

COERCION VERSUS CO-OPTATION:
WESTERN RELATIONS WITH THE MPLA AND FRELIMO
FROM 1956 TO 1976

Gillian Rosalind Gunn Clissold

A thesis submitted to the University of London
in conformity with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

The London School of Economics and Political Science

UMI Number: U166536

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.




UMI U166536

Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.

Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC
789 East Eisenhower Parkway
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

THESES

F

7844



753445

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyses the development of Western relations with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) from 1956 to 1976.

It concludes that nationalist attitudes were influenced by eleven factors, of which only one--perception of Western policies--was consistently present in every time period. Even when a movement was becoming increasingly hostile to the West due to other factors, perception of a friendly Western attitude was capable of producing a positive nationalist response.

Although seven factors shaped Western policies, in general governments reacted in accord with the impact of nationalist policies on interests deemed important. For cold war-focussed countries, a movement's policies were only examined to determine their influence on that international competition. Because both nationalist groups had ties with the socialist world, and because Portugal threatened to deny Western access to the Azores base if the West courted the nationalists, cold war-focussed states such as the United States avoided co-optation initiatives.

Those states with wider ties to the area tended to evaluate the impact of the whole spectrum of nationalist policies on regional interests when determining strategies. Countries with broad ties to the region, such as Britain, were capable of overlooking a movement's socialist alliances and adopting co-optation policies if the group was deemed willing and able to further the Western state's interests in the region.

The thesis also concludes that co-optation policies would have better protected Western interests than the coercion or neglect strategies so often selected and that such an approach would have produced stronger results in FRELIMO than in the MPLA. However, due to the interplay of other factors, even if subjected to consistently positive Western policies neither movement would have become a close Western ally.

Dedication

To Freda Elizabeth Gunn
and
J. B. (Iain) Gunn
who tried to teach me to be
both empathetic
and logical

Special thanks are also due to the Rockefeller Foundation, which financed the fieldwork for this study; to José Mota, who taught me Portuguese; to the many individuals in southern Africa, Europe, and the United States who gave me interviews; to Helen Kitchen, who gave me the self-confidence and institutional support to start this work; to Cole Kitchen, who proofread it; to David Collis, Shawn Malone, Tiffany Mitchell and Jerome Lebleu, whose extra work gave me time for thesis writing; to Dr. Christopher Coker, who put up with my procrastination; to Janet Gunn, Donna Gray, and Cathi Dunn, who provided constructive nagging; and last but not least to my husband, George (Ric) Clissold II, whose love, support, and encouragement permitted me finally to finish.


CONTENTS

MAPS	6
INTRODUCTION	8
PART I. EARLY NATIONALISM AND INITIAL WESTERN RESPONSE: 1956 TO 1963	
INTRODUCTION TO PART I	16
CHAPTER 1. MPLA: RADICAL ROOTS	18
CHAPTER 2. FRELIMO: EARLY CO-OPTABILITY	41
CHAPTER 3. ABORTED U.S. CO-OPTATION	55
PART II. POSITIONS HARDEN: 1964 TO 1969	
INTRODUCTION TO PART II	74
CHAPTER 4. MPLA: SUSPICION SHIFTS TO ENMITY	76
CHAPTER 5. FRELIMO: "THESE COUNTRIES ARE NOT REALLY OUR FRIENDS"	91
CHAPTER 6. COURTING THE COLONISER	114
PART III. MUTUAL ANTIPATHY GROWS: 1970 TO 1974	
INTRODUCTION TO PART III	127
CHAPTER 7. MPLA OVERTURES FOLLOWED BY HOSTILITY	130
CHAPTER 8. FRELIMO SHIFTS FROM OPERATIONAL TO IDEOLOGICAL CRITICISM OF THE WEST	145
CHAPTER 9. U.S. COMPLACENCY	165
CHAPTER 10. EUROPEAN AMBIVALENCE	183
PART IV. THE FINAL DAYS: 1974 TO 1975	
INTRODUCTION TO PART IV	198
CHAPTER 11. ANGOLA: A CASE OF FAILED COERCION	200
CHAPTER 12. MOZAMBIQUE: A CASE OF PARTIAL CO-OPTATION	228
CHAPTER 13. WASHINGTON'S CHOICE	256
CHAPTER 14. EUROPE'S SELECTIVE APPROACH	275
CONCLUSION	288
BIBLIOGRAPHY	299


LIST OF MAPS

Southern Africa.....	6
Angola and Mozambique.....	7

MAPS



Source: Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. xii.



Angola and Mozambique.

Source: Europa Publications, Africa South of the Sahara 1980-81 (London: Europa Publications, 1980), p. 132.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis analyses the development of Western relations with two movements that fought for their territories' independence from Portugal--the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola--MPLA) and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique--FRELIMO). The time frame extends from the 1956 founding of the oldest movement up to and including the 1974 to 1975 independence processes and their immediate aftermaths. Within the Western community, U.S. policy is given particular attention and European policy is discussed in detail only in the second half of the period under consideration, when it became activist. The policies of southern Africa's minority-ruled states, South Africa and Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe), are analysed only when they became relevant to the interaction between the nationalists and Western governments, again primarily in the later period.

This work focuses on the question of motivations. Why did Western governments sometimes seek to co-opt the nationalist movements and at other times try to coerce them? Why did the nationalists at times reach out to the West and appear willing to be co-opted, and at other times move to consolidate their relations with the Eastern bloc? Had the nationalists appeared more respectful of Western interests, would the West have been more supportive? Conversely, if the West had been more sympathetic towards the nationalists, would those groups have become more willing to be co-opted?

DEFINITION OF TERMS

This thesis uses some standard English-language terms in a specific way. It also employs several invented terms that are not standard written English. For the purpose of this work, the terms coercion strategy, co-optation strategy, "co-optable", and "level of co-optability" are intended to convey the following meanings:

- Coercion strategy: A strategy designed to use military or diplomatic means, or to help others do so, to force a political actor to adopt certain courses of action.
- Co-optation strategy: A strategy designed to entice a political actor, directly or indirectly, into pursuing certain courses of action.

- "Co-optable": A term invented by the author to indicate that an entity is predisposed to be enticed by friendly gestures into pursuing policies favourable to Western interests.
- "Level of co-optability": Another term invented by the author to describe the level of predisposition of a political actor to be enticed by friendly gestures into pursuing policies favourable to Western interests.

For the purposes of this paper, the terms derived from the root word "co-opt" should be viewed without the pejorative connotation of "manipulate". Furthermore, even though the latter two terms are invented, for ease of reading they will henceforth be used without the standard quotation marks.

DEFINITION OF WESTERN INTERESTS

In this work the word "interest" is used in the sense defined by Webster's dictionary. It can variously mean "a right, title or legal share in something", an "advantage or benefit", or "a feeling that accompanies or causes special attention to an object or a class of objects".¹ When used in conjunction with the word "Western", the phrase is intended to convey a Western stake in a development, a Western concern that certain events will benefit it and others will be detrimental.

Western states considered a range of interests as they formulated policy regarding Mozambique and Angola. They generally wished to:

- encourage Western orientation of states
- discourage establishment of communist/socialist systems
- block alliances with the Soviet Union, and on occasion those with other communist states
- placate domestic critics
- retain traditional alliances (trans-Atlantic and other)
- gain foreign support for nation-specific international agendas
- ensure access to markets
- ensure access to strategically located bases and ports

¹ Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary, (Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Inc, 1986).

- protect economic, cultural and political ties in African states neighbouring Mozambique and Angola, when extant

FACTORS INVOLVED

The research reported in this thesis identifies eleven factors that affected the co-optability of the nationalist movements and seven that influenced the decisions of Western governments to pursue coercion or co-optation policies. The impact of the factors is analysed over four chronological phases: Early nationalist struggle and initial Western response from 1956 to 1963 (described in Part I), hardening of nationalist and Western policies from 1964 to 1969 (Part II), further growth of mutual antipathy from 1970 to spring 1974 (Part III), and the crisis associated with the final days of the independence processes from spring 1974 through 1975 (Part IV).

The following is a list of the factors found to influence nationalist co-optability:

- background of the nationalist leadership
- source of the movement's ideological orientation
- formation as an artificial versus genuine front
- degree and nature of internal factional rivalry
- rivalry with other nationalist movements
- nature and actions of the movement's direct enemy
- relations with the movement's non-Western allies
- conditions of armed struggle
- attitudes of regional powers
- economic and geographic structure of the territory in question
- perception of Western policies

The factors found to influence Western governments' decisions to pursue co-optation or coercion policies are the following:

- relationship with a rival power
- related security, military, and strategic issues
- internal politics
- economic, cultural, and historical ties with the region
- policies of tacit and open allies in the region
- perception of nationalist divisions
- perception of the nationalists' policies

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the study pointed to the following conclusions:

1. The co-optability of the nationalist movements was influenced by all of the factors discussed, with the weight of each varying according to circumstance. Some factors played a heavy role in one phase, and then had no role whatsoever in other periods. Throughout the historical period, however, nationalist co-optability was consistently influenced by the leadership's perception of Western policies. Even when a movement was becoming increasingly hostile to the West due to the interplay of other factors, perception of a positive Western attitude was capable of producing an increase in co-optability. At times, the role of other factors was so strong that the likely shift would have been quite modest, but the historical record nonetheless strongly suggests that co-optation policies consistently would have had some discernable impact.

2. Western governments reacted to the nationalists in accord with the impact of nationalist policies on interests deemed important.

2a. States Focussed on the Cold War. For the countries that narrowly focussed on the rivalry with the Soviet Union, nationalist policies were only examined to determine their impact on the cold war competition. Because during most of the period under examination Portugal threatened to retaliate against any Western effort to co-opt the nationalists by barring the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) from its Azores military base, and since Azores access was deemed essential to successful competition with the Soviet Union, cold war-focussed states chose policies of either neglect or coercion. The United States, and for much of the period West Germany, fell into this category. These governments, and the United States in particular, ignored all other aspects of the nationalists' policies. Even pro-Western groups in the region were held at arm's length to avoid alienating Lisbon. There was little the nationalists could have done, other than ceasing to call for their territories' independence, to obtain favour from cold war-focussed states.

2b. States with a Wider Range of Interests. Those European states with a wider range of economic, cultural, and historical ties to the geographic region tended to pay greater attention to the nationalists' policies. They examined the impact of such policies on those broader regional interests and adopted coercion or co-optation

policies in response. With these countries the nationalists were in a position to influence policy, at least to some extent.

3. For a co-optation strategy to work well, there had to be favourable factors in both the subject movement and in the Western government concerned.

3a. FRELIMO was reasonably co-optable for much of the period, but anti-co-optation factors influencing all but a few Western governments prevented a full co-optation campaign from being tested. On the few occasions when certain Western states did briefly pursue co-optation, they received a cautious but positive FRELIMO response. If a full co-optation campaign had been implemented, FRELIMO would not have become fully pro-Western, but would have been willing to accommodate a wide range of Western interests.

3b. The MPLA was consistently less co-optable than FRELIMO, and Western governments placed even less effort into co-opting it than the Mozambican movement. If co-optation had been attempted, it would not have worked as well as with FRELIMO, but would have better protected Western interests than the neglect/coercion policies in fact adopted.

ACADEMIC CONTEXT

Before moving on, it is useful to identify this work's relationship with the existing literature in the field. This thesis builds upon, and yet is different from, the existing body of research. The works of the Ottaways,² Somerville,³ Wolfers and Bergerol,⁴ the Isaacmans,⁵ Hanlon,⁶

² David Ottaway and Marina Ottaway, Afrocommunism (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981).

³ Keith Somerville, Angola: Politics, Economics and Society (London: Francis Pinter, 1986)

⁴ Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the Front Line (London: Zed Press, 1983).

⁵ Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution (London: Westview Press, 1983).

⁶ Joseph Hanlon, Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire (London: Zed Books, 1984).

Munslow,⁷ Hall and Young,⁸ Cahen,⁹ Messiant¹⁰ and Heimer¹¹ all provide valuable insights, albeit from varying political perspectives, into the evolution of the nationalist movements' ideological orientation and attitudes towards the West. They contain relatively little information, however, about Western policies from 1956 to 1976 or the interaction between those policies and the views of the nationalists. Marcum's extremely valuable two-volume work¹² does address this interaction, but only with respect to Angola, and in 1978, when his concluding volume was published, some important events were too recent to permit dispassionate interviewing of the major protagonists. For example, at that time it was virtually impossible to find sources in South Africa and the United States willing to talk about their governments' decision-making processes regarding the 1975 Angola operations.

⁷ Barry Munslow, Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins (Harlow, United Kingdom: Longman Group, 1983).

⁸ Margaret Hall and Tom Young, Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence, (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1997).

⁹ Michel Cahen, "Corporatisme et colonialisme: Approche du cas mozambicain, 1933-1979. I", Cahiers d'Études, 92, XXIII-4 (1983).
_____, "Corporatisme et colonialisme: Approche du cas mozambicain, 1933-1979. II", Cahiers d'Études, 93, XXIV-1 (1984).
_____, "Le Portugal et l'Afrique", Afrique Contemporaine, (Jan-Mar 1986).
_____, "Check on Socialism in Mozambique: What Check? What Socialism?", Review of African Political Economy, no. 57 (July 1993).
_____, Mozambique: La Révolution Implosée (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987).

¹⁰ Christine Messiant, "Angola, Les Voies de l'Ethnisation et de la Décomposition", Lusotopie, no. 1-2 (1994).

¹¹ Franz Wilhelm Heimer, The Decolonization Conflict in Angola: 1974-76 (Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1979).

¹² John A. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, vol. 1, The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1969) and vol. 2, Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1978).

The works by El-Khawas,¹³ Stockwell,¹⁴ and Wright¹⁵ detail various aspects of U.S. policy towards Angola, but do not touch on Mozambique, and again the interaction element is missing. Noer¹⁶ provides an excellent documentation and analysis of U.S. policy regarding southern Africa until 1968, but stops short of the independence process.

Mahoney¹⁷ enhances understanding of the declassified documents from the Kennedy White House with information from interviews of individuals involved in policy making during Kennedy's presidency. However, he makes little reference to the nationalists' perceptions and decisions or to the impact of U.S. actions on nationalist thinking. Recent works by Antunes¹⁸ provide a wealth of new information concerning U.S. policy during the Kennedy and Nixon administrations, but like Mahoney do not touch on the nationalists' evolution or the interaction element.

Much of the available literature includes references to South African and Rhodesian policy, but does not provide much detail.

Frankel¹⁹ and Geldenhuys²⁰ fill this gap by describing South African

¹³ U.S. Interdepartmental Group for Africa, The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum 39 (Secret), ed. Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen (Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1976). This is a reprint, with a new introduction and appendices, of the 1969 edition of a classified national security study entitled Southern Africa.

¹⁴ John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (London: First Futura Publications, 1978).

¹⁵ George Wright, The Destruction of a Nation (London: Pluto Press, 1997).

¹⁶ Thomas J. Noer, Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1948-1968 (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1985).

¹⁷ Richard D. Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal In Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

¹⁸ José Freire Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar: O Leão e a Raposa (Lisbon: Difusão Cultural, 1991).
_____, Nixon e Caetano: Promessas e Abandono (Lisbon: Difusão Cultural, 1992).

¹⁹ Philip H. Frankel, Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

²⁰ Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making (Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa, 1984).

decision making, and Flower²¹ and Martin and Johnson²² are useful regarding Rhodesia, but these authors do not address the specific manner in which those governments' policies influenced the development of Western relations with the nationalists. Minter provides useful insights regarding South African policy in the region, and UNITA's connections with both the Portuguese and Pretoria, but has little information concerning Western decision making during the period under consideration.²³ While Clarence-Smith²⁴ and Pitcher²⁵ provide detailed information concerning Portuguese decision making, relatively few facts regarding the policies of other Western European countries are available from the major published studies. (That is why the chapters on European policy in this work draw heavily on press reports and the author's interviews.)

Perhaps most significantly, existing work is not generally comparative and does not make a systematic attempt to work out conclusions regarding interaction between nationalists and Western governments that might be transferable to other geographic areas and time periods.

NOTES CONCERNING METHODOLOGY AND STYLE

All of the interviews with Mozambican and Angolan sources were conducted in Portuguese. In addition, most of the MPLA and FRELIMO documents cited were originally in Portuguese, as were all books cited that feature Portuguese titles. Books and articles with French titles were originally in French. All translations from both Portuguese and French are the work of the author.

²¹ Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981 (London: John Murray, 1987).

²² David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War (Harare, Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1981).

²³ William Minter, Apartheid's Contras (London: Zed Books, 1994).
_____, ed., Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1988).

²⁴ Gervase Clarence-Smith, The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825-1875: A Study in Economic Imperialism (Manchester, United Kingdom: University of Manchester, 1985).

²⁵ M. Anne Pitcher, Politics in the Portuguese Empire: The State, Industry and Cotton, 1926-1974 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

PART I
EARLY NATIONALISM AND INITIAL WESTERN RESPONSE:
1956 TO 1963

INTRODUCTION TO PART I

The circumstances in which the MPLA and FRELIMO were founded, in 1956 and 1962 respectively, the events that occurred in Angola and Mozambique shortly thereafter, and the reaction of the West to these developments all had a critical impact upon the co-optability of the nationalists and the predilection of the West to pursue a co-optation strategy in this early period. These events also conditioned the nationalists' interaction with the West over the following three decades. Therefore, this early period merits careful analysis.

The MPLA exhibited a relatively low level of co-optability during these early years. It began with an already formed, if still undeveloped and flexible, Marxist conception of the world. The enemy was not merely Portuguese colonialism. It was capitalism in general. FRELIMO, in contrast, demonstrated a relatively high level of co-optability. It started with a fairly non-ideological nationalistic desire simply to expel the Portuguese, and Marxist terminology did not enter its vocabulary until much later. Despite the differences in the movements' overall attitudes towards the West, however, both experienced a rise in their co-optability levels simultaneously in the middle of the period.

The Western country that showed the most interest in the nationalists in this period, the United States, followed an inconsistent course. It first viewed the emerging nationalists through a cold war prism, saw their rebellion as the product of Soviet subversion, and considered the movements worthy only of neglect or opposition. Washington then shifted to a co-optation approach, decided

the movements were reacting to Portuguese repression rather than Soviet expansionism, and adopted an anti-colonial strategy designed to eliminate the cause of the unrest. The co-optation policy lasted only two years, however, and was then abandoned.

The three chapters in Part I, on the MPLA, FRELIMO, and the United States respectively, will seek to answer the following questions: What factors were the most important in determining the level of co-optability of FRELIMO and the MPLA? How important was the nationalists' perception of Western policies in determining their level of co-optability? What accounted for the differences between the two movements? Why did the co-optability of both simultaneously rise in the middle of the period? If the West had pursued co-optation more vigorously, would the nationalists have become more co-optable? What factors most influenced the U.S. decision first to adopt and then to abandon a co-optation strategy? How important was the West's perception of nationalist policies in its deliberations? If the nationalists had appeared more co-optable, would the West have showed greater interest in co-optation? How did the events of this period condition future nationalist relations with the West?

CHAPTER 1
MPLA: RADICAL ROOTS

The MPLA displayed modest evidence of co-optability during its early years, particularly from late 1962 to mid-1963. However, Marxist philosophy was already the reference point for analysis and the movement defined the enemy not only as colonialism, but as capitalism in general. It was clearly interested in obtaining Western support, but it had already defined its principles in a manner that reduced, although did not eliminate, its ability to accommodate Western concerns.

Three interrelated factors were primarily responsible for this initial low level of co-optability: the background of the leadership; the movement's founding as an artificial front; and the influence of the movement's non-Western allies, specifically the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Soviet Union. The first factor, the background of the nationalists, in turn was influenced both by the actions of the direct enemy, Portugal, and by Angola's economic structure.

The MPLA's co-optability nonetheless did rise modestly in late 1962, mainly due to the movement's perception that the United States was adopting friendlier policies. It then fell again in mid-1963 following disappointment with the U.S. position. Rivalry with other nationalists, although not a factor in itself influencing co-optability, affected the MPLA's perception of U.S. policies and therefore played a secondary but important role.

This pattern suggests that a more sympathetic Western attitude might have sustained the modest 1962-1963 co-optability increase, but as the underlying forces initially limiting co-optability were already in place, even a maximum co-optation effort would not have produced a dramatic increase in the MPLA's willingness to accommodate Western concerns.

ANGOLAN CONTEXT

Before exploring the formation of the MPLA, it is useful to review the economic and cultural context in which the organisation arose.

As Heimer has pointed out, in contrast with the rest of Africa, in the 16th and 17th centuries the Angolan port cities of Luanda and Benguela and their immediate environs "constituted Portuguese

bridgeheads on the coast" and therefore when the European "scramble for Africa" began Angola had "two micro-societies of a 'creole' type" with long traditions of interaction with African society. This interaction was geographically quite restricted, however, and the African population elsewhere in the colony had very limited or no contact with the Portuguese. Therefore, "one could say that colonial occupation led to the constitution of a cluster of societies, where the 'modern' one was the central society, and the African ones the tributary societies".²⁶ Race relations also had special characteristics. Because Portugal lacked capital and know how, and permitted only limited foreign capital, it was impractical for Lisbon to do what France and Britain did--have a limited number of whites perform central roles and train blacks to execute most other tasks. Portugal instead drew on "the only other 'development resource' available, i.e. relatively important quantities of metropolitan manpower".²⁷ Whites therefore performed many of the less skilled jobs performed by Africans in other societies, such as "office boy" and waiter tasks. This meant that African opportunities for upward mobility "were more restricted than in other colonies".²⁸

According to Heimer, a consequence was

...the particularly clear cut delimitation between the central society and the tributary societies; through the reinforcement of economic boundaries by ideological (racial, cultural) cleavages. In the perspective of most tributary societies, the central society thus constituted a completely different world.²⁹

Messiant analyses Angola's history from a slightly different, but complementary, angle. She divides the Angolan elite from which the nationalist leaders emerged into three groups: the anciens assimilés, the évolués and the nouveaux assimilés. Anciens assimilés were urban mestíço (mixed race) and black individuals who had achieved "assimilated" status by acquiring Portuguese cultural characteristics. From the turn of the 20th century assimilados enjoyed higher status than the mass of "indigena" blacks. The anciens assimilés, in Messiant's view, are descendants of the multiracial colonial bourgeoisie that

²⁶ Heimer, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 11.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 11.

existed until the 19th century.³⁰ The group spoke Portuguese as its first language, was largely Catholic, and lived among and on occasion married whites. Though they were later somewhat marginalised by the increase in white migration and the "racial social and matrimonial closing of colonial society",³¹ the anciens assimilés remained the elite of the non-white population and had a strong group identity. Within this black/mestico community, socialization was markedly multiracial, and tribal origin was not a primary reference for an individual's identity.

The évolués in Messiant's model were an equally self-aware group that emerged among black Angolans in the neighbouring colony of the Belgian Congo, around Leopoldville. Primarily from the Bakongo ethnic group, the évolués were exposed to a much more racially segregated form of (Belgian) colonialism than the anciens assimilés. The évolués exalted the black race and the Bakongo people in particular. The group's leadership featured members of the aristocracy of the royal Kongo kingdom, was uneasy with people of Portuguese origin, and resented the imposition of European culture.³²

The nouveaux assimilés in Messiant's model were not descended from the old colonial bourgeoisie but from African society and the indigenas who were their social milieu. Their first language was African, and they acquired assimilated status only in the 20th century, largely due to the efforts of foreign (Protestant) missionaries after World War II. Like the anciens assimilés, the nouveaux were not an ethnic or neo-traditional elite, and they were largely in salaried jobs. However, as Messiant notes,

...the assimilated status which they gained at great cost did not open the doors to promotion. This brake, which became stronger after World War II with the hardening of social and racial divisions, meant they not only could not compete with whites, but they also could not compete with the anciens assimilés who lived above them and kept them at a distance.³³

The nouveaux assimilés perceived their differences from the descendants of the old bourgeoisie and mesticos "in terms that were simultaneously

³⁰ Messiant, op. cit., p. 161.

³¹ Ibid., p. 162.

³² Ibid., pp. 161-163.

³³ Ibid., p. 164.

racial and social".³⁴ In the face of the "superiority" of those who presented themselves as an aristocracy, the nouveaux assimilés tried to value their own characteristics, resulting from the connection they maintained with traditional African society and their colour.

Heimer's central/tributary society model and Messiant's anciens assimilés/évolués/nouveaux assimilés analytical framework are quite complimentary, and help one understand the origins of both the MPLA and its rivals.

FORMATION OF THE MPLA

The MPLA's leaders emerged primarily from the anciens assimilés group, in Messiant's terms, and had close ties with "central society", in Heimer's terms. Their families' relatively privileged status, made possible in part by Angola's rich natural resource base which provided economic prosperity for some, permitted many future MPLA leaders to study in Europe where they were exposed to Marxist ideology. Nouveaux assimilés formed part of the MPLA's rank and file. Essentially, as Heimer has asserted, the MPLA "primarily express[ed] the aspirations of the African and mestico petty bourgeoisie, and secondarily of the African proletariat".³⁵

Another factor which influenced the MPLA's leaders was Angola's moderately strong (at least in comparison to Mozambique's) economic and cultural integration with Portugal, which caused the PCP to take considerable interest in the territory.

The roots of the MPLA can be traced back to 1948 and the formation of the Federal Angolan Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party (Comitê Federal Angolano do Partido Comunista Português-CFA) in Luanda. Essentially a branch of the then-secret PCP, the CFA had a significant influence on the capital's intellectuals, who included some black youth organisations. Several nationalists who subsequently played leading roles in the MPLA were members of the CFA. As the Soviet historian A. M. Khazanov has noted, this ensured the emergence of a "firm, Marxist Leninist core" within the MPLA.³⁶

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Heimer, op. cit., p. 28.

³⁶ A. M. Khazanov, Agostinho Neto (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), p. 52.

According to Mário de Andrade, a leading MPLA figure, when the police clamped down in 1950 a group of young Angolans "dedicated to Marxist thought" decided to organise political action towards "the interest of the popular masses" through a "clandestine political organisation of revolutionary character" designed to win independence. Andrade remarked, "It was in this context that the Angolan Communist Party (Partido Comunista de Angola--PCA) was born in October 1955, [spread] the fundamental principles of Marxist doctrine", and established clandestine schools in the African quarters of Luanda.³⁷ Although the PCA was influenced by African youth, it did not spring from an African base itself. The leading scholar of Angolan history, John Marcum, characterises the PCA as essentially an overseas cell of the PCP.³⁸

Early the next year (1956), the PCA leaders helped create a nationalist front, the Party of Struggle of African Angolans (Partido da Luta dos Africanos de Angola--PLUA), which adopted an action programme similar to that of the PCA.³⁹ Subsequently other nationalist groups formed. According to Andrade, as control over them became difficult, the young Marxists of the Angolan Communist Party, the leaders of the PLUA, and "other patriots" formed the MPLA in December 1956.⁴⁰

The initial membership of the MPLA was urban-oriented, came from the Mbundu people concentrated in the capital, and was led mostly by mesticos and assimilados. As Messiant has noted, the MPLA founders broke, in Angola or in Europe, with their situation of elite privilege and denounced racial domination. They adopted a "progressive and socialist nationalism...founded on typical 'creole' values,...universalist,...multiracial, strongly influenced by European ideologies, Christian humanism and above all Marxism".⁴¹

There are various views as to why the MPLA was so attracted to the latter ideology. The Ottoways argue that it provided the urban,

³⁷ Mário de Andrade, "Et les colonies des Salazar?", Démocratie Nouvelle 4, no. 9 (September 1960).

³⁸ Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., Andrade, op. cit., p. 27.

³⁹ Andrade, op. cit., p. 35.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Messiant, op. cit, p. 162.

multi-racial leadership with an ideology that stood above race and allowed co-operation with black workers and the less educated.⁴² Heimer, using his central/tributary society dichotomy, notes that during the late colonial period "the central society had become the exclusive or predominant frame of reference for the mestiços and the growing number of urban Africans".⁴³

[They] internalized the ideology of the colonizers...[and accepted] the existence of a 'modern', 'civilized' and 'developing' central society, having a 'pre-eminence' over a number of 'backward rural societies'. Consequently their main grievance against colonial domination was not the exploitation of the periphery of the cluster by its centre, but the contradictions within the centre.⁴⁴

This created "a predisposition for 'nationalist' ideologies, i.e. political ideologies legitimating the existing social formation, produced by colonialism, in terms other than colonial".⁴⁵ Although Heimer does not explicitly say so, he implies that a Marxist style nationalism suited the MPLA because it legitimated the dominance of the "central society" from which the MPLA arose over the "tributary society" in terms that resonated with the group's European oriented, multi-racial outlook, yet challenged Portugal's right to dominate Angola and couched central society's domination in social justice and wealth redistribution terms capable of appealing to the less privileged.

Whatever explanation for the MPLA's Marxism one finds convincing, it is clear that the movement was designed as a broad front capable of encompassing divergent parties and groups, but was nonetheless founded by individuals who had already adopted a philosophical framework sympathetic towards Marxist thought. In short, it was an artificial front. This contradiction between the ideology of the organisers and the desire to create a broad front was evident in the MPLA's first manifesto, published in 1956. It called for the overthrow of Portuguese rule and the establishment of an independent Angolan state governed by a democratic "coalition of all the forces that fought Portuguese colonialism". It argued for a "revolutionary

⁴² Ottaway and Ottaway, op. cit., p. 101.

⁴³ Heimer, op. cit., p. 20.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 22.

struggle" by means of a "single front of all the anti-imperialist forces of Angola".⁴⁶ It "set aside" considerations of political opinion, social status, religious belief, and philosophical view in an effort to appeal to a wide base. However, the same founding document called for "planned economic development, the establishment of producers' cooperatives, state control over all foreign trade, and an agrarian reform 'to liquidate private monopoly' as well as to redistribute land to the poorest peasants".⁴⁷

So, while all nationalists were invited to join this new front, the post-independence society for which that front was fighting was already defined in broadly socialist terms.

This is not to say that the MPLA was in complete agreement with conventional communist analysis. In particular, the MPLA opposed the idea that Angola had to pass through capitalism before it could establish a socialist society. This theory, propounded by both the PCP and the PCA, was discussed at great length by the MPLA's founders and rejected. However, the very fact that the issue absorbed so much energy indicates that Marxist philosophy was already the reference point for analysis.

Portuguese policies in the late 1950s subsequently strengthened the Marxist strand in MPLA thought. The Portuguese secret police institution was established in 1957 and promptly sought to eliminate the nationalist organisations in Angolan territory. The waves of arrests in Luanda, which began in March 1958, forced the MPLA to shift to exile politics.⁴⁸ This meant that the MPLA's leadership increasingly came from the student elite developing in Europe. In line with the Portuguese government's official policy of promoting the assimilation of Africans into Portuguese culture, a small number of African Angolans had been studying in Portuguese universities since the 1940s. They were generally the sons of civil servants and came from relatively privileged assimilado or mestico families. In Europe they absorbed the radicalism prevalent in the student communities. In 1949 they established "Africa House" as a forum for exchanging ideas with other African nationalists, and in 1951 they participated in the founding of

⁴⁶ Andrade, op. cit., p. 30.

⁴⁷ Ottaway and Ottaway, op. cit., p. 102.

⁴⁸ Andrade, quoted in Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 37.

the Centre of African Studies. The organisations were generally closed down by the Portuguese authorities, the latter lasting only six months.⁴⁹ Therefore, the Angolan nationalists gradually shifted to France, where they were exposed to still more Marxist thought.

Among the intellectuals prominent in the exile Angolan community was the previously mentioned Andrade. Of mixed race, he studied in Portugal for six years and then moved to Paris in 1954, where he studied under Roger Bastide, a critic of Portuguese colonial policy, and became the MPLA's acting president. Viriato da Cruz, the first secretary general of the MPLA, fled Angola when a warrant for his arrest was issued in 1957, going first to Portugal and then to Paris. In the latter city he worked with Andrade and Lúcio Lára, the mestiço son of a wealthy sugar plantation owner who eventually became the MPLA's chief Marxist ideologist, and together they ran the MPLA in exile.

Another important MPLA figure radicalised in Europe was Agostinho Neto, the leader of the MPLA from 1962 until his death in 1979. However, his history was slightly different from that of his colleagues, because U.S. Methodist missionaries had an early impact on his development.

Neto was the son of a Methodist pastor from Catete district near Luanda. The Protestant church was competing with the government-sanctioned Catholic church in Angola, and because it took a negative view of Portuguese colonialism it was attractive to pro-independence Africans. Neto earned some of his secondary-school expenses by working as secretary to the Methodist Bishop Ralph Dodge, an American.⁵⁰ Through this connection Neto obtained a grant in 1947 from the Methodist missions of New York. Although his main love was poetry, Neto chose to use the grant to study medicine in Portugal.⁵¹ There he joined the various anti-colonial African organisations, and was exposed to Marxist political literature.⁵² He initially was attracted to the negritude ideas propounded by Léopold Senghor, but in the mid-1950s he began to

⁴⁹ Khazanov, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 16.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 20.

⁵² Ibid., p. 30.

work closely with the PCP.⁵³ Following a three-month imprisonment in 1951, he became a member of the Central Committee of the Movement of Democratic Unity-Youth, which had been established by the PCP to organise "colonial students who had decided to oppose fascism".⁵⁴ Neto later wrote, "The energy and heroism of the Portuguese Communists inspired and gave confidence to those who were fighting for their freedom in the colonies".⁵⁵ Neto sided with the Communist Party in the argument over whether African nationalists should devote their energies solely to independence efforts or whether they also had a duty to help the Portuguese communists oust the Portuguese government.⁵⁶

By the time Neto was imprisoned again in 1955, his poetry was earning him an international reputation. He continued to write while in prison, and his fame grew. His release in 1957 was partly attributed to a protest campaign mounted by writers around the world on his behalf.⁵⁷

Neto joined the MPLA in 1957 after release from prison, while still in Portugal. The following year he finished his medical studies and married a white Portuguese woman, Maria Eugenia. In 1959, he returned to Angola and did clandestine MPLA work while maintaining a medical practise as a "cover". In June 1960, he was again arrested.

Shortly after being detained, Neto was named honorary president of the MPLA and a campaign for his release was mounted. A group of British liberals and intellectuals, including Anthony Wedgwood Benn, Basil Davidson, Iris Murdoch, Julian Huxley, and John Osborne agitated for Neto's release.⁵⁸ Numerous letters were written to the London Times, and in the United States his former mentor Ralph Dodge organised a similar campaign.⁵⁹ The effort was effective, and in March 1962 Neto was released, although ordered to remain in Portugal.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 32-35.

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 37-43.

⁵⁵ Agostinho Neto, "Relatório do Comitê Central ao 1 Congresso do MPLA", p. 48. Quoted in Khazanov, op. cit., p. 44.

⁵⁶ Khazanov, op. cit., p. 25.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 33-39.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 115, 117.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 116.

Neto's early experiences had a contradictory effect upon his character. On the one hand, the personal and financial support of the U.S. Methodist church and the lobbying of European intellectuals for his release from prison made him appreciate the role of Western liberals in the independence effort. On the other hand, his exposure to Marxism in Portugal, his friendship with PCP leaders, and his membership in PCP-organised student groups pushed him towards a radical left position.

Although Neto had a critical impact upon the MPLA's character, the first military action for which the movement took credit occurred while he was still in prison. On 4 February 1961 a crowd of 3,000 attacked Luanda's central prison and other strategic points in the capital. The Portuguese retaliated against the African population, killing hundreds. The MPLA immediately announced the attack had been executed by its supporters. However, Portuguese author José Freire Antunes asserts in his 1991 work that the MPLA took credit for the event "after the fact". He cites an interview with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, a high ranking MPLA figure in the 1960s, who told Antunes, "In reality the MPLA had nothing to do with 4 February".⁶⁰ Antunes believes the attack was a spontaneous, unorganised revolt against the arbitrariness of the Portuguese security and prison officials over the previous two years.

Whatever the accuracy of Antunes' conclusion, in 1961 the attack was widely accepted as the work of the MPLA. It shocked Luanda's white population, and Portugal told U.S. officials Czechoslovakian arms were used in the attack, which Lisbon characterized as "part of an international plot to push Portugal out of the colonies".⁶¹

By the time the MPLA appeared in newspaper headlines, it had a high proportion of European-educated, left-inclined mestico and assimilado exiles in its leadership and was using Marxism as a philosophical frame of reference. It was thus well disposed towards the socialist world and suspicious of, though not yet overtly hostile towards, the West. It also had a leader in waiting who, while increasingly committed to Marxist ideology and close to the PCP, was also well aware that liberal Western leaders could be valuable allies in the struggle against Portugal.

⁶⁰ Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, op. cit., p. 150.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 148-149.

EMERGENCE OF THE RIVAL

Shortly after the MPLA was formed, a rival nationalist movement, Holden Roberto's Union of the People of Angola (União das Populações de Angola--UPA) emerged. When the UPA began to build a cordial relationship with Washington, the MPLA had a contradictory reaction. It was suspicious that the United States would help the UPA dominate the MPLA, but it also hoped that U.S. sympathy for the cause of Angolan independence could be shaped into support for the MPLA as well.

The UPA, which was the precursor to the more widely known Front for the National Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola--FNLA), was formed in 1958. It grew out of the Union of the People of Northern Angola (União das Populações do Norte de Angola--UPNA), which had called for the independence of the old Kongo kingdom of Angola as a separate country. The UPA was formed when the UPNA decided to extend its independence efforts to all of Angola, but its leaders retained their original ethnic orientation.⁶² The UPA's ideology was nationalist without a significant socialist component. Not surprisingly, its main support came from Bakongo people in the northern rural areas that had previously comprised the Kongo kingdom.

In Messiant's terms, the FNLA's leaders emerged from the *évolués* group, while its membership came from the "tributary society" in Heimer's model. The leadership was largely Baptist rather than Catholic, did not speak Portuguese as a first language, and was opposed not only to Portuguese colonialism but to the imposition of European culture. As Messiant has noted, the FNLA and MPLA were

...two elites that were urban and Western educated, but everything else separated them. Neither was prepared to accept the domination of the other. The *anciens assimilés* who led the MPLA considered the leadership of the FNLA to be composed of foreigners, *émigrés*, racists, tribalists and reactionaries who were culturally non-Angolan. The FNLA saw the MPLA as a culturally non-African elite which was assimilated and therefore alien, dominated by *mesticos* who were seen as "sons of colon"
who wanted independence in order to take the place of whites.⁶³

While the *nouveaux assimilés* of the capital were largely drawn to the MPLA, their counterparts in the countryside were more drawn to the FNLA.

⁶² Somerville, op. cit., p. 25.

⁶³ Messiant, op. cit., pp. 163-164.

Heimer asserts that the leadership of the FNLA maintained close ties with the Bakongo "tributary society", but was culturally integrated into the "central society" of Congo-Leopoldville. He characterizes the FNLA as a "non-revolutionary nationalist movement" which reflected "primarily the aspirations/interests of a petty bourgeoisie, and secondarily those of some peasant tributary societies...."⁶⁴

Roberto tended to regard whites and Portuguese colonialism as the sole enemy, and though he occasionally made overtures to the Soviet Union, he placed his main faith with the West. He first visited the United States in 1959 and gradually developed relationships with liberal members of Congress. He had cordial discussions with then-Senator John F. Kennedy and while in Washington painted the MPLA as a Soviet-controlled communist organisation.⁶⁵

In March 1961, five weeks after the Luanda prison raid attributed to the MPLA, Roberto organised a bloody uprising in the north among the Bakongo people. Approximately three hundred Europeans and many mesticos and assimilados, whom the UPA regarded as allied with the Europeans, were killed. According to Antunes, by the time the UPA uprising occurred in northern Angola, the CIA had already infiltrated the organisation. On 4 March, eleven days before violence broke out, the chief of the CIA post in Lisbon informed his Portuguese counterparts that the UPA was preparing an offensive in the Congo district to call attention to the Angolan situation in the United Nations, and specifically commented, "We have a CIA man in the UPA Central Committee".⁶⁶ The Portuguese, however, did not take the warning seriously.

A month after the uprising, in April 1961, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) began paying Roberto a modest retainer estimated at \$6,000 a month.⁶⁷ Rumours about the connection circulated in Africa.⁶⁸ When the Portuguese complained the U.S. replied that the

⁶⁴ Heimer, op. cit., pp 26-27.

⁶⁵ Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 15; Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 182.

⁶⁶ Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, op. cit., p. 174.

⁶⁷ Wright, op. cit., p. 36.

⁶⁸ Mahoney, op. cit., p. 204.

funds were merely for "intelligence gathering".⁶⁹ In July 1961 the U.S. also began to offer scholarships for Angolan students who had left Portugal after the March uprising and asked for asylum in France and Switzerland.⁷⁰ This was done indirectly through the CIA, but the U.S. connection was not kept secret for long. Roberto's increasingly public Washington ties accelerated the MPLA's growing apprehension and curiosity about U.S. intentions. When U.S. humanitarian assistance for Angolan refugees in Congo-Léopoldville, largely UPA supporters, began to arrive in mid-1961, this trend was further reinforced.⁷¹

The MPLA/FNLA conflict has traditionally been described as an ethnic struggle (Mbundu versus Bakongo) and as a conventional ideological competition (communist versus capitalist). While these elements clearly were present, the works of Heimer and Messiant suggest a third layer of conflict. There was a "reciprocal and very radical" rejection based on "social and cultural" differences between anciens assimilés and évolués.⁷² In Heimer's model, which is compatible with and complimentary to Messiant's, the conflict was between elites of two different "central societies", with an element of tributary/central society conflict as a result of the Bakongo non-elite support for the FNLA.

THE ROLE OF SOVIET INFLUENCE

While the MPLA's was reacting with a combination of apprehension and curiosity at the sight of Washington's openness to Roberto, Soviet policy in the early 1960s was reinforcing the MPLA's existing predisposition towards radical Marxism. In the early 1960s, Khrushchev turned towards southern Africa with high expectations that Soviet aid would induce the national liberation movements to embark upon direct transition to socialism. Moscow was particularly interested in Angola for the following reasons: (1) unlike Mozambique, it had the potential to become an economically independent unit; (2) it could become a springboard for operations in South West Africa (renamed Namibia by the

⁶⁹ Wright, op. cit., p. 37.

⁷⁰ Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, op. cit., p. 263.

⁷¹ Mahoney, op. cit., p. 205 and Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, op. cit., p. 264.

⁷² Messiant, pp. 161, 164.

United Nations in 1968); and (3) it had harbours of potential strategic value. Marcum notes, "Portuguese sources indicate that as early as 1952 an effort was made by a Soviet agent, one Feld Matvin, to unite [the nationalist movements in Angola]".⁷³

The Soviet Union provided the MPLA with various services, including publication of propaganda leaflets, supportive articles in Pravda, and training for trade union organisers linked with the National Union of Angolan Workers (União Nacional dos Trabalhadores de Angola--UNTA), a pro-MPLA labour organisation. In the United Nations the Soviet Union also consistently supported criticism of Portuguese colonialism. Moscow further sought to influence the MPLA through the PCP, with which it had close links.

CO-OPTABILITY RISES

Despite the MPLA leaders' Marxist background, the movement's unease about its rival's relationship with Washington, and the influence of the Soviet Union, for a brief period from late 1962 to mid-1963 the MPLA demonstrated rising co-optability, made overtures to the West, and moderated its rhetoric. This was due in part to the MPLA's perception that the United States was increasingly supportive of the nationalist cause and, if properly courted, might be convinced to provide the same assistance to the MPLA as that apparently on offer to Roberto's movement, renamed the FNLA in March 1962.⁷⁴ It was also partly due to the coincidental escape of the relatively pragmatic Agostinho Neto from Portugal, and his increased influence over MPLA policy. A final consideration was the MPLA's hope that the United States would exert pressure on the FNLA to form a united front on the MPLA's terms. Disappointment with the U.S. response to its overture ended the phase of higher co-optability by late 1963.

An incident in mid-1962 undoubtedly played an important role in MPLA thinking. A group of sixty MPLA activists under threat of imminent arrest in Portugal tried to flee to France in two groups. An MPLA activist who was in the first group recounted the following story in 1985:

We travelled in a convoy of cars. My car was driven by a young, well-muscled American who took us through Spain to France, and

⁷³ Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 29.

⁷⁴ Somerville, op. cit., p. 32.

we arrived safely in Paris. We had false documents that the American provided. I assumed he was CIA. The second group was arrested by Franco's police in Spain, but the U.S. ambassador in Madrid managed to get them released, and they eventually joined us in Paris.⁷⁵

Paulo Jorge, a top MPLA leader who served an extended term as Angola's foreign minister after independence, confirmed the story, and added that the U.S. Methodist church helped convince the U.S. ambassador to intervene.⁷⁶ We now know that the CIA had been secretly facilitating the travel of Angola students out of Portugal into France and Switzerland since mid 1961, so its perfectly possible that these MPLA activists did enjoy CIA assistance.

Consequently, when Neto escaped from Portugal in mid-1962 and fled first to Morocco and then to Congo-Léopoldville, there was already firm evidence that the United States was willing to provide some assistance. Neto's prison release had also given him firsthand knowledge of the power of Western liberals. When he was made president of the MPLA at the movement's First National Conference in December 1962, replacing the more radical Acting President Andrade, these experiences began to be reflected in MPLA policy.

At the conference, the movement articulated a new tactic regarding relations with the West. It described Portugal's NATO allies as "the true rulers of important sectors in the economy of Angola" because of their large economic investments.⁷⁷ Therefore, one of the goals of MPLA diplomatic activity would be to deepen economic "contradictions" inherent in Lisbon's relations with "imperialist countries in the Western Alliance".⁷⁸ The MPLA believed that the West supported the status quo in Angola in general, but also thought that the West hoped for modernisation of the colonial relationship so as to lessen the chance of eventual revolution. The MPLA believed that this difference between Portugal and the West could be turned to the nationalists' advantage.

⁷⁵ Source three, confidential interviews by author, April and May 1985.

⁷⁶ Paulo Jorge, interview by author, Luanda, Angola, 30 May 1985.

⁷⁷ The MPLA was perhaps overstating the case, because major Western investment in Angola did not begin until Portugal introduced new foreign investment legislation in 1965.

⁷⁸ MPLA First National Congress (December 1962), pp. 13-14.

The concrete policy manifestation of this new co-optability was the December 1962 MPLA conference's call for a "widening" of the range of MPLA representatives abroad and Neto's decision to undertake a foreign tour to New York, Washington, Rabat, Tunisia, Bonn, London, Paris, Switzerland, and Italy.⁷⁹

The policy shift and Neto's appointment as president were both resented by MPLA Secretary General da Cruz. He advocated a Maoist strategy, said that the MPLA should rely on its own resources without courting foreign assistance, and questioned the role of whites and mesticos in the movement. He labelled Neto a "rightist" and accused him of being an agent of the Portuguese secret police. Da Cruz was removed from the secretary general post and was eventually expelled from the movement.⁸⁰

Meanwhile, Neto implemented the new policy. In a speech to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, Neto hailed the "positive role" of that organisation and the virtues of non-alignment. "No country or organisation... [can claim] a monopoly" on aid to the Angolan struggle, he said, seeking to demonstrate independence from the Soviet Union.⁸¹ Perhaps remembering the role of Western liberals in obtaining his prison release, he lobbied at U.S. universities, re-invigorating the previous lukewarm policy of encouraging MPLA-oriented student groups in the West. While in Washington, Neto highlighted the movement's expulsion of the da Cruz faction, presenting that faction as extremist and its removal as a move towards moderation. In both New York and Washington, Neto met with representatives of Methodist organisations, renewed his acquaintance with Ralph Dodge, and obtained some promises of Methodist assistance for Angolan refugees.⁸²

Though the Methodist church was moderately supportive, U.S. government officials were unresponsive. As explained in more detail in chapter 3, the U.S. administration was in the midst of an internal debate about its co-optation policy, which the anti-co-optation group

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Khazanov, op. cit., pp. 137-138.

⁸¹ United Nations, General Assembly, Fourth Committee, "Declaration faite par M. Agostinho Neto du Mouvement Populaire de Liberation de l'Angola (MPLA)", 1427 session, 17 December 1962.

⁸² Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 14.

was gradually winning. What will there was among the embattled pro-co-optation element to intercede on Neto's behalf was perhaps undermined by his past association with "pro-communist" student groups and Radio Moscow's preference for Neto over Roberto. At the time of the visit, a Baltimore Sun article said, "[T]here [is] some doubt whether Neto [will] get much American support for the medical clinics his organization maintains in the Congo as a means of drawing support from Angolan refugees".⁸³ The press forecast was largely accurate.

Neto's effort to convince the United States to pressure the FNLA to form a common front was equally ineffective. Roberto had consistently resisted MPLA overtures for unity, and the MPLA suspected that Washington might be behind his obstinacy. For example, the MPLA believed that Roberto's support from the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) was provided on the condition that he not ally with the MPLA, though this was never proved and was denied by ACOA.⁸⁴ Neto's efforts had no effect, and in fact a mid-1963 Department of State cable said that the United States was not "in a position to exert much pressure on rival parties to coalesce".⁸⁵

In sum, the MPLA came away from its first overture to the West with little to show for its efforts. It received neutral to negative press coverage, little aid, and no diplomatic assistance for the united-front strategy.

Neto was under internal MPLA pressure to produce rapid results. The Western trip had been criticised by radical colleagues, particularly Andrade, who distrusted Washington and thought that Kennedy's apparent liberalism merely reflected a U.S. desire to replace Portuguese rule in Angola with its own neo-colonial control. When Neto's initiative produced few tangible results, the radical group's hand was strengthened, and this particular period of heightened MPLA co-optability came to an end. Perception of Western policy was clearly the primary, though not the only, cause of both the rise and fall of MPLA co-optability at this time.

⁸³ Baltimore Sun, 21 December 1962.

⁸⁴ Source three, interview.

⁸⁵ U.S. Department of State, "Circular 92" (telegram to embassies in Africa), 16 July 1963.

NATIONALIST RIVALRY

The MPLA's rivalry with the FNLA became more intense and violent in 1963 and early 1964. This had a negative effect upon the MPLA's already waning co-optability. Because the movement's leadership perceived the United States to be allied with Roberto, the increasingly acrimonious rivalry exacerbated MPLA irritation with Washington. The conflict also damaged the MPLA's relationship with a key regional power, Congo-Léopoldville, and as that power was growing closer to Washington, this reinforced MPLA disillusionment with the West. The nationalist rivalry also caused factional problems within the MPLA that weakened its international credibility and had a long-term impact upon the conditions of armed struggle that subsequently damaged the movement's co-optability.

At the heart of the 1963 to 1964 rivalry was competition for access to Congo-Léopoldville, which both movements considered the best base for launching guerrilla operations into Angola. Before Congo-Léopoldville's independence from Belgium in June 1960 this issue had been irrelevant, because the colonial authorities had been hostile to both Angolan nationalist movements.

Initially the MPLA was better positioned than the FNLA to gain access to the Congo-Léopoldville border. It had good relations with the neighbouring country's first leader, Patrice Lumumba, who shared some of the MPLA's philosophical views and was also sympathetically regarded by the Soviet Union. The MPLA's fortunes then declined with those of Lumumba, who was assassinated in January 1961, apparently by rivals, though the CIA had planned an unsuccessful assassination attempt months earlier.⁸⁶ Congo-Léopoldville was then run by the government of Premier Cyrille Adoula, with the support of the United States, while the United Nations tried to bring an end to the country's civil war. The MPLA's past association with Lumumba's supporters, who were pursuing a guerrilla war against the new regime, did little to improve MPLA relations with Adoula. In addition, Holden Roberto had lived in Congo-Léopoldville for a long period and had close personal ties with Adoula. Although the Congo-Léopoldville government officially aided both Angolan organisations, the FNLA was increasingly able to prevent the MPLA from using the neighbouring territory to launch operations.

⁸⁶ Mahoney, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-88.

In April 1963, the tensions between the two guerrilla organisations broke into the open and the FNLA attacked an MPLA contingent that had recently crossed over into Angolan territory from Congo-Léopoldville. Ten MPLA guerrillas died, and the organisation's operations inside Angola declined.⁸⁷ They only continued in Angola's Cabinda enclave, and there at a reduced level.

The tensions between the MPLA, the FNLA, and Adoula eventually damaged the MPLA's relationship with the United States. On 29 June 1963, Adoula officially recognised the FNLA's exile "government", the Revolutionary Angolan Government in Exile (Govêrno Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio--GRAE). U.S. financial aid for the Adoula government, and the fact that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams met Adoula a few days before the announcement, strengthened suspicion of U.S. involvement in the decision.⁸⁸ Indeed, the MPLA's Lúcio Lára claimed that the move was "inspired by American imperialists" to prevent the development of a "revolutionary nationalist" option in Angola.⁸⁹ What inclination the MPLA had to pursue closer ties with the United States was clearly further eroded.

MPLA fury at Adoula and the United States was probably inflamed by the knowledge that lack of access to the Congo-Léopoldville border would damage its relationship with the newly formed Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was formed in May 1963 in Addis Ababa and a special fund and "liberation committee" were established to aid nationalist movements. The OAU was determined to try to bring unity to the Angolan liberation struggle, and sent a goodwill mission to Léopoldville, which arrived on 14 July. In discussions with the mission the FNLA was able to stress its military accomplishments, made possible by Adoula's friendly attitude, and invited the OAU representatives to visit its bases within Angola. Neto had to concede that the MPLA did not have an organisational structure within Angola, and that the Congo-Léopoldville frontier was under Roberto's control. The MPLA presentation was further damaged by an internal split. A faction led by the previously expelled da Cruz insisted that the MPLA would have to come to terms with the FNLA so as to gain access to the border

⁸⁷ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 45.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 79.

⁸⁹ Interview with Lára in Robert Davies, Les Angolais (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1965), p. 203.

facilities. On 7 July that faction had broken up a meeting of the Neto group and the Congo-Léopoldville police had intervened. During the OAU mission's deliberations later in the month, da Cruz was given an opportunity to testify and attacked Neto's policies.⁹⁰

On 18 July 1963, the OAU committee presented its findings to an open session of the entire OAU organisation. Because the FNLA's "fighting force" was "far larger than any other", the committee reported, it controlled "the only real fighting front in Angola". Referring to the MPLA's small operation in the Cabinda enclave, the committee found that the "continued presence of another minor front would hinder the rapid achievement of independence". Therefore, the mission concluded it was "necessary for the FNLA to continue the leadership that has so far proven effective".⁹¹

The committee made the following recommendations: (1) all external aid to the Angolan rebels should be channelled through the Congo-Léopoldville government and earmarked for the FNLA; (2) the "fighting force of the MPLA" should seek admission into the FNLA; (3) African governments should not give support to any group except the FNLA; and (4) the OAU Council of Ministers at its next meeting should recommend that all African governments recognise Roberto's government in exile, the GRAE.⁹²

Neto reacted bitterly, and later attributed the MPLA defeat in the OAU to "American imperialism" and "its agents" combined with African "concessions to reaction".⁹³

Clearly, the Adoula recognition of the GRAE and the decision to allow Roberto exclusive access to the Congo-Léopoldville border with Angola had severe repercussions for the MPLA's relationship with the neighbouring state. To the extent that the MPLA thought that Adoula was acting on U.S. instructions, MPLA relations with Washington were damaged.

Following the OAU decision, the MPLA was obliged to move out of Congo-Léopoldville and was accepted in Congo-Brazzaville. Almost

⁹⁰ "General Report of the Goodwill Mission", quoted in Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 94-96.

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 97-98.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ "Discours de Agostinho Neto", CONCP Second Conference (Dar es Salaam, October 1965, mimeo).

immediately, a coup brought down the government of Congo-Brazzaville's President Fulbert Youlou, who had been in the midst of friendly discussions with the Portuguese and probably would not have offered the MPLA much assistance. He was replaced by a new radical regime, led by Alphonse Massamba-Debat. The new government was restricted by the OAU's order that all aid go to Roberto, but nonetheless was ideologically compatible with the MPLA.

The decline in MPLA co-optability caused by the above developments was clearly evident when the movement held a Cadres Conference in Brazzaville from 3 to 10 January 1964. The meeting criticised the movement's leadership, implicitly targeting Neto, and produced a new party programme. Its introduction reflected the MPLA's disillusionment with the West:

In reality, the Portuguese colonialists, the imperialists, and their agents are the main enemies of the Angolan people. They use all methods in order to maintain Portuguese sovereignty in Angola and to continue to oppress and exploit the Angolan people....⁹⁴

The rest of the document confirmed the revolutionary character of the MPLA, and called for "the abolition of all privileges conceded to Portugal and other foreigners", land reform under the slogan of "The Land Belongs to Those Who Work It", and "nationalisation of the land of the enemies". The party pledged itself to defend "the interests of comrade peasants and workers, the two most important groups in the country". Furthermore, the programme proclaimed that the MPLA would be "allied to all the progressive forces of the world".⁹⁵

The voice of moderation was not entirely absent from the programme, however. The MPLA still said that sovereignty would belong to "all the Angolan people, without regard to ethnicity, class, race, sex, age, political tendencies, religious beliefs, or philosophical convictions". It promised to encourage "private industry and commerce useful for the economy of the state and the life of the people" and to protect "economic enterprises exploited by foreigners that are useful to the life, progress, and reinforcement of the total independence of the Angolan people". Finally, it called for "non-adherence to a

⁹⁴ Programa Político--Aprovado na Conferência de Quadros (Luanda: Edições DIP/MPLA, January 1964).

⁹⁵ Ibid.

military bloc" and promised that the party would "forbid foreign military bases on national territory".⁹⁶

In other words, the MPLA was annoyed with the West, blamed it for the slow pace of the liberation struggle and for Roberto's victory in the OAU, and still envisioned a socialist post-independence Angola. At the same time, the MPLA could see the advantages of maintaining at least some foreign investment and looked towards a non-aligned foreign policy, albeit one allied with the world's "progressive forces".

SUMMARY

The MPLA's modest level of co-optability during its first eight years of existence was due in part to the background of its leaders. Angola's economic structure, specifically its relative prosperity and integration with Portugal, created opportunities for a small number of nationalists to study in Europe. Portuguese repression in Angola made those opportunities even more attractive. The Marxist thought absorbed by the early leaders in Europe was then reinforced by the support and advice supplied by the PCP. The MPLA's Marxist orientation, combined with the ambition of its leaders, also contributed to the decision to form the MPLA as an artificial front that defined the post-independence society for which it was fighting in quasi-socialist terms, though insisting that nationalists of all ideologies were welcome. Once the movement was formed, Soviet largesse further consolidated its leftist orientation.

The anti-Western forces were not powerful enough, however, to prevent the MPLA from adopting a more open attitude towards the West from late 1962 to early 1963, primarily in response to its perception of a pro-nationalist shift in the United States. The emergence of a new leader who had firsthand experience of the assistance that Western liberals could provide also motivated this adjustment. The MPLA was slow to react to U.S. policy, however, and by the time it approached Washington the United States was returning to a pro-Portugal stance. Disillusionment with U.S. policy, together with growing rivalry with the FNLA, which was perceived as U.S.-backed, not only ended the brief period of rising co-optability, but caused the movement to become even more hostile to the West than it had been before the overture.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

Because the MPLA's initial low level of co-optability was not primarily due to its perception of Western policies, it seems unlikely that friendlier Western actions would have converted the movement into a pro-Western organisation. However, if the West had pursued a co-optation strategy, the modest 1962-1963 rise in co-optability probably could have been sustained.

CHAPTER 2
FRELIMO: EARLY CO-OPTABILITY

FRELIMO was highly co-optable during the two years following its 1962 founding. Its platform was nationalistic, calling for complete Mozambican independence, but the ideological content of its founding documents was largely compatible with classic liberal democratic principles. Furthermore, the FRELIMO leadership appeared anxious to establish good relations with the West.

Three main factors contributed to FRELIMO's high level of co-optability: the background of the FRELIMO leadership; the movement's formation as a relatively genuine, rather than an artificial, front; and the influence of the movement's non-Western allies. As in the case of the MPLA, the first factor was influenced by the territory's economic structure and the actions of the direct enemy, Portugal. Another subsidiary factor, the movement's perception of Western policies, reinforced FRELIMO's high co-optability once the organisation was formed, but was not the original stimulus for the movement's open attitude towards the West.

A final dynamic that subsequently became important, internal factionalism, was present at a low level in this early phase. It was most evident in the internal debate about guerrilla strategy. That debate subsequently resulted in decisions that militated against co-optability. So, even though FRELIMO was highly co-optable during this period, dynamics that would later push it towards a more hard-line position were already evident.

BACKGROUND OF THE NATIONALISTS

For a variety of reasons, only a few of the nationalists who later formed FRELIMO's leadership were initially exposed to Marxist ideas.

Mozambique's early colonial history played an important role. Unlike in Angola, where the slave trade had led to a small but sustained white presence in two coastal cities, creating a creole anciens assimilés elite, the slave trade was "less sustained and pervasive along Mozambique's coast".⁹⁷ Mozambique had served the Portuguese as a resupply point for travel to the Portuguese holdings in Asia, and when Spain took over Portugal in 1580, Lisbon lost its Asian

⁹⁷ Minter, Apartheid's Contras, op. cit., p. 47.

empire. "...[W]hites in Mozambique were cut off from contact with the mother country [and]...[t]heir communities degenerated into isolated, decadent fiefdoms".⁹⁸ In the 19th century the old creole elite resided in the north of the country, in the Zambezi valley, in Zambézia, in the Island of Mocambique, and in the Island of Ibo. However, developments in the 20th century marginalised these elites socially and politically. The old creole centres were neglected and the two main cities of Beira and Lourenço Marques were "created out of nothing to serve the needs of the British hinterland".⁹⁹ Michel Cahen explains that "[a]s a result, the urban African elite had nothing on which to depend, no tradition. It was to be a Creole formation of the 20th century, entirely subordinated by the dynamics of modern Portuguese colonialism".¹⁰⁰ Therefore, borrowing Messiant's terminology from the Angola context, there were very few anciens assimilés with access to European education, where they might encounter Marxist thought. As Cahen has noted, "...[c]ontrary to Angola, there was no rapport between the communist pockets that had existed in Mozambique and...Frelimo. These pockets had been exclusively white and even weaker than in Angola".¹⁰¹

The nature of Mozambique's economy was also partially responsible for sheltering the nationalists from radical political theories. Unlike Angola, which was economically fairly self-sufficient with considerable mineral and agricultural resources, Mozambique was a service economy based on the provision of transport facilities to South Africa and Rhodesia and the export of labour. Workers from northern Mozambique were sent to neighbouring Anglophone territories as contract workers or fled to those territories to avoid Portugal's forced-labour requirements. In the British colonies, Mozambican migrants were allowed to join trade unions, experiencing organised political activity for the first time. They learned English, tuned into the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World Service, and heard of the independence campaigns under way in other countries.¹⁰²

⁹⁸ Noer, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

⁹⁹ Cahen, "Check on Socialism in Mozambique", *op. cit.*, p. 49.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Cahen, Mozambique, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

¹⁰² Munslow, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-79.

These migrants subsequently played a major role in the founding of the parties that were to join together to become FRELIMO. The National Democratic Union of Mozambique (União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique--UDENAMO) was influenced by Joshua Nkomo's nationalist movement in Rhodesia. Among FRELIMO's precursors, UDENAMO had the most radical programme. Its founding document used the term "vanguard", criticised "imperialistic exploitation", and pledged the organisation to defend all the people, "particularly the claims made by peasant and worker masses".¹⁰³ UDENAMO's rhetoric was not, however, explicitly Marxist.

The Mozambique African National Union (MANU) was founded in Kenya. It was modelled on that country's leading nationalist organisation, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), and actually used English in its title. MANU was dominated by the Makonde ethnic group of northern Mozambique.

Finally, the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente--UNAMI) was founded in Malawi. It derived its support primarily from the people of Tete province. Both MANU and UNAMI had fairly non-ideological platforms.¹⁰⁴

If Mozambique had possessed a different economic structure, with more links to Europe, larger numbers of the early leaders might have been exposed to a more ideological brand of nationalism.

The background of the early nationalists was also influenced by Portuguese policies, particularly Lisbon's neglect of Africans' educational needs, which was even more acute in Mozambique than in Angola.¹⁰⁵ In the mid-1950s, only ten of the six million Africans in Mozambique were in academic high schools.¹⁰⁶ This lack of educational access militated against exposure to Marxist ideology. Much of FRELIMO's middle-level leadership subsequently came from the pool of poorly educated youths resident inside Mozambique. This meant that the

¹⁰³ Edward A. Alpers, "The Struggle for Socialism in Mozambique, 1960-1972", in Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment, ed. Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1979), p. 270.

¹⁰⁴ Munslow, *op. cit.*, pp. 79-80.

¹⁰⁵ Isaacman and Isaacman, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

¹⁰⁶ John A. Marcum, "A Martyr for Mozambique", Africa Report, March-April 1969, p. 6.

middle-level leaders were most concerned about independence and gave little thought to the applicability of Marxism to post-independence Mozambican society.

FRELIMO's first leader, Eduardo Mondlane, was one of the very few Mozambicans to study abroad. However, he also happened to receive most of his education in the United States and to be heavily influenced by Christian rather than Marxist philosophy. Mondlane had such an impact upon the movement's character that it is worthwhile tracing his background in detail.

Born in 1920, this son of a Tonga chief was the first member of his family to receive education. His early experiences were in Protestant institutions run by missionaries. He attended a Swiss primary school, a Methodist agricultural school, and then travelled to South Africa to attend a Swiss secondary school in the Transvaal. In 1948, he became the first Mozambican African to enter the Witwatersrand University in Johannesburg. In 1949, the South African government declared him an "unwanted foreign student" and cancelled his student permit, probably in response to his founding of the Nucleus of Mozambican Students (Núcleo dos Estudantes de Moçambique-NEM), an organisation for local Mozambican students that criticised Portugal.¹⁰⁷

Upon his return to the Mozambican capital, Lourenço Marques (renamed Maputo after independence), Mondlane was arrested by the Portuguese and interrogated concerning NEM. Apparently hoping to cure Mondlane's radicalism with a dose of Portuguese education, in 1950 the authorities permitted him to take up a scholarship in Lisbon arranged through Protestant channels and the Phelps Stokes Fund in New York. Harassed by the Portuguese security police, Mondlane subsequently requested that his scholarship be transferred to the United States, and he entered Oberlin College in September 1951 at the age of thirty-one. He obtained his Bachelor of Arts degree in 1953 and went on to do graduate work in sociology and anthropology at Northwestern University, obtaining a master's degree and a doctorate.¹⁰⁸ In 1957, Mondlane went to work for the United Nations. When Tanganyika (now part of Tanzania) gained independence in December 1961, making physical access to

¹⁰⁷ Herbert Shore, "Resistance and Revolution in the Life of Eduardo Mondlane", introductory chapter in The Struggle for Mozambique, by Eduardo Mondlane (London: Penguin Books, 1969), p. xix.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

northern Mozambique possible, Mondlane resigned his United Nations job, which restricted his political activity, and took up a more permissive teaching post at Syracuse University. In June 1962, Mondlane finally arrived in the Tanganyikan capital, Dar es Salaam, and was named president of the newly formed FRELIMO.

According to one of Mondlane's biographers, Herbert Shore, Mondlane came to the United States a dedicated Christian, "firm in the belief that the principles and teachings of Christianity applied to the political and social world could form the basis for the ultimate liberation of his people".¹⁰⁹ Mondlane was active in Christian movements in the United States, and indeed it was at such a workshop that he met the American woman he was eventually to marry, Janet Rae Johnson. The connection between Mondlane's Christianity and his politics was clearly evident in one of his first letters to Janet. He wrote in 1951, "I am one of those who believes that, unless Christian ideals are put into practise, they are of no use".¹¹⁰

Mondlane was exposed to Marxist literature while abroad. He became familiar with the thinking of Mao Tse-tung, Fidel Castro, and Ho Chi Minh, and studied both the Yugoslav and Russian revolutions. Although clearly perceiving considerable overlap between his own Christian nationalist ideas and the socialist-style nationalism espoused by these leaders, he believed that none of their strategies were directly applicable to Mozambique.¹¹¹

Mondlane was also open to cordial relations with the West. This was illustrated by his friendly relations with officials in the U.S. Department of State, especially in the early months of 1961 when the new Kennedy administration took office. He apparently "found a particularly sympathetic listener in Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy".¹¹²

The other important FRELIMO leader with a high level of education was Marcelino dos Santos. Of mixed race, he studied in Portugal and Paris, and was influenced by the same radical ideological environment that affected the MPLA leaders. However, the ethnic

¹⁰⁹ Shore, op. cit., p. xxi.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. xxix.

¹¹² Marcum, "A Martyr for Mozambique", op. cit., p. 8.

background of dos Santos was a handicap that prevented him from being considered for the top post, and his ideological influence was therefore muted.

The rest of FRELIMO's initial leadership consisted of two types of people. A rural, commercial petty bourgeois group, and a collection of urban Africans who had occupied some of the very few jobs open to non-whites.¹¹³ Cahen has noted that the sectors from which FRELIMO grew had tenuous links with production. There were "just lowly office workers, commercial sector employees and health auxiliaries".¹¹⁴ At the time FRELIMO was formed, Mozambique had fewer than 5,000 assimilados and the mestico population was very small. Both groups were dependent on salaries. The situation did change somewhat in the 1960s, with better access to education and the growth of black merchants, "but the elite who created Frelimo were those who were ten years old around 1940 and 1950",¹¹⁵ well before reforms opened some additional doors to Africans.

THE FORMATION OF FRELIMO

FRELIMO was officially founded in 1962 when the three major Mozambican nationalist groups--UDENAMO, MANU, and UNAMI-moved their headquarters to Dar es Salaam and agreed to form a united front. Significantly, the members of each organisation entered the front individually, rather than as part of their original party grouping. Thus, FRELIMO was a true joining together of separate movements that pledged to give up their identity in favour of the new organisation.

The pressure for formation of a genuine front came not from the exile organisations but from activists within Mozambique. As a FRELIMO publication later remarked, "The existing, externally based organisations which joined hands to form FRELIMO... did so reluctantly, and largely at the urging of younger, unattached militants [from] inside Mozambique itself".¹¹⁶ Only four of those elected to the leadership came from exile. Because the bulk of the mid-level

¹¹³ Cahen, Mozambique, op. cit., p. 157.

¹¹⁴ Cahen, "Check on Socialism in Mozambique", op. cit., p. 49.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 49-50.

¹¹⁶ FRELIMO, Editorial, Mozambique Revolution, no. 61 (April-June 1972), p. 1.

leadership was affiliated with none of the exile organisations, and neither Mondlane nor Marcelino dos Santos (president and vice president respectively) were so affiliated, the tendency to favour one organisation over another in the process of forming the front was reduced.

Because FRELIMO formed as a genuine front, its policies had to accommodate the views of all three constituent parts, the bourgeois nationalist MANU and UNAMI and the more radical UDENAMO. Though the UDENAMO constitution formed the basis for FRELIMO's, the former's language was toned down sufficiently to accommodate more conservative views and permit genuine unity. For example, the word "vanguard" was dropped, as was the reference to the need for "particular" attention to be given to "the claims made by peasant and worker masses".¹¹⁷ The movement's First Congress, held in September 1962, called for "installation of a democratic regime based on total independence", declared that all Mozambicans would be equal, and promised to bring "economic reconstruction and development of production so as to transform Mozambique from a colonial and underdeveloped country into an economically independent country, industrial, developed, modern, prosperous, and strong".¹¹⁸ There was no reference to socialism or to re-distribution of wealth, and Marxist terminology was completely absent.

