

London School of Economics and Political Science

Legitimising Accession: Transformation Politics and Elite Consensus on EU Membership in Poland, 1989-2003.

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
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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

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Anna M. Pluta

19 September 2010

Abstract

This thesis considers the evolution of Poland's party-political consensus on accession to the European Union, starting with the elections to the contract parliament in June 1989 and ending with the accession referendum in June 2003. The main finding is that the establishment of consensus in favour of accession among Poland's political elites proved much more challenging than the elites' declarations of support suggest. Although most parties declared support for accession, throughout the entire pre-accession period they also supported policy proposals that contradicted accession conditions. The EU's strict neo-liberal economic requirements and the loss of national sovereignty accession entailed proved particularly challenging.

Rather than reconcile their policy proposals with EU's conditions, or change their stance on accession, parties rhetorically re-presented the EU into different visions that aligned with their ideological offering. Declarations of support for 'Social Europe', 'Christian Europe' or the 'Europe of Nations' gave the appearance of consensus. But in fact no in-depth consensus was possible since the way in which political groupings presented the 'Europe' they claimed to support was so different as to remove a common denominator they could agree on.

As a result, the single biggest change Polish society experienced since 1989 was never really addressed in political debate. The integration project was propelled forward not by in-depth political consensus but by a series of rhetorical compromises. At each stage of the accession process the parties' inability to negotiate more than a nominal consensus prevented meaningful public debate. During each electoral contest of the pre-accession period voters were presented with ambiguous rhetoric in place of alternative policy options that would have enabled the electorate to hold decision makers to account.

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Abbreviations

AWS	Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność	Solidarity Electoral Action
AWSP	Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy	Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right
BBWR	Bezpartyjny Blok Wspierania Reform	Non-Partisan Bloc for the Support of Reform
BBWR	Bezpartyjny Blok Współpracy z Rządem	Non-Party Bloc for Cooperation with the Government
COMCE	Commisio Episcipatum Communitatis Europensis	Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community
EEC		European Economic Communities
EU		European Union
KIE	Komitet Integracji Europejskiej	Committee for European Integration
KLD	Kongres Liberalno Demokratyczny	Liberal Democratic Congress
KKWO	Katolicki Komitet Wyborczy 'Ojczyzna'	Catholic Electoral Committee 'Motherland'

KPN	Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej	Confederation for Independent Poland
KPNOP	Obóz Patriotyczny Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej	Confederation for Independent Poland - Patriotic Camp
LPR	Liga Polskich Rodzin	League of Polish Families
MWGS	Ministerstwo Współpracy Gospodarczej z Zagranicą	Ministry of Economic Cooperation with Abroad
NATO		North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIK	Najwyższa Izba Kontroli	Supreme Chamber of Control
OPZZ	Ogólno-Polskie Związki Zawodowe	All Poland Trade Unions
PC	Porozumienie Centrum	Centre Accord
PChD	Partia Chrześcijańskich Demokratów	Christian-Democratic Party
PiS	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	Law and Order
PO	Platforma	Citizen's Platform

Obywatelska		
PPS	Polska Partia Socjalistyczna	Polish Socialist Party
PSL	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	Polish Agrarian Faction
PZPR	Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza	Polish United Workers' Party
RdR	Ruch dla Rzeczypospolitej	Movement for the Polish Republic
ROP	Ruch Odbudowy Polski	Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland
RSAWS	Ruch Społeczny Akcji Wyborczej Solidarność	Social Movement Solidarity Electoral Action
SD	Stronnictwo Demokratyczne	Democratic Faction
SdRP	Socjal Demokracja Rzeczypospolitej	Social Democracy of the Polish Republic
SKL	Stronnictwo Konserwatywno Ludowe	People's Conservative Faction
SLD	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Alliance of the Democratic Left

SN	Stronnictwo Narodowe	Nationalist Faction
UD	Unia Demokratyczna	Democratic Union
UKIE	Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej	Secretariat of the Committee for European Integration
UP	Unia Pracy	Labour Union
UPR	Unia Polityki Realnej	Union of Realist Politics
UW	Unia Wolności	Freedom Union
WAK	Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka	Catholic Electoral Action
ZChN	Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe	Christian Nationalist Faction
ZSL	Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe	United Agrarian Faction

Chapter 1

Introduction

Defining their geo-political identity has been traditionally problematic for the Poles. As Jacques Rupnik suggests, Poland represents the 'East of the West and the West of the East'.¹ Positioned between the Roman Catholic West and the Orthodox East, the Poles were often exposed to the expansionist ambitions of their powerful neighbours. Throughout their history they have, albeit with little success, sought to define their place in the international order. When the transformation of 1989 brought with it the possibility of re-defining the country's relationship with its Eastern and Western neighbours, the notion of 'Poland's place in Europe' came to the forefront of foreign policy debates.²

Less than a year after the completion of the 1988 round table talks the nascent elites used their new found freedom to re-direct Polish foreign policy towards integration with the European Communities. The symbolic appeal of the return to Europe was used to legitimize what historian Anatol Lieven has described as a 'quiet revolution'³: the 15 year long process of implementing the EU's accession conditionality that would radically alter the political, social and economic fabric of the applicant states.

Apart from successfully restructuring their economies to withstand the EU's competitive pressures, the applicant states would have to make extensive adjustments to a broad range of policy areas including foreign and home affairs, competition, agriculture, border control, monetary policy and the environment. The fact that legislation imported from well established liberal free market democracies was not always well suited to the nascent democracies and economies of the post-communist states made the process even more

¹ J. Rupnik, *The Other Europe*, (London 1988).

² J. Jedlicki, 'Poland's Perpetual Return to Europe', *Cross Currents: a Yearbook of Central European Culture*, volume 12, (1993), p78-88.

³ A. Lieven, 'Conclusions', in *Ambivalent Neighbors. The EU, NATO, and the Price of Membership*, eds. A. Lieven and D. Trenin (Washington, D.C. 2003), 295-312, p303.

challenging.⁴ The candidates had very little room for negotiation in accepting the EU's conditions. The accession project was largely non-negotiable and the scope of any negotiations would be confined to limited delays in the timetable under which aspiring members had to implement the required harmonization measures.⁵ This was a tall order for states that had only just emerged from over five decades of authoritarianism and state planning.

Accession conditionality also had other, unintended, consequences on the candidate states' nascent multi-party systems.⁶ By providing the post-communist states with what was in effect a ready-made blueprint for a neo-liberal, Western democracy, the EU unintentionally pre-empted the political debates on alternative policy options that may have otherwise taken place among the candidate countries' nascent political groupings. Because of its impact on almost all policy areas accession, conditionality was much more difficult to implement, and agree on, than individual policies such as for example health care or policing. As Sedelmeier has pointed out, the enlargement process encompasses too many aspects of policy making to be conceptualised as a policy in its own right.⁷ Rather, it should be viewed as a

⁴ E. Dunn 'Trojan Pig: Paradoxes of Food Safety Regulation' (paper presented at workshop on 'Oikos and Anthropos: Rationality, Technology, Infrastructure'. Social Science Research Council, Prague, Czech. Rep, 26-7 April 2002) quoted in L. A. S. Bruszt, David, 'Who Counts? Supranational Norms and Societal Needs', East European Politics and Societies, 17, 1 (2003), 72-82, p.79.

⁵ H. Grabbe, 'Challenges of EU Enlargement', in *Ambivalent Neighbors. The EU, NATO and the Price of Membership*, eds. A. Lieven and D. Trenin (Washington, D.C. 2003), 67-89, p.77, interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, 14 January 2002.

⁶ R. Bideleux, 'Europeanisation' and the limits to democratization in East-Central Europe' in *Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe*, ed. A. Agh, (Manchester 2001), D. Dakowska, 'Beyond conditionality: EU enlargement, European party federations and the transnational activity of German political foundations', *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 3/2 May 2002, H. Grabbe, *Profiting from EU Enlargement* (London 2001), H. Grabbe, 'How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8, 6 (2001), 1013-1031, H. Grabbe, 'A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants', (Robert Schuman Centre Working Paper 12/99 1999), H. Grabbe, 'The Implications of EU Enlargement', in *Developments in Central and East European Politics* 3, ed. S. White, H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, *Enlarging the EU Eastwards* (London 1998), A. Grzymala-Busse, Innes, Abby, 'Great Expectations', *East European Politics and Societies*, 17, (2003), 64-73, A. Innes, 'The Great Electoral Lottery', *Comparative Politics* 35, 1 (2002), 85-105, P. Mair, 'Popular Democracy and EU Enlargement', *East European Politics and Societies*, 17, 1 (2003), 58-63, R. Bideleux, 'Europeanization' and the limits to democratization in East-Central Europe', in *Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in East Central Europe*, ed. G. Pridham, Agh, Attila (Manchester 2001), 25-53, K. Raik, 'EU Accession of Central and East European Countries: Democracy and Integration as Conflicting Logics', *East European Politics and Societies*, 18, 4 (2004), 567-594.

⁷ U. Sedelmeier, 'Eastern Enlargement. Towards a European EU?', in *Policy Making in the European Union*, ed. H. Wallace (Oxford 2005).

policy framework. And this is what made the establishment of consensus on accession so challenging: in order to build in depth consensus both on the principle of accession and its requirements, political elites would have had to align their existing policy and ideological propositions with the EU's numerous and wide ranging membership conditions. Having attained this, political parties would then also have had to negotiate consensus with members of electoral committees, which often combined several smaller parties that would not otherwise have been able to cross parliamentary election thresholds and, if successfully elected, they would have had to align their stance further with government coalition partners. Moreover, to build the political compromise credited with sustaining Poland's integration project, all major parties across the political spectrum would have had to agree to the same detailed, wide ranging policy blueprint. This, however, would have left little room for political competitors to differentiate themselves during electoral contests in terms of policy alternatives.

In spite of the harsh economic reforms and extensive legal harmonization efforts it entailed, Poland's accession project remained a key priority for all post-communist governments. How, given the above challenges, did the Polish political elites maintain the consensus that sustained a pro EU membership foreign policy throughout the 15 year pre-accession period? What rhetorical strategies enabled them to declare support for accession and at the same time align its often unpopular policy requirements with their existing ideological niche? And how did they reconcile the contradictions between the popularity of accession and its unpopular practical implications?

As I will show, at all stages of the pre-accession period, parties were only able to attain the appearance of consensus by rhetorically re-inventing the EU. Presenting different visions of 'Europe' allowed parties to align their existing policy and ideological declarations with accession and facilitated a nominal consensus among electoral committee and coalition partners. But at every stage of the accession process Poland's political elites failed to establish in-depth

consensus on EU membership. Instead, the accession project was propelled by a series of rhetorical compromises made as a result of changes in parliamentary representation thresholds and coalition building compromises rather than by the political elites' in-depth commitment to both EU membership and its requirements.

The EU's Eastern enlargement has benefitted from extensive study. Numerous analyses approaching the subject both from the perspective of the entire Eastern enlargement⁸ and ones focusing on the specific Polish case⁹ are available. EU conditionality and the way in which it influenced policy making in the candidate states forms a prominent part of this subject area.¹⁰

⁸ G. Avery and C. Fraser, *The Enlargement of the European Union* (Sheffield 1998), D. Dinan, *Europe Recast: A History of European Union* (London 2004), A. Mayhew, *Recreating Europe. The European Union's Policy towards Central and Eastern Europe*. (Cambridge 1998). Grabbe and Hughes, *Enlarging the EU Eastwards*. Grabbe 'Back to Europe', Grzymala-Busse, Innes, S. Holmes, 'A European Doppelstaat?', *East European Politics and Societies*, 17, 1 (2003), 107-118, B. Törnquist-Plewa, 'Nationalism and Minority Questions in Central and Eastern Europe in the Context of EU Enlargement', *CFE Working Paper Series* 12, (Lund 2001), B. Törnquist-Plewa, 'East Goes West or West Goes East? Reflections on the EU Enlargement to Eastern Europe', in M. Herslund and R. Samson, ed. *Unity in Diversity. Europe and the European Union: Enlargement and Constitutional Treaty*, (Copenhagen, 2005), G. Pridham, *Designing Democracy. EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-communist Europe*, (Basingstoke 2005). A. M. Vachudova, *Europe Undivided. Democracy, Leverage & Integration after Communism*. (Oxford 2005).

⁹ M. Marody, Wilkin, Jerzy, ed., *Meandry Instytucjonalizacji: Dostosowanie Polski do Unii Europejskiej* (Kracow 2002), J. Hausner and M. Marody, *Jakość Rządzenia: Polska bliżej Unii Europejskiej?* (2000), J. Hausner, *Przystąpienie czy Integracja? Polska droga do Unii Europejskiej*. (Warsaw 1998), J. Hausner, Miroslawa, *Polski Talk Show: Dialog Społeczny a Integracja Europejska* (Kracow 2001), J. Górnjak, *Polityczny Wymian Integracji Europejskiej Polski* (Kracow 1999), J. Hausner and M. Marody, *Three Polands: the Potential for and Barriers to Integration with the European Union* (Warsaw 1999). A. W. Jabloński, 'The Europeanisation of government in Poland in the 1990's', in *Poland and the European Union*, ed. K. Cordell (London 2000), A. Dybczyński, 'The European Union and Ukrainian-Polish Relations', in *Poland and the European Union*, ed. K. Cordell (London 2000), E. Stadtmuller, 'Polish Perceptions of the European Union in the 1990's', in *Poland and the European Union*, ed. K. Cordell (London 2000), 24-44, C. Banasiński, ed., *Costs and Benefits of Poland's Membership in the European Union* (Warsaw 2003), M. Kozak, 'Polskie Regiony wobec Akcesji', in 2003), F. Millard, *Anatomy of the New Poland* (Aldershot 1994), P. Samecki, 'Financial Flows Between the EU and Poland in 2004-2013', in *Costs and Benefits of Poland's Membership in the EU*, ed. C. Banasiński (Warsaw 2003), 3-58, M. Szpunar, 'Polish Legal System in Light of Membership within the EU - Losses and Gains', in *Costs and Benefits of Poland's Membership in the EU*, ed. C. Banasiński (Warsaw 2003). H. Jahns, 'EU Pre-Accession Assistance for Poland', in *Poland in the European Union*, ed. E. Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, (Warsaw 2004), E. Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Implications of Poland's Association with the European Communities for Poland's Economy: Preliminary Assessment', in *Discussion Papers*, (Warsaw 1992), E. Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Financial Conditions of Poland's Accession to the European Union', in *Poland in the European Union*, ed. E. Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, (Warsaw 2004), 14-36, E. Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Effects of the Europe Agreement on the Polish Economy and Pre-Accession Challenges', *Yearbook of Polish European Studies*, 1, (1997).

¹⁰ H. Grabbe, 'Europeanization Goes East. Power and Uncertainty in the EU Accession Process', in *The Politics of Europeanisation*, eds. Kevin Featherstone and Claudio Radaelli, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Grabbe, Heather (2001) 'How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and diversity', *Journal of European Public Policy* 8 (6), 1013-1031; Sedelmeier and Schimmelfenning 'The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe', Lucien Cernat 'Europeanization,

The role of Europe in Polish political discourse and the challenges Polish elites experienced in defining themselves in relation to Europe have also been addressed in several studies. In a history of ideas analysis of Poland's discourse on Europe, Barbara Törnquist-Plewa observes a continuing ambivalence in Poland's definition of its relationship with Europe. Over the centuries the Poles have struggled, she finds, between the desire to belong to 'Europe' on the one hand and the threat of never quite belonging as well as, more recently, being treated as 'second rate' Europeans¹¹, on the other. Krystyna Paszkiewicz meanwhile, argues that disagreements on the desirability and characteristics of the process of European integration were based on fundamental ideological differences between the social, political and economic doctrines of the nascent elites¹². Madalena Pontes-Resende considers the role of 'Europe' in the creation of the right-wing and left-wing political identities in Poland. She finds that whereas the communist-successor party used support for European integration to legitimize their new social-democratic identity, the right side of the political spectrum chose to turn against 'Europe' in a populist attempt to gain votes¹³. Others question the validity of the language used in Poland to debate European integration and point out that the debate was limited to expressions of support for 'quick' or 'slow' accession¹⁴ and that the language used in it was highly abstract and symbolic¹⁵. In a comparative study of how the European issue was addressed in party-political competition in Poland, Hungary and the Czech

Varieties of Capitalism and Economic Performance in Central and Eastern Europe', Holmes, D. Ost, The Defeat of Solidarity. Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe. (Ithaca and London 2005), D. Ost, 'The Politics of Interest in Post-Communist East Europe', Theory and Society, (1993), Grzymala-Busse, Innes, Mair, Vachudova, W. Jacoby, The Enlargement of the European Union. Ordering from the Menu in Central and Eastern Europe (Cambridge 2004).

¹¹ B. Törnquist-Plewa, 'The Complex of an Unwanted Child: The Meanings of Europe in Polish Discourse', in The Meaning of Europe, ed. B. Strath, (Oxford and New York 2002), 215-242.

¹² Krystyna Paszkiewicz, 'Konceptje 'Powrotu do Europy' in Wspolczesna Polska Myśl Polityczna, ed. Bronisław Pasierb and Krystyna Paszkiewicz (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1996), pp. 15-38.

¹³ Madalena Pontes-Resende, 'A Party Family Theory of Party Positions on European Integration: A Polish Case Study', PhD Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science Department of Government, 2005, Madalena Pontes-Resende, 'The Change of Fate of a Political Symbol: 'Europe' and the Definition of Polish Right and Left Identities', Paper prepared for the 10th Ph.D. Summer School: European Parties and Party Systems, 2002.

¹⁴ J. Szacki, 'O Języku Debaty Europejskiej', in Czy Polska Ma Doktrynę Integracyjną? ed. Ryszard Legutko (Kracow: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, 1998).

¹⁵ R. Legutko, 'Debata Europejska – Retoryka i Polityka', in Czy Polska Ma Doktrynę Integracyjną? ed. Ryszard Legutko (Kracow: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, 1998).

Republic, Laure Neumayer shows that 'Europe' became a useful instrument for political parties to bolster their positions in domestic political competition.¹⁶ Agnes Batory¹⁷ and Tibor Navracsics¹⁸ meanwhile consider the challenges Hungarian parties experienced in aligning their policies with accession requirements. Batory concludes that Hungarian parties were able to maintain consensus only by limiting the way they addressed the EU to its purely technical aspects so as not to raise the problematic issue of sovereignty transfer. Navracsics observes that the apparent consensus between political parties was based on very different conceptions of the European project and its implications for Hungary¹⁹.

The role of Europe in the discourse of post-communist political elites has hence been the subject of several studies. The question of how Polish political elites sustained consensus on accession and how they reconciled their declared support with the extensive and difficult harmonization accession entailed has not, however, been addressed in detail. The most relevant studies are Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz's study of Poland's parliamentary elites' consensus on accession 'Membership in the European Union in the Political Culture of Parliamentarians'²⁰ and Jacek Kucharczyk's two analyses of political discourse on accession during the 1997-8 period: 'For and Even Against: Political Parties and the Prospect of European Integration in the 1997 Election' and 'The

¹⁶ L. Neumayer, *L'enjeu Europeen dans les transformations postcommunistes. Hongarie, Pologne, République Tchèque 1989-2004.* (Paris 2006), L. Neumayer, 'Euroscepticism in Central Europe', in *Central European History and the European Union. The Meaning of Europe.*, ed. S. J. Kirschbaum (Basingstoke 2007).

¹⁷ A. Batory, 'Hungarian Party Identities and the Question of European Integration', in 2001), A. Batory, 'Attitudes to Europe. Ideology, Strategy and the Issue of European Union Membership in Hungarian Party-Politics.', *Party Politics*, 8, 5 (2002), 525-539.

¹⁸ T. Navracsics, *A Missing Debate? Hungary and the European Union*, Sussex European Institute Working Paper No.21 (1997).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 'Członkowstwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej w Kulturze Politycznej Parlamentarzystów', *Obciążeni Polityką. Posłowie i Partie*, ed. Włodzimierz Wesołowski (Warsaw: IFIS, 2001), see also E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, *Powrót czy Droga w Nieznane? Europejskie Dylematy Polaków* (Warsaw: Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1998).

Kidnapping of Europe: European Integration in Polish Political Discourse 1997-1998'.²¹

In a sociological study of the views on European integration of the members of the 1993 and 1997 parliaments, Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz finds that consensus in favour of accession was a 'shallow' one.²² While most parliamentarians were supportive of EU membership, they differed as to the desired speed and conditions of accession. Moreover, Skotnicka-Illasiewicz argues that although many parliamentarians opposed accession, a taboo of 'political correctness' prevented explicit opposition to EU membership. Consequently, the political elites divided themselves into those who supported speedy accession and those advocating the completion of systemic transformation prior to entering the European Union²³.

Political scientist Jacek Kucharczyk meanwhile observes that most parties' vocal support for EU membership during the 1997 parliamentary contest was not matched by a willingness to implement the reforms required for accession²⁴. Frances Millard draws similar conclusions, finding that adherence to the EU's competition policy requirements proved a challenge to both the solidarity-successor cabinet between 1997 and 2001 and their communist-successor opposition as they struggled to reconcile the requirement to implement harsh restructuring measures with the maintenance of support amongst their trade unionist electorates²⁵.

²¹ J. Kucharczyk, 'Za a Nawet Przeciw. Partie Polityczne Wobec Perspektywy Integracji w Wyborach 1997', in Polska Eurodebata, ed. L. Kolarska-Bobińska (Warsaw 1999), J. Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998', in Polska Eurodebata, ed. L. Kolarska-Bobińska (Warsaw 1999).

²² E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 'Członkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej w Kulturze Politycznej Parlamentarzystów', *Obciążeni Polityką. Posłowie i Partie*, ed. Włodzimierz Wesołowski (Warsaw: IFIS, 2001).

²³ E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, *Powrót czy Droga w Nieznane? Europejskie Dylematy Polaków* (Warsaw: Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 1998).

²⁴ J. Kucharczyk, 'Za a Nawet Przeciw. Partie Polityczne Wobec Perspektywy Integracji w Wyborach 1997', in Polska Eurodebata, ed. Lena Kolarska-Bobińska (Warsaw: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 1999).

²⁵ F. Millard, 'Polish Domestic Politics and Accession to the European Union', *Back to Europe. Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union*, ed. Karen Henderson. (London: UCL Press, 1999).

In a study of the 1997-1998 parliamentary debates on Europe, Kucharczyk also finds that the ideological heterogeneity of both the Solidarity government and the communist-successor opposition prevented an in-depth debate on Europe²⁶. In place of addressing policy options, Kucharczyk observes, parliamentarians resorted to the use of symbolic, ideologically polarizing rhetoric. Similarly, Klaus Bachman points out the discrepancy between the way in which the Solidarity Electoral Action (*Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, AWS*) described Europe in its rhetoric and the realities of the 'really existing' European Union.²⁷ In an analysis of the 2000 presidential contest meanwhile, Alex Szczerbiak finds that, surprisingly, an issue as prominent as accession played a very limited role in the contestants' programmes.²⁸

The above mentioned studies hence reveal that presenting a clear stance on accession proved challenging for political elites. But they all approach the problem of building consensus on accession using social science analytical frameworks and most make use of data collected at a single point in time (primarily during the 1997-2001 AWS-Freedom Union coalition). They do not show how parties tackled the issue of accession at different stages of the pre-accession process and in the context of different coalition configurations and electoral ordinations. They also do not explain what strategies parties used to sustain consensus on the very complex and wide ranging set of policy areas Poland would be required to harmonize with prior to accession. In order to understand how consensus on accession evolved, it is necessary to study accession as a set of compromises and decisions that propelled the accession project forward over the span of 15 years. To understand how consensus on both accession and its conditionality was sustained by several very ideologically different governments, it will be necessary to study the way such consensus evolved throughout the entire pre-accession period.

²⁶ Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998'.

²⁷ K. Bachmann, 'Polska Kaczka'. Klaus Bachman, 'Polska Prawica Wobec Integracji Europejskiej', Czy Polska Ma Doktrynę Integracyjną? ed. Ryszard Legutko (Krakow: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, 1998).

²⁸ A. Szczerbiak, 'Europe as a Re-aligning Issue in Polish Politics?: Evidence from the October 2000 Presidential Election', (2001), SEI working paper nr.48.

An in-depth, historical analysis spanning the entire pre-accession period will show whether and if so how parties maintained consensus on a policy framework as complex and challenging as EU conditionality. The conclusions will be relevant not only for Poland but also for the post-communist and earlier members of the EU as well as for current and future candidates. This study does not intend to contrast the Polish experience with that of other member states. Conversely, by focusing on a detailed, in-depth analysis of a single country case it aims to bring forth the empirical material needed to draw broader hypotheses about how political elites in current and future member states cope with the EU's growing policy scope and competences. The Polish accession was of course very much shaped by the fact that it took place in the context of wide ranging systemic transformation and this made the challenge of building political consensus on accession even more complex. But maintaining consensus on the EU is a challenge for all member states and an understanding of the problems political parties face as they reconcile domestic policy preferences with those governed by the EU is critical to improving electoral participation in the European project.

The thesis will be structured chronologically, starting with the elections to the contract *sejm* in June 1989 and ending with the EU accession referendum in June 2003. The selected time period covers the span of Poland's party-political debate and consensus building process on accession. Although Poland's membership application to the EU was made only in April 1994 the process of conditional integration and harmonization with the European Union started with negotiations on the 1991 Association Treaty.

Each of the chronological chapters will broadly correspond to either one or two coalition governments. The second chapter will address the evolution of Poland's foreign policy under the contract parliament, starting with the 1989 parliamentary contest and ending with the appointment of the Jan Krzysztof Bielecki cabinet in December 1990. Chapter three will focus on the period from Bielecki's appointment until the communist-successors' victory in the autumn

of 1993. The communist-successor cabinets of Waldemar Pawlak, Józef Oleksy and Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz will be addressed in chapter four starting with the 1993 parliamentary election campaign and ending with the ascension of the Solidarity successor government in October 1997. Chapter five will focus on the Solidarity-successor cabinet of Jerzy Buzek and on the first phase of the accession negotiations. Lastly, chapter six will address the return of the communist-successor government in September 2001 and the final stages of the accession negotiations, ending with an analysis of the 2003 accession referendum campaign.

All chronological chapters of this study will be structured in a similar way. The first sections will cover the key domestic and EU developments and outline the main events in the integration process for the relevant time period. The party-political debate on Europe and the strategies political elites used to build consensus will be addressed in a separate section, which will consider how consensus on European issues was attained during parliamentary and presidential elections, electoral committee and coalition negotiations and parliamentary debates. Structuring the thesis in this manner will bring out how parties negotiated consensus during electoral contests, coalition formation and in parliamentary debate.

The study is based on a range of primary sources. These include the electoral materials of individual parties and political organisations, electoral committee programmes, governing coalition agreements and parliamentary debate transcripts. Whereas electoral materials such as leaflets of individual candidates as well as radio and television interviews were considered as part of the study, the presentation of parties' stance on Europe is based primarily on the parties' formal programmes. This is to prevent the programme of an individual candidate or a remark made during a media interview being misinterpreted as the negotiated and agreed approach of the entire party. A majority of the electoral material was obtained from the Political Parties' Archive at the Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of the Sciences and includes

available publications for all parliamentary and presidential elections from June 1989 to May 2003 as well as materials used during the EU referendum campaign in 2003. The study covers all major political parties that attained parliamentary representation during the June 1989 to May 2003 period. Primary material also includes a press review of several Polish daily and weekly newspapers. The press search included *Gazeta Wyborcza*, *Rzeczpospolita*, *Polityka*, *Wprost*, *Nasz Dziennik*, *Gazeta Polska*, *Życie*, *Trybuna Ludu* and *Tygodnik 'Solidarność'* for the period from May 1988 to August 2003. This selection represents all widely read newspapers and magazines in Poland during the period in question and is designed to cover publications representing all major political groupings. The most widely read daily, *Super Express*, was not included as it rarely reports political issues. These written sources are supplemented by data from semi structured interviews with members of parliament representing all major political groupings throughout the period in question, as well as interviews with former ministers and prime ministers, academics, journalists and clergy.

It will at this stage be pertinent to define some of the terms used in this study. For the purposes of this study the term 'elites' refers to members of party-political decision making bodies, members of parliament and senior level government decision makers of ministerial and deputy ministerial ranking. 'Nascent elites' refers to those members of the political elite who were not affiliated with the communist regime i.e. in most cases members of Solidarity-successor or other post-dissident political groupings.

'European integration' will denote the entire process of foreign policy re-alignment, membership negotiations and harmonization with both association and accession requirements that begun in 1989. The Association Treaty will be treated as part of the EU accession process due to the close alignment between the two treaties and the extent of accession conditionality included in the association treaty. Institutions such as the Council of Europe, the Hexagonale and Pentagonale, the Central European Free Trade Association as well as the

PHARE programme and less institutionalised cooperation agreements such as the Weimar Triangle talks will be addressed where they are relevant for the process of EU association and membership. The term 'accession' will be used to denote the process of joining the EU that started with the EU membership application in April 1994 and will cover all elements of the formal pre-accession strategy such as the structural dialogue, screening and negotiations. The term 'Euro-scepticism' will be used as per Paul Taggart's definition of: 'an idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration'²⁹. Taggart's and Szczerbiak's ³⁰ definition of 'hard' euro-sceptics as those outside the consensus on the positive nature of accession for their country and 'soft' euro-sceptics as those who 'express specific limited objections to the nature of the accession process' will also apply.

Lastly, the terms used to denote the ideological space parties occupy on the political spectrum require clarification. In Western political systems the distinction between 'right' and 'left' wing political groupings has traditionally been used to distinguish between an economically laissez faire, politically conservative 'right' wing and an economically interventionist, politically liberal 'left' wing. This distinction does not apply in Poland. Politically conservative groupings have often advocated interventionist economic policy and politically liberal parties have proposed laissez-faire economic solutions. In the Polish context in general and for the purposes of this thesis, the 'right' generally refers to Solidarity successor groupings and 'left' to the communist-successors.

²⁹ Taggart, Paul (1998) 'A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems' European Journal of Political Research Vol.33: 363-388.

³⁰ Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, 'Parties, Positions and Europe: Euro-scepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe' SEI Working Paper No 46, Opposing Europe Research Network Working Paper No 2.

Chapter 2

'Returning to Europe': European integration under the Mazowiecki cabinet

I could not point to a single breakthrough moment. With Jacques Delors from the very start we talked with a full awareness of common sentiments, in a climate of ...obviousness. Yes...for us it was obvious that Poland is returning home...I then believed that amidst this great transformation relations between us and the EC should be increasingly close and that we had the right to expect support and help.³¹

Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Prime Minister of Poland from August 1989 to December 1990

Introduction

1989 confronted Polish political elites with the need to reformulate foreign policy in a context of systemic transformation, severe economic crisis and a turbulent international climate. After over four decades of Soviet domination a pro-Western foreign policy was an obvious choice for the Solidarity-successor elites. The powerfully symbolism of the 'return to Europe' served as a rhetorical umbrella to legitimise a multi-faceted foreign policy that firmly placed Poland on a path towards association and eventual membership in the future European Union.

This chapter will consider the party-political debate that underpinned Poland's European integration policy under the Mazowiecki cabinet. The chapter will focus on the way in which the nascent political elites built consensus on European integration so early on in Poland's transformation process and in the context of limited knowledge of the nature and scope of European institutions. What kind of Europe did Polish parliamentarians wish to return to, and how closely did it reflect the European Community Poland associated with? Could different approaches to the way parties conceptualised 'Europe' be

³¹ Marek Saryusz-Wolski and Krzysztof Bobiński, interview with Tadeusz Mazowiecki *Polska i Unia*, 1, October 1998.

distinguished? Did most political parties maintain a pro-integration stance or could tensions between parties support for European integration and their domestic ideological and policy platforms already be observed?

The time period under consideration starts with the electoral campaign of the June 1989 contract parliament elections and ends with the presidential elections of November 1990. The first two sections will provide an overview of the key domestic and foreign political developments in Poland during the period in question. Section three will introduce the main political actors and present their stance on European integration during the 1989 elections, parliamentary debates and the 1990 presidential contest.

Domestic developments

1989 marked the start of rapid political and economic change for Poland and its Soviet bloc neighbours. In August 1988 the Polish United Workers' Party (*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR*) proposed round-table discussions to representatives of dissident groups, including Solidarity. While the more radical sections of Solidarity were initially suspicious of the government's intentions, Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa and his advisors eventually agreed to the talks, which took place between February and April 1989³². The round table agreement resulted in the re-legalization of Solidarity, the decision to hold partially free parliamentary elections to the *sejm*, or the lower house, and a fully democratic contest for a re-established senate as well as a strengthened presidential post.³³

Solidarity won all 35% of parliamentary seats allocated to it according to the contract agreement, as well as 99 of 100 seats in the fully contestable senate. As per the agreement the regime retained 65% of parliamentary seats³⁴. The participants of the talks agreed that fully democratic elections would take place

³² F.Millard, *Anatomy of the New Poland*, p77-82.

³³ Jabłoński, p.128, Jahns.

³⁴ V. Zubek, 'The Phoenix out of the Ashes: the Rise to Power of Poland's Post-Communist SdRP', *Communist and Post Communist Studies*, 28, 3 (1995), 275-306.p.278

no later than four years after the 1989 contest, once a more robust multi-party system developed, new elites gained political experience and the economic reforms initiated under the incumbent Rakowski government could be completed³⁵. But the *PZPR* soon lost ground when its pre-1989 satellite parties, *Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe* (United Agrarian Faction, *ZSL*) and *Stronnictwo Demokratyczne* (Democratic Faction, *SD*) declared independence³⁶. In August 1989 a 'government of national responsibility' was formed, creating a balance of power between *PZPR*'s communist General Jaruzelski in the function of President, and the Catholic dissident Tadeusz Mazowiecki as Prime Minister³⁷. The minister of foreign affairs post was assigned to a compromise 'independent' candidate: lawyer and academic Krzysztof Skubiszewski³⁸.

Political transformation took place in the context of a deep economic recession. Hyperinflation, triggered by the *PZPR*'s decision to free agricultural prices without limiting earnings, severely destabilized the economy and necessitated rapid reforms. The orchestrator of economic transformation was Finance Minister and deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, who advocated 'shock therapy' reforms. The Balcerowicz Plan, implemented in January 1990, was a radical move away from a state controlled economy. Controls on retail prices, private enterprise and foreign trade were virtually abolished and wages indexed to prevent inflation. The success of the plan relied on a 1bn USD International Monetary Fund stabilization fund, provided on the condition of Poland adhering to strict fiscal and monetary policy measures.³⁹ By late 1990 Poland had become one of the most open economies in the world⁴⁰. The restructuring took a heavy toll on Polish domestic industry however, as the majority of state owned enterprises proved unprofitable when competing on the global market.⁴¹ The years 1990 and 1991 were marked by severe recession.

³⁵ Ibid, p.279

³⁶ A. Dudek, *Pierwsze Lata III Rzeczypospolitej, 1989-2001* (Kracow 2005), chapter 3.

³⁷ F. Millard, *Polish Politics and Society* (London 1999). p.70-76

³⁸ Dudek, p.101.

³⁹ E. de Boer-Ashworth, *The Global Political Economy and Post-1989 Change. The Place of the Central European Transition* (Basingstoke 2000), p.158.

⁴⁰ B. Slay, 'The Dilemmas of Economic Liberalism in Poland', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 45, 2 (1993), 237-257.

⁴¹ Ibid.

Inflation almost doubled from 259% in 1989 to 586% 1990, unemployment rose to 12.3% and real wages decreased by 24.2%⁴².

Balcerowicz justified the radical nature of the 'therapy' by arguing it was imperative that the painful economic restructuring be carried out during what he described as a period of 'extraordinary politics'. During the first months of the 'velvet revolution', he argued, the new elite benefited from exceptionally high levels of public trust and greater than normal acceptance of painful reforms. This was hence the most appropriate time to implement unpopular policy that would most likely be rejected in the normal course of democracy when interest groups disadvantaged by given policies are sufficiently strong to prevent implementation. Economic restructuring could be successful therefore, because of the weak nature of Polish democracy. Once interest-based democracy was consolidated, Balcerowicz feared, Poland's powerful working class would jeopardize the harsh but necessary reform process⁴³.

Ironically, the new elites came to fear the very working class whose support brought them to power.⁴⁴ The 'shock therapy', so reminiscent of a communist 'five-year plan', was yet another exercise in the 'deferred gratification'⁴⁵ logic so often used to legitimize policy under the communist regime. Although designed to eradicate communism, the paradigm behind the top-down imposition of the economic reform and its orthodox policy framework was reminiscent of the logic of the universal grand-narrative of a communist state planned economy⁴⁶.

Meanwhile on the political front the absence of electoral legitimization forced the *PZPR* to adjust to new political circumstances. During its XI congress in January 1990 the party dissolved itself and set up a new organization called the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic (*Socjaldemokracja Rzeczypospolitej*

⁴² J. Adam, Social Costs of Transformation to a Market Economy in Post-Socialist Countries. The Cases of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary (Basingstoke 1999), p.22.

⁴³ L. Balcerowicz, Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation (Budapest 1995), p.316.

⁴⁴ Ost, The Defeat of Solidarity. Anger and Politics in Postcommunist Europe.

⁴⁵ Kolankiewicz and Lewis, p.58.

⁴⁶ de Boer-Ashworth, p50.

Polskiej, SdRP). The Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left (*Poselski Klub Lewicy Demokratycznej, PKLD*) was established under the leadership of Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, *PZPR* reformer, lawyer and former Fulbright scholar at Columbia University. Although Cimoszewicz was not a member of the *SdRP* he was closely affiliated with the new party and would later receive its backing as a candidate during the 1990 presidential contest.

The dissolution of the *PZPR* led to renewed calls for free parliamentary and presidential elections. Lech Wałęsa, who at the time did not hold a formal position in the government, was particularly vocal about this. He argued that since one of the partners had ceased to exist, the Round Table agreement was no longer valid and a new presidential election should be organised. Both Wałęsa and Mazowiecki decided to stand for the presidential post and their rivalry led to a rift within Solidarity. Wałęsa's supporters formed the Centre Accord (*Porozumienie Centrum, PC*). Advocates of Mazowiecki united in the Citizens' Movement for Democratic Action (*Ruch Obywatelskiej Akcji Demokratycznej, ROAD*). After losing the first ballot, Mazowiecki resigned from the post of Prime Minister and Wałęsa, the winner of the presidential contest, appointed Jan Krzysztof Bielecki as Prime Minister in January 1991.

Polish foreign policy

Mazowiecki pursued a 'two-track' foreign policy of re-defining relations with both the East and the West⁴⁷ and especially with Poland's powerful neighbours: a gradually disintegrating Soviet Union and a re-unifying Germany. The withdrawal of the 56,000 Soviet troops stationed on Polish territory and the attainment of border inviolability guarantees from the new German state were key priorities⁴⁸. The 'return to Europe' depended on the new government's ability to successfully re-define relations with the East. As long as Soviet troops

⁴⁷ K. Skubiszewski, *Polityka Zagraniczna i Odzyskanie Niepodległosci. Przemówienia, Oświadczenia, Wywiady 1989-1993*. (Warsaw 1997).

⁴⁸ Interview with Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 19 May 2006.

were present in Poland any advances towards the West would have to be made with caution.

Poland's position in international structures also underwent a radical redefinition. This included the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), formalization of relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the institutionalisation of the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) and attainment of guest status in the Council of Europe, followed by full membership once the first fully democratic elections were held.

The above initiatives occurred in the context of rapid regional transformation. The autumn of 1989 saw the velvet revolution in Czechoslovakia, the death of Nicolai Ceausescu in Romania and the fall of the Berlin wall. During the first half of 1990 fully free democratic elections were held in East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. By the summer of 1990 Poland's contract parliament was the only legislature of the region that had not been elected on the basis of a fully free democratic contest. Meanwhile in the USSR *perestroika* progressed and national independence movements gained strength, especially in the Baltic republics. But the post-communist states' ambitions of European integration met with limited enthusiasm from their Western counterparts. There was much disquiet about what would happen to the Soviet Empire and how they should react. Western leaders hedged their bets, preferring to make vague promises rather than give an explicit go-ahead for membership in the European Community.⁴⁹

Nonetheless, significant progress towards integration was made during the Mazowiecki period. First steps in integration with the EC were already initiated under the PZPR and Poland completed negotiations for a Trade and Economic Co-Operation Treaty with the EC under the 1989 Rakowski cabinet.⁵⁰ In July 1989 the European Council assigned the co-ordination of aid for the post-

⁴⁹ Interview with Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, 21 July 2005, Mayhew, p11.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p6-9. The treaty was signed in September 1989 under the Mazowiecki cabinet.

communist states to the European Commission.⁵¹ Post-communist leaders' initial hopes for a 'New Marshall Plan' did not materialize⁵² but a more limited aid programme was put in place.

The PHARE (Poland and Hungary Assistance to Restructuring Economies) programme⁵³, initiated in December 1989, provided Poland with 600 million ECU of financial aid, targeted primarily on economic restructuring advice and agriculture⁵⁴. A 240 million ECU credit line for state owned enterprise restructuring and small and medium sized (SME) businesses was made available by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) was established to support the private sector.⁵⁵ Like IMF and World Bank funding, EC aid was conditional. Recipients had to show progress towards the rule of law, respect for human rights, the introduction of multi-party democracy by means of direct popular elections and transformation towards a free market economy⁵⁶.

Another key element of Mazowiecki's foreign policy was the initiation of discussions about Poland's association with the EC. Otherwise known as the Europe Agreements, the association treaties established an institutional framework for free trade between the EC and the post-communist states. The treaties involved extensive commitment to economic restructuring and limited state intervention and protection of domestic industry.

Immediately after being appointed as Prime Minister Mazowiecki hence began to re-direct Poland's foreign policy away from the unstable Soviet Union and towards the West. European Community institutions meanwhile, were also

⁵¹ W. Wallace, 'Does the EU have an Ostpolitiek?', in *Ambivalent Neighbors. The EU, NATO, and the Price of Membership*, eds. A. Lieven and D. Trenin (Washington, D.C. 2003), 45-66, p48.

⁵² Mayhew, p136.

⁵³ P. Samecki, 'Pomoc Wspólnot Europejskich dla Polski', in *Polska w Procesie Integracji ze Współnotami Europejskimi*, ed. Z. Wysokińska (Warsaw 1994), 154-164, p155.

⁵⁴ Ibid, p159.

⁵⁵ T. Mattli, 'The Demand-Side Politics of EU Enlargement: Democracy and the Application for EU Membership', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9, 4 (2002), p554.

⁵⁶ Samecki, 'Pomoc Wspólnot Europejskich dla Polski', p156.

about to undergo extensive structural change. Before turning to the question of how 'Europe' and integration was addressed in Polish political rhetoric it will hence be pertinent to set out the contemporary institutional context of the European Communities.

The EC was confronted with the need to respond to post-communist states' demands for inclusion at a time of wide-ranging internal reforms. Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the completion of the single market, German unification and the debate on the future political framework of the Community were all on top of the agenda as the Cold War ended. In early 1990 Jacques Delors, the Commission President, and other EC leaders pushed for institutional reform towards closer political union and two intergovernmental conferences on these subjects opened in Rome in December 1990.

The supra-nationalist agenda gave rise to growing concerns about the EC's 'democratic deficit'. The democratic deficit was made up of several factors. Firstly, the powers of the Community's directly elected parliament were limited whereas unelected decision makers at the European Commission had formal agenda setting powers. Secondly, the complexity of the EC's decision making procedures limited the transparency of the process. Thirdly, decisions made by the EC were perceived as technical in nature and turnout to EP elections was low. The EC lacked a 'demos', a political community that wished to jointly delegate power to Brussels. Most significant however, were proposals for the increased use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers. In principle, the use of consensus limited the democratic deficit in that it provided member state representatives with a veto over any decisions they deemed unacceptable for their electorates. Qualified majority voting, where decisions have been made with approximately 65% majority, made it possible for decisions affecting the citizens of a given member state to be made against the voting preferences of that member states' representatives in the Council. In practice, the actual use of voting in the Council has been infrequent and the habit of consensus decision making ingrained in the Council's way of working.

Nonetheless, the compromises states have made to attain consensus have been shaped by potential coalition constellations and the possibility of a vote in the event consensus cannot be attained. The possibility of a vote has forced sceptical governments to compromise and seek amendments rather than block a decision altogether.⁵⁷

Increased use of QMV, favoured by Delors and other proponents of political union, would hence significantly impact member states' ability to influence decisions about their domestic affairs. Together with the implementation of the EMU, which entailed a transfer of much of member states' monetary and fiscal decision making competences, and the proposals to expand the EC's powers into elements of social policy, foreign as well as and policing and border control policies meant that EC membership inevitably entailed a significant loss of state sovereignty.

In Poland meanwhile, the powerfully symbolic slogan of the 'return to Europe' played a prominent role in party-political rhetoric. But the Polish debates reflected the nascent elites' limited knowledge of West European institutions and did not address Western leaders concerns with political union, EMU or the democratic deficit. Rather, Polish political actors begun to develop highly symbolic and ambiguous visions of Europe more suited to their new ideological identities than to the policy implications of association with the increasingly integrated European institutions. The following section will address the development of 'return to Europe' discourse under the Mazowiecki cabinet.

The 'return to Europe' in political debate

Debate about Poland's place in Europe was prominent already during the 1989 contract election and played a central role in the rhetoric of Poland's new political elites from the first days of the Mazowiecki cabinet. Apart from being a key element of the annual foreign policy debates European integration was also

⁵⁷ H. Wallace, 'An Institutional Anatomy of Five Policy Models', in *Policy Making in the European Union*, ed. H. Wallace, Wallace, William and Pollack, Mark (Oxford 2005), p.61.

the subject of discussion during prime ministerial *exposés* as well as during debates on related topics such as the ratification of the treaty on good neighbourly relations with Germany. As the *OKP* and *PZPR* fragmented into new political parties Poland's place in Europe featured in the nascent groupings' programmes. This section will firstly address the role of 'Europe' and the 'West' in the 1989 elections. The way parties presented their stance on European integration in their electoral programmes and during parliamentary debate will be addressed in the second sub-section and the role of the European discourse in the 1990 presidential election will be presented in sub-section three.

Elections to the 1989 contract sejm

The main participants of the 1989 contest were Solidarity and the *PZPR* with its satellite parties: *Stronnictwo Demokratyczne*, *Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe* and three *PZPR* affiliated Catholic groupings, *Stowarzyszenie Pax* (the Pax Alliance), *Unia Chrześcijańsko-Społeczna* (Christian-Social Union) and *Polski Związek Katolicko-Społeczny* (the Polish Catholic-Social Alliance).⁵⁸ The results of the contest were made public on 8 June 1989, with Solidarity attaining 160 of the 161 seats available to it in the *sejm* or the lower house and 92 of 100 in the senate. The public preference for the opposition was emphasised even further by the fact that only two of the ruling coalition's 35 guaranteed candidates gained 50% of the votes. In nearly all cases most voters crossed all names out of the guaranteed 'national list' to ensure its non-election⁵⁹. The 65% of votes allocated to the regime side were made up of *PZPR* with 38%, *Zjednoczone Stronnictwo Ludowe* with 17%, *Stronnictwo Demokratyczne* with 6% and the 3 Catholic groupings, which jointly held 5% of votes⁶⁰.

The 1989 elections, held on 4 June 1989, were primarily a plebiscite on the rule of the communist party. Neither the *PZPR* nor Solidarity expected the Round

⁵⁸ Dudek, p35.

⁵⁹ P. Lewis, 'Non-Competitive Elections and Regime Change: Poland 1989', *Parliamentary Affairs*, 43, 1 (1990), p97.

⁶⁰ Millard, *Polish Politics and Society*, p.80.

Table agreement to become redundant so soon and to have to define policies for Poland's unprecedented systemic transformation within weeks, not years, of the electoral contest. The programmes of the two main contestants contained only limited policy proposals, the *PZPR* perceiving its victory to be assured by the contract agreement⁶¹ and Solidarity viewing itself in the role of a future opposition to government policy rather than policy maker⁶².

The *PZPR*'s programme focused on the need to improve Poland's economic situation and establish equality of opportunity among different forms of property ownership. It also called for a new constitution and confirmed its support for trade union plurality. Regarding foreign policy, the *PZPR* emphasised the need for national sovereignty and territorial inviolability. It also declared: 'We will strengthen friendship and cooperation with our allies, also develop broad relations with other states. We want to continue to actively participate in healing international relations. Our planet and our continent have too many common aims and threats to maintain divisions among hostile camps.⁶³' Regarding foreign trade the *PZPR* stated: 'We decisively support the opening of Poland to the global market. We will act to break through the stagnation in the economic integration of socialist states⁶⁴'. While remaining loyal to the Soviet Union therefore the *PZPR* supported reform of the communist trading bloc and advocated Poland's participation in international economic organisations.

Solidarity participated in the 1989 contest as *Komitet Obywatelski 'Solidarność'* (Citizen's Committee 'Solidarity', *OKP*). The establishment of the *OKP* meant that Solidarity lent its name to two separate entities: 'Solidarity' the trade union and 'Solidarity' the political grouping institutionalized within the *OKP*

⁶¹ J. Hayden, 'Explaining the Collapse of Communism in Poland: How the Strategic Mispreception of Round Table Negotiators Produced Unanticipated Results', *Polish Sociological Review*, 4, 136 (2001).

⁶² Zubek.

⁶³ Deklaracja Wyborcza Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej, *Trybuna Ludu*, 6-7 May, 1989.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

framework⁶⁵. The Citizens' Committee mandate united representatives from a wide range of opposition organisations. The largest of these were the Solidarity trade union and Agrarian Solidarity (*Solidarność Rolników*). Other dissident groupings such as the *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna* (the Polish Socialist Party, PPS) and the *Stronnictwo Pracy* (the Labour Faction), *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej* and the liberal *Unia Polityki Realnej* (Union of Realist Politics, UPR) chose not to stand in the election but they did allow their members to participate in the OKP list⁶⁶.

Solidarity's programme addressed the need to draft a new constitution, abolish censorship, impose the rule of law and strengthen the powers of local government. It also asserted that the subsequent parliamentary elections should be fully democratic with 'no limitations or privileges'⁶⁷. Regarding economic policy Solidarity supported equality of state and private ownership and the introduction of hard budget constraints to both⁶⁸. It also opposed the state's direct involvement in the running of economic enterprise⁶⁹ and called for the establishment of an effective social security system⁷⁰.

The OKP's foreign policy aims included the consolidation of Polish sovereignty and independence, preservation and consolidation of peace in Europe and in the world, 'victory over anachronistic European divisions', 'development of international co-operation' and the 'strengthening and development and all that contributes to the more complete realization of human rights and better quality of life'⁷¹.

⁶⁵ M. Wenzel, 'Solidarity and Akcja Wyborcza 'Solidarność'. An Attempt at Reviving the Legend. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 31, 2 (1998), 139-156, p.147-148.

⁶⁶ Dudek, p.51. The latter two groupings also stood for election independently although neither attained representation without OKP backing.

⁶⁷ OKP 1989 Electoral Programme, section I/2, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1989 election folder.

⁶⁸ Ibid. section II/11.

⁶⁹ Ibid. section II/12.

⁷⁰ Ibid. Section II/10.

⁷¹ OKP, Polska i Świat. Oświadczenie w Sprawach Miedzynarodowych, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1989 election folder.

Regarding the Warsaw Pact the *OKP* stated: 'Without questioning or undermining....the Warsaw Pact...we feel that its functioning has to date been based on the rule of submitting the weaker partners to the stronger ones, which has led to adverse political, economic and social consequence'. Its stance on the political situation in other communist countries was made clear however in the declaration of its willingness to co-operate with 'all forces acting for pluralism and democracy in the USSR, Hungary and in other East European states'⁷².

The *OKP* did not present detailed proposals as to its preferred framework for Poland's relations with the EC. But its stance was clearly pro-Western. It called for 'multifaceted co-operation with the German Federal Republic, Great Britain, France, Italy and other European Community states'⁷³, declared support for 'strengthening European unity and popularizing European ideals' and asserted that 'Poland cannot exist without Europe, and there is no peaceful Europe without Poland'⁷⁴. Improved relations between Poland and Germany and mutual respect for 'separate identity and territorial inviolability'⁷⁵ would play a key role in diminishing European divisions, the *OKP* declared.

Solidarity was hence unmistakeably supportive of Poland's integration with the West. 'It is time for Poland to become a country where all are at home' its programme stated, 'it is time for Poland to return to Europe'⁷⁶.

But it also took care not to antagonise the USSR, calling for 'reform' rather than dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The presence of Soviet troops on Polish soil and the pervading uncertainty about how the USSR would react to any excessively overt declarations of dissent may have limited the *OKP* ability to make its foreign policy aspirations explicit.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ OKP June 1989 electoral leaflet, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1989 election folder.

Solidarity's pro-Western stance was perhaps best expressed with the famous 'High Noon' campaign poster. In a parody of the 1952 Oscar winning Western, the hero, played by Gary Newman complete with Stetson hat and cowboy boots, strode confidently against the backdrop of the 'Solidarity' logo. 'At High Noon, 4 June 1989' the caption declared. The poster sent a message louder and clearer than the most daring declarations of support for budding democratic movements. Vote for Solidarity, it promised, and you will get a chance to be part of the West. '*Solidarność*' was undeniably 'Western'. And this in turn made it represent everything communism was not. The image of the 'West' evoked a powerful promise of escape from Soviet domination and all that it entailed from food rations, unending queues, second rate consumer products through government corruption, inability to travel and censorship through to lack of political agency and, all too often, memories of persecution and loss of friends and family at the hands of the Soviet regime.

Skilled in using imagery and metaphor to get their message past censors, the dissidents were able to express all that Solidarity stood for more effectively by means of a Gary Newman photo than by detailed policy proposals. But while electorally effective and full of promise, such potent imagery gave the voters little indication of the strategies its representatives would later use to radically transform Poland's foreign and domestic policy.

Poland's place in Europe also featured in the programme of the *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej* (Confederation for Independent Poland, *KPN*), an opposition party established during the late 1970's under the leadership of Leszek Moczulski⁷⁷. The Confederates stated:

Our main moral and intellectual foundation is a set of values typical to the Christian, Western world view....we consider ourselves to be *Europeans* - in a civilisational way which has been shaped over the past one and a half millennia. Being a part of Europe, we are

⁷⁷ Akt Konfederacji Polski Niepodległej, 1 September 1979, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, *KPN* folder.

aware that we constitute, both us and our neighbours – its Eastern border, faced with repeated pressure from Asia...Our tradition springs from the thousand years of Christianity in this part of Europe, and especially from the thousand years of Polish Catholicism.⁷⁸

The KPN's vision of Poland's place in Europe was hence grounded in Polish Catholicism. This was the case, the Confederates implied, since Poland not only had been Christian for the past millennium, but also because of its past as defender of Western Christianity. 'Repeated pressure from Asia' referred to Poland's role as the '*Antemurale Christiantatis*', or protector of Christian Europe from Tartar and Ottoman invasions and more recently its victory in the 1919 Bolshevik war.

Parliamentary debate

The collapse of communism presented the political elites with the need to develop distinct narratives that would enable them to differentiate themselves from their competitors. Europe and Poland's role in it was a frequent subject of parliamentary discussion and featured in the programmes of almost all political groupings established during the Mazowiecki period. But the debate remained abstract, its participants favouring the use of metaphors and symbolism over precise discussion of the technical nature of EC reform or the association process. Polish elites focused on national identity, religion and the question of whether Poland already belonged to Europe, by virtue of its past sacrifices as the bulwark of European Christianity, or whether it was not yet 'good enough' to return and hence obliged to undergo a process of 'catching-up'. The symbolism of 'returning to Europe' proved powerful enough to garner public support and ambiguous enough to be adjusted to the parties' nascent ideological narratives. The powerful appeal of 'Europe' both legitimized the new parties' claims for power and became a conveniently malleable reflection of their preferred vision of Poland and its place in the international order.

⁷⁸ Program Konfederacji Polski Niepodległej, Uchwalony przez III Kongres KPN, Warszawa-Kraków, 4 February - 4 March 1989, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, KPN folder.

Tadeusz Mazowiecki's parliamentary *exposé* of 12 September 1989 was one of the first opportunities to publicly address Poland's future role in Europe.

Mazowiecki presented his hopes for Poland and its relationship with Europe as follows:

We want a Poland open to Europe and to the world; a Poland which - with no inferiority complex - will contribute to the creation of material and cultural goods; Poland whose citizens will feel welcome in other countries of Europe and the world, rather than like troublesome intruders.⁷⁹

Mazowiecki hence felt it was important for Poles to feel equal to their Western counterparts and not suffer from an 'inferiority complex'. He claimed that in order to be a part of 'Europe' and to integrate, the Poles had to transform, not only their economy and political system, but also their identity. A transformation from troublesome *gastarbeiter*s to wealthy, well-adjusted members of the rich countries' club was needed for the Poles to no longer feel inferior. Mazowiecki's vision implied an awareness of the emotional burden which Poland's 'separation' from Western Europe imposed on Polish identity. But he simultaneously implied that as things stood, the Poles were not equal to their Western neighbours.

Mazowiecki's enthusiasm for European integration was echoed by Bronisław Geremek, dissident intellectual and chair of the OKP parliamentary club. For Geremek, the 'return to Europe' was sufficiently important to justify the creation of a new constitution. 'We believe that the historic role of this parliament is the creation of a new constitution, which will lead Poland into Europe, Europe as a family of free nations' he stated.⁸⁰ Poland's 'place in Europe' was clearly of pivotal importance for Mazowiecki and Geremek. They both also implied that there was something Poland had to attain, a process it

⁷⁹ Tadeusz Mazowiecki, speech at parliamentary session nr.7, quoted in *Rzeczpospolita*, 213(2347), 13 September 1989, p.4.

⁸⁰ Bronisław Geremek, parliamentary session nr.7, 12 September 1989, 1989 Parliamentary Session Transcripts, sejm library (Biblioteka Sejmowa, hard copy transcripts are provided on request and are listed by parliamentary session numbers).

needed to go through, before it could 'return'. Communism had taken Poland away from Europe, their rhetoric implied, and now an effort was required for it to return. Poland was not yet 'good enough' to claim its right of belonging. Mazowiecki's own rhetoric hence reinforced the very inferiority complex he was so concerned about. Although the symbolism of the return provided a powerful rhetorical justification for a new constitution, neither Mazowiecki nor Geremek, or any other participant of the September debate, explained what the all-important process of 'returning' entailed. It was not made clear what 'economic and cultural' tasks Polish citizens would have to complete before they could start to feel like 'equal citizens' and not 'troublesome intruders'.

In January 1990, during his speech at the Council of Europe membership application, Mazowiecki presented his vision of Poland's relations with Europe in similar vein:

Europe is living through an exceptional time. Half the continent cut off from its mother trunk half a century ago, wants to return. A return to Europe!..Maybe...it would be more appropriate to speak about a rebirth of Europe which...ceased to exist since the Yalta decisions. Europe has always been a point of reference for us in our quest for our identity; Europe, which the Poles defended and which they loved. For three hundred years the idea of the 'bulwark of Christianity' has been popular in Poland – the bulwark of Europe. So, Europe is present in the Polish consciousness as a value for which it was worthwhile to live and for which it was sometimes necessary to die.⁸¹

For Mazowiecki, as for many other dissidents, European integration held an abstract and symbolic significance that could not be reduced to the technicalities of customs union or a common currency. Poland was inexorably linked to Europe. Tragically, it had been severed from 'its mother trunk' by the Soviet invasion. The Poles' European identity and their commitment to Europe had been proven by the numerous sacrifices they made while defending

⁸¹ Tadeusz Mazowiecki, speech at Council of Europe Meeting in Strasbourg, 30 January 1990, *Zbiór Dokumentów*, nr.1, 1990.

Western Europe from the un-Christian, barbaric East. Indeed, their allegiance to Europe was so great they were willing to die for it. Returning to Europe implied a return to freedom, an end to the long and arduous struggle against the Soviet oppressor, and to what for many had been a life-long sacrifice for Polish independence. European integration represented the culmination of dissident struggle and reward for a successful transformation.

Practically no debate about the legislative, economic and political implications of Poland's European integration policy took place within the *OKP*. Poland's 'return to Europe' remained a catch-all slogan: ambiguous and fluid, a 'sponge' concept⁸² that could be all things to all people. Years later, Mazowiecki spoke of the 'obviousness' of the pro-integration policy. Asked when he first felt convinced that accession to the European Union was the best solution for Poland he replied:

I could not point to a single breakthrough moment. With Jacques Delors from the very start we talked with a full awareness of common sentiments, in a climate of ...obviousness. Yes...for us it was obvious that Poland is returning home...I then believed that amidst this great transformation the relations between us and the EC should be increasingly close and that we had the right to expect support and help.⁸³

For Mazowiecki, European integration was a foregone conclusion. While Western decision makers remained cautious about making a commitment on Poland's membership in Western structures⁸⁴, the Polish Prime Minister believed that the West was obliged to assist in Poland's transformation and facilitate its integration with Western Europe.

In September 1989, the vision of the 'return to Europe' met with little parliamentary opposition and the only voice of dissent against Poland's pro-

⁸² A. Wolff-Powęska, 'Polska i kraje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej: poszukiwanie dróg przezwyciężenia podziału Europy', in *Wspólna Europa mit czy rzeczywistość?*, (Poznań 1990).

⁸³ Marek Saryusz-Wolski and Krzysztof Bobiński, interview with Tadeusz Mazowiecki *Polska i Unia*, nr.1, October 1998.

⁸⁴ Grabbe, 'Challenges of EU Enlargement', p67.

Western foreign policy came from *PZPR* 'hard-liners'⁸⁵. Rather than openly question the idea of closer integration with the European Communities they perceptively pointed to Western leaders' lack of enthusiasm. As Marian Orzechowski, leader of the *PZPR* parliamentary club, commented during the debate following Tadeusz Mazowiecki's *exposé* :

Poland has traditionally been a country open to Europe and to the world, and now it is becoming even more so. This was not always reciprocated; in fact, this was the case more often than not. We experience this to this day.⁸⁶

Unsurprisingly, relations with the USSR were the main point of dissent between the *PZPR* and the *OKP*. In 1989 the *PZPR* continued to question the new foreign policy direction and emphasise the importance of friendly relations with the USSR for Polish national security.⁸⁷ But it never directly opposed European integration and support for economic co-operation with the EC was prominent in its rhetoric. One example of this was the statement of the November 1989 XVI Plenum of the Central Committee calling for 'a new alignment of relations within a modernized and effective CMEA and a fundamentally closer relationship and co-operation with the European Communities⁸⁸'.

The *PZPR* eventually dissolved on 29 January 1990. Its successor party, the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic, was established immediately thereafter. At the time of its dissolution the *PZPR* had approximately 2 million members. The *SdRP* began with as few as 20 thousand⁸⁹. Leszek Miller, *PZPR* 'hardliner' and member of the Political Bureau, was appointed Secretary General. Aleksander Kwaśniewski, a *PZPR* 'reformer', former member of the Socialist Union of Polish Students (*Socjalistyczny Związek Studentów Polskich*,

⁸⁵ Bronisław Pasierb, 'Spory Parlamentarne Wokół Genezy Polskiej Orientacji Europejskiej', *Współczesna Polska Myśl Polityczna*, ed. Krystyna Paszkiewicz (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1996).

⁸⁶ Marian Orzechowski, speech at parliamentary session nr.7, 12 September 1989, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁸ XVI Plenum Komitetu Centralnego *PZPR*, Warsaw, 6 Nov.1989, section 8.

⁸⁹ E. Nalewajko, *Protopartie i Protosystem. Szkic do Obrazu Polskiej Wielopartyjności* (Warsaw 1997), p30.

SZSP) became head of the Executive Committee. Upon its formation the *SdRP* issued a statement on foreign policy, calling for a 'thorough reconstruction of the COMECON and a gradual change of the role of the Warsaw Pact'.⁹⁰ It also expressed support for the 'development of a common European home',⁹¹ a slogan frequently used, by Mikhail Gorbachev⁹². The first congress proposed establishment of closer links with Western social democratic parties and membership in the Socialist International. From its inception, this communist-successor grouping pursued a strategy of redefining its image into a modernized, West European social democratic party. The *SdRP* advocated a 'United Nations of Europe', which was to be founded on social democrat ideals.

⁹³ A pro-integrationist, pro-Western stance distanced the former communists from the atrocities of the *ancien régime* and was pivotal in the re-definition of their identity to a democratically legitimate, electable grouping.

But support for European integration did not mean that the *SdRP* agreed with the government's over-all foreign policy stance. NATO enlargement, German unification and the continuing presence of Soviet troops on Polish territory were the main points of dissent. In March 1990, in the midst of the German unification talks, the *SdRP* declared: 'Today safe borders and political and economic sovereignty are matters of the greatest importance...This is why we state that in a Europe divided into military blocs both the stretching out of the NATO border, and surrendering the security guarantee constituted by membership in the Warsaw Pact are not acceptable. Hence the necessity to have a strong Polish army and the point of temporarily stationing Soviet troops in Poland on the basis of mutually agreed and adhered to conditions. We consider the encouragement of anti-Soviet sentiments to be particularly dangerous. We

⁹⁰ 'Stanowiska i Oświadczenie w Sprawie Sytuacji Międzynarodowej, Polityki Zagranicznej i Współpracy z Siłami Lewicy Na Świecie', Trybuna Kongresowa, 31 January 1990.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² N. Davies, *Europe. A History*. (London 1997), p.37.

⁹³ Piotr Radzikowski 'Lewica Europejska: jej wartości i cele', Trybuna Ludu, 04 January 1990.

point to the manifestation of dangerous nationalist tendencies in both of the German states'.⁹⁴

In April 1990 the *SdRP* published its socio-economic programme. While supportive of the free market its programme also advocated extensive social security, public provision of health care, housing and education, and privatisation of state enterprises by issuing shares to employees.⁹⁵ Regarding foreign policy the *SdRP* underscored the need for debt reduction, IMF aid, and foreign investment regulation. It also raised concerns about Poland's deteriorating economic relations with the USSR and emphasised the importance of trade with the Soviet Union for the Polish economy.⁹⁶

The parliamentary debate on foreign policy of April 1990 presented another opportunity to address Poland's European integration policy. The parliamentarians considered with what kind of Europe and on what terms Poland should integrate. As during Mazowiecki's *exposé* debate however, they focused on the abstract question of defining Polish identity in relation to the rest of the continent rather than on the technical aspects of EC reform and association.

Krzysztof Skubiszewski outlined the new aims of Polish foreign policy. European security was a primary concern. As he would later point out, Skubiszewski was not as yet able to publicly discuss his ambitions of joining NATO⁹⁷. He did however, call for reform of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON as well as for closer integration with the European Communities and the Council of Europe⁹⁸ and for continued co-operation with both Germany and the USSR. Relations with the Soviet Union were to be rebuilt on the basis of common interests, equality and partnership.

⁹⁴ 'Stanowisko Rady Naczelnej w Sprawach Międzynarodowych', 10 March 1990.

⁹⁵ 'Program Społeczno-Gospodarczy Socjademokracji RP', *Trybuna*, nr.56, 19 April 1990.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁹⁷ Interview with Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 19 May 2006.

⁹⁸ Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28, 26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.

The *SdRP* was supportive of the government's European integration efforts.

Józef Oleksy, an *SdRP* parliamentarian and one of its founders, stated:

We will support the government in its efforts to integrate Poland's economic system into the economies of the leading European states as well as achieve at least an associate status of the EEC...The artificial division of Europe shaped during the cold war now fades into the past. Before us stands a far reaching modification of the structures and activities of the politico-military structures of the continent.⁹⁹

But Oleksy's stance was not unequivocally pro-Western. He expressed his opposition to German unification as well as to unified Germany's NATO membership and called for Poland to participate in the 2+4 talks. In order to strengthen European security, Oleksy proposed to assign a more meaningful role to the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe, a proposal that would be at the forefront of the reformed communists' foreign policy strategy for the next two years. He also pointed out that relations with the Soviet Union were no less important than those with the West.¹⁰⁰

While there was a general consensus in support of establishing some kind of affiliation with West European states, parliamentarians differed as to the kind of Europe into which Poland should integrate. Many favoured a 'Europe of Nations', a term originally coined by Charles de Gaulle in support of a highly inter-governmental European Community, made up of sovereign states where Council decisions would be based on consensus rather than qualified majority. Others appeared to advocate a more closely integrated European Community. But the discussion did not address the impact which these different types of international structure might have on Poland and the Poles and the language used during the debate was based on broad and vague slogans.

