

**THE SECOND GENERATIONS:  
A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF ORIGINS AND  
SOCIO-ECONOMIC OUTCOMES FOR  
CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES**

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
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## **Statement of Originality**

I hereby declare that this thesis – *The Second Generations: a Longitudinal Study of Origins and Socio-Economic Outcomes for Children of Immigrants in England and Wales* – is my own work



Signed: Jason Strelitz

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## Abstract

This thesis is a study of the relationship between childhood circumstances and socio-economic outcomes in adulthood for the Second Generation; children of immigrants in the UK. Using data from the ONS Longitudinal Study it aims to answer two main questions. After controlling for a range of childhood characteristics, are there significant differences in the aggregate socio-economic outcomes of Second Generation groups and the children of UK born parents? To what extent are particular childhood characteristics associated with socio-economic outcomes among the Second Generation?

The thesis analyses the experiences of the Second Generation as a whole, and a broad range of origin groups, including children of parents from: the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, India, Ireland, Pakistan, Southern Europe and 'White' English Speaking origins. Alongside a control group, of children of UK born parents, this breadth provides an important comparative perspective.

The results show the Second Generation to have experienced greater upward social mobility than the children of UK born parents but to be more disadvantaged in terms of deprivation and unemployment. These patterns are exacerbated when controlling for prior characteristics. All individual Second Generation groups experience greater long range upward mobility and disadvantaged origins appear less of a risk factor for disadvantaged destinations than they do for children of UK born parents. But for some, there is greater risk of downward mobility; advantaged origins are not the protective factor, which they are for most people.

The results show that for the Second Generation, socio-economic and geographical origins are important predictors of adult outcomes. However the relationship between social origins and destinations may be weaker than for children of UK born parents. It is discussed, whether factors such as greater levels of aspiration, and experiences of racism and discrimination may mediate the long term trajectories of some of the Second Generation.

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## **Introduction to the thesis**

The decades following the Second World War saw high levels of immigration to the UK. The immigrants came from diverse backgrounds - socially, culturally, phenotypically, linguistically, religiously and economically. Many intended to return to their countries of birth or to move on to other places; indeed many did (Patterson, 1968; Dhaya, 1973; Ballard, 1994 p. 11-13). However others, whether they had planned to or not, ended up staying, and in time many of those who had come alone were joined by family members or started new families in the UK. These populations fundamentally altered Britain during the second half of the twentieth century and continue to do so. Many of their children are now adults with children or even grandchildren themselves. What, though, is the situation of the Second Generation, the children of the immigrants of the 1940s, 50s and 60s, today? To what extent has the promise that the UK offered as a place with new opportunities and possibilities been realised for them? To what extent do they experience disadvantage? Moreover, were there any characteristics of the Second Generation, evident in their early life circumstances in the UK that were associated with the kinds of paths and trajectories they would follow?

There are many dimensions to experience, many different paths and trajectories that all individuals experience simultaneously. Second Generation studies often examine psychological and social indicators of assimilation or acculturation, the interaction of multiple cultures that occurs with migration into a new society. Subjects such as levels of segregation in schools and neighbourhoods, identity issues, patterns of family formation and experiences of discrimination are important and of significant interest to academics. This study focuses on the socio-economic trajectories of the children of immigrants. Relative socio-economic advantage and disadvantage constitute one important aspect of both integration into and opportunity in a society.

The central objective of the study is to examine outcomes for the Second Generation. The study follows the individual paths of 3,726 Second Generation immigrants from childhood in 1971 to adulthood in 1991 in order to identify the characteristics of their early life origins which were associated with their later life destinations. The study is based on an analysis of data from the ONS Longitudinal Study, a dataset that includes linked data for a 1 per cent sample from each Census of England and Wales since 1971. Using this data the study was able to track children of immigrants in 1971 (aged 0-16) to adulthood in 1991 (aged 20-36) across a wide range of socio-economic indicators. By using the 1971 data it was possible to look at the households in which these children grew up. Using a range of factors such as household composition, patterns of settlement, ethnic and country origins and social class, this research attempts to elucidate those characteristics associated with trajectories that lead to socio-economic advantages in adult life, and those associated with poverty and disadvantage.

It is important at the beginning to declare a personal interest. I do not believe that any work in the social sciences can be apolitical. The way in which we construct and represent knowledge is bound up with conscious and subconscious values, ideologies and culture. In applied social science, the field in which I am operating (my research is being conducted from a Department of Social Policy) this is particularly true. Social Policy is the business of changing society for the perceived better. Therefore research in this field must, of its nature, be political. In a study that encompasses issues of 'race' and 'ethnicity', both domains where the construction and representation of knowledge has been instrumental in ideologies of oppression and resistance, this is clearly evident. Moreover in this sphere where certain groups experience discrimination and disadvantage I believe that research ought to try to be transformative. As Gargi Bhattacharyya has remarked, 'scholarship is like activism...politics is what makes book-reading socially valuable rather than embarrassing and self-indulgent' (1999 p. 478).

At its core this research is aimed at building understanding of how policy can help enable immigrants to the UK to meet their goals and aspirations. I agree with the first assertion in the quotation below, which relates to the United States.

Policy cannot aim solely at regulating immigrant streams to the exclusion of facilitating the adjustment of new arrivals and increasing their connection to the institutions of the larger society. The experience of Gainers<sup>1</sup> shows that a welcoming reception...can have long-term benefits. The opposite is also true.

(Fernandez Kelly and Schaffler, 1996 p. 52)

What makes for a 'Gainer' among immigrants to the UK and their children? At present we do not really know. There is a wealth of sociological and econometric research which examines the associations between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes for the population as a whole. In the US there are longitudinal studies of children of immigrants that attempt to understand intergenerational processes for this particular subgroup. However, in the UK this is an area where there has been little quantitative research to date. This thesis attempts to address this important gap, developing understanding of the links between immigrant circumstances and Second Generation outcomes.

The outline of the thesis is as follows:

Chapter 1 focuses on one aspect of the study's overall approach. It makes an argument for an analysis of children of immigrants that is more rooted in the Second Generation discourse found in US academic studies than in the traditional ethnic minority paradigm of British research. It advocates an approach that seeks to understand the experiences of children of immigrants in relation to those of their parents and that includes analysis of a broad range of immigrant groups and not just those typically found in studies of minority ethnic groups. Whilst the study as a whole will contribute much new data, this chapter argues that in certain areas there is a need to view familiar data through an unfamiliar lens if we are to throw light not just on the experiences of the children of immigrants but on wider issues of 'race' and 'ethnicity'. Critically this approach encourages both comparative perspectives and offers an explanatory framework that may account for the diversity of outcomes experienced by the Second Generation from different origins.

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<sup>1</sup> Those who have experienced upward mobility.

Chapter 2 reviews the literature that underpins the approach taken in this study, drawing on methodological, conceptual and contextual sources. From a methodological perspective I discuss the generic ‘life chances’ literature which uses longitudinal data to understand the connections between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes. I consider the Second Generation literature in the US, discussing both historical and contemporary approaches, but concentrating on the latter, and debates surrounding the Segmented Assimilation Hypothesis.<sup>2</sup> This represents the conceptual backdrop to the study. I also discuss the context of the UK and the evidence from previous studies of minority ethnic groups. These include studies that have focussed on social mobility and studies of ‘ethnic effects’ which attempt to understand the role of factors such as education, class and ethnicity in explaining particular outcomes of different groups.<sup>3</sup> Largely drawing on research focussed on minority ethnic groups in the UK, I set out what is known about outcomes for those from various ethnic groups. The chapter concludes by highlighting key themes which may be important in drawing out hypotheses for the research.

Chapter 3 focuses on methodological issues. I introduce the dataset that is used in this thesis, the ONS Longitudinal Study. The order of the analysis is laid out in detail, and explanation for some particular choices is given. I outline how the study population for the research was defined and how the particular immigrant origin groups were constructed. I also discuss the outcome measures that are used in this study as measures of relative advantage and disadvantage.

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2 The Segmented Assimilation Hypothesis will be discussed at length in Chapter 2. It is the idea that unlike the European immigrants to the US of the late 1800s and early 1900s, who were seen as experiencing *‘a generational march into the middle classes’*, the paths for today’s Second Generation are more differentiated with some experiencing downward assimilation to the urban poor/underclass.

3 I use the term ‘minority ethnic groups’ rather than ‘ethnic minority groups’ throughout the thesis for purposes of consistency. Whilst both are commonly used in the literature, and both are acceptable terms, the former in implying that all people are ‘ethnic’ but some are in the minority, either in terms of numbers, power or both, is arguably more appropriate than the former. The exception is when I discuss the historical development of the use of different terms.

Chapter 4 sets the empirical scene of the study, painting a picture of the immigrant population of the UK in 1971. It provides a baseline for the study, showing the situation of different immigrant groups in terms of a wide range of demographic, geographical and socio-economic outcomes, alongside some discussion of their pre-migration origins. I use this baseline picture, as well as with theory discussed in Chapter 2, to draw out some broad hypotheses for how the Second Generations from these groups may have fared.

In Chapter 5 I turn to the experiences of the Second Generation. I examine their situation on a broad range of outcomes, but focus on the three core outcomes: social class, deprivation and unemployment. I examine differences between the Second Generation as a whole and the children of UK-born parents, and compare the outcomes of different groups. I attempt to gauge how the situation of the Second Generation compares with that of their immigrant forbears.

In Chapter 6, I move from the limited comparison of aggregate outcomes to a genuine longitudinal analysis of the relationship between 1971 circumstances and the three core 1991 outcomes. I use descriptive statistics to begin asking certain questions. Which characteristics appear most strongly and weakly associated with different adult outcomes? What differences and similarities are apparent in the relationship between childhood characteristics and adult outcomes across different Second Generation groups and the children of UK-born parents? I then use logistic regression analysis to assess whether observed differences and similarities in the outcomes of different groups remain or change when controlling for 1971 characteristics. In other words, is there evidence of 'ethnic' or 'Second Generation' effects in explaining social class, deprivation and unemployment outcomes?

Chapter 7 takes the analysis a stage forward. For the same three outcome variables, logistic regression is used to assess the relationship between childhood characteristics and adult outcomes for each Second Generation group and the children of UK-born parents. I attempt to determine whether there are particular characteristics which are significant precursors of adult outcomes across a range of groups or whether different groups exhibit

distinct intergenerational patterns. This analysis helps to develop a more nuanced account of the relationship between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes for the Second Generation.

Chapter 8 takes a tangent from the main analysis and examines two important questions that emerge from the analytic method used in the thesis. In a longitudinal study it is important to examine the characteristics of those people who are present at the beginning of the study but absent by the end. Sample attrition can have an impact on the representativeness of the study, so I need to ask whether there are differences between the 1971 characteristics of those who are present in the 1991 data and those who are absent. The second issue emerges from my decision in the main study, to focus on children of two immigrant parents. This reflects assumptions about the difference between having one or two immigrant parents. In Chapter 8 I test this assumption, asking whether there were differences in the situation of those with one or two immigrant parents in 1971, and whether there were differences in their 1991 outcomes.

Chapter 9 concludes the thesis. I present the key findings that emerge on Second Generation outcomes, patterns of mobility and the relationship between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes. Reflecting on the wider evidence base, I consider possible explanations of the patterns observed. I also suggest some implications of my theoretical approach, assessing its efficacy as a strategy for understanding the experiences of minority ethnic groups in the UK. Whilst the study operates at a fairly broad level of analysis, I draw out some policy implications which emerge from the findings. Finally I consider some of the weaknesses of my approach and raise questions which might be considered in future research.

# **1 - Studying the Second Generation**

## **1.1 Introduction**

In this chapter I discuss the rationale for the overall approach taken in my thesis. I concentrate on the potential benefits to analysis, policy and discourse of an approach that focuses on broad notions of 'immigration' and the 'Second Generation'. I begin by considering the importance of immigration studies in the UK. I discuss why, after some presence in the 1950s and 1960s, discussion in terms of 'immigrants' and the 'Second Generation' disappeared from British academic discourse, only starting to resurface in recent years. The case is then made for an enhanced immigrant frame of reference within the academic approach which could facilitate a broader comparative perspective, analysing differences across origin group, place and time. I conclude the chapter arguing that to an extent, explanations of the immigrant and Second Generation experience have hitherto, been overly ethnocentric. By focussing on aggregate outcomes of differently defined ethnic/racial groups, the dominant model minimises within-group diversity and narrows the scope of potential explanations.

## **1.2 The importance of studying immigrants and the Second Generation**

There are many reasons why the experiences of immigrants and their children are an important area for study. Immigration is a major topic within current public and policy discourse. Given certain socio-demographic and economic trends<sup>4</sup> that are likely to lead to continuing high levels of inward migration to the UK, and the emotive nature of the subject, its salience within popular discourse is likely to be maintained for a considerable time. Yet despite its importance, the amount of existing research in the area is limited, resulting in a knowledge vacuum at the policy level and a poor quality of public debate. Furthermore, if there are few studies of immigrants to the UK, there are even fewer

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<sup>4</sup> These include high levels of labour demand and an ageing society

studies which focus specifically on the Second Generation, as opposed to minority ethnic groups. These issues are expanded upon briefly below.

### *1.21 Immigration: a major subject in policy and public discourse*

With high levels of immigration over the past decade, compared with the previous twenty years, the issue of immigration has re-emerged at the centre of political and popular debate after a relative absence since the mid 1970s. In 1971 there were an estimated 200,000 immigrants to the UK. The figure fell to 153,000 by 1981 and then rose to 328,000 in 1991 and 513,000 in 2003 (Office for National Statistics, 2005).<sup>5</sup> The Government Actuary's Department estimates that there will be a further 8.4 million immigrants to the UK over the next twenty years (Darton and Strelitz, 2003).

Increased immigration in recent years has been associated by many with the series of forces often described as 'globalisation'. The wider spread of knowledge, the greater ease and lower cost of movement and the enhanced ability to move capital have acted as major factors encouraging migration (Castles, 2000a). At the same time the erosion of key elements of communal sustainability and social stability in many parts of the world, including post-colonial societies and the former USSR, have operated as push factors for many people (Hall, 2000).

The demand is not just on the part of migrants seeking opportunities in different countries. The UK, along with many other countries, needs migrants to perform various labour market functions that the existing population, for several reasons, does not. In many fields the private and public sectors are actively recruiting abroad in the same way that London Transport, for example, recruited in Caribbean countries in the 1950s (Holmes, 1988; Stuart, 2001). Equally significant is the proliferation of service industries, especially in London and the South-East, which rely on a workforce prepared to take low-status jobs with poor pay and conditions. Many people filling these roles are

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<sup>5</sup> The quality of data in this field is a subject that will be revisited throughout this chapter. Current estimates of immigration levels to the UK coming from the International Passenger Survey (IPS) are widely thought to be underestimates.

immigrants (Castles and Kosack, 1985; Wills and Telco, 2001). However, the need for immigrants is not just evident at the micro labour market level. The 2001 census showed for the first time a UK population in which those over the age of 60 outnumbered those under 16 (Office for National Statistics, 2003). With increasing life expectancy and low fertility rates, some argue that the only way to support the UK's ageing society in the future will be to bring in immigrants to help drive the economy and generate wealth (Harris, 2000; Roche, 2000; Glover et al., 2001; United Nations, 2001). (For critiques of this argument see Coleman, 2001; Browne, 2003).

### *1.22 A lack of knowledge*

The high level of immigration witnessed over recent years and projected to continue poses many questions and challenges for researchers and policy-makers. Yet despite widespread acknowledgement of the subject's significance, there has been a lack of research and data collection to date specifically concerning immigrants and the Second Generation, which has only begun to be acknowledged and remedied in recent years (see for example Glover et al., 2001; Kempton, 2002). This may be the result of a process whereby party-political priorities, political pressure in the 'race and ethnicity' field and idiosyncrasies of data collection in this area reinforced each other over many decades, resulting in an ever-diminishing pool of knowledge. Discussion of those immigrants who entered the UK during the large post-war wave of immigration focussed on 'non-white' immigrants from the Caribbean and South Asia. Over time the language and focus evolved from 'immigrants' to 'minority ethnic groups'. This is discussed further in Section 1.3 of this chapter.

Changes in census questions between 1971 and 2001 reflect this process. The 1971 census contained information on migration history, including the country each household member was born in; the year in which those born elsewhere entered the UK and the country of birth of each household member's mother and father. The 2001 census asked about respondents' country of birth, but other related questions focussed on ethnic group and there was an optional question on religion. Unlike many other European countries, the UK lacks the data required to discuss immigration as a generic concept (Haug, 2002).

A Council of Europe pan-European review, published in 2002, is indicative of this. Entitled 'The demographic characteristics of immigrant populations' the British chapter largely focuses on the minority ethnic groups as defined by the 1991 census (Coleman et al., 2002).

This has broad implications for both popular and policy discourse. Public attitudes are of critical importance when considering the subject of immigration. Few areas of public policy have the ability to ignite public passions to the same degree yet prejudice and racism are always underpinned by a lack of knowledge and understanding. Driven in part by particular sections of the media, much of the political and public discourse in the UK is dominated by discussion of asylum seekers, as if they were the only immigrants coming into the UK at present (Griffith and Chan-Kam, 2002). A visit to the website of leading polling organisation MORI is indicative. In its often updated 'Political Trends' section MORI lists policy areas for which it tracks the 'Best Party on Key Issues'. It asks about 17 policy areas, one of which is 'Asylum'. There is no mention of immigration, race relations or other potentially connected policy areas (MORI, 2005).<sup>6</sup> One example of the disparity between perception and reality in this area came from a MORI report in 2000 which showed that on average people believed that 20 per cent of the UK population were immigrants, a huge overestimate whether people interpreted the question as referring to the foreign-born population or to the minority ethnic population (MORI, 2000)<sup>7</sup>.

But beyond the public realm, we currently lack the requisite understanding to develop policies which promote the best opportunities for the UK's immigrant populations to succeed or which foster high levels of positive inter-community relations. This chapter argues that in the UK forward-looking policy on immigration is hampered by the near-exclusive focus on certain groups as 'minority ethnic groups' with little attention paid to their migration experiences or the experiences of other groups.

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6 <<http://www.mori.com/polls/trends.shtml>>

7 <<http://www.mori.com/polls/2000/rd-july.shtml>>

The 2001 census showed 7.5 per cent of the population of England and Wales were born abroad and 9 per cent define themselves as part of a minority ethnic group (National Statistics).

The nature of analyses to date has in many ways reinforced a highly ethnocentric explanation for the behaviour and experiences of members of minority ethnic groups. It is their ethnic group status which seems to take primacy in hierarchies of analysis. If, however, being a First or Second Generation immigrant is taken as the starting point, and differences and similarities on a broad range of dimensions are subsequently analysed, a more nuanced picture may emerge. It is true that through such an approach 'ethnic group' or country of origin may emerge as a highly useful explanatory variable for a range of outcomes. Indeed Portes and Rumbaut, whose work using the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS)<sup>8</sup> in the United States has been an important influence on the approach of this study, suggest that 'every multivariate analysis of CILS results to date has identified nationality or ethnicity as a strong and significant predictor of virtually every adaptation outcome' (2001 p. 11).

However, a diverse range of other characteristics such as parental education, social class and community networks are also shown to be important predictors of outcomes. Moreover, where they do consider nationality and ethnicity, Portes and Rumbaut attempt to elucidate the key characteristics driving the significance of those variables, meeting the challenge that 'explanations of ethnic causes rarely look at factors behind ethnicity, but assume unmeasured genetic or cultural factors based on stereotyping' (Nazroo, 2000 p. 318). I discuss these issues in further detail in the next chapter.

Substantial academic work concentrates on the socio-economic experiences of the immigrant population over the last 50 years in the UK. It is focussed largely on the experiences of certain minority ethnic groups. Yet there is little that:

- refers to people as immigrants, children of immigrants or First, Second or Third generation immigrants

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<sup>8</sup> The CILS is a dedicated longitudinal study focussing on the experiences of children of immigrants to the US. It contains longitudinal data on a sample that started at over 5,000 children in the first wave in 1992, and data on over 2,000 parents, from 77 different countries.

- analyses the relationship between immigrants' capital (economic, social, human, cultural) and outcomes for their children
- tries to measure the long-term impact of the phenomena linked to the migration process
- discusses the experiences of those people who have migrated to the UK but are not commonly thought of as minority ethnic groups such as the Irish or other European migrant groups
- compares the experiences of the post-war cohort of migrants to the UK with the experiences of other migrants in other places or at other times

There are exceptions (see for example Banton, 1955; Banton, 1959; Modood, 1992 p. 30; Robinson, 1993; Ballard, 1983; web; Model and Lapido, 1996; Robinson, 1996; Heath and McMahon, 1997; Valen, 2000; Loury et al., 2005). However, generally these perspectives are touched on rather than being at the core of the analyses.

In Section 1.4 of this chapter I suggest why the lack of focus on these issues in the literature is problematic and why a generic 'immigrants' paradigm that begins to look at the issues raised above would be a valuable addition to the existing race and ethnicity literature. First, however, I offer a perspective on why the literature evolved in the way that it did.

### 1.3 The disappearance of 'immigrants' and 'immigration'

Starting with the first studies of post-war immigrants such as Michael Banton's early works *The Coloured Quarter* (1955) and *White and Coloured* (1959), the evolution of a literature in 'racial and ethnic studies' has been an ongoing response to the racialisation and racism experienced by immigrants mostly from former British colonies in the decades following the Second World War. The Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain used the concept of 'racism'

to refer to all attempts to homogenise, stereotype and take demeaning views of other groups and in so doing racialise or attribute race-like properties to them. Racism creates races by turning open, overlapping, loosely structured and internally differentiated groups into closed and rigid natural or quasi-natural types, and hierarchically grading them on the basis of what are mistakenly believed to be neutral and universal criteria.

(Parekh, 2001 p. 3)

The experience of racialisation and racism has been, from arrival in the UK, an inescapable part of life for many immigrants and their families. A passage from A. Sivanandan's 'The Liberation of the Black Intellectual' gives a vivid image of this twin process and in its detail hints at many of the characteristics of racialisation and racism described by Parekh.

as the 'coloured' intellectual enters the mother-country, he is entered into another world where his colour, and not his intellect or his status, begins to define his life – he is entered into another relationship with himself. The porter (unless he is black), the immigration officer (who is never anything but white), the customs officials, the policeman of whom he seeks directions; the cabman who takes him to his lodgings and the landlady who takes him in at a price – none of them leave him in any doubt that he is not merely not welcome in their country, but should in fact be going back – to where he comes from. That indeed is their only curiosity, their only interest: where he comes from, which particular jungle, Asian, African or Caribbean.

(Sivanandan, 2000 p. 70-1)

Whilst the experience of racism as it is conventionally thought of in personal and institutional contexts is enormously important, the act of being racialised is critical. That is to say, the redefinition of the man in A. Sivanandan's story, who saw himself as a professional in his country of origin and yet was forced to review himself primarily as 'black', (or whatever word was used to describe the category that he was placed into by

his new society by virtue of his skin colour), was the first act of violation and oppression, the first act of racism from which all else flowed. The constructions of race and ethnicity emerge as key elements of the discussion throughout this chapter and are discussed in more detail later on.

When Caribbean and South Asian immigrants arrived in Britain they were subjected to many and varied forms of racism which pervaded all aspects of life: institutional and personal, covert and open, violent and verbal, colour-related and culture-related, to name some of the key distinctions. Policies sought to disperse some of these immigrants to different areas and schools. Many people were unable to obtain council housing and struggled to find rented accommodation resulting in exploitation by 'Rachmanite' landlords. The racist violence that ultimately led to the so-called race riots of Notting Hill and Nottingham in 1958, was an everyday experience for many people (Phillips and Phillips, 1998 p. 159-180; Travis, 2002).

In response to these ongoing processes, a literature emerged that attempted to highlight and counter the racism that people were experiencing. One side of this anti-racist discourse focussed on documenting racism and its consequences. The other took a more qualitative approach and brought in a wider range of contributors operating across the breadth of experience from the historical to the cultural and the psychoanalytic, in an attempt to explain the experience of racialisation and racism and propose and evaluate strategies of resistance. Both of these paradigms, alongside party political motivations, seem to have driven a move from the discussion of 'immigrants' to the discussion of 'racial and ethnic minorities'. This is explored further below.

### *1.31 Documenting the experience*

In the seminal *Racial Discrimination in England*, the first in the series of PEP/PSI studies, Daniel reported that the greatest source of immigrants' disappointment with their life in Britain was their experiences of prejudice and discrimination in general and specifically those experiences in relation to housing and employment (Daniel, 1969 p. 37). The study showed high levels of discrimination experienced by immigrants from the

Caribbean and South Asia. Moreover by contrasting the experience of immigrants from those places with the experience of Hungarian and Cypriot immigrants it argued that skin colour was the major component of that discrimination (Daniel, 1969 p. 209).

This arm of study evolved and proliferated. As well as further PEP/PSI studies (Smith, 1977; Brown, 1984; Modood et al., 1997), analyses have been made of all general surveys which have sampled large numbers of people from 'minority ethnic' groups (for example the Labour Force Survey see Owen, 1993; Berthoud, 1999), and many researchers have conducted specific smaller surveys focussed in this area. Moreover the incorporation of an 'ethnic origin' question in the 1991 census provided a springboard for a much greater amount of study than had previously been done using the existing 'country of origin' question. Within this process three important trends took place.

The first was a move from focussing on discrimination to focussing on disadvantage and outcomes in a broad range of areas such as housing, employment, education, income and health. Daniel's research had concentrated on showing processes of personal discrimination, both asking people about their experiences and carrying out controlled studies of racism through 'situation tests', sending people to housing, employment and motor insurance interviews and comparing differential responses for 'black' and 'white' participants. The research highlighted the existence of widespread racism and discrimination, and in turn made the link to ongoing social disadvantage. The study's sequel, *Racial Disadvantage in Britain* (Smith, 1977) and much subsequent research became more concerned with measuring the differential outcomes experienced by different groups; the explanations of those differences were taken as being determined *a priori*.

Second, the focus quickly moved from studies of immigrants to studies of 'racial and ethnic minorities'. This was not merely a question of semantics, but connected to what was studied. For example, Modood et al's *Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage* (1997), the major study emanating from the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, greatly enhanced the knowledge base about the situation of minority

ethnic groups in Britain today (albeit awaiting updating). However, it was a survey of outcomes across a very broad range of domains. It was generally not focussed on trying to bring out the explanatory factors behind those outcomes. Although there was some consideration of migration related issues, such as a question on pre-migration qualifications, this was not a central concern.

Yet analysis of the SARS (Samples of Anonymised Records), a 2 per cent sample of the census, reveals that in 1991, three years before the FNSEM was carried out 54 per cent of those who described themselves in the census as something other than 'White', were born outside of the UK. Moreover 73 per cent of adults - those over 16 who were the key interviewees on many of the socio-economic and demographic indicators covered - were born outside the UK. In other words, approximately three out of every four 'ethnic minority' adults in the UK in 1991 were immigrants (own calculations via NESSTAR online).

The final trend, which continued especially until recently, was for the literature to focus almost exclusively on the 'non-white groups' of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. This had different implications. On the one hand there was the exclusion of those immigrant groups which were not broadly considered 'non-white'. Increasingly, for example, there is an awareness of the exclusion of the Irish community who have suffered from this process (Hickman and Walter, 1997). Such exclusions have not always existed, for example, Daniel (1969) included Hungarians and Cypriots in his study, Krausz' (1971) *Ethnic Minorities in Britain* also included European origin immigrants, and Rex and Moore's (1967) classic study of Sparkbrook in Birmingham compared the experiences of Pakistani, West Indian and Irish immigrants. Michael Banton argued in 1967 that initially 'the similarities between the new wave of immigration and these earlier ones (Huguenots, Jews, and Irish) seemed more important than its distinctive features' (1967 p. 662).

A further consequence has been the relative exclusion from the literature of many recent immigrants to the UK whether or not they would normatively be considered non-white. The Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities is indicative of both of these processes. Whilst recognising that ideally populations of Irish and 'Black' African origin should have been considered (Modood et al., 1997), the authors say that due to cost and sampling limitations those groups were left out of the analysis. This is reasonable as all research is subject to constraints; however the choices made do have implications.

### *1.32 Self-Representation*

Within the more discursive and analytical arms of anti-racist politics and social science the focus has been on challenging hegemonic racist notions, constructions and representations of 'race' and 'blackness', conceptions of immigrants and processes of assimilation and integration. A key objective was to reassert and reclaim positive identities, language and imagery. For example in a 1967 paper for the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, Stuart Hall described how the optimism and hope of the mid 1950s had been lost and depicted the disillusionment of young people as a result of the racism they had encountered. Assimilation, he argued leads to non acceptance by either one's own community or the 'white' English community. The response must be a vigorous assertion of one's own identity.

I have noticed that the young immigrants I have met in the last year or two are falling back on their own reserves. They are closing-in their lines of contact, re-discovering their own racial and national identities and stereotyping their 'white' counterparts. In itself, this may not be a bad thing – if integration means the enforced loss and rejection of their own identity, then it is too high a price to pay.

(Hall, 1967 p. 14)

20 years later, the same writer, discussing his own experiences of identity change, wrote

The trouble is that the instant one learns to be 'an immigrant', one recognises one can't be an immigrant any longer, it isn't a tenable place to be.

(Hall, 1996b p. 116)

I interpret Hall as saying that by the time as an immigrant you have the insight to see how you are viewed by the majority culture - as an inferior immigrant - you understand that this contradicts how you see yourself, and how you wish to assert yourself in the society.

Early notions of assimilation and the melting pot theory, which argued that across generations, immigrant groups should and would blend into the majority culture, were increasingly critiqued as inadequate descriptions of the patterns actually observed, and unethical as a social aspiration. In factual terms it was becoming clear, even in countries such as the USA and Israel, where the melting pot theory was prevalent to the extent of being a central component of national ideology, that processes of acculturation, the interaction of different cultures, were in fact far more dynamic and complex than once assumed.

In the UK, the idea of the melting pot was invoked in the wake of anticipated large post-war immigration. In 1949, the Royal Commission on Population argued for encouraging migration as long as 'the migrants were of good human stock and were not prevented by their religion or race from intermarrying with the host population and becoming integrated into it' (Royal Commission on Population, 1949 p. 124).

However, these were subject to much criticism, especially as the Second Generation were growing up, presenting and grappling with a set of identity issues distinct from their parents.

Enoch Powell's 1968 'Rivers of Blood' speech highlights some of the pressures for change (see also Favell, 1998 p. 105-6). The speech, whilst very pointedly about 'non-white' minorities, constantly refers to the '*immigrant and immigrant-descended population*'. The speech maintained that *immigrants* (meaning 'non-white' people; Powell made not even the slightest allusion to there being a 'white' immigrant population), did not have the same natural rights as the native population and that their presence was corrosive. *Immigrant-descended* is a powerful expression, conveying a timelessness; further generations who are born in the UK will maintain these corrosive,

distinctive immigrant values and behaviour (Powell, 1967). To be labelled immigrant-descended would be a mark that forever one's right to belonging can be questioned. For someone stigmatised in this way, being an 'immigrant' is understandably psychologically, in Hall's words, '*untenable*'.

Given this kind of representation it is clear why the language of 'immigrant' was unhelpful. It was stripped of any universalistic and/or neutral meaning; immigrants meant 'black' people, 'black' people meant immigrants from the Caribbean and South Asia, and immigrants from the Caribbean and South Asia did not belong. It was necessary to redefine the terms of discourse in a way which rather than suggesting less of a place within the UK, reflected absolute rights and the experience of discrimination (Favell, 2001 p. 105-6). At the same time internationally there was a development of movements to reclaim the word 'black', asserting positive identities and challenging oppression both external and internalised. Writer/activists from diverse societies, such as Fanon, Biko and Carmichael, challenged the existing social order of 'race' relations (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967; Fanon, 1967; Biko and Ndebele, 1972; see also Ahluwalia and Zegeye, 2001), and their ideas were influential in finding their own context for social and political application in the UK. The more militant formulations of 'Black power' did emerge at the margins in the UK (Hiro, 1991). However Black consciousness greatly influenced many more, with the Second and Third generations from the Caribbean and South Asia asserting their identity. Many believed in 'eschewing chromatism' (Brah, 1999 p. 432) - no longer distinguishing between different racialised groups - and asserting a collective 'black' identity in the mainstream of anti-racist politics and action (Shukra, 1998).

### 1.33 *The political imperative*

The pressure to move from discussion of immigrants to a focus on ethnic minorities also came from Central Government. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act, which for the first time restricted immigration from the commonwealth, was the turning point in terms of Government problematising 'non-white' immigration (Solomos, 1993; Clarke and Speeden, 2001). From that point onwards cross-party consensus emerged that aimed

to appease populist sentiment with a philosophy that involved being tough on immigration and encouraging integration. It is encapsulated in Roy Hattersley's words: 'integration without control is impossible, but control without integration is indefensible' (Favell, 1998). This meant further immigration controls on the one hand, and Race Relations Acts on the other with a view to distinguishing the issue of immigration from the question of 'integrating' existing immigrants. So that in 1968 there was both a Commonwealth Immigration Act, further restricting immigration and a Race Relations Act. Aside from the more substantive issues in the Act, one symbolic amendment was to change the name of the The National Advisory Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NACCI) to the Community Relations Commission (CRC), what eight years later would become the Commission for Racial Equality.

#### **1.4 Why an 'immigrant' frame of reference is important**

Reflecting on the process of change from discussion of immigrants to minority ethnic groups suggests that it was, at least in part, a reaction to experiences of racism and was a response to the needs of minority communities. With the data that I intend to use for this study it would be possible to concentrate on certain minority ethnic groups and to augment the very small literature of longitudinal analyses of such groups without contextualising it within the wider immigrant experience. However, I believe that the lack of an immigrant and generational perspective, results in missing several important perspectives. In this section I argue why an 'immigrant' and therefore 'Second Generation' frame of reference is an important one. In using the lens of immigration and not minority ethnic groups, it is not my intention to detract from gains made by those attempting to combat racism; indeed that is my objective as well.

*Immigrants are Inward Migrants*

or

*Immigrants are the opposite of Emigrants*

Words can not be divested of their political meaning simply by breaking them down to their linguistic roots; however, my point is that immigrants are simply people who arrive to live in one country from another country. The word immigrant ought not to connote anything beyond that. It is not meant to imply a person is 'black/white', poor/rich, lazy/hard-working, secular/religious or anything else. Some of these may be true but determining that is a matter for empirical investigation – none should be implied by the word. We need a word in the UK to describe people who come to the UK from another country that acknowledges the full diversity within this population. If we can feel comfortable using 'immigrant' as a generic and neutral word then it becomes possible to analyse whether it has any substantive use in trying to explain peoples' experiences.

My central assertion is that moving from one country to another may be a factor impacting upon an individual's experience. That experience may be mediated by factors such as what they bring with them in terms of social, resource, cultural and human capital. Their lives may be further impacted upon by social and institutional factors such as racism, welfare and service provision, the extent of existing co-ethnic communities and the structure of labour markets. These are hypotheses much discussed in the US literature. It is not hard to see why. Moving from one county to another means at the very minimum: a change of culture, however mild; a loss of networks, even if moving into a community; a loss of implicit knowledge; and the attainment of a quality of difference. The well-known song lyrics below reflect the experience of probably the world's easiest cultural transition - 'white', male, rich, Englishman (pop star!) to New York - yet even under these minimal conditions, a socio-cultural alienation is felt. Of course such an example does not begin to reflect the harsh realities of racism, alienation, linguistic challenges and cultural distance which form the experience of many immigrants to the UK such as the professional in A. Sivanandan's piece quoted earlier.

I don't take coffee I take tea my dear  
I like my toast done on one side  
And you can hear it in my accent when I talk  
I'm an Englishman in New York  
I'm an alien, I'm a legal alien

(Sting, 1990)

Portes et al argued 25 years ago, in trying to revive a dormant field of study in the US, that 'immigrants are too distinct a social category to be entirely subsumed under that of native-born ethnic Americans' (Portes et al., 1978 p. 242). What is unique about immigration amongst sociological phenomena is that the subjects' lives are 'decisively influenced...by experiences of a whole life in a different country' (Portes et al., 1978 p. 242). Since then there has been a burgeoning literature in the USA on immigrants and the Second Generation, including a dedicated longitudinal study, and conceptual debate that aims not to re-hash old assimilation arguments but to understand the diverse experiences of immigrant groups interacting with a new society (Alba and Nee, 1997; Portes, 1997).

The same consideration that these authors made in 1978 applies in the UK today. My argument is that immigration has some universal meaning as a concept. It has been a consistent feature of social life historically and globally. Whilst each immigrant experience is unique, as each human experience is unique, the basis of social science is that human experiences, and by implication the experience of immigrants have commonalities, embody patterns that can help understand the individual experience. To take this further is to say that the experience of those groups who came to the UK from the Caribbean and South Asia in the decades following the Second World War may well have connections to the experiences of other groups at other times. Their experiences may be better understood by comparison with experiences of other groups. Likewise other groups experience may be understood by comparison with them. There are multiple analytic and discourse benefits to be gained from reconceptualising the experiences of these groups as immigrant experiences allowing for a range of new comparisons.

- By comparing the experiences of *all groups within one era, not just those typically considered as minority ethnic groups* the experiences of other groups typically un-studied, but discriminated against and disadvantaged can be acknowledged and addressed. Moreover, the concept of immigration to the UK can begin to be de-racialised. This is not entirely about a phenotypically 'black/white' divide, although that is one very important component.
- By comparing groups *across eras* we can use understanding of those factors that promoted better socio-economic trajectories for children of immigrants in one era, as instructive for developing policies for the future. Furthermore, a greater sense of the comparability of immigrant waves across times will help to develop a stronger national story of immigration, something seen as desirable by many (Runnymede Trust, 2000).
- By comparing *across places*, what has been learnt from the experiences of immigrants and the Second Generation in other countries can help us understand processes in the UK. As part of this, UK-centric notions of migration can be challenged as the concept is seen as universal and international. Below I consider each of these further.

#### *1.41 Comparison within one era – broadening the study population*

I have argued that the focus of study has long been those groups defined as 'black'. This has meant of the post-war immigrants to the UK, the focus was on those from the Caribbean and South Asia. However, in 1971 those groups represented less than a third of the total immigrant population. The immigrant population in the UK contained large numbers of people from a range of countries. In 1971 this included, as many from Eastern and Southern Europe as from the Caribbean, and large numbers from 'Old Commonwealth' countries (see Table 4.1). It is therefore apparent that the majority of discussions concerning immigrants and the Second Generation in the UK of the post-war period left out many people. This has several implications.

As mentioned earlier, the focus on ‘black’ groups has resulted in the relative exclusion from the discrimination literature of those groups consensually considered ‘white’ or at least ‘not black’. One notable example has been the relative exclusion of the largest minority ethnic group in the UK and what was in 1971 by far the largest single immigrant group; the Irish (Hickman and Walter, 1995; Walter, 1999; Mac an Ghaill, 2000; Runnymede Trust, 2000 p. 31-2; ONS Longitudinal Study, own calculations). Anti-Irish prejudice has always been present in the UK. For example, Walter (1999) says that in the 1950s and early 60s signs saying ‘No blacks, no Irish’, were commonplace. However appreciation of widespread discrimination and sustained disadvantage experienced by many people of Irish origin has only started to grow more recently with the publication of a dedicated Commission for Racial Equality report (Hickman and Walter, 1997). Recent research by Ennelli et al (2005) has highlighted the disadvantage experienced by young people of Turkish and Kurdish origin living in London. They are referred to as ‘invisible’, as they are not on the mainstream map of minority ethnic groups. Others have highlighted the absence of analyses of London’s large and racialised Arab population (Nagel, 2001).

The concentration on ‘black’ groups has resulted in the British public having a highly skewed understanding of the make-up of immigration to the UK. People hugely overestimate the proportion of immigrants from New Commonwealth countries, whereas those from Europe, Ireland, the Old Commonwealth and the USA greatly outnumber them (Favell, 1998 p. 205).

The focus on ‘black’ groups has also led to a pre-occupation with ‘black-oriented’ explanations. Those wanting to explain the experience of ‘black’ groups in the UK have largely concentrated on racialised explanations. On one side of the political spectrum this has meant wider racist discourses, prevalent in the public, press, and politics where aggregate group failure or success is typically attributed to perceived collective cultural/‘racial’ qualities. On the other side within the anti-racist discourses the focus has also been on racism, either directly or through the prism of race/class relations. Where racialised analysis has been eschewed it has largely been within a Marxist

approach where racial struggle has been viewed largely as a construct within wider class struggle.

Racism has a significant role in explaining the experiences of certain immigrant groups yet the focus on these issues has meant that a wide range of other explanations for differential mobility have been ignored. Indeed there seems no contradiction in saying that racism has mediated the experiences of all 'black' people in the UK, at the same time as other factors have also affected their socio-economic trajectories. If we were to study the experience of 'white' immigrants to the UK we would most likely focus on such characteristics as human, social and cultural capital on arrival in Britain and aspects of their circumstances in the UK such as the nature of local communities and regional labour market as all having some potential impact on their experience. It seems therefore legitimate to test whether such factors have impacted on the experiences of 'black' immigrant groups. Whilst there is some discussions of these issue in the UK literature, there has been limited research in focussed on this area in Britain, very occasionally with an immigrant focus, more often focussed on minority ethnic groups and never with a focus on the Second Generation. These issues are important not only because they may contribute to understanding but because some of them may be malleable to policy. They are discussed further in Chapter 2.

#### *1.42 Comparison across eras*

Comparing across eras is about understanding that immigrants of one era may share experiences with those of another. This is not necessarily always the case. For example Portes (1995) argues convincingly that various social changes have fundamentally affected the potential paths of today's immigrants to those of previous generations. He cites phenomena such as the growth of trans-national activities, the changing context of the inner city and the transformation of labour markets where ladders of opportunity extending from entry level jobs up through into management have been replaced by a more polarised structure.

However, the history of immigration reveals similar issues often coming to the fore both in the response of the receiving society and in the adaptive strategies of immigrant groups. Receiving societies have often exhibited intolerance and discrimination, often expressed concerns about issues such as language, education and cultural conflict, and articulated tensions in connection to issues such as housing provision and settlement location. Within immigrant groups, similarities extend from the often present tensions between First and Second Generations, the regularity of settling in similar urban areas and the importance of community groups whether aimed at leisure, worship, education or welfare provision. These suggest challenges faced across time by both receiving societies and immigrant groups, and may give clues to fundamental issues that face immigrants.

By comparing the experiences of groups across eras it may be possible to draw out key barriers and springboards for immigrant trajectories. Without such an approach each wave is seen as independent, uniquely offering entirely fresh challenges, and policy must be invented anew to meet these challenges. However the characteristics of immigration mentioned above offer clues that this may not be the case. The policy wheel need not necessarily be entirely re-invented each time another wave of immigrants enters the UK.

Beyond this there is a further, purely political, reason to compare the experiences of groups over time. One idea that many interested in countering racism believe is important to explicate is that the notion of a homogenous country pre-1945 is part of national mythology. The UK, it is suggested, has a longstanding history of immigration. This is a powerful ingredient in reconstituting inclusive notions of national identity and challenging exclusive elements. Creating a national story of immigration would be a very powerful progressive step. True, immigration is not part of the British fabric to the extent that it is in the US, but that does not mean we cannot take something from the value which that country places on its immigrants.

Hundreds of thousands of immigrants take the oath of citizenship every year. Each has come not only to take but to give. They come asking for a chance to work hard, support their families, and to rise in the world. And together they make our nation more, not less, American.

(Bush, 2001) Speech at Ellis Island, 10 July

This is not to valorise either American immigration or race relations policy. However, the idea expressed that immigrants '*make our nation, more not less*' is a powerful notion that has struggled to find a place in current UK political discourse. Events close to the completion of this thesis have indicated how such notions may be gaining ground in the UK. London's bid to host the Olympics of 2012 drew heavily on London's ethnic plurality in selling the image of the city, and the shocking roll of the victims of the London bombings of 7 July 2005 highlighted the immense diversity of the population which makes London function each day.

Peach's discussion of the 'Irish' and 'Jewish' model's of integration, provides a good example of the potential benefits of these comparative analysis (Peach, 2005). The conceptualisation of other groups' experiences, the Caribbean as the former, the Indian, and loosely Pakistani and Bangladeshi experiences as the latter, can at best be very imperfect. Yet the process requires one to engage with whether there are meaningful commonalities between otherwise very different group experiences. Moreover it builds a sense of the continuity of the immigrant experience in the UK.

#### *1.43 Comparison across places*

As with the potential benefits accrued from comparing across time, comparisons across places have both an analytic and political virtue. Britain is seen as exceptional, embodying a range of historical, cultural, geographical and psychological factors, connected, for example, to its island geography and colonial history, that make the experience of minority ethnic groups in the UK distinct from those in other countries. Favell, talking about the race and ethnicity literature describes how the British approach has largely seen the UK experience as unique or exceptional, sharing little with that of

other countries. He suggests that 'all the recognised landmark texts in the discipline...are works that formulated important conceptual and theoretical breakthroughs with material taken almost exclusively from the British setting' (Favell, 2001 p. 36-7).

The same author in his study *Philosophies of Integration* (Favell, 1998), a comparison of French and British responses to immigration, shows how individual stories – and the French and British are very different in many ways – can, by looking for common ground between them, throw a new light on some of the more profound issues. In the next Chapter I give a brief overview of the '*Segmented Assimilation Model*', which has developed in America, notably through the work of Portes and Rumbaut utilising the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study. With a tailored dataset entirely focussed on understanding the trajectories of children of immigrants they have developed significant theoretical insights and debate. Given that UK academics had no equivalent data to work with, it seems important that the emerging debate should be used to inform an analysis of the same issue in a UK context. But the focus for comparison need not be the US. Continental Europe should also be an important site for study of the trajectories of immigrants. However, as emerged from a seminal conference in Germany in 2003, *Paths of Integration: Similarities and Differences in the Settlement Process of immigrants in Europe 1880-2000*, many academics across Europe are now attempting to rethink their current and past immigrations using conceptual frameworks based on the US context.

Some studies have attempted to develop insight through cross-national comparison (Model and Lapido, 1996; Loury et al., 2005; Model, 2005). Model's work highlights the complexity of cross-national comparison. How, for example, can one compare the situation of immigrants in the US, where integration takes place alongside the African-American population, with a society such as the UK without such a large, longstanding, racialised and highly disadvantaged minority? However she shows the clear benefits of being able to compare experiences of immigrant integration in the context of distinct policy regimes (Model, 2005).

## 1.5 Beyond an ethnocentric understanding

I now move on to consider why there may be significant analytic mileage in going beyond race and ethnicity in our characterisation, analysis and understanding of the experience of immigrant groups. In a sense it is necessary to consider certain existing material through a different lens. There are several reasons why analysis based on race and ethnicity is important. The persistent prevalence of racism and racial disadvantage means that it is imperative to continue monitoring and tracking the situation across a broad range of dimensions and to deconstruct racism in wider institutional, cultural and personal settings. These have ongoing implications across the public policy spectrum. In addition people identify with certain groups and as such have a continuing desire to understand and explain their group experience. However, specifically in terms of understanding the experiences of immigrants and their children, there are several reasons why at best this is not enough and at worst it is highly problematic. Four reasons are discussed below:

- Classification, categorisation and the social construction of race and ethnicity
- Diversity within groups
- The discrimination vs. cultural ascription paradigm
- Finding a place for policy

### 1.51 *The social construction of race and ethnicity*

Race and ethnicity are not ‘natural’ categories, even though both concepts are often represented as if they were. Their boundaries are not fixed, nor is their membership uncontested. Race and ethnic groups, like nations, are imagined communities. People are socially defined as belonging to particular ethnic or racial groups, either in terms of definitions employed by others, or definitions which members of particular ethnic groups develop for themselves.

(Bulmer and Solomos, 1998 p. 822)

Race meaning the actual existence of biological categories superficially distinguished by 'colour', has no scientific validity and no explanatory power

(Modood et al., 2002 p. 420)

Race is of course not a scientific category. It's a political and social construct. It is the organising discursive category at the centre of a system of practices of socio-economic power, exclusion and exploitation. That is to say racism.

(Hall, 2000)

Race and ethnicity are social constructions used in structuring power relations, constructing mythologies, categorising people and placing them in boxes. Words such as 'black', 'white', 'British' and 'African' only have the meaning with which we as a society infuse them. If we understand this, we can more readily challenge their use as sole or even primary explanatory factors of experience. This means appreciating and accounting for the heterogeneity within these normatively described groups. It means that whilst in a racist society being 'black' or 'African' may define someone's experience more than being 'white' or being 'British' it no more defines the totality of their experience. The implications and arguments about the social construction of race and ethnicity go well beyond the scope of this paper. Here I will concentrate on one such implication that has a large impact on our understanding of immigrants and minority ethnic groups.

### *1.52 Classification and categorisation*

How do we know about the experiences of minority ethnic groups in the UK? There are many ways of course; our own experiences, those of people we know, what the media tells us and qualitative research. Yet we also rely heavily on statistics and data from quantitative research. Quantitative research has certain characteristics. One is that it tries to simplify the world, to make it understandable in the generality. Secondly it is often concerned with inference, drawing conclusions for populations based on samples. The first requirement militates against having too many categories: a two-by-two contingency table is easily understandable; as you add rows and columns complexity sets in. The

more that are added, the more the task of simplifying the world becomes harder. Likewise the second requirement; where statistical inference is required, sample sizes become important. So the lower the frequencies in the cells of a contingency table, the more problematic the analyses and interpretation becomes; the only way forward is to combine categories. Moreover, categories require labels and if race, ethnicity and nation are ‘imagined communities’ then the choice of labels must be understood as political. To highlight some of the problems consider a standard ‘ethnic’ survey question, such as the one below from the UK Labour Force Survey.

**30. ETHNIC**

*To which of these groups do [you / Name] consider you belong?*

- 1 White
- 2 Black - Caribbean
- 3 Black - African
- 4 Black - Other Black groups
- 5 Indian
- 6 Pakistani
- 7 Bangladeshi
- 8 Chinese
- 9 none of these

(Social Surveys Question Bank, 2003)

There are many things to notice from this question. It is an ‘ethnic’ question, yet the optional categories combine ‘racial’ categories, with categories related to countries, regions and continents. The result is to exclude, conflate and confuse.

- Many groups are excluded from this classification. Where might, a Jewish or Irish person put themselves? Are they ‘ethnically’ ‘white’? Quite possibly they identify with a shared cultural heritage, history and language that would suggest they are ethnically Jewish or Irish. Are they ‘racially’ ‘white’? Through much of their history, and for some their present they are made to feel decidedly ‘non-white’ in the same sense that the English are ‘white’? Are they phenotypically ‘white’? Quite possibly except for all the exceptions such Jews of North African, Middle Eastern and Ethiopian origin (there are significant communities of the former two in the UK). Where do individuals with ‘mixed’ parentage (the largest growth category in the most recent census) tick?

- Other labels conflate. Does ‘Black African’ realistically describe the experience of all the different populations that have immigrated to the UK over the past 50 years from a continent of 56 countries, 750 million people and over 1000 languages? It is of course a convenient label but is it an appropriate one?
- A category that is appropriate for an individual may not capture the ethnic characteristics which best explains their experience. For example, it is widely believed that for Muslims, the strongest cause of discrimination they experience stems from Islamophobia. However that is not captured by the categories, which for people from South Asia prioritise national origin over religion (see Modood et al., 1994; Modood, 1998 for a discussion of these issues). Lindley (2002) finds that Muslims are more likely to be disadvantaged in the labour market compared to Hindus or Sikhs.

What are the consequences of this? For some groups they are defined out of mattering. Others are put in ethno-racial boxes that do not describe their experiences in a meaningful way. The consequences for genuine understanding and appropriate policy delivery are clear.

### *1.53 Diversity within ‘groups’*

As much as people from each immigrant group have had common and shared experiences, each group embodies significant diversity. This is well brought out by the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities and indeed any social statistics related to minority ethnic groups. See for example Table 1.1, which is taken from the most recent Households Below Average Income Survey, the Government's annual study of household income based on data from the Family Resources Survey

**Table 1.1 Proportion of people in each quintile (5<sup>th</sup>) of the income distribution by ethnic group**

Ethnic group of head of household	Bottom quintile	Second quintile	Third quintile	Fourth quintile	Top quintile
White	18	20	21	21	21
Indian	28	19	18	18	17
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	54	29	9	4	5
Black Caribbean	32	20	16	19	13
Black Non-Caribbean	47	19	13	12	9
Chinese or Other	40	15	12	12	21

Source: DWP (2005) Households below Average Income<sup>9</sup>

Table 1.1 shows that taken as a whole each minority ethnic group is substantially less affluent than these considered ‘White’ and yet within all groups there are disparities of households income (see also Berthoud, 2002 for a separate analysis of the FRS). Equivalent diversities of experience can be found across most socio-economic dimensions.

Yet despite this, it is commonplace for discussion to focus on the aggregate group experience, or as Modood has suggested, ‘most researchers focus on one end of one of the polarities and try to explain that, sometimes proceeding as if their chosen end was the whole story’ (2005 p. 305). The consequence is misrepresentation, ignoring both disadvantaged people in groups branded ‘success stories’, and success and progress when achieved by members of groups that remain disadvantaged when considered at the aggregate level (Ballard, 1992). This has policy implications, a point made by William Julius Wilson in the *Declining Significance of Race* (in connection to African-Americans in the US). He writes that ‘the view was often expressed that since all blacks are suffering, there is no need to single out the black poor. My feeling is that such a monolithic view of the black community not only obscures significant differences in experiences and suffering among blacks, it also leads to policies that do not address the

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9 Notes:

- Incomes is on a “After Housing Costs Basis”
- Income is net equivalised disposable household income
- Results in this table are presented excluding the self-employed, with the exception of those by economic status of the family which includes the self-employed
- Data from Family Resources Survey

needs and concerns of those who are the most disadvantaged' (1980 p. 157). Ballard (1992) has also made the point that the ethnic and racial studies literature has been hampered by an inability to deal conceptually with the issue of 'black success'.

#### *1.54 The 'discrimination' versus 'cultural ascription' paradigm*

One consequence of the concentration on the experience of distinct ethnic groups has been that explanations for aggregate group experience have often either focussed on racism or cultural ascription, the latter being often of a highly racist manner. By cultural ascription, I refer to the received wisdom about a certain group that purports to explain a perceived aspect of their behaviour. An individual's politics in relation to a certain group may determine whether such ascriptions are negative or positive. Whilst the negative ascriptions are more pervasive, the positive ones are often invoked in the context of immigrant groups to explain relative success, sometimes referred to as 'model minorities'. Robinson talking about the 'success' of the Indian community in the UK refers to their 'cultural drive to economic achievement' (Robinson, 1996). Brodkin refers to what she argues is the commonly held belief amongst Jewish people throughout the world: 'part of my ethnic heritage was the belief that Jews were smart and that our success was due to our own efforts and abilities, reinforced by a culture that valued sticking together, hard work, education and deferred gratification' (Brodkin, 1998).

Ascribing modes of behaviour and values to 'groups' is a normative way of understanding the world, much discussed in social psychology. It gives individuals identity, both in terms of their own in-group identification and in relation to other groups (Festinger, 1954; Tajfel, 1978; 1982). With this comes the accumulation of prejudices and stereotypes - some of which may be rooted in a some kind of observed behaviour others which may be entirely fabricated - both of which may be for the benefit of bolstering in-group esteem or out-group subjugation and oppression. When the latter occurs, the product is racism. This can filter into politics. Obviously racist politics uses racism and cultural ascription yet anti-racist politics has also often seen the need to focus on the singular group experience. Hall (1996) recognises this in *New Ethnicities*. Whilst advocating the deconstruction of the 'essential black subject' (a powerful politically

unifying concept for minority ethnic groups) he recognises that this has implications for the consensus and solidarity that had existed in anti-racism campaigning under that banner.

Beyond the typicality of describing aggregate group experiences, the pressure to ascribe cultural factors or racism to explain behaviour is also exerted by other very different factors. As discussed in the previous section the needs of quantitative analysis profoundly influence the way that knowledge is constructed. In the same ways that the approach seeks categories that do not compromise the quantitative approach, so it militates against multidimensional understanding of the experiences of minority ethnic samples. The rarely sufficient numbers of minority ethnic groups in surveys presents problems for this approach. A small sample of people of Indian origin may be analysable on one or two dimensions but the more that sample is broken down to take account of other dimensions such as gender, age, place, class, the cell sizes become too small and analysis become unfeasible.

The implications of this are that the range of other factors that explain the experience of people from minority ethnic groups are ignored in many analyses. This is not just the case in the UK. For example, Cornel West commenting in his pamphlet, notably called *Race Matters*, says of one campaigning organisation that 'their preoccupation with race downplays the crucial class, environmental, patriarchal and homophobic determinants of black life changes' (1993 p. 44). This is mirrored in the UK context by Hall who says 'the question of the black subject cannot be represented without reference to dimensions of class, gender, sexuality and ethnicity' (1996 p. 167 see also Wilson, 1980, p. 167).

Considering Table 1.1 once more, it is also clear that one explanation for a group experience cannot suffice. Racism alone cannot explain why 32% of those of Black-Caribbean origin are in the bottom quintile of the income distribution; what would explain the 68% not in this quintile. Similarly a 'cultural drive to economic achievement' cannot be the sole explanation for 17% of Indians being in the top quintile or even 29% being in the top two quintiles. There must be other things 'going on'.

Race and ethnicity may be one or two amongst a range of dimensions critical to understanding experiences such as gender, social class, education, disability and many others. Such dimensions are widely held as fundamental to understanding the experiences of the majority ethnic population but are too often dropped for minority ethnic groups. Consequently explanations of the experiences of people from minority ethnic groups are locked into a ‘cultural ascription vs. racism’ paradigm to explain relative group success or failure without recognising potentially multiple explanatory factors.

### *1.55 Finding a place for policy*

A final reason to try and elucidate those common barriers to success experienced by immigrants, is to find so-called ‘policy space’, areas in which policy can act as a springboard of opportunity. Of course the existence of racism offers policy space (through anti-racist policies), but there may be other factors which if addressed can remove barriers to successful Second Generation trajectories. This was much discussed in the aftermath of the disturbances that took place in some Northern English towns such as Burnley and Bradford in 2001 (Blunkett, 2001; Cantle et al., 2001). One phenomenon highlighted in reports and commentaries was the lack of English being spoken at home in many households. However, empirical work carried out in the US does not necessarily support ‘common sense’ explanations of the time about the importance of immigrants learning English. In fact it has been argued that fluent bilingualism in the Second Generation, born from not speaking English at home, is consistently associated with the best outcomes (Portes and Hao, 2002). The only way to locate the policy space is to examine whether there are any factors that typically act as barriers and springboards across different ethnic groups.

## 1.6 Conclusion

This chapter raises a set of issues that go well beyond the scope of this single piece of research. It argues that a recontextualisation of the experience of children of immigrants from minority ethnic adults to the Second Generation will allow a broader and more complex analysis of the diversity of experience of different people from different immigrant groups. Such an approach has many potential analytical and political benefits, breaking down stereotypical accounts of success and failure and locating springboards and barriers that mediate the trajectories of children of immigrants. It can be helpful in understanding the experiences of the adults from minority ethnic groups whose parents were part of large migration waves of the 1950s and 1960s. Moreover it may help in developing an approach to maximise the opportunities for today's immigrants and young Second Generation. Comparing the experiences of those from the typically discussed minority ethnic groups with a full range of immigrants into the UK and not just with the 'White British' population may also aide the contextualisation of immigrant and Second Generation experiences within a wider migration process. One potential benefit could be the de-racialisation of immigration discourse in the UK.

## **2 - Exploring life chances for the Second Generation**

### **2.1 Introduction**

This thesis is concerned with outcomes for the Second Generation in early adulthood in terms of relative social advantage and disadvantage. It aims to explore the relationship between characteristics in childhood and those outcomes. As such, whilst the research is focussed on the Second Generation, I have drawn on a wide literature base in developing my approach. This Chapter aims to bring that literature base to the fore, providing the methodological, contextual and conceptual backdrops to the thesis.

I begin by considering broad methodological issues, discussing generic approaches to the study of intergenerational mobility and life chances amongst the population as a whole. I suggest reasons why the core questions of this field are important. I discuss some of the methods that have been used to explore them and present some important findings from research in this area. The latter is significant because factors which explain the relationship between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes for children of non-immigrants may be equally salient in explaining the experiences of children of immigrants.

I then discuss the mobility context of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the UK over the period 1971-1991. Whilst there has been little directly comparable research to this thesis, there have been some analyses of intra- and inter generational mobility of immigrants and minority ethnic groups. Although it typically lacks an intergenerational focus, the 'ethnic effects' literature is also relevant. This approach tries to explain the relationships between a range of characteristics and outcomes for minority ethnic groups, and to estimate the explanatory power of 'ethnic group' in explaining aggregate differences between groups.

In the third section I discuss the theoretical literature which I draw upon in my research. Whilst there have been explanations given for differential pathways of minority ethnic groups in the UK, for the reason I discussed in the previous Chapter, I draw heavily on US based approaches. There is a long history of Second Generation analyses in the US which is once again hotly contested in the context of a rich seam of data supporting and challenging the influential ‘segmented assimilation hypothesis’.

The Chapter concludes by presenting some key themes, which may be important in explaining and predicting the trajectories of children of immigrants. These will be referred to again at the end of Chapter 4 where they are used, alongside the picture that emerges of the immigrant First Generation in 1971, to draw out broad hypotheses for how the Second Generation would fare in early adulthood.

## 2.2 Intergenerational Mobility and Life Chances

To what extent do someone’s origins predict their socio-economic outcomes? This is an important question for social research. Some level of mobility, particularly the ability to rise up the social scale from disadvantaged origins to more advantaged destinations, is a goal that manages, albeit for different reasons, to straddle the normal political left-right divide. Immobility is to differing degrees, seen as a sign of unfairness, injustice or inefficiency; it means inequality of opportunity. It is anathema to meritocracy, and therefore problematic for those who believe that the most intelligent, hard working should be able to succeed, both for their benefit (i.e. just rewards) and for the benefit of society which requires the most capable leaders throughout public and commercial life. Yet it is also problematic for those who believe in social justice. Even if society is stratified in one way, or another, children should not be destined to a life of poverty simply because they are born into it.<sup>10</sup>

Two related quantitative literatures are concerned with these issues. One speaks in the language of intergenerational mobility and is perhaps more concerned with measuring overall levels of absolute and relative mobility and making comparisons across place and

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<sup>10</sup> There are ideological divisions over whether mobility exists in the UK and how it should be measured, interpreted and understood. This is discussed further below.

time. The other, the life chances literature, concentrates more on risk and protective factors, focussing on the relationship between childhood characteristics and later life outcomes.