Most of the party's initial foreign policy pronouncements were similarly neutral. The platform promised that FRELIMO would collaborate with all countries "on the basis of mutual respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and reciprocity of benefits, and pacific co-existence". Equally importantly, it committed FRELIMO to "forbid foreign military bases on the national territory" and to "non-adhesion to a military bloc".¹¹⁹

There were a few emotive phrases, but their tone was generally nationalistic and anti-racist rather than socialist. The Congress's "General Declaration" referred to Patrice Lumumba as an "African hero", condemned South African policies in South West Africa, and attacked the

¹¹⁷ Alpers, op. cit., p. 270.

¹¹⁸ FRELIMO, "Estatutos e Programa--1962", in Documentos Base da FRELIMO (Maputo: Tempografica, 1977), p. 33.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 34-35.

"retrograde policy of authorities in Southern Rhodesia",¹²⁰ while the platform called for the "abolition of the emigration accords between Mozambique and South Africa, and other colonial countries".¹²¹ All these points were compatible with liberal democratic values.

Of all the foreign policy statements, just one, the Declaration's announcement that FRELIMO "expresses the most energetic indignation... against all countries that supply Portugal and help maintain its regime", could be construed as criticising the West.¹²² It is noteworthy that FRELIMO's one anti-Western comment was based on operational rather than ideological concerns. FRELIMO did not criticise Western countries for being capitalist or exploitative, but merely for supplying Portugal. FRELIMO's founding documents also never referred to the Eastern bloc directly. The closest the movement came to such a reference was the Declaration's affirmation of solidarity with undefined "anti-imperialist forces in the world".¹²³

In a series of works, Cahen argues that FRELIMO never did become truly socialist, that it really represented an elite's desire to construct a modern cohesive state with a national consciousness, and that the Marxism it later espoused was not genuine.¹²⁴ Similarly, Hall and Young argue that FRELIMO later acquired Marxist trappings because it was psychologically appealing (for reasons discussed in chapter 5), not because it responded to their concrete experience or class interests.¹²⁵ While one may dispute these conclusions regarding later periods in FRELIMO's development, the authors are absolutely correct about the state of the movement in its early days. Its documents

¹²⁰ FRELIMO, "Declaração Geral", in Documentos Base da FRELIMO (Maputo: Tempografica, 1977), p. 16.

¹²¹ FRELIMO, "Estatutos e Programa--1962", op. cit., p. 34.

¹²² FRELIMO, "Declaração Geral", op. cit., p. 22.

¹²³ Ibid., pp. 15-17.

¹²⁴ Cahen, "Corporatisme et colonialisme: Approche du cas mozambicain, 1933-1979. I", op. cit.

_____, "Corporatisme et colonialisme: Approche du cas mozambicain, 1933-1979. II", op. cit.

_____, "Le Portugal et l'Afrique", op. cit.

_____, "Check on Socialism in Mozambique", op. cit.

_____, Mozambique: La Révolution Implosée, op. cit.

¹²⁵ Hall and Young, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

espoused very little that was incompatible with bourgeois liberal democracy.

In sum, during its early years FRELIMO could have been enticed into a close relationship with the West relatively easily. If the movement had not perceived certain Western countries to be supporting Portugal, the documentary record implies, FRELIMO would have had no quarrel with the West whatsoever.

PERCEPTION OF WESTERN POLICY

Immediately after FRELIMO's founding, its openness towards the West was reinforced by the leadership's perception that one important Western country, the United States, supported its goals. As FRELIMO did not immediately turn against the West when it perceived the United States to be reducing that support, however, perception of Western policy was not a primary motivation for FRELIMO's co-optability, but rather was a reinforcing, secondary factor.

After FRELIMO's First Congress, Mondlane returned to the United States to fulfill his contract with Syracuse University and used the opportunity to canvass for U.S. assistance. In particular, he wanted funds for the new Mozambique Institute being established in Dar es Salaam to educate young FRELIMO members. He eventually convinced the Ford Foundation to provide \$100,000 for the Institute's expenses. Initial FRELIMO relations with Washington also were friendly. Mondlane said that during the early days of Kennedy's presidency, the United States went through "a period of equivocation and seemed to be moving toward support for us".¹²⁶ The U.S. press returned the compliment, labelling Mondlane "a staunchly pro-American 'moderate'".¹²⁷ In early 1962, the New York-based African-American Institute, with CIA funding according to Mahoney, provided university training for pro-independence Mozambican exiles.¹²⁸ Indeed, the level of U.S. assistance to Mozambican students accelerated so fast in 1961 that in August of that year the U.S. consul in Lourenço Marques warned Washington that the program could not stay secret for very long, and fretted about potential

¹²⁶ Helen Kitchen, "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane", Africa Report, November 1967, p. 51.

¹²⁷ Marcum, "A Martyr for Mozambique", op. cit., p. 8.

¹²⁸ Mahoney, op. cit., p. 205.

Portuguese reaction.¹²⁹ In May 1963, Mondlane met with Robert F. Kennedy, and asked for direct military aid to FRELIMO. While Kennedy did apparently arrange a CIA subsidy for the Mondlane's travel costs, the request for military aid received no answer.¹³⁰ It is now known that just three days before the Mondlane/Kennedy meeting the CIA issued a memo concluding that FRELIMO was "weak" and not likely to attract "an effective political following". The CIA concluded that the Angolan conflict was more important, and the outcome there would determine the settlement in Mozambique.¹³¹ This may have accounted for Kennedy's non-response to Mondlane's request.

Towards the end of 1963, FRELIMO's relationship with the United States deteriorated. For various reasons (see chapter 3), the United States began to respond to Portuguese pressure to reduce its already modest support. Mondlane's disappointment was clear. He told President Kennedy:

The needs of the liberation forces are many, but none so great as a change in United States policy towards Portuguese colonialism. Friends of freedom and democracy cannot comprehend why the United States does not move to the forefront in this struggle for freedom. It is inconceivable to us that the United States must remain silent and secretive to placate Portugal.¹³²

Mondlane's language showed that he still perceived no inherent incompatibility between the interests of Western capitalism and FRELIMO. He was disappointed, but no less open to Western overtures than previously.

ROLE OF NON-WESTERN ALLIES

During its first two years, FRELIMO obtained support from a wide range of non-Western states, often receiving assistance from rivals simultaneously. Middle Eastern enemies Egypt and Israel¹³³ provided training facilities, as did Algeria. Tanzania's close relationship with Beijing meant that FRELIMO was well placed to appeal for Chinese assistance. Mondlane thought that the Chinese guerrilla experience was

¹²⁹ Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, op. cit., pp. 265-266.

¹³⁰ Mahoney, op. cit., p. 237. See also Noer, op. cit., p. 98.

¹³¹ Noer, op. cit., pp. 98-99.

¹³² Marcum, "A Martyr for Mozambique", op. cit., p. 8.

¹³³ Joao Reis and Armando Pedro Muiuane, eds., Datas e Documentos da História da FRELIMO (Imprensa Nacional: Maputo, 1975), p. 55.

applicable to Mozambique, because Mao Tse-tung stressed the importance of peasant support. The Beijing connection did not discourage FRELIMO from courting the Soviet Union, however, which also provided some training facilities.¹³⁴

Clearly, FRELIMO took help wherever it could find it, without regard to the donors' ideology, and perceived no contradiction in simultaneously maintaining good relations with countries barely on speaking terms with each other. Whether by design or accident, this guaranteed that there was no possibility of allies joining forces to pressure FRELIMO to adopt a certain policy, regarding relations with the West or other matters.

ABSENCE OF A CREDIBLE RIVAL

FRELIMO suffered from some factionalism immediately after its formation. However, the splits did not result in the formation of a credible rival party and had no impact upon the organisation's co-optability at that time.

The first split occurred when FRELIMO's secretary general, David Mabunda, sought to block the participation of another Central Committee member and was then himself expelled.¹³⁵ He went to Cairo, together with his supporters Paulo Gumane and Joao Mungwambe, and sought to recreate UDENAMO. They later renamed their organisation the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (Comissão Revolucionário de Moçambique--COREMO).¹³⁶ The motivation for the split appeared to be power rivalry rather than ideology.

Shortly afterwards, former MANU activists Mateus Mole and Milinga Malinga were accused of using FRELIMO "as a method of enriching themselves at the expense of the struggle for national liberation" and were removed from the Central Committee.¹³⁷

Disruptive though the splits were, they did not tear the organisation apart. Unlike the situation in Angola, the defectors were

¹³⁴ Warren Weinstein and Thomas H. Henriksen, eds., Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 61-62.

¹³⁵ FRELIMO, "Segundo Congresso da FRELIMO: Discurso Oficial do Comitê Central", in Documentos Base da FRELIMO (Maputo: Tempografica, 1977), p. 55.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 55-56.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

not able to launch significant rival organisations. This fact was confirmed by FRELIMO's 1963 recognition by the OAU as the sole legitimate liberation movement in Mozambique.

CONDITIONS OF ARMED STRUGGLE

FRELIMO did not launch armed struggle during the 1962 to 1963 period, but it did decide that such struggle should be undertaken soon. It began a debate about the character of the future struggle that was to have an important impact upon the organisation's subsequent co-optability.

The decision to launch armed struggle was related to FRELIMO's evaluation of the character of the direct enemy, Portugal. A 1960 massacre at Mueda in northern Mozambique, in which five hundred Africans staging a peaceful protest were killed by the Portuguese, had convinced most of the new FRELIMO members that negotiation would be futile. FRELIMO therefore decided to establish a secret military programme, to be activated, in Mondlane's words, after "a clandestine political force within Mozambique [had] prepar[ed] the people for the very difficult task of liberating the country".¹³⁸

But while the party was unified on the necessity of armed struggle, there were divergent views regarding how that struggle should be waged. Some leaders wanted a sudden insurrection, similar to Roberto's uprising in Angola. An overlapping group favoured urban-based operations. Still others, including Mondlane, believed a long guerrilla war would be necessary. In addition, Mondlane argued that the struggle would have to make its base in the countryside:

Both the agitation of the intellectuals and the strikes of the labour force were doomed to failure because in both cases it was the action of only a tiny isolated group.... The urban population of Mozambique amounts to altogether less than half a million. A nationalist movement without firm roots in the countryside would never hope to succeed.¹³⁹

At the First Congress, military strategy differences were glossed over in the interest of unity, and the meeting decided to send young men to Algeria for training without a firm idea what to do with them afterwards. By January 1963, the first fifty trainees arrived in North Africa.

¹³⁸ Kitchen, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

¹³⁹ Eduardo Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique (London: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 116.

During 1963, FRELIMO also started the previously planned politicisation campaign in northern Mozambique, preparing the ground for armed struggle. The strategy was to befriend local chiefs, thereby gaining an audience with the peasantry, and explain the goals for which FRELIMO would be fighting. A 1966 article in the FRELIMO publication A Voz da Revolução explained:

Political mobilisation consists of explaining to the people WHY IT IS that they are fighting and FOR WHAT IT IS that they are fighting. The people must know that we are fighting for the expulsion of the Portuguese colonialists and for the liberation of Mozambique, so that Progress, Liberty and Equality should return to our country.¹⁴⁰

It is noteworthy that FRELIMO's aims, as outlined to the peasants, were still those of liberal democracy.

The politicisation campaign showed that one option, urban insurrection, had already been disregarded. The choice between prolonged rural struggle and a quick uprising was still not made, though Mondlane was vigorously pushing for the former. The debate had no impact upon FRELIMO's co-optability in the period under discussion, but was to play a crucial role during the following years.

SUMMARY

FRELIMO's high degree of co-optability in the 1962 to 1963 period was not due to its perception of Western policy. FRELIMO was co-optable because of three factors over which the West had little control. First, the background of most of FRELIMO's future leaders did not predispose them to embrace Marxist philosophy. The activists inside Mozambique had a low level of education, and those in neighbouring African territories were primarily exposed to bourgeois nationalist rather than Marxist nationalist influences. The most important FRELIMO leader who was exposed to Marxism, Eduardo Mondlane, did not incorporate it uncritically into his philosophy and was equally influenced by Christian values. Second, the eventual formation of FRELIMO as a genuine front, in which all three constituent parts subsumed themselves in the new organisation, required the movement's platform to be broad enough to encompass a variety of views, including openness to Western governments. Third, the fact that FRELIMO sought and obtained support

¹⁴⁰ A Voz da Revolução, April 1966, quoted in Alpers, op. cit., p. 277. Emphasis in original.

from a heterogeneous group of non-Western allies meant that there was little coordinated anti-Western pressure on the movement.

Initial FRELIMO perception of U.S. sympathy was not the driving force behind its co-optability. The relatively modest role of the perception-of-Western-policy factor was clearly illustrated by Mondlane's reaction to the cooling of relations with the United States towards the end of the period. He was disappointed, but no less open to Western overtures than previously.

CHAPTER 3
ABORTED U.S. CO-OPTATION

Among the Western countries, the United States was the most active during this early period of the nationalist struggle and will therefore be the focus of analysis.

Shortly after Kennedy's inauguration, the United States began to pursue a co-optation policy. The administration voted against Portugal when the colonial question arose in the United Nations, was anxious to meet with leaders of the nationalist movements to exchange views, and indeed financially assisted some nationalists. The policy then abruptly shifted from co-optation to neglect. The United States began to support Portugal in United Nations votes, and dialogue with the nationalists was curtailed.

The most important factor that influenced the decision to pursue co-optation was internal U.S. politics, though relations with the Soviet Union also played a significant role. The decision to abandon co-optation stemmed primarily from strategic considerations, though internal U.S. politics and relations with the Soviet Union were again relevant.

In neither decision did U.S. perception of the nationalists' policies play a crucial role. It did not motivate the decision to try to co-opt the movements, nor did it prompt that policy to be abandoned. (It did influence the vigour with which the administration pursued the respective nationalist groups during the pro-co-optation policy phase, but this related to the fine-tuning of an already decided grand strategy, rather than to the design of the overall policy direction itself.) These facts suggest that even if the nationalists had displayed a higher level of co-optability, the U.S. movement first towards and then away from a co-optation strategy would have been no different.

Finally, as the U.S. sought to find a solution to the Portuguese colonial question, several of its officials drew conclusions regarding the links between economic and political structures that were later to play an important role in the eventual decolonisation of the territories.

THE CO-OPTATION INITIATIVE

When John F. Kennedy became president in January 1961, he inherited a policy respectful of Portugal's colonial position in Africa. The approach under his predecessor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, was best illustrated by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs John C. Satterwaite's congressional testimony. In early 1960, he told the U.S. Senate:

One of the criticisms of U.S. foreign policy... is that the United States is too considerate of its NATO allies with respect to their African territories. Now... the United states cannot carry out foreign relations in a vacuum... [I]t is evident and well known that Portugal has for many years now maintained the position that its overseas territories are an integral part of Portugal and... there is no evidence that they intend to change this policy. I should also point out that this is a country with which we have important base agreements.¹⁴¹

Satterwaite voiced doubts about the hope expressed by other witnesses that the emerging African nations would be "neutral", saying, "[I]n this day and age there is little that happens in the world which does not have a cold war aspect".¹⁴²

President Eisenhower's actions reflected similar assumptions. In May 1960, he visited Lisbon and praised the "real progress" Portuguese Premier António de Oliveira Salazar was making in Africa.¹⁴³ In December of the same year, the U.S. continued past policy and abstained in a United Nations General Assembly vote on a resolution dealing with Portugal's obligation to provide information on its overseas territories.

In July 1957, while a Senator in the U.S. Congress, Kennedy criticised U.S. opposition to the Algerian nationalists' efforts to obtain independence from France, and condemned Washington's reluctance to support global self determination. Kennedy labeled Eisenhower's attitude towards decolonisation as "a head in the sand policy" that and

¹⁴¹ Testimony of John C. Satterwaite, U.S. assistant secretary of state, United States Foreign Policy, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960, pp. 134-135.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 136.

¹⁴³ Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 181.

"earned the suspicion of all".¹⁴⁴ While a Senator, Kennedy also met with Holden Roberto.¹⁴⁵

It is not surprising, then, that one of Kennedy's early moves as president was to replace Eisenhower's pro-Portugal bureaucrats with his own personnel. He encouraged the recruitment and promotion of analysts with regionalist/long-term rather than globalist/short-term perspectives. His protégés tended to view Africa's conflicts as the result of local conditions rather than primarily the result of Soviet machinations. He believed that U.S. interests would be better served by supporting the nationalists' independence goals (and thereby reducing the chances for protracted struggle and radical revolution) than by supporting Portugal's colonial claims.

One of the new president's first personnel decisions was to make G. Mennen Williams assistant secretary of state for African affairs. During his Senate confirmation hearings, Williams advocated a pro-nationalist posture:

...[W]e are trying to help the African countries find what they call their African personality, to get their own freedom of actions.... We would like to see... that these countries have a strong enough political foundation to make their own determination as to what seems best to them and a strong enough economic basis to carry this out, and I think that we have enough confidence in the appropriateness of our free system and also of the causes that we in the West espouse that if they are really independent that we are not going to come off second best.¹⁴⁶

Former governor of Connecticut Chester Bowles echoed the same sentiments during his confirmation as under secretary of state. After listing African desire for freedom, economic growth, better education, and health, he remarked:

...[I]n other words, what we want for them is precisely what they want for themselves.... This underscores the enormous, universal, potentially close relationships that we have with these undeveloped peoples.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ Noer, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

¹⁴⁵ Mahoney, op. cit., pp. 19-25.

¹⁴⁶ Testimony of G. Mennen Williams, Nomination of Murat W. Williams, George W. Ball, Roger W. Jones and G. Mennen Williams, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961, pp. 87, 92.

¹⁴⁷ Testimony of Chester Bowles, Nomination of Chester Bowles, Under Secretary of State-Designate, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961, pp. 28-29.

The open-minded attitude of many of Kennedy's appointees was facilitated by the relatively non-confrontational relationship with the Soviet Union at this time. Though there was unease about Soviet intentions in various regions, Moscow was not involved in any high-profile initiatives that directly threatened U.S. interests when Kennedy came into office. The cold war was still being waged, but Kennedy did not rule out "the possibility of accommodation with the Soviet Union in the interests of peace".¹⁴⁸ Indeed, Adlai Stevenson, the new U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, advised the president to seek an early meeting with the Soviet leader, noting, "I think we will not find anyone easier to deal with than Khrushchev is".¹⁴⁹

While the appointments to the Africa posts and the undersecretary position went to idealistic individuals who strongly identified with the U.S. civil rights movement, the entire foreign policy establishment was not homogenous. Kennedy appointed a number of young ambassadors who

were in tune with the administration's emphasis on power politics and view of diplomacy as a weapon in the global contest with communism. To the "new crew" . . . Africa was important because it was an area of potential communist infiltration and this offered a chance for American victories. These diplomats were not "idealists" . . . but were considered "practical" and "tough".¹⁵⁰

Furthermore, the administration had a large group of "Europeanists" who questioned pro-African policies and lobbied for "continued subjugation of African issues to European priorities".¹⁵¹ Noer affirms that Kennedy was partial to Africa and opposed to racism

but he never allowed these to interfere with his view of international politics as a continuing struggle between America and Russia. Anti-communism was at the heart of Kennedy's diplomacy, and he viewed Africa primarily as an area of East-West competition. His support of decolonization was as much for strategic as for idealistic reasons.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables (New York: MacMillan, 1982), p. 201.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 201-202.

¹⁵⁰ Noer, op. cit., p. 64.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 66.

Once in office, Kennedy initially implemented a pro-Africa policy. According to Salazar's then-foreign minister, Franco Nogueira, the U.S. ambassador in Lisbon, C. Burke Elbrick, gave Salazar a lecture:

The United States is worried about Africa and about the dangers of Communist penetration of the continent, which the free world is anxious to avoid; President Kennedy thinks that self-determination and independence for the African countries constitute the most effective method for blocking the Soviet path. Furthermore, African nationalism is overpowering and de-colonisation is an inevitable phenomenon, and moreover corresponds to the ideas of liberty and human rights.¹⁵³

According to Nogueira, Elbrick added that Kennedy was particularly worried about the situation in Angola, and that if developments in the United Nations eventually embarrassed Portugal, Lisbon could not count on U.S. support. Elbrick advised Portugal to make a formal and public statement announcing acceptance of the principles of self-determination and independence. If Portugal did not do so, it would have to expect a crisis in relations with Washington. Adding a carrot to this stick, Elbrick continued that the United States was willing to study, along with other NATO countries, ways to financially compensate Portugal for the economic difficulties African independence would cause in the metropole.¹⁵⁴

A week later, on 13 March, debates on Portuguese colonial policy began in the United Nations. Portugal had not made the statement requested by Kennedy. Adlai Stevenson therefore attacked Lisbon's African policies and voted in favour of an Afro-Asian resolution demanding an enquiry into conditions in Angola. (The motion failed due to abstentions from the United Kingdom, France, Nationalist China, Chile, and Ecuador.)

The Portuguese response to the United Nations vote was prompt. At the next NATO meeting, Portugal's representative remarked, "The intrinsic contradiction in American policy [if not altered] would require us to revise our attitude to the United States".¹⁵⁵ This was the first veiled hint that Portugal might deny the United States access to

¹⁵³ Franco Nogueira, Salazar, vol. 5, A Resistência (1958-1964) (Porto, Portugal: Livraria Civilizaçao Editora, 1984), p. 210.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 225.

the Azores base, off the coast of north Africa, but it rang no alarm bells in Washington.

Other Western countries failed to support the U.S. line. The West German chancellor expressed sympathy with Portugal, and visits from representatives of Britain's Conservative government were reassuring.¹⁵⁶ French and British officials responded to U.S. requests that they put more pressure on Portugal by saying that they agreed in principle with Washington but did not believe that Portugal could be forced to change.

Kennedy was not deterred, and on 20 April the United States voted in favour of a General Assembly resolution calling on Portugal to prepare Angola for independence and establishing a five-member committee to investigate the Angolan situation in more depth. The United States found itself voting with the Afro-Asian bloc and the Soviet Union, and against Portugal, Brazil, France, the United Kingdom, and Belgium.¹⁵⁷

Again, Lisbon retaliated. At the next NATO meeting, held in Oslo on 8 May 1961, Portugal threatened to leave NATO and announced that it would delay what limited reforms were already under way in Africa. Lisbon also claimed the right to use those Portuguese soldiers who made up part of the NATO force for its war in Africa, and the right to send NATO equipment with them.

In this period, Kennedy did not restrict his support for African nationalists to overt diplomacy. He also used the CIA and the humanitarian aid programme. In late April 1961, the National Security Council Special Group authorised a covert \$6,000 annual payment to Holden Roberto, who had impressed Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy during a March 1961 visit to New York. Shortly thereafter, the CIA began to provide funding for university training of Mozambican nationalists in exile in Tanzania, many of whom were active in FRELIMO's precursors.¹⁵⁸ Mondlane may have encouraged this aid decision when he met with Robert F. Kennedy in early 1961.¹⁵⁹ The United States also extended humanitarian assistance to Angolan refugees (largely

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 222.

¹⁵⁷ Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 181.

¹⁵⁸ Mahoney, op. cit., p. 205.

¹⁵⁹ Marcum, "A Martyr for Mozambique", op. cit., p. 8.

Roberto supporters) in Congo-Léopoldville, and scholarship offers were made by U.S. embassies in Africa to refugee students from Portuguese territories.¹⁶⁰ Twelve students from Portuguese Africa who had been studying in Ghana were convinced to go to the United States, and the U.S. Information Agency was instructed to translate 550 American books to be freely distributed to Angolan students.¹⁶¹

The decision to favour FRELIMO's precursors and the UPA over the MPLA was not primarily due to a judgement that the former were pro-West and the latter anti-West. A CIA report on Angola noted that Roberto's group had the strongest military force of the Angolan movements, but the MPLA had more sophisticated leadership. It presented Neto as a leader of a moderate faction in the MPLA and predicted he would eventually win out over his rivals. The report said that both rebel groups had received offers of help from the Soviet Union, but that both would prefer assistance from the West.¹⁶² This suggests that, while perception of the nationalists' policies played a role, equally or more significant considerations were the fact that Mondlane and Roberto were already on good terms with the Kennedy brothers, the CIA was more familiar with Roberto than with Neto, and the UPA appeared the more militarily competent of the Angolan movements.

Rumours of U.S. aid to the nationalists only made Salazar more stubborn. On 30 June 1961, he said that recent modest reforms in colonial policy had "nothing to do with the Constitutional structure.... [The reforms] are only related to the natural and solid ties that link various parts of the whole nation".¹⁶³ At approximately the same time, Washington was informed by Elbrick that Portugal was sending was sending to Africa both soldiers and U.S.-supplied equipment that should have stayed in the metropole under the NATO agreement. The latter development put the United States in a particularly delicate position. While the main text of the 1951 Azores agreement prohibited use of U.S.-provided equipment in African territories without previous U.S. consent, a secret note adjusted guaranteed that there was "no doubt" that this authorization would be given in an emergency

¹⁶⁰ Mahoney, *op. cit.*, pp. 204-205.

¹⁶¹ Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

¹⁶² Nogueira, *op. cit.*, pp. 465-466.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 286-288.

situation. Elbrick reminded Rusk that Salazar could publicly invoke the secret clause and seriously embarrass Washington.¹⁶⁴

The Department of State Working Group on Angola, staffed by pro-co-optation regionalists, submitted a report on 4 July. The report said:

Angola is becoming, for the major part of the world, as Berlin is for Europe, the center of a great battle between liberty and oppression. It constitutes an important part of the world struggle between liberty and communism for the conquest of the spirit and the hearts of men. In this struggle, the United States can take only one position. We support liberty. Our obligation is indivisible, in Angola, in Berlin, in Laos. We believe that communism defends oppression. The field of battle is the world. For these reasons, through the eyes of the major part of the world, Angola is a case where the U.S. can fulfill its obligation to defend liberty.¹⁶⁵

The Working Group recommended that if Salazar did not change his approach the United States should recognise Roberto's provisional government, deny Portugal arms, help refugees from Angola, and establish a programme for educating Portuguese Africans in the United States.¹⁶⁶

SECOND THOUGHTS

From the middle of 1961 through 1962, an intense debate raged within the U.S. administration regarding the advisability of continuing the co-optation strategy. The Department of Defence opposed it, and the Department of State was increasingly divided. It is noteworthy that the policies of the nationalists did not play a role in the debate, which focussed on the issue of the threat to the Azores base rights posed by the new initiative, and was intensified by increased perception of Soviet threat that could make the base more crucial.

The first sign of major trouble was the Pentagon's negative response to the above-mentioned 4 July 1961 Department of State report, which advocated intensification of the co-optation effort. The Department of Defence reaction read:

Defense is worried because the precipitous and excessively aggressive execution of policy may produce reactions on the part of Portugal, and eventually of Spain, which could result in an unacceptable decrease in the capacity of the United States to

¹⁶⁴ Antunes, Kennedy e Salazar, op. cit., pp. 269-270.

¹⁶⁵ Nogueira, op. cit., p. 290.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 293-4.

support military missions which might be required in Berlin, Western Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.¹⁶⁷

The Department of State's pro-co-optation regionalists replied, "The continuation of this policy is absolutely necessary if the United States is to have good relations with the Afro-Asian states, and with many others in the free world".¹⁶⁸

The Department of Defence again reacted negatively:

[T]he maintenance of the military facilities which the United States has in the Azores and in Spain is vital to the execution of the military missions which would be necessary in time of war, or in an emergency situation. Therefore whatever line of action which would seriously prejudice the maintenance of the Azores and the bases in Spain would be unacceptable from the military point of view for the foreseeable future.¹⁶⁹

Despite this opposition, the Department of State pro-co-optation diplomats still had the upper hand. The U.S. military assistance programme was reviewed and a planned 1961 delivery to Portugal worth about \$25 million was pruned to \$3 million. In mid-July, the Department of State's Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs was instructed to organise a formal scholarship programme for African refugee students from the Portuguese territories.¹⁷⁰

The Department of State then acted upon a Working Group suggestion that the United States demand the return of U.S. arms provided to Portugal and sent to Angola. When Portugal refused, President Kennedy approved (on 21 August) the prohibition of the supply of military equipment for use in Africa. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara was dismayed and wrote to Kennedy that in light of the need to renew the Azores base agreement with Portugal in 1962, "whatever public pressure on the Portuguese in regard to the use of military material in Angola should be avoided".¹⁷¹ Curiously, Portugal did not choose to publicly reveal the 1951 secret clause to the Azores agreement.

In September, Portugal announced modest reforms in colonial administration and explained them at the next NATO meeting in Paris.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 288. Note: When the word "defence" is in a quote from a U.S. source, or in the title of a U.S. publication, it is spelled in the American manner, "defense".

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 289.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 184.

¹⁷¹ Nogueira, op. cit., p. 320.

The U.S. representatives were critical, but, according to Nogueira, "now in moderated terms".¹⁷² Canada and Norway took positions similar to Washington's, while France and West Germany were sympathetic to Portugal. Nogueira described the attitude of the United Kingdom and Belgium as that of "discreet understanding".¹⁷³ Britain had indefinitely suspended all licenses for export of military equipment to Portugal on 27 June, just ten days after supplying two major frigates to the Portuguese Navy. But Britain's Conservative government still considered the Angolan uprising a problem within the domestic jurisdiction of Portugal and said that it should not be permitted to weaken Portugal's role in NATO. Belgium was entangled in the attempted secession of Katanga from Congo-Léopoldville at this time and depended on the Benguela railroad through Angola for access. Consequently, the Belgian government was reluctant to annoy Portugal.

A new element then entered the deliberations in November, when the Lajes air base on Terceira Island in the Azores was extensively used in the transport of U.S. troops to Berlin. (Construction of the Berlin wall began on 13 August 1961.) The Azores airfields handled a total of fourteen thousand plane departures in fiscal 1961. This prompted Kennedy's military adviser, General Maxwell Taylor, to conclude that the administration had no choice but to give in to Salazar.¹⁷⁴ Under growing pressure, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Mennen Williams finally accepted the necessity of moderating U.S. rhetoric, but still insisted that it would be "unthinkable" to abandon the overall policy of supporting the nationalists against Portugal.¹⁷⁵

In January 1962, the United States again voted with the Afro-Asian bloc in support of a resolution affirming Angola's right to self-determination. But shortly afterwards Kennedy declared that, in Nogueira's paraphrasing, "he considered the use of the Azores base to be important, and expressed the hope that Portugal would continue to permit its use".¹⁷⁶ Late in January, Secretary of State Rusk visited

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 338.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 329.

¹⁷⁴ Mahoney, op. cit., p. 209.

¹⁷⁵ Nogueira, op. cit., p. 378.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 393-394.

Lisbon to repair relations with Salazar, and \$4.5 million of pending military aid was released.¹⁷⁷

An important memo was also written in January 1962 which influenced future policy. In late 1961 Paul Sakwa was assigned the task of writing a "think piece" on Africa by Richard Bissell, head of the CIA's clandestine services. Delivered on 17 January 1962, the memo recommended a nine point plan to obtain the independence of Angola and Mozambique by 1970. Under the plan Roberto would be given a salaried consultative status and "groomed for the premiership of Angola". Mondlane "would be offered a similar post in Mozambique". Portugal would be offered sufficient aid to double per capita income within five years. Sakwa recommended that the economic incentive "be so large as to capture the imagination of the average literate Portuguese to whom it would be leaked if turned down by Salazar".¹⁷⁸ If Salazar rejected the proposal, Sakwa recommended Washington engineer his overthrow. The cost of the programme was estimated at \$500 million per year for five years. The administration accepted Sakwa's carrot idea, but rejected the use of the stick. In March 1962, the National Security Council adopted a modified version of Sakwa's plan, and Elbrick told Salazar the United States was prepared to increase aid to Portugal and explore the possibility of multilateral aid from NATO in order to minimise the economic impact of African independence. The aid figure, however, was reduced to \$70 million per year.¹⁷⁹ Portugal never gave a clear reply.

On 18 June 1962, Elbrick finally brought Salazar the United States' formal request for an extension of the Azores agreement. When Portugal made no formal answer, Rusk travelled to Lisbon. This time, Nogueira reported, Rusk's attitude "did not reflect... the policy advocated by the Department of State. It was moderated...."¹⁸⁰ Rusk said that the United States did not want to destroy Portuguese influence in Africa and suggested that a respected international figure be appointed to study the problem for the United Nations. He criticised the newly formed Organisation of African Unity, calling it irresponsible and

¹⁷⁷ Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 273.

¹⁷⁸ Paul Sakwa, "U.S. Policy towards Portugal", 17 January 1962, NSF: Portugal, box 154, Kennedy Library. Quoted in Noer, op. cit., p. 87.

¹⁷⁹ Noer, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

¹⁸⁰ Nogueira, op. cit., p. 415.

intolerant.¹⁸¹ Rusk agreed that the Azores issue would be negotiated only after a complete review of U.S. bilateral relations with Portugal. On his way back to the United States, he visited the base.¹⁸²

Immediately after the Rusk meeting, Salazar reportedly commented to Nogueira, "If they want to renew the accord, the Americans will have to pay all the cost of the war in Africa. All of it".¹⁸³

In July, Portugal began negotiations for a \$20 million long-term loan from U.S. banks, which was successfully concluded. The United States went ahead with the controversial purchase of \$37 million worth of Angolan coffee. Perhaps more important, in September 1962 Rusk instructed the Department of State's Africa Bureau and the U.S. mission at the United Nations to cease all contact with African nationalists.¹⁸⁴

Meanwhile, the United States' attention was being absorbed by growing fears of Soviet threats in the Third World. The Vietnam conflict was intensifying, and in October 1962 the missile crisis abruptly exacerbated the cold war. Kennedy announced that Soviet missiles had been discovered in Cuba, demanded their removal, and started a blockade of the island. Portugal supported the United States in an emergency NATO meeting on the subject, and the situation was defused by Khrushchev's agreement to dismantle the missiles.

The Cuban missile crisis reshaped the prism through which the Kennedy administration viewed the world. Khrushchev was no longer perceived as "one of the easiest people to deal with", as he had been characterised by Stevenson back in early 1961. Washington no longer believed that it merely had to compete for Third World hearts and minds in a long-term strategy to decrease communism's appeal to the emerging nations. Rather, the Kennedy administration now believed that it was facing a determined, expansionist Soviet Union, which had to be confronted and stopped. The African problem was again defined as the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union rather than the social conditions that sowed the seeds of indigenous, spontaneous sympathy with communist philosophy.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Mahoney, op. cit., p. 217.

¹⁸³ Nogueira, op. cit., p. 416.

¹⁸⁴ Marcum, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 274; Mahoney, op. cit., p. 218.

As a result of this new perception, the Department of Defence was treated more respectfully when it called for moderation of policy on Portugal, and within the Department of State anti-co-optation Portugal specialists were able to assert their control over the younger and less experienced pro-co-optation officials in the Africa section.¹⁸⁵

By the closing weeks of 1962, it was clear that the co-optation effort was in jeopardy and that the policies of the nationalists had nothing to do with its fate. Portuguese pressure on the Azores base issue, combined with increased anxiety about base access in light of deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union and the undermining of pro-co-optation officials caused by that anxiety, were the motivating factors. The MPLA and FRELIMO could have declared themselves pro-Western capitalists. It would have made no difference to Washington's retreat from co-optation.

"DESCENDING TO THE VALLEY"

In December 1962, the U.S. anti-co-optation forces decisively won the bureaucratic battle. Salazar told Washington that he would only agree to extension of the Azores base agreement if the United States voted for Portugal in the United Nations. The United States capitulated on 14 December. A United Nations resolution was under consideration that condemned Portugal's role in Africa and proposed that the United Nations member states halt the supply and sale of arms and other military equipment to Lisbon. The United States, along with Spain, South Africa, and five other NATO members, voted against the measure. Washington was back where it had been in the closing days of the Eisenhower administration, voting with Portugal and against the Afro-Asian bloc.¹⁸⁶ Portugal responded by agreeing the United States could use the Azores facility while the base negotiations continued, but not for more than one year without a formal agreement.¹⁸⁷

The capitulation continued. The MPLA delegation that arrived in Washington in December 1962 in search of aid could not have selected a

¹⁸⁵ Mahoney, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

¹⁸⁶ Marcum, vol. 1, *op. cit.*, p. 274. See also M. A. Fernandes de Oliveira et al., A Descolonização Portuguesa: Aproximação ao seu Estudo, vol. 1 (Lisbon: Instituto Democracia e Liberdade, 1979), p. 186.

¹⁸⁷ Nogueira, *op. cit.*, p. 458.

worse moment for its visit, and was given a cold shoulder. On 21 May 1963, Ambassador Elbrick was withdrawn from Lisbon and replaced by Admiral George Andersen, an opponent of co-optation from the Pentagon. In June 1963 Senate hearings on foreign assistance, Defence Secretary McNamara emphasised that the Azores base was "important to the defense of Western Europe as well as the United States". He defended Portugal against accusations of misuse of NATO funds, remarking, "There has been no diversion of MAP [military assistance program] material from the NATO purposes since 1961".¹⁸⁸ Over the summer of 1963 Kennedy was also concerned about the fate of the pending nuclear test ban treaty in Congress. He feared that if the United States lost the Azores base the balance in Congress would tip against the treaty, one of his most important initiatives to date.¹⁸⁹

In July 1963, the United States, along with the United Kingdom and France, abstained in a United Nations Security Council vote condemning Portuguese colonialism. Kennedy met the Portuguese United Nations representative in Washington, and Portugal noted a "distinct change in the U.S. position".¹⁹⁰ Kennedy said that the U.S. decision in 1961 had been precipitous and added, "But don't ask me, after having climbed to the top of the mountain, to descend to the valley within a short period. I need at least two years".¹⁹¹ Kennedy then promised to send a personal representative to Lisbon for a detailed discussion.

At the end of August, Kennedy's promised representative, George Ball, arrived in Lisbon. According to Nogueira, Ball's letter of instruction from the president said that he should make it clear that while the United States reaffirmed its support for the principle of self-determination, Washington "would not... support any nationalist movement or nationalist leader".¹⁹² Ball then proposed to Salazar a ten-year, two-stage "Eurafrican" transition. First, Portugal would have to

¹⁸⁸ Testimony of Robert S. McNamara, Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963, pp. 214, 217.

¹⁸⁹ Noer, op. cit., p. 102.

¹⁹⁰ Nogueira, op. cit., p. 503.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 504.

¹⁹² Ibid., pp. 515-516.

be brought into the European Free Trade Association, then being formed. European partners would subsequently provide Portugal, in Ball's words:

...with the capital required to raise the standard of living in the metropole to the point where the overseas territories were no longer needed as dumping grounds for landless peasants or as happy hunting grounds for commercial interests.¹⁹³

(This was, essentially, a version of the Sakwa carrot, again without the stick.) In the second phase, Angola and Mozambique would be brought into the community's "preferential trading system", following which "measures towards self-determination could be taken in a calm atmosphere quite unlike the frantic concern that had so far surrounded the question".¹⁹⁴

Shortly after Ball's meetings with Salazar, the Kennedy administration told the African countries in the United Nations that "independence is not the only alternative to be considered in the process of self-determination".¹⁹⁵

The process of Portuguese-U.S. détente was then disrupted by the assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November 1963. Portugal was dismayed by his death so shortly after his reluctant conversion to their cause. "After a long and difficult journey", remarked Nogueira, "the President was starting to show an understanding of the implications of Portuguese policy in Africa, and the possibility of a Luso-American accord was real and promising. And now?"¹⁹⁶ But as the following months illustrated, Portugal had little to fear from Lyndon B. Johnson, Kennedy's vice president who succeeded him after the assassination.

THE UNITED STATES ANTICIPATES CABRAL

Ball's proposal for a "Eurafrican transition", while unpopular with nationalists because it fell short of immediate independence, did reveal the U.S. understanding of Portuguese reluctance to decolonise. Ball's analysis of Portugal's position, in fact, coincided with that

¹⁹³ George W. Ball, The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern Structure (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 251.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁹⁵ Nogueira, op. cit., p. 536.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 542.

adopted by leading nationalists and their Western supporters a decade later.

In 1971, the leader of Guinea-Bissau's nationalist movement, Amilcar Cabral, remarked:

The reason that Portugal is not decolonising now is because Portugal is not an imperialist country, and cannot neo-colonise. The economic infrastructure of Portugal is such that she cannot compete with other capitalist powers.¹⁹⁷

Ball was proposing that other capitalist powers help Portugal develop so that it could become economically strong enough to compete with other capitalist powers.

Ball's proposal also coincided with what pro-nationalist academic Gary Wasserman termed "consensual decolonisation".¹⁹⁸ In a 1975 article, Wasserman argued that peaceful decolonisation can occur only when the metropole has sufficient economic leverage over the colony to influence post-independence policies in a manner that protects the metropole's interests. In such a circumstance, Wasserman claimed, the metropole retains economic benefits even as the political tie is dissolved and therefore has little reason to resist decolonisation. However, because Portugal had relatively weak economic ties with the colonies, and made profits primarily by renting out labour and resources to foreign firms via concessions, Lisbon could not "consensually decolonise". Wasserman asserted that profits flowed from the title to land and administrative control over manpower. Once the political tie was broken via decolonisation, Portugal would become irrelevant to the economic equation. Unlike Britain's relationship with its former colonies, which Wasserman presented as the quintessential "consensual decolonisation", the end of Portugal's colonial ties to Africa would also mean a vast reduction in economic benefit. Wasserman concluded:

One can argue, then, that the very weakness of the Portuguese colonizers left them only with the response of forcibly suppressing nationalist movements.... Portugal was not

¹⁹⁷ Amilcar Cabral, "Speech at Central Hall Westminster, 25 October 1971", Guerrilheiro, Bulletin of the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (United Kingdom), November-December 1971.

¹⁹⁸ Gary Wasserman, "The Politics of Consensual Decolonization", African Review, 5, no. 1 (1975), p. 1.

economically (and politically) developed enough to maintain its favorable colonial relationships without formal authority.¹⁹⁹

Once again, Ball's "Eurafrican transition" would have addressed that problem by integrating Portugal into the European economy and rendering Lisbon strong enough to forge structural economic links with its colonies capable of withstanding decolonisation.

Recent work by several scholars has cast doubt on the validity of the assumptions inherent in Ball's, Cabral's and Wasserman's analysis. In their 1997 book Hall and Young assert that "the fragility of the [Portuguese] dictatorship's own political legitimacy, rather than economic weakness, underpinned the tenacity of its fight to retain its African empire against the forces of nationalism".²⁰⁰ Cahen's and Clarence-Smith's works substantiate Hall and Young's assertion, for they show that Portugal was obtaining less and less economic benefits from its colonies as the 1960s and 1970s progressed.²⁰¹ Pitcher's work helps reconcile the two opposing views, however. She asserts that "if the colonies did not bring general economic prosperity to the Portuguese people as a whole, some sectors of Portuguese business and finance clearly prospered from cheap supplies of raw materials, guaranteed markets, and protected investment".²⁰² Clarence Smith Also makes a useful contribution to this debate, for he notes that the colonies played a dual role. They played an ideological role for the buttressed nationalism which kept together "the uneasy alliance of class and political forces which had placed...[Salazar] in power". There was simultaneously an effort to "maximise the utility of the empire to Portugal in economic terms".²⁰³

For the purpose of this work it is not necessary to come to a definitive judgement regarding the reasons underlying Portugal's reluctance to decolonise. Our focus is on U.S.-nationalist relations, and considers Portuguese-nationalist relations only as they relate to that central topic. What is notable, however, is that the U.S.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

²⁰⁰ Hall and Young, op. cit., p. 5.

²⁰¹ Cahen, "Le Portugal et l'Afrique", op. cit.
_____, Mozambique, op. cit.
Clarence-Smith, op. cit.

²⁰² Pitcher, op. cit., pp. 210-211.

²⁰³ Clarence-Smith, op. cit., pp. 15-16.

government, the Guinea-Bissau nationalist leader Cabral, and a pro-nationalist Western analyst all came to the same conclusion. U.S. policy was partially based on the assumption, erroneous or accurate, shared by many nationalists. It failed, perhaps because the ideological need for colonies was indeed greater than the economic benefits they provided. In that case, the nationalists, their supporters and the United States were all equally mistaken.

SUMMARY

Kennedy's brief effort to co-opt nationalist movements in Angola and Mozambique was one of the most noteworthy events in the history of U.S. foreign policy. Never before or since has the United States made such a concerted effort to co-opt nationalist guerrillas fighting a valued ally. However, the historical record suggests that the policies of the nationalists had little to do with the decision to pursue the co-optation strategy. The decision occurred because a variety of domestic political forces produced a president who analysed U.S. competition with the Soviet Union from a new perspective. The fact that relations with Moscow were sufficiently non-confrontational to permit a long-term perspective contributed to the co-optation decision. The policies of the nationalists were relevant primarily to the extent that they determined which nationalist leaders courted the Kennedy brothers first and were able to secure aid while pro-co-optation officials controlled policy.

The abandonment of co-optation was equally unrelated to Washington's perception of nationalist policies. It was motivated by the combination of Portuguese blackmail over base access, growing tensions with the Soviet Union which made that blackmail more effective, and the rightward drift in U.S. domestic politics, partly caused by the mounting East-West tension. Neto was treated to a cool reception when he visited Washington in December 1962 not so much because he was considered a leftist but because he had terrible timing. He arrived just as the co-optation effort was abandoned.

In short, both pro- and anti-co-optation factions in the United States sought to protect the same set of interests. They simply advocated different tactics, and changing circumstances outside Africa caused the former's approach to be abandoned for that of the latter. Both groups wanted to defend a selection of the interests mentioned in the introduction. Both desired that potential future leaders of Angola

and Mozambique be Western oriented, reject establishment of socialism and avoid alliances with the Soviet Union. However, policies designed to co-opt nationalists into respecting these interests were increasingly perceived as jeopardizing other interests deemed more pressing. Co-optation tactics were damaging a critical trans-Atlantic alliance (that with Portugal), potentially eroding support for Washington's international agenda (specifically Portuguese support during the missile crisis and the Berlin airlift), and threatening access to a strategically located base (the Azores facility). Placating domestic critics, ensuring access to markets and protecting ties with states neighbouring the subject territories, the other interests listed in the introduction, did not play a significant role in shaping U.S. interests at this time.

PART II
POSITIONS HARDEN: 1964 TO 1969

INTRODUCTION TO PART II

Between 1964 and 1969 the positions of the nationalists and most Western governments significantly hardened. The MPLA, starting from an already low level of co-optability, began explicitly to label capitalism as the enemy, increased contacts with the socialist countries, and expended little energy communicating with Western leaders. FRELIMO, which began the period disappointed with the West though still somewhat co-optable, became progressively more hostile towards the United States and Europe. At the end of the period, it also added an ideological element to its criticism of the Western political system. FRELIMO never entirely rejected the idea that its interests could overlap with those of at least some sectors of Western society, however, and retained communication with an assortment of Western liberal organisations.

The United States not only continued to move away from the co-optation effort initiated in the early 1960s by Kennedy, but began actively to court Portugal. Contacts with the nationalists declined still further, U.S. arms again began to find their way to the Portuguese colonial wars, and Washington's language became even more respectful of Lisbon's concerns. With the exception of Sweden, European governments made little effort to initiate their own co-optation efforts and in some cases joined in placating Lisbon.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 seek not only to describe in detail the shifting positions of the nationalists and the Western governments, but also again to identify the factors that influenced their decisions. How significant was the initiation of armed struggle to the evolution of nationalist policies? What accounted for the differences between the

two movements' approaches? Was the decline in the co-optability of both primarily a reaction to perceived Western hostility or a result of other factors? Similarly, was the West's further shift away from co-optation motivated by perception of the nationalists' policies or by other concerns?

CHAPTER 4

MPLA: SUSPICION SHIFTS TO ENMITY

From 1964 to 1969 the MPLA's co-optability continued to decline from the relatively low level it had reached in 1963. The movement began explicitly to equate the struggle for independence with the struggle against capitalism, and to claim it was impossible to have one without the other. Movement documents also started openly to endorse Marxism-Leninism, and Neto eventually announced plans to form a "vanguard party" in the future. When other leftist movements felt compelled to condemn the Soviet Union's 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, the MPLA sided with Moscow. MPLA officials became frequent guests in Havana and Moscow, and were scarcely visible in Western capitals. Perhaps even more important, the MPLA re-evaluated Washington's earlier co-optation attempt, and came to conclusions that ensured a cynical response to any subsequent co-optation effort.

Two main factors were responsible for this further decline in MPLA co-optability: the movement's perception of Western policy and the influence of non-Western allies, specifically Cuba and the Soviet Union. A third factor, conditions of armed struggle, may have had a very small, marginal role, though there is insufficient research data to confirm this possibility.

The emergence of a third nationalist group in the 1964 to 1969 period had little direct effect upon MPLA co-optability at this time. Because that third movement was formed in a way that delegitimised the MPLA's main rival, however, its arrival on the scene ensured the survival of the MPLA as a credible movement. The enhanced credibility, in turn, may have contributed to the socialist countries' decision to increase aid to the MPLA, a decision that did influence the movement's co-optability.

This analysis suggests that the West could have influenced MPLA policy in this period, albeit only modestly. If the West had adopted a cordial, respectful approach, it certainly would not have obtained a pro-Western shift in MPLA policy, but the movement's co-optability probably would have declined less precipitously. Even with ongoing Eastern bloc influence, the MPLA could well have remained closer to a non-aligned position, for example by refraining from endorsing Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia.

THE RIVAL SPLITS

In the early 1960s, GRAE Foreign Minister Jonas Savimbi became restless under Holden Roberto's autocratic leadership and began organising his own base of support, mainly among southerners of the Ovimbundu tribe.

Matters came to a head at the Cairo OAU conference in July 1964.

Savimbi found the GRAE foreign minister position occupied by a rival and promptly resigned. He charged that the GRAE, "far from intensifying military action and regrouping the popular masses,... had limit[ed] itself to empty speeches". Savimbi called for a reconsideration of the OAU recognition of the GRAE, and accused Roberto of collusion with "American imperialism".²⁰⁴

Both Neto and Mondlane wanted the OAU to withdraw its exclusive recognition of the GRAE, the former for obvious reasons, and Mondlane because of fraternal ties with the MPLA. Therefore, according to an observer who participated in the negotiations, Neto, with FRELIMO encouragement, offered Savimbi a high MPLA post if he would inform the OAU about Roberto's past misconduct. Savimbi reportedly agreed, and under confidential conditions told the OAU heads of state that Roberto had been involved in the 1961 assassination of Patrice Lumumba and had embezzled OAU-sourced funds for personal luxuries.²⁰⁵

The manoeuvre had the desired effect. The OAU did not rescind its recognition of Roberto's government in exile but did establish a special committee to try to reconcile the nationalists' differences. In October 1964, after visiting Neto's guerrilla bases in Congo-Brazzaville, the committee reported that the MPLA was a "serious, active and capable movement able to lead an efficient fight" and recommended that OAU support be re-authorised.²⁰⁶ The Liberation Committee agreed, and funds began to flow again on a provisional basis.

The MPLA's claim to OAU aid was also strengthened by events in Congo-Léopoldville. In July 1964, Roberto's ally, Adoula, was ousted by Moise Tshombe. The new leader was on good terms with the Portuguese and restricted FNLA activities.

²⁰⁴ Savimbi resignation statement, Brazzaville, 17 August 1964, mimeo.

²⁰⁵ Source one, confidential interview by author, Maputo, Mozambique, October 1984.

²⁰⁶ Organisation of African Unity, "Report of the Conciliating Committee Between the Angolan Revolutionary Government (GRAE) and the People's Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA)", mimeo, 1964.

By the October 1965 OAU summit, the Liberation Committee was allocating one-third of its Angolan assistance to the MPLA. Although OAU recognition of the GRAE was not rescinded and the FNLA started to regain its footing following the 24 November 1965 rise to power in Congo-Léopoldville of Roberto's relative by marriage, Lieutenant General Joseph-Désiré Mobutu, the MPLA was definitely recovering some ground in the competition for international respectability.

Meanwhile, Savimbi was searching for external allies of his own. He went to China (where he won a promise of limited support), North Korea, North Vietnam, Algiers (where he met Cuban guerrilla leader Che Guevara), and finally travelled on to Brazzaville for consultations with Neto.²⁰⁷

The MPLA had helped get Savimbi's supporters out of Angola into Brazzaville and given them financial support on their arrival, so relations were cordial. According to an individual active in the nationalist movements at the time, Neto wanted to give Savimbi the promised high-level MPLA post, but "left-oriented" MPLA militants insisted that he work his way up from the bottom of the organisation. Savimbi declined.²⁰⁸ Whatever his intent, the MPLA's insistence that he join as an ordinary member showed that its claim to be a front unifying all nationalists was inaccurate. Savimbi was capable of bringing a sizable following into the MPLA, and to offer him only ordinary membership was not just a failure to live up to the Cairo pledge, but also a calculated insult intended to be rejected.

In 1965, Savimbi's relationship with the MPLA soured even further. He arrived in Lusaka in February and announced plans to found his own movement using Zambia as a base. The MPLA was distressed, as it considered Zambia its exclusive ally. In July 1965, Savimbi supporters, speaking as the Amigos do Manifesto Angolano (Amangola), said, "Since the MPLA demanded that we take a clear stand on co-operation, i.e., sign MPLA party cards, we... ceased to co-operate".²⁰⁹ Shortly afterwards, the MPLA cut all relations with Savimbi and violence broke out between MPLA and Savimbi supporters in Brazzaville.

²⁰⁷ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 160-161.

²⁰⁸ Source one, interview.

²⁰⁹ Amangola open letter, 14 July 1965, as quoted in Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 162.

Eventually, in March 1966, Savimbi entered Angola and founded the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola--UNITA). Its constitution pledged it to educate "all Angolans living outside the country... that real independence for Angola will only be achieved through an armed struggle waged against the Portuguese Colonial Power inside the country".²¹⁰ UNITA was ethno-populist and, while not explicitly anti-white, it did not have any whites or mesticos in its hierarchy and the membership was mainly uneducated peasants. The predominance of the Ovimbundu ethnic group provided the social glue to hold the organisation together. To the extent that it had any ideology at all, it was Macist. The Maoist influence, however, extended more to strategy for guerrilla war than it did to the definition of post-independence economic and social policies.

Messiant's model, described in chapter 1, is again useful here. She describes the UNITA leadership around Savimbi as nouveaux assimilés who did not want to accept the domination of the anciens assimilés and mesticos of the MPLA and saw them as "non-Angolan". UNITA prioritized racial distinctions regarding mesticos, and cultural distinctions regarding the anciens assimilés. Messiant believes Savimbi embraced Maoism because it was "a Marxism that opposed the European Marxism of the anciens assimilés and valued the Angolan people who were majority rural".²¹¹

Savimbi's personality also was an important factor. Minter has asserted that Savimbi believed he was destined to be Angola's leader and was frequently more hostile to rival rebel groups than he was to the Portuguese.²¹² Savimbi also showed, as Messiant has noted, "remarkable ideological agility capable of forming the most un-natural alliances".²¹³ Savimbi presented himself as a black power advocate to visiting U.S. black nationalists, and as a Maoist to white radicals.²¹⁴

²¹⁰ "Constitution of UNITA", article 2, as quoted in Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 166.

²¹¹ Messiant, op. cit., pp. 166-168.

²¹² Minter, Apartheid's Contras, op. cit., pp. 221-222.

²¹³ Messiant, op. cit., pp. 169-169.

²¹⁴ Minter, Apartheid's Contras, p. 222.

A year after its founding, UNITA's rhetorical commitment to self-sufficiency became an operational necessity. In March 1967, UNITA sabotaged Angola's Benguela railroad, a major export route for Zambia's copper. Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda was enraged and had Savimbi arrested upon arrival in Lusaka in June, and then expelled from the country and forbidden to return. Its Zambian access denied, UNITA made a virtue of necessity and emphasised self-reliance even more than previously.

The emergence of UNITA was a short-term blessing for the MPLA. It broke the FNLA's monopoly on OAU aid, thereby rescuing the MPLA from approaching obscurity and possibly encouraging greater socialist-country support. The appearance of UNITA also confirmed the MPLA's character as an artificial front. It is not clear if Savimbi would have agreed to merge his group with the MPLA even if a genuine common front offer had been made. In the event, the MPLA's unrealistic offer prevented his intentions from being truly tested.

RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN BLOC

Shortly after the FNLA split caused the OAU to renew assistance to the MPLA, Moscow and Havana also increased their aid to Neto. Although a detailed examination of Soviet and Cuban decision making is outside the scope of this work, it is clear that the OAU blessing encouraged these governments to take the MPLA more seriously. Other motivations, including the heightening of cold war tensions occasioned by the October 1962 missile crisis, also undoubtedly played a role. Whatever the reason for the aid increase, MPLA statements on foreign policy matters became increasingly pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban. Though there is no proof that either of these powers specifically offered aid in return for the MPLA's adoption of a hostile attitude towards the West, the MPLA knew that a cordial relationship with Western countries was not the best way to ensure its benefactors' largesse.

Cuban involvement with the MPLA was consolidated when Che Guevara came to Brazzaville in May 1965 for extensive consultations.²¹⁵ Neto was embarrassed that the MPLA had few guerrilla accomplishments, but Guevara nonetheless agreed to provide Cuban instructors for the MPLA and promised diplomatic and political support.²¹⁶ In 1966, the MPLA

²¹⁵ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 172.

²¹⁶ Ottaway and Ottaway, op. cit., p. 101.

sent its first guerrilla recruits to Cuba for training, was the exclusive representative of the Angolan nationalists at the "Tricontinental Conference" hosted in Havana, and even created a "Cienfuegos Column", named after a Cuban guerrilla leader. When Cuban instructors came to train the Congo-Brazzaville militia, some started training MPLA guerrillas as well.²¹⁷

Soviet support also increased in the second half of 1964, coinciding with the OAU decision to reinstate assistance. Portuguese communist leader Alvaro Cunhal arranged for Neto to go to Moscow for consultations. Correspondence reflecting mutual admiration between the MPLA and Moscow became common. In April 1965, Pravda concluded that by aiding the MPLA the Soviet Union and "other socialist countries" were playing "an important part in spreading the ideas of socialism and revolutionary anti-colonialist ideology without which the participation of vast masses in the liberation fight is impossible".²¹⁸ In August 1965, the MPLA thanked Moscow for discrediting Roberto as an "American puppet" and declared that when independence was won "our first words of gratitude will be addressed to our most loyal friends, the people and government of the USSR".²¹⁹ Growing numbers of MPLA militants went to Eastern Europe for military training.

The MPLA's position on the Soviet Union's 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia then highlighted its increasing compliance to Soviet wishes. Most nationalist movements in Africa denounced the intervention, but the MPLA, like Cuba, stuck by Moscow.

"IMPERIALISM ABANDONS ITS LIBERAL MASK"

The MPLA's perception of Western policies in the 1964 to 1969 period had an important impact upon the movement's co-optability, and encouraged its already inherent tendency to shift leftward. The MPLA responded to increased Western investment in the Portuguese colonies and Western diplomatic and military co-operation with Lisbon by increasing its anti-Western rhetoric. The MPLA also arrived at an analysis of Washington's previous co-optation attempt that, for the time being at least, ensured a suspicious response to any co-optation

²¹⁷ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 172.

²¹⁸ Pravda, 22 April 1965.

²¹⁹ Message from MPLA Foreign Secretary Luis de Azevedo, Jr., Pravda, 11 August 1965.

effort. (Chapter 7 shows that the MPLA did later consider liberal sectors of Europe as potential useful allies.)

The year 1964 started with a clear reminder that the United States was not interested in cordial relations. In March of that year, U.S. envoy Averell Harriman met with Algerian officials who repeatedly protested the direct aid the United States was sending Roberto, and reminded Harriman the OAU had declared all aid was to go through that group's liberation committee. Harriman interrupted the proceedings, announced he had another appointment, and left.²²⁰ Harriman's hostile demeanor surely was conveyed to the MPLA, further deepening the movement's distrust of Washington.

Even more disturbing to the movement, however, was increased Western investment in Portuguese Africa. Previously, Portugal had sought to exclude foreign powers from its colonies in an attempt to protect the Portuguese private sector. Labour had been rented out to foreigners and transit facilities provided for neighbours, but direct foreign investment in Mozambique and Angola had been discouraged. There are two explanations for why Lisbon decided to change investment policy. The conventional view is that the war bills had become onerous. Supporters of this argument point out that by 1965 Portugal's military spending accounted for 6.5 percent of its gross national product (GNP), double the level before the Angolan war started.²²¹ Even more alarming, war expenditures took up 48 percent of government spending.²²² Hence the "open door" investment policy was introduced.

Clarence-Smith, in contrast, asserts, "The negative effects of the wars on Portugal's economy have been greatly over-rated" and in the late 1960s "the economic utility of empire receded".²²³ He argues that the colonies became "a drain on the public purse" after the 1950s, due to non-war factors.. From 1963, to better integrate the colonies with the Portuguese economy, Portuguese products were allowed to enter the colonies freely and restrictions on transfers of funds to Portugal were relaxed. Since the colonies imported more goods from Portugal than they exported, the balance "had to be funded by the foreign exchange

²²⁰ Noer, *op. cit.*, p. 113..

²²¹ Munslow, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

²²² *Ibid.*

²²³ Clarence-Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

surpluses gained in transactions with foreign countries, which were turned into escudos". However, "as a crash programme of industrialisation and economic growth was implemented in the colonies, their balance of payments in regard to foreign partners deteriorated, and they were unable to pay their debts to metropolitan suppliers". The author further argues that the cost of the war was not as onerous as it appeared because "the Portuguese budget cannot readily be compared with those of wealthy European nations, because of the very low rate of social spending". The Portuguese spent 7.7 percent of GNP on its military from 1965 to 1970, a little less than the 8.1 percent spent by the United States in the same period.²²⁴ Therefore, in Clarence-Smith's view, the new investment rules were not related to the cost of the war but rather to "worries about the balance of payments, the need for integration into regional trading groups and the desire to gain Western support for the war in Africa...."²²⁵

Which ever argument one finds persuasive, and this author finds the second more plausible, the impact remained the same--increased Western investment was perceived as hostility to the nationalists.

New incentives included tax holidays, free repatriation of profits and capital, withdrawal of the obligation to invest only through joint ventures with Portuguese companies, simplification of investment procedures, and improved investment guarantees. Foreign company interest was considerable, though there was a delay of a year or two before large sums actually began to flow. The most notable transaction was Gulf Oil's 1966 investment in Angola's Cabinda province.

The MPLA criticised both this Portuguese overture to foreign capital and the West's response in a July 1965 article. The movement claimed that previously Western interests in Angola had conflicted at several levels. The "imperialist powers understood that Portugal in trying to 'maintain' Angola would end by losing it, and mortgage itself to foreign interests". This, the MPLA believed, was not entirely against Western interests, because it permitted them to penetrate Portugal's sphere of influence. But as a result "Portuguese colonialism

²²⁴ Ibid., p. 194-195.

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 205.

[became] nothing but a collective colonialism".²²⁶ Thus, the rest of the West, in the MPLA's eyes, was as guilty as Portugal.

More important, the MPLA now claimed that previously the United States had adopted a liberal posture not out of true concern for Angola, but in order to compete with traditional European influence in southern Africa:

American imperialism thus mounted on the back of African nationalism, taking advantage of it as a vehicle of penetration in the competitive struggle with the interests of the European bloc in the Congo, so closely associated with the Portuguese interests in Angola, in the other Portuguese colonies, and in Portugal. Via Angolan "nationalism" it would be possible to find a supplementary door to the Congo, mainly through Katanga, by means of the Benguela railway and the port of Lobito.²²⁷

Apart from a divergence in European and U.S. interests, the MPLA also perceived a contradiction within the U.S. policy:

The United States... sought, on the one hand, to support strongly Portuguese ultra-colonialism, while at the same time condemning some of its secondary aspects, in order to be able to satisfy the demands of world-wide public opinion.... On the other hand it was essential to preserve the future. In this way, there arose the need to create a false leadership of the Angolan nationalist movement, in order to make it deviate from its real goals. This false leadership, constituted by approved "nationalist" elements, would... permit the channelling of the aid destined to the people of Angola, and thus remove it from the real nationalists.²²⁸

The MPLA added another element to its analysis of U.S. support for Holden Roberto, seeing him as a U.S. weapon used to defeat the secessionists in Congo-Léopoldville, who were backed by Belgium:

Holden was... a means of pressure, which was used by the USA in the framework of the competition between the imperialist powers in Angola and mainly in the Congo. At the time of [Katanga's] secession, Holden constituted a potential weapon perpetually directed against Katanga and the interests of the European group.²²⁹

The article added that Roberto had received U.S. instructions to sabotage the Benguela railway, the main export route for Katanga's

²²⁶ Hugo Menezes, "Angola and the New Imperialist Strategy in Southern Africa", Faulha (Accra), 1 July 1965. Reprinted in Quem e o Inimigo, vol. 3, ed. Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein (Lisbon: Iniciativas Editoriais, 1978), p. 87.

²²⁷ Ibid., pp. 87-88.

²²⁸ Ibid., p. 88.

²²⁹ Ibid., p. 89.

minerals. The MPLA concluded, "Thus, to American 'liberalism' and 'anti-colonialism' which found expression in Cyrille Adoula and Holden Roberto, there stood opposed Anglo-Belgian-Portuguese colonialism, embodied in the personality of Moïse Tshombe".²³⁰

The MPLA believed that this formula had recently changed, however, accounting for the U.S. shift away from the liberal approach. The United States, the MPLA concluded, had become more nervous about the prospects of a nationalist victory in Angola:

In effect, imperialism was forced to unite, in order to fight the liberation movement. Imperialism was forced to abandon its "liberal" mask, to tighten its ranks, to take the positions called for by its most reactionary elements.²³¹

Clearly the MPLA believed that Washington's past support for the nationalists was due more to competition with Europe and a desire to limit the nationalists' leftward drift than to true sympathy, and that in any case the United States was now falling back into step with its more conservative partners.

In 1969, MPLA rhetoric grew more hostile and focussed particularly on the West's economic investment in Angola. Neto cited Gulf Oil's involvement in Cabinda, Belgian assistance to the oil operation, and West Germany's investment in iron ore development. Neto accused investors of providing Lisbon with the "means to prosecute the war" and remarked, "When our people win their independence they will have to examine this problem and take decisions in accord with our national interests".²³²

The death of Portuguese Premier Salazar in 1968 and his replacement by Marcello Caetano had no impact upon MPLA policy, even though many observers expected that Caetano would take a more progressive attitude towards decolonisation. An October 1969 MPLA article said that the leadership change "does not signify anything", and added that international capital still determined Portuguese policy. In the same statement, the MPLA claimed that Portugal wanted to

²³⁰ Ibid.

²³¹ Ibid., p. 90.

²³² Agostinho Neto, "Angola: Um Povo em Revolução", 1969 speech. Reprinted in Textos e Documentos do MPLA Sobre a Revolução Angolana, ed. Maria Isabel Pinto Ventura (Lisbon: Edições Maria da Fonte, 1974), p. 47.

form a South Atlantic military alliance "with the consent of the world guardian of imperialism, the United States".²³³

The MPLA's perception of Western policies was very different in 1969 than it had been seven years earlier. In 1962, the MPLA leadership, and particularly Neto, believed that although capitalism was not a desirable model, there might be a partial overlap between the goals of Western liberals and those of socialist-oriented nationalists. In 1969, the MPLA leadership believed that Western liberalism was simply a more sophisticated approach designed to achieve the same goals as old-style "imperialism"--political domination and economic exploitation of the Third World and competitive advantage in the race between Western powers to obtain the most benefits from that domination and exploitation. (This MPLA position was subsequently tempered slightly, as shown in chapter 7.)

EFFECT OF ARMED STRUGGLE

The MPLA's efforts to pursue armed struggle in the 1964 to 1969 period may have had a small negative impact upon its co-optability, but the scarcity of firsthand information makes a firm conclusion impossible.

The MPLA's military efforts were hampered by two conditions. First, until 1966, when MPLA infiltration via Zambia became possible, the MPLA had no reliable route into Angola proper and relied on actions launched from Congo-Brazzaville into the northern Cabinda enclave. Second, much of the MPLA leadership was reluctant to risk life and limb in battle and resisted Neto's attempts to move the MPLA's headquarters from Brazzaville to the interior, where guerrilla war could be better managed. Though Neto proposed the headquarters move at a February 1965 MPLA conference, the transfer did not occur until 1968,²³⁴ and even then the leadership spent more time outside the country than inside.²³⁵ These limitations on MPLA military manoeuvres curtailed the group's ability to build up "liberated" areas in which to develop its ideas about social organisation through practise.

²³³ MPLA, "Tudo o que acontece em Angola é determinado pela ação do MPLA", Vitória ou Morte (October/November 1969). Reprinted in Textos e Documentos do MPLA, op. cit., 76.

²³⁴ Khazanov, op. cit., pp. 177-178.

²³⁵ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 200.

That said, the MPLA did gain control of some territory. In September 1966, the Cienfuegos column finally broke through Portuguese defences and FNLA obstruction to the Dembos area in northern Angola and reactivated guerrillas who had been stranded there since access to the border of Congo-Léopoldville had been denied in 1963. In the same year, the MPLA opened an eastern front in Moxico district, using supplies transported from the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam via Zambia. Zambia had become independent from Britain in October 1964²³⁶ and lifted restrictions on nationalist movement activities two years later.²³⁷ Despite scuffles with the FNLA and increasingly efficient Portuguese counterattacks, by the late 1960s the MPLA controlled three chunks of "liberated" territory, in Cabinda, Dembos, and Moxico.

It is not clear just how MPLA interaction with the peasantry affected the movement's co-optability, for difficulties in obtaining access to the "liberated" areas discouraged scholarly investigation, and the MPLA's subsequent versions of events may not be accurate. According to Marcum, the MPLA largely failed to mobilise political support among Cabindans.²³⁸ In the Dembos area, competition with the FNLA hindered peasant-guerrilla bonding. The eastern front was lightly populated, and MPLA action consisted primarily of infrastructure sabotage and ambushes of Portuguese patrols. According to Basil Davidson, the MPLA was able to establish only a "minimal network of political co-operation" in the area.²³⁹ In general, the MPLA encountered problems establishing a political base in areas dominated by tribes not related to the Mbundu, the dominant ethnic group in the movement. The division of "liberated" territory into three separate geographic areas, and the fact that travellers between them had to run a gauntlet of FNLA and Portuguese units, also limited the development of a coherent social programme. Finally, the leadership's preference for exile slowed the growth of peasant-guerrilla relationships.

That said, the MPLA clearly was able to establish political bonds with some portions of the population. In such areas, peasants

²³⁶ Ibid., pp. 176-178.

²³⁷ Fred Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa, (New York, Paragon House, 1987), p. 70.

²³⁸ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 174.

