

**Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy:
the Case of
China's Response to the United States in 1989-2000**

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PhD Thesis

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Declaration by Candidate

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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with nationalism in Chinese foreign policy. Adopting methods of comparative studies and formalised language analysis, through the case study of China's response to US engagement, this thesis explores the nationalist momentum in Chinese foreign policy during 1989-2000 and how the CCP loosely controls Chinese IR scholars' nationalist writings.

The thesis argues that China is not a revisionist state despite the rise of the new nationalism. Chinese foreign policy since 1989 is best understood as largely being the product of an effectively yet loosely controlled, plural and reactive nationalism and that the CCP's domestic considerations keep Chinese foreign policy inward-looking. This thesis also argues that Chinese elites regard the US engagement policy as patronising and paternalistic and thus it fails to achieve its core objectives that centre on no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes and respect for international rules.

It has been found that focal points of nationalism in Chinese foreign policy are legitimacy of the CCP's one-party rule, territorial control and modernization and that the new Chinese nationalism is a weak force. It has also been found that the US engagement policy toward China has generated nationalism in China and the CCP's response is mainly defensive arguments rather than hostile acts.

I support my argument with a study of the CCP's official terms and Chinese IR scholars' writings. I examine how Chinese IR scholars try to follow the CCP's party line in foreign policy and how various groups of Chinese IR scholars interpret the party line in different ways. Focusing on the case of China's response to US engagement, I analyse Chinese elites' nationalistic views on the US approach to China in respect of security, political, cultural and economic issues. The implication of my research is that the growing concern about China threat has been in regional perceptions of Chinese goals rather than the CCP's diplomacy per se.

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Chapter I Introduction

Basic Questions and Arguments

What have been the dynamics of China's foreign policy since Jiang Zemin became the CCP's general secretary in the context of the post-cold war era? What are the focal points of this theme? Has China become a threat to the current international order due to this influence? The existing literature, including historical, ideological, realist, liberal and constructivist approaches, offers scattered insights into these questions, but leaves us with an incomplete understanding of Chinese foreign policy since 1989. In this thesis, the author will provide a nationalist interpretation of that policy and suggest new hypotheses regarding the motivations, sources, contents and consequences of Chinese foreign policy in the new era.

This thesis joins the controversy in the debate over China threat, and argues that China is not a revisionist state despite the rise of the new nationalism. I suggest that Chinese foreign policy since 1989 is best understood as largely being the product of an effectively yet loosely controlled, diversified, inconsistent and reactive nationalism that developed in the context of the post-cold war era after the collapse of communist regimes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.¹ This nationalist Chinese foreign policy is greatly restrained by domestic issues while China continues to strive hard for modernisation. Chinese domestic considerations, particularly the strong sense of insecurity as to state integrity and accordingly the need for more uniform national identity, keep Chinese foreign policy inward-looking. A profound fear of chaos and disorder among CCP leaders is a defining aspect of Chinese politics.² They appear to view foreign policy through the prism of its internal needs, seeking an external environment that will reduce the need to divert resources to conflict with the outside world.³ In practice, it is not on the agenda of Chinese foreign policy to challenge the current international order, though there are Chinese voices for modifying the current international system.

I will use the case of China-US relations to illustrate my analysis as US policy occupies the key position in Chinese foreign policy. It is concerned with the Chinese foreign

policy response to the US China policy during 1989-2000 when the process of China's modernisation was accelerated. It focuses on China's US policy formulation centred on Chinese political elites, namely senior CCP leaders and various groups of Chinese IR scholars, using the method of comparative studies to examine the Chinese writings of Sino-US relations. Therefore, in addition to addressing the "China threat" debate, this thesis also seeks to offer some insights into the ongoing debate over the efficacy of US engagement policy toward China and help answer the question of why the Chinese elite regard engagement as containment. I argue that, due to strong nationalist sentiments toward the US, in the main the Chinese elite regard the engagement policy as patronizing and paternalistic, take an anti-America approach, partly dismiss its main requirements for joining the international community in a peaceful and orderly way (for instance, over the Taiwan issue and some international norms), and thus engagement fails to achieve its core objectives which centre on no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes and respect for international rules.

Theoretical Perspectives

Is China a threat? Scholars interpret Chinese foreign policy from different theoretical perspectives and offer different answers. There are mainly five approaches that have dominated Chinese foreign policy studies: historical,⁴ ideological,⁵ realist⁶, liberal⁷ and constructivist.⁸ The historical approach contends that one can only understand Chinese foreign policy on the basis of historical and cultural legacy. Drawing on historical sources, Burles, Shulsky, Gill and Mulvenon argue that China is indeed a threat to world peace,⁹ yet Lowell Dittmer argues that Chinese foreign policy is overall benign.¹⁰ Scholars taking the ideological approach emphasize the principles of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, and suggest that China's relationship with the outside world is in the main based on its ideological belief. They differ over to what extent Chinese foreign policy is hostile toward the West. Steven I. Levine argues that China is still a rival of liberal democracies due to its communism-turned anti-imperialism.¹¹ Realists argue that one can actually better understand Chinese foreign policy with the support of such Western IR theories as balance of power, national interests, and domestic economic, military and systemic constraints. Swaine, Tellis and Goldstein suggest China might be a threat due to

its aggressive grand strategy,¹² yet Nathan, Ross and Blank argue that China is still vulnerable.¹³ Liberals do not regard China as a threat, as they believe interdependence brings about mutual benefits. Lampton argues that economic interdependence and common security will ensure peace between China and the US.¹⁴ Constructivists stress the significance of values rather than materials in international relations. Theorists like Hopf argue that learning and socialization generate peaceful foreign policies,¹⁵ yet Johnston deems it inapplicable in the Chinese case.¹⁶

This thesis is concerned with Chinese foreign policy since 1989, therefore historical factors are less important than contemporary issues despite their contribution to the research's historical context. Communist ideology still lingers on in China yet it has not been regarded as a vital variable since China embraced market economy in 1992. Neorealism and neoliberalism share the rationalist assumption that states are self-regarding and interests-driven, but debate whether states pursue relative or absolute gains. In the Chinese case, the former has difficulty accounting for China's WTO entry regardless of its high risk, the latter for China's rapid military expansion in the 1990s. (Realism has another weak point as realists interpret China's power in conflicting ways, so they draw different conclusions over China threat) Systemic constructivism advocated by Wendt fails to address China's reluctance to reform its political reform in a world of liberal democracy,¹⁷ unit-level constructivism advocated by Katzenstein ignores China's adaptation, though selective, to international norms.¹⁸

Nationalist Alternative

To grasp a more complete picture of Chinese foreign policy since 1989, this thesis offers an explanation from the perspective of nationalism. Many scholars like Segal equal nationalism to a "problem" if not a "threat".¹⁹ I suggest that nationalism does not necessarily amount to a threat and whether it leads to conflict is contingent. Nationalist threat comes from strong uniform consensus and external-oriented nationalism. In Chinese foreign policy, there is little sign of these two features. In the Chinese case, loosely controlled and domestic-oriented nationalism might not be a negative but rather a positive matter if not a contribution to international order.

There are already many books and papers on the new Chinese nationalism in general, including works by Dean, Dittmer, Kim, Tu, Cohen, Zheng Yongnian, Christopher Hughes etc.²⁰ Some scholars have already discussed new features of nationalism in China's foreign policy since 1989. For instance, in 1994 Robinson, Shambaugh and some other scholars observed the features of a nationalistic Chinese foreign policy: the Chinese are a great people and China is a great nation; the Chinese nation deserves a much better fate than that which it has experienced in the modern world; as a great nation, China naturally occupies a central position in world affairs and must be treated as a great power.²¹ Whiting states that, as China moves on from a planned economy to a market one with dramatic changes in people's economic and social life, legitimacy of the regime and national identity will be at stake. Therefore, he points out that an appeal to nationalism as a means of mobilising unity will be assertive, if not aggressive. In his view, how this affects Chinese foreign policy will depend on how foreign powers relate to China at that time.²²

Is the new nationalism in Chinese foreign policy a threat to the world? Scholars such as Whiting, Downs, Sanders, Oksenberg and Unger are cautious in exploring the limits of Chinese nationalism and in raising the question of whether Chinese nationalism is affirmative, assertive or aggressive, though they believe Chinese nationalism is a problem.²³ Some of them believe that Chinese nationalism is nothing more than normal patriotism that only becomes abnormal when provoked by highly threatening events.²⁴ Most of them deem that the new Chinese nationalism is still an on going process and has been restrained to date, yet its future is uncertain.

Some scholars clearly declare the new Chinese nationalism is not a threat. Zheng Yongnian contends that the CCP seems to be leaning towards a "voice" strategy and it has no intention to threaten Asia or challenge the US.²⁵ He also believes that external factors can restrain Chinese nationalism, as he has noted that nationalistic voices decline in China when the West, especially the US, shows respect to China. Zhao Shuisheng has examined different orientations of the new Chinese nationalism, nativist, anti-

traditionalist, and pragmatist, and their different international orientations.²⁶ He finds that pragmatic nationalism has been the dominant perspective in China since the 1980s. He agrees with Shambaugh who argued that post cold war Chinese nationalism was defensive, assertive in form and reactive in essence,²⁷ and argues that the new Chinese nationalism is a pragmatic one: powerful when China's national interests and territorial integrity are in jeopardy yet not making Chinese international behaviour aggressive. Edward Friedman joins them and argues that the new Chinese nationalism does not lead to conflict with the US if forces that favour economic growth and international integration can prevail. He contends that a U.S. policy of cautious and vigilant engagement can somehow help these peaceful forces prevail against the dominant chauvinists in Chinese politics.²⁸

Li Nan argues in a 2001 paper that the new Chinese nationalism is overall conservative and defensive from the perspective of the PLA.²⁹ He has examined the new dominant themes in Chinese military writings and deems that they have driven China's foreign policy away from Mao's internationalist and revolutionary approach toward a more conservative and nationalist direction. In his 2003 paper PLA Conservative Nationalism Li Nan examines the growth of PLA nationalism and argues once again that Chinese nationalism is conservative.³⁰ He points out that the main role of the PLA has become to maintain China's territorial integrity.

There are other scholars who believe that the new nationalism in Chinese foreign policy is towards aggressiveness. They like to say that the nationalistic goal of the CCP is the restoration of China's historical position in Asia. Yu Ying-shih considers that the rise of a new Chinese nationalism aims at replacing the dominant position of the West in the world and controlling the world in the twenty-first century. Huntington states that the Chinese have increasingly asserted their intention to resume the historic role of "the pre-eminent power in East Asia" and "to bring to an end the overlong century of humiliation and subordination to the West and Japan." James Lilley proclaims that there is a rallying cry for Chinese everywhere that after a century of humiliation China's time has finally come. Bernstein and Munro warn the West, driven by nationalist sentiment, China is

seeking to replace the US as the dominant power in Asia.³¹ In the eyes of these scholars, the new Chinese nationalism is quintessentially aggressive.

I focus on the core of Chinese foreign policy-making elites, namely Chinese IR (International Relations) scholars, and try to reveal the fracture of the new nationalism in Chinese foreign policy and the fact that it is still a weak force. Based on Goldman and Song's contribution³², I divide them mainly into 4 groups according to their closeness to the central power: personal advisers, institutional advisers, official intellectuals and liberals. (The views of liberals will be at times addressed yet not be focused upon due to their weak influence in the 1990s on which the author agrees with Zhao Suisheng.)³³ The author claims that there exists a thin consensus regarding the nationalist approach to China's foreign policy among Chinese IR scholars yet the disparities among them are so obvious that the current consensus manipulated and controlled by the CCP hardly appears to be a formidable force. It is not strong enough to "threaten" the current international order. As such, apart from concurring with Zheng Yongnian, Zhao Shuisheng, Li Nan and others that the new Chinese nationalism is largely domestic-oriented, I try to demonstrate that the nationalist Chinese foreign policy is not aggressive.

The author argues that the new Chinese nationalism is loosely yet still effectively controlled, therefore contributes to the debate on whether Chinese nationalism is top-down or bottom-up. Christensen and Munson argue that the CCP is trying hard to promote nationalism from above,³⁴ yet Gries argues that the most forceful manifestations of nationalism surge up from the people and the CCP can hardly control it.³⁵ The author identifies with the top-down model and claims that Chinese nationalism is under control and is not chaotic enough to bring about "problems" to the world.

Definitions

In this thesis the author regards shared culture, common economy and the self-consciousness to control a territory as inseparable parts of a nation, so it is in line with the definition offered by Smith.³⁶ Smith defines "nation" as a "named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths, and historical memories, a mass public

culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members”,³⁷ which stresses the idea of territorial control. In Chinese nationalism, this territory refers to shenzhou (the holy land). This approach can better explain the Chinese urge to maintain national integrity and become a great power in terms of wealth and power. In my eyes, a nation is a collective of people and what makes a nation unique is that it is a collective united by shared cultural features, a common economic system and belief in the right to control a territory. The belief in the right to territorial control is central to distinguishing nations from other human groups. Many groups hold common economy, myths, values and symbols, yet they are not nations, as they are just unified by economy and culture. Thus, a nation is defined by the author as a self-conscious community, formed from one or more ethnicities, identified by common economy and values of its own, claiming the right to political loyalty, identity, autonomy as a people and the control of a specific territory.

Based on this understanding, nationalism is regarded in this thesis as a sentiment that believes a nation’s own interests and values should be defended at almost any cost through creation and maintenance of the integrity of its nation-state. It is about power struggle in the context of world politics. It is about a state’s political movement to consolidate its power in the modern world.³⁸ Therefore the author largely regards nationalism as a political ideology that believes a nation’s own national ideas are especially valuable if not superior to others and that a nation has a unique identity due to these national ideas, which drives it to strive for more wealth and power. Breuilly says: “The term ‘nationalism’ is used to refer to political movements seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments.”³⁹ The author concurs and holds that one can better understand the new Chinese nationalism when regarding it as a state- motivated political movement that aims to maintain national integrity and improve Chinese power in international society.

This definition is firmly based on Chinese understandings as well. He Xin believes “that the direct appeal of nationalism is statism and patriotism, namely regarding maintaining national and state interests as noble value and paramount principle.”⁴⁰ For him,

nationalism means a political ideology based on traditional Chinese culture, guiding Chinese actions to promote national interests.⁴¹ Wang Jisi's understanding is similar to He Xin, regarding nationalism as a value to defend national interests. In his eyes, "...‘nationalism’ (or the almost synonymous concept of ‘patriotism’ in this context) is an ethical principle that is desired to keep national cohesion and political stability in society" and the government is responsible for putting it into foreign policy practices.⁴² Stressing the political role of the nation state, he thus believes that value and actions to defend interests are intertwined in nationalism.

Rise of the New Nationalism

The new Chinese nationalism rose up when China's stability and even survival was greatly challenged from both within China and abroad. It is the direct result of China's response to the newly changed domestic and international environment after the shattering events of 1989-91.⁴³ After the Tiananmen incident of June 1989 and its dramatic domestic consequences, the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, a new world order emerged during and after the Gulf War, blighted abruptly China's plan to enter the international community as an equal to other global powers.⁴⁴

Domestically the legitimacy of the communist ideology was more severely challenged than shortly after the death of Mao in 1976. The CCP began to realize that it should appeal for something spiritual that transcends disputes among the Chinese people in order to maintain national unity and social stability and to secure one-party rule. As the party knew that prolonged absence of political support might bring about "revolutionary alteration of political and social system,"⁴⁵ and societies with legitimate authority systems are "more likely to survive than those without,"⁴⁶ it did not ignore the danger.

Shortly after the crackdown in Tiananmen, the conservative force gained momentum.⁴⁷ In view of the danger to his economic reforms, Deng, despite his deteriorating health, made a foray against the conservative wing in early 1992 and put forth his theory of Socialist Market Economy with Chinese Characteristics. Against heavy odds, he saved China's

reform, but it does not follow that China would progress out of danger, as the party has to pay for its brutal handling of the 1989 demonstrations.⁴⁸ Due to his pragmatist approach to Marxism-Leninism, he brought in a great legitimacy crisis to the CCP. The Party's performance is now judged on "how well the economy is performing".⁴⁹ Deng Xiaoping began to realize that it would be hard for the CCP to resort in crisis to the ranks time and again, and China needs a powerful spiritual source to ensure social stability, which can be seen from his judgement that the greatest mistake the CCP had committed since adopting the reform and open-door policy was in the field of political education.⁵⁰ It is well known that he consulted many times the famous radical nationalist, He Xin, shortly after crushing the democratic movement by force.⁵¹ Since then, nationalism has played a significant role in the politics of the post-Tiananmen era.

After the June 4 event Jiang Zemin became the CCP's new helmsman. As the third generation party secretary arising out of technocratic bureaucracy, Jiang could not gain the authority enjoyed by Mao and Deng. Both Deng and Jiang knew well that China's way out was to continue reform and open door policies, and China would follow the route of the Soviet Union if it stuck with dated communist ideology, yet they also understood clearly that reform had engendered and would continue to engender disparities in society. It seemed to them that the CCP's rule would collapse if the party continued to inculcate the Chinese people with communism or if the party chose liberal democracy. In this scenario the safest way for the CCP to unify the Chinese people was nationalism.⁵² He and his colleagues began to embrace traditional values. For example, the International Confucian Studies Association's 1994 Conference in Beijing was introduced by Vice Premier Li Lanqing and former Minister Gu Mu and was concluded by Jiang Zemin and Li Ruihuan.⁵³

The two most important personal advisers of Jiang Zemin, Liu Ji and Wang Daohan, are in the same league as He Xin in terms of nationalism regardless of their different approaches to the economic reform.⁵⁴ Wang Daohan is among the first scholars who staunchly argued for an International Relations theory with Chinese characteristics.⁵⁵ Wang Daohan and Liu Ji advised Jiang Zemin to put *zhonghua minzu de weida fuxing*

(the Great Resurrection of the Chinese Nation) into Jiang's report to the national party congress.⁵⁶

On the world stage, the downfall of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union made the CCP's open door policy more difficult. CCP leaders suddenly found out that China became a pariah of the world, shorn of its supposedly deserved status commensurate with its rising economic capabilities. All the bad behaviour of the Chinese authorities, in terms of human rights, economic protectionism and military adventurism, which was tolerated by the West during the Cold War, held the world spotlight. More often than not, Chinese officials were isolated on international occasions. Lacking confidence in Chinese ideology, CCP leaders put more faith in China's hard power, for example, economic growth and military build-up. Nevertheless, the 1990-1991 Gulf War overshadowed this effort. The US-led allied forces won the war with flying colours, and the US army demonstrated its capability to address alone, if need be, any international conflicts in the world. It made the CCP leaders open their eyes and began to worry about China's security. Oksenberg and Economy regard China's situation as perilous from a historical point of view.⁵⁷

Nationalist views are widely accepted by Chinese people. He Qinglian, who is one of the most liberal and outspoken intellectuals in China, also takes a hard nationalist approach to China's security issues.⁵⁸ (John Derbyshire was completely amazed that Miss He could regard his sympathy over the independence movements of Xinjiang, Tibet and Taiwan as "nonsense".)⁵⁹ Without reference to nationalism, one can hardly understand the reasons why China was still in good shape as the only major communist power against all odds, why the PLA became more assertive over the Taiwan problem; why to screw foreigners has been regarded as patriotic;⁶⁰ why anti-Americanism (a means to distinguish Chinese from the West led by America and establish a unique Chinese identity) was steadily on the rise among Chinese youth in the 1990s;⁶¹ why, in 1996, China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs suspended English interpreting at its press conferences and required all foreign journalists to learn Chinese.

Nationalism does not amount to threat. It is contingent. There are conditions for nationalist threat. Firstly, (a) territorial claims of other countries, (b) imposition of local values or narrowly defined national values upon other countries; secondly, taking strategic actions toward achieving either or both these two objectives or even back up by force. If a foreign policy fails either of these two factors, it should not be called a “nationalist threat.” If it fails the second, it had better be regarded as “nationalist rhetoric.” From rhetoric to actions, there is a huge gap to bridge. Aggressive nationalism needs external-oriented policy ideas and strong uniform consensus among policy-makers to develop into the “maturity” stage, namely real nationalist threat, from only scattered voices.

In this thesis, I will inquire about the nature of the new nationalism in Chinese foreign policy and try to find whether it is aggressive. Is it strongly domestic-restrained in practice? Is it uniform enough to form a strong national will? The author will discuss (1) domestic constraints of the nationalist Chinese foreign policy, (2) whether there are variations, tensions and disparities among Chinese policy-makers, (3) whether the Chinese nationalist response to the US China policy is defensive.

Domestic Constraints

Though China’s self-perception changed considerably in the 1990s, when the CCP tried to transform China from object to subject in the international community,⁶² Chinese foreign policy is still very inward-looking. With cautious optimism, Lampton suggests that China’s future external behaviour will possibly continue to be shaped by domestic forces of change in China.⁶³

The rise of China’s “new nationalism” is a complex phenomenon reflecting both domestic and international factors⁶⁴, yet the decisive factors are internal concerns. The main concerns of the new Chinese nationalism are domestic issues and its external-oriented rhetoric is hollow and serves domestic needs. The most important priority is territorial integrity. Despite stern warnings from scholars like Goldman that nationalism

is unlikely to hold together China's diverse and decentralized regions,⁶⁵ in the post-Cold War era nationalist foreign policy rhetoric is intended to ensure China's regime stability.

- **Territorial Control**

Territorial control is at the centre of the new Chinese nationalism. One has to bear in mind that China used to be a vast empire. Nationalism cannot be understood well without reflecting on past political forms and particularly "empires of the pre-modern and early modern sorts."⁶⁶ Due to this legacy the CCP claims most territories, namely shenzhou (the holy land), occupied by different dynasties in the past. CCP leaders see Taiwanese, Tibetan and Uighur separatists as threatening, and view outside support for their causes with great alarm.⁶⁷ In recent years, Jiang Zemin's talks have been peppered with Confucian sayings and PRC spokesmen have asserted that all previous dynasties were in fact Chinese and that all the people who inhabit these territories are members of the Chinese family.⁶⁸

Almost all would agree that control over one's own nation-state is an objective for most nationalists. However, it is hard in reality to determine which territory belongs to whom.⁶⁹ While concern with territory is a necessary component of nationalism, many nations lay claim to territory even when the nation's members do not occupy it as a majority. Gellner's "Potato Principle" says that groups will look back to periods when they were mainly farmers to justify the control of land in an urban and industrial age, showing how territory itself is imagined.⁷⁰ Just as there are no predetermined nations, there are no predetermined homelands.

Nevertheless, the CCP would not agree with Gellner on this point. The Chinese nationalism is a "Sino-centric" cultural nationalism.⁷¹ The Confucian world was not "one big happy family" (tianxia yijia), but, rather, extremely Sino-centric, involving a "cultural superiority."⁷² Therefore the Chinese are inclined to claim all the territories that were sinicized by Chinese empires in history. If some of these territories are lost to powers other than China, Chinese will feel bitter and angry. Most educated Chinese are still painfully aware of the "unequal" treaties signed with the British at Nanking in 1842

and the Japanese at Shimonoseki in 1895 in which Hong Kong and Taiwan were ceded respectively to the British and Japanese.

- Modernisation

Modernisation plays a significant role in the new Chinese nationalism. Since the Self-strengthening Movement of the nineteenth century, a recurring theme in Chinese nationalism has been how China should be modernized.⁷³ Although there is no general theory, there is a broad consensus in the modernist school that nationalism both as a form of consciousness and as a political ideology has been the single most important factor shaping the structure and processes of the modern world.⁷⁴ Most scholars from other schools of nationalism admit that nationalism remains the road to modernity, despite their disagreement with the modernists. For instance, Smith's most important book, *The Ethnic Origin of Nations*, represents hitherto the strongest critique of modernism, yet he still accepts many modernist presuppositions.⁷⁵

Modernisation brings about political and economic gains for states, but it is a double-edged sword. It engenders political, economic and social problems for states to cope with. First of all, economic modernisation might give rise to devolution of power and go against nation-state building. Chinese nationalists used to hold the belief that China's problem lies solely with its domestic economic weakness and believed material capability alone can catapult China into being a great power.⁷⁶ Nevertheless China has been regarded as weak in its security in the post-Cold War world.⁷⁷ The fundamental reason largely lies in problems emerging from China's rapid economic modernisation and the dwindling of its central power. If there is always a danger of disintegration due to the process of modernisation, China will surely not be regarded by the world as a real great power.

Huntington says that modernisation breeds factors against social stability.⁷⁸ As modernisation advances, social diversity is inevitable and then the tightly tailored "nation-state making and keeping" scheme is inclined to failure and a range of conflicts arise as the political order begins to destabilize. This process leads to repression at home,

causing new rifts between society and state due to the regime's unsatisfactory civil rights record. In the case of China, Deng's reform and open-door policies have brought about overall economic increase and modernisation, yet the downside is also obvious: for one, wealth disparities between the rich and poor, the rise of localism and human rights movements.⁷⁹ In this scenario, Deng had always insisted on the policy of *bu zhenglun* (no debate), as he thought that this would rip up social stability.

China still faces uncertainties of economic development. In pursuit of modernisation, the CCP was boldly attempting to restructure its obsolete and unproductive state-owned enterprise system. It would not be an easy task. It was said that problems like falling foreign investment, rampant corruption and expected declines in China's trade surplus were on the horizon.⁸⁰ More important, and potentially destabilizing, was the widespread expectation that China's growth rate would fall again.⁸¹

Equally troubling to the CCP is increasing unemployment in both rural and urban areas. In 1998, according to one estimate, 26% of the rural workforce, were chronically unemployed.⁸² Some hundred million rural residents are adrift in China at any given time, migrants from the interior looking for work in the rich coastal areas.⁸³ They streamed into cities looking for new opportunities to make a living, crossing boundaries and defying the government's ability to "mould society into rigid, contradictory categories,"⁸⁴ and crime and problems of social order increased.

One of the most adverse impacts of the post-Mao reforms has been endemic corruption. Elizabeth J. Perry writes that "in the fall of 1993, Deputy Procurator-General Lian Guoqing acknowledged that corruption was 'worse than at any other period since New China was founded in 1949. It has spread into the Party, government, administration and every part of society, including politics, economy, ideology and culture.'"⁸⁵ The CCP's corruption leads directly to people's suspicion of the political ideology.

Due to the decline of the central power, civil society in China is getting stronger. An important development is occurring, manifest in the reappearance of non-governmental

organizations including secret societies and criminal gangs. Those organizations with genuine indigenous roots enriched by a Chinese modernity -- secret societies, Buddhism, lineage associations and professional agencies-- are likely to spread more rapidly, have greater appeal and prove more difficult for the core state apparatus to control, precisely because they cannot be dismissed as creatures of the outside world.⁸⁶

The spread of the Falun Gong sect is perhaps the most dramatic example of developments in this sphere. Falun Gong is a spiritual movement that is based on sinocized Buddhism. Out of the fear that believers of the Falun Gong cult would challenge the CCP's ruling power, the party has been engaging in a nation-wide movement to wipe it out in the name of purging heresy. This movement has brought about a political and human rights disaster and further displayed the CCP's ideological crisis.

Problems generated by modernisation push the Chinese elite to nationalism. The proponents of nationalism in the 1990s have different agendas for Chinese reforms, yet the mainstream is statism.⁸⁷ They do not challenge the power of the state and this is one of the most important reasons that even popular nationalism in the street is “managed, controlled and ultimately suppressed by the Party.”⁸⁸ The new nationalists aim by all means to build a strong modern nation state, lest China fall a prey to the West again. In the 1930s, many Chinese intellectuals believed that it was the precondition for China to be transformed into a modern liberal democracy that a strong central government be established.⁸⁹ In their views, what is the point of discussing the modernisation of China if China does not survive at all? Since the end of the Cold War, the same consideration has grown on CCP leaders and Chinese IR scholars. In many ways, Deng and Jiang's policies bear similarities to the political programmes of Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, Yuan Shikai, Sun Zhongshan, Jiang Jieshi and even Mao Zedong (“Mao Zedong's role as a pioneer of socialism will receive less attention and will appear far more problematic than his legacy as a nationalist modernizer.”),⁹⁰ in terms of commitments to create a strong state.⁹¹

- Legitimacy

External threat may be used by nationalists for domestic purposes. When the elites or rulers of a nation feel threatened in terms of legitimacy, either by external pressure or domestic unrest, it might stoke up nationalism and require strong loyalty to the state from its members. For instance, the CCP began to stoke Chinese nationalism as a way to recoup its popularity after the Tiananmen debacle and began to employ images of the US as a swaggering hegemon.⁹² Zhao Suisheng says that, after the rapid decay of communist ideology in China, the communist state used nationalism to shore up its waning legitimacy.⁹³ Xiao Gongqing advocated in *Zhanlue yu guanli* the use of a nationalism derived from Confucianism to fill the ideological void left with the collapse of communism.⁹⁴ Wong Kaying holds that the effort to find an alternative ideology to replace the dwindling communism is important consideration of the CCP's appeal to nationalism. He said that the call of nationalism under the glory of complete unification and nationalist revival easily replaced the dominant role played by the communist ideology and became the crucial measure of the party in uniting its people.⁹⁵

Since early this century, the Chinese elite, no matter whether nationalists or communists, have called upon the Chinese people to fight for national rejuvenation in order to restore China's glory. Chinese intellectuals just cannot forget the legacy of China's historical achievements. Although radical intellectuals in the May Fourth/New Culture movement of the 1910s and 1920s sought for modernity, they did not, consciously or unconsciously, sever their ties with China's "grand" tradition.⁹⁶

The slogan of *zhenxing zhonghua* (rejuvenation of China) was started by Sun Zhongshan but it was continued by Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Jiang Zemin.⁹⁷ The term "rejuvenation" refers to the psychological power contained in the concept of China's rise to its former world status that can be seen in two common assertions. Firstly, the CCP regards China's rise as regaining its lost international status rather than as obtaining something new. Secondly, the CCP considers the rise of China as a restoration of fairness rather than as gaining advantages over others. Enchanted by the grand target of the party,

scholars began to rewrite Chinese modern history and even well-known liberals like Hu Shi are interpreted as nationalists.⁹⁸ In Jiang's era, China for the first time openly pursued great power diplomacy (*daguo zhanlue*), obviously and cautiously departing from Deng's 1989 advice to "hide our capacities while biding our time" (*taoguang yanghui*).⁹⁹

To broaden the base of legitimacy the CCP has embraced Confucianism. It claims that Confucianism provides the "inheritance" and "spiritual resources" for spiritual civilization that needs to combine with material civilization for a socialist spiritual civilization.¹⁰⁰ While China seeks advanced science and technology from the West, "China should strive to enlighten the rest of the world with its traditional concept of harmony and to promote peace in the international arena."¹⁰¹ The task is to get the right synthesis: "Future globalization will integrate contributions from both the East and the West."¹⁰² Though the voice sounds tough, it aims to modify rather than challenge the current international system for the sake of domestic constituency.

Weak Momentum

Due to the encouragement or acquiescence of the CCP, Chinese intellectuals and Chinese IR scholars in particular embarked on a journey to establish in the context of the post-cold war era China's own social and cultural identity for the sake of politics. This sentiment is no longer the sole province of the party and its propagandists and is functioning as a form of consensus beyond the bounds of official culture.¹⁰³ In the early 1990s a number of journals advocating national studies (*guoxue*), such as *Zhongguo wenhua* (Chinese Culture), *Xueren* (Scholar), *Dongfang* (Oriental) and *Zhanlue yu guanli* (Strategy and Management), emerged and soon swept over the Chinese intelligentsia. There is a long tradition of advice and dissent from within in Chinese intellectual history.¹⁰⁴ Now the faction of advice has greatly increased their power through nationalism. Despite their appeal for democratisation¹⁰⁵, many liberals also take nationalist views toward the US.¹⁰⁶ People began to believe "an authoritarian party like the CCP is a necessary crutch" at the present stage of modernisation.¹⁰⁷ As a result, nationalist thinking that is concerned with political and social stability, economic

development and nation-state rights over democratic change and individual rights now dominates Chinese intellectual discourse.¹⁰⁸

This consensus has provided the CCP with an opportunity to cover domestic problems and survive against great odds. Nevertheless, it does not follow that this widespread nationalist momentum is one strong enough to challenge the current international order, as Chinese policy-makers still disagree with each other about many key issues while they agree on others to some degree.

- **Consensus Engineering**

To achieve consensus on the new nationalism, censorship in intellectual matters is carried out to guide Chinese scholars broadly to follow the party line. Chinese IR scholars, who are at the centre of this study, are among the most important parts in the CCP's efforts to engineer a uniform foreign policy discourse. This is the reason why, normally, it is extremely difficult to openly formulate dissent, as there are few ways to express oneself other than resorting to the guideline that had been elaborated by the CCP. Nevertheless, the censorship policy is not as strict as before. Because academic journals have modest circulations, they are given somewhat more latitude than other publishing media. As long as scholars do not confront the CCP leader head-on, "they can write in scholarly journals pretty much as they choose."¹⁰⁹

Censorship used to rely heavily on pre-publication examinations, yet now it has been increasingly focused on formalised language control. Language manipulation carried out by governments is one of the important controlling instruments in authoritarian states. To counter the influence of pluralism and tradition, authoritarian states tend to promote a uniform value system from above, call on its citizens to be more like-minded and suppress dissenting voices. Mazrui has described how East African countries take in education and communication a process of "counter-selection".¹¹⁰ Normally terms conducive to the present state are carefully selected by governments in these countries. Havel once talked about formalised language in the Czech totalitarian regime. In his view, what was created was "a system of ritual signs that replace reality with pseudo-

reality.¹¹¹ As a consequence, Havel argued, "In everyone there is some willingness to merge with the anonymous crowd and to flow comfortably along with it down the river of pseudo-life."¹¹² This is indeed an accurate description of the pseudo-consensus pointed out by Habermas and can be well applied to the Chinese intelligentsia.

In terms of politics, manipulated language is surely a powerful tool in winning public support for policies, particularly in an information society that increasingly relies on communication. To CCP leaders, manipulated language is more than promotion of certain ideologies. "It was a means to educate and mobilize a mass of people in the real or perceived benefits of Party programs."¹¹³ It is also a powerful weapon in the struggle of nation states against nation states, worldview against worldview. Schwartz delineates how careful employment of specific communist terminology reflected an early ideological split between China and the Soviet Union. Noting that political terminology can reveal a regime's intent, Schwartz illustrates how China, by coining the term "new democracy", rejected the Soviet Union's ideological tutelage.¹¹⁴ Rhetoric thereby passes for the tool of many strategic ends and therefore as a linguistic means for prolonging an authority's life.

In the West the term "propaganda" (xuanchuan) has negative connotations, but in the Chinese context, its importance cannot be overestimated.¹¹⁵ Through its propaganda structure, the CCP has radically reshaped and reinvented virtually all the vocabulary that came into its sphere, including seemingly unremarkable or basic words as well as newly coined political terminology. Schoenhals has noted that political debates in China often boil down to attempts to create the correct and uniform "formulation" on a given question, a brief aphoristic statement of the party's current wisdom on the topic.¹¹⁶ In terms of language manipulation, Habermas is right to say that playing the game of language means playing the game of domination, violence and distortion.

In China there is always a set of officially sanctioned political terms to guide the writing of Chinese intellectuals. The official institutes have the power to "purify" their work. For instance, between January and October 1953, the Xinhua News Agency issued some 177

“corrections” of no less than 243 domestic news items.¹¹⁷ Despite Deng Xiaoping’s open-mindedness, he fell heir to this traditional policy. “Like Mao Zedong before him, he appears to have believed that it was possible to make one see things differently by intentionally manipulating the tools with which one sees.”¹¹⁸

Due to the paucity of theory development, the CCP under Deng and Jiang’s leadership found it even harder to play the role of ideological tutor and had simply to rely on some official terms rather than Marxist and Maoist theories to control Chinese intellectuals. This made their policy control more ineffective and loosening. For a new age they knew the party needed a new set of formalised language and a new way to make intellectuals follow official terms in order to promote their values and policies. The party’s official terms became guidelines rather than an enforcement of Chinese intellectuals’ writings. They are encouraged to exercise self-discipline and support the party’s interests in their interpretations and are less forced to follow these terms literally.

- Official Terms of Chinese Nationalist Foreign Policy

In the 1990s the new nationalism in Chinese foreign policy could be summarized into four categories with these official terms: *he er butong* (incorporating things of diverse nature), *minzu zihao* (national pride), *weiji yishi* (consciousness of crisis) and *shouhai* (victim).¹¹⁹ They are a mixture of traditional Chinese values and Maoism, with apparently strong nationalistic sentiments, aiming at serving the rise of China as a great nation. (Fairbank’s argument is relevant today when he said that Maoism is itself Confucianism in Leninist garb, aiming to improve China’s world status.¹²⁰)

These terms are incorporated into China’s independent foreign policy of peace that promotes a peace-loving image of Chinese in the world. Many Chinese IR scholars claim that this policy is deeply rooted in the *ren* (benevolence) value in Confucianism, despite the fact that “adherents of another governing approach, the Legalist school, take a much harder view of relations between nations and the use of force.”¹²¹ Like reformists in the late Qing dynasty, Chinese scholars continue to uphold the classical constructs as their own most enduring points of reference; they infuse these age-old precepts with a

radically new spirit and fuse them with present principles. The result is the same as before: tension rather than synthesis.¹²² One can see that *minzu zihao* (national pride), *weiji yishi* (consciousness of crisis) and *shouhai* (victim) apparently clash with Chinese peace-loving rhetoric. For Western IR scholars, the more the CCP promotes a worldview packaged largely in ideals, the more they will suspect that CCP leaders are trying to hide their actual intentions behind “flowery rhetoric.”¹²³ This clash can only be explained by the inward-looking, self-absorbed, vulnerable and aggrieved nature of Chinese foreign policy.

The focus of the formulation *he er butong* (incorporating things of diverse nature) is “different”. It can also be called *dou er bu po* (fight but not break) in terms of US-China relations. The early 1990s is a watershed in new China’s history. It was the time when the Chinese people realized that they are apparently unique if not isolated in the world due to the collapse of communist regimes in the Soviet bloc. China becomes a lonely island among nations of liberal democracy. This shift necessitated a change in national identities, as national identity is a base for public opinion, policies, principles and policy platform. The awakening of Chinese self-consciousness began to nationalize Marxism-Leninism and make it a part of Chineseness. Together with the CCP’s resolute determination to become stronger economically, state capitalism started to take shape. This earthquake change is echoed in China’s foreign relations with its pursuit of a set of principles different from both China’s past and the West at present. This uniqueness is mainly constructed on China’s criticism of the West and America in particular. They have been depicted vividly as arrogant and dangerous, standing in the way of China’s great national resurrection. The CCP thus calls upon the Chinese people to be highly alerted, determined to enter the First World regardless of cost and international criticism.

Nationalist terms like *minzu zihao* (national pride), *weiji yishi* (consciousness of crisis) and *shouhai* (victim) aim to help maintain the relative stability of China and unite many social groups that are averse to follow Marxism-Leninism, thus the CCP can acquire “Hobbesian” legitimacy within the population “for delivering civil peace and civil order.”¹²⁴ The common past of glory and humiliation is used to invent a common new

identity. “In contrast to American nationalism of manifest destiny, Chinese nationalism is powered by feelings of national humiliation and pride.”¹²⁵

One can discern clearly *minzu zihao* (national pride), *weiji yishi* (consciousness of crisis) and *shouhai* (victim) through patriotic education in China. They are specifically designed to create a sense of insecurity and danger, impose duties and demand joint efforts¹²⁶. They highlight China’s long and glorious history and juxtapose it to the humiliating recent 150 years of history (since the Opium War in 1840) of being belittled by the West. It tells the Chinese people that the world is not yet in peace and there would be a second Opium War if China remained a developing country. Deng Xiaoping once said in public that the West intends to keep China in poverty and underdevelopment forever.¹²⁷ While CCP leaders revel in the great achievements they have contributed to their motherland, they also admit the backwardness of China and even exaggerate it, trying to bring out Chinese people’s instinct to survive.¹²⁸

To certain extent, the CCP’s effort to encourage nationalism among the Chinese people through these symbols is quite similar to Wang Jingwei’s movement to seek the legitimacy of his puppet regime in the 1940s. Both Wang’s team and the CCP lack theory development and rely on slogans to ensure their legitimacy. The propagandists who defended Wang’s regime tended to stress five terms. Three of these were brought together in a slogan: “*heping, fangong, jianguo*” (peace, anti-communism, rebuilding the country). The other two were *guofu* (the father of the country, that is, Sun Zhongshan) and *zhongguo geming* (the Chinese Revolution).¹²⁹ *Heping* (peace) and *jianguo* (rebuilding the country) constituted the core of his self-legitimation efforts. These two ideas could best explain and justify why he decided to side with the Japanese when they were invading his country. In addition to these two terms, he selected *guofu* (the father of the country) and *zhongguo geming* (the Chinese Revolution) to consolidate further his claim of political legitimacy.

- IR Scholars in Chinese Foreign Policy-making

These official terms need to be widely used and interpreted to take effect among the Chinese people. This task falls on to a special institutional group in Chinese foreign policy-making, namely, Chinese IR scholars. There is apparently a rich body of literature in foreign policy analysis on epistemic communities and bureaucratic politics but not necessarily IR scholars.¹³⁰ By and large, Chinese IR scholars are still the carriers of the CCP's propaganda and the official tasks of Chinese IR scholars are either interpreting the party line in a permitted way or acting as the party's mouthpiece. Therefore, it is plausible to regard what they have published as a fair extension of official policies or a key link of foreign policy-making.

Chinese IR scholars play a crucial role in Chinese foreign policy-making. In general, the relationship between CCP leaders and the Chinese academic community have been gradually improving since 1989.¹³¹ The more significant role of Chinese IR scholars has shown that "the pluralization of actors involved in foreign policy is proceeding rapidly."¹³² Their work is crucial for the CCP, because as Sutter argues, domestic concerns dominate the Chinese foreign policy-making agenda.¹³³ In this regard Chinese IR scholars can demonstrate more powerful influence on the society than diplomats.

Shambaugh has noted Chinese scholars' more active involvement in Chinese politics in Jiang Zemin's era.¹³⁴ Jiang has relied heavily on the intellectuals and specialists of Policy Research Office of the Central Committee, "many of whom he brought to Beijing from Shanghai, for policy advice on a broad range of issues."¹³⁵ During Jiang's tenure, the number of think tanks has proliferated and their policy advice is more sought by leaders and government institutions.¹³⁶ During the past two decades, the central-level think-tanks have evolved from being information-gatherers to information-analysers to policy initiators.¹³⁷ Fewsmith and Rosen have also noted Chinese intellectuals' growing impact on foreign policy-making through opportunities for consulting with relevant bureaucracies.¹³⁸

The author bases the research of Chinese IR scholars on Western studies of Chinese intellectuals. Goldman, Cheek and Hamrin analyse Chinese intellectuals in general through 3 major groups: ideological spokesmen, professional and academic elite, and critical intellectuals.¹³⁹ They did a wonderful job in analysing Chinese intellectuals in general in the 1980s through this grouping, yet after the Tiananmen incident Chinese intellectuals have regrouped. It is said that, in the post-1989 era, Chinese intellectuals can in general be split into the Extreme Left (who uphold traditional Marxist Leninist dogma and ideology), the Left (New Marxists and some people from the liberal camp who have taken up some leftist ideas), the Extreme Right (whose basic principle is opposition to the rule of the Communist Party), the Right (the broad liberal camp), and the Centre (reformists within the Communist Party system).¹⁴⁰ However, because the Extreme Left and the Extreme Right are at the two far poles of Chinese social thought, they generally have little influence on the CCP's policies.¹⁴¹

In the case of IR scholars, both ideological spokesmen and critical intellectuals are marginalized, and the former have gradually faded out and the latter have mostly been exiled. The group of professional and academic elites has divided into two major clubs: institutional advisers based in CASS (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) and other think-tanks, official intellectuals spreading out in universities. Song Xinning divides Chinese IR scholars into 3 categories: researchers in institutes under various government agencies, researchers in the CASS in Beijing and those at its provincial level and university professors and researchers.¹⁴² However, he also deems that the former two carry out similar studies: policy-oriented research.¹⁴³ Therefore the author puts them into one category, namely institutional advisers.

Based on Merle Goldman and Song's contribution and the change in Chinese intellectuals after the Tiananmen incident, I believe that Chinese IR scholars in foreign policy studies might be divided into 4 groups: personal advisors, institutional advisors, official intellectuals and liberals. Personal advisers are those scholar officials who have close personal contacts with top CCP leaders and whose economic and political interests are tied up with the fate of these leaders. In some sense they can be called the "brain trust" of

Chinese leaders.¹⁴⁴ Institutional advisers are those scholars who work with government agencies and research institutions like CASS and who are given orders to draft official policy initiatives, carry out practical foreign policy research and provide advices to top CCP leaders through the bureaucratic system. Official intellectuals mean those scholars working in Chinese colleges and universities. Liberals are those scholars who are *tizhiwai* (outside the official system) and most of whom do not work in state-funded units.

The author puts scholars in different groups according to their distance to China's power centre – in other words, the political power they have. A Chinese scholar's social/political position in the Chinese hierarchy substantially affects his writings. There might be some overlaps as some individuals may have changed jobs or positions in different times, but a scholar normally writes on behalf of the group at the higher position despite different positions the scholar might take in his or her career. For instance, an institutional adviser – a higher position – might move and become an official intellectual – a lower position – working with a university, but the scholar still writes as an institutional adviser due to his networking in the political hierarchy.

- Different Interpretations by Chinese IR Scholars

Human beings must embrace non-consequentialist norms if we hope to "make our lives meaningful over time."¹⁴⁵ Our plurality of values must be incorporated into our theories of rationality, because we are called upon to try to make sense of the "variety of ways we have of valuing things".¹⁴⁶ In order to do this, Chinese IR scholars have to submit their individual valuation to social practice and Chinese political culture in particular, so that social stability, continuity and consensus are maintained.¹⁴⁷ Ideas like national interests have histories and a kind of "specific gravity" and tend to be uniform.¹⁴⁸

Nevertheless, as Wendt eloquently explained, national interests and practices, fundamentally speaking, stem from the national identity that itself is formed through an evolutionary and dynamic mechanism.¹⁴⁹ As different interest groups, Chinese IR scholars have different needs of interests and then different discourse strategies.¹⁵⁰ Chinese IR scholars' writings are shaped by national interests and individual or group

interests as well. “Interest” is basic to politics. One cannot doubt that Chinese elites aim to enrich themselves through professional activities, within the constraints of the system. For most Chinese IR scholars, this means, among other things, engaging in social and professional activities in ways that will not risk the economic security the socialist system offers them. Due to their different interest pursuits they follow the CCP’s party line in different ways.

Chinese IR scholars have produced a large number of works interpreting the CCP’s official terms on Chinese foreign policy. In general they follow the CCP’s main theme, i.e. nationalism, yet the author tries to show that there are variance and tensions in different groups’ views if one examines their writings.

The CCP’s political terms as to the nationalistic party line is rather mechanical while the way Chinese IR scholars interpret it is diversified, full of varied inner thoughts, displaying different social needs. In the early 1940s the CCP carried out the Yanan Rectification movement. The contest was most openly between the forces around Mao, his competitors at the top among the Soviet-trained “Internationalist Faction” around former party leader Wang Ming and the loose cannons in the theory and literary institutions of Yanan, most notably Wang Shiwei. Every faction tried to justify themselves with official formalised language, though from their own perspectives. Yet scholars find that even within the victorious and uniform Maoist faction there are at least three identifiable domains of discourse in which the term “revolution” has significantly different meaning.¹⁵¹

One can see this more clearly from cases in the Cultural Revolution, as this is the period when Chinese minds were extremely controlled by CCP dogmas and every Chinese was forced to recite Mao’s precepts (yulu). It is the basic rule to stick to the formalised language and then express your own idea. Yao Wenyuan, one of the Gang of Four, developed a prose style of debate widely imitated by the young Red Guards: “The method was, first, to declare yourself a defender of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong

Thought; second, to pose a series of accusatory questions about your target; and third, to expose it as yet another example of counterrevolutionary infiltration of the party.”¹⁵²

- Power Distance and Different Interpretations

Chinese IR scholars have different distances from the CCP’s power centre, thus they have different interest pursuits and take different approaches to the party line. There are different decision-making patterns according to different issue areas,¹⁵³ national interest concerns and power interaction; however, there are three basic patterns in China during 1989-2000 in terms of who has the final say: the leader in command, the collective leadership and the bureaucratic organization. It is true that the Chinese foreign policy decision-making system is undergoing three trends simultaneously: “pluralization, institutionalisation and professionalization”,¹⁵⁴ however, these three patterns are still effective. Chinese IR scholars differ in to what extent they contribute to policy output. Personal advisers mainly get involved with the former two, institutional advisers the latter two, official intellectuals the last one.

The author states that, in general, the closer Chinese IR scholars are to the power centre, the more radical, more sincere and truer they are, the more appropriately they apply official political terms; that across different groups of Chinese IR scholars, over security and political issues, there is in terms of intensity of nationalist sentiments an ascending order along the line from liberals to official intellectuals to institutional advisers and finally to personal advisers, while over economic and cultural issues an ascending order along the line from liberals to institutional advisers to personal advisers and finally to official intellectuals (As personal and institutional advisers have in terms of nationalism more economic and political and social stakes in security and political issues, while official intellectuals have more stakes in economic and cultural issues.); while within the same group of Chinese IR scholars there is in terms of intensity of nationalist sentiments an ascending order along the line from economic, cultural, political and security issues for personal and institutional advisers, and an ascending order for official intellectuals and liberals along the line from political, economic, cultural and security issues. (So one can see security issues are the top concern for all groups of Chinese IR scholars.)

Personal advisors have always been a group of individuals who are active behind-the-scenes but who are little known to ordinary people. They offer advice on strategies and work to consolidate the power of CCP leaders. They include people who work actively to perpetuate the rule of the party and others who seek to encourage the party to change in line with their own ideas.¹⁵⁵ Compared with other groups of IR scholars, they are more concerned with the Marxism-Leninism-Maoism part of Chinese nationalism and the effectiveness of the CCP's one-party rule.

They can largely ignore the formalised language in a physical way as they are entirely trusted by the CCP's paramount leaders and they share the same value and sense of destiny to maintain both the unity of the whole state and the party. In fact, He Xin's political life is closely related to Deng Xiaoping, Wang Zhen and Chen Yun; Liu Ji, Wang Daohan's fate is personally related to Jiang Zemin.¹⁵⁶

The author will discuss some important personal advisers here, namely, Liu Ji, He Xin and Deng Liqun. He Xin is surely Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Li Peng's counsellor, Liu Ji mainly Jiang Zemin's counsellor, yet Deng Liqun is regarded by many in the West as an Old Leftist who criticizes reform and open-door policy and is not close to Deng and Jiang. However, the truth is more complicated than Western scholars labelled him. As a well-known senior leader in the CCP, who used to be a member of the central politburo in the 1980s, he is in fact against the ultra-leftist party line, which comports with Deng Xiaoping's policy. As an authoritative Marxist thinker, he is very influential in the Central Party Policy Research Office that is made up of counsellors for members of the politburo. Teng Wensheng, the director of the Central Party Policy Research Office in the 1990s and Jiang Zeming's adviser, used to claim publicly that he is Deng Liqun's mensheng (private student). In some sense, he is considered by many as Deng Xiaoping's zhengyou (a friend that gives forthright admonitions). Therefore, the author regards him as one of Jiang and Deng Xiaoping's advisers, though he is not as close to them as He Xin, Wang Daohan and Liu Ji.

When they use these official terms, their writings following the CCP's party line are the most true and sincere among Chinese IR scholars. Personal advisors can sometimes express their disapproval against the current policy as they are entitled to point out what the CCP has done wrong and then offer constructive suggestions. They are allowed to criticize the CCP as they are regarded as *ziji ren* (one of us). Personal advisers can see all secret government and military documents.¹⁵⁷ Therefore in the Popperian physical world they enjoy most freedom, yet they are the most sincere in terms of inner world due to their high-level identification with the central authority.

Institutional advisors who do not have close personal relationships with party leaders have to accommodate the formalised language. After the decline of the Old Left,¹⁵⁸ they constitute the main force of the so-called Neo-conservatives in post-1989 China.¹⁵⁹ As opposed to other groups of IR scholars, they represent the more pragmatic force in Chinese nationalism, rather concerned with political stability.

Because they seek only policy adjustments, their views are easily accepted by CCP leaders. They typically do not exert their influence through pressure in the public domain and therefore they are able to interact with policymakers through internal discussions and private exchange of views.¹⁶⁰ In Jiang Zemin's era, they were involved in the debate over and drafting of many major policy initiatives.¹⁶¹ Some overseas Chinese are also regarded as members of this community. Penn State's Liu Kang is said to have political ties with top party leaders through the recommendation of his CASS friends.¹⁶²

In terms of inner world they are quite true and sincere, though less than personal advisers, yet they do not often use the CCP's foreign policy terms very appropriately. In their articles they always refer to the official terms to show their loyalty for the CCP's leadership, yet most institutional advisors need not justify their argument following the party line as they have to study practical issues assigned by the party and bureaucracies and provide policy proposals. CASS undertakes the task of providing advisory services for CCP leaders on many issues, particularly at times of crisis.¹⁶³ For example in July 1999, just a week after the government declared Falun Gong to be an "evil cult," scholars

in the CASS “were given marching orders to defeat Falun Gong.”¹⁶⁴ In this scenario they can remark in passing the formalised language and then put it aside. For the central party and several bureaucracies, what institutional advisors should contribute most urgently is practical solutions for foreign policy-making problems rather than to toe the party line.

Official intellectuals are the majority of scholars specializing in IR studies who mainly work with universities. Overall, official intellectuals have less of an impact on policy-making than research institutes, due to the fact that they tend to focus more on pure theory rather than on practical social and economic issues.¹⁶⁵ Conventional wisdom is that the party exercises its strict control over them by the power to allot funds needed to pursue most forms of education, teaching, research and writing.¹⁶⁶

In the 1990s there was an overhaul of the Chinese higher education system which greatly affected official intellectuals’ approach to the party line. A key initiative in the reform of the state higher education system has been the gradual introduction of a multi-funding model for higher education. Funding for education now emanates from a variety of sources including: Student fees; Central, provincial and municipal Government sources; Fee for service training programs conducted for State Owned Enterprises; As above for private companies and Joint Ventures; Grants particularly from overseas Chinese but also from local businesses; Aid funding; Attraction of fee paying overseas students; and Commercial activities such as university businesses.¹⁶⁷ For many key universities, central government support now represents only one-third of their budgets.¹⁶⁸ This helps them to gain more financial independence from the CCP.

Thanks to their newly gained relative financial independence, in inner world they are much less true and sincere than personal and institutional advisers, yet in terms of physical world, they use more frequently the CCP’s foreign policy terms. In terms of nationalism, the party line to which they still give at least lip service constrains their writings. Sensitive topics must be addressed correctly and carefully.¹⁶⁹ However, they can more freely express concerns with the part of traditional values in Chinese nationalism and with social stability in China. If they do not agree with the party line, they have three

techniques: avoid, divert the focus of or twist the party's formalised language. They could simply avoid sensitive things as much as possible and then shy away from offending the party line. They could seemingly follow the formalised language yet focus on the subjects or ideas they prefer. They could also consult the party line yet twist the terms to the advantage of their own opinions. This method is more and more in the groove in the late 1990s. If they agree with the party line, they repeat and reify it from different perspectives.

Liberals in China are a minority and play little part in China's foreign policy -making.¹⁷⁰ In general, liberals' situation has improved in Jiang Zemin's era, yet their repression remains an important problem.¹⁷¹ Under Jiang, intellectuals who worked within the system were included in the decision-making process. However, the CCP did not set up a framework in the public domain for intellectuals to participate in the government decision-making process.¹⁷² This means that there is little chance for liberals to influence China's policy-making. Due to their distance from the power centre, they are among the groups that have benefited least from China's reform. Hamrin once said that they had to pay economic cost due to their lesser interest in the CCP's party line.¹⁷³ The NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy put Chinese liberals on the defensive and some liberals have even been accused by their colleagues of being traitors to the Chinese nation.¹⁷⁴ It is very hard for them to publish their research and they rely heavily on internet to make their opinions known. In their writing, they normally ignore official phraseology. The party always watches the liberals and occasionally puts right what liberals criticize.

However, one should bear in mind that many Chinese liberals are also very nationalistic, convinced that the US fears the emergence of a prosperous and stable China and will do anything in its power to "hold China down."¹⁷⁵ Some of them still mentally maintain their ties with the CCP. Many famous liberals used to work within the system and collaborate with the CCP. For instance, Hu Jiwei once agreed that the party secretary should decide to prohibit publication of critical issues, as he thinks it "not a bad thing" to withhold them.¹⁷⁶ It is hard for them entirely to cut their ties with the party's thought processes.

