From Paradigm to Practice: The Politics and Implementation of Sustainable Human Development in Uganda

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Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the Doctorate in Philosophy (PhD) in International Development

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September 14, 1998

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For my compañero, Stephen Baranyi, who inspired me and supported me through it all

A quarter of the world's people remain in severe poverty. In a global economy of US$ 25 trillion, this is a scandal--reflecting shameful inequalities and inexcusable failures of national and international policy.

UNDP, *1997 Human Development Report* [1]

We have discovered how to send people safely to the moon, but have not discovered how to ensure that people can live safely on earth-safe from war, disease, and the crushing poverty that stifles ambition, hope and enterprise.

Ian Smillie [2]

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[1] UNDP. *1997 Human Development Report*. Page 2. New York: Oxford University Press and the UN, 1997.

[2] Ian Smillie. *Mastering the Machine: Poverty, Aid and Technology*. Page ii. London: Intermediate Technology Publications, UK, 1991.

Acknowledgements:

I first encountered the notions of *Sustainable Human Development* (SHD) and *People Centred Development* (PCD) while working with UNDP in Central America. Although the unwieldy volume of documents which passed through our desks meant that we rarely had time to consume them all, UNDP's *1990 Human Development Report* immediately stood out. When read carefully, the report seemed to contain a scathing critique of the existing system of development cooperation. Indeed, it is the *Human Development* paradigm's potential challenge of the development establishment which convinced me to dedicate my doctoral thesis to it.

Initially, few of my family or colleagues--save for my husband--understood why I would forego so much income and spend the most productive (and reproductive) years of my life carrying out such time-consuming, demanding and costly research. As the thesis began taking shape though, important allies began to emerge.

My first break came when the *Development Studies Institute* (DESTIN) at the *London School of Economics and Political Science* (LSE) showed an interest in my research. It was James Putzel at DESTIN who helped me secure the funding and housing I needed to survive in London and helped me through the various hoops I would face along the way. Meghnad Desai, Director of LSE's *Centre for the Study of Global Governance* and one of the pioneers of UNDP's *Human Development Index*, opened doors for me at UNDP's *Human Development Report Office* in New York, provided valuable comments on my work, and encouraged me to publish my preliminary findings at the Centre. Convincing Teddy Brett and Christopher Hood to be my thesis supervisors was my next blessing. Not only have both incessantly pressed me to improve the substance and accuracy of my analysis but, together, they have been a formidable team; with one serving as the field-savvy Africanist with a natural feel for the critical issues in current development debates and the broad brush strokes on the canvas and the other as the erudite organizations scholar with unsurmountable knowledge of administration and implementation theory and an eye for conceptual coherence and methodological rigour.

Of course, the research would never have taken place without the access provided by UNDP and Action Aid. In this respect I am particularly grateful to Susan Johnson, David Archer, Raj Thamotheram and Nigel Twose at Action Aid in London and to Anthony Wasswa, Joffrey Atieli, Sara Mangali, Chris Kiwanuka and Med Makumbi in Action Aid-Uganda. Within UNDP, I owe special thanks to Babatunde Thomas and Joseph Opio-Odongo for giving me the green light to study UNDP's work in Kampala and to Mary Jo Kakinda, Betty Babirye Ddungu, and Phil Bartle for allowing me to visit their programmes in the Ugandan countryside. My Uganda research also benefited from the support of Makerere University's Institute for Social Research (MISR) and the insights of my Ugandan research assistants, Edward Ssekayombya and Elizabeth Waissa.

Finally, this thesis would not have been possible without the Academic Council on the United Nations' (ACUNS) Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, the British government's Overseas Students Scholarship (ORS) and the ongoing support of annual LSE studentships.

Abstract:

Today, the credibility of the international development community is increasingly being called into question. At the root of the problem are the extremely unequal nature of recent growth, the end of the Cold War, economic recession in the North, and the lacklustre record of foreign aid in reaching those left behind.

By the 1990s, the notion of *Sustainable Human Development* (SHD) or what is sometimes called *People-Centred Development* (PCD) was being hailed as a possible framework for building a newly-invigorated system of international development cooperation based on genuine North-South partnership, holistic, equitable, participatory, empowering and sustainable development.

This thesis explores the implementability and transformational potential of the SHD/PCD paradigm by analyzing how a multilateral development agency (UNDP) and an international NGO (Action Aid) put it into practice both globally and in Uganda. Its main argument is that despite both agencies' contributions to service-delivery and training, and their genuine efforts to reorient their work towards SHD/PCD approaches, in the final analysis neither UNDP or Action Aid realize the more transformative goals of the SHD/PCD agenda or seriously challenge the status quo. This is partly due to the excessively abstract, unfinished, ideologically confused and contradictory nature of the SHD/PCD paradigm itself. (i.e., the *Baroque Science Phenomenon*). However UNDP and Action Aid, both of which adopted SHD/PCD to enhance their profiles, must assume much of the responsibility blame for subordinating core SHD/PCD goals to their own organizational interests (i.e., the *River Pollution Phenomenon*). The thesis also demonstrates how both agencies undermine their effectiveness by making a series of fallacious assumptions about both poor communities' and their own catalytic potential in an effort to reconcile the gap between their agencies' SHD/PCD aspirations and the real-life constraints facing their goals.

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Chapter 1: Introduction: Sustainable Human Development -- The Way Forward or the Development Community Gone Astray?

> A Rising Tide of Wealth is supposed to lift all boats. But some are more seaworthy than others. The yachts and ocean liners are indeed rising in response to new opportunities, but the rafts and rowboats are taking on water--and some are sinking fast.
>
> UNDP, *1997 Human Development Report* [1]

I. The Current Crisis in International Development:

A) The Crisis of Unequal Development and Growing Marginalization:

As we approach the twenty-first century, the world is becoming an increasingly impoverished and unjust one. Despite the impressive growth and progress achieved by some developing countries in the last two decades, the vast majority of the world's population remain poor and marginalized. There is considerable debate about the exact nature of global poverty today and whether it has been reduced or aggravated by structural adjustment, globalization and liberalization policies. [2] Nevertheless, there is growing concern that, although the world economy as a whole has witnessed stellar growth in recent decades and significant progress has been made in improving the quality of life of many people, including those in developing countries [3], it is mainly a sub-set of some 15 countries which have experienced the most dramatic surges in growth while the poorest countries in the world have lagged behind. [4] There is also growing preoccupation that even the spectacular rates of growth achieved by the select few may be increasing existing inequalities and insecurity and, as such, may not be sustainable or worth sustaining. [5] The consequence may be a world characterized by a growing divide between 'haves' and 'have nots' and, for those left behind, a precarious existence in what some have called "a world of shanty states." [6] This suggests that there is 'a serious crisis in development' which the international community cannot ignore. [7]

Judging from the evidence above, the current crisis in development is perhaps not so much one of 'complete failure', since some progress has been made in improving the quality of life of many of those formerly considered poor [8], but rather a realization that we need to focus on those who have lagged behind. This preoccupation has been voiced by David Korten, who has warned that, if the world's imbalances in economic growth are allowed to continue, we will produce a world gargantuan in its excesses and grotesque in its human inequalities. [9]

This thesis concurs that the biggest development challenge facing us today is that of escalating global disparity and marginalization. Its chief aim is to explore how these can be reversed through the use of *Sustainable Human Development* (SHD) and *People-Centred Development* (PCD) approaches.

B) The Crisis in Development Theory:

In addition to the crisis of growing disparity and marginalization, many development thinkers and practitioners fear that the development discipline may have also lost its theoretical bearings. At one of the times of greatest human need, development thinking may be in the midst of a conceptual deadlock. While development theory and policy during most of the 1960s and 1970s was strongly anchored in Keynesian principles of development planning and state-centred development and while in the 1980's it was primarily inspired by liberalization and market-led ideals [10], by the 1990s many felt that development ideas had entered an impasse, as it became evident that neither of the post-war development models could address the root causes of global poverty and inequality. [11]

It is worth noting that some development thinkers question the existence of an impasse in development theory while others continue to debate the nature, origins and timing of the impasse. Hence, while

academics like Robert A. Packenham attribute the impasse in development thinking to the utopianism, over-politicization, and excessive holism of the Dependency theories which predominated during the 1960s and 1970s [12], Professor Colin Leys links the impasse in development theory to the predominance of neo-Liberalism and its excessive confidence in 'the market' and efforts to veil the political aspects of the neo-Liberal agenda. [13] At the same time, writers like Stuart Corbridge and Frans J. Schuurman argue that development theory is not in an impasse at all. Corbridge has argued that post-Marxist thought had successfully moved beyond the 'economism', 'essentialism' and 'epistemological fiat' of classical Marxism. [14] Schuurman agrees but attributes the breakthrough to development studies' growing recognition of the diversity of development processes and the importance of non-economic factors other than class and emphasizing rigorous empiricism and praxis rather than just theorization. [15]

What matters more than the exact nature of the impasse though, is the perception among many development scholars and practitioners that development discourse is in urgent need of a new development paradigm to fill the gaps left by the collapse of former models and to add clarity to the meaning of development which has been blurred by the recent surge in the nomenclature and in development concepts as the international community searches for alternatives. [16] If anything then, the impasse in development theory today may have less to do with a dearth of new ideas than it does with a search for an alternative shared development paradigm. The emergence of SHD/PCD addresses such needs by offering a paradigm which balances market, state and participatory approaches.

C) The Crisis in Development Cooperation:

The final crises of international development relates to the effectiveness of the existing system of international development

cooperation itself. Originally, much of the disillusion with development cooperation either focused on the perceived bankruptcy, bureaucratization and fragmentation of the United Nations' network of specialized development agencies [17], or stemmed from development agencies themselves which attributed their own ineffectiveness to decreasing foreign aid levels (Refer to **Table 1.1** in this Chapter) [18], the growing commercialization of aid, and pressures to do more 'contracting out' work. Today, nevertheless, the disenchantment with foreign aid has become much more generalized, with much of the criticism being directed at the system of international cooperation itself and with the roots of the problem being traced to factors as diverse as the lack of an 'enabling environment' or appropriate 'rules of the game' in developing societies themselves [19]; development interventions which are overly rigid, top-down, and non-participatory [20]; a system of development cooperation which is too concerned with self-perpetuation and filling its own pockets [21]; and a development establishment which uses foreign aid as a tool of neo-Imperialism [22] and as a way of imposing northern conditionalities upon the South. [23] Either way, many former supporters of foreign aid have become impatient with a system of international development cooperation which seems to have lost its way and proven ineffective at eradicating poverty or having long-term development impact. According to Sachs:

> The idea of development was once a towering monument inspiring international enthusiasm. Today the structure is falling apart and in danger of total collapse....Development has become a shape-less amoeba-like word. It cannot express anything because its outlines are blurred....The task then, is to push the rubble aside to open new ground. [24]

Naturally, many development actors do not believe that the system of international development cooperation is on the verge of collapse, but even the OECD's *1996 Development Co-operation Report*, warns that, if the OECD countries are to avoid a severe development crisis, they will need to adapt to the changing global context by both becoming more adept at securing additional financial commitments from donors nervous about the sluggishness of their

national economies, and, adopt a series of measures to correct their old weaknesses and become much more effective at meeting OECD's new development targets. [25] As the Ministers and Heads of Agencies in the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) put it in a communiqué released in early 1997, "We will need to change how we think and how we operate in a far more co-ordinated effort than we have known until now".[26]

Of course, the feeling of 'impending crisis' is far from new in development cooperation circles. As Smillie has pointed out, the *Pearson Commission Report* expressed considerable concern in 1969 over what was seen as dwindling public support for foreign aid and growing distrust and disillusionment with the system of development cooperation at the time. [27] Nevertheless, a sense of malaise now exists as well as a perception that the system of international development cooperation is not performing as it should; that it has failed to fill the gap between its ideals and reality; and that it has lost support in the North and the South.

D) The Need for An Alternative Development Approach

It is in this difficult context that the ideas of *Sustainable Human Development* (SHD) and *People-Centred Development* (PCD) have come to the fore as a novel and audacious development model which offers a possible response to the triple crisis discussed above. The need to find a credible development approach of this kind is the driving force behind this thesis.

II. SHD/PCD: A Response to the Crisis in International Development:

A) Defining SHD/PCD Approaches

The United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) defines *Sustainable Human Development* (SHD) as "the process of enlarging peoples' capabilities

and choices so as to enable them to better satisfy their own needs". This implies that people should not only be regarded as the "means" but also seen as the "ends" of development processes. In essence, SHD aspires towards what UNDP calls "the development of the people, by the people, for the people". [28] In *Initiatives for Change*, UNDP's chief statement of intent for the nineties, UNDP Administrator, Mr. James Gustave Speth, heralds SHD as a promising framework for building a newly-invigorated system of development cooperation based on genuine North-South partnership as well as for carrying out comprehensive policy and institutional reforms at the international, national and local levels. [29] More concretely, Mr. Speth argues that SHD--or, *People Centred Development* (PCD), as it is sometimes called--is a new development paradigm which should not only generate economic growth, but also distribute its benefits equitably; regenerate the environment rather than destroying it; and give priority to empowering poor people by enlarging their choices and ensuring their active participation rather than marginalizing them. [30] In sum, UNDP views SHD/PCD approaches as pro-poor, pro-nature, pro-jobs, pro-women, and pro-children. It stresses growth with employment, environmental protection, empowerment and equity.[31]

B) The Importance of SHD/PCD Approaches and UNDP's Unique Contribution

Since the 1990s SHD/PCD approaches have been gathering tremendous momentum. At the global level, these notions have become an integral part of the development cooperation policies of the OECD [32], and were given added impetus in the 1995 *World Summit for Social Development* at Copenhagen where 134 nation-states committed themselves to creating a framework of action to "place people at the centre of development". [33] More recently, SHD/PCD approaches have made considerable headway regionally and nationally as well. For instance, in 1994, the UN's *Economic Commission for Africa* organized a special *Conference of African Ministers Responsible for Human Development* to produce an

African Common Position on Social and Human Development in Africa. [34] *Human Development* also figured prominently on the agenda of the *Symposium on Asia-Pacific Cooperation* held in Hawaii in May 1990. [35] A few years later, in Valparaíso, Chile, representatives from Latin American political parties, labour organizations, academic institutions and NGOs proclaimed their commitment to *Human Development* in *The Valparaíso Report* which was entitled: *A Government for Human Development*. [36] In addition, 40 countries have produced national *Human Development Reports*, many of them involving a wide range of governmental and civil society actors in the process. [37]

Clearly, SHD/PCD approaches have become very influential in development circles. Furthermore, while UNDP did not invent this approach, it has undoubtedly played a key role in presenting them as a viable alternative to the neo-Liberal consensus which had become the doctrine of the World Bank, and has actively promoted them through its annual *Human Development Reports* (HDRs) and the speeches of its new Administrator.

C) SHD/PCD as an Alternative Framework for Development Cooperation:

This thesis will argue that SHD/PCD approaches introduce some innovations in the way we conceptualize development and will show that these ideas constitute a *bona fide* development paradigm, contain useful insights into development problems, move beyond state-vs-market dichotomies or excessive economism, and offer an ambitious agenda of potentially very radical and promising policy and reform proposals. Having said this, we must then ask whether this insightful and promising development paradigm is sufficiently robust or realistic to be operationalized into effective development policies and practice. This is a critical question given that, translating development paradigms into practice has long been the Achilles' heel of the development discipline.

As Dennis Rondinelli rightly points out:

> Although the rhetoric of development policy has changed drastically over the past half century....a substantial amount of evidence suggests that translating plans into action was, and continues to be, one of the most difficult tasks facing development administrators. [38]

And, as David Moore and Gerald Schmitz remind us:

> The buzzwords of development tend to have a relatively short product cycle and have usually been replaced by the time they are subject to any systematic critique. [39]

It is the difficulty of filling the gap between paradigm and practice which produces the main challenge which I propose to take on in my thesis.

III. Key Research Questions and the Guiding Threads of the Study:

A) Three Core Research Questions Posed in the Study

In this thesis I address the challenge presented above through three core sets of research questions.

First, I am concerned with the conceptual soundness and practical feasibility of the SHD/PCD paradigm. Can SHD/PCD approaches be effectively operationalized? What constraints are likely to emerge from the paradigm's abstractness and diverse theoretical foundations and ideological tenets? What effects might they have on SHD/PCD's implementability?

Second, what motives do international organizations have for advocating a SHD/PCD approach? How have these agencies' motives and organizational interests affected the way they have interpreted and implemented the SHD/PCD paradigm? How far have they been willing to reform the existing system of international development cooperation, and indeed, their own practices, to realize the SHD/PCD agenda?

Third, how have different types of international development organizations gone about putting SHD/PCD approaches into practice? What

kinds of obstacles have these organizations faced in carrying out SHD/PCD approaches? What impact have these agencies' SHD/PCD efforts had on the well-being and empowerment of the poorest? In this thesis I compare how a UN agency and an international NGO have performed in these respects.

Together, these questions should allow me to ascertain the extent to which inter-governmental development agencies and international NGOs are organizationally equipped to implement SHD/PCD initiatives; whether they are prepared to pursue the intra-organizational changes and broader institutional and policy reforms needed to realize the more transformative elements of the SHD/PCD agenda; and to test whether international development agencies can play a vanguard role in a paradigm shift.

B) The Guiding Threads of the Study: The Importance of Implementation, Institutions and Organizations in Development Processes

The above questions all involve a shared preoccupation with the pivotal role which implementation processes, institutions and organizations play in filling the gap between paradigm and practice in development. These concerns are the two guiding threads which stitch my thesis together.

'Implementation' refers to the process by which a paradigm is translated into practice. According to Conyers and Hills, it is an ongoing process involving an initial transition from concept (i.e., paradigm) to policy (i.e., commitments about the types of changes which are desirable); a transition from policy to plans (i.e., actual blueprints of the best way to bring about stated changes); and a final phase in which policies and plans are translated into concrete courses of action which, in development at least, normally take the form of specific development programmes or projects. [40] To capture this continuum, I study SHD/PCD at the conceptual level, while at the same time analyzing its impact at the policy, organizational, and programme/project levels. The four levels are the building blocks in SHD/PCD's translation from paradigm to practice.

My focus on the role played by 'institutions' and 'organizations' draws inspiration from the growing influence of what has been referred to as the *New Institutionalism*. [41] As a field and type of analysis, the *New Institutionalism* is recent, diverse, and subject to considerable debate [42], but its key premise that institutions and organizations play a critical role in shaping societal values and behaviour and can serve as catalysts of change, is having considerable influence in development. [43] The importance of the role played by institutions and organizations in development is the second guiding thread in my thesis. When I speak of 'institutions' and 'organizations', I am following Douglass North, who defines 'institutions' as the formal or informal "rules, enforcement characteristics of rules and, the norms of behaviour that structure repeated human interaction" (i.e., as the "rules of the game") [44]; and 'organizations' as "the players in the game" as well as the "initiators of institutional change", since, it is members of organizations who invest in the skills and knowledge which lead to revised evaluations of opportunities and which induce alterations in the rules of the game. [45] This distinction is very useful for my own research since it suggests that international development organizations are the key players to watch, as they are both the shapers of the rules and the vehicles for change, yet they are nevertheless, part of the much broader game and set of formal and informal rules which govern the broader system of international development cooperation and LDCs' own economic and political institutional arrangements. Hence, while international development organizations remain the focal point of my analysis, throughout this thesis, I make a conscious effort to show how these agencies' SHD/PCD efforts are themselves influenced and constrained by the rules and norms of the wider system of international development cooperation as well as of the existing institutional framework in LDCs.

There are three reasons for focusing my thesis on the role of international development organizations. Firs, as noted by *institutionalists*,

organizations are actors in their own right and have their own momentum and potential for changing values, norms and rules rather than simply being a product of these. Second, despite declining levels of Official Development Assistance (ODA), international assistance is still a crucial instrument of international cooperation as well as a substantial source of financial and technical resources. (Refer to **Table 1.1**) [46]. Third, in recent years, international development agencies have themselves been making a case for 'more aid' by arguing that they are beginning to introduce organizational reforms as well as new policies and practices which make them work more effectively. It is therefore critically important that we put these new claims and commitments to the test.

Finally, I should note that my thesis' focus on organizations does not mean that wider contextual or institutional factors which go beyond the aid regime are unimportant. As noted above, I will also examine the influence of contextual factors unique to Ugandan society (e.g., its history of tribal conflict, ethnic and religious tensions, and persistent war threats from neighbours, etc.); the effects of wider institutional constraints (e.g., limited access to markets or technical know-how and unequal and clientelistic power relations, etc.); and the implications of the Ugandan government's own development policies and plans (e.g., the Museveni government's heavy debt burden, unconsolidated democratic institutions, and weak civil service with poor planning capacity and a susceptibility towards corruption, etc.) for the effective implementation of SHD/PCD in Uganda. My overall concern then is to explore the role which different types of factors play in influencing the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches, with a special emphasis on the *interface* between wider contextual factors, institutional factors inherent to the aid regime as well as to Ugandan society, and the organizational features of the development agencies I have chosen to study.

IV. Establishing the Parameters of the Study:

A) The Choice of Country and Organizations to be Studied:

I have chosen Uganda as my country example and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Action Aid (AA) as my organizational case studies so as to analyze the impact of SHD/PCD in specific contexts.

I chose Uganda because I wanted to examine a country where the severe economic, social and political deprivation suffered by much of the population made the implementation of SHD/PCD especially urgent there. I also wanted to explore whether SHD/PCD approaches lend themselves to helping the 'poorest of the poor'. This meant that I would have to test the implementability of SHD/PCD approaches in a country with little or no experience of investing in people and where improvements in human well-being are desperately needed. Uganda meets all these criteria because with a GDP per capita of only US$ 218 in 1994, it is one of the world's poorest LDCs, it has suffered almost three decades of repression and civil strife, and has a poor record of investing in peoples' well-being, being ranked 155th out of 174 countries in UNDP's annual *Human Development Index* (HDI). [47] However, Uganda is also a promising testing ground for SHD/PCD approaches because many of the indicators coming from Uganda show great promise. Not only has the Ugandan economy been growing impressively since 1986 [48], but the democratic reforms and decentralization process launched by the Museveni Government in the mid 1990s are regarded as crucial steps towards creating an 'enabling environment' for Uganda's future *Human Development*. Uganda's future success is not certain, but the international community has identified Uganda as one of the countries with the greatest development potential in Africa and made it a favoured recipient of foreign aid. [49] This makes Uganda an ideal environment in which to assess the impact of foreign aid and SHD/PCD.

I have chosen the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Action Aid (AA) as my organizational case studies.

UNDP has 132 field offices all over the world and an annual budget of US$ 1.7 billion. [50] In addition to its size, UNDP is the UN agency with the most flexible and widest-reaching terms of reference which also has a key coordination role among the specialized development agencies of the UN system. The importance of UNDP's coordination role was reinforced by UN Secretary General, Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, in *An Agenda for Development*. [51] Secondly, as a very large, hierarchical, bureaucratic, politically-constrained and largely managerial development agency, UNDP provides an excellent venue for determining whether international development agencies with such traits were properly equipped to carry out flexible, process-based, and long-term participatory SHD/PCD approaches. Thirdly, UNDP is the agency most closely associated with the SHD/PCD in the international system and has come to be regarded as the champion of this cause.

AA was chosen as an international non-governmental organization (NGO) which was pursuing development goals similar to those of UNDP but which, organizationally speaking, was structured very differently from UNDP. Hence, like UNDP, by the 1990s, AA began to make a conscious effort to move beyond economistic definitions of development which equated poverty with a lack material resources. In *Giving People Choices: Action Aid and Development*, AA notes that because economic growth alone does not alleviate poverty and can even exacerbate it, AA's development objectives should not merely be economic growth, but rather "human development" and "giving people and their children control and choice over the processes of change which confront them." [52] Like UNDP, AA has also been trying to shift away from traditional forms of service-delivery and to shift towards much more flexible, participatory, and self-reliant approaches which go beyond project-specific interventions and are sustainable over the longer-term.

Yet, AA also differs from UNDP in important respects. As an NGO, AA has more political autonomy and is not directly restrained by the UN system and its member donor and recipient governments. AA has only 20 country programmes and its annual budget (US$ 57 million or, £38 million in 1994-95) [53] is comparatively small compared to UNDP's. Thus, AA provides an opportunity for comparing whether a smaller and politically more autonomous development organization which considers itself grassroots, hands-on and less bureaucratic and hierarchical than UNDP is in fact in a better position to lead a major paradigm shift, to challenge the existing system of development cooperation, and to translate SHD/PCD into practice. My comparison of the two agencies was facilitated by the fact that both have major development programmes in Uganda which I was given access to. [54]

B) Guidelines and Assessment Criteria Used to Determine SHD/PCD Impact:

In 1994, UNDP's Inter-Bureau Task Force on Sustainable Human Development suggested five major criteria or guidelines which could be used to assess the effectiveness of UNDP's SHD/PCD programmes. These are: [55]

i) Adopting a multidisciplinary and holistic approach based on interventions which build on cross-cutting themes (such as environment, gender, employment and sustainable livelihoods and poverty eradication) and in which innovation, flexibility, ongoing learning and effective evaluation are key to development; [56]

ii) Contributing to 'Sound governance' by showing policy and institutional impact at both the Upstream and Downstream levels, and helping countries develop sustained national and local governance capacity to increase their self-reliance over the longer-term; [57]

iii) Fostering genuine North-South partnership by creating a sense of national ownership, serving as a neutral consensus builder between government and civil society and working towards enhanced aid coordination between government and the international community as well as between international donors themselves; [58]

iv) Ensuring beneficiary participation in the identification, design, implementation and evaluation of development efforts, and empowering beneficiaries by ensuring that they acquire the confidence needed to assume control of their own destinies; [59]

v) Promoting equity by fulfilling service needs of the disadvantaged, by ensuring their participation and building their capabilities, and by supporting organizations which might do so as well. [60]

I wish to use these guidelines to assess the success of UNDP and AA in challenging existing institutional arrangements and in leading a major paradigm shift so as to be able to put SHD/PCD ideas into practice. Although, it is true that no other international development agency (or governmental entity that I am aware of) has ever achieved such high standards, it seems fair to assess UNDP's and AA's performance on the basis of goals which they have set out for themselves and that we set out to determine whether like UNDP and AA actually measure up to their own ideals, and whether they are able to close the gap between their own rhetoric and reality. **Table 1.2** outlines some of the variables, indicators and types of behaviour which I observed and the generic questions I asked in order to flesh out the above-stated guidelines in my own research.

C) The Main Features and Phases of the Research Methodology

My doctoral research was carried out over three years, from 1993-1995. Although the thesis traces the evolution of UNDP and AA during much of the nineties, the analysis contained herein is based on the reforms and policies carried out by both agencies during these three years and the UNDP and AA field programmes which I observed in Uganda during 1995.

The research involved four phases, including a review of the relevant literature and documents; a period of consultancy work and participant observation in UNDP's *Human Development Report Office* (HDRO) in New York; a set of unstructured interviews with key informants in the UK, New York and Washington; and, two periods of fieldwork in Uganda (from May-July 1995 and November-December 1995) where I used unstructured interviews, focus group discussions and semi-participant observation to get information from Ugandan government officials, fellow donors, development experts and beneficiaries. A list of key informants and details of the four phases of my research can be found in the thesis' **Appendix.**

The research design is primarily based on 'qualitative research' and, as such, the findings are largely based on human perceptions, insights and interpretations of events as opposed to given facts, statistical correlations, or specific calculations of probability or direct causality. [61] The thesis does, nevertheless, rely on a multiplicity of data collection and interpretation methods--an approach known as 'methodological integration'--as a means of cross-checking information and improving objectivity. [62] It also uses a 'grounded theory' approach influenced by the work of Glaser and Strauss. In practice, and in my research, the grounded theory approach is a reiterative process in which the researcher travels back and forth between data and theory as he/she ensures that the evidence available is properly grounded in existing theory and that the emerging theory fits the evidence on the ground. [63] (**Table A1** of the methodological appendix shows the steps used to record, organize, and interpret my data using grounded theory).

In addition to using UNDP and AA as 'organizational case studies', my fieldwork in Uganda involved 'multi-site studies' of selected UNDP and AA programmes and projects. Within UNDP, this involved 20 visits to specific project sites, beneficiary groups, and individuals from three UNDP-supported programmes: the *Africa 2000 Network*, the *Micro Projects Programme to Combat Aids* (MPP), and the *Community Management Programme* (CMP). Within AA, a one-day visit was paid to the *Kamuli* (AKP) Development Area (DA) but the fieldwork concentrated in the *Buwekula* (ABP) DA, where visits were made to 20 specific projects sites, beneficiary groups and individuals.

Overall, my doctoral research involved 211 interviews and visits chosen through 'non-probability sampling' techniques commonly used in qualitative research. Instead of selecting one's sample randomly or by calculating the exact probability of a respondent being chosen for one's

sample, in non-probability sampling, the researcher uses his/her own judgement and research interests as the main criteria for their sample. In my research I mainly used two non-probability sampling techniques: 'purposive sampling', where the researcher selects informants or projects on the basis of the chosen parameters and conceptual requirements of his/her study (e.g., informants known to be familiar with the work of UNDP's HDRO or field projects known to have strong SHD/PCD components), and 'snowball sampling', where the researcher relies on one informant to lead to another (e.g. visiting beneficiaries known for their effective results or, interviewing local members of the community cited by beneficiaries as influential persons in their area.) [64]

V. The Study's Two Major Hypotheses:

In this thesis, I aim to test two major hypotheses:

1. The *Baroque Science Phenomenon*:

One of the propositions which my thesis tries to test is whether the SHD/PCD paradigm is conceptually sound and, and if not, whether its conceptual deficiencies do not in fact complicate its operationalization into concrete development guidelines and programmes. In my thesis, I refer to this dilemma as the *Baroque Science Phenomenon* because, as it might turn out to be the case with SHD/PCD ideas, the Baroque Sciences made the assumption that there was an implicit harmony and understandable link among all phenomena in the world; that corruption or self-interested behaviour which threatens harmony is an aberration; and that, ultimately, all things can fit together despite apparent tensions. The main attraction of Baroque Science laid in its all-encompassing nature, while its major drawback was that the ideas remained attractive only as long as the theory was left abstract and was viewed from a distance and tensions and contradictions inherent in ideas, policies or programmes were often left unattended or merely tampered with rather than addresses head on. Yet, as soon as one

scratched beyond the surface and one's attention moved from abstract theory to actual implementation, the harmony in diversity threatened to become theoretical madness. And yet, scholars and development experts associated with UNDP's HDRs have never questioned SHD/PCD's conceptual soundness or fully addressed the implementational implications of possible conceptual deficiencies inherent in the paradigm.

2. The *River Pollution Phenomenon*:

The second hypothesis which I will be testing in my thesis is the possibility that, it is the efforts of UNDP and AA to reconcile the tensions inherent in the SHD/PCD approach and the gaps between SHD/PCD aspirations and their own organizational interests, which cause the gradual displacement or erosion of the more ambitious elements of the SHD/PCD agenda. In my thesis I refer to this possible tendency as the *River Pollution Phenomenon* because, like a running river which continually picks up debris as it runs downstream towards its destination, SHD/PCD initiatives may be themselves being weighed-down by the SHD/PCD paradigm's own conceptual limitations as well as by UNDP's and AA's pursuit of their own organizational interests as the paradigm makes its natural progression from development theory, to policy doctrine at agency headquarters in New York and London, and finally, into concrete development policies and programmes at the national and local levels in Uganda. These organizational interests may be manifesting themselves in a number of ways, including: i) a tendency for these agencies to do what is easiest and most feasible: (e.g., focussing on a narrow range of familiar options, working with easily accessible and trainable project beneficiaries, pursuing projects which are easier to implement, following existing rules and procedures about deadlines and fund disbursement); ii) a tendency towards self-perpetuation and do what is most likely to expand the mandate or power base of the agency (e.g. expanding the agency budget and keeping the money moving, increasing agency profile, adding on new functions, etc.); iii) a tendency

to do what is least objectionable to the most powerful stakeholders (e.g., giving into the political pressures of influential stakeholders who can exert the harshest sanctions); and iv) a tendency for agency staff to simplify the complexities of development processes (e.g., by discounting wider institutional constraints or hiding errors) in order to safeguard staff's professional advancement and to guarantee a positive image for the agency. When speaking of organizational interests though, it is important to clarify that, in my thesis, I am in no way claiming that the pursuit of organizational interests is by definition harmful to development processes or to the realization of SHD/PCD. Undeniably, it is quite plausible to encounter situations in which organizational interests coincide with, and are even conducive to the SHD/PCD agenda. The crux of the problem then is not that development agencies pursue their organizational interests--this, after all, is inevitable. What the *River Pollution Phenomenon* is trying to depict instead, is what happens when UNDP's and AA's pursuit of their own organizational interests are indeed in conflict with core transformational SHD/PCD goals and whether the latter get displaced in the process.

Another proposition to be tested in my thesis is whether, in an effort to deal with the *Baroque Science* and *River Pollution* Phenomena, UNDP and AA have (consciously or unconsciously) chosen to deny the severity of the constraints facing them by maintaining series of contestable assumptions about the implementability of SHD/PCD approaches and the true nature of the existing system of international development cooperation and development processes themselves. The first assumption which they may be making is that international development organizations such as theirs, whose mandate is partly one of continuous self-generation and whose power base emanates from mostly external and influential stakeholders (e.g., nation-states in the UN system or, northern sponsors) with a stake in the status quo, may not be in a position to challenge existing power structures either globally or in LDCs, nor to foster empowerment and self-reliance among the poor. A

second may be the supposition that development agencies with management structures as hierarchical, bureaucratic, managerially-oriented and sectorally-fragmented as UNDP's and AA's are capable of putting into practice SHD/PCD initiatives which require holistic, flexible, bottom-up, participatory, and collaborative modes of implementation. It may be especially unrealistic to expect these agencies to carry out development initiatives which simultaneously satisfy participatory and better monitoring and evaluation criteria--both components of the SHD/PCD agenda--when the former requires flexible and bottom-up management structures, while the latter depends on top-down managerial monitoring and evaluation systems and highly specialized technical advice. The final misconception may be the implicit assumption by UNDP and AA that the existing system of international development cooperation and development processes themselves are harmonious and symmetrical and that beneficiary communities are solidaristic and have unlimited indigenous knowledge and free time.

Although I do not think that *Baroque Science* or the *River Pollution* phenomena offer precise predictions, I would hypothesize that, as a result of these two phenomena and the above-mentioned contestable assumptions, although international development agencies like UNDP and AA have managed to improve their provision of alleviatory social services and skills training (i.e., *capability formation*), both have had serious difficulties transforming existing institutional arrangements and putting into practice the more radical empowerment and power-sharing components of the SHD/PCD agenda (i.e., enabling the poor to put their newly-acquired capabilities into practice, or *capability use*). As Diane Elson notes, although development agencies have rediscovered the essential truth that people ought to be at the centre of development, the extent of the social, political and economic changes this entails may not be appreciated. [65] These are the propositions I set out to assess here.

VI. Overview of Thesis Chapters:

The Chapters which follow provide the evidence needed to test the above hypotheses. **Chapter 2,** is the thesis' theoretical chapter and places the thesis' main questions and propositions in the context of the International Development Cooperation, SHD/PCD, Implementation and Institutional literatures. Even though my thesis does not invent a new 'integrative theory' *per se*, an eclectic conceptual framework allows me to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the four relevant literatures studied and to use them in a complementary fashion. **Chapter 3** provides an in-depth analysis of the conceptual soundness and coherence of SHD/PCD approaches and begins to build the case for the *Baroque Science Phenomenon*. **Chapter 4** is about Uganda's development potential. As such, it establishes what the Ugandan government has done to create an enabling institutional and policy environment for SHD/PCD and identifies the broader contextual and institutional factors which have undermined Ugandan development efforts in the past and which might do so today. **Chapter 5** analyses UNDP's conceptual interpretation and operationalization of the SHD/PCD paradigm and traces SHD/PCD's implementation through the organizational, policy, and programme/project levels so as to substantiate the *River Pollution* and *Baroque Science* phenomena. **Chapter 6** explores the same issues as Chapter 5, with the exception that the spotlight is on AA. Juxtaposing the experiences of the two agencies provides an ideal opportunity for comparing how an inter-governmental development agency and an international NGO differ in the way they go about operationalizing and implementing SHD/PCD. **Chapter 7** is the conclusion and highlights the thesis' key findings as well as their wider applicability and theoretical and their empirical implications. I also begin to reflect on how things could be done differently and suggest possible improvements. As an accompaniment to the thesis, I have added a **Methodological Appendix** which provides details about my research design as well as the validity, reliability and generalizability of the findings.

ENDNOTES:

1. UNDP. *1997 Human Development Report*. Page 82. New York: Oxford UP, 1997.

2. About the effects of globalization and liberalization on well-being, refer to the exchange between Keith Griffin and Manfred Bienefeld in: Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Vol. XVI, No. 3, 1995: Pages 359-389).

3. According to UNDP, from 1960 to 1993, the North-South gap in life expectancy was more than halved from 2 years to 11 years--undeniably an impressive feat (UNDP, *1996 Human Development Report*: Page 4).

4. According to Economists Keith Griffin an John Knight, all groups of countries experienced a rise in their per capita income from 1965-1985 and developing countries as a whole grew faster than the industrial market economies (3.0% a year compared to 2.4% a year). Yet, within the Third World, there has been a distinct tendency for the poorest countries to fall relatively behind the less poor. (Griffin, K. and Knight, J., Human Development and the International Development Strategy for the 1990s. Page 11. London: Macmillan in association with the United Nations, 1990).

According to Administrator, Mr. James Gustave Speth, worse off are the 47 countries we still call Least Developed. With 10% of the world's people, they have only 0.1% of the world's income. Furthermore, these countries' share of the world's trade declined from 0.6% in 1980 down to 0.2% in 1992. (James Gustave Speth, International Herald Tribune, Friday May 19, 1995).

In terms of income distribution, while in 1960, the richest 20% of the world's population had incomes 30 times larger than the poorest 20%; by 1990, the share of income of the richest quintile had doubled. (UNDP. *1992 Human Development Report*. Page 1. New York: Oxford UP and UN, 1992.)

5. UNDP, *1996 Human Development Report*: Pages 2-4.

6. Robert Kaplan, quoted in Smillie,I., The Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire--Non-Profit Organizations and International Development. Page 14. London: Intermediate Technology (IT) Publishers, 1995.

7. In an *Agenda for Development*, former UN Secretary General, Mr. Boutros Boutros Ghali, warns the international community that "development is in crisis" and "in danger of fading from the forefront of our agenda" as the competition to give more aid which characterized the Cold War era comes to an end. (Report of the UN Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Development*, Agenda Item 91, Forty Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly, A/48/935, May 6, 1994).

8. In its 1996 Report, the OECD underlines the fact that, in recent decades, "many countries have achieved truly dramatic improvements in overall indicators of human welfare" and that "development assistance has been an essential complementary factor in many achievements." (OECD, *1996 Development Cooperation Report*. Pages 1,6. Paris: OECD, 1997.)

9. Korten, *David., Global Growth at Too High Price*. Choices (The UNDP's Human Development Magazine), Volume 6, Number 1, January 1997: Page 4.

10. In Dilemmas of Development, John Toye provides a thorough critique of the Keynesian and state-centred development model which dominated development theory an doctrine during the 1960s and 1970s as well as a critique of the

counter-revolutionary market-led development approach which debunked Keynesian State planning ideas by the 1980s (Toye, John. Dilemmas of Development. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. Second Edition, 1993.)

11. David Moore and Gerald Schmitz give a detailed account of what they view as the impasse in development thinking. See: Moore, D. and Schmitz, G. (Editors), Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives. International Political Economy Series. Preface, Pages 308-309. UK: Macmillan Ltd., 1995.

12. See: Packenham, R. The Dependency Movement: Scholarship and Politics in Development Studies. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard UP, 1992.

13. Leys, Colin, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory. Preface and Chapter 1. London: James Currey Publishers, 1996.

14. Corbridge, *Stewart. Post-Marxism and Development Studies: Beyond the Impasse*. World Development, Volume 18, No. 5, 1990: Pages 623 and 633-34.

15.Schuurman, Frans, [Editor], Beyond the Impasse: New Directions in Development Theory. London: Zed Books, 1993.

16. Colin Leys quoted in the *Foreword* (Page ix) of Moore and Schmitz, Op. Cit.

17. For one of the most critical accounts of corruption within the UN' development agencies, see Graham Hancock's Lords of Poverty , 1991. For a mainstream but critical account of mismanagement at the UN, refer to former US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine K. Albright (The Washington Post January 3, 1995). In between the two camps, one finds those who concede that the UN has problems but attribute these to factors beyond the UN's control (e.g., inappropriate voting structure, arrears in payments by member nation-states, and the lack of visibility of the UN's successful social and development initiatives) and argue that UN reform can do away with these problems. (See, for example, Hans Singer and Richard Jolly, *Fifty Years On: The UN and Economic and Social Development: An Overview*. IDS Bulletin, Vol. 26, No. 4, October 1995).

18. Official Development Assistance (ODA) declined in real terms for the second consecutive year in 1995 as fourteen of the 21 OECD donors cut aid in real terms. At US$ 59 billion, ODA is now far inferior to private flows going to LDCs.(OECD, *Highlights of the 1996 Development Cooperation Report*. Paris: OECD, 1996.)

19. For an explanation of the importance of linking development cooperation to contextual factors and to policy and institutional reforms at the national level, refer to the World Bank, World Development Report 1990.

20. For an emphasis on the need for more flexible, bottom-up and democratic development, refer to: Chambers, Robert Rural Development: Putting the Last First. London: Longman Publishers, 1983; Korten, David, Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda. West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1989; or Rondinelli, Dennis, Development Projects as Policy Experiments: An Adaptive Approach to Development Administration. London: Routledge Publishers. 1993.

21. For such a view refer to Graham Hancock's Lords of Poverty. London: Mandarin Publishers, 1991.

22. For example: Hayter, Teresa, Aid as Imperialism. London: Penguin Publishers, 1971; Ferguson, James, The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. Cambridge: Cambridge UP,

1990; and, Morton, James, The Poverty of Nations: The Aid Dilemma at the Heart of Africa, London: British Academy Press, 1994.

23. For a discussion of the South's growing discontent with northern donors' use of aid as a form of social and political conditionality, refer to the summary report of the predominantly southern participants of the *World Hearings on Development*. (See Summary Report of the World Hearings on Development, convened by the President of the General Assembly, A/49/320, New York, USA, June 6-10, 1994. See Pages 18 & 24 especially.)

24. Sachs, Wolfgang. *Development: A Guide to the Ruins*. The New Internationalist, No. 232. June 1992.

25. OECD. *1996 Development Co-operation Report*, Op. Cit.; OECD, *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation*. Paris: OECD, 1996.

26. Communiqué by the British House of Commons' *All Party Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development*. Memo by British House of Commons announcing a presentation by Mr. James H. Michel, Chair of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. House of Commons, London, UK, January 30, 1997.

27. Smillie, Ian. 1995, Page 125, Op. Cit.

28. UNDP's annual Human Development Reports, 1990-1995.

29. Speth, J.G. *Initiatives for Change: The Future of the United Nations Development Programme* (UNDP). Report of the Administrator, May 2, 1994. Executive Board of UNDP and UNFPA. DP/1994/39. Item 3 of the Provisional Agenda Annual Session 1994, 6-17 June 1994, Geneva: UN, 1994.

30. Speth,J. G. *With a Soul and a Vision: A New Approach to Development and a New UNDP*. Address to the UNDP Staff. New York: UN Secretariat, July 27, 1993.

31. Speth, J.G., *Initiatives for Change*. Op. Cit.

32. In its *1996 Development Co-Operation Report*, the OECD defines its development mission as the achievement of realistic goals of 'human development' (OECD, *1996 Development Co-operation Report*, Page 1, Op. Cit,).

33. In the *Copenhagen Declaration adopted by the World Summit for Social Development*, signatory nation-states agree to establish "a People-Centred framework for social development".Page 5. (*Copenhagen Declaration* Adopted by the *World Summit for Social Development*. Advance Unedited Text. Copenhagen: UN, March 20, 1995.)

34. Economic Commission for Africa, *African Common Position on Social and Human Development in Africa*. *Conference of African Ministers Responsible for Human Development* to the *Preparatory Committee of the World Summit for Social Development*. Addis Ababa: ECA, January 20-21, 1994.

35. United Nations, *Annual Report of the Administrator and Programme-Level Activities: Human Development. Report of the Administrator to the UNDP Governing Council*, Thirty-Eight Session, 3-21 June 1991, DP/1991/11, 17 May 1991, New York: UN, 1991.

36. UNDP, *Sustainable Human Development: Suggested Criteria, Concerns and Best Examples*. Inter-Bureau Task Force on SHD. New YorkK UNDP, September, 1994.

37. Hijab, Nadia, *Promoting Sustainable Human Development: National Entry Points*. New York: UNDP HQ, August 1995.

38. Rondinelli, Dennis. 1993. Pages 3 and 6. Op. Cit.

39. Moore, David and Schmitz, Gerald. 1995. Page ix. Op. Cit.

40. Conyers, Diane and Hill, Peter. An Introduction to Social Planning in the Third World. Page 15. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons Publishers, 1992.

41. Among scholars advocating a *New Institutionalist* approach are Vincent Ostrom (See Ostrom, V., Feeney, D., and Picht, H. [Editors], Rethinking Institutional Analysis: Issues and Alternatives. California: International Centre for Economic Growth, 1988) and March and Olsen (See March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. London: The Free Press, 1989) in the field of Public Administration; Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol (See: Evans, P. Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. [Editors]. Bringing the State Back In. New York: Cambridge UP, 1992) in Political Sociology; Peter Katszenstein (See Katzenstein, P. [Editor], Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1978) and Keohane and Nye (See Keohane, R. and Nye, J. International Institutions and State Power. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989) in International Relations; and, Ronald Coase (See Coase, R. The Nature of the Firm, Economica Volume 4, Number 16, November 1937) and Douglass North (See North, D. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990) in Economics.

42. See: Ostrom, Elinor. *Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Towards Complementarity*. American Political Science Review. Volume 85, 1991, for attempt to bridge different strands of the *New Institutionalism*. In a later article on the New Institutionalism, Hall and Taylor identify at least three different schools of institutional thought (*Historical Institutionalism, Rational Choice Institutionalism,* and *Sociological Institutionalism).* In the article, the authors remark that it is striking that the different schools of institutional thought still remain distant from one another and suggest that it is time for the various schools of institutional thought to borrow or adapt some of the insights developed by others. (Hall, P. and Taylor, R. *Political Science and the Three Institutionalism*. Political Studies. Volume 44. Number 5, 1996.).

43. For applications of the *New Institutionalism* to Development Studies, see Terry Moe (Moe, T.M. *The New Economics of Organization*. American Journal of Political Science. Volume 28, Number 4, November 1994); Brian Van Arkadie (Van Arkadie, B. *The Role of Institutions in Development*. World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics. Washington DC: The World Bank, 1989); and John Harriss et al (See Harriss, John, Hunter, Janet, and Lewis, Colin. The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development. London: Routledge Press, 1995.)

44. Douglass North, *Institutions and Economic Growth: An Historical Introduction*. World Development. Volume 17, No., 9, 1989, Page 1321.

45. Douglass North. *Institutional and Credible Commitment*. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. Volume 149, Number 1, March 1993. See Pages 12-13.

46. At a total of US $ 59 billion in 1994-1995, annual ODA is hardly an insignificant sum. When you add the US$ 6-10 billion spent annually on international assistance by NGOs, we are talking about annual foreign aid expenditures of almost US$ 70 billion. (Smillie, Ian. 1995, Op. Cit. Page 147)

47. At 0.326, Uganda's HDI is lower than the average HDI for LDCs and below that expected of a country with a similar GDP p.c.(UNDP, *1996 HDR*, Table 1).

48. Uganda grew at a rate of almost 10% during 1994/95. (Min. of Finance and Economic Planning, *Background to the Budget 1995-1996*. Kampala: Govt.of Uganda, 1995.)

49. Net ODA for Uganda amounted to US$ 726 million in 1994--an increase of US$ 112 million from the foreign assistance given to Uganda in 1993. This accounted for 20% of Uganda's GNP in 1993. (OECD, *1995 Development Co-operation Report*. Table 38, statistical Annex. Paris: OECD, 1995). Foreign aid flowing into Uganda is believed to contribute 90% of the country's capital budget. (UNDP, *Draft Joint Issues Paper for the Uganda Country Programme Mid-Term Review*. Internal Document within the UNDP-Kampala Office. Kampala: UNDP, February 1995.)

50. Centre for Development Research, Assessment of UNDP: Development Capacity for Sustainable Human Development. Report by the Governments of Denmark, India, Sweden and the UK. Copenhagen: CDR, February 1996.

51. Boutros Boutros Ghali, *An Agenda for Development*. Report of the UN Secretary-General to the General Assembly. Agenda Item 91, Forty-Eighth Session of the UN General Assembly. Document A/48/935, N.Y., N.Y., USA, May 6, 1994. See also: UN Department of Public Information, *Secretary General Requests UNDP Administrator to Assist him in Ensuring Development Policy Coherence in the UN System*. UN Press Release. Document SG/SM/5380 DEV/2026. New York: UN, July 27, 1994.

52. Nigel Twose, *Giving People Choices: Action Aid and Development*. Page 5. A Document International Division, Action Aid HQ. London: AA, July 1994.

53. Action Aid, *The Human Face of Development: Annual Report 1995-96*.London: AA, 1996.

Although much smaller in size and scope than UNDP, AA is among the top five development NGOs which receive guaranteed funding from the UK government. And, in 1992, AA ranked 19th out of the 2000 largest fundraising charities in the UK. (Charities Aid Foundation, 1992 Charity Trends. Thornbride: CAF,1992).

54. AA's Uganda Country Programme is its third largest with an average annual allocation of £ 3.21 million (approximately US$ 4,500,000) in 1994-95 (Action Aid, *A Whole World of Achievement: Annual Report 1994-1995*. Page 17, London: AA, 1995).

During its 4th Programming Cycle (1992-96), the UNDP-Uganda CP consisted of US$ 61.45 million. (Government of Uganda and UNDP, *Joint Issues Paper for the Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Country Programme*. Annex II.Kampala: UNDP, June 1994.)

55. Inter-Bureau Task Force on Sustainable Human Development, *Sustainable Human Development: Suggested Criteria, Concerns and Best Examples*. See Page 1 especially. New York: UNDP, September 1994.

Although AA has not identified guidelines for measuring its SHD/PCD impact, it shares the principles and goals of the guidelines described below.

56. A UNDP guide for SHD/PCD practitioners notes that UNDP staff still do not think holistically and consider sectoral outputs are easier to measure. The same guide advises UNDP staff to constantly engage in social experimentation, social innovation and social learning. (Banuri, Tariq, Hyden, Goran, Juma, Calestous, and Rivera, Marcia. *A Summary of Sustainable Human Development from Concept to Operation: A Guide for the Practitioner: A Working Paper for Use by UNDP Staff*. See Pages 3-6. New York: UNDP, BPPS, August 1994.)

In the 1990s, AA also began developing "an integrated approach to development" (Griffiths, *Martin. Action Aid: Moving Forward in the Nineties*. Page 1. AA HQ. London, UK, August 1992.) and emphasizing networking, experimentation and better evaluation as means of learning. (Twose, Nigel. *Giving People Choices: Action Aid and Development*. Page 8, 13. London: AA HQ, London, July 1994.)

57. In a paper prepared by UNDP's Public Sector and Management Group in 1994, 'governance' is defined as "the system of formal and informal rules and procedures (institutions) and the way in which these rules and procedures are applied and followed by social actors through their organizations and groups".

According to this and other UNDP publications, UNDP is interested in promoting seven key features of 'Sound governance': the rule of law; political legitimacy and both electoral and bureaucratic accountability; a fair and reliable judicial system; freedom of expression and of association as well as access to information and communication; effective and efficient public sector management; broad participation and involvement in economic, political and social processes and cooperation with civil society; and sound fiscal, macro-economic, monetary, investment and pricing policies.

Within these areas, UNDP views building national institutional capacity (i.e., helping governments and civil society organizations attain self-sufficiency and to manage their own affairs), aid coordination, and consensus building between government and civil society as its comparative advantage.

(See: UNDP, *UNDP: A Charter For Change. Part I--Vision and Goals*. Working Paper by a Transition Team of UNDP Staff. New York: UNDP HQ, 1993; And, UNDP, *Governance, Public Sector Management, and Sustainable Human Development: A UNDP Strategy Paper*. Pages 3-4, 14. Public Sector and Management Group, Bureau for Programme Policy and Evaluation (BPPE). New York: UNDP HQ, June 1994.)

In the 1990s, AA too began to see the value of influencing wider governance issues and the policies and practices of others. (See Martin Griffiths, *Action Aid: Moving Forward in the Nineties*. Pages 1 and 5. AA headquarters, London, UK, August 1992). Moreover, like UNDP, AA complements its global advocacy work with strengthening a range of institutions (e.g., NGOs, government bodies, inter-governmental organizations and the private sector) in specific developing countries. What makes AA's governance work unique though is that it views its direct links with poor communities as its comparative advantage (See Nigel Twose, *Giving People Choices*. Op. Cit. Pages 11-12).

58. According to UNDP's guide for SHD/PCD practitioners, conventional methods of supporting national governments through foreign consultants must be reconsidered and more attention given to tapping into technical know-how already present in the country and inspiring a sense of ownership among LDC nationals. Other elements of improved aid coordination from UNDP's perspective include enhancing donor collaboration so as to avoid duplication and a greater involvement of NGOs and civil society organizations in development processes. (Banuri et al Pages 5, 6, 7, 9, Op. Cit.).

Like UNDP, AA has been consciously trying to build "relationships of mutual respect" with Southern partners and trying to "reduce the inherent potential for external views to dominate". In order to create balanced partnerships, AA has also been concentrating on creating a greater sense of ownership among its national counterparts and involving beneficiaries in those strategic decisions which most affect them. And although, as an NGO, AA does not have the donor special links with government or the UN coordination role which UNDP enjoys, AA is increasingly trying to strengthen civil society links with other development actors by itself entering into more diverse

relationships with other donors and by sharing these lessons with others (See Nigel Twose, See Pages 5,8, 11 and 12, Op. Cit.).

59. UNDP's guide book to SHD/PCD practitioners highlights the need to establish participatory institutions and practices at the national and local levels as well as to empower beneficiaries by building their capacity to decide their own destinies. According to UNDP, beneficiary dependence on outsiders could be reduced by giving the poor greater access to knowledge and information, enhancing their management, technical and organizational abilities, and helping them to build a resource-mobilization capacity of their own. (Banuri et al. Pages 7, 8, Op. Cit.).

In its work, AA also places great emphasis on providing people with the knowledge and motivation to assume greater control over the processes of change which confront them. According to *Giving People Choices: Action Aid and Development*, AA is not only committed to using participatory planning and evaluation methods but it also believes in supporting local institutions and in hiring mostly national staff. (Nigel Twose, See Page 5 and 7, Op. Cit.)

It is worth noting that while UNDP's and AA's interpretation of participation focusses on beneficiaries' participation in projects, in my thesis I also explore the effects of UNDP and AA's SHD/PCD efforts on economic participation (e.g., ave UNDP and AA projects improved farm yields, income or employment?) and wider political participation (e.g. how have UNDP's and AA's presence helped beneficiaries' organizational and protest capacity?)

60. According to UNDP, greater equity can be achieved by distributing resources and focusing service delivery on the most disadvantaged, as well as by strengthening those organizations (governmental and non-governmental) best suited to articulate local demands. (Banuri et al, See Page 4, Op. Cit.)

Equity is an equally important goal for AA. *Moving Forward in the Nineties*, Action Aid explicitly states that AA's chief mandate is to "transfer wealth from those who have benefited from economic prosperity to those who have not". (Griffiths, Martin Op. Cit. Page 1). Whereas, in the past, AA achieved this mostly by delivering education and health services to the poor, today it also considers alternative priorities (e.g., increasing food supply or access to water) when requested by the poor. (Nigel Twose, Pages 8, 9, Op. Cit.)

61. Bryman, Alan Research Methods in Organization Studies. Chapter 1. London: Unwin Publishers, 1994.

62. Bulmer, M. and Warwick, D.P. (Editors). Social Research in Developing Countries. Chapter 1., Page 19. London: UCL Press Ltd., Reprinted 1993.

63. Bryman, Alan and Burgess, Robert, Analyzing Qualitative Data. Chapter 1, Pages 1-6. London: Routledge Publishers, 1994.

64. On sampling, see: Robson, Colin, Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner Researchers. Chapter 5. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993.

65. Elson, Diane. *Economic Paradigm and their Implications for Models of Development: The Case of Human Development*. Culpeper, R., Berry, A., and Stewart, F. (Editors). Global Development Fifty Years After Bretton Woods. Essays in Honour of Gerald Helleiner. Ottawa: North-South Institute and Macmillan Pres, 1997.

Table 1.1: The Role of Official Development Assistance:





Table 1.2: Guidelines and Assessment Criteria Used to Determine SHD/PCD Progress and Impact		
Selected SHD/PCD Guidelines (Independent Variables)	**Components of the SHD/PCD Guidelines (Indicators of the Independent Variables)**	**Types of Behaviour and Trends Studied so as to Gage Changes in SHD/PCD indicators**
Multidisciplinary/Holistic Development	• Ability to do Work that incorporates cross-cutting themes (e.g., Gender Equity, Environment, Employment and Poverty Eradication--sometimes called UNDP's four Es) • Ability to work within a Programmatic Approach • Ability to be innovative, to learn and experiment in development processes	1. Do most, or at newer, projects/programmes incorporate priority cross-cutting themes? 2. Are staff working in a cross-sectoral fashion? (e.g., in multidisciplinary working groups, in a programmatic fashion) 3. Do agency staff and beneficiaries feel comfortable working across themes or in the form of programmes? 4. Are agencies innovating by trying out programmes in new areas & with new actors? 5. Are programme errors documented, openly discussed, analyzed and corrected?

Table 1.2: Guidelines and Assessment Criteria Used to Determine SHD/PCD Progress and Impact		
Selected SHD/PCD Guidelines (Independent Variables)	**Components of the SHD/PCD Guidelines (Indicators of the Independent Variables)**	**Types of Questions Used to Measure the Indicators of SHD/PCD**
Genuine North-South Partnership Donor Collaboration	• Ability to increase national ownership by government and to work within the framework of the national development vision and set priorities • Ability to enhance links and consensus between government and civil society • Ability to enhance aid coordination among donors as well as between donors and government	1. What organizational mechanisms/initiatives has the agency introduced so as to feed in national development goals/targets set by the government & other development actors into its own work? 2. What mechanisms/initiatives has the agency introduced to increase national government-civil society dialogue? Have any concrete collaborate efforts resulted from the dialogue? 3. What efforts/initiatives has the agency introduced to help the government's national coordination of aid? 4. What mechanisms/initiatives has the agency introduced to increase its communications with fellow development donors at the national and global levels? Have any concrete collaborate efforts resulted from the dialogue?

Table 1.2: Guidelines and Assessment Criteria Used to Determine SHD/PCD Progress and Impact		
Selected SHD/PCD Guidelines (Independent Variables)	**Components of the SHD/PCD Guidelines (Indicators of the Independent Variables)**	**Types of Questions Used to Measure the Indicators of SHD/PCD**
Equity	• Ability to respond to the needs of the most disadvantaged and to ensure delivery of services to the poorest • Ability to strengthen the capabilities of the poorest, or to at least support organizations that help the poorest	1. What proportion of the agencies' projects/programmes are aimed at the poorest? 2a. Do the agencies' projects/programmes actually reach the poorest? b. Who among the poorest do the agencies manage to reach? c. What services do the agencies give the poorest? 3a. What skills/capabilities do the agencies pass on to the poorest? b. Are the poorest able to apply such skills on their own? i.e., without the financial assistance of the agencies ? 4a. What organizations working with the poorest do the agencies support? b. Has the assistance to such organizations made them more responsive the poorest?

Table 1.2: Guidelines and Assessment Criteria Used to Determine SHD/PCD Progress and Impact		44
Selected SHD/PCD Guidelines (Independent Variables)	**Components of the SHD/PCD Guidelines (Indicators of the Independent Variables)**	**Types of Questions Used to Measure the Indicators of SHD/PCD**
Sound Governance	• The introduction of major development initiatives related to governance issues • Ability to have high impact on national policy and institutional arrangements (e.g., influence upon government, Parliamentary, Military, Judicial and Market structures) [Upstream influence] • Ability to strengthen national and local governance capacities [Downstream influence]	1. What new programmes/initiatives have been introduced in the area of sound governance? 2. Does the agency have a well-funded, high-powered and experienced advocacy team with a clear advocacy strategy which identifies priority issues to influence both globally and nationally? 3. Has the agency had global advocacy impact in the international community or influenced the system of development cooperation? 4. Is the agency trying to influence issues which are of strategic importance to sound governance at the national level? (e.g., democratization & accountability; rule of law & transparency; decentralization; civil service corruption; market liberalization and other economic incentives; participation and access to resources for women and other groups who are marginalized) 5. To What degree do operational and lower-level persons in the agency become involved in influencing/advocacy work? 6. How do other development actors perceive the advocacy effectiveness of the agency? 7. Has the agency strengthened the advocacy capacity of other national development actors? 8. How has the agency contributed to the decentralization process? 9. How has the agency strengthened local planning and technical capacities so that local local government officials and other community groups are equipped to address their own development and governance concerns? 10. How do national/local actors feel about the agencies' effectiveness in building national/local capacity and promoting greater self-reliance?

Table 1.2: Guidelines and Assessment Criteria Used to Determine SHD/PCD Progress and Impact

Selected SHD/PCD Guidelines (Independent Variables)	Components of the SHD/PCD Guidelines (Indicators of the Independent Variables)	Types of Questions Used to Measure the Indicators of SHD/PCD
Participation (Empowerment)	• Ability to involve beneficiaries (including government and community beneficiaries) in project/programme planning, implementation & evaluation • Ability to enhance the capabilities of beneficiaries (including government and community beneficiaries) to organize & to develop the skills needed to protest against inadequate development initiatives as well as to launch & finance their own initiatives	1a. Do project beneficiaries (including government and community beneficiaries) get consulted about their needs/aspirations early on in the development planning process? b. How broad and all-inclusive is the process of beneficiary consultation? (e.g., are women, the poorest, neighbouring communities consulted?) 2a. Do project beneficiaries (including government and community beneficiaries) get actively involved with project planning, implementation and evaluation? b. How broad is the community involvement? (e.g., are women & the poorest involved?) c. How deep is the community involvement? (e.g., Do people get involved only in carrying out menial tasks or do they participate in activities requiring considerable skill and decision-making? 3. Are there signs of communities carrying out their own business in a participatory fashion? 4a. What skills/capabilities have the agencies passed onto beneficiaries during the development process? b. Are there instances of community members passing on learned skills to other community members? c. Are there instances of community members either protesting against existing development initiatives, launching their own initiatives, or continuing an initiative on their own after the departure of the international development agencies?

Chapter 2:
The Theoretical Context and the Estate of the Literature: In Search of Conceptual Insights

> ....It is important to do more to develop 'test sites' in which alternative approaches to understanding administrative phenomena are identified, juxtaposed and tested.
>
> Christopher Hood [1]

I. The Theoretical Context: Borrowing and Building on Insights From Four Social Science Literatures

Because implementation processes and an institutional focus are the two guiding threads to my thesis, I will not only search for insights in the newly-emerging SHD/PCD Literature and the existing International Development Cooperation Literature, but also in the Implementation Process Literature in Public Administration and the wider Institutional Literature which spans all of the social sciences, since they all contain useful insights for my research questions and hypotheses. Combining these four literatures has enabled me to build on existing theory, while at the same time shedding new light on the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches. (**Table 2.1** provides a tabular illustration of the insights drawn from the four literatures in my thesis.)

A) The SHD/PCD Literature:

The SHD/PCD Literature can be divided into two main camps: those publications emanating from UNDP and its *Human Development Report Office* (HDRO) and writings independent of the United Nations.

To this day, much of what is written about SHD/PCD is dominated by UNDP and can be sub-divided into two categories: Annual *Human Development Reports* (HDRs) and complementary conceptual and policy-oriented think pieces produced by *the HDRO's Eminent Panel of Experts or consultants* [2]; and publications

consisting of case studies and guidelines for the operationalization of SHD/PCD within UNDP. The latter are normally produced by other UNDP Departments [3] and have grown since Speth's appointment in 1993.

With respect to the SHD/PCD Literature produced by UNDP's HDRO, the flagship of the Office is its annual HDRs, published since 1990. Because the HDRO is staffed by a handful of professionals, the bulk of the conceptual and empirical analysis for the HDRs is done by the HDRO's *Eminent Panel of Experts* or outside consultants hired to provide specific inputs. The success of the HDRs lies not only in that they are written by top-level development experts but also in that they are edited by communications experts who translate the ideas into appealing language and a format which incorporates innovative policy proposals, success stories, and think pieces by renowned world leaders, scholars and activists. In short, the HDRs complement accessible writing with cutting-edge conceptual analysis on a wide range of themes [4], useful statistical information [5], and wide-reaching policy recommendations. By the mid 1990s, the HDRO started commissioning a series of specialized occasional papers on themes which were related but at the same time went beyond its annual HDRs. Examples of such papers include: *Globalization and the Developing World* by Griffin and Rahman Khan (1992), *War, Peace and the Third World* by Dan Smith (1994), *Decentralization: A Survey of the Literature from a Human Development Perspective* by Klugman (1994), and *Human Development: From Concept to Action: A 10-Point Agenda* by Kaul and Menon (1993). Finally, parallel to the work of the HDRO, a couple of books by development experts associated with the HDRO have appeared, that echo the views in UNDP's HDRs and occasional papers. Griffin and Knight's Human Development and International Development Strategy for the 1990s (1990) and Mahbub ul Haq's Reflections on Human Development (1995) both fall under this category.

Thus, the HDRO has been prolific as well as ambitious in terms of the scope of its publications. However, I have three fundamental critiques of its literature. Firstly, most of it does not sufficiently address the fact that many of the more radical and transformative policy and institutional recommendations proposed in UNDP's HDRs go against the vested interests of powerful elites and influential, yet traditional, LDC governments unlikely to cede their advantage in existing global institutional arrangements and national power relations. Nor, for that matter, do UNDP's HDRs say much about how difficult and risky it would be for the poor and marginalized members of society to fight for the radical reforms put forward in the HDRs given the oligarchic and repressive nature of the societies and institutional regimes they find themselves in. Yet, the political and potentially conflictive nature of *Human Development* is something which UNDP's HDRs and related publications are conspicuously silent about.