²³⁹ Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), p. 242.

were grouped into small villages of no more than 100 people each to avoid exposing large numbers to Portuguese attack. Each village had its own elected "action committee", a militia, a "people's plantation" run on a collective basis, and a "people's shop". Fledgling labour unions were established to "stimulate production". Neto repeatedly exhorted guerrilla leaders to depend less on the outside and to cultivate support from the local people.²⁴⁰ To the extent that the peasants' desires for equitable distribution of land, health care, and education were consistent with the MPLA's socialist values, the armed struggle reinforced the MPLA's left orientation. The tenuous and inconsistent bond between the guerrillas and the population at this time, however, meant that the armed struggle experience was not a main factor driving the MPLA away from a co-optable position.

IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

By the end of the 1960s, the MPLA's statements on ideological matters were more explicitly Marxist than they had been at the beginning of the decade. A 1967 article in the MPLA newsletter Victory or Death (Vitória ou Morte) started by dividing Angolan society by class rather than race: "[G]enerally the behaviour of an Angolan before the phenomenon of the fight for national liberation varies fundamentally according to the social group to which he pertains, and not according to the ethnic racial group".²⁴¹ It criticised the theory of negritude for focussing on colour rather than economic relations. As the Ottaways have noted, one of the major appeals of Marxism for the MPLA leadership may have been that, by focussing on class rather than race, it provided an ideological framework that legitimised a major mestizo leadership role in an organisation with a largely black African rank and file.²⁴²

Colonialism was also analysed in Marxist terms:

[C]olonialism is no more than a manifestation of the fundamental contradiction of history, that is, the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production in the epoch of the supreme phase of capitalism and imperialism....

[C]olonialism is fundamentally the exploitation of man by man, with the peculiarity that the exploiter is foreign....

²⁴⁰ Ibid.

²⁴¹ MPLA, "Carácter Social da Luta de Libertaçao Nacional", in Vitória ou Morte (1967). Reprinted in Textos e Documentos do MPLA, op. cit., p. 54.

²⁴² Ottaway and Ottaway, op. cit., p. 101.

[Therefore] the process of struggle against colonialism should be encompassed in the process of struggle against all forms of exploitation in any society: this is revolutionary progress.... National independence, as the logical result of revolutionary struggle, should consist of the realisation of a society free from any type of exploitation of man by man.²⁴³

In 1969, Neto emphasised the importance of creating a vanguard party, a central tenet of Marxist-Leninist theory:

These [other African] countries fall into neo-colonialism because they do not mobilise their masses, because they do not have a vanguard organisation nor a party that directs the people. We are taking precautions against these dangers so that in the future Angola can be the truly progressive country that we all want.²⁴⁴ [Author's emphasis]

Clearly the MPLA was increasingly using a philosophical framework that integrated it with the socialist world and distanced it from the Western tradition.

SUMMARY

In sum, the MPLA, already exhibiting low co-optability in 1964, was even less co-optable by the end of the decade. It was supporting Moscow when many other Soviet allies were reluctant to do so, as in the case of the Czechoslovakian controversy, and had concluded that past evidence of Western goodwill was simply part of a sophisticated strategy to better dominate and exploit the Portuguese territories.

The main factors responsible for these developments in the 1964 to 1969 period were the movement's perception of Western policy and the influence of non-Western allies. The West appeared to the MPLA leadership to have lost interest in the nationalist cause. What pro-nationalist actions the West did take were perceived as designed to usurp the cause for "imperialist" purposes. The simultaneous growing generosity of the socialist world towards the movement, particularly the aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba, and the tacit pressure to support those benefactors' foreign policies and ideology, pulled the movement away from a co-optable position. The conditions of armed struggle may have marginally reinforced the trend away from co-optability, but were not a critical factor. The division of the MPLA's main rival enhanced the movement's prestige, which in turn may have

²⁴³ MPLA, "Carácter Social da Luta de Libertaçao Nacional", op. cit., pp. 55-56.

²⁴⁴ Agostinho Neto, "Angola: Um Povo em Revoluçao", op. cit., p. 47.

encouraged greater socialist-country largesse, but was not in itself a critical factor influencing the movement's evolving co-optability.

What might have occurred if Neto and his colleagues had perceived the West to be pursuing anti-colonial, pro-nationalist policies that did not exclude the MPLA? Given the legacy of low co-optability inherited from the 1956 to 1963 period, it seems unlikely that the MPLA would have responded to such an overture by becoming pro-Western. The availability of other funding options would, however, have made it less beholden to the Eastern bloc and perhaps able to resist pressure to endorse Soviet policy. For example, the MPLA might have had the courage to criticise, or at least not support, Moscow's intervention in Czechoslovakia. In short, a friendlier policy on the part of the West might have encouraged the MPLA to pursue a more balanced foreign policy, but the movement's early history would have prevented full co-optation.

CHAPTER 5

FRELIMO: "THESE COUNTRIES ARE NOT REALLY OUR FRIENDS"

From 1964 to 1969, FRELIMO's co-optability steadily declined, but the movement never completely turned its back on the West.

FRELIMO's ideology gradually shifted leftward, diplomatic exchanges with Western governments became less frequent, and diplomatic and material ties with the Eastern bloc steadily rose. Towards the end of the period, FRELIMO's language also showed the first evidence of ideological as well as operational conflict with the West. FRELIMO began to criticise not only the West's perceived support of Portugal in the Mozambican war, but also the West's capitalist system.

Four factors were responsible for the decline in FRELIMO co-optability. The most obvious were the movement's perception of Western policies and the influence of non-Western allies, which simultaneously pushed and pulled the movement leftward. FRELIMO came to believe that Western governments were uninterested in Mozambican independence and instead were increasingly providing military and financial assistance to Portugal's counter-insurgency efforts. There was also some suspicion that the West was exacerbating internal strains within the movement. At the same time, socialist governments provided growing material and diplomatic assistance to the movement, accompanied by pressure to support the Eastern bloc's foreign policy agenda.

Two less obvious factors, the conditions of armed struggle and internal factionalism, were also important. The former caused much of the FRELIMO leadership to increasingly adopt quasi-socialist rhetoric, while the latter led to the expulsion of those who did not share that view. The racial aspect of the internal factionalism, and the utility of Marxist analysis, which justifies cross-racial alliances, increased the philosophy's attractiveness to the increasingly multi-racial leadership.

Although it is impossible to come to a definitive judgement, it seems likely that without these two latter factors (conditions of armed struggle and internal factionalism), FRELIMO might have been slower to add an ideological element to its conflict with the West. It also seems likely that these developments probably would have shifted the movement somewhat leftward even if the push-pull effect of cold war politics had not played a major role.

Despite its disillusionment with Western governments, however, FRELIMO still had a high opinion of Western liberals and in the 1964 to 1969 period invested considerable resources lobbying liberal organisations in both Western Europe and the United States. This openness to Western liberals, even in the face of hostility from Western governments, was due in large part to a fifth factor: the background of the leadership. Because of Mondlane's long period of residence in the United States and his United Nations experience, he was aware that Western governments at times are forced to respond to their own populations' public opinion. He concluded that efforts to influence that public opinion remain worthwhile even when official policy seems intransigent.

EARLY INTERNAL DISSENSION

In 1964, FRELIMO's internal difficulties delayed the launch of armed struggle and contributed to suspicions about U.S. intentions. Early in the year, Mondlane travelled to Cairo to try to convince the defectors who had broken with the party in 1963 and re-formed UDENAMO (see chapter 2) to return to the fold. UDENAMO claimed that it could not do so because, being without financial resources, it would be swamped by FRELIMO. The United Arab Emirates therefore gave the dissidents a gift of funds, on the condition that they rejoin FRELIMO. UDENAMO accepted the terms and the cash, but asked for sixty days to inform its membership and Central Committee. FRELIMO agreed, and a deadline was set for 20 September 1964.²⁴⁵

Originally FRELIMO had intended to initiate its armed activity in July 1964, when weather would be suitable for guerrilla warfare. Mondlane delayed, however, hoping to launch the struggle from a united base.²⁴⁶ As 20 September approached, there was no sign that UDENAMO would follow through on its undertaking. Also, revelations concerning mid-ranking FRELIMO official Leo Milas, who had been implicated in the upsurge of factionalism, made the leadership fear that foreign parties were engineering the splits and that therefore they might not be healed easily.

Specifically, FRELIMO "began to suspect that Leo Milas might be one of those counter-revolutionary agents whom the enemy from time to

²⁴⁵ Source one, interview.

²⁴⁶ Editorial, Mozambique Revolution, no. 6 (May 1964), pp. 2-3.

time infiltrates in order to destroy our movement".²⁴⁷ A FRELIMO investigation into his background concluded that he had intentionally provoked factionalism and sought to "create a bad reputation for FRELIMO... in co-operation with... imperialism". Even more seriously, it concluded that Milas "is not a Mozambican.... He is a citizen of the United States of America, having been born in the State of Texas, and that his parents, also native born citizens of the United States, still live in southern California".²⁴⁸ Milas was expelled from FRELIMO in August and travelled to Khartoum, where he published anti-Mondlane pamphlets, "financed", said FRELIMO, "by who knows who".²⁴⁹

The Milas incident, together with UDENAMO's procrastination, eventually made Mondlane give up hope of establishing greater unity before launching armed struggle. Five days after UDENAMO's deadline expired, on 25 September 1964, FRELIMO's first armed actions inside Mozambique began.

A final round of talks with UDENAMO were held in Dar es Salaam in February 1965 at the behest of Tanzania's President Julius Nyerere. UDENAMO insisted that FRELIMO change its name in return for unity. Mondlane refused. "We finally concluded that these people were not really interested in unity and were merely negotiating so as to precipitate more splits", said a FRELIMO militant familiar with the talks. "We came to believe that they were simply enemy agents and did not waste any more energy trying to resolve the issue".²⁵⁰ The fact that most of the dissidents then went to the United States to study may have subsequently encouraged the view that Washington had a hand in the affair.

"U.S. WANTS TO CALM ITS ALLY"

FRELIMO had additional reasons to be annoyed with the West during the first two years of the period under examination. As outlined in chapter 6, the United States was adopting conciliatory policies towards

²⁴⁷ FRELIMO, "Segundo Congresso da FRELIMO: Discurso Oficial do Comitê Central", op. cit., p. 57.

²⁴⁸ FRELIMO, "Expulsion of Leo Milas from FRELIMO", Mozambique Revolution, no. 9 (August 1964), pp. 4-5.

²⁴⁹ FRELIMO, "Segundo Congresso da FRELIMO: Discurso Oficial do Comitê Central", op. cit., p. 57.

²⁵⁰ Source one, interview.

Portugal and abandoning its former liberalism. Mondlane nonetheless traveled to Washington in the early summer of 1964 to lobby for weapons. He met with William's deputy, Wayne Fredericks, and other mid-level officials who encouraged him "to concentrate on political organizing rather than on violence".²⁵¹ In an article published as the armed struggle was initiated, Mondlane criticised the new U.S. ambassador to Lisbon, Admiral Andersen, who had ended a March 1964 visit to Mozambique and Angola with pro-Portugal statements. Mondlane retorted:

When Admiral Andersen proclaims the unity that he says exists between Portugal and the United States of America, we... have no other alternative than to conclude that this is the point of view of the government of the United States.... We can only think that the United States of America wants to calm its ally, Portugal, and provide solidarity and material support for the maintenance of Portuguese colonialism and imperialism in the African continent.²⁵²

FRELIMO's opinion of the United States was not improved in late 1964 when the Ford automobile company established a new subsidiary in Portugal. That subsidiary then announced that the Ford Foundation had promised to consult the Salazar government on any future grants relating to Portuguese Africa.²⁵³ Shortly afterwards the Foundation withdrew support for FRELIMO's Mozambique Institute. A FRELIMO editorial responded, "The lesson is that, concerning our relations with imperialist countries, there is a certain principle to be adopted. These countries are not really our friends".²⁵⁴

It is therefore perhaps no coincidence that on 3 December 1964 Mondlane released a statement in Dar es Salaam redrafting FRELIMO's definition of African nationalism. Once again he left out any mention of socialism or Marxism, but he did say that African nationalism "is a reaction against foreign, especially Western, economic exploitation of the African natural and human resources".²⁵⁵

²⁵¹ Noer, op. cit., p. 121.

²⁵² Eduardo Mondlane, "O Ponto de Vista do Governo dos EUA", September 1964. Reprinted in Quem e o Inimigo, vol. 3, op. cit., p. 82.

²⁵³ Marcum, "A Martyr for Mozambique", op. cit., p. 8.

²⁵⁴ Editorial, Mozambique Revolution, no. 5 (April 1964), p. 2.

²⁵⁵ Eduardo Mondlane, "The Development of Nationalism in Mozambique", 3 December 1964, reprinted in The African Liberation Reader: Documents of the National Liberation Movements, vol 2, eds., Aquino

In 1965, FRELIMO grew even more frustrated with the United States. In February the party said that it had

tried to... contact the members of the American government who deal specifically with African matters.... The American government, however, refused to receive us. They told us that a member of the State Department would meet us privately, secretly at a hotel or restaurant, but not officially. We refused of course. FRELIMO is not at all interested in secret talks with the American government.²⁵⁶

FRELIMO noted the impending visit of a U.S. delegation to Mozambique and remarked, "We assume... that among other reasons, it was fear of Salazar's reaction that determined this attitude of the American government".²⁵⁷

The United States was not the only Western country to encounter FRELIMO criticism. In March 1965, FRELIMO labelled West Germany as the only country "which does not conceal her support to the colonial war".²⁵⁸ Relations with Bonn deteriorated even further later that year, when FRELIMO, along with other liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, invited East German representatives to the second meeting of the Conference of Nationalist Organisations of the Portuguese Colonies (Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas--CONCP). The West German ambassador in Dar es Salaam asked Marcelino dos Santos if this implied FRELIMO recognition of the German Democratic Republic. Dos Santos replied that it did not. Nonetheless, the ambassador reportedly responded, "If they participate, you will pay".²⁵⁹

Portugal's 1965 decision to open up its colonies to foreign investment then heightened FRELIMO's disdain for the West. FRELIMO responded in November 1965 with the most explicit rejection of "neo-colonialism" it had enunciated to date:

Neo-colonialism is a modern form of colonialism.... The principal difference in relation to colonialism is that there is no occupation of territory. There is only economic exploitation. The Portuguese would not need to have either troops or

da Braganca and Immanuel Wallerstein, (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 16.

²⁵⁶ Editorial, Mozambique Revolution, no. 16 (March 1965), p. 9.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 2.

²⁵⁹ Source one, interview.

administrators in Mozambique: It would be Mozambique's own puppet government which would [exploit Mozambicans].²⁶⁰

FRELIMO's overall foreign alignment in the 1964 to 1966 period was perhaps best summarised by Mondlane's answer in August 1965 to a question concerning what foreign policy FRELIMO would adopt after independence. Mondlane said, "We will be an independent African state, non-aligned in the sense that Tanzania is, and we will make friends with any country with which we feel we have a common interest and a common policy".²⁶¹

By early 1966, FRELIMO clearly perceived the West to be allied with Portugal and unsympathetic to the nationalist cause. The movement was also now apprehensive about future "neo-colonialism" in Mozambique. FRELIMO had not yet, however, adopted an explicitly Marxist outlook, and its conflict with the West was still operational rather than ideological. Indeed, even in 1966 Mondlane still thought it worthwhile to meet with Robert F. Kennedy in Dar es Salaam.²⁶²

RELATIONS WITH THE EAST

FRELIMO's growing dissatisfaction with the West was not immediately accompanied by realignment towards Moscow. Indeed, a FRELIMO activist involved in mobilising foreign support at the time later commented, "Nobody believed that we could launch a successful guerrilla war. The USSR took a condescending view towards us, saw us as 'country bumpkins'. We started the armed struggle with arms supplied only by Algeria".²⁶³

FRELIMO did have cordial contacts with Soviet representatives, participated in Soviet-sponsored conferences of liberation movements, and welcomed visiting Soviet journalists to its camps, but the atmosphere was uneasy.

Relations with China were warmer, though still ambivalent. In January 1964, Marcelino dos Santos and Mondlane had extensive

²⁶⁰ FRELIMO, A Voz da Revolução, November 1965, quoted in Alpers, op. cit., p. 279.

²⁶¹ Eduardo Mondlane, interview by Mozambique Revolution. "Interview with the President of FRELIMO", published in Mozambique Revolution, no. 20 (July-August 1965), pp. 3-4.

²⁶² Antunes, Nixon e Caetano, op. cit., p. 75.

²⁶³ Source one, interview.

conversations with Mao Tse-tung. According to FRELIMO, Mondlane left China convinced that the Chinese experience was relevant to Africa.²⁶⁴ The idea that the peasantry was a necessary and sufficient basis for launching revolution was particularly appealing. FRELIMO disliked Chinese cultural-revolution hysteria, however, and tried to avoid taking sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute, hoping eventually to cultivate support from both nations.²⁶⁵ Mondlane circumvented Beijing's demand that aid recipients sign propaganda statements condemning Soviet revisionism and arranged for all Chinese aid to be channelled through the Liberation Committee of the OAU. This camouflaged its origin and avoided embarrassing the Soviet Union.

FRELIMO also had some contact with Cuba in the early stage of the armed struggle. Che Guevara visited FRELIMO's headquarters in Dar es Salaam in 1965, but FRELIMO reportedly rejected Cuban tactics as unsuitable for the Mozambican situation.²⁶⁶

In sum, FRELIMO's policy towards the socialist countries in the early stage of the armed struggle was cordial, especially regarding Beijing, but in no way could the relationship be called an alliance. Mondlane was impatient with Sino-Soviet squabbling, and if he seemed to favour Beijing over Moscow, it was because the Chinese experience seemed more applicable to the Mozambican situation rather than because of an ideological preconception. FRELIMO's profound disappointment with Western, and especially U.S., policy on Portuguese colonialism certainly encouraged it to explore the possibility of obtaining help from the socialist countries more energetically than it might have done otherwise, but FRELIMO was still cautious.

THREE THEORIES REGARDING IDEOLOGY

From 1966 onwards FRELIMO intensified its armed struggle, suffered severe internal factionalism, and increasingly adopted socialist

²⁶⁴ "Mozambican Leaders Visiting China", Mozambique Revolution, no. 2 (January 1964), p. 9.

²⁶⁵ "The Afro-Asian Council Meeting in Algiers", Mozambique Revolution, no. 4 (March 1964), p. 10.

²⁶⁶ Thomas H. Henriksen, "Angola, Mozambique, and the Soviet Union: Liberation and the Quest for Influence", in Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations, ed. Warren Weinstein and Thomas H. Henriksen (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 61.

rhetoric. There are three theories regarding how these trends intersected.

The first, put forward by Munslow²⁶⁷ and many others, argues that the conditions of armed struggle pitted a "revolutionary" faction against a "bourgeois" group, and that the former developed socialist philosophy as a result of its efforts to engender grassroots support for FRELIMO guerrillas. This view, which for ease of reference will henceforth be termed the "conventional" perspective, argues that in the 1966 to 1969 period FRELIMO began to embrace socialism as a result of its experience on the ground, and that it was an authentic socialism which eventually evolved into a true intent to build a socialist post-independence society.

The second argument, espoused by Hall and Young, is that "[i]n deed, far from FRELIMO's Marxism 'coming from experience' the truth was almost the exact opposite--again like much else, FRELIMO's Marxism was imported from outside".²⁶⁸ The authors argue, in what will henceforth be termed the "psychological view", that Portugal's "colonialist and assimilationist ideology...[was] desperately humiliating for those Mozambicans who aspired to education and 'modernity'". They further quote a remark made by the first president of Mozambique, Samora Machel, in which he lamented that Portugal "forced a Mozambican to deny his personality, to transform himself into a little black Portuguese". Hall and Young assert that "the psychological strain induced by Portuguese colonialism in African aspirants to modernity was... peculiarly intense".²⁶⁹ The psychological view argues that the obvious alternative to colonial civilisation, African tradition, was unacceptable because conquest by Portugal had been facilitated by manipulation of traditional African divisions, and because FRELIMO wanted to modernise the country. Marxism, Hall and Young argue,

offered an historical labelling that restored both the dignity and historicity of African peoples--their capacity to participate in progress.... Marxism in all its variants provides a powerful secular vision of transcendence and renewal in which divisions have disappeared and new institutions have emerged to ensure progress, purity and harmony. The appeal of this to the

²⁶⁷ Munslow, op. cit., pp. 87-111.

²⁶⁸ Hall and Young, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

leaders of a society notable for its divisions is hardly surprising.²⁷⁰

The authors do concede that "it would be far-fetched to imagine that all FRELIMO's ideological effort was no more than an elaborate ruse (to secure Soviet bloc aid and obscure elite tensions), or that the FRELIMO leadership was over-awed by foreign advisors". They also believe FRELIMO voluntarily adopted socialist rhetoric for "its appeal lay in providing a language to account for the past, a vision of the future and an understanding of the struggle to attain that future, in terms which had the greatest affinity with FRELIMO's own political-military experience".²⁷¹ The role of experience is acknowledged, though not given as much importance as in the conventional view.

The third theory, propounded by Cahen, is that FRELIMO split into "two petty bourgeois factions that were socially different" and did not experience a genuine struggle between a revolutionary and bourgeois line. In Cahen's view, the internal factionalism that wracked FRELIMO from 1966 to 1969 set a "rural trader bourgeoisie" against the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" of "nurses and office workers" who came to dominate FRELIMO's military operations. Cahen argues, "Marxism appeared as the most appropriate nationalist ideology for a social faction in specific conditions where massive popular mobilisations were necessary to obtain independence".²⁷² (Emphasis in original.) Cahen concludes,

Stalinist Marxism was effective in legitimising the struggle for a modern, Jacobin, European-type nation. This was not a Marxism for a socialist transition.... The sincerity of the leadership is not in question--but they wished to construct a republic of bureaucrats and associated peasants in order to build a nation and not something else.²⁷³

Cahen's theory, henceforth referred to as the "bureaucratic" view, is partially congruent with the "conventional" explanation because he claims it was "the combination of these specifics with the circumstances of armed struggle [that] created the conditions for the implantation of 'Marxism'". (Emphasis in original.)²⁷⁴

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 67.

²⁷¹ Ibid., p. 63-64.

²⁷² Cahen, Mozambique, pp. 158-161.

²⁷³ Cahen, "Check on Socialism in Mozambique", op. cit., p. 50.

²⁷⁴ Cahen, Mozambique, p. 159.

ARMED STRUGGLE AND INTERNAL FACTIONALISM

Before arriving at conclusions regarding the merits of these three theories, knowledge of the specifics of FRELIMO's history are required.

Initially FRELIMO planned to launch operations all over the country simultaneously, and in September 1964 cadres were sent to seven of Mozambique's nine provinces. Military strategy was still unclear, however, and the choice between a Roberto-style insurrection and a prolonged popular war had not yet been made.

The actions of Mozambique's neighbours and the efficiency of the Portuguese secret police then started to resolve this ambiguity. The Malawian, South African, Southern Rhodesian, and Swazi governments clamped down on Mozambican nationalists within their borders, making it nearly impossible to infiltrate arms for a sudden uprising. By Christmas 1964, most of the southern underground network was uncovered, and the FRELIMO operation in Lourenço Marques was totally wiped out. Altogether about 1,500 FRELIMO sympathisers were arrested. Guerrilla units struggled forward in Tete and Zambézia provinces, but they too were soon forced to withdraw.²⁷⁵

Tanzanian policy also conditioned FRELIMO's options. Because of the difficulty of operating inside Mozambique, FRELIMO had been mobilising among Mozambican exiles resident in Tanzania. President Julius Nyerere became uneasy with this disruption of Tanzanian society, and FRELIMO agreed to cease the mobilisation and closed its recruitment facilities there. Through these actions Nyerere encouraged FRELIMO to move its focus from outside to inside Mozambique.²⁷⁶

In 1965, the war continued only in the north, in Cabo Delgado and Niassa provinces bordering Tanzania, and FRELIMO had to rethink its strategy. If it could not easily cross borders other than Tanzania's into Mozambique, and if it could not recruit among exiles in Dar es Salaam, it would have to build up liberated areas inside the country. In the eyes of much of the FRELIMO leadership, that required a closer relationship with the peasantry, which in turn meant paying attention to their problems.

The evolving guerrilla strategy interacted with two internal problems that preoccupied the party--the reluctance of some FRELIMO students to participate in the armed struggle inside Mozambique, and

²⁷⁵ Munslow, op. cit., p. 87.

²⁷⁶ Ibid., pp. 89-90.

the lack of coordination between the military and political sectors of the party.

The Central Committee addressed these difficulties in an October 1966 meeting. It was concerned that students tended to use the Mozambique Institute purely as a means to obtain education, without making a commitment to the armed struggle. The Central Committee noted the need to re-integrate the students into the struggle, ruled that those educated abroad must return to Mozambique upon finishing their schooling, and "ordered the Department of Education to change the Institute's programme to better suit the needs of the war".²⁷⁷

Even more important were the Central Committee's decisions concerning military-political divisions that had pitted the Department of Internal Organisation against the Department of Defence. The Committee argued that if all the people were to be mobilised to participate in the war, then the guerrillas would have to play an active role in politicisation. The Committee's final communiqué condemned "those who think there are two types of FRELIMO members, military and civil", and insisted that all Department of Internal Organisation militants "must pursue a political-military education".²⁷⁸

These directives were not meekly accepted. Resistance was particularly strong in Cabo Delgado province. The local Department of Internal Organisation leaders, called "Chairmen" in the British tradition, opposed delegating "their" political functions to either the fighters or the peasants. They wanted the army to remain simply the military force, while they retained political power, and at the end of 1966 they began organised opposition to the Central Committee's instructions.

This faction (the "trader/petty bourgeoisie" in Cahen's bureaucratic model, the "bourgeois" faction in Munslow's conventional view) increasingly associated with the leading FRELIMO civil authority in Cabo Delgado, Lazaro Nkavandame, defined the enemy simply as colonialism and wanted only independence, without changing the existing social structure. In contrast, Mondlane's group, (the "bureaucratic petty bourgeoisie" in Cahen's model, the "revolutionary" group in the

²⁷⁷ FRELIMO, "Reuniao do Comitê Central em Outubro 1966, Comunicado Final", in Documentos Base da FRELIMO (Maputo: Tempografica, 1977), pp. 44-45.

²⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 36.

conventional view), increasingly defined the enemy as both colonialism and the economic system that "exploited" the peasants.

Similarly, Nkavandame's group saw whites as the enemy, regardless of individual characteristics. White members of FRELIMO, and Africans with white wives (including Mondlane), were criticised. The "revolutionary" group divided people according to their role in the economy, regardless of race.²⁷⁹

The same differences of approach were evident in arguments about economic policy in the liberated areas. Mondlane's group wanted to collectivise production while the Chairmen wanted to continue the existing economic system more or less intact, but with themselves in control. In 1966, Nkavandame supporters in Cabo Delgado started employing peasants to work their fields at low wages. Both agricultural produce and essential imported goods were marketed at high prices by the Chairmen's trading shops. The peasants knew the prices of products in Tanzania and realised they were being forced to work far longer to earn a given item than they would have had to in Dar es Salaam.²⁸⁰

Nkavandame also used tribalism against the Mondlane group. He played on the northern Makonde's long-standing fear of domination by southerners, making much of the fact that many FRELIMO military leaders came from the south. In the same spirit, he allied with traditional chiefs, who resisted the threat to their authority represented by Mondlane.²⁸¹

Mondlane's ideas on the role of women in the struggle consolidated the traditional leader-chairmen alliance. Mondlane wanted to mobilise all possible energies in the struggle and called for the emancipation of women and their acceptance into society in the liberated areas as full equals. He opposed the bride-price system, child marriage, and polygamy. A Women's Detachment was created within the Department of Defence, and representatives attended the Chairmen's meetings. This enraged traditional leaders.²⁸²

The Chairmen also opposed the idea of making the struggle a "people's war". Such a war entailed a rise in the status of the young

²⁷⁹ Munslow, op. cit., p. 104.

²⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 105.

²⁸¹ Ibid., p. 106.

²⁸² Ibid.

guerrillas and an increasing FRELIMO identification with the peasantry.²⁸³ The Chairmen counter-proposed a shift to urban warfare, which was more easily controlled by political authority. The Department of Defence said that it would be impossible to win the conventional military confrontations with the Portuguese such a strategy would entail. The Chairmen accused the guerrillas of cowardice and encouraged the peasants to withhold food. Nkavandame and his cohorts recruited their own armies and began plans to declare Cabo Delgado independent without waiting for the struggle to spread to the rest of the country.²⁸⁴

Another controversy with similar underlying causes broke into the open at the Mozambique Institute in 1968. Over the previous two years, tensions between students, led by the Catholic teacher-priest Father Mateus Gwenjere, and Mondlane's group had escalated. Gwenjere backed student demands that courses all be given in English, was anti-white, insisted that student's lives not be jeopardised in the armed struggle, and claimed that students were being deprived of offered scholarships because leaders feared that their positions would later be taken over by the better educated graduates.²⁸⁵

In March 1968, major disturbances forced the closure of the Institute. About 80 percent of the student body fled. FRELIMO suspected that West Germany had a role in the incident, as that country's Dar es Salaam embassy promised that scholarships would await the students in Nairobi and provided their air fares.²⁸⁶

Violence continued in May, when a group of Makonde exiles repeatedly attacked the FRELIMO offices, killing a member of the Central Committee. In an effort to restore order, the Tanzanian government, some of whose members were close to Gwenjere and Nkavandame, expelled all whites working with FRELIMO from the country.²⁸⁷

²⁸³ FRELIMO, Relatório do Comitê Central ao 3 Congresso (Maputo: Departamento do Trabalho Ideológico da FRELIMO, 1977), pp. 15-16.

²⁸⁴ Ibid.

²⁸⁵ Munslow, op. cit., pp. 107, 111; source one, interview.

²⁸⁶ Source one, interview.

²⁸⁷ Alpers, op. cit., p. 283.

THE SECOND CONGRESS AND ITS AFTERMATH

All these issues were finally brought into the open in the 1968 Second Congress, one of the most important gatherings in FRELIMO's history to date. When organising the event Mondlane's group used a weapon Nkavandame could not counter. They declared the Congress would be held within Mozambique in "liberated territory". This was the stronghold of the "revolutionary" faction, since Nkavandame's supporters were concentrated in Dar es Salaam. Nkavandame and his entire delegation from Cabo Delgado decided not to attend the meeting.

The Second Congress was an almost total victory for the Mondlane line.²⁸⁸ It endorsed his positions regarding the relationship between military and political roles, the need for "prolonged popular war", the role of women, and the structure of production in the liberated areas. It also explicitly stated, "The administration of the liberated zones will move towards the establishment of popular power".²⁸⁹ The Central Committee was enlarged from twenty to forty members to permit the inclusion of militants from the front line of the battle, who shared the Mondlane group's aspirations.

Nkavandame and his supporters were not yet resigned to defeat, however. In a manner reminiscent of the FNLA's attacks against MPLA forces trying to enter Angola, Nkavandame attempted to prevent FRELIMO guerrillas from infiltrating into Mozambique from Tanzania by sealing off the main access area, Cabo Delgado. Mondlane sent one of his most trusted aides to attempt a reconciliation, but the emissary was killed as he tried to cross the border on 22 December 1968. Although Portuguese soldiers actually carried out the killing, FRELIMO believed that Nkavandame arranged it, and on 3 January 1969 he was stripped of all party responsibilities. FRELIMO hoped to try him for the murder, but by the spring of 1969 he had joined forces with the Portuguese and enjoyed their protection.²⁹⁰

FRELIMO was then thrown into total disarray by the assassination of Mondlane exactly a month after Nkavandame's expulsion. On 3 February

²⁸⁸ For full details of all Second Congress resolutions, see FRELIMO, "Resoluções do II Congresso", reprinted in Documentos Base da FRELIMO, op. cit., pp. 92-105.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 98.

²⁹⁰ "Press Statement on Lazaro Kavandame", Mozambique Revolution, no. 38 (March-April 1969), p. 10.

1969, Mondlane received a book through the post at his Dar es Salaam home that exploded as he opened it, killing him instantly. It was not clear if the parcel had been sent by the Portuguese secret police, or by Nkavandame's faction, or was the result of co-operation between those two forces. Within four weeks, two other FRELIMO leaders, Marcelino dos Santos and Uria Simango, were sent similar parcels, but they were intercepted before delivery.

FRELIMO's Central Committee met from 11 to 21 April 1969 to discuss the crisis. The internal conflict was publicly acknowledged and analysed. The Central Committee rejected the politics of Nkavandame and Gwenjere, and pledged to continue the revolutionary line advocated by Mondlane. A collective leadership was then selected to replace Mondlane. The new "Council of the Presidency" contained Uria Simango, who had sometimes supported Nkavandame in the previous debates, but had since changed sides; Samora Moisés Machel, secretary of the Department of Defence and a long-standing advocate of the "revolutionary" line; and Marcelino dos Santos, ideologically among the most Marxist of FRELIMO's leaders, a loyal supporter of Mondlane, and, incidentally, a light-skinned mestizo.²⁹¹

The crisis was still not over, however, as Simango took up the conservative cause. In November 1969, he published an article entitled "Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO" that attacked the new ideological content of FRELIMO rhetoric. He insisted that FRELIMO need only agree on the desirability of liberating Mozambique from Portuguese colonial domination through armed struggle:

The question of scientific socialism and capitalism in Mozambique should not divide us.... [A]n indigenous bourgeois class does exist and if it is willing to contribute to the liberation of our country, we must accept its help.²⁹²

He accused Machel, Chissano, and dos Santos of plotting against northerners in FRELIMO and planning his assassination.²⁹³

Simango's tactic backfired. Instead of rallying the chairmen's group, he gave the Mondlane supporters the justification for crushing him. FRELIMO's Executive Committee immediately suspended him from the

²⁹¹ Editorial, Mozambique Revolution, no. 38 (March-April 1969), pp. 1-3.

²⁹² Uria Simango, "Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO", 30 November 1969, reprinted in The African Liberation Reader, op. cit., pp. 125-127.

²⁹³ Ibid.

Council of the Presidency,²⁹⁴ and in May of the following year (1970) the Central Committee expelled him. Machel was elected president, Marcelino dos Santos vice president, and the Mondlane line was finally consolidated in power. The report of the May Central Committee meeting reaffirmed:

[T]he quality of the enemy for us does not derive from colour or nationality or race or religion of a person. Our enemy is all who exploit or create conditions for the exploitation of our people, whatever colour, race or religion.²⁹⁵

In a manner somewhat reminiscent of the MPLA's evolution a few years earlier, Marxist, class-based analysis, although motivated by a number of non-racial factors, also became particularly useful to a leadership that wished to legitimise inclusion of whites and mesticos in its top ranks.

Five years after the launch of armed struggle, FRELIMO appeared to know what sort of post-independence society it was fighting for--a socialist one. As the history of the internal debate shows, this conclusion was not primarily due to outside influence. It was in large part a result of the concrete conditions of armed struggle within Mozambique. One FRELIMO organiser later commented on the period:

We became Marxists without reading Marx. The conflict with Nkavandame in particular made us oppose both a continuing feudal organisation of society and a capitalist one.... Our Marxism grew out of our own attempts to resolve our concrete problems.²⁹⁶

Before moving on to discuss the manner in which these developments influenced FRELIMO's relations with the West, this is an appropriate moment to reflect on the utility of the three previously described theories regarding the divisions within the movement.

While some insist their perspective is the only "correct" one, in the view of this writer the three theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. The "bureaucratic" view of Cahen shares with the "conventional" perspective of Munslow a conviction that the key ingredient which pushed FRELIMO's leadership towards socialist rhetoric was the specific conditions of armed struggle. While Hall and Young at one point reject the role of experience, in other parts of their work

²⁹⁴ "Communiqué of the Executive Committee", Mozambique Revolution, no. 41 (October 1969), p. 5.

²⁹⁵ Reis and Muiuane, eds., Datas e Documentos da História da FRELIMO, op. cit., p. 125.

²⁹⁶ Source one, interview.

they seem to imply it had a role, as in their reference to Marxism's "affinity with FRELIMO's own political-military experience".²⁹⁷ Hall and Young's psychological theory can be accepted as valid without necessarily negating the conventional and bureaucratic models. One can conclude that FRELIMO increasingly adopted socialist rhetoric because it helped the movement overcome past humiliations and was psychologically appealing (Hall and Young), and because the armed struggle experience taught some socialist lessons (Munslow), and because socialist ideology permitted a bureaucratic elite of "nurses and office workers" to defeat a "rural trader bourgeoisie" (Cahen). Acceptance of one theory does not necessarily entail complete rejection of the other two.

Even if one does not agree with this author, and does insist on the supremacy of one model over the other two, for the purpose of this work a main conclusion remains valid. All three theories agree that FRELIMO adopted socialist language, at least to some extent, because of internal developments and conditions within Mozambique. Because the movement chose a socialist option in large part in reaction to its own circumstances in Africa (a claim consistent with all three models) it was more prepared to adjust ideology as conditions changed than those who adopted Marxism primarily due to theoretical discussions in a radical European environment.

Whether FRELIMO embraced socialism because it genuinely drew socialist conclusions from the war experience, or because it provided a psychological antidote to past humiliation, or because it served a bureaucratic bourgeoisie's effort to build a modern state, is of import to, but not central to, the conclusion relevant to this work. Whether one finds the arguments of Munslow, Hall and Young or Cahen most compelling, one is still left with a movement that gradually, and largely voluntarily, adopted socialist rhetoric, rather than one, as in the case of the MPLA, which began the independence struggle with pre-set assumptions about the nature of society, developed following exposure to European radical trends.

IMPACT OF ARMED STRUGGLE AND INTERNAL CRISES ON CO-OPTABILITY

The leftward shift in FRELIMO's internal politics from 1966 to 1969 was accompanied by a pronounced decline in its co-optability. The

²⁹⁷ Hall and Young, op. cit., p. 64.

movement's ties with socialist countries grew even closer, in part due to their ongoing largesse, and in part because of FRELIMO's own ideological evolution. FRELIMO's relationship with Western countries simultaneously deteriorated. The operational antipathy of the 1964 to 1966 period grew even more intense, and a new, though vaguely expressed, ideological strain entered the relationship. FRELIMO still did not totally turn its back on the West, however, and continued to court Western liberals in the hope that they in turn would pressure their governments in its favour.

As in other aspects of FRELIMO affairs, the 1968 Second Congress marked a turning point in the movement's relations with foreign governments, though signs of the new attitude were increasingly evident prior to the meeting.

Over the two years preceding the Congress, FRELIMO made overtures to the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Vietnam. In early 1966, FRELIMO attended the Tricontinental Conference in Havana.²⁹⁸ Later the same year Mondlane took a FRELIMO delegation to Moscow at the invitation of the Soviet-sponsored Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. In a joint declaration with its host, FRELIMO condemned Rhodesia's recent Unilateral Declaration of Independence, the "imperialist provocations in the near east and the provocation of the American imperialists against the heroic people of the Republic of Cuba", as well as U.S. actions in Vietnam.²⁹⁹ In October 1967, FRELIMO celebrated the anniversary of the Russian Revolution with considerable fanfare.³⁰⁰

These actions and statements apparently convinced Cuba that FRELIMO might be ready to accept the assistance it had declined earlier in the decade, and the offer was repeated in 1967. FRELIMO declined once more, again on the grounds that Cuban tactics were not suitable for the Mozambican situation.³⁰¹ But in July 1968 FRELIMO officially thanked Cuba for medicine, war material, and training, so relations

²⁹⁸ "The People's Conference of the Three Continents", Mozambique Revolution, no. 23 (January-February 1966), p. 12.

²⁹⁹ "Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee: Mozambique Liberation Front", Mozambique Revolution, no. 27 (October-December 1966), pp. 6-7.

³⁰⁰ Editorial, Mozambique Revolution, no. 31 (October-November 1967), p. 2.

³⁰¹ Keith Middlemas, Cabora Bassa: Engineering and Politics in Southern Africa (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), p. 180.

must have improved somewhat in the 1967 discussion.³⁰² And despite the increased contacts with the Soviet Union and its allies, FRELIMO still remained very close to China.

FRELIMO's operational conflict with the West also grew more intense in the 1966 to 1968 period, primarily in response to the movement's perception of ever greater Western support for Portuguese colonialism. Western investment in Portugal's Caboira Bassa dam project was particularly noted. In 1966, Portugal decided to build this huge dam within Mozambique to provide electricity for South Africa. Lisbon hoped that the large lake to be created by the dam would act as a natural barrier against guerrilla infiltration into the south of the country.³⁰³ In May 1966, Western firms were invited to bid for dam construction contracts. FRELIMO tried to convince Western governments to discourage their firms from participating, but most authorities responded along the same lines as the British. Britain's position was:

[The Foreign Office] should not wish to dissuade British firms from participation in this project if they felt it was in their commercial interest to do so, except in so far as participation might involve contravention of existing Rhodesian sanctions legislation.³⁰⁴

One of the first firms to be hired by Portugal was Sweden's ASEA, even though Sweden was unpopular with Portugal because of its anti-colonial policy.

When asked, in November 1967, what FRELIMO needed but was not receiving, Mondlane replied,

Above all, perhaps, we wish we had the outright political and diplomatic support of the Western powers for our struggle.... The United States, France, West Germany, Great Britain, and most of the NATO powers tacitly support the status quo in Portuguese-governed Africa.... If the West has decided, for reasons of expediency, that it cannot part company with fascist Portugal, and to leave the Africans of southern Africa to fend for themselves, remember it's not our choice. It's yours. We will accept that. But don't be surprised later if we are not very friendly to you.³⁰⁵

³⁰² FRELIMO, "Segundo Congresso da FRELIMO: Discurso Oficial do Comitê Central", op. cit., p. 71.

³⁰³ Middlemas, op. cit., p. 32.

³⁰⁴ Written reply to Parliamentary Question, 27 April 1970. Quoted in Middlemas, op. cit., p. 48.

³⁰⁵ Kitchen, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

Despite this increasing disillusionment, FRELIMO still did see value in making friends within the "progressive forces" of the West. Thus, in March 1968 Mondlane visited the United Kingdom on the invitation of radical British organisations. He spoke at the House of Commons, at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and at Oxford University. FRELIMO remarked that Mondlane's enthusiastic reception by British radicals "proves that the British people [are] in solidarity" with the movement.³⁰⁶ (Emphasis in original.) Portugal formally protested Britain's decision to allow "the terrorist Mondlane to enter" the country, but London replied that anyone could enter as long as they did not break the law.³⁰⁷ FRELIMO remarked, "This attitude of the British government, however, must not deceive us" and noted that Whitehall had given in to pressure, knowing there would have been a public protest had it attempted to forbid the visit. Nonetheless, Mondlane's experience in Britain reinforced the movement's belief that "[i]t is worthwhile maintaining contacts with the progressive movements" in the West as they could influence their governments.³⁰⁸ The Mozambique-Angola-Guinea Information Committee (MAGIC) run by British supporters of the liberation movements was established during Mondlane's visit.³⁰⁹ FRELIMO had already been distributing, since January 1964, an English-language version of its newsletter, titled Mozambique Revolution. The size and sophistication of that newsletter markedly increased in 1968.

The July 1968 Second Congress was then a turning point in FRELIMO's relations with both East and West. The Congress resolutions read in part:

[T]he struggle of the governments of the socialist countries for the consolidation of socialism is a great contribution to the struggle of the people against imperialism, and an important support for the movements of national liberation.³¹⁰

³⁰⁶ "Mondlane Visits UK", Mozambique Revolution, no. 33 (February-March 1968), pp. 14-15.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁰⁹ Source one, interview.

³¹⁰ FRELIMO, "Resoluções do II Congresso", op. cit., p. 101 and p. 105.

It declared that the movement would "intensify even more the relations of friendship and solidarity between FRELIMO and the socialist countries"³¹¹ and announced the intention to open an office in Cuba.

The Congress documents illustrated not only the movement's appreciation of Eastern bloc support but also contained the first evidence of ideological antipathy towards the West. One of the resolutions read, "This struggle... seeks the total liquidation of colonialism and imperialism, and the construction of a society free from exploitation of man by man".³¹² The expression "exploitation of man by man" was conventional Marxist terminology for capitalism, and FRELIMO's rejection of that system was now explicit and overt.

The Second Congress language regarding the West also reflected the new ideological antipathy. In addition to the now-common criticism of Western support for Portugal, FRELIMO condemned the "exploitation" of workers in "imperialist countries" and declared that "blacks in the United States live under the racial and economic oppression of American capitalism".³¹³ For the first time, FRELIMO criticised not just Western aid to Portugal but also the West's internal politics.

Despite this tough language, the Congress reaffirmed its previous decision to cultivate influence within progressive circles so as to influence Western governments and isolate Portugal. In September 1968, at the Second Session of the Central Committee, FRELIMO decided to establish a "support committee" in the United States, to be run by U.S. liberals, and to operate separately from the FRELIMO office in New York. At the same meeting more personnel were authorised to work on foreign affairs, and the external relations section was allocated additional funds.³¹⁴ In April 1969, immediately after Mondlane's death, the movement decided to establish permanent representation in Scandinavia.³¹⁵

³¹¹ Ibid., p. 106.

³¹² Ibid.

³¹³ Ibid., pp. 104-105.

³¹⁴ FRELIMO, "Resoluções da 2a. Sessão do Comitê Central de Setembro de 1968", reprinted in Documentos Base da FRELIMO, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

³¹⁵ FRELIMO, "Resolução sobre a Remodelação das Estruturas de Direcção Superior da FRELIMO, 11-21 Abril 1969", reprinted in Documentos Base da FRELIMO, op. cit., p. 140.

The latter move bore quick results. In late 1969, ASEA withdrew its \$350 million share in the Cahora Bassa consortium. The company claimed it pulled out because of legal problems associated with United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia, but FRELIMO insisted that "the real reason was the wholesale opposition to the project by the progressive forces in Sweden".³¹⁶

As part of the strategy to separate Portugal from its allies, FRELIMO also sought to prevent the metropole from being admitted to the European Free Trade Association then being formed. The movement believed this was critical, as Portugal's weak and poorly developed internal economy would not be "able to stand the economic strain of the war without constant injections of foreign capital".³¹⁷ The Western military ties with Portugal continued to be targeted, particularly those relating to NATO. The movement provided information to Western liberals about NATO arms officially restricted to the metropole but discovered in the Mozambican battlefield.³¹⁸

SUMMARY

By 1969, FRELIMO was considerably less co-optable than it had been five years earlier. In 1964, FRELIMO was puzzled and disappointed by Washington's declining interest in its cause, and anxious to re-establish the rapport of the 1962 to 1963 period. What criticism it did level at the West was purely operational. By 1969, FRELIMO's operational criticism had escalated, and the movement now also criticised the West's capitalist economic system. Though the language was vague, an ideological element was distinctly evident in the movement's evaluation of Western policy. Nonetheless, FRELIMO still believed that "progressive" movements in the West were capable of influencing their governments, and continued its contacts with these groups. In that sense, the movement had left the door at least partly open to the West.

FRELIMO's simultaneous perception of growing Western support for Portugal's colonial policies and appreciation of rising assistance from the socialist world from 1964 to 1969 were major motivations for its

³¹⁶ "ASEA Withdraws from Cahora Bassa", Mozambique Revolution, no. 40 (25 September 1969), p. 67.

³¹⁷ Mondlane, The Struggle for Mozambique, op. cit., pp. 206-207.

³¹⁸ Ibid., p. 105, quoting Flying Review International, April 1966.

co-optability shift. The addition of ideological antipathy to FRELIMO's relations with the West was also the result of FRELIMO's armed struggle experience and the related internal factionalism that led to the expulsion of conservatives. Whether one accepts the conventional analysis, the psychological view or the bureaucratic model, one is still left with the conclusion that FRELIMO's internal developments played a critical role in shaping its ideological outlook, and that external influences were not the sole nor the prime motivating factor.

The legacy of Mondlane's background was also important in this period. His long residence in the United States had educated him about how Western governments respond to the public opinion of their own populations. This made him particularly tenacious in the public relations field. The positive results obtained by this strategy caused his successor, who had not had the advantage of learning about Western culture firsthand, to continue the approach. (This was in marked contrast with the MPLA, which by 1969 had concluded that Western liberalism was simply a more sophisticated strategy to obtain political domination and exploitation of the Third World.)

What might have happened if the United States had continued to support FRELIMO as in the early days of the Kennedy administration, if the content of the "perception of the counterpart's policy" (PCP) factor had been reversed? The historical record suggests that the influence of the other three factors that pushed FRELIMO away from co-optability-socialist country assistance, conditions of armed struggle, and internal factionalism--would still have shifted its ideology leftward, though probably not as abruptly as in fact occurred.

This suggests that the West lost an opportunity in Mozambique in the 1964 to 1969 period. The three non-PCP factors ensured that no amount of Western largesse would have produced a fully co-optable FRELIMO, but if the movement had perceived the West to be more supportive, it well could have remained more open to Western concerns.

CHAPTER 6
COURTING THE COLONISER

During the period from 1964 to 1969, the United States not only moved farther away from the past effort to co-opt rebellious colonised Africans, but began actively to court the coloniser, particularly after Richard Nixon won the 1968 presidential election. Contacts with the nationalists, already reduced, ceased entirely.

As in the Kennedy administration's initial decision to back away from co-optation, the primary U.S. policy motivation was a strategic consideration--fear of losing access to the Azores base. Growing U.S. economic interests in the colonised territories, particularly Angola, played a modest role, while relations with the Soviet Union and internal U.S. politics were relevant but not central. The U.S. perception of the nationalists' policies had virtually no influence on U.S. decision making.

THE JOHNSON YEARS

When Lyndon Johnson moved into the White House following President Kennedy's assassination in November 1963, he consolidated the shift away from a co-optation strategy initiated by his predecessor.

For example, in December 1963 African delegations at the United Nations protested Portugal's use of U.S. aircraft in the African conflicts. Washington demanded the aircraft be returned, but took no punitive action when Lisbon agreed but kept the equipment on the continent.³¹⁹ Similarly, when Portuguese intelligence discovered that officials at the U.S.'s UN office had met secretly with Roberto in December 1963, they protested and Secretary of State Dean Rusk instructed the mission to halt such contacts.³²⁰

Roberto's flamboyant playing of the "China card" did energise Rusk, who was very concerned about Chinese intentions, but those energies were spent beseeching Lisbon rather than building relationships with the nationalists. In January 1964 Roberto announced he was accepting aid from China and other communist countries because

³¹⁹ Noer, op. cit., p. 107.

³²⁰ Ibid., p. 109.

"only the communists can give us what we need".³²¹ Rusk responded with what Noer characterises as an "almost hysterical" cable to embassies in Africa and Lisbon saying China was trying to take over African liberation movements. However, Rusk did not authorise renewed contacts with the nationalists. Rather, he urged a "new attempt to force Portugal to accept some form of self determination".³²² Roberto's flirtation with China did not prompt a new effort to coopt the nationalists, but it did temporarily energise an effort to coerce Lisbon. The NSC did meet to consider Rusk's idea, and considered various responses, weighing each possible policy in terms of the importance of maintaining U.S.-Portuguese military cooperation. In the end, the NSC simply recommended that European allies be encouraged to pressure Portugal to compromise. Even the NSC, however, conceded that France and the U.K. probably would not act as the United States desired. The NSC specifically rejected any direct action against Portugal because it would undermine U.S. interests in the Azores base.³²³

In April 1964 Assistant Secretary for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams submitted a memo to Rusk recommending that Washington respond to the growing ties between the nationalists and communist countries by offering "clandestine" assistance to those African nationalists willing to follow a moderate strategy of building a non-violent political underground and using strikes and demonstrations to win independence.³²⁴ The Pentagon, however, opposed the suggestion, and no new aid was provided to the nationalists, though Roberto's small stipend continued for the time being.

Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador to Portugal Admiral Andersen opposed any action that might endanger U.S. relations with Lisbon, and his influence on policy steadily grew. After a 1964 visit to Mozambique and Angola, he made a speech that signalled the new U.S. attitude. He recommended that the principle of self-determination be loosely interpreted and not imposed by force, and insisted that extensive

³²¹ Ibid., p. 109.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ Ibid., p. 112.

³²⁴ G. Mennen Williams, "Portuguese African Territories: Action Memorandum" to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, 29 April 1964, as described in Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 421.

Western economic assistance would encourage Portugal to reform its political system.³²⁵ After the speech he had the following exchange with Salazar:

Salazar - You know, Admiral, you Americans seem to think you can make changes in a matter of years, and we in Portugal know it takes centuries.

Andersen - Well, Mr. President, perhaps with good will on the part of all and a good deal of effort, it might be someplace in between.³²⁶

Andersen then lobbied against the Department of State liberals when he travelled to Washington a few weeks later. He reported to his superiors that the Portuguese considered Angola, Mozambique, and their other African provinces as part of Portugal; sincerely believed in a multiracial policy; and "rightfully believe that they have been victims of controversy and attacks in the UN and from many parts of the United States, Great Britain, and some of the Scandinavian countries". He concluded that "the steps they [the Portuguese] are taking are commendable if one recognizes the limitations of the resources which Portugal has" and suggested that President Johnson send a special envoy to Portuguese Africa to investigate the situation.³²⁷ Kennedy's former number two in the Department of Defence, Roswell Gilpatrick, was selected and visited the territories in the autumn, leaving the area just before FRELIMO launched its armed struggle on 25 September.

Upon his return, Gilpatrick took up the Andersen refrain. During a stopover in Lisbon he praised Portugal's administration, technical competence, troop morale, and black education programme.³²⁸ His subsequent report to Washington read in part as follows:

From the point of view of the security of the United States, the continuation of Angola and Mozambique as part of the Portuguese nation is preferable to any other foreseeable alternative; the departure of Portugal would create a dangerous vacuum which could lead to a confrontation between the African powers; there is no reason to think that Portugal's Africa policy will change in the short term nor that external pressure will have any effect, even if those pressures come from the United States; the

³²⁵ Nogueira, op. cit., p. 551.

³²⁶ Admiral George W. Andersen (U.S. Navy, retired), Policy Toward Africa for the Seventies, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd session, 1970, p. 121.

³²⁷ Ibid., p. 122.

³²⁸ Nogueira, op. cit., p. 577.

economic and social situation of Angola and Mozambique... only permits the base for autonomy or independence in the long term; in light of this the U.S. must reorient its policy and, without violating its principles, cease blindly following Afro-Asian hostility against Portugal.³²⁹

Gilpatrick suggested removing the restriction on U.S. arms supplies to the Portuguese African territories. In return, he believed, Lisbon would renew the Azores agreement on a long-term basis.

Meanwhile Portugal sought to pressure President Johnson not only by threatening to cut off Azores access, but also by approaching those countries the United States wished to isolate. In 1964, Lisbon made a diplomatic overture to China³³⁰ and signed a commercial accord with Cuba.³³¹

The following year Washington's security establishment developed a new interest in the Azores base, which further enhanced Portugal's leverage. The Pentagon wanted to install long range navigational aids (LORAN-C) in the Azores. In January 1965, Washington requested Portuguese permission to install the equipment, and again pressed for a formal new lease on the base. Portugal responded that it would only act on the two requests in exchange for arms sales and an end to U.S. pressure for African independence. Washington officially demurred, but did abstain on a UN resolution directed at Portugal.³³² In May 1965, however, the CIA "offered to sell Portugal 20 B-26 planes, through Intermountain Aviation, a CIA front organisation, knowing they would be used in the colonial wars".³³³ The secret deal, termed "Operation Sparrow", was revealed at the UN in September, and was halted, though not before Portugal acquired seven aircraft. Noer postulates that the operation "was most likely a 'rogue' initiative rather than an elaborate plot to aid Portugal", though he notes it "does show... the willingness of at least some in the administration to actively support Lisbon in its battle with African nationalism".³³⁴

³²⁹ Ibid., p. 586.

³³⁰ Ibid., pp. 552-553.

³³¹ Ibid., p. 588.

³³² Noer, op. cit., pp. 118-119.

³³³ Wright, op. cit., p. 50.

³³⁴ Noer, op. cit., p. 124.

U.S. investigation of Portuguese use of NATO equipment in Africa also suffered ongoing neglect. U.S. military attaches rarely sought to verify the alleged violations, and when reports were issued they were confidential and sent only to the U.S. Department of Defence. In a subsequent interview, a Portuguese official remarked,

This issue of the arms never became more than theatre. Clearly we used NATO arms in the war.... From time to time the Americans scolded us. But I, at least, never was reluctant to... [use NATO arms] when I had commands in Mozambique and Angola.³³⁵

Perhaps the most important development of the 1960s, however, was the U.S.'s direct intervention in Vietnam in 1965. All U.S. foreign policy was affected by the effort to get international support for the U.S. position. Portugal, predictably, supported Washington on the issue. As Noer has pointed out,

...[D]irect U.S. military intervention in Vietnam in 1965 crushed any remaining possibility for renewed efforts to force Portugal to compromise. Even more than Berlin or Cuba, Vietnam shifted American attention from all other global issues. Diplomacy in Africa became largely concerned with trying to rally support for the war in Asia.³³⁶

When the pro-co-optation Williams met with Johnson in August 1965, he found the president unwilling to consider any policy which might risk the Azores or lose any European support for the war.³³⁷

During the early years of the Johnson administration, most European governments also remained relatively tolerant of Portugal's colonial policies, with one notable exception. Portugal was admitted to the European Free Trade Association despite its Africa policies. In 1964, France requested permission to establish a station for scientific and ballistic tests in the Azores, together with associated air and sea rights. Portugal agreed on the promise of eight generously financed submarines and frigates. Following this accord, French arms supplies to Lisbon increased.³³⁸ The only European country out of step with the neutral or outright pro-Portuguese policies prevailing in the West was

³³⁵ Antunes, Nixon e Caetano, op. cit., p. 110.

³³⁶ Noer, op. cit., p. 123..

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ Nogueira, op. cit., p. 566.

Sweden, which began helping FRELIMO in 1964, channelling funds through its aid institution.³³⁹

For the next four years, from 1965 to 1969, Western policy in general followed the same path. In 1965, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved a resolution criticising NATO countries for supporting Lisbon and calling for an economic boycott of Portugal. The United States and Britain both abstained.³⁴⁰ The Azores agreement continued on a year-by-year basis, with Portugal constantly holding the threat of eviction over Washington's head. In 1965, a spokesman for the Department of Defence conceded in a hearing in Congress, "The status [of the Azores agreement] is dead center". The United States had indicated a desire to discuss the issue and was awaiting Portugal's response.³⁴¹ A year later, a spokesman for the same bureaucracy testified, "These negotiations continue in the form of occasional discussions... but no progress has been made recently".³⁴² Portugal was content to let Washington sweat.

Andersen had no doubt what was required. In 1966, he insisted that a "more sympathetic attitude" towards Portugal's Africa policies would produce "a very remarkable change in Portuguese views on NATO".³⁴³ The 1966 decision of President Charles de Gaulle to pull France out of integrated NATO military operations then caused NATO's naval command to be moved from Brest to Lisbon, further enhancing Portugal's leverage on Washington. The following year, the U.S. military used the Azores base

³³⁹ Basil Davidson, "Arms and the Portuguese", Africa Report, May 1970, p. 11.

³⁴⁰ De Oliveira et al., A Descolonização Portuguesa, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 190.

³⁴¹ General Robert J. Wood, Director of Military Assistance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 1st Session, March 1965, Part IV, p. 671.

³⁴² Vice Admiral L. C. Heinz, U.S. Navy, Director of Military Assistance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, March 1966, p. 232.

³⁴³ Andersen, quoted in Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 234.

as a staging post for rearming Israel, highlighting the importance of the islands.³⁴⁴

Another factor influencing U.S. policy was the slow but steady rise in U.S. corporations' interest in the territories following the lifting of Portuguese restrictions on foreign investment. Gulf Oil discovered petroleum in Angola's Cabinda enclave in 1966 (see chapter 4) and started exporting crude in November 1968. By the end of 1970, Gulf had paid \$30 million in taxes and royalties to the colonial government in Luanda. U.S. trade with the colonies also surged forward. According to the Department of Commerce, U.S. imports from Angola increased from \$26 million in 1960 to \$68 million in 1970, reflecting a rise in shipments of robusta coffee. U.S. exports to Angola rose 245 percent over the same period, from \$11 million to \$38 million. The percentage rises in Mozambique were similar, although the actual sums were more modest. U.S. imports rose 260 percent in the 1960s, from \$5 million to \$18 million, while exports more than doubled from \$10 million to \$22 million. Significantly, a large part of the increase in U.S. exports to Mozambique entailed sales of commercial and general-purpose aircraft.³⁴⁵

U.S. economic interests in Mozambique and Angola were still modest in comparison with interests elsewhere but did have some impact on policy. Concern about these economic ties was reflected, for example, at the United Nations in 1967, when a resolution on economic sanctions against Lisbon was again introduced. The U.S. representative said:

My delegation... has strong reservations concerning the emphasis placed in the draft resolution on factors other than the outmoded Portuguese policy [in Africa]. In particular the United States is concerned about the stress on the activities of foreign economic and financial interests.³⁴⁶

Ambassador Andersen acknowledged the role of economic interests in a November 1964 memo to Rusk, in which he said U.S. objectives in

³⁴⁴ Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960 (New York: Morrow, 1982), p. 59.

³⁴⁵ Department of Commerce testimony, U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa, hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Part I, May-June 1971, p. 271.

³⁴⁶ Quoted by Mondlane in The Struggle for Mozambique, op. cit., pp. 207-208.

Africa were to "block communist penetration", keep Africa "Western-oriented", and protect "access to African markets for our commerce".³⁴⁷

Another development that influenced the Johnson administration concerned the ports in Mozambique and Angola. The United States navy had used the ports of South Africa until 1967 when a controversy arose concerning the visit of a U.S. aircraft carrier. After that, the South African ports were only used in an emergency. The ports of Angola and Mozambique were valued as alternatives, even though they were not able to accommodate aircraft carriers.³⁴⁸

THE TAR BABY OPTION

Richard Nixon's victory in the 1968 elections then opened a new phase in U.S. southern Africa policy. The new administration adopted an even more pro-Portuguese stance, and cut the remaining tie with Angola's "pro-West" nationalist, Holden Roberto.

The process began even before Nixon actually took office. Lisbon thought the new U.S. leader would be sympathetic to the Portuguese cause and immediately after the elections, in November 1968, told Washington that it would draw up specific proposals relating to future use of the Azores base. Simultaneously, Nixon selected Henry Kissinger to head the National Security Council, and Kissinger in turn chose Roger Morris as his senior staff assistant for Africa. Before Nixon's inauguration, Morris was instructed to begin work on a major review of U.S. policy in southern Africa.

Official authorisation for the study came through on 10 April 1969, in the form of "National Security Study Memorandum 39", popularly dubbed the "Tar Baby" study. The memo, from Kissinger to the secretary of state, the secretary of defence, and the director of the CIA, called for a study to consider: "(1) the background and future prospects of major problems in the area; (2) alternative views of the U.S. interests in southern Africa; and (3) the full range of basic strategies and policy options open to the United States".³⁴⁹

The study, delivered to the National Security Council on 15 August 1969, described a variety of possible policies, ranging from

³⁴⁷ Andersen to Rusk, 5 November 1964, NSF: Congo, box 2, Johnson Library, quoted by Noer, op. cit., p. 120.

³⁴⁸ Antunes, Nixon e Caetano, op. cit., pp. 121-122.

³⁴⁹ Henry Kissinger, quoted in El-Khawas and Cohen, op. cit., p. 76.

option one, "closer association with the white regimes to protect and enhance our economic, strategic and scientific interests", to option five, "dissociation from both black and white states in an effort to limit our involvement in the problems of the area".³⁵⁰

Subsequent actions by the Nixon administration suggest that option two was the alternative finally adopted. The study summarised it as, "Broader association with both black and white states in an effort to encourage moderation in the white states, to enlist cooperation of the black states in reducing tensions and the likelihood of increasing cross-border violence, and to encourage improved relations among states in [the] area".³⁵¹ The "premise" underlying the option read,

The whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come is through them. There is no hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the white regimes, encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies and through more substantial economic assistance to the black states... help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change.³⁵²

The study outlined the general posture that the United States would adopt under this option. The United States would maintain public opposition to racial repression but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the white states. Washington would accept Portugal's claim that its current policies were reformist and would indicate its willingness to accept a solution short of majority rule.³⁵³ As operational examples, the paper proposed continuation of the arms embargo on Portuguese territories, but more liberal treatment for exports of dual purpose equipment and encouragement of trade and investment in Portuguese territories with full U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) facilities. Regarding the African insurgent movements, the paper suggested that the United States declare its opposition to the

³⁵⁰ National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern Africa, AF/NSC-IG 69, 15 August 1969, quoted in El-Khawas and Cohen, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

³⁵¹ Ibid., p. 84.

³⁵² Ibid., p. 106.

³⁵³ Ibid., p. 107.

use of force in racial confrontation and willingness to continue humanitarian assistance for refugees.³⁵⁴

Though all these measures were presented as just some of many options, and the paper did not specifically advocate one or another course, the report's final section, titled "The Area: Situation, Prospects and U.S. Interests", did make concrete evaluations and predictions. It said that the rebels could not oust the Portuguese and Lisbon could contain but not eliminate the guerrillas, change was likely to come from decisions made in Portugal, and there was no indication that the Caetano government planned to permit the territories self-determination.³⁵⁵ The text basically summarised the "premise" underlying option two.

Events over the following months made it even clearer that Washington had selected option two. Covert CIA aid to Roberto was reduced to \$10,000 per year for "information collection".³⁵⁶ A modest \$5 million aid programme to the African states bordering those ruled by white minority regimes was launched to try to convince them to modify their policies. In the first year of the Nixon administration, the number of Portuguese trained by the United States both in U.S. territory and abroad almost doubled.³⁵⁷ In January 1970, U.S. officials were instructed to curtail criticism of minority regimes and colonial conflicts in southern Africa.³⁵⁸ Simultaneously, U.S. diplomats abroad were instructed not to contact any of the nationalists. In Angola, U.S. Consul Richard Post had no communication channel with the MPLA. U.S. political officers in Lusaka and Dar es Salaam reduced their efforts to collect information on the nationalist movements and those nationalists who had tried to maintain contact with U.S. diplomats began to avoid such ties as the policy of the Nixon administration became evident.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 107-108.

³⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 128.

³⁵⁶ Antunes, Nixon e Caetano, op. cit., p. 134.

³⁵⁷ National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern Africa, AF/NSC-IG 69, 15 August 1969, quoted in El-Khawas and Cohen, op. cit., p. 48.

³⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 29.

³⁵⁹ Antunes, Nixon e Caetano, op. cit., p. 133.

The CIA virtually dismantled its networks in Angola and Mozambique on the pretext of budget cutting.³⁶⁰ Antunes asserts that "the non-communist elements within FRELIMO, previously stimulated and subsidised by the CIA, ceased to merit American attention".³⁶¹ One week after Mondlane's assassination the head of the CIA in Malawi expressed concern about the radicalising effect the event might have on FRELIMO and "confessed the ignorance of Langley concerning the play of [FRELIMO] internal forces".³⁶² John Stockwell, working for the CIA out of Zaire, was scolded by his superiors for visiting an FNLA base within Angola. Increasingly, the agency's knowledge of the nationalist groups "essentially came from the secret services of the white states".³⁶³

Shortly afterwards, the United States voted against several African-sponsored resolutions that proposed that Portugal be condemned for not recognising the right of people in the Portuguese territories to self-determination and independence, expressed concern over intensification of foreign economic activity in these territories, and appealed for a halt to Western training of Portuguese military personnel and the sale of arms.³⁶⁴ In 1973, Charles C. Diggs, Jr., chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Foreign Affairs, testified:

It has become obvious that the major decision to relax the arms embargo [against Portugal and South Africa] came at the end of 1969 and was linked with the National Security Council study memorandum... of that year regarding general U.S. policy toward southern Africa.³⁶⁵

While pressure from the U.S. business community was not the primary or even an important secondary reason for the Nixon

³⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 134.

³⁶¹ Ibid.

³⁶² Ibid.

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, Study in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 39: Southern Africa, AF/NSC-IG 69, 15 August 1969, quoted in El-Khawas and Cohen, op. cit., p. 46.

³⁶⁵ Charles C. Diggs, Jr., Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, March and April 1973, p. 71.

administration's decision to increasingly accommodate Portugal, elements of the business community did encourage a relaxation of restrictions on equipment sales to the Portuguese military. Antunes cites a 1969 letter from a U.S. entrepreneur, William Durney, to Nixon which read in part:

It is difficult to understand the tremendous investment the United States is making in the Congo, when our policy in relation to Portuguese Africa remains inflexible, even regarding the supply of any military equipment that would help the Portuguese protect themselves....³⁶⁶

Lisbon quickly sensed a change in Washington 's tone and became more complacent. In a 23 October 1969 memo U.S. Consul Post wrote from Luanda, "The Portuguese feel there has been a 'loss of innocence'...in relation to Portuguese Africa in the heart of U.S. public opinion...and that it is only a matter of time before official policy reflects this change".³⁶⁷

While the United States was consolidating its pro-Portuguese policies, Europe stuck to its laissez-faire attitude, again with the exception of Sweden. Not only did the Swedish construction company ASEA pull out of the Cabora Bassa project, but Sweden's Social Democratic Party invited the Portuguese liberation movements to attend its 1969 Congress in Stockholm. This was tantamount to diplomatic recognition.³⁶⁸

SUMMARY

By the end of the 1960s, the United States had executed a 180 degree turn, reversing the policy adopted at the beginning of the decade. Kennedy's "New Frontier" was replaced by Nixon's "Tar Baby". The MPLA and FRELIMO were no longer perceived as nationalists seeking their legitimate right to independence, who with careful coaxing could be persuaded to see the advantages of alliance with the West. They were considered inconvenient irritants disrupting Portuguese relations with NATO, who could not possibly win and were therefore best ignored. Although Europe may have differed with this conclusion in some respects, it generally concurred with the U.S. complacency.

³⁶⁶ Antunes, Nixon e Caetano, op. cit., p. 127.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 116.

³⁶⁸ Davidson, "Arms and the Portuguese", op. cit., p. 11.

The shift in attitude reflected no re-evaluation of the nationalists' policies. Rarely in the various congressional hearings and policy papers was the ideological hue of the nationalists or their growing ties to the socialist bloc mentioned. Even "pro-West" Holden Roberto found his CIA payments reduced to a pittance. Only if the MPLA and FRELIMO had stopped being nationalist and accepted rule by Portugal might U.S. policy have been different.

The primary motivation for U.S. policy was the ongoing strategic interest in maintaining access to the Azores base. Despite the sharp about-face in U.S. treatment of the nationalists, it is worthwhile to acknowledge an underlying consistency in policy. Even the most anti-co-optation members of the Johnson and Nixon administrations were seeking the same long term goal as the most idealistic Africanists of the Kennedy administration. Both sought to position the United States advantageously in the competition for primacy in the international community and to prevent the emergence of additional communist states. The definition of Washington's long term strategic goals remained identical. What changed was the specific tactic adopted to attain that goal. Efforts to co-opt would-be communists were dropped when they threatened the perceived need to maintain cordial relations with a NATO ally controlling access to a strategically located base and increasingly valued port facilities in Angola and Mozambique. U.S. intervention in Vietnam also meant that the effort to gain support for that war overshadowed other, less pressing, issues. For the first time, growing U.S. commercial interests in the region began to play some role, but were not yet significant.