Those researching these areas ask a range of questions including:

- How much mobility is there? This includes 'absolute' social mobility, the changing overall structure of society, and 'relative' social mobility, the likelihood of mobility for someone from one group versus someone else.
- What are the primary factors that impact upon whether mobility occurs? This applies both to structural factors impacting at the aggregate level (such as the changing occupational structure of the labour market) and those factors that impact upon individual trajectories at the micro level (including education, place of residence, ethnicity, gender, early parenthood).
- Do different aspects of mobility such as income, class and education correlate with each other or are there different stories for these distinct dimensions?
- Do patterns of mobility change over time? Do different places have different mobility patterns and if so, why?

## *2.21 The classical economic and sociological approaches*

Whilst often counterposed (Aldridge, 2001) the major distinction between the classical economics and sociological approaches to mobility lies not in the core methodology but in what aspects of mobility are identified and measured. Economists typically focus on income, sociologists concentrate on social class; both analyse their chosen indicator for generation 'one' (parents) and compare it with that of generation 'two' (children). Transition matrices are one common way of measuring and presenting mobility between different social class categories, or quintiles of the income distribution.

The aims of such analyses have largely been to measure the extent of mobility. Where possible attempts have also been made to show changes over time (Bjorkland and Jantti, 1997; Blanden et al., 2002), make comparisons across countries (Bjorkland and Jantti, 1997), and to explore the factors associated with mobility both at the aggregate national

level and at the level of the individual experience (Bowles and Gintis, 2001). A proliferation of research has come with the maturation of longitudinal studies such as the National Child Development Study (NCDS) and the British Cohort Study (BCS) in the UK. Others have used datasets with multigenerational data such as Heath and Payne (2000) using the British Election Survey in the UK and Corak and Heisz (1999) who used administrative tax data in Canada.

Early research suggested that most western societies were quite mobile. However, as there have been improvements in both data and analysis, this view has been consistently challenged (See Johnson and Reed, 1996 for an overview). Certain patterns have emerged, although they are contested.

- There has, over recent decades, been more upward than downward mobility (Dearden et al., 1997; Corak and Heisz, 1999). This has given rise to the notion of '*more room at the top*'. As the structure of society has changed, with the diminution of manual work and the expansion of professional and white-collar opportunities, so there have been greater opportunities for upward mobility.
- There is more mobility around the middle of the distribution than at the extremes (Johnson and Reed, 1996). This is important if our interests are, for example, poverty and life chances. Society should then not be understood as mobile simply because of substantial short range movement around the middle giving the impression of high aggregate mobility. Transition matrices are a useful way of understanding whether this is occurring.
- There is some evidence of less mobility in more unequal societies, both from comparative research, such as Bjorkland and Jantti's work comparing Sweden and the United States, and from historical research such as Blanden et al's comparison of the experiences of the 1958 and 1970 cohorts in the UK, using the NCDS and BCS70 (Bjorkland and Jantti, 1997; Blanden et al., 2001).

Using data from the NCDS to compare the positions of children and their parents, Dearden et al (1997) have shown the extent of immobility in the UK. Looking primarily

at a derived income variable based on a combination of social class and years in education and using a variety of tests, they found regression coefficients for mobility of between 0.4 and 0.7. By any comparative standard this would be considered a small amount of mobility.

Heath and Payne's work has used British election studies to compare the social class of fathers<sup>11</sup> with their sons and daughters. Their findings mirror much of what has been found out elsewhere. Their discussion of relative mobility rates is in terms of odds, an approach I will use later in the thesis. In a fully fluid society the odds of being in any particular social class, irrespective of your origins, would be 1:1. In reality the odds of someone whose father was in the most advantaged social class ending up in the most disadvantaged social class, and the reverse occurring is 38:1 (Heath and Payne, 2000).

Beyond attempting to assess the extent of mobility, other studies try to explain the individual mobility experience through patterns of association between childhood characteristics and adult outcomes. Within these 'classical' studies, the literature in this area is complicated by two factors, one methodological, the other, ideological.

Methodological problems centre on the main indicators of mobility; income and class. Income is a problematic variable on two main (related) counts. Incomes are volatile, over the short, medium and long term, and especially so for those with a tenuous relationship to the labour market. Consequently, in longitudinal cohort studies when periodic waves of data are taken over a long time span, there may be inaccuracies. These potential problems are exacerbated by the peculiar problem of the NCDS. The only income measure applicable for parents in studies such as Dearden et al (1997) was from 1974, however that income measurement was taken during the so-called 'three day week' and it is unclear whether incomes given were for a typical five day week<sup>12</sup>.

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11 One criticism of much of the work in this area has been the widespread use of father's occupation or income, as opposed to joint income where appropriate or notions of social class driven by consideration of both mother's and father's occupations.

12 For three months of 1974 Britain experienced a three day working week as a result of power cuts.

A more generic problem has been presented by Mazmunder (2001) using annual data from the US Social Security Administration dataset. He has shown how significantly patterns of mobility change when incomes are averaged out over different time periods. The relationship between fathers and sons earnings is 0.27 when the fathers' earnings are averaged over three years, but this rises to 0.47 and 0.65 when averaged over six and fifteen years respectively. Levels of mobility are therefore potentially overestimated when simply taking one year's income measure. This suggests caution in using one off income measurement as a measure of social position. One obvious way that this may manifest itself is the difference between an undergraduate student and someone who does not continue into post-compulsory education. The latter individual may well have a higher income than their studying counterpart yet to conclude that they were in a more advantaged social position would be spurious. After all, the student is choosing to have a lower income in the short term, in order to invest in long-term benefits.

However social class is problematic too. As an index reliant on the labour market situation of the head of household it is based on post-Second World War assumptions about two parent families, with a main male breadwinner in full-time employment. Consequently, it is a concept which is challenged by the transformed labour market situation of men and women. There are today, many fewer men and many more women in work, many women working in better paid occupations than men, and profound changes in working patterns such as the expansion of part-time and temporary employment, and the changing nature of self-employment. Changing family structures have also thrown up challenges to traditional notions of social class. Furthermore, there have always been concerns about inaccuracies in the matching between occupations and the changing social structure. These concerns have resulted in the new National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC) devised for the 2001 census (although this research, which uses previous census data, uses the older Registrar-General's social class classification).

The ideological issue, is the ongoing schism characterised by the debate between Saunders on one side and Breen and Goldthorpe on the other (Breen and Goldthorpe,

2002). Whilst both use the same data, the National Child Development Study, one side continually seeks to assert the importance of ability and effort, whilst the other asserts the primacy of structural inequalities. The former emphasises the importance of genetic transmission, cognitive test scores and motivation at school, whilst the latter emphasises social class, childhood poverty and other indicators of social disadvantage. Saunders concludes that British society is fluid and meritocratic; Breen and Goldthorpe have the contrary view.

One problem, common to all sociological and econometric research which examines the link between background characteristics and adult outcomes, has been that typically only 20-25% of the variance can be explained in regression analyses. This is what Bowles and Gintis (2003) have referred to as '*the black box problem*' of social mobility. What accounts for the other 75% of the variance? Of course in social science one never expects to account for all the variance, however there are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the consistency of this finding. Measurement error will be part of this, although the amount and variety of datasets that have produced similar results suggests further explanations as well. The widely cited UK Government's Performance and Innovation (PIU) Report on social mobility concluded that 'idiosyncratic factors and sheer luck...play a very large part' (Aldridge, 2001 p. 25) but Bowles and Gintis (2002 p. 3) have argued that 'the fundamental problem is not due to measuring the right variables poorly, but to missing some of the most important variables entirely.' Whilst the PIU claim may be right it is important to exhaust possible answers to the latter assertion before accepting it. I return to this theme, later in this Chapter.

## 2.22 *Life chances*

Rather than being rooted in the economics or sociological traditions, the life chances perspective on social mobility, stems from medical and most directly, developmental psychology models (Bynner, 2001). It is also, at least on face value, less influenced by ideological concerns than the paradigm discussed above. It utilises many of the same datasets as the classical models (for example NCDS in the UK, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in the US). However, rather than trying to assess aggregate

mobility, it focuses on trying to understand the background characteristics which predict a range of specific outcomes including social class and income, but also many others. As such the questions asked and hypotheses tested are slightly different. The core question in this research is: what factors are associated with a given outcome? Whilst not normally couched in terms associated with mobility<sup>13</sup>, discussions rather focussing on 'life chances' or 'risk and protective factors', when this area focuses on socio-economic conditions, it is essentially concerned with same issues as studies examining social mobility.

There is now a large body of research that links certain childhood circumstances to different adult outcomes. It is clear that no paths are pre-determined, and that there are many discontinuities of disadvantage as well as continuities (Hobcraft, 2003). As Schoon and others remark 'individuals are not passively exposed to experiential factors but can become producers of their development' (Schoon et al., 2002 p. 1487). However, there are childhood circumstances that are strongly associated with experiencing adult disadvantage, whether in terms of poverty, unemployment, housing or many other areas. Bynner (2001) provides an overview of these circumstances distinguishing 'child' risk factors (e.g. disability and behavioural issues), 'economic' risk factors (e.g. poverty and social class), 'family' risk factors (e.g. parental absence and lack of support), and 'school' risk factors (e.g. inadequate pre-schooling and class concentrations).

Axinn et al (1997) have used the PSID to explore whether experiences of childhood poverty have implications for adult disadvantage, independent of its influences on and associations with other factors. They find that childhood poverty is a much more significant predictor of whether someone will complete high school, than other family characteristics<sup>14</sup>. Hobcraft (1998) using the NCDS finds that, at ages 7, 11 and 16, child poverty, alongside contact with police and family disruption, is the most important predictor of living on a low income at age 33. Caspi et al (1998) using the New Zealand

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13 There are exceptions such as Hobcraft (1998) who does talk about the intergenerational transmission of social exclusion.

14 In the US where 85-87% of people finish High School this is an important indicator of disadvantage Kaufman (2001)

based Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and Development Study find that lack of parental resources in childhood is a highly significant predictor of experiencing youth unemployment, even after taking account of educational attainment, which it might be assumed would be the main conduit for the impact of poverty.

The literature emphasises several issues concerning these associations. Most importantly, risk factors should not be understood in isolation. In most cases different aspects of disadvantage interact with each other. Moreover they do so in different ways, with differential impacts dependent on the specific outcome concerned, and the timing, persistence and context (a major problem Schoon et al (2002) identify with multiple risk indices). Timing is important; for example much research emphasises how it is early influences that are key (Haveman and Wolfe, 1994). Kiernan (1997) focussing on the impact of parental divorce, shows that children whose parents divorce when they are young, experience a range of long-term negative outcomes in terms of their own economic situation and stability of future partnerships and marriage. However for children whose parents are grown-up when they divorce, only the latter is true.

Persistence is also seen as critical; it is not brief experiences of economic hardship that have a long-term impact and influence on the children, but long-term persistent disadvantage (Duncan et al., 1994; Bolger et al., 1995). Schoon et al (2002) emphasise the importance of the wider social context as well, suggesting that social class was a more important indicator for the BCS cohort (born in 1970) than those in the NCDS (born in 1958), and this primarily reflects a changing social and economic context rather than anything about micro level social processes.

Duncan and others (1998) in reviewing the literature on the relationship between childhood poverty and adult disadvantage suggest three conclusions that can be drawn from the literature as a whole. Firstly, the effect of parental income varies greatly between outcomes. Secondly, whilst parental income is usually significantly associated with all achievement outcomes, there is no agreement on the size of the association. Finally they suggest that estimates of the association may be upwardly biased, because

child poverty captures some important unobserved variables related to parenting and neighbourhood effects. If we link this last point, to assertions by Bynner (2001) and Hobcraft (1998 p. 95), that a large amount of the variance goes unexplained in these studies of the relationship between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes, it appears that the so-called 'black box' problem, discussed earlier, remains.

### *2.23 Inside the black box? Perceived self-efficacy and aspirations*

So what is this 'black box'? What are those unobserved characteristics that could possibly be so pivotal in understanding the relationship between childhood circumstances and adult circumstances? Bowles and Gintis (2001), and Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002) suggest that attitudes and aspirations may play an important role. This idea is supported by many qualitative and ethnographic accounts of deprived places and groups in which these factors emerge as central. Whilst rarely framed in the same paradigmatic language of mobility, life chances or risk and protective factors, such accounts have a large amount to say about the life chances of children. Indeed any research that considers the lives of families and/or children on low incomes and in deprived areas will have something to say, at least indirectly, about the life chances of disadvantaged children and their prospects for mobility.

From Robert Roberts' Salford in the first quarter of the Twentieth Century, to Young and Wilmott's Bethnal Green in the 1950s and Lebow's or Hannerz' Washington DC of the 1960s a story, repeated throughout these ethnographies, is about peoples' lack of aspiration to break out of 'working class' life (Young and Willmott, 1957 p. 146-8; Liebow, 1967; Hannerz, 1969; Roberts, 1971 p. 14-5). In the UK context, the authors suggested that this lack of aspiration was moulded by 'knowing your place', a degree of class solidarity (part positive sense of duty and loyalty, part envy driven coercion) and positive inclusion in the life of the working class community. In the US case studies, the lack of aspiration was discussed as a reflection of the helplessness of poverty, discrimination and consequent alienation. More recent studies in the UK, suggest a more complex picture which capture elements of both perspectives (Wood et al, 1999; Reay, 2001; Britton et al, 2002).

Wilson (1997; 2003) suggests that a concept related to aspirations may be important in bridging structural and personal accounts of mobility amongst the urban poor in the US. Based on social cognitive theory of developmental psychologists such as Bandura, he proposes a more nuanced concept than aspirations; 'perception of self-efficacy'. Peoples' education and career behaviour is not governed by aspirations per se, but by their most realistic and safest aspirations. I may aspire to being a fiction writer or an Olympic marathon runner, but because I do not really think I would be able to do either of those things I do not actively attempt to make them happen even though I may regularly think about them. Similarly a young person growing in disadvantaged circumstances may want to become a doctor, but may not know any doctors from their community, may not be thought able to study medicine by their school, may not believe they could afford to study for many years to become a doctor and may believe that people like themselves are '*just not clever enough*'. As such, aspirations are put aside, and sights are altered to what is perceived to be possible.

This is the situation described by some qualitative research. Archer and Yamashita (2003) show that young people in inner city schools may have professional aspirations, whilst acting in ways unlikely to realise those aspirations. Interviewing 15-16 year old school leavers, they show how the young people talk about '*knowing their limits*', have very low opinions of their academic abilities and ascribe success to luck. That is not a lack of aspiration in the way often described; it is some senses a rational perspective, evaluating likely outcomes and working towards what they perceive is the best that they are capable of. Whilst Shropshire and Middleton (1999) highlight the difference in career aspirations between children from low incomes families and those who are not, it remains striking how many of the children from low incomes families expressed professional aspirations.

I raise the subject of perceived self-efficacy as an important concept here not just because it has been posited as a potentially important part of the mobility process generally, but because it definitely has a place within many popular views of immigration. Immigrants

are seen as having particular high aspirations; what could be more self-efficacious an act than leaving your country, with your native language, culture, family and community, to live in a different country in search of a better life? Lupton (2004) in her comparative studies of schools in disadvantaged areas in the UK discusses this issue. Comparing children at schools with high concentrations of 'white' working class children and inner city schools with large numbers of Second Generation children, she notes a gulf between the two sets of children. Many of the former come from families, which have not experienced the benefit of education and do not place a particularly high value on what schools can offer. By contrast, large proportions of the immigrant families and their children are characterised by high levels of aspiration, seeing education and schools directly as their avenue for social mobility.

These ideas are supported by Modood (2004). He shows among a large sample of school children, that the proportions who said that they received familial encouragement to attend university and who always assumed they would go into higher education were higher amongst all minority ethnic groups than amongst 'white' children.<sup>15</sup> It is therefore worth considering whether perceived self-efficacy could be an important part of the mobility process for the Second Generation, perhaps distinguishing this group from children of UK-born parents in the relationship between social class origins and destinations. I elaborate on this further below.

### **2.3 The Context: Research on mobility for immigrants, the Second Generation and minority ethnic groups in the UK**

There has been little research in the UK on the intergenerational social mobility experiences of First and Second Generation immigrants. For example, in Rutter and Madge's review as part of the transmitted deprivation research programme, the section devoted to '*Ethnic Minorities*' was a cross-sectional account of ongoing discrimination and disadvantage faced by particular minority ethnic groups (Rutter and Madge, 1976).

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<sup>15</sup> The difference in proportions of the Black Caribbean/Other and White groups who assumed they would go into higher education was marginal.

The limited work that relates most closely to this area, aside from the wealth of cross-sectional research and survey data, focussing on minority ethnic group outcomes, can be divided into three areas.

### *2.31 The First Generation – intra-generational mobility*

*Intra-generational mobility* describes the experience of a single individual within their lifetime. There have been a few studies of such mobility of immigrants and minority ethnic groups, utilising longitudinal data, and specifically the ONS Longitudinal Study (LS). Robinson (1990b; 1990a) using LS data from 1971 and 1981, looked at the experiences of several groups. Analysing social class mobility, he concluded that Indians had been the most upwardly mobile, whilst Pakistanis had proved more likely to move into unemployment or remain in the most disadvantaged circumstances. Immigrants from the West Indies were more stable in their class positions over the ten years. Fielding (1995b) focuses on the same populations; however he opts for a combined South Asian group and therefore the sensitivity of Robinson's analysis is lost. He finds Caribbean immigrants to be more disadvantaged than Robinson does.

Other studies have focussed on specific groups and using LS data have tracked mobility a further ten years looking at Indians and Ugandan Asians from 1971 to 1991 (Robinson, 1996; Valen, 2000). Both Robinson and Valen showed the striking upward trajectory of many Ugandan Asians over the period 1981-91, Robinson suggesting that 'they reskilled and requalified themselves; they sought white-collar employment, which many achieved; they moved into self-employment: and they gained better quality housing...few other minority groups in Britain have achieved so much in such a short period of time' (Robinson, 1996 p. 242). Whilst at the aggregate level this is one way to consider the data (more experienced upward mobility than downward mobility), the study reveals that the majority actually experienced social class stability, and a sizeable proportion experienced downward mobility. As for Indian immigrants, over the twenty year period their upward trajectory continued.

In a more general study, Dobson et al (2001) examined several 'groups' over the 1971-1991 period including immigrants from Ireland, Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, the Indian Subcontinent and Sub-Saharan Africa. They show higher rates of mobility for all groups compared to the indigenous population, especially those from the Indian Subcontinent and Sub-Saharan Africa. They argue that a major reason for this is likely to be that these groups had more disadvantaged social class profiles at the beginning of the period, and therefore more scope for upward mobility. However these studies were concerned with the First Generation. Whilst their mobility patterns may well have impacted upon their children's prospects, other studies have considered the mobility of the Second Generation specifically.

### *2.32 Intergenerational mobility*

What distinguishes cross-sectional studies of Second Generation immigrants from general cross-sectional studies of minority ethnic groups is that the former studies are testing the idea of 'generation' as key to the immigration and integration process. This is the tradition of analyses in the US, as will be discussed later in the Chapter, and is the perspective being adopted in my research.

Hornsby-Smith and Dale, comparing First and Second Generation Irish immigrants to the UK show a generational effect. Using the General Household Survey, a cross-sectional survey, and comparing experiences of those from the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and the UK they show how the outcomes of the Second Generation from the Republic are much closer to those of the wider UK population than those of the First Generation.

Ballard's approach was to examine ethnicity and social class by age, in order to determine whether there was a generational shift in social class position. Comparing the 'white' population with those of Indian and Pakistani origins, he showed that amongst the older workers there was a great deal of comparative disadvantage experienced by those of Indian and Pakistani origin. However, he argued that when examining the younger

generation, those aged 18-29, there had been a great deal of convergence in the social class profiles of all groups (Ballard, 1996b).

Heath and Ridge (1983) using early data (from 1972) compared the experiences of 'non-White' and Irish immigrants, with native 'whites' and found that among the two immigrant groups the relationship between class origins and class destinations was weaker than for the native born population. More recent research by Heath and McMahon (2005) supports this view. They show that the Second Generation of Irish, Indian and Caribbean origins all had higher rates of upward mobility than British born 'whites'. Their results, from a multivariate analysis of the relationship between social class origins and destinations, show that Irish and Indian Second Generation men were more likely to access the 'salarariat'<sup>16</sup> than British born 'white' men of the same social class background. For Second Generation Caribbean men there was no such positive effect. For women by contrast, the relationship between class origins and class destinations appears broadly similar across all groups.

Several of these findings are supported by the first genuinely prospective longitudinal study of intergenerational mobility for minority ethnic groups in the UK (Platt, 2005a). Using the ONS Longitudinal Study, Platt compares patterns of intergenerational mobility for the Caribbean and Indian Second Generations and a White UK-born cohort between 1971 and 1991. She finds that both groups experience high rates of mobility from the lowest social classes, especially the Indians, and these rates exceed that of the White UK population. However, at the same time they are more at risk of downward mobility, and especially into unemployment, from which the most advantaged origins offer little protection. Indeed for the Caribbean Second Generation, coming from advantaged origins may increase the chances of unemployment. The paper argues that class origins are as important, if not more so, as predictors of outcomes, than ethnic origins. Interestingly, she finds that ethnicity is a more important factor for men than for women.

Harding and Balarajan's (1996) studies of differential mortality have this focus. Examining the mortality of Irish immigrants they show how the Second Generation experience '*adverse mortality risks*' much greater than the wider population and similar to that of the First Generation. This would suggest a lack of a generational effect. However they do show a significant generational effect on socio-economic outcomes with the Second Generation experiencing considerable upward mobility.

### 2.33 'Ethnic effects'

'Ethnic effects' describe the coefficient for an ethnic group explanatory variable which estimates a particular outcome having controlled for other characteristics (such as social class and education) in multivariate analysis. Significant 'ethnic effects', show that differences between groups remain even after controlling for certain characteristics. Much early research showed how immigrants, primarily of South Asian and Caribbean origin, had more disadvantaged occupational profiles even after controlling for educational attainment. That could be the consequence of discrimination, but could also be about migration effects; factors discussed earlier, such as language, culture divide, pressure of migration and absences of social networks. The ethnic effects literature that focuses on the Second Generation can exclude some of these factors; the Second Generation for example should have a much better grasp of the English language.

Heath and McMahon (1997) have analysed whether similar ethnic effects in unemployment and access to the more advantaged social classes persisted across generations. They argue that after controlling for age and education, the disadvantages existing in the First Generation across all three fronts persist for the Second Generation. They conclude that in all likelihood non-migration effects must therefore be important in understanding these 'ethnic penalties'.

In a more recent analysis however, Heath and Yu (2001) utilise cross-sectional data from the General Household Survey and Labour Force Survey. They look at the experiences of Indian, Pakistani, and Black Caribbean groups, focussing on unemployment and access to the 'salarariat'. Whilst disadvantages persist for the First Generation, for the Second

Generation there is polarization. On the one hand all groups have substantially caught up with the 'White UK' population in terms of access to the salariat. They still, however, experience far greater unemployment.

#### **2.4 The conceptual background: 'the new Second Generation'**

Given parents with the same social class background, or the same household income, would the amount of intergenerational mobility experienced by children of an immigrant be expected to be different to that of children of the UK-born population? Given two children of immigrants from similar social class or income backgrounds - after accounting for measurement error and some random effects - would we expect similar mobility patterns? It might be argued that structural inequalities such as labour market opportunity, school quality and neighbourhood disadvantage would have the strongest impact, and the experiences of the immigrant groups would be a product of their relative position within the social hierarchy.

Whilst such an account does have vigorous proponents when describing the situation of the wider population, the situation for immigrants and their children is more complex. Immigrants have a range of characteristics due to their previous life story and their new social environment which are not comparable to the experiences of the children of UK-born parents; some of these characteristics may help propel individuals up the social hierarchy, others may hold them back or result in a downward slide.

The conceptual debate over the socio-economic trajectories of the Second Generation has been led by a US based discourse. Although in recent years there has been more comparative analysis and theory from British and Continental European perspectives, the main body of the theoretical debate continues to be based on the US context (Vermeulen, 2001). There is a long history of meta-narrative discourse in the history of US immigration studies, which, for a variety of reasons, have generally been avoided by academics in the UK. From the canonical arguments of Warner and Srole (1945) and Gordon (1964) through to critiques, among them Glazer and Moynihan (1970) and Gans (1992), to the evolution of new theory (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes and Rumbaut,

2001) and the revision of old (Alba and Nee, 1997), the debates remain contested. Meta-narratives by nature simplify and can result in hegemonic discourses that do not reflect reality and are hard to break. However, they also help attempts to organise and summarize thoughts, identify broad processes and act as a focal point for the generation, exploration and testing of ideas. Underlying the broad theoretical discussions is a complex debate aimed at understanding those characteristics which predict mobility and developing policies to promote positive outcomes for the Second Generation

#### *2.41 The US discourse – ‘the canon’*

Straight-line assimilation theory was the dominant narrative of immigration and integration to the US for the best part of the twentieth century. Indeed it remains a powerful discourse in popular circles, consonant as it is with the ideology of the American dream. Proponents argued that over time, and as generations passed, immigrants who came into society at the bottom would be incorporated into the American middle classes.<sup>17</sup> The movement into Middle America would be associated with an inevitable loss of ethnicity, with each Generation becoming more assimilated to American norms. The loosening of ethnic ties would begin with Second Generation confronted with US public institutions, school being critical, and facilitated by adoption of English as the mother tongue and the progressive relegation of foreign languages. Over time, driven by intermarriage for example, ethnic differences between groups would vanish or at most become symbolic.

The evidence for this was the experience of European immigrants who had come in large numbers from Ireland and Southern and Eastern Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The argument came under severe criticism for its view of cultural assimilation; what for example characterises the American mainstream? Moreover it was seen as highly prescriptive of how immigrants should behave in order to become ‘more American’, and was seen as showing a lack of respect and understanding of different cultures. Critics also questioned whether this quick march into the middle

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<sup>17</sup> It is important to note the middle class often means something different in the USA than it does in the UK. In the former it refers to the mainstream, in the latter to the more affluent social strata.

class was an effective characterization of what happened, as well as the determinism of these arguments (Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997 p. 895; Foner, 2000; Alba and Nee, 2003 p. 215).

Foner (2000) for example reconsiders the Italians and East European Jews of New York in the first half of the twentieth century. She argues that incorporation into the middle classes took place on the back of the massive expansion of public education and the GI Bill giving these groups access to low cost home ownership. Given that these policy developments could not have been foreseen, for example in the 1920s, the arrival of these groups in the American middle class should not, Foner argues, be conceived as inevitable.

#### **2.42 The US discourse – ‘the segmented assimilation hypothesis’**

With the rise of a new Second Generation, the children of post-1965 immigrants to the US, a new literature was born, that has evolved over the past fifteen years. At the centre of this literature has been the ‘segmented assimilation hypothesis’ formulated by Portes and others. It is outlined in most detail in *Legacies: the Story of the Immigrant Second Generation* (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). This has questioned whether the Second Generation of today is integrating in a similar fashion to the Second Generation of the old European waves of migration. Whilst also critiquing the explanatory power of straight-line assimilation arguments for those earlier generations, they conclude that the experiences of the new Second Generation are and will continue to be different. These differences are caused by factors such as a greater diversity amongst immigrant populations, fundamental changes in the opportunity structure, and the existence of a trans-nationalism amongst immigrants, shaping alternative patterns of acculturation.

At the centre of this analysis are restructured labour markets in urban areas, the same areas which have remained the predominant settlement location for immigrants. Immigrants and the Second Generation at the turn of the century entered labour markets in a constantly expanding economy with a surfeit of skills-based manual jobs which could act as a springboard for upward mobility. Today’s Second Generation are faced

with a polarized labour market of high skill jobs requiring college education or low level minimum wage service jobs with few mobility prospects. The manner in which they face this situation will be determined by a range of factors, beginning with the incorporation of their parents.

Portes and Rumbaut outline three areas that they believe are at the core of understanding patterns of immigrant economic mobility.

- Parental capital - The skills, qualifications, work experience and English language capabilities with which immigrants arrive, are a key starting point. For those with strong transferable qualifications (or in many cases degrees from US institutions) and English language fluency, the prospects should be positive. They have the tools to enter professional classes, navigating neighbourhoods and schooling issues for their children as the professional classes do. For many however, other factors will in part determine how effectively individuals can capitalize these resources. Many arrive with good English but poor or non-transferable qualifications; many others arrive with little or no English.
- Contexts of reception: institutional, social, communal - How the immigrants are received is critical. At the institutional level the spectrum can range from undocumented immigrants who lack the most basic of rights, to certain highly favoured refugee groups with specific government investment geared towards soft landings and rapid integration. At the social level, racism and discrimination continue to play highly important roles in negatively shaping the housing, schooling and labour market opportunities of 'non-white' individuals and impacting greatly on the nature of social integration into the society. Importantly, given the racial diversity of new immigrants in the US it is asserted that 'a racial gradient continues to exist in US culture so that the darker a person's skin the greater is the social distance from dominant groups and the more difficult it is to make personal qualifications count (Portes and Rumbaut, p. 47).'

At the communal level, the impact of having a co-ethnic community can be very great. A community can offer support in confronting the new society; for disadvantaged individuals without such support it can be a lonely path. However, communities can act as both a springboard and a barrier to mobility. Portes and Rumbaut argue that a

community containing middle class professionals can help other immigrants convert their human capital into good quality employment. However an entirely working class community will lack that necessary 'bridging'<sup>18</sup> social capital and may ensure that new arrivals, even those with good human capital are only able to find poor quality work.

- Family structure - The authors claim that strong advantages are accrued to two parent families and that the multiple disadvantages faced by lone parents in US society are multiplied when families are confronted with the extra hurdles of being immigrants.

These factors will impact upon the nature of incorporation and mobility prospects for immigrant parents. However, Portes and Rumbaut argue that it is the way in which mobility patterns feed into, and interact with, particular acculturation paths of parents and children that will determine the latter's economic prospects. They outline three such acculturative paths: consonant, selective and dissonant acculturation. Consonant acculturation is the experience of families who lack strong communal ethnic ties and quickly assimilate into American middle class values and lifestyles. Selective acculturation refers to those who maintain strong ethnic ties, embedded in local communities but embracing certain adaptive aspects of assimilation. Dissonant acculturation refers to opposing trends; parents seek to maintain strong ethnic ties and remain embedded within co-ethnic communities, whilst children seek to break from those communities and adapt to American norms.

Those who experience dissonant acculturation in disadvantaged areas are likely to identify with the 'oppositional' sub-cultures (argued to be prevalent among disadvantaged African-American youth) of the inner city, struggle in public schools (see also Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997) and ultimately find it difficult to climb on to the employment ladder, unsupported by a community they choose not to draw support from; their experience is one of downward assimilation or what Gans (1992) called 'Second Generation decline'. Unable to obtain decent jobs, and unwilling to do the 'bottom of the rung' jobs their parents were willing to do, many will join the ranks of the non-working

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<sup>18</sup> The term 'bridging social capital' is used to describe the social links between people in one community with people in other communities

‘underclass’. Consonant acculturation is likely to give the Second Generation a positive upward path, although the lack of community support means they may struggle when faced with a lack of social networks and experiences of discrimination. It is selective acculturation that the authors argue is the best adaptive strategy, by holding on to the community, and therefore gaining a myriad of associated social and psychosocial benefits.

#### 2.43 Critiques

The ‘segmented assimilation hypothesis’ is an attractive theory. It draws its explanatory power from combining individual and group level characteristics with structural factors, enabling the model to engage both with the diversity of outcomes witnessed and with a variety of perspectives given for those outcomes. It makes sense of certain apparent anomalies that more one-dimensional perspectives might throw up. Why Second Generation Nicaraguans whose parents had a similar make-up to the first wave of Cubans should struggle comparatively. Why poorly educated Cubans of the second wave who might be expected to have difficult trajectories should transpire to be fairly resilient. Why Second Generation Haitians and West Indians have different outcomes even though both have suffered the most extreme racism, and in many ways been racially clumped together with the existing African-American communities.

The ‘segmented assimilation hypothesis’ is a characterization of a group experience. However the ‘group’ experience refers to a specific immigrant group at a specific time, in a specific place. Thus the Mexicans discussed in *Ethnicities* (Rumbaut and Portes, 2001) - the companion volume to *Legacies* - are the Mexicans of San Diego of the 1990s. Their experience is no more equivalent to that of Mexicans in other places or at other times, than to the Filipinos of San Diego at the same time. The model therefore effectively challenges national pictures which focus on the aggregate group experience, ignoring within group diversity. It observes relative homogeneity in immigrants group of a certain time and a certain place. It is unclear however how the model explains heterogeneity amongst such groups, if observed.

It is the idea of downward assimilation into some form of urban ‘underclass’ that has been the most controversial of the themes emerging from the segmented assimilation hypothesis. Much of that criticism has been levelled at the extent of Second Generation decline or stagnation that the authors observed. It has been suggested that the Second Generation cohort that Portes is studying is too young to judge their outcomes. Many late adolescents exhibit ‘oppositional’ behaviours, but that does not mean that once observed in full adult life they will not have changed their patterns of behaviour to some degree and experience better long term labour market outcomes (Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997; Foner, 2002).

Other fundamental criticism has argued that understanding the underlying processes is problematic given that the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study has no control group. What were the experiences of a matching sample of non Second Generation children from the wider population (Kasinitz et al., 2002)? How do we know that the experiences of the Second Generation were not matched by other children, be they ‘White’, ‘Hispanic’ or ‘African-American’, with similar socio-economic and household characteristics? In that case, noted drivers relating to the migration experience, and specifically, particular paths of acculturation, may not be as relevant as otherwise suggested.

Perlman and Waldinger (1997) argue that that the notion of Second Generation decline is dominated by the experience of one group; the Mexican Second Generation. If this group are excluded from analyses the overall picture becomes far more optimistic. Moreover, further research (Farley and Alba, 2002; Waldinger and Feliciano, 2004) has observed high levels of heterogeneity among an older cohort of Mexicans and aggregate convergence with the mainstream population. Thus, while they may be worse off than many other groups, the Second Generation have fared far better than their parents; they are on an upward trajectory, not experiencing decline.

The model has been criticised for suggesting that cultural assimilation can only take place to either 'white middle-class' or 'black underclass' norms. A further possibility with different implications could be assimilation into the norms and lifestyles of a 'black' middle class (Neckerman et al., 1999). Other criticism is that 'oppositional' cultures have always existed where there is a disconnect between school and the prospects for working class children with or without the existence of a proximal host such as African-American minority (Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997).

The model has been criticised for inadequately dealing with the issue of culture. Whilst few any longer try to explain immigrant trajectories in terms of the cultures of world religions, nationalities or continents, there remains a contested debate about the potential of role of a more specific notion of culture in understanding patterns of immigrant mobility (Vermeulen, 2001). Vermeluen, in his review of the debate about the role of culture in explaining patterns of social mobility amongst children of immigrants defines culture as 'the common world of experiences, values and knowledge that a certain social group constitutes and reproduces in their daily life' (Lofgren, 1981 cited in Vermeulen, 2001 p. 3). The debate surrounding the role of culture in explaining Second Generation mobility processes is politically polarised. Cultural explanations are often seen as being simplistic, stigmatising and racist, however others view purely structural accounts as ignoring an obvious explanatory factor for '*politically correct*' reasons. Perlmann (1998) suggests that Portes' model cannot account for the impact of the attitudes, beliefs and outlooks that different ethnic groups bring with them. Vermeulen mirrors this calling it 'ahistorical' ignoring the specificities of particular immigrant groups, their lives in their countries of origin, and their stories of migration. Perlmann asserts that 'some groups preserve or modify premigration cultural forms that serve as a buffer to over-rapid acculturation - the Vietnamese Church, the Sikh emphasis on family and tradition, the Cuban private schools seem ways to maintain premigration cultural patterns' (Perlmann, 1998 p. 17). He argues that these institutions have a major effect on the nature of interaction between immigrant groups and the societies they migrate into.

Portes' model has also been criticized as being a gendered account that may tell a male story but does not effectively characterise the experiences of women. The restructuring of the labour market with its emphasis on service rather than manufacturing jobs has favoured employment prospects for low income women. Over the past decades, women have become increasingly important figures in the labour market and major breadwinners; women's educational outcomes have increased correspondingly (Waldinger and Feliciano, 2004 p. 380-1).

## 2.5 Key themes

From the literatures discussed in this Chapter, I discuss certain key themes that may be important in mediating Second Generation trajectories and reflect on them in a UK context:

- Changing structure of labour markets
- Race and discrimination
- Human capital, social class and cultures of mobility
- Links between acculturation and mobility
- Gender
- Community and social capital
- Migration factors

### 2.51 *The changing structure of labour markets*

Whilst significant labour market change in the UK was well under way by 1971, the following two decades would witness major economic restructuring, with immense corresponding shocks to local conditions. The continuing shift from a manufacturing to a service based economy was central to this. At the same time, inner urban areas shed jobs to outer-lying areas (Turok and Edge, 1999). Immigrants, predominantly residing in urban and inner urban areas would be greatly affected by this. However, the restructuring was not uniform across the country. Whilst all places lost manufacturing work, the service economy took root in London - a definitive '*Global City*' - and the surrounding

South-East region (Sassen, 1991). Here something corresponding to the hourglass economy was created with high numbers of professional jobs alongside an abundant low skilled service economy. In much of the rest of the country, so reliant on the manufacturing base, regional economies depressed and remained that way, unable to generate new industry based jobs. If the service sector took hold, it was the public service sector which increasingly became a more significant component of overall local economies (Hudson, 1998).

For these reasons, London and the South-East, were from 1971-1991, relative to the rest of the UK, what Fielding (1995a) referred to as an 'escalator economy', providing a platform for upward mobility in a way that other regions could not. How did these regional changes effect the experience of the Second Generation groups? Different immigrants went to different areas, but all were driven by existing opportunities in the labour market and patterns of chain migration. The textile industries of the North-West of England may have been declining and restructuring in the 1950s and 1960s, but they only became truly moribund in the 1970s. To what extent did fortune strike and the choice to go to Salford rather than Slough, or Burnley rather than Brent narrow the funnel of opportunity for the Second Generation?<sup>19</sup>

## 2.52 *Race and discrimination*

An enormous body of research has shown has that 'non-white' minorities in the UK have been, and continue to be, subject to racism and discrimination in all aspects of their social lives (Daniel, 1969; Smith, 1977; Brown, 1984; Modood et al., 1997). The extent and effect of that racism is however, hard to quantify (Heath and McMahon, 2000). As discussed in Chapter 1, there is an assumption in some of the literature that unequal racial and ethnic outcomes are the sign of discrimination. But the diversity of outcomes within any ethnic minority community implicates a range of factors in mediating outcomes; region of settlement, discussed above, could be just one of these, or social class, discussed below. Moreover when a minority ethnic group does better than the majority

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<sup>19</sup> All these are areas of high minority ethnic populations. Salford and Burnley are in the North-West near Manchester, Slough is the South-East commuter belt and Brent is a London Borough.

population does that prove an absence of racism? Surely it rather proves that any racism is being successfully resisted and overcome. For example, people from minority ethnic groups take specific steps to overcome racism, such as staying longer in education knowing that often they need to be better qualified than the 'white' applicant to get the same job. Alternatively, they could still be doing less well than they should, penalized as they are by racism.

Heath and McMahon (2000) posit the idea of processes of 'inclusion' at the top of the labour market, and 'exclusion' at the bottom. They argue that racism operates in different ways, in different contexts. At the top of the labour market, racism may best be seen through glass ceilings and difficulties in finding work after spells outside the labour market. At the bottom end discrimination may block access to the labour market altogether. Discrimination may operate differently in different geographical and labour market contexts. Some areas in the UK have particularly heightened racial tensions with high levels of segregation in schools and neighbourhoods, whilst others are characterized by more positive race relations. Furthermore, racism does not operate the same for all groups. The phenomenon of Islamophobia for example, may be as significant a component of prejudice and discrimination as phenotype. Modood argues that 'cultural racisms...use cultural difference to vilify or demand cultural assimilation from groups who also suffer colour racism' (Modood et al., 1997 p. 353; see also Runnymede Trust, 1997; Runnymede Trust, 2000). Other phenomena, such as anti-Irish discrimination further complicate any notion of a simple picture.

Whilst the pernicious effects of racism and discrimination are typically the focus for discussions, some argue that the entrepreneurial qualities exhibited by many immigrants, evident in ethnic economies and rates of self-employment, should be understood as a positive response and resistance to that racism (Zimmer and Aldrich, 1987 p. 969).

### ***2.53 Human capital, social class and cultures of mobility***

Human capital and social class are important predictors of outcomes for the Second Generation in the US, and the similarly structured labour markets and overall patterns of

social mobility across the US and UK would suggest a predictive role for these factors in the UK. Studies of intergenerational social mobility that focus on the wider population, show that those whose parents have strong human capital and attain privileged social positions are best placed to follow into the higher status jobs themselves. Conversely, those who are poor in childhood are most likely to be poor in adulthood. But the story is more complicated for immigrants and the Second Generation, as the limited data on mobility for minority ethnic groups in the UK and as well as results from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study attests.

What might we expect to be the nature of these relationships for the children of immigrants in the UK context? For those whose parents have an advantaged social class, they have already succeeded in overcoming, at least partially, the range of migration related barriers including language, discrimination, lost networks and cultural barriers. They should be able to navigate through the typical channels opening up opportunities for their children to follow them into the higher status jobs.

But what of the prospects of those whose parents have not achieved the higher status roles? What class related factors will mediate their experience of intergenerational social mobility? The expansion of the middle class is an important part of the context. There was a generational shift in opportunities with the changes in the labour market discussed above, which disadvantaged many but also created '*more room at the top*' for many others (Aldridge, 2001). One would not expect therefore to see rigidity in the mobility patterns of the populations across generations.

What class-related factors would impact though, on the relative chances of different people taking advantage of this structural change? This turns focus on what is meant by class-related factors. By social class I refer to 'categories of people accumulating similar volumes and types of resources and investing them in promoting their own and their children's life chances' (cited in Modood, 2004 p. 87), rather than in the sense of relating to macro-social relations and the overall structure of society. From the perspective of resources, one important aspect is therefore the ability of parents to navigate the

schooling and neighbourhood markets in order to give children the best contexts and necessary resources to maximize their developmental potential. As the quotation above implies however, social class is not just about resources, but is also associated with a range of social attitudes and behaviours that will also impact upon investment decisions. It is therefore possible that immigrants, whilst not accessing the higher social class occupations, may have social attitudes and behaviours that in the UK are associated with such statuses (what may be referred to as cultural capital). This could manifest itself in several ways:

- Hidden social class: Immigrants may occupy a certain place in the social hierarchy of their new country that differs from the position they held in their country of origin. For a variety of reasons such as discrimination, language and a lack of specific social, financial and cultural capital resources, immigrants may not have been able to access occupations equivalent to the experience and skills they developed in their country of origin. There is much evidence that this occurred in the UK (Glass, 1960 p. 72; Daniel, 1969; Richmond, 1973 p. 88-89; Heath and Ridge, 1983). As Heath and McMahon (1997) argue, it should be expected that the First Generation will be '*disrupted*' whatever their qualifications, due to these factors. However, they may possess significant human capital, and generalised social and cultural capital, enabling them to propel their children on an upward trajectory. This may be about aspirations and perceived self-efficacy, about knowledge of how to work systems, helping their children at school or finding an elevated place within the co-ethnic community.
- Cultural difference: immigrants may come from societies with a incomparable class structure and where the relationship between certain kinds of employment and social status, and a set of attitudes and values is very different from in the UK. Ballard draws on this idea saying 'many observers have commented on the apparently 'middle class' outlook of members of the most successful component of the new minority population...' however he continues, 'rather than trying to explain such outcomes (educational success) by shoe-horning peasants<sup>20</sup> into the more familiar category "middle class" it is far more appropriate to focus in on the specific kinds of values and behaviours

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<sup>20</sup> Whilst the word peasant is often used pejoratively in the UK, Ballard uses it to refer to small-scale, landowning subsistence farmers, the origins of many immigrants to the UK in the post-war decades.

which are cultivated in such societies' (Ballard, web p. 33). He argues that the values and behaviours necessary for successful rural living among small-holding peasants, including long term financial planning, frugal living, self-dependency and hard work, are highly adaptive to the needs of urban life in the West in the mid-late twentieth century.

- Migrant selectivity and perceived self-efficacy: economic immigrants are a select group of individuals. Willing to leave their homes, culture, language and social networks they move overseas in search of better economic opportunities for themselves and their children. By definition therefore, irrespective of social backgrounds they place economic mobility high up their list of priorities and have high aspirations and expectations for their children (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001 p. 104; see Borjas, 1987 for a challenge to this viewpoint in a US context).

#### *2.54 Connection between acculturation and mobility*

Portes et al assert that the kinds of factors discussed above will both impact upon, and interact with patterns of acculturation to establish the mobility patterns of the Second Generation. As is the case with the new immigrants in the US, there is an enormous diversity across and within the groups studied in this research. They vary according to every relevant characteristic, including patterns of settlement, language, phenotype, class and religion. Some of the areas in which different patterns of acculturation occur may mediate experience are discussed below:

- Language: For many of the immigrants to the UK in the 1950s and 1960s, English was not their first language. For Indians, Pakistanis, Southern and Eastern Europeans (all groups analysed in this research) this was the case, whilst for immigrants of Caribbean and Irish origins English was their first language. Amongst Indians and Pakistani, levels of English tended to be poorer amongst women than men, and worse amongst Pakistanis than Indians. These differences persisted over time, and severely limited the ability of many in the labour market, particularly women of Pakistani origin (Modood et al., 1997).
- 'Oppositional' Cultures: One major difference between the US and a UK experience is the central position of African-American communities in the heart of US cities where many immigrants settled. Portes and Rumbaut posit the idea of

‘oppositional’ cultures developing amongst the Second Generation based on contact with peers from this alienated and discriminated against community and severely limiting their opportunities. As mentioned earlier this is a hotly contested notion. UK inner cities were sites of large mostly ‘white’ working class communities before the arrival of immigrants. Any existing ‘oppositional’ cultures would therefore have been amongst working class ‘white’ young people. Certain possibilities could emerge from this:

- Children of ‘white’ working class immigrants living in deprived neighbourhoods, would assimilate into the norms of their neighbourhoods taking on board the ‘oppositional’ cultures of ‘white’ peers.
- Children of immigrants from minority ethnic groups, racialised by and alienated from ‘white’ working class peers, would be free to adopt cultures of upward mobility independent of the community enforcement of the deprived neighbourhood. This is how Young and Wilmott (1957) describe the experiences of Jewish children in working class Bethnal Green in the 1950s.
- Children of minority ethnic immigrants experiencing discrimination and a lack of opportunity would create their own ‘oppositional’ cultures of resistance. This may be the position of some who argue that boys of Caribbean origin display ‘oppositional cultures’ in relation to schooling (See Modood, 2005 for an overview). The disturbances amongst young people of Caribbean origin in Toxteth, Brixton and Tottenham in 1981 and of Pakistani origin in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford in 2001 may reflect the extreme of this phenomenon.
- Children of ethnic minority immigrants would take on the ‘oppositional’ cultures across ethnic lines

• Community: Many people from immigrant groups settle in similar areas, and organise themselves in a variety of formal and informal ways. Some theory suggests that community formation is an important part of individuals’ success. It is key to the best adaptive strategy within Portes’ segmented assimilation model; ‘selective acculturation’ where the individual remains part of a strong supporting community whilst constructively

engaging with the new society. However this view has been opposed. Jordan and Duvell (2002) focussing on the Turkish community of Hackney in London argue that the insularities and hierarchies of some immigrant communities can stifle many of their members.

One particular debate concerns 'ethnic enclaves', areas of cities where, some argue, ethnic businesses flourish. Typically, similar lines of argument to those about the wider community follow. Some suggest that ethnic enclaves/economies provide important opportunities for individuals to apply their actual human capital rather than being downgraded by the wider economy, and that the enclave provides jobs and opportunities for many more. However, others have argued that the concept often romanticizes a world that provides a springboard for only a few. At the same time they argue, that the enclave can offer exploitative working conditions, low pay and insecurity for many more, as well as keeping them from important integrative benefits of finding work in the wider economy (Foner, 2002 p. 106 see also Sanders and Nee, 1987; Waldinger, 1993; Srinivasan, 1995).

- Ethnic Capital: Modood's notion of ethnic capital develops an explanatory framework which offers a potential link between cultural capital and aspiration and patterns of acculturation (Modood, 2004). Attempting to explain disproportionate participation in, and positive attitudes towards higher education amongst minority ethnic groups, he posits that high levels of aspiration amongst immigrants need to be combined with a context of '*norms reinforcement*' in order for those parental aspirations to be passed from one generation to the next. He argues that there are different cultures into which it is possible to acculturate; 'working class' popular culture or 'middle' class culture of education and mobility. Many parents try and direct their children towards the latter.<sup>21</sup> Qualitative research by Rhamie and Hallam (2002) lends support to this idea. Based on interviews with people of African-Caribbean origin who have successfully navigated the British education system, they suggest one model of success is based on a

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<sup>21</sup> A third possibility could also be for parents to try and guide their children towards an alternative culture, that related to neither 'typical' working nor middle class cultures of mobility; a highly religious lifestyle would be one such path.

supportive family and wider community fostering educational aspirations. They argue that this can compensate for low expectations and resources at school.

#### 2.55 *Gender*

There is evidence of divergent experiences of minority ethnic groups by gender. For example, whilst studies show girls are outperforming boys across all ethnic groups in educational outcomes, they also show that there is a particularly large 'gender gap' amongst pupils of Caribbean origin (Gillborn and Mirza, 2000; Bhattacharyya et al., 2003). Amongst this group, which at the aggregate level has the lowest attainment, it is boys who are the focus of concern for observers (Abbott, 2002). The notion of oppositional cultures is often one half of a polarized debate as to the causes of this phenomenon, whilst others have suggested that the low expectations and stereotyping of 'black' boys in schools has been critical (Jasper and Sewell, 2003).

Another group which has attracted concern has been women of Pakistani origin, seen as having low levels of access to higher education and employment. Arguments have been made that cultural norms and social pressures have maintained low aspiration and commitment to education. Whilst divergent employment outcomes remain, recent research has highlighted the role of child bearing patterns, some convergence of employment rates and the need for a generational analysis to understand the extent to which norms of the First Generation have persisted into the Second (Lindley and Dale, 2004b). Moreover, recent research has shown evidence of highly motivated cohorts among this population (Ahmad et al., 2003). There is now some suggestion that in fact boys of Pakistani origin are facing the more severe difficulties.

#### 2.56 *Other migration factors:*

What has brought the immigrants to their new country? Did they choose to come to improve the lives of themselves or their families or are they refugees forced to leave their home country? Are they planning to stay for a few years or to settle permanently? Have they come with the intention of earning money to send back as remittances to help family at 'home', or are they earning for themselves? The answers to these may have a range of

implications. There will be a resource impact; what they are able to bring with them and the amount of any earnings they have to live off and potentially invest in their new lives. There will also be a psychological and behavioural impact; is the individuals' focus on building and investing in a new life, or is their focus temporary?

To what extent does time in the country impact upon the mobility prospects of children. In terms of language, developing social networks and understanding local cultures and institutions, more time should be beneficial. This could be about age of migration; the younger someone arrived in the UK, the more chances they would have, including perhaps the experience of British schooling. Year of migration may also be important, with an advantage accrued to those who have spent more years in the UK irrespective of age at migration.

## **2.6 Conclusion**

My analysis of the relationship between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes for the children of immigrants draws on a broad literature base. The broad intergenerational mobility literature shows the UK to have been an upwardly mobile society through the 1970s and 1980s in which a changing labour market has created an enlarged middle class with the expansion of professional/managerial opportunities. However, it also points to a society in the UK where, despite some fluidity, there is a large amount of immobility where those from more disadvantaged origins are much more likely to experience disadvantaged destinations and vice versa. This is supported by the life chances literature which shows the strong connections between experiences of child poverty and adult disadvantage on a range of measures.

There has been limited quantitative research on the intergenerational mobility patterns of the Second Generation and minority ethnic groups; however the evidence suggests substantial diversity both between and within groups. Those of Indian origin have accessed more advantaged social class occupations at a higher rate, and those of Caribbean and Pakistani origins have been more disadvantaged. However there are

suggestions that all experience relative exclusion throughout the labour market. Those exploring ethnic effects have found that once educational qualifications have been controlled for, people from minority ethnic groups are more likely to be unemployed. Conversely, taking into account socio-economic background, there is also evidence that they are disproportionately likely to access higher education and the professional/managerial social classes.

The theoretical debate in the US suggests a range of important considerations in trying to hypothesise mobility experiences for the Second Generation. One important aspect of this concerns the impact of changing labour markets, ongoing discrimination and the polarisation of life chances between the inner cities and other areas. Have these factors come together to mean that, whilst some of the Second Generation may experience upward mobility compared to their parents, for others the prospects are worse with a high likelihood of joining the ranks of the urban low paid/non-working poor?

These pictures set up a range of interesting questions about the mobility experiences of the Second Generation. Some of these will be explored in this thesis particularly the respective roles of racial/ethnic origin, social class and resources, migration factors and geography in explaining outcomes and patterns of mobility.

## 3 - Methods, variables and measures

### 3.1 Introduction

This Chapter sets out the analytic process and describes the methods and measures used in the thesis. It begins by describing the main dataset that will be used throughout the analysis, the ONS Longitudinal Study. This is the only dataset that could be used for this kind of study in the UK, and I discuss its key attributes. However, the dataset is clearly not custom designed for my research aims and I discuss some of its drawbacks from the perspective of the research. The Chapter continues with a plan for the analysis covered in the next few chapters. I discuss how the different samples were selected and describe some important choices made in the selection process. The Chapter concludes with a discussion of the three core outcome variables, social class, an index of deprivation and unemployment, which are used in the analysis for drawing some conclusions about the relative advantage and disadvantage experienced by children of immigrants.

### 3.2 The ONS Longitudinal Study

#### 3.2.1 *Description of the data*

The ONS Longitudinal Study (LS) uniquely allows us to begin answering certain questions about the children of immigrants and associations between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes in a UK context. The LS is a dataset based on linking data from successive Censuses and from vital events registration. LS data are analysed under conditions of strict confidentiality and are only released for dissemination as aggregated, non-disclosive tables<sup>22</sup>. The LS contains Census information on an approximate one per cent sample of the usually resident population of England and Wales. The initial sample was selected in 1971, based on four selected dates of birth, and contained over 500,000 people. New sample members (LS members) have been added through the birth registration system, immigration, and further sample selections from

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<sup>22</sup> The Office for National Statistics does not release tables with frequency counts in any cell of between 1 and 3, or tables which would allow calculation of such cells in previously released tables.

subsequent Censuses. The LS currently includes Census data from 1971, 1981, 1991 and as of September 2004, the 2001 Censuses<sup>23</sup>. Data on LS members is linked over time. The LS also includes information on the members' household at a particular census. For example, for a ten year old LS member in 1971 there may also be data for their parents and siblings. In 1991 there would be a greater likelihood of data being available for a spouse and/or children.

### 3.22 *Strengths and weaknesses*

The LS is a data-set uniquely suited for my proposed study. It has several major strengths:

- **Sample size:** Unlike other longitudinal studies and most cross-sectional studies (except for the actual census), the LS has large samples of minority ethnic and immigrant populations. For example, in the 1971 LS there were over 32,000 immigrants (people born outside the UK) aged over 16. The sample size of any group directly reflects its actual size within the population of England and Wales as a whole. This allows analysis of the experience of all sizeable groups, without having to make choices about which groups should be included, as is the case with procedures such as booster samples (used by the Labour Force Survey) or multi-staged stratified samples (used by the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities).
- **Migration status and history:** The LS has census data on whether an individual was born in the UK, and if not, what their country of origin was. If they are an immigrant, the LS also contains year of entry and it is therefore possible to calculate their age at entry. In addition, LS members present at the 1971 Census gave information on their parents' countries of birth. Immigrants and children of immigrants can therefore be identified in the LS.
- **Immigrant and ethnic group:** The combination of country of birth and 'ethnic group' data allows for a uniquely sensitive analysis of immigrant groups in the UK. Although there was no ethnic group question in 1971, if an LS member is present both in 1971 and 1991 their ethnic group can be ascribed back to 1971. Consequently it is

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<sup>23</sup> Data from the 2001 census was incorporated too late into the ONS Longitudinal Study to be included in the thesis.

possible to analyse the populations by country of origin but with sensitivity to self-ascribed ethnic group. For example, immigrants from India in the post-war years may later describe their ethnicity as 'Indian' or as 'white'. These are two very different groups that would, problematically, be put together in an analysis based simply on country of origin. In the LS we are able to separate them. The 2001 census contained a question on religion; which will permit even more sensitive analyses, but it was not available for this research.

- **Longitudinal data:** It is a genuinely prospective longitudinal study following individuals throughout the life course. It therefore enables us to analyse associations between childhood experiences and adult outcomes, and better understand processes of stability and change.
- **Attrition:** The LS is less susceptible to attrition (apart from natural attrition due to migration and mortality), than other longitudinal datasets due to the compulsory nature of the census. However, there are issues connected to non-enumeration, the under-counting of particular groups in the 1991 census. The issue of attrition is discussed further in Chapter 8.

For these reasons, the LS is an excellent resource for beginning to address the questions of this research. The only other mature longitudinal data-sets which follow children into adulthood in the UK are the 1958 National Child Development Study and the 1970 British Cohort Study, but they only contain very small numbers of minority ethnic groups.

However, there are also drawbacks. It is important to recognise some constraints of the use of the LS for the purposes of this research. The LS provides a snapshot of individuals' lives on a single day every ten years, and is therefore insensitive to the more dynamic aspects of people's lives. Also the census does not contain ideal variables for measuring social disadvantage. Whilst there are several indicators of socio-economic position, the LS does not include data on income or the full range of educational qualifications (although the 2001 census does have detailed education data).

Neither the US-based Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study nor the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities in the UK would be appropriate for my research. For a start the former is US based and participants are still in their youth. The latter is not longitudinal and is focussed on specific minority ethnic groups. Yet both contain questions that would serve my study aims well. The Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study focuses on issues such as the background of immigrant parents in their country of origin, aspirations and values. Both surveys contain data on critical domains related to immigrant incorporation such as experiences of racism, language capabilities and the role of co-ethnic communities in individuals' lives. Absence of this data from the LS limits the scope of my analysis and my ability to paint a fully rounded picture of the trajectories of the children of immigrants.

### **3.3 Plan and Rationale of the Analysis**

#### *3.3.1 The order of analysis*

The analysis begins in Chapter 4 with a cross-sectional analysis of the immigrant population of England and Wales in 1971. It uses data from the LS in conjunction with the wider literature to infer some broad hypotheses about the patterns of outcomes and mobility that may be expected for the children of immigrants over the twenty year period to 1991. Chapter 5 is a survey of outcomes of the children of immigrants in 1991 looking at a range of demographic, geographic and socio-economic outcomes. It focuses on three key outcomes: social class, unemployment and an Index of Deprivation, discussed further below. Following this, in Chapters 6 and 7, the focus moves to the connection between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes. It is here that I try to discern the relationship between childhood circumstances and outcomes relating to relative advantage and disadvantage in early adulthood. Below I discuss some important features of the analyses contained in these chapters.

#### *3.3.2 Why the 1971 baseline focuses not on parents but all immigrants?*

Chapter 4 focuses on the situation of all immigrants in England and Wales in 1971 aged sixteen and over, whereas later chapters concentrate on the situation of those households

containing the sample to be followed from 1971 to 1991. The latter population is clearly of critical importance in a study of the relationship between parental circumstances and child outcomes, and its characteristics will be brought out in that aspect of the study. However, it is the immigrant population as a whole that represents the baseline from which hypotheses about Second Generation trajectories should be prospectively drawn rather than merely just parents. The focus on the immigrant population as a whole can give a broader sense of any generational shift in the situation of immigrants and their descendants within UK society. The alternative, although clearer analytically from one perspective, would leave certain questions that I hope to examine, unanswered.

### *3.33 Why focus on the immigrant or Second Generation population as a whole?*

At each stage of the analysis of Second Generation outcomes, I first consider the situation of the Second Generation as a whole, before analysing them by individual origin group. As would be assumed, there is great diversity within the Second Generation population on demographic and socio-economic characteristics. We know from the wider literature of the heterogeneity that exists within and between minority ethnic groups. So why look at immigrants or the Second Generation as a whole, when we know that this just hides a great deal of diversity? The reason for doing so is that discussion of immigrants at the aggregate level is commonplace within political, policy and popular discourses. Discussion often follows the lines of '*what are the consequences of migration for the UK?*', or '*how do immigrants contribute to or integrate into the society?*' Within these discussions, particular groups of immigrants are discussed but often especially outside of academic discussions it is simply the immigrant population per se, which is the focus. It is important to engage with, and contribute to, such discussions and in order to do so it is necessary to look at the data through the appropriate lens. Moreover, such an approach should not be seen as pandering to the superficial discourse of policy or political worlds.

Firstly, as has been discussed throughout the Chapters so far, there are many problems with the discourse at the academic level, especially with the level of categorisation that exists that neglects within group diversity of origin and experience. Furthermore to discuss the aggregate immigrant experience of a generation, encompassing as it does migrants from all over the world with a range of pasts, reasons for coming and experiences of settlement is useful. This is on the condition that it takes the rounded view of migration rather than the racialized view, which characterises much of the discourse. Of course, the story told remains historically contingent. The aggregate experiences of these children of immigrants will be a product of the immigrant story of that particular generation.

### *3.34 The importance of the control group*

One of the premier tools those researching immigrant incorporation have for understanding Second Generation trajectories is the, previously mentioned, Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study, an enormous undertaking following Second Generation populations in Southern Florida and California. It is the basis for much work in recent years and the data from the study forms the backbone of the Segmented Assimilation Hypothesis, discussed in the previous Chapter. However, this study has been criticised at a fundamental level by other researchers for lacking a control group (Kasinitz et al., 2002). How can we understand what processes are related to the migration process and what simply correspond to secular trends if we do not follow the wider non-immigrant origin population as well? Moreover how do we make sense of the patterns observed if they cannot be benchmarked to the wider society?

For this reason the matching sample of children of UK-born parents is a key component of the story that I tell in this thesis. By looking at them alongside the Second Generation we can better understand how the latter group have fared, where there are differences in the trajectories, understand why those have arisen. At the same time, it may even be possible that whilst the children of UK-born parents are used to better understand the experiences of the Second Generation, understanding the intergenerational mobility

patterns of children of immigrants can shed some light on the experiences of the children of UK-born parents themselves.

### **3.4 Constructing the study populations**

The LS is a large data set and a study population has to be defined and extracted from it. Inevitably, the definition of that study population reflects decisions about how to answer the research question; the definition must reflect the central interests of the research. The more that the study population can be narrowed removing elements that may be interesting but extraneous, the greater clarity of analysis will be possible. However, the desire to narrow the study population must be balanced with maintaining adequate sample sizes. This is an issue which continually confounds quantitative research on immigrants and minority ethnic groups. Whilst the LS is a unique resource because of its large sample size, once the study population begins to be narrowed samples sizes for each immigrant group can become small. Choices needed to be made between the analytical clarity and focus of the study, and the analytic limitations imposed by small numbers.

