceding the modern state. As a result, the nation and the state came to be regarded as separate entities. In the Japanese Marxist view, the foundation of the nation as an ethnic community was the masses. Therefore, a quest for search for popular history and culture was promoted as a means to discover the ethnic nation which would overthrow the modern capitalist state.

The second external factor was the rise of ethnic independence movements in Asia. The success of the Chinese Revolution in 1949 compelled Japanese leftist intellectuals to re-evaluate Asia in a positive way. Denouncing the Western model of modernity, they claimed that Japan should learn from the Asian forms of ethnic nationalism which successfully dissolved the internal division between the Western-influenced urban intelligentsia and the peasant masses by forging a shared attachment to the mass-oriented, ethnic historico-cultural community, and defeated Western imperialism. Thus, respect for the Asian model of social development was accompanied by respect for the masses and popular culture as driving forces to achieve a revolution against the elitist, bureaucratic modern state. Certainly, there was genuine growing interest in Asia among Japanese intellectuals in the 1950's.

For example, Takeuchi Yoshimi, a distinguished scholar of modern Chinese literature, maintained that contrary to Japan, where a Western model of modernisation was imported and handed down to the masses by the elites, the Chinese masses achieved a 'bottom-up' revolution from within and established their own modernisation model based on their own traditional culture and philosophy.¹¹ Regarding modern Japan as the slave of Western modernity, he thought Japan needed the Chinese type of modernisation. In another example, Uehara Senroku, who

specialised in German history, supported pan-Asianism based on ethnic nationalism. He was inspired by Johann Fichte's idea of the German nation as an ethnic community where the people could achieve individual liberty, and by Fichte's belief in ethnic nationalism as a means to unite the German people and elevate the German nation as the universal ideal.¹² Moreover, Uehara was also influenced by a German idea that ethnic nations could transcend state boundaries. Combining the idea of the nation beyond the state and ethnic nationalism, Uehara promoted the concept of a united Asia as a new world historical principle which would allow Asian ethnic nations to achieve true peace and independence.¹³

In this way, some leftist Japanese intellectuals who were dissatisfied with the post-war Japanese state turned to ethnic nationalism and to an Asian solidarity which was to be built on an extended continuum of the Japanese ethnic nation in order to realise Japan's true self. However, it is questionable to what extent interest in the idea of Asian solidarity among Japanese intellectuals was shared by the Japanese masses. One problem was the similarity between the post-war discourse of the Asian model of modernisation and the wartime discourse of Asianism which was exploited in order to justify Japanese imperialism as a means to protect Asia and its distinctiveness from Western threats. In post-war Japan, where anything related to military propaganda was denounced, it seems more likely that the leftist intellectuals' endorsement of the Asian way of modernity, combined with their hatred for the US, the representative of the Western capitalist civilisation, were observed with scepticism and caution by the Japanese public.¹⁴

Moreover, in the 1950s, Japanese people were still in the process of recovering from the destruction of the War and mourning for the war dead. Although many instances of Japan's wartime atrocities were revealed in the Tokyo Trial (1946-1948), the Trial traced the source of Japan's war responsibility to the wartime Japanese leaders, not to the masses.¹⁵ Even in the case of those intellectuals who expressed their regret and remorse regarding their wartime collaboration with the military state, the people to whom they felt guilt and shame tended to be

young Japanese students who went to the War, believing the war propaganda which they supported through their work.¹⁶ In consequence, in the minds of the Japanese, the sufferings of Asian people from Japan's wartime aggression were overshadowed by their own war sufferings.

The sense of victimhood and a lack of war guilt were further enhanced by the younger generations who were in their late teens and early 20s when the War ended. Those who had grown up during the War and received an imperialist education showed strong resentment against the older generations whom they believed to be responsible for the War. Their sense of victimhood was based on their bitter feeling that they were misled by the state and the older generations, and their sympathy for their friends who had died for their country, as they had been taught to do. At the same time, since they had been heavily influenced by right-wing romanticism in their childhood, they tended to have strong nationalist sentiments and romanticise the War.¹⁷ Their romanticised view of the war also influenced the later generations.¹⁸ However, this romanticised sense of victimhood lacked any concern for Asian victims.¹⁹

Another feature of this generation was their strong distrust of established authority, particularly the state. For example, Yoshimoto Takaaki, a popular thinker, has been known for his rejection of the establishment and authority. Instead, he romanticised the masses and adopted a populist nationalism. He also approved the prioritisation of private interests over public interests. He thought that the egoistic pursuit of private interests by the masses was a democratic means to dissolve the state authority.²⁰ Meanwhile, Tsurumi Shunsuke, a Harvard-educated philosopher, who led a civic anti-Vietnam War movement in the 1960s, sought to dissolve the state authority through collective actions to pursue universal values. For him, ethnic nationalism and universalism were not incompatible as he regarded ethnic solidarity as the basis of grass-roots movements to realise universal values such as democracy and peace.²¹

The expression of anti-state ethnic nationalism culminated in the popular opposition movement

against the revision of the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1960. As mentioned above, in the original treaty signed in 1952, the US did not have the obligation to defend Japan although it was granted the right to use Japanese lands for military purposes, because the Japanese constitution did not allow Japan to use its military forces to defend the US. In 1960 the Japanese government led by Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, a former class-A war convict, attempted to revise the Treaty in order to enable Japan to make a greater military contribution to the US security strategy and in return, impose on the US the obligation to defend Japan. Japan's rapid economic growth brought Japanese political leaders national confidence and they regarded the revision of the Treaty as a necessary step for Japan to reestablish its position as a respected country in the international community.

Nevertheless, such elite nationalism was not supported by the masses. Firstly, a group of radical communist students opposed the revision.²² Then, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) joined them. On 19 May 1960, the JSP politicians blockaded the Diet building in order to prevent the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) politicians from entering the building. However, they were violently removed by the police force and the LDP rammed the bill for the revision through the Diet.²³ An interesting point is that in the middle of fighting against the police force, the JSP members suddenly started singing a song calling for ethnic independence which used to be sung by communist activists in the 1950s, when ethnic nationalism was officially promoted by the Japan Communist Party (JCP).²⁴ This incident indicated that, in a sense, their opposition to the Treaty was a political manifestation of their ethnic nationalism.

The Japanese public also resented the violent adoption of the revision bill.²⁵ The undemocratic way in which the bill was handled by the LDP, and the fact that Kishi had been sentenced as a class-A war criminal, reminded Japanese people of the wartime military regime and enhanced the popular perception of continuity between the former regime and the post-war state. Moreover, the treaty revision suggested a greater possibility for Japan to get involved in war again. After 19 May

1960, ordinary Japanese people started participating in anti-treaty demonstrations and an estimated 5.6 million people joined the demonstrations and public gatherings on 04 June 1960.²⁶ The popular anti-treaty movement was based on the Japanese people's widely shared will to stand up to protect the nation from threats posed by the state. It was the moment when popular ethnic nationalism and political nationalism interacted with each other.

In this way, the Japanese people's desire to unburden themselves of war guilt, the perceived continuity between the wartime military state and the post-war state, and their bitter war experiences, together promoted the concept of the nation as a peace-oriented Japanese ethnic community in opposition to the state. The US-imposed Japanese constitution, which renounced the use of military forces, legitimised this concept and became a fundamental constituent of Japanese ethnic nationalism. As a result, the issue of the revision of the constitution became the intersection of political (constitutional) nationalism and ethnic nationalism. The LDP's repeated attempts to revise the constitution to allow Japan to use its military forces for a wider range of purposes had never succeeded until recently, despite the LDP's political domination. This indicates that the government has had to comply with the popular sentiments that favour the ideal of peace embraced by post-war Japanese ethnic nationalism.

To sum up, regardless of their ideological differences, the most influential Japanese intellectuals' works were often based on, and at the same time consolidated, the assumption that the state and the nation as an ethnic community were separate entities. Their works were motivated by their affection toward the nation and their wish to save the nation. The popularity of their works indicated that their sentiments for the nation were shared by a wide public audience.²⁷ Furthermore, the divorce of the nation from the state in Japanese self-perceptions was motivated by their desire to free themselves from the nation's military past. However, with the return of many of the former government officials who had occupied distinguished posts during the wartime period to the post-war government offices, the post-war state failed to make a break with the

former military regime.²⁸ This further widened the gap between the state and the nation in Japanese self- perceptions.

The rise of popular ethnic nationalism in post-war Japan was accompanied by the development of the concept of Japan as a distinctive ethnic cultural community. When the state lost its unifying power, Japanese people turned to the nation as an alternative collectivity as the basis of their identity that would replace the pre-1945 concept of the Imperial Japanese nation-state. The myth of Japan as a single ethnic nation which emerged in post-war Japan was in a sense an antithesis of the wartime concept of Japan as a mixed-race nation.²⁹

In the aftermath of the War, some intellectuals, such as historian Tsuda Sokichi (1946) and moral philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro (1962 [1948]: 313-96), advocated the concept of Japan as a single ethnic nation, defending the 'traditional' emperor system. While renouncing the relationship between the emperor and the people established by the Meiji elites, they claimed that Japan was a homogeneous nation which had been inhabited by a peaceful, agricultural, single-ethnic Japanese people since time immemorial, and which had not been directly ruled but symbolically reigned over by the emperor through his subjects' reverence toward him. It seemed that such an argument was not incompatible with general public sentiments toward the emperor in the aftermath of the War. Despite the leftist attacks on the emperor system, the enthusiastic reception of the emperor by the public during the imperial tours (1946-1954) clearly indicated that the unity between the people and the emperor had not automatically been broken by the defeat and the transformation of the emperor from a god to a human figure, following the official renunciation of his deified status.³⁰ Moreover, the idea of the emperor as a symbol of the Japanese ethnic nation was in harmony with the new constitution, which designated the emperor as the symbol of national unity which does not possess any political power.

The concept of Japan as a single ethnic nation was also supported by anthropological studies.

Referring to the bones of Palaeolithic man which had been discovered in 1931 by Naora Shinobu, anthropologist Hasebe Kotondo(1949) claimed that the Japanese, not the Ainu, were the original inhabitants of the Japanese archipelago.³¹ He maintained that Japanese people were direct descendants of a Stone Age People who had migrated to the Japanese archipelago from South China, which had been then connected to the archipelago by land. According to him, shortly after their migration, the archipelago and the continent were separated by the ocean as a result of geographical transformations, and Japan became isolated. He maintained that since then, their descendants multiplied and founded a peaceful, single ethnic utopia which came to be known as Japan.

Medical scientist Kiyono Kenji (1947), who had been engaged in the study of eugenics in the pre-war period, also maintained that the results of his scientific research proved that the homeland of the Japanese race had been Japan since the Japanese lands had been first inhabited. The theories of Hasebe and Kiyono have become the basis of anthropological studies on the origin of the Japanese nation and had significant influence on Japanese historiography.³² Their claim that their theories were based on the results of scientific research gave them credibility. As noted above, the concept of Japan as an ethnic nation was promoted by leftists for the purpose of unifying and mobilising the masses to fight against the state. The anthropological and historical studies provided communists and Japanese Marxist historians with scientific evidence that supported their claims about the Japanese ethnic nation.³³ In this way, those studies consolidated the foundation of the myth of Japan as a homogenous single ethnic nation.

It is important to note the significant role which Yanagita Kunio's folklore studies played in the development and dissemination of the concept of the Japanese ethnic nation. Yanagita was the founder of Japanese folklore studies and made significant contributions to its development in both the pre- and post-war periods.³⁴ As discussed in the previous chapter, despite his career as a government official, he adopted an anti-establishment, populist approach to his folklore studies.

He regarded written history as the history of Japanese elites, which had been subject to the influence of foreign cultures, and tried to discover the history of the common Japanese people through an examination of non-literate traditions such as oral traditions, folk religions and customs. He believed that true, distinctive Japanese traditions and culture were best preserved in Japanese agrarian communities. Yanagita's studies played a central role in the folklore movement in the 1930s.

Between the 1960s and 1980s, in contrast to the decline of Japanese folklore studies as an academic discipline, there was renewed and growing interest in folk culture and popular traditions among the Japanese public. Yanagita's work became very popular and his collected works (1968-1971), which were composed of thirty-six volumes, sold more than 60,000 sets in the 1970s.³⁵ The popularity of his work resulted from its ability to meet the demands of various segments of the Japanese population who were searching for the answer to the question of what the Japanese nation was.

Firstly, Yanagita's works, which contained various folk traditions, customs, religions, rituals, and myths collected from all over Japan, provided rich cultural resources to flesh out the concept of the Japanese ethnic nation advocated by communists. Secondly, Yanagita's focus on the life of common people as the foundation of Japanese national culture was favoured by the mass-oriented, anti-elite leftist and Marxist thinkers such as Yoshimoto Takaaki.³⁶ Thirdly, Yanagita's romanticisation of Japanese agrarian society, where the harmonious relationship between the life of the people and nature was still maintained, satisfied the romanticism of rightists. Furthermore, Yanagita's work appealed to the hearts of many Japanese people, especially those in the urban areas, who felt lost, experiencing rapid social transition and high economic growth accompanied by changes in social values and environmental pollution. Their nostalgic sentiments and yearning desire for something certain resonated with Yanagita's passion to search for a true, never-changing Japanese cultural distinctiveness preserved in an agrarian

society.

The growing popularity of Yanagita's folklore study was part of the Japanese people's quest for an ethnic national identity. In this process, a distinctive form of Japanese cultural nationalist ideology called *Nihonjinron* developed in the 1970s and 1980s.³⁷ *Nihonjinron* is the idea that Japanese people possess cultural uniqueness, especially in their way of communication and social structure. As Kosaku Yoshino (1992) argues, Japanese characters endorsed in the *Nihonjinron* discourses do not necessarily reflect empirical reality. Rather, they are images which function as cognitive frameworks which help Japanese people to make sense of social relationships and events from the point of view of the Japanese, and so reinforce their national identity.

The influences of the above noted anthropological studies and Yanagita's folklore studies on *Nihonjinron* are clearly visible. Firstly, *Nihonjinron* is based on the idea supported by anthropological studies that Japan, an island nation, which has been geographically separated from other countries, is composed of a single, homogeneous race which exclusively possesses certain unique cultural characteristics. Secondly, in *Nihonjinron* the pre-industrial, peasant community is treated as the prototype of modern Japanese society.³⁸ This idealisation of the pre-industrial past and the culture of the common people in agrarian society has close affinities with Yanagita's theory. Moreover, a large amount of literature on the unique Japanese culture and character, which are assumed to have been moulded by Japan's specific social structure and natural environments over a long period of time, also consolidated the concept of an apolitical unique Japanese cultural community which is the basis of *Nihonjinron*.³⁹

An interesting point is that while the concept of Japan as a single homogeneous ethnic nation was initially promoted by anti-state leftists in post-war Japan, and Yanagita's approach to the study of Japanese cultural uniqueness was anti-establishment, *Nihonjinron* has turned out to be a conservative ideology.⁴⁰ Dropping the spirit of resistance against the state, which was a driving

force for the development of Japanese ethnic nationalism in the early post-war period, *Nihonjinron* in the 1970s and 1980s inherited only its inward-looking, exclusive definition of the Japanese ethnic nation.

One of the reasons for this may be growing national confidence brought by the successful development of the Japanese economy under the state's heavy protectionism. During this period, Japanese people enjoyed peace and economic prosperity, which were guarded by the Constitution and the state's political and economic policies. So, it seems reasonable to assume that this, to some extent, mended the relationship between the state and the people which had been severed by the memory of the War. Moreover, the rise of Japan as an economic power in the international community, which was accompanied by 'Japan-bashing' by other countries, made Japanese people aware of Japan as a political and economic unit. The *Nihonjinron* which emerged in this condition was a result of the fusion of Japanese cultural, economic and political nationalism.⁴¹

Thus, despite growing interest in Asian solidarity among some leftist intellectuals, a conservative, inward-looking, exclusive Japanese ethnic nationalism became dominant on the popular level, and this hindered the development of an Asian consciousness among the Japanese public. The theory that Japan and Korea shared a common ancestor, which had developed alongside Japan's imperial expansionism and Asianism in pre-1945 Japan, was overshadowed by the idea that Japan was a unique, homogeneous, single ethnic nation in the post-war period. Moreover, the concept of the homogeneous nation concealed the existence of ethnic minorities in Japan, including a large number of Korean residents. In this way, not only did Japan lose its colonies in Asia after the War, but it also lost its links with Asia in Japanese historical consciousness.⁴² This post-war exclusive ethnic nationalism, based on the idea of Japanese historical, cultural and racial uniqueness which provided a bridge between the Left, the Right and the common people, can be understood as an antidote to aggressive, imperialist statist nationalism. One result was the

disappearance of the imperial period in Japanese historical consciousness.

For one thing, it seems quite natural that post-war Japanese intellectuals, who were searching for a way to reconstruct Japan and protect its political sovereignty and national identity from American political, economic and cultural influences, identified themselves with their counterparts in the Meiji period (1868-1912) when Japan had been in the process of Westernisation and coping with the threat posed by Western imperialism. For example, there was a tendency for Japanese leftist and progressive intellectuals, such as Maruyama, Takeuchi and Ishimoda, to idealise the Meiji period. They especially praised the Meiji Revolution and the People's Rights Movement in the early Meiji period as the historical moments when the Japanese people tried to bring about a revolution to realise their own ideal of a modern nation, fighting against the existing oppressive political establishments, namely the Tokugawa Shogunate and the elitist Meiji government respectively.

Some even looked to *kokugaku* (National Learning School), a nativist school of philosophy which had developed in the eighteenth century by a group of Japanese scholars who felt the need to protect Japan's historical and cultural distinctiveness from the influence of Confucianism which had been imported from China, and promoted by the Tokugawa Shogunate as the official moral ideology. They turned to the ancient myths of Japan recorded in *Kojiki* (compiled in 712) and *Nihonshoki* (compiled in 720), and to Shinto in their quest of the origin of Japan's cultural distinctiveness.⁴³ As Yanagita was heavily influenced by Motori Norinaga, a leading figure of *kokugaku*, and Yanagita himself regarded his folklore studies a 'new *kokugaku*'.⁴⁴

Growing interest in the early Meiji and pre-modern periods was not only an intellectual phenomenon but also widely shared by the Japanese public. As noted above, *Nihonjinron* idealised pre-modern Japanese agrarian society. Furthermore, in order to understand post-war Japanese popular historical consciousness, it is necessary to examine the influence of an

extremely popular historical novelist, Shiba Ryotaro. His view of history is characterised by a sharp contrast between 'good, bright Meiji' and 'bad, dark Showa'.⁴⁵ He praised the Meiji leaders who led Japan to a victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) but claimed that the victory brought the disease of imperialism and militarism to Japan.⁴⁶ Shiba's distaste for the Showa period (1926-1989) was reflected in the fact that he never chose the dark period as a setting for his novels.

The disappearance of the imperial Showa period is also clear in the choice of the theme for the hugely popular, prime-time historical dramas that run for a year every Sunday night, broadcast by NHK, the state-owned broadcasting company. As Carol Gluck (1993) points out, the most favoured subjects for the dramas are heroes in the Sengoku (Warring States) period (the sixteenth century) and the end of the Edo period (the late nineteenth century).

These periods were the times when the nation was in political transition. The popular heroes in these periods are often depicted as dedicating their lives to transforming the nation according to their beliefs in the ideal nation.⁴⁷ The NHK did once choose the pre-war Showa period for its Sunday night drama. The subject of the drama, called 'Sanga moyu' (1984), was the lives of Japanese Americans during the Second World War.⁴⁸ However, it had a low audience rating and the NHK has never chosen this period for the series since then.

In conclusion, the pre-1945 Showa period disappeared in Japanese historical consciousness, while, as Gluck (1993) says, historical continuity was maintained by stitching the Meiji period directly to the present.⁴⁹ In this process, the period of Japanese imperial expansion came to be seen as merely an exception or a bad dream, or a brief diversion from the 'normal' historical course of the peace-oriented Japanese nation, which was characterised by its agrarian nature and cultural distinctiveness. As a result, Japan's historical and cultural relations with Asia were forgotten.

3.2. Collective Memory of the Second World War: The German Case

Germany also has negative national pasts as an aggressor. However, on the surface, the ways in which the Germans have been dealing with their war guilt seem rather different from the Japanese case. In this section, I shall examine the relationships between German nationalism, national identity and the concept of Europe by analysing how the Germans have been remembering the Second World War. Group memories are often systematically distorted in order to maintain a desirable image of the group.⁵⁰ In this respect, the ways in which the War has been remembered by the Germans whose state has been internationally recognised as a perpetrator of crimes against humanity are not exceptional. What strategies did they adopt to deal with their negative national past? In order to legitimise their regimes, both German states needed to create their own versions of a new German national community whose territorial boundary was consistent with their ideologically defined political boundary. It was meant to replace the guilt-laden old German national community, which had been broken up as a result of the division of its statehood, and which could not function as the source of a German national identity that could serve the interests of the new German states. In the process of post-war nation-state building of both East and West Germany, the memory of the Nazi past played a significant role in defining who they were. Although objectively both German states shared the same historical heritage of the Nazi past, its memory served the development of German national identity in East and West Germany in different ways.

3.2.1. East Germany

I will start with East Germany, officially designated as the GDR (German Democratic Republic). According to the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the GDR, fascism is a product of the ultimate stage of capitalism. Thus, the anti-capitalist GDR refused to take any responsibility for the Nazi crimes and rejected the Nazi past as a part of its national history. When the GDR officially commemorated

the Second World War, its commemoration focused on the capitalist enemy and the courageous resistance of communist comrades against inhuman Nazism and fascism.⁵¹ Numerous monuments, gravestones, plaques and other historical markers were erected throughout East Germany by the government in order to remember the brutal Nazi crimes and commemorate heroic communist opposition and victory over capitalism, which was accused of providing the seedbed of fascism and National Socialism.⁵² In this way, East German leaders sought to construct an East German identity based on their claim of legitimate statehood as the only antifascist German state. That is to say, the East German state attempted to dissociate itself from its German Nazi ancestors through the ideological boundary of communism versus capitalism. Moreover, by identifying itself with the German working class as the victim of the Nazi regime, they tried to maintain the continuity of its nationhood as the antifascist German nation morally superior to capitalist West Germany.⁵³

In this context, the principal Nazi victim commemorated by the GDR was the working class, not the Jews. The working class commemorated as the hero transcended national boundaries. For example, the brochure printed in 1985 for the concentration camp of Buchenwald, and the Museum of the Antifascist Freedom Fight of the European Peoples in Sachsenhausen, both portray the War as international political struggle against fascism.⁵⁴ This political and ideological boundary of 'fascism versus communism' downplayed the role of the racial boundary which had been the dominant criterion adopted by the Nazis in order to determine whom they should exterminate. As a result, the Jewish victims of the Nazi regime have been hugely underrepresented in the official memory of the War in East Germany. The GDR's hostile policy toward Israel was also a good indication of the GDR's official stance toward the Jewish victims. Branding Israel as a capitalist, imperialist fascist state which was invading Arab space in collaboration with Western capitalist states, not only did the GDR refuse to make restitution payments to Israel, but also it formed alliances with Arab states in conflict with Israel. The GDR claimed that West Germany's reparations payments for Israel were nothing but a means to

disguise its own fascist nature, and were making 'an essential contribution to Israel's material and moral strength' in pursuing its antagonistic policy toward the Arabs.⁵⁵ Thus, the GDR's policy toward Israel was a symbolic manifestation of its refusal to take responsibility for, and a lack of sympathy towards, the Jewish victims of the Nazi regime.

Certainly, the official view of the Red Army as liberators who freed East Germans from fascism seemed to be incompatible with the personal memories and widespread stories about rapes and other kinds of violence inflicted on the German people by Soviet soldiers in the last stages of the War. However, political oppression, the East German people's desire to ease a sense of guilt and their own sense of victimhood forged through the War experiences resulted in their implicit, silent collective consent to the East German state's official historical discourse. As Caroline Wiedmer (1999:178) argues, the fact that by 1961 the citizens of the GDR had donated over 30 million marks for the construction of memorial sites to commemorate anti-fascist resistance fighters may suggest that the public perception of the Nazi past had been brought into line with the official historical discourse. By using the rhetoric of the German working class as the victim of National Socialism, the collective memory of the GDR was relieved from personal guilt which would have been brought by confronting their own personal support for the Nazi regime.⁵⁶ In a book written by Kurt Pätzold and Manfred Weißbecker in 1981, Pätzold pointed out the role of the common people in sustaining the murderous fascist system of the Nazi regime. Nevertheless, like other East German Marxist historians, he portrayed the common German people as innocent victims who were manipulated through a false consciousness imposed by imperialist fascists.⁵⁷ Therefore, the mass support for the Nazi regime had never been genuinely confronted in the public discourse in East Germany.

Thus, the combination of anti-fascist, communist ideology and self-victimisation was adopted by East Germans as a strategy to dissociate East Germany politically and psychologically from the racial crimes against humanity committed on behalf of the German nation by the Nazi regime

which enjoyed the support of the German masses. Thus, the reconstruction of national identity and the politics of national memory in early post-war East Germany took place against the background of the Nazi criminal past and the ideological division of German statehood. In this condition, the East German state exploited the memory of the War for the purpose of national regeneration. That is to say, for the East Germans, leftist anti-fascism, Marxist historiography and their self-victimised War memories served as a means of avoiding confrontation with their unpleasant national pasts and their war guilt, without jeopardising their national identity. This made the real victims of the previous regime invisible.

Despite the authoritarian nature of the East German government, we should be careful not to automatically assume a unity between the East German state and its people. Despite the state's concerted efforts to dissociate East Germany from the Nazi past and the absence of general public debate on the Nazi past, it was not unusual for East Germans to privately express in informal conversations their dissatisfaction with the current situation under the communist regime in comparison with their lives under the Nazis, which they regarded with greater favour.⁵⁸ Although publicly they were required to repress their memory of the Third Reich, it was privately preserved in a depoliticised manner by dissociating the memories of their lives under the Nazis from what the regime had done to others during the War.⁵⁹ As Mary Fulbrook (1999:162) argues, this resulted in the cleansing of the private memory of the Third Reich, and the lack of a sense of guilt for their connection with the Nazi crimes among the generation who experienced the War as young adults. Moreover, this depoliticised memory of the Third Reich and lack of a sense of guilt for the Nazi past were privately passed down to the younger generation. According to the results of a survey of 2,000 young East Germans on historical consciousness conducted in 1988, they tended to think they had nothing to do with the Third Reich and their view of it was more influenced by the stories told by their families than by the official memory.⁶⁰ They were inclined to accept the view that there had been positive sides in the Third Reich, and to be sympathetic to the older generation, who they understood had had no choice but obey and collaborate with the Nazi

regime in order to survive.

In this way, a popular memory distinct from the official memory developed in post-war East Germany. It is important to note that unlike the official memory, which was intended to separate East Germany from the Nazi past, the popular memory privately maintained continuity with the recent past, although the past was distorted and selectively reconstructed in the process of remembrance. This indicated the existence of a community in East Germany which was ontologically different from the GDR and which retained a historical link with pre-division Germany. Moreover, many East Germans expressed a sense of belonging to the German ethnic nation whose boundary transcended ideologically determined territorial borders rather than to the ideologically defined GDR. In an opinion poll conducted in East Germany in 1968, 59.9% replied that 'the whole of Germany is my fatherland' and 32% answered that their fatherland was the GDR.⁶¹ Certainly, the same opinion poll showed that 66.7% of respondents under the age of twenty recognised the GDR as their fatherland. This seemed to indicate that the state's policy to enhance a sense of belonging to the GDR had a greater effect on the younger generation who were born after the division of Germany. Nevertheless, for most of its history, the GDR government itself celebrated the whole of German history and culture as its own in order to claim itself as the legitimate successor to the whole German nation.

For example, in the 1950s it organised a series of anniversaries to celebrate great German cultural heroes such as Goethe, Bach, Beethoven and Schiller. In the 1960s the state looked further back to the distant past. For instance it organised the celebration of the 450th anniversary of the start of the Reformation in 1967, in order to achieve the religious unification of the predominantly Lutheran Protestant churches with the state.⁶² The early 1970s saw a decline in cultural enthusiasm as a result of the state's attempts to define the East German nation in terms of working class identity. However, in the 1980s the idea of the whole of German history was again strongly advocated by the state. By reinterpreting German history as an inevitable historical

process toward communist society, the state sought to incorporate the East German people's historical consciousness into their political identity and thus strengthen unity between the GDR and the East German historico-cultural community. It is difficult to assess the extent of its success. But, rather than enhancing popular commitment to the GDR, an East German national identity based on a sense of belonging to the whole German historico-cultural community might have smoothed the path toward the integration of the East German population into the wider German nation-state during the process of the unification of the two Germanys.

3.2.2. West Germany

In contrast, the West German state designated as the FRG (the Federal Republic of Germany) accepted the Nazi regime as part of its national history. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's decision to pay reparations to Israel and the representatives of Jewish victims was intended to transform Germany from a moral leper into a responsible, reliable member of the Western military alliance, which no longer resembled its predecessor regime, at least in the elite discourse.⁶³ One may say that by paying compensation to the victims of Nazi crimes and showing racial tolerance in its asylum policy, the FRG tried to pay off the German debt of the Nazi past. Unfortunately, Adenauer's sincerity in officially admitting German responsibility for the crimes committed by the Nazi regime was counterbalanced by his statement to the West German Parliament in 1951 which implicitly and collectively exonerated German people from the Nazi guilt. He said:

'The vast majority of the German people rejected the crimes which were committed against the Jews and did not participate in them....But in the name of the German people unspeakable crimes were committed, which impose upon us the duty of moral and material compensation.'⁶⁴

Thus, according to him, Germany had an obligation to take responsibility for unspeakable crimes committed against the Jews simply because they had been committed in the name of its people

by someone who did not represent the German people, against the wish of the vast majority of them. In other words, for him the payment of reparations to Israel was not the official acceptance of collective guilt of the German people but that of collective responsibility for crimes committed by a third party on behalf of them. In this sense, both East and West German governments had a similarity in the way in which they dealt with the Nazi past. That is, both sought to externalise the Nazi regime and exonerate the German *volk* from collective guilt for its crimes. Moreover, it seemed that many German people willingly supported the theme of the 'innocent German *volk*' by claiming that they had known little about the Holocaust.⁶⁵ This created a myth that the Holocaust was committed by a small group of Nazi leaders on behalf of the German people without their knowledge. A similar story was heard in post-war Japan.⁶⁶

As Gerd Knischewski and Ulla Spittler (1997:550) point out, the strong political and economic partnership between the FRG and the Western alliance systems, which was institutionalised through the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), the West European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Treaty of Organisation (NATO), and the initial lack of state sovereignty, made the West Germans 'dedicated Europeans'. Thus, a democratic European identity served, at least on the elite level, as a substitute for post-war German national identity in West Germany, which had been undermined by its weakened statehood and the division of the German nation. Moreover, the use of ideological confrontation with the GDR as a point of reference for self-definition helped West Germans to turn away from the moral confrontation with the Nazi past. In this way, the collective memory of the West Germans was also relieved of a sense of guilt associated with the Nazi crimes. The denazification processes of the FRG and the GDR within the framework of the Cold War politics were rather similar to the way in which Japan's partnership with the US turned Japan away from Asia, the principal victim of its imperial aggression, and helped Japan, now reborn as a democratic, antifascist country, to avoid confronting its responsibility for the tremendous sufferings it inflicted on its Asian neighbours.

In a sense, it can be said that the construction of post-war German national identity in West Germany during the initial stage was rather forward-looking. Instead of being proud of their national history, the West Germans were proud of their economic success and identified themselves as a part of Western Europe into which they were politically and economically integrated. Thus, West German leaders sought to construct a new post-war German national identity based on a clean break with the Nazi past. Nevertheless, such efforts to make a fresh start were not necessarily consistent. As in Japan, there was a relatively high degree of personnel continuity in Western German public life.⁶⁷ Although those whose previous involvement with the Nazi regime was revealed were accused by leftist liberals, and in many cases forced to resign from their posts, the fact that many more were allowed to stay in their positions, and thus forgiven, indicated a certain degree of structural continuity of West German politics and society.⁶⁸

It is important that we should not confuse official memory with popular memory. For instance, Adenauer's policy to pay reparations for the Nazi crimes did not receive public support.⁶⁹ According to the opinion polls, only 11 percent of the respondents supported it.⁷⁰ In a survey conducted in 1951, the year when Adenauer officially announced that the West German government and the German people had a moral and material obligation to compensate the victims of the Nazi regime, only 32% of West German respondents replied that Germany carried any guilt for the War.⁷¹ Moreover, Claudia Koonz (1994:265) describes her experience of encountering the local residents in Dachau who laughed about the 'good old days' when the village had prospered under the Nazi regime. Thus, governmental efforts to seal off the past and put the past to rest were not necessarily in accordance with public attitudes. In the same way, the development of West Germany's political and economic partnership with the Western alliance did not necessarily mean the development of European identity on the mass level.

While the FRG was attempting to close the historical chapter of the German Nazi past, both the government and the West German public were also eagerly attempting to remember German

sufferings in the War during the 1950s. For instance, the government launched two projects in the 1950s which were aimed at collecting the memories of expellees and POWs.⁷² The one was the publication of *the Documentation of the Expulsion of Germans from East-Central Europe*. It was an eight-volume collection of about 11,000 eyewitness accounts provided by German expellees themselves, who left or were driven out of their lands in Eastern Europe because of the aggression of the Red Army, of their horrific experiences, including looting, rape, the separation of families, forced labour and starvation. The other, which was completed in the 1974, was the compilation of an extensive, twenty-two volume collection of testimonies offered by former German prisoners of war about their sufferings during their harsh imprisonment, especially in the areas under the control of the Soviet Union. Even though their circulation figures were relatively small, these projects officially sanctified the memory of German sufferings and contributed to the self-victimisation of Germans. At least German victims were given opportunities to tell their side of the story of the War in the officially sanctified documents, while other victims were not.

Moreover, as Robert G. Moeller (1996:1030-31) points out, the sufferings of German expellees and POWs enshrined in the above official documentation corresponded to the War memory circulating in the popular culture of the 1950s. The experiences of expellees and common soldiers on the eastern front were often featured in popular novels, memoirs and films. The popularisation of the experiences of German POWs was also encouraged by those public events which were intended to remind the West German public of the sufferings and heroic acts of innocent, ordinary German soldiers who were doubly victimised first by manipulative, fanatic Nazi commanders, and then by the Red Army. In particular, annual Prisoner of War Remembrance Weeks, organised in the early 1950s by the Association of Returning Soldiers with the support of the FRG, involved a large sector of society including veterans' associations, the churches, political parties and local authorities, and enjoyed widespread popular support.⁷³ The memory of both German expellees and POWs began with the advance of the Red Army, and this focus on the last stage of the War helped the West German public to turn away from what happened to others earlier under the Nazi

regime.

Furthermore, as Elizabeth Heineman (1996) demonstrates, the memories of German women's War experiences at the home front portrayed them as victims, and were also nationalised and popularised. They focused mainly on their sufferings from bombings, hardships and rapes by communist enemies, and their contribution to post-war national reconstruction.⁷⁴ The generalisation and appropriation of women's experiences as national memories resulted in the demilitarisation of West Germany's collective memory of the War.⁷⁵ In this way, as in the case of East Germany and Japan, self-victimisation characterised West Germany's War memory in the 1950s.

Despite a relative lack of historical reference in West Germany's political discourses in the aftermath of the War, a strong public interest in the past is identifiable. For example, Rudy Koshar (1998) shows that not only conservative preservationists but also the general West German public was keen to re-establish historical architecture as a means to remember the better part of their community's past. Koshar explains that the highly schematic or technical arguments among the preservationist intellectuals had little impact on the general public interest in the reconstruction of historic buildings. Rather, it was based on 'popular desires for a general past mirrored in historic buildings' which derived from a sense of nostalgia for a better past widely held among the mass population whose psychological, physical and material well-being was threatened in the harsh conditions of their real post-war lives.⁷⁶ Such public sentiment was consistent with the slogan 'search for Romantic Germany', advocated by the German Central Administration of Tourism and consisting of the images of historic towns and architectural monuments untouched by the War.⁷⁷

An important point is that the images of the ideal community which the public, the preservationists and the West German government were seeking to represent through the reconstruction of historical architecture had high resonance in the sense that they tended to be pre-modern,

pre-industrial historico-cultural communities and had little reference to the Nazi past. While local communities took the initiative in the popular movement for the reconstruction of historical architecture, they tended to be indifferent to, or even against the preservation of Nazi-related buildings. As Fulbrook (1999:36-45) observes, the absence of physical reminders of the Nazi past in West Germany was rather striking. Many of them tended to be either deserted or destroyed, or reused for other purposes without traces of the Nazi past.⁷⁸ Thus, in this context the reconstruction of historical architecture can be interpreted as an attempt by West German local residents to bridge a temporal and spatial gap between the present and the distant past, bypassing the more recent Nazi past. In the 1950s, local communities were extremely reluctant to publicly admit their connection with the Nazi regime.