Developments regarding day to day relations with the Soviet Union were relevant, but not central. If relations had been better, the need to retain access to a strategically located base might have seemed less urgent. The use of the base to resupply Israel in 1967 was only indirectly related to the cold war, however, and yet played an important role in confirming the U.S. shift away from co-optation.

Internal U.S. politics were important to the extent that liberals uneasy with the anti-co-optation policy were insufficiently powerful to force a re-evaluation of approach, and the 1968 elections placed an even more pro-Portuguese administration in power. But the weight given to strategic considerations by the U.S. decision-making structure suggests that even if internal U.S. politics had been quite different, policy on FRELIMO and the MPLA would not have changed much.

PART III
MUTUAL ANTIPATHY GROWS: 1970 TO 1974

INTRODUCTION TO PART III

From 1970 until the fall of the Portuguese government in April 1974, the relationship between the nationalists and Western countries was increasingly characterised by mutual antipathy, with a few notable exceptions.

There was a brief, modest increase in apparent MPLA co-optability during the first two years of the decade, when it issued non-communist rhetoric and, in sharp contrast to its attitude in the late 1960s, sought to establish relations with liberal sectors in Europe. This phase ended in 1972, when the Angolan movement became more hostile towards the West than ever before. It declared that while Portugal was the direct enemy, "imperialism" was the principal enemy, and the socialist countries the main support of the nationalist cause. The effort to court Western liberals slackened. In the sphere of ideology, Agostinho Neto declared that the MPLA sought not only to "violently correct" production relations within Angola, but also to overthrow "a whole unjust system of oppression existing in the world".³⁶⁹

FRELIMO followed a more consistent course, becoming steadily less co-optable over the four-year period. The shift from operational to ideological criticism of the West, already evident in the late 1960s, became more pronounced. The socialist countries were identified as "natural allies", and conditions were placed on acceptance of aid from Western donors. Nonetheless, the movement did continue

³⁶⁹ Agostinho Neto, "Who is the Enemy?... What is Our Objective?", lecture delivered at the University of Dar es Salaam on 7 February 1974, published in The African Liberation Reader, vol. 3, op. cit., p. 214.

communication with liberal sectors in the West and sought to maintain independence from socialist supporters by playing donors off against each other.

In the years immediately preceding the coup, the international context was influenced by events in Portugal more than previously. After a short effort at colonial reform in the early 1970s, Portuguese soldiers adopted more brutal tactics in the field and Lisbon authorised close collaboration with white minority regimes in southern Africa. The Caetano government made it clear that Western overtures to the nationalists would result in retaliation against the state concerned, with Azores base access being used as a bargaining lever.

During the 1970 to 1974 period, the United States did not even consider seeking to co-opt the nationalists. Instead, relations with Lisbon steadily improved. Restrictions on arms sales were relaxed, training of Portuguese officers in the United States became the norm, and investments in Mozambique and Angola increased. The United States supported Portugal in the United Nations, refrained from criticising growing Portuguese coordination with Rhodesia and South Africa, and praised Portugal's policy of racial "toleration". In contrast, the nationalists were characterised as "implacably anti-Western".³⁷⁰

Because European countries devoted increasing attention to Portugal's colonial wars as the conflicts intensified, Part III also features a separate chapter on their policies. France generally went along with the U.S. approach, while West Germany and the United Kingdom exhibited unease with Portugal's policies and contemplated co-optation initiatives directed towards FRELIMO. Bonn considered such a policy option more seriously than did London, but both refrained from following through. In contrast, the already significant Scandinavian support for the nationalists increased, and the Netherlands adopted a similar approach.

Chapters 7 through 10 describe these events in detail and, as in previous sections, analyse the factors that influenced the decisions of the various protagonists. Why did the MPLA's co-optability fluctuate while FRELIMO's followed a less erratic course? What role was played by the differing conditions of armed struggle encountered by the respective nationalists? Did perception of Western policies have a

³⁷⁰ Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982), p. 859.

critical impact upon nationalist co-optability or were other factors more significant? What accounted for the minor differences between the approaches of the United States and some of the large European countries, and the major differences between the policies of Washington as opposed to those of Scandinavia and the Netherlands? When the United Kingdom and West Germany contemplated co-optation efforts, why did they only consider targeting FRELIMO, and why did they both fail to follow through on these plans? Finally, did perception of the nationalists' policies significantly influence Western policies in this period, or were other considerations more critical?

CHAPTER 7
MPLA OVERTURES FOLLOWED BY HOSTILITY

The MPLA went through two phases in the period from 1970 to 1974. During the first two years of the decade the movement's co-optability appeared to rise, though it is not clear if the new attitude reflected a genuine willingness to accommodate Western concerns or was designed only to achieve short-term goals. The MPLA disclaimed the communist label, showed irritation with the Soviet Union despite growing military ties to the socialist bloc, and developed cordial relations with Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands. During the second half of the period, from 1972 to 1974, the MPLA's co-optability declined substantially. It returned to overtly socialist rhetoric and sharply criticised the West. Conditions of armed struggle (including rivalry with other nationalists and the attitude of a key regional power), perception of Western policies, and relations with non-Western allies were the main factors responsible both for the initial rise and then the sharp fall in co-optability, though the factors had different weights and substantive contents during the first and second periods. In addition, internal factionalism played a role in the second period.

CO-OPTABILITY APPEARS TO RISE: 1970 TO 1972

The MPLA leadership entered the decade of the 1970s in an optimistic frame of mind. Its diplomatic lobbying in Africa began to show results in June 1971 when the OAU withdrew recognition from Roberto's government in exile. Though that body did not de-recognise the FNLA, the bulk of OAU liberation funds flowed to the MPLA. The same OAU meeting decided not to recognise UNITA.³⁷¹

The MPLA held its own in the military struggle against the Portuguese, despite its ongoing inability to infiltrate through Zaire (as Congo-Léopoldville was re-named in 1971). Supported from bases in Zambia, the movement hit Portuguese convoys and blew up bridges, roads, and barges on the Zambezi and other rivers in eastern Angola. British writer Basil Davidson visited the MPLA guerrillas inside Angola in mid-1970 and reported that they were "extremely well organised".³⁷² Even

³⁷¹ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 209.

³⁷² Basil Davidson, "Angola in the Tenth Year: A Report and an Analysis, May-July 1970", African Affairs, January 1971, pp. 37-49.

South African commentators conceded that the guerrillas were "efficiently trained" and "well armed", adding, "They hide in the rank undergrowth or dig in behind grass patches in the open, mere yards from the road but nigh invisible in... camouflage uniforms, their Simonov automatic rifles and Kalashnikov submachine guns aimed".³⁷³

Although there were only an estimated five hundred MPLA guerrillas operating in the east, in some areas they forced the Portuguese back to small outposts. In an attempt to cut the MPLA off from peasant support, the Portuguese stepped up the aldeamento policy, modelled on the U.S. strategic hamlet tactic in Vietnam, and forced inhabitants into protected villages. This, and the escalating sabotage, inflated the cost of the war to Lisbon. Portuguese commanders reported that they could not cope with the MPLA without more helicopters, which were subsequently acquired from the West at considerable expense. When these arrived, the MPLA switched to laying mines and booby traps.³⁷⁴ The MPLA tended to exaggerate its successes in the field, but the claim of MPLA officer Iko Carreira in 1971 that "after two years of marking time" the MPLA regained its "forward momentum" was not far from the truth.³⁷⁵

Some of the military progress may have been due to increased arms supplies from the socialist countries. During his mid-1970 visit to MPLA-controlled territory, Basil Davidson concluded that 70 to 80 percent of the MPLA's arms came from the socialist bloc.³⁷⁶ Significant numbers of MPLA students and military personnel were also receiving training in the Soviet Union.

Despite strengthening military ties with the socialists, the MPLA started to cultivate a non-communist public image. In a 1971 interview with Cologne Radio in West Germany, Neto responded to a question on the sort of economic system the MPLA would adopt by saying

³⁷³ Star (Johannesburg), 31 July and 1 August 1968. Rhodesian Herald (Salisbury), 30 July 1968.

³⁷⁴ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 214.

³⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 214.

³⁷⁶ Basil Davidson, "Walking 300 Miles With Guerrillas Through the Bush of Eastern Angola" (remarks presented at a seminar at the California Institute of Technology), Munger Africana Library Notes (Pasadena, California), no. 6 (1971), p. 8, cited in Marcum, vol. 2, p. 229.

that an elected Constituent Assembly would decide this question after independence.³⁷⁷

Then, on 4 February 1971, the MPLA's "Directing Committee" argued that the MPLA was not "a communist movement" but rather "a mass movement that gathers militants from many ideological currents, from all religions and social classes".³⁷⁸

In a December 1972 message commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the MPLA's founding, Neto was more explicit. He remarked that after independence the MPLA would not appropriate "honestly acquired goods" and insisted that the claim that the MPLA was a communist organisation was "propaganda designed to mislead our people".³⁷⁹

When Neto was asked about MPLA ideology in mid-1972, he first rejected the communist label "as our movement is formed by a people that are ideologically and politically different". He then added:

But the movement does have a political orientation. We have a precise goal.... Concerning the organisation of the economy we say that the Angolan people should be the owners of the riches of our country, that they should be paid fair salaries in order to avoid exploitation of workers, etc. This is what is normally called the socialist path. It is socialist because we don't have the intention of permitting either Angolans or foreigners to exploit anyone in our country.... We think that ideologically we do not necessarily follow the communist or Marxist line, but we follow the socialist line, with justice for all.³⁸⁰

These statements eloquently summarised the MPLA's dilemma. On the one hand, the MPLA is not communist, respects honestly acquired property, and embraces members of all ideological persuasions. But on the other hand it will organise the post-independence Angolan economy along socialist lines.

³⁷⁷ Agostinho Neto, "A Camarada Agostinho Neto responde a 13 perguntas feitas pela Rádio Colónia da Alemanha Federal e pelo Jornal Socialista Italiano 'Avanti'", 1971. Reprinted in José Fortunato, ed., Angola: Documentos do MPLA, vol. 1 (Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 1977), p. 184.

³⁷⁸ "Declaração do Comitê Director do MPLA", 4 February 1971. Reprinted in Textos e Documentos do MPLA, op. cit., p. 81.

³⁷⁹ Agostinho Neto, "Mensagem Por Ocasião do 15 Aniversário da Fundação do MPLA", 10 December 1971, reprinted in Angola: Documentos do MPLA, vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 199-202.

³⁸⁰ Agostinho Neto, "Entrevista Concedida a Ian Christie", July 1972. Reprinted in Angola: Documentos do MPLA, vol. 1, op. cit., pp. 219-221.

Several considerations motivated the MPLA's non-communist rhetoric. A primary factor was the circumstances under which armed struggle was being conducted. Portuguese offensives in eastern Angola were making it increasingly difficult for the MPLA to communicate with its units in that region. Greater co-operation with the FNLA, which controlled access to the area from Zaire, could potentially solve the problem. The MPLA therefore explored the possibility of establishing a unity pact with the FNLA, and it was clear that a non-communist posture would aid negotiations.

Asked, in July 1972, if one of the reasons for seeking unity was the fact that President Mobutu let the FNLA but not the MPLA operate from Zaire, Neto replied:

If we could use the 2,000-kilometre frontier between Zaire and Angola we could send in a lot of supplies, particularly war supplies for the first region. We are not capable, at this moment, of conveniently supplying the people of this region, and this is causing us major difficulties. Therefore the geographic situation is important when we discuss the proposal of unity between Angolan forces.³⁸¹

The FNLA-MPLA unity talks at first proceeded well. The FNLA was anxious to appear co-operative and thus worthy of OAU and other external support.³⁸² In June 1971, Neto and Roberto announced their reconciliation and pledged to work for unity. A formal agreement was then signed in December 1972 in Kinshasa. The parties promised to end hostile acts towards each other, create a Supreme Council for the Liberation of Angola, and coordinate a unified military command and a political council. They were allocated equal power in these structures. Representatives of the four OAU presidents who sponsored the unity talks were to arbitrate in the event of dispute.³⁸³

The accord did not outline the foreign relations or the ideological guidelines for the new organisation and made no mention of socialism. A few months before the signing, Neto referred to this:

[P]olitical and ideological differences are less important than the fact that the enemy is occupying our home.... Later there

³⁸¹ Ibid.

³⁸² Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 209.

³⁸³ "O Acordo MPLA-FNLA", MPLA document, CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

will be the problems of class differences. But for the moment the rich and the poor must unify for the same objectives.³⁸⁴

The MPLA was clearly playing the non-communist card to obtain immediate military advantages.

Though the conditions-of-armed-struggle factor was perhaps the most important influence pushing the MPLA towards moderate rhetoric, relations with non-Western allies also played a role. Neto was becoming concerned at Soviet "arrogance", and particularly the apparent Soviet assumption that Moscow would be afforded base facilities in post-independence Angola.³⁸⁵ An August 1971 MPLA document published in Algiers highlighted this worry. It mentioned that the strategic location of Portugal's Africa colonies meant they were desirable as military bases and then added:

It is believed that when a people liberates itself from colonial domination, this is in order to put itself at the disposition of another country, more precisely, the socialist countries.... But... we are totally autonomous and we do not follow the directives of any world power. It is we ourselves who elaborate our policy, we ourselves who formulate the directives of our life, we, finally, who determine our orientation.³⁸⁶

The juxtaposition of a reference to Angola's desirability as a base site and the statement that the MPLA would not "put itself at the disposition of... the socialist countries" was a clear rejection of Soviet appeals for base promises.

The fact that during this period the MPLA also courted those socialist countries on poor terms with Moscow also supports the theory that Neto was seeking to counter-balance Soviet ties. An information bulletin published by the MPLA in Algiers in August 1971 reported that Neto, Lúcio Lára, and other top MPLA officials had recently travelled to China for conversations with Chou En-lai.³⁸⁷ MPLA timing was poor, as China had just increased aid to the FNLA and was on good terms with UNITA. Consequently, Beijing did not give Neto material aid, though its propaganda did start to refer to his organisation in more flattering

³⁸⁴ Neto, "Entrevista Concedida a Ian Christie", op. cit., pp. 219-220.

³⁸⁵ Source three, interview.

³⁸⁶ Agostinho Neto, interview with Avanti, 1971. Reprinted in MPLA Informations (Algeria: MPLA Propaganda Department, August 1971), pp. 9-10.

³⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 37.

terms. At the end of the year Yugoslavia was added to the list of socialist but anti-Moscow countries whose support the MPLA highlighted.³⁸⁸

A third motivation for the non-communist rhetoric was the MPLA's perception of Western policies and the example set by FRELIMO. The movement concluded that although widespread Western support for African "liberation" might be unobtainable, NATO could be forced to split on the issue of Portuguese colonialism, and Western religious institutions might be approachable. (This was a shift from the movement's 1965 evaluation of all Western interest in the liberation struggle as cynical and entirely self-serving.) A 1970 MPLA message to militants stated:

The population of Europe better understands the objectives of our Revolution and our just anti-racist position. In the external sphere Portugal's fascist government has suffered major defeats and has not succeeded in maintaining the unity that apparently existed in NATO on the Portuguese colonial problem....³⁸⁹

In 1971, the MPLA repeated that "even within the heart of NATO there is already some criticism of Portugal and [statements of] the need to change this colonial situation...."³⁹⁰

The MPLA was aware of the success of FRELIMO's courting of Western liberals, particularly in discouraging Western investment in Mozambique, and sought to emulate the strategy. (See chapter 8 for more details on FRELIMO's strategy.)

The MPLA's hopes were partly fulfilled, for Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands did move more openly in favour of the MPLA. In 1970 Neto visited Scandinavia at the invitation of the region's Social Democratic Parties. In March 1972, the MPLA's radio programme "Angola Combatente" announced that Denmark was helping the MPLA to build a secondary school, providing medical help, and aiding the development of production. The Netherlands was praised in the same programme for turning down a Lisbon offer to visit Angola, and the commentator added that the Amsterdam government would probably accept an invitation to

³⁸⁸ "Mensagem Por Ocasião do 15 Aniversário da Fundação do MPLA", op. cit., p. 202.

³⁸⁹ "Mensagem aos Militantes Pronunciada Através da Rádio Tanzânia", 1 January 1970, reprinted in Angola: Documentos do MPLA, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 164.

³⁹⁰ Neto, interview with Avanti, op. cit., p. 9.

visit MPLA liberated territory.³⁹¹ The Scandinavian tour also consolidated MPLA relations with a non-NATO state, Sweden, which gave the MPLA about \$433,000 from 1972 to 1973.³⁹²

The MPLA's perception of greater openness on the part of some sectors of Western society was also encouraged by the actions of religious institutions. On 1 July 1970, Pope Paul VI received Neto, Amilcar Cabral, and Marcelino dos Santos, enraging the Portuguese.³⁹³ In the same year the World Council of Churches established a Special Program to Combat Racism. From 1970 to 1973 it gave between \$10,000 and \$25,000 to the MPLA per year. It gave UNITA far less, and fluctuated between equal and inferior treatment for the FNLA.³⁹⁴

It would appear that in the 1970 to 1972 period the MPLA partially revised its views towards at least a portion of the West. Although past U.S. efforts to court the nationalists were still regarded as cynical attempts to divert the movement from its goal, religious institutions and some European countries were now considered useful allies in the struggle against Portugal. Despite its non-communist rhetoric, however, the MPLA still clearly remained committed to socialist goals, and military ties with the socialist bloc increased during this period.

MPLA FORTUNES AND CO-OPTABILITY DECLINE

From 1973 to 1974 the MPLA suffered reverses on every front, returned to vigorous anti-Western rhetoric, and put less effort into courting Western liberals. By the eve of the Portuguese coup in April 1974, the movement appeared less co-optable than it had at virtually any point in its history. The same factors evident in the earlier period were largely responsible for the decline, but internal factionalism also played a subsidiary role.

First, the conditions of armed struggle changed, removing one motivation for the MPLA leadership to promote a non-communist image. Specifically, it became clear that the unity pact with the FNLA was not

³⁹¹ "Mensagem Radiodifundida Pelo 'Angola Combatente'", 30 March 1972, reprinted in Angola: Documentos do MPLA, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 206.

³⁹² Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 232.

³⁹³ Lawrence W. Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 220.

³⁹⁴ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 233.

going to afford the MPLA access to the Zairean infiltration routes. In January 1973, Neto foreshadowed future difficulties when he remarked that divisions between the FNLA and the MPLA were "the result of different conceptions of the struggle".³⁹⁵ Regarding problems obtaining access to the Zaire-Angola border, Neto implied that President Mobutu was a particular obstacle. "The problem is complex", he said, "because it is not only the Angolans who must negotiate, but, owing to the presence of our neighbours, African countries that help us also influence the course of the collaboration negotiations".³⁹⁶ Though the accord remained formally in effect, it was never implemented.

The FNLA then went on to usurp some of the MPLA's African allies. In 1973, Roberto visited Dar es Salaam twice at the invitation of Nyerere and was authorised to open an office there. Nyerere subsequently helped arrange Holden Roberto's visit to China in December 1973. In August, Roberto met with the OAU secretary general and was invited to attend the anniversary celebrations of one of the MPLA's most important allies, Congo-Brazzaville.³⁹⁷

The changing conditions of armed struggle not only reduced the MPLA's interest in moderating its rhetoric, but also contributed to internal factionalism, which in turn eventually influenced MPLA relations with the Soviet Union.

When it still appeared that the accord with the FNLA might succeed, some of the MPLA's guerrilla commanders became uneasy with the pact's military implications. Most important, Daniel Chipenda, leader of the part of the MPLA's Eastern Front bordering Zambia, feared that the Zairean access associated with the FNLA accord would permit the organisation to shift resources from his area to the North-Eastern Front. This suspicion was fuelled by the fact that both Chipenda and the area in which he was fighting were Ovimbundu, while the ethnic population in the front accessible from Zaire was Mbundu, the dominant ethnic group in the MPLA. At a January 1973 meeting with MPLA leaders from the Eastern Front, Neto exacerbated this fear by announcing his

³⁹⁵ Agostinho Neto, "Entrevista Concedida a Revista 'Africasie'", January 1973, reprinted in Angola: Documentos do MPLA, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 224.

³⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 225.

³⁹⁷ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 228.

intention to transfer human, financial, and military resources to the north, where, he said, there are people "who want to fight".³⁹⁸

In addition, Portugal's Operation Attila, launched in February 1972 in eastern Angola, began to inflict serious defeats on the MPLA, and by May 1973 the Lisbon press was reporting reduced insurgent activity.³⁹⁹ Although it was not widely known at the time, it has since become evident that, beginning in 1971, UNITA helped the Portuguese military battle the MPLA in return for various favours, including medical treatment for Savimbi, supply and repair of weapons, and safe passage for UNITA combatants through Portuguese-held territory. The full details are carefully documented in Minter's work.⁴⁰⁰ Portuguese General Costa Gomes, for example, made written reference to the UNITA-Portuguese deal as a "gentleman's agreement". Costa Gomes subsequently said it would have been easy to eliminate UNITA's several hundred guerrillas but from a military point of view it was better to use them against the MPLA.⁴⁰¹ The alliance is also confirmed by UNITA sources. Among many corroborating documents is a 14 September 1971 letter from UNITA Sector Chief Edmundo Rocha to a local timber merchant, who acted as go-between with the Portuguese military. "Regarding our possible cooperation in the struggle against the MPLA, or even the UPA", Rocha said, "We were always ready for such cooperation...."⁴⁰² Thus, in Eastern Angola the MPLA was actually fighting two, allied, enemies.

The military setbacks caused dissension in the ranks and a search by the leadership for scapegoats in the middle levels of military command. Tensions between Chipenda and Neto had been simmering through 1972, but broke into the open in a June 1973 letter from Neto to the government of Zambia, where Chipenda and his supporters had been staying:

In April [1973] a plot was discovered and subversive elements began to be detained.... They have all confessed that overall, Daniel Júlio Chipenda was head, that the objective was to

³⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 204.

³⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 201.

⁴⁰⁰ Minter, Operation Timber, op. cit.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid., p. 18.

⁴⁰² Ibid., p. 37, quoting Expresso, 17 November 1979.

physically eliminate the President of MPLA, and that Chipenda should be President of the Organisation.⁴⁰³

The letter appealed to Zambia to prevent Chipenda and his associates from leaving that country.

Chipenda's explanation of the Eastern Revolt, as it came to be called, was quite different:

The eastern part of Angola where we were operating was economically very underdeveloped. The MPLA leadership had an urban, intellectual orientation. It was difficult for them to understand the countryside. The rural people felt discriminated against in the organisation. It was not an ideological problem. It was simply that the leadership was not respectful of the rural people's feelings. We wanted more democratic procedures.⁴⁰⁴

Messiant has asserted that the Eastern Revolt, like some post-independence MPLA schisms, resulted from tensions between anciens and nouveaux assimilés rather than from primarily ethnic differences.⁴⁰⁵ As the above Chipenda quote illustrates, he represented the more recently educated, rural assimilado group, while the Neto-affiliated MPLA leadership had closer ties with mestiços and the anciens assimilés. Heimer's central/tributary society model is also helpful in understanding the Eastern Revolt; the rebels were closer to the latter and the central leadership closer to the former.⁴⁰⁶ The incident ended with Chipenda and some of his followers joining the FNLA.

The defection of the Eastern military and the failure of the FNLA unity agreement to permit resupply of the North-Eastern Front from Zaire further slowed MPLA military progress, and this in turn changed relations with Moscow. The Soviet Union accepted Neto's public sniping and flirtation with rival nations as long as he led the movement most likely to take power after independence. When his military fortunes reversed, however, the Soviet Union began considering alternatives. According to Paulo Jorge, the MPLA's foreign minister following independence, "There was a temporary suspension of help from the Soviet Union, a period of doubt when the MPLA appeared divided".⁴⁰⁷ With the

⁴⁰³ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 202.

⁴⁰⁴ Daniel Chipenda, interview by author, Lisbon, Portugal, April 1984.

⁴⁰⁵ Messiant, op. cit., pp. 172-173.

⁴⁰⁶ Heimer, op. cit., p. 96.

⁴⁰⁷ Jorge, interview.

FNLA increasingly tied to the Chinese, and UNITA militarily weak, the logical alternative for the Soviets was Chipenda. In early 1973, Moscow was still apparently on good enough terms with Neto to pass on intelligence concerning the alleged Chipenda plot, but Moscow then provided Chipenda with modest assistance later in the year and in 1974.⁴⁰⁸

Neto was furious and allegedly believed that there was "an American-Soviet agreement that placed Angola within an American sphere of influence and Mozambique within a Soviet sphere of influence".⁴⁰⁹ In a February 1974 speech at the University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, he remarked that the socialist camp was divided "and the relations of solidarity" had declined. He lamented:

[T]he national liberation struggle in Africa does not have a very sound basis in the international arena, and it is not political or ideological affinities that count, nor even the objectives themselves, for in most cases other interests dominate relations between the liberation forces and the world.... [E]fforts to transform the liberation movements into satellites of parties in power, subject to unacceptable paternalism, are caused by the fact that most of the liberation movements conducting an armed struggle have to do so from outside their countries.⁴¹⁰

Though much of the speech may have also been directed against the West, the statement that other interests besides ideological ones dominate relations between the liberation forces and the world seems to be a clear reference to Soviet pressure regarding base facilities and Moscow's recent tilt towards Chipenda.

As Neto mentioned, however, not all the socialist countries followed the Soviet Union's lead. A Yugoslav diplomat stationed in Luanda after independence reported that his country did not reduce support to the MPLA at the time of the Chipenda split. Neto visited Yugoslavia several times when the problems were occurring in his relations with Moscow, the diplomat stated, remarking that this was probably why the MPLA subsequently tended to speak highly of President

⁴⁰⁸ Weinstein and Henriksen, op. cit., p. 66; Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 201; Ottaway and Ottaway, op. cit., p. 105.

⁴⁰⁹ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 229.

⁴¹⁰ Neto, "Who is the Enemy?... What Is Our Objective?", op. cit., pp. 218-219.

Tito.⁴¹¹ Cuba also maintained aid, but as Havana was on better political terms with Moscow than was Belgrade, it made less of a public issue of the fact.⁴¹² These allies' decisions to stand by Neto, and the Soviet Union's ambivalence, had important implications for Neto's foreign policy after independence.

As the deal with the FNLA unravelled and factional problems damaged relations with the Soviet Union, the MPLA also lost confidence in its ability to divide NATO further. After the success obtaining Danish, Dutch, and Norwegian aid in the early 1970s, no additional Western donors materialised. Neto concluded that Portugal's new autonomy proposals, which stopped far short of independence, were part of a neo-colonialist plot, and he was uneasy about both rising Western arms sales to Portugal and increased foreign investment in the Portuguese colonies.

Unlike FRELIMO, the MPLA's commitment to collaboration with Western liberals was tactical rather than strategic, and was not based on a thorough understanding of the cyclical nature of domestic politics in Western democracies. When the tactic no longer yielded swift results, it was de-emphasised.

It was in this context that the MPLA shifted towards anti-capitalist, anti-Western rhetoric. The new approach was first evident in a February 1973 Neto speech in which the MPLA leader said that the Portuguese autonomy proposals reflected a "general change of tactics of the imperialist enemy" and noted that there had recently been a "massive influx of imperialist capital", announcing that the level of foreign investment in Portugal and its colonies had risen a third from 1969 to 1971. Neto also claimed that NATO was considering establishing naval bases in Angola.⁴¹³

Angola was therefore not dominated only by Portugal, Neto argued, but also by Britain, the United States, and other European countries that were competing to exploit Angola's wealth:

⁴¹¹ Source four, confidential interview by author, Luanda, Angola, 1985.

⁴¹² John A. Marcum, interview by author, Berkeley, California, United States, October 1986.

⁴¹³ Agostinho Neto, "The Enemy Have Changed Their Tactics", February 1973, reprinted in The African Liberation Reader vol. 3, op. cit., pp. 30-32.

[I]f we can say that Portugal is the manager of a series of politico-economic deals, we will see that it is not our principal enemy, but merely our direct enemy.... [T]he enemy is colonialism, the colonial system, and also imperialism, which sustains the former, to the point of being the principal enemy.⁴¹⁴

Neto also was less ideologically coy in this speech than previously. After remarking that the class interests of the poor Portuguese peasant sent to Angola "as a watchdog for fascism" and the class interests of black Angolans were similar because both "feel themselves slaves of the system as a whole", Neto addressed the international dimension of MPLA ideology:

I should like to emphasise that the liberation struggles are not aimed solely at violently correcting the relations between men and especially production relations within the country--they are also an important factor for the positive transformation of our entire continent and the whole world. [Emphasis in original] The national liberation struggle is also a means of overthrowing a whole unjust system of oppression existing in the world.⁴¹⁵

Finally, while criticising the Soviet aid suspension, Neto still insisted, "Within [the capitalist-socialist] division it is the socialists who hold high the banner of internationalism and in fact give the most support to the liberation movements".⁴¹⁶ Nowhere in the long speech was reference made to the support that the MPLA had received from some sectors of the West, a sharp departure from previous practise.

The rhetoric continued in July 1973, when the MPLA published an "Outline of the Unholy Anglo-Portuguese Alliance" in Lusaka. It claimed that the "historic" Anglo-Portuguese alliance had been strengthened since the coming to power of a conservative government in London in 1970, visits between the two countries had increased, and economic "concessions" had multiplied. Prince Philip's visit to Portugal in June 1973 was cited as proof of "not only Britain's tacit support for colonialist fascist Portugal, but also [its] total disregard [for people of the African colonies]".⁴¹⁷

⁴¹⁴ Neto, "Who is the Enemy?... What Is Our Objective?", op. cit., pp. 210-219.

⁴¹⁵ Ibid., p. 214.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid., p. 218.

⁴¹⁷ "Outline of the Unholy Anglo-Portuguese Alliance", MPLA Department of Information and Propaganda, Lusaka, Zambia, July 1973.

SUMMARY

It is clear from the above description that the MPLA became somewhat more co-optable in the 1970 to 1972 period, though it was ambivalent about just how much it was willing to distance itself from past policies, and then shifted to considerable hostility towards the West in 1973. The same three factors--conditions of armed struggle (including rivalry with other nationalists and the position of a key regional power), relations with non-Western allies, and perception of Western policies--contributed to both the increase and decline of co-optability. In the 1970 to 1972 period, the MPLA perceived NATO to be divisible on the question of Portuguese colonialism, hoped to obtain military access to an area controlled by more pro-Western individuals (Roberto and Mobutu), and was confident enough of Soviet aid to risk showing some independence from the Moscow line when that ally adopted a "paternalistic" attitude. In the 1972 to 1974 period, there was no hope of obtaining access to the coveted Zairean infiltration routes, there appeared to be little prospect of more support from the West, and the Soviet Union's decision to back the Chipenda faction both reduced the utility of a non-communist posture and increased the MPLA's interest in proving that it alone among the Angolan nationalists was the ideological true believer and therefore most deserved Soviet assistance.

What might have happened in the 1970 to 1974 period if the MPLA had perceived Western policies differently? What, for example, might have happened if, during the first two years of the decade, it had not perceived NATO to be divisible? Because of the strength of the movement's desire to obtain access to the Zairean infiltration routes and the utility of non-communist rhetoric in negotiations with individuals controlling these routes, it seems likely that the MPLA's appearance of co-optability still would have risen, though perhaps to a lesser extent. A different perception of Western policy could have had an even greater impact in the 1972 to 1974 period. The MPLA was simultaneously angry and panic-stricken over the Soviet Union's decision to back Chipenda rather than Neto. If the West had appeared well disposed towards the nationalists, the MPLA might have been willing to make a number of major compromises in return for assistance. Given the deep-rooted socialist and "anti-imperialist" philosophies of many of the movement's most prominent leaders, however, it is doubtful

that even a desperate MPLA would have shifted to a posture fully accommodating Western interests.

Perception of Western policy, therefore, had an important impact on fluctuating MPLA co-optability, though not one critical enough to cancel out entirely the influence of other, independent, factors.

CHAPTER 8

**FRELIMO SHIFTS FROM OPERATIONAL
TO IDEOLOGICAL CRITICISM OF THE WEST**

FRELIMO's course in the 1970 to 1974 period was less erratic than that of the MPLA. Over the four years preceding the Portuguese coup the movement grew steadily less co-optable, and by the eve of Caetano's fall from power it was more hostile to the West than ever before. Most significantly, the Marxist tendencies evident earlier became more pronounced and the shift from operational to ideological criticism of the West, already under way in the late 1960s, accelerated. The FRELIMO leadership now identified the socialist countries as "natural allies" and devoted less resources to lobbying Western governments than previously, concluding that Portugal's principal NATO allies were now immune to appeals. Indeed, so displeased was the movement with these administrations that it established pre-conditions for acceptance of Western aid.

However, the FRELIMO leadership did continue the past policy of distinguishing between governments and peoples, and in the 1970 to 1974 period facilitated the establishment of "support committees" in major Western capitals. FRELIMO also continued to court the small Western states that had already expressed sympathy for the nationalist cause and stepped up contacts with the Western churches that took a sympathetic view of the "liberation struggle".

Three main and two subsidiary factors influenced FRELIMO's attitude towards the West. Conditions of armed struggle continued to encourage the leadership to rely on the discretion and goodwill of the peasantry for survival, ensuring that the concerns of Mozambique's rural poor received some consideration. As in the late 1960s, socialist ideology also continued to serve as a useful framework for the "bureaucratic" elements trying to mobilise the masses in the name of modernising nationalism and a psychological balm for past humiliations.

Another main factor contributing to the decline in FRELIMO's co-optability was the growing assistance and related influence of the socialist countries. Because there were a variety of such allies and they were divided among themselves, the socialist country supporters were not in a position to dictate policies to the movement. They did,

however, reinforce FRELIMO's predisposition to view socialism as a more just system than capitalism. Perception of Western policies continued to play an important role as FRELIMO became more convinced that the West, with only a few exceptions, was now firmly opposed to the nationalists' cause

Finally, internal factionalism and the background of the movement's new leaders were subsidiary but still significant factors. Both were results of the specific conditions of armed struggle that in turn reinforced the tendency towards radical politics.

FACTIONAL AND MILITARY ISSUES

The first task of the new decade was to resolve the remaining internal difficulties caused by Mondlane's assassination and the Nkavandame split. At its May 1970 Central Committee meeting FRELIMO expelled Uria Simango, suspended since the November 1969 publication of his article "Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO". The Council of the Presidency was replaced by a more centralised president and vice president structure. Samora Machel was named to the former post and Marcelino dos Santos to the latter.⁴¹⁸

The background of the new FRELIMO leader was quite different from that of his predecessor. Mondlane was highly educated, familiar with the West, had strong Christian convictions, and came to the FRELIMO leadership with few ideological preconceptions. Machel, in contrast, had less formal education but more experience on the ground. From the south of the country, he had worked as a nurse in Lourenço Marques in the 1950s. He then received military instruction in Algeria, where most of the radical wing of FRELIMO was trained, and in 1965 became an instructor at the newly established camps in Tanzania. In 1966, he was promoted to secretary of the Department of Defence after the assassination of its former head, and spent the last four years before Mondlane's death in the most radical part of the movement. From the defence post he had strongly advocated politicisation of the military, and backed the "radical" faction in the power struggle with Nkavandame and Simango.⁴¹⁹ The appointment of dos Santos as number two

⁴¹⁸ "Comunicado Final da 40 Sessao do Comitê Central da FRELIMO de Maio de 1970", reprinted in Documentos Base da FRELIMO, op. cit., pp. 157-159.

⁴¹⁹ Munslow, op. cit., pp. 69, 72, 85, 88, 103.

was also significant, because he had developed a Marxist philosophical framework during his education in Portugal and France.⁴²⁰ (Because he was a light-skinned mestizo, his promotion reflected a concrete implementation of the "radical" wing's views on race relations.) Clearly the new leadership was more likely than the old to lead FRELIMO in a Marxist direction.

With its internal problems under control, FRELIMO turned its attention to the military struggle. The movement had already concluded that it could not push the Portuguese out of Mozambique simply by continuing operations in the northern areas accessible from Tanzania, principally the provinces of Cabo Delgado and Niassa. It sought to expand into the more central Tete Province, which could act as a link between anticipated supply sources in Zambia and the interior, and was the site for the Cabora Bassa dam project.

As FRELIMO moved into Tete, the Portuguese retaliated by launching "Operation Gordian Knot" against FRELIMO strongholds in Cabo Delgado. Beginning in May 1970, the rural population was subjected to extensive air attacks⁴²¹ and rounded up into "protected villages", called aldeamentos, in an effort to sever peasant-guerrilla links.

FRELIMO responded by providing peasants protection at FRELIMO bases and instructing the population in guerrilla tactics. The movement and the northern population grew somewhat closer as the Portuguese attacks caused them increasingly to rely upon each other for protection.⁴²²

By June 1970 the commander of the Portuguese forces in Mozambique, Kaúlza de Arriaga, reported to Caetano that FRELIMO controlled about 150,000 people in Cabo Delgado alone, and the aldeamentos were "heavily infiltrated."⁴²³ By August, "Operation Gordian Knot" was defeated.

⁴²⁰ Ibid., pp. 54, 65.

⁴²¹ Reis and Muiuane, eds., Datas e Documentos da História da FRELIMO, op. cit., p. 153.

⁴²² Munslow, op. cit., p. 116, quoting interview with Commander Leonardo Njawala, April 1975.

⁴²³ Letter from Kaúlza de Arriaga to Marcello Caetano, 1 June 1970, reprinted in José Freire Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, vol. 2 (Lisbon: Publicações Dom Quixote, 1985), pp. 259-264.

The stabilisation of FRELIMO's position in Cabo Delgado permitted the movement to focus on Tete in 1971 and 1972. In November 1971, de Arriaga told Caetano that FRELIMO could, "without any difficulty, contact the people [in Tete] and entice or force them to give support.... This support results in an almost perfect mixing of the enemy within the people".⁴²⁴

The Portuguese military's discomfort increased in July 1972, when FRELIMO used supply lines through Tete to open fronts in the provinces of Manica and Sofala. FRELIMO then conducted three "advances", which progressed slowly. The eastern advance got under way at the end of 1973, the southern advance was established by March 1974, while the north-eastern advance bogged down.⁴²⁵

FRELIMO's intermittent military successes had a profound impact on the Portuguese population resident in the country, leading them to conclude that their army was either unwilling or unable to provide protection. As Cahen has noted, FRELIMO's military actions "consummated the divorce" between the Portuguese army and Portuguese settlers, and strained relations between the Portuguese officer corps and the government in Lisbon. From 1971 to 1973 about a fifth of the Mozambican Portuguese population had returned to the metropole or re-emigrated to South Africa or Brazil.⁴²⁶

FRELIMO never came to control Manica and Sofala as it did Cabo Delgado, Niassa, and, to a lesser extent, Tete. From 1973 to the coup in Portugal, the tempo of FRELIMO territorial conquests slowed. Whether this was due to the length of supply lines, ethnic differences between guerrillas and the population, conflicts with local chiefs over FRELIMO opposition to certain traditions, or improved Portuguese efficiency is not clear. But by the eve of the coup the two armies were at a standoff, each controlling a third of the country and disputing the remaining third. This was reflected in de Arriaga's 1973 remark that while FRELIMO activity had decreased somewhat, it "could flare up again

⁴²⁴ Letter from Kaúlza de Arriaga to Marcello Caetano, 18 November 1971, reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 265-274.

⁴²⁵ Statements of Fernando Matavele, quoted in Reis and Muiuane, eds., Datas e Documentos da História da FRELIMO, op. cit., pp. 164-168.

⁴²⁶ Cahen, "Le Portugal et l'Afrique", op. cit., p. 11.

at any moment" and "the general population is predisposed to be receptive to subversion".⁴²⁷

THE DEVELOPMENT OF IDEOLOGY

The resolution of FRELIMO's internal split in favour of the Mondlane group and the extension of the movement's territorial control led to a crystallisation of ideology. Though FRELIMO still stopped short of openly declaring itself Marxist-Leninist, it increasingly adopted language compatible with that philosophy.

Right at the beginning of the decade, in a September 1970 speech, Machel specifically labelled capitalism as "the system of exploitation".⁴²⁸ Joaquim Chissano, a future president of Mozambique who at this point was rising through FRELIMO's ranks, echoed these sentiments, saying that socialism "leads to human dignity".⁴²⁹ In the same year, efforts to raise the political consciousness of the military were increased, and at the beginning of 1972 there was a mid-level reshuffle because, in Machel's words, "[W]e felt that our struggle... was no longer just a fight against colonialism... but rather was a struggle that integrated itself in the general struggle of all the revolutions".⁴³⁰

A Defence Department meeting held in July 1972 then sought to draw ideological conclusions from the conflicts that had wracked the movement in the late 1960s,⁴³¹ and five months later the ideology issue was re-addressed at a Central Committee meeting. The Central Committee decided that armed struggle should be made an integral part of the life of the Mozambican people, and the war should be more fully popularised. In 1973, FRELIMO ruled that a vanguard party on the lines established by Lenin should eventually be adopted when conditions permitted. The

⁴²⁷ Letter from Kaúlza de Arriaga to Marcello Caetano, 22 January 1973, reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 275-277.

⁴²⁸ Samora Machel, quoted in Rosberg and Callaghy, eds., op. cit., p. 292.

⁴²⁹ Joaquim Chissano, interview by Afrique Australe, 27 November 1970. Published in Afrique Australe, no. 2-3 (1971).

⁴³⁰ Samora Machel, "Intervençao do Presidente Samora Machel na Primeira Sessao de Trabalhos", reprinted in Documentos Base da FRELIMO, op. cit., p. 203.

⁴³¹ Munslow, op. cit., p. 137.

same year saw the formation of the first FRELIMO committees inside the military, and in January 1974 the FRELIMO school began operating. It taught the works of Marx and Lenin, and used examples from FRELIMO's own history to illustrate the theory of "class struggle".⁴³²

The movement's ideology at the eve of independence is probably best summarised in a paper titled "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in Mozambique". It was written by Machel in February 1974 for the Soviet Academy of Sciences and published in 1975 in Moscow. Machel emphasised the need for "installing power based on an alliance of the exploited social strata in our country, and bringing to fruition the national liberation struggle by destroying the system of exploitation of man by man".⁴³³ (Note: Cahen has argued that "popular power" in FRELIMO-ruled independent Mozambique was "a complete ideological fiction" and that socialism was used more to develop a modern state with a national consciousness than it was to really provide for the "massive and durable intervention of workers and peasants".⁴³⁴ However, this does not render irrelevant the manner in which FRELIMO chose to present itself in the early 1970s. Whether it subsequently lived up to or failed to fulfill its promises, at this stage in its development it was declaring with increasing energy its intention to pursue a socialist path.)

Machel presented the internal divisions within FRELIMO as an example of class struggle between a group that wished to replace the colonialists as the "exploiting class" and another reflecting "the objective interests of the masses struggling to abolish exploitation of man by man".⁴³⁵ Machel also remarked somewhat apologetically that "the absence of a vanguard party from the broad front" was not a specific FRELIMO strategy, but rather the result of "the non-existence of an organised working class and tradition", the burden of "reactionary

⁴³² Ibid., p. 138.

⁴³³ Samora Machel, "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in Mozambique", reprinted in Samora Machel, An African Revolutionary: Selected Speeches and Writings, ed. Barry Munslow (London: Zed Books, 1985), p. 35.

⁴³⁴ Cahen, Mozambique, op. cit., pp. 141-142.

⁴³⁵ Machel, "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in Mozambique", op. cit., p. 41.

tradition", and the isolation of Mozambican communities from the "world revolutionary movement". Machel insisted that FRELIMO needed to

replace obsolete loyalties to tribe, language, religion and culture with national unity and with a sense of belonging to an immense, exploited working class.... [T]he central question is one of a balance between the broad front intended to overthrow colonial imperialist domination on the one hand, and demands on the other of an ideology that can bring the revolution to its fruition, and already represents the claims of the broad working masses. [Author's emphasis]

He said that FRELIMO's strategy was to broaden the front by bringing in "new faces" and simultaneously raising the general standard of "consciousness". He concluded, "[W]e are gradually creating the conditions whereby, within the broadening front, there should be taking shape an organised revolutionary vanguard of the mass of Mozambican workers".⁴³⁶ Machel also rejected the non-traditional "foco" theory of Che Guevara, saying that it was "based on false premises".⁴³⁷

Although the organisation's rhetoric approached classical communism, FRELIMO's actual economic policies were more closely related to the African socialism of Nyerere and Kaunda. By the eve of the Portuguese coup, FRELIMO had four types of production relationships: individual peasant production (the most common form), pre-collective machambas (farms) in which peasants with adjacent plots jointly defended their crops against predators, collective machambas that were worked in addition to private plots, and totally collective production within FRELIMO's own structures.⁴³⁸ Full co-operative production was prevalent only in the liberated areas of Cabo Delgado. (Note: This coincides with Cahen's assertion that "Mozambican Marxism was not fundamentally different, in its ideological nature... from the nationalisms of Nkrumah, Nasser, Lumumba, [and] the FLN of Algeria...."⁴³⁹)

The development of political structures, on the other hand, more closely paralleled the rhetoric. "Structures of people's power", a form of rural democracy based on elected committees at the village and higher levels, were extended to all the liberated areas. As Cahen has

⁴³⁶ Ibid., pp. 42-45.

⁴³⁷ Ibid.

⁴³⁸ Munslow, op. cit., p. 142.

⁴³⁹ Cahen, Mozambique, op. cit., p. 167.

noted, they were flawed and insufficiently democratic, but they did represent FRELIMO's intention to adopt a "socialist" political model. Education was ostensibly designed to instil the "collective ideology that will enable us to make progress in the revolutionary process".⁴⁴⁰

RELATIONS WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

In the years immediately preceding the Portuguese coup, FRELIMO's relations with the socialist countries grew steadily warmer.

Socialist country support to FRELIMO markedly increased in 1971.⁴⁴¹ The July-September 1971 issue of Mozambique Revolution announced Machel's return from visits to the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Romania, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), commenting, "We form an alliance based on the fundamental fact that our aims are the same: to build a society where oppression and exploitation of man by man will no longer be possible".⁴⁴² During this tour, formal relations were established between FRELIMO and the communist parties in the countries visited.⁴⁴³ When Machel returned to the GDR in April 1972, Mozambique Revolution criticised the "Bonn-Pretoria axis" and supported the admission of the GDR to the United Nations.⁴⁴⁴ In June 1973, Machel again visited the Soviet Union and Romania, opening a FRELIMO representative office in the latter country.⁴⁴⁵

Though these Warsaw Pact contacts were important, and resulted in some material aid, it was the improvement in FRELIMO's relations with the Chinese that had the most effect upon the course of the armed struggle and the evolution of FRELIMO ideology. Machel visited China in the second half of 1971, along with North Korea and Vietnam. Upon

⁴⁴⁰ Machel, "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in Mozambique", op. cit., p. 60.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid., p. 70.

⁴⁴² "Alliance Against Imperialism", Mozambique Revolution, no. 48 (July-September 1971), p. 1.

⁴⁴³ Machel, "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in Mozambique", op. cit., p. 70.

⁴⁴⁴ "Alliance Against Imperialism", Mozambique Revolution, no. 51 (April-June 1972), p. 5.

⁴⁴⁵ "The President's Visit to Soviet Union and Romania", Mozambique Revolution, no. 55 (April-June 1973), pp. 7-8.

returning he proclaimed solidarity with Beijing.⁴⁴⁶ China's support for FRELIMO soon increased, eventually providing 80 percent of the movement's weapons.⁴⁴⁷ Chinese journalists visited FRELIMO liberated territory for three weeks early in 1972⁴⁴⁸ and Chinese experts began to provide regular training in FRELIMO's Tanzanian camps. By 1973, most junior guerrilla commanders had received this instruction.

One reason for the improvement in Sino-FRELIMO relations was that Chinese culture and political ideology meshed particularly well with that of the nationalists. The trainers' humble lifestyle meant that they did not mind working alongside the peasants, as mandated by FRELIMO policy. The Chinese cultural revolution tactic of exposing "heretics" while retaining them within the organisation was attractive to FRELIMO following its internal crises.

FRELIMO also was impressed by Chinese "selflessness". Concerning this period, a FRELIMO official later remarked:

China... didn't demand anything in return. China supported the liberation struggle the way some evangelists support missionary work. They did it because they believed in it, without any expectation of material reward.⁴⁴⁹

FRELIMO's relations with Beijing were also strengthened by the evolution of the movement's contacts with the nationalists in Rhodesia. Since 1968, FRELIMO had officially been allied with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), a guerrilla movement supported by the Soviet Union that was launching intermittent raids into Rhodesia from bases in Zambia. FRELIMO was suspicious of ZAPU's rival, the Chinese-supported Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) because of the latter's cordial relations with some FRELIMO defectors, and because it did not seem to be doing much fighting.⁴⁵⁰

Once FRELIMO established a presence in Tete, which bordered Rhodesia, it suggested that ZAPU use this area to infiltrate guerrillas into the neighbouring state. When ZAPU declined the offer, and ZANU requested permission to use the Tete route for guerrilla infiltration,

⁴⁴⁶ Middlemas, op. cit., p. 179.

⁴⁴⁷ Source one, interview.

⁴⁴⁸ "Chinese Guests Praise FRELIMO's Success", Mozambique Revolution, no. 50 (January-March 1972), pp. 17-19.

⁴⁴⁹ Source one, interview.

⁴⁵⁰ Martin and Johnson, op. cit., pp. 14-16.

FRELIMO re-evaluated its alliances. In mid-1972 FRELIMO finally allowed ZANU guerrillas and armaments to pass through Tete and into north-eastern Rhodesia. FRELIMO's shift from the Soviet-affiliated ZAPU to the Chinese-affiliated ZANU thus consolidated the movement's connections with Beijing, while weakening its relationship with Moscow.⁴⁵¹

Despite this steady shift in the direction of Beijing, FRELIMO rhetoric did try to avoid taking sides in the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Thus, Machel called "the great October Revolution" an "example" and a "strategic rear base for our fight".⁴⁵² In the same spirit of Sino-Soviet neutrality, Machel equally congratulated China and the GDR for "break[ing] out of isolation".⁴⁵³

It is relevant to note that while the evolving relationship with China influenced FRELIMO in a pro-socialist direction, China itself was in the midst of rapprochement with the United States at this time. (President Nixon made his historic visit to Beijing in 1972.) Therefore, growing FRELIMO-China ties did not necessarily result in pressure for a tough anti-Washington stance.

RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

While relations with the socialist countries grew more cordial, relations with the major Western powers became more strained than ever. In 1971, Mozambique Revolution said that FRELIMO sent delegations to socialist countries and not to the major Western powers because the latter "support Portuguese colonialism and are opposed to our people's aspirations".⁴⁵⁴ Though stated in more dismissive terms than usual, this was a restatement of the previous FRELIMO operational theme, that the West was hindering FRELIMO by assisting the Portuguese. However, the new, ideological, element in FRELIMO rhetoric also grew stronger. The West was also attacked for its economic and philosophical orientation:

This enmity [between FRELIMO and the West] has even deeper roots which lie in the contradictions between our ultimate aims on the

⁴⁵¹ Ibid.

⁴⁵² Machel, "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in Mozambique", op. cit., pp. 69-70.

⁴⁵³ Ibid., p. 70.

⁴⁵⁴ "Alliance Against Imperialism", Mozambique Revolution, no. 48 (July-September 1971), p. 6.

one hand and the very nature of their society on the other. Thus capitalist society is characterised by the principle of exploitation of man by man.... Yet we fight to put an end to these very evils in our own country!⁴⁵⁵

The United States was subject to the most vigorous criticism. Just as FRELIMO escalated from a strategic to a philosophical enmity with the West, it progressed from criticism of U.S. material aid for Portugal to a broader definition of U.S. "imperialist" interests in Mozambique. The United States, according to a 1970 FRELIMO article, wanted Mozambique "to remain as [a] colon[y]--providing a valuable source of raw materials, extensive markets and strategic military bases... for the U.S. and other imperialist powers...."⁴⁵⁶

In 1970, FRELIMO published an article titled "USA--How Far From Intervention?" The movement stated that the previous November a "highly placed member of the U.S. government [Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Bob Moore] paid a discreet, and for us highly disquieting, visit to Mozambique.... What was his mission?" (Emphasis in original.) Increasing U.S. investments in Mozambique were then tabulated. Remarking that it would be necessary to launch a pacification campaign against FRELIMO before these investments could be safe, and speculating upon U.S. interest in the port of Nacala, the author announced: "[I]t is easy to conclude that a more direct involvement of the U.S. in the Mozambican war cannot be excluded".⁴⁵⁷ (Emphasis in original.)

When the United States renewed the Azores agreement with Portugal in December 1971 and simultaneously provided Portugal with over \$4 million in loans and aid, FRELIMO reacted with a wave of anti-Americanism. Mozambique Revolution printed an article titled "\$435,000,000--Nixon's Investment in Portuguese Colonialism", accompanied by a cartoon showing a grinning caricature of the U.S. president handing a bag of money to a diminutive, begging Caetano.⁴⁵⁸ The writer claimed that the Azores base was not important enough to the United States to justify the large financial agreement that accompanied

⁴⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁵⁶ "U.S.A.--How Far From Intervention?", Mozambique Revolution, no. 42 (January-March 1970), p. 33.

⁴⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 33-34.

⁴⁵⁸ "\$435,000,000--Nixon's Investment in Portuguese Colonialism", Mozambique Revolution, no. 50 (January-March 1972), pp. 22-25.

the treaty, and that the funds were intended as direct aid to Lisbon. The article detailed alleged U.S. assistance to Portugal's military battle in Mozambique, citing "the supply of 20 B-26s" in 1969, "U.S. sales of herbicides" later used in "chemical warfare" in Mozambique, CIA co-operation with the Portuguese secret police, and CIA training for Portuguese special forces.⁴⁵⁹

Although the United States was criticised the most vigorously, West Germany was not far behind. In 1970, FRELIMO targeted the West German firm Siemens for contracting to work on the Cabora Bassa dam and complained that it had expected that Bonn's newly elected Social Democratic government "would speak with a new voice".⁴⁶⁰ The movement underlined its dissatisfaction with the West German position in March 1970 by writing an "Open Letter" to the new West German chancellor, Willy Brandt. The letter ridiculed the claim by West Germany's ambassador to Tanzania that Bonn supported FRELIMO, asking, "when, where and how has the Government of West Germany expressed any kind of support, even simply moral, to FRELIMO?" It further commented that FRELIMO was "astonished" by the "absolute silence from you and your government" on Siemens' Cabora Bassa contract. The letter closed with the claim that West Germany had provided Portugal with warships worth \$40 million in 1969 and that Bonn had known they were to be used in Africa.⁴⁶¹

Three years later, FRELIMO's hopes were raised when a Congress of West Germany's still-ruling Social Democratic Party (SDP) pledged to "concede to the national liberation movements all our solidarity and our political and humanitarian support"⁴⁶² and invited FRELIMO to Bonn for discussions. After much internal debate, FRELIMO accepted. The discussions ran from 2 to 8 August 1973, but were unproductive. FRELIMO demanded that the SDP force the West German government to halt arms supplies to Lisbon, "do everything in its power" to encourage companies to withdraw from Cabora Bassa, and "[p]ut whatever support [it] is

⁴⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 25.

⁴⁶⁰ "Africa on W. Germany", Mozambique Revolution, no. 42 (January-March 1970), p. 29.

⁴⁶¹ "Open Letter to the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany", Mozambique Revolution, no. 42 (January-March 1970), p. 30.

⁴⁶² "FRELIMO and West Germany's SDP--No Grounds for Co-operation", Mozambique Revolution, no. 56 (July-September 1973), pp. 20-21.

willing to give FRELIMO on a political and not a humanitarian basis".⁴⁶³ The SDP, according to FRELIMO, initially rejected these requests but did offer humanitarian aid.⁴⁶⁴ Shortly thereafter, the SDP retracted the humanitarian aid offer as well, citing allegiance to NATO policies.⁴⁶⁵ (See chapter 10 for details.)

The FRELIMO delegation returned empty handed, stating that it would not have accepted the humanitarian aid in any case because its other conditions were not fulfilled. "[W]e cannot establish relations with any organisation except on a correct political and moral basis",⁴⁶⁶ remarked Mozambique Revolution alongside a cartoon depicting Brandt handing warplanes to Caetano with one hand and medicines to a puzzled-looking Machel with the other.⁴⁶⁷

It is not clear what role was played by East German pressure on FRELIMO in this period. It is clear, however, that competition between East and West Germany was the backdrop for the discussions and must have had some bearing on FRELIMO's position. Over a decade later a FRELIMO official familiar with the episode said:

West Germany was worried about the influence East Germany was developing in Africa through its support for the liberation movements, and mounted a campaign to compete in this sphere. East Germany, in turn, was nervous about West Germany's manoeuvring. Rivalry between the two caused FRELIMO a number of problems.⁴⁶⁸

The United Kingdom also was the target of criticism. While expressing satisfaction that "English Electric" (sic) was not going to participate in Cabora Bassa, a 1970 issue of Mozambique Revolution lambasted Barclays Bank for helping to finance the project. It noted that the chairman of Barclays was prominent in the UK-South Africa

⁴⁶³ Ibid., p. 21.

⁴⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁶⁵ "Germans Deny Support for FRELIMO", Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg, South Africa), 8 August 1973.

⁴⁶⁶ "FRELIMO and West Germany's SDP--No Grounds for Co-operation", op. cit., p. 21.

⁴⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 20.

⁴⁶⁸ Source one, interview.

Trade Association and depicted the bank as a vulture with its talons embedded in southern Africa.⁴⁶⁹

Later the same year FRELIMO published what it claimed were excerpts from a foreign policy working paper of the newly elected British Conservative Party. The working paper allegedly advocated Anglo-Portuguese co-operation in southern Africa, particularly regarding naval port facilities in Angola and Mozambique.⁴⁷⁰ The Mozambique Revolution article commented that Britain was now taking the lead among Western nations in openly aligning herself with Portugal and South Africa.⁴⁷¹ As in the case with the United States, an ideological element was evident in the above article. The real motivation of the "clique" calling for support to Portugal and South Africa, it claimed, were the "interests... of the international capitalist class to which they belong".⁴⁷²

Britain's subsequent 1973 vote against an anti-Portugal United Nations measure was then cited as "no surprise".⁴⁷³ In the same year, when the British-Portuguese alliance celebrated its six hundredth birthday, FRELIMO published an article titled "600 Years--End British Collaboration in Portugal's Wars".⁴⁷⁴

FRELIMO did, however, attempt to establish links with Britain's Labour Party, then in opposition. A FRELIMO delegation addressed its annual conference in late 1973.⁴⁷⁵ In the same year Machel met with Labour Party politician Joan Lester.⁴⁷⁶

⁴⁶⁹ "Cahora Bassa and Barclays DCO", Mozambique Revolution, no. 42 (January-March 1970), pp. 35-37.

⁴⁷⁰ "Britain--Defending the Freedom to Exploit", Mozambique Revolution, no. 44 (July-September 1970), pp. 27-28.

⁴⁷¹ Ibid.

⁴⁷² Ibid.

⁴⁷³ "Sorting Our Friends from Our Enemies", Mozambique Revolution, no. 57 (October-December 1973), pp. 1-2.

⁴⁷⁴ "600 Years--End British Collaboration in Portugal's Wars", Mozambique Revolution, no. 54 (January-March 1973), pp. 18-19.

⁴⁷⁵ "Britain: Labour Party Conference", Mozambique Revolution, no. 57 (October-December 1973), p. 9.

⁴⁷⁶ Malcolm Rifkind (Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs), interview by author, London, United Kingdom, 30 January 1985.

France was the final major Western "enemy", but FRELIMO devoted relatively little effort to specific analysis of French policy. Instead, France was consistently listed as one of the primary supporters of Portugal, a significant arms supplier, and a main blocker of anti-colonial resolutions in the United Nations. France was specifically selected for criticism in 1970, when Minister of Finance Valéry Giscard d'Estaing visited Mozambique, and FRELIMO speculated that he was negotiating some "secret deal on [Mozambican] minerals" with the Portuguese.⁴⁷⁷

The above events show that FRELIMO was increasingly disillusioned with the main Western powers. As mentioned in chapter 2, however, Mondlane's 1968 experience with liberal sectors in the United States and Europe convinced him that it was worthwhile to cultivate "progressive" Western organisations. Mondlane's successors, who did not share his lengthy experience with Western institutions, were nonetheless convinced of the strategy's practical efficacy, and consistently continued his efforts.⁴⁷⁸ By the eve of the Portuguese coup, FRELIMO support committees had been established in Italy, the United States, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Canada.⁴⁷⁹

In 1972, FRELIMO credited U.S. committees with some U.S. local governments' rejection of bids from Gulf Oil because of its involvement in Mozambique and Angola.⁴⁸⁰ The following year Machel remarked, "In the United States, solidarity actions are multiplying, and [there is] collection of both financial and material help".⁴⁸¹

Support from Italian communities associated with the Italian Communist Party was also noted. Co-operation between the FRELIMO-

⁴⁷⁷ "The Mystery of Mr. Giscard D Estaing Safari" (sic), Mozambique Revolution, no. 42 (January-March 1970), pp. 38-39.

⁴⁷⁸ "Intervençao do Presidente Samora Machel na Primeira Sessao de Trabalhos", op. cit., p. 200.

⁴⁷⁹ FRELIMO, Relatório do Comitê Central ao 3 Congresso, op. cit., p. 43.

⁴⁸⁰ "\$435,000,000--Nixon's Investment in Portuguese Colonialism", op. cit., pp. 22-25.

⁴⁸¹ Samora Machel, "A Nossa Luta Transforma-se Efectivamente na Luta de Todo o Povo Moçambicano", speech, 25 September 1973, reprinted in Samora Machel: A Luta Continua, ed. José A. Salvador (Porto, Portugal: Edições Afrontamento, 1974), p. 135.

controlled Cabo Delgado hospital and the Santa Maria Nuova Communal Hospital in Reggio Emilia was undertaken, and a similar pact was established between the Commune of Bologna and FRELIMO's Education Centre at Tunduru.⁴⁸²

Probably the most important support committee was the one established in the Netherlands, for it played a major role in persuading that country's government to aid FRELIMO. FRELIMO previously classified the Netherlands as a supporter of Portugal in the United Nations. In January 1970, however, representatives of the MPLA and FRELIMO were received in the Hague by the Commission of Foreign Affairs in the Dutch Parliament, partly due to lobbying by the support committees. The Parliament then passed a resolution condemning Portuguese colonialism and Dutch military co-operation with Lisbon.⁴⁸³

Support organisations in the United Kingdom also had some effect. A "Dambusters Committee" designed to discourage British firms from participating in the Cabora Bassa project disrupted shareholder meetings at a number of banks, and, according to Middlemas, "helped persuade the Joseph Roundtree Social Services Trust to make its controversial grant of £30,000 to the Mozambique Institute".⁴⁸⁴ FRELIMO credited the British agitators for the fact that, when Caetano visited Britain in 1973, "about half of the British Parliament accused him of assassination".⁴⁸⁵

Another part of the FRELIMO strategy was to partially isolate Portugal by vigorously lobbying the small Western governments that had already shown sympathy for the nationalist cause. The Scandinavian governments, as in the past, stood out as particularly sympathetic to FRELIMO, and in the 1970 to 1974 period their material contributions to the cause increased. In 1971, Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, who had established a personal relationship with Machel, budgeted £125,000 for FRELIMO's use.⁴⁸⁶ According to a Swedish diplomat, however, these

⁴⁸² "Foreign Policy", Mozambique Revolution, no. 51 (April-June 1972), p. 28.

⁴⁸³ "Dutch Parliament Condemns NATO Support to Portugal", Mozambique Revolution, no. 42 (January-March 1970), pp. 22-24.

⁴⁸⁴ Middlemas, op. cit., p. 66.

⁴⁸⁵ Machel, "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in Mozambique", op. cit., p. 66.

⁴⁸⁶ Middlemas, op. cit., p. 166.

funds were only to be used for "humanitarian" purposes, with much of the money going to the Mozambique Institute.⁴⁸⁷ Curiously, FRELIMO had no qualms about accepting this restricted aid, in contrast to its attitude to the brief West German offer. Transport in FRELIMO liberated areas was also increasingly via Swedish-donated "Scania" vehicles, and some rural children began to use the term "Scania" as a generic word for "truck".⁴⁸⁸

Relations with other Scandinavian governments also continued to improve. On 25 September 1972, Machel announced that the foreign ministers of Norway and Denmark had recently visited the FRELIMO office in Dar es Salaam and affirmed their governments' support for the movement's cause.⁴⁸⁹ This was particularly notable because Norway was a NATO member. In April 1973, Norway followed up on this initiative by hosting an anti-colonial conference and promising to support FRELIMO.⁴⁹⁰

The Netherlands also eventually joined the list of countries providing official support for FRELIMO. Partly due to the above-mentioned pressure brought by the support committees, on 2 July 1973 the Dutch Minister for Development Aid announced, "The Dutch government is going to give support to the liberation movements because it wants to speed up the process of decolonisation in the territories occupied by Portugal, and not for 'humanitarian' reasons".⁴⁹¹ FRELIMO favourably compared this with the West German position.

Overtures were also made to the Italian and Belgian governments, and while neither outright supported FRELIMO, both were given credit for trying harder than most other NATO members to reduce military support to Portugal.⁴⁹²

⁴⁸⁷ Karin Storm Roxman (political officer, Swedish embassy), interview by author, Maputo, Mozambique, August 1984.

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁹ "Lancemo-Nos Na Luta Com Mais Determinaçao", 25 September 1972, reprinted in Samora Machel: A Luta Continua, op. cit., p. 129.

⁴⁹⁰ Middlemas, op. cit., p. 166.

⁴⁹¹ "FRELIMO and West Germany's SDP--No Grounds for Co-operation", op. cit., p. 21.

⁴⁹² "Venceremos: Intervenção da Delegação da FRELIMO na Conferência dos Comitês de Apoio e Solidariedade, Oxford, 12-15 Abril de 1974", CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal, pp. 5-6.

FRELIMO also made major breakthroughs in its relationship with Western churches. The Presbyterian churches in the United States had helped from the early days.⁴⁹³ One of FRELIMO's New York representatives subsequently reported also collecting funds from Quaker, Amish, and Mennonite communities.⁴⁹⁴

The December 1972 massacre of villagers by Portuguese soldiers at Wiriyamu, just south of Tete, then helped FRELIMO consolidate church support. A horrific eyewitness account by the British priest Father Adrian Hastings was published in the London Times in July 1973.⁴⁹⁵ After Hastings made a presentation at the United Nations later that month, FRELIMO's Marcelino dos Santos publicly embraced him.⁴⁹⁶ Shortly thereafter, the World Council of Churches, which had already condemned the Cabora Bassa project and offered safe conduct to deserters from the Portuguese army, gave \$60,000 to FRELIMO.⁴⁹⁷ More important, the Pope twice condemned the Portuguese action⁴⁹⁸ and FRELIMO noted that the massacre had "obliged even the Vatican to abandon its customary policy of silence on the colonial war".⁴⁹⁹

SUMMARY

By the eve of the Portuguese coup, FRELIMO was far closer to the socialist countries than it had been a decade earlier, and was espousing Marxist-Leninist ideology more often and energetically. This was due to a combination of external and internal factors.

Internally, the movement's armed struggle experience in first taking over and then administering the "liberated" areas convinced the leadership that Marxist ideology was a useful analytical and propaganda tool. (The author leaves open the possibility propounded by Cahen that

⁴⁹³ Middlemas, op. cit., p. 170.

⁴⁹⁴ Source one, interview.

⁴⁹⁵ Isaacman and Isaacman, op. cit., p. 106.

⁴⁹⁶ "Massacre' Priest Gets Hug From FRELIMO Man", Star (South Africa), 21 July 1973.

⁴⁹⁷ Middlemas, op. cit., p. 170.

⁴⁹⁸ "A Nossa Luta Transforma-se Efectivamente na Luta de Todo o Povo Moçambicano", op. cit., p. 135.

⁴⁹⁹ Machel, "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in Mozambique", op. cit., p. 66.

this "capture" of the FRELIMO leadership by Marxism was somewhat superficial and did not entail a genuine intention to build a socialist state.) The factional conflict with Nkavandame was resolved to the Mondlane faction's benefit by using Marxist "class struggle" precepts. The need to offer peasants better living conditions and political power in order to win them to the guerrilla cause found a familiar, though not perfectly congruent, echo in Marxism's call for "rule by the working class". Thus, FRELIMO's own concrete experiences on the ground were leading it to increasingly embrace Marxism as its official ideology.

A dual external dynamic then consolidated the internally generated shift. The major Western countries appeared to support Portugal, while the socialist countries, to differing degrees, aided FRELIMO operations. Thus, FRELIMO was naturally inclined to adopt the ideological trappings of its benefactors, adding a foreign element that overlaid, and seemed compatible with, the indigenous political trend already developing in the movement.

The internally and externally generated embrace of Marxism also added another element to FRELIMO's relationship with the West. In the 1970 to 1974 period the West was criticised not just because it operationally sided with FRELIMO's enemy, the refrain in the 1960s, but now also because its political philosophy contradicted the movement's. Thus, the West was criticised both because it was aiding Lisbon and because it was capitalist.

Despite all the above, however, FRELIMO retained certain important links with the West, had significant differences of opinion with the socialist allies, and was ambivalent about some aspects of Marxist ideology.

FRELIMO retained contacts with "progressive" sectors of the Western communities, establishing personal relationships with student, religious, and political leaders. These contacts were reasonably successful at pressuring some governments to refrain from supporting Lisbon, and at raising funds and "humanitarian aid" for the movement. Thus, the West was not classified as a homogeneously evil entity, even though overall its economic interests and philosophy--"exploitation of man by man"--were inimical to FRELIMO's ideals. The tenacity with which FRELIMO continued to court Western liberals finds its roots in Mondlane's firsthand experience with and deep understanding of domestic

politics in Western democracies, which he managed to convey to his successors.

The desire to consolidate relations with progressive Western forces, however, sometimes clashed with the interests of FRELIMO's socialist allies, as the 1973 caution about West German aid illustrates. Thus, FRELIMO was sceptical about certain gestures by Western progressives who were on particularly hostile terms with the movement's socialist benefactors.

Just as enmity with the West was incomplete, so was solidarity with the socialist bloc. FRELIMO refused to promise any of them base facilities, rejected Soviet suggestions that it remained allied with ZAPU, and deemed Cuba's "foto" strategy unsuitable to Mozambican conditions. Even with the Chinese, FRELIMO's closest ally, differences were evident. The movement was uneasy with the cultural revolution, and refused to back Beijing in its rivalry with Moscow.

Identification with classical Marxist-Leninist ideology was also imperfect. Establishment of a vanguard party, though accepted in principle, was considered inappropriate for FRELIMO's stage of development. Similarly, establishment of fully collectivised forms of production, praised in theory, was judged unsuitable for the conditions existing in much of the liberated areas.