Defensive Response to US China Policy

This thesis opts for the case of China's nationalist response to the US China policy during 1989-2000 in order to illustrate the new nationalism in Chinese foreign policy. In the main, there are in the US two schools with regard to the American foreign policy toward China.¹⁷⁷ The first is called engagement, either constructive (comprehensive) engagement, or conditional engagement, which stands for maintaining contacts with China and accommodating China's rise one way or another;¹⁷⁸ the second containment,¹⁷⁹ which calls for isolating China as the US did toward the Soviet Union during the cold war.¹⁸⁰ Scholars like Oksenberg, Economy, Nye, Ross, Shambaugh, Lampton, Gregor, Anderson, Shinn and Khalilzad belong to the former; others like Zalamea, Bernstein, Munro, Gertz, Terrill, Thornton and Mosher the latter. Generally speaking, the US administrations since 1989 have carried out engagement rather than containment policy toward China.¹⁸¹

• Constructive Engagement

The term "engagement" is defined by explaining that the US pursues a policy of engagement because "it does not wish to isolate or remain isolated from China."¹⁸² It highlights the positive role of economic interdependence, common security concerns and international socialization in China-US relations. The objective of constructive engagement is to make the most of the continuing contact and China's inclusion in the international community in order to influence its internal policies. To some extent, the adoption of constructive engagement in US foreign policy is based not on the validity and strength of the argument for engagement, but rather simply on an assessment that containment would not be effective. Shambaugh, for one, argues that there is no real alternative to engaging China.¹⁸³

Constructive engagement is now and again criticized by some scholars and politicians, largely due to its ambiguity and falling short of people's expectations. It fails to let China comply with all US requirements, particularly in security and political areas.

- Conditional Engagement

Scholars like Shinn, Gregor, Anderson and Khalilzad argue for conditional engagement. They prefer a clear, moderate, rules-based, essentially empirical strategy toward China. They argue that the US government should make it clear to the Chinese that the US welcomes the rise of China, that the US encourages economic integration and political cooperation with China, while maintaining a strong military presence in East Asia as a fallback. A defining character of this school is their tough stance toward China in terms of military issues, advocating Taiwan's protection.

One can see clearly this toughness from the work published by James Shinn and some other scholars: *Weaving the Net, Conditional Engagement with China*.¹⁸⁴ They set ten principles for China, mainly focused on security issues.¹⁸⁵ There are four principles for national integrity: no unilateral use of offensive military force, peaceful resolution of territorial disputes, respect for national sovereignty and freedom of navigation. The disputes over Taiwan and the South China Sea are likely to be the severest test of these principles. There are three for military issues, namely, moderation in military buildup, transparency of military forces, and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They are largely aiming at the future development of the PLA.

Generally speaking, conditional engagement has indeed taken a harsher stance toward China than constructive engagement. Gregor even calls for recognition that China is a potential threat to the US though not at the moment.¹⁸⁶ Gregor therefore warns the US to be cautious and argues that the US should always be "in control." Scholars like him strongly believe that America ought to adopt a clear and tough posture regarding the future status of Taiwan. Facing the uncertain development of China, it serves US interests to maintain Taiwan's status quo.¹⁸⁷

- Containment

The containment theory is supported by few scholars and politicians in the US.¹⁸⁸ Scholars like Zalamea, Bernstein and Munro, Gertz, Terrill, Thornton and Mosher belong

to this group. Bernstein and Munro are regarded as two main proponents for this policy.¹⁸⁹ They argue that China is preparing itself to become the dominant power in Asia, in place of America. This action would run counter to two key American interests: preventing any single country from dominating the Asian continent, and maintaining American superiority throughout the world. Gertz has gone even further than Bernstein and Munro and forecast a comprehensive confrontation between China and the US in *The China Threat*.¹⁹⁰ He argues that China has a master plan to increase her stature and influence in the world. The first phase of this plan will concentrate on getting the U.S. out of Asia. Terrill follows Gertz and warns of a comprehensive confrontation with China as a new empire in East Asia.¹⁹¹ He believes, due to Chinese cultural superiority, China will never be socialized into the international community, playing a positive role.

From their observations, scholars in this school believe that the economically successful China has the potential to become more powerful and thus dangerous to US interests. The fear is that technological prowess will bolster Chinese nationalism. Therefore some scholars begin to attack the core of engagement policy, namely economic integration. Thornton criticized the US policy toward China during the past three decades for being instrumental in the growth of Chinese power.¹⁹² He contends that China cannot be a strategic partner with the US and that continued American economic engagement will help China realize what he characterizes as its hegemonic ambitions. In the eyes of these scholars, it would be much better to "do whatever it can to slow down China's rise."¹⁹³

- China's response

So how to interpret China's response to the US China policy? Realists like Gertz advocating containment see a China resolutely pursuing its power at the expense of the US;¹⁹⁴ liberals like Lampton see a China gradually integrating into the international community through economic means;¹⁹⁵ social theorists like Johnston see a China learning to become a responsible major power;¹⁹⁶ psychological/cultural theorists like Saunders and Shambaugh see a China misperceiving US policies.¹⁹⁷ Their theories well explain China's response respectively in security, economic, normative and perception areas, yet fail to comprehend China's US policy in a general picture. Their explanations

are strong in specific areas yet weak in others, and overall find China's policy self-conflicting.

The author suggests one can understand China's foreign policy better from a nationalist perspective and argues that China's response to the US is overall defensive: military balancing, economic integration, political buffering, cultural incorporation and reorientation, which can be shown from the CCP's nationalist views of the US and Chinese IR scholars' interpretations of them. This way one can see a general and effective picture of Chinese foreign policy rather than a self-conflicting one.

Nationalist interpretation will also help to explain better the nature of the engagement/containment debate. Though scholars in both engagement and containment schools debate the right policy choice toward China, they agree on the US role in the bilateral relationship: US in control. They both dismiss equal status between China and the US, assuming the stereotype teacher-student relationship between the two countries. Even scholars in the engagement school try to "teach" Chinese how to handle China's territorial issues, which is entirely unacceptable to most Chinese. In 2003 David Lai noted that both engagement and containment policy schools seek to change China into the image of the US rather than communicate with China on an equal basis.¹⁹⁸ In his view, this patronizing and paternalistic approach will cause the US China policy to fail. The author agrees with him and will demonstrate this in the main body of this thesis.

Methodology: Analysis of Formalised Language

The CCP's party line is like a haystack and by no means concise. To get to grips with the core of the party line, the author focuses on the party's official terms i.e. formalised language that has always been repeated in official documents. Therefore the CCP's party line will be conflated into formalised language and thus be analysed.¹⁹⁹

The author opts for formalised language analysis to interrogate the main intentions that drive Chinese foreign policy and Chinese IR scholars' consensus and disparities over nationalist foreign policies. Formalised language discussed in this thesis is different from

that advocated by Bertrand Russell in the first place and then developed by Church and Carnap.²⁰⁰ Rather it is in line with critical hermeneutics represented by Habermas.²⁰¹ It means a set of selected terms in ordinary language. Ordinary language philosophy, represented by philosophers Austin and Ryle,²⁰² rejects the view championed by Russell that philosophical problems should be addressed in a formalised language akin to mathematics.

There is an important parameter to describe ordinary languages. This is the degree to which the language embedding the concept or concepts is formalised. A language is formal or formalised if the rules of manipulation of objects that one deals with depend only on the “form” and not on their “human meanings”. The “form” here means simply the material carrier of the concept, i.e. a linguistic object, and can be regarded as Popperian physical world. The “human meaning” is the response to the object in the human brain. While “forms” are subjected to examination and manipulation, i.e. are objective, “human meanings” are subjective and could be different according to different people’s interpretation.

Formalised language is a language impoverished with a restricted code in which options of language qualities such as vocabulary, style, syntax trope etc. are much more limited than ordinary language. Wang Jisi calls it “code word”.²⁰³ As a political language, it can be shown to include only a selection of the many different kinds of statements, propositions and incantations.²⁰⁴

This method is applicable, as propaganda in China is noteworthy for its seeming uniformity in language and there exists in China a political lexicon that defines and restricts political discourse.²⁰⁵ This has a lot to do with how formulations are adopted as lines or guiding principles (fangzhen) and with the process of disseminating the orthodoxy.²⁰⁶ Schoenhals argues that this formation of strictly defined official language is the strongest means of political control in China.²⁰⁷ The government issues official lists of scientific formulations of phrases that imply a tight connection between the signifier

and the signified.²⁰⁸ Through these lists, form and content become one. Political loyalties are measured by the extent to which these terms are followed.²⁰⁹

Methodology: Comparative Analysis

The author agrees with Harding that Chinese IR scholars differ over a number of issues.²¹⁰ The question is how and to what extent they differ on the new nationalism in Chinese foreign policy. Bearing this in mind, the author employs comparative studies to analyse the Chinese writings. The main methodology of this thesis is thus comparative studies.

In general, this approach compares specimens or cases that are similar in some respects yet differ in others. The aim is to find out why the objects are different: to reveal the general underlying dynamics that allow and generate such a variation; why the objects are similar and to what extent they are similar: to demonstrate the attributes that different objects share. This thesis has two sets of comparisons. The first set aims to compare different groups of Chinese IR scholars' understandings of a set of CCP foreign policy terms, in terms of truth, sincerity and appropriateness. Truth refers to true reflection of the CCP leadership thinking, appropriateness refers to applying the CCP's terms to the appropriate situation, and sincerity refers to sincere intention behind the writings of Chinese scholars. The second set intends to compare these groups' response over security, political, cultural and economic issues to the CCP's formalised language. In this way the author tries to display different agendas of different groups of Chinese IR scholars in terms of nationalism and different intensity of nationalism among them as well as that over different issues in the same group.

(see the table as follows)

Truth Sincerity Appropriateness Security	Personal Advisers	Institutional Advisers	Official Intellectuals	Liberals

Politics				
Culture				
Economy				

Sources

This thesis intends to explore the dynamics of Chinese foreign policy during 1989-2000. As it is well known that one can hardly come by internal documents from the Chinese government, we do not know clearly what happens in the black box of the highest level foreign policy-making in China. In this scenario, the author largely resorts instead to open sources. Given the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime, the strict censorship carried out by the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP and the Bureau of Press and Publication, it is extremely hard for those ideas to be published that are not permitted by the CCP. Nevertheless, it is also true that behind rhetoric always lie perceptions that have policy implications.²¹¹ From these sources the author will demonstrate the disparities and diversities of Chinese nationalism.

The sources of this thesis are mainly from 4 areas. The first is a full range of Chinese books, journals, periodicals, newspapers, websites, speeches and newsletters relating to the topic. Most books to which the author refers have been published since 1989. As for periodicals, *Xiandai guoji guanxi* (Contemporary International Relations), *Guoji wenti yanjiu* (International Studies), *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (World Economics and Politics), *Zhanlue yu guanli* (Strategy and Management) are the main academic source. Given the increasing significance of academic websites on the internet, the author also draws on some well-known internet sources like www.dajiyuan.com, www.hexinnet.com etc..

The author has collected roughly 50 articles/papers for analysis for each of the 4 issues. Most pieces are focused discussions on a single argument concerning one issue but there might be cases that a paper/article covers two or more issues. In this scenario, the author puts the piece into an issue chapter according to the work's primary argument.

As for the party line, I choose two books as its official texts: one is Deng Xiaoping wenxuan (Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol3)²¹², the other is an internal document with limited distribution in China, Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought)²¹³, which covers not only Deng Xiaoping's but also Jiang Zemin's foreign policy thinking. The former is surely the canon of Chinese foreign policy in Deng's era, the latter represents a new starting point. The latter is prefaced by Jiang Zemin and Qian Qichen, edited by the CCP Small Leading Group of Foreign Affairs, promoted by the CCP's Propaganda Department and published by Shijie shishi chubanshe (World Affairs Press), the press owned by the Department of Foreign Affairs. It is widely considered as the most authoritative official document of Chinese foreign policy in Jiang's era. The author chooses those most frequently repeated terms – or memes – in Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan and Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought to summarise the CCP's foreign policies.

The second source is my formal and informal interviews, face to face or by phone, with a number of distinguished Chinese scholars such as Liang Shoude, Feng Tejun, Wang Jisi, Wang Yizhou, Song Xinning, Chu Shulong and Yan Xuetong. Given the unique political culture in China, where some scholars might not say what they really think, which would discount to a certain degree the credibility of the interviews, I treat them with discretion and regard them as a supportive means. The third source is a variety of English books and papers in relation to Nationalism, Chinese foreign policy and US-China relations I have used at the LSE library.

In addition to these three, I use some of my lecture notes taken at Renmin University when I was a student in China. After consulting some scholars, including Chu Shulong, now a famous researcher at Qinghua University and then a lecturer at Renmin University, I am permitted to apply their unpublished ideas to my thesis.

Structure of Thesis

This chapter discusses issues with regard to basic questions and arguments, theoretical perspectives, definitions of key concepts and methodology of the study. Chapters II, III,

IV, V focus on the case of China's response to the US engagement, analyse respectively Chinese nationalistic views on the US approach to China in respect of security, political, cultural and economic issues. The author tries to explain through comparative studies how Chinese IR scholars, under the guidance of the CCP, respond to America's China policy, how they individually interpret the official text, particularly the CCP's formalised language, in their own way and the convergence and difference of their views. The last chapter sums up my findings, discusses possible implications and provides some concluding remarks.

Notes

¹ Johnston suggests that different groups of Chinese have different degree of nationalist sentiment and recommends further research. See A. I Johnston, 'The Correlates of Nationalism in Beijing Public Opinion 1998-2002,' IDSS working paper, 2003, pp. 1-22.

² Lucian Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics* (Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 12-16.

³ Ted Osius, 'Discussion of "The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes"', *Journal of Contemporary China* (2001), 10(26), 41-44; see also Robert G. Sutter, *Chinese Policy Priorities and Their Implications for the United States* (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

⁴ Important works include: John K. Fairbank (ed.), *The Chinese World Order* (Harvard University Press, 1968); Michael H. Hunt, 'Chinese Foreign Relations in Historical perspective,' in Harry Harding, (ed.), *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s* (Yale University Press, 1984); Harding, *China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao* (The Brookings Institution, 1987); Hunt, *The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy* (Columbia U.P., 1996); Lowell Dittmer, *Learning and The Reform Of Chinese Foreign Policy*, East Asian Institute Contemporary China Series, No. 20, 1999.

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⁶ See Allen S. Whitting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Stanford University Press, 1960), *Chinese Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy in the 1970s* (Ann Arbor, Center for Chinese Studies, 1979); Michael Yahuda, *China's Role in World Affairs* (St. Martin's Press, 1978); Gerald Segal, *The Great Power Triangle* (London, Macmillan Press, 1982); Kenneth G. Lieberthal, *Sino-Soviet Conflict in the 1970s: Its Evolution and Implications for the Strategic Triangle* (Rand Corporation, 1978).

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⁸ Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton University Press, 1995). See also Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (Columbia Univ. Press, 1996); Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999).

⁹ Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, 'Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings,' RAND, 1999; Bates Gill and James Mulvenon, 'The Chinese Strategic Rocket Forces:

Transition to Credible Deterrence', National Intelligence Council Conference, November 5, 1999, pp. 16-17.

¹⁰ Dittmer (1999).

¹¹ Levine (1994).

¹² See Stephen J. Blank, *The Dynamics of Russian Weapons Sales to China* (Strategic Studies Institute, 1997); Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future* (RAND, 2000); Avery Goldstein, 'The Diplomatic Face of China's Grand Strategy: A Rising Power's Emerging Choice,' *The China Quarterly* (December 2001).

¹³ Andrew Nathan & Robert Ross, *Great Wall & The Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security* (W.W. Norton, 1998); Blank (1997).

¹⁴ Lampton (Fall, 2003), pp. 37-48.

¹⁵ Ted Hopf, 'The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,' *International Security*, Vol.23, No. 1 (1998), p. 173.

¹⁶ Johnston (1995).

¹⁷ Wendt (1999).

¹⁸ See Katzenstein, *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe* (Ithaca, 1999); Johnston (1995).

¹⁹ See Segal, 'Tying China to the International system,' *Survival*, vol. 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 60-73; Mark J. Valencia, 'China and the South China Sea Dispute: Conflicting Claims and Potential Solutions in the South China Sea.' *Adelphi Paper*, no. 298. (Oxford University Press, 1995).

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²¹ Robinson and Shambaugh (1994), p. 43.

²² Whiting, 'Chinese nationalism and foreign policy after Deng', *The China Quarterly* (Jun 1995).

²³ Whiting, 'Assertive Nationalism in Chinese Foreign Policy,' *Asian Survey* , 23 (August 1983): 913-933; and Whiting, (June 1995), pp. 295-316; Erica Strecker Downs and Philip C. Saunders, 'Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Island,' *International Security* 23 (Winter 1998-99), pp. 114-146; Oksenberg, 'China's Confident Nationalism,' *Foreign Affairs* 65 (Winter-Spring 1986-87), p. 504; Jonathan Unger (ed.), *Chinese Nationalism* (M. E. Sharpe, Inc), pxvii.

²⁴ See Conference Report, 'Nationalism in Northeast Asia,' 30 April – 2 May, 2002.

²⁵ Zheng Yongnian (1999).

²⁶ Zhao Suisheng, 'Chinese Nationalism and its International Orientations,' *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 115 (Spring 2000).

²⁷ Shambaugh, 'Containment or Engagement of China,' *International Security* 21 (Fall 1996).

²⁸ Edward Friedman, 'Chinese Nationalism: Challenge to U.S. Interests,' in Stephen J. Flanagan and Michael E. Marti (eds.), *The People's Liberation Army and China in Transition* (NDU Press, 2003).

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³⁰ Ibid, 'PLA Conservative Nationalism' in Flanagan and Marti (eds.) (2003).

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³⁷ Smith (1991), p. 14.

³⁸ Thomas A. Metzger and Ramon H. Myers, 'Chinese Nationalism and American Policy,' *Orbis* 42 (Winter 1998): 21-37.

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⁴³ Regarding the reasons for this tragedy, see Ezra F. Vogel (ed.), *Living with China: US-China relations in the Twenty-first Century* (W.W Norton & Company, 1997), p. 24.

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⁵⁵ Song Xinning (2001), 10(26), 61–74.

⁵⁶ Interview with a source in the General Office of the Central Party.

⁵⁷ Oksenberg and Elizabeth (1998).

⁵⁸ John Derbyshire, 'Hitting the Great Wall of China,' *The Weekly Standard* (June 5th 2000).

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ See Geremie R. Barme, 'To Screw Foreigners Is Patriotic: China's Avant-Garde Nationalists,' in Unger (1996).

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⁶² Avery Goldman, 'Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival,' *International Security* (Winter 1997/98), pp. 36-73.

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⁶⁷ Osius (2001), 10(26), 41–44

⁶⁸ Yahuda, 'The Changing Faces of Chinese Nationalism: The Dimensions of Statehood', in Leifer (ed.), *Asian Nationalism* (Routledge, 2000), p. 22.

⁶⁹ Anderson (May–June 2001).

⁷⁰ Gellner (1983).

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⁷³ Deng Yong and Sherry Gray, 'Introduction: Growing pains—China Debates its International Future,' *Journal of Contemporary China* (2001), 10(26), 5–16.

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¹¹⁷ 'Xinhuashe dangzu guanyu 1953 nian xiaomie xinwen baodao zhong cuowu de qingkuang he jingyan gei Zhongxuanbu de baogao' [Report from the NCNA Party group to the Central Propaganda Department on stamping out errors in news reports in 1953], in *Xinhuashe xinwen yanjiubu*, vol. 3, p. 201.

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Chapter II China's Arguments on America: Security Issues

From this chapter onwards, I will begin to interpret, in the context presented in the introduction and based on the theoretical discussion I have made and the Chinese texts I have collected. Chapter II is on security issues arising out of US-China relations. I have collected over 50 articles and I concentrate on the Chinese writings on China threat (focusing on the security aspect), US-Japan security co-operation and the Taiwan issue, for the purpose of demonstrating nationalism in Chinese security policy and particularly the thin consensus reached among Chinese IR scholars over the CCP's formalized language as well as the tension among various groups.

China's security strategy between 1949 and the early 1980s showed considerable continuity, notwithstanding some dramatic international and domestic developments. Territorial control and great power status are the main themes in which one can find some strands of nationalism. During the period of 1949-1957, the Chinese security agenda was preoccupied with the safety of its territory. The military alliance with the Soviet Union was regarded as major security guarantees. A quick economic recovery was considered a security matter but it was second in priority to the country's responsibility in Korea.¹ "First and most important, after more than a century of conflict and occupation China wanted to preserve its territorial integrity. Second, recovery of the lost territories of Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet was a prime objective."² There is a consistency in the CCP's US policy. Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin have all looked at the US as their "archenemy."³ The root cause of the CCP leaders' animosity toward the US lies in their cardinal interests to maintain national integrity in order to maintain and boost the legitimacy of the CCP's one-party rule and their judgment that the US stands in China's way to reunite with Taiwan.

It does not follow that because Chinese security strategy has for long largely focused on territorial issues that it is static. Since the end of the Cold War, China has greatly changed its security concepts in line with the new domestic and international situation. In September 2001, Deputy Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant General Xiong Guangkai referred to the concept in a speech on China's national defence. He stated that China

“advocates a new security concept with mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and co-ordination at the core and stands for the promotion of multilateral security and security cooperation”.⁴ Obviously China has moved on toward a more co-operative approach of security. In the West, this new concept of security has been regarded as a direct Chinese reaction to policies and actions by the US that the CCP perceived as threatening.⁵

Five changes have occurred in the new Chinese security approach.⁶ Firstly, emphasis on military security has been shifted to a more comprehensive package. During the Cold War, the Chinese understanding of security was almost entirely centred on military security. After the end of the Cold War, the role of economic factors has been heavily stressed.⁷ Secondly, China has begun to move away from the concept of “Zero Game” and accepted the concept of mutual security.⁸ Thirdly, since the end of the Cold War, China has gradually accepted the concept of multilateral security dialogue and co-operation. Fourthly, China has recently led the establishment of confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the Asia-Pacific area.⁹ Fifthly, Chinese traditional military thinking stressed non-transparency, yet China has now gradually accepted the concept of transparency since the early 1990s. China has published white papers on both arms control and defence and Chinese PLA Navy and US Navy warships have exchanged port calls.¹⁰

Nevertheless, what has not changed in the post-Cold War era is the Chinese determination that China’s territorial issues should be controlled by Chinese and not interfered with by outside force. CCP leaders “are not reluctant to use rhetorical threats or demonstrations of military force” in order to intimidate and deter those sensitive areas like Taiwan, the South China Sea, and Hong Kong.¹¹ In this way China aims to demonstrate its absolute authority over its citizens and territories as a sovereign state. In this scenario, some scholars deem that it is hard to say that China has reduced other countries’ worry that China might challenge the regional military status quo.¹²

To make sure of China’s absolute sovereignty over territory, CCP leaders are not afraid to balance the US military force in East Asia. They still take a deeply rooted hard realpolitik worldview that China needs “military operational power” to make the country

further stronger.¹³ To counter the US influence in Taiwan, China has insisted that it will not be dictated to by the US on who it can do business with and will decide whether to sell weapons or military technologies to countries like Iran, Pakistan and Libya according to its own national interests.¹⁴ This has led to some very serious conflicts with the US regarding ballistic missiles and nuclear technologies.¹⁵

Some US scholars have noted growing anti-Americanism, nationalism and irredentism in China¹⁶ and observed an attitude that US power was a threat to China's quest for national reunification, evidence of the difficulty of integrating China into the international community. These scholars call for checking rising Chinese power through an effective security arrangement in East Asia. The Chinese response is that security has thus become the paramount objective of Chinese nationalism.¹⁷ A wave of nationalism swept the Chinese intellectual class prompted by the fear of disintegration.¹⁸ Observing US China policy, CCP leaders believe that the US is building a ring of encirclement around China that goes from Japan and Korea to China's northeast down around China's eastern and southeastern seaboards through Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Australia and up to China's western frontier with India and Pakistan. CCP leaders are determined to keep China's territorial integrity, to reunify Taiwan yet fear that the US and Japan will block their plan through military encirclement.

CCP leaders claim that China's nationalism can be traced solely to the high-handed, insensitive or downright malign acts of the US.¹⁹ In the last few of years, a number of outbreaks of anti-Americanism in China have given voice to nationalist sentiments. In May 1999, when the US force bombed the Belgrade Chinese embassy, the Chinese government supported massive anti-American riots erupting throughout China.²⁰ Furthermore, in April 2002, when an American EP-3 surveillance plane and a Chinese fighter plane collided near the south China coast, CCP leaders blamed US aggressiveness. With apparent support from the party, Chinese internet chat rooms threatened to “teach the United States a lesson” in ‘World War III.’²¹ The new Chinese nationalism compels the US and its allies in the Asia-Pacific region to act vigilantly.²²

On the other hand, many Americans blame the CCP's external-oriented strategies for the new Chinese nationalism. They do not believe it is domestic-oriented. They claim, as nationalist sentiments and desires are moulded into a comprehensive grand national strategy, the Chinese leadership seeks to assure the Chinese people that China will rise to great power status by shaping the conduct of the international system rather than just responding to its conditions.²³ In their eyes, this will cement further the legitimacy of CCP's rule as it accommodates the desire of Chinese nationalists: to restore China's dominance in East Asia. China's economic growth has given CCP leaders more capabilities to affect the region, which gave rise to apprehension among its neighbours. In the early 1990s Southeast Asian countries began privately to view China as a threat.²⁴

This has alerted some Western scholars who do not believe China has "no further territorial demands" other than Taiwan. Mosher points out that China has always been an expansionist power.²⁵ In their view, the Chinese challenge to the current international order is inevitable. Liberal theorists argue that China will be successfully enmeshed by the West in the current international system through economic interdependence, yet realists do not agree. The latter argue that it is true that China has now woven into the world economy, yet "the effects of economic interdependence will also be unpredictable."²⁶ It does not naturally reduce tension in international relations. When assessing the emerging international order, Waltz points out that economic competition is often as keen as military competition.²⁷ Samuel Huntington concurs and says that the principal conflicts of interests involving the US and the major powers are likely to be over economic issues.²⁸ Many realists thus consider that economic interdependence benefits emerging powers in terms of relative power gains and hence might lead to new conflicts over economic and security issues. Given China's authoritarian regime and its rapid economic growth, many Western scholars are quick to suggest that there is an impending power transition in favour of China and that is likely to generate disorder in the current international system.²⁹

The point to make here is that so far the CCP's security policies seem to be focused on territorial sovereignty. The main objective is effectively to monopolize power, ensuring that the authority of the Chinese government over its territory is not limited by these

outside. Unlike people in the West, CCP leaders regard recovery of Taiwan and Diaoyu Islands and firm control of Tibet and Xinjiang as China's domestic issues. Covered by Westphalian ideas of absolute sovereignty, Chinese leaders believe that they can do anything they regard as right rather than being dictated to by foreign powers.

Currently, CCP leaders intend to create regional security conditions that provide the opportunity to increase domestically the relative capabilities of the Chinese to achieve national reunification; in so doing work to prevent the US from usurping China's rise and hence to boost the party's legitimacy. This is the main reason why CCP leaders on many occasions proclaimed in public that their focus in the reform year was economic development though they strove hard to improve dramatically the PLA's strength and prepare for an invasion of Taiwan. They know well national reunification cannot be achieved until Chinese economic and military power are strong enough.

To achieve national reunification, China views military power as the primary guarantor of "comprehensive security," while viewing and embracing multilateral diplomatic efforts as partial and conditional.³⁰ CCP leaders choose to take a low profile before China gains enough economic and military capabilities. This point seems to explain why China does not back down from its territorial claims over islands in the South China Sea while asserting that disputes concerning territorial issues might be set aside rather than settled in multilateral institutions as there is much more to be obtained in terms of relative capabilities by keeping the sovereignty question undecided.

CCP leaders deftly take advantage of the nationalist sentiments and link the party's fate with China's territorial agenda, in order to help ensure the stability of one-party rule, diverting attention from domestic concerns. Diverting the Chinese attention to security problems and the US threat in particular can easily lead to nationalist sentiments among the Chinese people. The CCP counts on this and uses it to buttress its legitimacy yet is afraid that this might turn the battery against itself: they continue to take the party's traditional way to control by guiding the people with formalized language. The Chinese elite need to use the party's credo to justify their arguments and even social status, though their political intentions might at times have come second to demonstrating their fervour

and of enjoying a feeling of powerful presence or “public happiness,” as one can see from how the Red Guards followed Mao’s words during the Cultural Revolution.³¹

It is on security issues that all Chinese IR scholars reach a narrow consensus in nationalism. Most of them agree with the CCP that China needs to take measures to balance US power over Taiwan. Different groups of Chinese IR scholars have different priorities among Chinese policies. Nevertheless, they all put security issues as their number one concern.

2.1 Chinese Military Threat

Theory of Chinese Military Threat in the West

On balance, China has remained self-constrained despite its sustained economic growth. Between 1978 and 1992, there were no militarised incidents between the US and China. Once in 1994 and twice in 2001, the US and China had militarised disputes regarding US reconnaissance of Chinese territories.³² In 2000, the Chinese also conducted further tests of their ICBMs in protest at the possibility of future US sales of advanced weaponry to Taiwan. Between 1978 and 1992, there were three militarised disputes between China and Taiwan, which were regarded as instigated equally by both sides. The levels of violence only included two raids and a threat to blockade.³³

None the less, whether China will take a co-operative or assertive strategy vis-à-vis the existing international system with its rising power has been a controversial issue since the mid-1990s.³⁴ Though China's domestic and foreign environments will certainly experience plenty of changes by the year 2020, many Americans predict that China will nevertheless become a multi-dimensional regional competitor by that time. Many began to doubt China's declaration that “China will never impose any military threat to other countries.”³⁵ In a public opinion poll taken in the spring of 1998, Americans feared a nuclear attack from China more than from any other sovereign state and second only to nuclear attack from terrorists.³⁶ During the presidential campaign, George W. Bush claimed that Clinton's characterization of China as a “strategic partner” should be replaced by “strategic competitor.”

Therefore, some US scholars recommend the policy of engagement and hope it can meet the possible changes that will happen in China in future. In this strategy, America would continue its co-operative economic and security activities in order to encourage China to continue to be integrated into the international community. Other scholars not belonging to the engagement school interpret China's growing strength in a different way and warn the Americans against a strong, defiant and bellicose power, with a number of them advocating containment policy toward China. Taking account of the mounting nationalism among the Chinese elite and the assertiveness of the PLA against the Taiwanese regime, this is understandable, standing in the Americans' shoes. Between these two camps comes a middle-of-the-road approach proposed by the RAND Corporation. It is a policy of conagement, a combination of engagement and containment.³⁷

The rise of China threat is closely related to this controversy. In August 1990, a Japanese professor wrote an article describing China as a potential adversary in security due to its economic strength and sustained development.³⁸ In 1993, Huntington published an article in which he argued that the fundamental source of conflict in the post-Cold War era will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic, but rather cultural.³⁹ His conclusion is that the primary adversaries of Western civilization are Islam and Confucianism, which might join hands to challenge Western values and power. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro published in 1997 a controversial book *The Coming Conflict with China*, which argues China would certainly soon become America's formidable rival.⁴⁰ Hailed by the *New York Times* as one of the most notable books of that year in America, not surprisingly, it has been translated into Japanese, German and French, as well as some separate Chinese versions. The CCP has surely noticed the explosive impact of this book and regarded its authors as the main advocates of China Threat theory. In 2000 Gertz argued that the PLA modernization in recent years, supported by a thriving economy and a parade of modern weapons purchased from Russia and others, has generated a rising China with a virulent or aggressive disposition.⁴¹

The new Chinese nationalism has contributed to the rise of Chinese military threat theory. Advocates of the “China threat” theory often argue that China’s Spratly policy is driven by a nationalist ambition to restore hegemonic power in East Asia. This link is also suggested by Valencia when he says that the CCP’s approach to the South China Sea is “the result of a rising tide of nationalism that seems to be replacing socialism as the preferred societal glue.”⁴² Segal also stressed this point when stating: “the Chinese regime copes with the internal consequences of reform by taking a tough stand on nationalist issues, hence Beijing’s active and vigorous pursuit of claims in the South China Sea.”⁴³

There are some Western scholars that do not think it is wise to suggest a Chinese military threat theory.⁴⁴ Roy argues that it must be recognized that China faces immense domestic challenges on the road to dominate East Asia.⁴⁵ These include rising crime and civil disorder, discontent among peasants who remain in the fields, a wave of uncontrolled migration of other peasants into the cities, widespread corruption among officials, separatist pressures in Tibet, Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang, and regionalism in the other provinces. Kim argues that China is a paper tiger.⁴⁶ In his view, the post-1989 government is paralysed by mega-crisis, multiple and interlocking crises of authority, identity, motivation and ideology. These have converged at a time when the CCP is facing challenges from ethno nationalistic movements of non-Han minority peoples in the strategic borderlands of Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia. In his view, China is a weak, if not yet disintegrating state, and it is premature to proclaim a China security threat. Yahuda agrees with him.⁴⁷ He deems that, in its foreign relations, as well as in its domestic affairs, it is true to say that, despite the enormous progress that has been made, many deep-seated problems remain and, for the time being, the region and the wider world have more to fear from a China that can act as a “spoiler” than from any dominance that a still relatively weak China could possibly hope to provide. Gordon Chang even warns in his book, *The Coming Collapse of China*, that one should turn more attention to a more realistic “China Threat” – the threat of collapse – than any Chinese effort at military transformation or military breakthrough capabilities.⁴⁸

Party Line

CCP leaders stress the fact that Chinese foreign policy in security is domestic-concerned and thus peaceful. They claim that there are two outstanding characteristics in China's current foreign policy: peace and independence.⁴⁹ Those who "deny" it are regarded by the CCP as conspiracy-driven. The official media condemns the "China Threat Theory" as an elaborate and sinister deception. A Beijing Review article even claims the theory was invented in Japan.⁵⁰

A strong sense of insecurity among CCP leaders is widespread and deep-rooted. Oksenberg states: CCP leaders "believe that foreign leaders tend to be reluctant to welcome China's rise in world affairs and would prefer to delay or obstruct its progress. They fear that many in the outside world would prefer to divide China if given the opportunity..."⁵¹ The CCP proclaims that China does not threaten any nation but rather is threatened by other countries. Deng Xiaoping said: "China did not invade other countries and posed no threat to them, but other countries threatened China."⁵² He also said: "China cannot be a threat to the United States and the United States should not consider China as a threatening rival. We have never done anything to harm the United States."⁵³ In Chapter III of *Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao* (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought),⁵⁴ there are 2 sections on security issues. To refute the China threat theory, it proclaims: "China is against hegemonism and also strictly restrains itself from becoming a hegemon...and we will not seek hegemonic status."⁵⁵ It also says: "Afterwards, Comrade Deng Xiaoping told time and again friends in the third world that China would not seek hegemony, nor seek to do it forever in the future while becoming developed."⁵⁶ It says in section 10 of this chapter: " It is of profound historical background that China is a power to maintain world peace and stability. The Chinese cultural tradition highlights all along *he wei gui* (peace is highly valued)."⁵⁷ This point has been echoed by the Ministry of National Defence in its 1998 National Defence White Paper that declares "the defensive nature of China's national defence policy also springs from the country's historical and cultural traditions. China is a country with 5,000 years of civilization and a peace-loving tradition. Ancient Chinese thinkers advocated 'associating with benevolent gentlemen and befriending good neighbours', which shows that throughout history the Chinese people have longed for peace in the world and for

relations of friendship with the people of other countries.⁵⁸ Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought) goes on to say: “China is a power to maintain world peace and stability, as China has never sought hegemony, has never got the ambition to expand its strength, and entirely carries out defensive national defence policy. The Chinese military spending has all along been kept at a rather low level, and neither has China established military bases nor sent a single soldier in a foreign country.”⁵⁹ It continues to say: “As the largest developing country in the world, China does not now threaten any country. When China becomes stronger in the future, it will not threaten world peace, but rather further improve the strength to maintain world peace.”⁶⁰

The official formulations are *zhongguo bu qinlue bieren, dui renhe guojia dou bu goucheng weixie, que shou dao waiguo de weixie* (China did not invade other countries and posed no threat to them, but other countries threatened China), *bu cheng ba* (not seek hegemony), *he wei gui* (peace is highly valued), *weihu shijie heping yu wending de liliang* (a power to maintain world peace and stability), *fangyu xing guofang zhengce* (defensive national defence policy), *junfei jiao di* (military spending at a rather low level), *bu dui renhe guojia goucheng weixie* (China does not threaten any country).

Zhongguo bu qinlue bieren, dui renhe guojia dou bu goucheng weixie, que shou dao waiguo de weixie (China did not invade other countries and posed no threat to them, but other countries threatened China) as said by Deng Xiaoping means China is the victim of the threat from other countries and not vice versa. *Cheng ba* (seek hegemony) means playing the tyrant by power or force,⁶¹ *Bu cheng ba* (not seek hegemony) means China would not go this way. *Fangyu xing guofang zhengce* (defensive national defence policy) means defensive national defence policy, which stresses two points: firstly, China does and will not adopt aggressive international behaviour; secondly, China has the right to build up a strong fortress to protect its territory.

Personal Advisers

Facing the Chinese military threat theory in the world, most Chinese IR scholars have made their responses. Personal advisers argue that Chinese military threat theory is a

malicious conspiracy conceived by the West and maintain that China should not be afraid of it and should take courage to protect its overseas interests. They have a great sense of insecurity and call for a more powerful Chinese army. They begin to suggest that China must make “systematic preparations” against the invasive war and military attacks unleashed by the US under any pretext.⁶² They believe that what matters most is not so much the growth of Chinese capability as how CCP leaders use its new military strength.⁶³

Personal advisers take advantage of the patronizing character of the US China policy and depict the US as hostile. Wang Daohan follows the term *bu cheng ba* (not seek hegemony) and says: “There are currently a number of people in the world...who spread China threat theory, deeming that Mainland China would become a threat to Asia and even the whole world...This is a theory with evil motives. Due to China’s national situation and the fact that Mainland China has socialist system, it is not likely that China will threat the interests of other states.”⁶⁴ This is exactly in line with what the Chinese Premier Li Peng stated, “The China Threat Theory is not an objective view. It was spread by anti-China forces in Western countries with ulterior motives to contain China.”⁶⁵ Wang claims that there is an anti-China theory held in the West and he uses the phrase “evil motives” to show how truly and sincerely he follows the party line. In some sense it was not appropriate for him to make such a speech as he was in North America at that time. However, he did say so without any reservation, so the most persuasive explanation is his strong sense of insecurity.

Liu Ji deems that China is not at all aggressive, due to the unique Chinese culture, and there has been an anti-China scheme in the West since the end of the Cold War which threatens China’s integrity. He says: “The time-honoured and unique cultural tradition of China is a force for [national] integration; it includes an ardent spirit of nationalism...As soon as foreign invasions occur, however, the nation will surely unite. China never initiates aggression....Yet China is inclined to powerful passive resistance to aggression...Therefore, this nation is sensitive to international currents of anti-Communism and hegemonic politics, and, when confronted with such sentiments, is prone to respond with a narrow kind of nationalism.”⁶⁶ Following the term *bu cheng ba*

(not seek hegemony), he also says: “China is a peace-loving country and this has been proven over thousands of years. China is a good-hearted nation...In modern times, China was humiliated once and again, and hence it especially cherishes world peace and friendship...This is the reason why China has openly announced that it will never seek hegemony. In conclusion, from any meaning and any angle, China cannot form a threat to any nation.”⁶⁷ He attributes this character to the nature of socialism.

Liu Ji has for long urged CCP leaders to increase rapidly China’s military power due to the current international environment to China’s disadvantage. He particularly points out US hostility against China. In his opinion, several generations of Americans grew up confronting definite enemies. Therefore, there is a sense of loss after the Cold War - a loss of direction in policies and in many aspects of work. Yet some long for the past and continue to think in accordance with Cold War logic. In so doing, China naturally comes up when they seek a new enemy.⁶⁸

Liu Ji publicly defended Chinese new nationalism during his 1997 US visit. It is quite unusual as he was in this visit treated as more than just an academic but rather a messenger of Jiang Zemin himself. Plus, most academics and politicians in the West regard the Chinese new nationalism as negative in the process of China’s modernization. Liu Ji’s arguments strongly stress the peace-loving nature of the Chinese people. He uses emotional phrases like “never”, “proven over thousands of years,” “a good-hearted nation,” “especially cherishes world peace and friendship” to display his high identification of the CCP’s terms like *he wei gui* (peace is highly valued), *weihu shijie heping yu wending de liliang* (a power to maintain world peace and stability). He also literally follows the CCP’s point that China does not seek hegemony (*bu cheng ba*). He believes that Chinese are “inclined to powerful passive resistance to aggression”, and uses the phrase “from any meaning and any angle” to strengthen his view that “China cannot form a threat to any nation.” Nevertheless, he tries to justify China’s move to increase its military power dramatically by hinting that some Americans treat China as an “enemy,” so apparently it is the US rather than China that should be blamed for Chinese military build-up.

He Xin's stance on Chinese military threat theory is more aggressive than Wang and Liu. While denying the theory, he argues that China has been "blocked" by the West in terms of international space and China should not duck the issue of China's overseas interests, as he is worried about the sustainability of China's economic growth.⁶⁹ He points out that domestic needs require overseas economic expansion which should be protected by stronger military capabilities. In his view, China is facing up to enormous population pressure, resources and environment crises which make China need to seek for overseas development for future survival. He claims that even increasing investment in resources and environment would deplete China's limited domestic capital and squeeze limited resources. Nevertheless, he asserts, countries such as the US "block China expanding overseas, block China using one way or another the world capitalist environment and expanding its economic scale."⁷⁰

In his opinion the Chinese should rely on a strong central authority backed by a world class army to promote nationalism.⁷¹ He Xin strongly recommends a more forceful security policy in accordance with China's rising power and resultant overseas interest needs. However, he also claims that China is not a threat to the world but rather a *weihu shijie heping yu wending de liliang* (a power to maintain the world peace and stability). In his opinion the expansion of China's power is and will be peaceful (heping).

Currently in East Asia, the power pattern is that China is a major continental power and the US the world's most powerful maritime power,⁷² which does not favour China's further development. He Xin's opinion has reaffirmed the CCP's acknowledgement that, given the large population and industrial centres of China's East coast and recalling the experiences of the Opium War, it is better for the PLA to have barriers at sea than ashore.⁷³ From He's writings and speech one can see that he truly and sincerely follows the CCP's party line on the Chinese military threat theory. He is one of the staunchest advocates for an invincible Chinese army to ensure China's security.

Institutional Advisers

Institutional advisers are not "freewheeling scholars" giving their personal views.⁷⁴ They have to follow the direction of the CCP and defend on the world stage China's stance on

Chinese military threat theory. They are more satisfied with the status quo than personal advisers and not so eager to see a heavily armed China. Following the CCP's term *bu cheng ba* (not seek hegemony) institutional advisers proclaim that China is a peace-loving country by nature and China is not a threat to anybody, yet few of them use as many emotional and strong words as personal advisers to show their nationalist sentiments and loyalty to the party.

Institutional advisers confine their writings to the framework of the CCP's guideline. Following the term *bu cheng ba* (not seek hegemony), Li Jijun, a veteran IR scholar working with the Academy of Military Sciences, claims that the building block of ancient Chinese strategic culture is "harmony between heaven and human beings". Apparently Johnston will not agree with him on this point, as he concludes that China's traditional strategic culture was a "product of superior military preparations, the application of violence, and the destruction of the adversary."⁷⁵ Li takes different views and contends that the content of Chinese strategic culture can be summarized in short as "peace, defence, national unity and being aware of but not like war."⁷⁶ This is his interpretation of formalized terms like *he wei gui* (peace is highly valued), *dui renhe guojia dou bu goucheng weixie* (no threat to any country), *weihu shijie heping yu wending de liliang and bu chengba* (a power to maintain world peace and stability).

Another institutional adviser, Yan Xuetong, agrees with Li on this, and he calls it "oriental pacifism".⁷⁷ Fairbank mainly held a similar idea as to Chinese strategic culture, as he thought that the Chinese mode of production in its feudal history produced a holistic way of strategic thinking. The holistic approach to national security has been characteristic of Chinese strategists since Sun Tzu who have placed relatively less emphasis on purely military considerations than on political, economic, psychological or moral aspects of inter-state relations and conflict.⁷⁸ Institutional advisers have happily accepted Fairbank's theory. They deem that the Chinese culture is mainly based on agriculture rather than commerce, so it has little compelling drive to access overseas markets, and accordingly little tradition of war for expansion, apart from some wars punishment of neighbouring countries that dare to challenge the dominant status of

Chinese rule. One can see that this view apparently runs counter to He Xin's proposal that China should give more attention to its overseas interests.

Most institutional advisers believe that, given the nature of "oriental pacifism", Chinese security policy in the past was largely defensive. Peng Guangqian says that, though there are millions of wars in China's 5,000 years' history, they were scarcely overseas invasions. The core of Chinese strategic culture is seeking harmony among nations and unity of the whole country.⁷⁹ He Xin appreciates Chinese past glory when it expanded its territory during the Han and Tang dynasties, whereas institutional advisers focus their interpretations of Chinese history more on periods when China struggled to maintain its integrity. From Peng's perspective, the history of war in ancient China was mainly one for national unity and against any invasions from foreign enemies and most Chinese strategic thinkers, of whom Sun Tse is the most well-known in the West, prefer prudence in war rather than aggression.

Peng repeats the CCP's formulation *fangyu xing guofang zhengce* (defensive national defence policy) and says that the focal point of Chinese national security is surely rather more defensive than offensive. Peng maintains that the most persuasive example to show the peaceful nature and domestic orientation of Chinese security policy, in his opinion, is Zheng He's famous overseas voyage to South-East Asia, India and East Africa during the Ming dynasty. Peng claims that Zheng He had a chance to colonize the areas where he had set foot, yet he refused to do so, following the emperor's direction to demonstrate China's great power and glory without force, which is clearly in striking contrast with the cruel colonialism of the West. Thus, his conclusion is that most Chinese rulers had in tradition "little ambition" to conquer overseas territories, but rather focused on national defence due to China's non-war strategic culture.⁸⁰ When he uses words like "little ambition" rather than "no ambition" he has shown less nationalistic sentiments than personal advisers' "never."

Apart from justifying the CCP's formulations such as *he wei gui* (peace is highly valued), *bu cheng ba* (not seek hegemony) and *dui renhe guojia dou bu goucheng weixie* (no threat to any country), through historical studies, institutional advisers hold that

communist China has certainly inherited the traditional peaceful and domestic-oriented security policy. Li Jijun argues that one of the main points of Mao Zedong's military thoughts is positive defence, which has completely guaranteed China's peaceful foreign policy, despite the fact that President Jiang Zemin indicated in 2000 that the PLA was seeking a greater capability.⁸¹ Li says that, since the founding of New China, the nature of China's military strategy has not been changed at all, and has always remained defensive, no matter how the world situation revolves.⁸²

Peng Guangqian agrees with Li about the peaceful security policy proclaimed by the communist China. He claims that, China's national defence has always aimed to counter foreign invasion, safeguard Chinese national unity and security, as well as defend China's sovereignty of its land, sea and air. Peng admits that New China got involved with 8 military actions though out of self-defence.⁸³ On this point, he is much more objective than personal advisers' emotional and nationalist positions.

Some institutional advisers claim that the enormous resources of China also contribute to its peaceful foreign policy, which is indeed a very weak argument and obviously clashes with He Xin's view. In fact, China will become a country that spares no pains to gain resources from every corner of the world, due to its rapid economic expansion and extremely low efficiency in utilizing natural resources. For instance, China needs to import one-third of its oil. In 2004 the Argansk-Daqing pipeline project failed to come to pass due to Russia's strategic consideration.⁸⁴ Chinese leaders were furious and very worried about the country's energy supply.

However, institutional advisers just bury their heads in the sand. According to their writings, China is and will continue to be a country free from lack of resources for good. Institutional advisers know that hunting for scarce resources is an important factor leading to a country's aggressiveness, yet think this argument could only turn the fire of some Chinese scholars against themselves. They turn a blind eye to the tough reality China is facing and claim that China, unlike Western European countries, is so big that it possesses nearly all varieties of strategic resources for a self-developed national economy. Therefore, China can depend on itself to become a superpower.⁸⁵ From this one

can understand how inappropriately institutional advisers follow at times the party line and how insincere their arguments are to some degree.

As for China's defence expenditure, institutional advisers try to justify the CCP's formulations such as *junfei jiao di* (military spending at a rather low level) and *fangyu xing guangfang* (defensive national defence policy) that Chinese military spending has always been kept at a low level. An important way to see if China is a military threat is to assess if it has the capability to threaten other nations. There have been numerous studies about the PLA. In the West, some see that China's priority and grand strategy is to develop the economy and to transform China into a great power in 50 to 100 years.⁸⁶ Much of the increase in China's military spending in recent years has been largely driven by China's need to reunify Taiwan.⁸⁷

Personal advisers seldom use figures to back up their arguments yet institutional advisers rely on figures and facts to support theirs. They try to be more "objective" than personal advisers. They claim that China's defence policy is always defensive and that Chinese military construction's focal point is safeguarding China's sovereign land, air and sea (Taiwan is surely the focal point). In this scenario, they claim that China does not need to raise apace the budget for its military forces, regardless of the fact that the PLA's capabilities are growing fast.⁸⁸

Many Western scholars stress the aggressiveness of PLA from the point of view of China's continuously increasing defence budget.⁸⁹ Peng does not agree with his Western counterparts. He has asserted that, compared with Western countries and even some developing countries, China's defence budget is actually quite small. He quotes the statistics of IISS and points out the fact that, in 1994, China's per capita defence expenditure was only \$5.3, the 87th in the world.⁹⁰ Li Jijun agrees with him and argues in favour of the Chinese position.⁹¹

Peng Guangqian tries to prove the westerners wrong in the case of the so-called "grey zone". He argues that it is true that Chinese military forces are supported by off-budget capital such as arms sales and agricultural sideline production income, yet, compared

with the total amount, it is very small.⁹² Peng cites SIPRI's statistics and points out that in 1993, China exported arms worth \$420 million, only 4% of that of America and 9% of Russia.⁹³ The fact that Peng does not use first-hand figures but rather secondary ones from the West shows the non-transparency of Chinese defence expenditure and reduces the credibility of his argument. His support for the CCP's security policy terms is thus not appropriate.

Though institutional advisers do not call on the Chinese government to switch too many resources to military force-building as personal advisers advocate, they do regard the US as a threat to China's national security. Wang Jisi and Yan Xuetong clearly warn the Chinese people to guard against the US.⁹⁴

Some institutional advisers have examined varieties of opinion in the West on Chinese military threat theory and doubt those scholars' motive. Wang Jisi believes that this theory intends to provide an excuse for America's containment policy toward China.⁹⁵ Wang argues that the Clinton administration's China policy was in reality a combination of containment and engagement. He regards only as propaganda the Clinton administration's official proclamation that his policy toward China is indeed constructive engagement. In his opinion, the Clinton administration was going to break ground for containment policy toward China yet had not enough capability and willpower to do so. America is surely inclined to put pressure on China, contain China's power growth and thwart China's rise on the world stage, yet, due to its fierce economic competition with Japan and Europe, the US has to maintain the existing communication channel and play along with China against its will. On the whole, his analysis of the duality of the Clinton administration's China policy has been accepted by other institutional advisers.

Therefore, in light of Wang's logic, for China there are two Americas: one is real, one purely diplomatic. The real America, from the very end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, pursued its own "selfish strategic interests"⁹⁶ and spared no pains to keep its hegemonic status in the world. Throughout the 1990s, the engagement policy toward China promoted by the Clinton administration, adopts a rather obscure strategy, proclaiming no direct target. Nevertheless, Wang thinks that, while paying lip-service to

friendship with China, many Americans treat China as the “potential threat” to the American hegemony in the 21st century. The US government does not say so in public, as it is wise enough not to go to the length of creating an enemy while America still has plenty of time to prevent it from happening. In his writings Wang uses words like “selfish strategic interests” rather than “evil motives”, “potential threat” rather than “enemy” etc., and tries to justify in an academic rather than an emotional way the CCP’s formalized language like *shoudao waiguo de weixie* (other countries threatened China) and “China cannot be a threat to the United States, and the United States should not consider China as a threatening rival.”

Through his examination, Wang Jisi contends, obviously China and America have “not got a solid building block” for their bilateral security relations.⁹⁷ Shortly after the end of the Cold War, the US national security strategy had no specific target, like a lonely hero who takes pains to find his rival.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, over time some Americans began to realize that, among many potential threats, China would undoubtedly stand out as a fierce challenger. In Wang's eyes, the US perception lies in the fact that the two countries have virtually clashing national strategies. With the steady gearing up of China's economic power, political influence and defence capability, many Americans would “unwittingly” treat China as a rival rather than a partner in the mid-21st century. Wang's conclusion is that, a stable bilateral relationship between China and America would either be written in water at times or simply become a wild wish. Deng Xiaoping said that China “cannot be” a threat to the US and the US “should not” consider China as a threatening rival, yet Wang's realist views actually admit there is a possibility that China might threaten the US due to a clash of national interests.

Official Intellectuals

The approaches of official intellectuals toward the US over China threat theory are more conciliatory. Their opinion is that, as long as China's national integrity can be maintained there is no need to fear the threat from the US. They argue that China should not provoke the US with military aggressiveness so long as the US does not severely challenge China's core security interests over territorial issues, particularly in Taiwan. Therefore they show less interest in a rush for military build-up than personal and institutional

advisers though they also believe China needs military enhancement to defend its security. Their basic idea is that, though security is China's top concern in a hostile post-communist world, China's security environment is not as bad as personal and institutional advisers have described, and thus it is not wise for the Chinese government to put too many resources in the PLA.

Official intellectuals follow the party's terms like *he wei gui* (peace is highly valued), *bu cheng ba* (not seek hegemony), *weihu shijie heping yu wending de liliang* (a power to maintain world peace and stability) and *dui renhe guojia dou bu goucheng weixie* (no threat to any country), in order to pacify the US and try to explain away China's increased military power. They believe that it is not necessary to sour the US-China relationship through aggressive security policy until the Chinese nation is united into oneness and China is strong and confident enough to overpower the US. They deem that overseas expansion will give the US excuse to take preventive measures to intercept China's rise. Therefore their views are more based on interest calculation than the CCP's party line.⁹⁹

Therefore, official intellectuals try to convince the Americans that China is still confronted with plenty of domestic problems, has no ambition to compete with the US for dominance in East Asia and that China needs a peaceful and stable international environment to safeguard territorial sovereignty, to further improve national cohesion among the Chinese people and to maintain a stable domestic environment in which people's welfare can be improved. They claim that seeking the stability of the world community and East Asia in particular is in line with China's domestic needs. In the case of Taiwan, they believe that it is definitely in the Mainland's interests to reunify it as early as possible, yet it is not worth attacking the island and getting involved in a war with the US which China is not confident to win.

To pacify the Americans, Qin Yaqing, a professor at the College of Foreign Affairs, following *he wei gui* (peace is highly valued) and *bu cheng ba* (not seek hegemony), claims that China is willing to take its responsibility and try to keep the stability of international order and international system, for the sake of its own sustainable

development.¹⁰⁰ Following *bu cheng ba* (not seek hegemony), Luo Yuanzheng contends that China's need for economic development has required that it would not put scarce resources into overseas expansion and offensive war, resulting in neglecting many of its domestic projects that need more attention. He says that it would take a long time for China to eventually arise, so, at least in the near future, there would be little chance for China to wage a war.¹⁰¹ His view apparently clashes with He Xin's argument that China should now expand its overseas interests and Yan Xuetong's argument that China should be ready to take Taiwan by force.

To reduce the apprehension among CCP leaders about the China threat theory in the West, most official intellectuals ascribe the emergence of China threat theory to IR theories arising out of US academia, so they try to divert the CCP's attention from the US government to US scholars. This approach surely discounts the sincerity of their arguments following the CCP's party line, because when Deng Xiaoping said “*dui renhe guojia dou bu goucheng weixie* (no threat to any country)” and “*shoudao bieren de wexie* (other countries threatened China)”, he was talking about governments rather than academics. This position is also distant from Yan Xuetong's view that China threat theory is linked with the US government. Yang Guangbin, a scholar at Renmin University, believes that the China threat theory originated from Western IR theories.¹⁰² From his research he has found that the hegemonic stability theory, balance of power theory and geopolitics theory in realism are, in terms of Sino-American relations, all pessimistic about China's rise; the democratic peace theory in liberalism regards China as a potential threat; multilateralists do not think Chinese behaviour to defend the integrity of its national security and territory is justified; economic interdependence theory is the only one that is optimistic about Sino-American relations yet most conservatives do not agree. His conclusion is that it is not suitable to apply Western IR theories to Chinese reality. He says: “The history of Western international relations is largely a history of expansion and competition for hegemony. It is hard for people living in this environment and with those theories arising out of this history to understand why a stronger China would not expand its power. As such, the theory of China threat emerges. We have to doubt the possibility that one could apply Western IR theories to analyse China.”¹⁰³ His

writing might lead people to perceive that it is the academics rather than its government that should be blamed, which is obviously a long way from the CCP's position.