⁹⁹ Józef Oleksy, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28, 26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.

¹⁰⁰ Józef Oleksy, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28, 26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.

The parliamentarians were aware of the need to define what sort of a European organisation Poland would integrate with but rather than address the technical debates on issues such as the EMU, greater use of QMV or social policy competences they continued to use vague and symbolic terms for their preferred visions of Europe. Lesław Lech, of the *Stronnictwo Demokratyczne*, pointed out:

In returning to Europe, what, in the political sense, does it mean to get closer to the European institutions, and above all to the EEC? We should know what sort of Europe this should be. Will it be a Europe of Nations or a Nation Europe? It would appear the former notion is preferred.¹⁰¹

As Lech made clear, the ambition to join the EEC was not unconditional. While they supported integration, many parliamentarians qualified their enthusiasm by opting for what seemed to be an inter-governmentalist model. Wojciech Polak, of the Polish Social-Catholic Union, asserted: 'As regards European unity it appears that the concept of premier Margaret Thatcher is more realistic, one of a loose federation of sovereign European states, largely taking into account the civilisational and cultural diversity of the different European nations.'¹⁰²

The parliamentarians were hence caught between two ambitions: the desire to 'return to the West' and form closer links with European institutions on the one hand, and concerns for Poland's nascent independence on the other.

References to religion were prominent during the discussion. For many, Polish Christianity played a pivotal role in the country's relationship with Europe. As Jan Łopuszański of the *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe* (Christian Nationalist Faction, ZChN) commented:

¹⁰¹ Lesław Lech, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28, 26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.

¹⁰² Wojciech Polak, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28, 26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.

As Christianity was pushed out of the public life in Europe there was also less space for Poland and so her misfortunes occurred. Poland's hope to re-build the position among the family of nations which she deserves is closely linked to the hope for re-building an international Christian order.¹⁰³

Łopuszański hence believed that Poland's relationship with Europe was primarily based on Christianity. Others felt that Poland's religious, conservative national identity might be a burden rather than a justification of Poland's 'place in Europe'. Jan Czaja of the *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* (Polish Agrarian Faction, PSL) stated: 'We talk about a return to Europe, about writing ourselves into the process of European integration, association with the EEC, we want to attract foreign capital, but as a society we are closed, insecure and provincial'.¹⁰⁴ Lech Kozaczko of the OKP meanwhile was concerned about whether the Poles were not too poor for their wealthy Western neighbours. He stated: 'Citizens of the wealthy European nations have no desire to give up their own living standards for the sake of our entry into Europe, given the current state of our economy'.¹⁰⁵

While some doubted whether Poland and the Poles were 'good enough' to integrate with their West European neighbours, others argued that Poland's Christianity guaranteed its 'place in Europe'. On the one hand, the parliamentarians wanted to ensure that Poland got its 'honourable' and 'well-deserved' position in the international order, on the other they worried whether it would gain admittance to the prestigious Western club.

The discussion hence concentrated on broad, non-technical issues and reflected the parliamentarians' limited knowledge of European international structures¹⁰⁶. It was often unclear whether the speakers addressed the process of integrating

¹⁰³ Jan Łopuszański, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28, 26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.

¹⁰⁴ Jan Czaja, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28, 26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.

¹⁰⁵ Lech Kozaczko, 'Informacja Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych o polityce zagranicznej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w 1990 r', parliamentary session nr.28, 26 April 1990, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Warsaw, Government Plenipotentiary for European Integration from 1991 to 1996, Secretary of the Committee for European Integration 2000 to 2001, 14 January 2002.

with the European Community, other West European organizations or whether the debate was about Polish national identity and perceptions of Poland being either a part of the 'East' or the 'West'.

But increasingly distinct stances on Europe were evident in the programmes of new parties throughout 1990. While almost all parties continued to express support for some form of European integration an increasing number began to qualify the kind of Europe they wished Poland to integrate with. Several parties conditioned their support by emphasising that the Europe they wished to integrate with was a 'Europe of Nations' that did not impinge Polish sovereignty. Others however, presented explicit statements of support for association, membership and even speedy legal harmonisation of Polish law with that of the European Community.

The Polish Social-Democratic Union (*Polska Unia Socjaldemokratyczna, PUS*), established by a group of former *PZPR* members under the leadership of Tadeusz Fiszbach, declared: 'We believe that Poland should play an active part in the process of European integration by associating and eventually becoming a member of the European Community'¹⁰⁷. The Centre Accord presented a similarly enthusiastic stance in support of EC association and eventual membership. The *PC* was established in May 1990 by supporters of Lech Wałęsa, under the leadership of Jarosław Kaczyński. 'The main trajectory of Polish foreign policy is a pro-European orientation. Our guiding aim is the entry into a united Europe, the core of which is the European Community. The realisation of this task requires...the speediest possible harmonisation of financial and legal regulations and political and economic structures with those required in Western Europe'¹⁰⁸, it stated.

The *PC* hence advocated urgent harmonisation of Poland's law, political institutions and the economy with that of Western Europe. The European

¹⁰⁷ Stanowisko Unii Socjaldemokratycznej w Sprawach Międzynarodowych, Section 3.

¹⁰⁸ Porozumienie Centrum, Dokumenty i Programy. Tezy do dyskusji nad Polską Polityką Zagraniczną. Polska-Europa, 9 June 1990.

Community provided a much needed legislative and policy model for the transformation. The *PC* did not specify how such en-masse absorption of external legislation should be ratified and what role would parliamentary debate play in this process. The 'return to Europe' seemed to take priority over lengthy parliamentary procedure. A similar stance was presented by the Forum of the Democratic Right (*Forum Prawicy Demokratycznej, FPD*), established by Tadeusz Mazowiecki's supporters in June 1990. 'We see the need to go through a transition period, during which Poland will be associated with the EEC by means of the Europe Agreement. This period will allow Poland to align with European norms',¹⁰⁹ it stated.

While it did not explicitly address the association process or future membership in the EC, Solidarity continued to emphasise the importance of Poland's 'return to Europe'. It declared:

Poland has attained the opportunity of independence, the building of a democratic society and a return to Europe...while participating in the task of repairing the Polish Republic we want to shape a democratic state, civil society, an economy with a market and different forms of ownership. Only such a Poland will take the appropriate place in the family of European states.¹¹⁰

'Returning to Europe' was hence presented as the end-goal of the reform process. While they did not clarify how and on what terms Poland should 'return', regaining its 'appropriate place in Europe' was a key priority for the trade unionists. In early 1990 the trade union carried out a debate on whether it should withdraw from political life and focus on purely trade unionist activities or if it would remain in politics. Eventually a compromise was reached and the March 1990 congress decided that the union would continue to actively participate in political life. Solidarity hence took a challenging decision: it

¹⁰⁹ Forum Prawicy Demokratycznej: Trzy Programy, Deklaracja Założycielska, 'Założenia Programu Polityki Zagranicznej'.

¹¹⁰ 'Uchwała Programowa II Zjazdu Delegatów NSZZ 'Solidarność', Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 March 1990, dodatek.

would have to deal with the conflicting interests of a political party on the one hand and a trade union on the other¹¹¹.

Other groupings meanwhile, presented an increasingly qualified stance on European integration. They supported the integration process but asserted that the 'Europe' Poland would integrate had to be a 'Europe of Nations', that did not impinge national sovereignty.

The Polish Agrarian Faction 'Renewal' (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe 'Odrodzenie'*, *PSLO*), established in November 1989 as successor of the *PZPR* satellite United Agrarian Faction¹¹² presented such qualified support for European integration: 'We support the idea of a European Community with the maintenance of national sovereignty', their programme stated. 'The aim of our policy is a Europe of Nations working together on the basis of equal rights....We were and are a part of Europe and want to actively participate in the creation of its modern shape and future development based on mutual friendship among the countries of our continent'.¹¹³

A similar stance was presented by the Pax Association (*Stowarzyszenie Pax*), originally established under the communist regime as a *PZPR* 'collaborationist' organisation comprising Catholic laity and so-called 'patriotic' priests.¹¹⁴ 'We accept the idea of a common European home', their programme stated, 'but we understand this as a 'Europe of Nations' - a community of sovereign states and nations with their own historic and cultural identity',¹¹⁵ Pax asserted.

But the most vocal proponent of the 'Europe of Nations' rhetoric was the *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko-Narodowe*. Established in November 1989 by activists from the 'national-Catholic' strand of Solidarity *ZChN* emphasised the

¹¹¹ 'Uchwała Programowa II Zjazdu Delegatów NSZZ 'Solidarność', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 29 March 1990, dodatek.

¹¹² Nalewajko, p.27-28.

¹¹³ *PSL 'Odrodzenie' 'W Trosce o Jutro Polski. Korekcyjny Program Gospodarczy PSL 'Odrodzenie'*, 10 March 1990.

¹¹⁴ T. Bale, Aleks, Szczepiak, 'Why is there no Christian Democracy in Poland (and why does this matter)?', (Sussex European Institute 2006), SEI working paper nr: 91, p11.

¹¹⁵ Dokumenty Walnego Zgromadzenia Stowarzyszenia Pax. Deklaracja Programowa. 25 March 1990.

importance of the Catholic Church and advocated state adherence to what it saw as Christian values such as the criminalisation of abortion¹¹⁶ and the compulsory teaching of religion in schools. From its inception, the ZChN expressed qualified support for European integration and 'Europe of Nations' frequently featured in its rhetoric.¹¹⁷ In November 1990 Wiesław Chrzanowski, the leader of the ZChN, stated:

I am concerned by the fact that there are circles, especially on the left, also the left which has just come out of the underground, which make light of the problem. I would say that there are even those who present the willingness to sell out. They claim that national tendencies should be won over on the way to a united Europe, which Poland is supposed to 'melt into' so that, consequently, it would melt down. Such thinking is very useful for some of the ruling elites in Western Germany. We in ZChN support the creation of a 'Europe of Nations, as de Gaulle wanted, and which is close to the words of the Holy Father, and not a 'pan-Europe' which Kohl speaks about... Is the concern about Germans undertaking economic initiatives in Poland not unjustified, having a political rationale? I am thinking of the buying up of land, real estate, under the pretext of the needs of some business or other. What is interesting is that this is taking place almost exclusively on Polish territories previously belonging to Germany. This should be opposed.¹¹⁸

According to the leader of the ZChN German conspirators strove to re-gain the Recovered Territories. The plot was facilitated, Chrzanowski argued, not only by the reformed communists, but by the 'left' side of the Solidarity-successor wing. The debate on Europe divided the Solidarity-successor camp early in the integration process. Whereas dissident intellectuals such as Mazowiecki and Geremek saw 'returning to Europe' as an 'obvious' policy direction, the *Zjednoczenie* warned of an impending fourth partition.

¹¹⁶ Program Zjednoczenia Chrześcijańsko-Narodowego, Section 5, June 1990, Informator Parlamentarny OKP nr 25, 15.10.1990.

¹¹⁷ Program Zjednoczenia Chrześcijańsko-Narodowego, June 1990, Informator Parlamentarny OKP nr 25, 15.10.1990.

¹¹⁸ Wiesław Chrzanowski, quoted in 'Dwugłos o Niebiezpieczeństwach Utraty Suwerenności Ekonomicznej' Trybuna, 18 November 1990.

A similarly qualified approach was presented by Moczulski's party, the *KPN*. The concept of *miedzymorze* (the between-sea) lay at the heart of *KPN*'s foreign policy stance. Reminiscent of the powerful Polish-Lithuanian Union the concept of *miedzymorze* presented an alternative to integration with Western Europe. It advocated co-operation among countries in the region stretching from the Baltic to the Black seas. Different variants of *miedzymorze* were proposed but Poland, as the largest country of the region, was usually envisaged in a leading role¹¹⁹. The *KPN* did support some form of future co-operation with the European Community, which it presented as the 'Europe of Nations', but its programme implied that integration with the West would not happen in the near future. Rather the *KPN* preferred for this to take place after Poland and other post-communist states had built up their economic strength by means of regional integration¹²⁰.

Different presentations of 'Europe' and approaches to European integration could hence be distinguished. But the one thing all parties agreed on was the importance of Poland's newly regained sovereignty, which was prominent in the programmes of all major political groupings. The communist-successor *PSL* 'Odrodzenie' called for the 'strengthening of political and economic sovereignty'¹²¹. The *SdRP* declared: 'political and economic sovereignty' to be 'matters of the greatest importance'¹²². Both *PSL* and *SdRP* therefore underscored not only political but also economic sovereignty. The Social-Democratic Union emphasised the importance of consolidating sovereignty and territorial integrity¹²³. The *ZChN* declared: 'An independent state is the guarantor of the political identity of the nation and its necessary

¹¹⁹ M. Wolański, 'Koncepcje Europy w Polskiej Tradycji Politycznej', in *Jaka Europa?*, ed. M. Wolański (Wrocław 1998), 11-26., p.20. K. Rogaczewska, 'Naród-Państwo-Federalizm w Koncepcjach Adama Doboszyńskiego', in *Europa i integracja Europejska w polskiej myśli politycznej XX wieku*, ed. J. a. T. Juchnowski, Janusz (Wrocław 2003), 120-140.

¹²⁰ Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej, Program Trzeciej Rzeczypospolitej, Odbudowa Niepodległego Państwa Funkcjonalnego.

¹²¹ Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, 'Program Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego', 27 November 1989. Section II 'Zródła i Cele'

¹²² *SdRP*, 'Stanowisko Rady Naczelnej w Sprawach Międzynarodowych', 10 March 1990.

¹²³ 'Stanowisko Unii Socjaldemokratycznej w Sprawach Międzynarodowych'

embodiment¹²⁴. The Forum of the Democratic Right referred to the need for Poland to attain a 'sovereign subject status in international relations'¹²⁵.

Porozumienie Centrum meanwhile stated: 'Polish national interest requires full internal and external sovereignty'¹²⁶.

Given that Poland had only recently started to establish its independence from the weakening but still powerful Soviet Union it is not surprising that sovereignty was a key issue for all parties. But it is striking that the two developments that would significantly affect Polish sovereignty: EC reform and the forthcoming association negotiations¹²⁷ were not presented as a threat to it. Rather, the parties seemed to be trying to square up two contradictory ideas: the desire for close integration with the West and for the protection of Poland's newly regained sovereignty¹²⁸. Mazowiecki and Skubiszewski did not, at this stage, publicly raise their aspiration for Poland to join NATO for fear of repercussions from the USSR¹²⁹. Closer relations with the EC were hence perceived to protect Polish sovereignty from a potential threat from the East. Once NATO membership became part of the public foreign affairs agenda however the protection of Poland's sovereignty from the USSR and later Russia would diminish the strength of the argument in favour of association and accession. The first voices of concern about the benefits of integration with the EC on Polish domestic industry and national independence could be heard towards the end of 1990. As the next section will show several contestants in the 1990 presidential contest raised such concerns during the campaign.

¹²⁴ Program Zjednoczenia Chrześcijańsko-Narodowego, 'Zasady', June 1990, *Informator Parlamentarny* OKP nr 25, 15.10.1990

¹²⁵ Forum Prawicy Demokratycznej: Trzy Programy, Deklaracja Założycielska, 'Założenia Programu Polityki Zagranicznej'

¹²⁶ Porozumienie Centrum, Dokumenty i Programy. Tezy do dyskusji nad Polską Polityką Zagraniczną, 'Suwerenna Polityka Zagraniczna'.

¹²⁷ Vachudova, p67.

¹²⁹ Interview with Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 19 May 2006.

The 1990 presidential elections

The presidential contest of 1990 was post-communist Poland's first fully democratic election. The participants included Lech Wałęsa, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Roman Bartoszcze of the *PSL*, Leszek Moczulski, and the Polish- Canadian businessman and maverick founder of 'Party X', Stanisław Tymiński.

Tymiński attained second place during the first ballot, proving the biggest surprise of the election, with 23% of the vote following Lech Wałęsa's 40%. Contrary to expectations, Mazowiecki obtained only 18% of the vote. The communist-successor candidate, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, came fourth with 9% of the vote, the *PSL*'s Roman Bartoszcze attained 7% and *KPN* leader Leszek Moczulski 2.5%. Wałęsa eventually won the second round against Tymiński with 74%.¹³⁰

The main themes of the contest included fully free democratic elections, the role of the presidency, economic reform and the relationship between Church and state. Although all candidates presented a stance on foreign policy and European integration, few addressed the subject in detail and the rhetoric remained equally abstract to that evident in the parliamentary discussions and party-political programmes of the period.

Lech Wałęsa supported EC membership but felt that Poland needed to 'catch-up' with Western Europe. 'We can only attain accession to the European Communities after getting the country out from crisis and lessening the delays in our development as compared to Western states' he stated.¹³¹ . He also called for the reduction of Poland's debt, claiming it was the result of the West's policy

¹³⁰ Dudek, p.153.

¹³¹ Program Wyborczy Lecha Walesy, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1990 presidential elections folder.

of issuing generous and unconditional credits in an effort to weaken communist states while fully aware of these states' inability to pay.¹³²

Like that of his grouping, the *KPN*, Leszek Moczulski's programme advocated *międzymorze*, mentioned in previous sections. Only such regional cooperation, Moczulski argued, would allow post-communist states to compete with the European Community¹³³. For Moczulski, integration with the EC was a threat to Poland's independence rather than a catalyst for economic and political transformation.

In contrast to Moczulski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki had no reservations about EC association or membership. 'The already advanced negotiations on the association treaty with the European Community will be finalised. Our strategic aim is the accession to the Community at the end of the current decade', he declared.¹³⁴

Roman Bartoszcze was ambivalent about the benefits of European integration. He advised caution in entering international structures and was concerned that European integration would threaten national identity. 'New alliances must serve to strengthen sovereignty and security, and the processes of European integration must not undermine our national identity'.¹³⁵ Bartoszcze emphasised the need to ensure that cooperation with foreign capital was not paid for by lost opportunities to domestic investors. He was particularly concerned about preventing Polish land from being undersold to foreigners: 'National capital, and all arable land, should be protected against being sold at undervalued rates

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Dokumenty sztabu wyborczego Leszka Moczulskiego, Program Wyborczy, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1990 presidential elections folder.

¹³⁴ Program Wyborczy Tadeusza Mazowieckiego, section III, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1990 presidential elections folder, Tadeusz Mazowiecki's folder.

¹³⁵ Program Prezydencki Romana Bartoszcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1990 presidential elections folder.

to citizens of other countries' he declared.¹³⁶ He also proposed an interventionist economic policy and opposed extensive privatisation.¹³⁷

Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz's foreign policy proposals focused on attaining guarantees of territorial inviolability and the development of foreign economic cooperation. He also emphasised the need for a balance in foreign policy and warned against neglecting relations with the Soviet Union.¹³⁸ Regarding economic policy, Cimoszewicz called for greater state involvement and the development of an industrial strategy. In line with the *SdRP*'s 1990 program, Cimoszewicz opposed the privatisation of natural resources, infrastructure and the defence industry.¹³⁹

Stanisław Tymiński did not comment on Poland's relationship with the European Community or with any other international organization. He did however declare his willingness to support Poland's international integration and raised concerns about its reputation abroad.

Consensus on some form of European integration hence existed among all candidates in the presidential contest. But their rhetoric on the subject remained ambiguous and most did not present a stance on the forthcoming EC association negotiations or future membership. The West European debates on EMU and political union also remained unaddressed. But it was clear that the prospect of association and the transfer of economic sovereignty were not unproblematic for all candidates. Although Leszek Moczulski did not explicitly address the association agreement he clearly prioritized regional integration over speedy association with the EC. Similarly, while not explicitly opposing the forthcoming association talks, Roman Bartoszcze was very vocal in his concerns for Polish economic sovereignty and the interventionist economic proposals of both Bartoszcze and Cimoszewicz contradicted the neo-liberal

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Program Wyborczy Włodzimierza Cimoszewicza, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1990 presidential elections folder.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

approach of association conditionality that would require Poland to significantly limit state aid and eventually privatise almost all sectors of the economy.

Conclusions

The end of the communist regime confronted the nascent elites not only with the need to come up with a framework for political and economic transformation but also with the question of on the basis of what traditions should Poland's new identity be constructed.¹⁴⁰ Europe, traditionally a key element of narratives about Polish national identity¹⁴¹ provided political actors with a useful reference point for establishing new narratives about Poland's post-communist identity.

The concept of 'Europe' had two qualities which made it particularly suitable for this purpose. Firstly, it was a powerful symbol of freedom and prosperity¹⁴², representing everything that communism failed to deliver. 'Europe', in all of its varied interpretations, was inherently positive and desirable. Secondly, both popular and elite knowledge about the nature of West European institutions was limited and the speed of the transformation the EC was undergoing at the time further increased uncertainty about the future shape of its institutions. 'Europe' was hence both symbolically powerful and malleable, a representation of a wide range of desires and ambitions from freedom and democracy, security from Soviet influence, plentiful consumer goods and an end to the queues and shortages that had plagued the Poles under communism. It proved sufficiently ambiguous to be envisaged in creative and often contradictory ways that best suited the nascent political actors' new identities and their position in the ideological spectrum. Several narratives about Europe and Poland's relationship with it were present in Polish political debate during the Mazowiecki period.

¹⁴⁰ K. Bachmann, *Polska Kaczka - Europejski Staw. Szanse i Pułapki Polskiej Polityki Europejskiej*. (Warsaw 1999), p68.

¹⁴¹ Törnquist-Plewa, 2002.

¹⁴² Ibid, p235.

The narrative of the 'return to Europe' was most prominent in the rhetoric of the *OKP* and the Mazowiecki cabinet. Poland already belonged to Europe, the slogan implied, but communism had caused a break in the 'natural' historic continuum.¹⁴³ The 'return' served the two-fold purpose of symbolizing the process of closer integration with Western Europe but also, implicitly, of distancing its proponents from Soviet imposed communism, which, the rhetoric implied, caused the need for Poland to return in the first place. For Mazowiecki and his dissident colleagues the 'return' was the obvious, and the only, option. Confronted with the need to formulate policy much sooner than envisaged by the Round Table agreement, Solidarity lacked both a defined strategy for political and economic transformation and a narrative to legitimise it politically. The 'return to Europe' hence proved useful as a symbol of the new foreign policy direction, as well as an end goal of the transformation and a blueprint for it. The nature of the changes that would have to be carried out in order for Poland to 'return' were not specified but the appeal of 'the West' proved sufficiently powerful to justify a range of initiatives from radical economic reform to extensive legal harmonization.

In 1989 political actors did not appear to perceive a contradiction between Poland's integration with the European Community and the need to retain its newly regained sovereignty. Conversely, a closer relationship with Western Europe was seen to entail greater independence from the Soviet Union, whose troops, still stationed on Polish territory, continued to pose a threat to national sovereignty and the democratic transformation.

But by early 1990 the nature of the Polish consensus on European integration began to change. Conservative, agrarian groupings such as the *PSL* as well as those originating from Solidarity's Catholic-nationalist wing such as the *ZChN* were increasingly confronted with the contradiction between their ideological

¹⁴³ B. Z. Alpan, 'Intellectual and Political 'Europe': Rupture or Continuity in Central Europe', in Central European History and the European Union, ed. S. J. Kirschbaum (Basingstoke 2007), p.145.

emphasis on national sovereignty and the loss of sovereignty that integration with the European Community entailed.

The contradiction between these two aims was rhetorically squared by means of the 'Europe of Nations'. European integration was acceptable as long as it did not impinge upon national sovereignty. Therefore, the Europe Poland integrated with would have to be a 'Europe of Nations', an exclusively economic community of fully sovereign states. In place of adjusting their own rhetoric to the realities of the European Community, the Polish elites adjusted the kind of 'Europe' they wished to integrate with. But they did not address the extent to which their preferred form of European integration differed from the increasingly supranational political, economic and monetary union so prominent on the West European agenda at the time. Rather than present a stance on the sovereignty transfer inherent in extensive use of qualified majority voting, monetary union or the conditionality of the association process parties re-invented Europe into something which did not contradict their nationalist ideological platform: a community of fully sovereign nation states.

Emphasis on Polish Christianity and its historic role as the 'Bulwark of Europe' frequently featured in the rhetoric of the supporters of a 'Europe of Nations'. References were made to Poland's difficult history and its role as the *Antemurale Christianitatis*: the defender of European Christianity against the barbaric East¹⁴⁴. The 'Christian Europe' and 'Europe of Nations' narratives were juxtaposed against the rhetoric of the 'return to Europe'. Poland was not inferior to the West, proponents of 'Christian Europe' implied, it already belonged there and hence had no need to 'return'. Defining Europe and Poland's relationship with it with reference to Christianity enabled the implication that Poland's suffering and sacrifice as the 'bulwark of Europe' and defender of the Christian West meant that Western Europe was indebted to Poland and should support its re-integration efforts. Apart from the fact that Western powers failed to recognize

¹⁴⁴ J. Jedlicki, 'Historical Memory as a Source of Conflicts in Eastern Europe', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 32, (1999), 225-232.

this point of view, what the proponents of the ‘Christian Europe’ rhetoric did not address was that religion was one of the few policy areas excluded from the competences of the European Community.

The vision of Europe advocated by the communist-successor *SdRP* was anything but Christian meanwhile. The *SdRP* emphasized humanism and the enlightenment as key foundations of the European project. The ‘Europe’ presented by the *SdRP* was strikingly different to ‘Christian Europe’ and ‘Europe of Nations’ advocated by their political competitors on the solidarity-successor right. The rhetoric of the ‘return to Europe’ was unavailable to the successors of the *PZPR* by virtue of its implicit rejection of Soviet imposed communism. Although the need to consolidate Polish sovereignty was prominent in *SdRP* electoral materials the transfer of sovereignty inherent in European integration did not appear to present a problem for the *PZPR*’s successors. What the *SdRP* did not address however, was the fact that their interventionist economic policy and opposition to the privatization of large sectors of the economy was in direct contradiction to the foundations of the Single Market and the conditionality of the association agreement.

Although all political actors hence declared support for European integration their consensus was only nominal. Europe proved easy to agree on as long as it was sufficiently ambiguous to be defined according to the parties’ over-all ideological framework. Such rhetoric did not address the changes that were taking place in Western Europe at the time nor their potential impact on Polish sovereignty. Proposals for political union and EMU would significantly limit national sovereignty and lead to growing concerns about the ‘democratic deficit’. Far from a threat to democracy or sovereignty however, the liberal ruling elites saw European integration as a means of consolidating the economic and political transformation and asserting independence from the Soviet Union. The question of whether such extensive sovereignty transfer and policy conditionality required debate in a fully democratically elected parliament did not appear to concern the new decision makers. Poland was still

in the period of 'extraordinary politics'¹⁴⁵ and the decision for closer integration with Western Europe was deemed 'obvious'.

¹⁴⁵ Rose, Amanda. 1999. 'Extraordinary Politics in the Polish Transition.' *Communist and Post Communist Studies* 32:195-210.

Chapter 3

Putting metaphors into practice: the Association Agreement and the growth of euro-scepticism

That was my personal statement. The government did not express itself on this subject and luckily it does not have to express itself, since this matter could lead to its collapse. It is hence only reasonable that I, while speaking of the Maastricht Treaty, clearly emphasize: me, Goryszewski, and not - me, deputy Prime Minister. Then there is no conflict between me and Minister Bielecki.¹⁴⁶

Henryk Goryszewski, deputy leader of the *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe* and Deputy Prime Minister under Hanna Suchocka.

Introduction

By 1991 the difficult association negotiations led many Polish politicians to revise their expectations of European integration. Criticism of the Association Agreement was prominent during 1991 elections and although the treaty was eventually ratified the parliamentary ratification debate reflected growing doubts about the integration project both within the *sejm* and the cabinet.

The Association Treaty had wide ranging implications for the future shape of the Polish transformation. It placed Poland on a path of fast paced trade liberalisation, limiting its ability to protect domestic industries. The requirement to align domestic legislation with the EC law entailed wide ranging legislative adjustment¹⁴⁷ that would be made not on the basis of direct domestic demand but as part of integration with the EC. Further conditionality was introduced with the definition of membership criteria in 1993. Moreover, the EC itself was undergoing a wide ranging transformation with the signing and eventual ratification of the Maastricht treaty, which would significantly increase the body of law Poland would need to adopt to accede.

¹⁴⁶ Henryk Goryszewski, quoted in Artur Domosławski, 'Tajemnica Goryszewskiego', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.254,17/18 October 1992, p. 6.

¹⁴⁷ 'Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Poland, of the other part...', 16 December 1991.

This chapter considers the presentation of association and Copenhagen membership criteria conditionality in Polish political discourse. Was the appeal of the 'return to Europe' powerful enough to sustain commitment to detailed, neo-liberal economic policy and extensive legislative alignment even before the Polish electorate was able to elect a fully democratic legislature? Or could euro-sceptic dissent already be heard among Poland's newly elected parliamentarians? If consensus in favour of European integration existed then what was the basis of this consensus and did it address the wide ranging commitments made in the Europe Agreement? Did Polish political discourse reflect the changes that took place in the West European institutional framework and what, if any, was the Polish elites' response to the EU membership conditions?

The time period under consideration in this chapter starts with the appointment of the Jan Krzysztof Bielecki in January 1991 and ends with the collapse of the Suchocka coalition in the summer of 1993. The first two sections will present the domestic and foreign policy context during this period. Section three will address relations between Poland and the European Communities. Section four will consider the political discourse on European integration during the Bielecki cabinet, in the course of the 1991 parliamentary contest and during the Olszewski and Suchocka cabinets including the parliamentary debates on association and regional policy.

Domestic developments

The years from 1991 to 1993 were a turbulent period in Polish politics. In the span of less than two years Poland saw four prime ministers: Jan Krzysztof Bielecki from January 1991 to December 1991, Jan Olszewski from December 1991 to June 1992, Waldemar Pawlak for a short 33 days in June 1992 and finally Hanna Suchocka from July 1992 to October 1993.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ Millard, *Anatomy of the New Poland*, p84-103.

The 1991 presidential contest brought about not only a new president in the person of Lech Wałęsa but also a new prime minister, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, a former Solidarity adviser, businessman and member of the Liberal Democratic Congress (*Kongres Liberalno Demokratyczny, KLD*), who was appointed following Tadeusz Mazowiecki's December 1990 resignation.

The make-up of the parliament remained the same for almost another year. Poland's first fully free parliamentary election eventually took place in October 1991 and resulted in a highly fragmented parliament with almost 30 political groupings attaining representation to eventually form 17 parliamentary clubs. The fragmented *sejm* made government formation a challenging and prolonged task. Neither the *Unia Demokratyczna* nor any of the other Solidarity-successor groupings were willing to form a coalition with the communist-successor *SLD*. Allowing the communists back into government only two years after Solidarity's 1989 land-slide victory would have represented a resounding defeat for the former dissidents. Lengthy discussions between President Wałęsa and the Solidarity-successors ensued and a cabinet was eventually formed on 23 December 1991 under the leadership of Jan Olszewski. The coalition included *Porozumienie Centrum*, the *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*, several unaffiliated MP's, and three small agrarian groupings.¹⁴⁹ The coalition configuration meant that the relatively small and politically conservative *ZChN* held much more power than its 8% of the vote could be expected to warrant.¹⁵⁰ It did not help matters that the new Prime Minister did not benefit from the support of the President, who would have preferred a less independent minded head of government.

Having only limited control over the parliament and plagued by conflicts between coalition members and with the President, the Olszewski government did not last long. On 4 June 1991 Antoni Macierewicz, Minister of the Interior, issued lists of supposed communist collaborators that included several senior

¹⁵⁰ V. Zubek, 'The Fragmentation of Poland's Political Party System', Communist and Post Communist Studies, 26, 1 (1993), 47-71, p63.

members of the cabinet as well as the President. Wałęsa withdrew support for the cabinet that very evening and the government fell the following day.

After a failed attempt at cabinet formation by the leader of *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, Waldemar Pawlak,¹⁵¹ the post of Prime Minister was entrusted to Hanna Suchocka of the *Unia Demokratyczna*. Suchocka's grand coalition resulted in an even more diverse cabinet than that of Olszewski. It included the *UD*, the *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*, two agrarian groupings as well as the liberal-democrat Polish Economic Programme (*Polski Program Gospodarczy, PPG*).¹⁵²

Policy differences quickly emerged between the interventionist peasant parties and the laissez-faire liberals. European integration proved a salient point of dissent between the pro-integrationist *Unia Demokratyczna* and the euro-sceptic *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*. By the summer of 1993, voting discipline became increasingly unreliable. Eventually, the government fell as a result of a motion of no-confidence tabled by Solidarity. Wałęsa called for new elections to be scheduled in September 1993. Nonetheless, Hanna Suchocka introduced a number of successful reforms, the most relevant being the so-called 'Little Constitution', which provided an interim solution until work on the new constitution was finalized¹⁵³.

The turbulent political situation evolved in the context of an ongoing economic crisis¹⁵⁴ and subsequent cabinets of the early 1990 were confronted with increasing pressure to ease the restrictive fiscal and monetary policies.¹⁵⁵ The

¹⁵¹ K. Jasiewicz, 'Polish Politics on the Eve of the 1993 Elections: Toward Fragmentation or Pluralism?', *Communist and Post Communist Studies*, 26, 4 (1993), 387-411.

¹⁵² Millard, *Anatomy of the New Poland*, p105-106.

¹⁵³ F. Millard, 'The Polish Parliamentary Election of September, 1993', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 27, 3 (1994), 295-313; Millard, 1994, p105-106.

¹⁵⁴ Adam, Jan. 1999. *Social Costs of Transformation to a Market Economy in Post-Socialist Countries. The Cases of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary*. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, p23.

¹⁵⁵ Slay.

downturn was reversed only in 1993 but real wages continued to be significantly lower than before 1989 and unemployment remained high.¹⁵⁶

Foreign policy

Western leaders' reticence to make firm commitments on the post-communist states' membership in Western structures and their hard bargaining approach during association negotiations¹⁵⁷ dispelled East European illusions about extensive financial support and swift integration with both the EC and NATO. Nonetheless, significant steps were made towards integration into the EC as well as other Western and regional structures.

The establishment of formal relations with NATO proceeded slowly. Presented with Russian opposition, Western leaders stalled the NATO integration process in spite of Poland's and other post-communist countries intensive lobbying efforts.¹⁵⁸ Matters were complicated further when Lech Wałęsa, without consulting either the minister of Foreign Affairs or the prime minister,¹⁵⁹ publicly announced his NATO-bis proposal as an alternative to Poland's NATO entry.¹⁶⁰

Better progress was made in re-defining relations with other Western and regional structures. On 10 December 1992 Poland entered the European Free Trade Association and on 21 December 1992 the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) Treaty was signed. A February 1991 meeting of Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovak leaders in the Hungarian town of Visegrad led to the establishment of the Visegrad group. Apart from national independence, democratic consolidation, economic reform and human rights, the Visegrad

¹⁵⁶ Adam, p23.

¹⁵⁷ Wallace, 'Does the EU have an Ostpolitiek?', p51.

¹⁵⁸ 'Suchocka o polityce zagranicznej, NATO, otwórz się!' Gazeta Wyborcza, 9 January 1993, nr 204, p2.

¹⁵⁹ Olszewski, Jan. Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o podstawowych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski, 14 March 2002, 16th session, day 2, point 11. The content of all parliamentary debates after the contract sejm onwards is available on the sejm on-line archive:

<http://sejm.gov.pl/archiwum/arch2.html> under the menu path: Prace Sejmu - Sprawozdania Stenograficzne.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with Lech Wałęsa, 1 September 2005, 'Samotność prezydenta', Gazeta Wyborcza, nr 242, 14 October 1992, p3.

group's key aim was 'total integration into the European political, economic, security, and legislative order.'¹⁶¹ Polish and other post-communist leaders were unequivocally set on a course of total economic, political and legal integration with Western structures from the earliest stages of the transformation, even before a fully free domestic parliamentary contest could be held.

The most significant step in Poland's European integration made during this period however was Association with the EC. Association was formally proposed by Krzysztof Skubiszewski in December 1989, following informal discussions during a visit of European Commission President Jacques Delors to Warsaw. Initially, the EC was slow to react but in April 1990 the European Council declared the intention to complete association agreements with the post-communist states¹⁶² and issued a set of conditions Poland was to fulfil before the association negotiations could begin.¹⁶³ These included democratic elections, progress in economic and political reforms, introduction of the rule of law, and respect for human rights. Poland applied for associate membership of the EC on 25 May 1990. On the 21 June 1990 it submitted the 'Memorandum of the Government of the Republic of Poland concerning the Principles of the Association of Poland with the European Economic Community', which contained a draft Association Agreement. A key part of the memorandum was the assertion that Polish membership in the EC was the ultimate goal of the association process. Section 4 of the agreement stated: 'Association would last until the year 2000 and would, after this date, lead to Poland's accession to the Community'.¹⁶⁴ The Commission's response was unenthusiastic however and the EC refused to formally commit to enlargement. At this stage Western leaders still lacked a well-thought out strategy to respond to the potential opportunities of political and economic transformation and the threats posed by

¹⁶¹ S. Meiklejohn Terry, 'Poland's Foreign Policy since 1989: the Challenges of Independence', *Communist and Post Communist Studies*, 33, (2000), 7-47, p12-13.

¹⁶² J. Borkowski, 'Strategia Integracji Polski z UE', in *Integracja Europejska. Wybrane Problemy.*, ed. D. Milczarek and A. Nowak, (Warszawa 2003), 613-631, p616.

¹⁶³ Mayhew, p21.

¹⁶⁴ Memorandum Rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Sprawie Zasad Stowarzyszenia Polski z Europejską Współnotą Gospodarczą, 21 July, 1990, *Zbiór Dokumentów*, nr.3, 1990.

the perceived security vacuum and possibility of mass migration and growth of crime.¹⁶⁵

Following informal talks with the Mazowiecki cabinet in July 1990, the European Commission established a Permanent Delegation in Warsaw in September 1990; and on 18 December 1990 the Council of Ministers granted a mandate for the Association negotiations to the European Commission. The first round of negotiations between the EC and Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic started on 22 December 1990.¹⁶⁶

The negotiations did not proceed smoothly. The EC did not agree to formally commit to enlargement or to a full customs union. The Community had no desire to open its vulnerable markets to cheap imports from Eastern Europe. It was agreed that a free trade area, incorporating an 'asymmetry principle' in Poland's favour, would be established: the EC would lower its import barriers for Polish goods at a faster rate than Poland would lower its barriers to imports from European Community member states. The extent of the 'asymmetry' proved contentious however. The Poles were most concerned with steel, textiles and agriculture, which constituted a significant part of the country's GDP. But the EC imposed quotas on steel and textile imports; these were to be renegotiated each year with the goal of abolishing them completely after ten years. Most agricultural and fisheries produce were excluded from the agreement.

The financial protocol formed another difficult part of the negotiations. Proposed by the Polish side, the protocol was intended to establish an institutional framework for the financial assistance provided to Poland by the EC.¹⁶⁷ The Poles argued that financial assistance was needed to compensate for the economic inequalities between the associating parties and would provide

¹⁶⁵ Mayhew, p13.

¹⁶⁶ Interview with Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, 21 July 2005.

¹⁶⁷ M. Tabor, 'Dynamika i Uwarunkowania Procesu Negocjacji Układu Europejskiego', in *Polska w Procesie Integracji z Współnotami Europejskimi*, ed. W. N. PWN (Warsaw 1994), p54.

for the implementation of the Association Agreement. However, the EC did not agree to commit to long-term financial aid and the levels of assistance had to be re-negotiated each year.

The association process was structured to allow for the gradual re-negotiation of trade barriers between Poland and the EC. Once the Treaty was put in place annual talks would be held between the Commission and the Associate states. The fact that EC was not willing to sign different agreements with the three applicants was an additional hurdle.

The talks stalled in the summer of 1991. Poland had raised tariffs on food imports in May 1991 and the European Community retaliated by banning imports of Polish lamb.¹⁶⁸ Relations between Poland and the EC became increasingly strained and the talks were almost suspended in July 1991, during the sixth round. The centre of the controversy was the asymmetry principle and the EC's insistence on maintaining full quotas on steel and textiles for the entire ten year association period.¹⁶⁹ According to simulation studies, access to the Polish, Czechoslovakian and Hungarian markets would bring 1.4% growth in the EEC economies by 1993.¹⁷⁰ The Polish side felt that given this, as well as the Eastern applicants' limited access to Community agriculture, steel and textiles markets, made the agreement disadvantageous for the post-communist states.¹⁷¹

Initially the EC, and in particular France, was unwilling to compromise.¹⁷² But by 20 August 1991 the General Affairs Council confirmed the EC's desire to quickly finalise the Association Agreements, a decision which may have been precipitated by the Moscow Putsch of 19 August 1991.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸ 'Targi z EWG', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 2-3 May 1991.

¹⁶⁹ 'Warunki dla EWG', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 22 March 1991.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ Barbara Sieradzka, quoted in 'Do EWG Na naszych Warunkach', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 26 July 1991

¹⁷² Marcin Frybes, 'Polska Zrzujuje Rolnictwo Europy' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 9 September 1991, p.6, 'Polskie Mięso do EWG i ZSRR', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 1 October 1991.

¹⁷³ Interview with Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, 21 July 2005; Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, interviewed by Krzysztof Bobiński and Marek Saryusz-Wolski, *Polska i Unia*, nr.4, Styczeń 1999.

Agreement on the trade issues was eventually reached in October 1991 during the seventh round of the talks. The final association calendar included the establishment of a full free trade area within ten years, the lifting of most tariffs on industrial products by the time of treaty implementation and of all tariffs by 1996, and an end to EC quotas by the time of implementation with the exception of textile quotes which would be lifted within five years. The quotas on agricultural exports were limited and it was agreed that a 50% increase could take place in the following five years. Eventually, most of the trade barriers were lifted sooner than was expected. But the EC's hard bargaining approach fuelled euro-sceptic sentiments among Poland's political elites.

The 'Europe Agreement' was signed on 16 December 1991 but came into force in its entirety only on 1 February 1994, over two years after it was signed. The treaty had to be ratified by all twelve EC member states, which at the time were busy ratifying the Maastricht Treaty. In order for the sections on trade to come into force sooner an Interim Agreement on Trade was signed and implemented on 1 March 1992, without prior ratification by either the Polish or the member states' parliaments. A key part of the Association Treaty was hence implemented without parliamentary debate or assent.

By opening access to EC markets, association generated growth in the Polish economy.¹⁷⁴ But the agreement has also come under much criticism for excluding or limiting EC market access for Poland's most competitive sectors such as steel and textiles, which would only attain full market access in January 1998 and agriculture, which was excluded from the agreement.¹⁷⁵ Although the asymmetry structured into the agreement meant that the EC lifted trade barriers sooner than the East European states, the reduction in trade barriers was introduced at the slowest pace where Poland had the biggest export

¹⁷⁴ B. Kamiński, 'The Europe Agreements and Transition: Unique Returns from Integrating into the European Union', in *Between Past and Future: The Revolution of 1989 and Their Aftermath* ed. A. Sorin, Vladimir (Budapest 2000).

¹⁷⁵ Z. Wysokińska, 'Konkurencyjność Polskich Przedsiębiorstw na Rynku Unii Europejskiej - Szanse i Zagrożenia', in *Jednolity Rynek a Działania Dostosowawcze Polskich Przedsiębiorstw*, ed. P. Pasieczny (Warsaw 1998), 23-40, p26.

potential¹⁷⁶ and substantial barriers against some of Poland's most competitive sectors continued for five years after the signing of the treaty.¹⁷⁷ As well as curtailing access for key exports the agreement also limited Poland's ability to protect its nascent industries. The interim agreement, introduced in March 1992, included the so-called standstill principle, which prohibited signatories from introducing new import tariffs or any other measures with similar effects such as quotas and export subsidies.¹⁷⁸ The competition policy clauses were particularly detailed, establishing deadlines for the introduction of necessary legislation.¹⁷⁹ Given the depth of economic recession Poland was in at the time the strict timetable gave Polish manufacturers little time to restructure.¹⁸⁰ Association also significantly curtailed the states' ability to intervene in the economy. Article 63 prohibited all state aid which distorted or threatened to distort competition by establishing preferred treatment for individual enterprises and could thereby adversely affect free trade between Poland and the EC.¹⁸¹ Derogations of this rule were allowed under exceptional circumstances with the approval of the European Commission¹⁸² but in spite of these association meant that at a stage where the Polish economy was very much in flux the state's ability to use interventionist measures for the nascent private sector and for the restructuring of state owned enterprise was significantly curtailed.

Another key implication of the association treaty arose from articles 68 to 50. These established that the gradual harmonization of Polish law with the European body of law, or the *acquis communautaire*, was a key condition of

¹⁷⁶ Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Implications of Poland's Association with the European Communities for Poland's Economy: Preliminary Assessment', p3.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, p4.

¹⁷⁸ Wysokińska, p24.

¹⁷⁹ Mayhew, p50.

¹⁸⁰ Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Implications of Poland's Association with the European Communities for Poland's Economy: Preliminary Assessment', p5.

¹⁸¹ K. Karpus, 'Polskie specjalne strefy ekonomiczne w świetle standardów Unii Europejskiej dotyczących idzielenia pomocy publicznej', in Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Bilans Otwarcia., ed. J. Marszałek-Kawa (Toruń 2005), 155-163, p157.

¹⁸² Ibid, p157.

economic integration with the Community.¹⁸³ The *acquis* consisted of the European treaties, international agreements concluded by the Community, legal acts adopted by Community institutions, regulations, which were legal acts directly applicable to member state legislation, directives, obliging domestic legislators to adapt internal laws to the provisions stipulated in them; and recommendations and opinions, which although non-binding were to be taken into account in domestic law enforcement process.¹⁸⁴ The exact role of European legislation in domestic legal systems differs among member states and the process of referral of cases from the domestic arena to the European Court of Justice has not always proceeded smoothly. But the scope of EC law and its impact on the citizens' of the member states has remained significant. This was especially the case in the context of systemic transformation, where legislation suited to a capitalist economy was lacking in many policy areas. Association hence had a large scale impact on the Polish legal system and the nature of economic reform. Unilateral adjustment to European trade legislation did minimize the opportunity costs of remaining outside the EC economy. But much of the sovereignty that would formally be lost through accession was already transferred to the EC without the benefits of membership.¹⁸⁵

The Association Treaty did include a political co-operation element. An institutional framework made up of Association Councils and Committees at ministerial, parliamentary and official levels was established to encourage political dialogue on wide range of issues of mutual concern such as foreign policy, security, international crime, and environment. But from the view point of the associated states this was a poor substitute for membership.¹⁸⁶

Association did not provide for access to structural and CAP funding or allow individuals to work in EC member states, all of critical importance for the

¹⁸³ A. Harasimowicz, 'Aspekty Polityczne Stowarzyszenia Polski ze Wspolnotami Europejskimi', in Polska w Procesie Integracji ze Wspolnotami Europejskimi, ed. Z. Wysokińska (Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 1994), p13.

¹⁸⁴ Szpunar, p97.

¹⁸⁵ Vachudova, p67.

¹⁸⁶ J. Gower, 'EU Policy to Central and Eastern Europe', in Back to Europe. Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, ed. K. Henderson (London 1999), p5-6.

CEECs. A dispute resolution procedure was introduced for instances where the Association Councils were unable to reach agreement however this was not part of the interim agreement and was implemented only after both Poland and the EC member states ratified the agreement. Another criticism of the association process was that the extensive legislative change it brought about was not subject to sufficient oversight from domestic legislatures. A Parliamentary Association Committee was established from representatives of the *sejm*, senate and the European Parliament but it had no decision making rights and its role was limited to being kept informed about the implementation of the agreement and making recommendations.¹⁸⁷ The lack of parliamentary oversight was further exacerbated by the fact that the Interim Agreement, containing the majority of the high impact trade measures, was implemented without parliamentary ratification.

Implementation of association requirements began soon after the *sejm* ratified the treaty. The June 1992 ratification debate resulted in a piece of legislation obliging the government to present a programme of action to align the Polish economy with association requirements and a separate programme for legal harmonization with the Association Treaty, which identified specific tasks for ministries and central agencies.¹⁸⁸

The two programmes were accepted in November 1992 and January 1993 respectively.¹⁸⁹ The *sejm* also called for rapid action to protect the Polish economy from sudden and unfair competition¹⁹⁰, a request which reflected the sceptical tone of the debate and Polish elites' growing concerns about the advantages of association.

As the Association Agreements came into force, relations between Poland and the European Community became increasingly strained. In spite of the

¹⁸⁷ Harasimowicz, p.20.

¹⁸⁸ H. Kuzinska, 'Integracja Polski z Unią Europejską. Harmonizacja Podatków Pośrednich i Bezpośrednich.', in Jednolity Rynek a Działania Dostosowawcze Polskich Przedsiębiorstw, ed. M. Kamiński (Warszawa 1998), p107.

¹⁸⁹ Borkowski, p618.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, p622.

asymmetry principle, the growth of Polish exports to the Community continued to slow throughout 1993. In 1990 Polish exports to the EC grew by 43% but in 1992 they only rose by 9.7%. Imports from the EC grew faster than Polish exports and a negative trade balance developed. Matters did not improve when the EU threatened to implement stricter sanitary control measures for Polish agricultural products in response to Poland's introduction of import payments on agricultural goods.¹⁹¹ In May 1993 the EU refused a loan of ECU 1 billion applied for by the Suchocka government in October 1992.¹⁹² Shortly thereafter the Commission introduced anti-dumping tariffs on steel imports from the associated countries.¹⁹³ Poland's introduction of a 6% import tax, in violation of the association treaty's standstill principle¹⁹⁴ caused more friction.

The Poles felt that the agricultural restrictions were of a political nature rather than based on genuine sanitary concerns. They also claimed that several EC states continued to impose import restrictions in spite of the trade agreement being in force since March 1992.¹⁹⁵ Meanwhile, several member states delayed the Association Treaty ratification, which prevented the introduction of a formal trade dispute resolution system.¹⁹⁶ The Poles found themselves in a no-win situation. The non-ratification of the Association Agreement prevented the new associates from making a formal complaint as well as from developing an early warning system on trade barriers. As the Interim Agreement had been in effect since March 1992 however, Polish markets were already open to EC exporters.

The difficult association negotiations resulted in marked scepticism about the European project on the right side of the Polish political spectrum. Calls for a renegotiation of the Association Treaty could be heard with increasing

¹⁹¹ Waldemar Kumor, 'Polska - Wspólnota Europejska. Niepokój w obrotach' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 08 April 1993, nr 83, p15.

¹⁹² 'Miliarda nie Będzie' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.106, 8 May 1993.

¹⁹³ Małgorzata Alterman, 'Stal i Ratyfikacja' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.55, 06 March 1993.

¹⁹⁴ Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Implications of Poland's Association with the European Communities for Poland's Economy: Preliminary Assessment', , p10.

¹⁹⁵ 'Pryszczycy, Kwarantanna na Watpliwości', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.121, 26 May 1993.

¹⁹⁶ Jacek Pawlicki, 'Podchody z Europą', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.121, 26 May 1993.

frequency from groupings such as *Porozumienie Centrum* and the *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*. The Solidarity trade union also criticised the Association Agreement and its leader, Marian Krzaklewski proposed that the treaty should be signed only if clauses protecting trade union rights were included. This proposal did not prove effective however, as it was made in May 1993, some 18 months after the treaty was actually signed.¹⁹⁷ Apart from manifesting the extent of Krzaklewski's scepticism about the benefits of association this statement also exemplified Polish politicians' limited knowledge of the integration process.

In June 1992, following the Copenhagen summit, the EC finally made a formal commitment to enlargement, declaring that 'the associated countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union' and issued the long awaited membership criteria¹⁹⁸. Three main accession criteria were specified. Firstly, candidate states had to have stable democratic institutions protecting the rule of law, human rights and the rights of minorities. Secondly, they were to have functioning market economies and the capacity to deal with the competitive pressures of market forces within the Union. Thirdly, they were expected to adhere to the *acquis communautaire*, or the EU's body of law. Also, the Union's capacity to absorb new members was described as an 'important consideration' in the enlargement process.¹⁹⁹ But no definition of a 'functioning market economy', 'stable democratic institutions' or 'competitive pressures' was provided at this stage. As Heather Grabbe observed, the vague nature of these criteria enabled the EU to set targets for the new entrants which were often more demanding than those required of existing members. In effect, they allowed the EU to set an ever changing benchmark for the candidate countries.²⁰⁰ Moreover, much to the disappointment of the

¹⁹⁷Robert Soltyk, 'Związek podstawia nogę', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.122, 27 May 1993, p12.

¹⁹⁸Gower, p7.

¹⁹⁹'Documents from the Session of the European Council in Copenhagen (excerpts), Copenhagen, June 21-22, 1993', *Zbiór Dokumentów*, nr. 3, 1993.

²⁰⁰Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes, *Eastward Enlargement of the European Union* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997).

prospective entrants, the Copenhagen summit failed to provide the sought-after enlargement timetable.

The accession criteria were a tall order. Poland would not only have to align its political, judiciary and economic structures with those of the EU but it would also have to harmonize its legal system with the entire European *acquis*. The EU decided to use the so-called classical approach to enlargement, where the applicant state is expected to complete alignment with EU structures prior to accession. There was a significant difference between the bargaining involved in EU membership negotiations and those normally carried out between two international partners. The point of the talks would not be to attain agreement on the terms of accession; these were not negotiable. The purpose of the negotiations was to establish how and when the applicant would attain membership and whether they would be allowed to delay the implementation of a (relatively small) part of the *acquis* until after accession.²⁰¹ The potential use of transition periods did provide some limited flexibility for the applicant but the scope of policy where transition could be negotiated was too minimal to make any real difference to the non-negotiable nature of the accession project.²⁰²

In parallel to completing association negotiations West European leaders were busy finalising negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, formally known as the Treaty on the European Union (TEU). TEU negotiations were completed in December 1991 and the treaty was signed in February 1992. A prolonged ratification process followed with an unsettling no vote from the Danish electorate, remedied by treaty adjustments and a second Danish referendum.²⁰³

Maastricht established the so-called three pillar structure which included the European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) pillars. Although decision making in the latter

²⁰¹ Avery and Fraser, p32.

²⁰² Interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, 14 January 2002.

²⁰³ W. Nicoll, 'Maastricht Revisited: A Critical Analysis of the Treaty on European Union', in *The State of the European Community. The Maastricht Debates and Beyond*, ed. A. Cafurny, Glenda G. (Harlow 1993), 19-34, p.23.

two pillars remained primarily intergovernmental the European Union framework had significantly greater competences and influence on domestic policy than its predecessor. The TEU was also an important step in the implementation of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which was part of the Community pillar²⁰⁴ and the Maastricht treaty included the economic convergence criteria required for the implementation of the common currency. Many of the member states' monetary policy competences were transferred to the European level. Fiscal policy however remained uneasily positioned between Brussels and the member states, and the EU's social policy competences remained limited. Maastricht hence significantly broadened the scope of the *acquis* which the aspiring entrants would have to adopt²⁰⁵.

European integration in political debate

Association, the establishment of the Copenhagen membership criteria and the internal changes which the European Communities underwent with Maastricht would all have significant impact on Polish domestic policy and shape its political and economic transformation. The issue of European integration was prominent in party political rhetoric of the period. It was a frequent topic of discussion during parliamentary debate and featured in the electoral materials of all major groupings contesting the 1991 parliamentary elections. But while scepticism about European integration and especially the terms of the association treaty was prominent the language of the debate remained abstract. Debates on association ratification and regional policy made it apparent that parliamentarians either had limited knowledge of the technicalities of European integration or purposefully elected not to explicitly address key policy implications of association and the extensive alignment required for accession.

²⁰⁴ K. McNamara, 'Economic and Monetary Union', in Policy Making in the European Union, ed. H. e. a. Wallace (Oxford 2005), p157.

²⁰⁵ H. Wallace, 'Coming to Terms with a Larger Europe: Options for Economic Integration'.

The 1991 parliamentary elections

The 1991 elections were post-communist Poland's first fully democratic parliamentary contest. Following a lengthy debate on the electoral system ordination, a highly proportional option was chosen, which resulted in twenty-nine parties attaining parliamentary representation. A low turnout of 43.2%²⁰⁶ reflected public disappointment with the results of economic reform.

The two most successful parties were *Unia Demokratyczna* and *Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*, both of which attained 12% of the vote. They were closely followed by *Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka* (Catholic Electoral Action, WAK), a Catholic-nationalist coalition established under the leadership of the *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*, which obtained just under 9%. *Porozumienie Centrum*, *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej*, *Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny* and *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* all attained approximately 8% of the vote while *Solidarność* achieved a disappointing 5%.²⁰⁷

The communist-successor *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* aimed to represent the interests of Poland's impoverished farmers. The PSL declared its main aims to be the defence of Polish national interests, consolidation of parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, economic growth, and the protection of those most disadvantaged by the transformation. The Agrarians argued that to achieve real sovereignty Poland needed a strong market economy that incorporated principles of social solidarity. They also 'rejected dogmatic monetarism and the unquestioned worship of the market'²⁰⁸ advocating tax reductions, state guarantees for foreign investors, customs tariffs, import preferences for new technology, and a pragmatic approach to the budget deficit.

²⁰⁶ Frances Millard, *Polish Politics and Society* (Routledge: London, 1999), p84.

²⁰⁷ Ibid, p85.

²⁰⁸ Program Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego 1991, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1991 election folder.

The *PSL* repeatedly called for state protection for the agricultural sector, which it believed to have been disadvantaged by the transformation process. The farmer, according to the *PSL*, was integral in ensuring the survival of Poland's national identity.²⁰⁹ The Agrarians advocated state aid for agriculture and called on the government not to: 'escape from the responsibility...for the protection of the family farm from competition from the amply subsidized farming sectors of developed countries'.²¹⁰

European integration presented a dilemma for the *PSL*. While envious of their highly subsidized Western counterparts, Polish farmers were predominantly conservative, religious, patriotic, and distrustful of the European Community. The *PSL* hence had to weigh up the prospect of substantial financial rewards they believed EC membership would bring, in the form of subsidies, against the perceived threat to Polish sovereignty and national identity posed by the atheist 'cosmopolitans' from Brussels.

It should not be surprising therefore that the *PSL*'s programme did not present a clear stance on European integration. While welcoming financial aid from the EC, the agrarians were concerned about the threat which integration might pose to Poland's national identity. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was presented as an effective method of improving the quality of life in rural regions. The programme stated: 'Let us recall that the history of the European Economic Community began with the Common Agricultural Policy, from raising the living standards of the most discriminated group...that is the farmers'.²¹¹ However, only several sentences later it declared: 'The Poland which we want is not a Poland representing a narrow group of wealthy and worldly Europeans, but it is a Poland which strives for wealth in a spirit of solidarity'.²¹² While it wished to make use of the EC's agricultural subsidies, 'Europe' and

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Ibid.

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Ibid.

‘Europeans’ was not something the *PSL* wanted to be identified with. The *PSL*’s programme stated further:

Following the liberalisation of trade between the EEC and Poland it is necessary to urgently establish measures for the movement of capital and technology from the EEC to Poland, and of labour – from Poland to the EEC, as well as implement a compensation programme for the industry and agriculture, to be financed among others by international organizations and institutions. The deepening integration with Western Europe also cannot mean the loss of Polish national and cultural values.²¹³

For the Agrarians the European Community was hence useful in so far as it was going to be financially beneficial. The *PSL*’s stance on Europe was consistently ambiguous. On the one hand, it presented the costly and inefficient CAP as an example for Polish policy makers. On the other, it placated its conservative electorate with vocal expressions of concern for the impact of accession on Polish national identity, Catholic morality and culture.

Porozumienie Centrum declared the building of a ‘strong, democratic and fully independent Poland’ as its primary policy aim. During its first congress in May 1991 the *PC* transformed itself into a traditional, member based party and attempted to develop an ideological identity focused on Christian Democratic, centre right ideals.²¹⁴ International security and the consolidation of newly regained national sovereignty were now at the top of its agenda. Its programme stated:

We put Polish national interest as the first priority. We are not satisfied with the status of a buffer state, located in an insecure, in-between region. We do not agree to Poland’s old and new dependencies. We also cannot accept the stationing of foreign military on the territory of our country. We believe that seeking a third way between the West and the East is a dangerous mistake exposing our country to isolation and submission to foreign interests.

²¹³ Ibid.

²¹⁴ Bale, p27.

Security and Poland's civilisational development are attainable only in the context of West European communities and alliances.²¹⁵

The *Porozumienie*'s pro-integrationist stance was motivated primarily by national security concerns rather than by any economic benefits that could be derived from EC association or membership. The emphasis on preserving Polish sovereignty and independence appeared to contradict the PC's support for EC membership, which entailed a transfer of power away from the nation state.

Like the *PSL*, *Porozumienie Centrum* was hence also confronted with a dilemma. It strove to consolidate its anti-communist, Solidarity-successor identity by distancing itself from the former Soviet Union. The only viable way of achieving this however, short of regional isolation, was integration with Western Europe. However, the scope of the European Community's policy remit was becoming increasingly broad, encompassing areas such as monetary policy and justice and home affairs. Membership in the post-Maastricht European Union entailed a significant transfer of competences to Brussels. The former dissidents now had a predicament: they could not advocate closer cooperation with the post-Soviet states as this would put in question their Solidarity-successor roots, but they were also uneasy with the prospect of surrendering Poland's newly regained sovereignty to the EU. Consequently, their stance on European integration became increasingly ambiguous. Although they declared support for membership in the EU, they presented the Union as a largely inter-governmentalist, conservative and above all, Christian organisation. Rather than acknowledge that membership in the Union entailed a transfer of power away from the member states, they declared support for an EU which did not impinge on its members' sovereignty.

²¹⁵ Program Porozumienia Centrum 1991, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1991 election folder.

The *PC* frequently emphasised the importance of Polish Catholicism. It advocated cooperation between Church and state and defined its electorate as Christian. Its programme declared: 'We count on that part of society which has retained an awareness of Poland's Christian traditions and which is ready to build the prosperity of the Polish Republic on the lasting values given to us by Christianity'.²¹⁶ The Europe in which the *PC* wanted Poland to participate was founded on Christian values. It proclaimed that: 'the place of a sovereign and safe Poland is in a Europe shaped by Christian and democratic values'.²¹⁷

The emphasis on religion served to distance *Porozumienie Centrum* from the atheist successors of the communist regime. It also allowed the *PC* to express support for European integration while retaining the patriotic and religious rhetoric associated with the anti-communist opposition. For the *Porozumienie Centrum*, European integration was acceptable as long as it did not threaten the traditional, deeply religious Polish national identity; it did not pose a threat as long as it was founded on Christian values. There was no room for diversity in the *PC*'s rhetoric: the only Europe it could support was a Christian one.

Religion played a prominent role in the 1991 electoral campaign and the Church actively supported Catholic, Solidarity-successor groupings.²¹⁸ One such vocally religious contender was the *Wyborcza Akcja Katolicka*, which united parties calling for the Polish state to be organized according to Roman Catholic doctrine. *WAK*'s biggest participant was *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*²¹⁹ and most of its smaller member organizations, such as the Christian Citizen's Movement and the Union of Catholic Laity, eventually merged into *ZChN*. *WAK* advocated close relations between the Church and state and emphasized the special role played by the Polish Catholic Church in the country's history: 'In our difficult history, in shaping our culture, the Catholic Church has played

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ 'Do Wyborców', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 18 September 1991, p5, 'Wyborcza Tajemnica Kościoła', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 07 November 1991, p15.

²¹⁹ Millard, *Anatomy of the New Poland*, p34.

a special role. This cannot be forgotten'.²²⁰ In home affairs WAK proposed a strong presidency with the right to rule by decree, the criminalisation of abortion and extensive anti-corruption measures. It also called for thorough de-communisation and retribution for 'crimes against the Polish nation' committed by members of the communist regime. In respect to economic policy WAK supported a free market economy, protection for domestic industry and agriculture, and measures which would allow women not to participate in the labour force.

WAK's programme made no reference to the EU. It declared support for Poland's inclusion in 'the Europe-wide security system' but no mention was made of membership or association with the European Union. The only reference to 'Europe' could be found in point 29 of WAK's programme summary which called for 'Poland in a Europe of equal nations'.²²¹ The on-going debate about Europe within the ZChN²²², WAK's founding organisation, may form part of an explanation for the lack of clarity on accession in the Catholic Electoral Action's programme.

Although it defined itself as 'right wing' *Solidarność* advocated extensive redistribution and state subsidies for the failing heavy industry.²²³ It described its philosophy as based on the social teaching of the Catholic Church. Its main postulates included active social and industrial policy, privatization, a new constitution as well as measures to prevent unemployment. The programme only made very limited reference to foreign policy calling for a 'consolidation of Poland's sovereignty and independence'. At this stage no reference was made to NATO or the European Community.²²⁴

²²⁰ Program Wyborczy Katolickiej Akcji Wyborczej, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1991 election folder.

²²¹ Ibid.

²²² Interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, 14 January 2002.

²²³ 'NSZZ Solidarność - Region Mazowsze. Apel' 1991, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1991 election folder.

²²⁴ Ibid.

The *Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny* was established in June 1990 by a group of liberal dissidents from Gdańsk. Led by Janusz Lewandowski and his deputy, Donald Tusk, the *KLD* executive also included the future Prime Minister, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki. The Congress advocated liberal economic policy and backed Leszek Balcerowicz's 'shock therapy' reforms. The programme focused on civil liberties, emphasising individual freedom and the right to private property. The Congress was enthusiastically pro-integrationist. Bielecki, both as Prime Minister and later as Minister for European Integration enthusiastically supported membership of the EC and NATO, and the grouping often affirmed its support for European integration. The *KLD*'s euro-enthusiasm was perhaps best encapsulated by the cover of its programme. It presented Bielecki, complete with business suit and white gloves, stepping across the map of Europe, one foot still in Poland, caught in a hunter's trap, the aimed firmly at the region covering France and Germany but here labelled simply 'Europe'.²²⁵

Unia Demokratyczna's programme focused primarily on the economy. It advocated an active social policy, pension reforms, housing sector development and environmental protection. While supportive of private entrepreneurship the *UD* called for state enterprises to be given the opportunity to prove whether they could be profitable. It asserted that Christian values should form the basis of the Polish state. Its main programme did not specify a stance on either the European Community or NATO.²²⁶

Konfederacja Polski Niepodlegiej continued to focus on retribution against the communist regime. Its programme was critical of the post-1989 cabinets and called for radical change in both domestic and foreign policy. Regarding the economy, the *KPN* advocated measures to prevent inflation and unemployment, adequate wages, and a diversified, free-market economy. It

²²⁵ J. Holc, 'Liberalism and the Construction of the Democratic Subject in Postcommunism: the Case of Poland', *Slavic Review*, 56, 3 (Autumn 1997), 401-427, p417.

²²⁶ Program Wyborczy Unii Demokratycznej, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1991 election folder.

also argued that unemployment could be prevented by putting an end to what it described as the 'over-employment' of women.

The *KPN* claimed that the former Soviet bloc countries would be refused entry into West European organisations and should therefore develop their own regional cooperation structures. It stated:

This region will be refused entry into the West European community and it will therefore have to build a Regional Common Market. The development of such a market can significantly speed up the integration of the whole of Europe.²²⁷

The Confederates were not opposed to European integration *per se*. They did not, however, believe that Western Europe would allow post-communist states to accede to the European Community. In view of this, the *KPN* advocated that Central and East European states establish their own system of regional cooperation in order to withstand competition from the more economically advanced West European countries.