The period between the 1960s and the 1970s saw significant changes in the ways in which West Germans dealt with the Nazi past. The highly publicised trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 and the Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials of 1963-1966⁷⁹, accompanied by the related media coverage, forced the West Germans to confront the question of responsibility for the Nazi past. The official visit in 1970 to the memorial for the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising by the first Social Democratic Chancellor of the FRG, Willy Brandt, who knelt down in front of the memorial, was a highly symbolic gesture to show to the world the FRG's official acceptance of Germany's responsibility for the Nazi crimes.

Through the increasing amount of coverage of the Holocaust in the mass media such as books, radio, film and TV, memories of genocide entered into public consciousness. In the public domain, confrontation with the Nazi past mainly took a generational form.⁸⁰ That is to say, the older generation was accused of committing Nazi crimes by the younger generation. For the latter, this was a psychological strategy to build a memory wall to separate themselves from the old generation in historical consciousness, in order to be relieved from collective responsibility and guilt for the Nazi crimes. Thus, while the government accepted responsibility for the Nazi crimes in

order to put the past behind it, the young generation refused to accept it as their own past. In other words, they did not internalize the memory of the Nazi past but externalised it. To some extent, this might have helped the West Germans psychologically to unload the guilt of the Nazi past from the future of West Germany.

In the 1970s the leaders of the FRG focused on the process of building the West German nation-state. A crucial issue was the basis for the construction of a German national identity. The construction of a German national identity based on cultural and historical factors was problematic, given ideological conflict with the GDR, whose people were supposed to share many cultural and historical elements with West Germans. As Maurice Halbwachs (1992) and Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983) claim, the interests of the present, to some extent, shape the memory of the past. However, as Jeffrey K. Olick (1998) demonstrates, the past is not merely a dependent variable of the present. The German case shows that the past itself constrains the construction of the past in the present and conditions the present.

In its attempts to dissociate itself from the Nazi regime and at the same time differentiate itself from the GDR, the FRG initially sought to construct national identity based on identification with a liberal, democratic constitution rather than national cultural symbols and historical memories. By treating the negative past as a historical lesson, the FRG claimed its status as a legitimate promoter of democracy and world peace. In this way, a rhetoric of West Germany as a morally responsible nation emerged during this period. By wrapping up its specific past with such universal values as liberalism, democracy and world peace, the FRG generalised the German past. In this process of democratisation, which was accompanied by economic recovery and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Israel, the specificity of the racial aspects of the Nazi crimes against the Jews faded.

By the 1970s, both the East and West German states seemed to have achieved a certain degree

of success in establishing stable forms of sovereign political institutions with functional economic systems. However, to what degree this contributed to the development of German national identity on the popular level was uncertain. Such political institutional factors might have enhanced the nationally-defined cognitive framework. Nevertheless, this is not enough for the development of a national community to which people feel attached and with which they identify themselves. It requires cultural and historical ties as means of connecting people to the community. Certainly, from the beginning of the post-War era, the political leaders of both East and West Germany were well aware of the importance of the reconstruction of a historico-cultural German national community which could generate unity between the state and its people in the building of the new East and West German nation-states. Thus, they attempted to establish the historicity of their respective new nation-states through the reinterpretation of historical materials which were carefully selected, with a preference for pre-World War I German history. Nevertheless, it was questionable to what extent such historicity, based on the glorification of the distant national past and the repression of the recent past, could have generated a sense of historical continuity of the national community which could explain present conditions. Public confrontation with the Nazi past following the Auschwitz Trials generated strong urges among the West German people to restore the lost connection between the recent past and the present, in other words, to search for a history which could account for the present.

As in the previous period, the local community took the initiative in the search for historical continuity on the popular level. Rapid social changes and confrontation with the undigested national past led to the development of strong public interest in local history and culture. It was reflected in the publication of an increasing number of books on 'local history, photographs, statistics, nature studies, and prose and poetry in local dialects' in West Germany.⁸¹ It is difficult to say to what extent this public enthusiasm for local culture and local history could have strengthened German national identity. It seems natural to assume that it enhanced local and regional, rather than national, identity.⁸² Fulbrook (1999) argues that the regions had been a

primal basis of identity for many West Germans and that their proud identification with regions and Europe compensated for being 'ashamed to be German'.⁸³ Strong historical and cultural regional identities, contrasting with a lack of strong manifestation of national pride, were perhaps one of the reasons for the FRG's increasing emphasis on the national culture as the basis of German national identity in the 1980s.

During the 1980s the conservatives who took over government in the FRG promoted the concept of all-German national identity based on traditional cultural and ethnic symbols. 'Germany' in the conservative concept included the GDR. That is to say, political divisions created by the ideological difference between the two states were pushed aside. Instead, factors unifying the two German states were emphasised. In this context, historical issues played a significant role since, when 'one Germany' was discussed, it was impossible not to refer to historical and cultural relationships between the two states. This meant that confronting the Nazi past became a crucial issue. So, normalisation of the nation's recent past became a key element in political agenda. As a result, normalisation of relationships between West Germany and its former enemies took place. For example, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and French President Mitterrand commemorated together the dead of the First World War in 1984. In another example, Kohl met the US President Ronald Reagan at Bitburg, a German military cemetery which included the graves of members of the Waffen-SS as well as other German soldiers who fought in the Second World War, for the fortieth anniversary of the end of the War on 8 May 1985. The purpose of these events was to demonstrate reconciliation between former enemies and their willingness to become partners. These were official attempts to leave the past behind for the present and a brighter future. In Geoffrey H. Hartman's words (1994:10), 'Bitburg was meant to close the books on Germany's guilt, and to foster an unburdened national past'.

Michael Gayer and Miriam Hansen (1994:176) claims that in the 1980s the West Germans tried to remember the Nazi past *in order to forget it*. As Olick (1998) maintains, regularisation and

ritualisation of the commemoration of the Nazi past made it a normal part of West German politics. Thus, ritualisation is thought to make what is abnormal a normal part of national political culture. In other words, ritualisation served the domestication of the abnormal Nazi past while reducing the degree of its peculiarity and significance.⁸⁴

Normalisation of the Nazi past was also undertaken by a number of neo-conservative historians in the historians' debates in the 1980s, the so-called *Historikerstreit*.⁸⁵ Their main strategy was relativisation of the Nazi past. In his controversial essay written in 1986, Ernst Nolte claimed that the deeds of the Nazi regime had been a reaction to an external, Asian threat posed by Stalinism.⁸⁶ Supporting Nolte's historical interpretation, Joachim Fest argued that class murder by the Bolsheviks was equivalent to the Holocaust. This kind of revisionist argument softened the degree of atrocity and peculiarity of the Nazi crimes in comparison with crimes committed by other countries. It suggested that mass murder was not unique to Germany and it treated the period of the Nazi regime as a diversion from the normal historical course of the nation caused by the external threat. To cite another example, in his book entitled *Two sorts of demise: The Destruction of the German Reich and the end of European Jewry* (1986), Andreas Hillgruber treated the Holocaust and the expulsion of Germans from their 'homeland' by the Red Army as parallel phenomena, but placed much heavier weight on the latter.⁸⁷ In Charles S. Maier's words (1988:23), Hillgruber presented the German expulsion 'in technicolor', and the Holocaust in 'black, gray, and white'. In this way, neo-conservative, revisionist historians portrayed Germany as a normal nation like any other nation whose history had 'highs' as well as 'lows'.

This neo-conservative approach to the Nazi past was attacked by West German liberals, such as Jürgen Habermas, who insisted that German national identity should be based on people's identification with a democratic constitution and an anti-fascist liberalism learnt from history, rather than the romanticised concept of the German nation.⁸⁸ Thus, while the neo-conservatives recognised the Nazi past in order to put it behind them or to trivialise it, the leftists insisted that the

memory of the Nazi past had to be kept constantly in mind in order to enhance people's support for a democratic constitution and liberalism. Unlike the GDR, where the Marxist interpretation of Nazi history dominated the public discourse of the past, in the FRG there has been no clear public consensus as regards how to interpret the past.⁸⁹

Significantly, the revisionist interpretations of the Nazi past advocated by conservative historians in the *Historikerstreit* were not new. As Moeller (2001) demonstrates, the victimisation of German expellees and soldiers who bravely fought against the Red Army was a familiar theme of the popular War memories of the 1950s which were reflected in popular literature and films, but which were repressed in the public domain and taboo since the 1960s. Thus, what happened in the 1980s was the re-emergence of historical views which allowed the revival of the repressed popular memory of German victims in public historical discourse.⁹⁰

Furthermore, historical revisionism was not confined to the circle of professional historians. Themes such as the sufferings of innocent, ordinary German people blindly manipulated by a small group of mad Nazi commanders, and the Holocaust as part of the Nazi regime's fight against Bolshevism, were also identifiable in more widely accessible popular history books published in the late 1970s and 1980s.⁹¹ This might have indicated the persistence of a sense of victimhood in West Germany which was not eradicated by the accusations by the younger generation in the late 1960s. Heinz Bude's (1995) psychoanalytic interpretation suggests that what this so-called 1968 generation, who were born guilty, were attempting to do was to develop an autonomous, individual identity by freeing themselves from a collective historical stigma which they inherited from their parents, rather than to directly face their nation's horrible past.⁹² In other words, this might have been a kind of typical rebellious adolescent act of disobedience to adults in a process of personality development which was manifested in a collective form. It is difficult to judge the validity of this psychoanalytic explanation. However, many of those university students who joined the movement to accuse the older generation for the Nazi past found jobs in public

offices after their graduation⁹³ and became part of the state which had defended the victimisation of German soldiers. This meant that the movement failed to fundamentally transform the existing mode of thinking in which many West Germans remembered the War. In this sense, the rebellion by the 1968 generation in West Germany had a similar fate to that of their Japanese counterparts.

As Maier (1988) points out, neo-conservatism in the political sphere was accompanied by the development of *Alltagsgeschichte*, the historical study of the lives of common women and men based on anthropological and ethnographic models, which seemed to be equivalent to the popularisation of Yanagita Kunio's folklore study in Japan. Treating oral history as a legitimate source for understanding the lives of ordinary people, it contributed to the development of the concept of the German historico-cultural nation represented by the common people. Its influence was not confined to academic circles. For example, the highly successful television drama called *Heimat* (1985) depicted a nostalgic village life during the Nazi period without referring to the memory of racial hatred against Jews or the Holocaust. Thus, the 1980s witnessed a growing historical consciousness regarding a German cultural nation which was not tainted with the Nazi crimes.

It should be noted that while Habermas saw growing neoconservatism as a threat to democracy and liberalism, he did not renounce the idea of the German nation as a cultural community outright. Rather, as Maier (1988:153) explains, he thought a sense of belonging to enduring forms of life, that is cultural communities on multiple levels in which German people were born and nurtured, could legitimate the leftist claim that those Germans who were born after 1945 were also responsible for the nation's Nazi past. Given the development of German cultural nationalism, it must have been difficult for the advocates of universalistic values such as democracy and liberalism to win public support without tapping into the German people's growing cultural identity.

At the same time, the localisation of the Nazi past took place in the 1980s. Following the US TV

series 'Holocaust' (1979) which provoked heated public debates, numerous kinds of commemoration of the Holocaust took place at local initiative in West Germany.⁹⁴ West Germans were engaged in the discovery of local history under Nazi rule and the commemoration of Jewish victims. An important implication is that the incorporation of the shared national history of the Nazis into local history could horizontally connect West German local communities and tie them vertically with the West German state in the West German's historical consciousness. Since the end of the War, local identity had been strengthened alongside the development of civic national identity in West Germany. What had been missing was the development of a solid horizontal link between local communities. Recognition of the shared history of the Nazi past could unite West German local communities.

Moreover, the localisation of national history is at the same time the nationalisation of the local community because by internalising national history, the local community places itself within wider national historical discourses and becomes part of the narrative of the nation. Thus, the memory of the Nazi past could contribute to the solidification of a German national collectivity. This historical process of the evolution of the German nation, assisted by national cultural symbolism promoted by the West German government, implied the development of a German national identity as an extension of solid local identity. A lack of overt manifestation of national pride among West Germans in surveys did not mean a lack of national identity in West Germany. A shared sense of being ashamed of their national history before the internalised international audience could also enhance West German national identity.

Koonz (1994: 269) maintains that the shared public memory of historical events forges a sense belonging to civil society which transcends generation, class and regional divisions. Without shared memory, a person's identity as a member of the national community fades. Therefore, after the unification of the two states in 1990, the unification of their respective memories of the Nazi past was required in order to construct a unified German national community with which all

German people could identify themselves. Hence, the government attempted to revise the East German version of the Nazi past on the West German model. This meant that East Germans were required to share the responsibility for the Nazi crimes with their West German counterparts. Nevertheless, rather than sharing the responsibility, the people of the former GDR adopted the Cold War anti-Communist rhetoric propagated by the FRG which equated Nazism and Communism. After the collapse of Communism, they started blaming Communism for the Nazi past in order to be relieved of Nazi guilt. In this context, memories of German prisoners held by the Soviets and their sufferings under Communist oppression emerged among the people of the former GDR. In this way, the former East Germans managed to accommodate themselves within the public discourse on the Nazi past developed by the FRG, while continuing to dissociate themselves from the Nazi crimes by redefining their sense of victimhood according to an altered ideological boundary.

This is a good example of how a particular historical narrative among many is picked up by the public in order to maintain their desirable collective identity. We should note that the adoption of anti-Communist rhetoric by the people of the former GDR did not necessarily mean that their way of thinking was suddenly transformed after the collapse of the Communist government. Rather, it was a result of a long-term process of attitude formation. As psychological theories suggest, if people select those ideologies which are consonant with their existing value systems, it may be reasonable to assume that before a new ideology dominates society, the shared value system which supports it has already existed, even if it has not been visible. Thus, the adoption of the anti-Communist rhetoric indicated that an anti-Communist attitude had already existed among the people of the GDR before its collapse. It was further stimulated by political institutional change which led to the defeat of Communism. By accepting the ideology of the former FRG, the East German public chose to identify themselves with the victor, not the loser.

The fragility of the unity between the East German state and East German people may indicate

the GDR's failure in the construction of a solid East German national collectivity. The extent to which a self-definition that relied heavily on communist ideology could lead to the formation of an East German national community with which the East German people could identify themselves is questionable. As in West Germany, the institutional development of the East German state might have led to the development of a civic East German national identity. The East German government sought to maintain historical continuity through the reinterpretation of national history and culture moulded by a communist ideology, in order to legitimise the rule of the communist regime. Nevertheless, it was doubtful that such an official national history reconstructed by ideological engineering resonated with the pre-existing historical perception of the East German public. Rather, the imposition of unfamiliar historical narratives by the state might have undermined the historical continuity of the public perception and alienated East German people from the ideologically painted picture of an East German national community propagated by the state.

Oppression on the part of the Communist regime had made it difficult for East German people to speak out about the memory of the War in ways that were different from the official version. The collapse of the Communist regime gave them an opportunity to reconstruct the public memory of the War, which relied more on their private memory. Significant here is the fact that, as we have seen, West and East Germans had shared the victimised collective memory of German sufferings on the Eastern front in the War, although their enemies had been defined differently according to the ideologies of their respective regimes. This common memory of the German as victim, together with the discrediting of the communist regime among East Germans, smoothed the path of integration of East German memories of the War into the West German version. In this way, the shared memory of suffering under communism unified the history of the politically divided East and West German communities.

The West German leaders who became the leaders of a reunified Germany continued to express

their regret for the Nazi past in order to normalise Germany's past through mourning processes and thereby secure its status as a respected country in the international community. Nonetheless, the popular memory represented in media such as television programmes, books and films often contradicted official statements. For example, a film called Prisoners of Conscience (1992) depicted noble resisters against the Nazi regime as if they represented all German people. As Koonz (1994: 275) points out, 'in post-Bitburg recollection, Germans began to feel entitled to describe their own victimhood under Hitler'. This indicates that official attempts to put the Nazi past to rest through acceptance of responsibility for Nazi crimes and the ritualisation of the Nazi memory hardly reflected the historical consciousness of the German public.

In fact, the messages German leaders sent themselves were self-contradictory. While accepting responsibility for Nazi crimes in their official statements, they were careful not to let the past damage the unity of the nation, which was crucial for the development of a unified German national community. While the opposition parties claimed that official war commemoration should distinguish between the victims and the perpetrators, the conservative German leaders insisted that it should not divide the German people but should unite them. The national memorial established in the Neue Wache in 1993 reflected the new German state's desire to normalise the German past.

The Neue Wache was originally erected in Berlin in 1817-1818 and redesigned to commemorate the memory of the dead in the First World War in 1930-1931. The Neue Wache was inaugurated as the 'Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany for the Victims of War and Tyranny' on the National Day of Mourning in 1993. A newly added sculpture located in the middle of its interior represented the grief of mothers who lost their sons in war. While the sculpture clearly depicts sufferings caused by war in general, it cannot represent the qualitative distinctiveness of the Nazi racial war.⁹⁵ Moreover, the Christian symbolism adopted by the sculpture excludes the Jews from the object of its commemoration and the inscription of 'To the Victims of War and

'Tyranny' generalises the object of its commemoration, while blurring the distinction between the victims of the Nazi crimes and their perpetrators.⁹⁶ Thus, the establishment of the national war memorial in the Neue Wache can be interpreted as an attempt by the new German state to normalise the German past. Its aim was to construct a German national identity which could unite the people of Germany through the shared memory of undiscriminating sufferings in the War and under Nazism and in the post-war totalitarian dictatorship of the GDR.

In this way, the implicit ideology found in the symbolism of official war commemoration has been consistent with the persisting public memory of Germans as the victims. Among many potential historical narratives, only the rhetoric of Germans as the victims of Communism and Nazism could serve the interests of the former East Germans, former West Germans and the reunified German state. Because of moral pressure from the international community, and its political and economic interests, certainly the German government will continue to express its grief and regret for the Nazi past. However, this convergence of interests is likely to make the victimised German memory durable. Strong public opposition to the proposal for a National Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe in the mid-1990's, which granted victim status exclusively to the Jews, suggests the importance of the claim of victimhood in the popular historical consciousness and self-definition of Germans.⁹⁷

Reunification has provided another opportunity to revise the German past. That is to say, the memory of the division of Germany into two states and their reunification may replace or trivialise the Nazi past as the focal point of modern German history. As Olick (1998) points out, the tightening of German asylum policy in the 1990s, which could have evoked memories of Nazi racism, showed that the power of anti-Nazi arguments, which was the basis of the generous asylum policy, was undermined by the urge to solve current immigration problems. This change in the asylum policy and the relatively quiet reaction from the international community indicated that the German government's struggle to normalise the past by relativisation and ritualisation

achieved a certain degree of success. While knowing that they will never be able to get rid of their past, Germans have learned how to compromise with, if not master, the past, in ways which are acceptable to the state, to many of the German people and to the international community.

Finally, the significant progress of European integration after reunification has offered the German people with another way to define themselves, namely as a respected member of Europe. As mentioned above, while the post-war political situation has forced the FRG to be integrated into the transnational political and economic alliance of Western European countries, the memory of the Nazi past has placed a boundary between East Germany and West Germany, and the rest of Western Europe, in the cognitive map. After reunification, however, the German government has started attempting to integrate German history into European history.

While confining the memory of the Nazi past to rituals, as Thomas Banchoff (1997) argues, the German government has developed a rhetoric of European integration as a means to secure the common interest of peace and prosperity of European countries whose rivalries were responsible for their sufferings from destructive wars in the past. This rhetoric of common interest and shared responsibility can be seen as the German government's attempt to bind Germany and Western European countries together on the temporal plane through the perception of a common future destiny and shared bitter historical lessons. Furthermore, with the claim that the reunification of Germany is both a product of European integration and a driving force for European integration, the German government has tried to accommodate the German experience of its national division and reunification within the historical process of European integration.⁹⁸

The success of such political rhetoric on supranational regional integration depends on its resonance with popular interests and perceptions which are still, to a large extent, defined by the German people's existing national identity. A certain degree of success in the normalisation of German history has made possible the acceptance of Germany by the European community,

even if it involves the distortion of historical truth. Moreover, the advancement of European integration on the institutional and economic levels will continue to provide a supranational regional cognitive framework which may lead to the development of a sense of belonging to the wider European political and economic community among German people. However, now that the Cold War has been dissolved and the two Germanys are reunified, it is also true that Germany has lost the most significant driving force which had tied West Germany to Western Europe. Furthermore, if West Germans needed to develop an European identity in order to dissociate themselves from the criminal Nazi past, the normalisation of the Nazi past means a decline in the 'usability' of an European identity for the interest of German national identity. This suggests that identification with Europe may not be as attractive as before to the German people.

3.3. Conclusion

A comparison of the ways in which Japanese and German people handled their extremely negative recent pasts reveals many common elements: self-victimisation; the romanticisation of pre-modern, pre-industrial historico-cultural community; the search for the history of the common people; the glorification of the distant past; the advocacy of constitutional patriotism by leftists; accusations against the older generation by the younger generation. So, what is the reason for the huge difference in the regional policies of Japan and Germany?

It is important, first, to examine what political options were available to the Japanese and German governments to reconstruct their countries in the aftermath of the War. Japan was transformed into the US' number one ally in Asia during the Cold War. While Japan's responsibility for wartime aggression against the now communist countries such as China and North Korea was not questioned by the capitalist international community, South Korea's and Taiwan's resentment against Japanese colonisation was eased by their alliance with the US and their conflict with North Korea and China respectively. Thus, the politics of the Cold War politics allowed Japan not

to face up to its responsibility for its military aggression in Asia. On the other hand, West Germany had no option but to ally with its former enemies in Western Europe during the Cold War. For this reason, taking responsibility for the former regime's aggression against its European neighbours was a crucial step which the FRG had to make in the process of post-war national reconstruction. In this sense, the Europeanisation of West Germany was based on the national interests of the FRG in Cold War politics.

Another important factor is the geographical locations of the main victim groups as political units. On the one hand, the principal unit of the victims of Japan's imperial aggression has been the nation-state. They have been divided according to their citizenship and represented by their respective governments, which have placed their people's sufferings from Japanese imperialism at the core of their national memories. The fact that those countries whose peoples and national histories have been victimised by Japanese imperialism are geographically located in such close proximity to Japan has made it difficult for the development of supranational regionalism in East Asia.

On the other hand, in the German case, the principal victim groups were the Jews and Gypsies in Europe as racially designated groups. They did not constitute a nation-state at the time of the Holocaust. Israel, which declared its independence as a Jewish state in 1948, is situated far away from Germany. This has made it relatively easier for West Germany to rebuild its regional relationship, compared with Japan. This is because its capitalist neighbouring countries, as political units, did not represent the victim groups of the Third Reich's most horrible, qualitatively unique racial crimes. The acceptance of responsibility for the sufferings of its West European neighbours inflicted by the former regime in the War has allowed West Germany to transform Nazi crimes into a kind of international war crime committed against other countries, which could happen anywhere else. As a result, the narrative of European countries as victims of Nazi war crimes overshadowed their true racist nature. Thus, the normalisation of diplomatic relations

between Germany and its European neighbours has acted as the normalisation of the Nazi past. Furthermore, we also need to note that some European neighbours were not as innocent as they pretended to be. For example, despite the Vichy government's co-operation with the implementation of the Holocaust under the Nazi occupation, France's collaboration with the Nazi regime was hugely underrepresented in the public memory of the War in France. It was as late as 1993 when the French government finally acknowledged the guilt of the French Republic for racial crimes against the Jews committed by its former regime.⁹⁹ Therefore, repressed guilt for anti-Semitism outside of Germany, within Europe, may have given passive, silent support to Germany's attempts to normalise the Nazi past. The integration of Germany into the European community, with its Christian traditions and history, might have lessened the degree of uniqueness of the Nazi crimes against the Jews in German historical consciousness. In this sense, it may be said that European integration functioned as a healing process for Germany to cope with and recover from its Nazi past.

In conclusion, the differences between Japan and Germany in the ways in which they have handled their pasts are not as great as suggested by the face values of the official attitudes of the two countries toward their former victims. In both countries, the civic state-nation is grounded in the ethno-cultural nation and there has been considerable distance between elites and the 'common people' with romantic ideas of the nation still of significance. As a result, the governments of both countries have been struggling to find the right 'tone' to commemorate the darkest chapter of their national history, which can satisfy their nations without risking the relations with their new partners. The examination of the public memory of the War in Germany suggests that the FRG's willingness to admit its responsibility (but not necessarily its guilt) for the crimes committed by the former regime, in contrast to Japan's unwillingness to do so, relies more on contemporary international geopolitical conditions, which have locked Germany into the political space of Western Europe, than a pure sense of guilt for the Nazi racial crimes.

Meanwhile the end of the Cold War and increasing economic interdependence among East Asian countries have compelled Japan to review its regional policy. The Asian Values discourse, which I shall examine in the next chapter, emerged in this context. However, at the same time, the repressed memory of Japan's wartime aggression started to play a central role in the international politics of East Asia. The following chapters will demonstrate how the Japanese government has failed to strengthen popular identification with the state by mishandling the War memory in the domestic and international contexts.

Notes

¹ Eigi Oguma (2002b) gives a careful and detailed analysis of various post-war Japanese nationalist ideologies.

² However, as Oguma (2002b) points out, the ways in which they experienced the war differed, depending on to which age group they belonged to at the time of the war. As a result, generation gaps in their war experiences were reflected in differences in their political theories, as discussed later in this chapter.

³ Masao Maruyama (1997, Vol.10: 254) described post-war Japanese intellectuals as constituting a 'remorse community'. He himself was one of these intellectuals.

⁴ For example, in 1937, organised conversions of Japanese communists to national socialism in order to comply with state nationalism started taking place. For a careful analysis of this phenomenon, see Germaine A. Hoston (1994).

⁵ See Maruyama (1946).

⁶ Maruyama (1995 [1947], Vol.3: 105).

⁷ Maruyama (1996 [1986], Vol.13: 155).

⁸ Although Japan officially regained its independence in 1952 when the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect, it was accompanied by the conclusion of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America (the so-called Japan-US Security Treaty). This treaty granted the US the use of Japanese lands for their military bases. Moreover, it gave extraterritorial rights to the US military in Japan. Furthermore, its maintenance costs were equally shared by the US and Japanese governments. Nevertheless, the treaty did not include an obligation for the US military to defend Japan's security. Because of the unequal nature of the treaty, leftists considered that it gave Japan a semi-colonial status.

⁹ For the detail of this movement, see Oguma (2002b, Chapter 8). For Ishimoda Sho's emphasis on the ethnic nation, see Ishimoda (1952-3). This book became the bible for the movement.

However, the movement suffered from internal conflicts and dissolved by 1955.

¹⁰ The Association (often called *rekiken* in Japanese) constituted by progressive historians articulated the idea of the Japanese nation in terms of ethnic national consciousness. For comparison between ethnic nationalism promoted by *rekiken* and Maruyama's civic nationalism, see Curtis Anderson Gayle (2001).

¹¹ For Takeuchi's theory on the Chinese model of modernisation, see Takeuchi Yoshimi (1993 [1948]:11-57) and Oguma (2002b, Chapter 10).

¹² Many Japanese intellectuals who sought to reconstruct the modern Japanese ethnic nation in opposition to the postwar Japanese state found Johann Fichte's form of ethnic nationalism attractive (Oguma 2002b:140-41 and 264-265).

¹³ For Uehar Senroku's Pan-Asianism, see Uehara (1956).

¹⁴ For instance, Takeuchi (1993:229-237) sometimes referred to the wartime Asianist arguments in a way in which he might have appeared to support them. For example, he differentiated between the war against China (1937-1945) and the war against the U.S. and its allies (1941-1945). While admitting the former was a war of invasion, he maintained that the latter made some contribution to the independence of Asian countries (Takeuchi 1993). As a result, he was sometimes regarded as a fascist or nationalist.

¹⁵ For the effect of the Tokyo Trial on the Japanese perception of war responsibility, see Chapter 5 of this thesis.

¹⁶ For intellectuals' expression of regret, see, for example, Ishimoda (1952-3, Vol1:32) and Honda Akira (1955:40-2). Especially, as Oguma (2002b) points out, school teachers who taught children the virtue of dying for the emperor possessed a strong sense of guilt. Thus, when the Korean War (1950-1953) broke out and Japan's re-militarisation was considered by the US, *Nikkyoso*, a progressive teachers' union, adopted an anti-war resolution, proclaiming 'Never send our students to war'.

¹⁷ Mishima Yukio belonged to this generation. He romanticised the nation by idealising the death for the imperial Japanese nation. For his emperor-centred, right-wing, nationalist ideology, see, for example, Mishima (1969: 9-25).

¹⁸ As Naoko Shimazu (2003) points out, popular literature and films have enhanced a sense of Japanese victimhood. During the period of high economic growth (the mid 1960s – 1980s) accompanied by growing Japanese national confidence, the memory of the war became a consumable product. Film producers depicted the war in highly entertaining, exciting stories, using maximum visual effect. Shimazu argues that such films portrayed Japanese people as good, sincere people who greatly suffered from the war in which they were forced to participate by the military regime, while glorifying the pure spirits of Japanese soldiers who were fighting in losing battles in order to protect their beloved homeland.

¹⁹ For example, Yoshimoto Takaaki claimed that 'before feeling responsibility for Chinese victims, he (Takeda Yasuatsu, a scholar in Chinese literature) should think about the death of our own people' (Oguma 2002b: 630).

²⁰ See Yoshimoto (1969 [1960], Vol.13: 67-8). For the analysis of Yoshimoto's theory, see Oguma (2002b, Chapter 14) and Lawrence Olson (1992, Chapter 3).

²¹ For Tsurumi Shunsuke's idea of individuals who carry 'ethnic spirit' as the foundation of ethnic solidarity, see, for example, Tsurumi (1989). For the analysis of his theory, see Oguma (2002,

Chapter 16) and Olson (1992, Chapter 4).

²² It should be noted that the Japan Communist Party (JCP) enjoyed the status of moral leader in the early post-war period as it had been the only political party which had resisted the military state and opposed the war. It had especially strong influence among university students. However, after it dropped its radical policy in 1955, the radical faction of communist students left the party and founded a communist organisation in 1958, cutting off their ties with the JCP.

²³ Asahi Shimbun 20 May 1960.

²⁴ Ando Ryoichi (1960:65)

²⁵ According to a survey conducted by Asahi Shimbun on 25 and 26 May 1965, only 12% of the respondents supported the Kishi administration (See Asahi Shimbun 03 June 1960).

²⁶ Asahi Shimbun 04 June 1960. However, the anti-treaty movement declined after the revised treaty was officially ratified by the US and Japanese governments and the Kishi Cabinet resigned en masse on 15 July 1960.

²⁷ According to a survey of students of Kyoto University which was conducted in 1954, only 25% of respondents answered that they loved the state. On the other hand, 83% replied that they loved their homeland and 61% said they loved their ethnic nation. (See Oguma 2002b: 265.) Even though the students of such a prestigious university could not have had represented the masses, the results of the survey were a useful indication of the spread of the concept of an ethnic nation separate from the state.

²⁸ As Gary D. Allinson (1993) explains, the large majority of former government bureaucrats were allowed to continue filling posts in the post-war government, and most elite positions were occupied by elderly pre-war figures. For example, Shidehara Kijuro, who became Prime Minister in 1945, had previously served as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ichiro Hatoyama, who served as Prime Minister between 1954 and 1955, had been a career politician and was purged from public office by the occupation authority. Moreover, Kishi Nobusuke, who became Prime Minister in 1957, had been sentenced as a class-A criminal in the Tokyo Trial. He had occupied an influential post in Manshukuo and signed, as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Imperial rescript on the declaration of the outbreak of the war against the US and their allies.

²⁹ For the development of the myth of Japan as a homogeneous nation, see Oguma (2002a).

³⁰ For the details of the imperial tours, see John W. Dower (1999, Chapter 11) They were aimed at transferring the sovereign down to the level of the people, melding the emperor and the people and secularizing popular veneration of the emperor. Through these tours, which ended in August 1954, he visited every prefecture except Okinawa, which was still occupied by the US, and mingled with the common people. Everywhere his visit attracted a large crowd who greeted him with enthusiasm, cheering and waving the then illegal rising-sun flags. Dower explains that the emperor, who had been deprived of his former status and was trying hard to interact with ordinary people, came to personalise the plight of a once-proud nation which had been brought down by defeat in the public perception. Pointing out the favourable public reception of the emperor during the tours, Takahashi Tetsuya (2003) concludes that an overwhelming majority of the Japanese populace identified themselves with the emperor.

³¹ During the imperial period, the Japanese government promoted the concept of Japan as a mixed-ethnic nation in order to justify Japan's imperial expansion. According to the official interpretation of the ancient Japanese mythology based on *Kojiki* (compiled in 712) and *Nihonshoki* (compiled in 720), the Ainu were the indigenous people of the archipelago and were conquered by people who had migrated from the Asian continent. According to this official theory,

Japan was formed as a result of assimilation of multiple nations by the conquering Yamato nation.

³² Oguma (2002a: 308).

³³ For instance, historian Inoue Kiyoshi (1957:74) maintained that the Japanese nation was created from an almost completely homogeneous race that had lived in the same place for 2,000 years. In order to adapt the anthropological theory to Marxist historicism, he claimed that the Japanese nation had existed on the Japanese archipelago long before the arrival of the imperial family.

³⁴ For the details of his work, see Ronald A. Morse (1990) and J. Victor Koschmann, Keibo Oiwa and Shinji Yamashita (eds)(1985). In the Chapter 2 of this thesis, I have discussed the nature of his work and its influence on the development of the concept of Japan as an ethnic nation in pre-war Japan. In this chapter, I shall focus on the impact of his work on the post-war Japanese society.

³⁵ Ronald A. Morse (1985). In Morse's words, Yanagita became a 'cultural fashion' in the 1970s (1985:13).

³⁶ For Yanagita's theory of folklore studies which focuses on the history of the common people, see Yanagita (1934).

³⁷ For the analysis of *Nihonjinron*, see Kosaku Yoshino (1992) and Peter N. Dale (1986). Although its main advocates were those who belonged to the category of 'thinking elites', such as academics, journalists, writers, critics and business elites, the fact that their *Nihonjinron* discourses appeared in various forms of the popular media indicated that they had significant influence on a wide public audience and contributed to the formation of the ideological universe which constituted the concept of the Japanese cultural nation.

³⁸ See Yoshino (1992: Chapter 5).

³⁹ See for example, Nakane Chie (1967) and Doi Takeo (1971). Ruth Benedict's earlier cultural anthropological work (1947) on the unique characteristics of Japanese cultural patterns had a strong impact on later studies of Japanese society undertaken by Japanese scholars. She argued that Japan was a shame culture in the sense that behaviour patterns of Japanese people were governed by their fear of having their self-dignity undermined by real or imagined criticism from others rather than internalised moral conviction. Her argument was consonant with the criticisms of the Japanese character as lacking in self-autonomy and of the oppressive nature of Japanese society among Japanese progressive thinkers.

⁴⁰ According to Yoshino's survey (1992), only 28.6% of educators he interviewed positively responded to *Nihonjinron*, while 75.0% of businessmen did so. Considering the strong influence of progressivism on the Japanese education sector, it seems that *Nihonjinron* is less popular among leftists.

⁴¹ Thus, it is not surprising that businessmen were highly susceptible to *Nihonjinron*.

⁴² As Bernard Bernier (1985) argues, Yanagita denied the Chinese, Korean or Indian origins of many religious elements found in contemporary Japan, favouring the idea of Japanese cultural uniqueness. Moreover, as Yoneyama (1985) points out, Yanagita tried to trace the origin of Japanese culture to the Ryukyu culture of the southern islands, neglecting the similarity between Japanese and Korean cultures. When Japanese intellectuals mention the Asian origin of Japanese culture, they normally refer to China, the centre of Asian culture, paying little attention to the influence of the Korean peninsula, through which many Chinese cultural elements were believed to be transmitted to Japan. As a result, Japan's historical and cultural connection with

Korea has been most severed in post-war Japanese historical consciousness.

⁴³ *Kokugaku* scholars viewed Chinese civilisation as the major threat to Japanese cultural uniqueness. However, it should be noted that the development of *kokugaku* also took place in parallel with the development of *yogaku* (the Western Learning School), the study of Western sciences. Despite the official national seclusion policy, the Tokugawa Shogunate was interested in Western sciences and established schools for Western studies. Thus, it may be more appropriate to say that *kokugaku* was a reaction against the double threats posed by Chinese and Western civilisations.

⁴⁴ Yanagita (1964 [1935] 314-37). For the influence of *kokugaku* on Yanagita, see Aruga (1976, Chapter 5) and Irokawa Daikichi (1978:335-7).