Liberals

Liberals are basically not bound by the CCP's formalized language, yet it does not follow that they are not nationalistic. John Derbyshire once met up with He Qinglian, one of the most liberal intellectuals in China, famous for her relentless criticisms of Chinese government policy. Her book, *The Pitfalls of Modernization*, has been translated by Lawrence Sullivan and brought her fame in the West. Derbyshire says that things went well until they discussed China's territorial issues. He was told, "Xinjiang had been under Chinese influence for thousands of years. It was now an inalienable part of the motherland. The same for Tibet, which my article mentioned en passant. How would Americans feel if Hawaii suddenly demanded independence?"¹⁰⁴ According to He Qinglian, China has been threatened by the separatists supported by the West. "Qinglian had a copy of my article and said it was disgraceful for me to use the phrase 'Chinese Imperialism'. China had been a victim of imperialism! How could China herself even think of practising imperialism? Disgraceful!"¹⁰⁵ He Qinglian's view is indeed in line with the CCP's terms *like zhongguo bu qinlue bieren, dui renhe guojia dou bu goucheng weixie, que shou dao waiguo de weixie* (China did not invade other countries and posed no threat to them, but other countries threatened China), *bu cheng ba* (not seek hegemony) and *fangyu xing guofaang zhengce* (defensive national defence policy).

From liberals' writings and speeches one can understand that there is indeed a big market for nationalism in China though it is initiated by the CCP. Even liberals believe that, "Given recent US-led attempts to...split China by some Western countries, China needs more than ever to unite and promote patriotism... The more patriotism is promoted, the faster China can develop; and the more closely the Chinese people are united, the more likely attempts to contain China will fail."¹⁰⁶ In their eyes, the new Chinese nationalism is an indispensable way for the Chinese people to hold their nation together, protect their identity and advance their interests in a turbulent modern world.

Conclusion

One can see from this section that Chinese IR scholars try to stress the fact that Chinese military build-up aims to protect domestic agendas. CCP leaders worry about the spreading of Chinese military threat theory, as it stands in China's way of realizing full national unity and modernization. They even fear that if the China Threat Theory gains more influence, the US will become so alarmed that Washington will decide to attack China in order to thwart China's rise and to preserve US hegemony.¹⁰⁷ It is the reason why scholars like Bernstein and Munro are bombarded without mercy by the CCP.¹⁰⁸

Following the party, most Chinese IR scholars claim that China is not a threat to world peace and China has been threatened by the US.¹⁰⁹ Obviously, it is over territorial issues and particularly the Taiwan problem that Chinese IR scholars feel the US threat the most. In this sense Stephen Levine is right to say that nationalism has become the most prominent informal ideology in today's China.¹¹⁰ Nevertheless, regarding Chinese military threat theory, on which there exists a strong nationalist consensus among Chinese IR scholars, one can still note apparent ruptures.

Chinese IR scholars have examined both history and current affairs and try to prove, under the guidance of the nationalist party line, that China has always been a peace-loving country. Generally speaking, China's words toward the US were modest and conservative in the 1980s,¹¹¹ yet it did not remain so in the 1990s, particularly over China's security. From the perspective of personal and institutional advisers, the reason Chinese military threat theory becomes out of the blue all the rage in the West is rather obvious, as some politicians and intellectuals in America, for the purpose of maintaining the American hegemony for good, conspire to target China as their enemy and prevent China's rise in the 21st century. Personal advisers call on CCP leaders to build up a formidable PLA to confront the US, institutional advisers are rather cautious and official intellectuals are apparently less interested in this appeal. Official intellectuals take a rather conciliatory approach to the debate on the China threat theory and try to pacify both the Americans and CCP leaders. They do not maintain that there is a consistent policy in the US government to treat China as a future enemy though they agree there are

hostile voices among US academics. Liberals are also concerned with China's territorial integrity yet they pay little attention to the CCP's party line.

2.2 Taiwan Issue

In this section, the author will show how Chinese IR scholars respond to the CCP's formalized language on the Taiwan issue. To the CCP, concerns over Taiwan are related to the issue of regime legitimacy. With communist ideology being seriously eroded by the newly emerging market economy, the call of Chinese nationalism under the glory of complete unification and nationalist revival readily replaced the ideology's dominant role. As a result, it reinforced the influence of nationalism on the CCP's Taiwan policy.¹¹² Many Chinese elites do not care about the decline of the uniform ideology, yet they do worry about the independence of Taiwan. The CCP is wise enough to take advantage of this apprehension among the Chinese elite and try to rally the population behind the party.

The CCP's policy on Taiwan has been closely tied to its interpretation of the domestic and international situation in the post-cold war era.¹¹³ The party knows it rules a turbulent society in a hostile world. To maintain its one-party rule in the post-Communist era, the CCP skilfully takes the role of the guardian of Chinese territorial integrity and puts the Taiwan issue as the highest priority in Chinese security policy. In some sense, it is fair to say the Taiwan problem has convinced Chinese elites of the rightness of nationalism.

Kane identified several fundamental principles that guide Chinese domestic policy. These principles focus on a robust approach to sovereignty, a determination to strengthen the ruling party and a continuing commitment to ideological distinctiveness.¹¹⁴ CCP leaders understand the importance of US-China relations and have tried hard to improve them,¹¹⁵ yet Chinese US policy is subject to these domestic principles. As the US protection of Taiwan has challenged Chinese sovereignty and thus the legitimacy of the party, it becomes the biggest obstacle in the bilateral relationship. CCP leaders have thus decided

on promoting nationalism to oppose the US “intervention in the internal affairs” of China.¹¹⁶

To date, the nationalist position toward the US over Taiwan has indeed been useful in helping the CCP regarding national cohesion, yet in the long run it will generate other problems. Externally, it will produce a “security dilemma” between the US and China.¹¹⁷ This dilemma is in large measure a function of the Taiwan question.¹¹⁸ CCP leaders cannot forsake military solutions, Taiwanese are prone to de jure independence instead of satisfaction with de facto independence and US primacists view the world in power transition terms. Domestically, it will raise public expectation on Taiwan and limit the leadership’s flexibility in policy-making. The party has been perceived to be capable of defending China’s core security principles and territorial integrity, which makes it difficult for the CCP to back down when necessary.¹¹⁹ High public expectation has its psychological impact on Chinese policymakers as well. It could drive CCP leaders to make irrational strategic decisions in ways difficult for Western scholars and politicians to anticipate.¹²⁰

No Chinese leader, communist or liberal, can afford to be cast as *lishi zuiren* (a person condemned by history) for taking action that would permanently split the nation; such an appellation would be a lethal blow to any Chinese leader attempting to establish himself domestically.¹²¹ Out of fear of Taiwanese independence, the CCP has consistently refused to pledge not to use force against Taiwan despite pressure from the US. Jiang Zemin stated in December 1992 that the “PRC will adopt resolute measures if Taiwan declares Taiwan’s independence.”¹²² The pursuit of independence would, the CCP claims, involve the risk of war.

Evolvement of Taiwan Problem

The Taiwan problem has always been one of the focal points of Sino-American relationships during 1989-2000. The Chinese territorial claim to Taiwan is largely based on its imperial history. Anderson deemed it bizarre that liberals (nationalists as well) like Sun Yat-sen also made “absurd claims to territories in various parts of South-east Asia

and Central Asia”, including Taiwan, based on territorial conquests of dynastic rulers, and “both the KMT and the CCP later took over this inheritance” at various times.¹²³

Due to the US involvement, the PLA could not entirely clear away KMT troops in China's territory. Chiang Kai Shek fled to Taiwan at the close of 4 years' civil war, yet managed to stand firm against all the odds with the US assistance. After the outbreak of the Korean War, the stalemate across the Taiwan Straits was fixed in the context of the Cold War. The Mainland and Taiwan belonged to opposite groups, the East and West, until the great debate between the Soviet Union and China was inch by inch brought to the surface.

The US and China made agreements in 1972, 1978 and 1982. At the time of the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, both the KMT and the CCP claimed that they represented China. Therefore the US acknowledged in the Communiqué that both sides of the Taiwan Straits claimed that Taiwan was part of China and that the US did not contest that view. In the normalization of relations between China and the US, negotiated in 1978, the US terminated formal official relations with Taiwan and replaced those with the Mainland. In 1982 the US announced its commitment gradually to reduce weapons sales to Taiwan. With relationship with the US amicable and relationship with the Soviet Union improving in the late 1980s, China did not believe war was inevitable any longer.¹²⁴

Nevertheless, after the Soviet bloc in Europe unexpectedly collapsed, Taiwan became a flashpoint for China and the US. With its amazingly continuous and strong economic growth, China was getting more confident of its capability to take over Taiwan by fair means or even foul. However, the CCP claims that China could not move much closer to its aim to unify Taiwan on account of the US backup for the Taiwanese regime.

On the other hand, Taiwan's internal situation has greatly changed since Li Denghui became the president. Taiwan was for long under the KMT's authoritarian control.¹²⁵ In 1991 Taiwan terminated the “period of mobilization against communist rebellion”, marking an end to the aim of retaking the Mainland by force. This move indicated a fundamental shift in Taiwan's policy toward China.¹²⁶ The Taiwanese authority claimed

to represent only the people of Taiwan. Once democracy took root in Taiwan after 1987, the “local” people gained more power relative to the “mainlanders,” the 15 percent of the population that had fled the Mainland in the late 1940s. Many local people had less interest in the Mainland and Li Denghui tried in the 1990s to lay the basis for increasing independence by stressing local culture.¹²⁷ The movement for Taiwan’s independence has been encouraged by Li¹²⁸ and eventually led to an administration controlled by the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party. Therefore the tension across the Taiwan Straits has been in ascendance and in turn Chinese nationalism has been running high.

In 1995 Li Denghui was granted a visa by the US to conduct a “private” visit to his alma mater, Cornell University. Although this was billed as a private visit, the US Congress had voted 396-0 in the House and 97-1 in the Senate calling on the US President to admit Lee.¹²⁹ The CCP’s reaction was intense. During July 1995, the PLA ostentatiously tested six different types of guided missiles in the waters around Taiwan.¹³⁰ It aimed to terrify Taiwan away from any thoughts of independence. In the following years, the military exercises conducted adjacent to Taiwan were also designed to deter Taiwan from taking steps moving toward independence.¹³¹

The developing crisis in the Taiwan Straits dramatically influenced Chinese perception of the US. They blame the US for the political change in Taiwan. A public opinion poll conducted in 1995 found that 87.1% of respondents believed that the US was the country “least friendly” to China.¹³² It is no surprise at all that *China Can Say No* was published that year, selling perhaps two million copies.¹³³

However, this is not the end of the story. Democratisation contributed to a growing sense among some Taiwanese that there were large and widening differences between the Mainland and Taiwan.¹³⁴ This sense was encouraged by deliberate government efforts, from the mid-1990s on, to create an independent Taiwanese identity through the promotion of local history and culture. The leadership in the 1990s and today, now under a pro-independence President, Chen Shuibian, tried to transform a growing awareness of different-ness into a growing awareness of separate-ness from an entity called China. The

effort culminated in 2001 in a statement by President Chen that China and Taiwan were two states on different sides of the Straits.

The rise of identity politics in Taiwan has contributed to the CCP's worry about the permanent separation of Taiwan and even the formal declaration of independence by Chen. The response to the Taiwanese challenge is military build-up designed to deter Taiwanese from supporting independence and stepped-up diplomatic efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally. These behaviours, in turn, have contributed to arguments in the US that China is indeed a revisionist state.¹³⁵

Taiwan in US Engagement Policy

Taiwan's argument for independence is not stronger than the Mainland's territorial claim. UN documents on decolonisation and national liberation in the 1960s were clear that they recognized the right of oppressed peoples to determine their future, but also protected newly independent states from further dismemberment.¹³⁶ That is, the right to self-determination has generally been extended only to those peoples who are subject to alien rule and who have few opportunities to participate meaningfully in their own governance.¹³⁷ International practice and international law does not recognize the absolute right of any social, political or ethnic group to sovereign independence.

The Taiwan problem between China and the US is not about the international norms of national self-determination. US foreign policy practice has always been ambivalent over self-determination of a people. During the Cold War, the US ended up defending French colonialism in Vietnam in the 1950s. The US does not support Quebec independence and intervened against Serbia's suppression of the Kosovar population but did not support Kosovo independence.¹³⁸ It clearly does not officially recognize the right to national self-determination and sovereign statehood for Native Americans.

To the US, Taiwan occupies the key position in its engagement policy toward China, as how CCP leaders deal with the Taiwan problem is regarded as the paramount test of whether China will challenge US dominance. Some US scholars and decision-makers regard peaceful reunification as the bottom line that China should not cross, otherwise

bilateral relations would probably go off the track. Many US scholars and politicians believe that the Taiwan issue could lead to the expanding of more grandiose “revisionist” interests in China and the appearance of more authoritative evidence of a renegade China, as the Chinese defence of its territorial integrity in an era of long-range high-tech precision strike means that the military operational perimeter has to expand outward and includes pre-emption.¹³⁹

In the framework of engagement, the US has committed itself to defend Taiwan. While, officially, US policy has been agnostic as to whether Taiwan and China unify or not as long as it is done peacefully and with the approval of the Taiwanese people, its policy has now evolved to the point where Taiwan is regarded almost as the functional equivalent of a “major non-NATO ally”.¹⁴⁰ US hawks like Kagan and Wolfowitz have already begun to compare China’s rise with the rise of other revisionist states such as fascist Japan and Wilhelmine Germany.¹⁴¹ Moderatists like James Shinn contend that striking the Taiwan regime by force would be a blatant violation.¹⁴²

In the eyes of the CCP, engagement is supposed to accommodate rather than thwart China’s rise. Nevertheless, the US is applying such international principles as James Shinn has suggested to Taiwan, which is not a sovereign state, and meddles in China’s internal affairs. CCP leaders are especially concerned that the US will provide Taiwan with theatre missile defence (TMD) that will encourage pro-independence forces and re-establish the U.S.-Taiwan defence treaty on a de facto basis.¹⁴³ The understanding of CCP leaders is that what the Americans are doing is absolutely opposite to what they have claimed. They claim that China will not rise in real sense until the whole country is reunited.

Party Line

Top CCP leaders put the Taiwan problem at the core of the new Chinese nationalism and regard the US as the biggest obstacle in China’s reunification with the island. As long as China’s international identity is defined in terms of a nationalistic view of modern Chinese history in which Taiwan was ceded to Japan, a realpolitik perspective will prevail.¹⁴⁴ Deng Xiaoping surely belonged to thinkers of realpolitik. He believed that the

reunification of Taiwan is one of the most important components of China's resurrection and it is indeed an issue concerning Chinese national sentiments. Deng in 1984 made it clear to the Americans that China had changed its views on global strategy due mainly to the change in the U.S. attitude toward Taiwan.¹⁴⁵ Due to his influence, the Chinese realpolitik tendencies are infinitely preferable to the messianic versions of Chinese nationalism that might come to the fore if the US regards China as an enemy.¹⁴⁶

Deng himself employed strongly emotional nationalistic words in his discourse over the Taiwan issue. Deng said: "Our compatriots on the Mainland, those in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao and the overseas Chinese, are all descendants of the Chinese people. We should all strive to reunify our motherland and revitalize our nation."¹⁴⁷ "First of all, it (Taiwan Issue) is a national question, a question of national sentiments."¹⁴⁸ "The reunification of the country has long been the aspiration of all the Chinese people...Ever since the Opium War, reunification has been the common desire not just of one political party or group but of the whole Chinese nation, including the people in Taiwan."¹⁴⁹

Deng demonstrated his anger over the US involvement in Taiwan. "The question of Taiwan is the main obstacle to better relations between China and the United States and it might even develop into a crisis between the two nations...There is a group of people in the United States today who, carrying on the 'Dulles doctrine', regard Taiwan as a US aircraft carrier or as a territory within the US sphere of influence."¹⁵⁰

The book Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought) says: " The nature of Taiwan Relations Act is to continue to regard Taiwan as the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the US, intending to keep to some extent the US-Taiwan security co-operation another way through means like selling weapons to Taiwan, to continue to interfere in China's domestic affairs and make the US-Taiwan relations a sort of official sense."¹⁵¹ It goes on to say: "It is Taiwan Relations Act that has caused the crisis of the Sino-US relationship."¹⁵² It also says: "...the Taiwan problem is the most sensitive and most prominent one of political principle. If it is not dealt in a proper way, it will become an explosive problem. With regard to such bitter fruit as the Taiwan problem, the Chinese people can not and will not

swallow it up.”¹⁵³ If need be, in view of the fact that the basis for the country’s peaceful reunification is seriously imperilled by the US, China will have to enhance its capability to defend its sovereignty and security by military means.¹⁵⁴

CCP leaders have no ambition beyond its current border. According to the party line, Taiwan is within its border and a historical loss waiting to be recovered. There is good evidence that military modernization programs, training exercises and doctrinal innovation in the PLA, particularly since 1996, are largely aimed at dealing with the Taiwan issue.¹⁵⁵ However, the party line has also shown the CCP’s obvious intolerance over the US interference in the Taiwan problem. CCP leaders concluded that the US was bent on using its unchallenged post-Cold War political and military strength to contain China with rejuvenated military alliances.¹⁵⁶ The Taiwan Strait crises of the mid-1990s confirmed uneasiness on both sides of the Pacific. In this scenario, CCP leaders decided to balance the US power in East Asia. Chinese General Xiong Guangkai sternly warned the US that in an age of nuclear weapons “Washington cares more about Los Angeles than about Taipei.”¹⁵⁷

The author will explain 7 formalized terms here. Firstly, *minzu qinggan wenti* (a question of national sentiments) demonstrates the CCP’s nationalist drive over its policy concerning Taiwan. Secondly, *meiguo buchen de hangkongmujian* (the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the US) means that the US considers Taiwan as a powerful and perilous weapon against China, and “the US attempts to use the Taiwan card as leverage in bilateral dealings and a strategic check on an ascending China.”¹⁵⁸ Thirdly, *ganshe zhongguo neizheng* (interfere in China’s domestic affairs) means China’s approach to Taiwan is that it is surely not an international issue and the US has no right at all to get involved. *Ganshe* means “to interfere against somebody’s will” in Chinese dictionary¹⁵⁹ and it tries to demonstrate China’s detestation of the US Taiwan policy. Fourthly, *zhengzheng zhaocheng zhong mei guanxi weiji de shi yu taiwan guanxi fa* (It is Taiwan Relations Act that has caused the crisis of the Sino-US relationship) means that the basic cause of the crisis in the Sino-US relationship is the Taiwan Relations Act and US involvement in China’s domestic affairs. Clearly, the CCP blames the US for the tension between the two sides. Fifthly, *zui mingan zui tuchu de zhengzhi yuanze wenti* (the most

sensitive and prominent political principle) means Taiwan issue is a principal one on which the CCP will not back down at all. *Yuanze* means in standard Chinese dictionary “that one’s words and behaviour should follow”,¹⁶⁰ and this term shows that China will not bow down over the Taiwan issue before the US though China would compromise with regard to other issues. Sixthly, *baozha xing wenti* (an explosive problem) means Taiwan problem could completely destroy the relationship between China and the US. *Baozha* means in Chinese “explode all of a sudden”¹⁶¹ and this term shows the Chinese worry that the Taiwan problem might evolve out of control and lead to war out of the blue. Seventhly, *tun bu xiaqu, buhui tun xiaqu* (can not and will not swallow it up) declares in a crystal clear way that China will solve the Taiwan problem in its own way and China will balance the US power in East Asia.

Personal Advisers

Personal advisers closely follow these terms and particularly terms like *minzu qinggan wenti* (a question of national sentiments), *meiguo buchen de hangkongmujian* (the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the US) and *baozha xing wenti* (an explosive problem), *tun bu xiaqu, buhui tun xiaqu* (can not and will not swallow it up), and believing that it is the US conspiracy to disintegrate China and the US has a grand strategy to carry this plan. They firmly support the CCP’s decision to balance US power. Taiwan is regarded by those personal advisers as a chessman of the US to fulfil this grand strategy. They have noted the closer ties between the US and Taiwan. During the latter half of the Clinton administration, the US DoD pressed for closer military coordination with Taiwan for the purpose of maintaining influence in Taiwan.¹⁶² Under the Bush administration, this coordination has been pushed not only by this consideration, but also by concerns in the primacist wing of the Republican Party about the Chinese challenge to US power in East Asia.¹⁶³

Wang Daohan has noted the US policy change and proclaimed that the Taiwan problem is entirely China’s domestic issue and should not be meddled in by outsiders, whatever the US domestic concerns. He says: “In modern Chinese history of over 100 years, the Chinese people sought for the complete unity of their motherland, fought against foreign forces’ schemes to separate and bully China, shedding their blood one after another, and

eventually made the Chinese nation stand towering like a giant in the East of the world.”¹⁶⁴ Here Wang is actually trying to justify a possible war across the Taiwan Straits, following the CCP’s terms *tun bu xiaqu, buhui tun xiaqu* (can not and will not swallow it up), *baozha xing wenti* (an explosive problem) and *ganshe zhongguo neizheng* (interfere in China’s domestic affairs). Wang Daohan warns the Taiwanese authority, “the problem across the Taiwan Straits will be ultimately solved by the Chinese on the two sides, and relying on external forces is like drinking poison to quench thirst.”¹⁶⁵ He not surprisingly refers to the US as a poison in the relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland.

He Xin firmly believes that the US involvement in the Taiwan issue is a conspiracy. On US weapons sales to Taiwan, He Xin says: “Its objectives seem to include...2, to intensify the military competition between the two sides across the straits, to obstruct the process of the reunion of the two sides, and encourage the trend and strength of the Taiwanese independence movement. 3, to become prepared to use Taiwan as a main base to contain the Mainland China and exert the US influence in Asia Pacific.”¹⁶⁶ He predicts that the US will further infiltrate in and instigate rebellion against Mainland China, with Taiwan being the bridgehead. He even claims that US Taiwan policy is a part of its grand strategy to control the whole world. He says that the US objective in the world is very much explicit and has not changed for over one hundred years, which is to rule the whole world. In his view, the general principle of the US strategy on China has not changed over 50 years and has been entirely consistent, that is to contain and disintegrate China, though at times appeasing during fighting or at times fighting during appeasing.

He is not alone in making this judgment on the US strategy. It is said that the CCP’s assessments of US security strategy over the past decade suggest that China does not view Sino-American tensions as limited to the Taiwan issue. Rather, the dispute over Taiwan is symptomatic of a broader US strategy to contain China and undermine the CCP’s authority.¹⁶⁷

Under this background, Liu Ji denounces the US involvement in the Taiwan issue, advocates balancing the US military force in East Asia and warns the US of a possible

bloody war. He says: “The Taiwan issue is entirely a Chinese internal affair, in the same way that no matter what happens in Hawaii or California is an internal affair of the United States. Therefore, the United States should not itself involve in the Taiwan issue. Not to become involved in the Taiwan issue is the most intelligent approach considering American national interests.”¹⁶⁸¹⁶⁹ Liu Ji tries hard to establish a nationalistic and positive image of the CCP: “The Chinese Communist Party and Chinese people have been entirely firm patriots, the proof is a history written in blood. Do not have any illusions on this issue. I think Americans understand this very well: American ancestors waged the famous Civil War to maintain integrity when the South attempted independence.”¹⁷⁰¹⁷¹ Similar to Wang and He, Liu Ji employs many emotional words, for instance, a history written in blood, to display his high identification with the CCP’s party line, particularly the term *tun bu xiaqu, buhui tun xiaqu* (can not and will not swallow it up) and *baozha xing wenti* (an explosive problem).

Institutional Advisers

Institutional advisers have always clung to the CCP’s formalized language such as *minzu qinggan wenti* (a question of national sentiments), *tun bu xiaqu, buhui tun xiaqu* (can not and will not swallow it up) and *ganshe zhongguo neizheng* (interfere in China’s domestic affairs), insisted and proclaimed in public that the Taiwan issue is China’s domestic affair and accordingly shall not fall into the hands of external forces like the US. They understand that this issue would become more complicated if countries like the US became directly involved. Therefore they also claim it right to balance US power in Taiwan. However, these scholars are fully aware of the US role in relation to the confrontation and sometimes brinkmanship of war across the Taiwan Straits. These scholars claim that the Taiwan problem certainly grew out of the US intervention in the first place, since the consistent existence of the Taiwanese regime surely relies on enormous US support and Taiwan’s long-time defiance against the Mainland is closely bound up with its strong ties with America in politics, economy, military and intelligence affairs. More importantly, they assert that the Taiwanese independence movement in reality took shape in the US, got stronger and more aggressive and pro-active with the support of some US interest groups. In short, like those Americans who believe that “the ‘problem’ is China, and the ‘solution’ lies in US policy,”¹⁷² institutional advisers blame

the US for this hot potato in China's agenda to rise up in the 21st century. Though they claim the US conspiracy in their writings, they seldom regard it as a part of the US grand strategy to dominate the world, and they seldom remind Americans of a bloody war, keeping a distance from the term *baozha xing wenti* (an explosive problem), unlike personal advisers.

They point their fingers at the US for the origin of the current dilemma. Most institutional advisers claim that the PLA could have occupied Taiwan if the US Seventh Fleet had not appeared at the Taiwan Straits in 1950. They proclaim that it is the US that prevented China from unifying Taiwan, to fulfil gloriously the plan of the first generation leaders of the CCP.¹⁷³

A famous IR scholar from Shanghai International Studies Institute, Yang Jiemian, is inclined to think that it arises from the need of anti-communist strategy that the US eventually chose to support Taiwan. He argues that the US always regards communist regimes as its most dangerous enemies. Yang Jiemian says: "The US administration decided to prop up the KMT authority retreating to Taiwan, due to the Cold War and containing communism...America's intervention directly gave rise to the Taiwan issue and the lingering problems henceforth."¹⁷⁴

Some other institutional advisers believe that geopolitics also play a great role in the US final decision to draw a line with the CCP and assist the KMT regime in Taiwan to survive with economic, financial, political and military means. Su Ge, working with IIS (Institute of International Studies), holds that the two documents handed in by Dulles and MacArthur respectively to the Truman administration which analysed the then East Asian situation from the perspective of strategy, were of great importance in helping Truman make up his mind to send out the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits.¹⁷⁵ According to Su Ge, Dulles argued that Taiwan was certainly one of the most ideal areas to counter the looming Soviet expansion in East Asia; MacArthur argued that Taiwan was one of the most important links in the US line of defence extending from Aleutian Islands to the Philippines. In his view, the US decision to send the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Straits was not at all a response to the Korean War. He says: "In fact, before the Korean War

broke out, America's policy-making group had been hatching a plot to separate Taiwan and sever China.”¹⁷⁶

Su Ge's analysis has been supported by some Western scholars' research. Robert Ross applied geopolitics to his study of the US-China relationship.¹⁷⁷ He deems that although the US is a global superpower, it is not the regional hegemon in East Asia. China dominates continental Asia and the US is pre-eminent in maritime East Asia. Nevertheless, the Chinese control of Taiwan will change the balance.¹⁷⁸

At the close of the Korean War, compared with the enormous resources the CCP could gain by its strength, Taiwan was definitely much weaker and at an obvious disadvantage to its rival. Most institutional advisers even think that Taiwan could not stand a good chance of maintaining its stability and getting rich without US generous and long-term assistance. Yang Jiemian stresses that the close relationship between Taiwan and America was of great importance to both sides.¹⁷⁹ From his point of view, protecting and strengthening Taiwan is, of course, in line with America's strategic interests while, for Taiwan, close ties with America has the most important bearing on its survival.

Institutional scholars claim that Taiwan's economic development heavily relies upon US capital, technology and market access. Their argument is based on the history they present. The Taiwanese authority had around \$1.4 billion economic assistance from the US, which provided a solid foundation for Taiwan's economic take-off in the early 1960s. During 1952-1988, US capital accounted for 60% of Taiwan's foreign investment.

According to these scholars, while US economic assistance paved the way for Taiwan to become fortunately one of the four tigers in East Asia, US military assistance provided Taiwan's most basic need i.e. a secure international environment against heavy odds. To the CCP, the close military relationship between Taiwan and the US is the stickiest issue in the Sino-American relationship. Yang Jiemian says: " The Taiwan issue is the most important and sensitive core of the Sino-American relationship, while military relations between America and Taiwan is the most important and sensitive one in the Taiwan

issue."¹⁸⁰ One could see that his view is surely in line with the CCP's term *zui mingan zui tuchu de zhengzhi yuanze wenti* (the most sensitive and prominent political principle).

1979 was a turning point for Sino-American relations, during which the US established formal diplomatic relations with China but passed the Taiwan Relations Act in its Congress, despite China's stern protest. Institutional advisers follow the CCP's formalized language like *zhenzheng zhaocheng zhong mei guanxi weiji de shi yu taiwan guanxi fa* (It is Taiwan Relations Act that has caused the crisis of the Sino-US relationship). Taiwan Relations Act certainly strengthened their minds that the US new China policy originated from consideration of tactics rather than a wholehearted reconciliation. They claim that the Americans well reserved their room to manoeuvre in China's domestic affairs thereafter.¹⁸¹

Institutional advisers became more concerned about military relations existing between Taiwan and the US after the end of the Cold War. In the mid-1980s, as no major wars were anticipated, the PLA was directed to prepare for local, limited wars on China's periphery.¹⁸² After the independence movement in Taiwan became rampant, things began to change. Since the mid-1990s China has been dramatically turned into the world factory packing in enormous foreign investment. Chinese military forces have in consequence greatly improved their striking capability as the central government is able to put more funds into the PLA's modernization and procure more sophisticated weapons from Russia.¹⁸³ With the unity of the whole country once again at the top of the CCP's agenda, institutional advisers assert it appropriate that the PLA start to prepare for a major war with the US and Taiwan.

Institutional advisers claim that the US has unceasingly geared up its weapons sales to Taiwan since the 1990s, which severely threatens China's security. They assert that Taiwan has become the No. 2 buyer in the world weapons market, only second to Saudi Arabia. The US is the main source of Taiwan's military equipment, accounting for 95% of its procurement as a whole.

Institutional advisers have seen the Chinese deterrent strategy against Taiwan threatened by US ballistic missile defence (BMD) technologies. With national missile defence (NMD) on the operational horizon, institutional advisers specializing in security call on CCP leaders to take more aggressive measures in nuclear doctrine and strategy.¹⁸⁴ The rationale behind a combination of US TMD systems that could protect Taiwan coupled with a US NMD programme is that this “layered defence system” could be a credible counter to a Chinese nuclear threat.¹⁸⁵ Thus institutional advisers accuse the US of using double standards regarding the Taiwan issue.¹⁸⁶

Institutional advisers claim that these are good evidence that the US tries to obstruct China’s reunification with Taiwan, observing the Taiwan Relations Act. “It obliges the United States to deter Beijing from militarily intimidating or invading Taiwan, to provide defensive arms for Taiwan’s self-defence needs...”¹⁸⁷ Taking account of these facts, institutional advisers seem disappointed with the force of the legal framework established between the US and China since 1972. Chu Shulong says that the 8.17 communiqué has so far turned out to be little more than a scrap of paper.¹⁸⁸

During the 1990s, many more institutional advisers began to feel fairly confident with China’s economic rise. Due to the humiliation exerted by the West in the past and China’s now resolute determination to rise up in the 21st century, institutional advisers are constantly beset by the apprehension that the US would somehow thwart this process with its pre-emptive forces. For some of them, Taiwan could become America’s wildest card to play against China because of its strategic significance. If Taiwan became independent, in the view of many Chinese scholars, America would without doubt quickly embrace it into TMD arrangement as a sovereign state. China would in this scenario become more threatened than at present, which could in consequence put China’s future stability at risk. It is due to this consideration that Yang Jiemian regards an independent Taiwan as a dagger stuck into China’s heart.¹⁸⁹

It is suggested that the Taiwanese independence movement is more related to its internal ethnic politics. The major cleavages in Taiwan’s political culture fall along ethnic lines, that is, mainlanders, Hoklo Taiwanese, Hakka Taiwanese, and, to a smaller extent,

Malayo-Polynesian aborigines.¹⁹⁰ However, institutional advisers contend that the Americans have fostered the Taiwanese Independence Movement as a conspiracy to contain China. The main evidence is that most of the forerunners of the Taiwanese Independence Movement were at large in the US and beyond the reach of the then KMT authority. They note the fact that many key Taiwanese Independence Movement organizations have indeed been based in the US for quite a long time. The DPP could not come into power until these organizations were allowed to return and hence provided crucial support for its rise.¹⁹¹

To institutional advisers, the US sympathy toward Li Denghui equals its official support for the Taiwanese Independence Movement. Nevertheless they differ over the driving force behind the support. Guo Zhengyuan contends that the Clinton administration's good-will gesture toward Li meant in some sense the US strategic adjustment in East Asia after the end of the Cold War. Taiwan falls perfectly into a part of this plan. Guo says that the US Taiwan policy change aims in a great measure to check China's power increase and thereby reduces if not avoids the possibility to get directly involved with a military clash across the Taiwan Straits.¹⁹² Su Ge mainly blames the US Congress for Li Denghui's Cornell visit and the tension between the Mainland and Taiwan thereafter. Su Ge argues that it is the pressure from Congress that forced President Clinton to allow Li Denghui's visa application.¹⁹³

Official Intellectuals

Generally speaking, official intellectuals follow the CCP's formalized language on the US role in the Taiwan problem and support the CCP's policy to balance US power in Taiwan, yet they prefer peaceful reunification with Taiwan and are more balanced toward the US than personal and institutional advisers. They try to blame Taiwan for the tension between China and the US and some even dare to point out the faults on the Chinese side. The case of Taiwan involves both international and domestic issues for all three sides.¹⁹⁴ The DDP believes that it is Taiwan's right to announce independence while the KMT does not agree. The CCP feels that China alone is entitled to be involved in its resolution, as Taiwan is regarded as an integral part of China. Because Taiwan has strong lobbies in Washington, the Taiwan issue is also a matter of domestic concern in the US.

Official intellectuals have paid more attention to domestic issues than personal and institutional advisers, even including faults committed domestically.

Some official intellectuals blame the KMT authority for the origin of the Taiwan problem.¹⁹⁵ They have noted that it is Taiwan that takes the initiative to ally with the US in military affairs. Some official intellectuals contend that, in the first place, the Taiwanese authority was in truth much more eager to establish bilateral military relations, one way or another, than the US. One could say it is quite understandable, as it is anyway about survival for Taiwan and a military blueprint for the US.

Official intellectuals have witnessed more aggressive international behaviour from Taiwan. They are alarmed by Taiwan's diplomatic efforts to gain more influence in the international community. Apart from Li Denghui's visit to Cornell University in 1995, these efforts included Li Denghui's nine-day diplomatic tour in early 1994 to Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand; his May 1994 visit to Nicaragua, Costa Rica, South Africa and Swaziland; and his April 1995 private visit to the United Arab Emirates and Jordan; and Premier Lien Chan's June 1994 secret visit to Mexico after an official visit to Central America. The Taiwanese international behaviour is so aggressive that Nye and Freeman advocated that the US discourage actions by Taipei that might leave China with little choice but to resort to arms.¹⁹⁶

In Sino-US relationships, the US Congress often takes a conservative line. It opposed the 1996 CTBT treaty, whose final form was in large measure a function of hard US-China bargaining. To begin with, conservatives in Congress rejected the notion that the US and China had any shared interest in dealing with global warming as a global problem. Conservatives also opposed the ABM treaty and any restraint on ballistic missile defence, setting up a major conflict of interest with China, whose nuclear deterrent benefited from the US-Russian agreement. Official intellectuals stress the negative role played by Congress more than personal and institutional advisers.

Zhao Baoxu from Beijing University tries to highlight the influence of the Taiwanese lobby on US China policy. The US has enormous economic interests in Taiwan, which

have been used by the Taiwanese to their advantage. It is suggested that the Mainland has dealt in a formal and poor manner with administration officials in the US executive, yet Taiwan has dealt in a far more sophisticated and nuanced manner, more with the Congress than with the executive.¹⁹⁷ Zhao points out that Taiwan's approach has been impressively successful. For instance, in the early 1990s, Secretary of Defence William Perry began a revival of the military relationship with China, but it quickly ground to a halt in the US Congress due to the Taiwanese lobby.¹⁹⁸

Zhao says that Taiwan has spent enormous funds in lobbying US politicians since the KMT forces retreated to the island. The Taiwanese authority invited US politicians to travel to the island, to have holidays there, to sponsor their research on Taiwan as well. For instance, James Lilley was sponsored by Taiwan's fund when he was working with the American Enterprise Institute as a resident fellow. He also says that the Lobbying Company of Cassidy played a crucial role in Li Denghui's Cornell visit. He tries to demonstrate that the Taiwanese authority has always desperately asked for US help, and Taiwan should be blamed for the tension of US-China relations more than the US.¹⁹⁹ This position is far from the CCP's party line.

Some official intellectuals boldly point out faults on the Chinese side as to the origin of the Taiwan problem. They have certainly noticed the Truman administration's initial hesitation to defend Chiang Kaishek by force. Yu Xiaohui points out that, to prevent the CCP from leaning entirely on the Soviet side, the Americans sent goodwill signals to Mao and Zhou, in order to test the water and examine the possibility that the two countries could somehow manage to co-exist in peace if not become friends. On Jan. 5, 1950, President Truman made a public statement and reiterated that Taiwan was an inseparable part of China. Unfortunately, Truman's olive branch did not succeed as expected, as Mao abruptly refused his offer to establish good relations between the two giants. Yu believes that it is due to Mao and Zhou's wrong decision that the CCP missed an opportunity to establish a stable relationship with the US.²⁰⁰

Li Yihu from Beijing University argues for peaceful reunification with Taiwan. He believes that the stalemate across the Taiwan Straits lies in the Chinese thinking style and claims that peaceful resolution will be possible if the CCP is more flexible.

Mainland China resolutely clings to its “one China” policy, yet Taiwan tries to develop a “two Chinas” policy within its current legal framework. It seems to him: “This antithesis has been shown in the fields of policy and practice, but the origin behind it lies more in the clash of the two sides in thinking and conceptions, so the political stalemate across the Taiwan Straits is due to the conflict or even clash of thinking and conceptions.”²⁰¹ He then calls for CCP leaders to contemplate compromise on the “one China” policy. Official intellectuals like Li have noted the huge price that the Mainland has paid. In recent years, China has banned mainland Chinese from participating in any international security discussions that include Taiwanese, as CCP leaders rule that even informal international discussions of security issues with people from Taiwan in the room would amount to a tacit recognition of Taiwan as a separate political entity.²⁰² Official intellectuals like Li believe that in this way China has missed many opportunities to allay fear and suspicion on the Taiwanese side.

One can see from this that official intellectuals show more willingness in peaceful reunification with Taiwan. Actually this position may be acceptable to the US.²⁰³ China seeks to establish extensive and intensive linkages with states that have overlapping and common interests.²⁰⁴ Nevertheless, due to China’s inflexibility over Taiwan’s involvement in international institutions, China’s effort to build up common ground with the US has been greatly discounted. Lack of flexibility has also led to misperception of the US policy over Taiwan. In 1998 Clinton suggested China should give Taiwan more international space though he adopted the “three Nos” toward Taiwan—no support for Taiwan independence, no support for a two-China policy, no support for Taiwan’s membership in international organizations on the basis of statehood, yet China perceived a strengthening of US-Taiwan ties.²⁰⁵

Some official intellectuals like Jia Qingguo and Zhao Baoxu try to emphasize that the influence of the US in the Taiwan issue is actually in decline as the US increasingly

needs China over time. Somehow they hint that the US role could become less and less important. Therefore they claim peaceful reunification will be more achievable. In fact, they maintain that the US role in the Taiwan problem is not at all as important as the CCP has claimed. Jia says: “With the rise of China’s comprehensive national power and international influence, the importance of Mainland China and Taiwan upon the US will demonstrate a bigger and bigger gap and the US would less and less sacrifice its relations with the Mainland China for Taiwan.”²⁰⁶

Zhao agrees with Jia and is confident of peaceful resolution. He claims that time is on the side of peaceful reunification, as China’s giant market and its co-operation on all international issues becomes more and more indispensable, whereas Taiwan’s important status in the US strategy will gradually become weakened.²⁰⁷ Due to China’s growing market, they believe that China can take advantage of the US pluralist politics, as US national leaders are influenced by an always divided policy advisory, checked by a divided government between President and Congress.²⁰⁸ Official intellectuals thus claim that measures relying on economic interdependence will avoid a major war between China and the US.

Their liberalist approach highlighting economic interdependence between China and the US is apparently distant from the CCP’s party line, particularly terms like *baozha xing wenti* (an explosive problem) and *meiguo buchen de hangkongmujian* (the unsinkable aircraft carrier of the US). They are more confident of peaceful reunification than personal and institutional advisers. Though they have not challenged the CCP’s political terms, they do not follow them as sincerely as personal advisers. Over the possible war across the Straits, they normally just avoid it or remark in passing and divert to another topic in their writings.

Liberals

Liberals are concerned with the reunification with Taiwan as well. Nationalism has emerged as a leading ideological current behind China’s drive toward modernization and even liberals are involved.²⁰⁹ Chinese liberals strive to achieve democracy in China, yet

they agree with the CCP's nationalistic position over Taiwan. They are not willing to sacrifice China's territorial integrity for their political ideal. This nationalistic desire for territorial reunification is simply "poorly understood" in the US.²¹⁰

The US policies toward Taiwan have appeared to Chinese liberals as an effort to weaken their nation. Fundamental to the modern Chinese worldview and identity is the belief that Taiwan should be returned to China rather than exist as an independent country. Liberals, including exiled Chinese democratic activists, stand by this view. For instance, Wei Jingsheng, who spent years in jail for criticizing the CCP, stated at a press conference on his arrival in the US, "Taiwan is a territory that belongs to China."²¹¹ Therefore liberals' views are unsurprisingly in line with the CCP's term *minzu qinggan wenti* (a question of national sentiments), despite the fact that they are against the CCP's one-party rule.

In 2004, two famous liberals, Wang Dan and Wang Juntao, were accused by the Chinese media as collaborators with the pro-independence DPP. They were furious and moved heaven and earth to clear their name. The CCP's intention was to link overseas Chinese dissidents with Taiwan's pro-independence activists in order to reduce the dissidents' influence at home and liberals dare not offend Chinese nationalist sentiments.²¹² Therefore their discourse cannot cut loose from nationalist flavour.

Conclusion

From the discussion in this section one can see, due to the Taiwan problem, that there are indeed strong nationalist sentiments among Chinese IR scholars that the US is anti-Chinese and a threat to the survival of China. The Chinese elite proclaim that the Taiwan issue is an entirely Chinese domestic problem and they are against any US interference. They deem it necessary to balance US military force in East Asia due to the Taiwan problem. The message of the Chinese elite is clear: when they feel that China's territorial integrity is threatened by the US, they will fight.²¹³

Almost all Chinese IR scholars identify with the term *minzu ganqing wenti* (a question of national sentiments), yet they have different approaches to *tun bu xiaqu, buhui tun xiaqu* (can not and will not swallow it up) and *baozha xing wenti* (can not and will not swallow

it up). Personal advisers think that the Taiwan problem will improve the CCP's image as defender of Chinese sovereignty. They claim that Taiwan is standing in China's way to become a great power, a long-time ambition, and the US is the staunchest backup for this island. In the eyes of personal and institutional advisers, in this scenario, it is utterly hypocritical for the Americans to label their China policy engagement, to openly announce that the US has no intention to hinder China's rise in the world. Most Chinese IR scholars from these two groups believe that what the Americans say does not hold water and that they just want to pay lip-service to China, covering their unhealthy if not evil motive to dismember China.

The logic of these IR scholars is thus: Taiwan's defiance against the Chinese central government, not least the Taiwanese Independence Movement, would limit, constrain, delay or even destroy China's agenda to rise in the 21st century. They believe that the US is virtually the only factor that China could not overcome to reunify Taiwan by fair means or foul, so it is, unlike what the Americans say in public, in reality carrying on its policy to contain rather than accommodate conditionally China's power accretion. Therefore, the US engagement policy is regarded quite naturally by personal and institutional advisers as a sort of containment. Personal and institutional advisers will not think of a powerful China in a real sense with the question of Taiwan still hanging over it.

One can see in this section that personal and institutional advisers closely follow the CCP's formalized language. Where they differ is that personal advisers are more concerned with the interests of the CCP yet institutional advisers more with the interests of the nation and personal advisers have demonstrated more nationalist sentiments with their war warnings against the US.

Official intellectuals prefer peaceful reunification and have hinted that the dilemma of the Taiwan problem was actually caused by the CCP and the Taiwanese authority. If they dare to go a bit further from their present stance, they would suggest the CCP should re-examine their One-China-and -Two-Systems policy. Their approach is more balanced and not as warlike as personal and institutional advisers. Official intellectuals have occasionally twisted the party terms, particularly *baozha xing wenti* (can not and will not

swallow it up), into a soft line. Liberals have different political agendas for China from scholars from other groups, yet they are also against Taiwan's independence. It is on the Taiwan problem that they have displayed strong consensus with IR scholars from other groups.

2.3 US-Japan Security Alliance

In the 1990s, the CCP tried to generate a substantial victim complex and crisis consciousness over China's sovereign integrity among the Chinese elite. Many CCP leaders insist that China needs a "strong government" to inspire the people with nationalism that will serve as a bulwark against outside threats.²¹⁴ The CCP intended to draw on a sense of insecurity to suppress public demands for radical political reform²¹⁵ and has increasingly emphasized its hundred-year history of national humiliation and territorial loss.²¹⁶ It has encouraged the Chinese elite to focus on the suffering that China endured in modern history when Chinese territorial sovereignty was encroached upon by foreign powers and Japanese jingoism in particular. Appealing to the sense of China having been victimized by foreign aggressors in the past centres on Japan, the most important foreign aggressor in modern Chinese history.²¹⁷ Chinese are not convinced by Katzenstein's argument that Japan has evolved to a non-threatening and peace-loving state.²¹⁸

In the post-cold war era, Japan-US security alliance has adjusted its direction,²¹⁹ yet not weakened, as some Chinese expected. In East Asia, the debate about the utility of US bilateral alliances and the presence of US forces is still on-going.²²⁰ The US has been strongly encouraging Japan to take on more military responsibility in Asia-Pacific area, in the framework of the Japan-US security alliance.²²¹ CCP leaders have become increasingly suspicious that a key motivation behind efforts by the US and Japan to reinvigorate the Security Treaty is a desire to counter the rise of Chinese power.²²² Therefore this security co-operation becomes the target of Chinese nationalism.

This section aims to examine Chinese IR scholars' interpretation of the CCP's formulations on the Japan-US security co-operation in a new era. I will firstly discuss the

Japan-US security alliance from the perspective of US engagement, the content of the Japan-US security co-operation in the new era and China-Japan relations over this topic, and then present the official guidelines and Chinese IR scholars' interpretations.

Japan-US Security Alliance in US Engagement

Many US scholars and policy-makers, including many in the engagement school, believe that economic engagement alone cannot guarantee China's compliance with the international regime. Thus, security engagement is put forward by them to complement economic approach.²²³ From the US perspective, it is a fallback to protect vital US interests where engagement fails to do so. To achieve this goal, the US has built up a solid military foundation in conjunction with its Asian allies. Countries like Australia, Singapore, and South Korea are all included in the new US military arrangement,²²⁴ yet Japan plays the most important role.²²⁵

In the Cold War strategic environment, the US deemed a military presence in Japan essential.²²⁶ After the Cold War ended, the Japan-US security co-operation has been well maintained. It now takes on the challenge to discourage Chinese military adventurism by making the cost of such reckless activities unacceptably high to hard-liners in China. It is surely not directed at China alone, but also designed to bind Japan tightly to a bilateral security scheme and allow East Asian countries to put faith in America's balancing role in East Asia.²²⁷ By remaining a formidable force in Japan, the US will look serious and fully committed in its effort to integrate China into the international community.²²⁸ This will overall add credit to the US engagement policy, in the eyes of East Asian countries other than China.²²⁹

Americans are basically at a loss as to how to reassure China that engagement is not subterfuge or strategic deception.²³⁰ So it is not surprising that a hedging strategy is viewed by the Chinese elite as more sinister and less driven by uncertainty about Chinese power than its proponents in the US and Japan claim. If the US and Japan use force to meddle in China's sovereignty and internal affairs like Taiwan, China will certainly fight a war against aggression, thus leading to a major war against the US and Japan.²³¹

Japan's domestic change has been conducive to the US engagement policy toward China in the post-cold war era. Japan witnessed many changes in security policy during the 1990s. During the Gulf War, Japan faced bitter international criticism for not doing more than paying some US \$13 billion to support the multilateral forces. Under the Shinichi Kitaoka and Matake Kamiya Murayama administration, the Socialist Party abandoned its long-cherished policy of unarmed neutrality and adopted the policy of maintaining firmly the US-Japan Security Treaty. Under the Hashimoto administration, the "Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security—Alliance for the 21st Century" was issued by the leaders of the two countries in April 1996. Under the Obuchi administration, the Diet passed the Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in situations in Areas Surrounding Japan in May 1999.

During the period of change, the turning point of US engagement policy was in February 1995 when the Clinton administration released a report on the US East Asian security strategy. The report, known as the "Nye Initiative," announced that the Clinton administration would maintain its military presence in the Western Pacific at the level of about 100,000 for the foreseeable future. The key point of the Nye effort relevant to U.S.-China relations is "to leave open the possibility that Japan would use its military forces to assist the United States in the event of American defence of Taiwan in the aftermath of a Chinese attack on the island-nation."²³² It was a tangible manifestation of a US initiative toward Japan motivated in part to alter policy thinking in China.

To some extent, the Nye Initiative locked China's perception of the US engagement policy and US- Japan security alliance in the new era. The Japanese suggested that the Japan-US security alliance should be strengthened, as it is "a hedge against unforeseen circumstances and events, including the future rise of a clear-cut enemy".²³³ However, the Chinese response is apparently suspicion. In the wake of the Cold War, CCP leaders expected that the US would have to scale down its military deployments in the region.²³⁴ This judgment seemed to be right at least in the early 1990s. By the end of 1992, US forces had withdrawn from South-east Asia. Nevertheless, CCP leaders doubted that US forces would reduce their presence in East Asia. The Nye Initiative confirmed their

perception that US phasing out of this region would not be the case and the Japan-US Security Alliance is now regarded as a threat to China's security.²³⁵

Japan-US Security Cooperation in New Era

In a time that saw the growth of distrust between China on the one hand and the US and Japan on the other, it is no surprise that the Clinton-Hashimoto declaration on April 16, 1996, aroused strong concern among CCP leaders. It claims China was not an issue for those involved in the discussions.²³⁶ However, CCP leaders were suspicious that the alliance was in practice anti-Chinese. When they saw the draft, they drew the conclusion that it was a strategic arrangement designed to counter Chinese power. In their eyes, it meant that Americans had made up their minds to continuously buttress Japanese military forces, despite a wide range of disputes arising out of the bilateral trade relationship.

The *Japan-US Declaration on Security* covers in detail 5 practical issues, and the third one is widely viewed as targeting China. In CCP leaders' view, the third issue of the new agreement is the most controversial. It is with regard to the expansion of the defending area that Japan-US security co-operation should operate. *The Japan-US Security Cooperation Guidance*, signed by the two countries in Nov. 1978, stipulates that the arrangement would include Japan, the Korean Peninsula and the Philippines. Nevertheless, the new agreement aims to include the adjacent area, which in the eyes of CCP leaders means to cover the Taiwan Straits. This rhetorical revision not surprisingly inflamed them and they accused the US of constructing an explicit anti-Chinese US-Japan alliance, as they believed that it aims to protect Taiwan if there is a war across the straits.²³⁷

Some Japanese scholars argue in defence of the agreement that the adjacent area means in truth the sea lane for Japanese oil transportation particularly those channels in South-East Asia, and also the sea lane in the Indian Ocean. If there emerged conflicts in these areas, Japan would be responsible to provide necessary logistic assistance for the US army in battle. Nevertheless, CCP leaders are still alarmed that the Japan-US security co-operation would in fact include the Taiwan Straits.²³⁸ PLA leaders are even more certain of this.²³⁹

China-Japan Relations

China-Japan relationship has always been troublesome. A typical case was the controversy over the war-time history between Japan and China. In the 1994 APEC summit meeting, Jiang Zemin had a meeting with Murayama and delivered a clear warning to Japan: “Militarism sometimes comes to the surface inside Japan,” and “Japan must reflect on its history and it is important that you educate your youth on this.”²⁴⁰ Japan has been accused of whitewashing its past crime in textbooks. Japanese politicians have been accused of jingoism due to their visits to the Yasukuni Shrine where the “Class A” war criminals such as Tojo Hideki are enshrined and deified.

With China’s rise in economic and military force, there appears growing mutual distrust between Japan and China.²⁴¹ The two sides even engage in war with each other in business, with nationalist flavour.²⁴² Japan is currently seeking a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. China is very cautious about this move. With the government’s acquiescence, more than 22 million Chinese signed an on-line petition opposing Japan’s bid since March 23 2005.

The Japanese response to China is tit for tat. The new edition of a social studies textbook for Japanese middle schools states the Diaoyu Islands, over which both China and Japan claim sovereignty, are a part of Japan’s inherent territory historically and under international law. Japan has felt uneasy about China’s military development. In October 1994, Japanese Defence Agency chief Tokuichiro Tamazawa told US Defence Secretary William Perry that Japan is “anxious about [an increase in] the transparency” of China’s defence budget.²⁴³ While China is planning to acquire more sophisticated weapons from the EU to establish its military advantage over Taiwan, Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, Hiroyuki Hosoda, said on March 25 2005 that the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China would be a “big problem” for regional stability, which angered CCP leaders.

The CCP supports the victim complex among the Chinese elite, trying to overpower the Japanese side in the bilateral relationship. A victimization discourse has occupied a key position in Chinese nationalism.²⁴⁴ CCP leaders claim the Chinese were victims of

Japanese jingoism in modern history and say only nationalism can offer China a haven from falling to the hands of Japanese imperialists again.²⁴⁵ Now the US tries to encourage Japan to boost its military capabilities in the framework of Japan-US security co-operation, it has become the target of the new Chinese nationalism on a par with Japan.

Party Line

Due to the fact that the Japan-US security cooperation is built on a solid foundation, CCP leaders know there is little hope for them to disrupt it. The most accurate way of describing the CCP's preferences about the US-Japan alliance is that it returns to its pre-1996 form and function, not that it disappears entirely.²⁴⁶ CCP leaders usually are careful to say that they oppose the strengthening or reinforcement of the US-Japan alliance, not the alliance's existence *per se*.²⁴⁷

Nevertheless, the point to make here is, more importantly, the CCP entails an “external threat” linked with Japan that bullied China in modern history, so that the party can readily incite victim complex and national crisis consciousness among the Chinese elite when necessary. This is the main reason why the CCP uses tough rhetoric toward Japan and the US-Japan security alliance though it understands, at least partly, the balancing role of the US in East Asia.

In public the CCP claims that it does not appreciate the US as a balancing power in East Asia through Japan-US security co-operation. The party claims that the Japan-US military alliance is a pre-emptive arrangement aiming to contain China, a conspiracy designed by the US to weaken China. The CCP is said to be highly wary of the alleged raging jingoism in Japan and deny the positive role of the US in constraining Japanese aggressiveness, but rather, believe that the Americans are encouraging Japan to seek a more pro-active military role in East Asia if not the world.

The official guidelines call on the Chinese people to guard against the reviving jingoism in Japan and appeals to historical lessons to be learnt from bilateral relations. Article 9 of the post-war Japanese Constitution states Japan renounces war as a sovereign right of the

nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. Despite this fundamental legal constraint, CCP leaders do not trust the Japanese government.²⁴⁸

Deng Xiaoping thus said: "...it is the possibility that a handful of people in Japan...may revive militarism there -- that is what the Chinese are concerned about."²⁴⁹ Deng also tried to remind people of what the Chinese people had suffered from Japanese jingoism in the past and the territorial dispute centred on the Diaoyu Islands: "At various times Japan occupied many parts of our country; for 50 years it occupied Taiwan...In 1937 it launched a full-scale war that lasted for eight years...Japan inflicted untold damage upon China...If we were to settle historical accounts, it would be Japan that would owe China the most. Since Japan was defeated, China recovered all the places that had been occupied. The only outstanding issue is Senkaku Shoto [Diaoyu islands]..."²⁵⁰

Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought) contributes in chapter 4 a section, Work to Develop Good Sino-Japanese Relations Generation after Generation, to the official position on the Sino-Japanese relationship. It starts with the importance of the bilateral relationship and then says: "...the main objective to stress history is learn historical lessons and make sure that past experiences, if not forgotten, become a guide for the future."²⁵¹ It also says: "...on the alert against the tendency of a handful of Japanese to revive jingoism."²⁵² To the CCP, the integration of a fully rearmed Japan into the US global alliance network would be a worst-case scenario.²⁵³

The three main formulations *riben dui zhongguo de shanghai wufa guliang* (Japan had inflicted untold damage upon China), *qian shi bu wang hou shi zhi shi* (past experiences, if not forgotten, become a guide for the future), and *jingtijunguo zhuyi fuhuo* (on the alert against the tendency that a handful of Japanese want to revive jingoism) aim to encourage victim complex and crisis consciousness among the Chinese people. *Qian shi bu wang hou shi zhi shi* (past experiences, if not forgotten, become a guide for the future) means in Chinese "to remember past experiences and lessons might become the reference for future behaviour."²⁵⁴ *Jingtijunguo zhuyi* means keeping alert against the danger that could happen.²⁵⁵ *Fuhuo* means that something dead gains life again.²⁵⁶ *Jingtijunguo zhuyi*

fuhuo (on the alert against the tendency that a handful of Japanese want to revive jingoism) tries to remind the Chinese people of China's modern history of humiliation and calls on them to face the danger around.