Second, there is an absence of a lucid discussion about the operationalization and implementation of SHD/PCD approaches. For instance, in their *10-Point Agenda* for translating the *Human Development concept into action* (Op. Cit.), Inge Kaul and Saraswathi Menon do identify some key policies and basic financial and technical capacities which must be in place before launching a SHD/PCD Strategy, but the authors never go beyond telling us the obvious: i.e., that *Human Development* should be country-specific, that statistics need to be improved, that *Human Development* goals and targets should be set, that resources need to be mobilized, and that public demand for *Human Development* should be encouraged. However, the most difficult operationalization challenges surrounding SHD/PCD's implementation are left unattended. How, for example, will SHD/PCD be translated into clear yet comprehensive development strategies given the sheer breadth of the approach? How will implementors deal with the political pressures, organizational interests and both management and technical limitations

plaguing their own development agencies? How realistic is it to assume that agencies facing the above constraints can effectively promote and implement the more radical and transformational components of the SHD/PCD agenda? Instead of addressing these challenges head on, UNDP's HDRs have tended to feature very brief (and usually positive) "boxes" on different country experiences which, although they provide uplifting reading material, ultimately skate over the harder questions posed above and fail to give us a frank account of the setbacks and development impact which particular SHD/PCD initiatives have had in those development agencies and LDCs which have tried to put SHD/PCD ideas into practice. Even Mahbub ul Haq's long-awaited memoir, Reflections on Human Development, reveals next to nothing about the political pressures and internal conflicts faced by UNDP as a result of its promotion of the SHD/PCD agenda.

My third inquietude is that the HDRO's publications are uncritical of either the conceptual soundness of SHD/PCD approaches or the feasibility of their policy proposals. For instance, its literature makes no mention of the implications of the abstractness, vagueness, or unfinished nature of the SHD/PCD concept for its operationalization. This literature also fails to put the SHD/PCD approach in its proper historical and theoretical context, and, as a result, not only ends up treating the SHD/PCD paradigm as though it evolved entirely from the small cluster of Economists associated with the HDRO, but makes little or no recognition of SHD/PCD's diverse influences and simultaneous borrowing from widely-ranging development paradigms and doctrines. This means that the critical contributions to SHD/PCD thinking made by grassroots NGOs a well as the possible tensions inherent in the SHD/PCD paradigm and the HDRs' policy proposals go virtually unnoticed.

As noted above, once Speth became UNDP Administrator in 1993, other UNDP departments began producing SHD/PCD mission statements, country-

specific case studies, implementation guidelines and training manuals. Most influential among these publications are: Speth's own treatise, *With A Soul and a Vision: A New Approach to Development and a New UNDP; Sustainable Human Development: from Concept to Operation: A Guide for the Practitioner* produced by Tariq Banuri, Goran Hyden, Celestous Juma and Marcia Rivera; the Inter-Bureau Task Force on Sustainable Human Development's *Sustainable Human Development: Suggested Criteria, Concerns and Best Examples*; Nadia Hijab's *Promoting Sustainable Human Development: National Entry Points*, a series of country-specific SHD/PCD strategies and experiences written collaboratively by UNDP headquarters and country offices; and, the Office of Evaluation and Strategic Planning (OESP's) series on *Managing Change at UNDP*.

Together, these reports make an important contribution to the SHD/PCD Literature in that they, for the first time, explicitly state that the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches is UNDP's chief mandate; provide useful information on how UNDP has carried out SHD/PCD approaches in specific countries; and propose ways in which UNDP could translate the SHD/PCD paradigm into workable development strategies and entry point, while at the same time outlining the more fundamental organizational reforms and attitudinal changes which must take place if UNDP is to fulfil its SHD/PCD mandate. These reports should also be commended for their efforts to tackle some of the challenges involved in putting SHD/PCD ideas into practice. On the other hand, their main weakness is that they too fail to question the conceptual soundness and implementability of the SHD/PCD paradigm, or to give a realistic assessment of UNDP's capacity to play a vanguard role in its promotion, or of the actual political, organizational, and societal constraints which have hindered UNDP's or others' efforts to put SHD/PCD into practice.

As previously noted, there is a small yet growing SHD/PCD Literature which is independent of UNDP and the UN. Generally speaking, these works fall under three categories: those which address the topic of *Human Development* within the context of a broader *New Poverty Agenda*; Econometric and statistical contestations of the *Human Development Index (HDI)* and the data used in UNDP's HDRs; and lastly but very importantly, newly emerging independent critiques of the SHD/PCD paradigm and of UNDP's treatment of it.The independent critiques have produced the most insights for my thesis.

Typical of the first category of independent SHD/PCD publications is Lipton and Maxwell's treatment of *Human Development* as one of the many strands of what they consider a broad departure from the stabilization and adjustment policies of the 1980s and a growing interest in a *New Poverty Agenda* [6]--a trend which the authors trace to the World Bank's initial awareness of the regressive social effects of structural adjustment programmes. By the early 1990s, studies such as Giovanni Cornia et al's *Adjustment with a Human Face* [7] and articles such as those by Lipton and Maxwell were all pointing towards a 'rediscovery' of poverty issues within international development. My only reservation about these analyses is that they tended to treat SHD/PCD approaches merely as a variant of changing ideas within the World Bank rather than recognizing SHD/PCD as a development paradigm in its own right and with the potential to offer an alternative to the Bank's hegemonic thinking and practice. Today, of course, the World Bank has appropriated much of the SHD/PCD thinking and it is increasingly difficult to separate between the two doctrines.

A second rubric of the SHD/PCD Literature produced outside the U.N. consists of a series of econometric and statistical critiques of the imitations of the data and measurement of *Human Development* utilized by UNDP's HDRO. Economists such as Mark McGillivray have questioned both the

composition and usefulness of the HDI given its inability to provide country-to-country development level comparisons, its lack of year-to-year comparability, its inappropriate measurement of income, and the tendency of the variables comprising the HDI to be highly inter-correlated. According to McGillivray, the HDI furbishes little additional information that GNP per capita does not already provide. [8] While some of the econometric weaknesses of the HDI identified above have been corrected by the HDRO over the years, more theoretical Economists such as T.N. Srinivasan still attack it on the grounds that the Index does not reflect the complexity of Amartya Sen's conception of 'Capabilities' which provides the theoretical basis for the SHD/PCD approach and the inspiration for the HDI. [9] Critics such as Katarina Tomasevski have condemned the HDI for the absence of variables measuring human rights and political freedom in the Index and thus disassociating the political and economic developmental spheres despite the indivisibility of human rights. [10] Finally, the literature in this area has questioned the very quality and reliability of the data used in UNDP's HDRs. Officials in the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs have noted that the budgetary expenditures proposed in UNDP's HDRs are speculative "rules of thumb" with little empirical basis.[11] And, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra of Algeria, Chairman of the Group of 77, has criticized UNDP for publishing data which "do not jibe even with World Bank statistics". [12]

As might be expected, the main caveat of this literature is that, by concentrating on data and measurement issues, these analysts forget to question the implementability of SHD/PCD approaches or the capacity of agencies like UNDP (and indeed AA) to put these approaches into practice in the first place. Furthermore, while the best of these critiques allude to the gap evident between the SHD/PCD concept and the index, none of them enter into in-depth analyses of SHD/PCD's conceptual limitations nor do they provide empirical data on the impact SHD/PCD of efforts on peoples' well-being, either globally or in LDCs.

Fortunately, a few independent articles have recently subjected the SHD/PCD paradigm to closer scrutiny. This literature has alerted me to the sheer vagueness, as well as the unevolved nature [13], divergent historical and theoretical roots [14], and the hybrid nature of SHD/PCD approaches [15], especially as interpreted in much of UNDP's Literature. Others have also noted SHD/PCD's lack of a solid theoretical foundation aside from Amartya Sen's 'Capabilities approach', and the absence within SHD/PCD of a coherent vision or set of analytical tools with which to explore the structural root causes of poverty [16]. These more theoretical analyses have managed to move beyond questions of data and measurement by identifying possible tensions within the SHD/PCD approach and have thus prompted the development community to think more seriously about these issues. However, the debate still needs to go beyond generalities by anchoring these criticisms in concrete empirical evidence. Until this is done, it is difficult to assess how warranted the circumspection about SHD/PCD is, or what the implications the above critiques have on the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches in particular settings or organizations.

Yet, to be fair, not all of the debate surrounding the SHD/PCD approach has been restricted to the realm of the purely theoretical. In the early 1990s, some independent development experts were already contemplating the prospects of operationalizing SHD/PCD and taking real-life implementational constraints into consideration in their analyses. For example, V.V. Bhanoji Rao had pointed out as early as 1991 that, in its current form, the policy and reform proposals contained in UNDP's HDRs were all over the map and revealed a dangerous inability to develop a sharper policy focus or to identify and rank development priorities. [17] Similarly, Michael Hopkins has noted that the SHD/PCD recommendations put forward by UNDP's HDRs are "far too superficial" to guide the formulation of achievable development frameworks containing concrete, practical and country-specific actions in the grasp of policy-makers and development

practitioners alike. [18] An independent assessment of UNDP's SHD/PCD effectiveness commissioned jointly by recipient and donor governments draws similar conclusions and points out that, because SHD/PCD approaches are being interpreted so broadly by international development agencies such as UNDP, in the final analysis, SHD/PCD has virtually no direct use for organizational priority-setting. [19] Equally relevant to my own research are T.N. Srinivasan's assertions that none of UNDP's HDRs provide a sufficiently sophisticated institutional analysis or address what he calls "the political economy and sociology of the constraints which prevent most developing countries from replicating successful *Human Development*".

What Srinivasan is denouncing here is essentially the inability of much of the UNDP Literature on SHD/PCD to address the more political and institutional dimensions of SHD/PCD, as well as the resistance and conflict inevitably involved in SHD/PCD transitions. [20] This is an omission which neither Diane Elson or Katarina Tomasevski think should be taken lightly. In her analysis of the cursory fashion in which political freedom and human rights issues are dealt with in UNDP's HDRs, Katarina Tomasevski condemns international development agencies like UNDP for using the language of political freedom and human rights in their policy recommendations without offering clear outlines for developing an enabling framework containing the financial investment, organizational, substantive, and procedural standards needed to tackle such issues. [21] In her own critique of SHD/PCD approaches, Diane Elson rebukes those who claim to have rediscovered the importance of people-oriented development approaches for not paying sufficient attention to the need for a dramatic transformation in existing institutional arrangements and both socio-economic and political power relations in order to enable *capability building* to become *capability use*. [22] These latter writings have helped to focus my own research hypothesis by hinting at how, in addition to conceptual limitations, an inadequate consideration of institutional and political constraints can themselves

obstruct the effective operationalization of SHD/PCD approaches. What is once again missing in this literature though is evidence from actual SHD/PCD efforts in specific development agencies or countries.

Lastly, it is important to point out that, a handful of independent consultancy reports containing empirical evidence about the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches in specific settings and organizations do exist. These reports are normally not widely available to the public but I have gained access to some of them. For example, in their study of UNDP's implementation of SHD/PCD in 11 countries (including Uganda), Martin Godfrey and his fellow consultants argue that UNDP makes overly-optimistic assumptions about the viability of its SHD/PCD strategies and the technical capacity of its field offices to carry out SHD/PCD approaches and that, in doing so, ends up overlooking the confusion, lack of ownership and resentment which many UNDP field staff feel towards New York headquarters' imposition of SHD/PCD definitions and guidelines. Godfrey et al also reveal that, because of its tendency to over-direct its development efforts, UNDP has had difficulties strengthening existing national institutions or ensuring ownership, participation, empowerment and long-term sustainability in its SHD/PCD initiatives. [23] In another assessment, the *Centre for Development Research* looks at UNDP's SHD/PCD effectiveness in eight countries (including Uganda) and concludes that UNDP's tendency to interpret SHD/PCD too broadly and its insistence on carving out a unique niche for itself in the international community and to pursue a leadership role in a constellation of sectors and at both the global and field levels at once has left fellow donors in the UN community full of wrath towards UNDP. The same study also notes that UNDP's long-held image as an uncritical supporter of government, coupled with its lack of highly-specialized personnel or resources for advocacy work have equally undermined the agency's promotion of SHD/PCD approaches. [24] These empirical studies are most helpful in outlining the organizational

constraints which can be expected to impinge upon the operationalization of SHD/PCD within specific development agencies. Nevertheless, because these studies are mainly empirical, provide an overview of many countries, and focus mostly on UNDP, they can neither provide in-depth analysis of the theoretical limitations of SHD/PCD approaches, fully trace the translation of SHD/PCD from paradigm to practice at the global, national and local levels, or tell us whether the above obstacles are applicable to NGOs.

The above review shows that the existing SHD/PCD Literature provides useful cues about possible conceptual and empirical impediments to the effective operationalization and implementation of SHD/PCD. As such, both the potentially debilitating effects of conceptual deficiencies and both political and organizational constraints feature prominently in my study's two key hypotheses, the *Baroque Science* and the *River Pollution* Phenomena. At the same time, the above literature review also confirms the need for a study which puts the SHD/PCD paradigm to the double-barrel test of theory and practice and which makes the connection between the two using evidence from specific SHD/PCD efforts carried out by different international development organizations at the global level, as well as in an LDC country setting.

B) The International Development Cooperation Literature:

As mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, in addition to deriving insights in the SHD/PCD Literature, I have looked to the International Development Cooperation Literature for clues as to what I should look out for in my thesis and how to further develop my research hypotheses. Within this literature, I found several useful analyses of the setbacks which international development agencies have experienced in their past implementation of empowering development initiatives, including accounts of the conceptual limitations of their development ideas, the obstacles they encountered in their implementation, and the negative

repercussions of the pursuit of self-interests in the process. The NGO Literature and the International Development Cooperation Literature at large are simultaneously discussed in this Chapter.

One of the first systematic investigations of the impact of development NGOs in LDCs was Judith Tendler's pioneering 1982 analysis of 75 evaluation reports of NGO projects carried out on behalf of USAID. [25] It this ground-breaking assessment Tendler found that instead of reaching the poorest or carrying out participatory and empowering development efforts, many NGO projects were better described as decentralized decision-making by NGOs and/or selected local elites which were often not even indigenous to the region. In addition, Tendler's analysis of the internal dynamics of beneficiary communities showed that, contrary to NGO assumptions that poor recipients were intrinsically harmonious, they were in fact plagued by persistent patron-client relations, extreme inequality, and intra-community conflict. As such, Tendler found that NGOs' development interventions were often appropriated by elites and failed to redistribute wealth or to challenge existing power relations. Many of Tendler's early findings have been confirmed and supplemented by subsequent studies of NGO effectiveness. For instance, Roger Riddell's and Mark Robinson's (1990-1992) comparative study of 16 different poverty alleviation projects carried out by four NGOs in Bangladesh, India, Uganda and Zimbabwe concludes that, although international development NGOs have alleviated poverty and fostered some participation, by and large, the NGOs in the study had serious difficulties reaching the poorest of the poor, helping beneficiaries develop a sense of empowerment and self-reliance, or assuring long-term self-financing and sustainability. [26] In a joint study carried out by the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) on 'New Modes of Development Cooperation', Jean Bossuyt and Geert Laporte confirm that outside-driven development efforts in which different donors work with

their own chosen sectors and beneficiaries while failing to strengthen recipients' self-reliance or ensure long-term sustainability are recurring problems in the EU's bilateral development programmes as well. [27]

Another major concern in the International Development Cooperation Literature is the asymmetry of North-South relations, inadequate northern accountability towards beneficiaries, donors' bypassing of recipient governments and a consequent inability to significantly influence policies or institutional arrangement in the South. In their latest book, Beyond the Magic Bullet, Michael Edwards and David Hulme write at length about northern NGOs' lack of downward accountability towards aid recipients and the conspicuous absence of southern counterparts in northern NGOs' Executive Boards. Moreover, according to Edwards and Hulme, far from being catalysts of social change, addressing the root-causes of poverty, or influencing broader policy and institutional reforms, NGOs are increasingly playing the role of "gap fillers" who provide an uneven "patchwork quilt" of social services for the poor in developing countries. [28]

After conducting a survey of European, Canadian, and US NGOs' involvement in policy influencing work, Brian Smith drew similar conclusions and found that many development NGOs are apolitical and have a humanitarian approach and that, even when they do take on political issues, restrict their campaigns to narrow policy targets. [29] As NGO analyst John Clark explains, although progressive development NGOs agree that policy-related work is important to for social transformation, in practice, this kind of work is pushed off the agenda by NGOs' day-to-day management of project activities and donor demands. [30]

The dearth of agreed-on performance standards and of credible evaluations of development impact is another shortcoming identified in the International Development Cooperation Literature. According to Edwards and

Hulme, aside from probity and some quantifiable measures of service provision, indicators of quality impact or of broader organizational and policy effectiveness are hard to come by in the NGO community. [31] Alan Fowler and Kees Biekart are even harsher in their analysis and argue not only that most NGOs have yet to properly measure their development impact over the long-term, but that NGO's even lack a theory of the causes of change and are still incapable of identifying clear links between cause and effect in development processes. [32] Colin Leys, David Moore and Gerald Schmitz take the above ideas even further and argue that the vagueness of the development theories on which we base our development aspirations today have not only impeded us from developing common impact evaluation methods but have led to tremendous conceptual confusion. The main concern here is that in trying to be all things to all persons (for example by promising growth, equity and environmental sustainability; by seeking to equally accommodate market, state and community interests; or by claiming to be participatory and managerially effective at once) the development community is making unrealistic and contradictory pledges--what Leys calls "an increasingly incoherent discourse of opposites." [33]

Also present in the International Development Cooperation Literature are a series of analysts who, like many of the critics mentioned above, concur that international development agencies have fallen short of our expectations that they would empower and foster a sense of self-reliance among the poor, but attribute these setbacks largely to these agencies' own risk-aversion and excessive preoccupation with blueprints, budgetary rules, time-frames and targets. According to Ian Smillie, for example, it is these types of bureaucratic rigidities which, in his view, are reinforced by the *Logical Framework Approach*, coupled with conflicting stakeholder pressures, which have undermined NGOs development efforts in LDCs. [34] In a book entitled Development Projects as Policy Experiments, Dennis Rondinelli argues that recipient government administrations and bilateral

and multilateral development agencies have also erred on the side of creating overly bureaucratic, technocratic, top-down, sectoral and rigid organizational structures which are much too focussed on quick and concrete outputs to be conducive to the implementation of comprehensive, multi-sectoral and process-based development plans requiring experimentation and a flexible and participatory learning approach to development. [35]

A related obstacle to effective development implementation from Rondinelli's point of view is that international development agencies have generally underestimated the analytical and administrative capacities required to effectively carry out comprehensive, multi-sectoral and process-based development strategies, as well as the political dimensions and often conflictive nature of implementation processes. Rondinelli's picture, in short, is not only about organizationally rigid and skills-deficient development agencies, but also about sometimes unknowing and conflictive beneficiary communities, an uncollaborative and divided system of international development cooperation riddled by sectoral factionalism, turf-protection, fiefdom-creation, and development processes propelled by competing stakeholder agendas, as well as conflicting goals and interests.

A final re-emerging theme in this literature is the tension between what Michael Edwards calls 'development imperatives' and *'institutional imperatives'*--i.e., between what development agencies should be doing to fulfil their core mission and development goals and what they think they have to do to survive in an increasingly difficult environment. [36] Like Edwards, in Compassion and Calculation, David Sogge and his colleagues lament the way in which NGOs' drive towards self-perpetuation--a tendency which the authors attribute largely to political pressures emanating from traditional stakeholders with vested interests in the status quo--has prompted NGOs to paint an unrealistically rosy picture of their achievements on the ground and made them unlikely candidates to empower

the poorest or to pursue a transformational agenda. [37] Other NGO analysts agree that, due to the above-mentioned tendencies, it may be erroneous to assume that international voluntary development agencies are capable of challenging the status quo. [38]

The disruptive effects of organizational interests and political pressures is an issues which is further pursued in the wider International Development Cooperation Literature by the likes of Edward Clay and Bernard Schaffer, Graham Hancock, and James Ferguson. Although these latter authors recognizes that the obstacle to development are multiple and complex and would not deny the various constraints described above, what distinguishes their work from others is their emphasis on the primacy of organizational interests in defining the direction development programmes take. Hence, to long-time development analysts Edward Clay and Bernard Schaffer, institutional survivalism and organizational interests--or what they refer to as the *Bureaucratic Paradox* or *Irony*--can derail promising development initiatives in various forms. This may involve development agency staff resorting to a number of 'escape hatches', including narrowing down the agenda by working on projects which are easier to manage either because they reach a smaller and more easily serviced target group, they are sectoral rather than comprehensive in scope, and depend on measurable indicators or easily rewardable targets; sticking to well-known rules, procedures or counterparts; and doing what is least objectionable and most likely to please powerful stakeholders. [39]

In his work, Graham Hancock also writes about the drawbacks of *Bureaucratic Survivalism* which he defines as the inclination of international development agencies involved in the development business to constantly expand and perpetuate themselves and the desire of their staff to continue enjoying comfortable salaries and a privileged diplomatic lifestyle. [40]

James Ferguson offers yet another variant of the way in which organizational interests manifest themselves in international development cooperation. By focussing on the way in which development discourses evolve (i.e., the 'genealogy of development'), Ferguson aims to show that development agencies generate their own discourse and apparatuses and that they can cause unintended outcomes unrecognizable from their initial poverty-eradication and empowerment goals. In Ferguson's view, development agencies' need to "move the money" and to "sell their existing technical packages", is what leaves them constantly in search of "problems requiring a solution" and opting for already existing standardized, sectoral and technical (read apolitical) programmes which can be easily executed by development agencies and the established national government bureaucracies. In essence, says Ferguson, international development agencies favour development solutions which increase their chances of carrying out further interventions. Because this generally implies an emphasis on standardized and seemingly neutral technical solutions which can be executed by national government instruments as opposed to development work of a political nature, Ferguson believes that the kind of work normally carried out by international development agencies is more likely to further entrench state and bureaucratic power rather than to challenge existing power relations or institutional arrangements. [41]

The above insights from the International Development Cooperation Literature have helped me to focus of my thesis' research questions and hypotheses in four important areas. First of all, at the conceptual level, the work of development thinkers such as Leys, Moore and Schmitz and of NGO analysts such as Fowler and Biekart contributed to the formulation of my own research questions and hypotheses by confirming my initial inkling--as depicted in the *Baroque Science Phenomenon*-- that the sheer broadness and conceptual vagueness and ambiguity of newly-emerging development ideas such as SHD/PCD might render their interpretation and operationalization

particularly difficult. Secondly, the writings of Edwards and Sogge et al in the NGO Literature and of Clay and Schaffer, Hancock and Ferguson in the wider International Development Cooperation Literature, helped me to amalgamate my own early suppositions about the potentially disruptive effects of multiple political stakeholder pressures and organizational interests into the *River Pollution Phenomenon*. Thirdly, the discoveries discussed within the International Development Cooperation Literature provided many useful hints about the various kinds of implementational constraints which one might encounter in trying to implement ambitious and comprehensive participatory development initiatives similar to SHD/PCD.

In this respect, the International Development Cooperation Literature has proven particularly useful in alerting me to the difficulties of reaching the poorest of the poor; of achieving widespread participation and empowerment among the poor and the sometimes conflictive nature of beneficiary communities themselves; of the asymmetrical, top-down, welfarist, fragmented, territorial and overly rigid and bureaucratic forms which well-intended development initiatives sometimes take; and, the limited technical an administrative skills or performance standards available in many development programmes and projects. Lastly, the combination of the *Baroque Science* and the *River Pollution* Phenomena, along with the various shortcomings in the development record described above, were useful in helping me to identify the series of contestable assumptions which international development agencies tend to make about the adequacy of their own organizational structures and their potential for empowering the poor and bringing about catalytic change; about the seemingly harmonious and symmetrical nature of the wider system of international development cooperation; and about the altruistic nature and amount of free time and knowledge available in poor communities.

However, in addition to deriving insights from the International Development Cooperation Literature which helped to shape my own research questions and hypotheses, my thesis aims to contribute to this existing body of literature as well. First of all, by amalgamating the various contributions found in the International Development Cooperation Literature into a unified analysis threaded together by the *Baroque Science* and the *River Pollution* phenomena, I hope to be able to add structure and coherence to this literature, at least as it applies to the study of the SHD/PCD approaches. My second intention is to determine the applicability of the various claims of the International Development Cooperation Literature when, as in my analysis of SHD/PCD, they are tested at the conceptual, organizational, policy and programme-levels as well as from a global, national and local perspective. Finally, by comparing the SHD/PCD efforts an international NGO and a UN agency, I hope to move beyond the tendency of the International Development Cooperation Literature to write separately about NGO and other development organizations.

C) The Implementation Process Literature

The SHD/PCD and International Development Cooperation Literatures are not the only ones which contain useful insights for my research. There is also a branch of Public Administration, which I refer to here as the Implementation Process Literature [42], which addresses many of the implementability issues I am interested in exploring in my own thesis. In my thesis, I have chosen to focus only on the work of a few select thinkers who contribute important perspectives to understanding 'implementation processes', even though they might not recognize themselves as such.

Within the Implementation Process Literature, there are a number writings on implementation processes which are relevant to my own research. For example, Daniel P. Moynihan's view that policy-makers and implementors often oversell ambitious and ambiguous theories which they do not fully

understand and lack the concrete data, as well as the technical and management skills to implement properly is directly related to the concerns I raise in my thesis about the conceptual limitations of the SHD/PCD paradigm. [43] Similarly, Christopher Hood's notion of *'Information Distortion'* helps to understand why, in hierarchical agencies where interventions are highly technical and where the planning and implementation processes are very distant from one another--as is usually the case in development work--implementors exaggerate successes or cover up errors as a means of protecting their professional interests. [44] Peter Blau's findings that, due to their distaste for rigid bureaucratic rules, front-line welfare workers often failed to refer clients to needed training or services which would given them greater autonomy [45], is helpful in understanding how, in development processes too, development workers that must adhere to strict bureaucratic demands can end up making programme decisions which slow down beneficiaries' progress or restrict their autonomy and thus ultimately reinforce their dependence. Each of the above thinkers offers discoveries relevant to my own research. Moreover, there are several other studies on implementation processes which are potentially related as well. However, in my thesis, I focus on two particular studies of implementation processes which influenced the formulation of my two core research hypotheses.

The first study is Eugene Bardach's The Implementation Game. [46] After studying US policy reform efforts and the launching of several new social programmes in areas such as mental health, Bardach observed that after new policy mandates had been agreed to, authorized and adopted, they consistently suffered from an underachievement of goals. This, asserts Bardach, is partly due to the fact that implementation processes are themselves inherently complex and unpredictable, involving numerous activities, many different hands, and a plethora of complications which need to be resolved along the way. Above all though, Bardach argues that it is the 'politics of implementation'--i.e., the process of persuasion,

bargaining and manoeuvring by those stakeholders (e.g., clients, competitors, etc.) involved in the planning and implementation process which creates a constantly shifting set of political and organizational pressures which eventually result in the derailment of original programme goals. Bardach's conception of implementation processes as part of the larger 'game of politics' in which different parties obstruct the implementation of programmes by pursuing and negotiating for their own interests contributed immensely to the formulation of my own *River Pollution Phenomenon* in which political pressures from a multiplicity of stakeholders and the organizational interests of development agencies are believed to erode and eventually displace those core SHD/PCD goals originally undertaken by UNDP and Action Aid.

But the applicability of Bardach's work to my own does not end here. In The Implementation Game, Bardach also introduces a set of four 'implementation games' which give additional insights on the kinds of implementation problems which I analyze in my own study of SHD/PCD approaches. As Bardach explains, because implementation is a political process involving constant negotiation and concession-making, the goals of a policy or programme usually undergo considerable change in the implementation process. This will especially be the case if the original goals are ambiguous or, if the consensus upon which they were based was weak to begin with. Under these circumstances, notes Bardach, a series of 'Deflection of Goals' games can occur, including tactics such as 'Piling On' (i.e., when some stakeholders see a new programme as a political vehicle and use the opportunity to pile on their own goals and objectives, thereby causing the programme's original mission and goals to become much broader than anticipated). Other 'games' which shed light on the kinds of implementation setbacks which occur when carrying out complex and comprehensive social interventions such as SHD/PCD are what Bardach refers to as: 'Massive Resistance' (i.e., when a group of powerful stakeholders

explicitly resist and refuse to comply with some aspect of the policy or programme); 'Incompetence' (i.e., when the design of a policy or programme far outweighs the skills or competencies of those put in charge of its implementation); or 'The Budget Game' (i.e., a tendency for bureaucrats to constantly try to 'move the money'--often at the expense of quality monitoring or implementation). Each of these games helps explain the forces which cause the 'Displacement of Goals' in promising policies and programmes and thus help illuminate the logic of one of the core hypotheses in my research, the *River Pollution Phenomenon*.

Finally, Bardach also contributes to the other core hypothesis in my thesis, the *Baroque Science Phenomenon* by cautioning that it is impossible to implement a policy or programme that is conceptually defective:

> Any policy or program implies an economic, and probably a sociological theory about the way the world works. If this theory is fundamentally incorrect, the policy will probably fail no matter how well it is implemented. This is because implementation problems tend to exaggerate rather than ameliorate basic conceptual problems. [47]

And, warning against operationalizing paradigms susceptible to political pressures and organizational interests into complex programmes:

> Programs predicated on continually high levels of competence on expeditious inter-organizational coordination, or on sophisticated methods of accommodating diversity and heterogeneity are very vulnerable....They are not necessarily doomed to failure but they are aching for trouble. [48]

Sam Sieber is the other analyst specializing in social interventions whose insights on implementation processes have greatly influenced by research focus and hypotheses. Like Bardach, Sieber is very much aware that, in many cases, social interventions produce counter-productive and even regressive effects, contrary to those originally planned. And, like Bardach, Sieber regards the implementation process as extremely complex and riddled with tensions and divergent interests and humans themselves as constantly resisting changes which threaten the status quo. Nevertheless, according to Sieber, because, the trade-offs in strategies for social

change containing multiple goals and contradictory interests are rarely recognized, their unanticipated and reverse consequences are overlooked.

It is in an effort to deal with such complexities that prompts those actors in the implementation process to resort to using what Sieber calls 'Mechanisms of Conversion'. Sieber defines 'Mechanisms of Conversion' as those ways in which actors deal with and resist change in the existing order. They are also the source of regressive social interventions. In Fatal Remedies [49], Sieber identifies seven Mechanisms of Conversion which lead to regressive interventions. Out of these, four are particularly applicable to my research, the most important among them being 'Goal Displacement'. Sieber defines Goal Displacement as the process by which instrumental goals become a terminal value. In other words, the implementor becomes overly dedicated to the means--i.e., the rules, procedures and the bureaucratization process in his/her own organizations--in the service-delivery process and is thus derailed from achieving his/her wider goals. Goal Displacement usually occurs when a bureaucrat tries to do things in the most efficient or official manner possible and ends up placing the means over the ends. It is especially prevalent when the goals of the organization are incompatible with an emphasis on bureaucratic forms of organizational efficiency and control. Other Mechanisms of Conversion pertinent to my own research questions include: 'Overcommitment' (i.e., interventions that try to achieve more than is realistically possible within the existing capacity); 'Placation' (i.e., interventions which are merely means of placating certain parties whose support is considered necessary or whose attacks require neutralization); and, 'Exploitation' (i.e., when certain groups manage to appropriate a set of interventions).

Sieber's Conversion Mechanisms offer useful insights for my formulation of the *Baroque Science Phenomenon* by highlighting that major gaps between implementors' goals and aspirations and their organizations'

capacities can render the realization of such goals extremely difficult, and by pointing out that, Goal Displacement is most likely to occur when bureaucrats are expected to operationalize ideas or to fulfil goals which are in tension with one another. Sieber's Goal Displacement model is equally relevant to my thesis' *River Pollution Phenomenon.* Most instructive in this respect are Sieber's findings that organizational interests are most likely to overwhelm the initial goals of programmes and to exacerbate Goal Displacement in situations where either scarcity of resources or severe competition among agencies results in poor inter-agency collaboration and compels agencies to constantly build larger clienteles, to 'keep the money moving', and to apply more expedient (i.e., 'blueprint') solutions. In sum, by warning that ambiguous or contradictory goals and gaps between goals and real implementation capacity (i.e., the *Baroque Science Phenomenon*) can perpetuate Goal Displacement and that the gradual displacement of policy and programme goals (i.e., the *River Pollution Phenomenon*) can be exacerbated by organizational pressures, Sieber's work has helped me to see how the *Baroque Science* and *River Pollution* Phenomena might be inter-related and propelled by a mix of conceptual incoherence, political pressures and organizational interests.

Clearly then, the *Baroque Science* and *River Pollution* Phenomena borrow many of their insights from Implementation Process theorists. Still, there are three fundamental differences. First of all, when merged, the two phenomena developed allow us to construct a fairly detailed account of how it is both deficient or overly ambitious ideas and organizational interests which, when they occur together, seriously obstruct implementation processes. Secondly, while most of the ideas of the Implementation Process Literature apply to the State and public institutions, the two phenomena introduced in this thesis show that similar problems also evident in multilateral development agencies and international NGOs. And third, while

the Implementation Process Literature concentrates its analysis at the national level and on developed countries, the phenomena developed here show how implementation problems manifest themselves in developing societies and at different levels, including in the international, national and local sphere.

Even though the Implementation Process Literature are not widely read in international development circles, the above discussion illustrates that this stream of Public Administration contains several lessons directly pertinent to my own research questions and hypotheses. The first pertinent lesson offered is that implementation is an intricately political process characterized by multiple stakeholder pressures and organizational interests. This particular finding is reminiscent of Sogge et al's, Clay and Schaffer's, Hancock's, as well as Ferguson's claims in the International Development Cooperation Literature. An additional revelation provided by the studies of implementation processes discussed above is that, these processes are inherently complex and, as such, even competent agencies are likely to encounter some difficulties translating even the most promising ideas into practice. A third and related insight and one which, again, is not as evolved as it could be in international development thinking, is the realization that, in life, there invariably tends to be a gap between those goals and ideals which we, as humans, aspire to and our real capacities to effectively put such ideas into practice.

Although this latter dilemma is also one indirectly alluded to by development scholars such as Leys and Moore and Schmitz, these thinkers seem to place most of the blame on the self-interest of development agencies and on the nature of those development ideas in vogue today rather than attributing any of the problems to the complex and sometimes unpredictable nature of implementation processes themselves. The final contribution of the Implementation Process Literature lies in its detailed

look at the conditions under which the displacement and erosion of goals which I speculate about in my own hypotheses are most likely to occur (i.e., when theories are incomplete, goals are ambiguous, stakeholder pressures multiple, and pressures for self-perpetuation and the need to attend to organizational interests are the strongest) and the various forms of organizational interests which impinge upon social interventions.

In fact, by amalgamating insights contained in the Implementation Process Literature with those previously reviewed in the International Development Cooperation Literature it is possible to further fine-tune the *River Pollution Phenomenon* by identifying four different types of organizational interests which might lead to a displacement of the SHD/PCD agenda and which should be carefully gauged. These include: i) a tendency to do what is easiest and most feasible (e.g., working within a narrow range of options, with accessible and trainable beneficiaries, complying with organizational rules, pre-set targets, etc.)--Clay and Schaffer's *Bureaucratic Paradox/Irony* and Sieber's notion of 'Goal Displacement' both highlight this tendency; ii) a tendency towards self-perpetuation (e.g., by seeking profile, constantly expanding one's programme and client-base, or by keeping the money moving)--a tendency reflected in Ferguson's account of how development agencies push pre-packaged technical solutions as well as in Bardach's 'Budget Games'; iii) a tendency to do what is least objectionable to powerful stakeholders who can exert sanctions--a tendency emphasized in Sieber's notion of 'Placation' and Bardach's 'Piling On', as well as in Smillie's, and Rondinelli's concern with influential stakeholder pressures, and; iv) a tendency to simplify the complexities of development processes (e.g., by overlooking wider institutional constraints, exaggerating successes or underplaying errors for the sake of a positive agency image or and personal job security)--tendencies reflected in Hancock's analysis of opportunistic development professionals and Sogge et al's exposure of the lack of impact evaluation standards in development.

In sum, despite the fact that the analysts of implementation processes discussed in this section base much of their research on governmental programmes in Western developed nations, their insights about the inherent difficulties of implementation processes and their detailed knowledge of the types of obstacles (games) which one can expect to find in the implementation process provide useful cues for my own research, especially when amalgamated with insights from the International Development Cooperation Literature. It is for this reason that development studies should consider tapping into other literatures such as the Implementation Process Literature and to test the latter's pertinence to Third World contexts while at the same time using it to test the applicability of international development ideas beyond LDCs.

D) The Institutional Literature

There is one more literature which offers important insights for my study of SHD/PCD approaches: the *New Institutionalism* which I referred to in Chapter 1. Because the Institutional Literature is extremely broad, in my thesis I focus on two branches of the literature which have greatly influenced development thinking: what in my thesis I refer to as the *Democratic Development* (DD) and the *New Institutional Economics* (NIE). These two streams of institutional thought are almost diametric opposites to one another both in terms of their emphases and core assumptions. Yet, I would argue that each one of them offers useful reflections on the problems of putting SHD/PCD into practice and that the two are complementary.

Rather than being a formal school of thought *per se*, what I refer to in this thesis as *Democratic Development* (DD) ideas are probably best described as a loose grouping of like-minded thinkers who share a general set of beliefs and assumptions about the importance of promoting more democratic

organizations. In the field of international development, prominent advocates of the DD include Robert Chambers, David Korten, Dennis Rondinelli, Michael Cernea and Stan Burkey. Even though there is considerable variance in their views, DD proponents agree on three key premises: Firstly, they share a conviction that social change requires the replacement of hierarchical and bureaucratic organizational structures with much more equitable, decentralized and participatory ones. In essence, DD thinkers believe that it is the unequal distribution of resources and power which causes and perpetuates poverty and deprivation in developing society. However, given the difficulties of attacking the root causes of inequality, and especially of doing so in a non-violent manner and through short and medium-term development work, DD thinkers argue that we have to contend with first democratizing those organizations we work with. In development cooperation, this implies creating bottom-up, flexible and accountable management structures and development projects which promote equity, decentralization and beneficiary participation. The assumption is that, by taking part in democratic development projects, the poor will in learn organizational and consensus-building skills, gain a sense of self-reliance and, as a result, will in the longer-run be better equipped and empowered to address the root causes of inequality and injustice in their society. [50] Their second conviction is the belief that, to be effective, development efforts must tap into indigenous knowledge and the local organizations and solidarity of the poor. [51] The third salient characteristic of DD thinkers is the belief that rigid development blueprints must be replaced by a flexible and adaptive approach to development. [52] This, the DD School emphasizes, requires development staff willing to abandon many of their former biases (e.g., their urban bias, their penchant for technocratic solutions or bureaucratic procedures, a tendency towards over-specialization and disciplinary territoriality, etc.). [53]

As is evident from the discussion above, the three key premises of the DD School reinforce one another and overlap with the development setbacks and implementation constraints identified by many of the authors already mentioned in this Chapter. At the same time though, there are many important impediments to development which the DD School does not sufficiently take into account. One critique of the DD School made by neo-Marxists, for instance, is that, by restricting its promotion of participation, decentralization and democratization to the organizational and project level, the DD School does not do enough to bring about social transformation in unjust LDCs. Deep-rooted socio-economic and political change, claim these critics, cannot bypass the role of the state and may well involve violent resistance by popular and even revolutionary movements. [54] This brings me to a second deficiency of the DD School and that is its inability to provide a critical analysis of the conceptual soundness of the SHD/PCD paradigm which it closely adheres to. DD thinkers seldom consider whether the ambitious principles of the SHD/PCD paradigm might be in tension with one another or whether greater equity, accountability and participation can become a reality in class-divided and clientelistic developing societies. Equally disconcerting is that, even though DD advocates know that the development record and organizational capacity of international development agencies is poor, many still assume that these agencies will play a catalytic role in bringing about a paradigmatic shift in development and have, in this sense, failed to appreciate the gap between these agencies' development aspirations and their actual organizational capacities.

The DD School also romanticizes development processes and poor beneficiaries. In their literature, government officials and economic elites are often depicted as exploitative and corrupt, while poor beneficiary communities are painted as inherently wise and solidaristic. Mention is hardly ever made of the reality that, far from always being

helpful or adaptive, indigenous knowledge and local traditions can be quite crude, parochial and detrimental to development processes; that internal community conflicts, limited local knowledge, and self-interested, exploitative and corrupt behaviour among the poor often renders participation and empowerment unfeasible; or, that building group solidarity is far from the top of the priority lists of most poor communities. [55] This latter point is important in that mutuality and broad participation in poor beneficiary communities is not easily achievable. This is not only due to inequities in wealth and knowledge (as emphasized by the DD School) but also to the fact that, many poor people do not share the altruism, participation and empowerment goals which SHD/PCD and DD advocates assume they do. The above shortcomings of the DD School mean that its advocates have wrongfully sustained a series of assumptions about the true nature of development processes and development cooperation and failed to question the likelihood of international development agencies empowering the poor and effectively implementing SHD/PCD. These criticisms are addressed by the *New Institutional Economics* (NIE), the second branch of the *New Institutionalism* containing useful insights for my thesis.

By the time Douglass North was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1993, the NIE had influenced most social sciences. Its appeal lay in NIE's long-awaited recognition of the role played by ideology, culture and history in human activity as well as in its challenge of neo-Classical Economics which had never explained the existence of human organizations. International Development analysts appreciated the NIE for its lucid analysis of the adverse effects of human opportunism and inappropriate institutional arrangements--both neglected in previous development models. The pioneers of the NIE were Economists Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson. But it was Douglass North's Nobel Prize which gave the NIE recognition. In recent years, the NIE has been applied to Third World development problems by Elinor Ostrom, Samuel Paul and E.A. Brett.

Although some worry that the NIE is a far cry from the 'grand theory' some claim it to be [56], NIE thinkers do share core ideas and assumptions which characterize them as a distinct group. To start, NIE advocates concentrate their analysis on the behaviour of what they perceive to be rational self-maximizing individuals. [57] NIE thinkers assume that people maximize their own rather than social interests unless incentives and sanctions are created to ensure otherwise. When such sanctions and incentives are not in place, rent-seeking behaviour (e.g., 'shirking', 'free-riding') and a series of monitoring and imperfect information problems (e.g., 'adverse selection', 'moral hazard') can cause counterproductive development effects. [58] To NIE analysts, the solution is to formulate institutional arrangements based on clear rules and rule enforcement, to maintain hierarchical organizations capable of effective monitoring, and to create controls and incentives against opportunistic behaviour. [59] A second concern shared by NIE thinkers is the creation of institutional arrangements and organizations effective at generating growth and efficiency. In fact, according to NIE advocates, humans create institutional arrangements and organizations precisely to reduce the uncertainties of human exchange and to reduce those 'transformation costs' and 'transaction costs' involved in productive and exchange processes. [60] A third feature of the NIE School of thought is that, by putting the spotlight on the detrimental effects of high *transaction costs*, they have been able to illustrate how excessive Statist regulation (e.g., redundant requirements for licenses, permits or complex bureaucratic procedures to carry out certain transactions), ill-defined laws (e.g., confusing rules about property rights or infinite accompanying clauses), and improper law enforcement (e.g., the use of legal loopholes and the acceptance of bribes) have produced anti-developmental institutional frameworks and widespread cynicism about the rule of law and contractual agreements. [61] The last salient feature of the NIE is the assumption that human interactions are by nature hierarchical, efficient, and involve unequal authority and gains. [62]

Several of the assumptions of NIE thinkers provide insights useful for my own research. For example, the NIE School's finding that individual opportunism can produce various forms of rent-seeking behaviour among development staff, recipient government officials and poor beneficiaries influenced my own supposition that many of the more ambitious and loftier ideals of the SHD/PCD agenda may not be easily operationalizable by international development agencies and that it may be a fallacious to assume that development processes are predominantly harmonious and that poor beneficiaries are naturally solidaristic and altruistic. Similarly, NIE's insight that efficient development requires clear rules of the game, rule enforcement, appropriate incentives, and close monitoring helped to shape my hypothesis that SHD/PCD goals like broad participation and empowerment may not be easily implementable in LDC societies characterized by improper law enforcement, unaccountable and corrupt political institutions, high transaction costs, and a marginalized peasantry with little access to assets, power, education or free time. NIE's premise that some authority and specialized expertise may be needed for efficient development is equally pertinent to my work since it alerts me to the possibility that it may be unrealistic to expect the poor to resolve development problems relying mostly on their own resources and knowledge.

Judging from the discussion above, by factoring in the adverse effects of human opportunism and some of the technical requirements of efficiency, NIE injects some much-needed realism into many of the more utopian assumptions of DD thinkers. NIE' merits notwithstanding though, one should not forget that the NIE School is itself wrought with deficiencies. Four of these are particularly pertinent to my SHD/PCD research. The first caveat of the NIE Literature is that although it examines how opportunism generates *transaction costs* and perverse institutional

arrangements detrimental to development, in actuality, development setbacks and costs resulting from opportunistic behaviour are only a small portion of a much larger array of development impediments, including, vague and contradictory development concepts, political pressures and organizational interests, extreme inequality, exploitation, and authoritarianism in LDC societies, etc.). However, because the NIE concerns itself mainly with opportunistic tendencies, the adverse effects of development constraints such as the ones mentioned above, are underrated in some NIE analyzes. The second weakness of many NIE advocates lies in their assumption that growth and efficient service provision are the chief aims of development. Hence, even though the SHD/PCD paradigm reminds us that development is more than material growth or efficiency and the DD School stresses that inequity in access to resources and power is one of the root causes of poverty and deprivation, the direct eradication of gross inequalities, exploitation, and the oppression of the poor by elites does not figure highly in NIE's economistic development vision. [63] My third concern about the NIE is that much of it claims that the search for technological and economic efficiency makes hierarchies inevitable; the implication being that flatter, more democratic or participatory forms of organization are simply not an option. The NIE fails to allude to the reality that the highly specialized technical advice which creates much of the hierarchy in organizations is far from infallible. NIE advocates are equally silent about the regressive effects hierarchical management structures can have on development processes and how hierarchy itself generates the preconditions for both employer and worker opportunism by giving employers, experts and elites strategic advantages of information and power over their employees, beneficiaries, and constituents and leaving the latter marginalized, feeling exploited and with little recourse but to resort to malfeasance. [64] My last critique of the NIE School has to do with its inherent conservatism and reinforcement of the status quo. By choosing an analytical framework preoccupied mostly with efficiency, growth and the need for hierarchy, NIE

thinkers end up generally approving of rather than questioning the justice of those political economic structures and relations which prevail in society. As such, they generally do not assign enough of a central role to questions such as who formulates 'the rules of the game' in the first place, who such rules benefit, and how institutional arrangements can both reflect and reinforce injustice and existing political inequities in society. [65] In LDCs where democracy and civil society are weak, excessive regulation persists, *exit* options are rare, public accountability is unheard of and the poor lack the resources, confidence or skills to exert *voice*, the NIE may prove as difficult to bring to fruition as the lofty ideals of DD.

On the basis of the evidence provided in this section, it is obvious that both the DD and NIE Schools of thought offer insights useful for testing the potential of SHD/PCD approaches. Clearly, both institutional approaches have very different foci, and some might say even opposed visions of development. For instance, while DD thinkers are chiefly interested in promoting democratization, equity and mutuality within developing communities and in creating development organizations which embody these same principles, NIE analysts prefer to concentrate their efforts on generating growth, increasing efficiency in service delivery, and in finding means of controlling forms of individual opportunism and rent-seeking behaviour which result in unnecessarily high *transaction costs* and inefficient institutional arrangements. If anything though, the discussion in this Chapter illustrates that both the DD School and the NIE Schools have legitimate concerns and offer useful insights about the feasibility of implementing SHD/PCD approaches in poor LDCs. Despite their differences, I would argue that the premises of the two schools are complementary and that, by eclectically borrowing from each, one can arrive at a deeper understanding of the implementability of SHD/PCD which recognizes the importance of both equity and efficiency in development processes. In

fact, in an article about the *New Institutionalism*, Hall and Taylor express surprise at how distant various schools of institutional thought have remained given that each reveals genuine dimensions of human behaviour and suggest that the time has come for greater interchange among them. [66]

In my thesis I propose to achieve this balance by proposing that DD's belief that democratic, participatory and less hierarchical societies and organizations are helpful for SHD/PCD is quite likely accurate but, at the same time proposing that, DD's assumptions that development processes are harmonious, that beneficiary communities are naturally solidaristic, and that the poor have the trust, time and knowledge needed to foster broad participation are questionable. On the other side of the coin, I would propose that NIE's claims that development processes are undermined by opportunism and that close monitoring, incentives, rule enforcement, and technical authority are needed for efficient development are accurate but, that overly rigid, hierarchical and top-down management structures and outside expertise, even if efficient, also undermine core SHD/PCD goals. I would further argue that complementing insights from the DD and NIE Schools of thought may not go far enough. As pointed out in the above critiques of both DD and NIE thinkers, both Schools of thought have a built-in conservatism. In the case of the NIE it derives mainly from the School's inability to analyze the political economy of institutions and to recognize that even efficient institutional arrangements may reinforce power and resource inequalities in LDCs and that organizations have a momentum and interests of their own. In the case of DD, although its advocates are aware that economic and power disparities aggravate poverty and uneven development, by concentrating on the organizational and project levels, DD analysts fail to provide an in-depth assessment of the conceptual and operational soundness of SHD/PCD or to question the catalytic potential of international development agencies to challenge existing power relations and the status quo.

II. Towards Complementarity: Designing an Eclectic Conceptual Framework with which to Analyze SHD/PCD Approaches

This chapter has covered considerable conceptual ground. Its main message has been that there are as many as four social science literatures which offer useful insights for my research hypotheses and for testing the implementability of SHD/PCD. The SHD/PCD Literature, and especially publications independent from UNDP, have provided excellent critiques of the more conceptual foundations of the SHD/PCD paradigm (the *Baroque Science Phenomenon*). In addition to an overview of the impact of foreign aid in SHD/PCD-related areas, the International Development Cooperation Literature explores the links between international, societal and organizational factors affecting development processes, including the displacing effects of a divided international cooperation community, top-down and bureaucratic management structures, multiple stakeholder pressures, organizational interests, and conflictive beneficiary communities. The Implementation Process Literature is undoubtedly at its best when analyzing organizational dynamics and the various ways in which political pressures and organizational interests erode initially audacious policy/programme goals during implementation processes (the *River Pollution Phenomenon*). Finally, the Institutional Literature, although split into two streams, when used in an eclectic fashion offers revelations both about the limits of overly top-down, technocratic and inequitable development efforts as well as about the unlikelihood of perfectly participatory and self-reliant development and the limited capacities, commitment and solidarity of beneficiary communities. The wisdom of each of these literatures points to the need to draw insights from each one of them in order to gain a fuller understanding of the implementability of SHD/PCD. This eclectic use of various social science literatures to determine the theoretical and practical feasibility of SHD/PCD and the introduction and testing of the *Baroque Science* and *River Pollution Phenomena* through original research on SHD/PCD at the global, national and local levels constitute my thesis' conceptual contributions.

ENDNOTES:

1. Christopher Hood. *Public Administration: Lost an Empire, Not Yet Found a Role*. Page 120. In Adrian Leftwich (Editor). New Directions in Political Science: An International Review of Achievements and Prospects. Aldershot, Hants, UK: Edward Elgar Publishers, 1990.

2. From 1990-1995, Pakistan's former Planning and Finance Minister, Dr. Mahbub ul Haq who acted as Special Advisor to the UNDP Administrator and led UNDP's HRDO. In 1996, Dr. Richard Jolly, formerly Deputy Director at UNICEF took over Dr. Haq. Through the years, the *Eminent Panel of Experts* associated with UNDP's HDRO has included development luminaries like Amartya Sen, Meghnad Desai, Keith Griffin Frances Stewart, Paul Streeten, and Gustav Ranis and Hans Singer. Other prominent contributors include Franz Schuurmann, Roger Riddell, David Korten, Robert Chambers, and Bella Abzug.

3. UNDP's *Bureau for Policy and Programme Support* (BPPS), UNDP's *Inter-Bureau Task Force on Sustainable Human Development*, and the *Office of Evaluation and Strategic Planning* (OESP) have led the way in the production of internal case studies and practitioner guidelines for operationalizing SHD/PCD.

4. Since 1990, the themes of UNDP's HDRs have changed annually. The 1990 HDR introduced the concept of *Human Development* and put forward a case for a new development approach, while subsequent reports have focussed on those national policy and institutional reforms needed to bring about *Human Development* in LDCs (1991 HDR); the need for global institutional renewal in the global arena (1992 HDR); the prerequisites for 'Sound governance and civil society participation (1992 HDR and the 1993 HDR); proposals for the *Copenhagen Summit for Social Development* (1994 HDR); an assessment of the role of gender in development (1995 HDR); and the link between growth and *Human Development* (1996 HDR), as well as between Poverty and Human Development (1997 HDR).

5. In addition to more than 50 statistical tables, UNDP's annual HDRs provide disaggregated *Human Development* data on the basis of gender, age, region, religion, etc. and ranks countries' *Human Development* performance on the basis of a Human Development Index (HDI), A Human Poverty Index (HPI), and a Political Freedom Index (PFI), although the latter enjoyed wide usage.

6. See: Lipton, M. and Maxwell, S. *The New Poverty Agenda*. IDS Discussion Paper No. 306. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), Brighton, UK: University of Sussex. 1992. Another essay which looks at SHD/PCD in the context of the World Bank's changing views on poverty is Michael Askwith's *Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Human Development:Semantics or Substance?* IDS Discussion Paper No. 345. 1994.

7. Cornia, Giovanni, Jolly, Richard, and Stewart, Frances. *Adjustment with a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth*. Volumes 1 and 2. Oxford: UNICEF and Oxford University Press, 1987.

8. See, Mark McGillivray. *The Human Development Index: Yet another Redundant Composite Development Indicator?* World Development Volume 19, No. 10., 1991 and Mark McGillivray and Howard White, Measuring Development? *The UNDP's Human Development Index*. Journal of International Development. Volume 15, No. 2, 1993.

9. T.N. Srinivasan, *Human Development: A New Paradigm or Reinvention of the Wheel*. American Economic Review, May 1994. 106th Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. Boston, MA, USA. January 3-5, 1993.

10. Katarina Tomasevski. *A Critique of the UNDP Political Freedom Index 1991*. Page 14. In Bard-Anders Andreassen and Theresa Swinehart (Editors), Human Rights in Developing Countries Yearbook, 1991. Oslo: The Norwegian Institute of Human Rights in Cooperation with Scandinavian University Press, 1992.

11. Leen Boer and Ad Koekkoek, *Human Development Report: Fad or Fixture?* Development Policy Review, Vol. 11, 1993. Page 430.

12. Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra quoted in Thalif Deen, UN-IPS, Op. Cit.

13. See, for example, Martin Godfrey et al. *Building The Capacity to Prevent Poverty: UNDP as Facilitator*. Page 5. Independent Consultancy Evaluation Carried Out for UNDP Between April-October 1994. New York, New York, USA, 1994.

14. See for example, Michael Hopkins. *Human Development Revisited: A New Development Report* in World Development, Volume 19, No. 10 1991.

15. Refer to Leen Boer and Ad Koekkoek, Op. Cit.

16. Interviews #10 and #11.

17. V. V. Rao. *Human Development Report 1990: Review and Assessment*. World Development Volume 19, No. 10, 1991

18. Michael Hopkins, Op. Cit.

19. Centre for Development Research. *Assessment of UNDP: Developing Capacity for Sustainable Human Development*. See Page i, 17, 32, 34. Report by the governments of Denmark, India, Sweden and the UK. Copenhagen: CDR, February 1996.

20. T.N. Srinivasan, Pages 12-13. Op. Cit.

21. Katarina Tomasevski, Pages 8, 14. Op. Cit.

22. Diane Elson. 1997. Op. Cit.

23. Godfrey et al. Op. Cit.

24. Centre for Development Research. Op. Cit.

25. Tendler, Judith. *Turning Private Voluntary Organizations into Development Agencies: Questions for Evaluation*. A.I.D. Program Evaluation Discussion Paper No. 12. Washington DC: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), April 1982.

26. Roger Riddell and Mark Robinson. *The Impact of NGO Poverty Alleviation Projects: Results of the Case Study Evaluations*. Working Paper 68. London, UK: ODI, November 1992. The above ODI report includes an assessment of the performance of four Ugandan NGOs, including one of AA by John de Coninck discussed in Chapter 6.

27. ECDPM and ODI. *European Union Agencies: Comparative Management and Effectiveness*. Document's Summary. Maastricht and London: ECDPM and ODI, June 1996.

28. Michael Edwards and David Hulme. Beyond the Magic Bullet: Non-Governmental Organisations--Performance and Accountability. Refer especially to the discussion on the effects of the *New Policy Agenda* in Chapter 1. London: Save the Children Fund and Earthscan Publications, 1996.

29. According to Smith, American NGOs are more traditional and apolitical than their Canadian or European sister organizations. (See: Brian Smith. More Than Altruism: The Politics of Private Foreign Aid. Pages 158 and 219 especially. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990.

30. Clark. Page 147, Op. Cit.

31. Edwards and Hulme, Pages 9-11, Op. Cit.

32. Alan Fowler and Kees Biekart. Chapter 4. Op. Cit.

33. Colin Leys, The Rise and Fall of Development Theory. Pages 25-26. London: James Currey Publishers, 1996.

34. Ian Smillie. The Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire--Nonprofit Organizations and International Development. See Chapter 12. London: Intermediate Technology Publications, 1995.

35. Dennis Rondinelli. Op. Cit.

36. Edwards, Michael. *International Development NGOs: Legitimacy, Accountability, Regulation and Roles*. Discussion Paper for the Commission on the Future of the Voluntary Sector (CFVS) and the *British Overseas Aid Group* (BOAG). London: BOAG, Dec. 1996.

37. Sogge et al. Op. Cit.

38. Brian Smith, for example, goes as far as to claim that NGOs repeatedly end up reproducing the status quo and that through their alleviatory work may even reinforce the political and economic stability of undesirable LDC governments. (Brian Smith. Pages 279-283, Op. Cit.)

39. E.J. Clay and B.B. Schaffer. Room for Manoeuvre: An Exploration of Public Policy in Agricultural and Rural Development. London: Heinemann Pub., 1984.

40. Hancock, Graham. Lords of Poverty. UK: Mandarin Publishers,1991.

41. James Ferguson. The Anti-Politics Machine. Op. Cit.

42. According to Jan-Erik Lane, the Implementation Literature in Public Administration is sub-divided between those who focus on implementation outcomes/outputs; those who study implementational processes; and those who concentrate on the effects and long-term impact of implementation. (For an overview of implementation approaches in Public Administration, see: Jan-Erik Lane's book, The Public Sector: Concepts, Models and Approaches. Chapter 4. Second Edition. London: Sage Publications, 1995.)

43. Daniel P. Moynihan. Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding. Toronto: The Free Press, a division of the Macmillan Co. Third Edition, 1969.

44. Christopher Hood. Administrative Analysis: An Introduction to Rules, Enforcement and Organizations. New York: Wheatsheaf Books and St. Martin's Press, 1986.

45. Peter Blau. *Orientation Toward Clients in a Public Welfare Agency*, in: On the Nature of Organizations. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1974.

46. Eugene Bardach. The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes a Law. Cambridge, MA: M.I. T. Press, 1979.

47. Eugene Bardach, Page 252. Op. Cit.

48. In these conclusions, Bardach is drawing heavily on Pressman and Wildavsky's book, Implementation (1973), which argues that the more decision points a program-assembly process has, the more complicated its implementation becomes and the more the opportunity for something to go wrong in the process. (Pressman and Wildavsky as discussed in Eugene Bardach. Page 273. Op. Cit).

49. Sam Sieber. Fatal Remedies: The Ironies of Social Intervention. Chapter 1 in particular. New York: Plenum Press, 1981.

50. David Korten incorporates these ideas into what he calls an *Equity-Led Sustainable Growth Strategy* which addresses the need to increase equity in developing societies. (Korten, David. Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda. West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press, 1990).

Robert Chambers writes about how learning from the poor, strengthening participatory management practices, and development interventions that pass on organizational skills to the poor helps them become aware of their conditions and to demand greater control over their lives. (Chambers, Robert. Rural Development: Putting the Last First. London: Longman Publishers, 1983).

51. In Rural Development: Putting the Last First, Chambers critiques development experts for failing to recongize the merits of indigenous knowledge which, he argues, is better adapted to the environment of the poor. (Chambers, Robert. Chapter 4. Op. Cit.)

Korten's "Learning Process Approach" also regards the incorporation of local knowledge as a key component of successful development initiatives. (Korten, David. Community Organization and Rural Development: A Learning Process Approach. Public Administration Review. September/October 1980).

The notion of solidarity among the poor and between the poor and development workers figures highly in the work of DD thinkers like Stan Burkey who places great emphasis on creating an atmosphere of solidarity and mutual understanding. (Burkey, Stan. People First: A Guide to Self-Reliant, Participatory Rural Development. New Jersey: Zed Publishers, 1993.)

52. As early as 1980, David Korten was recommending a flexible and environmentally-responsive "Learning Process Approach" to implementing development projects as opposed to the much more rigid, time-bound and over-rationalistic 'Blueprint Approach' to development implementation. (Korten, 1980. Op. Cit.). Dennis Rondinelli embraces Korten's critique of 'Blueprint Approaches' and offers his own solution: to treat development as an incremental social learning process and to integrate the planning and

implementation of development projects so that the very design of projects takes into consideration the need for ongoing experimentation and social learning during implementation. (Rondinelli 1993, Op. Cit.).

53. Chambers criticizes the development profession's disciplinary territoriality, over-specialization and simplification of complex development problems, and rigid diagnosis-prescription approach to analyzing development problems, (Robert Chambers, 1983. Op. Cit.) In a later article about the development profession Chambers further argues the conservative biases of development professionals--i.e., their 'rich-bias', 'urban-biased', 'male-bias', 'high tech-bias', 'project-bias', and 'quantification-bias') explain why development interventions have placed the poor last and reinforced existing inequalities in LDCs (Robert Chambers. *Normal Professionalism, New Paradigms and Development*. IDS Discussion Paper # 227. Falmer, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Dec. 1986.)

54. David Slater makes precisely this point in an article in which he challenges Dennis Rondinelli's argument that decentralization and participation are appropriate means of achieving economic redistribution, political democratization or long-term social change. Development processes, argues Slater, can not be separated from broader power struggles in LDCs. He proposes revisiting neo-Marxist ideas about revolutionary change as the alternative (David Slater. *Debating Decentralization--A Reply to Rondinelli*. Development and Change. Volume 21. 1990. Pages 501-512.)

Laura Macdonald is another scholar who concludes that participatory development can be depoliticized to the point where it ends up reinforcing the dominant class interests rather than democratizing or challenging the status quo in LDCs. (Laura Macdonald. *NGOs and the Problematic Discourse of Participation: Cases from Costa Rica*. David Moore and Gerald, Schmitz (Editors). Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives. London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1995.)

55. In his critique of DD thinkers, E.A. Brett points out that when consulted about their development aspirations, the poor usually opt for financial assistance that benefits them as individuals rather than assistance with improving group solidarity or participation. (E.A. Brett. Participation and Accountability in Development Administration. Page 4. Monograph. London: London School of Economics and Political Science, January 1997).

56. Several of the contributors to the Harriss, Hunter and Lewis volume on the NIE question whether the NIE should be considered a 'grand theory' given its focus on the 'micro-foundations' of economies and institutions and its inability to offer truly new insights. (See: John Harriss, Janet Hunter and Colin Lewis. Chapter 1: *Introduction-- Development and Significance of NIE*. Pages 1-2 . in Harriss, Hunter and Lewis (Editors). The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development. London: Routledge Publishers, 1995.)

57. According to Gary Libecap, the NIE wrongly assumes that the individual is constantly trying to minimize his/her loss and to maximize gains. Even Douglass North who objects to rationality assumptions, still regards economic agents as responding to incentives in consistent, predictable, and a goal-oriented way. (Gary Libecap. *Politics, Institutions and Institutional Change. A Commentary*. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. Volume 149. Number 1. March 1993.) Although the NIE thinkers also write about collective action, add Nabli and Nugent, they explain collective outcomes in terms of individual motivation. (Mustapha K. Nabli and Jeffrey Nugent. *The New Institutional Economics and Its Applicability to Development*.World Development.Volume 17.No. 9. 1989.

58. One problem which preoccupies NIE theorists is that employers (principals) can not know certain information about job applicants (agents) before they enter into a contractual relationship. This is what NIE analysts refer to as the problem of 'adverse selection'. Moreover, even in the ex-post contracting situation, the performance of agents is not easily observable since the principal may be far away or lack the sufficient technical expertise to know if the agent is as efficient as he/she claims. NIE thinkers call this dilemma 'moral hazard'. Under such circumstances of asymmetrical and imperfect information, NIE thinkers argue that there is bound to be ample opportunities for rent-seeking behaviour such as 'shirking' (i.e., when individuals find it in their interest to reduce their efforts knowing that the resulting losses in team reward will be borne largely by the others) or 'free-riding' (i.e., when individuals find it preferable not to contribute in the provision of public goods since they know that such goods are indivisible and that they will still benefit as a result). In LDCs where government is ineffective and where the distance between development managers and beneficiary communities are long, problems of imperfect information and weak monitoring, as well as inadequate law enforcement and opportunism can become widespread. (See: Moe, *The New Economics of Organization*. American Journal of Political Science. Volume 28., Number 4, November 1984; see also: Nabli, Mustapha and Nugent, Jeffrey. Op. Cit.)

59. According to Samuel Paul, the key to effective public performance lies in increasing government accountability to the public by creating monitoring and incentive systems for public services which are compatible with and meet the expectations of clients. This would include ensuring that clients have *exit* (i.e., alternative sources of supply) and *voice* (i.e., the ability to exert pressure upon government) options open to them. (Samuel Paul. *Accountability in Public Services: Exit, Voice and Capture*. A World Bank Working Paper. Washington DC: World Bank, 1992.). Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues, on the other hand, propose the creation of polycentric institutional arrangements which combine the best elements of both centralized and decentralized institutional systems. Such arrangements would be created in close collaboration with beneficiary communities and would involve coordination in rule making and enforcement among numerous independent jurisdictions as well as between the national, regional and local levels. (Elinor Ostrom, Larry Schroeder and Susan Wynne. Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993). Finally, Douglass North would add that the evolution of the correct 'Mental Models' (i.e., peoples' attitudes and belief systems) is also a requisite to eliminating strategic behaviour and securing 'Credible Commitments' (i.e., the motivation and desire of players to want to honour their commitments) over the longer-term. (Douglass North. *Institutions and Credible Commitments*. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. Volume 149. Number 1. Page 13. March 1993.)

60. In addition to the costs of producing goods and services by transforming inputs into outputs (i.e., transformation costs), the key to the performance of economies is the lowering of transaction costs (i.e., the costs of setting up and maintaining contractual relationships). In large scale economies, interdependence and the need for impersonal exchanges give rise to opportunistic behaviours which make the costs of transacting very high and undermine efficient development. (Bardhan, Pranab. *The New Institutional Economics and Development Theory: A Brief Critical Assessment*. World Development. Volume 17, No.9, 1989)

61. John Harriss et al citing the work of Douglass North. Page 6, Op. Cit.

62. As Terry Moe explains, to NIE and *transaction costs* theorists such as Ronald Coase, hierarchy has its own inherent efficiency and is at the core of humans' need for organizations. For Coase, in other words, *transaction costs* and the limitations and unpredictability of human exchanges lead optimizing individuals to prefer hierarchy to markets. (Moe, Terry. Page 745. Op. Cit.)

63. Development scholars such as Robert Bates and Mushtaq Khan conclude that it is only once the still economistic NIE begins to embed its analysis within the study of politics that it will begin understand that development outcomes have much to do with the political context and the "the balance of power between the classes and groups affected by an institution". (Harriss, Hunter and Lewis. Page 13. Op. Cit).

