

The London School of Economics and Political Science

*Time to Agree: Time Pressure and ‘Deadline Diplomacy’ in
Peace Negotiations*

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


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Abstract

The research explores the impact of various forms of time pressure on the outcomes of negotiation processes in territorial conflicts in the post-Cold War period. Deadlines are used increasingly often by mediators to spur deadlocked negotiation processes, under the assumption that fixed time limits tend to favour pragmatism. Yet, little attention is typically paid to the durability of agreements concluded in these conditions; moreover, research in experimental psychology suggests that time pressure may impact negatively on individual and collective decision-making by reducing each side's ability to deal with complex issues, complex inter-group dynamics and inter-cultural relations.

The comparative section of the research assesses the impact of natural and artificial deadlines on negotiation outcomes through a fuzzy-set comparison of 68 episodes of negotiation in territorial conflicts between 1990 and 2005. The results reveal that high levels of time pressure can be associated with both 'broad' and 'limited' agreements, but that low levels of time pressure or its absence are consistently associated with more durable ones. Other exploratory models also confirm the findings of experimental psychology and show that 'complex' negotiations are more likely to result in durable agreements when they take place under no or low time pressure.

These results are explored and discussed in detail in two pairs of case studies: the Bougainville and Casamance peace processes, and the Dayton and Camp David proximity talks. These cases confirm the intuitions of the comparative section; they provide evidence of the negative impact of time pressure on the cognitive processes of the actors involved and highlight, in particular, how in certain conditions the absence or low levels of time pressure can impact on the durability of agreements by making possible effective intra-rebel agreements before official negotiations, and that time pressure works in proximity talks only when applied to solving circumscribed deadlocks.

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List of acronyms

AFP	<i>Agence France Presse</i>
AP	Associated Press
ARB	Africa Research Bulletin
BCL	Bougainville Copper Limited
BIG	Bougainville Interim Government
BRG	Bougainville Reconciliation Government
BRA	Bougainville Revolutionary Army
BTG	Bougainville Transitional Government
DoP	Declaration of Principles
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office, UK
IDF	Israel Defence Forces
IEBL	Inter-Entity Boundary Line [Former Yugoslavia]
IFOR	NATO Implementation Force [Former Yugoslavia]
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
MAR	Minorities At Risk project
MFDC	<i>Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance</i>
MHS	Mutually Hurting Stalemate
PA	Palestinian [National] Authority
PLA	Panguna Landowners Association [Bougainville]
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PMC	Private Military Company
PMG	Peace Monitoring Group [Bougainville]
PNG	Papua New Guinea
PNGDF	Papua New Guinea Defence Forces
RMTLTF	Road Mine Tailings Lease Trust Fund [Bougainville]
TMG	Truce Monitoring Group [Bougainville]
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Project
UN IRIN	United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force [Former Yugoslavia]
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
YPA	Yugoslav People's Army

Before pulling her veil back down, she lifted it a little more and cast a glance which Omar noticed, inhaled and tried to hold on to.

It was a moment too fleet to be detected by the crowd
but an eternity for the lover.

Time has two faces, Khayyam said to himself.
It has two dimension, its length is measured by the rhythm of the sun
but its depth by the rhythm of passion.

Amin Maalouf, *Samarkand*, chapter 5

To Reham

Chapter 1

Introduction

Time is important in any aspect of human life, and the pressure that derives from time shortage can have decisive effects on the way we act, and on the choices we make.

If time matters in any work environment, it is arguably particularly important in negotiation. Indeed, probably no major manual for negotiators neglects the role played by time pressure. Time pressure received significant coverage in some of the first comprehensive manuals for business negotiators published in the 1960s, such as those by Carl Stevens (1963) and by Walton and McKersie (1965). This emphasis is present also in the classical works of Zartman and Berman (1982), Christopher Moore (1986), Raymond Cohen (1991), Pruitt and Carnevale (1997) and also in recently published and widespread manuals such as those written by Geoffrey Berridge (2005) for diplomats and by Leigh Thompson (2005) for members of the business community. Some – such as Walton and McKersie, and Thompson – while arguing that time pressure is part of the ‘essentials of negotiation’ (cf. Thompson 2005, 34-5) do not discuss the role of time pressure in detail; others, in particular Zartman and Berman, Moore, Cohen and Berridge, dedicate in-depth reflections to the various forms that time pressure could assume and to the practical lessons provided by exemplar episodes of business or diplomatic interactions, in particular in cross-cultural milieus.

In the diplomatic realm, this attention to the role time pressure plays in conflict resolution and peace negotiations is certainly shared by many senior practitioners and politicians. In a recent article dealing with the withdrawal of

American troops from Iraq, former Democratic candidate to the White House John Kerry observed that 'Iraqi leaders have responded only to deadlines' and argued for a disengagement strategy modeled around a fixed schedule that would put the Iraqi government under pressure to implement those measures that would make such withdrawal safe and feasible¹. According to Ambassador Dennis Ross, one of the key American brokers in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations during the Clinton administration, 'the concept of a deadline is critical to making a negotiation work' (Bebchick 2002, 122). Evidence exists to suggest that these statements are symptoms of a particularly high reliance on time pressure in contemporary diplomacy as a means for keeping momentum and maximising the efficiency and time-effectiveness of bilateral and multilateral talks, at times encouraged by the experience of diplomats in the private sector (cf. Chollet 1997, 236).

Still, such emphasis on time pressure is often based on a remarkably poor analytical background. Most of the statements arguing for the importance of time pressure in negotiation imply that its impact is generally beneficial. Some practitioners and politicians – including Senator Kerry in the abovementioned article – seem to rely only on anecdotic evidence or on the commonsensical perception that 'necessity is the mother of invention' (Sunshine 1990, 185) – that, under the pressure of time and events, people increase their inventiveness, efficiency and productiveness. These intuitions are also substantiated, to some degree, by more rigorous scientific research. A structured bulk of hypotheses inquiring the range of positive effects time pressure may exert on negotiation has been laid down by Carl Stevens in his 1963 manual 'Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation'. Stevens' hypotheses, as elaborated by Pruitt and Drews (1969, 45), argue that time pressure tends to produce a 'softer approach to negotiation', which would involve a lower level of demands, large concessions and less bluffing.

Commonsense, however, would also suggest that time pressure is a 'double-edged sword' (Iklé 1964, 72) which operates within a complex array of trade-offs. In negotiation, not only do some forms of time pressure fail to be considered

¹ Kerry, John. 2006. Two Deadlines and an Exit. *The New York Times*, 5 April 2006.

credible enough to influence the behaviour of the target actor, but many run the risk of backfiring by forcing potentially fruitful interactive processes to failure or by drastically reducing the quality of the output. With the passing of years, social psychology developed a series of arguments that aimed at either circumstantiating or denying altogether the validity of Stevens' hypotheses. In particular, these works point at the negative impact of time pressure on the flexibility of the negotiators options (Carnevale, O'Connor and McCusker 1993, 124-5), on the prospects for problem-solving behaviour and integrative results from the negotiation (Yukl et al. 1976), and on the cognitive coordinates of inter-personal and inter-cultural interactions (Wright 1974).

This thesis, in its wholeness, aims at critically reviewing these debates and at testing some crucial hypotheses on the impact of time pressure on peace negotiations. Before entering into these debates, this introductory chapter provides some basic information on the main concepts that will be used throughout the research and on its methodological assumptions. More specifically, the following paragraphs will, first, provide a working definition of 'time pressure'; will then discuss the reasons for – and implications of – analyzing the role of time pressure specifically in peace negotiations; and will finally introduce the main methodological features of the comparative and case-study sections. The chapter will then conclude with a brief outline of the main contents of each of the following chapters, of their main arguments and of their conclusions.

1. The explanatory variable: time, time pressure and deadlines

What do we mean exactly by 'time pressure', and how does such concept relate to debates on the role deadlines play in human interactions?

A first definition of time pressure has been suggested by Smith, Pruitt and Carnevale in their seminal article 'Matching and Mismatching' (1982). The authors make clear at the beginning of their analysis that 'time pressure is here defined as closeness to a deadline that, if reached, ends the negotiation without agreement' (Smith, Pruitt and Carnevale 1982, 876). In this context, deadlines are seen as the core element, a crucial limit that sets in motion the dynamics of time

pressure. ‘Deadlines’ are defined by Christopher Moore (1986, 239) as ‘limits that delineate the period of time in which an agreement must be reached’. The idea of ‘limit’ is inherent in the etymology itself of the term, which was originally used with reference to the physical perimeter around a prison whose crossing would have resulted in the shooting of the prisoner (cf. Sunshine 1990, 185). The idea of ‘closeness’ to a deadline as factor which unleashes time pressure also reflects the traditional understanding of negotiation processes as divided into ‘phases’, as suggested by Carl Stevens in the early 1960s. In his analysis of the negotiation environment, Stevens argued that the ‘early’ phase of negotiation, when toughness is the norm, is clearly different from a ‘late’ phase when the parties tend to show an increased willingness of reaching an agreement (Stevens 1963, in Pruitt and Drews 1967).

However, while extremely plain and close to the commonsensical approach to time pressure, this definition suffers from many oversimplifications and can hardly constitute the basis for a robust analysis of the role time pressure plays in negotiation. It suffers, first, from an extremely spatialised approach to time, as the impact of time schedules on human behaviour on the basis of objective ‘closeness’ to a deadline - which is clearly at odds with much of contemporary philosophy and social science. A Bergsonian approach to time and *durée* would not, to be true, concede much to pure subjectivism either (cf. Fraser 1968, 23-5); what Bergson would argue for is a form of individual ‘dynamism’ in which past, present and future overlap in the conscience of the decision-maker in relation to a specific decision to take, or act to perform.

Many other crucial elements for defining time pressure in human interactions are also not taken into consideration in this definition. What does an analysis of time pressure have to say on the potential changes in the distribution of the outcomes between the negotiators that can result from exercising such pressure? How many, and which kind of actors are to be included in such analysis? And how would it be possible to approach the cognitive, psychological and strategic dynamics that underlie time pressure and directly generate the observable results associated with it?

Answers to these and other questions may be found if a more comprehensive and nuanced definition of time pressure is adopted. A particularly effective definition in this sense is included in the classical work of Pruitt and Drews (1967, 4), where time pressure is conceived as ‘a perception on the part of both negotiators that the negotiation is about to be terminated whether or not an agreement is reached’. This definition stresses the subjective dynamics (‘perceptions’) that underlie the acceptance of a specific timeframe as relevant or not for the negotiation. The specific mixture of objective and subjective elements is a typical feature of the debate on the effectiveness of deadlines – a debate that traditionally focuses on the presence of allegedly substantial differences between ‘artificial’ and ‘practical’ deadlines (Berridge 2005, 58-61; cf. also Moore 1986, 240).

According to a generally accepted convention, we define ‘artificial’ deadlines those set by a party in a negotiation, or by a mediator, as a strategic move in the negotiation process. The typical form of artificial deadline is the ‘target date’ for reaching an agreement set by a party during a negotiation. ‘Practical’ deadlines, on the other hand, are hurdles whose presence and effects are beyond the control of the parties involved. In international negotiations, this latter category may include ‘scheduled elections, the opening of other conferences where the subject at issue may be high on the agenda, the expiry of the negotiating authority of a key party, and the expiry of a ceasefire agreement’ (Berridge 2005, 61). The main difference between the two lies in the fact that the ‘practical’ deadline is by definition irrevocable, whereas the ‘artificial’ one is still under the control of one of the parties involved in the negotiation.

Many analysts tend to emphasize the radical differences between these strategic devices. Geoffrey Berridge (2005, 58-9, after De Soto 1999) even argues that artificial deadlines ‘are not deadlines at all’ unless they are ‘pegged [...] to some date that has significance more or less independent of the negotiators’ – which include not just ‘practical’ deadlines but also symbolic dates such as anniversaries of relevant treaties or events, or religious festivities.

However, at a closer look it is disputable whether major differences actually exist between these two kinds of deadlines in terms of their concrete effects on the

negotiation process. The political and civil calendars are full of potentially attractive dates that would fit for signing agreements. By the same token, whereas some events mentioned by Berridge almost always amount to relevant deadlines for ongoing negotiations (scheduled elections in particular), the relevance of others are highly dependent on the specific climate of the negotiation concerned. Disclosing the departure flight reservation is sometimes mentioned as a potential occasion for becoming subject of time pressure (Sunshine 1990, 186); however, not always would a party prefer being subject to this form of pressure than simply delaying the flight booking.

What we would argue is that the relevance of any form of time pressure, whether it is the result of an 'artificial' or 'practical' deadline, depends on the perception of the recipient, and the cognitive processes they unleash are by all ways comparable. In this sense, no deadline is 'objectively' relevant for causing time pressure, but 'objective' and 'subjective' dynamics combine for determining the impact of a specific time limit on an ongoing negotiation.

The crucial determinant in this sense is the degree to which a deadlines is perceived as corresponding to a credible commitment of the party that imposes it. The idea of commitments as core components of negotiating behavior has been famously proposed by Thomas Schelling in 1960 and has been occasionally used in the context of studies on time pressure; still, in a debate pivoting on issues of credibility and perception such as the one on deadlines, it is astonishing to observe how little attention the idea of commitment has received up to date. In Schelling's words (1960, 22-8), such concept describes a strategy in which a party pegs itself to a specific bidding position, thus voluntarily reducing its freedom of action, in order to force the negotiating partner to accept the terms implied in such stance; in reply to this, the latter negotiator would first assess the credibility of such 'pegging', and would then consider consequently the offers put forward by the other party. In concluding his analysis, Schelling thus claims that the effectiveness of such strategies 'clearly depend not only on incurring a commitment but on communicating it persuasively to the other party' (*ibid.*, 28). This description closely reminds the terms of the debate of time pressure. On these bases, we would argue that there are both substantive and authoritative

grounds to claim that the distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ deadlines fails to take account of the natural polarity between commitment and perception which normally takes place in negotiation, and thus creates an inexistent line of separation between phenomena that seem to occur along the same operative and conceptual lines.

Pruitt and Drews’ definition also points to an element which is neglected by Smith, Pruitt and Carnevale: the importance of considering issues of symmetry and asymmetry when dealing with time pressure.

It is somehow conventional to approach to time pressure in asymmetric terms, as a strategic move imposed by a negotiator on the partner. The aim of this tactic, as it is stated by the Inns of Court School of Law negotiation manual (2004, 150), is ‘to transfer responsibility for reaching settlement to the opponent and force him or her to accept the offer because of anxiety that failure to do so might cause negotiation to break down’. Such situation of extreme asymmetry, however, is not always the case. Simulated experiments typically operate under a fixed timeframe which is made known to both participants. In a real world negotiation, systemic factors or external mediators often exert forms of time pressure which affect all the participants in a negotiation in a comparable way.

The role of time pressure in mediation is twofold. Expiring deadlines may, first of all, be a factor leading mediators to intervene more decisively in an ongoing conflict (Carnevale et al. 1993, 354 ff.). But the intervention of mediators is usually itself characterized by an extensive use of time pressure on the parties that negotiate (Touval and Zartman 1993, 125-6). The two dynamics tend somehow to reinforce one another – increasing pressure on the mediator will make it more probable that such pressures will be transferred on the mediated parties. However, whereas the former situation is arguably just an evolution of the basic bilateral model, the latter condition introduces a quantitative change in the analysis: seen from the point of view of the subjects of the mediation effort, a deadline imposed by a mediator breaks, at least partially, the basic asymmetry that characterizes the imposition of a deadline in a strictly bilateral setting.

Even in this context, it is possible that marginal forms of asymmetry emerge. As Starkey et al. note (1999, 44) in relation to the Oslo talks between

Israel and the Palestinians, ‘the time factor does not necessarily affect all negotiation actors equally’ not just because a party exerts time pressure to the partner, but also because a systemic pressure impacts differently on the single actors depending on their perception of the strategic milieu, on their interests and priorities of the parties, on their cultural background. Arguably no effort to understand the impact of time pressure on negotiation could be considered satisfactory if no attempt is made to locate the role of time pressure within the polarity between asymmetry and symmetry, despite the fact that – as we discuss in the next chapter – elaborating a comparative research framework that can account for asymmetric time pressure remains a complex endeavor.

A third improvement in Pruitt and Drews’ definition of time pressure, when compared to Smith, Pruitt and Carnevale, lies in the absence of the word ‘deadline’ – thus implying that deadlines need not be the only instrument of time pressure. Whereas there is a general agreement on the fact that establishing fixed timeframes for the acceptance of specific bids is the privileged, more direct way of imposing time pressure, some authors rightly tend to be more vague and flexible when it comes to define the specific event or strategy which is deemed to generate such pressure. For instance, Roger Fisher (1971, 108-109; cf. also Berridge 1989, 475) approached the issue of generating time pressure from a perspective of ‘opportunities’. In international negotiation, he argued, the aim of a negotiating party should be ‘to present an adversary government with a fading opportunity’ (Fisher 1971, 108) – that is, ‘[t]hey ought to perceive the decision which we are asking them to make as an opportunity which they will lose if they fail to act soon’ (*ibid.*). Fisher’s take on time pressure points at a relatively marginal, yet relevant set of dynamics that can be associated with time pressure in negotiation. The concept of ‘fading opportunity’ clearly comprises the operative dynamics involved in the concept of deadline, which places the time limit of the threat somewhere in the near future, but at the same time includes situations when time pressure operates *ex post* – that is, situations in which parties have already witnessed an event that may impact negatively on their strategic options (such as a change in the other party’s strategic alliances, or a new factor affecting the negotiating milieu) and decide that decisions should be taken quickly in order to

minimize the losses associated with such changes. Even if in weaker terms when compared to explicit deadlines, such conditions surely exert a visible time pressure effect on decision-making. Nor seems to be their exclusion advisable for methodological reasons, as the operative problems in including such *ex post* factor, while surely challenging, are arguably not dissimilar to the coordinates (commitment, perception of relevance) that have been mentioned in relation to the process leading ‘artificial deadlines’ to be relevant in the context of a specific negotiation.

While, for all these reasons, Pruitt and Drews’ approach arguably amounts to a sensible improvement for the description of what time pressure is about, it still lacks clarity when it comes to define analytically through what dynamics it is deemed to impact on human interaction. To this regard, we would suggest that that Pruitt and Drews, as well as Smith, Pruitt and Carnevale, arguably confuse the idea of ‘deadline’ and the traditional concept of ‘ultimatum’. The fact that the two words are deemed by these authors to share most of their semantic area is proven by the claim, present with different wordings in both definitions of time pressure, that the main threat prospected by deadlines would be to terminate the ongoing negotiation ‘whether or not an agreement is reached’. As deadlines are thus seen as accompanying the last proposals of a series of bids, they would clearly overlap with the semantic and conceptual area of the idea of ‘ultimatum’ – built upon the Latin root ‘ultimum’, which in fact means ‘last’ (cf. O’Neill 1991, 88).

Still, while it is clear that the feeling of irrevocability is certainly a part of the psychological and operative milieu surrounding an effective deadline, claiming that their main effect is to reach a final agreement in a negotiation is partially misleading. While, in fact, the final effect of time pressure may be the termination of a negotiation, the strategic aim of attaching deadlines to specific bids is typically to influence the decision making process of the target parties so that they are forced to adopt a different position – possibly more flexible and conciliatory – than the one they used to stick to under no such pressure. In many cases, in particular when time pressure is successful, such distinction between aims and effects may not be particularly significant in descriptive terms. In

analytical terms, however, such confusion can be considered as one of the causes of the prevailing interest in the specialised literature on understanding the timing by which agreements are struck under time pressure, as opposed to analyses on all issues related to the quality of such agreements and of the operative dynamics leading to specific outcomes. Such analytical imbalance, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter, is arguably one of the core faults of the present literature on deadlines and time pressure.

Thus, even if Pruitt and Drews' definition is very close to our understanding of time pressure, we believe that a new, more explicit and articulated definition is necessary. In the following analysis, we therefore conceive 'time pressure' as *a perception by one or more parties involved in a negotiation that a specific event or strategy will impact on the negotiation milieu or on the strategic options of the parties and that it will reduce the time available for reaching an agreement.*

Our approach on time pressure is thus based on a reformulation of the three pillars that have emerged in Pruitt and Drews' definition: the importance of credibility and perceptions in defining effective forms of time pressure; the role of symmetry and asymmetry ('one or more parties') in determining its impact, leaving the door open for considering the agency of third parties and mediators; the need to consider both future- or past-oriented 'events' (thus not just 'deadlines' proper) as unleashing factors for such pressure.

2. The setting: peace negotiations

Arguably no analysis of time pressure in negotiation can be considered complete if its specific impact on the cultural, strategic and systemic coordinates for decision-making of the actors is taken into consideration.

This task may be particularly challenging in the context of international negotiation. Some of the core literature on time pressure mentioned so far (Pruitt and Drews 1967; Smith, Pruitt and Carnevale 1982), and many other works that will be discussed in the following chapters (including Stuhlmacher, Gillespie and Champagne 1998, and Carnevale and Lawler 1986), rely on *ad hoc* experiments. In the analysis of the impact of time pressure on specific strategic choices,

however, the transition from an experimental, artificial context to the complex and crosscutting dynamics of the international arena is by no means straightforward (cf. Holsti 1971, 67). One of the main aims of this research is to apply and test in real-world international interactions a series of assumptions and debates that have so far taken place primarily among scholars with various theoretical backgrounds and academic interests, but who shared a reliance on social experiments as the main – if not only – means for exploring the impact of time shortage and time pressure on negotiation and decision-making.

Quite intuitively, the international political events that more closely resemble the characteristics of an experimental setting – and which could allow an immediate translation of the assumptions and results of experimental analyses to real-world international negotiations – are international crises. The definition itself of ‘crisis’ often incorporates the idea of time shortage. A widely accepted definition of ‘international crisis’ elaborated and refined by James Robinson (1968, 510-1), Charles Hermann (1969, 414) and Michael Brecher (1977, 42-4; 1979, 447-8) includes as one of the constitutive features of a crisis the ‘restrict[ion of] the amount of time available for response’ (Hermann 1969, 414). Other authors, although not mentioning time pressure amongst the defining factors of international crises, still consider ‘urgency’ as a crucial determinant of the ‘crisis atmosphere’ (Snyder and Diesing 1977, 8). Therefore, they surely share with social experiments the presence of a fixed (and generally short) timeframe; moreover, as Walton and McKersie (1965, 382) put it, ‘[i]n a crisis a large number of behavioral output of the particular decision maker is related to a limited range of agenda items’. This ‘facilitates observation’ of the dynamics involved (*ibid.*), as the negotiation milieu, the main actors involved, the main stakes of the negotiation, the precipitating events and its main outcomes become intelligible with relative ease for the researcher.

Despite these considerations, this thesis focuses primarily on another set of international interactions – peace processes and peace negotiations. While we acknowledge that exploring systematically the role of time pressure in the negotiation processes that take place during international crises would arguably provide a series of interesting insights, the abovementioned definitions also imply

that time pressure is an integral component of the very concept of ‘crisis’, and – while in some occasions crises are brought about willingly by some actors – their occurrence is often beyond the individual will of any of the actors involved. On the other hand, as peace negotiations (as well as other forms of peace negotiations) might or might not take place under time pressure, analysing time pressure in this setting allows us to answer not just the question of how time pressure *can* influence the outcomes of international interactions, but also whether it *should* or not – i.e. whether, if the presence or absence of time pressure is in any way dependent on explicit choices or strategies, the impact of such pressure is positive or negative, and how these considerations should impact on diplomatic practice. This choice also allows us to include in the analysis episodes of negotiation that show some significant variation both in the dependent and in the independent variables – thus adding to the validity and reliability of our conclusions.

Peace negotiations clearly represent only a sub-set of international negotiations that allow for such variability and are, in this sense, not different from other processes such as bilateral diplomatic interactions, negotiations in international organisations and negotiations in the context of global or regional economic regimes and institutions. One could argue that peace negotiations, when compared to routine (i.e. continuous) diplomatic interactions, provide both distinct units of analysis (the negotiation of specific agreements) and a sense of ‘process’ – a characteristic that they share with few other forms of international negotiation, with the possible exception of economic negotiations in forums such as the GATT/WTO. Yet, the main reason for focusing on peace negotiations is a substantive, and, to a certain extent, arbitrary one: anecdotic evidence – for instance from prolonged peace negotiations, such as those between Israeli and Palestinians – suggests that over the last decades conflict resolution efforts have witnessed a clear metamorphosis from agreements and mediation efforts focused on low-paced confidence-building processes to high-stakes, ‘make-or-break’ comprehensive agreement proposals, in which strict time limits are used systematically to break deadlocks on crucial issues. Post-Cold War peace negotiations thus have the potential for providing a privileged perspective for

analyzing the impact of time pressure in international negotiation and its interaction with a range of contextual variables.

This thesis will not claim, however, that these negotiations are necessarily representative of international negotiations at large; for achieving a reasonable level of representativeness, the comparative section of the analysis should have been extended to include at least some other types of negotiation (in particular economic negotiations). Yet, by aiming at providing a detailed and coherent picture of the role of time pressure in international joint decision-making in a specific sub-field of international negotiation, this thesis has the ambition to pave the way for further, more systematic comparative research across various forms of international diplomacy.

Because of its primary focus on time pressure, it is also worth remarking that this thesis will not aim at providing a comprehensive model to explain successful peace agreements, nor will it claim that no other causal pattern leading to successful peace agreements exists except those including either the absence or the presence of time pressure. In other words, we do not aim at constructing a ‘theory’ of conflict resolution, and the analysis in chapter 4 and in the case-study section does not have the ambition to create an exhaustive picture of the necessary and sufficient causal patterns related to ‘broad’ or comprehensive peace agreements; rather, as it will be explained in chapters 2 and 3, it aims at exploring specific relations between time pressure and negotiation outcomes and between time pressure and specific indicators of conflict complexity. The theoretical basis for assuming that these relations matter in international negotiations rests on the claims made by diplomats as recorded in the diplomatic manuals reviewed, more than on any existing empirical analysis on role of specific pre-conditions and negotiation techniques in generating broad or durable peace agreements – as no such analysis currently exists in the discipline. What the comparative analysis aims at exploring, thus, is the sub-set of configurations associated with broad and durable agreements that include the time pressure variables and the relations among variables within these configurations.

3. The methodology: configurational analysis and fuzzy-set logic

It should be clear by now that the primary aim of this thesis is to answer to some relevant research questions concerning the impact of deadlines and time pressure on peace negotiations. Yet, the reader will find that, when compared to other volumes on post-Cold War peace negotiations and peace processes (cf. Bell 2000, Höglund 2004, Bose 2007), particular attention is devoted throughout the research to justifying a range of methodological choices – including the choice of the comparative technique which will inform the analysis of the dataset in chapters 3 and 4, and the criteria for the selection of case studies.

That a social researcher aims at providing credible and transparent justifications for his or her methodological choices should not be surprising. Yet one may suggest that, in the field of peace research as in many branches of political science and international relations, it is too often the case that methodology defines ontology, and not – as it should be – the reverse (cf. Hall 2003; Goertz 2006). The identification of highly-regarded refereed journals – such as the *Journal of Peace Research* (cf. *Journal of Peace Research* 1971) – with specific methodological approaches goes some way to confirming this intuition. While we reckon that peace researchers cannot be asked to be proficient both in their field of specialization and in a broad variety of methodological approaches, more attention should arguably be devoted to exploring new comparative methods that provide a better fit for specific research designs, and to justify the choice of specific case studies from which generalisable intuitions are drawn.

The methodological framework of this research aims at embodying these ambitions. The choice of methodologies based on configurational diversity rather than covariation is motivated by the desire to explore research hypotheses that explicitly consider the possibility of equifinality – that is, that different causal patterns could lead to the same outcome. The aim to highlight specific patterns of causation within conflict resolution less parsimonious than diplomatic ‘models’ (such as the ‘Camp David model’ discussed in chapter 6) and yet useful for conflict analysis and conflict resolution also provided a natural reason for opting for a research methodology based on configurations of factors. The choice of the

specific qualitative comparative methodology used in chapters 3 and 4 – truth-table fuzzy-set logic – was in turn inspired by the size of the empirical basis of the research, which appeared as too limited to be credibly analysed through large-N statistical methods, but at the same time too broad to be analysed through the conventional tools of fuzzy-set logic which allow to highlight relations of causal sufficiency and necessity.

Truth-table fuzzy-set logic analysis, as implemented through the software fsQCA, relies on benchmarks in the levels of consistency and coverage of specific configurations to identify, essentially on a probabilistic basis, the presence or absence of relevant causal connections in a dataset, and to assess their strength. Set-theoretic consistency, as defined by Charles Ragin (2008b, 44), ‘gauges the degree to which the cases sharing a given combination [...] agree in displaying the outcome in question’; set-theoretic coverage, on the other hand, ‘assesses the degree to which a cause or causal combination “accounts for” instances of an outcome’. In other words:

Consistency, like significance, signals whether an empirical connection merits the close attention of the investigator. If a hypothesized subset relation is not consistent, then the researcher’s theory or conjecture is not supported. Coverage, like strength, indicates the empirical relevance or importance of a set-theoretic connection (Ragin 2008b, 45).

Truth-table fuzzy-set logic and its main features will be briefly introduced in chapters 3 and 4, while the connections between the fuzzy-set analysis and the case study selection will be outlined in a brief methodological note that introduces chapter 5 and the case-study section. In this context, suffice it to say that the idea of ‘configurational analysis’ is used in to define a methodological approach mainly derived from the writings of Charles Ragin (1987; 2000; 2008), although present in social science research at least since Max Weber (cf. Agewall 2005). Such approach suggests that empirical cases should be seen as ‘different combinations of values on relevant variables’, so that each combination can be considered as ‘a potentially different type of case’, and variables viewed as ‘components of configurations’ (Ragin 2000, 72-4). This approach is different from pure quantitative analysis, whose focus on covariation rests on implicit

assumptions of causal homogeneity (i.e., that causal factors can operate in the same way for all the cases considered); its reliance on the presence of sufficient or necessary combinations on causal conditions for generating specific outcomes also differentiates this research method from case-oriented research, whose descriptive focus on complexity may narrow the scope for enacting any structured comparison.

Although a higher reliance on configurational thinking would arguably benefit any branch of social research, strong arguments exist for claiming that such approach is particularly necessary for real-world research on negotiation. Researchers using social-psychological experiments taking place in controlled environment and formal models of strategic interactions enjoy the privilege of treating every single variable affecting the result of the negotiation as operating in insulation from the others. While it is fairly obvious that this is not always the case, it is also true that the manipulating power of the scientist in these conditions is extremely vast. Even factors that typically exist not by themselves but as coordinates for action, such as time, can be described with good approximation as ‘strategies’ that can be manipulated to the will of the mediator or of the negotiators.

This is certainly the case when a specific experiment can be repeated various times changing only the timeframe of the decision-making process; but what about real world interactions? In this context, we would argue that time pressure could not be observable as an independent strategy, but would be better seen as a strategic device being attached to specific threats and offers advanced by the parties or by a mediator. In other words, we would argue that time pressure can be used strategically, but is not a strategy in itself. Considering time pressure as an independent variable amounts, to our understanding, to a methodological and conceptual mistake: ‘methodological’, as detaching time pressure from the specific context of threats and offers in which it is advanced fatally leads to overestimate or underestimate the impact of such pressure on a negotiation; ‘conceptual’, as such approach fails to take into account the real essence of ‘time’ and its existence as underlying coordinate of action.

While this argument could be advanced at every level of analysis and in every context of human interaction, certainly the abovementioned confusion can be considered trivial when the researcher has a high manipulation power over his actors. For an external observer of international negotiations, however, such confusion can fatally affect its analysis and conclusions. We would argue that the nature itself of time pressure leaves no alternative to the researcher than considering each negotiation as a unique combination of variables more than a bundle of independently-defined factors. In this sense, the analysis of international peace negotiation could arguably be considered as a textbook example of international interaction that can be understood only in a multivariate setting – where the causal units that are associated to a specific outcome are not individual variables, but configurations of variables (cf. Mahoney and Goertz 2006, 234-5).

4. Structure of the research

The thesis is divided into three macro-sections.

Section one includes chapter two and provides a general introduction to the current debates on the role of time in conflict resolution and to the study of time pressure in negotiation. The main thesis that is articulated in this section is that there exists a substantive divide between the way in which the impact of time pressure and deadlines is framed by authors of renowned diplomatic manuals and the current debate on time pressure in social and experimental psychology. Chapter two begins by introducing and explaining the concepts and labels that are used to navigate through the literature on time pressure (such as ‘diplomatic wisdom’ or ‘experimental psychology’). It then briefly reviews the way in which time is deemed to impact on conflict resolution according to conflict resolution studies, before turning explicitly on explaining why leading experts in the field of conflict or diplomatic studies (such as William Zartman or Geoffrey Berridge) describe time pressure as a factor which, although with some caveats, has overall a positive impact on negotiation outcomes. These suggestions are contrasted with

the significant body of literature, primarily linked with social and cognitive psychology, which highlights the negative impact of time pressure on interactive decision-making, in particular in ‘complex’ environments. These considerations are then used to inspire two core research questions which guide the following comparative section and the following case-study analysis. The chapter concludes by reviewing directly a range of sub-debates on the role of time pressure in conflict resolution which are only partially covered or not covered by this research, accounting for their exclusion from the research framework or explaining how these research question can help shedding light at least on some of the issues that they raise.

Section two includes chapters three and four and outlines the comparative model. Chapter three begins by outlining the criteria used for selecting the episodes of negotiation to be included in the dataset. It explains how existing comparative datasets, and in particular the UCDP Armed Conflict dataset, have been used to inform the choice of units of analysis, but also highlights the reasons why a new dataset had to be created for this research, and discusses the criteria that have been used for case selection. The chapter then reviews in detail the fuzzy-set methodology adopted for the analysis, explaining in particular how the procedural stages of truth-table fuzzy-set analysis have impacted on the choice of triangulating strategies for coding each episode of negotiation. The last part of the chapter outlines the variables included in the model, whose choice has been inspired by Sawyer and Guretzkow’s ‘contingency framework’ for the analysis of international negotiations, explaining their operationalisation and providing a range of examples from the dataset.

Chapter 4 details the results of the truth-table fuzzy-set analysis of the dataset. The chapter begins by providing a detailed descriptive overview of the dataset, focusing in particular on the descriptive statistics concerning the two variables that operationalise the concept of ‘time pressure’. The chapter then proceeds by articulating the research questions introduced in chapter two into four main research hypotheses, and then outlines and discusses eleven interpretative models aimed at addressing each of these research hypotheses and analyses them

through fuzzy-set logic. In doing this, this chapter not only lays out the ‘best’ models for answering the research questions, but aims at outlining discursively the process through which these models can be associated with the research questions and hypotheses, and at explaining in detail what their methodological and conceptual assets and liabilities are. The chapter concludes by explaining how the models discussed in the chapter help shedding light on each of the research hypothesis. These models go some way to confirm the intuition that time pressure can be associated with both ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ negotiation outcomes, but also that only the absence or low levels of time pressure can be associated with durable outcomes. Evidence is also provided to support the hypothesis that the absence or low levels of time pressure (and not its presence) are associated with durable outcomes when the level of complexity of a negotiation process is significant.

Section three includes chapters five and six and is focused on the discussion of four case studies. The criteria for the selection of the case studies are explained in detail in the introductory sections of each chapter; in brief, the first pair of case studies is an attempt to ‘process-trace’ one of the causal patterns highlighted by the main model elaborated in chapter 4 which include the absence or low levels of time pressure and high level of complexity, using a macro-level perspective – i.e. by comparing two relevant episodes of negotiation in the Bougainville and Casamance peace processes with other episodes of negotiation in the same conflicts. The second pair of case studies, by contrast, focuses on the association between the presence or high levels of time pressure and the presence of high levels of complexity by comparing one episode of negotiation where such configuration of factors can be associated with a broad and durable agreement (the 1995 Dayton proximity talks) and one in which such negotiations failed (the 2000 Camp David summit).

Both chapters, after having outlined the reasons for the case selection, provide a brief historical background of the case studies and justify in detail the fuzzy-set codes that have been attributed to these conflicts and to the episodes of negotiation under scrutiny. In chapter five the analysis proper is then focused on understanding how the general features that these episodes of negotiation share

(the absence / low levels of time pressure, the presence of various forms of issue, decision-making and inter-cultural complexity) can be associated with the outcomes of the negotiations. In chapter six, by contrast, the analysis is aimed at understanding why time pressure succeeded in the context of the Dayton talks in generating a comprehensive and durable agreement, how these reasons fit in the general theoretical framework suggested previously on the relations between time pressure and conflict complexity, and if the failure of the 2000 Camp David summit can be explained by pointing at a failure to learn the 'right lessons' from Dayton. The evidence produced by these case studies overall dovetails effectively with the fuzzy-set models, by confirming the importance of low-paced negotiations in favouring intra-rebel agreements and, thus, more durable peace agreements; and in suggesting that the success of time pressure at Dayton is arguably to be associated not so much with the success of strict deadlines in breaking deadlocks on intractable issues, but rather on the effectiveness of strict time limits in generating agreements on specific and relatively 'simple' issues in simple decision-making contexts and as part of effective issue sequencing.

The conclusive chapter finally summarises the main and ancillary findings of the research, their implications for the academic field of conflict studies and for diplomatic practices, some considerations on the methodologies used in the research, and outlines various potential paths for further research.

Chapter 2

Time pressure and deadlines in international negotiation: a review

As we mentioned above, one of the most apparent features of the current treatment of time pressure in conflict resolution is that, while many diplomats advocate the importance of deadlines for the success of negotiations, few provide a systematic analysis of the process through which time limits impact on the decisions and strategies of the parties involved. More specifically, the main thesis of this chapter is that a certain degree of incommunicability exists between two bodies of literature – between what we will define as ‘diplomatic manuals’ and the most recent conclusions of experimental psychology, in particular those influenced by cognitivist approaches.

The main sources that will be reviewed, and which justify attaching these labels to these bodies of literature, are, on the one hand, manuals written primarily since the 1980s with the explicit aim of providing an overview of negotiating principles and strategies to diplomats and politicians involved in international negotiations, spanning from Zartman and Berman’s ‘The Practical Negotiator’ (1982) to Berridge’s ‘Diplomacy: Theory and Practice’ (2005). On the other hand, the works in experimental psychology upon which we will rely are papers which represent the debates on the role of time pressure on individual and collective decision-making which have been developing since the 1950s in journals such as the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* (cf. Smock 1955), the *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* (cf. Pruitt and Drews 1969) or the *Journal of Applied Psychology* (cf. Wright 1974). More recent contributions, which are mostly influenced by the increased relevance of cognitivist approaches to decision-making, have also been collected in Edland and Maule’s edited volume

'Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and Decision Making' (1993), on which a significant part of our analysis in paragraph 2 is based.

This chapter will argue that, despite occasional attempts to bridge the gap between these two fields of research (cf. Pruitt and Carnevale 1997), the common understanding of the assets and liabilities of time pressure in international negotiations that one could find in diplomatic manuals is very partial. In particular, evidence will be provided to suggest that a crucial set of findings of experimental psychology concerning the cognitive impact of time pressure on individual and collective decision-making – which highlights the systematic negative impact of time pressure on 'complex' decision-making processes – is not considered in diplomatic manuals, and that this could drastically affect the diplomats' perception of the efficiency of time pressure, in particular when applied 'artificially' in prolonged peace negotiations. This realisation could have major disruptive effects as it could be argued that a rather optimistic approach to 'time management' – according to some directly drawn from the world of corporate business (Chollet 1997, 236) – is one of the cornerstones of the current paradigms in conflict resolution.

This chapter will begin by outlined the development of the debate on the role of time in diplomacy and conflict resolution, which will help understand the important position played by time pressure in most diplomatic manuals. Material from experimental psychology will then be reviewed to highlight what the main contribution of psychologists to the understanding of the impact of time pressure on decision-making and negotiation is – namely, the role of 'situational factors' or 'task variables' as intervening variables. This analysis will serve as a basis for making explicit the main research questions that will be answered in the following chapters and to review the debates related to the role of time pressure in negotiation that will be not be directly addressed but that will receive some attention in the case-study section of the research, and those which do not fall within the theoretical reach of this study.

1. The perspective of diplomacy and conflict resolution

1.1 *In conflict resolution, time matters*

If anything, the literature on conflict resolution and international diplomacy agrees on the fact that, in diplomacy and conflict management, time matters. More specifically, arguments have been advanced to suggest that time matters at least in three main regards: conflicts need to ‘ripen’ before they can de-escalate – that is, conflict de-escalation can take place only if it takes place at the ‘right time’; military and diplomatic interventions seem to be more effective when arranged around fixed timescales; and, when peace negotiations begin, time – or, as it is often defined, ‘diplomatic momentum’ – is one of the main variables that needs to be taken into account for negotiations to succeed.

The idea of conflict ‘ripeness’, arguably ‘the most influential recent theory of peacemaking’ (Selby 2007), is used to formalise what is a rather intuitive truth in conflict resolution – that ‘parties resolve their conflict only when they are ready to do so’ (Zartman 2003a) – and to stress the importance of the ‘timing’ of any type of peace initiative (*ibid.*). Evidence exists to suggest that at least since the 1970s diplomats (including Henry Kissinger) have identified a series of factors – in particular the presence of a ‘stalemate’ on the ground – that would help understand whether a conflict is ‘ripe’ for resolution (*ibid.*).

Michael Greig (2001, 692) suggested that two main conceptions of ‘ripeness’ exist in the literature: one focused on ‘contextual factors’ – typically related to the ‘costs and pain of conflict’ and to the relationship between the disputants – which would affect the parties’ willingness to accept negotiated solutions; and one focused on the ‘temporal factors’ and on the ‘lifecycle of a dispute’ which would alone help understand when mediation is most likely to succeed. This bipartition echoes one of the earliest conceptualisations of conflict ripeness by John Burton (1972, 7), who criticised the approach of those believing that ‘at some stage, which cannot be defined, conflict can be resolved; at others not’ to his own understanding of conflict resolution, based on the idea that ‘conditions in which conflicts can or cannot be resolved can be determined’.

In fact, few would believe that the timing of successful de-escalations and interventions could be defined solely on the basis of a predetermined ‘lifecycle of a dispute’; indeed, the most relevant contribution of ‘ripeness’ theory to conflict resolution has been the analysis of the conditions that make conflicts ‘ripe for solution’ (Zartman 1985), and in particular of the conditions in which parties could be said to be in a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (Kleiboer 1994, 110). Yet, in more general terms, ‘ripeness’ theory has significantly contributed, at least since the publication of Zartman and Berman’s negotiation manual in 1982, to the creation of a cultural climate in conflict resolution studies where the ‘timing’ of peace initiatives became a crucial research variable.

In the post-Cold War period, such stress on the ‘timing’ of conflict resolution efforts assumed various forms. On the one hand, an increasing number of senior diplomats and policy advisors – in particular in the Clinton administration – became convinced that interventions in conflicts have more chances to succeed if they are not only *timely*, but also *timed*. This, in turn, has contributed to attract attention on the impact of time pressure on peace negotiations and on the possibility of using such pressure to increase the probability of reaching agreements.

The importance of ‘timed’ interventions in ongoing conflicts was discussed at large in one of the defining speeches of the Clinton era (Sicherman 1997, 9), delivered by Clinton’s National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in 1996 at the George Washington University. In that speech, titled ‘Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines’, Lake suggested that the American interventions in Haiti and Bosnia highlighted the need to set ‘sharp withdrawal deadlines’ to maximise the effectiveness of such missions. These withdrawal deadlines, coupled with clearly defined mission targets, would provide a ‘breathing room’ for the local populations to implement the policy changes needed for sustainable political change and economic recovery. Lake continues:

It is a dangerous hubris to believe we can build other nations. But where our own interests are engaged, we can help nations build themselves – and give them time to make a start at it.

If a clear deadline for the withdrawal of the troops is set, Lake argues, people would build their own nations ‘quickly’ and more resolutely – and this is ‘why setting deadlines is so important’.

More recently, the Democratic senator and presidential candidate John Kerry confirmed the resilience of Lake’s argument in the political discourse on conflict resolution by applying it to the American intervention in Iraq. In an article which appeared on 5 April 2006 on *The New York Times* under the title ‘Two Deadlines and an Exit’, Kerry advocated a military and political strategy based on the strict enforcement of various types of deadlines:

As our generals have said, the war cannot be won militarily. It must be won politically. [...] So far, Iraqi leaders have responded only to deadlines – a deadline to transfer authority to a provisional government, and a deadline to hold three elections. Now we must set another deadline to extricate our troops and get Iraq up on its own two feet.

The idea of ‘setting deadlines’ for military interventions in conflicts dovetails with what is arguably one of the most widely used concepts in conflict resolution – the notion of ‘peace process’. The political processes mentioned by Lake and Kerry – power transfers, creation of transitional political and military authorities, arranging national elections – are part of the wider set of diplomatic, political, economic and social dynamics that are typically subsumed under the idea of peace process. Military interventions, under this perspective, would appear as only one of the pieces of a wider jigsaw of political and diplomatic initiatives that need to be appropriately coordinated, managed and – indeed – synchronised.

Despite its wide popularity, the concept of ‘peace process’ is very difficult to define. Little agreement, in particular, exists on whether it is really possible to grasp what the standard contents of peace processes are: the definition provided by John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty (2001, 11), which focuses on five criteria that ‘must’ be present in each peace process², is contested by Bell (2000, 16), who

² The five criteria are: 1) the protagonists must be willing to negotiate in good faith; 2) the key actors must be included in the process; 3) the negotiations must address the central issues in the dispute; 4) force must not be used to achieve objectives; 5) the negotiators must be committed to a sustained process.

suggests that conflict resolution efforts are labeled as peace processes ‘whenever it suits one of the parties to the conflict to so describe it’.

Most analyses tend to agree, however, on two main points. On the one hand, peace processes – or at least the idea that peace can (or should) come as part of a ‘process’ – are typically described as something rather new. Jan Selby (2007) suggests that ‘the term entered international political and diplomatic discourse only in the mid- to late 1970s’ to refer to the negotiations between Egypt and Israel after the 1973 Kippur war. However, he continues:

The widespread use of the term has [...] only really taken off since the end of the Cold War. If we take *The Times*’ use of the phrase as an example, it was entirely absent from the paper’s journalistic vocabulary until 1974. By 1978, however, the term appeared in 50 articles, and by 1990 562 articles. Since 1990, it has appeared with an average 843 *Times* articles per year.

Moreover, agreement seems to exist on the fact that the defining feature of peace processes is the temporal scattering and sequencing of a vast range of conflict resolution activities (Bell 2000, 31; Darby and Mac Ginty 2000, 6-8). In peace processes, ‘matters of process, duration, sequencing and timing are viewed as key to the making of peace’ (Selby 2007).

On these bases, it might not be too far-fetched to suggest that the use of timed interventions and, more in general, the increased importance of time as a central variable in conflict resolution are part of what is perceived and portrayed as a coherent and new approach to peace building. This approach, at times described as influenced by the ‘experiences in the corporate world’ of senior diplomats like Dayton’s architect Richard Holbrooke (Chollet 1997, 236), is based on the rejection of previous military and diplomatic strategies which lacked ‘clear and achievable’ aims and targets (Lake 1996) and advocates the manipulation of time as a central component of an effective management of conflicts and of their ultimate resolution.

1.2 Diplomatic momentum is crucial in prolonged negotiations

In the context of peace negotiations, the main implication of this set of strategies is the increased interest paid to factors or strategies which can help keeping what is typically called the ‘momentum’ of peace negotiations.

In general terms, ‘momentum’ is defined by Peter Adler (1981, 14) as ‘the dynamic intensity that propels [a unit] through the layers of social resistance towards some desired or feared destiny [...] encompassing rate, grace, intensity, effort and success’. Its relevance in peace negotiations has been discussed, among others, by Geoffrey Berridge (1989, 475), who argues that:

In a complex and distracting world, the importance to the solution of an international political problem of keeping senior politicians, generals and civil servants on all sides seized with the importance of sustaining diplomatic momentum is self-evident. This is even more important when it is remembered that negotiated settlements of wars normally require the appearance of a favourable combination of circumstances which can sometimes be easily upset. If the moment is lost, it may not be regained for a long time.

Two main understandings of what such ‘diplomatic momentum’ exactly entails emerge from the literature. On the one hand, Watkins and Lundberg (1998, 131) focus on the impact of specific ‘architectures’ of negotiation processes on ‘overcom[ing] residual barriers, effectively bootstrapping the proceedings’. Among these elements of the negotiation ‘architecture’ they include the use of secret diplomacy, of mutual confidence building measures and of staged agreements (*ibid.*, 131-2). The positive impact of these measures on the ‘momentum’ of the talks would lie primarily in the fact that they can allow the parties to sustain a continuous negotiation process without interference from external actors (secret negotiations) and to overcome the potential deadlocks that can be caused by the lack of mutual trust by using confidence-building gestures and by postponing the most difficult issues to a later stage of the talks (cf. also Kelman 1992, 19).

While Watkins and Lundberg are right to suggest that these measures are crucial for the success of negotiation processes between former enemies, whether

they also constitute the typical strategies which can help generate or sustain ‘diplomatic momentum’ is debatable. Adler’s definition suggests that momentum should arguably be conceived as a sort of added value to diplomatic processes, which dramatically ‘propels’ the talk beyond the level of intensity and effectiveness that would be reached by using any negotiation ‘architecture’. Moreover, Geoffrey Berridge (2005, 58) correctly argues that, while confidence building and piecemeal bargaining do indeed help keeping the momentum of a process alive, they are rarely able to maintain momentum unaided, not least ‘because [of their] unavoidable slowness’. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that the strategies which most directly help sustain diplomatic momentum are not those based on guaranteeing secrecy or helping the construction of trust, but rather those which operate on the parties’ perception of the negotiation process, either by framing it as a process that cannot be reversed or by instilling in the parties a sense of urgency to reach an agreement.

The first effect is typically created through what Berridge defines as ‘metaphors of movement’, which can be used not just to generate a sense of irreversibility, but also to ‘talk up the talks’, portray in over-optimistic terms its development and suggest that a final agreement is closer than most would think. One of the ‘metaphors of movement’ that are most commonly used in negotiations is the ‘train metaphor’: in the Angola/Namibia negotiations in 1988 a US official described the success of the negotiations by claiming that:

‘If anyone had got off the train when they arrived in Geneva they would have sprained a wrist. [...] If anyone tried to get off now they will break both legs’ (Berridge 1989, 477).

In 2001 Shimon Peres described in similar terms the attempts that were underway for restarting the Oslo process:

[...] the sooner we shall arrive to the cessation of fire and the cessation of incitement, the train of peace can leave its first station and go through the entire sequence mentioned in the Mitchell Report until we shall reach the most important station, where the political negotiations in order to attain a permanent solution based on 242 and 338 will be attained³.

³ Statement by Israel FM Shimon Peres and US Secretary of State Colin Powell, 28 June 2001

As such, the idea of ‘talking up the talks’ or of using metaphors to convey a sense of diplomatic momentum is not always portrayed in positive terms. As early as in 1983 Altaf Gauhar, in what is arguably one of the early criticisms of the concept of peace process, suggests that in many circumstances international actors brokering peace negotiations – such as in Israel/Palestine, Namibia and Afghanistan – provide only an ‘illusion of momentum’, which is ‘an end in itself’ and which covers up the pretence of the international community ‘to be doing something substantive’ in such conflicts (Gauhar 1983, xxxxi). While this criticism is certainly well placed, it does not fundamentally affect Berridge’s argument, which does not suggest that strategies for keeping the momentum alive can alone succeed in generating agreements, but rather that this tactics can provide ‘special assistance’ in maintaining the pace of prolonged negotiations (Berridge 2005, 58) and that, everything else being equal, can increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement when compared to a condition were no such strategies are employed.

1.3 On a balance, deadlines have a positive impact on negotiations

According to Berridge, the main factor which helps ‘maintaining the momentum’ of a negotiation besides the use of ‘metaphors of movements’ is the presence – or the imposition – of deadlines and the sense of urgency that time pressure can generate on the parties involved in a negotiation.

While the importance of metaphors of movement in negotiations has been highlighted and conceptualised rather recently and still remains a rather secondary aspect in the debate on diplomatic momentum, the impact of deadlines on negotiations has been systematically studied in industrial negotiations since the 1960s (Stevens 1963; Walton and McKersie 1965) and explicitly incorporated in diplomatic manuals at least since the 1980s (Zartman and Berman 1982; Moore 1986). As the importance of deadlines in humanitarian interventions has achieved visibility in conflict resolution in the post-Cold War era, the role of similar time limits in peace negotiations has also received increasing attention from the early

1990s until present (Sunshine 1990; Pruitt and Carnevale 1997; Rao 2001; Berridge 2005).

In line with the general enthusiasm that accompanies the debate on diplomatic momentum, most senior politicians and mediators involved in peace negotiations, as well as most manuals written with contemporary diplomacy and conflict resolution in mind, seem to agree on the fact that negotiations carried out under deadlines tend to bear better results. Deadlines, whether set as part of the negotiating process or imposed by external events, are deemed to 'facilitate agreement, lower expectations, call bluffs, and produce final proposals' (Zartman and Berman 1982, 195). As stated by Carl Stevens (1963, 200):

An approaching deadline puts pressure on the parties to state their true positions and this does much to squeeze element of bluff out of the later steps of negotiation. However, an approaching deadline does much more [...]. It brings pressures to bear which actually change the least favorable terms upon which each party is willing to settle; thus, it operates as a force tending to bring about conditions necessary for agreement.

Among others, the use of deadlines in peace negotiations has been defined as 'critical' by Clinton's mediator Dennis Ross (Bebchick 2002, 122), and the establishment of deadlines has been described as a 'particularly important' component of the negotiating strategies adopted by the American administration vis-à-vis Panama in the early 1990s (Blechman and Cofman Witter 1999, 9) and of the peace processes in Namibia/Angola and in Northern Ireland (Berridge 1989; Berridge 2005, 60-1).

Yet, as for most aspects related to the creation of a 'diplomatic momentum', the impact of deadlines on peace processes is usually not praised unconditionally. On the one hand, when deadlines are set as part of the negotiating process by one of the parties involved or by a mediator, they might fail if they are not perceived as credible. Strictly speaking, deadlines are not necessarily effective by themselves but only if they become source of time pressure; therefore, they should be perceived as 'real and essential' (Bebchick 2002, 122) for the development of the negotiations, and the threat to end the negotiation process if agreement is reached by a certain time limit should be sustainable (Moore 1986, 244).

If deadlines are considered as credible, a second potential problem highlighted by the diplomatic literature is the fact that the presence of a fixed time frame for the negotiation might encourage brinkmanship (Moore 1986, 244): the parties might be tempted to toughen their positions in the hope that the other side would ultimately give in shortly before the deadline hits. This dynamic might push one party to ‘break off talks altogether’ (Bebchick 2002, 122; cf. also Watkins 1999, 260) and thus increase the risk that the negotiation would ultimately end without an agreement.