Personal Advisers

Personal advisers' views on Japan-US security co-operation are ambiguous and inconsistent, yet the main theme is clear: never trust both the US and Japan as they are the origin of Chinese security problems. To personal advisers the 1996 US-Japanese security agreements appear to have broadened Japan's strategic role in East Asia and to have provided US strategic support for Japanese politicians wishing to strike a military posture in the region less deferential to China than in the past.²⁵⁷ He Xin even warns of a possible war between China on the one side and the US and Japan on the other.

Wang Daohan appreciates Japanese economic achievement yet is on guard against its current security strategy to keep China at bay. His secretary, Zhang Nianchi, is often regarded as his mouthpiece. Zhang once said that the most obvious feeling of the Japanese to Chinese re-unification is fear and its the basic reason why Japan is glad to collaborate with the US in security against China.²⁵⁸ Wang Daohan is also famous in China for his abomination of Japanese arrogance. His view has long been in line with the term *riben dui zhongguo de sunhai wufa guliang* (Japan had inflicted untold damage upon China). When he was the mayor of Shanghai in 1982, he intended in the first place to invite Japanese corporations to help Shanghai establish its motor industry, yet was furious when Japanese partners refused to do so due to their negative judgment of the Chinese market. Wang then turned to a German corporation and tried hard to make the joint venture a big success in China. He said: "their (Japanese) attitude greatly hurt my national pride, so I told my associates to arrange my visit to Germany as soon as possible."²⁵⁹

As Ross observes, it is inevitable that the US and Japan will stand together against China because it is the only regional power likely to challenge the security status quo in East Asia.²⁶⁰ However, shortly after the Tiananmen incident, He Xin made a judgment that Japan could be used as China's partner fighting against the US hegemony due to the

disputes between Japan and the US over trade issues, regardless of the fact that Japan would not challenge the US security dominance. Though He Xin has always firmly believed that Japan's strategy toward China is not friendly at all and it seeks to disintegrate China as well, he believes that China could break down the Western sanction on China through an olive branch offered to Japan. Nevertheless, at the end of last century, there was a twist in his thought. He warned the Chinese authority that there would be possibly a war between Japan and China in the near future. In fact, his inconsistent views on Japan demonstrate that the CCP's approach to Japan is largely pragmatic and there has rarely been a clear and reasonable Japan policy in China. The CCP's Japan policy has been mainly based on contingency.

He Xin strongly believes that the Japanese strategy towards China is "divide and rule." He says: "I must point out that Japan, as with the US and other Western powers, is waiting for this situation to arise. Its ultimate objective is, first, to disintegrate China, and then incorporate selectively and gradually the pieces after the disintegration into a new world system, as an economic and political dependant."²⁶¹ However, He Xin also deems that China can take advantage of the clash between Japan and the US. He says: "The reason why the US pays particular attention to Chinese affairs is to keep alert and guard against the alliance between China and Japan, to constrain the rise of Japan and Western Pacific economic powers, apart from the tendency that China would potentially become a modern industrial power. Nevertheless, under the current situation where the world will face earthquake-like change, the Japanese and Chinese governments should, if they are wise enough, understand that they both face the US strategic threat and share a common lot."²⁶² He even says: "In fact, the US almost undoubtedly will focus on Japan as the next strategic target after solving the China problem. The US would probably mount a global movement to comprehensively squeeze, compress and restrain Japanese economic expansion."²⁶³

Nevertheless, in late 1998 he claimed that Japan and China could engage in another war and called on the CCP to become aware of the danger. He says: "Due to the Japanese despising Chinese military technologies and the enormous Japanese potential in the areas of military and high technologies, it is not impossible that Japan becomes

comprehensively militarised and jingoistized in high technologies. Japan has prepared this strategy in its society's ideology and public opinion. In Japanese high-level political and economic circles (particularly financial capitalists), there are deeply rooted right wing forces that have been paving the way for this. There is a great possibility that Japan and China would be at war in the future.”²⁶⁴ Obviously he follows the term *jingtijunguo zhuyifuhuo* (on the alert against the tendency that a handful of Japanese want to revive jingoism).

Personal advisers worry that Japan blocks China's rise.²⁶⁵ To counter the Japan-US security alliance, He Xin deems that it is applicable for China to collaborate with Russia.²⁶⁶ CCP leaders took his advice and established a regional security organization in conjunction with Russia. In 1996, China, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan established the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO). A sixth member, Uzbekistan, joined the group afterwards. The original Shanghai Five was established “for the express purpose of: working out extant border disputes peacefully...co-ordinating and co-operating about cross-border security due to the terrorist, separatist and criminal activities that had been plaguing each other in the border areas.”²⁶⁷ However, in the US it is widely believed that this organization aims to counter the US influence in Central Asia.

Institutional Advisers

The low level of contact between China and Japan after 1945 is a factor contributing to Chinese perception of Japan.²⁶⁸ Lack of understanding of Japanese domestic politics leads institutional advisers to perceive a militant Japan. Nevertheless, the decisive factor is the CCP's nationalistic guidance and agitation. Institutional advisers have followed the CCP's formulation *jingtijunguo zhuyifuhuo* (on the alert against the tendency that a handful of Japanese want to revive jingoism) and greatly denounced the Japanese jingoism and the US support for its revival. It is said that, facing the rise of China, in the eyes of political leaders in the ROK and Russia rising Chinese power is not as much of a concern in their security policies as it is for Japan and the US, even though in material structural terms they ought to be more worried about China's power gain, which underscores the problems with a neo-realist explanation for regional responses to Chinese power.²⁶⁹ Institutional scholars claim that the reason is understandable: the US and Japan

do not accept China's power increase. These specialists have noted recent changes in Japanese attitudes toward China and judged that China appeared likely to meet even more opposition and gain less support from Japan as it sought to expand its influence in world affairs.²⁷⁰ They claim that there is a conspiracy to contain China behind the Japan-US security cooperation, and the US is trying hard to incite Japanese jingoism. Nevertheless, few of them predict a war between China and Japan as personal advisers do.

Many institutional advisers assert Americans have a secret plan to weaken if not divide and control China. Wang Jincun says that Japan-US security cooperation is a part of this conspiracy.²⁷¹ Wang is not alone among institutional advisers to take this rhetoric. After NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999, popular nationalism ran so high that many college students took to the streets again, which was certainly unusual since 1989. From the CCP's perspective, the US was entirely guilty if not evil to do this, whatever motive it harboured.

It is against this background that, at the end of last century, institutional advisers began to promote a big conspiracy that was said to be forged by the US against China and other continental countries. Wang Jincun contends that waging a war against Yugoslavia is certainly the breakthrough and test field for the strategy of the US global military invasion. With hegemonism in mind, Americans find out that there are potential competitive rivals if not enemies, so the US authority tries to trade on its present economic, technological and military advantages to annihilate all the potential threats in embryo.

Wang says that it is with this in mind that the US has established its global military invasion strategy. It seems to Wang that the objective is mainly some continental countries like Russia, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, not least China, the only communist power with enormous economic and military capabilities. Targeting these countries, the US takes in the west front the policy of NATO expansion to East and South Europe; and in the east front, the US has finished its strategic encirclement of China and North Korea, through measures such as revising Japan-America security co-operation,

defining the new guidance, gearing up its military capacities in East Asia and South-East Asia, and constructing TMD projects in conjunction with Japan and South Korea.

Some institutional advisers claim that TMD is a crucial part of this project. Institutional advisers show their worries that the plan of TMD will be a major step toward deployment of a ballistic missile defence system to defend continental America, which will nullify China's nuclear deterrent capability.²⁷² They "stressed that US sales of TMD systems to Taiwan would cause serious and unprecedented disruptions in Sino-American relations."²⁷³ They note that containment against China that centred on TMD has begun to take place. Chen Chao says: "Following that (Japan-US Security Treaty), the US has promoted so-called TMD to Japan and South Korea...Specialists think that the objective of TMD is in fact China. America is also planning to include Taiwan into TMD...The situation mentioned above shows that the strategic arrangement of American encirclement and containment against China is carrying on as planned"²⁷⁴

With the conspiracy theory in mind, institutional advisers assert that the US is obviously trying to boost Japanese forces in order to check the rise of China, in its own favour. From the Chinese side, the best situation for its security is that the US would begin to reduce its military forces in East Asia yet Japan would continue to keep its peaceful constitution forced upon them by General MacArthur. Between a formidable yet stable force of America and a militant and aggressive Japan, undoubtedly the CCP would prefer the former. What worries institutional advisers most is that a number of US IR scholars and even its political leaders begin to consider cutting down its spending on military forces in Japan and in the same breath encouraging Japan to take on more security responsibility. The last thing CCP leaders want to see is this scenario. They prefer to see Japan as a lame duck economic power in East Asia.²⁷⁵

Gu Qingsheng's view is quite representative of the understanding of institutional advisers of so called "US incitement." In *China Can Say No*, a book written by some journalists closely related to CASS, he contributes an article called Americans Teaching Japanese Yes or No, which shows people his apprehension that the Americans would be trying hard to encourage jingoism which wrought immeasurable suffering on people in China in

the past. Gu Qingsheng maintains that many Japanese are still hesitant to abandon their present constitution and rely heavily if not completely on its SDF for Japan's security. Under present circumstances, the US policy is beyond dispute the most decisive. If the US carries its policy in the Cold War toward Japan and continues to keep the ghost at bay, Japan would still be a peaceful and constructive force in East Asia; if vice versa, Japan would surely turn out to be the greatest threat to regional stability, not least China's peripheral security. Institutional advisers claim that, for better or for worse, the US holds the key to the issue of war and peace with China. They claim that Chinese largely watch what the US would do to China and make their responses and adjustments accordingly.²⁷⁶ It is the same case in Japan's US policy.²⁷⁷ Therefore the US should be mainly blamed for the worsening of security environment in East Asia.

In this article, Gu refers to an academic discussion among three people: a US scholar, Morse, a Japanese journalist and a Japanese professor. The American Morse is portrayed as an evil instructor who intends to whip up the distrust of Japanese against China. Morse wants the Japanese to clearly understand that the target of Japan-US security and defence cooperation should be China. In his view, Taiwan is of more significance to Japan than the US, as far as their national interests are concerned. He argues that, if Japan continues to rely exclusively on the US for security, sooner or later, the economic and security system in East Asia would fall apart and hence put Japan's national interests at massive risk. Therefore, Morse encourages the Japanese to expand their military forces.

Morse comes out with a quite unusual argument that the Americans do not wholeheartedly respect Japan since it is not a normal country in terms of international law. He contends that Americans pay tribute to a country's strength, independence and accountability rather than full obedience. Gu regards Morse's argument as a sheer evil incitement against China. To Gu, it does not make any sense to say that the US respects China but not Japan because China is a powerful rival that competes allegedly with the US for dominance in East Asia and Japan has succumbed to US foreign policy. Gu says: "This sort of American-style education aims without doubt to incite the Japanese, who need America's protection and vie with Americans for interests as well, to clearly understand that America could get rid of this ally and contain Japan with its rival China.

Nevertheless, what is more in their minds seems to let Japan strengthen its national defence, learn defence economy model from America."²⁷⁸

Is it necessary for the Americans to be so on their guard against China? Institutional advisers like Yan Xuetong proclaim the US security alert against China unreasonable. Yan highly appreciates China's positive role as a balancing power to counter the dominance of Japan-US security alliance in East Asia and argues that China is not a threat to regional stability.²⁷⁹ In his view, the current asymmetric system in the Asia-Pacific is dominated by the US-Japan alliance. The rise of China will help restore a balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region and reduce the dangers inherent in the domination of just one power.

Official Intellectuals

In terms of nationalist sentiments toward the US-Japan security alliance, official intellectuals and personal and institutional advisers are in the same league, yet official intellectuals' views are much more balanced than those of personal and institutional advisers. They keep a distance from the CCP's term *qian shi buwang hou shi zhi shi* (past experiences, if not forgotten, become a guide for the future) and do not pay as close attention to the crimes committed by the Japanese in the past as official and institutional advisers. They twist the term *junguo zhuyi fuhuo* (the tendency that a handful of Japanese want to revive jingoism) into something like the Japanese aspiration for more international responsibilities. Due to this approach, official scholars like Shi Yinhong who argue for a softer line toward Japan have been accused by a number of institutional advisers as "traitors".

Official intellectuals accept the CCP's official line that Japan-US security co-operation targets China. Zhang Dalin says that, after the end of the Cold War, the target of the Japan-US security regime has dramatically changed.²⁸⁰ It used to be the Soviet Union, but now changes to the regional risk in East Asia, in the main against China and North Korea. Yet they deem it understandable from the perspective of geopolitical theories.

Many official intellectuals are interested in Nicholas Spykman, who saw three great centres of world power: the Atlantic coastal regions of North America, Europe and the Far-Eastern coastland of Eurasia. They hold that Spykman's theory remarkably suits US geopolitical interests, a crucial guidance to counter any great power arising out of Eurasia. From their perspective, Kennan can to some extent be regarded as a follower of Spykman. Kennan believed in the necessity of a tight containment of the Eurasian power from the peripheral area. Most official intellectuals claim that the US victory in the Cold War is virtually the success of this peripheral area theory championed by Spykman and Kennan.

From their perspective, the practice of the peripheral area theory has not come to an end yet. Official intellectuals argue that, though the Soviet Union collapsed, the US could not yet fulfil its ambition to control the whole world, since another continental power, namely, China, is growing stronger and stronger as the result of its cheap and high-quality labour force in the world market. In their opinion, in this scenario, it is indeed natural for China to be tightly surrounded by the US. These official intellectuals claim that the Americans are getting unsurprisingly worried about the coming challenge from China in the Asia-Pacific region, and China does indeed challenge the US dominance in Asia-Pacific region.

They also note that geopolitics play an important role in the Japanese perception of China. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, strategic thinkers in the Japanese government focused more on China's rising power as the key regional security concern for Japan in the foreseeable future.²⁸¹ Official intellectuals agree that Chinese control of Taiwan would alarm Japanese military planners, giving China a presence along Japan's shipping routes and abutting its Ryukyu Island chain.²⁸² The PLA's activities in South China Sea adds to this concern.²⁸³

They have noted the role of Japan's domestic politics in Japan-US security alliance. They agree that "a vast majority of the Japanese people came to share the understanding that their country must take on a greater security responsibility in proportion to its economic power".²⁸⁴ Political and generational change in Japan has diluted the influence of older

pro-China factions in the LDP and brought a younger generation into positions of political power that is alienated by China's use of the history card to bash Japan.²⁸⁵ With a growing role for NGOs in Japan's civil society and its foreign relations, there are now more voices inside Japan critiquing China from a liberal perspective on human rights. With the new change in mind, official intellectuals agree with Rozman about the contradictions between those advocating a "predominantly engagement" strategy and those supporting a "predominantly containment" approach which sharpened during the 1990s.²⁸⁶

Pang Zhongying, a scholar at Nankai University, acknowledges the change of Japan's domestic politics in China-Japan relations. He says: " 'perfect timing' of the global post-Cold War politics and the US super first class status in particular, 'right place' in East Asia where international pattern is under dramatic change, 'right support' from the new gradually rising nationalism among the Japanese make those who propose to do away with pacifism and establish a 'normal country' of strong military strength, well accepted in society."²⁸⁷ Generation change in Japan gives birth to new perceptions of international relations. For instance, these young generation leaders take different approaches to Taiwan. Li Denghui, a traitor in the CCP's eyes, is regarded as a grandfatherly wise man by many young Japanese politicians.²⁸⁸ Pang has also noted the Japanese perception change on regional security. He says: "The Korean peninsular problem has got worse in the last 5 years. In the era of mass media, Japanese nationals have 'personally' sensed 'security threat' from a neighbouring country that has nuclear weapons and missile-striking capabilities and they might readily believe the right-wing policy proposal that Japan must 'save itself in security' (strike North Korea in pre-emption)."²⁸⁹

Some official intellectuals even try to justify the Japan-US security co-operation to the advantage of China. East Asia is a region lacking international institutions. International institutional perspective is generally regarded as the product of neo-liberalism, combined with some elements of neo-realism. The international institutional perspective stresses formal and informal institutions formed between and among states to push forward co-operation and further their mutual interest for survival.²⁹⁰ If one looks at East Asia from this perspective, pessimism will prevail over East Asian security co-operation. Problems

such as weakness of regional security mechanism, short history in international security co-operation, salient conflicting rather than common security interest, diverse culture and lack of any sense of community etc contribute to regional instability.²⁹¹ Some official intellectuals begin to appreciate the positive role of US-Japan security alliance as a regional institution in East Asia. They agree that the alliance has both restrained and facilitated Japan's defence capability and its regional security role.²⁹² As long as the US presence is viewed as restraining Japan from pursuing an independent military capability, it will be seen as contributing to regional stability.²⁹³

Following the international institutional perspective, Zhang Linhong from Beijing University and Han Yugui from Shandong Normal University believe that Japan-US security co-operation has two positive points. Firstly, they consider that it could prevent the proliferation of mass destructive weapons in Asia that would weaken China's peripheral security. They deem that this is actually a common ground for China-US security interests.²⁹⁴ They also point out that Japan-US security co-operation is a useful instrument to keep Japanese jingoism at bay. They say that, while the core objective of the US in Asia Pacific after the end of the Cold War is to prevent the rising China from challenging US dominance, "the US could keep its influence on Japan, entangle it and guard against it becoming a dominant power on its own, through strengthening the security relationship between Japan and the US."²⁹⁵ Their perception is that China need not view the Japan-US security alliance as inherently hostile to its interests. "Under some circumstances they can be considered useful or at least harmless."²⁹⁶ Some official intellectuals have noted that the Bush administration "has been careful to balance its strong pro-Japanese slant with reaffirmation of continued interest in closer mutually beneficial relations with China designed in part to sustain regional peace and stability."²⁹⁷

Liberals

The Chinese image of the US and Japan has been in continual decline since the mid-1990s. According to the Beijing Area Study, a randomly-sampled survey conducted by the Research Centre on Contemporary China at Beijing University, the mean temperature towards Japan on a 100-degree feeling thermometer has dropped to 36 degrees in 2001 from 51 degrees in 1998. The mean level of warlikeness on a 1-7-point peaceful-to-

warlike scale attributed to the Japanese in 2001 was 4.2, to Americans 3.7 and to the Chinese people, 1.5.²⁹⁸ On certain issues relating to Japan, even Chinese liberals take a nationalist stance. They are not only against the CCP but also worry about the integrity of China's sovereignty.

Shortly after the Sixteenth Party Congress in late 2002, a famous liberal, Ma Licheng, published an article advocating the improvement of Sino-Japanese relations.²⁹⁹ He argued that Chinese had not adequately recognized antimilitarist trends in Japan and suggested that China and Japan should embark on a more co-operative path. Ma has noted that an unhealthy anti-Japanese hatred is widespread in China. Ma proceeds to a broader critique of the popular nationalism that emerged in the 1990s. Ma's solution is simple: "We need the generosity of a great and victorious nation and do not need to be excessively harsh with Japan."³⁰⁰ Arguing that "the apology question has been resolved," Ma urges both Chinese and Japanese to "overcome parochial views" and "look forward" in the bilateral relationship.³⁰¹ His article stirred a great deal of interest in both China and Japan, but the CCP has not taken any important initiatives to improve the relationship. Ma was kicked out of his unit "People's Daily".

Nevertheless, even a liberal like him does not make any concessions to the Japanese over the Diaoyu Islands. In an interview by nan feng chuang, he maintained that "our government's approach that China has a clear position and does not readily appeal to arms is right."³⁰² His opinion is that the Diaoyu Islands belongs to China yet the Chinese should settle this dispute with Japan through diplomacy rather than war.

Another famous liberal, Liu Xiaobo, has showed his anger over the CCP's repression upon Chinese people's rights to demonstrate their grievance over Japanese jingoism. He says: " Over matters like damage claims from Japan, fighting against Japanese politicians' visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, demanding the Japanese government's formal apology for its crime committed in WWII...only in China that was most greatly harmed by the Japanese invasion has the spontaneous rights-defending protest movement in society against the Japanese government been given the cold shoulder and oppressed all along by the CCP authority."³⁰³ He blames the CCP for not being nationalist enough.

Conclusion

From this section one can see that, if the CCP stresses the importance of China's territorial integrity, its strategy to call for victim complex and crisis consciousness will be successful, yet not all Chinese IR scholars equally share the concerns about the strengthening of the US-Japan alliance. There is an ongoing debate among Chinese IR scholars about how worried China should be and what countermeasures are required to cope with adjustments in the alliance.³⁰⁴ Different groups of IR scholars defend China's security in different degrees of nationalist tone. Once again one could see the different interpretation approaches of Chinese IR scholars to the CCP's party line. On the Japan-US security co-operation, personal advisers' views are the most radical and emotional yet ambiguous and inconsistent, which shows that the CCP has not found a clear strategy towards the Japan-US security alliance. Institutional advisers voice their support for the party line and denounce Japanese jingoism and the US conspiracy as well, though their views are not as emotional and radical as that of personal advisers. Official intellectuals try to address this issue in a balanced way from theoretical perspectives, are willing to understand the Japan-US security alliance from a Japanese perspective and even try to call on the Chinese to put history behind them and acknowledge Japan's aspiration for more international responsibilities. To some degree they even appreciate the positive role of the US in checking Japanese jingoism. Liberals propose to regard Japan-China relations in a new way yet they are also firm defenders of China's territory.

Notes

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Chapter III: China's Arguments on America: Political Issues

Chapter III is on political issues arising out of US-China relations. The author has collected 55 influential articles with regard to this topic and focuses on Chinese writings on multi-polarity, peaceful evolution and human rights, as they will effectively demonstrate the newly emerged nationalism over power struggle and political values in Chinese foreign policy and how Chinese IR scholars treat the party line and interpret it in their own ways.

If there is a relatively strong consensus over security issues, that is not the case over political issues. Politics is essentially about power distribution and political values. Under the influence of nationalism, the CCP is sensitive to China's political gain or loss i.e. power status change in the world. Increasing power status is regarded as beneficial to the CCP's legitimacy though it is not as decisive as territorial control or economic achievement, therefore the CCP tries to stress that China is indeed a great power and has become or at least is becoming a "pole" in the post-cold war era. The CCP also tries to defend the current Chinese political system and values in order to maintain the righteousness and advantage of the communist rule. As the CCP is not at all confident of its ruling status it tries to establish a buffer zone for China in international politics, so that its ruling status might continue to be protected in a stable international environment.

This research has found out that there are much stronger tensions about political issues among different groups of Chinese IR scholars and official intellectuals take views much more distant from the CCP's party line over political issues than personal and institutional advisers.

3.1 Multi-polarity

The author will start with the CCP's formalized language over multipolarity,¹ a code word used by CCP leaders to show their national pride and crisis consciousness, and express their concerns about China's power status in the world. Despite some arguments

against the concept of “unipolarity”,² some US scholars who take realist criteria for measurement conclude that the post-Cold War world is a US-dominated unipolar system.³ They believe that it is based on this superiority that the US can afford to engage China. In this scenario, they fail to note the domestic needs of the term multipolarity and claim this approach largely aims to undermine the US “unipolar moment.”⁴

Regarding the US engagement policy, the CCP is still on the defensive yet tries to portray an image of a state in control in the bilateral relationship. The term “multipolarity” well suits the party’s needs. In the framework of multipolarity, CCP leaders take the realist concept “balance of power” to demonstrate China’s capability to check the US as a responsible “great power” in the world⁵ and to firm up China’s national interests.⁶ Following this term, they believe that adherence to sovereignty will protect the CCP’s vulnerable position from any external encroachment.

CCP leaders have stood for a multi-polar world for a long time. During the Cold War period, China allied with the US to check China’s then greatest threat the Soviet Union and the strategic triangle approach worked well to the advantage of China.⁷ In the 1990s, the CCP believed that four nations threatened China: Russia, India, Japan and the US.⁸ With both internal and external threats looming large, the CCP hoped the global pattern of power would gradually shift to a multipolar world in which the CCP would survive in a more comfortable international environment.⁹ The party tried to convince the Chinese people that “the world has been moving with a dizzying pace toward multipolarity.”¹⁰ Nevertheless, CCP leaders themselves have not dwelled on self-deception. They point out, “The world . . . is still full of contradictions. Hegemonism and power politics are the roots of instability in the world.”¹¹

Some Western scholars fail to see the CCP’s real intention behind the term multi-polarity and remark that the Chinese elite are too materialist and narrowly state-centric, focusing on the tangible capabilities of polar states. In their eyes, CCP leaders fail to take into account the emerging normative structure of international politics¹² and they are still far from accepting a post-Cold War framework of globalisation.¹³

The external role of the term multipolarity is largely directed at the US as, in terms of external pressure, the US is still the largest concern of the CCP.¹⁴ Though the CCP understands that it is impossible for China to find an ally among great powers including Japan, EU, Russia and India, the party still hopes China can become their “partner” to reduce the US dominance in the framework of multipolarity. The party does not expect these powers to “balance” the US in conjunction with China, yet believes closer relations with these states help alleviate its tension with the US.

Most CCP leaders consider balance of power from two angles. Firstly, they regard it as a sort of strategic foreign policy, as Britain did in the 19th century toward Europe.¹⁵ However, history reveals that balance of power is more an ideal than a fact.¹⁶ In this vein it is suggested that CCP leaders have inherited the traditional Chinese way of preserving security by “pitting barbarian against barbarian”.¹⁷

Secondly, they regard it as a relatively static situation in the short run, for instance, when they use this concept to describe the present world politics.¹⁸ In the eyes of CCP leaders, because the capabilities of nation states are all the while changing, if one sees it from a long period the rise and fall of the great powers is quite natural. While a country is in the process of rise, its capabilities are steadily getting larger; therefore the other great powers have to tackle this phenomenon and adjust accordingly their own foreign policies in order to safeguard their own national interests. Considering China’s rapid economic growth, the CCP is aware of the danger of being balanced by other powers and tries hard to suppress the China threat theory.

Many Americans ignore the term multipolarity’s domestic appeal and stress its external orientation to the US. Some even exaggerate the danger of this approach taken by China. Even scholars who are considered “pro-engagement” point to the term multipolarity as indicative of a fundamental clash of interests with the US desire to preserve its global and regional pre-dominance.¹⁹ In 1998 the US DoD claimed that, although China has no plan to lead a faction or bloc of nations in directly challenging US power or its international

political activities, certain of its other policies are designed to achieve the same result.²⁰ Americans believe that these policies aim to halt further expansion of US power in Asia as, it is suggested, in the CCP's view, the strengthening of US power enables the US to influence world events in ways that are potentially harmful to China, including an enhanced US ability to intervene in China's internal affairs and prevent Taiwan's reunification with the mainland.²¹

Party Line

In Deng's opinion, the theory of a multi-polar world, on the one hand, can alert CCP members to keep united for survival given its world view that nation states exist in a world full of conflicts and struggle; on the other hand, can reduce the US dominance and give China more international political space. Deng tried to establish among the Chinese people an image of a secure and powerful China in a challenging world and virtually regarded the multi-polar world theory as a crucial international political instrument to achieve this end.²² Deng was confident of China's role in a multi-polar world. His idea of multi-polarity is based on rosy projections of Chinese economic and military growth.²³ At the end of the Cold War, he said: "In the so-called multi-polar world, China too will be a pole. We should not belittle our own importance: one way or another, China will be counted as a pole."²⁴ For Deng, a state with superior cultural achievements is entitled to esteem and influence in the world,²⁵ which demonstrates his national pride. From what Deng said, one can surely know that he would not agree with Segal as to China's world status,²⁶ and he was absolutely confident of China's great power status and uniqueness.

In chapter II of *Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao* (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought), there is a section regarding the formulation "multi-polarity." It tries to highlight Deng Xiaoping's ideas on the change of the post-Cold War international system. "Comrade Deng Xiaoping held that, 'now the old pattern is changing, yet never comes to an end, the new pattern has not taken shape.'"²⁷ This section goes on, proclaiming that multi-polarity is on the rise. "The progress and change of the post-Cold War world situation has fully justified comrade Deng Xiaoping's wise prediction that the world pattern will progress toward multi-polarity. Today, against the

background of a variety of powers in the world splitting up and re-assembling, when international relations are still in deep adjustment, the trend of multi-polarity of the world has made new progress, either at the global and district level or in political and economic fields...A variety of countries have admitted that the world multi-polarity is a trend."²⁸ This judgment made by the CCP becomes overwhelmingly the fundamental guidance of Chinese IR scholars' research on the nature of the post-Cold War international system. This section analyses the strengths of the US, EU, Japan, Russia and the third world and China, and claims that the US hegemony surely stands in the world's way to achieve that. It is China's responsibility to reduce the US hegemony and help make multi-polarity take place in the world.²⁹ In section two of chapter three, the CCP then calls on the Chinese people to fight against hegemonism, obviously targeting the US.³⁰ In view of China's strength, one can tell the exaggeration and strong nationalist pride behind it.

Deng's judgment that China is surely one pole in the world set the keynote for the CCP's party line on China's world status. The *ji* in *duo ji hua* (multi-polarization) means in Chinese "either of the extremities, north or south, of the earth, or either of the two terminals, positive and negative, of an electric cell or a magnet."³¹ When the CCP uses the formulation *duo ji hua* (multi-polarization), it tries to demonstrate a strong sense of national pride plus crisis consciousness and highlight four important ideas: firstly, China is a great power on the world stage;³² secondly, China is facing a challenging world and national interests of world powers clashing among one another; thirdly, world powers differ in values; fourthly, the pattern is an objective that China should strive for, still developing.

The CCP claim that, to achieve *duo ji hua* (multi-polarization), China should and has the capabilities to fight hegemonism. Taking advantage of Chinese experiences in the recent past, CCP leaders claim a hegemonic power is more likely to use its wealth and influence for its own interests than for public good.³³ The term fight hegemonism has expressly displayed the duality of the party's call for multipolarity, with China both as a state in an unsafe world and as a great power in international politics, though currently the latter overpowers the former.³⁴

Personal Advisers

How do Chinese IR scholars respond to this party line? Personal advisers identify with the duality of the term of *duo ji hua* (multi-polarization), yet their focus is on the danger from outside and the US in particular. They see a relative decline in US power and the rise of China, so that the world will be “multi-polar”, yet they believe China is still in a dangerous world, similar to the Warring States era.³⁵ They call on the Chinese people boldly and wisely to defend China’s interests in the world.

He Xin views it as crucial to secure and boost China’s image as a great power in the world, but he seldom uses this term. He prefers the term “late Warring States period” in Chinese history when several powers brutally fought each other. This term can show China’s rising power, and in the meantime demonstrate personal advisers’ worry about the CCP’s capability to survive in a tough world, revealing their high identification of “fight hegemony”. He said in 2002: “Recently, there have emerged two strategic thoughts-‘lianheng’ and ‘hezong’-in contemporary international geopolitics, which is extremely similar to the international political situation displayed by the late Warring States period in China.”³⁶ He also said in 1990: “It is worth noting that the general situation of the world after the dramatic change in the Soviet Union and East Europe is amazingly similar to the situation of the late Warring States period in ancient history, during which six powers clashed with one another while one power dominated, though there are great difference between them in nature and scale.”³⁷ The dominant power was the despotic Qin Kingdom during the Warring States period and now it is the US in the world.

He Xin highlights the balance of power role in the multi-polarity proposition.³⁸ Compared with institutional advisers and official intellectuals, he is more inclined to the “balancing” role of this approach, though he knows the difficulty of China finding an ally to balance the US. From his perspective, the main reason for this is that the present international environment leaves China little room to manoeuvre in favour of its national interests, though there are many other ways of dealing with a dominant power.³⁹

Nevertheless, the US has plenty of choices for its global strategy.⁴⁰ Western democracies form the core in world politics, the “great power society,” wherein members embrace democratic values, subscribe to liberal economic ethos and share an “in-group” mentality.⁴¹ China can neither influence effectively the US China policy from within nor check the US dominance with the support of international institutions.

Personal advisers’ judgment that China is in a hostile world drives them to take self-centred and “wise” measures to defend China’s national interests. They have highly militarized the party line of multi-polarity, which can be seen from their politicization of international affairs including economic issues. In the era of economic interdependence they stress economic “competition” in a multi-polar world. They believe that a wise way to fight the US hegemony is to gain more economic edge through economic competition.⁴² Wang Daohan prefers to use the term *guoji jingzheng* (international competition) to highlight Chinese crisis consciousness and highlight more conflict in a multi-polar world. He believes that “the world is moving toward the direction of multi-polarity”.⁴³ Obviously he follows the party line as to this matter, yet he points out, “in the meantime...the competition among nations has already switched more to competition of comprehensive national power based on economy and led by science and technology.”⁴⁴ In his view, the objective of nation states in economic competition is power-struggle-oriented.

In personal advisers’ opinion, economic expansion as an effective instrument to increase China’s power should be subject to China’s political needs. If need be economic benefits can be sacrificed to ensure political gains. They believe a small number of countries adopt hegemonism and they are not willing to see the rise of China. In Liu Ji’s view China should get ready for temporary economic setbacks due to political reasons. He claims that the struggle between China and these western countries would never come to an end.⁴⁵ In other words, it is a long-term task for China to fight hegemony.

Because they analyse international affairs mainly from a political stance, it is not surprising that they find far more conflicts than co-operation in the international

community. Much as China would like to completely step out of the shadow of Mao's class struggle theory, it is still a one-party-system country and sticks to socialism with Chinese characteristics, clashing with liberal democracies in its political system.

For instance, in Liu Ji's view, power struggle in the age of multi-polarity will produce more conflicts in international economic affairs. While discussing economic interdependence, personal advisers do not forget to remind CCP leaders of the danger from outside as they are worried that economic globalisation "could very well derail China's quest for great power status."⁴⁶ Like Wang Daohan, Liu Ji regards economic growth as an effective weapon for power struggle in international politics.⁴⁷

Institutional Advisers

Institutional advisors follow the party line and help raise China's image as a great power, blame the US for China's pursuit of multi-polarity and regard it as China's self-defence. They take more practical approaches upon this formulation, as it is their responsibility to tell the central party, as a pole, exactly what China's relationship with the US is in a multi-polar world and how to fight hegemonism. They claim that life under US hegemony will be neither peaceful nor liberal, as unchecked power will surely abuse its power.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, most of them do not come up with any aggressive measures to fight against US power on the world stage but rather advocate defending China on the domestic front.

Yan Xuetong is a scholar who focuses on power politics,⁴⁹ and who defends the hegemony-anti-hegemony model in Sino-US relations in order to maintain China's great power status. He claims that the US has been seeking hegemony ever since the end of the Cold War.⁵⁰ In this scenario, countries like China and Russia have no choice other than taking measured policies to prevent a world dominated by the US.⁵¹ Yan deems that the task China is facing is extremely difficult as the US hegemony takes a new form i.e. institutional one that is different from historical hegemonies. "The foundation of institutional hegemony is strength plus international norms, therefore the US has been continuously promoting the establishment of new international norms after the Cold

War.”⁵² Therefore, given China’s different political system from the West, Yan agrees that the CCP should be aware that the clash between China and the US hegemony is almost inevitable.⁵³

Then, under the US pressure, how to fight hegemonism? What institutional advisers advocate is largely domestic effort. They link this formulation with a concept in vogue called CNP (comprehensive national power), which can be measured numerically in their eyes. They argue that China might improve their CNP as quickly and enormously as possible to boost multi-polarity in which China is a pole, different from personal advisers’ approach that calls for manoeuvre among great powers. When they talk about polarity, they think from the angle of politics in general. To them, a pole means a great power, either a nation state or a regional union like the EU, with global influence. This influence comes from the comprehensive national power, which is measurable, of these powers.

Institutional advisers use a basket of factors to study CNP, including economic, political, technological, cultural and social issues. Some institutional scholars have even designed a set of complicated mathematical formulae to calculate great powers’ CNPs and ranked them in a list. Dong Xiuling’s study indicated that China was number 8 in the world in 1980 and number 6 in 1988 in terms of CNP.⁵⁴ Institutional advisers also try to calculate mathematically the hierarchy of the world’s future great powers. According to the forecast of Academy of Military Sciences, China’s CNP by 2020 will grow equal to that of the US in a multi-polar structure.⁵⁵

Some institutional advisers understand the vulnerability of China, yet they are still confident of China’s great power status, because they claim China can rely on its own “magic weapons” in Chinese RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) which actually stands on shakable ground. China’s ancient statecraft urges the development and use of surprise “magic weapons” to win wars, a theory that institutional advisers are proud of today. Some authors’ books “boldly predict the United States will lose its initial lead within a decade and then fall behind other nations in this RMA competition...Thus, the effect of

the RMA will reinforce the current ‘inevitable’ trend toward multipolarity and the end of America’s superpower status.”⁵⁶ This new move in China has alerted some Americans to propose keeping China weak.⁵⁷

Official Intellectuals

To most official intellectuals who work at universities, the formulation *duo ji hua* (multi-polarization) has become a cliché to follow. They are proud of China’s great power status and claim any “continued US uni-pole status” should be challenged,⁵⁸ yet in their writings they show less interest in China’s active role to “fight hegemony” than personal and institutional advisers. Rather, they are actually resigned to the fate that they believe is the CCP’s and put their faith in the power increase of Japan, EU and Russia and their conflicts with the US. Most official intellectuals claim that China will benefit from the situation resulted from the evolution of multi-polarity, though it does not mean support for the rise in the relative power of Japan or a more aggressive Russia.⁵⁹

They mainly regard balance of power as a relatively static situation in a specific period. Due to the power expansion of other powers other than the US, most official intellectuals claim that multi-polarity is an objective trend that will happen in the future, though they agreed that it was not clear what the trends were in the evolution of multi-polarity.⁶⁰

Though a majority of official intellectuals acknowledge the strength of the US economy, many of them still claim that the US is not as powerful as before, due to non-economic reasons. As late as 1998 and 1999 they continued to claim that the US power was in the midst of a downward trend.⁶¹ Though after 2000 a number of them began to admit the US preponderance in the short run, they continue to argue that the United States is likely decline over the long-term.⁶² In 2004, Yuan Ming, a scholar from Beijing University, points out that the US is still “facing unexpected difficulties and challenges.”⁶³

Official intellectuals are not as confident as Deng Xiaoping who strongly believed that China is a pole, but rather focus on one point of the CCP’s formulation *duo ji hua* (multi-polarization), namely that multi-polarity is still more a trend than reality. Deng

Xiaoping's judgment is not appreciated by other powers, as Japan, EU and Russia seem to have their own ideas about what the post-Cold War order should look like after the terrorist events of September 11, 2001.⁶⁴ Professor Chen Yue at Renmin University uses the term "*yi chao duo qiang*" (one superpower and several great powers) to describe the post-Cold War world pattern, "formed by the US as the only superpower and other powers, namely a world pattern with one pole and several powers."⁶⁵ His idea represents mainstream thinking among official intellectuals, which is generally in accordance with the party line yet has different focal points.

- Japan

Though CCP leaders have become increasingly worried about signs that the US may now be abetting Japanese remilitarization in order to limit rising Chinese power,⁶⁶ most official intellectuals regard Japan as a pole that might balance the US hegemony, as they claim that it can exert a great influence all over the world with its formidable economic power and its potential military force.⁶⁷ As far as Japan's wealth is concerned, a number of official intellectuals argue that the US economic advantage will always be challenged as Japan has in their eyes extraordinarily abundant capital. Despite Japan's "lost decade" in the 1990s, official intellectuals also regard Japan as the economic leader in East Asia and a truly regional power in this sense.⁶⁸

In science and technology many official intellectuals do not think Japan is doing very well in fundamental research, yet they all acknowledge the achievement of Japan's applied sciences. Zhan Shiliang says that the US retains superiority in high technology for a long time but is challenged severely by Japan in the fields of consumer electronics, communication, robot and computer hardware. This is about the future competitive forces of world powers, so the US is extremely concerned.⁶⁹

From the perspective of these scholars, Japan has been striving hard to become a superpower since the early 1990s. Many official intellectuals always see the potential dispute, a display of the contradiction, between Japan and the US even during the Cold War. These scholars think that these two countries managed to cover their quarrels in

politics and economy for the purpose of confronting their common enemy, the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, as the second largest economy in the world Japan not only wants to become an economic power but a political giant as well. At least in public opinion, Japanese can now choose to say "No" to the US, when their national interests clash with each other.

In 1991 Xi Runchang wrote a paper representing the mainstream view of official intellectuals of Japan as a world power. He said:" For Japan, facing the collapse of the bipolar world pattern, its strategic objective is to grasp the favourable chance, strive to become a great power and then exert its role in world politics as a pole."⁷⁰ In the eyes of official intellectuals, Japan will surely become a real great power in time though this process is constrained by the evolvement of the contradiction between the US and Japan. According to Zhu Wenli at Beijing University, the US does not really want to see Japan as a pole. "When Japan was trapped in financial turbulence after the collapse of its bubble economy, the Clinton administration held on to the managed trade strategy, exerting both political and economic pressure to force the Japanese to accept trade quotas."⁷¹

In 2005 Japan began to seek a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. In the early 1990s, some official intellectuals rightly predicted this move and noted Japan was determined to achieve its political ambition on the world stage. Xi Runchang noted that Japan had taken series of important measures in order to realize its political objectives.⁷² These include adjusting its foreign strategy in line with its political ambition, actively establishing Japan's image as a great power, trying to destroy the limitation of the Peaceful Constitution and sending troops overseas, in the hope that it could turn Japan into a military power. Official intellectuals claim these attempts exposed Japan's desire to become a world political power, which they believe will contribute to multi-polarity.

- European Union

Many official intellectuals regard Europe as a pole in the world that has contradiction with the US. Europe is the origin of modern civilization. The Industrial Revolution broke ground in Britain in the first place, and the French revolution greatly changed the world's

economic and political systems. According to Hayek's view, Britain, France and Germany represent respectively great values of human beings, i.e. freedom, equality and collectivism. Chinese are very proud of their glorious history and claim China was the No. 1 power in the world for over 3,000 years.⁷³ Nevertheless, in 1839 China lost the Opium War against Britain, a country with only one-tenth of its population and China begun its history of one hundred years' humiliation. To date it is still very difficult for Chinese intellectuals to shrug off this shadow from history. Very naturally, Chinese official intellectuals do not find it difficult to follow the CCP's *duo ji hua* (multi-polarization) formulation and regard Europe as an important pole in today's world that is able to check the US hegemony.

Some official intellectuals highlight European countries' advancement in economy, culture, technology and education, though they point out that European countries are very small in terms of economic size in contrast with the US and Japan, and they can not compete with the US and Japan unless they are united into one body. Since the end of the Cold War, most official intellectuals on Europe studies have got more and more interested in European integration, which has become a fashion among them to the extent that studies on specific countries are considered out of date. The reason behind this trend is partly because they expect a united EU will gain more capability to limit US dominance. In the light of their opinion, the main driving force for the deepening process of European integration comes from the function of the contradiction in international politics. Europe's desire to become equal to the US and Japan is the display of this contradiction.

In the minds of official intellectuals, Europe always belongs to the second world that is opposite to the US hegemony in terms of contradiction. Through the analysis of contradiction, they are happy to see the development of the contradiction between the US and EU, which they believe helps maintain China's great power status. Since China became a WTO member, EU has become more important than before, as it can provide both strategic and economic assistance to China. Therefore official intellectuals agree with Deng Xiaoping that China needs a united, powerful and growing Europe.⁷⁴

On balance, official intellectuals hold that Europe plays a great role mainly in three areas in international politics. Firstly, it contributes to maintaining the peace and stability of Europe and its adjacent areas, such as North Africa and the Middle East. Though there has been no one voice, at least in so far as politics is concerned, in Europe toward these difficulties, EU does make a great effort to act up to its own opinions and try to solve European problems itself.

Secondly, they maintain that Europe is a key force to maintain the world's political and economic stability. European countries like France, Britain and Spain still have a strong impact on policies of their former colonies. Many official intellectuals acknowledge European countries' positive role in maintaining stability in those countries.

More importantly, these scholars have noted that, during the Cold War, European countries tried to exert their influence in the world through functional rather than military means, which was totally different from both the Soviet Union and the US. While promoting détente between the East and West, European countries tried hard to avoid or at times oppose extreme actions. The European way was based on functionalism that focused on economic and social issues rather than politics alone. Many official intellectuals think this style originated from Europe's experience of its integration process. After World War II, most European countries used their resources to develop trade and economy rather than to construct formidable military forces as the Soviet Union and the US did. They were becoming more like trading states, very different from traditional political-military states. Official intellectuals claim the European way will greatly limit US aggressiveness in world affairs, which is apparently in China's interests.

- Russia

Official intellectuals have noted deepened conflict between Russia and the US than between Japan and the US, which they believe will benefit China, though they deem Russia's collaboration with China is half-hearted. They point out that, as the second largest nuclear power in the world and a regional power in the Eurasian continent, Russia

is the most important country to check the US power in the world. They proclaim that, like China, Russia's foreign policy has two important objectives, in a very long period, which are firstly to create a peaceful international environment for its transition period in economy and politics; secondly to maintain its social stability, resurrecting its glory and power of the old days. Russia is facing similar problems to China: how to safeguard the security of its extraordinarily vast territory, how to explore its remote and underdeveloped areas, how to help establish new rules for world politics and economy, how, together with other countries, to solve its mounting difficulties and obstacles to economic development.⁷⁵ Most official intellectuals think that Russia's determination to bring back the glory of the old days clash with US hegemony in many ways.

In the light of their analysis of contradiction in international politics, official intellectuals have noted Russia's effort to help establish new rules for world politics and economy for the purpose of restraining the US. These scholars point out that it is in line with the Chinese call to establish a new world order. They argue that China should accommodate Russian policies to join the re-arrangement of regional and international powers, though not in an active way. They understand it is impossible for China and Russia to become allies, but agree that the Russians are in the Chinese league to accommodate multipolarity and reshape the world order in the 21st century.⁷⁶

Many official intellectuals claim that consideration of national interests compels Russia to draw close to China. The evolvement of contradiction prevails over wishful human considerations. Some official intellectuals point out that, due to geo-political reasons, Russia has little choice but to fight the US hegemony. Li Yihu from Beijing University says: "America's nibbling at its non-traditional sphere of influence and strategic interests, namely, Eurasian continent, and particularly the eastern expansion of NATO led by America, are the main security and diplomatic issues Russia is facing. It has already driven Russia into a corner and it has to get to grips with this difficult problem as to geopolitics, adjust in large scale the direction of its diplomatic strategy. With regard to America's strategy to enter the inner part of the Eurasian continent, Russia has already taken strong counter-strategy. It has changed its direction of unrequited affection, 'lean on

the West', as to its international strategy and foreign policy, and moved timely to the focus and policy pattern of 'lay-equal-stress-on-the-West-and-East' as well as 'face-the-East."⁷⁷ His analysis makes sense. To all intents and purposes, since the early 1990s Russia has tried to co-operate with China against US power through developing a partnership with China, though largely limited in the area of security.⁷⁸

Official intellectuals appreciate Russia's role in restraining US behaviour; however, in their opinion, it is hard for Russia and China to collaborate to balance the US. As in their observation of the current international pattern, official intellectuals prefer to regard balance of power as a static situation in international relations rather than an effective policy for China. One can see this clearly from their approach to Russia. They are aware of the impotence of the Chinese and Russian joint challenge to the US, which discounts the validity of both China and Russia as two *ji* (poles) in *duo ji hua* (multi-polarization). Facing the US preponderance, they begin to realize the expectation on the part of other states that any geopolitical challenge to the US is futile.⁷⁹

Russia is not trying as hard to construct anti-US alliances nor undermine US alliances globally or regionally as the Soviets were doing during the Cold War. Like China, Russia tries to balance the US internally, say, mobilizing economic and technological and human resource to translate into military/strategic power. Russia signed a treaty of friendship with China, a treaty that embodied some of the Chinese normative vision of international relations, i.e. multi-polarity and anti-hegemony: it would not be so much an alliance as a contingent collaboration. Russia has to rely on closer ties with Europe and the US to develop the Russian economy. Strategically, Russia's most useful role in the Sino-Russian relationship is as a source of weapons for China, not a strategic partner for confronting and counterbalancing US power. The two countries try to collaborate more through upholding the international institutional status quo, say, strengthening the role of the UN, than through bilateral arrangements, lest the relationship between the two countries appears to be obviously against the US. Anyway, official intellectuals have noted that, regardless of Deng Xiaoping's tough rhetoric, China is not doing a great deal to encourage the emergence of a united anti-US front.⁸⁰

As one can see, most official intellectuals follow the CCP's *duo ji hua* (multi-polarization) formulation and try to reify it in their research, despite their different focal points from Deng Xiaoping. Most of them, like Chen Yue, do not believe that China is a pole already and deem that multi-polarity is only a pattern to take shape in the future. However, we do have some official intellectuals who go even further. There is no way they can escape from the CCP's formalized language in their writing, yet they have more often than not opinions in private against what they publish. Professor Song Xinning keeps at arm's length with the main stream and argues that if China wants to enter the international community as a full member in the 21st century, it should desert the concept of pole and multi-polarity, because it means virtually conflict rather than peace and security, which would be right against the main tendency of current international relations, at least of relations among big powers.⁸¹ Nevertheless, his voice has rung hollow to other Chinese IR scholars, not to mention the Chinese authorities, as he simply cannot get his idea across in public. What he does is to twist the formulation *duo ji hua* to another concept, *duo yuan hua* (multi-unit or plural), which aims to alleviate the degree of conflict embedded in *duo ji hua* (multi-polarization).⁸² Shi Yinhong, a well-known scholar working at Renmin University, has all along taken this view. In a paper on nationalism he says: "It is due to this that international society, in which nation states have now widely gained political independence, is a plural society in terms of culture and will be so in the future."⁸³

Liberals

Chinese liberals have always been against the policy of multi-polarity. Cao Changqing constantly criticizes this policy. He once praised the Russian President Putin for his reluctance to take this approach. He praised the realist side of Putin's leadership. He said: "It is this kind of realism that makes him choose to be pro-West and inclined to the US and NATO, to integrate into Europe and not seek 'multi-polarity' and counter the US and Western civilization."⁸⁴ Liu Xiaobo has gone even further and called multi-polarity a dirty policy. "(According to advocates of *taoguang yanghui* <hide one's capabilities and bide one's time> China) should make the most of the trend that the world is getting more

and more multi-polar, fully employ the diplomatic tactics of *hezong lianheng* (manoeuvre among different powers), support in the world any country that challenges the US, establish wide united front, whatever these countries' regime, whatever their role in the world, whatever their attitudes toward China. As long as they defy the US, China should support them in an obvious or secret way...try to win over all powers that can check the US, in order to balance and then change the Bush administration's current diplomatic strategy of containing China.⁸⁵ In their eyes the CCP opts for the multi-polarity policy, intentionally aiming to check the US hegemony rather than due to domestic needs.

Conclusion

In the 1980s and 1990s the official Chinese foreign policy guidelines claimed that China's power status in the world was rising and the world was heading towards multi-polarity, a more stable world of balanced power among five or so major centres (US, Russia, Europe, Japan and China).⁸⁶ However, a growing number of Chinese IR scholars represented by official intellectuals have concluded that this transitional pattern is going to endure for a much longer period with the US remaining as the sole superpower.⁸⁷ Therefore, Western scholars like Ross deem, in terms of external orientation, that it is unclear what precisely one can infer about Chinese strategic goals from this multi-polarity discourse.⁸⁸ Nevertheless, in terms of domestic needs it is clearer: to boost the CCP's legitimacy, to highlight China's difference in terms of political system and values, to raise national pride and crisis consciousness among Chinese people.

Except in the area of security, one could at best describe China's balancing against the US hegemony as "hesitant, low-key and inconsistent."⁸⁹ The US wants to integrate China into the US-led international order through engagement. China is already integrated in many parts of the world community and is actively trying to break into the remaining areas. Nevertheless, China intends to do so with the CCP still in power, so it prefers to establish a buffer zone and protect the party's interests first. CCP leaders will not be told to how to behave and engagement with China will be increasingly on equal terms.⁹⁰

Chinese IR scholars take different approaches to interpret the CCP's *duo ji hua* (multi-polarization) formulation. Liberals are obviously against this policy. Personal advisers simply choose another term, "the late Warring States period", to add more tension to the term multi-polarity and their discourse has shown more truth and sincerity in following the party line. Institutional scholars highlight structural conflict between China and the US, advocate to fight hegemony, and they use statistics as facts to defend China against danger from the US. Both personal and institutional advisers blame the US threat for China's multi-polarity policy choice.

Official intellectuals publish the majority of IR papers and monographs, and they generally follow the CCP's direction, yet most of them do not believe China is already a pole and they apply the Marxist theory of contradiction to international politics and maintain that multi-polarity is an objective process, one to come in the future. In addition, there are some official intellectuals who prefer to twist the formulation into "plural" and ease up the intensity of conflict. Official intellectuals are more content with the current international order, and are much less aggressive than those personal and institutional advisers regarding China's US policies.

In terms of nationalism, personal advisers are surely the most radical, having a much stronger "sense of distinctiveness"⁹¹ than other groups, regarding the world as a loose collective in which nation states are at war with each other. For domestic reasons, CCP leaders need this sense of uniqueness in a dangerous world spreading among the Chinese people and, in fact, in terms of the external effect of China's call for multi-polarization, even top CCP leaders admit that it is a bit "out of touch with reality."⁹² Therefore it is fair to say China hopes to see a less dominant US and wants to establish itself as a great power. Balance of power is unable to guarantee China's great power status and China knows it has to accommodate international norms, yet this is a long-term process. China needs time to adjust so it opts for political buffering, namely retaining the CCP's rule yet reforming its policies in an incremental way.

3.2 Peaceful Evolution

Under the pressure of international norms the CCP is taking political buffering in international politics. On the one hand it has shown some flexibility in political reform as demonstrated by the grassroots democracy through village elections; on the other hand, it still seeks to secure the ruling status of the party. This section aims to examine Chinese IR scholars' interpretation of the CCP's formulation "peaceful evolution" responding to the impact of US engagement on China's political system. The author will present both the official guidelines and those offered by Chinese IR scholars in this regard,⁹³ and show the consensus and difference among different groups of Chinese IR scholars.

Peaceful Evolution and Democratic Peace

Peaceful evolution is closely related to domestic regime perspective in IR theory. This aims at explaining the interaction between domestic political institutions and foreign strategy and practice. Traditionally, liberal trans-nationalists often claimed that democracies are inherently more just than authoritarian states, therefore any change toward democracy, including peaceful evolution, was encouraged. Former US Secretary of State George Schultz told a 1983 State Department conference that the US should not overlook the personages and organizations in socialist countries who were seeking peaceful evolution as it is Americans' duty to morally and strategically help them.⁹⁴ After the end of the Cold War, the literature on democracy and foreign policy, especially the "democratic peace", is expanding rapidly.⁹⁵ It claims that although democratic regimes are nearly as violence-prone in their relations with authoritarian states as authoritarian states are towards each other, they are more peaceful between and among democratic states because such regimes possess cultural and institutional constraints against going to war between each other.⁹⁶

Due to the new development of international norms in general and the idea of democratic peace in particular, CCP leaders are becoming more cautious toward the US. With the

collapse of the Soviet Union, the common enemy of China and the US had gone. The difference in political systems began to be involved in the bilateral relationship, though not the decisive one. The US foreign policy has long been composed of two pillars: one is based on realistic assessment of national power and interests, the other from a desire to affirm liberal democracy, for which America stands.⁹⁷ With the Cold War over, many Americans believe authoritarian regimes like China will capitulate eventually to the forces of democratic change,⁹⁸ and they deem it no longer necessary to support authoritarian countries that had allied with the US against the Soviets.

Under the influence of democratic peace theory, the discourse over China in the West has shifted from the 1980s. At that time there was little discussion in the US about whether China was or was not part of the “international community.” From the 1990s on, however, this has been the dominant discourse. Many of the harshest policy debates in the US have been over whether it is even possible to socialize a “dictatorial, nationalistic and dissatisfied” China within the international community.⁹⁹ China is compelled to acknowledge that it does not share a collective identity with the West and has been apparently marginalized. Liberal democracies in the West have coalesced into a core, the so-called “great power society”. With common liberal values and democratic ethos, the core forms a separate liberal zone of moderation and peace. In the eyes of CCP leaders, international norms have acquired sufficient legitimacy and authority in international society that China can resist but can do little to alter and they are actually norms for the interests of the West.¹⁰⁰ Being excluded from the world core, the Chinese elite will be readily directed by CCP leaders at “outgroup” states i.e. Western countries.¹⁰¹

CCP leaders worry more about China’s regime stability than being excluded by the West from the “great power society”. CCP leaders have noted that Americans believe it is within their power “to tame the Chinese dragon and bring about a transition to peaceful relations in East Asia.”¹⁰² In their view, promoting democracy is a conspiracy to topple communist governments by non-military means.¹⁰³ In the 1950s, the late US Secretary of State Dulles hoped that the third and fourth generation Chinese would peacefully turn China into a democratic country. CCP leaders hate this prediction and try hard to prevent

it from happening.¹⁰⁴ Their actions are reasonable as one can already see some signs of the result of peaceful evolution in the current Chinese society from the change in the Chinese way of life.¹⁰⁵

From the US side, China's democratisation is not as important as other critical issues, such as proliferation of mass destructive weapons, peace across the Taiwan Straits and respect for national sovereignty etc. Nevertheless, CCP leaders worry about the loss of their power and they cannot afford to ignore peaceful evolution. Therefore, they claim that the US is plotting to press for regime change in China without force, as happened in Taiwan. They support their claim with the American hegemonic decline theory and Joseph Nye's soft power argument. They opine that the US intended to destroy the socialist bloc with military forces during the Cold War. With the decline of US power, from their perspective, it is natural for the US to use its mass media, international organization, international law etc. to put pressure on China for the purpose of regime change.