In his response to Douglas North, Gary Libecap claims that by never directly addressing redistribution issues or the way political processes and bargaining affect institutional change, the NIE ultimately fails to understand that both winners and losers are created in institutional arrangements where redistributions of wealth and political power are generally at stake. As Libecap puts it: "Politicians forge links with influential interest groups to advance their positions. The coercive power of the State and the political influence of various interest groups allow for opportunism in statutes, court opinions, and administrative rulings in redistributing wealth and property rights to those who are politically advantaged. (Libecap. 32. Op. Cit.)

64. As Bardhan puts it: "In the *Transaction Costs* and *Imperfect Information* theories, by demonstrating the economic rationale of some existing institutions in terms of *transaction costs* and *moral hazard*, it is underemphasized that a more democratic organization of the work process (following the neo-Marxist analysis of Bowles: 1985 and 1987) or a more egalitarian distribution of assets (following on Roemers' neo-Marxist analogy: 1982) might significantly reduce (though not eliminate) the information constraints and Hobbesian malfeasance problems which form the staple of much of the Principal-Agent games in the literature." (Bardhan. Page 1394. Op. Cit.)

65. Harriss, Hunter and Lewis themselves reproach the NIE for failing to see that "the institutions of society--formal and informal--are created to serve those in possession of bargaining power" and that "the effort to uphold these institutions, even in the face of changes in transaction costs, information flows and their increasing disutility, leads to the formation of dominant interest groups." (Harriss, Hunter and Lewis. Page 10. Op. Cit.).

66. Hall, Peter and Taylor, Rosemary. *Political Science and the Three New Instituionalisms*. Political Studies. Volume 44. Number 5. Page 955.

Table 2.1: Summary of Conceptual Insights From Diverse Social Science Literatures

	SHD/PCD LIT.	INT'L DEV. COOP. LIT.	IMP.PROC. LIT.	DD LIT.	NIE LIT
SHD/PCD CRITERIA					
Little Holistic Dev:					
*Little Learning		Rondinelli;		Korten, Cernea; Chambers	
*Region/Sectorialism	CDR	Rondinelli			
*Ltd Staff skills, time or information	CDR	Rondinelli, ECPM/ODI Riddell/Robinson;	Bardach, Sieber, Moynihan;		
*Poor M&E of Impact	CDR	Edwards/Hulme, Sogge et al	Hood		Brett; Paul
Little Participation					
*Top-Down Dev.	Godfrey et al, CDR	Tendler, Rondinelli; Edwards/Hulme,		Chambers & Korten	
*No Accountability		Smillie, Sogge et al;			Brett, Paul
*Bypassing Govts.	Godfrey et al	Smillie, ECPM/ODI			
Little Empowerment:					
*No Long-Term Sustainability;	Godfrey et al	ECPM/ODI, Clark, Riddell/Robinson;		Chambers & Korten, Cernea; Burkey	
*Dependence instead of Self-Reliance;	Godfrey et al CDR	Sogge et al, Wood Smith, Smillie;			
*Ltd Beneficiary Capacity/Know-how		Rondinelli, ECPM/ODI	Blau		Brett
Little Equity:					
*Poorest Unreached;	Godfrey et al	Edwards/Hulme, Tendler, Sogge et al Riddell/Robinson;		Chambers & Korten;	
*Elite Corruption & Capture of Aid;	Godfrey et al	Tendler	Bardach, Sieber;	Chambers & Korten	
*Ltd Beneficiary Solidarity/Altruism		Tendler	Blau		Brett, Paul
Little Policy Impact			Not address-ed head on		
*Poor Advocacy & Min. Policy Effect;	Godfrey et al CDR	Sogge et al, Clark Edwards/Hulme;			
*No Real Challenge to the Status Quo;		Smith, Ferguson, Wood, Sogge et al			
*Transaction Costs; Perverse Incentives					Brett, Paul, Ostrom
Little Civil Society Strengthening:					
*Ltd. Support of Indigenous Orgs.	Godfrey et al CDR	Smillie, Clark		Chambers & Korten	
Poor Inter-Org. Collaboration	Godfrey et al CDR	Smillie, ECPM/ODI, Clark	Bardach		
Asymmetrical Partnerships		Smillie, Clark, Sogge et al, Wood	Blau		Brett

Table 2.1 Continued	SHD/PCD LIT.	INT'L DEV. COOP. LIT	IMP.PROC. LIT.	DD LIT.	NIE LIT.
MAJOR THESIS PHENOMENA:					
Pressure by Diverse Stakeholders Dilutes Original Dev. Goals *[River Pollution Phenomenon]*	Srinivasan, Elson & Tomasevski (on how political power & resistance matters)	Smillie, Rondinelli, Edwards/Hulme, Sogge et al	Bardach Sieber Moynihan		Brett, Paul & Ostrom: Individual opportunism sets back dev.goals
Org. Interests Dilute Dev. Goals: **Tendency to do the Easiest to Fundraise &Meet Rules, Targets** **Tendency to Keep Money Moving/ Expand Programs;** **Tendency to Listen to Powerful Stakeholders** **Tendency to Romantize Dev.& Cover Errors to Ensure Promotions** *[River Pollution Phenomenon]*	Not addressed head on	Clay/Schaffer's, Smillie, Sogge et al Ferguson, Smillie, Edwards Sogge et al, Smillie, Ferguson, Edwards Hancock, Sogge et al	Blau, Bardach Bardach, Sieber Bardach, Sieber Hood, Moynihan	Chambers & Korten Focus on Org. Interests of elites	Brett, Paul & Ostrom focus on individual opportunism
Dev. Agencies' own Mgt./Organizational Rigidities (e.g., Blueprints, Top-Down Planning & Bureaucratization) Undermine the Implementation of Flexible, Holistic & Participatory Dev. *[River Pollution Phenomenon]*	Godfrey et al, CDR	Rondinelli, Smillie, ECPM/ODI	Blau	Chambers, Korten & Cernea	Brett, & Paul: (hierarchy is needed) Ostrom: (Hierarchy & participation needed)
Newly Emerging Dev. Theories Riddled with Internal Tensions ***SHD/PCD concetually unsound** *[Baroque Science Phenomenon]*	Boer& Koekkoek Godfrey et al, CDR, Hopkins, Rao, Tomasevski, Srinivasan, Korten, & Elson	Leys, Moore/Schmitz, Smith	Bardach, Sieber & Moynihan	Not addressed head on	Brett: Certain SHD/PCD ideals may not be realistic

Chapter 3: Sustainable Human Development and People Centred Development Revisited: A Promising and Sound Alternative Development Paradigm or Baroque Science?

> The concept of Sustainable Human Development is not clear and has many interpretations. The concept is still a tangled English garden and it will take a long time for it to become an ordered French *jardin*. This will be a long process and we should not expect miracles
>
> Jean Claude Millerón [1]

The conceptual soundness of the SHD/PCD paradigm cannot be taken for granted. And yet, as shown in Chapter 2, conceptual critiques of the SHD/PCD have been conspicuously absent from UNDP's HDRs and related publications and neither the international community or those development agencies which have adopted SHD/PCD as the chief pillar of their development strategies have seriously scrutinized the conceptual soundness of SHD/PCD ideas or fully drawn out the implications for SHD/PCD's eventual implementation. In this Chapter, I aim to correct this omission by providing a conceptual critique of SHD/PCD. The chapter starts by exploring whether SHD/PCD constitutes a *bona fide* development paradigm; it then identifies the key features and greatest strengths of the SHD/PCD paradigm, including those potentially radical features which have prompted development scholars and practitioners to hail SHD/PCD as an alternative development paradigm; and culminates with a theoretical analysis of SHD/PCD's conceptual coherence and clarity and of the implications for SHD/PCD's translation from paradigm to practice.

I. SHD/PCD as a Promising Alternative Development Paradigm:

The first issue which I explore in this Chapter is whether SHD/PCD approaches are a *bona fide* development paradigm. To some development scholars and officials, SHD/PCD is not a 'paradigm' in the Kuhnian sense since SHD/PCD ideas are not fully evolved and still need to be clarified and tested against empirical reality; SHD/PCD ideas represent more of a

shift towards the use of new indicators rather than a substantive change in substantial thinking; SHD/PCD treats the symptoms but not the causes of the problem and offers no explanation of the root causes of poverty; and, it lacks a coherent vision, set of analytical tools or theoretical foundations of its own, other than what it borrows from Amartya Sen's 'Capabilities approach. [2]. Although there may well be some truth to the comments made above, they do not prove that SHD/PCD approaches do not qualify as a *bona fide* development paradigm in the Kuhnian sense or that it does not constitute an alternative development framework which offers useful insights and both promising and radical solutions to difficult development problems.

Kuhn defines a 'paradigm' as a 'world view' in which a constellation of beliefs, values and techniques are shared by members of a common community. Such a 'world view' addresses a particular set of problems and offers 'puzzle solutions' for such problems. [3]. On the basis of this definition, SHD/PCD certainly qualifies as a *bona fide* paradigm. First of all, SHD/PCD's adherents do share a number of common assumptions, including: i) a desire to escape the strait jacket of economic determinism in conventional development by paying greater attention to environmental, gender, governance and cultural dimensions of development; ii) a belief in the centrality of institutional diversity and in the cultural distinctiveness of particular sub-groups; iii) a commitment to strengthening civil society and promoting peoples' empowerment and self-determination; and, iv) a pledge to simultaneously work 'downstream' (i.e., at the grassroots) and 'upstream' (i.e., at the level of global governance and national policy). These shared goals and values are what make SHD/PCD approaches a shared 'world view' of development. To those who argue that SHD/PCD approaches, especially as advocated by UNDP, fail to address the root causes of poverty, Kuhn might have pointed out that most paradigms focus on a selected sub-set of problems and that no paradigm solves all the

problems it defines. [4]. To appease those disturbed by the divergent focus, interpretations and tactics used by different adherents of the SHD/PCD paradigm, it is worth noting that there is nothing in Kuhnian logic dictating that there has to be a standard interpretation or agreed upon rules within a paradigm. Kuhn himself noted that while adherents of a paradigm usually shared core values, it was natural (and perhaps inevitable) that they would choose to apply them in very different ways and to offer a variation of focuses and explanations of their 'shared world view'. Finally, Kuhn also claimed that a paradigm normally either emerged out of a crisis in a particular discipline or it precipitated a crisis by offering an alternative interpretation or set of solutions to the hegemonic framework.[5] As seen in Chapter 1, SHD/PCD approaches themselves emerged out of a triple crisis in international development and, by challenging many of the assumptions of the hegemonic neo-Liberal doctrine, has managed to spawn considerable debate about the way forward in international development.

Taking the above discussion a step further, I would argue that, in addition to being a *bona fide* development paradigm, SHD/PCD approaches offer numerous welcome insights into development processes as well as a series of potentially radical and promising reform and policy proposals. Many within the international community have questioned the merits of the SHD/PCD paradigm, claiming that SHD/PCD is merely the latest fashionable slogan in development circles and that their own agencies (including the World Bank) had been investing in human capital and carrying out people-centred development approaches long before SHD/PCD's stocks soared. [6] However, a closer examination of the key features of the SHD/PCD shows that the paradigm has many strengths; that although far from being novel, SHD/PCD's core premises do differentiate it from more economistic development doctrines; and, that SHD/PCD's ambitious reform and policy agenda have the potential to take the development discipline and profession in surprisingly radical and promising directions.

The first positive feature of the SHD/PCD paradigm lies in its broad scope and ability to move beyond economistic development models based chiefly on income, purchasing power or consumption. SHD/PCD achieves this mainly by arguing that improvements in the health and education of disadvantaged groups, environmental conditions, and peoples' own freedom and security are equally important components of human well-being. As Keith Griffin and John Knight point out, economists have traditionally concentrated their analyses on either on rates of growth or the production of goods and services, assuming that, if these improved, so would human welfare. Accordingly, the merit of SHD/PCD and Amartya Sen's 'Capabilities approach which provides much of the theoretical foundation of the SHD/PCD paradigm, lies in that instead of being income, commodity or utility-based, SHD/PCD argues that it is people's capability to be or do certain things that truly matters. As Griffin and Knight put it:

> Human fulfilment is about whether people.... are malnourished or starve, whether women lead healthy and tolerable lives....whether people can control their lives at work,... whether people have access to work at all, whether people control their political lives, whether they have the education to be full members of society with some control over their destiny. These are all aspects of the standard of living--but only loosely included or not included at all in the measure of GNP per capita. [7]

The passage above not only reminds us that well-being has components that money cannot buy, but also that, as Amartya Sen himself writes, "human beings are the agents, beneficiaries and adjudicators of progress." Lamentably, claims Sen, development planners have often confused the 'means' and the 'ends' in development by focussing on wealth creation and treating people as the means through which progress is brought about rather than as the ultimate concern of all development processes. [8] Although the argument that people rather than income or things should be the ends of development may seem obvious, there is convincing evidence showing that advocates of the neo-Liberal doctrine seriously neglected the human dimension of development during much of the 1980s [9]. Moreover, although Keynesian Development Economists' Harrod-Domar model and their concern with

full employment took into account the importance of investing in human capital, as did the *UN's First Development Decade Plan* which spoke of 'government of the people, by the people and for the people', during the most of the post-War years, the emphasis was more on growth, GNP (at the time a new measure) and labour productivity than on *Human Development* as an end in itself. Today, notes Sir Hans Singer, even though advocates of SHD/PCD regard growth and income distribution as important vehicles for development, the emphasis has shifted in that the purpose of development itself is defined as the well-being of people. In this sense, the current *Human Development* approach is less economistic than the Keynesian growth system which did not explicitly mention human driving forces. [10]

SHD/PCD's second distinguishing feature is that, by placing the focus on 'people's empowerment', the paradigm has managed to transcend the dichotomy between market-oriented and state-centred development models which polarized development thinking and practice during the post-War era:

> The central fallacy in the old ideological debate was that the state and the market are necessarily separate and even antagonistic--and that one is benevolent, and the other not. In practice, both state and markets are often dominated by the same power structures. This suggests a more pragmatic third option: Both state and market should be guided by the people. The two should work in tandem, and people should be sufficiently empowered to exert effective control over both. [11]

The centrality of the notions of peoples' empowerment, of strengthening civil society participation by giving people the space and freedom to pursue their own initiatives, and of ensuring that both market and state institutions are accountable to the demands of the people, are viewed by some actors in the international community view as being among the most promising and radical contributions of the SHD/PCD paradigm. [12]

Thirdly, SHD/PCD ideas are appealing because they apply to all countries (North and South), to all persons (poor and rich), to individuals

and communities and, to present and future generations. SHD/PCD's universality and sustainability is aptly expressed in UNDP's 1994 HDR:

> *Human Development* is thus a broad and comprehensive concept. It covers all *Human Development* choices at all stages of development. .....It is as concerned with the generation of economic growth as with its distribution, as concerned with basic needs as with the entire spectrum of human aspirations, as concerned with the human dilemmas of the North as with the human deprivation of the South. ....Universalism of life claims is the common thread that binds the demands of *Human Development* today with the exigencies of development tomorrow, especially with the need for environmental preservation and regeneration for the future. [13]

SHD/PCD's strong environmental dimension and applicability to all countries and generations has been cited by scholars such as Prof. Paul Streeten as one of the greatest strengths of SHD/PCD approaches and recognized by diplomats like Ms. Ann Grant from the UK Mission to the UN, who has praised SHD/PCD for emphasizing the importance of "safeguarding the environment for future generations". [14]

Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, the SHD/PCD paradigm has contributed greatly to development discourse and action by setting forth a comprehensive package of ambitious policy proposals aimed at dramatically altering the rules of the game in development cooperation and challenging existing power relations at the global, national and organizational levels.

Much of the policy and reform agenda promoted by UNDP's HDRs and related SHD/PCD publications at the global level is fairly moderate and contains uncontroversial proposals such as increasing levels of ODA, making aid disbursements more efficient and targeted through a 20/20 Compact under which 20% of LDC budgets and 20% of donor's ODA would be allocated to human priority expenditures, and the signing of a *Human Development Compact* in which all nations would pledge to meet the most basic human needs of their populations. However, within the same agenda, there are a number of proposals which are quite radical in that they seriously challenge the

hegemonic neo-Liberal doctrine and seek to dramatically alter power relations in the existing system of international development cooperation. Chief among the more fundamental changes put forward by the SHD/PCD agenda is making the global trade, finance, and aid regimes more equitable, democratic and just. This involves redressing existing inequities in world trade by compensating LDCs for damages resulting from global pollution or industrial country protectionism and restrictions on migration; the introduction of a tax (i.e., the so-called *Tobin Tax*) on speculative currency transactions; the creation of an *Anti-Monopoly Authority* to penalize transnational corporations engaging in oligopolistic activity or environmentally unsound practices; and transferring money to LDCs in exchange for their efforts to reduce global human security threats such as drug-trafficking, terrorism or the spread of AIDS/HIV. Parallel and perhaps even more radical proposals include a plea to donors to forgive large portions of the LDC debt; to give the poorest countries access to an *International Investment Trust* which would allow LDCs to borrow on terms appropriate to their respective levels of development; forming a *World Central Bank* which would expand financial opportunities for the poorest nations and an *Economic Security Council* capable of reviewing threats to human global security and which would grant voting rights to more populous LDCs, and levying a compulsory income tax on the richest nations to create a Global Safety Net to help the poorest nations make Human Development progress.[15]

The SHD/PCD agenda includes an equally ambitious set of policy and reform proposals at the national level. Admittedly, SHD/PCD proposals such as stimulating growth by privatizing inefficient public enterprises, decentralizing service-delivery, reducing taxes; and creating profit incentives for medium-small enterprises conform rather than challenge the neo-Liberal hegemony. [16] At the same time though, the SHD/PCD agenda's call for increased public spending in basic health and education and

improved safety nets for the poor, though fairly tame and reformist in tone, do divert from the neo-Liberal doctrine by placing greater emphasis on reducing inequality and building the poor's capabilities. [17] And, the UNDP's denouncement of arms spending and the military industrial complex and HDR proposals that the poor be given more equitable access to credit, land, and productive assets [18] are undeniably quite audacious and do fundamentally challenge the status quo by calling for a redistribution of existing wealth patterns and power relations in society. In the political sphere, the call for elected government, the rule of law, freedom of expression, and equality of opportunity [19] are among the more moderate elements of SHD/PCD agenda for 'Sound governance'. Yet, notions such as strengthening civil society organizations (including NGOs, Peoples' Organizations, advocacy groups and unions), fostering grassroots participation, and empowering vulnerable groups relative to governments and business elites so as to make both more accountable to the disenfranchised are all radical ideas with potential to alter existing national power relations. The anti-establishment fervour of some of SHD/PCD's political proposals are evident in quotes such as this one:

> Changing the power equation requires the organization of countervailing forces, or even a revolution. Peoples' organizations--be they farmers' cooperatives, residents' associations or consumer groups--offer some the most important sources of countervailing power. And they often exercise it through the sharing of information and ideas--it is ideas, not vested interests that rule the world for good or evil. [20]

Finally, even at the organizational level too, the SHD/PCD agenda puts forward a series of provocative proposals for change. In fact, in *With a Soul and a Vision*, UNDP Administrator Speth, calls for nothing less than the adoption of "a fundamentally new approach to international cooperation for development" and a major organizational overhaul of UNDP:

> The world is changing and UNDP must change with it. We can be a powerful force helping countries achieve positive transformations, but we must also transform ourselves. We can help countries build their capacities but only if we build ours. The world....is truly counting on us. So rise to this occasion. You have the potential to be magnificent. [21]

Since Mr. Speth's arrival in 1993 UNDP has been constantly changing. At the inter-organizational level, and largely due to increased international rivalry over diminishing funds, UNDP has been trying to elevate its public profile and competitiveness by carving out a niche in international development; improving the quality of its substantive expertise; entering into inter-sectoral areas related to SHD/PCD which are not covered by other UN agencies; and seeking greater media exposure [22]. On a more radical and ambitious scale, UNDP has been playing a greater coordination, synthesizing and unifying role within the UN family and helping to enhance the influence and power of the UN vis-a-vis the hegemonic neo-Liberal influence of the World Bank. At the intra-organizational level, UNDP has responded to pressures from some donor governments (especially the US government) in its Executive Board to become a leaner and more efficient organization. This has entailed carrying out neo-Liberal and managerial-style reforms such as cutting administrative staff, creating closer links between staff performance and promotions, and introducing more diligent project/programme monitoring. [23] Simultaneously though, left-leaning donors (especially Nordic governments) have prompted UNDP to pursue policies much more conducive to the more radical and transformative elements of the SHD/PCD agenda. These include putting UNDP squarely behind operationalization of the SHD/PCD paradigm, focussing UNDP's assistance on the human needs of the poor, replacing UNDP's bureaucratic culture and excessive number of projects with much a much more flexible and political approach to development which includes initiating dialogue on 'Sound governance' both nationally and globally, strengthening the indigenous capacity of LDC governments, and building a sense of ownership among UNDP field staff and beneficiaries by decentralizing decision-making, building North-South partnerships based on reciprocal responsibilities, and encouraging bottom-up and grassroots initiatives involving previously neglected and vulnerable groups. [24]

As is apparent from the vast menu on offer above, the SHD/PCD agenda takes on board a wide range of issues at the global, national and organizational levels. While some of these policy proposals are neo-Liberal in nature and others are at best reformist, some provide radical alternatives to the hegemonic neo-Liberal doctrine and challenge existing institutional arrangements and power relations. Yet, what makes the above-mentioned proposals 'radical' is not so much that they are leftist as opposed to right-wing. For example, neo-Liberal ideas such as liberalizing global migration and labour movements or tying promotions to performance are themselves radical and probably beneficial for development. Thus, the left certainly does not have a monopoly on radicalism or anti-hegemonic ideas. However, what gives the SHD/PCD its radical edge is its recognition that poverty springs from an inequitable international order and unjust national power relations which marginalize the poor; that foreign aid alone is not enough; and that challenging existing institutional arrangements and power relations at the global, national and organizational levels is a prerequisite to building institutional frameworks conducive to *core Human Development* goals like holistic and flexible development, 'Sound governance', North-South partnerships, greater equity, participation, empowerment, and self-reliance among the poor. This concern with the asymmetry of power and resources, exploitation and injustice is indeed inspired by leftist and neo-Marxist thinking. Far from shying away from criticizing hegemonic power, SHD/PCD's policy agenda attacks the exclusiveness of Western markets, the monopolistic and exploitative tendencies of big corporations, the undemocratic, hierarchical and bureaucratic nature of international institutions, and the unequal distribution of resources, opportunities and power in LDCs. As part of its mandate for change, SHD/PCD calls for nothing less than building countervailing forces in civil society to challenge vested interests and the status quo. As Ms. Cathy Corcoran from the *Catholic Agency for Overseas Development* (CAFOD) has pointed out, if you take the proposals of the SHD/PCD

paradigm to their natural conclusion, the ideas are extremely radical and powerful in that they incite people to fight injustice and to demand change: "Imagine if it were to happen here, in the UK?, she asked; If people demanded not to be excluded, to be empowered?" [25]

II. In the Midst of the Tangled English Garden: The Conceptual Deficiencies and Contradictory Nature of the SHD/PCD Paradigm

The discussion above illustrates that, contrary to the dismissals of some actors in the international development community, once explored in greater depth, SHD/PCD approaches meet the requisites of a *bona fide* development paradigm, offer a refreshing perspective on many development problems, and advocate a remarkably radical policy and reform agenda which has the potential to seriously challenge the hegemonic neo-Liberal doctrine and existing institutional arrangements and power relations at the global, national and organizational level. If this is indeed the case--and the evidence above is very compelling--then the one pending theoretical question is whether the SHD/PCD paradigm is sufficiently sound and coherent to be implemented in the form of a comprehensive yet clear development strategy. In the following section, I argue that despite its merits and promise, SHD/PCD's overly abstract, unfinished, vague, hybrid and incoherent nature make its effective operationalization an uphill battle.

A) The Abstract, Vague and Unfinished Nature of the SHD/PCD Paradigm

As shown in Chapter 2, assertions that the SHD/PCD paradigm is overly abstract and that many of its ideas are incomplete are not uncommon in the SHD/PCD Literature. What I attempt to do in this Chapter is to take these general critiques a step further by providing a detailed analysis of what exactly makes the SHD/PCD paradigm overly abstract and vague, why the paradigm too hybrid or unfinished as a usable development theory, and how this effects the operationalization efforts of those development actors trying to put the paradigm into practice at different levels.

A careful examination of original SHD/PCD texts and Sen's related works, as well as a reading of secondary texts and the analysis of interviews with many of the pioneers of the *Human Development* approach reveals that the first source of abstractness in the SHD/PCD paradigm lies in the intricately complex and philosophical nature of Amartya Sen's 'Capabilities approach', which provides the theoretical foundations of the SHD/PCD paradigm. This is something which is immediately evident in Sen's writings. In his writings on the 'Capabilities approach', for instance, Sen asks a series of extremely complex and epistemological questions about human nature (including different notions of utility, human morality, motives, altruism, agency, freedom, choice, power and control) [26]; draws on a wide range of disciplines and philosophers (including, among others, the work of Aristotle, Kant, Rawls, Dewey, Smith and Marx are only a few) [27]; and introduces the reader to a succession of brilliant, yet very difficult to understand theoretical distinctions and concepts (of which *capabilities*, overall *functionings*, primitive and refined functionings, being well-off, well-being, well-being freedom, agency freedom, agency information, overall entitlements, exchange and endowment entitlements, effective power, procedural control, counterfactual choice are only a few. [28] This is not to critique the substance or to undermine the contribution of Amartya Sen's ideas to development. Far, from it. There is no denying that Sen's ideas have given tremendous theoretical depth to development ideas and inspired a whole generation in the process. The point being here though is that the sheer complexity and philosophical character of Sen's ideas has made them remote from development practitioners and difficult for them to know how to operationalize such lofty ideas into better development practice. This is a dilemma which Prof. Sen himself alluded to when he noted during our interview that, that because the SHD/PCD paradigm was build around a set of principles rather than an action, its implementation was very difficult indeed. To paraphrase his words: "One cannot implement a set of principles or an approach. "One can at best re-think and put weight on it". [29]

A related conceptual weakness of SHD/PCD is that the 'Capabilities approach' on which it is based is vague and incomplete. This is evident in Sen's own writings as well as in comments made by others in writing and in interviews. The first problem is that because to Sen, both *functionings* (i.e., peoples' various 'doings' and 'beings') and *capabilities* (i.e. the capability to do this or that, or the various combinations of functionings which a person can achieve) [30] are infinite (*n-tuples*) in number; are co-realizable; vary depending on individuals' preferences and values, the characteristics of the goods in question, as well as on the environment and culture persons belong to and; are often unobservable and not numerically representable, it is not possible to fully rank, order or value human *capabilities* or *functionings*. In fact, according to Sen's writings, although there may be some agreed valuations, "the 'natural' form of well-being ranking is indeed that of a partial, incomplete order"; it would be "quite wrong to expect anything like the complete ordering that utilitarians have made us prone to demand"...except under the artificial assumption of complete and unproblematic interpersonal comparability" and; at any rate, "incompleteness is *not* (Sen's emphasis) an embarrassment." [31] Although Sen is right to resist pressures to concretize and quantify the notions of *capabilities* and *functionings*, this creates difficulties for development practitioners who can not pursue all human *functionings/capabilities* at once, but must choose which human functionings/capabilities to address first, which persons are in most need, and how to measure progress in functionings/ capabilities expansion. In each of these cases, Sen's 'Capabilities approach' falls short of providing useful answers. As Srinivasan and Sudgen note in their critiques of the 'fuzzy' and 'unfinished' nature of Sen's ideas:

> Given the rich array of *functionings* that Sen takes to be relevant, given the extent of disagreement among reasonable people about the nature of the good life, and given the unresolved problem of how to value sets, it is natural to ask how far Sen's framework is operational. [32]

To confuse matters even further, both Sen and the other development scholars associated with UNDP's HDRs have given confusing messages as to whether the SHD/PCD paradigm and the 'Capabilities approach' lends itself to prioritizing or valuing human *functionings/capabilities*. For example, although Sen himself has proclaimed (as he does in the quotes above) that human functionings/capabilities should be co-realizable and do not lend themselves to observation, ranking, valuation or interpersonal comparisons, in his *Tanner Lecture*, Sen has written about the possibility of there being a small number of 'minimum' *capabilities* [33] and both through his own and the HDRO's publications on the *Human Development Index* (HDI), has condoned the use of a few measurable variables to ascertain and rank human well-being. [34] Lord Meghnad Desai who is most directly credited with translating the SHD/PCD and 'Capabilities approach' into the HDI, has himself conceded that the theoretical structure of the SHD/PCD and 'Capabilities approach' have remained incomplete because Sen has left so many key issues unresolved:

> Sen has never made a list of *capabilities*, nor has he ever explained whether there are some basic *capabilities* which are more imperative than others, a distinction which is essential if one is to have an implementable concept and measure. [35]

According to Prof. Frances Stewart, also an advisor to UNDP's HDRO, the relativity, lack of observability, and incompleteness of *capabilities* explains why, in practice, advocates of the SHD/PCD and 'Capabilities approach' have had little choice but to measure SHD/PCD and *capabilities* using *basic functionings* which are almost identical to 'basic needs'. [36]

Also missing from the SHD/PCD and 'Capabilities approach' is a clear explanation of how the various components of the approaches are interlinked or how it is exactly human well-being is achieved by individuals or within households. In his writings, Sen himself notes that when one is speaking of capability sets of *refined functioning achievements* where complex human values,

agency, and priorities as well as varying individual and societal circumstances and opportunities are involved, one ends up having to deal with a "simultaneity of relationships" and "mutually dependent concepts" which are very intricate and sophisticated. [37] As Desai elaborates in his own writings on the 'Capabilities approach', there is no one connection between capabilities and commodities since one commodity (e.g., food) may be relevant to many *capabilities* (e.g., the capability to enjoy a prolonged life, the capability of being well-nourished, the capability of ensuring reproduction,....etc.) and since many commodities (e.g., food, water, medicine,....etc.) may be required to generate one *capability* (e.g., the capability to enjoy a prolonged life). Similarly, a small set or even one *capability* (e.g., the capability to enjoy a prolonged life) can span a large set of possible functionings (e.g., being well-nourished, being free of illness, being well-informed, being socially-integrated,....etc.). In short, a *capability* does not readily yield a "shopping list" of definite functionings or commodities. [38] The discussion above is instructive because it shows that, although *capabilities*, *functionings*, commodities and human well-being in general are intricately inter-related, as Prof. Paul Streeten, one of the advocates of SHD/PCD approaches in UNDP's HDRO, has pointed out, it is still not fully understood how exactly how the different elements of the SHD/PCD paradigm or of Sen's 'Capabilities approach' are related, or they affect one another or, what kinds of trade offs exist between them. [39] It also means that although human well-being is highly dependent on individuals' values, perceptions and circumstances, there still is no micro structure or SHD/PCD theoretical construct which can be applied at the individual or household level and which would enable *Human Development* analysts to move beyond having to use of social averages (on which the HDI relies) insensitive to distribution or to individual and cultural specificities to come ascertain *Human Development* performance. This is yet another respect in which the SHD/PCD approach has remained overly

abstract and which needs to be properly concretized. "No one has ever sat down and worked this out", remarked Lord Desai during our interview. [40]

The abstract, vague and unfinished nature of the SHD/PCD paradigm and of the 'Capabilities approach' from which it draws much of its theoretical substance has direct implications for its operationalization. According to John Knight, co-author of a book on *Human Development* with Keith Griffin, because Sen's 'Capabilities approach' "is framed at an extremely high level of philosophizing", its ideas are not only difficult to grasp, but it makes it very difficult for development practitioners to bridge the gulf between the philosophy of human *capabilities* and their need for concrete policy proposals and programme priorities. In Mr. Knight's view then, the SHD/PCD paradigm's operationalization is something which still needs to be properly thought out and factored into SHD/PCD's theoretical framework:

> There seems to be a gap between Sen's conceptualization of *Human Development* and its operationalization.....Thus far, we have Sen's highly theoretical approach and the nitty gritty practical material which lacks theoretical depth. The two have not been put together yet and there is a tremendous debate as to whether this is possible. [41]

On the ground, senior managers like Dr. Francois Farah, Director of the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) in Uganda, also expressed scepticism about basing a development strategy on ideas as vague and abstract as SHD/PCD:

> SHD/PCD is a vision and a set of goals rather than a development strategy *per se*. UNDP is wrong to treat SHD/PCD as a coherent development strategy which it can implement on its own when, in actuality, SHD/PCD approaches are like the human body which has many parts, each with their own purpose and functioning mechanism but which can not work unless there is a clear understanding of the links and harmony between the parts. [42]

In sum, the evidence above shows that SHD/PCD and the 'Capabilities approach' on which it is based is a very abstract, vague and incomplete paradigm which needs to be concretized in many important respects, including: closing the gap between philosophical principles and concrete policies/programmes by identifying those sectors, social groups and development interventions most likely to transform existing institutional

arrangements and power relations so that they are more conducive to *capability-building* and *capability-use*; establishing the exact nature of the connection and trade offs between different SHD/PCD components so as allow policy-makers and implementors to know how certain interventions help or hinder one another and what opportunity costs are at stake in making specific policy and programme choices; creating a framework for determining how human *capabilities* are built up at the micro level so as to allow development policy-makers and development practitioners to promote SHD/PCD at the individual and household level as well as at the macro-economic and international levels; and, ranking, ordering and valuing human capabilities so as to enable development practitioners to monitor the impact of their programmes--all of these are aspects of SHD/PCD ideas which would need to be refined before the paradigm is translatable into comprehensive yet concrete and clear development strategies and programmes .

B) The Ideological Ambiguity and Hybrid Nature of the SHD/PCD Paradigm

Another conceptual deficiency and potential setback to the implementation of the SHD/PCD paradigm lies with the hybrid theoretical roots and ideological ambiguity of the paradigm. In Chapter 2, we saw that in both the SHD/PCD Literature and the International Development Cooperation Literature there were concerns that newly emerging development discourses such as SHD/PCD lacked specificity, were theoretically and ideologically ambiguous, and tried to be 'all things to all persons'. During my own research, I further learned that the ideological ambiguity and theoretical hybridity of the SHD/PCD paradigm was a very real problem for both its advocates and implementors. For instance, Prof. Frances Stewart, one of the scholars who helped to pioneer and promote the SHD/PCD approach, herself remarked that the meaning of *Human Development* was so ambiguous that it was almost like motherhood in that there was nothing in it that countries could be opposed to [43], while in the NGO sector, Dr. Ian

Linden, Director of the Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR) in the UK, disapproved of SHD/PCD's politically ambiguous language in which the class base and ideological origins of development ideas were left intentionally vague in order to attract broad-based support from a wide range of stakeholders. [44]

Whether international development agencies like UNDP and AA have utilized and reinforced the ambiguity of SHD/PCD approaches for organizational purposes such as appeasing diverse stakeholders is an issue which will be addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. What I explore in this Chapter is something which is missing from the existing literature and that is an actual analysis of what exactly makes the SHD/PCD paradigm theoretically and ideologically ambiguous and how this ambiguity is likely to affect both the views and development effectiveness of those actors working to translate SHD/PCD ideas from paradigm into practice. The section which follows illustrates that instead of being wholly intentional, the ambiguity of the SHD/PCD paradigm is largely the product of the very hybrid theoretical roots and ideological influences of the SHD/PCD paradigm itself. To appreciate this point, it is necessary to trace the diverse theoretical origins and ideological tendencies of SHD/PCD approaches.

SHD/PCD's Reformist and Social Democratic Inclination: 'Basic Needs', Sen's 'Capabilities Approach'--The Influence of Keynesian Development Economists

The centrality of human well-being and of investing in people dates back to the origins of modern development thinking. Even during the early post-war years, the *Beveridge Report* and Keynesian Economists recognized the importance of full employment in giving people access to a decent income, of investing in human resources, and of building an effective welfare state to provide social safety nets for the poor. [45] Furthermore, in the landmark 1974 book, Redistribution with Growth, post-war Economists already showed an awareness that growth without some form of income or asset

redistribution was not enough to ensure the well-being of the poor.[46] Most commonly though, the theoretical roots of SHD/PCD approach are traced to the 'Basic Needs approach' propagated by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank in the 1970s [47] and to Amartya Sen's 'Capabilities approach'. [48] Indeed, many of the Economists involved in the 'Basic Needs approach' (Paul Streeten, Frances Stewart, Gustave Ranis, Hans Singer, Mahbub ul Haq and Keith Griffin) had by the 1990s become the intellectual impetus behind the SHD/PCD approach and UNDP's HDRs.

The strong links between SHD/PCD and the 'Basic Needs approach' is something which is evident in both the SHD/PCD Literature and the interviews which I conducted with proponents of both approaches. The 'Basic Needs approach' had three main parts: First, it emphasized the importance of increasing incomes through efficient, labour-intensive production. Second, it assigned a key role in reducing poverty to public services. Thirdly, it encouraged public involvement in public service delivery. [49] The overarching objective of the 'Basic Needs approach' then was that all persons should have the right to lead "minimally decent life defined in terms of levels of health, nutrition, literacy and basic need goods and services (e.g., food, health services, water, etc.). [50] Mass public service provision was seen as the main way of achieving this, although increased levels of income, be it through efficient labour-intensive production or greater employment, was also regarded as an important means of people acquiring the basic goods and services necessary for a decent life. [51] The 'Basic Needs approach's dethronement of GNP per capita as the measure of well-being and its introduction of the idea that some goods are more basic than others for a 'minimally decent life' represented important steps forward in development theory and doctrine. Over time, the 'Basic Needs approach' has come under considerable attack for having been (or having been interpreted as being) too concerned with commodity consumption (what some critics call 'commodity fetishism') [52];

for having been too focussed on state-led or reformist solutions; for failing to address the need for a redistribution of assets, a *New International Economic Order* (NIEO) and the economic empowerment of the poor; as well as for having been overly paternalistic in its treatment of the poor as 'recipients' of public assistance rather than proactive change agents. [53] The problem, as explained in UNDP's 1996 HDR, was that, in practice, the 'Basic Needs approach' was often (though wrongly) reduced by policy-makers and planners to "top-down state action" and a "count, cost and deliver" approach to servicing the poor. [54] As early proponents of the 'Basic Needs approach' like Paul Streeten and Frances Stewart have pointed out though, the 'Basic Needs approach' had always emphasized that the true end of all development was to give people the opportunities they needed to live full lives. [55] This, along with the premise that GNP alone is not a satisfactory measure of human well-being and that, in order to alleviate poverty, it is essential to give people access to the range of basic goods and services necessary for a decent life, is an idea which SHD/PCD and 'Basic Needs' approaches undoubtedly share. This commonality is explicitly recognized by UNDP's HDR's which credit the 'Basic Needs approach' with "returning to the central purpose of development--promoting human well-being, especially of the poor" [56]. And, pioneers of the 'Basic Needs approach' like Stewart and Streeten themselves acknowledge that, although SHD/PCD draws much of its inspiration for promotion human well-being beyond income from the 'Basic Needs approach', SHD/PCD goes a step further in that it applies to all countries and to 'higher-level capabilities' as well as basic ones and has stronger environmental, governance and gender components. [57] These latter features of SHD/PCD, of course, are influenced by Sen's 'Capabilities approach'.

In his writings, Sen argues that the 'Capabilities approach' is related to, but fundamentally differs from, characterizing development as either (i) the expansion of goods and services, (ii) an increase in

utilities, or (iii) meeting basic needs". [58] According to Sen, human well-being is best achieved by increasing people's choices so as to give them access to a wider spectrum of *capabilities* and *functionings*. At any time then, given an individual's entitlements and constraints, he or she faces a *capability set* which represents that person's freedom to achieve various combinations of *functionings*. Income is but only one of the conditions necessary to achieve these capabilities and some capabilities (e.g., the capability to freely express one's views) do not require income at all. [59] The central idea in Sen's work then is that the ultimate purpose of development is to enhance peoples' quality of life and that social change must be assessed in terms of the richness of human life resulting from it.

Sen's 'Capabilities approach' makes a dramatic break from neo-Classical Economics not only because it rejects income as the chief measure of progress but because it rejects neo-Classical assumptions that all persons are the same and engage in utilitarian-maximizing behaviour. Sen instead believes that people have varying expectations and capabilities and that the traits of the environment and the availability of resources--none of which is given--also affect peoples choices and opportunities. [60] Sen's work breaks from Welfare Economics as well since Welfare Economics makes no reference to the mental estate or value systems of individuals. [61] Finally, as noted by pioneers of the 'Basic Needs approach', Sen's work is related to but, at the same time, builds on the 'Basic Needs approach' since it includes 'higher-level' capabilities and functionings beyond basic needs and since what truly matters in the 'Capabilities approach' is having the *capability* of being well-fed, whereas the ultimate objective of the 'Basic Needs approach' is minimal decent life characteristics (i.e., being well-fed). The latter distinction is critical because it gives individual choice--be it the ability to choose among various capabilities or to choose not to tackle deprivation at all--a primary position. [62] The above

differences notwithstanding, it is obvious that the 'Capabilities approach' has parallels with the 'Basic Needs approach and that SHD/PCD's key premise that development is about enhancing people's well-being and ability to choose to lead significant lives borrows heavily from both.

Ideologically, both the 'Basic Needs approach' and the 'Capabilities approach' are probably best classified as reformist Keynesian and social democratic ideas. Their platform is 'reformist' and 'moderate' in that instead of calling for a complete overhaul of existing institutional arrangements and power relations, its proponents accept the assumption that capitalism is currently the only means to achieving development, albeit with some regulation of the worst tendencies of the market to exacerbate inequality and exploitation and an expanded role for government in planning, redistributive fiscal policies, and social services and welfare for the poor. Development scholars like Lord Desai accept the 'moderate' and 'left-of-centre' ideological label and during our interview classified the SHD/PCD platform as "a revisionist programme" which, on the one hand, is pro-public expenditure and borrows from the UNCTAD and UNIDO progressive agenda of the 1970s but, which is perhaps "more market-friendly" and "even-handed." "One thing which SHD/PCD definitely is not", he asserted, "is the far-Left neo-Marxist and Dependency view 'a la Baran and Gunder Frank' which blamed Third World underdevelopment on the North." [63]

The Keynesian influences and preference for a governmental role in development are evident in many of the writings of the best-known advocates of SHD/PCD. For example, in an article entitled *Development: Which Way Now?* Sen explicitly states that Keynesian Development Economists' assumptions that development planning and strong state activism led to growth have still to be proven incorrect. [64] And, in Hunger and Public Action Sen and Dreze are adamant that social security cannot be left to market forces and that when thinking of 'incentives', we should not only think of those that

offer profits in the market place, but also of those that motivate diverse forms of public action, including well-planned public policies for "support-led security" and direct state intervention in the form of full employment and income supplementation programmes, food subsidies and the regulation of private trader activities, and land redistribution. [65] Other publications deriving from UNDP's HDRO have been equally supportive of Keynesian and reformist principles of public planning and state activism. For instance, Keith Griffin et al caution that, "if left to its own devices the global economy would operate in such a way that capital systematically would be transferred from poor to rich countries"; And that, "one institution: the state, must play a leading role in guiding the development process and intervening where necessary to ensure that the full benefits of *Human Development* are reaped." [66] Although these authors do not necessarily call for a larger state, they do advocate a state actively involved in the public provision of primary health, basic education and training programmes geared towards the poor as well as public compensation and regulation of the worst excesses of the market. At the national level, such measures might include a state-supported "social and economic security strategy" consisting of guaranteed access to minimum food (achieved through food stamps, food rationing, and food staples sold at subsidized prices); guaranteed employment and a subsistence wage; allowing government subsidies to state enterprises deemed to have social benefits (e.g., research, training) or redistributive effects not fully captured by their revenue; and a major redistribution of wealth through progressive land and income tax, sweeping agrarian and water reform, the creation of multi-purpose cooperatives and worker-managed enterprises, and even a once-for-all redistribution of assets. At the global level, regulation and compensation measures might include cancelling the foreign debt of the poorest LDCs, closer supervision of international commercial banks, compensating poor countries for the emigration of skilled labour, and compulsory taxation of rich countries to guarantee foreign aid for LDCs. [67]

The Radical and Activist Inclinations: Liberation Theology and Freire's Notion of Conscientization--The Influence of NGOs and Grassroots Actors.

Aside from Keynesian and reformist influences, there is a current of thought which has strongly influenced SHD/PCD thinking which does draw its ideological inspiration from neo-Marxist ideals: i.e., From *Liberation Theology* and the *Conscientization* approach inspired by the Christian gospel and Portuguese educator Paulo Freire, respectively.

These ideas have strongly influenced the DD thinkers described in Chapter 2 and have had a particularly strong following among NGOs, although several of its major premises have equally influenced UNDP's interpretation of the SHD/PCD paradigm. The first influential premise emanating from this stream of thought is in fact one of the cornerstones of the SHD/PCD paradigm: i.e., the idea that development cannot be measured simply in terms of income or material wealth and that development involves the broader enhancement of human well-being. Although rarely recognized by economists, this premise has links to Vatican II and is a pivotal component of *Pope Paul VI's Populorum Progressio* (*The Progress of Peoples*), one of the innovative papal documents produced in the 1960s which rejects "the reduction of development to mere economic growth" and advocates a notion of 'integral development' which involves the "realization of the fullness of human potential." [68] The same idea also has strong roots in the work of Paulo Freire who, decades ago, was already proclaiming that "in order to determine whether a society is developing one must go beyond criteria based on indices of per capita income." [69] Another SHD/PCD idea traceable to this stream of thought as well as to the grassroots work of NGOs in the Third World is the notion of viewing empowerment as means of 'consciousness-raising' (i.e., *conscientizacao* in Portuguese) and of liberating the poor from social injustice and the oppression of ruling elites. This conception of participation/empowerment as 'liberation' is heavily

influenced by Paulo Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed [70] and is ideologically very radical and neo-Marxist in its origins in as far as it denounces the privilege of established elites and makes a clarion call for collective struggle against oppression as opposed to being content with alleviatory social safety nets or individual self-enhancement. The last SHD/PCD premise borrowed from this radical stream of thought is the recognition that participatory community development projects are not enough and that, over the long-run, profound transformation is needed. [71] This belief in 'bold transformations' is often accompanied by calls, such as Pope Paul VI's, for some 'regulatory world body', not unlike the NIEO, to resist monopolistic power by national elites and neo-colonialism. [72]

This more leftist and neo-Marxist interpretation of SHD/PCD ideas is especially evident in the mandates of both secular and Christian NGOs as well as in the writings and views of NGO practitioners themselves. For example, OXFAM's latest Handbook of Development and Relief explicitly cites Liberation Theology and *Conscientization* as major influences and provides a definition of 'empowerment' based not only on individual 'strength' and 'confidence', but also on the need for 'collective action' to "challenge and overcome oppression and injustice" and to seek "a more equitable sharing of power and a higher-level of political awareness" for disadvantaged people. [73] In recent years, NGO experts like David Korten have written considerably about the catalytic role NGOs and People's Organizations have played in the evolution of the *People-Centred Development* vision and cites the *Symposium on Development Alternatives: The Challenge for NGOs*, where development professionals from 42 countries met in London in March 1987 to discuss the major development challenges facing the voluntary sector as early influences and articulations of such ideas. In the meantime, international officials like Dharam Ghai, former director of the *United Nations Research Institute for Social Development* (UNRISD) have carefully catalogued the

way in which the radical conscientization and empowerment ideas mentioned above and the practical experiences of NGOs and grassroots organization such as the *Grameen Bank* in Bangladesh, the *Self-Employed Women's Association* (SEWA) in India, and *Sarilikas'* peasant groups and rural workers' organizations in the Philippines, have contributed to the evolution of SHD/PCD ideas and practice. In each case, notes Ghai, there has been a process of capability expansion, conscientization and the empowerment of the poor. [74]

As CIIR's Ian Linden, summarized it during our interview: "Originally it was Freire's notion that political conflict and struggle were inherent in all development processes which most shaped the beliefs and practices of NGOs." "For this reason, he noted, "the contribution of NGOs to the notion of SHD/PCD is very important, even if today there is a shift within NGOs to move away from the idea that NGOs should be confrontational." [75]

In addition to being evident in the NGO sector, the radical approaches to empowerment and conscientization described above are also evident in publications associated with UNDP's own HDRO as well as in statements made by UNDP officials themselves. Hence, although when asked about the theoretical roots and ideological influences of SHD/PCD ideas, those development scholars associated with UNDP's HDRO emphasized the influence of the 'Basic Needs approach' and the 'Capabilities approach' and generally distanced SHD/PCD ideas from those of the more neo-Marxist NIEO, there is little denying that some of the more radical global reform and policy proposals put forward by UNDP's own HDRs (e.g. compensating LDCs for global pollution or industrial country protectionism, creating an *Anti-Monopoly Authority*, or, introducing a compulsory income tax for rich countries in order to give more *Human Development* to poor ones--see Page 90 for details) have obviously been influenced by the NIEO; while national proposals like a major redistribution of assets and organizing civil

society and the poor to form countervailing power to vested interests (see Page 91 for details) are clearly influenced by Freirean interpretations of conscientization and peoples' empowerment. Radical interpretations of people-power are found in Sen's own writings. In Hunger and Public Action, Dreze and Sen write that, given the extreme deprivation, inequality and lack of leaders' "commitment to radical social change" in many poor countries, "radical transformation" may require a great deal more than the activities of the state or formal political rights--i.e., it may require strong popular activism, including a role for "adversarial politics" (as opposed to "collaborative" politics) by social movements and grassroots organizations. [76] In their SHD/PCD writings, Griffin and McKinley echo a similar message when they write that, in order to "alter the distribution of income, wealth and political power" and to "empower" people,...."it is not enough to design programmes which increase well-being"....or to ensure that the poor "actively participate in the formulation and implementation of development programmes". In addition, they argue, one must "strengthen civil society" and ensure that the poor and deprived organize around grassroots and local institutions; that they form wide supporting coalitions to overcome the resistance of those opposing change--most likely to be the middle and upper classes that prospered under the status quo, according to the authors; and that they develop "the capability to act in furthering their own interests". [77] During my interviews, UNDP officials known for their radical interpretation of SHD/PCD concurred that strengthening civil society and empowering the poor to form countervailing forces against the state and elites was a key part of the SHD/PCD agenda.[78]

The Market and Capitalist Inclination: The Influence of the Neo-Liberal Doctrine

Lastly, SHD/PCD approaches, especially as interpreted by some of UNDP's annual HDRs, incorporate a number of the same neo-Liberal principles and policy prescriptions advocated by the World Bank.

To be more precise, the SHD/PCD paradigm seems to borrow at least three premises from neo-Liberal doctrine. The first premise is the assumption that market liberalization is the most effective means of bringing about efficient growth, and that this will eventually bring about development. The idea comes from neo-Liberal economists like Deepak Lal, Peter Bauer and Bela Balassa, all of whom argue that it was the excessive regulation and protectionism popularized by nationalistic governments during the era of Import-Substituting Industrialization (ISI) which dwarfed productivity, trade, and therefore development in LDCs. [79] As discussed in Chapter 2, neo-Liberal economists worry that unwarranted 'dirigisme' by 'omniscient central authority' runs counter to 'the economic principle' and inhibits competition, investment, efficiency and individual motivation for hard work by creating unnecessarily high transactions costs which make it impossible for LDCs to achieve their economic optimum and thus relegates them to perpetual mediocrity and 'second best welfare economies'. [80] Policy-wise, neo-Liberals' commitment to market liberalization translates into market deregulation, privatization, and the shrinkage of the state as well as its withdrawal from central planning, investment or redistributive activities. [81] The second neo-Liberal idea evident in the SHD/PCD agenda is a preoccupation with establishing clear 'rules of the game' and proper rule enforcement so as to fight the rent-seeking behaviour which neo-Liberals view as the worse hindrance to development in LDCs. As Prof. Ann Krueger explains in her article, *The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society*, when government restrictions proliferate in an economy, they in turn give rise to a variety of rents, both legal and illegal, which can take the form of bribery, corruption, smuggling and black markets. Such rent-seeking behaviour, notes Krueger, not only lead to economic inefficiency by escalating the prices of transactions and discouraging the adoption of innovative technologies but they also sap peoples' initiative and trust in

the market and prompt them to themselves engage in rent-seeking in order to carry out their business, and ultimately breed unjust governments which favour those who can afford to pay rents and thus end up reinforcing inequalities in society. [82] The third idea which the SHD/PCD paradigm has borrowed from neo-Liberal thinking is the notion that international cooperation must shift from being 'entitlement-based', towards becoming 'performance and incentive-based'. The idea here is that the unilateral concessions demanded by the South from the richer North during the heyday of the NIEO in the 1970s should be replaced by a mutually beneficial North-South relationship based on reciprocal gains as well as the conditioning of foreign aid to LDCs' effective pursuit of policies and institutional reforms deemed desirable by Northern donors. [83] The message that 'the era of entitlements was over' and that LDCs could no longer expect major economic concessions or 'blank cheques' without donors wanting to 'have a say on how such money was spent' was a view which was reiterated during interviews with Northern government representatives at the UN. [84]

SHD/PCD texts, and especially those writings associated with UNDP, are full of evidence of support for the three neo-Liberal premises discussed above. In his later writings, for example, Sen himself has given considerably greater attention to "the rewards from greater integration into the world market" and to the importance of market incentives (as opposed to the incentives to public action which he emphasized in Hunger and Public Action) by highlighting that the "counterproductive nature of some government regulations and controls have been clear for a long time" and that these have "interfered with the efficiency of economic operations of modern industries" as well as failed "to promote any kind of real equity in distributional matters." [85] A change in emphasis is equally evident in the later work of Keith Griffin which applauds "the benefits that come from competition, liberalization and increased efficiency, the greater use of market forces in the former centrally planned economies"...and highlights

"the importance of moving beyond an emphasis on national sovereignty and state security". [86] With respect to the neo-Liberal call for moving away from 'entitlement-based' development cooperation', this view can be found in Dr. Mahbub ul Haq's own book, Reflections on Human Development, where he writes that, the sterile (NIEO) dialogue of the 1970s must give way to North-South relations built on "more open markets, not more managed markets" and to a more enlightened development cooperation dialogue based on "mutual interests" and "two-sided responsibility" rather than on "one-sided accusations", and "unilateral concessions" and massive transfers of financial resources. [87] And, as noted earlier in this Chapter, UNDP's HDRs themselves contain proposals which support a transition towards a more liberalized market economy through the privatization of inefficient or loss-making state enterprises, reduced and simplified taxation, and opening up to international trade and direct foreign investment. UNDP's HDRs also favour a shift towards a more efficient and competitive economy through the elimination of government tariffs, quotas or price controls, the introduction of "a legal system that protects property rights, both from illegal forced seizure in civil society and from capricious nationalization by the state" and the promotion of competitive business practices based on clear rules, open transactions, and legally enforceable contracts rather than on personal contacts, bribes or corruption which "sap initiative, reduce output and undermine productive investment." (Refer back to discussion in page 90 as well). [88]

Finally, my own interviews confirmed that the SHD/PCD paradigm was viewed both by international development scholars and officials as sharing key premises with the neo-Liberal doctrine of the World Bank. While outside critics like David Korten explicitly refer to the SHD/PCD agenda as the "Washington Consensus with a Human Face" and those like Manfred Bienefeld condemn it for not sufficiently stressing the potentially adverse effects of globalization on those who lack the bargaining power to

negotiate fairer terms when entering the market, even insiders like Meghnad Desai agree that although the SHD/PCD paradigm recognizes the shortfalls of asymmetrical access to markets, the paradigm ultimately accepts that free market capitalism has become the only game in town. [89]

From the above analysis, it becomes evident that, the SHD/PCD paradigm is extremely hybrid and draws inspiration from very diverse--and sometimes opposed--theoretical and ideological tendencies. (**Table 3.1** at the end of this Chapter summarizes the radical, reformist and conformist elements of the SHD/PCD agenda drawn from the different theoretical and ideological influences as outlined in various SHD/PCD publications and as discussed above.) Delineating the hybrid theoretical origins and ideological tendencies of SHD/PCD ideas as I have done above illustrates that whereas some of the fuzziness of SHD/PCD approaches may partly be the result of the intentional veiling or manipulation of the paradigm's meaning by international development agencies themselves (an issue which will be explored in greater depth in Chapters 5 and 6), much of the ambiguity of SHD/PCD's meaning undoubtedly also emanates from the SHD/PCD paradigm's eclectic origins and its marrying of a very mixed bag of often opposed theoretical and ideological influences.

Of course, the finding that the SHD/PCD paradigm borrows heavily from reformist, radical and neo-Liberal doctrines should not come as too much of a surprise given that one of the innovative features of the paradigm is precisely to attempt to transcend the dichotomy between state and market institutions by emphasizing the empowerment of poor persons and communities. Nor, for that matter, is the attempt at conceptual reconciliation undesirable given the mounting evidence in the International Development Literature that market and redistributive approaches are both valid and that state, market and community institutions each play an important role in development processes. What is problematic,

nevertheless, is that the proponents of the SHD/PCD approach often make what seem like opposite or shifting statements about the role of different institutional arrangements. For instance, while Sen clearly places the emphasis on 'incentives for public action' and writes of the importance of the state's involvement in economic activities and regulatory measures such as subsidizing food prices, rationing, and even controlling trader activities in his publications from the late 1980s, by the mid 1990s he is writing instead about the importance of 'economic incentives' and warning against the counterproductive nature of governmental regulation and controls. [90] Keith Griffin's writings can be equally perplexing. Hence, while in some instances Griffin worries about rising inequality in the distribution of global and intra-country income and the inequitable tendencies which the global economy has when left to its own devices [91], at other times, he praises the accelerated growth which has resulted from globalization and states that, contrary to widely held beliefs, polarization among peoples has diminished and global growth has in fact helped to reduce inequalities in the distribution of world income. [92]

By similar virtue, Dr. Mahbub ul Haq, once deemed an ardent protectionist and supporter of the NIEO [93], in his latest book, Reflections on Human Development, writes about the imperativeness of "economic liberalism so that people are free from excessive economic controls and regulation" [94]. In addition, the writings of different SHD/PCD authors sometimes contradict one another as well. For example, while in *Development: Which Way Now?* Sen supports the systematic involvement of the state in the economic sphere and supports the pursuit of planned economic development in countries like China, Sri Lanka and Romania, in the Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Griffin praises the greater use of market forces and the continuation of the global trend towards lesser use of administrative procedures to allocate resources in the former planned economies. [95] The potentially negative implementational implications of the SHD/PCD

paradigm's theoretical and ideological hybridity and of the confusion caused by the ambiguous positions of different advocates is a problem which respondents in the international community were acutely aware of [96] and which later also became evident in the field in Uganda. Mr. Per Arne Stroberg, a senior *Human Development* advisor at UNDP, was one respondent who sounded alarm bells about SHD/PCD's ideological ambiguity and possible adverse effects for its implementation:

> SHD/PCD takes Socialist values and merges them with market ideas and gets away with it..... But as the tensions inherent in UNDP's HDRs' policy recommendations become clearer, there is bound to be growing discord over these proposals. [97]

What we seem to have here then, are a group of development theorists whose ideas have changed over time and who, through SHD/PCD approaches, are striving to find 'a third way' which is a composite of old and new ideas and which reconciles the left-right conflict in development thought. It is important to point out, of course, that it is natural (and indeed desirable) for theorists to modify their ideas over time. What creates difficulties in the case of the SHD/PCD paradigm though, is that the above-mentioned thinkers have still to provide a unified position or a clear roadmap on exactly how to reconcile possible tensions between the sometimes opposed ideas which comprise SHD/PCD.

C) Incoherencies and Tensions Inherent in the SHD/PCD Paradigm:

A final conceptual deficiency discussed in this Chapter are the incoherencies and tensions inherent in the SHD/PCD paradigm itself. Although development scholars and practitioners have long suspected that newly emerging development approaches like SHD/PCD might be riddled with internal tensions and incoherencies (Refer back to Chapter 2), such criticisms have never been taken beyond the level of generalities and a detailed analysis of exactly how the SHD/PCD paradigm is internally contradictory and what implications this has for its implementation still

remains to be done. This is precisely what I attempt to do in the following section in order to illustrate that, in addition to being overly abstract, vague, unfinished, and both theoretically and ideologically ambiguous, the SHD/PCD paradigm suffers from a series of tensions between its core components, as well as between its aspirations and the real-life constraints it faces in the system of international development cooperation and those developing societies in which it must be realized. Whereas the first set of these tensions are largely attributable to the vague, unfinished and ambiguous nature of the SHD/PCD paradigm itself, the latter set of tensions are largely a consequence of the series of contestable assumptions which international development agencies make about their own ability to meet multiple (and often conflicting) goals as well as their inattention to the contextual and institutional constraints facing them.

Tensions Between the Components of SHD/PCD Paradigm

Within the SHD/PCD paradigm, there are two major types of tensions present: tensions between the various policy and reform proposals put forward by the SHD/PCD agenda, and actual tensions between the core goals of the SHD/PCD paradigm, as discussed in Chapter 1.

As illustrated above, the SHD/PCD paradigm, especially as advocated by those associated with UNDP, tends to draw policy and reform proposals from diverse theoretical and ideological orientations espousing very different values, priorities, and institutional preferences for achieving development. In theory, SHD/PCD's simultaneous embrace of diverse ideological frameworks and institutional arrangements (i.e., state-market-and community) is not necessarily problematic since each of the institutional arrangements in question has a useful role to play in development processes. However, once translated into practice, tensions, trade-offs, and conflicts of interest can exist between such alternative

institutional arrangements and visions of development. This leaves some very difficult choices for those who must translate SHD/PCD into practice.

One example which comes to mind is the tension and opportunity costs between SHD/PCD's Keynesian recommendations to increase public social spending and to enlarge safety nets and its simultaneous neo-Liberal proposal to introduce stabilization programmes and to reduce taxes. Here we clearly have two sets of policies in potential tension with one another since one proposes to strengthen the state's hand in the economy and therefore probably to generate additional revenue, while the other aims to roll back the state's economic activism and its expenditures. Another case in point are the tensions present between the SHD/PCD policy agenda's simultaneous call for greater equity and redistribution and for privatization and the observance of laws which guarantee private property ownership. Once again, although in principle, these two policy proposals are not by definition contradictory, in practice, because privatization can have enormous social costs (e.g., job losses, loss of social benefits) among vulnerable groups like women, ethnic minorities, youth and the elderly and because it is almost always elites or the established nomenklatura who have the money to purchase privatized public enterprises,[98] privatization policies often end up aggravating rather than improving equity in society. Moreover, because in many LDC societies, public accountability towards the poor, law enforcement, and tax collection mechanisms are often ineffective, even when privatization leads to increased economic growth or efficiency, such gains may not translate themselves into increased public investment in basic services for the poor.

Similar tensions exist between the SHD/PCD policy agenda's simultaneous calls for protecting private property rights and for a major redistribution of society's productive assets. Once again, while these two objectives are not contradictory in principle, in practice, because in

many LDCs the distribution of productive assets, and especially of land, is heavily concentrated in the hands of the few and social relations operate in a semi-feudal manner, it is extremely difficult to carry out major land or water reform without challenging the private property rights and arousing resistance among the landed oligarchy. The trade-offs between respect for private property rights and economic justice for the poor are inescapable in circumstances such as these.

A final illustration of policy tensions inherent in the SHD/PCD agenda is found in SHD/PCD's simultaneous espousal of neo-Liberal goals such as globalization and liberalized trade, of Keynesian goals like employment-intensive production, and neo-Marxist goals like stronger unions and guaranteed wages for poor workers. Once again, it is not difficult to see how conflicts of interest might arise between these objectives. After all, whereas the primary purpose of labour unions is to guarantee employment and improve workers' wages and rights, that of globalization and liberalization is to seek minimal production costs, which may imply replacing human labour with new technology, keeping wages down, or going elsewhere if workers are too demanding in their wages or work conditions.

Added to above-mentioned policy trade-offs is the problem that particular policy and reform proposals put forward by the SHD/PCD agenda themselves embrace contradictory principles. Take, for example, SHD/PCD's policy and reform proposals in the area of foreign development assistance. On the one hand, SHD/PCD advocates are adamant that foreign aid should no longer be viewed as an 'entitlement' and insist that foreign aid disbursements should increasingly take into consideration performance indicators and evidence of effective development impact on the ground. At the same time though, one the SHD/PCD agenda's chief policy proposals--the so-called, *20/20 Compact* which recommends that 20% of recipient government budgets and foreign aid be guaranteed for priority *Human Development*

programmes in LDCs, irrespective of varying recipient country needs, reverts into a universalistic entitlement logic.

Policy aside, there also exist tensions between the SHD/PCD paradigm's own goals. [99] Some of these latter tensions are a result of SHD/PCD's hybrid ideological tendencies (i.e., tensions created by SHD/PCD's simultaneous espousal of market efficiency, equity, and participation principles) but others derive from the unrealistic aspirations and fallacious assumptions of the very international development organizations which have adopted the SHD/PCD paradigm as their chief mandate. At least two tensions between the core goals of the SHD/PCD paradigm are worth noting. The first tension is that between effective policy advocacy and participation/empowerment. As Jane Covey explains in her analysis, these two SHD/PCD goals often end up at odds with one another and trade offs must be made between them because the quick and ever-changing pace of effective advocacy campaigning are very difficult to reconcile with the gradual and much slower learning process of fostering participation and empowerment (and indeed strong donor alliances or North-South partnerships). [100] A second set of tensions inherent in the SHD/PCD paradigm are those between SHD/PCD's simultaneous promotion of 'Sound governance' and national self-determination. The friction in this case results from the fact that although SHD/PCD encourages greater ownership and self-reliance among LDCs, it at the same time promotes a *'Sound governance'* agenda with many pre-defined policy and reform options as well as stronger linkage of foreign aid to donors' preferred policy and reform agenda. SHD/PCD efforts to encourage LDCs to take control over their destiny but to at the same time support the international community's tendency to press a particular policy and reform agenda, are clearly at odds with one another.

The kinds of tensions between the various components of SHD/PCD described above are not particularly troublesome in theory or in the

abstract. However, when it comes to operationalizing the SHD/PCD paradigm into practice, the trade-offs, opportunity costs and conflicts of interest involved are inescapable. Unfortunately, because of often mixed signals and ambiguous statements by SHD/PCD proponents themselves, the absence of a concrete SHD/PCD Action Plan, and the lack of a prioritization, ordering, or valuation of human *capabilities*, the SHD/PCD and 'Capabilities approach' offer little guidance to policy-makers or development practitioners grappling with the difficult choices described above.

Hence, although the SHD/PCD paradigm offers a wide menu of ambitious policy reforms with the potential to alter the status quo, neither the paradigm or its advocates clarify which human *capabilities*--if any--matter most, which components of the SHD/PCD agenda should be given preference, or which criteria policy-makers or practitioners should rely on to make difficult judgement calls. The point being made here is not that the different components of the SHD/PCD agenda need always be at odds with one another or that some components of the SHD/PCD agenda are more conducive to poverty-eradication than others. The message, is simply that, when translated into policy and practice, some of the SHD/PCD agenda's core goals and policy proposals may be at odds with one another. Moreover, since the SHD/PCD and 'Capabilities approach' do not offer many clues as to how to decide between difficult options but rather tell us that all the components of the SHD/PCD paradigm should be realized together, policy-makers and practitioners are left making most of the difficult choices which must be made in order to produce a coherent whole. For example, when in tension, should be achieving equity be given priority over achieving efficiency? Should SHD/PCD goals and policies give priority to the human needs of landless peasants and poor women? How do different types of SHD/PCD interventions affect one another? and, Which interventions are most likely to help those groups deemed to be a priority?