Despite these qualifications, however, the impact of deadlines and time pressure is typically described in positive terms by diplomats. If deadlines are perceived as not credible, they will simply ‘lose their meaning’ (Watkins 1999, 260); if not, even if one party decided to play the ‘endgame’, when the deadline approximates time pressure would allegedly help parties to ‘lower expectations’ and get to some form of agreement. That is, under time pressure the parties who are less satisfied by the final agreement would anyway tend to accept a proposal which is ‘favorable to the proposer but agreeable to the other party as well’ (Zartman 1977, 627). The main influence of deadlines, the diplomatic wisdom goes, lies in transforming the negotiation process into a ‘musical chair effect’: parties ‘try to maneuver [sic] to be in the best position when the music stops’, but in the end they will try ‘to come to an agreement wherever they are when the deadline hits’ (Zartman and Berman 1982, 195) and try to ‘salvage an agreement’ (Sunshine 1990, 185) under the assumption that ‘an imperfect agreement is usually better than no agreement at all’ (Berridge 2005, 61).

On balance, thus, manipulating time pressure would thus seem to be a rather easy and relatively safe strategy to increase the probability that a negotiating process would lead to positive results.

2. The perspective of experimental psychology

Considering the attention that is increasingly paid to the role of diplomatic momentum and to time pressure as a crucial variable to bring prolonged peace negotiations to a successful conclusion, it is striking to note that the large majority

of diplomatic manuals and papers written in conflict resolution studies still leave at least two important questions unanswered.

First of all, most of these analyses are rather imprecise when it comes to specify how exactly the 'results' of these negotiations should be assessed. The final objective of the models suggested by diplomatic manuals which support the use of deadlines in international negotiations is to have the parties involved in the negotiation process reach some form of agreement; with few exceptions (cf. Moore 1986, 245), little attention is paid to how 'good' and how lasting such agreement is likely to be. Zartman and Berman (1982, 195-6), for instance, suggest that the effectiveness of deadlines is due to the fact that the party which leaves the negotiation with the comparatively less advantageous deal would still accept it on the basis of the fact that this is 'the best he can do' and that there is 'no time left to make any real improvements'. This assumption, however, appears as highly unrealistic in the context of real-world diplomacy and conflict resolution, where an unsatisfactory agreement can easily be overthrown as a consequence of internal quarrels, electoral downturns or leadership struggles. Furthermore, this approach seems to neglect the fact that, by definition, peace agreements struck in the context of peace processes are not the result of 'one-off' strategic interactions but rather the outcome of prolonged interactions, and thus the party that has been object of most pressure could have the opportunity to ask for a reconsideration of the terms of the deal.

Furthermore, the approach to deadlines shown in diplomatic manuals primarily depends on the fact that the range of alternatives available to negotiators under time pressure is portrayed as limited to either 'favourable' or 'agreeable' solutions. This, again, appears as extremely optimistic, since in most conflicts the preferences of the parties are typically widely spread and only partially overlapping. If we assume that, under the pressure of time, the parties might find it particularly difficult to interact effectively, gather adequate information on the other side's position, and overcome a range of organisational and cognitive problems, this would make us doubt as to whether the result of the negotiation could be really perceived by them as 'the best they can do'. That is, it is difficult to suggest that a party would naturally perceive a deal that is proposed under time

pressure in more favourable terms than it would under normal conditions; and this, in turn, could imply that time pressure is not just potentially irrelevant, but also intrinsically detrimental for the development of most peace negotiations.

In a sense, the fact that these questions are not given satisfactory answers in diplomatic manuals could be dismissed as the result of a somehow simplistic and over-optimistic approach to conflict resolution. Yet, at a closer look it is also reasonable to suggest that the underestimation of the negative effects of time pressure is primarily due to the reliance of authors like William Zartman or Berman on a series of studies published by behaviouralist social psychologists in the late 1960s. Indeed, in some circumstances diplomatic manuals written in the 1980s seem to do little more than paraphrasing the outcomes of experimental studies published up to fifteen years earlier. For instance, Zartman and Berman's suggestion that 'deadlines tend to facilitate agreement, lower expectations, call bluffs, and produce final proposals' appears to be a reformulation of the outcomes of Dean Pruitt and Julie Latané Drews's experimental analysis on the impact of time pressure on negotiation behaviour published in 1969 ('increased time pressure resulted in less ambitious goals, lower level of demands, and less bluffing' – Pruitt and Drews 1969, 43).

In particular with the increase in relevance of cognitivist approaches to decision-making, Pruitt and Drews' suggestions have been put into question by a number of empirical studies in experimental psychology. At the present, it can be suggested that the large majority of social psychologists and decision-making theorists would agree on two basic statements: while the effects of time pressure on decision-making are mixed, when cognitive dynamics are considered, on average time pressure can be associated with lower quality of decision-making outputs and 'suboptimal' negotiation outcomes; and, most importantly, the 'attributes' of the decision maker and 'task characteristics' directly affect the impact of time pressure and can make it difficult to draw general conclusions on the impact of time pressure without reference to the specific context in which it is applied.

2.1 An alternative approach (1): '*closing of the mind*' under time pressure

The starting point of contemporary decision-making reviews on time pressure is not dissimilar from the assumptions of diplomats and practitioners: the fundamental impact of time pressure on decision-making and negotiation is to 'reduce inaction' (Pruitt and Carnevale 1993, 61). In normal work environments, this effect can be associated with an increase in 'performance and efficiency' provided that the level of time pressure is neither too high nor too low, and, most importantly, if that the level of stress of the actors involved is kept to a minimum (Rastegary and Landy 1993, 227). In the presence of a 'competitive' interactive process (Carnevale, O'Connor and McCusker 1993, 123), however, this level of stress would be high enough to generate not just an acceleration, but also qualitative changes in the behaviour and cognitive processes of the actors involved; and, from a cognitivist perspective, 'homogeneous, consistent and [...] robust' evidence exists to suggest that the impact of 'time stress on decision making effectiveness' is overwhelmingly negative (Zakay 1993, 60).

At least since the 1970s a significant body of literature has developed to test the hypothesis that, under time pressure, decision-makers have to cope with 'some distortion into [their] subjectively ideal judgment policy' (Wright 1974, 556) and are subject to what Arie Kruglanski called 'epistemic freezing' – that is, they would enter a condition in which they are 'less aware of plausible alternative hypotheses and/or inconsistent bits of evidence competing with a given judgment' (Kruglanski and Freund 1983, 19; cf. also Kruglanski 1989, 404). Among the 'systematic changes of cognitive process when decisions have to be made under time restrictions' highlighted by Edland and Svenson (1993, 36-7) and Zakay (1993, 60), the four most relevant arguably are: an increase in 'selectivity of the input of information', where 'information that is perceived as most important is processed first, and then processing is continued until time is up'; a decrease in the 'accuracy of human judgments'; increased importance being paid to 'negative information'; a 'tendency of locking in on a strategy' and a 'decreas[ing] competence of finding alternative strategies in problem solving'.

As a whole, these suggestions aim at applying to the analysis of time pressure earlier studies undertaken since the late 1950s, which suggest that ‘increase in drive’ associated to a condition of ‘emotional arousal’ reduces ‘cue utilisation’ (Easterbrook 1959, 183-4). A similar idea was later summarized effectively by De Dreu (2003, 280), who described the outcome of such reduction in cue utilization as the ‘closing of the mind’ of negotiators.

However, these results, ‘consistent’ and ‘robust’ as they might be, still encounter the opposition of part of the scientific community, which continues to amass evidence supporting the original claims by Pruitt and Drews – that ‘time pressure produces lower demands, faster concessions, and faster agreement’ (Carnevale, O’Connor and McCusker 1993, 122). Indeed, the reliance of social psychologists and decision-making theorists on social experiments – where real-life conditions are recreated in artificial and often grossly over-simplified settings (Holsti 1971, 67) – contributes to make specific empirical works only partially comparable with each other.

Some form of consensus, however, seems to have emerged in today’s decision-making theory at least around a less ambitious yet potentially far-reaching statement: as suggested by Stuhlmacher et al. (1998 – emphasis added), ‘although time pressure in negotiation has significant effects, *situational factors play a major role on its impact*’. That is, the main focus of the contemporary debate on time pressure in social psychology and decision-making theory has arguably shifted from the analysis of the general effects of time pressure on decision-making and negotiation behaviour to the analysis of the conditions under which time pressure is deemed to have a positive or negative impact on decision-making outputs or negotiation outcomes.

2.2 An alternative approach (2): *situational factors as intervening variables*

It is possible to suggest that three main sets of ‘situational factors’ are being considered by the literature: the distribution of payoffs and the negotiators’ goals; task or context variables; and the personal characteristics of the bargainers.

2.2.1 Distribution of payoffs and the negotiators' goals

The debates on how the types of issues that are being disputed or the negotiators' goals interact with time pressure are arguably those which remain less sensible to the problems raised by cognitive psychology. Yukl et al. (1976) suggested that one of the main effects of time pressure is to interrupt integrative bargaining processes primarily by impinging on the processes of systematic concession making (e.g. piecemeal bargaining). Elaborating on these conclusions, Carnevale and Lawler (1986) argued that the effects of time pressure on integrative bargaining depend on whether negotiators have cooperative or competitive goals – that is, that time pressure would enhance competitiveness and produce poor negotiation outcomes only when negotiators were in a hostile, competitive context, but not when they were in a cooperative context.

These conclusions are hardly surprising: since there is a general agreement on the fact that time pressure 'reduces inaction', it is reasonable to expect that some form of time pressure would be largely beneficial if the solution of a negotiation process is at hand. Yet, they also pose two main problems. On the one hand, while it is relatively easy to create artificial conditions in social experiments where two parties can be strongly encouraged to behave in a cooperative way, in real life (and in international politics) it is often quite unrealistic to suggest that negotiating parties would not show some 'competitive' or 'individualistic' goals, all the more if we consider that the strategic use of time pressure is more probable when 'the likelihood of agreement is low, such as when the disputants are intransigent' (Carnevale, O'Connor and McCusker 1993, 124; Kressel and Pruitt 1989).

On the other hand, and most importantly, if it is still possible to suggest that in some occasions parties could behave cooperatively in real life negotiations, it is also likely that the conditions in which the negotiation takes place will have an impact on the choice to behave competitively or cooperatively. For instance, the impact of time pressure on the 'disclosure of truthful information' is considered as a crucial factor influencing the competitiveness of negotiations in Yukl et al. (1976) and Carnevale and Lawler (1986). The interaction between factors which

are both exogenous and endogenous to the negotiation process, therefore, seems to highlight the importance and pervasiveness of task or context variables influencing the negotiator's cognitive processes in determining the effect of time pressure on negotiation.

2.2.2 Task or context variables

Time pressure, according to a range of studies, seems to have particularly marked and negative impact on decision-making and negotiation in three conditions: when the issues at stake are complex; when the task and/or the information available are highly ambiguous; and when group dynamics come into play.

The suggestion that time pressure tends to have a detrimental impact on joint decision-making in negotiations on complex issues has been widely discussed (Carnevale, O'Connor and McCusker 1993; Zakay 1993; Stuhlmacher, Gillespie and Champagne 1998). The negative effects of time pressure in these circumstances can be ascribed both to the impact of time shortage on negotiation strategies and to cognitive dynamics. According to Carnevale, O'Connor and McCusker (1993, 124), the positive impact of time pressure in 'speeding up concession making' is typically found in 'negotiations that are relatively simple and that involve a single issue or dimension of value': from a strategic standpoint, the presence of more 'issues to resolve' would make it difficult for the parties to deal with a broad variety of problems under shortage of time. Strategic shortcomings are reinforced by the negative cognitive dynamics unfolding under the stress generated by time pressure, which, according to Zakay (1993, 60), tends to reduce 'information processing' and make decision-makers forget 'important data'.

The negative impact of time pressure on decision-making and negotiations tends also to be amplified in the presence of ambiguous information (Stiensmeier-Pelster and Schürmann 1993, 241). Since the 1950s social psychologists have observed that individuals operating under 'psychological stress and anxiety [are] likely to be less tolerant of ambiguity' (Smock 1955, 182) and have suggested

even ‘normal’ individuals tend to be more prone to schizophrenic-like associative distractions (Usdansky and Chapman 1960, 145). Under time pressure, ‘the accuracy of human judgments decreases’ (Edland and Svenson 1993, 36), more importance is given to ‘negative information’ (Zakay 1993, 60), and in general ‘the harassed decision maker is pictured as becoming extremely alert to discrediting evidence on a few salient dimensions’ (Wright 1974, 560; cf. also Wright and Weitz 1977); the ability of decision-makers to cope with unfamiliar circumstances and information that need to be adequately processed and decoded is therefore also likely to decrease.

Finally, evidence has been advanced also to suggest that decision-making dynamics within groups also tend to be negatively affected by time pressure. On the one hand, a recent study by Mosterd and Rutte (2000) demonstrated that, when an individual or smaller group negotiate on behalf of a larger audience to which they are accountable, time pressure encourages the negotiator to behave more competitively than he or she would in the same context but without time pressure, and thus make it more likely that the negotiation reaches impasses or results in a suboptimal outcome. Moreover, as low time pressure can allow more time for taking on board a vast variety of opinions and perspectives, it is at times suggested that agreements reached under time pressure are less likely to be accepted by members of a group than agreements negotiated without explicit time constraints. Even recent studies on time pressure (cf. Stuhlmacher, Gillespie and Champagne 1998) rely in this regard on the seminal work by Roland Frye and Thomas Stritch (1964) on the effects of timed vs. nontimed discussions in small groups. Whereas previous studies suggested that only extreme time pressure reduces the quality of the output of group decision-making (Pepinsky et al. 1960), Frye and Stritch’s experiment provided proved that ‘time limits of the type used in this experiment impose a psychological pressure which creates greater initial sensitivity and agreement’, but also that ‘[t]his tendency seems to be soon offset by a distinct reduction in satisfaction with the group decision which inhibits coalescence’ (Frye and Stritch 1964, 143). Their findings, in other words, suggested that time pressure has a positive impact on the likelihood of getting to agreements in the short term, but also a negative impact on the durability of the

agreement itself. 'Time pressured group members', they argued, 'are less inclined to change their rankings after the group discussion', so that they tend to be 'less willing to accept the group decision' (*ibid.*, 142). Therefore they concluded:

Reduced discussion time reduces the interaction potential which may lead to resentment and thus rejection of the group decision. The personal reaction seems to be: "If you won't listen to my opinion, or if I don't get a chance to express it because of lack of time, I will not accept your opinion" (Frye and Stritch 1964, 142).




Figure 2.1
The impact of time pressure on complex and easy tasks
(SOURCE: ZACHAY 1993, 68)

2.2.3 Personal characteristics of the bargainers

The third set of ‘situational factors’ which is deemed to interact with time pressure and affect its impact on decision-making and negotiation outcomes is related to the personal ‘characteristics’ of the bargainers (cf. Stiensmeier-Pelster and Schürmann 1993, 253). In general terms, as Rastegary and Landy (1993, 235) suggest:

It is clear that the interaction between individual characteristics and the characteristics of the decision-making situation affects the perception of stress and an individual’s response to it. The resulting response in turn affects each individual’s decision-making strategies.

Two main types of arguments can be ascribed to this category. On the one hand, the individual’s approach to decision-making seems to affect how time pressure impacts on the outcomes of the decision. Stiensmeier-Pelster and Schürmann (1993) tested the impact of deadlines on individuals showing different ‘action-control modes’ – ‘action’ oriented or ‘state’ oriented. Their experiments showed that ‘the action-oriented adapt to time pressure particularly by filtrating the available information’, whereas ‘the state-oriented especially accelerate their information processing’ (ibid., 251). That is, their analysis seems to suggest that action-oriented individuals are those that are most likely to produce ‘efficient’ outcomes, provided that they manage to successfully ‘filtrate’ the information available. State-oriented individuals, by contrast, simply ‘do the same thing, but faster’, which implies ‘an intensification of cognitive effort’ and might result in a loss of concentration, increased inaccuracy and ultimately less efficient decisions.

Other scholars have focused not on the individual’s approach to decision-making, but rather on the individual’s cultural background (cf. Roth et al. 1991), and in particular on their ‘culture’ of time. The polarity between ‘monochronic’ and ‘polychronic’ cultures was coined by Edward T. Hall in 1983 (cf. also Foster 1992, 105-44; Macduff 2006). In Hall’s words, ‘polychronic’ cultures are characterised by a penchant towards ‘doing many things at once’ and by stressing ‘involvement of people and completion of transactions rather than adherence to preset schedules’; therefore, in such contexts ‘time is seldom experienced as

“wasted” (Hall 1983, 46). ‘Monochronic’ cultures, on the other hand, ‘tend to make a fetish out of management’ and stress the ‘tangibility’ of time schedules, which become ‘a classification system that orders life’ (ibid., 46-8). Hall also argued that Northern Europeans should be considered as ‘monochronic’, whereas Arabs and Latinos would qualify for the ‘polychronic’ group (cf. Alon and Brett 2007). According to this approach, time pressure would have a tangible impact on individuals belonging to ‘monochronic’ cultures, but would have a negligible, if not detrimental, impact on the behaviour of ‘polychronic’ negotiators and decision-makers.

3. Research questions and the debates on time pressure

3.1 Outlining the research questions

To summarise, then, the current state of diplomatic and conflict resolution studies could be outlined in four statements: 1) taking into account the temporal organisation of diplomatic efforts is an increasingly important feature of the debate on conflict resolution at least since the 1980s; 2) this approach has both a descriptive and a prescriptive side, as it is aimed both at understanding how time typically impacts on conflict resolution efforts and at reproducing some of these effects in *ad hoc* negotiation strategies; 3) time pressure from deadlines, both as the result of events which are beyond the control of the negotiators and as a result of time limits set by the negotiators themselves, is considered as one of the main factors (and possibly the single most important one) which help sustain the ‘momentum’ of negotiations; 4) while time pressure needs to be credible and may at times encourage brinkmanship, a significant group of negotiation and diplomatic manuals which includes Zartman and Berman (1982), Moore (1986), Sunshine (1990), Rao (2000) and Berridge (2005) suggests that on a balance it tends to benefit prolonged negotiations by providing a decisive drive to the parties towards reaching a final agreement.

This conclusion, however, does not appear as particularly convincing for two main reasons: 1) all the studies which support this position base their

conclusions on anecdotic evidence only and do not explain how exactly the alleged 'success' of this and other diplomatic tactics is assessed; 2) diplomatic and conflict resolution studies seem to neglect the arguments put forward in particular by cognitive studies on the negative impact of time pressure on individual and collective decision-making and on negotiation.

The lack of dialogue between social and cognitive psychologists and negotiation theorists working on industrial relations and business negotiations on the impact of time pressure has been highlighted as early as in 1975 by Jeffrey Rubin and Barry Brown. In their volume 'The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation' (1975, 293) they included as research questions for 'future research on bargaining' a series of important questions which had not yet received a robust answer:

Under what conditions do time limits tend to serve constructive ends, thereby increasing bargaining effectiveness? When will the opposite tend to be true? What sorts of bargainers are likely to prove especially susceptible to time pressure?

These questions seem not to have received a convincing answer from negotiation theorists to date and they also seem to have been systematically neglected by scholars working specifically on international negotiations and conflict resolution. We would argue that the current state of research on time pressure, where the level of incommunicability between diplomatic manuals and social and cognitive psychologists is still significant, highlights even more clearly the need to provide answers to these questions in particular in the field of international diplomacy.

In this sense, the two most fundamental questions that seem to emerge from the state of the debate on time pressure in international diplomacy and conflict resolution arguably are:

- 1) Do contemporary negotiations provide systematic evidence to suggest that peace negotiations taking place under relevant time pressure from deadlines tend to be more successful than negotiations unfolding under mild or no time pressure?

- 2) Is it possible to suggest that, in the context of complex negotiations where many issues are at stake, where complex inter-group decision-making dynamics are present and where the information available is ambiguous, time pressure can rarely be associated with successful negotiation outcomes?

The first question calls for a systematic review of the impact of time pressure on peace negotiations to test the main tenet emerging from most diplomatic manuals. The second question subsumes what could be portrayed as the most powerful set of criticisms leveled by cognitive psychologists against 'optimist' approaches to time pressure and, by aiming at shedding light on the conditions in which time pressure is most likely to succeed or fail, articulates the three questions posed by Rubin and Brown.

Since research questions arguably capture the heart of the current disagreements between the diplomatic literature and the contributions of social psychologists, as outlined in paragraph 2, they should also take precedence over many other interesting research strands which emerge in the literature on time pressure. On this basis, we will be forced to neglect some of the other debates that surround the role of time pressure in negotiation, while others will receive less attention than they would arguably deserve. This approach is somehow inevitable if we take into account the complete absence of comparative empirical research on the role of time pressure in conflict resolution and the fact that most research strands in the field of time pressure still lack a rigorous conceptualisation, although efforts will be made to provide a general assessment on most of them at least in the conclusions.

3.2 Other debates partially covered

3.2.1 Cultural aspects of time pressure

Culture is arguably an important component of the debates on negotiation in general, and on time pressure in particular. Defined by Guy Faure and Gunnar Sjöstedt (1993, 8) as ‘a set of shared and enduring meanings, values and beliefs that characterize national, ethnic, or other groups and orient their behavior’, culture can exert its influence on international interactions at various levels. It can be seen as source of superficial feelings of ‘sameness’ or ‘otherness’ when individuals from similar or different geographical and cultural milieus interact with one another.

The current debates on culture essentially proceed at two different levels. On the one hand, disagreement exists on whether culture should be considered as little more than a ‘background noise’ in international negotiations (‘even the best understanding of any such effect [of culture] is tautological, its measure vague, and its role in the process basically epiphenomenal’ – Zartman 1993 ,17; cf. also Samuelson 1997, 126) or whether its impacts on negotiation, complex as they might be, can still be researched and analysed in discrete categories (Coffman Wittes 2005, 138; Thompson 2005, 245). Within this latter approach, the role of culture is primarily analysed either in relation to the impact of specific culturally-informed mindsets on the individual negotiator or to the aggregate consequences of inter-cultural differences on the encounter between negotiators (cf. Coffman Wittes 2005, 138).

While it is apparent that, from an empirical perspective, culture is indeed a very ephemeral concept, to suggest that its role in international negotiations is necessarily ‘epiphenomenal’ is debatable. In particular when the core of the disagreements between two strands of research lies in the importance of specific cognitive factors, the role of culture seems to be at least an aspect that deserves to be taken into account.

The real problem posed by culture seems, however, to lie in understanding how exactly it should be analysed and operationalised in the context of the analysis of time pressure. In works on time pressure, culture is typically analysed

in the context of what we have defined as ‘personal characteristics of the bargainers’ with the aim of exploring the impact of ‘monochronic’ and ‘polychronic’ perceptions of time on the negotiators’ reactions to tight schedules. However, once again, all the suggestions in this regard are based on anecdotic evidence of members of the business community and diplomats who engaged in various types of international negotiations; as a consequence, apart from a vague distinction between Western and non-Western cultures, it is unclear which nations or cultures should exactly figure in the ‘monochronic’ and ‘polychronic’ categories⁴.

The impact of culture, however, could also be analysed in dyadic terms as the consequence of inter-cultural differences on the behaviours of mediators. This research strand seems more promising. Intercultural variance can affect many aspects of the negotiation encounter (cf. Thompson 2005, 245) and encounters with individuals perceived as ‘strangers’, irrespectively to their specific cultural background or identity, are often considered as a source of ‘uncertainty and anxiety’ (Gudykunst 1988, 123-4). On these bases, it is possible to argue that the presence of relevant inter-cultural rifts can be considered as a factor which increases the complexity of negotiation processes and could be analysed as a proxy for the hypothesis suggesting that negotiators tend to struggle to cope with ‘ambiguous’ information under time pressure.

Therefore, our analysis will approach the relation between time pressure and the cultural features of the negotiators in dyadic terms – by focusing on the complexity of inter-cultural relations – and not directly by exploring the role of specific ‘cultures of time’ in mediating the impact of deadlines on a bargaining process. The role of cultural prejudices in the choice and impact of specific negotiating strategies will be assessed *en passant* in the analysis of the case studies, but the relative unsophistication of the debate on the ‘culture of time’ makes it difficult to identify a specific research hypothesis to test in the

⁴ Adair and Brett (2005) provide probably the most thorough attempt to operationalise this difference through the concepts of ‘high context’ and ‘low context’ cultures. However, their analysis is still based on a rather rough distinction between Western and Eastern cultures (the latter including four Asian countries – Hong Kong (China), Japan, Russia and Thailand) and does not provide a credible framework for an analysis of international negotiations worldwide.

comparative section, and a clear research framework that can guide the coding of specific ethnic and cultural groups.

3.2.2 *Credibility*

The problem of credibility of deadlines is obviously central in the debates on time pressure, and as such is mentioned by most authors (Zartman and Berman 1982, 197; Moore 1986, 244; Berridge 1989, 476; Watkins 1999, 260; Bebchick 2002, 122; Berridge 2005, 58). The concept of ‘credibility’ is particularly important as it provides the conceptual and practical link between the presence or imposition of a deadline and the presence of time pressure: as time pressure, according to our definition, is triggered by a perception of urgency, which in turn causes an acceleration in a decision-making process, the time limit which sets this process in motion should be perceived as ‘real’ (Bebchick 2002, 122; Berridge 2005, 58) for it to have any influence on the behaviour of the actors involved.

Yet, despite the obvious importance of credibility, little or no effort has been done so far to identify which measures would enhance the credibility of specific time limits. The main contribution in this sense focuses not so much on the processes which would make deadlines more credible, but on the identification of specific *types* of deadlines which tend to be perceived as more ‘realistic’ (Berridge 2006, 58), in particular those which are beyond the control of the parties involved (such as ‘practical’ deadlines – *ibid.*, 61-4). Yet, apart from these considerations, the large majority of authors (cf. Zartman and Berman 1982; Moore 1986; Watkins 1999) simply highlight the importance of credibility without explaining *how* deadlines could be made more credible.

While the absence of a systematic framework for assessing credibility does not diminish its importance as a *trait d’union* between the physical presence of a time limit and its effectiveness in creating a sense of urgency in a negotiation, the current state of the literature reveals that most authors would simply identify a deadline as credible when it is perceived as such, and thus that no clear criterion for identifying the presence of credible deadlines exists. Therefore, our analysis should arguably bypass, at least in the comparative part, the issue of the individual

credibility of specific deadlines and follow Berridge's framework, which, by distinguishing between types of deadlines which are more or less likely to be considered as credible, is arguably the one, among those available in the literature, which provides the more accurate categorisation of deadline credibility in a comparative context. The specific credibility of deadlines which fall within Berridge's broad categories – and in particular within the composite category of 'artificial deadlines' – would then be assessed on an individual basis in some of the case studies.

3.2.3 Asymmetry

In the context of their reviews of time pressure, some authors have discussed how the same deadline might have different impacts on different actors within the same negotiation process, or how deadlines could be used by one side to create pressure on other parties – that is, how the effects of deadlines could be asymmetrical (cf. Moore 1986, 240; Sunshine 1990, 186-7). Artificial deadlines that generate asymmetrical time pressure in joint decision-making processes are sometimes referred to as 'ultimata' (cf. Berridge 2005, 59 – although the words 'deadline' and 'ultimatum' are also often used as synonyms) and are employed frequently in international crises and negotiation processes, typically with the aim of altering the distribution of gains among the negotiators.

The impact of asymmetrical time pressure on negotiation processes is undoubtedly important, but – again – not easy to assess. The vast majority of the deadlines which are included in typologies like Berridge's (2005) and which are going to be discussed in chapter 3 tend to have at least some impact on all the sides of a conflict; on this basis, a comparative analysis of asymmetric time pressure would bring relevant results if we were able to assess not the abstract 'strength' of a deadline, but rather how each actor perceives each deadline. This, in turn, raises problems which are not dissimilar from those that we have highlighted in the previous paragraph discussing the credibility of deadlines; thus, in the absence of a clear comparative framework for describing or predicting

individual reactions to time pressure, a comparative analysis should arguably be based on Berridge's categorisation of types of deadlines as a proxy for the 'strength' of time pressure, and such 'strength' should then be kept constant for all the actors involved in a specific episode of negotiation.

Also taking into account the complexities of structuring *ex novo* a comparative analysis of the role of time pressure in peace negotiations within the limits of a single research project, it seems reasonable to focus the comparative analysis on the core research questions which emerge from the literature and provide, for each episode of negotiation analysed, an aggregate assessment of the characteristics and behaviour of all the actors involved in a peace negotiation and not of the individual characteristics and behaviour of each of them. To do otherwise would imply elaborating a second comparative dataset based on individual data but in which, for the abovementioned reasons, all the actors involved in the same episode of negotiation would be considered as subject to the same time pressure: such dataset would help ascertain individual responsibilities for the failure of specific negotiation processes and would help understand how time pressure impacts on the distribution of negotiation payoffs, but would not add much to our broad understanding how time pressure interacts with major task or context variables. Still, the analysis of the specific strategic conditions, characteristics, behaviours and reactions to deadlines of individual actors will then be provided in the case-study section in relation to a representative sample of episodes of negotiation.

3.3 Other debates not covered

3.3.1 'Deadline effect'

A debate which exists in the literature and which is not directly relevant for our analysis concerns the impact of fixed deadlines on the timing by which agreements are reached within a negotiation process. Diplomats are typically very interested in this. John Cross (1969, 13 – emphasis in the original) points out to this regard that 'if it did not matter *when* the parties agreed, it would not matter

whether they agreed at all'. Manuals usually develop this argument by observing that '90 percent of the negotiation takes place in the last 10 percent of the time allowed' (Starkey et al. 1999, 44) or also that '80% of negotiating concessions are made in the final 2% of negotiating time' (Sunshine 1990, 185).

In formal model research, this aspect has been explored in a variety of models, including the so-called Rubinstein Bargaining Model. As the passing of time impacts negatively on the preferences of the negotiators, such model of formal interaction argues that, where two parties make in turn offers for the partition of a pie, under certain conditions they may agree immediately on an asymmetric partition which embodies such discount factors and comes to the advantage of the first bidder (Rubinstein 1982).

It has to be said that the primary aim of such model is not to discover specific effects of time pressure on negotiation, but rather to discuss the impact on the distribution of gains from negotiation when the bargainers are characterized by a discounting factor related to their impatience – a factor whose underlying logic is arguably not far from Fisher's idea of 'fading opportunities' (Fisher 1971, 108). In any case, the relevance of this model for our analysis lies in the fact that it generated, among other strands of research, a debate on the formal modeling of the impact of time on negotiation, a debate which soon reached similar conclusions to the abovementioned negotiation manuals. Research on the implications of the Rubinstein model, when its assumptions about the players' rationality and complete information are partially modified, results in models 'which exclude perpetual disagreement, but not delay' (Vannetelbosch 1999, 113). Another strand of game theory research also shows that irrevocable endogenous commitments in presence of a fixed deadline result in the so-called 'deadline effect' – a procrastination of the bidding process up to the final, 'take-it-or-leave-it' offer (Fershtman and Seidmann 1993; Calabuig et al. 2004).

As a whole, however, this debate appears to focus on a set of theoretical problems which only partially overlaps with the approach that we have outlined in this chapter. Trying to explain at what stage in the negotiation process the agreement is reached does not necessarily shed light on the quality of the agreement that is reached and on how such quality is affected by the cognitive

impact of time pressure. Thus, while the case studies will discuss *en passant* how specific forms of time pressure, or its absence, impacted on the schedule of specific negotiation processes, providing a precise account of the factors which could explain the exact timing of negotiation outcomes is beyond our direct research interests.

3.3.2 Implementation of agreements

Another relevant research strand which exists in the analysis of time pressure in relation to conflict resolution is the analysis of the role of deadlines in the implementation of peace agreements.

The concept of ‘implementation’ could be portrayed in two different ways in the context of peace processes and peace negotiations. On the one hand, one may consider as ‘implementation’ the negotiation of detailed agreements disciplined by an initial framework agreement or declaration of principles. On the other, the implementation of an agreement could simply imply the execution of the dispositions included in a detailed treaty, which typically include measures such as the demobilisation of paramilitary group, the liberation of war prisoners or the organisation of elections.

While apparently similar, we would argue that these two forms of ‘implementation’ are, at a closer look, fundamentally different: the former implies that further negotiations are undertaken under the framework of an initial treaty, whereas the latter – what could be considered as ‘implementation’ proper – entails carrying out specific pre-agreed measures which normally do not involve further negotiations and whose respect typically depends on each side complying with its own obligations and allowing a process of confidence-building to unfold.

The latter form of ‘implementation’ has received significant attention in the literature. Under the correct assumption that signing a peace agreement does not necessarily translate into the end of violence on the ground, major peace treaties like the Dayton agreement have been analysed in detail to reveal the obligations that the parties had to satisfy and the timeframes by which each measure had to be implemented. Cousens and Cater (2001, 47-8), for instance, identified 31 major

obligations in the Dayton agreement which were pegged to specific deadlines, ranging from 1-3 days after the signing of the treaty to two years and nine months.

While in many cases the difference between framework agreements and comprehensive peace agreements is apparent from the language and size of the agreements themselves (as a comparison between the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles and the 1995 Oslo II agreement in Israel/Palestine, or between the 1998 Lincoln agreement and the 2001 peace treaty in Bougainville would easily reveal), in some circumstances the differences between the two forms of agreement can be more blurred. For instance, the 'Roadmap for Peace', proposed in 2003 by George W. Bush to restart the peace process in Israel/Palestine, includes three major deadlines, the first of which was very close (one month) and included 31 dispositions to be implemented, while the latter two, more distant in time, would have coincided with the convening of two international conferences whose agenda was outlined only in generic terms. Yet, despite these occasional ambiguities, in the vast majority of cases it is possible to decide quite clearly if an agreement is signed to set the stage for further negotiations, and thus include sentences like 'an agreement will be concluded ...' or 'permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible' (articles III and IV of the 1993 Oslo Declaration of Principles), and agreements where specific deliverable obligations are agreed upon and a time frame for their implementation is set out.

For these reasons, as our hypotheses concern the negotiation processes that lead to peace agreements and not on the execution of agreed dispositions, we will concentrate only on the follow-ups of framework agreements and not in the process of implementation of comprehensive agreements. The presence of a framework agreement will be considered as an important source of deadlines in the context of peace processes, while the fact that an agreement has been successfully implemented – that is, that it succeeded to generate stable and durable peace – will be taken into account only as a factor which contributes to the success of the negotiation process. As a whole, thus, no specific attention will be paid to the specific process of implementation and to assessing whether or not the specific phases outlined in the agreement have been followed rigorously.

Chapter 3

The comparative model (I): dataset, methodology and research variables

The purpose of the empirical analysis implemented in this section of the research is to test the impact of time pressure on the negotiation outcomes (breadth and durability) in contemporary territorial conflicts between 1990 and 2005.

In the absence of similar comparative efforts in the literature on peace research and decision-making analysis, each single phase of the research design will be outlined and discussed. We will first explain the criteria for selection of the dataset, clarifying the relations between the dataset that will be used for our empirical analysis and other existing datasets on armed conflict and conflict termination. We will then give details on the qualitative methodological framework that will be used for implementing the analysis. Finally, we will enumerate the dependent and independent variables of the model, locate them in the existing research agenda on time pressure, conflict resolution and policy analysis, and explain their operationalisation.

1. The dataset

The selection of the empirical dataset on which the interpretative model will be fitted involves two different stages: first, the identification of a comprehensive list of contemporary territorial conflicts; secondly, the selection of specific episodes of negotiation within these conflicts.

1.1 Analysis of conflicts: the UCDP datasets

To identify the range of territorial conflicts to be considered for the research we use the datasets produced by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research of the University of Uppsala, Sweden. The project has now been operating for over 20 years and is currently led by Prof. Peter Wallensteen.

The main reasons for choosing UCDP as basis for our research are three. First, the datasets produced by this project are becoming increasingly popular among researchers who explore aspects related to conflict resolution or to ethnic and civil warfare and whose interests intersect the scope of our own research effort (cf. Cunningham 2006a and 2006b; Svenson 2007; Hultman 2007; Melander and Öberg 2006). The popularity of UCDP is arguably due to the visibility that its datasets receive through the Oslo-based *Journal of Peace Research* – who has been publishing for the last 15 years yearly overviews of world conflicts written by Peter Wallensteen and other UCDP researchers – and through other major Scandinavian peace research centres (including SIPRI).

A second reason that directed our choice lies in the particularly suitable selection criteria used by this project. UCDP datasets define ‘conflict’ as ‘a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths’. (Harbom and Högladh 2006, 3). Two main features of this definition delineate the peculiarity of UCDP when compared to other similar datasets, such as the Correlates of War project. The definition, first, suggests that conflicts should be organized on the basis of the *nature* of the disputed issues and not on the basis of the *identity* of the actors involved. In fact, it does not distinguish between inter-state and intra-state conflicts - it allows any conflict in which at least one party is ‘the government of a state’ to be included in the dataset – while it introduces immediately the potential difference between government-based incompatibilities, which concern the ‘type of political system, the replacement of the central government, or the change of its composition’, and those that “concern the status of a territory, e.g. the change of

the state in control of a certain territory [...], secession or autonomy'. While the identity of the actors involved is certainly a relevant feature in the description of a conflict, we would argue, in line with our analysis in the previous chapters, that the complexity of the decision-making processes, more than the identity itself of the actors, affects the impact of the use of time pressure and other similar conflict management techniques. UCDP allows us not to be constrained by the inter- and intra-state rift, while at the same time signaling us which conflicts revolve around territorial disputes.

As anticipated above, only conflicts of a 'territorial' nature will be included in the analysis. Together with the very practical motivation of reducing what may potentially become an extremely vast empirical dataset, territorial conflicts are seen by many IR scholars as particularly prone to violence and to escalate into zero-sum contrapositions and, ultimately, intractable wars (Vasquez 1996, 535; Turner Johnson 2000, 435; Gibler 2007). As the use of time pressure itself seems to be more probable when 'the likelihood of agreement is low, such as when the disputants are intransigent' (Carnevale, O'Connor and McCusker 1993, 124; Kressel and Pruitt 1989), analyzing its impact on one of the most intractable forms of conflict in the international arena seemed to be a particularly fitting choice.

A second reason of interest in the definition of 'conflict' provided by the UCDP lies in the 25 battle deaths per year and per dyad threshold which is used to identify what constitutes at least a 'minor' conflict to be included in the dataset. This method for computing battle deaths is certainly particularly inclusive⁵ and allows us to take into consideration a particularly comprehensive range of conflicts.

A third, major reason for using UCDP material resides in the significant variety of datasets provided by the project, which include what is arguably the only attempt made to date by a major quantitative project on world conflicts to produce a dataset specifically dedicated to peace agreements. The UCDP Peace Agreement (PA) dataset, elaborated in 2006 in conjunction of the publication of a

⁵ COW, for instance, traditionally used the criterion of 1000 overall deaths for the whole duration of the conflict. For a discussion of the differences between UCDP and COW in computing battle deaths, cf. Cunningham (2006a, 58-9).

paper on the most relevant trends in conflict termination since the end of the Cold War (Harbom, Höglbladh and Wallensteen 2006), provides a list of the peace agreements signed between 1989 and 2005 for each main geographical region and following the partition between ‘governmental’ and ‘territorial’ conflicts. The PA dataset proves to be an extremely helpful source of qualitative and quantitative information on signed agreements: the authors of the project, among other things, classified the breadth of each agreement (‘partial’, ‘process’ or ‘comprehensive’), described the main dispositions included in the signed documents, enumerated the actors who acted as mediators and proposed a series of indicators for understanding whether they were successful in terminating the conflict or not.

The PA dataset also provides a suitable timeframe for the research. As it has been noted in the introduction, the years since the end of the Cold War⁶ have witnessed increased international activism in the field of conflict management; in particular in coincidence with the prolonged peace efforts in Israel-Palestine, Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland and Nagorno-Karabakh, the idea of timely-organised peace talks and the very concept of ‘peace process’ (although first suggested in the 1970s) have acquired increased relevance in the diplomatic discourse (Selby 2007). Concluding the analysis in 2005 also seems to be a sensible choice, as it leaves a reasonable time gap to assess the durability of all the agreements included in the set.

1.2 Analysis of ‘episodes of negotiation’: criteria for selection

The UCDP PA Dataset includes 149 agreements signed between 1989 and 2005, 43 of which were signed in the context of territorial disputes. While we may have been tempted to use this dataset of 43 cases for the empirical analysis, we decided to proceed with a more complex process of selection. We decided to consult the main UCDP dataset – the UCDP/PRIOR Armed Conflict dataset v.4-2006 – for

⁶ Since the December 1989 Malta summit between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev is often considered as the crucial event which marks the end of the Cold War, 1990 seems thus a more appropriate starting date for our analysis. Moreover, only one agreement out of the 149 included in the Peace Agreement Dataset was signed in 1989 (the Gbadolite declaration on Angola, 22 June 1989), and this instance would be excluded from our analysis in any case as it is ascribed to a ‘government’-type dispute.

extrapolating the full range of territorial conflicts that took place between 1990 and 2005 or that ended after 2005 (61 in total), and to analyse case-by-case this full dataset looking for relevant ‘episodes of negotiation’.

The main reasons for this choice were two. First, as it has been suggested in the previous chapter, an analysis of the effects of time pressure on negotiation should include not only successful negotiation processes, but also failed ones. The rationale for this stems logically from the fact that the efficacy of time pressure derives from posing a clear-cut ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ alternative, which may well convince some actors to leave the negotiating table. The PA dataset, however, does not consider failed negotiation processes. To some extent, this choice seems to be a reasonable one: detecting and coding not just signed agreements but also failed negotiation processes certainly generates a range of methodological and practical problems which are not easy to overcome. Still, failure remains the Damocles sword for any negotiation process; thus, focusing only on successful agreements arguably creates a strong bias in the whole selection process.

Also, the choice of the authors of this dataset to focus exclusively on negotiation processes which generate at least ‘partial’ or ‘process’ agreements is questionable. While not amounting necessarily to epochal and stable breakthroughs in the history of a conflict, ‘partial’ peace agreements – which include, among others, the whole series of treaties signed over the Oslo Process, the 2000 Eritrea-Ethiopia agreement and the 2001 Mindanao agreement – already signal a relevant commitment of the parties to non-belligerency and often put forward comprehensive frameworks for the solution of a conflict. It is thus possible to argue that a whole range of much more limited and circumscribed agreements also exists, agreements which, while being the result of negotiation processes which include a reasonably inclusive range of actors, succeed only in regulating a very specific and partial aspect of a conflict. Typical examples of these are bilateral ceasefire agreements or also what are sometimes designated as ‘humanitarian pause’ agreements (for instance in the 2000 ‘Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh’ agreement), which indicate not just a commitment to suspend military hostilities but also a convergence of views on some practical arrangements to facilitate the influx of aid to the local population.

In neglecting a whole range of negotiating efforts which not just may altogether fail, but also that may result in authentically ‘partial’ outcomes which regulate a specific, although very limited, aspect of the conflict, the PA dataset does not qualify for being a completely satisfactory basis of our research.

However, even if it constituted a comprehensive overview of post-1990 peace efforts, exercises of triangulation would be necessary to verify the reliability of the selection process adopted by the UCDP extensors. The second reason for opting for a more careful selection process which does not rely directly on the PA Dataset lies indeed in some contradictions that emerged after comparisons have been carried out between this dataset and the comparative material produced by other similar projects. In some cases, such as in relation to the 1993 Tripura Memorandum of Understanding, the analytical stand of the UCDP extensors on the breadth of specific agreements is sharply in contrast with the prevailing opinion of the scientific community⁷. In other occasions, agreements which are commonly depicted as crucial steps towards peace – such as the 1998 Lincoln Agreement in Bougainville (Regan 2001, 11; Tapi 2002) – are not included altogether in the dataset. Since arguably no single research project can claim to be a ‘definitive’ source of information on a specific issue – even more so in the extremely intricate field of peace research – we believe that a comprehensive approach which takes into consideration a range of sources and opinions as large as possible would provide us with a more reliable (although never perfect) picture of the processes under scrutiny.

For these reasons, it would seem reasonable to observe directly each conflict included in the UCDP main dataset – the Armed Conflict Dataset – and to decide, through the analysis of primary and secondary sources, which ‘episodes of negotiations’ should be included in our analysis. This would allow us to minimise

⁷ The 1993 Tripura agreement, classified by the UCDP as ‘full’ agreement, was signed between Tripura officials and the leaders of the major rebel group ATTF on 23 August 1993. No mention of this agreement is made in the Minorities at Risk qualitative database, another major comparative source for the analysis of ethnic conflictuality which provides extremely detailed timelines of most contemporary ethnic and civil wars, including the Tripura conflict. Nor it can be traced in any piece of news provided by news search engines, including Nexis News. The reason for the lack of attention to this lies most probably in the fact that the agreement was indeed a partial and ambiguous deal signed in unclear circumstances (as the UCDP extensor in fact admits) and in the fact, as the regional expert Samir Kumar Das (2005, 15) notes, that, despite opposite claims by the UCDP extensor, ‘the text of the accord provides for neither statehood nor the formation of any autonomous district council’.

selection bias problems (since we still rely on what the UCDP researchers defined as ‘territorial conflicts’), while at the same time allowing a more conscious and ‘hands-in’ approach to the analysis of the dataset. For this purpose, we will define ‘episodes of negotiation’ specific instances of prolonged negotiation in the conflicts included in the dataset, which start when a specific proposal of agreement is advanced and end when the document is officially signed or rejected, and which satisfy three supplementary conditions.

The first condition that will be considered can be labelled ‘inclusivity’. A strong version of this criterion would imply that all the parties involved in a conflict should be involved in the negotiation efforts. This condition is, however, almost impossible to satisfy, mainly because of the problems in identifying who is involved in the conflict (for instance, what should the minimum size or power of a group be for considering it as a ‘party’ in a conflict?), but also because hardly any agreement, not even those commonly seen as particularly inclusive, can reasonably include all the parties involved in a conflict. Indeed, the exclusion of certain splinter groups is typically one of the main aims of such diplomatic efforts. We therefore opt for a *weak* version of this principle, which implies excluding those diplomatic initiatives that are expressly unilateral. This is often the case with the declaration of ceasefires (cf. O’Ballance 2000, 198; 202) and, in general, with diplomatic initiatives taking place at the beginning of a peace process.

The second condition can be defined as ‘minimal commitment’. It requires two main sub-conditions: that the parties declare or show willingness to discuss directly with the counterparts; and that the negotiation is organised around a clear set of disputed issues and includes, at a certain stage, the discussion of a written proposal of agreement on this set of issues or on a specific sub-set. The reason for including this condition lies mainly in the need to identify some minimum standard which allows us to include also failed negotiations in the dataset.

The third criterion, which we will call ‘incrementalism’, implies that, for being included in the dataset, each episode of negotiation should be focused in the negotiation of a new proposal which, if approved, would constitute an improvement of the status quo. Our use of the term ‘incrementalism’ has no

prescriptive implications – that is, we do not aspire, in this context, to contribute to the debate on whether or not peace negotiations that follow an incremental path are more successful than others⁸. While we do believe that peace processes are often ‘de-escalating’ efforts, in which the breadth of agreements gradually increases as the emotional and institutional connections between the parties become tighter and violence on the ground decreases, in this context we just consider this concept as a useful analytical tool which provides us with a rather unbiased rationale for choosing which episodes need to be studied in the myriad of diplomatic contacts taking place in peace processes. In some contexts (e.g. in the Nagaland revolt in India) mutually-agreed ceasefires have been renewed regularly for years while no significant progress on the solution of the conflict was taking place. Including each single agreement in such contexts would probably denature the very essence of the comparative effort and, in some occasions, create a strong numeric bias in favour of stalemated conflicts relying on short-term truces. It can be noted incidentally that such approach has been tacitly adopted also by the coders of UCDP, who seem to have followed this rule (with very few exceptions, all in the South Sudan case) in the composition of the PA Dataset, although not explicitly mentioning it in the codebook of the dataset.

To summarise, these criteria allow us to exclude at least four categories of agreements: unilateral ceasefires (e.g. the February 2005 ceasefire in Chechnya; the ceasefire proclaimed by Sinn Fein after the Downing Street declaration); renewed ceasefires (e.g. in the Nagaland conflict in India); proposals of agreement put forward by foreign powers or would-be mediators and rejected by the relevant parties before any negotiation on the proposal has been attempted (e.g. the 2003 Kozak Memorandum between Moldova and Transnistria; the 2003 Geneva Accord in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict); and declarations or agreements stipulated by regional powers without the participation of any local actor involved in a territorial conflict (a pattern followed in various settlements in Asia, in particular in the Kashmir conflict).

⁸ For a critical assessment of the debate on incrementalism in peace negotiations, cf. Bose (2007, 4-5; 302-3).

2. Methodology: Fuzzy Sets and the Scope for Triangulation

The dataset will be analysed using fuzzy-set logic, a methodological articulation of the family of large-N qualitative comparative techniques known as Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA).

In this context it is not possible to explain in detail the characteristics of QCA in general, and of fuzzy-set logic in particular. Suffice it to say that this methodology is widely used in comparative politics and international relations (cf., among others, Koenig-Archibugi 2004; Epstein et al. 2005; Vis 2007; Binder 2008) and a significant amount of material is now available (cf. Ragin 1987, 2000, 2007, 2008a, 2008b) on the logical and mathematical roots of QCA fuzzy-set techniques, on their main characteristics and on their potential impact on the study of social science. Still, a few relevant features of fuzzy-set logic will need to be recapitulated and briefly discussed, not least because the operationalisation of the research variables will be directly dependent on the use of this analytical technique, and of its specific ‘truth-table’ variant.

QCA methods are based on three main pillars: the concept of configurational complexity as main epistemological assumption of the analysis; the use of the 0/1 Boolean polarity to identify non-membership and membership of a particular empirical instance in a specific ‘set’ (i.e. variable); the discovery of relations of sufficiency and necessity as a means to suggest potential causal patterns towards the outcome phenomenon.

The crucial phase in this process, as it is often the case in large-N comparative efforts, is the phase of coding. To create a homogeneous and easily accessible set of data, and in line with Boolean logic, QCA does use numbers (0 and 1) to formalise membership / non-membership in given sets. Fuzzy-set logic, by admitting the possibility of partial membership in specific sets, can also allow for the use of any decimal comprised between 0 and 1.

Even if such use of decimals may make fuzzy-set tables appear very similar to statistical tables, it is important to emphasise that QCA and fuzzy-set logic are *not* quantitative methods. The main difference with quantitative method lies in the fact that in QCA data are not analysed through multivariate or logistic regressions

but using the logical concepts of sufficiency and necessity – in the case of fuzzy-set logic, often with the help of computerised models to overcome the practical difficulties of the analysis. Arguably, however, QCA also marks a discursive revolution in large-N comparative analysis as it explicitly rejects any claim to objectivity and stresses that scores are attributed on the basis of ‘the researcher’s conceptual understanding’ (Ragin 2000, 157) of the set and on his or her personal approach to the empirical instances involved. Data tables, in this context, should not just be seen as a way of facilitating a replication of the computational part of the analysis, but are themselves part of the analysis because they encapsulate personal qualitative judgments.

While the choice of fuzzy-set logic implies that the researcher willingly decides to opt for a qualitative methodology, a common thread in the relatively short history of such methodology has been the search for coding techniques that can enable some form of ‘pegging’ of these codes. The qualitative essence of fuzzy sets is mostly incarnated by the use of three-, five- or seven-value fuzzy sets, which allow respectively for one, three and five intermediate values between the 0/1 extremes. These intermediate values are the algebraic equivalent of verbal statements such as ‘not fully out or fully in’, ‘more in than out’, ‘more or less in’ (Ragin 2000, 156). However, such logical equivalents of fuzzy values are not equally clear when ‘continuous’ fuzzy-sets, which allow for the use of any value between 0 and 1, are employed. Continuous fuzzy-sets, which are used eagerly by Ragin in his works, are typically based on transformations of interval-scale data performed through a range of calibration procedures (cf. Ragin 2008a).

The use of these techniques allows the researcher to adopt a rather hands-off approach to the data and can increase the reliability of the coding process, in particular when the data are by nature not interval-scale. When this is not the case, an emerging practice in fuzzy-set analysis is to base one’s coding primarily on some form of triangulation with existing data or codes provided by other datasets, which would in turn be made available as integral part of the research (cf. Binder 2008).

The effective integration of triangulated or pegged codes with some form of discretionary qualitative assessment is made possible by a recently-developed

computational technique proposed and discussed by Ragin in his latest works (cf. Ragin 2007; Ragin 2008b). This technique, which will be used for performing the fuzzy-set analysis in the next chapter, is usually known as ‘truth-table fuzzy-set logic’ and is based on two analytical steps. It implies, first of all, the use of truth tables to generate a preliminary map of the configurational diversity of the dataset – i.e. to list all the potential configurations that may theoretically be present on the basis of the variables listed, and indicate how many empirical instances of each of them are present in the dataset. The fuzzy scores of each case should be simplified at this stage using crisp sets – therefore, fuzzy values up to 0.5 will be counted as 0, higher than 0.5 as 1. Configurations of causal factors which feature less than a certain number of empirical instances will be excluded from the analysis, together with those that show a low consistency score – and thus, in the language of fuzzy-set logic, are not likely to be subsets of the outcome. The second stage of the analysis implies a consistency analysis for each combination of causal patterns which recovers the single fuzzy scores for the selected combinations, and whose parsimonious outcome will be used as ‘result’ of the fuzzy-set analysis.

This two-stage approach can allow the researcher to implement the coding procedure in two different steps. The first step implies the choice of whether an empirical instance shows ‘high’ (>0.5) or ‘low’ (<0.5) membership in a specific set; the second step consists in the choice of the specific fuzzy score within the ‘half’ that has been identified. In the following coding procedure, the first stage of this process will be pegged, whenever possible, on triangulations among a range of comparative sources produced by international relations and comparative politics scholars. In other words, whether an empirical case passes or not the 0.5 threshold will be determined on the basis of whether it has achieved pre-set scores in specific variables featured in internationally-recognised datasets and comparative projects. If such sources are not available for specific variables (as it is the case for time pressure), a set of fixed criteria will be determined to establish an acceptable degree of consistency among the cases, with only one partial exception (the ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ variable⁹).

⁹ The reasons for this choice, and why this exception is only partial, will be explained in paragraph 3.3.2.

The specific fuzzy-set score within each half, on the other hand, will be mainly determined on the basis of a first-hand analysis of primary sources and will rely more heavily on the researcher's personal understanding of the empirical phenomena under scrutiny. Following Ragin's latest research orientations¹⁰, even six-value fuzzy sets will be adopted (0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1), in order to reduce the range of variability within each half and to prevent the obvious methodological difficulties that would derive from including a 0.5 value in the codes.

3. Research variables

As we mentioned above, no existing comparative dataset provides an adequate and parsimonious research framework for analysing the impact of time pressure from a configurational perspective. The only possible exception is represented by what is sometimes described in negotiation and conflict studies as the 'contingency framework' – a research model originally pioneered by Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) and further developed by Druckman (1973; 1977) and Bercovich (1984). This model concentrates on a limited number of causal variables associated with international negotiation processes and divides them into three categories (cf. Bercovich and Jackson 2001, 65-6): 'antecedent conditions' or 'context' (which include indicators of the nature of the dispute – such as intensity and complexity - and of the relationship between the parties), 'current conditions' or 'process' (which describe the environment in which a conflict management attempt took place, including its timing), and 'consequent conditions' or 'outcome' (which specify the type of conflict management method and the style of mediation).