Current Chinese Ideology

Peaceful evolution entails ideological change. One might argue that ideology no longer plays a great role in the US-China relationship. In practice, ideology is actually not an urgent task in US engagement policy toward China, though the Americans are quite willing to see a democratic China. The US cares more about Chinese external than its domestic behaviour. Nevertheless, as far as China's domestic politics is concerned, there is no great escape for ideology.

Firstly, as long as the CCP is still in control, it has to carry on political indoctrination on a daily basis to boost its legitimacy, because its nature is an ideological party with didactic function and not an elected one, as their counterparts in the West. Chinese foreign policy must serve the party's domestic needs. It is suggested that beliefs about threats to visions of legitimate domestic order are the sources of co-operative and competitive foreign policies. Realpolitik policies will be adopted towards states that are believed to be the sources of threat to this legitimate domestic order.¹⁰⁶ Due to CCP leaders' belief that US

democracy is a threat, anti-America ideology has always been a part of Chinese foreign policy discourse.

Secondly, China has traditionally been a civilization-state with strong cultural centrism and Chinese intellectuals often take on the job of ideological construction in order to keep stability of the whole country, sometimes at the expense of other nations' interests. For instance, the US is always targeted by Chinese, not due to China's ambition to replace it as the hegemon of the world but rather due to China's internal needs to unite the vast civilization-state. As security is the top priority in domestic policies, the PLA are encouraged to use ideological means to achieve unity.¹⁰⁷

The present official Chinese ideology is called in public "socialism with Chinese characteristics" or "democracy with Chinese characteristics." In some sense, Gerald Segal is right to say that the old ideology has already died,¹⁰⁸ because the nature of the communist party has changed greatly if not totally. Therefore, to renew official ideology and to build broad-based national support for the regime was a challenge to the post-Tiananmen leadership.¹⁰⁹ Nevertheless, CCP leaders have successfully replaced the old ideology with a new one in such a tricky way that different people can interpret it in different ways for their own benefits. CCP leaders use the same discourse as before but change the connotation of the basic concepts and then apply them to reality in order to serve new practical aims. The old generation is satisfied because the old ideology has been retained at least in name. The younger generation is not bothered, because the new political education does not clash with their business-focused mind. More and more West-trained Chinese scholars treasure this harmony and some even appreciate what the party has done with the ideology, because they approve of evolution rather than revolution as far as China's future transition is concerned.¹¹⁰

Thus Chinese IR scholars can flexibly interpret the classic communism theory as long as they are in line with the party's nationalist approach. Now socialism with Chinese characteristics is powerful enough to accommodate the capitalist content, the reality already developed in China. CCP leaders are confident that they would eventually find

the solution for Chinese reform, even though they have not reached an agreement on the blueprint for this. Practice is more important than theories. Jiang Zemin points out, "...we should take Marxism as the guidance, practice is the only criterion to test the truth."¹¹¹ CCP leaders are quite happy to learn all the advanced in America, including science and technology, business and administrative management, as well as legal system, but they are very reluctant to admit that they would like to accept the American political system and its values. To most CCP leaders, that means peaceful evolution, the loss of their "self-esteem",¹¹² the collapse of China itself. It's the main reason why they seem to be quite satisfied with the present ideology. As long as the old bottle is able to carry new water, so be it. Anyway, a broken bottle is no good for anybody.

How do CCP leaders put together all the contradictory elements of the present ideology? And, particularly, how do they incorporate capitalism into the current ideology? The method they take here is to divide socialist system into two layers. The first is the principle system that means public ownership, people's democratic dictatorship and Marxism as the guideline for Chinese politics, economy and culture. The second is practical system that means practical institutions of politics, economy and culture, covering distribution of power, operation system, economic management etc. The former stipulates the nature of Chinese society and should remain as it is. The latter is only a tool for the former and could be changed from time to time, depending on different situations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and East Europe, Jiang Zemin pointed out that Communist leaders in East Europe and the Soviet Union failed to handle problems in the second layer. He believed that China should draw several lessons from this and use a strong practical system to support the principal system.¹¹³

This distinction has broadened the latitude of China's reform and it is hence able to accommodate a market economy within the framework of present ideology as expected. It is in this context that China's economy and particularly private enterprises have developed at an amazing speed which ensured the success of anti-peaceful evolution policies.

Gerald Segal hit the mark that nationalism would play a increasingly important role in Chinese society in the 21st century; however, it will not replace the old ideology entirely but rather appear in the guise of familiar discourse. Nationalism, socialism and capitalism are united in “practice,” a typical Marxist concept. They are all covered by Deng Xiaoping’s Theory, “which combined Marxism with Chinese practice ”,¹¹⁴ or “Marxism without Marx”.¹¹⁵ CCP leaders proclaim that this theory has transcended varieties of theoretical debates, which are mostly considered as problems in China, between nationalism, socialism and liberalism, and therefore is more capable of guiding Chinese in further modernizing China and restoring China’s glory.

To all intents and purposes, Deng’s focus on “practice” is apparently pragmatism. One sees that, after 1992, on a number of international occasions, for Chinese, socialism simply means Chinese national interests rather than equality and public ownership, as it should be. The reason for this is understandable: China is now the only major socialist power in the world. Defending socialism is in some sense uniting Chinese elites and defending China. By using the phraseology of socialism CCP leaders “hope to keep the support of the party membership, government officials and working class, at the same time developing capitalism in China.”¹¹⁶

The CCP's official stance on the combination of socialism and nationalism provide CCP leaders a unique tool to imagine and strive for a united and powerful China. The party further legitimises its position as the representative of national interests.¹¹⁷ CCP leaders who spoke in Chinese nation’s name successfully demanded that Chinese citizens identify themselves with the nation and “subordinate other interests to those of the state.”¹¹⁸

Crisis Consciousness

The current ideology has practically supplied enough room for nationalism and particularly anti-peaceful evolution discourse. CCP leaders intend thus to cultivate strong crisis consciousness among the Chinese elite and persuade them to believe that the US engagement policy toward China is for certain peaceful evolution that is allegedly against

China's national interests. They claim that the policy advocates a "peaceful" rather than "warlike" policy, yet in fact it is still a hostile policy aiming to topple socialist China and encroach upon China's political sovereignty and can be called "psychological warfare".¹¹⁹ The party allowed the PLA "to increase hardness of realpolitik understandings"¹²⁰ toward the US for the purpose of raising Chinese elites' crisis awareness

This awareness is apparently strong in the official foreign policy guidelines and accordingly tough line toward the US as to ideology. David Campbell argues that the cohesion of ingroups depends on establishing the danger posed by outgroups.¹²¹ There are five factors that have further prompted nationalist policies: factional politics, leadership instability, foreign negotiations, external challenges and changes in global power balance.¹²² The former three are domestic factors and the latter two external-linked yet still domestic-concerned.

Factional politics has made it difficult for crisis discourse in the current Chinese foreign policy to recede.¹²³ To maintain their power, different political factions compete to play hard in ideological discourse. In terms of China's domestic politics, there are two strong bases of assertive nationalism: the "leftist" ideological faction and components of the PLA. The two factions share ideological concern because both see chaos as the only alternative to "stability", namely, undiluted authority for the CCP. Deng Xiaoping agreed with these two factions over the CCP's ruling status.¹²⁴ In this scenario other political factions have to follow suit, otherwise they might be wiped out of China's political arena.

Deng's alertness against US peaceful evolution drew heavily on the PLA's nationalist sentiments. Shortly after the June 4 event, the PLA newspaper, Jiefangjun Bao, published a range of articles arguing for anti-peaceful evolution line and called on the Chinese people to "beware the Glint and Flash of Cold Steel in the 'Halo of peace'."¹²⁵ One article warned, "peaceful evolution" is even more vicious, wicked and more conducive to infiltration and deception than other imperialist strategies aimed at socialist countries.¹²⁶ One writer stressed the danger of "ideological and cultural infiltration...through economic

and trade contacts and cultural exchange.”¹²⁷ In Sept 2004, Jiefangjun Bao says, “Western hostile forces are not willing to see the rise of a powerful China, and they will continue to carry out political plots of ‘westernisation’ and ‘disintegration’.”¹²⁸ The PLA continues to view anti-peaceful evolution as vital in the process of “the great resurrection of Chinese nation.”¹²⁹

According to the PLA, the definition of military threat includes jeopardy to “sovereignty,” different from American and Japanese definitions that allegedly omit this concern.¹³⁰ Therefore, given the nature of peaceful evolution policy’s concern over China’s domestic politics, it is regarded as a kind of military threat. PLA academics believe that two factors determine military threat: “First...fundamental contradictions or interest conflicts, such as opposing social systems and ideologies as well as disputes in economic interests, territorial and ocean rights and interests which are the prerequisites for the rise of a threat.... Second...one side must be backed by powerful military strength, which is the condition for posing a threat.”¹³¹ Apparently anti-peaceful evolution should be a duty undertaken by the PLA.

Party line

The official guidelines vehemently denounce the US attempt to change China's unique political identity,¹³² mixed and still being made. In the early 1990s, a wave of attacks targeted the West and the US in particular.¹³³ Through the 1990s, a litany of alleged threats including “peaceful evolution” blamed perceived threats on “U.S. imperialism”.¹³⁴ Nevertheless CCP leaders also understand the significance of a stable China-US relationship and they do not want to provoke Americans to the extent that bilateral relations might be out of control. They point out that the bilateral relationship should be established on mutual benefits. In their eyes, the proper way for the two countries is not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs during political exchanges, and seek common ground while reserving differences in ideology.

Deng Xiaoping was always on guard against the Western intention to derail Socialism with Chinese characteristics. He said: “The Western imperialists are trying to make all

socialist countries abandon the socialist road, to bring them in the end under the rule of international monopoly capital and set them on the road to capitalism...Only socialism can save China and only socialism can develop China."¹³⁵ "The Western countries are staging a third world war without gunsmoke. By that I mean they want to bring about the peaceful evolution of socialist countries towards capitalism."¹³⁶ Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought) contributes one section, the future of socialism is still very bright, to the official position on socialist ideology. It starts with the new challenge to socialism in the world and then relates at length how socialism has made China great again. "During the last twenty years, China has made achievements attracting world attention, with earth-shaking change. Socialism with Chinese characteristics is thriving and growing vigorously. In no time China has risen, standing out among nations in the world."¹³⁷ It goes on to claim that the Chinese people are confident of the future of socialism and then warn against peaceful evolution by Western countries. "Since last tens of years, the practice of the international class struggle has testified that, whatever the change of the world situation, Western countries have never given up the policy of peaceful evolution toward socialist countries..."¹³⁸ It cites Deng Xiaoping's view: "He (Deng) points out...There is now in the US an opinion: fight a world war without smoke of gunpowder. We should be alerted."¹³⁹

On 24 September 1991 Jiang Zemin, commemorating the 110th anniversary of Lu Xun's birth, expressed the CCP's uncompromisingly assertive nationalist themes: "International hostile forces will never stop using peaceful evolution against us for a single day...peaceful evolution and bourgeois liberalization are aimed not only at overthrowing our socialist system but, fundamentally, at depriving us of our national independence and state sovereignty."¹⁴⁰ Apparently he believed that peaceful evolution is more than aiming at socialism in China - it is China itself.

The formulation *heping yanbian* (peaceful evolution) means in Chinese "long term development and change without force".¹⁴¹ There are three points here: firstly, it means regime change for China, which is in line with "Only socialism can save China and only

socialism can develop China”; secondly, this process is relatively not warlike, which is in line with “a third world war without gunsmoke”; thirdly, this process will take a long time. Among Chinese IR scholars, personal and institutional advisers concentrate on the first point, while official intellectuals on the second and third ones.

Personal Advisers

As strategic thinkers whose personal fates are tied up with the party, personal advisers are extremely worried about “regime change” namely the collapse of the CCP’s rule, which is the first point of the formulation *heping yanbian* (peaceful evolution). In their eyes it largely means political penetration and might lead to China’s collapse.

Liu Ji believes that both “Democratic and Republic administrations had a strong belief in, therefore encouraged, a ‘peaceful evolution’ in China”,¹⁴² that the US has been apparently trying to promote its ideology to the world and dominate it in a soft way, and he regards it as a conspiracy. He says: “[Some in the United States] make ideology a priority in international affairs...Now the United States, as the victor of the Cold War, is attempting to spread the American model of democracy. By using ideology as leverage in diplomacy, it is possible to repeat the mistakes of the former Soviet Union.”¹⁴³ He calls on the Chinese people to pay close attention to the US conspiracy. He believes that there is obviously a scheme of peaceful evolution in the West against Chinese national interests and the Chinese people must improve their national quality and fight against the hostile forces against China’s political stability.¹⁴⁴

He Xin noted the coming threat from the US peaceful evolution shortly after the Tiananmen incident. A sharply anti-American analysis by He Xin was authoritatively circulated within the CCP.¹⁴⁵ He argued that China lies “in the way of the American goal of world unification.” It enumerated eight U.S. stratagems for “ideological and political penetration of China” in the past decade and warned, “the United States will undoubtedly devote all its energy to turning China into chaos and subjugating and dissecting China...causing a unified China to decompose into a number of tattered parts.” His attack

that Washington wanted to disintegrate China explains China's response to President Bush's meeting with the Dalai Lama in the White House.¹⁴⁶

Nevertheless, He Xin called on the party to keep balance and not to react strongly against the US peaceful evolution, while he advocated establishing a new political ideology centred on nationalism.¹⁴⁷ He does not think anti-peaceful evolution entirely amounts to defending the old-type socialism. It seems to him the struggle between the US and China about peaceful evolution is more a conflict of national interests than of ideology.¹⁴⁸

Deng Liqun argues that the US peaceful evolution policy toward China is the biggest worry for China's national security. Chinese definitions of national security also consider threats to political stability. In this broader content the US is perceived as a political threat, employing a combination of peaceful evolution and sanctions.¹⁴⁹ Therefore when Deng Liqun talks about a security threat he actually means a political one. In 1996 he invited some scholars in the same league to produce a secret document that emerged among the Chinese elite and became surprisingly popular. It is called *10,000 Character Manifesto* and is the second of its kind. The first one surfaced in 1995, called *Several Elements Affecting China's National Security*. The second one is called *Preliminary Discussion on Domestic and External Situation of China's National Security and Its Main Threat in Future Ten or Twenty Years*,¹⁵⁰ which is mainly on peaceful evolution. This paper opines that peaceful evolution has become China's biggest political threat.

At first, it points out the social change within China after the collapse of the Soviet bloc. Due to the prosperity of the private economy, a new capitalist group is emerging and class struggle may replace economic construction as the main social conflict. "The growth of capitalists and the spread of their way of life are eroding little by little the healthy social consciousness. The spiritual foundation of the CCP and the state is seriously threatened."¹⁵¹

This paper argues that, in the near future, the basic threat China faces will be political: (1) Western powers headed by the US would start a new Cold War against China; (2) there

would always be potential "peaceful evolution" within China; (3) separatist activities in Taiwan, Hong Kong and inland minority areas would surface; (4) disputes on borders with neighbouring countries might lead to serious conflicts.

The author also argues that peaceful evolution will be the most critical threat. Now "peaceful evolution" is "in fact a kind of spiritual opium more misleading and deceptive than opium....We must not relax our vigilance against the imperialist armed aggression and 'peaceful evolution' conspiracy at any time."¹⁵² Compared with a new Cold War threat from outside, the danger from within is much more serious. Whether or not peaceful evolution will occur largely depends on whether the leadership of the party can be in the hands of real Marxists and, more importantly, whether the central party will avoid historical mistakes in policy-making. The way to fight against "peaceful evolution" is to stick with nationalist party line.¹⁵³

The core of this paper is that it opines there is a strong force in the party representing capitalist political and economic interests. The paper challenges the current policy of "one focus and two basic points", doubting the rightness of the criteria of productive forces. The author categorically says it is wrong to think that there will be no need to care about ideology as long as the economy is improving. He warns that there will be a great danger of regime change, which means the CCP will probably be changed to a social democratic party, representing the interests of the whole nation rather than just the working class.

The author regards the US as the main force promoting peaceful evolution in China. He holds that peaceful evolution and military containment are two instruments for the US and other Western powers to apply Cold War policy against socialist countries. The US exerted great pressure on China for some time, but restored normal relationship when US elites observed that it was possible that China could be transformed without force. "Its character is reinforcing internal adjustment, using comprehensively five ways, including diplomatic, economic, ideological, cultural and secret activities, to achieve the end of Westernising, dividing and weakening China, based on military forces to fight a war

without gunpowder." ¹⁵⁴ This passage is almost the same as page 61 of Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought).

As per this paper, ideology and cultural infiltration are always on top of the agenda of Western peaceful evolution strategy. In recent years, the object of its infiltration has transferred from young students to leaders in charge of the party, government, army units and large-and-medium-scale state-owned enterprises. The tone of the paper is consistent with that of some PLA officers. They believe that there is a psychological war, a kind of war without powder, between China and the US.¹⁵⁵ PLA officers and Deng Liqun believe that the US used the ideas of democracy to undermine the communist party in the Soviet Union and it intends now to use the same rationale for interfering in China's internal affairs.

It points out that a new character in peaceful evolution is that foreign capital has joined in and led China to depend on the West in economy. With foreign capital pouring in, Chinese national industries are pounded more and more severely. The author maintains that some Western monopolies and companies are trying to push into China's finance, insurance, high tech and other sensitive economic departments, to buy national enterprises, to control many Chinese state owned companies with little resources. The author claims that the US government has observed this tendency and strategically encouraged its transnational companies to do so. To Americans, Chinese economic dependence on the US will put China's future in the hands of Washington.¹⁵⁶ The author argues that if dependence on US capital and technologies does not cease, China's modernization will hasten the demise of the current regime.

From above one can see that personal advisers' approach to Peaceful Evolution is even more radical than Deng Xiaoping's, which has demonstrated their worry over the CCP's stable rule in China. They expressly feel it is their "obligation"¹⁵⁷ to defend the current regime and call on the Chinese people to fight against the US regime change conspiracy.

Institutional Advisers

Institutional advisers in general and those working in CASS in particular are urged to propose alternatives to Western capitalist regimes, in order to counter the threat of liberal democracy. In a direct or indirect way, they resort to nationalism to defend the CCP's anti-peaceful evolution position.

Some of them take the approach of social democracy under the influence of Chinese nationalism. They call for a Chinese self-evolution, a term called "institutional innovation", rather than being taught by the US how to manage and reform China. In their eyes, "peaceful evolution" is not "Chinese" at all and thus should be denounced. Due to their apparent collaboration with the CCP and their effort to find a middle way between classic socialism and current liberal democracy, they are on many occasions called the New Left school.

These institutional advisers go to great lengths to construct a new ideology in China. CCP leaders appreciate their efforts to establish a new way between traditional capitalism and socialism, between Western centrist and cultural relativism, so these scholars do not risk offending the authorities. This "safe" exploration has become a fashion among many Chinese young scholars, both in China and overseas, among whom the MIT scholar Cui Zhiyuan is a typical representative. The reason the author chooses his writing rather than some scholars in CASS is that he has always been regarded as the real spiritual leader of this group, and he has close contact with new leftists in CASS like Wang Hui, Huang Ping and Xia Yong who are President Hu Jintao's councillors. (Xia Yong has left CASS and is in charge of Hu Jintao's Office.)

What Cui has done so far is to try to extract some useful genes from the Maoist era and apply them to the current situation and then, achieve what he says is institutional innovation. Where culture is concerned, he does not think that China should follow the West. He notes that "Western centrists" have the greatest esteem for their own unique tradition, wrongly viewing it as a universal one.¹⁵⁸ He argues that the opportunity for the

Third World to develop lies in institutional innovation i.e. finding a unique road, different from both the West and the present Third World.

Cui does not approve of the privatisation that has been carried out in Russia and Eastern Europe. He maintains that it will make consolidation of democracy extremely difficult. Through his study, he has demonstrated that all major privatisation strategies pursued in Russia and Eastern Europe have faced serious dilemmas. When they initially facilitated the transition to democracy, they soon endangered the consolidation of democratic regimes. Because of the dissatisfaction generated by privatisation programmes, it is not certain that democratic regimes will be eventually consolidated.

So what should China do? According to Cui, the Chinese can probably find an alternative with the help of J.E Meade, the 1977 economics Nobel Laureate. Meade designed a labour-capital partnership, whereby the workers and those who provide risk capital jointly manage the concern as partners.¹⁵⁹ Meade's social dividend proposal means every citizen is paid a tax-free social dividend according to the citizen's age and family status but without any other conditions. Cui agrees with Meade that it will promote equality by providing everyone with the same basic unconditional income and reduce the risks by providing some part of income that is unaffected by variations required by flexibility in the labour market.

Institutional advisers' exploration aims to establish a theory transcending Western liberalism and guiding China's future reform. Deng Xiaoping told the Chinese people of his generation not to debate the definition of socialism, leaving the theoretical problems to younger generations. Cui's effort is the beginning of this process as a member of the young elite. He has hinted that the partnership Meade advocated could become the right form of Chinese socialism. If institutional advisers like Cui are right, they could save the legitimacy crisis of the CCP and create a new ideology for China, welcomed by the party.

Some other institutional advisers directly appeal to nationalism as a proposed weapon to counter the US "peaceful evolution". In their eyes, "once people lose their sense of

country, of national defence and of nation, total collapse of the spirit will inevitably follow.”¹⁶⁰ National identity suffers as the “spiritual infiltration of hostile forces” gives rise to “a slavish 'conquered people'.” Therefore “we should foster the most precious national spirit of the Chinese nation, resurrect the spirit of patriotism, revive the will to build the nation.”¹⁶¹

A research report carried out by Fang Ning from CASS can fully represent those scholars’ arguments. The research is called Growing China--A Study on Present Chinese Youth's State and National Consciousness¹⁶² that studies the Chinese young generation's national consciousness, covering the time period from the late 1970s to the present. As this report shows, during the 1980s young Chinese began to examine China's historical development and the reality they were facing. With the Cultural Revolution as the background, Chinese youth longed for the rich West and unceasingly criticized China's past. “Learning from the US” became a popular slogan among Chinese youngsters. Peaceful evolution seemed to be welcomed by them.

In his opinion, after 1989 Chinese youth were compelled to re-examine their reflection of the 1980s, in the context of a new international environment. Many Chinese youth regard anti-China policies in the US as a challenge to Chinese territorial integrity. From the perspective of Chinese youth, the US intentionally tried to thwart China's rise in the name of democracy. Because more young Chinese became well-educated in the 1990s than in the 1980s, as an expanding group, they began to think for themselves rather than rely on their teachers. It is in this context that Chinese nationalism ran high.

Fang's research shows that the Sino-American relationship's change has greatly affected Chinese social thought. China begins to be aware of the danger of US peaceful evolution policy and tries to counter it with the help of nationalism. US containment and enmity toward China, including bombing China's embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999 and the Yinghe Vessel event, has further boosted China's surging nationalism that is the main reason why peaceful evolution policy has lost popularity in China. Fang claims that, to the Chinese, democracy is unacceptable if it is against China's national interests. He also claims that

the CCP's political education is successful which can be seen from the Chinese elite's about-face over democracy in the 1990s.

Institutional advisers like Fang are very close to those popular nationalists, who share with him their firm resistance to American peaceful evolution. Among those nationalists, Song Qiang and Wang Xiaodong are the most famous. Song is a contributor to the book *China Can Say No* and one of the founders of the nationalist journal *Zhanlue yu guanli* (Strategy and Management) that has considerable support in the PLA.

In this book Song tells people of his own transition from pro-America scholar to an anti-America one. He used to admire the US to excess. He says that in the 1980s all the old values were re-assessed. Among many things, "only America, America and America, could give students with liberal characters a surprising view."¹⁶³ Nevertheless, this sort of good impression of the US was shattered when Song began to know the imperialist nature of the US hegemony after the US challenged Chinese national interests many times. To many young Chinese, the American system is good, but only for Americans, not for Chinese. In their eyes, Americans pursue democracy, freedom and prosperity within the US but hegemonism outside, which is against national interests of developing countries. Therefore the popularity of anti-America feelings is naturally understood. Song said: "The anti-America voice in the world is not like the past, when it was a courageous gesture to fight against the imperialist will. The anti-America voice in the world now has the spirit plus materials as weapons."¹⁶⁴ Song strongly believes that China has to stand up and resolutely defend its national interests against US hegemony, which is a just cause shared by other developing countries.

From the foregoing one can see that institutional scholars are concerned with regime change, yet they do not dwell on the CCP's one-party rule consideration but rather focus on China's political stability. Some try to explore something transcending capitalist and socialist systems, some try to strengthen China as a political entity with bare nationalism. Their writings are sincerely and truly identified with the CCP's formalized language, yet

their response to the CCP's formalized language is obviously more practical and less narrow-minded than that of personal advisers.

Official Intellectuals

Most official intellectuals buy the formulation “peaceful evolution” and admit the fact that China is under great pressure to change its regime. During the 1990s, in terms of economic policy, China went through a period from the left to increasingly the right. Naturally, some Chinese thought the task of anti-peaceful evolution in China was growing more urgent. Chen Daisun from Beijing University agreed that peaceful evolution was under way in China.¹⁶⁵ He said that Western new liberal economics “has become an instrument for the West to access markets in developing countries, to carry peaceful evolution in socialist countries.”¹⁶⁶ Chen was well trained at Harvard University and played a critical role in the Chinese study of Western economics. His remarks reflected the old generation's worry that China would gradually become involved with the international capitalist system and betray socialist beliefs.

However, most official intellectuals focus more on the idea that peaceful evolution is a long-term and peaceful process than “a world war without smoke of gunpowder.” They are much less aggressive than personal and institutional advisers. They have noted that many more Americans begin to understand that excessive meddling in China's internal affairs only gives CCP leaders an excuse to resist change toward democracy and in this way the US also hands CCP leaders an opportunity to rally the Chinese behind them in their opposition to the US. In short, many official intellectuals gradually think in the shoes of Americans and believe the US will face reality and will encourage rather than push China toward democracy.¹⁶⁷

As such, Feng Tejun and Song Xinning and their colleagues prefer the term *heping jingzheng* (compete peacefully) rather than “peaceful evolution”.¹⁶⁸ They say: “We must understand that the downfall of capitalism is still a very long term historical process and the current capitalist regime still has some self-adjustment ability and is not at its end and put to flight. Socialism is a newly-born social system and has an incomparable advantage

that capitalism has not, yet the socialist system is not mature, with some at the primary stage, some having hindrances and varied shortcomings. Its innate advantage has not been fully tapped out, in terms either of economic efficiency or political democracy. The old system is in decline yet still viable; the new system has a bright future yet is still in fledgling form. This situation in which the two systems compete with each other determines that the socialist system has not achieved the conditions to replace the capitalist system in the whole world, either to date or in the far future.”¹⁶⁹ They follow the party line and proclaim that socialism will eventually win the victory in the competition against capitalism, although they say there is no clear sign for that at the moment. Their discourse is much less sincere than personal and institutional advisers over the fate of socialism and they try to weaken the term “peaceful evolution” with an alternative *heping jingzheng* (compete peacefully).

Liberals

Most liberals support the US peaceful evolution policy toward China and welcome China’s regime change. Ren Quan says: “Peaceful evolution is a way of political transition through which a feudal authoritarian society peacefully becomes a capitalist democracy almost without violence. This is what capitalist democracies led by the US hope and what the Chinese people hope as well. Since the June 4 event the Chinese Mainland has in fact entered a new period of peaceful evolution, a period of brewing new democratic movement, which is the consensus of democratic activists abroad and in China.”¹⁷⁰ In his opinion, most democratic activists believe the US peaceful evolution policy is right and people such as Xu Wenli and Wang Dan take this view.¹⁷¹

Conclusion

From the foregoing, one can see that, in terms of interpreting the formulation *heping yanbian* (compete peacefully), personal advisers are the most nationalistic. They view peaceful evolution from a strategic perspective, regarding it as a real threat to the CCP’s one-party rule. Many institutional advisers take a hard nationalist approach in their understanding of the term and try to find practical ways to counter US engagement. Their views are the most radical in terms of anti-Americanism due to their alliance with popular

nationalism. Both personal and institutional advisers stress the fact that China's anti-peaceful evolution effort is due to self-defence against the US pressure for regime change. Official intellectuals' interpretation is much more soft-line and theoretical, trying to twist the formulation to "peaceful competition". Their approach is less sincere than the former two groups in following the CCP's party line. While IR scholars from other groups deem that China must not allow peaceful evolution to take place,¹⁷² Liberals, understandably, are eager to see peaceful evolution come to pass soon.

3.3 Human Rights

In this section, the author will show how Chinese IR scholars respond to the CCP's formalized language on human rights.¹⁷³ Against US critics of China's human rights record, the core argument of the Chinese authorities is that sovereignty comes before human rights, that subsistence and development are the top priority of human rights,¹⁷⁴ which was articulated in the first place by He Xin.¹⁷⁵ Due to these nationalist arguments, CCP leaders do not believe human rights are universal but rather particularly linked with culture.¹⁷⁶ In the thick of the confrontation between the US and China shortly after the Tiananmen incident, Deng Xiaoping shifted toward nationalism and took He Xin's theories, imparting them into the CCP's party line and Chinese foreign policy. As often as China is attacked by the West over human rights issues, the CCP fights back with these theories.

Nationalist Understanding of Sovereignty and Human Rights

The CCP fights against Western accusations over its human rights record mainly with nationalism. The CCP's arguments on human rights are closely connected with the realist concept "absolute sovereignty (*zhu quan*)", similar to what has been termed "hyper-sovereignty values."¹⁷⁷ This concept was widely accepted in Europe when nationalism was at its peak in the 18-19th centuries. Now CCP leaders have picked it up. Deng Xiaoping understood the Chinese weakness in China-US relations and tried hard to avoid confrontation with the US,¹⁷⁸ yet Deng Xiaoping took an assertive nationalist stance over

issues of Chinese sovereignty: “We should never make concessions on matters of internal affairs and sovereignty and there is absolutely no room for compromise.”¹⁷⁹

It is suggested that China is now one of the strongest defenders of a more traditional absolutist concept of sovereignty, fighting as a conservative power along with a number of developing countries to reaffirm sovereignty and internal autonomy against challenges from evolving concepts of human rights, domestic governance and humanitarian intervention; concepts being pushed predominantly by liberal democracies.¹⁸⁰

In the West, scholars have been questioning the concept of sovereignty. Constructivists like Katzenstein point out that there are numerous examples of various types of sovereignty, which suggests that sovereignty is not an unquestioned foundational institution of international politics that can be assumed at the level of the international system.¹⁸¹ They argue that though the logic of sovereignty is taken for granted in realism, it has never triumphed in a pure form.¹⁸² Callahan concurs with him and points out that international politics in practice has already been deconstructing the very notion of sovereignty and its Westphalian roots.¹⁸³ He has noted the strong influence of supranational organizations like the European Union. He even believes that the notion of Greater China and the Chinese Diaspora will compel people in East Asia to turn more attention to concepts far beyond traditional understanding of sovereignty. Some scholars take even more radical positions. Neo-liberalists like Ohmae claim that nation states have already lost their role as meaningful units of participation in the global economy.¹⁸⁴

Under the impact of nationalism, realist understanding of sovereignty constitutes the main stream in Chinese IR theory. CCP leaders argue that sovereignty allows for the Chinese way of dealing with China’s human rights issues and external powers have no right to “teach” China how things should be done. This kind of nationalist understanding of human rights is shaped by Chinese history and culture. China has long been a country stressing political stability yet lacking political and civil liberty. Shadowed by China’s authoritarian history, the CCP’s official policy has been to pay lip-service to universalism of human rights but to argue for cultural relativism.¹⁸⁵

Sovereignty is intimately interwoven with knowledge practices and one must consider how it has operated within Chinese knowledge practices.¹⁸⁶ It is important to see how the Western concept of “sovereignty” has been constructed in China.¹⁸⁷ The Chinese dictionary defines “sovereignty” in a realist rather than liberal way. It highlights a distinction between internal and external spheres, where a sovereign state must be united domestically and thus able to defend itself against external forces. Zhu does not mean state, but “owner” in the sense of control over properties. *Quan* is the modern word for power, “a provisional advantage that derives from exceptional circumstances.”¹⁸⁸ *Zhuquan* (sovereignty) thus is the power enjoyed by the owner. With this understanding, CCP leaders believe Western countries should not intervene in China’s human rights issues that are regarded as China’s domestic affairs.

Human Rights and China-US Relations

Due to the unyielding stance of the CCP, human rights issues have been a problem in Sino-US relations since 1989, though not necessarily the most important. Despite strong opposition, the then Bush administration continued to engage China in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, the drama of the crackdown around Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, occurred just when the balance of concerns in US foreign policy began to move more toward affirming the country’s values than looking after its strategic interests.¹⁸⁹ Under pressure from the media and Congress, the Bush administration linked China’s MFN status with its human rights behaviour.

The two sides have opposing views on its concept and hence on US human rights diplomacy towards China. CCP leaders do not interpret human rights at a universal level as their US counterparts do. In terms of the basis of human rights, CCP leaders take a “developmentalist” view and regard subsistence and development as the most important.¹⁹⁰ It is suggested that their stance focusing on economic human rights holds water to some degree, as plenty of Western scholars also argue for people’s economic rights.¹⁹¹ As for the relationship between human rights and sovereignty, CCP leaders support the idea that sovereignty always comes before human rights. From their

perspective, the Americans have no moral high ground from which to teach others how to improve their human rights.

Though it is said that President Clinton's decision to de-link human rights and MFN trading status in 1994 ended meaningful pressure on China, China is still subjected to US intervention over a number of human rights issues such as prison labour, family planning, religious freedom, Tibet, Xinjiang etc.¹⁹² Blame rhetoric has a destructive effect on inter-group relations, despite the nature of the "real" conflict of interest at stake.¹⁹³ US accusations about human rights give rise to increasing nationalism among CCP leaders. China's human rights situation was undoubtedly at its worst during the Cultural Revolution, yet the US kept silent at that time. By 1989 China had signed and ratified the UN's Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and five other treaties and covenants on human rights.¹⁹⁴ Nevertheless China's progress in human rights has been ignored by the US. CCP leaders were bewildered at the timing of the appearance of human rights in the relationship and suspect the US motive.¹⁹⁵

US human rights accusations have also generated strong nationalism among the Chinese elite. Western dominance in international high politics leads many Westerners to be self-righteous in low politics and social values. Since the end of the Cold War, the Chinese elite have found themselves confronted with a Western bloc led by the US insistent on setting a set of human rights standards and rules that China has played no part in drafting but is called upon to comply with.¹⁹⁶

Since the early 1990s, increasing numbers of Chinese professionals have been free to visit or study in Western countries. What they have experienced in the West is not only the significance of human rights but also poverty, prejudice and isolation or at best paternalistic Orientalism. These privileged Chinese elites are very sensitive of their Chinese identity. Given their allegedly unfair treatment in the West they become more eager to seek for their Chinese roots.

To some extent, the CCP is successful in guiding younger elites to defend their Chinese values. The CCP regards the American human rights accusation against China as hegemonism that violates Chinese belief. This position has been widely supported by overseas Chinese students. Most Chinese students in the US mouth Chinese government's rhetoric even when they are not exposed to its media. China's exiled dissidents in the US are often confronted with hostility from such students, who question the dissidents' patriotism and attack their character.¹⁹⁷

On balance, the US has occupied higher moral ground than China in terms of human rights, yet the US approach to human rights is vulnerable at least on two accounts. One is its old concept of a Cold War confrontation between liberal democracy and Communist totalitarianism, which never really fits East Asia.¹⁹⁸ The other is the US tendency to misapply general principles to unique situations. Chinese are sceptical of universalism and China's stance is in fact developmentalist.¹⁹⁹ Nevertheless, Americans have overlooked the particularity side of human rights. The linking of MFN trade status with human rights is a prime example.²⁰⁰

Party Line

Deng Xiaoping claimed that China has a different human rights concept from the West. He said: "I should like to ask: what are human rights? Above all, how many people are they meant for? Do those rights belong to the minority, to the majority or to all the people in a country? Our concept of human rights is, in essence, different from that of the Western world, because we see the question from a different point of view."²⁰¹ He was angry with US policy as it intervenes in Chinese domestic issues on the excuse of human rights. He said: "In handling relations between countries, we should follow the principle of non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The People's Republic of China will never allow any country to interfere in its internal affairs."²⁰² CCP leaders use the concept "absolute sovereignty" to defend their own way of dealing with human rights.

Regarding US linkage of MFN status to China's human rights record, the senior CCP leader, Peng Zhen, took a strong nationalist position and declared that any condition attached to bilateral trade could be interpreted as an insult and challenge to China and is absolutely unacceptable.²⁰³ Deng believed that national sovereignty is more important than human rights: "Actually, national sovereignty is far more important than human rights, but they (Western countries) often infringe the sovereignty of poor, weak countries of the Third World."²⁰⁴ "Some Western countries, on the pretext that China has an unsatisfactory human rights record and an irrational and illegitimate socialist system, attempt to jeopardize our national sovereignty. Countries that play power politics are not qualified to talk about human rights."²⁰⁵ The book *Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao* (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought) says: "The US...tries hard to impose its own social system and ideology upon other countries, to interfere at will with the domestic politics of other countries in the name of 'human rights, liberty and democracy'.²⁰⁶ It also says: " It (America) noisily preaches 'human rights are superior to sovereignty', influences public opinion for the 'new interventionism', brazenly challenges the objectives and principles of the UN Charter, tramples on international law and the basic rules of international relations, resorts to or threatens to use force everywhere regardless of the UN, adopts new 'gunboat policy'".²⁰⁷

The bottom line of the official guidelines is that US human rights diplomacy is nothing less than power politics. The CCP is convinced that the US intends through this means to pave the way for its dominance in the world. The CCP simply does not believe in universality of human rights, to say nothing of their promotion by the US.

The author would like to stress 4 important points here. Firstly, *shengcun* (subsistence) only means in Chinese to "live a life without reference to spiritual and political considerations".²⁰⁸ Secondly, *fazhan* (development) means in Chinese the natural process of changing from small to big, from simple to complex, from lower level to higher level, which is mainly materialistic and not on political change at all.²⁰⁹ Thirdly, *renquan* (human rights) is more an individualistic than a collective term, which is firmly against patriotism and sovereignty according to Chinese understanding. Fourthly, in the Chinese

view, it is only an excuse used by the US and other Western countries to bully developing countries and to thwart the rise of developing countries as a collective in economy.

Personal Advisers

Personal advisers concur with Deng Xiaoping that China should uphold the line of state-in-command, even at the expense of the interests of some individuals. In fact, He Xin has created these formulations such as “sovereignty is superior to human rights”, and “subsistence is the top priority of human rights”.²¹⁰ His argument is indeed consistent with the Marxist belief that the foundation of human rights is subsistence and development. According to Marx and Engels, human rights are the outcome of change in economic environment in general, and development of the capitalist commodity economy in particular.

Marxists and their followers regard economic development as the foundation of human rights. This theory constitutes the basis of personal advisers’ arguments over human rights, and is in line with Deng Xiaoping’s productive forces criterion. Deng Xiaoping said that the basic principle of Marxism was to develop productive forces.²¹¹ He asserted that whether or not a policy is good depends on whether it is favourable to the improvement of productive forces, which is one of the most typical slogans of Deng's materialism.

Deng Xiaoping’s approach has been widely supported among the Chinese elite at a time when the parameters of human rights are expanding rapidly in international discourse and when the US appears stubborn in its adherence to a seemingly narrow framework of civil and political rights. The US urges China to ratify the twin international human rights covenants - one on political and civil rights, the other on economic, social and cultural rights - but the US Congress has no plans to consider ratification of the economic rights covenant.²¹² Therefore, the US is indeed vulnerable in terms of economic rights.²¹³

He Xin applied Deng’s criterion to human rights issues and created basic formulations like “sovereignty is superior to human rights” and “subsistence is the top priority of

human rights". Nevertheless, personal advisers do not bother to reify these formulations and they mostly leave it to institutional advisers, official intellectuals and propagandists. However, one should remember that these personal advisers are actually the toughest and most nationalist as to people's individual rights in general and political rights in particular.

Personal advisers such as He Xin often point out that, because of the emergence of globalisation, the wealth gap between rich and poor countries is growing bigger. They assert that most developing countries do not concur with the West on putting political rights ahead of subsistence and regarding it as the precondition, and they criticize the US for largely caring about people's political rights rather than economic, social, cultural and developmental rights.²¹⁴ Following the Cold War, whenever the human rights conference discussed developmental rights, developing countries all urged the human rights committee to establish a specific regime to carry out the 1986 Manifesto of Developmental Rights and to help the Third World with development rights.²¹⁵

Personal advisers like He Xin, Wang Daohan and Liu Ji deem that sovereignty is a secure refuge to cover China's bad human rights record. They put sovereignty as the foundation of international law. Firstly, they assert that sovereignty makes it possible that the whole world is divided into many equal and independent entities based on territories and hence international relations were born against this background. In this sense, sovereignty is the precondition of the existence of international law. Secondly, because states are the creator and practitioner of international law, the starting point of most sub-fields of international law, such as maritime law, aviation law, diplomatic law etc, is still safeguarding sovereignty. Thirdly, personal advisers are convinced that Five Principles Of Peaceful Co-Existence, advocated by Zhou Enlai, should be universally accepted by all countries. When Zhou Enlai raised these principles in the first place, he fixed his eyes on traditional understanding of sovereignty--absolute and independent. To him, it was certainly a haven for China to protect its national interests. Personal advisers deem it suitable to echo their support for Zhou Enlai's policy approach in new circumstances.

As such, personal advisers argue that the legislature of human rights should be made by states according to the principle of sovereignty. They agree with some Western scholars that the cause of human rights violations is largely national and the solutions must also be largely national.²¹⁶ States have their right to enact constitutional and other laws and to stipulate basic rights citizens can enjoy and basic responsibilities they should take, though states should respect international law. While making laws, articles about citizens' rights and freedom i.e. human rights should come from sovereignty rather than a foreign country or an international organization. This position obviously aims to defend China's human rights record against intervention from the West, not least the US. He Xin attacked Western human rights intervention as neo-colonialism. He once said: "One of the slogans in Kosovo war was 'human rights are superior to sovereignty', which means clash of values is prior to clash of sovereignties. The UK and US proposed 'neo-interventionism', and their theory is in fact a kind of neo-colonialist theory."²¹⁷

They believe that the realization of human rights is guaranteed by states. In their view, International Human Rights Convention lists human rights in detail, but it is only through states that its stipulations can become reality. After the end of the Second World War, Western countries adopted the welfare system, so the least advantaged people in their countries could be taken care of, but this system is limited within the border of nation states. In fact, it is still very difficult for developing countries to get economic assistance from the West. The improvement of national welfare is mainly the duty of states rather than international society. A sovereign country's policy determines the subsistence and development rights of its people, which are according to personal scholars the most important in human rights. Because of the reality of the separation of nation states, if international society wants to raise the standard of human rights all over the world, it should respect the principle of equality among states. They presume that "sovereignty is the last defence of developing countries".²¹⁸ On the world stage co-operation cannot be occur without the full participation of different countries as equal members. Personal advisers warn the US that it shall not make mistakes in this regard. Liu Ji claims that co-operation will not work if the US tries to impose upon other countries its values of democracy and human rights.²¹⁹

Personal advisers harshly advise Americans to mind their own business. Liu Ji said: “Yet America has its own social problems and is far from being an ideal society. The best choice for Americans is to focus on improving their own society. If America does things really well, their achievement will have the force of truth and Chinese will learn from them. ...But if the US does not focus on improving itself but instead tries to make China accept everything American, then the Chinese will naturally ask, ‘Is this what human rights and democracy means to the Americans?’ This will result in conflicts.”²²⁰

Apparently personal advisers’ discourse is full of strong words in terms of anti-US human rights policy toward China. As they are the main designers of the CCP’s human rights policies, it is not surprising that they follow the party line most sincerely, truly and appropriately.

Institutional Advisers

Institutional advisers follow the CCP’s formalized language and defend China’s position in the language exchange between China and the US, trying to build up a positive image for China on the world stage. Their main argument is that the integrity of China’s political sovereignty and the importance of economic development over civil and political rights serve China’s national interests.

Some institutional advisers have studied US human rights diplomacy to highlight its hegemonism. The word “hegemonism” is surely softer in tone than He Xin’s “neo-colonialism”. In their eyes, it started from President Carter and was fully developed in the Reagan administration. After George Bush came into power, human rights had become one of America’s basic national policies, equal to such important strategic issues as peace and security. From their point of view, US human rights diplomacy enforces the US criterion upon other countries, interferes in their domestic politics in the name of human rights and brings about suffering to many people in the world. It is typical hegemonism and is hypocritical. Wang Zaibang says: “Reality has proved that some countries...regard themselves as the protector of human rights and force their own values and social systems

on to other countries regardless of differences in historical traditions, development level and targets of human rights protection...it might make the human rights situation worse...”²²¹

In March 1999, NATO led by the US began to air strike Yugoslavia. With the war still continuing, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair raised a new theory to deal with international affairs, namely, neo-interventionism. It is regarded as humanitarian quasi-intervention by Jack Donnelly, who defines it as a situation wherein “one party tries to subordinate the other to its will through injury or punishment,” for the purpose of “remedy(ing) gross, systematic violations of internationally-recognized human rights.”²²² Blair proposed to confine traditional non-interventionism and spread Western values around the world. The basis of this new theory is that sovereignty is no longer as important as human rights. Americans embraced this idea immediately and adopted it as the theoretical foundation of the war against Yugoslavia. Many more Western scholars also support interventionism. They conclude that despite the restrictions of the UN Charter on such interventions, a new international consensus seems to have been formed that allows such interventions.²²³ Nevertheless, Western countries have failed to provide an effective way to ease the tension when the sovereignty norm grates with the free trade norm or the evolving humanitarian intervention norm.²²⁴ The CCP is aware of it and has called once again for “respect of sovereignty.” It is also alert to the threat to its one-party rule in China due to the persuasiveness of the interventionist theory and mustered many institutional advisers to fight back.

Institutional advisers claim that neo-interventionism justifies forceful intervention in other countries’ domestic politics.²²⁵ CCP leaders are afraid that the US will become the final judge of international relations and then international law will come to nothing. If a country refuses to accept the US judgment, it will then be punished by economic sanctions or even military strike. Institutional advisers say it is the return of jungle law rather than humanitarian development of international society. Zhu Muzhi from CASS said: “If one asks what ‘human rights are superior to sovereignty’ means, the following formula will be the most concise answer: it equals to hegemonism.”²²⁶ His words

orchestrate the official guideline that human rights movement is for the US nothing but a convenient weapon with which to bully other countries.

In this scenario, institutional advisers follow the CCP's formalized language and stress the importance of sovereignty. Wang Yizhou from CASS deems that sovereignty is obviously superior to human rights. He says: "Practice has proved that nations without nation-states framework and accordingly without protection of international law are the most wretched ones, a typical examples being the Kurdish nation that has tens of millions of population yet are scattered in Turkey, Iraq, Iran and other countries. Human rights there are not protected at all and anybody can bully them. The UN can do nothing about it and can only stand by with folded arms."²²⁷ His opinion of the UN is obviously in line with some Western scholars that disregard the role of the UN in world politics, because they believe it was designed primarily to protect states from incursions by other states, not to protect citizens from abuses by their own governments on humanitarian grounds.²²⁸

Many institutional advisers emphasize the difference in interpretation of human rights between China and the West, and criticize Western scholars' attitudes to apply their criteria to the entire world. They maintain that different countries have different national conditions, that one country's theory on human rights depends on its political system, economic development, spiritual life, cultural characteristics and educational quality. Because national conditions among nation states differ in thousands of ways, it is not right and also inappropriate to establish a sort of universal standard across the whole world. For instance, Fan Guoxiang, vice-president of the China Society for Human Rights Studies, advocate human rights with Chinese characteristics: "...it is imperative to properly deal with relations between individuals and the community. Public matters should precede private ones. Justice should come before gains."²²⁹

Institutional scholars criticize Western countries because they are accustomed to impose their own models on other countries with their own models, though they themselves do not behave very well in many areas.²³⁰ They claim that there are too many serious human rights problems in the US, including lack of safeguard for life, freedom and personal

safety; serious rights violations by law enforcement departments; plight of the poor, hungry and homeless; worrying conditions for women and children; deep-rooted racial discrimination; wantonly infringing human rights of other countries etc.²³¹ Therefore, “in 2001, without support from the majority of member countries”,²³² the US was voted out of the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the International Narcotics Committee.

It seems to the Chinese public that their critics have a point. For example, when people in the West take to the street and demonstrate for the rights of pet animals, children in many sub-Saharan countries are still suffering from hunger and on the verge of death. These scholars claim that it is indeed impractical to measure human rights situation in over 180 countries with just one criterion advocated by the West. To safeguard and promote people's rights, to demonstrate people's values and dignity, all countries could possibly come together and negotiate common objectives and basic rules, yet they should be very cautious and deal with each case on its own merits while facing specific procedures and methods.²³³

Seeking truth from facts and mutually respecting one another is vital in international co-operation. Nevertheless, the point to make here is that institutional advisers have no intention to appeal to the consciousness of people in the West and communicate with them for the sake of improving the welfare of developing countries but, rather, try to defend China's external image in terms of human rights, as the main target of their discourses is their domestic audience rather than outside world.

As China still retains the name of a socialist country, some institutional advisers defend China's position from the stance of traditional ideology. They claim, “The essence of socialist democracy is that the people are the master of the country. The system of people's congress and the system of multi-party co-operation and political consultation under the leadership of the CPC embody this characteristic and these systems are constantly being developed and improved.”²³⁴ Therefore people's human rights are well-observed and “Chinese government respects the people's political rights and enlists the

people's initiatives.”²³⁵ They claim that with the establishment of the welfare system, Western societies have grown increasingly stable and have been enjoying long-term economic prosperity, yet capitalist countries have too many bad records in human rights to mind other countries' business.

According to these scholars, people in socialist countries should enjoy more freedom and democracy than capitalist countries, which is stipulated in these countries' constitutions. Nevertheless, socialist countries have a very short history and are not yet mature: some faults have emerged in their construction. People's rights in these countries have not yet been fully realized and need improvements through economic and political reform.²³⁶ This kind of discourse is expressly in line with Deng Xiaoping's theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics that asserts that the full advantages of socialism have not yet been displayed.

Some other institutional advisers directly attack US human rights policy and vilify its image to justify China's stance. The author will examine as follows Chinese scholar Liu Wenzong's article and demonstrate how institutional advisers defame the image of the US. His article has two parts: one a brief history of US human rights foreign policy, one his comments.²³⁷ He starts with criticizing the sinister motive of US human rights policy, considering it as a barbarous intervention in other countries' domestic issues. He says in 1977 when Carter was elected president of the US, he began to send human rights issue diplomats to overseas embassies and consulates. He says this is the beginning of the US human rights diplomacy. It seems to him that Carter's human rights foreign policy covered too many areas and had no focal point. He maintains that the Carter administration held double standards in its human rights foreign policy. He cites America's allegedly unprincipled protection of Israel to support his argument.

He then goes on to discuss the Reagan administration. He noticed that president Reagan did not agree totally with Carter's human rights diplomacy. The Reagan administration chose the Soviet bloc as the core of its human rights diplomacy. In 1981, while facing large-scale internal unrest, the Polish government announced a war situation.

Immediately, the US partly ceased some economic relationship with Poland, with the excuse of the Polish government's violation of human rights. Liu says that as such human rights became a weapon of the struggle between the US and the Soviet bloc.

US human rights policy toward the Soviets played a big role at the final stage of its disappearance. After the Soviet Union had gone, the Bush administration switched its attention from the Soviets to China. From Liu's perspective, the US was deeply involved in the June 4 event, providing information, finance and even guidance for the democrats in the streets. He says that the Bush administration's human rights diplomacy has three characteristics: a) clearly regard human rights as the basic US national policy, strategically equal to peace and security; b) In the relationship with China, link human rights with the MFN status, China's WTO entry and technology co-operation;²³⁸ c) Further expand the connotation and scope of human rights diplomacy, trying to attack and topple other countries' political systems. He then gives the Americans a dressing-down for their human rights policy.

Liu's discourse well represents institutional advisers' approaches to defame the US image in respect of human rights. During the second part of his article, he defends the CCP's position and accuses the Americans of hypocrisy. He deems that the US "unilaterally" interprets human rights and works its own will on others; that the US government intervenes in other countries' domestic issues "in the name of" human rights; that the US preaches the theory that human rights are superior to sovereignty and carries out in fact hegemonism in the world; that the US takes different criteria towards different countries. His conclusion is to repeat the CCP's formulation that US human rights diplomacy amounts to "power politics". Institutional advisers like him believe that the US aims to dominate the world "in the smog of" human rights.

Like many other nationalists who believe their own states are always right and others wrong, many institutional advisers claim US human rights foreign policy is hypocritical, as the Americans themselves have a bad human rights record. They point out that the US keeps silent about its own human rights issues and does not allow others to mention them.

For instance, one thing they cite is racism in the US. In April-May 1992, Chinese media extensively reported the racial riot arising out of the case of a black young driver, Rodney King, who was beaten badly by white policemen. Institutional advisers told the Chinese public that there existed an entrenched human rights flaw in the US, the most obvious of which is the huge gap between blacks and whites.

Apart from smearing the image of the US, institutional advisers go to great lengths to build up a positive image of China in terms of human rights. They assert that China has made a great improvement on developmental rights. Wang Zhuqian points out that, in China not only the problem of food and clothing for the 1.2 billion Chinese has been solved, but also a constant increase in people's income has been maintained. He refers to Chinese statistics to support his argument. "Compared with other countries in the world, China belongs to the low-income countries, but the living standards of the people have been enhanced greatly...China, the largest developing country that had one-quarter of the world's poor population in the late 1970s, now has less than one-30th of the world's total."²³⁹ He proudly proclaims, "China is trying to eliminate absolute poverty by the end of 2000."²⁴⁰ As one can see now, it is surely not the case.

According to their discourse, the CCP has continued to put safeguarding and promotion of people's rights to subsistence and development at the top of its agenda, sparing no efforts to develop the economy, enhance comprehensive national power and improve people's access to subsistence and development. They claim that the problem of ensuring poverty-stricken people have enough to eat and wear has basically been solved and their quality of life has been greatly improved, forming a striking contrast with the situation worldwide in which the population in absolute poverty keeps increasing. Following the CCP's party line, they present a positive China on the world stage in terms of human rights, justifying their claim that US accusations are unfounded.

Official Intellectuals

Generally speaking, official intellectuals take much a softer line on US accusations about human rights issues. They normally generally follow the party line over sovereignty and

seldom attack the US human rights record, especially not regarding US policy as strategic if not evil. They seldom mention the priority order between civic and political rights and economic rights. Some even believe they are all equally significant for human beings and acknowledge the universality of political rights, which is obviously not in line with the party.

Some official intellectuals resort to history to explain China's position. It seems to them that history has played a great role in China's current human rights policy. After the Opium War, China suffered badly from the bullying of the West and the Chinese central governments surrendered more often than not while facing Western and then Japanese threats. In the 1990s the Chinese people supported the CCP though they were not satisfied with the progress of China's political reform, as they believed that its policies were beneficial to China's sovereign integrity and the increase of China's wealth. Due to bitter historical memories, official intellectuals are willing to tolerate the CCP's faults as long as it effectively maintains national integrity and strives for economic growth.

As such, those official intellectuals acknowledge the CCP's contribution to China's national interests from the perspective of history. In other words, in their view, China's faults regarding human rights are mainly due not so much to the party's policies as to historical evolution. Chinese scholar Zhu Ruiji maintains that, given China's historical burden, the CCP's achievements are impressive and worth praising. He says: The human rights situation of the Chinese people made overall amelioration development. China's comprehensive national power has been greatly improved, and China's international status and prestige is growing.²⁴¹ From his view one can see that official intellectuals identify with the party, in a great measure because they believe the party has indeed accomplished a lot considering China's historical backwardness and weakness in modern times.

Xiao Gongqin, a well-known scholar in Shanghai Normal University, who advocates constructive rather than radical nationalism in China, acknowledges the positive aspect of US human rights policy. In his opinion, US policy is not so much a strategic arrangement

as a cultural product of its tradition. He points out, “The difference of political culture between China and the US lies in, on the US side, the fact that there has long been in the US political culture a kind of idealism or ‘human rights fundamentalism’ based on human rights, liberty and democracy. There exist strong Christian cultural sentiments in US national characters. This kind of political culture has a long-term origin, from the responsibility of the whites to ideas and ideal of liberal democracy aiming to ‘liberate the whole human race’.”²⁴² In his view, this kind of interventionism of liberal democracy is really out of sincerity for some Americans and cannot be simply regarded as some rich people’s selfish greed for external expansion. One can see his opinion is in apparent contrast with institutional advisers’ view that the US approach is hypocritical.