⁴⁵ For Shiba Ryotaro's historical view, see Masanori Nakamura (1998).

⁴⁶ See Shiba Ryotaro (1990).

⁴⁷ On the other hand, popular period dramas broadcast by commercial TV stations often depict the lively lives of ordinary people in the Edo period (1603-1867). A popular theme is that common people who are suffering under the cruel rule of malicious local administrators are saved by, often drifting, uncorrupted, good-hearted *samurai*.

⁴⁸ In the drama, those Japanese Americans were depicted as the victims of international politics and the war, whose lives were helplessly swept away by the current of the times.

⁴⁹ However, it should be noted that, as Gayle (2001) points out, there was a great degree of similarity between the post-war concept of the Japanese ethnic nation and the pre-war version. Rather than creating entirely new concepts, leftist intellectuals tried to explain their ideas, using the existing language but giving it new dimensions. Thus, on the ideological level, there was no clear break between pre-1945 and post-1945.

⁵⁰ Roy F. Baumeister and Stephen Hastings (1997).

⁵¹ See for example, Jeffrey Herf (1997:Chapter 2) and Mary Fulbrook (1999:28-35).

⁵² Claudia Koonz (1994: 264).

⁵³ This Marxist interpretation of German History was reflected in the Museum for German History at Unter den Linden. The museum presented German history as a sequence of liberating revolutions and counter-revolutionary setbacks which culminated in the defeat of Nazi fascism by Soviet liberators and the establishment of the GDR. In this historical discourse, the nation's involvement in the Third Reich, the racist nature of its crimes and Jewish victims disappeared. See Charles S. Maier (1988:124-126).

⁵⁴ Fulbrook (1999:30-33).

⁵⁵ Herf (1997:188-200).

⁵⁶ Gerd Knischewski and Ulla Spittler (1997: 241).

⁵⁷ Fulbrook (1999:136-138).

⁵⁸ Fulbrook (1999:158).

⁵⁹ Alexander von Plato (1995:220).

⁶⁰ Fulbrook (1999:164-165).

⁶¹ Fulbrook (1999:193-195).

⁶² Fulbrook (1999:87-88).

⁶³ Koonz (1994: 262) and Jeffrey K. Olick (1998: 501).

⁶⁴ Fulbrook (1999:66).

⁶⁵ Fulbrook (1999:67-68). However, as Fulbrook argues, they had known about the Holocaust. Walter Laqueur (1980) examines how the Holocaust had come to be known to millions of Germans and to the government officials of neutral and Allied countries during the War.

⁶⁶ Alexander Mitscherlich and Margaret Mitscherlich (1975) called this West German failure to come to terms with the recent past as an 'inability to mourn'.

⁶⁷ Fulbrook (1999:60-65). The most notable case was the appointment of Hans Globke as Adenauer's chief aide in the Chancellery. As a civil servant, he wrote the official commentary on the Nuremberg Race Law of 1935, which deprived Jewish Germans of full citizenship rights. The so-called '131-Law' which was passed in 1951 ensured continuity of employment and full pensions for former Nazi civil servants not actually convicted of a crime.

⁶⁸ Although the GDR accused the FRG of allowing former officials of the Nazi regime to work in public offices, as Herf (1997) points out, the image of the GDR government as an antifascist government cleansed of all former Nazis was more an antifascist myth than reality. For example, Simon Wiesenthal, an Austrian journalist, compiled a list of 39 former Nazis who continued to retain their influence in the press, the radio and other propaganda organs of the GDR (Herf 1997:188-189).

⁶⁹ As Robert G. Moeller (1996: 1014-1017) explains, the reparations to Israel met with considerable opposition from both the West German public and politicians, including leading members of his own party. With Adenauer's forceful intervention, the treaty promising the payment of reparations to Israel was finally ratified by the West German parliament in 1953.

⁷⁰ Koonz (1994:264).

⁷¹ Jeffrey K. Olick and Daniel Levy (1997:928; Note 14).

⁷² For these projects, see Moeller (1996:1023-1030). Interestingly, as I discuss in later chapters, the sufferings of expellees and soldiers captured by the Soviet army have been also enshrined by the Japanese government and the veterans' association.

⁷³ Neil Gregor (2003: 193-194).

⁷⁴ As Elizabeth Heineman (1996:374-380) explains, because of a shortage of male labour, many women were engaged in clearing away the piles of heavy rubble in destroyed cities in order to feed their families. As the 'Women of the Rubble', they came to symbolise the suffering of ordinary Germans and the almost heroic strength of German citizens who survived the War and rebuilt the country.

⁷⁵ In this process, the fact that many German women supported the Nazi regime, enjoyed the advantages and the improvement of material life brought by the War, and profited from generous

family allowances provided by the regime, was forgotten (Heineman 1996:360-361).

⁷⁶ Rudy Koshar (1998: 233).

⁷⁷ Koshar (1998:238).

⁷⁸ See Fulbrook (1999:36-45). A good example of the deserted, neglected Nazi-related physical remains of great significance was the stadium at Nuremberg where the famous Nuremberg Nazi Party rallies had taken place. At the Dachau concentration camp, the Americans' attempts to set up a photographic exhibition on the Nazi atrocities in the mid-1950s, and the survivors' plan to hold a tenth anniversary commemoration, met strong opposition from the local community, which protested against the use of the concentration camp as a site of remembrance of the Nazi atrocities. When a memorial was erected there in 1960, it commemorated Catholic victims who died there for their opposition to Hitler. The Flossenbürg concentration camp was used by re-settlers from eastern provinces as a shelter or a source of building materials to construct new houses in the 1950s. In the 1960s some parts of the concentration camp was used for industrial purposes and by the mid 1960s it was demolished.

⁷⁹ As Fulbrook (1999:72) points out, the sentences given by this trial were extraordinary mild.

⁸⁰ Knischewski and Spittler (1997:243), Olick and Levy (1997:929-930), Fulbrook (1999:171).

⁸¹ Koshar (1998: 284).

⁸² As Koshar (1998:47) explains, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a movement to preserve local cultures and history took place in Germany. An important point is that the enhancement of local identity did not weaken German national identity. Rather, regional identity came to be increasingly based on a sense of belonging to a particular local community as part of the wider, multi-centred German historic-cultural community which was distinct from the modern, centralised German state. Thus, strong regional identity provided a solid basis for German national identity.

⁸³ Fulbrook (1999:199-200). She introduces results of a survey conducted in the 1980s which concluded that only 21% of West Germans were proud of their nation.

⁸⁴ Olick (1998:554).

⁸⁵ For the *Histokerstreit*, see Maier (1988).

⁸⁶ Maier (1988:29-30).

⁸⁷ Maier (1988:19-25).

⁸⁸ Maier (1988:151-154).

⁸⁹ This lack of consensus also led to the dispute over the German Historical Museum in Berlin which was established in 1987. As a result, the museum's representation of German history was a product of compromise between leftist progressivism and rightist conservatism, which satisfied neither side. However, because of the former's fear that a state-owned museum of national history could be exploited by conservatives in order to promote the state's interests and the development of state-centred nationalism, and because of the proposal which emphasised the external impact of the Great Depression on the rise of Nazism, stronger opposition to the museum came from leftists. See Maier (1988:128-139).

⁹⁰ Moeller (2001:192).

⁹¹ Fulbrook (1999:122-125).

⁹² Heinz Bude (1995:304-305)

⁹³ Bude (1995:298)

⁹⁴ Knischewski and Spittler (1997:244) and Koonz (1994:268).

⁹⁵ Knischewski and Spittler (1997:251) and Wiedmer (1999: 115-120).

⁹⁶ Knischewski and Spittler (1997:251). The plaque outside the Neue Wache names the victims it commemorates. It places Jews, Sinti, Romany Gipsies, homosexuals and the disabled who were the targets of the Nazi mass murders, and the expellees and victims of communism many of whom had supported the murderous regime side by side without distinguishing between them.

⁹⁷ After arousing much controversy, the Memorial was approved by the German parliament in June 1999. Its construction began in 2001 and is expected to be completed in 2005.

⁹⁸ Thomas Banchoff (1997:66).

⁹⁹ Wiedmer (1999:32-57). An estimated 13,152 Jews, including more than four thousand children, were arrested in Paris and its suburbs to be deported to a concentration camp by the French police as part of the Holocaust on 16 and 17 July 1942. Although the Gestapo had initially demanded the deportation of only Jewish male and female adults, aged between 15-60 and 15-55 respectively, the head of the Vichy government, Pierre Laval, requested permission to deport children as well, partly in order to reduce the burden of housing and feeding those Jewish children whose parents had been deported. Thus, the French government did more than what was demanded by the Nazi occupiers in the Holocaust. In 1993, the day of the annual ceremony at Vélodrome d'Hiver to commemorate the round-up of 16-17 July 1942 was officially designated the 'National Day of Commemoration of the Racist and Anti-Semitic Persecutions Committed under the de facto Authority called the "Government of the French State" (1940-1944)'.

Chapter 4. The Prospect for Supranational Regional Solidarity in East Asia

While the world has been undergoing processes of globalisation, we can also observe a localisation of identities on various levels happening in many parts of the world as a response to globalisation.¹ That is to say, in the era of globalisation, the world has experienced its homogenising effects and this has resulted in the awakening of a respect for local roots as a means to secure one's social identity, which has been threatened by homogenising forces of the globalisation processes.

When scholars of sociology discuss localisation, they tend to focus mainly on the local ethnic communities within a society, or in a wider context, on the locality based on religious divisions such as Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East. In both cases, the new localism is based on identification with the already existing local community which possesses an identifiable distinctive local character and discoverable history as markers to distinguish it from others. Nevertheless, the increasing number of transnational regional organisations suggests that there has been another level of groupings arising worldwide against the background of globalisation, namely groupings based on division of the world into regions, in other words, supranational Regionalisation.² An important question is whether geographical spaces called 'Regions' which transcend national borders could develop into localities to which their inhabitants would feel a sense of belonging and which have significant political, economic or cultural consequences.

Relative neglect of supranational Regionalism and Regional identity in the field of sociology seems to have resulted from the fact that they have been found mainly in political and economic discourses produced by elites, rather than in people's everyday life. Furthermore, the extent to which distinctive cultural elements and history shared by the entire Region can be identified is

unknown. This seems to have resulted in scepticism among sociologists about the possibility of the formation of a supranational Regional identity. However, political and economic processes and those of identity formation are not independent of each other. On the one hand, as the government with democratic election systems is responsive to public opinion, the fate of Regional policy in the political and economic sphere depends on the extent to which the government's Regional policy is consistent with the mass perception of and attitudes toward the Region. In countries ruled by authoritarian governments, the government has more influence on the production and reproduction of public discourses. Thus, politics and the formation of public attitudes toward the Region cannot be separated from each other. Therefore, whether it is democratic or authoritarian, it seems advisable for a government which supports a policy of Regional co-operation to encourage positive identification to the supranational Region on the mass level in its attempts to accommodate the nation within the Regional framework into which it has been politically and economically integrated. This could be done through the reform of history teaching, public policy for foreign residents, immigration laws and the control of the media, while at the same time emphasising shared elements among neighbouring countries in the same Region.

On the other hand, nationalism and national identity which are based on belief in the cultural and historical uniqueness of the nation may resist the formation of Regionalism and Regional identity which transcends national boundaries. Nonetheless, a person's identity consists of multiple levels and its composition is not fixed but can change depending on contexts. As social identity theory argues, individuals possess multiple ways of describing and categorising themselves and it is the socio-historical contexts which determine the salience of identities.³ Furthermore, Michael Billig's (1991) rhetorical approach stresses the argumentative nature of ideological processes in everyday thinking, claiming that there are always competing, often contradictory, themes involved within them. That is to say, various latent ideologies can be stocked in individual minds and the most appropriate one will be selected in order to justify and

validate situations. Thus, according to Billig the ways people perceive the world, including themselves and others, are not necessarily consistent and they are a result of negotiation between different ideologies. This suggests that, theoretically speaking, the pre-existence of established nationalism and national identity itself may not necessarily rule out the possibility of supranational Regional identity. It might be possible for nationalism and national identity on the one hand and supranational Regionalism and Regional identity on the other to co-exist in individual minds.

Nevertheless, the arena of ideological and identity formation cannot be confined to the minds of individuals. As Billig (1995) points out, the latency of national consciousness does not rely on arbitrary individual psychological processes. He argues that it is constantly maintained as a meaningful form of one's social life built within the framework of nation-states. This means that nationalism and national identity are 'more than an inner psychological state or an individual self-definition'.⁴ Their significance lies in the collective forms in which they are constantly being produced and reproduced and it is this durable collectivity which makes them socially meaningful. That is why it is crucial to examine social mechanisms and practices which collectively sustain national consciousness among the mass population.

Supranational Regionalism and Regional identity cannot be independent of nationalism and national identity in the sense that the former has to operate within the world system of nation-states. Therefore, the arena of negotiation between the former and the latter cannot also be restricted to the minds of individuals. Certainly, it is possible that a person develops Regional identification as a result of various personal experiences. However, for a Regional identity to acquire social significance, it needs to be collectively shared by other members of society and its formation has to be understood as a consequence of both psychological and social processes. The existence of supranational Regionalism and Regional identity in the minds of individuals does not guarantee the existence of a Regional identity as a durable collective

identity which can become the basis of Regional solidarity.

An important question is whether it is possible for national identity and Regional identity to co-exist on the mass level. If the answer is affirmative, in what way? The nation-states often exploit pre-existing ethnic symbols and historical myths in order to transform politically demarcated space into national communities. To apply this, one may argue that for a geographical Region to compose a Regional community with a solid form of Regional identity, the construction of historical memories and cultural symbols which can be shared within the Region is required. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1983) place strong emphasis on the social-engineering aspect of cultural and historical processes. According to Hobsbawm, history and traditions which are the main sources of national identity and nationalism are often social constructs and can be transformed according to changes in the condition of society. This suggests that people's recognition of unavoidable political and economic conditions which require Regional co-operation for national survival, such as economic crisis, may facilitate the development of Regional consciousness on the myth of common Regional cultural and historical elements in order to justify necessary Regional co-operation.

Moreover, the theory of cognitive dissonance in social psychology maintains that inconsistent cognition (e.g. historical antagonism within the Region vs. the necessity of Regional co-operation) causes cognitive disturbance. As a result, this creates a drive to reduce it by seeking attitude-consistent information.⁵ The combination of the cognitive dissonance theory and Hobsbawmian theory implies that if the public perceives that Regional co-operation is necessary, people may selectively choose historical and cultural information which is consistent with the perceived necessity of Regional co-operation. That is to say, they may come to emphasise cultural commonality within the Region and reinterpret historical relationships with neighbouring countries in a more positive direction. An important point is that the formation of such supranational Regional identification is motivated by national interests. This means that a

Regional identity is likely to be built as an extension of national identity. Therefore, as Anthony D. Smith (1992) argues, the possibility of collective formation of a Regional identity depends on the extent to which common Regional historical memories and cultural heritages within a Region can become a part of each nation's national identity.

To sum up, the existence of nationalism and national identity and the fact that Regionalism has been initiated mainly in the political and economic spheres do not necessarily rule out the possibility of the formation of supranational Regional identification on the popular level. Governmental efforts to encourage the formation of Regional consciousness and mass perception of the situations which require Regional co-operation may lead to the formation of a Regional identity in the public domain. Certainly, it is arguable whether or not such a new Regional identity is based on real feelings of kinship or genuine attachment to shared cultural elements and historical memories. Rather, it may be instrumental. It may be based more on a shared future perspective for increasing political and economic interdependence rather than historical and cultural commonality within a Region.

Nonetheless, there were many cases, including Japan, in which the elites' perceptions of the necessity for political and economic integration of regions within a nation was the driving force for the formation of political and economic nationalism in the modern era. It was accompanied by cultural nationalism and in the end resulted in the development of nationalism and national identity on the mass level. Then, it may not be unreasonable to consider the possibility of the formation of a supranational Regionalism and Regional identity on the mass level preceded by a political and economic Regionalism among elites. The most important difference between the two situations is that the formation of supranational Regionalism and of Regional identity have to negotiate with well-established pre-existing nationalism and national identity which have politically, economically, culturally, historically and geographically long divided a Region into national communities and differentiated each nation within the Region. Moreover, the fact that

the state is the principal actor in the spheres of political and economic Regionalism indicates that it is unlikely to lead to the formation of Regional institutions which seriously undermine the interests of the state.

In this chapter, I shall examine the prospect of the formation of a supranational Regional solidarity in East Asia. In the first section of this chapter, relationships between nationalism and political and economic Regionalism in post Cold War East Asia will be examined. In the second section, the role of cultural ideology in the formation of Regional solidarity will be discussed. I shall evaluate the potentiality of the 'Asian Values' discourses as a cultural marker which might be able to differentiate East Asia from the rest of the world. In the concluding section, I shall argue to what extent political and economic Regionalism and cultural Regionalist ideology could result in the formation of a supranational Regional solidarity in the era of globalisation.

4.1. State nationalism and political and economic Regionalism in post Cold War East Asia

Nationalism and Regionalism may appear incompatible. First of all, the arenas of political and economic interests of those countries which are geographically closely situated tend to compete with each other, as the conflict between China and Southeast Asian countries over the control of the South China Sea demonstrates. Secondly, the existence of well-established national identities and a lack of shared historical memories among different nations make difficult the formation of a supranational Regional identity as a solid basis of Regionalism.⁶ This may be especially true in the case of East Asia. Western and Japanese imperialism was a dominant factor which contributed to the development of the nationalism of East Asian countries in the modern era. In consequence, there is a clear gap in historical memories between Japan and the rest of the East Asian countries. It is understandable that strong nationalism in Korea, which was the most exploited victim of Japanese colonialism, may be incompatible with the idea of

identification with an East Asia which includes Japan, at least, on the emotional level. In this way, these historical facts suggest difficulties in the formation of a Regional identity in East Asia. Nevertheless, 'difficulty' does not necessarily mean 'impossibility'.

In the case of the South China Sea, the demand for stability of Regional security which is a pre-requisite for the development of a Regional economy in which each nation's economy is heavily interdependent has eased tension between the countries involved. That is to say, a conflict caused by each nation's national interests can be avoided or softened as a result of the pursuit of another national interest. The question is which kind of national interests should be given priority and whether or not other countries share the same interests. At least, in the economic sphere, shared economic interests in the stability of a Regional economy have provided the ground for the formation of economic Regionalism between East Asian states.⁷

Economic factors have affected not only the political and economic domains of nationalism but also its psychological aspect. If there is anything common in nationalisms of East Asian countries, it is their deeply rooted inferiority complex to the West and their newly acquired confidence brought by rapid economic development in recent history. The nationalism of East Asian people consists of ambivalent feelings toward the West. Encounters with the advanced West followed by Western imperialism brought Asian people admiration for the West and simultaneously a sense of inferiority. However, economic success and technological advance have finally brought East Asian people confidence and opportunities to speak for themselves. Thus, economic factors have played a significant role in the development of positive nationalistic feelings among East Asian countries. Given these facts, it seems possible that their shared historical memories of Western imperialism, their inferiority complex to the West, their experience of rapid, successful economic development and newly acquired confidence may lead to the formation of positive Regional consciousness and identity in East Asia. At least, this is the rhetoric often used by the elites of East Asian countries such as Singapore and Malaysia.

Bitter memories of imperialism and a new confidence will not easily allow East Asian countries to be dominated by others again. Nevertheless, it is unarguable that as a consequence of globalisation, especially the growth of the world market dominated by the US, which has been increasingly penetrating and dominating the economies of individual countries, nation-states are bound to lose some of their sovereignty.⁸ As a result, a political will to halt or to reverse the process of globalisation in order to safeguard a degree of national sovereignty and other state interests may emerge. In the international community, it is undeniable that there is unequal distribution of power. Those nations like the US which possess strong political and economic influence attempt to establish their ideas and values as 'universal rules' with which they claim every country should comply, and to use international institutions such as the United Nations in order to justify the enforcement of these rules. Since each nation's politics and economy are heavily interdependent and can affect other nations or the world as a whole, it is necessary to have common rules in the international community. The problem is that it is difficult to set rules which are neutral to every country. Some rules may be in favour of some country, normally those which can exercise strong political and economic power, and contradict national interests of others. As these rules supported by international organisations are imposed on each country with collective pressure, it is quite difficult for individual countries to oppose them. In this condition, Regionalism can be used as a means to protect and enhance the interests of individual states. Collective voices can speak louder than a single voice.

A good examples of Regionalism as a way to protect national interests against pressure from the international community can be found in the conflict between Western developed countries on the one hand and Southeast Asian developing countries and China on the other over the issues of human rights. China and many of those Southeast Asian countries are under the control of rather paternalistic, authoritarian regimes according to the Western democratic standard. Western countries, especially the US, have criticised them for their disrespect for human rights and urged them to adopt the Western style of democracy. However, in many

respects, the immediate adoption of Western liberalism and democracy seems to contradict the state interests of those East Asian countries. It may overturn the economic structures which have been protected by governmental intervention and protection and served rather well to their rapid economic development until the mid-1990s. This would also lead to changes in political structures and might cause political and social instability. A more important point for political elites of authoritarian regimes is that it would undermine the power of governments. Therefore, it is not difficult to understand why they object to the imposition of Western democracy and human rights.

Nonetheless, even though the East Asian countries have gained more economic power than before, they are not strong enough to fight individually against collective pressure from the international community dominated by Western countries. Thus, they have chosen to turn to Regionalism in order to collectively voice their position on the human rights issues. In 1993, Asian states jointly announced the Bangkok Declaration. It accepts that 'human rights' are 'universal' in nature but adds that they must be considered in the context of national and Regional particularities.⁹ It was a collective, Regional expression against Western hegemony of the world.

Sharing some common political and economic interests, Southeast Asian countries have been trying to develop Regionalism in order to protect their national interests in international society. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand in 1967. It was later joined by Brunei (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997) and Cambodia (1999). The ASEAN declaration of 8 August 1967 says:

'Considering that the countries in Southeast Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring

their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples...¹⁰

This suggests that Regionalism is not necessarily incompatible with nationalism in the political and economic spheres. On the contrary, Regionalism can be a useful weapon for enhancing national interests, especially in their relations with those outside the Region. As Michael Yahuda (1996: 4) maintains, the ASEAN was designed in practice to enhance the effective independence of its member states, not to integrate the Region by merging their sovereignty.

On the other hand, bitter historical memories of Japanese imperialism which fueled the development of nationalisms in Korea, Taiwan and China, and ideological conflict between North and South Korea, and between Taiwan and China have made it difficult for Regionalism to develop in Northeast Asia. Although economically the relationships between these countries have been improving with the exception of North Korea, there has been a lack of formal Regional institutionalisation equivalent to the ASEAN or the EU. Thus, considering the historical backgrounds, the development of a solid form of Regionalism in Northeast Asia seems rather difficult. However, as Björn Hettne (1996) argues, since Regionalism in the late modernity has been closely linked to globalisation, Regionalism cannot be explained merely by considering intra-Regional relationships. The prospect for a Regionalism among Northeast Asian countries has to be examined in terms of their relations with other countries and Regions in the global context.

Kishore Mahbubani (1995), Permanent Secretary of Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, points to the inclusive nature of Asia-Pacific Regionalism, claiming that it has been trying to draw diverse societies into the Region's dynamism. The idea of an East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) comprising the ASEAN, China, Japan and South Korea was originally proposed in 1990

by the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed. In 1993 the ASEAN formally accepted it as a caucus within the larger framework of the US-dominated APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation).¹¹ It was an attempt by Southeast Asian economic Regionalism to integrate Northeast Asia into its Regional framework. The proposal for the EAEC was unsuccessful mainly because of strong opposition by the US which put pressure on South Korea and Japan to reject the proposal.¹² Nonetheless, the idea implies a possibility that institutionalised Regionalism in Southeast Asia may provide a ground for the development of Regionalism in Northeast Asia by integrating the latter into the extended Regional framework of the former. Since the importance of economic relations with the ASEAN has become greater for China, South Korea and Japan, their integration into the larger framework of East Asian Regionalism, led by the ASEAN, might lessen the impact of historical memories on their relationships because isolation within the Region is fatal to their state interests.

Apart from historical reasons, one of the main factors which has prevented the development of Regionalism in East Asia is the strong political, economic and cultural presence of the US in the Region. The Cold War gave great strategic significance to the US relations with Taiwan, South Korea, Japan and capitalist countries of Southeast Asia. Moreover, since the East Asian Region has acquired strong economic power, it has gained economic importance as well. Thus, having close relationships with those East Asian countries has been crucial for the US foreign policy. As a result, the US has tried to strengthen relations with the APEC. In other words, the US has attempted to build a Regional economic alliance within the Asian-Pacific Region.

This Asian-Pacific economic Regionalism led by the US has negatively functioned against the development of East Asian Regionalism. It has hindered the development of Regional consciousness as exclusively Asian. Since the elites of East Asian countries, especially Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, have been aware that their economy and security heavily depend on the US, this has severely restricted thinking solely in terms of East Asia. However, the situation

has been changing. After the dissolution of the Cold War the mutual strategic interests between the US and East Asian countries have become less significant. In contrast, the relations between China and other East Asian countries have become closer as a result of the relative economic liberalisation of China. The conflict over the issue of human rights between the US on the one hand and China and some Southeast Asian countries on the other has improved the diplomatic relations between China and those Southeast Asian countries. After the Tiananmen incident in 1989, despite Western accusations of China for its violation of human rights accompanied by economic sanctions, the ASEAN saved China from isolation by insisting that it was China's own business and it should be free from intervention by other countries.¹³ They made it clear that their existing friendly policies toward China would not change.

The reason behind the ASEAN's support for China is not simply that they share the same stance on the human rights issues, but also that the ASEAN was afraid that China's international isolation might radicalise China's foreign policies, which were becoming more open, and this would affect the stability of East Asian Regional security. In consequence, China-ASEAN relations developed significantly after the event. In this way, the elite perceptions of the US in the Southeast Asian countries have shifted toward a less favourable direction, while positive political and economic relations between China and Southeast Asian countries have been enhanced.

The close military relationship of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to the US has also prevented the development of Regional consciousness in Northeast Asia. Conflict between North and South Korea, and between China and Taiwan have made it necessary for South Korea and Taiwan to depend on military support from the US. In the case of Japan, because of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the US, the latter has the right to have its military base in Japan in order to protect Japan's security. Moreover, the US and Japan have built very strong economic relations. As a result, Japan has been politically and economically

closer to the US than other East Asian countries. Therefore, for the development of Regionalism in Northeast Asia, the integration of North Korea and China into the Regional security dialogue, which may decrease the necessity of a US military presence in the Region, and Japan's active Regional role, which is less susceptible to US influence, are crucial.

Since the East Asian Region presents enormous potential economic benefit to the US, the US is afraid of being excluded from the Region's economic circle. The US has been using the APEC and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a means to exercise its economic influence in the Region. Nevertheless, the severe economic crisis in the Region which started from Thailand in the middle of 1997 has made Asian leaders critical of the US policy, the APEC and the US-dominated IMF. East Asian leaders perceived the reluctance of the US to take quick measures to stop the expansion of the economic crisis in the Region as the decline of the US commitment to the region.¹⁴ Furthermore, Thai, Indonesia and South Korean press expressed resentment at the excessively draconian nature of the IMF rescue packages as they were given under the condition that they should be used 'properly' according to the instruction of the IMF which was intended to introduce Western systems of economic policies to East Asian countries.¹⁵

The East Asia criticism of and scepticism toward the US and the IMF fuelled by this economic crisis called for the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) in which Japan was expected to take the initiative. The proposal for the AMF was aborted mainly because of strong opposition that emerged from the US and the IMF. They were afraid that the AMF might take the place of the IMF and that it might lessen the US influence on the Region. Nonetheless, the proposal to set up the AMF, which consisted only of East Asian states, itself demonstrated the development of economic Regionalism among the East Asian elites. It was an exercise of thinking in terms of East Asia similar to the idea of East Asian Economic Caucus within the APEC.¹⁶ It indicated the emergence of an East Asian political and economic alliance of which

the US cannot be a part. The economic crisis made East Asian leaders realised that the IMF and the APEC were too large to effectively deal with Regional problems of East Asia and that the ASEAN were too small to do so. In this condition, the idea of East Asian Regionalism offered the alternative solution.

In fact, the recent economic crisis facilitated the development of Regional economic cooperation in East Asia. Since 1997, the leaders and high level officials of the ASEAN countries, and China, Japan and South Korea, have met regularly to discuss further economic cooperation within the Region. In 1999, they issued 'the Joint Statement on the East Asian Cooperation' which stresses the necessity of Regional cooperation and interaction for the promotion of peace, stability and prosperity in the Region, and expresses their commitment to collective efforts to advance mutual understanding, trust and friendly relations.¹⁷ A significant feature of this so-called ASEAN+3 framework is that it consists of multiple levels of Regional dialogues: 1) between ASEAN+3 countries, 2) between ASEAN + each of China, Japan and Korea, 3) between China, Japan and Korea, and 4) between the ASEAN countries.¹⁸ These multi-level processes of the ASEAN+3 framework seem to be rather effective in the integration of Northeast Asian countries into ASEAN-led Regionalism. For example, in 2001 China and the ASEAN agreed to form a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) within 10 years and have already started actual negotiations. Following China, Japan has also agreed to conclude an Economic Partnership Agreement including an FTA within 10 years. Meanwhile, Japan and South Korea have been planning to complete their negotiation process for the formation of an FTA within 2005.¹⁹ The combination of these different FTAs within the Region might help the establishment of an East Asian Free Trade Area which was recommended as a necessary step for the formation of an East Asian Community by the East Asian Vision Group.²⁰ The President of the Philippines even supports the idea of a common East Asian currency as one of goals of the ASEAN+3 alliance.²¹

In this way, the dissolution of the Cold War and the Regional economic crisis have changed the

international relations within the East Asian Region. Certainly, what economic turmoil has affected is mainly the political and economic aspects of Regionalism. Nonetheless, its impact is not necessarily limited to the political and economic spheres. As Hettne (1996) argues, the new Regionalism after the end of the Cold War is comprehensive and involves multidimensional processes which include not only economic and political aspects but also social and cultural aspects. For instance, the economic turmoil which made Japan and South Korea realise their mutual economic interdependence altered the South Korean government's cultural policy toward Japan. South Korean President Kim Dae Jung asked for financial aid from Japan and loosened the restriction on its cultural imports from Japan, stating that Japan and South Korea should clear off their past.²² An increasing level of interaction between the two countries culminated in their joint hosting of the World Football Cup in 2002, during which South Korean visitors to Japan for the purpose of short stay were exempted from making a visa application. At the Japan-South Korea Summit in July 2004, the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro promised to consider a permanent visa exemption for short-stay visitors from South Korea.

It is difficult to predict where this political and economic East Asian Regionalism is heading. Certainly, it will not lead to the establishment of a supranational state which would undermine the sovereignty of individual states. This is because the development of East Asia Regionalism has been motivated by the interests of each state. A report submitted at the ASEAN+3 meeting in 2001 by the East Asian Vision Group, which consisted of representatives of each of the ASEAN+3 countries, recommends the development of East Asia as a community of nations. As measures to achieve this goal, the Group promotes closer cooperation in the economy, finance, security, environmental protection, and the formation of the identity of an East Asian community. Thus, the Group regards the development of an East Asian Regional identity as one of keys to the success of East Asian community building. So, on what basis can an East Asia identity be constructed at the popular level?

The impacts of economic crisis on East Asian Regionalism should be considered within the multidimensional Regional framework. Each dimension is not independent but interconnected. A shared negative impression of the US among the elites of East Asian countries may increase Regional consciousness and reinforce a US versus East Asia cognitive framework. Moreover, the recent economic crisis has enhanced the importance of the Regional tie and the perception of shared destiny. Furthermore, the development of European and American Regionalisms, which have been represented by the enlargement and deeper integration of the European Union and the formation of the Free Trade Area of Americas respectively, have made East Asian elites aware of the trend of supranational Regionalism around the world.²³ In consequence, these factors may lead to the invention and reinvention of discourses of 'Asianness' in various forms. An important question is to what extent Regionalism identifiable in political and economic discourses among elites can be actually shared by the mass of the population.

Some theorists of nationalism regard the coincidence of the boundary of the state as a political community and that of the nation as an ethnic community as an important factor for the development of nationalism as a mass movement.²⁴ From this, one may argue that for the successful formation of a solid sense of belonging to a political community, the co-existence of a solid sense of belonging to an ethnic community whose boundary coincides with that of the political community is required. What can this suggest about the formation of Regionalism and a Regional identity? Regarding European integration, Philip Schlesinger (1994: 48) argues that Europe has been simultaneously undergoing the processes of centralisation and fragmentation generated by nationalism and Regionalism and that culture will be 'one of the key political battlefields'. This suggests that in order to predict the future of East Asian Regionalism, we also need to examine what kind of cultural movements have emerged in the wake of political and economic Regionalism in East Asia.

4.2. The role of cultural ideology in the formation of a supranational regional identity in late modernity

Samuel Huntington (1993) divides the world into major civilisations and maintains that in the post Cold War epoch, the fundamental source of conflicts will not be primarily ideological or economic but cultural. A major weakness of his civilisation paradigm is that it is based on cultural essentialism. Culture is not static but dynamic and can change according to changes in political, economic and social conditions. Certainly, in late modernity, the society and culture of East Asia have been undergoing dramatic changes due to the impact of globalisation processes.

The point is, toward which direction have these changes been heading?

Both Huntington and those who criticise him by emphasising homogenising forces of globalisation share the same mistake by failing to recognise the dual processes of globalisation, namely universalisation and particularisation. Both sides underestimate the capacity of cultures to integrate other cultural elements into their own existing systems. As Immanuel Wallerstein (1984:166-7) argues, globalisation consists of both assimilation into the universal and the reinvention of differences. That is to say, cultural tolerance makes it possible for people to adopt elements of other cultures in their own way and transform their cultures while maintaining cultural continuity. On the other hand, changes in local cultures affect the cultures of other parts of the world as a result of globalisation. In other words, globalisation is the processes of ongoing interactive dialogue between the global and the local. Similarly, Ronald Robertson (1991) emphasises the ideas of 'relativisation' in the globalisation processes. With the concept of 'relativisation', Robertson rejects the idea of universal effects of globalisation on different societies and insists that the impacts of globalisation are relative to the nature of individual cultures and societies. Each culture integrates universal elements through the lens of its particularity and some particular elements of individual cultures are exported to the global arena to be consumed by its various members in their own ways.

Post-modernists often claim that in late modernity subject is fragmented and de-centred. They maintain that the post-modern subject has no fixed identity and that identity is 'formed and transformed continuously in relation to the way we are represented and addressed in the cultural systems'.²⁵ According to them, people confront tension and conflicts between different values surrounding them. However, this is not a phenomenon specific to late modernity. Throughout modern history, culture has been always subject to changes and individuals have assumed different identities at different times. Certainly, in late modernity the range of values and social roles available to individuals has been rapidly expanding. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that subject has become suddenly fragmented in later modernity.

The discourse of 'de-centred subject' seems to be a result of the shift of intellectual interest from Cartesianism to more social paradigms rather than of any actual change of the human subject itself. Firstly, Marxism places strong emphasis on historical constraint on the formation of the subject. That is to say, human beings are subjected to historical conditions and the latter provides the former with material and cultural resources for the formation of 'self'.²⁶ Secondly, according to the Freudian theory, the unconscious, which is the basis of identity formation, is a result of socialisation. Moreover, Ferdinand de Saussure maintains that language, which is a means for us to understand and express ourselves, is a product of social and cultural systems which pre-exist us.²⁷ Furthermore, Michel Foucault emphasises the collective influence of modern institutions on identity formation.²⁸ In this way, the Cartesian concept of the modern subject as an indivisible, unified, coherent entity has been replaced by a new concept of modern subject which is of a more social, collective nature.²⁹ This suggests that although it is undeniable that the world has been experiencing rapid social and cultural changes in late modernity, it may be the way intellectuals understand the nature of the subject which has actually changed, rather than the nature of the subject itself. The changes in the intellectual trend cannot be simply equated with those in human nature. Moreover, if identity formation is influenced by social and historical conditions, a person's identity may be more durable and less

fragmented than it is assumed to be by post-modernists. This is because historical conditions are the result of long-term processes and often resistant to change. Moreover, as Robertson's 'relativisation' theory suggests, culture integrates new elements into pre-existing cultural systems, maintaining its continuity. This durability of historical and cultural conditions limits the homogenising as well as fragmenting impacts of globalisation on one's identity.

Furthermore, even if, as structural linguists such as Jacques Derrida (1981) claim, we may not be able to fix and have control over the meanings of language which we use in order to understand and express who we are, it does not necessarily follow that our identity is unstable, disintegrated and dislocated. The reason for this is that even though it may be true that language can be interpreted in multiple ways and its meanings can never be fully fixed, language is socially constructed and its meanings have to reflect society's ideologies. Otherwise, it would fail to make sense and would not be able to function as a means of communication. This suggests that the meanings of language do not change arbitrarily. They are determined by ideological contexts. In other words, in a context which is dominated by particular ideologies, the meanings of language can be rather fixed and consistent. Thus, the flexibility of language cannot be taken as evidence of the fragmentation of modern subject.