In short, FRELIMO exhibited a mixture of pragmatic and ideologically driven policies at the time of the Portuguese coup. It had come to its policy positions primarily as a result of the armed struggle conditions it encountered in Mozambique, the internal strains that occasionally wracked the organisation, the influence of its principal allies, and its perception of Western policies.

What might FRELIMO's attitude towards the West have been if it had perceived the major NATO powers to be assisting the movement and firmly opposed to Portuguese colonialism? Because FRELIMO's outlook was by now so firmly rooted in its own specific armed struggle and internal factional experience, it seems unlikely that it would have shifted to a capitalist, pro-Western attitude under such circumstances. As in the late 1960s, a vigorous co-optation effort on the part of the West at this time would probably have won greater FRELIMO consideration of Western interests and more moderate rhetoric. Regardless of the nature of Western policies, however, the movement's ideology would have shifted significantly leftward, bringing it into some degree of conflict with the capitalist West.

CHAPTER 9

U.S. COMPLACENCY

From 1970 until the Portuguese coup in April 1974, Washington relegated the MPLA and FRELIMO to the status of irrelevancies. No effort was made to establish contact with their leaders. No voices of any consequence called for a co-optation effort. Those uneasy with policy sought only to limit Washington's growing alliance with Portugal.

Even the limited efforts of such liberals were unsuccessful and Washington's courting of Lisbon, initiated in the late 1960s, intensified. Restrictions on sales of U.S. equipment likely to be used in the African wars were relaxed, the training of Portuguese military officers in U.S. facilities increased, U.S. investments in Portugal's African colonies grew, and generous loans were granted to the coloniser.

A mix of factors similar, but not identical, to those motivating U.S. policy in the late 1960s influenced Washington's posture in the 1970 to 1974 period. The ongoing cold war with the Soviet Union, related concern about maintaining access to the strategically useful Azores base (made more acute in the early 1970s by events in the Middle East), and internal politics were the most important elements. U.S. economic interests in the African territories played only a minor role, and while perception of the nationalists' policies did have some impact on policy, it was not a critical determinant.

THE NIXON-KISSINGER WORLD VIEW

From 1970 to the coup in 1974, U.S. policy on Mozambique and Angola was heavily influenced by the world views of Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon. Philosophically, both focussed on the U.S. competition with the Soviet Union, and in the early 1970s their preoccupation with Vietnam simultaneously reinforced this predisposition and reduced resources available for other international questions.

Kissinger's subsequent memoirs also revealed that he believed that Third World "radicalism" derived from ideological inspiration and was therefore unreformable. He rejected the idea that it might, in part, be a reaction to Western behaviour-a reaction that could change in response to shifts in Western policy. Thus, he has written of the late 1960s and early 1970s:

The working level in our government, especially in the State Department, operated on the romantic view that Third World radicalism was really frustrated Western liberalism. Third World leaders, they believed, had become extremist because the West had backed conservative regimes, because we did not understand their reformist aspirations, because their societies were backward and eager for change--for every reason, in fact, other than the most likely: ideological commitment to the implacable anti-Western doctrines they were espousing.⁵⁰⁰

Kissinger also placed great emphasis on not conceding to the Soviet Union even in relatively minor conflicts. He subsequently wrote:

Soviet ideological hostility translates itself into geopolitical rivalry in the manner of a traditional great power, seeking gains any one of which might be marginal but whose accumulation will upset the global equilibrium. Emotionally committed to facing an overall moral challenge in an apocalyptic confrontation, we thus run the risk of floundering vis-à-vis more ambiguous Soviet attempts to nibble away at the balance of power.... The United States as the leader of the democracies had a responsibility to defend global security even against ambiguous and seemingly marginal assaults.⁵⁰¹

Both the MPLA and FRELIMO produced radical rhetoric, and because Kissinger associated this with "implacable anti-Western doctrines", he concluded that diplomatic efforts to woo these organisations would be futile. He believed that, given their associations with Moscow, their coming to power would represent a "gain" for the USSR, which, "marginal" though it might be, could help the Soviet Union "nibble away at the balance of power".

Strengthening relations with Portugal, on the other hand, was perfectly compatible with the above world view. First, because Third World radicalism was seen to arise from ideology and not from Western backing of conservative regimes, closer association with Portugal was not viewed as risking further radicalisation of African leaders. Second, because Portugal was both a staunch anti-communist ally in Europe and a key member of NATO, Kissinger viewed it as a valuable ally in the overriding competition with Moscow. Third, Portugal had important existing and potential base assets, specifically the Azores and port cities in Africa, which were growing in significance as aircraft refuelling and submarine surveillance facilities gained increasing weight in the Soviet-U.S. military race.

⁵⁰⁰ Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982), op. cit., p. 859.

⁵⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 980-981.

Option 2 of National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39), as described in chapter 6, neatly fitted the above Kissinger-Nixon preoccupations and in January 1970 Nixon and Kissinger "officially endorsed 'option 2' and began their policy of 'communication' with the white minorities".⁵⁰² (This fact did not become widely known publicly until 1975.)

The year following the NSSM study, 1970, provided numerous examples of the new U.S. attitude towards Portuguese colonialism. U.S. Representative to the United Nations Charles W. Yost told the Subcommittee on Africa of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs that Portugal's "multiracialism and the opportunities for non-whites in its African territories" distinguished it from "the rest of southern Africa".⁵⁰³ Secretary of State William Rogers echoed this sentiment during a 1970 visit to Lisbon, commending "the Portuguese policy of racial toleration".⁵⁰⁴

U.S. actions in the United Nations during 1970 also reflected concern for Portugal's position. The United States voted against African-sponsored resolutions that proposed that Portugal be condemned for not recognising the African territories' right to self-determination, expressed concern over the intensification of foreign economic activities in those territories, and appealed for a halt to training of Portuguese military personnel by foreign countries and the sale of arms.⁵⁰⁵

Although the United Nations votes raised Lisbon's morale and reinforced the nationalists' anger at the United States, Washington's policy decisions on sales to Portugal probably had a more decisive impact on the course of the struggle in the Portuguese territories. On 28 January 1970 Kissinger sent a secret memo to his principal colleague in Washington announcing the decision that "dual use" non-lethal equipment

⁵⁰² Noer, op. cit., p. 240.

⁵⁰³ Testimony of Charles W. Yost, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Policy Towards Africa for the Seventies, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, March 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, May 19, 20, 21, June 4, September 30, October 1, November 18, and December 3, 1970, p. 298.

⁵⁰⁴ William Rogers as quoted by Ken Owen, "Closer Ties with US", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 4 June 1970.

⁵⁰⁵ El-Khawas and Cohen, op. cit., p. 46.

would be excluded from the arms embargo on Portugal.⁵⁰⁶ The National Security Council subsequently issued new guidelines that liberalised regulation governing such of sales. Department of Commerce official Rauer H. Myer later stated that in 1970 jurisdiction over sales of two herbicides was taken away from the Office of Munitions Control, where sales were supervised by the Department of State, and placed under "validated licensing control", meaning that sales would be supervised by the Department of Commerce. The justification, according to Myer, was that the chemicals "were not the defoliants that were particularly favored... for military defoliations".⁵⁰⁷

Similarly, at the end of 1970 the United States indicated willingness to sell Boeing 707 aircraft to Portugal, where they presumably could be used for troop transport.⁵⁰⁸ Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David D. Newsom subsequently explained that the request to purchase the aircraft "came at a time... that was critical in the American aerospace situation" and the sale was therefore approved "without restrictions".⁵⁰⁹ The total number of aircraft, both planes and helicopters, going from the United States to Mozambique and Angola in 1970 amounted to thirty-three, up from seven in 1969.⁵¹⁰ After listening to testimony on this subject in 1973, Representative John C. Culver concluded that in 1970 there had been a "substantial relaxation" of the control programmes.⁵¹¹

Not even Lisbon's apparent November 1970 assistance to rebels who invaded the country of Guinea (formerly part of French West Africa, and sometimes referred to as Guinea-Conakry) from bases in the Portuguese

⁵⁰⁶ Antunes, Nixon e Caetano, op. cit., p. 147.

⁵⁰⁷ Testimony of Rauer H. Myer, Director, Office of Export Control, Bureau of East-West Trade, Department of Commerce, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

⁵⁰⁸ Oudes, statement, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 6.

⁵⁰⁹ Testimony of David D. Newsom, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Department of State, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 153.

⁵¹⁰ "Exports of Aircraft and Helicopters to Mozambique and Angola, 1963-1972", U.S. Bureau of Census FT-410 Export Statistics. Reprinted in Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 52.

⁵¹¹ Statement of Representative John C. Culver, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 42.

colony of Guinea-Bissau disrupted the increasingly friendly relations between Lisbon and Washington. The United States abstained on a United Nations vote criticising Portugal for its action, though U.S. diplomats reported privately that they believed Portugal had indeed been involved in the invasion.⁵¹²

Perhaps anticipating that the administration would turn a blind eye, a few U.S. companies also engaged in deals with Portugal of questionable legality. According to Antunes, some sympathisers of Portugal within the Nixon administration "established channels through which war material was supplied to Lisbon".⁵¹³ Former Portuguese Foreign Minister Nogueira told Antunes in an interview, "John Mitchell was a friend of [Portuguese] Ambassador Garin and arranged ways for us to receive arms".⁵¹⁴ In September 1970, the Chrysler company sold Portugal almost \$200,000 worth of military equipment without obtaining a license from the State Department and was later fined.⁵¹⁵

As already mentioned in chapters 7 and 8, U.S. diplomats in Africa were instructed to reduce contacts with the nationalists and, and the CIA cut back its information gathering in the region.

U.S. concern for Lisbon's needs continued into 1971. In June, Department of Commerce official Harold B. Scott was asked by the House Subcommittee on Africa if the previously sold Boeing 707s could be used by Portugal to transport troops for the African wars. He replied that they were "for such use as the Portuguese Government wished to make of them". Asked about export licenses to the Bell Company for export of five helicopters for the Portuguese government, he replied that the licenses had been issued, but the helicopters "were for transporting materials to a dam construction site"⁵¹⁶ (the Cabora Bassa dam). The possibility that these aircraft might be used for military purposes and therefore violate

⁵¹² "Conakry Raid Puts Doubts on Caetano", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 22 December 1970.

⁵¹³ Antunes, Nixon e Caetano, op. cit., p. 131.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid.

⁵¹⁵ Ibid., p. 132.

⁵¹⁶ Testimony of Harold B. Scott, Deputy Assistant Secretary and Director, Bureau of International Commerce, Department of Commerce, U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Part 1, May 4, 5, 11, 12, June 2, 3, 15, 16, 30, and July 15, 1971, p. 270.

the U.S. embargo against arms sales for use in Portugal's Africa wars concerned some members of Congress, but not the administration.

Three months later, in September, Assistant Secretary of State Newsom defended Washington's United Nations voting record in a manner that Lisbon must have found profoundly reassuring. He said that as a major power the United States needed to consider issues in a world context, and consider "how any particular action would affect other problem areas in the world". He added, "Rarely can one nation, any nation, however powerful, affect basic attitudes in another society if that society clings to its vested interests and resists change".⁵¹⁷

Further revelations of growing Portuguese-U.S. military co-operation occurred in November 1971 when a Pentagon spokesperson testified that the budget for U.S. training of Portuguese military personnel had doubled since Nixon took office. It subsequently emerged that the United States planned to train eighty-three Portuguese air force officers in fiscal years 1971 and 1972, a tenfold jump over the average of the previous seven years. During the November 1971 hearing, the Pentagon spokesperson noted that it was likely that U.S.-trained Portuguese personnel were rotated to African assignments, and added, "We would have no prohibition on U.S.-trained Portuguese officers going where their country sen[ds] them".⁵¹⁸

THE AZORES AGREEMENT

In December 1971, negotiations for continued U.S. use of the Azores, which had been going on behind the scenes since 1969 and undoubtedly accounted for much of Washington's sensitivity to Portuguese concerns outlined above, culminated in a visit by President Nixon to the base and the simultaneous exchange of notes in Brussels between the Portuguese foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state. This was the first visit by a U.S. president to Portuguese soil since before the wars began in the African territories.⁵¹⁹ The "executive agreement" Nixon celebrated

⁵¹⁷ "A Look at African Issues at the United Nations", address by David D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to the Atlanta Press Club, 21 September 1971.

⁵¹⁸ Pentagon spokesman's testimony at the November 1971 hearings as summarised in Oudes, statement, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

⁵¹⁹ Bruce Oudes, "Naval Bases and Foreign Quarrels", Washington Post (Washington, D.C.), 30 January 1972.

was also the first formal U.S.-Portuguese Azores accord in nine years, as Washington had let the previous lease expire in the early 1960s. (During the intervening period the United States had used the Azores on an ad hoc basis, with the rent in effect being about \$1 million per year in grant military aid.⁵²⁰)

Lisbon drove a hard bargain. In return for a relatively short twenty-five month lease, Portugal received the loan of an "oceanographic research vessel" (worth \$8 million according to Caetano),⁵²¹ \$1 million in educational assistance, the transfer of \$5 million worth of "non-military excess equipment" from the U.S. Department of Defence,⁵²² favourable terms for the purchase of U.S. food commodities valued at \$30 million, an offer of up to \$400 million in U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) financing credits,⁵²³ and the waiver of Portugal's \$350,000 contribution to support of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Portugal.⁵²⁴

Lisbon was delighted, and on 16 December 1971 Caetano announced that the United States and Portugal were "now allies".⁵²⁵ Some members of the U.S. Congress were less pleased. Both Senator Clifford P. Case and Representative Charles Diggs protested, the former by demanding that

⁵²⁰ Ibid.

⁵²¹ Text of the radio and television talk broadcast by Portuguese Prime Minister Marcello Caetano, 16 December 1971. Reprinted in Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain, hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, on S. Res. 214 Relative to the Submission of Any Portuguese Base Agreement as a Treaty, February 1, 2, and 3, 1972, p. 26.

⁵²² Testimony of Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State, Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain, op. cit., p. 58.

⁵²³ Testimony of George W. Bader, Regional Director (Africa), Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), Department of Defense, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 99. See also Johnson, testimony, Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain, op. cit., p. 24.

⁵²⁴ Testimony of Col. Richard A. Bowen, Country Desk Officer, European Region, Department of Defense, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 105.

⁵²⁵ Oudes, "Naval Bases and Foreign Quarrels", op. cit., quoting Caetano's 16 December 1971 radio and television address.

Congress be consulted on the Azores base deal,⁵²⁶ and the latter by resigning his post from the U.S. delegation to the United Nations.⁵²⁷

CONSOLIDATION OF THE NEW RELATIONSHIP

Over the following months U.S.-Portuguese relations continued to blossom. Remarks by U.S. officials were consistently favourable to Lisbon, and the nationalists, if mentioned at all, were referred to dismissively.

In June 1972, Assistant Secretary Newsom told the Mid-America Committee in Chicago, "[O]ur response to the needs of one area is frequently limited by our interests in another"; he emphasised that the United States had only limited influence on southern African governments. Regarding the nationalist movements in Portuguese territories, Newsom conceded, "The leaders... seek contacts with and help from the West [but] the United States has traditionally been unwilling to recognize opposition elements in colonial territories until an internationally recognized transfer of power has taken place".⁵²⁸ Nine months later, Newsom visited Lisbon for talks with Caetano and other top officials, and returned to remark that it would be "unrealistic" to expect the United States to pressure Portugal to change policies "rooted in tradition and politics".⁵²⁹

The United States continued to be considerate of Portuguese interests in the United Nations as well. In February 1972, the United States, (along with the United Kingdom, France, Argentina, Belgium, and Italy) abstained on a United Nations Security Council resolution calling for Portugal to give its African territories independence.⁵³⁰ In November

⁵²⁶ Statements of Senator Clifford P. Case and Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr., Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain, op. cit., p. 2.

⁵²⁷ U.S. Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr., Press Conference Statement of Resignation from U.S. Delegation to the 26th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, reprinted in Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain, op. cit., pp. 138-141.

⁵²⁸ David D. Newsom, "Southern Africa: Constant Themes in U.S. Policy", speech, June 1972. Reprinted in Current Foreign Policy, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, p. 4.

⁵²⁹ David D. Newsom, testimony, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 143.

⁵³⁰ "End Portuguese Rule--UN Call", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 5 February 1972.

the General Assembly voted ninety-eight to six, with eight abstentions, in favour of a call for Portugal to begin negotiations with the "national liberation movements" with a view to independence.⁵³¹ The United States again voted against the measure.⁵³²

Again, consolidation of the Portuguese-U.S. relationship was marked by rising sales of dual-purpose equipment. In 1972, the value of aircraft exported to Portugal alone (not counting Mozambique and Angola) rose more than fivefold.⁵³³ In the autumn of 1972, Marchés Tropicaux and the Portuguese press reported that the United States was permitting the sale of Aero Commanders manufactured by Rockwell International to Portugal for use in Mozambique, and Rockwell officials said that they were negotiating for the sale of four more.⁵³⁴ In late 1972, a dozen Bell helicopters were sold to Mozambique with the support of the U.S. official export credit agency, Eximbank,⁵³⁵ and in 1973 Portuguese newspapers announced that the Portuguese national airline was buying Boeing 747s as troop carriers.⁵³⁶ In the fifteen months between January 1972 and March 1973 the United States sold \$341,920 worth of aircraft to Angola and \$3,370,998 worth to Mozambique.⁵³⁷ In April 1973, a Department of Commerce official reported that over the previous seven years only one application to export aircraft to Mozambique or Angola had been denied.⁵³⁸

Portugal also was able to increase dramatically its herbicide purchases. Though technically deemed agricultural products, these herbicides in fact were useful for killing off vegetation in which guerrillas could conceal themselves, and for damaging the crops of

⁵³¹ "Success at the UN", Mozambique Revolution, no. 53 (October-December 1972), p. 17.

⁵³² Middlemas, op. cit., p. 174.

⁵³³ "Exports of Aircraft and Helicopters to Mozambique and Angola, 1963-1972", op. cit., p. 52, p. 58.

⁵³⁴ Oudes, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 7.

⁵³⁵ Ibid., p. 8.

⁵³⁶ Jennifer Davis, statement, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 79.

⁵³⁷ "Aircraft and Helicopter Licenses and Reexport Authorizations Issued to Portuguese Territories in Africa during 1972 and 1973 (as of Mar. 15)", in Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 29.

⁵³⁸ Myer, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 50.

peasants who lent them assistance. In 1972, the United States exported \$680 million worth of herbicides to Portugal, Mozambique, and Angola, up from \$59 million in 1969.⁵³⁹

Many of the aircraft and herbicide deals were financed with Eximbank assistance, extended in association with the Azores agreement. At the close of 1972, Eximbank exposure in Angola and Mozambique was over \$20 million and \$12 million respectively, up from about \$13 million and \$5 million respectively in 1971.⁵⁴⁰

The number of Portuguese military personnel receiving U.S. training rose only slightly after the leap in 1971, averaging eighty-six per year for 1972 and 1973, but the type of training grew more sophisticated.⁵⁴¹ Portuguese jet fighter pilots were trained in West Germany using U.S. Air Force facilities,⁵⁴² a group of Portuguese officers received counterinsurgency training in the U.S. Army's Jungle Warfare School in the Panama Canal Zone,⁵⁴³ and Portuguese officers received special instruction at U.S. centres such as the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.⁵⁴⁴ Asked by Representative Donald Fraser in September 1973 to provide "some assurance" that none of the U.S.-trained Portuguese officers were involved in the war in Africa, the Department of State's director of the Office of Southern African Affairs, John Foley, replied, "I don't think I can".⁵⁴⁵

⁵³⁹ "Portugal Afrique: La Guerre de L'OTAN", Jeune Afrique, no. 705 (13 July 1974), p. 64.

⁵⁴⁰ Testimony of Robert S. Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Department of State, U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Part 3, 1973, p. 102.

⁵⁴¹ Testimony of James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs, Department of Defense, Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo, op. cit., p. 89.

⁵⁴² Tad Szulc, "Lisbon and Washington: Behind the Portuguese Revolution", Foreign Policy, no. 21 (Winter 1975-6), p. 21.

⁵⁴³ Ibid.

⁵⁴⁴ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 236.

⁵⁴⁵ Testimony of John W. Foley, Director, Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, International Protection of Human Rights--The Work of International Organisations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy, hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organisations and Movements of the

The U.S. military's operational interest in Portuguese Africa also rose. In June 1973, the Supreme Allied Atlantic Command in Norfolk, Virginia "began to elaborate emergency plans for an eventual intervention in South Africa, which reinforced American attention regarding Angola and Mozambique within the NATO context".⁵⁴⁶

Ironically, the U.S. decision to consolidate relations with Portugal in 1972 coincided with a rightward shift in internal Portuguese politics. From 1970 to 1972 Portuguese "Europeanists", who believed that the nation's future prosperity lay in economic integration with Europe rather than Africa, had challenged their "Africanist" rivals. Their arguments resembled Ball's 1963 call for a "Eurafrican transition" and Wasserman's theory of "consensual decolonisation", and they called for granting greater autonomy to the African territories. However, in mid-1972 hard-line Africanists regained control, Portugal began to accept military assistance from southern Africa's minority governments, and reports of atrocities against civilians rose. As military reverses in Africa increased, anti-war sentiment began to emerge within the armed forces. In late 1973 the Movement of the Armed Forces (Movimento das Forças Armadas--MFA) was formed and called for a negotiated solution to the military conflict in Africa.⁵⁴⁷ The United States allied itself more closely with Portugal just as the top of that ally's structure was moving rightward, while the middle and bottom, together with "Europeanist" economic interests, was shifting left.

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

In October 1973, Egypt's attack on Israel in the Yom Kippur War firmly cemented Washington's ties with Caetano and further strained relations with the nationalists. The United States urgently wanted to airlift arms to Israel and sought permission from its NATO allies to refuel supply planes at their bases en route to the Middle East. All refused⁵⁴⁸ except

Committee of Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, August 1, September 13, 19, 20, 27, October 3, 4, 10, 11, 16, 18, 24, 25, November 1, December 7, 1973, p. 186.

⁵⁴⁶ Antunes, Nixon e Caetano, op. cit., p. 267.

⁵⁴⁷ Henderson, op. cit., p. 225.

⁵⁴⁸ "Portugal Earns the Gratitude of Washington", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 30 November 1973.

Portugal, which, after tense negotiations, provided unconditional transit rights at the Lajes air base in the Azores.⁵⁴⁹

Kissinger, who had become secretary of state in September 1973 and now was running U.S. foreign policy without much input from a Watergate-preoccupied President Nixon, was grateful. He swiftly asked Congress to eliminate an amendment to the pending Foreign Assistance Act that would have made a law of the executive order forbidding the use of U.S. arms in Portuguese Africa.⁵⁵⁰ It had been introduced by liberal members of Congress, who now found themselves in an awkward position as most supported Israel and appreciated Lisbon's recent help. Kissinger then visited Lisbon in December 1973 on his way back from a tour of the Middle East. In his memoirs, Kissinger remarked that he "owed the Portuguese a show of support for its [sic] assistance during the airlift".⁵⁵¹ He also presumably wanted to discuss extension of the Azores base agreement, officially due to expire in February 1974, though the "grace period" would not end until six months after that. Kissinger himself subsequently acknowledged that the December visit led to "a large area of agreement" with respect to "problems of concern" to both countries.⁵⁵²

Author Henry Jackson claims that Kissinger promised Lisbon sophisticated arms, including transport aircraft and "red eye" (surface-to-air) missiles.⁵⁵³ Jackson further says that after Kissinger returned to Washington, rumours abounded that the secretary of state had consented to Portugal's use of these weapons in Africa and some black officials in the Department of State contemplated resigning in protest.⁵⁵⁴ Gerald Bender, a leading U.S. specialist on Angola at the University of California, also insists that Kissinger privately agreed to meet Portugal's request for arms for Africa.⁵⁵⁵ Speculation that Kissinger's decisions had pleased

⁵⁴⁹ Kissinger, op. cit., p. 520.

⁵⁵⁰ "Portugal Calls for U.S. Aid in African Wars", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 15 November 1973.

⁵⁵¹ Kissinger, op. cit., p. 792.

⁵⁵² Department of State Bulletin 70, Number 1803, 14 January 1973, pp. 25-26.

⁵⁵³ Jackson, op. cit., p. 63.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁵ Gerald J. Bender, "Kissinger and Angola: The Anatomy of Failure" (unpublished typescript, 1976), p. 6; Notícias de Portugal (Lisbon),

Lisbon was naturally encouraged by reports in early 1974 that Portugal was offering the United States use of the Mozambican ports of Lourenço Marques⁵⁵⁶ and Nacala⁵⁵⁷ as naval bases. However, Antunes' exhaustive analysis of the Lisbon-Washington interaction shows that Kissinger drove a hard bargain, that Lisbon received little material reward for its assistance, and that Portugal's request for missiles was specifically rejected.⁵⁵⁸ The event did, however, strengthen U.S. concern to maintain access to the Azores base, and impacted the tone of U.S. pronouncements, which became even more solicitous of Lisbon's concerns.

Heightened U.S. sensitivity to Lisbon's concerns was also evident in the March 1974 hearings in Congress on Portuguese Africa. On 14 March, Department of State official W. Paul O'Neil Jr. told the House Africa Subcommittee, "We do not... feel that Portugal must necessarily be completely excluded from the future of these areas.... Portugal's official policy of racial equality... gives the parties involved a framework within which they could achieve some common ground for discussion".⁵⁵⁹ A week later, David Newsom made a two-day trip to Lisbon for talks with Caetano and Foreign Minister Rui Patrício amid intense press speculation that the visit indicated increased U.S. sympathy for Portugal's Africa policies.⁵⁶⁰

ECONOMIC PENETRATION

A final aspect of U.S. actions in the 1970 to 1974 period that had important implications for post-coup developments, but received relatively little attention at the time, was the growing U.S. economic

29 December 1983.

⁵⁵⁶ "Lourenço Marques Considered as an American Naval Base", South Africa Financial Gazette (South Africa), 1 February 1974.

⁵⁵⁷ "Portugal Offers U.S. A Base", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 7 February 1974.

⁵⁵⁸ Antunes, Nixon e Caetano, op. cit., pp. 269-291.

⁵⁵⁹ Testimony of W. Paul O'Neil Jr., Director, Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, The Complex of United States-Portuguese Relations: Before and After the Coup, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, March 14, October 8, 9, and 22, 1974, pp. 6-7.

⁵⁶⁰ "Sympathy for Lisbon's Policies", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 21 March 1974.

penetration of the Angolan and, to a lesser but still significant extent, the Mozambican economies. In 1970 the Department of Commerce abandoned its previous policy of "neither encouraging nor discouraging" investments in South Africa and began to actively promote U.S. economic involvement in southern Africa.⁵⁶¹ Antunes cites a U.S. businessman who, in a 1970 visit to Angola, enthusiastically chortled that "Angola is twice as big as Texas and three times as rich".⁵⁶² In 1970, businessmen "of conservative outlook" also replaced liberal members of the State Department's Africa Advisory Council.⁵⁶³

By 1970, U.S. investment in the Portuguese colonies equalled that of the United Kingdom. They both provided 15 percent of the total, behind South Africa, which accounted for over one-third of the investments.⁵⁶⁴ David Newsom testified to Congress that the U.S. private sector had invested "at least" \$170 million in Angola, of which \$150 million was associated with the oil business. This represented 6.3 percent of total U.S. investment in Africa.⁵⁶⁵ The most important U.S. economic activity in the territories was Gulf Oil's investment in Angola's Cabinda Province. Gulf had discovered oil there in 1966 and gained almost total control of oil production in the province by 1971.⁵⁶⁶ By 1972 it had invested \$209 million in Angola and in that year paid \$61 million to the Portuguese authorities,⁵⁶⁷ providing 13 percent of the total Angolan provincial budget and 60 percent of its 1972 military expenditures.⁵⁶⁸ By 1975 (a year after the Portuguese coup), Gulf's Cabinda operation had absorbed

⁵⁶¹ Noer, op. cit., p. 241.

⁵⁶² Antunes, Nixon e Caetano, op. cit., p. 132.

⁵⁶³ Ibid., p. 128.

⁵⁶⁴ Munslow, op. cit., p. 48.

⁵⁶⁵ Testimony of David D. Newsom, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Department of State, Policy Toward Africa for the Seventies, op. cit., p. 176.

⁵⁶⁶ Jackson, op. cit., p. 59.

⁵⁶⁷ Henderson, op. cit., p. 210.

⁵⁶⁸ Ibid.

\$300 million in investments and was producing 150,000 barrels per day.⁵⁶⁹ Texaco also was involved in Angola, but on a much smaller scale.⁵⁷⁰

Gulf's activities attracted some criticism from liberal U.S. organisations, but the firm argued that its Cabinda investment was a "politically neutral" act.⁵⁷¹ In 1971 a Gulf representative also insisted that Gulf had not contributed funds to any of the nationalist movements in Angola.⁵⁷²

Though the oil operation was by far the largest U.S. investment in Angola, U.S. firms were also involved in manufacturing, the most significant investment being General Tire's 10 percent interest in a factory,⁵⁷³ and in mining, where U.S. firms were active in iron ore, diamond, sulphur, and phosphates exploration and extraction.⁵⁷⁴ Trade with Angola was also spurred by the investments. In 1970, the United States was importing 162 percent more from Angola (primarily coffee) and was sending 245 percent more exports to that territory than it had a decade earlier.⁵⁷⁵

U.S. economic penetration of Mozambique was less vigorous. David Newsom testified in 1970 that direct U.S. investment amounted to "at least \$15 million" of which \$10 million was associated with oil exploration. This represented about 0.6 percent of total U.S. investment in Africa.⁵⁷⁶ In 1970, the United States was importing 260 percent more

⁵⁶⁹ Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

⁵⁷⁰ Newsom, testimony, Policy Toward Africa for the Seventies, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

⁵⁷¹ "Gulf Statement to Trustees, Ohio Conference, The United Church of Christ", Columbus, Ohio, 10 September 1970.

⁵⁷² Testimony of Paul Sheldon, Vice President, Gulf Oil Corporation, U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa, Part 1, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-107.

⁵⁷³ Newsom, testimony, Policy Towards Africa for the Seventies, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

⁵⁷⁴ Scott, testimony, U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa, Part 1, *op. cit.*, p. 271.

⁵⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷⁶ Newsom, testimony, Policy Toward Africa for the Seventies, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

from Mozambique (mainly cashews) and exporting 112 percent more to that territory than it had in 1960.⁵⁷⁷

The rising level of U.S. private investment in Angola led to an interesting political development. While U.S. diplomats were accepting the picture painted by Portugal, the private sector's aim was to protect profits rather than reassure politicians. Thus, in the 1970 to 1974 period Gulf Oil executives extended tentative feelers to the nationalists in Angola. According to sources close to the discussions, the contacts with MPLA officials were "very informal" and took place outside Angola, occasionally in Canada. Gulf was given only vague undertakings regarding the MPLA's future policy on the oil industry. However, on the basis of these talks, and similar ones with the FNLA and UNITA, the company came to the conclusion that it "could do business with an MPLA government in Angola". It was less sure of its ability to conduct business under a regime led by the other movements. This assessment was primarily based on the educational level and economic sophistication of the officials of the respective movements.⁵⁷⁸

SUMMARY

By the eve of the Portuguese coup, U.S. policy towards the MPLA and FRELIMO entailed no official contact with the liberation movements, economic aid and financial credits for Lisbon, relaxation of restrictions on sales of dual-purpose equipment, lax policing of the prohibition against use of U.S. equipment in Africa, increased training of Portuguese forces, and support for Lisbon's position at the United Nations. The possibility that Washington's obsession with the Soviet Union might hand Moscow opportunities in the battle for African nationalists' "hearts and minds", a major preoccupation in the early 1960s, did not occur to U.S. decision makers in the Kissinger era. The likelihood of the nationalists taking power was deemed so remote, and the damage that contacts with the movements would inflict upon the Portuguese-U.S. relationship was judged so severe, that Washington simply turned its back on the African leaders who, within nineteen months, would be running the independent nations of Mozambique and Angola.

⁵⁷⁷ Scott, testimony, U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa, Part 1, op. cit., p. 271.

⁵⁷⁸ John Sassi (ex-Gulf Oil employee), interview by author, New York, United States, 14 October 1987.

Three main factors were largely responsible for this U.S. policy. Tense relations with the Soviet Union caused Washington to be particularly hostile towards any political organisation espousing socialist goals. Concern about access to strategic assets such as the Azores base, already heightened by cold war tensions, was further accentuated by the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the extensive use of the Azores to re-supply Israel. Internal U.S. politics, moving in an anti-co-optation direction following Nixon's 1972 landslide electoral victory, were further complicated by that conflict. Many of the liberals in Congress most critical of the growing U.S. relationship with Portugal also were extremely concerned about Israel's security, and the utility of the Azores in 1973 muted their criticism of Lisbon.

U.S. economic interests in Mozambique and Angola grew remarkably in the 1970 to 1974 period, but still accounted for only a small portion of worldwide U.S. business. Therefore, they did not have a profound impact on U.S. policy, though the investments and trade did further alienate the nationalists, as described in chapters 7 and 8.

Perception of the nationalists' positions did, superficially at least, appear to play some role in the development of U.S. policy. Nixon's principal foreign policy architect, Henry Kissinger, considered the nationalists inherently anti-Western and therefore unlikely to respond positively to any U.S. overture. Unlike the U.S. private sector in this period, however, the U.S. government made no effort to look beyond the movements' public rhetoric and discover what their plans for post-independence society might imply for a long term relationship.

In short, U.S. interests mandated a coercion policy. Washington's need to retain trans-Atlantic alliances, gain support for its extra-Africa international agenda (regarding Israel and Vietnam), and ensure access to strategically located bases and ports (including not only the Azores base but now also Mozambican ports), all pushed it toward accommodating Lisbon rather than the nationalists. It sought to block alliances with the Soviet Union and encourage Western orientation of states not by efforts to co-opt nationalist groups contending for power, but by reinforcing the status quo.

What might Kissinger's position have been if the MPLA and FRELIMO had adopted a pro-Western, pro-capitalist posture? The weight given to strategic and cold war considerations by the Nixon administration suggests that in this circumstance a co-optation effort still would have been ruled out. The nationalists were thought incapable of taking power,

and the short-term political-military cost of alienating Portugal was considered too great. The U.S. administration referred to its perception of the nationalists' policies when that perception appeared to confirm the wisdom of an anti-co-optation policy already adopted for other reasons, and not because that perception was actually a key determinant of policy. If perception of nationalist policies really had been an important consideration, Kissinger would have distinguished between the socialist-style MPLA and FRELIMO and the more conservative UNITA and FNLA. He made no such discrimination.

CHAPTER 10
EUROPEAN AMBIVALENCE

From 1970 to 1974 France adopted a policy similar to that of the United States regarding the nationalists, while West Germany and the United Kingdom displayed some unease with Washington's approach but refrained from launching major co-optation efforts of their own. As in the late 1960s, however, the Scandinavian countries took a quite different course. Those governments already aiding the nationalists increased their support, neighbours joined in, and a small state outside the region, the Netherlands, eventually followed suit.

In no case was a European country's anti-co-optation policy primarily motivated by decision makers' perceptions of nationalist policies. Economic, cultural, and historical ties with the region, policies of allies, relations with the Soviet Union, strategic considerations, and internal political alignments played the most prominent roles in shaping the policies of the large European states. In the case of the small pro-nationalist states--Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands--internal politics was the main factor in shaping policy, though the absence of counterbalancing pressures favouring an alliance with Lisbon was also significant.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

During the first two years of the decade, London paid little attention to the MPLA or FRELIMO, and turned a blind eye to Portugal's counter-insurgency efforts. From 1973 to the April 1974 coup, however, the British government began to express unease about the course of the conflict and established tentative contacts with FRELIMO.

The most important consideration influencing Britain's policies was the nation's economic, cultural, and historical links with the region. As long as it appeared that Portugal could prevent the wars in its territories from spilling over into neighbouring ex-British colonies, Britain's Conservative government was content to let the conflicts unfold. Once the violence in Mozambique appeared likely to disrupt the Anglophone states of Swaziland, Tanzania, Malawi, and Rhodesia, however, Whitehall became uncomfortable. Britain had important ties with these states and wished to protect its long-term interests. While maintaining access to markets was perhaps a modest U.S. interest, it was a very strong British interest.

Internal British politics also played a significant, though less vital, role. When the brutal tactics adopted by Portuguese troops in Mozambique became public in 1973, the British population became increasingly unhappy with London's close association with Lisbon. The Labour Party's victory in the March 1974 elections also made Britain's internal political alignments more conducive to criticism of Portugal, though this new development barely had time to affect policy before the April coup in Lisbon transformed the political context entirely.

Finally, Britain's relations with allies had an impact on policy. Initially, Britain was most concerned about maintaining cordial relations with its NATO allies, which largely accepted Portugal's counter-insurgency efforts. Once the extreme violence of Portuguese soldiers became known, however, there was an outcry from Britain's Commonwealth friends, placing London in the uncomfortable position of trying to please two sets of allies with opposing positions.

By the eve of the Portuguese coup, therefore, the British government was re-evaluating its approach towards the nationalists, particularly those in Mozambique, but had not yet firmly declared against Portuguese colonialism. In this period, as previously, perception of the policies of FRELIMO and the MPLA had little to do with British decision making.

1970 to 1972

Britain began 1970 with a decision that reflected its lack of interest in a co-optation policy. In April 1970, the Foreign Office issued a written reply to a Parliamentary question on Caboira Bassa, the dam project in Mozambique that FRELIMO vehemently opposed. The Foreign Office said that it would not dissuade British firms from participating in the project "except insofar as participation might involve contravention of our existing Rhodesian sanctions legislation".⁵⁷⁹ (Britain had imposed sanctions on Rhodesia in 1965, when Rhodesia made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence following Britain's efforts to bring about more equitable race relations in the colony.)

The June 1970 electoral victory of the Conservative Party and Edward Heath's rise to the post of prime minister consolidated the anti-co-optation tendency. Heath continued his predecessor's Caboira Bassa

⁵⁷⁹ Middlemas, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

policy and indeed subsequently quarrelled with Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda over the participation of British firms.⁵⁸⁰

A series of trips by British politicians then increased the public perception of British-Portuguese harmony. Iain Sprout, a Member of Parliament from Aberdeen, spent Christmas of 1970 in Mozambique as a guest of Kaúlza de Arriaga and spoke glowingly of Portuguese policies.⁵⁸¹ Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas Home then remarked that he hoped Britain would have a more intimate relationship with Portugal,⁵⁸² and in June 1971 visited Portugal for "cordial" talks about southern Africa.⁵⁸³

A few months later the Portuguese envoy to NATO, José Gago de Medeiros, wrote to Caetano that the British chief of defence staff, Sir Peter Hill-Norton, had recently told him (Gago de Medeiros):

Write to me and say what, in your opinion, are the points of divergence between Portugal and England. It is important that we return to a situation of full friendship, trust and co-operation.⁵⁸⁴

Britain's voting record in the United Nations also remained neutral or pro-Portuguese. In November 1970, the United Nations Trusteeship committee called for independence for the Portuguese territories. Britain, along with South Africa, Portugal, the United States, Brazil, Spain, and Colombia, voted against the measure.⁵⁸⁵ In February 1972, when the United Nations Security Council called on Portugal to give independence to its territories, the United Kingdom abstained.⁵⁸⁶

The British left took two different approaches in the 1970 to 1972 period. The Labour Party, now in opposition, adopted rhetoric sympathetic

⁵⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

⁵⁸¹ "Mozambique Lauded by British MP", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 4 January 1971.

⁵⁸² "Closer UK, Portugal Ties Seen by Home", Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg, South Africa), 3 June 1971.

⁵⁸³ "Southern Africa as Main Talking Point", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 21 June 1971.

⁵⁸⁴ Letter from José Gago de Medeiros to Marcello Caetano, 18 November 1971, reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 146-148.

⁵⁸⁵ "Portugal Asked to Hand Over", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 19 November 1970.

⁵⁸⁶ "End Portuguese Rule--UN Call", op. cit.

to the liberation movements, approving pro-nationalist resolutions in its 1970 and 1971 Party Conferences and condemning British participation in Cabo Bassa. But Labour leader Harold Wilson was careful, in the words of Middlemas, "not to commit his party against a European ally".⁵⁸⁷

The left outside the official opposition took a more vigorous role. As mentioned in chapter 8, members of Britain's Committee for Freedom formed a "Dambusters Committee" to pressure British firms not to participate in Cabo Bassa and to urge philanthropies to support FRELIMO's Mozambique Institute.⁵⁸⁸

1973 to the Coup

On 10 July 1973, the London Times ran a story titled "Portuguese Massacre Reported by Priest". The story was written by Father Adrian Hastings, who in turn based his information on reports from Spanish missionaries in Mozambique. Hastings claimed that Portuguese soldiers had killed hundreds of Mozambican peasants in a frenzied rage. Among other atrocities, he claimed they disembowelled pregnant women and shot off the heads of children and used the severed skulls as footballs.⁵⁸⁹

The emotive story divided British opinion. Though the Times backed the massacre report in a 13 July editorial,⁵⁹⁰ the BBC refused to air a film by Hastings, saying it had "no news value".⁵⁹¹ Considerable scepticism was voiced in establishment quarters, but in September 1973 Portugal finally admitted that one hundred people had been gunned down at close range and that twenty to thirty had survived to report the event. Caetano quickly fired Col. Armando Videira, the military commander of Tete Province.⁵⁹²

The massacre report could not have come at a worse time for Portugal, as Caetano was scheduled to make an official visit to London

⁵⁸⁷ Middlemas, op. cit., p. 166.

⁵⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁹ "Portuguese Massacre Reported by Priest", Times (London), 10 July 1973.

⁵⁹⁰ "The Evidence of Massacre", Times (London), 13 July 1973.

⁵⁹¹ "Ban' on Priest Film", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 14 July 1973.

⁵⁹² "There Was a Massacre in Mozambique", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 25 September 1973.

within a few days. He made the journey, but had to be protected by one hundred security men. A protest march of about five thousand people was organised in London, and Caetano was heckled in Parliament.⁵⁹³

Though Labour leader Harold Wilson called for Portugal to be expelled from NATO,⁵⁹⁴ the Conservative government remained publicly supportive of Lisbon. In December, Britain voted against a United Nations resolution proposing that Portugal no longer represent the territories of Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau in the General Assembly.⁵⁹⁵ In January 1974, Portuguese official Manuel Sarmento Rodrigues referred to British Secretary of State for the Environment Geoffrey Rippon as a "grande amigo" of Portugal.⁵⁹⁶

Despite the public show of solidarity with Portugal, however, Britain was becoming uneasy about the deteriorating security situation in Mozambique and its impact on neighbouring Anglophone states. Rhodesia and Tanzania were both increasingly affected by the war, and the civil service began to contemplate alternatives to the established policy.⁵⁹⁷

Domestic British politics then changed on 4 March 1974, when the Labour Party regained power and Harold Wilson returned to the post of prime minister. Wilson was less forgiving of Portuguese behaviour in Africa, and his past sympathetic rhetoric regarding the nationalists suggested that he would take a more flexible policy at the United Nations. An intriguing remark by a British diplomat also confirms Britain's growing interest in FRELIMO:

There has always been a historical difference between the way London has viewed Mozambique, and the way other Western governments have. Mozambique is surrounded by ex-British colonies in which the U.K. had, and still has, major economic interests. Britain has a trade interest in the long-term stability of Mozambique, and therefore established contact with FRELIMO before the Portuguese coup.⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹³ "Heavy Police Precautions", Times (London), 16 July 1973.

⁵⁹⁴ Middlemas, op. cit., p. 171.

⁵⁹⁵ "Sorting Out Our Friends from Our Enemies", op. cit., pp. 1-2.

⁵⁹⁶ Letter from Manuel Sarmento Rodrigues to Marcello Caetano, 24 January 1974, reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 346-349.

⁵⁹⁷ Rifkind, interview.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid.

Though there was apparently no concerted effort at co-optation, the report suggests that London was seriously considering such a strategy, even before the Labour Party returned to power.

WEST GERMANY

From 1970 to 1973 Bonn essentially went along with Washington's anti-co-optation approach. In mid-1973, however, the ruling Social Democratic Party (SDP) split on the issue of Portuguese colonialism, and a brief attempt was made to launch a co-optation effort targeted at FRELIMO. The pro-Portuguese element in the SDP regained influence, the co-optation effort was abandoned, and by the eve of the Portuguese coup Bonn was still a Lisbon ally.

West Germany's relationship with the Soviet Union and its allies, related strategic considerations, policies of Bonn's allies, and internal politics were the primary considerations shaping policy. The co-optation experiment in 1973 was caused by the growing strength of left-wing SDP members and a shift in the party's interpretation of how to further Bonn's competition with the Soviet Union and East Germany, not by a substantive change in the nature of West German interests. Though FRELIMO reacted to the SDP overture in a suspicious manner that did little to encourage further assistance, perception of the nationalists' policies does not seem to have been a critical factor in West German decision making.

1970 to 1973

When Willie Brandt's SDP took power in June 1970, it inherited a strong relationship with Portugal. Brandt's predecessor had been a major arms supplier to Caetano in the NATO context, and Bonn benefited from access to a tracking station and air base facilities on the Azores. The more liberal members of the SDP were uncomfortable with this legacy, but initially did not act on their concerns. Brandt defended the participation of West German firms in the Cabora Bassa construction and defined the venture as a purely commercial project that would benefit the people of Mozambique regardless of who ruled the territory.⁵⁹⁹ Concerned that this would be viewed negatively by the rest of Africa, where support was sought in the diplomatic competition with East Germany, Brandt sent Heinz Kuhne, Chief Minister of North-Rhine Westphalia, to explain West

⁵⁹⁹ Middlemas, op. cit., p. 165.

German participation in Cabo de Bassa to Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda. Kuhne stopped off to meet with FRELIMO officials in Dar es Salaam, and returned to Bonn highly sympathetic to the Mozambican nationalists. He told Brandt that Cabo de Bassa could "light a spark" in Africa. Later, as chairman of the partly government-funded Friedrich Ebert Peace Foundation, Kuhne arranged for the donation of DM16 million to FRELIMO.⁶⁰⁰

Kuhne's counsel may have influenced the government's decision to deny export credits to Siemens and AEG for their operations in Mozambique. His position also stimulated the growing anti-Portuguese sentiment in the Bundestag, where eventually more than a dozen deputies supported the anti-Cabo de Bassa campaign.⁶⁰¹

However, correspondence between Portuguese officials in the early 1970s shows that Lisbon perceived Bonn to be merely protecting its image. In March 1971, a deputy to the Portuguese National Assembly returned from a trip to Bonn and reported to Caetano that West German diplomats were having difficulty maintaining good relations with black Africa because of the Bonn-Lisbon connection. He reported that there was "no bad faith" in the West German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but rather a strong desire that Portugal resolve its problems "in accordance with the policy... laid down by President... Caetano".⁶⁰² Similarly, in a November 1971 letter to Caetano, de Arriaga classified the West German consul in Mozambique as among the diplomats with whom he "maintained very friendly relations".⁶⁰³

1973 to 1974

The low-level tensions between the Kuhne and Brandt positions then exploded in August 1973. As mentioned in chapter 8, FRELIMO representatives were invited to Bonn for talks with the SDP. On 7 August, newspapers declared that the SDP had "announced its support for FRELIMO... and a ban on any West German arms deliveries to Portugal". SDP

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 167-168.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid.

⁶⁰² Letter from Manuel Homem de Mello to Marcello Caetano, 8 March 1971, reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 334-340.

⁶⁰³ Letter from Kaúlza de Arriaga to Marcello Caetano, 18 November 1971, reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 273.

official Hans Jurgen Wischnewski said that his party would help FRELIMO with its publicity work, and talks on future aid would continue the following day. The Portuguese embassy in Bonn protested vigorously.⁶⁰⁴

On 8 August, the West German government denied the reports. A spokesman for the West German embassy in Pretoria, South Africa, remarked:

My government made it clear this morning that there will be no official contact with FRELIMO. There is an element in the SDP, however, which is anxious to demonstrate support for the FRELIMO movement and their hostility to Portugal.⁶⁰⁵

A spokesman for the Foreign Office in Bonn similarly said that West Germany and Portugal "are both members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and it would be ridiculous if our policies in this respect were different".⁶⁰⁶

As outlined in chapter 8, FRELIMO said that it would only accept West German aid if it were given on a "political" rather than a "humanitarian" basis.⁶⁰⁷ This complicated the task of FRELIMO sympathisers within the SDP, but there is no evidence that FRELIMO's position played a critical role in determining the West German decision. Pressure from Portugal and NATO, and concern not to alienate those allies in light of ongoing tensions with East Germany and the Soviet Union, seem to have been the critical determinants.

Thus, on the eve of the Portuguese coup West Germany was only slightly better prepared than other Western countries for the coming upheaval. Some members of its ruling party had established rapport with nationalist leaders, but their policy recommendations were overruled. An ideal opportunity to influence decisively one of the movements that was soon to take power was consequently left unexploited. At the end of the day, Bonn's NATO concerns overrode its desire to cultivate African support in its competition with East Germany.

⁶⁰⁴ "Support for FRELIMO From Brandt Party", Times (London), 1 August 1973. See also "FRELIMO Promised Aid By Party", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 7 August 1973.

⁶⁰⁵ "Germans Deny Support for FRELIMO", op. cit.

⁶⁰⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁰⁷ "FRELIMO and West Germany's SDP--No Grounds for Co-operation", op. cit., p. 20.

FRANCE

From 1970 to 1974, France, unlike Britain and West Germany, never considered launching a co-optation effort directed at either FRELIMO or the MPLA. Paris did occasionally vote for resolutions critical of Portugal at the United Nations, but throughout the period it continued to market arms vigorously to Lisbon, well aware that a portion were destined for the African wars.

The most important factor motivating French policy was the country's special strategic circumstances. Due to France's qualified NATO membership, its access to Portugal's Azores facility was based on a bilateral agreement with Lisbon.⁶⁰⁸ Therefore, it was particularly vulnerable to Portuguese retaliation should it threaten Lisbon's interests. The French desire to maintain Azores access was also motivated by the nature of French relations with the Soviet Union.

A secondary, but still important, factor influencing policy was France's historical, cultural, and economic connection with the region. Specifically, France wanted to protect the stability of ex-French colonies near the Portuguese territories and ensure good relations with Francophone states throughout Africa. Unlike London, however, Paris never concluded that fulfilling these goals might be incompatible with a close relationship with Portugal.

France's most important contribution to the war was helicopter supply. The Portuguese had already purchased French helicopters in the 1960s, and stepped up purchases of Alouette IIIs and Pumas in the 1970 to 1974 period.⁶⁰⁹ An estimated sixty Alouettes were in service in Angola by 1971.⁶¹⁰

France's qualified membership in NATO meant that the final destination of arms it sold to Portugal was less strictly monitored than was the end-use of NATO arms sales. According to historian Lawrence Henderson, French military support to Portugal was provided with no official restriction as to where the material could be used.⁶¹¹

⁶⁰⁸ In 1964 France received Portuguese permission to establish a station on the Azores for scientific and ballistic tests, together with air and sea rights. See Nogueira, *op. cit.*, p. 566.

⁶⁰⁹ Marcum, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

⁶¹⁰ S. J. Bosgra and Christopher van Krimpen, Portugal and NATO (Amsterdam: Angola Comité, 1972), pp. 26-28.

⁶¹¹ Henderson, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

The French were concerned, however, about the effect of Portugal's wars on Francophone African security. No threat was perceived from Mozambique, for it bordered no ex-French colonies, or from Angola, where the war was fairly contained. However, the third war in Portuguese Africa, the conflict in Guinea-Bissau, did threaten Francophone neighbours. Hoping to "neutralise the war potential of the enemy in his sanctuaries",⁶¹² in November 1970 Portugal assisted an exile invasion of Guinea-Conakry, which was helping the PAIGC nationalist movement of Guinea-Bissau.⁶¹³

Portugal perhaps expected France to acquiesce to the Guinea-Conakry raid, given the poor relations between Paris and Guinea-Conakry's radical leader, Sékou Touré. Portugal guessed incorrectly; France was extremely indignant about this foreign meddling in its "own" sphere. Irritation with Lisbon's interference may have been partially responsible for France's October 1972 decision to vote for the United Nations General Assembly resolution requiring Portugal to negotiate with the liberation movements.⁶¹⁴ Whatever the motivation for the vote, France then joined the United States and the United Kingdom in getting the language watered down in the Security Council.⁶¹⁵

French relations with Rhodesia also conditioned attitudes towards the nationalists. In 1971, Rhodesia boldly asked France to help Portugal combat FRELIMO. As Ken Flower, then head of Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organisation, tells it, "De Gaulle and Pompidou were only too ready to snub their noses at the British and ignore the United Nations, and thus I found that my opposite number in Paris... was always anxious to help".⁶¹⁶ In 1971, when Rhodesia became increasingly worried about Portuguese setbacks in Mozambique, Flower conveyed the concern to Paris. Flower reportedly told the French that Portugal was not controlling cross-border infiltration into Rhodesia and was permitting the Cabora Bassa project to be threatened. Flower asked France to

⁶¹² Letter from António de Spínola to Marcello Caetano, 12 November 1970, reprinted in José Freire Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, vol. 1 (Lisbon: Publicações Dom Quixote, 1985), pp. 148-150.

⁶¹³ Ibid.

⁶¹⁴ Middlemas, op. cit., p. 174.

⁶¹⁵ "Success at the UN", op. cit., pp. 16-17.

⁶¹⁶ Flower, Serving Secretly, op. cit., p. 74.

consider this information "at the highest level" with a view to coordinating a response with Lisbon. When France pursued the matter, Portugal insisted that the situation was under control. France apparently accepted Lisbon's reassurance, and, according to a Portuguese source, the French intelligence branch told its Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discount Flower's report.⁶¹⁷

It is worth noting that France rejected Rhodesia's request not because it found "coordination" with Portugal against FRELIMO politically distasteful, but because Lisbon said that such coordination was not necessary.

In sum, by the eve of the Portuguese coup the French were little better prepared than the rest of the West for the disintegration of the Portuguese empire. Their marketing of military equipment to Portugal remained vigorous, and when France did criticise Lisbon, it was over Portuguese meddling in Francophone Africa, rather than in response to Portuguese colonial tactics.

SCANDINAVIA AND THE NETHERLANDS

Scandinavia, already much closer to the nationalist movements than the rest of the West, increased its aid to the MPLA and FRELIMO in the 1970 to 1974 period, and the Netherlands eventually adopted a similar policy. Domestic politics was the motivation. Liberal opinion was important to these governments, as liberals either kept them in power or were part of the coalition that formed the government's base. The more South Africa and Rhodesia became involved in the war, and the more Portuguese "atrocities" were highlighted in the press, the more concerned liberals became over the fate of the nationalists. The governments, structurally linked to liberal opinion, had to respond or face domestic opposition.

Had these governments been concerned about preserving Azores base access, or had major economic interests in trade with Portugal, they might have decided to run the risk of flouting domestic opinion. In the event, however, they had little to lose by aiding the nationalists and much to lose in the domestic arena by maintaining close links with Lisbon.

⁶¹⁷ Letter from Jorge Jardim to Marcello Caetano, 28 October 1971, reprinted in Antunes, ed., Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 23-26.

Sweden

As already mentioned in chapter 8, Swedish aid to the nationalists increased considerably in the 1970 to 1974 period. Fund-raising began in the schools and youth centres. In 1971, Olof Palme's government budgeted a contribution of £125,000 for FRELIMO.⁶¹⁸ In the 1972 to 1973 fiscal year, the Swedish government allocated about \$3 million in assistance for "civilian activities" of the MPLA, FRELIMO, and the PAIGC,⁶¹⁹ while FNLA aid requests were rebuffed. In July 1973, the Swedish foreign minister said that his government would double aid for FRELIMO over the following twelve months.⁶²⁰ In March 1974, just a month before the Portuguese coup, Sweden announced that it would triple its FRELIMO aid.⁶²¹

Sweden was extremely careful, however, to keep its support restricted to humanitarian and civilian activities, refusing to permit funds to be spent for military purposes. It is also interesting to note that, according to a Swedish diplomat, the main motivation for Swedish aid to the MPLA and FRELIMO during this and later periods was not sympathy for the individual nationalist organisations themselves, but rather a desire to assist those who were fighting minority rule in southern Africa. "We actually were uncomfortable with many aspects of MPLA and FRELIMO policies", the diplomat remarked, "but we supported them because they were part of the overall anti-apartheid struggle".⁶²²

Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands

The Danish government started to aid the MPLA and FRELIMO in 1970, with support restricted to humanitarian supplies. In July 1973, however, Danish students began raising funds for the nationalists, and placed no conditions on use of the funds. One student leader remarked, "The more recent developments, with Rhodesia and South Africa fighting together

⁶¹⁸ Middlemas, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

⁶¹⁹ Marcum, *vol. 2, op. cit.*, p. 232.

⁶²⁰ "Sweden to Double Frelimo Aid", *Star* (Johannesburg, South Africa), 16 July 1973.

⁶²¹ "Sweden Triples Its Aid to Frelimo Guerrillas", *Times* (London), 26 March 1974.

⁶²² Fin Altan (political officer at the Swedish embassy), interview by author, Luanda, Angola, 20 May 1985.

with Portugal, make it necessary to increase aid to the African freedom movements".⁶²³

Perhaps the most remarkable Scandinavian aid source was Norway, as it was a NATO member and therefore technically allied with Portugal. Like Sweden, it decided to increase aid in March 1974, just a month before the Portuguese coup, allocating substantial funds to FRELIMO, the MPLA, and the PAIGC.⁶²⁴

Throughout the early 1970s, liberals in the Netherlands had criticised the Dutch foreign minister for the support he gave Portugal. Finally, in July 1973 the minister for development aid, under pressure from Social Democrats, announced grants "to speed up the process of decolonisation in the territories occupied by Portugal, and not for humanitarian reasons".⁶²⁵

The "Angola Comité" support group in the Netherlands, active since 1961, also organised a successful boycott of Angolan coffee, reducing the Angolan portion of Dutch coffee imports from 30 percent to 2 percent by 1972.⁶²⁶ By 1973, the Netherlands had also stopped imports of Angolan petroleum.⁶²⁷

SUMMARY

In the 1970 to 1974 period the policies of Britain, West Germany, and France differed in significant details, but not in overall direction. All three continued their alliances with Portugal, albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm. None launched a vigorous co-optation effort, though London and Bonn considered such overtures towards FRELIMO.

These governments did not acquiesce to Portugal's coercion policies primarily because they perceived the nationalists to be hostile to Western interests. West Germany's SDP did not abruptly withdraw its offer to aid FRELIMO because it suddenly discovered that Machel envisioned a socialist future for independent Mozambique, but because it

⁶²³ "Students Aid Terror Groups", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 21 August 1973.

⁶²⁴ "Norway, India Give Aid", Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg, South Africa), 11 March 1974.

⁶²⁵ Middlemas, op. cit., p. 167.

⁶²⁶ Angola Comité, press communication, 12 December 1972, cited in Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 232.

⁶²⁷ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 232.

was reluctant to disrupt the unity of NATO, its main protector against security threats posed by its Eastern neighbours. France continued to sell arms to Portugal for use against the nationalists not primarily because it considered the latter a threat to Western interests, but because the sales were profitable and Paris wanted to maintain good relations with Portugal to ensure access to the Azores base.

Moreover, the United Kingdom did not establish contact with FRELIMO just before the Portuguese coup because it concluded that the organisation had become more open to Western influence, but because the FRELIMO/Portugal conflict was damaging British interests in the region and it therefore wished to broker a peace.

It was not perception of the nationalists' policies that drove decision making in London, Bonn, and Paris, but a shifting combination of East-West concerns, related strategic interests, internal politics, and historically rooted economic and other ties to the region. If FRELIMO and the MPLA had renounced their socialist ambitions, but still insisted on their territories' independence from Portugal, the policies of the major European powers probably would have been little different.

There is one area in which the policies of nationalists did make a difference, however. When West Germany and Britain became ambivalent about Portuguese colonialism and decided to establish tentative contacts with a nationalist group, why did they select FRELIMO and not the MPLA? The ideological content of the two movements' rhetoric was by now quite similar, and both were declaring themselves allies of the Eastern bloc. In Britain's case, the fact that FRELIMO was disrupting neighbouring Anglophone states, and the MPLA was not, played a critical role. This was not a consideration, however, in the West German case. Part of the explanation can be found in the divergent MPLA and FRELIMO strategies towards the Western public. By the time Portuguese colonialism began to appear increasingly threatened, in 1973 and early 1974, the MPLA had reduced its efforts to reach out to the West. FRELIMO had done the opposite, increasing contacts with liberal sympathisers in Europe as the wars progressed. Therefore, while London and Bonn were not reacting to the ideological content of FRELIMO's policies, they were reacting to the fact that FRELIMO's public relations campaign both created domestic pro-FRELIMO constituencies and raised the organisation's profile within the respective capitals.

Finally, while the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands increased aid to the nationalists in this period, it was the internal

politics of these states, and the impact upon those politics of rising Rhodesian and South African assistance to Portugal, that motivated policy. Perception of the nationalists' policies did not play a primary role. If the MPLA and FRELIMO had adopted more or less ideological stances, it would not have made much difference to the Scandinavian public. As long as they fought against minority rule in southern Africa, public opinion in Scandinavia remained on their side.

To recap, European interests in the disputed territories overlapped with U.S. interests, but were not identical. Like their counterparts in Washington, European diplomats wished to retain traditional alliances and ensure access to markets. However, unlike the United States, one European state (Britain) found that enmity to one of the nationalist groups was incompatible with those interests as they pertained to Mozambique and its neighbours. For some European countries (Scandinavia, the Netherlands and to a certain extent West Germany) the need to placate domestic critics occasionally over-rode other interests, a development which did not concern the United States. The overall nature of U.S. and European interests were similar. The specific substantive content of some European states' internal and external conditions, however, sometimes mandated responses that diverged considerably from those of Washington.

PART IV
THE FINAL DAYS: 1974 TO 1975

INTRODUCTION TO PART IV

Shortly after midnight on 25 April 1974, the announcer on Lisbon's Catholic Radio station read the chorus of a prohibited song. At this signal, the MFA, having recovered from a failed coup attempt the month before, began to execute a new set of plans. Key military commanders were detained, government radio and television stations were occupied, as were strategic highways, the national bank, and the international airport. At 8:00 P.M. the government announced the surrender of Caetano to General António de Spínola. Within twenty-four hours, a new "Junta of National Salvation" appeared on television screens and pledged to govern Portugal according to the programme of the MFA.⁶²⁸

The coup in Portugal completely altered the context of the nationalist struggles. From the coup to the independence of Mozambique and Angola in June and November 1975 respectively, each participant in the colonial conflicts had to make hard choices between co-optation and coercion strategies in a constantly shifting political-military environment.

Overall, the MPLA became less co-optable during the months following the Portuguese coup. By the time it took power on 11 November 1975, it had solidified previously strained ties with the socialist countries and its public statements had a strong anti-Western tone. However, during the nineteen-month period under consideration, the MPLA did make occasional, quite vigorous, efforts to establish a mutual understanding with Western governments. Despite its growing links with the East, it seemed reluctant to burn all its bridges with the West.

⁶²⁸ Henderson, op. cit., p. 240.

FRELIMO's relations with the United States and Europe followed a convoluted course. It initially paid little attention to the West while it sought to force Lisbon to agree to hand over power to its leaders as the government of Mozambique. Once Portugal largely agreed to FRELIMO's terms in September 1974, the movement began to focus on its future international alignment and showed interest in accommodating some Western concerns. In early 1975, however, FRELIMO grew more hostile to most Western governments. The main exception, other than the Scandinavian and Dutch governments, with which it had long enjoyed friendly relations, was the United Kingdom. Relations with London continued to improve markedly, while relations with Washington deteriorated to their worst state ever.

Top Washington officials initially paid little attention to the situations in Mozambique and Angola, and lower-ranking officials were left free to explore co-optation possibilities. However, this soon changed. Pro-co-optation diplomats were fired and Washington adopted a military coercion policy in Angola while a policy of semi-hostile neglect was applied to Mozambique. Some European countries, such as France, aided the coercion policy in Angola and ignored Mozambique, while others, such as Britain, were neutral in Angola and enthusiastically pursued co-optation in Mozambique.

Chapters 11 through 14 explore the factors that influenced the various actors' policies in this period. What was the impact of the two nationalist movements' levels of internal factionalism and rivalries with other groups? Did the attitudes of the nationalists' allies play a critical role? Did the movements' varying perceptions of Western policies significantly influence their level of co-optability? Concerning the other, Western, side of the equation, did domestic politics primarily explain the differences in the approaches of Western countries to the nationalists, or did economic and cultural ties also have a role? Were relations with tacit and open allies a major influence? Was a perception of high internal factionalism and rivalry with other groups conducive to adoption of coercion policies? Did a Western country's relationship with the Soviet Union primarily determine its reaction to the nationalists, or did Western governments also carefully weigh the actual policies of the nationalists themselves?

CHAPTER 11
ANGOLA: A CASE OF FAILED COERCION

From the Portuguese coup until Angola's independence, the MPLA became progressively less co-optable. By the time the movement took power on 11 November 1975, it was firmly allied with the Eastern bloc and issuing harsh anti-Western rhetoric. However, throughout this period, even at the end when the movement was fighting U.S.- and South African-backed rivals, the MPLA made periodic efforts to establish contacts with Western leaders. So while the MPLA's co-optability was lower than ever before at independence, it still retained, albeit at a very modest level, some interest in reaching a modus vivendi with Western governments.

Six interrelated factors accounted for the decline in MPLA co-optability. The first two, rivalry with other nationalists and the attitude of regional powers, created a context conducive to external intervention, which in turn conditioned the second two factors--the MPLA's perception of Western policies and its relations with non-Western allies. A fifth factor, internal factionalism, created circumstances that at one point exacerbated suspicions of a Western anti-MPLA conspiracy, and later created internal pressures for an anti-Western posture. A sixth factor, Angola's economic structure, became relevant in a new manner. That structure both deprived neighbouring tacit Western allies of opportunities to act as bridges to the West (as chapter 12 will show did occur in the case of one Mozambican neighbour) and gave the MPLA the confidence that a poor relationship with Western governments would not prevent independent Angola from obtaining the capital and technology it would require for development.

THE MPLA ON THE DEFENSIVE (APRIL TO JULY 1974)

Immediately following the coup, the Portuguese government was dominated by a group associated with Spínola that sought a slow transfer of power to internal coalitions in Mozambique and Angola likely to be dominated by the resident Portuguese communities.⁶²⁹ Spínola conditioned his offer of a referendum on self-determination with the comment that "self-

⁶²⁹ Carlos Gaspar, "Incomplete Failure: Portugal's Policies Towards Angola and Mozambique Since Independence", in Regional Conflict and U.S. Policy: Angola and Mozambique, ed. Richard J. Bloomfield (Algonac, Michigan: Reference Publications, 1988), pp. 43-45.

determination should not be confused with independence".⁶³⁰ The MPLA responded that if there were no change in colonial policy, the MPLA would "clean up the situation in Angola by striking harder blows at the Portuguese army".⁶³¹ Meanwhile, the movement's mission in Algiers announced that it was ready to negotiate with the new Portuguese government, but only "concerning the complete independence of our country". In a somewhat conciliatory gesture to the West, the MPLA added that a future independent Angola would co-operate with other countries and welcome foreign residents "who wish to work honestly and within the framework of the future institutions".⁶³²

Neto, who was in Canada at the time of the coup, travelled to Europe and devoted particular attention to the United Kingdom. On 1 May, he called on Joan Lestor, Minister of State in the Foreign Office with special responsibility for Africa, and asked the United Kingdom to cease all arms sales to Portugal. Copies of Neto's 1974 Dar es Salaam speech, in which he stressed the MPLA's interest in a non-racial government, also began to appear in London post boxes.⁶³³ If the MPLA's rhetoric was partially designed to suit Western ears, however, it certainly was not designed to have a soothing effect upon Salisbury⁶³⁴ and Pretoria. While in the United Kingdom, Neto pledged to aid the guerrillas fighting those governments and promised that the MPLA would fight South Africa if Pretoria intervened in Angola.⁶³⁵

Meanwhile, new factional problems, in addition to the ongoing Eastern Revolt, arose within the movement. On 11 May 1974, a group of Brazzaville-based exiles calling themselves the "Active Revolt" issued the "Appeal of the Nineteen". The document, signed by prestigious MPLA mesticos, intellectuals and some assimilados blamed recent MPLA reverses on insensitive and secretive leadership, accused Neto of undemocratic

⁶³⁰ "Portuguese Junta Opposes Freeing African Lands", New York Times, 28 April 1974.

⁶³¹ "Terrorists to step up armed fight", Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg, South Africa), 27 April 1974.

⁶³² "MPLA ready to talk", Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg, South Africa), 29 April 1974.

⁶³³ "Fight Will Continue Says Neto", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 2 May 1974.

⁶³⁴ Salisbury (now Harare) was the capital city of Rhodesia.

⁶³⁵ Ibid.

"presidentialism", and demanded that a congress be held to resolve leadership issues.⁶³⁶ According to Messiant, the Active Revolt was spearheaded by anciens assimilés.⁶³⁷

Neto loyalists believed that the Active Revolt was fomented by "imperialism".⁶³⁸ The MPLA knew that elements in the French government and U.S. ally Zairean President Mobutu favoured secession of Angola's oil-rich province of Cabinda. Congo-Brazzaville Prime Minister Henri Lopes also backed Cabindan secession and aided the movement fighting for that cause, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (Front pour la Libération de l'Enclave de Cabinda--FLEC). When Lopes supported the Active Revolt and urged the group to endorse Cabindan secession,⁶³⁹ the MPLA suspected a U.S.-French-Congolese-Zairean plot.

As events unfolded in mid-1974, the MPLA was neither the strongest militarily nor the most popular political power among the three contending movements. UNITA signed a cease-fire with Portugal in June 1974 and immediately was able to operate legally.⁶⁴⁰ It quickly launched a campaign among the Ovimbundu, and was able to add significantly to both its army and its overall membership, including recruitment of some "high level assimilados".⁶⁴¹ In Messiant's words, UNITA "played the ethnic card".⁶⁴² Although UNITA was the weakest movement militarily, its political base was widening and beginning to outstrip that of the MPLA. The FNLA was by far the strongest movement militarily. In late May 1974, the Chinese announced the arrival of a contingent of 112 military advisers in Zaire to train the FNLA, and implied that more would soon

⁶³⁶ Artur Queiroz, Angola do 25 de Abril ao 11 de Novembro: A Via Agreste da Liberdade (Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 1978), p. 15. See also Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 248.

⁶³⁷ Messiant, op. cit., p. 173.

⁶³⁸ "Temperemo-nos Para Novas Lutas Para a Nova Fase da Revolução", speech by Agostinho Neto at opening of Inter-Regional Conference of Militants, September 1974. Reprinted in Tudo Pelo Povo! (Luanda: MPLA, 1978), p. 99.

⁶³⁹ Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 32.

⁶⁴⁰ Bridgland, op. cit., p. 105.