Some official intellectuals like Tian Jin actually appreciate the value of political rights though still lean to economic rights. Tian Jin wrote an article on human rights and particularly the history of human rights development.²⁴³ Tian Jin’s article The Development Of International Human Rights Activities and Issues in Debate, is divided into two parts, one on the development of international human rights activities and the other on some debated issues.

At the beginning of the article, he points out that the international human rights movement is an important part of contemporary world politics and international relations. It seems to him, from the 1940s onwards, the contents of human rights have been getting much broader thanks to the effort of international organizations and many human rights activists in the world. The 1945 UN Charter claims that the peoples of the United Nations were determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations, large and small. He deems that the human rights part of the UN Charter, largely on civic and political rights, is indeed consistent with the historical trend and certainly reflect public opinions across the world. In Tian Jin’s eyes, it is indeed positive progress. One can see from here that official intellectuals are not against people’s political rights while stressing the importance of economic rights.

Tian Jin then recalls the history of human rights movement in the 1950s. During this period, there were many conflicts between the East and West over the contents of human rights. Many countries had varied ideas on the draft of Economic, Social, Cultural Rights International Convention and International Convention of Citizen and Political Rights. Tian Jin says that due to their effort, member states eventually passed some conventions and rules in protection of women and children, on rights of stateless people, on anti-discrimination in employment and on cancellation of forced labour and slavery.

He goes on to examine the human rights development of the 1960s. He says that the UN composition changed dramatically with the joining of many more newly-established developing countries. They strongly required the rights of national determination and stated that this was the pre-requisite of upholding individual rights, that any kind of colonialism and racism were an infringement of national determination. In the UN assembly, Manifesto of Bestowing Colonial States and People Independence was passed in 1960, Eternal Sovereignty of National Resources in 1962. It seems to him that these two conventions are the important extensions of Manifesto of World Human Rights, as they have reified nearly every right stipulated in it.

Tian Jin says that the 1970s are the turning point in the human rights movement history. In his eyes both political and economic rights were stressed on the world stage during this period. He points out that civic rights were stressed during this period. In the European Security Co-operation Conference, Western countries showed great interest in humanitarian co-operation with the Soviet bloc and desired to make personal contacts a sort of catalyst to promote liberalization in socialist countries. The West was eager to see flexibility in Soviet policies on family gathering, marriage between different nationalities and free communication on travel information.

He then moves on to the 1980s. He actually shows official intellectuals' sympathy over Gorbachev's effort to improve his people's political rights. After Gorbachev came into power in the Soviet Union, he tried to accommodate critics in the West, introducing some fresh ideas of humanism and human rights to his people, such as socialist humanism,

value of human beings and its full development as the starting point of reform, the advantage of reform for the improvement of citizens' political, social and individual rights etc. Gorbachev even loosened restrictions on dissidents, religious belief and people's emigration rights. Tian Jin gives many compliments to these efforts though Gorbachev is regarded as a traitor of socialism in China.

In the 1980s official intellectuals' arguments on human rights are mainly based upon the theory of class struggle. According to this sort of old ideology, they claimed categorically that there were no human rights at all in capitalist countries. In the 1990s, though they maintained that one could not expect China's human rights situation, particularly its political rights situation, to be changed overnight, they began to face China's bad human rights record. In the late 1990s, more and more official intellectuals at universities began to forsake traditional ideological stereotypes and admitted that human rights conditions in the West were actually better than in China. Apparently they kept a distance from the official formulations.

Obviously, official intellectuals have accepted universalist notions of human rights in their developmentalist rhetoric, which is in line with Van Ness's observations on the Chinese response to Western human rights critics.²⁴⁴ This developmentalist approach actually conforms to the modernization theory of comparative politics that Chinese nationalists agree with, which, represented by Seymour Martin Lipset in particular, suggests that economic modernization leads to social, cultural and political change.²⁴⁵ It is also consistent with the work of Inglehart who argues that economic change drives political change.²⁴⁶

Liberals

Liberals are the most radical in terms of human rights among Chinese IR scholars. Nathan believes that there is in terms of human rights "an undoubted improvement over Mao's" under the current regime,²⁴⁷ yet Chinese liberals are not satisfied. Most of them are strongly against the CCP's formalized language. Liu Xiaobo attacks the CCP's party line that puts subsistence and developmental rights before political rights. He say: " It is

well known that, while the CCP authority responded to Western countries' human rights diplomacy after the June 4 event, its most effective tactics are to cut apart human rights in general as a whole, separating subsistence and developmental rights from other human rights and political rights in particular. The authority only stresses subsistence and developmental rights and tries hard to play down and even cancel human rights relating to speech, thinking (belief), association, demonstration, election etc.”²⁴⁸ Nevertheless, it does not follow that Liu Xiaobo believes that there is no need for subsistence and developmental rights. He says there are four paramount human rights issues including the peasant problem, June 4 problem, Falun gong problem and unemployment, yet the most urgent is the peasant problem and China needs to modernize its agriculture as soon as possible.²⁴⁹

Conclusion

From the above one can see that personal advisers take advantage of the weak points of the US position, set the keynote from the perspective of strategy and theory, take the toughest and most nationalistic approach and defend China's human rights record from the doctrine of exclusivity and cultural relativism based upon the concepts that promote subsistence, development and collective rights over individual rights; institutional advisers engage in a “war of saliva” with the US, try to construct an evil image of the US and a positive one of China; official intellectuals keep at arm's length from the CCP's formulations, divert the language exchange to abstract discourses and seldom attack the US for its so-called bad record. They acknowledge the universal value of political rights, while following official formulations and stressing the importance of subsistence and development rights for the purpose of economic growth for the time being. They argue that China's faults in human rights are largely due to historical legacies and their approach is the most developmentalist. Though liberals acknowledge the importance of economic rights, most of them attack the CCP for its poor political rights record.

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²³³ Yu Mengjia, 'Universal Human Rights in Development,'

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Chapter IV: China's Arguments on America: Cultural Issues

Chapter IV discusses cultural issues arising out of US-China relations. The author has collected 48 articles relating to cultural issues in US-China relations, largely from *Xiandai guoji guanxi*, *Guoji wenti yanjiu*, *Zhanlue yu guanli* and *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi*, and also from some important books and websites. I focus on the Chinese writings on the debate over cultural conflict theory and on the US media, and try to show the domestic concerns of Chinese nationalism in foreign policy from the angle of culture, what is the CCP's formalised language on cultural issues in foreign policy and how different groups of Chinese IR scholars articulate the CCP's formalised language.

Culture is one of the core parts of nationalism, which seeks to protect or establish unique values. In the Chinese case, this process has been going on in opposition to Western culture. Zhao Suisheng said in 2000: “One important characteristic of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s was its harsh criticism of ‘Western values’.”¹ Nevertheless, CCP leaders do not aim to rid China of modernisation-driven Western culture, but rather deconstruct and then incorporate it into a new Chinese culture.

What the CCP aims to establish is a new culture based on a mixture of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, traditional Chinese values and Confucianism in particular, together with liberalism. These values are not new to the world, yet this “re-orientation,”² an effort to integrate all three together in an organic way, is surely brand new. One of the main reasons why the CCP resorts to China’s indigenous values to buttress its legitimacy is that Marxism-Leninism and Maoism largely clash with liberalism and these two trends need to be balanced so that they can truly take root in Chinese soil.³ Marxism-Leninism and liberalism are both the product of the Enlightenment, while Confucian ethics that emerged in socialist East Asia are often a confirmation, rather than a critique, of the Enlightenment mentality.⁴ New Confucianism has no intention to reverse the human process of modernisation that is stressed by both Marxism-Leninism and Maoism and liberalism.

In this context, the CCP tries to highlight a unique Chinese identity *he er butong* ('Incorporating things of diverse nature').⁵ *He* (harmony) is in line with Confucian pacifism while difference aims to proclaim the legitimacy of Deng's Socialism with Chinese Characteristics that tries to combine liberalism and Marxism-Leninism and Maoism. Guided by this new approach, China has developed a preference for the use of "partnerships" with other nations in foreign policy, which allows for different values.⁶

Chinese Cultural Re-orientation

Samuel Kim believes there are in Chinese foreign policy two schools - the *exotica sinica* "continuity" and revolutionary "discontinuity".⁷ In fact, this phenomenon is also the reflection of Chinese cultural evolution. In the 1990s, in terms of continuity, the CCP still kept Marxism-Leninism and Maoism and Deng's economic liberalism, and rediscovered traditional values in order to strike a balance between the former two; in terms of discontinuity, the CCP takes de-constructive approaches to these three strands and does away with factors that are not compatible with modernisation.

Generally speaking, Chinese culture has been in constant change. China's mainstream culture has over time exhibited great flexibility. In modern times this attribute has helped China to learn from the West.⁸ The New Cultural Movement around 1919 brought liberalism into China, the PRC's establishment in 1949 secured several decades' dominance of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, yet it is impossible for China to cut loose from its indigenous roots. China has been going through a period in which these three trends begin to mingle together and evolve toward oneness since Deng Xiaoping adopted his reform and open-door policy, and this process has been expedited since 1989 with the rise of the new nationalism. The problem is that it is a huge task to mix the three strands in an organic way, therefore the traditional Chinese wisdom *he er butong* (incorporating things of diverse nature) serves the turn. Anyway, Confucianism predisposes followers to "accept the status quo as intrinsically reasonable."⁹

Traditional Chinese culture has two strong points that can be retrieved and inspire the latter-day modern world: party-state centred on Confucianism and holistic thinking based

on Zhou Yi.¹⁰ They might contribute to social stability and order of human beings.¹¹ In conjunction with Western culture that is more atomistic and analytical yet more in clash, traditional Chinese culture might play a crucial role in establishing a cosmopolitan and peaceful world culture.¹²

China has sustained what Wang Gungwu terms as a “historical oneness”.¹³ This oneness is labelled as civilisation-state by many and is owed largely to China’s party state system. To all intents and purposes, Confucians constituted a party, at least in its primary form.¹⁴ As a party, the Confucian school checked the power of the Emperor, the army, aristocrats and other interest groups and maintained the balance of power in the central authority. It also established an efficient inner-party balance system to maintain self-control.¹⁵

The mainstream Chinese culture stems from Zhou Yi that emphasises holistic thinking through maintaining balance of Yin and Yang. Confucius believed that all factors of nature and human beings are linked together as a whole and accordingly should be studied as a whole.¹⁶ Xiong Shili explained this argument.¹⁷ He believes that the vitality that engenders human creativity is the same energy that gives rise to the great earth. The ethic of forming one body with nature looms large in his moral idealism.

Due to this kind of holistic thinking, the Chinese most of the time take an un-exploitative way in dealing with outside world, as “others” are a necessary part of the universe as a whole. “Others” exist for the sake of “us” and the whole. In fact, “China as an empire was not established by conquest of other nations”.¹⁸ The practice-based view of “the other” may account for the fact that Han Chinese were “not racial or biological in any overt sense”.¹⁹

Shortly after the Opium War, the new world of industrialisation so relentlessly challenged China’s traditional agriculture-based economy and family-centred social structure that Confucianism seemed to become almost irrelevant to the vital concerns of the modern world.²⁰ Due to the gradual marginalisation of Confucianism China sank into turmoil.

To strengthen China and restore its past glory, the Chinese tried some form of liberalism in the first place, yet it failed to bring about a unified, modernised and powerful China as expected. Therefore the Chinese finally chose Marxism-Lennism and Maoism for a way out. However socialism was not as helpful as people expected either. Since 1949 until 1978 Chinese society was subjected to profoundly disruptive campaigns approximately every five years. In the end, Deng Xiaoping brought in economic liberalism by the back door in the 1980s.

Culture and Chinese Understanding of Engagement

Domestic cultural re-orientation has affected Chinese foreign policy. To control Liberalism and maintain Marxism-Lennism and Maoism in China, Deng Xiaoping's strategy in foreign policy is a mixture of Confucian and Legalist approaches, wen and wu, namely, to use hostile policies or to use cooperative ones with the West.²¹ In China-US relations, CCP leaders tend to include cultural issues, which belong to the wen approach, into their policies.

Neither the conditional engagement proposed by James Shinn nor the constructive engagement raised by A. I. Johnston and Robert Ross has addressed the cultural issues of the Sino-American relationship, as it is mainly excluded from the US administration's China policies. As far as engagement itself is concerned, cultural matters play from the perspective of the US little role other than educational and technological exchanges. This is not the case for the CCP. The party tries to convince the Chinese public that the Chinese way of life is indeed different from liberal democracies yet the Chinese difference is reasonable. It is not right for the US to nullify this difference. Therefore CCP leaders repeatedly claim that there is a conspiracy carried out by the US that aims to vilify and discredit Chinese culture and to Westernise China in the area of culture.²² It is alleged that the US is using cultural means to incite rebellions in China, particularly in the case of the Falun Gong movement.²³

Most Chinese IR scholars take on board the CCP's approach to the US engagement with cultural issues. Apart from the pressure from the party, there are two other reasons. On the one hand, civil society has not yet taken shape in China and Chinese IR scholars often perceive other nations unwittingly from their own experiences of the Chinese environment and hence treat at times what happens in civil society as official policies. They regard the media and academics in the US as the government's mouthpiece, as in China.

On the other hand, some Chinese IR scholars, due to Sino-centric thinking, claim to pursue the subjectivity of the Chinese culture. Whatever the economic and political realities of China's future may be, one thing is pretty certain that cultural attitudes forming the basis for the attitudes of Chinese intellectuals across the political spectrum will continue to be shaped by "compelling nationalistic aspirations."²⁴ Therefore, when Chinese IR scholars examine the US engagement policy toward China, they are tempted to accuse the US media and academia, to suit their own nationalistic needs. Surely this trend is very much encouraged by the CCP.

Party Line

The core values of the CCP's understanding of nationalism in terms of foreign policy are four: *he er butong* (incorporating things of diverse nature), *weiji yishi* (crisis consciousness), *shouhai* (victim complex) and *minzu zihao* (national pride). One can see this clearly from Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping²⁵ and the book Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought).²⁶ The author has already extensively demonstrated the CCP's formalised language on *weiji yishi* (crisis consciousness) and *he er butong* (incorporating things of diverse nature) in preceding chapters and this chapter will deal with these two in the first section and in the second section turn attention to *shouhai* (victim complex) and *minzu zihao* (national pride) through analysis of the Chinese response to the US media.

On the establishment of a new Chinese culture, Deng Xiaoping said, "Today we still uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, part of which we have inherited

and part of which we have developed ourselves...we are building a socialism suited to conditions in China.”²⁷ The CCP thus stresses the need to cling to Marxism-Leninism and Maoism and proclaims, “Comrade Deng Xiaoping time and again warned us that forefathers should not be forgotten, namely, Marxism-Leninism and Maoism should not be forgotten.”²⁸ “The Chinese people deeply understand from experience such a truth: only socialism can save China.”²⁹

The CCP highlights Confucian values *hexie* (harmony) and pacifism. Deng said, “We adhere to an independent foreign policy of peace and do not join any bloc. We are prepared to maintain contacts and make friends with everyone.”³⁰ The CCP says: “The Chinese cultural tradition highlights all along ‘*he wei gui* (peace is highly valued)’.”³¹ Then how to achieve this? It says: “(We) should during external relations stick to equality among nations, persuade people with reason, never become overbearing nor servile, and be natural and graceful, displaying the manner of a great and proud country...”³²

The CCP also tries to embrace Western liberalism. Deng Xiaoping said, “...we must make it clear that our guideline is just that -- to open and not to close.”³³ The CCP says: “...it (socialism) has to boldly...imbibe and make use of all advanced management means and skills of countries in the present world including developed capitalist countries...”³⁴ It also says: “ The open-door policy (*duiwai kaifang*) is due to the need to consolidate and develop the socialist system, to establish and improve the socialist market economy, to realise the strategic objective of modernisation.”³⁵

In the mean time the CCP tries to demonstrate a strong victim complex in its official guidelines while showing Chinese national pride. Deng said, “We, the Chinese people, have our national self-respect and pride. We deem it the highest honour to love our socialist motherland and contribute our all to her socialist construction.”³⁶ The CCP is surely proud of China’s history. It says, “ The Chinese people has a history of long-term and splendid civilisation, and made important contributions toward the improvement and advancement of human beings.”³⁷ Nevertheless, the CCP believes that Chinese pride has been tarnished by Western countries. Deng said that when he heard shortly after the June

4 event in 1989 that seven Western countries had decided to impose sanctions on China, it reminded him of 1900, “when the allied forces of the eight powers invaded China.”³⁸ He also said, “For more than a century after the Opium War China was subjected to humiliation, and the Chinese people were looked down upon.”³⁹ Following Deng, the CCP says, after the Opium War, “The Chinese nation fully suffered the invasion, bullying and oppression of imperialist powers, and the Chinese people lived in an abyss of suffering.”⁴⁰ The party proclaims that the Chinese people resolutely do not want to return to “the humiliated status in the past.”⁴¹

The danger against Chinese civilisation still exists according to the CCP’s guidelines. Deng said, “...some Westerners are trying to (overthrow the socialist system in China).”⁴² The CCP appeals to the Chinese crisis consciousness and says: “ Socialism is still at a low tide in the world...Domestic and external enemies collude with each other and have never forsaken the attempt to westernize, disintegrate, infiltrate, subvert and separate China.”⁴³

Among many terms, the most important ones are *jianchi ma ke si lie ning zhuyi mao zedong sixiang* (uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought), *lao zhuzong buneng wang* (forefathers should not be forgotten), *he wei gui* (peace is highly valued), *yangyang daguo fengfan* (the manner of a great and proud country), *duiwai kaifang* (the open-door policy), *zhonghua minzu shi weida de minzu* (the Chinese nation is a great nation), *guoqu de quru diwei* (the humiliated status in the past). *Lao zhuzong* (forefathers) means largely revolutionary forefathers like Marx, Engels, Mao, Zhou etc, and also Chinese ancestors. *Lao zhuzong buneng wang* (forefathers should not be forgotten) aims to emphasise the CCP’s respect for tradition. *Yangyang* in *yangyang daguo fengfan* (the manner of a great and proud country) means “grand manner” in Chinese,⁴⁴ and hints that China is superior to other countries in morality, which is a typical Confucian Sino-centric view. *Quru* in *guoqu de quru diwei* (the humiliated status in the past) means in Chinese oppression and humiliation suffered by people,⁴⁵ and it clearly shows the CCP’s resentment of US dominance and aggression.

The author will in the first section focus on the Chinese response to the theory of clash of civilisations, and in the second on Chinese coverage of the US media.

4.1 Clash of Civilisations

The CCP's effort to mix Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, Confucianism and liberalism is still at the early stage and the foundation of Chinese civilisation is still Confucianism regardless of the baptism of communism.⁴⁶ Its position on the status of Chinese culture in world society is that it is superior to others in terms of peace-keeping,⁴⁷ and as such it should be defended for the purpose of maintaining world peace, whereas they believe the US culture is aggressive. The CCP has long described the US as the source of international problems.⁴⁸

Clash of Civilisations Theory

Chinese elites believe in *he er butong* (incorporating things of diverse nature) yet mainstream Western IR theorists do not. In Western IR studies there is a key question: are relations among nation states inevitably conflictual? Neo-liberalism and neo-realism share the rationalist assumption that states are self-regarding, yet debate whether states pursue relative or absolute gains. Neo-liberals maintain that international institutions and interdependence restrain state aggression. In the US-China case, optimists like Lampton regard economic interdependence and common security concerns as ensuring peace.⁴⁹

Realists like Kennedy have argued that rising powers like China and hegemons like the US invariably go to war.⁵⁰ Policymakers and pundits like Condoleezza Rice and Ted Carpenter have drawn on such arguments to suggest that China is a revisionist power destined to clash with the US.⁵¹ Tom Christensen regards China as the “high church of realpolitik” today.⁵² In Chinese Realism, Johnston similarly argued that Chinese are socialised into a “hard realpolitik” strategic culture/ideology that favours “hitting hard and hitting first.”⁵³ CCP leaders taking this view are predisposed to choose force over

peaceful means. Drawing on social psychology to defend realism, Mercer argued that ethnocentrism explains the group egoism that neo-realists take for granted. Conflict, in his view, is “an inescapable feature of intergroup and interstate relations”⁵⁴.

Constructivists like Wendt argue against realists that conflict is not the inevitable product of anarchy.⁵⁵ Constructivist IR theorists focus on the social – rather than material – side of the debate. To Wendt structural realists are wrong to assume self-help from the material structure of the world system.⁵⁶ In Social Theory of International Politics, Wendt defends himself against Mercer’s critique, arguing that the “in-group bias” Mercer cites does not predetermine enmity.⁵⁷ Generally speaking, the constructivist approach is compatible with Confucian views on international relations.

After the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama’s theory of the end of history was a knockout in the academic world. The question is: Shall we human beings from now onwards never get involved with conflict any more? If not, what would likely give rise to the next clash? Some scholars in the realist school deem that economic conflicts would be at the top of the agenda, whereas for scholars like Samuel Huntington, clash of civilisations would fall under the most possible answer. To Huntington, “the primary issue is not politics and diplomacy; it is the cultural epistemology that informs certain forms of interaction.”⁵⁸

Similar to Mercer, Huntington has made a realist argument at the even broader level of “civilisations”: with the end of the Cold War the major civilisations of the world are destined to clash.⁵⁹ Identity dynamics, in Huntington’s view, make international conflict inevitable and he regards China as the most powerful challenge to US preponderance. Conservative pundits following him suggested that China was not at all a “civilised” country.⁶⁰

Huntington contends that the fault line of civilisations would in the 21st century dominate international conflicts. To him, the looming confrontation would somehow break out between different civilisations and the West would face a showdown with the Non-west in particular. Not surprisingly, he stresses the possible threat from Islamic and Confucian

civilisations, and is worried about the likelihood that these two groups would eventually collaborate for the purpose of fighting against their common enemy.

His contention is in line with other scholars' inclination to "other" Chinese culture. From the 1990s on, the dominant discourse is that China has been outside the world community and that has not yet demonstrated sufficiently that it will "play by the rules".⁶¹ The linguistic subtext is an obvious sharp "othering" of China that includes a civilising discourse (China is not yet a civilised state) or perhaps a sports discourse (China cheats at games).

Few Western scholars claim in public that they would like to see China's change in culture, yet few scholars advocate cultural communication between the West and China on an equal basis and their views are mostly overshadowed by the teacher-student prototype. Scholars like Susan Strange proclaim the superiority of Western culture and believe that the attractive culture has played a very positive role in US foreign policy to secure its hegemony. "This sense of superiority led them to look at everything in the world primarily through an American lens."⁶²

Confucianism has offered a counter-argument to Huntington's thesis. Huntington's exclusive dichotomies — east/west and subject/object — characteristic of modern consciousness working directly out of the Enlightenment, are in striking contrast with the Confucian preference for the "nuanced between" in interconnected binary structures.⁶³ The Confucian horizon extends beyond instrumental rationality and presents an inclusive cosmological and humanist vision by transcending an "either/or" mode of thinking.⁶⁴ In some sense, there is a strong awareness in the world community of the need for a more holistic ethic for sustainable development.⁶⁵

After Hu Jintao took over from Jiang Zemin in 2002, his team declared a more humanist approach to lead China, which has been hailed by many as a Confucian turn. Anyway, if one word could characterise the entire history of Chinese philosophy, it would be humanism.⁶⁶ The CCP has stressed sustainable development that is indicative of the

expedition of organic combination of the three trends: Confucianism, Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, and liberalism. Hu Jintao's modernist project follows the ideal of building a society that is "just, participatory, sustainable and peaceful".⁶⁷ His new approach to China's politics will add more Confucian flavour to Chinese foreign policy in general and its US policy in particular.

Personal Advisers

Personal advisers follow the CCP's terms regarding culture and call on the US to accept the Chinese socialist system in a multi-cultural world. Liu Ji particularly stresses he er butong (incorporating things of diverse nature) and holds that Chinese culture does not clash with alien ones, though *butong* in his eyes actually means socialism in China. He says: "In 5,000 years, Chinese culture has assimilated countless elements from other cultures. 'Incorporating things of diverse nature' is a distinct feature of Chinese culture. This is the reason why its vitality has lasted for 5,000 years."⁶⁸.

In their view, the US should take a Confucian way and tolerate Chinese socialism. Among Chinese IR scholars, personal advisers are the most vehement defenders of Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, who identify with the CCP's effort to mix Marxism-Leninism and Maoism with traditional Chinese values. They believe this is the only way for socialism to survive in China. They claim, "The Chinese people have chosen socialism with Chinese characteristics. The fundamental goal of the Chinese revolution is to rid China of its weakness, make China rich and to modernise China."⁶⁹ Liu Ji says that, since the end of the Cold War, China has become the only big country to maintain a Marxist system and many people of bullied and humiliated nations expect China to lead them in confronting hegemonic politics. Thus, China is liable to be in an opposite position to the US for moral reasons.⁷⁰ He asks the Americans why they cannot tolerate Chinese socialism as the US is a pluralistic country.⁷¹

For the sake of the continuity of the Chinese socialist system, they advocate that socialism should be integrated into the Chinese soil. Liu Ji says, "The time-honoured and unique cultural tradition of China is a force for [national] integration; it includes an

ardent spirit of nationalism.”⁷² It seems to Liu Ji that the establishment of a new cultural identity is a natural result of the CCP’s legitimacy crisis. He Xin particularly stresses the significance of mixing Marxism-Leninism and Maoism and traditional Chinese values together. He says, “ (We) shall thoroughly study the theory of New Pragmatism advocated by Deng Xiaoping, the theory of Socialism at Primary Stage and Socialism with Chinese (national, cultural and traditional) characteristics. (We) should particularly regard as the core of our modern political ideology patriotism and nationalism that expand the Chinese national spirit and cultural tradition.”⁷³ In his view, one of the strong points of Confucianism is that it prefers the status quo rather than radical change, which serves the interests of the CCP.⁷⁴

Personal advisers like He Xin, Wang Daohan and Liu Ji know that the way out for Chinese socialism in an isolated environment is Chinese nationalism. They have demonstrated an extremely deep *minzu zihao* (national pride), *weiji yishi* (crisis consciousness) and *shouhai* (victim complex). He Xin is even ready to defend the new Chinese culture through war. He is proud of the Chinese tradition. He says: “ Our ancestors established a great historical China. Now we must imbue the Chinese people with consciousness of modern nation states.”⁷⁵ He dislikes the trend to doubt and abuse the Chinese and tries to remind them that they are originally the offspring of a heroic race.⁷⁶ Wang Daohan deems that it is the duty of the Chinese people across the Taiwan Straits to glorify Chinese traditional values. He says that the Chinese nation has great cohesive force and the basic interests of people across the straits are identical. He believes that the common national cultural spirit is the important cornerstone of the unity of the two sides.⁷⁷ Wang Daohan calls on the Chinese people, including the Taiwanese, to fight for the great resurrection of Chinese civilisation.⁷⁸ Liu Ji agrees with He and Wang on Chinese pride.⁷⁹

Personal advisers seem to grieve over the dominance of Western culture, and blame the West for China’s problems. To vilify the West they substitute Chinese socialism for Chinese tradition. As such, they have hijacked traditional Chinese culture. Wang Daohan talks of the historical choice of socialism by the Chinese people and linked the rise of

socialism with the modern Chinese history of humiliation due to invasion by the West. To rid China completely of the humiliation imposed by the West, he calls for unity among Chinese: “The Chinese people stepping into the 21st century will never accept the fate of being separated and controlled by others.”⁸⁰ He Xin claims that Westerners do not respect the Chinese people and Chinese culture. He says: “ In their eyes the Chinese are inferior people, and Chinese culture is inferior culture.”⁸¹ “As a matter of fact, in the eyes of Westerners, there always exists contempt or discrimination upon the Chinese people in race and culture.”⁸² He attacks Western scholars who are critical of Chinese socialism. “ I know some Westerners, so-called Sinologists, including some Sinologists that are self-allegedly very friendly toward and understand well China, yet I have noted almost everywhere that they only consider Chinese civilisation as a kind of already dated antique, as interesting as those African woodcuts yet of little significance.”⁸³ “ The Chinese in their eyes are low-grade in terms of culture and race, so they are used to speak to us with a rebuking and teaching tone.”⁸⁴

Therefore personal advisers remind the Chinese people of Western cultural imperialism and call for unity under the banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics. He Xin tries to remind people that “there are still imperialists in the world” and “there is still a kind of cultural imperialist foreign policy”.⁸⁵ Liu Ji says the US, using revolutionary means, violent means, means of compulsions, or administrative means to export their own culture, is mistaken.⁸⁶

By binding socialism and Chinese traditional culture together, and equating Western pressure on the socialist system to that on Chinese tradition, personal advisers protect the CCP’s interests. Personal advisers actually put the interests of the CCP before the revival of Chinese traditional culture. Their focus is still defending socialism though they try to justify Chinese socialism with Confucian pacifism. From their opinions one can see Confucianism is only an instrument for them to boost the CCP’s legitimacy and they are not nationalist enough in terms of culture.

Institutional Advisers

Most institutional advisers identify with socialism though not as closely as personal advisers. They try to highlight the fact that Confucianism is in fact not a strong force in current China though they claim China has retained Confucian pacifism. These scholars do not agree with Huntington that China is a Confucian country, as Marxism-Leninism and Maoism still play the most important role in China.⁸⁷ What the CCP needs at present is not the comprehensive revival of Confucianism, but rather some parts of it, so the CCP's party line is still socialism with Chinese characteristics. It is far from true to say China is a Confucian country. They argue that Huntington intends to exaggerate the difference between Chinese and US culture, to sow the seed of evil and call to prevent China's rise.

Because of this, many institutional advisers believe that Huntington's conclusion is scarcely tenable. They contend that Confucianism has been under attack since the May 4 movement, sometimes greatly vilified, as during the Cultural Revolution. Wang Xiaodong argues that China has for a long time been subjected to "the uneasy rule" of Western civilisation, be it Marxism or liberalism.⁸⁸ Therefore, it is unfair to blame Chinese traditional culture for what is going wrong in China. The opposite is true: that Western civilisation should take much of the responsibility.

A small number of institutional advisers claim that the core of Confucianism has "been deserted completely" in Mainland China.⁸⁹ Wang Xiaodong points out that, compared with Islamic civilisation, nations in East Asia were less concerned to save their traditional values, and had no intention following the Cold War to fight against the invasion of Western civilisation in the guise of globalisation. On the contrary, they have accepted it whole-heartedly. So Wang Xiaodong says that what one can see in East Asia is the assimilation of Confucian culture by the West rather than the alleged clash between them.

In their eyes, the problem with Confucian culture is that it could no longer reproduce on its own as influential a value system as Western civilisation in the foreseeable future, despite the fact that it has left an enormous legacy of literature, music, architecture and

even cuisine. To survive in this world, East Asia has to become Westernised sooner or later. If people in East Asia do regenerate a strong will for a different identity in due time, their choice will be restructuring Confucianism and creating a new value system that can be compatible with a market economy and rule of law, to stand out as a “sub-stream tributary rather than an adversary of the Western civilisation”⁹⁰ This is exactly the CCP’s party line on the new Chinese identity that aims to integrate liberalism, Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, and Confucianism.

Institutional advisers seldom use the term “imperialism” as personal advisers do, yet Western culture is in their view too patronising and paternalistic toward Chinese values. Some institutional advisers criticise Huntington from the perspective of Orientalism. According to Said, Orientalism is “a manner of regularised (or Orientalised) writing, vision and study, dominated by imperatives, perspectives and ideological biases ostensibly suited to the Orient.”⁹¹ It is the image of the “Orient” expressed as an entire system of thought and scholarship. Western philosophy has created antithesis between the East and the West, with the former being the subject, the latter the object. Therefore, Western intellectuals, wittingly or unwittingly, would fall into Western-centrism, sticking to the principle that the West is always superior to the East. All in all, the East could not save itself and needs to be studied, found, redeemed and led, of course, by the West. They could not represent themselves and need to be represented by others. Said’s discourse comports with the CCP’s formalised language *guoqu de quru diwei* (the humiliated status in the past), *guoji guonei didui shili xianghu goujie, xihua, fenhua, jinxing shentou dianfu he fenlie de tumou* (Overseas and domestic enemies are in collusion with each other, aiming to westernise and divide China with infiltrative, subversive and splittist schemes) etc., therefore the Chinese government has acceded to the Chinese study of his theory.

Institutional advisers even go far beyond Said’s point and appeal for the restructuring of the East’s subjectivity. This effort is indeed in line with the CCP’s line that Chinese culture will play an important role on the world stage in the future and its formalised language *zhonghua minzu shi weida de minzu* (the Chinese nation is a great nation). They

understand that the East in terms of Said's discourse means mainly the Arab world, not necessarily including East Asia, yet they believe it is appropriate to apply Said's theory to the Chinese case. They maintain that, though there are indeed many decayed contents in Chinese traditional culture,⁹² through a re-construction of the Chinese value system, in conjunction with elements of Western civilisation, China could become equal to the West.

Some institutional advisers believe that Huntington's theory is not really about "cultural" clash but rather "interest" clash, smacking of racism. Wang Xiaodong categorically claims that Huntington is completely ethnocentric. Wang points out that, according to the world map drawn up by Huntington, the fault line of civilisations and that of ethnic groups are identical. To him, this is not difficult to follow, as the real problem Huntington intends to address is interest clash originating from ethnic conflict rather than clash of civilisations.⁹³

Institutional advisers are also concerned with the consideration of resources scramble behind Huntington's theory. They believe that the West intends to monopolise the world's strategic resources. One might think this has indeed gone too far beyond Huntington's thesis, yet Chinese scholars are indeed serious. According to these institutional advisers, the Whites used to monopolise most natural resources, yet things have been greatly changed in recent decades, for non-Westerners have gained more powerful capabilities to extract resources from our mother planet. Wang Xiaodong proclaims that this conflict could be readily resolved by advancement of new technologies, whereas many Westerners stick to the dated theory that scarcity of natural resources would certainly lead to conflict if not war among different ethnic groups.⁹⁴

What's Huntington's real motive to deliver his clash of civilisations theory? Most institutional advisers hold that he intends to point out the forthcoming threat from the East and China in particular, appeals to the unity of the West at this turning point and hence tries to maintain the hegemony the US still enjoys.⁹⁵ These scholars think that fear would creep into Westerners' minds. They take fright at the rise of East Asia and Greater

China in particular. If the West were not the only “subject” in the world, Western intellectuals would cry out over the possible decline of their civilisation.

Many institutional advisers believe “the value system of Western culture, with the idea of individualism at the centre, a decadent lifestyle based on materialism, and a concept of gain or benefit in interpersonal relations”⁹⁶ is in decline. Ren Yi holds that it is out of this fear that Huntington delivered his controversial theory.⁹⁷ Ren deems that Western scholars like Huntington could no longer bear China’s rise, worrying that the West could somehow become equal to the East, losing its dominance in the world. It seems to Ren that Huntington is much more sober than Said, noting that the West will no longer be the controller of international politics.

Institutional advisers like Lu Shi say that Huntington does not even try to conceal in his book his appreciation of Western hegemony in international affairs. Huntington feels comfortable with the fact that decisions in accordance with the interests of the West, made either in the UN Security Council or IMF, are in great measure presented to the world as the interests of the whole world community. Lu Shi contends that this has shown in particular Huntington’s hegemonic mind.⁹⁸

Institutional advisers like Lu Shi have studied Huntington’s proposal aimed at saving the West from the loss of its hegemony. They claim that, whilst facing the rise of East Asia, Huntington does not choose communication and reconciliation as the proper way to maintain world peace but rather prefers Western unity as a stronghold to fight against enemies which he thinks would grow stronger and stronger and possibly eventually bully the West.

As for China in particular, institutional advisers claim that though China is not currently a Confucian country both countries need to learn from Confucian teachings. They appeal for more understanding from the US, for *ren* (benevolence) and *he wei gui* (peace is highly valued). Amid the turmoil of the world, they claim that this would be of great help in re-adjusting current international relations. “The Chinese concept of ‘benevolence’

will influence international norms and make international society more civilised.”⁹⁹ Institutional advisers proclaim that the proper way to establish a new world order is surely not through conflict, but rather, communication and mutual learning of *ren* (benevolence) and *he* (harmony).

Official Intellectuals

Official intellectuals are not as radical as personal and institutional advisers in terms of anti-Americanism, yet they are the staunchest defenders of traditional Chinese values. They take a theoretical approach and claim that the purpose of Huntington’s theory is to address US domestic rather than external problems. They think that Huntington’s theory is based on his perception of US domestic affairs and originated from the loss of the Whites’ superiority over other ethnic minorities. As such, they have actually discounted the *weiji yishi* (crisis consciousness) that the CCP intends to incite among the Chinese people. Among official intellectuals there are some staunch followers of Confucianism who identify China more as a Confucian country than as a socialist one.

Since the adoption of open-door policy, a large number of official intellectuals working with Chinese universities have been to the US for short or long-term visits. Because of their training in Marxism, they are sensitive to the disparity of different classes and ethnic groups, and are at home with relevant analysis thereof. The quality of Chinese journalists working in the US has also improved, compared with the 1980s. Therefore, even those college teachers who never set foot on US soil begin to understand the US better.

Official intellectuals like Zhang Xiaojin tend to understand Huntington from the perspective of America’s domestic issues.¹⁰⁰ He holds that all grand theories originate in the first place from the thinkers’ personal experiences of a specific point in everyday life. However rational the thinkers would be, the starting point of their theoretical journey is mainly perceptual. Zhang deems that, in the case of Huntington, the point that prompted him to construct this controversial theory is closely connected with his observation of America’s population change. The US foundation was laid down by WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestants) and all other European immigrants close to them. In the history

of this young country, they used to treat Indians and Blacks in an unfair if not savage way. None the less, things have been turned upside down since the 1970s. The US minorities, including Blacks, Hispanics, Asians and Indians, have risen up, claiming the human rights they are entitled to enjoy as fellow citizens. The Whites as a community have had to back down and reluctantly recognise the justice of the claim from the ethnic minorities. Many intellectuals on the left go even further maintaining that it would be politically wrong to criticise minorities in general and Blacks in particular.

They observe the fact that the West has been encountering a massive problem, as it is likely that Westerners might one day fall in their homeland into oblivion in the sea of non-westerners, which worries extremely scholars such as Huntington. Many conservatives take fright at the assertiveness of the US minorities as well as the fact that they would account for half of the population. The annoying thing is, however, that it is nowadays a taboo to address their worry straightforward from the ethnic perspective, on account of political correctness. Some conservatives think that this is entirely over the limit but they dare not say so in public, afraid of breaking the default consensus of political correctness in society. Therefore official intellectuals believe that, in this scenario Samuel Huntington chose to express it through the paradigm of civilisation. Many official intellectuals even think that Huntington's tenor is to tackle a complicated and touchy internal problem in the guise of an international one.

Many official intellectuals acknowledge the difference between Western and Chinese cultures, rather than duck this problem as some institutional advisers do. After the Kosovo incident, Xiao Gongqin pointed out, "As I have said previously, the US 'human rights fundamentalism' based on individualistic Protestant culture and China's collective-centrism and collective human rights conception in its Confucian culture will clash and constantly widen the gap between the two sides during mutual actions."¹⁰¹ He agrees with Huntington that the cultural tension between China and the US might lead to conflict if not war. Crises of confidence will at times arise due to the political cultural difference existing between the two countries. "Once this crisis takes place, hard-liners in the two sides will react in a mutual-provocative way."¹⁰²

Some official intellectuals like Jiang Qing fiercely defend Confucianism from Huntington's attacks. They are far from China's power centre yet live an academic life as a Chinese scholar, writing in Chinese discourse. They are less constrained by socialism than personal and institutional advisers. As academics, they demand equal status to their Western counterparts and believe in a modernist approach to Chinese discourse. They agree with Tu Weiming that the US needs to transform herself from a teaching civilisation into a learning culture. "Since the end of the Second World War, America's self-image as a tutor of Confucian East Asia has been so ingrained in the public consciousness that the teacher-disciple relationship, as in the case of John Dewey and his disciples Hu Shi and Feng Youlan, has been accepted as the norm. It is now time to work at a new equilibrium of mutual learning and appreciation."¹⁰³

Jiang Qing is regarded as the most important New Confucian thinker in Mainland China. He attacks Western culture centred on instrumental rationality and advises Chinese government to promote Confucianism. He regards Confucianism as superior to Western culture. He asserts that Confucianism is an advanced culture that puts priority on virtue and justice rather than on power politics, utility and efficiency. "In my opinion, if judged as per the criteria of Chinese culture, 'advanced culture' must be a culture that puts priority on virtue and righteousness. In today's words, it must be a culture that puts priority on goodness and justice."¹⁰⁴

Mencius' culture-dominated definition of binary hua-yi relations leaves a deep imprint in Chinese history. Tang scholar Chen Yan's view reflects this influence: "Some people are born in barbarian lands but their actions are in harmony with rites and righteousness. In that case, they are barbarian in appearance only but they have a Chinese heart and mind."¹⁰⁵ Seen from this angle, Western culture is a "culture of villains", a "culture subduing people by force." Jiang points out, "According to China's cultural criteria of 'education of the holy man,' Western culture since modern times has been typical 'hegemonic culture' and 'utilitarian culture.'"¹⁰⁶ He says that liberal democracy is a culture without virtue. "The problem Western liberal democracy has solved is the

problem of legitimacy in procedure and public opinion and this is not a problem of value. In Chinese words, it has not touched the content of ‘virtue’. In other words, procedure itself is only in connection with justice of form and not value. Public opinion is only in connection with form and quantity, not with moral values.”¹⁰⁷ Therefore he deems Western culture that Huntington tries to defend as “mediocre and vulgar”.

Therefore, Jiang Qing firmly believes in the revival of Confucianism.¹⁰⁸ In this sense, US culture is decadent.¹⁰⁹ He proclaims that Chinese culture can save human beings. “In my view, Chinese culture is the spiritual, moral and academic force to clear away social Darwinism that has cursed human beings. The moral nature of Chinese culture determines that it is the one to ‘bring about peace and harmony for 10,000 generations.’”¹¹⁰

Liberals

Liberals’ response to the theory of clash of civilisations is divided, despite their anti-CCP consensus. Some liberals, such as Liu Junning and Cao Changqing, deem that Western culture is universal and China should completely accept it. Nevertheless, they do not buy Huntington’s argument that future world conflict will be due to a clash of civilisations. Liu Junning holds that the main clash in the world is still on ideology.¹¹¹ Cao believes it will be the clash “between democracy and dictatorship.”¹¹² Cao says, “Left-wing scholars in the West like Huntington, seemingly respecting the Third World and their cultures, are in fact the greatest racial discriminationists. They believe in their heart that those in non-western culture are not able to accept Western culture that is obviously the most advanced civilisation in the present world.”¹¹³

Some liberals such as Li Shenzhi and Sheng Hong do not agree with Huntington about a clash of civilisations and believe in cultural integration. They claim that Chinese culture will play a crucial role in the integration of global culture. Li Shengzhi points out, “Chinese culture seeks for such highest realm as harmony, even unity, between nature and human beings (namely, so-called ‘realm of heaven’) in order to realise harmony among people. It is entirely in line with the current great trend of globalisation.”¹¹⁴

Other liberals, like Feng Chuan, acknowledge clash of civilisations yet believe it is controllable as the Chinese culture is Confucian liberalism. They believe, “ ‘Confucian liberalism’ grows out of the foundation of Chinese culture. It is not a simple copy of Western liberalism but rather shows expressly the innate spirit of Chinese culture in many ways.”¹¹⁵

Conclusion

The CCP aims to integrate Marxism-Leninism and Maoism, liberalism and traditional Chinese values, and establish a new Chinese culture that is claimed to be peaceful and does not clash with other civilisations. From above, one can see that there is a thin nationalist consensus among Chinese IR scholars that China’s culture should be protected (even some liberals believe Chinese culture should and will play a positive role in the world.) and China should continue to take *duiwai kaifang* (the open-door policy), yet differ on what China should protect the most among the three trends, how and to what extent. Personal and institutional advisers are more concerned with socialist culture yet official intellectuals are more concerned with traditional culture and Confucianism in particular. Personal advisers regard Western cultural dominance as “imperialism”; institutional advisers “orientalism,” official intellectuals “patronising and paternalistic.” Both personal and institutional advisers blame the West for the “clash of civilisations”, yet official intellectuals objectively acknowledge the difference between China and the West in culture. Official intellectuals are the group that mostly identifies China as a Confucian country.

In respect of Huntington’s theory, personal advisers believe that the US is trying to vilify if not destroy Chinese culture. Institutional advisers follow the CCP’s party line and claim that it is more than a daydream for China to ally with Islamic countries to counter US aggression. They insist on the US learning Chinese values, trying to break down the prototype of teacher-student relationship between the West and China. Official intellectuals mostly avoid being too close to the party line and argue that US aggressiveness in terms of culture is due to its domestic worries.

From this section one can see that the future of Chinese identity construction is uncertain, as IR scholars differ over what specific values Chinese should take among several opposing approaches. It is hard for Chinese IR scholars to "find the unifying thread, the balancing mean, the underlying value, or the all-embracing conception."¹¹⁶

4.2 Media

Media is in the West a dynamic force that constructs and de-constructs culture on a daily basis. The CCP understands from its own experiences the importance of media as far as foreign policy is concerned. The June 4 event TV coverage is still a burden for Chinese foreign policy.¹¹⁷ To more clearly analyse America's China policy-making process, the CCP began to study the influence of US media on US foreign behaviour in the 1990s. US foreign policy journalists often claim that their work is objective and based on facts, yet the CCP proclaims that the US media is generally speaking dominated by its ideology, self-asserted if not fully biased, especially over a country with different culture like China. In the eyes of CCP leaders, US journalists try to establish US cultural hegemony and they manipulate the mass media for the purpose of demonising China and thereby gaining public support for a hard-line China policy.

Media and PR

The Media industry is closely related to Public Relations (PR) in the West, particularly in terms of politics. It is created to counter media's over-extended power by creating positive publicity and image-building.¹¹⁸ Gabriel Tarde and Walter Lippman are two of PR's founding figures.¹¹⁹ They believed that PR work could control public attitudes on various topics in order to "manufacture consent" for the continuing rule of the ruling elite.¹²⁰ PR has been regarded as a recipe to "manufacture the imprimatur of 'popular support' to validate the decision-making activity of elites".¹²¹

In China the media is under direct control of the CCP. One can see this from Chinese media's anti-Falun Gong movement.¹²² However, since China adopted the reform and

open-door policy, it is suggested that Chinese media's watchdog role has been slightly improved.¹²³ More importantly, there has recently emerged a number of commercial media enterprises.¹²⁴ Media control has been fragmented since 1992. So far it would appear that fragmentation has resulted in socio-economic but not political liberalisation.¹²⁵ There is to date no apparent contradiction between a market economy as practised in China and the continuance of one-party rule, though party officials have no difficulty in reeling more independent media back to a more conservative line, through censure or sacking or even arresting those who are responsible,¹²⁶ if they step too far beyond the party line.

Since the Tiananmen incident in 1989 the CCP has been looking for new ways to maintain and justify its hold on power, therefore PR work has been more important in improving the CCP's legitimacy.¹²⁷ The party tries to strengthen notions of both the foreign Other and the Chinese Self, to present a negative picture of post-communist societies in the ex-Soviet bloc in order to bolster fears of the potential for chaos in China if the CCP was overturned, to engage in image-building activities in order to mould public opinion in favour of the party.¹²⁸

The Internet has been growing in importance as a tool of government PR work in recent years. Some scholars have argued that it will be one of the major means ultimately to undermine the CCP's legitimacy in China,¹²⁹ yet some others have revealed that to date the Internet has been effectively incorporated as a tool of the party's PR work with its dangers held in check.¹³⁰ For instance, since 1999 the bulletin board of People's Daily, "Strong Nation Forum" (qiang guo luntan) has become one of the most popular sites in China. The boards are closely censored by the police, yet the highly nationalist messages there have effectively generated substantial support for the party.

Nationalism

Since 1989, the CCP has faced the difficult task of finding a positive image, a reliable replacement for that of a communist revolutionary party. Nationalism, fanned by the official media, has become an important tool to fulfil this regeneration.¹³¹ To some

extent, the CCP has effectively grasped both traditional media control means in communist regimes and new approaches like PR in the West. The party has demonstrated its flexibility.¹³²

Throughout the 1990s, the CCP has carefully fanned the flames of nationalism and anti-Americanism through its propaganda system. To counter persistent denigration by the US, the Chinese official media has portrayed the US “as the self-appointed policeman of the world”.¹³³ The Chinese media began to promote the view that US-led Western countries were now trying to “contain China”, inciting Chinese people’s crisis consciousness.¹³⁴

The Chinese government’s handling of NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 most vividly illustrates the way in which the controlled Chinese media carefully whip up and manage the masses’ nationalist sentiments. The party-controlled media did not report NATO’s or US statements that the bombing was a mistake or either’s regrets or apologies until three days after the bombing was first reported in China and it portrayed the bombing as intentional and barbaric, part of a larger US evil plan to try to control the entire world.

What is the result of the CCP’s media campaigns? Apparently the party has gained more support from the public though some worry that the manipulation might backfire some day. It is suggested that the Chinese government could hence easily whip up their people into a war frenzy in the name of “recovery” of Taiwan or retention of Tibet.¹³⁵ Students are becoming more patriotic and more pro-CCP.¹³⁶ The consciousness of the Chinese public has been distorted to some degree, as demonstrated by Chinese public’s sympathy toward terrorists in the September 11 tragedy.¹³⁷

China’s Image Building

Chinese nationalism requires a lustrous image of China and the CCP. National image-building has long been a crucial component of PR in practice in international relations. Positive image is one of the goals that states pursue and it is an independent factor in

international relations. For instance, Thucydides regards honour as one of the important national goals.¹³⁸ Morgenthau regards prestige-seeking as one of his three classified foreign policies.¹³⁹ National image-building is about building images of power, real or imagined.¹⁴⁰ Generally speaking, classic realists regard image-building as “human nature”.

It is true that classical realists have a narrow view of prestige, namely, images of power.¹⁴¹ Nevertheless, they argue that states are not only driven by the desire for material benefits such as national security and national power, they are also motivated by aspiration for national honour and prestige. This suggests that, in their eyes, pursuit of honourable and prestigious national images have a causal impact on foreign policy. Neo-realists largely focus on the use of reputation in international confrontation.¹⁴² Neo-liberal institutionalists stress the utility of reputation in international co-operation. In their eyes, what makes players more likely to co-operate is their expectation for the future, i.e. future rewards for co-operation now and future penalty for defection now.¹⁴³

Scholars in the game theory school stress the instrumental nature of national image-building. Most game theorists believe that governments decide what images to pursue depending on the issue at hand. If they want to prevent other states from taking hostile actions, they are likely to establish a resolute image. If they want to encourage co-operation from others, they tend to establish an image of a trustworthy partner. Some game theorists stress the importance of credibility in foreign policy. If policy-makers regard reputation as sufficiently important, they will engage in national image-building for long-term benefits.¹⁴⁴

For over 2000 years Confucianism dominated Chinese culture and public shaming is not accepted in Chinese culture.¹⁴⁵ In external relations, Chinese imperial rulers tried to demonstrate the peaceful nature of Chinese foreign policy. Many modern China experts are convinced that, in terms of foreign policy, traditional China was indeed more peaceful than other empires and that this strategic culture continues to influence China’s military strategy today.¹⁴⁶

During the reform period, the CCP has all but abandoned the image of a bastion of revolution/liberation. Instead it has given unprecedented emphasis to the images of China as a peace lover, an independent actor and a major power. China has consistently pursued the images of China as a peace-loving nation, an opponent of hegemony and a justice defender. Since 1989 the CCP has tried to incorporate Confucianism into the new Chinese culture, to promote the traditional idea of *he er butong* (incorporating things of diverse nature) in Chinese foreign policy and present an image of harmony on the world stage.

Different Understandings of Media

Images are largely established by media, either through PR or government control, yet China and the US have different approaches to how national images should be constructed. Firstly, in terms of foreign affairs reporting, the Chinese way is typically Confucian i.e. holistic, as the CCP regards journalism and foreign relations as an entity and stresses the responsibility of the media industry in foreign relations. The CCP's focus is on "fair" coverage, i.e., balanced reporting that supports a stable US-China relationship. The US media were criticised for failing to use a broad range of sources in reporting on China, imposing preconceived notions on their stories. The US view, in contrast, is that journalists are obligated to report exactly what they see rather than stress the responsibility of journalists to foreign relations.¹⁴⁷

Secondly, as discussed above, Chinese media is still not an independent power in society. The Chinese government still relies more on propaganda control than PR to deal with the media. By contrast, the US media is independent of the government and aims to provide the "unvarnished truth" about US foreign affairs.¹⁴⁸ Due to the dominance of the state media, popular Chinese objections to the US tend to sound oddly uninformed. Chinese public have accepted the CCP's portrait of the US as a "hegemon".¹⁴⁹

These differences lead to media war between the two countries. The CCP claims that the Chinese public has substantial access to US media, which provides the possibility for a

richer and broader understanding of US culture and society. Chinese foreign affairs journalists assert that China's coverage of the US is much more extensive than US media reports on China.¹⁵⁰ In the meantime the CCP claims that the Americans know little of the Chinese culture and the current situation due to the poor work of US journalists. At times the media war between the two sides can be very tense if not ugly.¹⁵¹

Party line

The CCP is resentful of the US effort to “defame” China’s image. To maintain a positive image in the world, CCP leaders carefully defend China’s position while attacking the US media. Deng Xiaoping once said: “The American public got its information from the Voice of America and from American newspapers and periodicals, which reported that blood was flowing like a river in Tiananmen Square and that tens of thousands of people had died. They even gave the exact number of casualties. The Voice of America has gone too far. The people working for it tell lies (*sahuang*); they are completely dishonest.”¹⁵² He also said that China should not bow down before the Western media: “At the moment, the media worldwide are putting pressure on us; we should take it calmly and not allow ourselves to be provoked.”¹⁵³

CCP leaders regard the party as the guardian of Chinese culture and image. The party deems that there is a US conspiracy that aims to vilify and discredit Chinese culture and hence calls for self-defence. It urges Chinese IR scholars to follow such formalised language as *guoji yilun ya women* (the media worldwide are putting pressure on us), *zhonghua minzu you zhe youjiu huihuang de wenming shi* (the Chinese people has a history of long-term and splendid civilisation), *zhonghua minzu shi weida de minzu* (the Chinese nation is a great nation). The CCP constantly tries to remind the Chinese people of the evil committed by the West by formulised language like *zhonghua minzu baoshou diguo zhuyi lieqiang de qinlue qinling he yapo* (the Chinese nation fully suffered the invasion, bullying and oppression of imperialist powers), *guoqu de quru diwei* (the humiliated status in the past), *guoji guonei didui shili xianghu goujie, cong wei fangqi dui woguo jinxing xihua, fenhua, jinxing shentou, dianfu he fenlie de tumou* (domestic and external enemies collude with each other and have never forsaken the attempt to

westernise, disintegrate, infiltrate, subvert and separate China). The party appeals to history and calls on Chinese IR scholars to defend the CCP's contribution to China.

After the mid-1990s Jiang Zemin began to enjoy dominant power in China. He was sensitive enough to notice the change in social values among the Chinese people due to the emergence of new classes in China, particularly those of the middle class and entrepreneurs. Behind this state of new social stratification rests a widespread cynical view of power and politics in China. Therefore Jiang used propaganda themes appealing to nationalistic sentiment in order to foster a more cohesive populace.¹⁵⁴ In the late 1990s the Chinese media was inundated with articles or programmes strongly promoting Jiang's new theories of the "Three Represents" and the call to rule China by law and virtue (*yifa yide zhi guo*). Jiang's concept of which "traditional" socialist and "Chinese" values might be adopted was further articulated and his nationalist approach to save the CCP was laid bare.¹⁵⁵

Personal Advisers

Personal advisers believe that the US media is an instrument of US government's cultural "imperialism" and is not objective at all, following Deng Xiaoping's terms like *guoji yilun ya women* (the media worldwide are putting pressure on us) and *sahuang* (tell lies). Liu Ji once said, "the Western media and the US media in particular all along have their bias, and often attack China without reason."¹⁵⁶ He even made fun of US journalists that they could not see real China in daytime due to the 12-hour time difference.¹⁵⁷ He Xin deems that the US media is rumour-mongering in support of the US government. He attacks the state-funded VOA: "There are other varieties of rumours. For instance, this March the VOA attacked me by name in its News Figures according to libel materials. I am really lucky!"¹⁵⁸ During an interview, He Xin expressed his disappointment with the Western media for its distortion of facts. "In terms of disappointment, I mean this point, namely, I used to believe that the Western news media has so-called objectivity and fairness. However, I have noted that since the 1989 event many of their reports on Chinese issues have very strong bias of ideology, value and conception."¹⁵⁹ He Xin is obviously aggrieved by the global worship of US culture due to US media world

dominance. He says: “ It seems to me, the US culture in the 20th century established for the human world a number of modern totems through such media industry as Broad Avenue. (The US) has conquered many relatively backward countries in terms of culture with your unrivalled advertising means. A number of new totems, one of which is the totem of political democracy, are the totem of US ideology in terms of culture, the totem of US way of life in terms of economy.”¹⁶⁰ As such he believes that the positive image of the US in the world is largely due to the US PR movement backed by its power dominance rather than from facts.