The grouping of people has a range of causes and consequences, both analytical and political. As discussed in Chapter 1 ‘standard’ minority ethnic groups used in British discourse such as ‘Black Africans’, ‘East African Asians’, ‘Irish’ and ‘Pakistani & Bangladeshis’ range enormously as to the nature of the particular, national and supranational, ethnic and religious boundaries that they draw upon. Categorisation by its very nature simplifies. Researchers need to strike a balance between over categorisation with the consequences of not being able to explain whichever phenomena are being investigated and under categorisation, which can result in inadequate explanations that appear to draw conclusions about populations which have mistakenly been put together. It is a process constrained by the data being used, and especially two aspects: the numbers in the sample and what is known about the individuals.

The LS is better equipped than other datasets in both these regards. It is a very large random sample, with relatively large numbers for a wide range of immigrant groups.

Moreover, it has data on both country of origin and ethnicity. Once the 2001 data has been incorporated it will have data on religion as well. In constructing the immigrant groups for this study I too conflate national and ethnic boundaries, attempting to construct meaningful groups which will allow analysis. I use a notion of 'origin groups', not entirely based on country of origin or ethnicity, but a combination of the two. The way in which it is done reflects my own prejudices about what are the most important kinds of homogeneity, but at the same time it is consonant with normative approaches.

### *3.41 The 1971 study population*

The 1971 cross-sectional study focuses on the adult immigrant population and therefore considers all persons aged sixteen and over. The first stage in creating the 1971 study population was to use individuals' 'country of birth'. These were amalgamated into eight groups. Two of these were single countries, India and the Republic of Ireland. Europe was divided into two; Southern Europe<sup>24</sup> being evenly divided amongst a few countries, whilst Eastern Europe<sup>25</sup> consisted mostly of Russians and Poles. In the 1971 census 'Pakistan' incorporates Bangladesh (which only became independent that year). The English speaking Caribbean countries were put together, as is standard. Old Commonwealth & USA<sup>26</sup> born comprises those from English speaking, 'Western' countries. East Africa is all those from countries in that region.

At this stage, the 'ethnic group' question was used. Ascribing ethnic group to individuals in 1971, based on 1991 data, relies on certain assumptions. It assumes that people do not change their ethnicity over a twenty period and can only be done for those people successfully traced in 1971 and 1991. It may well be wrong to assume that people do not change their stated ethnicity over a twenty year period. However, the two changes that seem most likely should not impact upon this analysis. Children of immigrants may self-ascribe differently from how their parents defined them, but the 1971 cross-sectional analysis in Chapter 8 is not an analysis of children of immigrants. A further possibility is that over the period of two decades someone may change their self-ascribed ethnicity, for

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24 Spain; Italy; Malta; Cyprus; Turkey

25 Austria; Hungary; Poland; USSR

26 Australia; New Zealand; South Africa; Canada

example, from Black-Caribbean to Black-British, or Indian to Asian-British. However it would be more surprising if an individual changed from 'Black Caribbean' to 'White British' or vice versa, and it this kind of change that would cause problems for my approach to classification.

Using the 'ethnic group' question, it is possible to refine some of the original groups. There is a large group of people from the Caribbean, India, Pakistan and East Africa whose ethnic group is 'White British'. With the independence from British colonial rule that occurred in many countries in the decades preceding 1971, (e.g. India and Pakistan in 1947, Jamaica in 1962, Kenya and Zambia in 1963 and Barbados in 1966), came the return<sup>27</sup> to the UK of many who formed part of the colonial infrastructure, or who had created homes in these former colonies and decided to return to the UK. It makes no sense to characterise these people in the same way as the majorities coming from those countries.<sup>28</sup> They are therefore taken out and put in a category of their own, referred to as 'White New Commonwealth'. The numbers of these immigrants are shown in Table 3.1.<sup>29</sup>

**Table 3.1 Number of Immigrants of 'White' Ethnic Group from particular countries of origin**

<i>Country of Birth</i>	<i>Self-Defined 'White' Ethnic Group (n=)</i>
Caribbean	142
India	563
Pakistan	78
East Africa	151

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Another area where attention is required is the 'Pakistan and Bangladesh' group. The LS in 1971 classifies them as one group, indeed Bangladesh only came into existence as an independent state in 1971. Yet when this group is looked at in terms of their ethnic origin (using 1991 data) fewer than one in ten people describe themselves as Bangladeshi origin. Therefore to call this group 'Pakistani and Bangladeshi' would essentially be a misclassification; it is almost entirely Pakistani. These two populations are placed

27 Perhaps after several generations


28 This is the point made by Berthoud et al (1997) in arguing against the use of 'country of birth' as an indicator.

29 Those not successfully traced to 1991 could not be given an ascribed ethnicity.


together in many analyses. Yet there are major differences that are often overlooked when they are conflated in analyses. For example they have radically different patterns of settlement in the UK as shown in Figure 3.1 and

Figure 3.2. Whilst 64% of Bangladeshis lived in London and the South-East in 1991, just 30% of Pakistanis did. At the same time 63% of Pakistanis lived in the North and Midlands, compared to 31% of Bangladeshis. There is also evidence of divergent outcomes in areas such as education (DfES Research & Statistics, 2005). They are therefore separated and, as the group of Bangladeshi origin is so small, they are placed in the residual 'other' category.

**Figure 3.1** Pakistani population by regions of residence in 1991; all ages



**Figure 3.2** Bangladeshi population by regions of residence in 1991; all ages



Source: Sample of Anonymised Records (1991) Own calculations

The population from East Africa is comprised mostly of those whose ethnic origin is South Asian rather than Black African. This reflects the migration of East African Asians to the UK around the end of the 1960s and early 1970s that would later include the largest group from Uganda, but also saw many coming from Malawi and Kenya. This population group was significantly larger in the UK in 1971 than any Black African groups.

Some final refinement of the data, removing visitors for example, leaves a sample population of immigrants. This is shown in Table 3.2. By far the largest origin group – almost one quarter of all immigrants – were from Ireland. The next largest groups were those from India, followed closely by those from Southern Europe, the Caribbean and Eastern Europe. Approximately six percent of immigrants were from both Pakistan and Old Commonwealth countries and the USA. There were small proportions of East African Asians and ‘white’ immigrants from New Commonwealth countries. The relative prominence of immigrants from Ireland, the rest of Europe, and the Old Commonwealth and USA is interesting in the light of the typical migration discourse in the UK, discussed in Chapter 1, so often focussed on particular minority ethnic groups. The ‘Other countries’ category is not analysed as an individual group but its numbers are included when I refer to all immigrants. It is comprised of a very wide range of origins including large numbers from Western European, African and East Asian countries.

**Table 3.2** Percentage immigrants in each ‘origin group’ in 1971; all aged 16+

	%	N
Ireland	24.1	7,809
Other countries	19.1	6,199
India	11.9	3,867
Southern Europe	9.6	3,126
Caribbean	9.5	3,082
Eastern Europe	9.5	3,077
Old Commonwealth and USA	6.2	2,012
Pakistan	5.7	1,841
White New Commonwealth	2.7	868
East African Asian	1.7	535

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

### 3.42 The Second Generation study population; 1971-1991

#### 3.421 Factors in creating the Second Generation study population

I now turn to the construction of the Second Generation sample. This required consideration of a broad range of factors not just connected to origin group, but also what is meant by 'Second Generation' and a 'child of immigrants'. Although the LS contains information for both LS members and co-household members, for the longitudinal analysis, only data on LS members was used as only their information was linked from census to census. Data on co-household members was not linked over time. The tension between sample size and clarity of analysis was a recurring issue in deciding how to answer a range of important population selection questions:

- *How old should the children be in 1971?* The children must be living with their parents in 1971 in order to have the background parental characteristics necessary for the study of childhood precursors of adult outcomes. Therefore the upper age limit for the children was set at 16. Platt (2005a), using the same dataset to study intergenerational mobility, included only those children aged 8-16 in 1971. From a certain perspective that age range is preferable. In 1991, those aged 0-7 in 1971, were aged 20-27; a proportion of these still studying and all at the beginning of their career paths. However just including those aged 8-16 in 1971 severely limits the sample size. I choose rather to use all aged 0-16. Following this study, 2001 data will be available when the study population will be aged 30-46. Thus the current study can exploit the full potential sample, while conscious of important age issues, many of which can be fully addressed by a follow up study.
- *One immigrant parent or two?* The analysis focuses on those with two immigrant parents, both of whom are from the same origin group. Both of these decisions reduce the sample sizes but are critical to the clarity of the analysis. Although many Second Generation studies look at those with 'at least one immigrant parent'<sup>30</sup> there is increasing evidence that the trajectories of those with one immigrant parent and one native parent

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<sup>30</sup> Those with one immigrant parent are sometimes, rather confusingly, referred to as the 2.5 generation

are different from those with two immigrant parents (Jensen, 2001; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Ramakrishnan, 2004; Rumbaut, 2004). Moreover, this finding is entirely in line with much of the theoretical arguments about the important influence on immigrant and Second Generation trajectories. With only one immigrant parent it becomes very hard to distinguish potential migration and origin-group related factors on outcomes for the Second Generation. I explore the similarities and differences between those with one, and two immigrant parents in Chapter 8.

The study is looking at those with two immigrant parents from the same 'immigrant group'. This choice clearly leaves out an aspect of the wider migration story. For example, as becomes clear in the Chapter 4, endogamy is near universal for some groups but more uncommon for others. However, if one of the ideas being tested in this thesis is the relative salience of origin group on Second Generation trajectories then it would become very difficult to disentangle effects for children with parents from distinct origins. Furthermore, the proportions with two immigrant parents from distinct origin groups in 1971 are small, and the origins diverse. They would therefore be difficult to study using LS data.

- *Other issues:* There were some other characteristics that the study population needed to meet. Only those LS members living with one or two parents were included so that information on LS members' parents was available. The Second Generation are generally considered those who are born in the country in which their parents settle. Second generation analyses tend to include an element of what is referred to as the 1.5 generation: that is, children of immigrants who spent some of their years outside the country they migrated to. The cut off point for this is not agreed. However this study takes the most conservative line, including only those who arrived in the UK aged four or below as they would receive all of their schooling in the UK (Heath and McMahon, 2005).

There is also a comparison group selected from the LS: this comprised UK-born LS members aged 16 or under at the 1971 census, living with at least one parent, where neither parent is an immigrant. They are referred to in the thesis as COUKBs (Children Of UK-born parents).

All individuals in the Second Generation groups and the COUKB sample must also be successfully linked to the LS sample from the 1991 Census. Although there is relatively low attrition in the LS, there other reasons why people may not be present in 1991, death, emigration and non-enumeration. This issue is addressed further in Chapter 8.

### 3.422 The Second Generation groups

There are fewer origin groups in the Second Generation component of the study than in the cross-sectional study of immigrants in 1971. The Second Generation study focuses on seven 'Second Generation origin groups', the relative sizes of which can be seen in Table 3.3.

**Table 3.3 The Second Generation Groups aged 0-16 in 1971, traced to 1991**

	%	N=
Ireland	37	1,383
Eastern Europe	6	215
Southern Europe	10	378
Caribbean	26	968
India	12	455
Pakistan	4	166
White English Speaking	4	161

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

The groups are derived by parents' country of birth from the 1971 Census and self-ascribed ethnicity from the 1991 Census. *Ireland* consists of those just from the Republic; the *Caribbean*, *India* and *Pakistan* groups are all from those places except those who self-define as 'White UK' or specifically in the case of Pakistan those who describe themselves as 'Bangladeshi'<sup>31</sup>. *Southern Europe* comprises people mostly from

<sup>31</sup> Pakistan and Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) are jointly coded in the 1971 LS country of birth variable.

Italy and Cyprus<sup>32</sup>, whilst *Eastern Europe* is predominantly Russians and Poles. The ‘White’ *English Speaking* group combines the *Old Commonwealth and USA* and ‘White’ *New Commonwealth* groups from the 1971 cross-sectional analysis. The *East African Asian* group was placed in the residual ‘other’ category as it was too small to be analysed separately. The ‘other’ category is not used in the research as it is extremely diverse and lacks any coherent meaning as a group. However its members are included in the analysis when the focussing on the Second Generation as a whole.

### **3.5 Variables and measures of disadvantage and advantage**

Whilst the census has proved a good source for identifying area deprivation and disadvantage, (albeit not without controversy, see Chalmers, 2001), it is less good for identifying disadvantaged individuals. However, it does contain many area-level, household-level and individual-level variables that could be used to measure disadvantage: access to basic household amenities; access to a car; residence in a deprived area; early parenthood; economic inactivity; educational qualifications; household overcrowding; housing tenure; lone parenthood, social class and unemployment. All of these were analysed as origins and outcomes for the Second Generation. As well as contributing to an overall picture of relative advantage/disadvantage, each on its own is of substantive interest and helps develop a rounded picture of the socio-economic and demographic position of the Second Generation in early adulthood.

However the intergenerational analysis needed to be more streamlined. This means selecting variables that best meet certain criteria and which complemented each other and could help create a triangulated picture. The criteria for judging appropriateness were:

- To what extent does the variable indicate, or act as a good proxy for, an aspect of socio-economic disadvantage?
- Can the results be related to previous research in the field?

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<sup>32</sup> Southern Europe: Italy, Spain; Malta; Cyprus; Turkey  
Eastern Europe: USSR, Poland, Hungary, Austria

- What constraints are placed on the efficacy of the variable by the particular study population?

Of the possible variables. I decided that four would not be used as part of the intergenerational analysis in Chapters 6 and 7. These were, having a higher qualification, having a limiting long-term illness, lone parenthood and early motherhood.

- With changes in the labour market in recent decades, *educational qualifications* are an increasingly important and nuanced indicator of social position and relative disadvantage (Carr-Hill and Chalmers-Dixon, 2003). However the 1991 census only asked about 'Higher Qualifications' (post-18). As a result, only 17% of 20-36 year olds had such qualifications (1991 SARS, own calculations)<sup>33</sup> lack of such higher qualifications clearly does not equate with significant social disadvantage.<sup>34</sup>
- *Limiting long-term illness* is an aspect of wider disadvantage, and whilst there is an extensive literature on health inequalities and specifically the relationship between limiting long term illness and social disadvantage (Harding, 2003) issues of aetiology, diverge from the central thrust of this research, concerned with social disadvantage.
- *Lone parenthood and early parenthood* are phenomena that are both intrinsically economically disadvantaging (e.g. the inability to provide two incomes or to complete education) and are also associated with, and therefore act as a proxy for, disadvantage in the UK. Moreover there is also a wide literature on these subjects. However the nature of the study population makes the use of these measures less viable. Firstly, with small sample sizes for many of the groups, choosing an outcome such as lone parenthood, that focuses on less than half of the sample – places constraints on the multivariate analyses. More importantly, the proxy aspects of both phenomena may be misplaced in the context of studying immigrant and minority ethnic populations. The delayed child rearing that is characteristic of many in the UK is not shared by many immigrants, especially those from South Asia (Berthoud, 2001). Robson and Berthoud (2003) have shown that unlike 'white' women, for whom early motherhood is associated with significant disadvantage,

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33 A further 4% were students

34 This is a possible variable for measuring relative advantage/prosperity

for Pakistani women it has no significant effect and for Indian women only a marginal one.

Likewise lone parenthood is widespread amongst African-Caribbean women (and very uncommon among South Asians) and may not be associated with certain aspects of social disadvantage in the same way as it may be in the wider population (Duncan and Edwards, 1997). Its social origins are based in different traditions of family formation and structure in Caribbean countries (Berthoud and Beishon, 1997). Table 3.4 shows the higher proportions of lone parent families in Caribbean households than in 'White' UK ones. It also shows that whilst 'White' households have a higher social class profile than the Black-Caribbean population in general, this is substantially reversed amongst lone parents. The class profiles of multi and lone parent household are very different among the 'White' population but broadly similar among the Caribbean population. In some groups, the intrinsic disadvantage associated with phenomena such as lone and early parenthood, may also be mediated by different attitudes and behaviours towards communal or multi-generational support (EOC, 2003), although this should not be overstated (SSI, 1998).

**Table 3.4 Social Class by household type (Lone Parent and Multi-parent households) and ethnic group ('White' and Black-Caribbean), all aged 20-36**

		White		Caribbean	
		Multi-Parent Household	Lone Parent Household	Multi-Parent Household	Lone Parent Household
% Social Class of head of household	i/ii	35	18	29	26
	iiin/m	49	49	54	51
	iv/v	17	33	17	23
		Column total (%)	100	100	100
		n=	90,619	9326	432

Source: 1991 Sample of Anonymised Records (authors' own calculations)

<sup>1</sup> i/ii Professional/Managerial; iiin/m skilled non-manual/manual; iv/v semi-skilled/unskilled

### 3.51 The variables analysed: social class

Social class is an important if contested tool for analysing social stratification (Rose, 1998). There is a large literature on intergenerational social mobility using social class as its core outcome variable, and the limited amount of work on minority ethnic groups' mobility has almost entirely used social class (see previous Chapter). A new official social class schema has been devised for the 2001 census (Rose and Pevalin, 2003), the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classification (NS-SEC). Consistent with previous studies of minority ethnic mobility using the LS, the analysis in this thesis uses the older Social Class based on Occupation, formerly known as the *Registrar General's Social Class schema* (Robinson, 1990c; Robinson, 1996; Valen, 2000). Social Class based on occupation has been criticised both for its lack of a theoretical underpinning and its weakness in responding to the changing nature of occupations over time (Elias, 1997). This has led to some sociologists in the field of mobility to use the Goldthorpe class schema and latterly the creation of the NS-SEC.

Social Class in this research is based on current or last occupation and individuals are given either their social class or their spouse's if that is higher. The schema is grouped into three categories: Social Classes 'i' and 'ii' – 'Professional' and 'Managerial', 'iin' and 'iim' - 'Skilled non manual' and 'Skilled manual' and 'iv' and 'v' – 'Semi-skilled' and 'Unskilled'. Having a social class of iv or v indicates one aspect of social disadvantage. One problem which emerged was missing social class data for some individuals. This was strongly associated with unemployment, increasingly recognised as a problem for mobility studies (Miller, 1998). Given the age group - early adulthood - and that 1991 was a time of high youth unemployment, this may indicate people who have never had a job. People unemployed and without a social class, are included in the schema in a category called 'inactive'. In the multivariate analyses this category is considered to be associated with disadvantage alongside social class iv/v.

A further problem resulted from the age range of the study population as it contained a small proportion of students. It was necessary to find a way of meaningfully coding

them. A test of the social class of older members of the study population who had higher degrees revealed that the overwhelming majority were in social class i/ii (see Table 3.5). The single exception was Second Generation Indian women. However 67% of this group were in social class i/ii, still a very high proportion. Students are therefore coded in Social Class i/ii, whilst acknowledging the risk that this could marginally inflate the proportions in this class.

**Table 3.5 Social Class of those aged 24-36 with higher qualifications, 1991**

	Men (%)		Women (%)		n=	
	Social Class i/ii	Social Class iiin/m/iv/v/inactive	Social Class i/ii	Social Class iiin/m/iv/v/inactive		
Second Generation Origin Group	UK-born	84	16	90	10	11,865
	Ireland	86	14	90	10	179
	Eastern Europe	78	23	87	13	87
	Caribbean	75	25	82	18	79
	India	86	14	67	33	47

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

### 3.52 Unemployment

The second outcome focused on is ‘unemployment’, defined as those out of work but ‘*unemployed and looking for a job*’ or ‘actively seeking work’ rather than a broader notion of economic inactivity. Whilst economic inactivity is an important indicator of social disadvantage, it is reflected in the social class data (as discussed above). Those neither ‘in work’ nor ‘actively seeking work’ are excluded from the analysis when looking at this outcome.

In looking at unemployment it will be possible to build on some of the ‘ethnic effects’ literature discussed in the previous Chapter. Studies such as Heath and McMahon (1997) have been concerned with explaining why people from certain minority ethnic groups are often found to have differential employment rates, even after controlling for educational attainment and other background characteristics. This may give an insight into discrimination that certain Second Generation groups might experience, although the meaning of ‘ethnic effects’ is more complicated than this. One weakness with unemployment as an indicator is its particularly gendered nature. Women who are out of

work are much more likely to be defined as 'economically inactive'<sup>35</sup> than men who are more likely to be 'actively seeking work'.

### 3.53 *Index of deprivation*

Both the indicators above describe someone's relative advantage/disadvantage in relation to their labour market position; where on the occupational hierarchy they or their family sit, and whether they are successfully accessing work. As such, they focus on one aspect of disadvantage. However, several of the other possible variables give an insight into peoples' actual purchasing power; access to a car; access to basic household amenities (e.g. central heating); owner occupation; household overcrowding and living in a deprived area.

Yet each variable, taken alone as an indicator of relative advantage or disadvantage, may be problematic. For example, as Table 3.6 shows, the meaning of owner occupation may be different for those of Pakistani origin than it is for other groups. For this group it is associated with high levels of overcrowding and it may not be a particular indicator of relative advantage. Similarly, household access to a car is often used as an indicator of affluence although car ownership in major urban areas and particularly London may be more of a luxury than in less densely populated areas with worse public transport where it is a greater necessity. With such a high proportion of immigrant groups living in urban areas, access to a car is likely to be unsuitable as a sole indicator of deprivation. Indeed, because no indicator solely reflects deprivation I chose to combine these variables into an Index of Deprivation.

**Table 3.6 Household Density by selected immigrant groups among owner occupiers , all aged 20-36**

		Household Density (people per room)					Row total (%)
		up to 0.5	0.5 - 0.7	0.75 – 1	1-1.5	over 1.5	
%	'White' UK-born	46	31	21	2	0	100
Ethnic Group	'Black' Caribbean	41	32	23	4	1	100
	Pakistani	13	18	34	24	10	100

Source: 1991 Sample of Anonymised Records (author's own calculations)

<sup>35</sup> I recognise concerns about the expression 'economic inactivity' which devalues the unpaid contribution of many including those involved in caring for young, old, sick and disabled.

One way of constructing an Index is through techniques such as Principal Components or Factor Analysis; taking a series of variables and attempting to find the underlying relationships between them. However correlations amongst the possible variables revealed that they were not of an order of magnitude to make such an analysis worthwhile. Instead, I use what Bradshaw and Finch (2003) refer to as the cumulative approach in developing their notion of 'core poverty', also used by Harding and Balarajan (2003) to create an Index of Deprivation. Bradshaw and Finch's work starts from the idea that several of the main indicators of poverty used in the UK, correlate poorly with each other; the poor populations they describe, have surprisingly little overlap. They argue convincingly that a simple accumulation of the number of indicators on which someone is poor is the best way of identifying those most likely to be the most poor.

This approach is open to criticism on the grounds that it weights different variables equally (is not having access to a car equivalent to not having an inside toilet?) and that it considers people who are different to be part of the same population. However, it is a pragmatic response to imperfect variables and measures. In the case of the variables in the ONS Longitudinal Study, it is known that more often those who live in owner occupied homes are more affluent than those in rented accommodation, however clearly renting is not a precise indicator of social disadvantage. For example, there are many people in the 20-36 age range who are socially advantaged but have not yet climbed onto the 'property ladder'. Likewise, especially when considering certain minority ethnic groups, owner-occupation no more confirms affluence. However to take five dichotomous variables and say that if someone is lacking on three or four they are more likely to be more socially disadvantaged than someone who lacks zero or one seems highly plausible.


The Index therefore takes the five variables mentioned above, and codes them as shown in Table 3.7. An individual scoring two or below is in the 'most deprived' group; those scoring five are in the 'least deprived' group.

**Table 3.7 Coding for the Index of Deprivation**

	Score	
	Yes	No
Household has access to a car	1	0
Lives in owner-occupied housing	1	0
Has sole access to all basic household amenities	1	0
Does not live in the quartile of most deprived neighbourhoods	1	0
Does not live in the quartile of most overcrowded housing	1	0

In order to be confident that this provides an appropriate measure of relative advantage and disadvantage, the Index of Deprivation was tested. The measures that comprise the Index of Deprivation are indicators of consumption and expenditure; they are all items that can be purchased. If the measure is indicative of relative advantage and disadvantage there should be some relationship with indicators of potential income generation. Figure 3.3 shows the relationship of outcomes on the Index of Deprivation in 1991 with social class, household type and unemployment in 1991. As is evident, very small proportions of those who are in social class i/ii are also in the 'most deprived' category, and the proportion rises as the social class status becomes more disadvantaged. The reverse is true for the proportion who are in the 'least deprived' category. One quarter of those in lone parent families are 'most deprived' compared to 16% of those in multi-parent households. The distinction between those in work and unemployed is very large; amongst those in work, 11% are in the 'most deprived' category and 42% 'least deprived', compared to 38% and 19% of the unemployed.

Figure 3.3 Index of Deprivation by Social Class, Household Type and Employment Status;  
Whole study population in 1991



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Table 3.8 shows the results of a logistic regression model which estimates the probabilities of these explanatory variables predicting being in the 'most deprived' and 'least deprived' categories, the outcome measures that will be used later in the analysis. In this multivariate context, the relationships remain strong, and highly significant. Those in social classes iv/v and inactive are approximately much less likely than those social class i/ii to be 'least deprived' and far more likely to be 'most deprived'. Those in multi-parent households are more likely to be 'least deprived' and less likely to 'most deprived'. Those 'actively seeking work' are less likely than those 'in work' to be 'least deprived' and much more likely to be 'most deprived'.

The Index of Deprivation therefore appears to be a robust, sensitive and meaningful indicator of relative advantage and disadvantage.

Table 3.8 Results from Logistic Regression model: relationship between social class, unemployment and household with Index of Deprivation in 1991; full study

	Least Deprived				Most Deprived			
	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval			Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval		
Skilled n/m	0.55	***	0.53	0.57	2.36	***	2.22	2.49
Semi/unskilled	0.27	***	0.25	0.28	5.09	***	4.77	5.43
Inactive	0.24	***	0.21	0.29	5.59	***	4.95	6.31
Multi-Parent	1.45	***	1.35	1.55	0.64	***	0.59	0.70
Actively Seeking Work	0.44	***	0.42	0.47	3.42	***	3.23	3.62
Observations	80753				80753			
P > chi <sup>2</sup>	***				***			

\*\*\* p<0.01

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

### 3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has set out the analytical plan for the thesis. The ONS Longitudinal Study is a dataset offering unique possibilities for investigating the connection between childhood characteristics and adult outcomes for the children of immigrants to the UK. With the broad range of immigrant origin groups that it is possible to include in the study, and a careful selection of different outcome measures, I intend to utilise it to answer some of the questions laid out in Chapters 1 and 2.

## **4 - The Immigrant Population in 1971**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The primary focus of this research is the Second Generation, their destinations in adulthood, and what best predicts their pathways into relative social advantage or disadvantage. This can be done by looking at socio-economic outcomes in 1991, and modelling various aspects of the relationship between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes, examining different factors such as ethnicity, social class and place of residence. This is the approach taken in the subsequent chapters. However, before considering outcomes for children of immigrants it is important to look at the situation of their parents, and the wider immigrant population. In doing this, it will be possible to consider what outcomes might be expected for the Second Generation. Once outcomes have been analysed, our understanding of the situation of the immigrants in 1971 may enhance our ability to explain the intergenerational processes observed. That is the purpose of this chapter, setting the scene and drawing out general hypotheses for the trajectories of the Second Generation.

The ONS Longitudinal Study, as already mentioned, has some major strengths and weaknesses. This is very much the case for exploring the circumstances of immigrant populations in 1971. The LS contains data about their contemporary socio-economic and household circumstances. It has information on individuals' country of origin, their self-defined ethnicity (ascribed back from the 1991 census) and when they arrived in the UK. However, there are important data that it does not provide. This research takes the perspective that experiences of the Second Generation are likely to be mediated by their parents total migration experience; their pre-migration characteristics, what led them out of their country of origin and to the UK, and how they settled and were received upon arrival. We do not have data in the LS that measures all the potentially relevant factors. We do not know from the LS about individuals' English language abilities, nor the communal infrastructure that people were able to draw support from. Racism and discrimination may have a considerable impact on immigrants' experiences but the LS

offers no way of measuring this (although phenomena such as ethnic penalties in unemployment may be an indicator).

As a result, whilst Chapter 4 is centred on a cross-sectional analysis using 1971 data from the LS, it continues to draw on the wider literature to add value to the picture that can be drawn of the immigrant population in 1971. This is mostly research that focuses on the ‘minority ethnic’ groups as discussed in Chapter 1; those from India, the Caribbean, Pakistan and Ireland. Whilst the lens of ‘immigrants and the Second Generation’ differs from the typical minority ethnic group focus, this latter perspective is the pre-existing and ongoing research context in which my work sits.

This Chapter is split into four main sections. Firstly, I briefly describe the origins of the different immigrant groups; their situation in their country of origin, and the circumstances surrounding their waves of immigration to the UK. I then turn to data from the ONS Longitudinal Study. I begin by looking at some basic characteristics, including when they arrived in the UK, and their age and sex profiles. Following this, I consider how they settled, considering their household situation, regions and the type of neighbourhoods. Finally, I examine their socio-economic circumstances on a range of outcomes. The analysis mostly considers those aged 16 and over.

At the end of the Chapter I draw together this baseline data with the conceptual, contextual, and methodological literatures discussed in Chapter 2. In doing so, I hypothesise how different factors may impact upon the trajectories of children of immigrants, and what may be the cumulative effect of these factors on aggregate group outcomes for the Second Generation.

As described in the previous Chapter, the groups that I focus on in this Chapter are as follows:

**Table 4.1 Percentage of immigrants in each 'origin group' in 1971; all LS members aged 16+**

	% of total	n=
Ireland	29.8	7,809
India	14.7	3,867
Southern Europe	11.9	3,126
Caribbean	11.8	3,082
Eastern Europe	11.7	3,077
Old Commonwealth & USA	7.7	2,012
Pakistan	7.0	1,841
'White' New Commonwealth	3.3	868
East African Asian	2.0	535

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

## 4.2 The Immigrant Population in 1971

### 4.21 Who were they before they came?

Migration is a subject about which it is easy to take a myopic view. It is tempting...to regard migrant populations as more homogenous than they really are, and also to focus on the proximate end of the migratory flow, so ignoring its geographically distant source.

(Ballard, 1983 p. 117)

Before considering what 1971 census data in the LS has to say about the immigrant population of that time, it is useful to briefly consider what is known about these different groups prior to their arrival in the UK. What baggage did they bring with them? What kinds of human, social or cultural capital may they have had to draw upon?

At the same time, significant limitations are imposed on answering these questions by the existing literature. For reasons discussed in Chapter 1, there are not many studies of the migrations of these groups, and very little comprehensive, quantitative research sampling whole immigrant group populations and exploring pre-migration characteristics. What exists, however, for certain groups is a significant amount of research, much taking a case study approach, and some involving data collection, even if not through random sampling techniques (and consequently, not necessarily representative). The number of studies

varies enormously between different groups. For most of the 'white' groups, there has been comparatively little research.

Migration is often discussed in terms of 'push' and 'pull' factors, what makes people want or need to leave their country of origin, and what brings them to a specific place (Schoorl et al., 2000). There are a wide range of factors that operate as pushes, however, for almost all the immigrants in this research, their migration was, at least in some sense, voluntary. The exception may well be some of the East African Asians and Eastern Europeans, although the major proportion of the former group, the Ugandan Asian refugee population are not in this dataset, as their arrival in the UK followed the taking of the 1971 census. For some immigrants, it appears to be just chance that brought them to the UK. However for most people, there were specific pulls.

Firstly, many of the immigrants were Commonwealth citizens, who had full migration rights prior to the Commonwealth Immigration Acts. Initially came 'pioneer migrants' with certain connections, whether through UK recruitments campaigns or military service. Allied to perceived labour market opportunities, this created a process of chain migration. People from one locality having settled, would then create the infrastructure which allowed friends and relatives to join them. Those who went first could help others find housing, work, and even through earnings in the new country, some assisted relatives afford the passage over. This is one of the main ways in which clustering occurs when even people from the same villages can often be found living in close proximity to each other. Below I give a brief overview of the circumstances surrounding the immigration of the different groups.

- *The Caribbean*

Many English-speaking Caribbean countries had a history of emigration that predated large scale migration to Britain following the Second World War. Driven by the experiences of several thousand servicemen who had been based in the UK, a desire to earn money, and the availability of work in the expanding post-war UK economy, people started to go to the UK towards the end of the 1940s. However, despite being

Commonwealth citizens, giving people rights of citizenship and cultural connections to the UK, it was only following the 1952 McCarran-Walter Act, which dramatically reduced entry to the USA, that immigration to the UK increased rapidly (Holmes, 1988).

The vast majority of Caribbean immigrants came from Jamaica, the rest from the other former British colonies such as Barbados, Trinidad, Montserrat and St Lucia. Peach's analysis shows no correlation between levels of immigration and economic conditions or population density in the individual Caribbean countries. He concludes that 'push' factors were not the main drivers, rather that the 'pull' of perceived opportunities in the UK were key (Peach, 1967).

The Caribbean immigration included people from a range of occupations and social class backgrounds. The very poor were few among them; the boat fare (£28.10<sup>36</sup> on the Windrush<sup>37</sup> for example) precluded that (Phillips and Phillips, 1998). However, there were differences between the smaller middle class and larger more working class migrations. The former was often more family based, intending to stay longer and build lives in the UK. The younger immigrants were more likely to be individuals going alone, with the intention of earning money, sending back remittances<sup>38</sup> and saving for a better life back home in the Caribbean (Philpott, 1973; Thomas-Hope, 1992). This included many independent women (Byron, 1994). Whilst there are no definitive numbers, the evidence indicates that the majority of migrants came from skilled or semi-skilled backgrounds. Fryer (1984) suggests that 13% of men and 5% of women were unskilled workers, whilst 46% of men and 27% of women were skilled manual workers. Despite the intentions of many to make their trips temporary in nature, the Commonwealth Immigration Acts of 1962 and 1969 had two unintended consequences. They not only precipitated a surge of immigrants wanting to beat the restrictions but also, in limiting the possibilities of return in the future, encouraged many to put down roots and settle in the UK for longer than initially intended.

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36 Over £600 in today's prices

37 The iconic passenger ship of the Caribbean migration to the UK

38 Money sent back to the country of origin

- *India*

Whilst 1971 had begun to see the arrival of East African Asians in the UK, the vast majority of Indians in this research are those who came from India itself. There had already been a small Indian presence in Britain in the first half of the twentieth century. However, large scale immigration began in the post-1945 years. It took off in the early 1950s in response to labour shortages in the UK and in the aftermath of independence and partition of India and Pakistan. A large proportion of Indian migrants were Sikhs from the Punjab; Gujarati Hindus were the next largest group. Together they comprised the overwhelming majority of Indian migrants to the UK. Ballard (1983) places the migration of those from Jullunder Doab region of the Punjab in an important historical context. He shows that there has been a long history of economic migration from that region and that the move to the UK was just one stage in a history that had been continuous for a hundred years and would persist to other parts of the world after Britain had shut its doors. This group therefore had a tradition of seeking out and exploiting the best opportunities. What was different about the migration to the UK was that many people began to settle in England and call over their families quite quickly. Whilst trans-national links remained, remittances were never a big feature of that migration.

There was a diverse socio-economic mix amongst the immigrants. Many were farmers, able to sell or mortgage their land to finance the trip. Others were professionals who came on vouchers after the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act. The migration was characterised by much chain migration, with many individuals from the same families and villages immigrating to the same destinations. As a result, there were strong kin and friendship networks and important communal ties on arrival. Whilst many from Gujarat had good levels of literacy, migrants from India as a whole had neither the fluency of English nor the Westernised cultural capital that characterised East African Asians (Ballard, 1983).

- *Pakistan*

The majority of migrants from Pakistan come from the regions of the Punjab and Mirpur. Generally speaking it was a migration of rural people. Shaw (2000) suggests that the divide in her study was 95% rural-origins and 5% urban, but emphasises that stereotypical notions of '*urban equals educated*' whilst '*rural means illiterate*' ought to be challenged. There is a history of migration from the regions of Mirpur and the Punjab, with strong connections between these regions and the British Merchant Navy. As was the case with groups, chain migration followed the war with the opening up of opportunities, especially in the North of England. There was also a 'beat the ban' rush before the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act (Anwar, 1996 p. 9).

Subsequent migration was mostly based on 'family reunification' as well as some professionals on vouchers. However, there were specific pushes as well as the pull of the labour market. These included the aftermath of partition with India and the violence that ensued, and the construction of the Mangla Dam that left many people without their livelihoods and with compensation that could provide for a move to England more easily than an adequate land purchase at home.

The Pakistani immigration was also largely a Muslim immigration. Islam is a very important part of many Pakistani people's culture, beliefs and values. From early on it was apparent that this was likely to have an important impact on the acculturation of Pakistani immigrants (Hashmi, 1972). Two areas in which this is important are *biraderi* or kinship networks, and *purdah*. The strength of large kinship networks may partly explain the strong trans-national lives of Pakistani migrants, with implications for the marriage traditions and the ongoing importance of remittances. *Purdah* is a Farsi word for curtain and refers to the separation of the worlds of women and men (Khan, 1999). Whilst adapting and evolving even in traditional households in Britain, traditions and cultures of purdah may have contributed to the notably long period prior to family reunification that characterised many Pakistani immigrants, in comparison to contemporary immigrants. It has also had implications for women's labour market participation, and some argue that a relatively ambivalent attitude towards women's

education was carried over from Pakistan to the UK (Jeffery, 1976). However, these cultural and religious explanations are challenged by others. For example, in Ballard's comparison of Jullunder and Mirpur, he suggests that the Mirpuri economy increasingly weakened, and consequently there was a heavy reliance on remittances. Shaw argues that the childbearing of Pakistani women was as much the cause of low labour market participation as issues of purdah (Shaw, 2000).

- *Ireland*

Ireland has long been the first port of call for filling labour shortages in Britain, with historically, levels of immigration closely following unemployment levels in Britain as a whole. In the post-Second World War economic boom, levels of immigration rose to the high pre-1900 levels. Whilst Scotland had high rates of migration from Northern Ireland, it was the Republic of Ireland that provided the vast majority of Irish immigration to England and Wales. Prior to the Second World War, employment opportunities for Irish immigrants were severely restricted to particular occupations; however the requirements of wartime and a booming post-war economy meant that Irish immigrant workers could perform a range of jobs. Kobayashi (2001) has shown though, that despite some discussion of a brain-drain in the late 1960s, the majority of immigrants were semi-skilled or unskilled workers, filling vacancies in manual work. Whilst the wave of Irish immigrants of the 1980s-90s was better educated than the UK population as a whole, those from earlier waves had fewer educational qualifications than the UK population.

- *Eastern Europe*

The large immigration from Eastern Europe took place during and in the aftermath of the Second World War, with a large percentage coming from Poland. The immigrants split into three major groups: approximately 90,000 troops from the Polish Army exiled in Britain who chose to join the Polish Resettlement Corps and stay in the UK, about 33,000 dependants of these soldiers and 100,000 people on the European voluntary workers scheme. This scheme was for civilians displaced during the War and brought over from the Western Zones of Germany to do shortage occupations in the UK. It included 29,400 Poles, 13,783 Latvians, 9,400 Yugoslavs, 8,238 Ukrainians and 9,312 Germans. All of

these groups were received well by the authorities who looked to settle them in communities together and help them to integrate. Most of the Eastern European immigrants were brought over to perform manual work; this was the dominant work of those in the Polish resettlement corps. However, there is evidence that a high proportion of this population may have had professional and white-collar experience in their countries of origin. On the whole though, they were too old, too lacking in English and recognised experience and qualifications to pursue their pre-war careers (Zubrzycki, 1956. p. 54-63, 89-95).

- *Southern Europe*

Cyprus: Clywik's (2002) research outlines some of the characteristics of the Cypriot migration to the UK in the post war years. It draws on limited Cypriot government data and interviews with about fifty members of North London's Cypriot community. 87% of emigrants from Cyprus, between 1955 and 1963, came to Britain. There were a range of push factors: high unemployment, civil unrest, uncertainty about the future of the country, colonial price fixing of agricultural produce and crop failure. Britain was seen as a land of opportunity, and, as Cypriots had British citizenship, it was an obvious choice for many prior to the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962. Migration followed the patterns of other groups, with pioneer migration of young men followed by their families, and older men and independent women. Clywik suggests that there was a mix of urban and rural immigrants as well as skilled, semi-skilled and agricultural workers. Differing from some groups, she suggests that there was never a myth of return, and whilst ties were maintained with Cyprus, remittances and strong trans-national connections did not characterise the migration. They arrived in Britain to stay. One important dimension of this population was that Cypriot migrants were split between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. The latter group was larger, and their immigration largely pre-dated that of the former.

Italy: Whilst a small Italian population had resided in the UK in the first half of the twentieth century, this was quadrupled by an immigration of about 150,000 people between 1948 and 1968. The vast majority of these people were from the impoverished

south of Italy, and they were brought in large numbers to do manual work in the mines, foundries and factories. After the war there was a reactivation of some old chains of migration. However, the bulk of immigrants came through '*large impersonal recruitment schemes*'. Individuals did not even choose to migrate to the UK specifically; they were just sent by agencies to work abroad. Overtime, new chains of migration developed (Colpi, 1991 p. 133-152).


I now turn to the picture of these immigrant groups in Britain, using data from the ONS Longitudinal Study.

## 4.3 The Immigrant Population in 1971 - A cross sectional survey

### 4.31 Demographic and migration factors

In 1971, 8.4% of the UK population aged 16 and over, were born outside of the UK (ONS Longitudinal Study<sup>39</sup>). Of those, 80% had arrived in the years since the Second World War, with 60% in the previous sixteen years, and nearly one quarter in the previous six. 'Recency effects' could have affected this, in that those who had immigrated to the UK earlier would be more likely to have died or emigrated. However, the pattern observed in Figure 4.1 mirrors the widely known pattern of large increases in immigration to the UK in the decades following the end of the Second World War. A surge of immigration directly followed the War, and after a reduction in the level of immigration, there followed increases in each five-year period from 1950 onwards.

**Figure 4.1** Year of entry to England & Wales of those born outside the UK<sup>40</sup>  
All Immigrants; LS members aged 16+ in 1971




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

39 All data referred to from this point forward is taken from the author's own analysis of the ONS Longitudinal Study unless otherwise stated.

40 For figures and tables based on bivariate relationships, frequency counts can be derived from the total numbers in each group, as shown in Tables 4.1 and 5.18. Where tables and figures express multivariate relationships, this is not possible, and frequency counts can be derived from tables in Appendices 1-3.

As can be seen from Figure 4.2, the entry of these groups into the UK was far from uniform. Irish immigration took place at steady and high rates throughout the twentieth century, whilst the vast majority of the Eastern European immigration was in one five year period (the highest single period migration of any group), immediately following the Second World War. Migration from India rose steeply and consistently between 1955 and 1971, whilst the peak of the Caribbean immigration was earlier, in the 1960-4 period, and immigration levels had reduced by the later period. The immigration of those from Pakistan rose towards the end of the period. Other groups were characterised by steadier, if slowly increasing, patterns of migration. These dates of entry - indicating length of time people may have had to settle, adapt and accumulate resources - may be important when considering individuals' socio-economic and household situation, and longer term trajectories.

**Figure 4.2** **Period of Entry to UK by Immigrant Group; 1971**  
Immigrant groups; LS members aged 16+ in 1971




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Periods shown cover twenty years from 1890 till 1930 and then five years until 1965. The final period is six and a third years.

One frequently observed characteristic of migration is the pattern of men migrating first and, having laid the groundwork by finding a home, work and a community, being followed by their families. Figure 4.3 bears this out. In almost all cases the pattern is for the proportion of the immigrant group who are male to decline in the years prior to 1971. Amongst some groups, for whom the immigration took place earlier, by the later periods the majority of immigrants are female. For later immigrations, such as that from Pakistan, in the period 1965-1971 there remains a male majority (with the bulk of family reunification taking place after 1971). However by the later period, there was already a steep decline in the proportion of men from the previous decade, which had seen male migration at over 90% of the total.

**Figure 4.3 Percentage of immigrants who are male by period of entry**  
Immigrant groups; all LS members aged 16+ in 1971



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

As a consequence of this, the different immigrant groups had distinct gender make-ups. Those groups whose migrations were earlier, were, like the UK-born population, majority female and those where migration was more recent had more men; the Pakistani population (aged 16+) being only 23% female.

**Table 4.2** **Gender make-up of Immigrant Groups; percentage female**  
Immigrant groups; all LS members aged 16+ in 1971

	% female
Old Commonwealth and USA	54
Ireland	53
'White' New Commonwealth	52
Southern Europe	52
Caribbean	49
East African Asian	44
Eastern Europe	43
India	42
Pakistan	23

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

It might be expected that given the different dates of entry profiles of different groups, they would also have different age profiles. However that would imply that all groups had similar age at entry profiles. The typical age profile of immigrants at time of migration is young to mid adulthood (Castles, 2000b). This was the case for most of the groups in this study as shown in Table 4.3. For most groups, 67-75% of arrivals were within the early to mid adulthood range of 18-39. The exceptions were those from the Old Commonwealth and USA, and 'White' New Commonwealth.


**Table 4.3** **Proportion aged between 18 and 39 on arrival in the UK**  
Immigrant groups; LS members aged 16+ in 1971

	% aged 18-39 on arrival
Caribbean	73
Southern Europe	70
Pakistan	69
Ireland	68
Eastern Europe	68
India	67
East African Asian	66
Old Commonwealth & USA	48
'White' New Commonwealth	28

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

This is brought out by Figure 4.4, which shows most groups with a pyramidal age of entry profile; smaller proportions in both older and younger age groups. This pattern was dramatically reversed for the 'White' New Commonwealth and the Old Commonwealth and USA groups, among which 69% and 49% arrived aged seventeen and under. Of 'White' New Commonwealth immigrants, over half arrived aged 0-9, a very different situation to other groups. It will be interesting to see whether these different ages of entry are associated with different outcomes for the Second Generation, although given the patterns observed, it may be difficult to distinguish effects of age at entry from overall group effects. The pyramidal 'age at entry' profiles of most immigrant groups suggest that differences in the overall age structure in 1971 would likely reflect 'year of entry' rather than 'age at entry', except in the case of 'White' New Commonwealth and Old Commonwealth and USA immigrants.

**Figure 4.4 Percentage by age when they first arrived in the UK (% by age range)**  
Immigrant groups; LS members aged 16+ in 1971



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Figure 4.5-Figure 4.15 show the age structures of the immigrant groups for those aged over sixteen. The Pakistani and East African Asian immigrants had the youngest profiles, with a small percentage of these populations aged over 45. The Caribbean and Indian groups were also relatively young, but had an older profile, with 20-25% of their populations (aged over 16) being aged 45+. By contrast, approximately half of the equivalent UK-born population was aged over 45. Most of the other groups had age profiles similar to that of the UK population. The Eastern European group however (Figure 4.9), was particularly old. Given their relatively old age profile on entry, and the fact that the peak of their migration was considerably earlier than other groups this may have been expected, but it is clearly pronounced in the population pyramid.

**Figure 4.5-Figure 4.15 Population Pyramids: origin groups by age ranges and gender**  
UK-born and Immigrant groups; LS members aged 16+ in 1971

Figure 4.5




Figure 4.6




Figure 4.7




Figure 4.8




Figure 4.9 Eastern Europe




Figure 4.10 Old Commonwealth and USA




Figure 4.11 Caribbean




Figure 4.12 India




Figure 4.13 Pakistan




Figure 4.14 East Africa Asian





Figure 4.15 'White' New Commonwealth



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study


#### 4.32 Patterns of settlement: households, geography and housing

The first section focussed on the immigrants' migration. This section begins to paint a picture of their settlement in the UK. It considers patterns of marriage and parenthood, regions and neighbourhoods, and the type of housing in which these immigrants lived.

##### 4.321 Marriage

Intermarriage or exogamy, has long been considered an important litmus test of assimilation, indicating as it does that 'individuals of putatively different ethnic backgrounds no longer perceive social and cultural differences significant enough to create a barrier to a long term union' (Alba, 1995 p. 13). The radically different marriage patterns evident in Figure 4.16 do suggest very different patterns of settlement and assimilation among the different immigrant groups.

Figure 4.16 Origin group of spouses  
Immigrant groups; LS members aged 16+ in 1971, all with spouses



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

There are arguably three blocs; those from the Caribbean, South Asia and East African Asians; the Old Commonwealth and USA and 'White' New Commonwealth groups and Eastern Europeans and Irish. Amongst people from the 'non-white groups'<sup>41</sup> there was an overwhelming norm of endogamy. In fact the trend was more pervasive in these groups than it might appear. The vast majority of spouses with different countries of birth were actually from one of the other two groups. With Indian, Pakistani and East African Asian immigrants, ethnicity-based intra-marriage may well have been maintained and indeed may have taken precedence over nationality-based intra-marriage.

Amongst the Old Commonwealth and USA, and 'White' New Commonwealth groups, over 70% had UK-born spouses. For Eastern European and Irish immigrants, there were approximately equal shares of spouses who were UK-born. However, the marriage patterns of Southern European immigrants lie somewhere between the situation of the other European groups and the 'non-white' groups, with over 60% endogamy.

These blocs are indicative of very different patterns of assimilation for the immigrant groups. The wholesale intermarriage of some groups most probably indicates a short social distance between them and the wider population, and low levels of ethnic cohesiveness among the immigrant community. Where intermarriage is rare, it suggests the opposite. However, there are other explanations for what is observed here. We do not know in which country partnerships were formed, and for UK-born spouses, we know neither their ethnic or national origin nor their religion. As was shown earlier, large proportions of the 'White' New Commonwealth and Old Commonwealth and USA groups entered the UK in childhood and this may explain part of the story. The main part of the thesis focuses on children of two immigrant parents, although in Chapter 8 I contrast their experiences with children with one immigrant and one UK-born parent. In doing so, I discuss further possible implications of differing patterns of partnership formation.

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41 'Non-white' refers to the Caribbean, Indian, Pakistani and East African Asian groups; those traditionally treated as minority ethnic groups in the UK.

#### 4.322 Lone Parent households

The proportion of lone parent households in the UK was much lower in 1971 than today. In 1971, just 5% of the UK-born group in households with children were in lone parent households. For most of the immigrant groups, the rates were also low and broadly similar (all within two percentage points). One group stands out however. Among Caribbean immigrants, 14% of those in households with children were in lone parent households. Whilst much lower than the rate of lone parent households among those of Caribbean origin today, the high relative rate reflects the particular tendency for single female-headed households amongst this population (Berthoud, 2005).

**Table 4.4 Percentage in Lone Parent Households of those in households with children**  
UK-born and Immigrant groups; LS members aged 16+ in 1971

	% in Lone Parent Households of all in households with children
UK-born	5
India	3
Southern Europe	4
Old Commonwealth and USA	4
Pakistan	5
Ireland	6
Eastern Europe	6
'White' New Commonwealth	6
East African Asian	7
Caribbean	14


Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

#### 4.323 Regions of settlement

London, as a centuries old cosmopolitan city, major port (sea in the past, air today), and commercial hub has long been a magnet for immigrants. Of the 50,000 Huguenot refugees who fled to England at the end of the eighteenth century, well over half settled in London. Likewise a majority of the UK's Jewish population has long been concentrated in the capital. All of the groups in this study had a higher proportion of their population in London and the South-East than the UK-born population although this ranged from 35% for Pakistanis to 73% of Southern European immigrants. The combined areas of the South-West, North-East, East Anglia and Wales were places of

very low levels of settlement for all immigrant groups.<sup>42</sup> Outside of the concentrations in London, the West Midlands had relatively high numbers of immigrants from the Caribbean, India and Pakistan. The latter were particularly spread out, with significant settlement in the North West and Yorkshire and the Humber.

**Figure 4.17 Percentage in region of England and Wales**  
UK-born and Immigrant groups; LS members aged 16+ in 1971




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

42 Scotland and Northern Ireland are not covered as the LS is based on the Census of England and Wales

#### 4.323 Neighbourhoods of settlement

By reducing the spatial level of analysis from the region to the ward<sup>43</sup>, it is possible to better understand the kinds of local areas in which people were living. Figure 4.18 highlights one aspect of neighbourhoods. Wards are ranked according to the proportion of resident 'heads of households' whose country of origin was one of the New Commonwealth<sup>44</sup> countries or Pakistan.<sup>45</sup> This is divided into quartiles and Figure 4.18 gives the percentage from each immigrant group in each quartile of concentration.

Figure 4.18 **Percentage in quartiles of wards ranked by concentrations of New Commonwealth and Pakistan residents;**  
UK-born and Immigrant groups; LS members aged 16+ in 1971



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

First consider the six groups on the left hand side of the figure. All immigrant groups were more likely to live in areas of high 'non-white' concentration than the UK population. In fact all groups were all more likely than not, to be in the two quartiles of highest 'non-white' concentration. Over half of those from Eastern Europe and Ireland,

43 There are 8414 wards in England and Wales. Ward sizes vary greatly but the average ward has a population of around 5000 people Glennerster et al. (1999).

44 India, the Caribbean countries and commonwealth countries in Africa excluding South Africa

45 This is not an ideal measure of concentration but is one of the limited number of small area statistics for the 1971 Census that is provided by the LS. These groups are those typically considered 'non-white' or 'minority ethnic' groups.


and over 60% of Southern Europeans were living in the quartile of highest concentration compared to only 21% of the UK-born population. The columns to the right hand side of Figure 4.18 are the ‘non-white’ groups, which appear on one level to be tautological. Given that these groups are small proportions of the national population, any unequal distribution of this group within all wards, will make them appear highly concentrated in certain wards. Whilst not an ideal measure, it does emphasise the tendency of these groups to have been concentrated in certain areas.

The Carstairs Index is a composite measure of deprivation used to assess the level of material well-being characteristic of local area populations<sup>46</sup>. As Figure 4.19 shows, the areas in which immigrants lived were often among the most deprived. Immigrants from the Old Commonwealth and USA were the only ones more likely to live in the less deprived areas. There was a fairly even distribution of ‘White’ New Commonwealth immigrants throughout the quartiles. Eastern and Southern Europeans and Irish immigrants alongside the UK population, show a clear propensity to have lived in the more deprived areas.

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<sup>46</sup> The Carstairs Index is based on proportions in the ward of residence who are unemployed, in social class iv or v, without access to a car and in living in overcrowded accommodation (one or more people per room)

**Figure 4.19 Percentage in quartiles of wards ranked by deprivation on Carstairs Index**  
UK-born and Immigrant groups; LS members aged 16+ in 1971



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

However the Indian, Caribbean, Pakistani and East African Asian populations were overwhelmingly concentrated in the quartile of most deprived of neighbourhoods; approximately 85% of each group were in the 50% most deprived wards. As such, whilst over 60% of the 'White' New Commonwealth, Old Commonwealth and USA and Caribbean immigrants were settled in the South-East, there was a huge disparity in the types of area in which they settled.

#### 4.323 Patterns of housing

With a sense of the regions, and the kinds of local areas in which the immigrant population was living, we now turn the housing situation of different groups. At the aggregate level, immigrants and the UK-born population had similar owner occupation rates; the big difference was between proportions renting in the private and council sectors.<sup>47</sup> However there were differences between groups.

<sup>47</sup> The 1971 LS combines Private Renting and Housing Association (HA) categories. However HAs were a fraction of the category. This is distinct from 1991 where HA and Council Housing are a combined category and the former represents a much more significant proportion of the total.


**Table 4.5 Percentage by Housing Tenure**  
UK-born and all immigrants; all LS members aged 16+ in 1971

	Owner Occupied	Rent from Council	Rent from Private Landlord	Row total (%)
UK-born	51	30	19	100
Immigrant	55	17	28	100

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

By far the highest levels of owner occupation were found amongst the Indian and Pakistani populations. The UK-born population had a comparatively low level of owner occupation and the Old Commonwealth and USA group was second least likely to own their own home; over 40% were in privately rented accommodation.

**Figure 4.20 Housing tenure (%)**  
UK-born and immigrant group; all LS members aged 16+ in 1971



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

At face value this may seem counter-intuitive to someone unfamiliar with the specific literature, as owner occupation is typically associated with affluence. However, as mentioned earlier in the thesis, this situation was a direct consequence of different contemporary housing contexts faced by certain immigrants from the rest of the population. With racism, of a '*no coloured, no Pakis*' nature and exploitative landlords endemic within the private lettings market, and more subtle, yet demonstrable racism


within the council housing sector, owner occupation was perceived by many minority ethnic immigrants to be the best (and at times only) way of securing housing (Daniel, 1969 p. 151-153). With little capital, this meant buying very poor quality accommodation, joining with other families and living in single rooms. By contrast, the UK-born population's surge in owner-occupation was being driven by increased affluence.

Owner occupation therefore had a very different meaning for different parts of the population. The disparities are demonstrated in Figure 4.21, which gives an insight into the quality of owner occupied housing. For the South Asian groups especially, owner occupation was associated with chronic overcrowding<sup>48</sup>. 78% of the Pakistani population in owner occupied accommodation were in the quartile of most overcrowded housing; only 15% of the UK-born group were. On an alternative indicator of housing quality - lack of basic amenities (inside toilets and showers/baths) - the same pattern persisted. Whilst 56% of Pakistani owner occupiers had a property with sole use of these basic amenities, 90% of the UK-born population and 95% of Old Commonwealth and USA and 'White New Commonwealth' owner occupiers had these amenities.

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<sup>48</sup> Overcrowding is defined as the number of rooms in a household divided by the number of people normally resident. All individuals were given a score for overcrowding and then divided into four quartiles.


**Figure 4.21 Percentage in quartile of overcrowding among those in owner occupied housing**  
UK-born and immigrant group; all LS members aged 16+ in 1971



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Looking more generally at the situation of overcrowding across all tenures, reveals huge disparities in the living conditions of different groups. The UK-born and Old Commonwealth and USA, Eastern European and 'White' New Commonwealth immigrants had approximately even chances of being in each quartile of overcrowding. Large proportions of the Irish and Southern European immigrants were in the quartile of most overcrowded housing. However the Indian, Caribbean, East African Asian and Pakistani immigrants were overwhelmingly concentrated in the most overcrowded quartile. Fewer than 10% of each of these groups were in the least overcrowded 50% of housing.


**Figure 4.22 Overcrowding by immigrant group by quartile**  
 UK-born and immigrant group; all LS members aged 16+ in 1971



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

The same groups were most disadvantaged in terms of access to basic household amenities. However there were substantial differences between the groups. Only half of Pakistanis had sole access to all amenities compared to 65% of Indian and 71% Caribbean immigrants. Among Pakistani immigrants, a significant proportion lacked any access to a bath or inside toilets. This indicates very poor quality housing. At the other end of the scale, the 'White' New Commonwealth and Old Commonwealth and USA born population were in the most advantaged situation, with small proportions lacking amenities and only 2% lacking any amenities.

Figure 4.23 **Access to basic household amenities by origin group (Bath and Inside toilet)**  
UK-born and immigrant group; all LS members aged 16+ in 1971



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

#### 4.33 Socio-economic situation


In looking at the neighbourhood and housing conditions of different immigrants we began to get a feel for the spread of socio-economic circumstances from one group to another, as well as the diversity that exists within each group. I now turn to other indicators of socio-economic situation.

##### 4.331 Access to a car

Access to a car is one indicator the census has for an individual's financial situation. As Figure 4.24 shows, nearly 70% of Pakistani and Caribbean immigrants had no access to a car in 1971. Amongst East African Asian, Eastern European, Indian and Irish immigrants between 50-60% lacked access, whilst Southern Europeans had similar rates to the UK-born population at just over 40%. Two groups, the Old Commonwealth and USA, and 'White' New Commonwealth born, had nearer 30% lacking access. By contrast approximately 20% of the population of these two groups had access to two or more cars.

All other groups had nearer 10%, or well under, in this category associated with affluence.

Figure 4.24 **Access to cars by immigrant group**  
UK-born and immigrant group; all LS members aged 16+ in 1971




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

#### 4.332 Economic activity

Figure 4.25 shows differing patterns of economic activity across the different immigrant groups. It considers all those aged 16-60, excluding only those defined as students. Patterns of economic activity of men and women were very different in 1971. Rates of male activity were very high; 94% of UK-born men were in work, and most other groups had similar proportions employed. The Caribbean and Irish immigrant populations had the highest rates of male inactivity, with 10-11% out of work.

**Figure 4.25****Economic Activity by sex and origin group;**

UK-born and immigrant group; all LS members aged 16-60 in 1971 not students



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

However, there are much larger differences amongst the female population. In most groups, 55-60% of women were in employment; although three groups stand out, the Caribbean, Indian and Pakistanis. Amongst the Caribbean immigrant population, 69% of women were in work; the highest proportion of any group. Much has been written about the propensity of this population to seek work, driven both by historical-cultural factors which promoted female independence, and structural factors such as the low levels of employment and rates of pay for men of Caribbean origin (Reynolds, 2001).

By stark contrast, 37% of female Indian immigrants, and only 10% of those from Pakistan were in employment. These populations came from cultures where women were much less likely to work outside of the home environment. At the same time, they lacked English language abilities in comparison to their male counterparts and had larger families which they started earlier. All of these factors contributed to low levels of employment. It is worth noting however that the difference between Pakistani and Indian

women was greater than that between Indian women and those from most of the other groups.

#### 4.333 Social class

Social Class is one the main indicators of socio-economic position used in this study. Some of the issues in relation to its use as an indicator of relative advantage/disadvantage were discussed in the previous Chapter. Here, as in the remainder of the thesis, the Registrar-General's Social Scale, or Social Class based on Occupation is used. The 1971 census recorded peoples' current or most recent occupation (if they were retired or unemployed). Using this, social class in 1971 in this section is coded on the following criteria:

- Only those aged between 15 and 60 and below are included.
- For those who had a spouse they are coded with the more advantaged social class of the two.
- Students are not included.
- Those who were out of work and have no coded social class, and also have no spouse with a social class are coded as 'inactive'.
- All others without social class are excluded from this section of the analysis.
- Because of sample size constraints, an amalgamated version of Registrar-General's Social Class is used combining social classes i and ii, iiin and iiim, and iv and v<sup>49</sup>.

As shown in Table 4.6, the UK-born population had a more advantaged social class profile than the immigrant population, with high proportions in both social class i/ii and iiin/m, whilst a considerably higher proportion of immigrants were in both social class iv/v or inactive.

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49 Professional and Managerial, Skilled non-manual and Skilled Manual, Semi-Skilled and Unskilled.

**Table 4.6 Social Class Status (%)**  
 UK-born and immigrant group; all LS members aged 16-60 in 1971


	UK-born	Immigrant
i/ii	25	21
iiin/m	53	42
iv/v	19	31
Inactive	3	6
Column total (%)	100	100

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

However, as shown in Figure 4.26 there are differences between groups; some have a more advantaged social class profile than the UK population, and others appreciably lower. Pakistani immigrants were notably the most disadvantaged, with the highest proportions in both social class iv/v and inactive. Whilst the differences between groups in the latter category were fairly small, this is a product of generally high employment rates. However, whilst nearly 55% of Pakistanis were in social class iv/v the next most disadvantaged groups, the Caribbean and Indian immigrants had fewer than 40% in this category. At the other end of the scale, the 'White' New Commonwealth and Old Commonwealth and USA groups had very high proportions in social class i/ii, and very few in the most disadvantaged category.