Certainly, there are normally various, often contradictory, ideologies within society. However, this, too, does not necessarily mean that the modern subject has been suffering from the fragmentation of its identity. As Billig's (1991) rhetorical approach suggests, people possess the ability to cope with contradictory information in everyday thinking. By continuously creating and recreating narratives of the coherent, true self, one can assume a consistent identity and maintain a sense of self-integrity. In the sense that narratives are composed of language of which the meanings are defined by historical and cultural conditions, the narrative of the self is a social construction and to a certain extent shared by other members of society. This shared narrative of the self leads to the formation of collective identity, which is more than individual

self-definition. At the same time, collective identity attempts to produce and reproduce particular ideologies to maintain itself.

To sum up, post-modernist theories have contributed to the better understanding of the social nature of identity formation processes. Nonetheless, they have also contributed to a myth of the fragmentation of late-modern identity. They tend to fail to recognise reciprocal relationships between society and individuals mediated by ideology-loaded language which determines the formation of collectivity and binds individuals to their society. In modern social life in which individuals encounter various levels of social interactions, their identity might appear rather arbitrary as it changes according to social contexts. Nevertheless, identity cannot be produced out of nothing. If, as the social identity theory suggests, individuals possess multiple identities of which salience is determined by social contexts, each latent identity has to be maintained and, if necessary, modified by reference to current ideology in order to be ready to function properly whenever it is called for. Ideology is not dying in late modernity. As long as identity is built on narratives made of ideology-loaded language, identity and ideology cannot be separated. Shared ideology functions as a bridge between individuals and constitutes the basis of collectivity within society which is more than the psychological inner state of individual members.

The above arguments emphasise the importance of the role which ideology plays in the formation of collective identity. In the introduction of this chapter, I argued that for the formation of East Asian solidarity, political and economic Regionalism are insufficient and it requires a cultural basis for Regionalism. What kind of cultural ideology is available to East Asia for the formation of a Regional identity? On the one hand, their desire for 'development' has driven East Asian countries to adopt the Western model of modernisation. There has been strong admiration for Western cultures as Westernisation has been equated with 'progress'. Moreover, new transnational media systems, such as the Internet and the satellite TV broadcasting, and

the global market, have brought opportunities for people to forge a sense of belonging to a wider community which transcends the existing national boundaries.

On the other hand, it seems also true that as a reaction against rapid social changes in late modernity, respect for traditional, indigenous cultural and social values has resurfaced. An interesting point is that these values are sometimes regarded as the values of Asia. For instance, the results of interviews with 120 middle class Malays conducted by Joel S. Kahn (1997) shows that the most respondents articulated some form of the 'Asian Values' arguments against the 'Western Values'. As another example, the book entitled No to ieru Ajia (The Asia That Can Say No) co-authored by the Malaysian Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir and Ishihara Shintaro, a conservative Japanese politician, was published in 1994. This book, which emphasises the superiority of distinctive Asian thought and spirit to Western modernism, was well received and sold 70,000 copies in Japan within the first four weeks of its publication.³⁰ Moreover, by the mid-1990s many East Asian intellectuals and opinion leaders supported the idea that there were common values in East Asia.³¹ In this way, not only in the political and economic spheres, but also in the intellectual and cultural arenas, there has been growing interest in the discourses of Asian distinctiveness and identity in parallel with an increasing level of political and economic Regional interaction.

There are a number of possible reasons for this emergence of Regional consciousness among East Asian people. First of all, political and economic Regionalism has offered a cognitive framework for Regional consciousness to grow. At the same time, the increasing degree of European integration may have made Asian people more aware of Regional groupings around the world. Secondly, successful economic development has made East Asian people more confident in their own culture and values. As Mahbubani (1995) argues, economic progress has provided East Asian people with opportunities to overcome the inferiority complex brought by Western imperialism and regain their self-confidence.³² Furthermore, perceived moral decay

and high crime rates in the West have produced the impression that the Western models predominantly promoted by the US are flawed and thus, undesirable for Asia. As a result, it seems that the reassertion of their own cultural and social values has begun to emerge.³³

In this way, political and economic Regionalisation, a shared inferiority complex to the West and the common experience of successful economic development have together provided East Asia with potential ideological and perceptual frameworks for the formation of a Regional identity. Under these conditions, the Asian Values discourses have been promoted as a cultural ideology to compete with prevailing Western values and justify political and economic Regionalism in East Asia. The potentiality of Asian Values discourses as a cultural ideological basis for the formation of Regional solidarity relies on their exploitation of Confucian values which are shared by many East Asian countries. In other words, they can be a part of both national and Regional traditions at the same time. Certainly, the concept of Asian Values has been criticised as misleading because Asia is constituted by enormous religious, cultural, political differences.³⁴ However, what matters in the formation of Regional consciousness is not objective internal diversity within Asia but people's subjective perception of their relationship with 'Asia'. Moreover, the perceived degree of diversity and cohesiveness within a Region is often relative to its relations with the outside. That is to say, perceived differences between the West and East Asia might weaken the perception of diversity within East Asia. The above kind of criticism seems to underestimate the flexibility of the perception of cultural values and the influence of ideology on the person's perception of the reality. We only need to be reminded of how Asianism developed as an extension of nationalism in the minds of many Japanese elites, militarists and intellectuals in pre-1945 Japan.

The concept of Asian Values which has been advocated by some East Asian elites and intellectuals is largely based on Confucian ethics such as a sense of responsibility toward the family, society and the government, emphasis on communal, rather than individual, interests,

the virtue of hard work, high regard for societal harmony, and respect for authority. Confucianism spread originally from China throughout East Asia and has been interwoven with Buddhism, Taoism, Islam and other doctrines for a long period of time, and deeply rooted in East Asian society in various forms. Therefore, although Confucianism originated in China, it has been integrated into several indigenous cultures, and so the ways in which Confucian ethics function may be different between different societies. Furthermore, the meanings of Confucian ethics are so malleable that various, even contradictory, interpretations of them are possible.

It might be said that the Asian Values based on Confucianism are not necessarily Asian. The same values may be found in other cultures. David I. Hitchcock (1997) insists that even if there are differences between Asia and Western values, these differences may be diminishing through globalisation and modernisation. Nonetheless, the effectiveness of the Asian Values discourses in the formation of East Asian collectivity does not depend on whether those values are in fact distinctively Asian in an objective sense or whether the Asian values exist at all. It depends on the possibility of various values in different societies being placed together in the same category under the inclusive name of 'Asian Values', regardless of the differences between societies in the ways in which they actually function. The Asian Values which are discovered in China may be different from those in Malaysia. Nevertheless, their differences may not matter. The point is that people in these countries have started adopting the same 'West versus Asia' cognitive paradigm in their perception of the world, and as a result, become more conscious of self as Asian than before, while creating a myth of differences between the West and Asia. People do not react to the reality itself but to the perception of the reality. In consequence, it may not be impossible for an Asian identity based on this myth to develop. Thus, the potentiality of the Asian Values discourses as a cultural bridge between East Asian countries cannot be ruled out, despite observable cultural diversity within the Region.

Finally, the Asian Values which have been produced and reproduced are not a renaissance of

ancient Confucian values. Firstly, as mentioned above, they are a product of cultural fusion of Confucianism of Chinese origin and other indigenous cultures. Secondly, they are a result of interaction between modernity and tradition. Values within Asian society have been modified, reinterpreted and redefined over years to fit into modern contexts. That is to say, the elements of traditional values which do not fit in the modern contexts have been de-emphasised and those compatible with them have been stressed. In this way, Confucianism has survived dramatic social changes in late modernity by its flexible adjustment.

To sum up, the basis of the West versus Asia cognitive framework has been gradually formed in East Asia. This has given Asian people another way to perceive the world, based on Regional categorisation. However, categories themselves are like empty vessels and do not automatically construct identities. For an identity to be formed, something which can fill categories, increase intra-category coherence and differentiate themselves from other categories is required such as shared cultural elements, history and destiny. In the case of East Asia, economic interdependence has brought to the Region a perception of shared destiny and the discourses of the Asian Values has provided it with a potential cultural element to fill the category of East Asia. Because of its flexibility and ability to be intermixed with other cultural elements, the myth of the Asian Values has the potential to function as a bridge not only between East Asian countries but also between modernity and tradition, while maintaining cultural continuity.

The problem of the Asian Values discourses is that they have been exploited by some East Asian political leaders to justify a lack of respect for democracy and human rights in their government. In this way the idea of the Asian Values has come to be seen as posing a threat to Western liberalism and the idea of human rights. However, Confucianism itself does not reject the idea of refusing a ruler who does not possess moral qualities and strong self-disciplines which are considered essential for the realisation of moral government. For the idea of the Asian Values to become a successful ideology, its values have to be adjusted in the way in which they

have universal appeal. For example, Lee Seung-hwan (2000:60) argues that Confucian emphasis on serving the masses, rather than individual interests, has promoted 'practical democracy'. Chaibong Hahm (2001:12) maintains that the right way to defend Confucianism is to show that it not only protects those values which Western liberals call human rights but also those values that Western liberalism fails to defend and preserve. Thus, Asian Values have been presented as something Asian but not exclusive to Asia, and something which can contribute to the progress of universal human civilisation as an alternative to Western liberalism and individualism. One may argue that this universalistic aspect of the Asian Values discourse undermines its effectiveness as cultural ideology. However, in modern times, have we not seen nationalists justify their cause by claiming some kind of universal values and ideals?

4.3. Conclusion

Politically and economically, the relations between East Asian countries have become increasingly interdependent, and the recent economic crisis has enhanced the importance of the Regional tie and the perception of shared Regional destiny. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that the East Asian government will try to move public attitudes toward their neighbours in a more positive direction. The advocacy of the Asian Values by some Asian political elites and the lifting of the ban on cultural imports from Japan by South Korea can be regarded as attempts by the governments to encourage the development of Regionalism and Regional consciousness on the mass level for political and economic purposes.

Nevertheless, at the same time, the state needs to sustain national identity among the masses in order to maintain its power, securing the unity between the state and the nation. That is to say, in late modernity the East Asian states have to be engaged in the ideological management of nationalism, Regionalism and globalism. Since the state cannot totally control the course of ideological processes in the public sphere, it is essential to examine how the mass population is

involved in these processes in order to understand the outcome of ideological competitions and its influence on collective identity. As discussed above, when the political community, represented by the state, and the historico-cultural community, with distinctive historical memories and cultural traits in which people's everyday life is deeply rooted, coincide in the perception of the mass population, nationalism exerts the strongest mobilising power and national collectivity becomes the most stable and secure. In this case, the interests of the state are identified with those of the historico-cultural national community. The state is regarded as the means to realise the collective desires of the people, who believe that they belong to a particular historico-cultural community, and when the state fails to do so, they are ready to stand against it.

On the other hand, if the state loses its centralising power, there is the possibility of the fragmentation of the existing historico-cultural community, which may lead to the emergence of a new historico-cultural collectivity with a wish to secure its existence and interests through the establishment of a new state. Thus, although state nationalism and popular nationalism have their own respective lives, they cannot be independent of each other. They need the support of each other in order to secure the lives of the state and of its people. This suggests that for the formation of solid, stable collectivity, the convergence of a political community and historico-cultural community in the perception of the mass population is essential. A question is, could political and economic interdependence and a myth of cultural commonality within a Region lead to the formation of Regional solidarity?

Political and economic integration and common cultural elements may not be sufficient for the formation of a solid collective identity, especially in late modernity when a person's cultural identity is composed of a variety of cultural categories whose boundaries can cut across each other. Dick Hebdige (1989: 90) emphasises 'the binding power of transnational media systems' that offer people new forms of community and alliance which can transcend the boundaries of

class, race, gender, Region and nation. That is to say, according to him, people in late modernity have more capacity to construct new communities and identities through the mass media, popular culture and consumption than before. This diversification of cultural identities has made it difficult for a single cultural category to dominate the rest. Moreover, Kevin Robins (1991:28) points out that the world has seen cultural globalisation through the manufacture of universal cultural products. He argues that there is a belief in 'world cultural convergence', in other words 'a belief in the convergence of lifestyle, culture, and behaviour among consumer segments across the world'.

Both Hebdige and Robins fail to take into consideration the fact that diversification and universalisation of cultural identities always operate in particular social, historical and cultural contexts. As Robertson (1991) argues, cultural processes are relative to the context in which they take place. That is to say, diversification and universalisation of cultural identities take place within the existing national cultural community. Robins also claims that the link between culture and territory has been significantly broken as a result of cultural globalisation. To some extent, this may be true since there has been less constraint of national boundaries on the flow of cultural information and consumption. Nonetheless, this does not mean that the community to which people have believed they belong is disappearing as the sense of belonging to a particular community consists not only of common cultural traits but also shared historical memories of ideologically defined 'homelands'.

The continuing existence of institutional framework of nation-states and established national historical memories are unlikely to allow the national community to be erased from people's memory and cognitive framework. This suggests that even though cultural factors may have been losing their influence as the main definer of national collective identity, it is possible for national identity to survive the wave of globalisation. Multiplication of cultural boundaries might make possible the formation of cultural boundaries both below and above the national level of

which the supranational Regional cultural boundary could be one option. Then, it seems that the final obstacle in the construction of Regional collectivity is established national historical memories, which have divided the nations within the Region. The ideological battlefield may be more historical rather than cultural in late modernity, although cultural symbols continue to function as resources of historical memories.³⁵

Finally, it seems that the consequence of globalisation is not the dissolution of nations but rather separation between the state and the nation as a historico-cultural community which had been merged as one entity. That is to say, the increasing influence of international organisations and global capitalism has weakened the state's hold on the historico-cultural national community. An important point is that the decline of the state's political and economic role should not be equated with the decline of the established historico-cultural national community on which popular nationalism is based because they are different entities. What is required for the study of nationalism and Regionalism in the era of globalisation is to examine in what way the state and historico-cultural national community respectively cope with the impact of globalisation. If, as argued above, the main ideological battlefield for collective identity is historical, we need to look at how each of them reacts to the influence of an a historical globalisation and universalism, and in what way it will affect the existing national identities and the formation of supranational Regional collectivity. Thus, the ways in which the state and the mass population of the historico-cultural national community construct and reconstruct historical memories are the key to the formation of mass collectivity in late modernity.

There has been renewed interest in historical relationships between Japan and Korea in the pre-modern period among historians. On 23 December 2001, his 68th birthday, Emperor Akihito commented at a press conference that he felt a certain kinship with Korea because Zoku nihonki, the one of the oldest chronicles of Japanese history, compiled in 797, said that the mother of Emperor Kammu was on the line of King Muryonng of the Kingdom of Paekche, which

occupied the southwest Korean Peninsula between the fourth and seventh century.³⁶ Recently, South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun expressed his intention not to place the historical issue of Japanese colonialism on his agenda during his presidency, stating that Japan and South Korea should make efforts not to allow the past to become an obstacle to friendship between the two countries.³⁷ So, can they build a common identity on the basis of shared political and economic interests, perceived common destiny and cultural values, and the historical memory of the distant past, while bypassing the recent past?

Ronald P. Dore (2000:222-225) argues that Japan will resist incorporation into US-led global capitalism partly because of the strong sense of cultural and racial uniqueness among the Japanese, and the persistence of a nationally-framed holistic way of thinking in Japan. On the other hand, he is less assertive about Japan's future relations with Asia. While admitting that there are similarities between Japan and Korea in terms of employment institutions, business practices and the expected role of the state in the economy, he suggests that a widely held perception of Asianess as backwardness in contrast with Western modernity has been limiting the impact of the Asian Values discourses on Japan's economic behaviour. Nevertheless, he implies that the further economic progress of other East Asian countries may change the situation. A question is what will happen to the Japanese sense of national uniqueness, then? Is it going to erode in the face of the discovery of some cultural commonalities and economic interdependence within East Asia? Dore points to the combination of survivor's guilt and patriotism as one of the factors that have sustained the Japanese sense of national distinctiveness. In the remaining chapters, I shall explore the Japanese historical memories of the Asia-Pacific War and their implication for the possibility of the development of an Asian identity in Japan.

Notes

¹ Stuart Hall (1992:304-309).

² In this chapter, the capital letter 'R' is used for supranational Regions and Regionalism so that they will not be confused with regions and regionalism *within* a nation.

³ The theory of social identity; see, for example, Diminic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg (eds) (1999).

⁴ Michael Billig (1995: 69).

⁵ For the theory of cognitive dissonance, see Leon Festinger (1957).

⁶ Anthony D. Smith (1992).

⁷ In this chapter, 'East Asian economic Regionalism' refers to an ideology which calls for an increasing degree of Regional economic co-operation between China, Japan, South Korea, and 10 member states of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), namely Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

⁸ Björn Hettne (1996).

⁹ The document of the Bangkok Declaration (1993) on human rights is available at <<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu5/wcbangk.htm>>

¹⁰ For The ASEAN Declaration (1967) see <<http://www.aseansec.org/1629.htm>>

¹¹ For the concept of the EAEC (the East Asia Economic Caucus) and its relation with the APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), see Richard Higgott and Richard Stubbs (1995) and Terada Takashi (2003).

¹² Higgott and Stubbs (1995:522).

¹³ Jie Chen (1993:228).

¹⁴ Terada (2003: 265).

¹⁵ Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 January 1998.

¹⁶ Higgott (1998).

¹⁷ For Joint Statement on East Asia Cooperation, issued on 28 November 1999, see <<http://www.aseansec.org/6337.htm>>

¹⁸ Zhang Yunling (2002).

¹⁹ For the recent development of East Asian economic regionalism, see Yamazawa Ippei (2002) and Terada (2003).

²⁰ The East Asian Vision Group (EAVG) was set up under the initiative of South Korean

President Kim Dae Jung in 1998. The EAVG, which was composed of two representatives from each of the ASEAN countries, and China, Japan and Korea, was instructed to submit recommendations for the realisation of an East Asian Community at the fifth ASEAN+3 meeting in 2001. The report presented by the EAVG at the meeting is available at <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/report2001.pdf>>

²¹ See the speech made by Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, the President of the Philippines at an international conference 'The Future of Asia 2003' held in Tokyo. The manuscript of her speech is available at

<http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/FR/NIKKEI/inasia/future/2003/2003speech_arroyo.html>

²² Asahi Shimbun, 30 April 1998.

²³ Terada (2003).

²⁴ See, for example, Walker Connor (1994) and Ernest Gellner (1983).

²⁵ Hall (1992: 277).

²⁶ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (1951: Vol.1:329) argue that 'It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness'.

²⁷ Hall (1992: 288).

²⁸ See, for example, Michael Foucault (1967).

²⁹ For this conceptual change of the modern subject, see Hall (1992:274-291).

³⁰ Furuoka Humitaka (2002).

³¹ See, for example, *Human Studies*, September 1995, which is a special issue on Asian values. It featured a survey of East Asian intellectuals on the idea of Asian values. It showed that the idea that there were values common to Asian countries was widely held among them.

³² Cultural determinism as an explanation of East Asian economic miracle is not limited to East Asian political leaders and intellectuals. As Lee Seung-Hwan (2000) argues, many Western observers have been trying to explain both the up and down of East Asian economy in terms of its particular cultural characteristics.

³³ Time Magazine, 14 June 1993: 16-19.

³⁴ See, for example, Michael Freeman (1996).

³⁵ A good example is the anti-Thai riots in Cambodia which took place in January 2003. A mob of about 1000 protesters, who were angry with an alleged rumor of a Thai actress's comment that Cambodia had stolen Angkor Wat from Thailand, attacked the Thai embassy and Thai owned businesses in Phnom Penh. Angkor Wat is a temple which had been built in the capital of the ancient Khmer empire in the north of present Cambodia and has been the country's national symbol. There have been repeated disputes over national borders between the two countries and widespread discontent with the expansion of Thai businesses in Cambodia. This incident shows how the historico-cultural symbols of the nation could trigger strong public reactions, being combined with frustration with the present conditions.

³⁶ Mainichi Shimbun, 26 December 2001.

³⁷ Yomiuri Shimbun, 22 July 2004.

Chapter 5. Memory of the Asia-Pacific War in the Official Discourse since the 1990s¹

In the previous chapter, I have argued that difficulty in the development of supranational regionalism and regional identity in late modernity lies in the fact that they have to be accommodated within the systems of the nation-states. That is, they need to negotiate with well-established, pre-existing nationalism and national identity which have long divided a region into separate national communities. The concept of 'Asia' is a historical product and has been evolving throughout modern history. Thus, it is not an empty bag into which the political and intellectual elites could put anything they wished. Whether the elite discourse of post-Cold War Asianism can lead to the development of Asian solidarity and redefine the national identities of East Asian peoples as part of Asia at the mass level depends on the extent to which it is resonant with the existing popular perception of 'Asia' which has been defined and redefined through political, economic, social, cultural and historical processes. These concepts are heavily loaded with historical memories.

Given the fact that the bitter historical memory of Japanese imperialism has been nationalised and deeply rooted in the national historical consciousness of its East Asian victim countries, it is unlikely that growing regional economic interdependence and the elite discourse of Asian cultural commonality alone could lead to the development of East Asian solidarity. It will also require the development of historical consensus as a common historical platform between Japan and other East Asian countries which will enable them to develop shared historical narratives that could accommodate each country's historical memory.

The post-war Japanese political community has been dominated by conflicts between the leftist, progressive, pacifist ideology represented by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) on the one hand and

the conservative, rightist, state-centred ideology advocated by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on the other. The former ideology is based on faith in Japan's so-called 'Peace Constitution' (1946) which was written in accordance with the proposal of the General Headquarters of the Allied Occupation (GHQ). Its Article 9 renounces the use of force as a means to settle international disputes, and the possession of land, sea and air forces. As Yamazaki (2002:169) maintains, while globalisation has contributed to the development of neo-liberalism, which favours individualism, market-oriented society and minimal governmental interference in the economic sphere, neo-conservatism, which advocates the importance of collectivism, disciplined society and strong governance, has been growing in the Japanese political community in a climate of political and economic uncertainty.

For example, when Japan was criticised for not sending its military forces to the Persian Gulf War (1991) and excluded from the declarations of appreciation made by the US and Kuwait, despite its contribution of \$13 billion, humiliated Japanese politicians were convinced that military power still determined international politics to a significant degree. Thus, some started claiming that the Peace Constitution was an obstacle to Japan winning respect and increasing its political power in the international community. Moreover, the launch of a suspected missile from North Korea over Japanese territory in 1998 caused a real sense of threat to Japan's security for the first time in its post-war history. Since this incident, the validity of Article 9 has been more openly questioned. The LDP has taken advantage of this perceived threat to national security in order to enhance the state's power in the domestic and international contexts through the introduction of neo-conservative policies.

For instance, in order to promote patriotism and enhance national identity through education, the government has been attempting to revise the Fundamental Law of Education (FLE) which was written under the guidance of the occupation authority in 1947. In 2000 the Education Reform National Conference (ERNC) was established as the main body for the state's education reform

planning. While the 1947 FLE places strong emphasis on individualism and democratic values,² the ERNC's proposal for its revision focuses on 'the cultivation of patriotism', 'respect for Japanese history and traditional culture' and 'international coexistence'.³

In this way, despite Japan's increasing reliance on the economy of the East Asian region and the emergence of the Asian Values discourse, there has been growing neo-conservatism in the Japanese political community since the 1990's. The recent development of neo-conservatism has been driven by a desire to normalise Japan through the re-evaluation of Japan's wartime and post-war history among conservative politicians and intellectuals. The important point is that this ideological movement has re-opened the darkest chapter of Japan's history, to which Japanese people had turned a blind eye in pursuit of an optimistic, forward-looking pacifist ideology and economic success. This has brought an opportunity for them to re-assess the nation's forgotten past. At last, Japan has become ready to face its aggressive past.

In this chapter, I will analyse the official memory of the Asia-Pacific War. Even though the sovereignty of the state has been under external and internal pressure in the era of globalisation, the state still plays a significant role in the formation of collective memory.⁴ Firstly, it possesses the ability to expose the state versions of historical narratives to the wider public audience. Secondly, the state is still regarded as the principal and legitimate actor in international politics and the official version of historical narratives is regarded as representing the nation's historical stance. In order to analyse the official memory of the pre- and inter-war period, I shall examine the official stance on Japan's responsibility for its wartime aggression, the official commemoration of the War, the legislation in respect of the War-related national flag and anthem, and the recent controversy over history textbooks for the junior high school. The memory of the War acquired centrality in the official discourses in the 1990's. This has resulted in the significant development of historical revisionism and attempts among conservative political elites and intellectuals to restore the unity between the state and the nation in Japanese historical consciousness which has been

undermined by post-war popular Japanese self-perception as a victim of the military state.

5.1. The Official stance on Japan's responsibility for its wartime aggression

The International Military Tribunal of the Far East, known as the Tokyo Trial (1946-1948), in which the leading members of the Japanese military government were prosecuted for their war crimes by the Western Alliance, left Japanese responsibility for Japan's crimes committed against its Asian neighbours unquestioned. Firstly, in the trial the victims of Japan's militarism were generalised and thus, the particularity of Asian victims' sufferings was not acknowledged. Secondly, the fact that the responsibility for the War of the emperor, who had been the symbol of the Japanese nation-state, was not questioned meant that the responsibility of Japan as a nation was not questioned either. As a result, the idea developed that only the leaders of the military state were responsible for Japan's war crimes and that the Japanese people were also the victims of the War, and of the state which led innocent Japanese people into this disastrous War. The state was to be blamed, not the nation. These interpretations of the War enabled Japanese people to avoid moral confrontation with the nation's past aggression against other Asian peoples.

This victimised memory could have threatened the unity between state and nation because the Japanese self-perception as a victim of the War was possible only by dissociating itself from the former military state. In such a condition, the post-war state has tried to maintain the unity between state and nation through the institutionalisation of the victimised memory of the War. By officially commemorating the War in various ways, the state has acknowledged the nation's sufferings from the War and acted as a guardian of the Japanese memory of the War.

For example, the Japanese government has been committed to the protection of the welfare of veterans and the families of Japanese soldiers who died in the War. Military pensions and condolence payments which were cut off by the occupation authority in 1946 were restored by the

Japanese government after Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952.⁵ In 1953 the Law for Relief for War Victims (*engoho*) and the pension scheme (*onkyuho*) for Japanese soldiers were modified so as to enable those sentenced as war criminals in the Tokyo Trial and their families to receive pensions and benefits from the state. As a result of these changes, the death of those executed military leaders came to be treated as a death for public service and their families were granted state pensions and benefits.

The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare is in charge of organising memorial services for the war dead, supplying care and payments of pensions for the war bereaved families and the war wounded, and supporting the return of war-displaced Japanese and their settlement and independence in Japan. The Japan Bereaved Family Association (JBFA) has developed strong political influence through its connection with the LDP, which monopolised political power in the government from 1955 until 1993. As Steven T. Benfell (2002) points out,⁶ the JBFA has gained formidable support in the political community and built its political influence through its provision of financial support to co-operative politicians and its capability to deliver a significant number of votes.⁷

In addition to the JBFA's pressure, a view of the Tokyo Trial as 'victors' justice', which has been gaining popularity in the conservative segment of Japanese society, also contributed to the state's protection of the welfare of the sentenced political and military elites and their families. That is to say, the illegal acts of the Allied powers, such as the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the massive, indiscriminating killings of non-combatants in air raids on Japanese cities, appeared to undermine the fairness and justice of the Trial. As a result, this has left room for the questioning of the validity and fairness of the sentences given to Japanese political and military leaders and thus obscured the criminality of Japan's wartime acts and Japan's war responsibility.⁸

An important point is that while the Japanese government has been willing to protect the welfare

of Japanese veterans and war bereaved families, that of those Koreans who were forced to join the Japanese military to fight for Japan has been neglected. This is because having Japanese nationality has been an essential condition for receiving military pensions and condolence payments from the government; and when the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 came into effect in 1952, immigrants from Japan's former colonies lost their Japanese nationality.⁹ As late as 2000, a law was passed which was aimed at offering a certain amount of condolence money to those former Korean soldiers who were severely injured in the War, and the bereaved families of Korean soldiers.¹⁰ However, compared with the amount of pensions and allowances which have been granted to their Japanese counterparts, the amount of money offered to former Korean soldiers and Korean war bereaved family by this law is far less.¹¹

Moreover, unlike the pensions and allowances granted to former Japanese soldiers and war bereaved families, what this law offers to wounded former Korean soldiers and Korean war bereaved families is a 'once and for all' offer of condolence money as a humanitarian gesture by the government to express its sympathy to their suffering in the War, not as state compensation.¹² In this way, for a long period of time former Korean soldiers were denied the status of victim of the War in the Japanese official discourse. Moreover, even if their sufferings were recently acknowledged by the government, it refused to take responsibility for their sufferings in legal terms.

In contrast, Japanese victimhood has been guarded by the legislation of various war-related laws. They include the above mentioned Law for Relief of War Victims and the pension scheme for former Japanese soldiers and their families, the Law for Reward Payment for Dispossessed Landlords¹³, and the Repatriate Benefits Allowance Law¹⁴. As James J. Orr (2001) argues, even though the establishment of these laws was rather controversial, and met strong criticism from leftist and pacifist opinion leaders and the mass media, it has contributed to the consolidation of Japanese victimhood.

The state's assistance to atomic-bomb victims is also significant in its role in protecting the Japanese sense of victimhood.¹⁵ Although the laws to provide assistance to atomic bomb victims do not include a nationality requirement, the fact that the majority of Korean atomic bomb survivors returned to Korea immediately after the War has made it difficult for Korean victims to receive assistance from the Japanese government.¹⁶ In order to improve the situation of Korean victims, the Japanese government agreed to provide free Japan-based treatment for approximately 70 Korean atomic bomb victims annually from 1981 for five years, on condition that the South Korean government would be responsible for all the transportation costs between the two countries. In 1986, the South Korean government refused to extend the programme. Among various reasons for its decision, one was its claim that the Japanese government should bear full financial responsibility for this programme as the suffering of Korean atomic bomb victims was a consequence of Japanese colonial policies.¹⁷

Although the Japanese government donated 42 million yen (approximately £210,000) to the South Korean Red Cross for the care of Korean atomic bomb victims in 1989 and 1990, and it agreed to contribute \$25 million to the South Korean government for their treatment in 1990, they were again offered as humanitarian gestures, not state compensation for its former colonial subjects. Thus, the state has refused to take full responsibility for the suffering of Korean people who were doubly victimised by the atomic bombings and by the Japanese colonial policies.

In this way, 'Asia' as a victim of Japanese imperialism did not exist in Japanese official discourse for a long time. Accordingly, neither did 'Japan' as an aggressor. Moreover, the normalisation agreements signed by South Korea¹⁸ in 1965, and People's Republic of China in 1972¹⁹, have been the basis of the Japanese government's argument to justify its refusal of any claims for war-related compensation made by the citizens of these countries. This is because in these agreements, both countries consented to waive future claims for war indemnities.²⁰ For the

Japanese government these agreements were meant to officially close the historical chapter of its darkest imperial past. In consequence, the victims of Japanese imperialism vanished, at least for the Japanese dominant political community, and the victimised memory of Japanese people was officially preserved by the legislation of the international agreements and various domestic laws. In this way, the state protected the Japanese nation from collective war guilt.

This explains the traditional official view on Japan's war responsibility held by the LDP. This historical view, which protects the victim status of Japanese citizens and is critical of the judgement of the Tokyo Trial, has been deeply rooted in the political culture of the LDP. However, Japan's official historical stance on the War started to change in the 1990's. When South Korean President Roh Tae-u visited Japan in May 1990, Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki made an official apology for the 'unbearable pain and sadness of the Korean people inflicted by our country's past behaviour'²¹ and Emperor Akihito expressed 'the deepest regret' to the people of Korea in his speech.²² Kaifu claimed that with this apology the historical issue was completely settled.²³ Roh Tae-u also maintained in his speech that Japan and South Korea must start a new era of friendly cooperation, while sharing the correct historical standpoint and washing away past mistakes.²⁴ Nevertheless, it was far from a closure of the past.

In 1991, former Korean soldiers who were sentenced in the Tokyo Trial, and former comfort women who were subjected to sexual service for the Japanese military, filed law suits against the Japanese government, demanding the state's apology and compensation. In 1992, official documents which proved the government's involvement in the operation of comfort women were discovered by a Japanese historian.²⁵ In this way, memories of various aspects of Japanese aggression, which cannot be represented by such general terms as 'the unfortunate past' or 'the past behaviour', started to emerge in the 1990's.

When Hosokawa Morihiro, who did not represent the LDP but belonged to a progressive party,

became prime minister on 05 August 1993, Japan's official historical stance on the War became much more apologetic.²⁶ Nevertheless, his efforts to improve the historical relationship between Japan and other Asian countries was destroyed by the statements made by two ministers, which denied Japanese wartime aggression.²⁷

In 1995, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi from the JSP, who led the right-left coalition administration composed of the LDP, the JSP and the New Party *Sakigake* (a liberal spin-off of the LDP), attempted to adopt a resolution on the renunciation of war which would acknowledge Japan's past aggression against Asian nations.²⁸ The resolution, entitled Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned from History, was adopted by the National Diet on 09 June 1995. However, its passage was rather controversial. A large number of the members of the House of Representatives were absent in the Diet and the resolution was approved by only 230 members of the House, which was less than half of the total of 511 members of the House.²⁹ Moreover, as a result of compromise between the JSP and the LDP³⁰, the content of the resolution satisfied supporters of neither of the parties. The resolution states:

The House of Representatives resolves as follows:

On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II, this House offers its sincere condolences to those who fell in action and victims of wars and similar actions all over the world. Solemnly reflecting upon many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression in the modern history of the world, and recognising that Japan carried out those acts in the past, inflicting pain and suffering upon the peoples of other countries, especially in Asia, the Members of this House express a sense of deep remorse. We must transcend the differences over historical views of the past war and learn humbly the lessons of history so as to build a peaceful international society. This house expresses its resolve, under the banner of eternal peace enshrined in the Constitution of Japan, to join hands with other nations of the world and to pave the way to a future that allows all human beings to live together.³¹

Firstly, the sentence 'many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression in the modern history of the war' implied that Japan was not the only country which colonised others and committed acts of aggression. This relativised the degree of Japan's historical sinfulness and dispersed the burden of its history of colonialism and wartime aggression. Furthermore, the inclusion of the phrase 'transcend the differences over historical views of the past war' indicated the existence of an alternative view of the War, that is to say, the War as a war to liberate Asia from Western imperialism.³² Certainly, it was the first resolution to formally admit Japan's past aggression. However, because of its rather self-justifying content and the fact that it did not win the approval of the majority of the House, not only did the resolution fail to present a nation's united front regarding the recognition of Japan's wartime aggression to the international community, but also cast doubt on the credibility of Japan's sincerity in its commitment to peace 'on the basis of lessons learned from history'.

Statements made by politicians which can be regarded as officially representing the voice of a nation are always under close scrutiny by the people of their own country and the international community. In Japan, it is especially true in the case of those statements on Japan's wartime history. Any comments which can be taken to justify or deny Japan's wartime aggression become the target of fierce attacks by the international community, particularly Korea and China, and the leftist segment of the Japanese mass media. For Asian victims, such comments challenge their own historical memories as the victim of Japan's wartime aggression. For the latter, justifying or denying any atrocity cannot be compatible with the idea of Japan as a responsible, moral nation which is committed to the promotion of world peace. Therefore, it seems rather odd that such comments have been repeatedly made by Japanese politicians who should have known better; that they would provoke reactions, while risking their own political lives.³³

The declining power of the LDP and the rise of leftist, progressive parties during the 1990s resulted in the emergence of contradictory urges to accept responsibility for Japan's wartime

aggression on the one hand, and to deny it on the other, in the political sphere. Every time a remark based on a view which denies or justifies Japan's wartime acts is publicly made and criticised by the international community, the Japanese public regards it as shameful for the nation as it spoils the nation's image as a moral nation. However, this does not prove that such a view is confined only to the members of the LDP and is not shared by the majority of the public. As Noriyuki Kawano and Masatsugu Matsuo (2002: 204) point out, although those ministers who were forced to resign from their ministerial posts for their war-related comments have never been re-appointed to either ministerial offices or to important Diet posts, most of them were re-elected as members of the Diet in the subsequent election. This suggests that their historical view did not negatively affect voters' judgement of their political credibility. The public punished them before the eyes of the international community once, but accepted them afterwards as representatives of the nation.