The general framework suggested by this model will also be followed in the articulation of the research variables for our research. More specifically, the model that we will develop will be organised around eight explanatory and two outcome variables. Independent variables will include two indicators for time pressure and two groups of three variables, the first aiming at describing the

¹⁰ Charles Ragin, e-mail messages to the author, 5-10 October 2007.

severity of a conflict and the degree of foreign intervention, and the second the level of ‘complexity’ of each episode of negotiation. The two outcome variables will aim at capturing the level of success of each negotiation process.

3.1 Measuring time pressure

The working hypothesis that has been put forward in chapter one suggested that there exist two major forms of time pressure: a first kind deriving from ‘practical deadlines’ – i.e. from ‘events that are either completely beyond the control of the negotiating party or only cancelled at considerable cost’ (Berridge 2005, 61) – and a second kind deriving from ‘artificial deadlines’ – i.e. from the imposition of ‘target dates’ operating as ‘psychological devices to egg negotiations on’ (De Soto 1999, 363). This broad distinction suggests that two separate variables may be needed to capture the variety of events and strategies that can be studied under the broader label of ‘time pressure’. The ideas of ‘practical’ and ‘artificial’ deadlines, however, are still too abstract to constitute by themselves reliable bases for the analysis, and will need to be further analysed and deconstructed to create a range of observable and measurable indicators.

As mentioned above, the analysis of time pressure – i.e. of both practical and artificial deadlines – in international peace negotiations is an area not yet covered by any comparative research; therefore, no significant form of triangulation is possible in the coding of these variables. The data are thus derived from direct analysis of the episodes of negotiations included in the dataset using primary and secondary sources. These include: comparative datasets or reviews of peace agreements (UCDP Peace Agreements dataset; Conciliation Resources / ACCORD; appendix of Bell 2000) as detailed in appendix 1 table 1; articles and reports from online archives (especially LexisNews) or internationally-renowned NGOs such as the International Crisis Group; and other secondary sources as detailed in appendix 1 table 2. In appendix 2 table 3a scores from 0 to 2 have been assigned to describe the absence (0), presence (2) or presence in weak form (1) of each of the events / strategies treated as indicators of ‘practical deadlines’ or ‘deadline diplomacy’, as discussed in the paragraphs that follow. The final fuzzy-

set scores, included in appendix 2 table 4, are calibrated on the sum of these scores for each category. An aggregate score of 2 is considered as sufficient for the 0.5 threshold to be passed.

3.1.1 Practical deadlines

In line with the analysis of Geoffrey Berridge (2005, 61-64), we would argue that there exist three major categories of events generating ‘practical deadlines’.

The first comprises a range of *political events* which are, by definition, beyond the control of the negotiating parties. Scheduled elections are a typical example of predetermined political occurrences which create a sense of urgency in those involved in international negotiations. Elections can change the composition of the parliamentary constituency of one of the negotiating parties and, if the ruling party or coalition is defeated, can ultimately result in changes in the composition of the negotiating team or, possibly, in its withdrawal. On the other hand, concluding (if possible with a good deal) a lengthy negotiation process before the date of election can be constitute an important added political value for the incumbent ruling parties or political leaders. Scheduled national elections in Ecuador in May 1996 played a relevant role in speeding up the negotiations between Ecuador and Peru over the Cordillera del Condor (Scott Palmer 1997, 124-5); similarly, the forthcoming 1998 presidential elections of were at the top of Filipino President Ramos’ worries when he increased his commitment to solve the Mindanao dispute (Abubakar 2004, 460).

Berridge also mentions a second relevant form of practical deadlines: *military events*. The expiry of the mandate of a peacekeeping force or the expiry of a ceasefire agreement surely create strong pressure for the involved parties to reach some form of agreement at the negotiating table. Such discussions may simply result in the prorogation of existing arrangements, or can provide the opportunity for generating more ambitious deals. In Nagaland-India relations, the need to prorogate regularly (for periods of two or three months) the August 1997 ceasefire created occasions for the discussion of comprehensive proposals of agreement in 1998, even though they were ultimately met by failure. In Niger, the

expiry of the ceasefire clauses included in the Ouagadougou 1 agreement on 9 April 1995 created a strong sense of urgency in the parties and ultimately helped to bring the negotiations of the Ouagadougou 2 comprehensive peace agreement to a successful conclusion on the 15th of that month (Deschamps 2000, 30). While ceasefire agreements and peacekeeping operations are to some extent diplomatic efforts, the approaching of a date which may change the military balance on the ground has arguably a similar effect as the approaching of an election in creating a sense of inevitability and urgency in the negotiating parties.

To these two main types of practical deadlines we will add a third, weaker category, which includes so-called *symbolic deadlines*. In this we mark a first, partial point of departure from Berridge (2005, 59), who assigns deadlines derived from the use of symbolic events (anniversaries and religious festivals above all) to a third, separate category distinguished from 'practical' and 'artificial' deadlines. While he acknowledges their cogency and propagandistic importance, he also believes that they do not share the degree of inevitability typically associated with practical deadlines (*ibid.* 60). Berridge has a point in highlighting the peculiarities attached to the use of such symbolism in negotiation: it is apparent that, while most religious festivals occur regularly every year, only in rare circumstances negotiators see the opportunity of using them for adding a particular solemn aura to an agreement. Yet, not every single day in the calendar is a religious feast; nor all the potential anniversary that may be used instrumentally to mark the date of the solemn signing of an agreement have the same weight in front of the public. This is particularly the case if these events are not just used *ex post* to seal agreed-on peace treaties (as it has been the case in Northern Ireland with the 'Good Friday' agreement), but if the presence of religious festivals or celebrations is used to signal a one-off window of opportunity for exchanging concessions while avoiding the risk of being perceived as 'weak'. This spirit was most probably at the origin of the 2000 unilateral ceasefire bid of India in Kashmir, which coincided with the month of Ramadan, and of a similar initiative agreed by all Naga rebel factions in November 1997 in the weeks during which the 125th anniversary of the arrival of Christianity in Nagaland was celebrated. Such exceptional anniversaries, and – to some extent – even major religious festivals

that occur once every year are indeed events whose recurrence is ‘beyond the control of the negotiating part[ies]’, and therefore we would argue that symbolic deadlines have much more in common with political and military deadlines than Berridge concedes.

3.1.2 Artificial deadlines

The concept of ‘artificial deadlines’ is again proposed by Berridge (2005, 58). Our analysis of this concept, however, adds to what Berridge identifies as main instance of ‘artificial’ time pressure (i.e. the use of ‘target dates’ in the context of what we will call ‘deadline diplomacy’) two other categories which are, rather unconvincingly, included in Berridge’s exemplification of ‘practical deadlines’: the use of summits and tactics of issue-linkage. These three categories all appear to be instances of the use of time pressure as part of diplomatic strategies which aim at creating a sense of psychological pressure on the parties through the public announcement of target dates.

The first category comprises what is sometimes called ‘deadline diplomacy’. The expression ‘deadline diplomacy’ has recently acquired some popularity in the context of the international efforts for solving the Darfur crisis (cf. Nathan 2006, 17)¹¹. With this expression we refer to a systematic use of target dates in the context of an ongoing peace process either through preliminary ‘roadmap’ or ‘framework’ agreements, or through systematic diplomatic interventions by international mediators. The Israeli-Palestinian peace process provides a number of examples of the use of framework agreements for delineating short- and long-term plans for the solution of the conflict and in which one of the main penalties for not complying with timely-organised negotiation plans was the risk of seeing the whole process collapsing. The so-called Oslo 1 agreement (Declaration of Principles) provided a general framework for the constitution of an effective, although embryonic, form of Palestinian authority in

¹¹ Cf. also: Sudan: Deadline Diplomacy is Failing. *ARB*, May 2006, 16622–16624.

the Territories, and in Article V it established two deadlines of high symbolic value: it fixed in five years the life-span of the transitional arrangements outlined by the agreement, and stated that permanent status negotiations should begin no later than three years since the beginning of the transitional period. After the end of the Oslo process had been certified by the failure of the Camp David 2000 summit, the so-called 'Roadmap' agreement (April 2003) proposed by George W. Bush outlined a negotiation process organized around three phases, each of them marked by a fixed deadline. A similarly aggressive 'hands-in' approach has been present in Sudan in 2005 and 2006, although in this latter case diplomatic efforts have been less focused on outlining written 'roadmaps' and more on using deadlines to push the parties to produce 'quick accords' (Nathan 2006, 15), in response to the mounting pressure deriving from the worsening situation on the ground and from the worries of the international public opinion.

The second category of 'artificial' time pressure refers to the use of summity. There is wide agreement on the fact that the summits can be used 'to keep up the momentum of ongoing talks or to confront specialists' talks with an impending negotiation deadline' (Melissen 2003, 15). As David Dunn points out (1996, 250), many negotiators see 'a set date for either the signing of a treaty or the issuing of a final communiqué [as] a useful discipline against a more protracted negotiating process'. Defining deadlines deriving from the foreseen end of a summit as 'useful discipline' for negotiators highlights the connections between the use of summity and the concept of 'deadline diplomacy'; in this sense, Berridge's choice of considering summity as a form of 'practical' time pressure seems to dismiss the inherent political nature of summits and the (albeit limited) degree of flexibility that summits typically concede to negotiators to prorogate the pre-scheduled end of the talks if some more time for reaching an agreement is needed (as it has been the case, for instance, in the Ouagadougou 2 talks between Niger and Tuareg representatives in April 1995). However, we believe that, for summity to be considered as a relevant source of artificial time pressure, the location of the summit should be in a foreign country – i.e. a country that is different from those in which the conflict is taking place. The concept of summity in itself does not imply that the parties have to move beyond their

national boundaries; arguably, however, the commitment of a party to travel abroad to meet the counterparts in a foreign venue adds to the strength of the time pressure exerted by the ‘set date’ for the end of the meeting. Deadlines deriving from the scheduled end of peace conferences that take place in one of the capitals of the regions or states involved in a conflict (such as the Arawa Conference in Bougainville in October 1994, or the negotiations in Fomboni on the secession crisis in the Comoros) have intuitively less (if any) cogency, as in many cases the use of the term ‘conference’ to define such meetings does not imply a qualitative shift towards the use of some form of time pressure, but may amount to an attempt to give more solemnity to the ongoing diplomatic and political dialogue between the parties involved.

A third category of ‘artificial’ deadlines is constituted by the strategic use of issue-linkage in the context of comprehensive negotiation efforts or, more in general, in the context of client-patron diplomatic relationships. This category aims at operationalising the concept of ‘fading opportunity’ suggested by Roger Fisher (1971, 108), who correctly considers the creation of windows of opportunity which are going to close if a party ‘fail[s] to act soon’ as a potential form of diplomatic time pressure. In this sense, in particular in the context of localized conflicts which take place under the shadow of a regional power, the signing of a formal deal signaling a change in the strategic orientations of the states that were supporting (or defending) the efforts of local guerrillas can create a feeling that time works against such groups, and thus it may be necessary for them to accelerate their negotiating efforts. The concept of issue linkage is present in Berridge’s categorization of practical deadlines (‘opening of other conferences’ – Berridge 2005, 61); however, the strategic use of multi-level bargaining and of horizontal linkages between disputed issues can indeed be considered as a form of diplomatic time pressure whenever the issue linkage is strategically synchronized with ongoing negotiation efforts in different diplomatic tables. The signing of the Georgian-Russian ‘Treaty of Friendship, Neighborliness and Cooperation’ in March 1994, with which the Russians officially severed their links with the Abkhazian rebels, speeded up the Georgian-Abkhazian negotiation process and arguably played a major role in generating the May 1994 final agreement. In some

cases, however, the time elapsed between two linked negotiation efforts may be too long to judge the practical interrelations between two agreements. For instance, the Farakka Water Agreement between India and Bangladesh in December 1996 arguably put the rebel groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts under ‘tremendous pressure’ (Moshin 2003, 42) to accelerate their diplomatic efforts in solving the ongoing ethnic conflict; however, the final Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord was signed only on 2 December 1997 – i.e. about one year after the Farakka Agreement. While Amena Moshin has a point in arguing that the latter created favorable conditions for the signing of the former, the time elapsed – one year – would probably imply an overstretch of the concept of ‘fading opportunity’.

3.2 Measuring success in negotiation

The outcome variables of the model aim at measuring how successful a specific episode of negotiation has been. As it has been explained in the previous chapter, the concept of ‘success’ will be operationalised using two different operational variables: the ‘breadth’ of the final agreement and its ‘duration’¹².

3.2.1 Breadth

The variable ‘breadth’ aims at capturing how many of the underlying disputed issues or reasons for conflictuality have been addressed in the final negotiated outcome of a specific episode of negotiation.

In this sense, this variable is similar in scope to the ‘pa_type’ variable included in the UCDP PA Dataset. This variable classifies the agreements included in the dataset according to three major categories: ‘full agreements’, ‘partial peace agreements’ and ‘peace process agreements’. *Full* agreements are in

¹² The model will not directly assess the relation between agreement breadth and duration (cf. Page Fortna 2003), but the difference between the causal patterns leading to broad or lasting agreements will incidentally shed light also on this field of research.

place when ‘one or more dyad agrees to settle the whole incompatibility’; *partial* peace agreements require that ‘one or more dyad agrees to settle a part of the incompatibility’; peace *process* agreements take place ‘when one or more dyad agrees to initiate a process that aims to settle the incompatibility’ (Högbladh 2006, 9).

It can be easily noted that these definitions are not particularly helpful in explaining analytically what peculiar features of the observed agreements should be present for justifying the inclusion of a specific empirical case in one of these categories. The dataset, however, does supplement the choice of a specific ‘label’ for each agreement with a qualitative explanation of the main features included therein, and thus allows the reader to understand what practical guidelines are followed in the classification process, at least in relation to ‘peace process’ and ‘full’ agreements. The 2002 Machakos Protocol in Sudan, for instance, is classified as a ‘peace process’ agreement because it ‘included the general procedures for a transitional process and an agreement that further negotiations would be held to specify the terms of this framework’; the 2001 Bougainville Peace Agreement, finally, is classified as ‘full’ agreement because it ‘detail[s] both the short- and long-term issues that needed to be targeted to end the conflict’. The concept of ‘partial’ peace agreement, quite understandably, is less amenable to fixed definitions: a ‘partial’ peace settlement may involve agreement on partial forms of territorial devolution to be exchanged for a prolonged ceasefire (e.g. 1991 Tamanrasset Agreement between Mali and Tuareg groups), political arrangements in the context of a transitional pacification process, possibly associated with some military redeployments (e.g. 1995 Oslo B agreement in Israel/Palestine), or in general any combination of partial measures that fails to address some of the relevant short- and long-term disputed issues in a conflict.

The presence of significant ‘outstanding issues’ is also signaled by the UCDP OA Dataset through a six-value categorical variable (out_iss), which adds to the understanding of each specific agreement by outlining whether: (1) The agreement is part of a process that will be finalized in the last agreement; (2) Outstanding issues were spelled out; (3) A central issue to the incompatibility was delegated to a commission; (4) The agreement provided for new negotiations or

national talks; (5) The agreement outlined a negotiating agenda or provisions in a future peace agreement.

The combined outlook provided by the variables ‘pa_type’ and ‘out_iss’ is in general clear and comprehensive, although, as we have noted, in some occasions the information and the classification provided do clash with the prevailing opinion with the scientific community or with the evidence put forward by other comparative projects. While not renouncing to our right and duty to carry out triangulations and cross-source comparisons, we will in general consider the classification provided by the PA Dataset as main source for assigning the fuzzy scores of the agreements listed therein, with two caveats.

First, as explained in paragraph 1.2, we will want to code under the label of ‘breath’ also episodes of ‘failed’ negotiations and of partially-successful agreements which are not included in the PA Dataset. For this reason, if the outcome of an episode of negotiation is listed in the UCDP PA Dataset we will assume that it is already a relatively successful episode of negotiation, and therefore will receive a fuzzy score higher than the 0.5 threshold. Values below the threshold will typically be reserved for failed negotiation processes (0) and for bare ceasefire agreements that do not feature any relevant political deal or include some limited clauses related to what are sometimes called ‘humanitarian pauses’.

Secondly, we will explicitly retain some flexibility in deciding whether what the PA Dataset may list as a ‘partial’ agreement is more or less ‘broad’ than the a ‘peace process’ one. In general, agreements which include little more than ceasefire arrangements (e.g. the 1993 Paris Truce between Niger and the Tuareg rebels) may be considered as less ‘broad’ than peace process agreements which outlines ceasefire conditions early on in preliminary exchange of letters (as it was the case in the 1993 Declaration of Principles in Israel/Palestine) and in the body of the treaty delineate complex and timely-ordered political and military processes.

3.2.2 Duration

To explore the ‘duration’ of an agreement we will look at two main indicators.

First, we will try to understand for how long an agreement remained in place and was acknowledged by its signatories as formally valid. The abrogation of an agreement is not uncommon (a recent instance of this being the official abrogation of the February 2002 Memorandum of Understanding between the Sri Lankan Government and Tamil Tigers in January 2008) and, if anything, it clearly indicates that the state of affairs brought about by its dispositions is not considered anymore as acceptable by one or more of the parties who at first signed it. The concept of abrogation is here intended as a formal dismissal of the agreed text by a major official of one of the signatories, which may or may not involve any official written act. It logically does not include the case in which a new agreement, by subsuming and expanding previously agreed disposition, abrogates previous partial arrangements.

Most agreements, however, fail in practice long before being formally abrogated. A crucial measurement for the concept of ‘duration’ is thus the length of the subsequent period of peace which is brought about by the agreement. The absence of renewed violence, and not the subsistence of the specific political, economic or military state of affairs delineated by an agreement, is arguably the correct measure capturing the informal life-span of an agreed peace settlement. While, as we have noted, ‘broad’ agreements would formally aim at creating ambitious institutional frameworks for the post-conflictual coexistence of the warring parties, the ultimate, minimum objective that such frameworks are designed to achieve is to prevent any party involved from resorting to violence again.

The UCDP PA Dataset includes a group of indicators under the label ‘termination variables’ which aim at identifying how successful each agreement has been in terminating a specific conflict. The indicator ‘Vi05’ is a dummy variable describing whether ‘violence with the same parties restarted within 5 years’ (long-term success); ‘Vi01’ is a categorical variable signaling whether the agreement ‘terminated the whole conflict the following year, signed an active year’ (short-term success); ‘termdur’ indicates the ‘number of years since last activity’; ‘noconf05’ is another dummy variable specifying if the conflict was

‘still terminated as of 2005’. With ‘termination of conflict’ the UCDP PA Dataset implies that in the time span analysed in no single year more than 25 people died in conflict-related violence.

Using these criteria, we would easily have to acknowledge that many peace treaties, although not being formally abrogated, have in fact failed to terminate their conflicts. According to the UCDP PA Dataset, agreements which failed to terminate a conflict both in a short- and in a long-term perspective include the 1991-1994 Honiara agreements in Bougainville, the 2002 Machakos Protocol and the 2003 Agreement on Security Arrangements in Sudan and the agreements signed in the context of the Oslo process from 1995 to 1999 (Oslo B, Hebron Protocol, Wye River Memorandum, Sharm el-Sheikh/Wye II protocol). Agreements that succeeded immediately to create stable peace in the short term (one year) include the Washington and Dayton agreements in Yugoslavia and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland; agreements that turned out to be successful only in the long term include the 2001 and 2002 Fomboni Declaration and Agreements in the Comoros, and the 1997 Chittagong Hills Tract Peace Accord.

In the fuzzy-set analysis, we will aim at establishing, first of all, if a specific agreement has been abrogated at any stage without being replaced by a more comprehensive one. Also using more recent versions of the general UCDP datasets on armed conflicts, we will then aim at establishing how successful an agreement has been in regulating or concluding a conflict. If an agreement succeeded both in the short- and in the long-term to terminate a conflict and has not been abrogated without replacement in the range of five years, the agreement will receive a fuzzy score of 1¹³. If the agreement failed or was abrogated within one year since its signing, it will receive a score of 0. A success in the short-term but failure to create stable peace or abrogation in the range of five years will be coded with a score short of the 0.5 threshold; a success in the long term even in face of initial problems (i.e. violence did not restart within five years of the signing with the exception of the first one year) will lead us to consider the 0.5 threshold as passed. The data provided by the UCDP PA Dataset will be used,

¹³ For the most recent agreements in the dataset, the five-year span will be reduced to three.

when available, as a reference for the analysis, but will be supplemented by a review of the data of other UCDP datasets and of primary and secondary material on each episode of negotiation studied.

3.3 Conflict resolution variables

Three independent variables will be introduced to explore the relations between time pressure and what are commonly considered as crucial determinants of conflict resolution efforts. Two variables will aim at assessing the level of ‘intractability’ of the conflict: the first, named ‘intensity’, will describe the long-term severity of a conflict using some conventional quantitative indicators, and its values will be kept constant for all episodes of negotiation taking place in a specific conflict; the second, labeled ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, will aim at capturing the short-term severity of the conflict using qualitative indicators, so that each single episode of negotiation within a larger peace process may receive different scores. A third variable will be an aggregate measure for external intervention.

3.3.1 Conflict intensity

The concept of ‘intensity’ is used here to understand the ‘size’ or ‘severity’ of a specific conflict.

There is no agreement in the field of peace research on how this crucial concept should be operationalised and measured. ‘Intensity’ is explicitly included in a major comparative project, COSIMO (Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research), which employs a qualitative method based on assessing the level of violence present in a specific conflict. A typology of four levels of conflict is thus adopted: ‘latent conflict’ (completely nonviolent), ‘crisis’ (mostly nonviolent), ‘severe crisis’ (sporadic, irregular use of force, ‘war-in-sight’ crisis) and ‘war’ (systematic, collective use of force by regular troops). Other large-N

researches on conflict resolution use similar qualitative scales of violence as control variable (cf. Beardsley et al. 2006, 74). Even if we exclude the stage of 'latent conflict' from our analysis (as the COSIMO project is explicitly voted to the analysis also of pre-war crises), the qualitative labels attached to each level of violence are arguably rather vague and extremely difficult to operationalise; all the more because, in this context, some significant quantitative indicators are naturally provided by the nature itself of warfare, and failure to take them into consideration, at least in the context of a structured network of triangulations, would be hardly justifiable.

The main indicator is, intuitively, the number of battle deaths. The UCDP datasets use the 25-deaths-per-year threshold to identify if a conflict should be included in the dataset as 'minor', and a second, higher threshold (1000 deaths per year) for classifying them as 'wars'. The count of battle-deaths can be considered as a rather clear and straightforward indicator of the level of intensity of a conflict; still, two main problems exist in relation to this measure. First, the specific level of battle deaths is always difficult to determine, not just because of the different estimates that may be produced by the parties involved in the conflict, but also because there exist a range of different opinions on what 'war casualties' are: some estimates may legitimately include not just 'deaths in combat' but also 'battle-related deaths' (e.g. due to conflict-related diseases) in the overall computation of casualties (Lacina and Gleditsch 2005, 147-50; Lacina 2006, 277-8). Many researchers, moreover, would stress that mortality is only one of the conflict-related factors which marks the impact of war on a specific population - displacement and migration being some major examples of the wider demographic impact of war. (Brunborg and Urdal 2005; Brunborg and Tabeau 2005).

In our analysis, we do not need to be particularly accurate in the computation of such factors, and we will opt for a particular inclusive coding criterion by considering the general 'social impact' of a conflict on the region in which it is fought. We will do this by using a three-level typology which will identify conflicts as having a 'low', 'medium' or 'high' social impact, computed

by considering the overall toll of casualties and displaced people in relation to the overall population of the areas involved.

The overall fuzzy score for intensity will be derived by adding this score to the one calculated on the basis of a second indicator – conflict duration. For defining ‘duration’ we will adopt the definition suggested by the COSIMO dataset, which defines the beginning of a conflict as ‘the point when the initiator or aggressor formulates demands and pushes them with certain instruments,’ and the conclusion as ‘the point when certain demands are dropped or when a war has come to a decisive end.’ Many conflicts included in our dataset have not reached such conclusion, so that the overall duration will be computed up to the end of the period under consideration (i.e. 2005). ‘Short’, ‘medium’ and ‘long’ conflicts will be classified using the thresholds of 10 (or less), 17 and 25 (or more) years of duration.

Conflicts which are short and with a very limited social impact typically include boundary disputes (e.g. Ecuador/Peru over the Cordillera del Condor); long and destructive conflicts include protracted ethnic wars, such as the Tamil rebellion in Sri Lanka and the Moro guerrilla in the Philippines. Long but relatively low-key struggles typically characterize the guerrillas in north-east India and in Bangladesh (e.g. Chittagong Hill Tracts), while other conflicts, such as the Bougainville rebellion, appear to be relatively short on a comparative scale but had significant social impact.

3.3.2 Mutually Hurting Stalemate

The concept of ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ (MHS) has been first suggested by William Zartman to describe the typical situation in which a conflict would be ‘ripe’ for resolution. Zartman’s approach has been effectively summarized by Marieke Kleiboer (1994, 110):

A ripe moment implies that a mutually hurting stalemate exists, marked by a recent or impending catastrophe [...]; the efforts of both parties to impose unilateral solutions are blocked and bilateral solutions become conceivable, leading antagonists to perceive that there is a workable alternative to combat;

and power relations have changed in a way that a party that previously had the upper hand in the conflict starts slipping and the underdog starts rising (e.g. before settlement can be achieved, a rough power parity between the disputants needs to exist).

The four components of MHS outlined in this summary, which reflect what Zartman has exposed – although less succinctly – in various works (e.g. Zartman 2000, 228-32), are the presence of an objective obstacle to the prosecution of hostilities, the perception by the parties that war has failed, the perception that peace is possible and the presence of a certain parity in the capabilities on the ground.

Even from this brief exposition it would appear that the concept of MHS, while extremely appealing and powerful in theory, is not easy to operationalise in practice. Stephen Stedman (1991, 240) has correctly noted that the ‘to improve the usefulness of the concept, we need to bring more precision to it, so that ripeness becomes more than a tautology and subject to more rigorous definition than [...] “I know it when I see it”’. In Zartman’s own words (2000, 229), ‘the ripe moment is necessarily a perceptual event, not one that stands alone in objective reality’. In one of the few analytical studies which tried to operationalise the idea of MHS, Mooradian and Druckman focused on coding a range of ‘incidents’ occurring in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on a six-value scale describing whether the event had been a move towards peace or towards further violence (Mooradian and Druckman 1999, 714-5). In other words, they did not attempt to operationalise directly the concept of MHS, but rather tried to observe *ex post* if conflict resolution efforts were really taking place in more ‘ripe’ phases of the conflict; triangulation with qualitative methodologies (mainly interviews) were used to substantiate the conclusions of the research (*ibid.*, 724).

In our research effort, therefore, we have reasons to renounce to any ambition of giving this variable a fixed quantitative pegging, except for the cases in which a ‘recent or impending catastrophe’ (Kleiboer 1994, 110) clearly throws its shadow on the conflict. By ‘catastrophe’ we will mean literally catastrophic natural occurrences that make the prosecution of the conflict practically infeasible: the 2004 Aceh tsunami, which profoundly affected the course of the peace process in north-west Indonesia, can be considered as a paradigmatic

instance of such events. In other occasions, however, we will look for declarations and commitments by the actors involved in a conflict in which they recognize that the use of violence has failed in producing the desired results and that an agreement with the counterparts is possible and desirable. Between May and June 1997 in Nagaland, for instance, first the Indian Prime Minister Kumar Gujral ‘offer[ed] to hold unconditional talks with insurgent groups’ and was reciprocated by a public statement by the rebel organization NSCN (I-M) in which it ‘stated that it is ready to find a political solution to the decades-long conflict’ (Minorities at Risk project 2009). Well-documented statements put forward by major commentators and analysts, in absence of contrasting statements by the actors involved in the conflict, will also be taken into account (e.g. Thomas De Waal’s analysis of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where data are provided to show that by May 1994 ‘[b]oth the Armenians and Azerbaijanis were exhausted’ – De Waal 2003, 239).

3.3.3 External intervention

The variable ‘external intervention’ captures the level of influence that external actors exert in the context of a specific episode of negotiation.

Our understanding of the concept of ‘external intervention’ only partially overlaps with the idea of ‘mediation’, which is widely used in the context of peace research. ‘Mediation’ can be defined as ‘assistance to interacting parties by a third party who may or may not have authority to impose an outcome’ (Wall and Druckman 2003, 694). For mediation to occur, two conditions should logically be present: the disputing parties should request, or at least accept, the intervention of a third party, and latter should be willing to be involved in the negotiation process (Wall et al. 2001, 371). Negotiating parties thus have to delegate some power on their negotiation process to a third actor; peace researchers in the field of mediation typically aim at exploring *how* the mediator uses this power – in other words, what style of mediation he decides to adopt in intervening in the negotiation. Classifications of potential ‘styles of mediations’, ‘mediation strategies’ or ‘mediation techniques’ are very common in peace research (e.g.

Bercovitch and Houston 2000, 175; Wall et al. 2001, 376; Beardsley et al. 2006) and help shed light on the variety of instruments that mediators can use to affect the behavior of the negotiating parties.

Less often, however, researchers focus on *why* some of these strategies are more effective than others. In our research, we will adopt Jeffrey Rubin's analysis of mediators' 'influence' as preferred viewpoint for approaching the role of external actors in negotiation. Defining 'effectiveness' in mediation as successfully 'leverag[ing] disputants into behaving differently than they would otherwise,' Rubin proposes a taxonomy based on the 'kinds of interpersonal resources that he or she has access to or is likely to apply' (Rubin 1992, 254). Following the works of French and Raven on the different bases of social power, he identifies six of such resources: reward, coercion, expertise, legitimacy, reference and information¹⁴. The first two identify the typical 'hard politics' components of foreign intervention, whereas the other four are more in line with the standard features of mediation strategies as defined by the abovementioned literature on mediation.

We will adopt this classification as the basis our analysis for at least three reasons. First, Rubin's classification allows us to elaborate not just an indicator for the presence of external 'assistance' to a negotiation process, but also, more in general, of the degree of foreign intervention in a conflict – a crucial dimension in any conflict, and particularly in inter-state conflicts within weak states. Secondly, while the author himself recognizes that some of the dividing lines between these forms of influence 'may be fuzzy at times' (ibid., 256), this taxonomy suggests a set of useful conceptual benchmarks that can help to pinpoint, on a high-low continuum, the level of intrusiveness of foreign actors¹⁵. Finally, in cases in which

¹⁴ Rubin defines these concepts as follows: *reward* power is present 'when the influencer offers some positive benefit in exchange for compliance'; *coercive* influence entails 'the threat to impose one of any of a number of possible punishments unless compliance results'; *expert* power exists when the influencers succeeds in 'creat[ing] the impression of being in possession of some body of information or expertise that justifies a particular request'; *legitimate* power 'requires the influencer to persuade on the basis of having the *right* to make a request'; *referent* power 'builds on the *relationship* that exists between influencer and recipient'; *informational* power 'works because of the *content* of the information conveyed' (Rubin 1992, 255-6, emphasis in original).

¹⁵ It should be noted, incidentally, that most qualitative categorizations of 'mediation strategies' often include similar indicators for different strategies, and thus make any coding process no less fuzzy than what is allowed by Rubin's classification. In Beardsley et al. (2001, 66), for instance, the two categories which mark respectively the low and high extremes – in terms of coerciveness –

specific information on a negotiation process is not available, a general assessment may also be advanced using Rubin's categories just by considering the identity of the mediators – i.e. the resources that they are potentially able to employ for influencing the parties.

To operationalise this concept, we will first identify the group of actors that operated as mediators or external interveners in a specific conflict in the time period during which the episodes of negotiation under scrutiny were taking place. COSIMO, UCDP PA Dataset and Jacob Bercovitch's 'Mediation Project' all include qualitative variables which specify, for many conflicts included in our analysis, which external actors intervened and, in many cases, what their main strategies and aims were.

We will then use such material and primary and secondary additional resources to identify which resources among those included in Rubin's classification were used by this group of actors. The 0.5 threshold will be considered as passed if we have reasons to say that they took advantage of both 'hard politics' and 'mediation' strategies as defined above; the specific fuzzy score within each half will be determined mainly by considering how many of these resources have been used.

3.4 'Complexity' variables

The last group of variables includes a set of measures of complexity. As explained in the previous chapter, these variables aim at capturing the presence of conditions that may increase the intricacy of the negotiation process and thus potentially affect the impact of practical or artificial deadlines on the negotiation outcomes.

Three variables will be considered: number of issues at stake, decision-making complexity and inter-cultural differences.

of the classification of mediation techniques include various identical indicators (e.g. 'supply missing information' and 'supply and filter information').

3.4.1 Number of issues at stake

An ‘issue’ is conceived in this context rather broadly as ‘a disputed conflict point or question, the subject of a conflict or controversy’ (Randle 1987, 1).

One way in which conflicts may differ from one another is, intuitively, on the kinds and number of disputed issues on which the parties are fighting. Many researches have been produced on how conflicts which differ in the kind of issues at stake also differ in their development and, ultimately, in their termination (cf. Diehl 1992). Looking at the connection between certain roots of conflicts and negotiation outcomes is not, however, in line with the analytical framework of this research, which has already been circumscribed around the broad, yet well defined, issue area of territorial conflicts. Still, territorial conflicts, while they are all centered on some form of territorial claim or dispute, may differ from one another for the number of correlated, yet qualitatively different disputes that may overlap, making them more ‘intractable’ and raising a number of practical and cognitive obstacles in the path towards their resolution. In this sense, the number of such issues constitutes an interesting variable that can add to the predictive power of our research.

The COSIMO dataset provides an interesting classification of issues that may be disputed in a conflict. This taxonomy includes eight categories: (1) territory, borders, sea borders; (2) decolonization, national independence; (3) ethnic, religious or regional autonomy; (4) ideology, system; (5) internal power¹⁶; (6) international power¹⁷; (7) resources; (8) others. While not being in principle different from many other similar classifications produced by the specialized literature, and while being rather obscure in some of its labels, COSIMO’s taxonomy will be the one on which we will peg our coding. This choice is not due only to the fact that COSIMO already classifies most of the conflicts included in our database using these categories, but also because it proposes a further set of

¹⁶ Wars which include not just rebellions on ethnic grounds, but also a struggle for the control of the central government.

¹⁷ Disputes in the context of broader hegemonic projects (rare after the end of the Cold War).

macro-issues, as an intermediate level of operationalisation, for helping the theoretical contextualization of these eight categories: according to COSIMO's authors, issues 2, 5 and 6 pertain the realm of 'international power', issues 3 and 4 'national power', and issues 1 and 7 'material or territorial resources'.

The coding of the empirical cases will be largely dependent on a first-hand review and assessment of each conflict, but we will use COSIMO's data, whenever available, as a guideline for the assessment. This will be done by generating an aggregate indicator for complexity to which specific fuzzy scores will be pegged; the 0.5 threshold will typically be considered as passed when the score of the aggregate indicator is higher than 5¹⁸.

The civil war in Bougainville, which involved both secessionist claims, ethnic rivalries and was sparked by a major dispute on the redistribution of the revenues of the copper mines in the island would constitute, for instance, a typical case of conflict which falls into all three macro-areas. Less asymmetric conflicts which ultimately involve a struggle for political hegemony in a country and which are rooted in an ethnic division (e.g. the Tamil revolt in Sri Lanka) would be included in the categories of 'internal conflict' and 'ethnic autonomy', and would thus in general pass the 0.5 threshold. Boundary disputes (e.g. Ecuador-Peru) would typically involve a minimum level of complexity.

3.4.2 Complexity of decision-making

A second relevant articulation of the idea of 'complexity' in negotiation concerns the decision-making procedures of the parties.

¹⁸ This indicator is generated by associating each of the eight categories coded by COSIMO to specific weighted scores, which are then summed together to generate a final aggregate score. 1 point is added when a conflict features disputed issues associated with categories 1 and 8; 2 points are added for issues associated with categories 2,4,5 and 7; 3 points for issues associated with categories 3 and 5. When the aggregate score is 0 or 1, the guideline fuzzy score is 0; when 2 or 3, the fuzzy score is 0.2; when 3 or 4, the fuzzy score is 0.4; when 5, the fuzzy score is 0.6; when 6 or 7, the fuzzy score is 0.8; when 8 or higher, the fuzzy score is 1. Some of these guideline scores have been further amended on the basis of direct qualitative assessment of specific conflicts; in particular, the Bougainville conflict has been attributed the highest score (1) because of the peculiar relevance of economic factors in the conflict; similarly, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has been attributed a score of 0.8 instead of 0.6 to highlight the role of a wide range of economic issues among the red lines of the peace negotiations; the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has been attributed a score of 0.4 instead of 0.2 to differentiate it from pure border conflicts.

A lot has been written on how important the presence of constraints on the ability of negotiators to take final decisions on certain matters can be for the quality of negotiation outputs, in particular since Putnam's use of the 'two-level game' metaphor (Putnam 1988). The analysis of such 'constraints' is often focused on the role of regime types in affecting international negotiation processes. David Scott Palmer (1997, 134), for instance, notes that 'democracy has complicated, rather than eased or prevented, the conflict for both Peru and Ecuador by contributing to interactions that have tended to harden positions rather than to help elected leaders find the balance points for a settlement.' In democratic states, which are by definition constructed around a complex network of checks and balances, the net of 'domestic-international entanglements' is intuitively thicker than in the case of authoritarian states. Yet, as Putnam himself acknowledges, the concept of domestic constituency need not to apply only to democratic states (*ibid.*, 436-437); furthermore, negotiators representing sub-national movements such as rebel groups – groups which could not be described using the same range of political concepts that we adopt for classifying nation-states – have arguably to take into account a range of 'win-sets' defined by the political, social, ethnic and ideological framework in which they operate.

For these reasons, the concept of 'veto player' seems to provide a more adequate representation of the constraints characterizing decision-making procedures in two- or multi-level bargaining. Tsebelis (1995, 301) defines a veto player as an 'individual or collective actor whose agreement [...] is required for a change in policy'. Cunningham (2006a, 2006b) employs this concept for exploring the relations between the number of civil war actors and civil war duration, moving from the assumption that 'when there are more actors [...] with divergent preferences that have to approve any new policy, it becomes harder to implement policy and to move from the status quo,' (Cunningham 2006b, 877). With sub-national groups, the number of such actor can be computed, according to Cunningham (2006a, 39-44), by identifying those groups that have a cohesive internal organization ('cohesiveness'), who can afford to continue warfare if negotiations fail ('viability') and who 'have preferences that are to some extent divergent from the other parties to the conflict' ('autonomy').

The concept of veto player and, in the context of nation-states, its interactions with measurements of a country's position in the democracy-autocracy continuum, will be the bases for our attempt to create an aggregate measure of the overall 'complexity' of the decision-making processes of the parties involved in a conflict. This measure necessarily produces a rather general and rough portrayal of the extreme diversity of institutional structures and decision-making processes which constrain the negotiators' individual freedom of action; yet, an aggregate measurement of whether a specific negotiation process takes place between parties operating, for instance, in strongly centralized or extremely decentralized decision-making contexts does add to the interpretative power of the model.

For each episode of negotiation, we will divide the actors directly involved in the conflict in two sides (often corresponding to 'sideA' and 'sideB' identified by the UCDP Armed Conflict Dataset) and, for each of them, we will establish the degree of decision-making complexity using a three-value indicator. When aggregated in the single indicator, various combinations of values can determine if the 0.5 threshold is passed.

If describing nation-state actors, we will consider their score in the Polity IV 'executive constraints' statistic for the years corresponding to the episode of negotiation under scrutiny. This statistic considers the number and strength of 'accountability groups' that constrain the activity of executive officials, and constitute a good proxy for the idea of veto player in the context of full-fledged nation-states¹⁹. High scores (6-7) will be considered as sign of 'high' complexity; lower scores (4-5) as signs of 'medium' complexity; and extremely low scores as sign of 'low' complexity. States featuring high values in this indicator during the relevant episodes of negotiation featured in the dataset include Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and the Philippines; Sri Lanka, on the other hand, would be included – at least during some of the episodes of negotiation – in the middle category; the lowest category would feature more decisively authoritarian states, such as the Comoros. For non-state actors, we will create a similar three-value indicator considering the data provided by the Minorities at Risk quantitative

¹⁹ This indicator is also strongly correlated to the general Polity IV indicator for democracy (Gleditsch and Ward 1997, 380; Wade and Reiter 2007, 346).

project on the number of organizations representing group interests ('onum') and, when available, indicators of their organizational cohesion ('orgcoh' and 'cohesx') and their scope ('orgscop' and 'milscop'). According to MAR data, rebel groups appear to be particularly divided in the Tamil side in Sri Lanka and in the Aceh rebellion, where a lower number of veto players is present in relatively 'younger' conflicts, such as the Bougainville revolt.

3.4.3 Inter-cultural differences

The last variable that will be used to operationalise the concept of complexity is designed to signal the presence of significant inter-cultural cleavages between the parties involved in a specific conflict.

The importance of culture in international negotiation and the potential relations between time pressure and the cultural background of the negotiators has already been discussed in chapter one. It will suffice to note, in this context, that this variable does not aim at coding the negotiators involved in a specific episode of negotiation on the basis of the 'civilisation' to which they belong, but rather at specifying how different the sides of a conflict are in cultural terms. Significant cultural difference can be associated with increased interpersonal and emotive barriers between negotiators, a heightened feeling of threat, and with the presence of a range of practical communication problems.

An interesting analytical framework for operationalising this dyadic variable is provided by the Minorities at Risk project. The MAR dataset includes an aggregate variable labeled 'ethnic difference index' (ethdifxx) which summarizes the values of four indexes measuring some crucial cultural features which may mark the difference between a majority and a minority group: language, religion, physical appearance²⁰ and customs. The first three, being the factors in which cultural differences are most easily observable, are coded according to a four-

²⁰ The indicator 'physical appearance' captures the presence of different racial groups and the level of their intermixture. The concept does not have obviously any specific biological value, but just aims at describing the presence of clearly recognisable different physical traits between ethnic groups.

value scale (0 to 3), while customs is coded as a dummy variable (0 or 1). The overall maximum score for the aggregate index is thus ten.

This index is available in MAR for most of the conflicts included in our dataset and is easily computable for the missing ones. In our analysis, we will use it to determine whether the 0.5 threshold is passed, considering whether a specific conflict has obtained a score in the MAR index higher or lower than five. As a general rule, the specific fuzzy score within each half will be determined using a similar correspondence between the ten-value structure of the index and the six values of the fuzzy-set. Some adjustments on these scores will be possible in presence of contrasting evidence emerging from the triangulation with other qualitative sources.

Conflicts which receive the highest score in this index include some of the ethnic struggles in north-east India (e.g. Tripura and Chittagong Hill Tracts) and the conflict in Southern Sudan. Typical examples of conflicts receiving middle-range scores are the internal wars in former Yugoslavia, where significant difference in religion and language are matched by relatively marginal differences in physical appearance. Conflicts with low values in this index, such as the one in Northern Ireland or the ethic struggle in Aceh, are characterized by some rather differences in customs and, in the case of Northern Ireland, by a religious cleavage within Christianity, but also by the absence of major differentiation in language and physical appearance.

Chapter 4

The comparative model (II): explanatory models and discussion

This chapter outlines in detail how the exploratory model elaborated in the previous chapter has been used for extrapolating indications on the role of time pressure in negotiation. It will first give details on the general dataset that have been used for the fuzzy set analysis; it will then make explicit the most relevant expectations and research questions that informed our approach to the empirical analysis; the specific methodology for the fuzzy set comparison and its outcomes will be reported; a preliminary interpretation of these results will finally be provided to will pave the way for the analysis of the specific processes through which time pressure affects negotiation outcomes that will be implemented in the following chapters.

1. The research framework

1.1 Descriptive overview

For implementing the analysis, the eight explanatory variables and two outcome variables described in the previous chapters have been coded as indicated in the column on the right-hand side of table 4.1.

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES	
a) Time pressure	
EX1 – Practical deadlines	TPR
EX2 – Artificial deadlines	DED
b) Conflict management	
EX3 – Conflict intensity	SEV
EX4 – Mutually Hurting Stalemate	MHS
EX5 – External intervention	MED
c) Complexity	
EX6 – Number of issues at stake	ISS
EX7 – Complexity of decision-making	DEC
EX8 – Inter-cultural differences	INT
OUTCOME VARIABLES	
OUT1 – Agreement breadth	BRE
OUT2 – Agreement duration	DUR

Table 4.1
Explanatory and outcome variables

Following the convention suggested by Charles Ragin, when these codes will be used in their upper-case form (e.g. TPR), they indicate presence / high levels of the corresponding variable; in their lower-case form (e.g. tpr) they indicate absence / low levels of the corresponding variable²¹.

1.1.1 Variables and dataset

The dataset that is used has been selected on the basis of the procedure specified in chapter 3, paragraph 1.2. After having analysed the first half of the territorial conflicts listed by the UCDP ‘Armed Conflicts’ dataset, 68 episodes of negotiation has been identified. The conflicts analysed are listed in appendix 2, table 1.

The table shows the list of territorial conflicts identified by the UCDP ‘Armed Conflicts’ dataset (version 4-2007), the phases in which at least the 25

²¹ In some papers, and in the most recent version of the software fsQCA (January 2009), the absence / low levels of a variable are indicated by placing the tilde operator character ~ before the name of the variable (e.g. ~mhs), while the presence / high values are indicated simply by the name of the variable in lower case (e.g. mhs). In the analysis we opt for the upper/lower-case formula, which was used in previous versions of fsQCA and which allows a more immediate visual reading of the configurations.

battle-deaths per year were recorded, and whether at least in one of these phases the 1000 battle-deaths per year threshold has been reached (i.e. whether these conflicts could be identified as ‘wars’ [W] – as opposed to ‘minor conflicts’ [M] and ‘dubious’ cases [D], where significant disagreement exists on whether the 1000 battle-deaths threshold has been passed). The last column specifies the number of episodes of negotiation that has been found through the empirical analysis of these cases compared to the number of agreements included in the UCDP ‘Peace Agreements’ dataset, which is specified in brackets.

From the table it can be inferred that that 24 out of 61 conflicts analysed (39%) featured at least one relevant ‘episode of negotiation’ as defined in chapter 3, while the UCDP PA identified at least one peace agreement in 22 conflicts (36%) – a relatively minor discrepancy related to differences in the coding of the conflicts in Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh, Kosovo, Nagaland, Bodoland and Sri Lanka. As a whole, the overall number of episodes of negotiation is 1.6 times higher in our analysis than in the UCDP PA dataset (68 against 42). As shown by figure 4.1, 28 of the episodes that are included in our dataset fall below the 0.5 fuzzy-set threshold, and thus describe instances where either negotiations failed (9) or produced agreements (typically ceasefires or truces) which do not comply with the criteria for inclusion in the UCDP PA dataset (19). Most of these cases are related to prolonged peace processes (e.g. Israel/Palestine, Bougainville and Sudan), where a series of tentative negotiations were undertaken and interlocutory agreements signed in the early stages of the process, or to largely inconclusive peace processes (e.g. Sri Lanka) where no comprehensive agreements have been signed to date but a number of negotiation attempts have been undertaken over the years.

Overall, thus, our analysis of the first group of UCDP territorial conflicts seem to have integrated, rather than radically reshaped, the classification of peace agreements suggested by the UCDP PA dataset: the number of agreements which pass the 0.5 threshold for breadth (40) is, in the end, not substantially different from the agreements described by the UCDP PA Dataset (42).




Figure 4.1
Distribution of fuzzy-set scores, agreement breadth [BRE]

1.1.2 Time pressure

The specific episodes of negotiation that have been identified are outlined in appendix 2, table 2. The codes that have been attributed to each episode of negotiation are detailed in appendix 2, table 3; in appendix 2, table 4 are detailed the specific codes attributed to each indicator of the two time pressure variables and, when available, the guideline codes provided by other relevant datasets in relation to the other variables, as discussed in chapter 3.

Figure 4.2 and 4.3 outline the distribution of fuzzy-set scores in the two variables coding time pressure. The first apparent – and to a certain extent surprising – result that emerges from the coding of the dataset is that the large majority of the episodes of negotiation analysed seem to have taken place under little or no time pressure from ‘practical’ deadlines. Figure 4.1 shows that 71%

had to be attributed a score equal to zero, and that 19% received other scores lower than the 0.5 threshold. This result is mostly due to the fact that only few episodes of negotiations seem to have taken place under the pressure of expiring ceasefires (6; 9%) and that only two episodes of negotiations were concluded in dates or periods of symbolic relevance, although a larger percentage of episodes of negotiation (14; 21%) took place under the shadow of pending elections.




Figure 4.2
Distribution of fuzzy-set scores, practical deadlines [TPR]

The results for 'artificial' time pressure are more evenly distributed. Figure 4.2 shows that 62% of the episodes of negotiations passed the 0.5 threshold, and that only 26% received a score equal to 0, while more than half of the units of analysis (56%) received a score equal to 0.6 or 0.8. The breakdown of the results shows that these results are mostly affected by the fact that in more than half of the cases (39; 57%) negotiations took place in summits hosted by third countries; in fifteen units of analysis (22%) we observed a direct use of 'deadline

diplomacy', while in six instances (9%) we observed the presence of 'fading opportunities' as discussed in chapter 3.




Figure 4.3
Distribution of fuzzy-set scores, artificial deadlines [DED]

1.2 Research hypotheses

In the context of QCA and fuzzy-set logic it is arguably difficult to state research hypotheses as boldly as it is customary in quantitative research, at least for three reasons. First, the configurational nature of QCA – as opposed to the logic of covariation typical of statistical analysis – implies that no variable is analysed individually, since each of them is embedded in specific causal configurations. Secondly, the (potential) presence of parallel causal patterns leading to the same predicted outcome implies that the same variable may appear in different configurations, so that, at times, both high and low values of the same variable can be associated to the same predicted outcome. Thirdly, one may argue, in line

with Charles Ragin's suggestions, that using QCA for testing pre-set hypotheses somehow betrays the very nature of quantitative comparative analysis, which, by allowing the researcher to organise and visualise all the potential causal patterns that seem to emerge from a particular phenomenon, seems indeed to be more appropriate for exploring and generating new hypotheses more than testing existing ones – in Ragin's words, to operate as 'tool for discovery' (Ragin 2000, xv).

Yet, despite these caveats, our analysis aims at shedding light on a set of specific research questions which focus on relevant disagreements in the literature on time pressure, as outlined in chapter 2, and at confirming a set of basic assumptions held by the conflict resolution literature.

1.2.1 The general impact of time pressure

The first general research question that we posed in chapter 2 was the following:

Do contemporary negotiations provide systematic evidence to suggest that peace negotiations taking place under relevant time pressure from deadlines tend to be more successful than negotiations unfolding under mild or no time pressure?

The general hypothesis that can be derived from our criticism of the literature on international negotiation (e.g. Zartman 1977, 627; Zartman and Berman 1981, 195-196) that we detailed in chapter 2, paragraph 2, and of the operationalisation of the idea of 'successful negotiations' as detailed in chapter 3 can be subsumed in the following hypothesis:

H1: Peace negotiations taking place under relevant time pressure from deadlines might (or might not) result in broad agreements, but they tend not to result in durable ones.

$BRE = f(TPR \wedge DED; tpr \wedge ded)$

$DUR = f(tpr \wedge ded)$

1.2.2 Time pressure and complexity

The second general research question posed in chapter 2 was the following:

Is it possible to suggest that, in the context of complex negotiations where many issues are at stake, where complex inter-group decision-making dynamics are present and where the information available is ambiguous, time pressure can rarely be associated with successful negotiation outcomes?

This research question aims at shedding light on the role of contextual factors which increase the ‘complexity’ of negotiation processes in negotiations which the conflict resolution literature would expect, everything else being equal, to be successful – that is, negotiations that we could describe as ‘integrative’ or, more appropriately, as taking place in an ‘integrative environment’. In these circumstances, it is also often suggested that time pressure would be more likely to have a positive impact on negotiation outcomes (Carnevale and Lawler 1986; Carnevale, O’Connor and McCusker 1993).

The research hypotheses that can be derived from this general question can be detailed as follows:

H2: Integrative negotiations taking place under time pressure will result in durable agreements if the negotiation milieu is not complex.

Integrative negotiations taking place under low time pressure and in complex milieus will result in durable agreements...

H3a: ... because of the presence of opportunities for the sides involved to create lasting coalitions (impact of decision-making complexity);

H3b: ... because of the presence of more opportunities for discussing / agreeing on all the issues at stake (impact of issue complexity)

H3c: ... because of the presence of opportunities for the parties to build a constructive negotiation environment and build confidence between actors from different backgrounds (impact of inter-cultural differences)

$$DUR = f(tpr \wedge ded \vee DEC \vee ISS \vee INT)$$

1.2.3 Conflict management variables

On the basis of the existing literature, we also hold three sets of expectations on the behaviour of the ‘conflict management’ variables, and, in exploring the impact of time pressure on negotiation outcomes, we aimed at answering three major research questions.

The three expectations imply that:

H4: Comprehensive and lasting agreements are comparatively²² more likely in the presence of low conflict intensity [EX1]; strong external intervention [EX2]; and clear mutually hurting stalemate [EX3].

$$BRE = f(sev \wedge MED \wedge MHS)$$

$$DUR = f(sev \wedge MED \wedge MHS)$$

These expectations are in line with most of the literature on peace negotiations. The connection between low conflict intensity and increased likelihood of generating positive negotiation outcomes is supported by an overwhelming consensus and has been discussed and tested, among others, by Jackson (2000), Kleiboer (1996), Kressel and Pruitt (1989) and by Kochan and Jick (1978). The positive correlation between the presence of a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ and successful conflict resolution is an integral component of the theory of ‘ripeness’ as suggested by Zartman, and is reinforced by the findings other scholars who employ similar concepts (such as ‘military stalemate’ – cf. Fearon 2004). Less apparent is arguably the causal that should connect an increase in external intervention (as defined in chapter 3) with more comprehensive and

²² The use of the term ‘comparatively’ here somehow corresponds to the familiar expression ‘everything else being equal’ that is used in statistical analysis. As QCA fundamentally violates the principles of covariation, the latter formula is in practice empty in our context. Still, the word ‘comparatively’ somehow conveys the idea that an impact of these variables on the outcomes of negotiation processes which consistently falsifies the existing consensus in the discipline should be considered at least as an odd outcome and may indeed lead to reconsider the overall reliability of the comparison.

durable negotiation outcomes. Since Rubin's definition is not limited to classifying the strength of external mediation, but also includes some forms of proper intervention of foreign actors in a specific war theatre (e.g. Russia in Abkhazia or India in the Chittagong Hills conflict), it may be reasonable to expect such 'external intervention' at times to impact negatively on the likelihood of getting to a stable resolution of a conflict. In practice, however, as Rubin's categories seem to overlap in most cases with the traditional definitions of 'mediation' that have been mentioned in the previous chapter, the variable can be expected to reflect the overwhelming consensus on the positive impact of external mediation on negotiation outcomes (cf. Beardsley et al. 2006, 77; Wall 2001, 381; Kressel and Pruitt 1989), although some more marginal variations may be registered.