It is noticeable that the larger differences between the groups are at the ends of the social class scale. The groups have, relatively speaking, similar proportions in social class iiin/m; the substantial differences between the groups are in the proportions in social class i/ii and iv/v are more substantial.


**Figure 4.26 Social Class by Immigrant Group**  
UK-born and immigrant group; all LS members aged 16+ in 1971



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Based on these two social class categories, Figure 4.27 highlights the pronounced differences between the groups. For each group, the proportion in social class iv/v is subtracted from that in social class i/ii. The Pakistani immigrant group stands out as by far the most disadvantaged. The Caribbean, Indian, Southern European and Irish groups were also much more concentrated at the disadvantaged end of the social class scale. The Old Commonwealth and USA and 'White' New Commonwealth groups by contrast have particularly advantaged social class profiles. In this picture, the UK-born population were at the advantaged end of the spectrum although much less so than the two most privileged immigrant groups.

**Figure 4.27 Difference between percentages in Social Class i/ii and iv/v**  
 UK-born and immigrant group; all LS members aged 16+ in 1971



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

One characteristic that may feed into these social class differentials is educational attainment. Participation in higher education was still low amongst the general population in 1971 compared to today. Amongst the UK-born population of those aged 18 and over, only 10% were either students or had higher education qualifications. However some immigrant groups had rates well above this. Over a quarter of 'White' New Commonwealth, Old Commonwealth and USA born, and East African Asian immigrants were in this category. Fifteen per cent of Indian immigrants were students or had degrees, and the Caribbean immigrant population had the same proportions as the UK-born. Other groups had smaller proportions with higher qualifications or still in education.

**Table 4.7 Percentage with degrees or students in 1971**  
 UK-born and immigrant group; all LS members aged 18+ in 1971

	% with degrees or students
UK-born	10
'White' New Commonwealth	27
Old Commonwealth and USA	26
East African Asian	26
India	15
Caribbean	10
Ireland	8
Pakistan	8
Eastern Europe	7
Southern Europe	6

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

*The situation of the 1971 immigrants: conclusions*

How can these findings be summarised? Certain patterns emerge from the data. The 'White' English Speaking groups of 'White' New Commonwealth and Old Commonwealth and USA origins arrived in the UK, many at young ages and appeared to assimilate into the more advantaged end of UK society. The vast majority, of those who were married, had UK-born spouses. They were highly educated, and on all measures of affluence and social position, with the exception of living in owner occupied housing, were at the advantaged end of the social spectrum. Their migration was at a steady, low rate not marked by any particular waves. Perhaps the low levels of owner occupation indicate transience, and that these were populations not necessarily laying down long-term roots in the UK.

The Irish and Eastern Europeans were clearly more disadvantaged than the UK population, but in some respects closer to their situation than other groups. They were less likely than many other groups to live in deprived areas, in overcrowded accommodation, to be without access to a car, and the social class profile approached that of the UK-born population. They had large concentrations in the South-East, but also more of a regional spread than other groups. Allied to their marriage patterns, half in-group, half out-group, the indication may be of groups with genuine communities but with a social proximity to the wider population. The Southern Europeans by contrast, whilst on certain indicators having a similar profile to the other European groups, appear

more disadvantaged. Moreover, they were highly concentrated in the South-East, in deprived areas, and their patterns of marriage were more similar to those of the 'non-white' groups than the other European groups.

The Indians and East African Asians, whilst looking similar on some of the deprivation related variables, were different. The latter with much more education and a higher social class profile were substantially more advantaged than the former, with a social class profile very similar to the UK-born population.

Of all the groups, the Pakistani and Caribbean immigrants were the most disadvantaged. However, it is the former group that really stands out; highly disadvantaged on virtually every indicator whether social class, housing quality or female economic activity. They are at the beginning of their migration, are young and overwhelmingly male. The Caribbean immigrant population, whilst being clearly the second most disadvantaged group, on some indicators had aggregate outcomes not too different from the Indian, Irish or Southern European populations.

#### **4.4 Developing hypotheses**

How do we turn this baseline data in conjunction with the theory of Chapter 2 into a set of hypotheses that may help us understand the experiences of the Second Generation in the UK? Many factors were discussed in Chapter 2; factors that are inter-connected, difficult to measure, and that suggest conflicting outcomes. There are the theoretical ideas emanating from literatures on the US Second Generation, theory and empirical research concerning the UK minority ethnic populations, as well as that which focuses on broader fields of intergenerational social mobility and the childhood precursors of adult outcomes. Unpacking cause and effect is the task of a literature rather than a single study. Moreover, the LS data that is used in this study allows analysis of a broad range of Second Generation groups but lacks a depth of data that would allow us to fully illuminate a complicated and nuanced picture. Most critically, I have demographic, geographic and socio-economic data but lack information on aspects of acculturation,

which the theory argues is vital. However, this body of theory can act as a road map to guide the research.

I begin by considering the independent variables that I have in my analysis. Mostly these are 1971 background variables that provided both the baseline picture of the immigrant population in 1971, discussed in this Chapter, and the specific childhood circumstances for the individuals who will ultimately be traced to 1991 (discussed in the following Chapters). In Chapters 6 and 7, I will analyse the relationship between these 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes for the Second Generation, developing a better understanding of the factors that explain diversity, both between and within groups. In concluding this Chapter however, using the theory discussed thus far, I draw on some of these characteristics to develop general hypotheses for the aggregate outcomes for the different Second Generation groups.

#### *4.41 The roles of age and gender*

- **Age**

The Second Generation that will be analyzed are all be aged 20-36 in 1991. This is a volatile time in establishing career paths and access to resources. The younger ages may be still in full time study or disadvantaged in the relatively high unemployment of the 1991 youth labour market<sup>50</sup>. Those who were older would most likely have more settled careers and have accumulated resources. The age distributions of the Second Generation groups will vary however. The different population age profiles of the First Generation groups (see Figure 4.5-Figure 4.15) reflect different stages of the immigration process. The Second Generations of these groups are likely to reflect this in 1991, with differences in their age distributions; the Eastern European Second Generation, whose parents were the oldest will be skewed towards the older age group, and the Caribbean and Pakistani cohorts, whose parents were the youngest, will be more concentrated among the younger ages, with the other groups in between. A lack of consideration of age may distort the picture of relative disadvantage and advantage, indicating substantive differences

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<sup>50</sup> Male unemployment (proportion actively seeking work) was twice the rate for 18-24 year olds as for 25-44 year olds in 1991 (ONS, 2002)

between groups, when such differences may at least partially be explained by diverse age distributions.

- **Gender**

If potential age effects are largely statistical in nature, any gender effects are substantive and are more difficult to theorize. Evidence discussed in Chapter 2 might suggest particular gender effects for the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations. Amongst the former, women of Black-Caribbean origin had better outcomes than men on a number of domains, and their high rate of economic activity is notable among all groups. In recent research, differences have been particularly pronounced in education, where the 'gender gap' in attainment is far higher amongst those of Black-Caribbean or Black-British ethnicity than in any other ethnic group (DfES Research & Statistics, 2005). Patterson (2005) suggests that this a consistent pattern across the 'Black Atlantic', with similar gender divides in education, present in the Caribbean and among African-Americans in the US. For the Pakistani Second Generation, there is however conflicting evidence. Some have argued that Pakistani women have been disadvantaged by cultures that have discouraged education. However, more recently, there is also evidence of better outcomes at GCSEs among Pakistani girls than boys.

#### **4.42 Demographic and migration related factors**

- **Parents age of entry and Parent's time in UK**

Earlier arrivals in the UK for parents, both in terms of age at entry, and year of entry ought to be associated with more advantaged outcomes for their children. Parents' age at entry may be most significant for those whose first language was not English, given that more time would allow greater exposure to English and accrue all the related benefits (Espenshade and Fu, 1997; Espinosa and Masssey, 1997). Moreover, the impact of time could well be more widespread, effecting acculturation in a variety of ways (Modood et al., 1997 p. 335). However, as Figure 4.4 showed, those groups with notably young 'age at entry' profiles were also from English-speaking origins and could be argued to have

cultures most similar to those they would come across in the UK (see Figure 4.4). It may be difficult to disentangle the effects of ‘age at entry’ from other specific group effects.

Parents’ age at entry and time in the UK may also correlate quite closely with their children’s age, and may therefore have similar kinds of effects as discussed above. This may raise issues of multicollinearity<sup>51</sup> for the regression analyses later in the thesis. However, any effect over and above that might indicate advantages of longer adaptation and favour those who came in the decade following the war rather than those who came in the decade preceding 1971.

- Early motherhood

There is evidence that having a child at a young age (22 or younger), is associated with a range of disadvantaged outcomes for children in the UK (Hobcraft and Kiernan, 2001). This phenomenon may impact differently for particular immigrant groups. Certain consequences of early motherhood (incomplete education, curtailment of early labour market experience and lower resources for investment in the child), may impact similarly across groups, but the associated precursors may be different for those who come from cultures where early fertility age is not socially stratified in the same way as in the UK. For those from South Asia, who start families earlier, this may be particularly true (Berthoud, 2001; Robson and Berthoud, 2003). Moreover, immigrants may be protected from some of the effects of early motherhood by more extensive kinship networks, where greater levels of support are provided.

- Lone parent families

Many studies have shown the relationship between being in a lone parent family in childhood and certain adverse outcomes in later life, although there is strong evidence that it is the poverty associated with such households which is most connected to adult disadvantage (Caspi et al., 1998; Joshi, 1999; Bynner, 2001; Sible-Rushton, 2004). In line with previous research, coming from a lone parent family would be expected to be an important precursor of disadvantage. However, the numbers of lone parent families in

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<sup>51</sup> High levels of correlation among particular explanatory variable is problematic in multivariate analysis

1971 were fairly small. This is especially the case for certain Second Generation origin groups, particularly those from South Asia. The exception is among Caribbean immigrants, for whom lone parenthood was more common, even if the rate was relatively low compared to its propensity amongst the Second Generation of Caribbean origin.

#### *4.43 Socio-economic precursors*

The theory discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that socio-economic origins are strongly associated with paths of mobility. Those with parents in more advantaged social classes should be able to attain more advantaged outcomes; those with more disadvantaged origins are more likely to remain at the bottom of the social ladder. One aspect of this is parental education. Those whose parents had higher qualifications would be expected to enter the professional and managerial social classes and generally experience more advantaged outcomes. Indeed, where such qualifications exist alongside lower social class profile for parents, one may expect long-range mobility. However, the 1971 census only had data on higher qualifications, obtained by a small and therefore particularly privileged proportion of the adult population. Qualifications, therefore, may only be expected to explain a small part of the story. Moreover, the relative effects of qualifications gained overseas may vary.

One would expect strong associations between social class origins and destinations. However, the relationship might be affected by two things. Firstly, given the expansion of middle class occupations, we would perhaps expect a stronger relationship between advantaged origins and advantaged destinations, than between disadvantaged origins and disadvantaged destinations. Moreover, there was evidence from previous research on mobility for minority ethnic groups, discussed in Chapter 2, that the relationship between social class origins and destinations may be weaker for immigrants and their children than for the non-immigrant population (Heath and Ridge, 1983; Heath and McMahon, 2005). There is also the argument of Portes (2001), that having a higher status population within a particular immigrant group will make it easier for others in that group to access higher status jobs.

Growing up in poverty has been repeatedly highlighted as an important childhood precursor of later life disadvantage (e.g. Axinn et al., 1997; Hobcraft, 1998; Gregg et al., 1999; Bynner, 2001). The census does not have any income measures however there are a variety of variables that can act as proxies for income or other indicators of deprivation in their own right. Both the lacking of basic household amenities and access to a car were widely used indicators of deprivation from the 1971 census. They have been used to explain differential health outcomes or identifying disadvantaged areas, two particular strengths of the ONS longitudinal study census data and the Census respectively (Fox and Goldblatt, 1982; Dale et al., 1996; PAT 18, 2000). Lacking access to basic amenities (sole use of an inside toilet and bath) and lacking access to a car in childhood, would be expected to be associated with adult disadvantage. On both of these indicators, the Pakistani immigrants were the most disadvantaged; however other groups including the Caribbean, Indian and Irish immigrants were notably disadvantaged.

There is a strong association between residence in social housing in childhood and adult disadvantage (Hobcraft, 1998; Sible-Rushton, 2004). However, many immigrants were limited in their ability to access social housing in the 1950s and 60s. Consequently, different tenures carried different meanings for certain immigrant groups in 1971 than for the UK population as a whole (see Figure 4.21). Therefore, whilst living in rented accommodation may act as an indicator of disadvantage for the children of UK-born parents and certain other immigrant groups, the associations between tenure and outcome for some of the Second Generation may be more complex. Household overcrowding, another frequently used census indicator of deprivation, may therefore be a better indicator and predict later life outcomes in a similar way to access to household amenities and access to a car.

#### *4.44 Geography*

- Region of residence

If there is some form of regional economic penalty, two ideas can be hypothesized. In line with Fielding's notion of the South-East as a regional escalator, it would be expected that the penalty would disadvantage those in the Northern regions, and possibly the

Midlands, compared to the South-East. If this is the case, the Pakistani Second Generation, predominantly growing up in the North and Midlands, would be particularly disadvantaged. In addition, groups with majorities not in the North, would have a disproportionate percentage of their disadvantaged Second Generation in the North compared to the South-east; for example the Indian Second Generation in the North would fare less well than their counterparts in the South.

- Neighbourhood deprivation

There are clearly associations between the type of neighbourhood in which an individual grows up and their later life outcomes. However whilst there is evidence of independent 'neighbourhood effects' on outcomes, the extent and nature of these effects are complicated (Buck, 2001; Gibbons, 2002).

In the US Second Generation literature it is argued that deprived neighbourhoods may be particularly disadvantaging for the Second Generation as a consequence of the difficult schooling experience which are typical of the inner cities in which they live. More controversially, it is suggested that this is compounded by the 'oppositional' youth cultures that are said to take root in these schools and the wider neighbourhoods, alongside a disadvantaged African-American population. In the UK context, the schools may mirror the US picture but the racial dynamics faced by the Second Generation were very different. If the US picture that Portes paints matched directly onto the UK context, deprived areas would be expected to be particularly problematic for the 'White' Second Generation who lived in them. Could this be the experience of large numbers of the disadvantaged Southern European Second Generation, concentrated as they are in deprived areas?

Whilst this may be one consequence, what is known from the wider literature is that deprived neighbourhoods have been very difficult places for children from minority ethnic groups to grow up in (Mumford and Power, 2003). At the extreme, this has been highlighted over the years by the disturbances among Pakistani and Caribbean youth that have taken place in highly deprived areas, such as Brixton in London, Toxteth in

Liverpool, and Manningham in Bradford. These have shown that the alienation caused by the combination of racism and neighbourhood deprivation is particularly strong.

#### *4.45 Parents Immigrant Group*

What might be the expected ‘effect’ of the Second Generation’s origin group; the combined country of origin and ethnic group indicator that categorizes individuals into a particular migration stream. To what extent will this be a significant predictor of outcomes compared to those who are children of UK-born parents?

‘Ethnic effects’ are frequently discussed in terms of penalties, and the residual impact of ethnicity in explaining, for example, higher levels of unemployment having accounted for a range of characteristics notably, education. For some, it equates to discrimination, but as Heath and McMahon point out, it does not have that causal quality.

‘We use the expression “ethnic penalty” to refer to all the sources of disadvantage that might lead an ethnic group to fare less well in the labour market than do similarly-qualified Whites. In other words, it is a broader concept than that of discrimination, although discrimination is likely to be a major component of the “ethnic penalty”. We should note that statistical data of the kind available from the Census do not allow us to distinguish discrimination from other sources of disadvantage’ (Heath and McMahon, 1995, see also Berthoud 2002 p. 6<sup>52</sup>)

An ‘ethnic effect’ captures shared qualities within the group that could reflect the experience of discrimination, but could also relate to any other shared characteristic of the group, not brought out in the control variables used. This could include factors such as language, or contexts of reception (National Research Council, 2004).

Whilst ‘ethnic effects’ are typically conceptualised as ‘penalties’, they can also be positive. Having accounted for a range of characteristics, being from a particular group may be positively associated with a certain outcome (see for example Leslie et al., 2002;

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52 See also Berthoud, R (2000)

Portes and Hao, 2004). This may, for example, be capturing aspects of hidden social class, discussed earlier, high levels of perceived self-efficacy that may be associated with immigrant families, or the resource provided by the co-ethnic community.

#### **4.5 Hypotheses for the Second Generation Groups**

Developing hypotheses for how the Second Generation groups will fare is complicated. I discussed in Chapter 1 the problem of analyses which focus on outcomes at the aggregate level. Given that, attempting to aggregate a wide range of potential explanatory factors to estimate their combined impact in producing an aggregate outcome is, from a rigorous empirical perspective, highly challenging. Moreover the process continues to make assumptions based on aggregates, rather than acknowledging heterogeneity within groups and trying to explain intergenerational process in terms of those differences.

Yet it seems a worthwhile task nonetheless for two main reasons. Firstly, the next Chapter focuses on aggregate outcomes of the different Second Generation groups. Aggregate outcomes are an important classificatory tool and criticism of over-reliance on them in explaining processes does not mean they can be ignored altogether. As Song (2004 p. 873-4) has argued:

‘The collective positioning of groups within a racial hierarchy may obscure important forms of internal variation within groups and complex forms of stratification interweaving class, gender and race. Regional differences in the treatment and experiences of groups are, of course, also possible... Nevertheless the question – who is worse off than others – should not be off limits, either politically or intellectually. We should not overlook the possibility that some groups experience particular or distinctive forms of racial abuse or disadvantage more frequently or more intensely than other groups.’

Secondly, in analysing the precursors of 1991 outcomes for the Second Generation I am attempting to achieve two things. At the level of the individual, I am trying to understand

the diversity within groups and explain why, for example, someone from one group may be in social class i/ii whilst another is in social class iv/v. However at the group level, I am attempting to offer alternative explanations for the aggregate picture that go beyond the 'discrimination versus cultural ascription paradigm' discussed in Chapter 1. To what extent can you explain why one group has a certain proportion in a certain social class in terms of their social class origins, their regional profile or their parent's entry to the UK at a certain age? Such an approach can give a more nuanced perspective to aggregate outcomes.

One way of combining the theory of intergenerational mobility as discussed, with the broad range of factors and the baseline data that we have on the immigrant populations in 1971, is to conduct a hypothesis exercise by constructing a table, as below, gauging the cumulative impact of a range of factors. The categories and classifications are based on the theory and evidence discussed thus far, and the picture that emerges of the different First Generation groups in this Chapter. On each category, First Generation groups are scored as either 1 for less advantaged or 0 for more advantaged. The categories are as follows:

- *Discrimination*: there is much evidence that discrimination has had an effect on life chances for minority ethnic groups.
- *English as a second language*: For the children of parents who do not speak English, this could be an important barrier
- *Concentrated outside the South-east region*: The changing labour market between 1971 and 1991 may well have favoured those groups concentrated in the South-East rather than the North and Midlands
- *Lacking parental human capital*: Parental education is an important predictor of outcomes and having parents with higher qualifications would be expected to be associated with advantaged outcomes
- *Small professional/managerial class*: Not only are those from more advantaged backgrounds more likely to have more advantaged outcomes but the argument is made that being in a community with a middle class population creates the conditions in which all are more likely to experience upward mobility

- *High Deprivation (lacking basic household amenities):* Poverty is a powerful predictor of outcomes for children. The more deprivation in one group the more disadvantaged outcomes would be expected.
- *Young population:* Within the cohort of the Second Generation in this study, the younger population are less likely to have had the opportunity to achieve more advantaged outcomes
- *Lacking positive immigrant effect:* The previous evidence suggests that the relationship between social class origins and destinations is weaker for immigrants and the Second Generation. Several positive explanations were posited for this, such as hidden social class and greater levels of aspiration and perceived self-efficacy.

**Table 4.8 Hypothesis Exercise:** Disadvantaged scores 1; not disadvantaged scores 0

	Discrimination	Language	Regional Disadvantage	Human Capital	Social Disadvantage	Poverty and Deprivation	Age Effect	Immigrant Effect
	<i>Experience of Discrimination</i> <sup>53</sup>	<i>English as a second language</i>	<i>More than 50% Concentrated outside South-East region</i>	<i>Fewer than 10% with higher qualification or students</i>	<i>Fewer than 15% in Social Class i/ii</i>	<i>Over 25% without sole use of basic amenities</i>	<i>Over 50% aged under 35</i>	<i>Lacking positive Immigrant effect (hidden social class, perceived self-efficacy)</i>
COUKB <sup>54</sup>	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	1
'White' English Speaking <sup>55</sup>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Irish	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Eastern European	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Southern European	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	0
Indian	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
Caribbean	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	0
Pakistani	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0

	Scores out of 8
COUKB	2
'White' New Commonwealth	0
Irish	1
East European	3
Caribbean	4
Southern European	5
Indian	5
Pakistani	7

53 I recognise that there is increasing evidence of racism experienced by 'White' groups such as those of Irish and Turkish origin. Whilst not diminishing that discrimination there is not the evidence that these groups have experienced the kind of discrimination that had affected their structural outcomes in the same way as those of Caribbean and South Asian origins..

54 Children of UK born parents

55 Combined 'White' New Commonwealth and Old Commonwealth and USA groups (not Irish)

How can this table be interpreted? The ‘White’ English Speaking (non Irish) group had overwhelming advantages in its favour and would be expected to have advantaged outcomes. The Irish Second Generation was relatively advantaged, with similar prospects perhaps to the children of UK-born parents (COUKBs). A middle group of Eastern and Southern Europeans, Indians and Caribbean were disadvantaged on a number of measures. However the Pakistani group stands out as the most disadvantaged. This reflects the latter group’s position on a range of indicators examined in this Chapter.

To those familiar with the situation of minority ethnic groups in the UK these conclusions may be, in part, surprising. The notion that Second Generation ‘white’ immigrants would have mobility similar to those of Indian and Caribbean origin may seem dubious given the pernicious impact of racism and discrimination. Moreover evidence that the situation of the Indian origin population is substantially more advantaged than those of Caribbean origin would throw doubt on my hypotheses.

This exercise has obvious flaws. Whilst based on theory, the choice of particular indicators is arbitrary. For those categories that are data-based, the thresholds are arbitrary. For the other categories, the answers are subjective. Most problematically, the table acts as if the weight of each of these factors is the same and that they operate in the same way for all the Second Generation groups, when this is clearly not the case.

Nevertheless, the hypothesis exercise is useful. It offers a way of organising the diverse factors that may feed into Second Generation outcomes. With the benefit of longitudinal data analysis, it will be possible to then reflect on the appropriate predictive value of different aspects of the 1971 circumstances of children of immigrants, having observed their outcomes in 1991. It will perhaps suggest certain factors that have been overestimated and others that are underestimated or even left out all together, in trying to understand the aggregate outcomes of Second Generation groups.

#### 4.6 Conclusion

This Chapter surveyed the situation of a wide range of immigrant groups in England and Wales in 1971. Drawing on some of the broader literature that considered several groups' migration histories, but mostly using cross-sectional data from the ONS Longitudinal Study, the Chapter painted a portrait of great diversity between groups. At one end of the scale, 'White' English speaking immigrant groups were heavily advantaged across a broad range of domains, and appeared socially and economically integrated on measures such as intermarriage and neighbourhood residence. At the other end of the scale, several groups were much more disadvantaged than the native population, with those of Pakistani origin standing out. The Chapter concluded by drawing on the theory of Chapter 2 and the data of this Chapter, to consider how the different 1971 characteristics may act as precursors for 1991 outcomes. Moreover it considered the extent to which cumulative consideration of such precursors may give clues as to the aggregate outcomes for different Second Generation Groups. It is to these aggregate outcomes that I now turn.

## 5 - The Second Generations: Outcomes in 1991

### 5.1 Introduction

This Chapter considers the situation of the Second Generation in 1991 using the ONS Longitudinal Study. These are the children of the UK's 1971 immigrant population; aged between 0-16 in 1971, and by 1991, aged 20-36. We can observe their outcomes in early adulthood on a range of domains. The way in which the Second Generation as a whole, and the particular origin groups, were derived was discussed in Chapter 3.

This Chapter has two stages. Firstly, it compares the situation of the whole Second Generation to that of the children of UK-born parents (COUKBs). As discussed in Chapter 3, this provides results for a literature and discourse focussing on the overall impact and consequences of migration. Then the Chapter considers the Second Generation by origin group, again comparing their situation to that of the COUKBs. Through this, an understanding of the aggregate picture of different groups emerges, alongside evidence of the diversity of experiences within the particular Second Generation populations.

This Chapter mostly uses descriptive statistics. In each section, I focus on a range of outcomes: demographic, geographic, housing and deprivation, education and labour market related. Each section concludes with an analysis of the key outcomes of the study, as discussed in Chapter 3; these relate to social class, unemployment and the Index of Deprivation. These are the outcomes which are analysed in greater detail both in this and subsequent chapters.

I also consider the outcomes in terms of age, and in certain instances, gender differences. It is important to bring these aspects to the fore of the analysis. Given the focus on a population aged 20-36, a lack of consideration of age could easily give results which appear to suggest substantive differences between groups when in reality they simply

reflect different age distributions. These ages are a time of particular flux and volatility in terms of establishing career paths and access to resources. Those who are younger may still be in full time study, or experiencing disadvantage in the youth labour market<sup>56</sup>. Those who are older may have more settled careers, and may have accumulated resources. Moreover, the household situation may well be different across this age span. Some of the sample may still be living with parents; others will be parents themselves.

The important consideration of gender is less connected to how the sample is defined and more to substantive analytical understanding. Given what is known about gendered differentiation of experience and outcomes, and previous research suggesting its critical role in understanding migration and Second Generation experiences, it is important to bring this dimension into the presentation of descriptive statistics.

## **5.2 The Second Generation: All the children of immigrants**

### *5.21 Demographic characteristics*

As Table 5.1 shows, the Second Generation had a much younger profile than the COUKBs. This reflects the fact that, as was seen in the previous chapter, a significant proportion of immigrants in England and Wales in 1971 were young adults who had arrived in the preceding decade. Immigrants had a younger age profile than the wider UK population in 1971, therefore their children had a younger age profile in 1991. The ten percentage points more of COUKBs in the 31-36 age range may well be reflected in the relative social position of the two groups.

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<sup>56</sup> Male unemployment (proportion actively seeking work) was twice the rate for 18-24 year olds as for 25-44 year olds in 1991 (ONS, 2002)

**Table 5.1 Percentage by age range and sex<sup>57</sup>**  
**COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991**

	% in each age range			Row totals 100%	% Male Female	
	20-24	25-30	31-36		Male	Female
COUKB	29	38	34		50	51
Second Generation	34	42	24		48	52

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

The Second Generation would be expected to have had the same sex ratio as the COUKBs. Although the differences were small, that the Second Generation had a higher proportion of women suggests further investigation may be important. One possible explanation for this is greater out migration by Second Generation males. However, a further possibility, and a more concerning one, could be that it reflects selection bias of some sort. The under-enumeration of young adult men from certain minority ethnic groups in the 1991 census could directly feed into this (Owen, 1996; Simpson, 1996). I examine this in further detail in Chapter 8.

The different age structure of the two groups appears to be reflected in their household composition. Whilst nearly 60% of COUKBs were in 'two adult, no dependent households', this was the case for only 40% of the Second Generation. By contrast, they were much more likely to be 'non married individuals'. The Second Generation were slightly more likely to be 'lone parents' than COUKBs. When I consider only women in households with children however, the differences become starker. Nearly twice as many women of the Second Generation were heading lone parent families than COUKBs. At over a third of all the Second Generation, this represents a high proportion. Whether or not lone parenthood had the same implications for Second Generation families as for COUKBs is an important question.

<sup>57</sup> The descriptive data in figures and tables in this Chapter are rounded to the nearest whole number for the purposes of simplicity and accessible presentation. Percentages do not therefore always add up to 100%. Frequency counts for bivariate tables can be calculated from the total number in each group (see Table 3.3). For multivariate tables in this and subsequent Chapters, frequency counts can be calculated by reference to the tables in Appendices 1-3.

**Table 5.2 Percentage by type of Household  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991**

	<i>COUKBs (%)</i>	<i>Second Generation (%)</i>
Non married individuals	33	48
Lone parent with dependent children	5	8
Two Adults, no children	21	16
Two adults, dependent children	39	26
Other	2	3
Column total (%)	100	100

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

**Table 5.3 Percentage in lone parent households for women in households with children  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991**

	<i>Lone Parent Households (%)</i>
COUKBs	19
Second Generation	34

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

## 5.22 *Regions and neighbourhoods*

Table 5.4 shows that the majority of the Second Generation were living in London and the South East, whilst secondary concentrations existed in the North-West/Yorkshire and Humber, and Midlands regions. The South West, North-East, Wales and East of England were home to more than a quarter of COUKBs, but less than a tenth of the Second Generation. These patterns strongly mirror what was seen in 1971 (see Table 4.18). It shows the Second Generation maintaining, at least at the broad regional levels, the patterns of residence established by their parents.

**Table 5.4 Percentage by region of England and Wales;  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991**

	<i>South-east</i>	<i>Midlands</i>	<i>North-West / Yorkshire and Humber</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Row total (%)</i>
COUKB	31	19	24	27	100
Second Generation	56	22	15	8	100

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

The Second Generations were nearly twice as likely to live in deprived areas as the COUKBs as shown in Table 5.5. Immigrants disproportionately settle in the major urban conurbations, and specifically London, and it is in these places where the most deprived areas are found. As with regions, the evidence is that settlement patterns of the Second

Generation in 1991, at this smaller level of the neighbourhood, resembled those of their parents in 1971.

**Table 5.5 Percentage living in the quartile of most deprived areas (Carstairs Indicator)<sup>58</sup> COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991**

	<i>% in most deprived areas</i>
COUKB	36
Second Generation	60

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

However these areas may have had characteristics, other than being deprived, that make them particularly attractive to the Second Generation. Specifically, they may have been areas which contained a co-ethnic community and as such provided a range of resources in terms of family, social networks and cultural and religious services and institutions (Daley, 1998; Peach, 1998). These could apply to the wider population as well, although it is conceivable that they exerted a stronger pull on the Second Generation.

### *5.23 Housing and deprivation*

The housing tenure profile of the two groups was broadly similar. Given the situation in 1971 this may be surprising. The COUKBs were marginally more likely to be owner occupiers, but the Second Generation, rather than being found more in the private rented sector, were actually more likely to be in the socially rented sector. The small proportion in this sector in 1971, and the evidence that immigrants found it particularly difficult to access social housing, suggests that a shift occurred over the period. The Second Generation had become more effective at securing social housing by 1991 than their parents generation were in 1971.

However, there are other potential explanations. It could also represent a generational and periodic shift in the meaning of social housing whereby the provision became increasingly residualised, and with residence increasingly associated with social disadvantage and less a sought after commodity (Peach and Byron, 1993; Burrows, 1997; Phillips, 1998). Furthermore, the relative suburbanisation of 'white' populations from

many inner urban areas may have also released social housing for minority ethnic groups (Lupton and Power, 2004).

**Table 5.6** **Housing tenure by origin group (%)**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991

	<i>Owner Occupiers</i>	<i>Private Rented</i>	<i>Social Rented</i>	<i>Row total (%)</i>
COUKB	71	10	18	100
Second Generation	69	9	22	100

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

As Table 5.7 shows, mirroring their parents' generation, the quality of owner occupied housing may not have been as high for the Second Generation as for COUKBs. Whilst similar proportions of those in owner-occupied housing were in the quartile of lowest overcrowding, a substantially higher proportion of the Second Generation were in the quartile of highest overcrowding.

**Table 5.7** **Household Overcrowding<sup>59</sup> by quartile among those in owner occupied housing (%)**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991

	<i>Housing Overcrowding: % by quartile</i>				
	<i>Lowest Density</i>	<i>Second Lowest</i>	<i>Second Highest</i>	<i>Highest Density</i>	<i>Row total (%)</i>
COUKB	28	31	28	13	100
Second Generation	27	26	25	22	100

In terms of general household overcrowding, across all tenures, the Second Generation were more disadvantaged than COUKBs. Whilst both groups had similar proportions in the quartile of lowest housing density, the Second Generation had seven percentage points more, in the quartile of highest overcrowding.

**Table 5.8** **Household Overcrowding by quartile (%)**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991

	<i>Housing Overcrowding: % by quartile</i>				
	<i>Lowest Density</i>	<i>Second Lowest</i>	<i>Second Highest</i>	<i>Highest Density</i>	<i>Row total (%)</i>
COUKB	25	29	29	17	100
Second Generation	25	26	25	24	100

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

58 The Carstairs indicator of local deprivation is calculated by area rates of: male unemployment, proportion of households in social classes iv/v, car ownership and overcrowding

59 Measured in people per room

The proportions without access to basic amenities, seen in Table 5.9, were similar for the two groups. However in terms of access to a car there were considerable differences, with a much lower proportion of the Second Generation having access. As mentioned earlier, this may simply be a product of the greater likelihood of the Second Generations living in urban and specifically inner urban areas, but it may also be a consequence of a comparative lack of resources.

**Table 5.9** Access to car and basic household amenities (%)  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991

	<i>With access to all basic amenities</i>	<i>With access to car</i>
COUKB	83	83
Second Generation	82	72

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

#### 5.24 *Education and the labour market*

The 1991 census only asked individuals' highest 'higher' qualification, referring to post-18 educational, vocational and professional qualifications. Whilst there was an expansion of higher qualifications between 1971 and 1991 it remains a relatively crude measure when considering the whole population, only capturing the educational qualifications of a small minority.<sup>60</sup>

Table 5.10 shows the Second Generation had marginally more individuals with 'higher qualifications' than the COUKBs. From one perspective this is surprising as the Second Generation were younger, and a higher proportion were of student age. However the period preceding 1991 also saw a rapid expansion of higher education, with a 50% increase in university places between 1981 and 1991 (Hodge, 2003). This would favour the younger cohort. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, many minority ethnic groups have higher rates of participation in higher education than the 'White UK' population (Modood, 2005 p. 297).

60 The 2001 Census by contrast asks for qualifications starting with GCSE's and GNVQ level 1; 'Higher qualifications are Levels 4 and 5. It will be a much more useful analytical instrument.'

**Table 5.10 Percentage with at least one higher qualification**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991

	<i>With Higher Qualifications (%)</i>
COUKB	15
Second Generation	17

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

The COUKBs had a better overall labour market position than the Second Generation. Economic activity is a measure of all those who are either in work or in education. 'Economically inactive', therefore refers to those detached from the labour market, including those looking for work, but also many (especially women), making an active choice to bring up family, and others who are disengaged from employment for various reasons such as ill health.

When disaggregated by sex, the results reveal an important distinction. Table 5.11 shows that amongst men, the Second Generations were much more likely to be inactive than the COUKBs (20% vs. 13%), whereas for women, this pattern was marginally reversed (33% vs. 31%). For men, this would suggest some comparative labour market disadvantage for the Second Generation. For women, by contrast, it may show a greater propensity for Second Generation women to seek employment.

**Table 5.11 Economic Inactivity (%) (Not in work or full-time education)**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991

	<i>% Economically Inactive</i>		
	<i>All</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>
COUKB	23	13	33
Second Generation	26	20	31

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

### 5.24 Key outcomes: social class, index of deprivation and unemployment

The Second Generation was more concentrated at both ends of the social class distribution<sup>61</sup>; higher proportions in social classes i/ii and ‘inactive’, although a smaller proportion in social class iv/v. This indicates a major transition from the situation of the immigrant population in 1971, who had smaller proportions in social class i/ii, and much more of the population in social class iv/v. It suggests that the Second Generation experienced a large amount of upward social mobility.

**Table 5.12 Social Class (%)**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991

	<i>i/ii</i>	<i>iiin/n</i>	<i>iv/v</i>	<i>Inactive</i>	Row Total (%)
COUKB	37	45	14	4	100
Second Generation	38	43	12	7	100

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Yet many of the Second Generation were disadvantaged and outside the labour market altogether. ‘Inactive’ could have different meanings. It could be that smaller proportions were not succeeding in accessing work throughout the full social class distribution. This would indicate some form of ethnic penalty operating for all jobs (Berthoud, 2000). Alternatively it could indicate that a higher proportion of the Second Generation were unable to access the lower end of the labour market. This would suggest something more in line with a Portes-like notion of downward assimilation into a situation of worklessness.

As explained in Chapter 3, the Index of Deprivation is a cumulative indicator taking account of: being in the most deprived quartile of neighbourhood deprivation, living in rented accommodation, lacking access to a car, being in the most overcrowded quartile of housing, and lacking sole access to all basic household amenities. There were sizeable differences between the two populations on the index of deprivation, with a quarter of the

61 As discussed in Chapter 3, there are missing data issues with the social class variable. Of those with a missing social class, many are students, many others are unemployed. In the following analysis students are coded with as social class i/ii while others with no class, who are economically inactive, are coded as ‘inactive’. The rationale is given in Chapter 3.

Second Generation in the 'most deprived' category compared to 16% of COUKBs. Nearly 40% of COUKBs, by contrast, were in the least deprived group compared to less than a quarter of the Second Generation.

**Table 5.13** **Levels of deprivation on the Index of Deprivation (%)**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991

	<i>Most Deprived</i>	<i>2nd Most Deprived</i>	<i>2nd Least Deprived</i>	<i>Least Deprived</i>	<i>Row Total (%)</i>
COUKB	16	17	28	39	100
Second Generation	26	23	28	24	100

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Unemployment refers specifically to those who are not in employment but who are actively seeking work. It is different to the broader notion of 'economic inactivity' which can reflect a choice to stay outside the world of paid work, as well as those unable to garner employment. Unemployment is therefore more indicative of particular barriers people face in accessing the labour market. Table 5.14 shows that the Second Generation experienced a much higher rate of unemployment than COUKBs; this is consistent with regular findings of higher unemployment amongst people from minority ethnic groups.

**Table 5.14** **Unemployment (%)**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991

	<i>Unemployed</i>
COUKB	9
Second Generation	15

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Table 5.15 shows quite clearly, what has been demonstrated previously for minority ethnic groups, that higher rates of unemployment were not simply a consequence of being less well qualified. Whilst both COUKBs and the Second Generation had substantially reduced rates of unemployment among those with higher qualifications, differences in the relative rates of unemployment were even greater than between those without higher qualifications. This matches the finding of Berthoud (1999).

**Table 5.15** Unemployment (actively seeking work) by higher qualification (%)  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991

	Unemployed (%)	
	With Higher Qualification	Without Higher Qualifications
COUKB	4	11
Second Generation	9	19

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

### 5.25 Analysis of key outcomes

I now turn to a series of logistic regression models to test whether apparent differences and similarities between the children of UK-born parents (COUKBs) and the Second Generation persist after controlling for age and sex. The details of the variables and results are shown below in Table 5.16. I give odds ratios and significance levels based on p-values for each independent variable, as well as p-values for the  $\chi^2$  for the individual models as a whole.

**Table 5.16** Variables in logistic regression models; coding in parentheses

<i>Dependent Variables</i> (all dichotomous unless stated):		<i>Coding</i>
Social Class i/ii		Social classes i/ii (1); Other social class (0)
Social Class iv/v/inactive		Social classes iv/v/no class (1); Other social class (0)
Most Deprived		Deprived on 3-5 indices on Index of Deprivation (1); All others (0)
Least Deprived		Deprived on 0 indices of Index of Deprivation (1); All others (0)
Unemployed		Actively Seeking Work (1); In work (0)
<i>Independent Variables:</i>		
Sex		Male (0); Female (1)
Age		Continuous
Second Generation		Children of UK-born parents (0); Second Generation immigrants (1)

**Table 5.17** Logistic Regression Models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	Social Class		Index of Deprivation		
	i/ii	iv/v/inactive	Most Deprived	Least Deprived	Unemployed
	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
Sex	1.07 ***	0.90 ***	1.22 ***	0.96 **	0.56 ***
Age	1.07 ***	0.95 ***	0.97 ***	1.04 ***	0.94 ***
Second Generation	1.12 ***	1.02	1.76 ***	0.50 ***	1.82 ***

Women were more likely to be in social class i/ii than other social classes (1.07:1) and they were less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive (0.90:1). Women were however, more likely than men to be 'most deprived' and marginally less likely to be in the 'least deprived' group. The greatest difference was on unemployment. Women were much less likely to be unemployed than men (0.56:1). This is not surprising as women outside the labour market are more commonly classified as economically inactive.

The age effects are significant, as expected for this population at a time of particular flux in their career and family lives. Being older appears consistently associated with more advantaged outcomes. Each year is associated with a significantly greater likelihood of being in social class i/ii (1.07:1), despite the deflating effect that would be expected by including students in this category. At the same time each year is associated with less chance of being in social class iv/v/inactive (0.95:1). The effects are smaller for the index of deprivation, however each year is still significantly associated with a lower likelihood of being 'most deprived', and a greater probability of being 'least deprived'. Those who were older are also significantly less likely to be unemployed (0.94:1).

The final row considers the Second Generation population as a whole versus the children of UK-born parents (COUKBs). The Second Generation had a greater likelihood of being in social class i/ii than the COUKBs having controlled for age and sex (1.12:1). However, neither group was significantly more likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive. The larger differences between the populations were on unemployment and the Index of Deprivation. The Second Generation population had a much greater chance of being in the 'most deprived' category than COUKBs (1.76:1) and were much less likely to be in 'least deprived' category (0.56:1). They were also much more likely to be unemployed (1.83:1).

## 5.26 *Discussion*

This section, focussing on the Second Generation, has revealed some interesting patterns. On the one hand the Second Generation appeared to achieve social class outcomes that well out-performed the situation of their parents twenty years previously. They were more likely to be in social class i/ii than the COUKBs whereas the immigrant population were much less likely to be in this social class in 1971. Moreover, whereas the immigrant population of 1971 was disproportionately found at the disadvantaged end the social class spectrum in 1971 this was not the case for the Second Generation. This is consistent with evidence that has shown high levels of social mobility for a range of minority ethnic groups.

However, the findings also mirror evidence from previous research that people from minority ethnic groups have a weaker attachment to the labour market. The Second Generation were more likely to be inactive, and this was reflected in a much greater probability of being unemployed. Given the gains made in social class, it is striking the extent to which the Second Generation remain disadvantaged in terms of their attachment to the labour market. Although not analysed in detail, this appeared to be problem for both those with higher qualifications and those without; this is not a straight story of social polarisation. This is consistent with some findings that focus on minority ethnic groups (for example Heath and McMahon, 1997; Heath and Yu, 2001).

The problems of securing employment may directly feed into a greater degree of deprivation experienced by the Second Generation. They were much less likely to have been in the 'least deprived' category, and much more likely to have been in the 'most deprived' category. For a variety of reasons therefore, it appears that they may have been unable to convert their occupational advantages into commensurate resources, relative to the children of UK-born parents.

### **5.3 The Second Generations: Different groups, different stories?**

Having considered the Second Generation as a whole, and viewed their aggregate outcomes in comparison to the population of children of UK-born parents (COUKBs), the analysis now turns to outcomes in terms of origin groups<sup>62</sup>. This begins to unpack the substantial diversity found within the Second Generation population.

Of the Second Generation groups, the Irish were the largest followed by a sizeable Caribbean Second Generation. The Indian and Southern European Second Generations were just over 10%. The Eastern Europeans, Pakistani, and 'White English Speaking' Second Generations ranged from just below, to just above 5% of the overall Second Generation study population.

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62 The Second Generation groups analysed in this Chapter are those discussed in Chapter 3.

**Table 5.18 The Second Generation Groups**

	<i>Study Population (n=)</i>	<i>% of Second Generation study population</i>
COUKB	95,037	-
Ireland	1,383	37.1%
Caribbean	968	26.0%
India	455	12.2%
Southern Europe	378	10.1%
Eastern Europe	215	5.8%
Pakistan	166	4.5%
‘White English Speaking’	161	4.3%
Column total (%)		100

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

### *5.31 Demographic characteristics*


Most of the groups had fairly similar sex profiles to the COUKB population, as would be expected. However it is notable that some groups did have significant majorities of one sex or another. The Caribbean, Eastern European and ‘White English Speaking’ Second Generations all had high proportions of women, whilst there were a higher proportion of men among the Pakistani Second Generation. As mentioned earlier, this could indicate selective patterns of out-migration amongst the Second Generation. One could speculate that amongst Caribbean immigrants, this could reflect a pattern of sending some boys back to countries of origin to complete schooling and them staying there (Phillips and Potter, 2003). Amongst Pakistanis, perhaps more women than men, return to Pakistan for marriage. However a more concerning possibility would be selection bias driven by under-enumeration of certain groups such as young men of Black-Caribbean origin (Simpson, 1996). This could potentially affect impact on the representativeness of the sample.

**Table 5.19      Sex by origin group**  
 COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991

	<i>% Female</i>
COUKB	51
Ireland	51
Eastern Europe	55
Southern Europe	45
Caribbean	56
India	52
Pakistan	38
‘White English Speaking’	59

The reason for different age profiles among the different groups is more straightforward and has clearer implications for the overall analysis of the study. The different age profiles of the different groups in 1971, observed in the previous chapter, would be expected to be reflected in the age profiles of their children. Although it might be expected that the South Asian women have children younger, the critical mechanism here is the particular migration stream of parents. Figure 5.1 shows the proportions for each group aged 20-24, 25-30 and 31-36. For those groups whose migration was later (or in the particular case of the ‘White English Speaking’ Second Generation, younger) this is reflected in a much younger profile for their children in 1991. Thus the Eastern European Second Generation had a relatively old age profile. The Caribbean, Indian and Pakistani Second Generations were all much younger, progressively so with the latter group heavily skewed to the youngest age bracket; over 70% aged 20-24. These groups had very small proportions in the oldest age bracket. Given what is known about under-enumeration, estimates of the older proportion for certain groups such as the Caribbean Second Generation may even be inflated.


**Figure 5.1** Percentage in particular age range by origin group  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

As shown in Figure 5.2, there were different patterns of household composition amongst the different groups. All Second Generation groups had more non-married individuals and fewer households containing two adults with or without dependent children than the COUKBs. Some groups had a higher rate of lone parent households; this would be expected given the higher rate for the Second Generation as a whole.


**Figure 5.2 Household make-up by origin group**  
 COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

The differences in proportions of lone parent households are brought out most strongly when focussing only on women in households where there are children. There are some major disparities (Figure 5.3). Amongst COUKBs, almost a fifth of women were heading a lone parent family. Three groups - the Southern and Eastern European, and Indian Second Generations - had rates of about half of this. Other groups had far higher rates. Over 70% of Second Generation Caribbean women in households with children were lone parents. This is an extremely high rate, but consistent with other sources (Lindley and Dale, 2004a). Amongst the 'White English Speaking' Second Generation 49% were lone parents and amongst Pakistanis the rate was nearly a third. These rates are higher than may be expected although the numbers of lone parents in both these groups are low and ought to be treated with caution.

**Figure 5.3** Percentage of lone parents; all women in households with children  
COUKBs and Second Generation in 1991




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

### 5.32 Region and neighbourhood

The Second Generations maintained different settlement patterns from the COUKB population, mirroring those of their parents' generation. Whilst the COUKBs were fairly evenly spread across all the regions of England and Wales, other groups had particular concentrations in other areas: the Caribbean, Irish, Southern European and 'White English Speaking' Second Generations in the South-East, the Indians in the South-East and Midlands, and the Pakistanis in the North and Midlands. Few of the Second Generation lived in the South-West, North-East, East Anglia or Wales, reflecting their concentration in the major urban areas plus, in certain cases, particular towns in the South East and the old Northern industrial belt.


**Figure 5.4** Region of Residence by Immigrant Group  
COUKBs and Second Generation in 1991



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Major disparities between the different groups are evident in terms of residence in deprived areas. Whilst 32% of COUKBs lived in the most deprived quartile of wards 82%, 79% and 67% of the Pakistani, Caribbean and Indian Second Generations were concentrated in these areas. All Second Generation groups had higher proportions in these areas than the COUKBs; however the concentrations for some groups were smaller. There is an apparent age effect; in seven out of eight groups the older cohort was less likely to live in a deprived neighbourhood. However the differences vary, with small reductions for the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations, and much larger ones for the Indian, Irish and Eastern and Southern European Second Generations. This age effect is likely to be a sign of greater financial resources. But what are the implications if the deprived area exerted a pull for a Second Generation population connected to ethnic communities? Did it have a greater pull for the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations than other groups, or did they simply not have the resources to leave these areas? Were those in less deprived neighbourhoods also living in co-ethnic communities, or were those areas more likely to be more ethnically mixed?

**Figure 5.5** Percentage in most deprived quartile of wards on Carstairs indicator of deprivation by origin group and age  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

### 5.33 Housing and deprivation

There were large differences in the housing tenure profiles between the groups, as shown in Figure 5.6. Several groups had relatively high rates of owner occupation, including the Southern and Eastern European, Pakistani and Indian Second Generations; the latter having much the lowest rate of residence in social housing. This was a pattern seen for the South Asian groups in 1971. The Irish and 'White English Speaking' Second Generations had a housing profile similar to COUKBs. The Caribbean Second Generation were marked by particularly low rates of owner occupation and by far the highest rate of residence in social housing (40%). This increase in concentration in social housing represented a shift from private rented housing amongst the First Generation. It was a consequence of all the issues discussed earlier: less discrimination in the sector, widespread residualisation of social housing and the suburbanisation of the 'white' population from inner urban areas (Peach and Byron, 1993). Whilst in some groups, most notably the Irish Second Generation, there was a higher proportion of renters among those who were younger; this was not the situation of the Caribbean Second Generation.<sup>63</sup>

**Figure 5.6** **Housing tenure by Second Generation Group (%)**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

63 It is important to note that some LS members may be living with their parents

As was shown for the immigrant population in 1971, tenure may only tell part of the story. Overcrowding is another important dimension of housing. There were three groups, COUKBs, the Eastern European and 'White English Speaking' Second Generations, with low levels of overcrowding; Southern Europeans, Irish and Caribbean Second Generations were divided roughly evenly across the quartiles of overcrowding. However, the Indian and most strikingly, the Pakistani Second Generation, were overwhelming concentrated in the more overcrowded housing; 39% and 53% in the bottom quartile.

**Figure 5.7 Quartile of household overcrowding by Second Generation Group and age (%)**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

As with the 1971 immigrant population, there appears to have been a pay-off between tenure and overcrowding for certain groups. For example, Table 5.20 shows the vast differences between proportions in owner-occupied housing who were in the quartile of highest overcrowding. Whilst most groups had less than a one in four chance of being in this position, the two groups with the highest rates of owner-occupation, the Indian and Pakistan Second Generations, had over 40% and nearly 60% likelihood of being in the quartile of highest overcrowding.

**Table 5.20** **Household Overcrowding by origin group among those in owner occupied housing, percentage in each quartile highest overcrowding; COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991**


	<i>% in Owner Occupied housing in quartile of highest overcrowding</i>
COUKB	13
Eastern Europe	9
White' English Speaking	15
Ireland	16
Southern Europe	19
Caribbean	22
India	41
Pakistan	57

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Access to basic amenities is another indicator of the housing quality. I distinguish between those who do not have access to one of their own bath or shower, an inside toilet or central heating, as opposed to those who have access to all three. As can be seen in Figure 5.8, access to all three was the norm. The Pakistani Second Generation, with 40% lacking basic amenities, were by far the most disadvantaged on this variable. Amongst the other groups, the distribution was fairly narrow. The Indian and Caribbean Second Generations were the only other two groups who were more disadvantaged than the COUKB, although the difference was slight.

Figure 5.8 suggests that the access to amenities variable was not particularly responsive to age and sex. In all groups, with the exception of the Pakistanis, the proportion without access to all basic amenities declined as age increased. This is what would be expected, although in several cases the difference is not particularly great. The situation of the Pakistanis, with the older population having less access to basic amenities, is puzzling. One possibility may be that higher fertility rates at younger ages fed into the associated costs of larger families, with the consequence of living in inferior housing.

**Figure 5.8** Percentage lacking at least one of bath/shower, inside toilet (sole use of household) or central heating in home by origin group and age;  
COUKBS and the Second Generation in 1991




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Access to a car is one of the key deprivation indicators used in census analyses. The range between the groups was large; from 12% of the Southern European Second Generation lacking access, to 45% of the Caribbean Second Generation. This latter group had particularly low access, 10% lower than the Pakistani Second Generation, but this may at least partially reflect their much greater concentration in London. At the other end of the scale, the Indian and Eastern Europeans had similar proportions to the COUKBs, despite their greater concentration in urban areas.

Most groups exhibited the expected age effect, with the older cohort being more likely to be in a household with access to a car. Amongst certain groups, the difference appears substantial, with large differences in access for the older Indian, Eastern European and Irish Second Generations. Indeed, the older Indian Second Generation, were among the most likely to have access to a car, with only 13% lacking access. For other groups any age effects appear minimal.

**Figure 5.9 Percentage in a household lacking access to car by origin group and age range**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Proportion for Pakistani Second Generation aged 26-36 not disclosed because of small cell sizes

### 5.34 Education and the labour market

Table 5.21 shows the proportions economically inactive, (not in education, training or employment). 23% of COUKBs were inactive, and all but two groups were within three percentage points of this (plus or minus). The Caribbean Second Generation had the second highest proportion inactive, however considerably less than the Pakistani Second Generation, with by far the highest rates of inactivity at 42%.

**Table 5.21 Proportion economically inactive by origin group**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991


	<i>% Economically Inactive</i>
COUKB	23
Eastern Europe	20
India	22
'White English Speaking'	24
Ireland	25
Southern Europe	26
Caribbean	29
Pakistan	42

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

This measure should be highly sensitive to sex, as women are far more likely to be looking after children at home and therefore not in education or employment. As Figure 5.10 shows, this is almost always the case. Gender differences were greatest for the COUKBs, among whom there was a twenty percentage point difference between the inactivity rates for women and men. Other groups show varying, but smaller differences, perhaps revealing something important in the different patterns of labour market participation of the Second Generation groups.

The exceptional group appears to have been the Caribbean Second Generation. Among this population, inactivity rates were in fact slightly higher for men than women, and whilst men had the second highest inactivity rate, Second Generation Caribbean women had far lower inactivity rates than their COUKB, Irish, Southern European or Pakistani counterparts. This mirrors certain findings relating to the immigrants of 1971, although in 1971, Caribbean women had the highest rates of economic activity of all groups. This is an indication that as women's participation in the labour market generally expanded between 1971 and 1991, perhaps their relative position became more disadvantaged.

**Figure 5.10 Economic inactivity by origin group, age and sex**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

The relationship between inactivity and age is complicated. For certain groups, the COUKBs, Southern European, Eastern European, Irish and Indian Second Generations, inactivity rates appear to rise with age, whereas for the other groups' inactivity rates fell substantially, with age. This may well reflect two conflicting processes. On the one hand, employment becomes more common with age, however so does staying home and looking after children. Thus with a population aged 20-36, we may expect male inactivity rates to fall with age but female inactivity rates to rise.

As discussed earlier, the 1991 census education question only captures a small proportion of the education distribution. Of COUKBs, 15% had a higher qualification. This was exceeded or equaled by all groups, except for the Caribbean and Southern European Second Generations, among whom only 10% had higher qualifications. The Eastern European Second Generation stands out as relatively highly qualified.

With students more likely to be amongst the younger cohort, a greater proportion of the older cohort would be more expected to have qualifications. This is the case, although the overall between-group pattern remains the same. Certain groups stand out as having particularly large differences by age groups. This is especially so of the Pakistani Second Generation, although the overall numbers in their older cohort were small. However, the Indian and Caribbean Second Generations also appear to have particularly large differences by age. This may reflect a finding that these groups enter education in higher numbers in their twenties than the wider UK population, as a consequence of prior and ongoing disadvantages in education and the labour market (Ballard, web).

**Figure 5.11 Percentage with Highest Qualification by origin group and age range**  
 COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Figure 5.12 reveals an interesting pattern, as in all but one group there was a higher proportion of men with higher qualifications than women. This reflects the norms of the 1980s, when higher education still had a male bias.<sup>64</sup> However, among the Caribbean Second Generation there were a higher proportion of women with higher qualifications. Although the difference was marginal (2%) the pattern, relative to other groups, is indicative of the particular interaction of gender and educational qualifications within this group.

<sup>64</sup> As of 1995-6 the majority of those accepted to higher education courses were women and their proportion is increasing.

**Figure 5.12 Percentage with higher qualifications by origin group and sex**  
 COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

### 5.35 Key outcomes: social class, the index of deprivation and unemployment

Now I turn to three key outcome measures that will form a major part of the following analysis.

Table 5.22 shows the proportions of the Second Generation by origin group, in each of the four social class categories. First consider social class i/ii, the advantaged end of the social class spectrum. The Eastern European Second Generation had by far the highest proportion in this category. Three other groups had higher proportions than the COUKB population; the Indian, 'White English Speaking' and Irish Second Generations. The Pakistani Second Generation had marginally fewer than the COUKBs and the Southern Europeans had four percentage points less. The Caribbean Second Generation had particularly small proportions in this social class category, relative to other groups.

Whilst the proportion was ten percentage points fewer than the COUKBs, this still equates to more than one in four individuals.

**Table 5.22 Social class by origin group**  
COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991

	% <i>i/ii</i> <i>iiin/m</i> <i>Iv/v</i> <i>inactive</i> <i>Row totals (%)</i>				
	<i>i/ii</i>	<i>iiin/m</i>	<i>Iv/v</i>	<i>inactive</i>	<i>Row totals (%)</i>
COUKB	37	45	14	4	100
Eastern Europe	61	28	7	5	100
India	45	40	11	5	100
‘White English Speaking’	41	45	6	8	100
Ireland	37	43	14	6	100
Pakistan	36	27	18	19	100
Southern Europe	33	53	9	5	100
Caribbean	27	48	15	10	100

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study


At the other end of the class spectrum there was a more mixed situation for the Second Generation. Several groups, including the Eastern and Southern European and ‘White English Speaking’ Second Generations, had particularly low proportions in social class iv/v. The Indian and Irish Second Generations also had a smaller percentage than the COUKBs. However, the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations had higher proportions, particularly the latter.

Whilst all groups had higher proportions than the COUKBs in the inactive category, the Caribbean and Pakistani groups had much higher rates. Large proportions of these groups were therefore excluded from the labour market, especially the Pakistani Second Generation.

One way of understanding this picture is as a simple snapshot of the social class distribution in 1991, as described above. However, Figure 5.13 attempts to tell the story of changing circumstances from the First Generation in 1971 to the Second Generation in 1991, by comparing the outcomes of Table 5.22 to the cross-sectional picture of the immigrant groups in 1971, discussed in the previous chapter. Figure 5.13 presents the data in two ways. The light bar is the expansion (in percentage points), for each group in the proportions in social class i/ii comparing the immigrant population in 1971 with the Second Generation population in 1991. The dark bar is the percentage point change in relation to the UK population or COUKBs over the same period. If a certain group had ten percentage points fewer in social class i/ii than the UK-born population in 1971, and ten percentage points more in 1991 than the COUKBs, their 'catch-up rate' would be twenty percentage points.

As Figure 5.13 shows, all groups experienced a greater expansion in the proportions in the more advantaged social classes compared to the immigrant generation of 1971. This is not necessarily surprising; there was a significant expansion of these classes over the period with '*more room at the top*'. For some groups, the expansion was very substantial with the largest increases for the Eastern European, Indian and Pakistani Second Generations. Moreover, all groups had more substantial growth in proportions in social class i/ii relative to their First Generation forbears, than the growth experienced by the COUKBs in relation to the wider UK-born population. They all have a positive catch-up rate, of at least ten percentage points with the exception of the Caribbean Second Generation.


**Figure 5.13 Change in proportions in social class i/ii by origin group**  
Compares immigrant population in 1971 (aged 16-60) to Second Generation population in 1991 (aged 20-36)



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

As evidenced by Figure 5.14, all groups, particularly the Pakistani and Caribbean Second Generations, had much reduced proportions in social class iv/v relative to the First Generations in 1971. By contrast, the reduction of COUKBs in this category compared to the UK-born population in 1971 was small. This may indicate a relative lack of upward social mobility from the most disadvantaged social classes for this population, something that will be investigated further in subsequent chapters. However, as other research has highlighted, for the Pakistani and Caribbean Second Generations, there is a problem of exclusion from the labour market altogether. Both these populations saw large rises in the proportions 'inactive'. This also reflects structural change in the labour market which saw the rise in inactivity and workless households. However, it is notable the extent to which, among the study population examined in this research, these changes only really appear to impact on the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations.

**Figure 5.14** Change in Social Class Profile between immigrant population (aged 16-60) in 1971 and Second generation population (aged 20-36) in 1991




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> 'White' English Speaking Second Generation are not included because of small numbers

Part of the story may relate to the relative ages of the 1971 and 1991 populations being compared. The 1971 population was all of working age. Here the focus is on a population at the early stage of their careers. Yet even considering 1991 alone, age may well be expected to impact on these relative social class positions. Within the 20-36 age range, those who were older should be more likely to access those jobs with a more advantaged social class profile. This is brought out in Figure 5.15.

All groups show a major age effect and in certain groups those effects appear quite dramatic. Most notably, all had higher proportions of the older cohort in social class i/ii, despite the counteracting effect of including students in the social class category (the overwhelming majority of whom were in their early twenties). There was also a large reduction in the proportion inactive amongst the older cohort, particularly amongst the Caribbean and Indian Second Generations.

Figure 5.15 Social Class by origin group and age: difference in percentage points between ages 20-25 and 26-36 cohorts; COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Eastern Europe, Pakistani and 'White English Speaking' Second Generations are not included because of small numbers

There do not appear to be simple patterns of differences in the social class positions of men and women (Figure 5.16). Amongst COUKBs and the Irish Second Generation there were more men in social class iv/v and more women in the 'inactive' category. Amongst the Eastern European Second Generation there were proportionately many more women in the social class i/ii but amongst Southern Europeans there were the same proportions, with more women in social class iiin/m and many more men in social class iv/v. Amongst the Caribbean Second Generation there was a higher proportion of women in social class i/ii and more men in social class iv/v. There were more Second Generation Indian men in both these classes and among the Pakistani Second Generation there were higher proportions of men in social class i/ii and more women in both social class iv/v and inactive categories. This pattern of relative female disadvantage was only matched and exceeded by the 'White English Speaking' Second Generation.

**Figure 5.16** Social Class by origin group and sex: difference in percentage points between proportions of men and women in each social class category; COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

I now turn to the Index of Deprivation. Two groups, the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations, stand out as having had by far the highest proportions in the 'most deprived' category; 42% and 43% respectively.