⁶⁴¹ Heimer, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

⁶⁴² Messiant, op. cit., p. 169.

follow.⁶⁴³ The group's popular support, limited to the Bakongo and some whites, was less than that of either the MPLA or UNITA.⁶⁴⁴ The MPLA had significant political support in the urban areas and in the colonial and administrative apparatus, but unlike FRELIMO, it was never accepted as the liberator of "all the people" and its social base was "comparatively very narrow".⁶⁴⁵ Politically, the MPLA was stronger than the FNLA and weaker than UNITA. Militarily, it was weaker than the former but stronger than the latter. If its two rivals allied, it could be out-voted in an election, and out-gunned in a war. Consequently, the Neto group feared that the FNLA and/or UNITA would declare one or both of the MPLA revolts (Active and Eastern) to be the "real MPLA", conclude a deal with the rival, and exclude the Neto element.

While Chinese support for the FNLA gravely worried the MPLA, it actually helped the latter re-attract Moscow's interest. The Soviet Union was competing with China for influence in the Third World and did not want to be seen to permit its historical ally (the Neto-MPLA) to lose to Beijing's. As China specialist Eugene Lawson has pointed out, "the Soviet Union... was reeling from a series of diplomatic defeats in Africa, and the Chinese move to back the FNLA was the last straw". Lawson even claims that "the dynamics of Sino-Soviet competition" rather than cold war tensions "probably were dominant in Moscow's considerations".⁶⁴⁶ Another observer, U.S. international relations expert Charles Ebinger, argues that to explain Moscow's involvement as solely "a test of America's will in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate" is erroneous, and that the Soviet Union was also "deeply disturbed by the level of material support that the Chinese began to send" the MPLA's rivals.⁶⁴⁷

Meanwhile, the MPLA was coping with a rising tide of violence in Luanda. On 11 July 1974, the body of a white taxi driver was found in the outskirts of the capital. His colleagues, believing he had been murdered

⁶⁴³ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 67.

⁶⁴⁴ Heimer, op. cit., pp. 64066.

⁶⁴⁵ Messiant, op. cit., pp. 171-172.

⁶⁴⁶ Eugene K. Lawson, "China's Policy in Ethiopia and Angola", in Weinstein and Henriksen, op. cit., pp. 174-175.

⁶⁴⁷ Charles K. Ebinger, "External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War", Orbis, Fall 1976, pp. 684 and 687.

by MPLA sympathisers, attacked blacks in Luanda's slums.⁶⁴⁸ Death squads soon emerged, armed by right-wing elements in the Portuguese army. The MPLA had difficulty arming its supporters, partly because the Soviet Union was still reluctant to provide aid in light of MPLA factional problems.⁶⁴⁹

In the immediate post-coup period all three movements realized that they might eventually compete for white votes in a future election. The MPLA therefore used "pragmatic" language that implied it would pursue social goals of equality and justice without immediately implementing sweeping changes, though it left no doubt its long term plans included a non-capitalist model. The Neto faction of the MPLA

advocated a reconstrução nacional supported by all population segments-a policy which opposed precipitating incisive structural changes that the Angolan economy and society could not yet cope with, and which was fundamentally oriented towards the undogmatic, though marxist-inspired, elaboration of a non-capitalist decolonization.... (Emphasis in original.)⁶⁵⁰

The movement also emphasised its non-racist tradition and multiracial leadership.⁶⁵¹ While this posture was adopted for internal Angolan consumption, it was less threatening to Western powers than other political options.

During the three months following the Portuguese coup, the MPLA's co-optability declined only slightly. The movement perceived that Western governments, in coordination with certain regional powers, were fomenting internal factionalism within the movement. However, the same internal factionalism caused the MPLA's socialist allies to be less than generous in aid decisions. While increasingly suspicious of Western intentions, the movement nonetheless remained open to contacts with Western leaders in the hope of offsetting lukewarm socialist support. Finally, internal electoral dynamics caused the MPLA to adopt "pragmatic" language regarding future plans.

⁶⁴⁸ Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 18.

⁶⁴⁹ John A. Marcum, "Southern Africa After the Collapse of Portuguese Rule", in Africa: From Mystery to Maze, ed. Helen Kitchen (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1976), pp. 96-98.

⁶⁵⁰ Heimer, op. cit., p. 86.

⁶⁵¹ Ibid., p. 60.

MPLA RECOVERY (JULY 1974 TO JANUARY 1975)

From July 1974 to early 1975, the MPLA's fortunes improved, in part due to the rising influence of radicals in the Portuguese government.

Relations with the Soviet Union also consolidated, and MPLA suspicions about Western intentions grew.

Developments in Lisbon were perhaps the most important aspect of this period. Radicals were becoming impatient with Spínola's reluctance to decolonise. They were supported by war-weary commanders in Africa and much of the Portuguese population. The pressure on Spínola increased in July 1974 when the radicals first forced the replacement of his prime minister by their candidate, Vasco Gonçalves, and then used the escalating violence in Luanda as justification for the appointment of a leading radical figure, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, as the territory's governor-general.⁶⁵² Upon arrival in Luanda, Coutinho declared that only the (Neto) MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA would be considered representative of the Angolan people, marginalising the Active and Eastern Revolts.⁶⁵³ On 27 July 1974, Spínola agreed to an ill-defined independence process.⁶⁵⁴

These events, together with concern about competition with China, spurred the Soviet Union to strengthen its support for the MPLA. Moscow realised that the FNLA and UNITA were gaining external assistance and, due to the rise of the left in Portugal, Neto was now back as a "legitimate" participant in the decolonisation process. The Soviet Union did not want to be politically shut out in Angola, and thus in August 1974 it declared the MPLA the "true spokesman" for the Angolan people. Whether Moscow re-started military aid at this time is unclear.⁶⁵⁵

The new Soviet attitude was perhaps responsible for Neto's remarks on foreign affairs at the MPLA "Inter Regional Conference of Militants" held inside Angola from 12 to 21 September. (The conference was attended only by the Neto group because the Eastern and Active Revolts had permanently split from Neto during a 12 August MPLA Congress in

⁶⁵² Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., pp. 37-38.

⁶⁵³ Ibid., p. 40 and p. 48.

⁶⁵⁴ "Spínola spells it out", Sunday Times (Johannesburg, South Africa), 28 July 1974.

⁶⁵⁵ According to Stockwell, around this time the Soviet Union began to fly arms to Dar es Salaam for the "liberation movements" in Africa. CIA analysts at the time were unsure if the weaponry was intended for the ANC, ZAPU, or the MPLA. See Stockwell, op. cit., p. 67.

Zambia.)⁶⁵⁶ Neto blamed the internal MPLA problems on "systematic sabotage... by foreign forces commanded by imperialism"⁶⁵⁷ and praised the socialist states, remarking, "We all recognise once again that the solidarity of the socialist countries was and is fundamental, it is the principal material base of our combat".⁶⁵⁸

Just as the MPLA was getting its own affairs in order, reports began to circulate that convinced its leaders the United States was plotting to exclude Neto from independence negotiations. On 28 September 1974, a Guinea-Conakry newspaper, Horoya, published a letter allegedly written by a member of the MFA to the country's president, Sekou Touré. The letter said that on 14 September Spínola, Mobutu, Roberto, and Chipenda had met on the island of Sal in Cape Verde and agreed that Portugal should support Roberto in an Angola without oil-rich Cabinda, which would be handed over to FLEC. A Zaire-Angola-Cabinda federation would then be formed with Mobutu as president, and possibly with Roberto as vice president. Chipenda and Active Revolt leader Pinto de Andrade would be recognised as the leaders of the MPLA, and along with Savimbi would be in the Angolan government under Roberto.⁶⁵⁹

Whether accurate or exaggerated, this report caused pro-MPLA journalists to label the Sal meeting a "United States plot".⁶⁶⁰ President Nixon's June 1974 meeting with Spínola in the Azores, at which the U.S. leader appeared to endorse the General's plans for Africa,⁶⁶¹ together with Washington's close relations with the FNLA, made such a claim plausible to those already suspicious about U.S. intentions. In an interview with the Mozambican magazine Tempo shortly after the Sal

⁶⁵⁶ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 250.

⁶⁵⁷ "Temperemo-nos Para Novas Lutas Para a Nova Fase da Revolução", op. cit., p. 99.

⁶⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 102.

⁶⁵⁹ Marga Holness, "Angola: The Struggle Continues", in Martin and Johnson, op. cit., p. 83.

⁶⁶⁰ Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 46.

⁶⁶¹ "Spínola's Summit Triumph", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 20 June 1974.

meeting, Neto said that Angola was subject to an "imperialist siege" assisted by "some African countries".⁶⁶²

Whatever the true nature of Spínola's discussions in Sal, he clearly had gone too far for the radicals in the MFA and was forced to resign at the end of September. His replacement by General Costa Gomes meant that the more radical wing of the MFA now firmly had the upper hand.

Following Spínola's removal, Portugal began cease-fire discussions with the MPLA and FNLA. On 12 October, Neto stated in Lusaka that the MPLA programme "guarantees the protection of the persons and goods of all foreigners who respect the laws in force in the country", and insisted that Portugal's concern about the future of the white population was therefore unfounded.⁶⁶³

Among allies, however, Neto's rhetoric was less reassuring. In an interview with a radical journalist from Mozambique, he acknowledged that white concerns about future property rights were "just", but added:

On the other hand they must not... forget... a bigger factor, the MPLA's concern to really defend the interests of the masses, of the most exploited classes..., the peasants and workers.... We do not think it very fair that they now propose that priority be given to the resolution of their problems rather than to the problems of those who suffered most from colonialism.⁶⁶⁴

Despite Neto's contradictory stances, the negotiations with Lisbon progressed rapidly. On 21 October, the MPLA finally signed a cease-fire with the Portuguese and thereby won the right to operate legally in Angola.⁶⁶⁵ Ironically, at approximately the same time, the Soviet Union began to supply the MPLA with a modest amount of weaponry. Some sources say that Soviet military aid began in October,⁶⁶⁶ and most agree that some shipments arrived via Congo-Brazzaville in November. The MPLA itself states that about 250 individuals went to the Soviet Union for training

⁶⁶² "Agostinho Neto: Angola e o cerco imperialista ao MPLA", Tempo (Mozambique), 3 November 1974.

⁶⁶³ "Declaração do MPLA Sobre a Posição Portuguesa no Processo de Descolonização de Angola", statement by Neto in Lusaka, 12 October 1974. Typewritten document, CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

⁶⁶⁴ "Agostinho Neto: Angola e o cerco imperialista ao MPLA", op. cit.

⁶⁶⁵ Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 48.

⁶⁶⁶ Marcum, "Southern Africa After the Collapse of Portuguese Rule", op. cit., p. 97.

in December.⁶⁶⁷ The MPLA believed that it needed the weaponry and skills in order to compete with its rivals, which it believed were already receiving Western support. One MPLA commander lamented at the time of the cease-fire:

It will be very difficult to pursue the armed struggle that will follow the negotiations for independence. The UPA [FNLA] and UNITA will ally against us. Chipenda also will ally with them. If we do not rapidly receive the support of the socialist countries it is going to be very difficult. They have all the support they need from the Americans, from France, from West Germany....⁶⁶⁸

The official cease-fire signing meant that the MPLA was now entitled to open offices in Angola, which it rapidly did. The MPLA representatives promptly made statements that must have further alarmed the minority regimes in the region. First, a mid-ranking official, Erminio Escorcio,⁶⁶⁹ and then the effective number two in the movement, Lúcio Lára, proclaimed support for the guerrilla struggles in South Africa, Namibia (as South West Africa had been renamed by the United Nations in 1968), and Rhodesia and implied that the MPLA would give such organisations bases in Angola.⁶⁷⁰ The strident MPLA rhetoric contrasted with that of the FNLA, which expressed solidarity with the region's "oppressed people" less explicitly,⁶⁷¹ and UNITA representatives, who said they would not aid guerrilla movements in the region.⁶⁷²

These same MPLA representatives went out of their way, however, to present a non-aligned image concerning East-West matters. Erminio Escorcio, for example, told a South African journalist:

Certainly our aid came mainly from the Eastern bloc but to the question whether we will bend to pressure from that direction the

⁶⁶⁷ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 253. See also Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 51.

⁶⁶⁸ Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

⁶⁶⁹ Tom Ballantyne, "Angola will back terror", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 25 October 1974.

⁶⁷⁰ Carol Birkby, "Angola threat to SA", Sunday Times (Johannesburg, South Africa), 17 November 1974.

⁶⁷¹ Ibid.

⁶⁷² "Angola 'won't support rebels'" Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 13 November 1974. See also "Guerrilla Aid Offer", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 10 February 1975.

answer is 'absolutely not!' The MPLA did not fight for the freedom of Angola for the benefit of the Eastern bloc.⁶⁷³

The MPLA also appeared to be open to overtures from the U.S. government and private sector. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Donald Easum visited Luanda from 21 to 23 November 1974. Easum and the U.S. consul general in Angola, Tom Killoran, met with Lúcio Lára to discuss future U.S.-MPLA relations, the possible structure of a transition government, and the MPLA's attitude towards UNITA and the FNLA. Interviews with three participants at the meeting suggest that there was a general, though not unanimous, expression of goodwill. In a 1985 interview, Lára remarked:

Killoran apparently had a good attitude towards us. His opinion appeared to be that the U.S. should not be hostile to the MPLA, that we were in the best position to govern Angola in a reasonable manner. We had really serious talks, and he apparently informed Washington of his judgement.⁶⁷⁴

In a 1989 interview, Donald Easum recalled, "We were cordially received and given the impression Lára believed good relations with the U.S. were in the interest of both the MPLA and the Angolan nation".⁶⁷⁵ Killoran's aides were less impressed with Lára, and one subsequently remarked, "I came away with the impression that there were both nationalist and communist tendencies within the MPLA, sometimes embodied in the same person".⁶⁷⁶

The MPLA also began to meet openly with representatives of the U.S. Gulf Oil Corporation. (Secret contacts had already occurred between Gulf and the MPLA earlier in the year.⁶⁷⁷) According to an executive who worked for Gulf at the time, the MPLA expressed interest in extending the boundaries of the Gulf concession in Cabinda to permit the firm to operate in deep water. The terms compared well with those previously offered by the Portuguese government. Throughout the discussions, the

⁶⁷³ Ballantyne, "Angola will back terror", op. cit.

⁶⁷⁴ Lúcio Lára, interview by author, Luanda, Angola, 26 June 1985.

⁶⁷⁵ Donald Easum, interview by author, New York, United States, 15 February 1989.

⁶⁷⁶ Source five, confidential interview by author, Harare, Zimbabwe, 20 May 1986.

⁶⁷⁷ Testimony of Paul Sheldon, Vice President, Gulf Oil Corporation, The Complex of United States-Portuguese Relations: Before and After the Coup, op. cit., p. 30.

MPLA representatives were perceived by Gulf to be conducting themselves in a "businesslike manner".⁶⁷⁸

Meanwhile, the independence process continued apace. Neto, Roberto, and Savimbi had a preliminary meeting in Mombasa, Kenya, from 3 to 4 January 1975.⁶⁷⁹ Formal independence negotiations began five days later (on 10 January) in Alvor, Portugal. After acrimonious discussions, the three leaders signed the Alvor Accord on 15 January. This document named the three as the sole legitimate representatives of the Angolan people, classified Cabinda as a part of Angola, set 11 November 1975 as the date for independence, allotted ministries in a coalition government, mandated that government to draft a provisional constitution and conduct legislative elections during an eleven-month transition period, and instructed each movement to pool eight thousand soldiers each into a common national army.⁶⁸⁰ One casualty of the Alvor negotiations was Rosa Coutinho. The FNLA and UNITA delegations insisted that he not occupy the newly created "High Commissioner" post created by Alvor, and Silva Cardoso was selected instead.⁶⁸¹

During the above-described seven-month period, from mid-1974 to early 1975, the MPLA's co-optability declined moderately. It accused the West of mounting an "imperialist siege", strengthened ties with Moscow, and loudly proclaimed support for other nationalist groups with which the West was uncomfortable. However, the movement still sought to maintain a non-aligned image and remained open to cordial contacts with both Western diplomats and the U.S. private sector.

The factors accounting for the moderate decline in MPLA co-optability were similar to those evident in the previous period, though internal factionalism was temporarily not involved. The growing rivalry with other nationalist groups and the MPLA's perception that the West and other powers (Zaire and China) were plotting with those groups to exclude it from the independence process caused the movement to ask for more help from its Eastern allies. Because the victory of the Portuguese left had put the MPLA back into the power race, Moscow was more willing to provide aid than previously. The dual influence of increased perception of

⁶⁷⁸ Sassi, interview.

⁶⁷⁹ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 255.

⁶⁸⁰ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 255.

⁶⁸¹ Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 71.

Western hostility and greater assistance from Eastern allies pushed the MPLA leftward. The movement's willingness nonetheless to maintain contacts with Western representatives seemed to be related to the leadership's perception that some Western officials, particularly the U.S. consul general, were open minded, and that some links with Western capitalism would promote the prosperity of post-independence Angola.

TENSIONS ESCALATE (JANUARY TO MAY 1975)

The Alvor Agreement began under inauspicious circumstances. On 22 January 1975, days before the inauguration of the Transitional Government, the U.S. government's "Forty Committee" approved a CIA proposal to provide a covert grant of \$300,000 to the FNLA, though it rejected a proposal that \$100,000 be provided to UNITA.⁶⁸² The decision was made possible by Kissinger's late November 1974 dismissal of Assistant Secretary of State Donald Easum, who had been blocking the plan.⁶⁸³ (See chapter 14 for details.) Shortly after the U.S. aid decision, the FNLA's purchase of a Luanda newspaper and television station alerted observers that cash was arriving from somewhere.⁶⁸⁴ Although the MPLA could not be certain about the source of the funds, it was obvious to the movement's leaders that some external financial source was now supporting its main rival more vigorously. Given past experience, Western sources were naturally suspected.

The Transitional Government was installed on 31 January as planned, and the MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA representatives took up their ministerial portfolios. Almost immediately, however, they began using their positions to further inter-movement competition rather than to prepare the country for independence.

On the symbolic date of 4 February, the fourteenth anniversary of the MPLA's launching of armed struggle, Agostinho Neto returned to Luanda and received an enthusiastic welcome.⁶⁸⁵ In a speech two weeks later, he declared that the MPLA would support the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO), both of which were left-inclined guerrilla movements fighting minority

⁶⁸² Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 257.

⁶⁸³ Easum, interview.

⁶⁸⁴ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 257.

⁶⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 259

rule. Neto further criticised the fact that the Angolan economy was "in the hands of foreigners", and called for wealth redistribution. However, Neto also assured listeners that the MPLA would respect honestly earned private property and claimed that the movement would be non-aligned in East-West matters. "We do not obey the orders of any great powers in this world",⁶⁸⁶ he said.

While Neto was on the political hustings, violence in the country continued to increase. On 1 February, a day after the Transitional Government was installed, a confrontation in Luanda between the MPLA and the FNLA left seven people dead.⁶⁸⁷ FNLA-MPLA battles in Luanda's slums subsequently escalated. The perception of the U.S. consul general's assistants, who toured the strife-torn parts of Luanda, was that the FNLA was the main instigator of the skirmishes.⁶⁸⁸ Violence also spread to other parts of the country later in February as Holden Roberto moved forces from Zaire into northern Angola.⁶⁸⁹ By the end of the month it was clear that neither the Transitional Government nor the Portuguese authorities were in control of the country.⁶⁹⁰ ***

As the violence increased, the MPLA representatives in Luanda remained in periodic contact with the office of the U.S. consul general, and Tom Killoran reportedly continued to think highly of those MPLA members he encountered.⁶⁹¹

The biggest urban battle to date then occurred on 23 March when FNLA soldiers launched a major attack on MPLA installations in Luanda.⁶⁹² A few days later, FNLA soldiers gunned down a large number (fifty according to U.S. sources, sixty-five according to the MPLA) of unarmed MPLA activists at a "Revolutionary Instruction Centre" sixty kilometres

⁶⁸⁶ Agostinho Neto, "O MPLA e Uma Barreira Intransponível", 16 February 1975. Reprinted in Tudo Pelo Povo!, op. cit., pp. 107-111.

⁶⁸⁷ Henderson, op. cit., p. 247.

⁶⁸⁸ Source five, interview.

⁶⁸⁹ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 68.

⁶⁹⁰ Henderson, op. cit., p. 247.

⁶⁹¹ Source five, interview.

⁶⁹² Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 258.

from the capital.⁶⁹³ A contingent of FNLA soldiers (estimated at five hundred by Marcum) then arrived in Luanda, and intense fighting raged for days in the slums.⁶⁹⁴

The MPLA urgently appealed to its socialist allies for assistance and soon began to receive arms stockpiled in Cabinda.⁶⁹⁵ The weapons were reportedly delivered to that enclave by socialist countries via Congo-Brazzaville.⁶⁹⁶

Socialist-country arms for the MPLA continued to arrive in Angola through April, and a U.S. consulate official monitoring MPLA radio communication in Luanda believes that he detected a conversation concerning the off-loading of Polish arms at Luanda port at this time.⁶⁹⁷ Greek, Soviet, and Yugoslav ships also delivered arms to both Angolan ports and Congo-Brazzaville.⁶⁹⁸

The increased arms supplies to the MPLA, the influx of FNLA soldiers from Zaire, and an early April assassination attempt against Neto exacerbated tensions.⁶⁹⁹ Evidence of increased Chinese aid to the FNLA, Roberto's trip to the Middle East in search of additional funds,⁷⁰⁰ China's pledge to provide UNITA with seventy tons of arms via Tanzania,⁷⁰¹ minor MPLA-UNITA skirmishes in the Angola town of Sa de Bandeira,⁷⁰² and Savimbi's lavish praise of South African leader John Vorster⁷⁰³ also

⁶⁹³ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 68. See also "Angola: Tempo de Massacre--Entrevista com o Presidente do MPLA, Dr. Agostinho Neto", Tempo, 11 May 1975, p. 23.

⁶⁹⁴ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 258.

⁶⁹⁵ Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 87.

⁶⁹⁶ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 259. See also Stockwell, op. cit., p. 69.

⁶⁹⁷ Source five, interview.

⁶⁹⁸ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 259.

⁶⁹⁹ "Target was MPLA leader's aircraft", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 8 April 1975.

⁷⁰⁰ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 259.

⁷⁰¹ Bridgland, op. cit., p. 118.

⁷⁰² "Angola: Tempo de Massacre--Entrevista com o Presidente do MPLA, Dr. Agostinho Neto", op. cit., p. 23.

⁷⁰³ "Vorster is hailed by Savimbi", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 29 April 1975.

exacerbated the situation. When the FNLA killed an estimated seven hundred MPLA supporters in Luanda at the end of April, it became clear the violence had gained a momentum of its own and would be very hard to stop.⁷⁰⁴

MPLA interest in maintaining relations with Western governments nonetheless continued. Neto visited the Netherlands and Belgium in the spring of 1975 and said that the consultations "produced positive results". In the Netherlands he met primarily with "friends who always supported us", while in Belgium he was "happily surprised" to obtain a sympathetic hearing. Neto also praised the role of Scandinavian countries. The only Western country Neto explicitly criticised at this time was France, which he accused of "never hiding its hostility to the people of Angola" and having a "close relationship with South Africa".⁷⁰⁵ The MPLA belief that President Giscard d'Estaing had endorsed Mobutu's Cabinda secession plan when the French leader visited Kinshasa in early 1975 probably accounted for Neto's irritation.⁷⁰⁶

At this time, Lúcio Lára stated that the essential first step towards securing peaceful transition to independence would be an embargo on arms and personnel coming into Angola by air, sea, and land. This may have been designed as a subtle overture to the West, but it produced no discernible Western response.⁷⁰⁷

Although the MPLA leadership evinced interest in contacts with Western governments, this interest did not lead it to soften its ideological pronouncements, which indeed became even more radical. In a May 1975 interview with the left-leaning Mozambican magazine Tempo, Neto said that the MPLA sought "a socialist road" and would "abolish the privileges acquired at the cost of the least favoured sectors of the population and plan... a redistribution of wealth". When asked to respond to the accusation that the MPLA followed an "imported ideology", Neto said, "One part of the world still suffers from capitalist exploitation,

⁷⁰⁴ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 259.

⁷⁰⁵ "Angola: Tempo de Massacre--Entrevista com o Presidente do MPLA, Dr. Agostinho Neto", op. cit., p. 23.

⁷⁰⁶ Colin Legum and Tony Hodges, eds., After Angola: The War over Southern Africa (London: Rex Collings, 1976), p. 27.

⁷⁰⁷ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 260.

the other part of the world tries to create a socialist society.... A choice has to be made".⁷⁰⁸

In sum, during the five months following the signing of the Alvor Accord the MPLA became increasingly anxious about mounting evidence that Western countries, China, and regional powers were intervening, or preparing to intervene, on behalf of its primary nationalist rival, the FNLA. The initiation of FNLA attacks on MPLA supporters in Luanda exacerbated the threat perception. The movement responded by simultaneously appealing to the Eastern bloc for increased assistance and lobbying Western diplomats in the hope of convincing them not to view the MPLA as an enemy. This led to contradictory public statements, as the movement sought to appeal to two audiences. Overall, the MPLA's co-optability level declined somewhat, but the movement still had not entirely given up on the prospect of reaching a mutually acceptable accord with Western governments.

THE RACE FOR POWER (MAY TO NOVEMBER 1975)

From May 1975 until Angola's independence on 11 November 1975, political violence rose daily as all three Angolan movements and their respective backers participated in an unabashed race for power. The U.S. alliance with the FNLA and UNITA was strengthened, Zaire and South Africa vigorously entered the fray on behalf of the same movements, and MPLA dependence on socialist-country assistance sharply escalated. By independence day, MPLA relations with the West were more hostile than at any previous point in Angolan history. However, even during this tense period there was still evidence of some, albeit very modest, MPLA interest in reaching an understanding with the West.

A primary trigger for the increased violence was the MPLA's attempt to stage a demonstration to celebrate 1 May.⁷⁰⁹ When the FNLA attacked the celebrants, the MPLA responded with its newly acquired arms. FNLA offices in Luanda were destroyed.⁷¹⁰ Commanders of the integrated armed forces established by Alvor and officials in the Transitional Government tried to establish a truce, to no avail. An observer close to Neto later remarked, "The leaders of the MPLA knew that it was not worth

⁷⁰⁸ "Angola: Tempo de Massacre--Entrevista com o Presidente do MPLA, Dr. Agostinho Neto", op. cit., p. 23.

⁷⁰⁹ Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 89.

⁷¹⁰ Ibid., p. 90.

stopping. The UPA [FNLA] men would again return to let loose the massacres and the attacks against the movement's bases".⁷¹¹ As the MPLA moved onto the offensive in Luanda in mid-May, Zaire sent an estimated 1,200 soldiers into Angola to fight alongside the FNLA.⁷¹² In the same month, Neto met with Cuban commander Flavio Bravo in Brazzaville,⁷¹³ and in late May or early June (sources differ about the date) more than two hundred Cuban combat advisers arrived to staff MPLA training camps.⁷¹⁴

South Africa also became more involved in the conflict at this time. At the end of May, Daniel Chipenda, who by now was the FNLA's political commissar, flew to Windhoek in Namibia for "medical treatment".⁷¹⁵ His trip was known to the MPLA because it was reported by the media. In light of later developments, it is possible that Chipenda discussed the possibility of South African aid for the FNLA during the period of his "treatment".

MPLA relations with UNITA also deteriorated. After Savimbi rejected a Neto proposal that the two movements join forces,⁷¹⁶ the MPLA went on the offensive and on 4 June killed a large number of UNITA recruits preparing to leave Luanda for military training in the south of the country.⁷¹⁷ Many observers, including a U.S. diplomat present in Luanda at the time, believe that the far-left MPLA Central Committee member Nito Alves may have organised the action without Neto's permission.⁷¹⁸

The MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA were now at war not only in Luanda, but also in outlying areas. Alarmed by this development, African leaders convinced the three movements to meet in Kenya. The discussions occurred

⁷¹¹ Ibid., p. 91.

⁷¹² Bridgland, op. cit., p. 123.

⁷¹³ Wolfers and Bergerol, op. cit., p. 29.

⁷¹⁴ Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New York: William Morrow, 1986), p. 638.

⁷¹⁵ "Guerrilla Chief flies to SWA for treatment", Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg, South Africa), 30 May 1974.

⁷¹⁶ Bridgland, op. cit., p. 123.

⁷¹⁷ Ibid., p. 124. See also Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 260.

⁷¹⁸ Source five, interview. See also Bridgland, op. cit., p. 125, and Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 260.

from 16 to 21 June, and produced the "Nakuru agreement".⁷¹⁹ While the discussions were under way, however, Zairean soldiers continued to enter Angola,⁷²⁰ and fresh supplies of socialist-country arms arrived for the MPLA.⁷²¹

In July, the conflict intensified still more. On the ninth, the MPLA began to attack its rivals in Luanda with even greater ferocity.⁷²² Most UNITA and FNLA members fled the capital, and the Transitional Government collapsed. The FNLA fought back elsewhere in the country, assisted by right-wing Portuguese groups and Zairean soldiers, and drove the MPLA out of the Uíge and Zaire districts of Angola.⁷²³

External involvement in Angola also escalated. On 16 July, the U.S. National Security Council approved a plan to increase aid to the FNLA and begin aid to UNITA. By the end of the month, \$14 million was approved and planes of equipment were on their way to Kinshasa.⁷²⁴ Ironically, on the same day (16 July) that the National Security Council approved the aid increase, Cuba's President Fidel Castro asked a leftist MFA leader visiting Havana to arrange for Portuguese permission for the Cuban armed forces to enter Angola, making it clear that Cuba was planning to intervene militarily.⁷²⁵ FNLA sources say that fifty Cuban soldiers entered Congo-Brazzaville in late July to help handle shipments of Russian arms.⁷²⁶ South Africa also increased its involvement during July, in two phases. First, the head of South Africa's Bureau for State Security met Chipenda in Windhoek and discussed possible future assistance to the FNLA. Then a South African engineer working on a joint South African-Portuguese project in southern Angola (the Cunene-Ruacana hydroelectric enterprise) was robbed and beaten up. South African forces

⁷¹⁹ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 260.

⁷²⁰ Queiroz, Angola, op. cit., p. 92.

⁷²¹ Ibid. p. 93.

⁷²² Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 260.

⁷²³ Ibid., p. 261.

⁷²⁴ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 53.

⁷²⁵ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 443.

⁷²⁶ Legum and Hodges, op. cit., p. 21.

immediately entered the town, disarmed all FNLA, UNITA, and MPLA units in the area, and took some MPLA officials prisoner.⁷²⁷

Although South Africa was involved in the Cunene-Ruacana water project along the Angola-Namibia border, its economic links with Angola overall were modest. Unlike the case in Mozambique, Angolan labourers did not migrate to work in South Africa, and Angolan ports were too far away to be useful for South African transit traffic. The only significant South African economic tie was the investment of the De Beers company in Angola's diamond mines.⁷²⁸ In 1973, just 6 percent of Angola's imports came from South Africa, in contrast to 70 percent from Western Europe.⁷²⁹ This left South Africa with relatively little economic leverage on Angola, and military action consequently became the primary instrument for exerting influence. (As chapter 12 illustrates, the situation was quite different in Mozambique.)

During the months of August and September 1975, earlier decisions by Zaire, South Africa, the United States, China, the Soviet Union, and Cuba to back their respective Angolan allies more vigorously became clearly evident on the ground. Not only did the level and sophistication of weaponry rise, but observers detected the growing physical presence of foreign "advisers". If the MPLA leadership had harboured any doubts about U.S. or South African intentions earlier, these developments convinced even the most open-minded in that leadership that Washington and Pretoria intended to oppose the movement militarily.

In early August, the South African forces that had previously crossed to just inside Angola moved north to occupy the entire Cunene-Ruacana hydroelectric project.⁷³⁰ Within days, South African forces fired on MPLA installations and a supermarket.⁷³¹ In late August, South Africa also agreed to establish training camps for UNITA and the FNLA in southern Angola. In early September, South Africa used helicopters to move its troops thirty-five miles further north to intercept alleged

⁷²⁷ Wolfers and Bergerol, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁷²⁸ Joseph Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 167-168.

⁷²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 282.

⁷³⁰ Marcum, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

⁷³¹ Wolfers and Bergerol, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

SWAPO activities.⁷³² According to a source that may not be entirely reliable, the FNLA's Chipenda met shortly thereafter with South African Minister of Defence P.W. Botha in Windhoek and pledged that if the FNLA gained power it would adopt a favourable policy towards the Republic and establish full trade links.⁷³³ Whether that is true or not, by late September South African instructors were staffing FNLA and UNITA training camps in southern Angola.⁷³⁴

The U.S. role also grew. On 20 August, President Ford authorised the expenditure of an additional \$10.7 million to be spent on arms, ammunition, and advisers for the FNLA and UNITA.⁷³⁵ At about the same time, the first U.S. arms for UNITA, authorised in mid-July, began to arrive in Angola.⁷³⁶ Many of the details concerning U.S. decision making were not known to the MPLA leadership at the time, but soon the MPLA encountered evidence of those decisions. For example, on 10 September the MPLA found crates of U.S. weapons complete with U.S. Air Force shipping labels when it drove the FNLA out of Caxito.⁷³⁷

Evidence of Chinese and Zairean involvement also continued to surface. Although China was becoming uneasy about the performance of FNLA troops, it did authorise Zaire to release additional Chinese arms to the organisation.⁷³⁸ In early September, the FNLA acknowledged receipt of 450 tons of arms from China.⁷³⁹ Mobutu further assisted his allies by committing still more Zairean troops to aid both the FNLA and FLEC.⁷⁴⁰ A large shipment of Chinese arms for UNITA also arrived at this time in the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam, but Samora Machel convinced President

⁷³² Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 268.

⁷³³ Gordon Winter, Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police (Harmondsworth, United Kingdom: Penguin, 1981), pp. 537-538.

⁷³⁴ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 269.

⁷³⁵ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 166.

⁷³⁶ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 268.

⁷³⁷ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 209.

⁷³⁸ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 265.

⁷³⁹ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 68.

⁷⁴⁰ Ibid., pp. 168-169.

Nyerere to prevent them from being shipped on to Zambia for UNITA.⁷⁴¹ The cordial relationship between Machel and Neto suggests that the former probably informed the latter of the arms' arrival in Dar es Salaam.

Despite President Nyerere's interference in the delivery of Chinese arms, Savimbi was able to increase his military operations. On 4 August, MPLA forces fired on a plane that British industrialist Roland "Tiny" Rowland had provided Savimbi, and UNITA counter-attacked.⁷⁴² From that date forward, UNITA initiated a growing number of offensive operations, though it remained weaker militarily than either the MPLA or FNLA.

The MPLA also contributed to the internationalisation of the conflict. Neto, like Savimbi and Roberto, realised that the planned October elections were not going to take place, and that whoever controlled Luanda on independence day would declare himself president. Whether the MPLA was committed to the Alvor Accord and a democratic resolution of the power struggle previously is an open question, but from August onwards it clearly was committed to a military strategy. Military support from the socialist bloc, already significant, continued to escalate.

In August, the MPLA enquired if Moscow would be willing to send troops to Angola, and was informed that as this might trigger a U.S. response, such aid would not be possible. The Cubans were more forthcoming, however, and during August an additional two hundred Cuban infantry instructors arrived in Angola. By late September, Cuban ships carrying heavy arms and hundreds of soldiers began to arrive in Congo-Brazzaville's Pointe Noire port, and Angola's Amboim and Novo Redondo ports.⁷⁴³

Clearly, the MPLA's perception that Western countries were providing significant assistance to the FNLA and UNITA played a major role in pushing the movement towards a closer relationship with the socialist bloc and frostier relations with the West. But internal MPLA developments also played a role, for Neto was experiencing growing leftist pressure within his own ranks.

⁷⁴¹ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 265.

⁷⁴² Bridgland, op. cit., p. 127.

⁷⁴³ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 273.

As the MPLA established control in Luanda, it set up "People's Neighbourhood Committees". These soon were influenced by young Portuguese activists who were arriving from the metropole. One such individual was Sita Valles, a woman formerly associated with Portugal's Union of Communist Students. She and Nito Alves became romantically involved and set up house together in Luanda. Alves and the new allies he formed via Valles took up key posts in the Neighbourhood Committees, and used them as a base from which to criticise Neto from a far-left perspective.⁷⁴⁴

Although the left-wing pressure at this point primarily focussed on local Luanda matters, it created a climate that affected MPLA policy on other issues. Alves's new-found friends were extremely anti-West and opposed any negotiated solution to the conflict with the FNLA or UNITA. These attitudes, combined with the ability of the charismatic Alves to whip the Luanda slums into a state of highly emotional excitement, influenced Neto's attitudes towards both the West and the rival movements.

Despite these developments, Neto continued to communicate with the U.S. consulate in Luanda, though the discourse now featured increased mutual suspicion. According to a U.S. Department of State source familiar with the contacts:

We tried to explain to the MPLA that while we insisted Angola have elections, we were not out to destroy their movement. The MPLA appeared not to believe us because they knew we were aiding the FNLA and UNITA.⁷⁴⁵

The MPLA also again tried to convince Western observers that it was primarily nationalist rather than Marxist. In an August interview with the Financial Times, an MPLA official said, "We are a nationalist movement that has Marxists in its leadership. We accept help from anyone, and would accept help from the devil himself. We have received much aid from Western as well as communist sources".⁷⁴⁶

Contacts with Gulf Oil also continued. According to Colin Legum, in September 1975 Gulf began paying its quarterly royalties due Angola, worth \$116 million, into "the MPLA's own account".⁷⁴⁷

⁷⁴⁴ Wolfers and Bergerol, op. cit., pp. 71-74.

⁷⁴⁵ Source five, interview.

⁷⁴⁶ "A Recipe for Chaos", Financial Times (London), 12 August 1975.

⁷⁴⁷ Legum and Hodges, op. cit., p. 12.

The ongoing cordial contacts between the MPLA and Gulf Oil also illustrated an aspect of Angola's economic structure that limited MPLA co-optability. Angola's prime economic resources were oil and diamonds. Because these commodities are capable of rendering large profits for firms participating in their extraction, Angola's main resources were attractive to a wide range of foreign companies. The MPLA concluded, correctly, that exploitation of its natural resources would be judged sufficiently lucrative by the international business community that poor relations with Western governments would not block access to foreign technology and capital needed for development. The high value of the products also indicated that large amounts of official development assistance (aid) would not be required, further reducing the relative cost of hostile relations with the West.

The final battle for Luanda got under way in earnest on 14 October, when the South Africans mounted Operation Zulu from a Namibian staging base.⁷⁴⁸ A motorized force entered Angola at Cuangar. The column's armoured cars soon linked up with one thousand UNITA soldiers, and began to move rapidly through MPLA defences. The Zulu force captured Moçâmedes (now Namibe) on Angola's southern coast on 28 October, and by 7 November, four days before independence, was still rapidly pushing northward. A second, smaller South African column drove the MPLA's Katanga gendarme allies out of Luso and moved towards the MPLA's last outpost on the Benguela railroad, Texeira de Sousa, on Angola's eastern border.⁷⁴⁹

Meanwhile, the FNLA, using South African and U.S. arms, and aided by Zairean soldiers, pushed towards Luanda from the north. An unsuccessful operation was also launched in Cabinda.⁷⁵⁰ On 8 November, Roberto began an all-out assault on Luanda, traversing the Kifangondo plain twenty kilometres outside Luanda. By the eve of independence, the FNLA was shelling Luanda.⁷⁵¹ Roberto was deprived of Chinese assistance, however, for on 27 October the Chinese special instructors left Zaire,⁷⁵² apparently due to Beijing's disillusionment with the FNLA.

⁷⁴⁸ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 269.

⁷⁴⁹ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 170.

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 169.

⁷⁵¹ Ibid., p. 170.

⁷⁵² Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 265.

In an acute state of agitation about the impending, possibly simultaneous, arrival of South African, Zairean, UNITA, and FNLA troops on the outskirts of Luanda, the MPLA sent a special delegation to Washington, which arrived on 22 October. According to John Stockwell, former leader of the CIA Angola Task Force, the group came "to plead the MPLA's potential friendliness towards the United States" but was only received at a low level in the Department of State.⁷⁵³

With the MPLA rebuffed by Washington, and still panicked about its future security, on 4 November an envoy of the organisation asked Cuba to provide manpower to help defend the capital. The Cuban Communist Party Central Committee approved the request on 5 November.⁷⁵⁴ On November 7, a battalion of Cuban soldiers was airlifted in aged Cuban planes to help hold Luanda until reinforcements could be sent.⁷⁵⁵ The newly arrived Cuban troops, together with the MPLA, immediately confronted the FNLA on 10 November in the now infamous "Battle of Kifangondo",⁷⁵⁶ halting the FNLA's advance. While that battle was raging outside Luanda, the Portuguese high commissioner announced that he was transferring power to "the Angolan people", lowered the Angolan flag, and together with the last two thousand Portuguese troops quietly boarded naval transports bound for Lisbon. A few minutes after midnight on the night of 10 to 11 November, thousands of Luanda residents gathered in a stadium heard Neto declare independence.

The Independence Proclamation⁷⁵⁷ and the new Constitution⁷⁵⁸ announced on the same day provide useful material for analysing the MPLA's state of mind as it took power. Taken together, the documents reveal: a socialist, "anti-imperialist", ideological viewpoint; an intent to build a centrally planned, socialist economy that would leave some room for the private sector; a belief that there was a "natural"

⁷⁵³ Stockwell, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

⁷⁵⁴ Szulc, *Fidel: A Critical Portrait*, *op. cit.*, pp. 637-639.

⁷⁵⁵ Marcum, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

⁷⁵⁶ Queiroz, *Angola*, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120.

⁷⁵⁷ Agostinho Neto, "Proclamação da Independência", *Textos Políticos Escolhidos* (Luanda: Edições DIP, 1985), p. 40.

⁷⁵⁸ "Constitutional Law of the People's Republic of Angola", approved by acclamation by the Central Committee of the MPLA, on 10 November 1975. Document in CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

political alliance with socialist countries, despite the MPLA's opposition to establishment of foreign bases; and an ongoing interest in building respectful diplomatic and trading relationships with Western countries.

In the six months preceding independence, the self-reinforcing cycle evident since the Portuguese coup gained momentum. The MPLA perceived its nationalist rival to be enjoying increasing support from Western countries, regional powers, and China. This caused it to move closer to the Eastern bloc, to which it appealed for money, arms, and eventually manpower. Internal factionalism again played a role as the Alves group agitated from a far left position. The interaction of these factors made the MPLA less co-optable than at any earlier point in its development when it took power on 11 November 1975, yet even then it did not completely turn its back on the West, as its independence day proclamation made clear.

SUMMARY

From the Portuguese coup in April 1974 until Angolan independence in November 1975 the MPLA clearly became considerably less co-optable. Relations with the West passed through four phases. Openness to accommodating Western concerns declined modestly in the first two phases, and then steeply in the last two. A complex interaction between local and international factors was responsible. Rivalry with other nationalist movements, resurgent internal factionalism, and the antagonistic attitude of regional powers made the MPLA leadership fearful of being either politically marginalised or physically eliminated. In this context, perception of Western policies and relations with socialist allies played a decisive role, particularly in the second two phases, pushing the MPLA to a quite hostile posture regarding the West. If either set of factors, local or international, had been different, the outcome could well have been distinct.

In the first phase--the three months following the Portuguese coup--the MPLA, in alliance with FRELIMO, sought to convince Lisbon to give the African territories full independence. The MPLA leadership was distracted from this task by rising racial violence in Luanda, and by the Active Revolt and Cabinda secession plot, which it believed were fomented by the West. The consequent hostility towards the West was partially balanced by the realisation that prospects for obtaining increased Soviet aid, still damaged by the Chipenda (Eastern Revolt) factionalism in 1973,

remained endangered by the new internal division. Therefore, while the movement was increasingly suspicious of Western plans, it remained interested in contacts with Western leaders.

In the second phase, from July 1974 to January 1975, MPLA co-optability declined moderately again. Most of the factors present in preceding months were still evident, though internal factionalism played a lesser role. Increasing competition with UNITA and the MPLA, combined with the perception that these movements were receiving assistance from the West, excited both fear and resentment. The "Sal plot" to exclude Neto from power, which the MPLA believed bore Washington's "fingerprints", exacerbated anti-Western sentiment. The victory of the Portuguese left and its support for Neto increased the MPLA's attractiveness to Moscow just as the MPLA concluded that Western support for rivals meant that socialist allies were more urgently required. Moscow's willingness to provide the desired weapons pulled the movement further leftward.

Nonetheless, the MPLA leadership had not turned its back on the West entirely, as conversations involving Easum, Killoran, and Gulf Oil illustrate. The MPLA seemed to believe that although the West was generally hostile, some Western officials and businesspeople were open-minded.

During the third phase, from January to May 1975, MPLA co-optability declined more precipitously. Though the leadership was ignorant of the U.S. government's decision to increase aid to its rivals days after the Alvor Accord was signed, it saw the results of the largesse on the streets of Luanda and drew its own conclusions. FNLA violence against the MPLA in Luanda, confirmed by U.S. diplomats, increased MPLA fears and led to an even greater flow of arms from the Soviet Union. Evidence of Chinese aid for the FNLA and UNITA's growing public relationship with South Africa heightened the MPLA's threat perception still further. Unlike in the case of Mozambique, there were too few economic links between Angola and South Africa for economic interdependence to be used as a basis for rapprochement with Pretoria. (See chapter 12 for the contrasting situation with regard to Mozambique.)

Though rhetoric shifted leftward, and co-optability declined, the movement still did not abandon contacts with Western diplomats. It continued to lobby Western officials in the hope of convincing them that the MPLA was not necessarily hostile to their interests.

From May to November 1975, a self-perpetuating cycle gained almost unstoppable inertia. The MPLA perceived increased threats from rivals, regional powers, and the United States. It successfully appealed to socialist allies for support, and then perceived even greater threat as its rivals obtained commensurate escalations from their regional, Western, and Chinese backers. Internal factionalism again played a role as the Nito Alves faction pushed the MPLA, from within, towards greater friendship with the socialist states, more intransigence in negotiations with allies, and a more anti-Western rhetorical posture.

The apparent willingness of Gulf Oil to consolidate relations with the MPLA in this period, even as relations with the West reached their nadir, highlighted the fact that the territory's economic structure, specifically its highly attractive oil and diamond resources, meant that Angolan access to foreign technology and capital necessary for development would probably not be blocked by MPLA confrontation with Western governments. Thus, Angola's economic structure had a somewhat limiting effect on MPLA co-optability.

Yet, even in the heat of battle, the MPLA did not completely walk away from the West, as illustrated by its late October decision to send a delegation to Washington, and its independence day statement.

The six factors that influenced MPLA co-optability in the 1974 to 1975 period were so closely intertwined that it is very difficult to weigh exactly what effect each had independently from the others. Consequently, it is hard to determine just what impact a concerted Western co-optation policy might have had. We can merely rule out certain possibilities.

By this point in the movement's history, even a vigorous co-optation strategy would have produced only modest results. Even if the West had offered assistance to the MPLA in the months before independence, the movement would not have become pro-Western. The internal impetus for radical left ideology, manifested by the Nito Alves faction, militated against accommodation. The strengthening of the (Neto) MPLA by Portuguese internal politics would have attracted Soviet largesse, even if the West had not been perceived as threatening MPLA interests. Moscow's concern not to lose either substantive or symbolic battles in its competition with China meant that the Soviet Union would have been interested in bolstering the MPLA, even if it were no longer seen as a victim of Western aggression. Rivalry with other nationalist groups, and fear of alliances between those groups and both regional and

Chinese backers, would have made the MPLA appeal for increased socialist-world support even if the West had not been aiding the movement's rivals. Angola's economic structure would have given the MPLA confidence that access to capital and technology required for exploitation of resources would not be jeopardised by political confrontation with the West.

However, the damage to Western interests could have been reduced considerably if a co-optation rather than a coercion strategy had been adopted. Such a strategy would have altered regional dynamics. If South Africa had not perceived that Washington would acquiesce to, or even support, an invasion, regional threats to the MPLA probably would have been less, and the MPLA might not have appealed for Cuban troops. If Zaire had concluded that the United States would energetically criticise its role as a channel for Chinese aid to the FNLA, the violence in Luanda would have been less, and the MPLA leadership would have been less frantic for protection. The MPLA leadership's reluctance to walk away from discussions with U.S. diplomats even in the midst of a coercive political environment, as manifested by the lingering contacts with Easum and Killoran, suggests that genuine negotiations could have occurred in a co-optation environment. In such talks, the MPLA surely would not have abandoned its friendly rhetoric regarding the socialist world or its socialist plans for Angola. But it well might have given greater weight to the importance of retaining Western goodwill, and perhaps returned to the delicate balancing act it occasionally performed in previous periods.

In short, a Western effort at co-optation would not have created a pliable ally, but it certainly would have resulted in a less implacable enemy.

CHAPTER 12
MOZAMBIQUE: A CASE OF PARTIAL CO-OPTATION

FRELIMO's interaction with the West during the period from the Portuguese coup to Mozambique's independence in June 1975 can best be characterised as a case of partial co-optation.

FRELIMO's attitudes evolved in phases. At first, the movement focussed on the goal of forcing Portugal to accept the principle of independence and paid relatively little attention to other Western countries. However, once it became clear in September 1974 that Portugal would hand over power to FRELIMO as the government of an independent Mozambique, the movement began to focus on its future government-to-government relations and exhibited far greater interest in accommodating Western concerns. FRELIMO's attitude shifted in early 1975, however, and the movement became more selective about which Western countries it sought to accommodate. Relations with the United Kingdom continued to improve, while relations with the United States sharply deteriorated.

Several factors were involved in the movement's late 1974 opening to the West. FRELIMO's perception of Western and neighbouring states' policies played the most prominent and consistent role. Local economic and geographic circumstances, low levels of both internal factionalism and rivalry with other nationalist groups, poor relations with Moscow, and the effectiveness of the movement's guerrilla operations all also played important roles. FRELIMO never became totally co-optable, but by early 1975 it was well on its way to partial co-optability.

The factors that caused FRELIMO subsequently to adopt a more selective approach to Western countries were more limited. The movement's perception of certain states' policies towards the future FRELIMO-ruled state of Mozambique stands out as the most important consideration.

This analysis suggests that, had different Western policies been adopted, FRELIMO would have been more open to building constructive relationships with Western countries at the time of independence. However, it also suggests that even if vigorous co-optation policies had been pursued, FRELIMO would not have emerged as "pro-Western".

THE INDEPENDENCE NEGOTIATIONS (APRIL TO SEPTEMBER 1974)

During the first five months following the coup, FRELIMO used a carrot and stick strategy. The movement tried to tempt Portugal into granting independence by repeatedly promising not to persecute whites, and

simultaneously sought to pressure Lisbon by increasing guerrilla attacks on Portuguese targets.

Like the MPLA, FRELIMO was alarmed by Spínola's pledge to maintain Portugal as a "pluricontinental entirety".⁷⁵⁹ The FRELIMO Executive Committee responded, "[O]nly through recognition of the right to independence of the Mozambican people, led by FRELIMO, their authentic and legitimate representative, will the war end. Any attempt to elude the real problem will only lead to new... sacrifices". Thus, FRELIMO not only demanded immediate independence, but implied that power should be directly transferred to its leadership. The Executive Committee added that it feared that Rhodesia and South Africa might be planning to help Portugal block independence.⁷⁶⁰ FRELIMO did not include any Western countries in the list of potential anti-independence forces.

By May, Spínola had still failed to commit Portugal to immediate decolonisation, and FRELIMO swiftly launched new guerrilla operations in the Beira area. The Portuguese forces initially fought back, but their will soon collapsed. In June, MFA sympathisers in the Portuguese officer corps arranged informal cease-fires with individual FRELIMO units and thousands of Portuguese soldiers deserted.⁷⁶¹

A first round of official discussions between FRELIMO and the new Portuguese authorities occurred on 5 and 6 June in the Zambian capital, Lusaka. The new Portuguese foreign minister, Mário Soares, proposed a cease-fire and a referendum to discover if the people of Mozambique wanted independence or not. Machel counter-demanded that Portugal recognise FRELIMO as the Mozambican people's legitimate representative, recognise Mozambique's right to complete independence, and begin a process of transferring power to FRELIMO. The talks were suspended until July.⁷⁶²

⁷⁵⁹ F. A. Gonçalves Ferreira, 15 Anos da História Recente de Portugal (1970-1984): Os Factos, os Erros, os Protagonistas, a Análise e Interpretacão (Lisbon: António Coelho Dias, 1985), p. 412. See also "Portuguese Junta Opposes Freeing African Lands", New York Times, 28 April 1974.

⁷⁶⁰ "Statement by the FRELIMO Executive Committee on the events in Portugal" 27 April 1974, FRELIMO document, CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

⁷⁶¹ Hanlon, Mozambique, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

⁷⁶² Iain Christie, Machel of Mozambique (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988), p. 81.

FRELIMO's position was not well received by the Soviet Union, which sought to "dissuade" the movement from making "excessive demands".⁷⁶³ A well-placed FRELIMO source says that the Soviets were urging caution because they were afraid that confrontational tactics would "jeopardise the democratic process in Portugal" and adds, "We did not welcome the advice".⁷⁶⁴ Some of FRELIMO's African allies, particularly Kenneth Kaunda and Julius Nyerere, also urged Machel to accept the referendum plan.⁷⁶⁵

FRELIMO was disconcerted by the pressure. The movement's newsletter, Mozambique Revolution, complained that the negotiations in Lusaka had "demobilised" public opinion and added, "Now more than ever, there must be no vacillation in international support for our struggle". The newsletter also announced plans to start new military operations in Zambézia province in July.⁷⁶⁶

In late June, at the eleventh OAU summit, Machel showed irritation with his allies' advice. "One does not ask a slave if he desires to be free", he said, "especially after his revolt, and much less when [the questioner] is the slave owner". He also revealed the second, "carrot", element of the movement's strategy, pledging that FRELIMO would "guarantee the life, integrity, and legitimate interests of Portuguese citizens in Mozambique".⁷⁶⁷

The talks scheduled for July were not held, largely due to power struggles in Lisbon. FRELIMO used the time to launch its new military operations in Zambézia province, the principle plantation region of Mozambique, "against an army that preferred fraternising with the guerillas to fighting".⁷⁶⁸ Indeed, two thousand Portuguese soldiers and

⁷⁶³ "Russia's Strategy in Portugal", Christian Science Monitor (Boston, United States), 9 July 1974. Also source seven, confidential interviews by author, Maputo, Mozambique, 30 September 1984 and Wye Plantation, Maryland, United States, 20 November 1986.

⁷⁶⁴ Source seven, interview.

⁷⁶⁵ Middlemas, op. cit., pp. 326-327 and Christie, op. cit., p. 82.

⁷⁶⁶ "International Support Must Continue", Mozambique Revolution, no. 59 (April-June 1974), pp. 1-3.

⁷⁶⁷ "Discurso do presidente da FRELIMO, Camarada Samora Machel, a 11a Sessao da OUA", A Voz da FRELIMO, 27 June 1974, CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

⁷⁶⁸ Cahen, "Le Portugal et l'Afrique", op. cit., p. 11.

officers at the Boane Barracks near Lourenço Marques refused to go north to fight.⁷⁶⁹ Officers at Nampula general headquarters also declared themselves in favour of ceasing operations against FRELIMO.⁷⁷⁰ In late July, Machel encouraged this trend by broadcasting a message from Dar es Salaam in which he reassured whites and Portuguese soldiers that those who "want to experience and build the new Mozambique" would be welcome to remain in the country.⁷⁷¹ Lisbon's ambivalence about Mozambican independence ended on 27 July when the Portuguese left forced Spínola to declare his readiness to "initiate the transfer of power to the people of the overseas territories".⁷⁷² In a secret meeting in the Tanzanian capital Dar es Salaam, beginning on 30 July, the Portuguese agreed that FRELIMO was the legitimate and authentic representative of the Mozambican people, and a secret protocol was signed.⁷⁷³

In early August, the Portuguese government again entered into quiet talks with FRELIMO, first in Rome and then in Dar es Salaam.⁷⁷⁴ This time the Portuguese delegation was led by Melo Antunes, an anti-colonial army officer who was one of the leaders of the 25 April coup.⁷⁷⁵ The talks provoked huge pro-FRELIMO rallies in Mozambique, and Portuguese residents, sensing that the tide was turning, began to depart in large numbers.⁷⁷⁶

The most important negotiations then occurred in Lusaka from 5 to 7 September and culminated with the Lusaka accords. Portugal agreed to swiftly form a FRELIMO-dominated Transitional Government, and then to hand over power to FRELIMO as the government of an independent Mozambique

⁷⁶⁹ Hanlon, Mozambique, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

⁷⁷⁰ Christie, op. cit., p. 83.

⁷⁷¹ Samora Machel, radio broadcast from Dar es Salaam, 24 July 1974. Quoted in Christie, op. cit., p. 84.

⁷⁷² "Spínola spells it out", Sunday Times (London, United Kingdom), 28 July 1974.

⁷⁷³ Hall and Young, op. cit., pp. 42-43.

⁷⁷⁴ "Lisbon sees Waldheim visit as UN accolade", Times (London, United Kingdom), 3 August 1974.

⁷⁷⁵ Hanlon, Mozambique, op. cit., p. 44.

⁷⁷⁶ "Crowds at LM, Luanda rallies", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 5 August 1974.

on 25 June 1975. In return, FRELIMO agreed to the cease-fire that the Portuguese government urgently desired.⁷⁷⁷

The progress caused new problems. The Rhodesian government gradually realised that Lisbon was giving in to FRELIMO's demands. According to a mercenary who had worked for the Rhodesian government in 1974 and 1975, within six weeks of the Portuguese coup Salisbury had developed a plan to divide Mozambique at the Zambezi river, install a non-communist Mozambican group in the southern section bordering Rhodesia, and let FRELIMO have the northern half.⁷⁷⁸ Rhodesia's June 1974 decision to welcome a group of forty ex-members of Portugal's Mozambique-based "Special Groups" and install them in a Rhodesian camp was undoubtedly related to this plan.⁷⁷⁹

When the Portuguese government initiated independence discussions with FRELIMO in August, Rhodesia began to develop the plan further. On 16 August, the head of Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organisation, Ken Flower, submitted a brief to Rhodesian leader Ian Smith in which he highlighted Rhodesia's recent military and intelligence successes and then remarked, "With the shutters coming down along our border with Mozambique we need to project these activities into Mozambique...." He further urged Smith to try to convince South Africa to assist such operations.⁷⁸⁰

Another result of the independence negotiations was the growth of rival political groups. In August, a variety of anti-FRELIMO forces united into the National Coalition Party, which included Nkavandame, Simango, and Gwenjere.⁷⁸¹ The rising violence against FRELIMO supporters, including bomb attacks, beatings, and police killings of black demonstrators, contributed to the tense atmosphere.

In the period from the Portuguese coup to the 7 September 1974 agreement on independence, FRELIMO devoted little attention to the issue of relations with Western countries and focussed its energy on obtaining a power handover promise from Lisbon. The only significant development in

⁷⁷⁷ Christie, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

⁷⁷⁸ Source eight, confidential interview by author, Washington D.C., United States, 19 July 1986.

⁷⁷⁹ Ken Flower as quoted in Martin and Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁷⁸⁰ Flower, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-146.

⁷⁸¹ Hanlon, Mozambique, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

FRELIMO's international alignment was its irritation at Soviet meddling and apprehension about Rhodesian and South African plans.

EVOLUTION TOWARDS PARTIAL CO-OPTABILITY (SEPTEMBER TO JANUARY 1975)

After 7 September 1974, FRELIMO began to shift from a guerrilla movement to a government in waiting. Through the last quarter of 1974 the movement started to come to terms with the responsibilities governing would entail and showed an interest in at least partially accommodating the concerns both of Western governments and South Africa. Its attitude towards Rhodesia remained unclear, perhaps deliberately so.

For a few days immediately following the Lusaka Accords, it appeared that the Transitional Government might be physically prevented from taking office. Within hours of the signing, angry whites took over the Lourenço Marques radio station and called for a Rhodesian-style Unilateral Declaration of Independence. They also appealed to elite Portuguese commando units to assemble and await instructions,⁷⁸² and asked customs officials to open the borders in the hope that South African troops would intervene.⁷⁸³ Gwenjere and Simango lent their support to the rebellion. Similar white rebellions were staged in other cities, and whites drove through black residential areas shooting at random. Blacks set up road blocks and burned cars.⁷⁸⁴

FRELIMO responded swiftly with an 8 September radio broadcast from Dar es Salaam. Machel said that the rebels were at the service of "international imperialism", which was trying to cause racial conflict and thereby create a pretext for "internationalising aggression". He reminded the Portuguese officers that a cease-fire was in effect, pledged that the FRELIMO forces and the Portuguese army would "co-operate closely to... safeguard the Mozambican independence process", and made a direct appeal to whites:

Unaware elements in the white population, who were manipulated by villainous fascistic colonisers, should immediately return to their houses and refuse to be instruments of the fascists. This is the best way to defend their legitimate interests, which FRELIMO promises to protect....⁷⁸⁵

⁷⁸² Christie, op. cit., p. 85.

⁷⁸³ Munslow, op. cit., p. 128.

⁷⁸⁴ Hanlon, Mozambique, op. cit., p. 45.

⁷⁸⁵ Samora Machel, "Moçambicanas, Moçambicanos!", 8 September 1974, typewritten FRELIMO document, CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

Machel's broadcast also had a direct message for the governments of Rhodesia and South Africa:

We must warn neighbouring countries that the criminals wish to involve in their desperate actions that neither FRELIMO nor the African and non-African allies of the Mozambican people nor the international community will tolerate what would necessarily be considered imperialist aggression.⁷⁸⁶

This implied that FRELIMO had a pledge of outside support in the event of a South African or Rhodesian invasion.

FRELIMO supporters in Lourenço Marques also played an important role in neutralising the crisis. Though there were few clandestine FRELIMO cells in the capital, those that survived emerged from underground and toured the black residential areas calling for calm.⁷⁸⁷

FRELIMO also began to fly its guerrillas to the capital from their northern operational bases using planes provided by the OAU.⁷⁸⁸ The situation was brought back under control before they became a factor. On 9 September the Portuguese armed forces gave the rebels an ultimatum to evacuate the radio station or face the consequences, and the rebels surrendered.⁷⁸⁹

Western diplomats were impressed. One said:

It is incredible the way FRELIMO managed to control the situation for three days in the face of great provocation.... After 400 years of Portuguese colonialism, the Africans saw whites trying to steal their independence. But still they remained calm, and that demonstrates FRELIMO's control over the people and FRELIMO's maturity.⁷⁹⁰

The swift resolution of the uprising permitted the Transitional Government to take power on schedule on 25 September. Machel decided to stay outside the government, in order to devote full time to party matters, and Joaquim Chissano became the prime minister. Under the Lusaka Accord six cabinet ministers were named by FRELIMO and three by Portugal.

Machel's speech at the inauguration of the Transitional Government succinctly summarised FRELIMO's frame of mind. He said that the

⁷⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁷ Source seven, interview.

⁷⁸⁸ "Message from Comrade Samora Moisés Machel, President of FRELIMO, to the 24th Session of the Liberation Committee of the OAU", Dar es Salaam, 8 January 1985, CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

⁷⁸⁹ Christie, op. cit., p. 87.

⁷⁹⁰ "Frelimo stops backlash", Observer (London, United Kingdom), 15 September 1974.

government would be an instrument of FRELIMO, the movement would try to create habits of "collective work", the white population had nothing to fear, and FRELIMO was grateful to its African allies, the socialist countries, and the anti-colonial forces in the West (in that order) for assistance during the war.⁷⁹¹

The most pressing foreign policy issue for FRELIMO after the Transitional Government took office was relations with South Africa. For a number of reasons, South Africa had not sought to block independence, and FRELIMO set about ensuring that Pretoria did not change its mind.

One of the most important reasons for South Africa's inaction was its interest in continuing "détente" with African states. In May 1974, Prime Minister Vorster had met with President Léopold Senghor of Senegal and President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire in the latter's capital; he hoped for more encounters. He was well aware that intervention in Mozambique would have damaged détente, as FRELIMO was considered the legitimate claimant to power by virtually all African governments.⁷⁹²

Some sources say that a feud between branches of the South African government also contributed to South Africa's decision. The head of South Africa's Bureau of State Security (BOSS), General Hendrik van den Bergh, was engaged in a power struggle with South African Defence Minister P.W. Botha. The two had been enemies since 1968, when Vorster appointed van den Bergh head of the new intelligence agency (BOSS), and placed it above Military Intelligence.⁷⁹³ Van den Bergh had a close relationship with Vorster because the two had shared a cell when in detention during World War II. (They, like many Afrikaners, had refused to fight Germany.) Van den Bergh helped design Vorster's détente policy and condemned P.W. Botha's Military Intelligence for failing to support it.⁷⁹⁴ Most important for FRELIMO, van den Bergh was more interested in Namibia (often still referred to as South West Africa in official South African circles) than

⁷⁹¹ "Mensagem do Presidente Samora Moisés Machel Por Ocasião do Tomada de Posse do Governo de Transição", 20 September 1974, document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

⁷⁹² Source six, confidential interview by author, Pretoria, South Africa, 5 December 1985.

⁷⁹³ Flower, op. cit., p. 153.

⁷⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 164.

Rhodesia. The head of Rhodesia's Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), Ken Flower, reports:

I remember van den Bergh saying there were only 40,000 whites of Afrikaner stock in Rhodesia compared with 75,000 in South West Africa, which meant that Rhodesia's future was of less importance to South Africa than the future of South West Africa.⁷⁹⁵

This partly explains why van den Bergh was subsequently willing to go along with an operation against Namibia's neighbour, Angola, but remained steadfastly opposed to an operation in Rhodesia's neighbour, Mozambique.

Another factor may have been South Africa's concern about the reaction of radical Portuguese soldiers. "Van den Bergh realised he would end up not just fighting FRELIMO but also many of the Portuguese soldiers remaining in the country", a Mozambican source reported.⁷⁹⁶

Perhaps the most critical factor, however, was South Africa's extensive economic links with Mozambique. These links conferred significant, though not always equal, benefits to residents on both sides of the border. The links gave South Africa a non-military tool with which to influence any government ruling Mozambique and an interest in maintaining stability within Mozambique. At the same time, the economic benefits accrued on the northern side of the border gave any government ruling Mozambique an interest in reaching a modus vivendi with its southern neighbour.

The railroad from Mozambique's capital to South Africa had opened in 1895, and traditionally carried half of the imports and exports of South Africa's Transvaal province. In 1973, Mozambique handled one-fifth of South Africa's imports and exports, a total of 6.2 million tonnes. The next largest source of transit business was Rhodesia, with 3.3 million tonnes.⁷⁹⁷ In 1974, revenue from transport services earned Mozambique 38 percent of its income.⁷⁹⁸

From 1908 until independence there had been an average of more than eighty thousand Mozambicans working in South African mines. Indeed, in the 1970 to 1974 period there were more Mozambicans than South

⁷⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 157.

⁷⁹⁶ Source two, confidential interviews by author, Maputo, Mozambique, September 1984 and February 1986.

⁷⁹⁷ Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, op. cit., pp. 131-132.

⁷⁹⁸ Ruth First, Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1983), p. 26.

Africans working in those mines.⁷⁹⁹ Remittances from relatives working in South Africa were critical to large numbers of Mozambicans, and in 1975 migrant labour accounted for 12 percent of Mozambique's wage labour force.⁸⁰⁰ In 1974 "invisible earnings", mostly from South African wage remittances, earned Mozambique 46 percent of its income.⁸⁰¹

Trade ties were also strong. In 1973, 20 percent of Mozambique's imports came from South Africa (double the percentage in 1965), compared with 19 percent from Portugal (just over one-half the figure for 1965).⁸⁰² In 1973, South Africa also became Mozambique's third most important export market, after Portugal and the United States.⁸⁰³

In several respects, Mozambique began to be more closely integrated with South Africa than it was with Portugal, more a colony of Pretoria than of Lisbon. This reflected the weak and underdeveloped character of the Portuguese economy, and the rapid growth and industrialisation of the South African economy in this period. It also reflected the character of Mozambique's resources. Mozambique's main resources capable of quickly earning the country foreign exchange were manpower and transport facilities. To be converted into cash, these resources required the goodwill of a neighbour possessing foreign exchange. Manpower needed nearby mines and commercial farms in which to labour, and transport facilities required neighbours' freight. South Africa was in a position to provide these economic linkages. No other country had both the geographic proximity and economic power to play this role.

The increasing integration of the two southern African economies gave Pretoria precisely the structural ties to Mozambique that Lisbon had been slow to develop. Pretoria used these economic connections to protect its interests and maintain past benefits despite the abrupt, radical change in the formal political structure of the Mozambican territory. One could perhaps say that at independence, South Africa was "consensually neo-colonising" Mozambique. To the extent that FRELIMO's decision to

⁷⁹⁹ Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, op. cit., p. 133.

⁸⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 294.

⁸⁰¹ First, op. cit., p. 26.

⁸⁰² Hanlon, Beggar Your Neighbours, op. cit., p. 293; Hanlon, Mozambique, op. cit., p. 283.

⁸⁰³ Munslow, op. cit., p. 28.

treat South Africa respectfully enhanced the movement's image in the West, South Africa's "consensual neo-colonisation" of Mozambique facilitated FRELIMO-Western relations.

Détente concerns, internal South African bureaucratic rivalries, military considerations, and the knowledge that the Republic's interests could perhaps best be protected through use of economic ties rather than force all caused Pretoria to adopt a cautious attitude towards those seeking to engage in violent resistance to a FRELIMO take-over. Thus, in August 1974 the South African consul general in Mozambique refused a request by Mozambican whites for assistance.⁸⁰⁴ A South African official later commented, "We said Portugal had the right to hand over to any government it wanted to. In Mozambique, Portugal chose to hand over to FRELIMO. In Angola, Portugal chose the Alvor Accord".⁸⁰⁵ The white rebels then reportedly approached Minister of Defence P.W. Botha for assistance. FRELIMO legend claims that Botha agreed to help, but that van den Bergh sabotaged the plot by having his agents place sugar in the tanks of the military vehicles gathering for the operation.⁸⁰⁶ This colourful account has never been confirmed.

Not only did South Africa refrain from intervening, but its consul general was invited to the 25 September inauguration of the Transitional Government, where he was seated between the British consul general and a representative of the Chinese Communist Party.⁸⁰⁷ South Africa's Rand Daily Mail newspaper accurately summarised Pretoria's view in an 18 September article when it said, "In the short term it seems unlikely that FRELIMO will do anything... to antagonise whites in... South Africa".⁸⁰⁸

Shortly after his inauguration as prime minister, Joaquim Chissano began to meet regularly with the South African diplomat Brand Fourie, and, according to a South African source, "Leant over backwards to establish a good relationship".⁸⁰⁹ Chissano's pragmatism was also evident

⁸⁰⁴ Source six, interview.

⁸⁰⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁰⁶ Source two, interview.

⁸⁰⁷ Source six, interview.

⁸⁰⁸ "Rumours...then came panic", Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg, South Africa), 18 September 1974.