The communist successor Social Democracy of the Polish Republic participated in the 1991 elections as part of the Social Democratic Alliance, or the *Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*. Established in June 1991, this new coalition consisted of approximately thirty communist-successor and left-wing organizations such as the All Poland Trade Unions (*Ogólno-Polskie Związki Zawodowe, OPZZ*), the Polish Socialist Party, the Democratic Women's Union as well as several smaller trade unions and youth movements established under the auspices of the communist regime. The *SLD* was critical of the shock therapy reforms and accused the Mazowiecki and Bielecki governments of damaging the Polish economy and creating poverty. The *SLD* emphasized its commitment to

²²⁷ Program Wyborczy Konfederacji Polski Niepodległej, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1991 election folder.

democracy, free speech and the rule of law. Its programme also called for a clear division between Church and state.²²⁸

Regarding economic policy, the *SLD* called for the state to play an active role in industry and agriculture. It advocated varied forms of ownership, including the state, private enterprise and worker co-operatives. Its programme also called for measures to reduce unemployment, improve social services and protect women's rights, including the right to abortion.

The euro-enthusiasm of reformers such as Józef Oleksy or Aleksander Kwaśniewski was not evident in the *SLD*'s programme. While it did not explicitly oppose European integration, the Alliance remained very sceptical about NATO and called for the re-establishment of closer relations with the East. The *SLD* advocated the development of a pan-European security system under the auspices of the CSCE and a re-instatement of the regional ties dissolved after the collapse of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. Its programme also called for 'including Poland in a Europe-wide integration process encompassing a region stretching from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains, and not linking it only with the EEC'.²²⁹

Partia Chrześcijańskich Demokratów (Party of Christian Democrats, *PChD*) was established in December 1990 by a group of former Solidarity activists. The *PChD* supported EU membership. Its programme declared:

The development of the legal, economic and social framework for Polish accession to the European Community is a priority, so as to reach this aim Poland should quickly associate with the European Community, on the basis, however, of asymmetric rules

²²⁸ Program Wyborczy Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1991 election folder.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

which would allow for a gradual restructuring of the Polish economy with international competition.²³⁰

Regarding internal affairs, the *PChD* emphasized the importance of a free market economy and the protection of private property. It also called for greater recognition of civil liberties and for measures against anti-Semitism and other forms of discrimination.

The 1991 electoral campaign reflected a wide range of views on European integration. As the nascent political groupings strove to align their stance on Europe within their party-political ideologies they developed interpretations of what European integration and 'Europe' entailed. Most Solidarity-successor groupings emphasised the EC's Christian foundations. Rather than focus on the socio-economic impact of European integration, the politicians continued to use vague and symbolic references to 'Christian values', 'civilisational backwardness' and 'catching-up with Europe'. For the Solidarity-successors, who identified with the Catholic, patriotic ethos of the anti-communist struggle, the European Community was above all Christian.

Taking a clear cut stance on Europe proved most difficult for right-wing parties such as the *ZChN*, *KPN* and *Porozumienie Centrum*. National security was a paramount concern for them and their greatest fear was that Poland would once again suffer at the hands of its powerful neighbours. These groupings differed, however, in their assessment of which neighbour was to be feared most. Some advised against European integration, arguing this would make Poland dangerously vulnerable to German influence. Others felt that conversely, it was safer to ally Poland with the Western powers to be protected from Russia's neo-imperialist ambitions. The *KPN* feared German economic colonisation and hence warned against integration with the German-dominated EU. *Porozumienie Centrum*, on the other hand, called for a decisive shift towards Western security alliances that would distance Poland from the East.

²³⁰ Program Wyborczy Partii Chrześcijańsko Demokratycznej, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1991 election folder.

Meanwhile at the *ZChN*, the warring Euro-enthusiast and Euro-sceptic factions failed to present a coherent strategy on Europe and instead did not outline a stance at all.

In spite of their apparent misgivings however, all parties declared support for some sort of European integration. They were at least nominally supportive of EEC association and accession even though they often presented economic policy proposals that contradicted the association agreement. The only explicit voice of dissent against the integration project came from the far-right Nationalist Faction (*Stronnictwo Narodowe, SN*), which declared: 'We cannot surrender elements of our sovereignty for the sake of international structures such as the European Economic Community, where Germany dominates. Decisions about Poland must be made in Poland'.²³¹

In contrast to the Catholic-nationalist groupings, liberal parties such as *Unia Demokratyczna* and the *KLD* were more concerned about economic reform than about German or Russian expansionist ambitions. For the liberals, European integration gave Poland with the opportunity to 'catch-up with the West'. They believed that integration would facilitate Polish reforms and consolidate democracy. Turning away from the European Community, on the other hand, would leave Poland both economically and 'civilisationally' backward and would present a grave threat to systemic reform, they argued. The liberal groupings saw no viable alternative to EU membership.

European integration in parliamentary debate

Doubts about EC membership were apparent already during Jan Krzysztof Bielecki's *exposé* in January 1991. The Prime Minister was emphatically supportive of European integration. He confirmed his plans to maintain the foreign policy direction of the past fifteen months and stated that membership

²³¹ Program Wyborczy Stronnictwa Narodowego, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1991 election folder.

in the European Community remained a strategic objective.²³² In response to Bielecki's pro-integrationist stance several parliamentarians pointed out that accession could threaten Polish sovereignty and national identity. Bonawentura Ziembra, of the Pax Association commented:

Our efforts at acceding to the EEC – which the Prime Minister spoke about – should be accompanied by an awareness that this will be a lengthy process and in the end it will depend on us whether and with what we will accede to Europe. I believe that the Polish nation has to offer to Europe certain values, not only material but also spiritual and cultural. Entering the European Communities cannot take place at the cost of giving up our identity and sovereignty.²³³

Ziembra hence believed that although Poland may have lacked 'material' wealth it had 'spiritual and cultural' values to offer. He was concerned about the adverse impact which European integration may have on these values and on Polish sovereignty.

Similar sentiments were expressed by Ziembra's colleague from Pax, Józef Wójcik:

Let us finally abandon the degrading, as John Paul the II put it, slogan of the supposed need for Poland to return to Europe. We were and are in Europe and the cultural, spiritual and moral contribution we have made towards its identity is not insignificant. We have witnessed the opposition against two world wars, a sea of suffering and millions of corpses, finally the Holocaust in Europe.²³⁴

Wójcik hence justified the claim of moral superiority by reference to the suffering to which Poland had been subjected during its troubled past. Now it was Western Europe's turn to help Poland, he seemed to suggest.

²³² Jan Krzysztof Bielecki's expose, session nr.48, 5 January 1991, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.

²³³ Bonawentura Ziembra, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki's expose, session nr.48, 5 January 1991, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.

²³⁴ Józef Wójcik, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki's expose, session nr.48, 5 January 1991, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.

Similar arguments were presented during the debate on the ratification of the Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations and Cooperation with Germany in October 1991. Tadeusz Mazowiecki and those associated with *ROAD* saw the treaty as a step towards joining the EC and NATO. But *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*, which opposed the ratification, perceived closer relations with Germany as a threat. Marek Jurek warned that the clause allowing German citizens to purchase property in towns where they were born could become a 'pretext for organized colonising action on the territory of the Polish state'.²³⁵ The *ZChN* harboured genuine concerns about the possibility of German colonisation. It was also increasingly sceptical about the Association negotiations. As Henryk Goryszewski, leader of the *ZChN*, stated in June 1991: 'Our forefathers did not die in the struggle for Polishness for us to now dissolve in some Europeanness or worldliness'.²³⁶

The stance of the *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* was similar to that of the *ZChN*. On 17 September 1991 the Agrarians proposed a referendum on the Association Agreements. Jacek Komorowski, the *PSL*'s press spokesman, described association as 'the destruction of agriculture'.²³⁷ The referendum proposal met with little support but the Agrarians continued to oppose association. In October 1991 Jacek Soska, one of the *PSL*'s staunchest euro-sceptics, called for an end to the association negotiations.

Association treaty ratification debate

Doubt and ambiguity about association were also evident in the debates of the newly elected *sejm*. The first parliamentary reading of the Association Treaty was held on 21 May 1992, almost three months after the Interim Agreement on Trade came into effect on 1 March 1992. As a result, many parliamentarians felt they had been presented with a *fait accompli*, which further contributed to their distrust of the association process. Public support for ratification was limited.

²³⁵ Parliamentary session nr.78, 17 October 1991, Parliamentary Session Transcripts, Sejm Library.

²³⁶ 'Nie Rozpłyń się w Europejskości', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 24 June 1991.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*

According to a survey carried out by *Wprost* magazine, as many as 42% of respondents opposed ratification, 27% supported it while 31% were undecided.²³⁸

Krzysztof Skubiszewski, however, was far from sceptical. In the opening speech to the ratification debate he argued that European integration would not only bring economic and security benefits but would also act as a guarantor of Polish independence and democracy. He stated:

There is no event which can be compared to this in the history of our state....the Community is today, along with the United States...the bastion of democracy in the world...Association with the Community will be a guarantee for us, as for other member states, not only of economic and social development, but above all it will be a guarantee of the retention and expression of our national existence. ²³⁹

Skubiszewski hence believed that European integration would not only guarantee economic growth and regional stability but also ensure democracy and national sovereignty. His argument implied that the only alternative to integration was a totalitarian, socially and economically underdeveloped existence which, Skubiszewski suggested, may eventually lead to the obliteration of the Polish state.

Piotr-Nowina Konopka of the *Unia Demokratyczna* presented a similar stance to that of Skubiszewski, arguing that Poland had been sent to 'the sidelines of history' by communism while its West European neighbours pursued 'God given' freedoms to establish free market, liberal democracies. Similarly for Nowina-Konopka, the future of Poland's systemic transformation depended on the ratification of the Association Treaty. He argued:

²³⁸ Łuczak, 'Europa, Europa?', *Wprost*, nr.14, 05 April 1992.

²³⁹ Krzysztof Skubiszewski, 'Pierwsze czytanie rządowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Układu Europejskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Rzeczypospolitą Polską a Współnotami Europejskimi i ich państwami członkowskimi, sporzązonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r', 21 May 1992, 15th session, day 1, discussion point 1.

Our future political and economic system depends on whether or not we take the decision enabling the president to ratify this treaty. Not taking this decision would be an unambiguous signal....that Poland has given up on the path once taken by developed countries and once again relies on a systemic and political experiment as she is deciding to go its own way and is shutting herself away from other countries, that her choice is isolation and autarky.²⁴⁰

On another occasion Leszek Balcerowicz, author of 'shock therapy' reform had similar sentiments with regards to the association treaty, describing it as 'a matter of survival, a guarantee that we have moved away from the despair of the post-Yalta years'²⁴¹. This kind of 'no-alternative' strategy on Europe in effect meant an unquestioning support for a neo-liberal, free-market economy. The symbolic desirability of 'returning to Europe' thereby justified policy and precluded discussion of policy alternatives to either European integration or the 'shock-therapy' reforms.

Józef Oleksy of the *SLD* was more critical of the Association Treaty. While supportive of ratification, he repeatedly questioned the economic benefits the treaty would bring to Poland. He also pointed out that the agreement made no concrete commitment to enlargement and, while promising aid and further integration, did not specify how this was to be provided. Oleksy further criticised the negotiators for failing to ensure the inclusion of an accession timetable in the Association Treaty. To integrate with Europe, he argued, Poland would have to achieve greater economic and political stability and respect for civil liberties: 'Poland will be reckoned with, when it will be a stable and politically predictable state, with respect for law and civic responsibilities,

²⁴⁰ Piotr Nowina-Konopka, 'Pierwsze czytanie rządowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Układu Europejskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Wspólnotami Europejskimi i ich państwami członkowskimi, sporzązonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r', 21 May 1992, 15th session, day 1, discussion point 1.

²⁴¹ L. Balcerowicz, 'Statement by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz at the Signing of the Association Agreement with the European Community', *Zbior Dokumentow*, 4, (1991).

offering good products, a country open to European partners and not one that is xenophobic and concerned only with itself'.²⁴²

The social-democrats hence continued to present the European Community as a tolerant, liberal and democratic organization. In order to accede, they implied, Poland had to ensure that it was also sufficiently tolerant and open to diversity. A multicultural, diverse and most importantly secular vision of Europe was posed against the 'Christian Europe' envisaged by the Solidarity-successor camp.

Leszek Moczulski of the *KPN* cautioned against both undue enthusiasm and excessive scepticism about integration. His main concerns were the sale of land to foreigners and the impact of the Association Treaty on ethical issues such as the legalisation of abortion or euthanasia. Moczulski either disregarded or was not aware that the Association Agreements had no impact on such matters. He also questioned Skubiszewski's and Nowina-Konopka's argument that the European Community was a guarantor of Polish democracy and argued that it was degrading for Poles to think in this way. The *KPN* declared it was not prepared to ratify the Association Agreement due to a lack of information about its potential economic and legislative implications. It proposed that before ratification could be considered the cabinet needed to compile a detailed report on the political and economic impact of association.²⁴³

Stanisław Kalemba, of the *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, pointed out that Poland should not neglect its relations with Russia and the Newly Independent States. The *PSL* was critical of the fact that the Polish economy had, over the previous two years, become more open to Western Europe than to Poland's Eastern neighbours. Like his colleagues from the *KPN* and the *Zjednoczenie*

²⁴² Józef Oleksy, 'Pierwsze czytanie rządowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Układu Europejskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Wspólnotami Europejskimi i ich państwami członkowskimi, sporzązonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r', 21 May 1992, 15th session, day 1, point 1.

²⁴³ 'Pierwsze czytanie rządowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Układu Europejskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Wspólnotami Europejskimi i ich państwami członkowskimi, sporzązonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r', 21 May 1992, 15th session, day 1, point 1.

Chrześcijańsko Narodowe, Kalemба criticised the government for implementing the treaty before it had been ratified by parliament. The *PSL* proposed that the ratification request be returned to parliamentary commissions for further consideration.²⁴⁴

The subsequent speaker, Henryk Goryszewski, had the difficult task of combining a deputy leadership of the euro-sceptic *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe* with a deputy Prime Ministership in Hanna Suchocka's pro-integrationist cabinet. The ambiguity of Goryszewski's presentation reflected the difficulty of his position. He stated:

There are different methods of uniting Europe and different visions of it. If it is to be a Europe deserving of its traditions, and deserving of those traditions of which it was a source, creator and which it gave forth to the world, then it must be a Europe of Nations. In such a Europe we want to find ourselves, in a Europe which will be a community of independent and self-governing sovereign nations.²⁴⁵

Goryszewski's presentation was hence ambiguous enough to straddle the *ZChN*'s euro-scepticism and the pro-integrationist stance of the Suchocka cabinet. Another *ZChN* representative, Jacek Truszczyński, was less reserved. He stated: 'The restrictions contained in European agreements threaten the reconstruction of the economies of the Czech and Slovak Republics, Poland and Hungary'.²⁴⁶

Other Solidarity-successor groupings, such the *Porozumienie Centrum*, the *Partia Chrześcijańskich Demokratów* and *Solidarność* questioned the benefits of the Association Treaty but did not oppose its ratification. Marcin Przybyłowicz of

²⁴⁴ Stanisław Kalemба, 'Pierwsze czytanie rządowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Układu Europejskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Wspólnotami Europejskimi i ich państwami członkowskimi, sporzązonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r', 21 May 1992, 15th session, day 1, point 1.

²⁴⁵ Henryk Goryszewski, 'Pierwsze czytanie rządowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Układu Europejskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Wspólnotami Europejskimi i ich państwami członkowskimi, sporzązonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r', 21 May 1992, 15th session, day 1, point 1.

²⁴⁶ Jacek Truszczyński, 'Pierwsze czytanie rządowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Układu Europejskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Wspólnotami Europejskimi i ich państwami członkowskimi, sporzązonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r', 21 May 1992, 15th session, day 1, discussion point 1.

the *Porozumienie Centrum* pointed out that association with the European Community was a just reward for Poland after the contribution it had made to the struggle against communism. While questioning the potential impact of association and eventual membership on Polish national identity and religious traditions, several MP's argued that such threats were a product of globalisation rather than of the Association Agreements; they argued that non-ratification of the treaty would do little to protect Poland against them. The debate ended on a critical note from Janusz Korwin-Mikke of the *Unia Polityki Realnej* (Union of Realist Politics, *UPR*). Korwin-Mikke accused the EC of being 'taken over by socialists' and of forcing Poland to abandon legal norms such as capital punishment or the ban on abortion. Even slapping a child, Korwin-Mikke argued, could put one in jail. He ended his presentation by asking his colleagues whether they would vote for membership in the European Union of Socialist Republics.

The *PSL*'s suggestion for the ratification proposal to be passed over to parliamentary commissions was accepted and the draft was eventually ratified by five parliamentary commissions: foreign policy, foreign economic relations and fisheries, agriculture, economic policy, finance and the legislative commission. The commissions' discussions concerned primarily the economic benefits of the treaty. Agriculture was very much a point of dissent and Jacek Soska, a representative of the *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, tabled a motion against treaty ratification in the agriculture commission. While recommending ratification the commissions called for the establishment of a programme of action which would harmonise Polish legislation with the Association Treaty. A Parliamentary Commission on European Integration was established and charged with supervising the implementation of the Association Treaty, consultations on negotiations between Poland and the EC, and formulating recommendations concerning Poland's relationship with the Community.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁷ 'Kolejny Krok w Lipcu' *Rzeczpospolita*, 12/21 June 1992, nr. 144(3182), p1.

The second parliamentary debate took place on July 3rd 1992. During the final vote, the *ZChN* parliamentarians divided. Pro-integrationists such as Wiesław Chrzanowski and Jacek Kurski voted for ratification but the radical wing of the party remained sceptical. Jacek Turczyński was adamant in his opposition to association with the European Community. He stated: 'Acceptance of the treaty associating Poland with the European Communities may mean a complete breakdown of the Polish economy as a result of forcing the weaker partner to compete with the stronger one'.²⁴⁸

According to Ryszard Czarnecki, who at the time was responsible for the *ZChN*'s foreign policy strategy, euro-sceptics such as Marek Jurek and Jan Łopuszański voted against the Europe Agreements because they opposed eventual membership in the EU. Czarnecki also voted against ratification. He later explained that his main motivation for doing so was that Poland had been offered worse conditions than those presented to previous entrants. Asked whether the *ZChN*'s opposition was in any way influenced by the establishment of the European Union and the growing transfer of competences from member states to Brussels, he replied that the Maastricht Treaty 'was an abstraction' and that its impact was considered neither during internal discussions at the *ZChN* nor during the parliamentary debates.²⁴⁹

The *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej* abstained. Leszek Moczulski explained that while his party supported European integration, it felt that the Association Treaty was forced on Poland by the economically powerful West European states. 'Having someone on their knees agree to given conditions is not building integration, it is the building of conflicts which will destroy integration'

²⁴⁸ Jacek Turczyński 'Drugie czytanie rządowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Układu Europejskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Rzeczypospolitą Polską a Współnotami Europejskimi i ich państwami członkowskimi, sporzązonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r' 3 July 1992, 19th session, 3rd day, discussion point 9.

²⁴⁹ Interview with Ryszard Czarnecki, 15 June 2005.

Moczulski argued. He went on to ask whether those who supported European integration were not in fact seeking a replacement for the Soviet hegemony.²⁵⁰

Other groupings, such as Solidarity, *Porozumienie Centrum*, and *PChD* supported ratification. Their support was qualified however, by concerns for Polish national identity as well as the potentially adverse effects of opening the country's weak economy to a much stronger competitor.²⁵¹

Although Jacek Soska once again submitted a proposal for non-ratification, his colleagues from the *PSL* voted in favour of the treaty. Soska argued that the Polish agricultural sector was too weak to compete with its heavily subsidised West European counterparts and that the government had failed to implement adequate restructuring measures which would enable the sector to compete with West European farmers. Other *PSL* representatives, however, pointed out that opening up Polish markets may in fact aid the restructuring process and in the long term make the local farmers more competitive.²⁵²

The liberal parties maintained the enthusiastic stance they had presented during the first reading and the *Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny* proposed that membership application be made immediately after the ratification of the Association Treaty. The *SLD* also maintained its previous stance. Although it criticised the Solidarity-successor negotiators for failing to ensure that Polish interests were fully protected, the Alliance nonetheless supported ratification.

²⁵⁰ Leszek Moczulski, 'Drugie czytanie rządowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Układu Europejskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Wspólnotami Europejskimi i ich państwami członkowskimi, sporzązonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r' 3 July 1992, 19th session, 3rd day, discussion point 9.

²⁵¹ 'Drugie czytanie rządowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Układu Europejskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Wspólnotami Europejskimi i ich państwami członkowskimi, sporzązonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r' 3 July 1992, 19th session, 3rd day, discussion point 9.

²⁵² 'Drugie czytanie rządowego projektu ustawy o ratyfikacji Układu Europejskiego ustanawiającego stowarzyszenie między Rzecząpospolitą Polską a Wspólnotami Europejskimi i ich państwami członkowskimi, sporzązonego w Brukseli dnia 16 grudnia 1991 r' 3 July 1992, 19th session, 3rd day, discussion point 9.

The association treaty was eventually ratified on July 4th 1991 with 238 votes against 78, with 20 abstentions.²⁵³ In November 1991 the economist and European integration expert Jacek Saryusz Wolski was appointed Plenipotentiary for European Integration and charged with coordinating association activites. The harmonisation programme legislated during the ratification debate was presented to the cabinet in November 1992. In January 1993 Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, presented the newly established Parliamentary Commission for European Integration with a progress report identifying free movement of capital and the sale of land as the areas needing most attention.²⁵⁴

In January the government passed a legal harmonisation programme which identified over sixty legislative changes requiring immediate adjustment. Saryusz-Wolski pointed out that in addition to introducing the adjustments required under the Association Treaty, the programme also prepared Poland for future membership in the European Community. The harmonisation programme encompassed a broad range of legislation on customs, manufacturing, banking, financial reporting, patents, labour law, education, tourism, environmental protection and health care.²⁵⁵ The *acquis communautaire* had a widespread impact on Polish legislation even before the membership application was submitted.

Regional policy debate

Growing euro-scepticism was also apparent during the *Sejm* debates on regionalisation. In May 1993 Saryusz-Wolski announced that Poland would develop a regional policy programme with the aid of EC funds.²⁵⁶ Sixty million ECU of European Community aid had been paid out in 1992 and a majority of these funds were intended for regional development. As part of the programme

²⁵³ G. Sanford, 'Parliamentary Control and the Constitutional Definition of Foreign Policy Making in Democratic Poland', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 51, 5 (1999), 769-797.

²⁵⁴ 'Jak Się Dopusować' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 21 January 1993, nr 17, p15.

²⁵⁵ Dorota Pilot, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 27 January 1993, nr 22, p15.

²⁵⁶ Alina Bialkowska, 'Regionalne Pieniadze EWG' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.135, 09 June 1992, p4.

Polish civil servants were to be educated in formulating effective regional policy.

The liberals had no objections to regionalisation. As Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Minister for European Integration in the Suchocka cabinet, stated during a press conference: 'Poland is too large a country to effectively integrate with Europe. It has to divide into regions'. For the nationalist groupings, however, participation in the EU's regional policy was much more than just a cost effective way to educate public servants or build better roads. It represented their greatest fear: their motherland would once again be partitioned and colonized by the German empire, which this time appeared in the guise of the European Union.

When the Silesian *voivod* initiated talks about the formation of a Carpathian Euro-region, the *KPN*, *PC*, *NSZZ Solidarność* and the *ZChN* asked Prime Minister Suchocka for his dismissal on the grounds that he was destabilising Polish sovereignty. They also claimed that the formation of the Euro-region contradicted Polish foreign policy and argued it would eventually lead to a 'soft' incorporation of Silesia into Germany.

The debate on regionalisation brought out stark differences between two of Suchocka's biggest coalition partners, the euro-enthusiastic *Unia Demokratyczna* and the euro-sceptic *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*. Both parties raised doubts about their compatibility from the start of the coalition. As Bronisław Geremek commented: 'There are deep policy differences between the coalition parties, especially the [Democratic] Union and the *ZChN*. *Unia Demokratyczna* will not agree to a programme of de-communization, hostility to Europe, or punishing women and doctors for abortion'.²⁵⁷

The *ZChN* also raised concerns about the coalition's ideological compatibility. While commenting on Hanna Suchocka's *exposé* Marek Jurek stated:

²⁵⁷ Ewa Milewicz, 'Siódemka się trzyma', interview with Bronisław Geremek, *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 19-20 September 1993, p3.

Each of the previous Prime Ministers... emphasised the role of the Catholic Church in building democracy. Hanna Suchocka did not even mention the Church. Secondly, the Prime Minister's declaration that the primary aim of Polish foreign policy remains integration with Europe. This means, that she does not recognize some of our doubts, which we presented during the debate on the ratification of the Association Agreement.²⁵⁸

The ZChN's vision of what an integrated Europe should look like was very different from that advocated by the *Unia Demokratyczna*. Whereas the liberals opted for a closely integrated 'Maastricht Europe', the ZChN was in favour of an intergovernmental 'Europe of Nations'. As the party spokesman, Ryszard Czarnecki explained: 'We have serious doubts about political integration with Europe. In our opinion for example the concept of a United States of Europe could become dangerous for Poland.²⁵⁹ He then suggested a re-negotiation of the Association Agreements.

The ZChN's participation in a government led by the pro-integrationist, liberal Suchocka presented a dilemma for Henryk Goryszewski, who was both leader of the ZChN and deputy Prime Minister. His and his party's stance on European integration contradicted that of the Prime Minister. During an interview entitled 'Goryszewski's Secret' published by *Gazeta Wyborcza* Goryszewski attempted to distinguish between what he described as his personal anti-Maastricht stance, and his 'professional' support for Suchocka's pro-integration strategy. Questioned about his criticism of the Maastricht Treaty, he replied:

That was my personal statement. The government did not express itself on this subject and luckily it does not have to express itself, since this matter could lead to its collapse. It is hence only reasonable that I, while speaking of the Maastricht Treaty, clearly emphasize: me, Goryszewski,

²⁵⁸ 'Koalicja szansy czy strachu' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.163, 13 July 1992, p11.

²⁵⁹ Alina Białkowska, 'Czy Wpuścimy EWG' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.65, 17 March 1992, p4.

and not – me, deputy Prime Minister. Then there is no conflict between me and minister Bielecki.²⁶⁰

The full extent of the conflict between the two coalition partners eventually came to light during the parliamentary debate on regionalisation. Following the establishment of the Carpathian Region, the ZChN called for a parliamentary debate, requesting the government to justify its support for the region's development. Two debates took place, on 20 February and 3 March 1993. The ZChN carried out a full blown attack on both the cabinet and the *Unia Demokratyczna*, arguing that Suchocka's European integration policy would eventually lead to the loss of Polish sovereignty. The liberals meanwhile saw regionalisation as a means of improving economic cooperation and consolidating security. As Krzysztof Skubiszewski stated during the inauguration of the Carpathian region: 'This is a new opportunity for neighbourly relations, an opportunity to overcome the past and eliminate economic divisions'.²⁶¹

The discussion did not prove fruitful. In his opening speech to the second debate, on 3 March, Krzysztof Skubiszewski reiterated his support for regionalisation. In response, Jan Łopuszański of the ZChN accused the government of facilitating a new partition of Poland. 'I know that there are dark forces planning to demolish Poland's borders but why are you playing a part in this, for God's sake?'²⁶² he asked Minister Skubiszewski. Łopuszański then asserted that this kind of behaviour would be paid for in the blood of future generations.

Łopuszański was awarded a standing ovation; one female parliamentarian even kissed him. The *Porozumienie Centrum* meanwhile was increasingly sceptical in its support for integration and took the side of the Christian-Nationalists, accusing the *Unia Demokratyczna* of failing to represent Polish national interest.

²⁶⁰ Artur Domosławski, 'Tajemnica Goryszewskiego', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 17/18 October 1992, nr. 245, p6.

²⁶¹ Edward Krzemień, 'Europa ojczyzn czy regionów', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.55, 6-7 March 1993, p3.

²⁶² Piotr Piasek and Dominika Wielowieyska, 'Koalicja dwóch światów', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.44, 22 February 1993, p3.

But the PC's support for the Christian-Nationalists may have been motivated as much by an ambition to fragment the governing coalition as by genuine doubts about regionalisation.

Another grouping that was strongly opposed to regionalisation was the *Ruch Odbudowy Polski* (Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, ROP), established by Jan Olszewski following the fall of his cabinet in December 1992. Although during his Prime Ministership Olszewski claimed to support association, he began to call for re-negotiation of the Europe Agreements as trade disputes with the EU became more frequent. The libertarian Janusz Korwin-Mikke also supported the ZChN and argued that euro-regions were the work of masons and would lead to 'another Yugoslavia'.

The regional policy debates made manifest the discord within the governing coalition and the extent of disagreement about European integration policy. After the debate *Unia Demokratyczna* issued a statement condemning ZChN's lack of clear stance on Europe and intra-coalition talks followed, however neither party was willing to compromise and the already weak coalition suffered further damage.²⁶³ Conflicting party-political views on Europe were proving divisive even at the early stages of the integration process.

Conclusions

The years 1991 to 1993 saw significant change in party-political approaches to European integration. As it became clear that no new 'Marshall Plan' would be forthcoming and that the West European states would not welcome their impoverished Eastern neighbours with open arms, the Polish political right revised its initially enthusiastic approach towards the European project. The liberals, meanwhile, remained unwaveringly euro-enthusiastic.

Establishing a clear cut stance on Europe once again proved most problematic for groupings competing on a nationalist or religious platform. As the

²⁶³ 'Unia w zwarciu z ZChN' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr. 47, 25 December 1993, p2.

extensive implications of association on national sovereignty and economic policy became clear the Polish right wing increasingly struggled with presenting an unambiguous approach to Poland's integration with the EEC. The hard realities of international trade and the EC's unwillingness to provide special treatment to the Central and East European states shattered the idealised image of 'returning to Europe' harboured by the Solidarity-successor elites, no longer able to reconcile emphasising their role in attaining Poland's newly won national sovereignty with the loss of national competences inherent in European integration. Groupings such as *Porozumienie Centrum* and *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe* found it impossible to maintain unqualified support for what they increasingly perceived to be an organisation which threatened Polish independence. Moreover, as integration with NATO became increasingly likely, security concerns lessened and consequently integration with the European Community had to be justified on economic grounds, which proved increasingly difficult in light of the growing trade deficit.

Another point of tension between the right wing parties' proposals and European integration arose in the area of economic policy. The interventionist, protectionist economic policies advocated by the PC, *Solidarność* and most of the agrarian groupings clashed with the association treaty and the Copenhagen criteria. All of these groupings supported a range of protectionist measures including export subsidies and import tariffs, neither of which were allowed under the association agreement.

Even though none of the above parties declared their opposition to EC membership they all raised concerns about the benefits of the association treaty and repeatedly called for its re-negotiation. By the time they were able to voice their concerns in parliament however the main provisions of the treaty had become a *fait accompli* by means of the interim trade agreement. But the tumultuous debates on association and regionalisation made it evident that Poland lacked in-depth political consensus on European integration and on its

full implications. The appeal of the 'return to Europe' was no longer sufficient to sustain consensus on the complexities of the integration project.

Support for European integration proved far less problematic for the two liberal parties: the Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Congress. The association requirements and the accession criteria were much better aligned to liberal economic policy and to the way in which these two groupings presented national sovereignty than to that of the other solidarity-successor parties. The liberals argued that EU membership would bring about the economic growth necessary for political stability and embed Poland in the Western sphere of influence. Moreover, they pointed out, integration would not carry any additional economic cost as the reforms required for accession would have to be carried out anyway to successfully complete the transformation. The processes of systemic economic transformation and European integration were hence seen to be interdependent, accession requirements providing a model for transition reforms.²⁶⁴

Liberal politicians also argued that European integration would consolidate both the transition to democracy and Polish sovereignty. They presented the EC as a panacea for all Polish ills, from the dysfunctional economy and unstable political system to the lack of international security. They also portrayed the EC as a bastion of democracy and economic prosperity, and, by implication, the rejection of its accession as a failure of the Polish transition.

But the EC was far from the democratic stronghold the liberals presented it to be. As the Polish elites debated the historical parallels between regionalisation and the partitions their West European counterparts were increasingly confronted with concerns about the EC's democratic deficit. EU membership may have indeed served to consolidate democracy and the free market in the applicant states in the sense that it served as a perceived 'reward' for reform.

²⁶⁴ 'Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny. Deklaracja Programowa – zasady ogólne', 'Unia Demokratyczna: z Programu Unii Demokratycznej', 1991, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1991 election folder.

But once in the EU the new entrants would be confronted with complex and opaque decision making processes shaping a wide range of decisions that often impacted the daily lives of their citizens.

Apart from the EC's internal decision making processes the democratic legitimisation of Poland's integration with the Communities also presented problems. This was the case for three reasons. Firstly, the integration process was driven primarily by the executive, with only very limited involvement from the parliament. The association treaty was negotiated by the contract cabinet of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, before the Polish electorate could choose the first fully democratically elected *sejm*. Even after the 1991 elections, when the *sejm* was presented with the opportunity to ratify the association treaty, this took place only after the key trade sections had already been implemented. Also, the complex, technical nature of both the association and the entire integration process did not lend itself to easy parliamentary scrutiny and the parliamentarians were often forced to rely on the advice of the Plenipotentiary for European Integration.

Secondly, discourse about the political implications of integration remained ambiguous and symbolic. Although the issue of sovereignty was at the forefront of the debate there was relatively little discussion of the practical implications of accession and how it would impact sovereignty, such as the limitations on national economic policy, legal harmonization or indeed the very scope and means of the EU's decision-making powers. Where parties expressed scepticism, this was justified by symbolic rhetoric, such as the comparison between regional policy and the partitions or the frequent references to German domination. Support for integration meanwhile was often justified by the implicit threat that should Poland fail to accede then not only the transition but even its very national independence may be put in jeopardy. As Ryszard Czarnecki of the ZChN pointed out, key issues such as Maastricht were an

'abstraction'²⁶⁵. Instead, political debate addressed historical wrongs, the threat of German colonisation and the 'spilling of Polish blood'. Such rhetoric not only failed to inform about the key implications of the integration process but also did not provide the public with clear policy choices on the basis of which it could hold its elected representatives to account with regards to the integration process.

Thirdly, electoral choice about European integration was made more problematic by the limited nature of public knowledge of the EU and the implications of Poland's association and membership in it. CBOS studies of March 1992 show that whereas 80% of respondents supported Poland's integration with Western Europe only two thirds recognized the abbreviation 'EEC' or had heard about the association agreement.²⁶⁶

Establishing consensus on European integration was also problematic due to disagreements within the Suchocka cabinet, which brought together euro-enthusiastic liberals such as Suchocka, Bielecki and Skubiszewski with euro-sceptics such as Heryk Goryszewski from the Catholic-nationalist *ZChN* and with the conservative, euro-ambivalent agrarians. The ways in which different sides of the political spectrum conceptualised national sovereignty were a key factor in the disagreements. The liberals felt that integration with international structures strengthened sovereignty by granting Poland a greater say in the globalisation process, even if this took place at the cost of competences that traditionally lay within the domain of the state. The nationalist groupings presented sovereignty in a more traditional manner and saw the loss of national competences as form of colonisation, which in turn enabled them to make frequent use of an emotionally powerful rhetoric about the past suffering the Poles endured at the hands of their neighbours. Meanwhile, as the next chapter will show, the two communist-successor groupings were also developing their own representations of the EU.

²⁶⁵ Interview with Ryszard Czarnecki, 15 June 2005.

²⁶⁶ CBOS report, March 1992 quoted in Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Implications of Poland's Association with the European Communities for Poland's Economy: Preliminary Assessment'.

Chapter 4

SLD-PSL coalition: European integration under the successors of the *ancien régime*

SLD will change its coalition partner if *PSL* makes Poland's entry to the European Union impossible.²⁶⁷

Aleksander Kwaśniewski, leader of the *Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*

Introduction

This chapter considers the evolution of party-political consensus on European integration during the communist-successor *SLD* and *PSL* coalition, starting with the September 1993 parliamentary contest and ending with the September 1997 victory of the Solidarity-Electoral Action and Freedom Union coalition.

The period in question saw a number of key developments in Poland's accession project. The Association Agreement came into force in January 1994 and in April 1994 Poland formally applied for EU membership. The years from 1995 to 1997 saw extensive efforts at preparation for negotiations and eventual membership on both the Polish and EU side. As integration progressed Europe played an increasingly prominent role in political debate and the establishment of party-political consensus on EU membership became increasingly important.

The question of how party-political consensus on accession was established in Poland during this critical phase of its integration project is the primary focus of this chapter. How did individual political groupings reconcile the increasingly detailed accession requirements with their existing policy and ideological proposals? What were the key factors shaping the parliamentary debate on accession and how was consensus on Europe established within the ruling coalition?

The 1993-7 *sejm* was markedly different from its predecessor in that most of the small solidarity successor parties did not manage to cross the newly introduced 5% representation threshold. The composition of the new *sejm* influenced the

²⁶⁷ Aleksander Kwaśniewski, quoted in 'SLD, PSL i Europa' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.29, 3 February 1995, p3.

tone of parliamentary debate on Europe since representatives of groupings such as the Christian-Nationalist Faction, the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, and Solidarity, which had been increasingly critical of European integration both in the incumbent *sejm* and during the 1993 electoral campaign, were now no longer able to voice their concerns in parliament or government. The period from September 1993 to August 1997 hence saw little dissent on Europe from parliamentary opposition. But vocal concerns and scepticism about accession could be heard during the 1993 parliamentary and 1995 presidential campaign as well as during the 1997 debate on the new constitution. The strongest voice of dissent within parliament came from the agrarian *PSL* and discord on Europe between the traditional, conservative agrarians and the increasingly euro-enthusiastic Social Democrats was evident both during parliamentary debate and in several publicly voiced disagreements among the leadership of the two groupings.

Following an overview of domestic developments in section one, the second section will account for the progress of Poland's integration with the EU during the 1993-7 period. Section three will focus on the party-political debate on accession and the evolution of consensus on Poland's EU membership including the 1993 parliamentary and 1995 presidential campaigns, parliamentary debate, relations between the coalition partners as well as the role of European integration in the 1997 debate on the new constitution.

Domestic developments

The September 1993 parliamentary contest saw the return to power of many former members of the Polish United Workers' Party, now reformed into a Western style social-democratic Alliance of the Democratic Left, or the *Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej*. The *SLD*'s victory was a consequence of two factors. The first was popular disenchantment with the harsh economic reforms initiated in 1990 by Leszek Balcerowicz and continued under the leadership of Jan Krzysztof Bielecki and Hanna Suchocka. The second factor was the introduction of a 5% parliamentary representation threshold for parties and 8% for

coalitions, which significantly limited the fragmented solidarity-successor right parties' representation in the *sejm*.

Following unsuccessful coalition talks with the solidarity-successor Democratic Union and the Labour Union²⁶⁸ the *SLD* eventually formed government together with the agrarian *PSL*. The *UP* agreed to informally back the coalition and *Unia Demokratyczna* pledged support on selected issues. Although the two groupings shared a communist-successor heritage the policies of the centre-left, politically liberal and pro-integrationist *SLD* were hardly a compatible match for the conservative, agrarian and at times euro-sceptic *PSL*. A coalition between the communist-successor *SLD* and the Democratic Union and the Labour Union might have been more ideologically compatible but neither of the latter two groupings was willing to formally co-operate with successors of the *ancien régime*.²⁶⁹

In spite of having won more parliamentary seats than their coalition partner the *SLD* agreed to appoint Waldemar Pawlak, *PSL* leader, as Prime Minister. This helped the Social Democrats dispel public concerns about a return to the authoritarian ways of the *PZPR*. Much to the *PSL*'s dismay, the *SLD* offered the leadership of the parliamentary commission on foreign affairs to Bronisław Geremek of *Unia Demokratyczna*. The *Sojusz* thereby provided further proof that it had no desire to divert Poland from its pro-integrationist foreign policy. Granting this post to an enthusiastically pro-integrationist former dissident affirmed the *SLD*'s new, pro-Western stance.

Discord among the coalition partners intensified as the *SLD*, increasingly confident in its new, democratically legitimized role, strove to control the Prime Ministerial appointment. Pawlak soon became embroiled in a power struggle with Aleksander Kwaśniewski and was eventually replaced by Józef Oleksy of

²⁶⁸ Ka-Lok Chan, Kenneth, 'Poland at the Crossroads: the 1993 General Election', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47, 1 (1995), 123-145, p142.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p142.

the *SLD* in February 1995.²⁷⁰ Meanwhile, the *SLD* had not only to contend with a difficult coalition partner but also with its increasingly challenging relationship²⁷¹ with President Wałęsa.²⁷²

The power struggle between the president and the coalition centred on control over three key ministries: foreign affairs, defence and internal affairs, all of which had traditionally been manned by presidential appointment as part of the agreement made as part of the power sharing arrangements of the contract *sejm*. According to the 'Little Constitution' foreign policy was to be established with the co-operation of the President, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister but the definition of precisely who was responsible for which part of policy formation was open to interpretation.²⁷³

In an attempt to influence foreign policy the *SLD* placed increasing pressure on Andrzej Olechowski, the head of foreign affairs, from the start of his appointment in October 1993. The communist-successors quickly set about attempting to shift policy formation away from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Alternative decision-making centres, such as the Prime Minister's Office for International Affairs, established by the *PSL*'s Michał Strąk, or the Ministry for Foreign Economic Cooperation were set up. Both institutions promptly began forming a 'shadow' foreign policy. Civilian control of the military, required for NATO membership, was another vocal point of dissent between the coalition and the President.²⁷⁴

But the lack of a clear constitutional definition of who was responsible for foreign policy making continued to complicate the already difficult relationship between the President and the *SLD*. Foreign policy was now formulated by the communist-successor Prime Minister on the one hand and Lech Wałęsa and his

²⁷⁰ 'Podtrzymywanie Koalicji' *Trybuna*, nr.33, 8 February 1995.

²⁷¹ V. Zubek, 'The Eclipse of Walesa's Political Career', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 49, 1 (1997), 107-124. p119-120.

²⁷² J. Wiatr, 'Poland's Three Parliaments in the Era of Transition, 1989-1995', *International Political Science Review*, 18, 4 (1997), 443-450, p449.

²⁷³ Sanford, p774.

²⁷⁴ Interview with Lech Wałęsa, 1 September 2005, Paweł Wroński, 'Podkopywanie Wieży Kontrolnej' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.282, 5 December 1994, p12, Zbigniew Okoński, quoted in Jeffrey Simon, *Poland and NATO. A study in Civil-Military Relations*, (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), p46.

protégé Władysław Bartoszewski on the other.²⁷⁵ Unlike Pawlak, Józef Oleksy was unambiguously supportive of EU and NATO accession and the President and the Prime Minister agreed on a pro-integrationist policy stance.

Establishing a common stance towards Russia²⁷⁶ as well as relations with the Vatican²⁷⁷ proved far more problematic however. As the 1995 presidential contest approached the incumbent president became increasingly blunt in his criticism of the communist-successors,²⁷⁸ even going so far as to publicly describe them as 'criminals'.²⁷⁹ For Lech Wałęsa, as for most Solidarity-successor politicians, Józef Oleksy's appointment represented not a democratic choice but the failure of the pre-1989 struggle. Rather than accept their opponent's election both the President and many of the Solidarity-successor elites saw the *SLD*'s victory as a call to arms against the communist enemy.

But the solidarity-successors remained fragmented in the run up to the 1995 presidential contest, which resulted in the victory of Aleksander Kwaśniewski who competed with over a dozen solidarity-successor backed candidates. The communist-successors were now in control of both the cabinet and the presidency. But their celebrations quickly ended when on 19 December 1995, Andrzej Milczanowski, Minister of Internal Affairs, publicly accused Józef Oleksy of espionage.²⁸⁰ A parliamentary debate on the subject, instigated by the *PSL* in an attempt to publicize the accusation even further²⁸¹, took place on December 22. The case against Oleksy was eventually dropped but by then he had little choice but to resign²⁸² and in February 1996 the running of the cabinet was taken over by another *SLD* reformer, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, with

²⁷⁵ 'Rząd o polityce zagranicznej. Tajne korekty' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.92, 19 April 1995, p3.

²⁷⁶ 'Jak doszło do awantury o koniec wojny' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.94, 21 April 1995, p3.

²⁷⁷ A. Umińska - Woroniecka, 'Stosunki Dyplomatyczne RP ze Stolicą Apostolską w Latach Dziewięćdziesiątych', in Kościół i Związki Wyznaniowe w Stosunkach Międzynarodowych, ed. T. Dębowksi (Wrocław 2003).

²⁷⁸ Zubek, 'The Eclipse of Waleśa's Political Career', p119-120.

²⁷⁹ 'Rząd o polityce zagranicznej. Tajne korekty' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.92, 19 April 1995, p3, 'Premier komentuje wypowiedź prezydenta. To nie służy Polsce' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr. 92, 19 April 1995, p3.

²⁸⁰ Ewa Milewicz, 'Krótka historia sprawy Józefa Oleksego' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.96, 23 April 1996, p3, Sanford, p782.

²⁸¹ Janusz Piechociński, interview by Eryk Mistewicz and Jerzy Sławomir Mac, 'Nie Heblowana Poręcz', *Wprost*, nr. 6(689), 11 February 1996, p17-18.

²⁸² A. Szczerbiak, 'Dealing with the Communist Past or the Politics of the Present? Lustration in Post-Communist Poland', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 54, 4 (2002), 553-572, p28.

Oleksy taking over the leadership of the *SdRP*. In spite of the crisis, the *SLD* enjoyed a high level of popular support; 52% of respondents evaluated Oleksy's government as 'quiet good' or 'very good' at the time of his resignation.²⁸³

While it no longer had to deal with Wałęsa, the *SLD* still had to contend with a critical coalition partner. Ideological differences between the coalition partners became increasingly pronounced. The *PSL*'s conservatism clashed with the *SLD*'s growing appreciation of liberal social democracy, resulting in conflicts over issues ranging from ministerial appointments to abortion, lustration and foreign policy. The ideological schism between the two groupings was underscored by the *PSL* investigating the possibility of a minority coalition with the right wing, conservative Confederation for Independent Poland.

Maintaining internal unity among its numerous member groupings was also not an easy task for *SLD* leadership. Economic policy was a particularly problematic point of dissent between the economically liberal reformers in the Alliance's leadership and its second largest member organization, the All-Polish Trade Union Agreement (*Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków Zawodowych, OPZZ*) as the workers' social welfare demands clashed with the *SLD*'s liberal economic approach.²⁸⁴

The *SLD-PSL* coalition inherited a healthy economy, with a GDP growth of 5% in 1994.²⁸⁵ In spite of fears of excessive wage demands on the part of the *OPZZ* and other lobbies growth continued throughout the subsequent years but by the mid-1990's the coalition's failure to reform the social security system became an increasing threat to economic stability.²⁸⁶

²⁸³ F. Millard, 'Polish Domestic Politics and Accession to the European Union', in *Back to Europe. Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union*, ed. K. Henderson (London 1999), p24.

²⁸⁴ A. Mahr, 'Resurrection of the Successor Parties and Democratization in East-Central Europe', *Communist and Post Communist Studies*, 28, 4 (1995), 393-409.

²⁸⁵ G. Blażyca, 'Continuity and Change in Polish Economic Policy: the Impact of the 1993 Election', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48, 1 (1996), 85-100, p93.

²⁸⁶ T. Inglot, 'The Politics of Social Policy Reform in Post-Communist Poland: Government Responses to the Social Insurance Costs during 1989-1993', *Communist and Post Communist Studies*, 28, 3 (1995), 361-373.

Meanwhile, Aleksander Kwaśniewski's resounding victory in the 1995 presidential contest led to renewed attempts at consolidation on the solidarity-successor side of the political spectrum. In June 1996 these resulted in the formation of the Solidarity Electoral Action from among 22 parties and other political groupings under the umbrella of the Solidarity trade union. The AWS was an ideologically heterogeneous coalition and its members included socially conservative trade unionists, economic interventionists and liberals as well as Catholic nationalists and advocates of state and church separation.²⁸⁷ Rather than shared ideological or policy preferences, the key participation criteria appeared to be declared anti-communism.²⁸⁸ The *Akcja Wyborcza* continued to expand and incorporate smaller right wing groupings throughout the remainder of 1996²⁸⁹ and was a prominent participant in the debate preceding the 1997 referendum on the new constitution.

European integration policy

The communist-successors' return to power in October 1993 led to concerns for the continuity of Poland's Western foreign policy orientation.²⁹⁰ Such fears were quickly dispelled, however, and the period from 1993 to 1997 saw significant progress in the integration project. On 29 March 1994 the Polish cabinet unanimously approved Poland's application for EU membership, which was submitted on 8 April 1994 following a brief parliamentary debate on 7 April.²⁹¹ EU membership benefited from strong public support which grew from 77% in June 1994 to a pre-accession peak of 80% in May 1995.²⁹² The application was formally accepted by the EU during the Luxembourg summit of 29-30 October 1994.

²⁸⁷ Bale, p139-156.

²⁸⁸ A. Madera, 'Unia Europejska jako Europa Ojczyzn w Retoryce Akcji Wyborczej Solidarnosc', in *Europa i Integracja Europejska w Polskiej Myśli Politycznej XX Wieku*, ed. J. a. T. Juchnowski, Janusz (Wroclaw 2003), 172-192., p172-173.

²⁸⁹ Ibid, p172-173.

²⁹⁰ Edward Krzemien, 'Polityka zagraniczna a groźba ze Wschodu, Niebezpieczne związki' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr 235, 10 July 1993, p. 4; T. Los-Nowak, 'Contemporary Government Attitudes Towards the European Union', in *Poland and the European Union*, ed. K. Cordell (London 2000).

²⁹¹Ibid, p17-18.

²⁹² A. Szczerbiak, 'Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership in Poland', in 2000), p6.

But relations between Poland and the EU were not unproblematic. Poland's trade deficit with the Union persisted: in the first quarter of 1994 Polish exports to the EU amounted to USD 2.1 million while EU imports to Poland were valued at USD 2.4 million. The Poles frequently voiced their views on the shortcomings of the integration process, the lack of a clear accession timetable being their main concern. During the November 1993 Inauguration Session of the Joint Polish-EU Parliamentary Commission, for example, Andrzej Olechowski called for an unambiguous confirmation of the CEECs' future membership status.²⁹³

Matters did not improve when in June 1994, during the talks to establish an early warning system on trade barriers, the EU refused to accept Polish proposals for agricultural price subsidies.²⁹⁴ The Poles were also disappointed not to be invited to the December 1994 European Council at Essen. The Polish Ambassador to the EU, Jan Kułakowski, claimed that the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl had previously 'led him to believe' that Poland would be asked to participate.²⁹⁵

The Essen summit was a key milestone in the accession process in that it saw the formal launch of the pre-accession strategy, which marked the start of the practical implementation of the accession criteria defined at Copenhagen.²⁹⁶ Initially proposed by the Commission in June 1994, the strategy document was entitled 'Strategy for Preparing Central and Eastern European Countries for Future Accession to the European Union'. The document proposed the preparation of a white paper on the expansion of the single market, the development of a strategy on agriculture, adjustments to the PHARE program, cooperation in areas of foreign policy and justice and home affairs (the so-called

²⁹³ 'Inauguration Session of the Joint Parliamentary Commission of the Republic of Poland and the European Union', Warsaw, November 29, 1993, *Zbiór Dokumentów*, nr.4, 1993.

²⁹⁴ 'Unia przeciw opłatom wyrównawczym' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.146, 25/26 June 1995, p21.

²⁹⁶ A. Mayhew, 'Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and East European Candidate Countries.' (2000), p7.

second and third pillars), the environment²⁹⁷, transport policy, culture, education and training, regional policy, as well as the structured dialogue²⁹⁸, which was defined as: 'the holding of meetings between, on the one hand, the Council of the Union and, on the other hand, all the associated countries of central and eastern Europe on matters of common interest, decided in advance, arising in the Union's areas of competence'.²⁹⁹ This involved an annual invitation of CEE heads of state for the second day of European Council meetings, semi-annual meetings of foreign ministers on second day of General Affairs Council as well as bi-annual joint ministerial meetings in connection with other Council of Ministers' meetings.³⁰⁰ Although the multilateral nature of the structured dialogue addressed the limitations of the bilateral political dialogue provided by Association the CEE participants did not benefit from any decision making powers during the meetings.³⁰¹

The strategy incorporated earlier agreements and commitments such as the Europe Agreements and PHARE, which aimed to set a framework for the adaptation of accession requirements, with the addition of the Single Market White Paper and the Structured Dialogue, intended to facilitate the harmonization process with the provision of aid and a framework for multilateral discussion.³⁰² As Heather Grabbe has pointed out, while the strategy provided detailed legislative adaptation measures it only did so in limited policy areas, focusing primarily on the liberalization of external economic relations and creating the conditions for free movement of industrial goods, services and, to some extent capital. It did not however, address

²⁹⁷ Borkowski, p621, Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Effects of the Europe Agreement on the Polish Economy and Pre-Accession Challenges', p130.

²⁹⁸ Borkowski, p622

²⁹⁹ 'Strategy for Preparing Central and Eastern European Countries for Future Accession to the European Union', quoted in Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 1997, p130.

³⁰⁰ M. A. Rupp, 'The pre-accession strategy and the governmental structures of the Visegrad countries', in Back to Europe. Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union., ed. K. Henderson (London 1999), p94.

³⁰¹ Gower, p10.

³⁰² H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, 'Central and east European views on EU enlargement: political debates and public opinion', in *Ibid*, p11.

agricultural policy³⁰³ and the free movement of labour, both of critical importance to Poland. Moreover, it did not provide a timetable for the adaptation of the requirements.³⁰⁴

The Single Market White Paper was accepted by the Cannes European Council in June 1995.³⁰⁵ It covered the following policy areas: free movement of capital, free movement and safety of industrial products, social policy and action, agriculture, transport, audiovisual, environment, telecoms, taxation, free movement of persons, public procurement, and financial services.³⁰⁶ Rather than list all regulations and directives required for internal market adaptation it provided a guide to the legal framework which the candidate states were expected to adopt.³⁰⁷ In each policy area the required legislation was divided into 'Stage 1' measures, deemed essential to single market implementation and 'Stage 2' measures, which contained detailed rules for implementation. Although some sequencing between the policy areas was recommended it was left up to the applicant states to prioritize the implementation of the harmonization measures.³⁰⁸

The White Paper also emphasized that creation of conditions for single market must go beyond legislative approximation and include the creation of adequate structures for regulation, implementation and enforcement to ensure that legislation was effective. It also underscored the need for effective administrative and legal institutions and a pool of appropriately trained officials.³⁰⁹ The Paper extended the conditionality of the Association Agreements to a large number of new policy areas. Unlike the Association

³⁰³ Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Effects of the Europe Agreement on the Polish Economy and Pre-Accession Challenges', p130.

³⁰⁴ Grabbe, 'A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants', p11.

³⁰⁵ Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Effects of the Europe Agreement on the Polish Economy and Pre-Accession Challenges', p131.

³⁰⁶ Grabbe, 'A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants', p11.

³⁰⁷ Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Effects of the Europe Agreement on the Polish Economy and Pre-Accession Challenges', p131.

³⁰⁸ Grabbe, 'A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants', p12.

³⁰⁹ Gower, p8-10.

Treaty it was not legally binding³¹⁰ but the Commission declared the applicants' progress in its implementation as a key measure of their readiness for accession³¹¹ thereby making its requirements a key concern for CEE decision-makers and granting it a wide ranging impact on domestic legislation even before the EU confirmed a schedule for the start of accession negotiations.

The White Paper suffered from several shortcomings. Firstly, the accession conditions for some policy areas, such as the environment, were more stringent than those required of existing member states. Secondly, the policy scope of the White Paper was selective in that by focusing on the single market it addressed only some aspects of the *acquis* and of the broader conditions outlined at Essen. Even within the Single Market area the Paper provided detailed requirements for only two of the 'Four Freedoms': the movement of goods and capital. The movement of services was addressed in a limited manner and the White Paper did not tackle the politically sensitive issue of the free movement of labour.³¹² Lastly, although it was recommending extensive policy reform to the CEECs the EU was not willing to commit to clear timelines around either the negotiations or actual accession.³¹³

Nonetheless, the EU continued to put in place the steps needed to start negotiations. The December 1995 Madrid European Council requested the Commission to prepare opinions on the membership applications and on the impact enlargement would have on the EU's budget and policies.³¹⁴ The Madrid Council also established additional membership criteria including the development of the applicants' market economies, adjustment of their administrative structures and the creation of a stable economic and monetary

³¹⁰ de Boer-Ashworth, p121.

³¹¹ Grabbe, 'A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants', p12.

³¹² Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Effects of the Europe Agreement on the Polish Economy and Pre-Accession Challenges', p131.

³¹³ Ibid, p132.

³¹⁴ Mayhew, 'Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and East European Candidate Countries', p7.

environment.³¹⁵ In spite of repeated requests from the Polish side however the EU continued to refrain from making a firm commitment on an enlargement timetable. The lack of a clear accession timetable, as well as the growing trade deficit and the practical limitations of the structural dialogue were all raised by the Polish Foreign Affairs Minister Bartoszewski during a July 1995 meeting with the head of the European Commission, Jacques Santer. Although Santer responded that he expected negotiations to start in 1997, he once again refused to formally commit to a time table.³¹⁶

Within the EU meanwhile, the enlargement project confronted decision makers with the need to reform its internal structures in order to facilitate a significantly larger number of member states and the mid-1990 saw extensive debate on this subject.³¹⁷ The Union also moved closer towards monetary union and in 1997 the Stability and Growth Pact was introduced. The pact, founded on articles 99 and 104 of the Treaty of European Union specifying that that a government whose budget deficit exceeds 3% of GDP or whose public debt exceeds 60% of GDP may be required to correct the situation and may be subject to sanctions and penalties if it fails to do so.³¹⁸ The convergence criteria had a strong influence on Polish monetary policy. The need to adhere to the criteria was emphasized in the National Integration Strategy document of 1997³¹⁹ and the requirement to limit public debt to 60% of GDP was seen to be important enough for Poland to take the unorthodox step of including it in its new constitution.³²⁰

As part of the preparation of the *avis*, or its opinion of the candidates' readiness for enlargement requested by the Madrid Council, on April 26th 1996 the

³¹⁵ Avery and Fraser.

³¹⁶ Małgorzata Alterman, 'Minister Bartoszewski w Brukseli, Czekamy na sygnał z Europy' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.166, 19 July 1995, p7.

³¹⁷ Krystyna Grzybowska, 'Jakie Centrum Europy' *Rzeczpospolita*, 07 September; Maria Wągrowska, 'Strategia dla Europy Środkowej Nie Wystarcza' *Rzeczpospolita*, 28 November 1994, Gower, p10-11.

³¹⁸ McNamara, 2005.

³¹⁹ Kuzińska.

³²⁰ Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, section X, Art.216, par.5, <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/polski/kon1.htm>, last accessed 8 June 2009, Hausner, *Przystąpienie czy Integracja? Polska droga do Unii Europejskiej*, A. K. Piasecki, *Referenda w III RP* (Warszawa 2005).

Commission issued the candidate states with detailed questionnaires concerning macroeconomic indicators, customs and tax policies, employment and welfare, the state of industry and agriculture, compatibility of their legislative systems with that of the EU as well as foreign policy, and justice and home affairs.³²¹ The Polish response was prepared within three months of receipt of the questionnaire and the *avis* was presented to the Council of Ministers in July of 1997³²² as part of 'Agenda 2000', which dealt with wide-ranging EU reforms concerning areas such as the 2000-6 financial framework, structural funds, Common Agricultural Policy reform and enlargement.³²³

The opinion for Poland was based on a range of information sources including the April 1996 questionnaire response, bilateral meetings as well as reports from Member State embassies, the Commission's Warsaw delegation as well as other international and non-governmental organizations. The *avis* was structured around the Copenhagen criteria but the fulfilment of Association Agreement requirements and the White Paper recommendations were also used as benchmarks for the Commission's assessment.³²⁴ Although none of the candidates were deemed to have met the Copenhagen criteria³²⁵ the Commission's assessment of Poland's ability to do so in the medium term was positive and it recommended to the Council that 'negotiations for accession should be opened with Poland'.³²⁶ While an important step towards the start of negotiations at this stage the recommendation required Council approval, which would eventually be granted in December 1997. Agenda 2000 also included an expanded pre-accession strategy³²⁷ and a study assessing the consequences of enlargement. The benefits of enlargement outlined in the study included a strengthening of the EU's over-all position in global markets,

³²¹ R. Stawarska, 'Economics of the EU Enlargement: the Positive Case', *Yearbook of Polish European Studies*, 2, (1998), p142.

³²² Mayhew, 'Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and East European Candidate Countries', p7.

³²³ Gower, p12.

³²⁴ de Boer-Ashworth, p122.

³²⁵ Gower, p13-14.

³²⁶ de Boer-Ashworth, p122.

³²⁷ Borkowski, p622.

enrichment of its human potential in highly qualified labour, a positive impact of the CEECs geographic position on transport, energy transit and communications as well as those arising from the significant natural resources of the acceding states. The study also pointed out however that enlargement would require substantial sectoral and regional adjustment, although it was forecast that by the time of accession the implementation of the Europe Agreements would have led to considerable progress in integrating the EU and candidate markets.³²⁸

The summer of 1997 also saw the culmination of the negotiations leading to the Treaty of Amsterdam. The resulting treaty fell short of expectations in that far-reaching institutional reform was postponed until one year before the EU would expand to reach 20 member states.³²⁹ Limited extension of qualified majority voting was introduced but no modifications were made to the vote weighting procedures.³³⁰ One important adjustment approved during the Amsterdam Council was the incorporation of the Schengen Agreement, dealing with the removal of systematic border controls, into the *acquis*. Until this time Schengen had been a separate agreement between five EU member states. Its incorporation into the *acquis* meant that the candidate states would eventually be required to implement it along with the rest of European legislation.

The Polish side meanwhile continued with the legal and institutional adjustments required to meet the association and membership requirements. In 1995 the Polish cabinet issued directive 133/95, concerning the implementation of obligations required for participation in the Single Market, specifying the tasks which individual ministries and other governmental institutions would need to complete in order to align with the EU's requirements. New laws

³²⁸ Avery and Fraser.

³²⁹ Gower, p12, Borkowski, p622.

³³⁰ Gower, p12.

liberalizing the sale of land to foreigners were also introduced, albeit with much opposition from the *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*.³³¹

On 14 March 1995 the *sejm* requested the Cabinet to develop a pre-accession strategy by January 1997.³³² The 'National Strategy for Integration', published in the summer of 1997, outlined the strategic directions and objectives of Poland's accession. Framed around the Copenhagen criteria it provided a high level description of the tasks required for the adjustment process.³³³ The Strategy provided only a brief and general overview of Poland's integration challenges. Presented from the standpoint of accession being a given, it did not forecast the costs and benefits that would result from Poland not joining the EU. It also outlined the main challenges to accession, the weak preparation of Polish administrative staff and limited training potential being salient concerns.³³⁴

The mid-1990's saw extensive reform in Poland's institutional structures. Regarding European integration the most significant institutional change during this period was the establishment of the Committee for European Integration (*Komitet Integracji Europejskiej, KIE*).³³⁵ By 1994 it was clear that the existing institutional structures were not adequate for effective co-ordination of Poland's integration effort. The Office of the Plenipotentiary for European Integration, a part of the Council of Ministers,³³⁶ was responsible for this task until the establishment of the *KIE*. The Office came under increasing criticism for failing to protect Polish interests under the Association Agreement. In September 1994 the Supreme Chamber of Control (*Najwyższa Izba Kontroli, NIK*) presented the Parliamentary Commission for the Association Agreements with a report assessing the performance of the Plenipotentiary for European

³³¹ Tadeusz Samborski, 57th session, day 2, 25.08.1995, *Sprawozdanie ministra spraw wewnętrznych z realizacji w 1994 r. ustawy z dnia 24 marca 1920 r. o nabywaniu nieruchomości przez cudzoziemców* (druk nr 937).

³³² Kuzinska.

³³³ Komitet Integracji Europejskiej. 1997. *Narodowa Strategia Integracji*. Warsaw: UKIE, de Boer-Ashworth, p121.

³³⁴ Hausner, *Przystąpienie czy Integracja? Polska droga do Unii Europejskiej*, p148.

³³⁵ Sanford, p791.

³³⁶ J. Borkowski, 'Co-ordination of Poland's European Integration Policy', *Yearbook of Polish European Studies*, 2, (1998), p52.

Integration over the period from 1991 to 1993. The issues highlighted in the report included under-staffing, insufficient resources and critically, the lack of formal authority to co-ordinate the harmonization effort and ensure efficient implementation of the Association Treaty in relevant ministries.³³⁷ Although the Plenipotentiary did have ministerial rank, he could only participate in Cabinet meetings if invited to do so.³³⁸ Moreover, the only mechanism by which he could introduce policy change was a 3-year, pre-approved programme of action, which in effect meant that he lacked the means to adjust the course of integration policy. Lastly, it was only in March 1994 that it became compulsory for new legislation to be approved by the Plenipotentiary for compatibility with EU regulations and until this time the Office of the Plenipotentiary had very little impact on both the economic and legal aspects of the integration process. Due to the lack of an effective formal co-ordination mechanism, an informal cooperation process between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the Plenipotentiary for European Integration and the Ministry for Foreign Trade Cooperation developed in the form of the so-called Committee of Three. The Committee of Three produced most of the strategic documentation required for cooperation with the EU, including the membership application.

The legislation establishing the Committee for European Integration came into force on 8 August 1996, as part of a broader programme of state administration reforms carried out in 1996 and 1997.³³⁹ On 14 October 1996 President Kwaśniewski appointed Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz as head of the *KIE*. Danuta Hubner, previously responsible for Poland's OECD membership negotiations, took on the post of *KIE* Secretary.³⁴⁰ The Committee was charged with the co-ordination of Poland's integration efforts, the harmonization of Polish legislation to European standards, and the administration of foreign aid.³⁴¹

³³⁷ Ibid, p52.

³³⁸ Ibid., p52.

³³⁹ Hausner, *Przystąpienie czy Integracja? Polska droga do Unii Europejskiej*, p148.

³⁴⁰ Bernadeta Waszkiewicz, 'Premier na czele Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej' *Rzeczpospolita*, 15 October 1996.

³⁴¹ Borkowski, 'Co-ordination of Poland's European Integration Policy', p52.

The *KIE* consisted of a chairperson, a secretary and committee members, who were the ministers of foreign affairs, internal affairs, economy and finance, environment and natural resources, work and social policy, agriculture and food industry, and justice. The Prime Minister could appoint three further members whose expertise would aid the realization of the Committee's tasks.

The head of the central bank and the chair of the governmental Centre for Strategic Studies could also participate. Decisions were to be made by consensus or majority vote when consensus was not reached.³⁴²

According to the 'National Strategy for Integration' the integration process was to be structured on three levels: strategic, which was to be overseen by the *KIE*, operational, which lay in the realm of Secretaries or Under-Secretaries of State charged with integration matters in respective ministries and lastly the working level, which was to be implemented by Chiefs of Units within departments and sections of their respective ministries and offices. While outlining the responsibilities of the *KIE* the legislation did not however define the instruments of inter-ministerial co-ordination which the Committee could use to enforce integration requirements.³⁴³ For the time being the lack of such a definition did not present extensive problems since the appointment of the prime minister as head of the Committee provided it with sufficient authority for effective co-ordination.

As Hubner argued during an interview for the *Rzeczpospolita* daily shortly after her appointment, this institutional set up had several important benefits. Its broad structure allowed for a horizontal co-ordination of all actions, the ministerial rank of the members meant that it did not have to wait for the approval of the cabinet, and it allowed for both the over-seeing of day to day

³⁴² Ustawa 8 sierpnia 1996 r. o Komitecie Integracji Europejskiej, *Rzeczpospolita*, 6 September 1996.