The SHD/PCD choices made by policy-makers and development

practitioners may not (and need not) always be anti neo-Liberal in inclination. After all, as noted earlier in this chapter,some neo-Liberal reforms (e.g., liberalizing global migration and the flow of labour) can themselves be radical moves which challenge the status quo and have high *Human Development* benefits. At the same time though, SHD/PCD advocates claim that *Human Development* aims to challenge vested interests in the neo-Liberal hegemony and to transform existing power relations and institutional arrangements so that these benefit the poorest. This means that, when equity and efficient growth or the interests of the poor and those of elites are at odds with one another, a truly progressive approach to SHD/PCD should favour policy reforms which directly redistribute power and assets to the poorest, even if such policies have been traditionally associated with the Left. In fact, in an article written for UNDP's HDRO Griffin and McKinley recognize that conflicts and trade-offs may result between faster growth and greater equity in the distribution of the benefits of growth. Under such circumstances they argue, value judgements must be made to resolve the conflict, from the perspective of the interests of the poorest since the indirect effects on poverty from a trickle-down of the benefits of growth seldom are sufficiently large to occur sufficiently fast to outweigh the direct benefits of redistributive policies. [101]

Tensions Between the Aspirations of the SHD/PCD Paradigm and the Reality of Constraints Present in The Existing System of International Cooperation and Development Processes

As mentioned above, in addition to disharmony between some of the components of the SHD/PCD paradigm, a number of tensions may also exist between the overall aspirations of SHD/PCD and the reality of constraints present in the wider environment in which those aspirations must be realized. These latter tensions may be rooted in a series of fallacious assumptions made by international development organizations, including the contestable assumption that, despite their need for organizational survival and dependence on a multiplicity of powerful stakeholders, international

development agencies are capable of leading a paradigmatic shift, empowering the poorest, and challenging existing power relations and the current system of development cooperation. Another possibly wrongful assumption is the belief that international development organizations which are hierarchical, bureaucratic, managerial, sectorally-based, and project-driven will be capable of carrying out development efforts which need to be holistic, flexible, and participatory in nature and involve strong substantive analysis and policy advocacy and, that such agencies can simultaneously meet the managerial and participatory demands of donors. The third contestable assumption worthy of exploration is the supposition that both the system of international development cooperation and beneficiary communities themselves are by nature harmonious and solidaire and welcome more democratic, power-sharing, and consensus-based development approaches. The purpose of the Chapters which follow is precisely to show how the aspirations of those agencies who have adopted the SHD/PCD paradigm have been at odds with the reality in the constraints present in the international community and LDC societies themselves.

Development experts have documented the adverse effects of a number of the contestable assumptions mentioned above (see Chapter 2). Yet no one has analyzed in depth either the tensions present between the policy proposals and core goals of the SHD/PCD paradigm or the gap between SHD/PCD ideals development agency aspirations and the extent of the environmental constraints facing them. And yet, the analysis in this Chapter confirms that, due to its vagueness and ambiguity as well as its attempts to reconcile policy recommendations and core goals at odds with one another, the SHD/PCD paradigm is riddled with inconsistencies and internal tensions. The chapters which follow explore how such tensions have affected the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches, whether UNDP and AA have been able to overcome these contradictions, and what the implications of these experiences are for SHD/PCD's implementation.

III. SHD/PCD as Baroque Science: Confronting SHD/PCD's Conceptual Deficiencies

A) The SHD/PCD Paradigm as a Baroque Science

When speaking about the incoherencies of the SHD/PCD paradigm, it is very appropriate to speak of a *Baroque Science Phenomenon*. For, like Baroque Sciences which assumed that there was an implicit harmony in all things no matter how diverse, SHD/PCD's proponents have also assume that despite the paradigm's abstractness, incompleteness, vagueness, and sometimes ambiguous and contradictory nature, SHD/PCD must somehow be coherent as well. I have borrowed the term 'Baroque Science' from Mack Walker's book, German Home Towns. In this book Walker identifies three traits which made German Cameralism in the 1600s and 1700s a 'Baroque Science' [102] and which are directly applicable to my depiction of SHD/PCD as a 'Baroque Science'.

The first is the belief that all diversity can be fully comprehended and that there is inherent harmony among all the parts of a whole, despite vagueness or apparent tensions, trade offs or conflicts of interest between the parts or between the parts and the whole. [103] As Christopher Hood and Michael Jackson explain, German Cameralism was a vague administrative doctrine which incorporated a range of conservative and radical ideas at once, yet had no single definitive text encompassing the ideas of the school. [104] The parallels with the SHD/PCD paradigm are inescapable. Like the Cameralists and other advocates of Baroque Science, the proponents of SHD/PCD merge wide-ranging ideas and philosophies, have no shared text, and assume that all the components of their paradigm are co-realizable and that there is somehow an inherent harmony between the various parts of the paradigm despite the fact that the ranking, value, or links between SHD/PCD's various parts remain unknown. In short, like the German Cameralists, SHD/PCD proponents neglect the potential trade offs between the various components of their paradigm and possible conflicts of interests between what is beneficial for powerful elites and the poorest.

The second feature which Walker attributes to Baroque Sciences is the belief that tensions, discord or distortions resulting from oligarchy, self-interest or corruption which threaten the harmony of the whole are aberrations rather than the norm and, as such, can be eliminated with minor tampering and adjustments. [105] In the preceding pages we have seen that, like the Cameralists, the pioneers of SHD/PCD approaches have left the SHD/PCD paradigm unfinished and its inherent tensions unresolved. The third similarity between Cameralist Baroque Science and SHD/PCD is that the ideas involved in both are convincing only as long as they remain in the form of abstract theory. However, once the ideas are closely scrutinized and their implementability tested (as I propose to do in the following chapters) in terms of wider real-life constraints, the apparent "harmony in diversity threatens to become theoretical madness." [106] As Hood and Jackson note, although the Cameralists constantly invoked 'science', their ideas were closer to generalizations based on 'rules of thumb'.[107] In the case of SHD/PCD we have seen that, when it comes to designing concrete action plans or identifying values, priorities or links between SHD/PCD's various components, the SHD/PCD paradigm also falls short of expectations.

B) The Implications of SHD/PCD's Conceptual Deficiencies for its Operationalization and Implementation

This Chapter has provided a detailed analysis of the origins and conceptual soundness of the SHD/PCD paradigm. It has argued that, in addition to fulfilling the prerequisites of a *bona fide* development paradigm, SHD/PCD approaches offer useful and refreshing insights as well an ambitious and sometimes radical policy and reform agenda with the potential to challenge the neo-Liberal hegemony and to transform existing institutional arrangements and power relations. The weaknesses of the SHD/PCD paradigm, therefore, lie elsewhere. As the Chapter illustrates, the main conceptual deficiency of the SHD/PCD paradigm lies in the sheer abstractness, vagueness and unfinished nature of the paradigm, as well as in its theoretical hybridity and ambiguous ideological tendencies, all of

which have potentially negative implications for SHD/PCD's eventual operationalization. The implementation of the SHD/PCD paradigm is further complicated by tensions present between the core goals and policy recommendations of the SHD/PCD paradigm as well as the gulf between SHD/PCD aspirations and the reality of the constraints present in the global environment and LDCs in which SHD/PCD must be put into practice.

Although some of the conceptual deficiencies mentioned above are not unfamiliar to development and SHD/PCD critics (Refer back to Chapter 2), this Chapter attempts to move beyond general criticisms and to draw out some of the implications of SHD/PCD's conceptual shortfalls for its eventual operationalization and implementation. The analysis contained in the Chapter tries to achieve this in three ways. Firstly, instead of uncritically declaring SHD/PCD a 'new development paradigm' or casually dismissing it as 'rhetoric' on the basis of general impressions, the Chapter collects testimony from those international development actors who have actively involved in the promotion and implementation of SHD/PCD approaches. The purpose of providing first-hand testimonies in this Chapter is to use interviews to confirm more general claims made in the literature, and partly to explore different development actors' perceptions of the conceptual soundness and implementability of SHD/PCD paradigm. Since my doctoral work is mostly based on qualitative research, it is important to realize that when I speak of different interviewee's views of the SHD/PCD paradigm, I am not suggesting that such comments are statistically representative, or that because certain actors voice them, that they must be true. The idea, instead, is simply to show that development actors are aware of the conceptual weaknesses of the SHD/PCD paradigm. This is in itself an important finding, not only because such research has not been done before, but because, as we will see in later chapters, development actors' perceptions of the conceptual usefulness of SHD/PCD do affect the way they interpret and go about translating SHD/PCD

ideas from paradigm to practice. However, because development actors' views alone are not sufficient evidence of the conceptual weaknesses of the SHD/PCD paradigm, this Chapter complements interview material with textual analysis of key SHD/PCD documents in order to trace SHD/PCD's theoretical roots and ideological tendencies and to further assess SHD/PCD's conceptual soundness. Secondly, through the lens of the *Baroque Science Phenomenon*, the Chapter tries to integrate dispersed critiques of the SHD/PCD paradigm. Thirdly, the Chapter tries to expose the implications of SHD/PCD conceptual deficiencies for its operationalization and implementation.

If I had to pinpoint the most significant lessons derived from the above discussion for the implementation of the SHD/PCD paradigm, I would, first of all, note that, all ambitious paradigms with such high expectations and which address complex issues (which are often the ones most worth resolving) and which must be put into practice in heterogeneous societies with diverse ideologies and groupings (as is the case in most societies), and implemented through organizations with many of their own interests (as is the case with most organizations), there are bound to be difficulties in putting such ideas into action and at least some gap between paradigm and practice. However, when on top of these inevitable restrictions, one starts off with a paradigm as abstract, vague, unfinished, hybrid and ambiguous as SHD/PCD, the operationalization and implementation process are bound to be even more complicated and policy-makers and practitioners even more confused. The second lesson to be learned is that if, in addition to a nebulous theory, its implementors undermine the discrepancies between the aspirations of their theory and their own capacities and the extent of the real-life constraints at stake, one can expect the implementation process to be even further complicated. While the first of these lessons has been shown in this Chapter, the second lesson will become evident in chapters to come.

The above findings coincide with those of analysts of implementation processes such as Moynihan, Bardach and Sieber. For example, in his analysis of the botched implementation of participatory principles Moynihan advise against putting into practice theories which remain unproven and suffused with ambiguities, and reproaches policy-makers and implementors who oversell their ideas and undermine the limitations of their knowledge or the severity of the real-life constraints at stake. [108] In The Implementation Game, Bardach too warns that if the original goals of an approach are vague or ambiguous to begin with and if the consensus upon which they are based is precarious--as is the case with the SHD/PCD paradigm in which there is no consensus on clear ideological positions, the prioritization or valuation of *capabilities* or a blueprint for action--one can expect a 'Deflection of Goals' during the implementation process. [109] In Fatal Remedies, Sam Sieber relays a similar message by pointing out that 'Goal Displacement' is most likely to occur when there are multiple or opposing goals involved in a doctrine or intervention. As we have seen in this Chapter, this is clearly the case with the SHD/PCD approach which has a number of goals which are in possible tension with one another. In his work Sieber also points out that 'Goal Displacement' is most likely to occur when the goals of an intervention are at odds with the reality of the situation in the particular institutions or organizations implementing such goals. [110] Sieber's description parallels the discrepancies I found between SHD/PCD aspirations and the reality of the constrains present in the international community, within specific development agencies and LDCs.

The Chapters which follow show how UNDP and AA have gone about putting the SHD/PCD paradigm into practice, including how both agencies have dealt with the conceptual deficiencies and tensions inherent in the SHD/PCD paradigm, the discrepancy between their SHD/PCD aspirations, wider contextual and institutional constraints, and their own organizational limitations and contestable assumptions about development.

ENDNOTES:

1. Interview # 39.

2. Interviews # 39, 23, 10, 11.

3. Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Page 175. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Second enlarged Edition, 1970.

4. According to Kuhn, just like no paradigm solves all the problems it defines, no two paradigms address the same problems or leave the same problems unsolved. Paradigmatic debates always involve the question: which problems is it more significant to have solved? (Kuhn, Page 110, Op. Cit.)

5. Kuhn, Pages 44 and 77-79. Op. Cit.

6. Interviews #6, 18, 21.

7. Keith Griffin and John Knight. (Editors). Page 10. Op. Cit.

8. Amartya Sen, *Development as Capability Expansion*. Page 41. in Griffin and Knight, Ibid.

9. Cornia, Jolly and Stewart. 1987. Op. Cit.

10. Interview #17. See also: Singer, Hans and Griffith-Jones, Stephany. *New Patterns of Macro-Economic Governance*. Pages 1-8. *Occasional Paper # 10. New York: Human Development Report Office*, UNDP HQ, July 1994.

11. UNDP, *1993 HDR*. Page 53. Op. Cit.

12. Interviews # 31, 32, 37, 44.

13. UNDP, *1992 HDR*. Overview, Page 2 and UNDP, *1994 HDR*. Chapter 1, Page 13.

14. Interviews # 9 and 43.

15. UNDP. See especially the *1992 HDR*. Pages 45-50.

16. UNDP. *1991 HDR*. Pages 5, 44 especially.

17. UNDP. *1992 HDR*. Page 50

18. UNDP. *1993 HDR*. Page 31.

19. UNDP. *1992 HDR*. See Chapter 2.

20. UNDP. *1993 HDR*. Page 29.

21. Speth, *With a Soul and a Vision*. Pages 6, 9. Op. Cit.

22. Speth, *Initiative for Change: Follow up to Decision 95/22, Paragraph 4. Note by the Administrator.* See Annex I. Op. Cit.

23. UNDP. *Change and Reform in UNDP: Highlights*. Oct. 1995. N.Y., N.Y., USA.

24. James Gustave Speth. *With a Soul and a Vision*. Pages 5-9. Op. Cit.

25. Interview #5.

26. See, for instance, Amartya Sen's *Dewey Lectures 1, 2 and 3*. Journal of Philosophy, Volume 82 (April 1985).

27. See, for instance, Amartya Sen, *Development as Capability Expansion* in Griffin and Knight (Editors). Op. Cit.

28. Sen's *Dewey Lectures*, as published in the Journal of Philosophy. Op. Cit.

29. Interview #16.

30. Sen defines *functionings* as "constitutive elements of living". In other words, a functioning is an achievement of a person. *Capabilities*, on the other hand, are defined as "a derivative notion": It reflects the various combinations of *functionings* (doings and beings) that a person can achieve. Capabilities, although not directly observable, in essence, reflect a person's freedom to choose between different ways of living and refer to what people can or can not do (e.g., whether they can live long, escape avoidable morbidity, be well-nourished, being able to read, write and communicate, take part in literary and scientific pursuits and so forth). (See Amartya Sen, *Development as Capability Expansion*. Page 44. in Griffin and Knight (Editors).Op. Cit.

31. Amartya Sen, *Well-Being and Freedom*. Pages 198-200. *Dewey Lectures 1,2,3*. Op. Cit.

32. T.N. Srinivasan (1994), Page 6, Op. Cit. quoting Robert Sugden, *Welfare, Resources, and Capabilities: A Review of 'Inequality Reexamined' by Amartya Sen*. The Journal of Economic Literature. Volume XXXI. Number 4. 1993.

33. Desai, Meghnad, *Poverty and Capability: Towards an Empirically Implementable Measure*. Page 9. *London: Suntory-Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines* (STICERD), London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), 1990.

34. See: Sudhir Anand and Amartya Sen. *Human Development Index: Methodology and Measurement*. Monograph. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, July 1993.

35. Interview # 11b. Lord Desai noted that, in order to turn the SHD/PCD paradigm into an implementable measure such as the HDI, he had himself decided to identify 5 basic capabilities which were deemed indispensable. (Also see: Desai, *Poverty and Capability: Towards an Empirically Implementable Measure,* 1990. Op. Cit.)

36. Frances Stewart, *Basic Needs, Capabilities and Human Development*. Unpublished Monograph. Oxford: University of Oxford, April 1995.

37. Sen, *Freedom and Agency*. Page 202. *The Dewey Lectures 1,2, 3*. Op. Cit.

38. Desai, 1990. Page 33. Op. Cit.

39. Interview # 9.

40. Interview # 11b.

41. Interview # 13.

42. Interview # 142.

43. Interview # 14.

44. Interview #1.

45. Singer, Hans and Griffith-Jones, Stephany. 1994. Op. Cit.

46. Chenery, H., Ahluwalia, M., Bell, C.L.G., Duloy, J.H. and Jolly, R. Redistribution with Growth. London: Oxford University Press, 1974.

47. Interview #20, 24, 33, 15.

48. Interview # 11a, 11b, 13.

49. UNDP. *1996 HDR*. Page 47.

50. Frances Stewart, *Basic Needs, Capabilities and Human Development*. Page 4. Op. Cit. Refer also to: Paul Streeten, *Human Development: Means and Ends*. Unpublished Monograph. Washington DC, USA. January 1995.

51. UNDP. *1996 HDR*. Page 47.

52. Paul Streeten quoting from Sudhir Anand and Martin Ravallion's 1992 critique of *Basic Needs*. (Streeten, Human Development: Means and Ends. (Op.Cit.)

53. Diane Elson. *Economic Paradigms and their Implications for Models of Development: The Case of Human Development*. Op. Cit.

54. UNDP. *1996 HDR*. Page 48.

55. See Paul Streeten, *Human Development: Means and Ends*. (Op. Cit.) and Frances Stewart, *Basic Needs, Capabilities and Human Development* (Op. Cit.).

56. UNDP. *1996 HDR*. Page 47.

57. Interview # 9 and Frances Stewart, *Basic Needs, Capabilities and Human Development* Op. Cit.

58. Sen as quoted in: Diane Elson. 1997. Op. Cit.

59. Also conditioning individuals' capabilities and functionings are the specific characteristics of goods, personal traits, expectations of others' behaviour, and features of the wider social environment people live in. (Stewart, F., *Basic Needs, Capabilities and Human Development*, Page 2, Op. Cit.; And, Desai, M., *Poverty and Capability: Toward an Implementable Measure*. Page 8. Op. Cit.)

60. Desai. 1990. Page 7-8, Op. Cit.

61. For a more detailed discussion of how Sen's *Capabilities* approach transcends 'Revealed Preference Welfarism', see Robert Sugden, *Welfare, Resources and Capabilities: A Review of Inequality Reexamined by Amartya Sen*. Journal of Economic Literature. Volume XXXI (December 1993).

62. Frances Stewart. 1995. Page 13-17. Op. Cit. It is important to point out that even though Prof. Stewart regards Sen's *Capabilities* approach as wider-reaching than the *Basic Needs* approach for the reasons mentioned above, she also argues that, for measurement purposes, the *Basic Needs* approach is much more robust than the *Capabilities* approach since it incorporates stronger elements of valuation and it is more observable.

63. Interview # 11b.

In a monograph entitled: *Thinking About Development Over the Last 40 Years*, Frances Stewart makes a similar distinction and notes that while the thinkers associated with the Basic Needs/Redistribution (and later SHD/PCD) ideas were mainly Northerners, their Dependency School counterparts in UNCTAD and the G-77 in the South preferred to call for a much more radical NIEO (Frances Stewart, *Thinking About Development Over the Last 40 Years*. Page 6. Unpublished Monograph. Oxford: University of Oxford, April 21, 1995.)

64. Amartya Sen. *Development: Which Way Now?* Especially Pages 751-52. The Economic Journal. Volume 93. December 1983.

65. Dreze, Jean and Sen, Amartya. Hunger and Public Action. Pages 17, 89, 246, 259. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

In his analysis of Sen's work, Robert Sugden also argues that Sen tends to believe very strongly that "it is the responsibility of government to promote the overall good of society" (Sugden. 1993. Page 1948. Op. Cit.).

66. Keith Griffin and Azizur Rahman Khan. *Globalization and the Developing World: An Essay on the International Dimensions of Development in the Post Cold-War Era*. Pages 34. HDRO Occasional Paper #2. New York: HDRO, UNDP HQ, 1992; And, Keith Griffin and Terry McMcKinley. *HDRO Occasional Paper # 6. Towards a Human Development Strategy*. Page 8. New York: HDRO, UNDP HQ, 1993, respectively.

67. Ibid.

68. Linden, Ian. *Back to Basics: Revisiting Catholic Social Teaching*. Page 7. London: Catholic Institute for International Relations (CIIR), 1994.

69. Paulo Freire as quoted by Stan Burkey in People First: A Guide to Self-Reliant, Participatory Rural Development. Page 30. Op. Cit.

70. Sections from Paulo Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Page 532, reprinted in: Charles Wilber (Editor). The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment. New York: Random House, 1984.

71. See, for example, Stan Burkey. Page 33. Op. Cit.

72. Ian Linden, *Back to Basics*. Page 8. Op. Cit.

73. Eade, Deborah and William, Suzanne, The OXFAM Handbook of Development and Relief. Volume I. Chapter 1, Pages 10,12. Oxford; OXFAM Publication, 1995.

74. See David Korten. Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda. Pages 5, 71, 94. West Hartford, Conn: Kumarian Press, 1990; And, Dharam Ghai. *Participatory Development: Some Perspectives From Grassroots Experiences.* See pages 5, 14, 15 especially. UNRISD Discussion Paper. Geneva, 1988.)

75. Interview # 1.

For an overview of the influence of Freirean and participatory ideas in development theory, see Barbara Ingham, *The Meaning of Development: Interactions Between "New" and "Old" Ideas*. World Development, Vol.21, No. 11, 1993.

76. Sen and Dreze. Pages 275-279. Op. Cit.

77. Griffin and McKinley. Pages 9, 10. Op. Cit.

78. Interview # 31, 32, 44.

79. For an excellent analysis of the influence of neo-Liberal Economics in development thinking (i.e., what is sometimes called the 'Counter-Revolution' in development), refer to John Toye's Dilemmas of Development. 1993. Op. Cit.

80. Deepak Lal, *The Misconception of 'Development Economics'*. Finance & Development. Pages 11, 12. June 1985.

81. Refer, for instance to Bauer's arguments against state ownership in Toye's Dilemmas of Development. Pages 78-81. Op. Cit.

82. Ann O. Krueger. *The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society*. American Economic Review. Page 291. Number 3, June 1974.

83. In a special series of the IDS Bulletin on good governance and foreign aid, several of the authors show how aid conditionality is increasingly being used to promote the neo-Liberal 'Washington Consensus', and World Bank priorities such as economic liberalization, reduced transaction costs, and a diminished public and more efficient public sector. At the same time though, the same articles do show that the current trend towards greater aid conditionality can sometimes be used to promote more leftist ideals such as active political activism, broad community participation, social justice and respect for human rights. (See: IDS Bulletin, Volume 24, Number 2, 1993, especially articles by Carol Lancaster, Mark Robinson and Dennis Osborne)

84. Interviews # 52 and 55 respectively.

85. Sen, Amartya. *Beyond Liberalization: Social Opportunity and Human Capability*. Page 9,10. London: Suntory-Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD), London School of Economics and Political Science, November 1994.

86. Griffin, Keith. *Global Prospects for Development and Human Security*. Pages 362-363 Canadian Journal of Development Studies. Volume XVI, Number 3, 1995.

87. Mahbub ul Haq, 1995. Page 34. Op. Cit.

88. UNDP. *1993 HDR*. Pages 24, 28, 32, 33, 45.

89. See David Korten, *Sustainable Societies and Global Governance: The People-Centred Consensus*. People-Centred Development Forum. New York, New York, USA, October 4, 1994; Manfred Bienefeld, *Assessing Current Development Trends: Reflections on Keith Griffin's 'Global Prospects for Development and Human Security'*, Canadian Journal of Development Studies Volume XVI, No. 3, 1995; And interview #11b,respectively.

90. Compare, for instance, Dreze and Sen's pro-state statements in Hunger and Public Action (Pages 89, 246, 259, for example), Op. Cit with Sen's 1994 much more pro-market approach in his 1994 article, *Beyond Liberalization: Social Opportunity and Human Capability* (Pages 8-9). Op. Cit.

91. See: Keith Griffin and John Knight. Page 11. Op. Cit. And, Keith Griffin and Azizur Rhaman Khan, Page 34. Op. Cit., respectively.

92. Griffin, K. *Global Prospects for Development and Human Security*. Pages 363-64. Op.Cit.

93. During our interview, a senior UN official noted that Dr. Mahbub ul Haq was known within the UN for having been involved with the ideas of the NIEO during the 1970s. (Interview with senior UN official, N.Y. N.Y., USA).

94. Mahbub ul Haq. Reflections on Human Development. Page 20. Op. Cit.

95. Amartya Sen, *Development: Which Way Now?* Page 752. Op. Cit. And, Keith Griffin, *Global Prospects for Development and Human Security*. Page 363. Op. Cit.

96. See: Interviews # 3, 29, and 34.

97. Interview # 34.

98. UNDP. *1993 HDR*. Pages 47-48. Op. Cit.

99. i.e., holistic and flexible development; sound governance and effective policy advocacy; equity; participation and empowerment; donor collaboration and improved North-South partnerships.(Refer to Chapter 1 for details).

100. Jane Covey. *Accountability and Effectiveness in NGO Policy Alliances*. Page 175. Michael Edwards and David Hulme (Editors). Beyond the Magic Bullet: Non-Governmental Organizations--Performance and Accountability. London: Earthscan Publishers, 1996.

101. Griffin and McKinley. Page 4. 1993. Op. Cit.

102. Theorists and writers which influenced the Baroque Science and Cameralist traditions in Germany during this time were, among others, the German philosopher and mathematician Baron Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716); Veit Seckendorff (1626-1692), State Chancellor at a succession of saxon principalities and University Chancellor at Halle where Cameralist Science was extremely influential; Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), Professor of Law and Philosophy at Leipzig and Halle; Christian Wolff (1675-1754), Thomasius' successor at Halle; and Johann v. Justi (1705-1771) who was instrumental in developing police science as a form of implementing Cameralist principles. (See: Mack Walker, *Cameralism and Community*. German Home Towns. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1971).

103. Under German Cameralism, for example, it was assumed that despite the wide diversity of traditions, customs and practices present in German Hometowns, somehow these Hometowns fitted harmoniously with the sovereign whole. The aspirations of individuals, Hometowns and the state were never regarded to be at odds with one another and as tensions between self-interest and the common good (i.e., the 'collective weal') went unrecognized. The reality, however, was quite different as conflicts of interest did exist between Hometowns and the countryside, between Guild members and outsiders, and between the State and the Hometowns. (Mack Walker. Pages 145-146.Op. Cit.)

104. Hood, Christopher and Jackson, Michael. *Two Administrative Philosophies: From the Leading Edge and the Lumber Room*. Page 180-181. In: Hood, Christopher and Jackson, Michael, Administrative Argument. Hants, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Co.,1991.

105. For example, under German Cameralism, rather than intervening directly to eliminate tensions between central and local policies and practices, the central state left most of the institutions, traditions, and essence of German Hometowns relatively intact and allowed them to function as they always had. (Walker. Pages 147-150. Op. Cit.)

106. For example, in the case of German Cameralism, although in theory, it was logical to attempt to regulate the various aspects of the economy and of business in the German Hometowns in order to maintain harmony between the various activities of the Hometowns as well as between the Hometowns and State law and principles, in practice, this implied an endless compilation of economic and professional classifications, a patchwork of laws and regulations, and an unrealistic amounts of endless monitoring and policing by state officials. In practice then, the aspirations and the regulatory framework of German Cameralism were untenable. (Walker. Page 151. Op. Cit.)

107. Hood, C. and Jackson, M. Page 182. Op. Cit.

108. Moynihan, Daniel. Pages 168-171 especially. Op. Cit.

109. Bardach. Pages 19-20, Op. Cit.

110. Sam Sieber. Pages 21-23. Op Cit.

Table 3.1: Radical, Reformist and Conformist Aspects of the SHD/PCD Agenda

Radical (Anti status quo) Elements of SHD/PCD	Reformist (Moderate) Elements of SHD/PCD	Conformist (neo-Liberal) Elements of SHD/PCD
Global Level Reforms: •Make DC's ODA contributions mandatory •Create an Ec. Security Council with permanent votes for LDCs •Compensate LDCs for damages caused by DCs' migration and trade restrictions & pay LDCs to fight global human security threats •Penalize Oligarchic behaviour by TNCs •Create int'l institutions that prioritize credit & ease interest rates for poorest LDCs •Forgive/Reschedule LDC debt	Global Level Reforms: •Strengthened role for UN as Dev. Umbrella. •Global SHD/PCD Compact signed by all Form Global Safety Nets for LDCs •Focus ODA on SHD/PCD •A 20/20 Compact for all •Diversify exports to avoid dependence on global price fluctuations •Increase manufactured component of exports to increase value added •Encourage regional economic groups	Global Level Reforms: •All countries, includ. LDCs must adopt policies that attract considerable DFI. (e.g. Free-floating exchange rates, DFI incentives) •All countries, includ. LDCs must foster 'dynamic competitiveness' and liberalized trade by ending export subsidies, tariffs & NTBs includ. quotas & obstructive health & safety regulations.
National Level Reforms: •Call for demilitarization. •Access to assets (including credit, land & a once-and-for all redistribution of assets) •Fiscal polices to benefit the poorest. •Halt capital flight. •Enhance grassroots democracy & participation •Empower the poor •Organize & foster alliances within civil society & with the poor which countervails the power of govt & employers	National Level Reforms: •Safety Nets for poorest •Increase Human priority expenditures in basic health & education •Increase employment-intensive production •Invest in infrastructure; as well as R&D •Skills training for all •Free & fair elections; Accountable govt •Rule of law;law enforcement;equality of opportunity;freedom of expression;human security	National Level Reforms: •Sound macroeconomic policies (e.g, avoid deficits, price controls; raise interest rates) •Privatize public corps to boost efficient production & service delivery •Increase competition & profit incentives for private enterprises •Simplify & reduce taxes •Eliminate excessive regulation & corruption •Reduce state's role in economic planning •Promote 'Good Governance'
Organizational-Project Level Reforms: •Changes in existing power relations & institutional reforms are needed on top of foreign aid or org. reforms •Replace high project load by effective policy advocacy •Build genuine North-South partnerships with southern counterparts & beneficiaries •Foster ownership & participation among field-level development agency staff & beneficiaries by reversing top-down organizational structures & introducing effective forms of downward accountability •Replace foreign-imposed blue prints with indigenous knowledge & flexible learning	Organizational-Project Level Reforms: •Increase ODA disbursements & foreign aid projects targeting the poor •Focus foreign aid on the SHD/PCD agenda •Relieve short-term suffering with more emergency relief •Improve aid coordination & forge new coop. agreements with WB, GEF, FAO, UNEP, UNHCR, etc. •Improve development agencies' research, policy analysis & substantive capacity •Work multi-sectorally •introducing effective accountability	Organizational-Project Level Reforms: •Shift from 'entitlement' based to 'incentive' & 'performance' based orgs. •Cut staff & administrative costs in Dev. Agencies •Allow independent audits by int'l accounting firms •Introduce personal liability & penalize infraction of financial or other rules. •More efficient Exe. Board •Introduce a Corporate Plan, success indicators, & an evaluation methodologies to measure impact.

Source: UNDP, *Human Development Reports*, 1990-1997.

Chapter 4: The Pearl to Rise and Shine Again? A Glance at Uganda's Human Development Prospects

> Rebuilding Uganda involves remaking all aspects of Ugandan society from the physical infrastructure to the soul and the spirit of the nation. It will require strong and substantial political will to overcome significant resistance generated by the wide scope of the reform measures. These reforms will remain artificial forms superimposed from the top unless genuine attempts are made to decentralize power to the grassroots through popular participation. External and internal resources must be mobilized and managed efficiently and effectively to create widely and equitably distributed economic and spiritual prosperity. When human values are enhanced and all forms of dehumanization curbed, the pearl of Africa will be seen to rise and shine again.
>
> Mahmood Mamdani [1]

I. The Tarnished Pearl: Uganda, Land of Promise, Land of Despair

Thanks largely to the discipline and commitment to stability and institutional reform by the *National Resistance Movement* (NRM), for over a decade now, Uganda has been considered one of the countries most likely to progress in Africa. Yet, despite the new development opportunities unleashed by the NRM's numerous political and economic reforms, today Uganda is still an extremely impoverished country whose future *Human Development* remains uncertain. In this Chapter, I provide a very general overview of the new development opportunities which have opened up for Ugandans since the arrival of the NRM government in 1986 until 1996, while at the same time exploring some of the broader contextual and institutional constraints which persist in the state and market sectors as well as in Uganda's civil society and system of international development cooperation.

The purpose of this exercise is twofold. On the one hand, I am interested in developing an idea of the kind of environment in which international development agencies like UNDP and AA have had to operate in and in seeing whether Uganda has an environment conducive to SHD/PCD by exploring how Uganda ares with respect to the key aspects of 'Sound governance' [2] which agencies like UNDP believe to be an important component as well as a precondition for SHD/PCD. On the other hand, I am also

interested in determining whether the types of contraints which are currently undermining Uganda's SHD/PCD are a product of the unequal and dualistic forms which development has taken in Uganda (that is, the types of constraints highlighted by advocates of the *Democratic Development [DD]* school of thought: e.g., lack of access to wealth, productive assets, or political power by the majority of poor Ugandans; and the persistence of clientelistic relations) or, whether Uganda's development setbacks are attributed mainly to the conflictual and opportunistic nature of development actors (i.e., the chief concerns of the advocates of the *New Institutional Economics* [NIE]: high transaction costs and distrust in existing institutional arrangements resulting from predatory behaviour by government officials and the tendency of community beneficiaries to exploit one another and to use foreign aid as a means of personal gain.)

A) The Colonial Legacy and Post-Independence Debacle

When the young Winston Churchill first visited the Kingdom of Uganda in 1907, he described it as "one beautiful garden from end to end" and marvelled at the industriousness, sophisticated organizations, elegance of manners, and peacefulness of its people. It was these attributes, combined with British innovation which convinced Churchill that Uganda would always be "the Pearl of Africa": "Nowhere else in Africa.... unless some grievous error or neglect should intervene will (development) results be more brilliant, more substantial or more rapidly realized", he asserted. [3] Lamentably, Uganda's development during the 20th Century did not unfold as expected. True, the British did build railways, imported advanced western knowledge, and introduced modern systems of public administration as well as a network of missionary-run schools and hospitals. However, at the time of Independence in 1962, Uganda also inherited a colonial economy dominated by expatriate monopolies and Asian entrepreneurs; an education system which had neglected the higher education of Africans; a public

service which was efficient and shared a strong civil service ethic but whose upper echelons were predominantly made up of expatriate managers who were paid, trained, regulated by, and accountable to an external power; and, a Baganda elite (the dominant tribe in the South) which had signed a pact with the British Empire which recognized, and indeed extended, the hierarchical position of the Baganda but which did so at the expense of rival tribal groups, especially in the non-kingdom areas, and ceded hegemonic ruling power to the British. [4]

With so many conflicting interests left unresolved, it was not surprising that Uganda's Independence was followed by a prolonged period of civil war (especially between southern economic administrative power and northern political and military control) and the gradual impoverishment of the majority of Ugandans. First, came the government of Milton Obote which, once it had broken its pact with the Baganda Kingdom, used the military to abrogate the *1962 Independence Constitution* and to monopolize political power. As part of an effort to move to the Left, Obote nationalized a large number of firms and assumed control of much of the import and export business in Uganda. When Obote was overthrown by his army commander, Idi Amin, in 1971, the centralization of state power was accelerated and disregard for the rule of law and human rights worsened. Amin expelled Asian entrepreneurs and confiscated houses, shops, warehouses and factories in order to distribute these to supporters of his regime. By the 1970s, Uganda was on a downward spiral of rapid economic decline and political chaos. State predation and shortages had become chronic, the parallel black market (*Magendo*) was almost the only functioning sector of the economy, and Ugandans lived in constant terror as military and local officials looted rural areas and abused their authority without impunity. [5]

Amin was eventually overthrown in 1979 by the Tanzanian army and exiled Ugandans. But despite some attempts at democratization between

1979-81, Amin's rule was followed by no less than five successive dictatorships: the regimes of Yasufu Lule, Godfrey Binaisa, Muwanga, Obote II and the Okellos). By the mid 1980s, Uganda's infrastructure was virtually in ruins as a result of continued civil strife; public services had collapsed due to deteriorating equipment, erratic supplies and the exodus of Ugandan professionals; the country's economy was in dire straits due to the collapse of the state's tax and marketing revenues after state parastatals, marketing boards and cooperatives ceased to function and factories closed down [6]; crime and extortion were widespread as the government lost control of security forces and the army [7]; and donors had practically withdrawn from the country. It was these circumstances, coupled with Obote's contentious win in the 1980 Elections that prompted Yoweri Museveni and his *National Resistance Army* (NRA) to take to the jungle to wage a guerrilla war. After considerable suffering (especially in the infamous *Luwero Triangle*), Museveni's guerrillas were finally triumphant in 1986 when his *National Resistance Movement* (NRM) assumed power. [8] It is estimated that 1 million people may have lost their lives in the interim.[9]

B) Uganda's Human Development Prospects Today

From the moment it took power in 1986, the NRM promised Ugandans that the bloodshed and suffering caused by previous regimes would never be repeated again. In accordance with its pledge, the NRM government embarked on a national reconciliation and reconstruction campaign and enshrined its pledges in a *10-Point Programme*, a development strategy based on 10 goals: i) to establish popular democracy; ii) to restore security; iii) to consolidate national unity; iv) to defend national independence; v) to build a national economy; vi) to restore and rehabilitate social services; vii) to eliminate corruption and misuse of power; viii) to resettle displaced peoples; ix) to foster regional cooperation and respect for human

rights; and, x) to build a mixed economy which is self-sustaining, yet integrated into the global economy. Clearly, many of these priorities overlap with core SHD/PCD goals such as 'Sound governance' through observance of the rule of law, democratic processes and popular participation (NRM Programme: Pages 7-9); guaranteeing the poor access to basic social services and empowering them to take charge of their own destinies (NRM Programme: Page 25); moving beyond Capitalist-Socialist dichotomies by promoting a mixed, diversified, self-sustaining, yet globally-integrated economy; (NRM Programme: Pages 19, 35); and enhancing cooperation among neighbours while at the same time speaking out against dictatorship or human rights violations. (NRM Programme: Page 33). [10]

In order to realize the *Human Development* goals set out in its *10-Point Programme*, the NRM government has introduced an ambitious and often radical reform agenda spanning the political, military, and economic spheres as well as Ugandan civil society at large. Its chief aim has been to revive the full spectrum of Ugandan institutions in order to create an enabling environment for the country's long-term *Sustainable Human Development.* In many respects, the NRM's development efforts have been a major success. Between 1987-1994, the Ugandan economy grew at an average rate of 5% and even reached 10% in 1995 [11], government spending increased nearly five-fold in real terms between 1987-1993 [12], and foreign flows of both private and official transfers increased from 2.2% of GDP in 1985/86 to as much as 13% by 1993-94. [13] As the crowning touch, Yoweri Museveni's had his mandate renewed by an overwhelming majority of the Ugandan people who re-elected him with 74% of the vote during the 1996 Presidential Elections [14].

On a more sombre note though, with a per capita income of only US$ 220 in 1994, Uganda's real GDP was still well below the level enjoyed by Ugandans 25 years ago and the country still ranked among the poorest in the world. [15] Moreover, according to some estimates, as many as 61% of Ugandans

are still defined as poor [16] and despite the fact that many Ugandans have some minimal access to land, few live beyond basic subsistence levels. [17] Aggravating things even further, despite the fact that levels of inequality in Uganda have never been as extreme as those of neighbouring Kenya, the country's latest Gini coefficients reveal a widening urban-rural gap and growing regional inequalities between the poorer North and the better-off southern and central regions. [18] Added to the picture is the reality that, the NRM's total budget expenditure has remained extremely low at only about US $40 per head (and only US$ 2 per capita for health and education combined). [19] Consequently Uganda's social indicators remain very dismal: In health, while Ugandans' life expectancy used to compare favourably to that of other sub-Saharan countries, at only 43 years of age, today Ugandans have one of the shortest life expectancies in the world [20], child mortality remains extremely high at 203 per 1000 births due to malnutrition and preventable infectious diseases [21], and, according to World Health Organization estimates, the number of HIV-infected people in Uganda could increase to more than 1.9 million by 1998, thereby further increasing the high number of needy widows and orphans in the country. [22] In the area of education, literacy remains extremely low at 54% (much lower among women and in rural areas) [23], 43% of Ugandans in the bottom quartile have no education at all, as many as 70% of pupils dropped out by Primary 7 in 1986 compared to 10% in 1975, and the quality of education remains poor due to dilapidated school facilities, the rising proportion of untrained teachers and the scarcity of instructional materials. [24] (**Table 4.1** accompanying this Chapter provides regional and longitudinal data on changing social indicators for Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania).

The continued human deprivation of Ugandans is reflected in the country's disappointing and deteriorating ranking in UNDP's *1997 HDR*, where Uganda placed 159th out of 175 countries in the HDI. [25] Lastly, but definitely not least, the Ugandan government has become increasingly

dependent on foreign aid. In fact, as a share of GDP, Uganda's gross aid flows have risen from 2.7% in 1986/87 up to 13.4 % in 1993/94 and by the mid 1990s, foreign aid covered more than 80% of all the public investment in Uganda. Although foreign aid has been critical in maintaining the country's infrastructure and in keeping Uganda's social capital base from sliding back too far, because grants account for less than half the total aid, the increased borrowing has exacerbated Uganda's external debt which, in 1994, reached US$ 3.2 billion--i.e.,80% of Uganda's GDP in 1993/94. [26]

Although statistics do not capture the ingenuity and adaptability of Ugandans and, as such, do not provide a full picture of Ugandans' well-being, it is safe to say that Uganda today is as much a land of promise as it is a land of despair. The sections which follow provide a more in-depth analysis of the institutional opportunities and constraints facing Uganda and of the ways in which the policies of the NRM government have affected the country's SHD/PCD prospects over the last ten years.

II. Institutional Opportunities and Constraints Affecting Uganda' SHD/PCD Prospects

A) Institutional Opportunities and Constraints in the State Sector

Upon its coming to power in 1986, one of the first actions initiated by the NRM was a process of national reconciliation. Among other things, this process included the demobilization and domestication of the Ugandan army, including the offer of amnesty to the country's armed opposition groups and the absorption of elements from defeated armies into the NRA. [27] As part of its early pacification efforts, the NRM government took measures to domesticate the army by subjecting it to a *Code of Conduct and* publicly disciplining abuses by soldiers, by assigning the army developmental tasks such as repairing roads and planting maize, giving the army special representation (along with interest groups such as women, workers, and the disabled) in the *National Resistance Council* (NRC), the interim parliament, and by

demobilizing two-thirds of Uganda's 100,000 soldiers. [28] Although insurgency activities have been re-ignited in Northern Uganda and surges of violence still occur in the East [29], by and large, the NRM's reconciliation efforts did reduce the full-scale civil war and anarchy of the 1980s.

In the political realm, the NRM's reconciliation efforts have involved the establishment of a broad-based system of 'movement politics' in which rival political parties, ethnic groups, and representatives for the army, women, workers and disabled persons, were all incorporated and offered Cabinet positions in the interim NRM government. The re-establishment of law and order and the stamping out of pervasive crime and corruption was another a political priority for the NRM. The NRM partly achieved this by formalizing the justice functions of locally-elected *Resistance Councils* (RCs or LCs now) originally established by the NRM to ensure law and order in rural communities during the civil war [30], and partly by introducing a *Leadership Code* and establishing the *Office of the Inspector General of Government* (IGG) and the *Public Accounts Committee* (PAC) to investigate charges of corruption and embezzlement both within and outside of government. [31] Another important step in restoring faith in the honesty and competence of the Ugandan government has been the overhaul of the Ugandan civil service, including the elimination of 42,000 'ghost workers' whose names were on the government payroll but whose salary was pocketed by fellow civil servants. Through the NRM's *Civil Service Reform Programme* (CSRP), Uganda's bloated civil service comprising 38 Ministries and 320,000 staff members has been reduced to 21 Ministries and 145,000 employees. [32]

In addition to the reinstatement of law and order, social and political freedoms have been expanded as well. As a result, in Uganda today, there is religious tolerance, most of Uganda's traditional Kingdoms have been reinstated, several human rights organizations and NGOs operate

in the country in a fairly autonomous fashion, and several daily newspapers compete with one another. [33] Perhaps even more importantly, under the NRM Uganda also started on a gradual path towards democratization which began with the setting up of elected local RCs in 1987, and was followed by elections to Parliament in 1989, the 1994 Constituent Assembly Elections aimed at forming a legitimate Constituent Assembly [34] to approve Uganda's new Constitution, and culminated in Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in 1996. President Museveni's electoral victory in 1996 was the first secured by universal and direct suffrage since 1962.

The last significant institutional reforms introduced by the NRM in the last 10 years has been the initiation of a decentralization process as a means of giving more direct power to the people and ensuring a more equitable distribution of resources between and within districts, as well as a means of improving public sector performance, transparency and accountability. [35] In spite of Uganda's decision to remain a unitary state as opposed to a federal system, the decentralization process has involved a substantial delegation of power and resources to sub-national centres. In accordance with the decentralization legislation, much of the budgetary allocations and service delivery functions of the line ministries have been transferred to the Districts, along with responsibilities for development planning, local policing, prisons and justice, administrative matters and revenue collection in their respective local areas. [36]

The above institutional reforms have reduced the tribal conflict, violence and predatory rule which plagued Uganda during the 1970s and 1980s. By restoring the rule of law, efficiency, tolerance and democratic accountability of the Ugandan state, the NRM has clearly enhanced Uganda's SHD/PCD prospects. This does not mean, however, that Uganda is no longer plagued by regional conflict, clientelistic tendencies, and continued inefficiency and rent-seeking behaviour within public institutions.

Persistent Civil War and Regional Conflict

To this day, one of the most destructive impediments to human security in Uganda is the country's protracted civil war in the North, new violence in the West (Kasese), and continued regional conflict with Sudan and the Congo (formerly Zaire). It is partly true that being surrounded by dangerous neighbours has left the Museveni government with little choice but to engage them. Still, there is no denying that the persistent aggression has undermined Uganda's long-term SHD/PCD prospects. First of all, as shown in **Table 4.2**, at 27%, the Ugandan government's security expenditures in the 1994/95 Recurrent Budget were twice the proportion of money being spent by the government in health and education jointly. [37] The second detrimental effect of the continuation of civil war has been mounting regional inequalities as well as the growing impoverishment and marginalization of the North which has been excluded from the economic recovery as a result of inadequate infrastructure and limited access to markets in Kampala and the central region. Appleton and MacKinnon estimate that as much as 39% of the rural population in the North fall under the lowest expenditure quartile, compared to only 17% in the central region. [38]

Limited Democracy and Freedom

Uganda's Constituent and Presidential Elections were clearly a watershed for Ugandan democracy. Nevertheless, it would be a delusion to assume that the country has become a perfectly free and democratic society as a result of these two events. The truth is that democracy in Uganda is still precarious and incomplete. To begin with, some Ugandans worry that the Constituent Assembly's decision to limit Ugandans' freedom of association and to prohibit the creation of coherent political party platforms (mostly out of fear that multi-party politics can lead to a resurgence of tribal and ethnic conflict) may be restricting the expansion

of political pluralism and open political debate among Ugandans. [39] This situation is particularly worrying given that, since the Constituent Assembly Elections in 1994, the NRM began transforming itself into a professional political organization akin to a political party while at the same time closing the door to organized political opposition. Another way in which the NRM regime has escaped direct political competition has been by restoring Uganda's traditional kingdoms but reducing their role to predominantly a cultural and ceremonial one by prohibiting the kings from sitting in Parliament or participating in partisan politics even though other interest groups in Uganda, including the army, unions, youth, women and even the disabled, have guaranteed representation in Parliament. [40]

This is not to say, of course, that the existing political system in Uganda does not allow some degree of dissent to operate through Parliament or local RCs. Nevertheless, since political parties are banned, Uganda's traditional Kings can not become involved in politics, and there no second legislative chamber such as a Senate or House of Lords to veto government policy, the Museveni's government faces no organized competition. Having said this though, it is important to realize that, despite its political shortcomings, the Museveni government has come a long way from the patrimonialism and authoritarian style of "personal rule" which predominated in unintegrated African societies during the post-colonial era; that very few African countries have moved towards multiparty elections and that in a regional context Uganda is among those African countries which have made the most significant strides towards partial political liberalization; and that, even in Western societies, democracy is a fragile plant whose sometimes ambiguous rules, boundaries and accountabilities can break down, whose elected politicians are also subject to party-related corruption, and whose elites need to constantly exercise personal restraint over their own power for the system to work. [41]

Clientelistic and Parochial RC/LC Rule

Another serious constraint in Uganda's existing system of governance lies in the sometimes parochial rule of local Resistance Councils (RC/LCs) which were delegated new powers by the central government via the decentralization process. There are essentially three issues at stake here. The first concern is that, with the exception of RC/LC Councils at the very lowest village level (RC/LC I) where some 100-200 persons vote, the selection of RC/LCs used to place through indirect voting. [42] The pyramidal and indirect form of elections used to select most RC/LCs means that the democratic legitimacy of the system becomes diluted precisely at the higher levels where long-term planning and public budgetary expenditures take place. A second deficiency in the election of RC/LCs is that, even at the village level, elections are by queuing as opposed to secret ballot, making it very difficult for locals not to support locally powerful elites such as influential landlords, tribal leaders, and in the case of women, whoever their husbands support. [43] Moreover, as James Katarobo discovered during his study of the Constituent Assembly Elections in 1994, in Uganda it is still not uncommon for candidates to resort to intimidation and violence to secure votes, for electoral officials biased in favour of a certain candidate to manipulate electoral procedures or to disenfranchise illiterate or disabled voters, and for candidates to offer gifts of money and scarce commodities as a means of buying votes. According to Katarobo, even when the voting process is secret, because of the persistence of patron-client relationships, tribalism, fear of witchcraft and sorcery, and lack of popular knowledge or access to information about electoral processes, poor Ugandans feel obligated to reciprocate for the payment of gifts given to them by candidates by delivering their vote to those who paid them. [44] When you add to this the prohibition of political party platforms, what you end up with in Ugandan is a particularly localized, individualized, and patronizing form of

politics. [45] The third caveat of RC/LC rule is that, because President Museveni personally appoints a District Administrator (A Resident District Commissioner under the 1995 Constitution) to watch over every District and ensure that RC/LCs remain loyal to the government, RC/LCs often reinforce the established order rather than challenge inequity or unjust traditions.

Limited Expertise and Continued Rent-Seeking Behaviour in the Public Service

The effectiveness of both local and central government in Uganda has also been undermined by the paucity of public resources and the consequent lack of technical expertise and runaway corruption in the public service.

Despite the retrenchment of ghost employees and modest wage increases for civil servants, at the time of my visit in 1995, Uganda's national civil service was still grappling with problems such as fierce inter-ministerial competition and dependence on donor funds, unacceptably low wages, lack of appropriate office equipment or of access to transport, insufficient specialized staff to engage in policy formulation and planning, inadequate statistical and technical information, confused and overlapping institutional responsibilities, and unnecessary routines and procedures which kept the ministries' few highly-trained civil servants performing tedious administrative duties. [46] At the District level, the lack of public resources and the government's recent retrenchment has resulted in the Ugandan civil service having to spread itself out very thinly in the Ugandan countryside and Ugandans having to pay user fees (either legally or illegally) for services or having to forego services altogether. According to the draft *Poverty Action Plan*, due to their lack of transport and the reality that their inadequate remuneration forces them to spend much of their time on non government related activities, District government staff rarely go to the field. [47] With respect to RC/LCs, their effectiveness has tended to be undermined by their inexperience in

strategic planning and management [48], the erratic and badly advertised nature of RC/LC meetings [49], the dismal and geographically varying revenues which RC/LCs collect from local taxation [50], and poor coordination between public servants and RC/LCs as well as between the five overlapping levels of local government and the tens of thousands of RC/LC Committee members who are increasingly expected to be politicians, administrators and magistrates all in one, but receive no transport, training or allowances.

However, the factor which has most seriously undermined the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Ugandan state is the persistence of rent-seeking behaviour, despite the NRM's anti-corruption efforts. During my first field visit alone, newspapers reported that the NRM Secretariat could not vouch for the 221 million excess Ugandan shillings it had paid to District Administrations in the year ending on June 1991; that a 1 billion Ugandan shillings pension fraud scheme involving thousands of fictitious files had been unearthed in the Ministry of Education and Sport; that senior *Uganda Commercial Bank* officials were suspected of taking portions of loans given to prominent Ugandan businessmen and politicians [51]; and, that a sporadic spot check on government vehicles had exposed a racket of false "garage bills." [52] At the District level, corruption is equally common, with medical provisions destined for government health clinics appearing for sale in local markets and RC/LCs members looking the other way. [53]

As is evident from the above discussion, the lack of consolidation of Uganda's new democracy and the persistence of clientelistic and unequal relations resulting from poverty and historically inappropriate social and political structures--all key concerns of the DD school of thought--continue being an impediment to 'Sound governance' in Uganda. Yet, as noted by NIE advocates, constraints associated with rent-seeking behaviour and limited technical expertise in Uganda's civil service also potentially undermine the creation of a political environment conducive to SHD/PCD.

B) Institutional Opportunities and Constraints in the Market Sector

When the NRM first seized power, its economic policies were heavily influenced by Dependency and Marxist thought. As such, the Museveni government was vehemently opposed to the stabilization and structural adjustment programmes often advocated by foreign donors. By May 1987, nevertheless, the NRM succumbed to foreign pressure and adopted the *Economic Recovery Programme* (ERP, 1987-1993) proposed by the IMF and the World Bank. Under the ERP, the NRM government freed the Ugandan exchange rate, allowed the Ugandan Shilling to devalue and legalized foreign exchange bureaux (FOREX Bureaux) in order to stimulate domestic output and thus improve the competitiveness of its exports and its balance of trade. The NRM also introduced a *Structural Adjustment Programme* (SAP) aimed at controlling spiralling inflation through monetary contraction, restoring positive real interest rates and imposing stricter budgetary discipline. [54] Once inflation was brought under 10%, a *Revenue Authority* was created, foreign contributions towards the ERP grew, the deficit was brought under control, and, by 1995, the Ugandan economy was growing at unprecedented rates.

The NRM's new-found faith in liberalization did not stop at monetary policy. Many of the protectionist economic structures which had led to predatory behaviour and high transaction costs were gradually dismantled, including the monopolies once guaranteed to the Coffee, Lint and Produce Marketing Boards, which were replaced by numerous private firms offering market prices for farmers' produce. [55] By the mid 1990s, the government had reduced its tariffs, import duties and quantitative restrictions and managed to rationalize the tariff structure down to the 10-30% range. [56] In the banking sector, the rapidly growing but badly managed *Uganda Commercial Bank* (UCB) retrenched half of its staff, closed down some 30 UCB branches which were not economically viable and turned 55 into mobile

vehicles, and imposed stricter commercial lending criteria, including limits on the amount of money lent to one borrower or to Bank insiders. In addition, some 2,500 Asian enterprises expropriated under the Amin regime were returned to their original owners and 1,700 owners have had their claims met by the NRM government. [57] However, the climax to the liberalization process in Uganda probably came when, after enormous pressure from the World Bank and considerable debate within the Ugandan government, the NRM agreed to the *Parastatal Enterprise and Divestiture* (PEDR) Statute which paved the way for the eventual divestiture of 43 public enterprises and the liquidation of 17 parastatals by 1993/94. [58] Finally, by the mid 1990s, the NRM had also launched a *Rehabilitation and Development Plan* (1993-1996) to accelerate the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Uganda's long neglected infrastructure, including roads, telecommunications,and energy.[59]

The above economic reforms have clearly stimulated the Ugandan economy. Reduced inflation, improved infrastructure, and the greater availability of imported inputs have no doubt helped to jump-start Uganda's industrial and manufacturing recovery, while banking sector reforms have increased the availability of credit to the private sector, and, according to World bank estimates, reduced state subsidies, tax exemptions and preferred access guarantees, may be saving Ugandans as much as US$ 180 million a year--about three times the government's contribution to the development budget. [60] In their totality, these reforms have increased investors' trust in the Ugandan economy and helped to create an environment much more conducive to growth, something which UNDP's own HDRs cite as being an important prerequisite for long-term *Sustainable Human Development*. But even in the market sphere, Uganda's future growth and long-term SHD/PCD potential is threatened by remaining economic institutional constraints.

A Weak Capitalist Class and Disorganized and Disadvantaged Working Class

Despite the proliferation of entrepreneurial activity as a means of survival during the 1970s and 1980s, Uganda's indigenous capitalist classes remain small, have little capital, rely on primitive technology and skills, and are predominantly concentrated in the central regions of the country. In addition, because much of Uganda's entrepreneurial class emerged from the black market, its members still retain the informal, political, village, and tribal links and obligations through which it originally accumulated its wealth. Thus, while the entrepreneurial spirit is alive and well in Uganda, its chief characteristics are a far cry from the independent, rational and profit maximizing business class depicted in neo-Classical Economics. Instead, many Ugandan business elites still depend on state-derived contacts and rents. Due to poor infrastructure, unreliable supplies and lack of major markets in rural areas, they are reluctant to venture beyond the Kampala-Jinja-Entebbe triangle. And although some Ugandan elites have more resources than others, because of their fear of fraud, many prefer to avoid large transactions or dealings with persons with whom they do not have village, tribal or family links. [61]

Due to the above-mentioned constraints, the private sector in Uganda has traditionally been fragmented and ineffective at influencing the government's economic policy dialogue. Thanks largely to their improved policy research capacity (attained largely with the support of foreign funds), their own personal contacts in the upper echelons of government, and the new receptivity of President Museveni towards business interests, large Ugandan business associations are beginning to directly lobby the Ugandan President and key PEC and NRC members on economic issues. [62] However, small business groups representing the informal sector and national union bodies like the *National Organization of Trade Unions* (NOTU), a federation representing 15 trade unions with a combined membership of

80,000, has failed to gain the ear of the NRM while the *Uganda Public Employees Union* (UPEC) was virtually obliterated in the privatization process. [63]

Persistent Protectionism, Erratic Supplies and Rent-Seeking Behaviour

Another very obstructive impediment to the development of Ugandan markets is the continuation of protectionist practices. According to a study conducted on behalf of the *Danish Development Agency* (DANIDA) in Uganda, despite the above-mentioned reforms, protection continues to be high in Uganda, averaging 93% in relation to competition from outside the region and 64% within the *Preferential Trade Agreement* (PTA) area. Even though recent reforms have ameliorated the situation somewhat (e.g., by eliminating export taxes and dismantling many former marketing boards), the tax regime in Uganda continues to be excessive and regressive. Fuel taxes, for example, are extremely high and corporate taxes of 50% seriously undermine small Ugandan firms, while foreign firms and NGOs continue receiving import and other exemptions not available to local ones. [64] Persistent protectionism has had various negative effects on the Ugandan market economy. The first undesirable effect of protectionist schemes is that they impose an anti-export bias in the economy [65]. Taxes on simple capital assets and inputs (e.g., bicycles, sewing machines, hoes, seeds, etc.) also make it increasingly difficult for the very poor to gain access to even simple capital assets, while the exemption of capital imports by foreign firms and donors can, in some cases, act as a disincentive to local manufacturers of the same inputs. A final detrimental side-effect of protectionism in Uganda is that it instigates illegal smuggling and the continuation of the black market economy by Ugandan producers and traders hoping to bypass the high transaction costs created by heavy-handed regulation and predatory behaviour. [66] The persistence of these various forms of illegal activity and predation translated into a very uneven

distribution of public resources. As E.A. Brett points out, "while predation secures resources for a small minority, it denies the state the income required to provide essential services for the many". [67] Predation also has the effect of criminalizing business since it impedes small businesses obeying the law from operating profitably. When you add to the problem of protectionism, the high cost of raw materials, irregular electrical supply and restrictions to sell through wholesale channels, Ugandan manufacturers' chances for open competition seem even slimmer. [68]

Unclear Rules of the Game and Uneven Law Enforcement

An added obstacle hindering the expansion of Uganda's economy is the absence of clear laws and consistent law enforcement, both of which have heightened transaction costs and the risks of investment. One major source of the problem has to do with the insecurity of land titles in Uganda. At present, the Ugandan Constitution recognizes at least four land tenure systems: Customary Ownership, Mailo (a form of landlord-tenant relationship in which tenants enjoy special protection and many *de facto* freehold rights and have), Leasehold (the leasing of public land) and Freehold. [69] Unfortunately, lack of clarification about how the various land ownership systems will actually work together means that land security in Uganda remains uncertain. It is still unknown, for instance, what will be a peasant's protection as a tenant on public land, whether Mailo tenants' traditional tenurial rights are sufficiently and legally secure, or whether the 'rights of squatters' supersede those of legal Mailo owners, and if not, what kind of compensation must be paid to Mailo owners. [70] In addition, under some of the above tenure systems, the ownership rights of women and particularly those of widows and orphans, are especially insecure. This is a deterrent to rural investment by poor rural women who still have no choice but to farm on their husbands' land, have little control over the income generated by the land they work and, upon the death

of their husbands, must allow male relatives to decide the fate of family's land without their consent. [71] Uganda's land tenure laws have still to be translated into enforceable rules and Ugandans informed of their rights.

A second source of uncertainty in the Ugandan market is lack of trust in contractual agreements, the laws governing market transactions, or in the enforcement of such laws. Examples of breaches of contract and violations of financial and market laws abound in Uganda. These may include cases in which private companies misrepresent their achievements; firms which, in collusion with government officials, overcharge or send false bills for work never done; private companies which utilize government equipment without paying for its use; or, firms being awarded lucrative contracts when other firms offered lower bids in the tendering process. [72]

Donor-Led and Exclusive Policy-Making Processes

One of the dominant features of policy-making in Uganda is that high-level economic decisions are dominated by President Museveni and his select cadre of advisers. Not only are strategic executive bodies such as *The National Resistance Council* (NRC), the Cabinet, *The Presidential Economic Council* (PEC), and the *National Executive Committee* (NEC), all presided over by the President. But, because of inadequate resources or technical expertise, the contribution of the sector ministries to the policy formulation process in Uganda remains negligible and uncoordinated. Furthermore, the youth of the private sector, the weakness of the union movement (including the disarray of the public service union since its retrenchment), the prohibition of opposition parties, and the lack of clear mechanisms for the operation of lobby groups, all make organized policy influencing difficult. Consequently, the policy advocacy which does occur is usually by individuals with family links or personal access to top decision-makers. [73]

Another feature of economic decision-making in Uganda is the enormous clout which foreign interests and donor pressures have in the process. Given its lack of national technical and planning capacity, its desperate need of foreign exchange, the NRM government has often had no choice but to cave into the political and economic conditionality of the donor community. The weight of donor pressures upon the shoulders of the NRM first came to light when Museveni reluctantly endorsed the ERP and SAP, but was equally evident in the adoption of economic policies such as deregulation, civil service reform, and privatization, all of which were donor-instigated. Official donors have also proven very adept at placing policy advisers and upgrading strategic thinking and planning units within key financial and economic planning ministries [74], in establishing donor-funded research groups and think tanks such as the *Economic Policy Research Centre* (EPRC), the *Export Policy Analysis and Development Unit* (EPADU) and the *Agricultural Secretariat*, and in directly lobbying the Ugandan government (e.g., the World Bank's successful lobbying for the creation of *Priority Programme Areas* (PPAs) in Uganda's recurrent budget [75]) and indirectly influencing economic policy through publications and country economic studies promoted at major conferences.[76]

Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile, Permanent Secretary and Secretary to the Treasury in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning concedes that economic policy in Uganda has been strongly influenced by donor conditionality but, at the same time notes that, the Ugandan government has implemented economic reforms at its own pace and, in cases such as the introduction of FOREX Bureaux and the acceleration of the decentralization programme, has even taken the initiative. [77] This does not mean, of course, that donor-led and elite-inspired economic policies have been necessarily bad for Uganda's economy. After all, as shown above, the NRM's liberalization and deregulation policies have increased growth and foreign investment in Uganda. However, the pressure of major donors to focus on physical rehabilitation and economic reforms may be partly responsible for

the NRM's delay in drafting national poverty-eradication plans and strategies. This is not to say that infrastructural reconstruction and economic reform do not contribute to poverty reduction--obviously they do. Still, aside from the general commitments of its *10-Point Programme*, the NRM government has been slow in drafting a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy or setting specific poverty reduction targets. In fact, the government's 1993 *Rehabilitation and Development Plan* (RDP) in 1993 does not explicitly list 'poverty reduction' as a key criteria for development projects and the World Bank-supported *Programme for the Alleviation of Poverty Social Costs of Adjustment* (PAPSCA) was only a temporary and minor contribution.

Donors' overpowering influence over Ugandan economic policy may also have undermined Ugandans' internalization of the policy debate on poverty. In fact, Ugandan officials have invariably complained about their lack of ownership over their government's policy-eradication efforts which many feel are controlled by the World Bank, the IMF and a small cadre of Ugandan government officials who serve as the Bank's interlocutors. Such was the case, for instance, in the drafting of Growing out of Poverty (1993), the main profile on poverty produced jointly by the World Bank and the Government of Uganda in the mid 1990s. With the exception of a small cluster of Economists from the MFEP who enjoy a special relationship with the World Bank, few government officials from the line ministries or the social sectors participated actively in the report's production [78] and the policy debates which emerged in the process remained inaccessible and remote from the concerns of most poor Ugandans. In 1997, with the release of an equity and socially-conscious *Draft Poverty Action Plan* [79], it was hoped that the spotlight would finally be placed on the issue of poverty reduction. The challenges involved in doing so for both the Ugandan government and for donors like UNDP and AA who are interested in pursuing a SHD/PCD agenda is the primary focus of my own work and of Chapters to come.

In sum, while liberalization policies have increased market-based activity and the chances for more open competition in Uganda, the persistence of unclear rules of the game and poor law enforcement, protectionism and state-derived rents continue to produce high transaction costs, to limit efficiency and to act as disincentives to market entry and investment in Uganda--all concerns of the NIE. At the same time though, as highlighted by DD advocates, many of Uganda's economic bottlenecks lie in the persistence of clientelistic power relations and the inequitable manner in which Uganda's wealth is distributed, the lack of access to technical expertise, services or capital inputs in remote rural areas, and the limited access to power or organizational and lobbying capacity, especially among small businesses and truly poor and disempowered Ugandans.

C) Institutional Opportunities and Constraints in Civil Society and Uganda's System of International Development Cooperation.

Within civil society, Uganda has made significant progress in fostering an open and diverse community in which human rights are respected and both donor and grassroots development initiatives encouraged. To begin with, Uganda is presently party to most international human rights instruments and maintains an open policy of reception to human rights groups. [80] And, in the 1995 Constitution, the Ugandan government introduced several legal advances in the area of human rights, including the permanent establishment of a *Uganda Human Rights Commission* which investigates emerging human rights complaints. [81] Moreover, as noted earlier in this Chapter, the NRM has from the outset made a conscious effort not to discriminate any of Uganda's numerous ethnic groups and has incorporated members from former political parties into the NRM government.