Institutional Advisers

Institutional advisers closely follow the party line that the US media tells lies (*sahuang*). When the CCP is under great pressure from world opinion (*guoji yilun ya women*) and the Chinese people begin to doubt the legitimacy of the CCP’s one-party rule, institutional advisers try to convince the Chinese public that what the Western media and particularly the US media say is not true. They claim that US journalists intend to defame the CCP. They largely base their argument on their theoretical analysis over ideology of cultural hegemony.

In their view, ideology is innately biased yet the US media is indeed highly ideologised. They hold that ideology is still a crucial component of US foreign policy. Bian Qingzhu points out that the US was in dispute with European countries for a long time after it became independent. Against the “Old Continent”, the Americans boasted publicly about their values of freedom, democracy, and diplomatic morals.¹⁶¹

The question is where on earth the ideology, in the context of this totally new international environment after the end of the Cold War, comes from? To answer this question, personal advisers fix their eyes more on the PR work of the US government yet institutional advisers more on the media industry itself. The latter think that the media industry has contributed a lot in ideological factors of the US China policy and it is always in the shadow of US social values and way of life. Liu Kang is a scholar working with the University of Pennsylvania, very influential among institutional advisers and

having close contact with CASS, so the author puts him in the league of institutional advisers.¹⁶² His book *Behind the Demonization of China* reflects a growing nationalism in China as well as concern over the US media. "Laden with criticism of both American culture and the motives of US foreign policy, these books hypothesise a conspiracy between the media and the US government to 'contain' and discredit China."¹⁶³

From his point of view, the role of ideology is in short to interpret and construct some specific values and judgment as universal truth accepted by the public.¹⁶⁴ He agrees with PR theorists like Tarde and Lippman and asserts that intellectuals take cover in the name of the public from being regarded as biased while trying maintain and improve the interests of some groups in a society, rather than the public.¹⁶⁵

He argues that the US mass media is amazingly successful in interpreting US nationalism into a sort of new internationalism or universalism i.e. international norms. A growing number of international relations scholars have noted the impact of international norms on national practices.¹⁶⁶ For most human beings, group norms are among the most important sources of influence over their behaviours.¹⁶⁷ Therefore if a superpower like the US hijacks international norms with its narrow nationalist approach, other states' reasonable interests will be in danger.

In his view, liberty, rule of law and technology are typical US national values. On account of the great power of US media like CNN, TIME, Washington Post, New York Times, movies made in Hollywood etc., American values in the guise of international norm have advanced by infiltration into almost all corners of the world. The power of the US media has been further increased due to the advance of new technologies, which can be shown by its coverage of the June 4 event in 1989.¹⁶⁸

"'Freedom' is America's national myth and the fundamental pillar of American ideology,"¹⁶⁹ Liu Kang says. In his view, it is through the US media that freedom turns into an eternal truth regardless of historical, time, racial and cultural differences. He argues that "freedom" indeed has been building up a solid foundation and framework for

America as a big tower. However, the problem is, if one steps out of this big tower, one might have different views of freedom and would somehow consider it as a sort of specific product arising out of history. Nevertheless, thanks to the US media, “US freedom” has become an international norm.

Rule of law is for Liu Kang the second pillar of US ideology.¹⁷⁰ It seems to him that law is to some extent if not totally a procedure only, short of justice. The Americans respect their legal system, as rule of law is by nature the core of Western culture, but Liu Kang takes a Confucian view (or following Jiang Zemin’s “rule of virtue”) and argues that this does not necessarily mean it represents justice. As long as rule is followed, the authority of law will be well maintained despite that truth could in a measure be discounted or distorted. In his eyes, it is this sort of value that the Americans move heaven and earth to preach to the world.

To a certain extent, Liu Kang is slightly post-modern in his argument as to media's role in US culture-moulding. He deconstructs the whole legal system and doubts its justice and universality. In his view, the US legal system cannot be promoted to other countries on account of its own faults and its typical US national characters. Liu Kang cites the Simpson case to shore up his argument. His opinion is that due to a range of solid evidences against him, Simpson manipulated successfully the US legal system with the support of his lawyers who shrewdly turned this obvious murder case into one of racial discrimination. Despite the failure of the US legal system, Americans still continue to trust in the principle of rule of law. In Liu Kang's view, the mass media has contributed greatly in persuading the public to put their faith in a system that benefits elites the most.

Technology cult is the third pillar, according to Liu Kang, of US ideology.¹⁷¹ Due to mass media's propaganda that Americans have grasped the most advanced technology in the world comes the credible evidence that they have indeed discovered the very truth of human beings ahead of other nations. Technological preponderance leads to ideological self-righteousness and technology itself has been ideologised.

Traditionally, Chinese try to separate technology from ideology and only accept Western technology without its cultural attachment. In an information technology era, it is more difficult for Chinese to continue in this way, as Western culture is more closely integrated into technology. For example, the Internet through which the Chinese people can more readily access Western news reports and spread opinions poses a serious threat to the CCP's rule and its political propaganda.¹⁷² Many institutional advisers like Liu Kang have noted this danger and try to de-link the US technology and its social and political implications.

Liu Kang says, "Lots of Americans think that America has freedom, rule of law and more advanced technology, so Americans, in their own right, have got the truth, universal and almost valid everywhere. This is America's ideology. This is the spiritual pillar of Americans."¹⁷³ This belief has been input by US media on a daily basis, and the media fills Americans with pride and confidence in their country, which goes to such extremes that many Americans then believe that the US has human beings' truth in her hands. In Liu's eyes this is definitely not the case.

Based on their assertion that US mass media is not as objective as claimed, institutional advisers show very strong interest in the concept of cultural hegemony. Due to the rise of new conservatism in Chinese academia, the tallest theory of post-modernism becomes surprisingly popular. Many Chinese intellectuals have embraced Foucault's idea that knowledge is power and believe accordingly that Western intellectuals make the most of their advantage in knowledge, to become teachers if not preachers to the Third World. Chinese scholars deem that Western intellectuals' domestic PR work has secured elites' social, economic and political advantages over other classes,¹⁷⁴ their international PR work helps them enjoy these privileges against other nations. Many institutional advisers exposed to Western academic training champion this idea with extreme zeal.

Li Xin is one of them.¹⁷⁵ He divides US cultural hegemony into three categories: popular culture, language and news information hegemony. It seems to him that the essence of these three lies in other nations' voluntary acceptance of US cultural dominance. As far as

popular culture is concerned, he is amazed that US products have infiltrated all corners of the world. In the case of Chinese youth, many Chinese IR scholars deem he is quite right, for young students that are mostly Americanised in their way of life are those who are most likely to turn a blind eye to China's complicated reality.

As for language hegemony, Li Xin deems that, in information society, whoever gains language superiority over others would dominate information flow. As a former colony of the British Empire which took control in its heyday of a quarter of the world's territory and population, and which promoted English as official and business language among its colonies, the US takes advantage of this legacy and spreads its values in a surprisingly efficient way. At present 80% electronic information in the world is saved in English, two-thirds scientists are able to read English. Therefore one can say that English is undoubtedly the dominant language in international relations.

To institutional scholars, "Much U.S. coverage...is selective, negative and presents an incomplete picture of China. As a result, the American media are not helping the US public to be better informed."¹⁷⁶ One of the most important reasons for this failure is lack of understanding Chinese language and hence Chinese culture.¹⁷⁷

As far as the media hegemony is concerned, Li Xin contends that 90% of international news information is controlled by the West and the US in particular. Through the selection and interpretation of news materials, they are trying to brainwash people in the Third World into willingly accepting Western values. Back in 1997 in Britain, he conducted a survey in the College of Journalism, Media and Culture at the University of Wales. His interviewees were 24 research and taught course students from 12 African countries. The result of this study supported his presumption. Over 80% of the international news these countries were using was from Associated Press and Reuters; secondly, 60-70% of the international news were covering the US, only 20% covering the Third World, mostly on the negative side.

He regards it as carpet-bombing of the Third World by the West. As long as you take news from the CNN, you would become brainwashed by American values. This is Li Xin's logic. His view is surely in line with the party's stance over information globalisation. The rapid extension of the information highway has created a space beyond geographic boundaries and hastened China's modernisation. After the original enthusiasm of embracing the technical breakthrough, the CCP has realised that the Internet would make Chinese people more influenced by Western thought and stopped describing it as fair and secure. Many worry about the dominance of English resources on the Internet and the danger of brainwashing.¹⁷⁸

Based on theories of ideology and cultural hegemony, institutional advisers attack the US media for the purpose of rescuing the CCP's image among the Chinese people. To them, the US media, as one of the most crucial foreign policy instruments, takes advantage of its hegemonic status in the world and actively promote its hegemony. In their view, they intend to achieve this goal at the expense of China's image and consequently demonise China to the best they can.

The concept of demonisation is arguably raised by Li Xiguang and Liu Kang in the first place. Li used to work with Xin Hua News Agency. In 1996 they edited a book named *Behind Demonizing China*, all the rage among Chinese youth. Liu Kang says that China's image has been deliberately smeared in the US by the media and some China study scholars. Liu Kang entirely disagrees with Huntington on his theory of clash of civilisations, and looks down on his academic contributions. For some Chinese scholars like Liu Kang, Huntington's research is not an academic work but rather a PR work and only represents the superiority of the whites over others. He has lashed Orville Schell and Perry Link as they have criticized emerging Chinese nationalism. Liu Kang says that most Americans have no deep prejudice against China, nevertheless, those like Perry Link, Orville Schell, Andrew Nathan and Yu Yingshi play a negative role. "Amid the present adverse trend to demonise China in America, these authorities and experts do not play a role of critics with sober rationality as scholars should do, but add fuel to the flames and stir up trouble. It is very regretful and worrying."¹⁷⁹ In their eyes, China

studies scholars' works (or PR) have played a critical role in "regimenting the public mind,"¹⁸⁰ inputting negative images of China into the Western public's minds.

In China, institutional advisers are among those who are most accustomed to the West. They claim they do not mind negative stories when these stories are accurate; rather, they say, their concerns originate from the perception that Western reporting is predominantly negative without being tempered by coverage of the positive aspects of China's development. "Such coverage, they posit, undermines the healthy development of the Sino-American relationship."¹⁸¹ Those institutional scholars thus argue that the picture of China in the Western public's minds is not complete, due to the one-sided Western coverage of China. Wang Minjuan and Shi Anling have studied some popular books on China in the US. Their conclusion is that they have a single-minded stereotype to smear China's image, exposing China's darkness and even horror since the late 1980s and Cultural Revolution in particular and never mentioning China's bright side.¹⁸²

Some institutional advisers have already realised the role of popular books in Sino-American relations. Like Liu Kang, Wu and Shi, they claim that these books, in order to accommodate the mainstream ideology in the US, have demonised China in public and replaced the Soviet Union with China as a new enemy. They believe that "the U.S. press has its own ideological framework or is excessively responsive to an agenda set by Washington D.C.-based editors or the US government".¹⁸³ The main objective of the media is to maintain the US hegemony. These scholars claim that what the US media has done will greatly damage relations between these two countries.

To counter-attack the US media, institutional advisers from the PLA have proposed some war-like ways to defend China's positive image.¹⁸⁴ They have meticulously studied the US media during the 1991 Gulf War and during the fight for Kosovo. They have noted with great interest psychological-warfare activities and the increased strategic role that the mass media played during both operations. In "*On PSYWAR in Recent High-Tech Local Wars*", Wang Zhengxin and Yang Suping emphasize the importance of gaining media superiority and of controlling the negative effects of media coverage.¹⁸⁵ Xu

Hezhen says that one cannot believe that “the foreign moon is rounder than our own”, for this is defeatist psychology.¹⁸⁶

Official Intellectuals

Official intellectuals are the most nationalist among Chinese IR scholars in culture, as they are either more concerned with the status of *Chinese* academia as an interest group in the world academic community or more pro-Confucianism. They keep a distance from the official formalised language *guoji yilun ya women* (the media worldwide are putting pressure on us) and *sahuang* (tell lies), as it mainly stresses the interests of the party rather than the whole Chinese society or rather the Chinese academic community.

Many official intellectuals highlight the urgency to improve the quality of Chinese academic products, establish the authority of Chinese academia. To them institutional advisers' radical approach to Western culture is in fact a Western rather than Chinese response, an emotional rather than sober response, falling short of academic quality. Some of them publicly expressed their dissatisfaction over institutional advisers' approach. A famous scholar working with Beijing University, Sun Liping, tries to pinpoint extreme ideas among institutional advisers to interest-driven and Cold War thinking and advocates more high quality research.¹⁸⁷ He deems that little valuable and innovative research has been done by institutional advisers yet they readily follow the fashion of post-modernism and particularly its Chinese derivative “cultural conservatism” (i.e. socialism with Chinese characteristics, more than just traditional values). In his view, the reason for this phenomenon is connected with the composition of this elite group. Sun has noted that they are actually a club that are best informed of Western academia among Chinese intellectuals, either well trained in Western academia or greatly influenced by Western scholars. Most of them speak Western languages well. It seems to Sun that their radical reaction toward the US media and academia is either due to their bitter personal experiences, bullied or despised, as foreign students in the West, or due to their own desperate effort to survive and to find a place in Western academia, which has reduced the quality of their research as Chinese scholars.

Sun has also pointed out that the rise of Chinese cultural conservatism is closely related to the new economic reality China has to face in a new era. When China was still self-closed the West was viewed from a distance as the world of rational and reasonable institutions, of overflowing energy and full creativity, of advanced technology and abundant capital, yet since the 1990s, when China was further exposed to the world economy, the West has surely become China's competitor in terms of world market. The ideal image of the West is broken and many Chinese IR scholars (mainly institutional advisers) begin to doubt the motives of the US media and academia towards China. Sun himself keeps a distance from these scholars and believes that they are still under the spell of the "Cold War thinking" though most of them are quite familiar with Western literature and have plenty of contacts in Western academia. When he uses the term "Cold War thinking," he does not mean the ideological thinking style arising out of the Cold War period when the socialist bloc fought against the capitalist bloc, but rather means the CCP's victim complex. He contends that this complex, which took shape due to the modern Chinese history of humiliation, has greatly strengthened the Chinese sensitivity about economic competition between China and the US and inequality in international relations. In terms of its impact upon the quality of research, he does not think it benefits Chinese academia if Chinese IR scholars study international relations through lenses of such thinking patterns like strong powers and weak powers, like suzerainty and the colonised.

Another scholar from Beijing University, Zhu Wenli, deems that institutional advisers have actually wrongly interpreted the US media in an emotional and not an academic way. She argues that it is due to the US policy of plural culture rather than cultural hegemony that the anti-China voice can be heard in the US media. After examining US cultural history she holds that cultural pluralism took shape in the late 1980s yet its root could be tracked down to the period of the civil rights movement in the 1960s when liberalism was all the rage in the West. Those who believe in plural culture deem that there should be no dominant culture in the world and all kinds of cultures and values are equal. No culture is right enough to command other cultures to learn, if not copy, its own values. They also deem that the current dominant status the WASP culture enjoys is due

to the preceding US history, and now the US situation has turned out to be greatly different, therefore the US politics and legal system should become plural and the US value system should also become plural. Zhu Wenli is pretty sure that the policy of cultural pluralism has been well carried out in the US and therefore one can always find diversified opinions from US academia and the media industry.¹⁸⁸ She believes that, in line with liberalism or rather political correctness, there is a consensus in the US that when China tramples these “universal values” within its border it should be criticised.

Confucian thinker Jiang Qing is more interested in the nature of media in modern time - both Chinese and Western media - than the media war between China and the US. It is true that he tries to discredit the US media yet he does not really follow the party line. He argues that both the Chinese and US public are under the spell of media and he advocates “close communication” or “face-to-face communication”.¹⁸⁹ Why should human beings need this kind of traditional communication? He believes that “it is determined by spreading means of truth. It is only through face-to-face communication that truth (*dao*) of the universe and life can be spread. Media nowadays cannot do it, as there is a medium standing between, cutting off the true existence of human beings and making it hard for human beings to communicate in a direct way.”¹⁹⁰ He even goes on to blame modern media for human beings’ alienation. In his view, language has been turned into a pure instrument due to modern media’s control over our life world. Therefore he calls on elites to “use as little as possible modern media to communicate at a deep level.”¹⁹¹ Apparently, serious topics like China’s cultural re-orientation and China-US relations should be discussed at this level.

Liberals

Almost all liberals are against the CCP’s media control in China and appreciate US press freedom. Liu Xiaobo published several articles during the trial of the South China Metropolitan Case (Nan Du Case). He deems that the editors of this well-known newspaper have been trapped due to their laying bare the SARS epidemic and other negative events in Guangdong. He says, “The current CCP regime is proclaiming to ‘establish modern political civilisation’, yet one of the main symbols of ‘modern political

civilization' is press freedom. A society that wilfully frames up consciousness of journalism and oppresses liberal media is not able to produce a journalist army with social responsibility and professional morality, not able to cultivate an independent fourth power, let alone modern civilisation of press freedom."¹⁹² Neither has he talked about the US government's PR work nor ideological bias of the media. Likewise other liberals mostly focus on the CCP's misconduct. On April 30, 2003, Wang Dan made a comment in Radio Free Asia, attacking the CCP's media control during the SARS epidemic. He blamed media control for the disaster. He says that media control brings about social instability, contrary to the CCP's expectation, ruins the government's credit in economy and prevents the fledgling Chinese market system from maturity. His conclusion is: "If (China) does not carry out political reform and media reform in particular, (the problem) will probably not be solved once and for all...It will be strange if such a political and economic system does not go wrong."¹⁹³

Conclusion

From the above, one can see that, by and large, the CCP's approach to the US media is self-defence. Personal and institutional advisers take an aggressive stance against the US media to defend the CCP's party line, political terms like *guoji yilun ya women* (the media worldwide are putting pressure on us) and *sahuang* (tell lies). Personal advisers have a repelling sense of crisis consciousness and are most critical of the US media. They believe that there is a conspiracy in the US government to discredit the CCP and call on Chinese to stand up and fight against US "cultural imperialism." Compared with official intellectuals, they are much closer to Marxism-Leninism-Maoism among the three components of the new Chinese culture. Institutional advisers engage in debates to discredit the US media and to defend what the CCP has achieved in the time of reform and make proposals to take PR measures to produce a positive image for the CCP. They are less concerned with the PR work of the US government than personal advisers.

Many official intellectuals are eager to improve the quality of Chinese research. To them institutional advisers' response to Western culture is not academic enough. Official intellectuals try to avoid the party line, taking a different approach, trying to explain the

clash in terms of media between the two sides in a balanced way and showing much less critical sentiments about the US media. They do not buy the idea that there is a consistent and intentional cultural attack from the US government. Nevertheless they are those who are the most conservative among Chinese IR scholars in terms of Chinese traditional values. As always, liberals expressly attack the CCP's party line. In the media war between China and the US, they take the side of the US.

Notes

¹ Zhao Suisheng (Spring 2000).

² Tu (Fall 2001).

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ See Liu Ji (27 May 1997).

⁶ Wilhelm (2003).

⁷ See Kim (1994), pp. 3-41.

⁸ Yuan (2004).

⁹ See Tu (Fall 2001).

¹⁰ See Tu 'Embodying the Universe: A Note on Confucian Self-realization', *World & I* (August 1989), pp. 475-485.

¹¹ See Tu (Fall 2001).

¹² See Habermas (1990) (1994). See also D. Jones, 'Ethics and Morality in Contemporary Cosmopolitanism', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* (February, 2003).

¹³ Wang, G. *The Chinese way: China's position in international relations* (Scandinavian University Press, 1995), p. 52.

¹⁴ He Xin, 'The Confucian School is China's Earliest Party,'

<http://www.hexinnet.com/documents/200311/rujia.htm>

¹⁵ There were several competing groups within the Confucian school and they helped establish balance of power in the party state.

¹⁶ See Wing-tsit Chan, *A Source Book of Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 86.

¹⁷ Xiong Shili, *Xin weishilun* [New Theory on Consciousness-only], (Taipei, Guangwen, 1962), pp. 49-92.

¹⁸ See Qin Gao, 'Selling Culture: Ancient Chinese Conceptions of "The Other" in Legends,' in Chan and Mandaville (eds.), *Zen of International Relations* (N.Y., Palgrave, 2001).

¹⁹ Watson, J. L., 'Rites or beliefs? the Construction of a United Culture in Late Imperial China', Dittmer and Kim (1993), pp. 80-103. p.83.

²⁰ Levenson, *Confucian China and its Modern Fate: A Trilogy* (University of California Press, 1968).

²¹ The most important thinker of Legalism, Han Fei Zi (? - 233 BC), believes that power (shi), methods of government (shu) and law (fa) must be used together to gain a supreme authority.

²² Thomas (April 2003); See also Xu Hezhen, 'Focus on Psychological War, Against the Background of Grand Strategy,' *Junshi kexue*, Issue 5 (2000).

²³ See Maria Hsia Chang, *Falun Gong: The End of Days* (Yale University Press, 2004).

²⁴ Barmé (July 1995).

²⁵ Deng Xiaoping (1994).

²⁶ The CCP Small Leading Group of Foreign Affairs (2000).

²⁷ Deng (1994), p. 191.

²⁸ The CCP Small Leading Group of Foreign Affairs (2000), p.7.

²⁹ Ibid, p. 53.

³⁰ Deng (1994) p. 165.

³¹The CCP Small Leading Group of Foreign Affairs (2000), p. 121.

³²Ibid, p. 14.

³³Deng (1994), p. 61.

³⁴The CCP Small Leading Group of Foreign Affairs (2000), p. 11.

³⁵Ibid, p. 97.

³⁶Deng (1994), p. 15.

³⁷The CCP Small Leading Group of Foreign Affairs (2000), pp. 95-96.

³⁸Deng (1994), pp. 344-345.

³⁹Ibid, pp. 224-225.

⁴⁰The CCP Small Leading Group of Foreign Affairs (2000), p. 65.

⁴¹Ibid, p72.

⁴²Deng (1994), p. 321.

⁴³The CCP Small Leading Group of Foreign Affairs (2000), p. 206.

⁴⁴Han , Li Yuying, Li Zhijiang et al (1990), p. 495.

⁴⁵Ibid, p. 601.

⁴⁶See, Hsu, C. &Linduff, K. M., *Western Chou Civilisation* [Yale University Press, 1988]; and Hsu, C.‘Applying Confucian Ethics to International Relations’ *Ethics and International Affairs* vol5 (1991).

⁴⁷See Qin Gao (2001).

⁴⁸Tanaka (2004).

⁴⁹Lampton, ‘The Stealth Normalization of U.S.-China Relations,’ *The National Interest* (Fall 2003), pp. 37-48

⁵⁰See Kennedy (1987).

⁵¹Condoleezza Rice, ‘Promoting the National Interest,’ *Foreign Affairs* (Jan./Feb. 2000); Ted Galen Carpenter, ‘Roiling Asia: U.S. Coziness with China upsets the Neighbors,’ *Foreign Affairs* (Nov./Dec. 1998), pp. 2-6.

⁵²Christensen (Sep/Oct 1996).

⁵³See Johnston (1995).

⁵⁴Mercer, ‘Anarchy and identity,’ *International Organization* (Spring 1995), p. 233.

⁵⁵Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it,’ *International Organization* (Spring 1992).

⁵⁶Ibid, pp. 394-395.

⁵⁷See Wendt (1999).

⁵⁸D.R. Howland, *Borders of Chinese Civilisation* (Duke University Press, 1996), p. 2.

⁵⁹Huntington (1993).

⁶⁰See ‘Fox Special Report with Brit Hume’, (April 9, 2001).

⁶¹Johnston (2004).

⁶²Yuan (2004).

⁶³See Schwartz, *China and Other Matters* (Harvard University Press, 1996), pp45-64.

⁶⁴See Tu (Fall 2001).

⁶⁵See Hans Küng, *Global Ethic* (New York, 2000).

⁶⁶Wing-tsit Chan (1963), p. 3.

⁶⁷The Earth Charter, see www.earthcharter.org

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹Liu Ji (27 May 1997).

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³He Xin, ‘Thought on Ideological Issues,’
<http://www.hexinworld.com/documents/zhengzhi/yishi.htm>

⁷⁴He, ‘A Brief Biography of Confucius,’ *Hong Kong Commercial Daily* (Nov. 29, 2002).

⁷⁵He, ‘History and National Consciousness,’
<http://www.hexinworld.com/documents/other/gudingxianjie/lsxygmys.htm>

⁷⁶He, ‘We are Originally the Offspring of a Heroic Race,’
<http://www.hexinworld.com/documents/other/zhuixinshangchuang/womenyuanshiyanxiong.htm>

⁷⁷Wang Daohan, Speech in the Fourth Meeting of the First Council of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (March 20, 1995).

⁷⁸ Wang Daohan, 'Wang Daohan Raises up Three Points as to the Dialogue and Negotiation that Concerns the People across the Two Sides,' *People's Daily* (April 28, 2003).

⁷⁹ Liu Ji (27 May 1997).

⁸⁰ Wang Daohan, Wang Daohan's Speech for the Chinese New Year, Jan 31, 2004.

⁸¹ He, 'Appeal to Your Consciousness,'
<http://www.hexinworld.com/documents/zhenzhi/woxiang01.htm>

⁸² *Ibid.*

⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁶ Liu Ji (27 May 1997).

⁸⁷ See Kang Xiaoguang, 'Outline of Nationalism,' *Zhanlue yu guanli*, Vol6 (2002).

⁸⁸ Wang Xiaodong (1999).

⁸⁹ See Kang, (2002).

⁹⁰ Wang Xiaodong (1999).

⁹¹ Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, Vintage, 1979).

⁹² See Kang (2002).

⁹³ Wang Xiaodong (1999).

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ Ren Yi, 'Chinese and Western Conceptions of Civilisation in the Eyes of Western Historical Philosophy,' *Xin yuandao*, Vol1 (2003).

⁹⁶ See Xu Hezhen (2000), pp. 67-76.

⁹⁷ Ren , Vol1 (2003).

⁹⁸ Lu Shi, in *Why China Says No* (1996), p. 20.

⁹⁹ Yan Xuetong (2001).

¹⁰⁰ Interview with professor Zhang Xiaojin during his UK visit in 2003.

¹⁰¹ Xiao Gongqin (2001).

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ See Tu (Fall 2001).

¹⁰⁴ Chen Bing, Chen Yin, 'Jiang Qing's Road in Confucianism,' *Shenzhen jin bao* (May 29, 2004).

¹⁰⁵ Smith, R. J., 'Chinese Maps: Images of "All under Heaven",' (Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 8.

¹⁰⁶ Chen Bing, Chen Yin (2004).

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Jiang Qing and Lioyd A .Sciban , 'Beyond Modernization and Liberalism: Dialogue between Jiang Qing and Sciban,' <http://www.confucius2000.com/confucius/jqslydtls05.htm>

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¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ Li Shengzhi, 'Globalization and Chinese Culture,' in Li and He, *China's Road* (Nanfang ribao press, 2000).

¹¹⁵ Feng Chuan, 'Confucian Liberalism,' *Bo lan qun shu* (April, 2002).

¹¹⁶ Wm. Theodore de Bary, *Neo-Confucian Orthodoxy and the Learning of the Mind-and Heart* (Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 216.

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¹¹⁸ See Walter Lippman, *Public Opinion* (Free Press, 1997). See also Stuart Ewen, *PR! A Social History of Spin* (Basic Books, 1996).

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¹²⁴ See Daniel C. Lynch, *After the Propaganda State* (Stanford University Press, 1999); See also Zhao Yuezhi, *Media Market, and Democracy in China* (University of Illinois Press, 1998).

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¹²⁶ Sascha Matuszak, 'The Price of Stability,' April 12, 2004, <http://www.antiwar.com/matuszak/?articleid=2293>.

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¹³¹ See 'Realistic Responses and Strategic Choices for China After the Soviet Upheaval', *Zhongguo qingnian bao* (Sept. 1991). It advocated nationalism as a unifying force combining Western rationalism.

¹³² Brady (2002).

¹³³ Congress Report (July 2002).

¹³⁴ Brady, (2002).

¹³⁵ Derbyshire (June 5th 2000).

¹³⁶ Sascha Matuszak, Patriotism, Jan. 25, 2002. See <http://www.antiwar.com/matuszak/?articleid=536>.

¹³⁷ Congress Report (July 2002).

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Chapter V China's Arguments on America: Economic Issues

In this chapter, the author will move on to the CCP's formulations on US-China relations regarding economic issues. Based on 47 articles on this topic, the author will examine and discuss the Chinese writings on US economic power and China's WTO entry, for the purpose of presenting the CCP's nationalistic stance on economic issues in the bilateral relationship and how Chinese IR scholars respond to it.

The CCP's legitimacy claims now rest heavily on its achievement of nationalist and economic objectives. Despite its rhetoric, the CCP has only a limited ability to deliver nationalist goals such as reunification with Taiwan, control over the Diaoyu and Spratly Islands, and increased international prestige. Therefore it is vital for China to join the world economy and expedite its economic modernisation.¹ Regardless of suffering from the dislocations of modernisation, China has to remain dependent on international loans, foreign investment and access to foreign markets. To all intents and purposes the core component of the CCP's foreign economic policy is economic binding. However, it is suggested by Karl Gerth that economic bonding encourages and spreads nationalism in China.²

In the 1990s, China became one of the world's manufacturing centres and began to produce enormous amounts of labour-intensive and even high tech-intensive goods. Many Chinese people began to take pride in China's contribution to the world economy and to readily slip into the Chinese glory of the past. On the other hand, there emerged an increasingly growing belief that China as a nation needs its own national brands whose core technologies are in the hands of Chinese. The labels of "foreign goods" were flaunted by some rich people who had strong links with abroad and generated contempt if not hatred among the majority.

For the sake of nationalist goals, the CCP intends to maximise China's gains from international economic activities. Since the mid-1990s, China has hoped for a multi-polar world in which it could readily develop its economy, yet it did not happen at the

beginning of the 21st century. What the CCP faces is an increasingly globalised world with a still strong and dominant power - the US.³ The party thus adopts a pragmatic strategy that aims to at times bend current international rules and norms in order to achieve national wealth and power while largely complying with international rules. China has never aimed at becoming a western “market economy” but rather at engaging and using other market economies to become a great power.⁴ As such the US is not a model to copy or learn from but rather an objective to exploit. This strategy apparently challenges US engagement policy toward China.

Economic interdependence is the core of US engagement toward China. The rationale behind engagement is that it may bring about a China that will be integrated into world capitalism and will be more accepting of the contemporary international order and more committed to bringing about social changes in it through peaceful means.⁵ It encourages China to behave well as a responsible major power in the world and it tries to push China gradually toward democratic political change.

5.1 US Economic Power

The CCP’s observation of US economic power in the age of globalisation is the foundation of China’s increasingly strong economic nationalism. Rapid economic growth since 1992 has greatly boosted the CCP’s confidence in China’s comprehensive national power and national pride. Therefore the CCP’s party line is centred on the view that the US heyday has gone and its gradual yet irreversible decline is under way. Jiang Zemin’s close friend Liu Ji even publicly claimed in 2004 that the September 11 event would hasten the US decline.⁶ This tendency has been supported by the US decline theory in the West.⁷

Most Chinese IR scholars follow the US decline thesis yet some do not agree and argue that the US is still the dominant power in the world economy and there is little sign of its weakening. However, it does not follow that these scholars affirm the US policy of engagement. They also call on CCP leaders to take notice of China’s financial and

economic crisis, warning them against US hostility and arrogance. Financial and economic crises are in general one of the main causes of the emergence of nationalist movements or regimes, since nationalists might grasp the opportunity and proclaim their capacity for solving the crisis, which can be seen clearly from the upsurge of nationalist movements in countries like Turkey, India and China in the first half of the twentieth century. Therefore, in terms of economy, these scholars are actually more anti-US than those who closely toe the party line.

Economic Globalisation and US Power

From the 1990s onwards the debate of US decline was set in the new context of economic globalisation. Due to different interpretations of globalisation, different Chinese IR scholars have different perceptions of the American decline theory. However, by and large they regard globalisation as a double-edged sword that might delay the US decline yet might also constrain its international behaviour.

Economic globalisation benefits US dominance in a number of aspects in the short term. Firstly, as the country that has most powerful transnational corporations, the US draws on corporate power to maintain its dominance in the world. Corporate powers in the US have developed the concept of “disciplinary neo-liberalism”, which means they are in charge of the rules of international trade. They ask the US government to implement these rules in the world and in turn help the US government maintain its hegemony.⁸

Secondly, economic globalisation has promoted the ideology of liberalism in the world and has provided opportunities for the US to spread democracy in non-Western areas. When the US draws on its military might to protect and secure its economic interests in non-democratic countries, its liberal allies will only pay lip service to protest.⁹

Thirdly, ongoing globalisation is flanked by gigantic US global military dominance, which has secured US power for the moment. Globalisation is about international norms yet, in general, international rules are defined by the strong. The cases of Kosovo and

East Timor have the same character but the US adopted opposite policies toward each. The US claimed that these different policies were both responsible.¹⁰

Fourthly, globalisation helps the US government find new ways to manage rising powers like China. It has intertwined Chinese and US economic interests and China's economy is now heavily dependent on the US. The CCP's economic development strategy creates interdependence which means that an end to interdependence is far more costly to the CCP than to the US.¹¹ Due to China's dependence on the US market, capital and technology, one can say that, to some degree, the US holds the key to China's economic growth. A US scholar pointed out, the CCP's strategy can only succeed if Americans allow it.¹²

On the other hand, plenty of factors restraining US power supervene with globalisation. In the long term they will function to the disadvantage of the US. Globalisation is about networks of interest, devolution and trans-national power. Due to the diffusion of advanced technology and management skills, one after another emerging markets stride into the capitalist economic system as heavy-weight players. State power is steadily undercut by market forces and bypassed by corporate powers and myriads of non-governmental actors. Regardless of its dominant power in the world, there is also no escape for the US in this inexorable world-wide move.

Globalisation might expedite China's economic growth and restrain further the behaviour of the US government. China's greatest threat to the US is not military but its determination to become an economic superpower. The Chinese economy is competitive in the world due to its huge market and cheap yet well-trained labour force. Due to China's long-term policy of "*fu guo qiang bing*" (enrich the state and strengthen the army), the CCP has always pursued the improvement of China's technologies. Globalisation has made it much easier for China to acquire advanced technologies from the West. Therefore China's economic challenge to the US is not simply its wealth increase but also a comprehensive one, as China has the potential to catch up with the US in almost every industrial field.¹³

In addition, corporate forces in the US also tie Washington's hands. US transnational corporations are increasingly dependent on China as a market, source of imports and offshore manufacturing base. For the sake of their own interests, they might lobby the US government to allow for China's economic expansion in the world. The US economy is remarkably heterogeneous by virtue of the strength of those transnational corporations and it is hard to manage all corporations in line with some politicians' strategy to ensure US preponderance in the world.

Theory of American Decline

Though globalisation will in the long run move on to the disadvantage of world-wide US economic dominance, it is hard to tell whether this will lead to US decline, and, if so, when the juncture is or will be. The US in decline theory tries to offer an answer to the questions. It was first raised by Paul Kennedy in his classic book published in 1987, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.¹⁴ This book led to a "decline debate" about whether the US is in decline from its Cold War "superpower" status in the post-Cold War era¹⁵ and prompted the rise of a sub-discipline within International Relations studying Global Change, mostly from a long-term perspective.¹⁶ Kennedy believes that there is a clash between military and economic establishment. He says that a very heavy investment in armaments, while bringing greater security in the short term, may so erode the commercial competitiveness of the US economy that the nation will be less secure in the long term.

Kennedy's theory was refuted by scholars like Susan Strange and J. S. Nye, as they believed that US comprehensive national power would continue to dominate the world and as such no other power could replace the US as the world leader in the near future. Nevertheless, even during the booming 1990s, doubts about US preponderance still existed. Inspired by Kennedy, authors like Pat Buchanan, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Edward Luttwak and Kevin Phillips argued that the US moved toward a decadent phase. Their voice was unfortunately justified by the Sept. 11 event in 2001. More and more scholars

have since accepted the premise that al Qaeda attacked the US because terrorists had this perception that the US was weak.

In this scenario, views that the US is in decline have run rampant once again in the era of globalisation when the process of power de-centralisation is hastened. Scholars like Immanuel Wallerstein, Charles A. Kupchan and Emmanuel Todd contend that Pax Americana has come to a close.

Wallerstein, the originator of world-systems theory, says in his book, *The Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World*, that the US is a lone superpower that has lost direction amidst a global chaos it cannot control.¹⁷ He believes that power devolution in international relations is in process and the Sept. 11 event marked the turning point. Kupchan believes that all great nations must fall. In his book *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century*, Kupchan asserts that the rise of the EU and East Asia will create a serious challenge to US preponderance.¹⁸ He regards optimists' assumption as shaky, as he does not believe a unipolar system can last, due to the centrifugal force of globalisation. Emmanuel Todd, a French scholar, is famous for predicting the fall of the Soviet Union back in 1975 before it occurred.¹⁹ Now he has written *After the Empire: The Breakdown of the American Order*,²⁰ which is regarded by many as the most important work since Francis Fukuyama's *The End of History and the Last Man*, positing that the U.S is overextended, regardless of its current preponderance in the world. In his view, with its trade deficits, dependence on foreign capital and emerging plutocracy, the US economically depends on a world that it increasingly antagonises.²¹

The theory of American decline is linked with the thesis of Western declinism in general. Its history can be traced back to philosophers from Frederick Neitzche²² to Martin Heidegger²³ and writers from Henry Adams²⁴ to Robert Bly,²⁵ yet the most influential authors of this thesis are Spengler²⁶ and Toynbee.²⁷ The viewpoint of Spengler and Toynbee on the decline of the West is an insidious thesis whose continued popularity and beguiling appeal endures. Contemporarily, left-wing authors like Kirkpatrick Sale²⁸ and

Noam Chomsky²⁹ tend to insist that Western culture must be transformed as the West's rapacious drive for profit and expansion threatens to bring about its own demise.

These books have been introduced to Chinese IR scholars and help to generate a huge market for US declinism, as it means the Chinese civilisation might dominate East Asia once again. Chinese statecraft has long been inspired by historical experiences from the Warring States era when several weak kingdoms fought against the strongest Qin kingdom. CCP leaders regard the US as the Qin kingdom of our age and are hoping to check its power in conjunction with other powers. Their followers have quantitatively analysed the relative power of the nations of a new international political and economic order in which the US and maybe the West will decline economically, socially and militarily, and China will become one of the definitive great powers in a multi-pole world. Some, like He Xin, predict that the US will decline in 15 to 20 years, others, like Wang Jisi, argue that it may take longer.

Following this theory, many Chinese strategists in the PLA are confident of China's rise in the world and believe China will become too strong for the US to control. They calculate power ratios and predict US decline. They acknowledge that China is still weak as compared with the US, yet they are pretty sure that China is safe. The U.S. military forces can be defeated through ancient strategic techniques known collectively as "the inferior defeats the superior".³⁰

China's Economic Expansion

Though not many Western declinists regard China as a serious challenger to the US power, they acknowledge China is one of the world's fastest growing economies.³¹ China is now widely regarded as one of the engines of world capitalism and China "is no longer an enemy of capitalism."³²

Chinese economic growth has been confirmed by data from the IMF and World Bank.³³ China had become the 9th largest exporter in the world.³⁴ It is predicted that by the year 2020 China might have the largest economy in the world.³⁵ China has now become one of

the favourable countries for FDI. Combined with trade and technology transfer, this amounted to a truly massive shift of Western resources to China, greater and faster than any other shift of resources in the history of the world.”³⁶

Nevertheless, despite harsh words occasionally, Chinese foreign policy has shown no intention to bring down US leadership in the world. “China is still a country whose real interest lies mainly within its boundaries and, to a lesser extent, in the Asia-Pacific region where developments may have a direct impact on China’s national interests.”³⁷ The CCP has no real power to challenge worldwide US preponderance. Their penchant for declinism can only be well understood as an instrument to serve its domestic legitimacy rather than a sign of its aggressiveness.

Party Line

In this scenario, the CCP’s party line on the theory of American decline is ambiguous. On the one hand, it embraces this theory to boost the CCP’s achievement and accordingly its legitimacy among the Chinese people; on the other hand, it entails voices challenging this theory to maintain a low profile, keeping the Chinese people alerted against the US hegemony, to heighten a crisis consciousness among the Chinese people. However, the former is the focal point that the party intends to propagandise.

The CCP is confident of the increase of China’s share in world GNP and believes that the US share will steadily decline in the long run. The CCP tries to explain the reasons for the US decision on engagement toward China from the angle of China’s growing economy as opposed to the US. The CCP says: “Facing the fact of China’s rise, the US administration also realised that it does not benefit itself to allow for further worsening China-US relationship and began to gradually adjust its China policy.”³⁸ “...the US administration understood that China’s rise and development is irresistible, and China will play a crucial role in world economic and political relations. It is impossible to isolate and contain China.”³⁹

However, CCP leaders also point out, in the short run, despite rapid economic growth China is still the weaker partner in China-US relations. Deng Xiaoping said that the world economy is still controlled by international monopoly capital led by the US. He said: “The Western imperialists are trying to make all socialist countries abandon the socialist road, to bring them in the end under the rule of international monopoly capital and set them on the road to capitalism.”⁴⁰ Due to this advantage, the US will continue to seek China’s disintegration. The CCP sticks with the US conspiracy theory. In the concluding remarks of Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought), the CCP points out: “From the perspective of the world scope, socialism is still at a low ebb, the contrast of world power is still that the north dominates the south. International and domestic enemies, collaborating with each other, have never given up their conspiracies to ‘Westernise’, ‘split up’, infiltrate, subvert and break up China.”⁴¹ The CCP also says: “Exactly as comrade Deng Xiaoping said, ‘The international monopoly capital is controlling at present the economy of the world, the market has been occupied by them, and hence it is not easy to fight out. It is even harder to fight out for a poor country like China.’”⁴²

The main formulations here are *zhongguo jueqi* (China’s rise), *xihua* (westernise), *fenhua* (split-up), *guoji longduan ziben kongzhi shijie jingji* (the international monopoly capital is controlling at present the economy of the world), *fendou chulai hen bu rongyi* (it is not easy to fight out). They aim to create both national pride and crisis consciousness among the Chinese people. *Jueqi* means to become a great power in economy, *xihua* (westernise) means to terminate socialism and even Chineseness in China, *fenhua* (split-up) means to split up the whole country. They try to show the evil motive of the US toward China. *Kongzhi* (control) means to control and manipulate⁴³ and it demonstrates the relative weakness of China against the US in terms of the economy.

Personal Advisers

How do different groups of Chinese IR scholars react to the CCP’s formulations on US economic power? One can observe they differ much more than they do over security, political and cultural issues, while interpreting the official guidelines.

By and large personal advisers focus on the long-term prospect of the US economy and its strategic implications for China. He Xin deems that US dominance is temporary and China's rise is irresistible. "...Even if this world empire in American dream can be established, it will be destined to live a short life."⁴⁴ In his view, the collapse of US dominance will start from its finance and the outbreak of new large-scale international financial crisis is inevitable.⁴⁵ He Xin's prediction has been justified to some degree by the economic policies of George Bush's second-term administration. While the US economy is sitting on a volcano, in his view, China might lead the world economy. "If China can continually keep up social stability for over 10 years, China will probably become, in terms of overall comprehensive national power, a superpower in the world in the first half of the 21st century."⁴⁶

Liu Ji is also confident that US power is in decline. "In my view, it is not wrong to say, in terms of strategy, the US has begun to decline since the Sept 11 event, and this super giant will fall down in the 21st century."⁴⁷ In his eyes, the dilemma for the US is, if it stops hegemonism in the world, it cannot continue to maintain its high standard consumption and prosperity; if it carries on its aggressive foreign policy in the world, it will surely become public enemy No. 1 and be destroyed by people in the world. When predicting the US will decline, he declares, "China will become the locomotive of world economic development in the 21st century."⁴⁸

In the meantime, personal advisers understand that the Chinese discourse should not become too over-confident as the CCP still needs the consciousness of national crisis to unite the Chinese people and stay in power. He Xin claims that, for the moment, the US is still the preponderant power in the world economy, taking advantage of China's weakness.⁴⁹ In his opinion, the US has no intention to use its dominance for the sake of universal interests but rather exploiting non-Western countries like China. He points out that those advanced in industry and technology have already occupied the advantage in the world market and can take a commanding position.⁵⁰ He also says: "10-20 years ago, the Soviet Union and East Europe were still newly-developed industrial countries rising

in economy. Now those countries are all in decline and dire straits in terms of economy. To all intents and purposes, they are defeated in a clever way from three frontlines: ideology, economy and politics, in fierce competition with Western countries in world economy, industry and technology.”⁵¹ What he says is entirely in line with formulations such as *xihua* (westernise), *fenhua* (split-up) and *fendou chulai hen bu rongyi* (it is not easy to fight out), despite the fact that he does not use them as such.

Liu Ji holds that US economic supremacy following the Cold War makes it arrogant and ambitious to impose its own will upon the world in general and China in particular. In his view, currently the US economic preponderance is still undisputable.⁵² However, the US has abused the economic power it enjoys and its foreign policies are unjust. He says: “Being dizzy with success, it (the US) is prone to arrogance.”⁵³ The US became a world power this century during the two world wars and the Cold War. Several generations grew confronting definite enemies like Germany and the Soviet Union. Therefore, since the end of the Cold War the US as the strongest economy in the world has somehow lost direction in policies. In Liu’s view, some Americans continue to think in accordance with Cold War logic. “In so doing, China naturally comes up when some people seek a new enemy.”⁵⁴

Institutional Advisers

Due to political considerations, most institutional scholars take responsibility to maintain and improve the CCP’s positive image, therefore they closely follow the party line and claim the US will decline in the long term. One can see the consistency of nationalistic arguments of those scholars from 1988 to 2000, who tried hard to present in public an increasingly powerful China in contrast with the US. In the meantime they have to provide practical advice for the government on current US-China relations, facing US preponderance in the world. As such, they have to defend China’s policies on two fronts, analysing US economic power in the world from both long-term and short-term perspectives.

Wang Huihong published a paper in 1988 on the US economic status in the world, which actually represented mainstream thinking among institutional advisers as to US economic power in the long run.⁵⁵ Though it was written before 1989, the author deems it appropriate to analyse it here due to its argument that is widely supported by most institutional advisers. Wang argued that US financial status was obviously in decline, and it was difficult for the US to turn back this tendency.

Wang's article is divided into 3 parts, respectively on the decline of the US international financial status, on its irreversible fate of misfortune and on its negative influence on the world economy. In the first part, Wang examines the history of the US financial status since 1945. He has noted that the US had always been a creditor country since 1919, and long remained the biggest net creditor country in the West. Nevertheless, from 1985 onwards the US began to become a net debtor country and its foreign debt reached \$111.9 billion. In the meantime, Japan rose to become the biggest net creditor country in 1985 and its net foreign asset was \$129.8 billion, surpassing Britain and West Germany.

Wang deems that the US has already lost its leadership in the banking industry. During mid-1980s, Japanese banks began to ascend and then dominated the world banking industry. In 1987, Japanese banks had 35% of world banking assets, over double that of American banks. Wang has also examined the dominant status of the US dollar in the international monetary system. He points out that, during the 1980s, the US dollar was forced to raise its value for 5 years, which led to an enormous American foreign trade and balance sheet deficit. With the help of the market and government policy, the US dollar began to devalue again after Feb. 1985. Wang has also noticed that the US dollar's function as a savings currency decreased. In 1987, in the world foreign currency reserve, the ratio of the US dollar had been cut to 60-65%. In 1988 only 50% of world trade was settled in US dollars. From his perspective, the status of New York as the largest financial centre was in this scenario challenged for the first time. During the 1980s, Japan's financial liberalization speeded up and the financial market in Tokyo quickly prospered. Britain reformed its old financial system in the 1980s and made London's financial market vibrant again.

In the second part, Wang contends that the tendency of the US economic power's decline would continue for a long time and was difficult to reverse. He maintains that the US total debt would expand further, though the speed of its increase would be lower. Financial debts and foreign trade debts would not decrease rapidly in the short term. Wang also contends that the status of the US dollar in the financial market would continue to diminish. He noted that due to Japan's rapid economic development and the internationalisation of the Yen, Japan would soon raise its financial status in the world, not least in East Asia. Soon after the emergence of the European Monetary Unit, it became the fourth strongest currency in the European capital market. Thus, in the West, as far as world currency was concerned, one would see multi-polarity rather than US dollar dominance.

In the third part of his article, he seems to be fairly sure, in the long run, that the Western economy and the US economy in particular would be bogged down, that the struggle among these powers would become more and more tense and that the US would certainly lose its economic leadership in the world. In the meantime, China further expanded rapidly its economy in the world. Institutional advisers thus claim that the US has, in this scenario, to opt for engagement policy toward a stronger China, aiming to *xihua* (westernise) and *fenzhua* (split-up) China. This is apparently in line with the CCP's nationalistic proclamation that the US intends to disintegrate China for fear that it might become too strong.

Institutional advisers like Wang Huihong try to show Chinese people the US in a dire situation in the long term, in contrast with the CCP's great economic performance. Nevertheless, worrying that some Chinese might become overconfident of Chinese capabilities and ask for radical policies toward the US, some institutional advisers call on the Chinese people to face the reality that the US is still a superpower, advocating a low-profile policy toward the US that is supposed to be in line with China's national interests. Yan Xuetong deems that the external environment for China's rise is not at all ideal.⁵⁶ Hu Angang, a famous scholar in China Academy of Science, is confident of China's growth

in economy yet reminds the Chinese people of China's low per capita income due to its huge population. He predicted that though China's GDP would surpass the US around 2015, nevertheless its per capita GDP would only amount to one-fourth of that of the US.⁵⁷

Wang Jisi is among those who acknowledge US dominance in the near future and try to argue against the theory that America will become even weaker in economic terms. They warn Chinese leaders not to exaggerate the weaker side of the US and face the great danger.

Wang Jisi edited in 1999 a book called Gaochu bu sheng Han—lengzhan hou meiguo de quanqiu zhanlue he shijie diwei (Lonely on High-The US Global Strategy and World Status After the Cold War).⁵⁸ In the last chapter of this influential book, Wang tries to acquaint some Chinese scholars with some facts that they have reckoned incorrectly. It is claimed that one of the main reasons some Chinese scholars contend that the US is in decline is that Germany and Japan's economic growth rate has been for some time higher than that of the US. Wang argues that this phenomenon began to change during the mid-1990s. He says that during 1995-1997, the US economic growth rate was respectively 2.0%, 2.4% and 3.9%, much higher than Germany's and Japan's during that time.

Wang challenges another theory - that the US has lost the edge of economic competition in contrast with Japan. Some Chinese scholars claim that the growth of the US productive rate has declined rapidly, that Japan beat the US in manufacturing and that foreign banks have further invaded the US financial market. Wang cites some new research and says that the US is, on the contrary, still among the top 3 as far as international competition is concerned. For example, he quotes a report by the World Economic Forum in 1997, which says the US secured third place in the list of international competitors, second only to Singapore and Hong Kong.

Wang also discusses other good US economic performance during the Clinton administration. He points out that the US unemployment rate in Dec. 1998 was only

around 4.4%, far lower than that of the EU. He says that there are some other indexes which show that the US economy is actually in good shape, such as the exchange rate, consumers' confidence index, Dow Jones industrial index, productivity rate and corporate profit rate.

Apart from providing some “right” facts, Wang Jisi also tries to highlight some faults in the theory of America in decline. Firstly, he does not think the trade deficit is a really important index by which to judge the US economy. It seems to him that the trade deficit only covers tangible commodities and excludes service trade. Secondly, as for the debt problem, Wang has highlighted its benefit for the US. He regards the budget deficit as an important part of US economic policy and not a bad result of economic crises. He points out that foreign investment is very helpful for the US to make up budget and current account deficits due to trade deficit, and hence is good for the US to achieve overall balance of international balance sheet. Thirdly, as for the average GNP, Wang does not think that it is an at all good index. He highly recommends PPP as more effective to judge a nation's economic development. He points out that in 1994 the average GNP of the US adjusted by PPP was \$2, 664 billion, No. 1 in the world.

As such, Wang follows the CCP's line and shows his apprehension toward a hegemonic America that is reluctant to see China's rise. He deems it unwise for Chinese to have faith in US good will. “ The US surely will not change its strategic objective for almost 100 years, namely, change China as per the US interests and value system. We should not have any illusion. The Chinese should walk their own way, therefore the leeway for better US-China relationship is rather limited, not to mention that the US has never put the amelioration of US-China relationship as the top objective of its China policy.”⁵⁹ As for the future status of the US in the world, he refuses, like the CCP, to give an abrupt answer.⁶⁰ To sum up, Wang Jisi is in fact a believer in the CCP's conspiracy theory, since he deems it a real threat to the CCP's rule in China.

Zi Zhongyun, his colleague in CASS, supports his argument. She deems that the US is still in the driving seat of the world economy and still attracting most talents in the world,

which ensures its hegemony in the 21st century. What she worries is how China currently responds to the US preponderance. In her view, “Though the theory of American decline lingers on now, what people in the world worry is not what influence it will bring about if the US declines, but rather, whether it is good or bad fortune for the world that a US is the only superpower, still far ahead of other countries in all aspects....”⁶¹

Official Intellectuals

Most official intellectuals are more concerned with the impact of US power on China’s domestic economic issues and prefer not to ignore the prevailing US economy in the world and call for protection of Chinese industries. To them the debate about whether the US is in decline is unimportant, as they focus on the Chinese national economy whatever direction the US power evolves. They are more concerned with the economic implications of US dominance than its political implications.

There are yet a number of official intellectuals who claim that US power, and particularly its economic power, is indeed in decline. They try to tell the Chinese public that China is safe as the US cannot afford to take containment policy toward China. Shi Yinhong is one of them and he agrees with US declinism, particularly economic decline. At the end of last century, Shi doubted US leadership capability in the world.⁶² In his eyes, there has not been a fresh, coherent and long-term US strategy, either global or regional. Shi argues that the US has entered a long-term war against the Muslim world since the Sept. 11 event; that the war in Iraq has overstretched its military and economic resources. In his view, the power transition in East Asia might benefit China’s rise.⁶³ These official intellectuals deem that though the US is still the only superpower in the world, its policy has been checked by other powers and international law. “It is strong but not strong enough to do whatever it likes.”⁶⁴

Nevertheless, the long-term prospect of US economic power is not what concerns the majority of official intellectuals. To all intents and purposes they focus on its short-term impact upon China. Generally speaking, the majority of official intellectuals highlight the official terms like *guoji longduan ziben kongzhi shijie jingji* (the international monopoly

capital is controlling at present the economy of the world) and *fendou chulai hen bu rongyi* (it is not easy to fight out). In terms of economy, they stress the fact that the world economy is still dominated by the West and warn of a decisive and immediate threat from the US to the Chinese economy.

Li Yongsheng, a scholar working with Liaoning University, published in 1999 an influential paper on the US financial hegemony.⁶⁵ He expressed his worry that it is hard to reform China's financial system due to the threat from the US financial industry. The paper is divided into two parts, with the first on the content and nature of financial hegemony, the second on the forms of financial hegemonic exploitation. In his opinion, hegemony simply means leadership and domination, financial hegemony means a power that dominates the international monetary system by right of its overwhelming advantage in politics, economy, finance and military forces, and work its own will, principle or rule upon the whole system and then gain the hegemonic profit. It seems to him, financial hegemony amounts to the extension of economic and military hegemony. He claims that a hegemonic country like the US is destined to exploit other countries and particularly developing countries like China.

In the second part, he has explained how the US exploits other countries through its financial hegemony. The first is to make the most of the US dollar's dominant status in the international monetary system. He points out that, due to this privileged position, the US is able to loot large quantities of mintage tax and seize foreigners' resources without payment. According to IMF statistics, almost half of the U.S dollar circulation is outside America and the US government benefits by around \$15 billion. At the same time, the US can enjoy the fruit of other countries' economic development. If the US burden of debt is too great, it can devalue US dollars to reduce its debt and then stimulate its exportation. Another advantage of the US dollar's dominance is that it can shift its crises to other countries. If there is a deficit in America's current account, the US government can make it up with issuing more notes and then the inflation will be transferred to other countries. During a financial crisis, the US can avoid deflation with currency circulation increase and thus avoid economic recession.

Li Yongsheng has done much research on the flow of international capital, and concludes that the US has benefited greatly from it. He says that international capital moves among countries with a speed and amount unseen before. With the rapid development of emerging markets, enormous capital amounts flow to specific areas for colossal rewards, particularly South America and ASEAN countries. During financial crises, Western investors leave emerging markets with high rewards and, as a result, these areas' economy is hit heavily if not blighted. Li Yongsheng contends that the main body of the ill-gotten wealth in reality returns to the US. It seems to him that most mutual funds and hedge funds are based in the US. What they have earned from emerging markets flows back to the US. Li Yongsheng contends that invasive financial speculation by private financial funds is the most damaging way that developing countries are exploited. In this scenario official scholars like him argue that China should be very cautious in opening its financial market to the West.