³⁴³ Borkowski, 'Co-ordination of Poland's European Integration Policy', 1998.

policy implementation of the integration process as well as for a long term strategy function.³⁴⁴

The appointment of the Prime Minister as chair of the committee was important in that it facilitated co-ordination between all the relevant ministries. The PM was senior enough to ensure that the integration process did not get 'hijacked' by the interests of the individual ministries. Cimoszewicz explained his rationale for personally leading the *KIE* as follows:

I decided that a very strong co-ordination centre was needed since traditionally, Polish ministers did not need to work together. There was hence a significant danger that they would behave traditionally, that is defend their competences. So I decided that the Committee should be led by someone whose constitutional position is higher than those ministers, and this is why I took on the leadership of the Committee; and I believe that this is how things should remain in Poland for a long time.³⁴⁵

It cannot be disputed that the appointment of the Prime Minister as the chairperson of the *KIE* vested the Committee with sufficient authority to ensure that the integration process progressed efficiently. But the institutional set up appears to have also been motivated by political reasons. Throughout the Oleksy and Cimoszewicz cabinets foreign policy making gradually shifted away from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards the Prime Minister and the Presidential Chancellery. As Józef Oleksy stated:

I am very comfortable in this area and at a time so important for Poland, in the day before her integration with Europe, I intend to intensify my efforts in the international arena...President Kwaśniewski will also

³⁴⁴ Danuta Hubner, interviewed by Zygmunt Słomkowski, 'Ostatnie Przygotowania do decydujących negocjacji' *Rzeczpospolita*, nr.290, 12 December 1996, p11.

³⁴⁵ Interview with Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 21 July 1998.

be very active in foreign policy as he is knowledgeable in this area.³⁴⁶

He described the role of the Minister of Foreign Affairs as follows: 'It is enough that he is a perfect manager of the diplomatic service and coordinator of foreign policy between the centres of power'.³⁴⁷

According to Piotr Nowina-Konopka and Jerzy Osiatyński of the *Unia Wolności*, the Committee was intended to duplicate the functions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Another liberal, Bronisław Geremek, made similar claims.

According to Geremek, the policy making role of Dariusz Rosatti, who headed Foreign Affairs at the time, was very limited and foreign policy was formulated primarily by Kwaśniewski and Cimoszewicz.³⁴⁸

Indeed, Dariusz Rosatti appears to have been relegated to the role of a glorified administrator rather than key policy maker. The establishment of the Committee for European Integration, while certainly providing an efficient institutional structure for the integration process, was also motivated by internal power struggles within the SLD's desire to shift power away from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards the Prime Minister's chancellery.

Rosatti eventually voiced concerns about the persistent lack of co-ordination among the different policy making centres: 'In effect Poland is perceived as a country in which several institutions, acting in a chaotic manner and often in competition with each other, are not building the image of a solid state but undermining it'³⁴⁹ he stated during a press interview.

From its inception therefore, the Committee for European Integration was influenced by power struggles between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the

³⁴⁶ Józef Oleksy, quoted in Edward Krzemień, 'Premier wysoko ceni swe talenty dyplomatyczne', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.279, 01 December 1995, p3.

³⁴⁷ Józef Oleksy, quoted in Edward Krzemień, 'Premier wysoko ceni swe talenty dyplomatyczne', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.279, 01 December 1995, p3.

³⁴⁸ 'Euro-Polacy', *Wprost*, nr.19 (753), 1105.97.

³⁴⁹ Dariusz Rosatti quoted in Stanisław Janecki, 'Dyplomacja Kolegów' *Wprost*, nr.19 (753), 11 May 1997, p21-22.

Prime Minister. As chapter five will show, these problems were exacerbated when following Solidarity's return to power Prime Minister Buzek delegated the running of the *KIE* to Ryszard Czarnecki of the euro-sceptic Christian-Nationalist Faction.

In parallel to consolidating its relations with the EU Poland also made progress in integration with other Western structures. In December 1996 NATO formally announced its intention to enlarge by its 50th anniversary in May 1998 and in July 1997 Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were formally invited to join the Alliance.³⁵⁰ In 1995 Poland became a member of the World Trade Organization and in 1996 it joined the OECD. Regional co-operation came to a stall however with the January 1994 Czech declaration that the Visegrad agreement had become 'obsolete'.³⁵¹ Some progress was made in further trade liberalization within the Central European Free Trade Association.³⁵²

European integration in political debate

The *sejm* brought about by the 19 September 1993 parliamentary contest was as much a result of electoral choice as of the new legislation introducing representation thresholds of 5% for political parties and 8% for electoral coalitions. The *SLD* and *PSL* were the two biggest winners, respectively attaining 171 and 132 out of the 460 available seats.³⁵³ The new electoral legislation meant that a ruling coalition could be formed on the basis of less than 36% of cast votes, just over 1% more than the 35% of votes that did not result in representation.³⁵⁴ While the new law hence served to temporarily consolidate the make-up of the parliament it also disenfranchised a large proportion of the electorate.³⁵⁵ None of the smaller groupings positioned on the

³⁵⁰ 'Deklaracja Madrycka na Temat Euro-Atlantyckiego Bezpieczeństwa i Współpracy Przyjęta przez Szefów Państw i Rządów Uczestniczących w Posiedzeniu Rady Północnoatlantyckiej', Madryt, 8 Lipca 1997r, Zbiór Dokumentów, nr. 3, 1997, p234.

³⁵¹ Meiklejohn Terry, p33.

³⁵² Ibid, p33.

³⁵³ Ka-lok Chan, p123.

³⁵⁴ Ibid, p139.

³⁵⁵ K. Dawisha, 'Electocracies and the Hobbesian Fishbowl of Postcommunist Politics', *East European Politics and Societies*, 13, 2 (1999), 256-270, p256.

Solidarity-successor right such as the Christian Nationalist Faction, the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland, Centre Accord or Solidarity attained representation. Their vocal doubts about the benefits of European integration, so prominent during the debates on Regionalization and the Association Treaty described in the previous chapter, would be absent from parliamentary debate for the forthcoming four years. Moreover, none of these groupings would participate in key decisions about Poland's integration strategy.

1993 parliamentary election

Key issues addressed during the 1993 campaign were the direction of economic reform, relations between Church and state, de-communization as well as foreign policy including relations with the EU, NATO and Russia. The social cost of economic transition lay at the heart of the campaign and parties perceived not to bear responsibility for the harsh reforms such as the *SLD*, *PSL* and the centre-left Labour Union were able to capitalize.³⁵⁶ The *SLD*'s core electorate consisted of those most disadvantaged by the transformation. While advocating a continuation of market reforms the *SLD* advocated a slower approach and placed much emphasis on workers' rights, an approach strongly supported by the *OPZZ* trade union which with 61 parliamentary seats³⁵⁷ was the *SLD*'s second largest member organization after the *PZPR*-successor *Socjal-Demokracja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Unia Demokratyczna*, most closely associated with the 'Shock Therapy' reforms continued to advocate a laissez-faire economic approach and attained only 11% of the vote which translated into 16% of parliamentary seats. The other liberal grouping, *Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny*, did not attain representation.

Name of grouping	Percentage of votes	Percentage of parliamentary seats
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	20.41%	37.17%

³⁵⁶ J. Nagle, Democracy and Democratization. Post-Communist Europe in Comparative Perspective (London 1999), p399-402.

³⁵⁷ Ibid, p399.

Name of grouping	Percentage of votes	Percentage of parliamentary seats
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	15.4%	28.69%
Unia Demokratyczna	10.59%	16.07%
Unia Pracy	7.28%	8.91%
Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej	5.77%	4.78%
Bezpartyjny Blok Wsparcia Reform	5.41%	3.48%
Mniejszość Niemiecka (German Minority)	0.62%	0.9% ³⁵⁸
Narodowy Komitet Wyborczy 'Ojczyzna' (National Electoral Committee 'Fatherland')	6.37%	-
Porozumienie Centrum	4.42%	-
Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny	3.99%	-
Unia Polityki Realnej	3.18%	-
Samoobrona	2.78%	-
Partia 'X'	2.74%	-
Other	6.14%	

Table 1: Electoral results of the 1993 parliamentary election, September 1993.³⁵⁹

Relations between Church and state as well as the growing political presence of the successors of the *ancien régime* were a frequent subject of vocal and emotive rhetoric from Solidarity-successor right parties such as the *Porozumienie Centrum*, Christian-Nationalist Faction³⁶⁰ and the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland.³⁶¹ The Centre Accord, for example, claimed that the Church was being 'vehemently attacked by left-wing and post-communist environments'³⁶² and declared that it was vital that Poland return to its righteous, Catholic moral order, which, the PC claimed, would facilitate a strict reckoning with the perpetrators of communist regime. 'Those who have

³⁵⁸ Parties representing ethnic minorities were exempt from the 5% threshold.

³⁵⁹ A.Dudek, Pierwsze Lata III Rzeczypospolitej, (Kracow 2005), p326.

³⁶⁰ Program Wyborczy Zjednoczenia Chrześcijańsko-Narodowego, 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁶¹ 'Ruch dla Rzeczypospolitej. Program społeczno-gospodarczy', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁶² 'Porozumienie Centrum - Zjednoczenie Polskie Program Wyborczy 1993', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

committed crimes must be rid of their privileges and removed from civil service'³⁶³, its programme stated.

The *SLD* meanwhile was emphatically opposed to the use of Catholic doctrine in politics and warned against the creation of a state where: 'Catholic doctrine holds the monopoly for truth, righteousness, morality and ethics, and where the law is based on decisions of the clergy and religious norms. Intolerance and a growing feeling of threat among minorities develop in such an atmosphere.'³⁶⁴ As could be expected given its communist heritage, the Alliance's program did not extensively address the issue of lustration. It did however ask the electorate not to allow 'historic slogans and sentiments become a barrier to a reasonable compromise in the interest of our Polish matters'.³⁶⁵

European integration was a prominent topic in the 1993 campaign. With the exception of the *BBWR* and *NSZZ Solidarność* all major groupings presented a stance on Europe. Although none declared explicit opposition to European integration most of the parties on the Catholic right were increasingly sceptical about the benefits of both association and EU membership. Their lukewarm support was heavily qualified with calls for a slow down to the integration process, re-negotiation of the Association Agreements and the need to protect the Polish economy from Western competition. Concerns for the impact of accession on Polish sovereignty were also prominent. Doubts about European integration expressed during the 1993 campaign did not however translate into parliamentary debate as with the exception of the *KPN* none of the euro-sceptic groupings were represented in the 1993-7 *sejm*.

The Christian Nationalist Faction participated in the 1993 contest as part of the Catholic Electoral Committee 'Motherland' (*Katolicki Komitet Wyborczy 'Ojczyzna'*, *KKWO*). The Committee also included the *PChD* and the

³⁶³ 'Porozumienie Centrum - Zjednoczenie Polskie Program Wyborczy 1993', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁶⁴ 'Deklaracja Wyborcza Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

Conservative Party (*Partia Konserwatywna*) alongside a few smaller Catholic-nationalist organizations. As could be expected from a coalition dominated by Christian-nationalist groupings most KKWO's members were sceptical about integration. The Committee's programme made only a brief reference to foreign policy, stating that it should be based on Poland's 'national and state interest'.³⁶⁶ A closer inspection of the individual Committee members' programmes however reveals discrepancies in its members' views on European integration.

As could be expected, the ZChN was sceptical of EC membership and section IV.11 of its programme called for a cautious approach to European integration:

'We should abandon the orthodox approach in pushing for a quick entry of Poland to the European Communities. We have warned that their stance is egotistic. In light of the recession Western Europe is not enthusiastic about accepting Polish goods, it makes use of restrictions for the so-called sensitive goods....we must use those measures included in the Association Agreement which will allow for the protection of Polish interests'.³⁶⁷

Although the ZChN did not explicitly oppose membership in the European Community it argued that the integration process should be slowed down so as to protect Polish industry. As an alternative to closer integration with Western Europe it proposed regional cooperation with other post-communist states and with the USA.³⁶⁸

The Conservative Party, another KKWO member, was similarly sceptical about EC membership. Its programme stated:

'The Conservative Party does not oppose Polish participation in the process of economic unification of Europe. It does not accept, however, plans to surrender

³⁶⁶ Broszura Wyborcza KKK 'Ojczyzna', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁶⁷ Program Wyborczy Zjednoczenia Chrześcijańsko-Narodowego, 1993, section IV.11 Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁶⁸ Ibid. section V.

the sovereignty of the Polish Republic...we believe that the unification of nations in a homogenous European organism is an unnatural concept, threatening to encourage rather than diminish conflicts.'³⁶⁹

A very different stance was presented by the *Partia Chrześcijańskich Demokratów*. Traditionally pro-integrationist, the *PChD* maintained its support for EC membership during the 1993 campaign. Section 77.1 of its programme stated:

'Developing legal, economic and social frameworks for Polish entry to the European Community should be a priority in Polish foreign policy. Quick association with the European Community and economic co-operation with the countries belonging to EFTA are necessary, however, on the basis of asymmetries allowing for a gradual adaptation of Polish industry to international competition. In order to intensify this process the harmonization of the necessary legislation with the norms and directives operating in the EC should be expedited.'³⁷⁰

Although it emphasized the need to protect domestic industry, the *PChD* supported Poland's membership in the EU. In contrast to the Conservatives and Christian-nationalists' calls for slower integration, the *Partia Chrześcijańskich Demokratów* argued that harmonization measures needed for accession should be implemented as soon as possible.

Concerns about the impact of European integration were also evident in the stance of the Centre Accord. While declaring support for accession the *PC* emphasized the need to protect Polish interests. Its programme stated: 'It lies in our national interest to harmonize accession with the European Economic Community with domestic policy and respect for national values and traditions. Our diplomacy should be tough in defending the national interest of

³⁶⁹ 'Polska 1993: Propozycja Konserwatywna', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁷⁰ 'Deklaracja Programowa Partii Chrześcijańskich Demokratów', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

Polish agriculture and industry during negotiations with the EEC'.³⁷¹ The PC also advocated the use of trade barriers to protect Polish industry from foreign competition. Concerning agriculture, it emphasized the need to: 'protect Poland from the unfair competition and the flood of subsidized products from the European Economic Community and the post-Soviet territories and the simultaneous closure of Western markets to Polish foodstuffs'.³⁷² Its programme further called for the adjustment of the level of Polish agricultural subsidies to those of the EU.

Ruch dla Rzeczypospolitej (Movement for the Polish Republic, *RdR*) established by Jan Olszewski in December 1993 was markedly sceptical about integration and called for the renegotiation of the Association Agreement. The *RdR* argued:

Integration in the form of membership in the European Community, as specified by the Association Agreements, will not occur quickly and the conditions on which it is expected to take place can be hardly thought of as beneficial. The negative economic and political effects may already be observed today.³⁷³

RdR also emphasized the importance of Polish traditions, Catholicism, family values as well as the importance of 'ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious unity' of Polish society. National sovereignty was very much a priority for the Movement. According to section 6.10.3 of its programme, 'the greatest threat for us is yet another Russo-German domination'.³⁷⁴

Although it did not make explicit reference to relations with the EU *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej* emphasized the need to ensure that Poland remained independent from foreign capital and called for a renegotiation of 'agreements

³⁷¹ Program Wyborczy Porozumienia Centrum, 1993 Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁷² Ibid.

³⁷³ 'Ruch dla Rzeczypospolitej. Program społeczno-gospodarczy', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

with international institutions', presumably referring to the Association Treaty.³⁷⁵

The agrarian *Samoobrona* (Self-defence) was also sceptical about European integration. Registered as a political party in 1992 under the leadership of Andrzej Lepper *Samoobrona* begun as an agrarian protest movement opposed to 'foreign-imposed reforms'. Adamantly nationalist and often anti-Semitic, *Samoobrona* warned against the adverse impact of international organizations, accused the existing political elite of introducing an 'anti-national, anti-Polish development path on the orders of foreign superiors'.³⁷⁶ Stanislaw Skalski, one of *Samoobrona*'s candidates for the *sejm*, declared: 'There is no democracy in Poland. There is only Jewocracy'.³⁷⁷

Regarding economic policy, *Samoobrona* proposed increased state intervention to protect domestic industry and agriculture. It called for a rejection of the: 'dogmatic thinking, aimed to subject Poland to foreign interests and foreign habits, and a surrender of sovereignty and the integration of Poland into the "European Soviets", a great, bureaucratized machine governed by international financiers'.³⁷⁸ But Self-Defence did not explicitly oppose European integration. Instead, it declared its support for the 'Europe of Nations': 'Fully recognizing the need for European integration' its programme stated, 'we cannot agree to Poland's accession to the EEC on the conditions dictated to a dependent. We stand for a Europe of Nations...We reject the notion of limiting national sovereignty and identity as it is just an incarnation of the Brezhnev doctrine'.³⁷⁹

Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe campaigned on a conservative, religious platform. Its programme emphasized the vital role which the Polish smallholder played in

³⁷⁵ Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej, 'Materiały Wyborcze', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁷⁶ Może, a wiec musi być lepiej. Krajowy Komitet Wyborczy Samoobrona - Leppera. Materiały Programowe', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁷⁷ Stanislaw Skalski, Self-Defence 1993 *sejm* candidate, quoted in Ka-Lok Chan, p153.

³⁷⁸ Może, a wiec musi być lepiej. Krajowy Komitet Wyborczy Samoobrona - Leppera. Materiały Programowe', 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁷⁹ Ibid.

protecting Poland's national sovereignty and the consequent need for state aid to said smallholder. The Agrarians' stance on European integration was ambiguous. For example, section 20 of their programme stated: 'Poland's civilisational aspirations and its central geographic location constitute fundamental reasons for the development of international cooperation, above all with states of the European Economic Community. Poland should find its place in a unified, European economic area'.³⁸⁰

The very next section of the programme was less enthusiastic however. It stated: 'Full membership in the EC is a matter for the future. A lot can change. We treat the current Association Agreement with the EEC as an initial step, which does not decide anything'.³⁸¹ The Agrarians tried to be all things to all voters; while never explicitly supportive of accession they also never declared opposition to EC membership.

A large part of the *PSL*'s programme was devoted to calls for Western financial aid. It made repeated requests for a 'new Marshall Plan' for Eastern Europe and argued that Poland should seek reparations for the losses it incurred during World War II:

Poland has a special, moral right to seek aid from Europe. We made a tremendous contribution to the victory against the forces which launched World War II, without ever receiving war reparations. The level of the reparations, which we should receive, is estimated at several hundred million dollars. Currently, a new world order is developing and various accounts are being settled, it would be just to grant Poland aid necessary for it to lift itself out of the backwardness for which it is not responsible'.³⁸²

In contrast to its future coalition partner the rhetoric of the *SLD* was increasingly pro-integrationist. As it re-defined its political identity from a

³⁸⁰ Program Wyborczy Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego, 1993, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁸¹ Ibid.

³⁸² Ibid.

successor of the authoritarian Polish United Workers Party to a modern, social democratic grouping the *SLD*'s support for a united Europe grew stronger. Its programme stated: 'Integration with the European Communities is necessary'. But the Alliance also underscored the importance of Poland's relationship with the post-Soviet bloc: 'Our position in the West is closely related to the development of good, equal political and economic relations with the East'.³⁸³

The *SLD*'s euro-enthusiasm was not matched by an economic policy proposition that was aligned with the liberal economic requirements of the Association Agreement however. The Alliance emphasized a more gradual approach to economic reform and the need to protect the most vulnerable sections of society from the adverse effects of the transformation was a central theme of its campaign. It advocated greater state intervention in the economy, a slower privatization programme as well as increased subsidies for state industries.³⁸⁴

While supportive of European integration, the centre-left *Unia Pracy* emphasized the need to protect Polish national interest and 'dignity'.³⁸⁵ It expressed support for the continuation of integration efforts but also made it clear that in its view 'until now Polish policy towards the EEC has been too submissive and has not protected Polish economic interests to a sufficient extent'.³⁸⁶

The liberal parties, *Unia Demokratyczna* and *Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny*, continued to present an enthusiastically pro-integrationist stance. The *UD* declared:

The search for opportunities of growth and security ties us to the European Community and to NATO. For

³⁸³ 'Program Sojuszu Lewicy Demokratycznej', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁸⁴ Nagle, p399.

³⁸⁵ 'Program Wyborczy Unii Pracy', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

³⁸⁶ 'Program Wyborczy Unii Pracy', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

many years of post-war history the West European structures ensured the security and stable economic situation of the Western part of our continent. They were able to consolidate democratic values, and allowed their members to experience dynamic civilisational and economic growth, preserve peace and establish the basis for stabilization....The Association Agreement with the European Community...constitutes a logical consequence of acknowledging that our choice is that for membership in a world of democracy, peace and economic growth. ³⁸⁷

Once again therefore, the liberals equated European integration with democracy and prosperity. The *UD* presented EU membership as the only way of ensuring Poland's security, peace and economic growth. Rather than as a choice, which could be debated and compared with viable alternatives, the liberals viewed accession as the sole means of successful systemic transition.

Although none of the major parties declared explicit opposition to Poland's integration with the EU the 1993 campaign saw vocal scepticism about both association and membership. Many parties chose to present an ambiguous stance, hedging support for integration with numerous conditions concerning the protection of the Polish economy, sovereignty and national identity. Several groupings, including the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland and the Confederation for Independent Poland, called for a re-negotiation of the Association Agreement. With the exception of the liberals, almost all contestants advocated protectionist economic policies at odds with the EU's requirements of fast paced privatization and state subsidy reductions. Furthermore, while the euro-sceptic parties supported some form of political integration the Europe they indicated the Europe they wished to integrate with was a 'Europe of Nations' which did not impinge on national sovereignty. The kind of integration many Polish politicians had in mind appeared to be very different from that which membership in an increasingly integrated European

³⁸⁷ 'Program Wyborczy Unii Demokratycznej', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1993 election folder.

Union would entail. As most of the small euro-sceptic groupings did not attain sufficient votes to cross the representation threshold however their concerns could not be heard in *Sejm*. The lack of parliamentary discord on Europe gave the appearance of a broad elite consensus for accession.

1995 presidential elections

For the Solidarity-successor side of the political spectrum, the 1995 presidential contest presented an opportunity to re-gain political representation and the rhetoric of the 1995 campaign was marked by a growing polarization based on attitudes towards the communist past.³⁸⁸ In order to effectively compete with the *SLD*'s candidate Aleksander Kwaśniewski the numerous right-wing groupings would have had to agree to back a single candidate. While aware of the need to compromise, many right wing leaders aspired to the presidency and the 1995 contest was preceded by several unsuccessful attempts at compromising on a common candidate.³⁸⁹ Kwaśniewski was eventually confronted with as many as eight competitors: Lech Wałęsa, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, Tadeusz Zieliński, Andrzej Lepper, Waldemar Pawlak, Jan Olszewski, Janusz Korwin-Mikke, and Jacek Kuroń. The results of the contest are shown in table 2.

Candidate	1st round results	2nd round result
Aleksander Kwaśniewski	35.11%	51.72%
Lech Wałęsa	33.11%	48.28%
Jacek Kuroń	9.22%	
Jan Olszewski	6.86%	
Waldemar Pawlak	4.31%	
Tadeusz Zieliński	3.53%	
Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz	2.76%	
Janusz Korwin-Mikke	2.40%	
Andrzej Lepper	1.32%	
Others	1.38%	

³⁸⁸ Szczerbiak, 'Dealing with the Communist Past or the Politics of the Present? Lustration in Post-Communist Poland'.

³⁸⁹ Tomasz Sakiewicz, 'Kościół nie dał się Wciągnąć' *Gazeta Polska*, nr.24(110), 24 August 1995.

Table 2: 1995 presidential election results³⁹⁰

While the Solidarity-successors' inability to unite was driven primarily by personal ambitions of its leaders it also reflected genuine ideological differences. These were particularly apparent regarding EU membership, which was frequently addressed during the electoral campaign.

The ZChN backed economist Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz made it clear that it was a 'Europe of Nations' she wanted Poland to join. Her doubts about the EU were made apparent in contrast to her unequivocal support for speedy NATO³⁹¹ membership. Section 1.3 of her programme stated:

Polish accession to the EU should take place on the basis of the respect for the subsidiarity and national and economic interests of our country, which would require e.g. the negotiation of adequately long transition periods to protect some sectors of our economy from the implementation (once in the EU) of all the regulations compulsory for the members of the community....Poland, co-operating with the member states, should support integrationist tendencies, however clearly emphasizing the need to maintain the national character and specificity of the member states of the EU, and with reference to the concept of the 'Europe of Nations'.³⁹²

Janusz Korwin-Mikke of the libertarian *Unia Polityki Realnej* was more sceptical. Although he saw opening up EU markets to Polish imports as beneficial he feared the EU's 'socialist' regulations and a 'vassal' relationship to Brussels. His programme declared:

A positive aspect of acceding to the EU is the opening of European markets to Polish goods. If however we implement all the 'harmonization measures' (European standards, production costs, energy costs etc) which Brussels is currently suggesting to us, then it could turn

³⁹⁰ Millard, Polish Politics and Society, p92.

³⁹¹ Program Wyborczy Hanny Gronkiewicz Waltz, 1995, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.

³⁹² Ibid.

out, that at the time of accession our goods and production will not be at all competitive any more. The invasion of socialism in the form of the social pact and the vassalization of our country to the omnipotent Brussels bureaucracy is no doubt a danger.³⁹³

Korwin-Mikke was also concerned about whether the final outcome of accession negotiations would not be disadvantageous for Poland. Fears of Poland once again becoming subservient to another state lay at the heart of his and other euro-sceptic politicians' doubts about EU membership. Korwin Mikke did not appear to be aware of the fact that Poland would be required to adopt the entire European *acquis* and that it was only the timing around the implementation rather than its contents that would be the subject of negotiation.

Jacek Kuroń, backed by *Unia Wolności*, was very supportive of EU membership. Section V of his programme stated:

Poland, while maintaining its identity, must become a part of the European Communities and NATO. We must strive to this aim with consequence and good planning, without giving in to pressure or blackmail. On this depends our security and the possibility of realizing the most vital interests of the state and the most important aspirations of the nation.³⁹⁴

Once again the liberals hence declared their unequivocal support for the EU. Kuroń saw European integration as vital for Poland. Without membership in these Western organizations, he argued, Poland would not be able to realize its key interests and aspirations.

Several Solidarity-successor candidates chose not to address EU accession at all. Leszek Moczulski, for example, stated that he would 'put foreign and defence

³⁹³ 'Program Wyborczy Janusza Korwin-Mikke', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.

³⁹⁴ 'Program Wyborczy Jacka Kuronia', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.

policy in line with Polish national interest'.³⁹⁵ He did not however, explain what kind of policy this would entail and how it would impact on the approaching EU membership negotiations. Marek Markiewicz, of the *Partia Republikańska*, took a similar approach. While not addressing EU accession directly he did emphasize the need for maintaining Polish independence and promised a 'struggle for sovereignty and the maintenance of national and cultural identity, the construction of a state recognizing moral values and the legacy of Polish national culture'.³⁹⁶

Jan Olszewski of the *Ruch Odbudowy Polski* also did not present a stance on EU accession in his programme. He did, however, express support for NATO membership.³⁹⁷ Olszewski's programme referred to the EU only once, in a section advocating greater use of agricultural subsidies. These, Olszewski argued, would allow Poland to better compete with the EU, third world and post-Soviet markets. His euro-scepticism was reflected in his economic policy. He proposed strongly interventionist and protectionist measures which, if implemented, would have created barriers to Poland's participation in the EU.

Waldemar Pawlak of the *PSL* hedged his bets on the EU. On the one hand, his programme reached out to the euro-enthusiasts claiming that he 'consequently strengthened Poland's place among the free nations of Europe'.³⁹⁸ On the other hand, it asserted that he did so: 'without unnecessary fireworks, but also without begging or hanging at the door-handles of international organizations'.³⁹⁹ Pawlak hence remained ambiguous trying to appeal to both euro-sceptic and euro-enthusiast voters at the same time.

³⁹⁵ 'Program Wyborczy Leszka Moczulskiego - Zobowiązanie Złożone w Państwowej Komisji Wyborczej', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.

³⁹⁶ 'Program Wyborczy Marka Markiewicza', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.

³⁹⁷ 'Program Wyborczy Jana Olszewskiego', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.

³⁹⁸ 'Program Wyborczy Waldemara Pawlaka', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

Samoobrona's Andrzej Lepper was more sceptical. He criticized the prospect of a customs union with the EU and instead proposed increased customs barriers on agricultural goods and the introduction of state funded promotion of Polish products on the world market. Polish peasants, Lepper argued, suffered because of the political elites' compliance with international agreements, especially with the Association Treaties. His programme stated:

The politicians' intention is to diminish the impact of Polish agriculture while simultaneously supporting imports of agricultural products from the European Union. The continuation of this doomed policy will only lead to the collapse of a great number of farms, which will be in accordance with the Association Agreement.⁴⁰⁰

Lepper was sceptical about the acceptance of foreign aid and refused to: 'accept aid from foreign institutions and states which attempt to treat Poland as a pawn in international games or those which try to make us economically or militarily dependant. This has to be clearly stated to protect the national interest and national security of Poland'.⁴⁰¹

In contrast to the agrarian candidates, Aleksander Kwaśniewski was unambiguous in his support for membership in both the European Union and NATO. He did, however, assert that accession should diminish social inequalities and emphasized the need to protect the Polish agricultural sector. His programme stated:

What is most important for the development and economic security of Poland is the accession to the European Union, in parallel to a simultaneous expansion of trade relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We are all entering the Union, the whole society. This cannot be a process limited to the chosen few, while robbing others of work and prospects. Well thought out protectionist measures

⁴⁰⁰ Program Wyborczy Andrzeja Leppera, 1995, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid.

should be provided to Poland's agriculture, so that it should gain access to West European markets on the grounds of fair competition.⁴⁰²

Tadeusz Zieliński, backed by the Labour Union, supported accession but emphasized the need to ensure that: 'the balance of costs and benefits be fair and that Polish national interests are harmoniously incorporated into the structure of supra-national interests.'⁴⁰³ Lech Wałęsa's programme meanwhile gave little indication of the President's views on international affairs. Instead, it concentrated on rebuttals of criticism of Wałęsa causing 'embarrassment'⁴⁰⁴ to Poland and lacking the skills required to be an effective international statesman.

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Parliamentary debate

With the most vocal euro-sceptics out of parliament the main lines of dissent on European integration during the 1993-1997 coalition ran not so much between the government and parliamentary opposition as between the coalition partners themselves and between the Solidarity-successor president. Co-habitation between President Wałęsa and the communist-successor cabinet did not prove easy. In the final year of his presidency Wałęsa's diplomacy became increasingly outspoken. His demands for a speedy acceptance into the EU and NATO on the basis of Poland's sacrifices in the struggle against communism appeared to be calculated more towards attaining popular support at home than towards building sustainable relations with Western partners.⁴⁰⁶

In spite of the President's antics Poland continued to make sound progress towards integration. The EU membership application was not subject to parliamentary ratification although a parliamentary discussion on its

⁴⁰² Program Wyborczy Aleksandra Kwaśniewskiego, 1995, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.

⁴⁰³ Program Wyborczy Tadeusza Zielińskiego, 1995, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.

⁴⁰⁴ Program Lecha Wałęsy, 1995, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995 presidential election folder.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁶ Zubek, 'The Eclipse of Walesa's Political Career', p119-120.

subject in April 1994, lasting less than 30 minutes, did take place. In contrast to the heated discussions on the ratification of the Association Agreement the submission of the membership application was backed by a consensus both within the cabinet and the *Sejm*. The *PSL*, represented by Jan Borkowski, argued that the interests of the Polish farmers would be better protected with the ability to influence EU policy from within. Even the euro-sceptic *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej* supported the application. Other parliamentary groupings, such as *Unia Demokratyczna* and *Unia Pracy*, expressed enthusiastic support. A more vocal debate may have taken place had groupings previously opposed or sceptical towards the Association Agreements been represented in the parliament. Neither the *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*, *Porozumienie Centrum* or *Ruch Odbudowy Polski*, all of which had expressed vocal concerns about integration during the 1993 electoral campaign, could participate in the parliamentary debate. Doubts about European integration, harboured by so many of the solidarity-successor politicians, were not voiced during the membership application debate.

The debate also did not manifest the extent to which the coalition partners lacked consensus on European integration. Although both parties were in principle supportive of accession they never agreed on a common integration policy and Europe continued to cause dissent throughout the *SLD-PSL* coalition.⁴⁰⁷ During the February 1995 cabinet re-shuffle the coalition's lack of consensus on European integration became so problematic that Aleksander Kwaśniewski publicly declared the *SLD* would change its coalition partner were the *PSL* to make Poland's entry to the European Union impossible.⁴⁰⁸

As the *SLD*'s enthusiasm for Europe grew⁴⁰⁹ the agrarians became increasingly concerned about the impact of accession on Poland's economy and national sovereignty. The sale of land to foreigners became a salient concern for the *PSL*,

⁴⁰⁷ Interview with Waldemar Pawlak, 20 July 2005.

⁴⁰⁸ Aleksander Kwaśniewski, quoted in 'SLD, PSL i Europa' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.29, 03 February 1995, p3.

⁴⁰⁹ Address by the President of the Republic of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski before the Chairman and Members of the European Commission Brussels, January 18, 1996, *Zbiór Dokumentów*, nr.1, 1996.

many of whose representatives feared that allowing foreign, and especially German, nationals to buy Polish land might lead to a form of 'economic occupation' by Poland's Western neighbour.

The agrarians' concerns were exemplified during the August 1995 *sejm* debate on new legislation liberalizing the sale of land to foreigners. *PSL* representative Tadeusz Samborski described the issue as a 'national problem' and warned about the large numbers of German citizens ready to buy out Western Poland.⁴¹⁰ *Zielony Sztandar*, a farmers' magazine supportive of the *PSL*, commented on the subject of the sale of land laws as follows: 'All historic patriots, starting with Boleslaw Chrobry,⁴¹¹ are turning in their graves at the news of the *Sejm* accepting such anti-Polish legislation.'⁴¹²

The *PSL*'s critical stance on integration was also apparent during the May 1995 foreign policy debate when the *Stronnictwo* was the only grouping not voting in support of Foreign Affairs Minister's Bartoszewski's pro-integrationist *exposé*.⁴¹³ Waldemar Pawlak confirmed that the *PSL* supported European integration but he also emphasized that critical for this was the consolidation of Poland's position in a 'family of sovereign nations'.⁴¹⁴ Pawlak begun his presentation by calling for honesty and integrity in foreign affairs matters and criticized the practice of adopting a subservient attitude towards the EU. He also questioned whether Minister Bartoszewski spoke as a 'Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs or as an expert from the European Union and NATO?'.⁴¹⁵ Pawlak's attack on Bartoszewski was a surprise to the *SLD*, which had previously agreed with the *PSL* to support the *exposé*. Jerzy Wiatr, an *SLD* parliamentarian, defended Bartoszewski: 'We are happy to have such a minister and that Poland is

⁴¹⁰ Tadeusz Samborski, 57th session, 2 dzień. 25.08.1995, Sprawozdanie ministra spraw wewnętrznych z realizacji w 1994 r. ustawy z dnia 24 marca 1920 r. o nabywaniu nieruchomości przez cudzoziemców (druk nr 937).

⁴¹¹ Boleslaw I Chrobry was crowned as the first King of Poland in 1025.

⁴¹² *Zielony Sztandar*, 7 June 1996, quoted in Bachmann. p12.

⁴¹³ Pawlak wojuje z Bartoszewskim' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.121, 26 May 1995, p1.

⁴¹⁴ Waldemar Pawlak, 50th session, day 2, 25.05.1995, Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o głównych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid.

represented in this manner on the international arena'.⁴¹⁶ While his tone was clearly sceptical of the government's integration approach Pawlak did not clarify how this approach should be changed: what accession conditions should be questioned or which policies adjusted to attain the *PSL*'s support.⁴¹⁷

The *PSL*'s euro-scepticism did not escape criticism from the European Union. In July 1997 Wim van Velzen, the head of the delegation of the European Parliament to Poland, praised the progress made by the Oleksy and Cimoszewicz cabinets but also voiced concerns about the growth of euro-scepticism among Polish political parties:

The reforms are continuing. In this regard I do not see any major changes from the time when Józef Oleksy took over the presidency. The current head of the cabinet also keeps to the same strategy. Matters were different under Waldemar Pawlak....When I read the declarations of *ROP* or 'Solidarity' I notice that they place more emphasis on matters other than opening up the Union or the improvement of the competitiveness of the Polish economy, they say more about the maintenance of Polish traditions, about protectionism. *PSL* has heralded this for years. These three forces – *PSL*, *ROP* and 'Solidarity' – support a somewhat difference stance to the current one and I do not know, what will happen in the near future, especially that you are entering a pre-electoral period.⁴¹⁸

Van Velzen's criticism was not unfounded. Although their doubts were muted by lack of parliamentary representation the Solidarity-successor groupings remained sceptical about European integration. None were willing to openly oppose accession but they staunchly supported increased tariffs, industrial subsidies and other measures that were incompatible with membership. According to Jan Olszewski, entering the EU within a five year perspective was economically unrealistic. He stated:

⁴¹⁶ Jerzy Wiatr, 50th session, day 2, 25.05.1995, Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o głównych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski.

⁴¹⁷ Waldemar Pawlak, 50th session, day 2, 25.05.1995, Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o głównych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski.

⁴¹⁸ Małgorzata Grzelec, 'Sarmaci i Europejczycy', *Rzeczpospolita*, 15 July 1996.

No country, not even Portugal or Greece, entered the Union from such a low level as the one on which we find ourselves today. I believe that the future place of Poland is in the unifying Europe, because civilisationally we have belonged to this region for a thousand years. As a euro-realistic however, I must say that the hopes that we will find ourselves there in four, five years, are a mystification. This is simply impossible for economic reasons.⁴¹⁹

A similarly ambiguous stance on the EU was presented by Marian Piłka of the *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*, who suggested developing closer links with the 'Asian tigers' and deepening cooperation with the Central European Free Trade Association as alternatives to EU membership.⁴²⁰

Meanwhile the *SLD* maintained its pro-integrationist rhetoric. In March 1997 Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz made a televised appeal for a party-political agreement on a common stance in support of NATO and EU accession.⁴²¹ A similar statement of support for European integration was issued by foreign affairs minister Dariusz Rosati in an article for *Gazeta Wyborcza* written jointly with the German minister of foreign affairs Klaus Kinkel. Both ministers called for the development of a closely integrated 'Europe of citizens' where regional policy, structural adjustment and social solidarity would play key roles.⁴²²

But not all *SLD* representatives shared the euro-enthusiasm of their leaders. The *OPZZ* trade union was much less supportive of integration than the former *PZPR* reformers in the Alliance's leadership. The *OPZZ*'s euro-scepticism came to light during a meeting between union representatives and President Kwaśniewski in April 1996. Speaking in the name of 'trade unionists concerned by NATO and the European Union' Stefan Macner of the *OPZZ* warned the President: 'We will find ourselves at the European table in the role of waiters

⁴¹⁹ Jan Olszewski, interviewed by Sławomir Mac and Dorota Macieja, *Życie*, nr. 11(746), 16 March 1997, p19.

⁴²⁰ Juliusz Urbanowicz, 'Liga Antyeuropejska' *Wprost*, nr.15 (750), 13 April 1997.

⁴²¹ Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 'Sobotnie wystąpienie telewizyjne premiera Włodzimierza Cimoszewicza. Nie popuszmy tego, co zdołaliśmy osiągnąć' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.52, 3 March 1997, p5.

⁴²² Dariusz Rosati and Klaus Kinkel, 'Wspólnie kształtować Europę' *Rzeczpospolita*, 15 June 1995.

and servants. The politician will be known as a 'European', but the average man will not gain anything'.⁴²³ Another *OPZZ* representative, Krzysztof Gwara, claimed that EU entry would mean the end of Polish agriculture. Gwara was also concerned about the new legislation allowing foreigners to buy land: 'They will buy Wrocław, Poznań and Gdańsk', he feared.⁴²⁴

NATO membership was a particularly challenging issue for the *SLD*. The Alliance's stance on NATO membership during the 1993 elections was far from unambiguous. It only formally agreed to back NATO accession in the midst of the failed coalition negotiations with the Labour Union⁴²⁵ but doubts about Poland's membership in Western military structure could be heard from *SLD* parliamentarians well after the 1993 talks⁴²⁶ and the subject continued to cause disagreement even during the talks on the *SLD*'s 1997 electoral programme.⁴²⁷

The *SLD*'s euro-enthusiastic rhetoric was not matched by willingness to implement the fast paced economic reform required for accession. The liberal economic approach of the Association Agreement, the Single Market programme and the EU's increasingly strict competition policy⁴²⁸ did not align well with the Alliance's emphasis on slower privatization and state intervention.⁴²⁹ Several policy decisions of the *SLD-PSL* cabinet were particularly problematic for accession. The first of these was a law allowing for the establishment of 'special economic regions' (*strefy gospodarcze*) where extensive tax reductions were granted to companies. The tax breaks were as high as 100% depending on criteria such as where capital investment exceeded 1m PLN or where there were more than ten full time employees. The first such

⁴²³ Agata Nowakowska and Natalia Skipietrow, 'W OPZZ boją się Unii Europejskiej i NATO' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr 93, 19 April 1996, p3.

⁴²⁴ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁵ Edward Krzemień, 'I PSL, i SLD też do NATO chce' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr 238, 10 November 1993, p1, Konrad Napierała, 106th session, day 3, discussion point 10, 9 May 1997, *Informacja ministra spraw zagranicznych o głównych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski*.

⁴²⁶ Longin Pastusiak, 20th session, day 2, discussion point 7, 12 May 1994, *Informacja rządu o głównych kierunkach polityki zagranicznej Polski*.

⁴²⁷ Agata Nowakowska, 'Partia protestu, partia sukcesu, partia władzy', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr 173, 26-27 July 1997, p. 10.

⁴²⁸ S. Wilks, 'Competition Policy', in *Policy Making in the European Union*, ed. H. Wallace, et al (Oxford 2005), p115.

⁴²⁹ Bachmann, p153.

region was set up by a Council of Ministers directive in October 1995 for the duration of 20 years.⁴³⁰ The directive contravened Article 63 of the Association Treaty which banned any public aid distorting competition and thereby negatively impacting trade between Poland and the Communities and the 'special regions' as well as other forms of state aid used in Poland eventually became a controversial point of discussion with the European Commission.⁴³¹ Another controversial breach of the Association Treaty took place when the *SLD* granted permission to Hyundai for the construction of sedan cars, which was judged to impinge on the interests of EU producers.⁴³² Other problematic policy areas included the signing of a non-visa agreement with Russia without consultation with EU as well as a cessation of reform in the telecoms and insurance sectors.⁴³³

Nonetheless, the *SLD* continued to present a staunchly pro-integrationist rhetoric which increasingly featured the concept of 'Social Europe'. The *SLD* was not able to make use of the 'return to Europe' slogan popular with the liberal right; this would have begged the question as to whether it was not the Alliance's communist predecessors who caused Poland's need to return in the first place. A 'Christian Europe' rhetoric was also not available to the secular grouping. Instead, the *SLD* emphasized its links with European Social Democracy and the associated values of tolerance, diversity, open mindedness as well as social equality and wealth re-distribution.⁴³⁴ As Józef Oleksy stated during the May 1997 *sejm* debate on European integration, the *SLD*'s vision of future Europe was closest to that of the European social democratic parties.⁴³⁵

⁴³⁰ Karpus, p155.

⁴³¹ Ibid.

⁴³² Bachmann, p153.

⁴³³ Ibid, p153.

⁴³⁴ L. Rubisz, 'Europejska integracja wartości. Program lewicy polskiej a manifest socjaldemokratyczny Blaira i Schroedera', in *Europa i My*, ed. W. a. R. Piatkowska-Stepaniak, Lech (Opole 2000), p184.

⁴³⁵ Józef Oleksy, 107th session, day 2, discussion points 7 and 8, 21 May 1997, 7. Rządowy raport z wykonania programu działań dostosowujących polską gospodarkę i system prawnny do wymagań Układu Europejskiego oraz przyszłego członkostwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej w 1995 r. (druk nr 1816) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji (druk nr 2163), 8. Narodowa Strategia Integracji (druk nr 2156) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji i projektem uchwały (druk nr 2282-A).

As it progressed in re-defining itself into a modern, social democratic grouping the *SLD*'s enthusiasm for European integration grew increasingly unquestioning. Like the liberal groupings, the social democrats did not present viable alternatives to accession. This stance was reflected in the 'National Strategy for Integration' prepared under the auspices of the Committee for European Integration, chaired by the *SLD*'s Prime Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz. The tone of the document was unquestioningly supportive of accession, proposing speedy integration not only with EU structures but also with the Schengen Agreement (which at this time was not yet a part of the EU's *acquis*), Poland's participation in the development of a European defence identity and European Monetary Union. The Strategy document reflected the euro-enthusiastic stance of the *SLD*'s leadership and did not present an analysis of either alternatives to accession or a detailed study of the work required to harmonize with the EU and the costs Poland would incur as a result of the harmonization effort. Issues such as the impact of accession on Polish national sovereignty and transparency of democratic decision making were not addressed.⁴³⁶

The Strategy came under severe criticism in parliament. The *Federacyjny Klub Parlamentarny na Rzecz Akcji Wyborczej 'Solidarność'* (Federated Parliamentary Club for the Cause of Solidarity Electoral Action), established by KPN and BBWR representatives in support of the AWS, was one of the most severe critics. Janina Kraus, a representative of the AWS club, criticized the strategy for lacking a clear presentation of accession requirements and the costs involved in fulfilling them. She also pointed out that the document was underpinned by the assumption that accession was beneficial for Poland and that efforts at meeting EU requirements had to be made even though at this stage the Union provided neither a formal commitment nor a timetable for enlargement. Kraus also stated that it was in Poland's interest to accede as quickly as possible. Speedy accession was needed, she argued, because the disadvantageous conditions of

⁴³⁶ Bachmann, p153-155.

the Association Agreement meant that Poland was forced to finance its restructuring effort with no substantial aid from the EU. She pointed out that the economic restructuring brought about by association had an adverse effect on the Polish economy, as was reflected by the growing trade deficit with the EU. The AWS club did not vote in favour of the Integration Strategy.⁴³⁷ Andrzej Gąsienica-Makowski of the BBWR was also critical of the Integration Strategy and called for a slowdown of the integration process⁴³⁸ while Jerzy Wuttke of the newly established Christian-Nationalist club *Porozumienie Prawicy* (Agreement of the Right) argued that the Strategy was written from the perspective of the EU and did not take Polish economic and political interests into account.⁴³⁹

The agrarians were also critical of the 1997 National Integration Strategy. Aleksander Bentkowski, PSL's press spokesperson, claimed:

It is not true that we oppose accession to the EU. It is the Polish farmers who would benefit most from membership. Union experts have calculated that subsidies to Poland's agricultural sector would proportionally have to amount to as much as in Germany or France that is approx. 5.5 million USD. But we also see threats. The programme of integration with the Union presented to the parliament does not define the benefits which Poland should gain due to entry into West European structures. It vaguely talks about bigger exports but not about the effects of the free entry of

⁴³⁷ Janina Kraus, 107th session, day 2, discussion points 7 and 8, 21 May 1997, 7. Rządowy raport z wykonania programu działań dostosowujących polską gospodarkę i system prawy do wymagań Układu Europejskiego oraz przyszłego członkostwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej w 1995 r. (druk nr 1816) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji (druk nr 2163), 8. Narodowa Strategia Integracji (druk nr 2156) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji i projektem uchwały (druk nr 2282-A).

⁴³⁸ Andrzej Gąsienica-Makowski, 107th session, day 2, discussion points 7 and 8, 21 May 1997, 7. Rządowy raport z wykonania programu działań dostosowujących polską gospodarkę i system prawy do wymagań Układu Europejskiego oraz przyszłego członkostwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej w 1995 r. (druk nr 1816) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji (druk nr 2163), 8. Narodowa Strategia Integracji (druk nr 2156) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji i projektem uchwały (druk nr 2282-A).

⁴³⁹ Jerzy Wuttke, 107th session, day 2, discussion points 7 and 8, 21 May 1997, 7. Rządowy raport z wykonania programu działań dostosowujących polską gospodarkę i system prawy do wymagań Układu Europejskiego oraz przyszłego członkostwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej w 1995 r. (druk nr 1816) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji (druk nr 2163), 8. Narodowa Strategia Integracji (druk nr 2156) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji i projektem uchwały (druk nr 2282-A).

goods into our markets or about the supposed necessity to allow for an unlimited sale of land to foreigners.⁴⁴⁰

Jerzy Osiatyński of the Freedom Union on the other hand presented a very different stance criticizing the cabinet for being too slow in the implementation of reforms required for accession.⁴⁴¹

The final months of the SLD-PSL coalition hence saw both increased opposition to the social democrats' unquestioning rhetorical support for accession as well as to their failure to implement the reforms required for EU membership. The 1994-1997 parliament did not, however, see an in-depth discussion of the consequences European integration would have on either the Polish economy or on how the transfer of domestic competences would change the way in which policy decisions affecting the Polish public were made. Issues such as Schengen being made an accession requirement by virtue of its incorporation into the *acquis*, the EU's strict emphasis on the candidates' adherence to single market rules and the restrictions on domestic monetary policy enshrined in the convergence criteria were not subject of *sejm* debate. Although scepticism towards the integration process was evident it was limited to emotive but ambiguous concerns about a threat to Polish independence, Poland 'acceding on its knees' or not being treated as an 'equal partner' rather than on how the EU's policy requirements would limit the decision making powers of Poland's democratically elected representatives or the benefits of harmonizing a country undergoing economic transition with a regulatory framework designed for advanced economies.

⁴⁴⁰ Aleksander Bentkowski, interviewed by Zofia Stachura and Dorota Macieja, 'Stronnictwo z Unią', *Tygodnik Solidarność*, nr.15(750), 13 April 1997, p19-20.

⁴⁴¹ Jerzy Osiatyński, 107th session, day 2, discussion points 7 and 8, 21 May 1997, 7. Rządowy raport z wykonania programu działań dostosowujących polską gospodarkę i system prawny do wymagań Układu Europejskiego oraz przyszłego członkostwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej w 1995 r. (druk nr 1816) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji (druk nr 2163), 8. Narodowa Strategia Integracji (druk nr 2156) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji i projektem uchwały (druk nr 2282-A).

The 1997 constitution referendum and the ratification of international agreements

The transfer of decision making powers to international organizations such as the EU was one of the most contested issues in the 1997 constitution referendum campaign.⁴⁴² The referendum took place on May 25th 1997 and the proposed draft, prepared by a joint *sejm* and senate committee chaired by Aleksander Kwaśniewski, was approved with 54% of the vote.⁴⁴³ Although several constitution drafts were proposed by various opposition groupings and NGOs the referendum allowed only for a choice for or against the government's draft. Articles 90 and 91, which dealt with the ratification of international treaties, were among the most contested elements of the draft constitution. Section 1 of Article 90 stated: 'The Republic of Poland may, by virtue of international agreements, delegate to an international organization or international institution the competence of organs of State authority in relation to certain matters.'⁴⁴⁴

The article went on to outline the ratification procedures for international agreements. Two alternative methods were allowed: an international treaty could be ratified either by 2/3 parliamentary and 2/3 senate majority with a minimum of 50% attendance in both chambers, or in a referendum. The choice of which method would be used was to be settled by a 50% absolute parliamentary majority i.e. the proposal would need the support of at least half of all elected MP's.⁴⁴⁵

For the Catholic-nationalists Article 90.1 constituted an unacceptable threat to Polish sovereignty and the article formed a key part of the vocal objections which the Solidarity-successor right, most of which was now united within the Solidarity Electoral Action, presented against the draft treaty.⁴⁴⁶ According to

⁴⁴² Hausner, *Przystąpienie czy Integracja? Polska droga do Unii Europejskiej*, p100.

⁴⁴³ K. Jasiewicz, 'Dead Ends and New Beginnings: the Quest for a Procedural Republic in Poland', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 33, (2000), 101-122, p103.

⁴⁴⁴ 'The Constitution of the Republic of Poland', 2 April 1997, *Dziennik Ustaw*, nr. 78, item 483.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴⁶ K. Korbonski, 'Poland Ten Years after: the Church', *Communist and Post Communist Studies*, 33, (2000), 123-146., p138.

the ZChN the constitution 'robbed Poland of sovereignty and gave away decisions impacting the future of our nation into the hands of international organizations'.⁴⁴⁷ *Ruch Odbudowy Polski* harboured similar concerns. Zbigniew Romaszewski of the ROP stated: 'This is not the constitution of a sovereign state, but of some supranational structure. The article about the possibility of surrendering a part of our sovereignty to unspecified international organizations is terrifying!'⁴⁴⁸ The National Commission of NSZZ *Solidarność* also appealed to the electorate to vote against the draft constitution and called for a 'Guarantee of state sovereignty' and the 'removal of the constitutional rule allowing for the transfer of state competences to international institutions beyond the control of the nation'.⁴⁴⁹

The debate on Article 90 was often emotional and at times the Catholic-nationalist groupings' interpretations of the article clearly did not reflect the intentions of its authors. A pamphlet entitled 'Konstytucji: NIE' ('To the Constitution: NO') for example, claimed that section 90.1 meant that the President and a 'disciplined *Sejm*' could transfer state competences to the Russian mafia as 'this was too, an international organization'. The pamphlet also referred to article 91.1, which stated that a ratified international treaty would become part of the national legal system and would be directly applicable in national courts. 'Directly' the authors of 'Konstytucji: NIE' argued 'means that an "international" agent", legally dressed up in a Polish uniform, can confiscate your property, act against national interest, and the law will be on his side'.⁴⁵⁰

Much of the discussion centred on the exact implications of articles 90 and 91. While its opponents, such as ROP's Zbigniew Romaszewski for example, claimed that it would 'force Poland to accept everything, without negotiation

⁴⁴⁷ Marek Beylin, 'Moja Gazetka Przedwyborcza, Kto z kim...' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.31, 06 February 1997, p10.

⁴⁴⁸ Zbigniew Romaszewski, quoted in 'Tak czy nie w referendum konstytucyjnym' *Życie*, nr.119 (196), 23 May 1997, p. 2.

⁴⁴⁹ 'Konstytucja "Solidarność" przeciw' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.117, 21 May 1997, p18.

⁴⁵⁰ 'Konstytucji: NIE' *Tygodnik Solidarność*, nr.21(453), 02 May 1997, p14.

and regardless of the level of importance, that will be legislated by the European Parliament or another legislative body in international organizations to which Poland will belong'.⁴⁵¹ Romaszewski's point about the direct effect EU law would have in Poland once the accession treaty was ratified in the manner proposed by the 1997 constitution was valid. The *SLD* on the other hand, did not view the transfer of legislative powers to international bodies as an infringement on national sovereignty. As Józef Oleksy pointed out, Poland would not be forced to participate in any international organizations and international treaties would undergo either the parliamentary ratification procedure or be ratified in a country-wide referendum. Any competency transfer would be made to an international organization of member states which participated in the organization on the same terms as Poland, he also argued, and Poland would be able to withdraw from any international agreements.⁴⁵² Oleksy also asked whether those opposed to the draft constitution were spreading false information about its implications and if they were not in fact motivated by wanting to sabotage the constitutional framework for the ratification of the EU and NATO accession treaties. 'If this is the case', he challenged 'then they should directly state they oppose these aims of Poland and not pretend that they are concerned with the good of the constitution'.⁴⁵³

The discussions about the draft Constitution confronted the euro-sceptic groupings with the need to present a clear stance on the impact of European integration on Polish sovereignty. During electoral campaigns and parliamentary debates politicians could remain ambiguous and express support for the elusive 'Europe of Nations' or make vague declarations without actually stating whether they were for or against accession. During the

⁴⁵¹ Zbigniew Romaszewski, *Diabeł tkwi w Szczegółach*, *Gazeta Polska*, 30 April 1997, quoted in Bachmann, *Polska Kaczka. Europejski Staw*. p169.

⁴⁵² Józef Oleksy, 107th session, day 2, discussion points 7 and 8, 21 May 1997, 7. Rządowy raport z wykonania programu działań dostosowujących polską gospodarkę i system prawny do wymagań Układu Europejskiego oraz przyszłego członkostwa Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w Unii Europejskiej w 1995 r. (druk nr 1816) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji (druk nr 2163), 8. Narodowa Strategia Integracji (druk nr 2156) wraz ze stanowiskiem komisji i projektem uchwały (druk nr 2282-A).

⁴⁵³ *Ibid.*

constitutional debate, however, they had to take a stance on the practicalities of how competences of the Polish state would be delegated to the European Union. Consequently, many groupings took a stance against the transfer of Poland's decision making powers to the EU. Even if they claimed not to oppose EU membership, the constitution referendum debate showed they were not willing to agree to a transfer of sovereignty away from the national level. The *SLD* on the other hand remained strong in its euro-enthusiastic rhetoric and refused to address the extensive transfer of national decision making powers to the EU that accession entailed.

Conclusions

The period of the first *SLD-PSL* coalition saw significant progress in Poland's European integration. But unlike its predecessor the 1993-7 *sejm* did not witness vocal debate on integration issues. Most euro-sceptic groupings remained out of power due to their failure to cross the representation thresholds in the 1993 parliamentary contest and to the victory of Aleksander Kwaśniewski in the 1995 presidential elections. The absence of groupings such as *ZChN*, *ROP* and *PC* from parliament gave the appearance of a party political consensus on integration. As was evident during the 1993 parliamentary campaign, the 1995 presidential contest and the 1997 constitution referendum campaign the Polish political scene was not free from euro-sceptic concerns. In the *sejm* the main source of criticism of the *SLD*'s pro-integrationist stance came from its agrarian coalition partner the *PSL*, whose stance on Europe was closer to the euro-sceptic Solidarity-successor right than to the *SLD*, whose rhetoric was in turn more similar to that of the unquestioningly euro-enthusiastic liberals. Integration continued to be a thorny point of dissent for the two groupings and they did not manage to develop a shared stance on accession throughout their four year coalition.

On entering government, the Alliance of the Democratic Left was confronted with the need to convince both the Polish public and Western observers that it had genuinely reformed into a social democratic party. The *SLD*'s stance

towards European integration played a critical role in this. As it redefined itself from a successor of the authoritarian *PZPR* to a social-democratic grouping modelled on the West European centre-left parties, its rhetoric took on an increasingly pro-integrationist stance.

But the *SLD*'s unquestioningly euro-enthusiastic rhetoric was not matched by a commitment to implement the reforms outlined in the Association Treaty and the Single Market White Paper. In particular, the interventionist, left wing economic policy prerogatives of the *OPZZ* trade union, the *SLD*'s second largest member grouping were ill matched with the EU's neo-liberal requirements. The communist-successor's enthusiasm hence appeared to be based more on rhetoric than policy commitment. The *PSL* meanwhile presented a consistently ambiguous stance on European integration, on the one hand emphasizing its own efforts to protect the Polish peasant from foreign economic occupation and calling for state intervention to protect the Polish economy, yet praising the financial benefits of EU membership on the other.

The *SLD*'s increasingly pro-integrationist rhetoric presented a challenge for the Solidarity-successor groupings in a difficult position. Support for European integration was increasingly associated with the liberal, communist-successor left. This was something with which the Solidarity-successor groupings did not wish to associate themselves, their anti-Soviet past being at the core of their political rhetoric. The Solidarity-successor parties were hence confronted with the need to re-invent 'Europe' in a way that would suit their party-political identity. As the following chapter will show, this resulted in the development of a new integration narrative.

Chapter 5

Evangelising accession: European integration under Solidarity Electoral Action

Those who speak of a 'Europe of Nations', and it is particularly the AWS which emphasised this in its rhetoric, they do not understand the processes which are taking place in the European Union. They are under the impression that it is possible to accede to the European Union while remaining completely autonomous with regards to all matters related to the economy, the state, society...this is of course an abstraction... if one understands things in this way then one does not want to be a member of the European Union since it is simply not possible.⁴⁵⁴

Danuta Hubner,
Secretary of the Committee of European Integration,
September 1996-October 1997

Introduction

This chapter considers the evolution of Poland's political consensus on European integration during the 1997-2001 solidarity successor cabinet starting with the 1997 election campaign and ending with the fragmentation of the AWS in the summer of 2001. The period in question was critical to Poland's integration process as it covers the first phase of accession negotiations. The chapter focuses on how political consensus on European integration was sustained during this key stage of the integration project. Did individual parties present an unambiguous stance on accession? How did they reconcile the EU's policy requirements with their existing policy and ideological proposals? And how did the ideologically heterogeneous Solidarity Electoral Action build consensus on Europe both internally and in coalition with the liberal, euro-enthusiastic Freedom Union?

The first section will outline the main domestic developments during the period. The subsequent two sections will account for integration policy developments in the EU and Poland, and the negotiations. Party-political

⁴⁵⁴ Interview with Danuta Hubner, 24 July 1998.

consensus on accession will be addressed in the final section, which will include sub sections on the 1997 parliamentary and 2000 presidential contests and parliamentary debate.

Domestic developments

When the AWS collected a third of the votes in the September 1997 elections some believed that its formation signalled the consolidation of the Polish right wing⁴⁵⁵. The *Akcja Wyborcza*, it was hoped, would evolve into a Christian Democratic, moderate, centre-right grouping capable of achieving consensus on a coherent policy programme.⁴⁵⁶ But it soon became clear that personal politics and ideological diversity would impede policy-making. Matters were made worse when the AWS formed a coalition government with the liberal *Unia Wolności*. European integration became a particularly thorny point of dissent as Prime Minister Buzek manoeuvred between the euro-enthusiastic *Unia Wolności* and the euro-sceptic *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*, one of the AWS' biggest member organisations.

The AWS was established in June 1996 under the initiative of Marian Krzaklewski, leader of the NSZZ *Solidarność*. By September 1997 it incorporated approximately forty political parties, ranging from euro-sceptic Catholic-nationalists to pro-integrationist liberals, whose only common denominator was the desire to prevent the successors of the *ancien régime* from maintaining political power. Apart from the 'Solidarity' Trade Union, the AWS' largest members were *Porozumienie Centrum*, *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*, *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej*, *Polska Federacja Stowarzyszeń Rodzin Katolickich*, (the Polish Association of Catholic Families) and the centre-right *Stronnictwo Konserwatywno -Ludowe* (People's Agrarian Faction, SKL).

The power-sharing arrangements of the AWS were agreed upon in October 1996. Strategic decisions were made by the Solidarity Trade Union and the

⁴⁵⁵ Wenzel.

⁴⁵⁶ Władysław Wesołowski, Partie: Same Klopoty, (Warsaw: IfiS PAN, 2000), p72-73.

above mentioned organisations. The legislative body of the AWS was the National Commission, which consisted of five to seven representatives of the trade union and one representative from each of the other member organisations, with a maximum limit of fifty members. The National Commission's decisions were approved by a $\frac{3}{4}$ majority and the post of chairperson was assigned to the chairperson of the National Commission of NSZZ *Solidarność* i.e. Marian Krzaklewski. The Chair was to have four deputies, one of whom would be a member of the Solidarity Trade Union. The executive of the AWS was the Coordinating Committee which was elected by the National Commission and consisted of ten members, half of whom were trade unionists and the remainder of whom represented the five largest member-organisations. Marian Krzaklewski was also appointed Secretary of the Coordinating Committee.

The combined functions of leader of the Solidarity Trade Union, chairperson of the AWS legislative and the secretary of its executive made Krzaklewski a powerful figure in the Electoral Action. His influence was strengthened further on 2 March 1997 when, during a meeting of the AWS National Commission, he was granted the authority to make unilateral decisions in crisis situations. Deputy chairpersons of the National Commission and members of the Executive Committee were also elected during this meeting. Power struggles amongst the different factions of the movement were already becoming apparent at this early stage. The Catholic-nationalist groupings united to stop Lech Kaczyński, leader of the *Porozumienie Centrum*, from becoming a deputy chair. Faced with the radicals' opposition Kaczyński decided not to stand and the deputy posts were eventually taken up by Janusz Tomaszewski from Solidarity, Marian Piłka of the ZChN and Adam Słomka of the *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej*.⁴⁵⁷ Kaczyński's place was given to Kazimierz Kapera, leader of the *Polska Federacja Stowarzyszeń Rodzin Katolickich*. The centrist, pro-integrationist groupings such as such as *Porozumienie Centrum* or the

⁴⁵⁷ Witold Załuska, 'AWS Wybrała Władze' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.73, 27 March 1997, p.3.

Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe were hence excluded from the Executive Committee. In spite of this they chose to remain within the AWS as this offered them a realistic chance of crossing the representation threshold.

With 27% of the vote, the *SLD* was the second most successful contestant in the 1997 elections. But as they were limited in their coalition-building ability by their authoritarian past the social-democrats were unable to enter government. Having attained almost 34% of the vote, the AWS proceeded to form a coalition with the liberal and pro-integrationist *Unia Wolności*. Prior to the election it seemed that ideological differences between the two groupings would prevent them from governing together. Few pre-electoral discussions between AWS and the *UW* took place. In fact, they appeared adversarial. Leszek Balcerowicz, leader of the *Unia Wolności*, volunteered the following about the AWS's economic strategy: 'I have the impression that the page on expenses was written by socialists, and the page on taxes by a handful of liberals'.⁴⁵⁸ In terms of policy, the programmes of either *ROP* or the *PSL* would have been a better match for the *Akcja Wyborcza* but neither of these two groupings obtained enough votes to build a majority government. Meanwhile, having attained over 13% of the vote *Unia Wolności* became an attractive coalition partner. Partnership with the interventionist, conservative AWS was hardly an attractive option for the liberals however. Hence, to form government, the AWS was forced to make significant concessions in key policy areas. After nearly two months of negotiations, the *UW* struck a hard bargain and gained control over the ministries of finance, foreign affairs, defence, and justice, with Balcerowicz appointed as Finance Minister and Deputy Premier. The coalition agreement was finally signed on 11 November 1997 and the new government was granted the parliamentary vote of confidence on the same day.

More a marriage of convenience than a working partnership, the governing coalition was fraught with conflicts from its inception. Rydlewski notes that over thirty conflicts between the coalition partners were made public by 30

⁴⁵⁸ Leszek Balcerowicz, 'Wydatki i Podatki AWS' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 28/29 May 1997, p3.

September 1998.⁴⁵⁹ The disagreements concerned a wide array of policy matters, including ministerial and voivodship appointments, administrative reform, economic policy, family planning education in schools, re-privatisation, and media reform.

As Hausner and Marody point out, the lack of an ideological common ground meant that personnel policy was the main instrument through which the governing coalition could maintain coherence and stability.⁴⁶⁰ As section 2 will show, the European integration process proved a salient example of how attempts to resolve ideological differences by means of personnel arrangements impeded policy formation.

As per the AWS-UW coalition agreement, personnel appointments were distributed proportionally to the number of votes attained by the coalition partners.⁴⁶¹ Ministerial and deputy ministerial positions were balanced between the UW and the Electoral Action: where the AWS appointed the minister, the *Unia Wolności* could select their second-in-command, and conversely, where the UW selected the minister the Electoral Action would appoint the deputy. Such power-sharing arrangements led to some peculiar ministerial tandems, the most striking of which was the appointment of the *Unia Wolności*'s Piotr Nowina-Konopka as deputy to the Christian-nationalist head of the Committee for European Integration, Ryszard Czarnecki. Correspondingly, another nationalist, Adam Stomka of the KPN-OP, was made second in command to the liberal Foreign Affairs Minister Bronisław Geremek.

Apart from a headstrong coalition partner and a communist-successor president⁴⁶² internal disagreements within the AWS member groupings also proved an on-going challenge for Prime Minister Buzek. Having attained power on the basis of the symbolically appealing if ambiguous ethos of its anti-

⁴⁵⁹ G. Rydlewski, *Rządzenie Koalicyjne w Polsce* (Warsaw 2000), chapters 2 and 3.

⁴⁶⁰ Górnjak, p56.

⁴⁶¹ 'Umowa Koalicyjna Pomiędzy Akcją Wyborczą Solidarność i Unią Wolności' section 8, in Rydlewski, Grzegorz. 2000. *Rządzenie Koalicyjne w Polsce*, p148.