1.3 Methodology

The fuzzy-set analysis has been executed using the freeware software fsQCA 2.0. The software applies what Charles Ragin defines 'truth-table fuzzy-set analysis', a form of fuzzy-set analysis which relies on the use of truth tables for the selection of configurations and which uses thresholds of consistency scores to define membership / non membership in the outcome. Ragin (2008) suggests that:

This new analytic strategy is superior in several respects to the one sketched in 'Fuzzy-Set Social Science' (Ragin, 2000). While both approaches have strengths and weaknesses, the one presented here uses the truth table as the key analytic device. A further advantage of the fuzzy-set truth-table approach presented in this chapter is that it is more transparent. Thus, the researcher has more direct control over the process of data analysis. This type of control is central to the practice of case-oriented research.

The specific methodology that can be employed for implementing fuzzy-set analysis through this software is clearly explained by Ragin in the appendix of his

recent publication specifically focused on this methodological approach (2008b) and can also be extrapolated from the manual of the programme (Ragin 2006b).

The analysis has been implemented using the ‘truth table algorithm’ methodology. Of the crisp-set configurations that have been produced by the programme (through the process that has been explained in chapter 3, paragraph 2) the configurations which included at least two instances in the dataset have been accepted for both datasets. The consistency cutoff that is used is typically 0.8 or at the closest higher value in the dataset, with the exception of one model where values significantly higher than 0.8 are considered to refine the results. Following Ragin’s advice, the benchmark values for considering a model as acceptable are 0.8/0.85 for solution consistency and 0.65/0.7 for solution coverage²³. The values of consistency for each configuration are considered as the main indicator of their significance (cf. Ragin 2008b, 44-5); configurations are also arranged in each model according to their individual consistency score (in decrescent order).

2. Fuzzy-set analysis

2.1 The general impact of time pressure

To answer the first general research question posed in chapter 2, we have first of all to analyse the full dataset to understand which causal patterns can be connected with broad and durable agreements.

2.1.1 Main model: time pressure as a single variable

In the first instance, we have executed the analysis by integrating the two variables for time pressure (tpr and ded) into a single variable (coded as ‘tim’), so that $tim=tpr+ded$. In seven cases the sum of the two scores resulted in a value

²³ Charles Ragin, e-mail message to the author, 19 September 2008.

higher than 1, which has been normalised to 1. Both analyses have been implemented under similar conditions – keeping the frequency cutoff at 2 (that is, including only configurations which featured at least twice in the dataset) and the consistency cutoff at 0.8 or at the closest higher value in the dataset. The programme has also been instructed to produce the most parsimonious fuzzy-set solution²⁴. The cases included in the dataset used to explore agreement breadth are 68 (i.e. the full dataset); those included in the dataset for duration are 61 (i.e. the full dataset but excluding the failed episodes of negotiation).

The results are the following:

*** Model 2.1.1a²⁵**

Model: bre = f(tim, sev, mhs, med, dec, iss, int) - Conditions: none			
	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
TIM*MHS+	.683616	.288136	.790850
tim*MED+	.412429	.129943	.768421
sev*med	.333333	.039548	.710843
frequency cutoff 2.000000	solution coverage .870057		
consistency cutoff .800000	solution consistency .736842		

*** Model 2.1.1b**

Model: dur = f(tim, sev, mhs, med, dec, iss, int) - Conditions: none			
	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
MHS*DEC+	.659341	.219780	.845070
sev*DEC+	.456044	.000000	.821782
tim*sev+	.362637	.016484	.804878
sev*med	.313187	.010989	.760000
frequency cutoff 2.000000	solution coverage .714286		
consistency cutoff .803572	solution consistency .802469		

Discussion:

- a) Methodology: according to the standards of fuzzy-set analysis both results are not particularly significant (in particular the score for consistency of the model for agreement breadth is lower than the normal 0.8 and 0.75 standards) but overall acceptable. The results for agreement breadth cover

²⁴ This is done by instructing the program, in the ‘configurations to minimise’ screen, ‘not to care’ the reminders of the analysis. The procedure is explained in Ragin 2006b, 103.

²⁵ Models are numbered according to the paragraphs in which they are presented; models marked with the star * are the ‘best’ models on which the conclusions of the chapter will be primarily based.

a broader section of the dataset, as more valid configurations (i.e. with a frequency equal or higher to 2) were included in the analysis, but the value for duration is also acceptable. On the contrary, the results for agreement duration are significantly stronger in terms of solution consistency.

- b) Time pressure: the most consistent configuration in the model for agreement breadth suggests that the presence of time pressure and of a mutually hurting stalemate could be associated with durable agreements, although the second most consistent configuration also suggests that the absence of time pressure and the presence of strong external mediation can be associated with the same outcome. On the other hand, the only configuration that includes time pressure in the model for agreement duration suggests that its absence – in association with the absence of conflict severity – can be associated with durable agreements.
- c) General analysis: configurations that can be associated with both broad and durable agreements tend to include the absence of conflict severity and the presence of a mutually hurting stalemate. On the other hand, both the presence and the absence of external interventions, in interaction with other variables, can be associated with the outcomes.
- d)

2.1.2 Alternative model: disaggregating time pressure

If we test two models under the abovementioned conditions, but keeping the two variables for time pressure separate, the results are the following:

Model 2.1.2a

Model: bre = f(tpr, ded, sev, mhs, med, dec, iss, int) - Conditions: none			
	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
MHS*ISS+	.745763	.016949	.851613
DED*MHS+	.604520	.028249	.816794
ded*sev+	.457627	.000000	.794117
ded*MED+	.497175	.028249	.785714
sev*DEC+	.480226	.005650	.779816
sev*med+	.333333	.000000	.710843
TPR	.192090	.022599	.708333
frequency cutoff 2.000000	solution coverage .898305		
consistency cutoff .800000	solution consistency .726028		

Model 2.1.2b

Model: dur = f(tpr, ded, sev, mhs, med, dec, iss, int) - Conditions: none			
	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
ded*MHS*DEC+	.494506	.038462	.873786
sev*DEC*ISS+	.406593	.000000	.850574
ded*sev*ISS+	.395604	.000000	.837209
sev*med*ISS+	.274725	.000000	.793651
int+	.478022	.137363	.790909
MHS*med*DEC	.351648	.032967	.790123
frequency cutoff 2.000000	solution coverage .736264		
consistency cutoff .809524	solution consistency .792899		

Discussion:

- a) Methodology: the increased complexity of the outcome configurations is reflected in slightly improved coverage scores but also in lower levels of consistency, which were already rather low (in particular for agreement breadth). In sum, the quality of the outcome seems to have decreased when compared to models 2.1.1a and 2.1.1b.
- b) Time pressure: the analysis confirms the results of the previous models – namely, that the presence of significant time pressure in episodes of negotiations can be associated with broad agreements but not with durable ones. More specifically, the model for agreement breadth suggests that artificial time pressure can be associated with broad agreements in the presence of a mutually hurting stalemate (similar to the configuration of model 2.1.1a) but also that the absence of artificial time pressure can be associated with broad agreements in the absence of conflict severity or in the presence of significant external interventions. The model also suggests that the presence of practical deadlines could be associated with broad agreements, but the consistency score for this one-variable configuration is extremely low (.708). On the other hand, the model for conflict duration suggests (again) that only the absence of time pressure – in configuration respectively with mutually hurting stalemate and decision-making complexity, and with low severity and high issue complexity – can be associated with durable agreements.
- c) General analysis: as above.

2.2 Complexity and ‘integrative’ negotiations

The absence of a mutually hurting stalemate is used as a proxy for absence of an integrative negotiation environment, under the assumption that, in general, territorial conflicts would be perceived as a zero-sum game unless a mutually hurting stalemate forces the parties to abandon the conflict and pursue peace negotiations (Vasquez 1996, 535; Turner Johnson 2000, 435; Gibler 2007). Negotiations are thus considered as integrative if they have a score for mutually hurting stalemate higher than the 0.5 threshold. As explained in chapter 3, ‘complexity’ is articulated in three variables: decision-making complexity; issue complexity; inter-cultural differences. The operationalisation of these variables is explained in chapter 3.

The choice of focusing only on units of analysis which feature values for MHS higher than 0.5 results in a drastic shrinking of the dataset (n=43). In order to maintain the frequency cutoff at 2, the configurational complexity of the dataset has also been reduced by excluding the two remaining conflict resolution variables (conflict intensity and external intervention) – so that overall these models would include five explanatory variables. The interaction between complexity and conflict resolution variables is explored separately in paragraph 2.2.2.

2.2.1 Choosing the best model

Hypotheses H2 and H3 can arguably be explored using two different models.

2.2.1.1 Aggregate measure of complexity

An aggregate measure of ‘complexity’ can be elaborated by adding up the fuzzy scores for the three variables and by establishing a threshold for deciding whether or not a negotiation is ‘complex’, and a separate fuzzy-set analysis can be

implemented for ‘complex’ and ‘non-complex’ negotiations. In order to do this, the fuzzy-set scores for the three variables related to conflict complexity have been added up to create an aggregate indicator for complexity.

The results for ‘non-complex’ episodes of negotiation are the following:

Model 2.2.1.1a

Model: DUR = f(TPR, DED, DEC, ISS, INT) - Conditions: MHS>0.5; DEC+ISS+INT<1.5			
	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
tpr*ded*ISS*int+	.415094	.226415	1.000000
tpr*DED*DEC*int	.377358	.188679	.869565
frequency cutoff 2.000000	solution coverage .603774		
consistency cutoff .842105	solution consistency .914286		

The results for ‘complex’ episodes of negotiation are the following:

Model 2.2.1.1b

Model: DUR = f(TPR, DED, DEC, ISS, INT) - Conditions: MHS>0.5; DEC+ISS+INT>1.5			
	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
tpr*ded*DEC*INT+	.486486	.180180	.981818
tpr*DED*DEC*ISS+	.405405	.081081	.957447
tpr*DED*dec*INT	.414414	.153153	.851852
frequency cutoff 2.000000	solution coverage .738739		
consistency cutoff .847826	solution consistency .901099		

Discussion:

a) Methodology: these models are arguably the best ones for testing both H2 and H3, but their validity depends on whether a meaningful aggregate threshold can be established. The distribution of this aggregate indicator for complexity does not show any significant discontinuity – i.e. no obvious threshold can be inferred from the data. Since the range of results is comprised between 0 and 3, a tentative threshold of 1.5 has been established, but as such this threshold appears as very arbitrary and the distinction between ‘non-complex’ and ‘complex’ negotiation processes as implemented here is not particularly convincing. This threshold also splits the dataset MHS>0.5 (n=43) into two very uneven datasets – the first (DEC+ISS+INT<1.5) including only 13 cases. The model adopts the frequency and consistency cutoffs that we used in the models discussed in paragraph 2.1, and the results for coverage and consistency are acceptable

for the first model (although coverage is quite low) and good for the second model.

b) Time pressure: the methodological flaws of these models imply that no valid inference can be derived from them. At any rate, the results are quite inconclusive – in both models we find configurations which associate both the absence and the presence of artificial time pressure with durable negotiation outcomes.

2.2.1.2 Individual indicators for complexity

The whole dataset of episodes of negotiations featuring $MHS>0.5$ could be analysed, and the interaction of time pressure with each measure of complexity can be reviewed *ex post* on the basis of the results of the fuzzy-set analysis. This model arguably provides a useful approach to H3, but is not as suitable as the previous models for testing H2 in relation to H3 as ‘simple’ and ‘complex’ episodes of negotiations are analysed contextually.

If we adopt the frequency and consistency cutoffs that we used in the models discussed in paragraph 2.1, the complex results are the following:

* Model 2.2.1.2a

Model: $DUR = f(TPR, DED, DEC, ISS, INT)$ [complex] - Conditions: $MHS>0.5$			
	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
tpr*ded*ISS*int	.286585	.024390	1.000000
tpr*ded*DEC*INT	.347561	.000000	.982759
tpr*DEC*ISS	.554878	.036585	.957895
tpr*DED*DEC*int	.250000	.030488	.911111
tpr*DED*ISS*INT	.329268	.000000	.870968
tpr*DED*dec*INT	.286585	.030488	.854545
tpr*ded*iss*INT	.231707	.000000	.844444
tpr*dec*iss*INT	.237805	.000000	.829787
frequency cutoff 2.000000	solution coverage .762195		
consistency cutoff .815789	solution consistency .868056		

A more parsimonious model can be elaborated by looking for clear discontinuities in the consistency scores of the configurations included in the truth table, as outlined in table 4.2.

configurations					No.	Consistency
tpr	ded	dec	iss	int	No.	Consistency
0	0	0	1	0	2	1.000000
0	0	1	1	0	3	1.000000
0	0	1	1	1	4	.981132
0	1	1	1	1	6	.977778
0	1	1	1	0	6	.972973
0	0	1	0	1	3	.972222
0	1	1	0	0	3	.903226
0	1	0	0	1	2	.882353
0	1	0	1	1	8	.851064
0	0	0	0	1	3	.815789

Table 4.2
Truth table for DUR = f(TPR, DED, DEC, ISS, INT)
[frequency cutoff: 2; consistency cutoff: .80]

The most relevant discontinuity is between the sixth and seventh configurations (.972222/.903226). If we adopt the latter value as consistency cutoff for the analysis, the complex and parsimonious results are the following:

* Model 2.2.1.2b

Model: DUR = f(TPR, DED, DEC, ISS, INT) [complex] - Conditions: MHS>0.5			
	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
tpr*ded*ISS*int+	.286585	.024390	1.00000
tpr*ded*DEC*INT+	.347561	.030488	.982759
tpr*DEC*ISS	.554878	.128049	.957895
frequency cutoff 2.000000	solution coverage .609756		
consistency cutoff .972222	solution consistency .961538		

Model 2.2.1.2c

Model: DUR = f(TPR, DED, DEC, ISS, INT) [parsimonious] - Conditions: MHS>0.5			
	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
DEC*INT+	.451219	.280488	.986667
ISS*int	.341463	.170732	.965517
frequency cutoff 2.000000	solution coverage .621952		
consistency cutoff .972222	solution consistency .971429		

Discussion:

- a) Methodology: 2.2.1.2a is overall a good model – solution consistency is above 85% and coverage above 75%. This level of coverage is also due to the high number of configurations in the outcome (8), which can be reduced to three or two if we consider a higher consistency cutoff (as in models 2.2.1.2b-c). The downside of models 2.2.1.2b-c is that the value for solution coverage is extremely low; yet, model 2.2.1.2b does little more than ‘selecting’ the strongest configurations of model 2.2.1.2a by using the most relevant discontinuity in the consistency scores of the configurations in the dataset, so it can be considered as an elaboration – and not a replacement – of model 2.2.1.2a. Model 2.2.1.2c highlights the strongest variables within 2.2.1.2b.
- b) Time pressure: The results suggest that two main patterns related to lasting agreements, with essentially the same level of coverage and consistency: 1) $tpr*ded*ISS*int$ (low natural and artificial time pressure; high issue complexity; low inter-cultural differences); 2) $tpr*ded*DEC*INT$ (low natural and artificial time pressure; high decision-making complexity; high inter-cultural differences). As a whole, the results show that the typical configurations related to lasting agreements show high level of complexity for at least two variables (decision-making and issue) AND low levels of time pressure, while the effect of inter-cultural complexity is ambiguous – as highlighted clearly in Model 2.2.1.2c. In other words, the data seem to support H3a and H3b but not necessarily H3c.

2.2.2 Analysis of robustness

As mentioned above, two conflict resolution variables – conflict intensity and external intervention – have been omitted from the models discussed in paragraph 2.2.1. To explore how the indicators of conflict complexity interact with these variables, we further subdivided the MHS>0.5 dataset into four smaller datasets corresponding to four different combinations of high (>0.5) and low (<0.5) values

of the two remaining variables. The number of units of analysis included in each of these dataset is the following:

	sev>0.5	sev<0.5
med>0.5	n=20	n=10
med<0.5	n=7	n=6

Table 4.3
Breakdown of the dataset MHS>0.5

The datasets corresponding to low values of external intervention include too few cases to be analysed, while the analysis of model 2.2.1.2a can be replicated for the two datasets corresponding to high values of external intervention. The results are the following:

Model 2.2.2a

Model: DUR = f(TPR, DED, DEC, ISS, INT) [complex] - Conditions: MHS>0.5; SEV>0.5; MED>0.5			
	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
tpr*DEC*ISS*INT+	.500000	.162162	.973684
tpr*DED*DEC*ISS+	.405405	.067568	.937500
tpr*DED*ISS*INT	.472973	.135135	.833333
<hr/>			
frequency cutoff 3.000000	solution coverage .702703		
consistency cutoff .787879	solution consistency .866667		

Model 2.2.2b

Model: DUR = f(TPR, DED, DEC, ISS, INT) [complex] - Conditions: MHS>0.5; SEV<0.5; MED>0.5			
	Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
tpr*ded*ISS*int+	.446808	.212766	1.000000
tpr*DED*DEC*int+	.319149	.106383	1.000000
tpr*dec*iss*INT	.148936	.085106	1.000000
<hr/>			
frequency cutoff 1.000000	solution coverage 0.638298		
consistency cutoff 1.000000	solution consistency 1.000000		

Discussion:

- Methodology: the levels of coverage and consistency of model 2.2.2a are overall acceptable; for this model the frequency cutoff has been set at 3 in the absence of any configuration which recurred twice in the dataset. Model 2.2.2b includes a very limited number of configurations, all of

which had the maximum score for consistency; still, the coverage of the final model remains very low (0.63).

- b) Time pressure: because of the limited number of units of analysis included in both datasets, the results of these models (and in particular of 2.2.2b, which has the less satisfactory levels of coverage) should arguably not be taken too far. Yet, in general terms, the most interesting result of two models seems to be that, in intense and complex conflicts with relevant external intervention, the presence of relevant artificial time pressure can be associated with durable agreements (model 2.2.2a), while from model 2.2.2b one could infer that the trade-off between conflict complexity and time pressure tends to be clearer in less intense conflicts.

3. Conclusions

The models discussed in this chapter provide significant evidence that sheds light on all the research hypotheses discussed in paragraph 1.2. More specifically, this analysis allows us to answer to each research question as follows:

3.1 Assessing H1

Research question 1: Do contemporary negotiations provide systematic evidence to suggest that peace negotiations taking place under relevant time pressure from deadlines tend to be more successful than negotiations unfolding under mild or no time pressure?

H1: Peace negotiations taking place under relevant time pressure from deadlines might (or might not) result in broad agreements, but they tend not to result in durable ones.

$BRE = f(TPR \wedge DED; tpr \wedge ded)$

$DUR = f(tpr \wedge ded)$

The models discussed in paragraphs 2.1 seem to confirm that the criticism that we raised against the approach to time pressure that emerges from diplomatic manuals, and that we summarised in H1, was well placed. The two strongest configurations included in model 2.1.1a suggest that the presence of time pressure and of a mutually hurting stalemate, and the absence of time pressure and the presence of strong external intervention can be associated with ‘broad’ agreements; however, model 2.1.1b suggests that only the absence of time pressure (in conjunction with low conflict intensity, in a configuration which is relatively weak but still stronger than those included in model 2.1.1a) can be associated with durable agreements. As a whole, thus, these models provide evidence that supports the hypothesis that time pressure can help, under certain conditions, reaching comprehensive peace agreements, but also suggest that only low or no time pressure can be associated with durable agreements.

3.2 Assessing H2 and H3

Research question 2: Is it possible to suggest that, in the context of complex negotiations where many issues are at stake, where complex inter-group decision-making dynamics are present and where the information available is ambiguous, time pressure can rarely be associated with successful negotiation outcomes?

H2: Integrative negotiations taking place under time pressure will result in durable agreements if the negotiation milieu is not complex.

Integrative negotiations taking place under low time pressure and in complex milieus will result in durable agreements...

H3a: ... because of the presence of opportunities for the sides involved to create lasting coalitions (impact of decision-making complexity);

H3b: ... because of the presence of more opportunities for discussing / agreeing on all the issues at stake (impact of issue complexity)

H3c: ... because of the presence of opportunities for the parties to build a constructive negotiation environment and build confidence between actors from different backgrounds (impact of inter-cultural differences).

$$\text{DUR} = f(\text{tpr} \wedge \text{ded} \vee \text{DEC} \vee \text{ISS} \vee \text{INT})$$

Providing a clear answer to the second research question outlined in chapter 2 and to hypotheses 2 and 3 is not an easy task. The problems that we faced in creating an aggregate indicator for conflict complexity implied that no clear-cut answer can be provided for H2. In paragraph 2.2, however, we did generate an overall convincing model – 2.2.1.2a – which features excellent coverage and consistency scores and whose most significant configurations suggest that the absence of time pressure and the presence of high levels of decision-making and issue complexity can be associated with durable agreements. When the model is replicated using a higher consistency cutoff based on the most evident gap highlighted by the truth table (model 2.2.1.2b), only configurations showing interaction between the absence of time pressure and the presence of relevant decision-making and issue complexity are left.

This analysis thus leaves us with four main conclusions:

a) As a whole, this analysis provides evidence to support both H3a and H3b – that is, this analysis suggest that, among negotiations which take place in an integrative environments and in the presence of complex issues and complex decision-making processes, those which generate more lasting agreements are those which take place under low or no time pressure.

b) The outcomes are, however, less conclusive in relation to H3c, suggesting that the results of the interaction between time pressure and the presence of inter-cultural differences might be different depending on the presence/absence of other form of complexity. More specifically, of the two strongest configurations highlighted by models 2.2.1.2a and 2.2.1.2b ($\text{tpr} * \text{ded} * \text{ISS} * \text{int} + \text{tpr} * \text{ded} * \text{DEC} * \text{INT}$), the former seems to show the more familiar features of non-zero-sum negotiations – where the absence of time pressure can allow for the gradual and extensive discussion of complex issues if no relevant inter-cultural barrier exist – while the latter is more difficult to

interpret: the presence of low time pressure and high inter-cultural complexity somehow recalls typical confidence-building processes, although the fourth variable (complex decision-making) would not directly fit this scenario.

c) More parsimonious versions of models 2.2.1.2a and 2.2.1.2b – such as model 2.2.1.2c – feature only variables related to conflict complexity but not time pressure, supporting the suggestion that, among the causal variables reviewed in these models, time pressure variables are those which provide the weakest contribution to determining the outcome. This result is not surprising and confirms that the impact of the manipulation of time on the outcomes of negotiation processes is relevant, but still secondary when compared to that of major variables such as issue or decision-making complexity.

d) The exclusion of two relevant variables from the models discussed in paragraph 2.2.1, which was justified on methodological grounds, was compensated by the elaboration of two models to explore how the abovementioned configurations are affected by the presence of different levels of conflict intensity. The models discussed in paragraph 2.2.2 are overall weak – as they include relatively little samples from the dataset – but they seem to suggest that, the more a conflict is intense, the more likely it is that time pressure (and not its absence) can be associated with durable negotiation outcomes.

3.3 Assessing H4

H4: Comprehensive and lasting agreements are comparatively more likely in the presence of low conflict intensity [EX1]; strong external intervention [EX2]; and clear mutually hurting stalemate [EX3].

$$\text{BRE} = f(\text{sev} \wedge \text{MED} \wedge \text{MHS})$$

$$\text{DUR} = f(\text{sev} \wedge \text{MED} \wedge \text{MHS})$$

The models discussed in paragraph 2.1 provide three insights in relation to H4:

a) The configurations which appear in models 2.1.1a, 2.1.1b, 2.1.2a and 2.1.2b are in general in line with the expectations detailed in H4, since configurations that can be associated with both broad and durable agreements tend to include the absence of conflict severity and the presence of a mutually hurting stalemate – although in no configuration all the variables are simultaneously present. Since H4 is primarily aimed at further verifying the reliability of the models being discussed in these paragraphs by comparing their outcomes with the main expectations of the literature, these results provide more evidence to suggest that these models are overall ‘good’ ones.

b) The interaction between the third conflict resolution variable – external interventions – and the other explanatory variables is more complex, as both the presence and the absence of external interventions, in interaction with other variables, can be associated with the outcomes. This result was somehow anticipated (cf. par. 1.2.3) considering the complexity of this variable as articulated by Rubin.

c) In models 2.1.1a and 2.1.1b, it is also interesting to note that only ‘conflict resolution’ variables are included in the outcomes of the model for agreement breadth, while both ‘conflict resolution’ variables and variables describing the ‘complexity’ of a conflict are included in the outcomes of model for duration. This effect appears to be a robust one as it is confirmed also by models 2.1.2a and 2.1.2b – with the relevant exception of the presence of issue complexity in the most consistent configuration of model 2.1.2a. This somehow unexpected result is in line with the intuition that contextual factors play a particularly relevant role in determining the duration of agreements.

Chapter 5

Complexity and the absence of time pressure: Bougainville and Casamance

1. Methodological rationale of the case studies

The case-study section that includes chapters 5 and 6 is designed to shed light on a range of relevant dynamics highlighted by the fuzzy-set analysis.

In chapter 1 we briefly discussed the importance of providing transparent and coherent explanations for the choice of case studies in a comparative research. Many recent comparative volumes on conflict resolution still rely on rather vague and arbitrary criteria for case selection: the presence of some degree of diversity across the selected cases is often used to justify *ex post* choices that appear to be primarily driven by the prominence of specific conflicts in the discipline and in the news rather than by any relevant methodological consideration (cf. Blum 2007, 48-50; Höglund 2004, 41-3; Carment, James and Taydas 2006; Bose 2007). While focusing on the most intractable or politically-relevant conflicts is obviously not in itself a liability, the absence of clear criteria for case selection does impinge on the generalisability of the results of such works. Scholarly works which attempt to integrate a large- or medium-N comparative framework with a case-study analysis – thus justifying the choice of the latter with reference to significant dynamics highlighted by the former – are still too few, and, even in these rare instances (cf. Cunningham 2006a), the choice of specific case-studies seems to be primarily determined by exogenous factors such as the author's familiarity with a specific geographical region or with other country-specific factors.

In the following case-study chapters, a different approach will be attempted. With John Gerring (2007, 12-3), we would argue that case studies and cross-case studies (i.e. large- or medium-N analysis) should be conceived not as ‘opponents’, but rather as ‘complements’. We will try and put this suggestion into practice by explaining in detail how each pair of case studies relates with the outcomes of the fuzzy-set analysis, how the choice to explore specific models and configurations is influenced or inspired by relevant theoretical assumptions, and whether or not other episodes of negotiation showing similar features are present in the dataset – and, if so, why only some of them are selected.

As a whole, this section could be loosely described as aimed at ‘process-tracing’ (ibid., 178) specific dynamics that emerged from the previous comparative section – primarily the interaction between the absence of time pressure and decision-making and issue complexity in generating durable agreements. More specifically, the first two case studies (discussed in this chapter) could be described as ‘pathway’ cases (ibid., 122): chosen as examples of one of the strongest causal patterns highlighted by the comparative model, they ‘build on prior cross-case analysis’ and aim at providing a ‘uniquely penetrating insight into [the] causal mechanisms’ that link the variables included in the configuration and the expected outcome.

The criteria for the selection of the second pair of case studies (the 1995 Dayton proximity talks and the 2000 Camp David summit) are more hybrid. The choice of the main case study (Dayton) is inspired by another relevant configuration discussed in chapter 4 – and therefore that case primarily approached as a ‘pathway case’ – but the choice of the configuration to be analysed is in itself inspired by what Gerring defines as an attempt ‘to show why apparent deviations from the norm are not *really* deviant, or do not challenge the core of the theory’ (ibid., 108 – emphasis in the original) – an approach that he associates with the selection of ‘influential’ cases. The second set of case studies thus aims not only at ‘process-tracing’ the causal links suggested by that relevant configuration, but also at understanding if such process – which appears as different from the patterns discussed in the first set of case studies – really contradicts the findings of the previous chapter. This ‘two-tier’ approach to case

selection is made possible by the configurational logic of QCA and adds a further level of methodological sophistication to Gerring's analysis – which often assumes that the comparative analysis inspiring the case-study selection is covariational in nature (cf. *ibid.*, 122).

2. First set of case studies: interpreting the second explanatory configuration

Models 2.2.1.2a-b suggest that, when the analysis is limited to the integrative negotiations, one of the two configurations of explanatory variables associated with durable agreements includes low 'natural' time pressure, low 'artificial' time pressure, high complexity of decision-making and high inter-cultural barriers ($tpr*ded*DEC*INT$). The relation between this configuration and the outcome variable 'durability' is plotted in figure 1. The triangular form of the plot is typical of what Charles Ragin (2006, 294) defines as 'fuzzy subset relations consistent with sufficiency', and thus confirms the results of the computerised fuzzy-set analysis.

When considering what may explain the relation between this set of variables and the durability of peace agreement, the theories that immediately come to mind are those associating effective negotiation processes in complex milieus to the creation of trust among the negotiating parties. 'Trust' – Herbert Kelman suggests (2005, 640) – 'is a central requirement for the peaceful and effective management of all relationships', but is typically lacking when 'enemies' are separated by intercultural divides negotiate with each other. In these contexts, 'working trust and interpersonal trust may emerge' when the interests of the parties gradually converge 'over time' (*ibid.*, 647). This result seems thus to support hypothesis H4c, which suggests that the negative impact of time pressure in integrative and complex negotiations is primarily due to the absence of opportunities for the parties to build a constructive negotiation environment and build confidence between actors from different backgrounds (Wright 1974; Wright and Weitz 1977; Edland and Svenson 1993, 37).




Figure 5.1
Plot of the second outcome configuration of model 2.2.1.2a-b

The presence of high decision-making complexity among the explanatory variables, however, complicates the picture. On the one hand, one can clearly argue that this configuration supports not just hypothesis H4c, but also H4a – which argues that the presence of time pressure may decrease the opportunities for the sides involved to create lasting coalitions (Carnevale, O'Connor and McCusker 1993, 124-5; Christensen-Szalanski 1980). On the other hand, and most importantly, this configuration also seems to expose a potential gap in the literature on peace agreements, as no major interpretative approach to the durability of peace agreements seems to provide a direct explanation for the

interaction between all three interpretative variables (four if we consider both ‘practical’ and ‘artificial’ time pressure).

The two case studies analysed in this chapter – the Burnham Truce in the Bougainville peace process (Papua New Guinea) and the 2004 peace agreement on the Casamance revolt in Senegal – can help to shed light on these dynamics. These agreements (coded respectively as 3BOU05 and 4SEN02 in the dataset) are among the few agreements plotted in figure 1 which feature values below the 0.5 threshold for both time pressure variables and above the threshold for decision-making complexity, inter-cultural differences and agreement durability – i.e. that correspond to the causal pattern $tpr^*ded^*DEC^*INT$.

Code	Conflict	Agreement / Episode of Negotiation	Year
3BOU01	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Ceasefire	1990
3BOU02	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	The Honiara Declaration	1991
3BOU03	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Honiara Commitments to Peace	1994
3BOU04	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Arawa Conference	1994
3BOU05	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Burnham Truce	1997
3BOU06	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Lincoln Agreement	1998
3BOU07	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Lincoln Process	1998
3BOU08	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Bougainville Peace Agreement	2001
4SEN01	Senegal (Casamance)	Ceasefire	1991
4SEN02	Senegal (Casamance)	Accord général de paix	2004

Case	TPR	DED	SEV	MHS	MED	DEC	ISS	INT	BRE	DUR
3BOU01	0	0	0.6	0.2	0	0.8	1	0.8	0.2	0.4
3BOU02	0	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.8	1	0.8	0.4	0.4
3BOU03	0	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.8	1	0.8	0.4	0.6
3BOU04	0	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.8	1	0.8	0	0.6
3BOU05	0	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	1	0.8	0.6	1
3BOU06	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	1	0.8	0.8	1
3BOU07	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.8	1	0.8	0	n/a
3BOU08	0.2	0	0.6	1	0.8	0.8	1	0.8	1	1
4SEN01	0	0	0.4	0.2	0	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.2	0
4SEN02	0	0.4	0.4	0.8	0	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.8

Table 5.1
Episodes of negotiation in the Bougainville and Casamance conflicts
and fuzzy-set scores

The analysis of these two case studies aims at shedding light, more specifically, on three questions:

- What are the *processes* that explain why the interaction between low time pressure, high decision-making complexity and high inter-cultural differences can produce durable agreements?
- Under what *conditions* do low time pressure, high decision-making complexity and relevant inter-cultural differences produce durable agreements – that is, how do these three variables interact with the other ‘conflict management’ variables in these case studies?
- Is there evidence to suggest that the absence of artificial time pressure in these case studies part of negotiating strategies based on an *explicit rejection of deadline diplomacy*?

Each case study is structured in three parts. It begins with a general overview of the conflict, summarising the historical features of the dispute and briefly outlining the contents of the main agreements signed. Each coding decision is then reviewed in an apposite thematic paragraph, which also outlines the debates and disagreements among the sources in relation to specific aspects of each conflict. Finally, the last section of each case study is focused on analysing in detail the process that led to the agreements under review (the Burnham truce and the 2004 peace agreement respectively), with the aim to uncover the specific reasons why they arguably succeeded where previous agreements did not. The final paragraph of the section will then collect the main findings of each case study and provide a direct answer to the abovementioned question.

3. Bougainville: overview of the conflict

Bougainville is an island in the east of Papua New Guinea of approximately 9,300 squared kilometres with a population of 160,000. Bougainville and the surrounding islands are usually known as ‘North Solomons’ and are geographically part of the Solomon Islands archipelagos. In 1900, at the end of

the colonial quarrels between Germany and Britain on Melanesia, the Solomons became officially a British protectorate, whereas Bougainville was attached to the German protectorate of New Guinea. The German protectorate then included a territory in the north-eastern part of the island of New Guinea (called in local language *Papua*) known as *Kaiser-Wilhelmsland*, and other smaller islands on the north-east of New Guinea. Lost by Germany in the Treaty of Versailles and under Australian protectorate until 1949, the colony was then joined to the south-eastern part of the island of New Guinea previously under British control to create the Australian Territory of Papua New Guinea (PNG), which then became independent on 16 September 1975.




Figure 5.2
Papua New Guinea and Bougainville
(SOURCE: CONCILIATION RESOURCES, ACCORD, NO. 12 - 2002)

3.1 The origins of the revolt (1964-1988)

In the last decades of Australian rule, the rich mineral resources of Bougainville (in particular copper and gold) started being exploited systematically. In 1964 Conzinc Riotinto of Australia (CRA) began explorations in the centre of the island, in what would have soon become the site of a vast open-sky mine administered by a new company under the name of Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) (May 2004, 275). From the outset these mining activities were not welcomed by locals, who were expropriated of their lands often without adequate compensation, and who resented the change in the environment and landscape of the island brought about by the mine.

Economic grievances (350 claims for compensation were raised between 1966 and 1969 only) quickly translated into political ones. In September 1968 the spokesman of a group of young educated Bougainvilleans, Leo Hannett, called for a referendum to be held on the independence of the island in 1970. Talks with the central government resulted in pledges to assure a high degree of autonomy. On 1st September 1975 (few days before the formal independence of PNG), after the PNG government had refused to allocate \$3.5 million to the island to complete basic infrastructural works (despite the fact that the royalties of the mine were allowing the government to cash approximately \$50 million per year), the Bougainvillean leadership unilaterally declared independence. Diplomatic talks, concluded on 9 August 1976, convinced the leaders to desist from the secession plans in exchange for a significant devolution of powers to the authorities of the newly-constituted North Solomons province.

In 1979, a Panguna Landowners Association (PLA) was created to coordinate the claims of the landowners expropriated by the BLC, and in 1980 it successfully negotiated a new scheme for corresponding compensations. The agreement included the creation of a fund (the Road Mine Tailings Lease Trust Fund - RMTLF) to finance local activities, into which some of the profits of the mine would have been directed. By the mid-1980s, as a portion of landowners still had not received satisfactory compensation and accusations of corruption were raised against the managers of the RMTLF, some members of the PLA – headed

by landowner Francis Ona – started calling for more a more proactive stance against the activity of the BCL.

3.2 The revolt unravels (1988-1991)

In March 1988 500 militants of the PLA submitted a petition of demands and, not satisfied with the response, organized a sit-in which stopped the production of the mine for several hours. In the following months, events rapidly escalated. In November, after the company's denial of the environmental impact of the mining activities, explosive was stolen from the warehouses and employed in a series of acts of sabotage. As the government of PNG decided to send reinforcements to the military and police personnel stationed on the island, in February 1989 Ona began waiving the possibility of a secession of Bougainville from PNG and in April 1989 he referred in a speech to the possibility of creating an independent Bougainville Republic. His refusal of the Bougainville Development Package proposed by the PNG government in May 1989 convinced the authorities in Port Moresby to declare the state of emergency in the North Solomons province in January 1990 and to move additional troops to the island (May 2004, 278-80).

Since the early phases of this escalation, the PLA began fragmenting into numerous factions (May 2004, 279). By early 1989, the militants who approved the course of action chosen by Ona were referring to themselves as 'Bougainville Revolutionary Army' (BRA). They received support in particular from a separate group of anti-government militants ('Fifty Toea Association'), mainly based in the south of the island. A range of bandit groups also soon mushroomed in the island, especially in the south, to exploit the situation of chaos created by the clashes between the BRA and the PNG Defense Forces (PNGDF).

Split in its leadership (with more moderate traditional leaders consistently more inclined than Ona to negotiate a peaceful solution to the dispute) but organized around a bulk of trained men often with past experience in the PNG army, the Bougainvilleans engaged in a bloody confrontation with the PNGDF in the first months of 1990. The 'Operation Footloose' launched by the PNG government resulted in a state of generalized guerrilla war, with the BRA

successfully resisting the offensive of the PNGDF and counter-attacking governmental sites in the island (Wesley Smith 1991, 190). Hostilities continued after a weak and ineffective ceasefire agreement signed on 1st March, which indirectly sanctioned the successes of the BRA and encouraged the rebel movements to form a Bougainville Interim Government (BIG), presided by Ona. One of the first acts of the BIG was to declare the unilateral independence of the island on 17 May. As more PGNDF troops landed on the island in the autumn of 1990, splinter groups such as the 'Buka Liberation Front' began operating, often with the support of the PGNDF, to weaken the leadership of the BRA.

In early 1991, the Solomon Islands attempted to launch a peace initiative by sending to Bougainville two government ministers, but the ceasefire struck on 23 January 1991 (the 'Honiara declaration') failed to stop the hostilities. The reasons for the failure of this early mediation attempt remain disputed. While a peace settlement at this stage of the conflict was not welcomed by the PGNDF, which were still mounting pressure around the island to win the resistance of the BRA (also by embagoing the supplies of food and aid from international NGOs), the increasing fragmentation of the leadership of the rebel movement appears to be the determinant factor behind its failure (Wesley Smith 1992, 159). Despite the fact that the interim BIG chairman, Joseph Kabui, had signed the Honiara agreement on behalf of the interim government, BRA authorities on the ground explicitly contested his (and Ona's) authority to impose a peace settlement, and continued the struggle (*ibid.*, 160). At the end of 1991, in an attempt to reaffirm his control on the BRA after renewed severe clashes in the April and September, and in stark contrast to the spirit of the Honiara talks, Ona stated that the BRA was prepared to 'fight to the last man' (*ibid.*).


3.3 The 'war of attrition' and the beginning of the peace process (1991-1998)

Over the following years the conflict continued with short outbreaks of violence and long periods of stalemate. This protracted 'war of attrition' (Saffu 1995, 224) pervasively affected the living environment of the island: continuing skirmishes between the PNGDF and the rebels caused 'occasional fatalities' (Standish 1993,

216), but most importantly forced an increasing number of civilians to leave the island or to seek refuge in 'care centres' and fuelled a significant budget deficit in the finances of PNG. Despite this, and despite regular efforts to kick-start new rounds of negotiations, there had been none until a declaration of ceasefire was negotiated between PNG officials and Sam Kauona, a BRA commander in the summer of 1994. Together with a temporary ceasefire, the agreement disciplined the lifting of the embargoes and the deployment of a South Pacific peacekeeping force with troops from Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu. A peace conference was arranged in Arawa in the October, chaired by the Solomon Islands, to confirm these arrangements and discuss the prospect of establishing a durable peace agreement. The meeting, however, ended with no agreement between the parties, most probably because 'the top brass' of a divided BRA did not take part in the conference. The peacekeeping force was withdrawn on October 19 'leaving behind bloodshed, paybacks, and over 2,000 refugees' (Hayashida 1996, 154).

After the Arawa initiative the conflict continued for two years without any major diplomatic breakthrough. The situation, however, was soon to change, primarily as a consequence of the so-called Sandline affair, a political and diplomatic crisis brought about by PNG Prime Minister Julius Chan's ill-fated decision to recruit a London-based private military company, Sandline International, to train PNGDF troops and help uproot the conflict. The crisis was followed by a major political crisis in PNG and convinced two regional powers - Australia and New Zealand – to throw their diplomatic and economic weight behind the Bougainvillean peace negotiations. After initial groundwork by two Australian negotiators, New Zealand sponsored a series of talks which resulted on 10 October 1997 in the signing of the Burnham Truce, calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities. The agreement was signed by 75 Bougainvillean delegates and 17 PNG government officials, and was followed by the deployment in mid-November of a 260-member Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) composed of unarmed military and civilian monitors from New Zealand, Australia, Tonga, Fiji and Vanuatu.

factors of peace



factors of conflict

Figure 5.3
Overview of the Bougainville conflict and peace process
(SOURCE: CONCILIATION RESOURCES, ACCORD, NO. 12 - 2002)

The Burnham Truce constituted the starting point for a formal peace process. A new meeting took place on 23 January 1998 at Lincoln University,

Christchurch. In that occasion the delegates agreed on committing to a 'permanent and irrevocable' ceasefire, which was finalized on 30 April 1998, and on the replacement of the TMG (whose mandate expired in February) with a 300-member Peace Monitoring Group (PMG) led by Australia.

After April, however, 'momentum for the peace process began to slow'; in particular, '[b]oth of the specific deadlines set in the Lincoln Agreement – to meet on 'the political issue' by 30 June and to hold elections for the Bougainville Reconciliation Government (BRG) before the end of 1998 – were missed.' (Wolfers 2002, 45). The responsibility of the derailing of these negotiations is typically ascribed to the divisions within the PNG political system over the opportunity to grant Bougainville increased autonomy as agreed in the Lincoln Agreement. In 1999 and 2000 the process proceeded slowly in a piecemeal fashion, with Bougainvillean leaders and representatives from the PNG government gradually reaching pragmatic agreements on the transition towards some form of local government that could grant higher autonomy to the island. In early 1999 Bougainvillean leaders, including pro-government and rebel factions, set up an interim BRG and a Bougainville Consultative Assembly, and in May delegates to be sent to the Bougainville People's Congress were chosen by local leaders (Kerr 2000, 65). Yet, little agreement still existed on the final political status of Bougainville within PNG (including whether or not Bougainvillean would have been allowed to vote in a referendum on the independence of the island) and on the disarmament of the militias operating in the island.

3.4 The peace settlement (2000-2001)

In 2000 and early 2001, as skirmishes between the PNGDF and BRA had become increasingly rare, the parties met 'at intervals' (Wolfers 2002, 47) in the attempt to find an agreement on the timescale for the referendum and for the disarmament, and on the exact competence of the Bougainvillean local government in the period leading to the referendum. In December 2000 significant convergence was reached around the proposal of the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer of postponing the referendum in 10-15 years' time and of making its

outcome subject to ratification by the PNG national parliament. Further talks were organized from January to April 2001 by the Australian government between ex-combatants to discuss the framework for the disposal of weapons, and between leaders and officials to agree on the competences of the Bougainvillean local government.

On 31 August 2001 the text of the Bougainville Peace Agreement was signed in Arawa. The agreement postponed the referendum at least to 2011 and included a detailed list of the competences of the PNG national government and of the autonomous Bougainville government, a series of financial arrangements, dispositions for regulating the transition of powers, and a plan for the collection of weapons throughout the island. While the implementation of the 2001 peace agreement has not been without problems (among other things, the big ceremony for the handing in of weapons 'saw the collection of only about a dozen homemade guns and weapons of World War II vintage' – Chin 2002, 153) and while the postponement of the referendum might have obscured only momentarily the deep disagreements on the final status of the island, by 2005 no significant resurgence of violence in the island and 'no repressive action by state authorities' (MAR) has been signaled.

4. Thematic analysis and fuzzy set coding

The Bougainville peace process represents a relevant instance of successful conflict resolution in the post-Cold War period, and is often mentioned and discussed among the paradigmatic peace processes of the 1990s (cf. Bell 2000, 22-4).

4.1 Conflict management

In general terms, the Bougainville conflict appears to be an example of persistent conflict which caused a relatively low number of combat-related casualties, and

which developed primarily as the consequence of long-term economic and social grievances sparked by the 1987-88 revolt over the policies of the BLC.

There is a general agreement on the fact that by the mid-1990s the overall number of battle-related deaths in the conflict was in the realm of the 'hundreds'²⁶. The social impact of protracted warfare in a relatively small island, however, has been extremely high: the number of civilians who died as a consequence of the military operations or of the economic and medical blockade of the island is unclear, but estimates vary from a minimum of 'at least 3,000' (Bercovitch and Jackson 1997) up to 20,000 (Bell 2000, Minorities at Risk project 2009). Bell's figure would imply that the war caused, directly or indirectly, the death of approximately 1/8 of the population of the island, suggesting that the social impact of the conflict was among the highest in post-Cold War warfare. For this reason, despite the relatively low number of conflict-related deaths, the conflict arguably deserves to pass the 0.5 fuzzy threshold for conflict intensity.

Also because of the relative scarcity of prolonged periods of open military confrontation, it is somehow difficult to identify when exactly the Bougainvillean conflict reached a situation of 'mutually hurting stalemate.' Since 1994 Australian newspapers depicted the Bougainvillean conflict as an 'agony' and a 'bloody stalemate'²⁷. The rebel's representative to the United Nations, Mike Forster, declared in an interview to the *Sidney Morning Herald* on April 1994 that:

We believe the answer lies in a negotiated settlement, some give and take on both sides. We don't believe that the request for an unconditional surrender made by Papua New Guinea to the rebels is realistic and we don't believe either that complete and immediate secession is realistic, but somewhere in the middle there's a shared ground²⁸.

However, at that stage, the reaction of the government of Papua New Guinea led by Paias Wingti, which was explicitly committed to crushing the rebel movement, was still scornful: Wingti replied to a resolution passed by the UN

²⁶ Papua New Guinea: Anti-Rebel Offensive. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 4 July 1996, in Lacina, Meier and Schüepp (2006); cf. also Bercovitch and Jackson (1997).

²⁷ Bougainville's agony drags on in bloody stalemate. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 2 April 1994, 13.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

Commission of Human Rights in Geneva calling for a negotiated end of the conflict by describing the commission as 'ignorant international do-gooders'²⁹.

This and other declarations from government officials suggest that, while the situation on the ground was arguably already stalemated before the mid-1990s, and while at least some significant fringes of the rebel movements showed interest in engaging in wide-ranging talks with the PNG government before the Lincoln process, the PNG government continued to believe in the possibility of solving the conflict militarily well into the second half of the decade, and considered truces and ceasefires (including the one brokered in the Arawa conference) only as temporary measures to reorganize its war efforts. The continuing failure of military offensives in 1995 and 1996 made it increasingly clear that the PNG government was unlikely to acquire control of the Panguna mine and of the capital Arawa solely by military means³⁰; however, it was not until the summer of 1997, after these military failures were coupled with a political and diplomatic scandal sparked by the use of private military troops in these offensives (the so-called 'Sandline crisis' – discussed in paragraph 5.1.1) that the PNG government officially accepted that no alternative existed to constructive dialogue with the Bougainvillean rebels. For this reason, the 0.5 threshold for 'mutually hurting stalemate' is considered as passed only since the Burnham Truce (3BOU05).

4.2 Complexity

The conflict in Bougainville is a paradigmatic instance of 'complex' conflict. The primary form of 'complexity' that can be associated with this conflict is the high number of issues at stake. As mentioned in paragraph 2, Bougainvilleans typically consider the annexation of their island to Papua New Guinea as a legacy of the colonial period, and therefore have deep-seeded independentist ambitions, which already surfaced in the mid-1970s when Papua New Guinea became an independent state. However, what makes the Bougainvillean conflict particularly

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ South Pacific war fades back into obscurity as military offensive fails. *AFP*, 12 August 1996.

‘complex’ from this perspective is the overlap of two different set of claims – secessionist and economic – each of which bears particular strength on its own and which ultimately reinforced each other. The 1988-2001 conflict in Bougainville was, in fact, sparked by a rebellion related to the redistribution of the wealth generated by the exploitation of the natural resources of the island, and could be considered, according to Chris Ballard and Glenn Banks (2003), as a typical example of ‘resource war’ – a war generated by complaints on the behaviour of a multinational corporation that controls most of the natural resources of a specific territory. Competing claims on the control of specific natural resources, according to Michael Ross (2004a, 61), make ‘conflict more likely to occur, last longer, and produce more casualties when it does occur’, in particular if the process of extraction is capital-intensive (Ross 2004b) and the local community benefits from the process only indirectly through the redistribution of the profits (and not, for instance, directly through the employment of locals). As the number of post-Cold War territorial conflicts featuring both deep-seeded independentist and major economic claims is relatively low, the Bougainville conflict arguably belongs to the highest membership class in the ‘complexity of issues at stake’ variable.

A high membership score should also be assigned to the variable describing ‘decision-making complexity’. Papua New Guinea is typically considered as ‘a successful example of “established” democracy’ (Reilly 1999, 225) and has received the highest score in the EXCONST variable of the Polity IV dataset ever since its independence in 1975. More difficult is to assess the level of fragmentation of the rebel front in Bougainville. Roland May (2004, 279) argues that by 1989 the rebel front was already split in various sub-groups, and reporters suggested that in 1990 ‘a mini civil war’³¹ had erupted in the south of the island, ‘with Bougainvilleans fighting one another along clan lines’³²; yet, the Minorities at Risk project (2003) claims that ‘[t]he Bougainvilleans were primarily represented by the militant BRA throughout the early to mid-1990s’ and that ‘conventional organizations have risen to the forefront’ only after the 2001 peace agreement. The peace talks which took place since 1997, however, seem to

³¹ New Zealand role sought in defusing Bougainville. *The Dominion*, 26 July 1995, 11.

³² *Ibid.*

confirm the impression that, while the Bougainvillean rebels did not fragment into a vast galaxy of competing guerrilla groups, the rebel front was indeed moderately divided. When the Burnham pre-negotiation talks were held in July 1997 with the aim of helping the Bougainvilleans to find a common negotiating position, they were attended by 'more than 70 Bougainville leaders representing different interest groups on the island', including 'the BRA and the BIG, the BTG and the Resistance force, women's groups, the Churches and local chiefs' (Tapi 2002, 26). In consideration of this moderately divided negotiation milieu within the rebels, and of the univocally democratic regime type of PNG, the fuzzy score associated to 'decision-making complexity' of the process has been set at 0.8.

Arguably the most difficult and potentially controversial aspect in coding the Bougainvillean process concerns the presence or absence of a major inter-cultural cleavage, also because the MAR database does not provide a figure that could guide the coding process. In itself Papua New Guinea is one of the most ethnically fragmented states on the planet: as Benjamin Reilly (2000-01, 170) notes, 'approximately 840 distinct languages [are] spoken in PNG, around a quarter of the world's stock, reflecting enormous cultural divisions'. Arguments based on the ethnic distinctiveness of Bougainville have been used by Francis Ona, the leader of BRA, to justify his secessionist claims³³. This alone justifies the choice of attributing a fuzzy-set score higher than the 0.5 threshold. The extent to which such cultural and linguistic diversity implies that a major inter-cultural cleavage existed in the conflict is, however, disputable. PNG arguably constitutes a rather peculiar instance among sovereign states in which every ethnic group is somehow to be considered as an ethnic minority – a situation far different from the 'bipolar linguistic divisions that have molded political development in Canada, Belgium, Estonia and some African states' (Reilly 2000-01, 178). Bougainville itself is extremely fragmented ethnically and linguistically: figure 5.4 shows that the 160,000 inhabitants of the island speak at least 28 different languages, the majority of which is spoken by less than 2,000 people. One may still suggest that, even in the absence of a 'bipolar linguistic division', the Bougainvilleans found themselves consistently opposed to the specific ethnic

³³ PNG Politics Cries Out for Honest Broker. *Canberra Times*, 22 July 1997, 9.

group that yielded power. However, even this suggestion appears to be highly debatable, as no single ethnic group has succeeded in controlling the political process in PNG and, while relatively ethnically-homogeneous coalitions regularly emerge, these coalitions appear 'to rotate' regularly (*ibid.*). For these reasons, despite the extreme ethnic divisions that characterize PNG and Bougainville itself, we have chosen to assign to the conflict a fuzzy score of 0.8, short of the highest membership score.



Figure 5.4
Main language groups in Bougainville (2001)

5. ‘There are no deadlines’: the Burnham Truce

The 1997 Burnham Truce arguably constitutes the turning point of the Bougainville conflict and a crucial step for the development of the peace process, whose framework would be formalised three months later, in January 1998, with the Lincoln Agreement.

The truce itself was agreed after ten days of talks in the Burnham military base, near Christchurch, New Zealand, on 10 October 1997. The final document was signed by representatives of the PNG government, the BTG, the BIG, Commanders of the Resistance Force and the BRA. The signatories agreed not just on the suspension of hostilities but also to meet on regular basis to monitor the implementation of the commitment, and to the deployment of a multinational Truce Monitoring Group led by New Zealand.

5.1 The background: two new elements

The success of the Burnham Truce and of the following Lincoln Agreement can be associated with two major changes in the diplomatic milieu of the Bougainville peace process. The agreement was concluded, first of all, after the so-called ‘Sandline affair’ - a major domestic and international scandal which followed the decision of PM Julius Chan to hire a London-based private military company (PMC) to support the war effort in Bougainville, which had deep impacts on the politics of PNG and on the relations between the government and the armed forces. Moreover, while New Zealand and Australia had been involved in the peace process at least since 1995, the Sandline affair reinforced the determination of these two major regional powers to mediate directly between the parties. The involvement of New Zealand coincided with the adoption of new negotiating strategies which, also because of the political climate generated by the Sandline affair, directly contributed to the success of the truce.

5.1.1 The impact of the ‘Sandline affair’

In the early months of 1997 PNG Prime Minister Julius Chan decided to hire a British-based private military consultancy firm, Sandline International, to train and assist the PNGDF with the aim of organizing a decisive military operation to bring the Bougainville conflict to a conclusion. One of the world’s major private military corporations at that time, Sandline was known for providing not just training and military advice but also ‘combat support’, entailing ‘the use of very high levels of lethal force’ (Kinsey 2006, 10), and for the dubious records of senior members of its staff³⁴.