Kato Norihiro (1997) describes this contradiction within Japanese historical memory as one of 'Jekyll and Hyde'. That is to say, the apology statements are a manifestation of Japanese self-identity which seeks the approval of the international community as a respected member. On the other hand, the anti-apology remarks are a manifestation of the Japanese desire to justify its national past so as to commemorate the death of their ancestors who sacrificed their lives for the nation without being criticised by the international community, as other nations do. Therefore, even though they might look opposed on the surface, they are different sides of the same coin in the sense that both are encouraged by the same motive, that is to say, a desire to normalise the nation. In this way, 'the return of Asia'³⁴ in Japanese official discourse in the 1990's has led to the eruption of various competing nationalist ideologies, both on the political and popular levels, rather than the erosion of Japanese nationalism.

5.2. The official commemoration of the war dead

Three major war-related events have been officially commemorated, namely, the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima (06 August 1945) and Nagasaki (09 August 1945), and the Japanese surrender (15 August 1945). The television coverage of war-related subjects is heavily concentrated on these dates.³⁵ What has emerged from the combination of these selected events is the concept of the Japanese as the victim of the military state and the only victim of the atomic bombs in human history. While in the American view the causal link between the atomic bombings and Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor has been established,³⁶ the memory of Pearl Harbour has been largely overshadowed by the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japanese historical consciousness. The exclusive focus on the last part of the War in the official war commemoration resulted in the exclusion from the Japanese official discourse of the memories of other Asian peoples' sufferings brought by Japan's colonial policies and aggression.

During the occupation, Japan missed opportunities to become a normal nation. For Japan, the War which they started with the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 was the Great East Asian War whose officially declared aim was to free East Asia from Western oppression. However, the use of this naming of the War was banned by the occupation authority and it was replaced with 'the Pacific War'. As Benfell (2002) points out, this renaming of the War de-emphasised Japanese aggression in Asia and obscured who were its main victims.³⁷ Moreover, this renaming has transformed the meaning of the War in the Japanese perception from a just war to an unjust war and made Japan unable to come to terms with the death of Japanese soldiers who are now perceived to have died for the wrong cause.

The commemoration of the war dead is often exploited by the state in order to consolidate the unity of a nation in a relatively unproblematic way, by enshrining those compatriots who lost their lives to protect the nation, and by blaming their foreign enemies for their nation's sufferings.

However, this is not the case for Japan. The controversy surrounding Yasukuni Shrine clearly demonstrates the difficulties Japan has been facing in dealing with the death of those who died for the country, believing that they were fighting for the just cause. The original model of Yasukuni Shrine was Tokyo Shokonsha, a shrine founded at central Tokyo on 1869, based on the wish of Emperor Meiji in order to honor those who fought and died to re-establish imperial rule in the Meiji Restoration. In 1879 it was renamed Yasukuni Shrine. Since then, Yasukuni Shrine has been the primary place to commemorate the spirits of Japanese citizens who died serving the country in war.³⁸ It enshrines those spirits as a collective guardian deity of the nation. During the wartime period, Japanese soldiers were encouraged to believe that it was an honour to die for the country and be enshrined as a national deity at Yasukuni Shrine.

After the War, the occupation authority, which regarded State Shinto as a major source of Japanese militarism and ultranationalism, implemented policies to dismantle the system which had united the state and Shinto and enforce the strict separation of government and religion. For example, the Shinto Directive issued on 15 December 1945 ended the state patronage of Shinto. The Religious Corporation Ordinance, announced on 28 December 1945, stipulated that a religious organisation could become a corporation by registering with the government. As a result of these laws, the Association of Shinto Shrines (*Jinja Honcho*) was established in 1946 as a nongovernmental religious corporation, and most of the Shinto shrines throughout Japan, which had been under the jurisdiction of the Home Office, joined it. However, Yasukuni Shrine, which had been administered by the ministries of the Army and Navy, re-established itself as a single independent religious corporation.

Despite the occupation authority's efforts to separate government and religion, after the occupation ended, Yasukuni Shrine, which faced financial difficulty as a result of the loss of state patronage, immediately started advocating the nationalisation of the Shrine with the strong support of the Japan Bereaved Family Association (JBFA), the Association of Shinto Shrines,

veterans associations, right-wing organisations and conservative politicians. Especially, its alliance with the JBFA, which has a strong influence on the LDP, has helped Yasukuni Shrine to win support from the LDP. Between 1969 and 1974 the LDP repeatedly submitted to the Diet a proposal to secularise Yasukuni Shrine and nationalise it as a non-religious corporation, to commemorate the Japanese war dead under the special jurisdiction of the prime minister. Nevertheless, because of strong objection from the opposition party and other religious, civic and left-wing organizations, the bill was discarded.³⁹ After this, Yasukuni Shrine came to adopt a strategy to encourage official visits to the Shrine by the prime minister as a step to symbolically re-integrate the Shrine as part of Japan's national polity.

Apart from the constitutional principle of separation of government and religion, there is another problem about the nationalization of Yasukuni Shrine. That is, the issue of whom it has enshrined. As discussed above, in Japan the wartime leaders were presented as the enemies of Japanese people. Nevertheless, in 1978 the Yasukuni Shrine decided to enshrine fourteen Class-A war criminals executed in the Tokyo Trials, including wartime Prime Minister Tojo Hideki.⁴⁰ This was intended to annul the historical view institutionalised by the Tokyo Trial and show respect for the death of these leaders who were executed for their service to the nation.

This symbolic fusion of the death of ordinary Japanese soldiers and that of those accused as war criminals has made the Japanese commemoration of the war dead at Yasukuni Shrine further problematic. On the one hand, the JBFA, which cannot accept that the death of Japanese soldiers was 'meaningless', claiming that they sacrificed their lives for the just cause and the state should show respect for their precious sacrifice.⁴¹ On the other hand, for Asian victims of Japan's wartime aggression, it is unacceptable for the Japanese state to commemorate the death of war criminals who were responsible for their sufferings. Therefore, every time the Japanese prime minister attempts to visit Yasukuni Shrine, it provokes strong resentment among Japan's Asian neighbours.

Moreover, the fusion of the death of ordinary Japanese soldiers and that of the wartime state leaders makes the myth of Japanese people as the victim of the wartime state untenable. It blurs the distinction between the victim (ordinary Japanese people) and the perpetrator (military leaders) and thus casts doubt on the Japanese people's claim to a victim status. Furthermore, the condemnation of the Japanese prime minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine by the international community undermines the credit of Japan as a moral, pacifist nation. The visit to the Shrine by the Japanese prime minister could be interpreted as the state's approval of the wartime propaganda.

In this way, the visit to Yasukuni Shrine by the head of the state not only deepens the gap between Japan and its Asian neighbours but could also widen the gap between the Japanese state and Japanese people. Furthermore, this also involves a legal issue. The Japanese Constitution insists on separation between the state and religion. Under the current interpretation of Article 20 of the Constitution, Cabinet ministers are not allowed to visit religious institutions in their official capacities. Therefore, cabinet ministers who wish to visit the Shrine will have to do so in a private capacity. However, it is questionable whether the prime minister's action in respect of such a controversial issue under the intense scrutiny of the international community and the Japanese public can be considered 'personal'.

15 August has been chosen as the date when important war-related speeches and official war commemorations take place.⁴² This date symbolises not only Japan's defeat in the War but also the collapse of the myth of the divinity of the emperor, and of the Japanese nation, which had been the core of the modern Japanese mentality. Accordingly, this date has been fraught with strong symbolic meanings in Japan's war commemoration. The date may symbolise Japan's humiliation. It may be regarded as the end of sufferings caused by the War. Some may consider it the starting point of a new democratic Japan. Those leftist pacifists may claim that the date is the day when

the Japanese public started to awake from the military state's deception. Therefore, a visit to Yasukuni Shrine by the Japanese prime minister on 15 August could invoke particularly strong symbolic meanings, compared with other dates, and cause controversies both within and outside Japan.

This issue became the centre of intense attention in 2001 when Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro from the LDP declared that he would visit Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August. In post-war Japan, Nakasone Yasuhiro was the only Japanese prime minister who visited the Shrine on 15 August in an official capacity. It was on 15 August 1985, the fortieth anniversary of Japan's surrender in the War. Although he bowed only once before an alter, avoiding the traditional Shinto ritual of two bows, two hand claps and a final bow, in order to respect the provisions on the separation of religion and state in the Constitution, he made it clear that his visit was an 'official visit' by using his official car and public funds for his flower offerings. His action was motivated by his desire to re-establish the place of Japan in the post-war world as a normal nation-state which is allowed to show respect for the death of those who died for the nation. As expected, his action was strongly condemned by Korea and China.

The same desire to normalise Japan's wartime past can be identified in Koizumi's determination to visit the Shrine on 15 August 2001. Since his campaign for the LDP presidency in April 2001, he declared that he would definitely visit Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August in an official capacity if he became the prime minister. After he was appointed as the prime minister, his intention did not change. However, as the date was approaching, opposition against his visit to the Shrine was growing both inside and outside Japan. Understandably, the Chinese and South Korean governments officially criticised his plan. At the same time, committees to support the prime minister's visit to the Shrine were founded, mainly by the LDP members.⁴³ It looked as if the whole region was watching every movement of the prime minister.

In the end, Koizumi visited the Shrine on 13 August 2001, two days before the anniversary.⁴⁴ Although he tried hard to accommodate both sides, his visit pleased neither of them. Those who supported his visit were disappointed with the change of date, claiming that he yielded to foreign pressure.⁴⁵ Those who opposed it condemned his action, saying that the change of the date did not justify his action.⁴⁶ The governments of China, Korea and Taiwan officially expressed strong regret at his visit. Considering the experience of Nakasone's official visit to the Shrine, these were expected reactions. Why was he so eager to visit the Shrine?

He gave two main reasons for his wish to visit the Shrine, firstly to pay respects and mourn for those who gave up their lives during the War, and secondly to pledge never to go to war again. During a meeting of the Lower House Budget Committee on May 14 2001, he said

'I visited Yasukuni Shrine in the past because of my feelings that war should never happen again, and to pay my respects and express my appreciation from the bottom of my heart for the noble feelings of the war dead who probably did not want to fight, but who could not refuse to go into battle on behalf of their families and their country.....I will continue visiting Yasukuni Shrine as prime minister. Even if I am criticised, my sentiment as a Japanese has nothing to do with religion. It is a natural human feeling'.⁴⁷

He repeatedly used the word 'natural' to explain his intention to visit the Shrine. This indicates his desire to make it acceptable as a normal thing to do for Japanese people to mourn for the death of those who died for the nation. However, he underestimated the impact of the symbolic meanings which Yasukuni Shrine carried. As explained before, it is not an innocent, neutral place. It was the place which was used as the core of the military propaganda. Moreover, it was the place where the prosecuted wartime leaders were enshrined. Asian victims cannot be expected to accept the Shrine as a natural place to pray for peace. It is also unlikely that the post-war Japanese generation will develop a 'natural' attachment to such a place, which has been the centre of international criticism and a reminder of their ancestors' sin. Some people pointed out the

inappropriateness of Yasukuni Shrine as a place to officially commemorate the sacrifice of Japanese people in the War, and proposed alternative ideas such as the establishment of a new national war cemetery, which both Japanese people and foreigners can visit to mourn for the war dead without inviting criticisms or arousing resentment.⁴⁸ In fact, Yasukuni Shrine is not the only place to enshrine the Japanese war dead.

The existence of Chidorigafuchi Cemetery for the War Dead in central Tokyo has been largely overshadowed by Yasukuni Shrine. It is a national cemetery built in 1959 in order to keep the remains of unknown Japanese soldiers who died fighting abroad since the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). The plan to build Chidorigafuchi Cemetery began in 1953 and the cabinet agreed that the government would provide for its maintenance and management. Nonetheless, the process of its construction was not smooth because of strong opposition by the supporters of Yasukuni Shrine to the plan to make Chidorigafuchi Cemetery the nation's principal site for mourning the war dead. As a result, it turned out to be a site with no obvious religious overtones, to store individuals' remains that cannot be identified, rather than a cemetery. Its rather simple, unkempt appearance is in sharp contrast to the grandness of Yasukuni Shrine.

In the sense that Chidorigafuchi Cemetery does not have association with either religion or the wartime military state, and enshrines no war criminals, it might be a more appropriate, and definitely less controversial, site for the official commemoration of the war dead, than the stigmatised Yasukuni Shrine. However, because of the strong political influence of Yasukuni Shrine which has many supporters in the political and business circles, and a strong connection with the JBFA, it seems very difficult to replace Yasukuni Shrine with Chidorigafuchi Cemetery or a brand new national cemetery as the principal site to mourn for the war dead. Moreover, we also need to consider the special emotional appeal which Yasukuni Shrine has to the families of the Japanese war dead. If one's beloved person died wishing to be enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine, it seems natural for him/her to have an emotional attachment to Yasukuni Shrine where the value of

the person's death has been greatly increased by being enshrined as a national deity.⁴⁹ While Chidorigafuchi Cemetery receives approximately 150,000 visitors annually, Yasukuni Shrine is visited by about six million people each year.⁵⁰ Although Yasukuni Shrine has been the centre of criticism, these figures demonstrate its stronger appeal to many Japanese people as a site to commemorate the war dead, compared with the new, non-religious, impersonal Chidorigafuchi Cemetery which has little connection with the persons they lost. Nevertheless, this might change as the War generation is disappearing. Even if a brand new cemetery is to be constructed as an alternative to Yasukuni Shrine, the dispute over the question of who should be enshrined will continue to be difficult to settle. This is because the Japanese public has been clearly divided between conservatives and rightists, who claim that such a principal national cemetery should enshrine indiscriminately the spirits of all the Japanese war dead, including the military leaders, and leftists and pacifists who prefer the site which enshrines all the victims of the War regardless of their nationalities, except the war criminals.

While the Yasukuni issue has highlighted Japan's inability to mourn, the commemoration of the atomic bombings at Hiroshima on 06 August 1945, and Nagasaki on 09 August 1945, offers Japanese people the best opportunity to mourn for the sacrifice of the nation. Each year large public ceremonies are held by the respective municipal governments on 06 and 09 August and are attended by atomic bomb victims, prominent politicians, normally including the prime minister, peace activists, ordinary citizens and both right-wing and left-wing activists. The significance of the commemoration of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings is its capacity to accommodate the interests of various groups. The absolute brutality of atomic bombs has given Japanese people a right to mourn without being criticised and granted them a victim status. As Benfell (2002) points out, the public commemoration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has contributed to the institutionalisation of the view that only a small number of Japanese military leaders were guilty of Japan's wartime aggression, while the majority of Japanese people are victims of the War. Thus, the memories of the atomic bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki have relieved ordinary

Japanese citizens from a sense of collective guilt. Moreover, the unique experience of being the only country to survive the attacks by nuclear weapons has contributed to the myth of Japanese uniqueness. Since the atomic bombs were dropped by the US military in the course of an international war, the incidents were interpreted in a national sense. In consequence, the memory of the atomic bombings has been nationalised as a shared national experience and has unified the historical consciousness of the nation.⁵¹

Furthermore, since nuclear weapons are one of the major threats to world peace, the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have also been interpreted in a global context. They have become a world heritage of human tragedy and a symbol of world peace. In this context, Japan has been given a status as a promoter and guardian of world peace. For right-wing revisionists who reject the Tokyo Trial as an injustice imposed by the Western allies, the atomic bombings represent the hypocrisy of US politics. The fact that the US, which prosecuted Japanese military leaders for their crimes against peace and humanity, has never apologised for its atomic bombings, and their refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 2001, have cast doubt on the credibility of the US as world leader, and the validity of the US-centred historical view. In this way, the memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have served the interests of various groups in Japan.⁵² Thus, for the state, the commemoration of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a means to unify the nation and the state through the shared memory of the nation's sufferings and to present the post-war state as a moral guardian committed to the promotion of world peace to the eyes of the Japanese public and the international community.

In conclusion, the commemoration of the atomic bombings has offered the state the opportunity to enhance unity between the state and the nation in Japanese historical consciousness. However, the prime minister's visit to Yasukuni Shrine in 2001 has proved the state's inability to master the memory of the War in the domestic and international contexts.

5.3. The legalisation of *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* as the national flag and anthem

Hinomaru literally means the 'sun circle'. This sun-circle motif was often used as military insignia by various military figures in the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries.⁵³ In the early seventeenth century, trading ships sent abroad carried a *hinomaru* flag. It was also used as the symbol of a ship carrying the shogun. In 1854, when Japan's national seclusion ended, the Tokugawa Shogunate decided that Japanese ships should use a *hinomaru* banner with a white background so as not to be mistaken for foreign vessels. Furthermore, in Proclamation No.57, issued in 1870 by the Grand Council of State of the new Meiji government, *hinomaru* was officially made the flag of Japan for use on commercial vessels. In subsequent years, a number of official documents and notifications were publicly issued in order to reinforce the status of *hinomaru* as the official national flag, a symbol of imperial Japan.

The lyrics of *kimigayo* were originally taken from a poem written by an unknown author around the tenth century. *Kimigayo* means 'your Majesty's era'. The lyrics can be translated into English as follows:

'May the reign of your Majesty continue for a thousand generations and for the eternity that it takes for small pebbles to grow into a great rock and become covered with moss'.

Before the Meiji period, there was no such a thing as a national anthem in Japan. When Oyama Iwao was commissioned to select appropriate words for a national anthem in 1869 by the Meiji government, he chose this poem. The melody composed by music specialists at the Imperial Household Agency, which adopted the scale used in the traditional Japanese music called *gagaku*, was selected by Hayashi Hiromori, the head of the *gagaku* section at the Agency. The new national anthem was first performed in the imperial palace on 03 November 1880, the Meiji Emperor's twenty-eighth birthday.

The interesting point is that although the Meiji government was devoted to Westernisation of Japan in various aspects, it adopted traditional symbolism for the new national flag and anthem, which were meant to represent the modern Japanese nation-state. The *hinomaru* motif and *kimigayo* poem had been used over many centuries among the Japanese elite class in the pre-Meiji period.⁵⁴ These traditional symbols, it appears, which had been preserved by the Japanese elite class over many centuries, were adopted by the Meiji government in order to reinforce the myth of the historical continuity and eternity of a Japanese nation which had been reigned by an unbroken imperial line. In this way, *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* played central roles in the state's propaganda of emperor-centred nationalist ideology.

Hinomaru and *kimigayo* were banned by the occupation authority. However, the ban on the use of *hinomaru* was lifted in 1949. Since Japan regained its full sovereignty in 1952, the Japanese government has been encouraging the use of *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* at various events and ceremonies.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, despite the fact that *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* had been de facto Japan's national flag and anthem in post-war Japan, they were not granted legal status as the official national flag and anthem until 1999. The main reason for this unusual lack of a legalized national flag and anthem in post-war Japan was opposition to the use of *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* by the leftist progressives who regarded them as the symbols of the military Japanese state and its imperialism.

Education has been the battlefield for the conflict between the rightist conservatives and the leftist progressives. *Nikkyoso* is the largest union for elementary and junior high school teachers and was established in 1947. *Nikkyoso* has been closely associated with the JSP. According to the surveys conducted by the Ministry of Education, Sports, Culture and Technology, *Nikkyoso* boasted a membership rate of 86.3% in 1958.⁵⁶ Although the rate gradually declined (to about 35% in the 1990's), its leftist progressive ideology has been influential among school teachers.

The issue of *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* has been at the centre of the conflict between the union teachers, who object to the use of *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* at school and the conservative local education authority, which requires both, in line with the government's instructions.⁵⁷

In August 1999, the bill to officially designate *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* as the national flag and anthem was passed into law.⁵⁸ As Yamazaki (2002: 183) suggests, the suicide of a stressed high school principal in Hiroshima may have been used to justify the need to legalise the status of *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* in order to avoid confusion over their status, as well as further conflicts. However, the more important factors which allowed the coalition government, led by the LDP, to legalise those war-related controversial symbols were the decline of the Left and the perceived threat to Japan's national security posed by North Korea.

In December 1989 *Nikkyoso* split as a result of ideological conflict between those who are affiliated with the JSP and those allied to the Japanese Communist Party (JCP). The former group retained the name *Nikkyoso* and it had a membership rate of about 37% of teachers at public elementary and junior high schools. The latter, more radical members left *Nikkyoso* and established *Zenkyo* in 1992, whose membership rate was only about 9%.⁵⁹ As Robert Aspinall and Peter Cave (2001:89) explain, after this split *Nikkyoso* came to adopt a more conciliatory policy toward the government. Although *Zenkyo*, which was supported by the JCP and retained the progressive spirit of the original *Nikkyoso*, was committed to fight against the rightist ideology advocated by the LDP and the local education authority, its membership rate was not high enough to exert influence on the education authority's policy to the same degree as the former *Nikkyoso* did. In this way, the leftist progressive ideology lost its influence in the educational sphere in the 1990s.

Moreover, in the political arena, the formation of coalition governments during the 1990s, especially the surprising establishment of the right-left coalition administration in 1994, resulted in

a further decline in the influence of leftist ideology. Certainly, the LDP's failure to get the majority of seats in the 1993 election seemed to end the post-war Japanese political structure which had been dominated by a single party. Nevertheless, it was far from the end of rightist conservatism in the Japanese political community. In fact, the political aspirations of opposition parties enhanced by the collapse of the LDP's monopoly of ruling power made them ready to compromise on ideological differences with the LDP, which still had 42-43 % of the seats in the House of Representatives. In consequence, the establishment of the coalition governments softened the opposition of the leftist parties to the LDP.

For example, about one month after the formation of the right-left coalition government in 1994, Prime Minister Murayama from the JSP acknowledged that the status of *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* as the national flag and anthem had been already established among Japanese people and said that it was desirable that the instruction of the Ministry of Education, Sports, Culture and Technology to use them at schools should be implemented at schools without further trouble.⁶⁰ This softened the opposition of *Nikkyoso* to the rightist policy of the Ministry. In 1995, *Nikkyoso* announced drastic changes in its policy with a more pro-government orientation and decided to drop the issue of *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* from its main agenda.⁶¹

The right-left coalition virtually ended in 1996. After Murayama resigned in 1996, the LDP started rebuilding its power.⁶² All four prime ministers after Murayama were elected from the LDP. Although the LDP has been unable to win a majority of the seats, it has resumed its political leadership by building the coalition government with other conservatives or centrists. In this way, changes in the Japanese political structure in the 1990's weakened the power of leftist progressive ideology, not rightist conservative ideology.

Furthermore, North Korea's missile incident in 1998 posed an intense threat to Japan's national security. This incident undermined the popularity of pacifist ideology and made the Japanese

public more supportive of the idea of a more active Japanese Self Defence Force (SDF).⁶³ The LDP did not miss the opportunity to increase the state's power, brought about by this change in the public attitude toward Japan's national security policy and the role of the state. The increasing fear about Japan's national security made the Japanese public aware of the importance of the role of the SDF and the state as the protector of national security. Several new laws which aimed to reinforce the state's surveillance power were established by the Obuchi administration (1998-2000).⁶⁴

Under these circumstances, on 11 June 1999, the bill to legally define *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* as the national flag and anthem was proposed to the Diet.⁶⁵ Only 60 days later, it became law on 09 August 1999.⁶⁶ The government spent no more than 12 days on substantive public hearings and they were legalized without public consensus.⁶⁷ Although public discussions and debates on this controversial issue took place, there was no strong oppositional movement among the general public influential enough to shake the government's determination to legalise them.⁶⁸ Moreover, as noted above, the decline in the influence of the JSP as the major oppositional force against rightist conservatism in the LDP-led government created a situation in which there was no body influential enough to be able to organise a mass movement to oppose the bill.⁶⁹

To sum up, the decline in leftist progressive ideology and the increasing sense of fear about Japan's national security helped the Japanese government to pass the bill to legalise *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* as the official national flag and anthem. Their legalisation can be interpreted as another example of the government's attempt to normalise the nation's relationship with the past, and the relationship between the state and the nation in Japanese historical consciousness. But this could not have had positive effects on Japan's relations with its neighbouring countries, which had been the victims of Japan's imperialism.⁷⁰ Therefore, the legalisation of these symbols which invokes the memory of Japanese imperialism for Japan's Asian neighbours suggested that for the Japanese government the enhancement of patriotism through the promotion of traditional

national symbolism and the normalisation of the country were more important than the improvement of Japan's supranational regional relationship.

5.4. Controversies over history textbooks

History textbooks, whose contents are normally under the supervision of the state, provide children with a set of standardised historical narratives based on the official interpretation of national and international history. They habituate them to the adoption of standardised historical positioning as the Japanese, which is based on the concept of the world divided by national boundaries. They encourage children to adopt a point of reference as a Japanese in interpreting historical materials and making sense of the present as the logical consequence of the sequence of past events. This adds a sense of historical continuity to people's perception of the nation, which implies assured certainty of the nation's future existence. Thus, history teaching plays a significant role in the formation of national identity and the maintenance of the nation's existence.

The Japanese government has been trying to control the contents of history teaching at school through the screening process for textbooks.⁷¹ Since 1956, when the Ministry of Education had tightened screening process, often revisions were ordered or recommended in order to tone down or remove the description of Japan's aggression during the War and the period of colonial rule. As a result, by 1960 the number of indications of Japan's aggression in Japanese history textbooks were dramatically reduced.⁷² Especially, the mentions of military comfort women, the Nanking Massacre, the killing of Okinawan people by the Japanese army and Unit 731⁷³ were strongly discouraged.

In 1965 Ienaga Saburo, a historian and author of history textbooks, filed three law suits against the government. He claimed that the textbook screening by the Ministry was a violation of freedom of expression and scholarship guaranteed by the Constitution, and also against the 1947

Fundamental Law of Education's principle, which stated that education should not be subject to improper control. His high-profile court battles altogether lasted for 32 years until the Supreme Court granted him a partial victory in the third law suit in 1997.⁷⁴ As Yoshiko Nozaki and Hiromitsu Inokuchi (1998) point out, although Ienaga's claim that government screening of textbooks was unconstitutional was rejected, his court battles, which attracted huge publicity, contributed to increasing public awareness about the issue of the validity and invalidity of the screening process.

In Japan, the issue of history textbooks has been a diplomatic issue as well as domestic one. In 1982, when the Japanese newspapers reported that textbook writers replaced the term 'invasion' with 'advancement' to describe Japan's military expansion in Asia, upon the request of the Ministry of Education, China and South Korea lodged formal protests against the Japanese government.⁷⁵ As a result of strong criticism from Asian countries, the Ministry of Education promised to allow textbooks to treat the modern historical relationships between Japan and other Asian countries from the perspective of mutual understanding and cooperation, with due consideration for Japan's neighbouring countries.⁷⁶ Although the Ministry continued advising textbook authors to tone down the descriptions of Japan's wartime aggression, diplomatic pressure from South Korea and China and growing criticism from progressive groups stimulated by Ienaga's court battles forced the Ministry to relax its screening policy after the textbook controversy of 1982.⁷⁷

Nonetheless, the resurgence of Japanese historical revisionism in the 1990s brought the textbook issue back to the centre of the public attention. The driving force of this revisionist movement is *Jiyushugi shikan kenkyukai* (the Liberal View of History Study Group), founded in 1996 and led by Fujioka Nobutaka, a Professor in Education at Tokyo University. Claiming that the Japanese people have been brainwashed by the Tokyo Trial-based, a masochistic historical view which despises the modern Japanese history as the history of an evil state, the Group's activities are aimed at freeing Japanese people from this prevalent anti-Japanese historical view. Its members

believe that the nation will cease to exist without a national history to be proud of and have been promoting 'healthy nationalism' based on a sense of pride in national history.⁷⁸ As a result, they have been devoted to the propagation of a positive, ethnocentric view of Japanese history through the publication of numerous books and articles in a major newspaper and magazines.⁷⁹

Furthermore, resenting the report that the mention of comfort women would appear in all the junior high school history textbooks from 1997, Fujioka established *Atarashii rekishi kyokasho wo tsukurukai* (the Committee to Write New History Textbooks; hereafter *tsukurukai*) in 1996. It should be noted that *tsukurukai*'s revisionist arguments show remarkable similarity to the arguments advocated by groups of rightwing politicians who have been criticising the contents of Japanese history textbooks for being partial and calling for their 'normalisation'.⁸⁰ Like Fujioka, they have been demanding the elimination of the mention of comfort women from the textbooks and denying Japan's wartime aggression.

In 2000, *tsukurukai* submitted its own junior high school history textbook to the Ministry of Education for screening. Because of its extremely ethnocentric contents which justified Japan's colonialism and invasion of Asia as self-defence and as a war for the liberation of Asia, and ignored Japan's war crimes and aggression including the Nanking Massacre and comfort women, the new textbook was harshly attacked by historians, progressive and pacifist groups and the international community.⁸¹ Thus, when it passed the screening process in April 2001, despite the fact that 137 corrections were required, the Japanese government was strongly criticised. Although few local education boards had selected the textbook, the fact that the Ministry authorised the textbook meant that the Japanese government officially recognised the ethnocentric historical view and this led to the severing of Japan's diplomatic relations with South Korea and China.⁸² Their relations were further strained when the Ministry refused to comply with the demands for revisions in the textbook by South Korea and China.⁸³ For example, the South Korean government responded with a hard-line policy which included the suspension of the next

phase of the South Korean market's opening to Japanese popular cultural materials and the scaling-down of civilian and youth exchange programmes between Japan and South Korea.⁸⁴

Furthermore, in 2001 South Korea's National Assembly unanimously passed a resolution to annul the Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration of a New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century, signed in 1998, because of growing public anti-Japanese sentiment.⁸⁵ Thus, although the South Korean government temporarily softened its critical tone on Japan's past aggression in 1998 because of the need for economic cooperation between the two countries in the middle of the East Asian economic crisis, the textbook issue has highlighted the fact that common economic interests cannot fill the gap in historical memory between Japan and its East Asian neighbours.⁸⁶

5.5. Conclusion

The relationship between the Japanese state and the people deteriorated in the 1990s. The Japanese government's failure to gain respect from the international community in the Gulf War (1991) exposed the state's inability to handle international issues and brought a sense of humiliation to many Japanese, including Fujioka.⁸⁷ Moreover, the prolonged economic recession which started in 1991 also showed the state's inability to solve domestic problems. Furthermore, the revelation of widespread corruption and immorality in the political community and police authority resulted in the state's loss of credibility with the people. In this way, the level of frustration among the Japanese public with an incompetent, distrusted state was on the increase in the 1990's. In addition, the gas attack on the Tokyo underground in 1995 by a religious cult, and the security threat posed by North Korea destroyed the myth of Japan as one of the safest countries in the world and Japanese people lost their confidence in Japan's social and national security.

However, this has not resulted in the rejection of the state system itself by the Japanese public.

On the contrary, many Japanese people have started expressing their wish to normalise the country and have a more efficient state, which is better capable of handling domestic and international issues and protecting national security. The collapse of leftist ideology, which had been the basis of pacifism and anti-statism in post-war Japan, has also cast doubt on the validity of post-war Japanese pacifism. This has created growing concerns about having a state which is not able to use its military force to defend the nation's honour and security. In this way, the above conditions in the 1990s have accentuated the role of the state in protecting the interest of the nation in the world of the nation-states, and strengthened the perception of the inseparable link between the state and the nation. This has created an atmosphere which has allowed the emergence of a call for a stronger state, something which had been regarded as taboo.

The state did not miss this opportunity. It has been trying to restore the unity between the state and the nation by encouraging the development of patriotism through the legalisation of a national flag and anthem, and the commemoration of the Japanese war dead. The problem is that those symbols which the state has chosen to enhance Japanese patriotism, namely *hinomaru* (national flag), *kimigayo* (national anthem) and Yasukuni Shrine, have been tainted by shame and guilt. Even though the state is well aware that these symbols can invoke emotional uneasiness and resistance among, not only Asian people, but also many Japanese people, it has been unable to find alternative national symbols which can serve as the basis of positive Japanese national identity and patriotism. This is because those tainted symbols are still the source of national attachment for many politically-minded segments of the Japanese population which together constitute the solid electoral support for the dominant LDP. The invention of a bland new national flag, anthem and a site for the commemoration of the war dead, which could unite the entire Japanese population and the state, seems impossible. So, Japanese conservative politicians, intellectuals and right-wing activists who have been concerned about a lack of unity between the state and the nation have started to attempt to rewrite national history in order to revise the meanings of those national symbols in Japanese historical consciousness.

The recent textbook controversy is a result of this growing historical revisionism in Japan. As many critics point out, the ethnocentric historical view propagated by the Liberal View of History Study Group and its spin-off, *tsukurukai*, which has been the main advocate of revisionism, is rather illogical and unscientific.⁸⁸ It is quite easy to refute their arguments by confronting them with historical findings. However, it seems that logical counter-arguments and historical facts supported by scientific research have not been effective enough to stop people from listening to them. This is because their ethnocentric arguments operate on an emotional level rather than on a logical one. Fujioka and his collaborators' strategy is to stimulate the public frustration with the existing state and manipulate people's political, economic and social anxieties using provocative language in order to attract public attention. As Laura Hein and Mark Selden (1998:10) argue emotionalism in Fujioka's rhetoric appeals to passion, not to reason. Oguma Eiji and Ueno Yoko (2003) call the neo-revisionist movement a 'healing nationalism' which emerged to heal the anxiety of ordinary citizens who are facing an identity crisis brought on by the end of Cold War and globalisation. These insecure people, who have lost a sense of direction, have been attracted to the neo-revisionist movement in order to escape from their anxiety, which was caused by the collapse of the value systems, while searching for the source of stability in a positive national history. An important point is that, as Takahashi Tetsuya (2003:7) maintains, the historical distortions in neo-revisionism are distortion 'in conformity with the actual "war memory" of an overwhelming majority of post war Japanese nationals'. That is to say, the neo-revisionism which claims the innocence of Japan is consonant with the widespread victimised memory forged in post-war Japan.⁸⁹

In conclusion, for the development of Asian solidarity, it is crucial for Japan and other Asian countries to form a common historical platform which will enable them to form shared historical narratives. In post-war Japan, anti-state popular nationalism and a lack of political nationalism on the mass level have prevented Japanese people from developing political national identity as an active participant in the state's policy making, and resulted in the alienation of the state from the

people. A significant consequence of this is the passive approval by the Japanese public of the political system, which is incapable of handling the issue of war responsibility and gaining the trust of Asian neighbours. The nation has been seated on a comfortable chair labelled 'a war victim' under the umbrella of a state which has been protecting the nation from the storm of international criticism.

Notes

¹ There is a debate on what the war which ended in 1945 should be called. While the Second World War (1939-1945) or the Pacific War (1941-1945) has often been used in the official discourse in postwar Japan, as a result of the encouragement of the occupation authority, those who believe the war was a just war to emancipate Asia from oppressive Western imperialism prefer to call it the Great East Asian War. Moreover, those who emphasise the aspect of Japanese aggression and imperial expansion in Asia before and during the war tend to call it 'the Fifteen-year War' which refers to the series of military events from the Manchurian Incident in 1931 up to Japan's surrender in 1945. This is because Japan's military aggression in Asia was not confined to the period of the Second World War and the Pacific War. For example, the Nanking Massacre, in which an estimated 20,000 of Chinese people were said to have been killed by the Japanese army in Nanking, took place in 1937. However, since the mid-1980's the term 'Asia-Pacific War' which covers the military events in both the Asian and Pacific regions and which is more ideologically neutral has been preferred by historians (See Norma Field 1995: 408). Thus, in this chapter, I use the latter term and 'the War' refers to 'Asia-Pacific War'.

² The full text of 1947 FLE is available at <http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/kihon/about/index.htm>

³ For comparison between 1947 FLE and the ERNC's proposal for its revision, see Akito Okada (2002). The proposal for the revision of the FLE announced by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, which is based on the proposal by the ERNC, is available at <http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/shougai/03061601/index.htm>

⁴ Naoko Shimazu's (2003) study shows the close correlation between Japanese politics and the popular representations of the War in the Japanese media.

⁵ The full text of the revision of the Law is available at <http://www.shugiin.go.jp/itdb_housei.nsf/html/houritsu/01619530807181.htm>. For the history of the pension scheme, see <http://www.soumu.go.jp/jinji/onkyu.htm>

⁶ His article is available at <<http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/200202/0202a001.htm>>

⁷ According to The Economist (Vol. 335 03 June 1995), the JABF has a membership of more than one million households and is a formidable organiser of votes. Its Chairman, Hashimoto Ryutaro, became Prime Minister in 1996.

⁸ For a critical examination of the Trial see Chihiro Hosoya, Nisuke Ando, Yasuaki Onuma and Richard H. Minear (eds) (1986) and John W. Dower (1999, Chapter 15).

⁹ Although the South Korean government offered condolence payments for bereaved families of former Korean soldiers in 1974, it was limited to those who lived in South Korea. Thus, those Korean former soldiers and Korean bereaved families living in Japan were unable to receive war compensation from either the Japanese or the South Korean government.

¹⁰ The detail of the law is available at <http://www.soumu.go.jp/daijinkanbou/kanri/seido.html>.