**Table 5.23 Percentage in 'most deprived' and 'least deprived' categories on the Index of Deprivation; COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991**


	% Most Deprived      Least Deprived	
	Most Deprived	Least Deprived
COUKB	16	39
Eastern Europe	13	41
Southern Europe	13	37
India	18	18
'White English Speaking'	22	30
Ireland	22	29
Caribbean	42	8
Pakistan	43	4

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Deprivation ought to decrease with age, as individuals have access to greater resources. However, especially given the particular ages being focused on, there may be confounding effects where some people are either moving out of the family home, or they are starting families and are constrained by related costs. With the exception of the Irish Second Generation, the impact of age is small. For this group, almost one third of the younger cohort was in the 'most deprived' category; a higher proportion than anyone except for the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations. However, the proportion of the older cohort in the 'most deprived' category is similar to other groups. For most groups there was a reduction, although only slight, in the proportion in the older cohorts. In two groups, the 'White English Speaking' and Pakistani Second Generations, the pattern was in fact reversed.

In the 'least deprived' category, the patterns broadly appear the reverse of the 'most deprived' category. Very small fractions of the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations were in the 'least deprived' category. The one exception to the general pattern was the Indian Second Generation which had a smaller proportion in the 'least deprived' category than other groups with similar proportions in the 'most deprived' category.

**Figure 5.17 Percentage in the 'most deprived' category on Index of Deprivation by origin group and age**  
 COUKBs and Second Generation in 1991




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

The relationship between age and being in the 'least deprived' category on the Index of Deprivation is less ambiguous than age and the 'most deprived' category. As Figure 5.18 shows, in each group the older cohort were more likely to be in the 'least deprived' category as they accumulated resources. For some groups, the differences were very large; the older Irish and Eastern European Second Generations were nearly twice as likely to be in the 'least deprived' category as their younger counterparts.

However, for the Caribbean Second Generation the difference was small. As was evident in Figure 5.5, the older Caribbean Second Generation were no more likely to move out to less deprived neighbourhoods and this may feed into the above finding.

**Figure 5.18 Percentage in 'least deprived' category on Index of Deprivation by origin group and age; COUKBs and Second Generation in 1991**




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Data for the Pakistani Second Generation was not disclosed

There appears some variation according to sex on the Index of Deprivation. In the 'most deprived' category women were more likely to be more deprived in 5 out of 7 groups, and there was little difference in the other two. The difference was most pronounced in the Caribbean Second Generation, among who nearly half of the women were in the 'most deprived' category. This is especially notable given the relatively better educational and labour market positions of the Caribbean Second Generation women. Conversely, there were also greater proportions of women in the 'least deprived' category among certain groups.

**Figure 5.19** Percentage by 'most deprived' and 'least deprived' on the Index of Deprivation by origin group and sex  
COUKBS and Second Generation in 1991




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Pakistani Second Generation are not included because of small numbers

The unemployment rate among COUKBs was 8% (see Figure 5.20). This is the lowest rate for any group apart from the East European Second Generation. There were steadily rising unemployment rates through several groups with 14% of the Indian Second Generation unemployed. However, there are substantial differences between all the groups and the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations; for these groups one quarter and one fifth were, respectively, unemployed. This partially helps to explain the very large proportions of these groups in the social class inactive category.

**Figure 5.20 Percentage unemployed by Second Generation group and age range**  
 COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Pakistani Second Generation age data is not included because of small numbers

Age appears to play an important role here. All groups apart for Eastern Europeans show substantial reductions in unemployment with age. So whilst the older Caribbean Second Generation were more likely to be in work than their younger counterparts, the gap between them and the older cohort of other groups was wider.

There were important differences by sex, when looking at unemployment. As mentioned previously, male unemployment rates are generally higher than those of women, who, if out of work were more likely to be classified as 'economically inactive'. This is reflected amongst all Second Generation groups, but for the Indian Second Generation the difference was marginal. Among all women, those of the Caribbean Second Generation had the highest unemployment rate, reflecting their greater participation in the labour market as well as other factors.


**Figure 5.21 Percentage unemployed by Second Generation group and sex  
COUKBs and Second Generation in 1991**



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Earlier in the Chapter it was shown that higher qualifications could not account for, but rather appeared to exacerbate the differences in unemployment rates between the Second Generation and the COUKBs. Figure 5.22 shows that for some groups this was not the case. Notably the Indian Second Generation had a very substantial fall in unemployment for those with qualifications. For the Irish and Caribbean Second Generations, the falls also appear relatively large (50%) although not equivalent to the reductions in unemployed COUKBs. For other groups, the reductions were much smaller. The Pakistani Second Generation are highly conspicuous. Those with higher qualifications in this group had higher rates of unemployment, than even the Caribbean Second Generation without qualifications.

**Figure 5.22 Percentage unemployed by higher qualifications, or lack of them and origin group COUKBs and the Second Generation in 1991**



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup>Data for Eastern Europeans was not disclosed

## 5.4 Analysis of Key Outcomes

As in the section of this Chapter that analysed the Second Generation as a whole, I now turn to a series of logistic regression models to test differences between the origin groups and the matching children of UK-born parents sample (COUKBs). I control for age and sex, and generate odds ratios which express the odds of someone from a specific Second Generation group experiencing a particular outcome.

**Table 5.24 Logistic Regression Models**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	Social Class		Index of Deprivation		
	i/ii Odds Ratio	iv/v/inactive Odds Ratio	'Most deprived' Odds Ratio	'Least deprived' Odds Ratio	Unemployed Odds Ratio
Sex	1.07 ***	0.90 ***	1.22 ***	0.96 ***	0.56 ***
Age	1.07 ***	0.95 ***	0.97 ***	1.03 ***	0.94 ***
Irish	0.99	1.10	1.53 ***	0.62 ***	1.37 ***
Eastern European	2.44 ***	0.62 **	0.82	1.01	1.05
Southern European	0.89	0.68 **	0.80	0.93	1.57 ***
Caribbean	0.72 ***	1.38 ***	3.62 ***	0.15 ***	2.79 ***
Indian	1.71 ***	0.70 **	1.08	0.38 ***	1.65 ***
Pakistani	1.30	2.07 ***	3.60 ***	0.07 ***	3.93 ***
White' English Speaking	1.26	0.71	1.43 *	0.70 **	1.71 **
Prob > chi2	***	***	***	***	***
n=	97529	97529	96875	96875	81799

\*\*\* p<0.01 \*\* p<0.05 \* p<0.1

In terms of access to social class i/ii, the Second Generation as a whole were relatively advantaged. However when looking at individual groups only the Eastern European and Indian Second Generations were significantly more likely to be in social class i/ii than COUKBs (2.4:1 and 1.7:1 respectively). Only the Caribbean Second Generation were significantly less likely to be in social class i/ii (0.72:1).

The same two groups - Eastern European and Indian Second Generations - as were associated with a greater likelihood of being at the upper end of the social class scale were also less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive. Being from Southern Europe is also associated with less chance of being at the lower end of the social class scale. However, for the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations, there was greater probability of being in this social class category (1.4:1 and 2.07:1 respectively).

In terms of the Index of Deprivation, the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations were much more likely to be in the ‘most deprived’ category than the children of UK-born parents, with odds ratios of 3.6:1. But the Irish Second Generation were also significantly more likely to be in this group. At the other end of the deprivation scale all groups except the Eastern and Southern Europeans Second Generations were significantly less likely to be in the ‘least deprived’ category than the COUKBs. This includes the ‘White English Speaking’ and Irish Second Generations with odds ratios of 0.70:1 and 0.62:1. However it is the Indian, Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generation with by far the lowest odds of being in the ‘least deprived’ category compared to COUKBs; 0.39:1, 0.15:1 and 0.07:1 respectively.

With the exception of those of Eastern European origin, all the other Second Generation groups were more likely to be unemployed than the COUKB population. For the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations however the odds of being unemployed were much higher; 2.8:1 and 3.9:1 respectively. This emphasises the particularly acute labour market disadvantage experienced by these Second Generation groups.

## 5.5 Discussion

These findings as a whole mirror much of the comparable research in this area to date and bear interesting comparison with the general hypotheses set out at the end of Chapter 4. The ‘White English Speaking’ Second Generation analyzed in Chapter 4 as ‘White New Commonwealth’ and Old Commonwealth and USA appeared to be an exceedingly advantaged group. Yet the Second Generation does not appear to have matched the outcomes of the immigrant generation of 1971. Their social class profile was not significantly different from the COUKBs and they were more likely to be in the ‘most deprived’ category (significant at the 10% level), less likely to be ‘least deprived’ and more likely to be unemployed. There was clearly large out-migration from the 1971 group (the immigrant groups in 1971 were relatively large) and it may be that the ‘stayers’ were less advantaged than those who left. It will be interesting to see in the following Chapters whether this story appears to be borne out.

The Eastern European Second Generation were more advantaged than their Southern European counterparts, with nearly twice the proportion in social class i/ii, fewer in social class iv/v or inactive and a smaller proportion unemployed. However the differences on the Index of Deprivation were small and (neither were significantly different to the COUKBs).

The Irish Second Generation, on whom there has been some research, appear to have broadly similar prospects to the COUKBs. In terms of social class outcomes this was the case, mirroring the findings of Hornsby-Smith and Dale (1988) and Harding and Balajaran (1996) which had showed upward social mobility for the Irish Second Generation and convergence with the social class structure of the 'White UK' population. However the Irish Second Generation remained disadvantaged compared to the COUKBs in terms of deprivation and unemployment.

The Indian Second Generation was in some respects worse off than the Irish Second Generation but on other outcomes more advantaged. Consistent with previous findings the Indian Second Generation overtook the children of UK-born parents in terms of access to more advantaged social classes (Heath and McMahon, 2005). Moreover at the aggregate level they did not exhibit particular polarization with relatively small proportions in the most disadvantaged classes. This may well feed into the fact that there were no significant differences between the Indian Second Generation and the COUKBs in proportions 'most deprived' on the Index of Deprivation. However, unlike what their general position suggested, the Indian Second Generation substantially less likely to be in the 'least deprived' category. Perhaps the general lack of resources in 1971 was still impacting on the next generation two decades later. The other factor which may feed into their lower likelihood of being in the 'least deprived' category may have been their greater probability of being unemployed. Despite their strong education and social class outcomes this greater likelihood remains (consistent with previous findings) that even those with higher qualifications were more likely to be unemployed than their COUKB counterparts. This was shown in Figure 5.22. Therefore, even if the Indian Second

Generation are able to access higher skilled jobs, spells of unemployment would make it harder to accumulate the resources which may equate with being in the 'least deprived' category.

The two groups which were consistently disadvantaged though on almost all dimensions were the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations. Amongst both, but especially the latter, there was evidence of significant polarization. There was substantial growth in the proportions in social class i/ii compared to the immigrant First Generation in 1971. However at the other end of the distribution there were very high proportions inactive as well as unemployment and deprived. Amongst the Caribbean Second Generation there was the clearest gender differentiation. Caribbean Second Generation women had relatively high labour market participation, and a higher social class profile than men but experienced higher rates of unemployment and deprivation.

The broad analysis of the Second Generation as a whole in the first half of the Chapter clearly suppressed a great deal of the diversity that exists between the different Second Generation groups. Yet two important stories that emerged for the Second Generation repeated themselves consistently across the individual Second Generation groups.

For all Second Generation groups the relative improvement in their class profiles versus the COUKB population was notable. It was not just a question of '*more room at the top*', but they were disproportionately filling that room. One contention is that their relatively lower social class profiles in 1971 make this finding unsurprising. This assumes that 'all things being equal' a 10% growth, for example, in social class i/ii would be equally spread across all groups. All things are not equal however; a range of factors could limit or promote mobility for Second Generation groups as discussed in Chapter 2. The consistency of the finding, across all groups, suggests something important distinguishes the apparently disadvantaged populations of the Second Generation and COUKBs. In the following Chapter I explore the relationship between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes to try and develop an understanding of how and why these differences emerged between the groups and across the period 1971-1991.

The second pattern that repeated itself across the groups was that the great strides made in terms of social class outcomes did not appear to bring commensurate gains in terms of deprivation and unemployment. Whilst the Second Generation groups made gains in education and enhanced their ability to attain higher status occupations their attachment to the labour market, whether qualified or not, was weaker. This may have fed into their greater levels of deprivation as well. The analyses in the next Chapters aim to explain better why these disparate outcomes occurred.

## **6 - From childhood characteristics to adult outcomes**

### **6.1 Introduction**

Chapter 4 examined the baseline situation of the immigrants to England and Wales in 1971. Chapter 5 described the position of the children of those immigrants according to a range of outcome measures in 1991. In Chapters 6 and 7, I attempt to exploit fully the longitudinal component of the ONS Longitudinal Study, drawing these two stories together in an effort to understand what it was about the 1971 situation that gave rise to the 1991 picture.

In examining this link between childhood circumstances and parental characteristics, with later life outcomes, this Chapter intends to begin answering certain questions:

- To what extent are different childhood circumstances associated with later life outcomes? Are some more strongly associated than others, and if so by how much?
- To what degree do the same patterns operate for the Second Generation and for children of UK-born parents (COUKBs)? To what degree are these patterns replicated across Second Generation groups?

In answering these broad questions the Chapter intends to shed light on some more specific questions:

- Can the outcomes observed in the previous chapter be understood in terms of 1971 background characteristics?
- How does controlling for 1971 characteristics in multivariate analyses impact upon our understanding of apparent Second Generation group differences and similarities on these outcomes?

The Chapter is structured similarly to the previous one. First, I consider the Second Generation as whole compared to COUKBs, starting with descriptive statistics followed by multivariate analyses of the associations between 1971 circumstances and adult

outcomes. Following this, I carry out a more in depth analysis of the Second Generation, initially focussing on groups individually, and then comparing them to each other and the COUKB population.

Five core outcomes are once again at the centre of this analysis. Two represent social advantage; social class i/ii and the ‘least deprived’ category on the index of deprivation. Three outcomes represent social disadvantage; social class iv/v/inactive, the ‘most deprived’ category on the index of deprivation and unemployed.

A broad range of variables are introduced as background characteristics. These were first discussed in the hypothesis generation section of Chapter 4. All are measured in 1971, when those followed in this study lived with at least one parent. They are described in

**Table 6.1.** Those variables with the suffix “(missing)” are for missing values and are only used in the multivariate analyses.

**Table 6.1** **Background characteristics and variables used in Chapter 6 descriptive and multivariate analyses**

‘Reference category’ refers to the multivariate analysis;

‘At times combined’: certain categories on some variables are combined to deal with small sample sizes

<i>Category</i>	<i>Variable – all 1971</i>	<i>Other treatment of variable</i>
One parent with a higher qualification	Without Higher Qualifications	Reference Category
	With Higher Qualifications	
	Qualifications (missing)	
Household with access to a car	No Access to a Car	Reference Category
	Access to a Car	At times combined
	Access to 2 Cars	
Highest social class (Registrar-General’s) of parent	Social Class i/ii	Reference Category
	Social Class iii/m	
	Social Class iv/v	
	Social Class (missing)	
Father in work vs. out of work	Father Out of Work	Reference Category
	Father in Work	
	Father in Work (missing)	
Housing tenure	Owner Occupied Housing	Reference Category
	Social Rented Housing	At times combined
	Private Rented Housing	

Quartile of household overcrowding (rooms divided by persons in the household)	Least Overcrowded	Reference Category At times combined
	2nd Least Overcrowded	
	2nd Most Overcrowded	
	Most Overcrowded	
	Overcrowded (missing)	
Sole access of household to all basic amenities vs sharing or lacking some access	With all Basic amenities	Reference Category
	Lacking Basic Household Amenities	
Quartile of neighbourhood deprivation on Carstairs indicator	Least Deprived Neighbourhood	Reference Category At times combined
	2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood	
	2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood	
	Most Deprived Neighbourhood	
	Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)	
Region of residence in England or Wales	South-East Region	Reference Category
	North Region	
	Midlands Region	
	Other Region	
Household type	Multi-Parent Household	Reference Category
	Lone Parent Household	
	Lone Parent (missing)	
Age of Mother at birth	Mother aged 22-30 at birth	Reference Category At times combined
	Mother aged 31+ at birth	
	Mother aged 22 and under at birth	
	Young Mother (missing)	
Mother's age of entry to UK	Mother Age Entry 18-23	Reference Category
	Mother Age Entry 24-30	
	Mother Age Entry 31+	
	Mother Age Entry (missing)	
Mother's year of entry to UK	Mother Year of Entry (early)	Reference Category
	Mother Year of Entry (mid)	
	Mother Year of Entry (late)	
	Mother Year of Entry (missing)	
Father's age of entry to UK	Father Age Entry 18-23	Reference Category
	Father Age Entry 24-30	
	Father Age Entry 31+	
	Father Age Entry (missing)	
Father's year of entry to UK	Father Year of Entry (early)	Reference Category
	Father Year of Entry (mid)	
	Father Year of Entry (late)	
	Father Year of Entry (missing)	

## 6.2 COUKBs and the Second Generation: 1971 characteristics to 1991 outcomes

### 6.21 Social Class i/ii

Figure 6.1 shows the proportion of COUKBs who were in Social Class i/ii in 1991 by 1971 background characteristics. It appears that amongst COUKBs, strong continuities of class and relative socio-economic advantage exist. Those characteristics, indicative of relative social advantage, are most strongly associated with this outcome. Particularly salient are having parents with higher qualifications, in social class i/ii, and with access to two or more cars. There are marginally weaker associations for those who were living in the least overcrowded quartile of housing, in owner occupied housing and in the least deprived quartile of wards.

At the other end of the scale, those characteristics that denote relative disadvantage are weakly associated with being in social class i/ii. Those who were living in the most overcrowded quartile of housing, in social housing, without access to cars, with parents in social class iv/v, lacking basic household amenities and having a father out of work were much less likely to be in social class i/ii in 1991.

Figure 6.2 shows associations between 1971 characteristics and being in social class i/ii in 1991 for the Second Generation. For the Second Generation, excluding migration related variables, the same six variables, in similar proportions, are most strongly associated with being in social class i/ii in 1991 as for the COUKBs. However, certain migration variables also feature prominently. Having a mother and father who entered the UK prior to 1944, and having a father who entered before the age of 10, are strongly associated with this outcome.

There are theoretical reasons why these migration variables could be important. Those who had lived in the UK for longer would have had longer to adapt to their new country by 1971. Those entering at a young age would have completed most of their schooling and had greater opportunities for socialisation in the UK, potentially facilitating adaptation and upward mobility. However, thinking back to the previous chapters, there could be other explanations. For example, those groups that were particularly


disadvantaged both in 1971 and 1991, were few among the pre-1944 immigrants. ‘Arrival pre-1944’ could simply be identifying particular origin groups, advantaged for other reasons, rather than indicating an explanation. A further possibility is that age of entry is a proxy for children’s age. As most immigrants arrived at similar ages, those that arrived earlier also had their children earlier. The Second Generation of earlier migrants were, on average, older than other groups, giving them more time to establish relatively advantaged social class positions (especially given the age profile of the population in this study).

In terms of the salience of father’s age at arrival, Chapter 4 showed that a large proportion of young arrivals were from the groups that comprise the ‘White’ English Speaking Second Generation in this analysis; Old Commonwealth and USA and ‘White New Commonwealth’. People from these groups had a wide range of comparative advantages over and above their arrival in the UK at a young age. Any of these, such as being ‘White’, speaking English, cultural affinity or greater resources could explain the apparent effect.

At the bottom of the scale on Figure 6.2, the range among the variables most weakly associated with being in social class i/ii for the Second Generation, is narrower than for the COUKBs in Figure 6.1. For the COUKBs there are six variables more weakly associated with being in social class i/ii, than the variable with the weakest association among the Second Generation. For example, similar proportions of both groups, who were in lone parent households in 1971, were in social class i/ii in 1991. However whilst at 29% it is the characteristic most weakly associated with social class i/ii for the Second Generation, at 31% for the COUKBs it is only the eighth weakest.

Therefore, the figures suggest that COUKBs and the Second Generations had similar continuities of advantage, but that the COUKBs experienced a greater continuity of disadvantage. Among this group, the indicators of 1971 disadvantage have weaker associations with being in social class i/ii than among the Second Generation.


Figure 6.1 Percentage in Social Class i/ii in 1991 by 1971 characteristics; COUKBs



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Base range 86266-4665

Figure 6.2 Percentage in Social Class i/ii in 1991 by 1971 characteristics; Second Generation



Source ONS Longitudinal Study


<sup>1</sup> Base range 3842-210

This is brought out further in Figure 6.3 which highlights the similarities and differences in associations between 1971 background characteristics and social class outcomes in 1991 for COUKBs and Second Generation populations. It shows the proportion of the Second Generation in social class i/ii by each 1971 background characteristic subtracted from the equivalent proportion of the COUKB population. For example, 35% of COUKBs and 37% of the Second Generation, who were resident in the Midlands region in 1971, were in social class i/ii in 1991. The percentage-point difference is therefore 'two'.

As Figure 6.3 shows, having parents with higher qualifications, and living in owner occupied housing are more associated with COUKBs being in social class i/ii than the Second Generation. What might explain this? Immigrant parents, for a variety of reasons, may be less likely to accrue the associated benefits of higher qualifications than UK-born individuals. Specifically, their qualifications, many gained overseas, may not be always recognised (Daniel, 1968). More generally, barriers of language, culture or discrimination may block the conversion of those qualifications into labour market opportunities, and consequently, into a range of capital assets (financial, social and cultural) to pass on to their children. In terms of owner occupation, it was apparent in Chapter 4 that this phenomenon had a different meaning for the UK-born population and certain immigrants groups, notably those from South Asia. For the former it meant affluence, for the latter it often did not, but was rather the only housing option as a consequence of discrimination in social and private rental sectors (see also Rex and Moore, 1967; Peach, 1998).

At the bottom of Figure 6.3, we can see that the Second Generation, who in 1971, had a father out of work, who lived in the most overcrowded quartile, lacked basic household amenities, with no access to cars and with parents in social class iv/v, by 1991 were 9-10 percentage points more likely to be in social class i/ii than COUKBs from these origins. This brings out the point made above, that socio-economic disadvantage may not have been an impediment to upward social mobility for the Second Generation to the same extent as it was for COUKBs.

Figure 6.3 Percentage-point difference between proportion in Social Class i/ii in 1991 for COUKBs and Second Generation by 1971 background variable



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Base range 86266-210


## 6.22 Social class iv/v/inactive

In essence, the patterns in Figure 6.4 are the reverse of those in Figure 6.1. Those factors, which are strongly associated with COUKBs being in social class i/ii, are weakly associated with being social class iv/v/inactive and vice versa. One variable stands out particularly; 35% of those with a father out of work in 1971 were in the most disadvantaged social class category in 1991. Given the dynamics of labour market behaviour (albeit not the same extent in 1971 as today) and the fact that the census is a snapshot of one day, this is a strong association. The level of social class continuity is 26%; one in four of those with parents in social class iv/v in 1971 were in social class iv/v/inactive in 1991. This compares to less than one in ten among those with parents in social class i/ii in 1971 ending up in social class iv/v/inactive.

As with the previous outcome, it is notable that all variables have the expected effect outlined at the end of Chapter 4. The Carstairs indicator of neighbourhood deprivation offers a good example. With each quartile of greater deprivation (the more deprived the neighbourhood of origin in 1971), the likelihood of being in social class iv/v/inactive in 1991 increases.

The importance of place is not limited to neighbourhoods however. Whilst 15% of COUKBs, whose parents lived in the South-East of England in 1971, were in social class iv/v/inactive in 1991, this is the case for 19% and 21% of those whose parents were in the Midlands and Northern regions of England. This offers some support to the notion of the South-East as an 'escalator region' discussed previously in Chapter 4. This is the idea that, relative to other regions, the South-East has operated as an aid to social mobility in recent decades.

Figure 6.4 Percentage in Social Class iv/v/inactive in 1991 by 1971 characteristics; COUKBs




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Base range between 86266-4665

There is a similar story for the Second Generation (Figure 6.5) as for the COUKBs although there are some noticeable differences. The particular salience of having a father out of work in 1971 is not as strong for the Second Generation. Residence in the North of England, and coming from a lone parent household, are amongst the characteristics with the strongest associations. In terms of migration factors, having parents who entered at an older age is particularly associated with being in social class iv/v/inactive. At the other end of the scale, those factors, which are most strongly associated with being in social class i/ii, are most weakly associated with being in social class iv/v.

Figure 6.5 Percentage in Social Class iv/v/inactive<sup>1</sup> in 1991 by 1971 characteristics; Second Generation




Source: <http://www.ifs.org.uk/reports/05020/05020.pdf>

<sup>1</sup> Base range 3842-210

Figure 6.6 shows that the 1971 characteristics more associated with being in social class iv/v/inactive for COUKBs than the Second Generation are connected to disadvantage; having a father out of work, being in the most overcrowded quartile, lacking basic household amenities and access to a car, and parents being in social class iv/v. By contrast those characteristics which are more associated with being in social class iv/v/inactive for the Second Generation are having parents with higher qualifications, living in owner-occupied housing and residing in the North and Midlands regions in 1971.

Figure 6.6 Percentage-point difference between proportions in Social Class iv/v/inactive among COUKBs and Second Generation by 1971 parental characteristics



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study


<sup>1</sup> Base range 86266-210

### 6.23 'Most Deprived' on the index of deprivation

The same variables which are most salient in associations with being in social class iv/v/inactive for COUKBs are also those most strongly associated with being in the 'most deprived' category on the index of deprivation. Having a father out of work in 1971 has a particularly strong association with this outcome. There is greater regional differentiation on this outcome than on the social class outcomes, with more than 20% of

those from the North being 'most deprived' compared to 12% of those from the South-East. For those with background characteristics related to affluence, such as having parents in social class i/ii, and access to two or more cars, there is relatively little likelihood of being in the 'most deprived' category.

Figure 6.7 Percentage 'most deprived' on index of deprivation in 1991 by 1971 characteristics; COUKBs




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Base range between 85678-4645

The Second Generation as a whole were far more likely to be in the 'most deprived' category, and this is reflected in a stronger relationship between the background characteristics and the outcome as whole. There are eleven non-migration related variables as strongly associated with being in the 'most deprived' group for the Second Generation as the three variables with the strongest associations for the COUKBs. Those who were in lone parent households were particularly likely to be in the 'most deprived' category. Living in private rented housing, and having a mother aged 15-22 at birth, are other childhood characteristics that are particular salient precursors of deprivation, but which were less so in relation to social class. Otherwise, the patterns are familiar. Towards the other end of the scale, we can see that nearly one in five of those whose

parents had higher qualifications were 'most deprived'. This highlights how, relative to COUKBs, even the more advantaged of the Second Generation had a high probability of being in this category.

Figure 6.8 Proportion of the Second Generation who were in the 'most deprived' category on index of deprivation in 1991 by parental characteristics in 1971




Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Base range 3822-203

Figure 6.9 reveals an interesting pattern. Only one variable is more strongly associated with being in the 'most deprived' category for the COUKBs than the Second Generation. With some exceptions, the relatively smaller percentage point differences, towards the top of the figure, are mostly background characteristics related to disadvantage. By contrast, the larger percentage point differences, nearer the bottom of the figure, are largely those connected with advantage. This suggests differences in the experiences of the relatively advantaged and disadvantaged from the two groups. Amongst those of disadvantaged origins, the outcomes of COUKBs and the Second Generation are relatively similar. Fewer of the former are in the 'most deprived' category reflecting the lower amount of deprivation in this population as a whole. However, when comparing the COUKBs and Second Generation from relatively advantaged origins, more

substantial differences appear. Unlike COUKBs from advantaged origins who are highly unlikely to be in the 'most deprived' category, coming from a relatively advantaged background appears to be little protection for the Second Generation from experiencing this outcome

Figure 6.9 Percentage-point difference between proportions in the 'most deprived' category on the index of deprivation among COUKBs and Second Generation by 1971 parental characteristics



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Base range 85678-203

#### 6.24 Least Deprived

Table 6.2 shows the 1971 characteristics most strongly and weakly associated with being in the 'least deprived' category on the index of deprivation for COUKBs and the Second Generation. The patterns, discussed above in relation to the 'most deprived' category, appear amplified. Overall, 39% of COUKBs, but only 24% of the Second Generation were in the 'least deprived' category. More than 50% of COUKBs with access to more than two cars, parents in social class i/ii, parents with higher qualifications, living in owner occupied housing and in the least overcrowded quartile of housing were in the

'least deprived' category. Among the Second Generation there are no variables with such strong associations.

Table 6.2      Associations between 1971 characteristics and 'least deprived' in 1991 for COUKBs and Second Generation; five strongest and weakest associations

1971 Background Characteristics	% associated with being in the 'least deprived' category			
	COUKB		Second Generation	
Access to 2+ Cars	55	Access to 2+ Cars	45	
Social Class i/ii	54	Least overcrowded quartile	40	
Higher Qualifications		Parents Social Class i/ii	39	
Owner Occupied Housing	50	Other Regions	38	
Least overcrowded quartile		Least deprived quartile of wards	34	
Father Out of Work	19	Lacking Basic Household Amenities	14	
Most Overcrowded quartile	24	Most Overcrowded quartile		
Lacking Basic Household Amenities		Private rented housing		16
No Access to Cars		North of England		
Council Housing	26	No Access to Cars	17	

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Base range COUKBs 46954-4645; range Second Generation 2635-203

As with the 'most deprived' category, the pattern appears to be that the greatest differentiation may be for those from more advantaged backgrounds. As shown in Figure 6.10, those variables with the smallest differences in associations between the two groups include having a father out of work, no access to cars, living in the most overcrowded quartile of housing, living in social housing and having parents in social class iv/v. However, the differences in the associations between the groups, are large for those who lived in owner occupied housing and in the South-East, and had parents with higher qualifications.


This pattern may be explained by different variables having different meanings for the two populations. The evidence presented so far suggests that this is the case for owner occupied housing. However, this is less so for parents with higher qualifications, which was strongly associated with advantaged social class outcomes for both COUKBs and the

Second Generation. Why do the Second Generation effectively convert their parents' higher qualifications into an advantaged social class profile (albeit not to the extent of the COUKBs) but do not convert it into advantage on the deprivation index outcomes?

In reflecting on some potential explanations it is worth recalling what is meant by 'least deprived'. Being 'least deprived' means meeting all of the following criteria: not living in the most overcrowded quartile of housing; having access to a car; living in housing with own access to basic amenities; not living in the most deprived quartile of wards and living in owner occupied housing. This suggests several possible explanations for the lack of parity on the deprivation indicator between those COUKBs and the Second Generation who are relatively advantaged in terms of social class:

- the Second Generation are younger and therefore those in more advantaged occupations have had less opportunity to convert their occupational advantage into the capital assets; more of them, for example, are students or at the early stage of their careers.
- A high proportion of the Second Generation live more in inner urban areas to which they have a greater pull due to the proximity of co-ethnic communities. These inner urban areas are also the more deprived wards. Moreover, those living in these areas may be less likely to need a car.
- There is an income distribution within the higher classes. Whilst there may appear to be a degree of social class parity, the appearance belies income differences and therefore resource inequality (Goldthorpe, 1995; Phillips and Sarre, 1995; Elias and McKnight, 1997) This relates, for example, to the evidence that whilst certain minority ethnic groups have disproportionately high numbers in higher education, they are often much more likely to be in the 'new' and less prestigious universities and studying part-time (Modood and Acland, 1998; Owen et al., 2000).

Figure 6.10 Percentage-point difference between proportion in 'least deprived' in 1991 for COUKBs and Second Generation by 1971 background variable



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Base range COUKBs 85678-203

## 6.25 Unemployment

**Table 6.3** shows the 1971 characteristics most strongly and weakly associated with being unemployed in 1991 for COUKBs and the Second Generation. Nearly one quarter of those from both groups with a father out of work in 1971 were unemployed in 1991. However with the exception of this characteristic, a similar pattern exists as with the 'most deprived' outcome. The indicators of socio-economic childhood disadvantage are most strongly associated with unemployment among both COUKBs and the Second Generation. However all variables are more strongly associated with unemployment for the Second Generation than the COUKBs, reflecting their higher overall unemployment rate. For example, 15% of COUKBs *without* access to a car in 1971 were unemployed in

1991; the fourth strongest association among COUKBs. However the same proportion (15%) of the Second Generation, *with* access to a car in 1971, was unemployed in 1991.

Table 6.3      Associations between 1971 characteristics and 'unemployment' in 1991 for COUKBs and Second Generation; five strongest and weakest associations


1971 Background Characteristics	% associated with being unemployed			
	COUKB		Second Generation	
	Father Out of Work	23	Father Out of Work	24
	Lacking Basic Household Amenities	16	Lacking Basic Household Amenities	22
	Most Overcrowded quartile		Private rented housing	21
	No Access to Cars	15	Lone Parent Household	
	Lone Parent Household	14	Other Regions	20
	Council Housing			
	Social Class iv/v			
	Parents Social Class i/ii	6	Access to 2+ Cars	9
	Access to 2+ Cars	7	Least deprived quartile of wards	12
	Parents With Higher Qualifications		Least overcrowded quartile	13
	Least overcrowded quartile		Parents With Higher Qualifications	
	Owner Occupied Housing	8	Access to 1 Car	

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Base range COUKBs 41025-4230; Second Generation 1365-180

Figure 6.11 shows the differences in associations with being unemployed in 1991 for COUKBs and the Second Generation. There is less of a discernable pattern than in the figures relating to the index of deprivation. However there are some interesting differences between the two groups. The Second Generation appear to experience a disproportionate regional unemployment penalty outside of the North of England. In the North, a region that experienced particularly high unemployment, this may have impacted on both populations relatively equally. There is a large difference for those whose parents were in social class i/ii in 1971. This might suggest a phenomenon akin to the ethnic penalties experienced throughout the income and qualifications distributions that have been discussed elsewhere, particularly in relation to unemployment.

Figure 6.11 Percentage-point difference between proportion 'unemployment' in 1991 for COUKBs and Second Generation by 1971 background variable



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Base range 72577-180

## 6.26 Summary Conclusions

Certain patterns seem to emerge from these descriptive statistics. In terms of social class outcomes, both groups appear to experience persistence of advantage across generations. Those who were most advantaged on a range of outcomes in childhood in 1971, were more likely to be in social class i/ii in adulthood. However, the Second Generation experienced less continuity of disadvantage than COUKBs. There is a weaker connection between childhood and adult disadvantage, and more of the Second Generation from disadvantaged origins were in social class i/ii in 1991. Whilst most background characteristics were associated with a similar or greater probability of being in social class i/ii, for the Second Generation, there is some evidence of divergence for those

whose parents had higher qualifications and were in owner occupied housing. It was suggested that the former may indicate more difficulty faced by immigrants than the UK-born population in converting their high level education into labour market success, and a range of social, cultural and financial capital assets to pass on to their children. The weaker association with owner occupation was consistent with some findings discussed previously in this thesis that owner occupation was not the indicator of social advantage for some immigrants, particularly those from South Asia, which it was for the UK-born population.

The Second Generation were much more likely to be 'most deprived' and less likely to be 'least deprived' than COUKBs. This has a distorting effect on the results as the vast majority of background characteristics carry stronger associations for the Second Generation. However Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.10 do indicate that the processes within the groups were not necessarily the same. Among those from more disadvantaged origins the two groups exhibited relatively small differences in the levels of association between background characteristics and outcomes. Both the disadvantaged COUKBs and Second Generation were more likely be 'most deprived' and less likely to be 'least deprived'. However, large differences are observed between those from more advantaged backgrounds. COUKBs from these backgrounds were far less likely to be in the 'most deprived' category and more likely to be 'least deprived'.

Some of the patterns observed for the deprivation outcomes, are evident in the associations with being unemployed, although they are not as clear. There is some evidence which may support notions of an 'Second Generation penalty' in unemployment, experienced across the socio-economic spectrum. For example, whilst only 6% of COUKBs whose parents were in social class i/ii were unemployed, this was the case for 16% of the Second Generation.

### 6.3 Second Generation effects?

I now use logistic regression analysis to explore these issues further. The intention is to determine whether differences between COUKBs and the Second Generation on the five core outcomes persist, after controlling for the 1971 characteristics discussed in the previous section (outlined in

**Table 6.1).** In other words, is there an observable ‘Second Generation’ effect? The focus here is not on the background characteristics per se. Their function in the following analysis is as control variables. With the vast majority of the sample being COUKBs it is this group’s experiences that will drive the coefficients and odds ratios for the 1971 characteristics, consequently we will not learn much about the predictive value of the 1971 characteristics for the Second Generation. It is only in the next chapter when I analyse the groups on an individual basis that I consider the roles of the background characteristics as explanatory variables.

As in previous models I show odds ratios and significance levels based on p-values and 95% confidence intervals. The odds ratio shows the direction of the relationship between the explanatory variable and the outcome, and the size of that relationship expressed as odds. Stars indicate significance levels based on  $p < .01$  (\*),  $p < .05$  (\*\*) and  $p < 0.01$  (\*\*\*)<sup>65</sup>. I give greater weight in discussion of the results to those characteristics significant at the 5% and 1% levels. I also give the number of observations and the significance level for the full model.<sup>65</sup>

#### 6.31 Results

Table 6.4 shows, that after controlling for a range of demographic, socio-economic and geographical characteristics, there are significant differences between the COUKBs and the Second Generation on all the outcomes. The Second Generation are much more likely to be in social class i/ii than COUKBs (1.51:1). The only significant background characteristic with a higher odds ratio is having parents with higher qualifications. The

Second Generation were also less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive (0.78:1). The Second Generation were more likely to be in the 'most deprived' category (1.27:1) and less likely to be in the 'least deprived' category (0.67:1). They were also more likely to be 'unemployed' (1.38:1).

There is one directional change evident in this analysis from the models in the previous chapter that only controlled for age and sex. In those previous models there was no significant difference between the groups' likelihood of being in social class iv/v/inactive. Yet the Second Generation, with their generally more disadvantaged circumstances in 1971, become significantly less likely to be in this social class category once those circumstances have been controlled for. This is mirrored by the change with regard to social class i/ii. Whilst the Second Generation were more likely to be in this social class when just controlling for age and sex, that greater likelihood equated to just 1.12:1. However, having controlled for the 1971 background characteristics the Second Generation were much more likely to be in social class i/ii (1.51:1). On the other outcomes the effect is the reverse. After controlling for childhood characteristics, the Second Generation were more likely to be 'most deprived' and unemployed and less likely to be 'least deprived', than when only controlling for age and sex.

What are the implications of this? Why, after controlling for a range of background characteristics, is being in the Second Generation associated with a greater likelihood of attaining more advantaged social class positions but also greater probability of being disadvantaged in terms of deprivation and unemployment?

In terms of their relative success on the social class outcomes, explanations may lie in different versions of the classic immigrant story, more common in US discourse but with evidence here. One scenario sees immigrants arrive with low skills but high aspirations and perceived self-efficacy; whilst they work in low skill jobs they pass this drive for social mobility onto their children to succeed through education. Another version

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65 After running test models, I decided to exclude data on father's age, age at entry and year of entry because when these variables were included there were significant problems of multicollinearity with the

suggests that better skilled people arrive, but due to barriers of language, unrecognised qualifications, culture and discrimination they are unable to access employment commensurate with their skill levels. They experience downward mobility on arrival. They have, however, the cultural capital typically associated with the 'middle classes' to pass onto their children. A third explanation sees the immigrant community as a potential resource providing support, social capital and networks, and potentially employment serving community needs. Either way the results demonstrate a positive 'Second Generation effect'; despite relatively disadvantaged circumstances the Second Generation were more likely to experience upward mobility.

So, if these advantages are present for immigrant families and the Second Generation what explains the dissonance between the social class outcomes and those related to deprivation and unemployment? In terms of the unemployment outcome, the evidence here is consistent with several studies that have shown 'ethnic penalties' in unemployment. Even after controlling for educational qualifications, individuals from certain minority ethnic groups are more likely to be unemployed. This may be explained by discrimination, lack of informal networks with bridges into a range of job markets or living in deprived areas with shortages of work (PAT 1, 2000).

In terms of deprivation, I considered some potential explanations above. There may a distribution within the social classes. The Second Generation in social class i/ii may be more likely to be on lower incomes as teachers and nurses for example whilst the COUKBs have higher proportions in better paid professions and business. Similarly there may be a distribution within social class iv/v/inactive. Certainly the Second Generation were more likely to be inactive, but they among the lower skilled workforce may also be more likely to be in temporary, part-time work rather than better quality, full-time perhaps unionised work. Clearly the greater likelihood of being unemployed will have an impact on access to resources. Whether attempting to access work towards the upper or lower ends of the income distribution time spent not working makes it much harder to purchase and maintain assets such as housing, let alone better quality housing.

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equivalent variables for mothers.

As mentioned previously, the index of deprivation may upwardly bias estimates of deprivation among the Second Generation, because of this group's greater propensity to live in inner urban areas for a range of reasons. Alongside this there are other methodological caveats that are worth considering. Firstly, the controls available used in the analysis are limited. The census does not provide a great depth of information and important data relating to patterns of acculturation, used for example in the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study is not available to me. However the most obvious factor not controlled for here is ethnicity and immigrant origins. This picture provides an aggregated view of the Second Generation as a whole, offering some interesting insights to the discourse that takes place at that level, but not a nuanced picture accounting for substantial differences seen between groups in Chapters 4 and 5. It is only upon considering the results by immigrant group origin as well, that a more profound understanding of the intergenerational processes taking place can be reached. It is to this, which I now turn.

**Table 6.4 Differences between COUKBs and the Second Generation: results from logistic regression models**

Explanatory Variables	Outcomes / Dependent Variables										Model 5				
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5		
	Professional/		95% Odds Ratio Confidence Interval	Semi/Unskilled/		95% Odds Ratio Confidence Interval	Most Deprived		95% Odds Ratio Confidence Interval	Least Deprived		95% Odds Ratio Confidence Interval	Actively Seeking Work		
Sex	1.10 ***	1.07	1.13	0.87 ***	0.84	0.90	1.21 ***	1.16	1.25	0.98 *	0.95	1.00	0.57 ***	0.54	0.60
Age	1.09 ***	1.09	1.09	0.93 ***	0.93	0.94	0.96 ***	0.95	0.96	1.05 ***	1.05	1.05	0.93 ***	0.92	0.93
With Higher Qualifications	1.67 ***	1.60	1.75	0.74 ***	0.69	0.79	1.04			1.09 ***	1.04	1.14	1.01		
Qualifications (missing)	1.11 ***	1.03	1.19	1.05	0.96	1.14	1.09 *	1.00	1.19	0.98			1.16 ***	1.04	1.29
Access to a Car	1.26 ***	1.22	1.31	0.71 ***	0.69	0.74	0.54 ***	0.52	0.57	1.61 ***	1.56	1.67	0.74 ***	0.70	0.78
Skilled non/manual	0.61 ***	0.59	0.63	1.29 ***	1.22	1.37	1.19 ***	1.12	1.27	0.91 ***	0.87	0.94	1.10 **	1.02	1.18
Semi/Unskilled	0.52 ***	0.49	0.54	1.67 ***	1.57	1.78	1.49 ***	1.39	1.59	0.77 ***	0.73	0.81	1.26 ***	1.16	1.37
Social Class (missing)	0.61 ***	0.56	0.66	1.63 ***	1.49	1.79	1.60 ***	1.45	1.77	0.70 ***	0.65	0.77	1.44 ***	1.27	1.63
Father in Work	1.20 ***	1.12	1.30	0.71 ***	0.66	0.75	0.65 ***	0.61	0.69	1.42 ***	1.31	1.53	0.58 ***	0.54	0.64
Father in Work (missing)	1.10			0.71 ***	0.59	0.85	0.68 ***	0.56	0.81	1.59 ***	1.32	1.91	0.59 ***	0.46	0.75
Social Rented Housing	0.58 ***	0.56	0.60	1.66 ***	1.59	1.74	2.27 ***	2.17	2.38	0.50 ***	0.49	0.52	1.43 ***	1.35	1.52
Private Rented Housing	0.81 ***	0.77	0.85	1.31 ***	1.24	1.38	1.58 ***	1.49	1.67	0.66 ***	0.63	0.69	1.14 ***	1.06	1.23
2nd Least Overcrowded	0.84 ***	0.81	0.87	1.13 ***	1.07	1.19	1.14 ***	1.07	1.21	0.92 ***	0.89	0.95	1.03		
2nd Most Overcrowded	0.75 ***	0.72	0.78	1.30 ***	1.23	1.37	1.40 ***	1.32	1.48	0.78 ***	0.75	0.81	1.16 ***	1.08	1.24
Most Overcrowded	0.59 ***	0.56	0.62	1.69 ***	1.60	1.78	1.95 ***	1.84	2.07	0.55 ***	0.53	0.58	1.55 ***	1.45	1.67
Overcrowded (missing)	0.61 ***	0.55	0.68	2.00 ***	1.78	2.24	2.72 ***	2.42	3.05	0.43 ***	0.39	0.49	2.02 ***	1.74	2.34
Lacking Basic Household Amenities	0.81 ***	0.77	0.86	1.26 ***	1.20	1.33	1.36 ***	1.28	1.43	0.72 ***	0.68	0.75	1.30 ***	1.22	1.40
2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood	0.90 ***	0.86	0.94	1.06 *	1.00	1.13	1.18 ***	1.10	1.26	0.94 **	0.90	0.99	1.08 *	1.00	1.18
2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood	0.81 ***	0.78	0.85	1.17 ***	1.10	1.24	1.32 ***	1.24	1.42	0.84 ***	0.81	0.88	1.18 ***	1.09	1.28
Most Deprived Neighbourhood	0.76 ***	0.73	0.80	1.28 ***	1.21	1.36	1.66 ***	1.55	1.77	0.64 ***	0.61	0.67	1.30 ***	1.20	1.41
North Region	0.93 ***	0.90	0.97	1.24 ***	1.18	1.30	1.29 ***	1.23	1.35	0.70 ***	0.68	0.73	1.12 ***	1.05	1.19
Midlands Region	0.84 ***	0.81	0.88	1.20 ***	1.14	1.26	1.13 ***	1.07	1.19	0.81 ***	0.78	0.84	0.97		
Other Region	0.86 ***	0.83	0.90	1.24 ***	1.17	1.30	0.96			0.90 ***	0.87	0.94	1.01		
Lone Parent Household	0.97			1.01			0.99			0.85 *	0.72	1.00	1.08		
Lone Parent (missing)	0.51 ***	0.48	0.55	1.59 ***	1.46	1.72	1.18 ***	1.08	1.29	0.75 ***	0.70	0.81	1.35 ***	1.19	1.53
Young Mother at birth	0.90 ***	0.87	0.93	1.05 **	1.01	1.10	1.14 ***	1.09	1.19	0.86 ***	0.83	0.89	1.06 **	1.00	1.12
Young Mother (missing)	0.68 ***	0.58	0.79	1.28 ***	1.10	1.49	1.43 ***	1.22	1.67	0.77 ***	0.66	0.90	1.20 *	0.98	1.48
<b>Second Generation</b>	<b>1.51 ***</b>	<b>1.41</b>	<b>1.61</b>	<b>0.78 ***</b>	<b>0.72</b>	<b>0.85</b>	<b>1.27 ***</b>	<b>1.17</b>	<b>1.37</b>	<b>0.67 ***</b>	<b>0.62</b>	<b>0.72</b>	<b>1.38 ***</b>	<b>1.26</b>	<b>1.52</b>
Observations	98337			98337			97665			97665			82458		
P > chi <sup>2</sup>	***			***			***			***			***		

p<0.1 \* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\*

## 6.4 COUKBs and the Second Generation origin groups

I now build on the previous sections of this Chapter by examining the relationships between 1971 background characteristics and the adult outcomes in 1991 for the individual Second Generation groups. The basic questions to be explored remain the same:

- To what extent are particular characteristics in childhood associated with later life outcomes within individual Second Generation groups?
- What are the similarities and differences between groups in the association of childhood characteristics with later life outcomes?
- Do similarities and differences in the observed aggregate outcomes of individual Second Generation groups persist, after controlling for background characteristics in multivariate analysis?

Before proceeding it is important to inject a few notes of caution regarding the analysis. The relatively detailed nature of the cross tabulations used in the following sections, places, in certain instances, a strain on sample sizes. This has several consequences. In several cases, data is missing. One reason for this is that, as mentioned earlier, the Office for National Statistics does not release tables derived from LS data, with any cell with a frequency count of between one and three. In other instances I chose not to use certain tables. For example, there are a very small number of the Pakistani Second Generation in the 'least deprived' category on the index of deprivation. When this group are broken down by factors such as parents' educational qualifications or social class, the numbers in individual cells become much smaller and estimates can become unstable. Even when data is disclosed and used, cell counts are often smaller here than in other parts of the broader analysis and therefore should be interpreted with more caution.

Finally, behind this section is a mass of data, as the bivariate relationships were explored for all seventeen independent variables with each of the five outcome variables. This is too much data to present. What follows is an attempt to use the data succinctly, bringing

out some important themes that begin to address the questions outlined above, which provide the background for the multivariate analyses that follows.

The structure of the next section is as follows. It begins by considering some key themes drawn out from consideration of the relationships between 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes by individual groups. First I consider social class mobility, an important story itself within the broader sociological literature. I then focus on three precursors – region of origin, having a father out of work and parents with higher qualifications – that appeared important across a range of groups.


Following this, I make some direct comparisons between the precursors of a particular outcome for two groups. Taking two Second Generation groups with similar outcomes (e.g. both with 35% in the most deprived category), I show differences and similarities in the salience of particular background characteristics. Finally, I run individual logistic regression models in order to estimate any ‘origin group effects’ that remain in predicting outcomes, after controlling for 1971 characteristics.

#### **6.41 *From 1971 Circumstances to 1991 Outcomes: Key Themes***

##### **6.411 Intergenerational Social Class Mobility**

Figure 6.12 shows the social class outcomes of those whose parents were in social classes i/ii/iiin/m. 85% of COUKBs whose parents were in these social classes remain in them. This rate is equalled or exceeded by most Second Generation Groups. However, two groups, the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations, experience noticeable downward mobility from these social classes; only 78% and 69%, respectively, remain in the more advantaged social classes. Both of these groups have larger proportions in both social class iv/v and inactive categories than all other groups. A large proportion of the Pakistani Second Generation (14%) are ‘inactive’, double those of the Caribbean Second Generation. These higher rates of downward mobility are particularly conspicuous in the context of the ‘*more room at the top*’ thesis discussed in the previous chapter.

Figure 6.12 Social Class outcomes in 1991 of those whose parents were in Social Class i/ii/iiin/m in 1971 by Second Generation origin group and COUKB



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Base: COUKBs 88598; Second Generation 4147


<sup>2</sup> Social class iv/v/ and inactive combined for 'White' English Speaking Second Generation

The general expansion of the middle classes, and shrinking of manual occupations should mean that all other things being equal, there is generally high social mobility from the most disadvantaged social classes across all groups. This can be seen in Figure 6.13. The lowest rate of upward mobility is found among the Pakistani Second Generation (60%). Among other groups, the rate of upward mobility ranges between the Caribbean Second Generation (72%) and the Southern Europeans (87%). However all groups have a higher rate of 'long-range'<sup>66</sup> upward mobility than the COUKBs. This ranges from 56% and 43% of the Eastern European and Indian Second Generations, to several groups with between 30 and 40%, and the Caribbean Second Generation with only marginally higher upward mobility than the COUKBs. Certain groups have particularly high proportions in social class iiin/m, notably the Southern European, but also the Caribbean and 'White English Speaking' Second Generations, as well as the COUKBs.

66 From the most disadvantaged social class origins to the most advantaged social class destinations

The highest rate of stability from social class iv/v origins is found among COUKBs. However, the Pakistani and Caribbean Second Generations, which contain the second and third highest proportions in this social class category (18% and 15%), also have large proportions who are 'inactive'; 13% and 22% respectively.

Figure 6.13 Social Class outcomes in 1991 of those whose parents were in Social Class iv/v in 1971 by Second Generation origin group and COUKB



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Base COUKBs 88598; range Irish 1354-'White English Speaking' 156


#### 6.412 A regional effect?

It is apparent that across all the Second Generation groups, as well as amongst COUKBs, there was a disadvantage related to residence in the North of England relative to the South-East. In several instances, notably the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations, there were also disadvantages associated with the Midlands. Figure 6.14 brings the North-South divide out further. Focussing on the North and South-East regions, it shows the association between region of residence in 1971 and outcomes in 1991. The two blocks of bars on the left hand side shows proportions in social class i/ii and the 'least deprived' category on the index of deprivation; higher proportions (taller bars) are associated with more advantaged outcomes. Conversely for the three blocks on the right, which show proportions in the 'most deprived' category, in social class iv/v/inactive and unemployed, the higher proportions equate to more relative disadvantage.

Those from the South-East are more advantaged on twenty-seven out of the thirty-three outcomes. Those from the North are advantaged in only two cases. On face value this would appear to give strong support for the hypothesis of the South-East as an escalator region. As has been mentioned before, this suggests that the economic restructuring that took place over the last quarter of the twentieth century favoured people in the South-East of England. It is in this region, that a disproportionately large share of the new white-collar employment opportunities was created whilst other regions continued to lose manual work. That these regional patterns were seen for the COUKBs to the same extent as the Second Generation groups, lends support to this idea.

However, there may have be alternative explanations. For example there could have been widespread pre-existing regional inequalities. In terms of the Second Generation, selective migration may have occurred. London and the South-East may have been magnets for more professional migrants than other parts of the country, where opportunities in manufacturing industry may have been more of a pull factor. In controlling for other characteristics the multivariate analysis may shed further light on this issue.

Figure 6.14 Percentage in social class i/ii and iv/v/inactive, in 'most deprived' and 'least deprived' categories on the index of deprivation and 'unemployed' in 1991 by residence in the North and South-East in 1991 and Second Generation origin group and COUKB



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup> Outcomes for 'White' English Speaking Second Generation, Pakistani Second Generation on 'least deprived' and Eastern European Second Generation on social class iv/v/inactive not disclosed

#### 6.413 'Father out of work'

No single background characteristic had as consistently strong associations with 1991 outcomes, across a range of groups, as having a father out of work in 1971. This is brought out in Table 6.5, which shows the rank of this characteristic in terms of strength of association with the outcomes measures related to disadvantage, compared to the other 1971 characteristics. For COUKBs, the Irish and Southern European Second Generations it is the most salient of the background characteristics for all three outcomes. For the Caribbean Second Generation it has strong associations, whilst for the Indian and Pakistani Second Generations it ranks first and second respectively on the 'most deprived' category, but much lower on the other two outcomes.

This raises several questions: why is this characteristic so salient generally? Why is it less so for the Indian and Pakistani Second Generations? For these groups what could explain its strong association with deprivation, but not social class or unemployment?

As mentioned in Chapter 4, longitudinal research has highlighted paternal unemployment in childhood as a risk factor for later life disadvantage (Johnson and Reed, 1996; Machin, 1998). In 1971, only 9% of men of working age were economically inactive (Office for National Statistics, 2000). Among the fathers of the study population in this research, the overall rate in 1971 was under 6%. It was therefore an uncommon phenomenon associated with broad disadvantage. But why might it be less of an acute risk factor for the children of Indian and Pakistani migrants on the social class and unemployment outcomes, whereas it was equivalent on the index of deprivation?

**Table 6.5** Rank of association of 'Father out of work' in 1971 with outcomes of social class iv/v/inactive, 'most deprived' and 'unemployed' by Second Generation origin group

Second Generation Groups		Social Class iv/v/inactive	'Most Deprived'	Unemployed	Rank
	COUKB	1	1	1	
	Irish	1	1	1	
	Eastern European	ND	ND	ND	
	Southern European	1	1	1	
	Caribbean	2	6	1	
	India	16	1	15	
	Pakistan	9	2	20	
	'White English Speaking'	ND	ND	ND	

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

<sup>1</sup>No data for Eastern Europe and 'White English Speaking' Second Generations

One explanation may lie in the risk factors of paternal unemployment being partially associative and partially causal. The precursors of unemployment for non-immigrant men may have been socio-economic factors such as education, social class and geography that would also be associated with disadvantaged outcomes for their children. Unemployment for some immigrants, especially those of Indian, Pakistani and the Caribbean origins may have been more or equally connected to factors such as language (for immigrants from South Asia), culture and discrimination, some of which (in particular language and culture), may well have diminished for the Second Generation.

Thus, the associative element of the risk factor may operate differentially for the children of non-immigrant and certain immigrant parents. The fact that 'father out of work' is an important precursor for the Caribbean Second Generation, but less so for the South Asian groups, indicates that language could play a critical explanatory role.

However, as Machin (1998) shows, paternal unemployment is a risk factor for adverse outcomes, even after controlling for other factors. This may indicate a causal aspect that relates to the economic disadvantage caused by being out of work. This would impact across groups in a similar fashion feeding into the outcome which most reflects resources - the Index of Deprivation - on which it is strongly associated with disadvantage for all groups.

#### 6.414 Qualifications

As discussed in Chapter 4, there is a wealth of research showing a strong association between parental qualifications and child outcomes (Blanden and Gregg, 2004). The evidence in Table 6.6 shows that this relationship may be an important one for all the Second Generation groups. A variety of mechanisms are posited for the importance of parental qualifications in mediating child outcomes. These include parental interest and involvements in their children's education, and ability to help them, as well as placing the parents in a labour market position which enables them to facilitate good opportunities for their children (Feinstein and Symons, 1999). These mechanisms provide possible insights into why qualifications may be a less important precursor for predicting advantaged outcomes for the Indian Second Generation. Some have suggested that the Indian First Generation could, for example, have had a strong interest in their children's education emanating from the culture of the migrant group irrespective of their own qualifications (Robinson, 1996). Alternatively, the relatively high rate of self-employment among Indian immigrants may indicate that strong entrepreneurialism allowed some to create economic opportunities for their children through routes other than those resulting from higher qualifications (Metcalf et al., 1996).

**Table 6.6** Rank of association of 'With Higher qualifications' in 1971 with –outcomes of social class i/ii, and 'least deprived' by Second Generation origin group

Second Generation Group		Social Class i/ii	'Least Deprived'	Rank
	COUKB	1	1	
	Irish	5	6	
	Eastern Europe	1	2	
	Southern Europe	1	2	
	Caribbean	1	1	
	India	6	5	
	Pakistan	1	ND	
	'White English Speaking'	6	1	

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study


#### 6.42 *Different groups with different drivers*

The next section takes forward the discussion on whether there are different drivers of relative advantage and disadvantage within the different Second Generation groups. Here I present three figures, each taking two Second Generation groups and comparing the associations between the 1971 characteristics and a single outcome. The aim is to use the simplicity of the descriptive statistics to highlight how two groups with similar aggregate outcomes may have similar and distinct precursors for those outcomes. In each case I calculate the percentage-point difference in the association, between a given 1971 characteristic and 1991 outcome, for the two Second Generation groups. Those associations, which are stronger for one group, are presented on one side of the y-axis, for the other group on the other side.

Almost equal proportions of the Irish and Pakistani Second Generations were in social class i/ii in 1991 (37% and 36% respectively). Figure 6.15 shows the differences in associations between 1971 background characteristics and this outcome for these two groups. Having an older mother (aged 31+ at birth) appears to be particularly disadvantaging for the Pakistani Second Generation. One interpretation is that given the comparatively young fertility rates among those of Pakistani origin, this variable could be a proxy for large families. Berthoud (1998; 2002) has shown associations between those of Pakistani origin and larger families, and in turn, between large families and economic disadvantage. In terms of owner occupied housing, it was suggested in Chapter 4 that, for a variety of reasons, this might not be the symbol of advantage for the Pakistani First

Generation that it was for other groups. This is further supported in Figure 6.15, which shows this background characteristics more strongly associated with being in social class i/ii for the Irish Second Generation.

**Figure 6.15 Difference in proportions associated with Social Class i/ii in 1991 by 1971 characteristics for the Irish and Pakistani Second Generations**



**Source: ONS Longitudinal Study**


By contrast there is a large difference - 25 percentage-points - in the proportions in social class i/ii among those whose parents had higher qualifications. The small numbers with higher qualifications may well explain part of this. However the relative importance of social class i/ii origins for the Pakistani Second Generation as well, suggests that they may have been better at converting advantaged origins into more advantaged social class destinations. It could reflect a distribution within the social class i/ii and higher qualifications categories in 1971. Pakistani immigrants in these categories may have had a different and more advantageous set of occupations and qualifications than their Irish counterparts.

The Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations had by far the highest proportions in the 'most deprived' category on the index of deprivation; 42% and 43% respectively. However Figure 6.16 suggests some large differences in the nature of relationships between 1971 characteristics and being 'most deprived' in 1991 amongst these populations. Far greater proportions of the Caribbean Second Generation, not resident in the most deprived neighbourhoods and in the South-East, were in the 'most deprived' category compared to the Pakistani Second Generation. However, the Caribbean Second Generation from these origins was not particularly disadvantaged; the proportions in the 'most deprived' category are equal or less than the average for the group as a whole. Rather both background characteristics are associated with particularly low proportions of the Pakistani Second Generation being in the 'most deprived' category. This suggests that geography may be a particularly important dimension in understanding the experiences of the Pakistani Second Generation.

By contrast, being in the least overcrowded quartile of housing and mother's age 31+ at birth are more associated with being in the 'most deprived' category for the Pakistani Second Generation. The importance of 'mother's age 31+ at birth' is consistent with Figure 6.15. Living in the least and most overcrowded housing are similarly associated with being in the 'most deprived' category. This suggests that, on this indicator for this group, levels of household overcrowding may not be an important precursor of disadvantage. Whilst highlighting the differences between the groups, what is also noticeable is the similarities. Out of the 22 background characteristics, the associations of 13 have no more than a five percentage point difference between the groups and 8 have no more than a one percentage point difference.

**Figure 6.16 Difference in proportions associated with being 'most deprived' on the index of deprivation in 1991 by 1971 characteristics for the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations**


1971 Characteristics



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

This is even more the case in Figure 6.17, comparing the associations between 1971 characteristics and being unemployed in 1991 for the Southern European and Indian Second Generations. Out of 21 variables, 15 are within 5 percentage-points either way. For the Southern European Second Generation, 11 percentage points more, of those whose father was out of work in 1971, were themselves unemployed in 1991. This highlights the apparent difference in the importance of this characteristic discussed previously. For the Indian Second Generation, it is the 'Midlands' that is particularly associated with relative disadvantage. However the Southern European Second Generation has 0% coded as unemployed among those who lived in the Midlands in 1971; this ought to be treated with caution. These kinds of issues ought to become clearer in the multivariate analysis.

Figure 6.17 Difference in proportions associated with 'unemployed' in 1991 by 1971 characteristics  
Southern European and Indian Second Generations



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

## 6.5 1971 characteristics to 1991 outcomes: analysis of group origin effect

The previous section explored the relationship between 1971 characteristics and those core outcomes within the different groups. It appeared that for all groups the circumstances of an individual's childhood may be associated with differential outcomes in early adulthood, although the significance of types of circumstances may differ. In this section I build on these descriptive findings. The aim is to see what belonging to the 'Second Generation group' means for the likelihood of an individual experiencing one of the five core outcomes, once 1971 childhood characteristics have been taken into account. Is being in a certain group still associated with a greater likelihood of being in social class i/ii or in the 'most deprived' category? Or, does the relationship between group membership and particular advantage or disadvantage compared to COUKBs diminish, as other demographic, socio-economic and geographic characteristics are controlled for?