Also to be commended are the NRM's genuine efforts to enhance the public representation of special interest groups such as women, youth and the disabled, all of whom have guaranteed representation in Parliament and are accorded special attention in the 1995 Constitution. Likewise, the

NRM has allowed the proliferation of various competing newspapers, the airwaves were open to private entrepreneurs in 1994, both business associations and unions are permitted to operate, all religious groups are tolerated. [82] Finally, since 1986, Uganda has witnessed the mushrooming of 1,500 foreign and indigenous NGOs (about 300 of them are believed to be international) which, despite compulsory registration for the larger NGOs, operate in a fairly *laissez-faire* manner and, in their aggregate, have annual expenditures of around US$ 125 million--an amount equal to the World Bank's 30% contribution towards the *Rehabilitation and Development Plan* in 1992/93. [83]

Nevertheless, as in other sectors, Ugandan civil society still has far to go before becoming the tolerant, well-informed and proactive civil society crucial for the fulfilment of SHD/PCD ideals of 'Sound governance'.

Occasional Intolerance Towards Alternative Views in Civil Society

One of the most preoccupying aspects of the NRM regime in Uganda is the political intimidation sometimes experienced by activists, journalists, and politically-oriented NGOs. In the labour sector, although unions are legal, the use of police to break strikes and the arrest of union leaders has taken place in public sector industries like the former *Uganda Transport Bus Company* [UTC] and *Uganda Railways*.[84] At least 20 journalists have been harassed or taken to court on sedition charges or for breaching 'professional decorum' after having published stories which offended President Museveni. And, politicized and confrontational Ugandan NGOs such as the *Ugandan Human Rights Activists* (UHRA), the *National Organization of Educators and Election Monitors* (NOCEM), the *Ugandan Law Society* (ULS), the *Centre for Constitutional Governance* (CCG), and the *Foundation for African Development* (FAD) have had their meetings disrupted by state officials. [85] As a case in point, Lance Seera-Muwanga, Executive Director of UHRA was allegedly detained without trial in

Muwanga, Executive Director of UHRA was allegedly detained without trial in 1987 for giving an interview critical of the NRM regime and the *Ugandan Federation of Women Lawyers* (FIDA) has avoided politically-sensitive issues like the detainment of women in military barracks to avoid government criticism.

Hence, although tolerance and respect for the rule of law has improved substantially in Uganda over the last 10 years and some of the above allegations remain unsubstantiated while others may well be propaganda, as Susan Dicklich points out, the NRM has not always been as tolerant as it could be of civil society groups who challenge the status quo and do not function in an apolitical and non-confrontational manner. [86]

An Impoverished, Traditional and Marginalized Rural Majority

The other serious obstacle standing in the way of a well-informed and politically active civil society in Uganda is the impoverished and marginalized estate of the majority of Ugandans, especially in rural areas. As already mentioned above, by some estimates, as many as two-thirds of Ugandans are classified as poor and most lack access to even basic social services and information. In the view of some analysts, the de facto privatization of social services in Uganda is undesirable on several grounds. First of all, the whole depends on the goodwill of foreign donors. Secondly, the system heightens poverty and reinforces existing inequalities by making poor Ugandans pay for mediocre public services with out-of-pocket payments. And, thirdly, the system hides the reality that the social services available in both the public and private sector rely on the staff, equipment and distribution channels of the state. [87]

Having a population as impoverished, unhealthy and illiterate as Uganda's has calamitous consequences for building a dynamic civil society: Illiterate persons with no access to newspapers or incapable of reading one

can not inform themselves about current affairs or their legal rights and are unlikely to take an active role in political processes which they do not fully understand and can only be explained to them by their patrons. Persons who are unwell, have no means of transport, no assets to invest, or who must carry out numerous economic activities (including predatory ones) at once simply to survive are unlikely to have the free time to attend local meetings or to join local community associations. Similarly, Ugandan villagers governed by tribal loyalties and traditional beliefs (e.g., the belief that women should not own land) and who have limited access to information, modern scientific knowledge or training are unlikely to challenge social norms or manage multisectoral SHD/PCD efforts. [88]

A Fragmented, Duplicative and Unaccountable Donor Community

One last factor to be taken into consideration is the nature of Uganda's international development cooperation system. Claims that it is donors who have sustained basic social services and spearheaded grassroots development initiatives in Uganda are irrefutable. On the other hand, it is equally true that the traits which the donor community has assumed in Uganda over the years may also be counterproductive to achieving long-term *Sustainable Human Development* and a self-reliant Ugandan civil society.

There are a number of explanations for this. The first is that the international development community in Uganda has dominated development processes in the country and, in the process, has tended to reinforce the lack of national ownership and the unequal relationship between donors and recipients in the country. Even more ominous though, "donors' support of some areas of government but not others" has created "problems of comparability between civil servants receiving supplementation and others who did not" and "may have postponed the necessary restructuring of ministries and reduction in over-staffing". [89] Another detrimental

characteristic of donor assistance in Uganda is that the donor community is itself uncoordinated and highly atomized. As such, development approaches vary tremendously from donor to donor, both in terms of ideology and methodology. The lack of coordination means that donors often duplicate each others' work and concentrate most of their activities in the central zone surrounding Kampala and in the health and education sectors and in the process neglect the needs of Ugandans who do fall under such parameters. [90]

In the case of international NGOs, a different phenomenon has occurred and that is the tendency for such NGOs to bypass the Ugandan government altogether. Part of the problem is rooted in the inability of the underfunded *NGO Registration Board* to effectively coordinate NGO activities with the government's development efforts so as to avoid duplication. The other side of the coin though is that NGOs rarely feel accountable to Ugandan government authorities who they view as too demoralized or corrupt to be trusted with development funds. Unfortunately, by neglecting the Ugandan government, NGOs end up operating in policy vacuum which hinders the sustainability of their efforts. [91]

In short, despite the NRM's tolerance towards opponents and NGOs, major contextual and institutional contraints still stand in the way of a fully open Ugandan civil society. As DD thinkers would emphasize, many of the remaining obstacles are attributable to the inequitable distribution of resources, and the growing impoverishment and political marginalization of most poor Ugandans. Yet, as noted by NIE thinkers, some constraints are due to technical deficiencies and self-interested behaviour in Ugandan civil society and in the system of international cooperation.

III. The Theoretical and Implementation Implications of Persisting Institutional Constraints for Uganda's Future Human Development

From the above discussion we can draw out a number of important empirical and theoretical lessons about the potential of SHD/PCD in Uganda.

First, the NRM government has proven to be earnestly committed to a process of national reconciliation, rehabilitation and institutional reform. Early on, it itself to a *10-Point Programme* comprised of development goals similar to SHD/PCD ideals. A few years into its rule, the NRM also introduced of far-reaching political and economic institutional reforms to restore Ugandans' trust in the state, the competitiveness of the economy, and the diversity of Ugandan civil society. These reforms have undoubtedly improved Ugandans' *Human Development* prospects.

On the other hand, without detracting from Museveni's achievements, the discussion in this Chapter shows that serious constraints are still standing in the way of Uganda's *Human Development*. (Refer to **Table 4.3** for a summary of persisting constraints in Uganda). These mostly institutional constraints are prevalent in the state and market sectors as well as within Ugandan civil society and, until they are resolved, the "Pearl" is unlikely to rise again. Hence, despite the impressive strides made by the NRM regime, the Ugandan state is still not subject to organized competition from opposition parties, the Ugandan civil service remains underfunded, demoralized, uncoordinated and corrupt, and Ugandan policy debates and decision-making mechanisms are still dominated by foreign interests and a small elite of government officials and hence, remain inaccessible to the majority of poor and unorganized Ugandans. Economically, despite the NRM's physical rehabilitation and economic liberalization efforts, persistent protectionism, state-derived rents and tribal/village links, lack of access to markets, inputs or services in rural areas, and both unclear rules and poor rule enforcement continue to undermine competitive economic activities. And, in civil society, the reluctance of NGOs to become politically involved, clientelistic power relations, lack of information, illiteracy, and poverty in the Ugandan countryside, have all made it difficult for poor Ugandans to organize or to *express voice*.

Theoretically speaking, the evidence presented above confirms that wider institutional constraints continue to hinder the realization of SHD/PCD approaches in Uganda and suggests that such institutional constraints are as much related to problems of undemocratic governance and unequal access to wealth and productive assets--the key concerns of DD thinkers--as they are rooted in unclear rules of the game, high transaction costs resulting from persistent regulation and rent-seeking behaviour and poor coordination within the international development cooperation system and lack of technical knowledge, organizational capacities or free time within poor beneficiary communities--all preoccupations of NIE advocates.

As for why these constraints have persisted despite the reform efforts of the NRM government, the response seems to be threefold. The first reason is that reform processes are by nature both difficult and gradual, especially when one is dealing with constraints which have been deeply-embedded in Ugandan society over decades of conflict and bad rule. The second reason is that Ugandan development policy has been greatly dictated by foreign donors and a small elite of government officials who have often sought to protect their own power base (e.g., donors prioritizing direct foreign investment or Ugandan government officials delaying the privatization of state enterprises from which they derive benefits) rather than addressing the *Human Development* needs of poor Ugandans. The third reason though is that the 'Sound governance' agenda which constitutes part of SHD/PCD approaches is itself flawed, and hence, difficult, for any government to realize. Although the problematic nature of the 'Sound governance' agenda is too complex to address in depth, it is important to point out that there is no agreement on what 'Sound governance' means nor on operational benchmarks with which to measure its progress. [92] Moreover, the 'Sound governance'/democratization discourse has become one of the magic trio of "development panaceas" (along with 'the market' and 'civil society') which is commonly used in vague,

simplistic, and biased ways. [93] In this respect ,it could be argued that, like the SHD/PCD paradigm, the 'Sound governance' agenda is itself a *Baroque Science* in as far as it has become an ambiguous "public-policy wish list" which tries to be all things to all persons yet the links and the prioritization of its various parts are not fully understood, and the agenda's components are themselves sometimes at odds with one another (e.g., democratizing government is among the goals/ends of the 'Sound governance' agenda but doing so through external pressure runs counter to the 'Sound governance' agenda's commitment to self-determination and participatory processes/means). Finally, some have criticized the 'Sound governance' agenda on the grounds that it has been dictated by Western countries who do not adhere to its ideals but use the agenda for "regime maintenance" and to secure their power base rather than to challenge unequal and undemocratic relations at the global and national level. [94]

The above caveats aside, it is still important to ascertain how far Uganda has advanced in the realization of the *ideal type* 'Sound governance' principles put forth in the SHD/PCD agenda. The evidence above shows that although the NRM government has not fared badly in this respect, it still has far to go in creating a system of governance which is responsive to the human needs of the majority of poor Ugandans. The chapters which follow given an account of how two different international development organizations (UNDP and AA) attempt to implement SHD/PCD approaches in Uganda in the context of the above institutional constraints and their own contestable assumptions and organizational interests and limitations.

ENDNOTES:

1. Mahmood Mamdani, *The Politics of Democratic Reform in Uganda*. Page 239. in P. Langseth, J. Katarobo, E.A. Brett, and J. Munene (Editors). Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation. Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1995.

2. i.e., the rule of law; political legitimacy and both electoral and bureaucratic accountability; a fair and reliable judicial system; freedom of expression and of association as well as access to information and communication; effective and efficient public sector management; broad participation and involvement in economic, political and social processes and cooperation with civil society; and sound fiscal, macro-economic, monetary, investment and pricing policies. (Refer back to endnote #57 in Chapter 1)

3. Winston Churchill. My African Journey: Sabbatical of a Lifetime. Pages 56-57, 125-126. London: Mandarin Press, 1990.

4. E.A. Brett. *Institutional Theory and Social Change in Uganda*. Pages 206-208. in Harriss, J., Hunter, J. and Lewis, C.(Editors). Op. Cit.

5. Emmanuel Nabuguzi. *Popular Initiatives in Service Provision in Uganda*. Page 197. in John Semboja and Ole Therkildsen (Editors). Service Provision Under Stress in East Africa: The State, NGOs and Peoples' Organization in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Copenhagen and London: Centre for Development Research and James Currey Publishers, 1995.

6. By 1980, imports and exports had fallen by two-thirds from their peak value in 1972; industrial production had dropped by 80%; and the cost of living for low-income workers had risen by 500% between 1971 and 1977. (Emmanuel Nabuguzi. *Popular Initiatives in Service Provision in Uganda*. Page 197. in John Semboja and Ole Therkildsen [Editors]. Op. Cit.)

7. Per Tideman. *Popular Versus State provision of Local Justice: The Resistance Councils in Uganda*. Page 223. in John Semboja and Ole Therkildsen (Editors). Op. Cit.

8. Dan M. Mudoola. *Institution-Building: The Case of the NRM and the Military in Uganda: 1986-89*. Pages 230-231. in Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle (Editors). Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment and Revolutionary Change. London: James Currey Publishers, 1991.

9. James Katarobo, *Preface* in P. Langseth, J. Katarobo, E.A. Brett and J. Munene (Editors), Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation. Op. Cit.

10. NRM Secretariat. *Ten-Point Programme of NRM*. NRM Directorate of Information and Mass Mobilization, Kampala, Uganda, 1985?)

11. DANIDA. *Evaluation of Poverty Reduction in Danish Development Assistance. Country Study: Uganda*. Volume 1: Main Report. Page 27. Denmark: DANIDA, November 1996.

By contrast, average annual GDP growth for the period 1980-1990 had only been 2.8%. (Alison Evans, *Growth and Poverty Reduction in Uganda*. Page 1. Paper presented at the Poverty Reduction and Development Cooperation Conference. Copenhagen, Denmark, February 23-24, 1994.)

12. Charles Harvey and Mark Robinson. *Economic Reform and Political Liberalization in Uganda*. IDS Research Report # 29. Page iii. Sussex, UK: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, November 1995.

13. World Bank. *Uganda: The Challenge of Growth ad Poverty Reduction.* Page 5. World Bank Report # 14313-UG. Washington DC.: The World Bank, Country Operations Division, Eastern Africa Department, Africa Region, June 30, 1995.

14. *Seeds of Stability: Yoweri Museveni tells Quentin Peel the Philosophy Behind Uganda's Success*. The Financial Times. Monday January 27, 1997.

15. World Bank, June 30, 1995. Page i and 2. Op. Cit.

16. Warren Nyamugasira. *Poverty in Uganda: Vulnerable Groups and Their Coping Strategies*. Page 2. Paper Presented to: *Challenge of Growth and Poverty Reduction in Uganda*. Seminar Organized by the Government of Uganda and The World Bank. November 6-7, 1995. Uganda International Conference Centre. Kampala, Uganda.)

17. Uganda's most recent Integrated Household Survey estimates that, in 1992/1993, the majority of Ugandan households (86%) lived in homes with about 5 persons yet had no more than US$ 100 per month to spend. With respect to land, recent data collected by J. Mackinnon and S. Appleton shows that while few Ugandans have no access to land at all, the majority of Ugandans (62%) have access to less than 1 hectare of land--only enough for the subsistence survival of one family--and only a small elite (1.3%) have access to more than 10 hectares of land. (As quoted in the DANIDA report, *Evaluation of Poverty Reduction in Danish Development Assistance. Country Study: Uganda*. Chapter 3. Op. Cit).

18. According to World Bank data collected in the mid 1990s, while Uganda had a national Gini coefficient of 0.377 in 1989, by 1992 the Gini coefficient had risen to 0.409. The higher the value of the Gini coefficient, of course, the higher the inequality. (World Bank, June 30, 1995. Page 85. Op. Cit.)

19. Anne Marie Goetz, Simon Maxwell and Henry Manyire. *Poverty Assessment and Public Expenditure: Country Field Study: Uganda*. Pages 26-27. A Study for the SPA Working Group on Poverty and Social Policy. Sussex, UK: Institute of Development Studies. University of Sussex, September 1994.)

20. By comparison, in 1994, Life Expectancy had risen to 58 years in Kenya and up to 52 in Tanzania. (Opio, Fred. *The Dynamics of Poverty in Uganda: The Social Dimension*. Page 3. Paper Presented to: *Challenge of Growth and Poverty Reduction in Uganda*. Seminar Organized by the Government of Uganda and The World Bank. November 6-7, 1995. Uganda International Conference Centre. Kampala, Uganda.)

21. Warren Nyamusagasira. Page 1. Op. Cit.

In addition, 69% of the Ugandan population is estimated to be food-deficient, mainly due to security disparities. (Opio. Pages 11-12. Op. Cit.)

22. The World Bank. June 30, 1995. Page 5. Op. Cit.

23. Warren Nyamugasira. Page 3, Op. Cit.

24. Fred Opio. Pages 8 and 10. Op. Cit.

25. UNDP. *1997 HDR*. Table 1.

Uganda's HDI ranking as 159th out of 177 countries in UNDP's *1997 HDR* represents a deterioration from its rank of 146th out of 173 countries in UNDP's *1993 HDR*.

26. The World Bank. June 30, 1995. Page 17. Op. Cit.

27. Dan M. Mudoola. Page 239. Op. Cit.

28. Holger Bernt Hansen and Michael Twaddle, *Introduction*, Page 11. in Hansen, H.B. and Twaddle, M. (Editors). From Chaos to Order: The Politics of Constitution-Making in Uganda. London: James Currey Publishers, 1995.

29. The most serious military conflicts in Uganda today are in the Northern region where fighting between the Ugandan-supported Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan-backed Kony Resistance Army (LRA) of Lord Kony is rife. Another source of conflict in the North are the activities of the West Bank Front (WNBF), soldiers of former President Idi Amin, now exiled in Saudi Arabia. Based in Sudan and under the leadership of a former Amin Minister, Juma Oris, the WNBF continues to harass the local Ugandan populace by periodically crossing into Ugandan territory. Although not a political offensive, hostilities also continue in Eastern Uganda where the nomadic Karamajong people use arms to encroach upon cattle farms. (J. Oloka-Onyango. *Uganda*. Pages 380-381 in Human Rights in Developing Countries: Yearbook 1996. Peter Baehr, Lalaine Sadiwa and Jaqueline Smith (Editors) with cooperation by Annelies Bosch. The Hague, The Netherlands,: Nordic Human Rights Publications in collaboration with Kluwer Law International, 1996).

Finally, the Museveni's government's alleged support of Laurent Kabila's guerrilla army which overthrew the Mobutu regime in Zaire in the Spring of 1997 and Museveni's affiliation with Tutsi-friendly tribes, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Kagame government in Rwanda may still cause retaliation from Uganda's Western neighbour. (*Shaking Up Africa*. Time Magazine. April 14, 1997, Op. Cit.)

30. Per Tideman, *Popular Versus State Provision of Local Justice: The Resistance Councils in Uganda*. Pages 231-235. Op. Cit.

31. A. Ruzindana. *Combatting Corruption in Uganda*. Pages 195-198. In Langseth, Katarobo, Brett and Munene (Editors). Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation. Op. Cit.

32. Petter Langseth. *Civil Service Reform in Uganda: Objectives and Strategic Plans*. Page 100-105. In Langseth, Katarobo, Brett and Munene (Editors). Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation. Op. Cit.

33. J. Oloka-Onyango. Uganda. Pages 381, 384. Human Right in Developing Countries Yearbook: 1996. Op. Cit.

34. Although Uganda's Constituent Assembly was predominantly elected by universal suffrage, 69 members were appointed by the National Resistance Council. These appointments included a fixed number of representatives from former political parties, the army, unions, women's and youth groups and 10 nominees selected by President Museveni personally. In all then, 214 out the 283 CA member were democratically elected (James Katarobo. *Electoral Choices in the Constituent Assembly Election of March 1994*. In Hansen, H.B. and Twaddle, M. (Editors) From Chaos to Order: The Politics of Constitution-Making in Uganda. Op. Cit.

35. Refer to the official government speech made at the October 1992 launching of the decentralization policy as quoted in A. J. Regan. *A Comparative Framework for Analysis of Uganda's Decentralization Policy*. Page 286. In Langseth, Katarobo, Brett and Munene (Editors). Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation. Op. Cit.)

36. Responsibilities retained by the Central government include defence and national security, foreign relations and external trade (including trademarks and patents), natural resource exploration, banking and currency exchange control, all citizenship and immigration matters, national plans, national taxation of incomes, national administration of justice, secondary schools and institutions of higher learning, and hospitals. (United Nations. *Economic Policy and Planning Implications of Decentralization*. Page 13-14 Report on TSS-1 Mission to Uganda. October 18-30, 1995. UN. Department of Development Support and Management Services. New York, New York, USA, December 1995.)

37. As illustrated in **Table 4.1**, although the proportion of the Ugandan government's recurrent budget spent on security had began to decline in the early 1990s (from 38% in 19901/1991 down to 23% in 1993/94), the proportion of was beginning to rise again (up to 27%) by 1994/95. (See *Background to the Budget 1995-1996*. Page 25. Op. Cit.). The increases in security expenditure in 1995 were largely the result of accelerated subversive activity in the North but according to some reports, were also a product of Uganda's alleged contributions to anti-government armed guerrillas in both neighbouring Zaire and Sudan. (*Shaking Up Africa*. Time Magazine. April 14, 1997. Op. Cit.)

38. Appleton and MacKinnon as quoted in: DANIDA. *Evaluation of Poverty Reduction in Danish Development Assistance. Country Study: Uganda*. Page 15-16. Op. Cit.

39. Under the current parliament all politicians are appointed by invitation extended to them in their individual capacity but they do not represent political parties or known party platform or policy positions. (See: Paul K. Ssemogerere. *Conditions for a Stable Democratization Process in Uganda*. in Towards Democracy--A Case of Uganda. Summary Report of Proceedings, Page xxv. Proceedings of the International Seminar on Democratization Process in Africa. July 15-18, 1993. Kampala, Uganda.)

40. Government of Uganda. Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. Article 246 (e). Page 152. Kampala, Uganda, 1995.

41. On the authoritarian nature of the patrimonial state and "personal rule" in Africa during the post-colonial period, see Richard Sandbrook, *The State and Economic Stagnation in Tropical Africa*. World Development. Volume 14, Number 3, 1986; on the partial nature of political liberalization processes in Africa, see Bratton, Michael and Rothchild, Donald. *The Institutional Bases of Governance in Africa*. In Hyden, Goran and Bratton, Michael (Editors), Governance and Politics in Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, USA, 1990; and, on the limits of modern Western democracies, see Eva Etzioni-Halevy, Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983.

42. The RC/LC electoral process generally worked as follows: the Village RC/LC Council (RC/LC I) elects a 9-member Committee; the gathering of all RC/LC I Committee members within a Parish then make up the Parish (RC/LC II) Committee. The assembly of all RC/LC II Committees in a sub-County then comprise the next Council in the hierarchy (The RC/LC III Committee) which also selects a 9-member Committee and the same process of indirect selection is then repeated at the RC/LC IV (County) and the RC/LC V (District) level. (Per Tideman. *Popular Versus State Provision of Local Justice*. Page 229. Op. Cit.)

However, it should be noted that after the 1995 Constitution, the representativeness of RC/LCs improved as it was decided that District Chairpersons would be elected by universal suffrage and that District Chairs would collectively form Uganda's democratically elected Parliament. This was achieved by the Parliamentary Elections of 1996. Nevertheless, the problem of watered down democracy persists since RC/LC officials at the RC/LC II, III and IV levels are still selected in an indirect manner.

43. During an informal conversation, an RC/LC V Chairwoman for Education in her District, noted that during RC/LC elections it was very difficult for her not to vote for her husband, himself a senior Minister in the current NRM Government, without publicly being criticized for making such a decision.

44. As James Katarobo points out, poverty-stricken Ugandans in rural areas are most vulnerable to having their votes bought by gifts from politicians due to their desperate desire for scarce goods and their ignorance of electoral rules and procedures. (James Katarobo. *Electoral Choices in the Constituent Assembly Elections of March 1994*. Pages 17, 141. Op. Cit.)

45. E. A. Brett. Providing for the Rural Poor. Page 44. Op. Cit.

46. Tim Lamont. *Economic Planning and Policy Formulation in Uganda*. See Pages 12-17 especially. In Langseth, Katarobo, Brett and Munene (Editors). Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation. Op. Cit.

47. John MacKinnon, Fred Opio, German Ssemoegerere and Margaret Kakande. *A Draft Poverty Action Plan for Uganda*. Page 29. Plan presented to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. April 1996. Kampala, Uganda.

48. United Nations. *Economic Policy and Planning Implications of Decentralization*. See section A.5 in particular. Draft Report on a TSS-1 Mission to Uganda. October 18-30, 1995. United Nations Department of Development Support and Management Serviced. New York, New York, December 1995.

49. Fred Golooba Mutebi. *Decentralization in Uganda: The Role of Popular Participation in Service Delivery.* Paper presented to the Development Studies Institute (DESTIN), London School of Economics and Political Science. London, UK January 20, 1997.

50. Whereas better-off Districts such as Mukono were raising around 650 million Ugandan Shillings in the early 1990s, impoverished regions such as Kumi District, had a revenue of no more than 50 million Ugandan Shillings. (E.A. Brett. Providing for the Rural Poor. Page 50. Op, Cit.)

51. *UCB Corruption: Suruma Speaks out*. The Sunday Vision. December 3, 1995.

52. Other forms of fraud recently discovered in the Ugandan government include fake cheques, manipulation of receipts with connivance of accounting officers, and officials operating bank accounts in the name of the government. (*Top Government Officials at the Centre of Fraud*. The Sunday Vision. December 3, 1995.)

53. Off the record conversation with RC/LC V Chairwoman for Education. London, UK. February 9, 1997.

54. Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile. *Economic Reform and Development*. Page 5. In Langseth, Katarobo, Brett and Munene (Editors). Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation. Op. Cit.

55. DANIDA. *Evaluation of Poverty Reduction in Danish Development Assistance*. Country Study: Uganda. Page 2. Op. Cit.

56. The World Bank. *Uganda: The Challenge of Growth and Poverty. Page 27.* Op. Cit. gives a useful chronology of the NRM's deregulation of trade in Uganda.

57. DANIDA. *Evaluation of Poverty Reduction in Danish Development Assistance*. Country Study: Uganda. Chapter 5. Op. Cit.

58. A year later, 11 public corporations had been privatized, 10 had been repossessed by their former Asian owners, 9 had been liquidated and 16 were up for sale with agreements awaiting signature. It was agreed that the Ugandan government would retain full control over 10 remaining public enterprises covering the utilities, railways, the Central Bank, and the Coffee and Tea Authorities (Harvey and Robinson. Pages 33-35. Op. Cit.). To this day though, many of Uganda's 180+ state companies remain in public hands.

59. Republic of Uganda. *Rehabilitation and Development Plan: 1993/94-1995/96*. Pages 44-50. Kampala: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, December 1993)

60. World Bank. *Uganda: The Challenge of Growth and Poverty Reduction*. Page 11. Op. Cit.

61. E.A. Brett. Providing for the Rural Poor. Chapter 4. Op. Cit.

62. For example, in 1994, President Museveni convened a meeting for business representatives to voice their concerns about the quality of infrastructure in the country. (Harvey and Robinson, Page 13. Op. Cit.)

63. Some Ugandans have also expressed anger at the way Mr. R. W. Kasozi, the workers' official spokesman and the leading representative of NOTU in Parliament, was assigned the marginal government post of Deputy Minister of Wildlife an Antiquities. According to National Analyst Magazine, despite having three seats in Parliament, Mr. Kasozi's marginalization confirms the NRM's minimal recognition of workers. (Emmanuel Baingana. *What have Workers Achieved Under NRM?* National Analyst Magazine. May 4-June 1, 1995.)

64. DANIDA. *Evaluation of Poverty Reduction in Danish Development Assistance*. Country Study: Uganda. Page 31. Op. Cit.

65. The most explicit example of bias against exports is the tax on coffee exports which the NRM has continued to levy. Less explicit forms of bias include border duties and the taxing of high-cost inputs which exporters tend to use more than producers selling in the national market. (World Bank. *Uganda: The Challenge of Growth and Poverty Reduction*. Page 36. Op. Cit.)

66. During my stay in small Ugandan towns, for example, I learned that many Ugandans transported their goods at night to avoid the possibility of roadside license fees and taxation.

67. Brett,. E.A. Providing for the Rural Poor. Page 75. Op Cit.

68. Rita Laker Ojok. *Managing Input Supplies for Small Farmers in Uganda: A Problem for Institutional Change*. Pages 42-43. In Langseth, Katarobo, Brett and Munene (Editors). Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation. Op. Cit.

69. Government of Uganda. Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. Article 237. Page 146. Op. Cit.

70. *Whose Constitution Will it be?* Page 8. National Analyst. May 4, 1995.

71. *Draft Poverty Action Plan for Uganda*. Page 33, 37. Op. Cit.

72. Augustine Ruzindana. *Combatting Corruption in Uganda*. Pages 200-208 especially. In Langseth, Katarobo, Brett and Munene (Editors). Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation. Op. Cit.

73. Tim Lamont. *Economic Planning and Policy Formulation in Uganda.* Pages 14-20 especially. In Langseth, Katarobo, Brett and Munene (Editors). Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation. Op. Cit.

74. An example of this is the Economic Analysis Unit (EAU) supported by the World Bank in the Ministry of Finance (MOF) as well as the rehabilitation of the Statistics Department and the strengthening of the Economic Planning Department (EDP), both within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MFEP). (Tim Lamont. Page 15-17. Ibid.)

75. Tim Lamont. Page 18. Ibid.

76. Influential publications produced by the World Bank include: *Public Choices for Private Initiative* (1991), the *Growing out of Poverty* (1993) Report, and *The Challenge of Growth and Poverty Reduction* Report (1995).

77. Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile. *Management of the Economic Reform Programme*. Page 8. In Langseth, Katarobo, Brett and Munene (Editors). Uganda: Landmarks in Rebuilding a Nation. Op. Cit.

78. Anne Marie Goetz, Simon Maxwell and Henry Manyire. *Poverty Assessment and Public Expenditure--Country Field Study: Uganda*. Page 34-39. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies (IDS). University of Sussex, September 1994.

79. The *Poverty Action Plan* which was produced by both foreign and Ugandan consultants focuses on growth as well as redistribution and emphasizes the importance of giving the rural poor access to credit, guaranteed land lands and basic social services. It also endorses the *20/20 Compact* put forward by UNDP's HDRs and the promise of government resources for universal primary education and primary health. (J. MacKinnon, F. Opio, G. Ssemoegerere and M. Kakande. *A Draft Poverty Action Plan for Uganda*. Kampala, Uganda, April 1996).

80. In 1995, the Ugandan government acceded to the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (CCPR), the *International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families*, and the *Convention on the Prevention of and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.* Before then Uganda was already party to the *Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (CEDWA), the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* (CRC), the *Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment and Punishment* (CAT), and the *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights* (CHPR). (J. Oloka-Onyango. *Uganda*. Page 372-74. Human Rights in Developing Countries: Yearbook 1996. Op. Cit.)

81. Government of Uganda. 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. Chapter 4. Op. Cit.

82. J. Oloka-Onyango. Page 386, 387, 404. Op. Cit.

83. Joy Kwesiga and Anthony Ratter. *Realizing the Development Potential of NGOs and Community Groups in Uganda*. Page 11. Special Report to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Kampala: Government of Uganda, 1993.

84. Emmanuel Baingana. *What Have Workers Achieved Under NRM?* National Analyst Magazine. May 4-June 1, 1995.

85. J. Oloka-Onyango. Page 381-383. Op. Cit.

86. Susan Dicklich. Page 12. Op. Cit.

87. According to estimates from the late 1980s and early 1990s, about 75% of expenditures on health in Uganda were covered by out-of-pocket payments regardless of whether the provider was government, NGOs or the private sectors. Similarly, up to 90% of school costs were contributed by parents themselves, mainly through PTA fees. (Emmanuel Nauguzi. Page 205. Op. Cit.)

88. For a similar line of argument, refer to E.A. Brett, *Providing for the Rural Poor*. Chapter 6. Op. Cit.

89. Harvey and Robinson. Page 42. Op. Cit.

90. DANIDA. *Evaluation of Poverty Reduction in Danish Development Assistance. Country Study: Uganda*. Page 44. Op. Cit.

There is an *Aid Coordination Unit* in existence within the MFEP but it is under-equipped, under-staffed, has no access to transport and its responsibilities are unclear vis-a-vis the line Ministries, District governments and the *NGO Registration Board.* (Anthony Ratter and Joy Kwesiga. Pages 24-26. Op. Cit.)

91. DANIDA. *Evaluation of Poverty Reduction in Danish Development Assistance. Country Study: Uganda*. Page 44. Op. Cit. And, John de Coninck. *Evaluating the Impact of NGOs in Rural Poverty Alleviation. Uganda Country Study*. Page 15-17. Working Paper # 51. London: Overseas Development Institute, 1992.

92. Gerald Schmitz. *Democratization and Demystification: Deconstructing 'Governance' as Development Paradigm*. Page 71. in Schmitz and Moore (Editors). 1995. Op. Cit.

93. Gordon White, *Civil Society, Democratisation and Development*. Page 1. Article to be published in: Democratisation in the South: The Jagged Wave. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996.

94. Gerald Schmitz, Pages 71-77. Op. Cit.

MAP OF UGANDA:

Source: Child Health and Development Centre/ UNICEF, Uganda

Table 4.1:

Table 3: Life Expectancy at Birth (in years) and Infant Mortality Rates (per 1000 live births)

	KENYA		TANZANIA		UGANDA	
	Life Expectancy (Yrs)	Infant Mortality Rate	Life Expectancy (Yrs)	Infant Mortality Rate	Life Expectancy (Yrs)	Infant Mortality Rate
1970	50.0	102.0	45.1	132.0	49.8	108.8
1971	50.5	100.0	45.6	131.0	50.2	106.6
1972	51.0	98.0	46.0	130.0	50.7	104.4
1973	51.5	96.0	46.1	129.0	50.3	106.6
1974	52.0	92.0	46.3	127.0	49.9	111.1
1975	52.5	90.0	46.4	126.0	49.5	113.3
1976	5.30	88.0	46.5	125.0	49.1	115.5
1977	53.5	86.4	46.6	123.8	48.7	115.5
1978	53.9	84.8	46.8	122.7	48.6	115.5
1979	54.4	84.1	47.0	122.2	48.5	115.5
1980	54.9	83.2	47.2	121.5	48.4	115.5
1981	55.4	81.6	47.4	120.6	48.4	115.5
1982	55.9	80.0	47.5	119.2	48.3	115.5
1983	56.4	78.4	47.7	118.4	48.3	115.5
1984	56.9	76.8	47.8	117.6	48.3	115.5
1985	57.4	75.1	48.0	116.9	48.3	115.4
1986	57.9	74.0	48.2	116.1	48.2	115.4
1987	58.6	71.9	48.3	115.3	48.2	115.4
1988	58.7	70.3	48.1	115.3	47.8	115.9
1989	58.9	68.8	47.8	115.3	47.3	116.4
1990	58.8	67.2	47.5	115.3	46.9	117.0
1991	58.9	65.4	47.7	110.5	46.9	116.7
1992	58.8	63.1	49.4	93.7	45.8	122.5
1993	58.8	61.0	50.9	84.3	45.6	121.1
1994	58.8	60.7	52.2	82.1	45.0	120.3
1995*	59.1	-	52.4	-	43.1	N.A

*Provisional estimates

Source: World Bank: World Development Report, various issues, The World Bank, Washington D.C.
UNDP: 1993: Human Development Report.

Source: Fred Opio. "The Dynamics of Poverty in Uganda: The Social Dimension;" Presented at: The Challenge of Growth and Poverty Reduction in Uganda. Seminar organized by the Government of Uganda and the World Bank. November 6-7, 1995. Kampala, Uganda.

Table 4.2:

Table 3.3: Functional classification of Government Recurrent Expenditure

	1990/91	1991/92	1992/93	1993/94	1994/95
Administration and social	80.3%	47.1%	66.7%	82.7%	83.2%
General public service 2/	16.8%	22.6%	22.5%	41.2%	39.9%
Security 3/	37.5%	13.3%	23.8%	22.9%	26.9%
Education 4/	17.5%	4.1%	14.1%	12.0%	10.8%
Health 5/	5.6%	1.4%	5.1%	4.8%	4.2%
Other social services 6/	3.0%	5.7%	1.2%	1.8%	1.4%
Economic Functions	8.6%	18.1%	6.4%	6.0%	4.8%
of which:					
Rural areas 7/	3.4%	2.3%	2.5%	1.8%	1.8%
Others 8/	5.2%	15.8%	3.9%	4.2%	3.0%
Unallocated items	0.6%	6.9%	5.5%	0.0%	0.4%
Interest payments (Net)	10.5%	27.9%	21.5%	11.3%	11.6%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

1/ For 1988/89-1991/92, based on cash releases and includes expenditure on Statutory expenditure and for 1992/93-1993/94 based on cheques printed.
2/ Comprises President's Office, State House, V/President, P/Minister, Public Service, Foreign Affairs, Justice, Finance and Economic Planning, Judiciary, N/Assembly Audit, Local Government, Public Service Commission, Law Reform Commission, Decentralised Services
3/ Comprises Defence, Internal Affairs, Police, Prisons.
4/ Comprises Education, Makerere, and Uganda Management Institute, Teaching Service Commission,
5/ Health ministry, Mulago hospital.
6/ Information and Broadcasting, Labour, Women in Development, Karamoja Development Agency Mass Mobilisation, and Inspectorate of Government.
7/ Agriculture, Commerce, Trade and Industry, National Agricultural Res. Organisation
8/ Comprises Lands, Works Transport and Communications, Tourism, and Energy.

Source: Background to the Budget, 1995-1996.
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Government of Uganda.
Kampala, Uganda, 1995.

Table 4.3: Major Contextual and Institutional Constraints Impeding Uganda's Human Development

Institutional Sector	Persisting Contextual and Institutional Constraints in Uganda
Within the State	• Persistent Civil War & Intra-Regional Conflict • Limited Democracy & Freedom • Clientelistic & Parochial RC/LC Rule • Limited Government Resources, Expert Knowledge or Skills • Continued Rent-Seeking & Corruption
Within the Market	• Donor-Led and Exclusive Policy-Making • A Small Capitalist Class with Strong Black Market as well as Tribal/Village Links • A Disorganized & Marginalized Working Class • Persistent Protectionism & Rent-Seeking Behaviour • Lack of Access to Markets, Inputs, Services in Remote Rural areas • Unclear Rules of the Game & Uneven Law Enforcement
Within Civil Society & the Donor Community	• No Guarantee of Tolerance Towards Politicized and Confrontational Oppostion within Civil Society • Fragmented, Duplicative & Unaccountable Donor Community • Impoverished, Traditional & Marginalized Rural Majority

Chapter 5:
The Rude Awakening:
UNDP's Implementation of Sustainable Human Development in Uganda and Beyond

> If we are not serious [about participation and empowerment], let us stop using these words. If we are serious, let us recognize that we are talking about radical change....There has been time enough to change policies, to adjust programmes, to re-design projects, to invent and implement procedures. Something much deeper is needed....The challenge is personal, professional and institutional.
>
> Robert Chambers [1]

I. Introduction: UNDP's Implementation of SHD/PCD Approaches in Uganda and Beyond--The *Baroque Science* and *River Polluting* Phenomena Revisited

By the early 1990s, UNDP's promotion of SHD/PCD approaches were widely acclaimed in the international community and beginning to gain momentum far beyond UNDP's HDRO. By the time James Gustave Speth had become Administrator in 1993, UNDP had made a conscious decision to make the SHD/PCD paradigm the agencies chief mandate and *raison d'etre and* set in motion a series of policy, organizational and programme reforms to equip itself to realize its new-found mission. The purpose of this Chapter is to test the validity of both the *Baroque Science* and *River Pollution* Phenomena presented in the first chapter of the thesis by exploring whether the conceptual deficiencies of the SHD/PCD paradigm described in Chapter 3 have indeed hindered UNDP's operationalization implementation of the SHD/PCD paradigm and determining whether the core transformative goals of the SHD/PCD agenda have been displaced in the process and, if so, determining why and how this has occurred.

This chapter tries to answer these questions by exploring how UNDP has changed as a result of its adoption of SHD/PCD approaches and what factors motivated UNDP's adoption of SHD/PCD approaches; how exactly UNDP has gone about interpreting, operationalizing and implementing SHD/PCD approaches both in headquarters (HQ) and in the field in Uganda; what kinds of constraints and disruptions UNDP has met in the process; and what

development impact the agency's SHD/PCD efforts have had thus far, both globally and at the field level in Uganda. The chapter analyzes the full transition of SHD/PCD from paradigm to practice by tracing the various steps involved in the process. As such, the chapter is organized around UNDP's adoption and promotion of SHD/PCD at the conceptual, policy, programme/project levels and each section analyses UNDP's impact on the five core SHD/PCD components and guidelines outlined in Chapter 1. Hence, while the first section on UNDP's conceptual interpretation of SHD/PCD analyses UNDP's achievements in producing multi-sectoral, holistic and integrated development; the policy section explores UNDP's donor coordination efforts and its advocacy impact on 'Sound governance' issues; and the last section the programme/project level looks at UNDP's progress in enhancing North-South partnerships and national ownership, fostering beneficiary participation and empowerment, and improving equity and the public service needs, capabilities and self-reliance of the poorest. With respect to time-lines, the Chapter focusses on the implementation of UNDP's *Fifth Programming Cycle* (1992-1996) which is the first to contain strong SHD/PCD components. On top of this, the Chapter places special attention on what was happening in 1995, the year in which I visited UNDP headquarters (HQ) in New York and the UNDP-Uganda Country Programme (CP) and in which UNDP's promotion of SHD/PCD was at its peak as the agency UNDP prepared itself to influence the *1995 World Summit for Social Development (WSSD).*

II. UNDP Before and After the Adoption of SHD/PCD in Uganda and Beyond

Obviously, UNDP's transition towards SHD/PCD approaches, both in HQ and in the field in Uganda has been gradual and ongoing. As such, there is no clear date on which one can pin UNDP's adoption of SHD/PCD. However, as UNDP's first programming cycle designed with SHD/PCD goals in mind, the Fifth Programming Cycle is a useful watermark for comparing the way UNDP operated before and after the adoption of SHD/PCD in Uganda and beyond.

A) UNDP Before and After the Adoption of SHD/PCD Approaches

Although the United Nations became involved in technical assistance work immediately after WWII, UNDP did not come into being until 1966 when it was given a mandate to "facilitate overall planning and needed coordination of the several types of technical cooperation programmes carried on" and to allocate its resources in an equitable and universal manner world-wide. [2] For most of the 1960s and much of the early 1970s, UNDP's development work consisted mostly of financing traditional forms of technical assistance--i.e., foreign expertise, fellowships and imported equipment. Agricultural development (e.g., locust control, rice growing, livestock production, digging water wells, etc.), natural resources (e.g., hydrology projects, mineral exploration, etc.), infrastructure (e.g., navigation administration, civil aviation and telecommunications training, etc.), industry (e.g., coal mining, iron production, etc.) and development planning (e.g., regional and sectoral planning, statistical training) were all among the UNDP's favoured areas of support during this period. By 1975, however, after undertaking a major examination of the impact of its technical assistance efforts, UNDP decided to add "new dimensions" to its work, including building up the productivity, managerial, technical and research capacities of recipient governments and promoting greater self-reliance among developing countries. These new dimensions represented an early attempt to move beyond blueprint project packages, dependence on outside experts and technology and the excessive preoccupation with inputs by focussing more on results, building indigenous capacities, introducing more flexible policies and forms of technical cooperation, increasing local purchases of equipment, and encouraging LDC governments and institutions to assume greater responsibility for the execution of UNDP-financed projects.

By the late 1970s and early 1980s, UNDP had become known as a leader of technical cooperation at the country level as well as an effective

problem-solving agency with strong field offices and solid relationships with LDC governments. Around that time though, the steady proliferation of UN system funding agencies began to undermine UNDP's coordinating role as well as threatening its funding base. It was in the context of this newly competitive environment that UNDP decided to seek new forms of financing by establishing special trusts, entering into a wide range of cost-sharing arrangements with recipient governments and third parties, providing management support services to other development agencies, and becoming directly involved in operational implementation. By the early 1980s, UNDP was administering ten separate trust funds with expenditures of over US$50 million a year and the number of organizations acting as executors of UNDP-supported projects had grown from the original six to 29, including UNDP's own Office For Project Execution, established in 1973. By this time UNDP was also overseeing other UN funds in the field (chiefly, the *UN Population Fund*, the *World Food Programme*, and the *Voluntary Fund for Women*), leading roundtable consultations on international cooperation with fellow donors, assuming the chairmanship of several international steering committees and supporting a wide range of research initiatives and world conferences. [3]

By 1990, UNDP worked in 152 countries, had a network of 112 field offices, had 6,140 projects under execution, and contracted out 21, 944 consultants (about half were international and half national) and close to 6, 888 staff members (most of them nationals and in the field). By its 4th Programming Cycle (1987-1991) UNDP had achieved expenditures of US$ 3.7 billion, compared to only US$ 2.6 billion during its Third Programming Cycle (1982-1986). The largest amount of UNDP funds in 1990 were going towards general development issues (approximately 22% of programme expenditures), with agriculture and fishing (20%), industry (12%), natural resources (11%) and transport and communications (8%) also constituting important sectors, but with health (4%), human settlements (4%) education (3.8%) lagging considerably behind. [4]

On the basis of the above narrative, it is evident that, although almost from its inception, UNDP worked in a multi-sectoral fashion and made a conscious effort to expand its network of field offices, to build strong links with recipient governments, and to expand its funding base as well as its range of services and sectors of work, by the dawning of the Fifth Programming Cycle (1992-1996), UNDP was also facing serious challenges. For one, UNDP's expansion into numerous new areas of work meant that the agency was more than ever suffering from a lack of focus or a unique niche for itself, the need to develop substantive expertise as well as research or policy analysis capacities of its own. Moreover, by becoming involved in so many development activities over the last three decades and by deciding to expand its own implementation and management services in response to financial difficulties and increased competition from fellow UN agencies, UNDP had never been able to realize its longer-term goals of fostering national ownership and greater self-reliance in the South or of playing the coordination and coherence role which it had been initially mandated to play within the UN system.

It is also important to remember that the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s made the position of international development agencies like UNDP even more precarious since, in the post Cold War era, neither the Western or Eastern bloc needed to continue outdoing one another in order to capture the loyalties of the Third World through generous development aid programmes which were by then thought to have only limited development impact. This shift in the winds proved to be an especially difficult blow for UNDP which had prospered in the 1960s and 1970s precisely by building close links with southern governments but which consisted mostly of generalists managers and hence lacked its own niche, in-house substantive or policy-influencing expertise, especially in the field [5], or strong links with actors other than recipient and donor governments. In fact, a study of UNDP's effectiveness commissioned by the governments of Denmark, India,

Sweden and the UK, criticizes UNDP precisely for having played too much of a 'mailbox function' or 'processing function' for other agencies for far too long during its earlier years [6] and a private consultancy firm told UNDP as early as 1991 that if it wanted to survive the challenges of the post Cold War era, it had no choice but to become a thought-leader, assume greater global leadership, reduce its cumbersome procedures and numerous projects, and carve out a niche for itself in the UN and the aid regime at large. [7] It is in this difficult context in which UNDP decided to adopt SHD/PCD approaches as the cornerstone of its development mandate by the early 1990s and to eventually place SHD/PCD guidelines at the centre of the agency's Fifth Programming Cycle.

In the eyes of Mr. Speth and other senior UNDP managers, SHD/PCD answered their prayers by providing UNDP with unprecedented public profile as an intellectual leader and counterweight to the World Bank's neo-Liberal agenda, a newly focussed mandate, and a unique niche to help it compete for diminishing funds with the specialized agencies of the UN system which already had their own sectoral focus and were beginning to work in new cross-sectoral areas to capture a bigger portion of the international development cooperation pie. The prevalence of organizational interests in the motives behind UNDP's adoption of SHD/PCD is evident in UNDP documents and speeches. Indeed, in his opening statements to the UNDP Executive Board in 1996, Mr. Speth reminded his constituents that it was precisely in response to declining core resources [8] that UNDP was trying to transform itself into 'the recognized leader and powerful champion of SHD/PCD'.[9] The explicit link between UNDP's adoption of SHD/PCD approaches and the agency's pursuit of its own organizational interests emerged as a dominant theme during my interviews as well. According to Ms. Saraswathi Menon, at the time a policy analyst in UNDP's HDRO, while claiming that UNDP had adopted SHD/PCD in order to resolve its financial crisis was going too far, UNDP had undeniably continued supporting the promotion of SHD/PCD

approaches because the approach appealed to potential donors. [10] The finding that UNDP adopted the SHD/PCD paradigm largely as a means of fulfilling its organizational interests, does not, however, mean that UNDP was never committed to implementing SHD/PCD approaches. Quite the contrary, during the Fifth Cycle, UNDP introduced many conceptual, policy, organization and programme reforms to help it move in this direction.

For example, at the conceptual level, UNDP proclaimed its commitment to SHD/PCD as early as 1993 when it declared that the agency's two-fold mission was: First, "to assist countries in their endeavour to achieve *Sustainable Human Development*"; and, Second: "to support the United Nations in the endeavour to achieve world peace, human security and development." [11] UNDP's conceptual commitment to SHD/PCD was unequivocally reiterated in UNDP's 1996 Mission Statement (reproduced in **Table 5.1**) which affirms that UNDP's mission is to help countries achieve *Sustainable Human Development* by assisting them in the design and implementation of development programmes based on what UNDP has labelled the four E's: The Eradication of Poverty, Employment Creation and Sustainable Livelihoods, Empowerment of Women, and Environmental Protection and Regeneration, with first priority going towards Poverty Eradication. [12] The adoption of a SHD/PCD mandate and the pursuit of the four E's were intended to give UNDP a new sense of direction as well as an integrated framework on which to focus its development work. Finally, at its 1994 global UNDP meeting in Rye, New York, senior staff agreed on seven prerequisites to operationalize SHD/PCD for UNDP. [13]

At the level of policy, UNDP's Fifth Programming Cycle differed from former ones in that it involved UNDP much more proactively in what the agency now calls *Upstream* work--i.e., in policy analysis and in assuming an intellectual leadership role in current development debates and institutional reforms. At the global level, examples of such efforts include UNDP's attempts to influence the outcomes of the 1995 WSSD through

the policy proposals put forward in its *1994 HDR* [14] as well as the UNDP Administrator's policy contribution to key international documents such as *Agenda for Development*. [15] At the national level, UNDP has encouraged recipient governments to draft national *Human Development* and poverty eradication plans and national HDRs. In terms of donor and aid coordination, at the behest of former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali, UNDP Administrator Speth has tried to play a greater policy and aid coordination role within the UN at large. And at the national level, the Fifth Cycle has led to the establishment of a network of high-profile UN *Resident Coordinators* (who are usually but not always UNDP's Resident Representative--RR) equipped to oversee and ease collaboration between all UN activities in the field; the introduction of a mechanism for joint UN-government development planning in the form of the *Country Strategy Note* (CSN); and a shift towards greater harmonization of country programme presentation and budgetary procedures through the *Joint Consultative Group on Policy* (JCGP) which includes UN agencies such as UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, IFAD, WFP UNHCR. [16] Each of these initiatives were intended to improve UN-wide coordination both globally and in the field and to reassert UNDP's coordination functions within the UN at both levels.

The 1990s brought numerous changes into UNDP at the programme level as well. First of all, in terms of programme expenditures, although sectoral allocations did not change dramatically from the Fourth to the Fifth Programme cycles, the available evidence shows that UNDP did somewhat reduce the proportion of its funds going towards its traditional sectors of agriculture, fishing, and industry and started investing more money (though not much more) in general development (i.e., development planning, policy work, cross-cutting themes, etc.) and in social development areas like health, education and settlements. [17] On top of this, a review of 79 UNDP CPs covering both the Fourth and Fifth cycles revealed a definite shift in

emphasis towards poverty and *Human Development* concerns. According to the study, not only are the programmes executed under UNDP's Fifth Cycle more multi-sectoral and multi-dimensional in approach but 76% of the Fifth cycle programmes sampled addressed poverty alleviation as a theme, compared with only 34% of the programmes for the same countries in the Fourth cycle. [18]

Other recent programme innovations at UNDP include the establishment of nine Centres of Experimentation (Bolivia, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Egypt, Mali, Pakistan, Thailand, Vietnam and Zimbabwe) which have been encouraged to innovate and to form a network of 'change agents' within UNDP [19]; the launch of newly flexible and collaborative initiatives with grassroots organizations, including the *Partners in Development Programme* (PDP), the *Local Initiative for Urban Environment* (LIFE) and the *Africa 2000 Network*--all of them aimed at building bridges between LDC governments, UNDP, NGOs and Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) [20]; the introduction of more effective methods of measuring development impact in the form of the *Programme Impact Performance Assessment*--PIPA; the replacement of UNDP's entitlement-based system of resource allocation with the *Target for Resource Assignment* (TRAC) which disburses funds to country programmes on a much more competitive basis depending on each CP's SHD/PCD performance; and an increase in the proportion of UNDP funds channelled to Least Developed Countries (LLDCS) during the Fifth Cycle: Between 1977-81, 64% of the country-level Indicative Planning Figures (IPF) went to LLDCs with GNP/pc below US$ 500, yet by 1982-1986, this had risen to 79% and, by 1995, 87% of UNDP core resources went to LLDCs with annual pc GNP of US $750 or less. [21] During the Fifth Cycle UNDP also shifted towards a much more holistic and integrated *Programmatic approach* to development planning. Thanks to its adoption of a *Programmatic approach* during the Fifth Cycle, UNDP has also been able to reduce the total number of UNDP-supported projects by half (from 6,888 in 1990 down to 3,811 projects by 1995) while keeping total project budgets constant. [22]

Finally, in an effort to decentralize authority from UNDP HQ to the field and to build greater capacity and ownership in recipient countries, UNDP used the Fifth Cycle to promote *National Execution* (NEX) as the preferred implementation modality for UNDP-Supported programmes. [23] By 1993, the share of nationally-executed projects at UNDP had jumped to 75%, the use of national experts had more than doubled and personnel costs declined since the personnel costs of NEX projects were lower than they had been for agency-executed projects which had become dependent on costly international consultants yet were the norm in previous UNDP cycles. [24] And, in order to facilitate *National Execution*, during the Fifth cycle UNDP also delegated authority downward to country offices for procurement of project budgets of up to US $100,000. [25] As part of its effort to delegate more power from HQ to the field, at the 1994 Rye Conference for senior UNDP managers, UNDP HQ made a genuine effort to incorporate RRs into the agency's brainstorming process about UNDP's future. Nevertheless, there is no denying--even within HQ--that, despite the above decentralization efforts, relations between UNDP HQ and field offices remain very top-down. In the case of the Rye Conference, for example, UNDP HQ had already decided to make SHD/PCD the cornerstone of its mandate before inviting RRs to discuss the agency's future and it was clearly New York HQ which defined the parameters of the discussions which took place at Rye. During my interview with Ms. Sharon Capeling Alajika, Chief of OESP, conceded that, the impetus for implementing SHD/PCD had emanated predominantly from UNDP HQ and that motivating RRs to carry out SHD/PCD at the field level was proving extremely difficult since some RRs viewed New York HQ as a distant paper maze imposing utopian ideas--such as SHD/PCD--upon the field. [26]

(**Table 5.2** shows UNDP's increased emphasis on poverty alleviation and on use of national human resources during its Fifth cycle.)

In the realm of management, in 1993, UNDP created an in house *Transition Team* which designed a 7 Point Programme of Change at UNDP which included translating global goals into operational activities, strengthening partnerships, promoting Resident Coordinators, Human Resource Management, restructuring HQ, and decentralizing and streamlining. [27] During the Fifth Cycle UNDP also created an *Office of Evaluation and Strategic Planning* (OESP) which has provided UNDP with its first Corporate Plan and a Strategic Planning Framework aimed at introducing UNDP to 'results-oriented management' by identifying specific success indicators based on the SHD/PCD framework. [28] UNDP has tried to enhance its organizational effectiveness by strengthening linkages between the various UNDP Departments spearheading SHD/PCD within UNDP HQ as well. However, during my interviews with UNDP officials at New York HQ, a number of officials conceded that mechanisms of collaboration between the HDRO and UNDP's operational departments were still few [29]; that there were still tensions between the thinkers and doers within the agency [30]; that staff in UNDP's regional bureaux often felt isolated and that they had few chances for cross-regional learning [31]; that coordination between UNDP departments occurred mainly between senior-level officials but rarely at lower levels [32]; and, that turf battles between the current Directors of the *Human Development Report Office* (HDRO) and the *Office of Development Studies* (ODS) had resulted in the severance of ties between these two offices even though both were intended to work hand in hand in the promotion of SHD/PCD at UNDP HQ. [33]

Also in the area of management, UNDP has adopted a series of measures to become a more accountable and leaner organization. This has involved introducing staff performance systems based on more transparent and objective criteria, enhancing the career development opportunities of national professional staff, and pledging considerably more resources towards staff training. In terms of financial accountability, UNDP has

introduced independent audits for its CPs and procedures for personal liability for financial loss to UNDP. [34] Finally, in 1996 Speth announced that, from 1992-1997, UNDP will have reduced its administrative budget in real terms by 12%, have cut its regular staff at New York HQ by 31% and its total regular staff by 13%. [35] (See **Table 5.3** for an Organizational Chart of UNDP as the agency was in 1994, mid way through the Fifth Cycle).

B) The UNDP-Uganda Country Programme Before and After the Adoption of SHD/PCD Approaches

Before the Fifth Programming Cycle, the UNDP-Uganda CP worked very much in the way in which UNDP operated elsewhere from the 1960s-1980s. This involved mostly accounting to and receiving policy directives, guidelines, evaluation missions from New York HQ; providing technical assistance--usually in the form of fellowships, foreign experts, or equipment; and sustaining a considerable but mostly administrative and generalist cadre of national field staff to oversee between 40-60 projects (less than today due to the difficulties of working in warn-torn Uganda), most of them aimed at supporting the recipient government, implemented by fellow UN agencies, and concentrated in technical and scientific fields like agriculture and fishing, natural industry infrastructure and communications, and development administration. The amount of resources managed by the UNDP-Uganda CP grew steadily from US$ 10 million during the First Programming Cycle (1972-1976) up to US$ 50 million by the Fourth Programming Cycle (1988-1991) and eventually reached US$ 77 million during the Fifth Programming Cycle (1992-1996). [36] Follow-up work on conferences, chairmanships of committees, and participation in special working groups and roundtables continued to take place, but it was the management of the project portfolio (i.e., fulfilling the reporting demands of New York HQ, ensuring that consultants' contracts were signed on time or that tripartite evaluations were carried out for each project) which absorbed most of UNDP's national budget and the CP project officer's time, both in Uganda and elsewhere. Before the 5th Programming Cycle, on the basis of

both its own strengths and the Ugandan government's *Rehabilitation and Development Plan* (1987-1991), the UNDP-Uganda CP concentrated on the rehabilitation of Uganda's infrastructure and in strengthening the planning capacity of government institutions. Both goals emphasized high-tech solutions and central government ministries based in Kampala. During the 4th Programming Cycle, for example, the UNDP-Uganda CP had two major goals: Agriculture and Integrated Rural Development (which absorbed over 60% of the US$ 63 million spent during the cycle and consisted mostly of highly technological and government-centred projects like support to a Migratory Pest Unit in the Ministry of Agriculture, the rehabilitation of the National Parks and Game Reserve Department, the establishment of an agro-meteorological services and climatological data in the Department of Meteorology) and the Enhancement of Planning, Financial and Human Capacities (which absorbed the remainder to the budget and consisted mostly of capital-intensive sectoral projects in the areas of communications, infrastructure, and industry, but also included a handful of projects in support of public administration in the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, the Uganda Commercial Bank and the Uganda Development Bank). In essence, the Fourth Cycle UNDP-Uganda CP did not have *Human Development* or poverty reduction as an overriding goal, it did not have any projects in the area of 'Sound governance', it had only four projects in the social sector (none in HIV/AIDS), and only two projects whose major goals included building the capacities of NGOs and community groups. [37] Moreover, by UNDP's own admission, many of the 43 individual projects executed as part of its Fourth Cycle CP in Uganda were overly dispersed, lacked common goals or linkages, did not have counterpart inputs from government, and therefore, had limited long-term sustainability. [38]

As in the rest of UNDP though, by the mid 1990s, the UNDP-Uganda CP started making a decisive shift towards SHD/PCD approaches.

To start, in its Fifth Programming Cycle, the UNDP-Uganda CP explicitly defines its goals as developing Uganda's human resources and enhancing national self-sufficiency as well as the Ugandan government's capacities in *Human Development* issues and social and economic policy analysis. Accordingly, the UNDP-Uganda Office proposed that its Fifth Programming Cycle concentrate in four areas with strong parallels to the above-mentioned four Es: Policy and Management Capacity, Poverty Alleviation and Rural Development, HIV/AIDS and Environment and Natural Resources, and that at least 60% of the Fifth Cycle's resources be invested in the first two. [39] Although the shift in resources allocation from the Fourth to the Fifth cycles are not dramatic, the UNDP-Uganda CP for the Fifth Programming Cycle does represent an attempt to gradually place more emphasis on *Human Development* at the *Upstream* level by enhancing national capacities in the realm of policy and 'Sound governance' and at the *Downstream* level, by focussing much more on poverty alleviation and social sectors. The latter was achieved by introducing more projects with a strong poverty focus, and especially projects aimed at strengthening the capacity of NGOs and CBOs at the community level. The shift, of course, coincided not only with UNDP's desire to pay more attention to *Human Development* issues but with the Ugandan government's desire to focus more on poverty eradication, as described in Chapter 4. Unluckily, because of dwindling core resources at UNDP, the resources of the UNDP-Uganda's CP were unexpectedly cut by 30% half through the 5th Programming Cycle. In the process, the UNDP-Uganda CP not only saw its budget diminish from US$ 77 million down to US$ 57 million, but the area of Poverty Alleviation was hit the hardest. Instead of the projected US$ 27 million once intended for poverty alleviation and rural development projects, UNDP allocated only US$ 16 million. [40] In short, despite its initial efforts to prioritize poverty alleviation--i.e., what UNDP considered the most important of the four E's--financial troubles caused UNDP to considerably lessen its emphasis on

poverty alleviation. In fact, the Mid Term Review of UNDP-Uganda's 1992-1996 CP itself concludes that UNDP's development efforts had been spread too thinly among too many projects and that the CP would continue to lack focus or SHD/PCD impact unless it refocussed on poverty reduction and equitable development. [41] (**Table 5.4** shows how the resources of the UNDP-Uganda CP were declining by 1992 and how poverty alleviation never became the salient component of the UNDP-Uganda CP during the Fifth Cycle).

At the policy level, during the Fifth Cycle, the UNDP-Uganda Office has tried to further the SHD/PCD agenda in two ways. The first has been by supporting a series of *Upstream*-level interventions aimed at promoting 'Sound governance' and wider political institutional reforms, including UNDP support to Uganda's civil service reform, electoral processes, and decentralization. The second way in which the UNDP-Uganda Office has tried to influence SHD/PCD policies has been by convening Uganda's first *National Workshop on Human Development* in January 1994. This workshop was instrumental in bringing together Ugandan government officials, donors, NGOs, and Ugandan academics to debate and analyze the Uganda's *Human Development* conditions and challenges. At the workshop, UNDP and the Ugandan government also discussed ways of accelerating the promotion and implementation of SHD/PCD in Uganda through the creation of a National Task Force and SHD/PCD Technical Teams within the MFEP which would help the government design a Human Development Profile, and eventually, a SHD/PCD Strategy and Action Plan which would: i) specify priority SHD/PCD sectors and targets (e.g., poverty reduction, basic education, health and nutrition for all, etc.), ii) needed areas of national capacity building for the implementation of policies conducive to SHD/PCD (e.g., undertake independent research on methods to promote SHD/PCD in Uganda, develop guidelines to mainstream SHD/PCD at the policy and programme levels, set up a core team to develop a SHD/PCD strategy within government, set up a

permanent data base and monitoring system on SHD/PCD, train district and local leaders on SHD/PCD etc.) and iii) a framework for dialogue between the government and donors to provide financial support for Human Development (e.g., promote SHD/PCD as the champion concept to lead the dialogue between donors and the Ugandan government, reform aid coordination mechanisms in Uganda, assign the office of the UN Resident Coordinator to lead the dialogue, integrate the programmes and budgets of donor agencies, etc.) [42] At the time of my visit, UNDP-Uganda had designed a 1995 Plan for the Operationalization of SHD/PCD to follow up on these proposals.

By late 1994, the promotion of SHD/PCD in Uganda had began to gain momentum at the organizational level as well. With the arrival of Dr. Babatunde Thomas as UNDP-Uganda's new RR, the UNDP-Uganda CP was given much needed intellectual gravitas, while the assignment of Dr. Joseph Opio Odongo as the UNDP-Uganda Office's first Human Development Advisor prompted an internal review of how SHD/PCD was being integrated into the Office's work. [43] As the UNDP-Uganda Office's new RR, Dr. Thomas proceeded to stimulate the cross-fertilization of ideas as well as a more integrated, multi-sectoral, flexible, team learning approach to development. He did so largely by encouraging informal luncheon debates about SHD/PCD issues and bringing in outside analysts (such as myself) to talk during those occasions but also by establishing a series of multi-sectoral and multi-departmental office working groups such as the *Strategic Planning, Policy and Resident Coordination Unit*--SPPRC, the *Programme Development and Resource Mobilization Unit*--PDRM, and the *Quality Management Group*), and re-organizing the UNDP-Uganda Office's previously individual and sectorally-based project officers into two major clusters: *Development Management and Governance Issues* (Cluster I) and *Human Survival and Environmental Management* (Cluster II). [44] Under Dr. Thomas' stewardship, the UNDP-Uganda Office began assuming a more proactive coordination role as well. This was achieved through Dr. Thomas' appointment as Resident

Coordinator for the UN in Uganda, as well as through monthly meetings of the heads of the UN in Uganda chaired by UNDP and UNDP's leadership role in the *Country Strategy Note* (CSN) process--an attempt to plan development objectives jointly between the government and all UN agencies in Uganda. However, despite UNDP's increased involvement in multi-sectoral projects and policy-level work, the UNDP-Uganda Office continued to be composed of a much larger cadre of administrative and support staff (41 UNDP staff in 1994) than of technical or policy professionals (in 1994 the UNDP-Uganda Office had professional staff, of which only two--the SHD advisor and the Chief Economist were specialists) overseeing the Office 85 projects under implementation. Added to these numbers, of course, should be the numerous Chief Technical Advisors and fellow consultants hired under each of these projects and their own secretarial and office staff. (The Organizational Chart of the UNDP-Uganda Office in **Table 5.5** attests to the large numbers generalists and of support staff absorbed by UNDP's still dispersed CP).