¹¹ According to the law, 2.6 million yen (approximately £13,000) is offered to each bereaved family of former Korean soldiers who died in the War, and 4 million yen (approximately £20,000) to surviving former Korean soldiers who were severely wounded in the War. However, they have been denied the right to receive the state pension for war-wounded former soldiers which has been offered to their Japanese counterparts since 1952. (Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition, 13 April 2001). Currently, surviving former Japanese soldiers who were most severely wounded in the War are entitled to the state pension of maximum 9.7 million yen (approximately £48,500) (Mainichi Shimbun, 26 June 2003).

¹² Mainichi Shimbun, 13 February 2000.

¹³ In the process of the occupation authority's land reform, which was aimed at eliminating feudalistic aspects of Japanese society through the establishment of a large class of yeoman, landlords were forced to sell their land to the government at devalued prices to be distributed to former tenant farmers. After the occupation ended, they started demanding state compensation for the loss of their land. As a result of the well-organised nationwide movement by landlords, the law was passed in 1965. It offered a total of 145 billion yen (approximately £725 million) in negotiable bonds paying over 10 years to dispossessed landlords. It should be noted that the payment was made, not in the form of compensation but as a reward for their contribution to the nation's postwar democratic process and economic growth in which the land reform played a significant role. For the detail of the legislation process of this law, see James J. Orr (2001:148-155).

¹⁴ 3.2 million Japanese civilians who had lived abroad, mainly in Japanese colonies, had to go back to Japan after Japan's surrender, giving up all their overseas assets. In the 1950s these Japanese war repatriates organised a nationwide campaign to demand state compensation for their lost overseas assets. Because of the fact that they constituted a large voting group, they received substantial government support in rebuilding their lives in postwar Japan. In 1957 the Repatriate Benefits Allowance Law was passed through which 50 billion yen (approximately £250 million) was budgeted to grant allowances to war repatriates. Moreover, another law was enacted in 1967 in order to grant a total of 192.5 billion yen (approximately £ 962.5 million) to them for their loss based on their service to the (wartime) state's policy. For the details of this process, see Orr (2001: 156-169).

¹⁵ Nevertheless, as Orr (2001: 169-72) points out, the government was less keen on offering assistance to atomic-bomb victims, compared with dispossessed landlords and war repatriates. One reason is that the government was initially hesitant to advocate Japanese victimhood as the victim of the atomic bombs because of Japan's strategic alliance with the US in the Cold War international politics. Another reason is that, unlike landlords and repatriates, atomic-bomb victims did not form a large voting block. The Atomic Bomb Victim Medical Care Law, which was the first law to provide limited medical care to atomic bomb victims, was passed in 1957 only as a result of pressure from the anti-nuclear mass movement. In 1968, the Atomic Bomb Victims Special Measures Act was enacted in order to compensate for the inadequacies of the first law. Nonetheless, these two laws were based on the state's welfare policies, not its acknowledgement of the suffering of atomic bomb victims as war victims. It was only in 1994 that the government finally passed a law which promised to offer comprehensive assistance to atomic bomb victims, acknowledging the state's responsibility for their sufferings as war victims.

¹⁶ Furthermore, although Korean atomic bomb victims were entitled to receive the state's medical treatment according to the laws, the Japanese Immigration Control Law often prevented them from entering Japan. For Japanese treatment of Korean atomic bomb victims, see Michael Weiner (1995a).

¹⁷ Weiner (1995a, 17).

¹⁸ In the Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and Economic Cooperation of June 22, 1965 Japan promised to offer a \$300 million grant for the Korean property claim and \$200 million in government-to-government credits to South Korea as economic assistance. Both countries agreed that with this, the problem concerning claims for war-related compensation between their citizens was completely settled forever. This agreement has prevented South Korean people from gaining individual compensation. As Kwan Bong Kim (1971:58) points out, although the then South Korean government regarded this settlement as Japan's compensation, the Japanese government considered it 'economic cooperation' or a 'congratulatory fund' for South Korea's independence. Thus, the Japanese government managed to legally settle the issue of war reparations without clarifying its responsibility for the sufferings of Korean people under Japanese colonial rule.

¹⁹ The Tanaka-Zhou Communique of 1972 states that the People's Republic of China declared the renunciation of claims for war reparations against Japan out of friendship between the peoples of the both countries. The full text is available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/nc_seimei.html

²⁰ Similar agreements were signed by other Asian countries including Indonesia, the Philippines and Burma between 1954 and 1959. As Field (1995:412) explains, the Asian states were desperately seeking for Japan's financial contribution to the reconstruction of their countries. Thus, they compromised with the Japanese government in various ways, including renunciation of their rights to demand further individual war compensation and lack of a clear apology from Japan in the agreements. Moreover, the grants from Japan were left in the hands of the governments, not those of their citizens. The Korean public was resentful of the agreement and called the government a traitor (Chong-Sik Lee 1985).

²¹ Kaifu Toshiki (1992).

²² In the speech made by Emperor Hirohito in 1984, he expressed his sincere regret for the unfortunate past in the relationship between Japan and Korea. His speech was criticised by Korea as it was not clear who created 'the unfortunate past'. Emperor Akihito made this point clear by saying that he cannot but feel the deepest regret for the sufferings endured by Korean people during the unfortunate period brought by Japan. Emperor Akihito's full speech is available in Mainichi Shimbun, 25 May 1990.

²³ Asahi Shimbun, 26 May 1990.

²⁴ Asahi Shimbun, 25 May 1990. However, according to a survey jointly conducted by Asahi Shimbun and a major Korean newspaper, while 52% of Japanese respondents replied that Japan apologised enough, 79% of Korean respondents were not satisfied with the Japanese apology (Asahi Shimbun, 01 August 1990).

²⁵ Asahi Shimbun, 11 January 1992. Until then the Japanese government had denied the state's involvement in the operation of comfort women. Although the discovery of the documents forced the government to admit it, it denied that comfort women were forcefully recruited (Asahi Shimbun, 07 July 1992). Nonetheless, the acknowledgement of the state's involvement encouraged the Japanese government to find a way to express its apology to former comfort women. In

consequence, an Asian Women's Fund was established in 1995 which was aimed at offering 'sympathy money' collected through private contributions to former comfort women, together with a letter of apology signed by the prime minister. However, this system was criticised as it was regarded as a means for the Japanese government to evade its responsibility for the sufferings of comfort women and avoid the payment of the state compensation (Asahi Shimbun, 15 August 1996). Furthermore, in 1996 the United Nations Human Rights Committee published a report which criticised the treatment of comfort women by the Japanese military as a crime against humanity and called upon the Japanese government to compensate them. See the report at <<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/b6ad5f3990967f3e802566d600575fc>>

²⁶ On the day when Hosokawa was formally appointed prime minister, the Japanese government admitted that in most cases comfort women were forcefully recruited and apologised for their sufferings (Asahi Shimbun, 05 August 1993). On 11 August 1993, he stated in a press conference that he understood that the (Asia-Pacific) War was a war of invasion and an unjust war. This was followed by his speech in the Diet on 23 August 1993 in which he formally apologised for Japan's past aggression and colonial rule (Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition, 23 August 1993). Furthermore, when Hosokawa visited South Korea in November 1993, he more explicitly admitted Japanese wartime aggression against Korea and apologised, mentioning the imposition of the Japanese language, the forced adoption of Japanese names, comfort women, and forced labour as examples of Japanese colonial policies which inflicted unbearable pains on the Korean people.

²⁷ On 05 May 1994 the Minister of Justice, Nagano Shigeto of the LDP, said in an interview with a newspaper reporter that the so-called Nanking Massacre was a fabrication (Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition, 07 May 1994). Furthermore, on 12 August 1994 the Minister of Environment, Shin Sakurai, stated in a press conference that Japan did not have an intention of invasion when it launched the War. He added that as a result of the War, Asian countries gained independence from Western colonial rule (Asahi Shimbun, 14 August 1994). Both of them resigned from their ministerial positions as a result of strong criticism against their comments from China, Korea and the Japanese public.

²⁸ This alliance forced the JSP to compromise several of the party's long-standing policies. For example, Murayama acknowledged that the existence of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces is constitutional, contrary to his party's traditional critical stance on the issue (Asahi Shimbun, 21 July 1994). In consequence, the JSP lost many of their supporters. This was reflected in the results of the local elections in early 1995 in which the JSP won the lowest number of seats for prefectural assemblies in the party's forty-year history. Thus, the adoption of the anti-war resolution based on the party's core pacifist ideology was considered crucial for the survival of the party. Ryuji Mukae (1996) gives detailed accounts of the struggle over the resolution between the LDP, the JSP and the New Party Sakigake.

²⁹ Asahi Shimbun, 10 June 1995.

³⁰ The LDP was strongly opposed to the inclusion of Japan's apology for its aggression in Asia for fear that it might upset the JBFA and because it objected to the historical view which regarded Japan as an aggressor (Mukae 1996).

³¹ Quoted from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at <<http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/address9506.html>> For the Japanese version, see Asahi Shimbun, 10 June 1995.

³² For the interpretation of the resolution, also see Masumi Fukatsu (1995).

³³ A detailed list of controversial remarks made by prominent Japanese politicians on Japan's

imperial history and their consequences is available in Noriyuki Kawano and Masatsugu Masao (2002).

³⁴ Sebastian Conrad (2003: 87).

³⁵ Shimazu (2003) shows how the popular memory of war, which became a consumable product in popular entertainment such as film and popular literature in the 1970s and 1980s, enhanced Japanese victimhood by portraying the Japanese as 'good, sincere people who were forced to go to war and suffered greatly' (pp.113).

³⁶ Roy F. Baumeister and Stephen Hastings (1997: 284).

³⁷ In the Tokyo Trial, the particular sufferings of Asian people as a result of Japan's aggression was not recognised. With the history of Western colonialism in Asia, it would not have been very convenient for the Western allies to accuse Japan of aggression in Asia. Moreover, North Korea and China, which together consisted of the majority of the Asian victims of Japan's wartime aggression, were the Western allies' enemies in the Cold War. For the Western allies, Japan was their important strategic base in Asia. These Western strategic interests in the Cold War might also have been a reason why the particularity of Asian sufferings from Japan's aggression was overlooked in the Tokyo Trials. See Dower (1999, Chapter 15). For example, the staffs of Unit 731, a Japanese biological warfare unit which had conducted lethal experiments on thousands of living human subjects in Manchuria, were never prosecuted in the Tokyo Trial in exchange for sharing the results of their research with the American military. The majority of the victims were Chinese prisoners. For the details of Unit 731, see Sheldon H. Harris (1994).

³⁸ For the historical background of Yasukuni Shrine, see Murakami Shigeyoshi (1986) and Chapter 1 of this thesis. I have relied on his book for historical information on Yasukuni Shrine.

³⁹ Yasukuni Shrine and the JBFA were also unsatisfied with the proposal as they insisted on the maintenance of Yasukuni Shrine as a Shinto shrine.

⁴⁰ Asahi Shimbun, 19 April 1979.

⁴¹ Naturally, the JBFA and the Yasukuni Shrine regard the War as a war of justice to liberate Asia from Western oppression (Buruma 1995: 219-225).

⁴² Steven T. Benfell (2002). Every year on 15 August the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare organises the national memorial service for the war dead at a large hall in central Tokyo, called Nihon Budokan, in the presence of the emperor, empress, top government officials and members of the JBFA, in order to comfort the spirits of the 3.1 million Japanese war dead.

⁴³ According to an opinion poll conducted by Asahi Shimbun in July, 41% of respondents supported the visit, while 42% said that the prime minister should be cautious. In early August, while 65% said he should be cautious, 26% supported his visit to the Shrine. This change is thought to be the result of mounting pressure from China and Korea. (Asahi Shimbun, 04 August 2001).

⁴⁴ He paid for flower offerings with his own money and did not perform Shinto practices to avoid violating the Constitution. Nevertheless, he did not make it clear whether his visit was official or private. For his official statement on his visit, see Asahi Shimbun 14 August 2001. Because of its huge publicity and the fact that he signed as prime minister, it can be hardly said that it was a private visit.

⁴⁵ Sankei Shimbun, a major Japanese right-wing newspaper, described as 'extremely regrettable' the fact that Koizumi did not keep his promise that he would visit the Shrine on 15 August due to

foreign pressure (Sankie Shimbun, 14 August 2001).

⁴⁶ Asahi Shimbun questioned the constitutionality of his visit. Moreover, it maintained that the people of neighbouring countries still bore the scars of Japanese wartime aggression and Koizumi failed to give careful consideration to this issue (Asahi Shimbun, 14 August 2001). Mainichi Shimbun also criticised his visit, saying that his compromising policy did not serve the nation's interest. It stated that as a national leader and a representative of his country, Koizumi failed to understand that his personal feelings for the war dead and his visit had no currency internationally (Mainichi Shimbun, 14 August 2001).

⁴⁷ Asahi Shimbun, 04 August 2001.

⁴⁸ Asahi Shimbun, 05 August 2001. Another idea was proposed by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hiromu Nonaka, in 1999. He suggested the possibility of removing the Class-A criminals from Yasukuni Shrine and transforming the Shrine into a non-religious corporation in order to solve the problems surrounding the Shrine. However, his proposal was rejected by the Shrine (Asahi Shimbun, 25 June 2001). For the stance of Yasukuni Shrine and the JBFA, see Itagaki Tadashi (2000).

⁴⁹ At Yasukuni Shrine, the names of the war dead are listed as a national deity. By 1976 the number of the war dead enshrined by Yasukuni Shrine reached about 2.4 million, which covered most of the Japanese war dead in the Asia-Pacific War (Murakami 1986: 43).

⁵⁰ Asahi Shimbun, 06 August 2001.

⁵¹ For the nationalisation of the memory of the atomic bombings, see Chapter 6 of this thesis.

⁵² However, the existence of Korean victims of the atomic bombings, who were living in Japan as forced labour at the time of the bombing, has been severely marginalised in the official memory. See Chapter 6 of this thesis.

⁵³ For the history of *Hinomaru* and *Kimigayo*, see
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/11/09/990906.htm

⁵⁴ According to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (see Note 55), the poem had been recited at auspicious occasions and banquets celebrating important events throughout pre-modern history. Tanabe Hisao, a musicologist, also points out that the poem had been adopted by various local folk songs since 15-16th century (Asahi Shimbun 29 July 2000). Moreover, *gagaku* was Japanese traditional imperial court music whose history can be traced back to the Heian period, about 1,200 years ago.

⁵⁵ For example, the curriculum guidelines issued by the Ministry of Education in 1958 stated that 'It is desirable that *hinomaru* be hoisted and *kimigayo* be sung on national holidays'. The guidelines, which were revised in 1977, recognised them as the national flag and national anthem for the first time. Furthermore, the new guidelines announced in 1989 required the schools to instruct students to hoist the national flag and sing the national anthem at ceremonies, including entrance and graduation ceremonies (Tateo Shimizu 1999:5-6). For information on how the status of *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* has changed in the educational guidelines, see a web site of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology at
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/11/09/990906.htm

⁵⁶ For the change in the *Nikkyoso* membership rate, see the Ministry's web site at
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/15/02/030204.htm

⁵⁷ The intensity of such conflict led to the suicide of a high school principal in Hiroshima Prefecture,

where the progressive ideology is particularly strong, the night before his school's graduation ceremony in February 1999. On another incident, in 1998, the students of Tokorozawa High School in Saitama boycotted the school entrance ceremony as the result of the school's newly appointed principal's insistence on the use of *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* at the ceremony. This incident attracted intensive media attention. See Robert Aspinall and Peter Cave (2001).

⁵⁸ The main reason for the objection to *kimigayo* is that it can be regarded as the symbol of emperor warship and militarist imperial Japan. Responding to this criticism, Prime Minister Obuchi explained that 'your Majesty' meant the emperor as the symbol of the state and the unity of the people, whose status is derived from the will of the people with whom reside sovereign power, as stated in the Constitution. Thus, the government claims that the content of *kimigayo* is based on the nation's wish for national prosperity and peace (Asahi Shimbun, 30 June 1999).

⁵⁹ Zenkyo's membership rate is available at
<http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/houdou/15/02/030204.htm>

⁶⁰ Asahi Shimbun, 21 July 1994. Following his statement, the JSP announced that the party also recognised *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* as the national flag and anthem (Asahi Shimbun, 29 July 1994).

⁶¹ Asahi Shimbun, 04 September 1995. *Nikkyoso* announced the adoption of a conciliatory policy in order to reconcile itself with the Ministry of Education, Sports, Culture and Technology. This meant the further decline of the Left as an organised opposition to the Ministry's rightist conservative policy and resulted in the rise of the Ministry's power in the educational sphere.

⁶² After Murayama resigned in 1996, the Japan Socialist Party was renamed as the Social Democratic Party (SDP). In the general election in 1996, the share of the SDP's seats in the House of Representatives dropped significantly from 13.7% to 7.0%. This symbolised a decline of the SDP's power in Japanese politics. Yamazaki (2002: 180) provides a table which shows the change in the number of seats for each party.

⁶³ In an annual survey conducted in late March 1999 by Yomiuri Shimbun, 53% of the respondents supported the revision of the Constitution to allow the SDF to play a more active role. This figure was the highest record in post-war history (Yomiuri Shimbun, 09 April 1999). See also Bhurbhinder Singh (2001:155).

⁶⁴ For example, a law which allowed the police to intercept telecommunications was passed in order to prevent organised crimes. In another example, a law to assign a 10-digit ID number to all Japanese residents and allow government agencies all over Japan to access their ID numbers and personal information, such as the date of birth and address, was passed. These two laws, which were criticised as a violation of the right to privacy, and the law to legalise the status of *hinomaru* and *kimigayo*, were passed during the same session of the Diet in August 1999.

⁶⁵ Although the law itself does not state that the use of *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* in public schools is compulsory, the Ministry of Education, Sports, Culture and Technology said that teachers' refusal to use them at school can be punished as a violation of the Law for the Local Civil Servants. (Asahi Shimbun, 03 August 1999).

⁶⁶ The bill was approved by 406 to 86 in the House of Representatives on 22 July 2003 and by 166 to 71 in the House of Councillors on 09 August 2003 (Yamazaki 2002: 183).

⁶⁷ Shimizu (1999: 4).

⁶⁸ According to a survey conducted by Asahi Shimbun in June 1999, while 59% of the respondents said the legalisation of *hinomaru* was necessary, 35% said it was unnecessary. As

regards *kimigayo*, 47% said its legislation was necessary and 45% said it was not. Moreover, the percentages of the respondents who said they felt attachment to *hinomaru* and *kimigayo* were 79% and 65% respectively. It seems that the majority of the respondents did not feel strong resistance to their legalisation. However, the survey shows a clear generation gap on this subject. The younger generation showed much less attachment to *kimigayo* and stronger objection to the legislation, compared with the older generation. See *Asahi Shimbun*, 30 June 1999.

⁶⁹ In February 1999 the Japan Communist Party (JCP), which was the only party that had strictly maintained leftist, progressive ideology, shifted its position on the issue of the national flag and anthem and admitted the necessity to legalise them through public consensus (*Akahata Shimbun*, 07 March 1999). This made the government more confident in proceeding to the legalisation of *hinomaru* and *kimigayo*.

⁷⁰ On the day when the law was passed, both China and Korea manifested their concern about the rise of conservatism and rightist ideology in Japan (*Asahi Shimbun*, 10 August 1999).

⁷¹ Moreover, by 1963, the Ministry of Education increased its influence on the content of history teaching by establishing the selection process for textbooks. According to the regulation, public schools had to use the textbooks selected by county-level local education boards, which consisted of several local school districts, and whose members were appointed by the Ministry. The local education boards were authorised to choose textbooks from those which passed the screening process. However, in 1966 ILO and UNESCO jointly issued a recommendation on the status of teachers which advised that teachers should be involved in selecting textbooks. As a result, the Ministry introduced an arrangement in which the local education boards were to select textbooks according to the result of voting by local schools under its jurisdiction, in order to make the selection process reflect teachers' opinions. Nevertheless, in 1990 the Ministry attempted (and failed) to abolish the voting system and make more schools use the same textbooks by widening the area unit for textbook selection, in order to increase its control over textbooks and enhance the standardisation of textbooks. This met strong opposition from *Nikkyoso* and the Publishing Workers' Union, and in 1997 the Ministry issued a notice to the local school boards which encouraged the reduction of the size of the area unit for textbook selection and the involvement of teachers in the selection process. See Tawara Yoshifumi (2001:84-105).

⁷² Tawara (1997: 29-30).

⁷³ Unit 731 was a Japanese biological warfare unit which had conducted experiments on about three thousand Chinese prisoners in Manchuria. See also Note 37 in this chapter.

⁷⁴ For Ienaga's court battles, see Yoshiko Nozaki and Hiromitsu Inokuchi (1998). In his third law suit, the Supreme Court granted him a partial victory in 1997. While admitting that government screening itself was not unconstitutional, the Ministry's orders to revise some parts of his high school textbook, including the Nanking Massacre and Unit 731 were illegal (*Asahi Shimbun*, 30 August 1997).

⁷⁵ For the detail of the textbook controversy in 1982, see Caroline Rose (1999). As she explains, it was soon found out that the report was a false report and the alleged change of the term did not take place in the screening of 1982. Nevertheless, as Ienaga's court battles show, textbook writers had often been asked to revise the texts to soften the degree of Japan's aggression. In fact, as Tawara (1997:119-20) points out, in 1981 many textbooks replaced 'invasion' with more neutral words upon the request of the Ministry.

⁷⁶ For this process see Rose (209-10).

⁷⁷ For instance, the mention of the Nanking Massacre was incorporated into the 1984 editions of

all the junior high school history textbooks and the 1985 editions of all the high school history textbooks (Tawara 1997:33-4). Moreover, when a rightist group called National Council to Protect Japan (*Nihon wo mamoru kokumin gikai*) compiled a high school history textbook in 1986, which was based on the right-wing, emperor-centred historical view, the screening system functioned to soften its right-wing tone and correct mistakes (Lee Won-deog 2001:26).

⁷⁸ For example, see Fujioka Nobukatsu (1996a). Tawara (1997) gives detailed accounts of the Group's ideology and activities.

⁷⁹ For instance, articles written by the Group's members were serialised in *Sankei Shimbun*, one of the major Japanese daily newspapers, in 1996 and they were edited by Fujioka and published as a book entitled *Kyokasho ga oshienai rekishi* (History Not Taught in School Textbooks). Both of its volume 1 and volume 2 (1996b) became best-sellers.

⁸⁰ These groups were the Parliamentarians' League to Bequeath Correct History, formed in 1995 by members of the New Frontier Party to oppose the inclusion of an apology in the Diet resolution of 1995, the Diet-members League for a Bright Japan founded in 1996 by members of the LDP, and the Group of Young Diet-members Concerned About Japan's Future and History Education established by young members of the LDP. They jointly attacked the existing Japanese history textbooks for their negative descriptions of Japan's wartime past and put pressure on the Ministry of Education to 'correct' their contents. Altogether these groups had more than 200 members within the Diet. For the connections between these political groups and *tsukurukai*, see Tawara (1997:35-7). For example, they often invited Fujioka to their workshops. Okuno Seisuke, president of the Diet-members League for a Bright Japan publicly praised Fujioka's historical view.

⁸¹ For critiques of the textbook, see Tawara (2001) and Lee Won-deog(2001).

⁸² It should be noted that the contents of the new editions of the seven existing junior high school history textbooks submitted for screening in 2001 also showed a significant regression in their descriptions of Japan's aggression in Asia, mainly as a result of the pressure from the Ministry (Tawara 2001: 35-45). For example, the mention of comfort women disappeared in three textbooks.

⁸³ *Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition*, 09 July 2001.

⁸⁴ *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 July 2001.

⁸⁵ Lee Won-Deog (2001:22). On 08 October 1998 South Korea and Japan announced a rather future-oriented joint declaration in which both the governments agreed on the development of a Japan-South Korea partnership as the common goal for the twenty-first century. (*Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition*, 08 October 1998). As a result, the South Korean government lifted its ban on cultural imports from Japan in 1998. Thus, the textbook controversy of 2001 reversed the process to enhance partnership between Korea and Japan, which had been promised in 1998.

⁸⁶ To ensure the success of the joint hosting of the Football World Cup 2002, Japan and South Korea adopted a forward-looking diplomacy again in 2001 and the South Korean government lifted the ban on the import of Japanese popular cultural materials (*Asahi Shimbun*, 22 March 2002). Moreover, the Committee for Japan-South Korea Joint Historical Research was established in March 2002. Nonetheless, the Japanese government's insistence that school textbooks would not have to reflect the results of the joint research was criticised by the South Korean media (*Asahi Shimbun*, 25 March 2002).

⁸⁷ Aron Gerow (1998:32). In fact, Fujioka admitted that the Gulf War had a profound impact on the development of his historical view (Fujioka 1996a). It was ironical that Japan was criticised by the

US for its decision not to send its military force to the Gulf War, a decision based on the Peace Constitution designed by the US occupation authority.

⁸⁸ For the criticism of the Liberal View of History Study Group and tsukurukai, see Tawara (1997; 2001), Nagahara Kenji (2000), and Komori Yoichi and Takahashi Tetsuya (eds)(1998).

⁸⁹ See also Rikki Kersten (2003).

Chapter 6. Memory of the Asia-Pacific War: Examination of War/Peace Museums in Japan¹

As postmodernists point out, globalisation whose dynamic processes involve the drawing and redrawing of social boundaries may have created the possibility of new social groupings. However, new boundaries have to be drawn on the existing map of the world which is multi-dimensionally divided by existing, often well-established, boundaries into diverse communities which carry their own memories. As discussed in Chapter 4, while globalisation may have contributed to the emergence of Asianist discourses among some East Asian political leaders and intellectuals, increasing levels of economic interdependence and cultural interaction in the East Asian region have created the necessity for East Asian countries to accommodate their historical memories in the regional context in order to redefine their regional economic and political partnerships. Ironically, this process has highlighted a deep gap in historical memory between Japan and the former East Asian victims of Japanese imperialism.

As discussed in Chapter 5, the atrocities committed against East Asian peoples by Imperial Japan came to occupy the central position in the public and official historical discourses in the 1990s. Thus, the perception of 'Asia' as a victim of Japan's wartime aggression, and that of imperial Japan as a culprit, has confronted the Japanese public and urged them to redefine their historical position in their relation to the Japanese state and to Asia. The aim of this chapter is to examine how the Asia-Pacific War has been remembered by the Japanese public and how their memory of the War has redefined and been redefined by their national identity in the local, national, supranational regional and global contexts.

The balance of power between private memory and the public representation of the past in the formation of shared national memories is not fixed. When the number of people who have direct

experience of a particular event declines, popular memory of the event becomes more dependent on the existing dominant public narratives than on private memory. This shift in the balance of power is happening to the popular memory of the War. When the majority of the population belongs to the post-war generation, the popular memory of the war cannot rely on the private memory of the direct experience of the war. Certainly, memories can be passed on from the older generation to the younger generation, for example in the form of storytelling, diaries, photographs, novels and films based on the personal experiences of the War. However, such indirect memories can never be the same as firsthand memories. This is because when the post-war generation receives information on the War, it has to be processed through their own existing cognitive templates. Furthermore, by the time such information reaches the receivers, normally it has already gone through a series of ideological processes.

Thus, the post-war generation can never share the firsthand memory of the War. As time passes, the popular memory of the War comes to rely more on the dominant public narrative of the War as its first reference because of the inaccessibility of the firsthand memory to the majority of the population. This increases the influence of institutions and social agencies on the formation of the popular memory of the War since they are the principal providers of narratives on the War which are the resources of popular memory. They reorganise available historical materials, including personal accounts of the War, private photographs, letters and other personal belongings whose familiar forms make their narratives more realistic to the post-war generation, through selective processes, in order to create particular representations of the War which serve their own particular interests.

Discussing the role of museums in the formation of national collective memory, Lucy Noakes (1997:90) maintains:

'Museums are powerful sites of cultural transmission and public education; they are an embodiment of knowledge and power, important hegemonic instruments. The state museum is an important site not only for the exhibition of objects, but also for the exhibition of national beliefs; it is a place where the 'imagined community' of the nation becomes visible'.

She admits that individual visitors may interpret the representations of materials exhibited in the museum differently. Thus, historical representations at the museum are not necessarily the same as historical memories of individual people. However, she argues that the selection of objects from the past in the museum is an important means of legitimizing it, giving it an aura of importance. She states that 'when objects appear in museums, they become part of 'our' history' (Noakes 1997: 92).

In this chapter, I shall examine the permanent exhibitions of several prominent war/peace museums in Japan which have been playing a significant role in transmitting historical narratives on the Asia-Pacific War. It was only in the 1990s that museums which focused on modern Japanese histories of wars started to emerge. The Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum had been founded in 1955 with the stated purpose to 'convey to the peoples of all countries the reality of the damage inflicted by the atomic bomb, and contribute to the achievement of nuclear abolition and lasting world peace, which is the spirit of Hiroshima'.² The Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum was also established in 1955 for the similar purpose. An important feature of these two museums, which have been the most popular destinations of school trips, is that both had exclusively focused on the experience of the atomic bombings without providing information on the historical contexts surrounding them before they went through refurbishment in the mid-1990's. Such exhibitions only served the consolidation of a sense of victimhood among Japanese people and the legitimisation of Japan's national mission as a peace promoter. Furthermore, Yushukan museum inside the Yasukuni Shrine describes the objects exhibited as articles left by the honourable gods who died as martyrs for the war.³ Not only does its exhibition fail to mention the

suffering of other Asian peoples from Japan's imperial aggression, but also it describes the war as a war of justice to free Asia from Western imperialism.

However, significant changes were taking place in the 1990s as regards the way in which Japanese modern history should be exhibited in museums. Several museums which display the whole Japanese modern history of Japanese wars, including Japanese imperialism and aggression in Asia, were founded in the 1990s. In Japan, these museums have been established as peace museums rather than war museums. Their purpose of displaying war history is to inspire visitors with anti-war values and persuade them to renounce war. Typically, their exhibitions end with displays of post-war anti-war, antinuclear and peace activities around the world. Nevertheless, Hayashi Kozo (1999) points to a danger in these peace museums. He warns that the establishment of peace museums, without accepting Japan's historical responsibility for Japan's military aggression, is nothing more than the repression of the memory of those victims of Japanese imperialism. He maintains that it can be an attempt to forget the past for a bright future. Therefore, he insists that the exhibition of Japan's wartime aggression has been the most important task for peace museums in Japan.

The war exhibition movement in the 1980s certainly contributed to the establishment of peace museums in the 1990s. It consisted of locally-based grass-roots movements supported by the local governments which aimed to distribute information on Japan's modern war history, including Japan's imperial aggression, and the war experiences of local people through temporary exhibitions at local history museums.⁴ As Yamabe Masahiko (1996 and 2000) points out, the fact that peace ideology had been firmly rooted in Japanese society by the middle of 1980s, and that the Japanese government started gradually acknowledging Japan's military aggression,⁵ made it possible for local governments to get actively involved in peace movements.⁶ In this way, during the 1980s, Japan's wartime past was re-examined as a part of popular peace movements which vowed never to engage in war again. The war exhibition movement, led by local communities and

local governments without the state's initiative, indicates ordinary people's desire to remember the War in the local context; in other words, to construct localised memories of the War. By displaying the sufferings of local communities and other Asian peoples side by side, it showed that both Japanese people and Asian people were victims of the War for which the military state was responsible. In this sense, it can be said that the movement further consolidated the Japanese people's sense of self-victimisation and widened the gap between the state and the people.

Although this locally-based war exhibition movement certainly gave impetus to the establishment of comprehensive peace museums in the 1990s, the relationship between them has been rather complicated. Major peace museums in Japan are totally or partly funded by the local governments. As a result, the political composition of the local governments has often affected the contents of their exhibitions. Because Japan's war responsibility caused many controversies in both domestic and international contexts in the 1990s, the issue of how these peace museums should exhibit the War attracted much attention and created heated public debates. In this chapter, I shall examine several major war/peace museums which were established or renovated since the 1990's. The examination of these museums will show how the memory of the War has become an intersection of various competing historical discourses which have defined and been defined by localism, nationalism and universalism.

6.1. State-sponsored museums: *Showakan* and *Heiwa Kinen Tenji Shiryokan*

6.1.1. *Showakan* (Showa Hall)

Showakan was founded at the centre of Tokyo in 1999 by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare at the request of the Japan War-Bereaved Association (JWBA) which demanded the establishment of a facility to commemorate the sacrifice of those who lost their lives in the War and the suffering of their families. During its planning, which began in 1979, there were divided

opinions within the committee regarding how it should treat the War and, as a result, many of the original committee members left the project.⁷ Its huge modern-looking building, which consists of nine floors, is situated next to the Imperial Palace in the middle of Tokyo. 12.3 trillion yen (approximately £61.5 million) was spent on its establishment. Although it is funded by the ministry with an annual budget of 600 million yen (approximately £3 million), the JWBA is in charge of its practical management. A plate at the entrance with the signature of Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto reads 'this facility was named *Showakan* as it was designed to tell the next generation about the hardships of those who suffered from the War which symbolised the Showa era'. Thus, the aim of *Showakan* is to provide information on the hardships of Japanese people during and after the War. A document supplied by *Showakan* clearly states with an underlining that 'the materials related to the War itself are not to be exhibited'.⁸

The permanent exhibition, which had 55,530 visitors between April 1999 and March 2000, occupies two floors.⁹ It displays various materials which were commonly used by ordinary Japanese people during and in the aftermath of the War. The exhibition at the seventh floor is divided into six sections: 1) *senninbari*¹⁰ and love for family, 2) life of ordinary household, 3) life under the material control,¹¹ 4) life of students during the War, 5) life under the threat of air-raids, 6) newspapers on 15 August 1945. The permanent exhibition on the sixth floor is about the Japanese people's hardship in the aftermath of the War and Japan's recovery. The sections which show the sufferings of children and mothers, such as poor housing and the scarcity of food and commodities, are followed by the sections which demonstrate the recovery of Japan and its various achievements in the area of business, industry, popular entertainment, sports and culture in the 1950s.¹²

Thus, this exhibition shows how ordinary people's lives in Japan were affected by the War, without actually explaining about the historical background of the War.¹³ It is aimed at delivering information on hardships which ordinary Japanese people suffered during and in the aftermath of

the War and there is no explanation of how and why the War happened. Moreover, because of its exclusive focus on the suffering of Japanese people in Japan, the exhibition completely ignores what happened in the battlefield and Japan's former colonies and the sufferings of those foreigners living in Japan and its colonies. Thus, this exhibition limits victimhood exclusively to ordinary Japanese citizens in Japan.

6.1.2. *Heiwa Kinen Tenji Shiryokan* (Peace Memorial Exhibition Hall)

Heiwa Kinen Tenji Shiryokan (which can be translated as peace memorial exhibition hall) was founded in central Tokyo in 2000 by a foundation under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications. According to its leaflet, the aim of the foundation is to show sympathy toward a) former Japanese soldiers who have been unable to receive military pensions for various reasons, b) Japanese people who worked as forced labour at concentration camps in the former Soviet Union and Mongolia in the aftermath of the War and c) Japanese residents in the former Japanese colonies who were displaced and forced to go back to Japan after the War, and to pray for everlasting peace by commemorating their sacrifice and hardships. The exhibition is a part of their activities.

The first main section is designed to give visitors a better understanding of former soldiers who are not entitled to receive military pension or benefits for reasons such as that the length of their military service was not long enough. The primary message of this section is their sufferings are no less noble than those of others who receive military pensions and benefits. The second section is dedicated to the commemoration of the suffering of approximately five hundred and seventy thousand Japanese people in Manchuria, including many civilians, who were taken to concentration camps in the former Soviet Union and Mongolia in the aftermath of the War. Among them, about fifty-five thousand people died there. The third section is designed to show the sufferings of those 3.2 million Japanese civilians who had lived abroad and were forced to go back to Japan after Japan's surrender. Their lives were under threat and they had to give up everything

they had there. A film displayed in this section ends with a caption which says 'The repatriation was a big tragedy caused by the War'.

The second and third sections are aimed at commemorating the sufferings of Japanese people on the continent, many of whom were civilians, in the aftermath of the War. This leads to a question about why there were so many civilians on the continent in the first place. However, in this exhibition, there is no explanation about the historical background of Japanese Imperialism which was the cause of Japanese immigration to the Asian continent. This exhibition blames the War for the sufferings of the Japanese on the continent and carefully avoids reference to the state's responsibility for their sufferings and the War. In a way this exhibition is an attempt by the state to unify the people with the state by recognising the nation's sufferings as a result of the War.

To sum up, both state-sponsored museums disseminate the image of Japanese people as victims of the War. The fact that both were established under the jurisdiction of the government ministries and publicly funded can be taken as a manifestation of the official interpretation of the War. In the middle of controversies over Japan's responsibility for its war crimes, such exhibitions, which exclusively focus on the sufferings of the Japanese and neglect those of others, can widen the gap between Japan and the international community in terms of historical interpretations and moral responsibility.