⁴⁶² Korbonksi, p126.

communist, Solidarity heritage once in government *Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność* was confronted with the need to negotiate policy decisions. The member groupings disagreed in their interpretations of the 'real' programme of the AWS and in March 1998 the 'Team for the Implementation of the AWS Programme' was established. The 'Team' consisted of twenty-seven parliamentarians including a group of Catholic-nationalists, Adam Słomka's *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej – Obóz Patriotyczny* as well as two notoriously anti-integrationist members of the ZChN, Jan Łopuszański and Andrzej Chrzanowski.⁴⁶³ Two particularly contentious issues were administrative reform and the sale of the Gdańsk shipyard. When Słomka and Łopuszański voted against the government's administrative reform proposal in July they were both expelled from the AWS. Another five members of KPN-OP then left the Action as a sign of protest against Słomka's expulsion. The AWS' ranks continued to diminish when on 24 July seven Catholic-nationalist parliamentarians left in protest against the sale of the Gdańsk shipyard. *Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność* now had 187 parliamentary seats, which combined with the *Unia Wolności*'s sixty seats left the government with a narrow majority of fifteen seats. An attempt at the formation of a single AWS party, *Ruch Społeczny AWS* (AWS Social Movement) proved unsuccessful.⁴⁶⁴ Some Catholic-nationalist parliamentarians, such as the head of the parliamentary commission for culture Jan Maria Jackowski, or the head of the commission for the family, Maria Smerczyńska, chose to remain in the *Akcja Wyborcza*. Paradoxically, as the ranks of the radical Catholics within the AWS shrunk, their bargaining power increased. The *Akcja* needed all the votes it could muster, which enabled the radicals to use the threat of leaving to their advantage. In spite of the coalition's voting discipline difficulties however the Buzek cabinet implemented several key reforms including social security, pensions, healthcare and administrative reform.⁴⁶⁵

⁴⁶⁴ Bale, p17.

⁴⁶⁵ Jabłoński, p141.

Aleksander Kwaśniewski's victory and Marian Krzaklewski's disappointing third place in the 2000 presidential contest dispelled any illusions to the future electoral chances of the AWS. The *Akcja* fragmented throughout 2001. On 11 January 2001 Maciej Płażyński, Donald Tusk and Andrzej Olechowski established the *Platforma Obywatelska* (Citizens' Platform, *PO*) and by 17 January 2001 eighteen *SKL* parliamentarians defected to the Platform, leaving the AWS with only 157 MP's. In March 2001 Lech Kaczyński, justice minister and former leader of the *Porozumienie Centrum*, established another new grouping called *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (Law and Order, *PiS*) and shortly thereafter five parliamentarians from the *Przymierze Prawicy* (Agreement of the Right) left the AWS to join *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*. The final straw came in May 2001 when NSZZ *Solidarność* also left the Electoral Action.

As the AWS fragmented, a consolidation took place on the left side of the political spectrum. Following the communist-successors' failure to form government in 1997, Józef Oleksy resigned from the post of *SLD* leader and was replaced by Leszek Miller, formerly Minister for Labour and Social Security. Miller was known for his hard-line approach and good relations with the *SLD*'s conservative regional leaders. Miller set out to transform the *SLD* coalition into a single party. Following a year of preparations the founding declaration of the new Alliance of the Democratic Left was signed in April 1999. Most *SLD* member organisations joined the new party during its first congress in December 1999; only Piotr Ikonowicz's socialists and several other small fringe groupings chose not to participate.

The final two years of the Buzek cabinet took place in the context of an economic downturn, decreasing popular support for the government and a divided coalition. By 2000 unemployment was approaching 20% and the economic boom of the late 1990s was quickly disappearing as growth slowed from just under 7% in 1996 to 4% in 2000 with bleak forecasts of 1% for 2001.⁴⁶⁶

⁴⁶⁶'Poland's economic challenge', 24 September 2001, BBC News (<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1556641.stm>, last accessed 14 May 2005).

The troubled AWS-UW coalition collapsed in June 1999 and by the summer of 2001 Jerzy Buzek was faced with a minority government, a budgetary crisis, growing unemployment and a stalemate in accession negotiations. During the 2001 parliamentary elections the Polish right wing was once again divided into several small groupings. Neither the *Unia Wolności* nor the AWS managed to cross the 5% threshold required for parliamentary representation following the 2001 elections.

EU integration policy

The Commission's recommendation to start Eastern enlargement negotiations was accepted at the December 1997 Luxembourg European Council, which decided to launch the accession process as per article O of the Treaty of the European Union. Negotiations were to be opened at the same time with ten applicants: Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Malta, Slovenia and Cyprus. It was agreed that enlargement would take place in two phases⁴⁶⁷. Poland was placed in the first phase, together with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus; the remaining candidates were expected to accede in the second phase. The accession process was launched on 30 March 1998 during a meeting of EU foreign ministers with the 10 applicant countries.⁴⁶⁸

The Luxembourg Council also implemented two key adjustments to the pre-accession process. Firstly, all financial assistance was to be brought into a single framework under the Accession Partnerships and the PHARE programme reformed to align more closely with accession requirements.⁴⁶⁹ Secondly, applicants were expected to make 'precise commitments'⁴⁷⁰ towards democratic consolidation, macro-economic stabilization, nuclear safety and the adoption of

⁴⁶⁷ J. Blocker, '1997 in Review: EU Finds Success on EMU, Failure on Expansion Reforms', in RFE/RL.

⁴⁶⁸ Avery and Fraser, p135.

⁴⁶⁹ Jahns, p37.

⁴⁷⁰ Gower, p14-15.

national programmes for harmonization with community *acquis* within a precise timetable.⁴⁷¹

The Accession Partnerships marked a key stage in the pre-accession process as they provided the EU with a structured means of measuring the applicants' progress in meeting accession requirements. The Partnership Agreements defined short and medium term policy reform priorities for each of the applicants, who were required to prepare 'National Programmes for Adoption of the *Acquis*' setting timetables for the adoption of the reforms. Starting in November 1998 the Commission issued annual assessments of the applicants' progress and the applicant states were expected to update the national programmes in line with the assessments. The applicants would be ranked according to how far the Commission judged them to have progressed in implementing its requirements. The rankings were made public and frequently featured in the media, which further strengthened the Commission's ability to influence the candidates' domestic policy options. Further to the Commission's assessment the European Council could take 'appropriate steps with regard to any pre-accession assistance granted to any applicant State', acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, where 'the commitments contained in the Europe Agreements are not respected and/or the progress towards fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria is insufficient'.⁴⁷²

The Partnerships covered a wide range of policy areas including policy areas not adopted by all member states such as Schengen and the Euro. The short term economic priorities for Poland included steel industry reform, restructuring of the coal sector, acceleration of privatization, restructuring of state enterprises, development of the financial sector and banking privatization, improvement of bankruptcy proceedings and capital movement liberalization.

⁴⁷¹ Borkowski, 'Strategia Integracji Polski z UE', p624.

⁴⁷² H. Grabbe and K. Hughes, 'Central and east European views on EU enlargement: political debates and public opinion', in Back to Europe. Central and Eastern Europe and the European Union, ed. K. Henderson (London 1999), p13.

⁴⁷³ Political requirements included the reinforcement of institutional and administrative capacity, border management and the continuation of legal approximation of environmental legislation. ⁴⁷⁴

In December 1999 the European Commission decided to lift the division between the two 'waves' of applicant countries and started negotiations with the remaining candidates: Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia and Romania. The issue of when Poland could join and whether it would be able to do so together with other 'first wave' candidates hence became a concern for the Polish media and consequently, for the political elites. The Buzek cabinet aimed for Poland to join as part of the first wave in 2002.⁴⁷⁵ But delays in the harmonisation process caused concerns about the possible postponement of accession.⁴⁷⁶ Poland had delayed the implementation of required legislative changes in the areas of free movement of goods, telecommunications and consumer protection.

Renewed attempts at reform of the EU's decision making structures were made during the Nice summit of December 2000, which increased the number of European Parliament members⁴⁷⁷ and implemented a new weighting of votes in the Council, which meant that Poland would have 28 votes. The initial proposal was for Poland to be granted only twenty-six votes, two fewer than Spain, although the difference in population between the two countries was only 400,000. After some last minute bargaining, the Poles managed to negotiate the additional two votes.⁴⁷⁸ While the EU refused to provide a clear timetable for membership it announced that new members could participate in the May 2004 elections to the European Parliament thereby indicating that the first wave of enlargement would take place before this time. If Poland was to accede by this date, however, negotiations would have to be completed by the end of 2002

⁴⁷³ Ibid, p15.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid, p15-16.

⁴⁷⁵ 'Pytanie o Unię' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr 44, 22 February 2000, p17.

⁴⁷⁶ Jacek Pawlicki, 'Polska - Unia Europejska, Remenant w obietnicach' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.210, 09 August 1999, p21.

⁴⁷⁷ Bachmann, p196.

⁴⁷⁸ Jacek Safuta, 'Szarża na Niceę' Polityka, nr. 51/2000 (2276).

thereby allowing enough time for treaty ratification. Moreover, the reforms agreed at Nice were inadequate to efficiently cope with an EU of 26 states and a new Inter Governmental Conference to deal with the EU's constitutional structure was scheduled for 2004.⁴⁷⁹

Another key development within the Union was the launch of the common currency. On May 2nd 1998 the Council decided to bring 11 countries into the monetary union as of January 1 1999.⁴⁸⁰ The final exchange rate was set up on 1 June 1999⁴⁸¹ and euro banknotes were introduced on January 1 2002.⁴⁸² The Eastern candidates were not expected to be able to meet the convergence criteria on accession. But the strict monetary policy measures needed to attain them, including the monitoring of the inflation rate, budget deficit and public debt, foreign exchange variation and long term interest rates were a central part of the EU's requirements.⁴⁸³ The candidate states were expected to implement these monetary measures in spite of the fact that the convergence criteria, designed for the economies of the EU-15, did not take into account the specific nature of the nature of transition economies whose fast growth led to high levels of structural inflation.⁴⁸⁴ Meanwhile, the East European economies became increasingly integrated with the EU, with the candidates' exports to the Union forming 55.6% of 1999 exports, an increase of almost 10% from 45.9% in 1997. For the EU however the trade relationship with the applicant states represented only about 5% of exports in 1999.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁷⁹ W. Orlowski, Alan, 'The Impact of EU Accession on Enterprise Adoption and Institutional Development in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', in 2001), p6.

⁴⁸⁰ McNamara, p147.

⁴⁸¹ K. Bachmann, *Które do Europy* (Warsaw 2002), p152.

⁴⁸² The countries adopting the common currency were Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany the Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. Although they met the convergence criteria the UK and Sweden opted out, Greece failed to meet the criteria and so was unable to participate and the Denmark's participation was rejected in a referendum.

⁴⁸³ B. Góralczyk, 'Political Dilemmas Behind the European Union Enlargement Towards the East', *Yearbook of Polish European Studies*, 3, (1999), p148.

⁴⁸⁴ M. Grzesiak, 'Miejsce Narodowego Banku Polskiego w Europejskim Systemie Banków Centralnych', in *Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Bilans Otwarcia.*, ed. J. Marszałek-Kawa (Toruń 2005), 164-173, p172.

⁴⁸⁵ F. Francois, Joseph and Rombout, Machiel, 'Trade Effects from the Integration of the Central and East European Countries into the European Union', *SEI Working Paper No 41*, (Sussex European Institute 2001), p5.

In parallel to the progress in EU integration Poland also finalized the NATO membership process. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary began membership negotiations on 16 September 1997 and the accession protocol was signed just over two years later, on 16 December 1999.⁴⁸⁶

Polish integration policy

Co-ordination among Poland's governmental institutions continued to present problems for the integration effort. The institutions responsible for integration included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister's Chancellery and the Committee for European Integration. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was charged with policy formulation and *KIE* was to manage policy development and co-ordinate implementation among the different ministries. The office of the Chief Negotiator meanwhile was based at the Prime Minister's Chancellery.

⁴⁸⁷ The selection of the Chief Negotiator proved contentious. Initially, Jerzy Buzek considered Jacek Saryusz-Wolski for the post, however, when the *KIE* and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not agree to allow Saryusz-Wolski the latitude he requested he withdrew his candidacy. ⁴⁸⁸ Eventually *Unia Wolności*'s Jan Kułakowski, was appointed to the post. ⁴⁸⁹

Unlike his predecessor, Prime Minister Buzek did not chair the Committee for European Integration himself. Instead, Buzek delegated the chairmanship to the leader of the euro-sceptic *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*, Ryszard Czarnecki. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in turn handed to the *Unia Wolności* and Professor Bronisław Geremek was appointed its head.

Czarnecki was a peculiar choice to co-ordinate Poland's integration effort. Less than ten months prior to taking up his post at the *KIE* he opposed the AWS expressing any form of support for EU accession. Czarnecki later stated that his motivation to lead the *KIE* was driven by an ambition to achieve ministerial

⁴⁸⁶ The Warsaw Voice (<http://www2.warsawvoice.pl/old/v542/nato/n7.htm>, last accessed 27 May 2005).

⁴⁸⁷ Górnia, p27.

⁴⁸⁸ 'Who Will Lead Us to Europe?' The Warsaw Voice, 01 February 1998 (<http://www.warsawvoice.pl/archiwum.phtml/673/>, last accessed 30 June 2006).

⁴⁸⁹ Górnia, p27.

rank: 'I wanted to be a full minister, and I achieved this, it did not make much difference of what, but I wanted to be a minister',⁴⁹⁰ he stated. According to Czarnecki, Buzek had previously offered him the role of Geremek's deputy of Foreign Affairs but he turned this down as it was not a 'full' ministerial appointment.⁴⁹¹ Years later, when he took part in the accession referendum, Ryszard Czarnecki voted against membership.⁴⁹²

The ZChN advocated a strategy of 'tough' negotiations and Czarnecki readily took on the challenge of protecting Polish national interest.⁴⁹³ In March 1998, during his parliamentary presentation of the negotiation mandate, he stated that Poland aimed to integrate with a 'Europe of Nations', which guaranteed protection of national sovereignty and economic interests. He also pointed out that Poland did not have to accede to 'Europe' as it already was a part of it and had been for centuries.⁴⁹⁴ Czarnecki declared: 'We always were and are in Europe. We do not have to accede to it because we co-created it, and we did so with greater effort than those to whom its creation is now attributed, or those who grant themselves exclusive rights to "Europeaness"'.⁴⁹⁵

Ryszard Czarnecki would not be an easy partner for the EU. This became apparent when he opposed Poland's contribution to the EU's science and technology fund arguing it was contradictory to the Polish value system. The unethical nature of the fund lay in the possibility of it carrying out research on abortion, euthanasia, genetic engineering, and artificial insemination.⁴⁹⁶ Unsurprisingly, conflicts soon developed between Czarnecki and the euro-enthusiastic liberals from *Unia Wolności*. The most serious of these was a disagreement with deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Leszek Balcerowicz concerning the administration of EU aid. The AWS initially

⁴⁹⁰ Interview with Ryszard Czarnecki, 15 June 2005.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

⁴⁹² Ibid.

⁴⁹³ Ryszard Czarnecki, parliamentary debate on European Integration, 18 March 1998 (www.sejm.gov.pl, last accessed 15 February 2004).

⁴⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁶ Jędrzej Bielecki, 'Wątpliwości Etyczne Polski' *Rzeczpospolita*, 28 April 1998.

opposed Balcerowicz's suggestion that EU aid be administered via the Ministry of Finance⁴⁹⁷ but it was forced to change its stance as Czarnecki's management style was subjected to increasing criticism.

It became clear that efficient management of the PHARE and structural funds was not a top priority for Czarnecki. In early May 1998 Louisewies van der Laan, the spokesperson of Commissioner for Enlargement Hans van der Broek warned that if the applications for PHARE aid were not submitted by May 15th Poland may lose the allocated funds.⁴⁹⁸ Czarnecki replied by claiming that no such deadline existed.⁴⁹⁹ The Commission also criticised the *KIE* for delays in the submission of documents related to the implementation of the *acquis*. It was the Committee's responsibility to establish a calendar for the implementation of the required legislative changes and to assign responsibility for their implementation to the relevant institutions. According to van der Broek, Poland was the last of the ten applicant countries to submit such a document.⁵⁰⁰

In the meantime, *Unia Wolności* made renewed attempts at gaining control of EU funds. A draft law on public finances, submitted by the *UW* in early May 1998, specified that foreign aid administration would be moved to the Ministry of Finance. The *UW* was determined to gain control over foreign aid. According to Leszek Balcerowicz, allowing the *KIE* to continue managing the funds would only lead to 'multiplying pathology'.⁵⁰¹ Czarnecki was the only minister to give a *votum separatum* on the new legislation.

By the time the new regulations were in place, however, the damage had already been done. The scandal erupted at the end of July when the European Commission rejected 34 million ECU worth of the PHARE aid applications submitted by the *KIE*. Although the documents were submitted on the 15 May deadline, many projects were rejected due to poor quality. According to

⁴⁹⁷ Jędrzej Bielecki, 'Na Razie Tajne' *Rzeczpospolita*, 25 March 1998.

⁴⁹⁸ Jędrzej Bielecki, 'Na Razie Tajne' *Rzeczpospolita*, 25 March 1998

⁴⁹⁹ P Apanowicz and J Bielecki, 'Czarnecki Poprawia van der Broeka' *Rzeczpospolita*, 09 May 1998.

⁵⁰⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁰¹ K Jędrzejewska, 'Racja po Stronie Balcerowicza' *Rzeczpospolita*, 15 may 1998.

Commissioner van der Broek there would have been sufficient time for any necessary revisions had the projects been submitted earlier.

Apart from the loss of PHARE funds other problems at the *KIE* also pointed to Czarnecki's inability to fulfil the requirements of his position. Inconsistent organisational arrangements, the *Akcja Wyborcza*'s ambiguous stance towards accession and the question marks over Czarnecki's support for it led to confusion among the Polish negotiation team as well as at the European Commission.⁵⁰² EU officials complained they did not know with whom they should negotiate.⁵⁰³ Concerns were raised about the lack of coordination among the ministries responsible for the harmonisation process, the loss of confidential documentation and the inefficient manner in which the *KIE* was run in general. By the summer of 1998, close to thirty confidential documents were said to have gone missing from the offices of the Committee.⁵⁰⁴

The *SLD* was very critical of both the way the integration institutions were structured and with Czarnecki's appointment as head of *KIE*. Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz commented: 'I believe the Committee functions badly. This is largely due to the weak position of the chair of this committee and in this particular case the incompetence of a particular individual.'⁵⁰⁵

A report by the Supreme Chamber of Control, published in June 1999, eventually brought to light the extent of the management problems at the *KIE*.⁵⁰⁶ Only 34 of the 119 tasks identified by the National Integration Strategy had been implemented as of mid October 1998. The Committee had also not adequately monitored the tasks the Strategy set for other institutions. Quality control further showed that organisational changes, which were to be implemented at the *KIE* Secretariat following a request from the Prime Minister in October 1997 had not been put in place until March 1998. According to the

⁵⁰² Interview with Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 21 July 1998, interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, 14 January 2002; interview with John O'Rourke, European Commission Representative in Warsaw, 17 January 2002.

⁵⁰³ 'Koszt Braku Koordynacji' *Rzeczpospolita*, 5 April 1999.

⁵⁰⁴ 'Zapowiedź Zmian Personalnych' *Rzeczpospolita*, 30 July 1998.

⁵⁰⁵ Interview with Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 21 July 1998.

⁵⁰⁶ 'Dyskretny zakres ogólności, Unia i Polska, nr. 17, June 1999.

report the delay had 'a negative impact on the completion of tasks the *KIE* Secretariat was responsible for and led to disagreements over competences'.⁵⁰⁷ The job descriptions of several managers had not been adjusted to the new regulations for over a year. The Council for Information Strategy, whose inaugural meeting took place in September 1997, had not met again until October 1998. The development of a national information programme was discussed during the second meeting but, as *NIK* noted, no such programme was put in place until June 1999 when the quality inspection report was published.⁵⁰⁸

The Committee for European Integration was not the only institution to have mismanaged the integration process however. In October 1997 the *KIE* requested the *sejm* to develop a procedure which would allow it to comment on and control all parliamentary legislation with regards to its compatibility with EU law. The procedure had not been produced until April 1999. Furthermore, the Ministry of Transport was found to have ignored European legislation, at a cost of several hundred thousand zlotys, when it failed to harmonise Polish fisheries regulations with those of the EU.⁵⁰⁹

The loss of the PHARE funds was the proverbial last straw that finally led to personnel changes at the *KIE*. Both Ryszard Czarnecki and his deputy Piotr Nowina-Konopka were sent on leave⁵¹⁰ following the rejection of the funding applications. After long discussions with the *ZChN*, Buzek dismissed Czarnecki and Nowina-Konopka and ran the *KIE* himself.⁵¹¹ The role of *KIE* secretary was filled by Maria Karasińska-Fendler, previously an expert in European integration economics at Łódź University. A *ZChN* advisor and a known sympathizer of this grouping, she had no formal party-political affiliation. Ryszard Czarnecki maintained a ministerial function at the Chancellery of the

⁵⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid.

⁵¹⁰ G. Blażyca and M. Kolkiewicz, 'Poland and the EU: internal disputes, domestic politics and accession', *Journal of communist studies and transition politics*, 15, 4 (1999), 131-143, p132.

⁵¹¹ 'Czarnecki Bez Teki' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.173, 25/26 July 1998.

Prime Minister as 'minister with no portfolio' and was charged with promoting European integration and developing a programme of European education in Poland.

The changes at the Committee for European Integration met with a positive response from the Commission. The Commissioner for Enlargement applauded the decision to assign the administration of these funds to the Ministry of Finance.⁵¹² In contrast to the highly politicised style of Czarnecki, Karasińska-Fendler aimed to stick to the day to day integration process. Her priority was: 'not people but good procedures, not ideology and speaking about how we will protect national interests, but keeping an eye on the simple, technical matters'.⁵¹³ Under the leadership of the new secretary the *KIE* made progress in supporting the transposition of EU legislation and co-ordination of the integration tasks. The involvement of Prime Minister Buzek in disciplining tardy ministers allowed for greater coordination in implementing the required legislative changes and sped up the process of harmonising Polish law with the European *acquis*. The management of structural aid also improved as Karasińska-Fendler made sure that the allocated funds were used effectively and that applications were submitted on time.⁵¹⁴

Yet problems soon arose as the negotiations on the contentious chapters of agriculture and industrial policy began. Disagreements between the Commission and the Polish negotiators concerning the industrial policy chapter reflected the continuing lack of a unified policy stance on the part of the government. When the European Commission refused to back down to Polish demands different responses could be heard from the Committee for European Integration and from the AWS's deputy-minister for industry, Janusz Kaczurba. Whereas Karasińska-Fendler confirmed that Poland would agree to the EU's requests, Kaczurba disregarded her stance and continued to push for an

⁵¹² Marcin Zdort, 'Informacje' *Rzeczpospolita*, 29 July 1998.

⁵¹³ Maria Karasińska-Fendler, quoted in 'Zapowiedź Zmian Personalnych' *Rzeczpospolita*, 30 July 1998.

⁵¹⁴ Interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, 14 January 2002.

extended transition period for the steel industry subsidies.⁵¹⁵ As one senior level decision maker at the *KIE* put it: 'Poland consistently lacked an integration strategy'.⁵¹⁶

The deteriorating relations between Poland and the European Commission also became apparent during Commissioner van der Broek's visit to the *Sejm* in November 1998.⁵¹⁷ AWS parliamentarians informed the Commissioner that Poland did not have to join the EU and could remain economically viable outside it. They also questioned the benefits of the Common Agricultural Policy. Even representatives of the euro enthusiastic *SLD* were concerned about the EU's ability to undertake the institutional reforms necessary for enlargement. On leaving the meeting an irritated van der Broek reminded the parliamentarians that the membership application was a Polish initiative and that should they not want to accede to the EU, they would not be forced to do so.⁵¹⁸

The replacement of Ryszard Czarnecki proved insufficient to remedy the lack of coordination between the numerous administrative bodies involved in the integration process. In December 1998, Karasińska-Fendler recommended to Jerzy Buzek that *KIE* be reformed to allow it greater authority over its participant ministries. When Buzek refused to carry out the reforms Karasińska-Fendler tendered her resignation stating that she was unable to continue in her post due to ineffective institutional arrangements.⁵¹⁹

Meanwhile, Ryszard Czarnecki, now based at the Prime Minister's Chancellery, worked on developing the Public Information Programme (*Program Informowania Społeczeństwa, PIS*). Czarnecki's euro-sceptic stance was soon affirmed with the appointment of Artur Gurski, previously an editor of the anti-integrationist, radical-Catholic '*Nasz Dziennik*', to a senior position in his

⁵¹⁵ Jędrzej Bielecki, 'Spór Coraz Ostrzejszy' *Rzeczpospolita*, 14 October 1998.

⁵¹⁶ Interview with anonymous *KIE* employee, 11 October 2002.

⁵¹⁷ Blażyca and Kolkiewicz, 'Poland and the EU: internal disputes, domestic politics and accession', p134.

⁵¹⁸ Jędrzej Bielecki, 'Członkowstwo na Własną Odpowiedzialność' *Rzeczpospolita*, 27 November 1998.

⁵¹⁹ Interview with anonymous *KIE* employee, 11 October 2002.

department. In developing the *PIS*, Czarnecki set out to provide what he described as objective and unbiased information about the EU. As he stated during a press briefing: 'It is a lot better for those whom we want to reach to have a feeling that the government is providing trustworthy information rather than some ideology or propaganda'.⁵²⁰ Other contributors to the information programme, such as the undersecretary of state at the *KIE*, Jarosław Pietras and the sociologist Elżbieta Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, also felt that the *PIS* should above all provide objective information about the EU. However, representatives of pro-integrationist NGOs such as the Schuman Foundation and the Polish European Movement argued it was not possible to encourage public interest in integration without presenting a positive image of the EU.⁵²¹

The first version of the document, completed in December 1998, set out to 'promote information and not ideas, to inform without emotion and to sincerely educate about the positive and the problematic consequences which EU membership brings with it'.⁵²² This caused uproar both at the Committee for European Integration and at the cabinet. It was argued that a state which has since 1991 declared EU membership as its strategic aim could not now inform the public about this in a 'detached' and 'lukewarm' manner. The programme was also criticised for lack of consultation with NGOs and the public. While it targeted information to specific social groups, e.g.: youth, the unemployed or the elderly, none of these groups had been consulted during the preparation of the programme. As a result, rather than specifying the kind of information that was required, the programme made vague references to the need to establish links with social groups.⁵²³ A new version of the *PIS* was eventually produced. The emphasis now lay on 'attaining a broad and lasting support of society for

⁵²⁰ *Unia i Polska*, nr 14, January 1999.

⁵²¹ *Ibid.*

⁵²² 'Nowy - stary PIS' *Unia i Polska*, nr. 7, March 1999.

⁵²³ Górniaak, p28.

the process of integration with the EU' and a 'rise in society's interest in the subject of integration'.⁵²⁴

Although Ryszard Czarnecki was obligated to consult NGOs while preparing the second draft, many non-governmental organisations still felt that they had not been given a voice in the preparation of the programme. The European Commission also took an interest and, according to *Unia i Polska*, some of its staff felt that Poland should have either asked the Commission for advice or outsourced the development of the information strategy to an experienced public relations company. One Commission representative felt that since the current authors had not managed to create an acceptable programme 'there is no point in wasting even more money'.⁵²⁵ The second draft of the *PIS* was eventually approved on 4 May 1999 however its implementation was delayed until the autumn of 1999.

In the meantime, Jan Kułakowski set about developing his own European information campaign. On top of his responsibilities as Chief Negotiator, Kułakowski toured Poland giving lectures about the local impact of integration. The programme, comprising of sixteen regional conferences, was entitled 'Understanding the Negotiations'. When a puzzled journalist asked Kułakowski's assistant whether her boss was responsible for information policy as well as negotiations she replied: 'It's his hobby'.⁵²⁶ It would appear that the Chief Negotiator did not have much confidence in an information programme prepared by the former leader of the *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*. Kułakowski justified the need for the programme by emphasising that in order for negotiations to be effective they needed broad public awareness and backing. He stated:

We do not want to negotiate closed up in the silence of offices. Negotiations make sense only if they are backed by

⁵²⁴ *Unia i Polska*, January 1999, nr.4

⁵²⁵ 'Nowy - stary PIS' *Unia i Polska*, nr.7, March 1999.

⁵²⁶ Marek Saryusz-Wolski, 'Z Kułakowskim po kraju' *Unia i Polska*, nr.14, June 1999.

public opinion. We have to have a sense of what is going on in society in relation to the negotiations.⁵²⁷

Shortly after approving the Public Information Programme in May 1999, the cabinet authorized an updated version of the 'National Programme of Preparation to Membership in the European Union' (NPPM). First developed in 1998 as part of the Accession Partnership framework, the programme had been adjusted to address the current integration strategy. The updated version identified harmonisation of Polish law with the European *acquis* as a key priority. Other urgent tasks included faster privatisation, the development of effective anti-trust policy and restructuring of the economy. The programme also addressed the need to reform intellectual property rights as well as to strengthen and reform the tax system.⁵²⁸

The NPPM privatisation strategy included plans to sell state owned telecommunications, banking, and heavy industry. Polish steelworks were to be privatised by 2001 and all loss making mines were to be closed. It was expected that over half of the workers employed in heavy industry at the time would be made redundant and their compensation packages were to be covered by the Polish government partly from the state budget and partly from the PHARE funds.⁵²⁹

The completion of heavy industry reforms was one of the most challenging and publicly scrutinised elements of the Single Market adjustment process. The restructuring project begun in 1992 with the view to meet the Association requirement of full restructuring by 1999. The privatisation process stalled however and employment levels had not changed. In 1998 the Polish government requested an extension of Association timelines. The new restructuring programme was put in place and bolstered with a 30 million euro

⁵²⁷ Ibid.

⁵²⁸ Magda Tadeusiak, 'Priorytet: ambitna konieczność' *Unia i Polska*, nr.14, June 1999.

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

fund for social protection and redundancies. The Commission agreed for Poland to maintain a 6% tariff on steel products in 1998 and 3% in 1999.⁵³⁰

Meanwhile, the position of the *KIE* Secretary remained vacant. According to Janina Paradowska of *Polityka* magazine, Jerzy Buzek initially promised the post to the *Unia Wolności*. The *UW*'s preferred candidate, Jerzy Osiatyński, was never appointed however, and the *UKIE* remained undirected.⁵³¹ It was also speculated that Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, formerly Governmental Plenipotentiary for European Integration, might be appointed as *UKIE* secretary, with Karasińska-Fendler as first deputy. But the conditions set by both Saryusz-Wolski and Karasińska-Fendler entailed a significant strengthening of the Committee and as such were not acceptable to the euro-sceptic *ZChN*. Saryusz-Wolski wanted the *KIE* to have sufficient authority over its member ministries to effectively coordinate the integration processes, and for its internal structure to be re-hauled so as to avoid overlapping competences. He also argued that there should be a much stronger relationship with the negotiation team and with the head negotiator, and a much less 'vassal' relationship with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs including, among other issues, the co-supervision of Poland's EU representation in Brussels. Jerzy Buzek, who had to balance the interests of the numerous groupings represented in the government, was not willing to risk conflict with either the Catholic-nationalists or the liberals by placing the *KIE* under the control of either grouping.⁵³²

According to *Unia i Polska*, several proposals for reform were discussed during the first quarter of 1999. The most radical scenario suggested the dissolution of the Committee and the transfer of responsibility for negotiations and integration policy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This would have given the *Unia Wolności* and Bronisław Geremek full control over the integration process and as such was not acceptable to most of the *AWS* and especially to the

⁵³⁰ Górniaak, p38.

⁵³¹ Janina Paradowska, 'Akcja Przeciw Unii, Unia Przeciw Akcji' *Polityka*, nr 23 (2000), (<http://polityka.onet.pl/archiwum.asp>, last accessed 25 February 2004).

⁵³² *Ibid.*

Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe. Other proposals considered appointing someone with sufficient authority, such as a third deputy Prime Minister, to head the *KIE*. While allowing the *KIE* sufficient clout to coordinate the integration process, this would have diminished the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as place the Chief Negotiator under the control of the new head of *KIE*, which would not have been acceptable to the *UW*. The last option was for the leadership of the Committee to be taken up by someone who did not have partisan affiliations. The *KIE* would become a monitoring body for the progress of integration and responsibility for the implementation of the integration policy would remain with the Prime Minister's chancellery and with individual ministries.⁵³³

In the end, Prime Minister Buzek rejected all of these options. Some restructuring took place and the Committee's eight departments downsized to seven and Paweł Samecki, a senior staff member of the Committee, was appointed as acting *UKIE* secretary. In June 1999 Buzek asked his former cabinet chief Wojciech Arkuszewski to become involved in the co-ordination of legal harmonization and Arkuszewski's close relationship with the prime minister and authority within the *AWS* facilitated some progress in the harmonization process.⁵³⁴ But a permanent secretary was not appointed for a total of sixteen months and the formal leadership of the *KIE* remained with Buzek. The lack of coordination among the numerous institutions continued to impact the integration process.

Conflict also developed between the *KIE* and the Office of the Chief Negotiator. The euro-enthusiast Kułakowski never found it easy to get on with the Christian-nationalists and communication was finally severed over a conflict concerning the sale of land to foreigners. This was one of the most contentious and widely debated negotiation areas. For the *ZChN*, allowing foreigners to buy Polish land constituted a means to yet another German occupation. Initially

⁵³³ *Unia i Polska*, nr.4, January 1999.

⁵³⁴ R. Zubek, 'Complying with Transposition Commitments in Poland: Collective Dilemmas, Core Executives and Legislative Outcomes', *West European Politics*, 28, 3 (2005), 592-619, p606.

therefore, the *ZChN* called for a total ban on the sale of land. When in July 1999 Kułakowski proposed an eighteen year transition period the *KIE* retorted with a barrage of criticism. Eventually the two institutions ceased to communicate altogether. In spite of the *KIE* and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' buildings being only some 100 metres away from each other, Jan Kułakowski stopped visiting the Committee. When asked why, he commented:

There is currently no one there corresponding to me in rank, it is them who should come to see me. I have my staff and know what is going on. It is true that Nowina-Konopka personally linked the *UKIE* with the negotiation team, and now there is no one fulfilling this role; I am incessantly asking the Prime Minister reinstate the previous state of affairs.⁵³⁵

Although Kułakowski lacked the backing of many *AWS* politicians he had the support of the President. During a meeting with the negotiation team in June 1999 Kwaśniewski argued that Poland should not request overly long transition periods on the sale of land, as this may have meant having to make concessions in other areas. He also expressed concerns about the *KIE* and the 'lengthy uncertainty about the appointment of the head of *KIE*, as well as the manner in which this institution is functioning'.⁵³⁶

Legislative harmonization was also subject to criticism. According to Ewa Freyberg, an *SLD* parliamentarian, new legislation often contradicted that of the European *acquis*:

The draft legislation prepared by the cabinet is often so bad that I do not know if it can contribute to the over-all improvement of the government's projects. We have tremendous problems with how to then turn this into a good product. Some of the projects have been highlighted by the *KIE* secretariat as contradictory to European Union legislation. Better co-ordination of work is necessary, and co-operation of government and parliament...the Prime Minister, as the Head of the

⁵³⁵ Jan Kułakowski, quoted in Janicki, Mariusz, 'KIE w Dwa Kije', *Polityka*, 4(1999).

⁵³⁶ Aleksander Kwaśniewski, quoted in *Unia i Polska*, nr.4, June 1999.

Committee for European Integration, is not able to take care of the work of the Committee and at the same time lead the secretariat.⁵³⁷

It became clear that the acting head, Jacek Samecki, did not have sufficient authority to push the integration process forward. Delays in harmonising legislation ensued and led to intensified concerns about Poland not being able to accede as part of the first wave. The Commission's 1999 progress report noted that Poland had not progressed significantly with legal harmonization. Lack of progress was also noted in state aid, and steel, fisheries and agriculture restructuring and infrastructure investment. Moreover, as a result of disagreements between the interventionist AWS groupings and the liberals within the cabinet Poland also missed a December 1999 deadline for the enactment of legislation defining state aid criteria⁵³⁸. It did not help matters when negotiations stalled in April 2000 as Poland refused to lower agricultural tariffs.⁵³⁹

The legislative harmonization process improved when the parliamentary Commission for European Integration, headed by *Unia Wolności*'s Tadeusz Mazowiecki, proposed draft legislation calling for the government to submit all required harmonisation measures for parliamentary ratification by July 2000.

The proposal also included a request to:

establish a subject who, appointed by the Prime Minister and the government, will bear the responsibility for the efficiency and co-ordination of harmonization measures and for the carrying out the scheduled works in a disciplined manner.⁵⁴⁰

Jacek Saryusz-Wolski proved an acceptable candidate, combining European integration expertise with a Solidarity background and a lack of party-political

⁵³⁷ Ewa Freyberg, 'Wirtualna Integracja' *Unia i Polska*, nr.3(31), 21 February 2000.

⁵³⁸ M. Castle, *Democracy in Poland* (Cambridge 2002), p223.

⁵³⁹ Arkadiusz Dawidow, 'Liberalizujemy!' *Wprost*, 27 September 2000, p7.

⁵⁴⁰ Druk sejmowy 1685, III kadencja (<http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki4ka.nsf>, last accessed 2 November 2003).

affiliation. Saryusz-Wolski quickly proceeded to raise the profile of the UKIE and improve coordination between the member ministries. As he stated shortly after his appointment in April 2000:

The co-ordination role of the Committee for European Integration should be strengthened, as well as the back office, which is the secretariat of the committee. The Secretariat should not only provide information but also monitor the legislative work within the government. I also foresee a greater participation of the KIE secretariat in the work of parliamentary commissions so that the legislation accepted by the government remains in accordance with EU law after it leaves the commissions.⁵⁴¹

Saryusz-Wolski's appointment brought long awaited improvements in the integration process⁵⁴² and a large part of the required draft legislation was submitted and voted on by the summer of 2000⁵⁴³ and substantial progress made throughout the remainder of that year⁵⁴⁴. The EU recognised the improvement and the 2000 Commission report praised the progress made in privatisation and harmonisation of Polish law with European norms. Nonetheless, problems still persisted with delays in legal reforms and the restructuring of the agricultural sector.⁵⁴⁵

Negotiations

Although the negotiations formally started in April 1998 the first seven months of the process was taken up by 'screening': a detailed assessment of the compatibility of the applicant states' legislation with that of the EU. To date previous entrants had been required to harmonise their legal system with that of the EU. In certain areas applicant states could however negotiate an extension of time they had to harmonize. The time allocated for harmonisation

⁵⁴¹ Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, interview by Arkadiusz Dawidowski, 'Mister Europa przyspiesza' Trybuna, 19 April 2000.

⁵⁴² Interview with John O'Rourke, 10 January 2002.

⁵⁴⁴ R. Zubek, *Core Executive and Europeanization in Central Europe* (New York 2008), p33.

⁵⁴⁵ Jacek Safuta, 'Nieco cieplej' Polityka, nr 47/2000 (2272).

was known as the transition period. Contrary to popular perception, membership negotiations did not concern the conditions of membership but only the time within which the candidate states adhered to the EU's requirements.

In relation to accession the term negotiation was hence misleading in that a negotiation implies discussion and agreement on a set of terms from all negotiation partners. The accession process was different however, in that the terms of membership were already defined in the *acquis communautaire*. Moreover, any transition periods required unanimous agreement from all member states which significantly limited the flexibility needed to accommodate the needs of the candidates. As a result, the candidates scope for bargaining was minimal and the process largely one sided.⁵⁴⁶

The negotiations were divided into thirty one chapters. These included free movement of goods, freedom of movement of persons, freedom to provide services, free movement of capital, company law, competition policy, agriculture, fisheries, transport policy taxation, economic and monetary union, statistics, social policy and employment, energy, industrial policy, small and medium sized enterprises, science and research, education and training, telecommunications and information technology, culture and audiovisual policy, regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments, environment, consumer and health protection, justice and home affairs, customs union, external relations, common foreign and security policy, financial control, financial and budgetary provisions and institutions. Less contentious negotiation chapters, such as science and research or education and training could be closed straight away as no harmonisation measures were necessary. Other areas required lengthy negotiations however.

⁵⁴⁶ Grabbe, 'A Partnership for Accession? The Implications of EU Conditionality for the Central and East European Applicants.', p.193, Mayhew, 'Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and East European Candidate Countries.', p12.

Agriculture was one of the most contentious negotiation chapters. 25% of the Polish workforce was in farming and 40% of its population rural.⁵⁴⁷ The agriculture chapter and specifically the attainment of Common Agricultural Policy funds on par with those of existing member states was hence a key negotiation area for the Poles. Total farming support levels in the EU were estimated to be over ten times higher in 1999 than those in Poland, potentially making CAP implementation one of the most financially advantageous aspects of enlargement for Poland. Farming support amounted to as much as 12% of total Polish budget spend in 1999 but the allocation of spending was much less efficient compared to that of the EU.⁵⁴⁸ 9.7% of the 12% spend was used for incapacity and pension payments for farmers and only 2.4% on active agricultural policy.⁵⁴⁹ Agricultural restructuring funds were hence limited and Poland's agricultural policy and especially the repeated increases of import tariffs on agricultural products was not aligned with the CAP reforms taking place within the EU throughout the pre-accession period.⁵⁵⁰

State aid was another contentious issue as the Poles strove to secure a transition period until 2017 for the 'Special Economic Zones'.⁵⁵¹ Other contentious topics included the free movement of capital, which included the sale of land to foreigners, as well as the chapters concerned with regional funds and the budget.

The first two years of negotiations did not proceed smoothly. As the AWS pushed for a 'tough' negotiation stance many chapters remained open and membership appeared increasingly distant as successive accession dates proved unrealistic. By January 2000 only eight of the thirty negotiation chapters had been closed. They included statistics, industrial policy, small and medium sized

⁵⁴⁷M. Johnson and J.Rollo, 'EU Enlargement and Commercial Policy: Enlargement and the Making of Commercial Policy', in 2001), p21.

⁵⁴⁸Hausner and Marody, *Jakość Rządzenia: Polska bliżej Unii Europejskiej?*, p35.

⁵⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁵⁰Ibid.

⁵⁵¹Mayhew, 'Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the Negotiations with the Central and East European Candidate Countries.', p26.

enterprises, science and research, telecoms and IT, consumer and health protection and external Relations.

In March 2001 the EU called for seven year transition periods on the free movement of labour in exchange for seven years on the sale of land. This was not acceptable for the *ZChN*, whose influence grew as other parties left the AWS. Ryszard Czarnecki was not willing to give in:

Any compromise on the subject of land would only increase the pressure on Poland from the side of the EU. We can combine tough negotiations with a quick accession. Neither this government, nor the next one can afford for the prices of land in Poland to be lower than those in the EU. Liberalization would cause an increase in German interest in our real estate. Polish society is very sensitive in this matter.⁵⁵²

ZChN had the support of the euro-sceptic factions of *PSL*. 'Are you joking?' stated one *PSL* parliamentarian 'This is not a compromise. I would call a traitor anyone who would agree to this'.⁵⁵³

The elites' tough stance on the sale of land did not reflect the priorities of the public however. According to a 1998 Institute of Public Affairs study issues identified as important in negotiations with EU were, in the order of priority: farming (66%), the right to work in other member states (54%), the right to reside in other member states (37%), and purchase of Polish real estate by foreigners (10%).⁵⁵⁴ The issue of the sale of land, so prominent in the rhetoric of the euro-sceptic elites, sat well below other public priorities such the ability to improve livelihoods by working in the EU and the fear of the adverse impact of accession on the Polish farming sector. Perhaps as a reflection of the importance attached to the issue in elite debate however the numbers of those opposed to the sale of land to foreigners grew from 43% in September 2000 to 51% in March

⁵⁵² Ryszard Czarnecki, quoted in Katarzyna van Kraainen, 'Propozycja nie do Odrzucenia' *Życie*, nr.98(1391), 26 April 2001, p3.

⁵⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁴ M. Gerszewska and J. Kucharczyk, 'Oczekiwania Polakow Wobec Negocjacji z Unia Europejska', in *Polska Eurodebata*, ed. L. Kolarska-Bobińska (Warsaw 1999), p30.

2001.⁵⁵⁵ In 2001 the majority of respondents also supported a 'tough' negotiation strategy. 68% felt that Poland should defend its negotiation stance even if this meant a delay to accession and only 14% felt that concessions should be made.

⁵⁵⁶

The government's unwillingness to compromise on the sale of land led to further doubts about Poland's ability to complete the integration process by the end of 2002. Nonetheless, Jerzy Buzek still refused to acknowledge that 2002 was unrealistic. A disagreement between Saryusz-Wolski and Buzek concerning the date of accession ensued. What initially appeared to be confusion between the date on which Poland would be ready to accede and the actual date of accession proved a convenient excuse to discredit the exacting head of the *KIE* Secretariat. On 20 May 2001 Saryusz-Wolski announced that 1 January 2003 was not a realistic entry date and that Poland could be expected to accede on 1 January 2004.⁵⁵⁷ Only two days later however, at a Brussels press conference held jointly with the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, Buzek stated that there had been no change in the expected accession date of 1 January 2003. He further informed the confused journalists that his discussions with Prodi had not broached the subject of the accession date. Saryusz-Wolski, also present at the press briefing, was reported to have appeared flustered and had declined to comment on the discrepancy between his and the Prime Minister's statements.⁵⁵⁸

Saryusz-Wolski retracted his claim several days later. He stated:

In relation to my statement of May 21st on the matter of the date of Poland's accession to the European Union, I would like to declare that I did not consult its content with the Prime Minister. In particular, there was no justification for my statement that the Polish side is considering the

⁵⁵⁵ Hausner and Marody, *Jakość Rządzenia: Polska bliżej Unii Europejskiej?*, p70.

⁵⁵⁶ Hausner, 2001 Hausner, *Polski Talk Show: Dialog Społeczny a Integracja Europejska.*, p70; Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej 'Public Opinion' Report nr 2001/38.

⁵⁵⁷ 'Negocjacje z UE. Cel: rok 2004' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.118, 22 May 2001, p. 1.

⁵⁵⁸ Jacek Pawlicki, 'Negocjacje z Unią Europejską. Data? Jaka Data?' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.119(2001), 23 May 2001, p4.

possibility of postponing in time the actual date of Polish accession to the EU that is from the date 2003 to the year 2004.⁵⁵⁹

The communist-successor opposition was very critical of the government's confusion about the accession timetable. Leszek Miller commented: 'This is the final break down of the current negotiation strategy'.⁵⁶⁰ According to Józef Oleksy it 'made our country appear unprofessional, they make it look like it does not have a stable strategy regarding the European Union'.⁵⁶¹

Indeed, a strategy did appear to be lacking. The negotiations continued to stall throughout the following months and it soon became clear that January 2003 was indeed an unrealistic target date. In July 2001 Poland had closed only sixteen out of thirty-one negotiation chapters and reached the bottom rung in the European Commission's progress chart, followed only by Bulgaria and Romania. However, neither Jerzy Buzek nor Jan Kułakowski were willing to compromise. Kułakowski pointed out: 'We aren't treating this as a race. We are taking it seriously, and we think our European partners recognise this'.⁵⁶² The integration process would not speed up again until a change in negotiation strategy was implemented after the SLD's return to power in September 2001.

EU membership in political debate

European integration was a particularly thorny point of dissent during the first two years of AWS rule as Prime Minister Buzek manoeuvred between the euro-enthusiastic *Unia Wolności* and the euro-sceptic *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*, one of the AWS' biggest member organisations. The ideological diversity of the AWS-UW government greatly problematized the development of a coherent European integration doctrine, thereby problematizing policy making and hampering the integration process. But in spite of the discord between coalition partners the accession project progressed, propelled by the

⁵⁵⁹ 'Saryusz I już' Trybuna Ludu, 24 May 2001, p1.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶² John Reed, 'Poland's tough EU negotiator prefers long game' *Financial Times*, 3 July 2001.

euro-enthusiast Freedom Union. Once the UW left the coalition in June 1999 and as the AWS euro-sceptics proved increasingly unwilling to compromise on transition periods for the sale of land negotiations slowed down. The challenge of building consensus on accession in the ideologically diverse 1997-2001 cabinet will be discussed in depth in this section.

The 1997 election campaign

The 1997 elections took place on September 21st 1997 on the basis of the same electoral ordination as those in 1993, with parliamentary representation thresholds set at 5% for parties and 8% for electoral coalitions. It became clear early on in the campaign that the contest would be primarily played out between the two biggest groupings: the communist-successor SLD and the Solidarity-successor AWS. The other contestants included *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, *Ruch Odbudowy Polski*, *Unia Pracy* and *Unia Wolności*. The results of the contest are presented in table 3.

Name of grouping	Percentage of votes	Percentage of parliamentary seats
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	27,13%	35,7%
Unia Wolności	13,37%	13,0%
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	7,31%	5,9%
Ruch Odbudowy Polski	5,56%	1,3%
Unia Pracy	4,74%	-
Krajowa Partia Emerytów i Rencistów	2,18%	-
Unia Prawicy Rzeczypospolitej	2,03%	-
Krajowe Porozumienie Emerytów i Rencistów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej	1,63%	-
Blok dla Polski	1,36%	-

Table 3: 1997 parliamentary election results.⁵⁶³

Key topics addressed in the campaign included de-communisation, relations between Church and state, privatisation, social policy reform and European integration. *Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność* and *Ruch Odbudowy Polski* advocated thorough de-communisation, a close relationship between the Church and the

⁵⁶³ F. Millard, Polish Politics and Society, (London 1999).

state and adamantly opposed abortion. In terms of socio-economic policy, the AWS planned reforms to the state administration, social security, education and health care. The *SLD* advocated a separation of Church and state and the legalisation of abortion. Women's rights played a prominent role in the programme.⁵⁶⁴ Regarding economic policy, the *SLD* advocated continued privatisation and an anti-inflationary monetary policy but also emphasised the need to prevent unemployment.⁵⁶⁵ It also proposed an 'active industrial policy' advocating the use of tariffs, credit preferences and state concessions.⁵⁶⁶

A similar economic platform was presented by *Unia Pracy*. Positioned on the left of the *SLD* the *UP* focused on social inequalities, poverty and unemployment. It criticised both the Solidarity-successor and communist-successor government for pursuing neo-liberal economic policies.⁵⁶⁷ Instead, it advocated greater involvement of workers in enterprise management and a cautious approach to privatisation. An interventionist economic programme, with a strong emphasis on state aid for the farming sector, was also presented by the politically conservative *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*.

European integration was a salient issue in the 1997 campaign but the rhetoric on Europe remained ambiguous and symbolic. Although most groupings declared support for some form of integration they did not reconcile accession requirements with their socio-economic and political policy proposals. In terms of rhetoric however, the liberal *Unia Wolności* and the *SLD* were markedly enthusiastic about integration whereas politically conservative groupings such as the AWS, *ROP* and *PSL* took a more sceptical approach.

⁵⁶⁴ SLD 1997 Electoral Program 'Dobre Dziś – Lepsze Jutro', sections 4 and 5, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid, section 9.

⁵⁶⁶ Ibid, section 1.

⁵⁶⁷ Unia Pracy 1997 electoral program: 'Zasługujesz na Wiecej. Deklaracja Wyborcza Unii Pracy', section I. Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.

By 1997 the *SLD*'s stance towards European integration was one of unambiguous support for both NATO and EU membership.⁵⁶⁸ One of its slogans stated: 'To Europe? To the Left of Course!' Its programme declared: 'We consider Poland's membership in the European Union and NATO to be the most important foreign policy aims...acceding to the European "Fatherland of Fatherlands" will bring better and safer lives to the Poles'.⁵⁶⁹

The post-communists presented themselves as a modernised, social-democratic party capable of cooperating with Western partners on an equal footing.⁵⁷⁰ Their European integration doctrine was based on the blueprint of 'Social Europe' advocated by the Party of European Socialists of the European Parliament. In contrast to the *AWS*' 'Europe of Nations', the *SLD* advocated a 'European Fatherland' (*Ojczyzna Europa*), favouring close political integration and cooperation among the Union's member states. The Alliance emphasised the social aspects of the EU, such as the principle of solidarity inherent in the structural and cohesion funding programmes, the social charter, human rights, and anti-discrimination regulations. The key priorities of 'Social Europe' were employment, education, the environment and social security.⁵⁷¹ The doctrine was outlined in *Trybuna* (a daily paper closely affiliated with the social democrats) by *SLD* parliamentarian Tadeusz Iwiński:

The left emphasizes not only the requirements of the common market but also the necessity of creating a socially integrated Europe – one of development and solidarity, a project combining economic and social factors. It is about a humanitarian solution, closer to the average person, and related to such problems as employment, education, security and the struggle with organized crime.⁵⁷²

⁵⁶⁸ *SLD* 1997 Electoral Program, 'Dobre Dziś – Lepsze Jutro', section 15, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.

⁵⁷⁰ *Ibid*, section 1.

⁵⁷¹ Tadeusz Iwiński, 'Lewicowa Wizja Europy' *Trybuna*, nr.161, 12-13 July 1997, p. 12.

⁵⁷² *Ibid*.

In contrast to the *SLD*, Jan Olszewski's *Ruch Odbudowy Polski* took a cautious stance on accession. While enthusiastic about NATO membership⁵⁷³ *ROP*'s support for EU membership was conditioned on protecting the Polish economy and maintaining subsidies and customs barriers. It stated:

Poland cannot remain in the grey zone between Western Europe and Russia. Poland's participation in Western economic structures requires time and money. We must prepare for it by modernizing agriculture, re-gaining self-sufficiency in agricultural production and gaining a positive balance in the trade of agricultural products; modernizing the industrial sector, radically raising the competitiveness of industrial undertakings, strengthening exports. ⁵⁷⁴

ROP's integration strategy hence entailed firstly ensuring that Poland's economic development was on par with that of its European trade partners before accession could take place. Judging by 1997 growth rates, membership could hence be expected to take place in the next ten to twenty years.

ROP also emphasised the importance of keeping strategic industries such as banking and telecommunications in Polish hands and advocated interventionist economic policy and the use of state concessions, preferential credits and customs tariffs. ⁵⁷⁵

The Movement's highly conditional support for accession may have reflected its internal divisions. On the one hand the movement included conservatives such as Piotr Naimski and Radek Sikorski who expressed careful support for an economic union similar to the stance of British Conservatives. On the other hand, concerns about economic occupation, loss of the Recovered Territories and surrender of Polish sovereignty expressed in Antoni Macierwicz's paper

⁵⁷³ 'Karta Niepodległości Ruchu Odbudowy Polski z 11 Listopada 1996 roku', section 1, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.

⁵⁷⁴ Program Wyborczy Ruchu Odbudowy Polski, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.

⁵⁷⁵ Ibid.

Głos indicated a much more sceptical stance, similar to that of the most sceptical members of the *ZChN* and *PSL*.⁵⁷⁶

Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe's stance towards EU accession combined the desire to protect Polish national identity from 'liberal pressures', 'post-modernism' and 'aggressive counter-culture'⁵⁷⁷ with the ambition to make use of the EU's agricultural subsidies and structural funds. For the *PSL*, EU membership was a zero-sum game, to be won either by 'us' or by 'Brussels'. The success of the integration process lay in the hands of the negotiators who had to be 'tough' in defending Polish national identity, its economy, and above all the agricultural sector. As section 8 of the Agrarians' programme specified:

We are going to the European Union for better living conditions and not so that things are worse than they are now. We should therefore negotiate for such membership conditions, which would bring about real structural change in Poland with the aid of the Union's funds...We want the same rules and opportunities in the struggle against structural and regional backwardness. We bring the dowry of a nation of almost 40 million, qualified professionals, extensive natural resources. We have created the European heritage for over 1000 years and wish to co-create it on terms of partnership and mutual understanding.⁵⁷⁸

The centre left *Unia Pracy* saw EU and NATO membership as a guarantee of Poland's international security⁵⁷⁹ but was also concerned about the potentially adverse impact on the labour market and emphasised the need to ensure fair accession terms for Poland:

Economic integration with Europe is a great opportunity for us, but we are badly prepared for it. We must strive to quickly develop a competitive industrial sector. In integration negotiations we must aim to achieve conditions

⁵⁷⁶ Bachmann, Polska Kaczka - Europejski Staw. Szanse i Pułapki Polskiej Polityki Europejskiej, p167-9.

⁵⁷⁷ 'V Kongres Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego. Dokumenty Programowe', 1997, p.142.

⁵⁷⁸ Program Wyborczy Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego 1997, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 parliamentary elections folder.

⁵⁷⁹ Unia Pracy 1997 electoral program: 'Zasługujesz na Wiecej. Deklaracja Wyborcza Unii Pracy', section I. Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder, section 4.

not worse than those gained by Spain, Greece, Ireland or Portugal. We cannot allow for integration to bring the growth of unemployment and turn us into the European raw materials base.⁵⁸⁰

Gaining parliamentary representation and preventing the communist-successors from maintaining political power was the primary *raison d'être* of the AWS. As the 'Declaration of the AWS' stated: 'The aim of the Action is the formation of a wide electoral bloc which will have a chance of winning the upcoming parliamentary elections'.⁵⁸¹ Rather than shared policy goals therefore, it was the desire to remove their political competitors from power that united the AWS' member groupings.

In light of this formulating the AWS programme was not an easy task, as was exemplified by the disagreements involved in the attempts to attain consensus on accession. Following a heated debate in March 1997 the AWS eventually declared its support for European integration. The most vocal opponents of this declaration included the *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*, the far right Nationalist Democratic Faction (*Stronnictwo Narodowo-Demokratyczne*) and the libertarian *Unia Polityki Realnej*.⁵⁸² Disagreements on the content of the draft document reflected the internal divisions of the AWS. The first version stated that the *Akcja Wyborcza* supported integration with a Europe that was: 'a political and economic organization of nation states, which regulate their internal political and economic issues in accordance to their own traditions'.⁵⁸³ A clause stating that the AWS would support only this kind of Europe was later added on the request of Marian Krzaklewski. The amendment was opposed by the pro-integrationist groupings including the Conservative Agrarians, *Ruch Stu* and the Conservative Coalition (*Koalicja Konserwatywna*).⁵⁸⁴

⁵⁸⁰ Ibid, section 1.

⁵⁸¹ Andrzej Anusz, et al. ABC Akcji Wyborczej Solidarność, (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza Fulmen, 1997), p9.

⁵⁸² Witold Zatuska, 'AWS Wybrała Władze', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr. 73, 27 March 1997, p3.

⁵⁸³ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁴ Ibid.

The AWS' economic programme, completed on 2 April 1997, was even more ambiguous. 'Poland should remain a sovereign state, not isolated from the European Union, but co-operating with the European Communities as well as other countries in Europe and the world',⁵⁸⁵ it stated. The programme did not mention accession and seemed to suggest that Poland should only co-operate with the European Economic Community, in place of becoming a member of it. It also pointed out that Poland's economic interests were not compatible with those of the EU and asserted that as Poland could not expect to attain access to CAP funding agricultural policy integration should only take place once the Polish farming sector was able to compete with that of the EU.⁵⁸⁶

The ambiguity of the above declarations and the prolonged discussions preceding the presentation of the Electoral Action's stance suggest that the AWS did not arrive at consensus on an accession strategy prior to the 1997 contest. Krzysztof Oksiuta of the *Stronnictwo Konserwatywno-Ludowe*, one of the AWS' member groupings, later confirmed this:

In all our electoral materials it was emphasised that we are going to the European Union.... There is the matter of the speed of integration with the European Union, and here there were very different voices in the electoral campaign. There were those who wanted to [accede] as quickly as possible, and my grouping, the Conservative-Agrarian Faction, was one of those, and there were opponents who thought well, the European Union, being in Europe does not mean that we have to [accede] straight away, that we should reform this European Union to a Europe of Nations, retain the national character, our institutions and so forth, and so because of this the speed of integration should be slower. Threats were made about selling out national property. That was ZChN and these radically Catholic trends, so there was this stance in the electoral campaign. The Solidarity Trade Union also aligned itself in this formula in different regions of the country, depending on who was the regional head....the leader

⁵⁸⁵ Program Gospodarczy AWS, 2/4/1997, 'Stosunki Gospodarcze z Otoczeniem Międzynarodowym' quoted in Madera, 2003, p179.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

himself, Marian Krzaklewski, did not take a clear stance in the electoral campaign...it was only after the election that the AWS decided to opt for faster integration.⁵⁸⁷

The AWS's lukewarm stance on Europe proved too much for Andrzej Olechowski of the liberal, pro-integrationist One Hundred Movement (*Ruch Stu*). Olechowski announced his withdrawal from the AWS in a letter to Marian Krzaklewski published in *Gazeta Wyborcza* on 21 June 1997.⁵⁸⁸ The letter was very critical of the Electoral Action and of its 1997 electoral programme. Olechowski described the Action's stance in the constitutional debate as divisive as well as 'immoral and irresponsible'. He pointed out that the protectionist economic policy was not one with which a free-market liberal could agree. The combination of tax cuts and increased public spending, Olechowski argued, was bound to produce double digit inflation and a growing budget deficit. He was also critical of the AWS's stance on Europe. The letter stated:

The AWS's approach to European integration is particularly disappointing. The Action does not appear to believe that a speedy membership in NATO and the European Union is the only realistic method of consolidating the independence and the civilisational advancement of the Poles...European integration is a historic opportunity for escaping the 'balance of power' world where international relations are a zero sum game....we must not only accede to the European Union, but this union must also be 'deep' and be continually deepened.⁵⁸⁹

The ideological diversity represented by the Electoral Action's member organisations reflected the views on European integration they presented during the 1997 contest. On the one hand, centre-right, liberal organisations, such as the Conservative-Agrarian Faction or the *Ruch Stu*, advocated speedy

⁵⁸⁷ Interview with Krzysztof Oksiuta, 9 July 1998.

⁵⁸⁸ Andrzej Olechowski, 'List do przewodniczącego AWS, Odchodząc z AWS' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.143, 21/21 June 1997, p13-14.

⁵⁸⁹ Ibid, p13-14.

accession. On the other hand, Catholic-nationalist groupings such as the *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej*, the ZChN and the Catholic Families were very sceptical of accession. While not explicitly opposed to European integration, these parties qualified their support with numerous and often unrealistic conditions.

The *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej – Obóz Patriotyczny* (Confederation for Independent Poland – Patriotic Faction, KPN-OP)⁵⁹⁰ typified such conditional support. While it did not explicitly oppose EU membership, the KPN-OP was sceptical about the advantages it would bring to Poland. In section 6.8 of their programme the Confederates called for the re-negotiation of the Association Agreements and claimed that in order for Poland to compete with the EU on an equal footing Polish annual growth should average between 10% and 15%. This was hardly a realistic expectation given that the Polish economy grew 7% in 1997. The programme ended with a section entitled 'Problems with European integration'. According to the KPN these included agricultural over-production, growing unemployment, and 'a ruthless battle, breaking all established rules, for subsidies, production levels, markets and employment'.⁵⁹¹

Like the Confederates, the *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe* also did not explicitly oppose accession and its programme lacked a clear stance on the EU. Section 36 called for the 'abandonment of dogma' in the nature and speed of integration with European and other international economic structures.⁵⁹² The Christian-nationalists' preferred speed and nature of integration were not specified however. Moreover, ZChN made several euro-sceptic declarations prior to the campaign. In February 1996, for example, the ZChN condemned

⁵⁹⁰ KPN-OP was established in June 1997 by Adam Słomka following a power struggle between Słomka and Leszek Moczulski. Moczulski's faction of the Confederation chose to leave the AWS prior to the September 1997 elections and hence did not gain parliamentary representation.

⁵⁹¹ KPN-OP programme, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, KPN folder.

⁵⁹² 'Program Gospodarczo-Społeczny ZChN', *Informator Zjednoczenia Chrześcijańsko Narodowego*, nr.42/7, 29.02.96, Warsaw, section 36, p.8, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ZChN folder.

new legislation increasing foreigners' rights to purchase land⁵⁹³ and in June 1996 it called for a re-negotiation of the Association Agreements and extensive transition periods in the event of accession.⁵⁹⁴ The ZChN's euro-sceptic stance was also reflected by the fact that it did not seek membership of Christian Democratic international organizations such as the European Peoples' Party and instead established links with the euro-sceptic, conservative-nationalist 'Union for Europe' grouping in the European Parliament⁵⁹⁵.

The ZChN's stance was very different from that of the *Porozumienie Centrum*. The PC was not known for its euro-enthusiasm but even its lukewarm support contrasted sharply with the ZChN's scepticism. Having emphasized the need for speedy NATO membership⁵⁹⁶ the PC's 1997 programme stated:

Membership in the European Union lies at the heart of the strategic interests of our country, as it ties it civilisationally, politically and economically with the West and allows for faster economic growth. While considering social and economic realities as wide as possible a representation of Poland in Union institutions should be ensured and the period of waiting for membership should be made as short as possible.⁵⁹⁷

Another grouping that supported speedy membership in the EU was Aleksander Hall's Conservative-Agrarian Faction. Its programme not only emphasised the need for speedy accession but also criticised those who feared it would lead to the loss of national values and identity:

The European Union is not a melting pot which turns nations participating in the integration process into a homogenous European society. Respect for national

⁵⁹³ 'V Nadzwyczajny Zjazd Krajowy Zjednoczenia Chrześcijańsko-Narodowego', Uchwała nr.1, *Informator Zjednoczenia Chrześcijańsko-Narodowego*, nr. 41/6, 28 February 1996, Warsaw, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ZChN folder.

⁵⁹⁴ *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*, Uchwała nr.20/30/96, 15 June 1996, Archive of Political Parties, Institute of Political Studies, ZChN folder.

⁵⁹⁵ Bale, p17.

⁵⁹⁶ Uchwała nr.5 IV Kongresu Porozumienia Centrum - Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, section 2, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, Porozumienie Centrum folder.

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid.

traditions and diversity is the obvious right of each member state, and has been made use of by the members with no limitations. Membership in the European Union will be the consequence of our 1000 year old presence in Europe, and not a break with national tradition.⁵⁹⁸

In light of the above the AWS' umbrella programme had to be sufficiently ambiguous to incorporate the contradictory approaches of its member groupings. The heading of the section on European integration stated: 'Full membership in NATO and integration with Europe'.⁵⁹⁹ An implicit distinction between NATO membership and 'integration' with the EU was hence established. The disparity between enthusiastic support for NATO and the lukewarm acceptance of European integration was also prominent further in the programme:

We decisively support Poland's full membership in NATO to take place as soon as possible. Integration with the European Union will create a real possibility of gaining direct influence on the shaping of the new European order. We will be an active participant in international co-operation, we aim towards the establishment of a Europe where free nations are united in a Europe of Nations.⁶⁰⁰

Unlike that of NATO membership, the desired timing of integration with the European Union was not specified. Moreover, the programme did not explicitly state that the Electoral Action supported EU membership and instead only declared support for an unspecified form of 'integration'. Integration was desirable, the AWS argued, as it would allow Poland to influence the evolution of the new European order. This new Europe would, the programme implied, be an intergovernmental 'Europe of Nations'. The Europe which the Electoral Action supported had little in common with the closely integrated and increasingly federalist European Union. It was also very different from the kind

⁵⁹⁸ Program Wyborczy Stronnictwa Konserwatywno-Ludowego, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.

⁵⁹⁹ Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, 'Pełne Członkostwo w NATO i Integracja z Europą', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid.

of Europe favoured by the euro-enthusiast *SLD* and *Unia Wolności*. As Danuta Hubner, the head of the presidential chancellery, commented:

Those who speak of a 'Europe of Nations', and it is particularly the *AWS* which emphasised this in its rhetoric, they do not understand the processes which are taking place in the European Union. They are under the impression that it is possible to accede to the European Union while remaining completely autonomous with regards to all matters related to the economy, the state, society...this is of course an abstraction... if one understands things in this way then one does not want to be a member of the European Union since it is simply not possible.⁶⁰¹

To compromise between its diverse member organisations the *AWS* hence tried to do the impossible. Confronted with the need to both oppose and support accession, the Action's leadership resorted to an abstraction. They would support EU membership, but only if membership did not involve any kind of integration. The 'Europe of Nations' that the *AWS* supported was a very different organisation from that with which it was about to start accession negotiations.