Finally, at the programme level, by the Fifth Programming Cycle, the UNDP-Uganda Country Office was making an effort to move from a project-based approach to development based on the individual formulation and implementation, and evaluation of numerous projects in various sectors towards a *Programmatic approach* in which development issues are closely inter-linked, treated in a multi-sectoral fashion, and placed under the umbrella of wider coherent programmes. During the Fifth Cycle, the UNDP-Uganda CP also made important strides in building greater ownership of programmes among recipient governments by moving towards the *National Execution* (NEX) of UNDP-Uganda supported projects and setting up a NEX Unit within the Ugandan government. [45] Another programmatic change put into place during the Fifth cycle was the *Target for Resource Assignment* (TRAC), a much more decentralized and flexible performance-based system of resource allocation. TRAC freed the UNDP-Uganda Office from the micro management of budgets by New York HQs by

delegating authority to the UNDP-Uganda CP when it came to the procurement of project budgets up to US$100,000. However, whereas most staff in the UNDP-Uganda Office welcomed HQ's decentralization efforts, many feared that system like TRAC tied the UNDP-Uganda CP's funding too closely to SHD/PCD priorities set in New York. In addition, none of the staff I spoke to viewed their rapport with UNDP HQ as reciprocal or maintained regular channels of communication with HQ departments (e.g.,the HDRO, ODS, OESP etc.) other than their supervisors in the Regional Bureau for Africa. [46]

Although it is difficult to attribute development achievements solely to UNDP's support, especially when donors like the World Bank and the IMF have been much more influential in Uganda, in the Mid-Term Review of the its Fifth Cycle Programme, the UNDP-Uganda Office claims that its achievements in Uganda include: improved revenue collection, inflation and debt management, the rationalization and modernization of the Ugandan civil service in the area of Economic Policy and Management Capacity-Building; improved rural infrastructure, strengthened Agricultural Planning and Statistics Departments, and improved accessibility to credit for small scale enterprises in the area of Poverty Alleviation and Rural Development; support to the development of a National Environmental Action Plan and the Environment Management Authority in the Area of Environment and Natural Resources; and support to the Uganda AIDS Commission and indigenous NGOs like the Aids Support Organization (TASO) and a role in the formulation of a national HIV/AIDS strategy and operational plan as well as in 80 small income-generating projects in the area of HIV/AIDS and Human Survival. [47]

In sum, during the Fifth Programming Cycle, the UNDP-Uganda Office made a conscious effort to place SHD/PCD and poverty alleviation at the centre of its CP; to accelerate the promotion of the SHD/PCD agenda by launching a national workshop and putting forth capacity-building proposals to mainstream *Human Development* at the policy level; became involved in a

series *Upstream*-level interventions aimed at promoting 'Sound governance' and wider institutional reforms; it enhanced the role of NGOs and grassroots CBOs in its *Downstream* interventions; and introduced important organizational and programme-related changes aimed at increasing the intellectual and coordination capacity of UNDP in Uganda, making the operation of the UNDP-Uganda Office more flexible, multi-sectoral, and enhancing the role of the Ugandan government, NGOs and grassroots communities in the implementation of UNDP-supported projects. These advances notwithstanding, change at UNDP has been slow and the agency has faced serious obstacles in its efforts to operationalize and implement SHD/PCD in Uganda and beyond. The sections which follow outline the setbacks suffered by UNDP at the conceptual, policy and programme levels.

III. UNDP's Conceptual Interpretation and Imposition of the SHD/PCD Paradigm in Uganda and Beyond

A) Obstacles Related to SHD/PCD's Conceptual Complexity

The first major finding to emerge from research was that just like the various international development experts and officials I had interviewed in London, New York, and Washington (Refer back to Chapter 3), development actors in Uganda had tremendous difficulties grasping the meaning, novelty or usefulness of the SHD/PCD paradigm and had dramatically different definitions and ways of operationalizing SHD/PCD approaches.

Within the Ugandan government, my interviews with officials showed that most of them appreciated that SHD/PCD approaches were about poverty eradication and improving peoples' well-being and felt that such goals were complementary to those of the Museveni government, often citing the NRM's *10-Point Programme* or the proceedings of *The Challenge of Growth and Poverty Reduction in Uganda Conference* held in Kampala in November 1995 as evidence of shared UNDP-government *Human Development* and poverty-eradication goals. [48] However, my interviews also revealed that, aside from those small pockets of government

directly receiving funding from UNDP (i.e., mainly the *National Execution Unit* [NEX] , the *Aid Coordination Department* within the MFEP and parts of the *Decentralization Secretariat*), few officials in the Ugandan government could speak at length about the meaning of SHD/PCD and key officials such as Ms. Mary Muduuli, Commissioner for Economic Planning in the MFEP, admitted to never having read the SHD/PCD literature and not knowing how SHD/PCD ideas added to ongoing development debates in Uganda, while others noted that they did not understand how SHD/PCD was different from existing social development terminology, indicators or efforts or equated SHD/PCD with foreign grants for improved national or local government planning capacities. [49]

Within the donor community in Uganda, several respondents remarked that SHD/PCD approaches were simply the latest 'jargon' developed by UNDP to resolve its own organizational problems and that, instead of transmitting novel thinking, UNDP was mostly articulating the existing consensus and advocating development practices already underway in other donor agencies. [50] When it came to discussing the novelty of the SHD/PCD approach then, many UNDP-Uganda staff themselves seemed to think that SHD/PCD approaches were radically different from what UNDP had been doing all along. As one of the middle-level managers in the UNDP-Uganda Office retorted: "SHD/PCD is a gimmick. What is new about telling us to focus on women, the environment and the poor? UNDP should have been doing this all along." [51] In addition, respondents noted that SHD/PCD was not necessarily the preferred concept/term in the donor community in Uganda donor agencies used their own development definitions and terminology [52], and that SHD/PCD was too vague and abstract to guide the development interventions of donors in a constructive and concrete way. [53]

Moreover, although most UNDP personnel in Uganda understood that SHD/PCD approaches were generally about 'improving peoples' living standards' and 'putting people at the centre of development', it was they

who expressed the most confusion about the meaning of SHD/PCD approaches and apprehension about the relevance or usefulness of SHD/PCD ideas to their work. With respect to the meaning of SHD/PCD, many of the UNDP-Uganda CP staff I spoke to remarked that, because SHD/PCD approaches were extremely vague, broad and abstract, it was difficult for them to understand what SHD/PCD entailed. In the view of a senior manager in the UNDP-Uganda Office, "the SHD/PCD approach is so broad and nebulous that "it seems to have no limits....anything one wants falls within SHD/PCD and can be justified under it"...."What falls outside of it?", he asked. [54] My conversations with professional staff in the UNDP-Uganda Office also revealed that many of them had never internalized the concept of SHD/PCD and did not feel comfortable having a conceptual discussion about it. In fact, during our interview, UNDP-Uganda's RR, Dr. Babatunde Thomas, conceded that his staff were confused about the meaning of SHD/PCD, that they had not internalized the concept, and that they had little ownership of it since they felt that it mostly emanated from UNDP HQ in New York. [55]

Finally, during my field work, I learned that UNDP-Uganda staff were finding it extremely difficult to close the gap between SHD/PCD theory and practice and held serious reservations about the operationalizability and practicality of SHD/PCD approaches despite the pressures from the Administrator's Office in New York to 'sell' SHD/PCD in the field. As one UNDP-Uganda senior advisor, pointed out, UNDP would first have to itself be clear about what SHD/PCD was about before it could make it clear to politicians and planners [56], while another explained that, because SHD/PCD is "only a set of principles, it is hard to quantify or to operationalize into concrete guidelines" [57]. A UNDP Programme Officer summarized the difficult predicament of the UNDP-Uganda Office by noting that, while everyone knew that SHD/PCD was supposed to lead to poverty eradication, no one knew how to operationalize SHD/PCD so that it had a clear focus yet at the same time constituted an integrated development strategy. [58] In fact,

an internal analysis of the UNDP-Uganda CP through the SHD/PCD lens confirmed that UNDP-Uganda staff had trouble determining what constituted *Upstream* and *Downstream* SHD/PCD interventions or how to go about making UNDP-supported programmes pro-Human Development and pro-poor. [59]

As shown above, many of the difficulties encountered by UNDP-Uganda staff in interpreting and operationalizing SHD/PCD in a clear yet integrated fashion are undoubtedly rooted in the sheer abstractness, complexity, and unfinished nature of the SHD/PCD paradigm. Yet, as the following sections will show, much of the problem is attributable to UNDP's own dispersed operationalization of the SHD/PCD paradigm into what often seem like an endless array of entry points, emphases, and agendas.

B) Obstacles Related to UNDP's Interpretation, Imposition and Manipulation of SHD/PCD Approaches

i) The Dispersed and Fragmented Interpretation of SHD/PCD Approaches Within the UNDP

The difficulties which staff in the UNDP-Uganda Office have had grasping, disaggregating, and effectively operationalizing SHD/PCD approaches have coincided with a very dispersed and fragmented interpretation and operationalization of SHD/PCD approaches within UNDP. Within UNDP at large, for instance, in addition to a new two-fold mission and '4 substantive SHD/PCD priorities (i.e., the 4 Es already mentioned), the agency's internal documents also point to '5 Capacities and Strengths of UNDP', a '7 Point Programme of Change at UNDP', '7 Prerequisites for the Operationalization of SHD/PCD', and propose a '10 Point Agenda for a New Approach to Development Cooperation' as well as '10 Patterns of Intervention' in which UNDP should specialize in order to realize its SHD/PCD goals. [60] Judging from the wide range of entry points, emphases and agendas on offer above, it would seem that UNDP's interpretation and operationalization of SHD/PCD has become very dispersed and sectorally-fragmented (especially in the case of the 4 Es) and currently constitutes

far too many separate components to comprise a focussed and integrated SHD/PCD strategy. Indeed, the assessment report produced by the *Centre for Development Research* on UNDP's effectiveness comes to a similar conclusion and urges UNDP to immediately focus its SHD/PCD strategy by concentrating on only two multi-sectoral and cross-cutting areas: i) helping to build capacity in effective management of public resources for SHD/PCD and; ii) creating an enabling environment for people's participation and choice. [61]

Within the UNDP-Uganda Office, the difficulties of giving focus to UNDP's wide menu of SHD/PCD entry points, emphases, and agendas has resulted in individual staff members assigning SHD/PCD approaches their own meaning and focus. Hence, while the Programme Officer in charge of UNDP-Uganda's governance portfolio defines SHD/PCD mainly as 'Sound governance' and sees policy-level interventions as the preferred venue for implementing SHD/PCD, the Office' Resident Economist primarily views SHD/PCD as an economic planning tool which can be used to make adjustments in economic programmes, and the Volunteer Coordinator feels that SHD/PCD interventions should be predominantly community-based and implemented at the household level. Naturally, these divergent definitions and interpretations of SHD/PCD are not mutually exclusive. However, the wide gulf in interpretations and perspectives does make it more difficult for the UNDP in Uganda to develop an integrated SHD/PCD strategy and present a clear yet unified SHD/PCD vision to the Ugandan government, donors or beneficiaries. Under ideal circumstances, of course, it would be possible to formulate such a strategy, even when the ideas at stake are complex and the agency's interpretation of those ideas rather messy. Unfortunately, in the case of UNDP, the appropriate circumstances do not exist. As the following sections show, the problem lies with UNDP's own treatment of SHD/PCD as well as with the limited analytical skills and experience of UNDP staff in dealing with multi-sectoral and integrated development issues.

ii) UNDP's Top-Down Interpretation and Imposition of SHD/PCD Approaches

Another factor which has significantly undermined the promotion of SHD/PCD within UNDP has to do with the impositioned and top-down manner in which UNDP introduced SHD/PCD ideas into the organization. A 1994 external evaluation commissioned on UNDP's effectiveness confirms that a serious gap always existed between the way UNDP HQ in New York and UNDP country offices viewed SHD/PCD ideas. According to the assessment, whereas UNDP HQ generally favours "increasingly comprehensive" and "complex definitions" of poverty and SHD/PCD, UNDP Country Offices yearned for "simplicity" and clear guidelines for operationalization." [62] In a confidential internal memo, a senior UNDP staffer intricately involved in the operationalization of SHD/PCD within UNDO candidly admits that UNDP HQ had made the mistake of carrying out SHD/PCD in very "a top-down way" and "as though it had been created on a different planet and now needed to be operationalized on earth", when, in fact, the SHD/PCD concept should have been treated more as "a distillation of successful operational experiences on the ground." The same memo goes on to openly recognize that UNDP's imposition of the SHD/PCD paradigm was aggravated even further by UNDP HQ's attempts to continually "sell" SHD/PCD in a manner that "rubbed a lot of people the wrong way." [63]

Apprehensions about UNDP HQ's imposition of SHD/PCD ideas upon the field became evident during my interviews with staff from the UNDP-Uganda CP, where several senior managers admitted feeling "pressed against the wall" by the Administrator's Office and the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS) to adopt SHD/PCD ideas even though field staff themselves had not yet internalized the SHD/PCD paradigm. As one senior UNDP-Uganda manager explained, "BPPS does not say you have to do x, or y but, they do say UNDP is about x and y and since incentives go towards BPPS-supported ideas, other interests in the field tend to get excluded." [64] The restricting effect of New York HQ's definition of the parameters within which the UNDP-Uganda CP can operate was identified as a problem by various

UNDP-Uganda Programme Officers, several of whom complained that they felt little ownership of SHD/PCD ideas and that the top-down manner in which policy directives were still decided at UNDP made it difficult for them to challenge New York HQ's tendency to send abstract SHD/PCD guidelines bearing little relevance to Uganda's development reality. [65]

In retrospect, the overly dispersed, fragmented and top-down manner in which SHD/PCD was interpreted and operationalized within UNDP was perhaps predictable given that UNDP's transition into a multi-sectoral, decentralized and more analytical development agency is still far from complete. The fact is that despite recent efforts to decentralize some of its funds through the introduction of the TRAC funding system and NEX, UNDP still has very hierarchical decision-making structures in the sense that all of the agency's funds are disbursed from HQs, all staff positions are decided in HQs and all of the agency's key policy-making (e.g., BPPS) and strategic management (e.g., OESP) units and guidelines are based in New York HQ. [66] Moreover, despite UNDP's recent efforts in the 1990s to develop more of a substantive and policy analysis capacity, the available evidence shows that the majority of UNDP staff still lack the experience or substantive analytical capacity needed to deal with complex and holistic development issues which transcend traditional sectoral boundaries. Recent studies show that UNDP staff still tend to divide along sectoral or regional lines and that, even within UNDP HQ's main policy arm, the BPPS, UNDP lacks substantive personnel in key multi-sectoral SHD/PCD areas such as poverty eradication and gender equity. Furthermore, this is unlikely to change soon since there are few funds for UNDP to expand its expertise in these areas. [67] In essence, UNDP's own organizational composition seems to be at odds with the analytical capacity and the bottom-up and multi-sectoral organizational structures needed to effectively operationalize SHD/PCD approaches into integrated strategies and to pursue core SHD/PCD goals such as holistic thinking and multi-sectoral development.

iii) UNDP's Toning Down of SHD/PCD's Potentially Transformative and Controversial Components

Another factor which may have undermined the operationalization of SHD/PCD ideas within UNDP has to do with the agency's own decision to shift its position on the more audacious and potentially controversial components of the SHD/PCD paradigm in the face of adversity. The first shift came when, in order to appease the concerns of Republican former UNDP Administrator, Mr. William Draper II that many of the ideas in the HDRs were too reminiscent of "Old Labour and Fabian Party ideas" [68], the Team of Experts in the HDRO agreed to incorporate more things into the HDRs about the virtues of free markets. According to Prof. Streeten, while the HDRO's Team of Experts agreed that people-friendly markets played an important role in development, more doubtful market policy proposals such as the private supply of education and health services, the supposed benefits of cost-recovery and saying that the state was over-extended in LDCs, were incorporated into the HDRs largely to please Mr. Draper. [69] The concessions made by the HDRO may have aggravated the conceptual confusion and ideological ambiguity already surrounding UNDP's promotion of SHD/PCD.

The above incident was the first of a series of compromises which UNDP would find itself making in the face of resistance to the more transformational and anti-status quo proposals contained in the SHD/PCD agenda. The other instance occurred when UNDP first tried to introduce a *Political Freedom Index* (PFI) in 1991. Although the PFI was from the start regarded as ill-conceived [70], much of the outcry over the index in the international community was undeniably political and largely provoked by G-77 countries (and especially in preponderant southern nation-states such as China, Algeria, India, and Pakistan) who saw the PFI as a potential threat to their governments' tight reins on national power and resented outside influences in internal human rights and governance issues. [71] Shaken by the debate which ensued, UNDP responded by refraining from

publishing PFI figures for all countries in its *1992 HDR* and from mentioning the PFI in the future. In the process, UNDP learned an important lesson about the costs of challenging traditional yet powerful southern nation-states still influential within the UN system and as well as in UNDP's Executive Board.

By way of synthesis, the evidence above would seem to show that the UNDP staff in Uganda have had serious difficulties grasping the meaning of SHD/PCD approaches and operationalizing such ideas in a focused yet integrated manner. These finding seem to confirm the *Baroque Science Phenomenon* presented earlier in a number of ways. First of all, we can see from the evidence that, as was the case with Baroque Sciences, while lofty ideas such as SHD/PCD seem appealing and convincing in the abstract, their sheer vagueness, abstractness and incomplete nature make their translation into practice extremely difficult. Secondly, as in the Baroque Sciences which assumed that the various parts of the whole somehow fit together harmoniously, in the case of the SHD/PCD paradigm, while in theory it is assumed that the various components of SHD/PCD have an inherent order to them, in actuality, it is extremely difficult for practitioners to translate the paradigm into practice without knowing the exact nature of the links and effects between SHD/PCD's various components, which entry points should be given priority, or in what sector or level one should intervene first. In the case of the UNDP-Uganda Office, for example, practitioners not only complained that they had not had time to fully internalize SHD/PCD ideas but also that they did not understand which of the various components should be given priority, at what level one should apply the ideas first, or how SHD/PCD ideas could be given focus while at the same time remaining a an integrated and cohesive whole. The grievances of the UNDP staff in Uganda also bring to mind Bardach who cautioned that a policy or programme based on an overly complex theoretical framework was bound to run into difficulties in the implementation process.

At the same time though, the evidence above reveals that not all of the difficulties UNDP has encountered in its promotion of SHD/PCD ideas are attributable to conceptual deficiencies. Instead, the analysis shows that UNDP's own actions and traits have also complicated its operationalization of SHD/PCD approaches. Here I am referring to UNDP's overly dispersed SHD/PCD entry points, priorities and emphases, its top-down imposition of SHD/PCD ideas and the agency's lack of personnel with substantive experience in multi-sectoral and integrated development, all of which have made it harder for staff to understand what SHD/PCD ideas are about, to feel enough ownership of SHD/PCD ideas to give their own angle and focus, or to mould the ideas into concrete yet multi-sectoral and integrated development strategies. Added to the above should be UNDP's own shifting position on SHD/PCD and its decisions to abandon some of the more transformative components of the SHD/PCD agenda in the face of resistance from traditional stakeholders within UNDP and the wider donor community.

Consistent with the *River Pollution Phenomenon*, UNDP's decision to downplay both the PFI and the anti-establishment components of the SHD/PCD agenda undoubtedly led to a partial displacement of core SHD/PCD goals such as the promotion of 'Sound governance' and challenging existing power relations and the neo-Liberal hegemony. The concessions made by UNDP in this case are also interesting in that they reveal how, within UNDP, conceptual judgement calls depend heavily on the agency's growing need to maintain its development niche and to attend to its own organizational interests by listening to the grievances of powerful stakeholders --in this case, both traditional staff within UNDP and preponderant nation-states with the power to create noise in the international community and UNDP's Executive Board. Of course, having organizational interests is not in and of itself a bad thing. The problem is that, in this case, there is a tension between UNDP's pursuit of the more radical, albeit controversial, goals of the SHD/PCD agenda and of its own organizational interests.

Finally, the above analysis also confirms that agencies like UNDP may be sustaining a series of contestable assumptions which have no foundation in reality. In essence, by romanticizing the SHD/PCD paradigm and its operationalization UNDP seems to be failing to recognize that: an inter-governmental development agency dependent on the approval of traditional nation-states may lack the political autonomy needed to challenge hegemonic ideas and the balance of power in the existing system of international cooperation; that an agency still spread too thinly in too many sectors, staffed mostly by generalists, and operated in a top-down manner may lack the capability to create multi-sectoral and integrated development strategies at the field level; and, that a system of international development cooperation where actors protect their own interests may not be conducive to development approaches which require close collaboration. Thus, as in Baroque Sciences, there would once again seem to be a gap between UNDP's SHD/PCD aspirations, its own organizational interests and capacities, and the severity of the constraints present in the international system of international development cooperation.

IV. UNDP's Effectiveness in Implementing SHD/PCD in Uganda and Beyond

A) UNDP's Implementation of SHD/PCD at the Policy Level

At the level of policy, UNDP's has tried to pursue the SHD/PCD agenda mostly in two ways: i) attempting to assume a greater leadership role in coordinating development policy and aid within the UN system at the behest of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali; and ii) launching both a global and national dialogues on 'Sound governance' and poverty reduction.

i) UNDP's Efforts to Coordinate Donors and Foreign Aid Within the UN at Large and Within Uganda

At the level of UN HQ, UNDP Administrator Speth has concentrated much of his policy coordination efforts in acting as a de facto *Resident Coordinator*

for the UN's development activities in New York as well as on being a spokesperson for an expanded role for the UN in the realm of development. Unfortunately for UNDP though, there is considerable evidence suggesting that Mr. Speth's increased involvement in coordinating and leading the UN's development policies and efforts at the global level has antagonized the World Bank as well as the UN's specialized agencies. [72] The resulting friction was evident in the negativity of several of the UN and World Bank officials I spoke to in New York and Washington.

In the case of the UN's specialized agencies, I learned that such agencies were much more interested in guarding their organizational autonomy and strengthening their respective sectoral niches within the existing system of international development cooperation than they were in promoting an integrated development approach such as SHD/PCD or in being coordinated by UNDP. To paraphrase the words of a senior UNICEF Expert:

> UN agencies like UNICEF will not let themselves be coordinated by UNDP....or in *perestroika* fashion. Donors want the UN to work together but each agency to keep its identity. [73]

However, equal scepticism was expressed at the World Bank where some officials felt that UNDP's limited resources, analytical capacity, and clout threw UNDP's coordination ambitions into doubt:

> The reason that more global resources are put into the World Bank than into the UN system is not only that the Bank is seen as having more high calibre staff than the UN, but also that powerful donors know that they have more clout within the Bank since power is distributed according to donation size. [74]

Others at the Bank also remarked that the Bank did not welcome UNDP's or the UN's policy coordination efforts in the North if such efforts were to result in attempts to place the Bretton Woods institutions under the UN umbrella and to make them accountable to the General Assembly and ECOSOC.[75]

It appeared that resistance to UNDP's policy coordination efforts in the field were as ardent as those faced by UNDP in New York and Washington.

First, when asked about UNDP's policy coordination leadership in the Ugandan context, most donors I interviewed remarked that it was other international development agencies which were playing the most proactive role in terms of policy, programme and donor coordination. For example, Mr. Patrick Fine, Head of USAID's Development Office in Uganda, noted that it was the World Bank which led Monthly Donor Coordination Meetings in Kampala, USAID which was in charge of the Private Sector Donor Sub-Group, and UNICEF and USAID which chaired the Social Sector Donor Sub-Group. [76] When probed as to why UNDP was not playing a more significant role in policy or donor coordination in Uganda, Mr. Iradj Alikhani, Chief Economist for the World Bank in Uganda, asserted that "it was one thing to be a leader and another to claim that one wants to be a leader." "Where is UNDP's thinking and technical capacity?, "Where are the results that an agency must show to take leadership?", he asked. "Human Development Reports formulated in New York do not establish UNDP's expertise at the country level," he warned. [77] Other donors and Uganda-based development advisors concurred that the UNDP-Uganda Office had foregone its window of opportunity in the area of policy and donor coordination due not only to its restricted funds and substantive technical capacity, but also due to the poor leadership of its previous RR, Mr. Tedla Teshome, and UNDP's bureaucratic nature and inability to shake off perceptions that its staff were ineffective political appointees. [78]

Fellow donors within the UN family were even less gracious when asked about UNDP's coordination effectiveness. For instance, Dr. Francois Farah, Director of the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) in Uganda, remarked that while he agreed in principle that UNDP should coordinate UN agency policies and activities given its seniority in the UN system , he at the same time felt that UNDP lacked the clout or maturity to do so. Underlying Dr. Farah's responses was undeniably an added concern that UNDP's increased coordination efforts might put a damper on other UN agencies' ambitions for

greater organizational autonomy: "UNFPA does not want to be put under the aegis of UNDP although we are part of the same family. Coordination is all right but it works only when one recognizes each agency's identity", he declared. [79] Fears over UNDP's possible encroachment upon the separate mandates of other specialized UN agencies were reiterated by staff in the World Food Programme (WFP) in Uganda who conceded that there existed a "passive resistance" between UNDP and UN agencies such as WFP which were fighting to become more autonomous and self-sufficient. [80]

Although effective donor and aid coordination (or lack thereof) is something which is difficult to observe, especially during a short period, during my field research in Uganda I was able to collect documentation and to witness instances which corroborate the coordination problems described above. For instance, while the available documentation shows that the UNDP-Uganda CP has made a useful contribution to aid coordination through its *National Technical Cooperation Assessment* (NATCAP) mechanism which is aimed at enabling recipient governments to define their technical cooperation priorities and promoting systematic programming and coordination of technical cooperation. Unfortunately though, because of budgetary constraints, the second phase of NATCAP which was expected to produce a Technical Cooperation Programme to help identify technical cooperation resources from all sources, was stalled at the time I visited Uganda in 1995. [81] Similarly, because, in 1995, the MFEP was not holding the aid coordination meetings which it was meant to, UNDP was still unable to play the "big coordination role of linking government with other donors and agencies" at such meetings. Instead, UNDP's own internal documents reveal that the main policy and donor coordination meetings which had been taking place in Uganda during the Fifth cycle were the Paris Consultative Group Meetings organized by the World Bank in collaboration with Ugandan government, monthly donor meetings chaired by the World Bank, and a series of sectoral meetings led by the donors cited above. [82] The only meetings

being led by UNDP in 1995 then, were monthly meetings of heads of the UN who, as part of the UN family, have little choice but to accept UNDP's coordination. However, even within the UN system, there is written evidence suggesting that UNDP's coordination ambitions have not been welcomed by specialized UN agencies struggling to retain their distinctive character, focus, fundraising, governance structures and their own accountability on country programme and policy matters. [83] Hence, apart from being named leader of the newly constituted but much reduced *United Nations Development Group* (after much negotiation it was decided that the group would only be comprised of UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF and would exclude the WFP and the World Bank's IFAD), UNDP has had to settle for leading one of the small sub-groups of the various inter-agency task forces led by different UN agencies, and has reduced the scope of its coordination efforts to improving field-level programme collaboration (e.g., by promoting the *Country Strategy Note* and the *Resident Coordinator System)* and harmonizing operational and procedural systems between UN agencies [84]. And, even these modest coordination goals have progressed slowly as UN agencies have resisted UNDP's efforts to harmonize programme and administrative procedures. [85]

On the basis of the evidence provided above, it would seem that UNDP-Uganda's own organizational limitations (i.e., its restricted global power vis-a-vis the World Bank and limited funds, analytical capacity or trajectory of policy influence), coupled with the sectoral protectionism of other donors have undermined UNDP's hopes of playing a greater leadership role in coordinating development efforts in the UN system at large as well as in Uganda. Of course, the conflictual and territorial nature of donor behaviour, or what UNDP-Uganda's SHD/PCD Advisor calls the "balkanization" of Uganda's system of international development cooperation" [86], is not exclusive to UNDP but rather a prevalent feature of Ugandan development cooperation which, as noted in Chapter 4, has been reinforced by the Ugandan government's own poor coordination of donors and the tendency of

Ugandan ministries to take advantage of donors' sectoralism and territoriality to protect their own funding. [87] The result has been a system of development cooperation in which each donor operates in their own sphere and ministerial zone and in which territoriality and turf-battles occupy time and energy which could have been spent on poverty-eradication.

Judging from the discussion above, it would also seem that UNDP's donor and aid coordination ambitions, both in New York and in the field in Uganda, have been undermined by UNDP's inability to appreciate the gap between its coordination aspirations and the reality of the situation in the international development cooperation community or within its own agency. In particular, UNDP seems to have made two contestable assumptions: one, that the agency had the appropriate organizational structures to play a greater policy and aid coordination role, in the process ignoring its own lack of funds, substantive technical capacity, or trajectory as a shaper of policy; and, two, that the existing system of international development cooperation is harmonious and driven by a common desire for cross-agency and cross-sectoral collaboration, thereby failing to recognize the prevalence of sectoralism, territoriality, and fiefdom-creation within the international donor community. In the case of UNDP, the tensions already present within the donor community may have been further aggravated by the financial corruption of the Ugandan civil service and the balkanized nature of the aid system in Uganda as well as by UNDP's own insistence on using SHD/PCD as a means of increasing its profile in the system of development cooperation even it this meant alienating fellow UN agencies by reducing their share of UNDP-supported consultancies and contracts through the introduction national execution modalities. [88] These findings have direct implications for my analysis of the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches in as far as they show that, as stated in the River Pollution Phenomenon, organizational interests (and specifically the need to pursue a higher public profile through a greater

leadership role in policy and aid coordination), coupled with inappropriate organizational structures within UNDP and the lack of an enabling environment within the donor community in Uganda, have caused UNDP to gradually scale down some of its more ambitious coordination aspirations. The above evidence is equally instructive in that it confirms that, as stated in the *Baroque Science Phenomenon*, the contestable assumptions held by UNDP can end up resulting in a serious gap between UNDP's SHD/PCD aspirations and what is doable in the existing development context.

ii) UNDP's Efforts to Foster a Policy Dialogue on 'Sound Governance' and Poverty Reduction

The other important way in which UNDP has been trying to exert policy influence has been by promoting a policy dialogue on 'Sound governance' and poverty reduction, both at the global and national levels. As already mentioned, at the global level, UNDP' has concentrated its policy efforts on using the policy proposals contained in its *1994 HDR* to influence the outcomes of the 1995 Social Summit in Copenhagen. At the national level, the policy efforts of the UNDP-Uganda Office have focused mainly on supporting *Upstream*-level programmes conducive to wider governance and institutional reform in civil service and electoral reform, the decentralization process, and in trying to convince the Ugandan government to formulate and implement its own National *Human Development* Strategy. However, as the following sections show, UNDP has encountered serious difficulties enhancing its policy work, at the conceptual as well as at the global and national levels.

Conceptually speaking, UNDP's main obstacle to effectively promoting a 'Sound governance' debate lies with the sheer vagueness of the concept of 'Sound governance' and the lack of controversy surrounding its varying definitions. The conceptual weaknesses of the whole 'Sound governance'

debate has already been discussed in Chapter 4 and does not need to be addressed here. What is useful to emphasize at this point though is that, like the wider 'Sound governance' debate, UNDP itself has never quite moved beyond a very general definition of 'Sound governance' (as stated in Chapter 1, endnote #57). The lack of concreteness of UNDP's treatment of 'Sound governance' is evident in the vagueness and idealism of many of the policy statements found in UNDP documents. Hence, while statements such as: "leadership should be transformational", "government will be expected to facilitate rather than interfere", "the state must be called upon to manage less but to manage better and differently", or, "which approach to adopt towards civil service reform should be gauged on the extent to which, in the circumstances prevailing at the time, it (a particular approach) is deemed better able than alternatives to produce desirable outcomes" [89] are commendable in principle, they are of little use to the practitioner since they do not specify what aspects of the 'Sound governance' agenda UNDP prioritizes or how the tensions which sometimes occur between the different components of the agenda will be resolved (e.g., greater democratization vs. greater self-determination), or what kinds of benchmarks the agency plans to use to assess 'Sound governance' progress. As the sections which follow will show, the vagueness of UNDP's approach to 'Sound governance', once coupled with factors such as political resistance and organizational interests and limitations has had adverse effects on UNDP's promotion of the 'Sound governance' agenda, both globally and in Uganda.

At the global level, both the moderate (e.g., increased ODA funding, a *20/20 Compact, etc.)* and more audacious policy proposals (e.g., a reinvigorated framework for global governance based on the establishment of an *Economic Security Council*, a *World Central Bank* and a *Global Human Security Compact)* put forward by UNDP at the WSSD were intended to give UNDP a catalytic role in global governance debates as well as to challenge the status quo by advocating a more equitable, democratic, and caring system of international

cooperation. This, at least, was the intention before UNDP's pro-active approach to 'Sound governance' was unexpectedly put to an end by those international actors that rejected UNDP's policy activism. My interviews in New York indicate that both UN officials and large, influential, albeit traditional UN member-states LDCs such as India, China, and Nigeria [90], feared that UNDP's proactive promotion of the 'Sound Governance' agenda threatened their own power bases.

Among traditional nation-states the main concern was that through its promotion of 'Sound governance' ideals such as demilitarization, democratization, respect of human rights and the investment of the peace dividend on social investments for the poor, UNDP was not only challenging the power (and sometimes authoritarian preferences) of still influential LDC governments but, in the process, was also undermining the sacredness of the principle of self-determination in the world regime and the South's efforts to vehemently protect its diminishing global power base and national sovereignty in the face of declining aid entitlements and escalating northern conditionality. [91]

However, in addition to political pressures exerted by influential LDCs fearing global and national power loss, UNDP's global advocacy efforts at the WSSD were frustrated by the territoriality and protection of organizational interests within the UN system itself. In fact, not long after traditional nation-states started protesting that UNDP had overstepped its mandate by promoting global policy proposals at the WSSD which their governments had not officially endorsed [92], the UN Secretariat's Department of Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development (DPCSD) itself began accusing UNDP's HDRO of pre-empting the results of the Social Summit as well as of overstepping its mandate and encroaching upon the responsibilities of the DPCSD. According to UN insiders, the rivalry which ensued between the DPCSD and UNDP's HDRO culminated in a turf battle

which ended only once UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali ruled that it was the DPCSD which had been formally given the mandate to organize global summits, and that the HDRO, therefore, should step back. [93]

The first negative consequence of the above events was that, by December 1994, the UN General Assembly had decided to formally distance itself from the SHD/PCD policy proposals in UNDP's HDRs. It did so by officially stating that UNDP's HDRs were to be regarded as 'reports *to* UNDP rather than Reports *of* UNDP' and reiterating that all policies governing operational activities for development would continue to be set by UN member-states [94]. Lamentably, as pointed out by a senior official within the HDRO, UNDP's official distancing from the HDRO undermined the Office's policy impact on core SHD/PCD goals such as 'Sound Governance' by sending mixed signals of support to SHD/PCD promoters and change agents within UNDP as well as by appearing lukewarm and inconsistent on its support of SHD/PCD to the international community at large. [95] The second adverse effect of the 'rap on the knuckles' received by UNDP was the subsequent distancing of nation-states themselves from the SHD/PCD proposals put forward by UNDP at the WSSD. As another senior advisor within UNDP explained, and as is evident in the Declaration of the WSSD, governments were partly reluctant to adopt SHD/PCD proposals initially put forward in UNDP's 1994 HDR or to use the term 'SHD' in the text of the Summit's Declaration since such ideas and terminology were deemed to be too closely associated with UNDP and governments preferred to promote their own proposals and terminology. [96] Finally, even within UNDP, internal memos reveal that, after seeing how its efforts to promote global 'Sound governance' were met by resistance from nation-states and fellow UN agencies, UNDP began warning its own staff to avoid offending the G-77 which saw SHD/PCD as 'bristling with conditionality' or regional entities like the *Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific* (ESCAP) which feared that SHD/PCD's focus on governance

ignored harder areas of aid. Instead, UNDP suggests, staff should adopt a more "low key" approach to SHD/PCD, restrict itself to supporting ongoing national endeavours and policy proposals already "blessed by inter-governmental consensus in the General Assembly" [97], and generally pursue SHD/PCD goals like 'Sound governance' and poverty eradication in an apolitical fashion. Indeed, in a presentation to parliamentarians in the British House of Commons in 1996, UNDP Administrator Speth, suggested that there was a difference between 'Governance' and 'Politics', and noted that UNDP should be careful not to intervene in the latter. He did not, however, say how UNDP would distinguish the thin line separating the two.[98]

At the national level, as already mentioned, the UNDP-Uganda Office has followed a two-track approach to the promotion of 'Sound governance' and poverty eradication in Uganda.

The first track has entailed supporting a series of *Upstream* programme interventions aimed at wider governance and political institutional reforms, including assisting the Ugandan government's civil service reform, as well as electoral processes and decentralization. As part of its support to the Constituent Assembly elections in 1994, for instance, UNDP facilitated civic education and the coordination of international observers and local monitoring groups--both crucial contributions given the lack of information accessible to Ugandan peasants about democratic processes, as problem highlighted in Chapter 4. In the case of civil service reform, UNDP claims that its technical assistance contributed to the creation of a rationalized Ugandan civil service with an improved remuneration package for employees retained in the service. [99] In the case of decentralization, UNDP's consultants have provided an in-depth analysis of how core planning concepts could be applied to a Strategic Decentralization Planning Framework and produced a proposal for UNDP's support in the formulation of a prototype Integrated District Plan and a training

programme for decentralized planning. [100] Through these policy-related programmes, the UNDP-Uganda Office has shown that it wants to begin contributing to wider governance and institutional reform processes.

The main barrier faced by the UNDP in Uganda in its promotion of the 'Sound governance' agenda and wider institutional change is that, the UNDP-Uganda's potential in this area has never been fully realized. The first reason for this is that the UNDP-Uganda CP for the Fifth Programming Cycle does not include 'Sound governance' as one of its main components and, as such, the CP has only 3 projects (out of 85) which address 'Sound governance' issues at the *Upstream* level. Even more problematic, at US$ 2.7 million (out of a total Fifth Cycle budget of US $ 54 million), the amount of resources allocated to these programmes from 1992-1996 amounted to only a few hundred thousand dollars a year--much too little to have significant policy impact. (See **Table 5.5**). Given the limited amount of resources UNDP was making available for projects with a wider institutional and 'Sound governance' component it should not be surprising that several of the actors I spoke to in Uganda noted that it was donors such as the World Bank which had substantial resources, in-house policy analysis and research capacity which influenced Ugandan governance and poverty debates.[101]

These claims were confirmed during my research in Uganda, where I was able to directly observe that it was the World Bank's publication: *Uganda: The Challenge of Growth and Poverty Reduction* (Op. Cit) which was recommended to me as mandatory reading by respondents and that it was the numerous studies presented at the World Bank's seminar on poverty reduction, held jointly with the Ugandan government in November 1995 which was preoccupying the minds of policy makers and development experts during my two visits to Uganda in 1995. That same year, the only publication the UNDP-Uganda Office had released was a *Development Cooperation Report for Uganda during 1993-1994*

which contained mostly descriptive statistical data and showed little evidence of substantive policy leadership. Finally, during my research, I also learned that the one area in which donors could show that they had influenced Ugandan government policy: i.e., in the establishment of five *Priority Programme Areas* (PPAs)--health, primary education, agricultural research, rural feeder roads and water supply--which would be protected from funding cuts in the Ugandan budget, were predominantly the result of the World Bank's policy advocacy efforts. [102]

The second track used by the UNDP-Uganda Office to influence Ugandan policy was to try to convince the Ugandan government to give priority to poverty reduction and *Human Development* issues by formulating a National Human Development Strategy for Uganda. In this area, it is worth noting that, through its organization of a *National Human Development Workshop* in 1994 and recommendations for possible activities to follow-up on the Workshop, the UNDP-Uganda Office did make a genuine attempt to put poverty reduction and SHD/PCD policies on the table in Uganda. UNDP's main mistake though, seems to have been its tendency to propose its own concrete and easily visible technical outputs--e.g., creating a special SHD Unit and SHD data base within the MFEP or formulating a special SHD Strategy--rather than working within the framework existing national development and poverty reduction initiatives. As an illustration of this tendency, MFEP officials told of how the UNDP-Uganda Office had recently drafted a new poverty reduction project without involving key ministry officials. The resulting document, they complained, had to be re-drafted by the MFEP since its proposition to establish a new Poverty Reduction and Human Development Data Base within the MFEP went against the Ministry's desire to build up its existing capacity on poverty analysis rather than creating a separate academic unit within the Ministry. [103] In the view of Ms. Mary Muduuli, the Ministry's Commissioner for Economic Planning, the above incident showed

how "UNDP still has a tendency to send ready-made documents to the Ugandan government simply because HQ told them to spend the money". [104] At the time of last visit to Uganda, the UNDP-Uganda Office and the MFEP were still discussing a draft Preparatory Assistance on Poverty Reduction which they hoped would become the foundation for a larger programme.

The other major setback encountered by UNDP in its efforts to promote SHD/PCD policies and to strengthen the poverty analysis capacity of the Ugandan government is that the Ugandan civil service has itself been weakened by the constant brain drain, rent-seeking behaviour and inadequate coordination or policy leadership resulting from the shortage of public funds for office equipment or to pay expert personnel. The UNDP-Uganda Office has made an earnest attempt to remedy this situation by investing close to US$ 6.4 million from the Fifth Programming Cycle on projects aimed at strengthening the policy and economic analysis capacity of the Ugandan government. (Refer to **Table 5.5**). Such projects have undoubted helped to consolidate the analysis, planning, budgeting and statistical collection skills of senior government managers in key ministries such as MFEP. [105] However, according to UNDP's own Mid Term Review of the Fifth Programming Cycle UNDP-Uganda CP, because the Ugandan government often does not provide counterpart government personnel to work alongside UNDP project advisors, UNDP advisors often end up assuming the policy analysis or management responsibilities of government officials. Instead of transferring skills, notes the review, many of UNDP's capacity-building efforts end up fostering a "dependency syndrome." [106] As noted by Ms. Mududuli, UNDP's capacity building efforts were also unsustainable over the longer-term since the Ugandan government could not match UNDP's top-up salaries or maintain UNDP-provided lap-top computers, vehicles, and secretaries once such projects came to an end. [107] Hence, although UNDP's efforts to build policy analysis and management capacity is not unique to UNDP and is partly a product of pressures from Ugandan officials for a greater share of aid funds [108], there

seems to be evidence that such projects lack sustainability and may aggravate dependence rather than foster self-reliance.

From the above, we can deduce that UNDP HQ's initially ambitious efforts to prompt change within the existing system of international development cooperation and to promote core SHD/PCD goals like 'Sound governance' were aborted by resistance from still influential southern nation-states protecting their foreign aid entitlements and power base at home as well as from fellow UN agencies set on protecting their own turf in the existing system of international development cooperation. In turn, UNDP's overriding concern with elevating its global profile while at the same time protecting its own organizational interests by retaining the support of both northern and southern governments in its Executive Board, eventually resulted in the agency taking much of the bite out of its initially radical global advocacy agenda, consistent with the *River Pollution Phenomenon*. These findings not only confirm that an inter-governmental organization as dependent as UNDP is on placating powerful nation-states is unlikely to be in a position to challenge the status quo but also that, far from being harmonious or collaborative, international organizations are prone towards territoriality and to protecting their own niche and organizational interests in the existing system of international development cooperation. At the country level, the impact of UNDP's policy influencing and capacity building efforts in Uganda have been mainly thwarted by UNDP-Uganda's own organizational deficiencies, including the limited amount of resources it invests in Upstream and policy-related interventions, its lack of policy research or credibility as a substantive policy shaper, and its penchant for pursuing its own organizational interests by doing what is easiest (e.g., pushing its own agenda) and most likely to preserve its niche in technical cooperation services or to be rewarded by UNDP HQ (e.g., by suggesting the creation of a separate data base which requires the use of UNDP advisors and is easily identifiable as

a UNDP output.) Finally, as stated in the *Baroque Science Phenomenon*, the evidence above shows that UNDP's policy advocacy aspirations have been at odds with the reality in Uganda and the international community at large.

C) UNDP's Implementation of SHD/PCD at the Programme/Project and Grassroots Level in Uganda

The last aspect of UNDP's SHD/PCD efforts which I explore are UNDP-Uganda's programmes with a strong SHD/PCD component at the grassroots level as it is these initiatives which directly touch the lives of poor Ugandans.

i) Overall Constraints Encountered in the UNDP-Uganda Country Programme

The first obstacle standing in the way of UNDP's effective implementation of holistic and integrated SHD/PCD programmes in Uganda has been the persistence of a multiplicity of 85, largely sectoral and ministry-linked UNDP projects in the UNDP-Uganda CP. In addition, data from UNDP's Report on *Development Cooperation in Uganda in 1993-1994* shows that, even by late 1995, the bulk of UNDP-supported technical cooperation projects in Uganda concentrated in traditional sectors such as agriculture, industrial and mineral exploitation, infrastructure and conventional forms of technical cooperation such as assistance to customs and aviation regulations or transport policy. The exception to the rule are those funds which were beginning to go towards HIV/AIDS projects (about US$ 2.8 million between 1992-1996), on projects with a strong poverty focus, especially at the grassroots levels (US$ 3.5 million), and projects related to wider governance issues and institutional reforms (i.e., the US$ 2.7 million spent on civil service reform, electoral processes and decentralization). However, a close look at the numbers in **Table 5.6** shows that, the bulk of the US$ 54 million budget for the 1992-1996 UNDP-Uganda CP was still being channelled towards the traditional UNDP sectors such as agriculture, industry, infrastructure/communications and economic management. [109]

Nevertheless, despite its difficulties in breaking old patterns of working mostly with central government ministries and providing technical assistance in the traditional sectors of agriculture, industry and infrastructure, as mentioned above, the UNDP-Uganda CP has undertaken a series of organizational and programme-level reforms in order to better equip itself to implement integrated and empowering SHD/PCD initiatives. These efforts, unfortunately, have not been without their problems.

In the case of UNDP-Uganda's adoption of a *Programmatic approach*, even though, by the time of my visit, the technical staff in the Office were already organized into two clusters which transcended traditional divisions of labour along sectoral lines, many of the programme officers I spoke to noted that, due to lack of experience, guidance, or time their attempts to work in a multi-sectoral fashion and to draft holistic and integrated programmes had not worked out. Instead, noted one respondent, UNDP-Uganda staff had simply ended up treating existing sectoral projects like programmes but been unable to properly link up these various projects or to integrate *Upstream* interventions with *Downstream* and community-based work. [110] From the data available in **Table 5.6**, it is obvious that far from moving towards a *Programmatic approach*, in 1995, the UNDP-Uganda CP was still spread out too thinly by implementing over 85 separate sectoral projects. [111] The Mid-Term Review of the UNDP-Uganda's Fifth Cycle further confirms that, with the exception of the *HIV/AIDS Prevention and Poverty Reduction Programme* which does indeed effectively integrate policy and community-level interventions, "UNDP's new *Programmatic approach* was not successfully applied in Uganda" and that the novelty and complexity of the *Programmatic approach*, coupled with its lack of synchronization with the Ugandan government or other donors resulted in each of these actors formulating their own programmes. [112]

With respect to *National Execution* (NEX) several senior managers in the UNDP-Uganda Office remarked that, although NEX had initially been intended to implement development cooperation projects for the whole Ugandan government and on behalf of all donors, including NGOs and CBOs, in actuality, NEX had been reduced to a specific unit within the MFEP and was only being used for UNDP-supported projects executed by the Ugandan government. [113] Hence, according to UNDP's own Mid-Term Review of the UNDP-Uganda CP, NEX was still far from being considered a shared national mechanism since both donors and government ministries had opted to retain their own multiple donor-ministry implementation modalities. [114] Similarly, many of the development actors I spoke to seemed to regard NEX as "an extra layer of bureaucracy" and as a 'UNDP Unit' artificially sustained by UNDP-supported salaries, vehicles, computers and telephones. [115] As one top-level UNDP manager commented, given NEX's financial dependence on UNDP, the government's lack of ownership of NEX, and UNDP distrust of the Ugandan government's ability to manage NEX, it was perhaps predictable that the UNDP-Uganda Office would end up leading NEX and formulating new initiatives such as the *HIV/Aids Prevention Programme and Poverty Reduction Project* which MFEP officials had rejected precisely because they had not been sufficiently involved. [116] In both cases, UNDP failed to cede project formulation responsibilities to government. In retrospect, it would seem that, by creating NEX without first ensuring that other donors, government ministries and NGOs would use the NEX mechanism, UNDP may have aggravated duplication in Uganda's system of development cooperation and failed to introduced a form of national execution owned by the Ugandan government or accessible to civil society partners and Ugandan communities, as initially intended. At the same time though, not all of the blame can be assigned to UNDP. Given the prevalence of fiefdom creation and rent-seeking behaviour and the lack of skilled Ugandan personnel in the Ugandan civil service, UNDP had actually few choices but to do as it did.

ii) *Constraints in the Implementation of Selected UNDP Field Programmes/Projects*

On top of the general programme setbacks described above, my research involved a more in-depth analysis of three UNDP-supported programmes under execution at the grassroots level [117] : *The Africa 2000 Network; the Micro Projects Programme to Combat Aids* (MPP); and the *Community Management Programme* (CMP). The projects have been selected because they are part of UNDP's recent efforts to move beyond supporting sector-specific projects implemented mostly by central government ministries. Moreover, each of the programmes supports core SHD/PCD goals such as working through non-governmental organizations and community groups at the grassroots level, reaching the poorest in rural areas, and using participatory capacity-building approaches to empower Ugandan communities be more self-reliant..

In the case of the *Africa 2000 Network*, the chief development objective of the programme is to combat environmental degradation and to promote ecologically sustainable development by seeking the support and mobilizing NGOs and community groups. The Network's main outputs include giving Ugandan farmers needed inputs (e.g., zero grazing cattle, chickens, animal feed, fertilizer, water pumps, spades and hoes, etc.) and offering on-the spot training session on environmentally sound and mostly indigenous technologies to improve farm productivity (e.g. teaching techniques like grazing, mulching, grafting, building trenches to avoid soil erosion, building latrines, using fuel efficient stoves, etc.). In addition, the Network has been quite effective at public education, forging links between Ugandan farmers through exchange visits, the dissemination of information about environmentally sound and indigenous farming practices through theatre, radio and a community-oriented newsletter called UGANDA ENVIRONEWS, and incorporating Ugandan NGOs (e.g., Environmental Alert, CARD, JESE) as trainers and project implementors. During our visits with

beneficiaries in Fort Portal and Iganga, we observed that the Network's model farmers had indeed constructed compost pits to supply manure for their gardens, built ditches to avoid soil erosion, and were cutting grass for mulching and planting trees for firewood and fruit. The *Africa 2000 Network* is part of an international UNDP programme established in 10-12 African countries in 1989. In Uganda, the Network is directly executed by a National Coordinator who is directly hired and supervised by UNDP. The National Coordinator is assisted by regional coordinators based in the field who in turn hire both international and national NGOs/CBOs to implement the Network's various projects. Since its inception in 1990, the Network has invested over US$ 2 million and created 31 small projects in Central Uganda, each with budgets ranging from US$ 15-20,000 and composed of various beneficiary groups of 30-50 farmers. Finally but most importantly, during our field visits, some farmers informed us that their farm incomes and crop yields had improved thanks to the programme.

In the *Micro Projects Programme to Combat Aids*, (MPP), the chief premise is that, in addition to providing curative care (e.g., medical attention, counselling and drugs), development agencies should enhance the well-being and self-sufficiency of Ugandan communities afflicted by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In Uganda, MPP has tried to achieved this by encouraging Ugandan communities afflicted by HIV/AIDS to form groups and giving such groups seed capital as well training in basic savings and book-keeping techniques in order to enable them to launch their own income-generating activities (IGAs). The group's profits are then either re-invested in the group (usually in the form of technical training--e.g., sewing skills) or used to help widows or pay school fees for orphans whose parents have died of HIV/AIDS. MPP is directly implemented by the NEX Unit in the MFEP which overseas the work of MPP's national coordinator in Kampala and appoints the programme's regional coordinators in the field. Since 1992, MPP has supported a total of 116 micro projects from 20 districts. Approximately

95% of the US$ 700,000 earmarked for the MPP pilot programme has already been disbursed. The income generated from the community-based IGAs created with MPP's assistance have provided school fees for 3,500 orphans and helped over 500 families to increase their own incomes rather than having to rely on the charity of family or the church. In addition to supplementing communities' incomes, MPP has strengthened an array of both international (e.g., World Vision, SALEM) and local NGOs (e.g., Uganda Women's Concern) now serving as umbrella organizations and providing training and lending implementational support to MPP.

Lastly, in the *Community Management Programme* (CMP), both communities and local politicians are equipped with poverty analysis, development planning and evaluation skills which are supposed to enable beneficiaries to formulate their own community development project proposals. In CMP, consultants and staff play the role of catalysts and mobilizers rather than that of omniscient development experts. The Programme is supported by UNDP but directly implemented by the United Nations Commission on Human Settlements (HABITAT). CMP is run by a Canadian Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) who answers both to UNDP and HABITAT. He in turn has a government counterpart in the Ministry of Gender and Community Development. As in the Africa *2000 Network* and MPP, CMP's CTA and national coordinator are assisted by a team of regional coordinator, the main difference being that, in the case of CMP, all government counterparts are government employees on secondment to CMP. By the time of my visit in 1995, the project had shifted its focus from 'community development' towards 'community management and empowerment' and was being increasingly geared towards fostering community self-reliance. The programme's most outstanding results include several mobilization workshops on communications and data collection and analysis skills as well as a series of training sessions involving central government representatives, district officials, project staff and community beneficiaries. The latter trainings have concentrated

on consolidating skills in gender awareness, improved agricultural systems, community participation needs, writing effective project proposals, designing baseline surveys and evaluation techniques. According to CMP reports, by July 1995, over 14 community projects had been submitted to the Programme, including 10 proposals for the construction of community facilities and 4 in income-generating activities. CMP's most unique feature is probably its conscious involvement of government officials from all levels (e.g., from Kampala Ministries, District Offices and local Resistance Councils--RC/LCs) both as project managers and beneficiaries. This aspect of CMP's design largely explains the support it has received from government officials who have praised CMP for working alongside government and facilitating the decentralization process by strengthening local planning capacities rather than duplicating government services. (The enclosed **MAP** shows the physical location of the three above programmes and **Table 5.7** summarizes their objectives and achievements.)

The constraints faced by UNDP in the above three programmes range from broader institutional to inter-organizational, intra-organizational, and community level constraints. I focus on those constraints with greatest implications for UNDP's implementation of SHD/PCD in Uganda.

a) Broader Institutional Constraints:

Because the broader constraints obstructing the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches in rural Uganda were described in detail in Chapter 4, here I only discuss those most commonly found in UNDP-supported projects.

Lack of Access to Productive Assets and Markets

One of the most common institutional obstacles cited by project beneficiaries and staff as a hindrance to the success of UNDP-supported

development efforts was poor access to roads, markets, supply parts, or repair services in remote rural areas. Respondents also complained of insufficient seed capital, land or income to hire labour or to invest in productive investments as serious impediments. In MPP, for example, Ms. Betty Ddungo, MPP's National Coordinator, herself concludes that many MPP projects have failed precisely because the grants given out by UNDP to community groups were much too small to start viable projects which would produce sufficient profits to be shared among all group members. These findings coincide with the independent evaluation of the programme carried out by R.M. Nyonyitono et al concludes that the community groups funded through MPP have at best made small profits and that only a few (2 out of 17 micro projects visited by the study) made enough profit to set up HIV/ AIDS education funds. The internal hand-over report by E.A. Birungi, MPP Regional Coordinator in Mbale confirms that, out of the 800 orphans which were expected to benefit from the 23 MPP projects in Mbale, only 200 did so since many projects never took off or had insufficient returns. [118]

Limited Access to Government Assistance For Community Development

A parallel problem was that, despite the decentralization process, the availability of government funds for community-level development was especially inaccessible to the poorest Ugandans. As beneficiaries from CMP explained, in their community, *Entandikwa* government loans intended for poor persons who were not otherwise eligible for bank credit often went to persons who had capital or land to invest in, who could pay the 12% interest rate, and who were politically connected. In fact, during our visits to the *Africa 2000 Network*, the RC/LC V member responsible for *Entandikwa* in Kabarole District himself admitted that *Entandikwa* credit normally went to those with close ties to local government officials. [119]

The above confirms the findings in Chapter 4 that the poor's lack of access to resources is a major impediment to SHD/PCD in Uganda. Furthermore, according to UNDP's own analyses (see endnote 118), because of the small size of the loans given out by UNDP, programmes like MPP and the *Africa 2000 Network* were having only limited impact in this respect.

b) Inter-Organizational Constraints:

Weak UNDP-Government Consultation and Communication

One of the dominant features of the UNDP-supported programmes I studied in the Ugandan countryside was poor collaboration between UNDP and government actors, both before and during project implementation. This has diminished UNDP's chances of incorporating SHD/PCD goals into local development strategies or of fostering genuine North-South partnerships.

The fragile state of UNDP-government relations was evident in the work of the *Africa 2000 Network* and MPP in Fort Portal as well as in MPP's work in Mbale District. Mr. James Mkata, the Assistant Chief Administrative Officer for Kabarole District pointed out that, although UNDP should be consulting with his office on a regular basis, UNDP had arrived in the region with pre-conceived project ideas and that he had barely seen UNDP project coordinators after their initial arrival. [120] Mr. Mkata further complained that, with the exception of a letter which arrived from UNDP a few days before our meeting, his office had not been consulted about UNDP's recent decision to merge the coordination of *MPP* and the *Africa 2000 Network* in Fort Portal. During a subsequent conversation, Ms. Mary Jo Kakinda, National Coordinator for the *Africa 2000 Network* confirmed that neither local government officials or the Fort Portal District Committee for *MPP* had been involved in decisions about changes to MPP's management structure in

Fort Portal. In response to the government charge that UNDP did not work closely enough with Kabarole District officials, Ms. Kakinda, pointed out that, when District officials were given reports by UNDP, they did not read them since what truly mattered to them was the direct benefits they could accrue from collaboration with UNDP. Also in Fort Portal, the District Agricultural Officer for Kabarole District told us that he worried about the duplicative effects of inadequate UNDP-government collaboration and of donors like UNDP giving farmers advice that contradicted that of the government's. [121] Finally, in Mbale District, the Deputy Resident District Commissioner noted that UNDP's tendency to visit District officials only *after* the agency was established in the area and needed their official approval contrasted considerably with the approach of donors like ODA/DfID and CARE who had invited District officials to advise on potential District projects prior to settling in Mbale. [122] The lack of communication between UNDP and District officials was confirmed by UNDP's reluctance towards my visiting government officials during my research as well as by these officials' lack of knowledge about what UNDP was doing in their Districts.

Limited Government Interest in UNDP-Supported Projects

According to my findings, the lack of Ugandan government involvement in the early planning or later implementation of UNDP-supported projects in their areas cannot be entirely blamed on UNDP. Undeniably, a major part of the problem in many of the projects studies is the inefficiency of the Ugandan government itself [123] as well as the reluctance of government officials to contribute to donor-supported development efforts unless they were directly compensated for doing so. Hence in Mbale and Tororo, I learned that local government officials who had originally been active members of MPP's *District Selection Committee* were inactive by the time of our visit due to the lack of sufficient incentives available from MPP. This situation, said the Assistant Chief Administrative Officer for the

member of MPP's District Selection Committee, would not improve until MPP improved its sitting allowances for *District Selection Committee* members. When these comments were relayed to MPP's National Coordinator, she remarked that MPP already paid *District Selection Committee* members a transport allowance of 20,000 shillings per meeting as an incentive to attend. [124]

Admittedly, in some of the UNDP-supported projects we visited, the Uganda government was considerably more active. In CMP in Mubende, for instance, both the District's Chief Administrative Officer and the RC/LC V Chairman told us that, in addition to giving government officials useful training, District officials were active in monitoring CMP projects, and that CMP staff themselves contributed to the District's through their participation in the formulation of Mubende's first *District Development Plan.* [125] Still, even in Mubende, the willingness of local government officials to invest time and energy in donor-led development efforts has not come free. The truth is that the local government's collaboration in CMP is attributed largely to the fact that a number of key CMP staff, including the District Coordinator and Community Development Assistants for CMP in Mubende, are government personnel who have been seconded to CMP. For such officials, working with CMP implies attractive project "incentives" and, in the case of the District Project Coordinator, the right to a secretary, a driver and a vehicle--all benefits which are a rarity in government circles and virtually unseen in rural areas. In addition, CMP's *Project Coordinating Team* (composed of the District Project Coordinator, the Chief Administrative Officer, and heads of other relevant departments in the District Administration) are paid a sitting allowance for CMP meetings attended. [126] Besides reinforcing dependence on foreign funds, CMP's proximity to government has the drawback of having work with Ugandan civil servants who see themselves as bureaucrats rather than enablers of communities; of endless logistical glitches (e.g., lack of vehicles for community

mobilizers); and of stifling bureaucracy (e.g., salary delays for staff, low morale among national professional staff who, despite project top-ups, resent being paid less than international administrative staff). [127] Here, my intention is not to chastise the use of financial incentives to motivate Ugandan government officials, but simply to show that, because of the dearth of public resources, in Ugandan civil servants have become dependent on extracting benefits from donors and that this undermines these projects' goals of self-sufficiency and sustainability. UNDP's main error in these projects then was not that it gave financial incentives but that it failed to openly acknowledge the problem and to take measures to counter its adverse effects in the initial programme formulation phase by considering alternatives that generate money from sources other than donors (e.g., getting project beneficiaries to pay government officials a small fee for needed services in the project; getting government officials to create governmental IGAs and to reinvest part of the profits into salaries and the rest into the project's sustainability. etc.), while at the same time treating the problem at the wider institutional and policy levels.

Government Pressures in Beneficiary Selection

As hinted above, sometimes projects can suffer more as a result of Ugandan government involvement than they do from its absence. In Mbale District, for instance, an elected RC/LC official who was also a member of MPP's *District Selection Committee* told us that even though both the RC/LC I and RC/LC V Chairpersons approved all MPP project proposals and confirmed their viability as well as the legitimacy of the groups applying, project proposals were known to be signed by RCs/LCs or local government officials in exchange for bribes. Furthermore, remarked the respondent, it would not be uncommon for a lower level RC/LC I Chair giving an honest assessment of a project proposal to be overridden by a higher-level RC/LC Chairperson. [128]

c) Intra-Organizational and Project-Level Constraints:

Inability to Reach the Poorest

One of the biggest shortcomings of UNDP-supported programmes at the intra-organizational and project level was their inability to reach the poorest. In the case of CMP in Mubende, the Programme's Regional Coordinator for Mubende conceded that the non-educated were not selected for CMP trainings and that only the educated had participated in CMP's Baseline Survey as they were in a better position to read and respond to the survey questions posed. [129] In the *Africa 2000 Network* in Fort Portal, one of the most active model farmers we visited was a well-educated nurse who happened to be one of the founding members of *Joint Efforts to Save the Environment* (JESE), the Network's implementing NGO in the area, as well as the aunt of JESE's Coordinator for Fort Portal. [130] Another favoured beneficiary was not only a fairly large farmer with over 10 acres of land, but also the RC V member for Kabarole District. [131] In Iganga, the *Community Association for Rural Development* (CARD), the local community-based organization acting both as implementor and beneficiary of the Network's projects in that District, admitted to channelling most of the project's benefits directly to CARD's Management Executive. The valuable water pump supplied to the group by the Network was set up in the Project Coordinator's farm and, of the first six cows given to the group, one went to the Project Coordinator, one to the Project Vice-Chair, one to the Treasurer, one to the Assistant General Secretary, and one to a family where the father was one of CARD's founders, thereby leaving only one cow for a farmer not on CARD's Executive. [132] These findings have very negative implications for UNDP's realization of core SHD/PCD goals like greater equity and accessible social services for the poorest since they suggest that, by channelling project benefits to community members who have privileged access to resources, power

information, and UNDP project managers, UNDP's interventions may be reinforcing rather than reducing existing inequalities in rural Uganda.[133]

Opportunism by Intermediary NGOs Serving Poor Rural Communities

Another trend which may be aggravating inequalities in the Ugandan countryside is the growing expansionism and financial donor dependence of UNDP's intermediary NGOs. For example, in a few years, the *Joint Effort to Save the Environment* (JESE), the local NGO contracted out by the *Africa 2000 Network* to oversee projects in Fort Portal had grown from a small cadre of volunteers to an NGO with full-time staff and fairly high operating costs. According to the figures in JESE's April 1, 1994 Project Document, out of JESE's 24 million Shilling budget for 1994, only 3 million shillings (12%) actually went to farmers in the form of credit--the same sum farmers contributed to the project in the first place, while 2.5 million shillings were being spent on exchange visits, 5 million shillings (or 20%) on transport, 4.5 million shillings (or 19%) on administrative and contingency costs, and 6 million shillings (or 25%) on meeting the costs of extension and training services, including staff salaries, allowances and staff training and development. Admittedly, some of JESE's organizational expenditures, notably those related to the NGO's training and extension services as well as to exchange visits, do constitute benefits for farmers as well. Even so, the budget figures show that the trend at JESE is clearly towards escalating administrative and logistical costs. [134] Interestingly, a similar trend can be found in the *Africa 2000 Network*'s international programme which allocates only US$ 8 million (31%) out of its US$ 26 million budget towards financial and material support for community-based activities, with the rest going towards technical assistance to intermediary NGOs and research institutes (US$ 8 million--or 31%), communications and networking by project coordinators and implementing NGOs (US$ 4 million--or 15%) and programme support costs and administration (US $6 million--or 23%).[135]

In the *Uganda Women's Concern Ministry*, this initially very modest indigenous NGO created by locals in Mbale in 1991 was given a grant of 2.6 million shillings by MPP to establish a pig breeding centre which started with 6 pigs and eventually grew to provide 18 families with pigs and to generate enough profits to help care for 40 families and 240 orphans. However, by the time of our visit, this NGO had already moved from its once modest office space in a simple 1-room structure (which now lay idle in the background) to a newly-constructed and fairly modern 10-room complex of which we were proudly given a tour. Today, the *Uganda Women's Concern Ministry* is comprised of numerous departments and monthly salaries alone cost over 4 million shillings. The rapidity with which it has expanded is surprising. Moreover, the NGO's Coordinator who happens to be the wife of an MPP District Selection Committee member, was submitting an even more ambitious 98 million shilling expansion proposal to UNDP. [136]

Distant, Paternalistic and Unaccountable Management Methods

Another obstacle in UNDP's promotion of SHD/PCD in the Ugandan countryside has been the use of top-down, technocratic and paternalistic management approaches by some UNDP project coordinators. For example, in Mbale and Tororo, we were told by several project beneficiaries that they had not seen MPP's Regional Coordinator in the last 6-8 months even though, according to the National Coordinator, he had been submitting detailed reports of his field visits to project beneficiaries in the area. Near the end of our visit to MPP projects in Mbale and Tororo we also learned that there were certain projects in the District, namely mainly those up Mount Elgon on the border with Kenya, which, due to their remoteness, no MPP Coordinator had ever wanted to visit. When I asked how such projects were monitored, I was told by MPP's National Coordinator that they had recently sent the young secretary from the MPP Mbale Office to meet with project beneficiaries since she was herself "from up there on the hills."

Even within CMP in Mubende which utilizes local government staff and residents as community mobilizers, beneficiaries complained that UNDP and HABITAT imposed unrealistic rules requiring community groups to formulate and evaluate their own project proposals. As one mobilizer in the S.S. Secondary School Group explained: "It is difficult for peasants to write proposals which are very complicated since most of them are illiterate. Yet, CMP staff are adamant that project proposals be written." During my research, I discovered that project beneficiaries generally coped by 'shirking' their project formulation responsibilities and paying community mobilizers to write project proposals on their behalf. An added problem was that because CMP community mobilizers, though locals, were identified and assessed by CMP rather than selected by communities, they were not accountable to or bound to incorporate the needs of beneficiaries in the projects they formulated. Beneficiaries from the S.S. Light Secondary School Construction Project also complained that, by the time CMP projects reached their communities, the projects' objectives and parameters had been pre-defined by external development experts and were difficult to alter even if they did not coincide with local community aspirations and hence were not conducive to self-reliant development in the long-run. As an example of the strait-jacket such projects put communities in, group members recalled how, after considerable collective discussion, they had decided that what they most wanted UNDP's/HABITAT's assistance for was the creation of revolving savings funds which would eventually generate personal loans for group members. However, because CMP staff had unilaterally decided that they would not provide loans or grants, the group had decided that they had little choice but to settle for the only other development priority they could agree on: the construction of a school. [137]

Lack of Feasibility Studies, Monitoring or Impact Evaluation

The absence of pre-feasibility studies or impact assessments is another major drawback of the UNDP-supported project we visited and one which has renders learning processes in such projects very difficult.