Even some old-generation official intellectuals forsake the classic Marxist teaching that "capitalist countries are decaying day by day" and argue against the theory of American decline. Huang Annian, a professor in his 70s at Beijing Normal University, is their representative. He calls on the Chinese people not to duck US supremacy and the problems China has to face. "There are now some experts, scholars, media and even very few government officials that lack sobering assessment of the difficulty of Chinese modernisation process...proclaiming that China will catch up with the US in 30 and even 20 years' time. Neither does this assessment conform to the Chinese reality, nor is it in line with the situation of advanced countries in the world, therefore it is very harmful."⁶⁶ In his view, China's dependence on the US economy has added to the complexity of Chinese modernisation. He agrees with Thornton that the Chinese are thus worse off than the Soviets were because China's economic health is tied more directly to the US than the Soviet Union's ever was.⁶⁷ Scholars like him call on the CCP to develop further China's domestic markets.

Liberals

Most liberals are glad to see a strong US that contributes to China's democratic movement. Cao Changqing welcomes the emerging American Empire. In his view, the US has "the most powerful military might in human history", "the US economy is the combination of Japan, Germany and Britain", the US "soft power covers the whole world", it is "Mecca of spirit and knowledge", its pop culture affects the world, therefore the US is indeed an empire now.⁶⁸ He says, "the US is indeed establishing an empire yet not a military one, but rather a 'spiritual empire' whose value of freedom and democracy covers the whole world. The 'American Empire' that is founded on this liberal spirit and thinking shall not decline, and even the whole 21st century belongs to the US."⁶⁹

Nevertheless, they have no intention to follow the CCP and call for attention to the US evil strategy against China, despite the fact they are eager to see the development of the Chinese economy. Liu Xiaobo has showed contempt to those who exaggerate the danger from the US. In his view, they are not so much afraid as jealous of the US. "...in their sub-consciousness, (they are) waiting for the decisive blow against the US, waiting for the resurrection of the Arab world or Mainland China, waiting for the US to decline or perish..."⁷⁰ Liu is angry that some Chinese people and scholars in particular "gloat at US misfortune" when the Sept. 11 event and the Columbia Spacecraft accident happened. "Some thank Allah for protecting Iraq, some believe it is God's punishment of the US for its intention to dominate the world, some predict that the US will soon decline and China will eventually rise and defeat the US..."⁷¹ The point to make here is that almost all liberals regard a strong US economy as vital in China's democratic cause.

Conclusion

From the above one can see that Chinese IR scholars' views on the US economic power is diversified and even antagonistic, yet there are mainly two branches: one that takes pride in China's economic expansion and the US decline in the long term in the era of globalisation; the other that stresses crisis consciousness due to US continual dominance and US determination to delay US decline in the short term. Except for liberals, both views are based on nationalist sentiments though with different focuses.

In spirit, personal advisers care most for the interests of the party and follow the CCP's terms most sincerely and appropriately. They analyse the US economy more from long-term strategic angles. When claiming that China will arise in the long term they actually mean the CCP's rule will continue for a long time. Institutional advisers have dual tasks given by the CCP. On the one hand they help the CCP claim credit from China's economic growth, on the other, they have to cope with current complexities in China-US relationship shadowed by the present US preponderance. In terms of the economy, most official intellectuals have demonstrated a more nationalist approach than the CCP. They highlight the aggressiveness of US economic power and worry about vulnerable Chinese national industries as opposed to the dominant Western corporate power. It is those scholars that argue for more protectionist measures to bend international rules at times and protect Chinese industries. Liberals firmly believe that the US will continue to rule the world. In their eyes, the US is a benign empire that deserves acclaim.

5.2 WTO Entry

The author will discuss in this section the communication between Chinese IR scholars and the CCP's formalised language on China's WTO entry and try to demonstrate Chinese nationalistic sentiments in the most liberal foreign policy decision China has ever made.

CCP leaders pursued WTO membership as a means to continue China's rapid economic growth, which would help the party maintain its monopoly on power.⁷² Nevertheless, it is apparent that current globalism has melted away many taken-for-granted norms and national identities are re-examined.⁷³ The CCP recognizes this impact on the Chinese people following WTO entry and is conscious of the necessity of maintaining social stability.

China finally gained membership of the WTO at the end of 2001. However, the party was not fully prepared for admission.⁷⁴ CCP leaders opt for WTO membership yet it does not

follow that they entirely accept WTO rules. On the contrary, they publicly vowed to impose Chinese values on international institutions like the WTO.⁷⁵ They opted for WTO membership, yet they did not do so mainly for the purpose of willingly embracing world market economy, but rather due to the fact that they had no other choice. Only from this point can one understand why the anti-WTO voice among Chinese IR scholars could be heard without hindrance in an authoritarian country while the government had already shown its determination to enter this free trade community.

China and International Organizations

Does China intend to revise international rules? This question is closely related to the following one: does a rising power intend to change international rules as its relative power increases? There is some tension between Morgenthau and power transition theorists like Organski and Kugler in answering this question. Morgenthau believes that any rising state is by definition a revisionist one in so far as it wants to increase its power and change the global distribution.⁷⁶ For Organski and Kugler only rising states that want to change the rules as the power distribution changes are non-status quo powers. Revisionist states have a “desire to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work.”⁷⁷

If one follows the power transition theory and examines China’s foreign policy after 1989, it is hard to say China intends to change international rules. China has now become deeply involved with international organisations. Before the 1990s, China favoured bilateral rather than multilateral channels, as China harboured strong suspicion toward international mechanisms.⁷⁸ Nevertheless, since the end of the Cold War, China has rapidly departed from this position and has come to acknowledge international norms and advocate interdependence and co-operation.⁷⁹ The principle of co-reliance and co-development in international economy has been more respected than before.

There can be little doubt that China’s membership in international organisations has increased dramatically in the post-Maoist period.⁸⁰ By 1997 China ranked eleventh in belonging to most international governmental organisations in the world with 45. The US

ranked ninth with 47.⁸¹ Johnston argues that China has complied with international rules of international institutions.⁸² Since China entered the WTO, it is suggested that China has generally accepted its overall decision-making procedures and structures, and has been cautious about taking a leadership role inside the institution.⁸³ There are indeed some primary compliance problems, yet many experts argue that they will not be so much a wilful disregard of WTO commitments by the central government, but rather non-compliance by hard-to-control provincial and local authorities.⁸⁴

To ensure China enters the international community in a peaceful way, the US has put multilateral economic organisations at the heart of its engagement policy toward China.⁸⁵ The main objective of economic engagement is to promote the development of economic and democratic reforms in China, as well as regional stability in Asia,⁸⁶ building up in China a domestic constituency for more open-minded orientation and thus enmesh China in international institutions. Nevertheless, there are in the US many politicians and scholars who suspect China might use its increasingly powerful economic strength “to challenge the status quo in the WTO.”⁸⁷ Some Americans suggest that, though China showed signs of becoming more of a “trading state”, China is not satisfied with the current international system despite gaining from it.⁸⁸

In this scenario, many Americans believe it is a must for international organisations involved to stand firm.⁸⁹ Americans then impose a hard negotiating posture on the terms of WTO admission. They claim that to argue that better relations encourage reform in China is not to argue that the US should compromise its principles but rather that the right tools must be adopted in order to exert enough leverage.⁹⁰

History of China’s WTO Entry

The WTO is the international organization with the greatest influence upon China’s social system, among all the international institutions that China has joined. Due to the demands of the US and other Western countries, China failed to reach agreement with the GATT. In July 1995, China began negotiations for entry into the newly-established WTO. China stuck to its position as a developing country. As such, China would not have

to open its markets to foreign companies on an equitable basis and it would be exempt from the provisions of the WTO treaty concerning subsidies and intellectual property rights. Americans worried that China's mercantilism would ultimately destroy the US economy and insisted on regarding China as a special case, rather than just a developing country in the normal sense. In this scenario, the CCP allowed for different voices from the official line rising to surface, i.e. opinions that are against China's WTO entry, partly as negotiation tactics.⁹¹

In April 1999, the then Chinese premier Zhu Rongji visited the US, telling the Americans that China was ready to make more concessions. Zhu is one of the most liberal leaders in the CCP in terms of economics. When he became the premier, one of the most difficult issues for the central government to tackle was how to reform state-owned enterprises that were on the brink of bankruptcy. Due to strong resistance from interest groups within the CCP, it is hard for Zhu to carry out his more radical policy from within. Against this backdrop Zhu was personally eager to make a deal with the US, at the expense of some interest groups in China.

Interest groups in China demonstrated their anger over the concessions Zhu Rongji was planning to make. Under great pressure from Chinese conservatives, Jiang Zemin withdrew from his original position and allowed for public critics of Zhu's concessions in the US. Due to the party's encouragement, nationalism ran rampant. Therefore, very unusually in the CCP's history, voices of opposition against the Politburo's decision began to be heard. It is said that Wu Jichuan, minister of information industries, even tendered his resignation, as he was really angry that Zhu made those concessions without consulting him.⁹²

Soon after Zhu returned to Beijing, the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was bombed by US forces. The WTO negotiations were not reopened until after the Jiang-Clinton meeting in New Zealand in September 1999. Facing the volatile relations with the US, Jiang's team took a pragmatic approach and tried to anchor the China-US relationship in economic interdependence. Chinese negotiators came back to the table and bilateral agreement on

China's entry was reached in mid-November after heated bargaining. China finally gained membership of the organisation in late 2001, with too many concessions in the eyes of a number of Chinese IR scholars.

Problems with the WTO Entry

China's WTO entry is of gigantic consequence to Chinese society. It "will either transform China into the golden goose, as many Americans claim, or be the poison pill that kills it."⁹³ It took many years for China to reach an acceptable agreement with the US, yet those CCP leaders who argued for the agreement deemed it worthwhile as they recognised that joining the world is the best way to deepen China's reforms.⁹⁴ Fewsmith has provided a critical analysis of the political and social implications of China's accession to the WTO.⁹⁵ He believes it will also reinforce some positive trends apparent in China's political economy. Participation in the WTO will have considerable impact on China's political system. It will play a vital role in developing the rule of law in China. In addition, WTO accession will help further remove the government from people's lives and expand the political breathing space of non-government associations.

Nevertheless, reforms do not surely and naturally bring about social stability and economic prosperity. The short-and long-term consequences of China's WTO entry are difficult to anticipate in what appears to be a trade-off between stability and restructuring.⁹⁶

There are many economic difficulties for China to face. On top of all the costs of the WTO entry is its negative impact upon China's agriculture. China's agriculture sector is the weakest link in the entire economy and peasants will be hit hardest by WTO entry at a time when rural incomes are falling.⁹⁷ The rural economy will be further put under pressure because of competition from the West.

Zhu Rongji expected to further the reform of China's state-owned enterprises with China's WTO entry, yet it did not appear to be easy.⁹⁸ In inland China they are still the main-stay of the local economy, producing the largest part of local tax income and

providing most jobs for urban residents. Local authorities resisted Zhu's radical reform policies.

China's financial system is fragile compared with its Western counterparts. WTO requires that China allow RMB-denominated financial transactions to be handled by foreign financial institutions by the end of 2006. Nevertheless, China has not yet been ready to fulfil its promise.⁹⁹ AMC authority in operations of the indebted SOEs needs to be substantially enhanced and more transparency needs to be brought into the valuation and disposal of state assets.

WTO membership will surely exacerbate the already existing severe unemployment problem. Over 6.5 million urban workers lost their jobs in 1999, excluding the rural jobless, who are not recorded in official tallies.¹⁰⁰

The net loss of jobs will depend on how many jobs the increased exports and FDI will create, as the Chinese market will be much easier for FDI to access.¹⁰¹

Another challenge facing China after the accession is the impact on the legal system. The WTO is the most important international organisation ruled by clear-cut trading rules rather than personalities. The requirement of the WTO is an open, transparent and efficient legal system.¹⁰² Without this, the broader objectives for economic transition cannot be accomplished. It is a huge task for China to reform its legal system to follow WTO rules.

Pragmatism

CCP leaders believe that there is no choice for China to maintain rapid economic growth other than joining the WTO. In this sense, the Chinese way is extremely pragmatic. It is completely in line with Deng Xiaoping's famous saying on China's economic development approach: "It doesn't matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice."

China has made broad concessions to the WTO. There are several practical and contingent reasons for this. Firstly, Jiang Zemin prefers to establish a stable relationship with the US, lest China lose a peaceful regional environment in which it might continue to focus on its economic modernisation agenda. Jiang and his team deemed that China's entry into the WTO would impart new momentum to the relationship and give it an underpinning that has been noticeably lacking since 1989.

Secondly, Zhu Rongji planned to use China's WTO membership to encourage state-owned enterprises to break up monopolies and become more competitive in the global economy. Zhu expected this would make the Chinese economy more efficient and reduce the heavy burden of subsidies on the central government.¹⁰³ Due to the strong resistance from a variety of interest groups, Zhu was convinced that a commitment to WTO rules might subdue these conservatives.

Thirdly, there was also concern that pressures would mount for admitting Taiwan into the WTO ahead of Mainland China.¹⁰⁴ In the eyes of CCP leaders, it is imperative for Mainland China to have stronger influence in international organisations than Taiwan.

Considering the contingent factors above, the then Politburo decided on signing the WTO against great odds. The whole policy-making process was kept secret. The central authority made a decision not to keep informed those in ministries whose interests would be greatly diminished by China's WTO membership.¹⁰⁵ The People's Bank of China, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Information and other institutions including many large-size state-owned enterprises were basically excluded from the negotiation process.

In some sense, the West could readily be used by top CCP leaders as a scapegoat if something goes wrong in the near future. The result is that the credit would belong to the CCP while the agony arising out of the process would certainly be ascribed to the West. In case of anything going badly wrong, it is good for the party's legitimacy to prepare a

fallback, say, a conspiracy of the US, as an excuse for its failure to keep the reform on track. As a result, pragmatism entails nationalism.

Party Line

The CCP's party line on China's WTO entry is a mixture of pragmatism and nationalism. Pragmatism does not clash with nationalism. One might see both nationalistic sentiments and pragmatism of the CCP as to China's WTO entry from its official guidelines and formulations. Deng Xiaoping pointed out the disadvantage of China in the international market. He said: "The Western imperialists are trying to make all socialist countries abandon the socialist road, to bring them in the end under the rule of international monopoly capital...The international market has already been fully occupied, and it will be very hard for us to get in. Only socialism can save China, and only socialism can develop China."¹⁰⁶ He then called for a new international order based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. He said: "We must therefore take the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as the norms for the new international political and economic order."¹⁰⁷ In *Deng Xiaoping waijiao sixiang xuexi gangyao* (Introduction to Deng Xiaoping's Foreign Policy Thought), CCP leaders say: "International trade should be established on the foundation of equality and mutual benefits, helping meet each other's needs...(We) should gradually establish through dialogue an equal and co-operative North-South relationship, against the inequality and varieties of discriminative policies and approaches in international trade, forbidding frequently taking economic sanctions against other countries."¹⁰⁸ The CCP expressly states that China will not follow the Western regime in terms of the political system under the new circumstances.¹⁰⁹ It says: "The socialist system and socialist public ownership should not be touched. We can not permit producing a new capitalist class.' 'Whatever the openness, public ownership economy is still the main body.'"¹¹⁰ From the above one can see that the CCP continues with the open-door policy that brings economic growth to China, yet has no intention to carry out political reform, but rather try to impose Chinese values, a mixture of traditional Chinese culture, socialism and liberalism, upon international economic institutions.

Following Deng's teaching, in 1993 Jiang Zemin proposed three principles to guide China's GATT negotiations over market access: 1. The GATT was an international organization and without China it was incomplete. 2. China should enter as a developing country. 3. There should be a balance between China's rights and obligations.¹¹¹ In the ensuing negotiations, China held to these three principles throughout.

Formulations like *pingdeng huli* (equality and mutual benefits), *duihua* (dialogue), *fandui bu pingdeng*, *fandui qishi* (against the inequality and varieties of discriminative policies and approaches), *gongyouzhi jingji shizhong haishi zhuti* (public ownership economy is all the same the main body), *fazhanzhong guojia* (a developing country) show vividly that the CCP does not completely buy WTO principal, though largely in voice. *Qishi* (discriminative policies and approaches) means in Chinese dictionary to treat somebody unfairly.¹¹² It is one of the main tasks to put right what the WTO has done wrong to developing countries, namely, discriminating against these countries. Many CCP leaders claim that, as a developing country, to defend China's national interests in the WTO is surely to promote the values of developing countries, as the CCP is the defender of third world interests. This is in line with the victim complex in Chinese nationalism.

Personal Advisers

Nationalist sentiments come from both pros and cons of China's WTO entry. The former blame international institutions like the WTO for flaws in international economic regime, blame the US for delaying China's entry and taking advantage of China during negotiations; the latter believe that WTO membership will greatly threaten China's national interests. Personal advisers belong to the former group.

Following the CCP's pragmatism and nationalism, personal advisers have clearly expressed China's reasons and intentions to join the WTO, though not necessarily with the CCP's formulations literally. They try to criticise globalisation, depict a Chinese vision of the WTO while justifying China's WTO membership. According to them, it seems possible for China to participate and lead the WTO toward a new direction in a Chinese way. Therefore, in spirit, they are the sincerest followers of the party line. Wang

Daohan has echoed his support for *gongyouzhi jingji shizhong haishi zhuti* (public ownership economy is all the same the main body) and stressed the importance of a market economy under the CCP's leadership in the context of China's WTO entry.¹¹³ He believes that it is also "stressing politics" to know clearly both the advantage and disadvantage of China's WTO entry.¹¹⁴ Liu Ji always takes a nationalistic stance over China's WTO entry. He says: "It is our objective to realize the great resurrection of the Chinese nation in the 21st century."¹¹⁵ Liu Ji believes that the current regime of the world economy is flawed and he tries to deliver a Chinese vision as a better one. He says: "Nevertheless, real economic globalisation is not only liberalisation of trade or finance but also should be the comprehensive liberalisation of all productive variables. Technology should also be liberalised, there should be no restraint over technology transfer. The flow of human resources should also be liberalised, and it should not be that only Chinese Ph.Ds and masters are permitted to go to the US and not those who labour."¹¹⁶ On the one hand, Liu supports China's WTO membership and follows the CCP's formulations; on the other hand, he has offered his prescription for the flaws of current international economic institutions.

He Xin has voiced his concern over China's WTO entry yet agrees with the CCP's decision to join. He believes that there is a conspiracy in the West to weaken the Chinese economy through the WTO regime. "As a country that steps late into the global capitalist market, China has not been and also not been able to become equal to advanced countries, but rather, has been only in a position to be dependent and exploited passively...it is due to China's dependence and weakness that they agree to accept China. Their aim is nothing but try to, step by step, annex, digest and even destroy in some areas (yet not all industries) our economy."¹¹⁷ Nevertheless, He Xin also regards the WTO as an opportunity for China to dramatically expand its power into the world. He encourages Chinese entrepreneurs to step audaciously into the global market, serving China's national interests, dominating the world. Domestically there are plenty of problems in China, yet He believes that, if China regards the whole world as its market and resources, these problems will be sorted out and it will be impossible to contain China.¹¹⁸

Institutional Advisers

Most institutional advisers belong to the group that follows the CCP's formalised language, welcoming China's WTO entry yet very critical of the nature of international institutions and the US hegemonism in particular. A small number of institutional advisers are apparently against China's WTO membership, at least at the turn of the 21st century.

Most institutional advisers have expressed their appreciation of China's WTO membership. In their views there were three main goals for China to join the WTO. Firstly, WTO entry will help create a more favourable external environment for China's domestic economic reform and development. Secondly, entrance into the WTO will further domestic economic system reform. Thirdly, it would help strengthen economic ties and trade between Taiwan and Mainland China and contribute to the completion of the great nationalist task of re-unification.¹¹⁹

Some institutional advisers like Zhang Shuguang and Zhao Nong believe that the situation after China's WTO entry can be well controlled as long as China takes proper measures to counter the negative impact of entry. They have made some proposals: 1, accordingly adjust relevant provisions of international trade and FDI, in accordance with WTO rules; 2, draw on WTO's provisions for developing countries' discrimination treatment and protective measures, in order to delay as much as possible the effect of WTO membership; 3, adjust China's economic structure so as to achieve the aim of avoiding disadvantage.¹²⁰

During the negotiation, the Chinese government tried hard to join the WTO as a developing country, therefore it encouraged its officials and institutional advisers to express their anger regarding the current international economic regime. Long Yongtu, an LSE IR department graduate and the chief Chinese negotiator for China's WTO entry, once talked about his understanding of the WTO regime. He says that, in the congress of the WTO, there is a small negotiation room only for Western countries. There is meanwhile a big café, where other members wait for the policy results from the small

negotiation room.¹²¹ Institutional advisers like Long on the one hand understand clearly that it is a must for China to enter the WTO, in order to enjoy the benefits of international trade; on the other, they are afraid that China is too weak to compete with the West. For them, attacking the US hegemony can only add more credit to their support for China's WTO entry.

Like Long, Wang Yizhou in CASS is glad to see China's WTO entry yet deems that the current international economic regime is unfair to most developing countries. Nevertheless, he is pessimistic about any hope of overhauling the international regime soon. He believes that, for a fairly long time to come, the revision of international rules and organisational regulations will probably be incompatible with the wishes and demands of the majority of countries in the international community.¹²²

Zhang Yuncheng from the CICIR agrees with WTO entry, yet is worried that, with China's WTO entry, China might face fierce competition from the US, not only economically but also politically. Zhang Yuncheng deems that, with China's WTO entry, China is entering a period of increasing international economic friction. Due to the differing political and economic systems of the two countries, future economic competition between China and the US will carry political significance. As such, CCP leaders are facing a severe challenge on how to gain economic benefits while avoiding political risks.¹²³

These scholars mentioned above, like most institutional advisers, demonstrated China's eagerness to join the WTO and accused the US of delaying China's entry. Their views are basically in line with the CCP's formulations like *fazhanzhong guojia* (a developing country), *pingdeng huli* (equality and mutual benefits), *zunzhong zhuquan* (respect a country's sovereignty), *duihua* (dialogue), *fandui bu pingdeng fandui qishi* (against the inequality and varieties of discriminative policies and approaches), *gongyouzhi jingji shizhong haishi zhuti* (public ownership economy is all the same the main body). However, a very small number of institutional advisers go even further and are publicly against China's WTO entry, beyond the constraint of these formulations. They are

actually used by the CCP to achieve its different political goals before, during and after China's WTO entry negotiations. They are allowed to voice in public their disapproval of China's WTO entry, as they are used by the CCP to achieve at least three objectives: to add more weight to the advantage of China during the negotiations, to blame the West in case of turmoil in the wake of the WTO entry and to increase crisis consciousness among the Chinese people through the bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises.

These institutional advisers have extensive contacts with middle-rank officials in central and some local governments, who are not at all eager to join the WTO. In their eyes, China had already enjoyed most favoured nation (MFN) status with all countries except the US. Despite the annual China-bashing ritual in the US Congress, they know the US will grant it to them anyway.¹²⁴ To middle-rank central and local officials, the costs of conforming immediately to the expectations of the US were relatively large, yet the gains from the WTO membership are not that attractive.¹²⁵

A scholar in the league of New Leftists, well trained at Yale University, Wang Shaoguang, believes that WTO membership will influence China in a negative way economically. Aside from this, he has discussed another important issue: the social and political impact of China's WTO entry.¹²⁶ Wang does not buy the idea that "globalisation is an economic phenomenon, not a political one."¹²⁷ In his eyes, this can lead to the belief that takes economic organisations like the WTO as given, or as something that is divorced from politics, which is not the case.

Wang points out that the victims of China's WTO membership are those workers and peasants, the least advantaged people in China, who have borne the cost of China's recent reform. He deems that those people are the social foundation of the CCP's reign. During the last 10 years of the last century, they saw no improvement of their living standards but instead the emergence of a new class of wealthy people. It is too hard for them to come to terms with the growing gap between the rich and the poor.

It seems to Wang that the increase of inequality could water down the legitimacy of the CCP's rule. Firstly, if the Chinese government cannot solve soon the problem of the gap between the rich and the poor, it will lose its ethical foundation. Secondly, too much inequality would lead to slow economic development. He cites the study carried out by Alesina and Rodrik, and Persson and Tabellini, to support his argument and points out that the basic reason why the Chinese economy is slowing down dramatically is the worsening of its social equality.

Wang contends that if the CCP decides to join in the WTO and carries on the policy that bestows most benefits from economic reform on a minority, the public would no longer bear inequality. Wang argues that no country can survive under severe economic inequality. Is there a chance that China joining the WTO thereby manages to build up a workable welfare system? Wang is very pessimistic on this vision, as he thinks that China is at the moment crying out for more investment and cannot afford such a luxury. To him, the wise decision is to avert the WTO entry.

Wang is not alone among institutional advisers. Zuo Dapei in CASS has always fought against China's WTO entry and regards the agreement as an unequal treaty. "The way we have joined the WTO agreement will make China the victim of the WTO, make China unable to have the status to enjoy exporting to foreign markets opened by other countries, yet at the same time must open its markets to import more foreign products than member states at the same level."¹²⁸ He publicly calls for withdrawing from the WTO. Regarding WTO membership, the CCP is caught up in the tension in diplomacy between China's determination to show itself as an active, involved participant in international institutions and its desire to minimise commitments and constraints.¹²⁹ Zuo Dapei is clearly in favour of the latter as, in his eyes, it is more real. He agrees with the idea that it is much better to withdraw from the WTO in order to gain substantial space of economic development than to stay in it for a false reputation.¹³⁰

Official Intellectuals

Official intellectuals' opinions are even more fractured than institutional advisers. Some of them simply follow the CCP's formalised language, optimistically agree with China's WTO entry, though believe international regime is flawed; some support the CCP's line with many concerns, highlighting the fact that China is still a developing country; some are staunch anti-WTO scholars, proclaiming that China's national interests will be devastated by the WTO regime.

A small number of official intellectuals are happy to see the Chinese government join the WTO, in order to maintain a close relationship with the US. In some sense, they are quite pro-America, though at times they feel angry about the American hegemonic style. A scholar at Beijing University, Zhu Wenli, does not believe the WTO regime can check US power in a real sense. With China's WTO entry, it is still reasonable to guard against US hegemony. "The golden time of free trade sounds rather like a myth and many Chinese analysts tend to believe friction and retaliation are keynotes of world trade."¹³¹

Her colleague, Wang Yong, agrees with her about US dominance in the international regime. To maintain this dominance, the US in his eyes tries to draw on any kind of possible excuses to protect its own national interests. He argues that, after the end of the Cold War, China and the US have to compete fiercely for the world market. To hold down the Chinese economy, the US government as well as those business leaders collaborate to demand China joining the WTO not as a developing country. Wang points out that the Americans have cited 5 excuses not to let China enter the WTO as a third world country and profit at the expense of America's national interests.¹³² It seems to him it is due to the fact that the WTO will bring substantial benefits to China that the US tried to restrain China's economic expansion, therefore China should join the WTO to pursue its own interests.

Some official intellectuals have no problem with China's WTO entry, but they do have a consensus that China should join as a developing country. They were angry that the US was too demanding during China's WTO negotiations. They suspect that Americans want

to halt China's rise. They suspect that the US begins to curb Chinese ambitions by raising their business costs.¹³³ To them China has therefore been bullied by the US during the WTO negotiations.

They point out that it is true that the Chinese economy has been growing apace since 1978, but China's development is mainly through the increase of quantity rather than quality. Compared with advanced countries, China is still a quite backward rural country that is fighting against time for foreign investment to aid industrialisation. From the point of view of these official intellectuals, the world should not turn a blind eye to the reality and too highly evaluate China's economic status due to some selfish if not evil motives.

Before China joined the WTO in 2001, the US Congress debated every year whether or not to give China MFN treatment, which was an embarrassment for Chinese intellectuals and CCP officials. A scholar at Fudan University, Zou Genbao, says that, since 1990, the struggle between China and the US on MFN status has been closely related to the fact that many Americans are trying to establish another Roman Empire in the name of freedom and democracy. Zou argues that China has obviously become America's biggest obstacle to promoting such an ambitious global strategy.¹³⁴

As a well-known scholar, Zou's view in his work is ostensibly nationalistic in terms of his interpretation of the CCP's formulations such as *pingdeng huli* (equality and mutual benefits), *fandui bu pingdeng, fandui qishi* (against the inequality and varieties of discriminative policies and approaches). He says that there are always people in the US administration and Congress who try in vain to force China to submit through cancelling the MFN status in order to achieve their political goals.¹³⁵ He is surely on the side of the CCP and worries about the social disorder that would come with WTO membership, a new role that requires rule of law rather than party policies.

Zou Genbao has explained the reasons why some Americans were inclined to cancel China's MFN status.¹³⁶ He points out that there are some interest groups, for example,

some unions in manufacturing industry, who felt that their interests were extraordinarily threatened by goods made in China and therefore were strongly against China's MFN status. Zou has also disputed the US accusation that China had breached the "Sino-US Trade Relations Agreement", signed in 1979. Zou contends that the US was employing wrong statistical methods. The US took account of the huge volume of goods from Hong Kong on the Chinese side rather than Hong Kong itself, in light of the principle of origin.

The second point is on intellectual property protection. Zou points out that China was forgivable in this case, in that it was quite late for China to impose the legislature and practice of intellectual property law. He argues that China is such a vast country that it is really difficult to make sure every individual acts properly in accordance with intellectual property law. The third is on the goods from reform-through-labour camps. Zou contends that China used to export these goods to the US but had already prohibited it due to mounting external pressure. In his view, it is a bit fussy for the US to raise something from ages ago.

A large number of official intellectuals are strongly against WTO entry and some of them are authoritative scholars like Wen Tiejun and Han Deqiang.¹³⁷ They are the most nationalist scholars in terms of China's WTO entry. They voice their discontent over WTO rules, particularly over provisions as to China's agriculture, following the formulations *fandui bu pingdeng* and *fandui qishi* (against the inequality and varieties of discriminative policies and approaches). After two decades of reform and opening, it is evident that some industrial sectors such as textiles, machinery and electronics have become competitive in international markets,¹³⁸ yet China's industries like agriculture, aviation, banking, motor manufacturing etc. are still vulnerable. As such, these official intellectuals are very concerned about the negative impact on vulnerable sectors of China's WTO membership.

Han Deqiang, a young professor working in China University of Aviation and Aerospace, is famous for his concerns about China's unbalanced and unsustainable development and is regarded as the most nationalist and outspoken scholar on a range of issues and the

WTO problem in particular. In June 2001 he was invited to a conference in Brussels and organised by the EU council, in which he delivered a powerful speech against China's WTO entry. His main argument is that joining the WTO does not conform to China's national interests, and would definitely lead to economic disaster and hence put an end to China's glorious national resurrection.¹³⁹ He then called for a unique Chinese identity in terms of national economy.

He contends that Chinese enterprises have no capability to compete with their Western counterparts. As far as production scale is concerned, the total yearly sales for China's top 500 enterprises are only the same as General Motors. An enormous proportion of China's products are made in myriads of relatively small- and medium-sized enterprises, and the scale of each enterprise is too small in terms of productivity. As far as technology is concerned, compared with the West, the technical equipment of Chinese enterprises is rather backward and they are unable to compete with their Western counterparts in quality, function and varieties. With regard to capital, Chinese enterprises are generally short of abundant investment and can hardly increase their market occupation ratio. Chinese brands do not achieve high profits as quality goods, for lack of international reputation.

Due to these problems, Han points out that Chinese banks' bad debts would become over the limit and put the whole economy at high risk. According to his argument, market competition is the main source of Chinese bad debts rather than corruption, as people normally say. If China joins the WTO, Western corporations would force most Chinese enterprises into a corner. The bankruptcy of those businesses would produce more and more new bad debts.

Most worrying, from Han's point of view, is Chinese agriculture. It is well-known that China's agriculture has no scale efficiency, compared with the US, Canada, Australia and Argentina. Until 2001, the annual income per peasant in the Chinese countryside was no higher than \$80. Therefore Han argues that, if China joins WTO, peasants' income will

go down further, and they would have no choice except migrating into cities, where there are already millions of unemployed workers.

Therefore Han Deqiang doubts the motive of the West in accepting China as a WTO member. In his view, China was a victim during the WTO negotiations. Han is not the only one in China to harbour this perception. The US conspiracy theory has been widely accepted among PLA officers.¹⁴⁰

Han enjoys a reputation in China against copying the US model. He said in his speech: "Since taking the reform and open-door policy, China has learned everything from America...This sort of thinking stereotype has played a great role in persuading the public to support joining WTO."¹⁴¹

Official intellectuals like Han thus call for protection of national industries. In their minds, nationalism won attention as a corollary to self-reliance.¹⁴² There is no problem for these scholars to refer to historical cases to back up his opinion. "Modern China saw patriotic intellectuals with the Chinese spirit, like Zhu Ziqing, who 'would rather die of starvation than receive relief grain from the United States'."¹⁴³ Self-reliance has long been regarded as a vital component of Chinese national pride. In history, even buying goods made in foreign countries used to be regarded as betrayal of national interests.¹⁴⁴ Therefore protection of national industries can be justified in terms of both national interests and ideology.

Liberals

Most liberals support China's WTO entry as they believe that it will bring about democracy in China in due course. CCP leaders have determined that economic opening is required for the CCP to remain in power. Historically, such behaviour led to democracy, in cases such as Chile, Spain and Taiwan.¹⁴⁵ In the eyes of these liberals, anything beneficial to democracy should be encouraged. It is said that economic globalisation brings about "ideological" or "ideational" change.¹⁴⁶ Liu Xiaobo is thus confident that China's WTO entry will follow suit. Though he believes that the high

demand of Western countries in China's WTO negotiations originated from their "own economic interests", he deems that China will benefit objectively in politics, as "WTO entry can most powerfully accelerate China's change toward a state ruled by law from one ruled by personalities."¹⁴⁷

These liberals are glad to collaborate with reformers within the CCP. After Deng Xiaoping died in 1997, which means the last main old charismatic guard of communism had already receded into history, young generation reformers in the party could at last act out their opinions with less restraint. To sort out China's economic problems in their own way at the turn of the century, they even kept the whole WTO negotiation process secret from the public and made bold to decide on some disadvantaged clauses against China's social stability in the coming 3-5 years, as they understood clearly what the WTO meant to China in the long run in terms of its economy. During WTO negotiations, CCP leaders sought to shore up support for the government's economic reform programme.¹⁴⁸ Once China decides to go in, it would have little excuse to carry on the old Chinese management style. Most liberals appreciate reformers' policies and call on the US for support.¹⁴⁹

These liberals do not think excessive pressure will work in the case of China and have noted that the Chinese people traditionally have not responded positively to confrontation and coercion.¹⁵⁰ Facing US pressure, the Chinese largely stay defiant and try to find a way out with tough messages to the US. For instance, in 1994 just before the US Congress' decision on MFN, the Chinese rewarded former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl with large contracts, including a big Airbus deal, for his "co-operation" in not making trade contingent on human rights performance.

These liberals also deem that tough policies are not in line with the interests of the international community. They argue that China has not been a real threat to the US, as it is suggested that the Chinese challenge to US economic dominance in East Asia is based upon an economic system that is still too weak and dependent upon its very power being challenged to succeed.¹⁵¹ MFN revocation would hurt US companies doing business in

China, particularly corporations such as Motorola, IBM, Boeing and Chrysler, whose success in China boosts the US economy.¹⁵² Martin Lee, head of Hong Kong's largest democratic party, once said he would not like to see the US use MFN as a bludgeon, even if China mishandles the Hong Kong transition, "because it hurts Hong Kong first and badly..." and because doing so is like saying: "If you still beat your wife and violently, I'll shoot her."¹⁵³

Nevertheless, there are some liberals like Wei Jinsheng who are strongly against China's WTO entry as they believe China should not be rewarded by the international community due to its poor human rights record. He says, "It will be a mistake if the US business community believes that they will enjoy an ideal business environment in China while Chinese workers' rights have not been improved."¹⁵⁴

Conclusion

Varieties of views over China's WTO entry can ostensibly demonstrate the fracture of nationalism among Chinese IR scholars. They have achieved the most uniform agreement over the Taiwan problem (though not monolithic), yet showed their different understanding of Chinese nationalism by their conflicting views on China's WTO entry.

Chinese IR scholars all believe the US tries to slow if not stop China's rapid economic growth against China's national interests. Personal advisers accuse the US of obstructing China's WTO entry; most institutional advisers do as personal advisers, yet a small number voice their concerns about its negative impact on the country; some official intellectuals support entry while criticising US hegemony, some support it although worry that it will put China in danger, and a large number of them are resolutely against it. Even liberals have among themselves opposing opinions on China's WTO entry.

In terms of truth, sincerity and appropriateness of their discourse following the CCP's formalised language, personal advisers are most in line. The writings of most institutional advisers are closer to the party line than those of official intellectuals. A small number of institutional advisers and the majority of official intellectuals have expressed their

opposition to entry, concerning problems like unemployment and bankruptcy of national industries. In terms of economic nationalism official intellectuals are obviously the most radical group. At least in words, their views are in direct opposition to the CCP's official terms. Nevertheless, both pros and cons support or disapprove the party line on the same account: China's new nationalism.

Due to its worry that WTO membership might add to domestic pressure for dramatic social and political change, the CCP on one hand tries to persuade the Chinese people to understand the necessity of WTO membership; and on the other, allows in private for the anti-WTO voice to ensure the legitimacy of one-party rule. Thus the CCP has also prepared its way out for possible breaches of WTO rules. The encouragement for different voices shows the CCP's intention to retain its right not to follow all WTO regulations, if not trying to call for adjusting WTO rules. These future moves might be justified by domestic requirements. Whether the CCP's tactics will work is still uncertain, yet one can obviously see the tension of Chinese nationalism within Chinese IR scholars through their approaches to the CCP's stance on WTO entry.

Notes

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¹²⁶ Wang Shaoguang, *Shijie* (Outlook), Vol3.

¹²⁷ Breslin (July 2002).

¹²⁸ Zuo Dapei, Public Letter for NPC over Revising Provisions of China's WTO Entry Agreement, Feb 10, 2003.

¹²⁹ Johnston & Ross (1999), pp. 248-254.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Zhu Wenli (2001), 10(26).

¹³² See Wang Jisi, in Zhaobaoxu (1999), pp. 100-101.

¹³³ Thornton (2003).

¹³⁴ Zou Genbao, 'Shi lun zhong mei zuihuiguo daiyu he yongjiu xing zhengchang maoyi guanxi' [On Sino-America MFN and PNTR], *Journal of Nanjing University of Economics*, Vol5 (2000), p. 3.

¹³⁵ Ibid, p. 4.

¹³⁶ Ibid, pp. 3-4..

¹³⁷ For Wen Tiejun, see 'WTO Entry's Challenge to Three Nong Problem', in *China Reform* (May, 2004).

¹³⁸ Zhang Baijia (2004).

¹³⁹ Han Deqiang, <http://www.zazhiz.org/2001/zs0110a.txt>.

¹⁴⁰ Howard M. Krawitz, 'China's Trade Opening', in Flanagan and Marti (2003).

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Hunt, 'Chinese National Identity and the Strong State,' in Dittmer and Kim (1993), pp. 62-79. He substitutes the term "patriotism" for "nationalism".

¹⁴³ Foreign Minister Chen Yi made a similar statement in May 1962, refusing President Kennedy's implied offer of wheat. See Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Vietnam* (University of Michigan Press, 1976), p. 71.

¹⁴⁴ Ji Li, 'A great Spiritual Pillar and Lofty Moral Obligation,' *Shanghai Wenhui bao* (19 August 1989).

¹⁴⁵ See Rice (February 2000).

¹⁴⁶ Breslin (July 2002).

¹⁴⁷ Liu Xiaobo, 'Black Hair Turned White during Negotiations: Price that Has to be Paid by Monopoly System', Nov. 12, 2001.
<http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:PJw3GDoCe-gJ:www.epochtimes.com/gb/1/11/30/n153525.htm>

¹⁴⁸ Medeiros (March 2000).

¹⁴⁹ Fewsmith (July 2000).

¹⁵⁰ China Service Coordinating Office (27 March 1997), p. 2.

¹⁵¹ Thornton (2003).

¹⁵² See Mike Boyer 'China: Favoured Nation? Cincinnati Firms Want Trade Renewal,' *The Cincinnati Enquirer* (June 15, 1999).

¹⁵³ As quoted in Steven Erlanger, 'Clinton to Tweak China Over Hong Kong,' *The New York Times* (April 15, 1997).

¹⁵⁴ Wei Jingsheng, Cited by BBC news,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/simp/hi/newsid_660000/newsid_661800/661845.stm

Chapter VI Conclusion:

Nationalism in China's Response to the United States

Adopting the methods of comparative studies and formalised language analysis, through the case study of the Chinese response to US engagement, this study has illustrated and discussed the nationalist momentum in Chinese foreign policy in the 1990s and how the CCP loosely controls Chinese IR scholars' nationalist views. My analysis has focused on what are the focal points of Chinese nationalism in foreign policy, how Chinese IR scholars are trying to follow the CCP's party line in foreign policy and how various groups of Chinese IR scholars interpret the party line in different ways.

It has been found that nationalism became an important factor in Chinese foreign policy during the 1990s. China has become a post-communist society that still retains its communist government since the early 1990s. The CCP has undergone a repackaging, similar to the re-invention of the British Labour party under Tony Blair.¹ The new economic and political goals of the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao leadership are adopting marketisation and other capitalist-type systems without describing them as such, while maintaining the CCP's one-party rule. Academics are encouraged to study the fate of the CPSU in the Soviet Union and other one-party states, such as Mexico and Singapore, trying to learn from their mistakes and successes. In doing so, the CCP needs to move from being a revolutionary party to a political party and needs to forge a new consensus in China, a logic for continuing CCP rule indefinitely.

According to Xiao Gongqin, the emotions and reasoned concepts stemming from nationalism form an extremely valuable and natural political resource.² The general loss of confidence in Marxist-Leninist revolution and economics, caused by the internal capitalist-oriented reform, forced the CCP to rely on nationalist objectives to unite the nation.³

The CCP led by Jiang Zemin stressed traditional Chinese values, in addition to "traditional Marxist-Leninist ones." Jiang's concept of which traditional Chinese values

must be incorporated was articulated in the late 1990s by the new theories of the “Three Represents” (*san ge daibiao*) and the call to rule China by law and morality (*yifa yide zhi guo*), both of which have been promoted in Chinese academia. The evolution of “Jiang Thought” means indeed a nationalist turn.

The CCP has carefully fanned the flames of nationalism and anti-Americanism through party-controlled academic institutions. To counter persistent US objections to China’s behaviour in Taiwan, weapons proliferation, human rights etc, the CCP has portrayed the US as the self-appointed policeman of the world, whose foreign policy is inherently aggressive and bent on undermining China’s national sovereignty. CCP leaders consistently characterise the US as a “hegemon”, connoting a powerful protagonist and overbearing bully that is China’s major competitor, but they also believe that the US is a declining power with important vulnerabilities that can be exploited. The CCP has projected these negative images while also deliberately portraying China as an emerging power, seeking its great power identity.⁴

It has been found that the focal points of nationalism in Chinese foreign policy are domestic-oriented: legitimacy of the CCP’s one-party rule, territorial control and modernisation. In the 1990s, China’s foreign policy still served the main goals of its leaders: namely, strengthening, reforming and ensuring the survival of a Leninist political system in transition. It has also been found that the CCP’s promotion of nationalism and anti-Americanism reflects a larger strategy to maintain social stability and control as the economy rapidly opens up to the outside world and western values and culture.

Johnston has argued that foreign policy is critical for identity construction and thus for regime legitimisation.⁵ Regime legitimisation involves, among other things, the construction of a “national identity” among the members of a society. Identity construction rests on establishing and perpetuating differences between the ingroup and all other outgroups. Foreign policy is a process in which differences between a sovereign nation-state ingroup and a sovereign nation state outgroup are created.

When CCP leaders come to believe their legitimacy is declining, foreign policy becomes a key tool used to intensify ingroup identity inside China. The CCP's foreign policy strategies are both positive (e.g. designed to cue national pride in being a member of the ingroup) and negative (e.g. designed to exaggerate threat from outgroups). The specific content of these positive and negative strategies depends on the specific, contingent contents of national identity. Generally speaking, the purpose and effect of the CCP's foreign policy strategies serve to increase the strength of realpolitik rhetoric directed towards the outside and particularly US engagement toward China.

The most useful instrument to separate the Chinese from others is the concept of sovereignty. Thus, at a time when US and European leaders increasingly stress the interdependencies that have eroded political and economic sovereignty, CCP leaders stubbornly cling to orthodox principles of sovereignty that many US and European scholars view as antique.

Territorial sovereignty is at the core of Chinese nationalism in the 1990s. The strong words from the CCP have actually demonstrated the party's main concerns for China's security. The gesture to achieve nationalist goals such as reunification with Taiwan and control over the Diaoyu and Spratly Islands will unite the whole nation around the CCP. CCP leaders sternly warn the US of a "bloody war" over Taiwan, though, in practice, a potential military confrontation over Taiwan is viewed as a distant possibility.⁶ The main audience of the CCP's tough rhetoric is in fact the Chinese people within Mainland China.

The CCP's legitimacy claims also rest heavily on its economic performance and emphasise the achievement of modernisation objectives. The government has only a limited ability to achieve these goals and will have difficulty satisfying the rising expectations created by its own claims. The CCP thus uses nationalist rhetoric to cover its failures, though it does not follow that the CCP will isolate China's economy again as modernisation requires continuous and expanded access to the international economy.

It has been found that Chinese nationalism is a weak force. As a Leninist party in transition the CCP is slow in theory development and has mainly to rely on official terms to control Chinese academia. In the 1990s the party used a set of nationalist terms in foreign policy to guide Chinese IR scholars and encourage self-discipline. While IR scholars' response appears to be in thin consensus in security areas, it also encompasses a set of widely differing opinions on political, economic and cultural aspects of the CCP's party line.

In China the main function of academics is still to support and disseminate the ideas of the CCP. The party decides what the people should know rather than what they want to know. Since the CCP controls academic institutions, which in turn exercise a great deal of power in their active control of the flow of information, academic institutions in China are essentially the tool for the propagation of foreign policies and both the content and structure of Chinese academics reflect the dominant ideology — in our case, the new Chinese nationalism — of the party and the state.

Since the early 1990s, there appears to be some change in the Chinese academia. The process of making foreign policy in China has become much more institutionalised and decentralised, and is far less dependent on any individual leader. The CCP has also acted to diversify the sources of policy analysis it receives from inside and outside the government. For example, newly invigorated IIS of the foreign ministry and CASS now play a prominent role as think-tanks, and the ministry has also begun to hire specialists from outside the government to serve as consultants on technical issues. Institutional scholars and some official intellectuals increasingly participate in internal study groups, write reports and draft policy briefs. These scholars help sensitise CCP leaders to international trends as well as presenting them with a range of policy options.

However, various groups of IR scholars play different roles in Chinese foreign policy-making structure and interpret the party line in different ways.

Chinese IR scholars, on the one hand, reach a thin consensus on security issues with the CCP and, on the other hand, demonstrate various different opinions from the party's nationalist line. The nationalism among Chinese IR specialists and practitioners is divided on many non-territorial issues. Regarding what constitutes the Chinese nationalism, they have not reached a strong consensus on political, economic and cultural issues. Following *he er bu tong* (incorporating things of different nature), the new Chinese nationalism aims to incorporate strands including Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, Confucianism and some elements of liberalism. But Chinese IR specialists and practitioners differ widely in their opinions about what should be the main theme of the new Chinese nationalism. Most personal and institutional advisers regard Marxism-Leninism, Maoism as the dominant force, but an increasingly large number of official intellectuals suggest Confucianism should prevail.

With regard to how to achieve China's nationalistic goals, Chinese IR specialists and practitioners also have different agendas. On economic reform, most personal advisers advocate open-door policies to ensure steady growth of GDP, yet a very large number of institutional advisers and official intellectuals appeal for protecting national enterprises to keep local jobs safe. On political issues – say, peaceful evolution - personal and institutional advisers feel threatened by external forces, but official intellectuals are not much concerned about it and virtually appreciate gradual political reform.

As such, if one examines China's foreign policies in the 1990s and early this century, including China's decision to join the WTO, one can certainly see that nationalistic momentum is not uniform enough to form a strong national will. The new nationalism is centred on the CCP as the embodiment and object of patriotic sentiment, but the party needs to accommodate different groups' clashing arguments. If one group wins in one case at one time, its rival's interests/opinions must be addressed in another case at another time. The implication of this is that top leaders will continue to be constrained in the way that they deal with domestic politics.

In general, on security and political issues, personal advisers and institutional advisers use more radical discourse than other groups; over economic and cultural issues, official intellectuals use more nationalist discourse than other groups. Apart from security issues, personal and institutional advisers adopt a more nationalist approach to political issues than economic and cultural issues, while official intellectuals and liberals adopt a more nationalist approach to economic and cultural issues than political issues.

It was found that US engagement policy toward China has failed to achieve its objectives. It has generated nationalism in China and China has become a strong competitor of the US in East Asia as the CCP has successfully responded to the US engagement, using military balancing, economic integration, political buffering, cultural incorporation and reorientation. The CCP regards the US engagement as paternalistic and arrogant and sees some American approaches toward China as overbearing.

It was also found that the CCP's response to the US is defensive. The CCP's counter-attack to the US is mainly words rather than acts. The China-US relationship is profoundly asymmetric. The US is the dominant power in the world today — militarily, economically, politically and culturally. China aspires to be a prosperous and powerful nation, but it still has a long way to go. China needs the US — for markets, technology, investment capital, specialized training opportunities and preservation of an international climate conducive to rapid Chinese development — far more than the US needs China. Disparity between China and the US means China is still weak and the US still holds the key to China's rise. The US can manage Chinese power expansion so that it will not challenge US core interests in East Asia.

The US should take a more enlightened approach, especially with respect to China's internal problems. Many of the problems are best seen as growing pains of a developing nation. They are China's own problems and they would be better off left to the Chinese to solve.⁷ The US should prepare to deal with the CCP with neither ill will nor illusion. In particular, the US should prepare to engage China frankly and equally.

According to David Shambaugh, China's support for the American war on al-Qaeda and global terrorism has contributed to new stability in their relations. In addition, the two economies have further integrated. If wisely managed by both sides – and if the key sensitivities of each are respected rather than provoked – the new stability in Sino-American relations may endure.⁸

To conclude, the new Chinese nationalism is not a threat to the current international order. Gilpin uses three operationalizable components to examine revisionist countries: the distribution of power, international rules and the hierarchy of prestige.⁹ Thus, it is legitimate to ask the following questions to test for status-quoiness: how does the state speak and act regarding distribution of power, the specific rules of diplomacy, of international economic institutions and hierarchy of prestige? For Gilpin, revisionist states demand fundamental changes in these three components. Anything less, it becomes problematic calling the state non-status quo.

There is always a gap between the CCP's words and pragmatic acts. Both words and pragmatic acts have their respective merits in China's foreign policy: while words paint China's foreign policy with a colour of nationalism, pragmatic acts create flexibility and allow the CCP's foreign policy behaviour to maximise China's national interests. If western observers take the CCP's words too seriously, they may lose sight of the pragmatism driving China's foreign policy behaviour.¹⁰

From the discussion in this thesis one can see that, due to the security and particularly Taiwan problems, there are indeed strong nationalist sentiments among the CCP and Chinese IR scholars that US power is a threat to the survival of China. In practice, Chinese foreign policy behaviour has not yet demonstrated any systematic and substantial dissatisfaction with the current power distribution. Chinese words regarding the security issue are obviously rather tough yet the CCP is still relatively cautious in terms of action. For instance, despite tough words, in fact many CCP leaders noted that Taiwan should be dealt with in a patient manner.¹¹ China does not act as a blatant initiator of

confrontations, but rather seems to be responding to aggressive political rhetoric by the Taiwanese pro-independence movement.

Since the mid-1980s, China has advocated the establishment of a fair and reasonable international political and economic order and has frequently criticised the unjust nature of the existing world order. However, the CCP seems to hold high this flag only in words, while it acts very pragmatically in deeds. The CCP understands it has no capacity to challenge US power either at present or in the foreseeable future. Also, the CCP does not view itself as a sheer loser in the current international structure: as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and one of the five recognised nuclear powers, China possesses some significant political and strategic weight in international affairs.

The CCP chooses not to make unilateral attempts to alter the existing power structure but seeks to make use of it. The compromise between words and pragmatism represents a recognition of the reality and China's position on the US military presence in East Asia is a good example. In word, China does not approve of the stationing of troops on the soil of another sovereign country. But, in reality, the CCP realizes that the US military presence in Japan is useful in preventing it from becoming a full-fledged and destabilising military power.

Generally speaking, the CCP follows international rules. Free trade, at this point in history, is perhaps the international norm least contested by national governments around the world. In the reform period China has moved generally to support norms of global free trade outright, even though compliance with and implementation of these norms will be difficult even after entry into the WTO. China's entry into the WTO is the clearest statement that officially China embraces the extant free trade regime. No doubt there will be failure to follow rules of status quo institutions and accusations of violations. However, it will be very hard for China to escape international scrutiny on this score. It will probably use many of the loop-holes in WTO rules to protect politically important economic constituencies when necessary. This is no different in kind from the arbitrary use of anti-dumping rules by the US to protect important economic constituencies.

Regarding international prestige, the CCP still keeps a low profile. The CCP's foreign policy dictum: "Stay out of trouble and never take the lead", stated by the late Deng Xiaoping, has been the guiding beacon for Chinese foreign policy thinking in the 1990s. This has set up a pattern of action in China's response to US engagement: principles, not workable proposals, and words, not deeds.

Therefore the author agrees with Ross that China is still a status quo power,¹² though China and the US have different opinions about whether the Taiwan problem is entirely a domestic issue of China.

The CCP under Hu Jintao's leadership in the 21st century is facing unprecedented domestic and international challenges. The lines between domestic and foreign issues are diminishing. China is undergoing marketisation, urbanisation, and potentially democratisation in the context of globalisation. China is still searching for its proper role in a world full of economic troubles, political instability and security threats. CCP leaders will face more and more complex challenges, including serving the needs of sustainable economic development, fighting against terrorism and ethnic separatism, dealing with the war against terrorism and crisis in North Korea, managing the issue of Taiwan and seeking for national unification, and maintaining regional stability and global peace in the long term.

In addressing such multiple challenges, there is no doubt that Chinese foreign policy will experience significant transition. Understanding international affairs is an increasingly important and challenging task. In fact, both CCP leaders and Chinese scholars are engaging in a serious learning process from the international community. National interests and practices stem from the national identity that itself is formed through an evolutionary and dynamic mechanism and particularly imitation and social learning.¹³ While recognising those deep-rooted elements and their effect on China's strategic culture and formation of its national identity, constructivists argue that institutions can socialise China and China can learn new interests through a complex set of ideational

channels.¹⁴ For instance, some scholars, by examining China's performance in international institutions, believe that China's participation quality has steadily improved in the past few years.¹⁵

In addition, the outside world needs to change its perception of the CCP and accept China's peaceful rise. This thesis has found that Chinese nationalism is not a strong force as it is mainly domestic-oriented and plural, yet some countries perceive it as a revisionist change in international relations. If it is hard to find concrete evidence that China is a revisionist state, there is a second explanation for the growing concern about Chinese power. That is, the primary changes have been in regional perceptions of Chinese goals, influenced by China's growing power relative to other states in the region, rather than the CCP's diplomacy *per se*.

Notes

¹ See Oliver August and Philip Webster, "China Turns to Blair for Tips on Transformation", <http://www.timesonline.co.uk>.

² Xiao Gongqin, "Minzuhui yu Zhongguo zhuanxing shiqi de yishixingtai" [Nationalism and the Ideology in the Transformational Period in China], *Zhanlue yu guanli* No. 4 (1994), p. 16.

³ See Kang Xiaoguang, "Zhongguo xiandiahua de mailuo yu chulu" [The Course and Outlet of China's Modernisation], *Zhanglue yu guanli*, No. 1 (1994), pp. 10-12.

⁴ Rozman, 'China's Quest for Great Power Identity,' *Orbis*, no. 3 (1999).

⁵ Johnston (manuscript, Harvard University, 1999).

⁶ Godwin (2003).

⁷ Lai, 'U.S.-China Relations: A New Start?' In Flanagan and Marti (2003).

⁸ Shambaugh, 'Sino-American Relations since September 11: Can the New Stability Last?' *Current History* (no. 656, 2002); and Aaron L. Friedberg, '11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations,' *Survival* (Spring 2002).

⁹ Gilpin (1981), p. 34.

¹⁰ Wu Xinbo, (2001).

¹¹ Medeiros (March 2000).

¹² See Ross (1997), pp. 33-45.

¹³ Wendt (1999), pp. 324-336.

¹⁴ Johnston and Ross (1999); Economy and Oksenberg (1999).

¹⁵ Johnston, "Reflection on the China Participating in the International System", in *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* No.7 (1999).

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