Once the decision was made public in late February, the PNG government had to face widespread criticism both from Australia and New Zealand – who considered the introduction of mercenary groups as a dangerous precedent for the region – and from its own military forces, whose moral had been undermined by the lengthy war in Bougainville and that were chronically underpaid. Despite Chan’s attempts to portray the tasks of Sandline as limited to training and his systematic refusal to apply the label ‘mercenary’ to the Sandline personnel, once the details of the contract were revealed (including the US\$36 million fee that the PNG government had committed to pay), the PNGDF officially refused to collaborate with the Sandline forces and raised allegation of corruption against Chan. The kidnapping of some Sandline employees in a PNGDF camp resulted in the sacking of a senior PNGDF officer for ‘gross insubordination bordering on treason’ (McCormack 1998, 296), which in turn was met in Port Moresby by mass demonstrations and riots. In mid-March the PNG government was forced to cancel the contract with Sandline; on 18 March Sandline employees began leaving the country.

Ex post Julius Chan’s deal with Sandline appeared ‘incredibly foolish [...] politically as well as diplomatically’³⁵, and the crisis that followed had many

³⁴ Dog of war with his tail between his legs; Profile: Lt-Col Timothy Spicer. *The Sunday Times*, 30 March 1997.

³⁵ A calm pause in PNG reveals unanswered questions. *The Dominion*, 31 March 1997, 2.

relevant consequences on the Bougainville conflict and the peace negotiations. On the one hand, it made explicit for Papua New Guinea that the conflict in Bougainville had reached a point of no return. The scandal widened the fracture between the PNG government and its military forces, pushed the country to the verge of a military mutiny and finally revealed that, even from a military standpoint, the cost of the war had become unbearably high for PNG. After the crisis, the government and the country at large clearly understood that the conflict had reached a condition of ‘hurting stalemate’: by the end of March, according to *The Economist*, ‘few people [believed] that any war against the entrenched Bougainville rebels and their leader, Francis Ona, would ever be winnable’³⁶. The affair also casted a shadow on the elections that were held between 14 and 28 June 1997, in which the hard-liner PM Chan even lost his seat in parliament and was replaced by a cabinet led by William ‘Bill’ Skate, who from the outset assumed a more conciliatory position vis-à-vis the Bougainvillian rebels³⁷.

5.1.2 The involvement of New Zealand

As a consequence of the Sandline affair, but also as culmination of longer-term commitments, new, powerful mediators – New Zealand and Australia – became directly involved in the conflict and decided to mediate directly between the parties and contribute to the deployment of truce monitoring forces.

Both powers had kept an almost neutral stance towards the conflict for most of the early 1990s, leaving NGOs and other minor regional actors – such as the Solomon islands – the task to mediate between the parties. Australia’s position was also particularly delicate, being the power from which PNG had seceded, and because of the multiple economic and political links between the two countries. However, in late 1995 the Australian authorities had organized an ambitious, yet unlucky series of meetings at Cairns to relaunch the peace process, which failed

³⁶ Papua New Guinea: Line in the Sand. *The Economist*, 29 March 1997, 40.

³⁷ Popular Skate rules uneasy alliance. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 23 July 1997, 8.

almost immediately after BRA representatives were fired on by government troops on their way back to Bougainville³⁸.

During the Sandline crisis, the pressure on Australia and New Zealand to 'abandon [their] pompous neutrality over Bougainville' mounted³⁹. Yet, in late March 1997 Ms Lilian Crofts, a representative of the BIG and BRA, officially rejected the prospect of an Australian mediation, alleging that, since the Australian authorities had kept on their territory supplies and equipment for Sandline while the political crisis was unfolding, they were somehow involved in the affair⁴⁰. On the contrary, New Zealand, that had been actively involved in the conflict since its outset through local NGOs and private individuals and that had kept to that date a lower profile, appeared as a more widely accepted broker; and the Sandline crisis convinced the New Zealander government to declare explicitly its availability to act as mediator in a new phase of the peace process.

When the affair was unfolding, New Zealand's Prime Minister Jim Bolger joined with Australia to condemn the use of mercenaries, and called for 'the government of Sir Julius Chan [to] commit itself to a comprehensive peace plan for Bougainville'⁴¹, stating that 'in these circumstances, New Zealand stands ready to offer assistance as may be appropriate to reinforce the efforts of the government [...] in successfully pursuing a peaceful, politically negotiated settlement on Bougainville'⁴². When the result of the elections was still to be announced, on 27 June 1997 the government-backed BTG and the independentist BIG/BRA accepted New Zealand's invitation, brokered by two Australian lawyers (Leo White and Mark Plunkett), to hold informal talks at the Burnham base, Christchurch, New Zealand to elaborate a shared declaration of intents to be then negotiated with the newly-elected PNG government⁴³.

³⁸ PNG troops accused of shots at rebel leaders. *Hobart Mercury*, 9 January 1996.

³⁹ Found wanting by our ally. *The Australian*, 14 March 1997, 15.

⁴⁰ Chan move raised Bougainville's peace hopes. *The Age*, 29 March 1997, 2.

⁴¹ Howard lays it on the line to PNG. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 March 1997, 12

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Breakthrough in South Pacific island civil war. *AFP*, 27 June 1997.

5.2 Kick-starting the process: the New Zealander approach

The success of the Burnham agreement can be connected with three specific decisions of the New Zealander mediators: the explicit rejection of the idea of structuring the negotiation around strict deadlines; the organisation of a pre-negotiation conference which was crucial in creating a common ground among the Bougainvillean delegations; the commitment of New Zealand to continue working with the PNG and Bougainvillean authorities after the agreement to help its implementation, which led to the creation of a truce monitoring force.

5.2.1 Rejection of deadline diplomacy

The Burnham truce not only took place in the absence of major ‘practical’ deadlines (indeed, immediately *after* a major national election), but the negotiating process that led to the agreement was also explicitly based on the rejection of artificial time pressure as a valid strategy for convincing the parties to reach an agreement.

The meetings in Burnham were preceded in May 1997 by a short-lived peace plan – known as Barter Peace Plan after the PNG Provincial Affairs minister that proposed it – which failed because, as the PNG national elections were approaching, ‘there was no-one the BRA could effectively negotiate with’⁴⁴. The plan, however, was widely perceived as a ‘breakthrough’ and as ‘the most realistic proposal in recent years’⁴⁵. Among other things, it provided an extended timeframe for the negotiation, aimed at favouring agreements between warring factions and at supporting the role of elders. Pat Howley, head of the Australian-funded PEACE foundation and involved in the conflict resolution efforts in Bougainville, was reported by the *Sydney Morning Herald* as strongly in favour to this plan. Its innovative features, according to Mr Howley, lied in the fact that:

⁴⁴ Bougainville rebels reject peace strategy. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 31 May 1997, 20.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

This strategy allows time and space for people to do their own thinking. [...] Nothing is imposed on them from the outside, there are no deadlines, no arguments over independence. In fact what you really need is a whole set of different solutions for different problems.⁴⁶

The fact that the Bougainvilleans had a strong preference for a slowly-paced negotiation process was confirmed on 18 June, when representatives of the BTG and other groups met in Auckland with the New Zealander foreign minister Don McKinnon and other senior officials. In that occasion, according to the BTG executive officer Robert Tapi (2002, 26):

The Bougainvilleans explained that earlier meetings had not succeeded because they had insufficient time to resolve internal difficulties. The New Zealand side was willing to listen and had no particular agenda except to support a process owned by Bougainvilleans.

This suggestion was followed by a request to 'host a meeting of all Bougainville factions so that they could come together and speak with one voice' (ibid.). When this preliminary meeting took place in early July, McKinnon remarked that 'the purpose was for warring Bougainvilleans to consult [...] without time constraints, and once they had reached common ground, to go to PNG with proposals for more substantive peace talks'.⁴⁷

5.2.2 Success of pre-negotiation agreements and truce monitoring

As shown by the abovementioned statements, in the case of the Burnham negotiations the rejection of deadline diplomacy appears as primarily functional to the need to provide sufficient time for preliminary negotiations among the Bougainvillean delegations to take place. The failure of previous negotiation attempts – the Bougainvillean delegation to Auckland suggested – had failed because the representatives from the island had 'insufficient time to resolve internal difficulties'. The absence of time pressure in Burnham would then allow

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Rebels nearly wreck PNG peace talks by firing on helicopter. *AFP*, 5 July 1997. Cf. also: PNG peace through NZ. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 July 1997, 14.

negotiations with the PNG government to begin only after an agreement on a common position has been reached among the Bougainvilleans.

The idea of reaching an agreement among the Bougainvilleans before official negotiations with the PNG government was not new. As mentioned earlier, in December 1995 Australia had organized a five-day peace conference in Cairns, a Queensland touristic resort not far from PNG, which was focused on reaching a common position among a wide range of stakeholders (the PNG-backed BTG, the BIG/BRA, Bougainvillean MPs, and a range of other minor groups), but with ‘no official PNG presence’⁴⁸. Commentators, at that time, noted that ‘[t]he significance of the Cairns talks [...] is that while autonomy for Bougainville remains the key issue, all the separate island factions are meeting for the first time to discuss it’⁴⁹; PM Julius Chan, while not attending the meeting, welcomed the initiative and stressed that ‘it [represented] their first real chance [for the BIG/BRA] in five years to hear at first hand what the leaders of the rest of Bougainville think’⁵⁰. The peace initiative, however, failed after rebel leaders returning to Bougainville were fired upon by the PNGDF, who had allegedly ‘not received instructions to allow the rebels a safe passage’⁵¹.

In the summer of 1997 the New Zealander diplomacy continued on the path set by the Australian diplomacy few years earlier, but with a much stronger emphasis on the absence of time limits for the talks and in a radically different political and diplomatic climate. After the Sandline affair and the fall of Julius Chan, the conflict was explicitly recognized, in the words of the Australian lawyer and mediator Mark Plunkett, as being in a ‘mutually-hurting stalemate’⁵²; indeed, according to the BIG vice chairman Joseph Kabui, ‘the mercenary issue acted as a catalyst’ for the new peace initiative⁵³. Moreover, the new PM Bill Skate appeared far keener on supporting peace talks on the Bougainville issue. He told the PNG parliament on 22 July that he wanted to see a ‘peaceful solution to the nine-year crisis’, and emphasised that ‘he believed it was necessary for Bougainvilleans

⁴⁸ Bougainville rebel leaders come in from tropical cold. *The Australian*, 14 December 1995.

⁴⁹ Cairns talks offer Bougainville hope. *Courier-Mail*, 16 December 1995.

⁵⁰ Killings cast pall over peace talks. *The Advertiser*, 14 December 1995.

⁵¹ PNG troops accused of shots at rebel leaders. *Hobart Mercury*, 9 January 1996.

⁵² ‘Road tested’ negotiation theories behind Bougainville peace talks. *AFP*, 13 July 1997. The final assault: negotiation. *Hobart Mercury*, 14 July 1997.

⁵³ Breakthrough in South Pacific island civil war. *AFP*, 27 June 1997.

themselves to establish peace before talks could take place with the national Government'⁵⁴. In what appeared as an official endorsement of the pre-negotiation talks in Burnham, he suggested that 'the people of Bougainville alone can solve this crisis, and indeed must be allowed to without interference from glory-seekers'⁵⁵.

The absence of time pressure and these 'hard' factors critically contributed to make the pre-negotiation talks organized by the New Zealand diplomacy in the summer of 1997 much 'more productive' than previous similar initiatives⁵⁶. The talks took place in Burnham on 5-18 July and were attended by 'more than 70 Bougainville leaders representing different interest groups on the island' and included 'delegates from the BRA and the BIG, the BTG and the Resistance force, women's groups, the Churches and local chiefs' (Tapi 2002). The final declaration – usually known as Burnham I (while the truce itself is designated as Burnham II) – included a commitment to declare a ceasefire and to engage in a negotiation process aimed at ending the war. The delegates wanted the peace process to include the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force and provisions for lifting the blockade and the restrictions in the activities of humanitarian agencies, and should have ensured that the people of Bouganville could 'freely and democratically exercise their right to determine their political future' (Bell 2000, 23). The date of the successive summit with the PNG government (early October) was also set in the final document of the conference – an important detail which testifies that the meeting was *not* taking place under the pressure of any pre-scheduled forthcoming summit.

New Zealand's 'quiet but effective diplomatic arm-twisting'⁵⁷ demonstrated in the Burnham negotiations was widely praised in the region. Australian newspapers contrasted the success of Burnham with the failed mediation attempts undertaken in the previous months and years by the Australian authorities, suggesting that:

⁵⁴ Popular Skate rules uneasy alliance. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 23 July 1997, 8.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ PNG politics cries out for honest broker. *Canberra Times*, 22 July 1997, 9.

⁵⁷ NZ's diplomatic example. *Canberra Times*, 11 December 1997, 12.

Australia's relationship with Papua New Guinea is unlikely to go into international affairs textbooks as a classic example of how to deal with a former colonial territory. In contrast, Australia's other island neighbour, New Zealand, is demonstrating that, when it comes to the tricky talk of international diplomacy, it has a well-developed sense of how best to use its limited but significant clout⁵⁸.

The success of New Zealand's mediation is, however, not to be associated only with its encouragement of 'self-help' in the Burnham negotiations⁵⁹, but also with its commitments to ensure, by organizing and participating in a peacekeeping operation, the presence of favourable conditions on the ground for the peace process to fruitfully develop. In early December, shortly before a new negotiation round in Lincoln was set to begin, a multinational Truce Monitoring Group (TMG), composed by over 200 unarmed civilian observers from New Zealand, Australia, Tonga, Fiji and Vanuatu was deployed in Bougainville (Kerr 1999, 61).

The force, replaced in February by an Australia-led Peace Monitoring Force, by ensuring that the truce would have been respected at least until the beginning of new comprehensive negotiations, effectively complemented the 'quiet' negotiating strategies employed by the New Zealander mediators and directly contributed to the successful resolution of one of the most intractable conflicts in the Pacific region.

6. Casamance: overview of the conflict

Casamance is a region in south Senegal, encompassing the two provinces of Kolda and Ziguinchor, with a population of approximately 800,000. Not dissimilarly from Bougainville, the area was at the centre of a series of intricate colonial struggles in the XIX century: under Portuguese influence until the mid-1800s, was gradually absorbed by the French empire until in 1866 the Portuguese officially gave up their rights. Yet, Casamance was – and still is – almost completely severed from the other provinces of Senegal by a British enclave, the Gambia, and enjoyed significant autonomy from Dakar throughout the colonial

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ Thumbs up for the Burnham accord. *The Evening Post*, 21 July 1997, 4.

period. The predominant ethnic group in Casamance, the Diola⁶⁰, also has strong connections with the population of the bordering Guinea-Bissau, while overall it amounts to only the 5% of the Senegalese population.



Figure 5.5
Political map of Senegal
(SOURCE: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS – PERRY-CASTAÑEDA LIBRARY MAP COLLECTION)

⁶⁰ At times spelled as 'Jola' in the Anglophone press – see: Senegal's southern rebellion starts to end. *BBC News*, 16 December 2004.

6.1 Origins and development of the revolt (1982-1995)

Considering its historical and ethnic distinctiveness, it comes to no surprise that the Casamançais population began developing some forms of political coordination still in the colonial period. The *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance* (MFDC), which later became the main force behind the separatist war, was founded as early as in March 1947 as a political party and as a pressure group lobbying for the interests of the Diola population in the Ziguinchor region. It obtained a first, symbolic success in 1960, when the first president of independent Senegal allegedly pledged to review the status of Casamance after 20 years of independence (FCO 1999, 2); the founder of the MFDC, Emile Badiane, died in 1972, was allegedly murdered by the Senegalese government in an attempt to cover up this deal.

The exact reasons for the outbreak of a full-fledged separatist revolt in 1982 are still unclear. By the early 1980s, after the death of Badiane, the MFDC had almost fallen into oblivion; yet between the late 1970s and the early 1980s the southern provinces of Senegal had been shaken by unrests of socio-economic nature (including protests against land expropriations for the construction of touristic resorts on the coastline) and in Ziguinchor riots regularly erupted at times for trivial reasons, including the defeat of the local Casa-Sport football team against Dakar after unfair refereeing decisions. The main consequence of this climate was the resurfacing of the separatist claims (possibly also associated with the expiry of the time period for redefining the status of Casamance in the deal struck by Badiane in 1960) and the resurgence of the MFDC under the leadership of the Catholic priest Father Augustine Diamacoune Senghor.

The formal outbreak of the rebellion is typically taken as 26 December 1982, when a mass demonstration in Zighinchor culminated with the replacement of the Senegalese tricolour with the Casamance flag on public building. Fr Senghor was arrested, among others, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment and would have been released only in late 1987; during his trial in December 1983 clashes took place in Diarbir and Ziguinchor, which ended with 29 dead. Occasional episodes of violence continued throughout the 1980s, in particular

after an armed wing of the MFDC – named ‘Attika’ (‘warrior’ in Diola) – was formed in 1985, but until the 1990s the activities of Attika were primarily ‘confined to ambushes and attacks on isolated police posts’. The Senegalese government regularly conceded amnesties and, shortly after the beginning of the revolt, appointed some Casamançais ministers in the cabinet as a sign of goodwill; however, it consistently refused to discuss the issue of independence and regularly carried out arrests of MFDC activists – so that throughout the revolt many senior members of the movement, including Fr Senghor, were almost continuously in and out of prison.

In April 1991 a first ceasefire agreement was agreed between the Senegalese government and the MFDC, followed in May by an agreement between Attika and the government of Guinea Bissau. The agreements were partially successful: a part of Attika observed the ceasefire and worked towards a more comprehensive peace agreement, but significant parts of the movement refused to lay down arms, bringing about a new surge in violence in early 1992. The violence reached its peak during the 1993 presidential election campaign, where Attika resorted to rocket attacks on the Ziguinchor airport and to a vast landmine campaign to discourage voters from polling their votes and to intimidate the government. These attacks notwithstanding, the president Diouf was re-elected and launched a new peace initiative, which resulted in a new ceasefire agreement being signed on July 1993. Like in 1991, the 1993 ceasefire disciplined the cessation of hostilities in exchange for the release of Casamançais prisoners from Senegalese prisons; and, not dissimilarly from the previous agreement, it succeeded to abate violence for approximately one year, while failing to provide solid grounds for comprehensive peace negotiations to begin.

6.2 Peak and decline (1995-2005)

The failure of the second ceasefire at the start of 1995 coincides with the peak of the conflict. Spurred by two attacks on the military and by the disappearance of four French tourists, the Senegalese army sent thousands of troops to Casamance and launched a campaign for the eradication of drug production, one of the main

sources of financing for the armed wings of the MFDC. Between October and November 1995 occurred 'some of the most intense firefights in the history of the conflict' (FCO 1999, 8). A new ceasefire helped decrease the intensity of the conflict in the following year, but, as another series of failed peace talks failed because of the 'disunity' of the MFDC (*ibid.*), violence reached another peak in August 1997, when Attika's troops attacked a military camp at Ziguinchor and provoked another series of retaliatory strikes by the Senegalese troops.

After 1997, however, the occasions for open confrontation between the MFDC and the Senegalese army gradually declined. The MFDC continued to disseminate landmines, and international organizations denounced various episodes of intimidation and extra-judicial killings (Amnesty International 1998). As sporadic fighting continued, the conflict appeared as deadlocked and was described in early 1998 as 'apparently insoluble'⁶¹. A new ceasefire was signed on 26 December 1999⁶², but it was soon met by a new rise in violence, primarily from 'renegade' groups who did not acknowledge the leadership of the mainstream MFDC leaders⁶³. The conflict also had significant impact on the northern regions of Guinea-Bissau, a country already shaken by internal conflicts and less politically stable than Senegal.

A new course in the conflict was inaugurated with the election on 19 March 2000 of the veteran opposition leader, Abdoulaye Wade, as president of Senegal. He immediately promised a 'global package' for the region, including a peace deal, removal of landmines and new economic measures⁶⁴. While 'fresh military clashes' in the areas bordering with Guinea-Bissau continued⁶⁵, Wade launched new peace initiatives which culminated in a new peace deal signed on 16 March 2001. The signing of the agreement followed the death on 30 November 2000 of the Casamance-born Guinea Bissau rebel leader Asumane Mane, who previously smuggled arms to the MFDC and occasionally provided it with safe havens in

⁶¹ PDS fighting talk. *ARB*, March 1998, 13042.

⁶² Casamance ceasefire. *ARB*, December 1999, 13808.

⁶³ Rising death toll in Casamance. *ARB*, January 2000, p. 13878.

⁶⁴ President Abdoulaye Wade. *ARB*, March 2000, 13891. Cf. also: A win for Wade's men and women. *The Economist*, 19 May 2001.

⁶⁵ National Security – In brief. *ARB*, April 2000, 13950.

north Guinea-Bissau⁶⁶, and shortly preceded a new round of national elections in Senegal. The agreement was designated as a ‘peace accord’⁶⁷ but was in fact little more than another ceasefire agreement⁶⁸, and was ‘postponed indefinitely’ already in May 2001⁶⁹.

Yet, despite the formal failure of the agreement, the level of violence in Casamance slowly ‘peter[ed] out’⁷⁰. The next major episode of violence would take place April 2004, when three soldiers were killed in southern Senegal. As many in the country felt that ‘the situation [had] gone on long enough’⁷¹, an ambitious peace agreement was struck on 30 December 2004. The deal, signed by the MFDC leader Augustine Diackoune Senghor and by the Senegalese Interior Minister Ousmane Ngom, included a pledge by the MFDC to demobilize and disarm its fighters; the movement also ‘definitely renounced armed struggle in favour of political struggle’. The government pledged to integrate the rebel fighters into paramilitary forces, and €94 million in reconstruction aid from 19 international lenders were included in the package⁷².

While some splinter groups refused to accept the agreement, blocking the development of a comprehensive negotiations on the status of Casamance, no major episode of violence was registered at least until March 2006, when some rebel factions engaged in low-intensity fighting with the Senegalese government and provoked a new, limited outflow of refugees to Gambia⁷³. After this outburst of violence, which ended by September 2006⁷⁴, few other episodes of violence are recorded in the country. Although the deadlocked peace process for the implementation of the 2004 agreement means that ‘the region remains in a state of neither war nor peace’⁷⁵, some encouraging signs – including the slow return of

⁶⁶ One war ends. *The Economist*, 15 May 1999.

⁶⁷ Casamance agreement. *ARB*, March 2001, 14346.

⁶⁸ The war in Casamance. *ARB*, March 2003, 15241.

⁶⁹ Casamance peace talks postponed. *ARB*, May 2001, 14417.

⁷⁰ Casamance villagers need help. *ARB*, January 2004, 15612.

⁷¹ The war in Casamance. *ARB*, March 2003, 15241.

⁷² Casamance deal signed. *ARB*, December 2004, 16038-16039.

⁷³ Rebel separated’, *ARB*, April 2006, 16601; MFDC rivalry. *ARB*, June 2006, 16691; Casamance offensive. *ARB*, August 2006, 16760.

⁷⁴ Lull in Casamance. *ARB*, October 2006, 16833.

⁷⁵ Peace mediator killed. *ARB*, December 2007, 17356; Can peace be taught in Casamance? *UN IRIN*, 17 April 2008.

refugee families to their homes in Casamance⁷⁶ – reveal that, while the region is somehow kept in a political and diplomatic ‘limbo’⁷⁷, the conflict is today ‘fizzl[ing] out’⁷⁸.

7. Thematic analysis and fuzzy set coding

The Casamance conflict is, as the other separatist wars in West Africa included in the dataset (the Tuareg rebellions in Niger and Mali), an extremely elusive conflict. While often portrayed as ‘Africa’s longest-running civil war’⁷⁹ and at times compared with Northern Ireland for its intensity, ethno-regional dimension and degeneration into ‘gangsterism’⁸⁰, the conflict’s ‘modest size’⁸¹ became, in particular since the decline in violence in the late 1990s, an obstacle to its own resolution: analysts noted that by 2004 ‘by Dakar it [was] mostly regarded as a distant problem with few consequences for the elite’⁸², and the insufficient attention that it received from international agencies and mediators can be associated to the fact that ‘abroad it is little known in the Anglophone world’⁸³.

7.1 *Conflict management*

The Casamance conflict can be described as a low intensity conflict⁸⁴, somehow similar the Bougainville war, and slowly died out since the late 1990s as a consequence of a wide range of factors.

The conflict is included as a minor conflict the UCDP Armed Conflict database for the years 1990, 1992-3, 1995, 1997-2003. The estimated number of

⁷⁶ Casamance in limbo. *ARB*, January 2008, 17395.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Finding incentives for peace in Casamance. *Africa News / UN IRIN*, 25 June 2008. Cf. also Evans (2004, 1) who, more appropriately, describes the conflict of ‘West Africa’s longest-running civil conflict’ [emphasis added].

⁸⁰ Senegal’s southern rebellion starts to end. *BBC News*, 16 December 2004.

⁸¹ Casamance review. *ARB*, August 2004, 15883.

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ A win for Wade’s men and women. *The Economist*, 19 May 2001.

casualties since 1990 is comprised between 1,000 and 3,000 (Bercovitch and Jackson 1997). By 2006 the number of individuals displaced or exiled was estimated in 64,000 – approximately 8% of the overall population of the region. More persistent than the Bougainville war (at times defined as a '50-year old problem'⁸⁵), yet with an arguably lesser impact on the region, the conflict has been attributed the same fuzzy-set score for severity as Bougainville (0.6).

At many stages, and in particular since the mid-1990s, the conflict was seen by the Senegalese authorities as little more than an issue of public order, and external mediation was often not welcomed. The French diplomacy, with few exceptions⁸⁶, showed interest in the Casamance rebels only when French citizens were involved – as it was the case in 1995, when four French tourists were kidnapped and later killed. Yet, in a sense, the peculiar geographical position of Casamance, and the ethnic and colonial links between the region and Guinea-Bissau, made it almost inevitable for the conflict to assume at least a regional dimension: the MFDC rebels often took refuge in Gambia or in Guinea-Bissau, and both countries, which also had to cope with a modest refugee influx, repeatedly tried to broker an agreement between Senegal and the rebels⁸⁷. However, the collusion between actors in Guinea-Bissau and the MFDC and the limited diplomatic leverage of Gambia essentially undermined all these efforts. Overall, thus, external mediation seems not to have contributed to any significant degree to the signing of the agreements included in the dataset.

The elusiveness of the conflict also makes it difficult to understand at which stage, if ever, the conflict reached a situation of stalemate. Contrary to Bougainville, no major political crisis comparable to the Sandline affair took place in Senegal; indeed, the Senegalese political system seemed to remain almost untouched by the rebellion. Yet the conflict does approximate a condition of stalemate in the first years of the new millennium, under at least two perspectives. First of all, if it is hard to find public declarations from senior Senegalese officials or rebel leaders stating explicitly that the conflict has reached an impasse, deadlock or stalemate, the large majority of analysts agreed that the steady decline

⁸⁵ Border reopens. *ARB*, August 2000, 14068.

⁸⁶ Weapons on agenda during president Wade's trip. *ARB*, May 2000, 13990.

⁸⁷ Instant war: Army rebels shatter Guinea-Bissau. *The Economist*, 20 June 1998.

in violence that followed the 2001 truce revealed that 'the conflict [had] been gone on long enough'⁸⁸; by 2006 observers would argue that 'no-one, including the rebels, can say with confidence what the fight is about any more'⁸⁹. After more than twenty years of low-intensity clashes, one might suggest that the conflict gradually 'died out', as the population became increasingly wary of the fighting and the economic conditions of the region continued to deteriorate⁹⁰.

However, while no single, major crisis can be connected with the beginning of comprehensive peace negotiations, the timing of the main truces and agreements struck since 2000 can somehow be collated with the death of the ageing leaders of the groups associated with the revolt. The 2001 truce, as noted, shortly followed the death of the leader of Guinea-Bissau rebels connected with the MFDC; the 2004 agreement was preceded by the death in June 2003 of the historical head of Attika, Sidi Badji, who had 'held out against any compromise with the government in Dakar' since the 1980s. The connection between these events and the agreements cannot be proven for certain, and on balance it seems clear that they acted asymmetrically on the negotiating power of the parties, damaging in particular the position of the MFDC; however, it seems reasonable to suggest that the interaction between the gradual 'dying out' of the conflict and the death of two senior leaders of the revolt significantly contributed to 'hallowing' the rebellion and making a political compromise more likely. For these reason, the MHS fuzzy-set score for the final agreement has been set at 0.6.

7.2 Complexity

The Casamance rebellion, while arguably focused on a more limited range of disputed issues than Bougainville, is characterized by a significant degree of decision-making and inter-cultural complexity.

The real aims of the revolt remain unclear. An economically distinctive region within Senegal, when the revolt unfolded Casamance rebels seemed

⁸⁸ The war in Casamance. *ARB*, March 2003, 15241. Cf. also: Casamance rebel factions meet in Gambia. *Africa News / UN IRIN*, 6 June 2001.

⁸⁹ Lull in Casamance. *ARB*, October 2006, 16883.

⁹⁰ Senegal's Casamance struggles back from 20 years of conflict. *AFP*, 24 May 2008.

primarily interested in reaffirming their sense of cultural pride and in securing adequate funding from the central government for the regional economy (primarily based on agriculture and tourism) to flourish. If among the aims of the revolt was at times mentioned full independence⁹¹ or the creation of a ‘Gabou federation’ with Gambia and Guinea-Bissau⁹², most factions within the MFDC repeatedly showed willingness to accept a solution that would see Casamance remain within Senegal with a certain degree of autonomy in exchange for economic concessions. The fuzzy-score for issue complexity has thus been set short of the 0.5 threshold.

The Minorities at Risk project suggests that the degree of inter-cultural difference between the Diola population in Casamance and the majority of the Senegalese population is moderately high (7/10). The Diola are the only major ethnic group in Senegal that does not speak Wolof; in Casamance 60% of the population belongs to this group, which however constitutes only the 5.5% of the population of Senegal as a whole (FCO 1999, 3). Moreover, the Casamance rebellion is often described as one of the conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa which developed around a Muslim-Christian divide (Minorities at Risk project 2009). While this suggestion is highly problematic (75% of the population in Casamance is Muslim – cf. Evans 2004, 3), a more relevant, yet relatively marginal religious divide seems to distinguish ‘imported’ religions from the local cults followed by 8% of the Casamançais population: indeed, most separatists belonged to animist groups whose rites focused on so-called *bois sacrés* (‘sacred woods’ – places of initiatory rites and precluded to most of the population) and which are strictly connected to the geographical and morphological features of the region, directly challenged by the growing immigration from the north and by the exploitation of natural resources⁹³. The fact that the Casamançais rebellion can be reasonably described as ‘a Diola project’ (FCO 1999, 4) is sufficient to consider the 0.5 threshold as passed; however, the religious picture and the fact that the MFDC did not ‘overtly base its demand on linguistic, cultural or ethnic grounds’ (FCO 1999,

⁹¹ Senegal’s voyage to development. *The Economist*, 13 January 2001.

⁹² Casamance factions meet. *ARB*, June 1999, 13593.

⁹³ The war in Casamance. *ARB*, March 2004, 15242.

3) suggest that the score for cultural diversity should be lower (0.6) than in the case of Bougainville.

The resolution of the Casamance conflict was also complicated by the presence of a high degree of decision-making complexity. The Polity IV project assigned a relatively low score (3/7) to the level of executive constraints in Senegal throughout the 1980s and 1990s, although the score doubled (6/7) since 2000. Overall, however, it is rather safe to suggest that Senegal has been – and still is – ‘one of the most democratic countries in Africa’⁹⁴: while Senegalese presidents enjoyed significant power at times tried to enact political reforms aimed at increasing the duration of the presidential mandate, the political system of the country is substantially stable and the parliament seems to act effectively as a counter-balance to the powers of the presidency. On the other hand, the rebel movement has been described by the Minorities at Risk project (2009) as ‘not highly organized or cohesive’. While the rebel movement was essentially structured around a single organization, the MFDC, the Front acted at least since the mid-1980s more as an ‘umbrella’ collecting a range of *maquisards* than as a centralized resistance movement. By the beginning of the new millennium, the MFDC was divided at least between the factions loyal to the historical leader Augustine Diamacone Senghour, the Attika group headed by Sidi Badji and other splinter factions, radically opposed to any agreement with the Senegalese government, many of which recognized the leadership of Salif Sadio. Not dissimilarly from Bougainville, since the 1980s a range of criminal groups began exploiting the chaos created by the revolt, prompting the suggestion from external observers that the region had witnessed ‘the degeneration of a political struggle into gangsterism’⁹⁵. Overall, thus, the conflict arguably deserves a high fuzzy-set score for decision-making complexity (0.8).

⁹⁴ Protest march. *ARB*, November 2003, 15541.

⁹⁵ Senegal’s southern rebellion starts to end. *BBC News*, 16 December 2004.

8. ‘Wash the dirty laundry in private’: the making of the 2004 agreement

The 2004 Casamance agreement, as mentioned above, somehow defies the clear-cut interpretative categories that we have adopted to assess the Bougainville peace process; indeed, it is arguable whether the concept of ‘peace process’ fully applies to the sequence of truces that were agreed since the early 1990s, or even whether the 2004 deal deserves to be labeled as a ‘peace agreement’. However, the evidence available seems to be sufficient for supporting three main claims: the 2004 agreement did set the stage for a reduction in the violence and for some form of conflict resolution, and thus deserves to pass the 0.5 threshold for ‘durability’; the extreme fragmentation of the rebel movement had been, at least since the mid-1990s, the main obstacle towards the resolution of the conflict; and the negotiations that led to the 2004 agreement corresponded with an explicit and, if not unprecedented, at least unusually vigorous and successful effort by the leadership of the MFDC to create common ground among the factions that composed the rebel movement before the start of negotiations with the Senegalese government.

Overall, these suggestions go some way towards confirming the interpretative picture suggested in the analysis of the Burnham truce: pre-negotiation coordination among the factions of highly divided rebel movements seems to be an important, if not primary, determinant of durable peace agreements in the context of conflicts which feature fragmented decision-making processes and high inter-cultural differences. Yet, they do so with at least two relevant caveats: in the case of Casamance, the process of coordination among rebel groups, while clearly favoured by the absence of time pressure and by the presence of some form of stalemate on the ground, seems not to be directly related to any explicit rejection of deadline diplomacy; and the level of fragmentation of the rebel movement seems to be less linked to the inter-cultural differences among the rebel groups than in Bougainville, and more to a leadership struggle among the historical leaders of the MFDC and among the heads of various *maquisard* factions.

8.1 The 2004 agreement and conflict termination

Before considering in detail the phase preceding the signing of the 2004 agreement, some more words should be spent to justify the claim that the treaty deserves to be considered as a reasonably ‘durable’ peace agreement. In fact, many still dispute whether the 2004 Casamance agreement really coincided with the de-escalation of the conflict, and how the treaty related with the Casamançais ‘peace process’ that was mentioned in political statements since the late 1990s. The Casamance ‘peace process’, thus, poses a more complicated case than the Bougainville process, where some disagreement might persist on the relevance of specific agreements (cf. Bell 2000, 18), but a general consensus exists on the fact that the Burnham negotiations and the Lincoln agreements kick-started a diplomatic peace process which resulted in the de-escalation of the conflict.

Many sources provide evidence suggesting that the 2004 agreement had little or no impact on the conflict. In January 2008 analysts of the Casamance conflict were observing that:

While all-out armed fighting has long been over, no comprehensive peace deal has been reached; the security climate is still precarious and some in the MFDC have resisted recovery efforts, refusing ‘normalisation’ without a resolution to the conflict⁹⁶.

Locals also typically look at the 2004 agreement with deep skepticism. Landing Diedhou, a former intermediary between the Senegalese government and the MFDC, suggested in June 2008 that ‘the peace process has not progressed in a long time – indeed, I’d say now it’s going backwards rather than forwards’⁹⁷. The absence of a real disarmament of the militias and the slowness of the process of demining contribute to perpetuating the feeling that the region remains in a state of ‘neither war nor peace’⁹⁸; occasional landmine blasts and exchanges of fire between rival factions or between the *maquisards* and the Senegalese government

⁹⁶ Casamance in limbo. *ARB*, January 2008, 17395.

⁹⁷ Finding incentives for peace in Casamance. *Africa News / UN IRIN*, 25 June 2008

⁹⁸ Neither war nor peace in Casamance after 25 years. *Africa News / UN IRIN*, 27 December 2007; Peace mediator killed. *ARB*, December 2007, 17356.

occasionally keep Casamance in the headlines of international news agencies to date⁹⁹.

Moreover, it is reasonable to suggest that the sudden disappearance of the Casamance rebellion from the UCDP dataset on armed conflicts since 2003 is one of those instances which expose the (somehow inevitable) arbitrariness of the criteria used by comparative datasets for classifying episodes of violence. The conflict already registered annual values of battle-related deaths only slightly exceeding the threshold (34 battle-related deaths per year – the threshold being 25) and the coders admitted that they had ‘insufficient information’ on battle-related deaths to code the conflict for the year 2006 (Harbom and Wallensteen 2007, 633). In other words, the trend of battle-related deaths (cf. figure 5.6) show that the conflict was already in steady decline since 2000, although the figure happened to descend below the threshold only since 2004; for the following years, the fact that the conflict was not coded as an armed conflict depended, by admission of the coders, primarily on the absence of clear information.

Yet, it is also clear that these observations, while highlighting that the conflict had reached a stalemate possibly since the late 1990s, are not in contrast neither with the suggestion that the conflict was in 2004 in a phase of de-escalation, nor, most importantly, with the claim that the 2004 agreement seems to have coincided with a further decrease in battle-related deaths in the conflict. The trend in battle-related deaths seems to confirm, instead, that, despite the fact that a conventional ‘peace process’ never started in Casamance, the conflict had in fact began the phase of de-escalation before a full-fledge peace treaty had been signed. Today Casamance is a region which is ‘no longer gripped by all-out armed conflict’¹⁰⁰ but which has to face the typical problems of post-conflict reconstruction, being ‘plagued by landmines, violent crime and occasional armed skirmishes, as well as political killings’¹⁰¹.

⁹⁹ Cf.: Lack of peace accord hampers demining in Casamance. *Africa News / UN IRIN*, 9 May 2008.

¹⁰⁰ Peace mediator killed. *ARB*, December 2007, 17356.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*




Figure 5.6

‘Fizzling out’ effect in the Casamance conflict

(SOURCE: ADAPTATION FROM LACINA, MEIER AND SCHÜEPP 2006, 276-7)

In this sense, the history of the Casamance rebellion seems to confirm Christine Bell’s intuition that the expression ‘peace process’ might be used not only to designate an organized sequence of peace negotiations resulting in a gradual reduction in the episodes of violence, but also to ‘describe a stage in the conflict’ (Bell 2000, 18) – a phase marked by attempts of dialogue between the parties, not necessarily successful, coinciding with a gradual ‘fizzling out’ of the fighting on the ground.

8.2 *Inter-faction coordination and pre-negotiation agreements*

Most analysts and ‘insiders’, however, agree on the fact that, at least since the late 1990s, the main obstacle towards the resolution of the conflict has been the fragmentation of the rebel movement and its inability to agree on what the final

aims of the revolt should be and on the opportunity to begin negotiations with the Senegalese government¹⁰².

The internal dynamics within the MFDC are defined since the 1990s as 'confused'¹⁰³. Throughout the height of the fight, internal quarrels and leadership struggles within the movement resulted in many episodes of violence and killings¹⁰⁴, so that journalists were at times uncertain whether specific acts were to be attributed to the Senegalese soldiers or to 'settling of scores' among MFDC factions¹⁰⁵. The MFDC was torn by the dualism between Augustine Diamacoune Senghour and Sidi Badji, the challenge from new leaders of the new generation (both Senghour and Badji were in their seventies) and from the *maquisards* led by Sadio, and was increasingly challenged from the outside by initiatives coming from Casamancais MPs and from the civil society¹⁰⁶.

In this context, the formation of a joint delegation representing most, if not all, the Casamance rebel groups was quickly recognized as a necessary precondition for significant negotiations to begin. According to analysts, by late 1998:

The need for such dialogue [was] made even more urgent because the young fighters are increasingly adopting behaviour akin to banditry and a resurgence of violence could provoke greater rigidity from the Senegalese regime which seems ever more fragile on the political front¹⁰⁷.

Contrary to Bougainville, where coordination among Bougainvilleans as in the case of the Cairns or in the Burnham meetings implied the involvement of a very diverse range of actors, including the government-supported BTG, in Casamance the presence of a single umbrella organisation, the MFDC, and of a charismatic – although ageing – historical leader, Fr. Diamacoune, implied that the rebels had more frequent and regular opportunities for meeting, discussing their strategies and coordinating their activities. The main forum where such coordination could take place had been the MFDC annual conferences, typically

¹⁰² Cf.: Casamance peace process stalled? *ARB*, September 1999, 13700.

¹⁰³ Casamance rebellion spreads. *ARB*, October 1997, 12867.

¹⁰⁴ Cf.: MFDC bases destroyed. *ARB*, January 2001, 14273.

¹⁰⁵ Is a peaceful solution possible? *ARB*, September 1997, 12808.

¹⁰⁶ Scepticism greets peace call. *ARB*, January 1998, 12980.

¹⁰⁷ Opposition protest', *ARB*, October 1998, 13287.

taking place in spring. At times, in particular when major diplomatic initiatives were on the way, coordination meetings were also organised in neighboring countries. One of the most important inter-faction meetings took place in Gambia on spring 1999, when ‘a large delegation of separatist rebels’ met in Banjul ‘in order to arrive at a common stance for their forthcoming negotiations with the Senegalese government’¹⁰⁸. However, a resurgence of violence from Sidi’s *maquisards* which coincided with the meeting and resulted in thirty deaths, highlighted the widening ‘split’ among the rebels¹⁰⁹.

By 2004 the situation both on the ground, with the end of the support from Guinea-Bissau rebels, and within the MFDC, after the death in 2003 of Fr. Diamacoune’s main alter-ego at the head of the movement, Sidi Badji, was already radically different than in the late 1990s. Yet, the 2004 agreement was also preceded in spring 2004 by another, and this time unexpectedly successful, major inter-rebel conference.

After poorly attended inter-rebel talks arranged in October 2003 shortly after the death of Sidi Badji and boycotted by the MFDC armed faction, Fr. Diamacoune and other senior members of the MFDC leadership called for a new meeting on 1-3 May 2004 extended to all Casamance rebel groups. Fr. Diamacoune suggestively described the conference, organized at the sports stadium in Ziguinchor and attended by at least a hundred representatives of vast array of factions in the movement, as a chance to ‘wash the movement’s dirty laundry in private’¹¹⁰. At the end of the conference, the armed wing of the MFDC released a statement at the end of the meetings offering a unilateral ceasefire, to disarm their troops and canton them within selected sites, asking in return to the Senegalese government to reduce its military presence in Casamance to the pre-1982 status quo and the dismantling of the military camps around three major Casamançais cities¹¹¹. In September 2004 this offer was followed by the announcement by the more moderate components of the MFDC that the Front was

¹⁰⁸ Casamance rebels disarm. *ARB*, April 1999, 13520. Cf. also: Casamance factions meet. *ARB*, June 1999, 13593.

¹⁰⁹ Casamance rebels split. *ARB*, May 1999, 13554.

¹¹⁰ Casamance separatist suggest unilateral ceasefire plan in Senegal. *World Markets Analysis*, 4 May 2004; Senegal’s southern rebels meet to bury differences. *AFP*, 2 May 2004.

¹¹¹ Casamance separatist suggest unilateral ceasefire plan in Senegal. *World Markets Analysis*, 4 May 2004.

considering transforming into a political party with a new name, 'Movement for Federalism and Constitutional Democracy' – still, incidentally, to be abbreviated in French as MFDC¹¹².

The May 2004 conference marks an important turning point in the Casamance conflict. In contrast with the October 2003 meeting¹¹³, the 2004 talks were not boycotted by the armed wing of the MFDC, which not just made clear what its conditions for agreeing on a peace treaty were, but also implemented a unilateral ceasefire as a sign of goodwill. While some *maquisard* factions did not accept Fr. Diamacoune's leadership and continued some forms of low intensity guerrilla¹¹⁴, analysts concluded that at the end of the conference the MFDC had a significantly 'unified position on a peace process that could take effect immediately'¹¹⁵. Moreover, even if the details of the negotiations that preceded the December 2004 agreement are not known, *Agence France Presse* reported that the agreement was concluded after 'months of secret negotiations'¹¹⁶, and the conditions included in the agreement, while excluding a clear commitment from the Senegalese government to reduce the number of troops, closely recall those set out after the May conference. In other words, sufficient evidence seems to exist to suggest that the May 2004 meeting significantly contributed to creating the conditions for the 2004 peace agreement to be struck.

9. Bougainville and Casamance: conclusions

This analysis arguably provides sufficient evidence to attempt an answer to the three questions that we set in paragraph 2, and thus to shed light on the second explanatory configuration that emerged from the fuzzy-set analysis.

¹¹² Senegal: separatist group official wants movement to become political party. *BBC Monitoring International Reports*, 26 September 2004.

¹¹³ Southern Senegalese rebel group to meet in May. *Panafrican News Agency (PANA) Daily Newswire*, 16 April 2004.

¹¹⁴ Frosty relations. *ARB*, December 2006, 16887; Casamance in limbo. *ARB*, January 2008, 17395.

¹¹⁵ Casamance separatist suggest unilateral ceasefire plan in Senegal. *World Markets Analysis*, 4 May 2004.

¹¹⁶ Casamance deal signed. *ARB*, December 2004, 16038.

What are the processes that explain why the interaction between low time pressure, high decision-making complexity and high inter-cultural differences can produce durable agreements?

In both case studies, durable agreements were signed shortly after successful pre-negotiation meetings attended by most of the factions representing the rebel movements had been organised. This evidence confirms that the three explanatory variables included in the configuration generated by the fuzzy-set analysis do interact with each other at least in some processes that lead to durable agreements; in particular, these cases seem to suggest that low time pressure can help ease the problems generated by high decision-making complexity, and which in turn might be related to relevant inter-cultural cleavages, by making it possible for the rebel groups involved in a negotiation to effectively coordinate among themselves before initiating formal negotiations with the counterpart.

Moreover, these case studies suggest that the relation between relevant inter-cultural differences and low time pressure that can result in durable agreements is, at least in some circumstances, mediated by decision-making complexity. Indeed, it is decision-making complexity – and, more precisely, the level of fragmentation of the rebel movements that have to negotiate with state governments – that appears to be the most relevant obstacle to the resolution of these conflicts, as shown clearly by the Casamance conflict. Cultural complexity, at least in the case of Bougainville, strongly impacts on the fragmentation of the rebel group and, thus, does play a role in the causal process leading to the agreements. However, these cases provide little or no evidence to support the claim that peace agreements in countries suffering from relevant inter-cultural divisions are primarily the consequence of major psychological breakthroughs in the relations between the rebel groups and their governmental counterparts; indeed, both case studies show that the crucial steps that determined the result of the negotiations were probably taking place *before* official negotiations between rebels and governmental counterparts would begin. On balance, to explain the

impact of time pressure (or its absence) on complex integrative negotiations in both these case studies, H4a appears as a stronger hypothesis than H4c.

Under what conditions do low time pressure, high decision-making complexity and relevant inter-cultural differences produce durable agreements – that is, how do these three variables interact with the other ‘conflict management’ variables in these case studies?

The presence of somehow comparable intra-rebel pre-negotiation coordination initiatives, however, does not obscure the fact that these two conflicts were, in many other respects, significantly different. The Bougainville revolt followed the somehow ‘standard’ phases of peace processes as identified, among others, by Bell (2000, 16-7) and Darby and Mac Ginty (2000, 2-11). Also, a broad range of mediators had been involved in the conflict since its outset, and the successful outcome of the process that started at Burnham can be associated with the involvement of a new mediator, New Zealand, with its commitment to deploy a truce monitoring force, and with its skilful use of negotiating strategies – including the explicit rejection of deadline diplomacy and the organisation of pre-negotiation meetings for the Bougainvillean side – which had only partially been experimented before.

The Casamance conflict, on the contrary, gradually ‘fizzled out’ in the middle of a sequence of truces which only occasionally, as in 2004, were supplemented by more comprehensive measures aimed at addressing the underlying causes of the revolt or at creating the conditions for a sustainable and durable peace. In Casamance, moreover, no external mediator with significant leverage became involved in the negotiations between the Senegalese government and the rebels, and, while regional mediators – such as Gambia and, to a lesser extent, Guinea-Bissau – occasionally offered their good offices for organising intra-rebel meetings and at times volunteered for arranging talks between the rebels and the government, these efforts did not impact to any significant degree on the conflict.

Most importantly, the analysis of the conditions in which the two agreements considered in this chapter were struck highlights how the durability of these deals crucially depended on the presence of some kind of ‘stalemate’ which made the continuation of violence on the ground unlikely or undesirable, and increased the pressure on the parties to find a negotiated solution to the ongoing conflict. In the case of Bougainville, the Sandline affair acted as catalyst for a range of dynamics that were already unfolding (the growing frustration of the PNGDF, the increasing unpopularity of Julius Chan, the gradual involvement of major regional mediators in the conflict) and created the conditions for successful negotiations to take place in New Zealand. In the case of Casamance, the absence of support from the rebel movements in Guinea-Bissau and the death of popular leaders of the revolt significantly increased the pressure on the rebels, including the representatives of Attika, to sit at the negotiating table.

These different types of ‘stalemates’ also corresponded to a different degree of symmetry in distribution of the outcomes of the agreements. The Sandline crisis put pressure on the PNG government, which in turn had to agree, from the Lincoln agreement onwards, to conceding various forms of autonomy to the rebel island. On the contrary, in Senegal it was the separatist movement to suffer most from the turns of events in the first years of the new millennium, and in fact the 2004 agreement included almost no serious commitment on behalf of the Senegalese government to devolve relevant powers to the southern provinces.

The relations between time pressure and ‘conflict management’ and ‘complexity’ variables, in the case studies analysed (and primarily the peace process in Bougainville), are summarised in figure 5.7. In the figure, the presence of a mutually hurting stalemate is portrayed as one of the main factor directly contributing to durable agreement, together with the presence of a strong mediator and of intra-rebel agreements. A strong mediator would contribute directly to the durability of agreements primarily by playing a role to the monitoring process (as New Zealand did in the Bougainville peace process), and indirectly by creating the conditions that make pre-negotiation agreements possible, also by slowing the pace of negotiations when needed. Conflict intractability – the third ‘conflict management’ variable – would, on the other hand, impact on the negotiation

outcomes only indirectly by creating the conditions for elements of ‘complexity’ to emerge, which would, in turn, impact on the negotiation milieu and on the choice of the mediation strategies.




Figure 5.7
Process-tracing model for the Bougainville and Casamance peace negotiations
[normal arrow: causal relations; dotted line / arrow: effect through intervening variables]

Is there evidence to suggest that the absence of artificial time pressure in these case studies part of negotiating strategies based on an explicit rejection of deadline diplomacy?

The role of time pressure in the Casamance conflict is difficult to assess. The 2004 agreement was not struck in a summit and did not involve any form of

deadline diplomacy. As these conditions also apply to all the relevant negotiation attempts that preceded it, it is not possible to suggest that the relative success of this agreement was determined by the explicit rejection of deadline diplomacy as a valid strategy for resolving intractable conflicts. However, the timing of the negotiation stages in 2004 does show that the final agreement in December 2004 came as the culmination of a gradual sequence of negotiating efforts, and that the durability of the 2004 agreement crucially depended on the fact that it was concluded in a 'ripe' phase of the conflict.

On the other hand, the Bougainville conflict is a very interesting example of a conflict where deadline diplomacy was explicitly rejected not just by the parties involved, by also by the external mediator (New Zealand). The New Zealander foreign minister Don McKinnon explicitly stated the purpose of the Burnham pre-negotiation meeting 'was for warring Bougainvilleans to consult [...] without time constraints'. In other words, the Bougainville conflict seems to suggest that the turning point of what was arguably one of the few successful 'paradigmatic' peace processes of the post-Cold War period coincided with an explicit decision of the external mediators to combine summit diplomacy with a timescale that was substantially more relaxed than in previous, similar occasions, and which allowed the rebel side to coordinate their positions more effectively than in the past.

Chapter 6

Complexity and negotiating strategies: assessing the ‘Camp David Model’

1. The ‘Camp David Model’

The Bougainville and Casamance peace process provide a macro-level perspective on the role of time pressure (or of its absence) in ongoing peace processes; however, as the operationalisation of the ‘artificial’ time pressure variable on chapter 3 shows, one of the main diplomatic settings in which time pressure is deemed to play a central role is summit diplomacy.

While the fuzzy-set analysis seems to suggest that time pressure, in general, is not associated with durable agreements, one causal pattern persistently emerging from the two most relevant combinations of control variables in the robustness analysis (SEV and MED; SEV and med) and from the first model through which we have attempted to explain the impact of time pressure (2.2.1.1b) suggests that the presence of artificial time pressure can be connected with durable agreements in the presence of both decision-making complexity and issue-complexity (DED*DEC*ISS). This configuration reflects the usual features of summit diplomacy, where the use of artificial time pressure is typically used to break a deadlock caused by complex issues at stake and complex decision-making settings.

In the dataset we have at least two examples of episodes of negotiations corresponding to explicit attempts to use summit diplomacy in intractable conflicts deadlocked by decision-making and issue complexity problems: the 1995 Dayton negotiations and the 2000 Camp David summit. Both summits

comply with the DED*DEC*ISS configuration, although only one of them (Dayton) also features a value for MHS>0.5 (that is, is included in the dataset for integrative negotiations) and resulted in a durable agreement. As a whole, however, it can be suggested that both summits constitute examples of what has been called the 'Camp David model' (Touval 1996, 562), a form of summit diplomacy – or, more appropriately, of 'proximity talks' – used to finalise what are perceived as complex negotiation processes, which is closed to the media and where no formal date is set for the summit to end, but where deadlines are used as a tactic to facilitate compromise (cf. also Carnevale and Lawler 1986, 637; Carnevale, O'Connor and McCusker 1993, 118). While the parallel between the 2000 Israeli-Palestinian summit and the successful Egyptian-Israeli negotiations brokered by Carter in 1978 is obvious (cf. Hanieh 2001, 86), it has also been demonstrated that the architect of the Dayton 'Proximity Peace Talks', Richard Holbrooke, 'had regarded Camp David as the model for [the] talks', that he 'had read William Quandt's 1986 book on the [Camp David] negotiations', that before the talks he had been in contact with Carter's team to understand 'how the situation at Camp David shaped their goals and tactics that lead to the historic agreement' and with Carter himself 'to discuss the comparisons' (Chollet 1997, 180), and that during the talks he managed the level of time pressure to be applied on the parties 'based on his study of Camp David' (*ibid.*, 201).

The Dayton and Camp David 2000 proximity talks also show significant differences, for instance in their diplomatic framework (in particular in terms of the seniority of the mediators directly involved in the negotiation process) and in the number of parties involved (two delegations in Camp David 2000; three parties in Dayton, one of which – Bosnia – fragmented along ethnic and religious lines). Most importantly, it has been credibly suggested that, since the American delegation approached the Camp David 2000 summit without an original draft proposal to submit to the parties (Quandt 2001, 367) and with a grossly inaccurate understanding of the Palestinian position, which they 'discovered' only during the talks (Hanieh 2001, 91), the 2000 diplomatic initiative was in fact more a 'rehearsal for a summit' than a full-fledged summit (*ibid.*, 90). Yet, overall, it seems reasonable to argue that, since both negotiations were inspired by a

common model and both explicitly aimed to resolve conflicts which were somehow comparable in terms of conflict intractability and decision-making, issue and intercultural complexity, both summits – and in particular the Dayton talks – could be analysed as paradigmatic instances of micro-level use of time pressure to achieve durable agreements in peace negotiations.