Logistic regression is used, and the primary concern is with the odds ratios and significance levels for the Second Generation groups, compared to COUKBs (the reference group). These results are shown in bold. As with the equivalent analysis that looked at the Second Generation as a whole, the results for the individual control variables are not discussed. They will be largely explaining the COUKBs, who are 90% of the overall sample, thus saying little about the individual Second Generation groups. Their role as explanatory variables is the focus of the next Chapter. I ran a series of models, gradually adding more background variables to observe changes in the odds ratios and significance levels for the different Second Generation groups.

Table 6.7 shows the results of a logistic regression model estimating the probability of being in social class i/ii as opposed to all other social class categories. Model 1, repeating that shown at the end of Chapter 5, introduces controls only for age and sex. It shows the Irish, Southern European, Pakistani and 'White English Speaking' Second Generations not to have significantly greater or lesser probability of being in social class i/ii than COUKBs. The Caribbean Second Generation are less likely to be in this social class category than COUKBs (0.72:1). However the Eastern European Second Generation are have a much greater likelihood of being in social class i/ii than the COUKBs (2.44:1). Those in the Indian Second Generation are also more likely to be in this social class category (1.71:1).

As the 1971 characteristics are introduced, however, there are interesting changes to four of the groups, and by Model 5 some very different results. The Caribbean Second Generation changes from being significantly negatively associated with being in social class i/ii (significant at the 1% level) to there being no significant difference between them and the COUKBs, with an odds ratio of 1.03:1. By Model 5, the Pakistani Second Generation is associated with twice the odds of being in social class i/ii compared to the COUKBs (significant at the 1% level). The odds for the Indian Second Generation increase substantially; in Model 5 they have an odds ratio of 2.4:1, equivalent to that of the Eastern European Second Generation in Model 1. By contrast the odds of the latter group fall, whilst they still have nearly twice the odds of being in social class i/ii

At the other end of the social class spectrum, similar patterns emerge as seen in Table 6.8. In Model 1, the Irish Second Generation are the only group without a significantly different probability of being in social class iv/v/inactive than the COUKBs. The Eastern European, Southern European and Indian Second Generations are significantly associated with less chance of being in this social class category (0.62:1, 0.68:1 and 0.70:1 respectively). However the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations are associated with a greater likelihood of being in these classes (1.38:1 and 2.07:1 respectively). Little changes with the introduction of the demographic characteristics, with the exception of the Pakistani Second Generation where the odds ratio falls by 0.15. After the socio-economic, housing and geographic variables have been introduced, the significant associations of all groups fall away, with the exception of the Indian Second Generation. Having controlled for the full range of 1971 characteristics, this group is even less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive than the COUKBs. None of the other groups, including the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations, are significantly more likely to be in this social class.

**Table 6.7** Logistic regression model: odds of being in Social Class i/ii in 1991

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	95% Confidence Interval	
	Odds Ratio						
<i>Sex</i>	1.07 ***	1.08 ***	1.08 ***	1.09 ***	1.10 ***	1.07	1.13
<i>Age</i>	1.07 ***	1.06 ***	1.06 ***	1.07 ***	1.07 ***	1.07	1.08
<i>Irish</i>	0.99	0.95	0.78	1.09	1.21	0.89	1.65
<i>Eastern European</i>	2.44 ***	2.30 ***	1.89 ***	1.73 **	1.90 ***	1.25	2.90
<i>Southern European</i>	0.89	0.88	0.74	0.70 *	0.82	0.56	1.19
<i>Caribbean</i>	0.72 ***	0.73 ***	0.65 **	0.89	1.03	0.75	1.41
<i>Indian</i>	1.71 ***	1.81 ***	1.71 ***	2.16 ***	2.40 ***	1.66	3.47
<i>Pakistani</i>	1.30	1.36 *	1.31	1.84 **	2.09 ***	1.32	3.32
<i>White' English Speaking</i>	1.26	1.31	1.14	1.18	1.22	0.79	1.90
<i>Fathers Age</i>		1.00 **	1.00 **	1.00 **	1.00 ***	1.00	1.01
<i>Mothers Age</i>		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00 *	1.00	1.00
<i>Fathers Age (missing)</i>		0.03 **	0.02 **	0.02 ***	~~~	~~~	~~~
<i>Mother aged 23-30 at birth</i>		1.02	1.02	0.98	0.98	0.94	1.01
<i>Mother aged 22 and under</i>		0.73 ***	0.73 ***	0.84 ***	0.91 ***	0.86	0.96
<i>Mother age at birth (missing)</i>		0.61 ***	0.61 ***	0.71 ***	0.79 **	0.65	0.96
<i>Multi Parent Household</i>		1.28 **	1.29 **	1.15	1.06	0.87	1.29
<i>Household Type (missing)</i>		0.89	0.89	1.04	0.95	0.81	1.12
<i>Fathers Year of entry</i>			1.00	1.01	1.01	0.99	1.03
<i>Mothers Year of entry</i>			0.99	1.00	0.99	0.98	1.01
<i>Father age at entry (missing)</i>			~	11.12	0.08	~	
<i>Father age at entry</i>			0.99	0.99	0.99	0.98	1.01
<i>Mother age of entry</i>			0.99	0.99	0.99	0.98	1.01
<i>Mother age of entry (missing)</i>			~	~	~	~	
<i>2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood</i>				0.84 ***	0.90 ***	0.86	0.95
<i>2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood</i>				0.71 ***	0.82 ***	0.78	0.86
<i>Most Deprived Neighbourhood</i>				0.61 ***	0.76 ***	0.73	0.80
<i>Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)</i>				0.82	0.81	0.60	1.09
<i>Midlands regions</i>				0.90 ***	0.93 ***	0.90	0.97
<i>South-East regions</i>				0.81 ***	0.84 ***	0.80	0.87
<i>Other regions</i>				0.85 ***	0.86 ***	0.83	0.90
<i>In Council Housing</i>				0.41 ***	0.57 ***	0.55	0.60
<i>In Private Rented Housing</i>				0.71 ***	0.81 ***	0.78	0.85
<i>Tenure (Missing)</i>				1.02	1.25	0.68	2.31
<i>2nd Least Overcrowded Housing</i>				0.78 ***	0.84 ***	0.81	0.88
<i>2nd Most Overcrowded Housing</i>				0.68 ***	0.75 ***	0.72	0.79
<i>Most Overcrowded Housing</i>				0.51 ***	0.59 ***	0.57	0.62
<i>Overcrowded Housing (missing)</i>				0.59 ***	0.59 ***	0.53	0.66
<i>Access to basic amenities</i>				0.69 ***	0.80 ***	0.76	0.84
<i>Father out of work</i>					0.82 ***	0.76	0.88
<i>Father economic activity (missing)</i>					0.01 ***	0.00	0.16
<i>Parents Lack Qualifications</i>					0.60 ***	0.57	0.63
<i>Parents Qualifications (missing)</i>					0.68 ***	0.63	0.74
<i>Access to a Car</i>					0.83 ***	0.79	0.87
<i>Access to a 2+ Cars</i>					0.66 ***	0.62	0.70
<i>Parents in Social Class iiin/m</i>					0.62 ***	0.60	0.65
<i>Parents in Social Class iv/v</i>					0.53 ***	0.50	0.55
<i>Parents Social Class (missing)</i>					0.62 ***	0.57	0.67

Prob > chi2	***	***	***	***	***		
n=	97529	87529	97529	97529	97529		

**Table 6.8 Logistic regression model: odds of being Social Class iv/v/inactive in 1991**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	
	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval				
<i>Sex</i>	0.90 ***	0.89 ***	0.89 ***	0.88 ***	0.87 ***	0.84 0.90
<i>Age</i>	0.95 ***	0.95 ***	0.95 ***	0.94 ***	0.94 ***	0.94 0.95
<i>Irish</i>	1.10	1.13 *	1.61 **	1.26	1.11	0.79 1.56
<i>Eastern European</i>	0.62 **	0.62 **	0.91	1.12	1.00	0.57 1.73
<i>Southern European</i>	0.68 **	0.68 **	0.93	1.06	0.94	0.61 1.47
<i>Caribbean</i>	1.38 ***	1.32 ***	1.64 ***	1.32	1.16	0.83 1.62
<i>Indian</i>	0.70 **	0.65 ***	0.77	0.67 *	0.58 **	0.38 0.89
<i>Pakistani</i>	2.07 ***	1.92 ***	2.24 ***	1.73 **	1.49	0.92 2.41
<i>White' English Speaking</i>	0.71	0.66 *	0.85	0.89	0.81	0.46 1.41
<i>Fathers Age</i>		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99 1.00
<i>Mothers Age</i>		1.00 *	1.00 **	1.00	1.00	1.00 1.00
<i>Fathers Age (missing)</i>		0.25	0.48	1.18		
<i>Mother aged 23-30 at birth</i>		0.92 ***	0.92 ***	0.98	0.98	0.93 1.02
<i>Mother aged 22 and under</i>		1.22 ***	1.22 ***	1.09 **	1.03	0.96 1.09
<i>Mother age at birth (missing)</i>		1.66 ***	1.66 ***	1.47 ***	1.30 **	1.07 1.58
<i>Multi Parent Household</i>		0.70 ***	0.69 ***	0.79 **	0.86	0.71 1.05
<i>Household Type (missing)</i>		1.03	1.03	0.87 *	0.98	0.84 1.14
<i>Fathers Year of entry</i>			1.00	0.99	0.99	0.97 1.01
<i>Mothers Year of entry</i>			1.01	1.01	1.01	0.99 1.03
<i>Father age at entry (missing)</i>			~	~	~	
<i>Father age at entry</i>			1.03 **	1.02 **	1.02 **	1.00 1.04
<i>Mother age of entry</i>			1.00	1.00	1.00	0.98 1.02
<i>Mother age of entry (missing)</i>			~	~	~	
<i>2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood</i>				1.11 ***	1.07 **	1.00 1.13
<i>2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood</i>				1.29 ***	1.18 ***	1.11 1.25
<i>Most Deprived Neighbourhood</i>				1.50 ***	1.29 ***	1.21 1.37
<i>Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)</i>				1.47 **	1.52 **	1.06 2.16
<i>Midlands regions</i>				1.31 ***	1.23 ***	1.17 1.29
<i>South-East regions</i>				1.22 ***	1.19 ***	1.13 1.25
<i>Other regions</i>				1.24 ***	1.23 ***	1.16 1.29
<i>In Council Housing</i>				2.19 ***	1.66 ***	1.59 1.73
<i>In Private Rented Housing</i>				1.49 ***	1.30 ***	1.23 1.37
<i>Tenure (Missing)</i>				1.59	1.29	0.61 2.75
<i>2nd Least Overcrowded Housing</i>				1.18 ***	1.12 ***	1.07 1.18
<i>2nd Most Overcrowded Housing</i>				1.40 ***	1.29 ***	1.23 1.36
<i>Most Overcrowded Housing</i>				1.92 ***	1.68 ***	1.59 1.77
<i>Overcrowded Housing (missing)</i>				2.29 ***	2.02 ***	1.80 2.27
<i>Access to basic amenities</i>				1.42 ***	1.27 ***	1.21 1.34
<i>Father out of work</i>					1.42 ***	1.33 1.52
<i>Father economic activity (missing)</i>					5.97	0.21 167.24
<i>Parents Lack Qualifications</i>					1.35 ***	1.25 1.45
<i>Parents Qualifications (missing)</i>					1.39 ***	1.24 1.54
<i>Access to a Car</i>					1.13 ***	1.05 1.21
<i>Access to a 2+ Cars</i>					1.58 ***	1.46 1.71
<i>Parents in Social Class iiin/m</i>					1.29 ***	1.21 1.36
<i>Parents in Social Class iv/v</i>					1.67 ***	1.57 1.78
<i>Parents Social Class (missing)</i>					1.64 ***	1.49 1.81

Prob > chi2 \*\*\*  
n= 97529 97529 97529 97529 97529

Table 6.9 shows the results from the logistic regression model predicting being in the 'most deprived' category on the index of deprivation. As mentioned previously, 'most deprived' equates to not meeting between three and five of the criteria that define the index. In Model 1, the Irish and 'White English Speaking' Second Generations are more likely to be 'most deprived' than the COUKBs after controlling for age and sex (1.53:1 and 1.43:1 respectively). The Pakistani and Caribbean Second Generations have a much greater likelihood of being in this group however (3.6:1). As the control variables are introduced, once again the picture changes. The odds ratios of those groups more likely to be 'most deprived' fall, especially so with the introduction of the socio-economic and geographical controls. By Model 5, the Irish and 'White English Speaking' Second Generations no longer have a greater likelihood of being 'most deprived'. However, the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations are still much more likely than the COUKBs to be deprived. The odds ratios have fallen substantially. For the Caribbean Second Generation, the odds have fallen from 3.6:1 to 2.51:1 and for the Pakistani Second Generation, the odds ratio in Model 1 was 3.62:1, compared to 1.97:1 in Model 5. The Indian Second Generation becomes increasingly less likely to be disadvantaged once the control variables have been introduced. By Model 5 they are significantly less likely to be 'most deprived', compared to COUKBs. This is a weak result (significant at the 10% level, confidence interval 0.45-1.05) but is consistent with the findings on the previous outcomes.

The results for being in the 'least deprived' category are shown in Table 6.10. Those of Eastern European or Southern European origins have similar odds of being in this category as the COUKBs. All other groups are significantly less likely to be categorised as 'least deprived', although there is a wide distribution. The Irish and 'White English Speaking' Second Generations are less likely to be in this category (0.62:1 and 0.7:1). The Indian Second Generation are substantially less likely to be least deprived (0.38:1). However, the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations are greatly disadvantaged with odds ratios of 0.15:1 and 0.07:1 respectively. After controlling for parental social class, access to a car and qualifications the Irish Second Generation are not significantly less likely to be 'least deprived'. The situation of the Southern European Second

Generation remains the same. The odds ratio for the Eastern European Second Generation falls, but the significance of their positive association with 'least deprived' is a weak one (significant at the 10% level, confidence interval 0.42-1.04).

For the Indian, Pakistani, and Caribbean Second Generations a familiar pattern is repeated with lower odds of disadvantage as controls are introduced, although for the latter two groups the changes are not great. After all the controls are introduced the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations remain much less likely to be 'least deprived' (0.22:1 and 0.15:1). For the Indian Second Generation, the change is more substantial. Their odds of being 'least deprived' having controlled for all background characteristics are 0.62:1.

It was seen in the previous Chapter that all groups had higher unemployment rates than the COUKBs, and that this was true for both those with or without higher qualifications. This is reflected in Model 1 where each Second Generation group with the exception of the Eastern Europeans (no significant difference) is more likely to be 'unemployed'. By far the largest odds are for the Pakistani and Caribbean Second Generations (2.8:1 and 3.9:1 respectively). By Model 3 the difference between Irish, Southern European, Indian and 'White English Speaking' Second Generations and the COUKBs has disappeared; these groups are no longer associated with a greater chance of being unemployed. However, by the final model, the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations still have high odds ratios and remain significantly associated with being unemployed. Although the levels of association have diminished substantially, both the Pakistan and Caribbean Second Generations remain substantially more likely to be unemployed than COUKBs. As with other outcomes the fall in odds ratio for the Pakistani Second Generation exceeds that of the Caribbean Second Generation.

Table 6.9 Logistic regression model: odds of being 'Most Deprived' on index of deprivation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5		
	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval					
<i>Sex</i>	1.22 ***	1.22 ***	1.22 ***	1.21 ***	1.21 ***	1.16	1.25
<i>Age</i>	0.97 ***	0.97 ***	0.97 ***	0.96 ***	0.96 ***	0.96	0.97
<i>Irish</i>	1.53 ***	1.58 ***	1.89 ***	1.35 *	1.13	0.80	1.58
<i>Eastern European</i>	0.82	0.83	1.14	1.54	1.33	0.77	2.28
<i>Southern European</i>	0.80	0.81	0.88	1.07	0.99	0.64	1.55
<i>Caribbean</i>	3.62 ***	3.47 ***	3.66 ***	2.90 ***	2.51 ***	1.81	3.47
<i>Indian</i>	1.08	1.02	0.96	0.81	0.69 *	0.45	1.05
<i>Pakistani</i>	3.60 ***	3.39 ***	3.13 ***	2.24 ***	1.97 **	1.23	3.15
<i>White' English Speaking</i>	1.43 *	1.33	1.46	1.58 *	1.42	0.87	2.34
<i>Fathers Age</i>		1.00	1.00 *	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
<i>Mothers Age</i>		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
<i>Fathers Age (missing)</i>		0.10	0.07	0.21	2.64	0.08	92.15
<i>Mother aged 23-30 at birth</i>		0.90 ***	0.90 ***	0.97	0.97	0.92	1.02
<i>Mother aged 22 and under</i>		1.34 ***	1.34 ***	1.19 ***	1.11 ***	1.04	1.19
<i>Mother age at birth (missing)</i>		1.79 ***	1.79 ***	1.56 ***	1.36 ***	1.11	1.66
<i>Multi Parent Household</i>		0.79 **	0.79 **	0.94	1.06	0.87	1.31
<i>Household Type (missing)</i>		1.07	1.07	0.87	1.04	0.89	1.22
<i>Fathers Year of entry</i>			1.01	1.01	1.01	0.98	1.03
<i>Mothers Year of entry</i>			1.01	1.01	1.01	0.99	1.03
<i>Father age at entry (missing)</i>		~	~	~	~	~	~
<i>Father age at entry</i>		~	~	~	~	~	~
<i>Mother age of entry</i>		1.00	1.00	0.99	0.98	1.01	
<i>Mother age of entry (missing)</i>		1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	1.02	
<i>2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood</i>			1.22 ***	1.17 ***	1.09	1.26	
<i>2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood</i>			1.43 ***	1.31 ***	1.22	1.40	
<i>Most Deprived Neighbourhood</i>			1.91 ***	1.63 ***	1.52	1.74	
<i>Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)</i>			0.85	0.96	0.58	1.57	
<i>Midlands regions</i>			1.43 ***	1.31 ***	1.24	1.37	
<i>South-East regions</i>			1.18 ***	1.14 ***	1.08	1.21	
<i>Other regions</i>			0.98	0.97	0.91	1.03	
<i>In Council Housing</i>			3.04 ***	2.25 ***	2.14	2.36	
<i>In Private Rented Housing</i>			1.83 ***	1.57 ***	1.48	1.66	
<i>Tenure (Missing)</i>			1.92 *	1.48	0.68	3.22	
<i>2nd Least Overcrowded Housing</i>			1.17 ***	1.13 ***	1.07	1.20	
<i>2nd Most Overcrowded Housing</i>			1.49 ***	1.39 ***	1.31	1.48	
<i>Most Overcrowded Housing</i>			2.22 ***	1.93 ***	1.82	2.05	
<i>Overcrowded Housing (missing)</i>			3.27 ***	2.80 ***	2.49	3.15	
<i>Access to basic amenities</i>			1.54 ***	1.35 ***	1.28	1.43	
<i>Father out of work</i>				1.56 ***	1.46	1.67	
<i>Father economic activity (missing)</i>					0.95	0.88	1.03
<i>Parents Lack Qualifications</i>					1.00	0.89	1.12
<i>Parents Qualifications (missing)</i>					1.26 ***	1.15	1.37
<i>Access to a Car</i>					2.27 ***	2.07	2.49
<i>Access to a 2+ Cars</i>					1.17 ***	1.10	1.25
<i>Parents in Social Class iin/m</i>					1.46 ***	1.36	1.57
<i>Parents in Social Class iv/v</i>					1.59 ***	1.44	1.76
<i>Parents Social Class (missing)</i>							

Prob > chi2

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n=

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**Table 6.10 Logistic regression model: odds of being 'Least Deprived' on index of deprivation**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	
	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval				
<i>Sex</i>	0.96 ***	0.96 ***	0.96 ***	0.97 *	0.98 *	0.95 1.00
<i>Age</i>	1.03 ***	1.04 ***	1.04 ***	1.05 ***	1.04 ***	1.04 1.05
<i>Irish</i>	0.62 ***	0.61 ***	0.46 ***	0.63 **	0.74	0.52 1.07
<i>Eastern European</i>	1.01	0.99	0.68 *	0.59 **	0.66 *	0.42 1.04
<i>Southern European</i>	0.93	0.92	0.78	0.70 *	0.77	0.51 1.18
<i>Caribbean</i>	0.15 ***	0.16 ***	0.14 ***	0.19 ***	0.22 ***	0.14 0.33
<i>Indian</i>	0.38 ***	0.40 ***	0.41 ***	0.54 **	0.62 **	0.39 0.97
<i>Pakistani</i>	0.07 ***	0.08 ***	0.08 ***	0.13 ***	0.15 ***	0.06 0.37
<i>White' English Speaking</i>	0.70 **	0.73 *	0.63 *	0.61 *	0.68	0.41 1.11
<i>Fathers Age</i>		1.00 *	1.00 *	1.00 **	1.00	1.00 1.00
<i>Mothers Age</i>		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00 1.00
<i>Fathers Age (missing)</i>	9.15	8.36	13.97 *	1.93	0.11	34.03
<i>Mother aged 23-30 at birth</i>	1.09 ***	1.09 ***	1.03	1.03	0.99	1.08
<i>Mother aged 22 and under</i>	0.71 ***	0.72 ***	0.83 ***	0.87 ***	0.83	0.92
<i>Mother age at birth (missing)</i>	0.58 ***	0.58 ***	0.70 ***	0.79 **	0.64	0.97
<i>Multi Parent Household</i>	1.21 *	1.21 *	1.01	0.89	0.73	1.10
<i>Household Type (missing)</i>	0.87 *	0.87 *	1.02	0.88	0.74	1.04
<i>Fathers Year of entry</i>		1.00	1.00	1.00	0.98	1.02
<i>Mothers Year of entry</i>		0.98 **	0.98	0.98 *	0.96	1.00
<i>Father age at entry (missing)</i>	~	~	~	~		
<i>Father age at entry</i>	~	~	~	~		
<i>Mother age of entry</i>	0.99 0.27	0.99	1.00	0.98	1.02	
<i>Mother age of entry (missing)</i>	1.00 0.99	1.00	1.00	0.98	1.02	
<i>2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood</i>			0.91 ***	0.94 **	0.90	0.99
<i>2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood</i>			0.78 ***	0.85 ***	0.81	0.88
<i>Most Deprived Neighbourhood</i>			0.57 ***	0.65 ***	0.62	0.68
<i>Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)</i>			0.92	0.88	0.66	1.17
<i>Midlands regions</i>			0.67 ***	0.70 ***	0.68	0.73
<i>South-East regions</i>			0.79 ***	0.80 ***	0.77	0.84
<i>Other regions</i>			0.90 ***	0.90 ***	0.86	0.94
<i>In Council Housing</i>			0.40 ***	0.50 ***	0.48	0.52
<i>In Private Rented Housing</i>			0.59 ***	0.66 ***	0.63	0.69
<i>Tenure (Missing)</i>			0.43 **	0.52 *	0.26	1.04
<i>2nd Least Overcrowded Housing</i>			0.89 ***	0.92 ***	0.89	0.95
<i>2nd Most Overcrowded Housing</i>			0.74 ***	0.78 ***	0.75	0.81
<i>Most Overcrowded Housing</i>			0.50 ***	0.56 ***	0.53	0.58
<i>Overcrowded Housing (missing)</i>			0.41 ***	0.43 ***	0.38	0.49
<i>Access to basic amenities</i>			0.64 ***	0.72 ***	0.68	0.76
<i>Father out of work</i>				0.70 ***	0.65	0.76
<i>Father economic activity (missing)</i>						
<i>Parents Lack Qualifications</i>					0.92 ***	0.88 0.96
<i>Parents Qualifications (missing)</i>					0.92 **	0.84 1.00
<i>Access to a Car</i>					0.91 ***	0.87 0.95
<i>Access to a 2+ Cars</i>					0.57 ***	0.54 0.60
<i>Parents in Social Class iiin/m</i>					0.91 ***	0.88 0.95
<i>Parents in Social Class iv/v</i>					0.78 ***	0.74 0.81
<i>Parents Social Class (missing)</i>					0.71 ***	0.65 0.77

Prob > chi2

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n=

96875

96875 96875 96875 96875

**Table 6.11 Logistic regression model: odds of being unemployed**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	95% Confidence Interval
	Odds Ratio					
<i>Sex</i>	0.56 ***	0.56 ***	0.56 ***	0.57 ***	0.57 ***	0.54 0.60
<i>Age</i>	0.94 ***	0.93 ***	0.93 ***	0.93 ***	0.93 ***	0.92 0.94
<i>Irish</i>	1.37 ***	1.40 ***	1.37	1.11	0.97	0.63 1.47
<i>Eastern European</i>	1.05	1.03	0.98	1.17	1.03	0.53 2.03
<i>Southern European</i>	1.57 ***	1.58 ***	1.52	1.63 *	1.50	0.91 2.48
<i>Caribbean</i>	2.79 ***	2.67 ***	2.59 ***	2.09 ***	1.90 ***	1.28 2.84
<i>Indian</i>	1.65 ***	1.57 ***	1.47	1.21	1.08	0.66 1.77
<i>Pakistani</i>	3.93 ***	3.71 ***	3.40 ***	2.53 ***	2.34 ***	1.32 4.15
<i>White' English Speaking</i>	1.71 **	1.63 **	1.59	1.55	1.44	0.79 2.63
<i>Fathers Age</i>		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
<i>Mothers Age</i>		1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
<i>Fathers Age (missing)</i>		0.05	0.08	0.21	0.98	0.92 1.05
<i>Mother aged 23-30 at birth</i>		0.93 **	0.93 **	0.98	1.04	0.95 1.13
<i>Mother aged 22 and under</i>		1.17 ***	1.16 ***	1.09 *	1.17	0.90 1.52
<i>Mother age at birth (missing)</i>		1.44 **	1.44 **	1.31 **	1.06	0.82 1.37
<i>Multi Parent Household</i>		0.86	0.86	0.97	1.12	0.92 1.37
<i>Household Type (missing)</i>		1.18	1.17	1.01	0.98	0.96 1.01
<i>Fathers Year of entry</i>			0.99	0.98	1.01	0.99 1.04
<i>Mothers Year of entry</i>			1.02	1.01	~	~ ~
<i>Father age at entry (missing)</i>		~	~	~	~	~
<i>Father age at entry</i>		0.00	0.01	1.00	0.98	1.02
<i>Mother age of entry</i>		1.01	1.00	0.99	0.97	1.01
<i>Mother age of entry (missing)</i>		0.99	0.99	1.08 *	0.99	1.18
<i>2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood</i>			1.10 **	1.18 ***	1.09	1.28
<i>2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood</i>			1.25 ***	1.30 ***	1.19	1.41
<i>Most Deprived Neighbourhood</i>			1.43 ***	0.82	0.44	1.53
<i>Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)</i>			0.76	1.13 ***	1.06	1.20
<i>Midlands regions</i>			1.19 ***	0.98	0.92	1.06
<i>South-East regions</i>			1.00	1.01	0.94	1.08
<i>Other regions</i>			1.02	1.44 ***	1.36	1.53
<i>In Council Housing</i>			1.73 ***	1.16 ***	1.07	1.25
<i>In Private Rented Housing</i>						
<i>Tenure (Missing)</i>			1.27 ***	1.35	0.50	3.65
<i>2nd Least Overcrowded Housing</i>			1.60	1.03	0.96	1.10
<i>2nd Most Overcrowded Housing</i>			1.05	1.15 ***	1.07	1.23
<i>Most Overcrowded Housing</i>			1.19 ***	1.53 ***	1.42	1.64
<i>Overcrowded Housing (missing)</i>			1.68 ***	1.97 ***	1.70	2.30
<i>Access to basic amenities</i>			2.27 ***	1.31 ***	1.22	1.41
<i>Father out of work</i>			1.42 ***	1.73 ***	1.58	1.89
<i>Father economic activity (missing)</i>				1.17	0.01	111.50
<i>Parents Lack Qualifications</i>				0.97	0.89	1.06
<i>Parents Qualifications (missing)</i>				1.11	0.96	1.27
<i>Access to a Car</i>				0.99	0.90	1.09
<i>Access to a 2+ Cars</i>				1.35 ***	1.22	1.50
<i>Parents in Social Class iiin/m</i>				1.11 **	1.03	1.20
<i>Parents in Social Class iv/v</i>				1.28 ***	1.18	1.40
<i>Parents Social Class (missing)</i>				1.48 ***	1.30	1.68

Prob > chi2

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## 6.6 Discussion

The logistic regression analyses allowed the exploration of the relationship between individual Second Generation groups and the five core outcomes and tested whether there was any evidence of significant differences between each Second Generation group and the COUKB population once sex, age and a diverse range of background characteristics had been controlled for.

The evidence suggests that different socio-economic, demographic and geographical profiles explain a lot of the cross-group diversity. However, many of the differences observed in Chapter 5 persist even after controlling for these factors. The relationship between 1971 characteristics and outcomes differs though according to which particular outcome is examined.

On the social class outcomes, once all control variables are introduced, there is a positive significant association for the Eastern European, Indian and Pakistani Second Generations with being in social class i/ii. For the Pakistani group, this is a notable change, from not having a significant association with the outcome when controlling for age and sex, to a significant association once all the controls were introduced. At the same time the Caribbean Second Generation changes from having a strong negative association with being in social class i/ii to there being no significant differences. At the other end of the social class scale, controlling for the background characteristics removes all significant associations between being a member of a Second Generation group and being in social class iv/v/inactive in 1991. The exception is the Indian Second Generation which is associated with less likelihood of being in this most disadvantaged social class after accounting for 1971 characteristics.

These results suggest that, contrary to what is found in some of the 'ethnic effects' literature which highlights barriers for certain minority ethnic groups, there may also be positive ethnic effects. The Indian, Pakistani and Eastern European Second Generations have more advantaged social class profiles than their origins would predict. Disadvantaged social origins, for these groups, have not proved the barrier to upward

social class mobility that they have for others. They appear to be drawing on some kind of (what Modood 2004 refers to as) 'ethnic capital' which helps overcome some of the barriers of social disadvantage. For other groups, any differences between their proportions in social class i/ii or iv/v inactive and those of the COUKBs, appeared to be accounted for by differences in the 1971 circumstances.

What could be the mechanisms that result in certain groups counteracting the structural mediators of intergenerational social mobility? Several possibilities were discussed earlier in the thesis. Most commonly asserted has been the idea that many immigrants experienced downward mobility on arrival, due to barriers of language, unrecognised experience and qualifications and discrimination. This has been suggested for both the South Asian and Eastern European groups (Zubrzycki, 1956; Daniel, 1968). However, over time they were able to climb the social ladder, or more importantly in the context of this research, pass on to their children the tools to gain upward mobility. Other explanations draw on the particular mobility and educational aspirations that are seen to characterise many immigrants, combined with the particular resource of immigrant family and community structures (Modood, 2005). An alternative explanation rests in the entrepreneurialism exhibited by certain groups, much written about in the context of Indian and Pakistani immigrants (Metcalf et al., 1996). It is not possible to draw conclusions about these mechanisms. However with the benefit of insights gained in the next Chapter I will reflect on this further in the Conclusion Chapter of the thesis.

For the other groups the differences in social class outcomes disappear once background characteristics have been controlled for. The group, for which odds ratios and significance levels changed most dramatically was the Caribbean Second Generation, less likely to be in social class i/ii and more likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive when controlling for just age and sex, but with no significant difference with the COUKBs once background characteristics were controlled for. The indication is that the social class outcomes for the Caribbean Second Generation can be understood in terms of their 1971 circumstances. This does not mean that the processes that mediate the intergenerational transfer of advantage and disadvantage are the same for this group as

for the children of UK-born parents; this will be explored further in the next Chapter. Moreover, given that the aggregate social class outcomes for this group were more disadvantaged, it is important to see the Second Generation's position as, at least in part, a legacy of the discrimination experienced by their parents' generation.

The positive effect for the Indian Second Generation is carried through to the outcomes derived from the index of deprivation and unemployment. Having taken into account the background characteristics, they are no more likely to be unemployed, and less likely to be in the 'most deprived' category, but remain less likely to be in the 'least deprived' category.

On these outcomes however the disadvantage for both the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations persists after controlling for 1971 characteristics. This is consistent with previous research which has showed minority ethnic groups to have positive social class outcomes, but remain disadvantaged in relation to unemployment and resources (Berthoud, 1998). This may reflect the propensity among large numbers of these groups to place a major emphasis on education, propelling them to advantaged social class outcomes. However, this is allied to ongoing exclusion from the labour market both among those trying to access professional/managerial occupations and others attempting to find employment at the bottom end of the labour market.

## **6.7 Conclusion**

This Chapter aimed to answer, or at least begin to answer, several questions. Looking at comparisons of the Second Generation as a whole with children of UK-born parents (COUKBs) and subsequently by individual origin groups it asked:

- What background/childhood characteristics are associated with 1991 outcomes related to relative advantaged and disadvantage?
- Are there differences in patterns across different groups?
- When controlling for these characteristics in multivariate analysis what impact is there upon apparent group differences observed on these outcomes?

The analyses produced a range of interesting findings. Looking at the Second Generation first of all, the discussion of associations between 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes highlighted a range of socio-economic and geographic characteristics as important precursors of later life outcomes. Controlling for these factors alters the associations between individual Second Generation groups and the outcomes. The analysis highlights that much of the Second Generation achieved high levels of social class mobility by early adulthood given their circumstances in 1971, but were they disproportionately among the deprived and unemployed.

Comparing those from individual Second Generation groups, factors including region of residence, parents' qualifications and father's employment appeared important precursors of later life outcomes, across a range of groups. However, there were distinct patterns particularly with respect to those of Caribbean and South Asian origin. Looking at social mobility there was great diversity, but whilst those of Caribbean and Pakistani origins were most likely to experience downward mobility, all groups experienced higher rates of long-range mobility from the most disadvantaged social classes than COUKBs. The comparison of groups suggested that were some important differences in the precursors of outcomes for different groups but also a great deal of similarity. These are explored further and estimated in the next chapter.

The multivariate analysis suggested some quite dramatic differences on the observed outcomes once 1971 characteristics had been controlled for. Having introduced all controls, the Second Generation of Indian, Pakistani and Eastern European origins were more likely to be in social class i/ii than COUKBs and no group was more likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive; indeed the Indian Second Generation were less likely to be. However the disadvantage, particularly of the Pakistani and Caribbean Second Generations, on the deprivation-related and unemployment outcomes, remained largely present after the introduction of the control variables.

## 7 - From childhood characteristics to adult outcomes (2)

### 7.1 Introduction

Chapter 7 builds on the findings of the previous chapter, investigating further the relationship between childhood characteristics in 1971 and adult outcomes in 1991, for the Second Generation and the children of UK-born parents (COUKBs). In Chapter 6, I used 1971 background characteristics as control variables to develop a better understanding of the aggregate group outcomes, and apparent similarities and differences between groups. In this Chapter, I continue to use logistic regression analysis but by looking at each group individually, aim to estimate the role of 1971 characteristics as explanatory factors for 1991 outcomes. The aim is to better understand the relative role of different demographic, socio-economic, geographic and migration-related factors in explaining outcomes for the Second Generation. By drawing out the precursors of advantage and disadvantage it will be possible to develop a more complete appreciation of the diversity of experience within individual groups, and an enhanced understanding of individual trajectories.

As in previous chapters, I begin by comparing the experiences of COUKBs and the Second Generation as a whole, before proceeding to an analysis based on individual Second Generation origin groups. The focus remains on the five core outcomes related to social class, the index of deprivation and unemployment. The variables used are the same as those in the Chapter 6 and are detailed in Table 6.1. As with the analyses in the previous chapter, I carried out the appropriate tests for multicollinearity and small cell counts preceding the analysis.

## 7.2 The relationship between 1971 circumstances and 1991 outcomes: COUKBs and the Second Generation

Table 7.1 shows the results from logistic regression models predicting the five core outcomes for the COUKBs. The vast majority of explanatory variables are significantly associated with the outcome variables. That is not surprising given the large samples being analysed here; over 97,000 people in four of the models and over 82,000 people in one. It is more instructive to look at the directions of relationships and the magnitude of the odds ratios.

Almost all the explanatory variables have the hypothesised relationship with the outcome measures. Those characteristics associated with more disadvantaged origins are associated with more disadvantaged destinations. For example, coming from a social class iv/v background was associated with a greater likelihood of being in social class iv/v/inactive, in the 'most deprived' category and unemployed, as well as less likelihood of being in social class i/ii and in the 'least deprived' category on the index of deprivation. Coming from a social class iiin/m background has lower odds ratios but is still more strongly associated with disadvantaged outcomes and more weakly associated with advantaged outcomes than coming from social class i/ii origins. On the household overcrowding variable, in every model, each quartile of higher overcrowding has an odds ratio indicating a greater degree of disadvantage.

There is evidence of a 'geography of relative advantage and disadvantage'. Each quartile of greater neighbourhood deprivation on the Carstairs indicator was associated with a greater degree of disadvantage on each variable. In terms of region, all regions are associated with greater disadvantage relative to the South-East; the North on all five outcomes, the Midlands on four and Other Regions on three.

An age effect is apparent, with those who are older more likely to be in social class i/ii and in the 'least deprived' category, and less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive, in the 'most deprived' category and unemployed. There are also gender effects with women

both more likely to be in social class i/ii, and 'most deprived', and less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive and 'least deprived' (although the latter effect was marginal). The largest gender effect was in terms of unemployment, with women far less likely than men to be in this situation (0.57:1). Coming from a lone parent household does not emerge as a significant predictor of outcomes. This may reflect differences in the meaning of lone parenthood in the 1960s from how the phenomenon evolved over the following decades<sup>67</sup>. Having a mother aged 22 and under at birth, was however associated with greater disadvantage on all outcomes.

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<sup>67</sup> Lone parenthood was initially the consequence of widowhood but became increasingly the product of divorce and extra-marital births

Table 7.2 shows the relationship between 1971 circumstances and 1991 outcomes for the Second Generation. The age effect, apparent for the COUKBs, was mirrored among the Second Generation. Each year older is associated with a greater likelihood of being in social class i/ii and 'least deprived' and a lower likelihood of being in social class iv/v/inactive, 'most deprived' and unemployed. There is also a gender effect. Women have a lower likelihood of being in social class iv/v/inactive than men (0.83:1), but a greater likelihood of being in the 'most deprived' category (1.33:1). Why women should be more disadvantaged on this one measure but more advantaged on the other is unclear, but it matches the finding for COUKBs. As with COUKBs, men were more likely than women to be unemployed.

There are strong associations between some of the socio-economic variables and outcomes, although not to the same extent as COUKBs.

- Those whose parents had higher qualifications were more likely to be in both social class i/ii (1.41:1) and 'least deprived' (1.28:1).
- Having access to a car in 1971 was associated with less likelihood of being in social class iv/v/inactive (0.70:1), in the 'most deprived' category (0.62:1) and unemployed (0.82:1).
- Those with a father in work in 1971 were significantly less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive (0.70:1) and unemployed (0.69:1).
- Being in rented housing in 1971 was strongly associated with disadvantage on all outcomes. This is especially so for those who were in social housing: less likely to be in social class i/ii (0.66:1) and 'least deprived' (0.62:1) and more likely to be social class iv/v/inactive (1.66:1), in the 'most deprived' category (1.99:1) and unemployed (1.30:1).
- The quartile of highest overcrowding is also associated with disadvantage. Those living in these conditions in 1971 were less likely to be in social class i/ii (0.73:1) and in the 'least deprived' category (0.59:1) and more likely to be 'most deprived' (1.48:1).

Whilst these associations are comparable to those of COUKBs, there is an important difference in the relationship between social class origins and outcomes for the two groups. Among the Second Generation, those from more disadvantaged social class

origins are less likely to be in social class i/ii. However the relationships between social class origins and being in social class iv/v/inactive in 1991 are much weaker. Whilst those from social class iv/v origins were more likely to be 'most deprived' there is no difference for those who were in social class iiin/m or between either of these origins and being 'least deprived'.

For the COUKBs, on all of these outcomes, as well as the unemployed outcome, there was a strongly significant relationship between the three social class origins and each outcome, with the more disadvantaged origins consistently the most strongly associated with most disadvantaged outcome and vice versa. However for the Second Generation, social class iiin/m (0.71:1) and iv/v (0.75:1) origins, were associated with a lower likelihood of being unemployed, compared to a social class i/ii background.

Both of these associations are only significant at the 10% level, so they should be interpreted with caution. However, they suggest that that once all the other background characteristics have been accounted for, the Second Generation from relatively advantaged origins were more likely to be unemployed than those from lower social class backgrounds. Therefore, whilst being from a social class i/ii background is a protective factor in terms of unemployment for COUKBs, this is less the case for the Second Generation. As discussed in the previous chapter, as well as in the literature review earlier in the thesis, there is evidence of ethnic penalties in unemployment for those from Indian, Pakistani and Caribbean backgrounds. It was also shown in Chapter 5 that the differences in unemployment rates between many groups and the COUKBs were higher when comparing those with higher qualifications than those without. It may be that it is these groups' experience that lies behind this association between more advantaged social class origins and unemployment. This will become more apparent, later in the Chapter.

There is evidence of disadvantage associated with coming from a deprived neighbourhood, however the picture is mixed. When considering social class outcomes, those who were in the second, third and 'most deprived' neighbourhoods were less likely to be in social class i/ii, and more likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive. However, the

odds ratios of these three quartiles are similar, indicating that this was an advantage associated with being in the ‘least deprived’ neighbourhoods rather than a particular disadvantage associated with the ‘most deprived’ neighbourhoods.

However, with the deprivation and unemployment outcomes, coming from the ‘most deprived’ neighbourhood is significantly associated with more disadvantaged outcomes, whilst the relationship between other neighbourhoods and these outcomes is weak. Those in the ‘most deprived’ quartile of neighbourhoods in 1971 were more likely to be in the ‘most deprived’ category and less likely to be in the ‘least deprived’ category.

The picture of regional disadvantage that emerged in the previous Chapter can be seen in Table 7.2. Living in the North and Midlands in 1971 was associated with both a greater likelihood of being in social class iv/v/inactive (1:51:1 and 1.42:1) and of being ‘most deprived’ (1.26:1 ad 1.29:1). Living in the North was also associated with a lower likelihood of being in the ‘least deprived’ category (0.67:1).

There are few significant associations for the family characteristics. After taking into account the other factors, coming from a lone parent household does not significantly predict any outcomes. Those born to a young mother were more likely to be in the ‘most deprived’ category; however this is significant just at the 10% level.

There is some evidence of advantage associated with mother’s entering the UK earlier. Those whose mother’s entered in the 1950s were less likely to be in social class i/ii and ‘least deprived’ and more likely to be ‘most deprived’ and unemployed. Those whose mother’s arrived in the 1960s were more likely to be in the ‘most deprived’ category and less likely to be ‘least deprived’. Importantly though, with the different Second Generation groups not included in this model, this may be picking up on particular groups rather than ages. As was seen in Chapters 4 and 5, the Eastern European immigrants arrived particularly early, immediately following the Second World War, and the Second Generation of this origin experienced particularly advantaged outcomes.

There is also evidence that those whose mothers entered at a late age (31+ years) experienced greater disadvantage. They are more likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive and 'most deprived' and less likely to be 'least deprived'.

### 7.3 Discussion

The evidence from the descriptive statistics of the previous Chapter, and the multivariate analysis presented above, suggests that as with the children of UK-born parents (COUKBs), there are strong relationships between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes for the children of immigrants. Socio-economic situation and place of residence during childhood are important influences on later life outcomes. Disadvantaged social origins such as having a father out of work or living in social housing are associated with a greater likelihood of disadvantaged outcomes and a lower likelihood of more advantaged outcomes. There is strong evidence of an important regional dimension, supporting notions of the South-East as an '*escalator region*'. It appears therefore, that the heterogeneity of outcomes witnessed for this group as a whole can be partly explained by the diverse set of circumstances in childhood, and not just by differences in the individual Second Generation origin groups. The kinds of structural explanations that much longitudinal research has highlighted for the population as a whole are also critical in mediating the trajectories of children of immigrants.

However, there is evidence that the relationships between origins and destinations for the Second Generation may be weaker and more nuanced than for the COUKBs. On social class outcomes there is a weaker connection between disadvantaged circumstances in childhood and disadvantaged outcomes in later life. The socio-economic factors that are risk factors for social class disadvantage in later life for COUKBs are less acute for the Second Generation. As suggested in the previous Chapters they have a greater likelihood of experiencing upward mobility 'from the bottom'.

However, with respect to the deprivation and unemployment outcomes the opposite may be the case. There is a weaker relationship, or even inverse relationship between disadvantaged origins and destinations. In other words, whilst disadvantaged origins are

not the risk factors for the Second Generation that they are for the children of UK-born parents, advantaged origins may not be as protective for the Second Generation. They are more likely to experience adverse outcomes whatever their background.

This lends further support to the related findings in the previous chapter. For a better understanding of why this might be the case, it is important to focus on the different origin groups within the Second Generation sample.

Table 7.1 Relationship between 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes for COUKBs; results from logistic regression models

	Outcomes / Dependent Variables									
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		Model 4	
	Social Class I/II		Social Class iv/v/inactive		Most Deprived		Least Deprived		Unemployed	
	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval
Sex	1.10 ***	1.07 1.13	0.87 ***	0.85 0.91	1.20 ***	1.16 1.25	0.97 *	0.95 1.00	0.57 ***	0.54 0.60
Age	1.09 ***	1.09 1.10	0.93 ***	0.93 0.94	0.96 ***	0.95 0.96	1.05 ***	1.04 1.05	0.93 ***	0.92 0.93
With Higher Qualifications	1.68 ***	1.60 1.76	0.74 ***	0.69 0.79	1.06		1.09 ***	1.04 1.14	1.05	
Qualifications (missing)	1.11 **	1.03 1.19	1.04		1.06		0.78 ***	0.66 0.90	1.17 **	1.05 1.31
Access to a Car	1.28 ***	1.24 1.33	0.71 ***	0.69 0.74	0.54 ***	0.52 0.56	1.61 ***	1.55 1.67	0.74 ***	0.70 0.78
Skilled non/manual	0.61 ***	0.59 0.64	1.30 ***	1.22 1.37	1.20 ***	1.13 1.29	0.91 ***	0.87 0.94	1.12 ***	1.04 1.21
Semi/Unskilled	0.52 ***	0.49 0.54	1.68 ***	1.58 1.79	1.49 ***	1.38 1.60	0.77 ***	0.73 0.81	1.30 ***	1.19 1.42
Social Class (missing)	0.61 ***	0.57 0.67	1.66 ***	1.51 1.83	1.65 ***	1.49 1.84	0.70 ***	0.64 0.76	1.52 ***	1.34 1.73
Father in Work	1.20 ***	1.11 1.29	0.71 ***	0.66 0.76	0.64 ***	0.60 0.69	1.45 ***	1.34 1.58	0.58 ***	0.53 0.63
Father in Work (missing)	1.08		0.71 ***	0.63 0.81	0.66 ***	0.58 0.75	1.63 ***	1.35 1.96	0.60 ***	0.51 0.71
Social Rented Housing	0.58 ***	0.56 0.60	1.66 ***	1.59 1.74	2.29 ***	2.18 2.40	0.50 ***	0.48 0.52	1.44 ***	1.35 1.53
Private Rented Housing	0.81 ***	0.77 0.85	1.30 ***	1.23 1.37	1.57 ***	1.47 1.67	0.66 ***	0.63 0.69	1.14 ***	1.06 1.23
2nd Least Overcrowded	0.83 ***	0.80 0.87	1.13 ***	1.07 1.19	1.14 ***	1.07 1.21	0.92 ***	0.89 0.95	1.03	
2nd Most Overcrowded	0.74 ***	0.71 0.77	1.30 ***	1.24 1.37	1.40 ***	1.32 1.49	0.78 ***	0.75 0.81	1.16 ***	1.08 1.25
Most Overcrowded	0.58 ***	0.55 0.61	1.71 ***	1.62 1.80	1.96 ***	1.84 2.08	0.56 ***	0.53 0.58	1.57 ***	1.46 1.69
Overcrowded (missing)	0.64 ***	0.57 0.71	2.05 ***	1.82 2.31	2.81 ***	2.48 3.17	0.44 ***	0.39 0.50	1.98 ***	1.69 2.33
Lacking Basic Household Amenities	0.79 ***	0.75 0.83	1.29 ***	1.22 1.36	1.38 ***	1.30 1.46	0.72 ***	0.68 0.76	1.34 ***	1.25 1.44
2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood	0.90 ***	0.86 0.95	1.06 *	1.00 1.13	1.18 ***	1.10 1.27	0.94 **	0.90 0.98	1.07	
2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood	0.82 ***	0.78 0.86	1.17 ***	1.11 1.25	1.32 ***	1.23 1.41	0.84 ***	0.81 0.88	1.17 ***	1.08 1.27
Most Deprived Neighbourhood	0.76 ***	0.72 0.80	1.28 ***	1.21 1.37	1.65 ***	1.54 1.77	0.65 ***	0.62 0.68	1.28 ***	1.17 1.39
Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)	0.83	0.61 1.11	1.50 **	1.05 2.14	1.14 ***	1.09 1.19	0.88		1.33 ***	1.17 1.50
North Region	0.93 ***	0.89 0.96	1.22 ***	1.17 1.28	1.29 ***	1.23 1.36	0.70 ***	0.67 0.73	1.13 ***	1.07 1.19
Midlands Region	0.83 ***	0.80 0.86	1.18 ***	1.12 1.24	1.12 ***	1.06 1.19	0.80 ***	0.77 0.84	0.97	
Other Region	0.85 ***	0.82 0.89	1.23 ***	1.16 1.29	0.96		0.89 ***	0.86 0.93	1.25 **	1.06 1.48
Lone Parent Household							0.84 **	0.71 0.99		
Lone Parent (missing)	0.50 ***	0.47 0.54	1.59 ***	1.47 1.73	1.20 ***	1.10 1.31	0.75 ***	0.70 0.81		
Young Mother at birth	0.90 ***	0.87 0.93	1.06 ***	1.01 1.10			0.85 ***	0.82 0.89	1.06 0.05	1.00 1.12
Young Mother (missing)	0.68 ***	0.60 0.77	1.30 ***	1.14 1.47	1.43 ***	1.26 1.63				
Observations	93880		93880		93244		93244		78717	
P > chi <sup>2</sup>	***		***		***		***		***	

**Table 7.2 Relationship between 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes for the Second Generation; results from logistic regression models**

	Outcomes / Dependent Variables											
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Social Class I/II		Social Class IV/V/Inactive		Most Deprived		Least Deprived		Unemployed			
	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval		
Sex	1.03	0.90 1.16		0.83 **	0.71 0.97		1.33 ***	1.16 1.54	1.04	0.89 1.21	0.59 *** 0.49 0.70	
Age	1.07 ***	1.05 1.09		0.92 ***	0.90 0.94		0.95 ***	0.93 0.97	1.10 ***	1.07 1.12	0.90 *** 0.88 0.93	
With Higher Qualifications	1.41 ***	1.14 1.73		0.79	0.59 1.06		0.87	0.67 1.14	1.28 **	1.01 1.62	0.70 ** 0.51 0.97	
Qualifications (missing)	1.08	0.86 1.37		1.10	0.83 1.45		1.23	0.95 1.58	0.98	0.73 1.30	1.06 0.77 1.45	
Access to a Car	1.02	0.88 1.17		0.70 ***	0.59 0.84		0.62 ***	0.52 0.73	1.60 ***	1.36 1.88	0.82 * 0.68 1.00	
Skilled non/manual	0.51 ***	0.41 0.64		1.18	0.85 1.63		1.03	0.76 1.39	0.84	0.65 1.07	0.71 ** 0.51 0.98	
Semi/Unskilled	0.49 ***	0.39 0.63		1.38 *	0.99 1.92		1.39 **	1.02 1.89	0.80	0.61 1.04	0.75 * 0.53 1.05	
Social Class (missing)	0.53 ***	0.37 0.75		1.12	0.72 1.75		1.02	0.67 1.53	0.78	0.51 1.20	0.64 * 0.39 1.04	
Father in Work	1.23	0.94 1.63		0.70 **	0.52 0.94		0.79	0.59 1.05	0.94	0.67 1.31	0.69 ** 0.49 0.97	
Father in Work (missing)	1.36	0.53 3.52		0.73	0.26 2.07		1.49	0.57 3.87	0.73	0.24 2.25	0.54 0.14 2.04	
Social Rented Housing	0.66 ***	0.55 0.78		1.66 ***	1.36 2.03		1.99 ***	1.65 2.41	0.62 ***	0.51 0.76	1.30 ** 1.03 1.65	
Private Rented Housing	0.91	0.75 1.10		1.34 **	1.06 1.69		1.71 ***	1.39 2.12	0.66 ***	0.52 0.85	1.19 0.91 1.54	
2nd Least Overcrowded	1.02	0.79 1.31		1.18	0.83 1.68		0.98	0.69 1.38	0.92	0.70 1.21	1.12 0.75 1.66	
2nd Most Overcrowded	0.92	0.73 1.16		1.03	0.75 1.42		1.11	0.82 1.51	0.83	0.64 1.06	0.97 0.68 1.40	
Most Overcrowded	0.73 ***	0.59 0.91		1.21	0.90 1.65		1.48 ***	1.11 1.98	0.53 ***	0.42 0.68	1.24 0.88 1.74	
Overcrowded (missing)	0.57 ***	0.41 0.80		1.30	0.86 1.97		1.82 ***	1.24 2.67	0.42 ***	0.28 0.63	1.87 *** 1.19 2.93	
Lacking Basic Household Amenities	0.99	0.83 1.16		1.00	0.82 1.22		1.16	0.97 1.38	0.78 **	0.62 0.97	1.08 0.87 1.34	
2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood	0.73 **	0.55 0.96		1.44 *	0.98 2.12		1.10	0.77 1.56	1.06	0.79 1.43	1.35 0.88 2.08	
2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood	0.62 ***	0.48 0.81		1.45 *	1.00 2.09		1.33 *	0.96 1.85	0.80	0.60 1.08	1.46 * 0.97 2.21	
Most Deprived Neighbourhood	0.67 ***	0.52 0.87		1.60 **	1.11 2.30		1.56 ***	1.13 2.16	0.59 ***	0.44 0.79	1.67 ** 1.11 2.50	
North Region	1.04	0.87 1.25		1.51 ***	1.22 1.88		1.26 **	1.03 1.55	0.67 ***	0.53 0.85	0.90 0.70 1.17	
Midlands Region	1.04	0.88 1.22		1.42 ***	1.16 1.72		1.29 ***	1.07 1.55	0.91	0.75 1.11	1.04 0.83 1.30	
Other Region	1.01	0.78 1.32		1.12	0.79 1.59		0.79	0.56 1.11	1.55 ***	1.17 2.05	1.48 ** 1.04 2.12	
Lone Parent Household	0.60	0.24 1.51		1.21	0.44 3.34		0.65	0.26 1.64	1.03	0.35 3.05	1.71 0.46 6.33	
Lone Parent (missing)	0.84	0.54 1.31		1.26	0.69 2.31		0.61	0.32 1.16	0.93	0.58 1.50	1.34 0.61 2.95	
Young Mother at birth	0.90	0.74 1.10		1.08	0.85 1.38		1.21 *	0.97 1.51	0.96	0.75 1.22	1.08 0.82 1.43	
Young Mother (missing)	0.77	0.35 1.69		0.81	0.35 1.88		1.37	0.65 2.90	1.04	0.41 2.65	0.81 0.26 2.51	
Mother Year of Entry (mid)	0.74 ***	0.60 0.92		1.07	0.80 1.44		2.00 ***	1.47 2.73	0.73 **	0.58 0.93	1.54 ** 1.05 2.27	
Mother Year of Entry (late)	1.03	0.79 1.36		0.88	0.62 1.26		1.68 ***	1.17 2.40	0.72 **	0.52 0.98	1.37 0.88 2.12	
Mother Age Entry 18-23	1.02	0.84 1.24		0.97	0.77 1.23		1.02	0.82 1.27	0.97	0.78 1.21	1.04 0.80 1.37	
Mother Age Entry 24-30	0.93	0.74 1.17		1.01	0.76 1.34		1.01	0.78 1.32	0.78 *	0.60 1.02	1.16 0.84 1.60	
Mother Age Entry 31+	0.92	0.69 1.23		1.46 **	1.03 2.05		1.34 *	0.97 1.85	0.68 **	0.48 0.98	1.02 0.67 1.53	
Mother Age Entry (missing)	0.66 **	0.45 0.96		1.69 **	1.11 2.57		1.61 **	1.09 2.40	0.48 ***	0.29 0.79	1.36 0.84 2.22	
Observations	4457			4457			4421		4421		3741	
P > chi <sup>2</sup>	***			***			***		***		***	

## 7.4 The Second Generation Groups

### 7.4.1 *Introduction to the analysis*

The next stage considers results from logistic regression models for the individual Second Generation groups. I take the same approach as in previous models with some small alterations to model specification and interpretation, as a consequence of the much smaller sample sizes being used in these regression models. When full models were run, including all of the 1971 background variables, several of the models were not significant according to the  $\chi^2$  goodness-of-fit test. This was a consequence of small sample sizes and a large amount of error, with the models prone to ‘over-fitting’ (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000 p. 92). If, however, all explanatory variables with significance levels less than 0.5 (the 50% level) are removed from the model, then chi-squares become significant; almost all well within the 1% level. I therefore use the method of stepwise deletion to remove these highly insignificant explanatory variables. This technique is sometimes criticized for placing statistical techniques ahead of theory. However that is not what is occurring here. All the variables put in the original models are theory based. The stepwise deletion removes those that are contributing little but error to the overall models, ensuring that the final models are more robust.

These results, focusing on the individual Second Generation groups, ought to be viewed with a degree of caution. When analysing populations with small numbers, there is a greater risk of random error. In certain instances this has meant not looking at certain populations on specific outcomes. When, on any given dichotomous outcome, there was a count of fewer than fifty in one of the two cells, the results from the model have not been presented. Below this number, I found large error terms and parameter estimates when running models and decided these results were too unreliable. Consequently, I present no data for either the Eastern European or ‘White English Speaking’ Second Generations populations on any disadvantage related outcomes, or for the latter on the ‘least deprived’ category, for the Pakistani Second Generation on the ‘least deprived’ category or for Southern Europeans on social class iv/v/inactive.

There are further cautions. In this section, I treat the five outcome measures less as individual indicators and more as different indicators of the overall phenomena of relative advantage and disadvantage. I make the assumption that an explanatory variable that significantly predicts several outcomes has more interpretive value than if it significantly predicts just one. The former shows some degree of consistency indicating robustness, the latter is more likely, although not necessarily, to be picking up a random effect. Where, however, explanatory variables are significantly associated with outcomes in contradictory ways (as with parents' social class for the Second Generation in the previous section) I do try to interpret in terms of the specific meanings of the outcome variables. This is necessary as there has been considerable evidence in the previous chapters of different effects for the social class outcomes and those that relate to the index of deprivation and unemployment. Whilst I do consider those background characteristics that are significant at the 10% level, I give greater weight where they appear to corroborate other significant findings at the 5% or 1% levels, rather than standing alone as sole predictors of an outcome at the 10% level.

Below I consider each group in turn, presenting the results of their individual models, examining the impact of demographic, socio-economic and geographic characteristics on outcomes. However I consider the migration variables - mother's age at entry and year of entry - at the end, looking at all groups together. This is because when looking at one group alone, it is difficult to distinguish migration effects from cohort effects. Only by examining the results on these variables for all groups together is it possible to draw out any patterns.

## 7.5 The Results

### 7.51 *The Irish Second Generation*

For the Irish Second Generation, as evident in Table 7.3, age is a significant predictor of outcomes. Those who were older were significantly more likely to be in social class i/ii and to be 'least deprived'. They were less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive, in the 'most deprived' category or unemployed. Men were more likely to be actively seeking work. However, women were more likely to be 'most deprived'.

Parents' social class is not a particularly salient predictor of outcomes for the Irish Second Generation. The one significant association (at the 10% level) is for those from a social class iv/v background, who were more likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive themselves (1.32:1). However, several other socio-economic characteristics significantly predicted outcomes in 1991. Having a father in work in 1971 appeared an important precursor of outcomes for this group in the previous chapter. Those with a father in work in 1971 were significantly less likely to be actively seeking work in 1991 than those whose fathers were out of work. They were also less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive and in the 'most deprived' category. Being in rented housing in 1971 and especially social housing, were significantly associated with less advantaged outcomes. Those who lived in social housing were both less likely to be in social class i/ii and less likely to be 'least deprived' (0.55:1 and 0.69:1). They were much more likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive (2.12:1) and in the 'most deprived' category (2.10:1) and more likely to be unemployed (1.55:1, significant at the 10% level). Living in private rented housing was also a significant precursor of disadvantage.

Other significant predictors were access to a car and household overcrowding. Having access to a car in 1971 was associated with less likelihood of being either in social class iv/v/inactive, or in the 'most deprived' category, and a greater probability of being 'least deprived'. Those who were in the most overcrowded housing in 1971 were less likely to be in social class i/ii and in the 'least deprived' category.

Geography also appears to be important for the Irish Second Generation. Those who were in the Northern regions in 1971 had a greater chance of being in social class iv/v/inactive, in the 'most deprived' category and unemployed. They were less likely to be 'least deprived'. Neighbourhoods were also important. Those in the 'most deprived' quartile of neighbourhoods were less likely to be in social class i/ii (0.57:1) and more likely to be 'most deprived' (1.40:1). Those in the second and third 'most deprived' neighbourhoods were respectively less likely to be in social class i/ii and more likely to be unemployed than those in the quartile of 'least deprived' wards.

#### *7.52 The Eastern European Second Generation*

The small numbers of the Eastern European Second Generation (Table 7.4) may explain the relatively few significant results. As with the Irish Second Generation, those who were older were significantly more likely to be in social class i/ii and the 'least deprived' category. There is a strong association between having parents with higher qualifications and being in social class i/ii in 1991. Those with access to a car in 1971, were much more likely to be 'least deprived' (2.29:1).

There are weak effects for two other socio-economic indicators; those in social housing were less likely to be in social class i/ii, and those from social class iiin/m origins were less likely to be 'least deprived'. Men were more likely to be in social class i/ii than women and those in the Midlands were more likely to be 'least deprived' (all significant at the 10% level).

#### *7.53 The Southern European Second Generation*

The age effect is the one consistent predictor across different outcomes for the Southern European Second Generation (Table 7.5). Being older is associated with a greater likelihood of being in social class i/ii and 'least deprived', and less probability of being unemployed. Men were also twice as likely as women to be unemployed, a finding mirrored by other groups.