The above state-sponsored war-related exhibitions are aimed at showing the Japanese public that the state understands their sufferings and stands by their side. On the surface, it might appear that these exhibitions are consonant with the Japanese victimised self-image and that they could enhance the unity between the state and the nation. Nonetheless, when the role of the state in Japanese historical consciousness is examined, it looks more likely that these exhibitions could sever their unity. In post-war Japan the state has been blamed for Japanese sufferings because people in Japan have thought that it was the state which led the 'innocent' Japanese into

a disastrous War. Moreover, people have also believed that the state, not the nation, was responsible for the sufferings of victims of Japanese imperial aggression in the War. What the Japanese public expects from the state is that the state should admit its responsibility for the sufferings of all the victims of its past military aggression, in order to absolve the nation of guilt for war crimes. This means that the state and the nation have become clearly separate entities in public historical consciousness in post-war Japan. Therefore, the state's attempt to identify itself with the innocent nation in these exhibitions, without taking responsibility for Japan's war crimes, is not compatible with the popular historical perception. If the nation cannot blame the state, against whom can the nation claim its victim status?

Furthermore, these exhibitions do not display materials related to the atomic bombings which have been the core of Japanese popular memory of the War. This lack of consonance with popular memory has meant that the state fails to represent the historical consciousness of the Japanese public appropriately, a consciousness which has been dominated by a pacifist ideology and self-image as the only victim of nuclear weapons. In this way, these exhibitions can alienate the state not only from the international community but also from the Japanese public.

Moreover, these exhibitions can also widen the generation gap. Those who experienced the War and its aftermath will find many familiar materials there. As they went through both the difficulties of the War and its aftermath, and Japan's post-war prosperity, exhibitions which avoid anything that might cause a sense of guilt may make them feel a comforting nostalgia towards the time when they were struggling. Such exhibitions allow them to see the past from the point of view of successful survivors who have overcome enormous hardship and contributed to the nation's recovery. On the other hand, the post-war generation will see the exhibition differently. Those who have received post-war education will try to locate the exhibition in the framework of their historical knowledge, which has been largely acquired from history classes, the press, films and books. They are more used to seeing the War in an international context and they are more

critically aware of what Japan did to others and what the US did to Japan. However, since the exhibition totally ignores international history, Japanese imperial expansion and the atomic bombings, which are the symbols of the War for the post-war generation, the exhibition is dissonant from the framework of their historical knowledge of the War. As they never experienced the War themselves, the mere display of materials commonly used during and in the aftermath of the War, but completely dissociated from their historical context, is unlikely to make the post-war generation feel any connection with them.

In conclusion, the exhibitions at the state-sponsored museums alienate the state not only from the international community but also from the Japanese public. Moreover, they also widen the generation gap within Japanese historical consciousness. Thus, the absence of other Asian victims and atomic bomb victims in these exhibitions serves to divide rather than unite the Japanese nation-state.

6.2. The Osaka International Peace Center (Peace Osaka)

In 1991, the Osaka International Peace Center, which is often called Peace Osaka, was opened in Osaka, the second largest city in Japan. It is run by a public foundation funded by the Osaka prefectural and municipal governments. They invested 200 million yen (approximately 1 million pounds) in its establishment and give a huge amount in subsidies to the museum every year.¹⁴ The museum attracts about 70,000 visitors a year.

Its permanent exhibition is divided into three categories. Each section sees the War from different points of view: as citizens of Osaka, Japan and Global society. The section about local war experiences provides information on the damage caused to the lives of people in Osaka by over fifty indiscriminate air-raids which killed 15,000 civilians. This section particularly focuses on the impacts of the War on the lives of children in Osaka. In a lecture hall, short films about the air-raids

in Osaka are shown. One of them is a short cartoon film about the tragic life of children who were separated from their parents; evacuated to the safety of the countryside and killed there by a fire. An interesting point about this film is the way it depicts the relationship between Korean and Japanese residents in Osaka. At the beginning of the film, there is a scene of a friendly conversation between Korean and Japanese parents. It gives the impression that Korean residents were peacefully integrated into the community of Osaka. On the other hand, the film also criticised the treatment of Korean people by the Japanese government such as the forced adoption of Japanese names and their low wages. Another scene shows that Japanese children in the countryside despise Korean children who have been evacuated from Osaka, while depicting strong friendship between Korean children and Japanese children from Osaka. This film conveys the message that people in Osaka had less discrimination against Korean people and that children were innocent victims of the War. It may be argued that by seeing the impacts of the War on Osaka from the point of the view of innocent; children in Osaka, the involvement of Osaka in Japan's imperial projects as a major industrial centre which was devoted to the production of munitions for the War has been somehow purified and its victimhood has been sanctified.

Another significant feature of this museum is that it was the first publicly-funded museum which explicitly exhibited Japan's wartime aggression, including the Nanking Massacre, the use of Chinese people in experiments by the Japanese chemical warfare unit and Chinese and Korean comfort women. In Osaka, which still has a large Korean population, the citizens initiated in 1981 a local movement to promote a war exhibition. Throughout the 1980's the movement developed with a strong emphasis on Japan's military aggression in Asia.¹⁵ The impact of this movement on the historical view on the War held by Osaka citizens was highlighted in 1987 by an incident in which junior high school students from Osaka prompted a petition for the inclusion of the history of Japan's aggression in the exhibition of the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.¹⁶ Although their request was turned down by the municipal government of Hiroshima, this incident showed strong interest in the history of Japanese aggression in Asia among Osaka citizens. Thus, it seemed

natural for the Osaka International Peace Center, which was established at the request of Osaka citizens, to incorporate that part of Japan's wartime history in its exhibition.

Nevertheless, in 1996 the right-wing activists launched an attack on the Osaka International Peace Center, claiming that its exhibition was based on a masochistic historical view in which Japan's history was interpreted from the point of view of others. Their criticism was supported by the rightist section of the Japanese media.¹⁷ The fact that the Center is funded by the prefectural and municipal governments, and that its administrative staffs are on loan from them, has put the Center in a very awkward position. In 1997, one of the dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) members of the Osaka prefectural assembly questioned the prefectural governor relentlessly about the 'ideological bias' permeating the exhibition at a meeting of the prefectural assembly's budget committee.¹⁸ He cast doubt on the credibility of some materials at the Center. Moreover, those against the exhibition demanded the abolition of the subsidiaries of the prefectural and municipal governments to the Center.¹⁹

Furthermore, attacks on the Center took a rather peculiar turn in January 2000. Despite a strong protest from China, the Center granted permission to use its lecture hall for a conference on the Nanking Massacre, organised by a right-wing group. At the Conference, theories which denied the Chinese claim that 300,000 Chinese, including many civilians, were killed by the Japanese army at Nanking in 1937 were introduced. What was the reason for the permission to use the lecture hall for the conference, whose theme clearly contradicted the stance of the Center on the historical interpretation of Japan's wartime aggression in Asia? The chairman of the Center and the mayor maintained that the principle of freedom of speech, which was protected by the constitution, did not allow them to refuse the use of the hall which was regarded as a public space, simply because of ideological differences.²⁰ The Japanese government's response was similar. The Minister of Foreign Affairs explained to a Chinese newspaper reporter that the Japanese government's historical view was different from that of the organisation which held the conference

and that it was undeniable that many Chinese civilians were killed by the Japanese army in Nanking²¹. Moreover, the Japanese ambassador to China told the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs that the government could not ban the conference simply because the organisation's view was different from that of the government due to the principle of freedom of speech and assembly which Japan had espoused as a result of its history.²²

In conclusion, the case of the Osaka International Peace Center has highlighted a dilemma which faces war-related museums funded by local government. On the one hand, many of them have been established as a way of responding to local peace movements which demand the recognition of the history of Japan's wartime aggression in Asia. On the other hand, their status as publicly-funded institutions makes them susceptible to political pressure from local politicians associated with the conservative LDP. One thing that is clear is that the Center has been offering space for the contestation of war-related memories. Exhibition room A represents the War from the point of view of Osaka citizens. Room B introduces the War from Korean and Chinese perspectives. Room C is designed to increase the visitor's self-awareness as a global citizen. This multi-layered perspective adopted by the Centre may strengthen Japanese visitors' local identity and global identity but not their identification with the state.

The exhibition, with its multiple perspectives, does not unify the nation by offering a homogenized memory of the War but divides it by creating discrepancies in the memory of the War among visitors. Moreover, the highly publicised conflict between the Center and the LDP, which has dominated the central government throughout the post-war era, could turn those who identify with either Osaka citizens or Chinese and Korean victims, or with both, against the state. This might be the consequence which the exhibition has been aiming to achieve in order not to let Japan become an aggressive nationalist country again. Nevertheless, an unintended consequence might be that the disintegration of the nation-state through divided memories can make it hard for the nation-state to function as a unified entity and so take full responsibility for its past.

6.3. Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum

The relation between Okinawa and the Japanese state is ambivalent.²³ In 1879 the Meiji government, backed by military force, moved to abolish the semi-independent Ryukyu Kingdom. After becoming a prefecture of Japan, Okinawa and its people were rapidly 'Japanised' through an intensive assimilation program designed to turn Okinawan people into imperial subjects. In this way, Okinawa came to be fully integrated into Japan's imperial projects and in the end, became the site of the final battle of the War. After Japan's surrender Okinawa was placed under the rule of the US military, which used Okinawa as the main military base in Asia during the Cold War. As a result of the intensive reversion movement in Okinawa, in which Okinawan people expressed their strong desire to be re-united with Japan, it was finally returned to Japan in 1972.

The original Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum was founded in 1975 and it was completely renovated in 2000 at a cost of approximately £36.455 million. In its first year, the new museum attracted 456,697 visitors.²⁴ The fact that it is directly run by the Okinawa prefectural government has had a strong influences on the content of its exhibition. The most significant feature of the exhibition is that it is based on the interpretation of the War from the point of view of local people in Okinawa who regard themselves as the victims of the military state.

It starts with the process by which Okinawa, which possessed a distinctive culture, religion and language, was forced to become a part of Japan under the military state. This is followed by a section about 'the policy to indoctrinate people as Japanese imperial subjects in the colonies and occupied territories'. An interesting point is that the assimilation policy adopted in Okinawa, and that in Japan's colonies, were very similar. This implies that Okinawa, a

distinctive ethnic community formerly called Ryukyu Kingdom, was colonised by the modern Japanese state. Here, people in Okinawa, and other Asian people in Japan's colonies, are treated as equal in terms of their relationships with the Japanese state. A panel at the very beginning of the exhibition says:

'Long ago our Ryukyuan ancestors, a truly peace-loving people, crossed the ocean and engaged in trade with Asian nations. The ocean, a source of golden life, a bridge of peace and friendship, still lives in the hearts of our people.'

There is no doubt that 'our people' refers to people in Okinawa, not the Japanese in a general sense. Throughout the exhibition, a clear identity of the people of Okinawa, separate from the state and Japanese people in the mainland, is visible. The exhibition is extremely critical of the military state and is full of anger at what it did to Okinawa. An interesting point is that there is no significant reference to the sufferings of Japanese people in the mainland, while there are explicit mentions of the sufferings of other Asian victims of Japan's imperial aggression. For example, there is no display about the atomic bombings. On the other hand, there is a section entitled 'How textbooks in other countries describe the Asia-Pacific War'. In this section, textbooks of other countries such as Korea and the Philippines are displayed with a Japanese translation which tells the story of Japan's imperial aggression. This may indicate that the exhibition shows that people in Okinawa feel more sympathy towards other Asian victims of the Japanese military state than toward the Japanese in the Japanese mainland.

The most distinctive feature of this exhibition is the section dedicated to the Battle of Okinawa (1945), in which far more civilians than soldiers died. Throughout this section, strong resentment is directed at the Japanese army, rather than US and British forces. A panel describes the battle as follows:

'As the fighting escalated, not only did indiscriminate shelling by US and British forces take thousands of lives, but, in many places, the Japanese army also killed civilians. Viewing Okinawan civilians as spies, Japanese soldiers tortured and murdered local residents. And, seeking refuge for themselves, they forced civilians out of evacuation caves....Japanese forces also seized food, now in very short supply, from civilians, and ordered deaths for those said to be an encumbrance in combat. With no safe place to go, a number of civilians were taken in as refugees by US forces, but many others starved to death as food ran out, or were killed in desperation by fellow-residents in conditions that can only be described as a hell on earth.'

Interestingly, the exhibition does not show much anger at the US forces. The impression conveyed by this section is that the US forces did what their soldiers were supposed to do in a war. A photograph shows an American soldier treating the wounds of a young girl. Another panel is a picture of an American soldier holding a young girl in his arm whom he rescued from the site of a mass suicide. The humanitarian side of the US forces represented by these photographs was in sharp contrast to the brutality of the Japanese army.

Thus, this is the exhibition of the Okinawan people's resentment against a state which forcefully integrated the peace-loving people of Ryukyu Kingdom into disastrous imperial projects and betrayed them at the end. It should be noted that the process by which the content of the exhibition was decided was not trouble-free. In August 1999, it was revealed that revisions of the exhibition's contents, which had been already finalised by the museum's supervising committee, was secretly taking place on the order of the newly elected governor of Okinawa, who was backed by the dominant LDP.²⁵ The revisions were designed to soften the image of the brutality of the Japanese military against Okinawan civilians and conceal the fact that not only did the Japanese military fail to protect Okinawan civilians but they also killed them.²⁶ In the end, as a result of the strong opposition of local people and the local media to these revisions, they were cancelled and the preparation of the exhibition

proceeded according to the original plan.²⁷

It is understandable that a museum run by a local government tends to be susceptible to the influence of political pressure. A turning point was the victory of Inamine Keiichi, with the support of the LDP and the local business circle over leftist-backed Ota Masahide, who had been the incumbent governor of Okinawa since 1990, in the gubernatorial election of 1998. In a sense, his victory reflected Okinawan people's expectation of economic benefits, which could be brought to Okinawa through the close connection between Inamine and the central government, dominated by the LDP. The relationship between Ota and the central government had deteriorated because of his strong commitment to the local movement, which demanded the reduction of the presence of the US military in Okinawa.²⁸ As a result, Okinawa, where local business had been suffering from a severe depression, could not have expected much economic support from the central government. However, the victory of Inamine brought hope to Okinawa's local economy. Leaders of Okinawa's business circle embraced Inamine's victory and emphasised the importance of public enterprises and public financial investment in revitalising the local economy in Okinawa.²⁹

In fact, the government's attitude towards Okinawa drastically changed after the election. The government's decision to host a G8 summit in three prefectures, including Okinawa in 2000, highlighted its change of attitude toward Okinawa. Moreover, shortly after the government chose Okinawa as a main location of the summit, it announced the issue of a new 2000 yen note to celebrate the Millennium, and *shureimon*, a gate which is one of the significant pieces of historical architectures in Okinawa, was selected to be printed on the face of the note. These showed the strong government desire to unite Okinawa with the state and enhance its integration into the system of Japanese nations-state.³⁰ According to surveys conducted by Okinawa Times prior to the summit, the majority of people in Okinawa welcomed the government's decision to host the summit in Okinawa because they expected

that this could revitalise the local economy and bring Okinawa the best opportunity to call for world peace.³¹

The revision of the exhibition at the museum was taking place in tandem with the preparation for the summit. It is understandable that Governor Inamine ordered the revision in order not to offend the central government. Nevertheless, if he assumed that the expectation of economic benefits which could be brought to Okinawa by closely working with the government in the preparation for the summit might justify the revision which favoured the state's position, the subsequent strong opposition to the revision by the local people proved that he was completely wrong. The anticipation of economic benefits was not sufficient for Okinawan people to sell their painful memory of the War and their peace ideology which had been the foundation of their identity as Okinawan people.

In conclusion, the attempted revision of the exhibition further deepened the gap between Okinawa and the state. Despite the government's attempt to use the summit as a means to reintegrate Okinawa into the Japanese nation-state, the economic interest of Okinawan people could not constitute a solid bridge between them and the state. The issue of the exhibition proved that their memory of Okinawa's modern history has been so heavily localised that it cannot be subsumed into the official memory of modern Japanese history in which they could hardly accommodate their own version of local history. The identity of Okinawan people has been undergoing a process of localisation and globalisation, namely self as a member of Okinawan community, which has its own distinctive culture and history, and as a citizen of global society who has a mission to promote world peace. This might give an impression that there is no place for nationalism in the identity of Okinawan people. However, the relationship between the state and Okinawan people is more complicated.

The fact that the indoctrination of Okinawan people as imperial subjects and Japan's

colonisation of Korea and Taiwan were exhibited side by side implies the recognition of common sufferings of Okinawan and Asian peoples as the victim of Japan's military state. Moreover, Okinawa's geographical proximity to China and its pre-modern history as a semi-dependency of China might suggest that it is possible for Okinawan people to develop an Asian identity as an extension of their Okinawan identity. An obstacle could be the importance of political citizenship in the minds of Okinawan people who were denied citizenship by the US and were desperate to restore their suppressed human rights by obtaining citizenship from the Japanese government during the US occupation. Their experience of not belonging to any sovereign political institution has made them well aware of the necessity of the state's protection to secure their lives in the modern international system. In fact, after its reversion to Japan in 1972, no matter how strained their relationship with the state, it has never led to a movement calling for their independence from Japan. They have chosen to live as Japanese. In this sense their political identity as citizens of Japan as a political institution may be stronger than that of Japanese people in the mainland who have never been in a position to make a decision on their nationality and therefore, have never questioned it. This strong political national identity may obstruct the development of an Asian identity in the minds of Okinawan people.

6.4. Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum

The atomic bombing of Nagasaki on 09 August 1945 has been one of the main symbols of the War for Japanese people. 11 million people visit Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum each year. The forerunner of the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, which was a one-floor exhibition room in a city hall, was established in 1955 by the Nagasaki municipal government and it was expanded several times later. In order to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing, the municipal government decided to found a new museum to replace the old one, and Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum was opened on 1 April 1996. However, the process of its preparation was far from smooth. On 1

January 1996, Asahi Shimbun Western Edition reported that materials related to Japan's wartime aggression were going to be included in the permanent exhibition of the new museum. This decision of the Nagasaki municipal government was based on their belief that in order to call for the eradication of nuclear weapons, it was necessary to understand the meaning of the atomic bombing at Nagasaki by placing it in the context of modern world history. They argued, therefore, it was essential for Japan to face its past of imperial aggression which resulted in the atomic bombings. This reflected a significant shift in the view on the atomic bombings which had been treated in isolation from the context of the War, almost like a natural disaster.

In 1992, the foundations of a former prison was discovered 300m away from the epicentre of the atomic bomb. It has been reported that among 48 prisoners killed there by the atomic bomb, 33 were Chinese and 13 were Korean prisoners.³² This undermined the exclusivity of Japanese victimhood in the atomic bombing. The fact that these foreign prisoners were brought to Japan to be subjected to forced labour proved that the Japanese were not only victims but also aggressors. Local groups strongly demanded the preservation of the entire remains of the prison at their original site. Despite its initial promise to preserve the entire remains, in the end the municipal government decided to destroy more than 50% of the remains, including the execution site, in order to construct an underground car park. As the reason for the change of his policy, Municipal Governor Motoshima argued that the cost of the original plan was too high and the remains themselves did not show the destructiveness of the atomic bomb. Thus, he claimed, they were not valuable as remains of atomic bomb damage.³³ As Buruma (1994:251) points out, the change of his policy was reported to be a result of political pressure from the LDP whose support he needed to stay in office. Although a large part of the remains which were the historical witness of Japan as an aggressor was destroyed, this incident created an atmosphere that demanded the recognition of Japanese wartime aggression in peace movements in Nagasaki. Ito Kazunaga, who replaced Motoshima as a new municipal governor of Nagasaki in 1995, emphasised the necessity for Japan to acknowledge its history as an imperial aggressor and apologise to its victims in order for

Japan to contribute to the development of world peace.³⁴

Thus, the demand for the acknowledgement of Japan's wartime aggression and Japan's apology for its victims has become an integral part of official peace ideology in Nagasaki. The inclusion of materials related to Japan's wartime aggression in the permanent exhibition of the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum marked a first step for the new governor to realise his peace ideology. However, his decision met strong opposition among conservative politicians, local financial circles, and right-wing activists. Their argument was that the inclusion of Japan's wartime aggression would create an idea that Japan deserved the atomic bombings because of its war crimes and lead to the approval of the use of the atomic bombings.³⁵

On 22 March 1996, ten days before the opening of the museum, it was reported that the municipal government had given in to the pressure of the opposition.³⁶ For example, a photograph of Nanking Massacre was replaced by a photograph of soldiers entering Nanking city. Furthermore, some parts of the texts on explanation panels were modified so as not to mention Japan's wartime crimes. Local groups, the Chinese media and the Chinese government strongly criticised these changes.³⁷ On 30 March 1996, as a result of the meeting with the representatives of the Chinese Consulate General, the municipal government decided to include a photograph of Nanking Massacre.³⁸ Moreover, a day before its opening, video facilities located in the section which dealt with the war between Japan and China and the Second World War were revealed for the first time. The section offers ten different films including those issues related to Japan's military aggression such as the Nanking Massacre, the Japanese chemical weapon unit, and comfort women. There are only two small video screens. Visitors sit in front of the screen and choose a film by pressing a button. Certainly, the degree of the exposure of materials to the audience that such films can exert is relatively limited, compared with photographic panels. Nonetheless, the inclusion of those materials in the exhibition was a victory for the pacifism that dominated Nagasaki.³⁹

While both Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been the symbols of pacifist ideology, what is distinctive about Nagasaki is the strong influence of Christianity on its peace ideology. Nagasaki is a city with a large Christian population. After the arrival of the first Portuguese ships in the southern part of Japan in 1543, Nagasaki became the centre for European trade and cultural exchange. Omura Sumitada, the local feudal lord who converted to Christianity, transferred jurisdiction over the port of Nagasaki to the Jusuits, a Spanish Catholic organisation. As a result, Nagasaki thrived as the centre of missionary work as well. In 1588, however, national ruler Toyotomi Hideyoshi seized control of Nagasaki and issued a ban on Christianity in an attempt to separate religion from trade. Despite the ban, many Christians in Nagasaki secretly kept their Christian beliefs. By 1612 when the Tokugawa Shogunate also issued a ban on Christianity, the majority of residents in Nagasaki were said to be Christians.⁴⁰ After a Christian peasants revolt in 1637, the Tokugawa Shogunate banned the visits of Portuguese ships to Japan and adopted a radical policy of Christian persecution and national isolation. Nevertheless, the Dutch and Chinese were allowed to continue trading at Nagasaki. As a result, the city enjoyed its prosperity as Japan's only gateway for foreign culture and advanced European sciences. This unique legacy of Nagasaki as a Christian town and a window to the outside of Japan may have contributed to the universalism penetrating the city which has been advocating its mission to promote world peace as the victim of the atomic bombing.

Inside the museum, there is a huge replica of the ruins of Urakami Cathedral. The explanation panels for these ruins inform visitors of the sufferings of people in Urakami who were constantly persecuted for their beliefs in Christianity. An interesting point is that there is no explanation about the impact of the state's policy to indoctrinate the people as loyal imperial subjects through the worship of State Shinto on Nagasaki. The fact that the state rigorously implemented this policy throughout its entire territories, and that Nagasaki prospered as a prominent military port town with many military factories, show that Nagasaki could not have escaped being involved in Japan's imperial projects. However, the panel's implication that Nagasaki had been a Christian

town long before the Meiji government was established and its people kept their Christian beliefs during the very time when Japan's Shinto-based nationalism was growing suggest that Nagasaki and imperial Japan have been historically and culturally separate entities. The influence of universalism is also reflected in a peace memorial which was built at the corner of the Peace Park in 1955. It is a giant statue of a Greek god-like, almost naked male figure whose strong physique does not resemble that of the Japanese. The fact that the statue does not possess anything to indicate its nationality or ethnicity symbolises the universalism of peace ideology promoted by Nagasaki City.

The influence of Nagasaki's Christian history on the view of the War and the self-perception of people in Nagasaki in its ambivalent relation with the Japanese nation-state can be detected in the controversial statement about the emperor's war responsibility made in 1988 by the Christian mayor of Nagasaki, Motoshima Hitoshi.⁴¹ He said:

'I think that the emperor does bear responsibility for the war. However, by the will of the great majority of the Japanese people, as well as of the Allied powers, he was released from having to take responsibility and became the symbol of the new Constitution'.⁴²

It was the moment when the emperor was dying and continuous reporting by the press on his deteriorating condition created a quasi-sacred atmosphere in which the attention of the whole nation was concentrated on his life and death. In a sense it was the moment when the entire nation was united around the dying emperor even though feelings toward him varied among the Japanese public. Under these circumstances, his remark on the emperor's responsibility was harshly attacked by conservatives and rightists. In January 1990, Motoshima was shot in the back by a right wing extremist and nearly lost his life.

Concerning Motoshima's statement, Buruma (1994:253) argues that he broke a Japanese taboo.

By escaping legal prosecution in the Tokyo Trial and renouncing his political power, the emperor dissociated himself from the state and became a symbol of the nation. As a result, his innocence was equated with the innocence of the Japanese people. Buruma states that once malicious generals and admirals had gone, the image of an innocent, peace-loving emperor who had been deceived by them had to be maintained for the unification of post-war Japan and the development of pacifism in Japan. According to the above logic, if the emperor was responsible for the War, so were the Japanese people. That is why, Buruma maintains, Motoshima's comment indirectly challenged the widely held view on the Japanese people's individual responsibility for Japan's war crimes.

However, blaming the emperor as the former head of the military state for Japan's aggression against Asian people and the wartime sufferings of Japanese people might be another means for the Japanese public to safeguard their innocence and victim status in their historical consciousness. In fact, by claiming '*If the emperor....had resolved to end the war earlier, there would have been no Battle of Okinawa, no nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki*',⁴³ Motoshima treated Japanese people as the victim of the emperor's wrong leadership as the head of the state. Therefore, while he was attacked by rightists who wished to maintain unity between the state and the nation through emperor worship, he gained support from leftists who sought to preserve the collectivity of the Japanese nation as an innocent victim of the state's misconduct.

In Japan, leftists often associate the emperor with the state and accuse him of responsibility for the War, claiming that worship of emperor-centered State Shinto led Japan into a disastrous War. Thus, they applauded Motoshima's statement. However, the source of Motoshima's conviction about the emperor's war responsibility was not leftist ideology. He had been associated with the LDP which had strong connections with the right-wing groups. Rather, his pacifism was based on his Christian belief on morality and a liberal philosophical concept of individual responsibility.⁴⁴ In 1991, although he had lost the LDP's support which had been his main political support base, he

won a victory in his bid for a fourth term in the municipal election. This indicated that his pacifism and liberalism were supported by the citizens of Nagasaki. It was only when he gave in to political pressure and destroyed a large part of the remains of the former prison in 1992 that the citizens of Nagasaki started turning their back on him.⁴⁵

In conclusion, the history of Nagasaki as a Christian city, as a victim of the suppression of freedom of belief and as a victim of the atomic bombing, has created a distinctive pacifism in the city which consists of a mixture of Christian universalism, Western liberalism and localism. What is missing here is the identity of Nagasaki as part of the Japanese nation-state. Thus, the memory of the atomic bombing in Nagasaki which has been universalised and localised at the same time is unlikely to provide a solid basis of the unification between the state and the nation.

The controversies over the treatment of the remains of the prison and the exhibition of the new museum indicate that the memory of the atomic bombing is dividing rather than unifying for the nation-state. The mayor in his peace declaration called for a historical view which could be embraced by other Asian people, and Nagasaki citizens have denied the exclusivity of Japanese victimhood by insisting the inclusion of the sufferings of Chinese and Korean victims of the War in historical memory. Nonetheless, it is doubtful whether their pacifism, defined by universalism and localism, could serve the foundation of Asian solidarity. If Asian solidarity has to be based on an Asian identity which is formed on the extended continuum of a national identity, the memory of the atomic bombing presented by Nagasaki, which lacks a strong national base, may not be able to function as a historical bridge between Japan and the rest of Asia.

6.5. Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and Peace Memorial Park

Japan's unique experience as the victim of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki has turned Hiroshima into a symbol of peace and given Japanese people an exclusive claim to

leadership of the world antinuclear weapon movement.⁴⁶ In 1949 the Japanese government passed the Peace Memorial City Construction Law which aimed to rebuild Hiroshima as a peace memorial city to symbolise the human ideal of a sincere pursuit of genuine and lasting peace. In 1952, in accordance with the Law, the official construction plan to build Peace Memorial Park in the hypocenter area was made. Various facilities and numerous memorials which were designed to manifest the desire for lasting peace were built in the Park. In a sense, the Park as a whole can be regarded as a museum.

On the one hand, its status as a Mecca of world peace has given the Park an aura of universalism. The inscription on the Cenotaph, which reads 'Let all the souls here rest in peace; for we shall not repeat the evil', deliberately obscures who was the victim and who was the victimiser in the atomic bombing. The Cenotaph was built in 1952, which was the year when the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was signed. Thus, it is understandable that the municipal government of Hiroshima, which was desperately seeking for government funding for the reconstruction of the city, avoided any reference to the fact that the atomic bomb had been dropped by the US, which would have undermined diplomatic relations between Japan and the US. On the other hand, the memory of Hiroshima has been heavily nationalised by excluding other nationalities from victimhood. For instance, until 1994 the permanent exhibition at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, which attracted over one million visitors each year, did not include the history of Japanese aggression in Asia. The original exhibition exclusively focused on the damage inflicted by the atomic-bomb which Hiroshima and its people suffered.

In 1994 a new wing (West Building) was added to the museum.⁴⁷ The exhibition in the West Building is designed to place the atomic bombing in a historical context by providing visitors with information on the historical background of the War. It shows how Hiroshima developed into a major military port city and includes relatively brief, detached mentions of the Nanking Massacre and the presence of Korean workers in Hiroshima who were engaged in forced labour at military

facilities. A panel explains about overseas *hibakusha*⁴⁸, many of whom were Koreans who had been forcefully brought to work in Japan. Nonetheless, when visitors moved to the East Building the devastating, horrifying impacts of the atomic bomb which people in Hiroshima had to endure are so vividly depicted, and emotions which the exhibition can provoke in the minds of visitors are so intense, that they overshadow the image of other Asian people as a victim which they saw earlier in the West Building. Certainly, the West Building's exhibition shows some efforts to incorporate other views of the War and the atomic bombing. However, one cannot escape the impression that the museum as a whole is carefully designed not to undermine the victimhood of Hiroshima citizens and the legitimacy of their heroic mission to promote world peace.

Nothing symbolises the exclusivity of Hiroshima's victimhood more explicitly than the history of the Monument to the Memory of the Korean Victims of the A-bomb.⁴⁹ In 1969 the municipal authority rejected the request of a group of Korean residents affiliated with South Korea called *Zainippon Taikan Minkoku Mindan* (*Mindan*, for short) for the construction of a memorial to commemorate the memory of Korean atomic bomb victims within Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park. As a result, it was built outside the Park in 1970. Their repeated request for the transfer of the memorial to the Park was turned down by the municipal authority for the following three reasons: 1) the regulation established in 1967 restricted any construction of memorials by a third party within the official territory of the Park, 2) if the memorial were to be relocated within the Park, it had to be a 'unified memorial' which commemorated the victims of both South and North Korean people lest the political issue of the division of Korea undermine the sacredness of the site, 3) the central cenotaph in the Park enshrines all souls of atomic bomb victims regardless of their race or nationality and thus, there was no need to have a separate memorial which was dedicated solely to Korean victims.⁵⁰ The very physical location of the Korean memorial symbolised the marginalisation of Korean victims in the official memory of Hiroshima and the exclusiveness of Japanese victimhood. Moreover, even if the central cenotaph was meant to enshrine all the atomic bomb victims, the fact that Korean victims were enshrined with their adopted Japanese

names suppressed Korean victimhood and made it invisible.⁵¹

In 1990 the plan to have a Korean memorial within the Memorial Park was proposed by the municipal government. There were several factors for their change of attitude. As mentioned in the previous chapter, when South Korean President Roh Tae-u visited Japan in 1990, Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki made an official apology for the sufferings of Korean people inflicted by Japan's past behaviour and Emperor Akihito expressed the deepest regret to the people of Korea in his speech. This was followed by the government's move toward the improvement of the legal status of Korean residents in Japan⁵² and the resolution of the issue of compensation to Korean victims of the War, including the offer of \$25 million to support medical treatment of atomic bomb victims living in Korea.⁵³

Furthermore, the municipal government was preparing itself for hosting the Asian Games in 1994, an Asian version of the Olympics. In that process, it became clear that the treatment of the Korean memorial by the municipal government contradicted the image of Hiroshima as the centre of world peace and the slogan of international friendship which the municipal government had been promoting.⁵⁴ Moreover, groups of citizens also criticised the marginalisation of the Korean memorial by the municipal government. As a result of this mixture of international political climate, the interest of the municipal government and civic pressure, the municipal government finally agreed to have a Korean memorial within the Park on condition that it had to be a unified memorial which would enshrine atomic bomb victims of both North and South Korea.

One big problem about relocating the existing Korean memorial within the Park was strong opposition from *Zainippon Chosenjin Sorengo* (Soren, for short), an organisation which represented Korean residents affiliated to North Korea. They claimed that the existing memorial built by *Mindan*, affiliated to South Korea, was dedicated exclusively to South Korean victims and excluded North Korean victims as its inscription adopted the word 'kankokujin' which normally

refers to South Koreans in contemporary Japanese usage. Thus, the municipal government and an advisory committee maintained that the inscription had to be changed to commemorate all the Korean atomic bomb victims. They proposed a new inscription which read '*genbaku giseisha ireihi*' (memorial for the atomic bomb victims), dropping the word '*kankokujin*'.⁵⁵

The leaders of both *Mindan* and *Soren* accepted the proposed inscription because their top priority was to build a unified Korean memorial within the Park. Nonetheless, other members of the organisations and many Japanese citizens protested against it. They argued that the proposed inscription generalised the death of Korean atomic bomb victims, and therefore obscured the incommensurability of the specific sufferings of Korean victims. They regarded the proposed inscription as an attempt by the municipal government to erase the memory of Korea's double sufferings from the atomic bomb and Japanese imperialism and wipe out the distinctiveness of Korean ethnicity. In consequence, the plan to construct a unified Korean memorial was halted and the existing Korean memorial was moved to the Park as a temporary solution in 1999. This matter has not been solved yet.⁵⁶

Thus, the issue of the exhibition at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the Korean memorial has shown that the memory of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima has not been homogeneous nor uncontested. It may be worth noting that the memory of Hiroshima occupied an ambivalent position at the beginning of the post-war Japanese history. During the aftermath of the War, the impact and nature of atomic bomb damage were kept secret from the public by the occupation authority's censorship.⁵⁷ When the censorship was softened in 1949, the public started realising the real extent of damage brought by the atomic bombs and came to embrace Hiroshima as a national symbol of wartime Japanese sufferings by the early 1950's. Nevertheless, the Japanese government, which was strengthening its strategic partnership with the US in the Cold War international political structure, was initially reluctant to advocate Japanese victimhood as a result of the atomic bombs.⁵⁸

On the other hand, left-wing activists sought to exploit a growing public sentiment about the atomic bombings in order to gain public support for their protest against the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America which was signed in 1951. Nonetheless, their strong communist ideological tone failed to attract much public sympathy. Those wide sections of Japanese society who benefited from the military, trade, and diplomatic alliance between Japan and the US were especially sceptical of the leftist's usage of the memory of Hiroshima in their ideological movement against the government.⁵⁹ Thus, as James J. Orr (2001:46) argues, the memory of Hiroshima was initially placed in the middle of the conflict between the government and the left-wing activists and failed to transcend interests of various sections of the Japanese government and society. As a result, it did not constitute a solid basis for the popular national memory of the War before the mid-1950's.

The situation started to change in 1954 when a Japanese tuna boat called the Fifth *Fukuryu-maru* (Lucky Dragon) was exposed to radioactive fallout from a hydrogen bomb test conducted by the US at the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The crew complained of lethargy and began to lose their hair, which were typical symptoms of radiation poisoning. Six months later, the Lucky Dragon's radio operator died. This incident was heavily publicised by the media and raised popular consciousness of Japan's history as the only nation which suffered from the nuclear weapon and Japan's noble national mission to eradicate the threat of the nuclear weapon for the universal ideal of world peace.