As a case in point, in the Bananyole Youth Group for Carpentry and Joinery, a Tororo group supported by MPP, the lack of a proper feasibility study resulted in some very unsound investment advice being given to the group. In this instance, while most group's members were young farmers who had originally applied for funding to start an agricultural maize and soya growing project, without having carried out a feasibility study, the MPP Regional Coordinator at the time told the group that it was preferable for them not to become involved in an agricultural activity since this would make them dependent on the weather. On the basis of this advice, the group settled for a carpentry project instead, only to realize much later that, poor access to roads, unpredictable electricity, and the limited market potential of their small village meant that carpentry was not a profitable or sustainable business venture there. At the time of our visit, this group was requesting additional funds from MPP in order to move their business to a larger town with better facilities [138] During our research we also discovered that UNDP-supported projects which gave the impression of being successful on the surface were difficult to assess properly due to inadequate ongoing project monitoring. For example, of all the model farmers we visited in the *Africa 2000 Network*, only one farmer from Iganga was able to show records comparing his overall farm income and crop yields both before and after UNDP's assistance. In this case, the farmer could prove that his farm's net profit had increased from 245,130 Shillings in 1991 up to 771,390 Shillings in 1993, the period during which he received assistance from the *Africa 2000 Network* via CARD. However, all other farmers visited in the Network, lacked 'before' and 'after' records of their farm's

performance and when asked for their r records, claimed that they had recently lost them. The Network's national Coordination, Ms. Kakinda conceded during our interview that the programme's data on increased farm income or productivity was incomplete since beneficiaries were not keeping records and since occasional visits by the national and regional coordinator did not allow enough time to gage groups' progress. [139]

A related problem was the absence of comprehensive impact evaluations. Although all three UNDP-supported programmes studied had produced evaluation reports, an analysis of the data in these reports reveals that the projects have tended to focus on the measurement of quantitative outputs (e.g., number of community groups given grants, number of training sessions carried out, etc.) instead of producing evidence of long-term development impact on beneficiaries' living standards either in terms of increased income, productivity, trade, or employment. Nor, for that matter, had indicators or a methodology been developed to ascertain whether these interventions had achieved core SHD/PCD goals like reaching the poorest, reducing inequities, or fostering greater empowerment and self-reliance. In CMP, for instance, during my interview with Mr. Joshua Ogwang , National Programme Coordinator for CMP, conceded that, although in places such as Mubende, District officials were very active in CMP, the programme did not yet have conclusive indicators showing that CMP trainings had influenced government policy or development plans. [140] In its 1995 Mid-Term Review of the Fifth Cycle UNDP-Uganda CP, evaluators concede that the absence of appropriate impact assessment is a major problem in the UNDP-Uganda CP and that the CP never identified success indicators with which to measure its progress. [141]

d) Community and Beneficiary-Level Constraints:

Limited Community-Level Know-how

In many of the projects we visited, serious implementation setbacks occurred due to a dearth of know-how within the beneficiary communities. [142] Unfortunately, these bottlenecks were rarely detected in time. In the Omukise Yetolere Grinding Mill Group supported by MPP in Tororo, for instance, because no one in the community knew how to install the grinding mill given to the group by MPP, a small fortune had to be spent bringing in a technician from Kampala, and, even then, the grinding mill broke down after its installation since group members had not been aware that they could not utilize the mill until its newly-built cement foundation had dried. When I visited, the grinding mill was still out of operation.

Preference for Quick Profit Rather than Training and Participation

During our research we also found that beneficiary groups were often much more interested in receiving financial grants, loans or inputs which could be directly used to generate profit than they were in receiving training which would build up their long-term capabilities. Hence, in the Unity Group Women's Association in Tororo town, a group supported by MPP, we discovered that group members were demanding that the money given by MPP to the project's intermediary NGO, SALEM Brotherhood, to train group members in tailoring skills be instead given directly to the group so that they could buy textiles and profit from selling clothes in the interim rather than having to wait to improve their tailoring skills before expanding the group's income. [143] During our research, we even learned of instances in which groups' desire to earn cash in the short-term led them to deceive UNDP staff. In the case of the Nabweya Women's Group supported by MPP in Mbale, for example, group members had claimed that they already

possessed tailoring skills in order to receive sewing machines from MPP. Upon the arrival of the sewing machines though, it became clear that group members did not know how to sew and that the group had planned to rent out the sewing machines for profit. [144] And, in the S.S. Light Secondary School Construction Project supported by CMP in Mubende, we learned that this project too had began to suffer as a result of shirking and low participation after CMP rejected group members' request for individual credit and savings opportunities and told them to settle for a collective school construction project with no concrete individual financial gains. [145]

Reluctance to Work Collectively Due to Unaccountability and Corruption

Another obstacle which we found in UNDP-supported projects was that internal tensions or distrust within beneficiary communities often meant that people did not want to or could not work collectively. This problem was pervasive in all three of the UNDP-supported field programmes we visited. Sometimes, tensions or distrust within communities would result in the exclusion of some members in project activities. In the *Africa 2000 Network*, for instance, distrust was the cause of low participation in the Burhara Group where men had discouraged their wives from planting trees due to their fears that tree planting might bring land ownership rights to the women. [146] But, most commonly, the tensions and mistrust resulting from the beneficiary community's social heterogeneity and internal inequalities manifested themselves in the form of unaccountable, autocratic or, corrupt leadership by group leaders known to be taking advantage of group members. As the Chief Administrative Officer for NGO and Women's affairs in Kabarole District noted, better-off women or established organizations in Kabarole were known to have formed groups in an impromptu manner for the purpose of capturing outside aid funds. This, he remarked, had made many community members reluctant to join groups even though this was a prerequisite to receiving assistance from donors such as UNDP. [147] And indeed, in Mubende,

I discovered that the Kisakyamaria Women's Group for Mushroom Growing which was receiving management and report writing skills training from CMP was in fact led by a well-connected US-educated College Professor from the Mubende National Teacher's College who was the neighbour of the local CMP Mobilization Officer. During my visit, I learned that this group leader had deceivingly told her poorer and less educated group members that a grant she had been given by British Volunteer Services Overseas (VSO) was in fact a personal loan from herself to the group and that, as such, the group would have to pay her back for it. [148] However, by far the worse violations of trust were encountered between group leaders and community members were in MPP which was the UNDP programme most directly involved in giving out grants to community groups. In MPP we came across half a dozen situations such as the one at the Malaba Women's Quarrying Group in Tororo where we discovered that the group's Chairwoman had unilaterally spent as much as 600,000 shillings of the 2 million shillings given to the group by MPP in order to pay for personal physical therapy in Kampala. Because this group's Chairwoman was the only person in the group who spoke English, was educated and kept the group's financial records, she was able to hide her expenditures from group members until MPP's National Coordinator asked to see their bank book. [149] The lack of accountability by group leaders in MPP probably has a lot to do with the fact that the ultimate beneficiaries of these group initiatives (i.e., orphans and widows of HIV/AIDS victims) are not the same persons implementing the projects or receiving UNDP grants.

Lack of Self-Reliance and Community Dependence on Outside Assistance

The final, but perhaps most detrimental shortcoming which I observed in UNDP-supported programmes was a tendency by community beneficiaries to become overly dependent on UNDP funding, often refusing to carry out beneficial group activities without a financial reward from UNDP for doing so. [150] For example, after the Chiraro Group in Kabarole insisted on

receiving additional training from the *Africa 2000 Network* to improve the quality of their farming techniques, group members refused to donate even a small sum of money to defray some of the public transport costs involved in travelling to Kampala to obtain the training. In their defence, group members claimed that their farm incomes were far too small for them to generate the 30,000 shillings (about US$ 30.00) for transport requested of the group by the Network. Ironically though, when the Network's National Coordinator asked group members whether they ever travelled to Kampala to visit family and friends, most responded that they did so but that in those instances they did so for their own purposes. To this, the National Coordinator retorted that if group members could afford to travel to Kampala for personal reasons, she did not see why they could not afford to travel for training and farm visits. [151] This exchange is illustrative of the severity of beneficiary dependence on foreign funding in Uganda and raises questions about the self-reliance and long-term sustainability of donor-supported projects after agencies like UNDP withdraw from the area.

The above discussion of UNDP's efforts to implement SHD/PCD at the programme and project/grassroots level in Uganda has several implications for my analysis of the implementability of SHD/PCD approaches in LDCs. First of all, at the general programme level, the tendency of the UNDP-Uganda CP to continue implementing over 85 small projects in traditional sectors like agriculture and industry and its difficulties applying the *Programmatic approach* confirm that when one is dealing with a vague and complex development paradigm such as SHD/PCD in which concrete entry points, priorities or connections between components are not easily apparent, the operationalization of such ideas becomes extremely difficult. At the same time though, we can see that because UNDP has retained its strategy-building functions, policy units, and hence its intellectual capacity, in New York HQ [152], to this day, the agency is lacking field staff with the analytical, integrated planning and consensus-building skills required to

carry out integrated development approaches which foster national ownership and capacity. These findings seem to confirm that UNDP is wrong to assume that a top-down, generalist, and financially-strapped organization such as itself has the organizational structures needed to carry out holistic and bottom-up SHD/PCD initiatives. Secondly, the above findings shows that although effective development at the grassroots level requires flexibility and genuine community participation--as stated by DD thinkers, NIE thinkers are also correct in point out that community participation and indigenous knowledge should not be seen as a panacea since, to be truly effective, participatory development projects also require at least technical expertise, close supervision and some form of managerial regulation by specialized development experts. Thirdly, the evidence in this chapter shows that, far from being harmonious or naturally collaborative, the existing system of international development cooperation in Uganda is characterized by territorialism and a system of foreign aid in which donors and sectoral government ministries have their own vested interests and created their own fiefdoms. What we end up with is a cadre of UNDP-Uganda staff who have become accustomed to meeting the quantitative, time-restricted, and top-down demands of UNDP HQ and to getting around the territoriality of the donors community and the rent-seeking behaviour of government officials, by focusing on quick and visual results and proceeding on their own, often at the expense of core SHD/PCD goals like enhanced donor collaboration, North-South partnership and national ownership, and greater self-reliance.

At the project and grassroots level, although the UNDP-Uganda CP has obviously made a genuine effort to widen the scope of its networks by working more directly with civil society actors and supporting grassroots initiatives, the evidence in this chapter suggests that such efforts have fallen short of reaching the poorest Ugandans, generating broad-based participation, empowering and fostering greater self-reliance among

beneficiaries, or creating conditions for long-term sustainability. Admittedly, many of the obstacles which the UNDP-Uganda CP has faced at the project/grassroots level have been beyond limited scope of intervention (e.g., broader institutional and community-level constraints). Still, many others have clearly been a product of UNDP's pursuit of its organizational interests--and specifically its tendency to do things in an expedient and top-down fashion, at the expense of SHD/PCD's goals of participatory, empowering and self-reliant development. UNDP's idealism and preoccupation with being seen as the champion of SHD/PCD caused it to overlook the severity of the constraints facing it and to sustain contestable assumptions such as the supposition that beneficiaries are naturally altruistic and equipped with abundant indigenous skills, free time and inputs to carry out complex and time-consuming SHD/PCD initiatives.

V. Conclusion: The *Baroque Science* and *River Polluting* Phenomena Confirmed

By way of conclusion, it is undeniable that UNDP has made impressive strides in putting the SHD/PCD paradigm into practice at the conceptual, policy, and programme/project levels both in Uganda and beyond. As the above evidence shows, UNDP has been particularly effective at redefining its mission on the basis of the achievement of SHD/PCD, at raising the profile of *Human Development* concerns in international reports and conferences, and at diversifying into new areas such as wider institutional and governance issues as well as into grassroots projects which actively involve NGOs and beneficiary communities in efforts to implement SHD/PCD at the grassroots level. At the same time though, it is equally clear from the evidence presented in this chapter that UNDP has encountered serious setbacks in its efforts to implement SHD/PCD both globally and in Uganda.

First of all, we have seen that the sheer abstractness, complexity, and incompleteness of the SHD/PCD paradigm created serious interpretation

and operationalization difficulties for donors, government officials and for the professionals in the UNDP-Uganda Office. As in the *Baroque Science Phenomenon*, UNDP staff in Uganda found themselves unable to grapple with a paradigm whose meaning was much too vague, whose components' linkages were not fully understood and whose priority entry points were difficult to identify. Moreover, as in Baroque Sciences, UNDP's idealism, coupled with its determination to elevate its profile by becoming known as the chief promoter of SHD/PCD, seem to have impeded UNDP from detecting (or at least addressing) the internal tensions inherent in the SHD/PCD paradigm (e.g., the tension between the strong conditionality inherent in donors' promotion of SHD/PCD and their promotion of SHD/PCD goals like fostering greater self-reliance in LDCs; the trade offs between expecting development agencies to implement programmes which integrate fast-paced policy advocacy--*Upstream* work with slow-paced grassroots-level participation--*Downstream* work; the tension between expecting project coordinators to foster flexible, participatory and beneficiary-driven initiatives while at the same time providing detailed feasibility analyses and monitoring which requires a very managerial approach to project implementation) or recognizing the gap present between SHD/PCD ideals and the severity of constraints in its own agency, the existing system of international cooperation, and within developing societies. UNDP's inability to appreciate the gap between ideals and its reality explains why it continued sustaining a series of over-ambitious assumptions about the ability of inter-governmental agencies to lead a major paradigmatic shift and challenge existing power relations; about the ability of the international community to work in a harmonious fashion; about the ability of an organization as top-down, bureaucratic and sectoral as UNDP to work in a bottom-up, integrated, analytical and flexible manner; and about the altruism and omniscience of poor beneficiary communities.

Judging from the evidence in this chapter, it would seem that SHD/PCD's conceptual vagueness and abstractness, the unknown links or prioritization of SHD/PCD various components, the internal tensions and trade offs between various SHD/PCD components, and the gap between SHD/PCD ideals and existent constraints were felt most at the field level in Uganda and among UNDP-Uganda Office professionals as it is they who were left with the burden of putting SHD/PCD ideas into practice in the context of extreme poverty, social inequality and political and institutional weaknesses.

On top of SHD/PCD's conceptual deficiencies though, this chapter shows that UNDP's own actions--namely the agency's overly dispersed interpretation of SHD/PCD approaches, its top-down imposition of SHD/PCD ideas and its own shifting ideological position on SHD/PCD--which have added to the confusion surrounding the implementation of the SHD/PCD paradigm. These latter actions by UNDP were partly the result of its inexperience in dealing with a development paradigm as ambitious and complex as SHD/PCD. However, they are also, to a great extent, the product of UNDP's tendency to place its own organizational interests ahead of core SHD/PCD goals when the two are at odds with one another. In the case of UNDP, we have seen that its organizational interests can take various forms, including giving into political resistance from its most powerful stakeholders (e.g., by abandoning the more audacious components of its global 'Sound Governance' agenda once it came under attack by traditional UN member nation-states and fellow UN agencies or CMP's tendency to incorporate government officials in its projects' implementation but to disregard the concerns of community beneficiaries); trying to extend its own development mandate (e.g., by insisting that UNDP lead the UN's global development efforts even though fellow UN agencies saw this as a threat to their growing autonomy or the tendency of intermediary NGOs working with MPP and the *Africa 2000 Network* to expand their own operations); concentrating on what is easiest and most feasible (e.g., bypassing inefficient

government offices in the MFEP in Kampala rather than ensuring their ownership or CMP's tendency to pre-define project parameters and to refuse to give out cash loans rather than engaging community beneficiaries in a participatory process); or simplifying the complexity of development processes and failing to acknowledge the gap present between UNDP's SHD/PCD ideas and the severity of the constraints the agency faces (e.g., by failing to recognize the conceptual deficiencies of SHD/PCD, the limited autonomy and organizational capacity of UNDP, the territoriality in the system of international development cooperation, or how limited beneficiary knowledge and altruism undermines the effectiveness of IGAs).

The first two forms of organizational interests mentioned above (i.e., giving in to powerful stakeholders and trying to extend the agency's development mandate) seemed strongest at the policy and global level, probably because it is at this level that the highest decisions about development mandates and policies are made. It is at this level, therefore, that UNDP is under the greatest pressure from UN member nation-states not to adopt overly radical policies and from the HQs of fellow UN agencies not to expand its global development efforts at the expense of those agencies. The last two forms of organizational interests (i.e., doing what is easiest and a tendency to simplify the complexities of development processes) seemed to manifest themselves most strongly at the programme and national level where, as it is to be expected, the obstacles to putting SHD/PCD approaches into practice in poor societies with weak institutional frameworks, limited financial and human resources, and weak governance trajectories are felt most directly. Either way, and as stated in the *River Pollution Phenomenon*, the unfortunate result, has been a gradual displacement of core SHD/PCD goals such as pursuing an audacious 'Sound governance' agenda, introducing more democratic and equitable structures as well as greater collaboration in the existing system of international development cooperation, moving towards more flexible, integrated and analytical, and

learning-based development interventions, building genuine North-South partnership and national ownership, and fostering greater equity, participation, empowerment and long-term self-reliance in LDCs.

Despite the above findings though, it is important to realize that the empirical test to which I am putting UNDP in this Chapter is an extremely exacting one. This is not only because, almost by definition, there is always a gap between an agency's aspirations and the reality, but also because UNDP has perhaps set unrealistic goals for itself which no other international development agency, or any other institution for that matter, has ever been able to realize. In similar vein, the analysis in this chapter should not be taken to mean that everything UNDP does is guided by organizational interests or that such interests always with core SHD/PCD goals. For instance, during my research I did find a few instances in which UNDP followed alternative pathways and behaved in ways which ran counter to the logic of the *River Pollution Phenomenon* (e.g., UNDP-Uganda's decision to work via unknown NGOs and to give credit to CBOs in programmes such as MPP was a risky move which went against the agency's tendency to work unilaterally and to 'do what is easiest'). I also encountered instances in which UNDP's pursuit of its own organizational interests (e.g., trying to elevate its global profile by putting forth a set of very audacious policy proposals at the *1995 Social Summit*) coincided with and indeed helped promote core SHD/PCD goals (such as promoting the 'Sound governance' agenda). On top of that, organizational interests are rarely homogeneous and agencies like UNDP can be simultaneously under pressure to pursue different stakeholder agendas (e.g., northern donors' desire to push 'Sound governance' ideals and recipient governments' pressure to give LDC governments aid entitlements free of conditionalities). Under such circumstances, it is often those stakeholders who are the most influential or exert the greatest pressure (e.g., the G-77 countries) who win out. Furthermore, not all of the setbacks encountered in UNDP-supported SHD/PCD

initiatives can be blamed on UNDP's behaviour. After all, as this chapter has shown, the rent-seeking behaviour of Ugandan officials themselves must assume much of the blame for the limited impact of many of UNDP's SHD/PCD efforts at the programme and project/grassroots levels in Uganda. Lastly, the *River Pollution Phenomenon*, should not be taken to mean that all the constraints impinging upon UNDP's SHD/PCD agenda are of an organizational nature. Instead, this thesis recognizes that a series of broader contextual and institutional factors (e.g., Uganda's tribal values and inequitable social structures, its undeveloped and overly centralized markets, and its cash-strapped, inefficient and rent-seeking civil service, etc.) have also obstructed the implementation of SHD/PCD in Uganda. What this chapter does usefully show, however, is that UNDP's organizational interests--and specifically UNDP's inescapable need for self-perpetuation--are important underlying causes as it is they which have caused UNDP to sustain a series of contestable assumptions which have impeded the agency from recognizing the gap between its SHD/PCD aspirations and the reality of the organizational, institutional and societal constraints which it faces. Another distinction which is helpful here is that, while the four forms of organizational interests described above are especially useful in explaining why it has taken UNDP so long to design SHD/PCD policies and programmes as well as why UNDP has constantly found itself displacing the more ambitious SHD/PCD components of its programmes, it is the existence of wider institutional constraints both globally and in Uganda which largely explain why it is so difficult to put SHD/PCD initiatives into practice once designed and why their impact has been less than hoped.

Theoretically speaking, this chapter's analysis of UNDP's implementation of SHD/PCD coincides with the claims of the International Development Cooperation literature (notably, Tendler, Smillie, Rondinelli, Riddell and Robinson) that international development agencies have difficulties challenging the status quo, influencing policies or fostering

flexible, participatory, empowering or self-sufficient development and confirms the warnings of Clay and Schaffer as well as those of Implementation Process thinkers like Bardach and Sieber that implementation processes are inherently complex and political, that organizational self-interest usually leads to some goal displacement in the process, and that there is always a gap between ideals and practice no matter how good the ideas involved. Perhaps more importantly though, the chapter makes two theoretical contributions to the existing literature.

The first theoretical contribution lies in showing that rent-seeking behaviour (e.g., the search for personal benefits, free-riding, and limited participation by government, intermediary and community beneficiaries) and limited knowledge (e.g., lack of information and scientific knowledge by beneficiaries, and weak project feasibility, integrated planning and impact assessment skills by project advisors) as well the inequitable distribution of socio-economic resources and political power (e.g., beneficiaries' lack of access to sufficient land, inputs, markets, or government assistance) and the undemocratic nature of project management (e.g., project managers imposing project priorities or procedures on beneficiaries) can be impediments in the implementation of UNDP's SHD/PCD efforts. In other words, the chapter shows that both the concerns of the NIE and DD schools of thought have an empirical basis in UNDP's experience in Uganda. A closer analysis of the three UNDP-supported programmes studied also shows that problems of rent-seeking were most severe in MPP where UNDP was working through government officials and giving out cash loans to beneficiaries yet had only distant supervision from a regional project coordinator who occasionally visited the region from Kampala. In projects where UNDP did not need to work with government (e.g., the *Africa 2000 Network*) or where no cash loans were given out (e.g., CMP), beneficiary and government opportunism were kept in check. The second but perhaps more important theoretical contribution of the chapter lies in showing how the

conceptual deficiencies of the SHD/PCD paradigm manifest themselves in the field level and how they complicate the operationalization efforts of those UNDP-Uganda staff who have been assigned the task of putting SHD/PCD ideas into practice in Uganda. By revealing the gap between UNDP's SHD/PCD aspirations and the severity of the conceptual, organizational and broader institutional constraints the agency faces in its efforts to put SHD/PCD approaches into question, the chapter also manages to challenge the SHD/PCD Literature and the inability of those associated with it to question the implementability of SHD/PCD approaches in least developed countries.

Finally, it is important to realize that, because of the difficulties of getting to know an agency as image-conscious as UNDP from outside, the evidence provided in this chapter is not complete. On top of that, because much of the information used in the chapter is based on interviews, much of the material presented is based on actors' own perceptions rather than on statistically representative facts. All the same, I would argue that the combination of testimonies, directly-observed behaviour, quantitative data, and assessment reports analyzed in this chapter constitute one of the most comprehensive portraits of the inner workings of UNDP ever put together and that the chapter's exploration of the views and perceptions of the key actors involved in the implementation of SHD/PCD ideas are essential to understanding why the SHD/PCD paradigm has been so difficult to operationalize both in Uganda and beyond.

ENDNOTES:

1. Robert Chambers, *The Bangladesh Human Development Report 1996.* Page 67. Quoted in: *Summary Report: UNDP-NGO European Forum*. Page 3. Brussels:UNDP, December 18, 1996.

2. 1965 General Assembly resolution 2029 (XX) on the creation of UNDP. (As quoted in: UNDP, *Generation: Portrait of the United Nations Development programme 1950-1985*. Page 28. New York: UNDP Information Division, 1985.

3. Ibid. Pages 27-45.

4. UNDP. *PNUD: Informe Anual 1990*. Preface, Pages 29, 44. New York:UNDP HQ, 1990.

5. As pointed out in UNDP documents, until the publication of annual HDRs, UNDP had always had difficulties being viewed as a substantive contributor to development debates since the tripartite arrangement of the 1971 Consensus had created UNDP to act as a coordinator, facilitator and manager, as opposed to a source of substantive development expertise. (UNDP. *UNDP: A Charter for Change. PART II - Management Challenges*. A Working Paper by a Transition Team of UNDP Staff. New York: UNDP HQ, October 1993.)

A study commissioned by UNDP from a private consultancy firm revealed that parallel to the unnecessary swelling of UNDP staff in headquarters from 278 in 1975 to 467 in 1990, most of the new positions being created were operational as opposed to strategic or policy-oriented, thereby reinforcing UNDP's traditional role as a predominantly operative and administrative agency as opposed to an analytical or substantive one. (Koetz, Axel G. and Otte, Max F. *A Strategy-Based Senior Management Structure for the United Nations Development Programme*. Page 2-3. New York: Kienbaum & Partners International Management Consultants, January 31, 1991.)

6. Centre for Development Research. *Assessment of UNDP: Developing Capacity for Sustainable Human Development*. Page 4. Report Prepared for the Governments of Denmark, India, Sweden and the UK. Copenhagen: UN and CDR, February 1996.

7. UNDP was told that given the agency's lack of a shared vision, a coherent strategy, or focus and the growing number of middle-level managers carrying out cumbersome administrative procedures and projects with no performance criteria with which to measure their effectiveness, UNDP would not survive long without major changes. (Koetz, Axel and Otte, Max. Page 4, 20. Op. Cit.)

8. Contributions to UNDP Core Resources were expected to be approximately US$ 900 million in 1996 as compared to US$ 928 million in 1995. Because of declining resources, by the mid 1990s, UNDP was obtaining almost 50% of its total income (US$ 1.8 billion in 1995) from none core resources such as co-financing, cost-sharing and trust funds. (Speth, James Gustave. *Opening Statement to the UNDP/ UNFPA Executive Board.* Page 3. Annual Session for 1996. Geneva: Palais des Nations, May 13, 1996.)

9. During his address, Mr. Speth warned Executive Board member nation-states that unless they helped UNDP reach its US $3.3. billion target for the year 2001, he would not blame UNDP's country offices for feeling betrayed and that they had "adopted major changes seemingly to little avail." (United Nations. *Report on the Annual Session of the Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Development Fund*. Page 40. Agenda Item 1. Annual Session 1996. 6-17 May 1997. DP/1996/19. Geneva: UNDP and UNFPA, 23 May, 1996.)

10. Interview #33. Links between UNDP's desire for organizational survival and the adoption of SHD/PCD approaches also emerged during interview # 3, 6, 11a, 14, 24, 29, 31, 34, 35, 43, 51, 54, and 161.

11. UNDP. *UNDP: A Charter for Change. Part I--Vision and Goals*. Page 10. Working Paper by UNDP's Transition Team. New York: UNDP HQ, October 1993.

12. United Nations. *Report of the Annual Session of the Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Population Fund*. Page 43. Op. Cit.

13. The prerequisites include: the collection of data on SHD/PCD and the publication of national SHD/PCD reports; the identification of governmental and NGO partners to promote SHD/PCD; strong advocacy efforts to create awareness about SHD/PCD; the strengthening of country office analytical and policy dialogue capacities; identifying UNDP's comparative advantage in the promotion of SHD/PCD at the country level; strengthening the backstopping and guidance ability of UNDP's HQ's Regional Bureau and the Bureau for Policy and Programme Support; and carrying out UNDP-wide training on SHD/PCD concepts and experiences. (UNDP. *Building a New UNDP*. Page 31. New York: Office of Evaluation and Strategic Planning (OESP), UNDP, 1995.

14. UNDP. *UNDP in 1996: Progress in Change*. Page 2, 4. Op. Cit.

15. United Nation, *Secretary-General Requests UNDP Administrator to Assist Him in Ensuring Development Policy Coherence in United Nations System*. United Nations Press Release. (Department of Public Information). Document SG/SM/5380 DEV/2026, New York: UN, July 27, 1994.

16. Speth, J.G. *Opening Statement by James Gustave Speth, Administrator to the United Nations Development Programme.* Page 6. Op. Cit. Presentation made to the UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board Annual Session. New York: UNDP and UNFPA, 1996.

17. By comparing UNDP's 1990 and 1993 annual reports, one can see that while, in 1990, 22% of programme funds went towards general development, 51% of programme allocations went to aggregately towards agriculture/fisheries, industry, natural resources and transport and communications and 12% towards health, education and human settlements together, by 1993, the respective sums were 27%, 40% and 14%. (UNDP. *Informe Anual 1990*, top Table on Page 29. Op. Cit. And, UNDP, *1993 UNDP Annual Report*, Table A, Page 15. Op. Cit.)

18. Godfrey et al. Page 5. Op. Cit.

19. UNDP. *Strategic Management in UNDP*. Page 34-35. New York: Office of Evaluation and Strategic Planning (OESP), UNDP, 1995.

20. UNDP. *Institutionalizing Participatory Approaches to Development: Experiences Within UNDP*. Page 7, 11-12. A Paper Presented to the Inter-Agency Learning Group on Participation. New York: UNDP, September 17-18, 1996.

21. UNDP. *Generation: Portrait of the United Nations Development Programme--1950-1985*. Page 30. Op. Cit. And, UNDP. *UNDP in 1996: Progress in Change*. Page 1. OP. Cit.

22. UNDP. *Change and Reform in UNDP: Highlights*. New York: UNDP, October 1995.

23. For a summary of programme-related reforms carried out within UNDP during the Fifth Cycle, see: United Nations, *Report on the Annual Session of the Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Population Fund*. Pages 28-32. Op. Cit.

24. UNDP. *National Execution: Promise and Challenges*. Refer to the tables in Page 25 in particular. New York: Office of Evaluation and Strategic Planning (OESP), UNDP, 1995.

25. UNDP. *UNDP in 1996--Progress in Change*. Page 9. Op. Cit.

26. Interview # 45.

27. UNDP. *Building a New UNDP*. Page 30. Op. Cit.

28. UNDP. *Building a New UNDP*. Page 8. New York: Office of Evaluation and Strategic Planning (OESP), UNDP, 1995.

29. Interview # 40.

30. Interview # 45.

31. Centre for Development Research on behalf of UNDP. See Page 35., Op. Cit.

32. Interview # 54.

33. Interview with Senior Advisor from the HDRO, UNDP.

34. UNDP. Opening Statement by James Gustave Speth to the UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board. Page 5. Op. Cit.

35. UNDP. *UNDP in 1996: Progress in Change*. Page 7. Op. Cit.

36. UNDP. *PNUD Informe Anual 1990*. Page 42. Op. Cit.

37. UNDP. *Country and Inter-Country Programme and Projects: Third Country Programme for Uganda.* Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme. Thirty-Fifth Session. Item 5 (b) (iii) of the provisional agenda. 6 June-1 July 1988. Document DP/CP/UGA/3. New York: UNDP, March 3, 1988.

38. United Nations. *Programme Planning: Country and Inter-Country Programmes and Projects: Fourth Country Programme for Uganda.* Pages 5-7. Report submitted to the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programme. Thirty-ninth session. Item 6 on the provisional agenda. Geneva: UN, 4-29 May, 1992.

39. Ibid. Page 9-19.

40. UNDP-Uganda and Uganda Government. *Consultancy Report for the Mid-Term Review of the GOU/UNDP Fourth Country Programme* 1992-1996. Page 12. Kampala: UNDP-Uganda, March 1995.

41. UNDP-Uganda and Government of Uganda. *Full Report of the Mid-Term Review of the Government of Uganda UNDP-Funded Fourth Country Programme (1992-1996)*. Colline Hotel. Page 3. Mukono, Uganda: UNDP-Uganda, March 6, 1995.

42. UNDP-Uganda. *Policies, Plans and Programmes Promoting Human Development in Uganda.* Chapter 6. Consultancy Report Prepared by James Katunze and Barbara Mbire for the UNDP Country Office. Kampala: UNDP-Uganda, November 1994.

43. Opio Odongo, Joseph. *Synthesis of Audits of UNDP Programmes Through the SHD Lens.* Internal memo. Kampala: UNDP-Uganda Office, September 2, 1994.

44. UNDP-Uganda. *UNDP-Uganda Country Programme Responsibilities.* Internal Document. Kampala: UNDP-Uganda, November 1995.

45. UNDP-Uganda. *Full Report of the Mid-Term Review of the Government of Uganda UNDP-Funded Fourth Country Programme (1992-1996).* Pages 3-4. Op. Cit.

46. This communication gap became obvious when I learned that UNDP-Uganda's own Resident Representative did not yet know that, in late 1995, Dr. Richard Jolly had replaced Mahbub ul Haq as the mastermind UNDP's behind the annual HDR's and that the UNDP-Uganda Office's SHD Advisor had never communicated with the HDRO and did not know whether, Sakiko Fukuda Parr, the Director of UNDP's HDRO since 1994 was a man or a woman.

47. UNDP-Uganda. *Full Report of the Mid-Term Review.* Pages 5-7. Op. Cit.

48. Interview #: 78, 177, 148.

49. For example, interview # 148 and 150.

50. Interview # 140.

51. Middle-level manager in the UNDP-Uganda Office. Kampala, Uganda. December 1995.

52. Interview # 139.

53. Interview # 142.

54. Senior manager in the UNDP-Uganda Office. Kampala, Uganda. Interviewed in December 1995.

55. Interview # 163.

56. Interview with Senior Advisor in the UNDP-Uganda Office. Interviewed December , 1995. Kampala, Uganda.

57. Interview with a Senior Advisor in the UNDP-Uganda Office. Interviewed November and December 1995. Kampala, Uganda.

58. Programme Officer in the UNDP-Uganda Office. Interviewed in December 1995. Kampala, Uganda.

59. Opio Odongo, Joseph. *Synthesis of Audits of UNDP Programmes Through the SHD Lens.* Op. Cit.

60. UNDP's diverse goals, priorities, patterns of interventions, comparative advantages and corporate objectives are summarized in: UNDP. *Building a New UNDP.* Op. Cit.

61. Centre for Development Research. See Annex I, Page 4 and the Introduction, Page x, 1996. Op. Cit.

62. Martin Godfrey et al. *Executive Summary*. Op. Cit. 1994.

63. Internal memo drafted by a Senior BPPS Official in UNDP HQ. January 26, 1995. Confidential memo only for reference without direct attribution.

64. Senior manager in the UNDP-Uganda Office. Kampala, Uganda. December 1995.

65. As an illustration of this problem, one UNDP-Uganda Programme Officer pointed out how, even though shelter was an important aspect of SHD/PCD in Uganda, this concern had not been incorporated into the UNDP-Uganda CP's list of SHD/PCD priorities since it was not explicitly mentioned as priority in the SHD/PCD guidelines sent from New York HQ. (Interview with UNDP-Uganda Programme Officer, November, Kampala, Uganda, 1995.)

66. In his evaluation of UNDP's effectiveness, Martin Godfrey et al also conclude that UNDP's practice of giving instructions and ear-marking funds from the Centre has hindered its efforts to decentralize decision-making and enhance internal participation. (Godfrey et al, Page 29., Op. Cit.)

67. Assessment Report produced by the Centre for Development Research, Pages 35, 69., Op. Cit.

68. Interview # 11b.

69. Interview # 9.

70. For example, in Dr. David Korten's view, the PFI was ill-conceived since it was based on a scholarly framework rather than on the *UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights* which was supported by UN member states (Interview # 10). And, Mr. Per Arne Stroberg at UNDP's BPPS himself agreed that the PFI had been controversial not only because its conditionality potential but also because the measurement had not been very precise. (Interview # 34).

71. At a meeting of ECOSOC on July 1st, 1994, Ambassador Ramtane Lamamra of Algeria, then Chairman of the G-77, publicly accused UNDP of using the HDRs to "bestow its own annual awards for superlative social and economic performances". He later told reporters that "Developing countries did not agree with either the concept of quantifying political governance or UNDP's concept of ranking countries in any fashion--be it political, economic, social or cultural". (Press Report by Thalif Deen, *Development: Controversial Report Pits US Against Third World.* Inter-Press Service, July 10, 1994. World Wide Distribution via APC Networks.)

72. The Centre for Development Research makes a similar finding. Op. Cit.

73. Interview with senior official in UNICEF HQ. January 1995. New York, New York, USA.

74.Interview with World Bank Official. World Bank HQ. Washington DC,USA, 1995.

75. World Bank Official. World Bank HQ. Washington DC., US., 1995.

76. Interview # 139.

77. Interview # 87.

78. Interview # 143, 78 & 144.

79. Interview # 142.

80. Interview # 138.

81. UNDP-Uganda. *Consultancy Report for the Mid-Term Review*. Page 24-25. Op. Cit.

82. See: UNDP-Uganda and Government of Uganda. *Consultancy Report for the Mid-Term Review*. Pages 30-33. Op. Cit.

83. See: Mr. Kofi Anan, *Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform*. Report of the UN Secretary-General to the UN General Assembly. Page 51, 53. Fifty-first Session. Agenda Item 168. Document A/51/950. New York: UN, July 14, 1997. And Centre for Development Research. Pages 55-56 and Annex 1:Page 4. Op. Cit.

84. UNDP. *UNDP 1996: Progress in Change*. Op. Cit. Pages 13-16.

85. During the UNDP Administrator's 1996 address to the UNDP Executive Board, several member states expressed concern that the *Country Strategy Note* process had only been fully adopted by governments in 16 countries and that harmonization of procedures was very slow coming and that other UN agencies were still dragging their feet on the changes (United Nations. 'Annual Report of the UNDP Administrator and Related Manners', in the *Report on the Annual Session of the Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Population Fund*. Pages 28 and 33. Op. Cit.).

86. Interview # 151.

87. As a UNDP-Uganda manager explained, in Uganda today, it is common knowledge that while UNFPA enjoys strong support in the Ministry of Community and Gender Development, UNICEF is favoured by the Ministries of Health and Water Sanitation as well as by the Social Sector Department within the MFEP, and UNDP is closely allied to the Aid Coordination Unit, the National Execution Unit, and the Manpower Planning Department within the MFEP. (Interview with UNDP-Uganda Manager. Kampala, Uganda, December 1995.)

88. The resentment of other UN agencies towards UNDP's growing public profile, coordination leadership and use of contractual partners other than fellow UN agencies was confirmed during interviews with UNDP Administrator, James Gustave Speth, BPPS Chief Sally Timpson and Mr. Nikhil Chandavarkar, Head of UNDP's Inter-Agency Coordination and External Policy Office, (Interviews # 44, 54, 59)

89. UNDP. *Governance, Public Sector Management and Sustainable Human Development: UNDP Strategy Paper*. Pages 9, 5, and 7 respectively. Op. Cit.

90. These countries were specifically mentioned by interviewees as being amongst those most ardently opposed to the political activism of UNDP's HDRs. (Interview # 27, 28, 42.)

91. The view that LDCs do not want poverty-governance programme imposed upon them since they have governments equipped to do this on their own was strongly put forward by Mrs. Mitra Vaishid, Minister and Third Secretary of the Permanent Indian Mission to the UN. (Interview # 48.)

92. In meetings of the UNDP Executive Board, member-states such as the Philippines accused UNDP of failing to "go through governments" while others criticized UNDP for "performing some of ECOSOC's coordinating functions". (See UNDP Executive Board Meeting. First Regular Session, February 17, 1994. DP/1994/SR.5, March 8, 1994.)

93. Interview with Senior Advisor in UNDP HQ. New York, New York, USA, 1996.

94. United Nations, General Assembly, GA Document A/49/730. New York: UN, December 1994.

95. Interview with Senior Advisor from the HDRO, UNDP. New York, New York, USA. 1996.

96. Interview with Senior Advisor within the BPPS at UNDP. New York, New York, USA, 1996. Obviously, proximity to UNDP is only one of the reasons why policy proposals originating from UNDP's HDRs were never ratified at the WSSD.

97. Internal UNDP memo produced in BPPS, UNDP New York: UNDP HQ, January 1995.

98. Speth, J. G. Agenda for Poverty Eradication and Reform in UNDP. Presentation made to the All Party Parliamentary Group on Overseas Development, British House of Commons. February 1, 1996. London, UK.

99. UNDP-Uganda. *Consultancy Report for the Mid-Term Review*. Page 15, 22. Op. Cit.

100. UNDP. *Economic Policy and Planning Implications of Decentralization*. Draft Report on TSS-1 Mission to Uganda. 18-30 October, 1995. New York: UN Department of Development Support and Management Services, 1995.

101. Interviews # 87, 139, 144.

102. Interview # 78 & 144.

103. Interview # 144.

104. Interview # 148.

When confronted with this accusations by MFEP officials, a UNDP staff member remarked that unless UNDP had drafted its own Poverty Eradication Project and led the way with SHD/PCD initiatives, things would have stalled indefinitely.

105. UNDP-Uganda. *Consultancy Report for the Mid-Term Review*. Page 15. Op. Cit.

106. Ibid. Page 17.

107. Interview # 148.

108. Senior officials from the Ministry of Community and Gender Development, confirmed that Ugandan government ministries often utilized technical assistance funds to finance office equipment and vehicles as well as to 'top-up' their salaries and to attend training courses with generous per diems. (Senior officials in the Ministry of Community and Gender Development, Government of Uganda, Kampala, Uganda, 1995.)

109. See: **Table 5.6** accompanying this Chapter, and UNDP-Uganda's *Report on Development Cooperation in Uganda 1993-1994.* Pages 121-211. Kampala, Uganda. July 1995.

110. Interview with Programme Officer in the UNDP-Uganda Office. Interviewed December, 1995. Kampala, Uganda.

111. UNDP's Mid-Term Review itself concludes that the development impact of the 1992-1996 UNDP-Uganda CP has been adversely affected by the fact that "its resources have been spread too thinly." (UNDP-Uganda. *Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations: UNDP-Uganda CP Mid-Term Review*. Page 8. Kampala: UNDP-Uganda, 1995.)

112. UNDP. *Consultancy Report for the Mid-Term Review*. Page 23, 35. Op. Cit.

113. Senior Advisor in the UNDP-Uganda Office. Kampala, Uganda, November 1995.

114. UNDP. *Consultancy Report for the Mid-Term Review*. Page 23. Op. Cit.

115. UNDP-Uganda officials and donors based in Uganda.

116. Senior UNDP Manager interviewed December, 1995. Kampala, Uganda.

According to the respondent, out of every US$ 1 put into LDCs by donors, donors received US$ 1.40 back from their foreign aid. However, because under NEX much of this money now stays in Uganda, foreign consultants and the donor community at large have much to lose in the form of potential contracts if project execution is left to national authorities.

117. It is important to note that although UNDP staff do not directly implement these projects at the field level, the Chief Technical Advisers, Regional Programme Coordinators, Community Workers and intermediary NGOs hired by UNDP or NEX to oversee these projects are all evaluated and closely supervised by UNDP.

118. See: R.M. Nyonyitono et al. *Report of the Evaluation Mission: The Micro Projects Programme to Combat Aids* (UGA/91/005/1/01/99). Kampala: UNDP, July 1994; E. A. Birungi, *Hand Over Report--Mbale Region*. MPP Out-going Regional Coordinator. Kampala: MPP-Mbale, March 31, 1995; And, Betty Ddungo. *Micro Projects to Combat Aids: Periodic Evaluation Reports for Rakai and Masaka*. Kampala: MPP-Uganda, December 1995.

119. Model Farmer for the *Africa 2000 Network and RC/LC V member,* Kabarole District. November 1995.

120. Interview # 170.

121. Interview # 172.

122. Interview # 183.

123. According to UNDP-Uganda's Mid Term Review, problems emanating from UNDP's links with the Ugandan government (e.g., delays in processing or approving projects, complicated bureaucratic procedures, inadequate

monitoring, procurement delays in correspondence, orders or the arrival of equipment, lack of government counterpart funds and poor communication within government) are common-place in UNDP-supported projects. (UNDP-Uganda. *Consultancy Report for the Mid-Term Review*. Page 20, 41. Op. Cit.)

124. Interview # 189.

125. Interview # 205 and 206.

126. Ogwang, Joshua *CMP in Uganda--An Update of Project Status*. Kampala: CMP National Programme Coordination Office, June 1995.

127. UNDP, HABITAT, Government of Uganda. *Community Management Programme (CMP): Project Performance Evaluation Report* . Page 12-14. Kampala: CMP-Uganda, July 1995.

128. Interview with a locally-elected RC/LC representative and member of MPP's *District Selection Committee.* Interviewed in Mbale town, November 1995.

129. Interview with Mr. Godfrey Kuruhiira, CMP Regional Coordinator for Mubende District. Interviewed in Kampala, Uganda, December 11, 1995.

130. Interview # 167.

131. Interview # 168.

132. Interview # 175.

133. John de Coninck, Director of the *Community Development Research Network* (CDRN) in Kampala, confirmed that, for the sake of expediency, international development agencies often choose project beneficiaries out of convenience rather than on the basis of human need. (Interview # 81).

134. During my interview with JESE's Coordinator, I was also informed that the Coordinator's salary (125,000 Shillings/Mo. according to the 1994 budget) would soon double (to 380,000 shillings/mo.).

135. UNDP. *Project Document: Africa 200 Network*. (INT/89/G22/A/56/31). New York: UNDP HQ, May 1989.

136. Interview # 181.

137. Interview # 198.

138. Interview # 191.

139. Interview # 164.

140. Interview # 201.

141. UNDP-Uganda. *Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations--UNDP-Uganda CP Mid-Term Review*. Page 8. Kampala: UNDP-Uganda, 1995.

142. Ms. Josephine Harmsworth Andama, former head of SNV's *Community Action Programme* (CAP) and currently a development consultant in Kampala explained that many community-based projects in Uganda fail precisely because donors

mistakenly assume that poor community members can make highly technical decisions about construction or agricultural matters. (Interview # 137)

143. Interview # 180.

144. Interview # 182.

145. Interview # 198.

146. Teresa Kakooza. *An Evaluation Report on Projects Funded by UNDP/Africa 2000 Network.* Page 40. Kampala. UNDP-Uganda, September 1993.

147. Interview with Mr. Elias Byamungu, Chief Administrative Officer for NGOs and Women's Affairs, Kabarole District. Fort Portal, November 16, 1995

148. During the course of our visit, in fear of being caught making profit out of a foreign grant, the group leader retracted her previous comments to the group and instead told them that the money they had received from her had always been meant to be a gift from herself to the group. (Interview # 197).

149. Interview # 195.

150. Mr. Stan Burkey, National Coordinator of the Change Agent Programme by Quaker Services Norway in Uganda, noted that h is experience with promoting grassroots development in Uganda had shown that when communities became dependent on foreign aid they could lose their motivation to help themselves. (Interview # 76).

151. Interview # 174.

152. In its recent assessment of UNDP, the Centre for Development Research warns that "as long as the UNDP has a primary funding and service role towards the entire UN system, concentrated expertise development becomes impossible in UNDP's Country Offices." (Page. viii, Op. Cit.)

TABLE 5.1: UNDP's New Mission Statement

MISSION STATEMENT

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED
...to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights,
in the dignity and worth of the human person,
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small,
... to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
and for these ends
... to employ international machinery for the promotion
of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,
have resolved to combine our efforts to accomplish these aims ....

From the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations

UNDP is part of the United Nations and upholds the vision of the United Nations Charter. It is committed to the principle that development is inseparable from the quest for peace and human security and that the United Nations must be a strong force for development as well as peace.

UNDP's mission is to help countries in their efforts to achieve sustainable human development by assisting them to build their capacity to design and carry out development programmes in poverty eradication, employment creation and sustainable livelihoods, the empowerment of women and the protection and regeneration of the environment, giving first priority to poverty eradication.

UNDP also acts to help the United Nations family to become a unified and powerful force for sustainable human development and works to strengthen international cooperation for sustainable human development.

UNDP, at the request of governments and in support of its areas of focus, assists in building capacity for good governance, popular participation, private and public sector development and growth with equity, stressing that national plans and priorities constitute the only viable frame of reference for the national programming of operational activities for development within the United Nations system.

UNDP resident representatives normally serve as resident coordinators of the operational activities of the United Nations system, supporting at the request of governments the coordination of development and humanitarian assistance. Resident coordinators also help to orchestrate the full intellectual and technical resources of the United Nations system in support of national development.

UNDP strives to be an effective development partner for the United Nations relief agencies, working to sustain livelihoods while they seek to sustain lives. It acts to help countries to prepare for, avoid and manage complex emergencies and disasters.

UNDP draws on expertise from around the world, including from developing countries, United Nations specialized agencies, civil society organizations and research institutes.

UNDP supports South-South cooperation by actively promoting the exchange of experience among developing countries.

UNDP supports, within its areas of focus, technology transfer, adaptation, and access to the most effective technology.

UNDP receives voluntary contributions from nearly every country in the world. UNDP seeks to ensure a predictable flow of resources to support its programmes. It provides grant funds through criteria based on universality that strongly favour low-income countries, particularly the least developed.

UNDP is politically neutral and its cooperation is impartial. It seeks to conduct its work in a manner transparent and accountable to all its stakeholders.

UNDP is committed to a process of continuing self-evaluation and reform. It aims to improve its own efficiency and effectiveness and to assist the United Nations system in becoming a stronger force for the benefit of the people and countries of the world.

UNDP will continue to support an international development cooperation framework that responds to changing global, regional and national circumstances.

Source: UNDP, "UNDP in 1996: Progress in Change". New York, New York, USA, October 1996.

Table 5.2:

Progress Achieved in UNDP as Whole During the Fifth Programming Cycle (1992-1996)

Table 1: Percentage of Country Programmes with Emphasis on Poverty Alleviation, by Region, Fourth and Fifth Cycle

	Total Number of CPs	% with Emphasis on P.A. 4th Cycle	% with Emphasis on P.A.5th Cycle
Africa	25	32%	80%
Asia	19	16%	79%
Latin America	21	62%	85%
Arab Region	10	10%	50%
Europe	4	50%	50%
Total	79	34%	76%

Source: Godfrey et al. Building the Capacity to Prevent Poverty: UNDP as Facilitator. Consultancy Report Commissioned by UNDP. Page 96. New York, New York, USA. 1995.





Source: UNDP, *National Execution: Promise and Challenges*. Pages 14 and 25, respectively. OESP, UNDP HQ. New York, New York, USA 1995.

Table 5.3: UNDP Organizational Chart



Source: UNDP, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support. New York, New York, USA.

Table 5.4: Trends in the UNDP-Uganda CP During the 5th Programming Cycle (1992-1996)



Non-IPF and Cost-sharing expenditure resources have generally been on a downward trend since peaking in 1989 (CP3). However, since the beginning of the current cycle, these resources have averaged US$9.2m p.a.





Source: Government of Uganda and UNDP-Uganda. *Joint Issues Paper for the Mid-Term Review of the fourth CP.* Page 6. Kampala, Uganda. June 1994.

Actual IPF expenditures by programme with the bulk of US$15.5m were reserved for AIDS Prevention allocated largely in 1993 and early 1994

Table 5.5: Organizational Chart of the UNDP-Uganda Office in Kampala.



NB: In early 1994, the UNDP-Uganda Office had 19 professional staff and 41 support staff. Added to this are the various consultants (Chief Technical Advisors) and their staff hired to oversee UNDP's 80 plus programmes/projects.

Sources: UNDP-Uganda. Country Programme Responsibilities. Internal Document from the UNDP-Uganda Office. 1995. Kampala, Uganda.

UNDP and Government of Uganda. Joint Issues Paper for the Mid-Term Review of the Fourth Country Programme. ANNEX II and III. June 1994. Kampala, Uganda.

POV = Strong Poverty Focus
ECM= Economic Management projects
SG= Sound Governance Projects
AIDS= HIV/AIDS Projects

Table 5.6:

PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
LEDGER OF PROJECTS FOR IPF
EXCLUDING PROJECTS FINANCIALLY COMPLETED BEFORE 1992
AS OF October 31 1995

Country : UGA UGANDA

PROJECT NUMBER and SHORT TITLE		BUDGET BEFORE 1992	BUDGET 1992	BUDGET 1993	BUDGET 1994	BUDGET 1995	BUDGET 1996	TOTAL 1992-1996	BUDGET AFTER 1996	GRAND TOTAL
UGA/81/006/U/01/13 GOVERNMENT PRINTING		1,993,292	0	16,304	0	0	0	16,304	0	2,009,596
UGA/84/006/T/01/99 MEDICAL SCHOOL, TCDC		406,671	154,909	160,856	54,142	0	0	369,907	0	776,578
UGA/84/018/S/01/37 IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY		371,227	-75	0	0	0	0	-75	0	371,152
UGA/84/023/U/01/12 DAIRY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT		4,066,555	770,894	32,748	0	0	0	803,642	0	4,870,197
UGA/85/001/P/01/40 EXTERNAL DEBT CONTROL AND REG.	ECM	189,048	24,228	0	0	0	0	24,228	0	213,276
UGA/85/008/P/01/12 TSETSE CONTROL		434,257	-1,284	-400	0	0	0	-1,684	0	432,573
UGA/86/001/D/01/12 VETERINARY TRAINING		1,502,338	23,668	658	-150	0	0	24,176	0	1,526,514
UGA/86/005/P/01/56 LOW COST HOUSING, NAMUNONGO	POV	1,605,432	128,547	55,957	10,173	0	0	194,677	0	1,800,109
UGA/86/006/L/01/11 SPWP LUWERO	POV	2,867,062	-750	0	0	0	0	-750	0	2,866,312
UGA/86/009/N/01/31 PLSP *programme logistical support*		377,595	53,275	1,375	0	0	0	54,650	0	432,245
UGA/86/010/U/01/12 WILDLIFE AND PARKS		2,256,164	702,437	91,830	-2,220	1,160	0	793,207	0	3,049,371
UGA/86/012/N/01/12 FORESTRY TRAINING		1,486,938	96,351	3,375	0	0	0	99,726	0	1,586,664

NB: The ledger excludes the dozen international and regional projects supported by UNDP, including CMP and the *Africa 2000 Network.*

PROJECT NUMBER and SHORT TITLE	BUDGET BEFORE 1992	BUDGET 1992	BUDGET 1993	BUDGET 1994	BUDGET 1995	BUDGET 1996	TOTAL 1992-1996	BUDGET AFTER 1996	GRAND TOTAL
UGA/86/013/U/01/11 FEEDER ROADS	3,185,071	743,118	131,496	53,341	0	0	927,955	0	4,113,026
UGA/86/015/T/01/37 AGRICULTURAL TOOLS, SOROTI	217,458	295,726	121,974	634,223	439,137	0	1,491,060	0	1,708,518
UGA/86/016/G/01/49 TOURISM DEVELOPMENT PLANNING	619,157	15,367	0	0	0	0	15,367	0	634,524
UGA/87/002/S/01/31 PSP programme support project	328,998	2,502	30,784	47,828	111,656	0	192,770	0	521,768
UGA/87/003/S/01/12 HORTICULTURE INDUSTRY	2,524,591	896,679	437,682	20,557	3,000	0	1,357,918	0	3,882,509
UGA/87/004/L/01/32 UNV ASSISTANCE	258,375	148,856	206,155	145,891	41,900	0	542,802	0	801,177
UGA/87/006/K/01/12 PLANT PROTECTION	843,108	419,138	24,934	-26	0	0	444,046	0	1,287,154
UGA/87/007/O/01/12 FISHERIES STATISTICS	1,484,696	-20,103	40,000	0	0	0	19,897	0	1,504,593
UGA/87/008/K/01/42 ECON PLANNING AND AID COORDINA ECM	3,932,971	498,361	22,562	0	0	0	520,923	0	4,453,894
UGA/87/009/N/01/40 EXTERNAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT	604,368	106,330	262,004	102,721	0	0	471,055	0	1,075,423
UGA/87/014/K/01/13 POV BEND basic integrated rural Education	351,155	99,997	-35,130	270	0	0	65,137	0	416,292
UGA/87/015/N/01/31 MAKERERE PLANNING OFFICE	323,173	34,036	168,097	67,647	329,658	0	599,438	0	922,611

PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
LEDGER OF PROJECTS FOR IPF
EXCLUDING PROJECTS FINANCIALLY COMPLETED BEFORE 1992
AS OF October 31 1995

Country : UGA UGANDA

PROJECT NUMBER and SHORT TITLE		BUDGET BEFORE 1992	BUDGET 1992	BUDGET 1993	BUDGET 1994	BUDGET 1995	BUDGET 1996	TOTAL 1992-1996	BUDGET AFTER 1996	GRAND TOTAL
UGA/87/020/L/01/99 CONSULTANCY SERVICES		455,346	165,537	230,170	7,167	0	0	402,874	0	858,220
UGA/87/024/I/01/99 MASULITA TRAINING CENTRE		0	0	5,335	96,665	0	0	102,000	0	102,000
UGA/87/025/Q/01/01 SURVEYING AND MAPPING		1,600,443	210,582	151,443	28,564	10,166	0	400,755	0	2,001,198
UGA/87/028/N/01/15 CIVIL AVIATION III		213,496	1,153	0	0	0	0	1,153	0	214,649
UGA/87/029/N/01/01 UGANDA COMMERCIAL BANK	ECM	1,778,204	360,283	99,228	5	0	0	459,516	0	2,237,720
UGA/87/030/N/01/11 HOTEL TRAINING		1,452,244	232,233	-18,492	0	0	0	213,741	0	1,665,985
UGA/87/031/J/01/16 METEOROLOGICAL SERVICES		846,381	399,120	476,147	26,270	37,516	0	939,053	0	1,785,434
UGA/88/002/P/01/12 AGRICULTURAL CENSUS		2,769,287	888,161	359,165	45,165	0	0	1,292,491	0	4,061,778
UGA/88/004/Q/01/31 UMBRELLA PROJECT FOR NID		525,637	274,900	186,471	-867	72,267	0	532,771	0	1,058,408
UGA/88/005/G/01/99 CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION	SG	101,968	0	568,056	0	0	0	568,056	0	670,024
UGA/89/001/I/01/01 MINERAL INVESTMENT		78,186	698,018	600,305	672,691	261,780	0	2,232,794	0	2,310,980
UGA/89/002/K/01/01 POPULATION CENSUS		889,755	-28,319	169,031	105,885	0	0	246,597	0	1,136,352

PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
LEDGER OF PROJECTS FOR IPF
EXCLUDING PROJECTS FINANCIALLY COMPLETED BEFORE 1992
AS OF October 31 1995

Country : UGA UGANDA

PROJECT NUMBER and SHORT TITLE			BUDGET BEFORE 1992	BUDGET 1992	BUDGET 1993	BUDGET 1994	BUDGET 1995	BUDGET 1996	TOTAL 1992-1996	BUDGET AFTER 1996	GRAND TOTAL	
UGA/89/003/H/01/12 AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PLANNING			268,267	21,778	-697	3,781	0	0	24,862	0	293,129	
UGA/89/004/G/01/12 AGRICULTURAL EXTENSION			430,715	-842	0	0	0	0	-842	0	429,873	
UGA/89/011/K/01/42 ALLEVIATION OF POVERTY	POV		169,415	23,067	0	0	0	0	23,067	0	192,482	
UGA/89/012/J/01/11 LIPW KARAMOJA	POV		486,900	46,901	93,903	32	66,748	0	207,584	0	694,484	
UGA/89/014/H/01/56 SHELTER STRATEGY	POV	GROSS	382,621	89,738	2,420	0	0	0	92,158	0	474,779	
		CS	0	89,739	195,561	0	0	0	285,300	0	285,300	other donors
		NET	382,621	-1	-193,141	0	0	0	-193,142	0	189,479	
UGA/90/001/G/01/31 MANAGEMENT TRAINING	ECM		38	2,411	0	25,000	407,551	305,000	739,962	0	740,000	
UGA/90/002/J/01/37 BUREAU OF STANDARDS			506,214	323,580	112,641	109,475	87,298	0	632,994	0	1,139,208	
UGA/90/010/J/01/31 CENSUS BUSINESS ESTABLISMENTS			516,078	298,254	-41,123	0	0	0	257,131	0	773,209	
UGA/90/012/K/01/37 INDICATIVE INDUSTRIAL PLAN			16,164	245,076	557,804	97,337	4,239	0	904,456	0	920,620	
UGA/90/013/G/01/99 INVESTMENT PROMOTION SEMINAR			117,841	1,212	36,165	0	0	0	37,377	0	155,218	
UGA/90/016/H/01/37 MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION			222,690	89,828	45,103	79	0	0	135,010	0	357,700	

PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
LEDGER OF PROJECTS FOR IPF
EXCLUDING PROJECTS FINANCIALLY COMPLETED BEFORE 1992
AS OF October 31 1995

Country : UGA UGANDA

PROJECT NUMBER and SHORT TITLE		BUDGET BEFORE 1992	BUDGET 1992	BUDGET 1993	BUDGET 1994	BUDGET 1995	BUDGET 1996	TOTAL 1992-1996	BUDGET AFTER 1996	GRAND TOTAL
UGA/90/017/K/01/37										
SMALL SCALE INDUSTRIES		134,418	144,147	331,250	124,881	21,382	0	621,660	0	756,078
UGA/90/018/G/01/42										
TRANSPORT POLICY AND PLANNING		354,068	668,168	280,001	177,597	4,200	0	1,129,966	0	1,484,034
UGA/90/019/G/01/62										
PROMOTION OF EXTERNAL TRADE		104,938	337,563	70,088	185,309	157,000	0	749,960	0	854,898
UGA/90/020/J/01/01										
CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION		94	208,505	311,576	336,327	319,560	7,840	1,183,808	0	1,183,902
UGA/90/021/L/01/15										
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY		653,701	1,242,898	697,753	346,839	183,651	0	2,471,141	0	3,124,842
UGA/90/022/0/01/99	ECM									
ASSISTANCE TO DEPT. ECONOMICS	GROSS	17,040	412,619	1,028,759	508,105	336,342	309,413	2,595,238	0	2,612,278
	CS	0	0	0	526,136	185,804	129,000	840,940	0	840,940 other donors
	NET	17,040	412,619	1,028,759	-18,031	150,538	180,413	1,754,298	0	1,771,338
UGA/91/001/F/01/42										
SPECIAL DEVELOPMENT MISSIONS		159,066	37,179	0	0	33,755	0	70,934	0	230,000
UGA/91/003/K/01/99	AIDS									
AIDS CONTROL PROGRAMME		173,800	190,212	79,631	89,535	101,465	84,000	544,843	0	718,643
UGA/91/004/E/01/42	ECM									
ECONOMIC POLICY REFORM		0	522,777	186,786	0	0	0	709,563	0	709,563
UGA/91/005/J/01/99	AIDS									
AIDS MICRO PROJECTS		9,442	237,720	333,063	526,436	120,051	0	1,217,270	0	1,226,712
UGA/91/010/D/01/49										
TOURISM MASTER PLAN		0	454,196	262,090	7,100	0	0	723,386	0	723,386

PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
LEDGER OF PROJECTS FOR IPF
EXCLUDING PROJECTS FINANCIALLY COMPLETED BEFORE 1992
AS OF October 31 1995

Country : UGA UGANDA

PROJECT NUMBER and SHORT TITLE		BUDGET BEFORE 1992	BUDGET 1992	BUDGET 1993	BUDGET 1994	BUDGET 1995	BUDGET 1996	TOTAL 1992-1996	BUDGET AFTER 1996	GRAND TOTAL	
UGA/91/011/I/01/99 SG											
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM	GROSS	0	218,575	316,255	334,093	181,061	0	1,049,984	0	1,049,984	
	CS	0	0	0	65,000	85,000	0	150,000	0	150,000	others
	NET	0	218,575	316,255	269,093	96,061	0	899,984	0	899,984	
UGA/92/001/F/01/42											
LOW COST WATER PILOT PROJECT	GROSS	0	0	199,679	386,609	246,226	0	832,514	0	832,514	
	CS	0	0	0	86,650	25,864	0	112,514	0	112,514	
	NET	0	0	199,679	299,959	220,362	0	720,000	0	720,000	
UGA/92/002/E/01/01											
GEOTHERMAL EXPLORATION		0	0	249,876	-35,945	6,000	0	219,931	0	219,931	
UGA/92/003/E/01/99											
WILDLIFE CLUBS OF UGANDA		0	21,271	84,969	101,345	54,065	0	261,650	0	261,650	
UGA/92/004/F/01/11											
NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY FUND POV		0	47,314	265,871	308,731	83,200	0	705,116	0	705,116	
UGA/92/006/D/01/99											
KALERWE DRAINAGE (Community based) POV		0	0	304,853	224,357	6,000	0	535,210	0	535,210	
UGA/92/007/E/01/99											
SUPPORT TO MIN. OF WATER		0	0	53,000	48,500	10,000	0	111,500	0	111,500	
UGA/92/009/J/01/99											
VETERANS ASSOCIATION		0	26,733	242,885	156,207	439,676	0	865,501	0	865,501	
UGA/92/010/D/01/12											
COMMUNITY DAIRY PRODUCTION POV		0	0	391,831	38,296	4,648	0	434,775	0	434,775	
UGA/92/011/C/01/99											
KARAMOJA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT POV		0	0	0	65,071	188,386	0	253,457	0	253,457	

PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
LEDGER OF PROJECTS FOR IPF
EXCLUDING PROJECTS FINANCIALLY COMPLETED BEFORE 1992
AS OF October 31 1995

Country : UGA UGANDA

PROJECT NUMBER and SHORT TITLE		BUDGET BEFORE 1992	BUDGET 1992	BUDGET 1993	BUDGET 1994	BUDGET 1995	BUDGET 1996	TOTAL 1992-1996	BUDGET AFTER 1996	GRAND TOTAL
UGA/93/001/D/01/42										
ECONOMIC PLANNING	ECM	0	0	505,050	491,090	562,188	0	1,558,328	0	1,558,328
UGA/93/003/E/01/99										
COMM. PRODUCTIVE ENTERPRISES	POV	0	0	0	31,865	544,772	339.990	916,627	0	916,627
UGA/93/006/C/01/12										
COAST FEVER VACCINE		0	0	171,852	3,159	24,989	0	200,000	0	200,000
UGA/93/008/B/01/99										
AIDS CONTROL PROGRAMME	AIDS	0	0	0	29,159	545,941	137.700	712,800	0	712,800
UGA/93/010/E/01/99										
ASSISTANCE TO PRISON SERVICES		0	0	0	104,200	172,800	65,000	342,000	0	342,000
UGA/93/014/K/01/99	SG									
ELECTORAL PROCESS IN UGANDA	GROSS	0	0	537,886	2,066,397	567,079	0	3,171,362	0	3,171,362
	CS	0	0	332,904	2,219,549	0	0	2,552,453	0	2,552,453 Other donors
	NET	0	0	204,982	-153,152	567,079	0	618,909	0	618,909
UGA/93/020/C/01/99										
REHABILITATION OF HEALTH UNITS	POV	0	0	8,063	204,567	0	0	212,630	0	212,630
UGA/93/031/C/01/11										
EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY MISSION		0	0	0	135,883	103,404	0	239,287	0	239,287
UGA/93/039/D/01/99										
FOOD CROP POST HARVEST SYSTEMS		0	0	0	152,878	412,899	216,823	782,600	0	782,600
UGA/93/046/F/01/99										
CONSULTANCY SERVICES II		0	0	0	257,337	358,440	372,817	908,594	0	988,594
UGA/94/003/C/01/99	SG									
ASSISTANCE TO DECENTRALIZATION		0	0	0	0	254,612	206,500	461,112	0	461,112

PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
LEDGER OF PROJECTS FOR IPF
EXCLUDING PROJECTS FINANCIALLY COMPLETED BEFORE 1992
AS OF October 31 1995

Country : UGA UGANDA

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PROJECT NUMBER and SHORT TITLE		BUDGET BEFORE 1992	BUDGET 1992	BUDGET 1993	BUDGET 1994	BUDGET 1995	BUDGET 1996	TOTAL 1992-1996	BUDGET AFTER 1996	GRAND TOTAL
UGA/94/006/A/01/99 NaTCAP PHASE II	ECM	0	0	0	573	49,427	0	50,000	0	50,000
UGA/94/007/C/01/99 CRIME PREVENTION		0	0	0	73,748	0	0	73,748	0	73,748
UGA/95/001/C/01/99 MITIGATION OF AIDS IMPACT		0	0	0	0	4,030,801	6,107,848	10,138,649	0	10,138,649
UGA/95/002/A/01/99 PRIVATE SECTOR		0	0	0	0	371,250	385,250	756,500	0	756,500
UGA/95/003/A/01/99 ELECTORAL PROCESS	SG	0	0	0	0	621,600	61,300	682,900	0	682,900
UGA/95/009/A/01/99 IMPACT STUDIES OF HIV/AIDS	AIDS	0	0	0	0	289,000	0	289,000	0	289,000

PROGRAMME AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
LEDGER OF PROJECTS FOR IPF
EXCLUDING PROJECTS FINANCIALLY COMPLETED BEFORE 1992
AS OF October 31 1995

Country : UGA UGANDA

	BUDGET BEFORE 1992	BUDGET 1992	BUDGET 1993	BUDGET 1994	BUDGET 1995	BUDGET 1996	TOTAL 1992-1996	BUDGET AFTER 1996	GRAND TOTAL
COUNTRY TOTAL									
Approved Projects:	47,664,157	14,304,755	12,319,403	9,831,895	13,279,946	8,599,481	58,335,480	0	105,999,637
Cost Sharing:	0	89,739	528,465	2,897,335	296,668	129,000	3,941,207	0	3,941,207
Net Total	47,664,157	14,215,016	11,790,938	6,934,560	12,983,278	8,470,481	54,394,273	0	102,058,430

MAP of UNDP Projects Visited:



Source: Child Health and Development Centre/ UNICEF, Uganda

AFRICA 2000 Network Projects in Kabarole and Iganga

COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME (CMP) Projects visited in MUbende

MICRO PROJECTS PROGRAMME TO COMBAT AIDS (MPP) Projects visited in Mbale and Tororo

Table 5.7: Highlights of Selected UNDP-Supported Field Programmes Studied

Programme Title: *Africa 2000 Network* (INT/89/G22/A/56/31)		
Project Traits	**Development Objectives**	**Highlight of Achievements**
Implementor/s: UNDP's Office of Project Services (OPS) **Executors:** Various NGOs & Community Based Organizations **Duration:** 5 Years; Starting in 1989 but in 1990 in Uganda **Total Budget:** US$ 5.7 million **Main Funders:** Canada, France, Denmark, Norway & Japan **Ugandan Budget:** Approx. US$ 2 million since 1991 **Geographic Scope:** Africa; Arab States **Scope in Uganda:** 31 small projects in central Uganda each with budgets ranging from US$ 15,000-40,000 and each composed of many beneficiary groups with 30-50 members receiving small individual loans and support. **Sector:** Environment & Agriculture; Public Education	**Chief Development Objective:** Combat environmental degradation & promote ecologically sustainable development by seeking the support & mobilizing NGOs and community groups **Specific Objectives:** **Training:** 1. On the spot training on organic and largely indigenous farming techniques (e.g., Grafting, mulching and making compost pits, building trenches to avoid erosion, building animal bins)) and hygienic home practices (e.g., building latrines, using fuel efficient stoves) **Public Education:** 2. Disseminating information about new farming innovations and success stories through radio, theatre & a monthly magazine (UGANDA ENVIRONEWS) and Exchange visits to farmers from other regions or countries. **Inputs:** 3. Furbish farmers with needed inputs: e.g., Water pumps, Zero-gr- ing cattle, chickens, rab. .s, feed, drugs, spades, hoes, boots, etc. **Typical Projects:** Tree Planting Cattle Raising Poultry Keeping Passion Fruit Growing Bee Keeping Fish farming	**Major Achievements:** • Has taught a couple of thousand Ugandan farmers how to utilize environmentally-sound & largely indigenous farming techniques. During our visits to project beneficiaries in Fort Portal and Iganga, we observed that the Network's model farmers have indeed constructed compost pits, built ditches to avoid soil erosion, and were cutting grass for mulching and planting trees for firewood and fruit. In addition, most farms we visited had either built chicken coups, rabbit sheds or were practicing zero grazing with at least one cow. • Has helped forge links between Uganda farmers from different regions via exchange visits, theatre, radio and a community-oriented newsletter called UGANDA ENVIRONEWS • Has helped finance and strengthen Ugandan NGOs' (e.g., Environmental Alert, CARD, JESE, DENIVA, among others) experience in project implementation.