In contrast to that of the *AWS*, the programme of *Unia Wolności* was unambiguously supportive of integration, calling for both NATO and EU membership to take place as soon as possible. Accession would entail few socio-economic costs, the *Unia* argued, since the reforms required for it would have had to be carried out anyway if Poland was to successfully transform itself into a free-market, liberal democracy. The *UW* competed on a neo-liberal, laissez-faire economic platform, proposing continued privatisation, abolition of state concessions and subsidies, as well as pension and health care reform.⁶⁰² *Unia Wolności*'s neo-liberal economic policy preferences were hence well-aligned with accession requirements. Its programme stated:

⁶⁰¹ Interview with Danuta Hubner, 24 July 1998.

⁶⁰² 'Program Wyborczy Unii Wolności', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997 election folder.

It should be emphasized that reform efforts, necessary for the success of our foreign policy must take place anyway, if we want to tear Poland away from decades of relative backwardness. These efforts will bring us greater international security and faster development when we take a reformed Poland into NATO and the European Union. Without completing domestic reforms the achievement of national aims may prove to be impossible.⁶⁰³

In contrast to the AWS, the SLD, *Unia Wolności* and *Unia Pracy* hence appeared staunchly pro-integrationist. Vocal enthusiasm for accession should not be taken at face value however. In his analysis of the 1997 electoral campaign Jacek Kucharczyk of the Institute for Public Studies in Warsaw, assessed the compatibility of the 1997 electoral programmes with the 1996 recommendations of the European Commission. The recommendations, known as the *avis*, provided an overview of Poland's readiness to integrate with the EU and identified six political and four economic areas that needed reform. The results of Kucharczyk's analysis are summarised in table 3. The first political issue addressed by the Commission concerned the tax authorities' ability to request information from the taxpayer's bank, which was considered to violate banking privacy. Secondly, the Commission raised concerns about freedom of the press. Journalists could be jailed for up to eight years for making mocking or untruthful observations about organs of the state. The third political recommendation addressed the lack of a legal definition of non-governmental organisations, which prevented them from applying for tax reductions. The Commission also addressed civilian control of the military, protection of national minorities, funding for the police and the judiciary, and lack of compensation for victims of the communist and Nazi regimes. Regarding economic policy, the Commission identified the need to restructure the agricultural sector, reform social security, eliminate state concessions and subsidies, speed up the re-privatisation process as well as privatise the banking and telecommunications sectors.

⁶⁰³ Ibid, section 99.

As is shown in table 3, *Unia Wolności* was the only grouping whose enthusiasm for EU membership was matched by a willingness to implement the required reforms. The AWS meanwhile failed to address many of the Commission's recommendations. Regarding the political requirements it did not address the issue of minorities' protection, banking privacy or the establishment of a legal definition of NGOs. The *Akcja Wyborcza* also did not advocate banking and telecommunications privatisation nor did it address the requirement to limit state subsidies. Although vocal euro-enthusiasm played a key part in the *SLD*'s efforts to distance itself from its authoritarian past its policies often contradicted the recommendations of the *avis*.⁶⁰⁴ The *SLD* addressed only four of the recommendations: civilian control of the military, better financing for the judiciary, minorities protection, and social security and the agricultural reform. While the *Unia Pracy* addressed most of the political recommendations, its socio-economic programme was significantly less compatible with the Commission's requirements. The *UP* postulated social security reform and restructuring of the agricultural sector but it also advocated protection of the domestic industry and the use of subsidies to prevent job losses in the heavy industry.⁶⁰⁵

ROP's questionable support for European integration appeared even more dubious when its programme was considered in light of the recommendations of the European Commission. Regarding the political issues, *ROP* supported the need for quick re-privatisation, civilian control of the military, legal protection of the press as well as better police and judiciary financing; however, it did not address minorities' rights, banking privacy nor the need for a legal definition of NGOs. It was the Movement's economic programme, however, which was most at odds with the Commission's recommendations. Regarding the agricultural sector, *ROP* argued that Poland should only accede to the EU if it was exempted from the Common Agricultural Policy. It also emphasised the need to protect domestic markets and ensure adequate governmental support

⁶⁰⁴ Kucharczyk, 'Za a Nawer Przeciw. Partie Polityczne Wobec Perspektywy Integracji w Wyborach 1997'.

⁶⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

for Polish industries. *ROP* did not support the privatisation of banking and telecommunications and argued that these were strategic sectors that should remain in Polish hands.⁶⁰⁶

The *PSL*'s electoral programme also did not match many of the European Commission's recommendations. Regarding the political items, it addressed only those concerning the need for a more efficient judiciary and civilian control of the military. Regarding the agricultural sector, the Agrarians felt that no reforms should be undertaken and that the Polish peasants should receive the same subsidies as their West European colleagues. *PSL* advocated an interventionist economic policy, calling for slower privatisation and emphasising the need to protect domestic industries by means of subsidies and concessions. The Agrarians also opposed the privatisation of the banking and telecommunications sectors.⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁷ Ibid.

	Unia Wolności	Unia Pracy	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność	Ruch Odbudowy Polski
Banking privacy legislation	Expressed intention to resolve	Did not address	Did not address	Did not address	Did not address	Did not address
Freedom of the press	Proposed new legislation	Proposed new legislation	Did not address	Did not address	Proposed new legislation	Proposed reform of media regulation
Judiciary and police funding and resource provision	Called for more resources	Called for more resources	Called for more resources	SLD did not address, SdRP called for more resources	Called for more resources	Called for more resources
Measures against the discrimination of national minorities	Did not address	Expressed need to allow national minorities to 'exist freely'	Did not address	Expressed the need to protect national minorities	Did not address	Did not address
Lack of a legal definition of non-governmental organizations	Aimed to establish an 'NGO friendly state'	Planned to clarify legal situation	Did not address	Did not address	Did not address	Did not address
Civilian control of the armed forces	Supported civilian control	Supported civilian control	Supported civilian control	Supported civilian control	Supported civilian control	Supported civilian control
Compensation for victims of Nazi and Communist regimes	Expressed strong support	Did not address	Did not address	Referred to need for re-privatization	Expressed strong support	Expressed strong support

	Unia Wolności	Unia Pracy	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej	Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność	Ruch Odbudowy Polski
Agricultural sector reform	Advocated market liberalization	Advocated market liberalization	Expressed intention to support small family farms (the opposite of what was required)	Suggested 'dual-employment' of peasants as means of restructuring	Advocated market liberalization	Proposed for Poland to be excluded from CAP when in the EU
Banking and telecommunications privatization	Intended to privatize	Opposed privatization	Opposed banking privatization and called for telecoms to remain under 'state protection'	Did not address directly, postulated telecoms reform	Did not address	Opposed privatization as 'strategic sectors'
Abolition of state subsidies and concessions	Opposed interventionism	Called for need to protect work places and develop an active 'structural policy'	Advocated interventionism	Proposed an 'active industrial policy' and use of concessions	Opposed concessions and did not address issue of subsidies	Advocated interventionism
Social security reform	Proposed reform	Proposed reform	Proposed reform	Proposed reform	Proposed reform	Proposed reform

Table 4: 1997 electoral programmes and European Commission recommendations, adapted from Jacek Kucharczyk.⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰⁸ Ibid.

The above analysis hence highlights the contradictions between the parties' declarations of support for Europe and their unwillingness to implement the reforms required for accession. It also shows how little the European integration doctrines of the AWS and its coalition partner, *Unia Wolności* had in common. For the liberal *Unia Wolności*, the processes of systemic transformation and European integration were mutually reinforcing. The reforms required for accession would, according to the liberals, have to be carried out anyway if Poland was to develop into a liberal, free-market democracy. The AWS numerous member groupings meanwhile struggled to present a consistent stance on accession. The restructuring of the heavy industry went against the interests of many of the Action's trade unionist voters and the AWS was also uncomfortable with the transfer of national competences to Brussels. But rather than address these concerns Electoral Action declared support for the 'Europe of Nations', a structure which had little in common with either the increasingly integrated post-Maastricht EU or the liberal, closely integrated community envisioned by *Unia Wolności*.

The 2000 Presidential Elections

The presidential election took place on October 8th, 2000. The Solidarity-successor groupings once again proved unable back a single candidate and, as during the 1995 contest, the incumbent Aleksander Kwaśniewski competed with several contenders. In total, thirteen candidates registered. Apart from Kwaśniewski, they included the liberal Andrzej Olechowski, Marian Krzaklewski, Jarosław Kalinowski of the PSL, the leader of the radical Agrarian *Samobrona* movement Andrzej Lepper, Jan Olszewski, the libertarian Janusz Korwin-Mikke, Lech Wałęsa, the Catholic-nationalist Jan Łopuszański, Dariusz Grabowski of the KPN, the former Chief of General Staff Tadeusz Wilecki, the socialist Piotr Ikonowicz, and Bogdan Pawłowski, who had no party-political affiliation. The results are presented in table 5.

	Candidate	Results
1	Aleksander Kwaśniewski	53.90%
2	Andrzej Olechowski	17.30%
3	Marian Krzaklewski	15.57%
4	Jarosław Kalinowski	5.95%
5	Andrzej Lepper	3.05%
6	Janusz Korwin-Mikke	1.43%
7	Lech Wałęsa	1.01%
8	Jan Łopuszański	0.79%
9	Dariusz Grabowski	0.51%
10	Piotr Ikonowicz	0.22%
11	Tadeusz Wilecki	0.16%
12	Bogdan Pawłowski	0.10%

Table 5: Results of the 2000 presidential election.⁶⁰⁹

Aleksander Kwaśniewski was presented as a moderate⁶¹⁰, 'president of all Poles', head and shoulders above the squabbling Solidarity-successor candidates. He described himself as a 'social-liberal' and a proponent of the Blairite '3rd way':

In the context of democratic values, human rights, I am a proponent of the liberal option, which above all underlines the individuality of persons and their rights. At the same time I expect responsibility. But as far as my political views are concerned, then these are undoubtedly social democrat, understood as tolerance, religious freedom, independence of one's views and faith, concern for human problems. On the other hand I do not hide that regarding the relationship between the economic sphere and social policy, I support a compromise between the so called liberal vision and the social democratic one. In this case one could say that I am very close to the views expressed by Tony Blair, leader of the Labour Party.⁶¹¹

⁶⁰⁹ Dudek, p490.

⁶¹⁰ Program Wyborczy Aleksandra Kwaśniewskiego, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.

⁶¹¹ *Ibid.*

His rhetoric was unequivocally supportive of accession and he argued that Poland should become a regional leader facilitating future enlargements. His programme stated:

We want a Poland which is respected in the world – we should therefore strengthen our presence in NATO, act on its further enlargement, build friendly, equal relations in our near vicinity leading an active regional policy. We should be serious and determined in our preparations to open ourselves to Europe, harmonizing our law and economy with the requirements of the European Union and making our standards and level of quality of life closer to those of the highly developed countries. We should strive for the doors to European and trans-Atlantic structures to remain open for other countries from our region.⁶¹²

Kwaśniewski's euro-enthusiastic stance was very much at odds with that of Marian Krzaklewski. Caught once again between the centre-right, pro-integrationist side of the Solidarity-successor electorate and the radical Catholic supporters of the religious movement and radion station Radio Maryja, Krzaklewski exhibited a thinly veiled dislike of the EU.

Presenting an unambiguous stance on the hence EU proved problematic for Krzaklewski. He did not oppose accession: 'Our national interest depends on ensuring Poland an appropriate and sovereign position in the family of European nations. Poland's integration with the EU, as understood by AWS, serves to ensure Polish well-being, access for our products to the markets of the European Community, ensuring Polish industry and agriculture the conditions for development comparable to those that countries that are EU members have, giving Poland additional guarantees of external security', he stated. Joining the EU would act as, according to Krzaklewski, 'a condition of the better solution of the economic

⁶¹² Ibid.

and social problems faced by Poland and as the road to a fuller realization of the national interest and to the strengthening of Polish identity'.⁶¹³

But the EU Krzaklewski supported was a 'community of free nations that remember their identity'.⁶¹⁴ He advocated a 'Europe of Nations' as an alternative to 'left wing federalist utopias' and warned of 'idealizing accession without being aware of the full scale of its costs' and of a 'cultural revolution' purportedly planned by left wing euro-enthusiasts. Brussels, Krzaklewski warned, could easily become the new Moscow and could once again lead to the 'evil' of communism and its successors.⁶¹⁵

According to Krzaklewski, a pro-integrationist plot was being hatched by euro-enthusiasts from *SLD* and *Unia Wolności*. Accession, Krzaklewski argued, should be seen in cost-benefit terms rather than as an 'ideological aim'. He declared:

The choice which *Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność* has to make is as follows. Either we will realize the political project created by our enemies, or we will realize our own political strategy. A strategy of victory! The idea of our opponents has already been presented to the public. It has been spoken about by both the leaders of the *SLD*: Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Leszek Miller, and by the representatives of the left wing of the *Unia Wolności*...According to this project, the basic theme organizing the Polish political scene should be integration with the European Union, seen as an ideological and not a practical aim of Polish policy – as it is seen by the AWS and a large part of the responsible politicians in the 'post-August' camp – it should serve to ensure prosperity for the Poles, opening of the markets of the European Community to our products, provide Polish industry and agriculture with development conditions comparable to those of the

⁶¹³ Marian Krzaklewski, quoted in Szczerbiak, 'Europe as a Re-aligning Issue in Polish Politics?: Evidence from the October 2000 Presidential Election', p11.

⁶¹⁴ Ibid.

⁶¹⁵ Program Wyborczy Mariana Krzaklewskiego, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.

economies of the Union's member states, create additional guarantees of external security for Poland.⁶¹⁶

Krzaklewski hence made no attempt to reach out to the communist-successor electorate. He actively alienated voters who had any previous affiliation with the communist party⁶¹⁷ as well as those on the centre-right, who were dismayed with the divisive, polarising politics of Krzaklewski and the AWS. Consequently, his electorate was limited to voters with right wing, Catholic-nationalist sympathies. On this side of the political spectrum however, Krzaklewski was confronted with numerous rivals such as Jan Łopuszański, Dariusz Grabowski of the *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej*, and the former Chief of Staff Tadeusz Wilecki.

Andrzej Olechowski presented himself as a capable businessman with no party-political affiliation. His programme focused on educational reform, improvement of the judicial system, job creation, the elimination of corruption and party nomenclature, infrastructure modernisation and the separation of foreign policy from party-political conflicts.

Olechowski was unambiguous in his support for European integration. The opening statement of his programme described his pride at the political consensus which had led to Poland's membership in NATO and which, he stated, 'will shortly lead to membership in the European Union'.⁶¹⁸ He was critical of the fact that negotiations with the EU had fallen prey to party-political interests and made the separation of foreign policy from party politics a key element of his programme. Olechowski was also concerned about the growing polarisation of Polish political life. He stated:

⁶¹⁶ Ibid.

⁶¹⁷ Ibid.

⁶¹⁸ Program Wyborczy Andrzeja Olechowskiego, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.

It is a tragic paradox that August – when all were in solidarity, when *Solidarność* and Poland were one thing – has divided us...If we go on defining our identity in contrast to that of others we will deepen our weakness. Mr. Wałęsa wants to be anti-Jaruzelski, Mr. Kwaśniewski wants to be anti-Wałęsa, Mr. Krzaklewski wants to be anti-Kwaśniewski. This chain leads nowhere!⁶¹⁹

Like Kwaśniewski, Olechowski presented himself as a safe, moderate and capable candidate. By distancing himself from party-politics he offered an alternative to the Solidarity-successor candidates who were perceived as quarrelsome and ineffective. The fact that Kwaśniewski and Olechowski, who aimed to heal the schism between the post-Solidarity and post-communist sections of political elites, attained the most votes indicates how disappointed the electorate was with the internal conflicts and polarising approach of the AWS.

Jarosław Kalinowski, chairman of the communist-successor *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, came fourth, with 5.95% of the vote. Kalinowski did not devote much attention to foreign affairs, focusing instead on unemployment, social security, health care and education. He advocated an interventionist economic policy with agricultural export subsidies and payment guarantees for farmers. In contrast to his euro-sceptic colleagues, Kalinowski supported membership in the European Union, given that it was based on a 'partnership'.

The PSL's main challenge came in the form of the radical Agrarian *Samoobrona* and its leader Andrzej Lepper. Although Lepper attained only 3.05% of the votes, this was over a twofold improvement from the 1995 contest where he got 1.32%.⁶²⁰ Lepper's radical approach contrasted with Kalinowski's centrist programme. He was made famous for organising farmers' protests and was particularly critical of the liberal, shock-therapy reformer Leszek Balcerowicz.

⁶¹⁹ Ibid.

⁶²⁰ Frances Millard, Polish Politics and Society (Routledge: London, 1999), p92.

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⁶¹⁹ Ibid.

⁶²⁰ Frances Millard, Polish Politics and Society (Routledge: London, 1999), p92.

Lepper advocated a policy he described as the 'Third Way', rejecting both communism and capitalism. His proposals included free access to education and healthcare, a right to work and a tax-free minimum income. He also called for state support for the construction industry, sales guarantees for agricultural products, increased import tariffs, subsidised credits and full pensions for farmers.⁶²¹

Lepper's programme did not specify whether he supported or opposed EU accession. Instead he called for a thorough debate which would allow 'society to make a conscious choice'⁶²² about the EU. His programme devoted much attention to Poland's relations with the East. He called for a better defined policy towards the East which would have included the rebuilding of 'proper, good neighbourly relations with the former USSR, especially with Russia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia'.⁶²³

Three of the remaining seven contenders campaigned on a strongly anti-integrationist platform. These were Jan Łopuszański, Tadeusz Wilecki and Janusz Korwin-Mikke. Of the three, Łopuszański was the most adamant in his opposition to EU membership. Łopuszański presented his opponents as collaborators, working for foreign interests seeking to once again occupy Poland. He described the presidential contest as a struggle for Poland's future. His programme stated: 'Our motherland – Poland, today finds itself in one of the hardest periods of its history... Yet another partition of Poland is taking place. Our sovereignty is threatened'.⁶²⁴

Łopuszański's stance on Europe was summed up with the slogan: 'Europe yes – European Union – no!'⁶²⁵ He supported friendly relations with other European

⁶²¹ Program Wyborczy Andrzeja Leppera, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.

⁶²² Ibid.

⁶²⁴ Program Wyborczy Jana Łopuszańskiego, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.

⁶²⁵ Ibid.

states and argued that Poland should use its geopolitical location to serve as a bridge between Eastern and Western Europe. If European integration was to take place however, it had to be based on Christian principles and in no way impinge on the national sovereignty of its participants. His programme stated: 'We support the unity of Europe – built on the foundation of its Christian culture. We assert that outside of this culture European unity is not possible'.⁶²⁶

Apart from the EU's secularity, Łopuszański's main objection to membership was its impact on Polish sovereignty. He stated:

Having experienced half a century of totalitarianism, it is with the greatest concern that we observe the development of the European Union, in which we note elements of the very same dangerous utopia – with its supranational decisions and the destruction of the sovereignty of nations... This is why we want to speak with the representatives of European nations about ways of co-operating and coming closer which would serve as alternatives to the European Union. About a Europe of Nations understood as a Europe of sovereign national states. I want this to have a significant dimension within my presidency.⁶²⁷

For Jan Łopuszański EU membership was not just evocative of the partitions; it was another partition. He venerated the Polish nation state and was much more concerned with its sovereignty than with the quality of life of its citizens. He blamed Poland's economic problems on the 'West', the European Union, and their 'spies' Leszek Balcerowicz and Aleksander Kwaśniewski. Any dissent against the EU's 'economic occupation' would, according to Łopuszański, be quashed by NATO forces.

The former Chief of General Staff Tadeusz Wilecki was equally sceptical about EU membership. His programme stated:

⁶²⁶ Ibid.

⁶²⁷ Ibid.

I oppose the speeding up of accession to the European Union. The entry to it in the current condition of our country will be nothing else but a further dependency on foreign capital, further diminishment of Polish sovereignty, pushing Poles to the role of slaves in their own country. I will demand a nationwide referendum in this matter. It cannot be allowed for the European Union to tell Poland to solve its problems when it is the European Union itself which is the problem.⁶²⁸

Wilecki also advocated the reinstatement of the death penalty, educational reform, import barriers and a reform of the taxation system. He emphasised the importance of the Catholic Church in Polish society and proposed measures against drug abuse and pornography. In contrast to Jan Łopuszański, Wilecki did not oppose Polish membership in NATO. He called for strong, professional armed forces which would allow Poland to become a credible member of NATO.

For the libertarian Janusz Korwin-Mikke, 'euro-socialism' presented the greatest danger to Poland's sovereignty. As an alternative to EU membership, Korwin-Mikke proposed participation in the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). His programme stated:

While signing and ratifying international treaties I will be directed only by Justice and the interest of Poland – and not the interest of foreign states, international organizations, and the doctrine of euro-socialism.... I will consider Poland's accession to NAFTA, in the face of a growing conflict between the USA and the European Union, I would prefer to stand on the side of the United States. Washington is further away from Honolulu than from Warsaw – yet Hawaii is a part of NAFTA. Moreover, NAFTA does not infringe on states' sovereignty.⁶²⁹

⁶²⁸ Program Wyborczy Tadeusza Wileckiego, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.

⁶²⁹ Program Wyborczy Janusza Korwin-Mikke, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.

Korwin-Mikke's other proposals included the re-introduction of the death penalty, reform of the social services, stringent anti-corruption measures, a fully professional military and judicial reform.⁶³⁰

While supportive of EU membership, Lech Wałęsa asserted that Poland should not join the European Union 'on its knees'. His programme stated: 'We do not have to degrade ourselves. Let us not allow for Poland to enter the Union on the basis of a second-category membership...We have the right to expect a partner like approach'.⁶³¹ In order to achieve such a partnership Wałęsa proposed a strategy which combined what he described as a 'New Generation Marshall Plan' with 'good relations with neighbours'.⁶³² He argued that in compensation for the economic ruin caused by the cold war the West should develop an extensive and well coordinated plan of financial aid for post-communist countries.⁶³³

Dariusz Grabowski, of the *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej*, presented a very cautious stance on accession. His programme declared: 'Poland has existed before the European Union, and it will exist even if the European Union was to dissolve itself'.⁶³⁴ Grabowski argued that EU membership should only take place if backed by a positive referendum result after a fair and unbiased debate. The existing debate, he implied, was neither fair nor unbiased. Grabowski described his foreign policy objectives as heightening Poland's prestige and importance in the international arena and the development of friendly relations with its neighbours. While not explicitly opposed to accession he repeatedly called for a referendum: 'The Nation must decide about the possibility of accession to the European Union

⁶³⁰ Ibid.

⁶³¹ Program Wyborczy Lecha Wałęsy, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.

⁶³² Ibid.

⁶³³ Ibid.

⁶³⁴ Program Wyborczy Dariusza Grabowskiego, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.

in a referendum. It should therefore be honestly and accurately informed, and hence know the truth about the positive and negative effects of our accession'.⁶³⁵

Jan Olszewski, leader of the *Ruch Odbudowy Polski*, withdrew from the contest on 2 October 2000 asking his supporters to back Marian Krzaklewski instead.

According to opinion polls, Olszewski stood a chance of gaining as much as 5% of the vote. During the campaign Olszewski emphasised that Polish national interest should be protected in the process of accession. He advocated measures to protect the economy from EU imports and was opposed to foreigners buying Polish land. He also wanted to guarantee Polish ownership of strategic industries such as banking, energy and telecommunications. While not explicitly opposed to accession Olszewski advocated policies which effectively precluded the implementation of the European *acquis* in Poland.⁶³⁶

Widespread support for the moderate, unifying approach of both Aleksander Kwaśniewski and the runner-up Andrzej Olechowski reflected growing disappointment with the AWS. The results also showed support for candidates who were unambiguously in favour of EU membership. Of the 61.1% who voted, 71.2% supported Kwaśniewski and Olechowski, both of whom were enthusiastically pro-integrationist. Marian Krzaklewski was, as usual, caught up between his euro-sceptic, trade unionist support base and the centre-right pro-integrationist AWS electorate. Andrzej Lepper also refrained from declaring his anti-integrationist stance and resorted to calls for a 'fair' referendum. Although they did not declare opposition to EU membership, many candidates advocated measures which contradicted accession requirements. In particular, protectionist measures such as extensive subsidies and import barriers contradicted the customs union and strict limits on state subsidies required for accession.

⁶³⁵ Ibid.

⁶³⁶ Program Wyborczy Jana Olszewskiego, 2000, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2000 presidential election folder.

Parliamentary debate

The need to reconcile the *Unia Wolności*'s euro-enthusiasm with the scepticism of the Catholic-nationalist sections of the AWS was reflected in the coalition agreement, which referred to 'Guaranteeing Poland's security by means of attaining membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and reforming the military as quickly as possible as well as strengthening the economic and political position of the country by preparing and effectively carrying out negotiations regarding Polish accession to the European Union'.⁶³⁷ Like the AWS' programme therefore, the coalition agreement implicitly contrasted support for quick NATO membership with a more qualified stance on the EU. Rather than call for quick accession it emphasised the need for 'preparation; and 'effective negotiations'.

As it manoeuvred between the euro-sceptic ZChN and the euro-enthusiast *Unia Wolności*'s the AWS' stance toward European integration became increasingly ambiguous. The start of the accession negotiations and the EU's increasing prominent role in the media confronted Electoral Action with the need to present a coherent integration doctrine that would be broad enough to incorporate the divergent views of its numerous member organisations as well as those of its coalition partner. The AWS resorted to the well-tested political marketing tool of Polish Catholicism and developed the strategy of 're-evangelising Europe'.⁶³⁸

AWS representatives often referred to the benefits that Poland's conservative, religious morality offered Europe and the evangelisation opportunity which accession to a consumerist, increasingly secular EU offered Polish Catholics. In his *exposé* Jerzy Buzek emphasised the need to defend Poland's national identity and referred to 'the moral values which will be our contribution to the integrating

⁶³⁷ Umowa Koalicyjna Pomiędzy Akcją Wyborczą Solidarność i Unią Wolności' section 8 re-printed in Rydlewski, Grzegorz. 2000. Rządzenie Koalicyjne w Polsce.

⁶³⁸ A. Pluta, 'Evangelizing Accession: Solidarity Electoral Action and Poland's EU Membership', Slovo, 16, 2 (2004).2.

Europe'.⁶³⁹ While presenting the stance of the AWS parliamentary club Marian Krzaklewski pursued a similar rhetoric, referring to the Christian roots of Europe and the opportunity of influencing the European order.⁶⁴⁰

The AWS' 'evangelisation' rhetoric reflected the stance of the Catholic hierarchy. 1997 marked a turnaround in the Episcopate's attitude towards the EU. The Bishops' fears of imminent secularisation were quelled during a visit to the European Commission in November 1997. On their return, Bishop Pieronek urged the Polish Church to change the way it thought about Europe. Rather than feared, European integration should be seen as a 'wonderful opportunity and a great Evangelical challenge for the Church'.⁶⁴¹ Bishop Muszyński explained the new re-evangelisation doctrine as follows:

This will need to be put into evangelization programmes. The nation will need to be told what benefits are related to entering the European Union, but also what are the inconveniences and burdens connected with it. But if the Poles are shown the purpose of it, they will be able to take on sacrifices...the Union is starting a public ethical debate on the subject of what it is doing, and the Churches have the full right to come up with an ethical assessment of the politicians' doings.⁶⁴²

The church's new stance on European integration was further expounded during a 1999 meeting of diocesan representatives:

⁶³⁹ Buzek, Jerzy, 3 kadencja, 2 posiedzenie, 1 dzień (10.11.1997), 1 punkt porządku dziennego: Przedstawiony przez prezesa Rady Ministrów program działania Rady Ministrów wraz z wnioskiem o udzielenie jej wotum zaufania.

⁶⁴⁰ Krzaklewski, Marian, 3 kadencja, 2 posiedzenie, 1 dzień (10.11.1997), 1 punkt porządku dziennego: Przedstawiony przez prezesa Rady Ministrów program działania Rady Ministrów wraz z wnioskiem o udzielenie jej wotum zaufania.

⁶⁴¹ List pasterski Episkopatu Polski z okazji dziesięciolecia pontifikatu papieża Jana Pawła II i beatyfikacji ślugi bożego O. Honorata Kozmińskiego, 18 June 1999, quoted in P. Mazurkiewicz, 'Tożsamość Polskiego Kościoła po 1989 R.', in Kościół wobec Integracji Europejskiej, ed. J. Grosfeld (Warszawa 1996). p22; Andrzej Domosławski, 'Kościoła Drogi do Europy' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.284. 20 June 1997, p23.

⁶⁴² Edward Krzemień, 'Uczymy się Unii' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.261, 19 August 1997, p1.

Our nation, which has suffered so much in the past, and especially in the period of the Second World War, has much to offer Europe, and above all its Christian tradition, enriched with contemporary religious experience. The church in Poland hence stands before great historic tasks, for the fulfilment of which it will require a fresh approach and missionary fervour. Sufficient strength must be found for our nation to resist the tendencies of modern civilization, which propose a move away from spiritual values for the sake of unrestrained consumption or the forsaking of traditional religious and moral values for a secular culture and moral relativism.⁶⁴³

The Church's support for European integration was also repeatedly affirmed by the Pope. During his speech at the *Sejm* on 11 June 1999 for example he declared: 'Poland's integration with the European Union has from the start had the support of the Holy See. The historic experience of the Polish nation, its spiritual and cultural wealth can contribute to the over-all well being of the human family and especially to strengthening peace and security in Europe'.⁶⁴⁴

But the Episcopate's euro-enthusiasm was not unqualified.⁶⁴⁵ European integration was acceptable as long as it did not adversely affect Polish sovereignty and national identity. Many among the Catholic hierarchy still perceived the EU as an anti-religious, morally corrupt entity. Józef Glemp, the Archbishop of Poland, described the EU's morally corrupt nature as follows: 'Atheism, secularization, which in Europe take the form of ideology together with euthanasia and homosexual marriages, these are the great challenges of the Church.'⁶⁴⁶

The stance of the hierarchy represented that of the majority of Polish priests. According to an Institute of Public Affairs (*Instytut Spraw Publicznych*) poll carried out shortly before the start of negotiations the majority of Polish priests supported

⁶⁴³ Drugi Synod Plenarny, Sesja w Pozaniu, 'Kościół wobec życia społeczno-gospodarczego', *Kurier Synodalny*, 2(59)/1999 p24, quoted in Jackowska, 2000, p12.

⁶⁴⁴ John Paul II, quoted in T. Pieronek, 'Rola Kościoła Katolickiego w Polsce w Procesie Integracji Europejskiej.' 24 September 2004.

⁶⁴⁵ Interview with Tadeusz Pieronek, 25 July 2005.

⁶⁴⁶ Ewa Czaczkowska, 'Zawsze Mieliśmy Nadzieję' *Rzeczpospolita*, 19 December 2001.

accession and expected it to have a positive influence on the Polish economy, living standards, international security, the rule of law, democratization, the reform process and education levels. The perceived democratic nature and efficiency of EU institutions was highly rated among the clergy. Most priests feared the negative consequences of accession for moral and religious standards, solidity of family life and religiousness. Some, however, also felt that these negative processes were a part of an irreversible civilisational process, independent of accession itself. The majority felt accession placed new objectives before the church in the form of the evangelist mission in Europe, the development of a Christian ethic and the strengthening of the cultural and national identity of Poles.

⁶⁴⁷ For the mainstream of the Church therefore, accession was a challenge rather than a threat. But the EU the clergy supported was a 'Europe of Nations' which preserved the fullest possible national autonomy⁶⁴⁸. Like the Christian-nationalist political elites therefore, most Polish priests supported accession to a much less politically integrated organization than the EU of the late 1990's.

The pro-integrationist stance was not embraced by all members of the Catholic Church however. The most euro-sceptic representative of the Church was Father Rydzyk's movement of Radio Maryja. Established in 1991 by a small group of devout Catholics, Radio Maryja had grown to become a nation-wide organisation whose influence on the radical-Catholic electorate made it a force the political elites could not ignore.

The movement advocated a populist and nationalist brand of Catholicism, its concept of patriotism reinforced by the perception of a continuous threat to Poland's national identity. Liberalism, secularism and moral relativism embodied in European integration were presented as the greatest dangers to the traditional, patriotic mentality of the Poles. The EU's democratic deficit and the fact that

⁶⁴⁷L. Kolarska-Bobińska, J. Kucharczyk, E. Firlit and B. Roguska, 'Duchowienstwo Polskie Wobec Integracji z Unią Europejską', in *Polska Eurodebata*, (Warsaw 1999), p109.

⁶⁴⁸Ibid, p75.

negotiations started before an in-depth public information campaign was carried out were also among Radio Maryja's criticisms of the accession process. The pro-integrationist Church hierarchy was, according to Radio Maryja, 'infected with a communist way of thinking'.⁶⁴⁹

For the time being the re-evangelisation doctrine turned out to be an effective, if temporary, remedy to reconcile the AWS member groupings' contradictory views on accession. During the opening parliamentary debate in October 1997 Marian Krzaklewski presented the following stance on accession:

European integration will allow Poland the chance to speed up economic growth. We will also gain a real possibility of directly influencing the evolution of the new European order. We will co-create the unity of the continent, while preserving our identity. We will consolidate our Polishness. The only concrete foundation of the European community is Christianity. And inseparable from it is the love for freedom, a responsible freedom. The creators of the idea of a common Europe turned to Christianity.⁶⁵⁰

The AWS hence supported European integration as long as the EU to which Poland acceded was, above all, Christian. Although it was never clarified how the challenging task of evangelising the EU would be carried out, the 're-evangelisation' doctrine was broad enough to incorporate both the euro-sceptic views of the ZChN and the pro-integrationist stance of the *Porozumienie Centrum* or the *Partia Chrześcijańskich Demokratów*. While the need to preserve the traditional, Catholic identity of the Poles made accession to the secular, morally corrupt Europe unacceptable for the Catholic-nationalist politicians, the prospect of preserving Polish national identity and sovereignty by means of evangelising the EU's member states allowed a way out of the dilemma. For the time being, the re-

⁶⁴⁹ G. Tokarz, 'Polski tradycyjny katolicyzm wobec integracji europejskiej w latach 1996-2002', in *Kościoły i Związki Wyznaniowe w Stosunkach Międzynarodowych*, ed. T. Dębowski (Wrocław 2003), p57.

⁶⁵⁰ Marian Krzaklewski quoted in Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998', p304.

evangelisation doctrine served its purpose, proving sufficiently flexible to accommodate both the liberal euro-enthusiasts and the euro-sceptic Catholic-nationalists.

The radical-Catholic parliamentarians no longer resorted to veiled doubts and ambiguous conditions of support to express their views about EU accession. Their anti-integrationism was openly declared with the formation of *Rodzina Polska* (Polish Family) by the Radio Maryja parliamentarians. The grouping campaigned on an explicitly anti-integrationist platform in the local elections of October 1998. Piotr Jaroszyński, one of Father Rydzyk's closest associates and leader of the *Rodzina*, raised the following objections to EU membership:

What is the spiritual and cultural purpose of the European Union? What sort of a thing is this? If there are to be no nations, but only some sort of societies, if there is to be legalization of abortion, euthanasia, homosexual relationships then what a thing is this, is it a cancerous thing? The EU plans to weaken us, take away our independence and turn the nation into the West's serfs.⁶⁵¹

As it was confronted with the need to make concrete policy decisions the *Akcja Wyborcza*'s consensus on EU accession grew increasingly threadbare. The ambiguity of the evangelisation doctrine allowed for very different interpretations of the AWS' stance towards the EU, which was quickly capitalised on by its anti-integrationist members. As numerous factions claimed to have the only 'correct' interpretation of the *Akcja*'s programme its ambiguous nature became increasingly salient. A striking example of the different ways in which the AWS programme was interpreted took place in October 1998 when Jan Maria Jackowski, a nationalist-Catholic parliamentarian associated with Radio Maryja, announced that the *Akcja* was in fact opposed to EU accession. The phrase 'European integration'

⁶⁵¹ 'Nic nie jest takie jak sie wydaje. Piotr Jaroszyński w rozmowie z Jarosławem Kurskim' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.239, 12 October 1998, p2.

should not, according to Jackowski, be interpreted to mean 'EU accession' but rather as a general statement of support for an unspecified form of association with Western Europe.⁶⁵²

Doubts about accession were also manifest in the rhetoric of the *Zjednoczenie Chrześcijańsko Narodowe*. The ZChN's press spokesman, Michał Kamiński, declared that the party 'does not look at the European Union with unbounded enthusiasm'.⁶⁵³ During an interview with the author Kamiński stated that the ZChN supported accession. But when asked about benefits of accession for Poland indicated he did not think there were any.⁶⁵⁴ He did however, provide a long list of costs Poland would incur as a result of it, including an adverse impact on national identity and high costs of economic restructuring. He was also concerned that the Polish economy not being able to cope with EU competition. Although he declared his support for accession therefore Kamiński's stance towards the EU appeared contradictory. Although he claimed the ZChN was in favour of accession he was not able to clarify what motivated the parties' support. He was, however, able to provide a lengthy list of disadvantages of accession.

The ZChN's stance on Europe was defined in more detail by its General Secretary, Artur Zawisza. Describing himself as a 'Euro-sceptic-on the-Vistula', Zawisza rejected 'a federal super-state led by Brussels without discussion' in favour of 'a Europe of free nations, seeking their inspiration in the Bethlehem grotto.' Zawisza defined a set of conditions which the EU would have to meet for the ZChN to support Polish accession. These included the freedom to opt out of the euro, the maintenance of legal sovereignty in certain spheres, the retention of the veto, rejection of European citizenship, a subordinate role for the Commission, future EU enlargement into the Ukraine and Belarus, immediate and equal access to the

⁶⁵² Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998', p. 306-307.

⁶⁵³ Szczerbiak, 'Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership in Poland', p11.

⁶⁵⁴ Interview with Michał Kamiński, 24 July 1998.

European single market for Polish agricultural products and appropriate derogations in 'sensitive' areas such as the sale of land to foreigners.⁶⁵⁵ Later the ZChN also added the condition of Poland attaining the same number of votes in the Council of Ministers as Spain.⁶⁵⁶

Eventually, internal disagreements on accession led several anti-integrationist AWS parliamentarians, primarily from the ZChN, to establish *Porozumienie Polskie* (Polish Agreement), a new, anti-accession grouping under the leadership of Jan Łopuszański in April 1999.⁶⁵⁷ The *Porozumienie* was registered as a political party in November 1999.⁶⁵⁸

The establishment of the *Porozumienie* softened the euro-sceptic rhetoric of both the ZChN, and the entire Electoral Action. But most of the AWS' participants qualified their statements of support for accession with the condition that the Europe Poland accede to was a 'Europe of Nations' and their stance appeared to be founded on resignation rather than support.⁶⁵⁹ The *Komitet Organizacyjny Chrześcijańskiej Demokracji* (Organizational Committee of Christian Democracy) which united former *Porozumienie Centrum*, PSL and ROP parliamentarians declared in February 1999: 'Without integration with Western Europe we are destined to be marginalized civilisationally and economically. Entry to EU structures is eventually unavoidable, but it will be a difficult process'.⁶⁶⁰

Jan Łopuszański's Catholic-nationalist *Nasze Koło* (Our Circle) however, many of whose members were former AWS members, voted against the ratification of the

⁶⁵⁵ Szczerbiak, 'Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership in Poland', p11.

⁶⁵⁶ Ibid, p11.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid, p9.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid, p9.

⁶⁵⁹ B. Rogowska, 'Partie Prawicowe Wobec Integracji Europejskiej, 1989-1998', in *Europa i Integracja Europejska w Polskiej Myśli Politycznej XX Wieku*, ed. J. Juchnowski, Janusz (Wroclaw 2003), p146.

⁶⁶⁰ Oświadczenie Komitetu Organizacyjnego Chrześcijańskiej Demokracji 4/2/1999 quoted in Ibid. p145.

NATO accession treaty. During the *Sejm* ratification debate Łopuszański questioned the loyalty of Poland's Western allies:

I imagined, maybe somewhat mischievously, such a scenario: God forbid, a conflict on the Eastern border. Poland proves its will to fight, the Eastern territories of the Polish state are taken over by the opponent. The second phase of the war, the allies come to Poland's aid, the Western part of Poland is taken up by the allies. Are you sure that this scenario is not a possible, realistic scenario? We will not support this ratification.⁶⁶¹

Parliamentary debate on integration with the EU meanwhile continued to be dominated by references to historic heritage and disagreements about moral issues between *SLD* and *AWS* representatives. As Kucharczyk points out, while observing the debate on the EU one had the impression the two sides were referring to different organizations.⁶⁶² Although both sides declared support for accession the contradictory ways in which they conceptualized the EU precluded any real consensus on what it was that Poland was acceding to or what kind of strategy it should pursue in doing so. The *SLD* referred to a modern, people-friendly European state which was not caught up in normative differences. For the communist successors the EU was above all a secular organization, which guaranteed the freedom of all its citizens and protected them from religious, ethnic and other forms of discrimination.

AWS representatives on the other hand referred to a 'Europe of Nations', founded on Christian values and which did not impinge upon the national sovereignty of its member states. Rather than question their opponents' conceptualization of the EU the solidarity-successor parliamentarians reminded the *SLD* of its authoritarian past and questioned its commitment to the tolerant values it attributed to the EU. The communist-successors meanwhile, pointed to the contradictions inherent in

⁶⁶¹ Debata proatlantycka, Będziemy trzymać drzwi do NATO otwarte' Gazeta Wyborcza, 21-22 November 1998, nr , p4.

⁶⁶² Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998'.

the AWS' Christian 'Europe of Nations' and the realities of the increasingly integrated and secular EU.⁶⁶³ Rather than a discussion of the costs and benefits which accession might bring to each grouping's respective electorates the debate was dominated by rhetorical tactics used to bolster the ideological identity of the groupings and differentiate them from their political opponents. Parliamentary debate addressed neither the policy implications of accession requirements nor internal developments taking place within the EU at the time, such as the debate on the Union's future decision making framework, the implementation of the common currency or the proposals to increase the EU's competences in the areas of justice and home affairs or foreign policy. As Marian Plażynski, one of the AWS's most euro-enthusiastic parliamentarians stated: 'The problem does not lie in the fact that Poland has not declared its stance on the internal reform of the EU but in that there is nothing which suggests that it has such a stance'⁶⁶⁴.

The debate on Europe reflected broader characteristics of the party system. The Polish parties were legitimized more by symbolism and myth than representation of socio-economic interest groups⁶⁶⁵. Both *SLD* and *AWS* used broad 'catch-all' rhetoric, sufficiently vague to appeal to a variety of social interest groups, with the only clear ideological distinction being the historic divide between the communist and non-communist camps.⁶⁶⁶ As the parties strove to compete on the basis of historic symbolism in place of interest group representation party-political debate became increasingly polarized and adversarial.⁶⁶⁷ The fact that the numerous *AWS* member organizations' only common denominator was their historic opposition to the communist regime polarized the political scene even further as rather than focus on policy differences the debate centred on whether one of the political

⁶⁶³ Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998', p307.

⁶⁶⁴ Plażynski, Maciej 'Z Otwartymi Oczami', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 18-19.03.2000 quoted in J. Hausner, *Jakość Rządzenia: Polska bliżej Unii Europejskiej?*, p11.

⁶⁶⁵ M. Jezinski, 'The Quest for Myth in the Polish Political Discourse', *Polish Sociological Review*, 4, 136 (2001), W. Wesołowski, 'Political Actors and Democracy: Poland 1990-1997', *Polish Sociological Review*, 119, 3 (1997), 227-248., 1997.

⁶⁶⁶ Ibid, p231-232.

⁶⁶⁷ Ibid, p231-232.

opponents had the right to be a part of the political system in the first place.⁶⁶⁸ The formation of coalitions on the basis of historic heritage rather than shared policy preferences made the debate even more problematic as coalition members were forced to resort to even broader 'catch-all' rhetorical strategies once in government than those used during electoral campaigns.

The European issue, with its strong symbolic appeal, was easily instrumentalized as part of this dynamic. The different visions of Europe the parties presented were more of a reflection of their preferred vision of the future Polish state than of their views on accession and its impact on Polish society. The lack of interest group representation and the consequent fluidity of the party system precluded a debate on the costs and benefits of accession and instead led to 'Europe' becoming yet another reflection of the symbols and myths the parties had to resort to in order to differentiate themselves.

The communist-successor and solidarity-successor divide among political elites was reflected in public opinion with the historic conflict being perceived as the strongest social conflict above income disparities, wealth, class or the urban and rural divide. Polish political competition was based on the symbolism of historic heritage rather than on existing socio-economic differences among social interest groups.⁶⁶⁹ Polls also reflected the consequent weak relationship between political elites and society, with government support falling by 10% during the first seven months of 1999⁶⁷⁰ and a growing distrust in political parties. According to a 1999 Centre for the Study of Public Opinion report a majority of respondents felt that the government was ineffective and that politicians were untrustworthy, corrupt

⁶⁶⁸ Ibid, p243-244.

⁶⁶⁹ CBOS 'Public Opinion' report nr 2000/10 quoted in Hausner and Marody, *Jakość Rządzenia: Polska bliżej Unii Europejskiej?*, p44.

⁶⁷⁰ Ibid, p40.

and cared primarily for the interests of their parties rather than those of the citizens.⁶⁷¹

Meanwhile, public support for accession continued to decrease. The number of respondents declaring they would vote in favour of accession in the event of a referendum dropped from an 80% high in 1996 to 63% in 1998.⁶⁷² By late 2000 support levels fell to 57%, with opposition growing to 26%.⁶⁷³ Moreover, a closer inspection of the polls suggests that the prospect of EU membership caused significant concerns even among those who supported it.

Firstly, a marked change in public perception of the expected costs and benefits of accession took place throughout the 1990's. The impact of accession on the farming sector was one of the main areas of concern and in May 1999 61% of respondents felt accession would have a negative effect on individual farms while only 17% said that it will be positive. These figures contrasted sharply with analogous June 1994 figures of 24% and 40% respectively. In 1999 42% thought EU membership would have a negative effect on the functioning of public sector and state enterprises whereas only 30% who felt it would be positive. Again these figures show a marked change of 1994 views from 37% and 32% respectively. The number who believed that EU membership would have a positive effect on the private sector fell from 67% in 1994 to 48% in 1999 and the numbers of those who felt it would have a negative impact increased from 6% to 21% over the same period. 46% expected unemployment to increase after accession while only 23% thought it would fall. Once again, the figures show a reversal of 1994 polls which had found 23% of respondents expecting unemployment growth and 40% expecting it to fall. The number who expected accession to have a positive effect on their living standards fell from 57% in 1994 to 38% in 1999 and that of those

⁶⁷¹ CBOS 'Public Opinion' report nr 1999/13, quoted in *Ibid*, p45.

⁶⁷² CBOS 'Public Opinion' report nr 103/1998, Górnjak., p47-48.

⁶⁷³ A. Dawson, 'A Polish Bridge?', *Geopolitics*, 6, 1 (2001), 91-106, p 101.

expecting a negative impact increased from 10% to 25%.⁶⁷⁴ Expectations concerning the impact accession would have on both Poland as a whole and the respondents personally also reflected significant growth in scepticism towards the EU. In August 1997, 41% of respondents expected EU membership to bring Poland more harm than good and the number of those expecting it to benefit them or their families personally fell to 27%, while 31% did not know how the process would affect them.⁶⁷⁵

Secondly, most Poles were in no hurry for Poland to accede. In September 1998 60% supported entering the EU with 'no hurry' (*bez pośpiechu*) whereas only 25% felt accession should take place as soon as possible.⁶⁷⁶ The number of those who supported the earliest possible EU membership as a means of precipitating the modernization of the Polish economy fell from 40% in April 1997 to 27% in November 1999.⁶⁷⁷ The numbers of those who believed that modernization should precede accession grew from 48% in 1997 to 62% in 1999.⁶⁷⁸ According to an October 1999 study, 74% of Poles believed that Poland should implement transition reforms before accession while only 12% felt that reforms and accession should take place concurrently.⁶⁷⁹

Thirdly, the polls showed a continuing perception of inequality in Poland-EU relations. 55% of respondents believed that Poland would be a 'second class member'⁶⁸⁰ and fears of not being treated as 'an equal partner' were prevalent among the public. In June 1996 only 19% of respondents felt that EU member states would derive the greatest benefit from accession as opposed to Poland; their

⁶⁷⁴ Szczerbiak, 'Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership in Poland',

⁶⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁶ OBOP quoted in Górnjak, p.55.

⁶⁷⁷ Szczerbiak, 'Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership in Poland', p16.

⁶⁷⁸ Ibid, p16.

⁶⁷⁹ Ibid, p17.

⁶⁸⁰ L. Kolarska-Bobińska, 'Dialog Społeczny w Procesie Negocjacji o Członkostwo Unii Europejskiej. Materiały Konferencyjne', in Polska Eurodebata, ed. L. Kolarska-Bobińska (Warsaw 1999), p16.

numbers increased to 47% in November 1999. Only 8% felt that Poland would be the main beneficiary and 27% thought the benefits of accession would be equal for both sides.⁶⁸¹ A 2000 Institute of Public Affairs study found that the majority of respondents felt the word 'negotiations' did not fit the situation as there was nothing for Poland to negotiate. Most perceived Poland as the weaker partner who could only accept conditions presented by the EU rather than present its own terms. Such sentiments were accompanied by negative emotions towards the EU and the perception that integration was a negative, no-win situation for Poland.⁶⁸²

Views on accession correlated primarily with professional occupation, age and education levels. Farmers were the most sceptical occupational group and only 25% supported accession. Most support for EU membership came from those employed in the public sector, the higher educated, youth and the unemployed.⁶⁸³ Opposition to accession also correlated with xenophobia against Jews and the Roma as well as with the frequency of listening to Radio Maryja.⁶⁸⁴ Support for accession also correlated with a perception of equal relations between Poland and the EU.⁶⁸⁵ Fears about the adverse impact of accession on the Polish economy were among the greatest concerns of the public and were especially prominent among farmers, low-qualified workers as well as *PSL* and *ROP* electorates.⁶⁸⁶

A 1998 qualitative study, where respondents were asked to describe their fears and expectations of accession, found that support for accession was primarily motivated by expectations of attaining geo-political security, economic progress

⁶⁸¹ Szczerbiak, 'Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership in Poland', p6.

⁶⁸² J. Grzelak, 'Kultura Negocjacyjna Polakow w Kontekscie Integracji z Unia Europejska', (Warsaw 2000), p24.

⁶⁸³ Kolarska-Bobińska, 'Dialog Społeczny w Procesie Negocjacji o Członkostwo Unii Europejskiej. Materiały Konferencyjne', p12-14.

⁶⁸⁴ Górniaak, p60.

⁶⁸⁵ J. Kucharczyk, 'Polska-Unia: nierowne partnerstwo', in Polacy Wobec Wielkiej Zmiany. Integracja z Unią Europejską, ed. L. Kolarska-Bobińska (Warsaw 2001).

⁶⁸⁶ Kolarska-Bobińska, 'Dialog Społeczny w Procesie Negocjacji o Członkostwo Unii Europejskiej. Materiały Konferencyjne', p18.

and 'civilisational advance'.⁶⁸⁷ The analysis of fears of accession showed a prominent theme of conspiracy and betrayal on part of both EU and domestic elites, with fears of losing national independence, German re-occupation and being subjugated to foreign influence being among the most salient concerns. The respondents also worried about the possible destruction of Polish agriculture and the growth of unemployment.⁶⁸⁸

In 1997 only 20% of respondents thought European integration was a key electoral topic⁶⁸⁹ and in June 2001 the majority of respondents believed that the ruling elites and especially the president, the parliament and the cabinet took a strongly pro-integrationist stance. The three political groupings seen as the most euro-enthusiastic were the *SLD*, *AWS* and *Unia Wolności*.⁶⁹⁰ The *PSL*'s stance was perceived as ambiguous and *Samoobrona* was seen as an anti-integrationist grouping.⁶⁹¹ It was the *PSL* however, which had the greatest number of euro-sceptics among its electorate with as many as 49% of its 1997 voters declaring opposition to accession.⁶⁹²

Most respondents also doubted the abilities of the Polish negotiation team. According to a Centre for the Study of Public Opinion study the number of Poles who said that they trusted the negotiators to defend Polish national interest fell from 51% in December 1998 to 42% in October 1999, while the number who said that they did not trust them increased from 36% to 42% over the same period.⁶⁹³ A 1999 Institute of Public Affairs study showed that 41% of respondents thought Polish negotiators made too many concessions during the accession negotiations,

⁶⁸⁷ H. Palska, 'Polacy o Nadziejach i Obawach Związanych a Przystąpieniem Polski do Unii Europejskiej: Analiza Tresci Wypowiedzi', in *Polacy Wobec Integracji z Unią Europejską*, ed. B. Mach (Warsaw 1998).

⁶⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁸⁹ CBOS 'Public Opinion' report nr 1997/51 in K. Żuba, 'Eurosceptycyzm - pryncypia i postawy', in *Europa i My*, ed. W. Piątkowska-Stepaniak, Lech (Opole 2000), 111-128, p119.

⁶⁹⁰ B. Roguska, 'Postrzeganie Elit Politycznych w Kontekscie Integracji', in *Polacy Wobec Wielkiej Zmiany. Integracja z Unią Europejską*, ed. L. Kolarska-Bobińska (Warsaw 2001).

⁶⁹¹ Ibid.

⁶⁹² CBOS 'Public Opinion' report nr 1998/79 in Zuba, p118.

⁶⁹³ Szczerbiak, 'Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership in Poland', p12.

38% trusted the government's negotiation stance and felt that Poland was well prepared for membership⁶⁹⁴ whereas 57% believed that Poland would be ready to accede in 2003. Respondents who described themselves as well informed about the EU also felt that Poland was well prepared for negotiations; those who felt badly informed also felt that the negotiators were not well prepared.⁶⁹⁵

The lack of public debate about the costs and benefits of accession was reflected in the respondents' view that European integration would have little or no influence in their lives. As Kolarska-Bobińska points out, the public saw the integration project as something taking place 'above' the citizens.⁶⁹⁶ A large proportion of those who believe integration would have significant influence on their lives however also tended to oppose it⁶⁹⁷. In March 2001 only 7% felt 'well informed' about accession.⁶⁹⁸

According to a 2001 Demoskop study, 67% did not know why Poland should accede and as many wished to have more information about accession.⁶⁹⁹ Similar results were reflected in Institute of Public Affairs 2000 study, which found that the majority of respondents felt they were not sufficiently informed about the EU and did not know what its purpose was.⁷⁰⁰ Moreover, the majority felt that they did not know what the accession negotiations were about and as few as 14% were able to correctly identify the main topics of negotiation.⁷⁰¹

The numbers of those who felt they did not understand the rationale for EU membership were hence higher than those who supported it, which raises the

⁶⁹⁴ Kolarska-Bobińska and J. Kucharczyk, 'Polacy a Unia Europejska. Wyniki Badan Empirycznych', in Polska Eurodebata, ed. L. Kolarska-Bobińska (Warsaw 1999), p12.

⁶⁹⁵ Ibid, p21.

⁶⁹⁶ Ibid, p12.

⁶⁹⁷ Ibid, p19.

⁶⁹⁸ Hausner, Polski Talk Show: Dialog Społeczny a Integracja Europejska, Hausner and Marody, Three Polands: the Potential for and Barriers to Integration with the European Union. p69.

⁶⁹⁹ Hausner, 2001, p.71, PAP 2001. 11 May, 2001.

⁷⁰⁰ Grzelak, p22.

⁷⁰¹ Ibid, p22.

question of why, admittedly having so little understanding of it, did most respondents also declare willingness to vote for accession in the event of a referendum. It may have been the case that many respondents felt Poland had no choice but to accede. The above mentioned 1998 qualitative study of public views on accession provides a possible explanation. According to this study although most respondents felt Poland should accede their support was based on the belief that accession was a necessity⁷⁰². Accession was perceived as a 'necessary evil' without which Poland would not be able to attain the geo-political security, economic progress and 'civilisational advance' it needed⁷⁰³. Rather than base their views on the impact accession was expected to have on their every-day lives most respondents may have resigned themselves to it on the grounds it was an inevitable, elite-supported and driven process that would result in abstract gains such as a strengthening of Poland's geo-political situation, 'returning to Europe' and 'ending the division between East and West'.⁷⁰⁴

Conclusions

The establishment of elite consensus on accession proved problematic during the 1997-2001 period. As the analysis of the 1997 electoral contest shows, the ideologically heterogeneous AWS struggled to define its stance on accession during the campaign and presenting a coherent integration strategy proved even more problematic once the *Akcja Wyborcza* entered coalition with the euro-enthusiast *Unia Wolności*. The AWS hence resorted to the ambiguous, albeit politically profitable, 're-evangelisation' rhetoric. While this provided an effective means to gain electoral legitimisation, such neo-messianism could not be translated into concrete policy proposals. Eventually, the issue of accession became one of the key factors leading to the fragmentation of the AWS.⁷⁰⁵ Nominal

⁷⁰² Palska,

⁷⁰³ Ibid.

⁷⁰⁴ Szczerbiak, 'Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership in Poland',

⁷⁰⁵ Interview with Maciej Plażynski, 13 July 2005.

consensus could not replace a clear stance on individual policy issues. Neither could the proportional assignation of personnel under the AWS-UW coalition agreement replace the compromise and cooperation required for the formulation of one coherent integration strategy.

The formation of party identity on the basis of historical heritage rather than representation of socio-economic interest groups was reflected in the political debate, which focused on historic divisions rather than policy proposals. Both the Solidarity-successor and the Communist-successor sides of the political spectrum defined themselves in terms of their past rather than in relation to current and future problems facing the Polish state and its citizens.⁷⁰⁶ Almost a decade after the collapse of communism the threat of the communist regime and the ethos of the struggle against it could still legitimise political power. Parallels may be drawn between the way the ideologically multifarious dissident Solidarity movement maintained unity by reference to the common communist enemy and the manner in which the diverse members of the AWS united once again to struggle against the reformed communists. For the AWS elites eliminating the political opponent was more important than ensuring the progress of the policies they had promised to implement. In spite of a very different systemic context, the anti-communist elites' claims for political power were still legitimated by the goals of 1980.

The issue of accession reflected this dynamic. Rather than focus on the impact EU membership would have on the every-day lives of the electorate, the parliamentary debates on accession centred on abstract, symbolic visions of a Christian, loosely integrated 'Europe of Nations', favoured by the AWS and the SLD's secular, closely integrated 'Social Europe'. Although both sides' declarations of support for accession gave the appearance of a nominal consensus on EU membership their radically different interpretations of what the EU was meant that

⁷⁰⁶ Bachmann, *Polska Kaczka - Europejski Staw. Szanse i Pułapki Polskiej Polityki Europejskiej*, p73.

no in-depth debate on the accession project could take place. Support for accession was possible precisely because the implications of accession were not discussed.

With the exception of *Unia Wolności*, none of the main political groupings were able to reconcile their 1997 electoral proposals with accession requirements. The protectionist measures advocated by the *PSL* and *ROP* as well as their opposition to privatizing key sectors such as telecoms and banking contrasted sharply with the requirements defined in the Association Agreement and the Single Market White Paper. Both the *SLD* and *AWS* meanwhile struggled to reconcile the need to appeal to their trade unionist support bases⁷⁰⁷ with the EU's increasingly vocal calls for Poland to meet its privatization and trade liberalization requirements.

The manner in which the *SLD* and the *AWS* envisaged the 'Europes' they wished to accede to precluded a discussion of the political implications of accession⁷⁰⁸. The *SLD*'s unquestioning support for accession to a democratic and tolerant 'Social Europe' and the *AWS*'s support for the a-political 'Europe of Nations' uniting 'fully sovereign states' meant that neither grouping was willing to address the extent to which member state competences were transferred to the really existing EU.

The only groupings which were willing to address the political impact of accession and the extent to which it would diminish the competences of Poland's democratically elected decision makers were those on the Catholic-successor right⁷⁰⁹. The issue of the democratic deficit and the loss of national competences frequently featured among the rhetoric of the *Porozumienie Polskie* and in the programmes of *Radio Maryja*. Given the radical Catholic-nationalist stance of these organizations however, their concerns could easily be dismissed by the

⁷⁰⁷ G. Blażyca, 'Polish Socioeconomic Development in the 1990s and Scenarios for EU Accession', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 51, 5 (1999), 799-819, p810-811.

⁷⁰⁸ Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy..'.

⁷⁰⁹ Interview with Jan Łopuszański, 14 July 2005.

mainstream elites. The increasingly strict conditionality introduced with the Accession Partnerships and the influence it granted the EU on the applicants' domestic legislative and policy decisions was also not addressed during the debate.

But in spite of the challenges which establishing in-depth consensus on accession posed during the 1997-2001 period the Buzek cabinet also saw the implementation of several key reforms required for accession. These included a wide ranging administrative and social security reform as well as the restructuring of the mining, energy and steel sectors.⁷¹⁰ As Bachmann points out, a paradox can be observed when comparing the rhetoric and policy records of the *SLD* and the *AWS*. In spite of its unquestioningly pro-accession rhetoric while in power the *SLD* delayed meeting several key accession requirements such as for example mining and steel restructuring. The *AWS* meanwhile, while often markedly sceptical about European integration in its rhetoric, achieved the implementation of these very politically contentious reforms⁷¹¹ thus enabling the integration process to move forward.

But the reforms implemented by the Buzek cabinet were driven more by closed-doors bargaining among the *AWS* groupings and the *Unia Wolności* than in-depth consensus on the need to continue the integration effort. The *AWS*' ideological diversity and its inability to compromise with the pro-integrationist *UW* precluded the establishment of in-depth consensus on accession.⁷¹² The *ZChN*'s partisan interests also prevented Jerzy Buzek from appointing the *UKIE* secretary at a time when good coordination of integration policy was crucial. Matters improved somewhat when Jacek Saryusz-Wolski finally took up the post in April 2000, however the *AWS*' unwillingness to compromise on the issue of the sale of land continued to stall negotiations. The firm stance appeared to be driven by the

⁷¹⁰ Bachmann, 'Polska Kaczka - Europejski Staw. Szanse i Pułapki Polskiej Polityki Europejskiej', p164.

⁷¹¹ Ibid, p166.

⁷¹² Interview with anonymous KIE employee, 10 Oct. 2002.

concerns of the Catholic-nationalist AWS groupings rather than by the concerns of the Polish public. As mentioned in the previous section only 10% of respondents to a 1998 Institute of Public Affairs study felt that the sale of land should be a priority for negotiators. Other issues such as the right to work in the EU were perceived to be much more important, with 57% respondents to a study carried out in 2000 declaring they would oppose EU membership if it meant a ten-year ban on employment in EU countries.⁷¹³ The integration process would continue to move forward again only after the 2001 *SLD* victory and the subsequent negotiation stance adjustments, which will be addressed in the following chapter.

⁷¹³ Dawson, p 102.

Chapter 6

The completion of negotiations and the accession referendum

How does the Christian faith look? The fall of morality, pornography, drugs and more mosques being built than Churches; should the Poles, a nation which has endured so many sacrifices in its fight for freedom, give this freedom away in return for the promise of money? Does accession to the state, which is the European Union, not contradict the spilling of blood of those who during World War II gave their lives for our freedom? ⁷¹⁴

Roman Giertych, MP for *Liga Polskich Rodzin*

Introduction

This chapter addresses the final two years of the pre-accession period, starting with the victory of the *SLD-PSL* coalition in the September 2001 parliamentary contest and ending with the accession referendum in June 2003. It focuses on the question of how party-political actors negotiated consensus on joining the EU during this final phase of the pre-accession period. To what extent did political parties reconcile accession requirements with their policy proposals during the 2001 contest and in parliamentary debate, and what stance did they take during the referendum campaign? How successful was the euro-enthusiastic *SLD* in negotiating support for accession and its negotiation strategy with the euro-sceptic, agrarian *PSL*? What were the key themes of parliamentary debate on Europe? How did party-political actors approach the pre-referendum campaign and what motivated the strong vote of public support for accession?

Following a brief overview of domestic developments, the second section of this chapter presents the evolution of Poland's integration policy during the period in question. The party-political debate will be addressed in the third section, which includes sub-sections on the 2001 parliamentary contest, parliamentary debate and the accession referendum.

⁷¹⁴ Roman Giertych, 6th session, day 2, 29 November 2001, Stanowisko negocjacyjne rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w rozmowach z Unią Europejską.

Domestic developments

In 2001 Poland was experiencing a severe economic down turn with a skyrocketing budgetary deficit and unemployment approaching 18%. The September 2001 parliamentary contest resulted in victory for the *SLD*. The incumbent *AWS* and its former coalition partner *Unia Wolności* failed to attain representation. 15 seats short of a parliamentary majority the *SLD-UP*'s was not able to govern on its own. Initially, Aleksander Kwaśniewski suggested that the *SLD* form a minority government⁷¹⁵ backed by an informal arrangement with the *Platforma Obywatelska*. When the *PO* refused to cooperate, the *SLD* formed a coalition with the *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* on 10 October 2001.

As during the 1994-1997 *SLD-PSL* cabinet, differences between the coalition partners quickly emerged and EU membership was one of the main points of dissent.⁷¹⁶ The *SLD* saw accession as a way to overcome the economic crisis and proceeded to make the compromises necessary to accede as quickly as possible⁷¹⁷ but to the detriment of the coalition. A much criticised example of this approach took place when the *SLD* provided the agrarians with the full details of its new stance on the sale of land only after presenting them to the EU.

Progress in negotiations was made easier by the fact that *SLD* retained control over the key cabinet posts responsible for integration. Responsibility for accession negotiations was assigned to Foreign Affairs Minister, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz. Prime Minister Leszek Miller undertook the leadership of the Committee for European Integration and the post of the *KIE* Secretary was assigned to Danuta Hubner, who was also Cimoszewicz's deputy. The new Chief Negotiator, Jan Truszczyński, was to be based at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁷¹⁵ Interview with Joanna Solska and Renata Łęska, 3 September 2005.

⁷¹⁶ Interview with Waldemar Pawlak, 20 July 2005; interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.

⁷¹⁷ Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.

The agrarians left the cabinet on March 2 2002. European integration was one of the key points of dissent but the coalition partners also disagreed on a range of other policy areas. The coalition eventually broke down when *PSL* voted against a government proposal on highway taxes. Miller proceeded to form a minority government with the informal backing of several small groupings such as the *Stronnictwo Konserwatywno -Ludowe* and the German minority, which gave him a precarious majority of 2 with 232 (out of 460) votes.

The cabinet made several attempts at economic reform but recovery was slow and Miller's government increasingly unpopular. In 2002 unemployment reached 19% and the government's popularity continued to fall with 66% of respondents in a 2003 survey describing the government's work as bad.⁷¹⁸ Widely reported corruption scandals,⁷¹⁹ an on-going conflict between Prime Minister Miller and President Krzaklewski, and a highly critical parliamentary opposition did not help matters. Miller resigned shortly after the accession referendum and was replaced by the former minister of finance Marek Belka.

As well as having to contend with a difficult coalition partner, the *SLD* was also confronted with a largely euro-sceptic parliamentary opposition. The 2001 parliament included several previously unrepresented parties, most of which were sceptical or undecided about accession. For the first time a grouping explicitly opposed to accession attained significant representation; the radical-Catholic *Liga Polskich Rodzin* (League of Polish Families, *LPR*) received 7.87% of the vote on a vehemently anti-integrationist platform.⁷²⁰ Another frequent critic of the EU was the agrarian Self-Defence, which, although leaving the decision on whether to join in the hands of the electorate, often warned of the perils of accession. Dominated

⁷¹⁸ Piasecki, p.50.