The ban-the-bomb movement to eradicate the nuclear bomb, led by Yasui Kaoru in the mid-1950's, transformed the antinuclear peace movement from an ideological project of communists and socialists into a nonpartisan, popular ethnic nationalist movement. In this movement, the memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki played a significant role in defining Japan as a unique ethnic nation and legitimising Japan's noble national mission to realise world peace.⁶⁰

The movement demanded not only the banning of nuclear weapons but also assistance to atomic bomb survivors. This resulted in the enactment of the A-bomb Survivors Medical Care Law in 1957, which was the first law specifically designed to help atomic bomb survivors. In this way, the movement elevated the status of *hibakusha* to be the icon of the nation's suffering and the ambassador to promote world peace in Japanese popular consciousness.⁶¹

As Orr (2001) argues, the success of the ban-the-bomb movement relied on its ability to accommodate different segments of Japanese society and politics. Orr especially emphasises the vital role of the women's involvement in the success of the movement as a mass movement. Firstly, the discovery that the Lucky Dragon's tuna catch was contaminated by radioactive chemicals raised genuine concern about the impact of nuclear tests on the safety of foods among housewives and mothers who were responsible for providing their families with nutritious foods. Secondly, Yasui's involvement as an educator in community activities, such as reading groups, for housewives in the Suginami Community Center, gave him good contacts among them and convinced him that they were the infrastructure on which his peace movement must be built. In a sense, the movement gave women a new place in society. That is to say, through the movement, they discovered a new mission to protect their families, nation and world from the nuclear threat. In other words, they found a new way of self-realisation as women, mothers, wives, and national and global citizens. In this way the movement offered an integrated platform for feminism, nationalism and globalism.⁶²

Moreover, when the movement became a nationwide mass movement, the government could no longer be indifferent to its antinuclear peace ideology. Yasui was well aware that for the movement to succeed, it had to gain support from both pro-US conservative LDP politicians and the leftist groups. Thus, he carefully avoided anti-capitalist and anti-statist ideology in the movement. This made it easy for the pro-US government to show its sympathy towards the movement. On the other hand, the leftist groups, who regarded the peace movement as a good opportunity to attract

mass support for their attack on Japan's military alliance with the US, also assisted the movement. In this way, by accommodating a wide segment of Japanese political community and society, the movement forged the widely shared myth of Japan's national mission to eradicate nuclear weapons for world peace, a mission that was based on the Japanese national self-image as the only victim of the nuclear weapon in human history. The movement itself was fragmented and declined by the early 1960's when it started voicing strong leftist ideology. Nevertheless, as Orr (2001:38) maintains, it certainly helped the myth of Japan's atomic bomb victimhood to become 'a part of the Japanese cultural and political treasury'. This myth was institutionalised by the annual commemoration ceremony of the atomic bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Furthermore, it was given universal credence by the Nobel Peace Committee's decision in 1974 to award the Nobel Peace Prize to former Prime Minister Sato Eisaku for his formal declaration of the three non-nuclear principles: Japan would not posses, produce, or bring nuclear weapons onto Japanese soil.

However, the idea of Asia as the victim of Japan's military aggression and the existence of Korean atomic bomb victims have threatened the legitimacy of this myth of Japanese atomic bomb victimhood and its exclusivity as a uniquely Japanese experience. As discussed above, the inclusion of the history of Japan's wartime aggression in the exhibition at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum and the issue of the Korean atomic bomb memorial clearly show that the widely accepted memory of national victimhood symbolised by Hiroshima has been challenged by competing memories of 'other' victims, especially Korean atomic bomb victims. Nevertheless, the weakness of the claim of Korean victimhood lies in the fact that the Korean memory of the atomic bomb and of Japanese colonialism has suffered from internal fragmentation on multiple levels.⁶³

There are a number of reasons for this. Firstly, post-war ideological conflict between North and South Korea has divided the Korean community in Japan and prevented the development of a unified Korean memory. Secondly, Korean memory has been fragmented by a generation gap. As

Lisa Yoneyama (1999:161) points out, the granite stones and pebbles of the memorial which were shipped from South Korea symbolise the yearning of Korean victims for their homeland. However, even if this nostalgia for the homeland might be widely shared by the first generation of Korean immigrants, it is uncertain that it has been embraced by younger generations who were born in Japan and believe that their future lies in Japan, rather than regarding themselves as Korean citizens residing in Japan. For them, the critical issue is to acquire full Japanese citizenship, while maintaining their ethnic identity.⁶⁴ The memory of Korean atomic bomb victims provides them with historical evidence to validate the legitimacy of their claims for equal civil rights in Japan. Thus, Korean memory has been torn between the older generations' backward-looking, nostalgic nationalism and the younger generations' forward-looking liberal nationalism and multiculturalism.

Thirdly, the concept of Korea represented by the memorial has been criticised even among South Korean residents for its inscription which reads 'In memory of prince Yi Gu and the other 200,000 or more souls'.⁶⁵ Prince Yi Gu, the nephew of the Korean Yi Dynasty's twenty-seventh King, was killed by the atomic bomb in Hiroshima when serving as a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Japanese imperial army. The problem is that the Korean royal family has been regarded by many Koreans as national traitors because of their collaboration with the Japanese imperial state. As Yoneyama argues, the inclusion of the prince in the inscription may have been an attempt to restore the names of many Koreans denigrated as national traitors who were forced to collaborate with the imperial authority.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, the commemoration of a Korean royal alongside other 'innocent' Korean civilian victims has been unacceptable for many Koreans. Thus, the inscription of the prince's name has highlighted a deep rift among Koreans regarding the question of what concept of Korea should be commemorated. Furthermore, Jung Yeong-hae's study (1986) shows that young Korean female residents in Japan have started questioning the conventional notion of Korean ethnicity in which women tend to be subjugated.

All of these suggests that the contemporary Korean community in Japan has been facing a problem of the internal fragmentation of the concept of Korean ethnicity, as well as of the memory of the War and Japanese imperialism. This raises the question of whether such a fragmented memory among Korean residents in Japan could break the spell of Japanese victimhood, which has been guarded by the memory of the atomic bombing at Hiroshima and is firmly established in Japanese cultural and political consciousness through popular peace movements and political and legal institutionalisation. Nevertheless, the Japanese memory of Hiroshima has been also challenged by groups of Japanese citizens who demand that the atomic bombing should be remembered in the context of the War and that the sufferings of victims of Japan's wartime aggression should be acknowledged. This has undermined the idea of Japan's noble national mission to realise world peace.

To sum up, Hiroshima has become an intersection of various historical discourses which define and are defined by identity and politics. In this sense, the memory of Hiroshima has lost its force as a master narrative to unite various sections of the Japanese political community and society. It is likely that Hiroshima will continue playing a role as a symbol of world peace. However, losing its hold on Japanese popular ethnic and political consciousness, Hiroshima's universalistic calls for world peace may sound rather empty to the Japanese public.

6.6. Conclusion

Roy F. Baumeister and Stephen Hastings (1997) maintain that group memories are systematically distorted in a variety of ways in order to maintain a desirable image of the groups. Forgetting is one of the most common means of the distortion of memory. Ernest Renan (1999: 19) claims that 'a nation is a soul, a spiritual principle' composed of common memories and the desire and will to live together. The formation of common memories requires not only common remembering but also common forgetting. Renan regards the forgetting of the shameful pasts of a group as an

essential factor in the formation of national consciousness.

In the case of Japan, for a long time Japanese war-related museums which were designed to disseminate an image of Japanese people as a victim of the atomic bombings excluded Japan's wartime aggression on the Asian continent.⁶⁷ The victimhood of Asian people was denied or marginalised in the shadow of Japanese victimhood. Being able to accommodate the interests of a wide sector of the Japanese political community and society, the memory of the atomic bombings had been nationalised and functioned as a bridge to unite the state and the nation. This led to the formation of a new myth of Japan's national uniqueness as the only victim of the nuclear weapon in human history and brought Japanese people a noble national mission to save the world from the threat of nuclear weapons. This Japanese sense of self as a 'chosen people' had been protected by Japan's so-called peace constitution, the only constitution in the world which renounced both the use of force as a means of settling international disputes and the possession of land, sea and air forces. The myth of Japanese uniqueness as a people chosen to bring peace to the world was further consolidated by the government's declaration of the three non-nuclear principles and the winning of the Nobel Peace Prize by former Prime Minister Sato. Thus, in the nationalisation process of the memory of the atomic bombings, the state served the interests of the nation and their unity was maintained by their pursuit of the common goal to gain respect from the international community.

However, the emergence of other Asian people as the victims of Japan's wartime aggression has weakened the unifying force of the memory of the atomic bombings and severed the relationship between the state and the nation. The integration of the sufferings of other Asian people in the nation's victimhood has made the nation turn against the state. By repositioning Japanese people and other Asian people equally as victims of the Japanese state, the nation has blamed the state for its past misconduct and for its refusal to take responsibility for the sufferings it caused to them. This has brought a sense of national crisis to Japanese rightist political and intellectual elites.

Since the mid-1990s several regulations which were intended to enhance the national consciousness of the Japanese were enacted.⁶⁸ The establishment of the two state-sponsored war-related museums can be also regarded as an attempt by the state to restore the unity between the state and nation in Japanese historical consciousness. A major obstacle for the state could be the incompatibility between pacifist ideology, which has been deeply integrated into popular national consciousness in post-war Japan, and the undeniable historical facts of Japan's wartime aggression. The examination of the major war related museums in Japan in this chapter demonstrates that the localisation of the memory of the War based on universal principles, such as human rights and world peace, has been taking place in Japan. Does this mean the erosion of national identity as rightist politicians and intellectuals fear?

My answer is no. This is because reactions to the emergence of Asian victims have been dictated by a sense of shame and guilt aroused by Japanese people's national identity, which have tightly tied them to the nation's aggressive past. Some of them have adopted strategies of denying the nation's past as an aggressor at all and demanding the self-affirmative strong state which is capable of protecting the nation's self-respect without yielding to pressure from other countries. Others have chosen to localise their memory of the War and advocate a universal ideal of peace, while insisting that the state should bear the burden of the nation's sinful pasts in order to represent the nation as a morally responsible country to the eyes of international society. In both cases, their reactions are strategies for them to cope with their uncomfortable feelings as the citizens of the accused country. Despite obvious differences in their interpretations of the War, both have been trying to use the state in order to ease conflict between their national identity and their identity as a member of international society in one way or another. If Japanese people are losing national identity, why should they bother about the accusation by other Asian peoples of Japan's imperial aggression and the state's failure to represent Japan as a moral nation?

The localisation of the War memory is a means for Japanese citizens to shift war responsibility

onto the state in order to claim their own victimhood and sublimate their sense of guilt and shame. However, the state has been reluctant to acknowledge its war responsibility. As a result, locally based civic movements demand official acknowledgement that Japan's imperial aggression against other Asia countries has taken place. What those pacifist Japanese citizens want is a state which is capable of accepting the guilt of the nation and taking full responsibility for the sufferings of innocent Asian and Japanese people. Only such a state could absolve the nation of guilt for war crimes and enable the nation to regain respect from the international community.

An important point is that although their civic actions are locally based and often based on universal principles, they are aiming to mend the nation's reputation and restore its honour in international society. Therefore, the localisation of the War memory and of identity does not mean the erosion of their national identity. Rather, local civic movements based on universal principles are Japanese citizens' manifestation of their dignity as Japanese and their desire to have a morally responsible state as a respected member of international society. In this sense, local civic movements which demand the integration of the nation's past as an aggressor into national history are a form of civic nationalism in opposition to the existing incompetent state. Thus, localism is a tool for Japanese citizens to participate in the politics of national memory. The emergence of Asian victims has made the Japanese more aware of their identity as a member of the Japanese political community. It has also made it clear that the state is still a principal actor handling the issues of national history in international contexts.

What does this suggest about the prospect for the formation of supranational regional solidarity in East Asia? For one thing, the disputes over the historical interpretation of the War between the Japanese government and other Asian countries have strained Japan's relationship with them. Moreover, the perception of Asia as a victim of Japan's aggression has not only divided the Japanese political community and society but also widened the gap between the state and the nation. On the one hand, inward-looking statist nationalism advocated by the right-wing activists

and conservative politicians justifies Japanese military actions during the War, and therefore isolates Japan from East Asia in historical consciousness. On the other hand, outward-looking civic nationalism in Japan tends to show more sympathy towards Asian victims of Japan's imperial aggression and may be compatible with the idea of Asian solidarity. However, because of its embrace of universal principles it is more likely to opt for universalism which transcends regional boundaries. Certainly, there has been an increasing degree of interaction between Japan and its neighbouring countries in the spheres of business, finance, trade and popular cultures. Nonetheless, because of a lack of active support from the conservative-dominated state which keeps feeding the Japanese sense of victimhood, and conflicting historical interpretations within Japanese society, it is unlikely that such non-political interactions alone can become a solid foundation of supranational regional solidarity in East Asia. Unlike in the former West Germany where identification with Europe offered a partial solution to the split between the state and society, in Japan identification with Asia divides the nation. Squeezed between inward-looking nationalism and outward-looking nationalism, supranational regionalism seems difficult to grow in Japan on the collective level.

Notes

¹ Information on the museums studied in this Chapter is largely based on my own examination of their exhibitions in February 2001 and materials supplied by them. For those materials, see the section for 'Publications by the museums and their related organisations' in Bibliography of this thesis.

² Hataguchi Minoru (1999: 74).

³ The main purpose of Yushukan is to exhibit objects such as war trophies left by the 'honorable gods' who died for the emperor and country since the Meiji Restoration. It was closed by the Allied authority after the War but reopened after the occupation ended. See Ian Buruma (1995: 219-24).

⁴ For the war exhibition movement, see Yamabe Masahiko (1996).

⁵ In 1983, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone admitted that the War was 'a war of invasion' in the budget meeting of the House of Representatives (Asahi Shimbun, 19 February 1983).

⁶ In the 1980s many cities declared themselves as a 'nuclear-free cities' (*hikakutoshi sengen*) in

order to show their commitment to the abolition of nuclear weapons. Although the pro-US government avoided criticising the US for the possession of nuclear weapons, the relaxation of state control over the local governments in the 1980's made it relatively easier for the local governments to support a growing popular pacifist ideology.

⁷ See *rekishi kyouikusha kyogikai* (2000). It is a useful guidebook which gives information on various war/peace museums in Japan and abroad.

⁸ *Showakan ni tsuite*, a document supplied by *Showakan*.

⁹ This number of visitors is based on the annual report of *Showakan* (2000).

¹⁰ *Senninbari* is a soldier's good-luck belt with stitches made by one thousand women. It was believed that the belt would protect a soldier.

¹¹ During the War people had to cope with the limited availability of food, metal, textile and leather which the government tried to keep for the military. In 1941, every household was ordered to submit products made of steel and copper. A standing signboard is displayed which reads 'if you are Japanese, you cannot indulge in luxury'.

¹² A section displays a television, washing machine and refrigerator which were admired as *sanshunoshinki* (the three sacred treasure). The word *sanshunoshinki* originally referred to the three sacred treasures which symbolised the sacredness of the Japanese imperial throne. The fact that the same word was used to refer to these home electric appliances indicates how quickly the divinity of the imperial family dissolved after the War. It seems that worship of the Emperor was quickly replaced by the worship of material wealth and convenience.

¹³ For example, school textbooks which were used in the aftermath of the War are displayed. Because of the lack of materials, the same textbooks which had been used before 1945 were used in the aftermath of the War. However, many parts of their texts which could invoke emperor worship or nationalism were painted over with black ink as a result of censorship enforced by the occupation authority. The display only says 'The textbooks with black paint used in the aftermath of the War'. It does not explain why many parts of their texts were painted.

¹⁴ For the period between 01 April 2003 and 31 March 2004, it received a subsidy of 101.74 million yen from the prefectural government and that of 105.996 million yen from the municipal government. See the Centre's annual report (2004).

¹⁵ Yamabe (1996:14-5).

¹⁶ Ian Buruma (1994: 107)

¹⁷ For example, see *Sankei Shimbun*, a popular right-of-centre newspaper, 18 October 1996.

¹⁸ See Yamabe (1998: 168-9).

¹⁹ Yamabe (1999: 87).

²⁰ *Asahi Shimbun* Osaka Edition 18 January 2000 and 27 January 2000. After the incident, the Center decided not to grant permission to use its hall to any external organisations (*Mainichi Shimbun* Osaka Edition 25 August 2000).

²¹ *Mainichi Shimbun* Osaka Edition, 24 January 2000.

²² *Asahi Shimbun* Osaka Edition, 27 January 2000.

²³ For detailed discussion on the relationship between Okinawa and the state, see Oguma Eiji (1998).

²⁴ This information is based on the annual report of the museum (2000).

²⁵ The details of this incidents were reported by Ryukyu Shimpo and Okinawa Times, the leading local newspapers in Okinawa, from 12 August 1999 until October.

²⁶ For the details of the revisions, see Okinawa Times, 28 August 1999 and 10 September 1999.

²⁷ Nevertheless, although materials about 'comfort stations' in Okinawa are included in the museum catalogue, they have been excluded from the exhibition.

²⁸ 75% of the US military bases in Japan are located in Okinawa. In 1996, 1966 out of 2934 landowners in Okinawa refused to renew their contracts to lease their lands to the US military. Then, the government ordered Governor Ota to sign the contracts in the place of landowners but he refused to do it. In the end, Prime Minister Hashimoto signed them and let the US military continue using their lands, while agreeing to reduce the scale of the US military bases in Okinawa. This incident severely undermined the relationship between the state and Okinawan people. For details of this incident, see Okinawa Times' web site at <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/spe/k_index.html#hot>

²⁹ Okinawa Times, 21 November 1998.

³⁰ It should be noted that, as discussed in the previous chapter, the bill to officially designate *Hinomaru* and *Kimigayo* as the national flag and anthem was passed into law in August 1999. The government's decision to host the summit in Okinawa and to print *shureimon* on the new note can be regarded as a significant part of the state's nationalisation project to enhance the unity between the state and the people.

³¹ Okinawa Times, 20 July 1999 and 07 December 1999.

³² Asahi Shimbun Western Edition, 17 July 1992.

³³ Asahi Shimbun Western Edition, 04 April 1992 and 17 July 1992.

³⁴ See Ito's Nagasaki Peace Declaration delivered on 09 August 1995. Its full text is available from <<http://www.mainichi-msn.co.jp/shakai/wadai/heiwa/nagasaki-j/>> Conventionally, the municipal governor of Nagasaki makes a Peace Declaration every year at a ceremony to commemorate the atomic bombing of Nagasaki on 09 August.

³⁵ Asahi Shimbun Western Edition, 18 March 1996.

³⁶ Asahi Shimbun Western Edition, 22 March 1996.

³⁷ Asahi Shimbun Western Edition, 28 March 1996.

³⁸ Asahi Shimbun Western Edition, 31 March 1996.

³⁹ On 23 April 1996, an opposition group demanded the removal of the section on the ground that photographs and films exhibited there were fictions. On 25 April 1996, the municipal government confirmed that the original source of a part of the films and a photograph which depicted the Nanking Massacre was an American war propaganda film called The Battle of China (1944) which consisted of a mixture of films shot on the spot and fictions. Nevertheless, the municipal

government decided to maintain the exhibition of Japan's military aggression, while removing the materials which were suspected to be fictions. See *Asahi Shimbun Western Edition*, 24, 25 and 26 April 1996 and *Asahi Shimbun Standard Edition*, 02 May 1996.

⁴⁰ Urakami is a district of Nagasaki which had a large number of Christian residents at the time of the bombing. For the history of Urakami as a Christian town, see Urakawa Wasaburo (1943).

⁴¹ For Motoshima's comment and the controversy it aroused, see Norma Field (1991: 269-72) and Buruma (1995:249-58).

⁴² Field (1991: 178).

⁴³ *Asahi Shimbun*, December 8 1988.

⁴⁴ See Motoshima's interview with Buruma (1995:254-5).

⁴⁵ *Asahi Shimbun Western Edition*, 24 April 1992.

⁴⁶ For example, see James J. Orr (2001), Lisa Yoneyama (1999, Chapter 5) and Buruma (1995).

⁴⁷ Daniel Seltz (1999) gives a detailed account of the representation of the atomic bombing in Hiroshima in the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Hall.

⁴⁸ The word '*hibakusha*' refers to people who were killed by the atomic bombs or exposed to their lethal post-explosion radiation.

⁴⁹ For discussion of the memorial for the Korean atomic bomb victims, see Yoneyama (1999, Chapter 5).

⁵⁰ Yoneyama (1999: 159).

⁵¹ Yoneyama (1999:179).

⁵² In 1990 it was decided that the foreign registration law should be revised in order to abolish the practice of requiring fingerprints of the first and second generations of Korean immigrants. The revised law was enacted in 1994. However, instead of fingerprints, the new law requires Korean residents to submit their signature, photograph and information on their family. This has been criticised as a violation of Korean residents' human rights. See *Asahi Shimbun* 08 January 1993.

⁵³ Michael Weiner (1995a: 5).

⁵⁴ Yoneyama (1999:165).

⁵⁵ For the details of the proposed inscription, see Yoneyama (1999: 166-170).

⁵⁶ For this process, see *Mainichi Shimbun* Osaka Edition 01 August 2003.

⁵⁷ For the censorship of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, see Glenn D. Hook (1991). For the censorship of the depiction of the atomic bombings in Japanese cinema, see Kyoko Hirano (1996).

⁵⁸ See Chapter 5 of this thesis.

⁵⁹ It should be noted that the Japanese economy hugely benefited from the Korean War which broke out in 1950. Japan's position as the US' main military base in Asia boosted demand in the

Japanese heavy industry.

⁶⁰ For the details of the ban-the-bomb movement led by Yasui, see James J. Orr (2001, Chapter 3).

⁶¹ While the concept of *hibakusha* as a heroic, national symbol of peace was advocated by Japanese peace movements to the international community, within Japanese society they suffered from various forms of discrimination (Weiner 1995a: 10-2). Several Japanese atomic bomb-related films and novels show that *hibakusha* were treated as outcasts in Japanese society not only for their visible physical disability and disfigurement but also for fear that their offspring might be affected by the genetic inheritance of radioactive-related disease (John T. Dorsey and Naomi Matsuoka 1996). For example, a famous novel called *kuroi ame* (Black Rain) (1967), which later inspired a film of the same title in 1989, tells a story about a pretty, healthy-looking twenty-year old Japanese girl who is unable to find a marriage partner because of a rumour among villagers that she was in Hiroshima at the time of the atomic bombing.

⁶² For the feminisation of the memory of Hiroshima, see Yoneyama (1999, Chapter 6).

⁶³ For the fragmentation of the Korean memory of the atomic bomb, see Yoneyama (1999, Chapter 5).

⁶⁴ See the comment of Kan Sou-duku, a third generation Korean immigrant in Chugoku Shimbun, 01 August 1990.

⁶⁵ Yoneyama (1999:160).

⁶⁶ Cho Te-hi himself, who was a member of the committee for the construction of the Korean memorial, was one of those who were accused of collaborating with the Japanese imperial authority (Yoneyama 1999: 160).

⁶⁷ The exclusion of its own act of aggression is not unique to Japan. For example, the Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum in Washington agreed to drop its proposal to hold an exhibition in 1995 which would include explicit images of the human consequences of the atomic bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a result of strong opposition from the Senate and World War II veterans. There is a large literatures on the Smithsonian controversy. For example, see Kai Bird and Lawrence Lifschultz (ed.)(1998) and Michael J. Hogan (1996).

⁶⁸ For the government's attempts to normalise Japan as a nation-state through the enactment of various new regulations and projects, see Chapter 5.

Concluding Remarks

To sum up this analysis of Japanese nationalism from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, I want to discuss the impact of the nature of Japanese nationalism on the prospects for supranational regional solidarity in East Asia, using the findings of this study.

Japan witnessed the emergence of the discourse of supranational regionalism among elites and intellectuals both in the early and in the late twentieth century. In both cases, supranational regionalism was promoted as a means to protect national interests from Western influence and interference. However, there was a critical difference between the two cases. That is to say, while the new supranational regionalism of the late twentieth century was preceded by the formation of national community and national identity, in early nineteenth century Japan, supranational regionalism developed in parallel with nationalism and national identity in the process of modern Japanese nation-building. That is to say, at that time, both concepts of 'Asia' and 'Japan' were relatively new to many Japanese people. Therefore, theoretically speaking, it might have been possible for Japanese people/elites of that period to construct a concept of Japan as part of Asia and develop a sense of belonging to an Asian community as an extension of the Japanese nation. However, as we have seen in Chapter 2, despite the government's propagation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, for the majority of the Japanese people Asia was too abstract and too remote to feel that it was part of their homeland.

For those government officials and intellectuals who interacted with the world outside Japan, their idea of the Japanese nation was primarily based on comparison between Japan and other countries. For them, the West constituted the most significant other against which Japan was defined. In this context, the concept of Asia, of which Japan was a part, evolved as a

counterpart of the West. On the other hand, for the Japanese peasants who constituted the majority of the Japanese population, the concept of Japan was based on comparison between the urban and the rural, as well as between Japan and other countries. They tried to internalise a rather unfamiliar concept of the Japanese nation of which they now became part, by placing it on the continuum of their natural, agrarian local communities. For them, the urban represented the foreign. They sought an authentic Japan in the image of agrarian society in the countryside which had preserved native cultural traditions. This made their nationalism more inward-looking. Such inward-looking nationalism had no room to accommodate Asia as part of 'us'.

Meanwhile, during the Cold War, Japan dissociated itself from its historical ties with its East Asian neighbours, while enjoying economic prosperity through its alliance with the US, Japan's former enemy. However, the end of the Cold War and the prolonged economic recession forced Japan to reconsider its relations with East Asia. In these conditions, some Japanese politicians and intellectuals started supporting the idea of East Asian regionalism. Recently Japan has started playing a more active role than before in economic co-operation within the region. The progress of European integration may have had some impact on the development of political and economic regionalism in East Asia as a means of protecting national interests in international society. As I have discussed in Chapter 4, in the late 1990s high ranking government officials of East Asian countries started talking about the formation of an East Asian community as one of the common goals for the region. The important point is that the East Asian community which they envisage is a community of East Asian nations. Therefore, it is unlikely to lead to the formation of a supranational state which would undermine the sovereignty of individual East Asian states.

One of the most difficult tasks in the transformation of the East Asian region into an East Asian community is the formation of a concept of Asia with which peoples of East Asia could identify themselves. The concept of Asia is a historical product. This means that the development of an East Asian community requires the development of a common historical platform which can accommodate each East Asian country's national history. This is an extremely difficult task. As I have explained in Chapters 5 and 6, for Japan, its historical relationship with Asia represents the nation's shame and guilt. Its memory of the Asia-Pacific War has divided not only Japan and its former victim countries but also Japanese society itself. Up to now, Japan has failed to develop an interpretation of the Asia-Pacific War which can receive consent from the all sections of Japanese society and its East Asian neighbours.

Common economic interests and the necessity of economic and political co-operation within the region might convince East Asian political leaders and intellectuals that the history of Japanese imperialism should not become an obstacle to the development of partnership between Japan and other East Asian countries and the future prosperity of the region. In fact there has been growing interest in the historical relationship between Japan and Korea in the pre-modern period among Japanese historians. Nevertheless, can East Asian peoples develop a genuine sense of belonging to an East Asian community in which the recent past is missing; the past which has been the core of national identity for the peoples of East Asian countries, including Japan? As this thesis has demonstrated, in Japan the self-victimised memories of the Asia-Pacific War enshrined by the commemoration of the atomic-bomb victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and of the war dead at Yasukuni Shrine, have been essential components of post-war Japanese nationhood. Are the Japanese people going to give up those memories in exchange for an identity as a member of an East Asian community which is to be built on the

basis of the shared political and economic interests, perceived common destiny and the memory of historical relationships with other East Asian countries in distant pasts? The results of this study suggest that the answer is negative. Japanese memories of the Asia-Pacific War will continue to draw a boundary between Japan and its neighbours in Japanese historical consciousness in the foreseeable future.

One of main reasons for Japan's inability to take responsibility for its imperial aggression against its East Asian neighbours is that Japanese memories of the Asia-Pacific War have continued to divide the nation and separate the nation from the state. Firstly, the popular myth of the Japanese people as victims of the evil military state has prevented the development of a national political identity as an active participant in the government's policy-making among many Japanese people. This has resulted in the underdevelopment of a national political community composed of autonomous, subjective, self-critical individuals who possess a sense of responsibility for their public as well as personal actions in Japan. In consequence, Japanese nationhood has been built on an ethnic basis, rather than on a political basis. Secondly, pacifist segments of the Japanese population who are willing to admit the nation's past crimes and apologise to the victims of Japan's aggression have been unable to organise a movement influential enough to move the government. This is because their anti-state stance and their universalism have resulted in their alienation from the state, from the politically influential segment of the Japanese population who possess a strong ethnic national identity and from the majority of the Japanese population whose national identity has been based on their sense of belonging to the Japanese nation as an apolitical historico-cultural community. In consequence, the progressive movement has been unable to become popular enough to break the spell of dominant Japanese inward-looking ethnic nationalism which has, to a great extent, prevented

the development of supranational regional consciousness on the popular level in Japan.

In his controversial book, haisengoron (post-defeat theory), Kato Norihiro (1996) emphasises the necessity of restoring the unity of the Japanese collectivity as a nation-state in order for Japan to accept responsibility for its past aggression. He argues that this can be done only by mourning the death of Japanese soldiers who were brought to the wrong war and accepting that their death was meaningless. Because of the collectivism in his argument, he has been accused of being a nationalist. Those who criticise him regard Kato's call for the unity of the Japanese national collectivity as a dangerous call to return to holistic nationalism. For Rikki Kersten (2003), Japanese collective victimhood is the cause of Japan's failure to take on war responsibility. He argues that the development of active, autonomous individuals who have been subordinated to passive collective victimhood and their participation in democracy can make Japanese people more accountable for war responsibility.

However, as Sune I (1998) points out, when Korea and China attack Japan for its past aggression, they are demanding an apology from Japan as a nation-state, not from Japanese individuals. The argument of Kersten and other critics who believe in individualism and democracy as a solution to the issue of Japan's war responsibility fails to make clear how such autonomous individuals can meet the Asian victims' demand for the acceptance of collective guilt by Japan as a nation-state. In this sense, Kato has raised the crucial question of whether it is possible for the Japanese people to truly accept Japan's war responsibility without being a unified collectivity as a nation-state. The results of this study tell us that the answer is negative. Conflict over the issue of how to treat the death of the Japanese war dead and the history of Japanese imperialism will continue to divide Japanese society and separate the state from

society. This prevents Japan from showing a united front in accepting war responsibility as a nation-state. Japan's dilemma is that while a lack of popular identification with the state makes it hard for many Japanese people to accept Japan's war responsibility as their own, identification with the state has been strongly discouraged by popular pacifism. Moreover, there has been no organisation of influential political movements to reform the relation between the state and society. Thus, an imbalance between apolitical ethnic nationalism and political nationalism, with a heavy weight placed on the former, is the cause of Japan's inability to master its past and develop a healthy relationship with its Asian neighbours.

I do not mean to argue that a concept of Asia with which the Japanese people can identify themselves will never develop. Such a concept might evolve as a result of an increasing level of political, economic and cultural interaction within the region. The balance of power between political, economic, cultural and historical factors in defining Asia might shift as those generations who actually experienced the War eventually disappear. However, because of the centrality of the War memory in Japanese nationhood and in Japan's relations with its neighbours, this could happen only at a very slow pace. The recent conflict between South Korea and China over the historical interpretation of the kingdom of Koguryo, which occupied a large part of the Korean Peninsula between B.C.37-A.D.668, also demonstrates how deeply the region has been divided by nationally framed historical memories. While the South Korean people regard the history of Koguryo as the origin of the nation's ethnic history and serves as the source of their national pride, the Chinese state and Chinese historians have started treating the kingdom as just one of several local ethnic states under Chinese rule.¹ This has generated anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea. Such an incident proves that national history still matters to many East Asian people.

Furthermore, we also need to consider the impact of globalisation on nationalism and national identity. The results of the examination of the public memory of the Asia-Pacific War in Chapter 6 suggest that supranational regionalism has been squeezed between localism as a form of inward-looking nationalism on the one hand, and universalism as a form of outward-looking nationalism on the other hand. That is to say, even if an ahistorical concept of Asia based on common political and economic interests and loose cultural sharing becomes available to Japanese people as one of many points of reference, it seems that because of its very lack of historicity, such a fluid concept of Asia can only provide a rather fragile foundation for the development of supranational regional solidarity in East Asia.

Finally, I would like to make some points regarding how this study might contribute to the general theory of nationalism. Firstly, the social psychological approach adopted by this study allows us to appreciate the role of the masses as active agents in the process of the ideological formation of nationalism. That is to say, the pre-existing cultural practices, symbols and values prevailing among the masses affect the ways in which they perceive information and restrict the range of choices available to elites in their attempt to mobilise them. By examining the contents of these elements, we can better predict the success and failure of particular nationalist ideologies. This does not mean that political, economic and social factors are less important in the development of nationalism. As this study demonstrates, the state is still the principal actor in the politics of memory in both domestic and international contexts, and socio-economic factors play important roles in ideological processes. My social psychological approach is meant to complement the other approaches which focus on these factors.

Secondly, this study has highlighted the importance of differentiating between the nation and the state as different entities in understanding the nature of popular nationalism. This is the point which has been largely ignored by the modernist approaches. In pre-war Japan despite the fact that it was governed by the fully centralised state and that its linguistic and political boundaries, to a great degree, corresponded with each other, the unity between the state and nation was not secure even in the 1930s. As I have discussed in Chapter 2, a growing ethnic nationalism among intellectuals, as well as popular sentiments, often turned against the bureaucratic modern state and the cosmopolitan liberals. It is true that Japanese urban liberal intellectuals led political movements in cities demanding a representative, democratic government in the late 1910s and 1920s. This resulted in the establishment of the first party government in 1918 and the passage of the law for universal manhood suffrage in 1925.

Nonetheless, their universal ideals of liberalism and democracy failed to appeal to the majority of the Japanese population. Firstly, such universal ideals were believed to legitimise and fix the order of the inter-state system which had privileged the West and placed Japan in a marginalised position. Secondly, they were still alien concepts for the majority of the Japanese population. Thus, the development of democracy led to that of an alienated political community which accepted the existing Western dominated inter-state order and embraced unfamiliar Western political concepts. Popular ethnic nationalism was partly a response to this political development. That is to say, a large part of the Japanese population sought to find a sense of belonging in the Japanese ethnic community against the oppressive, bureaucratic, Western-centred state and its cosmopolitan liberal and capitalist partners. The national community they envisaged as ideal was not a modern nation-state nor a democratic political community but an apolitical historico-cultural community that embraced traditional agrarian

values. One might argue that such an apolitical ideological movement is politically inconsequential. Nevertheless, one should remember that ethnic nationalism played a significant role in defining the popular concept of the Japanese nation among the Japanese masses, and that their commitment to their nation defined in such ethnic terms constituted the basis of Japanese ultranationalism during the War. This reminds us that we should not underestimate the potential political consequence of ideological movements which are operating outside the political sphere, such as cultural nationalism.

The comparison with Germany is instructive in this point. Differentiation between the state and the nation also highlights the persistence of German national identity based on a sense of belonging to the German national community founded on the ethno-cultural nation. If we look only at the policies and official discourses of the German government, we might be left with an impression that German national identity might become more or less interchangeable with a European identity one day. Nevertheless, the examination of German collective memories of the Second World War in this study demonstrates how German people have maintained a sense of belonging to a distinctive German historico-cultural community which is separate from the modern civic state. What this finding suggests is that in order to understand the relationship between nationalism and supranational regionalism as mass phenomena, the analysis of state policies and elite discourses is insufficient. It has to be complemented by an examination of popular ideological movements which define and redefine the concepts of the nation and the supranational region.

Let me end on a personal note and return to my statement in the Preface, that 'this thesis reflects the journey I have taken in discovering my own sense of national identity'. Pre-1945 Japanese nationalism is normally associated with worship of the emperor as the head of the

state. However, for the majority of the post-war generations, including myself, both emperor worship and identification with the state are rather unfamiliar ideas. Therefore, I have found the explanations of pre-1945 Japanese nationalism in most of the existing literature rather puzzling. I have been unable to connect myself to the portrayal of faceless ordinary Japanese citizens as passive objects of state manipulation in the conventional view of Japanese nationalism. However, through the examination of the processes in which various segments of the Japanese population were actively engaged in developing the concept of the nation, I have come to understand the evolution of Japanese nationalism as a logical process. I believe that this transformation of the concept of Japanese nationalism from something irrational and strange into something logical and familiar which is attempted by this study can help the Japanese people to internalise as their own that part of their national history which has been missing in their historical consciousness. In this way, I hope that this study will offer a small but important step for the Japanese people to come to terms with Japan's imperial past.

Note

¹ Asahi Shimbun, 16 August 2004. It has been reported that the Chinese reinterpretation of the history of Koguryo is based on their concern that ethnic Koreans living in that part of the Chinese territory which overlaps the territory of Koguryo may develop an ethnic independence movement if North and South Korea are unified. Thus, they are trying to integrate the history of Koguryo as part of China's national history.

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