⁸⁰⁹ Source six, interview.

in a December 1974 interview. Asked about future relations with the neighbouring minority regimes, he said:

[O]ur relations... will depend upon the attitudes of South Africa and Rhodesia towards Mozambique.... We do not want to interfere in the internal affairs of South Africa or Rhodesia, despite our opposition to apartheid and racial segregation. But we also think that it falls to the South African and Rhodesian peoples to resolve their problems. It is convenient to note that between South Africa and Mozambique there exist commercial relations that were established by the Portuguese government.⁸¹⁰

Chissano went on to remark that neighbours' fees for the use of Mozambique's railroads and ports accounted for 40 percent of the territory's foreign exchange earnings,⁸¹¹ strongly implying that South Africa would continue to have access to these facilities. The Transitional Government's decision not to disrupt existing labour agreements with South Africa reflected FRELIMO's awareness of the structural integration of the Mozambican and South African economies, and its intention not to initiate a precipitous break.

FRELIMO also adopted a cautious policy regarding the ANC in this period. Although Machel strongly implied that FRELIMO might aid the guerrillas in Rhodesia (see below), on the subject of the ANC he simply appealed to South Africa to respond positively to the guerrilla group's request for talks, and did not address the question of future FRELIMO aid to the movement.⁸¹² According to an ANC source, at around this time FRELIMO secretly promised Pretoria that it would not provide bases to the ANC.⁸¹³

FRELIMO's respect for South African economic and military power and pleasure at Pretoria's decision not to block independence were important reasons for its cautious ANC policy. However, there was another, little known, cause. Back at the beginning of FRELIMO's "armed struggle", the ANC had adopted a paternalistic attitude towards its Mozambican colleagues. As a source close to Machel stated in 1984:

⁸¹⁰ "Joaquim Chissano--`Para fazer a revolução apoia-se na sua própria força'", Vida Mundial, no. 1839 (12 December 1974), pp. 18-24, CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

⁸¹¹ *Ibid.*

⁸¹² "Message from Comrade Samora Moisés Machel, President of FRELIMO, to the 24th Session of the Liberation Committee of the OAU", *op. cit.*

⁸¹³ Source nine, confidential interview by author, Maputo, Mozambique, 17 October 1984.

The ANC attitude in the early days was that we Mozambicans were too underdeveloped to start armed struggle. They said that they would first have to liberate South Africa, we would have to get more education, and then we would be in a position to start a guerrilla war against Portuguese colonialism.⁸¹⁴

This early ANC condescension undoubtedly influenced FRELIMO's subsequent attitudes.

FRELIMO's view of Rhodesia was somewhat different, in part because FRELIMO perceived Rhodesia's policies to be more hostile than South Africa's, in part because Mozambique's economy was less integrated with Rhodesia than with South Africa, and in part because FRELIMO had a closer relationship with ZANU than with the ANC. However, FRELIMO did moderate its anti-Rhodesian policy somewhat, probably due to behind-the-scenes negotiations (described below).

Rhodesia was annoyed by South Africa's reluctance to support the Zambezi division plot,⁸¹⁵ but decided to proceed with anti-FRELIMO plans nonetheless. In September 1974, intelligence head Ken Flower went to Lisbon, where, he later recounted, he "got mixed up with a bunch of conspirators--leading all the way to General Spínola himself--plotting to reverse the march of events in Mozambique". In a report to Ian Smith about the trip he said, "[W]e have the advantage of being in with the conspiracy and should be able to provide practical assistance if and when the next stage occurs".⁸¹⁶

FRELIMO did not know the details of these contacts, but clearly realised that Rhodesia was more hostile than South Africa. Thus, FRELIMO adopted a more aggressive tone with Salisbury than with Pretoria, though Machel still carefully stopped short of pledging immediate military aid to ZANU.⁸¹⁷

The careful language on ZANU aid was probably related in part to secret negotiations under way at the time. Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda was working, in coordination with South Africa, on a plan by which the allies of the Rhodesian guerrillas would pressure them to lay down arms and negotiate with Smith in return for South Africa forcing Rhodesia to make

⁸¹⁴ Source one, interview.

⁸¹⁵ Source eight, interview.

⁸¹⁶ Flower, op. cit., pp. 144-145.

⁸¹⁷ "Message from Comrade Samora Moisés Machel, President of FRELIMO, to the 24th Session of the Liberation Committee of the OAU", op. cit.

a number of concessions.⁸¹⁸ According to an ANC source in Mozambique, FRELIMO agreed that if these concessions were made, it would not provide bases to ZANU.⁸¹⁹ South Africa, which was impatient with Smith and beginning to think that a moderate African government in Rhodesia might better serve Pretoria's interests, did indeed pressure Smith, who responded with only limited concessions.

FRELIMO also adopted a pragmatic position regarding Rhodesian access to Mozambican transport routes. Rhodesia had been using the Beira railroad and oil pipeline to avoid sanctions, with Portuguese complicity. FRELIMO's alliance with ZANU obviously made the movement very interested in closing the route. However, FRELIMO also knew that such an action could produce Rhodesian retaliation and would deprive Mozambique of important foreign exchange revenue. Consequently, Machel decided to consolidate FRELIMO's position first and only later take action to close the transport link.⁸²⁰

FRELIMO's policies on neighbouring minority regimes in the last quarter of 1974 and the first month of 1975 show that the movement was willing to be exceedingly flexible and "co-optable" if it believed that the other party involved would be equally flexible. The movement's awareness of the economic structure it was inheriting, and willingness to adjust policies to at least temporarily accommodate constraints inherent in that structure, were also evident in this period.

In late 1974 and early 1975, FRELIMO also demonstrated willingness to accommodate some Western interests, though it was not going to turn its back on socialist allies or abandon its socialist plans for independent Mozambique.

The U.S. Department of State was aware of Mozambique's "efforts to seek a solution to the problem of Rhodesia",⁸²¹ and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Easum appeared to have an open mind concerning FRELIMO. In November, Easum met with Machel in Dar es Salaam

⁸¹⁸ Martin and Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

⁸¹⁹ Source nine, interview.

⁸²⁰ Marcum, "Southern Africa After the Collapse of Portuguese Rule", *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁸²¹ Testimony of Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, June and July 1975, p. 51.

and indicated U.S. interest in building a new relationship with Mozambique. Machel replied that he was "prepared to let bygones be bygones" and promised to arrange for Easum to visit Maputo,⁸²² the new name the Transitional Government had given Mozambique's capital city. Several weeks later, Easum became the first foreign diplomat granted an audience by the Transitional Government. Chissano stressed Mozambique's critical economic and relief needs. Mozambique's economy, unlike Angola's, was relatively poor and possessed resources of only limited interest to potential foreign sources of capital and technology. This meant that independent Mozambique would be quite dependent on international assistance, and FRELIMO knew it. Easum reported that he had already set up a working group in Washington to study possible aid programmes. He promised to expedite the group's deliberations when he returned to Washington and indicated that the next step might be a visit to Mozambique by a team of experts to study the situation on the ground.⁸²³ Upon departure, Easum told the Mozambican press, "I was not prepared for the great dedication and concern for the well-being of people that I have encountered when speaking to the prime minister in the Transitional Government".⁸²⁴

However, when Easum returned to Washington he found that his proposal for assistance to Mozambique had been turned down by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Kissinger said that any U.S. aid to Mozambique should be given to Portugal to administer since Washington wished to encourage the more conservative faction of the Portuguese regime. FRELIMO did not learn of this decision for several months, and as of early 1975 was still hopeful of U.S. aid.⁸²⁵

FRELIMO also met with British envoys in Dar es Salaam shortly after the Transitional Government took office, and sources on both sides

⁸²² Marcum, "Southern Africa After the Collapse of Portuguese Rule", *op. cit.*, p. 81.

⁸²³ Easum, interview. Information first published in Gillian Gunn, "Learning from Adversity: The Mozambican Experience", in Regional Conflict and U.S. Policy: Angola and Mozambique, ed. Richard J. Bloomfield (Algonac, Michigan: Reference Publications, 1988), p. 149.

⁸²⁴ "Secretário de Estado-Adjunto Norte-Americano Para Assuntos Africanos contactou Governo de Transição", Tempo (Mozambique), no. 219 (8 December 1974).

⁸²⁵ Easum, interview. Information first published in Gunn, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

recall the discussions as "highly constructive".⁸²⁶ Britain's Labour Party, having won the March 1974 general election, was anxious to repair Britain's relations with the African members of the Commonwealth, which it believed had been damaged by the previous Conservative government's handling of Rhodesia.⁸²⁷ Also, the United Kingdom was aware of FRELIMO's assistance to the Kaunda-Vorster initiative on Rhodesia, and was thus well disposed towards the movement. As is described in more detail in chapter 14, Britain was also interested in arrangements with FRELIMO that might reduce the cost of discouraging Rhodesian sanctions-busting via Mozambican territory.

For its part, FRELIMO appreciated the Labour Party's espousal of "socialist" philosophy and its past statements of support for Mozambican independence. The result of the discussions was a FRELIMO pledge to have the Transitional Government monitor Rhodesian sanctions-busting through Mozambican territory.⁸²⁸

FRELIMO also adopted a relatively open attitude towards Western investment in the closing months of 1974. In a December interview, Chissano responded to a question about the role of international capital by saying, "If the actions of these enterprises are in the interests of Mozambique, we will take adequate measures". Leaving the enterprises to function as they were was among the options he cited. Later in the same interview, Chissano responded to a question concerning development aid by saying, "[W]e can turn to any country, socialist or capitalist, as long as they do not insist, in exchange, on anything that compromises the political line of independent Mozambique".⁸²⁹

FRELIMO also adjusted its rhetoric when it realised that certain words irritated Western nerves. In an October 1974 interview with Chissano, a journalist pointed out that a pledge by Machel in Dar es Salaam to turn Mozambique into "a revolutionary base against imperialism and colonialism" had caused concern among Western diplomats. Chissano replied that being a revolutionary base "does not signify an arms arsenal

⁸²⁶ Rifkind, interview. Aquino de Bragança (professor, University of Mozambique), interview by author, Maputo, Mozambique, 20 August 1984.

⁸²⁷ Martin Meredith, The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia UDI to Zimbabwe (London: Pan Books Ltd, 1980), p. 170.

⁸²⁸ Rifkind, interview.

⁸²⁹ "Joaquim Chissano--`Para fazer a revolução Moçambique apoia-se na sua própria força'", op. cit., p. 18-24.

or interference in the internal affairs of other countries" and added that Mozambique would be a "revolutionary base" by example, by building "an anti-imperialist society" that others could emulate.⁸³⁰

FRELIMO's clear interest in establishing cordial relations with the West by no means implied a reduction of its relations with the East. While Chissano was given responsibility for developing relations with neighbouring minority regimes and Western governments, Machel concentrated on building ties with socialist countries that had supported FRELIMO. Thus, in December 1974, Machel visited East Germany, Bulgaria, and Romania to make agreements about future economic co-operation, and a trip to China was planned.⁸³¹ Furthermore, in a January 1975 speech in Dar es Salaam Machel declared the socialist countries FRELIMO's natural allies.⁸³²

FRELIMO repeatedly emphasised, however, that it would not directly copy Eastern bloc systems. At the inauguration of the Transitional Government Machel said, "Although we know how to seek inspiration and stimulation in the experiences of others, we will construct firmly on the basis of our own originality, basing [policy] on the special conditions of our country".⁸³³

In the period from the September 1974 Lusaka Accord to early 1975, FRELIMO moved towards a state of partial co-optability both regarding neighbouring minority regimes and Western countries. It promised not to provide bases for the ANC, and made a similar, though conditional, pledge regarding ZANU. It did not instruct the Transitional Government to cut off transport routes serving those states, and left labour arrangements with South Africa intact. FRELIMO immediately sought out Western diplomats and proposed that relations start anew, letting the acrimonious relations of the war period be forgotten. Its proposals regarding Western investment and future aid relationships were tactfully couched. When the movement realised that it had excited Western concern with careless

⁸³⁰ "Moçambique: Base Revolucionária Contra o Racismo e o Imperialismo", Tempo (Mozambique), no. 211 (13 October 1974), pp. 27-32.

⁸³¹ Christie, op. cit., p. 90.

⁸³² "Message from Comrade Samora Moisés Machel, President of FRELIMO, to the 24th Session of the Liberation Committee of the OAU", op. cit.

⁸³³ "Mensagem do Presidente Samora Moisés Machel Por Ocasião da Tomada de Posse do Governo de Transição", op. cit.

rhetoric, it swiftly made amends, for example by redefining the words "revolutionary base" to mean "example".

The most important reason for this rise in co-optability was FRELIMO's perception of Western governments' policies. The gracious treatment FRELIMO received from British and U.S. diplomats created the impression that these governments wanted to build a constructive relationship, and FRELIMO responded in kind. Simultaneously, local economic and geographic realities moderated relations with neighbouring minority regimes. This, in turn, helped the movement's relations with Western countries, which did not wish to see increased guerrilla warfare in southern Africa. Three other factors--Portuguese policies, FRELIMO's guerrilla strength, and lack of internal factionalism--also played roles, though more by refraining from sabotaging the movement's evolution towards partial co-optability than by actively promoting it. These three factors led to a direct handover of power that mitigated opportunities for external interference and associated nationalist resentments.

THE CO-OPTATION PROCESS STALLS (FEBRUARY TO JUNE 1975)

During the final months preceding Mozambican independence, FRELIMO became considerably less interested in accommodating the concerns of the United States, though it continued to respect the interests of the United Kingdom and South Africa.

As mentioned above, when Assistant Secretary of State Donald Easum returned to Washington following his talks with Chissano he found that his proposal for aid to Mozambique had been refused by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.⁸³⁴ Due to this and other problems unrelated to Mozambique, Easum was removed from his post. Shortly thereafter, the ex-U.S. ambassador to Chile, Nathaniel Davis, was nominated to replace him.

FRELIMO was puzzled and upset by this development. Chissano later remarked, "We made concrete proposals to the United States. We never received an answer. We think the United States was concerned about the manner in which we [were] receiv[ing] independence, and our alliance with the socialist countries".⁸³⁵ FRELIMO's disappointment was also underscored by a comment that Chissano allegedly made to Henry Kissinger in late

⁸³⁴ Easum, interview. Information first published in Gunn, *op. cit.*

⁸³⁵ Joaquim Chissano, (then Mozambique's foreign minister), interview by author, Maputo, Mozambique, 15 October 1984. Information first published in Gunn, *op. cit.*

1975. When the two diplomats unexpectedly encountered each other at the United Nations, Chissano reportedly said to Kissinger, "A year ago you sent your Africa man to see us and we liked what we heard. Why have we heard nothing else from the U.S. since then?"⁸³⁶

FRELIMO was also alarmed by the background of the new assistant secretary. Davis was associated in FRELIMO thinking with the covert U.S. destabilisation of Chile, which contributed to the downfall of one of FRELIMO's friends, Salvador Allende. FRELIMO was not alone in this regard. Most African embassies in Washington boycotted the Davis swearing-in ceremony on 4 April 1975, and even a U.S. ally, President Mobutu of Zaire, criticised the appointment.⁸³⁷ Davis did little to redeem himself in FRELIMO eyes in the period between starting his African responsibilities and Mozambican independence. In that period, FRELIMO was lobbying hard for Western countries to contribute aid to a United Nations Fund being established to help Mozambique cope with the future economic costs of enforcing international sanctions against Rhodesia. In a congressional hearing, Davis appeared to oppose a U.S. contribution to the fund.⁸³⁸ FRELIMO disappointment in U.S. policy probably accounts for the decision not to invite a U.S. representative to the 25 June independence celebrations.

Relations with other Western countries did not suffer as much, but, with the exception of the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, neither did they warm significantly. Once FRELIMO realised that it would not receive much help from the richest and most powerful Western state, its interest in the others waned too.

There were specific reasons for the relationship with the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands. As detailed in previous chapters, these governments had historically provided humanitarian and diplomatic assistance to FRELIMO, and thus were regarded as "special cases". In addition, during the transition period their aid departments, in consultation with FRELIMO, prepared major assistance programmes to be

⁸³⁶ Easum, interview.

⁸³⁷ Marcum, "Southern Africa After the Collapse of Portuguese Rule", op. cit., p. 82; statement of Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr., Nomination of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 19 February 1975, p. 84.

⁸³⁸ Nathaniel Davis, testimony, U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

implemented immediately after independence. They also made plans to establish embassies in the Mozambican capital shortly after independence day. These developments, combined with the ongoing close personal relationship between Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme and Machel, ensured that these governments were praised in FRELIMO documents.

The special relationship with Britain was due primarily to the Rhodesia matter. In January 1975, the Labour government's new Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, visited southern Africa as part of his effort to repair relations with African members of the Commonwealth. Throughout the trip, which included Zambia, Botswana, and South Africa, he made disparaging comments about Ian Smith.⁸³⁹ Then, in May 1975, Britain's Minister of Overseas Development, Judith Hart, flew to Dar es Salaam to see Machel, and discussed the possibility of the United Kingdom providing Mozambique £15,000,000 over one to two years if Mozambique applied sanctions against Rhodesia.⁸⁴⁰ It later turned out that Hart had exceeded her authorisation, and the eventual offer was more modest, but the move certainly helped improve British-FRELIMO relations.

Relations with the remaining Western governments, however, were lukewarm to chilly. France appeared more interested in Angola, which was geographically close to ex-French colonies, and relations with West Germany remained as cold as they had been in the pre-coup era.

The invitation list to the 25 June independence ceremonies reflected this state of affairs. The U.S., French, and West German representatives were not invited. Only seven Western countries appeared on the list, which was dominated by African, Asian, socialist, and communist states. The Western guests were Britain, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden.⁸⁴¹

While relations with much of the West chilled or stagnated, relations with South Africa continued to be cordial. In March 1975, Chissano told the South African Sunday Express that Mozambique would not allow the ANC to establish bases after independence, but would permit African nationalist organisations to establish diplomatic missions in the

⁸³⁹ Meredith, op. cit., p. 170.

⁸⁴⁰ Martin and Johnson, op. cit., p. 226.

⁸⁴¹ "5 nations not invited to Mozambique freedom day", Zambia Daily Mail (Lusaka, Zambia), 23 June 1975.

territory.⁸⁴² FRELIMO also remained in close contact with Pretoria regarding Rhodesia. The Rhodesia talks were moving slowly, and FRELIMO and Pretoria continued to consult on ways to get Smith and the guerrillas to the negotiating table.

In the final months leading up to independence, FRELIMO established a good working relationship with the South African officials running the railroad linking Lourenço Marques with South Africa, and FRELIMO indicated that it would like to continue the connection in the future. By June 1975, the relationship had developed to the point that the head of the South African Railways was invited to attend the very independence ceremonies from which the United States was pointedly excluded and received permission from his superiors to accept.⁸⁴³

The evolving relationship between South Africa and FRELIMO started to become so cordial that Machel was occasionally indirectly criticised by other African leaders at OAU meetings.⁸⁴⁴ Thus, in April 1975, in a speech to the Ninth Extraordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers, Machel emphasised that FRELIMO's contacts with South Africa did not indicate a willingness to enter into political dialogue with apartheid.⁸⁴⁵ He also insisted that "the application of the principle of non-interference in internal affairs [did] not exclude our identification and solidarity with the popular struggle in any country".⁸⁴⁶

Relations with Rhodesia did not fare nearly as well, and Machel's rhetoric was less reassuring than it had been in late 1974. When asked in June 1975 what FRELIMO policy would be on that neighbour, he said "I will let practise respond for itself. Ask me this after the 25th of June". A few days before independence he explicitly said, "As for Rhodesia, we will be engaged in the combat".⁸⁴⁷ The aggressive rhetoric was undoubtedly

⁸⁴² "Death week ends truce pact in Angola", Sunday Express (Johannesburg, South Africa), 30 March 1975.

⁸⁴³ Dr. J.G.H. Loubser (former general manager of South African Railways/Transport Services), interview by author, Cape Town, South Africa, 10 January 1986.

⁸⁴⁴ Meredith, op. cit., p. 184.

⁸⁴⁵ "A África Nada Tem a Diologar com O Regime de Pretoria", Tempo (Mozambique), no. 238 (20 April 1975), pp. 18-21.

⁸⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁷ "Machel's Rhodesia Pledge", Times of Zambia (Lusaka, Zambia), 21 June 1975.

due to the slow progress of the Vorster-Kaunda initiative.⁸⁴⁸ In January 1975, Smith had stopped the release of political prisoners⁸⁴⁹ and by May he was obstructing the talks.⁸⁵⁰

In the final months leading to independence, FRELIMO continued to solidify its relations with the socialist countries. The most important contact was with China, which Machel visited for seventeen days in February 1975. Upon arriving in Beijing, Machel said, "Since the beginning of our struggle the Popular Republic of China has been in the vanguard of the magnificent solidarity movement around us".⁸⁵¹ At the end of the visit China agreed to send a large delegation to the independence celebrations, to exchange ambassadors with Mozambique on independence day, and to provide the new nation economic and technical assistance, as well as a large food donation.⁸⁵² Machel also visited North Korea in March 1975 on his way back from China.⁸⁵³

Although Machel excluded the Soviet Union from his travels, perhaps owing to his earlier irritation at this ally's unwelcome advice, relations with Moscow were far from frosty. For example, the pro-FRELIMO magazine Tempo began to publish numerous articles by the Novosti news agency, some of which were vigorously anti-American.⁸⁵⁴

In the final days before independence, and on independence day itself, FRELIMO issued a variety of statements regarding future policy. All of them, including the new Constitution and the Independence Proclamation, emphasised the following themes: a strong ideological commitment to socialism; a desire to build close relations with the socialist countries; an openness to, though not a burning interest in, establishing relations with Western nations; and a desire to aid "liberation movements" in Rhodesia and South Africa tempered by an

⁸⁴⁸ Meredith, op. cit., p. 186.

⁸⁴⁹ Martin and Johnson, op. cit., p. 156.

⁸⁵⁰ Meredith, op. cit., p. 186.

⁸⁵¹ "República Popular da China--A Terra e o Povo", Tempo (Mozambique), no. 234 (23 March 1975).

⁸⁵² Ibid.

⁸⁵³ Christie, op. cit., p. 90.

⁸⁵⁴ For example, see K. Khatchatorov, "Ambassador in Chile", Tempo (Mozambique), no. 239 (27 April 1975), pp. 23-24.

acknowledgement that pragmatic considerations might make that difficult in the near term.⁸⁵⁵

Interestingly, on Angola FRELIMO did not come out openly in support of the MPLA, but rather called for unity between the movements in Angola.⁸⁵⁶ Though FRELIMO was close to the MPLA, and had a low regard for the FNLA, it reportedly considered UNITA to be a legitimate liberation movement.⁸⁵⁷

From January to June 1975, FRELIMO became more selective about which Western states it wished to accommodate, and the result was a general slowing of the movement's evolution towards partial co-optability. Relations with the United States sharply deteriorated, those with France and West Germany failed to improve, and Britain, alone among the major powers, received a warm reception. The friendship with the Scandinavian and Dutch governments continued to thrive. Relations with South Africa remained respectful while those with Rhodesia declined. Ties with the socialist states solidified, though the Chinese were given priority over the Soviet Union.

The major factor involved in all cases was FRELIMO's perception of the various governments' attitudes towards the future FRELIMO-ruled independent Mozambique. The governments of Britain, Scandinavia, and the Netherlands were perceived to be supportive, and South Africa was seen as non-interfering. The socialist states were viewed as allies ready to assist with significant aid packages, while the United States was seen as veering towards neo-colonial policies under the leadership of a CIA-tainted diplomat. France and West Germany were perceived as long-term backers of Portuguese colonialism who had not changed, and Rhodesia was considered to be increasingly untrustworthy.

As in the late 1974 period, Portuguese policies, FRELIMO's military strength, and the organisation's lack of factionalism created a

⁸⁵⁵ "The Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique", document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal; "Entrevista com o Presidente Samora", Tempo (Mozambique), 25 June 1975; "The Proclamation of Independence" and "President's message to the nation on independence day", Mozambique Revolution, no. 61 (25 June 1975), p. 23; "Discurso de Abertura da 7a sessao do Comitê Central da FRELIMO de Junho de 1975", in Documentos Base da FRELIMO, op. cit., pp. 181-197.

⁸⁵⁶ "Discurso de Abertura da 7a sessao do Comitê Central da FRELIMO de Junho de 1975", op. cit., pp. 181-197.

⁸⁵⁷ Source one, interview.

context unconducive to external interference and limited opportunities for FRELIMO-Western conflict, while local economic and geographic realities moderated relations with neighbouring states in a manner that assuaged Western fears. The influence of these factors did not change much from the previous late 1974 period, and yet FRELIMO's co-optability clearly declined. Therefore, these latter factors were not as significant as the factor that did change--FRELIMO's perception of Western policies.

SUMMARY

FRELIMO's relations with the West moved through three distinct phases in the period from the Portuguese coup of April 1974 to Mozambican independence in June 1975.

During the first five months following the coup, FRELIMO concentrated on convincing Portugal to agree to full independence for Mozambique. It used a carrot and stick strategy, pledging not to victimise Mozambican residents of Portuguese descent after independence, and threatening to escalate the guerrilla war if independence were not granted. Relatively little attention was paid in this period to other Western governments, which were perceived as neither significantly aiding nor hindering this process. However, two developments occurred that were to influence subsequent FRELIMO decisions. Rhodesia gave refuge to Portuguese army members who opposed independence, making FRELIMO fear that Rhodesia and/or South Africa might attempt to block independence. The Soviet Union, by pressuring FRELIMO to soften its terms in negotiations with Lisbon, angered the FRELIMO leadership.

Once Portugal agreed to transfer power to FRELIMO as the government of an independent Mozambique, and the movement neutralised a right-wing rebellion, the FRELIMO leadership began to focus on its future government-to-government relations. Although this process involved intensive consultation with and travel to socialist countries, the FRELIMO leadership also began a vigorous exploration of prospects for repairing relations with the Western countries that it had previously perceived as supporters of colonialism. FRELIMO's proposals regarding Western investment and future aid relationships were tactfully couched, its leadership avoided rhetoric offensive to Western diplomats, and constructive meetings were held with U.S. and British envoys. FRELIMO also adopted pragmatic policies regarding South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Rhodesia. This approach both enhanced relations with neighbours

and impressed Western governments concerned about stability in the region.

FRELIMO's desire to build new relationships with governments it viewed as past allies of Portuguese colonialism became more selective in the final months leading up to independence, however. The United States was rebuffed, while the relationship with the United Kingdom continued to warm.

Relations with neighbouring minority regimes similarly went in opposite directions. Relations with South Africa, although conducted at arms length, were cordial and respectful. Relations with Rhodesia deteriorated. Although the movement kept its intentions to itself for fear of exciting a Rhodesian intervention that might delay independence, FRELIMO made plans to aid guerrillas in anti-Rhodesian actions after independence.

Relations with the socialist countries and with the few Western countries that had long supported FRELIMO (Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands) also solidified in this period. China was clearly given more attention than the Soviet Union.

Overall, the movement's level of co-optability on independence day was roughly equal to, and on some regional and European matters slightly higher than, the level it had demonstrated on the eve of the Portuguese coup.

Several factors influenced the evolution of FRELIMO's policies, but one appeared consistently throughout the period from the coup to independence--FRELIMO's perceptions of other governments' policies. While the United States appeared interested in aiding independent Mozambique bilaterally, and sent an interlocutor who appeared to respect FRELIMO's views, the movement exhibited an interest in improving relations. When the United States was perceived to be shifting to a neo-colonial position regarding aid, and appointed an envoy viewed as an intelligence operative by most of Africa, FRELIMO rapidly lost interest in contacts with Washington. When Britain first exhibited cordial interest in FRELIMO, and then both criticised a FRELIMO enemy (Smith) and offered significant bilateral aid, relations swiftly warmed. Britain was the only country previously perceived as a supporter of colonialism to be invited to the independence celebrations.

Perception of the policies of Salisbury and Pretoria also shaped FRELIMO's attitudes towards its minority-ruled neighbours. When South Africa first refrained from supporting the September 1974 effort by

right-wing whites to stop independence and then showed a willingness to provide technical and economic services, FRELIMO was encouraged to continue the respectful attitude towards South African concerns that it had already adopted. When Salisbury appeared to be willing to negotiate on issues that FRELIMO cared about (i.e., majority rule in Rhodesia), FRELIMO was similarly willing to act with forbearance. When Rhodesia appeared to be planning to abandon those negotiations, FRELIMO became less respectful of Salisbury's concerns.

Although perception of other governments' policies played a prominent role in FRELIMO decision making, local economic and geographic realities were also important. FRELIMO realised that the young state of Mozambique would need to retain some economic ties with its minority-ruled neighbours, at least for the short term, in order to survive. Thus, shortly after independence plans were finalised, FRELIMO explored the possibility of reaching a modus vivendi with both governments.

In the South African case, this helped initiate a constructive cycle. South Africa, already interested in reaching out to black states as part of its détente strategy and aware that its economic ties with Mozambique gave it considerable leverage to protect its interests without use of force, was sufficiently reassured by FRELIMO's behaviour to embark on a policy of "consensual neo-colonisation" rather than coercion. FRELIMO, aware of Mozambique's economic dependence on South Africa, accepted and even encouraged the neo-colonisation overtures, which reassured South Africa still further. As the word "consensual" suggests, both sides accepted the neo-colonial arrangement.

FRELIMO's adoption of a more aggressive policy towards Rhodesia in part reflects that neighbour's lesser degree of economic integration with Mozambique. The more modest structural ties meant that it would have been harder for Salisbury than for Pretoria to "consensually neo-colonise" Mozambique, even if the former had decided to pursue that policy rather than backing out of its modus vivendi with FRELIMO. The neo-colonial instrument was available to Salisbury, but it would have been less effective, and in the event Salisbury chose not to use it.

The exploration of FRELIMO's relations with neighbouring minority regimes might appear superfluous to a discussion of FRELIMO relations with the West. However, as further explored in the next chapter, it was this FRELIMO attitude that partially conditioned Western governments' attitudes towards the movement. Western diplomats were anxious to protect regional stability. If FRELIMO had shown no flexibility regarding its

minority-ruled neighbours, and if the nature of Mozambique's economic structure had not provided South Africa the economic leverage with which to "consensually neo-colonise" Mozambique to protect its interests, Western attitudes towards FRELIMO would have been cooler.

It is also important to note that even when relations with a Western power were poor, neither side engaged in hostile acts against the other. For example, though FRELIMO and Washington distrusted each other, there was no substantive conflict, in sharp contrast to the Angola situation. This was due in part to South Africa's reluctance to aid any destabilisation effort, which deprived any hypothetical Western initiative of an easily accessible local base.

Additional important reasons for Western (and South African) disinterest in hostile actions were the strength of FRELIMO's guerrilla operations, the lack of internal factionalism within the movement, and the absence of a credible rival group. These three conditions forced Portugal to agree to the direct transfer of power in the Lusaka Accord. That accord (and particularly its rejection of elections as part of the transfer process), in turn, reduced opportunities for external intervention--there were no elections to tempt would-be foreign meddlers. The agreement also produced a unified government with no opposition legitimised by either international accords or strong electoral showing.

The Lusaka Accord was possible because of FRELIMO's strength, unity, and lack of credible opposition, and in turn reinforced those very characteristics. This shaped the choices available to those Western and regional governments uneasy with FRELIMO's rise to power. It deterred significant hostile action, which appeared to entail relatively high costs.

Finally, Mozambique's economic structure did not only contribute to the movement's co-optability by rendering it susceptible to "consensual neo-colonisation" by a tacit Western ally (South Africa). That structure also made FRELIMO realise that as an independent state Mozambique would find it challenging to attract capital and would be relatively highly dependent on foreign assistance. This prospect of aid dependence somewhat enhanced the movement's willingness to engage in dialogue with the West.

Because FRELIMO's co-optability was consistently influenced by the movement's perception of Western states' attitudes towards the future FRELIMO-ruled state of Mozambique, could the movement have been pushed to

a state of full co-optability if the West had behaved in a more friendly manner?

The history described in this and preceding chapters suggests that the answer is no. FRELIMO's ideology had been conditioned by a decade of experiences which convinced the leadership that: Marxism is a vital propaganda tool for mobilising the masses in favour of independence and national unity; the egalitarianism and re-distributive aspects of socialism are useful to some extent in soliciting grassroots support for the movement; Marxism is an essential part of the struggle against against the "commercial petty bourgeoisie" who challenged the leadership in the past and might again in the future; the major Western powers are willing to accommodate colonialism and racism in certain circumstances; and socialist countries are willing to assist African nationalist aspirations materially and morally. In light of these conclusions by the FRELIMO leadership, no amount of Western courting during the transition period could have turned FRELIMO into a pro-Western movement.

However, a more accommodating attitude by some Western powers could have caused FRELIMO to evolve to a more advanced state of partial co-optation. Had the United States offered significant bilateral aid, had Washington willingly contributed to the United Nations fund to help Mozambique bear the cost of Rhodesian sanctions, had U.S. educational scholarships and financial aid been under negotiation, and had an assistant secretary trusted by Africans been in office, FRELIMO would probably have treated the United States with more consideration. Given the less than optimal state of Soviet-FRELIMO relations, fear of Soviet irritation with a warming of U.S.-FRELIMO relations would probably not have dissuaded the movement's leadership from such actions. The gain from a U.S. co-optation effort would have been modest, but nonetheless significant.

CHAPTER 13
WASHINGTON'S CHOICE

U.S. policy evolved from indifference by top decision makers, which permitted lower-ranking officials to explore co-optation possibilities, to a policy of tentative and then vigorous coercion in Angola and semi-hostile neglect in Mozambique. Thus, when the two new independent countries were added to the map of the African continent, the United States had little influence over or communication with their governments.

Four primary factors affected U.S. decisions in this period. In descending order of importance, they are (1) the relationship with the rival superpower, (2) internal U.S. politics, (3) perception of coercion and/or co-optation opportunities presented by factionalism within and rivalries between nationalist groups, and (4) the policies of tacit U.S. allies.

THE 1974 TO 1975 CONTEXT

The two factors that most influenced U.S. policy--internal politics and the relationship with the Eastern bloc--were in flux in the 1974 to 1975 period.

Internal politics were recovering from the dual blows to national pride of Watergate and the withdrawal from Vietnam. These events produced a desire on the part of some politically influential constituencies and officials for the United States to reassert itself as a capable, vigorous world power. As Wright has noted,

...foreign policy was under assault by interests in the foreign policy establishment and the rising New Right.... These forces promoted a militant globalism, a position opposed to detente and the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT). They also wanted to pursue a unilateral foreign policy, implying non-consultation with U.S. allies, significantly increase military spending and actively confront the Soviet Union in the Third World.⁸⁵⁸

Watergate and Vietnam also created in the American people and in Congress a general distrust of the executive branch and the CIA, and an unwillingness to contemplate direct involvement in foreign conflicts perceived as marginal to U.S. interests. Another part of domestic politics that came into play at this time was the American people's profound distaste for South Africa and apartheid. Finally, "emergent Western European and Japanese business competition and OPEC quadrupling

⁸⁵⁸ Wright, op. cit., p. 59.

the price of oil" weakened the U.S. economy and eroded the nation's self confidence.⁸⁵⁹

Relations with the Eastern bloc were similarly shifting. The arms negotiations engineered by Nixon and Kissinger began to founder in early 1974. Kissinger remarked in his memoirs:

Whether it was Watergate that caused Moscow to put East-West negotiations into low gear in the spring of 1974, whether it was the general trend of our domestic debate, or whether both of those were used as a cover for decisions Moscow made for its own reasons cannot be established.... The fact is that during April 1974 Soviet conduct changed.... [N]egotiations stalemated.⁸⁶⁰

What Leonid Brezhnev needed, Kissinger added, was "an opposite number who could deliver. And that was exactly what Nixon more and more had lost the power to do".⁸⁶¹

Given Kissinger's belief that Moscow respected power and military strength over all else and that restraint allowed the Soviets to conclude that there was room for them to advance their interests,⁸⁶² the power vacuum created by the Watergate-Vietnam aftermath made him extremely sensitive to any evidence that the Soviet Union intended to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities. This, combined with Kissinger's belief that "we must resist marginal accretions of Soviet power even when the issues seem ambiguous",⁸⁶³ made the secretary of state, and the U.S. policy structure he dominated, hypersensitive to any evidence of Soviet "meddling" in Africa.

WAIT AND SEE (APRIL TO NOVEMBER 1974)

During the first seven months following the Portuguese coup, decisions affecting Portuguese colonies were left to mid-ranking officials. They explored a co-optation strategy regarding FRELIMO and opposed pressure for a coercion strategy regarding the MPLA. However, the coercive strategies that followed were foreshadowed in the growing tension within the U.S. government concerning Africa policy.

⁸⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 58.

⁸⁶⁰ Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 1153.

⁸⁶¹ Ibid., p. 1160.

⁸⁶² C. L. Sulzberger, The World and Richard Nixon (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1987), p. 193.

⁸⁶³ Kissinger, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

Three players were involved in the controversy: newly appointed Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Donald Easum, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and the CIA. Easum was a classic regionalist. He had extensive Africa experience and was respectful of African sensitivities. Kissinger knew little about the region, identified with NSSM 39's claim that "whites are here to stay", and was most concerned about possible Soviet efforts to exploit U.S. preoccupation with internal matters. The CIA shared Kissinger's views regarding Soviet intentions and was anxious to use its covert capabilities to limit Moscow's influence in Africa. The CIA-Kissinger versus Easum disagreement began as a conflict between globalist and regionalist perspectives, and evolved into a conflict between coercion and co-optation strategies.

Easum and Kissinger began to disagree even before the Portuguese coup. In early 1974, President Nixon had decided that the United States should be more forthcoming with Portugal, in order to consolidate NATO and create a favourable context for the pending renegotiation of the Azores base agreement. Kissinger therefore sought to modify the restrictions on arms sales to Portugal. When Easum discovered this plan, he expressed concern about its impact on African opinion, but found Kissinger unresponsive.⁸⁶⁴

U.S. policy continued to react to Portugal rather than Africa after the coup. On 12 June 1974, President Nixon met with Spínola in the Azores and expressed support for Portugal's decolonisation plans, which at this point still fell far short of the nationalists' demands. He also reportedly supported Spínola's view that Zaire might play a helpful role in Angola.⁸⁶⁵ Given Mobutu's known identification with the FNLA, this did not bode well for U.S. intentions regarding the MPLA.

Meanwhile, the CIA began to urge the Forty Committee, an advisory body of the National Security Council chaired by Kissinger, to authorise new covert activities in Angola.⁸⁶⁶ Easum adamantly opposed this and delayed paperwork necessary for a Forty Committee decision. Without that committee's approval, the CIA could only increase its intelligence

⁸⁶⁴ Witney Schneidman, American Foreign Policy and the Fall of the Portuguese Empire, 1961-1976, University of Southern California PhD thesis, 1987, p. 437.

⁸⁶⁵ António de Spínola, interview by Schneidman, op. cit., p. 351.

⁸⁶⁶ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 67.

retainer to Holden Roberto from \$15,000 to about \$25,000, which it did in July 1974.⁸⁶⁷

U.S. foreign policy was then disrupted by Nixon's August 1974 resignation in connection with the Watergate scandal. However, the event did not dilute Kissinger's influence, for Nixon's successor, President Ford, had a close relationship with the secretary of state. When it became clear in the autumn of 1974 that Portugal was going to quit both Mozambique and Angola, Kissinger's concern about the territories grew.

Easum, meanwhile, continued with his regionalist approach. His testimony to the U.S. Congress in early October 1974 summarises his perspective. He praised the "responsible and helpful attitude on the part of African nations" concerning decolonisation, and said that credit for the "significant developments" should also go the "individual liberation movements themselves and their leaders". He analysed the differences between the nationalist movements in Angola primarily in ethnic rather than ideological terms, described the MPLA as influenced by "European socialism", not mentioning the Soviet Union. When asked about whether the MPLA would nationalise U.S. firms, he said that it was far too early to predict what policies the movement would adopt. He added that the United States was looking forward to establishing "mutually beneficial relations with each of the... emerging Portuguese-speaking African states" and reported that a working group of U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) and Department of State officials had been established "to study ways in which we might respond to requests for... assistance". He also revealed that the United States had recently provided a small amount of emergency assistance "to help alleviate the dislocation" due to the revolt in Lourenço Marques.⁸⁶⁸

Shortly after testifying, Easum left for a tour of southern Africa. The frame of mind revealed by Easum's remarks to the U.S. Congress helps explain why his meetings with Machel, Chissano, and Neto during the trip were so cordial. As noted earlier, the main result of his trip was the agreement to send an AID team to Mozambique to explore assistance possibilities.

⁸⁶⁷ Schneidman, op. cit., p. 442.

⁸⁶⁸ Testimony of Donald Easum, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, The Complex of United States-Portuguese Relations: Before and After the Coup, op. cit., pp. 92-95.

The CIA, meanwhile, was preoccupied with Angola and urged the Forty Committee both to increase funding for Roberto by a factor of ten and to deliver the cash in one lump sum. The agency said that the funds were needed to purchase information from the FNLA and to enable the movement to buy sound trucks and other propaganda items. Kissinger, who had previously paid little attention to the issue, now began to side with the CIA. He was increasingly worried by the expanding role of the Communist Party in the Portuguese government.⁸⁶⁹ The 28 September resignation of Spínola and the formation of a left-inclined government under Costa Gomes and Vasco Gonçalves, with Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) participation, pushed his anxiety to a new high, particularly as the PCP had closer links to the Soviet Union than did most European communist parties.

Before leaving for Africa, Easum rejected the CIA proposal. He said that purchased information is inherently suspect, such a payment would favour one group over the others, and provision of a lump sum was unwise. While in southern Africa, Easum was inundated with CIA requests that he reconsider his objections.⁸⁷⁰

Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the April-November 1974 period was the timing of the CIA decision to ask for an aid increase for the FNLA. This occurred in June and July 1974, before the first, unconfirmed August reports of renewed Soviet aid to the MPLA. (See chapter 11.) Thus, the CIA's aid request was not a response to a Soviet action, but was in anticipation of increased Soviet aid to the MPLA.

THE DEBATE INTENSIFIES (NOVEMBER 1974 TO JULY 1975)

The simmering debate within the U.S. government over Mozambique and Angola escalated sharply during the first half of 1975, and the regionalists steadily lost ground to the globalists. The fledgling co-optation effort in Mozambique stalled, and the officials favouring coercion in Angola finally prevailed in mid-year.

The first sign that policy was entering a new era was Kissinger's 25 November decision to fire Donald Easum. Kissinger focussed on the Soviet Union's intentions in southern Africa, whereas Easum focussed on local conditions. Kissinger wanted someone who saw Africa through the same East-West prism as himself, and Easum clearly was not that person.

⁸⁶⁹ Schneidman, op. cit., p. 354

⁸⁷⁰ Easum, interview.

The departure of Easum was a crucial turning point for both U.S. policy and African perception of that policy. The study team Easum had promised to send to Mozambique was delayed, causing the previously described puzzlement in FRELIMO about U.S. intentions. Even more important, Easum's removal cleared the way for the CIA to increase funding for the FNLA and UNITA. Before leaving his office for the last time, Easum placed the CIA proposal upon his desk with a note to his deputy, Ed Mulcahy, who was due to take over as interim assistant secretary for Africa, saying that implementation of the CIA proposal seemed inevitable.⁸⁷¹

Mulcahy endorsed the proposal, and on 22 January the Forty Committee considered the aid request. CIA Africa division chief Jim Potts said that the agency had evidence that the Soviet Union was shipping weapons to the MPLA through Congo-Brazzaville, remarked "it was clear that Neto wasn't our man", and added that CIA support for Roberto and Savimbi would be "token" and give Washington leverage with the likely future rulers of Angola. Potts also highlighted Mobutu's alarm about developments in Angola.⁸⁷²

The intelligence regarding arms supplies, combined with Kissinger's growing concern about Soviet intentions in Portugal, guaranteed the secretary of state's support for the proposal. The Forty Committee authorised the CIA to provide \$300,000 to the FNLA, though it turned down a request for \$100,000 for UNITA.⁸⁷³ The Forty Committee intended the FNLA support, small by U.S. terms, to be used for "political" purposes.

The aid decision, made exactly one week after the Alvor Accord was signed, did not remain secret for long. What was a token amount in Washington represented significant cash in Luanda. Roberto's immediate purchase of a Luanda newspaper, a television station, and vehicles led many observers, including the MPLA, to assume that funds were coming from the United States. When Roberto moved his forces from Zaire into northern Angola shortly after the aid was received, that manoeuvre also appeared to be U.S. financed.

⁸⁷¹ Easum, interview

⁸⁷² Schneidman, op. cit., p. 443.

⁸⁷³ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 68.

Kissinger's decision regarding Easum's successor further illustrated his disregard for African opinion and lack of interest in co-optation efforts in either Mozambique or Angola. As noted in chapters 11 and 12, Kissinger could hardly have selected an individual more likely to offend African opinion than Nathaniel Davis. Because most African leaders believed that Davis had helped the CIA overthrow Chile's President Salvador Allende during his 1971 to 1973 term as ambassador to that South American country, Davis was viewed as a CIA "tool".

However, if Kissinger thought that by selecting Davis he chose a supporter of covert activities, he erred. Senator Joseph Biden asked Davis in his confirmation hearing if the nominee foresaw "circumstances in which you would recommend... use of CIA covert activities... in Angola, Mozambique or any other African country?" Davis replied, "I do not foresee such circumstances".⁸⁷⁴ Subsequent events proved that Davis meant what he said. Kissinger alienated African opinion without obtaining an obedient assistant secretary. Davis opposed covert intervention in Angola as Easum had, with just as little success.

Davis was not alone. The Angola desk officer at the CIA, Brenda MacElhinney, opposed the 22 January decision and did not believe that the MPLA was inherently hostile to the United States. She called for condemnation of outside interference and establishment of ties with all three movements.⁸⁷⁵

The U.S. consulate in Luanda was also divided. The consul general had good relations with the MPLA representatives, was impressed with their educational credentials, and believed them capable of ruling a united Angola.⁸⁷⁶ Perhaps because of this, the CIA did not inform him of the 22 January Forty Committee decision. Two of the consulate's top staffers, Ed Fugit and Bruce Porter, had a different perspective. They travelled in the countryside more than the consul and were aware of the ethnic and other social tensions underlying the competition between the three Alvor signatories. They feared that the situation would deteriorate into civil war and were far more prone than the consul to suspect the Soviets of covertly assisting the MPLA. The consul was increasingly

⁸⁷⁴ Testimony of Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary of State-Designate, Nomination of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, op. cit., p. 83.

⁸⁷⁵ Stockwell, op. cit., pp. 64, 69-70.

⁸⁷⁶ Source five, interview.

isolated, and Kissinger relied heavily on the reports of these staffers. Indeed, Fugit wrote the crucial passages of some of Kissinger's speeches.⁸⁷⁷

U.S. concern about Angola escalated through the spring of 1975 as the FNLA's military fortunes deteriorated. Initially, the FNLA had dominated the MPLA. However, in March the MPLA received additional Soviet equipment and began to fight back. This, combined with yet another leftward shift of the Portuguese government in March 1975 following Spínola's failed coup attempt, highly alarmed both Kissinger and the CIA.

The increasing level of violence in Angola began to concern the country's African neighbours acutely. In April, the presidents of Botswana, Zambia, and Tanzania met and reportedly decided to back Savimbi as the leader for a government of national unity.⁸⁷⁸ When Zambia's President Kaunda met with President Ford in Washington on 19 April,⁸⁷⁹ he conveyed his concern about the danger of large-scale Soviet intervention and his favourable impression of Savimbi.⁸⁸⁰ Some analysts believe that he also urged Ford and Kissinger to aid UNITA and the FNLA.⁸⁸¹

The MPLA's successful campaign to expel the FNLA and UNITA from Luanda, and the June arrival of Cuban advisers at MPLA camps in Angola, all set off more alarm bells. The United States concluded that "the MPLA had decided it could not win an election, and had opted for a military solution".⁸⁸² The possibility that the MPLA, which even Kissinger's advisers acknowledged suffered terribly at the hands of FNLA soldiers from February to May 1974,⁸⁸³ believed that its rival was intent upon such a military victory and could count on U.S. support for the effort, apparently was not considered.

An individual close to Kissinger at this crucial point in mid-1975 described the Secretary of State's attitude as follows.

⁸⁷⁷ Source five, interview.

⁸⁷⁸ Legum and Hodges, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁸⁷⁹ Nathaniel Davis, testimony, U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

⁸⁸⁰ Marcum, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

⁸⁸¹ Bridgland, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

⁸⁸² Source five, interview.

⁸⁸³ *Ibid.*

Kissinger's theory was that you don't talk tough to the Soviets until you have a bargaining chip--something on the ground. Then you can bargain for simultaneous withdrawal. The Saigon experience conditioned Kissinger's psyche. He did not want the U.S. to be further humiliated.⁸⁸⁴

This was a reference to the 30 April 1975 capture of Saigon by the North Vietnamese army, which discredited the U.S. claim that its withdrawal from Vietnam a year earlier had brought "peace with honor".⁸⁸⁵ Again, Washington did not seriously explore the possibility that in the process of creating that "bargaining chip" on "the ground", the United States might contribute to suspicions within the MPLA and its allies that the United States was planning to install the FNLA in power by force.

It was in this atmosphere that the National Security Council met on 27 June 1975 and requested that the CIA prepare an options paper on Angola. The swiftly prepared paper noted that the CIA understood that Kissinger wanted a \$14 million programme, that Assistant Secretary Nathaniel Davis opposed any covert programme in Angola, and that the special assistant to Kissinger, Sheldon Vance, favoured the operation because it would improve recently strained relations with Zaire's President Mobutu. (In June 1975, Mobutu had accused the United States of complicity in a coup attempt, expelled U.S. Ambassador Dean Hinton, and arrested most of the CIA's Zairean agents.⁸⁸⁶)

The CIA paper listed four options--limited financial support for political activity, a \$6 million programme, a \$14 million programme, and a \$40 million programme.⁸⁸⁷ On 16 July, President Ford approved the expenditure of \$6 million in financial aid and arms shipments for the FNLA. Eleven days later, he authorised an additional \$8 million for arms and aircraft, bringing the total up to Kissinger's figure of \$14 million. Though these decisions were secret, the administration also made a public request for Congress to provide Zaire with \$79 million in emergency aid. On 29 July, the first planeload of arms left the United States for Africa.⁸⁸⁸

⁸⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁸⁵ Sulzberger, op. cit., p. 119.

⁸⁸⁶ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 39.

⁸⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 52.

⁸⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 53.

The funds were not officially supposed to be spent on installing the FNLA in power, but rather on preventing a "cheap Neto victory".⁸⁸⁹ Former CIA Angola Task Force leader John Stockwell says that a CIA superior, Carl Bantam, explained the decision as follows:

Kissinger would like to win.... [H]e would like to stop the Soviets cold. But he knows that we can't get that kind of program through Congress.... [I]t would take a special appropriation.... So instead we are being asked to harass the Soviets, to... "prevent an easy victory by communist-backed forces in Angola".⁸⁹⁰

The July decisions were vigorously opposed by many Department of State personnel, including Davis, who favoured using diplomatic and political tools. They believed that the covert plan risked confrontation with the Soviet Union, and would commit U.S. resources and prestige in a situation where the outcome was uncertain. They urged President Ford to approach the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels, work through the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, and consult with Tanzania, Zaire, and Zambia to reduce the arms flow into Angola.⁸⁹¹ Ironically, this was exactly the policy the MPLA's Lúcio Lára was advocating at the time. (See chapter 11.) Davis fought vigorously for the Department of State point of view, prompting Kissinger to recall in his memoirs, "...[I]n 1975 the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of Africa managed to delay my dealing with Angola for nearly ten weeks because he opposed the decision he feared I would make".⁸⁹² Davis reacted to the July decision by quietly resigning and accepting a new assignment as ambassador to Switzerland.

A Washington power battle concerning Somalia also influenced Kissinger's thinking. In early June, a Kissinger rival, Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger, told a closed Senate hearing that the Soviets were placing missile sites in Somalia. The testimony leaked. Rumours followed that Schlesinger was dissatisfied with Kissinger's reluctance to contest Soviet encroachment and was trying to organise support among the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a more vigorous policy towards the Soviet Union.⁸⁹³ Schlesinger was allied with the previously mentioned "New Right"

⁸⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 50.

⁸⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 41.

⁸⁹¹ Schneidman, op. cit., p. 450.

⁸⁹² Kissinger, op. cit., p. 440.

⁸⁹³ Schneidman, op. cit., p. 452.

which wished to "actively confront" the Soviet Union.⁸⁹⁴ To rebut Schlesinger's allegations, Kissinger needed to prove that he could stand up to the Soviets.

Nowhere in Kissinger's memoirs or interviews does he discuss the policies of the MPLA, or even evince any familiarity with those policies. The MPLA's strong hints that it would aid the ANC and SWAPO, positions that Kissinger might logically find objectionable, were never mentioned. Nor did Kissinger remark upon the possibility of MPLA nationalisation of U.S. investments. As Stockwell later remarked, "[O]ur knowledge of the MPLA was nil. Almost no information was produced by the clandestine services about MPLA armies, leadership, or objectives".⁸⁹⁵ The MPLA's policies seemed irrelevant to Kissinger, except to the extent that they attracted Soviet support.

The irrelevancy of a nationalist movement's Marxism, and the relevancy of its susceptibility to "Soviet influence", is nicely illustrated by Kissinger's contrasting policy regarding Mozambique. FRELIMO's independence declaration and constitution were just as Marxist as the MPLA's rhetoric, albeit at times more tactfully presented. Yet Kissinger did not pursue a coercion policy in Mozambique. Instead, as he himself noted in December 1975, "We accepted in Mozambique a pro-Marxist faction that came to power by indigenous means, or perhaps with some minimum outside support in the FRELIMO [sic]".⁸⁹⁶ The fact that FRELIMO was on good terms with Moscow's arch-rival, Beijing, reassured Kissinger still further.

Although Kissinger's perception that there was no Soviet challenge to U.S. power in Mozambique was the dominant reason for his hands-off policy, it was probably not the sole reason. The fact that, unlike Angola, Mozambique featured no credible alternative to the radical contender for power, and thus the opportunity for intervention was reduced, also must have been considered. FRELIMO's ability to reach a modus vivendi with South Africa in the weeks just before independence was also relevant.

The fairly neutral U.S. policy on FRELIMO was reflected in Davis's testimony to Congress just before Mozambique's independence in June 1975.

⁸⁹⁴ Wright, op. cit., p. 59.

⁸⁹⁵ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 187.

⁸⁹⁶ Times (London, United Kingdom), 24 December 1975.

(Whereas Davis's views on Angola did not reflect U.S. policy, his views on Mozambique generally did.) Davis said:

[W]e are now looking forward to a cooperative relationship with the new Mozambique.... Its leaders are already participating in efforts to seek a solution to the problem of Rhodesia.... [There is] every prospect that Mozambique will regard itself as a nonaligned country.... I do not think that one should assume automatically that the Government of Mozambique is going to rush into extensive arrangements with the Soviet Union.⁸⁹⁷

The fact that FRELIMO's rise to power in Mozambique was not judged symbolic of Soviet encroachment, and thus did not require U.S. intervention, did not, however, imply any support for Easum's co-optation approach. Davis did not try to establish personal rapport with FRELIMO leaders and made no effort to assuage FRELIMO's dismay about Easum's removal. By refusing to contemplate a U.S. contribution to the United Nations fund being established to help soon-to-be-independent Mozambique cope with the economic hardship of imposing sanctions on Rhodesia, Davis and the United States missed an opportunity to reinvigorate the previous co-optation strategy. Senator Dick Clark identified the crucial issue when he queried Davis on the United Nations Fund decision,

... [B]ecause of our policies toward FRELIMO in the past... there is a natural reluctance on the part of the FRELIMO party to be eager to accept aid from the United States. But certainly they are going to be interested... in accepting aid through the United Nations.⁸⁹⁸

Clark correctly judged that because of the history of U.S.-FRELIMO antipathy, any improvement in relations would have to start with a U.S. overture towards the Mozambican party. Davis did not fight for such an overture, possibly because he had his hands full trying to forestall U.S. covert intervention in Angola.

THE COERCION ATTEMPT (JULY TO NOVEMBER 1975)

In the period between the July intervention decision and the independence of Angola in November, U.S. policy was again influenced by domestic politics and Eastern bloc actions. For the first time since the Portuguese coup, it was also affected by South Africa, which gradually became a tacit ally. The net result was that the Angola coercion effort

⁸⁹⁷ Nathaniel Davis, testimony, U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, op. cit., pp. 51-65.

⁸⁹⁸ Statement of Senator Dick Clark, U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

became more vigorous, but not sufficiently energetic to prevent the MPLA from declaring itself the government of Angola on 11 November.

Within five weeks of the original aid decision, the CIA pushed for an increase in funding. The number of Cuban advisers to the MPLA was rising; the MPLA was fighting effectively and retaking territory from the FNLA. On 20 August, President Ford authorised expenditure of an additional \$10.7 million for the purchase of arms and ammunition, and to pay the salaries of mercenaries. This brought the total authorised to date to \$24.7 million.⁸⁹⁹ For the first time, UNITA was included as a beneficiary.

The decision to include UNITA may have been influenced by South Africa's August decision to set up training camps in southern Angola both for Daniel Chipenda's wing of the FNLA and for UNITA.⁹⁰⁰ A South African military official present when the decision was made subsequently explained:

We had a request from these movements for aid, and we decided to expend a relatively small sum initially. The decision was taken in an informal setting... not at the centre of the government. It was made without a great deal of thought regarding the consequences. Our intuitive feeling was that we should have the most friendly power possible on that border, but there was no clear-cut policy. The opposition by the Department of Foreign Affairs to any change in our previous policy of not getting involved beyond our borders, combined with the lack of direction from the centre, meant we were somewhat ambivalent about the decision initially.⁹⁰¹

South Africa's decision that the MPLA would not be a friendly government was realistic. Shortly after the MPLA opened its office in Luanda, South Africa's consular officials had officially requested a meeting with MPLA leaders to discuss the movement's future policy regarding Pretoria. The MPLA had turned down the request.⁹⁰² This action, combined with the MPLA's public pledge to aid SWAPO and the ANC, all substantiated South Africa's conclusion.

According to the official involved in the decision, South Africa was not reacting to Cuban involvement at this point. South Africa was aware of the presence of Cuban advisers for the MPLA, but was not

⁸⁹⁹ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 166.

⁹⁰⁰ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 269.

⁹⁰¹ Source ten, confidential interview by author, Pretoria, South Africa, 12 December 1985.

⁹⁰² Ibid.

anticipating any major escalation of Cuban involvement, and certainly not the intervention of Cuban combat troops.⁹⁰³

The South African decision to become actively involved in Angola soon manifested itself in the South African Defence Force's August 9 move from the Ruacana Falls just inside the Angolan border, a position they had occupied in June 1975,⁹⁰⁴ to the Cunene-Ruacana hydroelectric project several miles deeper inside Angola.⁹⁰⁵

According to Stockwell, the CIA admired South African efficiency, welcomed Pretoria's involvement in the war, and considered shipping arms to U.S. nationalist allies via the South African-controlled port of Walvis Bay. Department of State personnel, in particular Mulcahy, who following Davis's resignation again found himself taking a leading role in Angola policy, threatened to resign in protest if the United States established a formal liaison with South Africa.⁹⁰⁶ The idea of creating a supply route to the nationalists via South Africa was then dropped.

In September, the South African instructors arrived at the UNITA and Chipenda/FNLA camps in southern Angola, and South African troops moved further into Angola.⁹⁰⁷ According to the South African military source:

We found that our new allies were totally disorganised. They could not utilise cash, so we provided arms. They could not use the arms, so we sent in officers to train them to use the arms. The training process was too slow, so we handled the weapons ourselves. We got pulled in gradually, needing to commit ourselves more if the past commitment was not to be wasted.⁹⁰⁸

In mid-September, Zaire sent additional troops into Angola to aid the FNLA, and the joint force cautiously advanced on Luanda. Late in the month, Cuban ships carrying a modest shipment of heavy Cuban arms and a few hundred Cuban soldiers arrived in Angola and neighbouring Congo-Brazzaville.⁹⁰⁹

⁹⁰³ Ibid.

⁹⁰⁴ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 268.

⁹⁰⁵ Ibid., p. 269.

⁹⁰⁶ Stockwell, op. cit., pp. 193, 196, 197.

⁹⁰⁷ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 269.

⁹⁰⁸ Source ten, interview.

⁹⁰⁹ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 273.

U.S. lack of interest in any alternative to the coercion strategy was also illustrated in September and October. According to Stockwell, in September Savimbi sent a message to the MPLA expressing interest in a peace deal. When the CIA discovered the move, it scolded Savimbi, saying that the United States wanted no "soft" allies.⁹¹⁰ Similarly, in October an MPLA delegation came to Washington to plead the MPLA's potential friendliness towards the United States, and was rebuffed.⁹¹¹

In October and early November, all forces engaged in the Angola conflict, including the United States, became involved in an intense effort to get to Luanda before 11 November. As described in more detail in chapter 11, on 14 October Pretoria mounted Operation Zulu, sending a major force, including South African troops, north towards key provincial capitals and Luanda. Simultaneously, the CIA sent in arms to support a Mobutu plan to encourage the secession of Cabinda, and CIA personnel began to "coordinate" with the Cabindan independence movement, FLEC.⁹¹² On 5 November, Cuba's Communist Party Central Committee officially authorised the dispatch of combat troops to Angola, and on 8 November a battalion arrived by plane in Luanda. The Cuban soldiers immediately entered battle against the FNLA-Zairean forces approaching the capital, using equipment supplied by the Soviet Union. On 11 November, the MPLA declared itself the government of Angola.

Why was the United States unable to prevent this from happening? A large part of the explanation can be found in the U.S. domestic political climate. The intervention was being kept secret from the American people, who, due to the Watergate and Vietnam experience, were unlikely to approve of the policy. In addition, as the Angola battles escalated, so did the congressional investigation into CIA assassinations and secret drug experiments on U.S. citizens. This made the incentive to keep the Angola operation quiet even greater. Secrecy places certain limits on a military operation. For example, the Forty Committee would not authorise supply of high-technology equipment to the FNLA and UNITA because this would be concrete evidence of U.S. involvement.⁹¹³ In addition, the United States refrained from using the most direct route to get supplies to the

⁹¹⁰ Stockwell, op. cit., p. 200.

⁹¹¹ Ibid.

⁹¹² Ibid., p. 169.

⁹¹³ Ibid., p. 188.

anti-MPLA forces in southern Angola, via the Pretoria-controlled port of Walvis Bay in Namibia, due to Mulcahy's threat to resign in protest. If U.S. public opinion had not been concerned about apartheid, such a resignation threat would have been ineffectual, and the efficient delivery route could have been used.

Although the events following 11 November 1975 are beyond the scope of this study, it is noteworthy that the same domestic political concerns about South African and CIA "adventurism" that hampered the pre-independence coercion effort subsequently forced the United States to abandon the effort altogether shortly after independence. The mid-November revelation of the South African role, and the congressional conclusion that the CIA had misled the oversight committees regarding the extent of the Angola operation, provoked intense public criticism, and by early 1976 the coercion effort was doomed.

SUMMARY

The foregoing chronology shows that U.S. policy on Mozambique and Angola in the period between the Portuguese coup and the respective colonies' independence ceremonies was most influenced by U.S. relations with the Eastern bloc and internal U.S. politics. MPLA and FRELIMO policies only had a significant impact upon U.S. policy to the extent that those policies attracted or repelled Soviet support. They otherwise played a very small role in U.S. decision making.

The critical importance of relations with the Soviet Union is illustrated by the different attitudes that Kissinger adopted towards the respective nationalist movements. Kissinger believed that the United States had to stop the MPLA not primarily because the MPLA was viewed as Marxist, pro-ANC, or anti-United States, but because the Soviet Union was perceived to have a close relationship with the movement, and the MPLA's victory would therefore represent a symbolic Soviet victory. Kissinger was less concerned about FRELIMO coming to power in Mozambique not because FRELIMO was judged to be less Marxist, but because FRELIMO's more arms-length relationship with Moscow and its cordial relations with Beijing meant that a FRELIMO victory was not seen to represent a major expansion of the Soviet Union's influence.

Domestic factors played a role in both encouraging and limiting U.S. pursuit of the coercion policy in Angola. The domestic repercussions from the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal made Kissinger and the CIA desire to prove U.S. vigour as a superpower. A coercion strategy served

that goal, while a co-optation strategy did not. Simultaneously, however, the Vietnam and Watergate issues made the U.S. public distrust the executive branch and feel uneasy about foreign intervention. The congressional investigation of CIA misdeeds, which gathered momentum in the final months before Angolan independence, exacerbated that distrust. Thus, the coercion strategy was adopted, satisfying Kissinger's desire for the United States to demonstrate resolve, but was limited due to fear of public reaction.

Domestic factors also played a lesser, but still important, role in U.S. policy towards Mozambique. The decision to abandon the tentative co-optation effort briefly explored after the Portuguese coup was related first to the Department of State staff change, which in turn was related to the domestic politics concerning Angola, and subsequently to the monopolisation of government attention by that sister colony. Because pre-coup FRELIMO-U.S. antipathy meant that FRELIMO was waiting for the first overture to come from the United States, Washington's fixation on Angola and lack of attention to Mozambique meant that the co-optation effort died from neglect.

The U.S. perception of rivalries between and factionalism within the respective nationalist movements also influenced policy. The fact that there were three credible movements in Angola, and only one in Mozambique, meant there was an obvious U.S. intervention opportunity in Angola, whereas the opportunity in Mozambique was more limited.

The policies of tacit allies were also significant. South Africa's Angola intervention encouraged the United States to escalate the coercion strategy, and Pretoria's restrained policy regarding FRELIMO discouraged the United States from pursuing such a strategy in Mozambique. The policy of South Africa was, in turn, partially influenced by the policies of the nationalists. FRELIMO's efforts to reach an understanding with South Africa partly accounted for Pretoria's non-intervention policy. Angola's confrontational attitude towards South Africa partly accounted for Pretoria's hostile reaction.

The attitude of another tacit ally, Zaire, also influenced Washington's thinking. Zaire's close ties with an MPLA rival made a U.S. coercion strategy in Angola both politically and operationally convenient. In contrast, Zaire had no border with and little interest in Mozambique.

To recap, during this period Washington's primary interests in Angola and Mozambique were: to discourage establishment of

communist/socialist systems, especially if the leaders of such were allied with the Soviet Union; to ensure ongoing access to the Azores base (with a lesser but still significant interest in strategically located port facilities in Mozambique and Angola); to ensure actions regarding the territories placated domestic critics, (who on balance were urging a more muscular policy regarding the Soviet Union); to strengthen traditional alliances with various actors participating in the Angola and Mozambican events (particularly Portugal); and, to protect ties with neighbouring African states (particularly Zaire). The interest in ensuring access to markets, though a long term consideration, did not significantly influence policy at this time. In sum, U.S. interests in Mozambique and Angola were primarily related to the manner in which events in these territories influenced other regional and global interests. U.S. interests in the territories themselves were quite modest.

Was there anything the MPLA could have done during this period to persuade the United States to abandon the coercion effort? Was there any course of action open to FRELIMO that could have either enticed the United States to restart the co-optation effort or provoked Washington into adopting a coercion strategy?

The answer seems to be that only policy shifts that altered a movement's perceived relationship with the Soviet Union, and therefore changed the symbolic implication of its victory for U.S. status, would have significantly changed U.S. policy. All other changes in MPLA and FRELIMO policy would have had only a limited impact upon U.S. strategy.

An MPLA shift to a more arms-length relationship with the socialist countries, similar to that of FRELIMO, was perhaps possible immediately after the Portuguese coup, when aid from Moscow was still suspended. The subsequent U.S., Zairean, Chinese, and South African decisions to back the MPLA's rivals, however, ensured that the MPLA would quickly mend its fences with the Soviet Union. The MPLA could have simply decided not to turn to Moscow. However, decisions taken by other outside powers, as described in chapter 11, created a context in which that policy was tantamount to suicide. The only policy decision that the MPLA could have taken with any hope of influencing U.S. policy, then, would probably have led to its destruction. Even if the United States had responded to such a hypothetical backing-away from the Eastern bloc by ceasing coercive action, it is unlikely that Zaire, China, or South Africa would have followed suit. Without help from Havana and Moscow, the

MPLA would have been extremely vulnerable militarily. An MPLA decision to distance itself from the Soviet Union was therefore not a plausible option.

Non-suicidal MPLA policy changes, such as a less confrontational attitude towards South Africa, might have made Pretoria less enthusiastic about intervention, and thereby deprived the United States of a tacit ally, but it would not have halted the coercion strategy altogether. Firmer guarantees about the security of Western investments, or advocacy of a mixed economy, would have made the task of the anti-coercion forces within the U.S. government easier, but also would not have had a significant impact on U.S. policy. Only if such MPLA policies had caused the Soviet Union to abandon the MPLA would the changes have had a significant impact upon U.S. decisions.

Plausible FRELIMO policy changes could have influenced U.S. strategy more, but it is unlikely that they could have decisively shifted Kissinger's views. If FRELIMO had energetically pursued the United States, rather than waiting for Washington to approach it, the movement could possibly have elicited support from Davis for continuation of the Easum co-optation effort. However, Washington's fixation on Angola would still have forced pro-co-optation diplomats to fight an uphill battle. On the other hand, if FRELIMO had adopted even more anti-Western policies and embraced more anti-capitalist rhetoric, it probably would not have prompted the United States to pursue a coercion effort. Only if FRELIMO had taken actions that caused it to be firmly identified as a Soviet "client" whose rise to power would represent enlargement of Moscow's influence might a coercion strategy have been contemplated.

In sum, the main factors shaping U.S. policy towards the MPLA and FRELIMO in this period were either beyond the control of the nationalists or susceptible to influence only at the price of self-destruction. U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and U.S. domestic politics were the critical issues, and neither was easily influenced by either movement. Any plausible policy shift that did not leave the movement vulnerable to military elimination would have had only a marginal impact upon U.S. policy.

CHAPTER 14
EUROPE'S SELECTIVE APPROACH

The European countries responded to the independence processes in a variety of ways. Some aided the U.S. coercion policy in Angola and ignored Mozambique, while others launched or continued vigorous co-optation policies in Mozambique and leaned towards neutrality in Angola. The European countries tended to be less concerned about the situation in Angola than was the United States, and when they did aid the coercion strategy, they did so in relatively modest ways.

The same factors that influenced U.S. policy (superpower rivalry, domestic politics, the policies of tacit allies, and perception of nationalist factionalism) affected European decision making. However, their relative weight varied. In general, the European governments ascribed less importance to superpower rivalry. Also, unlike the situation in the United States, domestic politics in Europe were not suffering from the twin shocks of foreign humiliation and domestic scandal, and consequently were less volatile.

Two additional factors, which played modest roles or were entirely irrelevant in U.S. decision making, were quite important for several European states. These were: (1) the level of a state's economic and cultural interests in both the disputed territories and their neighbours, and (2) the perception of nationalist policies, especially to the extent that they influenced the aforementioned interests.

UNITED KINGDOM

Of Washington's close allies, the United Kingdom's policies diverged most from those of the United States in the immediate pre-independence period. Britain pursued a vigorous co-optation policy in Mozambique and remained largely aloof from the U.S. coercion strategy in Angola.