⁷¹⁹ Ibid, p.49.

⁷²⁰ F. Millard, 'Elections in Poland in 2001: electoral manipulation and party upheaval', Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36, (2003), 69-86.

by radical-Catholic rhetoric, the debate on Europe became increasingly pre-occupied with religious and moral issues, such as abortion and same-sex marriage.

In spite of growing criticism from both the opposition and its coalition partner, the *SLD* pressed on with accession negotiations, which were completed in December 2002, and the Accession Treaty which was signed on 16 April 2003. The next section addresses the final stages of the negotiation process and the results of the talks.

The completion of accession negotiations

By late 2001 it was clear that if Poland was to accede as part of the first wave of entrants its negotiation strategy had to change. On entering government Miller encountered what he described as 'serious delays'⁷²¹ in the integration process. In November 2001 Poland was in ninth place amongst the aspiring member states in terms of closed negotiation chapters and hence well behind many of the 'second wave' countries.⁷²² Fifteen negotiation chapters remained open, including the most contentious ones such as the free movement of labour, the free movement of capital, agriculture, and the budget. The delays caused problems not only between Poland and the EU but also between Poland and other aspiring member states, which felt that Poland's hard-line negotiation stance was delaying accession for the whole region.⁷²³ In order for the negotiations to move forward the government had to compromise on the sale of land. Initial discussions took place when Gunther Verheugen, the enlargement commissioner, visited Warsaw in early November.⁷²⁴ Shortly thereafter Miller announced a change in the negotiation strategy during a televised address on 15 November:

⁷²¹ Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.

⁷²² 'Ziemia w Kawalkach' *Trybuna*, nr. 279(3572), 29 November 2001, p8.

⁷²³ Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.

⁷²⁴ Roman Guckowski and Małgorzata Borkowska, 'Tak Verheugena' *Trybuna*, 09 November 2001, nr. 262(3555), p3.

Negotiations cannot be delayed, time cannot be lost. There is no point waiting for better weather – it is happening now. Over the past four years our negotiating position has weakened. It is time to change this, speed up the negotiations and achieve success, which is within grasp, in the name of the best interest of the Poles.⁷²⁵

The new negotiation strategy consisted of two elements. Firstly, the transition period on the sale of farmland to foreigners would be reduced to twelve years from the 18 years requested by the AWS negotiators. The proposal also included a five year transition period for 'second homes'. Secondly, there would be no transition period on the sale of agricultural land that had been leased and farmed by the prospective owner for a minimum of three years. The second part of the strategy hence reduced the transition period on the sale of land to 3 years with the caveat that any EU citizen wishing to purchase land in Poland would first have to lease it for 3 years.

The full scope of the compromise was not shared with the *Sejm*, the public or even the *PSL* until after Cimoszewicz and Hubner presented it to the EU.⁷²⁶ Only the first part of strategy i.e. limiting the transition period on immediate sale from 18 to 12 years was discussed with the Parliamentary European Integration Commission and was announced following a Council of Ministers meeting. The proposal to allow EU citizens to purchase land after they have leased it for only 3 years was kept secret until it was presented to the EU.

The opposition responded with an uproar even before the full extent of the compromise became known. Zygmunt Wrzodak of the *LPR* made the following comments about the reduction of the transition period on recreational land from twelve to eighteen years: 'The trade of land, which is our mother, should never

⁷²⁵ Leszek Miller, quoted in 'Pozostaniemy Sobą' Trybuna, 16 November 2001, p1.

⁷²⁶ K. Skowroński, 'Interview with Antoni Macierwicz', in TVN 24 news channel, 11 November 2001).

take place. In this Polish land there is Polish blood. And today we are selling it to the Germans, who have previously caused Polish bloodshed'.⁷²⁷

When the proposal to allow the sale of agricultural land after a three year lease was made public *Liga Polskich Rodzin* unsuccessfully attempted a vote of no confidence in Cimoszewicz. It also called for a parliamentary debate to clarify the government's negotiation stance. The debate took place on 29 November 2001. Cimoszewicz apologised for the incident, calling it an 'oversight', but showed no intention of changing the new negotiation strategy. He stated:

As a result of what was clearly, I confirm this, an error, but an error strictly technical-organizational in nature, based on the lack of a sufficiently detailed written information, and in light of the fact that discussion during the [press] conference concentrated on the most important elements of the modification of the negotiation strategy, the forwarded information turned out to be incomplete. Regarding the purchase of land by foreigners', information was given about the reduction of the basic transition period from 18 to 12 years as well as a full resignation from the transition on the sale of land used for investment. The new stance on the sale of so called 'second homes' and the purchase of land by farmers previously personally farming the land on a lease was not mentioned.⁷²⁸

The head of foreign affairs hence dismissed a radical change in one of the most controversial negotiation topics as 'not-important' and described his failure to inform the public about this as a mere technical error. Had such a u-turn in the negotiation strategy been made public before it was agreed with Brussels it would have most likely resulted in a lengthy debate both with parliamentary opposition and between the coalition partners. Rather than risk the success of the negotiations, the *SLD* chose to present the *Sejm* and the public with a *fait-accompli*.

⁷²⁷ Quoted from Puls Trojki radio interview 15 November 2001 in 'Nie rzucim Ziemi' Wprost, 25 November 2001, p21.

⁷²⁸ Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 6th session, day 2, 29 November 2001, Stanowisko negocjacyjne rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w rozmowach z Unią Europejską.

Without a compromise the negotiations would have continued to stall, and this was not acceptable for the *SLD*.⁷²⁹

Unsurprisingly, the decision not to consult the new proposals with the *PSL* came under severe criticism from the agrarians. Stanisław Kalemba of the *PSL* stated:

We are a coalition member, but we too critically assess the manner in which Polish society was informed about the change in stance, we had the (parliamentary) European Commission. Here at the parliament we discussed, which was hard for us to accept, a change from 18 to 12 years, and from Brussels we receive information that it is 3 years. This is simply not acceptable...this is a foundation of our programme and there are certain barriers below which the *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* cannot go. ⁷³⁰

The *PSL*'s criticism once again brought to light the perennial tension between the *SLD*'s and *PSL*'s approach to accession. *PSL* had asserted the need to establish a lengthy transition period on the sale of land from the start of the negotiations. Had the agrarians been in a position to participate in the formulation of the new strategy they would likely have blocked such a far reaching compromise. The *SLD* on the other hand was happy to compromise since it saw the sale of land as a political issue blocking access to speedy accession and the urgently needed structural and CAP funding that came with it.⁷³¹ The *SLD*'s commitment to accession hence appears to have outweighed that to its coalition partner.

Cimoszewicz did not dwell on his failure to share the changed proposals with the public. Instead, he moved on to argue that even further compromises were needed:

A scrupulous analysis of the negotiation process so far, which was undertaken by the cabinet of Prime Minister

⁷²⁹ Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.

⁷³⁰ Stanisław Kalemba, 6th session, day 2, 29 November 2001, Stanowisko negocjacyjne rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w rozmowach z Unią Europejską.

⁷³¹ Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005, interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, 14 January 2002.

Leszek Miller during its first days in office, led to the conclusion that some of the current propositions for transition periods had a political undertone and did not create a real opportunity of closing the negotiations in specific areas...It is easy to declare oneself as the defender of national interest by proposing an indefensible stance...It is much harder to later look the truth in the face and lead negotiations in such a way so as to achieve as much as possible within narrow room for manoeuvre. Such is the aim of the current government, we want to attain the best possible results, not forgetting, that the negotiation table has two sides.⁷³²

He went on to re-affirm his cabinet's commitment for Poland to join the EU by 2004. In order for this to happen negotiations would have had to have been completed by the end of 2002. It was the government's intention to close all chapters which had no significant financial impact by mid-2002 so as to be able to focus on the key issues of agriculture, structural aid and the budget. Cimoszewicz also emphasised the importance of broad public participation in the accession process and the need to develop a long term strategy on the future of the EU that would allow Poland to play a role corresponding to its importance in the Central European region.

Disagreements about the sale of land continued into 2002. Whereas the *PSL* claimed that the three year lease period should start with accession the *SLD* argued that it should be counted from the start of the lease.⁷³³ Relations between the two parties became increasingly problematic. Miller later described the Agrarians' stance as 'distrustful and very inquisitive'⁷³⁴ whereas Waldemar Pawlak

⁷³²Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 6th session, day 2, 29 November 2001, Stanowisko negocjacyjne rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w rozmowach z Unią Europejską.

⁷³³Jerzy Sieradziński, 'Koniec Sporu?' Trybuna, nr.51(3648), 01 March 2002, p1 and 5.

⁷³⁴Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.

commented that 'the *SLD*'s and the *PSL*'s views about European integration had always been at odds'.⁷³⁵

In spite of the disagreements between the coalition partners and criticism from the largely euro-sceptic opposition the negotiations progressed and subsequent chapters were closed throughout 2002. The 'Free Movement of Capital' chapter was closed on 22 March 2002. The EU agreed to a transition period of twelve years for farmland and five years on the purchase of 'second homes'. A three year transition period was applied to the sale of farmland that had been leased for three years in Eastern Poland and for five years in the Western regions. By May 2002, twenty three out of the thirty-one negotiation chapters had been closed. Poland was still in ninth place in the Commission's rankings, followed by Malta, Bulgaria and Romania but progress had been made.

The negotiations were completed on 13 December 2002 in Copenhagen, on the 21st anniversary of the introduction of Martial Law in Poland. The results are summarised in table 5. The final session covered agriculture and the budget. Until 24 October 2002, the EU was unwilling to grant any CAP funds to the new entrants. Less than two months before the end of the negotiations it finally agreed to assign up to 25% of the existing member states' CAP subsidies in the first years of membership with an annual 5% increase⁷³⁶. As could be expected given the unfair nature of the proposal⁷³⁷ this was not acceptable for the Poles. Eventually, contradicting the economic arguments for the need to liberalise agriculture it used to justify its initial proposal⁷³⁸, the Commission agreed that monies from the structural funds and from Poland's budget would be used to top up the CAP funds. From 2004 to 2006 Polish farmers were to receive 60% of the funds allocated

⁷³⁵ Interview with Waldemar Pawlak, 20 July 2005.

⁷³⁶ Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Financial Conditions of Poland's Accession to the European Union', p18-19, Negocjacje Polska-UE 'Gazeta Wyborcza', Unia łatwo nie ustąpi 10.12.2001 Warszawa (PAP) - Jacek Pawlicki.

⁷³⁷ A. Mayhew, 'A Negotiating Position of the European Union on Agriculture, the Structural Funds and the EU Budget', in 2002), p9.

⁷³⁸ Ibid, p9.

to their West European counterparts and a new budget would to be negotiated thereafter.⁷³⁹

While politically advantageous for the *SLD*, changing the use of structural funds in this manner was less advantageous for Poland's economy. Apart from contributing to the budgetary deficit since co-financing would have to be covered from the national budget, the new agreement meant that structural funds, normally used to help modernise lagging regional economies, were turned into flat subsidies for land ownership.⁷⁴⁰

The Free Movement of Persons chapter was also closed in Copenhagen. It was left to the individual existing member states' discretion whether they imposed a transition period on opening up their labour markets to workers from the new entrant states. If, after two years, the member state wished to continue the transition period it would be allowed to do so for another three years. If the member state wished to extend the transition period further after the five years had passed it could do so for another two years if it was able to show that non-extension would severely disturb its domestic labour market.⁷⁴¹

Miller's main concern during the final stages of negotiations was the possibility that in spite of being one of the poorest member states Poland would become a net contributor to the EU budget.⁷⁴² This would not only have increased Poland's budgetary deficit but could have also discouraged the public from voting for membership during the forthcoming referendum.⁷⁴³

Although potential gains for Poland from accession amounted to as much as 7 billion Euros this estimate was based on full use of available structural funds. But

⁷³⁹ Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Financial Conditions of Poland's Accession to the European Union', p18-19.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid, p18-19.

⁷⁴¹ J. Wiśniewski, 'Swobodny Przepływ Osób', in Członkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej - Na Jakich Zasadach?, ed. M. Kisielewska (Warsaw 2003), 16-26.

⁷⁴² Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.

⁷⁴³ Ibid.

the funds required co-financing from the Polish side, often as much as 50% of the total sum, as well as administrative structures able to efficiently absorb the funds by allocating them to suitable recipients.⁷⁴⁴ If Poland absorbed less than 35% of available structural funds over the 2004-6 period then it stood the risk of becoming a net payer into the EU budget⁷⁴⁵. Moreover, most of the structural funds were transferred directly to recipients such as local government, businesses and non-governmental organisations, while member contributions to the EU, amounting to 1.3 billion Euros and 20% of Poland's budget deficit in 2004, were made from the state budget. The substantial benefits of structural funding for Poland as a whole would hence not be reflected in the Polish budget. To resolve the 'net-payer' issue the EU agreed to provide a lump sum payment of 1,443 billion Euros payment over 3 years, 443 million of which was provided directly from the EU's budget and the remainder from structural funds.⁷⁴⁶

⁷⁴⁴ Samecki, 'Financial Flows Between the EU and Poland in 2004-2013', p48.

⁷⁴⁵ Kawecka-Wykrzykowska, 'Financial Conditions of Poland's Accession to the European Union', p25.

⁷⁴⁶ Ibid, p23.

	Chapter	Date open	Date closed	Result
1	Free movement of goods	21.06.99	28.03.01, re-opened and closed on 28.11.01	Initially Poland did not ask for any transition periods. Chapter was re-opened and closed again on 28 November 2001 with a transition period extending the deadline for Poland to register prescribed medication.
2	Free movement of persons	26.95.99	21.12.01	7 year transition period for Polish citizens to work in EU-15 states. After the first 5 years EU-15 member states would have to show that allowing Polish citizens' to work seriously affects domestic labour market if they were to extend the transition period. Any member state that did opt to use the transition period would be allowed to opt out at any time.
3	Provision of services	12.11.99	14.11.00	No limitations on majority of services except low cost service provision in areas such as building and construction in Austria and Germany, which were limited in line with free movement of persons restrictions ⁷⁴⁷ . Transition period for implementation of Art. 5, directive 2000/12/EC re self-financing levels for co-operative banks. Self-financing to reach EUR 1m by 31 December 2007.
4	Free movement of capital	15.06.99	22.03. 02	5 years for 'second homes' ⁷⁴⁸ , 12 years for rural and forest land, land leased in western territories sold after 5 year lease, 3 years in Eastern territories.
5	Company law	19.05.99	28.11.01	No transition periods.
6	Competition policy	19.05.99	20.11. 02	Transition period until 2011 for Poland to increase state aid for small and medium sized enterprises

⁷⁴⁷ K. Kostrzewska, 'Swoboda Świadczenia Usług', in Członkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej - na jakich zasadach?, ed. M. Kisielewska (Warsaw 2003).

⁷⁴⁸ K. Kostrzewska, 'Swobodny Przepływ Kapitału', in Członkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej - Na Jakich Zasadach?, ed. M. Kisielewska (Warsaw 2003), p34.

	Chapter	Date open	Date closed	Result
7	Agriculture	14.06.00	13.12.02	For the first 3 years of membership Polish farmers would receive the following CAP funds as compared to EU-15 farmers: 2004-55% 2005-60% 2006-65% The funds were to be financed by CAP direct payments, structural funds and Polish budget.
8	Fisheries	19.05.99	10.06.02	No transition periods.
9	Transport Policy	10.11.99	10.06.02	Transition period for Poland re directive 96/53 concerning maximal size of transport vehicles and transit payments to be harmonised until 2010, transition period until 2006 re directive 91/440 for Poland to allow foreign investors access to its railway network.
10	Taxation	07.12.99	21.03.02	Transition periods on maintaining lower VAT rates: 5 years on 7% for construction VAT, 4 years on 3% for agricultural goods, 5 years 7% on catering, and 5 years for 0% on specialist books and magazines.
11	Economic and Monetary Union	30.09.99	07.12.02	No transition periods.
12	Statistics	19.04.99	19.04.99	No transition periods.
13	Social Policy and Employment	30.09.99	01.06.01	One transition period concerning safety at work regulations, until 31 December 2005.
14	Energy	12.11.99	27.07.01	Transition period until 2008 regarding Poland maintaining required minimum stock of oil.
15	Industrial Policy	29.10.98	19.05.99	No transition periods.

	Chapter	Date open	Date closed	Result
16	Small and medium sized enterprises	29.10.99	29.10.99	No transition periods.
17	Science and Research	10.11.98	10.11.98	No transition periods.
18	Education and Training	10.11.98	10.11.98	No transition periods.
19	Telecommunications and Information Technology	29.10.98	22.06.99	Transition period until 2006 for Poland to liberalise postal services.
20	Culture and Audiovisual Policy	29.10.98	04.12.01	No transition periods.
21	Regional policy and co-ordination of structural instruments	06.04.00	01.10.02	All Polish regions were classified as eligible for structural and cohesion funds. For 2004-6 Poland attained a total of EUR 7,635.3 billion structural funds and 3,733.3 billion EUR of cohesion funds.
22	Environment	07.12.99	26.10.01	Nine transition periods for Poland in areas concerning sewage, landfills, water, packaging, sulphur production, air transport emissions and control of refuse disposal outside of EU borders. Various deadlines, final deadline in 2017.
23	Consumers and health protection	19.04.99	19.05.99	No transition periods.
24	Justice and Home Affairs	06.05.00	30.06.02	No transition periods.
25	Customs Union	21.06.99	29.03.01	No transition periods.
26	External relations	01.05.99	12.11.99	No transition periods.
27	Common foreign and security policy	10.11.99	06.04.00	No transition periods.
28	Financial Control	06.04.00	14.06.00	No transition periods.

	Chapter	Date open	Date closed	Result
29	Finance and Budget	26.05.00	13.12.02	To prevent Poland becoming a net payer it was awarded approx. 1.5 billion EURO. Approximately 1/3 of this was derived from a special fund to diminish the Polish budgetary deficit and 2/3 from structural funds (i.e. funds already awarded to Poland which would otherwise have been used for structural aid).
30	Institutions	22.04.02	22.04.02	No transition periods, final agreement based on Treaty of Niece: 54 of 732 seats in EP, 27 of 231 European Council votes, one commissioner, one ECJ judge.

Table 6: Results of the EU accession negotiations.⁷⁴⁹

⁷⁴⁹ Based on The Government of the Republic of Poland, 'Geneza oraz Przebieg Procesu Negocjacji o Członkostwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej' (<http://www.exporter.pl/zarzadzanie/ue/negocjacje.html>, last accessed 26 June 2006).

The results of the negotiations were widely publicised in the Polish media and subject to comments from all major political parties. Unsurprisingly, most opposition parties were critical of the negotiation results with the anti-integrationist League of Polish Families being the most vocal critic. Roman Giertych of the *Liga Polskich Rodzin* immediately called for the government to stand down.⁷⁵⁰ He also stated:

The decision of Leszek Miller's government for Poland to enter the European Union is scandalous. The conditions which have been proposed to us and which we have accepted are not even conditions of the third, or fourth or fifth category. They mean that we will permanently remain in the grey zone of the European Union. That we will become purely a market for the community states. ⁷⁵¹

Danuta Hojarska of *Samoobrona* was equally sceptical. She stated:

On entering the European Union Poland loses sovereignty. I will lose markets, my children, who manage a farm, will not be able to sell their produce – since in our shops all the goods are from the EU. If we were offered equal, partner relations, such as those which other countries got with subsequent enlargements, then I would support the Union. My grandfather died for Poland, and I will in no circumstances agree to enter the Union.⁷⁵²

Both *LPR* and *Samoobrona* were hence critical of the impact of accession on Polish sovereignty and its economy. Most important for them, however, was that Poland did not participate in the EU on worse terms than the other member states. Both parties frequently expressed concerns that Poland would not be treated equally with the Western member states. Once in the EU, they argued, Poland would be used as a source of cheap labour and a dumping ground for second rate products.

⁷⁵⁰ 'Unia Nasza' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.292, 16 December 2002, p8.

⁷⁵¹ 'Kopenhaskie rozwiążanie' *Wprost*, nr.1047, 22 December 2002.

⁷⁵² *Ibid.*

The theme of Poland being inferior to the West, so prominent in the rhetoric the euro-sceptic Christian Nationalist Faction, could now be heard once again from representatives of Self Defence and *LPR*⁷⁵³, many of whom were former *ZChN* members.

Prawo i Sprawiedliwość was not overly critical of the negotiation result but even at this late stage of the accession process had not yet decided whether to back EU membership. Jarosław Kaczyński stated:

The results of the Copenhagen negotiations are a step in the direction which we were expecting. These are gains in the framework of the same total sums, but they have been made real, their structure is more advantageous. This is not a breakthrough, it is not a success, as the pro-government media are trying to present it, but it is better than it was when it was being proposed to accept Brussels' conditions. Whether to say yes or no during the accession referendum is subject to further analysis, the decision will most likely be made on January 18th during the *PiS* congress.⁷⁵⁴

The *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe* accepted the Copenhagen agreement. Eugeniusz Kłopotek declared:

The opponents of European Integration are sharpening their teeth and will subject the negotiated conditions to total criticism. However, its supporters perhaps are not falling into euphoria but they have certainly taken a breath of relief. It is good that each of the deputy Prime Ministers managed to get something, one wants to finally say that in the end Poland has won.⁷⁵⁵

Platforma Obywatelska was the only opposition grouping which unambiguously backed the negotiation results. The *PO*'s leader, Donald Tusk, stated: 'The results

⁷⁵³ Interview with Ryszard Czarnecki, 15 June 2005.

⁷⁵⁴ 'Unia Nasza' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.292, 16 December 2002, p8.

⁷⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

of the Copenhagen summit allow Poles to step towards the accession referendum with pride'.⁷⁵⁶ Tusk made sure however, that his praise for the negotiation results was not interpreted as praise for the government. He declared:

The task of the Platform will now be to convince the Poles that voting about Europe is not a vote for Leszek Miller. The fact that the negotiations ended on the 13th of December is a symbolic monument for all those who suffered for long years, some of whom perished precisely for this great idea of Poland returning to Western civilisation.⁷⁵⁷

Unable to criticise the *SLD* on the grounds of its stance on Europe, which was equally enthusiastic as that of the Platform, Tusk resorted to reminding the electorate of the *SLD*'s authoritarian roots as a means of differentiating himself from the communist-successors. In spite of close alignment on an issue of such historic importance for Poland as accession, as well as shared policy preferences on many other matters, the two groupings were still divided by their pre-1989 heritage.

The results of the negotiations were widely covered in the media and all major political groupings outlined their stance on the outcome of the talks. Several parties, for example *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, *PSL* or *Samoobrona*, presented the final agreement made in the negotiations as a decisive factor in their stance on accession. The way in which representatives of these parties talked about the negotiation results suggested they were synonymous with the terms of Poland's membership in the EU, thereby implying that the Poles had negotiated special membership conditions for themselves that derogated Poland from the European *acquis*. But the terms of accession remained non-negotiable throughout the pre-accession period. The scope of the negotiations was limited to allowing leeway in

⁷⁵⁶ 'Unia Nasza' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.292, 16 December 2002, p8.

⁷⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

the amount of time Poland had to fully align with the non-negotiable *acquis*, not the content of the *acquis*⁷⁵⁸, and the transition periods that were eventually allowed covered less than 5% of the *acquis*.⁷⁵⁹ The way in which the parties presented the negotiations hence suggested that the negotiators had had some choice as to the terms of Polish membership. In fact, the terms of membership were never up for negotiation. The parties did not appear to acknowledge this however and instead presented the results of the negotiations in a way that suggested much more had been at stake than only transition periods for the implementation of laws Poland had always been was obliged to adopt as a condition of membership.

Accession in political debate

The 2001 electoral campaign

The 2001 parliamentary elections were held on 23 September 2001. The contest took place under a changed electoral system, which favoured small parties.⁷⁶⁰ This did little to help the AWS and the *Unia Wolności* however and neither managed to enter parliament having attained 5.6% and 3.1% of the vote respectively. The economic crisis and growing public disenchantment with the economic transformation⁷⁶¹ bolstered the centre-left and the *SLD-UP* coalition became the largest parliamentary grouping with 41% of the votes and 216 parliamentary seats. This was the best electoral result in the history of post-communist Poland. But it was not enough to form a majority government and so the *SLD-UP* turned to *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, which attained 9% of the vote 42 parliamentary seats. The results of the contest are presented in table 7.

⁷⁵⁸ Interview with Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, 14 January 2002.

⁷⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁰ Millard, 'Elections in Poland in 2001: electoral manipulation and party upheaval', p74-5.

⁷⁶¹ K. Łabędź, 'Konceptje Polityczne współczesnej Solidarność (wybrane aspekty)', in Polacy, Polska, Europa. Interpretacje Idei Politycznych, ed. T. Godlewski, (Bydgoszcz 2002), 122-133, p129.

Name of grouping	Percentage of votes	Percentage of parliamentary seats
Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – Unia Pracy	41.04	46.96
Platforma Obywatelska	12.68	14.13
Samoobrona	10.20	11.52
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość	9.50	9.56
Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe	8.98	9.13
Liga Polskich Rodzin	7.87	8.26
Mniejszość Niemiecka ⁷⁶²	0.02	0.43
Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność – Ruch Społeczny	5.60	n/a
Unia Wolności	3.10	n/a
Alterntywa	0.42	n/a

Table 7: 2001 parliamentary election results⁷⁶³

The *SLD-UP* campaign capitalised on the mistakes of the Buzek cabinet and promised to return 'trust' and 'stability' to government as well as to 'fix' Buzek's public sector reforms. The communist-successors' other key proposals included investment in information technology, measures to decrease unemployment, promotion of economic growth, 'fair redistribution' and more 'equal life opportunities'.⁷⁶⁴

The *SLD* continued to unequivocally support EU membership. But in contrast to the federalist, 'Social Europe' it had advocated previously, the *SLD*'s rhetoric now called for the protection of national interest and emphasised that accession should be beneficial for Poland and should not be treated as an aim in its own right. Accession should 'take place as soon as possible' the Alliance declared in its programme, but it also insisted that Poland should accede 'on conditions that

⁷⁶² Parties representing ethnic and national minorities were exempt from representation thresholds.

⁷⁶³ Millard, 'Elections in Poland in 2001: electoral manipulation and party upheaval', p72.

⁷⁶⁴ Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – Unia Pracy, Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

ensure appropriate and long lasting gains for our country'.⁷⁶⁵ In the section entitled 'To Integrate Profitably' the *SLD*'s programme stated:

Before us is a great national challenge: the completion of the negotiation process with the EU and the preparation of Poland for integration. Integration is not an aim in itself. We want to be a part of the European Union to better realize our basic objectives: faster economic growth, the modernization of agriculture, infrastructure improvements, and equalization of opportunities.⁷⁶⁶

The *SLD*'s new rhetoric reflected falling popular support for accession and the public's preference to delay EU entry.⁷⁶⁷ The Alliance continued to enthusiastically support accession but its new rhetoric also tried not to alienate the increasingly euro-sceptic electorate. To ensure that Polish integration into the EU was profitable the *SLD* promised it would negotiate for optimal use of the Common Agricultural Policy, sufficient transition periods for agriculture, the right to work in the EU-15, access to regional funds, and the attainment of 'optimally high levels of EU financial aid'.⁷⁶⁸

The *SLD* advocated the use of a referendum to ratify the membership treaty which, the Alliance argued, should be preceded by an in-depth public debate on European integration to ensure the voters could make a well informed choice during the referendum. To facilitate such a debate, the *SLD* proposed to implement a large scale information and education programme. The Alliance also proposed that all

⁷⁶⁵ Manifest Programowy SLD, quoted in Piasecki, p48.

⁷⁶⁶ Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – Unia Pracy, Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

⁷⁶⁷ A. Szczerbiak, 'Polish Public Opinion: Explaining Declining Support for EU Membership', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 39, 1 (2001), 105-122.

⁷⁶⁸ Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – Unia Pracy, Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

political parties agree on a non-partisan programme of information about accession.⁷⁶⁹

Unia Pracy, which campaigned in coalition with the *SLD*, expressed support for accession to a 'modern' and 'Social' Europe but it also emphasised the need to protect Polish interests. 'Integration with the European Union presents Poland with the opportunity to catch up in civilisational delays and remove differences in levels of economic growth. We will, after all, accede to a modern, social Europe'⁷⁷⁰ it stated. But the *UP* also warned that accession conditions should be analysed in a 'sober and realistic' manner and that careful attention should be paid to potential infringements to the interests of Polish workers, farmers and consumers. Poland should not, according to the *UP*, become a 'second category' member and a clear reconciliation of costs and benefits should be made.⁷⁷¹

Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe was less enthusiastic about accession than its future coalition partners. The Agrarians did declare support for EU entry but emphasised that in order to be worthwhile, integration must be financially beneficial for the Polish economy and especially for the agricultural sector:

The objective of membership in the European Union, similarly to our participation in NATO, is a choice which should serve the realization of strategic aims – the catching up on civilisational handicaps, the diminution of economic and development differences...Integration with the EU should bring about an improvement in the quality of life of Poles, any other outcome would contradict the rationale for integration and the costs associated with it. Society

⁷⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁰ Program Wyborczy Unii Pracy, 'Otwarcie na Świat i Europę – zgodnie z interesem Polski', Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

⁷⁷¹ Ibid.

should be presented with a clear balance of costs and benefits.⁷⁷²

The *PSL* argued that for Poland to benefit from accession it must receive the same amount of CAP and structural funds as other member states. As previously, the *PSL* linked its support for accession with the economic benefits Poland would attain from it. Section 39 of its programme stated: 'The strengthening of Poland's national economic interest should form the basis of integration with the EU (strategic integration) and not a passive inclusion of our economy into a greater community'.⁷⁷³

Full access to the CAP funds, a demand which the European Commission was unlikely to meet, was of critical importance for the Agrarians. The *PSL* was also concerned about foreign firms taking control of strategic parts of the domestic economy as well as the trade deficit with the EU. Although critical of the previous cabinet's integration policy which, the *Stronnictwo* claimed, created an 'assymetry' in Polish-EU relations, the *PSL* supported the *AWS*' demand for an 18 year transition period on the sale of land to foreigners.⁷⁷⁴

The *PSL* continued to advocate an interventionist economic programme, elements of which did not sit well with accession requirements. The Agrarians proposed export subsidies, credit guarantees and called for a more 'flexible' monetary policy as well as state aid to prevent the 'collapse of agriculture'.⁷⁷⁵

The *Stronnictwo* also frequently raised doubts about the benefits of accession for the Polish economy and opposed foreign ownership of strategic sectors of the economy that would be allowed under the Community's free movement of capital.

⁷⁷² Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe. Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

⁷⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁷⁴ A. Szczerbiak, 'After the Election, Nearing the Endgame: the Polish Euro-debate in the Run up to the 2003 Accession Referendum', SEI Working Paper No 53, (Sussex European Institute 2002).

⁷⁷⁵ Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe. Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

Its position on Europe was made even more problematic by the Euro-enthusiasm of the *SLD* and the euro-scepticism of its main competitor, Self-defence. *PSL* leadership knew that given the *SLD*'s popularity, the Agrarians' only realistic chance of entering government would be in coalition with the pro-integrationist *SLD-UP*. Yet at the same time the *PSL* had to compete with the increasingly popular *Samoobrona*,⁷⁷⁶ which stood on a populist, euro-sceptic platform. The *PSL*'s hence remained characteristically ambiguous about accession, as it tried to balance between the conservative, Euro-sceptic politics of the countryside and its main competitor on the one hand and the *SLD*'s pro-integrationism and the promise of CAP and structural funding on the other.

Samoobrona was one of the biggest surprises of the 2001 contest, becoming the third largest parliamentary grouping with almost 10% of the vote. Originating from a populist agrarian protest movement established in the early 1990's⁷⁷⁷ it now defined itself as a national-agrarian social grassroots organisation, aiming for a 'moral and economic renewal' of Poland. It proposed an interventionist economic policy,⁷⁷⁸ a return to Christian values and a rejection of the 'satanic liberalism'⁷⁷⁹, 'uncontrolled consumption' and 'mutant consumerism'⁷⁸⁰. It also called for a 'defence of economic and political sovereignty of the state', which, it claimed was 'being rapidly lost under the smoke screen of integration with the European Union and NATO'.⁷⁸¹ It also advocated the retention of strategic industrial sectors in state hands as well as the increase of state benefits and support for agriculture.⁷⁸² Although its programme did not explicitly oppose accession, *Samoobrona*'s rhetoric made frequent references to 'economic colonisation' and threats which foreign

⁷⁷⁶ Millard, 'Elections in Poland in 2001: electoral manipulation and party upheaval', p74-5.

⁷⁷⁷ A. Prazmowska, 'The New Right in Poland: Nationalism, Anti-Semitism and Parliamentarianism', in *The Far Right in Western and Eastern Europe*, ed. L. Cheles (New York 1995), p211-213.

⁷⁷⁸ Samoobrona, 'Ogólne postulaty ideowo-programowe Samoobrony', section a.
<http://www.samoobrona.org.pl/partia.htm>, last accessed 7 January 2002.

⁷⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁸² Tezy Programowe 'Samoobrona RP', section I.1, <http://www.samoobrona.org.pl/partia.htm>, last accessed 7 January 2002.

economic institutions posed to Polish sovereignty. It was particularly concerned about economic integration and the impact of global businesses on the Polish economy. In one campaign leaflet *Samoobrona* stated:

Attempts to conquer Poland, in the past made by means of 'sword and fire'⁷⁸³ today take the form of 'without drawing the sword', and are primarily economic activities, aiming to quickly rid the Polish nation of any state of ownership in the economic sphere, stealing national wealth and handing it for nothing into the hands of foreign economic aggressors.⁷⁸⁴

Although it did not present a consistently anti-integrationist stance, instead deferring the decision to the referendum, *Samoobrona* was nonetheless very critical of accession.

The League of Polish Families was the only grouping to enter the 2001 parliament on an explicitly anti-accession platform.⁷⁸⁵ Vehemently anti-integrationist and xenophobic, the *LPR* appealed to conservative, religious voters who felt threatened by globalisation and perceived their Catholic morality as superior. Established in April 2001 its leaders included Antoni Macierewicz, one of Poland's staunchest euro-sceptics and former member of the *ZChN* as well as other politicians known for their critical stance of accession such as the trade unionist Zygmunt Wrzodak, Gabriel Janowski and Roman Giertych⁷⁸⁶, former member of the far right Nationalist Faction (*Stronnictwo Narodowe*) and leader of the *LPR*'s youth organisation All-Polish Youth (*Młodzież Wszechpolska*), notorious for its connections with the skinhead movement.

⁷⁸³ The quote refers to the famous novel by Polish author Henryk Sienkiewicz: 'Ogniem i Mieczem' (By Sword and Fire), the novel, criticised as anti-Ukrainian and nationalistic, is set in 17th century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and as one of its main themes recounts the bravery of Polish troops battling against Ukrainian rebels during the 1648-57 Khmelnytsky uprising.

⁷⁸⁴ Samoobrona, 'Brońmy Swego', <http://www.samoobrona.org.pl/partia.htm>, last accessed 7 January 2002.

⁷⁸⁵ The only other grouping that campaigned on an explicitly anti-accession platform was Alternative (Alternatywa), which attained less than 0.5% of the vote.

⁷⁸⁶ Piasecki.

The League united Catholic-nationalist organisations such as the National Faction, the Polish Agreement and the Catholic-nationalist Movement. It benefited from the backing of Father Rydzyk of the radical-Catholic Radio Maryja and had close links with the far right.

The *LPR*'s electoral slogan stated: 'For Poland – Independence, for the Poles – work, bread and homes'.⁷⁸⁷ The first section of its programme called for the removal of articles 90 and 91 from the Polish constitution. As was discussed in chapter 4, these articles allowed for international law to be incorporated into Polish legislation. According to the *LPR*, they 'formed the basis of the destruction of the sovereignty of the Polish state'.⁷⁸⁸

The *Liga* equated accession with the economic and cultural colonisation of Poland by the Western powers, in particular by Germany. EU membership, it argued, would lead to loss of national sovereignty and identity, secularisation, moral corruption, and the destruction of the Polish economy. Its programme declared:

It cannot be that Polish property is given away into foreign hands, the market is open to unfair 'competition', the economy is 'cooled down' and the Poles are robbed of work, while we pay for the creation of jobs in the European Union.⁷⁸⁹

Sale of land to foreigners was a major concern for the *LPR*. Given the chance, it claimed, wealthy Germans exiled after World War II would return to re-colonise

⁷⁸⁷ Liga Polskich Rodzin. Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

⁷⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁹ Program Solidarnego Narodowego Ligi Polskich Rodzin, section 2, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

the Recovered Territories by buying up farmland. This was only a short step away from yet another partition, it claimed.

Remaining outside of European structures was, for the *LPR*, the only way to save the Polish nation from engulfment by the European empire. It stated:

We stand before a question today: will we realize a Polish programme or programmes foreign to Poland? Consequently – will we have jobs, will we eat Polish bread? Will we have Polish homes? Or will we, as part of the European Union or another such modern Tower of Babel, import unemployment, eat foreign bread and live on the street? Let us choose an independent and sovereign Poland!⁷⁹⁰

In place of acceding to the EU, the *LPR* advocated joining the North American Free Trade Association. It argued that while this would provide adequate international security and economic integration it would not expose Poland to the dangers of annexation by the European super state.

Apart from marginal radical parties⁷⁹¹ the only other grouping to compete on an anti-integrationist platform was *Alternatywa* (The Alternative). Having attained as little as 0.5% of the vote however, *Alternatywa* did not enter parliament. Made up mostly of former *Konfederacja Polski Niepodległej* activists, it focused on the protection of Polish sovereignty. Like the *Liga Polskich Rodzin*, it proposed changes to articles 90 and 91 of the constitution and a renegotiation of the Association Agreement. In place of European integration it advocated greater national self-sufficiency.⁷⁹²

⁷⁹⁰ Ruch Społeczny *Alternatywa*, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

⁷⁹¹ For example the communist Partia Proletariatu.

⁷⁹² *Liga Polskich Rodzin*. Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder, 'Program solidaryzmu Narodowego Ligi Polskich Rodzin', section 1.2

The centre-right, economically liberal *Platforma Obywatelska* was staunchly euro-enthusiastic; two of its three founding members Maciej Płażyński⁷⁹³ and Andrzej Olechowski had left the AWS over disagreement with the Action's 'tough' negotiation strategy. The third, future prime minister Donald Tusk, was a former Freedom Union member well known for his euro-enthusiasm. Rather than explicitly present its a stance in favour of EU membership however, the Platform's programme frequently referred to accession as a given and focused on the need to put in place policies that would enable Poland to make optimal use of membership benefits, for example the establishment of adequate structures to administer aid for the agricultural sector.⁷⁹⁴

The *PO*'s programme focused on the economy, advocating measures such as a flat 15% tax rate, liberalisation of company law and employment legislation and a lowering of the tax burden on the employer.⁷⁹⁵ Its liberal approach to economic policy was well aligned with the economic requirements of accession.

Unia Wolności presented a centrist, moderate programme. Its slogan stated: 'A strong middle class is an opportunity for everyone'.⁷⁹⁶ The programme emphasised the need to reduce inflation, complete the privatisation process, lower and simplify taxes as well as introduce measures against unemployment. Section 4 of the *UW*'s programme was entitled: 'The European Union – an opportunity for the people and for the country'.⁷⁹⁷ It stated:

Poland's membership in the European Union is a great opportunity for Poland and the Poles. It will speed up the pace of economic growth, widen the markets for

⁷⁹³ Interview with Maciej Płażyński, 13 July 2005.

⁷⁹⁴ Platforma Obywatelska. Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

⁷⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹⁶ Deklaracja Programowa V Kongresu Unii Wolności, 16/17 December 2000, <http://www.uw.org.pl/archiwum/program.php?id=69>, last accessed 27 August 2005.

⁷⁹⁷ Unia Wolności, Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

producers, increase the flow of investment capital, and Poland will receive financial aid enabling it to decrease unemployment connected to the modernization of the economy. The Polish countryside and the agricultural sector will also gain a new opportunity – half of the EU's budget is assigned to the Common Agricultural Policy.⁷⁹⁸

The programme went on to assert other benefits of EU membership including greater international security, access to the EU labour market, and structural aid. The *UW* warned, however, that in order to benefit from accession it was necessary to implement adequate harmonisation measures. It proposed a set of reforms which would enable Poland to benefit from accession. These included the demonopolisation of telecommunications, air and rail travel and energy sectors, the introduction of EU quality and safety standards, the development of a public information programme about the EU and the development of new jobs and housing for inhabitants of the countryside.⁷⁹⁹ The *UW*'s policy proposals hence remained consistent with accession requirements.

Following the withdrawal of the Solidarity Trade Union from the AWS, Electoral Action re-named itself Solidarity Electoral Action of the Right (*Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność Prawicy, AWSP*). The new formation consisted of the Christian Nationalist Faction, the Agreement of the Polish Christian Democrats and the Social Movement AWS. The AWS emphasised the importance of family values, national identity and justice, and its programme often referred to the Action's historical roots in the Solidarity movement. Section V stated: 'Respect for culture, history, national values and the Solidarity message is very important for our right wing groupings. These protect the Poles from amnesia and from the loss of identity'.⁸⁰⁰

⁷⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁰ Akcja Wyborcza Solidarność, Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

The AWS backed EU membership as long as it did not impinge Poland's national identity. The *Akcja* declared its support for: 'The speedy and successful inclusion of Poland in a European Union where nation states will maintain their values and identity'.⁸⁰¹

The *Akcja*'s support for accession was subject to a number of conditions. Firstly, the nations represented by member states, AWS asserted, had to be treated as 'constituting subjects' to prevent the erosion of national identity. The programme did not specify what kinds of rights member states would be granted by virtue of being 'constituting subjects'. Secondly, the AWS called for the 'affirmation of Christian civilisation as the foundation of the European social order'.⁸⁰² The programme declared: 'We reject dangerous visions of a Europe with no values. These threaten the return of totalitarianisms and bring politics down to a game of interests, in which victory is had by the strong and the rich – regardless of who is right'.⁸⁰³ The AWS hence continued to support integration with an EU founded on Christian values.

The Electoral Action campaigned on a centre-right, liberal economic programme that advocated the simplification of the tax system and support for small and medium sized businesses as well as investment in transport infrastructure and subsidies for the agricultural sector to protect it from 'unfair' competition from abroad. It also called for a well thought out allocation of structural funds.

Lech Kaczyński's *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* did not present a clear cut stance on accession and instead emphasised that the final decision should be made in a nationwide referendum:

Our accession to the European Union is the great problem for today. It is this objective, among all those which we are

⁸⁰¹ Ibid.

⁸⁰² Ibid.

⁸⁰³ Ibid.

undertaking in the international arena that is both the most important and the most controversial. The decision to enter the European Union must be a decision of the nation, taken in a referendum.⁸⁰⁴

European integration was indeed problematic for *PiS*. Its inability to formulate a clear stance on EU membership reflected the different views of its members, which ranged from reluctant supporters such as Lech Kaczyński to euro-sceptics such as Marian Pilka and Marek Jurek, formerly one of the *ZChN*'s most vocal opponents of accession.⁸⁰⁵ *PiS* argued that the conditions on which Poland was to join the EU were as yet unknown, and hence it was not possible to formulate a well informed opinion. The programme stated: 'In order for a referendum to have any kind of sense the Poles must be presented with a trustworthy document describing all the effects of entering the EU including the benefits and the costs'.⁸⁰⁶

According to *PiS*, the membership negotiations had proceeded too quickly and the negotiators had put speedy accession above good membership conditions. The programme stated:

The accession date has for a long time been a central problem of negotiations. We do not dismiss this issue but we must emphasize very strongly that the efforts to attain a position in the Union appropriate and honourable for a large European nation like Poland' cannot be sufficiently effective when the manner and speed of negotiations are defined by subsequent, and as has become apparent not very realistic, dates of accession to the Union. What is most important is the quality of our presence and, what follows from this, a determined defence of our interests.⁸⁰⁷

⁸⁰⁴ Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

⁸⁰⁵ Szczerbiak, 'After the Election, Nearing the Endgame: the Polish Euro-debate in the Run up to the 2003 Accession Referendum', p31.

⁸⁰⁶ Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

⁸⁰⁷ Ibid.

Prawo i Sprawiedliwość hence did not oppose accession, as long as it took place on the right conditions, regardless of how long negotiating such conditions would take.

In contrast to its sceptical stance on the EU, *PiS* was enthusiastic about Poland's membership in NATO, arguing that this 'must be the foundation of Poland's foreign policy'⁸⁰⁸. *PiS* also advocated the development of good relations with the Baltic States and the Russian Federation. Regarding the latter however, it urged caution due to the 'large assets owned by our partner within our country'.⁸⁰⁹

PiS' political platform focused on the introduction of tough measures against crime and corruption as well as the 'moral cleansing' of the political elite. Its socio-economic proposals included lower taxes and interest rates as well as extensive investment in infrastructure and social policies to help the poor. These would be financed, *PiS* argued, from increased revenues that would be brought about by the reduction of corruption.

PiS also advocated the introduction of trade barriers to protect the Polish economy from foreign competition. The programme acknowledged that EU membership would invalidate most such measures but since speedy membership was increasingly unlikely, *PiS* argued, the current policy of lifting trade barriers was not relevant. Its programme then stated that even if accession was imminent, Poland should resort to protectionist measures that could be used within the EU such as increased controls over permits for new supermarkets, a tax regime that incentivised Polish owned export industries and the introduction of health and safety requirements to counterbalance similar measures being used against Polish exports. *PiS* also advocated the retention of state control over industries 'impacting economic security' by means of privatisation laws that allowed the state

⁸⁰⁸ Ibid, 'Foreign Policy' section.

⁸⁰⁹ Ibid.

to retain a controlling stake as well as a ban on Polish state owned pension funds investing in foreign stock markets.⁸¹⁰

If elected, *PiS* promised to hold a nationwide referendum covering a broad range of topics including the 'moral and ideological foundations of the state', the 'cleansing of public life' and measures against corruption. Regarding accession, it proposed that the public should be asked if it wished to be presented with 'a document, prepared by a parliamentary commission in co-operation with the government, presenting the effects of Poland's entry to the European Union'.⁸¹¹

While not opposed to accession *PiS* was sceptical about whether it would take place quickly and emphasised the need for the decision to be made by the public. The protectionist tone of its economic policy did not sit well with the EU's requirements to lift trade barriers. *PiS* acknowledged that some of the protectionist economic policy it advocated would be invalidated under membership but it nonetheless proposed that protectionist measures be introduced on the assumption accession would be delayed. The tone of its programme and its underlying assumption that accession was not imminent contrasted with that of the euro-enthusiastic Citizen's Platform, which presented quick accession as a given.

The 2001 contest resulted in strong parliamentary representation of accession opponents with the anti-integrationist *LPR* and the heavily euro-sceptic *Samoobrona* attaining just over 20% of parliamentary seats between them. Whereas in the previous *sejm* opponents of EU membership had been primarily located on the right wing fringes of the Solidarity Electoral Action, they now united in the League of Polish Families. Another 20% of seats was held by *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* and *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, both of which presented a 'soft Euro-sceptic' stance.

⁸¹⁰ Ibid, 'The economy – use of Polish capital' section.

⁸¹¹ Ibid, 'The economy – use of Polish capital' section.

Although neither opposed accession, they also did not present a clear-cut stance on the issue. Both favoured a 'hard-line' negotiation strategy and raised concerns about the potentially adverse impact of EU membership on the Polish economy and national identity. One example of these two parties' ambiguous approach to accession took place when both groupings failed to sign the 'Pact for Europe', an attempt to build a formal all party consensus on accession during the 2001 electoral contest.

As in previous contests the programmes of the soft euro-sceptic groupings like *PSL* and *PiS* were often at odds with accession requirements. The *PSL* advocated protectionist measures that included export subsidies, banned under the Association Agreement, as well as other protectionist measures such as credit guarantees and state aid for agriculture.⁸¹² *PiS* proposed a range of protectionist economic measures designed to protect Polish industry from 'unfair competition'.

As could be expected the programmes of the anti-integrationist *LPR* as well as that of *Self-Defence* were also at odds with accession requirements. Both advocated numerous trade controls and state subsidies that contradicted the Europe Agreements and accession requirements. On the other hand the programmes of the liberal groupings such as *Citizen's Platform* and the *Freedom Union* presented policies closely aligned with the EU conditionality. The *SLD* also aligned its programme with accession conditions. The liberal parties' policy proposals had always been consistent with accession conditionality. For the *SLD* however, the final stages of the pre-accession period hence saw a much closer alignment between policy proposals and the parties' traditionally euro-enthusiastic rhetoric. As Miller later explained, this was because by 2001 accession was at the forefront of the *SLD*'s political and economic agenda. The *SLD* leadership saw accession and the access to EU aid it brought as a way out of the economic crisis and hence

⁸¹² Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe. Materiały Wyborcze, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, 2001 parliamentary election folder.

emphasized effective alignment of government policy with accession requirements to ensure optimal absorption levels.⁸¹³

Another characteristic of the challenges Polish elites experienced throughout the entire pre-accession period that was also evident in the 2001 parliament was the discord between the way in which members of the future ruling coalition presented accession in the electoral campaign. Whereas the *SLD* was uncompromisingly supportive of membership, the *PSL* continued its approach of conditional support, emphasizing the threats accession posed to Polish identity and economy and calling for the need to compensate these threats with financial aid.

The growth of the euro-sceptic wing in parliament reflected over-all public sentiments, given that as many as 25-30% of voters also opposed accession at the time of the election.⁸¹⁴ But in spite of the approaching completion of negotiations and the historic significance of accession it was once again not a salient campaign issue. As a survey of television campaign coverage of the six main parties conducted by Szczerbiak has shown, accession did not play a significant part in most parties' campaigns.⁸¹⁵

Equally, for most voters accession was not a determining factor in electoral choice. According to a July 2001 study from the Social Research Workshop (Pracownia Bada Społecznych, PBS) only 4% of respondents cited EU membership as one of the issues that would have significant impact when determining which grouping they would support. A July 2001 Pentor survey found that, only 7% of respondents described EU membership as an important election issue.

⁸¹³ Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.

⁸¹⁴ Szczerbiak, 'After the Election, Nearing the Endgame: the Polish Euro-debate in the Run up to the 2003 Accession Referendum',

⁸¹⁵ *Ibid.*

Moreover, there was only limited correlation in the proportion of accession supporters among the parties' electorates and the parties' stance on the EU. Polling evidence indicated that the majority of the mainstream parties' electorates also supported accession. Even the harshly euro-sceptic Samoobrona counted more supporters of accession among its voters than opponents (33% in favour and 29% against).⁸¹⁶ The only exception was the *LPR* but even the electorate of this staunchly anti-integrationist grouping was made up of as much as 24% accession supporters as compared to 52% opponents.⁸¹⁷ This fact that support for accession often correlated with support for parties whose programmes called for measures that contradicted accession requirements such as *PiS* or *Samoobrona* suggests that public support for the EU was not founded on an in-depth understanding of the policy implications of accession.

Parliamentary debate

The prominence of right-wing, Catholic groupings such as *LPR*, Law and Order and Self-Defence among parliamentary opposition put issues of morality and religion firmly on the agenda during the final two years of the pre-accession debate. The secular *SLD* meanwhile, increasingly realised that in order to secure a yes vote in the approaching accession referendum it had to attain the backing of the Catholic Church for accession.⁸¹⁸

Building a good relationship with the Catholic hierarchy was at the top of the *SLD*'s agenda when it came back to power in the autumn of 2001.⁸¹⁹ From the start of his Prime Ministership Miller ensured he had the backing of the Church. Shortly after forming government he visited the Vatican to meet with the Pope and Archbishop Glemp was one of the first people Miller briefed following the

⁸¹⁶ B. Roguska and J. Kucharczyk. Wybory 2001 a integracja Polski z Uni Europejską. Warsaw: ISP. 2001, p13.

⁸¹⁷ Ibid.

⁸¹⁸ Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.

⁸¹⁹ Ibid.

Copenhagen talks. As Miller later commented, he 'tried to take the Church seriously'.⁸²⁰

The need to attain the support of the Church led the *SLD* to revise its approach to women's rights, and specifically to abortion. The liberalisation of the strict abortion legislation had always been one of the *SLD*'s prerogatives and played a prominent role in its 2001 campaign. In March 2001 for example, during a conference on 'Women and their Role in Politics', Leszek Miller criticised the *AWS* government for introducing one of 'the toughest anti-abortion laws in Europe' and called for its liberalisation.⁸²¹

The plans to change the law were soon shelved however as the *SLD*, confronted with a harshly euro-sceptic parliamentary opposition and growing public opposition to EU membership, realised that it needed the support of the Catholic Church. In the autumn of 2001 the *SLD* and the Episcopate came to an informal understanding about abortion. In exchange for the Episcopate's support for accession, the *SLD* was to abandon its plans to liberalise the abortion law. Miller explained the agreement as follows: 'Such a thing would not have been written down, but there was a certain understanding, a gesture, an unfinished sentence'.⁸²² Bishop Pieronek also confirmed the existence of such an agreement during an interview with the author⁸²³ and for *Gazeta Wyborcza* in January 2002. According to the *Gazeta*, Pieronek claimed that the Episcopate had made a pact with the *SLD*, where in exchange for the maintenance of the status quo on abortion the government could rely on the Church's support for accession.⁸²⁴ Archbishop Glemp refused to acknowledge the existence of such an agreement. When questioned

⁸²⁰ *Ibid.*

⁸²¹ Leszek Miller, speech at the National SLD Conference: 'Women and their Role in Politics', 04 March 2001.

⁸²² Interview with Leszek Miller, 26 July 2005.

⁸²³ Interview with Tadeusz Pieronek, Secretary, 25 July 2005.

⁸²⁴ 'Kraj w Skrócie' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 18 January 2002.

about it by the radical-Catholic *Nasz Dziennik* he described it as 'myths and press facts' and claimed he knew nothing about it.⁸²⁵

The Episcopate did take an increasingly positive stance towards accession however. On 8 November 2001, only three days after the announcement of the compromise on the sale of land, Glemp visited Gunther Verheugen in Brussels. After the meeting he declared that Poland's entry to the EU was a 'historical necessity'.⁸²⁶

Other members of the Episcopate were also supportive of accession. During a meeting of the Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of the European Community (*Commisio Episcopatum Communitatis Europensis*, COMECE), Wiktor Skwarc, the Bishop of Tarnów, commented: 'It is the Poles who need help. It is Poland which wants to accede to the Union, and not the Union to Poland. I am convinced that the mechanisms functioning in European agriculture will function equally well in Poland'.⁸²⁷

Following a lengthy and difficult debate⁸²⁸ the Episcopate formally confirmed its support for accession in a document entitled: 'Polish Bishops and European Integration', which was drafted during its 316th Plenary Session on the 20th and 21st of March 2002. The document stated:

The idea of a united Europe was born from the inspiration of Christian politicians such as Alcide de Gasperi, Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer. After the experience of many wars and conflicts on our continent, it expressed the desire for a peaceful co-existence of nations which would ensure basic human rights, prosperity and security. The global Church, and therefore the Polish Church, supported this process from the start. Europe, in the understanding of

⁸²⁵ Interview with Tadeusz Pieronek, Secretary, 25 July 2005.

⁸²⁶ 'Kościół a Unia Europejska' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.217, 17 September 2002, p16.

⁸²⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸²⁸ Pieronek.

the Church, is not only an economic and political structure, but above all it is a community of history, culture and tradition based on the lasting spiritual Judaeo-Christian foundations, natural law and Greek thought.⁸²⁹

But the Episcopate's preference for cultural homogeneity and belief in Europe's Judeo-Christian foundations contrasted with the views of other European Catholics. COMECE supported a more diverse kind of Europe. It issued the following statement on European integration:

A new European order of such kind, that it will serve the growth of the authentic common good must recognize and preserve those values, which constitute the most precious heritage of European humanism...Cultural roots, from which these above mentioned values arise, are diverse: the spiritual heritage of Greece and Rome, the input of the roman, Celtic, Germanic, Urgofin, as well as Jewish culture and the world of Islam.⁸³⁰

The Polish Episcopate was hence caught between the anti-integrationism of the radical Catholics and the pro-accession stance of the Pope and COMECE. The Episcopate could not go against the wishes of the Vatican, however, and it was growing uncomfortable with the radicalism of Radio Maryja.

The *SLD* meanwhile took care to remind its political opponents of the Vatican's support for accession. During the *sejm* debate on the change in negotiation strategy in November 2001 for example, Foreign Affairs Minister Cimoszewicz sought to bolster support for the contentious negotiation compromise by reminding his audience of the Pope's support for enlargement: 'Poland's integration with the European Union has from the beginning been observed and supported by the Holy

⁸²⁹ *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 22 March 2002, nr 69, p5.

⁸³⁰ Teresa Sotowska, 'Nadzieja, zaufanie, solidarność' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr 287, 10 December 2002, p12.

See. It sees in [integration] a chance for the development of our continent and a platform for common co-operation between nations'.⁸³¹

The Vatican's support for integration presented a challenge to the Catholic and anti-integrationist *Liga Polskich Rodzin*. Although they vehemently opposed accession, the radical-Catholic politicians could not openly disagree with the Pope. It was clear however that they perceived the European Union as un-Christian. In response to Cimoszewicz, *LPR* leader Roman Giertych stated:

How does the Christian faith look? The fall of morality, pornography, drugs and more mosques being built than Churches; should the Poles, a nation which has endured so many sacrifices in its fight for freedom, give this freedom away in return for the promise of money? Does accession to the state, which is the European Union, not contradict the spilling of blood of those who during World War II gave their lives for our freedom? ⁸³²

The kind of concerns Giertych expressed in November 2001 would continue to be a frequent subject of debate in the *sejm* throughout the final two years of the pre-accession period. In April 2002 for example, *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* proposed a 'Declaration about the Sovereignty of the State in the Area of Morality and Culture'. The declaration called on the EU to confirm that 'Polish legislation protecting the moral social order and in particular unborn life as well as the dignity of family, marriage and upbringing' should not be 'in any way limited by international regulations'.⁸³³

Jarosław Kaczyński, leader of *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, justified the proposal as follows:

⁸³¹ Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, 6th session, day 2, 29 November 2001, Stanowisko negocjacyjne rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w rozmowach z Unią Europejską.

⁸³² Roman Giertych, 6th session, day 2, 29 November 2001, Stanowisko negocjacyjne rządu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w rozmowach z Unią Europejską.

⁸³³ 'Nie ingeruje, ale ingeruje' Nasz Dziennik, nr 78(1271), 3 April 2002.

There could come a day when someone will get the idea to make all the European nations recognize homosexual marriages or euthanasia. We do not want it to be decided by a majority vote that euthanasia is legal and for European tribunals to enforce such legislation in Poland.⁸³⁴

The declaration was signed by sixty-four MP's from *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, *Samoobrona*, *LPR* and *Platforma Obywatelska*. The *SLD* was the only grouping which opposed it.⁸³⁵ When the proposal was discussed in parliament, Robert Smolen of the *SLD* explained that the declaration was irrelevant since moral matters did not fall under the *acquis* and that the manner in which the draft was phrased misled the public into thinking the EU could force its member states to adopt such legislation. Smoleń stated: 'It [the declaration] suggests that matters of the moral order, the protection of life, the family, the up-bringing of children are a part of the community law, which is not true'.⁸³⁶

The opposition was not receptive to the *SLD*'s criticism. *Platforma Obywatelska* confirmed that 'the Union does not interfere in the sphere of morality and culture' but it did not withdraw support for the proposal. Roman Giertych of the *LPR* stated that the best way of protecting Polish morality was not to enter the EU at all as it threatened to 'break our ethical backbone'.⁸³⁷

The *SLD* eventually managed to muster enough votes to prevent the declaration from being formally presented to the EU. Nonetheless, the subject of morality continued to dominate the debates on accession. In May 2002 the European Parliament recommended that member states legalise abortion and provide easy access to contraception. The opposition parties were outraged. As a result of their joint effort the Parliamentary Commission for European Integration passed a

⁸³⁴ Ibid.

⁸³⁵ Dominika Pszczołkowska and Jacek Pawlicki, 'Moralność po Unii' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr. 50, 28 February 2003, p9.

⁸³⁶ Ibid.

⁸³⁷ 'Nie ingeruje, ale ingeruje' *Nasz Dziennik*, nr.78(1271), 03 April 2002.

resolution condemning the EP's recommendations. Its authors stated that the recommendation 'threatened the competences of sovereign states and the spiritual foundations of our civilisation'.⁸³⁸ The Episcopate also opposed the recommendation and the Episcopal Council for the Family declared: 'Europe's international community sets new difficulties before Poland and other candidate states during the negotiations. Its only proposition in the face of a serious economic crisis is the legalization of the killing of citizens'.⁸³⁹

Both the parliamentary opposition and the Episcopate interpreted the EP's statement as if it was European law. Being only a recommendation however, the document was not binding. Danuta Hubner, the Minister for European Integration, attempted to clarify:

The matter of abortion does not fall under the *acquis communautaire*. The recommendation, even if it has been voted through, has no legislative consequences. This is only an opinion of the EP, which the minister acknowledges. The matter has not appeared in the negotiations, and neither has any other matter related to morality.⁸⁴⁰

The debate on the EP's recommendation suggested that the representatives of the euro-sceptic groupings may not have fully understood the EP's decision making powers. They interpreted a non-binding statement issued by an institution which had no legal remit in moral matters as an attempt to force Poland to legalise abortion. Moreover, they also appeared unaware of Art. 30 of the Treaty of the European Community that permitted trade restrictions for a number of public policy reasons, including morality.⁸⁴¹

⁸³⁸ 'Kłopot z Rezolucją' Gazeta Wyborcza, nr.155, 05 July 2002.

⁸³⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁴¹ A. Young, 'The Single Market', in Policy Making in the European Union, ed. H.Wallace (Oxford 2005), 94-112., p102.

The European Union opposed by Radio Maryja and *Liga Polskich Rodzin* hardly resembled the organisation which Poland was actually acceding to. Rather than an international community, the EU was perceived as an immoral coloniser, out to destroy the Poles' superior values, buy up their land and force them to legalise abortion.

As the above analysis shows, during the final stages of the negotiations the Polish debate on Europe was dominated by morality and religion. Symbolic and emotional concerns were much more prominent than matters directly affecting the quality of life of Polish citizens. The Episcopate formally declared its support for accession but the Catholic right continued to claim that EU membership would lead to legalised abortion, pornography and homosexual marriages. Practical issues such as the right to work in other member states, access to regional funds or the economic impact of accession on different social groups hardly appeared in the debate as parliamentarians were increasingly preoccupied with the threat of abortion on demand or same sex marriage.

Moral and religious sentiments also dominated discussions on the draft European Constitution. The European Convention, the body charged with drafting the new constitution, was established during the EU's Laeken Summit in December 2000. Led by former French President, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, the convention included representatives of current and aspiring member states, members of the European Parliament, and two representatives of the European Commission. Representatives from the candidate countries could participate in the discussion but only member states had veto power. The candidate countries were hence reduced to observer status in discussions over what was expected to become the EU's future constitution. The Polish delegation included Danuta Hubner who represented the government, Józef Oleksy, who represented the *sejm* and Senator Edmund Wittbrodt, who participated on behalf the senate.

For the Polish representatives the main point of dissent was the inclusion of the *Invocatio Dei* in the constitutional preamble.⁸⁴² The *Invocatio Dei* was of primary importance for the Catholic Church.⁸⁴³ In its formal declaration of support for accession, issued in March 2002, the Episcopate stated: 'We expect that a reference to God, who constitutes for religious persons the ultimate reason for existence of the basic values, the moral-religious and social order, will be made in future European legislation'.⁸⁴⁴

The *SLD* appeared to take the Episcopate's concerns to heart. On 7 April 2002 representatives of the Church hierarchy met with Oleksy, Hubner and Wittbrodt. After the meeting, Adam Szultz, the Episcopate's press spokesman, announced that all involved agreed that the European constitution should include a direct reference to God.⁸⁴⁵

The convention delegates then met with Józef Glemp and President Kwaśniewski in May 2002. Kwaśniewski agreed that the Polish delegation should propose the inclusion of the *Invocatio Dei* in the Constitution. Following the meeting Szultz announced that it was very important for the Church that the final document took account not only of social and economic values but also of spiritual and religious ones.⁸⁴⁶ Dariusz Szymczycha, Secretary of State at the presidential chancellery, confirmed that Polish representatives in the Convention would strive to 'push through these values'. Szymczycha stated: 'The president has pointed out that the Church is one of the fundamental European institutions. Therefore when the European Constitution is discussed today, we cannot escape from ethical, moral values, it is not possible to escape religious values'.⁸⁴⁷

⁸⁴² Jacek Pawlicki, 'Spór o Boga w unijnej konstytucji' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.265, 14 November 2002, p12.

⁸⁴³ J. Glemp, 'Prymas Polski: czy w konstytucji Unii Europejskiej znajdzie się odniesienie do Boga (dokumentacja)', in 26 August 2000).

⁸⁴⁴ 'Kościół a Unia Europejska' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr 217, 17 September 2002, p. 16.

⁸⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴⁶ 'Spotkanie Prezydenta i Prymasa' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr 106, 8 May 2002, p4.

⁸⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

While the *Invocatio Dei* dominated the debate on the Constitution, the key question of what kind of a European Union Poland wanted to participate in remained unaddressed. The *SLD* did not present a vision of what Europe it wanted to join. As Józef Oleksy stated during a press interview in February 2002:

We still have to develop a Polish vision of the Union's reforms. And we will present it in a single voice. There are different ideas. Last week during the 'Future of the Union Forum'...President Kwaśniewski emphasised a Europe of nation states. Different views and different accents are appearing in relation to various issues – it is precisely for this reason that the Polish delegates to the Convention should be regularly in touch with each other...Unfortunately, we did not meet before the start of the discussions. ⁸⁴⁸

The *SLD* hence did not develop a clear vision of the kind of 'Europe' the Constitution should establish. 'Europe of Nation States' appeared to imply an inter-governmentalist model, closer to the 'Europe of Nations' favoured by the AWS than to the federalist union which the *SLD* had supported in the late 1990s. However, neither Kwaśniewski nor the *SLD* specified exactly how a 'Europe of Nation States' could be established nor how it would alter existing EU policies and procedures. Oleksy meanwhile, appeared to waver between support for a federalist and an intergovernmental approach throughout convention talks. ⁸⁴⁹

It eventually became clear that the *Invocatio Dei* would not be included in the constitutional preamble. Following eighteen months of talks the first draft of the constitution was completed in May 2003. The preamble included a brief reference to religion but made no mention of Christianity. Europe, it stated, inherited 'cultural, religious and humanist values' which have 'embedded within the life of

⁸⁴⁸ Sławomir Kamiński, 'Wizji Jeszcze Nie Mamy' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.50, 28 February 2002, p6.

⁸⁴⁹ A. Schrijvers, 'Poland and the EU Constitutional Convention', in Central European History and the European Union. The Meaning of Europe., ed. S. J. Kirschbaum (Basingstoke 2007), p200.

society the central role of the human person and his or her inviolable and inalienable rights, and respect for law'.⁸⁵⁰

As could be expected, both the Episcopate and the opposition parties were disappointed with the draft constitution. Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek commented: 'I believe that the omission of a reference to Christianity in the European Constitution would be a great error. I cannot imagine how one can refer to European history and tradition but forget about Christianity. Europe is two thousand years of Christianity.'⁸⁵¹

Senator Wittbrodt was equally displeased with the draft. He stated:

I am disappointed. I will further strive for the inclusion of the statement drafted by me and the European Christian Democrats to be included in the final version of the constitution: 'The Union's values include the values of both those who believe in God as a source of truth, justice, goodness and beauty, as those who do not share this faith but who respect universal values deriving from other sources'.⁸⁵²

The *SLD* however, felt that the draft was a success. Danuta Hubner stated: 'We expected that the preamble will be somewhat more similar to the preamble of the Polish constitution. It is good however, that this first proposed draft makes a reference to religious values. For me this draft is acceptable'.⁸⁵³

Poland's observer status at the Convention meant that it had limited influence on the contents on the Constitution in that, unlike representatives of the existing member states, they would not be able to formally veto the agreed text. While the

⁸⁵⁰ Preamble to the 'Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe'. Adopted by consensus by the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003 submitted to the President of the European Council in Rome on 18 July 2003 (<http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf>, last accessed 25 June 2006).