Our analysis will thus aim at shedding light on three questions:

- How does the ‘Camp David model’ interact with various measures of complexity? Is it reasonable to suggest that, the less complex negotiation processes are, the more likely it is that summits arranged according to the ‘Camp David model’ are going to result in broad and durable agreements?
- Under what conditions is the ‘Camp David model’ more likely to result in broad and durable agreements – that is, how do the ‘complexity’ variables interact with the other ‘conflict management’ variables in these case studies?
- In their review of the impact of time pressure on negotiation processes, Carnevale and Lawler (1986, 656) suggest that ‘although high time pressure exerts pressure towards greater cooperation through lowering aspirations, it unleashes processes that have a deleterious effect on integrative bargaining (for example, less exchange of information and less use of ‘trial and error’). Do these case studies support this hypothesis?

2. Brief historical review

The Yugoslavian wars and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have arguably been two of the most closely observed and analysed conflicts in contemporary history, and in several major studies they have been analysed in parallel as instances of intractable ethnic wars with expose both the potential and the problems faced by conflict resolution efforts (cf. Bell 2000; Bose 2007). To provide an exhaustive historical review of both conflicts would not fit the size and purpose of this chapter; yet, before moving into the detailed analysis of the two summits which marked the high point of each peace process, it is important to briefly review the

general features and timeframes of each conflict and how conflict resolution efforts interacted with and impacted upon their development.

Code	Conflict	Agreement / Episode of Negotiation	Year
1YUG01	Yugoslavia (Slovenia)	Brioni Agreement	1991
1YUG02	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat)	The Zagreb ceasefire	1994
1YUG03	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat)	The Washington Agreement	1994
1YUG04	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serb)	The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement)	1995
1YUG05	Croatia (Serb)	The Erdut Agreement	1995
2PAL01	Israel (Palestine)	Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements/ Oslo Agreement	1993
2PAL02	Israel (Palestine)	Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area	1994
2PAL03	Israel (Palestine)	Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities Between Israel and the PLO	1994
2PAL04	Israel (Palestine)	Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip/ Oslo B	1995
2PAL05	Israel (Palestine)	Protocol on Redeployment in Hebron	1997
2PAL06	Israel (Palestine)	The Wye River Memorandum	1998
2PAL07	Israel (Palestine)	The Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum Wye II	1999
2PAL08	Israel (Palestine)	Camp David 2000 Summit	2000
2PAL09	Israel (Palestine)	'Road Map'	2003

Case	TPR	DED	SEV	MHS	MED	DEC	ISS	INT	BRE	DUR
1YUG01	0	0.4	0.4	1	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	1	1
1YUG02	0	0	1	0.6	0.8	1	1	0.6	0.2	0.8
1YUG03	0	0.6	1	0.6	1	1	1	0.6	0.6	0.8
1YUG04	0	1	1	0.8	1	1	1	0.6	1	1
1YUG05	0.4	0	1	0.8	0.8	1	0.8	0.8	1	1
2PAL01	0	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.8
2PAL02	0	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6
2PAL03	0	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6
2PAL04	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.2
2PAL05	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0
2PAL06	0.6	1	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	0
2PAL07	0	1	0.8	0.2	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	0
2PAL08	0	1	0.8	0.2	1	0.6	0.8	0.8	0	n/a
2PAL09	0	0	0.8	0.2	1	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0

Table 6.1

Episodes of negotiation in the Yugoslavian wars and Israeli-Palestinian conflict and fuzzy-set scores

2.1 The Yugoslavian wars

The roots of the devastating wars that would unfold on the Yugoslavian soil in the 1990s could be traced back to the gradual crumbling of the ambitious constitutional architecture of a country which kept together for more than eighty years a complex ethnic and political mosaic encompassing six republics, two autonomous provinces and six constituent nationalities. Ever since the approval of the third federal constitution in 1974, ‘the political center of gravity [...] shifted significantly from the country’s federal institutions to its republics and provinces’ (Cousens and Cater 2001, 17). In the 1980s, after the death of Joseph Tito, the Yugoslavian society and political system ‘began to disintegrate’ (Mirković 1996, 191; cf. also Doder 1993, 3), as the larger degree of autonomy now enjoyed by the single republics, the encouragement of local nationalisms and the creation of local police forces all contributed to the resurfacing of longer-term ethnic rivalries and to making them politically sensitive.

The first democratic elections in all the republics in 1990 not surprisingly resulted in the ascent to power of leaders well-versed in nationalist rhetoric, such as Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia; some of them, including the leader of the Croatian Democratic Union Franjo Tudjman in Croatia and of the Muslim-dominated Party for Democratic Action Alija Izetbegovic in Bosnia, were also committed to various degrees to separatist projects. Preparations for what appeared as an inevitable sequence of secessionist clashes began in fall 1990 with the movement of Serbian troops across Bosnia and the gradual expulsion of the Yugoslav People’s Army (YPA) from the Croatian territory. The war itself unfolded shortly after, when in June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia both declared independence; the former succeeded in securing it after a short series of skirmishes, while the latter fought a more intense, yet ultimately successful war with the YPA, which essentially ended with the recognition of both Slovenia and Croatia as independent nations by the members of the European Community (EC) in January 1992 (Cousens and Cater 2001, 19).




Figure 6.1
 Ethnic and political structure of Yugoslavia (1991)
 (SOURCE: UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS – PERRY-CASTAÑEDA LIBRARY MAP COLLECTION)

After the independence of the two northern republics, the focus of the conflict moved to the status of Bosnia, a crucial piece in the strategic jigsaw of the region and itself crisscrossed by ethnic and religious boundaries (its population being 44% Muslim, 31% Serb and 19% Croat). On 4 April 1992 President Izetbegovic ordered a general mobilisation of the Bosnian forces, to which the Yugoslavian authorities replied by ordering the YPA to occupy various strategic positions in Sarajevo and taking control of the airport. The EC recognised the

independence of Bosnia few days later, but Izetbegovic's move would not result in a short and substantially decisive conflict as in the case of the secession of Slovenia and Croatia, but in a lengthy and bloody war lasting until the end of 1995. Invaded from the north by the Croatians and from the south-east by the YPA/Serbian forces, which endeavoured to ethnically cleanse significant proportions of the territory with the aim of establishing an independent Bosnian-Serbian republic (Republika Srpska), the country plunged into a vicious sectarian war where military means were used to disentangle the complex ethnic and political mosaic on the ground and create the grounds for a partition of the Bosnian territory¹¹⁷.

While the international community was involved in the Yugoslavian wars since their inception in 1991 and repeatedly tried to prevent their escalation or contain their impact, the 'enforcement actions' which accompanied these initiatives 'often appeared ineffective and incoherent' (Bell 2000, 104). Early mediation attempts took place as early as in July 1991, when the EC 'Troika' (Italy, Belgium and Luxemburg) helped broker a first document, the so-called Brioni Accord, which called for negotiations between the parties to begin soon and included a vague commitment to refrain from unilateral violence and work towards a sustainable ceasefire.

The first major diplomatic effort after Brioni took place in the months which preceded the beginning of the Bosnian war with the aim of reaching an agreement on the status of the Bosnia and Herzegovina before sectarian violence could unfold: this set of diplomatic initiatives, which began with the October 1991 Peace Conference on Yugoslavia and culminated with the Cutileiro Plan ('Statement on Principles for New Constitutional Arrangement for Bosnia and Herzegovina' - Lisbon, 23 February 1992), did not succeed in providing the framework for a compromise, all the more because on 14 January a EC arbitration committee ruled that a Bosnian state would have met the conditions for recognition as an independent state had it carried out a referendum among its

¹¹⁷ In the following analysis we will refer to the non-secessionist republics of Serbia and Montenegro simply as 'Serbia' and to the JNA as 'Serbian forces', although formally the union of Serbia and Montenegro kept the denomination 'Yugoslavia' until March 1992 and assumed the denomination 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' between March 1992 and February 2003.

citizens – referendum which was regularly organised on 1st March and which set in motion the chain of events which led to the war (Lucarelli 2000, 27-8).

The war unfolded between 1992 and 1993 under the watch of a weak UN peacekeeping force – the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) – established by the UNSCR 743 (21 February 1992) and whose mandate was gradually broadened as the conflict escalated. By January 1993 a new diplomatic plan was set in place by the UN Special Envoy Cyrus Vance and the EC representative David (Lord) Owen, which was rejected in May by the Bosnian Serbs. A revised version of the plan advanced by Owen and Vance's successor, Thorvald Stoltenberg, which was based on an amended map that assigned more land to the Bosnian Serbs, was rejected by the Bosnian Muslims in August 1993. The main reason for the failure of both plans arguably lies in the reluctance of the representatives of the Bosnian main ethnic groups on agreeing on fixed inter-ethnic boundaries while the war still had the potential to drastically change the distribution of each ethnic group on the ground.

While the ground was still unsettled for finding a comprehensive solution to the conflict, a ceasefire agreement, followed by a comprehensive treaty establishing a political federation between Croats and Muslims in central Bosnia, and a confederation between this new entity and Croatia proper, was reached between the Croatian government, the Bosnian government and the Croatian Bosnian leadership. These agreements, signed in Washington on 18 March 1994, marked the first visible success of the increased diplomatic commitment by the Clinton administration in the conflict.

To see the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic come to the negotiation table and agree on a negotiated settlement for Bosnia one would have to wait twenty more months, during which NATO forces, officially involved in the conflict since June 1993, gradually increased their range of activity. The decisive turn of events that would set the stage for the de-escalation of the war unfolded after NATO and Croatian forces dealt decisive blows to the Bosnian Serbs in the late summer of 1995, under the diplomatic cover provided by increased international indignation in the aftermath of the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre and of the carnage of civilian in the Sarajevo marketplace on 28 August. These actions resulted in a

significant loss of land by the Bosnian Serbs, which by September controlled less than 50% of the Bosnian territory, and was followed on 12 October by a general ceasefire in Bosnia and Croatia and in November by the summoning of the Dayton proximity talks, attended by the Croatian, Serbian and Bosnian governments and by delegations of the major Bosnian factions. The talks produced a comprehensive agreement addressing the territorial organisation and constitutional architecture of the Bosnian state, which was signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 by Milosevic, Tudjman and Izetbegovic. In the context of the summit, the Croatian and Serbian governments also signed an agreement that resolved the last major territorial dispute between the two nations – the status of Eastern Slavonia, Croatia's eastern region – in Croatia's favour.

2.2 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one side of what Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan (1998, 5) have described as 'two separate but intertwined struggles': the battle between Israel and the neighbouring Arab states for the control of Mandate Palestine (the area controlled by the British until 1948), and the clash between Israel and the Arab states, later replaced by Palestinian nationalistic movements, over the establishment of a Jewish state over the whole of the mandated territory, over the position of the Palestinian population in the areas conquered with the 1967 war, and over the access to natural resources. The two struggles are intertwined in the sense that even contemporary Palestinian movements – such as Hamas – formally frame their struggle still as part of the war for the control of the whole of Israel/Palestine. However, the 1967 war and the peace treaties between Israel and Egypt (1979) and Israel and Jordan (1994) resulted in the generalised acceptance of the presence of Israel in the region as *fait accompli*, and was reflected in the increasing importance assumed by the negotiations on the position of the Palestinian populations within the 'imperial' borders established by Israel in the Six-day war.

The relations between Israel and Palestinian nationalist movements, organised since 1964 under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organisation

(PLO) and since 1969 under the leadership of the head of its strongest internal faction, Yasser Arafat, were extremely tense ever since 1967 but the conflict did not evolve into open confrontation until December 1987 (Quandt 2001, 274), when an incident at the Erez crossing point sparked the first *Intifada*. How exactly this revolt, which continued until 1991 and provoked the death of more than 2000 Palestinians and of approximately 150 Israeli soldiers, impacted on the willingness of the Israeli government to embark in negotiations with the PLO is still unclear (cf. Gewurz 2000, 185; Peres 1993, 54). An accurate depiction of the origins of what would be known as the Oslo process should arguably include not just the psychological – if not military – shock of the *Intifada*, but also the political climate generated by the end of the Cold War and the victorious Iraq war – which encouraged in the so-called theories of the ‘New Middle East’ (cf. Peres 1993) – and in the victory of Yitzhak Rabin and of the Labour party in the July 1992 Israeli elections, which replaced the previous Likud government led by Yitzhak Shamir (Friedgut 1995, 74-9; Zittrain Eisenberg and Caplan 1998, 106-7).

The October 1991 Madrid multilateral conference represented the occasion in which Israeli and Palestinians (the latter still attending as part of the Jordanian delegation) started framing their mutual demands for a peace agreement, although in the context of a wider regional peace settlement. By April 1992, however, secret talks between two senior Israeli and Palestinian officials were arranged by Norwegian academics and diplomats, which received a boost from Rabin’s election victory and gradually evolved into a comprehensive negotiation (cf. Makovsky 1996). The final outcome of the talks would be the first agreement between the Israeli government and the PLO – the so-called Declaration of Principles (DoP) – which was signed in Washington on 13 September 1993 by Rabin and Arafat. The agreement included a commitment by the Israeli side to allow for immediate self-government in Gaza and Jericho on an interim basis and for gradual empowerment of the Palestinian bodies in the West Bank. According to the DoP, the interim period would have lasted five years, at the end of which a Palestinian state would have been in place; the negotiations for what would have become known as ‘final status issues’ – the more controversial aspects related to the future Palestinian state, which included its exact boundaries, the status of

Jerusalem and the right of return of Palestinian refugees – were postponed to a later stage, but were to begin no later than three years since the agreement on the self-government of Gaza and Jericho.

The next three agreements included in the dataset set the stage for the implementation of the interim self-government in the territories. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement (4 May 1994) disciplined the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Gaza strip and from an area of approximately 65 km² around Jericho, in the West Bank, the transfer of power to a Palestinian Authority (PA) and the structure and competences of the latter. The signing of the agreement formally set in motion the two main deadlines of the Oslo process mentioned above. The Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities (29 August 1994) regulated the transfer of powers to the PA in five areas (education and culture; social welfare; tourism; health; taxation). The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (also known as Oslo II, signed on 28 September 1995) incorporated the two previous agreements and disciplined in detail the institutional framework of the PA, including the process for the creation of its central legislative body, the Palestinian Council.

The Oslo II agreement also marked the end point of what could be described as the less challenging phase of the Oslo process, where detailed dispositions were agreed in relation to the Interim period but where no commitment yet existed on the final status of the territories. The beginning of the phase where the final status should have been discussed was marked by a series of ominous events, beginning with the murder of Rabin in November 1995 and ill-fated political decisions by Rabin's successor Shimon Peres, which led a new escalation of violence between February and March 1996 and favoured the success of Likud's leader Benjamin Netanyahu in the May 1996 elections.

On 17 January 1997 Netanyahu and Arafat signed an agreement which regulated the withdrawal of Israeli forces from 80% of Hebron, restructured the deadlines of the interim period agenda and confirmed the commitment to concluding the final status negotiations by 4 May 1999. This deadline, however, appeared as increasingly unrealistic since the following major mediation attempt – which resulted in the Wye River Memorandum, signed on 23 October 1998 – did

not produce agreement on any relevant final status issue, so that the prospect of further interim phases after 1999 – and thus of a further dilution of the Oslo process – became increasingly likely. The Wye Memorandum, however, marked an important moment in the peace process it attested the fact that the role of the Clinton administration, who had been somehow sidelined in the first part of the process, had become increasingly intrusive: in Mark Heller's words, with Wye the American role has shifted 'from facilitator to mediator to separate initiator of diplomatic formulations' (Heller 1999). These efforts, however, failed to generate an agreement before the May 1999 deadline, and in the September 1999 Sharm el-Sheikh summit, attended by the new Israeli government led by the Labourist Ehud Barak, the final deadline for the talks was postponed to September 2000 but again little advancements were made on any final status issue.

In a somehow desperate attempt to save the Oslo process from collapse, and to secure an agreement before the end of his second term in office, President Clinton convened a summit at Camp David on 11 July 2000. The trilateral summit ended on 25 July with a laconic statement which testified that no agreement on any final status issue was reached. The failure of the summit was followed by a new period of violence – known as Second or Al-Aqsa *Intifada* – sparked by the visit of the Likud Leader and war criminal Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount on 28 September 2000. The revolt, whose end date is still unclear, claimed the life of approximately 6,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis and marked the *de facto* conclusion of the peace process.

The new American administration led by President George W. Bush repeatedly launched new peace initiatives in this period, the most relevant of which probably was the 'Performance-based roadmap to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict' (commonly known simply as 'Roadmap'), made public on 30 April 2003 and informally accepted both by the PA prime minister Mahmoud Abbas and by the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon. The Roadmap arguably marked the high point of the American role as 'separate initiator of diplomatic solutions' and detailed a piecemeal approach towards a final settlement, organised in three timely-organised phases. Once the parties officially declared their support for the project, although with various

caveats, on 4 June 2003, most of the deadlines detailed in the document had passed or were clearly unattainable – so that the agreement, while it never properly ‘failed’, immediately became little more than a general blueprint for the following negotiation attempts and completely lost its initial strength of being a clear-cut and timely-organised plan for peace. The intensification of the *Intifada* in the Gaza strip in 2004 and the absence of any further major diplomatic initiative at least until the 2007 Arab Peace Plan testifies the drastic weakening and ultimate defeat of the Oslo process.




Figure 6.2

The proposed settlement at the Camp David 2000 summit

(SOURCE: PASSIA – PALESTINE ACADEMIC SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS)

3. Thematic analysis and fuzzy-set coding

Both the Yugoslavian wars and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be considered as paradigmatic instances of intractable and complex conflicts, which at specific stages were object of intense attention from international mediators. The different duration of these conflicts, the complex nature of the ‘intimate’ relationship between Israelis and Palestinians on the ground (cf. Benvenisti 1995) and, most importantly, decisive military action in support of one side of the conflict in the crucial phase of the Yugoslavian wars arguably account for what emerges from the literature as the main difference between the two conflicts from a conflict resolution perspective – the presence of a ‘coerced’ mutually hurting stalemate in Bosnia in 1995 – which in turn decisively affected the results of the diplomatic efforts attempted by the American mediators.

3.1 The Yugoslavian wars

After the relatively bloodless war for the independence of Slovenia (which resulted in approximately 50 battle-related deaths – Heldt, Wallensteen and Nordquist 1992; Clodfelter 2002), the clashes between Croatian forces and the YPA and the Bosnian war caused one of worse bloodsheds of the post-Cold War period. Following Lacina, Meier and Schüepp (2006), the death toll of the clashes between Serbian and Croatian forces (including those not in Bosnian territory) and that of the Bosnian war proper should arguably be assessed in conjunction, and could be estimated in 100,000 to 150,000 battle-related deaths (Brogan 1998; Clodfelter 2002). Higher figures approximating 300,000 war-related – i.e. military and civilian – casualties (Eckhardt 1996; Leitenberg 2003; Cousens and Cater 2001) are probably overstated as the most reliable estimate of the military casualties is not higher than 50,000 units (Sollenberg and Wallensteen 1996), but are anyway indicative of the vast devastation generated by the war, at the end of which more than half of Bosnia’s 4.3 million citizens had been displaced (Cousens and Cater 2001, 25) and the economic infrastructure of the country had

been shattered. The fuzzy-set codes are thus short of the 0.5 threshold for the Slovenian war, but are at the maximum (1) for the Serbian-Croatian and Bosnian wars.

As mentioned above, international mediators have been active throughout the war at least since the Brioni conference in July 1991. In the case of the Slovenia independence war, the level of international involvement has been significant but primarily limited to diplomatic facilitation and recognition of the status-quo after the short war (fuzzy-set score: 0.6). The activities of international mediators have been much more intrusive – using Rubin's categories (1992, 254), moving from referent and reward power (i.e. using international recognition as a crucial diplomatic carrot) towards coercive influence – in the Serbo-Croatian and Bosnian wars since 1993, when the failure of the Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans corresponded to increased reliance on military coercion, which culminated in NATO's operation 'Deliberate Force' in the summer of 1995. Therefore all the scores for the agreements concluded in these conflicts have been set at 0.8 or over, and the score for the Dayton talks has been further raised to the maximum as in that occasion the American mediators directly oversaw the whole negotiation process – while their role in exerting 'expert' and 'informational' power over both the Washington and the Erdut agreements appears as relatively more marginal, considering that both agreements did little more than sanctioning the facts on the ground created by the war.

A particularly important aspect of the assessment of the Yugoslavian wars is determining how and when the conflict moved into a condition of hurting stalemate. Overall there seems to be agreement in the literature on the fact that, while the independence of Slovenia was reached after a brief and effective military campaign and while the position of the Croatian forces in relation to the Bosnian war was settled by early 1994, not until the NATO contingent intervened in force in the summer of 1995 and the ethnic cleansing on the ground was 'practically completed' that the Croatian-Serbian and Bosnian wars reached a phase of stalemate which was conducive to successful negotiations (Belloni and Deane 2005, 230; Goodby 1996, 520). The use of the concept of MHS in relation to the Dayton agreement has been contested by Elizabeth Cousens (2002, 538),

who suggested that “the Bosnian war did not end with a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ but with what is better called a ‘coerced compromise’” (cf. also Touval 1996, 548). However, as the concepts of MHS and ‘coerced compromise’ appear as not mutually exclusive – the former referring to the condition in which the parties approached the final negotiations, and the latter to the type of settlement through which the conflict was terminated – her analysis ultimately does not impinge on the suggestion that the decisive agreements of the Serbo-Croatian and Bosnian wars were reached after the parties had realised, also because of the significant military pressure from external actors, that the war was not entirely ‘winnable’ on the battle ground. Thus the fuzzy-set scores for all the five agreements listed in the dataset has been set over the 0.5 threshold, although, because of the significant level of pressure which followed the ‘Deliberate Force’ campaign, the two agreements struck in 1995 have been assigned the highest scores (0.8).

As for conflict complexity, the Yugoslavian wars arguably deserve to pass the 0.5 threshold in relation to all the indicators. The fuzzy-set scores for decision-making complexity has been kept to high values not so much because of the internal structure of the main governmental actors involved – which, with the exception of Slovenia, received relatively low scores in the Polity IV ‘executive constraints’ indicator – but rather because of the presence of multiple levels of decision-making and cross-boundary ethnic affiliations created, in particular in the Bosnian wars, by the fragmentation of the Bosnian elite. The high complexity of the issues at stake in the conflict is reflected by categorisation provided by the COSIMO dataset, which suggests that the wars encompassed all the three macro-groups of issues (international power, national power and material or territorial issues) coded by the project. The scores for inter-cultural complexity also pass the 0.5 threshold but only slightly. The presence of major linguistic differences within Bosnia and between Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia remains a matter of contention; while spoken Serbo-Croatian is understood almost across the entire former Yugoslavia, it can be written with two different alphabets and many local variants exists. Still, this score primarily reflects the assessment of the Minorities at Risk

project which correctly points at the presence of major religious differences as one of the main sources of tension in the country.

3.2 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a long-term conflict whose roots could be traced back to the beginning of mass Jewish immigration from Europe in the late XIX century and in the early decades of the XX century. Even if we assume that until the Six-day war the main ‘struggle’ (as defined by Zittrain Eisenberg and Caplan) was between Israel and the surrounding Arab states and not directly or primarily against the Palestinian people – something which still seems to be at odds with the events of the 1948-49 war – the roots of the conflict could be traced back to 1967 and would allow us to conclude that the conflict unfolded for approximately 26 years before the beginning of the Oslo process – something which would make the Israeli-Palestinian struggle as one of the longest lasting conflicts included in the dataset. Even so, the intensity of the war in this period rarely reached significant peaks at least before 1988. The clashes between the IDF and the Palestinian *fedayeen* in the seven years that followed the 1967 war caused approximately 3,300 deaths on the Palestinian side and 800 among the Israelis (Clodfelter 2002, 638-9). When the 1988 *Intifada* unfolded, the death toll of the conflict rapidly rose: between 1988 and 2000 approximately 13,000 Palestinians are believed to have been killed (Leitenberg 2003), to be added to the approximately 6,000 casualties of the Al-Aqsa *Intifada*. These figures, also when applied to the relatively small territory of Mandate Palestine, would arguably place the conflict in a middle category between the extreme death tolls of full-fledged wars like the Yugoslavian ones and the limited casualties of low-intensity conflicts. This, together with the notable length or resilience of the war, justifies the fuzzy-set score of 0.8 attributed to the conflict.

The fuzzy-set scores for external intervention reflect the increasing international involvement in the negotiation process at least since the Oslo II agreement. Even if the DoP was ultimately signed in Washington and the American administration was regularly updated about the process at least in the weeks before the agreement, the treaty itself was negotiated ‘without political

pressure from Washington' (Makovsky 1996, 130) although with the crucial help of the Norwegian and (to a lesser degree) British diplomacy in facilitating the talks. The level of international involvement drastically increased in the crucial phases of the process: the Oslo II agreement was concluded under bolder pressure from American and Egyptian mediators (and was in fact signed both in Taba and in Washington) and, as discussed above, in the final status negotiation the role of the American mediators became increasingly intrusive, as shown by the extreme pressure applied at Camp David 2000 or by the publication of the Roadmap in 2003 before securing the full approval of the parties. In Rubin's terms, the increasing use of 'reward power' since the mid-1990s and of 'coercive influence' at least since Camp David justifies considering the 0.5 threshold as passed since the 1995 Oslo II agreement.

While the intensity of external interventions arguably increased throughout the Oslo process, as years passed the conditions of mutually hurting stalemate which probably existed at some stage in the early 1990s gradually weakened. At the beginning of the decade it has been credibly suggested that the parties, and in particular the Israelis, were deeply concerned by the prolonged state of civil unrest generated by the Intifada. From the Israeli standpoint, the Intifada proved that the real problem that the Jewish state was called to address was not so much that of the 'territories', but rather that of its 'future relationship with their inhabitants' (Peres 1993, 54). On these bases it is possible to argue that, even if the conflict might not have entered a phase of clear-cut MHS, in the early 1990s a unique set of 'conducive factors' were at play to make the continuation of a military struggle look if not impossible, at least extremely undesirable (Gewurz 2000, 182-3). This illusion was probably shattered with the new phase of violence which unfolded since Baruch Goldstein's Cave of the Patriarch's massacre on 25 February 1994, after which the interim phase arguably remained in what Zarman (2004, 147) called a 'soft stalemate' – a condition which 'instead of pushing the parties to a solution is a stable, viable, bearable compromise of its own, preventing victory by either side but keeping the conflict alive'. The end of the interim phase and the dramatic weakening of the Oslo process resulted in a further deterioration of the stalemate reached by the conflict in the early 1990s and in the

development of a new phase of violence. For these reasons, the fuzzy-set codes for MHS have been kept (slightly) over the 0.5 threshold until 1994, have been fixed at 0.4 until Camp David 2000, and then at 0.2 for the Road Map.

As for the Yugoslavian wars, in the coding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict all the indicators for conflict complexity have received scores higher than 0.5. The figure for decision-making complexity has been set at 0.6 because of the high fragmentation of the Israeli side – which received 7/7 points in the Polity IV Executive Constraints variable throughout the period and which, because of the peculiar nature of its parliamentary system, is particularly liable to be blackmailed by minority veto players (cf. Hazan 1996, 22-3). The Palestinian side, however, has been solidly under the control of the PLO leadership; the various groups which were founded or acquired relevance since the first *Intifada* and which were responsible for various violent actions since the mid-1990s (including Hamas and Islamic Jihad) gradually acquired more prominence throughout the Oslo process but primarily acted in reaction to Israeli attacks (as in February-March 1996) and did not appear to be full-fledged veto players at least until Hamas' election victory in 2006. The scores for issue complexity have been set at 0.8 following COSIMO's assessment, which correctly suggest (as in the Yugoslavian wars) that the conflict spanned across all the three macro-groups of issues coded by the dataset; the score has however been set short of the full (1) score because fewer micro-groups of issues were selected than in the case of Yugoslavia (three and not four). Finally, the score for inter-cultural complexity has been set at 0.8 reflecting the assessment of the Minorities at Risk project which suggests that the parties were separated by major linguistic, religious and customary differences but only by minor 'racial' ones.

4. The Camp David model: shared features at Dayton and Camp David 2000

In both the Yugoslavian and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, the high point of the mediation efforts undertaken by international actors was marked by the summoning of summits which explicitly aimed at reproducing what was perceived as one of the most effective mediation efforts of the recent history of

United States – the Camp David agreement between Anwar El-Sadat and Menachem Begin in 1978-79.

The Dayton 'Proximity Peace Talks' were convened at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base outside Dayton, Ohio on 1 November 1995 and lasted until the morning of 21 November 1995¹¹⁸. The idea of summoning an in-or-out summit was agreed on 5 October contextually with the signing of a transitional ceasefire agreement which provided a temporary suspension of the hostilities in Bosnia. The talks were attended by three delegations from the Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian governments led respectively by Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, by a delegation of Bosnian Serbs, by four delegations from the so-called contact group (France, Germany, United Kingdom and Russia) plus a delegation from the European Union. The negotiations were led by the then assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke; the then Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, attended both the initial and the final days of the summit, and made a short appearance in the heart of the talks on day 14 before his planned travel to Japan.

The Camp David 2000 summit was convened at the Camp David presidential resort in Maryland between 11 and 25 July 2000. On 5 July President Clinton in person invited to Camp David the Israeli and Palestinian delegations, led by the Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak and by the chairman of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat, and led the talks personally throughout the summit, with the exception a brief planned travel to the G8 summit in Okinawa. At Camp David no other external delegation was present, so that the talks could be rightfully defined as a 'trilateral' summit (Hanieh 2001, 75). Clinton was assisted in the talks by a negotiating team which included the Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who took the lead of the negotiations during his absence (20-23 July), and the Middle East envoy Dennis Ross.

Despite these differences in the composition of the delegations and in the status of the American mediator that led the talks, the diplomatic settings of the

¹¹⁸ The fact that the summit began on the first day of the month makes it practical to refer to the days of the Dayton summit as 'Day 1', 'Day 12', etc. – as the numbering of the days also corresponds to the calendar date (e.g. Day 12 is 12 November). This practice is followed by Chollet (1997) and Holbrooke (1999) and is also adopted in the following analysis.

Dayton and Camp David 2000 proximity talks share six main substantial characteristics: 1) in both cases the parties operated under an almost complete ‘news blackout’; 2) both summits were described by the American mediators as the last chance for the parties involved to get a comprehensive peace agreement with American mediation, with the aim of creating the feeling among the negotiating parties of a ‘fading opportunity’; 3) in both cases the mediators officially denied at the outset and throughout the initial phases of the talks that a set deadline for the summit to end had been fixed, but 4) in both summits strict deadlines were set in the second half of the talks; 5) in both occasions practical or artificial deadlines were used by the parties to increase pressure unilaterally on the other delegations; and finally 6) in both summits the resort to time pressure was motivated, at least partially, by the belief that some of the actors involved were particularly keen on brinkmanship and thus sensitive to strict time limits.

4.1 News blackout

One of the most apparent features of the Dayton and Camp David 2000 proximity talks was the decision to prevent the parties to communicate directly with the press for the whole duration of the summit. The Camp David summit was therefore effectively described by the one of the major American networks as ‘a bewildering mix of news blackouts, rumors, deadlines’¹¹⁹. Such ‘strict embargo on news coverage’¹²⁰ implied that the press would be briefed only by official spokesmen – the State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns for the Dayton summit and the White House Press Secretary Joseph ‘Joe’ Lockhart for the Camp David summit – and the answers of the spokesmen in the Q&A sessions were typically very evasive. An example of the redundancy of the press meetings is provided by Lockhart’s replies to the questions concerning the cogency of the artificial deadline posed by Clinton’s trip to the Okinawa G7 summit during the Camp David talks:

¹¹⁹ Camp David Summit. *ABC News*, 19 July 2000.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

Is their deadline for the talks tonight like for midnight? If they don't reach an agreement, the President will go? Lockhart: Well, I think there is a deadline only in the sense that it does take some time to get there to Okinawa. [...] Joe, are they going to be continuing negotiating right through tomorrow morning? Lockhart: They are going to continue negotiating until they are not negotiating anymore¹²¹.

The ambiguity of the press releases and the very idea of pursuing an 'embargo on news coverage' were functional to 'reducing the risk that [the parties] would lose flexibility through too much publicity' (Touval 1996, 562) and complied with the diplomatic cliché that 'publicity is the enemy of negotiation' (Berridge 2005, 67). More precisely, in the case of Dayton, the 'radio silence' (Chollet 1997, 180) imposed since the end of the opening ceremony and the decision to allow only the State Department spokesman to address the press were portrayed as:

[...] necessary to keep the delegates themselves – many of whom had already proved adept at using the American press – away from grandstanding. Complete seclusion would let the negotiations proceed with minimal concern about how victories or concessions might play in the next day's press. In this way, U.S. negotiators hoped that the talks would be based solely on the basis of the issues, not on outside pressure created by leaks to the press (ibid., 180-181).

The 'news embargo' could thus be described as a crucial precondition for the mediation strategy chosen by the American mediators: if pressure had to be used effectively to force the parties to get to an agreement, then the power to create pressure on the parties was to be concentrated only in the hands of the mediators. In this sense, deadline diplomacy and news blackouts were two inextricably linked 'artificial conditions', the success of the former depending on the effectiveness of the latter.

¹²¹ Press briefing by Joe Lockhart. *M2 Presswire*, 18 July 2000.

4.2 'Hail Mary diplomacy'

One of the main forms of pressure applied by the American mediators in both summits was to convince the parties that the summit they were in was their last chance to achieve a comprehensive peace deal with the blessing of the United States. That is, the mediators made sure that the parties understood from the very outset that they were facing a 'fading opportunity' (cf. Fisher 1971, 108).

This strategy was played using a skilful blend of 'carrots' and 'sticks'. On the one hand, both the Dayton and the Camp David talks were described as an 'opportunity' that the parties had to seize¹²², or even, in more dramatic terms, as a unique 'moment in history' which provided an opportunity to reach a 'just and enduring end' to the ongoing conflicts¹²³. On the other hand, the mediators made it clear that no second chance would be given to the parties: Anthony Lake stressed with the Dayton delegations that 'there was no second chance for the US'; Joe Lockhart confirmed to the press that the American mediators at Camp David 'made it clear [to the parties] that this is the summit'¹²⁴.

The mediators, thus, decided on both occasions to play for the highest stakes and, conscious of the 'perils' associated with their strategy¹²⁵, resolved to portray the risks of non agreement in the worse possible terms ('there will be more hostility and more bitterness, perhaps even more violence',¹²⁶) hoping that this would convince the parties to 'seize the moment'¹²⁷. Richard Holbrooke in his memories describes this strategy as a 'Big Bang approach to negotiations' (Holbrooke 1999, 232); at Camp David Clinton conveyed a similar idea using a sport metaphor, describing the talks between Barak and Arafat as the 'Hail Mary pass' of the peace process – 'one dramatic effort to score a touchdown' (Quandt 2005, 367).

¹²² Camp David Summit. *ABC News*, 19 July 2000. Cf. also Chollet 1997, 238; and Sher 2006, 63.

¹²³ Camp David Summit', *ABC News*, 19 July 2000.

¹²⁴ Press briefing by Joe Lockhart. *M2 Presswire*, 18 July 2000.

¹²⁵ 'Washington: too. *AP Worldstream*, 5 July 2000.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

¹²⁷ President Clinton set to resume Mideast peace summit. *CNN*, 24 July 2000.

4.3 Not calendar-driven

Despite the fact that the both summits were clearly not set to last for more than few weeks, the American mediators decided, at least for the first part of the talks, to convey to the parties and to the media the impression that they were ready to go on negotiating ‘for a very long time’ if there was a ‘reasonable expectation’ that the talks were to be successful¹²⁸.

The official position on this conveyed by the spokesmen was extremely clear. At Dayton Burns repeated to the press various times that ‘there is no deadline’ (day 6), that ‘we’re not imposing any artificial deadline’, and that ‘to create an artificial deadline is most unhelpful’ (day 14)¹²⁹. Similarly, at Camp David the messages conveyed to the press consistently claimed that the talks were ‘not calendar-driven’ and that ‘President Clinton will put just as much time into these talks as long as he feels that there is the prospect for success’¹³⁰.

Behind close doors, the behaviour of the mediators was somehow less coherent. On day 6, exactly when Burns was declaring to the press that ‘there is no deadline’ for the talks, Holbrooke – disappointed with the slow progress on a number of issues in the first days of the talks – told the three presidents that ‘[We] can’t stay forever. You may want to stay to make Dayton your capital – I want to go home. [We] can’t stay beyond November 15’ (Chollet 1997, 199). However, while this moment of rage revealed what the initial deadline imagined by Holbrooke was, the 15 November deadline was not used strategically to pressure the parties; as Chollet (1997, 201-202) suggests, Holbrooke was then primarily driven by vague inferences derived from his knowledge of the ‘Camp David model’:

Based on his study of Camp David, Holbrooke assumed that a conference could not last any longer than two weeks. While he knew the first week would be slow, he had planned to end the conference around November 14, to coincide with Secretary Christopher’s travel to Asia.

¹²⁸ State Department regular briefing. *Federal News Services*, 6 November 1995.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ President Clinton set to resume Mideast peace summit. *CNN*, 24 July 2000.

After it became clear that the chances to get to any comprehensive agreement by day 15 were very feeble, Holbrooke wrote to Christopher suggesting to ‘recast’ the trip, which was initially conceived as ‘a closer trip’, to ‘become a last warning to get serious’ (*ibid.*, 224). Christopher then told the three presidents that, after his return from Japan, they ‘had to come to agreement or [the talks] could be closed down’ (*ibid.*, 225), but without mentioning any further fixed deadline. It was not until the negotiations were well into the third week that, ‘for the first time’, the idea of ‘fixing a firm deadline to end the talks’ was considered (Chollet 1997, 236). On day 17, Chollet (*ibid.*) reports:

After two days of warnings by high-level U.S. officials, Holbrooke saw that ‘both sides are fully primed for this [deadline] approach; indeed, they half dread it’. Holbrooke recognised this as ‘a high-risk strategy’, but he now thought it was probably going to be essential.

4.4 Extreme time pressure in the final days

Despite the absence of explicit time pressure in the first phases of the talks, the parties involved – and in particular the American mediators – consistently believed that the success of the summits depended on keeping the momentum of the talks alive¹³¹. This is expressed in clear, almost dramatic terms by Holbrooke with reference to the state of mind of the mediating team on Day 18 of the Dayton negotiations:

Negotiations have a certain pathology, a kind of live cycle almost like living organisms. At a certain point – which one might not recognise until later – the focus and momentum needed to get an agreement could disappear. *Something* could happen to break our single-minded commitment. [...] We worried that if we were still at Wright-Patterson over the Thanksgiving holiday, only a few days away, it would create the impression that we had stayed too long and accomplished too little (Holbrooke 1999, 288 – emphasis in the original).

¹³¹ Camp David Summit. *ABC News*, 19 July 2000; Chollet 1997, 218 and 242; Holbrooke 1999, 267 and 288; Sher 2005, 63.

Therefore, in the second half of both summits the mediators decided to resort explicitly to the ‘high risk strategy’ of using extreme time pressure. At Dayton, the first deadline conveyed – somehow hesitantly – to the parties was the date of Christopher’s departure for his planned travel to Asia (Day 14), but deadline diplomacy was used consistently and aggressively primarily in the last weekend of the summit. On Saturday (Day 18) Holbrooke and Christopher told the delegations that they ‘wanted to finish the negotiations by midnight Saturday, spend Sunday morning cleaning up final details, and make the announcement later that day’ (Holbrooke 1999, 289). That deadline was considered by Christopher and Holbrooke themselves as ‘obviously unrealistic’, but it was conveyed to the parties with the primary aim of leaving them ‘a twenty-four-hour cushion’ for the ‘real deadline, which was completion of the negotiations Sunday night and an announcement on Monday’ (*ibid.*). After the failure of the Sunday night deadline, the negotiations continued throughout Monday (Day 20) with a last deadline set on Tuesday morning, when Christopher had convened a final press conference at 11am to let the international press know what the outcome of the summit was.

The Camp David summit also unfolded under the shadow of an impending deadline: since the beginning of the Camp David talks it was clear that Clinton had plans for travelling to Okinawa to attend the G8 summit, which was due to take place on Friday 21 July. The looming deadline was clear in the minds of the delegations in the first week of the talks (Sher 2006, 75). According to the initial schedule, as conveyed to the parties, Clinton would have left for Japan on Wednesday 19; his departure was gradually postponed, as a breakthrough on the Jerusalem issue appeared imminent, until 1.30am on Thursday morning, after which Clinton had to leave even in the absence of an agreement.

4.5 Asymmetric time pressure

In both summits at least one of the parties involved could rely on impending deadlines to increase the pressure on some of the other delegations. The Dayton talks were taking place under a practical deadline set by the expiration of the United Nations mission in Eastern Slavonia on 30 November. In various

occasions, before and during the talks, the Croatian President Franjo Tuđman 'threatened to retake Eastern Slavonia by force if the Serbs do not agree by November 30 [...] to return under Zagreb's control'¹³². This deadline, and the fact that the diplomatic effort on the issue was not limited to the summit but also continued in the region by the American ambassador in Croatia Peter Galbraith and by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for the former Yugoslavia Thorvald Stoltenberg, helps explain why – as we will discuss more in detail in paragraph 4.1 – the status of Eastern Slavonia was the first major issue in the negotiating agenda at Dayton.

The Camp David talks also took place under an impending, although less imminent deadline: the formal end of the interim period set by the Oslo process on September 2000, after which the Palestinian authorities threatened to unilaterally declare the independence of their state. In the preliminary meetings of the summit in Washington DC, one of the senior members of the Palestinian delegation – Abu Alaa – reminded the Israeli and American sides of this time limit:

Do not forget that the deadline for a declaration of a Palestinian state is September 19. Then, the interim period will actually be over. It is a decision of the authorized Palestinian institutions. A Palestinian state is our right, and preparations toward its establishment will begin immediately (Sher 2006, 56)

While the September deadline was 'looming' on the Camp David talks¹³³, no agreement seemed to exist on the date by which the Palestinians were ready to declare independence – 19 September as mentioned by Abu Alaa, or 13 September as reported by other sources (*ibid.*; Sher 2006, 139). Moreover, the process by which the September deadline was set a rather awkward one: the deadline for the end of the interim period was originally established after five years since the approval of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement (4 May 1994) and thus it had already expired on May 1999; in the November 1999 Sharm-el-Sheikh summit the parties agreed on postponing agreement on the final status issues

¹³² Croatian troop movement reported in Eastern Slavonia. *AFP*, 10 November 1995. Cf. also: Deal cools Balkan flashpoint. *The Age*, 14 November 1995.

¹³³ Camp David Summit. *ABC News*, 19 November 2000.

(originally foreseen by May 1997) to February 2000 and the permanent agreement to September 2000. Therefore, while the deadline had some form of cogency, the fact that the original timetable of the Oslo process had already been diluted in various occasions and that the deadline for the resolution of the 'red-line' issues not just of the Oslo agreement, but also of the Sharm-el-Sheikh memorandum had already passed (cf. Hauss 2001, 134), certainly did not contribute to increase the credibility of this time limit.



Figure 6.3
Map of Eastern Slavonia

4.6 Cultural assumptions

Finally, one may suggest that both in 1995 and in 2000 the decision to rely on mediating strategies centred on extreme pressure depended, at least partially, on assumptions held by the mediating team on the cultural or personal

predispositions of some of the parties involved. In his biography Clinton (2004, 916) concluded his reflections on the Camp David summit by suggesting that:

Arafat was famous for waiting until the very last minute to make a decision, or 'five minutes to midnight' as we used to say. I had only six months to go as President. I certainly hoped Arafat's watch kept good time.

The decision to convene a summit and to use time pressure to try and resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could thus be associated to the perception of the Palestinian delegation, and of Arafat in particular, as being keen on 'brinkmanship'¹³⁴. The Camp David summit thus appears to be a typical instance where the mediating parties took Zartman and Berman's metaphor of the 'musical chair', as described in chapter 2, by the letter: an 'in-or-out' summit would have set a time when the music would have stopped, and so – mediators hoped – the parties keen on playing the 'chicken' game 'to come to an agreement whenever they are when the deadline hits' (Zartman and Berman 1982, 195).

Similar considerations could apply, although with more caveats, to the Dayton summit. At Dayton we do not have direct evidence of cultural or diplomatic prejudices against a specific actor comparable to those of the American team against Arafat at Camp David; yet the accounts of the summit provide plenty of evidence of the fact that during the talks Holbrooke and Christopher gradually became accustomed to Slobodan Milosevic's apparently irrational approach to the negotiations and successfully managed to use it to their own advantage. Of particular relevance in this sense is the negotiation which led to the liberation of the American journalist David Rohde on Day 8 of the summit: faced by increased pressure from the mediators and a letter from Christopher which essentially pegged the continuation of the summit to the solution of this diplomatic incident, Milosevic – who had previously claimed to have little control on the Serbian Bosnians who detained him – abruptly promised on the evening of day 7 to solve the issue by 6am of the following morning and punctually delivered his promise (Chollet 1997, 205-206). This episode proved that 'Don Slobo', as he was nicknamed by the American team (*ibid.*, 206), both had the power to submit the Serbian Bosnians to his will and could be effectively coerced by the mediators

¹³⁴ *Jordan Times*, 26-27 October 2001.

when faced with extreme pressure and an in-or-out alternative. The lesson of the Rohde negotiation clearly lingered on as the summit progressed and the precedent of day 7 was scrupulously followed in the last days of the summit when the parties had to agree on the last major issue on the table – the map of Bosnia.

5. Accounting for different outcomes: complexity and credibility

5.1 Issue complexity and deadline diplomacy

While both summits were convened with the ambitious aim of discussing all the relevant pending issues in each conflict and of agreeing on a comprehensive peace treaty, it is apparent that issue complexity played out in two very different ways in the Dayton and in the Camp David talks. At Dayton, many ‘sticking points’ (including some of the major ones, such as the status of Eastern Slavonia) were agreed on in week 1 and 2, so that a relatively small set of issues had to be negotiated in the last phases of the talks; by contrast, throughout the Camp David summit no agreement was reached on any of the relevant issues, and therefore the parties and the mediators had to deal with the full set of ‘red lines’ until the very last moment of the negotiations.

The Dayton negotiations focused on two macro-issues and on a range of smaller ones. The two macro-issues were the status of Bosnia and of Eastern Slavonia, the former encompassing at least four relevant sub-issues (the allocation of the inter-entity boundary line – IEBL – between the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia; the status of Sarajevo; the constitutional architecture of the Bosnian state; the timetable for the elections). Other comparatively minor issues discussed in the talks included the composition of the IFOR military force, the lifting of the sanctions against Serbia and the liberation of the American journalist David Rohde.

By Day 8 of the summit, the three ‘minor’ issues were essentially resolved: David Rohde had been freed by the Bosnian Serbians under pressure from Milosevic on the night between day 7 and 8; Milosevic had understood that the

Americans would have pushed for the revocation of the UN sanctions if a comprehensive agreement on the other pending issue was reached; and significant steps forward were made on the involvement of Russia in IFOR. An agreement on the Eastern Slavonia dispute was also reached by the evening of day 10, when Christopher successfully proposed a compromise on the last remaining disagreement – the duration of the period of operation of the UN transitional authority – after Milosevic had essentially agreed, in bilateral negotiations with Tudjman, on recognising Croatian sovereignty on the region.

Moreover, between day 11 and 17 most of the issues related to the status of Bosnia were discussed with profit. Despite Holbrooke's disappointment with the pace of the talks – on Day 14 he claimed that the negotiations were 'where [they] should have been on Day 8 or 9' (Chollet 1997, 224) – by Day 17 five of the eleven annexes of the treaty (Human Rights, Refugees, National Monuments, Civilian Implementation and Police) were completed; the general Framework Agreement and the annexes on Arbitration and Public Services were almost agreed upon, and the negotiations on the military annex – which was then subdivided into two separate annexes as requested by the European delegates – were at an advanced stage (Chollet 1997, 234). The last four days of the negotiations thus focused on few outstanding issues related to the constitutional features of Bosnia, the timescale for the elections, and the exact delimitation of the IEBL. On the latter issue – the one that would be resolved last, shortly before the final deadline on Day 22 – an agreement on two crucial principles already existed at that stage (the fact that most of the metropolitan area of Sarajevo was to be part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the principle according to which the Republika Srpska would have covered less than 50% of the territory of the new state), although until the last minute the parties could not agree on the exact ratio of territory between the two entities – 51% to 49% as requested by Milosevic or 55% to 45% as proposed by the mediators – and on the status of the city of Brcko and of the homonym corridor.

The range of unsettled issues that the Israeli and Palestinian delegations had to discuss in order to get to a comprehensive agreement at Camp David was arguably even more daunting. The four most relevant issue-areas under

discussions were the status of Jerusalem, the 'right of return' for the Palestinian refugees, the borders of the Palestinian state and a range of security arrangements – including the powers of the Palestinian police force and the control of the airspace over the West Bank (Hanieh 2001, 79). Other relevant issues under consideration at the summit included the access to water resources, the communication links between the West Bank and the Gaza strip and various economic arrangements.




Figure 6.4

The territorial architecture of Bosnia as defined at Dayton (1995)
(SOURCE: OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE AND EU SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE)

All these issues were discussed immediately by Clinton and by the parties at the inaugural session – one of the few plenary session of the summit – on Day 1; in that session, Clinton also proposed to focus the high-level meetings of the summit on the core issues and continue the discussion on the comparatively less relevant ones – including water and the economy – in lower-key inter-delegation committees. The proposal was, however, rejected by the Palestinian delegation, which stated that the resolution at least of some of the core issues was a precondition for any other negotiation to proceed (Hanieh 2001, 79), although it did agree on the creation of four working groups to discuss each of the main issues in parallel (Sher 2006, 67-8). Therefore, despite the initial impression (in particular from the Israeli side) was that the summit would have focused primarily on a specific issue – the status of Jerusalem – which was deemed as crucial for unlocking the other diplomatic tables (Sher 2006, 61), the negotiation process in two weeks of talks was ‘unclear and disorganised’ (Sher 2005, 63). On the last day of the summit, not only not a single ‘red line’ issue had been settled, but Clinton himself still had to juggle negotiations at many different levels, spanning from the specific areas of East Jerusalem that should have come under Palestinian sovereignty to the exact status of the Temple Mount and to wider unsolved security concerns raised by the Israeli delegation (Clinton 2004, 915).

The reasons why only the Dayton summit succeeded to get to a comprehensive agreement are obviously many and not necessarily related to the diplomatic tactics employed by the mediators. As mentioned earlier, the parties attending Dayton negotiations – and in particular the Serbian and the Bosnian Serbian delegations – had little alternatives but to agree on a ‘coerced compromise’ on the terms set by the Americans (Cousens 2002, 538), the continuation of violence on the ground being a strategically unviable option; and it was indeed Milosevic’s decision to yield in a series of occasions – particularly on the status of Eastern Slavonia and of Sarajevo – to keep the ‘momentum’ of the negotiations alive. However, it is also possible to suggest that the structure of the Dayton negotiations can be seen, at least *ex post*, as a crucial determinant of the success of the summit. The structure of the summit demonstrates that the issues under discussion were spread and sequenced somehow evenly throughout the

talks, and that, in particular, the success of extreme time pressure in the last day of the summit coincided with the fact that, by that time, only one major issue had remained – bridging the gap between the 49% of Bosnian territory requested by Milosevic and the 45% assigned by the previous maps. Therefore, evidence seems to exist to conclude that the success of a negotiating strategy which placed increasing emphasis on time pressure corresponded with – and possibly depended on – a gradual simplification throughout the talks of the set of unsettled issues that the summit was intended to resolve.

The extent to which the architecture of the summit was exclusively the result of successful agenda setting by Holbrooke and his team, however, is unclear. Holbrooke certainly decided that the first major issue to be discussed in the summit was to be the status of Eastern Slavonia, about which negotiations began immediately on day 1; what would have proved to be the most difficult issue to resolve – the delineation of the IEBL – was introduced ‘with a brief probe’ only on day 4 (Chollet 1997, 195). Yet, also influenced by the experience of 1978 Camp David summit, which lasted less than two weeks, Holbrooke had hoped that the parties would have agreed on the map of Bosnia by the beginning of the second week, and on day 8 he organised a ‘summit within the summit’ – what would have been known as the ‘map marathon’ (Chollet 1997, 209) – with the aim of reaching a breakthrough on the issue. The failure of the ‘marathon’ exposed the fact that, while Holbrooke and the American mediation team in general always had some control on the agenda of talks, they had in fact to accommodate in their initial plans a range of new developments which had the main effect of significantly diluting the timetable that they had conceived at the outset. Moreover, Holbrooke and Christopher also had to spend precious time and diplomatic leverage on issues – such as the liberation of David Rohde – which had no relevance in the context of the comprehensive peace agreement on Bosnia, but which were crucial to ensure the support of the American public and press for such agreement whenever it would have been reached. In turn, the parties also spent various days asking for reassurances on issues that were on the negotiating table but that they had not planned to discuss until the end of the talks, such as the lifting of the sanctions against Serbia. Milosevic’s pressure on the sanctions issue

provoked on day 6 one of the few, and possibly the most serious, violent outburst by Holbrooke throughout the whole summit (“[We’ve spent] six days here,” Holbrooke said. “[We] can’t stay forever. You may want to stay to make Dayton your capital – I want to go home. [We] can’t stay beyond November 15.” – Chollet 1997, 199) and testified the frustration of the American delegation at the low pace of the talks. Later on, on day 14, Holbrooke would have noted that:

My concern over the situation here is based on the amount of time we have lost on such issues as sanctions arguments, the time spent on Federation-building (although it was productive and unavoidable, it consumed eight days), and, above all, the immense difficulty of engaging the Bosnian government in a serious negotiation

On a balance, however, Holbrooke’s work on the summit agenda arguably deserves at least part of the credit for the success of the talks. When compared with the Dayton summit, the Camp David 2000 negotiations reveal all the problems that can emerge when the agenda of the talks is ‘unclear’, ‘tentative or improvised’ and when ‘negotiators [jump] from one topic to the next even before they finished dealing with the first topic’ (Maoz 2005, 207) – an approach also defined by Robert Malley (2005, 110) as ‘bumper car diplomacy’. Yet, as Holbrooke’s original plan and time schedule held only for the first few days, the main contribution of the mediators in Dayton was probably not in terms of agenda setting, but rather in terms of issue sequencing; in particular, the issue that came first in their list – the status of Eastern Slavonia – could be considered as an especially appropriate ‘ice breaker’ for the talks, not just because it was one of the issues for which negotiations were at a more advanced stage by the time the summit was convened, but also because of its rather ‘conventional’ nature – a territorial dispute between two sovereign states – which arguably made it comparatively more easy to resolve in a summit.