Britain's Mozambique policy was primarily driven by its interests in the states neighbouring that territory and by the desire of the newly elected Labour Party to enhance relations with the Commonwealth, which it believed the previous Conservative government had neglected. Policy regarding the Portuguese territories was therefore conditioned by London's interest in obtaining Third World support for a new international agenda. The fact that FRELIMO's evolving policies appeared not to threaten, and perhaps even to further, British interests in neighbouring states was also important, as was Labour's tendency to be

less concerned about East-West rivalry than either the Conservative Party or Washington.

A high-ranking British diplomat aptly summarised the United Kingdom's attitude in the period immediately after the coup:

We were most concerned about the effect events in the Portuguese territories might have upon neighbouring ex-British colonies. We have cultural and historical ties with these Anglophone states, as well as considerable economic interests. The United States, in contrast, worried more about geopolitical and strategic issues relating to Soviet influence.⁹¹⁴

Of all the territories neighbouring the Lusophone states, Britain was most concerned about its rebellious colony of Rhodesia. Whereas prior to the Lisbon coup FRELIMO's aid for ZANU and Portugal's efforts to hinder ZANU infiltration made an anti-FRELIMO, pro-Portugal policy appear logical, the prospect of Mozambican independence under a FRELIMO government made such a policy untenable. Even if the domestic situation had not led to a Labour victory in early 1974, Britain would have had to adjust its policy.

Also, since shortly after Rhodesia's 1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence Britain had maintained a costly naval patrol off the Mozambican coast to deter use of the Beira pipeline to ship oil to the Rhodesian refinery at Umtali.⁹¹⁵ Now that FRELIMO appeared likely to control this key transportation route, it was in London's interest to explore new collaboration that might increase the effectiveness and reduce the cost of efforts to prevent sanctions-busting via Beira.

Thus, as described in chapter 12, shortly after the FRELIMO-dominated Transitional Government took office in September 1974, British envoys met with FRELIMO representatives in Dar es Salaam.⁹¹⁶ Through these discussions, and observation of FRELIMO's public statements, Britain became aware that FRELIMO's policies did not threaten British interests in neighbouring states. It appeared likely that FRELIMO would be respectful towards South Africa, enjoy good to excellent relations with black-ruled ex-British colonies (Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, and Swaziland), and facilitate, within limits, a peaceful solution in Rhodesia. FRELIMO's skilful handling of the September 1974 right-wing backlash and related unrest also suggested that the movement was able to

⁹¹⁴ Rifkind, interview.

⁹¹⁵ Meredith, op. cit., p. 58.

⁹¹⁶ Rifkind, interview. De Bragança, interview.

defuse domestic conflict and maintain stability within Mozambique. All these elements boded well for Britain's fortunes in neighbouring states. Britain also became aware that most Commonwealth states were on excellent terms with FRELIMO and would consider aid to the movement proof of a new British attitude towards colonialism and minority rule.

Consequently, British policy shifted from exploratory contacts to vigorous engagement. In May 1975, Britain's Minister of Overseas Development, Judith Hart, met Machel in Dar es Salaam and discussed the possibility of the United Kingdom providing major financial assistance to help Mozambique cope with the cost of imposing sanctions on Rhodesia.⁹¹⁷ During the same month, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan promised to help Mozambique raise assistance elsewhere in the world.⁹¹⁸ The increasingly warm relationship was then reflected in FRELIMO's decision to invite Britain to the 25 June 1975 independence ceremonies, making the United Kingdom the only non-Scandinavian Western country invited besides Portugal.⁹¹⁹

Britain's policy on Angola was more ambivalent, for several reasons. The United Kingdom had fewer ties with the states neighbouring Angola and thus less incentive to involve itself in Angolan matters. Zambia was the only ex-British colony that shared a border with Angola. Its government slightly favoured UNITA just before independence, but was also on cordial terms with the MPLA. Zambia's main concern was to ensure that the Benguela railroad kept operating. Following the closure of the southern Africa rail route in 1965 after Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence and the imposition of international sanctions, the Benguela railroad had become a critical route for transporting landlocked Zambia's copper exports and manufactured goods imports. (The Benguela railroad links with Zambia's rail system and then crosses through Zaire to the Angolan coast.) Thus, Britain's main Angola-relevant interest in Zambia was maintenance of safe transportation, so coercion that might exacerbate conflict did not seem advisable.

The other ex-British territory in the vicinity, Botswana, was separated from Angola by a thin sliver of Namibian territory and had few

⁹¹⁷ Martin and Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

⁹¹⁸ "Sweden ready to help Mozambique", Daily News (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania), 19 May 1975.

⁹¹⁹ "5 nations not invited to Mozambique freedom day", *op. cit.*

links with Angola. Most of Botswana's trade travelled over South African rail lines.

Furthermore, Britain's international alliances created two conflicting pressures on its Angola policy. The Commonwealth, with which Britain wanted to improve relations, was divided about the relative merits of the MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA, especially before the South African involvement became public. Thus, unlike the situation with regard to Mozambique, the United Kingdom was not urged by ex-colonies to aid a particular Angolan movement. The Commonwealth also generally opposed outside military interference in Angola. This was countered by pressure from Washington to assist, or at least not hinder, the U.S. intervention effort.

Britain's policy decisions reflected these conflicting pressures. As Legum has remarked, Britain "chose to remain neutral as between the rivals, although strongly hostile to the Russian, Cuban and South African intervention".⁹²⁰ When the United States asked its allies to assist UNITA and the FNLA officially, Britain, along with the rest of the allies, refused.⁹²¹ However, London did eventually turn a blind eye to the CIA's indirect recruitment of British mercenaries to help the anti-MPLA effort.⁹²² The British businessman "Tiny" Rowland, whose company, Lonrho, had extensive interests in southern Africa, also provided significant assistance to UNITA, including pilots and a plane for Savimbi's use.⁹²³

The differences between Britain's policies on FRELIMO and the MPLA are instructive. Where Britain had major economic interests in states neighbouring a territory in which there was only one major nationalist movement, which was well regarded by the Commonwealth, it enquired about the policies of the nationalist movement seeking to rule the state. Upon finding the nationalists' policies generally not threatening to interests in neighbouring states, Britain tried to improve relations. The close ties between the nationalist movement and the Eastern bloc were not sufficiently disturbing to curtail the co-optation effort. When Britain had fewer economic interests in a state's neighbours, the nationalist movement in question was using Eastern bloc assistance to fight rivals

⁹²⁰ Legum and Hodges, *op. cit.* p. 27.

⁹²¹ Stockwell, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

⁹²² Bridgland, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁹²³ Marcum, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 439, footnote 190.

backed by a close British ally, and the Commonwealth was divided about the nationalists' relative merits, the United Kingdom adopted a passive policy. It did not seek to discover if the nationalists' policies were in its interests or to co-opt that group, but neither did it offer more than token support for the group's rivals. The implications of a Soviet and Cuban ally winning a military victory over a U.S. ally were not considered sufficiently perilous for the United Kingdom to become vigorously involved.

Clearly, both in Mozambique and Angola, East-West issues were less relevant to British decisions than they were to U.S. decisions, and interests in neighbouring states were more relevant. When the latter interests were substantial, nationalist policies were also considered highly relevant.

FRANCE

France, like Britain, was more concerned about the impact of Angolan and Mozambican independence upon its ex-colonies neighbouring those states than it was about developments within the territories themselves. The victory of the centrist Giscard d'Estaing in the May 1974 French presidential elections caused even greater emphasis to be placed on this concern, because he hoped to consolidate the economic, military, cultural, and political relations between France and its former colonies.⁹²⁴ The Giscard d'Estaing victory also produced greater French interest in East-West détente, which the new president believed would provide an opportunity for France to carve out a special area of influence.⁹²⁵

These considerations led France virtually to ignore Mozambique, as it had minimal interests in that territory's neighbouring states, and to focus on Angola. France had significant economic and political interests in its West African ex-colonies, which would likely be affected by events in Angola. France also hoped to develop economic interests in the French-speaking ex-Belgian colony of Zaire, which shares a long border with Angola.

⁹²⁴ Roy C. Macridis, "French Foreign Policy: The Quest for Rank", in Foreign Policy in World Politics: States and Regions, ed. Roy C. Macridis (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989), p. 55.

⁹²⁵ *Ibid.*

Unlike the British evaluation of the Marxist nationalists in Mozambique, however, France concluded that a victory of Marxist nationalists in Angola was not necessarily good for its interests in neighbouring states. This conclusion was unrelated to MPLA ideology or alliances with the East; it was due instead to MPLA policies on Cabinda and Zaire.

The issue of Cabinda (the Angolan enclave sandwiched between Zaire and Congo-Brazzaville) was a delicate one. During the nineteenth-century competition between European powers for colonial territory in Africa, France had laid claim to Cabinda. Portugal challenged the claim and occupied the territory in 1883. The rival claims were resolved at the Berlin Conference of 1884 to 1885 in favour of Portugal.⁹²⁶ (This was well before the oil wealth of Cabinda was known.) As the Angolan independence process progressed, Cabindan groups agitated for secession. The MPLA consistently opposed secession, while the FNLA and UNITA were less categorical on the issue. President Mobutu of Zaire strongly favoured secession, influencing the attitude of his FNLA friends. The Congo-Brazzaville government similarly favoured secession, though it was much more discreet in expressing the view, perhaps in deference to its friends in the MPLA.

Although France never outright declared support for Cabindan secession, it concluded that such an event would suit French interests. First, secession would provide the ex-French colony of Congo-Brazzaville with a small state as a neighbour, rather than an extension of the Angolan giant, better protecting Congo-Brazzaville's security. Second, as Zaire's President Mobutu favoured the secession plan, and France was trying to expand its political and economic influence in this French-speaking country, support for secession appeared wise. Third, France itself was interested in exploiting Cabinda's oil wealth and this would be more easily accomplished if the territory were separate from Angola.⁹²⁷

Completely apart from the Cabinda question, France's desire, in Stockwell's words, "to ingratiate itself with Mobutu"⁹²⁸ also militated against close French relations with the MPLA, for Mobutu strongly supported the FNLA movement. French aspirations in Zaire further meant

⁹²⁶ Somerville, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁹²⁷ Marcum, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 254. See also Stockwell, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

⁹²⁸ Stockwell, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

that the MPLA's recruitment of the Katanga gendarmes, who had previously fought for the secession of Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province, also distressed Paris. The MPLA's close relations with the Eastern bloc, and its own socialist rhetoric, were less worrying to the French than were the implications of an MPLA victory for these regional issues.

One element of French policy, however, was directly related to Angola, rather than to Angola's neighbours. The French hoped to pull Angola into the French "zone of influence" by integrating it into the institutions that linked France with its ex-colonies. This desire was reflected in France's March 1975 announcement that the future government of independent Angola would be invited to attend the regular summits of Francophone states.⁹²⁹ As France had allied itself with the FNLA because of regional concerns, an FNLA government in Luanda would obviously suit this ambition better than an MPLA government.

For all these reasons, France responded more positively than did Britain to U.S. requests for assistance in its coercion strategy, but did not go so far as actually providing troops. In early 1975, President Giscard d'Estaing visited Zaire and reportedly told Mobutu that France supported his policy of aiding Cabindan secession.⁹³⁰ The spring 1975 emergence of a mysterious Commander Jean da Costa "with French connections" as leader of an effort to prevent the MPLA from securing control over Cabinda⁹³¹ prompted additional speculation about French intentions in the province. In August 1975, French intelligence directors met with the CIA's deputy director to discuss Angola. France subsequently provided the FNLA with anti-tank missiles, mortar rounds, and ammunition for Mobutu's armoured cars. The equipment was transported by the CIA.⁹³² France's provision of four missile-firing helicopters to the FNLA in December 1975⁹³³ and its early 1976 assistance to the CIA's efforts to recruit French mercenaries to aid the FNLA, although occurring after the time period covered by this thesis, further reflected a French attitude

⁹²⁹ "French woo LM, Luanda", Star (Johannesburg, South Africa), 10 March 1975.

⁹³⁰ Legum and Hodges, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁹³¹ Marcum, vol. 2, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

⁹³² Stockwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 198-199.

⁹³³ *Ibid.*

towards the Angolan conflict that was already evident in the pre-independence period.⁹³⁴

The MPLA reacted to the French policy by making life for the officials at the French consulate in Luanda "extremely difficult" and eventually surrounding the office with troops. The consular staff fled, leaving the building to be occupied by MPLA and Cuban soldiers.⁹³⁵

In making decisions about the Angola situation, France first considered its interests in neighbouring states, and the interests of its allies in those states, rather than the ideological orientations or superpower alliances of the Angolan parties themselves. Though these latter concerns were relevant, they were not the primary consideration. French aid to the FNLA was not motivated primarily by a desire to "fight communism" or "stop the spread of Soviet and Cuban influence", but by a desire to curry favour with Mobutu and facilitate Cabindan secession. France helped the U.S. coercion policy in a small way, but Paris was motivated by very different concerns than was Washington.

It is also interesting to note that (as in the case of the United Kingdom in its relationship with Mozambique) when France had considerable economic interests in the states neighbouring a territory, it paid some attention to the specific policies of the nationalist movements in the territory and particularly noted the potential impact of those policies upon French interests in the neighbouring states. Unlike Britain's conclusion regarding FRELIMO, however, France concluded that the MPLA's policies were not favourable for French interests in neighbouring states.

WEST GERMANY

West Germany paid little attention to the colonial implications of the Portuguese coup and concentrated on the event's repercussions in Portugal. Some support for FNLA and UNITA did reportedly originate from West Germany, but the amounts involved were not substantial.⁹³⁶ After the failed attempt to improve relations with FRELIMO in 1973, the Mozambican situation was virtually ignored.

Several factors accounted for Bonn's relative lack of concern. As in the case of the United States, West Germany had few economic or

⁹³⁴ Ibid., p. 231.

⁹³⁵ Mr. Vaysett (political officer at the French embassy), interview by author, Luanda, Angola, 17 May 1985.

⁹³⁶ Marcum, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 263.

cultural interests in Mozambique, Angola, or the contiguous territories. Only in Angola's southern neighbour of Namibia, which had been a German colony prior to World War I, were there such ties, and these were modest.

The nature of Bonn's competition with East Germany had also shifted just prior to the Portuguese coup. Whereas in the 1970 to 1973 period West Germany had been anxious to court Third World support for its application to the United Nations, its September 1973 admission to that institution made catering to Third World opinion less critical.⁹³⁷ Furthermore, the involvement of East Germany's close allies, Cuba and the Soviet Union, on the side of the MPLA excited West Germany's competitive instincts. These considerations, combined with encouragement from the United States to slow the "spread of communism" by aiding the FNLA and UNITA, made modest aid to the MPLA's rivals appear advisable.

The rivalry with East Germany would have made it difficult for Bonn to cultivate relations with the MPLA and FRELIMO once the parties took power, even if the West German government had been so disposed. Bonn had long insisted on including the "Berlin Clause" in all government-to-government aid agreements. This clause required the recipient to recognise all of Berlin as a part of West Germany. Predictably, East Germany strongly urged those movements and governments with which it had cordial relations to reject the Berlin Clause. Thus, even if West Germany had wanted to follow the British example and promise Machel aid for the future independent state of Mozambique, long-standing policies would have required it to do so in terms that made rejection likely.

Bonn's decision to focus on events in Portugal was motivated by two factors: economic interests and domestic politics. By the eve of the Portuguese coup, West Germany had become the most important supplier of imports to Portugal,⁹³⁸ and the tumultuous political events in that country would have an impact, albeit modest, on West Germany's trade prospects. More important was the close relationship between the ruling German Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP). West German Prime Minister and SDP head Willy Brandt was close to the PSP leader, Mário Soares. Indeed, Soares had founded the PSP while in West Germany in 1973. The PSP was "centrist" in the Portuguese post-coup political context, and the West German SDP provided substantial funds to

⁹³⁷ Henderson, op. cit., p. 238.

⁹³⁸ Ibid.

help it compete with rivals.⁹³⁹ When Willy Brandt resigned in May 1974, his successor, Helmut Schmidt, continued the pro-Soares policy.

West Germany's support for Soares did indirectly influence the independence process. By aiding his party, Bonn strengthened the group opposing Spínola's early 1974 plan to offer federation rather than independence to the African territories. Once the principle of full independence was accepted in September 1974, and the Portuguese government began to move steadily leftward, West German support for the PSP worked against the interests of the pro-MPLA far-left elements in the Portuguese government, who were anxious to protect the MPLA's position in Luanda.

In sum, West Germany's impact upon the fortunes of the MPLA and FRELIMO was minimal in this period. West Germany did not seek to resuscitate its earlier contacts with FRELIMO, and, like the United States, it was excluded from the Mozambican independence ceremonies. Its provision of modest aid to UNITA and the FNLA, and alignment with the centrist rival of the MPLA's far-left Portuguese allies, ensured that relations with the new Angolan government would be poor. In the West German case, as in that of the United States, little attention was paid to MPLA or FRELIMO policies, the country had few economic interests in the disputed territories or their neighbours, and East-West considerations were important in decision making. However, unlike Washington, Bonn did not consider a Soviet-Cuban "victory" to be so destabilising to the East-West balance as to warrant active military intervention.

SCANDINAVIA AND THE NETHERLANDS

The policies of the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands continued to diverge significantly from those of the other Western governments in the period after the Portuguese coup. Again, the main factor motivating their policies was domestic opinion. Their populations' distaste for colonialism and racism, and support for the struggle against South African apartheid, continued to push the governments to adopt sympathetic policies towards both the MPLA and FRELIMO. However, these governments were not totally oblivious to the East-West element in the evolving situation in Angola.

⁹³⁹ Schneidman, *op. cit.*, pp. 418-419.

The policy decisions confronting these governments in Mozambique were relatively straightforward. Virtually no one except extreme right-wing elements in Portugal and South Africa opposed Lisbon's decision to hand power over to FRELIMO. Thus, the Scandinavian and Dutch governments were able swiftly to begin consultations with FRELIMO for future aid to the independent state of Mozambique. Simultaneously, plans were made for these states to open embassies in Mozambique immediately after independence. FRELIMO appreciation for these offers was reflected in the fact that the Scandinavian states and the Netherlands made up five of the seven Western countries invited to the independence celebrations.

The decisions confronting the Scandinavian and Dutch governments concerning Angola were more complicated. While not as concerned about the "spread of communism" as the United States, these countries were worried by the presence of Soviet arms and Cuban troops in the Angolan war. In addition, they were confused by the shifting positions adopted by their other friends in Africa, some of whom periodically supported the MPLA's rivals. Although humanitarian aid to the MPLA continued, steps were taken to ensure that the assistance was not diverted to military uses. Unlike in Mozambique, there were few discussions with the MPLA about future development aid, and in fact Swedish development aid to Angola did not start until two years after independence.⁹⁴⁰

Overall, the decisions of the Scandinavian and Dutch governments concerning the MPLA and FRELIMO were affected relatively little by East-West considerations or economic interests in Mozambique, Angola, and their neighbours. Domestic political concern about minority rule and colonialism was the main determining factor. However, even in this environment, perception of factionalism among the Angolan nationalists limited financial generosity towards the MPLA.

SUMMARY

The foregoing discussion shows that while most European countries were concerned about the implications of a Soviet and Cuban "victory" in Angola, this concern was not sufficiently grave to convince them to adopt a vigorous coercion policy. The European governments that did aid the U.S. strategy in Angola did so in a relatively modest manner. The European country most active in the coercion effort, France, was motivated more by concern about the impact of MPLA policies upon its

⁹⁴⁰ Altan, interview.

interests in neighbouring states than by cold war worries. When other factors did motivate a European state to initiate a new co-optation policy, specifically in British policy regarding FRELIMO, the fact that the target group was "Marxist" and close to the Eastern bloc was not considered an impediment.

The above description also shows that when a European state had considerable economic interests in states neighbouring a certain territory, it paid more attention to the policies of the nationalists in that territory. The United Kingdom had considerable interests in the states neighbouring Mozambique, carefully examined FRELIMO's policies, and upon discovering that those policies were relatively non-threatening to British interests launched a co-optation effort. France had economic interests in the states neighbouring Angola, examined the policies of the MPLA, and upon discovering that they were not entirely compatible with French interests became willing to aid the U.S. coercion strategy, albeit in a limited manner.

European policy decisions also showed that a nationalist group's factionalism discouraged European states otherwise predisposed to aid that group, as demonstrated in the case of the Scandinavian and Dutch unease regarding the MPLA. Lack of factionalism coincided with generous aid from those long or newly disposed to aid a given group, as in the Scandinavian-Dutch and British policies regarding FRELIMO.

Domestic politics were also highly relevant in European decisions. Labour's recent victory in the United Kingdom made Britain anxious to improve relations with the Commonwealth and less suspicious than previously of socialist nationalists. Giscard d'Estaing's victory in France and his wish to improve relations with ex-colonies increased French sensitivity to the opinion of those ex-colonies. The West German SDP's alliance with Soares was partially responsible for West Germany's decision to concentrate on the implications of the coup in Portugal rather than in Africa. The high value placed by Dutch and Scandinavian domestic politics on anti-colonial issues clearly had a major impact on these countries' policies.

Angola and Mozambique were relevant to Britain and France's ability to build support for non-cold war aspects of their international agendas (strengthening the role of the Commonwealth and the Francophone network respectively), while Washington's virtual only agenda was the cold war. Policy makers in London and Paris also had more substantive, concrete interests in the region than did their Washington counterparts,

or indeed those in West Germany, Scandinavia and the Netherlands. The two Portuguese territories had the ability to influence the stability of neighbours in which Britain and France were anxious to maintain or enhance commercial access, and France had commercial aspirations in Angola itself. More than any other Western countries, Britain and France's policies were at least partially conditioned by concrete, tangible interests in the region itself, rather than solely driven by implications for cold war rivalry and/or domestic politics.

In light of these considerations, how much influence did the MPLA and FRELIMO have upon the policies of European countries? In the case of FRELIMO-British and MPLA-French relations, the nationalists had considerable influence. If FRELIMO had, at this time, adopted overtly aggressive policies towards Rhodesia and South Africa, and been on bad terms with the governments of Tanzania, Zambia, Swaziland, and Malawi, London probably would have concluded that a FRELIMO government would damage British interests in neighbouring states. London therefore would probably have been less interested in pursuing a co-optation policy. If the MPLA had been on excellent terms with Mobutu and been willing to consider Cabindan secession, France might have aided the U.S. coercion effort in Angola less or not at all.

This suggests that when a European power had major interests in the states neighbouring a certain territory, it paid attention to the policies of the nationalists in that territory. This, in turn, gave the nationalists in said territory some opportunity to influence the decisions of the European government in question. As East-West considerations were not an overriding factor for most European governments, the simple fact that a movement was Marxist or on close terms with the Soviet Union was not an automatic barrier to a co-optation policy.

CONCLUSION

There are three types of conclusions that can be drawn from the preceding discussions: What happened? Why did the events happen? What might have occurred in a counter-factual circumstance (i.e., if certain conditions had been different)?

WHAT HAPPENED?

At the time of their foundings, the MPLA displayed moderately low co-optability whereas FRELIMO appeared quite open to Western overtures. The movements subsequently became less well disposed towards the West. By the eve of independence, the co-optability levels of both were very low, though the Mozambican movement remained less hostile than its Angolan counterpart. The evolution of the movements' attitudes was not consistent either over time or with regard to all Western states. After steady decline, MPLA co-optability briefly increased from 1970 to 1972, followed by a return to the downward trend. FRELIMO's attitude towards the West divided around 1970. Relations with the U.S. sharply deteriorated while relations with a few European states began to improve slightly.

Western attitudes towards the nationalists followed an irregular pattern. At first Washington backed Portugal's anti-nationalist policies, but in 1961 the Kennedy administration sharply shifted to co-optation. This was soon abandoned and from 1963 to 1974 Washington did not directly coerce the nationalists but did increasingly help Portugal do so. In the closing months before independence, Washington switched to energetic, direct coercion in Angola and semi-hostile neglect in Mozambique.

European governments began to take an interest in the nationalists in the late 1960s and early 1970s, with the Scandinavian governments and the Netherlands first adopting co-optation strategies. In 1973 West Germany toyed briefly with and then abandoned a co-optation policy towards FRELIMO, while the U.K. vigorously began to pursue a co-optation policy towards FRELIMO in the months just before independence. The rest of Europe either took little interest in the situation of Portuguese Africa or tacitly supported U.S. policies.

WHY DID THE EVENTS HAPPEN?

A range of factors influenced both nationalist and Western behaviour. The preceding chapters have detailed the precise dynamics involved in each phase. Only the overall trends will be addressed here.

Factors That Influenced Nationalist Co-optability

Background of the Nationalist Leadership. When, as in the case of the MPLA, the leadership of a nationalist movement was highly educated, had extensive exposure to Marxist theory, and was racially different from the majority of the population in the territory (creating the need for an ideologically based tie with the population), it displayed relatively low co-optability. When, as in the case of FRELIMO, the leadership generally had a low level of education, largely was of the same race as the majority of the population, and had formative experiences in states featuring capitalism or "bourgeois" socialism, it was at least somewhat co-optable.

Source of a Movement's Ideological Orientation. When socialist ideology arose primarily from internal developments (such as the need to mobilise ethnically diverse masses in the name of nationalism, the desire for a framework capable of undermining a rival faction, the need to generate grassroots support with a focus on egalitarianism and social justice and the appeal of a psychologically empowering philosophy), a movement's political principles tended to adjust to changing circumstances and hence allow for periods of moderately high co-optability. When socialist ideology was derived from academic training and examples set by (or pressures exerted by) foreign allies, a movement would tend to be less co-optable. FRELIMO displayed the former characteristics, the MPLA the latter.

Formation as an Artificial Versus Genuine Front. Formation as a relatively genuine front (the FRELIMO experience) required a movement to be somewhat flexible in its policies so as to build consensus among constituent groups, and this adaptive tradition indirectly enhanced co-optability. Formation as an artificial front (the MPLA experience) meant that a movement's leadership was not practised in the art of compromise, creating a mind-set less conducive to co-optability.

Degree and Nature of Internal Factionalism. A high degree of pervasive, ongoing factionalism correlated with low co-optability (MPLA case), whereas a lesser level of factionalism correlated with a somewhat higher degree of co-optability (FRELIMO case). However, this seemed to be more a result of the manner in which the behaviour of outside actors interacted with internal factionalism, and the distrust or confidence in foreign intentions so generated, than a result of the factionalism per se. Therefore, in a different international context, factionalism could have a different result.

Rivalry with Other Nationalist Movements. A high degree of such rivalry correlated with low co-optability (MPLA) and a low degree was associated with slightly higher co-optability (FRELIMO). However, as in the case of internal factionalism, the impact of a given rivalry on co-optability was related more to the perceived international alliances of the rival, and the message this conveyed regarding Western hostility or goodwill, than to the inherent characteristics of rivalry per se. When a movement had numerous occasions to fear that the West was allying with a rival to engineer the movement's destruction, it was naturally distrustful and inclined to solidify ties with the East. When a movement had no or only weak opponents, it had less reason to fear Western intentions.

Nature and Actions of the Movement's Direct Enemy. The nature of the direct enemy was relevant to the extent that it conditioned that enemy's actions. When internal splits within the direct enemy were resolved in favour of the hawks, and the majority of Western governments appeared to acquiesce to or even aid brutal military initiatives, co-optability declined. However, the Western governments that opposed the direct enemy's actions were viewed positively, and occasionally there was a selective increase in co-optability regarding these specific Western states. FRELIMO attitudes towards the Scandinavian, Dutch, and British governments are examples.

Relationship With Non-Western Allies. When non-Western allies conditioned aid on hostility to Western states, co-optability declined at least somewhat. The degree of decline varied in direct proportion to the dependence of the movement on the ally exerting the pressure. Receipt of support from a wide range of non-Western allies decreased the leverage of an individual ally, whereas dependence on a narrow range of such allies enhanced such leverage. FRELIMO fell into the former category, the MPLA into the latter.

Conditions of Armed Struggle. If the conditions of armed struggle led a movement to require access to an infiltration route via a pro-Western neighbour, co-optability could rise as long as the goal appeared achievable. This helps explain the upward shift in MPLA co-optability in the 1970 to 1972 period, when it was hoping for access to Angola via pro-Western Zaire. Similarly, if a movement had a strong, relatively self-reliant military presence within the disputed territory, it was less vulnerable to pressure from anti-Western allies. This was the case for FRELIMO in the latter years of the war. If a movement was militarily weak

and had little presence on the ground within the disputed territory (as in the case of the MPLA through much of the Angolan struggle), it was highly dependent upon outside allies and not in a position to resist if those allies pressured in an anti-Western direction. Finally, if a movement believed that socialist policies were conducive to maintaining peasant support for military operations (as FRELIMO came to believe), its co-optability declined.

Attitudes of Regional Powers. Military hostility from, or support for a rival by, a regional power tended to strengthen a nationalist movement's dependence on foreign allies, and if these were primarily anti-Western then co-optability would be reduced. If the movement perceived that a hostile regional power was acting in alliance with a Western government, co-optability declined even more. On the other hand, if a regional power was both positively disposed towards a movement and was seen as a Western ally, co-optability was enhanced. The MPLA's co-optability was reduced by both mechanisms, for Zairean and South African hostility enhanced its need for socialist-country support, and the regional powers' perceived alliance with the West exacerbated the movement's antipathy towards Western governments. The fact that the regional power that adopted a hostile posture towards FRELIMO (the government of Rhodesia's Ian Smith) was on bad terms with the West, and that a perceived Western ally (South Africa) was cordial towards FRELIMO, enhanced that movement's co-optability.

Economic and Geographic Structure of the Disputed Territory. These factors were particularly salient at the beginning and end of the independence struggle in each territory. When economic and geographic circumstances required a movement's leaders to live for periods of time in neighbouring capitalist or mixed-economy states, a movement's initial co-optability was heightened. When economic and geographic circumstances led a movement's leadership to have access to elite education in European capitals where Marxist philosophy was part of the normal academic debate, co-optability fell. Mozambique's circumstances subjected FRELIMO leaders to the former experiences; Angola's subjected the MPLA leadership to the latter experiences.

Even more important, in the last phase of the independence struggle close economic integration with a pro-Western neighbour that was willing and able to "consensually neo-colonise" created a bridge to the West and enhanced co-optability. When a movement was aware that the economic resources of which it was about to take control required the

goodwill of that neighbour to render profits, the co-optability-enhancing potential of the relationship was particularly strong. This was the case in FRELIMO's relations with South Africa, for without that neighbour's co-operation much of Mozambique's resources, primarily transport routes and labour, would lie idle.

In contrast, when a territory had significant wealth in the form of raw commodities in high demand in the international market, and was not economically integrated with a pro-Western neighbour, the movement was more free to choose its own path. This was the case with the MPLA, which felt confident that the high profits associated with extraction of oil and diamonds would gain it the capital it required regardless of how friendly or hostile it was to Western governments. Poverty and dependence correlated with higher co-optability, whereas wealth and economic independence correlated with lower co-optability.

Perception of Western Policies. Perception of Western policies, though never the sole determinant of nationalist attitudes, nonetheless had a consistent and significant impact on co-optability throughout the 1956 to 1976 period. When a movement perceived that the West was at least willing to consider its point of view, co-optability rose. This occurred most dramatically, and with respect to both movements, when the Kennedy administration briefly pursued a co-optation strategy in the early 1960s. It was again evident in the case of the MPLA in the 1970 to 1972 period when NATO was perceived as divisible on the issue of supporting Portuguese colonialism. The same dynamic occurred with regard to FRELIMO in 1974 and 1975, when the British government adopted a co-optation policy.

On the other hand, when a movement perceived that the West was aiding the direct enemy and/or assisting a rival, co-optability inevitably declined. This occurred when the Kennedy administration abandoned co-optation and shifted to support for Portugal's colonial policies in early 1963, and when subsequent U.S. administrations intensified that trend. The most dramatic evidence of perceived Western hostility reducing co-optability occurred in late 1974 and early 1975, when the MPLA concluded, correctly, that the U.S. was assisting those forces seeking to destroy the movement.

The degree of any given increase or decline in co-optability following a shift in perceptions of Western policy was always influenced by one or more of the ten other factors listed above. However, in every

time period explored, perception of Western policies had an important role.

Factors That Influenced Western Decisions to Pursue Coercion or Co-optation Policies

Relationship With a Rival Power, and Related Security, Military, and Strategic Issues. When relations with a rival power formed the prism through which most other matters were judged, and/or when a Western government came to believe that its ability to deal with future aggression by a rival was jeopardised by friendly relations with the movements in question, co-optation was swiftly abandoned. The U.S. decision to cut off contacts with the MPLA and FRELIMO as soon as Portugal threatened to retaliate by blocking access to the Azores base is a case in point. When a Western government had a lesser level of preoccupation with relations with the rival, and a broad range of interests in the geographic region in question, the rival/strategic/military factors militated much less strongly against co-optation. This was the case for much of Europe in the 1970s.

Even when the strategic/military concern was removed (as it was once Portugal agreed to the independence of its African colonies and ceased using Azores base access to pressure the West), tense relations with the rival could still push decision makers towards coercion when a nationalist movement's victory was seen to symbolise the rival's triumph. Thus, the United States felt driven to coerce the MPLA, which was primarily associated with Moscow in the eyes of world opinion, and was not driven to coerce FRELIMO, which balanced its ties to the Soviet Union with equal or greater links to China. For those European governments less obsessed with the cold war, and with a wider variety of interests in the region, preventing a Moscow-affiliated group from taking power was a lower priority. In fact, the one European country that did actively assist the U.S. coercion effort against the MPLA, France, was motivated as much by concerns regarding MPLA policies towards French friends in the region as by cold war concerns.

Internal Politics. The impact of internal politics on Western policies depended in large part upon the state of the previous factor discussed, relations with a rival power. When a Western government's concerns about relations with a rival power were not overwhelming (as in Europe in the 1970s) or when concerns were high but in a non-confrontational phase (as in the early months of the Kennedy

administration), Western sympathy for the underdog meant that internal politics tended to push policies towards co-optation. This effect was particularly strong when elements of civil society publicised brutal behaviour on the part of the nationalists' repressor (as occurred in Scandinavia and the Netherlands in the 1970s, and in Britain after the much-publicised December 1972 massacre in Mozambique).

However, when internal politics were closely intertwined with apprehension about relations with the rival power (as in the United States for the entire period after the Kennedy co-optation experiment and particularly in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate) and when the rival power was believed to benefit from a nationalist victory, internal politics pushed policy strongly towards coercion. Leaders simply feared being accused of demonstrating insufficient resolve against the rival.

Economic, Cultural, and Historical Ties With the Region. If a Western country had a high level of such ties with the region, it tended to pay considerable attention to the policies of a given nationalist movement when determining whether to adopt a coercion or co-optation approach. (See the item below on "Perception of the Nationalists' Policies" for further discussion of this issue.) If the nationalists' policies favoured the interests generated by such ties, then a co-optation strategy was more likely to be selected (option A); if they threatened such interests, coercion was more likely to be chosen (option B). If a nation had low economic, cultural, and historical interests in the region, nationalists' policies tended not to be examined for anything but their implications regarding competition with the rival world power (option C). British relations with FRELIMO were an example of option A, French relations with the MPLA an example of option B, and U.S. relations with both movements an example of option C.

Policies of Tacit and Open Allies in the Region. When a country in the region adopted its own coercion or co-optation strategy, the Western countries with which it was openly or tacitly allied tended to do the same. This is not to claim that the regional actor determined the policy of its Western ally. The policy of an ally in the region simply created a context more conducive to one Western policy stance or the other.

In the case of the United States, the coercion policies of open ally Zaire and tacit ally South Africa regarding the MPLA created a context conducive to a U.S. coercion policy regarding the same movement. Coercion became both politically attractive and operationally possible. Concerning FRELIMO, the pro-co-optation policies of South Africa

discouraged U.S. coercion of that movement and, together with the pro-FRELIMO stance of other British allies in the region, facilitated London's co-optation efforts concerning FRELIMO. The alliances of the Scandinavian and Dutch governments with anti-apartheid movements in the region obviously encouraged those governments' decisions to adopt co-optation strategies regarding both the MPLA and FRELIMO.

Perception of Nationalist Divisions. A high level of nationalist divisions indirectly facilitated a coercion strategy, for there were potential allies available to employ Western-supplied weapons without putting Western forces themselves in harm's way. Perception of severe nationalist divisions therefore made it relatively easy for a coercion-inclined Western power to implement its desired policy. Such divisions discouraged co-optation-inclined governments from increasing assistance, for it was not always clear who was the most appropriate recipient of the largesse.

On the other hand, a low level of nationalist divisions discouraged coercion-inclined governments from intervening, for there was no local surrogate available. It also encouraged co-optation-inclined governments, for the situation presented a straightforward choice concerning the recipient.

This factor became particularly relevant in the 1974 to 1975 period. Intense nationalist divisions in Angola encouraged U.S. coercion of the MPLA and discouraged Scandinavian and Dutch aid to that movement. The absence of nationalist divisions in Mozambique discouraged U.S. coercion, and encouraged British co-optation, of FRELIMO.

Perception of the Nationalists' Policies. As already partly explored above, Western perceptions of nationalist policies had an inconsistent impact on Western decision making.

For the Western countries that were preoccupied with military/strategic/competition-with-rival-power concerns, and had few cultural, economic, or historical ties to the region, nationalist policies usually were considered only in a very narrow manner.

From the end the Kennedy co-optation experiment in 1963 until the Portuguese coup in 1974, Washington paid little regard to the nationalists' policies, other than to take account of the fact that they were demanding independence from Portugal. It primarily considered the fact that Portugal would block access to the Azores base if contact were maintained with the MPLA and FRELIMO. In these circumstances, even the nationalists' alliance with or distance from the rival power was

irrelevant. As long as a co-optation policy would jeopardise the Azores, co-optation would have been impossible even with an anti-Soviet group.

If the strategic/military question were removed from the equation (as occurred once Portugal accepted the inevitability of colonial independence), a country with scarce interests in the region immediately would focus on competition with the rival power as its only policy guideline. If the policies of a nationalist group made its accession to power appear to be a symbolic victory for the rival, the group would be coerced, regardless of its policies on other matters. This was the case in U.S. relations with the MPLA from 1974 to 1975. If a nationalist group's policies did not lead it to be perceived as a surrogate of the rival, then coercion was not likely to be adopted. This was the case in U.S. relations with FRELIMO in the months before independence.

As already mentioned, those Western countries with a wider variety of interests in the region tended to consider a broader range of nationalist policies when choosing between coercion, neglect, or co-optation. Britain considered FRELIMO's policies regarding the numerous British interests in Mozambique's Anglophone neighbours, found them acceptable, and pursued co-optation. France examined the MPLA's policies towards various French interests in Angola's neighbours, found them wanting, and assisted U.S. coercion. Scandinavia and the Netherlands were most concerned about domestic support for the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, found MPLA and FRELIMO policies on that struggle acceptable, and pursued varying levels of co-optation policies concerning both movements.

Clarification of Western Interests

In conclusion, Western interests in Mozambique and Angola, were as intriguing for what they lacked as for what they contained. There was little interest in the territories' natural resources, with the exception of some U.S. and French interest in Angola's oil. There was interest in strategically located port facilities, but this was neither particularly strong nor consistent over time. U.S. interest arose only at the end of the period, when it became difficult to sustain domestic support for the use of South African ports. There was an interest in the U.S. and France in developing access to the Angolan market, but this never became an important factor.

Western interests in the two territories, on the whole, were derivative and indirect. Washington wished to ensure that the territories

not enhance Soviet power or prestige, and that policies regarding the territories not disrupt trans-Atlantic alliances or access to a strategically located base. Furthermore, Washington was concerned about the impact of events in Angola on a U.S. open and tacit allies, specifically Zaire and the white ruled states. Some European states, most particularly the U.K. and France, were even more concerned about the impact of Mozambican and Angolan events on neighbours, with commercial and transportation issues most obviously attracting attention. The Scandinavian and Dutch authorities focussed primarily on the implications of Mozambican and Angolan developments on domestic anti-apartheid sentiment, and were far less concerned with internal events in the individual territories. Britain and France had an interest that Mozambican and Angolan trends strengthen the networks each had established to influence events in and benefit from links with ex-colonies, (the Commonwealth in the case of the former and the Francophone Summit process in that of the latter). West Germany had an interest in ensuring that Mozambican and Angolan events strengthen its ability to compete with East Germany.

What all Western states had in common, then, was a relative lack of concrete interests in the Portuguese territories themselves. Instead, they all were concerned about the manner in which Angolan and Mozambican developments would influence other interests. Whether they were driven by a cold war fixation, an anti-apartheid concern, or the desire to influence events in ex-colonies, the theme remained consistent. Mozambique and Angola were not a central focus of Western interests. The territories' relevance was indirect and derivative, and the nationalists only attracted policy attention to the extent they impacted those interests.

COUNTERFACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES

What might have occurred if the various actors in the 1956 to 1976 events had adopted policies different from those pursued in fact?

If the West Had Pursued Co-optation?

Analysis of the events covered in Parts I through IV shows that the West could have gained quite considerably from a co-optation policy launched during the 1956 to 1963 period. It would have gained somewhat less if such a policy had only been adopted in the 1964 to 1969 period, and progressively less if it had only been launched in the 1970 to 1974

or 1974 to 1975 periods. The longer that policies of neglect or coercion were in force, the less was to be gained by a change.

There was also some difference in the reaction a pro-nationalist stance would have elicited from each of the movements under study. In each historical period, a co-optation strategy would have produced a somewhat greater reaction from FRELIMO than from the MPLA, largely because the former was less dependent on Eastern bloc support than was the latter. And although even a vigorous co-optation strategy would not have produced a pro-Western stance in either movement, in each phase under study it might well have better protected Western interests than the coercion/neglect strategies pursued by most Western states.

If the Nationalists Had Been More Pro-Western?

On the other side, the historical record shows that throughout the entire independence effort adoption of a more pro-Western posture would have gained the nationalists very little in relations with those countries preoccupied with the cold war. As long as the nationalists called for independence, Portugal would have threatened to cut off Azores access to any Western country that aided them. The fact that even the non-socialist FNLA lost most of its Washington largesse until the eve of independence illustrates this point. If the nationalists had adopted a pro-Western posture all the way through the independence effort, or at any stage in the process, they would have gained little from cold war-focussed governments.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

INTERVIEWS

Altan, Fin. Interview by author. Luanda, Angola, 20 May 1985.

Bragança, Aquino de. Interview by author. Maputo, Mozambique, 20 August 1984.

Chipenda, Daniel. Interview by author. Lisbon, Portugal, April 1984.

Chissano, Joaquim. Interview by Afrique Australe. 27 November 1970.
Published in Afrique Australe, no. 2-3 (1971). Reprinted in Quem é o Inimigo, vol. 2. Ed. Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein. Lisbon: Iniciativas Editoriais, 1978.

Chissano, Joaquim. Interview by author. Maputo, Mozambique, 15 October 1984.

Chissano, Joaquim. Interview by Vida Mundial. Published in Vida Mundial, no. 1839 (12 December 1974). Document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

Easum, Donald. Interview by author. New York, United States, 15 February 1989.

Jorge, Paulo. Interview by author. Luanda, Angola, 30 May 1985.

Lára, Lúcio. Interview by author. Luanda, Angola, 26 June 1985.

Loubser, Dr. J.G.H. (former general manager of South African Railways/Transport Services). Interview by author. Cape Town, South Africa, 10 January 1986.

Machel, Samora. Interview by Tempo (Mozambique). Published in Tempo (25 June 1975).

Marcum, John A. Interview by author. Berkeley, California, United States, October 1986.

Mondlane, Eduardo. Interview by Helen Kitchen. Published in Africa Report (November 1967).

Mondlane, Eduardo. Interview by Mozambique Revolution. Published in Mozambique Revolution, no. 20 (July-August 1965).

Neto, Agostinho. Interview by Africasie. January 1973. Reprinted in Angola: Documentos do MPLA, vol. 1. Ed. José Fortunato. Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 1977.

Neto, Agostinho. Interview by Avanti. 1971. Reprinted in MPLA Informations. Algeria: MPLA Propaganda Department, August 1971.

Neto, Agostinho. Interview by Ian Christie. July 1972. Reprinted in Angola: Documentos do MPLA, vol. 1. Ed. José Fortunato. Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 1977.

Neto, Agostinho. Interview by Cologne Radio. West Germany, 1971. Reprinted in Angola: Documentos do MPLA, vol. 1. Ed. José Fortunato. Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 1977.

Neto, Agostinho. Interview by Tempo (Mozambique). Published in Tempo (3 November 1974).

Neto, Agostinho. Interview by Tempo (Mozambique). Published in Tempo (11 May 1975).

Rifkind, Malcolm. Interview by author. London, United Kingdom, 30 January 1985.

Roxman, Karin Storm. Interview by author. Maputo, Mozambique, August 1984.

Sassi, John. Interview by author. New York, United States, 14 October 1987.

Source one. Confidential interview by author. Maputo, Mozambique, October 1984.

Source two. Confidential interviews by author. Maputo, Mozambique, September 1984 and February 1986.

Source three. Confidential interviews by author. Luanda, Angola, April and May 1985.

Source four. Confidential interview by author. Luanda, Angola, May 1985.

Source five. Confidential interview by author. Harare, Zimbabwe, 20 May 1986.

Source six. Confidential interview by author. Pretoria, South Africa, 5 December 1985.

Source seven. Confidential interviews by author. Maputo, Mozambique, 30 September 1984 and Wye Plantation, Maryland, United States, 20 November 1986.

Source eight. Confidential interview by author. Washington, D.C., United States, 10 July 1986.

Source nine. Confidential interview by author. Maputo, Mozambique, 17 October 1984.

Source ten. Confidential interview by author. Pretoria, South Africa, 12 December 1985.

Vaysett. Interview by author. Luanda, Angola, 17 May 1985.

INDIVIDUAL CORRESPONDENCE

Antunes, José Freire. ed. Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, vols. 1 and 2. Lisbon: Publicações Dom Quixote, 1985.

DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY ORGANISATIONS

Cabral, Amilcar. "Speech at Central Hall Westminster, 25 October 1971". Guerrilheiro, Bulletin of the Committee for Freedom in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (United Kingdom), November-December 1971.

European Commission. Green Paper on Relations Between the European Union and the ACP Countries on the Eve of the 21st Century: Challenges and Options for a New Partnership. November 1996.

FRELIMO. Mozambique Revolution, no.s 2, 4, 5, 6, 16, 27, 31, 33, 38, 40, 41, 42, 44, 48, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 59, 61.

FRELIMO. Documentos Base da FRELIMO. Maputo: Tempografica, 1977.

FRELIMO. Relatório do Comitê Central ao 3 Congresso. Maputo: Departamento do Trabalho Ideológico da FRELIMO, 1977.

FRELIMO. "Statement by the FRELIMO Executive Committee on the events in Portugal". 27 April 1974, Document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

FRELIMO. "The Constitution of the People's Republic of Mozambique". 1975. Document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

FRELIMO. "Venceremos: Intervenção da Delegação da FRELIMO na Conferência dos Comitês de Apoio e Solidariedade, Oxford, 12-15 Abril de 1974". Document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

Gulf Oil. "Gulf Statement to Trustees, Ohio Conference, The United Church of Christ". Columbus, Ohio, 10 September 1970.

Machel, Samora. "A Nossa Luta Transforma-se Efectivamente na Luta de Todo o Povo Moçambicano". Speech, 25 September 1973. In Samora Machel: A Luta Continua. Ed. José A. Salvador. Porto, Portugal: Edições Afrontamento, 1974.

Machel, Samora. "Discurso do presidente da FRELIMO, Camarada Samora Machel, a 11a Sessão da OUA". A Voz da FRELIMO, 27 June 1974. Document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

Machel, Samora. "Lancemo-Nos Na Luta Com Mais Determinação". 25 September 1972. In Samora Machel: A Luta Continua. Ed. José A. Salvador. Porto, Portugal: Edições Afrontamento, 1974.

Machel, Samora. "Mensagem do Presidente Samora Moisés Machel Por Ocasião do Tomada de Posse do Govêrno de Transição". 20 September 1974. Document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

Machel, Samora. "Message from Comrade Samora Moisés Machel, President of FRELIMO, to the 24th Session of the Liberation Committee of the OAU". Dar es Salaam, 8 January 1985. Document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

Machel, Samora. "Moçambicanas, Moçambicanos!" 8 September 1974. Document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

Mondlane, Eduardo. "The Development of Nationalism in Mozambique", 3 December 1964. Reprinted in The African Liberation Reader: Documents of the National Liberation Movements, vol. 2. Ed. Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein. London: Zed Press, 1982.

MPLA. "Carácter Social da Luta de Libertaçao Nacional". In Vitória ou Morte (1967). Reprinted in Textos e Documentos do MPLA Sobre a Revoluçao Angolana. Ed. Maria Isabel Pinto Ventura. Lisbon: Edições Maria da Fonte, 1974.

MPLA. "Constitutional Law of the People's Republic of Angola". 10 November 1975. Approved by acclamation by the MPLA Central Committee. Document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

MPLA. Angola: Documentos do MPLA, vol. 1. Ed. José Fortunato. Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 1977.

MPLA. MPLA First National Congress (December 1962). Document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

MPLA. "O Acordo MPLA-FNLA". Document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

MPLA. "Outline of the Unholy Anglo-Portuguese Alliance". MPLA Department of Information and Propaganda. Lusaka, Zambia, July 1973.

MPLA. Programa Político--Aprovado na Conferência de Quadros. Luanda: Edições DIP/MPLA, January 1964.

Neto, Agostinho. "Declaraçao do MPLA Sobre a Posiçao Portuguesa no Processo de Descolonizaçao de Angola". Statement, 12 October 1974. Document from CIDAC archives, Lisbon, Portugal.

Neto, Agostinho. "Declaration faite par M. Agostinho Neto du Mouvement Popular de Liberation de l'Angola (MPLA)". United Nations, General Assembly, Fourth Committee. 1427 session. 17 December 1962.

Neto, Agostinho. "Discours de Agostinho Neto" (mimeo). CONCP Second Conference. Dar es Salaam, October 1965.

Neto, Agostinho. "Mensagem Por Ocasion do 15 Aniversário da Fundação do MPLA". 10 December 1971. Reprinted in Angola: Documentos do MPLA, vol. 1. Ed. José Fortunato. Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 1977.

Neto, Agostinho. "O MPLA e Uma Barreira Intransponível". Speech, 16 February 1975. Reprinted in Tudo Pelo Povo! Luanda: MPLA, 1978.

Neto, Agostinho. "Proclamação da Independência". Reprinted in Textos Políticos Escolhidos. Luanda: Edições DIP, 1985.

Neto, Agostinho. "Temperemo-nos Para Novas Lutas Para a Nova Fase da Revolução". Speech, September 1974. Reprinted in Tudo Pelo Povo! Luanda: MPLA, 1978.

Neto, Agostinho. "The Enemy Have Changed Their Tactics". Speech, February 1973. Reprinted in The African Liberation Reader: Documents of the National Liberation Movements, vol. 3. Ed. Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein. London: Zed Press, 1982.

Neto, Agostinho. "Who is the Enemy?... What is Our Objective?" Lecture delivered at the University of Dar es Salaam on 7 February 1974. Published in The African Liberation Reader: Documents of the National Liberation Movements, vol. 3. Ed. Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein. London: Zed Press, 1982.

Organisation of African Unity. "Report of the Conciliating Committee Between the Angolan Revolutionary Government (GRAE) and the People's Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA)". Mimeo. 1964.

Savimbi, Jonas. Resignation statement (mimeo). Brazzaville, 17 August 1964.

Simango, Uria. "Gloomy Situation in FRELIMO". 30 November 1969. Reprinted in The African Liberation Reader: Documents of the National Liberation Movements, vol. 2. Ed. Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein. London: Zed Press, 1982.

U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH DOCUMENTS

Newsom, David D. "A Look at African Issues at the United Nations". Speech, Atlanta Press Club, 21 September 1971. Reprinted in Department of State Bulletin (11 October 1971).

Newsom, David D. "Southern Africa: Constant Themes in U.S. Policy". Speech, June 1972. Reprinted in Current Foreign Policy, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services.

U.S. Department of State. "Circular 92" (telegram to embassies in Africa). 16 July 1963.

U.S. Department of State. Department of State Bulletin 70, Number 1803
(14 January 1973).

U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Presence in Angola" (fact sheet). 4
October 1996.

U.S. Interdepartmental Group for Africa. The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa: National Security Study Memorandum 39 (Secret). Ed. Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen. Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill and Co., 1976.

U.S. CONGRESS DOCUMENTS

"Aircraft and Helicopter Licenses and Reexport Authorizations Issued to Portuguese Territories in Africa during 1972 and 1973 (as of Mar. 15)". In Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st session, March and April 1973.

Andersen, Admiral George W. (U.S. Navy, retired). Testimony. Policy Toward Africa for the Seventies. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd session, 1970.

Bader, George W. (Regional Director [Africa], Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [International Security Affairs], Department of Defense). Testimony. Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st session, March and April 1973.

Bowen, Col. Richard A. (Country Desk Officer, European Region, Department of Defense). Testimony. Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st session, March and April 1973.

Bowles, Chester. Testimony. Nomination of Chester Bowles, Under Secretary of State-Designate. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961.

Caetano, Marcello (Prime Minister of Portugal). Radio and television talk. 16 December 1971. Reprinted in Executive Agreements with

Portugal and Bahrain. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, on S. Res. 214 Relative to the Submission of Any Portuguese Base Agreement as a Treaty, February 1, 2, and 3, 1972.

Case, Senator Clifford P. Statement. Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, on S. Res. 214 Relative to the Submission of Any Portuguese Base Agreement as a Treaty, February 1972.

Clark, Senator Dick. Statement. U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa.

Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, June and July 1975.

Commerce, Department of. Testimony. U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Part I, May-June 1971.

Culver, Representative John C. Statement. Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st session, March and April 1973.

Davis, Jennifer. Statement. Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, March and April 1973.

Davis, Nathaniel. Testimony. Nomination of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, February 1975.

Davis, Nathaniel (Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, U.S. Department of State). Testimony. U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa. Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, June and July 1975.

Diggs, Representative Charles C., Jr. Statement. Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, on S.

Res. 214 Relative to the Submission of Any Portuguese Base
Agreement as a Treaty, February 1972.

Diggs, Representative Charles C., Jr. Testimony. Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, March and April 1973.

Diggs, Representative Charles C., Jr. Statement. Nomination of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 1st Session, 19 February 1975.

Diggs, Representative Charles C., Jr. Press Conference Statement of Resignation from U.S. Delegation to the 26th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Reprinted in Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, on S. Res. 214 Relative to the Submission of Any Portuguese Base Agreement as a Treaty, February 1972.

Easum, Donald (Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs). Testimony. The Complex of United States-Portuguese Relations: Before and After the Coup, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974.

"Exports of Aircraft and Helicopters to Mozambique and Angola, 1963-1972", U.S. Bureau of Census FT-410 Export Statistics. Reprinted in Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st session, March and April 1973.

Foley, John W. (Director, Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State). Testimony. International Protection of Human Rights--The Work of International Organizations and the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, August 1, September 13, 19, 20, 27, October 3, 4, 10, 11, 16, 18, 24, 25, November 1, December 7, 1973.

Heinz, Vice Admiral L. C. (U.S. Navy, Director of Military Assistance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs). Testimony. Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 2nd Session, March 1966.

Johnson, Ambassador U. Alexis (Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State). Testimony. Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd Session, on S. Res. 214 Relative to the Submission of Any Portuguese Base Agreement as a Treaty, February 1972.

McNamara, Robert S. Testimony. Foreign Assistance Act of 1963. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 88th Congress, 1st Session, 1963.

Myer, Rauer H. (Director, Office of Export Control, Bureau of East-West Trade, Department of Commerce). Testimony. Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st session, March and April 1973.

Newsom, David D. (Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Department of State). Testimony. Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st session, March and April 1973.

Newsom, David D. (Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Department of State). Testimony. Policy Toward Africa for the Seventies. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd session, 1970.

Noyes, James H. (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs, Department of Defense). Testimony. Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st session, March and April 1973.

O'Neil, W. Paul, Jr. (Director, Office of Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State). Testimony. The Complex of United States-Portuguese Relations: Before and After the Coup, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, March 14, October 8, 9, and 22, 1974.

Oudes, Bruce. Statement. Implementation of the U.S. Arms Embargo (Against Portugal and South Africa, and Related Issues). Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st session, March 20, 22, April 6, 1973.

Rusk, Dean. Testimony. Nomination of Dean Rusk, Secretary of State-Designate. Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961.

Satterwaite, John C. Testimony. United States Foreign Policy. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, 1960.

Scott, Harold B. (Deputy Assistant Secretary and Director, Bureau of International Commerce, Department of Commerce). Testimony. U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Part 1, May 4, 5, 11, 12, June 2, 3, 15, 16, 30, and July 15, 1971.

Sheldon, Paul (Vice President, Gulf Oil Corporation). Testimony. The Complex of United States-Portuguese Relations: Before and After the Coup, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974.

Sheldon, Paul (Vice President, Gulf Oil Corporation). Testimony. U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 92nd Congress, 1st Session, Part I, May-June 1971.

Smith, Robert S. (Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Department of State). Testimony. U.S. Business Involvement in Southern Africa, hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 93rd Congress, 1st Session, Part 3, 1973.

Williams, G. Mennen. Testimony. Nomination of Murat W. Williams, George W. Ball, Roger W. Jones and G. Mennen Williams. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, 1961.

Wood, General Robert J. (Director of Military Assistance, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs). Testimony. Foreign Assistance Act of 1965. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 89th Congress, 1st Session, March 1965, Part IV.

Yost, Charles W. (U.S. Representative to the United Nations). Testimony. Policy Towards Africa for the Seventies. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd Session, March 17, 18, 19, 23, 24, May 19, 20, 21, June 4, September 30, October 1, November 18, and December 3, 1970.

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS

Antunes, José Freire. Kennedy e Salazar: O Leão e a Raposa. Lisbon: Difusão Cultural, 1991.

Antunes, José Freire. Nixon e Caetano: Promessas e Abandono. Lisbon: Difusão Cultural, 1992.

Ball, George W. The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern Structure. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968.

Bosgra, S.J., and Christopher van Krimpen. Portugal and NATO. Amsterdam: Angola Comité, 1972.

Bridgland, Fred. Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa. New York: Paragon House, 1987.

Cahen, Michel. Mozambique: La Révolution Implosée. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987.

Christie, Iain. Machel of Mozambique. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1988.

Clarence-Smith, Gervase. The Third Portuguese Empire, 1825-1875: A Study in Economic Imperialism. Manchester, United Kingdom: University of Manchester, 1985.

Davidson, Basil. In the Eye of the Storm. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975.

Davies, Robert. Les Angolais. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1965.

De Bragança, Aquino, and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds. Quem e o Inimigo, vols. 2 and 3. Lisbon: Iniciativas Editoriais, 1978.

De Oliveira, M. A. Fernandes, J. A. Miranda Dias, F. Jasmins Pereira, F. J. Hopffer Rego, Hugo J. T. Velosa, M. L. Braga da Cruz, Rodrigo J. Baiao, L. Felipe R. Tomas. A Descolonização Portuguesa: Aproximação ao seu Estudo, vol. 1. Lisbon: Instituto Democracia e Liberdade, 1979.

Dicionário de Português-Inglês. Porto, Portugal: Porto Editora, 1983.

Europa Publications. Africa South of the Sahara 1980-81. London: Europa Publications, 1980.

Europa Publications. Africa South of the Sahara 1997. London: Europa Publications, 1996.

First, Ruth. Black Gold: The Mozambican Miner, Proletarian and Peasant. Sussex: Harvester Press, 1983.

Flower, Ken. Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record, Rhodesia into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981. London: John Murray, 1987.

Fortunato, José, ed. Angola: Documentos do MPLA, vol. 1. Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 1977.

Frankel, Philip H. Pretoria's Praetorians: Civil-Military Relations in South Africa. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Geldenhuys, Deon. The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making. Johannesburg: Macmillan South Africa, 1984.

Gonçalves Ferreira, F. A. 15 Anos Da História Recente de Portugal (1970-1984): Os Factos, os Erros, os Protagonistas, a Análise e Interpretação. Lisbon: António Coelho Dias, 1985.

Hall, Margaret and Tom Young, Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1997.

Hanlon, Joseph. Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986.

Hanlon, Joseph. Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire. London: Zed Books, 1984.

Heimer, Franz Wilhelm. The Decolonization Conflict in Angola: 1974-76. Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1979.

Henderson, Lawrence W. Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1979.

International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1988-1989. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988.

Isaacman, Allen, and Barbara Isaacman. Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution. London: Westview Press, 1983.

Jackson, Henry F. From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960. New York: Morrow, 1982.

Johnson, Phyllis, and David Martin, eds. Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986.

Kalb, Madeleine. The Congo Cables. New York: MacMillan, 1982.

Khazanov, A. M. Agostinho Neto. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986.

Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982.

Legum, Colin, and Tony Hodges, eds. After Angola: The War over Southern Africa. London: Rex Collings, 1976.

Machel, Samora. Samora Machel, An African Revolutionary: Selected Speeches and Writings. Ed. Barry Munslow. London: Zed Books, 1985.

Mahoney, Richard D. JFK: Ordeal In Africa. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Marcum, John A. The Angolan Revolution. Vol. 1, The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1969.

Marcum, John A. The Angolan Revolution. Vol. 2, Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1978.

Martin, David, and Phyllis Johnson. The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War. Harare, Zimbabwe: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1981.

Meredith, Martin. The Past is Another Country: Rhodesia UDI to Zimbabwe. London: Pan Books Ltd, 1980.

Middlemas, Keith. Cabora Bassa: Engineering and Politics in Southern Africa. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975.

Minter, William, ed. Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1988.

Minter, William. Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. London: Zed Books, 1994.

Mondlane, Eduardo. The Struggle for Mozambique. London: Penguin Books, 1969.

Munslow, Barry. Mozambique: The Revolution and its Origins. Harlow, United Kingdom: Longman Group, 1983.

Noer, Thomas J. Cold War and Black Liberation: The United States and White Rule in Africa, 1964-1968. Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1985.

Nogueira, Franco. Salazar, vol. 5, A Resistência (1958-1964). Porto, Portugal: Livraria Civilizaçao Editora, 1984.

Ottaway, David, and Marina Ottaway. Afrocommunism. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981.

Pitcher, M. Anne. Politics in the Portuguese Empire: The State, Industry and Cotton, 1926-1974. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.

Queiroz, Artur. Angola do 25 de Abril ao 11 de Novembro: A Via Agreste da Liberdade. Lisbon: Ulmeiro, 1978.

Reis, Joao, and Armando Pedro Muiuane, eds. Datas e Documentos da História da FRELIMO. Imprensa Nacional: Maputo, 1975.

Rosberg, Carl G., and Thomas M. Callaghy, eds. Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1979.

Somerville, Keith. Angola: Politics, Economics and Society. London: Francis Pinter, 1986.

Stockwell, John. In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story. London: First Futura Publications, 1978.

Sulzberger, C. L. The World and Richard Nixon. New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1987.

Szulc, Tad. Fidel: A Critical Portrait. New York: William Morrow, 1986.

Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary. Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster Inc, 1986.

Weinstein, Warren, and Thomas H. Henriksen, eds. Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations. New York: Praeger, 1980.

Winter, Gordon. Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police. Harmondsworth, United Kingdom: Penguin, 1981.

Wolfers, Michael, and Jane Bergerol. Angola in the Front Line. London: Zed Press, 1983.

Wright, George. The Destruction of a Nation. London: Pluto Press, 1997.

CHAPTERS IN BOOKS

Alpers, Edward A. "The Struggle for Socialism in Mozambique, 1960-1972". In Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment. Ed. Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1979.

Gaspar, Carlos. "Incomplete Failure: Portugal's Policies Towards Angola and Mozambique Since Independence". In Regional Conflict and U.S. Policy: Angola and Mozambique. Ed. Richard J. Bloomfield. Algonac, Michigan: Reference Publications, 1988.

Gunn, Gillian. "Learning from Adversity: The Mozambican Experience". In Regional Conflict and U.S. Policy: Angola and Mozambique. Ed. Richard J. Bloomfield. Algonac, Michigan: Reference Publications, 1988.

Henriksen, Thomas H. "Angola, Mozambique, and the Soviet Union: Liberation and the Quest for Influence". In Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations. Ed. Warren Weinstein and Thomas H. Henriksen. New York: Praeger, 1980.

Holness, Marga. "Angola: The Struggle Continues". In Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War. Ed. Phyllis Johnson and David Martin. Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986.

Lawson, Eugene K. "China's Policy in Ethiopia and Angola". In Soviet and Chinese Aid to African Nations. Ed. Warren Weinstein and Thomas H. Henriksen. New York: Praeger, 1980.

Machel, Samora. "The People's Democratic Revolutionary Process in Mozambique". Reprinted in Samora Machel, An African Revolutionary: Selected Speeches and Writings. Ed. Barry Munslow. London: Zed Books, 1985.

Macridis, Roy C. "French Foreign Policy: The Quest for Rank". In Foreign Policy in World Politics: States and Regions. Ed. Roy C. Macridis. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1989.

Marcum, John A. "Southern Africa After the Collapse of Portuguese Rule". In Africa: From Mystery to Maze. Ed. Helen Kitchen. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Company, 1976.

Mondlane, Eduardo. "O Ponto de Vista do Governo dos EUA", September 1964. Reprinted in Quem e o Inimigo, vol. 3. Ed. Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein. Lisbon: Iniciativas Editoriais, 1978.

Shore, Herbert. "Resistance and Revolution in the Life of Eduardo Mondlane". Introductory chapter in The Struggle for Mozambique, by Eduardo Mondlane. London: Penguin Books, 1969.

Wager, Stephen J., and Donald E. Schulz. "The Zapatista Revolt and Its Implications for Civil-Military Relations and the Future of Mexico". In Mexico Faces the 21st Century. Ed. Donald E. Schulz and Edward J. Williams. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1995.

JOURNAL ARTICLES

"A Africa Nada Tem a Diologar com O Regime de Pretoria". Tempo (Mozambique), no. 238 (20 April 1975).

Andrade, Mário de. "Et les colonies des Salazar?" Démocratie Nouvelle 4, no. 9 (September 1960).

Davidson, Basil. "Angola in the Tenth Year: A Report and an Analysis, May-July 1970". African Affairs (January 1971).

Davidson, Basil. "Arms and the Portuguese". Africa Report (May 1970).

Davidson, Basil. "Walking 300 Miles With Guerillas Through the Bush of Eastern Angola" (remarks presented at a seminar at the California Institute of Technology). Munger Africana Library Notes (Pasadena, California), no. 6 (1971).

Cahen, Michel. "Check on Socialism in Mozambique: What Check? What Socialism?". Review of African Political Economy, no. 57 (July 1993).

Cahen, Michel. "Corporatisme et colonialisme: Approche du cas mozambicain, 1933-1979. I". Cahiers d'Études, 92, XXIII-4 (1983).

Cahen, Michel. "Corporatisme et colonialisme: Approche du cas mozambicain, 1933-1979. II". Cahiers d'Études, 93, XXIV-1 (1984).

Cahen, Michel. "Le Portugal et l'Afrique". Afrique Contemporaine, (Jan-Mar 1986).

Ebinger, Charles K. "External Intervention in Internal War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Angolan Civil War". Orbis (Fall 1976).

Khatchatorov, K. "Ambassador in Chile". Tempo (Mozambique), no. 239 (27 April 1975).

Kitchen, Helen. "Conversation with Eduardo Mondlane". Africa Report (November 1967).

Marcum, John A. "A Martyr for Mozambique". Africa Report (March-April 1969).

McCormick, Shawn. "Angola: The Road to Peace". CSIS Africa Notes (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C.), no. 125 (June 6, 1991).

Menezes, Hugo. "Angola and the New Imperialist Strategy in Southern Africa". Faulha (Accra, Ghana), 1 July 1965. Reprinted in Quem e o Inimigo, vol. 3. Ed. Aquino de Bragança and Immanuel Wallerstein. Lisbon: Iniciativas Editoriais, 1978.

Messiant, Christine. "Angola, Les Voies de l'Ethnisation et de la Décomposition". Lusotopie, no. 1-2 (1994).

"Moçambique: Base Revolucionária Contra o Racismo e o Imperialismo". Tempo (Mozambique), no. 211 (13 October 1974).

"Portugal Afrique: La Guerre de L'OTAN". Jeune Afrique, no. 705 (13 July 1974).

"República Popular da China--A Terra e o Povo". Tempo (Mozambique), no. 234 (23 March 1975).

"Secretário de Estado-Adjunto Norte-Americano Para Assuntos Africanos contactou Governo de Transição". Tempo (Mozambique), no. 219 (8 December 1974).

Szulc, Tad. "Lisbon and Washington: Behind the Portuguese Revolution". Foreign Policy, no. 21 (Winter 1975-6).

Wasserman, Gary. "The Politics of Consensual Decolonization". African Review, 5, no. 1 (1975).

NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

Baltimore Sun (Baltimore, United States). 21 December 1962.

Christian Science Monitor (Boston, United States). 9 July 1974.

Daily News (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania), 19 May 1975.

Financial Times (London, United Kingdom). 12 August 1975.

New York Times (New York, United States). 28 April 1974.

Notícias de Portugal (Lisbon, Portugal). 29 December 1983.

Observer (London, United Kingdom). 15 September 1974.

Pravda (Moscow, Soviet Union). 22 April 1965; 11 August 1965.

Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg, South Africa). 3 June 1971, 8 August 1973, 11 March 1974, 27 April 1974, 29 April 1974, 30 May 1974, 18 September 1974.

Rhodesian Herald (Salisbury, Rhodesia). 30 July 1968.

South Africa Financial Gazette (South Africa). 1 February 1974.

Star (Johannesburg, South Africa). 31 July 1968, 1 August 1968, 4 June 1970, 19 November 1970, 22 December 1970, 4 January 1971, 21 June 1971, 5 February 1972, 14 July 1973, 16 July 1973, 21 July 1973, 7 August 1973, 21 August 1973, 25 September 1973, 15 November 1973, 30 November 1973, 7 February 1974, 21 March 1974, 2 May 1974, 20 June 1974, 5 August 1974, 25 October 1974, 13 November 1974, 10 February 1975, 10 March 1975, 8 April 1975, 29 April 1975.

Sunday Express (Johannesburg, South Africa). 30 March 1975.

Sunday Times (Johannesburg, South Africa). 28 July 1974, 17 November 1974.

Sunday Times (London, United Kingdom). 28 July 1974.

Times (London, United Kingdom). 10 July 1973, 13 July 1973, 16 July 1973, 1 August 1973, 26 March 1974, 3 August 1974, 24 December 1975.

Times of Zambia (Lusaka, Zambia). 21 June 1975.

Washington Post (Washington, D.C., United States). 30 January 1972, 28 January 1998.

Zambia Daily Mail (Lusaka, Zambia). 23 June 1975.

OTHER WORKS

Bender, Gerald J. "Kissinger and Angola: The Anatomy of Failure".

Unpublished typescript, 1976.

Witney Schneidman. American Foreign Policy and the Fall of the Portuguese Empire, 1961-1976. University of Southern California PhD thesis, 1987.