There are several socio-economic characteristics significantly associated with outcomes but none consistently across more than one outcome. Those who were in the most overcrowded housing in 1971 were much more likely to be 'most deprived' in 1991 (2.20:1). Those who were in social housing and in the 'most deprived' neighbourhoods in 1971 were less likely to be 'least deprived' (0.32:1 and 0.50:1).

There are also weaker associations between having a father out of work and living in private rented housing in childhood, with being in the 'most deprived' category and unemployed in adulthood. Those from the North were also less likely to be 'least deprived' and those with a young mother at birth more likely to be 'least deprived'. All these were significant at the 10% level.

#### *7.54 The Caribbean Second Generation*

As with other groups, for the Caribbean Second Generation (Table 7.6), age was a significant predictor of outcomes with those who were older, more likely to be in social class i/ii and less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive or unemployed. Women were less likely to be unemployed (0.49:1) but more likely to be 'most deprived' (1.51:1).

Certain relationships between socio-economic circumstances in childhood, and adult outcomes are similar to those of other groups. Among the Caribbean Second Generation, those in rented housing in childhood were more likely to be 'most deprived' and less likely to be 'least deprived'. Those who lived in private rented housing in 1971 were particularly disadvantaged. There are also weak associations between origins and outcomes for those whose parents had higher qualifications and those with access to a car.

However, in terms of parental social class origins there are some findings that differ from those of other groups. Those whose parents were in social class iv/v and iiin/m had much less likelihood of being in social class i/ii than those from more advantaged social class origins. This would be expected and is replicated in other groups. However being from social class iiin/m is also associated with less likelihood of being in social class

iv/v/inactive (0.73:1) and 'most deprived' (0.64:1). Moreover, coming from both social class iv/v and iiin/m backgrounds is associated with much less chance of being unemployed (0.24:1 and 0.22:1)

Regions and neighbourhoods are significant for the Caribbean Second Generation. Being from the Midlands was associated with both a greater likelihood of being in social class iv/v/inactive (1.75:1) and of being 'most deprived' (2.12:1). Those from the North in 1971 also had a greater probability of being 'most deprived'. The small number of the Caribbean Second Generation resident in 'Other regions' in 1971, were more likely to be 'least deprived' but also more likely to be unemployed. Those in the most and second most deprived quartile of neighbourhoods were less likely to be 'least deprived'. The latter were also less likely to be in social class i/ii,

There are some significant family background indicators for the Caribbean Second Generation. Those in lone parent families in 1971 were much less likely to be in social class i/ii (0.49:1), but also less likely to be in the 'most deprived' category. Having a young mother at birth was associated with a greater likelihood of being in the 'least deprived' category.

#### *7.55 The Indian Second Generation*

For the Second Generation of Indian origin (Table 7.6), being older was associated with a greater likelihood of being 'least deprived' and less probability of being unemployed. Women were 39% less likely to be in social class i/ii, but also 66% less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive.

There is a relationship between social class origins and outcomes, indicating typical patterns of mobility. Those coming from social class iv/v and iiin/m backgrounds were less likely to be in social class i/ii (0.53:1 and 0.44:1). This is supported by other relationships between indicators of relative economic disadvantage and various outcomes. Those who had access to a car were less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive and those in the quartile of most overcrowded housing were less likely both

to be in social class i/ii and to be 'least deprived'. There were some weaker associations, with those lacking amenities and with their father out of work in 1971, less likely to be in social class i/ii and the 'most deprived' category, respectively.

There is a disadvantage associated with the North for the Indian Second Generation. Those who lived in the North in 1971 had a lesser likelihood of being in social class i/ii and in the 'least deprived' category (0.58:1 and 0.41:1). They were also much more likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive (1.91:1) and 'most deprived' (2.13:1) than those Indians who were resident in the South-East. Living in the Midlands was also associated with over twice the likelihood of being in the 'most deprived' category. Among the Indian Second Generation, those who lived in the most deprived neighbourhoods in childhood had a lower likelihood of being in the 'least deprived' category in adulthood.

#### *7.56 The Pakistani Second Generation*

The Pakistani Second Generation (Table 7.8) is small, and this may explain why the models produce few significant results. Being older is associated with a greater likelihood of being in social class i/ii, and less likelihood of being in social class iv/v/inactive and unemployed. As with other groups, women were less likely to be unemployed than men (0.34:1: significant at the 10% level). Those whose parents had high level qualifications in 1971 (a small number), were less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive, and in the 'most deprived' category. They were also more likely to be unemployed, although high parameter estimates suggests treating this estimate with caution.

Mirroring findings for the Caribbean Second Generation, those from both social class iv/v and iiin/m backgrounds were much less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive (0.11:1). Those from the latter background were also less likely to be in the 'most deprived' category (0.48:1).

There is a regional effect for the Pakistani Second Generation, with a strong disadvantage associated with being from the Midlands. Those from the Midlands more than three

times as likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive, 'most deprived' and unemployed as those in the South-East.

#### **7.57 The 'White English Speaking' Second Generation**

The only outcome analysed for the 'White English Speaking' Second Generation was social class i/ii. Consistent with other groups there is an age effect. Each year older is associated with a greater likelihood of being in social class i/ii (significant at the 10% level). The strongest association between origins and outcomes was with parental social class. Those from social class iv/v and iiin/m were less likely to be in social class i/ii (0.20:1 and 0.17:1). There is also a weak effect for age of mother at birth with those whose mother was 22 or younger being less likely to be in social class i/ii (significant at the 10% level).

### **7.6 Discussion - Key Themes**

#### **7.61 The Caribbean and Pakistani social class effect**

Why might parents' social class have a different kind of association with outcomes for the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations than for other groups? Traditional stratification theory and evidence from studies of life chances and social mobility suggest that coming from a lower social class background should be associated with more disadvantaged outcomes. Using the general explanatory variables available in this study, social class background would be expected to be significant in this way, even after controlling for income and wealth related variables and parents' education; all important correlates of social class. This is the case for several groups. Indeed for the Caribbean Second Generation, those coming from a social class iv/v background a much lower probability of being in social class i/ii, compared with those from a more advantaged social class background after controlling for background characteristics. Yet on the disadvantage related outcome variables for both the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations, having accounted for a range of childhood characteristics, those from a more disadvantaged social class background were less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive, 'most deprived' and unemployed. The implication is that whilst coming

from a more advantaged social class background may be important in attaining relatively advantaged outcomes, for these groups it offers comparatively less protection, after controlling for other factors, from future disadvantage.

This is consistent with some previous research which shows, for example, particularly harsh ethnic penalties in unemployment for those of Caribbean and Pakistani ethnic origin. Even after controlling for their own educational attainment, people from these groups have higher unemployment whether they have higher degrees or lack qualifications altogether. However, the negative relationship between more disadvantaged social class origins and destinations might also suggest an earlier process in the lifespan, pre-dating an individual's search for work. It suggests perhaps that coming from more advantaged backgrounds may be less associated with the better educational outcomes and other personal characteristics, associated with achieving higher status occupations (Jackson et al., 2002). This may, for example, be picking up on the particular difficulty faced by boys of Caribbean and Pakistani origin in education, and findings that the social class gap<sup>68</sup> in educational attainment may be smaller for these groups than for 'white-UK' children (Gillborn and Mirza, 2000). It was this phenomenon that the high profile Black MP Diane Abbott was referring to when she announced that she was sending her son to an independent school instead of a local state school. Supporting her decision the Chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality wrote:

'She is a single mother of a black boy and, statistically, the prospects facing her are desperate. Being the son of an MP does not exempt you from the fate of all too many black boys - low achievement, exclusion, crime, imprisonment and premature death by gun crime.' (Phillips quoted by Holloway, 2003)

The results in Table 7.6 and Table 7.8 in some way support the sentiment expressed here, if not the detail.

At the same time socio-economic factors do matter, although more for predicting access to advantaged groups than as a protective factor from adult disadvantage. Within both

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68 The gap in educational attainment scores between those from different social class backgrounds

groups there are relationships between more advantaged socio-economic origins and more advantaged outcomes. Thus the situation of those from advantaged origins is mixed. On the one hand they are more likely to experience the more advantaged outcomes, yet their advantaged origins, do not protect them, in the same way as they do for other groups, from the possibilities of downward mobility and disadvantage.

#### *7.62 The importance of the age effect*

The COUKBs and every Second Generation group, without exception, show a highly significant relationship between age and outcomes. Being older is consistently found to be associated with a greater likelihood of being in social class i/ii and 'least deprived' and lesser likelihood of being in social class iv/v/inactive, 'most deprived' and unemployed. This fits with the hypothesis that ages 20-36 - the age group covered in this study - represents a time of important career development, where people increasingly are able to access better jobs and accumulate greater resources. It has implications for how the descriptive results are interpreted. Certain groups, notably the Pakistani, but also the Caribbean and Indian Second Generations, have younger age profiles than others, whilst those from the East European Second Generation are, on average, much older. Their aggregate group outcomes - that were observed in Chapter 5 - may therefore, although not necessarily, be a partial product of their age distributions. Using the linked 2001 census data in the ONS Longitudinal Study it will be possible to follow the study population up to ages 30-46 when potentially there will be less significant variations by age.

#### *7.63 Gender effects*

The only consistent gender effect across all groups is that men are more likely to be unemployed than women. As mentioned throughout the thesis, this is to be expected as this particular phenomenon is typically found to be gendered; men are generally more likely to be unemployed whilst women who are out of work are more often classified as 'economically inactive'. Among the Caribbean Second Generation, women were more likely to be 'most deprived' than men. This may well reflect the particularly high rate of female-headed lone parent households for this group. Whilst the discussion earlier in the

thesis suggested that women in lone parent households among the Caribbean origin population may be no less likely to be in social class i/ii as those in two parent households, the lack of a second income could result in a great probability of experiencing deprivation (Berthoud, 2005 p. 239).

#### *7.64 The Regional Effect*

The strong regional effect that appeared in the descriptive statistics is borne out in the multivariate analyses. For the Irish Second Generation being from the North was associated with a greater likelihood of being in social class iv/v/inactive, 'most deprived' and actively seeking work, and a lower probability of being 'least deprived'. Being from the Midlands was also associated with less probability of being 'least deprived' and a greater probability of actively seeking work. For the Southern Europeans, being from the North was associated with less likelihood of being 'least deprived'. For the Caribbean Second Generation, those from the North and Midlands were more likely to be 'most deprived' and those from the latter region more likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive. For the Indian Second Generation, being from the North is associated with a lower likelihood of being in social class i/ii and 'least deprived' and a higher likelihood of being in social class iv/v/inactive and 'most deprived'. Those from the Midlands were also more than twice as likely to be 'most deprived'. For the Pakistani Second Generation the Midlands has a positive association with all three disadvantage-related outcomes. These findings were mirrored by the experience of the COUKBs.

The results point to a strong disadvantage accruing to those of the Second Generation growing up in the Midlands and Northern regions of England. It is support for the notion of the South-East as an escalator region. Given that particular groups, notably the Pakistani Second Generation, were heavily concentrated outside of the South-East, this may well be an important component to understanding this group's high levels of disadvantage. It points to caution in relying too heavily on culture-based arguments at the expense of structural analysis, when assessing the situation of certain minority groups in Northern towns. I will discuss this further in the Conclusion Chapter.

### *7.65 Parents higher qualifications*

Previous research and evidence from both the descriptive statistics and the analysis of the Second Generation as a whole suggested that having parents with higher qualifications may have a larger effect than that found in this analysis. There were a small number of significant associations, half of these at the 10% level. The likelihood is that 'higher qualifications' in 1971 is too blunt an instrument with which to detect educational differences, as only a small proportion had them. This would be magnified for immigrants coming from countries with even smaller higher education systems, or with unrecognised qualifications. A further explanation is offered by Gang and Zimmerman (2000). Comparing the relationship between parent's and child's education for native born Germans and their children, and immigrants and the Second Generation, they find no parental education effect for the migrant group. They suggest that the human capital effect of migration may 'swamp' any effect of parents' formal schooling.

### *7.66 Other socio-economic indicators*

Access to a car in 1971 was a particularly salient predictor of more advantaged outcomes for the Irish and Eastern European Second Generations. Having access to a car was negatively associated with being in social class iv/v/inactive for the Indian Second Generation. This is consistent with previous findings; for groups that are more concentrated in inner urban areas this indicator is less likely to be a predictor of relative disadvantage.

For all groups except Indian and Pakistanis, there was some relationship between housing tenure in 1971 and outcomes in 1991. In all cases, being in rented housing, and particularly socially rented housing was associated with more disadvantaged outcomes. That tenure did not significantly predict outcomes for the groups of South Asian origin lends further support to the assertion that disadvantaged families from these groups were heavily concentrated in low quality owner occupied housing, rather than in one of the rental sectors. However, there is some evidence for high levels of household overcrowding predicting disadvantage for these groups. This is also the case for the Southern Europeans and the Irish. The mechanism that relates overcrowding in

childhood to later life disadvantage is not obvious. It could be a direct disadvantage connected to lack of space in the house, or it could be a proxy for low incomes. Alternatively it could be picking up on an unobserved disadvantage associated with more traditional religious households. Both traditional Catholic (Irish and Italian) and Muslim (Pakistani) households have above average fertility rates. However, the strong association between household overcrowding and outcomes evident for the COUKB population might militate against this latter cultural argument.

Having a father out of work in 1971 was a salient precursor of disadvantage for the Irish Second Generation and COUKBs. However, whilst it appeared important to a range of groups in the descriptive statistics in the previous chapter, this was not carried through to the multivariate analysis. This may partially reflect that male adult unemployment was generally low in 1971; there were small numbers in this category for several of the groups with relatively small sample sizes. However, it is also possible that for Irish immigrants with a shared language, skin colour and similarities of culture, to be unemployed would be an indicator of disadvantage equivalent to that of COUKBs. By contrast, for immigrants who spoke less good English, or experienced discrimination, being out of work carried a different meaning, and the barriers faced by the First Generation may have, at least in part, diminished for the Second Generation.

There is also some evidence that coming from the 'most deprived' neighbourhoods in 1971 was associated with disadvantage in 1991. For COUKBs there is sliding scale on each outcome variable; each quartile of greater neighbourhood deprivation is associated with a higher probability of disadvantage on each outcome. This variable was also significantly associated with outcomes for the Irish, Indian, Caribbean and Southern European Second Generations. It is conceivable that some of the effects of deprived areas, discussed by Portes, may have occurred here. However the nature of area effects is complicated and it is difficult to infer much from these limited findings.

### **7.67 Family Characteristics**

The family background variables included in the models, were in most instances, not significantly associated with the outcome measures. However for the Caribbean Second Generation, the group with much the highest rate of lone parent households even in 1971, this background factor was associated with a lower probability of being in social class i/ii. Strangely it was also associated with a lower chance of being 'most deprived', although this latter association was only significant at the 10% level. For the Caribbean and the 'White English Speaking' Second Generations, having a young mother at birth was also associated with having disadvantaged outcomes.

### **7.68 Migration Variables**

As mentioned in the introduction, it is necessary to consider the two migration variables - mother's age at entry and year of entry - by looking at all the Second Generation groups together. Independently, it is impossible to distinguish any impact of age at entry or time in the country from cohort effects. For example, it may be that those who came earlier from a particular group were already more advantaged in some way.

It was hypothesized that those immigrants who arrived at a younger age would accrue advantages that could be passed onto children, such as learning English, having stronger social networks and developing cultural understanding. The analysis uses dummy variables for entry at age 0-17, 18-23, 24-30 and 31+. Whilst there are numerous significant associations, there is no discernible pattern. Ages 18-23 are associated with advantaged outcomes twice and disadvantage three times, ages 24-20, three and four times respectively and age 31+ once associated with advantage, and three times disadvantage outcomes.

For year of entry, each Second Generation group has individual coding reflecting four periods of their distinct years of migration. Again however, the hypothesis was that those who had immigrated earlier may be advantaged through the benefit of extra time. Again findings are limited. On this variable there were fewer significant associations altogether and no discernible pattern.

### 7.69 *Missing Data*

Quite a few of the missing data variables are significant, despite the fact that in all instances the numbers are low. Some testing of variables such as 'overcrowded (missing)' which appeared to be significant in several instances did not reveal particularly high correlations with other variables, except other 'missing' variables.

## 7.7 Conclusion

The results emanating from these analyses offer some potentially important insights into the experiences of children of immigrants in England and Wales. In many ways the evidence provides robust support to the findings which emerged in the previous chapter. The story for most second generation groups is one where - as with the children of UK-born parents - socio-economic circumstances and places of residence in childhood are significant predictors of socio-economic outcomes in later life. As research has repeatedly shown for the wider population, it is clear from this analysis that the links between social origins and social destinations for the Second Generation are strong. These insights suggest that when faced with the kind of cross-sectional outcomes data presented in Chapter 5, attempts to understand its origins should not be simply rooted in 'ethnic explanations', but in the kind of structural arguments often used to explain the experiences of the wider population.

However, as with Chapter 6, Chapter 7 also contained evidence of a more complex picture; structural explanations of the kind used for the wider population can not suffice alone. When looking at the Second Generation as a whole, coming from a higher social class background was no protection from unemployment. For the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations this was true of all the disadvantage related variables. Those from more advantaged origins were more likely, having controlled for all other variables, to be not just unemployed, but in social class iv/v/inactive and in the 'most deprived' category on the index of deprivation. The analyses presented in this Chapter showed there to be a high risk of downward mobility for these two groups. Advantaged origins are not the protection for children from these groups, which they are for the

children from other groups. In the concluding Chapter, I will consider these findings and their implications further,

**Table 7.3** The Irish Second Generation: relationship between 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes;  
results from stepwise logistic regression models; threshold for variable inclusion  $p>0.5$

	Outcomes / Dependent Variables										
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		Model 4		
	Social Class I/II		Social Class IV/V/Inactive		Most Deprived		Least Deprived		Unemployed		
	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	
Sex				0.90	0.99 1.73				0.56 ***	0.38 0.81	
Age	1.09 ***	1.06 1.11		0.91 ***	0.87 0.94	1.31 *	0.99 1.73	1.12 ***	1.09 1.16	0.92 ***	0.88 0.96
With Higher Qualifications	1.14					0.90 ***	0.87 0.93	1.26	1.23		
Qualifications (missing)						0.74	1.33				
Access to a Car	1.15			0.71 **	0.51 0.99	0.45 ***	0.32 0.64	1.72 ***	1.31 2.27	0.73	
Skilled non/manual						1.45	0.80			1.21	
Semi/Unskilled				1.32 *	0.98 1.78	1.54	0.70				
Social Class (missing)	0.54 *	0.29 1.01		1.96 *	1.00 3.86	1.47	0.59				
Father in Work	1.28			0.67 *	0.42 1.06	0.66 *	0.42 1.02			0.42 ***	0.25 0.73
Father in Work (missing)	2.69			0.57				0.40		0.31 **	0.11 0.91
Social Rented Housing	0.55 ***	0.41 0.74		2.12 ***	1.46 3.09	2.10 ***	1.46 3.01	0.69 **	0.51 0.95	1.55 *	0.99 2.45
Private Rented Housing	0.79			1.89 ***	1.24 2.90	2.23 ***	1.48 3.36	0.68 *	0.46 1.00	2.03 **	1.21 3.39
2nd Least Overcrowded				1.49				0.82		1.27	
2nd Most Overcrowded				1.25				0.83			
Most Overcrowded	0.74 **	0.58 0.95		1.43		1.16		0.48 ***	0.31 0.75		
Overcrowded (missing)	0.51 **	0.27 0.97		1.63				0.49 *	0.23 1.06	1.67	
Lacking Basic Household Amenities								0.86		2.60 **	1.17 5.76
2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood	0.69			1.25						1.64	
2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood	0.60 **	0.39 0.91		1.27		1.33				1.61	
Most Deprived Neighbourhood	0.57 **	0.37 0.86		1.57		1.45 *	0.99 2.12	0.81			
Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)										1.58 *	0.98 2.55
North Region	1.25			1.56 **	1.08 2.24	1.41 *	0.98 2.03	0.59 **	0.40 0.85	1.65 **	1.05 2.59
Midlands Region				1.29		1.34		0.74 *	0.54 1.02	0.52	
Other Region	1.84 **	1.08 3.13				0.68		1.68 *	0.96 2.93		
Lone Parent Household	0.55							2.21			
Lone Parent (missing)						1.32		0.62		1.47	
Young Mother at birth						1.17				0.79	
Young Mother (missing)						4.04 **	1.40 11.67	0.41			
Mother Age Entry 18-23	1.24 *	0.99 1.57		0.82						0.85	
Mother Age Entry 24-30				1.18				0.83			
Mother Age Entry 31+				1.97 *	1.00 3.90	1.36		0.77			
Mother Age Entry (missing)				1.58		2.02 **	1.11 3.65	0.47 **	0.24 0.91	2.09 *	0.88 5.00
Moth Year of Entry (mid)	0.87			0.75		1.19		0.75 **	0.57 0.99	0.65	
Mother Year of Entry (late)											
Mother Year of Entry (missing)											
Observations	1354			1354		1354		1354		1152	
$P > \chi^2$	***			***		***		***		***	

**Table 7.4 The Eastern European Second Generation: relationship between 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes; results from stepwise logistic regression models; threshold for variable inclusion  $p>0.5$**

Explanatory Variables	Outcomes / Dependent Variables			
	Model 1		Model 2	
	Social Class I/II	Least Deprived	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval
Sex	1.81 *	0.98 3.37	1.27	
Age	1.10 **	1.02 1.18	1.13 ***	1.04 1.22
With Higher Qualifications	4.82 ***	1.83 12.71		
Qualifications (missing)	1.48			
Access to a Car		2.29 ** 1.18 4.44		
Skilled non/manual		0.57 * 0.30 1.08		
Semi/Unskilled				
Social Class (missing)				
Father in Work				
Father in Work (missing)				
Social Rented Housing	0.39 *	0.15 1.06	0.57	0.24 1.38
Private Rented Housing				
2nd Least Overcrowded				
2nd Most Overcrowded				
Most Overcrowded				
Overcrowded (missing)		0.14 * 0.01 1.31		
Lacking Basic Household Amenities				
2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood				
2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood				
Most Deprived Neighbourhood		0.69 0.37 1.32		
Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)				
North Region	0.71			
Midlands Region			1.91 * 0.95 3.85	
Other Region				
Lone Parent Household				
Lone Parent (missing)				
Young Mother at birth				
Young Mother (missing)				
Mother Age Entry 18-23	0.66			
Mother Age Entry 24-30	0.29 ** 0.11 0.77		0.51	
Mother Age Entry 31+	0.51		0.52	
Mother Age Entry (missing)	0.50		0.23 * 0.05 1.07	
Mother Year of Entry Mid				
Mother Year of Entry Late				
Mother Year of Entry (missing)				
Observations	212		212	
$P > \chi^2$	***		***	

**Table 7.5** The Southern European Second Generation: relationship between 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes; results from stepwise logistic regression models; threshold for variable inclusion  $p>0.5$

Explanatory Variables	Outcomes / Dependent Variables											
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Social Class I/II		Most Deprived		Least Deprived		Unemployed					
	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval		
Sex									0.47 **	0.23 0.96		
Age	1.07 **	1.01 1.13					1.08 ***	1.03 1.15	0.92 **	0.85 0.99		
With Higher Qualifications	2.07						2.06		2.83			
Qualifications (missing)												
Access to a Car	0.81		0.77				1.29		1.44			
Skilled non/manual	0.57						1.72		0.52			
Semi/Unskilled	0.74						1.66		0.53			
Social Class (missing)							0.32					
Father in Work			0.36 *	0.12 1.06			0.61					
Father in Work (missing)												
Social Rented Housing	0.63		1.96				0.32 ***	0.14 0.75	2.01			
Private Rented Housing	1.53						0.53		0.32 *	0.09 1.15		
2nd Least Overcrowded												
2nd Most Overcrowded												
Most Overcrowded			2.20 **	1.16 4.18								
Overcrowded (missing)	1.91						1.55					
Lacking Basic Household Amenities			1.30				0.71					
2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood												
2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood												
Most Deprived Neighbourhood							0.50 ***	0.30 0.82				
Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)	0.60											
North Region	0.42						0.40 *	0.14 1.17				
Midlands Region												
Other Region	0.62		0.66				1.32					
Lone Parent Household												
Lone Parent (missing)												
Young Mother at birth	0.68						1.73 *	0.96 3.12	1.60			
Young Mother (missing)												
Mother Age Entry 18-23	0.69		0.71									
Mother Age Entry 24-30	0.57 *	0.29 1.11	1.93 *	0.90 4.13								
Mother Age Entry 31+	0.23 **	0.06 0.81					0.34		3.28 **	1.08 9.90		
Mother Age Entry (missing)												
Moth Year of Entry 1949-60	0.62 *	0.39 1.00	1.58									
Mother Year of Entry 1961-			2.09 *	0.87 4.98			0.74					
Mother Year of Entry (missing)												
Observations	375		377		377				212			
$P > \chi^2$	**		***		***				***			

**Table 7.6 The Caribbean Second Generation: relationship between 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes; results from stepwise logistic regression models; threshold for variable inclusion  $p>0.5$**

	Outcomes / Dependent Variables											
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	Social Class I/II		Social Class IV/V/Inactive		Most Deprived		Least Deprived		Unemployed			
	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval		Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval
Sex	1.24			0.78			1.51 ***	1.14 2.00			0.49 ***	0.35 0.69
Age	1.04 **	1.00 1.09		0.93 ***			0.98				0.90 ***	0.86 0.95
With Higher Qualifications	1.87 *	0.97 3.61		0.64			0.67		1.72		0.33 **	0.12 0.91
Qualifications (missing)							1.38		0.70			
Access to a Car	0.84			0.70 *	0.49 1.00		0.82		1.34			
Skilled non/manual	0.64			0.73 *	0.53 1.02		0.64 ***	0.48 0.86			0.22 ***	0.08 0.56
Semi/Unskilled	0.58 *								1.29		0.24 ***	0.09 0.62
Social Class (missing)				0.75			0.62 *	0.35 1.08	2.01		0.32 **	0.11 0.91
Father in Work				0.66			0.64		2.20		0.71	
Father in Work (missing)												
Social Rented Housing							1.80 ***	1.31 2.49	0.42 **	0.22 0.82	1.39	
Private Rented Housing	1.24						2.09 ***	1.38 3.18	0.23 **	0.06 0.82	1.57 *	0.95 2.59
2nd Least Overcrowded	1.55			1.37					1.68			
2nd Most Overcrowded							0.88		1.30			
Most Overcrowded	0.78			1.21								
Overcrowded (missing)	0.61						2.18 **	1.23 3.86	0.60		1.38	
Lacking Basic Household Amenities									0.52			
2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood	0.59			2.33								
2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood	0.45 *	0.19 1.07		2.27					0.45 **	0.21 0.98	0.63 **	0.40 0.98
Most Deprived Neighbourhood	0.55			1.84					0.33 ***	0.17 0.66	1.31	
Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)												
North Region				1.24			1.98 **	1.23 3.18				
Midlands Region	1.13			1.75 ***			2.12 ***	1.53 2.94				
Other Region									2.87 **	1.27 6.46	2.93 ***	1.43 6.00
Lone Parent Household	0.49 **			0.69			0.54 *	0.27 1.07	0.51		0.62	
Lone Parent (missing)												
Young Mother at birth									2.25 **	1.09 4.63		
Young Mother (missing)	0.43			1.78								
Mother Age Entry 18-23				0.80			0.84		2.32 **	1.05 5.12	2.16 **	1.19 3.93
Mother Age Entry 24-30				0.73			0.65 **	0.44 0.97	2.79 **	1.16 6.73	2.02 **	1.07 3.80
Mother Age Entry 31+	1.49 *	0.94 2.37		1.25			0.80		2.37		1.74	
Mother Age Entry (missing)											2.31 **	1.05 5.10
Moth Year of Entry (mid)	0.89			0.86					0.74		0.80	
Mother Year of Entry (late)							0.85		0.62			
Mother Year of Entry (missing)												
Observations	937			940			937		934		827	
P > chi <sup>2</sup>	***			***			***		***		***	

**Table 7.7** The Indian Second Generation: relationship between 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes; results from stepwise logistic regression models; threshold for variable inclusion  $p>0.5$

	Outcomes / Dependent Variables									
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	Social Class I/II		Social Class IV/V/inactive		Most Deprived		Least Deprived		Unemployed	
	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval
Sex	0.71 *	0.48 1.05	0.54 **	0.31 0.92	1.47		1.44	0.84 2.50		
Age	1.05		0.96	0.89 1.05			1.10 **	1.02 1.18	0.88 **	0.80 0.96
With Higher Qualifications									0.45	0.13 1.61
Qualifications (missing)	1.37				0.60		2.54 **	1.06 6.08	0.40	0.11 1.41
Access to a Car	1.18		0.52 **	0.28 0.95	0.74		1.49	0.84 2.64	0.75	0.39 1.44
Skilled non/manual	0.44 **	0.22 0.90			0.67					
Semi/Unskilled	0.53 *	0.26 1.10			1.51					
Social Class (missing)	0.29 *	0.10 0.86	1.82	0.69 4.79			0.26 *	0.05 1.22		
Father in Work					0.43 *	0.17 1.12				
Father in Work (missing)									2.45	0.32 18.56
Social Rented Housing					0.26					
Private Rented Housing					0.23	1.78	2.01	0.71 5.67	1.55	0.60 4.04
2nd Least Overcrowded					1.94		0.39	0.13 1.18	0.08 *	0.01 1.21
2nd Most Overcrowded					1.93					
Most Overcrowded	0.61 *	0.38 0.95			1.50		0.40 ***	0.23 0.71		
Overcrowded (missing)	0.37 ***	0.19 0.72			2.51		0.24 **	0.08 0.67		
Lacking Basic Household Amenities	0.69 *	0.45 1.05					0.68	0.37 1.25		
2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood									0.28	0.04 2.22
2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood			0.39	0.11 1.37			0.44 **	0.22 0.90	0.45	0.08 2.66
Most Deprived Neighbourhood										
Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)										
North Region	0.58 *	0.33 1.01	1.91 **	1.05 3.47	2.13 *	0.97 4.66	0.41 **	0.18 0.94	0.74	0.35 1.56
Midlands Region	0.84				2.28 **	1.12 4.63				
Other Region					3.33					
Lone Parent Household							0.61	0.30 1.25	0.41 *	0.17 1.01
Lone Parent (missing)										
Young Mother at birth			0.61	0.24 1.51						
Young Mother (missing)										
Mother Age Entry 18-23			2.46	0.74 8.16			1.54	0.83 2.87	0.64	0.23 1.79
Mother Age Entry 24-30			2.08	0.59 7.36					0.51	0.16 1.55
Mother Age Entry 31+	0.70		2.65	0.73 9.67	0.52 **	0.29 0.93			0.48	0.14 1.61
Mother Age Entry (missing)	1.64									
Moth Year of Entry (mid)							0.50	0.22 1.14		
Mother Year of Entry (late)	1.45		0.59	0.30 1.19	0.54 *	0.28 1.05	0.26	0.03 2.33	0.74	0.41 1.35
Mother Year of Entry (missing)										
Observations	448		446	***	435	***	437	***	360	**
P > $\chi^2$	***									

**Table 7.8 The Pakistani Second Generation: relationship between 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes; results from stepwise logistic regression models; threshold for variable inclusion  $p>0.5$**

Explanatory Variables	Outcomes / Dependent Variables															
	Model 1				Model 2				Model 3		Model 4					
	Social Class I/II		Social Class IV/V/Inactive		Most Deprived		Unemployed									
	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval				
Sex	0.77		1.93		1.80		0.34	*	0.11	1.07						
Age	1.21	***	1.07	1.36	0.74	***	0.62	0.88	1.06		0.75	***	0.63	0.91		
With Higher Qualifications	2.61		0.03	**	0.00	0.47	0.10	**	0.01	0.86	5.18	*	0.97	27.57		
Qualifications (missing)									2.57				5.70			
Access to a Car			1.58													
Skilled non/manual			0.11	**	0.01	0.92	0.48	*	0.21	1.08	0.53					
Semi/Unskilled			0.11	*	0.01	1.02										
Social Class (missing)	0.53		0.18						1.83		4.86					
Father in Work																
Father in Work (missing)																
Social Rented Housing	0.48		0.21						2.06							
Private Rented Housing																
2nd Least Overcrowded			0.55													
2nd Most Overcrowded																
Most Overcrowded	0.59	*	1.58								0.31	*	0.08	1.12		
Overcrowded (missing)	0.28	*	1.38						0.43		0.47					
Lacking Basic Household Amenities																
2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood																
2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood																
Most Deprived Neighbourhood			0.28						1.78							
Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)																
North Region	0.61		2.20						1.93							
Midlands Region	0.63		2.98	*	0.90	9.83	3.25	**	1.11	9.45	3.53	**	1.23	10.16		
Other Region																
Lone Parent Household																
Lone Parent (missing)																
Young Mother at birth			1.90						1.80		1.97					
Young Mother (missing)																
Mother Age Entry 18-23									0.39	*	0.14	1.11				
Mother Age Entry 24-30									0.53				0.30	*	0.08	1.10
Mother Age Entry 31+													0.49			
Mother Age Entry (missing)																
Moth Year of Entry 1949-60																
Mother Year of Entry 1961-	1.40		0.63													
Mother Year of Entry (missing)			0.33	*	0.10	1.08										
Observations	154		160						156		107					
P > chi <sup>2</sup>	**		***						***		***					

**Table 7.9** The 'White English Speaking' Second Generation: relationship between 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes; results from stepwise logistic regression models; threshold for variable inclusion  $p>0.5$

Explanatory Variables	Outcomes / Dependent Variables		
	Model 1		
	Social Class VI/II		
	Odds Ratio	95% Confidence Interval	
Sex	1.95	0.87	4.36
Age	1.09 *	0.99	1.20
With Higher Qualifications	0.57	0.18	1.81
Qualifications (missing)			
Access to a Car	1.94	0.84	4.46
Skilled non/manual	0.17 ***	0.05	0.59
Semi/Unskilled	0.20 **	0.05	0.75
Social Class (missing)	0.32	0.07	1.55
Father in Work			
Father in Work (missing)			
Social Rented Housing	0.51	0.18	1.44
Private Rented Housing	0.26 *	0.06	1.11
2nd Least Overcrowded			
2nd Most Overcrowded			
Most Overcrowded			
Overcrowded (missing)	0.19 *	0.03	1.09
Lacking Basic Household Amenities			
2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood			
2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood	0.50	0.15	1.68
Most Deprived Neighbourhood	1.48	0.50	4.40
Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)			
North Region	0.53	0.12	2.43
Midlands Region			
Other Region	0.55	0.14	2.12
Lone Parent Household			
Lone Parent (missing)			
Young Mother at birth	0.35 *	0.11	1.07
Young Mother (missing)			
Mother Age Entry 18-23			
Mother Age Entry 24-30			
Mother Age Entry 31+	0.46	0.14	1.49
Mother Age Entry (missing)			
myentAng 56-61	0.61	0.28	1.34
Mother Year of Entry 1962-			
Mother Year of Entry (missing)			
Observations	156		
P > chi <sup>2</sup>	***		

## **8 - The Children of Immigrants not followed to 1991**

### **8.1 Introduction**

The core of this thesis focussed on a particular study population, drawn from the overall sample of children of immigrants found in the ONS Longitudinal Study in 1971. The selection process was described in detail in Chapter 3. Those included in the study were: all aged 0-16 in 1971, with parents born outside the UK from the same and particular national and ethnic origins, living with at least one parent in 1971, and successfully linked to a 1991 Census record. A matching sample of children of UK-born parents (COUKBs) was also included. In this Chapter, I take two of these criteria - having two immigrant parents, and being found at the 1991 Census and examine them further, with the objective of gaining insights into the characteristics of some of those not included in the main study population.

Both of these criteria raise important methodological and theoretical issues. In focussing on all those with two immigrant parents, leaving out the population with one immigrant parent, I chose to limit quite substantially, my potential sample size for the main study. In doing so, I made an assumption that my focus would enhance the clarity of the analysis. If however, the outcomes of those with one immigrant parent are found to be similar to those of someone with two immigrant parents, this poses challenges to my assumption, and potentially my interpretation of results in the main study.

Analysing the differences between those successfully traced from origin to destination, and those who are missing at the destination point is a critical component of longitudinal studies. Above all else, this is about determining the representativeness of the study population. However, in looking at immigrants and their children in a longitudinal context, this subject can potentially address important questions about the kinds of immigrants who remained in the UK over several decades and others whose presence was more transient.

## 8.2 One immigrant parent compared to two?

### 8.21 *Introduction*

There were several reasons why the main analysis opted to focus on children of two immigrant parents and not those of 'at least one' immigrant parent, as has historically been the case in some Second Generation studies. Among certain Second Generation groups, the numbers with just one immigrant parent were very small. Notably, those were the groups typically discussed as minority ethnic groups; the Second Generations of Caribbean, Indian and Pakistani origins. Including children of one immigrant parent would have therefore been difficult from the perspective of sample size. Moreover the objective was to create as simple and comparable picture as possible across all the groups in order to compare the precursors of different life trajectories, and test the association of Second Generation origin group with adult outcomes. Behind this was an assumption that having one immigrant parent might be very different to having two immigrant parents.

This assumption is based both on evidence that different types of people inter-marry, and an inference that some of the key characteristics that are seen as barriers to Second Generation opportunities, discussed throughout the thesis, are unlikely to be present in an inter-married context<sup>69</sup>. Inter-marriage has consistently been viewed by many researching immigrant incorporation as the critical mechanism of ethnic mingling that symbolises ultimate assimilation to the host society. Gordon (1964 p. 81) referred to it as the 'keystone of the arch of assimilation'; Jiobu (1988 p. 149) called it 'the litmus test of assimilation'. In early discussions of immigrant integration, intermarriage was seen as something that would typically take place in the Third Generation (Gordon, 1964). Discussions of the conditions which give rise to inter-marriage amongst more recent immigrant generations have been more equivocal (Qian and Lichter, 2001; Wildsmith et al., 2003; Grow, 2004; Khoo, 2004). However, those who inter-marry are still seen as to have a low social distance to, or to be more integrated within, the new society, albeit into a more diverse, multilayered society than was once envisaged.

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<sup>69</sup> When talking about my research, inter-married refers specifically to an immigrant married to a non immigrant. In the wider literature, it more typically refers to marriage between two people of different ethnic or religious origins.

So what might characterise an immigrant with such a low social distance to the new society? The evidence from Chapter 4 suggested that first and foremost those from 'White' dominated, Western, English-speaking countries were the most likely to be intermarried with the UK-born population. Following these groups were those from European countries where English was not the main language. Therefore skin colour seems to be important.

Other evidence has suggested that intermarriage is more common among more educated immigrants who are more likely to come into contact with members of the host society (Qian, 1999; Kulczycki and Lobo, 2002), and those from groups with smaller numbers, for whom it is harder to find mates from the same group (Blau et al., 1982). Furthermore, it is likely to be those who come without families of their own. As such, this population of immigrant 'inter-marriers' is likely to be a select group. However there are other methods that could determine selection. For example, it is not uncommon for British Pakistanis to marry native Pakistanis, bringing their partners to live in the UK. Whilst this population is not discussed here, the Chapter may raise interesting issues for considering this phenomenon, particularly as the practice has been seen by some as posing challenges to integration for the children of these partnerships (Singh, 2000 p. 7; Cantle et al., 2001 p. 37; Ouseley, 2001 p. 11).

Beyond potential selection effects, immigrant intermarriage may have an impact in itself on children. Some of the barriers to potential Second Generation opportunities may be overcome in the context of an intermarried household. The lack of English language, absence of social networks, cultural barriers and lack of knowledge and understanding in areas such as the education system should all be diminished for a child with one immigrant and one native born parent, compared to someone with two immigrant parents. Of course other barriers may persist or indeed new ones created. The difficulties, for example, that some individuals of mixed origins feel, unaccepted by any community, is one potential aspect of this (Tizard and Phoenix, 2002 p. 223-4).

Despite a clear rationale for analysing these groups separately, generally speaking quantitative researchers using the concept of the Second Generation have looked at those with 'at least one immigrant parent'. However whenever studies (all carried out

in the US), have tried to explore potential differences, those with one immigrant and one native born parent have regularly been found to have more advantaged outcomes than those with two immigrant parents. For example, in a fairly limited study, Martin and Poston (1977) found higher returns to education among children with one native and one immigrant parent than children of two immigrant parents. More recently, analysis of the Children of Immigrants longitudinal study (qualification for the study was based on 'at least one immigrant parent'), has sought to discern differences between these two groups. Jensen (2001) and Portes and Rumbaut (2001), whilst not controlling for background characteristics, found that children of one immigrant parent were advantaged on a range of outcomes compared to the children of two. A recent study by Ramakrishnan (2004) has attempted to go further and explore the differences between these two groups using multivariate analysis. Using data from the Current Population Survey he shows enduring advantages to children of just one immigrant parent in terms of education and income. His controls are however limited to basic demographic characteristics of age, sex and race. Whilst importantly demonstrating that these groups do have different outcomes he is unable to shed light on the mechanisms, as he does not control for background characteristics.

In this Chapter I address two questions:

- i) Are the characteristics of an immigrant partnered to a UK-born person different to an immigrant with a fellow immigrant partner?
- ii) Are there different trajectories for their children?

I am constrained however by the sample sizes in my data. Of the groups from the main study, I am only able to look at those of Irish, Eastern European, Southern European and Caribbean origin. It is important to note that there are no data on the ethnic origin of parents in this analysis, only their country of birth. I hypothesise that consistent with evidence from the US, immigrants partnered to a non immigrant in 1971 will be more advantaged than those partnered to an immigrant. Moreover, their children will have more advantaged outcomes even after controlling for background parental characteristics. The former hypothesis is based on the idea that more advantaged immigrants have a lower social distance to the native population and are more likely to inter-marry. The latter sees the intermarriage as a resource that

neutralises certain potential barriers to mobility faced by children of two immigrant parents.

There is good rationale for counter hypotheses as well. On selection, for example, whilst there is a lack of empirical data, there are assumptions made in the literature that unions between those of Black-Caribbean and White British origin have been predominantly amongst those from working class backgrounds (Tizard and Phoenix, 2002 p. 91), although this view is challenged by Berthoud and Beishon (1997 p. 31). In terms of the actual effects of different parental make-up, the previous Chapters of this thesis demonstrated evidence of positive ethnic effects accrued to certain groups. Although the US evidence does not suggest this, it is plausible that the intermarriage could, for example, remove from children certain benefits such as community support. Alternatively, if there is an immigrant ‘self-efficacy’ or ‘aspiration effect’, of the kind discussed in the previous chapter perhaps that could be diluted in an intermarried parental environment.

#### *8.22 Children of one immigrant parent – data and findings*

Table 8.1 shows different patterns of inter-marriage for children of parents of distinct origins. Amongst those of Irish origin, 34% of children had two Irish born parents compared to 66% with mixed Irish-UK-born parentage. Given a long history of Irish migration it is plausible that of those 66%, a significant proportion may be of Irish origin themselves. However, it is equally conceivable that because of similarities of language, skin colour and culture, there would be a rate of high inter-marriage between Irish migrants and British people not of Irish origin. The most intermarried group are the Eastern Europeans. This could be due to a large proportion being soldiers and displaced people who were in England after the Second World War, alone and without families. Of those of Southern European origin, 45% had two immigrant parents and 55% mixed parentage. The pattern of intermarriage for the other group is vastly different. Among those of Caribbean origin 86% had two immigrant parents and 14% had one.

**Table 8.1** Number and percentage of children with two immigrant parents (Second Generation) and with one immigrant and one native born parent (Mixed Parentage) by place of origin in 1971

	<i>Freq</i>	<i>%</i>
Irish Second Generation	1,379	34
Irish Mixed Parentage	2,677	66
Eastern European Second Generation	215	16
Eastern European Mixed Parentage	1,107	84
Southern European Second Generation	378	45
Southern European Mixed Parentage	455	55
Caribbean Second Generation	965	86
Caribbean Mixed Parentage	161	14

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

The sex ratios shown in Table 8.2 are revealing. For the European origin groups, the splits are similar and nearly 50:50. The slightly higher rate for the Eastern European males (55%) may also reflect the large military population. However amongst those of Caribbean origin the difference is striking. In intermarried couples with a Caribbean partner, nearly 9 out of 10 times the partner of Caribbean origin was male. This pattern of partnership formation has been widely noted previously (Brown, 1984; Berthoud and Beishon, 1997; Berthoud, 1999; Model and Fisher, 2002).

**Table 8.2** Sex breakdown of immigrant parents in intermarried couples

	<i>%</i>	
	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>
Irish	49	51
Eastern European	55	45
Southern European	53	47
Caribbean	89	11

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

In all four groups, the proportions of parents in social class i/ii in 1971 were smaller for the Second Generation than for those of Mixed Parentage. The difference among those of Caribbean origin is only two percentage points; very few from 'social class i/ii' in either group. However, whilst in the other groups higher proportions of the Second Generation were in social class iv/v, among those of Caribbean origin, a higher proportion of those with Mixed Parentage were in this social class category. There is therefore some evidence of polarisation. The overall patterns of the three

European origin groups are consistent with expectations that immigrant inter-marriers may be more advantaged, although this may be less the case among those of Caribbean origin.

**Table 8.3 Parents' Social Class in 1971 by origin group**

	% by Parents Social Class in 1971			
	<i>i/ii</i>	<i>iiin/m</i>	<i>iv/v</i>	<i>Row total (%)</i>
UK-born Parentage	24	53	23	100
Irish Second Generation	8	49	43	100
Irish Mixed Parentage	16	52	32	100
Eastern European Second Generation	22	51	28	100
Eastern European Mixed Parentage	28	47	25	100
Southern European Second Generation	9	56	36	100
Southern European Mixed Parentage	20	49	31	100
Caribbean Second Generation	4	50	46	100
Caribbean Mixed Parentage	6	43	51	100

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Table 8.4 shows the social class outcomes in 1991 for the children of these immigrants. Among those of Irish and Caribbean origin, the proportions who were in social class *i/ii* were almost the same, irrespective of whether the child had two immigrant parents or one. This is confirmed by the t-test results which show no significant differences between the proportions. By contrast, there are significant differences for those of Eastern and Southern European origin. Among the former, those of Mixed Parentage have far fewer in social class *i/ii* than the Second Generation. Among Southern Europeans, the reverse is true; those from mixed parentage backgrounds are more likely to be in social class *i/ii*. At the other end of the scale, the Eastern European Second Generation are significantly less likely to be in social class *iv/v/inactive* than those of Mixed Parentage (although only significant at the 10% level). However, there is highly significant difference amongst those of Caribbean origin, with six and five percentage points fewer in social classes *iv/v* and *inactive*, respectively, for the Second Generation.

**Table 8.4 Children's Social Class in 1991 by origin group**

	% by social class				Difference in means	
	i/ii	iiin/m	iv/v	Inactive	i/ii	Iv/v/inactive
UK	37	45	14	4		
Irish Second Generation	37	43	14	6		
Irish Mixed Parentage	37	45	13	5	.00	0.01
Eastern European Second Generation	61	28	7	5		
Eastern European Mixed Parentage	43	41	11	5	.18***	.03*
Southern European Second Generation	33	53	9	5		
Southern European Mixed Parentage	41	42	14	4	.08**	0.04
Caribbean Second Generation	27	48	15	10		
Caribbean Mixed Parentage	27	37	20	16	0	.11***

As shown in Table 8.5 there are no significant differences between the Second Generation and those of Mixed Parentage groups in the proportions 'most deprived' on the Index of deprivation. However among those of Irish and Caribbean origin, children of Mixed Parentage backgrounds are more likely to be 'least deprived' than the Second Generation.

**Table 8.5** Proportions in categories of deprivation on Index of Deprivation in 1991 and difference in means

	% Most Deprived      2 <sup>nd</sup> Most      2 <sup>nd</sup> Least      Least deprived				Difference in Means	
	Most Deprived	2 <sup>nd</sup> Most	2 <sup>nd</sup> Least	Least deprived	Most Deprived	Least Deprived
UK	16	17	28	39		
Irish Second Generation	22	21	28	29		
Irish Mixed Parentage	20	20	27	33	0.02	.04***
Eastern European Second Generation	13	13	34	41		
Eastern European Mixed Parentage	15	15	29	40	0.03	0.03
Southern European Second Generation	13	18	32	37		
Southern European Mixed Parentage	15	15	32	38	0.02	0.01
Caribbean Second Generation	42	25	24	8		
Caribbean Mixed Parentage	42	27	18	14	0	.05***

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

As Table 8.6 shows there are no significant differences between the proportions in work and unemployed. The large difference between the 22% of Caribbean Mixed Parentage and 14% of Caribbean Second Generation who are outside the labour market is reflected in the higher proportion of the former in the social class inactive category.

**Table 8.6 Unemployment in 1991 difference in means**

	%			Difference in Means
	In Work	Unemployed	Outside Labour Market	
UK	75	8	17	.
Irish Second Generation	73	11	16	0.00
Irish Mixed Parentage	72	11	17	
Eastern European Second Generation	74	7	18	0.02
Eastern European Mixed Parentage	73	9	18	
Southern European Second Generation	70	13	17	0.01
Southern European Mixed Parentage	70	13	18	
Caribbean Second Generation	65	21	14	0.06
Caribbean Mixed Parentage	54	24	22	

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

It is apparent that the relatively straightforward picture that has emerged from US-based research, which shows Mixed Parentage origins to be associated with more advantaged outcomes for children, compared to those who have two immigrant parents, is not replicated for these groups. Firstly, it is notable how little significant difference there is between groups on so many of the outcomes. Moreover where there are differences they do not appear to follow regular patterns. The Irish of Mixed Parentage are significantly less likely to be 'least deprived' than the Irish Second Generation. The Southern Europeans of Mixed Parentage are more likely to be in social class i/ii. However among those of Eastern European origin, the reverse is the case: the Second Generation are more likely to be in social class i/ii and less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive. Meanwhile, the Caribbean of Mixed Parentage group exhibit a polarisation; being more likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive and more likely to be 'least deprived'.

Table 8.7 shows results from a logistic regression model testing the significance of coming from a mixed parent background in predicting outcomes on social class, the Index of deprivation and unemployment. This is tested while controlling for the range of 1971 background characteristics used in the analysis in Chapters 6 and 7.

Once background characteristics have been controlled for there is even less evidence of the advantage accrued to children of only one immigrant parent. With the exception of the Caribbean of Mixed Parentage group, who are associated with a greater likelihood of being 'least deprived' (1.89:1), there is no association between those of Mixed Parentage with a greater likelihood of more advantage outcomes, or less chance of being disadvantaged. Having accounted for 1971 characteristics, the Irish (0.84:1) and Eastern European Mixed Parentage group (0.60:1) are less likely to be in social class i/ii. The Caribbean Mixed Parentage group is strongly associated with being in social class iv/v/inactive (1.81:1).

**Table 8.7** Probability of certain outcomes in 1991 for those of Mixed Parentage compared to the Second Generation when controlling for 1971 background characteristics; results from a series of logistic regression models

	Odds Ratios / Significance Levels / Confidence Intervals				
	Social Class i/ii	Social Class iv/v/inactive	Most deprived	Least deprived	Unemployed
<b>Irish Mixed Parentage</b>	0.84 ** (0.72-0.97)	1.04	1.04	1.01	1.02
<b>Eastern European Mixed Parentage</b>	0.60 *** (0.42-0.85)	1.39	1.10	1.11	1.20
<b>Southern European Mixed Parentage</b>	1.29	1.25	1.23	0.95	0.84
<b>Caribbean Mixed Parentage</b>	0.94	1.81 ** (1.14-2.87)	0.96	1.89 * (0.97-3.67)	1.26

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

### 8.23 Discussion

There was some evidence of a selection effect for mixed origin couples; they were more likely to be relatively advantaged in 1971. This was particularly the case among those of Eastern European, Southern European and Irish origins. For those of Caribbean origin there was evidence of polarisation, with those of mixed parentage found both at the more advantaged and disadvantage ends of the spectrum.

However as mentioned above, the hypothesised association of mixed parentage with experiencing more advantaged outcomes was not found. In terms of children's

outcomes there are examples of those from Mixed Parentage backgrounds being more advantaged and other instances where those of the Second Generation were more advantaged. The logistic regression model appears to offer evidence of a potential resource associated with having two immigrant parents. Both those from Eastern European and Irish origins are more likely to be in social class i/ii if they have two immigrant parents.

For those of Caribbean origin there is some evidence of a polarisation in terms of both origins and destinations. Polarisation of origins is perhaps easier to understand. For someone of Black-Caribbean origin, 'the low distance' discussed earlier may have occurred in universities or professional work places in line with the some theory about mixed marriages being associated with more advantaged social class. However unlike the US, from where much of the theory emanates, those of Black-Caribbean origin whilst concentrated in certain areas, have never been 'ghettoised' to the same degree as African-Americans or Caribbean immigrants in the US (Peach, 1996; Model and Fisher, 2002). The working class of Black-Caribbean origin, from their arrival in the UK, shared neighbourhoods, schools and workplaces with the 'White' working class. Consequently, low social distance never needed to be associated with upward social class mobility.

How could polarisation of destination be interpreted? Those with two Caribbean immigrant parents were less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive but also less likely to be in the 'least deprived' category. It is difficult to explain this finding because there could be important compositional differences between these groups that the data does not bring out. However, it may be that community support and immigrant aspiration bolstered the situation of children of two immigrants parents whilst a proportion of those with one immigrant parent experienced the alienation of mixed ethnicity. Yet, it is more likely that those of mixed origins would have some greater resources to pass on to their children, purely as a result of having one parent who had grown up in the UK. Moreover, those with mixed parentages may have a greater impetus to move out of areas of ethnic concentration (Model and Fisher, 2002).

At the same time, it is striking in how many instances the outcomes for those with one immigrant parent or two are so similar. This poses challenges both to the one of the basic assumptions of my research - that having two immigrant parents will be different to having one - and to interpretations of results rooted in migration related factors.

### **8.3 The Second Generation present in 1971 but missing in 1991**

#### **8.3.1 *Introduction***

Longitudinal studies face the perennial problem of sample attrition; from one wave of data collection to the next, for various reasons, participants are lost from the study. The most problematic aspect of this phenomenon is that attrition is not random. In any given study it ought to be assumed that there are particular characteristics in common to so-called ‘attritors’ (Fitzgerald et al., 1998; Aughinbaugh, 2004). Consequently, studies run the risk that whilst random sampling techniques were used to create the initial sample, subsequent analyses will be affected by systematic selection bias. The ONS Longitudinal Study is not like typical longitudinal studies; its participants do not know that they are part of it, they make no purposeful decision to remain in or out, and completing the census form is compulsory. Yet the problem of attrition has a mirror in the LS as, for a variety of reasons outlined below, individuals go missing. The tools used by longitudinal analysts for addressing attrition can be used here as well.

Our principle concern is the proportion of the original sample, who matched all the 1971 criteria for selection discussed above and in Chapter 3, with the exception that they were absent in 1991. To what extent is there evidence that this population has different characteristics to the one that was successfully traced to 1991, and that those characteristics challenge the representativeness of the 1991 sample?

There are several possible explanations for someone appearing in 1971 but not in 1991:

- Linkage Failure: the linking of LS data from one census to the next is a complex process, even more so prior to computerisation in 1991. The process takes place through the National Health Service Central Register. Although linkage rates are considered to be good, the overall linkage failure between 1971 and 1991 was approximately 10% (Hattersley, 1997).
- Death: although the population followed in this research, aged 0-16 in 1971, have a relatively low mortality risk, some of the disappearance between 1971 and 1991 will be due to this. Mortality is recorded in the LS as an element of vital events registration although it could not be incorporated in this study.
- Emigration: specifically when studying populations of immigrants, emigration is a key issue. Many migrants, as discussed in Chapter 1, do not intend to stay for a long time and return migration is common (Ballard, 1987 p. 28; Byron and Condon, 1996). There is no indicator in the 1971 census of whether someone was in the UK on a relatively permanent or temporary basis. Whilst the LS does contain data on emigration, it is not considered reliable (Hattersley and Creeser, 1995 p. 121), perhaps under-estimating actual levels by as much as 50% (Platt, 2005b).
- The problems of under-enumeration at the 1991 census have been well documented. (Ballard and Kalra, 1993; Ballard, 1996a; Owen, 1996; Simpson, 1996). Whilst the overall response rate was 97.8%, much lower rates were found amongst particular subgroups, specifically men, aged 20-34, from minority ethnic groups and living in inner city areas. This coincides with populations of particular interest in my research.

Platt (2005b) has analysed the effect of missing data on measuring mobility of minority ethnic groups using the ONS Longitudinal Study. She compares all absence in 2001, with presence in 1991. She argues that missing data has minimal impact on the overall patterns of mobility. Although certain groups, including those of Pakistani and Caribbean origin, are more likely to attrit, the impact of social class is the same across all ethnic groups, and there is substantial non-response at both ends of the social class spectrum.

In this Chapter I use a model for testing attrition based on that used by Alderman et al (2001). First, I test for significant differences in mean scores on a selection of

characteristics that could give some sense of the selectivity of the attritors. I look at age and sex as basic demographic characteristics and parental social class and access to car as indicators of relative socio-economic position. This is done for attritors and non-attritors in each Second Generation origin group. However that bivariate test can only tell us so much. I therefore follow this with a logistic regression model testing for the probability of being present in 1991 or not when controlling for the full range of 1971 background variables. I hypothesised, based on Platt's findings that there would be no significant difference between the attriting and non-attriting groups in terms of 1971 characteristics.

### *8.32 Present in 1971 but not in 1991 – data and findings*

Table 8.8 shows substantial differences in the attrition rate between the Second Generation Groups. 17% of COUKBs were missing in 1991. Little more than that, 21% of Eastern Europeans were also missing in 1991. This is much the lowest proportion out of the Second Generation groups. There are several possible explanations for this: this group is the oldest and has the most advantaged social class profile of all the groups. It is therefore less affected by some of the factors associated with under-enumeration. Also, this is the one group whose migration was largely involuntary; return migration would be less of an option. Furthermore, as the longest standing group in 1971, those present would already have made a long term commitment to the country; Eastern European 'short stayers' would have already left the UK by 1971. Among other groups the range is relatively small; nine percentage points between proportions missing from the Caribbean and Southern European Second Generations (41% missing in 1991) and the Irish Second Generations (32% missing in 1991)

**Table 8.8 Number of attritors and non attritors – COUKBs and the Second Generation**

	<i>Freq.</i>	<i>%</i>
COUKBs (present in 1991)	94,751	83
COUKBs (missing in 91)	19,580	17
Second Generation (present in 1991)	4,537	64
Second Generation (missing in 1991)	2,561	36
Irish (present)	1,379	68
Irish (missing)	642	32
East Europe (present)	215	79
East Europe (missing)	56	21
Southern Europe (present)	378	59
Southern Europe (missing)	258	41
Caribbean (present)	965	59
Caribbean (missing)	671	41
India (present)	453	64
India (missing)	250	36
Pakistan (present)	164	66
Pakistan (missing)	83	34
‘White’ English Speaking (present)	160	63
‘White’ English Speaking (missing)	93	37

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

Table 8.9 shows the mean scores, difference in means and t-test significance level on four characteristics - parents' social class in 1971, access to a car in 1971, sex and age - for the main study population and those present in 1971 but not in 1991. These variables provide a sense of the similarities or differences between the two groups.

For the COUKBs, the differences on all characteristics are significant although the large sample size would likely render this the case with even small differences. Those missing are more likely to be male and younger than the study population. Both of these are consistent with previous assessments of under-enumeration in the 1991 census. Those COUKBs not present in 1991 also appear to come from more advantaged backgrounds, with a more advantaged social class profile and greater access to cars.

A similar picture emerges for those of Irish origin. Those not present in 1991 were younger, more male and had a more advantaged parental social class profile. Those in the Eastern European, Southern European and 'White' English Speaking groups who were missing in 1991 were significantly younger than those present in 1991. This is not the case for the Caribbean, Indian or Pakistani groups. This could be explained by the already younger profile of these groups; the samples of these groups are mostly within the range with higher probabilities of under-enumeration. Alternatively, other factors such as ethnicity may supersede age in determining presence in 1991.

Among those of Caribbean origin, women were more likely to be present in 1991 than men, who were more likely to be in the 'missing' category. This is in line with previous work on the under-enumeration of Black-Caribbean men in the 1991 census and explains the pro-female sex profile of the Caribbean Second Generation discussed in Chapter 5. Similarly, the profile of the Pakistani Second Generation - more male in 1991 - can be explained by a greater proportion of women present in 1971 being missing in 1991.

Amongst those of Indian origin, there were no significant differences by age or sex between the two groups. However, those missing in 1991 did have a higher social class profile in 1971 and greater access to cars. There therefore appears to have been an affluence effect. This is more likely to be an issue of emigration than one of under-enumeration. However it is not apparent whether the out-migrants would have left as children with their families or themselves in adulthood.

**Table 8.9 Difference in means on parents social class, access to a car, sex and age for Main study population and those not present in 1991 by origin group**

		Means		
		Main Study Population	Not present in 1991	Difference in Means (significance level)
COUKB	parents social class <sup>1</sup>	2.71	2.62	0.09 ***
	access to a car <sup>2</sup>	0.76	0.78	0.02 ***
	sex	0.51	0.41	0.10 ***
	age <sup>3</sup>	7.91	6.94	0.97 *** ***
Second Generation	parents social class <sup>1</sup>	3.32	3.23	0.10 **
	access to a car <sup>2</sup>	0.45	0.50	0.05 ***
	sex	0.52	0.46	0.06 ***
	age <sup>3</sup>	6.90	5.72	1.19 ***
Ireland	parents social class <sup>1</sup>	3.48	3.34	0.14 *
	access to a car <sup>2</sup>	0.40	0.42	-0.01
	sex	0.51	0.42	0.09 ***
	age <sup>3</sup>	8.27	6.77	1.51 ***
Eastern Europe	parents social class <sup>1</sup>	2.79	2.63	0.16
	access to a car <sup>2</sup>	0.67	0.73	0.07
	sex	0.55	0.54	0.02
	age <sup>3</sup>	9.90	8.45	1.45 **
Southern Europe	parents social class <sup>1</sup>	3.30	3.34	-0.04
	access to a car <sup>2</sup>	0.74	0.72	0.01
	sex	0.45	0.48	0.04
	age <sup>3</sup>	7.08	6.09	1.00 **
Caribbean	parents social class <sup>1</sup>	3.66	3.67	-0.02
	access to a car <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.29	0.03
	sex	0.56	0.43	0.14 ***
	age <sup>3</sup>	6.12	5.90	0.22
India	parents social class <sup>1</sup>	3.31	3.07	0.24 *
	access to a car <sup>2</sup>	0.39	0.49	0.10 **
	sex	0.52	0.50	0.02
	age <sup>3</sup>	4.69	4.38	0.31
Pakistan	parents social class <sup>1</sup>	3.72	3.42	0.31
	access to a car <sup>2</sup>	0.34	0.42	0.09
	sex	0.38	0.52	0.13 **
	age <sup>3</sup>	3.23	3.49	0.26
White English Speaking	parents social class <sup>1</sup>	2.89	3.03	-0.14
	access to a car <sup>2</sup>	0.56	1.05	0.49 ***
	sex	0.59	0.53	0.07
	age <sup>3</sup>	7.15	3.85	3.30 ***

p<0.1 \* p<0.05 \*\* p<0.01 \*\*\*

Coding: 1 Parents Social Class 1-3 (Social Class i/ii- Social Class iv/v)

2 Access to a car 0-1 (No access-with access)

3 Age – continuous 0-16

I now turn to the results from a series of logistic regression models shown in Table 8.10. Distinct models were run for the COUKBs and individual Second Generation groups. The objective was to test which 1971 characteristics were significantly associated with being 'missing' in 1991.