Indeed, it is possible to conclude that the real difference between the Dayton and Camp David summits in terms of issue complexity concerned not so much the number, articulation or structuring of the issues under consideration, but the fact that the Dayton talks essentially proceeded at two different levels. On the one hand, the talks between Croatia and Serbia (on Eastern Slavonia and, more in

general, on the future structure of former Yugoslavia) were closely comparable to traditional post-war peace conferences, where one of the parties – in this case Serbia – had to accept, with some face-saving arrangements, the terms of the victor in relation to a series of important disputed matters, but none of which directly affected the existence of either states; on the other, the talks on the status of Bosnia amounted to a real ‘state-building’ effort, where all the basic features of a newly-formed state were under discussion. The success of the negotiation was ultimately due to the successful solution of all the pending issues between Croatians and Serbians in Croatia’s favour – which cleared the agenda from various issues and provided important bargaining chips and linkage opportunities for the rest of the talks – and to the fact that the negotiations on Bosnia were solved by the Serbian and Croatian leaders and imposed on the Bosnian delegation, which was sidelined at crucial phases of the negotiations and whose Serbian component was told of the exact terms of Milosevic’s compromises only shortly before the signing ceremony (causing the head of the delegation to faint and the delegation to boycott it – Chollet 1997, 251). The Camp David negotiations closely recall the Bosnian negotiations, not just because, as in Dayton, one state had to be built almost from scratch (Palestine), but also because many issues at stake – and in particular the ‘right to return’ of Palestinian refugees – had the potential of impinging profoundly on the demographic integrity of Israel.

The lesson to be drawn from the Dayton summit in terms of the potential of mediating strategies based on time pressure may thus be less far-fetched than it might seem at first: time pressure played a role in the last week of the summit after the negotiations had already produced significant breakthroughs and had already narrowed down into a circumscribed set of ‘sticking’ problems; and the success of Holbrooke and Christopher’s strategies in solving through deadline diplomacy a summit focused on ‘state building’ primarily derived from the ability of the mediators to pressure Milosevic to coerce his local proxies, not so much from the effectiveness of time pressure in pushing the Bosnians themselves into resolving the symbolic and emotionally-laden issues raised by the war (Touval 1996, 556). That is, the Dayton conference confirms that time pressure tends to work better in ‘simple’ settings and that it can succeed in speeding up a post-war

agreement between the victor and the defeated side once the general terms of the ‘peace’ are clear, but it bears no clear lesson on how deadlines could help resolving intractable conflicts among ‘intimate enemies’ (Benvenisti 1995) in ethnic and identity-based wars.

5.2 The debate on credibility

This conclusion, however, still leaves some questions unanswered. As mentioned in paragraph 4.4, at Dayton deadline diplomacy was used repeatedly at least throughout the last two weeks of the talks – the first mention of a deadline for the summit to finish is on day 6 – while at Camp David Clinton used his departure for the G8 summit at Okinawa as a deadline for the talks, but did not enforce or even mention any other deadline after he returned to Camp David from Japan. That is, the success of the Dayton talks could also be associated with the fact that Holbrooke and Christopher consistently and repeatedly relied on deadlines in the crucial phase of the talks, whereas at Camp David not just the agenda, but also the choice of which mediation strategies to adopt and of how central deadline diplomacy should have been could be portrayed as part of an unconvincing ‘trial and error’ approach to conflict resolution, which, in particular when applied to resolving a ‘one hundred-year conflict in a matter of months’ (Carnevale 2005, 214), was inherently doomed to fail.

The reliance on a single deadline which was soon believed not to be credible could thus account for the failure – or, indeed, the irrelevance – of deadline diplomacy at Camp David. The day before the beginning of the summit, Madeleine Albright reminded the delegations that Clinton would have left in eight days for the summit, that ‘it is very important that we finish our work by then’ and that this would have constituted the ‘timeframe’ of the talks (Sher 2006, 57). The deadline was obviously very ambitious – as it left less than a week for the talks to conclude – and the fact that in his initial address to the delegations Clinton reiterated Albright’s point only in vague terms, suggesting that leaving for the G8 with an agreement in hand ‘would mean a lot’ (*ibid.*, 63), surely did not help to convince the parties of the cogency of this time limit. When the deadline

approached, even the media proved skeptical, as suggested by the ABC News interview to the former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger on Wednesday 19 June, the day in which Clinton had planned to leave for Okinawa:

Is it really wise for the president to be negotiating in the context of this—this deadline for his own travel to go to an international meeting. I mean, given that these are life-altering discussions for the principals, one could argue that this is a fake deadline. Eagleburger: I'm afraid I basically agree with that.

The parties were also not convinced by other tactics that the mediators tried to implement at Camp David to convince them of the seriousness of the deadline, including the request to the delegations to pack their luggage together with Clinton on the 19th. Shortly before midnight, with no agreement on any issue in hand but sensing that some hope of finding a mediation on the status of Jerusalem still remained, Clinton consulted Barak and then asked him and Arafat to remain at Camp David and charged Madeleine Albright to continue the negotiations during his absence. At midnight, therefore, the delegations unpacked their luggage and the talks continued (Sher 2006, 87).

By contrary, at least the last deadline posed by the mediators at Dayton was taken extremely seriously by the parties. The main reason for this appears to be the fact that that final time limit was not just conveyed to the delegations, but was also made public. Indeed, the last day of the Dayton talks was the only day in the whole duration of the summit where not just the American delegation was successfully contacted by the press, but also where Christopher and Holbrooke decided to use the press – by convening a press conference at 12noon – to increase the credibility of one of their diplomatic tactics and force the parties to play their last cards for reaching an agreement.

Furthermore, the structure of summit also suggests that the success of the final deadline was at least partially related to the gradual build-up of pressure which began by the end of the first week of the talk. While two of the three main deadlines of the talks (on day 14 and 19) were missed and negotiations continued normally past those time limits, they arguably helped create a feeling of urgency which in turn helped the mediators to draw the negotiations to a conclusion. The

Dayton negotiations, thus, seem to confirm Berridge's intuition that, even if deadlines are 'missed', in many circumstances they benefit negotiation processes as many of them 'would have taken even longer in their absence and might not have been concluded at all' (Berridge 2005, 64).

The success of the last Dayton deadline could thus imply that incremental time pressure can help keep the momentum towards the final days of the talks, and that publicity can increase the credibility of a final deadline once very few issues have remained and once the general lines along which an agreement is to be struck have been agreed upon. Yet, at a more general level, the Dayton and Camp David negotiations also suggest that to infer from this success that it is possible to implement diplomatic tactics to convince other delegations of the credibility of a deadline is somehow misleading, for two main reasons.

First of all, while it is apparent that deadlines have to be seen as credible to have any relevance, both the Dayton and the Camp David summits provide evidence suggesting that common tactics used to enhance 'artificially' their credibility are rarely effective. Indeed, both tactics used at Camp David to increase the credibility of the 19/7 deadline – pegging it to a pre-arranged trip and having the delegations to pack their luggage to convince them that the summit was really over – were also used at Dayton, and at Dayton too they were perceived as little more than bluffs. The first (failed) deadline of the summit was to coincide with Christopher's pre-arranged travel to Asia; and on Day 19:

To add to the atmosphere of impending closure, Christopher and Holbrooke asked the U.S. delegation to pack their bags, requesting that the other delegations do the same. They also told everyone that the phones would be disconnected the next day, and began to collect bills. As the suitcases lined up outside the American VOQ, it became clear that the other delegations saw right through the bluff. Deadline or not, they didn't take the U.S. threat to leave seriously. (Chollet 1997, 239)

In his memoirs, Holbrooke described this episode as 'the most pathetic' of 'all the gambits that we tried at Dayton', adding that 'nobody else made the slightest effort to prepare for departure' (Holbrooke 1999, 294).

Secondly, and most importantly, the failure of deadline diplomacy at Camp David could have to do less with the credibility of specific deadlines than with the

credibility of a mediating strategy based on time pressure when it is implemented by an actor which himself was not immune from such pressure. Publicity was possibly a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the final deadline of the Dayton talks to be perceived as credible by the parties; what made it credible was primarily the fact that the parties knew that the Americans could credibly play a ‘walk-away’ strategy, threatening to hand the negotiations over to the Europeans, and possibly resume negotiations at a later stage from a better strategic standpoint. What weakened the credibility of using deadline diplomacy at Camp David was the fact that Clinton was arguably the actor which was most subject of time pressure. The expiry of Clinton’s second mandate, and the fact that this impending deadline exerted pressure equally on the American mediators – who wanted a success to boost the position of the Democrats in the campaign – and on both the Israelis and Palestinians – who saw in Clinton a particularly valuable mediator – only partially captures the pressure that the American mediators had to face¹³⁵. In fact, Clinton’s real deadlines were probably closer than the date Arafat indicated for the declaration of independence of Palestine (12 September); as Amnon Lipkin-Shahak (2005, 46) suggested:

July was much more convenient for [Clinton] than August or September, because with elections coming up in November and the campaign expected to move into overdrive in September, it would be hard for the President to devote himself to steering a political process that was supposed to resolve an age-old dispute.

On 24 July CNN commentators further suggested that Clinton’s immediate concern at Camp David could have been not just to conclude the negotiations before the Democratic electoral campaign started in August and September, but also not to ‘overshadow’ the Republican conventions which were due to begin on the last week of July¹³⁶. That is, it seems apparent that, while all the parties and mediators at Camp David had to cope with a tight schedule, the Israeli and

¹³⁵ Lipkin-Shahak (2005, 46) also argued that the deadline for the nominations of the Nobel Peace Prize could have ‘contributed to the way the timetable for the Israeli-Palestinian talks was defined’. However, this suggestion seems to be hardly tenable also because, while the recipient of the prize is typically announced in early October, the deadline for the nominations (1st February or the first meeting of the Nobel committee afterwards) had already passed.

¹³⁶ President Clinton Set to Resume Mideast Peace Summit. *CNN*, 24 July 2000.

Palestinian delegations had in fact a slightly more relaxed time frame than the Americans for reaching a final deal. While one could not deny that the complexity of the issues at stake alone accounts for most of the problems faced by the negotiators at Camp David, the fact that the Americans had to face deadlines that coincided, if not preceded, the 12 September deadline brandished by Arafat could help explain why the Palestinian delegation consistently hoped for a second summit to be convened shortly after Camp David: faced with a final ‘in-or-out’ summit, the Americans would have reasonably been under more pressure to get a better deal out of the Israeli delegation.

As a whole, thus, one may conclude that central problem faced by the American mediators was not so much their failure to make any specific deadline appear as credible, but rather the fact they themselves were not fully in control of the level of pressure applied on the parties, and that the parties were aware of their own timetable and prepared to use it in order to improve their bargaining position. That is, not the lack of ‘artificial’ credibility of deadlines, but the asymmetrical effect of various time limits on each delegation, including the American, could explain the failure of deadline diplomacy at Camp David. The lesson to be drawn from Dayton, on the contrary, is that, in the presence of a simplified agenda and agreement on the general terms of a negotiation, a sequence of artificial deadlines can help create a positive momentum for reaching an agreement, and a public commitment to a final deadline could help finalising the negotiations. In sum, neither summits provide evidence to suggest that time pressure can help parties involved in complex negotiations laden by major symbolic and identity-based issues reaching comprehensive agreements; and both ‘proximity talks’ seem to highlight that the credibility of deadline diplomacy depends more on the general political and strategic position of the actor imposing a deadline than on the success of any short-term diplomatic tactic.

6. Emotions and strategies under time pressure: lessons from Dayton

The analysis so far has discussed evidence on how various forms of time pressure have corresponded with different negotiation outcomes in summits that followed the so-called ‘Camp David model’. The literature on time pressure reviewed in chapter 2, however, also provides various theoretical insights on how exactly time pressure is deemed to impact on negotiations – that is, on the specific processes through which time pressure (or its absence) can affect the outcomes of joint decision-making. Our analysis has suggested, in particular, that the negative impact of time pressure on complex negotiations can be associated primarily with two sets of explanations: strategic and cognitive. On the one hand, authors like Yukl (1976) and Carnevale and Lawler (1986) have suggested that time pressure tends to have a negative impact on piecemeal bargaining and to reduce the use of ‘trial and error’ negotiating tactics. On the other hand, scholars adopting primarily cognitive approaches, like Edland and Svenson (1993) and Zachay (1993), argue that the negative impact of time pressure on complex decision-making environment can be due to cognitive changes such as increased sensibility to negative information, decreased ability to cope with ambiguous information and a tendency to ‘lock in on a strategy’. While these approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive – as discussed in chapter 2, the predictions of strategic approaches vary depending on whether the environment of the negotiation is cooperative or competitive, something which in turn can be determined by cognitive factors – there seem to exist in the literature on time pressure a significant divide between authors which relate the impact of time pressure primarily to the mere reduction of time available for negotiating and scholars which highlight the impact of time pressure on the emotional approach of the parties to the negotiation. Since almost all of these studies rely on meta-experiments – that is, their conclusions are based on the analysis of decision-making processes which take place in artificial and extreme conditions – the analysis of international summits explicitly based on the manipulation of time like those complying with the Camp David model can provide important insights on

the relevance of these perspectives to understand the processes through which time pressure impacts on the outcomes of real-world negotiations.

The first and most apparent conclusion that can be derived from both the Dayton and the Camp David 2000 summits is that the suggestion that deadline diplomacy can have a ‘deleterious’ effect on traditional mediation and negotiation strategies like piecemeal bargaining and ‘trial and error’ is clearly overstated. Even when it became clear that each summit not only had a time limit, but that this ideal limit was set in the mediators’ plans within one week (Camp David) or two (Dayton) from the beginning of the talks, there still remained plenty of time for normal diplomatic tactics to be employed, also because the contextual presence of all the major decision-makers involved in the process drastically speeded up the processes of collective decision-making and the time required for carrying out thorough consultations within each delegation.

The evidence from the Dayton negotiations, in particular, helps shed light on various hypotheses advanced by the literature. On the one hand, the idea that time pressure can encourage plain talking among the participants to a negotiation, diminish the use of bluffing and thus make it more difficult to build up hostile strategies is at least partially misleading. The parties which more sparingly resorted to bluffing during the talks were the Croatians and the Bosnians, but their attitude seems to be largely due to the very strong strategic position of the former, and to the emotional and strategic confusions of the latter (which will be discussed shortly). Milosevic, on the other hand, regularly resorted to threats and bluffs which the counterparts were rarely able to call, as the abovementioned negotiation that led to the liberation of David Rohde proved. While it can be argued that some of the main concession of Milosevic’s (such as on Sarajevo) were made under the mounting time pressure of the latter days of the talks, the summit in its entirety provides significant evidence to suggest that the fact that the talks had a set time limit did not fundamentally impact on the actors’ willingness to approach specific sub-negotiations aggressively, and that their general strategic position seems to remain by far the most fundamental factor impacting on the choice of specific negotiating strategies.

The Dayton negotiations also show that in real-life negotiations it is hardly the case that, even in occasions where time pressure could be seen as extreme, no room is left for ‘trial and error’ strategies. Indeed, in the morning of 21 November, Milosevic played exactly a ‘trial and error’ strategy with Christopher and Holbrooke to find an agreeable compromise on the last crucial issue standing (the status of Brcko): between 8 and 9am three different solutions were advanced (a bilateral agreement between Serbs and Croatians; the referral of the issue to Christopher himself for arbitration; the referral to a third party for arbitration), and shortly after 9am the American mediators had secured not just Milosevic’s, but also Tudjman’s and Izetbegovic’s approval on the latter solution. That is, while it is possible to suggest that in peace negotiations time pressure might *reduce* the room for playing ‘trial and error’ and other strategies which can favour integrative outcomes, the evidence from the Dayton negotiations does not support the argument according to which the impact of time pressure on the parties’ strategies is necessarily ‘deleterious’ (Carnevale and Lawler 1986, 656).

On the other hand, one of the core hypotheses of cognitive approaches to time pressure suggests that time pressure is most likely to have a negative impact on negotiators which have to face complex issues and process significant amounts of information; in these circumstances, negotiators are likely to use information in a more ‘shallow’ fashion and pay more attention to negative information; the overall ‘accuracy of human judgments’ is likely to decrease; and negotiators tend to lock themselves in on a specific strategy (Edland and Svenson 1993, 36-7). The Dayton negotiations go some way to confirming this interpretative framework: the party which entered the negotiation with comparatively more complex and ambiguous goals – the Bosnians – struggled all the way through to cope with the negotiation process. This effect goes some way to suggest that, in particular when most the pressure is focused on a non-state actor in the negotiations, the impact of time pressure on ‘state-building’ negotiations might be particularly deleterious.

From the first stages of the talks, the American mediators noted that ‘although the Bosnians had tried to prepare substantively for Dayton [...], they struck many U.S. negotiators as ill-prepared and unwilling to compromise’ (Chollet 1997, 195). The mediators tried to compensate for their organisational

problems by attaching American experts – including Richard Perle – to the Bosnian delegation, hoping that this would enhance their willingness to take bold decisions when negotiating with the other leaders. Yet, when the negotiation reached the ‘endgame’, it appeared that the problems faced by the Bosnians were not limited to information processing; they seemed to have reached a situation of extreme emotional arousal which made it increasingly difficult for them to approach the negotiation process rationally and make the most out of their negotiating position and of the sympathetic support that the American mediators were clearly prepared to provide them.

Two episodes aptly illustrate the psychological hardships of the Bosnian delegation under the mounting time pressure of the last days of the Dayton talks. The first was the ephemeral deal between Milosevic and Haris Silajdzic (the Bosnian prime minister) on day 19, when Milosevic accepted Silajdzic’s offer of a large but unpopulated area in western Bosnia to increase the proportion of territory under the control of the Republika Srpska. After the two informally agreed on the deal, the map was shown to the Croatian delegation, which rejected the settlement; Izetbegovic, worried about the reaction of the Croatian allies, also had to withdraw support for the deal. From the purely rational perspective of a ‘trial and error’ strategy, this diplomatic attempt could have been considered as a limited step forward, since it proved in principle that the swap of relatively marginal areas of territory would have made an agreement between Bosnians and Serbs possible, and the fact that the Croatians refused the deal only *after* having seen the map showed that Bosnians could have probably broken the deadlock by agreeing with the Croatians on which land they would have agreed to include in the swap. However, in front of Izetbegovic’s position, the Bosnian prime minister ‘exploded’, vociferously complained about the fact that he was regularly ‘undercut’ by the other leaders and by his own president and, ‘throwing his papers down on the table’, shouted at the mediators and at Izetbegovic ‘I can’t take this anymore’ before ‘storm[ing] out of the room and into the night’ (Chollet 1997, 242). As a consequence of this, the Bosnians remained cut off from the negotiation process for the rest of the crucial phases of the negotiation, and would be contacted only to ratify decisions taken by the other delegations. Silajdzic’s

reaction revealed how time pressure and decision-making complexity can interact in generating high levels of tension, anger and frustration and make it difficult, if not impossible for the parties called to handle complex negotiation processes to assess 'rationally' their achievements.

It therefore comes to no surprise that, when on Monday 20 the Bosnians were asked to accept the final take-it-or-leave-it proposal from Tudjman, the psychological attitude of the delegation was a mixture of resignation, obduracy and anger. Christopher, advised by Holbrooke to approach Izetbegovic with a 'drop-dead time limit' which 'should not be a bluff' (Holbrooke 1999, 304), met the Bosnian leader and set a one hour deadline for him and his delegation to decide. Faced with this extreme pressure, in Holbrooke's words:

Izetbegovic was visibly uncomfortable. He began to review his grievances – a familiar litany. We tried to reason with him, but *he became increasingly obdurate*. He mentioned the city of Brcko several times. *He felt that he had become the object of all the pressure* at Dayton, and he hated pressure. He was tired and beleaguered, and his delegation was about to explode. His eyes narrowing almost to the vanishing point, he looked away from us and mumbled something to his colleagues (Holbrooke 1999, 305 – emphasis added).

And, indeed, his delegation did 'explode' few minutes after Christopher had left. Holbrooke was immediately visited by Silajdzic, who was again in a 'towering rage' (Holbrooke 1999, 305) and 'almost completely out of control' (Chollet 1997, 245), accused the American delegation to have 'ruined everything' and stated that they could not ever accept a U.S. ultimatum (*ibid.*).

Thus, while the accounts of the Dayton and Camp David summits report of a number of episodes where some of the parties involved (including the American mediator themselves) lost control of their nerves, the last days of the Dayton talks clearly show that the parties which played their diplomatic cards more rationally and efficiently were the Croatian and the Serbian delegation. This, in turn, seems to be related not so much to the confidence that they had in the strength of their negotiating position (at least in the case of Serbia, since its position was extremely weak), but rather to the relative unambiguousness of their general objectives and to the fact that they were able to approach various issues in the negotiations with a

certain degree of emotional detachment, in particular from the Croatian side. This was clearly not the case of the Bosnian delegation, which entered the talks conscious that the entire fate of their nation would be decided at Dayton, and which had to face major decision-making complexities and had to cope with complex ethical and political dilemmas throughout the talks.

7. Conclusions

How does the 'Camp David model' interact with various measures of complexity? Is it reasonable to suggest that, the less complex negotiation processes are, the more likely it is that summits arranged according to the 'Camp David model' are going to result in broad and durable agreements?

The discussion in paragraphs 5 and 6 showed that, while the choice to convene an in-or-out summit which follows a tight timeframe is typically justified by the complexity of the peace process at stake, the success of the summits critically depends, among other factors, on the fact that time pressure is applied to resolve a restricted set of issues and on decision-makers with relatively clear strategic priorities. Our case-study analysis revealed an aspect which could not be caught with the comparative fuzzy-set review – namely, that even when a negotiation in its entirety can be described as very complex, time pressure can produce positive results if the structure of the issues at stake, the strategies of the actors involved and the skill of the mediators all concur in effectively sequencing issues evenly throughout the talks.

The analysis in paragraph 5 also demonstrated that the different results between the Dayton and Camp David summits could be related not only to different types of issue sequencing, but also to the fact that deadline diplomacy was employed much more convincingly at Dayton, where three deadlines were enforced and the last one was made public to increase its credibility. On the other hand, our review highlighted how the implementation of a strategy of deadline diplomacy by the mediators at Camp David was somehow undermined by the fact

that the mediators themselves were operating under tight deadlines. This consideration confirms the importance of assessing the relative impact of time pressure on all the parties involved, including the mediators, and may lead us to conclude that, while issue sequencing definitely played an important role in the success of deadline diplomacy at Dayton, at Camp David the strategy of deadline diplomacy was probably doomed to fail in any circumstance.

Under what conditions is the ‘Camp David model’ more likely to result in broad and durable agreements – that is, how do the ‘complexity’ variables interact with the other ‘conflict management’ variables in these case studies?

Our analysis relied from the outset on the assumption that, if our coding of conflict ‘ripeness’ is correct, then the presence of a mutually hurting stalemate at Dayton and its absence at Camp David 2000 could alone explain the success and failure of these summits. Moreover, whether or not one agrees with the predictive powers of the ‘ripeness’ theory, it is difficult to disagree on the fact that the strategic position of the American mediators vis-à-vis the Serbian delegation at Dayton was particularly strong and, again, could alone explain all the Serbian concessions throughout the summit, which were in turn crucial to keep the ‘momentum’ of the summit alive and thus help finalise the negotiations on all the diplomatic tables. However, on a whole, we tend to agree with the former UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Balkans, Carl Bildt, who argued that ‘whether the peace [in Bosnia] could have been achieved without force is doubtful, but nor could it have been achieved by force alone and without a new diplomatic approach’ (Bildt 2000, 144). That is, the Dayton settlement was made possible by the pressure brought about by the NATO intervention in the summer of 1995, yet the military intervention was a necessary, but arguably not sufficient cause for the end of the war.

If this assumption is true, then it is the *interaction* between specific mediation methods and a specific military condition on the ground that explains the success of the Dayton summit. In particular, the use of time pressure as one central strategy in the summit was met with success because, despite the fact that

a large proportion of the issues at stake pivoted around the state-building process in Bosnia, the decisions on the future of Bosnia were taken by two state actors (Croatia and Serbia) whose relative power position had been determined on the battle ground (cf. Touval 1996, 556). The Dayton negotiations, thus, have little to say on how time pressure can help solve inter-communitarian struggles and deadlocks in state-building processes when the only actors involved are those whose existence as sovereign actors is being determined by the very settlement under discussion, and whose relative power position is still potentially a matter of contention. If the success of the Dayton summit encouraged, if not determined, the use of the Camp David model to achieve a breakthrough in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in 2000, then it is fair to conclude that the lessons that were learned from that greatly successful summit were the wrong ones.

In their review of the impact of time pressure on negotiation processes, Carnevale and Lawler (1986, 656) suggest that 'although high time pressure exerts pressure towards greater cooperation through lowering aspirations, it unleashes processes that have a deleterious effect on integrative bargaining (for example, less exchange of information and less use of 'trial and error')). Do these case studies support this hypothesis?

Paragraph 6 provided evidence to suggest that Carnevale and Lawler's suggestion is probably overstated when applied to real-world negotiations. The Dayton talks seem to have provided plenty of time for the parties willing to do so (such as the Serbs) to attempt conventional negotiation strategies. Most importantly, even in the conditions of extreme time pressure which were present in the last days of the talks, the Serbs were able to put forward various proposals on the major outstanding issues – such as the status of the Brcko corridor – in what could indeed be described as a 'trial and error' strategy. On the other hand, the behaviour of the Bosnian delegation provides evidence which complies with the suggestions of cognitive studies on the impact of time pressure on collective decision-making – namely, that time pressure can result in increased sensibility to negative information and decreased ability to cope with ambiguous information,

which are most evident on actors that already face complex strategic choices and which can result in highly irrational and emotional behaviour. In particular, the behaviour of the Bosnian prime minister Silajdzic in the last days of the talks perfectly conforms with what Frye and Stritch's (1964, 142) suggest as the typical reaction of single members of groups involved in timed decision-making ('If you won't listen to my opinion [...] I will not accept your opinion') and, more generally, Edland and Svenson's argument (1993, 36) on the fact that under time pressure 'the accuracy of human judgments decreases'.

In sum, this analysis showed that the results of experiments on the cognitive impact of time pressure seem to provide an accurate depiction of real-world decision-making processes, while the extreme time shortage which is re-created in experiments appears to be too extreme when compared to real-world processes – which in turn seems to make hypotheses based on the somehow 'mechanical' impact of such shortage on the strategies of the actors involved less robust than they may appear.

Chapter 7

Conclusions

This thesis began by highlighting the problems and contradictions inherent in the current discourse on diplomatic momentum and on the role of time in peace negotiations. While most would agree that ‘the concept of deadline is critical to making a negotiation work’ (Bebchick 2002, 122), a review of the most relevant diplomatic manuals published over the last twenty years suggests that the trade-offs which affect the impact of time pressure on negotiations are often misrepresented and their severity systematically downplayed.

The comparative analysis and the case studies discussed in chapters 3 to 6 had three primary aims. On a general level, it sought to provide evidence to support this call for more prudence in portraying the potentials of time pressure in peace negotiations. From a purely descriptive perspective, thus, these chapters aimed at exploring how the presence or absence of time pressure in specific negotiation processes corresponded with more or less satisfactory negotiation outputs; the expectation, in this sense, was that any assessment of the impact of time pressure should vary significantly depending on how the outcome of a negotiation process is measured, and which specific form of time pressure is analysed.

The second aim of the research was to analyse how time pressure interacts with other contextual variables to generate specific outputs. This analysis was undertaken under the assumption that some of the optimistic claims that can be read in diplomatic manuals might in fact be accurate, but only in certain circumstances. Of the potential dynamics which might affect the impact of time

pressure, the factors which increase the complexity of a decision-making or negotiation process have received significant attention in experimental psychology. One of the central focuses of this research has thus been testing if it is possible to suggest that, the more a conflict is complex, the less likely it is that time pressure can have a positive impact on the negotiation process. Assessing the role of conflict complexity as an intervening variable could help describe analyses that portray in enthusiastic terms the impact of time pressure on peace negotiations not as outright false or unreliable, but rather as based on a partial and simplified assessment of the variegated and diverse causal patterns that can lead to the resolution of a conflict.

Finally, this research aimed at shedding light on some of the specific causal patterns through which time pressure can be deemed to impact on negotiation outputs. Any analysis in this direction is necessarily partial and can concentrate only on a limited number of variables out of the many contextual factors that can be considered for the analysis of territorial conflicts. The research focused, in the case study section, on two pairs of cases, which provided both a macro- and a micro-level perspective on the role of time pressure in specific negotiation processes, and provided evidence respectively on the interaction between the absence of time pressure and a specific configuration of decision-making and intercultural complexity and between the presence of time pressure, the presence of high issue complexity and the presence/absence of a mutually hurting stalemate.

In this final chapter the main results of the analysis will be summarised and the specific contributions of this research to conflict resolution studies and diplomatic practice discussed in detail. In the first two paragraphs the most relevant findings of the research will be presented, beginning with the evidence provided in relation to each of the three research aims described above ('main findings'), which will be then followed by other interesting findings that emerged from the analysis ('other relevant findings'). These paragraphs will be then followed by a discussion of the implications of the research for conflict studies and for policymakers, by an assessment of the strengths and liabilities of the

methodological approaches used in the thesis and by a brief overview of relevant issues which would benefit from further research.

1. Main findings

1.1 Time pressure from deadlines can have a positive or negative impact on the breadth of negotiated settlements in territorial conflicts, but tends to have a negative impact on their durability.

While plenty of anecdotic evidence exists on the impact of time pressure on specific episodes of negotiation, this research arguably amounts to the first systematic attempt to explore from a comparative perspective the impact of time pressure on peace negotiations, and possibly on international negotiations at large.

The results of the comparative analysis of the fuzzy-set dataset, described in chapter 4, suggest that the overall impact of time pressure is mixed when agreement breadth is considered as the main indicator of the ‘success’ of a negotiation process: the presence of time pressure can be associated with comprehensive agreements in conflicts which are in a mutually hurting stalemate, but the absence of time pressure tends to have the same effect when significant external interferences are in place. This analysis, however, also suggested that time pressure is likely to have a negative effect only (in combination with the low conflict intensity) when the durability of a peace agreement is considered as the main indicator for the success of an episode of negotiation.

This analysis, therefore, provides evidence to support the suggestion that time pressure might help conflict resolution in the short term, but not necessarily in the long term. That is, the different results observed in relation to agreement breadth and durability help substantiate our criticism of the approach to deadlines adopted by diplomatic manuals, epitomised by Zartman and Berman’s metaphor of the ‘musical chairs’ (cf. chapter 2, par. 1.3). While this comparative overview does not necessarily prove that such ‘musical chairs effect’ does not take place, it supports the claim that the agreements agreed upon in the presence of such

pressure tend to be more fragile and less durable, and thus that the diplomatic successes that can be achieved through such methods can result in little more than pyrrhic victories.

1.2 In the presence of factors which increase the complexity of a negotiation process, the absence of time pressure tends to be associated with durable agreements

The second set of models elaborated in the comparative section focused on the interaction between time pressure and indicators of complexity in integrative environment. The exclusive focus on episodes of negotiation that developed in the context of a mutually hurting stalemate constituted an attempt to limit the analysis to negotiations where parties were less likely to see the conflict as a zero-sum game, following Peter Carnevale's suggestion that in these circumstances time pressure is more likely to have a positive impact on negotiation outcomes (Carnevale and Lawler 1986; Carnevale, O'Connor and McCusker 1993). In this sense, our analysis followed the principle of 'least-likely' observations, under the assumption that demonstrating that in these circumstances and in the presence of elements of complexity the absence of time pressure can be more strongly associated with durable agreements than its presence would provide a stronger case in support of our theories than an analysis of the full dataset.

Our analysis, as articulated in H2 and H3, faced various methodological problems; in particular, we admitted the impossibility of creating a reliable aggregate indicator for conflict complexity that could allow us to analyse complex and non-complex conflict separately. From the analysis of the full MHS>0.5 dataset, however, we observed that the absence of both natural and artificial time pressure, in configurations which also included the presence of decision-making and issue complexity, is more strongly associated with durable agreements than the presence of time pressure. The two most relevant configurations highlighted by the models ($tpr*ded*ISS*int + tpr*ded*DEC*INT$) suggest, respectively, that the absence of time pressure can be associated with durable agreements in the presence of issue complexity and in the absence of relevant inter-cultural

differences, and that the absence of time pressure can produce these outcomes also in the presence of both decision-making complexity and intercultural complexity.

As a whole, this analysis goes some way to confirm the suggestion, derived from a variety of works in experimental psychology, that the absence / low levels of time pressure that can be associated with positive negotiation results in the presence of elements of complexity. The two configurations also seem to suggest that the relation between the absence / low levels of time pressure and conflict complexity as articulated by issue complexity and decision-making complexity is in line with these expectations, but also that both high and low levels of intercultural complexity can be associated with the outcome – a result which called for a more accurate analysis of the exact role of the latter variable in these configurations.

1.3 The absence of time pressure helped generate durable agreements in some peace processes by creating the conditions for more efficient intra-rebel coordination

Two pairs of case studies (chapters 5 and 6) provided the opportunity to explore specific causal patterns through which time pressure (or its absence) can affect the outcomes of negotiations. The choice of the first pair of case studies – two episodes of negotiations within the peace processes in Bougainville and Casamance – was directed by the results of the fuzzy-set analysis and was aimed a shedding light on the second configuration which emerged from the analysis of the interaction between time pressure and conflict complexity (tpr*ded*DEC*INT). Like in quantitative research, the causal links between the variables included in the outcomes of a fuzzy-set analysis and the outcomes might not be obvious; ‘tracing the process’ through which these variables interact to generate a specific outcome is thus usually considered as one of the main aims of case study analysis (cf. Gerring 2007, 178-84).

The analysis of the Bouganiville and Casamance peace process provided a range of interesting insights on how the deliberate choice to slow down a

negotiation process can, in the presence of a range of important conditions (including a mutually hurting stalemate and, at least in the case of Bougainville, significant diplomatic leverage by an external mediator), impact positively on the durability of negotiation outcomes. What was arguably the most relevant and interesting finding that emerged from this chapter is that the two fundamental and most durable agreements in these processes – the 1997 Burnham Truce and the 2004 Casamance peace agreement – were preceded by negotiation processes during which the rebel factions were able to generate more stable intra-faction coalitions than in the past, and that the absence of time pressure (more explicitly in the case of Bougainville, less so in the case of Casamance) was an important factor in allowing them to do so.

In Bougainville we documented the new diplomatic approach by New Zealand, based on providing significant leadership for new negotiations but ‘without time constraints’. The absence of a tight deadline, together with some relevant changes in the political and military condition of PNG, contributed to the success of the pre-summit meeting among Bougainvillean groups (including the BTG and BIG/BRA) which preceded the official signing of the Burnham ceasefire – a success which contrasts with the failure of a similar initiative (the Cairns conference) few years before under the auspices of the Australian diplomacy, and which paved the way for the ultimate resolution of the conflict. In Casamance, we described the conditions that led the large majority of the Casamançais rebel groups to take part in the May 2004 intra-rebel meeting, including various armed wings of the MFDC that had failed to attend a similar meeting in October 2003. While in Casamance we did not find evidence of the fact that the slow pace with which the 2004 peace agreement was negotiated was related to an explicit diplomatic strategy, in Casamance as well as in Bougainville this final (and until now overall effective) agreement was preceded by a successful inter-rebel conference which, in turn, took place in the absence of explicit and immanent deadlines.

It goes without saying that, as in any case study analysis, these conclusions should be aptly contextualised. As mentioned before, it is hardly surprising to note that the absence of time pressure was not, in either conflict, a decisive factor

in determining the final agreement, and that these agreements were preceded by some radical changes on the military and political milieus of the conflicts, as discussed at large in chapter 5. However, it would also be unwise to neglect the striking similarities between these two peace processes, which also represent two rather rare examples of successful peace processes in the post-Cold War era; it also seems at least ungenerous to oversee the positive impact that the new diplomatic and psychological milieu generated by the statements of New Zealander officials had on a conflict – the Bougainville war – which could be defined, under any standard, as a ‘complex’ one.

1.4 The success of ‘proximity talks’ which involved significant use of time pressure, such as the Dayton summit, can be associated with the gradual simplification of the issues at stake throughout the negotiation

The second set of case studies focused on two famous summits of the post-Cold War era – the 1996 Dayton proximity talks and the 2000 Camp David summit. The choice of these case studies was determined, on the one hand, by the recurrence in the comparative models discussed in chapter 4 of configurations that associated the presence of deadline diplomacy and of indicators of complexity with durable agreements, in particular in intense conflicts. On the other hand, these two summits are usually considered as the paradigmatic expression of what is defined by Sadia Touval (1996, 562) as the ‘Camp David model’ of conflict resolution – according to which summits closed to media and organised around tight deadlines can prove to be successful for resolving enduring conflicts.

Again, our analysis in of the Dayton and Camp David summits in chapter 6 resulted in a number of relevant observations on the features and effectiveness of summit diplomacy, which were discussed in detail in the conclusion of the chapter. However, the analysis also highlighted one particularly important aspect of the ‘Camp David model’ which has not yet received sufficient attention from the literature on conflict resolution – namely, that the undoubtedly positive effect of time pressure in the last days of the Dayton summit was crucially dependent on the fact that the range of issues at stake had gradually and steadily shrunk

throughout the summit. In other words, our analysis showed that, while the summit in its wholeness could be said to have dealt with a very complex set of issues, the success of the summit depended on the fact that the large majority of the ‘sticking points’ of the negotiations (including the status of Eastern Slavonia, the main constitutional features of Bosnia and the status of Sarajevo) had been resolved in earlier phases of the negotiation process, so that, when time pressure was applied systematically in the last days of the summit, only a very specific outstanding issue – the exact demarcation of the IEBL – had remained. Moreover, the very nature of the Dayton negotiation, where Milosevic could effectively coerce the Bosnian Serbian delegation into accepting a settlement of his own liking, created a condition by which most of the crucial decisions in the last days of the talks were taken by actors – Tudjman and Milosevic – who were not as deeply and emotionally involved in the partition of Bosnia as the Bosnians themselves, and the integrity of whose states was not directly threatened by this settlement.

This analysis had two main implications. From a theoretical perspective, these results comply with the intuition that time pressure tends to work better when the complexity of the negotiation or decision-making milieu is low; the fact that the Dayton summit was classified as a ‘complex’ negotiation in its wholeness obscured the fact that the success of the summit crucially depended on the fact that the range of issues there discussed gradually shrunk, to the point of reducing to one single outstanding disagreement. From a practical perspective, this analysis of the Dayton negotiation provided further evidence to explain the failure of the Camp David 2000 summit. While we acknowledged that the political and military milieu in which the two summits took place differed in many respects (cf. Belloni and Deane 2005, 230; Goodby 1996, 520; Zartman 2004, 147), the absence of a clear agenda at Camp David and the failure of the negotiations to simplify the broad range of ‘red lines’ in the first stages of the talk also played a significant role in diminishing the impact of time pressure in the later stages of the talks.

2. Other relevant findings

2.1 Practical deadlines have a comparatively marginal role in conflict resolution

Our analysis was initially inspired by the detailed overview provided by Geoffrey Berridge (2005, 58-64) of the role played by time pressure in diplomacy. Berridge suggests that three types of deadlines exist - artificial, symbolic and practical – and concludes that ‘there is little doubt [that] practical deadlines are usually the most valuable when it comes to sustaining momentum in negotiations’ (*ibid.*, 61).

However, our review of the episodes of negotiation included in the dataset revealed that, while a significant number of agreements was concluded in the presence of various forms of artificial deadlines, the episodes of negotiation which developed under the direct shadow of pending elections, expiring ceasefires or symbolic deadlines were relatively few. As discussed in chapter 4, paragraph 1.1.2, only two instances of relevant ‘symbolic deadlines’ were found in the dataset: the ‘Good Friday’ agreement in Northern Ireland and the 1997 ceasefire in Nagaland, while a third potential instance – the 2000 ceasefire declared by India on Kashmir – was not included in the dataset as the initiative was unilateral. Relatively marginal has also been the impact of expiring ceasefires (9% of the episodes of negotiation), although they did play a relevant role, for instance, in influencing the conflict between Niger and the Tuareg and, as we discussed in chapter 6, the negotiations on Eastern Slavonia at Dayton. More widespread, but still not particularly consistent, has been the impact of pending elections on peace negotiations (22% of the dataset), relevant instances of which included the agreements struck between 1995 and 1998 in the Oslo process, the negotiations on the Mindanao conflict in 1998 and the negotiations between Ecuador and Peru over the Cordillera del Condor dispute in 1996.

Moreover, together with this evidence that highlights that the role of practical deadlines should not be overstated, our analysis also went some way to suggest that, in certain occasions, parties might explicitly wait until a specific deadline has expired or a specific event has taken place before engaging in serious

negotiations. This is certainly the case of crucial elections which are deemed to change the leadership of a specific country, an example of which has been the June 1996 elections in Papua New Guinea that kick-started the process that led to the Burnham agreement in Casamance.

2.2 The presence of inter-cultural cleavages has a mixed impact on the durability of agreements signed under time pressure

Of the three variables that we used to operationalise the concept of ‘conflict complexity’, the presence of inter-cultural cleavages has been the one whose impact on conflict durability and whose interaction with the absence of time pressure has been more difficult to interpret. In contrast with decision-making and issue complexity, that seem to be systematically related with the absence of time pressure to generate durable agreements, the models that we discussed in chapter 4, paragraph 2.2.1.2 showed that both the presence and the absence of relevant inter-cultural cleavages, in interaction with the absence / low levels of time pressure, can be associated with durable negotiation outcomes.

This outcome seems not to be directly influenced by the distribution of fuzzy scores in the dataset (i.e. by systematic coding biases): the number of units of analysis which passes the 0.5 threshold in all three ‘complexity’ variables is essentially the same (48 for decision-making complexity; 50 for issue complexity; 49 for inter-cultural cleavages), and the number of episodes of negotiations which received the highest score for inter-cultural cleavage (18) is slightly higher, but still in line with the other variables (15 for issue complexity; 10 for decision-making complexity).

The explanation for these rather ambiguous results can possibly be found in the nature itself of the variable. In chapter 2 we suggested that the presence of inter-cultural cleavages can be considered as one of the conditions in which parties have to deal with ‘ambiguous’ information in a negotiation process. What our analysis in chapter 5 showed is that, at least in the case studies analysed, the presence of inter-cultural complexity seems to impact on the outcomes of some negotiations primarily by increasing the complexity of decision-making processes

– that is, it seems to act more as an intervening variable than as an independent variable which adds a separate layer of complexity to a negotiation process.

What this analysis suggests, thus, is not that inter-cultural cleavages have no impact on negotiation outcomes, nor this analysis has provided any evidence to deny the validity of long-term confidence building processes based on developing informal relationships through time between enemies separated by relevant cultural differences. The comparative models and the case studies, however, seem to suggest that the two remaining ‘complexity’ variables – decision-making and issue complexity – articulate the concept of ‘conflict complexity’ in a more consistent fashion, and seem to be directly and steadily associated with the absence of time pressure in processes which result in durable agreements. On the contrary, little evidence emerges from our case studies to support the suggestion that, at least in the context of single episodes of negotiation, the absence of time pressure might smoothen the relations between enemies separated by relevant inter-cultural barriers, while new evidence seems to exist to support Tamara Cofman Wittes’ (2005, 133) argument on the fact that culture primarily operates as an ‘intervening variable’ in diplomacy.

2.3 The extreme time shortage that is typically reproduced in social experiments is hardly comparable to real-life negotiations

In chapter 6 we introduced a quote from Carnevale and Lawler (1986, 656) which suggested that, in the presence of time pressure, parties can not just limit their exchanges of information, but also use more sparingly ‘trial and error’ strategies. While we reckon that Peter Carnevale has probably been the scholar who showed more interest in bridging the gap between the findings of experimental psychology and diplomatic studies, his works on time pressure are primarily based on *ad hoc* experiments. This specific quote summarises the conclusions of an experimental study which involved 96 students of the University of Iowa, where the participants who had to agree on a deal under time pressure were object both to ‘objective’ shortage of time (having five minutes to reach an agreement)

and to psychological pressure (a tape recorder reminded them each minute how much time remained).

Our analysis in chapter 6 focused on a specific event which probably represents the closest equivalent of Carnevale and Lawler's experiment in real-life negotiations – a last-minute negotiation session in an international summit under a looming deadline. In that circumstance – the negotiation between Milosevic, Holbrooke and Christopher on the Brcko corridor in the morning of day 23 of the Dayton summit – we noted that the parties played various 'trial and error' tactics and discussed at least three different settlements, despite the fact that they had only one hour available to get to an agreement. From this episode we concluded that, of the effects of time pressure discussed by Carnevale and Lawler, the failure of the parties to engage in 'trial and error' tactics might depend not so much (or not primarily) on the perceived level of time pressure, but rather on the objective absence of sufficient time for putting in place time-consuming strategies. During the Dayton summit, we do observe most of the effects described by Carnevale and Lawler in their analysis – including a clear deterioration of the quality of information exchange – but, even in the most extreme circumstances, a broad variety of strategies was attempted by the actors involved, in particular by those whose strategic priorities were clearer.

Therefore, our analysis provided tentative evidence to suggest that some of the effects of time pressure described by experimental studies in terms of strategy selection might be due more to the extreme time shortage in which these 'artificial' negotiations typically take place than to the psychological / cognitive effects of the perceived pressure generated by a pending deadline ('time pressure' proper). This conclusion signals the dangers that can derive from applying the results of social experiments to real-life negotiations without some form of triangulation with case-studies or comparative evidence, and further highlights the need for serious comparative analysis on the impact of time pressure on diplomacy.

3. Implications for conflict studies

This research is an attempt to shed light on a very specific set of research questions in the field of conflict studies. It focused on a branch of the larger debate on the impact of time in conflict resolution – the impact of practical and artificial deadlines on the breadth and durability of negotiated agreements – and, as such, it neglected a variety of relevant research questions which have so far received insufficient attention from the literature, including questions on the effectiveness of deadlines in implementation processes or in the usefulness of asymmetric time pressure in redressing strategic imbalances in peace negotiations. It also focused on a very limited time span – the post-Cold War period – under the assumption, as discussed in chapter 2, that since the end of the Cold War more attention has been paid not just by researchers, but also by diplomats themselves, on the need to discipline peace negotiations around fixed and – if possible – tight schedules.

Yet, within this sub-field of research, the findings that we mentioned in the previous paragraphs arguably amount to important steps forward in understanding the impact of time and of time management on peace negotiations. In exploring the role of time pressure in peace negotiations, however, this research also had the ambition to contribute to a set of broader debates in the discipline. These contributions include the following:

3.1 Neither incrementalism nor processes based on ‘make-or-break’ comprehensive negotiations provide universal recipes for effective conflict resolution

Until well into the new millennium, the immediate success of the 1993 Oslo DoP and the successful resolution of other major conflicts in the 1990s, including the wars in Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia and Nagorno-Karabakh, contributed to create in the post-Cold War period a sense that ‘negotiated settlement has surpassed military victory as the modal outcome in civil wars’ (Mason et al. 2007,

3), accompanied by a certain enthusiasm – among researchers and diplomats alike – for the effectiveness of piecemeal bargaining in the context of peace processes, which was attributed a good portion of the merits for this alleged new trend in conflict resolution. However, the ultimate failure of the Oslo process and the endurance of other major territorial conflicts in Africa, south-east Asia and in the Caucasus has more recently provoked new theoretical approaches which criticise the over-reliance of peace negotiations in the 1990s on slow-paced, incrementalist peace processes and advocate a more resolute approach to conflict resolution. This new trend is well represented by Sumantra Bose, who identifies in the over-reliance on incrementalist approaches one of the most relevant features of the conflict resolution efforts in the five conflicts that reviews in ‘Contested Lands’, and concludes that:

Time is not necessarily on the side of peace. If the steady progress envisaged by the incrementalist paradigm fails to materialize, and if the precious momentum that normally accompanies the onset and early stages of a peace process is lost, the tide can turn rapidly and the window of opportunity may close (Bose 2007, 302).

Our analysis of territorial peace negotiations in the post-Cold War period does not allow us to draw any general conclusions on the relevance of specific negotiation techniques other than the use of ‘deadline diplomacy’. Yet, as a whole, our comparative dataset and the case studies enable us to provide two insights to this debate. On the one hand, our review suggests that, while it is apparent that the concept of ‘peace process’ has indeed become the most common buzzword in conflict resolution, it is overall imprecise to suggest from a comparative perspective that today’s conflict resolution efforts are focused only (or overwhelmingly) on slow-paced or incrementalist approaches and neglect the value of comprehensive and ‘make-or-break’ negotiations. Rather, in the post-Cold War era we found both slow-paced and accelerated negotiations, incrementalist approaches and extreme time pressure. In this sense, Bose might have fallen in the fallacy effectively described by Christine Bell (2000, 19):

The existence of a few much publicized ‘peace processes’ in some highly visible cases of seemingly intractable social conflicts obscures the fluid

nature of conflict and attempts to resolve it, the multiplicity of initiatives which can be ongoing at any point in time, and the sheer number of formal peace processes and peace agreements which have been negotiated since 1990.

Moreover, our analysis shows that the debate on the relevance of the 'incrementalist paradigm' somehow misses the point. The second, and most important, suggestion supported by our analysis implies that this debate should focus less on blanket recipes for conflict resolution and more on understanding in which types of conflicts – or under what conditions – each mediation strategy has the best chances to succeed. The comparative models that we discussed in chapter 4, for instance, aim at exploring how time pressure impacts on complex and non-complex conflicts, and provide evidence not to suggest that time pressure *never* works in conflict resolution, but rather to say that, in complex conflicts and under specific conditions, the absence of time pressure is more consistently related to durable outcomes. This cautiousness seems to contrast with the fact that, as we discussed in the case-study section, the choice to employ artificial time pressure or to resort to other mediation tactics often depends more on the mediator's personal beliefs or political priorities than on any attempt to understand under what conditions each of these strategies is most likely to result in durable agreements. The failure to 'learn the right lessons' from previous conflict resolution attempts has also resulted in the failure of major conflict resolution initiatives, such as the Camp David 2000 summit. Our research should thus encourage scholars in conflict and peace studies to devote more energy to exploring comparatively the contextual factors which determine the success or failure of major mediation techniques, with the aim of providing an increasingly accurate and nuanced picture of their potentials and liabilities.

3.2 Different measurements of 'success' in negotiation can have a crucial impact on how the consequences of specific features of the negotiation process and of relevant mediation techniques are assessed.

It is well known, in conflict resolution studies, that different comparative datasets or different indicators used for coding relevant variables often end up portraying ‘different worlds of violence’ (Eberwein and Chojnacki 2001, 8). The dependence of the field of quantitative conflict studies on the Correlates of War project often creates a situation where ‘most projects do not conduct original historical research and depend heavily on COW’ (Sambanis 2004, 814). When such independent research is conducted and new datasets are created – such as the UCDP datasets, KOSIMO or Jacob Bercovich’s ‘Mediation Project’ – the validity and reliability of the results of such work is at times not as convincing as it should be (cf. Pinfari 2008).

Our analysis impacts on the debate on comparative datasets in conflict resolution at two different levels. On the one hand, as any analysis which demonstrates how the choice of different indicators for a specific outcome (in our case, for the ‘success’ of a negotiation) strongly influences the interpretation of a phenomenon, it calls for more caution and attention in inferring any general conclusion from comparative data. While the extensor of any comparative dataset in social sciences is required to account for the validity and reliability of each variable (cf. Munck and Verkuilen 2002), in the context of peace and conflict studies the complexity and intangibility of most relevant variables (such as conflict intensity or termination) should compel each author to engage widely with the debate surrounding the specific aspects of a conflict that are being coded and to justify each choice in relation to such debates, something which is absent from most codebooks. In areas where agreement in the discipline is still missing (for instance in delineating the major types of conflict termination), the user of these datasets should thus be aware that the categories used by a specific dataset are not necessarily correct and conceptually valid and should be encouraged to develop his/her own understanding of the prevailing positions in the literature. Ideally, the user should also be put in the condition to employ interchangeably different variables from different datasets – something which can be aided by a wider use of standard identification numbers for major conflicts (including, for instance, the COW country codes).

The second conclusion that can be derived from our analysis concerns, more specifically, the analysis of the outcomes of peace negotiations. It has to be said that only one relevant dataset (the UCDP PA Dataset) is currently available in this area, and that – despite the problems that we discussed in chapter 3 – the set of indicators provided for breadth and duration of agreements is overall convincing. Yet this dataset represents an exception in the panorama of large-N datasets in conflict studies, where little attention is paid to the type of agreement reached by the warring parties at the end of specific phases of conflict (indeed, the words ‘settlement’, ‘agreement’ and ‘compromise’ are often used interchangeably in large-N datasets – cf. Pinfari 2008, 11) and where, most importantly, major datasets such as the COW Militarized Interstate Disputes and the UCDP Conflict Termination datasets do not include variables aimed at coding the durability of such outcomes. The results of our analysis show that distinguishing between the type of outcome and the durability of such outcome can result in a different understanding of the phenomena under review, and this differentiation might help open new perspectives in current debates in conflict studies, such as the diatribe on whether empirical data support the claim that ‘since 1990 negotiated settlement has surpassed military victory as the modal outcome in civil wars’ (Mason et al. 2007, 3).

3.3 Increased dialogue and exchange of ideas between diplomatic manuals and experimental psychology should be encouraged

Throughout this research we relied on four types of sources that examine the impact of time pressure on decision-making or negotiation. Diplomatic manuals discuss time pressure among the factors which impact on a negotiation process and, in some circumstances, provide a detailed analysis of diplomatic momentum and its impact on negotiation outcomes (cf. Zartman and Berman 1982; Moore 1986; Sunshine 1990; Pruitt and Carnevale 1997; Rao 2001; Berridge 2005). Case-study papers discuss the relevance of time pressure, among many other variables, with reference to specific international crises or peace negotiations (cf. Berridge 1989; Blechman and Cofman Wittes 1999), or at times in the context of

small comparative reviews of the career of relevant diplomats (cf. Bebchick 2002). Papers by negotiation theorists review with accuracy the impact of time pressure on specific types of negotiation processes which take place in real-life diplomacy or business relations, supporting their theories with social experiments (cf. Wright 1974; Carnevale and Lawler 1986; Kressel and Pruitt 1989; Carnevale, O'Connor and McCusker 1993; Druckman 1994). Finally, papers by social psychologists provide a fresh take on the impact of time pressure on decision-making as one of the many areas in which time pressure impacts on social behaviour, supporting their findings either through social experiments or through theoretical discussions on the relative validity of behavioural and cognitive explanations (cf. Edland and Svenson 1993; Zachay 1993).

The third category of sources probably proved to be the most relevant for the type of analysis that we developed in this research, and the one whose results bear more direct relevance for understanding conflict resolution. At a minimum, thus, an increased dialogue between these sources – which are often very cautious in sponsoring an aggressive use of time pressure and warn of its negative cognitive impacts – and the writers of diplomatic manuals – which, on the other hand, tend to praise time pressure on the basis that ‘necessity is the mother of invention’ – would be highly desirable, so that the impact of time pressure can be portrayed in a more balanced and sensible fashion. Yet, our research also revealed that the deeper reason why these works are hardly listened to by the extensors of diplomatic manuals might be the fact that they tend to rely too much on social experiments and too little on comparative reviews of real-life negotiation processes to support their theories. A broader use of qualitative comparative techniques – if not the creation of medium-N or large-N datasets – in the study of peace negotiations can thus play a crucial role in bringing together the policy-oriented and the research-based souls of conflict studies and to minimise the risk of reading in diplomatic manuals suggestions which contrast with the empirical findings of most of the literature in the discipline.