⁸⁵¹ 'Obraza', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.125, 30 May 2003.

⁸⁵² *Ibid.*

⁸⁵³ *Ibid.*

Church was very vocal in its calls for the *Invocatio Dei*, it was aware from early on that Wittbrodt's proposal was unlikely to succeed. Bishop Pieronek later claimed that Wittbrodt himself did not believe a reference to Christianity would be included in the preamble. 'There was no chance of this. Wittbrodt was forthright in telling us that [the proposal] would not succeed. The *SLD* were not. They did not tell us that there was no chance of this happening',⁸⁵⁴ Pieronek stated.

The Polish debate on the European constitution was hence dominated by the subject of religion. While some practical issues, such as the number of votes Poland would have in the Council of Ministers, were eventually addressed, the discussion was limited to symbolic concerns to do with Catholic values and did not address future policies or the decision making structure of the EU.

The accession referendum campaign

The question of when and by what means the accession treaty would be ratified was a frequent point of discussion during the final two years of the pre-accession process. *SLD-UP* cabinet saw numerous proposals to hold an early referendum either on the subject of accession itself⁸⁵⁵ or the most contentious negotiation topics such as the sale of land to foreigners.⁸⁵⁶ Most were instigated by the League of Polish Families but often supported by parliamentarians from euro-sceptic parties such as Self Defence, *PiS* and *PSL*. The *SLD*, which opposed the proposals, claimed they aimed to derail accession given that Polish legislation prohibited a referendum on the same subject to be held more than once every 4 years.⁸⁵⁷

There was consensus among all major parties that the final decision on accession should be made by means of a nationwide referendum. In February 2003 the *sejm* agreed to hold the referendum over the space of two days to encourage turnout

⁸⁵⁴ Interview with Tadeusz Pieronek, 25 July 2005.

⁸⁵⁵ e.g.: LPR led proposal of 30/11/2001, druk nr 114.

⁸⁵⁶ M. Jabłoński, *Polskie Referendum Akcesyjne* (Wrocław 2007), p237.

⁸⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p235.

and the referendum was scheduled for the 7th and 8th of June 2003. The parliamentarians also agreed on the following referendum question:

Do you agree for the President of the Polish Republic to ratify the international agreement of April 16 2003 'The Treaty between Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Spain, the Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, Portugal, Sweden, Great Britain and Italy (member states of the European Union) regarding the accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, the Polish Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia to the European Union'?

Most groupings did not raise objections to the proposed wording. *Samoobrona* proposed that the phrase 'on negotiated conditions' be included while the *LPR* suggested that the question should include President Kwaśniewski's name. Neither proposal was accepted.

The *sejm* also set the rules for the referendum campaign. Access to public media was granted to political groupings that attained at least 3% of the vote in the September 2001 elections if they competed as individual parties or at least 6% if they competed as coalitions. Parliamentary clubs set up on the basis of electoral committees, such as *Platforma Obywatelska*, for example, were also granted media access. Non-governmental organisations could make use of publicly owned media (such as the *Telewizja Polska* television channels) if they registered at least one year before the referendum. No limitations were placed on the participation of NGOs financed by foreign sources. The timing of the referendum coincided with the campaign for local elections hence offering the parties an additional forum to gather support from local voters.

Prior to the referendum campaign, information about the EU was provided by the Centre for European Information, based at the Secretariat of the Committee for European Integration. An information campaign managed by Jerzy Wiatr,

Government Plenipotentiary for European Union Information, was also run in 2002. But the campaign was criticised as ineffective and the numerous government bodies it involved, ranging from the Public Television to Agency of Rural Development failed to coordinate their efforts.⁸⁵⁸

In January 2003 Lech Nikolski was appointed as minister without portfolio and charged with developing the government's pre-referendum campaign and coordinating the relevant institutions. Nikolski did not want to 'inform for the sake of providing information'.⁸⁵⁹ The *SLD* needed a 'yes' vote and the campaign aimed to attain this. His main concern was turnout. According to opinion polls popular support for accession was well above 60% and hence sufficiently high for the government to be confident of a 'yes' vote. Even with the referendum spread out over two days, however, it was still not certain whether over 50% of the electorate would take part.⁸⁶⁰

The pre-referendum campaign used a number of different channels to disseminate information including a national helpline as well as a local information campaign. A CD, containing the text of the Accession Treaty, national anthems of Poland and the EU as well as a description of the structure and functioning of the Union, was sent to all Polish homes and attached to major newspapers. The content of the CD was promotional in nature, emphasizing the benefits of the structural funds for Poland as a whole and detailing benefits of accession for individuals such as including the right to work abroad, the transition period on the sale of land and the future introduction of the Euro.⁸⁶¹

The Poles were hence presented with a large amount of information about the EU. But the campaign shed little light on how policy and legislative matters impacting

⁸⁵⁸ Piasecki, p59-60.

⁸⁵⁹ Interview with Lech Nikolski, 22 July 2005.

⁸⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁸⁶¹ Jabłoński, *Polskie Referendum Akcesyjne*, p270.

the Polish citizens would be decided in the new EU. It emphasized the economic benefits of membership such as funding from the structural and common agricultural policies and the right to work abroad. The information CD did not however, include a clear, transparent explanation of the EU's decision making structures. Nor did it address the extent of national competences that would be transferred to them as a result of a yes vote in the accession referendum. Given the complex nature of the EU providing such an explanation would not have been an easy task. But it seems that the authors did not even try to present such an explanation, choosing instead to focus on the economic benefits⁸⁶².

The *SLD*'s key opponents in the referendum campaign were the *Liga Polskich Rodzin*, *Samoobrona*, smaller right wing organisations such as the *Ruch Odbudowy Polski* and the *Unia Polityki Realnej*, as well as the anti-integrationist wing of the Catholic Church. Supporters of a 'no' vote could also be found among the *SLD*'s coalition partner, the *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*. There were occasions when *PSL* and *SLD* representatives stood on opposing sides during local debates.⁸⁶³ In the Lublin region for example, Nikolski clashed with the *PSL*'s Zdzisław Podkański, who opposed accession on the grounds that it would lead to the sale of land to foreigners. Moreover, the *PSL*'s electorate remained sceptical. According to a poll carried out of *PSL*'s website 55% of the party's supporters were opposed to accession on the basis of the conditions negotiated in Copenhagen, with only 43% declaring support.⁸⁶⁴ But the majority of *PSL* politicians supported EU membership and strove to explain its benefits to their rural electorate. Adam Tański for example, the *PSL*'s Minister for Agriculture, emphasised the importance of explaining to farmers that the EU was not anti-Christian. During a seminar on Polish agriculture and the EU in April 2003 he stated:

⁸⁶² Ibid.

⁸⁶³ Interview with Lech Nikolski, 22 July 2005.

⁸⁶⁴ Piasecki, p57.

During the pre-referendum campaign it should be stressed that the European Union is not an anti-Christian organization...we know that the views of local religious leaders have a lot of influence on the farmers, even though they often contradict the views of Bishops. There has to be an answer to this. Institutions which organize the pre-referendum campaign should make clear that the Union is not anti-Christian, that it was set up by Christian politicians.⁸⁶⁵

The *PSL*'s leader, Jarosław Kalinowski, also frequently expressed support for accession and the Agrarians' official stance was to support EU membership, albeit on the basis of 'hard negotiations, the protection of Polish land and the defence of Polish agriculture', as one *PSL* leaflet stated.⁸⁶⁶

The other agrarian party, *Samoobrona*, campaigned for a 'no' vote. In a leaflet entitled 'The European Union? The Choice is Yours' it stated: 'We never opposed a common, strong and united Europe. We say NO to a European Union based on the negotiated conditions, which will further deepen the financial, economic and social crisis'.⁸⁶⁷ The leaflet claimed that upon joining the EU, Poland would become a net payer to the EU's budget, half of its small and medium sized enterprises would fail and 60% of its steel and mining industry would be dismantled. It further argued that the agriculture, fisheries and food industry would collapse, energy and food prices would increase and unemployment levels would reach more than 20%. Consequently, *Samoobrona* argued, poverty levels would rise, the 'remainder of the national capital would be sold or stolen' and 'our land, woods and forests would for centuries pass into foreign hands'.⁸⁶⁸

⁸⁶⁵ 'UE nie jest antychrześcijańska' *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.96, 24 April 2003, p4.

⁸⁶⁶ *PSL* pre-referendum leaflet, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, European integration folder.

⁸⁶⁷ *Samoobrona* pre-referendum leaflet, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, European integration folder.

⁸⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

Mixed messages about accession could be heard from the Catholic Church meanwhile. The Polish Pope, John Paul II, presented a consistent stance of support throughout the campaign.⁸⁶⁹ His appeal in support of accession on May 19th 2003 was particularly influential to the final, enthusiastically pro-integrationist outcome of the referendum. Interpreted as an unequivocal statement of support for membership by 79% of respondents to a subsequent CBOS study it proved to be the strongest argument in favour of accession for 52% of those voting 'yes'.⁸⁷⁰

But the Church was far from united throughout the referendum campaign. Although formally the Polish Episcopate supported EU membership there were marked divisions among the Bishops and priests, several of whom were vocally critical of accession. They included Bishop Edward Frankowski of Sandomierz⁸⁷¹ and Henryk Jankowski, a priest in Gdańsk, who presented an exposition of Christ laying down, surrounded by EU emblems underneath the slogan: 'No to a Union without God'.⁸⁷² Others however, such as Józef Życiński, Tadeusz Gocławski, Henryk Muszyński and Tadeusz Pieronek frequently made statements in support for EU membership.

While the Vatican and the reluctant Polish episcopate declared support for accession the radical-Catholic right campaigned against EU membership. Father Rydzyk and his nationalist, staunchly religious Radio Maryja movement was a key player in this campaign. As the schism between the pro-integrationist Episcopate and the anti-accession Radio Maryja deepened, Rydzyk gained support among Polish Catholics. According to an opinion poll quoted in *Wprost* in September 2002, as many as 10% of Poles agreed with all of Father Rydzyk's teachings and 17% did not see any discrepancy between his teachings and those of the Polish Catholic

⁸⁶⁹ Piasecki., p64.

⁸⁷⁰ Jabłoński, Polskie Referendum Akcesyjne, p 273.

⁸⁷¹ Gazeta Wyborcza, 11.03.03 p.2 quoted in Piasecki, p64.

⁸⁷² Ibid, p64.

Church.⁸⁷³ Apart from the anti-integrationist rhetoric of the *Radio Maryja* radio channel itself, the movement used *Nasz Dziennik*, its daily newspaper, to run a series of anti-accession ads. These featured such slogans as 'Where norms are god – the European Union',⁸⁷⁴ 'the teacher in the kindergarten told us that if we do not convince grandpa and grandma to accession we will not get any toys' illustrated with a picture of young children,⁸⁷⁵ and 'he is not conforming to the norms of the union – he is an enemy of the people'.⁸⁷⁶ Colourful but devoid of humour, the ads implied the EU was just another incarnation of Soviet-style totalitarianism.

Like the radical wing of the Church, *Liga Polskich Rodzin* vehemently opposed the 'yes' vote. The threat of legalised abortion lay at the heart of the LPR's opposition to the EU. It argued that the EU's pro-abortion ideology led to the 'death of European nations' and collapse of Christian values. In a leaflet entitled: 'Threatened Life, Threatened Land', it stated:

Liga Polskich Rodzin condemns the resolution of the European Parliament calling for the legalization of abortion by all candidate states. With this resolution the European Parliament has shown its true, inhumane face. This is yet another example of the spreading of the ideology of the European Union, which brings moral degeneration and a civilisation of death. While European nations are dying out, European Union decision makers call for an even greater reduction to population growth. This means a slow death of the nations of Europe and the collapse of its culture and Christian values. Under the guise of 'responsibility' and 'conscious planning' not only the killing of unborn children is planned but in the longer perspective also the acceptance of sexual deviations.⁸⁷⁷

⁸⁷³ Bogusław Mazur, 'Rozłam w Kościele' *Wprost*, nr.1033, 15 September 2002; Piasecki, 2005, p64.

⁸⁷⁴ *Nasz Dziennik*, nr.127(1623), 2 June 2003.

⁸⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁸⁷⁷ *Liga Polskich Rodzin* pre-referendum leaflet, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, European Integration Folder.

According to the *LPR*, EU membership would lead to sexual deviation, abortion on demand and a general collapse of Poland's value system. Apart from destroying Polish morality, the League also claimed accession would impoverish the Poles. Its leaflet asked: 'In the long run, who do you think will stay in farming: you, Polish farmers, or the German farmer, the French one, or any other one within the EU?'⁸⁷⁸ The *LPR* also claimed that Poland would be a net payer into the EU's budget. It based this assertion on the assumption that accession would decrease Treasury income by 3 billion zlotys per year. Its programme did not explain, however, how this number was calculated.

Another contributor to the no-campaign was a coalition of three small right wing parties: *Ruch Odbudowy Polski*, *Porozumienie Polskie*, and *Solidarność Rolnicza*. In a statement issued on 16 April 2003 they declared:

The Accession Treaty signed today on behalf of Poland by Prime Minister Leszek Miller and negotiated by his government contains fundamental errors and proposals disadvantageous for Poland. It will be disadvantageous for Poland and for the Polish nation, its implementation will consolidate economic underdevelopment and threatens to deepen the socio-economic crisis.⁸⁷⁹

The three groupings called for the 'protection of the family and morality' from the EU. Their main concerns about accession were supremacy of EU law over the Polish constitution, the sale of land in the Recovered Territories to foreigners and the introduction of abortion and euthanasia.⁸⁸⁰ They also argued that the agreements concerning the fisheries and steel industries were disadvantageous for Poland, as were demands to break down trade agreements with CEFTA and the USA. 'For these reasons' they concluded 'we believe that the Accession Treaty acts

⁸⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁷⁹ *Ruch Odbudowy Polski*, *Porozumienie Polskie* and *Solidarność Rolnicza* pre-referendum leaflet, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, European Integration Folder.

⁸⁸⁰ Ibid.

against Polish interests and precludes an equal agreement between the states and nations of Europe, which we support'.⁸⁸¹

Another anti-accession grouping, the *Liga Polityki Realnej*, produced a leaflet outlining 100 reasons why Poland should not accede to the 'Great Socialist European Republic'.⁸⁸² *UPR*'s concerns about accession, which was described as the 'anschluss', included the propagation of bureaucracy, homosexuality and euthanasia. Its leaflet compared the EU to the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany and described it as 'anti-civilisational'. Like other anti-integrationist opposition groupings, *UPR*, used the pre-referendum campaign to express its opposition to both the EU and to the current government. A poster featuring Leszek Miller, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Danuta Hubner, Leszek Balcerowicz, and Jacques Santer stated: 'say no to them'. For the anti-integrationist parties, the no vote was as much about opposing the communist-successor government as about opposing accession.⁸⁸³

Prawo i Sprawiedliwość reluctantly supported the yes vote.⁸⁸⁴ It stated:

The basic rationale concerning Poland's national security speaks in support of taking the risk of confronting the unsatisfactory social and economic accession conditions. The accession of Poland and of other Central and East European nations to the Union entails a re-integration of Europe, divided as a result of World War II and of Soviet expansion. We are a great European nation. Poland hence has a particular responsibility to participate in and influence the evolution of our continent. Polish historical experience, spiritual and cultural wealth can produce a significant contribution to the building of a common Europe. Integration with the Union presents us with an

⁸⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸⁸² Unia Polityki Realnej, pre-referendum leaflet, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, European integration folder.

⁸⁸³ Ruch Odbudowy Polski, Porozumienie Polskie and Solidarność Rolnicza pre-referendum leaflet, Archiwum Partii Politycznych, European Integration Folder.

⁸⁸⁴ Piasecki, p57, Szczerbiak, 'After the Election, Nearing the Endgame: the Polish Euro-debate in the Run up to the 2003 Accession Referendum'.

opportunity of undertaking a fight for the respect which Poland deserves, for the importance of Poland both in Europe and globally.⁸⁸⁵

Although *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* did not believe the accession conditions were favourable, it was nonetheless willing to support EU membership on the grounds that it would strengthen Poland's geopolitical position.

Unia Wolności's enthusiastically pro-accession campaign contrasted sharply with *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*'s calculated support. 'I love Union.E' read UW stickers and a poster proclaimed 'This is your ticket to Europe'. ⁸⁸⁶ Władysław Frasyniuk, the leader of the UW asked 'Do you love Union.E? Express your feelings on the 7th and 8th of June. Do not miss this opportunity!'⁸⁸⁷ Another poster, which showed people kissing inside a double sleeping bag, read: 'It's better to be in'.⁸⁸⁸ In contrast to the moralising threats of the 'no' campaign, the *Unia Wolności* presented the EU as modern and desirable. Its campaign attempted to bring down the barriers between the Catholic, conservative anti-integrationists and the atheist, liberal supporters of accession. A poster featuring a smiling priest stated: 'Polish, Catholic, European' and another showed a young woman proclaiming: 'Polish, Atheist, Euro-enthusiast'.⁸⁸⁹ Another slogan read: 'Poland in Europe: logical'.⁸⁹⁰ Like its opponents at Radio Maryja, the Freedom Union appealed to the voters on an emotional level, presenting a humorous alternative to their conservative rhetoric but also not addressing the implications of EU membership for the Polish political system and its economy.

⁸⁸⁵ Jarosław Kaczyński, 'Silna Polska w Europie', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, European integration folder.

⁸⁸⁶ *Unia Wolności* pre-referendum leaflet, 2003, European Integration Folder, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences.

⁸⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid.

Unia Pracy was similarly enthusiastic. One of its leaflets stated: '*Unia Pracy* is not a party which believes in miracles. We believe in freedom, choices, an independent viewpoint and tolerance. This is guaranteed by the European Union'.⁸⁹¹ The Citizens' Platform meanwhile attempted to kill two birds with one stone, encouraging referendum attendance and criticising the Miller cabinet at the same time: 'Indifference is the greatest threat to the success of the European referendum', its leaflet stated. 'The result is not yet certain! It seems that the Poles have left the promotion of the Union to the incompetent government...Wake up! Wake up others!' the *PO* proclaimed.⁸⁹²

The *SLD*'s pre-referendum campaign combined support for accession with affirmations that EU membership would not threaten the Polish economy and national identity. When they defined the *SLD*'s campaign strategy in January 2003, Lech Nikolski, the minister in charge of the campaign, and President Kwaśniewski agreed that the key to a successful campaign lay in preventing the 'no' vote supporters from 'taking patriotism away from us'.⁸⁹³ The *SLD*'s slogan stated: 'Yes for Poland', emphasising that the communist-successors put Polish interests above European ones. During the campaign the *SLD* frequently rebuffed claims that accession would endanger Polish national identity and sovereignty. 'The European Union is not a United States of Europe, nor is it a super state with a capital in Brussels' one leaflet stated.⁸⁹⁴ Another assured the voters that the Union could not ban the teaching of religion from schools and provided them with a list of European saints. In the publication 'Poland in the European Union - YES!' the *SLD* stated:

⁸⁹¹ *Unia Pracy* pre-referendum leaflet, 2003, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, European integration folder.

⁸⁹² Platforma Obywatelska pre-referendum leaflet, 2003, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, European integration folder.

⁸⁹³ Interview with Lech Nikolski, 22 July 2005.

⁸⁹⁴ 'Polska w Unii Europejskiej - TAK', Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, European integration folder.

No one is forcing us to accede to the European Union. We know however, that entering this great family of the nations of Europe will be beneficial for our country, our economy, society and especially for future generations...In Copenhagen we negotiated the best possible conditions and the best among all the other candidate states; conditions which guarantee an equal partnership for Poland from the first moments of membership.⁸⁹⁵

The referendum resulted in a 77.5% vote of support for accession. The proposal to hold the referendum over two days proved beneficial for the turnout, which reached only 17.6% on the 7th of July but rose to a total of 59% on the 8th. Following treaty ratification in other member states, Poland joined the European Union on 1 May 2004.

One could argue that such a resounding vote of support for accession provided the democratic legitimacy required for a decision as important for Poland as accession to the European Union. As Polish legal scholar Jabłoński points out⁸⁹⁶, from a legal perspective, the referendum served to guarantee adequate legitimization for accession. As such, it legally absolved the ruling elites from responsibility for accession and the terms on which it took place, he also points out. But legitimizing accession by means of the referendum was problematic for several reasons.

Firstly, the electorate was being asked to legitimize a complex and lengthy harmonization process that was already largely complete at the time of referendum. EU membership required wide ranging adaptation measures to be implemented before accession that could no longer be reversed regardless of whether Poland acceded or not. As discussed in chapters 3 and 4, by the time of the referendum Poland had already undergone an extensive harmonization

⁸⁹⁵ 'Unia bez tajemnic', p5, Political Parties Archive, Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, European integration folder.

⁸⁹⁶ M. Jabłoński. Polskie Referendum Akcesyjne. (Wrocław 2007), p14.

process initiated as early as 1991 with the legislative and policy changes required by the Association Treaty.

Secondly, as McManus-Czubińska points out, rather than unequivocally supporting immediate accession 54% of those polled in an OPOB study would have preferred to accede 'at some more favorable time in the future' whereas only 25% wished to join immediately.⁸⁹⁷ Most of those who voted in favour of membership therefore did not agree with the timing of accession.

Lastly, polls from both CBOS and Eurobarometer taken shortly before the referendum reflected low levels of information about accession among the Polish public. According to a Eurobarometer May 2003 study 4% of Poles felt they were not at all informed about accession, 40% 'not very well informed' and 48% described themselves as 'well informed'.⁸⁹⁸ Although respondents did not feel well informed about accession a large majority were either 'very' or at least 'a little' interested in it. Whereas 18% of respondents in an April 2003 CBOS study declared themselves to be 'very interested' in accession and as many as 53% 'a little' interested⁸⁹⁹ only 11% felt they were well informed about it.⁹⁰⁰

Why did so many Poles vote in support for accession in spite of their limited understanding of what it entailed and preference for it to be delayed? According to a February CBOS study the majority of respondents expected accession to be beneficial for themselves as well as their country and its economy. 32% of respondents expected for accession to benefit themselves personally, compared to 28% who expected to lose out. 42% expected accession to benefit Poland as a

⁸⁹⁷ C. McManus-Czubińska, 'The Misuse of Referendums in Post-Communist Europe', in *The Quality of Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*, ed. D. a. K. Hutcheson, Elena (London and New York 2006).

⁸⁹⁸ Eurobarometer CC-EB 2003.2 Public Opinion in the Candidate Countries, Fieldwork: May 2003, Publication: June 2003.

⁸⁹⁹ CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, April 2003.

⁹⁰⁰ CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, April 2003, see also Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 'Polacy i Parlament Europejski. Postawy Polaków wobec polskich i europejskich instytucji demokratycznych', (Warsaw 2001), p6.

whole, as opposed to only 31% who felt it would not.⁹⁰¹ Although most expected prices for household goods to rise as many as 47% believed accession would benefit the private sector, compared to 22% expecting it to be disadvantageous for this sector. Overall, 50% felt accession would benefit the Polish economy while 28% felt it would not. The farming industry was perceived as the biggest loser of EU membership with 27% of respondents expecting benefits compared to 49% expecting losses.⁹⁰²

Similar results were shown in a Eurobarometer study carried out one month later, in May 2003. Although 61% of respondents described accession as a 'good thing' and 53% felt it would bring more advantages than disadvantages to Poland as a whole only 40% expected it to bring more advantages than disadvantages to themselves personally.⁹⁰³ While both studies show majority support for accession they also underscore that most respondents expected accession to bring greater benefits for Poland as a whole rather than for themselves as individuals. Indeed, according to Eurobarometer less than 50% of respondents felt accession would benefit them personally. Expectations of improved economic growth hence appear to have been a key determinant of support for EU membership.

The studies also brought to light strikingly high levels of trust in EU institutions. In May 2003 as many as 63% of Eurobarometer's Polish respondents stated they trusted the EU while only 17% did not (20% were not sure).⁹⁰⁴ Such high levels of trust contrasted sharply with increasingly low levels of public trust in Polish domestic institutions. As Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, director of the Institute of Public Affairs, has pointed out, only between 12% and 16% of Poles declared they

⁹⁰¹ B. Roguska, 'Polska Droga do Unii Europejskiej', in Polska, Europa, Świat. Opinia Publiczna w Okresie Integracji, ed. K. a. S. Zagorski, Michał (Warszawa 2005), p27.

⁹⁰² Ibid, p29.

⁹⁰³ Eurobarometer CC-EB 2003.2 Public Opinion in the Candidate Countries, Fieldwork: May 2003, Publication: June 2003.

⁹⁰⁴ Ibid, p17.

trusted the fundamental democratic institutions in Poland whereas only 7% believed that the national political institutions function effectively.⁹⁰⁵

CBOS studies have shown that public confidence in the parliament (*sejm*) decreased from 44 percent in 1998 to 20 percent in June 2002.⁹⁰⁶ Moreover, the belief that government officials represented the interests of the citizens weakened significantly throughout the pre-accession period. In 1993, only 19 percent of respondents claimed that the councillors represented their own interests but in 2002, this figure grew to 29 percent.⁹⁰⁷ In 1993, 22 percent of respondents stated that people got involved in politics out of willingness to help others. In 2002 only 6% were of the same opinion. As many as 89 percent of respondents thought that members of parliament represented their own interests or those of their parliamentary clubs, and only 8 percent disagreed with this statement.⁹⁰⁸ Most favoured EU institutions when compared to Polish ones. When they were asked to compare Polish institutions with those of the EU the majority of respondents in a 2001 Institute of Public Affairs study felt that EU institutions were closer to the public, more honest and more worked more effectively than Polish ones.⁹⁰⁹

Not only was public trust in Polish democratic institutions significantly lower than in European ones but there was an expectation that Polish institutions would improve with EU membership. In February 2003 40% of CBOS respondents expected accession to have a positive effect on the functioning of the Polish

⁹⁰⁵ Unia – szansa na reforme, Państwa', interview with Lena Kolarska -Bobińska, *Gazeta Wyborcza* (Warsaw) 3 August 2003, quoted in W. Sadurski, 'Accession's Democracy Dividend: the Impact of EU Enlargement upon Democracy in the New Member States of Central and Eastern Europe.', *European Law Journal*, 10, 4 (2004), 371-401. p373.

⁹⁰⁶ Opinions on the Functioning of Public Institutions (Warsaw, Poland: CBOS, June 2002)., in Kolarska Bobińska, *East European Politics and Societies*, p.93 *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pages 91-98.

⁹⁰⁷ My Village—Opinions prior to the Self-Government Elections (Warsaw, Poland: CBOS, February 2002) in L. Kolarska-Bobińska, 'The EU Accession and Strengthening of Institutions in East Central Europe: The Case of Poland', *East European Politics and Societies*, 17, 1 (2003), 91-98.

⁹⁰⁸ Psychological Portrayals of Party Electorates (Warsaw, Poland: CBOS June 2002), Public Opinion on Politics and the Motives of the Politicians' Actions (Warsaw, Poland: CBOS, May 1992) quoted in L. Kolarska-Bobińska, 'The EU Accession and Strengthening of Institutions in East Central Europe: The Case of Poland', see also *Instytut Spraw Publicznych*.

⁹⁰⁹ *Instytut Spraw Publicznych*, p5.

political system⁹¹⁰. A 2001 Institute of Public Affairs study found that 48% felt that accession would benefit the functioning of the parliament and local government, 54% that it would improve that of the cabinet, the public service and the judiciary.

⁹¹¹ There was also a strong correlation between the expectation that accession would benefit Poland's political institutions and the intention to participate in the accession referendum; approximately 80% of those intending to vote in the referendum also expected accession to improve the functioning of these institutions. ⁹¹²

In summary, the Polish public had limited expectations of personal gain from accession but they did expect EU membership to benefit Poland as a whole, and especially its economy. Also, a significant proportion of those who voted in favour of accession appear to have done so at least partly out of an expectation of improvement in the functioning of Poland's political institutions.

Was the Polish public justified in this expectation? Would accession bring with it less corrupt, more trustworthy political institutions? In some respects EU regulations certainly contributed to greater transparency and accountability of public institutions. The introduction of the EU's strict rules on the quality of the judicial process, its anti-discrimination measures and the possibility of referral of a case against public bodies to the European Court of Justice improved the checks and balances in place to protect civil liberties. But, as several scholars of European integration have pointed out,⁹¹³ accession also significantly limits the powers of national parliaments, shifting decision making powers from the directly elected legislative to the executive. While it tightens measures against corruption among

⁹¹⁰ Roguska, 'Polska Droga do Unii Europejskiej', p35.

⁹¹¹ Instytut Spraw Publicznych, p5.

⁹¹² Ibid, p6.

⁹¹³ Grabbe, 'How does Europeanisation affect CEE governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity', Jabłoński, Polskie Referendum Akcesyjne, Sadurski.

elected representatives therefore EU membership also diminishes the extent to which voters can influence policy.

According to Jabłoński, *sejm* and senate jointly lost 60% total legislative competences, and as much as 80% with regards to economic issues.⁹¹⁴ The *sejm* did retain some involvement in decision making but this was mostly consultative. The Council of Ministers was obliged to inform the parliament about a range of documents including draft EU legislation and international agreements, Council decisions and plans of work of the Council, Commission and European Parliament as well as other documents that may have bearing on the EU's legislative process such as white and green papers and Commission communiqués.⁹¹⁵ But apart from items falling under unanimous voting in the Council or those significantly impacting the Polish budget the Polish Council of Ministers is entitled to formulate its stance without taking the Polish parliament's opinion into account⁹¹⁶.

The transfer of decision making competences that took place as part of accession has hence been two-fold. Firstly, competences were transferred from the level of national legislative to the national executive, which represents Poland in the Council of Ministers, the body with the strongest legislative powers in the EU. Secondly, competences with regards to any decisions made on the basis of non-veto voting were transferred away from the Polish legislative to the Polish executive. All in all, the individual voter had much less visibility, understanding and influence on most of the policies and laws affecting them. Far from improving the functioning of democracy in the aspiring member states therefore, accession appears to have diminished it, by shifting power from directly elected parliamentarians to an indirectly appointed executive⁹¹⁷. Matters were made even

⁹¹⁴ Jabłoński, Polskie Referendum Akcesyjne, p275.

⁹¹⁵ Ibid, p277-278.

⁹¹⁶ Ibid, p278.

⁹¹⁷ Grabbe, 'How does Europeanisation affect CEE governance? Conditionality, Diffusion and Diversity'.

worse by the fact that the Polish *sejm* lacked access to appropriate expertise to enable it to form quality opinions on the wide range of EU legislation it is informed about.⁹¹⁸

Given the above shortcomings of democratic representation within the EU it is surprising that so many Poles would have expected EU membership to improve the functioning of Polish political institutions. The low levels of knowledge about the EU may form part of an explanation as to why the public believed a process that transfers power away from the electorate to be beneficial for political institutions. Perhaps the Poles' levels of trust in Polish parliamentarians and institutions were so low that most perceived any transfer of power, and especially one to Western and 'democratic' decision makers as a potential improvement. A further explanation may lay in the over-all positive views of the EU. As Sadurski has suggested, Polish public and elite perceptions of the EU may be based on an 'inferiority-superiority' complex dynamic. While opponents of accession strove to prove that Poland was not 'worse' than its Western neighbours supporters of accession saw the West as a model that could be used to 'civilise' Poland, including its unruly, corrupt politicians.⁹¹⁹

CBOS studies confirm that the Poles did indeed have a lower opinion of themselves than of EU citizens. The majority considered Europeans to be more ambitious, confident, educated, cultured, hard working, honest, frugal, and friendly and extrovert than Poles⁹²⁰. On positive note the Poles did see themselves as more religious, patriotic, helpful and team oriented than their EU counterparts.⁹²¹ But over-all the CBOS studies confirm that Poles maintained a lower opinion of

⁹¹⁸ Sadurski, T. Raunio, 'Why European Integration Increases Leadership Autonomy within Political Parties?', *Party Politics*, 8, 4 (2002), 405-422.

⁹¹⁹ Sadurski, p.372, see also Törnquist-Plewa, 'The Complex of an Unwanted Child..'.

⁹²⁰ Roguska, 'Polska Droga do Unii Europejskiej'.

⁹²¹ Kolarska-Bobińska, Kucharczyk, Firlit and Roguska, 'Duchowienstwo Polskie Wobec Integracji z Unią Europejską', Roguska, 'Polska Droga do Unii Europejskiej'.

themselves as compared to their West European counterparts. There may have been an expectation among the Polish public that joining the EU would facilitate Poles becoming more 'European' i.e.: educated, hard working, cultured etc and that it may also have a similar effect on their political elites.

Conclusion

The 2001 parliament differed from all of its pre-accession predecessors in that it was the first to include a large anti-integrationist grouping: the League of Polish Families. For the first time voters who did not want Poland to enter the EU were able to choose a party that promised to guarantee this.

Although the *LPR* was the only party to explicitly oppose accession approximately 30% of seats, including of the *LPR*'s 8% was won by parties either explicitly opposed to EU membership or critical of the government's strategy of speedy accession, such as *Samoobrona*, *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* or the *Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*. The 2001 contest hence presented the voters with less ambiguous choices regarding European Integration than the previous parliamentary elections of the pre-accession period. Ambiguity about the implications of accession remained a part of the rhetoric however and the discussion continued to be carried out in largely symbolic, undefined terms. But the 'for and even against'⁹²² stance so prominent in the rhetoric of the ideologically multifarious Solidarity Electoral Action was no longer a part of the debate. Even at this late stage of the pre-accession process however, EU membership was not a key campaign topic for any of the major groupings and it was also not a decisive factor in most voters' electoral choices.

As could be expected, the programmes of the *LPR* and *Samoobrona* both proposed a range of policies at odds with accession requirements. The economic platforms of

⁹²² Kucharczyk, 'Za a Nawię Przeciw. Partie Polityczne Wobec Perspektywy Integracji w Wyborach 1997'.

parties such as *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* and *PSL* also contradicted the liberal EU conditionality. The programmes of the *SLD-UP* and that of the liberal *Platforma Obywatelska* meanwhile were better aligned with accession requirements.

The break-up of the *SLD-PSL* coalition once again underscored the fragility of coalitions formed on the basis of past association with the communist regime. While the leadership of the *PSL* supported EU membership many *PSL* parliamentarians did not, and the *PSL*'s scepticism contrasted sharply with Miller's pro-integrationist strategy. While individual parties were increasingly clear about their stance on accession therefore negotiating in-depth consensus within the coalition once again proved challenging.

The presence of the right wing, euro-sceptic groupings put concerns about morality and religion firmly on the parliamentary agenda and these topics dominated the final two years of the debate on Europe. The sale of land to foreigners, the threat of abortion and same sex marriage and most of all, the EU's perceived immoral and anti-Christian nature, dominated the discussion. In contrast, relatively little was said about the economic costs and benefits of EU membership, the EURO, the implications of the European Constitution on the EU's decision making processes and the extent of national competences liable to be transferred to Brussels. The uproar over the symbolic threat of Westerners 're-colonising' the Recovered Territories contrasted sharply with the way in which the political elites accepted the lengthy transition periods on the right to work in other member states. Limited elite knowledge about the EU was underscored by the misunderstanding about the European Parliament's 2002 recommendation for the liberalisation of abortion. Although the EP was only expressing its opinion about the desirability of abortion on demand, the Polish right wing groupings appeared to believe that it was in fact forcing member states to adopt legislation to this effect.

The impact of accession on Polish sovereignty, including the wide ranging transfer of competences away from Poland to the EU and the potential use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers to legislate against the preferences of Polish representatives did feature in the materials of anti-integrationist parties both during the 2001 election and in the referendum campaign.⁹²³ But concerns about accession effects on the quality of Poland's democracy and the empowerment of its electorate often became subsumed in an emotive nationalist rhetoric that placed diminishment of democratic representation alongside the threat of Teutonic invasions and the murder of the Christ of Nations. Parties that opposed or were highly sceptical of accession tended to be on the nationalist right of the political spectrum and appeared to be more concerned about the adverse impact of accession on the culture, sovereignty and national identity of the Polish nation and state as a whole, rather than the impact on the political choices available to individual citizens. Meanwhile, liberal and centre left groupings such as *Platforma Obywatelska*, *Unia Pracy* or the *SLD*, who could have been expected to address the impact of the democratic deficit on the choices available to individual voters did not address it.

The way in which accession would change Poland's political decision making powers was also markedly absent from the government sponsored pre-referendum campaign. Rather than provide objective information about the costs and benefits of accession, the explicit aim of the campaign was to convince the voters to ratify the membership treaty. Judging by the 77% vote in favour of EU membership the campaign was hence successful. But a more in-depth analysis of the voters' views about accession showed that support for membership was less enthusiastic than would at first appear. A large proportion of voters did not feel well informed about accession and most would have preferred to postpone it even though they

⁹²³ Interview with Jan Łopuszański, 14 July 2005.

voted in favour. The single most influential factor in the referendum choice was an appeal for support of accession by the Polish Pope.⁹²⁴

Lastly, the use of a referendum as a means to legitimize accession was problematic in itself. In the referendum the public was asked to legitimize a process of legislative and policy harmonization that started over a decade beforehand, and that was almost complete at the time of ratification (with the exception of the transition period on the few issues covered during negotiations). The question of how the harmonization process was legitimized and what choices were available to the Polish electorate throughout the pre-accession period will be addressed in the concluding chapter.

⁹²⁴ A. Szczerbiak, 'The June 2003 Polish EU Accession Referendum', p125.

Chapter 7 Conclusions

Almost twenty years have passed since the start of Poland's integration with the European Communities. Poland is now a fully fledged member of the European Union and the dream of 'returning to Europe' has become a reality for many Poles. The accession project appears to have been a great success. Economic growth averaged over 5% from 2004 to 2008 and continued even during the global recession when Poland was the only EU country to show positive GDP growth at 1.7% in 2008.⁹²⁵ Public support for EU membership has risen steadily since the accession referendum and now stands at 87%.⁹²⁶

But as this historical analysis has shown, sustaining consensus on EU association and membership proved problematic for a majority of political parties throughout the 14 year pre-accession period. The first section of this concluding chapter will review the continuities in the way parties sustained the nominal consensus on EU membership throughout the pre-accession period. It will also highlight the reasons why although opposition to EU membership was present among Polish elites for the entire period in question it was rarely heard in the parliament or government. The second section will consider the reasons why sustaining consensus on accession proved so challenging for the Polish elites. It will also address the implications of the problems Polish parties experienced in sustaining consensus for Poland and on other current and aspiring EU member states.

⁹²⁵ Eurostat, 'Growth rate of GDP volume - percentage change on previous year', <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsieb020>

⁹²⁶ E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, ed, 5 Years of Poland's Membership of the European Union in the Social Context (Warsaw 2009), CBOS Polish Public Opinion Report April 2010, http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2010/04_2010.pdf.

The continuing challenge of attaining consensus

The two main challenges parties faced at every stage of the pre-accession period had to do with reconciling accession conditionality with their existing electoral platforms and attaining consensus on integration policy within governing coalitions.

Regarding the alignment of conditionality with different policy platforms, right-wing groupings such as *ZChN*, *ROP*, Centre Accord, and *KPN* found it especially difficult to reconcile their support for accession with the loss of national independence inherent in the transfer of national competences to the EU.

Accession presented the nationalist right with a dilemma. Re-directing Polish foreign policy towards the West and establishing closer links with its Western neighbours (whilst severing those with Russia) was very much in line with their over-all ideological preferences. The transfer of key policy making competences, especially ones traditionally judged to be the domain of the sovereign state such as industrial, migration and monetary policy, did not, by contrast, sit easily with the right wing groupings' emphasis on Polish national independence. Nonetheless, neither *ZChN*, *ROP*, *KPN*, *PC*, or any of the other smaller right wing groupings presented a clear stance against the transfer of these competences to the EU.

Moreover, they also did not address the issue of the EU's democratic deficit. The increasing use of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers and the subsequent possibility that key policy decisions impacting Poland would be made against the will of its representatives were not addressed.

The right wing groupings did repeatedly raise concerns about the threat which the EU posed to both Polish sovereignty and national identity. But they did not address the specifics of how the EU posed such a threat either in terms of policy transfer or the democratic deficit. Instead, these groupings addressed the issue of accession impact on Polish sovereignty and identity in a more general and

emotional fashion. They reconciled the tension between the emphasis in their ideology on national independence and sovereignty and the adverse consequences accession would have on independence and sovereignty not by opposing accession, but by re-presenting the EU into something they could support. Paradoxically, they appeared to support accession to a European Union which did not exist: an international body of fully independent, sovereign nation states.

The EU's liberal approach to trade and the limitations it placed on the protection of domestic enterprise⁹²⁷ also became problematic for both the communist successor and Solidarity-successor elites. *ROP, KPN, ZChN, PSL, AWS* and initially also the *SLD*, all opposed the privatisation of telecommunications, energy and banking sectors, called for a more relaxed monetary policy or advocated increases in customs tariffs on EU products. This was in contravention of both the Association Agreement and the 1997 Accession Partnerships detailing the accession requirements. Both *SLD* and *AWS* struggled to reconcile support for accession with the implications its stringent economic restructuring requirements would have for their trade unionist support bases. Following increasing pressure from the EU, the unpopular reforms were pushed through in 1998 by the controversial Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz of the Freedom Union.

The second challenge parties experienced as they strove to sustain consensus on accession was that of establishing a common stance within ideologically heterogeneous coalitions. Accession was a key point of dissent within most coalition cabinets of the pre-accession period. Difficulties in presenting a consistent stance on the EU first became manifest during the government of Hanna Suchocka in 1992 which united the pro-accession liberals of the *Unia Demokratyczna* and *Liberal Democratic Congress* with the euro-sceptic *ZChN*. Marked tensions on the subject of Europe were also evident in both of the *SLD-PSL* coalitions and

⁹²⁷ M. Golonka, 'International Regimes and Credibility Problems: An Assessment of the Role Played by the EU in Locking in Polish Trade Policy Reform', in *International Relations*, (London 2003), p288.

accession was also an almost constant subject of disagreement within the AWS-Freedom Union partnership.

The fact that historic affiliation with the communist regime or opposition to it, rather than shared policy and ideological preferences, formed the basis of each of the above coalitions made the establishment of policy consensus on Europe, and on many other issues⁹²⁸, all the more problematic. The 1993-1997 and 2001-2003 governments united the euro-sceptic, conservative and interventionist *PSL* with the centre-left, liberal and euro-enthusiastic *SLD*. The 1997-2000 coalition meanwhile united Solidarity Electoral Action, several of whose most powerful member organisations were euro-sceptic or doubtful about accession, with the uncompromisingly euro-enthusiastic, liberal Freedom Union.

All pre-accession coalitions were built on the basis of shared pre-1989 heritage rather than shared policy preferences. As subsequent governments resorted to legitimizing their claims to power on symbolic, historical rhetoric so also individual policy issues had to be addressed in line with this symbolic rhetoric. The debate on Europe, and indeed all political debate, remained divorced from policy. Perhaps the most prominent example of this was the Solidarity Electoral Action. Unable to unite its ideologically diverse member organisations on the basis of shared policy preferences, the AWS resorted to the historic myth of Solidarity's struggle against the communist enemy. The implicit narrative was that the transition was unfinished since the reincarnated communists were still in power.⁹²⁹ Patriotic, Catholic, conservative Poland was mobilized against implicitly foreign, cosmopolitan, liberal and left wing Poland. The AWS' reconciled this stance with support for accession by re-inventing the EU into an organisation of 'fully independent member states' that did not impinge its members' independence.

⁹²⁸ A. Grzymala-Busse, 'Coalition Formation and the Regime Divide in New Democracies', *Comparative Politics*, 34, 1 (2001), 85-104.

⁹²⁹ W. Wesołowski, 'The formation of political parties in post-communist Poland', in *Stabilising Fragile Democracies: comparing party systems in Southern and Eastern Europe*, ed. G. Pridham (London 1996).

Although a rhetorical consensus was hence sustained throughout pre-accession parties its maintenance was a continuing challenge.

How did parties maintain the appearance of consensus in spite of the challenges it involved? How did several ideologically different governments maintain a pro-accession foreign policy and continue the harmonisation effort? What strategies did they use to reconcile their declared support for accession and policy proposals that went against accession requirements? And how did they present a common stance on accession in spite of the on-going disagreements it caused within governing and electoral coalitions?

What is perhaps most striking about Poland's party-political debate on accession is that while all major political players declared their support for accession, the ways in which they envisaged the kind of Europe Poland was acceding to were markedly different. Moreover, the parties did not address how different the 'Europes' they supported were. They also did not take into account the fact that the shape of the EU Poland aspired to join could only be influenced by its current, not aspiring, members. Instead, they continued to declare support for accession, but only as long as Poland acceded to a 'Social', 'Christian' or 'Liberal' Europe. Such rhetoric gave the appearance of a debate but the discussion lacked a common denominator: the different 'Europes' Polish parties supported were more of a reflection of domestic ideological preferences than of the EU itself. Consensus could be maintained only by prefixing 'Europe' with adjectives.

Several such constructs of 'Europe' can be distinguished. The neo-liberal, economically right wing groupings such as the Citizens' Platform as well as the Freedom Union and its predecessors Democratic Union advocated a 'Liberal Europe' whose economic conditionality became a convenient blue print for the laissez-faire approach to economic transition. Being so closely aligned with their

existing ideological and policy proposals, Liberal Europe proved useful for its proponents in legitimizing their economic agenda. Harsh reform was necessary, they argued, as without it Poland would not be able to 'return to Europe'.

The *SLD* supported a 'Social Europe' and a 'European Fatherland' – '*Europa Ojczyzna*', a play of words on the right wing's '*Europa Ojczyzn*' – 'Europe of Fatherlands', or the Europe of Nations. Proving their newly acquired democratic credentials was critical for the communist successors and an enthusiastically pro-integrationist stance played a key role in the *SLD*'s disavowal of its authoritarian, pro-Soviet past. 'Social Europe' was a tolerant, modern and, most importantly, democratic antithesis to the implicitly parochial, intolerant and anti-integrationist 'Europe of Nations'.

Meanwhile, 'Europe of Nations' was, above all, Christian. It was especially prominent in the rhetoric of the solidarity-successor right. AWS representatives, for example, frequently emphasised the 'Christian' roots of the continent and Poland's role in defending it from Eastern (i.e. un-Christian) invasion. The concerns of the AWS' euro-sceptic member organisations were assuaged by a rhetoric which implied that rather than allow accession to weaken Polish Catholicism, Poland would 're-evangelise' Europe, once again becoming the European 'Christ of Nations'.

Europe hence proved to be a useful means of re-invention, an instrument that could strengthen radical reform agendas, diffuse association with an unpopular past or provide an ideological umbrella for diverse political groupings. But the proponents of these different types of Europe did not address the fact that Poland did not have a say in the shape of the European Union to which it acceded and on the extent to which accession would impact Polish sovereignty. Even after accession Poland would only have a limited influence on the Christian, Social or otherwise nature of the EU. But the way in which political groupings presented

Europe suggested that the Europe Poland acceded to would become 'Christian', 'Social' or a 'Europe of Nations' as long as its proponents were elected to power. What the political rhetoric did not address was the non-negotiable nature of accession. EU membership required wide ranging, detailed and largely economically liberal policy adjustments that Poland had no choice but to implement if it wanted to accede. Supporting these requirements proved problematic for all parties but the liberals. Yet rather than reconcile the tensions between their ideological and policy proposals and accession conditionality, parties continued to express support for accession without reconciling its requirements with their electoral and policy proposals.

The abstract, symbolic nature of the Polish debate is not surprising given the complexity of the European Union and the Polish elites, at least initially understandable, limited knowledge about it. The ideal-type scenario, where parties completely align their policies with accession requirements is of course not a realistic one. It is, however, a valid benchmark against which to measure the quality of democratic choice that was available to the Polish public. A fully informed electorate presented with crystal clear choices is an ideal. But it does not follow that only because the European project is complex and open to interpretation the public should not be able to hold political elites to account about it. And in order to measure the quality of the choices available we must have a concept of what would be the most desirable scenario. As I have shown, the Polish case has been far from the ideal type.

The expressions of support for membership that a large majority of political parties continued to make throughout the pre-accession period gave the appearance of an elite consensus. But the way parties presented their stances on the EU proved so vague and had so little to do with the real policy implications of accession that no in-depth consensus could be put in place. As a result, the single biggest change Polish society experienced since 1989 was never really addressed in political

debate. The integration project was propelled forward not by in-depth consensus but by a series of rhetorical compromises which were the incidental result of coalition and electoral committee configurations. At each stage of the accession process the parties' inability to negotiate more than a nominal consensus prevented meaningful public debate. Support for accession was possible precisely because the implications of accession were not addressed.

Moreover, even this shallow, rhetorical consensus was not sustained across the entire political spectrum. More than marginal opposition to EU membership was present on the Polish political scene from very early on in the accession project. The fact that it was not heard in the *sejm* and that it did not impede the pro-accession foreign policy direction was more due to parliamentary representation thresholds and coalition configurations than due to the wide elite consensus in favour of membership that has so often been credited with the success of Poland's integration project.⁹³⁰

The first steps towards association and eventual membership in the European Communities were taken during the contract parliament by the liberal, pro-Western cabinet of Tadeusz Mazowiecki with support from the reformist wing of the *PZPR* and later its social democratic incarnation, *SdRP*. Politicians such as Henryk Goryszewski, Antoni Macierewicz and the Kaczyński brothers, who went on to form *Porozumienie Centrum* and *ZChN* that would call for a renegotiation of the Association Treaty, were not a part of Mazowiecki's cabinet. Even at this early stage, however, the *ZChN* was already sceptical about the 'sell-out' of Poland to Western powers by the liberals and communist-successors.⁹³¹

⁹³⁰ Grabbe and Hughes, 'Central and east European views on EU enlargement: political debates and public opinion', Los-Nowak, Jacoby, Vachudova.

⁹³¹ Henryk Goryszewski, quoted in Artur Domosławski, 'Tajemnica Goryszewskiego', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, nr.254, 17/18 October 1992, p6.

Scepticism about EC membership became increasingly salient following the challenging association negotiations and parties such as the Christian Nationalist Faction, Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland and the Centre Accord called for a re-negotiation of the Association treaty during the 1993 parliamentary campaign. But these parties' concerns were not heard in the 1993-7 *sejm* as they did not cross the newly introduced 5% parliamentary representation threshold. Instead, the *SLD-PSL* coalition was formed on the basis of fewer votes than those wasted on parties which did not cross the threshold.⁹³² The 1997 election enabled the euro-sceptic groupings to return to the *sejm*. But they were only able to cross the representation threshold and form part of the government under the ideologically heterogeneous umbrella of the *AWS*. Although the euro-sceptics formed a significant proportion of the Electoral Action they had to negotiate their stance on Europe with other, euro-enthusiastic member organisations within the *AWS* and with an uncompromisingly pro-integrationist coalition partner in the form of the Freedom Union. Similarly, the Polish Agrarian Faction, which also called for a re-negotiation of the association agreement, had to contend with the increasingly pro-integrationist *SLD*. It was hence only in 2001, when the vocally anti-integrationist *Liga Polskich Rodzin* gained almost 18% of the vote, that accession opponents were able to gather sufficient support to attain parliamentary representation without having to compromise with euro-enthusiastic colleagues. But doubts about and opposition to both association and EU membership had been present on the Polish political scene from the start of the accession project. The fact that they were infrequently heard in parliament was more due to strategic coalition considerations and electoral legislation than due to the existence of an elite consensus on accession.

⁹³² Dawisha, p268.

Causes and implications of the nominal consensus

Why did finding common ground on Europe prove so problematic for the Polish parties? And why did they have to resort to the uncomfortable exercise of rhetorically re-constructing the EU into something which had little to do with the organisation to which Poland was actually acceding?

The process of reconciling policy and ideological preferences both within individual parties and among electoral committee and coalition partners is part and parcel of political competition and a key element of the role political parties play in prioritizing and channelling public preferences. Establishing consensus on individual policies or ideological declarations is relatively simple in that in the case of most individual policies there is ample room for negotiation. Compromise on another policy issue, deemed of less importance by one of the negotiation partners, can often be attained. It may also be the case that electoral committee or coalition partners simply do not agree on a particular issue, but still as they share support for the majority of their other policy proposals disagreement on a one or a few individual policies is not detrimental to the coalition.

The accession project, however, was far more complex and wide ranging than most individual policy matters. Defining a stance on accession was very different from defining a stance on individual policy areas such as education or monetary policy for example⁹³³. The breadth of the *acquis* meant that establishing consensus on accession was more akin to establishing consensus on the future shape of the entire Polish state, ranging from national identity, foreign, economic and defence policy down to minutiae encompassing detailed health and safety or consumer protection regulations. Consequently, parties did not have the room for negotiation and

⁹³³ Sedelmeier.

compromise with regards to accession they would normally have when agreeing a common stance on individual policy matters.

The extent of accession conditionality hence limited political debate on the terms of accession.⁹³⁴ Moreover, Poland was presented with the EU's wide ranging requirements at a time when it had only recently discarded the failed communist model and had not yet defined its own. Association with the EC and adaptation of the strict norms started even before the first fully democratic election took place, and well before the Poland's nascent political parties were able to form sufficient links with different social groups for interest based political competition to evolve.

The velvet revolutions of 1989 united dissidents from diverse ideological backgrounds with a common goal of opposing the communist regime.⁹³⁵ Having ascended to power the nascent political elites were confronted with a policy and identity vacuum that was initially defined in negative terms of 'not communism'.⁹³⁶ They needed to rapidly rebuild the entire political and economic system in parallel to defining new, politically legitimate national identity narratives. The legislative vacuum enabled not only the en-masse adoption of the EU's wide ranging conditionality⁹³⁷ but also brought with it the need to reconcile the impact integration with the Union would have on Polish national identity and its newly regained national independence. As Törnquist-Plewa has pointed out, the Poles have historically struggled with adapting European models while dealing with the way in which Europe and the West challenged their traditional identity.⁹³⁸ As a model, the EU served a two-fold purpose. It was powerfully symbolic and promised the economic prosperity and accountable political institutions that the

⁹³⁴ Grzymala-Busse, 'Great Expectations'.

⁹³⁵ J. Rupnik, 'Eastern Europe: the International Context', *Journal of Democracy*, 11, 2 (2000), 115-129.

⁹³⁶ Przeworski, Adam, *Sustainable Democracy*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p3.

⁹³⁷ Jacoby.

⁹³⁸ B. Törnquist-Plewa, 'The Complex of an Unwanted Child: The Meanings of Europe in Polish Discourse', in *The Meaning of Europe*, ed. B. Strath and M. Malmborg, (Oxford and New York 2002), p215-242.

former dissidents had fought to attain. It was therefore a useful tool to legitimise new, post-communist political identities. ‘Europe’ proved sufficiently ambiguous and malleable to be re-presented according to the different parties’ ideological flavours, and even for the contradictions between the parties’ policy proposals and the EU *acquis* to be disregarded. Secondly, it also provided the nascent decision makers with a ready-made economic policy framework that did not require a lengthy public debate, which some leading reformers feared would sabotage the reform process,⁹³⁹ and instead could be legitimized on the basis of the popular desire to ‘return to Europe’. On the other hand, however, accession posed a threat to the policies and ideas of almost all Polish political elites apart from the liberals. It required an extensive transfer of national competences to a supranational body, the implementation of economic policies that were disadvantageous to the nascent small domestic businesses and the restructuring of state owned and former state owned enterprises, and it also challenged the conservative, religious values of the Polish right. The parties hence continued to struggle, declaring support for accession on the one hand but unable to reconcile themselves with its implications on the other.

Accession conditionality thus became both a blueprint for transition reforms and a tight policy ‘straitjacket’ leaving pro-EU domestic political actors little room for policy based electoral competition.⁹⁴⁰ Accession presented a paradox: while reinforcing the process of systemic transition, accession conditionality also constrained domestic political competition. Economically, it provided the nascent elites with a policy blueprint and a ‘carrot’ to justify painful economic reform. But politically it pre-empted the debate on alternative policy options that may have enabled the nascent Polish party system to consolidate on the basis of forward looking policy rather than the symbolism associated with historic affiliations.

⁹³⁹ Balcerowicz, ‘Socialism, Capitalism, Transformation’.

⁹⁴⁰ Abby Innes, ‘Party competition in post-communist Europe: The great electoral lottery’, *Comparative Politics* 35, no. 1 (2002), pp. 85-105, Raik, p577.

Unable to differentiate themselves on the basis of competing policy proposals, political parties were limited to competing primarily on a symbolic, rhetorical basis. The concept of Europe was an appealing instrument in this. 'Europe' often conflated with the EU was a kind of conceptual sponge⁹⁴¹ or a mirror of the different parties preferred visions not only of the EU but of their political identity and the Polish state. Political discourse in post-communist Poland in general, and especially the discourse on Europe, was intended less to solve specific social problems but rather to build and maintain the identity of political actors.⁹⁴²

Europe was hence a useful tool in differentiating the parties' political identities. The problem is that ambiguous slogans such as 'Europe of Nations' or 'Social Europe' could be interpreted in any number of ways, enabling each participant of the debate to define the terms of discussion as they saw fit. The use of such rhetoric is typical of 'catch-all' parties⁹⁴³, where competitors for political power attempt to attract as wide an electorate as possible by making use of vague concepts whose ambiguity allows voters to interpret them in the way they wish. As a result, the voters are able to vote, but not to choose.⁹⁴⁴

Procedurally, accession was fully legitimate. The public elected the decision makers who propelled accession forward and even ratified the final agreement in a referendum. But on closer inspection, Poland's accession project was elite driven for its entire duration. The use of the referendum to ratify accession was problematic in itself. The voters were asked to legitimize a complex and lengthy harmonization process that was largely complete at the time of the referendum and moreover, would have been very difficult to reverse if they rejected accession.

⁹⁴¹ Wolff-Powęska.

⁹⁴² Hausner and Marody, *Jakość Rządzenia: Polska Bliżej Unii Europejskiej?*, p126.

⁹⁴³ P. Mair, ed, *The West European Party System* (Oxford 1990).

⁹⁴⁴ Przeworski, Adam, Pranab Bardham and Luiz Carlos Bresser Periera, *Sustainable Democracy*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, quoted in Golonka, p301.

Moreover, had they been given the choice most would have preferred to delay accession. The referendum served only to put the final seal of approval on a wide ranging set of complex policy decisions that had been already executed. These choices were legitimised not by the referendum but by the political elites' consensus in favour of EU association and accession. It was not so much the accession referendum but the policies competing groupings proposed during subsequent electoral contests of the pre-accession period that reflected the choices available to the Polish electorate. But here, rather than with alternative policy options that would have enabled it to hold decision makers to account, the public was presented with ambiguous rhetoric that had much more in common with the Polish political parties' attempts to forge distinct identities than with the realities of European integration.

It seems that a vicious circle develops when the processes of European integration and systemic transformation take place in parallel. By providing applicant states with a pre-defined policy blue-print accession conditionality precludes debate on policy and hence prevents parties from establishing links with social groups and representing their supporters on the basis of policy.⁹⁴⁵ This in turn leads to political debate becoming increasingly abstract and elites distancing themselves from their voters. Elites have little choice with regards to differentiating themselves on the basis of policy options so instead they have to resort to differentiating themselves on the basis of rhetoric. As political debate becomes increasingly abstract so the public is increasingly disenfranchised and distanced from the elites, and public trust in the elites decreases. Eventually, the public may even place greater trust in outside bodies such as the EU than in their own decision makers. This dynamic

⁹⁴⁵ Innes, 'The Great Electoral Lottery'.

may form part of the explanation as to why public trust in Polish domestic institutions decreased steadily throughout the pre-accession period.⁹⁴⁶

In spite of the ambiguous nature of the debate about accession, the majority of Poles continued to favour EU membership. According to CBOS polls public support for accession ranged from just over 50% in March 2001 to almost 80% shortly after the accession referendum in July 2003⁹⁴⁷. After an initial drop in support following the accession referendum, support for EU membership has risen reaching 87% in April 2010.⁹⁴⁸ But high levels of support were accompanied by low levels of knowledge about the EU.⁹⁴⁹

Would the public have been as supportive if an in depth debate on the implications of accession had taken place and if they did have a better understanding of accession requirements? The two Polish parties whose programmes remained consistently aligned with accession conditionality during the pre-accession period were the liberal *Unia Wolności* and its later incarnation, *Platforma Obywatelska*. But the liberals never attained more than 13% of the parliamentary vote, which suggests that only 13% of the voters were fully supportive of both EU membership and accession conditionality. This suggests that had they been presented with a clear overview of accession conditionality and had their decisions been based on the policy implications rather than the symbolic appeal of accession the majority of voters may have opposed it.

According to opinion polls, the key reason why most respondents supported accession was an expectation that it would benefit the Polish economy. Judging by the scale of Poland's economic growth since accession this expectation has been

⁹⁴⁶ Kolarska-Bobińska, 'The EU Accession and Strengthening of Institutions in East Central Europe: The Case of Poland'.

⁹⁴⁷ Roguska, 'Polska Droga do Unii Europejskiej', p.17.

⁹⁴⁸ CBOS Polish Public Opinion Report April 2010,

http://www.cbos.pl/PL/publikacje/public_opinion/2010/04_2010.pdf.

⁹⁴⁹ Eurobarometer CC-EB 2003.2 Public Opinion in the Candidate Countries, Fieldwork: May 2003, Publication: June 2003; CBOS, Polish Public Opinion, April 2003.

fulfilled, which may also explain continuing support for EU membership. But using economic growth to legitimate support for a set of institutions that have taken on a large part of competences of the state is in itself problematic. As Helen Wallace has pointed out, legitimising EU enlargement on economic grounds does not form a sustainable basis for the Union's long term political stability.⁹⁵⁰ The recent events in Greece have shown that legitimising institutions such as a common currency on the basis of economic prosperity poses the risk of political instability during economic downturn.

While accession bolstered public support for the EU it did not increase its prominence in political debate. As was reflected in the 2005 victory of the euro-sceptic *PiS* and *LPR* coalition, parties' stance on accession continued not to be a determining factor in electoral choice.⁹⁵¹ Given the electorate's low interest in the issue it is not surprising that there was a dissonance between elite and public views. But it is surprising that an issue of as much historic importance as accession and one that has as much impact on the future shape of the Polish state should consistently be judged to be of relatively low importance by the electorate. Had political parties not been subject to the constraints that the 'all or nothing' conditionality imposed on political rhetoric then the Polish debate on Europe may have taken place in more transparent terms, which may have in turn have led to a greater interest in accession among the public.

As this study has shown, the establishment of consensus in favour of accession among Poland's political elites proved much more challenging than the elites' declarations of support suggest. Contrary to the assertions of several studies of

⁹⁵⁰ H. Wallace, 'Deepening and Widening: Problems of Legitimacy for the EC', in European Identity and the Search for Legitimacy, ed. S. Garcia (1993).

⁹⁵¹ A. Szczerbiak, 'Why do Poles love the EU and what do they love about it?: Polish attitudes towards European integration during the first three years of EU membership.', Sussex European Institute, SEI Working Paper No 98, (2007), p37.

accession⁹⁵², the establishment of consensus on accession proved problematic for almost all Poland's political groupings at all stages of the pre-accession period. Although most parties declared support for EU membership, throughout the entire pre-accession period they also supported policy proposals that contradicted accession conditions. The EU's strict neo-liberal economic requirements and the loss of national sovereignty accession entailed proved particularly challenging.

The thesis also shows that the discrepancy between parties' overt declarations of support and the policy platforms they competed on, first identified by Kucharczyk in his study of the 1997 election⁹⁵³, occurred during all electoral contests of the pre-accession period. Moreover, the tension between accession conditionality and the way in which parties differentiated themselves occurred not only at the level of policy but was consistently evident in the parties' policy and ideological platforms as well as during electoral and cabinet coalition negotiations. Polish elites' consensus in favour of accession, was, as described by Kucharczyk and Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, a 'shallow' one⁴⁶. But as this historical comparison of how elites maintained consensus on accession during all stages of the accession period, the 'shallow' nature appears to have persisted throughout several very ideologically different cabinets including both solidarity-successor and communist successor ones as well as different electoral ordinations and coalition configurations.

Unwillingness to be 'politically incorrect' and oppose accession among the solidarity-successor right, as Skotnicka-Illasiewicz has suggested, may hence have contributed to the 'shallow' or 'nominal' consensus⁹⁵⁴. The underlying reason for

⁹⁵² Vachudova, Jacoby, Grabbe and Hughes, 'Central and east European views on EU enlargement: political debates and public opinion'.

⁹⁵³ Kucharczyk, 'Za a Nauer Przeciw. Partie Polityczne Wobec Perspektywy Integracji w Wyborach 1997', in, Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998', in, E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 'Członkowstwo w Unii Europejskiej w Badaniach Opinii Społecznej', in Polacy Wobec Integracji z Unią Europejską, ed. B. Mach (Warsaw 1998), E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 'Członkowstwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej w Kulturze Politycznej Parlamentarzystów', in Obrządeni Polityką. Posłowie i Partie, ed. W. Wesołowski (Warsaw 2001).

⁹⁵⁴ Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 'Członkowstwo w Unii Europejskiej w Badaniach Opinii Społecznej', in, Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 'Członkowstwo Polski w Unii Europejskiej w Kulturze Politycznej Parlamentarzystów', in, E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, 'Polska w Europie - odmienne Wizje', in Świat Elity Politycznej, eds. W. Wesołowski

the difficulties parties experienced in sustaining consensus however was the strict accession conditionality which presented them with the structural problem of how to compete on alternative policy options when accession required them to agree on an EU-prescribed policy framework for most policy areas. The difficulties parties experienced reconciling their ideological and policy proposals with accession conditionality were hence not only the result of the heavily polarized political scene of the AWS period⁹⁵⁵. Rather, they were more structural and caused by the combination of the wide span of the *acquis* and its non-negotiable nature which, together, left the applicant states in the 'policy straitjacket' Innes describes.⁹⁵⁶

Contrary to Innes' hypothesis however, in the Polish case the 'straitjacket' did not result in parties competing on the basis of how competent they were to implement the policies required for accession.⁹⁵⁷ This study has found that rather than reconcile their policy proposals with EU's conditions, or change their stance on accession, parties rhetorically re-presented the EU into different visions that aligned with their ideological offering. Declarations of support for 'Social Europe', 'Christian Europe' or the 'Europe of Nations' gave the appearance of consensus. But in fact no such consensus was possible since the way in which political groupings presented the 'Europe' they claimed to support was so different as to remove any common denominator they could agree on. The consensus was so shallow as to be only a rhetorical one.

As a result, the single biggest change Polish society experienced since 1989 was never really addressed in political debate. The integration project was propelled forward not by in-depth political consensus but by a series of rhetorical

and I. Pańkow (Warsaw 1995), E. Skotnicka-Illasiewicz, *Powrót czy Droga w Nieznane? Europejskie Dylematy Polaków* (Warsaw 1998).

⁹⁵⁵ Kucharczyk, 'Za a Nawiązanie. Partie Polityczne Wobec Perspektywy Integracji w Wyborach 1997', Kucharczyk, 'Porwanie Europy. Integracja Europejska w Polskim Dyskursie Politycznym 1997-1998', Szczerbiak, 'Europe as a Re-aligning Issue in Polish Politics?: Evidence from the October 2000 Presidential Election'.

⁹⁵⁶ Innes, 'The Great Electoral Lottery'.

⁹⁵⁷ Ibid.

compromises. At each stage of the accession process the parties' inability to negotiate more than a nominal consensus prevented in-depth public debate. During each electoral contest of the pre-accession period voters were presented with ambiguous rhetoric in place of alternative policy options that would have enabled them to hold decision makers to account. The Polish public had numerous opportunities to vote on the topic of accession but it was never presented with meaningful choices about it.

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