For the large COUKB group many characteristics are associated with being in the missing category, having accounted for all other factors. Those more likely to be missing were men, those who were younger, whose parents had a higher qualification in 1971, had access to a car, with parents in social class i/ii, lived in owner occupied rather than council housing and in the most overcrowded housing, lived in the South-East rather than North or Midlands, and had young mothers at birth. With the exception of sex and age effects which remain and have been discussed previously, there is no clear pattern, and perhaps an indication of twin processes indicated by Platt (2005b) with people from both advantaged and disadvantaged backgrounds likely to be missing.

Sex remains an important characteristic across many Second Generation origin groups. Men were more likely to be missing than women in the Irish (0.72:1), Caribbean (0.65:1) and 'White' English Speaking Second Generations (0.25:1: significant at the 10% level). Amongst the Pakistani Second Generation, women were much more likely to be missing (2.36:1).

For the Irish Second Generation, age was significant, with the youngest more likely to be missing. Also significant was having a mother who entered the UK later and those in owner occupied rather than council housing (also those with a missing value on parents' higher qualifications). The meaning behind mother's date of entry may be that 'short-stayers' are most likely to have left; those who entered earlier have already stayed for longer and are more committed to the country. By contrast owner occupation suggests a commitment and investment in the new country; this would suggest that rather than 'short-stayers' those leaving are the more affluent grown-up Second Generation.

Among the Eastern European Second Generation those from social class iiii/m backgrounds were less likely to be missing than those from social class i/ii (0.31:1). Those who were not born to young mothers were also more likely to be missing (significant at the 10% level). This is a further indicator of social advantage, if anything, better predicting being missing in 1991.

Among the Southern European Second Generation, having a mother who arrived later was associated with a greater probability of being missing in 1991. Those in privately rented accommodation were much likely to be missing as those in owner-occupied housing (2.29:1). Coming from the Midlands was associated with less chance of being missing than coming from the South-East. Having a young mother at birth is also associated with being missing (significant at the 10% level).

For the Caribbean and Indian Second Generations there are very few associations between 1971 characteristics and being missing in 1991. For the latter, those whose parents lacked qualifications were more likely to be missing (2.16:1). This contradicts the suggestion from the t-tests that those of Indian origin, more likely to be missing in 1991 were relatively more advantaged.

The finding that Pakistani Second Generation women are less likely to be present in 1991 emerges again; they were much less likely to be present in 1991 than men (2.36:1). Those in more overcrowded homes were more likely to be missing. Those who were in the Midlands and North in 1971 were 2.67 and 3.92 times more likely to be missing than those from the South-East. There are also significant associations between overcrowded housing, mothers being older at entry and being in skilled non/manual class with being missing in 1991, although these findings were weaker.

There is evidence of some major differences between those from the 'White' English Speaking Second Generation present in 1991 and those not. The previous section revealed very large age differences between the two groups, and whilst the significance of age disappears in the logistic regression there are several other significant associations. Those from social class i/ii backgrounds were more likely to be missing as are those in more overcrowded housing as well as those not in deprived neighbourhoods. This supports the finding in Chapter 5 that the outcomes for this

Second Generation group, did not appear to reflect the particularly advantaged position of the 'White' New commonwealth and Old Commonwealth and USA groups in 1971, which was observed in Chapter 4.

#### **8.4 Discussion**

Drawing substantive conclusions from these results is difficult. Not knowing the reasons why people were missing in 1991 is a real barrier to a fuller understanding. Can the findings be put down to emigration or mortality? These are interesting substantive issues. However, what is most important from the perspective of the main analysis in the thesis is the extent to which those missing is explained by under-enumeration. These issues impact on whether the samples discussed in the previous three Chapters are representative of those populations in England and Wales as a whole.

The results from this Chapter are inconclusive. It was clear that in most cases men were more likely to be missing in 1991; the Pakistani Second Generation is the exception. Among some groups, those who were younger were more likely to be missing although this was not the case for those of Caribbean, Indian or Pakistani origin. The evidence presented here however suggests no consistent attrition bias towards more or less advantaged groups consistent with the findings of Platt (2005b).

**Table 8.10 Logistic regression models: probability of not being present in 1991 for COUKBs and individual Second Generation groups**

	COUKB		Irish		Eastern Europe		Southern Europe		Caribbean		India		Pakistan		White English Speaking	
	Odds Ratio	95% confidence interval	Odds Ratio	95% confidence interval	Odds Ratio	95% confidence interval	Odds Ratio	95% confidence interval	Odds Ratio	95% confidence interval	Odds Ratio	95% confidence interval	Odds Ratio	95% confidence interval	Odds Ratio	95% confidence interval
Sex	0.68 ***	0.66 0.70	0.72 ***	0.58 0.89	0.99		1.23		0.65 ***	0.52 0.83	0.87		2.36 **	1.22 4.56	0.25 *	0.06 0.98
Age	0.96 ***	0.95 0.96	0.96 **	0.93 1.00	0.93		0.99		1.00		0.95		1.03		0.88	
Mothers Age at Entry			0.98		1.00		0.99		1.00		0.98		1.08 *	0.99 1.17	1.09	
Mothers Year of Entry			1.05 ***	1.02 1.08	1.03		1.07 **	1.02 1.13	1.03		0.96		0.94		1.11	
With Higher Qualifications	1.33 ***	1.26 1.39	0.80		0.70		0.99		0.85		2.16 ***	1.33 3.50	0.57		0.76	
Qualifications (missing)	1.34 ***	1.23 1.45	1.55 **	1.03 2.34	1.29		1.45		1.46 **	1.01 2.09	1.48		0.79		0.87	
Access to a Car	1.06 ***	1.03 1.09	1.04		1.11		1.14		0.88		1.33		0.98		1.68	
Skilled non/manual	0.80 ***	0.78 0.84	0.83		0.31 **	0.12 0.84	0.97		0.84		0.84		0.29 *	0.07 1.19	0.15 ** 0.03 0.77	
Semi/Unskilled	0.82 ***	0.77 0.86	0.76		0.74		1.22		0.82		0.87		0.56		0.10 * 0.01 0.96	
Father in Work	0.71 ***	0.66 0.76	0.78		2.31		0.63		1.00		1.03		0.42			
Social Rented Housing	0.95 **	0.91 0.99	0.74 **	0.58 0.96	1.96		1.12		0.85		1.23		0.53		4.07	
Private Rented Housing	1.03		0.92		0.95		2.29 ***	1.36 3.87	1.00		1.04		0.83		17.09 *** 2.84 103.02	
2nd Least Overcrowded	0.97		0.76		0.52		0.87		1.56		1.06		16.50 **	1.81 150.37	0.24 * 0.04 1.25	
2nd Most Overcrowded	1.05 *	1.00 1.10	0.84		1.15		0.88		1.30		1.01		5.53 *	0.75 40.86	0.07 ** 0.01 0.48	
Most Overcrowded	1.22 ***	1.18 1.29	0.74		0.58		0.67		1.23		1.01		2.64		0.03 *** 0.00 0.26	
Overcrowded (missing)	1.42 ***	1.26 1.60	1.36		0.44		0.56		0.88		0.99		1.92		0.44	
Lacking Basic Household Amenities	1.06 *	1.00 1.13	0.92		0.54		0.96		1.09		1.11		1.49		9.26	
2nd Least Deprived Neighbourhood	0.95 *	0.90 1.00	0.94		0.87		0.99		0.86		1.18		1.00		0.30 ** 0.12 0.76	
2nd Most Deprived Neighbourhood	0.97															
Most Deprived Neighbourhood	0.98															
Deprived Neighbourhood (missing)	0.83															
North Region	0.85 ***	0.81 0.89	1.10		0.74		0.74		0.70		1.21		2.67 **	1.15 6.20	0.05	
Midlands Region	1.00		1.08		0.67		0.53 **	0.29 0.97	0.81		1.13		3.92 ***	1.66 9.25	0.40	
Other Region	0.89 ***	0.85 0.94	0.72		0.87		0.54		0.75		1.13		1.14		0.10	
Young Mother at birth	0.91 ***	0.87 0.95	1.25		0.27 *	0.06 1.19	1.66 *	0.93 2.96	1.21		0.96		0.80		0.13	
Lone Parent Household							0.39									

Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

## **9 - Discussion and Conclusion**

This thesis has been a study of the Second Generation, the children of immigrants who arrived in the UK in the decades following the Second World War. My concern has been with their socio-economic outcomes and, critically, why some have experienced relative social advantage whilst others experienced relative disadvantage.

This final chapter is a review of the thesis as a whole.

I begin by briefly restating my objectives for the thesis and the steps that were taken over the previous eight chapters. I then present the key findings from the research and suggest some possible explanations. I consider the theoretical implications of the approach that was taken in the thesis, as well as some policy implications that can be drawn from both the findings and the theoretical approach. I outline some weaknesses in the study and conclude by suggesting some potential avenues for future research.

### **9.1 The Thesis' Aims**

The thesis had several objectives, both substantive and theoretical. At its core it aimed to understand the relationship between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes for children of immigrants in England and Wales. I hoped to develop a better understanding of the diversity of outcomes found within different origin groups and create a nuanced account of why different patterns of aggregate outcomes are found for different groups. One result could be to identify particular barriers and springboards for the Second Generation; those factors that appeared to hold them back in disadvantage, and those that were associated with paths of upward mobility.

I analysed a variety of Second Generation groups (plus a control sample of children of UK-born parents), including several not typically discussed in social research. The aims in broadening the scope from more typical studies focussed on minority ethnic groups were threefold. Firstly, these groups are a real part the story of immigration in the UK and ignoring them leaves a part of that story untold. One aspect of this is the

strong evidence that ‘invisible groups’, such as those of Irish and Turkish origin hide considerable disadvantage (Hickman and Walter, 1997; Ennelli et al., 2005). Secondly, ignoring the immigration of those who have been considered ‘White’ has rendered, and continues to reinforce, the normative view of immigration to the UK as a racialised one. This underpins prejudice and discrimination, and often circumscribes analyses of minority ethnic group outcomes within a ‘discrimination versus cultural ascription’ paradigm. Finally, examining the experience of a range of groups provides an important context to our understanding of how those from minority ethnic groups have fared in the UK, offering a comparative context, not just of the wider UK population, but also those who share immigrant origins. I also analysed the experiences of the Second Generation as a whole, as this is important in the context of a broad debate focussed on the ‘consequences of migration’. As emerged in the course of the analysis, examining the situation of the Second Generation also provided a useful starting point for developing ideas and identifying trends across groups.

The intention was to draw on two approaches not typically discussed within the minority ethnic group paradigm in the UK. One, the social mobility and life chances literatures, offer important insights into the relationship between childhood origins and adult destinations. The other, the US-based Second Generation literature, offers theoretical frameworks that combine structural accounts of mobility with the specific analysis of the conditions facing immigrants and their children, to help understand Second Generation trajectories.

## **9.2 The Thesis: The Chapters**

In Chapter 1, I set out the rationale for the ‘Second Generation’ perspective taken in the research. I suggested important reasons why the literature had evolved around a discourse focussed on particular minority ethnic groups but argued that an important perspective has been under utilised. The approach of Second Generation analysis, which attempts to understand the trajectories of children of immigrants drawing a broad range of pre and post-migration characteristics and experiences of both parents and their children, can offer important insights. Moreover, I argued that such a

approach is more conducive to comparative perspectives across different groups, different places and across time.

In Chapter 2, I reviewed the literatures drawn upon in my research, and which I hope my thesis contributes to. From a methodological perspective, I discussed the social mobility and life chances literatures focussed on the relationship between childhood circumstances and later life outcomes. I discussed the context of my study, considering previous research on social mobility for minority ethnic groups in the UK, and the evolving US Second Generation literature, particularly debates surrounding the 'segmented assimilation hypothesis'.

Chapter 3 was concerned with detailed methodological issues of my approach. I introduced the ONS Longitudinal Study, and described the ways in which I constructed my study populations for the analysis. I also discussed the outcome measures, which would be core to the research: social class, an index of deprivation and unemployment.

Chapter 4 focussed on the immigrant population of England and Wales in 1971. It began with a consideration of the circumstances of the different groups' migration to the UK. I then showed the situation of the groups in the UK on a broad range of demographic, geographical and socio-economic indicators. Chapter 5 assessed the situation of the Second Generation on a similar range of domains, and in a manner typical of survey based accounts of minority ethnic group aggregate outcomes.

In Chapters 6 and 7, I most fully exploited the longitudinal component of the ONS Longitudinal Study. In Chapter 6, I explored the extent to which the aggregate group differences and similarities observed in Chapter 5, between the children of UK-born parents and the Second Generation, as a whole and by individual group, could be understood in terms of 1971 characteristics. Did differences between ethnic groups persist after controlling for these characteristics in multivariate analysis? In Chapter 7, I analysed the Second Generation groups individually, aiming to identify those characteristics associated with outcomes within particular Second Generation groups.

In Chapter 8, I analysed two important questions which emerged from my particular method. Were there significant differences in the outcomes of children with one immigrant parent as opposed to those with two? Were there significant differences in the characteristics of those of the Second Generation who were successfully traced in the dataset from 1971 to 1991, and those who were not?

### **9.3 The Thesis: Findings**

#### **9.3.1 ‘Marching into the Middle Classes’ or ‘Second Generation Decline’?**

##### *Aggregate Outcomes for the Second Generation*

Two prominent meta-narratives of the experience of the Second Generation have been characterised by opposing analyses of ‘*marching into the middle classes*’ or ‘*Second Generation decline*’. The former, rooted in analyses of earlier generations of immigrants to the US starting from the turn of the last century, but revisited in recent years, sees the Second Generation experiencing upward mobility, and gaining footholds in the middle classes (Gordon, 1964; Alba and Nee, 1997). The latter, based on more recent research, focussed on the new generation of post 1960s immigrants in the US, identifies a process of downward mobility, with the children of many immigrants occupying a place among the low paid and non-working urban poor (Gans, 1992; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001).

The analysis in Chapter 5 revealed conflicting trends among the Second Generation in a UK. As a whole, the Second Generation had a high proportion in the more advantaged echelons of the social class distribution; there were large numbers in the professional/managerial occupations. By contrast, the immigrant generation in 1971 had many fewer in these social classes. Moreover, whilst there was a large structural expansion of the professional/managerial classes between 1971 and 1991, with the so-called ‘*more room at the top*’ phenomenon, the Second Generation appeared to fill the more advantaged occupations at a higher rate than the children of UK-born parents. At the same time, while the immigrant generation had large concentrations in the semi/unskilled social classes, the proportions of the Second Generation in these classes declined substantially.

Yet not everyone could be coded with a social class, and a category at the most disadvantaged end of the social class distribution, referred to as 'inactive', was a population that was unemployed, with no previous occupation, not in education and without a spouse with a coded social class. This population reflected another structural shift in the labour market between 1971 and 1991; the growth of the long-term unemployed, economically inactive population and workless households. While this category was small, it had a higher proportion of the Second Generation than children of UK-born parents.

Supporting this finding was evidence that the Second Generation were much more likely to be unemployed. This was true whether or not they had higher qualifications; indeed the difference in unemployment rates of the Second Generation and the children of UK-born parents was larger between those who had higher qualifications, than among those that did not. These higher unemployment rates may have fed into the higher deprivation among the Second Generation. They were much less likely than the children of UK-born parents to be in the 'least deprived' category on the index of deprivation, and much more likely to be in the 'most deprived' category.

Therefore, many of the Second Generation did '*march into the middle classes*'; but it was a version of the middle classes much more characterised by the instability of unemployment. Perhaps as a consequence of the higher unemployment rates or maybe because the professional/managerial jobs were at the lower income end of the professional/managerial spectrum, it was also a version of the middle classes which lacked the same material rewards as children of UK-born parents achieved. Moreover, there was also evidence of a '*Second Generation decline*', with a small but substantial proportion of the Second Generation among the 'inactive', and a much higher proportion among the 'most deprived'.

This was the Second Generation as a whole. To what extent did these aggregated results hide substantial diversity across different Second Generation groups?

Across all the groups, certain patterns emerged that saw results for the individual Second Generation groups reflect those for the Second Generation as a whole. Among all Second Generation groups there was an expansion in the proportion in the

professional/managerial classes, exceeding that of the children of UK-born parents. It may be argued that the Second Generation groups had lower proportions in these classes and this explains their higher rate of expansion. However, this assumes that the kind of social change observed should take place uniformly across groups; there is no reason to suppose that. Alongside this trend, was a greater amount of long-range social mobility for the children from each group compared to those of UK-born parents. The disproportionate expansion in the professional/managerial classes amongst the Second Generation was not because large numbers came from skilled worker backgrounds. Rather, it was a disproportionate leap for those whose parents were in the semi-skilled/unskilled social classes.

While most groups made great strides in terms of social class outcomes, there was widespread disadvantage in terms of unemployment and deprivation. With the exception of the Eastern European Second Generation, unemployment rates were higher in each group and only the Eastern and Southern European Second Generation were as likely as the children of UK-born parents to be in the 'least deprived' category on the index of deprivation. This picture, of the Second Generation not having outcomes on the unemployment and deprivation measures, which were commensurate with their social class gains, was reflected in the experiences of most Second Generation groups. However there were substantial differences between groups as well.

Consistent with previous findings in relation to both social class and unemployment (Heath and Yu, 2001) and education (Modood, 2005), the Pakistani Second Generation exhibited substantial polarisation of outcomes. They saw a 28 percentage point increase in the proportion in social class i/ii compared to the immigrant generation in 1971, catching-up with the proportion of children of UK-born parents in this class. Yet at the other end of the social class spectrum, they had by far the highest proportion in both the semi/unskilled and inactive categories. This was reflected in this group having the highest unemployment rate, over 25%. They also had by far the highest proportions in the 'most deprived' category and a fraction, fewer than 5%, in the 'least deprived' category.

The outcomes of the Caribbean Second Generation were less polarised than those of the Pakistani Second Generation; fewer at the higher end of the social class distribution and fewer at the lower end, out of work and ‘most deprived’. They also experienced a large expansion in the proportions in professional/managerial social classes, but had the lowest proportions in this class of any group. They had relatively high proportions in the most disadvantaged social classes, fewer than the Pakistani Second Generation, but much higher than other Second Generation groups. Together with the Pakistani Second Generation, they had substantially higher and lower proportions in the ‘most deprived’ and ‘least deprived’ categories respectively, than any other group.

There has been discussion in the literature of differing Irish and Indian trajectories (Peach, 2005), and the outcomes in Chapter 5 bear this out. The Indian Second Generation, whose parents’ generation had been very disadvantaged in 1971, had shed much of that disadvantage by 1991. They were more likely to be in the professional/managerial classes than most groups, less likely to be in the most disadvantaged social classes, and had similar proportions in the ‘most deprived’ category as the children of UK-born parents. It is a story that could fit the bill of *‘marching into the middle classes’*. However, as discussed with the Second Generation above, it was a middle class experience tempered by high rates of unemployment and deprivation which belied their aggregate position towards the top of the social class spectrum.

The social class position of the Irish Second Generation converged with that of the children of UK-born parents, with no significant differences at either end of the distribution. However this upward social class mobility, in comparison to the Irish immigrant generation in 1971, was not reflected on the other indicators. The Second Generation were more likely to be in the ‘most deprived’ category and unemployed, and less likely to be in the ‘least deprived’ category than the children of UK-born parents. The small ‘White’ English Speaking Second Generation had similar outcomes to the Irish Second Generation. This was surprising given their overwhelmingly advantaged position in 1971 and may reflect widespread out-migration by the more advantaged among this group.

For the Southern European Second Generation, there was a general picture of convergence with the outcomes of the children of UK-born parents. They were less likely to be in the most disadvantaged social classes, however they were uniquely concentrated amongst the skilled non/manual social classes, rather than the professional/managerial social classes. There were no differences on the deprivation outcomes, however they did have a much higher rate of unemployment than the children of UK-born parents.

If any group was best characterised as '*marching into the middle classes*' it was the Eastern European Second Generation. This group experienced enormous growth in the proportions in the professional/managerial classes, encompassing well over half their population. Meanwhile, they were not disadvantaged on any variable. It is notable however, that despite the overwhelmingly advantaged social class profile the proportions both unemployed and in the 'most deprived' and 'least deprived' categories were similar to those of the Southern European Second Generation and the children of UK-born parents.

### ***9.31 'Ethnic penalties' or 'Ethnic premiums'? Accounting for differences between groups***

The picture above describes the situation of the Second Generation in 1991, and reflects on some of the changes in aggregate positions of the groups relative to their immigrant parents' generation. It tells a story of diversity within groups, and in some cases polarisation. It also shows a hierarchy among the Second Generation, with certain groups more concentrated among the more advantaged, while relatively high proportions of other groups are found among the disadvantaged. However, it does not offer any explanations of these outcomes. In Chapter 6, I began to address this issue by looking at the association between 1971 circumstances and 1991 outcomes. In the analysis, I asked whether differences and similarities between the Second Generation groups and the children of UK-born on the three core outcomes, persisted or altered, when controlling for 1971 childhood characteristics. In other words, to what extent did differences and similarities in 1971 childhood circumstances explain differences and similarities in 1991 outcomes, and to what extent did coming from a particular Second Generation group explain any of the difference?

When considering the Second Generation as a whole, the analysis accentuated the patterns of outcomes discussed above. After controlling for all of the 1971 characteristics, they were more likely than the children of UK-born parents to be at the advantaged end of the social class distribution and less likely to be in social class semi/unskilled/inactive. However, the Second Generation were also more likely to be in the 'most deprived' category and unemployed and less likely to be in the 'least deprived' category.

This suggests that given their childhood circumstances in 1971, the Second Generation experienced disproportionately advantaged social class outcomes in 1991. This was suggested in the previous section by their high levels of convergence and 'catch-up' with the social class profile of the children of UK-born parents. However, they were also disproportionately deprived and unemployed. In the language of previous studies, this is an indication of 'ethnic penalties' or, in the specific context of this research, 'Second Generational penalties'. Yet the analysis of social class outcomes, rather than finding such 'penalties' revealed 'ethnic premiums'; the Second Generation are associated with a greater likelihood of having a more advantaged social class profile, after accounting for background characteristics.

How can this 'ethnic premium' in social class be interpreted? What might explain the advantaged social class outcomes of the Second Generation given their relatively disadvantaged origins? Several possible mechanisms have been discussed throughout the thesis to explain why this could occur. Many explanations see the immigrant community as being highly ambitious in terms of social mobility and seeing education as a direct route to attain that goal (Lupton, 2004). In turn, there are differing explanations of where this drive derives from. One explanation suggests these are the attitudes of middle class immigrants who experienced downward mobility upon arrival but have the knowledge, skills and values geared towards upward mobility, to pass onto their children (Platt, 2005a). Another interpretation argues that immigrants were not middle class in the sense that we understand it in contemporary Britain, but had cultures that valorised characteristics such as hard work and independence that are vital to mobility (Ballard, web). A third sees immigrants as a select group who by definition embody high levels of perceived-self-efficacy, and interest in social

mobility (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). This explains the small minority who make the decision to leave their country of origin in search of better opportunities, and helps to understand their educational and entrepreneurial aspirations. Allied to these explanations are others that assert the importance of family and community structures which enhance intergenerational transfer of these values, or 'norms reinforcement' (Modood, 2005).

Yet alongside these 'ethnic premiums', is evidence of 'ethnic penalties' relating to deprivation and unemployment. The ethnic penalties for unemployment have been highlighted by previous research, generally not controlling for childhood characteristics, so much as adult characteristics, particularly educational qualifications (Heath and McMahon, 1997; Berthoud, 1999; Roberts et al., 2000). Penalties in unemployment are easier to explain for the First Generation than the Second. The First Generation experienced barriers such as language, cultural distance and the shock of migration, alongside a large amount of overt racism and discrimination (Daniel, 1968). It is difficult to place much weight on the former factors for the Second Generation; after all these are people who grew up in the UK. Explanations of disproportionate unemployment generally hinge on a number of factors. Firstly, certain groups experience ongoing discrimination in the labour market. Secondly, the Second Generation are concentrated in inner city deprived areas, as shown in Chapter 5, and these are places which saw substantial job losses during the 1971-1991 period. Thirdly, a great deal of employment takes places through informal channels, and the Second Generation still lack the social capital links into these employment networks (Strategy Unit, 2003). Finally, among those who have qualifications, those of the Second Generation may be perceived as having weaker qualifications (e.g. from less prestigious universities Modood, 2004). This will be especially damaging in the context of discrimination; there is a widely held view that people from minority ethnic groups must be better qualified than the 'white' candidate to get the same job (Wrench and Modood, 2000).

These higher rates of unemployment may have fed directly into the 'ethnic penalty' on deprivation. For example, if work lives are more unstable, more likely to be punctuated by periods of unemployment, it is harder to invest in and maintain owner-occupied and better quality housing (Hogarth et al., 1996). Another explanation may

lie in the distribution within social class categories, touched on above and discussed elsewhere in the thesis. The Second Generation in the professional/managerial classes may for example be concentrated in the lower income public sector jobs, with little access to the higher incomes in the private sector; referred to by Watt (2005) as '*marginal professionals*'. The same may be true at the bottom of the social class distribution. The Second Generation may be more concentrated in the kind of unskilled work associated with the 'low pay/no pay cycle', with access to fewer training opportunities, and among men, less likely to be in full-time positions (Shields and Wheatley Price, 1999; Blackaby et al., 2002; Equal Opportunities Commission, 2005).

The analysis of these 'ethnic effects' reveals some interesting patterns. Three groups exhibit 'ethnic premiums' in terms of social class outcomes; the Eastern European, Indian and Pakistani Second Generations. In the analyses, the former two were more likely to be in professional/managerial social classes when controlling for age and sex. Having controlled for all background characteristics, the likelihood of the Indian Second Generation being in this social class, increased substantially. There were no significant difference between the Pakistan Second Generation and the children of UK-born parents in professional/managerial outcomes when just controlling for age and sex. Yet, after all the variables had been controlled for, the Pakistani Second Generation were twice as likely to be in this social class. At the other end of the social class distribution, only the Indian Second Generation were significantly different from the children of UK-born immigrants after controlling for childhood characteristics; over 40% less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive.

For the other Second Generation groups, the results indicate that, to a greater degree, we can understand their aggregate social class outcomes in terms of their demographic, socio-economic, and geographic characteristics in 1971. It does not mean that the character of the relationship between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes will be the same for each group. The control variables used in this analysis are broad and general and will not elucidate the nuance of particular intergenerational processes. For the Caribbean Second Generation, experiences of racism and discrimination and resistance to these phenomena may be paramount to understanding the individual experiences on social class outcomes. Drive to succeed in school for

example, may have been thwarted by low expectations among teachers. However the evidence suggests that these can be understood against the backdrop of structural inequalities within society as a whole in which these are played out. Their disadvantaged situation in 1991 is in part a legacy, of their parents disadvantage, 20 years earlier.

Part of the nuance may be found in the 'ethnic penalties' experienced by the Pakistani, Caribbean and Indian Second Generations on the deprivation and unemployment outcomes; particularly those of the former two. These two groups experienced very high levels of unemployment and deprivation, which were only partially attenuated by controlling for 1971 characteristics. The penalties for the Second Generation as a whole, discussed above, are largely the product of these groups' experience. They are consistent with a range of evidence showing penalties in unemployment for these groups, as well as cross-sectional evidence highlighting the large amount of income poverty found amongst them (Berthoud, 1998; 1999; 2002).

One way of explaining these findings is as follows. Notwithstanding major difficulties faced by both those of Caribbean and Pakistani origin in schools, we know that both these groups have a strong commitment to this sphere. This is reflected in disproportionate attempts to access higher education places, more so by the latter group, and by evidence that people from these groups attempt to access higher education at older ages, reflecting both disadvantage in earlier life in schools, and discrimination faced in the labour market (Connor et al., 2004). However, these groups are disproportionately concentrated in less prestigious universities and on part-time courses. This dual reality of high participation but with lower status is reflected in the ability to access more advantaged social classes but at the lower income ends of the social class categories. However that ability to access these jobs are mediated by a range of factors. The first of these is direct discrimination, which operates throughout the labour market, of both a direct and conscious, and subconscious 'unwitting' nature. Secondly, these two groups, particularly concentrated in deprived areas, lack the informal networks leading into employment opportunities. These processes occur not just at the advantaged end of the social class distribution, but at the disadvantaged end, where disproportionately high numbers lack qualifications altogether. The combination of being employed at the lower end of the each social

class category, and the greater instability of employment generally, together feed into the particularly high levels of deprivation.

In the next section, I reflect on the results from the individual Second Generation models, which examined the precursors of outcomes. This helps to develop the story further.

Before that, it is important to reflect on why the ethnic effects were so prominent among the Indian, Caribbean and Pakistani Second generations, but mostly absent for the Irish, Eastern and Southern European, and ‘White’ English Speaking Second Generation groups. The most obvious explanation relates to racism and the consequences of discrimination. Whilst there is evidence that ‘white’ minorities have experienced discrimination in the UK, it is highly likely that racism and the resistance to it has defined the experience of the ‘Black and Asian’ groups to a far greater extent, as a multitude of evidence, including from situational tests would suggest (Daniel, 1968; Wrench and Modood, 2000; BBC News, 2004). Whilst everyday racism may have been important in the lives of some of the ‘white’ Second Generation, their broad experience appears to be one of widespread socio-economic assimilation; the relationship between child circumstances and adult outcomes matches those of the children of UK-born parents. They are subject to the same structural influences on life chances. However for the ‘Black and Asian groups’ this is much less the case. They are subject to racism, and do not appear assimilated in the same way. This may have resulted in some being able to pursue paths of upward social class mobility, lying outside the ‘White’ working class cultures of the inner city. However for many, discrimination also mediated the nature and extent of their employment and ability to accumulate resources.

#### *9.32 ‘Snakes and Ladders’ for the Second Generation: the childhood precursors of advantaged and disadvantage outcomes*

Chapter 7 explored associations between childhood characteristics in 1971 and adult outcomes in 1991. The aim was to identify particular precursors of outcomes within the different Second Generation groups.

For the Second Generation as a whole there was strong evidence of a relationship between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes. As for the children of UK-born parents, socio-economic circumstances significantly predicted outcomes. Those with more disadvantaged origins were more likely to experience more disadvantaged destinations. For example, living in social housing, having a father out of work and lacking access to a car in 1971 were all associated with being in the semi/unskilled/inactive social classes in 1991. Likewise, coming from advantaged origins was associated with advantaged destinations. Those, whose parents had higher qualifications in 1971, were more likely in 1991, to be in the professional/managerial classes and 'least deprived' on the index of deprivation.

There was also strong evidence of a 'geography of disadvantage'. Those who were living in the North and Midlands regions were particularly disadvantaged, more likely to be in the semi/unskilled/inactive social classes and 'most deprived' on the index of deprivation. This fits the notion of the South-East as an escalator region which has promoted mobility over the twenty years between 1971 and 1991.

These factors all reflected processes taking place within the wider population. As previous research on social mobility and life chances would suggest the relationship between socio-economic circumstances in childhood and outcomes in adulthood for the children of UK-born parents were strong. However the relationship between origins and destinations did not appear to be as strong for the Second Generation as for the children of UK-born parents. Two main effects were noticeable.

The relationships between socio-economic circumstances and being in the semi/unskilled/inactive social class in 1991 were weaker for the Second Generation than for the children of UK-born parents. This appeared strongly in the discussion of descriptive statistics, and was borne out in the analysis. Certain factors, such as not having parents with higher qualifications, being in the most overcrowded quartile of housing, and lacking basic amenities were not significantly associated with being in the most disadvantaged social classes. Coming from a semi/unskilled background was much more weakly associated with remaining in this social class than for the children of UK-born parents. The implication is that for the Second Generation, coming from socially disadvantaged backgrounds was not the risk factor for experiencing

disadvantaged outcomes in adulthood, which it was for the children of UK-born parents; they were more likely to climb the socio-economic ladder.

The reverse was true however, when considering disadvantaged outcomes on the 'most deprived' category and unemployed measure. The relationship between advantaged origins and these outcomes were stronger for the Second Generation, indicating that these origins were not the protective factor the Second Generation that they were for the children of UK-born parents. They were more likely to experience downward mobility 'from the top'. Indeed, having controlled for all 1971 characteristics, among the Second Generation, those from a professional/managerial social class background were more likely, than those from more disadvantaged social class backgrounds, to be unemployed in 1991.

This pattern played itself out for the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations across all the variables related to disadvantage. Having controlled for all other characteristics, those from more disadvantaged social classes were less likely to be in social class iv/v/inactive, in the 'most deprived' category and, for the Caribbean Second Generation, unemployed. This is consistent with the patterns of relatively high downward mobility for these groups, discussed above, and with Platt's findings for the Caribbean Second Generation (Platt, 2005a).

How can this greater propensity for disadvantaged outcomes, from relatively advantaged origins be explained? Why are advantaged outcomes not the protective factor from downward mobility, which they are for others? In Chapter 7, I referred to the controversy surrounding the Diane Abbot's decision to send her son to a private school, rather than risk sending him to a local school, and Trevor Philips' comments suggesting that even the son of an Member of Parliament was not immune from the disadvantaged destiny of many 'black' men. I use it here as an exemplar, offering one possible, simplified picture of a process that could result in the findings above. Diane Abbot lives in Hackney, an area of London with a large concentration of people of Black-Caribbean origin. Quite apart from being MP for the area, this may reflect a strong preference among many people from minority ethnic groups for living in close proximity to people from their ethnic groups (Phillips, 1998; Bowes et al., 2002). Both 'choice' and 'constraint' can explain these preferences (Peach, 1998). On the

one hand people from minority ethnic groups may not want to move to areas where they perceive that they will experience racism. On the other hand there is a desire to live surrounded by a co-ethnic community both from the point of view of services such as religious and community institutions, and the desire to live in a neighbourhood with friends and relatives (Phillips, 1998).

For many parents in the professional/managerial social classes the choice of neighbourhoods will be governed by many things including affordability and the location of work, but critically also school quality. Increasing evidence on the link between house prices and school quality is evidence of this (Gibbons and Machin, 2003). With the inner London state education system seen as increasingly a risk, many parents are left with limited choices: leave inner London, access the few selective schools in the area, use the private education system or send their children to a local school (Butler, 2003). Tony Blair famously took the second of these options for his children, but it is limited; there are few places at such schools. Diane Abbot took the third of these options, but for most people, even in the professional/managerial classes, private education is unaffordable. The remaining choice is between leaving the area and using the local schools. Many in the professional/managerial classes move out of the inner urban areas, but minority ethnic families, with broader constraints on which neighbourhoods to live in (for the reasons mentioned above) remain in inner urban areas. They therefore send their children to a different kind of school from those attended by 'White' children from professional/managerial backgrounds, with a more disadvantaged peer group. For some, the consequence may be not that different from the process identified by some scholars in the US; 'Second Generation decline'.

### *9.33 Implications for the COUKBs*

The children of UK-born parents (COUKBs) provided a critical control group for the analysis. Comparing the situation of the Second Generation to this population, who were approximately 90% of the overall study population, provided the analysis with its context and critical frame of reference. Yet in the course of using this population as a control group, a great deal of data was presented concerning their situation and

the association between their childhood circumstances and later life outcomes for this population.

The findings mirrored a wealth of previous research showing the strong links between childhood circumstance and later life outcomes. This previous research, much of it outlined in Chapter 2 has shown that childhood disadvantage is strongly linked to adult disadvantaged and those who grow up in affluence and more likely to be relatively advantaged in adulthood. There are no surprises therefore in the data confirming this pattern.

More pertinent to this particular research is whether anything can be learnt about the relative patterns of associations between childhood circumstance and adult outcomes for the children of UK-born parents through the comparison with Second Generation. As discussed above, each Second Generation group experienced greater long-range social mobility, and a larger proportionate expansion in their professional/managerial classes. The implication is that there are particular characteristics shared by a proportion of immigrant families in disadvantaged circumstances, which are found less among the children of UK-born parents. This may be evidence that the ideas discussed in Chapter 2, related to aspiration, perceived self-efficacy and drive towards upward social mobility may be important in understanding a difference between sections of the populations. If this is the case, this is as relevant to our understanding of the trajectories of children of UK-born parents, as it is for the Second Generation. It may be that the experience of immigrant families lends weight to the idea that factors connecting to aspiration and perceived self-efficacy may be a critical component in understanding patterns of social mobility, and explaining the so-called black-box of social mobility.

## **9.4 Reflections on the theoretical approach**

### ***9.4.1 The Second Generation as a whole; some answers for a discourse***

Throughout the thesis, I presented results for the Second Generation as a whole, and I have discussed some of the related findings in the previous sections of this Chapter. To what extent can it be considered a useful or meaningful exercise given the

diversity that was contained within this population, which was, inevitably, found when disaggregating outcomes by different origin groups?

Quite apart from acting as a useful theoretical building block in the analytic process, I think it was an important way of analysing and presenting data. Firstly, the data for the Second Generation as a whole was more than the sum of the constituent Second Generation origin groups that were analysed independently. There was a large 'Other' category, comprising Second Generation individuals of very disparate origins. As a group they were too disparate to analyse meaningfully. However, collectively they were a sizeable population and their experiences are captured in the analysis of the Second Generation as whole.

The key motivation for looking at the Second Generation as a whole was to be able to analyse aggregate data of the kind used in the on-running debate about, the future of immigration to the UK, and within that, the consequences of migration (Harris and Coleman, 2003). Such debates often take place at the aggregate level, and therefore aggregated data, encompassing all of the Second Generation, has an important role to play.

The results for the Second Generation as a whole provided some important insights frequently reflecting trends found within all, or almost all of the individual Second Generation groups. The higher rate of expansion of professional/managerial classes and the higher proportions experiencing long-range intergenerational mobility suggest something about immigrant families and the mobility drive in general, perhaps indicating characteristics more universal to immigrants and less a particular cultural response? The higher rates of unemployment for the Second Generation, reflected in almost all groups, indicates perhaps the importance of social networks and parental knowledge of the system for finding work and the difficulties faced by those who remain in inner urban areas.

Of course these are the results for one particular cohort of the Second Generation. However the ideas above mirror findings from other research, and in drawing together the experience of a very diverse range of immigrant origins they present quite a powerful argument.

#### 9.42 *Other groups; new knowledge, new context*

Several of the individual Second Generation groups analysed in the thesis are not typically the focus of much research. The Second Generations of Eastern European, Southern European and ‘White’ English Speaking origins have barely been researched; the Irish Second Generation, even though they are the largest of the individual groups has, particularly until recently, been heavily under-researched. Their inclusion in the analysis was predicated on certain objectives; to bring out the experiences of Second Generation populations that little is known about, to attempt to deracialise how immigration is understood, and to provide a comparative context to the experience of South Asian and Caribbean Second Generations, that is not just the children of UK-born parents, but also the experience of other Second Generation groups.

In bringing out the stories of these groups there were some important findings. Particularly important, consistent as it is with results from a recent study by Enneli et al (2005), was a large amount of disadvantage found among the Southern European Second Generation. Enneli et al’s study focussed on those of Turkish and Kurdish origin, and both Turks and Turkish Cypriots were contained within the Southern European Second Generation. The findings on the Irish Second Generation proved interesting as well. These supported, in some ways, notions of an ‘Irish trajectory’ (Peach, 2005), with broadly similar social class outcomes to the children of UK-born parents, but more disadvantaged in terms of deprivation and unemployment.


In terms of deracialising how immigration is viewed, I think more discussion of these groups is critical. As the researcher, I was aware of racial dichotomy in how I instinctively viewed the data, perceiving the Indian, Pakistani and Caribbean Second Generations on the one hand, and the other groups on the other. I continually attempted to challenge this view, aware that it must prejudice how I interpret any findings.

Figure 9.1 helps to demonstrate the point further. Both Figures a) and b) show the proportion of Second Generation men in 1991 who were unemployed; Figure a),


including the children of UK-born parents and the Second Generation from India, Pakistan and the Caribbean and Figure b), including all the Second Generation groups. Figure a) may lead one to considering that issues of race and discrimination are key to explaining differentials in male unemployment, albeit with complexities that account for the differences between the Second Generation groups. However Figure b) suggests a more complex picture; the Indian Second Generation have a similar rate of unemployment to the Irish Second Generation, and a lower rate than the Southern European Second Generation. Furthermore, all Second Generation groups have higher rates of unemployment than the children of UK-born parents. So whilst issues of race in terms of a simple 'Black and Asian/White' dichotomy far from disappear in Figure b), it does suggest that they must be considered alongside wider issues of barriers to employment for the Second Generation, as well as perhaps more complex notions of 'race'.

**Figure 9.1 Percentage unemployment among men by origin group in 1991**

a) 'Non-white' Second Generation Groups and COUKBs



b) All Second Generation Groups and COUKBs



Source: ONS Longitudinal Study

This is not to suggest that there is no evidence of a division along ‘White/Black and Asian’ lines. As discussed above, the ‘ethnic effects’ found, whether penalties or premiums were with one exception (the Eastern European Second Generation on the social class i/ii category) found among the ‘Black and Asian’ groups. This did suggest that the ‘White’ groups were largely subject to the same structural processes as the children of UK-born parents, with their trajectories less influenced by their particular origins. Yet, when comparing all of the groups, similarities were also apparent; this must challenge racialised or culture-based explanations. Moreover, of critical importance, there was a great deal of disadvantage found across most groups.

#### *9.43 A life chances approach*

The life chances approach used in this research, analysing the relationship between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes for the Second Generation, added an important dimension to our understanding of minority ethnic experiences. Critically, it showed, as little research on these populations has been able to, that many of the same factors that help explain the outcomes for the wider population apply to the children of immigrants.

Characteristics related to the socio-economic situation of a household and patterns of residence are important childhood precursors of Second Generation outcomes. It therefore suggests that our understanding of minority ethnic group disadvantage must take these factors into account. However, the approach was also able draw out the nuances, the subtle differences in the associations between childhood circumstances and adult outcome that have been much discussed in this conclusion. The research definitely highlights the potential for this approach to really help develop a rounded and profound understanding of the trajectories of children of immigrants and minority ethnic groups. This would be enhanced if the right kind of dataset became available; an equivalent of the US based Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study for example. Including data directly related to the acculturation process, such as experiences of discrimination, language ability, pre-migration characteristics and community activity may bring out the nuance of the Second Generation trajectories further.

#### 9.43 *Generational analysis – Critical mechanism or added distraction?*

One of the key aspects of my approach was that it took a generation perspective. Rather than focussing on all those with particular ethnic origins for example, of a certain age, the focus was specifically on those born in the UK (or entered before the age of five), and with two immigrant parents. The approach appeared in the main part of the analysis to yield important results. There was strong evidence of widespread barriers for the first generation resulting in a range of disadvantaged outcomes across all groups. With many of the barriers of migration less applicable, the outcomes for the Second Generation were much improved and had in many ways converged with those of the children of UK-born parents. This was especially the case for the ‘White’ Second Generation and on the social class outcomes.

Whilst the Second Generation literature provided the explanatory tools to help make sense of many of the findings, I lacked the data to really explore the connections between patterns of acculturation and mobility. These are central to generation-focussed discussions engaging with issues to do with language, education in schools, and neighbourhood segregation as well beliefs, identity and values. The migration variables that I did use in the analysis - relating to parents age at entry and time in the country - did not provide consistent results. The lack of obvious patterns in the differences between having one immigrant parent and two also complicated the picture.

An analysis of the relationship between parental circumstances and adult outcomes, need not focus on migration factors, and it may be that whilst the data was suited to the longitudinal component of the study, it was not ideally suited for elucidating the generational effects of migration.

#### 9.5 Policy Implications

This study analysed the situation of a wide range of groups, with the benefit of longitudinal data, but without particularly detailed data. It is important not to attempt to shoe-horn the findings that have been discussed into a detailed set of policy responses for the Second Generation. However there are certain findings, which

suggest particular ways of conceptualising issues to do with the Second Generation, which are important for policy.

- Whilst the continuity of disadvantage may not have been as strong for the children of immigrants, as for the children of UK-born parents, the relationship between disadvantaged origins and disadvantaged destinations is a strong one. This suggests that any general anti-child poverty policies may have an important impact on the long-term trajectories of the Second Generation as well as the wider population.
- Regional differences in the opportunity structure which have favoured the South-East consistently impacted across all the Second Generation groups. Two important conclusions stem from this. As with the point made above, attempts to reduce the regional divide may focus fewer resources on the Second Generation, who are concentrated in the South-East, however it may have a particularly beneficial impact on those who are especially disadvantaged.

The regional picture may also add an important dimension to our understanding of racial dynamics and alienation amongst young people in particularly disadvantaged regions. Much of the response to the disturbances in Northern towns in 2001 and more recently following the London bombings of 2005, has focussed on issues such as citizenship and segregation. There have been calls for changes in the approach of both 'White' communities and minority ethnic communities, with a focus on fostering greater community cohesion among both, and encouraging more assimilation, particularly among Pakistani-origin Muslim communities. Yet the patterns of racial dynamics and alienation need not be viewed through the lens of the contemporary cultures of 'White' and minority ethnic communities. Rather the patterns of school and neighbourhood segregation, of group insularity and inter-group tensions can be understood as responses to a significant legacy of disadvantage within an ever constraining opportunity structure. If so slightly different conclusion may be drawn; ones that might focus less on the symptoms and issues connected to immigrant assimilation and a 'clash of civilisations' and more on the economic prospects for those growing up in disadvantaged regions.

- The weak levels of attachment to the labour market for the Second Generation, identified in this research, are consistent with a great deal of previous research. It is an issue, which needs to be addressed, both at the bottom of the labour market in

terms of entry level and low skilled work, but also in skills based professional/managerial occupations. There is a vital need to tackle this issue through more widespread equal opportunities employment policies, combating direct discrimination in the work place and trying to develop bridging social capital out of minority ethnic communities into employment networks. Moreover it is necessary to address fundamental issues in relation to poor education, transport and opportunities in deprived areas (PAT 1, 2000; Wrench and Modood, 2000; Strategy Unit, 2003). The findings of this thesis highlight this as a major issue, especially for those of Pakistani and Caribbean origin.

- Even for groups experiencing high levels of relative disadvantage, there were improvements in their situation on certain dimensions between the First and Second Generations. For all groups, age was highly significant with those who were older being significantly more advantaged. These findings suggest that it is important to compare 'like with like', when evaluating the relative situation of different ethnic groups; do they have similar age profiles and are they at the same stage of their migration. For example, to what extent, can the situation of the Indian and Pakistani communities be compared given their very different profiles on both these dimensions?
- If the explanation for an ethnic premium in social class outcomes for Second Generation groups in some way relates to particularly high levels of aspiration and commitment to education then this represents an opportunity for the education system. It suggests that given the right conditions, with a good quality of schooling the Second Generation may be a population ready to take advantage of those opportunities.

## **9.6 Weaknesses in the study**

- Age: Throughout the thesis it has been clear that the age of the study population, 20-36, resulted in large disparities in outcomes. Across all groups and outcomes age was the most consistently significant predictor of outcomes. Stretching across a period when large proportions would not have settled careers and the

difference in life stage between the older and younger people was substantial, there was a risk of creating a distorted picture. The different Second Generation groups having different age profiles, exacerbated this risk and by the youngest three groups being the minority ethnic groups. Among other things, I was forced to make an assumption about students, on the social class outcome, coding them in the professional/managerial social class. Fortunately, these issues can be addressed. In the 2001 census the study population of this research were aged 30-46 and this is now incorporated into the ONS Longitudinal Study. The Second Generations and children of UK-born parents can therefore be followed up to an age where most will have had a chance to establish their career path.

- Origin Groups: A further explanation of why some of the Second Generation groups may not have produced 'ethnic effects' is that some of the groups' experiences may have been too diverse. In Chapter 1, I discussed the analytic pitfalls associated with the categorisation of different groups. With the exception of the Irish Second Generation, the 'White' groups were created in what seemed like meaningful ways, yet none could be conceived as a particular wave of migration and as such there was probably quite a great deal of heterogeneity with respect to origins and experience. How could one expect to capture an 'ethnic effect' in a group that comprised children of Italian, Cypriot and Maltese immigrant parents?
- The Index of Deprivation: as previously discussed there remains a concern as to whether the index of deprivation is an entirely appropriate measure for a Second Generation population. Given the greater propensity to live in inner urban areas which are more likely to be deprived and in which access to a car may be less a necessary it may not indicate deprivation as robustly for this population as for the population as a whole.
- Sample Size: the comparatively large sample sizes available using the LS made this study possible; it could not be done any other way. Yet the sample sizes were limiting for some of the Second Generation, putting a strain on the analysis and perhaps not producing as robust results as would have been possible with larger numbers.
- Pre-migration characteristics: Given the theoretical orientation of the study, the analysis would have benefited greatly from data on the pre-migration characteristics of the immigrant populations. For example, it would potentially have

been very instructive to have had data on pre-migration occupation to test the hypothesis of downward mobility upon migration

## **9.7 Potential for further research**

There are ranges of interesting research questions that come out of this research. Firstly there is great potential for using the results from the 2001 census, now incorporated into the ONS Longitudinal Study. As mentioned earlier this would make it possible to measure the outcomes for the Second Generation at age 30-46 when many of the outcomes would be more settled. The 2001 census also includes detailed education data, which is a very useful measure of social advantage and disadvantage. Rather than simply knowing whether someone has a higher qualification or not, detailed data relating to school age and post-18 qualifications strongly predict labour market outcomes. In addition the 2001 census asked about religion. Given the evidence that many of South Asian origin identify themselves more by religion than ethnicity or nationality and that Islamaphobia is one of the most widespread causes of discrimination in Britain today, this is an important component for understanding Second Generation experiences.

The much discussed issue of aspiration and perceived self-efficacy is a really important area for further research. Are many immigrant families characterised by high levels of aspiration and perceived self-efficacy, and if so what explains it? Does it distinguish immigrant families and non-immigrant families in disadvantaged circumstances? Where it is present, how are aspirations passed from adults to children? If they are present, why do some experience upward mobility while others do not? On all of these subjects, including the basic question about whether immigrants tend to have particularly high aspirations, there is a lack of robust empirical evidence.

The downward mobility experienced by large proportions of the Caribbean and Pakistani Second Generations is a matter of great concern. The UK is an upwardly mobile society. Whilst levels of social mobility have shrunk as the large expansion on professional/managerial occupations has slowed down, it is not a society which sees

much downward mobility. Those with advantages are increasingly good at investing their advantages in ways that ensure that their children hold on to them. I offered one possible explanation for why this downward mobility occurs, with Pakistani and Caribbean families constrained by which neighbourhoods they feel comfortable in, and sending their children to inner city schools that other middle class parents would avoid. However it is important to test this idea or see if there are other explanations for the phenomenon.

The concern, discussed above, over the Index of deprivation suggests that some research into whether the census has a better measure of deprivation, taking into account the particular situation of minority ethnic and other immigrants groups, would be valuable.

## **9.8 Conclusion**

This thesis has offered new perspectives on the experiences of the children of immigrants to the UK. On the one hand, it has reinforced the broad understanding of the relative situation of some of the country's largest minority ethnic groups. Yet the longitudinal and comparative techniques that have been central to the approach have yielded a nuanced account, which has highlighted and explained some of the diversity found both within, and between groups. What is clear from the account is that the legacy of the disadvantage of the immigrants of England and Wales in 1971, while diminishing for many, persists strongly for others. Aspiration appears to drive many forward, but poverty and disadvantaged areas, alongside the pernicious effects of racism and discrimination, hold many others back. Whilst many have experienced upward mobility over a generation, others remain disadvantaged, characterised by a weak connection to the labour market and high levels of deprivation.

## 9.9 Conclusion Postscript<sup>70</sup>

The first Chapter of the thesis concentrated on deconstructing a discourse that seeks to understand the experience of minority ethnic groups in terms of aggregate group success or failure, essentialising the experience of members of that group as a product of specific cultural attributes or, racism and discrimination. It argued that, viewed through an immigrant/second generation lens, and using longitudinal data that would allow an analysis of the links between childhood circumstances and adult outcomes, it would be possible to provide a more nuanced account of the life trajectories of the Second Generation.

Given the extensive and rigorous analysis of ONS Longitudinal Study, to what extent was the thesis successful in this regard? As discussed in the conclusion, the thesis was successful in one major aspect of this. It highlighted how a large proportion of the Second Generation were subject to similar influences on life chances as the children of UK born parents. However it also showed, specifically for those groups widely discussed as minority ethnic groups - those from Caribbean, Indian and Pakistani origins - that the connections between origins and destinations were more complex. But did it add anything about the relative impact of discrimination, cultural and social origins or religious identification?

The study could not make any specific assertions about any of these issues as it lacked the data to do so. The data could not distinguish whether the large numbers of the Indian Second Generation experiencing upward mobility were a product of their parents relatively middle class social origins, or of a specific cultural inclination towards educational aspiration or another explanation. Nor could the data alone explain the very high levels of unemployment found among the Pakistani or Caribbean Second Generation, discerning any particular impact of Islamophobia, low expectations in schools or other negative influences on outcomes.

There is no way that 1971 and 1991 census data could have illuminated these questions any further. However, one might pose the question as to whether the types

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<sup>70</sup> Submitted as minor revisions

of quantitative analysis used in this thesis could throw light on these issues. Quantitative analysis, which measures more and different characteristics, can surely go further than this analysis. Datasets with the depth of the Millennium Cohort Study, that look at parenting and family life may well, given adequate sample sizes, highlight differences between groups or subsets there in. Specific immigrant-focussed studies such as the US-based Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS) have manifestly been able to show the differential impact of social origins, family and community structure, and language on second generation trajectories.

Yet as a rich a resource as the CILS is, it still seems to leave certain questions hanging in the final analysis.

- How do we quantify the experience, extent and impact of discrimination? A broad base of evidence not simply from differential outcomes, but from situational tests, organisational investigations and a broad range of qualitative research highlights the reality of discrimination in everyday British life. Yet defining the locus and nature of its impact in a quantitative life history analysis of the kind carried out in this thesis is not necessarily possible. If it is immeasurable there is a tendency to underestimate its influence or make generalised statements about its impact which are difficult to support. This thesis at times operated at both these ends of the spectrum.
- The role of culture is complex. There is a question over the preparedness of research to discuss it, risking pathologising or being seen to pathologise a particular group. If we are prepared to discuss it how do we deal with the plurality of cultural influences on individual behaviour? Can we get passed the tendency to look for a particular salient cultural attribute linked to a national/religious/ethnic status?
- How do we account for issues of agency, individuality and the unmeasured variables in quantitative analysis? The above areas of discrimination and culture are key components of this however the depth and fabric of life choices and influences upon them will always be downplayed in an analysis looking for broad patterns and connections. Sociology does not have all the answers. It is never going to have all the variables to explain differences in human behaviour and experience; psychology and genetics, family dynamics and no doubt sheer circumstance must also play pivotal roles.

The implication is that the kinds of questions that the thesis aimed to explore require an interplay between quantitative methods, which attempt to draw out about broad patterns, with qualitative analysis offering a richness of understanding. Given the scope of the questions originally posed in the introduction to the thesis it is not surprising to conclude that one method alone is insufficient in offering a comprehensive set of answers.

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Appendix 1 Number of observations for multivariate Figures and Tables in Chapter 5

	Various Figures and Tables				Figure 5.3	Table 5.20	Figure 5.22	
	Age 20-25	Age 26-36	Male	Female			People without higher qualifications	People with higher qualifications
COUKB	33,039	61,712	46,895	47,856	25,387	66,619	80,347	14,404
Ireland	425	954	678	701	336	953	1,159	220
Eastern Europe	35	180	96	119	51	173	123	92
Southern Europe	161	217	209	169	81	307	339	39
Caribbean	423	542	420	545	227	485	869	96
India	282	171	219	234	81	384	372	81
Pakistan	132	32	101	63	22	127	139	25
White English Speaking	63	97	65	95	37	102	125	35

Appendix 2 Number of observations for relationships between 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes

1971 Characteristics	1991 Outcomes; N=					
	Social Class		Index of Deprivation		Unemployed	
	COUKB	Second Generation	COUKB	Second Generation	COUKB	Second Generation
Mother Aged 15-22 at birth	18728	695	18586	687	15307	568
Mother Aged 23-30 at birth	47543	2083	47254	2070	40135	1756
Mother Aged 31+ at birth	25931	1590	25729	1575	21907	1345
Lone Parent Household	5293	335	5250	332	4230	271
Multi-Parent household	86266	3842	85678	3811	72577	3260
Least Deprived Wards	13997	347	13868	341	11890	297
2nd Least Deprived Wards	25657	693	23457	686	19906	583
2nd Most Deprived Wards	27493	1049	27354	1044	22986	879
Most Deprived Wards	28523	2368	28356	2350	23759	1982
North Region	31000	758	30793	748	25936	608
Midlands	17856	1022	17732	1016	15118	869
South-East	28011	2397	27819	2376	23410	2030
Other	17013	280	16900	281	14253	234
Father Out of work	4665	291	4645	288	3556	233
Father In Work	84024	2853	83448	3822	71018	3260
Parents without qualifications	72719	3228	72354	3202	60838	2729
With Qualifications	11308	479	11115	473	9880	399
Lacking Amenities	9656	1004	9621	994	7829	831
Sole Access to Amenities	84224	3453	83623	3427	70888	2910
No Car	32750	2644	32619	2635	26318	2196
1 Car	51068	1603	50712	1583	43755	1365
2+ Cars	10062	210	9913	203	8644	180
Low Crowding	26095	493	25828	491	22556	414
High Crowding	18612	2100	18547	2080	14741	1739
Owner Occupied	47339	2599	46954	2570	41025	2202
Council Rented	34154	1134	34053	1132	27371	944
Private Rented	12289	717	12199	711	10295	587
Social Class i/ii	21207	466	20896	460	18321	391
Social Class iiin/m	47385	2046	47174	2025	40004	1744
Social Class iv/v	20006	1635	19936	1628	16296	1360

Appendix 3 Number of observations for relationships between 1971 characteristics and 1991 outcomes

		Ireland			Eastern Europe			Southern Europe			Caribbean		
		1991 Outcomes N=: SC (Social Class) ID (Index of Deprivation) UN (Unemployment)											
		SC	ID	UN	SC	ID	UN	SC	ID	UN	SC	ID	UN
1971 Characteristics	Mother Aged 15-22 at birth	146	144	116	8	8	-	73	74	62	170	172	145
	Mother Aged 23-30 at birth	641	644	554	77	76	61	178	178	141	433	431	388
	Mother Aged 31+ at birth	549	547	467	125	124	103	122	123	110	307	304	272
	Lone Parent Household	81	81	59	13	13	-	-	-	-	125	125	107
	Multi-Parent Household	1255	1254	1077	192	190	156	342	343	284	777	774	693
	Not Most Deprived Wards	760	756	647	120	120	99	213	214	184	360	355	300
	Most Deprived Wards	594	598	505	94	92	77	162	163	131	580	582	529
	North Region	277	273	227	55	54	42	29	30	30	85	87	77
	Midlands	318	322	273	59	59	59	36	29	29	237	238	212
	South-East	696	695	598	77	76	65	257	257	212	573	572	502
	Father Out of work	119	121	97	9	9	-	20	20	15	50	48	41
	Father In Work	1157	1156	998	195	193	159	255	357	300	778	776	693
	Parents without Qualifications	1040	1036	879	148	147	119	339	341	288	657	652	583
	Parents with Qualifications	140	141	127	42	41	34	17	17	-	43	43	6
	Lacking Amenities	228	231	197	29	28	-	83	83	65	207	211	185
	Sole Access to Amenities	1126	1123	955	185	184	153	292	294	250	773	726	644
	No Car	846	854	697	96	94	80	138	139	118	646	649	566
	1+ Car	508	500	455	118	118	96	237	238	197	294	288	263
	Low Crowding	123	123	110	64	65	51	57	57	45	45	46	40
	High Crowding	623	626	517	35	34	28	130	132	104	569	560	495
	Owner Occupied Housing	560	556	487	177	175	148	284	285	240	493	493	452
	Rented Housing	793	796	663	37	37	-	90	91	74	442	439	372
	Social Class i/ii	104			45			32			32		
	Social Class iiin/m	618			108			204			433		
	Social Class iv/v	545	547	459	59	58	45	132	132	116	391	394	341
	Social Class i/ii/iiinm			717	623		152	129		238	193		234
													192

1971 Characteristics	India		Pakistan			'White' English Speaking			
	1991 Outcomes: SC ( <i>Social Class</i> ) ID ( <i>Index of Deprivation</i> ) UN ( <i>Unemployment</i> )								
	SC	ID	UN	SC	ID	UN	SC	ID	UN
Mother Aged 15-22 at birth	93	90	75	21	40	28	48	26-	
Mother Aged 23-30 at birth	208	202	170	66	65	48	76	77	70
Mother Aged 31+ at birth	135	133	119	53	51	35	49	50	42
Lone Parent Household	10	10-		5	5-		23	24-	
MultiParent Household	344	335	284	127	123	90	120	119	108
Not Most Deprived Wards	89	86	68	16	16	12	76	76	69
Most Deprived Wards	359	351	294	146	142	101	80	80	66
North Region	92	89	70	79	76	48	12-	-	
Midlands	188	186	158	42	40	30	20	20	19
South-East	156	150	121	36	37	35	110	111	96
Father Out of work	30	29	25-		9-	-		4-	
Father In Work	406	396	326	144	141	102	130	130	114
Parents without Qualifications	344	339	284	124	120	93	95	95	85
Parents with Qualifications	45	42-		14-		4	22	21-	
Lacking Amenities	187	178	151	84	80	57	18	19	17
Sole Access to Amenities	261	259	211	78	78	56	138	137	118
No Car	284	276	234	112	109	77	83	84	73
1+ Car	164	161	128	50	49	36	73	72	62
Low Crowding	22	21-	-		8-		21	21-	
High Crowding	259	254	216	111	109	77	68	68	59
Owner Occupied Housing	371	362	304	132	128	92	106	106	90
Rented Housing	70	75	58	30	30	21	50	50	45
Social Class i/ii	48			9			51		
Social Class iiin/m	192			55			58		
Social Class iv/v	176	172	144	85	81	54	49	48	41
Social Class i/ii/iiinm		234	192		65	51		89	79