3.4 The concept of mutually hurting stalemate can be fruitfully included, although with some caveats, in a comparative analysis of conflict resolution efforts

The concept of ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ captures a fundamental, yet intrinsically ephemeral concept in conflict resolution – the readiness of the warring parties to engage in fruitful negotiations. No relevant conclusion of this research is directly based on this variable, which was employed primarily to identify negotiations with an integrative potential in the explorative models of H2 and H3 and, thus, to create a more balanced ground for testing the impact of both the absence and the presence of time pressure. Despite this, it is clear that the concept of MHS has its own independent empirical relevance and overlaps only partially with variables traditionally used to describe the intensity of a conflict, and therefore is arguably crucial for any comparative analysis of peace negotiations.

In coding this variable, still, we encountered some of the problems that are typically highlighted by the literature on MHS. One of the most common criticism of the concept of MHS is that, as Zartman himself put it, ‘you can only tell it after it happened’ (Zartman 2003b). Indeed, since our analysis was based on coding MHS in relation to episodes of negotiation or conflicts that have already concluded, it is difficult to suggest that our analysis was not influenced by knowing what the outcome of a specific conflict or episode of negotiation was. This could have impacted on the fact that, in the majority (although not in the totality) of the units of analysis in our dataset, successful negotiations tend to correspond with stalemated conflicts.

These biases, however, should not obscure what is in fact a more nuanced and promising picture. Our coding was primarily based on searching for events which created significant discontinuities in the war efforts of the parties involved in a conflict and / or for what Zartman (2003b) defines as ‘expressions of ripeness’ – declarations by the parties which testify that they perceive negotiations as the only way forward. In this sense, it is hardly surprising that the likelihood of a MHS occurring tend to increase as conflicts progress, and therefore that in most long-term conflicts coded in the dataset the scores for MHS tend to increase as

well with time. Also, and most interestingly, our analysis has shown that in many circumstances it is possible to identify major events whose role in forcing the parties to the negotiation table is beyond doubt (such as the 2004 tsunami in Aceh, or the Sandline crisis in Bougainville). Moreover, the fact that the concept of MHS is now widely used in conflict and peace studies also implies that it is not difficult to find contributions by scholars and ‘experts’ who discuss whether or not a MHS was present in specific phases of relevant conflicts (including the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Yugoslavian wars). Therefore, the coding for these conflicts can also be triangulated with the available literature – something which was not possible when the concept of MHS and ‘ripeness’ were not as widely discussed as today.

In conclusion, the concept of MHS remains highly controversial and should probably be employed with caution in a comparative context, as we did in this research. Yet, the obvious explanatory potential of this variable and the increasing wealth of literature on the topic suggest that its use in comparative models should be explored more widely. In particular when qualitative comparative methodologies are employed, assessments of whether sincere ‘expressions of ripeness’ were proffered can be coupled with the more objective search for events which directly impact on the prosecution of a conflict, and generate an important descriptive variable to be added to the traditional set of explanatory variables (duration, intensity, external intervention, etc.) for analysing conflict resolution.

4. Implications for policymakers

4.1 In negotiations which involve complex and symbolic issues and a broad variety of actors, time pressure might help achieve broad agreements, but the chances that they will last are low

This conclusion, one of the main outcomes of this research, has been discussed at large in the previous paragraphs. What is worth adding is that the fact that natural

or practical deadlines played a relatively minor role in influencing the results of the comparative analysis suggests that most of the time pressure exercised during negotiation processes is actually artificial – that is, it can be somehow controlled and manipulated by diplomats. Diplomats, mediators and any actor involved in conflict resolution efforts should thus be aware of the fact that little evidence exists to suggest that such pressure results in durable agreements in complex negotiations.

One of the immediate objections that could be raised is that, while this suggestion can in principle be an interesting and useful one, distinguishing in practice between ‘complex’ and ‘non-complex’ negotiations is not easy. In particular in the post-Cold War era, the widespread perception is that most negotiations involve a broad variety of state and non-state actors, and in the large majority of cases the range of issues on the negotiating table involves a vast array of symbolic, political, economic and cultural disagreements. Yet, our analysis can provide a general direction at least in two ways. On the one hand, it is hardly true that all contemporary negotiations involve complex and entrenched disputes – for instance, the dataset included some rather minor boundary disputes (e.g. between Ecuador and Peru). At a micro-level, chapter 6 also demonstrated that even in the context of complex negotiations it can be profitable to apply time pressure to resolve a very specific issue which does not pose any particular problem of principle, while the use of extreme pressure to resolve major symbolic and life-changing disputes still remains undesirable.

On the other hand, the results of this analysis could be applied in relative terms, to suggest that a diplomat or of a mediator should use his/her experience to fine-tune the use of time pressure by taking into account the relative level of complexity of a conflict, and by being aware of the vast range of effects that time pressure can have on the parties’ behaviour. To the contents of this ‘call to caution’, which could arguably be the main contribution of this research to the behaviour of policy-makers involved in conflict resolution, we now turn in the following two paragraphs.

4.2 The range of trade-offs that should be taken into account when considering the impact of time pressure in peace negotiations is broader than most diplomatic manuals would suggest.

The first element of the ‘call to caution’ descends from our analysis in chapter 2 of the approach to time pressure by diplomatic manuals. In that occasion we suggested that diplomatic manuals tend to highlight two main problems associated with artificial time pressure – the credibility of the artificially-imposed deadlines and the risk that time pressure could encourage brinkmanship – but we also suggested that, on balance, most manuals (with the partial exception of Moore 1986) seem to endorse the use of time pressure as an overall effective strategy for reaching agreements.

Our analysis in chapter 2 and our discussion in the case-study section, however, suggested is that there is at least one major set of problems related with the presence or use of time pressure which is neglected by these manuals – the (typically negative) cognitive impact of time pressure on individual and joint decision-making. Evidence both from experimental psychology and from recent peace negotiations, in particular, show that the level of stress brought about by time pressure can have systematic negative effects on the quality of information gathering and on the processing of such information, in particular if ambiguous, and on group dynamics.

The overall conclusion from this analysis is not, again, that time pressure should never be used in negotiation; rather, this research aims at making diplomats aware of the fact that peace negotiations which take place under time pressure might be subject under a significant set of cognitive constraints which, depending on the characteristics of a conflict or of the issues under discussion, may balance out or even overtake the positive effects traditionally associated with time pressure in business and work environments.

4.3 The use of 'models' is dangerous.

Yet the most dangerous practice which needs to be reconsidered in conflict resolution seems to be the over-reliance on allegedly effective conflict resolution 'models' for resolving conflicts which have little or nothing in common. In this research we reviewed one of these 'models' – the one based on Camp-David-style proximity talks – and we stressed how the success of the 1995 Dayton talks, which are explicitly followed the pattern of the 1978 Camp David talks between Carter, Begin and Sadat, could hardly be repeated in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.

While our analysis focused primarily on aspects related to time pressure, the reasons why the 'Camp David model' is ill fitted as a generalized model for conflict resolution, in particular in the post-Cold War era, are apparent. Both in 1978 and in 1995 the primary actors in the summits (Israel and Egypt; Croatia and Serbia) were sovereign states, with defined borders and whose existence was not to be directly affected by the outcomes of the negotiations; in both cases, these actors had to agree on a territorial dispute that would not determine the survival of either actors as sovereign and independent entities, and according to a general blueprint which had already been set by military or political events which preceded the negotiation. In this sense, as we suggested in chapter 6, the 1978 Camp David summit and the 1995 Dayton talks are much closer to traditional post-war conferences than one would immediately think.

How exactly this model can be employed for bilateral negotiations in which the existence as a sovereign entity of one of the actors depends on the results of a negotiation is hard to understand. In 2000, none of the underlying causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict nor any feature which impacted on the military, diplomatic and strategic imbalance between the parties had been seriously addressed. In those conditions, the choice of using time pressure for resolving a 'one hundred-year conflict in a matter of months' (Carnevale 2005, 214) reveals at best an overoptimistic attitude towards the potentials of diplomacy and can be associated more with the impatience of the mediator to get to any meaningful

(albeit unstable) result than with any significant attempt to understand which mediating strategy was more likely to succeed in those specific circumstances.

This lesson should be considered carefully by the Obama administration, that is allegedly considering organising a new Camp David summit to re-launch the Israeli-Palestinian peace process¹³⁷. While this initiative could succeed in taking the Israeli-Palestinian conflict back to the top of the agenda of world leaders, no evidence can be drawn from relevant ‘proximity talks’ in the post-Cold War period to suggest that such effort can provide a significant contribution to the peace process itself.

4.4 Intra-rebel coordination plays an important role in favoring durable agreements, and the absence of time pressure can favour them

Amidst this series of caveats and calls for caution, our research also includes some constructive suggestions for diplomats and mediators. The first interesting intuition that emerges from the first set of case studies highlights the importance of intra-rebel meetings and agreements as a precondition for the durability of peace agreements. While the rationale for case selection – focused on exploring specific fuzzy-set configurations – does not necessarily imply that these cases are representative of broader trends, the peace negotiations in Casamance and, especially, in Bougainville provide consistent evidence to suggest that the effective intra-rebel coordination tends to smoothen the path towards durable agreements between rebel movements and governmental actors.

This finding is in line with existing research on the role of veto players in the perpetuation of ethnic conflicts and with the consequent call for ‘reduc[ing] the number of actors that can block settlement’ by encouraging the creation of joint delegations (Cunningham 2006, 167). What our research adds to this picture is the suggestion that the chances of success of such coalition-building process can be strongly affected by the timeframe in which such process takes place. In the Bougainville negotiations, for instance, the success of the Burnham intra-rebel

¹³⁷ Raghida Dergham. The Idea of a New Camp David and Parallel Negotiations on All Fronts. *Dar Al-Hayat*, 22 May 2009.

conference to obtain what the Cairns conference failed to deliver two years earlier can be associated not just with the new strategic context generated by the Sandline crisis, but also with the success of New Zealand in arranging effective negotiations from the level of intra-rebel coordination to the talks between the representatives of Bougainville and the PNG government, and with the rejection of deadline diplomacy as a viable strategy for forcing an agreement on the rebels.

4.5 In proximity talks, issue sequencing crucially affects the results of the negotiations

Another constructive note which emerges from the case-study section underlines the importance of effective agenda setting in proximity talks which are staged under significant time pressure. The comparison between the Dayton and Camp David 2000 negotiations showed, among other things, that Richard Holbrooke's idea of introducing the negotiations on the status of Bosnia at a later stage during the summit helped, if not to generate a rigorous and structured agenda for the talks, at least to create a constructive negotiation environment in which crucial issues were dealt one at a time without affecting the chances to generate constructive issue linkages. This approach is in stark contrast with Clinton's 'bumper car diplomacy' at Camp David, where all the relevant issues were discussed in parallel and none of the tracks of the talks achieve any sensible result.

Our previous conclusions suggest that the potential contribution of time pressure to 'having things done' outweigh the cognitive and strategic shortcomings of time pressure only in relatively simple contexts. Diplomats and mediators should keep this in mind both when approaching long-term peace negotiations and when arranging specific summits; using deadlines sparingly and to solve final deadlocks, ideally after other major disagreements have been resolved in more relaxed and detailed negotiations through issue linkage, can thus maximize the potentials of time pressure and minimize its shortcomings.

5. Reviewing truth-table fuzzy-set logic

In chapter 1 we mentioned the choice of the methodology used in the comparative section – truth-table fuzzy-set logic – was inspired by considerations on the size of the dataset and on the type of causal relations that the comparative models endeavoured to explore. While fuzzy-set logic is used increasingly often in political science and international relations, its development – and, all the more, the development of its latest truth-table variant – should arguably be conceived as part of a work-in-progress, motivated by the ambitious aim of finding a middle-ground between quantitative and qualitative methodologies. As such, it is important that researchers who adopt this methodology pay as much attention to the substantive results of the comparative analysis as to the validity and reliability of the results obtained, and of the methodological steps through which such comparison was implemented.

In general terms, our experience with truth-table fuzzy-set analysis in the comparative section of the research has been satisfactory. The first obvious virtue of fuzzy-set and QCA methods lies in their ambition to overcome the limits of covariational analysis and in the fact that the outcomes of comparative models are arranged in configurations of causal factors. Two important advantages of this approach are that the outcomes of these models suggest potential patterns of causation that can be further explored with the analysis of ‘pathway’ cases, and that each variable might appear in different configurations with different values – and may thus be described as contributing in various ways (i.e. with its absence / low levels or presence / high levels) to different necessary patterns leading to the same outcome. This proved to be particularly useful in the analysis of the role of time pressure in comprehensive agreements (model 2.1.1a), where both the absence / low levels and presence / high levels of time pressure were associated – in combination with other factors – with the same outcome.

Another interesting feature of the truth-table approach is the presence of a first level of selection of relevant configurations, during which the fuzzy-set scores are momentarily reduced into Boolean scores to be organised in truth

tables. As explained in chapter 3, this makes it possible, for a researcher who does not adopt a strictly quantitative ‘calibration’ procedure for assigning continuous fuzzy-set scores but resorts to the more qualitative interval-scale scores, to peg the choice of whether or not a specific unit of analysis passes the 0.5 threshold to some form of triangulation with scores from other datasets or comparative analysis – thus reducing (but not eliminating) the role of discretionary qualitative assessments in the procedure.

However, other aspects of fuzzy-set analysis still raise some methodological problems. For instance, in fuzzy-set analysis the assessments on the quality of models primarily depend on whether or not they reach or pass certain thresholds of coverage and, in particular, consistency; however, at the moment there is no clear consensus as to what levels of consistency could be considered as ‘high enough’ for a model to be considered as acceptable. This problem could be framed as part of the larger debate on the challenges faced by qualitative researchers in expressing ‘levels of causality’ (Brooks and Wohlforth 2007, 266), and has no easy solution. Indeed, suggesting that no consensus on this matter exists does not mean that any assessment on acceptable levels of consistency is purely subjective: a level of solution consistency ranging between 0.80 and 0.85 could in fact be ‘substantial enough’ for suggesting that some relevant ‘integral connection’ is at play (Ragin 2006a, 293). However, academic debate on consistency and coverage thresholds should arguably be encouraged to further enlarge the empirical evidence on the assets and liabilities of setting thresholds at pre-determinate levels, and to explore the opportunity of agreeing on a set of ‘standard’ consistency levels.

Our analysis in chapter 4 also provides evidence of the methodological challenges involved in generating a variety of fuzzy-set models for exploring a range of different research hypotheses. Ideally the chapter should have included a wide variety of models corresponding to various consistency thresholds and coverage cutoffs, and for all models various types of solutions (parsimonious, complex and intermediate – the latter itself articulated in relation to various pre-determined assumptions) should have been outlined and discussed. This process is arguably possible if a single hypothesis is being tested, but in our case – if the

narrative connecting the various models had to be kept at least vaguely intelligible for a reader who is not versed in this specific research methodology – only a number of models was ultimately chosen and discussed, with the whole range of parsimonious and complex solutions being outlined only in relation to the core models on conflict complexity. While we believe that the final results of the comparative sections are both valid and reliable, the challenges that we faced in framing this chapter also confirm the impression that fuzzy-set analysis can really fulfill its vocation of being an intelligible and fully transparent qualitative method when the number of variables and cases involved in the analysis, and the number of hypotheses to be explored, are relatively low.

6. Perspectives for further research

As mentioned above, this research focused on a very specific empirical realm – post-Cold War peace negotiations in territorial conflicts – and therefore its conclusions can be generalized beyond this dataset only at a hypothetical level. Yet, the choice of a relatively small dataset was influenced more by current trends in peace research – for instance the choice of relevant UCDP projects to focus on a similar timeframe – than by any strong assumption on the specificity of peace negotiations in the post-Cold War era.

A first, relevant direction for further research would thus be to repeat our analysis with reference to a wider dataset, obtained by relaxing some of the conditions set in chapter 3 for the selection of conflicts or episodes of negotiation. It would be interesting, in particular, to expand the dataset to include a larger portion (or the entirety) of the post-World War II period (the typical timeframes of the major conflict analysis datasets) and / or to compare the results obtained in this research with reference to territorial conflicts with what could emerge from an analysis of government-based conflicts (according to the distinction operated by UCDP datasets). While we expect that most of the suggestions which emerged from this research would still hold, relaxing these conditions would help to significantly increase the diversity of the dataset; it would also be reasonable to expect, for instance, that the inclusion of government-based conflicts could help

understand the role of time pressure in comparatively simpler conflicts – where negotiations tend to focus on a less diverse range of disputed issues than in territorial peace negotiations. Any of such changes in the composition of the dataset, however, would also make it more difficult to use QCA to frame the comparative analysis and would probably require switching to a quantitative approach.

In chapter 2 we also stated that this thesis explicitly avoids certain fields of research in conflict analysis which are affected by the debates on time pressure, but which cannot be reasonably included in a study focused on peace negotiations proper. One of these areas of research – the analysis of the implementation processes following major peace agreements – may represent an interesting context in which the theories developed in this thesis can be tested. Implementation processes are typically organized around fixed deadlines by which certain obligations included in an agreement should be implemented by the parties; the more a conflict is complex, the more fragmented such processes are likely to be – following Schelling’s old adage on the positive impact of piecemeal concession-making on confidence-building. On the basis of our research, it may be reasonable to suggest that, when such stages are marked by sharp deadlines, the effectiveness of such forms of time pressure also depends on the relative complexity of the tasks to be carried out. In this sense, and everything else being equal, having more (and reasonably-timed) deadlines associated with clearly-defined tasks might reduce the flexibility of the parties, but might help increase the effectiveness of micro-level decision-making processes and – incidentally – drastically reduce the negative consequences of major deadlines being transgressed by the parties. Empirical comparative research could help shed light on this and similar intuitions that can be derived from our analysis.

A final set of hypotheses that would deserve further attention concerns the role of credibility in the impact of time pressure and the effect of asymmetric time pressure on negotiation outcomes. In chapter 2 we discussed why a medium-N dataset is unfit for exploring how the credibility of a specific deadline impacted on its effectiveness in generating the desired outcomes, and we also highlighted the methodological complexities that would be entailed in a model focused on the

asymmetric effect of specific deadlines or the explicit use of time pressure to exert pressure on only one (or few) of the participants to a negotiation process. The problems that we faced in the case-study section to identify the exact subjective impact of specific deadlines – for example during the Camp David and Dayton summits – somehow confirms that our earlier perplexities were well-placed. Yet, our case studies also provided evidence to support the claim, not uncommon in the literature on time pressure, that, for predicting the outcome of a specific episode of negotiation in which either practical or artificial deadlines are present, understanding each party's reaction to such deadlines is crucial for interpreting their subsequent behaviour. The potential presence of many deadlines operating simultaneously and the importance of assessing the susceptibility to time pressure not just of the parties of a conflict, but also of the mediators themselves – two important aspects that emerged in our analysis of Camp David 2000 – somehow discourage the use of medium- or large-N datasets for exploring these dynamics. Still, a case-study analysis focused on a set of 8-10 episodes of negotiations could be extremely useful to further explore the empirical findings of our research. Such analysis would be particularly valuable if it focused on the conditions and strategies that can enhance the credibility of deadlines, or on how asymmetric artificial time pressure can help redress negotiations in which the parties involved are in condition of strategic asymmetry.

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Appendix 1

Sources for the comparative model

TABLE 2
MAIN SOURCES USED IN THE COMPARATIVE MODEL (CH. 3 AND 4)

TITLE / AUTHORS	SOURCE	MAIN FOCUS / USE IN THIS THESIS	PERIOD
1. Main comparative datasets (referenced in Appendix II, table 3a-b)			
Battle Deaths Dataset	Lacina, Meier and Schuepp 2006	Battle deaths (conflict intensity)	1945-2005
UCDP Armed Conflicts dataset	Harbom and Wallensteen 2007	Selection of conflicts	1946-2006
UCDP Peace Agreements dataset	Harbom, Höglund and Wallensteen. 2006	Selection and description of peace agreement; deadlines; agreement breadth and duration	1989-2005
COSIMO	Pfetsch & Rohloff 2000	Conflict intensity; mediation; issue complexity	1945-1999
Mediation Project, International Conflict Management dataset	Bercovitch and Houston 1999	Mediation	1945-1995
Minorities at Risk	Minorities at Risk Project 2009	Inter-cultural differences; decision-making complexity	1945-2006
Polity IV ¹³⁸		Decision-making complexity	1800-2008
2. Other comparative sources			
Conciliation Resources / ACCORD ¹³⁹		Selection and description of peace agreements; deadlines; agreement breadth and duration	
Militarised Interstate Disputes (MID)	Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004	Conflict intensity	1816-2001
Cambridge Carnegie Project (Resolving Self-Determination Disputes using Complex Power-Sharing) ¹⁴⁰		Selection and description of peace agreements; deadlines; agreement breadth and duration	
Peace agreements	Bell 2000	Selection and description of peace agreements; deadlines; agreements	

¹³⁸ <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm> (last accessed: 8 January 2010)

¹³⁹ <http://www.c-r.org> (last accessed: 8 January 2010)

¹⁴⁰ <http://www.polis.cam.ac.uk/research/cps> (last accessed: 8 January 2010)

		breadth	
Veto players dataset	Cunningham 2006b	Decision-making complexity	
3. General reference data / primary sources (deadlines and MHS)			
Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural Series			
Agence France Presse			
LexisNews			
New York Times Index			
The Economist Archives			
International Crisis Group reports			
Electoral studies (journal)			

TABLE 2
MAIN SECONDARY SOURCES USED IN THE COMPARATIVE MODEL (CH. 3 AND 4)

CONFLICT	MAIN SECONDARY SOURCES
Yugoslavia (Slovenia)	<i>See chapter 6</i>
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat)	<i>See chapter 6</i>
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serb)	<i>See chapter 6</i>
Croatia (Serb)	<i>See chapter 6</i>
Georgia (Abkhazia)	Hopf 2005; Tarkhan-Mouravi and Sumbadze 2006.
Azerbaijan-Armenia (Nagorno-Karabakh)	Betts 1999; Mooradian and Druckman 1999; De Waal 2003.
Israel (Palestine)	<i>See chapter 6</i>
Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts)	Ahsan and Chakma 1989; Rashiduzzaman 1998; Moshin 2003.
India (Nagaland)	Means 1971; Baruah 2003.
Indonesia (Aceh)	Lingga 2007; Aspinall and Crouch 2003.
Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	<i>See chapter 5</i>
Philippines (Mindanao)	Bertrand 2000; Quimpo 2001; Abubakar 2004; Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005.
Sri Lanka (Tamil)	Bouffard and Carment 2006; Moolakkattu 2005.
Comoros (Anjouan)	UN IRIN, 8 November 2001; Africa Review World of Information, 26 September 2002; UN IRIN, 11 December 2007.
Mali (Azawad)	Randall 2005.
Niger (Air and Azawad)	Deschamps 2000
Senegal (Casamance)	<i>See chapter 5</i>
Sudan (Southern Sudan)	Nathan 2006; Antwi-Boateng and O'Mahony 2008.
Ecuador-Peru	Maier 1969; Scott Palmer 2007.

Appendix 2

The Comparative Model

TABLE 1
CONFLICTS LISTED IN THE UCDP ARMED CONFLICTS DATASET
ANALYSED TO GENERATE THE FUZZY SET DATASET

No	CONFLICT	PERIOD / PHASES	INTENSITY	EoN (UCDP)
1	Azerbaijan-Armenia (Nagorno Karabakh)	1992-94; 2005	W	0 (0)
2	Bosnia-Herzegovina (Serbia)	1992-93; 1994-95	W	1 (1)
3	Bosnia-Herzegovina (Croatia)	1993; 1994	W	2 (1)
4	Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bihaća Krajina)	1993-95	M	0 (0)
5	Croatia (Serbia)	1993; 1994	W	1 (1)
6	Georgia (Abkhazia)	1992; 1993	W	2 (1)
7	Georgia (South Ossetia)	1992; 2004	M	0 (0)
8	Moldova (Dniestr)	1992	M	4 (1)
9	Russia (Chechenya)	1994-2005	W	2 (0)
10	Russia (Dagestan)	1999	M	0 (0)
11	Soviet Union (Azerbaijan)	1990	M	0 (0)
12	Soviet Union (Nagorno-Karabakh)	1991-92	M	1 (0)
13	Spain (Basques)	1991-92	M	0 (0)
14	UK (Northern Ireland; IRA)	1998	M	1 (1)
15	Yugoslavia (Croatia)	1991	W	0 (0)
16	Yugoslavia (Slovenia)	1991	W	1 (1)
17	Yugoslavia (Kosovo)	1998; 1999	W	0 (1)
18	Iran (Kurdistan)	1990; 1993; 1996	M	0 (0)
19	Iraq (Kurdistan)	1990; 1991; 1992-93; 1996	W	0 (0)
20	Iraq-Kuwait	1990; 1991	W	0 (0)
21	Israel (Palestine)	1985-2005	D	9 (6)
22	Turkey (Kurdistan)	1987-91; 1992-97; 1998-2005	W	0 (0)
23	Yemen (South Yemen)	1994	W	0 (0)
24	Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts)	1987-92	M	1 (1)
25	Burma (Arakan)	1991-92; 1994	D	0 (0)
26	Burma (Mon)	1990; 1996	M	0 (0)
27	Burma (Shan)	1993; 1994; 1995; 1996-2002; 2005	W	0 (0)
28	Burma (Cachin)	1976-92	M	0 (0)
29	Burma (Karen)	1992; 1996; 2005	M	0 (0)
30	Burma (Karen)	1950-1991; 1992, 1995, 1997-2003; 2005	W	0 (0)
31	Burma (Wa)	1997	M	0 (0)
32	India (Punjab)	1988-92; 1993	W	0 (0)
33	India (Nagaland)	1992-97; 2000; 2005	M	2 (0)
34	India (Manipur)	1992-2000; 2003-05	M	0 (0)
35	India (Tripura)	1992-93; 1995; 1997-2004	M	1 (1)
36	India (Kashmir)	1990-93; 1994-98; 1999-2005	W	0 (0)
37	India (Assam)	1990-91; 1994-2005	M	0 (0)
38	India (Bodoland)	1989-90; 1993-2004	M	0 (1)
39	India-Pakistan	1989-92; 1996-98; 1999; 2000-03	W	0 (0)
40	Indonesia (East Timor)	1992; 1997-98	D	0 (0)
41	Indonesia (Aceh)	1990-91; 1999-2002; 2003-05	M	3 (2)
42	Papua Nuova Guinea (Bougainville)	1989-90; 1992-96	M	8 (3)
43	Philippines (Mindanao)	1982-90; 1993-99; 2000; 2001-05	W	3 (1)
44	Sri Lanka	1989-2001; 2003; 2005	W	4 (0)
45	Thailand (Patani)	2003-05	M	0 (0)
46	Angola (Cabinda)	1991; 1994; 1996-98; 2002; 2004	M	0 (0)
47	Cameroon-Nigeria (Bakassi)	1996	M	0 (0)
48	Comoros (Anjouan)	1997	M	3 (3)
49	Eritrea-Ethiopia	1998-2000	W	1 (1)
50	Ethiopia (Ogaden)	1996; 1998-2002; 2004-05	D	0 (0)
51	Ethiopia (Afar)	1989-91; 1996	M	0 (0)
52	Ethiopia (Somali)	1996-1997; 1999	M	0 (0)
53	Ethiopia (Oromiya)	1989-91; 1999-2005	M	0 (0)
54	Mali (Azawad)	1990; 1994	M	2 (2)
55	Niger (Air and Azawad)	1992; 1994; 1997	M	2 (3)

56	Niger (Eastern Niger)	1996; 1997	M	0 (0)
57	Nigeria (Northern Nigeria)	2004	M	0 (0)
58	Nigeria (Niger Delta)	2004	M	0 (0)
59	Senegal (Casamance)	1990; 1992-93; 1995; 1997-98; 1999-2001; 2003	D	2 (1)
60	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	1983-92; 1993-94; 1995-2002; 2003-2004	W	11 (8)
61	Ecuador-Peru	1995	M	1 (1)
			Total	68 (42)

TABLE 2
EPISODES OF NEGOTIATION INCLUDED IN THE ANALYSIS

CODE	CONFLICT	AGREEMENT / EPISODE OF NEGOTIATION	YEAR
1YUG01	Yugoslavia (Slovenia)	Brioni Agreement	1991
1YUG02	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat)	The Zagreb ceasefire	1994
1YUG03	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Croat)	The Washington Agreement	1994
1YUG04	Bosnia and Herzegovina (Serb)	The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Dayton Agreement)	1995
1YUG05	Croatia (Serb)	The Erdut Agreement	1995
1ABK01	Georgia (Abkhazia)	Sochi agreement	1993
1ABK02	Georgia (Abkhazia)	Declaration on measures for a political settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict	1994
1KAR01	Azerbaijan-Armenia (Nagorno Karabakh)	Bishkek Protocol	1994
1CHE01	Russia (Chechnya)	Khasav-Yurt Accord	1996
1CHE02	Russia (Chechnya)	Peace Treaty and Principles of Interrelation between Russian Federation and Chechen Republic of Ichkeria	1997
1MOL01	Moldova (Dniestr)	Ceasefire	1992
1MOL02	Moldova (Dniestr)	Memorandum on the Basis for Normalization of Relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdnistria	1997
1MOL03	Moldova (Dniestr)	Odessa Agreement	1998
1MOL04	Moldova (Dniestr)	Kiev Joint Statement	1999
1IRE01	UK (Northern Ireland)	Belfast ('Good Friday') Agreement	1998
2PAL01	Israel (Palestine)	Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements/ Oslo Agreement	1993
2PAL02	Israel (Palestine)	Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area	1994
2PAL03	Israel (Palestine)	Agreement on Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities Between Israel and the PLO	1994
2PAL04	Israel (Palestine)	Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip/ Oslo B	1995
2PAL05	Israel (Palestine)	Protocol on Redeployment in Hebron	1997
2PAL06	Israel (Palestine)	The Wye River Memorandum	1998
2PAL07	Israel (Palestine)	The Sharm el-Sheik Memorandum Wye II	1999
2PAL08	Israel (Palestine)	Camp David 2000 Summit	2000
2PAL09	Israel (Palestine)	'Road Map'	2003

3CHI01	Bangladesh (Chittagong Hill Tracts)	Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord	1997
3TRI01	India (Tripura)	Memorandum of Settlement	1993
3NAG01	India (Nagaland)	Ceasefire agreement	1997
3NAG02	India (Nagaland)	Failed peace negotiations	1998
3ACE01	Indonesia (Aceh)	Joint Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh	2000
3ACE02	Indonesia (Aceh)	Cessation of Hostilities Framework Agreement	2002
3ACE03	Indonesia (Aceh)	Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement	2005
3BOU01	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Ceasefire	1990
3BOU02	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	The Honiara Declaration	1991
3BOU03	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Honiara Commitments to Peace	1994
3BOU04	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Arawa Conference	1994
3BOU05	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Burnham Truce	1997
3BOU06	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Lincoln Agreement	1998
3BOU07	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Lincoln Process	1998
3BOU08	Papua New Guinea (Bougainville)	Bougainville Peace Agreement	2001
3MIN01	Philippines (Mindanao)	Mindanao Final Agreement	1996
3MIN02	Philippines (Mindanao)	Estrada peace process	2000
3MIN03	Philippines (Mindanao)	Agreement on Peace between the government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front	2001
3SRI01	Sri Lanka (Tamil)	Ceasefire agreement	1995
3SRI02	Sri Lanka (Tamil)	Kumaratunga peace process	1995
3SRI03	Sri Lanka (Tamil)	Memorandum of understanding	2002
3SRI04	Sri Lanka (Tamil)	Norwegian peace process	2003
4COM01	Comoros (Anjouan)	The Famboni Declaration	2000
4COM02	Comoros (Anjouan)	The Famboni II Agreement	2001
4COM03	Comoros (Anjouan)	Agreement on the transitional arrangements in the Comoros	2003
4MAL01	Mali (Azawad)	Tamanrasset Accord	1991
4MAL02	Mali (Azawad)	Pacte National	1992
4TUA01	Niger (Air and Azawad)	Ouagadougou Accord (Ouaga 1)	1994

4TUA02	Niger (Air and Azawad)	Accord établissant une paix définitive entre le gouvernement de la république du Niger et l'organisation de la résistance armée (Ouaga 2)	1995
4SEN01	Senegal (Casamance)	Ceasefire agreement	1991
4SEN02	Senegal (Casamance)	Accord general de paix entre le gouvernement de la république du Senegal et le Mouvement des forces démocratique de la Casamace (MFDC)	2004
4SUD01	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	Abuja Conferences	1992
4SUD02	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	IGADD talks	1994
4SUD03	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	Chukudum Accord	1994
4SUD04	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	Khartoum Agreement	1997
4SUD05	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	Machakos Protocol	2002
4SUD06	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	Agreement on Security Arrangements During the Interim Period	2003
4SUD07	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	Framework on Wealth Sharing During the Pre-Interim and Interim Period	2004
4SUD08	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on Power Sharing	2004
4SUD09	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	The Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Abyei Area	2004
4SUD10	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	The Protocol Between the GOS and SPLM on the Resolution of Conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States	2004
4SUD11	Sudan (Southern Sudan)	Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement	2005
4ETH01	Eritrea-Ethiopia	Agreement between the Government of the State of Eritrea and the Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	2000
5ECP01	Ecuador-Peru	Acta Presidencial de Brasilia	1998

TABLE 3A
CODING OF TIME PRESSURE AND OTHER INDEXES FOR TRIANGULATION

Reg	Code	Year	pa_date	TPR ¹⁴¹			DED ¹⁴²			SEV			ISS		INT	
				ele	sym	ceas	dea	sum	opp	duration	COSIMO	int ¹⁴³	casualt ¹⁴⁴	COSIMO	comp ¹⁴⁵	typ ¹⁴⁶
1	1YUG01	1991	1991/07/12	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	4	50	N/A	N/A	5/10	
1	1YUG02	1994	1994/02/23	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	150,000	1,3,5,8	3/3	6/10	
1	1YUG03	1994	1994/03/01	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	4	150,000	1,3,5,8	3/3	6/10	
1	1YUG04	1995	1995/12/14	0	0	1	0	2	0	3	4	150,000	1,3,5,8	3/3	6/10	
1	1YUG05	1995	1995/11/12	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	150,000	1,5	3/3	8/10	
1	1ABK01	1993	1993/07/27	0	0	0	0	2	0	9	3	3,000	2,3,4	2/3	5/10	
1	1ABK02	1994	1994/04/04	0	0	0	0	0	2	10	3	3,000	2,3,4	2/3	5/10	
1	1KAR01	1994	1994/07/27	1	0	0	0	2	0	3	4	15,000	3,2	2/3	9/10	
1	1CHE01	1996	1996/08/30	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	4	72,000	1,2	2/3	9/10	
1	1CHE02	1997	1997/05/12	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	4	72,000	1,2	2/3	9/10	
1	1MOL01	1992	1992/07/21	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	2	1,000	2,3	2/3	1/10	
1	1MOL02	1997	1997/05/08	0	0	0	0	2	0	9	2	1,000	2,3	2/3	1/10	
1	1MOL03	1998	1998/03	0	0	0	0	2	0	10	2	1,000	2,3	2/3	1/10	
1	1MOL04	1999	1999/07	0	0	0	0	2	0	11	2	1,000	2,3	2/3	1/10	
1	1IRE01	1998	1998/04/10	0	2	0	2	0	0	30	3	3,000	2,3	2/3	3/10	
2	2PAL01	1993	1993/09/13	0	0	0	0	1	1	26	3	25,000	1,2,3	3/3	7/10	

¹⁴¹ Imminent elections; symbolic deadlines; expiring ceasefires (cf. chapter 3, paragraph 3.1.1).

¹⁴² Deadline diplomacy; summits; fading opportunities (cf. chapter 3, paragraph 3.1.2).

¹⁴³ COSIMO, Conflict intensity – 1: Latent conflict (completely nonviolent); 2: Crisis (mostly nonviolent); 3: Severe crisis (sporadic, irregular use of force, 'war-in-sight' crisis); 4: War (systematic, collective use of force by regular troops).

¹⁴⁴ PRIO-CSCW Battle Related Datasets 1946-2005, Version 2.0, by Bethany Lacina, best estimate for each conflict (when available).

¹⁴⁵ COSIMO, Disputed issues in a dispute – 1: Territory, borders, sea borders; 2: Decolonization, national independence; 3: Ethnic, religious or regional autonomy; 4: Ideology, system; 5: Internal power; 6: International power; 7: Resources; 8: Others.

¹⁴⁶ COSIMO, Disputed issues in a dispute, categories discussed above as aggregated into 'three groups that characterize the conflict by the objectives in dispute – 2,5,6: international power; 3,4: national power; 1,7,8: material or territorial issues'.

¹⁴⁷ Minorities at Risk, Ethic difference index (cf. chapter 3, paragraph 3.4.3).

Reg	Code	Year	pa_date	ele	sym	ceas	dea	sum	opp	duration	COSIMO		COSIMO		MAR
											int	casualt	comp	typ	
2	2PAL02	1994	1994/05/04	0	0	0	1	0	0	27	3	25,000	1,2,3	3/3	7/10
2	2PAL03	1994	1994/08/29	0	0	0	1	0	0	27	3	25,000	1,2,3	3/3	7/10
2	2PAL04	1995	1995/09/28	2	0	0	1	1	0	28	3	25,000	1,2,3	3/3	7/10
2	2PAL05	1997	1997/01/15	2	0	0	1	0	0	28	3	25,000	1,2,3	3/3	7/10
2	2PAL06	1998	1998/10/23	2	0	0	1	1	0	31	3	25,000	1,2,3	3/3	7/10
2	2PAL07	1999	1999/09/04	0	0	0	1	1	0	32	3	25,000	1,2,3	3/3	7/10
2	2PAL08	2000	2000/07	0	0	0	2	2	0	33	3	25,000	1,2,3	3/3	7/10
2	2PAL09	2003	2003/04/30	0	0	0	0	0	0	36	3	25,000	1,2,3	3/3	7/10
3	3CHI01	1997	1997/12/02	1	0	0	0	0	1	28	2	3,500	3	1/3	10/10
3	3TRI01	1993	1993/08/23	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	N/A	1,500	N/A	N/A	10/10
3	3NAG01	1997	1997/08/01	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	N/A	5,000	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3NAG02	1998	1998	2	2	2	0	0	0	6	N/A	5,000	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3ACE01	2000	2000/05/12	0	0	0	0	2	0	10	3	10,000	2	1/3	2/10
3	3ACE02	2002	2002/12/09	0	0	0	0	2	0	12	3	10,000	2	1/3	2/10
3	3ACE03	2005	2005/08/15	0	0	0	0	2	0	15	3	10,000	2	1/3	2/10
3	3BOU01	1990	1990/03	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	3	2,000	2,3,7	3/3	N/A
3	3BOU02	1991	1991/01/21	0	0	0	0	1	0	12	3	2,000	2,3,7	3/3	N/A
3	3BOU03	1994	1994/09/03	0	0	0	0	1	0	15	3	2,000	2,3,7	3/3	N/A
3	3BOU04	1994	1994/10	0	0	0	0	2	0	15	3	2,000	2,3,7	3/3	N/A
3	3BOU05	1997	1997/10/10	0	0	0	0	1	0	17	3	2,000	2,3,7	3/3	N/A
3	3BOU06	1998	1998/01/23	0	0	2	0	2	0	18	3	2,000	2,3,7	3/3	N/A
3	3BOU07	1998	1998/1999	0	0	1	0	2	0	18	3	2,000	2,3,7	3/3	N/A
3	3BOU08	2001	2001/08/30	1	0	0	0	0	0	22	3	2,000	2,3,7	3/3	N/A
3	3MIN01	1996	1996/09/02	2	0	0	0	0	0	29	3 (W)	60,000	2,3	2/3	5/10
3	3MIN02	2000	2000/06	0	0	0	2	0	1	29	3 (W)	60,000	2,3	2/3	5/10
3	3MIN03	2001	2001/06/22	1	0	0	0	2	0	29	3 (W)	60,000	2,3	2/3	5/10
3	3SRI01	1995	1995/02	1	0	0	0	0	0	16	4	80,000	1,3,5,7	2/3	7/10
3	3SRI02	1995	1995/04	0	0	2	0	0	0	16	4	80,000	1,3,5,7	2/3	7/10
3	3SRI03	2002	2002/02/22	0	0	0	0	0	1	16	4	80,000	1,3,5,7	2/3	7/10

Reg	Code	Year	pa_date	ele	sym	ceas	dea	sum	opp	duration	COSIMO		COSIMO		MAR
											int	casualt	comp	typ	
3	3SRI04	2003	2003/04	0	0	0	0	2	0	16	4	80,000	1,3,5,7	2/3	7/10
4	4COM01	2000	2000/08/26	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	50	3,5	1/3	N/A
4	4COM02	2001	2001/02/17	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	2	50	3,5	1/3	N/A
4	4COM03	2003	2003/12/20	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	2	50	3,5	1/3	N/A
4	4MAL01	1991	1991/01/06	0	0	0	0	2	0	9	3	300	1,3	2/3	7/10
4	4MAL02	1992	1992/04/11	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	3	300	1,3	2/3	7/10
4	4TUA01	1994	1994/10/09	0	0	0	0	2	0	5	3	500	1,3	2/3	7/10
4	4TUA02	1995	1995/04/15	0	0	2	0	2	0	5	3	500	1,3	2/3	7/10
4	4SEN01	1991	1991/04	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3	3,500	3	1/3	6/10
4	4SEN02	2004	2004/12/30	0	0	0	0	0	2	17	3	3,500	3	1/3	6/10
4	4SUD01	1992	1992-1993	0	0	0	0	2	0	8	4	55,000	5(?)	2/3	10/10
4	4SUD02	1994	1994/03-09	0	0	0	0	2	0	10	4	55,000	5(?)	2/3	10/10
4	4SUD03	1994	1994/12/12	0	0	0	0	2	0	10	4	55,000	5(?)	2/3	10/10
4	4SUD04	1997	1997/04/21	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	4	55,000	5(?)	2/3	10/10
4	4SUD05	2002	2002/07/20	0	0	0	0	2	0	19	4	55,000	5(?)	2/3	10/10
4	4SUD06	2003	2003/09/25	0	0	0	1	2	0	20	4	55,000	5(?)	2/3	10/10
4	4SUD07	2004	2004/01/07	0	0	0	1	2	0	21	4	55,000	5(?)	2/3	10/10
4	4SUD08	2004	2004/05/26	0	0	0	1	2	0	21	4	55,000	5(?)	2/3	10/10
4	4SUD09	2004	2004/05/26	0	0	0	1	2	0	21	4	55,000	5(?)	2/3	10/10
4	4SUD10	2004	2004/05/26	0	0	0	1	2	0	21	4	55,000	5(?)	2/3	10/10
4	4SUD11	2005	2005/01/09	0	0	0	1	2	0	22	4	55,000	5(?)	2/3	10/10
4	4ETH01	2000	2000/12/12	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	4	70,000	1,7	1/3	N/A
5	5ECP01	1998	1998/10/26	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	1	150	1,7	1/3	N/A

TABLE 3B
CODING OF TIME PRESSURE AND OTHER INDEXES FOR TRIANGULATION

Reg	Code	Year	pa_date	DEC		BRE			DUR		
				P IV exconst ¹⁴⁸	MAR onum ¹⁴⁹	pa_type ¹⁵⁰	ended ¹⁵¹	Vi05 ¹⁵²	Vi01 ¹⁵³	termdur ¹⁵⁴	noconf05 ¹⁵⁵
1	1YUG01	1991	1991/07/12	7/7	N/A	3	0	0	1	0	1
1	1YUG02	1994	1994/02/23	3/7	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1	1YUG03	1994	1994/03/01	3/7 (Hrv) 3/7 (Hrv) 1/7	N/A	2	0	0	1	0	1
1	1YUG04	1995	1995/12/14	(Yug) 3/7 (Hrv) 1/7	N/A	1	0	0	1	0	1
1	1YUG05	1995	1995/11/12	(Yug)	N/A	1	0	0	1	0	1
1	1ABK01	1993	1993/07/27	5/7	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1	1ABK02	1994	1994/04/04	5/7	N/A	2	0	0	0	1	1
1	1KAR01	1994	1994/07/27	3/7	7	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1	1CHE01	1996	1996/08/30	3/7	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1	1CHE02	1997	1997/05/12	3/7	1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1	1MOL01	1992	1992/07/21	5/7	4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1	1MOL02	1997	1997/05/08	7/7	4	2	0	0	0	5	1
1	1MOL03	1998	1998/03	7/7	4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1	1MOL04	1999	1999/07	7/7	4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
1	1IRE01	1998	1998/04/10	7/7	N/A	1	0	0	1	-99	1

¹⁴⁸ Polity IV, Executive constraints (year in which the episode of negotiation took place).

¹⁴⁹ Minorities at Risk, Number of organisations representing group interest (for minority groups), 1999-2000.

¹⁵⁰ UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset, Type of agreement: – 1: Full agreement (one or more dyad agrees to settle the whole incompatibility); 2: Partial peace (one or more dyad agrees to settle a part of the incompatibility); 3: Peace process agreement (one or more dyad agrees to initiate a process that aims to settle the incompatibility).

¹⁵¹ UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset, Agreement ended by 2005 – 1: Yes; 2: No.

¹⁵² UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset, Violence with the same parties restarted within 5 years – 1: Yes; 0: No; 99) Not applicable, agreement signed previous year.

¹⁵³ UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset, Terminated the whole conflict the following year, signed an active year - 2: Part of a peace process which ended the violence; 1: Yes; 0: No; -99: Not applicable.

¹⁵⁴ UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset, Number of years since last activity (as of 2005).

¹⁵⁵ UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset, Still terminated as of 2005 – 1: Yes; 0: No; -99) Not applicable.

Reg	Code	Year	pa_date	P IV exconst	MAR onum	pa_type	ended	Vi05	Vi01	termdur	noconf05
2	2PAL01	1993	1993/09/13	7/7	N/A	2	0	0	0	-99	0
2	2PAL02	1994	1994/05/04	7/7	N/A	2	0	0	0	-99	0
2	2PAL03	1994	1994/08/29	7/7	N/A	2	0	0	0	-99	0
2	2PAL04	1995	1995/09/28	7/7	N/A	2	0	1	0	-99	0
2	2PAL05	1997	1997/01/15	7/7	N/A	2	0	1	0	-99	0
2	2PAL06	1998	1998/10/23	7/7	3	2	1	1	0	-99	0
2	2PAL07	1999	1999/09/04	7/7	3	2	0	1	0	-99	0
2	2PAL08	2000	2000/07	7/7	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
2	2PAL09	2003	2003/04/30	7/7	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3CHI01	1997	1997/12/02	5/7	N/A	1	0	0	0	5	1
3	3TRI01	1993	1993/08/23	7/7	N/A	1	1	1	1	-99	0
3	3NAG01	1997	1997/08/01	7/7	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3NAG02	1998	1998	7/7	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3ACE01	2000	2000/05/12	6/7	5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3ACE02	2002	2002/12/09	6/7	6	2	0	1	0	-99	0
3	3ACE03	2005	2005/08/15	6/7	6	1	0	-99	-99	-99	-99
3	3BOU01	1990	1990/03	7/7	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3BOU02	1991	1991/01/21	7/7	3	3	1	1	0	1	0
3	3BOU03	1994	1994/09/03	7/7	3	3	1	1	0	0	0
3	3BOU04	1994	1994/10	7/7	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3BOU05	1997	1997/10/10	7/7	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3BOU06	1998	1998/01/23	7/7	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3BOU07	1998	1998/1999	7/7	3	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3BOU08	2001	2001/08/30	7/7	4	1	0	0	0	5	1
3	3MIN01	1996	1996/09/02	6/7	5	1	0	0	0	-99	0
3	3MIN02	2000	2000/06	6/7	6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3MIN03	2001	2001/06/22	6/7	6	3	0	0	0	-99	-99
3	3SRI01	1995	1995/02	5/7	9	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3SRI02	1995	1995/04	5/7	9	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
3	3SRI03	2002	2002/02/22	6/7	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Reg	Code	Year	pa_date	P IV exconst	MAR onum	pa_type	ended	Vi05	Vi01	termdur	noconf05
3	3SRI04	2003	2003/04		5/7	8	N/A	N/A	0	3	N/A
4	4COM01	2000	2000/08/26		2/7	N/A	2	1	0	3	1
4	4COM02	2001	2001/02/17		2/7	N/A	2	0	0	4	1
4	4COM03	2003	2003/12/20		5/7	N/A	1	0	0	6	1
4	4MAL01	1991	1991/01/06		N/A	N/A (0/1)	2	1	0	1	0
4	4MAL02	1992	1992/04/11		5/7	N/A (0/1)	1	1	0	2	0
4	4TUA01	1994	1994/10/09		7/7	N/A (0/1)	2	0	0	0	0
4	4TUA02	1995	1995/04/15		7/7	N/A (0/1)	1	0	0	1	0
4	4SEN01	1991	1991/04		6/7	2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
4	4SEN02	2004	2004/12/30		6/7	2	3	0	0	1	1
4	4SUD01	1992	1992-1993		1/7	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
4	4SUD02	1994	1994/03-09		1/7	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
4	4SUD03	1994	1994/12/12		1/7	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
4	4SUD04	1997	1997/04/21		1/7	N/A	1	1	0	-99	0
4	4SUD05	2002	2002/07/20		1/7	3	2	0	1	0	0
4	4SUD06	2003	2003/09/25		1/7	3	2	0	1	0	0
4	4SUD07	2004	2004/01/07		1/7	3	2	0	0	1	0
4	4SUD08	2004	2004/05/26		1/7	3	2	0	0	1	0
4	4SUD09	2004	2004/05/26		1/7	3	2	0	0	1	0
4	4SUD10	2004	2004/05/26		1/7	3	2	0	0	1	0
4	4SUD11	2005	2005/01/09		1/7	3	1	0	-99	0	-99
4	4ETH01	2000	2000/12/12		3/7	2/7	2	0	0	1	0
5	5ECP01	1998	1998/10/26		N/A	N/A	1	0	0	3	1

CASE	TPR	DED	SEV	MHS	MED	DEC	ISS	INT	BRE	DUR
1YUG01	0	0.4	0.4	1	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	1	1
1YUG02	0	0	1	0.6	0.8	1	1	0.6	0.2	0.8
1YUG03	0	0.6	1	0.6	1	1	1	0.6	0.6	0.8
1YUG04	0	0.8	1	0.8	1	1	1	0.6	1	1
1YUG05	0.4	0	1	0.8	0.8	1	0.8	0.8	1	1
1ABK01	0	0.6	0.6	0.2	1	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.2	0
1ABK02	0	0.6	0.6	0.6	1	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.4
1KAR01	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.8	1	0.4	0.8
1CHE01	0.2	0	1	0.8	0	0.2	0.2	1	0.2	0.4
1CHE02	0	0	1	0.8	0	0.2	0.2	1	0.4	0.4
1MOL01	0	0	0.4	0.6	1	0.8	0.6	0	0.2	1
1MOL02	0	0.6	0.4	0.8	1	0.8	0.6	0	0.6	1
1MOL03	0	0.6	0.4	0.8	1	0.8	0.6	0	0.8	1
1MOL04	0	0.6	0.4	0.8	1	0.8	0.6	0	0.8	1
1IRE01	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.2	1	1
2PAL01	0	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.8
2PAL02	0	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6
2PAL03	0	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6
2PAL04	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.2
2PAL05	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0
2PAL06	0.6	1	0.8	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	0
2PAL07	0	1	0.8	0.2	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.4	0
2PAL08	0	1	0.8	0.2	1	0.6	0.8	0.8	0	n/a
2PAL09	0	0	0.8	0.2	1	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.6	0
3CHI01	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.8	0	0.8	0.2	1	0.8	0.8
3TRI01	0.2	0	0.2	0.2	0	1	0.4	1	0.8	0.2
3NAG01	0.4	0	0.4	0.6	0	0.8	0.2	1	0.2	0.8
3NAG02	1	0	0.4	0.6	0	0.8	0.2	1	0	n/a
3ACE01	0	0.8	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.8	0.2	0	0.2	0.2
3ACE02	0	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.2	0.8	0.2	0	0.6	0.2
3ACE03	0	0.8	0.6	1	0.8	0.8	0.2	0	1	1
3BOU01	0	0	0.6	0.2	0	0.8	1	0.8	0.2	0.4
3BOU02	0	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.8	1	0.8	0.4	0.4
3BOU03	0	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.8	1	0.8	0.4	0.6
3BOU04	0	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.8	1	0.8	0	0.6
3BOU05	0	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	1	0.8	0.6	1
3BOU06	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.8	1	0.8	0.8	1
3BOU07	0.4	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.8	1	0.8	0	n/a
3BOU08	0.2	0	0.6	1	0.8	0.8	1	0.8	1	1
3MIN01	0.6	0.2	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.4
3MIN02	0	1	0.8	0.2	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.4	0	n/a
3MIN03	0.2	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.6	0.6
3SRI01	0.2	0	1	0.4	0.2	1	1	0.8	0.2	0
3SRI02	0.8	0	1	0.4	0.2	1	1	0.8	0	n/a
3SRI03	0	0.2	1	0.4	0.6	1	1	0.8	0.4	0
3SRI04	0	0.6	1	0.4	0.6	1	1	0.8	0	n/a
4COM01	0	0	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.2	0.6	0	0.6	0.8
4COM02	0	0	0.4	0.8	1	0.2	0.6	0	0.6	0.8
4COM03	0	0	0.4	0.8	1	0.6	0.6	0	1	1
4MAL01	0	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.8
4MAL02	0	0	0.4	0.8	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.8	1	0.8
4TUA01	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.2	1
4TUA02	1	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.8	1	1
4SEN01	0	0	0.4	0.2	0	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.2	0
4SEN02	0	0.4	0.4	0.8	0	0.8	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.8
4SUD01	0	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.2	1	0	n/a
4SUD02	0	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.6	1	0	0

CASE	TPR	DED	SEV	MHS	MED	DEC	ISS	INT	BRE	DUR
4SUD03	0	0.6	0.4	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.6	1	0.2	0
4SUD04	0	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.2	0.6	1	0.6	0
4SUD05	0	0.6	0.8	0.8	1	0.2	0.6	1	0.6	0.2
4SUD06	0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.2	0.6	1	0.6	0.2
4SUD07	0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.2	0.6	1	0.6	0.8
4SUD08	0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.2	0.6	1	0.6	0.8
4SUD09	0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.2	0.6	1	0.6	0.8
4SUD10	0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.2	0.6	1	0.6	0.8
4SUD11	0	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.2	0.6	1	0.8	0.8
4ETH01	0	0.6	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.8	1
5ECP01	0.4	0.6	0.2	1	0.8	1	0.2	0	1	1

Table 4
Fuzzy set scores