Programme Title:	*Micro Projects Programme to Combat Aids*	UGA/91/005/01/99
Project Traits	**Major Project Objectives**	**Highlight of Achievements**
Implementor/s: UNDP **Execution Agency:** Ugandan Gov't. via NEX **Duration:** 1992-1995 **Total Budget:** A larger, US$ 10 million "HIV/AIDS Prevention and Poverty Reduction Programme was drafted by the UNDP-Uganda Office in 1995 **Ugandan Budget:** US$ 700,000 for the pilot visited **Scope in Uganda:** 116 Micro-Projects giving micro credit to community-based groups & indirectly benefiting individual orphans, widows & the elderly in 20 districts in mainly central Uganda **Sector:** Health Micro-Finance	**Chief Development Objective:** Provide quick and flexible assistance to needy families and survivals of HIV/AIDS victims by supporting NGO and community-based activities attempting to lessen the adverse socio-economic consequences of the pandemic in Uganda. **Specific Objectives:** **Community-Based Income Generating Activities:** 1. Establish a mechanism capable of effectively channelling and monitoring technical and micro capital assistance to community-based actions initiated to generate income in areas seriously impacted by the HIV/AIDS pandemic **Help AIDS Orphans; Widows:** 2. To distribute money made from community groups' income-generating activities to care for the families of the victims or survivors of HIV/AIDS, with a special emphasis on orphans, widows and the elderly **Strengthen NGOs & CBOs:** 3. To strengthen the capacity of NGOs and Community-Based Organizations to address the socio-economic repercussions of the HIV/AIDS epidemic & to support innovative initiatives by such organizations. **Typical Projects:** Grants to start small businesses; Training & Input Costs Direct Grants for Social Services (e.g., School fees Renovation of Community-Based Infrastructure (e.g., Clinics, Daycare)	**Major Achievements:** • MPP has helped to increase the incomes of 500 families who have started-up small businesses in various sectors by giving them seed capital and teaching them the technical, book-keeping, and group management skills which they need to launch their own community-based income-generating activities (IGAs). • The Project has re-channelled profits from income-generating activities into social services and direct assistance to poor families with a large number of HIV/AIDS widows & orphans within them. Paying school fees for 3,500 orphans is an example of MPP's contribution in this area • By working on the premise that, in addition to providing curative care (e.g., medical attention, counselling and drugs), it is crucial to enhance the self-sufficiency of those afflicted by HIV/AIDS, the project has helped to change views so that those afflicted by the epidemic are seen as contributors to the community rather than merely as victims in need of charity by family & the church. • MPP has strengthened an array of international (e.g., World Vision, SALEM) and local NGOs (e.g., Uganda Women's Concern) now serving as umbrella organizations providing training and implementing MPP initiatives.

Programme Title: *Community Management Programme* (CMP) DN/91/UGA/D09		
Project Traits	**Major Project Objectives**	**Highlight of Achievements**
Implementing Agency: Government of Uganda via the Dept. of Community Development, Min. of Community & Gender Development **Administering Agency:** UNDP **Execution Agency:** HABITAT **Funders of the Wider Programme:** UNDP, HABITAT, DANIDA, Regional Funds, Selected Embassies & Recipient Gov'ts. **Geographic Scope:** Uganda, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ghana, Sri Lanka, Zambia **Scope in Uganda:** Two projects each in Kampala, Mpigi & Mubende District **Duration in Uganda:** **1992-1998** **Ugandan Budget:** **US$ 2.6 million** **Sector:** Training; Institutional Strengthening; Community-based development	**Chief Development Objective:** Improve the living & working conditions of the poor by empowering local communities & strengthening the capacity of local governments to plan, implement and maintain human settlement improvements & development. **Specific Objectives:** **Development Training:** 1. Train govt. officials, their staff & community leaders in the mgt. of operational strategies aimed at creating integrated enabling strategies as well as on gender, youth, environment & poverty-eradication issues **Support Community Efforts:** 2. Provide direct assistance to poor local community groups trying to improve services & facilities **Institutional Strengthening:** 3. Strengthen relevant local institutions & organizations involved in decentralized service provision & community management. **Typical Projects:** Building or rehabilitating local infrastructure (e.g., Schools, bridges and roads, draining ditches, neigbourhood sewer/waste systems) Community awareness programmes (e.g., gender, youth environment, violence) Production of basic commercial goods (e.g., bricks, building materials) High-level policy and planning seminars for govt. officials & community leaders	**Major Achievements:** • By July 1995, over 14 community proposals had been submitted to CMP, including 10 for the cons- truction of community facilities & 4 in income-generating activities • By mid 1995, several mobilization workshops on communications skills, data collection and analysis had taken place, as well as a series of training workshops on consolidating skills in gender awareness, improved agricultural systems, community participation needs, writing effective project proposals, designing baseline surveys and evaluation techniques. The latter involved central govt & district officials, project staff and community beneficiaries. • CMP has promoted a dvlp. approach which fully integrates govt. officials into CMP trainings & as project implementors & in which poor communities are encouraged to work alongside govt. to facilitate decentralization & strengthen local planning capacities rather than the two duplicating each others' work • By shifting its focus & methodology from 'community dvlp' towards 'community mgt. & empowerment', & getting local communities to draft their own project proposals while project staff act mainly as catalysts, CMP is hoping Ugandans begin to think more in terms of self-reliance rather than in terms of foreign dependence.

Chapter 6: Deja Vu?
Action Aid's Implementation of Sustainable Human Development in Uganda and Beyond.

> We have here almost a literal case of "trickle down" development: Of the sums contributed in the UK, only a very tiny proportion of the money (perhaps as little as 5-10 per cent) actually trickles down as money....available for actual community-based development. Staff salaries supposedly represent services delivered to the community, but their provision and allocation has been determined by OUR (emphasis in original) priorities and institutional legacy. The community's demand or need for these services has been justified by our planning procedures, but never been quantified. Value for money, the efficacy of this approach to development against the alternatives has never been demonstrated.
>
> Keith Rennie [1]

I. Introduction: Birds of a Feather? UNDP's and Action Aid's SHD/PCD Efforts Compared

As noted in Chapter 2, one of the recurring themes in the International Development Cooperation, and especially in the NGO literature, is the assumption that international development NGOs are much more effective than multilateral (or bilateral) development agencies at carrying out participatory and pro-poor development. The logic behind this argument is that, because of their smaller size, lower wages, directly operational approach, relative political autonomy from governments, greater involvement with grassroots community groups, and their value-oriented commitment to the eradication of poverty and injustice, NGOs are in an ideal position to implement SHD/PCD approaches. [2]

In the case of AA and UNDP, the differences in working styles and organizational structures are considerable. Although data on the average costs per staff in the two agencies are considered highly confidential, and therefore, are difficult to gain access to, the statistics available do show that, with a budget of approximately US$ 57 million in 1994-95, total staff of about 3500 and 20 Country Programmes (CPs), AA is considerably smaller and less dispersed than UNDP which, in 1995 had a budget of US$ 1.7 billion, staff of 6,000 and 132 Country Offices. (Refer to data provided in

Chapter 1). Another important difference is that while the UNDP-Uganda CP consists of over 85 technical cooperation projects implemented mostly from Kampala and through either Ugandan government officials (usually but not exclusively via NEX), other UN agencies, especially-hired consultants, or NGOs and CBOs, the majority of AA-Uganda's resources are concentrated in five Development Areas (DAs) in the Ugandan countryside where a large cadre of AA staff--DA managers, Area Managers, Field Development Workers (FDWs), drivers, etc.--live in the DA and directly oversee project implementation. Because UNDP and AA have divergent working styles and organizational structures, a comparison of the two agencies' development efforts is a good way of testing whether the above assumptions are correct and of exploring how two very different international development agencies put SHD/PCD into practice and the kinds of obstacles they face along the way.

Specifically, in this chapter I am interested in exploring four key issues related to both the *Baroque Science* and *River Pollution* Phenomena presented earlier. Firstly, I am interested in exploring whether an NGO like AA whose work has been supposedly guided by pro-poor, pro-equity and pro-participation values almost identical to those of the SHD/PCD approach is in a better position to internalize the SHD/PCD paradigm and to effectively fill the gap between SHD/PCD theory and practice. Secondly, I am interested in knowing exploring whether, because of its greater autonomy from governments, AA is in a better position (i.e., less susceptible to political resistance from UN member nation-states or to the turf battles between the specialized agencies of the UN system) than UNDP to pursue the more audacious and transformative goals of the SHD/PCD agenda. Thirdly, I am interested in knowing whether AA's directly operational and more hands-on approach to development is more likely to generate better results when it comes to the promotion of SHD/PCD, especially at the project and grassroots level. And lastly, I am interested in testing whether an NGO like AA which is smaller and supposedly considerably less hierarchical and

top-down than UNDP is organizationally better equipped to implement SHD/PCD approaches, both globally and in Uganda.

This chapter addresses the question identified above by tracing the evolution of AA's approach to development during the 1990's and taking a close look at how AA was going about interpreting, promoting and implementing SHD/PCD approaches during 1995--the year of my field research as well as the year in which AA introduced some of its most fundamental reforms in order to transform itself into an agency geared towards the realization of SHD/PCD. The Chapter explores AA's progress in realizing SHD/PCD globally as well as within Uganda and assesses what the NGO has done at the conceptual, policy and programme/project levels. Core SHD/PCD goals like the realization of flexible and integrated development approaches are mainly explored in the Chapter's earlier conceptual discussion while goals such as the promotion of 'Sound governance' and improved coordination are addressed in the section on policy-level interventions, and core SHD/PCD goals like reaching the poorest, achieving greater equity, and fostering participation and empowerment as well as self-reliant and sustainable development are mostly addressed in the final section on AA's implementation of SHD/PCD approaches at the programme/project and grassroots level.

II. Action Aid Before and After the Adoption of SHD/PCD Approaches

A) Action Aid's Mandate and Modus Operandi

AA is a registered UK charity and is constituted as a company, limited by guarantee. It is governed by a Board of Trustees which is responsible for setting and monitoring the strategic direction of the NGO and for establishing policy. The Trustees are also directors for the purposes of company law. The Board of Trustees meets quarterly and

delegates the day to day operation of the agency to an Executive Board, led by a Chief Executive and comprised of full time senior management. An Executive Committee of the Board, an Audit Committee and a Remuneration Committee meet regularly to make recommendations to the Board of Trustees and the Chief Executive and other principal officers. AA's Board of Trustees, the Chief Executive and its Division Directors are based in UK HQ in London; some fundraising and public education staff are also stationed in different regions of the UK; the NGO's Country Directors are based in the capitals of the 20 developing countries in which AA operates and are themselves supported by smaller rural offices in the various Development Areas (DAs) in which AA is active in their countries; and, since 1996, AA's Regional Directors for Africa and Asia have been based in Zimbabwe and India, respectively, while the Latin American region is directed by Ayuda Accion in Spain). Finally, there are a number of European partner organizations which bear the name 'Action Aid' (including, Action Aid-Ireland, Aide et Action in France, Ayuda en Accion in Spain and Azione Aiuto in Italy), or a foreign language equivalent, which also raise funds through child sponsorship but are independent registered charities.

AA's principal objective is to work with the poorest and the most disadvantaged people in the world to address the root causes of poverty and improve the quality of their lives. AA seeks to achieve its principal objective in three main ways: by implementing long-term development programmes and working directly with poor communities in 20 developing countries in three continents by providing emergency assistance in times of disaster and crisis; and by influencing how others contribute to the process of poverty eradication through UK-based fundraising, public education and policy influencing. In 1997, 66% of AA's income was derived from child sponsorship, 13% from official income, and the remainder from fundraising, European partners or other donations. [3]

B) Action Aid Before the Adoption of SHD/PCD Approaches

When AA was first created in 1972, its philanthropist creator, Cecil Jackson-Cole, was looking for ways to 'do good' by helping children around the world. It was with these goals in mind that AA came into being. According to most accounts, AA was built around the notion that Britons could help individual children in the Third World by sponsoring them from the UK. During the early years, AA had only four programmes (India, Kenya, Burundi and The Gambia) but these grew steadily during the 1980s and 1990s. AA began its work in Uganda in 1981. According to current accounts, in the early years, the system of "adoption by post" created by AA was not only very paternalistic and colonial in nature (e.g., providing British school uniforms or lunches for individual school children), but the focus on individual sponsorship meant that, even within one family, some children received AA support while others were excluded. [4]

By 1986, however, with the arrival of a more development-oriented CEO and the desire of AA staff to be more like its respected sister development organization, OXFAM, AA began making a gradual transition from paternalistic charity towards a *bona fide* development agency. The first and most fundamental change in this direction was the creation of Development Areas (DAs) with their respective development strategies. Hence, although AA continued its child sponsorship system, instead of the benefits going to individual children, by the mid 1980s, AA was funding the development of the whole community in which sponsored children lived. The second change was to make AA's development interventions more sustainable by replacing short-term programmes with much longer-term Country Strategies (i.e., a minimum of 10 years) [5]. One persistent trait of AA's work during these years was that the NGO spent between 75-80% of its funds on field-based development work in its overseas DAs. [6]

These two above-mentioned changes were the first among many which would help AA become a development agency espousing core SHD/PCD goals such as long-term and sustainable community development. These changes notwithstanding though, until the early 1990s, AA remained a centralized agency whose country programmes were often directed by "expatriates" and whose country offices and family of partner agencies were treated, and indeed, behaved as "dependencies" of AA HQ. The centralized nature of decision-making within the agency was evident in the fact that, despite 90% of AA's staff being based in the field, the agency's Board of Trustees only included northeners; AA's development policies and strategies were led by a strong International Division in London HQ; that regional desks were all based in London and were composed of country desks which played an active supervisory role in the monitoring and assessment of AA's Country Programmes in the field, and that the Finance and Administration, Human Resources, Support, Communications and Fundraising Divisions were also each based in London and kept a tight grip on operational procedures as well as budgetary guidelines and deadlines. Just like UNDP, AA's internal reports reveal that the size and the overhead expenditures of its HQ had been growing steadily and that the trend contradicted the NGO's corporate commitment to cost-effectiveness and to spending most of the agency's sponsorship money in the South. [7]

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the work of the AA-Uganda (AAU) Office followed very much the pattern described above. Until the mid 1990s, AAU's Directors were British expatriates, most operational procedures and budgetary parameters were set in London HQ and the AAU accountant was as a rule an expatriate as well. In addition, while the 36-person AAU Office in Kampala took the leadership in liaising with London HQs and in passing down most strategic management decisions, AAU's development interventions were clearly concentrated in the Ugandan countryside, and especially in the areas surrounding Kampala.

Although AA has from the outset been officially registered with the Ugandan government (its registration certificate is renewed every three years), sent annual progress reports to government, and been a member of Uganda's *NGO Consultative Committee*, the NGO's work concentrated in rural Development Area (DAs), where it was normally independent of government or fellow NGOs. In each of its three initial DAs (Mityana, Buwekula, and Kamuli) AAU operated large sectorally-based programmes on its own.

In the case of the *Buwekula DA* (ABP), for example, by late 1994, AAU had a budget of £402,000, over 50 vehicles and a staff of as many as 67 persons (including a Programme Coordinator, a Financial/Accounting unit, an Administration/ Logistics unit, and a series of Sectoral Supervisors, each with their respective teams of FDWs). [8] This large team of sectorally-oriented ABP staff worked in a hands-on fashion and directly delivered services and made decisions for project beneficiaries in the areas of infrastructure, water and sanitation, health, education, agriculture, women and development and small business promotion rather than playing a facilitation role in the community. [9] In an effort to move beyond direct rural service delivery, by 1994 the AAU created a *Programme Development Department* (PDD) which was given a mandate to begin supporting Ugandan NGOs such as *Vision Terudo* (a local NGO in Kumi District) and *Uganda's AIDS Support Organization* (TASO) in a more systematic fashion, as well as to become more involved in research initiatives such as the *Mubende Integrated Teacher Education Programme* (MITEP) and *Farmer Participatory Research* (FPR) initiative, carried out with assistance from the London-based National Research Institute (NRI) and starting to design possible advocacy initiatives. [10] Even by late 1995 though, AAU's PDD Unit had only seven staff (compared to the 202 staff members in the AAU Office in 1995) and a modest budget of £239,000 (compared to AAU's total annual budget of £3,210,000 in 1994-95.) [11] Moreover, as AA own documents recognize, because local institutions were

often weak and AA had traditionally been an operational agency, the NGO had often been unable to build effective partnerships with local actors. [12]

By late 1994 and early 1995, however, AA's transition towards SHD/PCD ideals was accelerated as AA introduced a series of additional changes in order to equip itself to carry out SHD/PCD approaches.

As in UNDP, AA's adoption of SHD/PCD approaches was largely motivated by its own organizational need to elevate its profile and secure a niche within an increasingly competitive and demanding development environment. The global competition and pressure to 'innovate' facing AA by the early 1990s was evidence during my interviews with senior AA staff in HQ and the field [13] as well as in internal reports such as that produced by AA's *Regionalization Working Group* which notes that, in a discouraging environment of donor fatigue, increased competition between agencies, greater donor control of NGO activities and demands for more accountability and evidence of development impact on the poor, NGOs like AA have no choice but to achieve greater impact by targeting AA activities more effectively on the poor while at the same time scaling up and expanding into new areas of work, including advocacy and emergency work. [14] Moreover, as was the case at UNDP, the impetus for change within AA came predominantly from HQ and personally from Mr. Martin Griffiths, AA's Director from 1991-1994, who assumed the role of 'change agent' within the NGO in a similar manner that Speth had within UNDP. As in UNDP then, AA's country staff and especially lower-level field-based staff were not significantly involved in the changes taking place at AA by the mid 1990s. [15] However, one aspect of AA's adoption of SHD/PCD approaches which differs from UNDP's experience is that, in the case of AA, the Board of Trustees never pressed for the adoption of SHD/PCD. Quite to the contrary, AA's cautious Board of Trustees were from the start much too concerned with maintaining financial accountability [16] to encourage participatory development efforts which

might prove difficult to measure [17] or policy advocacy efforts which would be too political to justify to traditional sponsors. [18] In the case of AA, furthermore, while some field managers feared that rapid changes would create too much uncertainty in their Country Programmes [19], the adoption of SHD/PCD ideas nevertheless supported by some AA middle-level managers and professional cadre, both in London and in the field, who felt that AA had to make the changes to remain innovative and to be finally seen as a progressive and *bona fide* development NGO. [20]

Even if the changes which took place at AA by the mid 1990s were motivated by organizational interests though, there is no denying that the NGO introduced significant innovations to help it move closer towards SHD/PCD approaches. Such innovations took place at the conceptual, policy, organizational and programme levels and encompassed AA HQ as well as AAU.

C) Action Aid After the Adoption of SHD/PCD Approaches

At the conceptual level, AA completed its transition from relief agency to a SHD/PCD agency by formally stating in its 1994 statement of purpose, *Giving People Choices*, that the agency was committed to recognizing beneficiary communities' own development specificities and needs; to collaborating with other development actors and strengthening local institutions; to building the capabilities and encouraging the participation of the poor; to being accountable and transparent; and to adopting a flexible learning-process to development work [21]--all core components of the SHD/PCD paradigm as defined in this thesis. AA's commitment to the notion of *Human Development* has since been reiterated in its *1995-1996 Annual Report* which is appropriately entitled: *The Human Face of Development* explicitly states that AA has come a long way from the traditional "charity view" of development which the agency initially held

and its current belief that development is about "enabling people to influence the environment in which they live." [22] (Refer to **Table 6.1** for a copy of AA's latest Vision and Mission statement).

As part of its efforts to equip itself into an NGO capable of carrying out SHD/PCD approaches, by the mid 1990s, AA underwent a major organizational restructuring aimed at containing the growing hierarchy and bureaucratization of the agency at large and the excessive concentration of decision-making powers in London HQ. AA's restructuring has, on the one hand, entailed ensuring that a greater proportion of AA staff in country offices are nationals and, on the other hand, launching a major regionalization/decentralization process aimed at delegating a great proportion of the NGO's decision-making, planning and operational management responsibilities from the centre to the periphery and creating regional offices based in the South so as to encourage greater local ownership, accountability and cost-effectiveness. [23] The restructuring process has also involved a reorganization and reduction of staff in London HQ, including the replacement of HQ' International Division (once divided into regional departments and individual country desks) with a much better-integrated Programme Development Division (PDD) now guided by common strategic goals and comprised of both thematic departments, (i.e., an Emergency Unit, an Impact Assessment and Programme Learning Department, a Resource Centre, an International Advocacy Department, and an International Education Unit) [24] and regional coordination departments (e.g., West and South Africa, East and Horn of Africa) composed of fewer staff and now mostly playing an advisory role rather than directly running individual country programmes. [25] (Refer to **Table 6.2** for a copy of AA's newly decentralized organizational structure by 1996/97).

At the programme level, since the mid 1990s AA has made a conscious effort to increase the capacity-building, participatory, and self-learning

components of its overseas programmes by introducing *Participatory Rural Appraisal* (PRA) techniques which allow AA managers to learn about beneficiary communities' development aspirations directly from them. [26] The NGO has also been working to strengthen its capacity to measure process-based impacts like participation and empowerment by creating community-based monitoring and evaluation methods. It is to this latter end that, since 1996, AA has been working with the British Overseas Development Administration (now the Department for International Development) on the formulation of *Sustainable, Measurable, Achievable Replicable and Time Bound* (SMART) forms of development assessment and a *Community Based Monitoring and Evaluation Systems* (CBMS) designed in partnership with beneficiary communities. [27] The final but perhaps the most noticeable change at AA since 1995 is the NGO's attempt to move beyond community work--or what AA calls 'DA-level work', by strengthening its research, analytical and policy influencing role both internationally and at the country level. It is with this goal in mind that, by the mid 1990s, AA HQ announced that it would launch global advocacy initiatives in seven focus areas (education, HIV/AIDS, natural resources, financing the poor, conflict, urban development and development cooperation) and that it would seek to influence the outcomes of the *UN Social Summit* in Copenhagen by supporting UNDP's *20/20 Compact*, giving exposure to adult literacy and children's education at the upcoming *World Conference on Education for All* in the year 2000, and exploring advocacy options to influence UN humanitarian approaches in the Great Lakes region of Africa. [28] In the meantime, AA-UK has been trying to kick-start a number of smaller policy-related initiatives, including the creation of a *Collaborative Leadership and Action Group on Advocacy* (CLAG) which draws 'next generation leaders' into current advocacy debates, preparing a Field Book for staff engaged in advocacy, and organizing staff training workshops on policy influencing. [29] Another important component of AA's efforts to extend its influence beyond field-

level interventions has been to intensify the NGO's role within inter-agency collaborative efforts such as the annual *Reality of Aid Report* produced jointly by AA, Eurostep (an umbrella of 22 European NGOs) and The International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), as well as AA's links with the Corporate sector and the World Bank. Finally, by the end of 1997, AA's Board of Trustees had also approved an agency-wide Advocacy Strategy to mainstream advocacy throughout the NGO.

At the country level in Uganda, by the mid 1990s, the AAU Country Programme was also undergoing major changes in an effort to move towards more integrated and empowering forms of community development. These changes included the dramatic reduction in the size of AAU's personnel as a whole (from 202 staff in late 1994 down to 151 in 1995 (the year I visited) and eventually down to 126 by the end of 1996 [30]). Although AAU's programme methodologies vary somewhat from DA to DA, by 1995, evaluations of large AAU DAs by consultants such as John de Coninck started to show that these DA's staff-dependent sectoral approach were causing a series of implementational difficulties, including unnecessary duplication and rivalries between sectors, beneficiary burn out from too many meetings by each sector, and the hiring of an excessive number of over-specialized staff who were making most programme decisions and implementing most activities on their own. It is with these concerns in mind that, by 1995, the AAU CP started moving away from large, top-down, sectorally-based, technocratic and administration-heavy DAs and to create much smaller and more integrated DAs composed of small but tightly-knit teams of FDWs capable of working in a multi-sectoral fashion and of functioning as development catalysts rather micro-managers of community development initiatives. In *the Buwekula Programme*, for instance, the 67-person cadre of sectoral experts and administrators were reduced to 41 staff members in early 1995. [31] Among the most innovative changes introduced by the AAU Programme to make its transition towards more empowering development

interventions was the creation of *Parish Development Committees (PDCs)* made up of beneficiaries and local community leaders themselves. Since 1995, the chief aim of AAU's DAs has been to train PDCs and those structures which complement them (e.g., community facilitators, wider development fora, etc.) to identify their development needs and formulate, implement and assess their own development initiatives. [32]

Moreover, the AAU CP has not restricted its reforms to the DA-level. Parallel to the above-mentioned changes, since 1995, AAU has worked hard to expand its work outside of DA-level work. It has done do by escalating its political networking and broader institutional-capacity-building role in Uganda at large. For instance, in addition to its ongoing support to TASO and *Vision Terudo* and its research involvement with MITEP and NRI, AAU has become increasingly involved in strengthening Ugandan CBOs through its *Strategies for Action* initiative which helps Ugandan communities respond to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and a series of Micro Projects which led management support and develop the resource mobilization skills of umbrella Peoples' Organizations and small business and credit and savings schemes started by small groups of women, poor farmers and disabled persons. [33] This latter effort is AAU's first direct venture into income-generation, business and urban community projects. Lastly but definitely not least, by the mid 1990s the AAU CP began to considerably enhance the research, lobbying and fundraising capacities of its Programme Development Department (PDD) whose expenditures in 1996 were triple what they had been a year earlier. [34] In short, in addition to its five core DAs, AAU is also involved in various institutional capacity building, research, and policy influencing efforts.

Judging from the above achievements, it is fair to say that, like UNDP, AA has made tremendous strides in trying to reform itself into an agency better able to influence wider development policies and to carry out flexible, targeted, integrated, and self-reliant community development

initiatives--all core components of the SHD/PCD agenda. As was the case in UNDP though, AA has faced obstacles putting SHD/PCD into practice at the conceptual, policy and programme/project levels both in Uganda and beyond.

III. Action Aid's Conceptual Interpretation of the SHD/PCD Paradigm

As we saw in the previous chapter, UNDP made an already difficult situation worse by proclaiming that the SHD/PCD paradigm was the answer to all development woes. AA, on the other hand, has avoided most of UNDP's conceptual pitfalls by never proclaiming SHD/PCD to be a novel development paradigm or the answer to the NGO's prayers nor imposing set definitions or entry points for SHD/PCD upon field offices and other development actors. Actually, AA has not been too preoccupied with conceptual issues at all. Instead, the NGO has preferred to use SHD/PCD ideas as a general source of inspiration and a new way of communicating the idea that development is about 'more than economics'.

However, by the time of my field research in 1995, this situation was beginning to change somewhat due to three factors: Firstly, AA's decision to begin involving poor communities in development planning meant that the NGO could no longer shy away from inducting both field staff and programme beneficiaries into the more abstract dimensions of the SHD/PCD paradigm by introducing them to concepts such as 'capability-building', 'participation', 'empowerment', and 'long-term sustainability'. Secondly, AA's growing interest in working in a multi-sectoral and integrated fashion meant that the conceptual merits and downfalls of different development approaches now also had to be addressed and understood by AA staff and beneficiaries. And, lastly, AA's mounting interest in becoming more actively involved in research, policy analysis, and advocacy work beyond the DA-level meant that AA staff would need to learn to 'abstract' from their practical field experiences. It is these three changes which by the

mid 1990s were forcing AA to address conceptual issues and to rise to the challenge of anchoring its work in both development theory and practice.

A) Action Aid's Conceptual Treatment of the SHD/PCD Paradigm

Like UNDP, AA started moving towards the adoption of SHD/PCD approaches during the mid 1990s. The first signs of the shift were evident in Martin Griffith's *Moving Forward in the Nineties.* Although in this document, Griffiths, AA's Director from 1991-1992, reiterated that working at the grassroots level and with poor communities in specific DAs would continue to be AA's comparative advantage, he also began placing unprecedented attention on the importance of AA becoming much more "international" and "influential" in its work. This, noted Griffiths, would require AA becoming a "channel of both ideas and resources", of becoming involved in "influencing the policies and practices of others" and in being "collaborative" rather than "competitive" by strengthening existing institutions and networks rather than working alone and working on each of these principles both globally and nationally. [35] Two years later, *Giving People Choices*, AA's key guiding document for the 1990s, went a step further and fully embraced the five core principles of SHD/PCD: i.e., pursuing holistic and flexible development approaches; influencing policy in support of the 'Sound governance' agenda; reinvigorated North-South partnerships and enhanced development collaboration; increased beneficiary participation and empowerment; and enhanced equity by providing services and building the capabilities of the poorest. Both reports are significant in that they represent a gradual departure from AA's main focus on children's poverty, community-level interventions and operational rural development programmes [36] and a shift towards more sustainable and high impact interventions by doing more global and policy-related work, working in a more participatory and empowering fashion, and operating within the context of existing local and global institutions and networks rather than building new ones.

As noted above though, where AA's conceptual approach to the SHD/PCD paradigm does diverge from UNDP's is in that AA has never attempted to formulate a specific definition of SHD/PCD or to establish the diverse array of SHD/PCD guidelines, entry points, focus points, etc. which UNDP did. Instead, AA staff have used the notion of SHD/PCD as a point of departure for thinking and talking about development in a broader fashion but have never felt compelled to either define SHD/PCD, to prove that SHD/PCD is novel, or to show how exactly the NGO applies SHD/PCD ideas to their work. In essence, the priority at AA has been on what is directly relevant to the field and easily translated into practical action. In fact, during our interviews, even more intellectual staff such as Robert Dodd, Head of AA HQ's former Policy and Research Division, noted that, at AA, they preferred to use the simpler term "community development" [37], while Mr. Hugh Goyder, Head of the Evaluation and Impact Assessment Department at AA HQ, noted, while UNDP had painstakingly defined and inculcated the SHD/PCD paradigm among its staff, AA had never pursued the meaning of SHD/PCD concept as consistently or holistically as UNDP since staff in the agency were unclear about what the SHD/PCD agenda involved. [38]

These admissions are instructive for they show that, in contrast to UNDP, AA has chosen to deal with the abstractness and complexity of the SHD/PCD agenda and its lack of agency-wide consensus regarding SHD/PCD's meaning or desirability by not placing too much emphasis on the concept or over-selling it to either fellow development actors or field staff. This largely explains why, in Uganda itself, even though programme reforms represent a shift towards a SHD/PCD approach, AA staff were not conscious of the emergence of SHD/PCD nor did they feel particularly pressured to 'define' or 'sell' the SHD/PCD paradigm to other development actors as had been the case at UNDP. [39] When probed about the conceptual influences in their development work, AA staff pointed to the practical experiences of respected development agencies (e.g., OXFAM, UNICEF) or to the development

writings of Robert Chambers (part of AA's Board of Trustees) or fellow practitioners on operationalizable ideas like PRA as major influences. [40]

In sum, rather than making an issue of the SHD/PCD paradigm, whether consciously or not, AA has preferred to detract attention from the concept itself and to focus on practical issues and to speak of field-level community development instead. The advantage of the above stance has been that AA has managed to keep to a minimum the confusion of its staff, the resentment of fellow development actors, and the political resistance from powerful stakeholders. The down side is that AA has ignored the gap between SHD/PCD theory and practice this has itself created a series of complications which have undermined AA's transformation into an NGO whose development work is informed by both theory and practice. These problems are outlined below as well as developed later in the Chapter.

B) Action Aid's Difficulties Operationalizing SHD/PCD and Filling the Gap Between Theory and Practice

The main disadvantage of AA's inattention to conceptual matters and definitions has been that it has led the NGO to introduce a series of organizational and programme reforms without first developing a shared or well-rounded conceptual vision of where the agency is going in the long-run. This, along with AA's top-down imposition of SHD/PCD-related reforms, had detrimental effects for the NGO's implementation of SHD/PCD approaches.

i) AA's Difficulties in 'Abstracting' From Field Experience and in Capturing the Conceptual Complexities of Development Processes

The first problem traceable to AA's absence of a shared conceptual framework and the NGO's neglect of conceptual matters is AA's inability to 'abstract' from its practical field work in its DAs, and hence, to engage in higher-level policy-analysis and influencing work. In fact, as noted by one of the senior managers in UK HQ, because AA staff have traditionally focussed on service-delivery and poverty alleviation work at the community

and micro level, most have little or no experience thinking in terms of broader development issues or policies. "This is what AA staff have become good at, what they have been recruited and trained for, what clients expect and what AA is inclined to do as most agencies prefer to do what they are good at", remarked the respondent. [41] This predisposition, was evident in the fact that AA Director of Policy Advocacy was changed four times between 1995-1997, that even by 1997 AA HQ still did not have an approved Advocacy Strategy in place, and by my own field observations that the AAU Office was having considerable trouble linking its policy advocacy work to its DA-level interventions--both difficulties are discussed further in the following section on AA's promotion of SHD/PCD at the policy level.

A similar problem related to both AA's neglect of conceptual matters as well as to SHD/PCD's own theoretical complexity is one which started becoming evident in mid 1995 when AA's managers decided that it was time to involve DA-level staff and project beneficiaries directly in development planning, implementation and evaluation processes and in the process discovered that neither AA field staff or beneficiaries fully comprehended the meaning of more abstract *Human Development* principles or the inter-linkages between the various components of integrated development and SHD/PCD ideas. These conceptual ambiguities have only recently been recognized by internal agency documents such as AA's *Africa Region Strategy for 1996* which openly recognizes that "a detailed understanding of the dynamics of poverty is still relatively superficial" within AA (as well as Africa and the foreign aid sector as a whole) and that AA still lacks clarity in determining whom its programmes should be directed at, how exactly it can attack the root causes of poverty, or how it should go about targeting policy-level inputs. [42] In its internal assessments, the AAU CP has itself expressed concern over its lack of the professional and analytical skills needed to abstract policy lessons from its field experiences or to reflect on the conceptual complexities of integrated and holistic development. [43]

ii) AA's Perpetual State of Flux and Trial and Error

Another adverse effect of AA's lack of a shared conceptual framework is that, as a result, the NGO has found itself in a perpetual state of flux and of trial and error as it tries to find its way. During my research, I found several examples of this. During the time that I followed events at AA (1995-1997), the NGO's International Division was restructured no less than three times. Moreover, not only did most of the AA staff members I spoke in London HQ change positions at least once during my research period, but most of my key informants (M. Griffiths, N. Twose, S. Johnson, R. Dodd, R. Thamotheram, H. Goyder) left AA during that time. In similar vein, even by 1997 when I had stopped consistently following events at AA, the change process in the NGO was still not complete and AA was still debating its Corporate Strategy and a possible agency-wide Advocacy Strategy. In AA-Uganda, there were similar signs of frustration with the constant and what sometimes seemed like direction-less changes within AA. For instance, an internal Communications Exercise carried out in the *Buwekula* DA revealed that staff morale and productivity were seriously suffering as a result of staff members' feelings of powerlessness over strategic programme changes at AAU. [44] A later interview with Mr. Nigel Twose, Head of AA HQ's International Division, confirmed that much of the flux and trial and error at AA could have been reduced had AA HQ not introduced major organizational reforms before the NGO had defined a conceptual vision of where it was going. [45]

iii) Internal Tensions Within AA

AA's lack of a coherent conceptual framework has also meant that the agency has been unable to rally its troops behind one shared cause or vision. Consequently, within AA one finds considerable internal discord with respect to what the NGO is about or where should be heading. In fact,

one respondent familiar with the upper echelons of AA describes the NGO as an agency "riddled with internal tensions" whose effectiveness has been seriously undermined by growing disagreement between the NGO's conservative forces (i.e., AA's cautious Board of Trustees preoccupied chiefly with financial accountability and the field's compliance to UK Charity Law and traditional child sponsors which according to market research are driven primarily by charitable motives); its progressive elements (i.e., AA's development-oriented Director and technical staff set on professionalizing the agency and moving it closer towards SHD/PCD approaches); and an increasingly autonomous cadre of regional and country directors whose positions vary from country to country. [46]

My research also revealed that a gulf existed at AA between the development perspectives of policy and technical development specialists and AA staff who had more administrative functions and dealt with financial or child sponsorship matters. The rift between the two camps was best articulated by Ms. Marion Jackson, Head of Marketing at AA HQ, who explained that while the policy and development specialists in the 'seventh floor' (i.e., formerly the International Division and currently the Programme Development Department) spent most of their time thinking about conceptual issues, achieving greater policy impact, and moving the agency closer towards SHD/PCD principles, staff in AA's administrative, financial, communications and sponsorship departments are far less inclined towards theorizing, took much more consideration of practical constraints, and hence, much more likely to support a traditional service-delivery approach to development. As for country-level managers, noted Ms. Jackson, they mostly favour doing 'more of the same' (i.e., continuing the current child sponsorship mechanism and traditional service-delivery in DAs) since they know that is what has won the approval of sponsors in the past since they, above all, value 'security' and 'growing income which they can spend as they like. To field managers, remarked Ms. Jackson, political advocacy

campaigns or national fundraising schemes which entail becoming involved in sensitive political issues and taking financial risks are not desirable since these put their own jobs in jeopardy. [47]

The internal rifts described above are illuminating not only because they illustrate that, far from being harmonious or naturally inclined towards consensus-building, NGOs like AA are themselves riddled with internal tensions and ideologically divided over the desirability or feasibility of core SHD/PCD principles. Ultimately, warned Ms. Jackson, AA can not continue simultaneous promoting traditional service delivery work in DAs and pursuing SHD/PCD goals like more advocacy work: "something has to give", she remarked. As the following section shows, this is indeed what happened in the case of AA's promotion of SHD/PCD at the policy level.

iv) The Top-Down Nature of AA's Adoption of SHD/PCD

Finally, as was the case in UNDP, one of the main caveats in AA's adoption of SHD/PCD approaches was the top-down manner in which SHD/PCD-related reforms were introduced within the agency and the harmful effects which this has had on HQ-AAU relations and the ownership of SHD/PCD-related ideas in the field. In the case of AA's promotion of SHD/PCD goals such as greater policy advocacy, for instance, my interviews revealed that several AA staff in Uganda felt that advocacy work had been imposed almost unilaterally upon them by AA HQ in London without sufficiently taking into consideration that most AAU staff were teachers, nurses or field-oriented people, and in some cases even former exiles, who could not afford to antagonize the government the way UK expatriates could. [48] Even when discussing AA's regionalization/decentralization process, AA respondents pointed out that much of the brain-storming for the process had taken place within AA HQ or among high-level Country Directors but had excluded lower-level and field-based staff in Ugandan DAs who, as a consequence, had

little ownership of the process and feared that the regionalization/ decentralization process might be utilized to cut existing African programmes in order to allocate funds to start up new AA programmes in other countries. [49] The above discussion clearly illustrates that, as in UNDP, reforms linked to SHD/PCD ideas are perceived to have emanated largely from AA HQs and, as such, not only suffer from a lack of local ownership but may even have exacerbated tensions between HQ and the AAU.

In summary, it would seem that in deciding not to dwell on complex conceptual definitions or to explicitly state its ideological position on SHD/PCD, AA has managed to bypass much of the confusion, resistance and grief suffered by UNDP. What has began to become apparent from the discussion above though is that, when it comes to putting SHD/PCD approaches into practice, AA's inattention to conceptual matters was not able to save the NGO from facing many operationalization problems. In the case of AA these problems are linked to the lack of theory which can inform practice and include complications like difficulties linking practical field experience to wider policy lessons and theoretical poverty debates; insufficient conceptual guidance or analytical skills among staff and beneficiaries to understand development processes well enough to be able to design, implement and assess integrated and process-based development initiatives; and lack of internal consensus or field-level ownership of what the NGO represents and where it is heading. The adverse effects of these problems is something which I return to in my later my analysis of AA's implementation of SHD/PCD at the policy and programme/project levels.

IV. Action Aid's Effectiveness Implementing SHD/PCD in Uganda and Beyond

A) Action Aid's Efforts to Promote SHD/PCD at the Policy Level

Like UNDP, AA has made conscious effort to position itself as an effective policy advocate capable of coordinating and influencing wider development debates and policies at the global and national level.

i) Policy Influencing and Coordination Efforts by Action Aid Headquarters

Some of AA's difficulties in the area of policy advocacy and coordination are no doubt attributable to AA's smaller size and lack of access to a global policy forum such as the UN. Nevertheless, a large part of AA's difficulties in advocacy are traceable to the NGOs' own inexperience in policy influencing and lack of personnel with specialized advocacy and lobbying experience. For example, according to AA's own internal assessments, for a long time the agency had difficulties distinguishing between policy research and analysis, programme promotion and actual lobbying. [50] I myself saw evidence of this during my research when I observed that even up to mid 1995, AA was committing the mistake of equating the replication of successful AA programmes such as *Regenerated Freireian Literacy Through Empowering and Community Techniques* (REFLECT) with policy advocacy and spending much of its time promoting programmes such as REFLECT instead of influencing broader institutional arrangements and policies. [51]

During my research of AA I was also able to directly observe that as late as mid 1995 AA HQ still lacked an established advocacy/lobbying department or an agency-wide Advocacy Strategy. In fact, the available evidence confirms that it took AA as many as 8 years and four restructuring attempts to create an effective policy advocacy department and to mainstream advocacy into the agency. AA HQ's various attempts to build an advocacy unit include the creation of a "Public Policy Unit"--1989-92 (the Unit was staffed by one person and seen as a peripheral 'think tank' which commissioned studies and ensured AA attended high profile global Conferences); the Policy and Research of "issues" approach inspired by *Moving Forward in the Nineties*--1992-1994 (the approach assumed that AA could have policy influence through direct service delivery and tried to integrate policy concerns with programming in the field. The approach led to new

research on issues like environment, education and children both in AA HQ and in the DAs but little specialist lobbying of decision-makers was done); the joint External Affairs and Policy Research approach--1994-1995 (under this model the Policy and Research Unit continued doing research on issues while and External Affairs Department lobbied MPs and other UK audiences. Unfortunately the approach focussed on UK audiences rather than on international advocacy and no overall advocacy policy was ever put forward); and more recently--1996-1997, an attempt has been made to identify seven priority issues for advocacy (i.e., education, HIV/AIDS, natural resources, financing the poor, conflict, urban development, and development cooperation) and to formulate an agency-wide and integrated Advocacy Strategy through a process of intra-agency consultation--i.e., the so-called Collaborative Leadership and Advocacy Group (CLAG) process. [52]

AA's inexperience and slowness in kick-starting its policy work in AA HQs, of course, largely explains why, by the end of 1997, the NGO still had not been able to narrow down its 7 overly dispersed and unwieldy advocacy themes into much more focussed and therefore workable advocacy themes. Nor was AA's top management expected to officially agree on an agency-wide Advocacy Strategy for AA or to select specific policy areas or targets around which AA could begin to design advocacy initiatives until 1998. Given AA's tendency to launch its advocacy work "from scratch" many times over, its lack of an agency-wide advocacy strategy and its limited number of international advocacy efforts by late 1997, it should not be surprising that the NGO's own internal analyses have concluded the AA's attempts to develop an agency-wide Advocacy Strategy and to influence policy at the global level have not been particularly effective. [53]

A second problem resulting from AA's inexperience in wider policy work had been the NGOs' difficulties forging strong collaborative links with fellow development NGOs carrying out global policy advocacy. The best

example of this is found in the disappointing results of AA's involvement in the *Reality of Aid* network, an effort by two NGO networks (Eurostep and ICVA) to influence international development policies through the publication of a shadow OECD/DA report on foreign aid. From the mid 1990s AA invested a considerable amount of money and energy in the *Reality of Aid Project* by assuming the role of lead agency and both hiring and paying the wage of a project coordinator for the project. According to a recent evaluation of the policy impact of the Reality of Aid project, however, although the *Reality of Aid* network has managed to produce useful annual report on foreign aid from the perspective of NGOs, the network has proven unable to produce a global advocacy strategy and therefore to influence global aid policy. [54] Perhaps more worryingly though, although AA had been chosen to be the lead agency in the Reality of Aid project in the mid 1990s, by the end of 1997, network members were requesting that AA's role as lead agency in the project be terminated given the NGO's domineering tendencies and competitive rather than collaborative behaviour. [55]

However, not all of AA's difficulties in the area of policy influencing work are rooted in inexperience or technical limitations. Actually, my research reveals that the setbacks experienced by AA in the area of global policy advocacy are also closely linked to internal organizational constraints and political pressures within the NGO itself.

The most obvious organizational constraint undermining AA's global advocacy efforts is the reality that the initiative to do advocacy and lobbying work at AA clearly emanated from London HQ and, as such, enjoys little support or legitimacy at the country level. During my research, I found that the top-down nature in which advocacy work was introduced into AA was not only evident in the fact that, until the mid 1990s, all of AA's

policy, research and advocacy staff were based in London and that it was not until 1995 that policy and advocacy professionals were put in place in AA-Uganda but also in the fact that, it was not until after my research and the creation of CLAG in 1997 that AA actually involved its southern staff in discussions about advocacy issues. [56] The imposed nature and lack of staff ownership of advocacy work in the field was also a view which dominated many of my interviews with AA staff in Uganda [57] and has even been explicitly recognized in internal (albeit confidential) AA documents which concede that because policy, research and advocacy work were seen as "London-based" and as "separate from Country Programme priorities", these never had much legitimacy or following within AA's Country Programmes. [58]

Finally, during my research, I also discovered that AA's lacklustre record in the area of global policy advocacy was also attributable to the reluctance of AA's own Board of Trustees to involve AA in policy influencing work or in challenging the status quo. According respondents familiar with the upper echelons of AA, the root of the problem laid with the political conservativeness (i.e.,Tory) disposition of AA's Board of Trustees who saw advocacy work as much too 'political' and potentially alienating to AA's traditional child sponsors. [59] My own research into the matter confirms that, with the exception of Prof. Robert Chambers at the University of Sussex and the Labourite Lord Dubbs, AA's Board of Trustees in the mid 1990s was predominantly made up of Conservative captains of industry and included familiar UK Tory names such as John Stanley (a Thatcherite Tory who managed the Falklands War for Prime Minister Thatcher) and Sir Christopher Chataway, a former athlete and well-known personality in British Tory Circles. Moreover, during my interview with Mr. Rodney Buse, Chairman of AA's Board of Trustees, he agreed that AA's child sponsors were predominantly Conservative, middle-aged, and an upper-middle class constituency who did not relate to AA's more transformational goals. For this reason, he explained, AA preferred to use a more 'neutral'

language and to emphasize the importance of having compassion for the poor rather than talking about the need for more radical institutional transformation. [60] It is this fear of becoming involved in 'political' issues which, by the mid 1990s, partly prompted AA's Board of Trustees to limit the amount of money the agency would be allowed to spend on advocacy and policy influencing work by introducing a rule which stipulated that no more than 5% of AA's resources could be spent on such work. [61] According to respondents, it was the Board of Trustees' unrealistic ceiling on agency expenditures on policy issues which has forced AA HQ to keep its advocacy unit to a minimum of 3-4 persons and which forced AA to let go a number of its policy and public education staff at AA HQ in 1994--an incident which caused resignations among several AA staff members who felt that although service-delivery was a valuable part of AA's work, alone, it was not sufficient to challenge wider institutional and governance arrangements. [62]

Although it is impossible for an outside researcher to capture the full range of an agency's advocacy work during a short period of time, judging from the available evidence, it would seem that, despite genuine efforts to increase its global advocacy efforts, the combination of technical limitations (i.e., inexperience, lack of the appropriate skills) coupled with inappropriate organizational structures (i.e., the imposition of advocacy work in a top-down fashion) and political resistance from traditional yet powerful stakeholders (i.e., Trustees' reluctance to enter into 'political' advocacy work) seem to have undermined AA's initial hopes of influencing global institutions and wider development debates.

As for AA's policy impact in Uganda itself, although the NGO had committed itself to becoming actively involved in advocacy work as early as 1992, because of the trial and error and various false starts described above, AAU's *Programme Development Department* (PDD) and advocacy functions were still in the early stages at the time of my visit in 1995 and were not to take off until 1997. However, it is useful to discuss some of the early

obstacles which the AAU Office was beginning to face in its efforts to become more involved in influencing wider policy and governance issues in Uganda. The first obstacle observed was the preference of the AAU CP to concentrate its development interventions in geographically limited DAs in rural areas. There is no denying, of course, that it is in the Ugandan countryside where poverty is most severe and where development assistance is needed most. At the same time though, AAU's rural and grassroots-focus has prevented the NGO from building the high profile and political access it would need both in Kampala and within the upper echelons of government in order to significantly influence Ugandan policy and institutional reforms. Another caveat of AAU's DA-focus is that it restricts the NGO's impact to a few thousand selected beneficiaries in rural areas. Moreover, with time, staff become so consumed with solving operational problems in their micro areas that they are unable to thin in holistic terms or to reflect about the root causes of poverty or wider institutional solutions.

During my field research, AAU's lack of profile among decision-makers and the international development community became evident during interviews with diverse development actors in Kampala. During such interviews government officials themselves asked me what AAU was about and what it was currently doing; respondents from bilateral agencies such as USAID noted that although though AAU was known to be effective in implementing education programmes on the ground, it was the World Bank which set the pace of education policy in Uganda; and respondents from fellow NGOs like OXFAM noted that although OXFAM and AA had shared values, the two NGOs did not collaborate much when it came to influencing wider policy issues in Uganda since AA was mainly involved in 'hands-on' operational activities in the field. [63]

The above problems turned out to be of considerable concern to AA-UK staff such as Nigel Twose who himself remarked that convincing AA staff in

the CPs to work beyond the local level or in a sectoral fashion by becoming more involved in broader policy issues or in learning from other CPs was proving to be a major struggle at AA and undermining cross-country and cross-sectoral learning within the NGO. [64] In Uganda itself, a senior manager in AAU's PDD in Kampala alluded to the same difficulties during our interview and remarked that, because the vast majority of AAU staff still worked in the field and were mainly concerned with meeting time-lines and targets set in the DAs which were still the 'bread and butter' of AAU's work, most AAU staff had little time to think about, let alone try to influence broader national and international policy issues. [65] The same respondent further confirmed that, although AAU was at the time trying to forge links with the World Bank and UNICEF as well as to carry out joint research initiatives with OXFAM, AAU had generally become accustomed to doing things on its own in the Ugandan countryside and was still somewhat wary of competition from fellow NGOs. [66] The limited time, money and skilled personnel available to the AAU to do advocacy work is confirmed by the available statistics, including the fact that out of the 39 AAU staff members based in Kampala in early 1995, only 3-4 persons had a mandate to do policy-influencing work and that AAU as whole spent as much as 78% of its budget in 1995 on DA-related activities. (See **Table 6.3**). Moreover, out of the modest amount of money which AAU spent on non-DA activities, it is estimated that AAU only spends about £35,000 per year on direct advocacy work in Uganda. [67] Finally, some AA staff also noted that, despite the pressures from AA HQ for the NGO to become more involved in policy advocacy in the South, the difficulty of raising delicate political issues in a country where memories of violence were still vivid, where staff from international NGOs like AA are sometimes themselves former political exiles who have understandably preferred to stay out of politics, and where international NGOs like AA are seen as foreign entities lacking a legitimate Ugandan constituency or voice, also explain why the AAU Office has not taken a more activist approach to policy influence in Uganda. [68]

Admittedly, problems such as limited time, experience, and resources, are inherent in any attempt to change the orientation of an agency that operates at many levels and in many contexts. Nevertheless, the slow and top-down manner in which AA's overall advocacy strategy was launched go a long way to explaining why the transition proved to be a particularly painful one at AA and why, at the time of my visit in 1995, AAU had few concrete policy results to speak of other than the recent formulation of a draft working paper justifying the expansion of its advocacy work. [69] Still, it is worth noting, nonetheless, that on a subsequent visit to AA HQ in London, Ms. Sara Mangali, head of AAU's PDD, reported that, during 1996, 10 staff positions had been established within the PDD in AAU; links had been fostered with the District governments of Mityana and Mubende through a research initiative on Non-Formal Education (NFE); new research had been started in areas such economic growth and the nature of the relationship between HIV/AIDS and conflict in Northern Uganda; and that new Non-DA Micro-Projects had been designed to help women and the blind. [70]

B) Action Aid's Implementation of SHD/PCD Approaches at the Programme/ Project and Grassroots Level in the *Buwekula* Development Area

The last aspect of AA's work which I analyze in this chapter are AA's SHD/PCD efforts at the programme and project levels in Uganda as a whole as well as in selected DAs. Because SHD/PCD aspires to bring about flexible and bottom-up development initiatives which aim to improve equity and to assist the poorest of the poor, to foster greater donor collaboration, genuine North-South partnerships as well as greater participation and a sense of ownership and self-reliance among aid recipients, the sections which follow explore whether AAU's organizational structures actually embody these features and to what extent these SHD/PCD goals have been furthered through AAU's field-level programmes/projects.

i) Action Aid-Uganda's Country Programme as A Whole

During my study of AA's CP in Uganda, it became evident that AA had many positive attributes, including a strong rural presence and direct involvement with poor rural communities (this is evident in **MAP 1** appended to this chapter which shows AAU's various DAs at the time of my visit in 1995); strict enforcement of rigorous accountability and transparency measures [71]; and a cadre of committed and disciplined staff which received ongoing training [72] as well as benefits such as transport to and from work, a daily free lunch and ample opportunities for exchange visits. [73] Respondents also identified AAU's dedication to building schools, training teachers, passing on new skills to communities, and trying to work in more participatory ways among the contributions the NGO had made in Uganda. [74] However, these achievements notwithstanding, my research revealed that the AAU CP was facing many of the same difficulties as UNDP in its attempt to mainstream SHD/PCD into its development programmes in Uganda.

North-South Tensions and Lack of Ownership Resulting from the Hierarchical and Top-Down Management Style of Action Aid HQ and the Action Aid-Uganda CP

One major factor afflicting AA's effectiveness in Uganda is the hierarchical nature of the organization's own structures and the top-down manner in which staff perceive that the NGO has carried out its agenda for change. Evidence of such perceptions has already been given above. What is important to add at this point is some of the supplementary evidence which corroborates these perceptions at the programme level. On the issue of northern domination, a glance at the organizational chart for AA HQ in **Table 6.2** confirms that, despite AA's regionalization/decentralization efforts, the NGO's main international programming unit--i.e., the Programme Development Department, has retained its main office in London, while functions such as Financial Management, Marketing, Sponsorship, and Human Resource Management are all still run from London, and AA's Director, General and Board of Trustees all remain London-based and dominated. With

respect to hierarchy within AA-Uganda, an organizational chart of the AAU Office in Kampala in **Table 6.4** clearly shows that the NGO is organized in a vertical fashion and that most responsibility is vested directly in the AAU Country Director. Another sign of the centralized manner in which planning and programming decisions are made in the AAU CP is evident in the similarity between AAU's various DAs. If DA-level and programme-related decisions were truly made by field staff and beneficiary communities in a decentralized manner, it would be very unlikely to find--as I did during my AAU field research, all but one of AAU's rural DAs introducing identical methodological changes such as the promotion of AA HQ's star education programme, REFLECT and the use of *Parish Development Committees* (PDCs) --the negative effects of which are analyzed later. AAU's tendency to impose 'blueprints' was explained by a former AAU manager as follows:

> Action Aid must spend the money and get things done. As a result, programmes end up being dictated rather than giving people choices. [75]

The above quotation shows that, like UNDP, smaller NGOs like AA are equally pressed by HQ and organizational imperatives to 'do what is easiest' : i.e., arriving in communities with pre-determined ideas, 'spending the money' rapidly, and producing concrete outputs on time.

Top-Heavy Management Structures and Limited Community-Level Investment

Another problematic feature of the AA-Uganda programme lies with its top-heavy management structures and high administrative and logistical cost. Of course, some perspective is in order here. For instance, compared to the UNDP-Uganda Office in Kampala (Refer back to Chapter 5), the staff of the AAU Office in Kampala (as shown in **Table 6.4**) is obviously much smaller than UNDP's and AAU overall has a much smaller proportion of its staff concentrated in Kampala than UNDP as well as a much ratio of administrative/logistical: professional/technical staff in its Kampala

Office than UNDP does. [76] Moreover, while only a small proportion of UNDP-Uganda's 85-plus projects are grassroots development initiatives, the bulk of AAU's CP (i.e., over 78% of the AAU CP budget in 1995 according to **Table 6.3**) goes directly towards development initiatives in AAU's five rural DAs. In short, there is no denying that AAU is overall smaller, less administration-heavy and less centralized in Kampala than UNDP.

At the same time though, even after major staff cutbacks in 1995, at the time of my visit, the AAU Office in Kampala had a staff of as many as 39 persons (this was later to increase with the expansion of the PDD) even though most of the NGO's development activities were based in the countryside. (See **Table 6.4**). Furthermore, despite AAU's efforts to cut its personnel costs in Kampala, to trim the size of its older DAs and to design much smaller and flatter DAs, during my field visits I observed that, even after staff cut-backs in its older DAs, AAU's organizational structure remained very administration-heavy. For example, in DAs such as the one in Buwekula, out of a remaining staff of 40 in 1995 (down from 67 at the end of 1994), only 15 Field Development Workers (FDWs) and 2 Area Managers spent most of their time working directly with beneficiary communities in the countryside, while the remainder of the DA's staff remained in Mubende town performing a series of management, administrative, logistical support and regulation functions. (e.g., reporting to Kampala, processing child sponsorship letters, filling in inventory on stationary and other materials, keeping track of motorcycle mileage, making out receipts for project-related purchases, etc.) (Refer to **Table 6.6** for details). [77]

I also found documents showing that the proportion of the AAU CP expenditures going towards the maintenance of the NGO's own operations (i.e., staff salaries, rent, vehicle maintenance, office services, etc.) is substantially larger than the proportion of money channelled directly into investments in beneficiary communities themselves. In fact, according to

an internal but confidential calculation carried out by AAU's Financial Unit, as little as £11 out of every £180 pledged by an individual AA sponsor annually--i.e., as little as 3.5% of a sponsor's donation--is money directly available to the beneficiary community [78].

Limited Collaboration with Other Development Agencies or Government

A related shortcoming of AAU's DA-focus and directly operational approach is the seclusion which results from doing things on its own and being the sole provider of all a community's development needs. This is one respect in which AA's style of grassroots work in Uganda differs dramatically from that of UNDP which was much more apt to use other UN agencies, the Ugandan government or intermediary NGOs and CBOs as implementors of its field projects. Luckily, by the time of my field visit, the AAU CP had begun supporting indigenous Ugandan NGOs such as TASO and VISION TERUDO and was experimenting with implementing development projects on behalf of other donors--the *Kamuli* DA which AAU implemented on behalf of the World Bank-funded PAPSCA initiative is an example of this. Nevertheless, AAU's seclusion, especially in its DAs, is something which became quite evident to me after being based in the *Buwekula* DA for six weeks and having virtually no interaction with non-AA staff and finding out that *Buwekula*'s DA Coordinator and UNDP/CMP's Chief Technical Advisor did not know each other (until my introduction) even though both agencies had been operating in the same areas around Mubende for years. A similar experience was recounted by Hugh Goyder, Head of AA-UK's Monitoring and Evaluation Department, who himself remarked that, whenever he visited the AAU CP, he rarely met anyone but AAU staff. [79] AAU's tendency to 'go it alone' (especially in rural DAs) and its reluctance to co-implement projects with other development agencies or the Ugandan government have not escaped the attention of other development actors, some of whom attributed AAU's seclusion to the NGO's strongly-held belief that its own methods of

doing things are superior and more easily put into practice when they do need to be debated with outsiders [80] as well as to the NGO's persistent distrust of the Ugandan government and, hence, its preference to bypass or duplicate government structures rather than dealing with the challenge of working with them. [81] Of course, as it will be shown later, AA's distrust of the Ugandan government, has often been justified. This, however, does not change the fact that AAU's reluctance to work through existing governmental institutions or to link up its beneficiaries with other development actors and potential funders has undermined its policy influence in top-level decision-making circles and reduced its potential learning from other development organizations. The decision also means that, once AAU leaves the vicinity, its beneficiaries may well be left in limbo. I return to this issue in my analysis of the *Buwekula* DA.

A Tendency to Attend to Organizational Interests By Doing What is Easiest

Finally, during my assessment of the AAU CP I discovered a number of ways in which AAU chose to 'do what is easiest' and most feasible in order to keep the money moving and to meet targets and deadlines set in AA HQ and the expectations of influential stakeholders such as the NGO's Board of Trustees. The most obvious example which I found of this tendency was AAU's choice of DAs. As explained by a respondent familiar with the early establishment of AAU CP, rather than targeting in those remote Ugandan regions which were the neediest (e.g., in the North), AAU's first two DAs (Mityana and Buwekula), were in great part chosen because of their proximity to Kampala, and hence, their convenience. [82] In the case of the *Buwekula* DA, this logic has meant that the two sub-Counties chosen by AAU (i.e., Kasambya and Kitenga) were not the poorest within Mubende District either but were chosen, instead, because their shorter distance from Mubende town made work there easier. These are not in and of themselves bad decisions since extreme poverty exists both in Mityana and Buwekula.

Moreover, given the danger and difficulty of working in remote areas in Uganda during the 1980s, this decision may have been logical. And, lastly, it is important to remember that when trying to attribute agency decisions to certain motives, one can never do so with certainty. Nonetheless, various other examples of AAU taking the easier path are discussed below and, in their collective, these decisions do show that NGOs are not necessarily more likely than other types of international development agencies to work with the poorest or in the most remote and neediest areas.

In summary, it would seem that, as a whole, the AAU CP has made significant progress in strengthening its advocacy and policy influencing capacity, its support of indigenous Ugandan NGOs and CBOs, and in trying to run a much leaner and less centralized agency as well as more participatory and bottom-up development programmes--all core components of the SHD/PCD approach. Moreover, despite the organizational limitations outlined above, AAU is still much less Kampala-based or administration-heavy than UNDP and generally spends a greater proportion of its budget, time and energy working directly with rural communities who remain the poorest section of Ugandan society. On top of this, AAU's preference for working on its own and in a 'hands on manner' does have its advantages in that it saves the NGO from spending valuable time and resources on turf-battles with fellow donors; it enables it closely to monitor field activities and to enforce work and financial accountability procedures; and ensures that agency staff spend time in the community rather than in Kampala, thereby reducing the scope for staff and beneficiary shirking, free-loading and corruption and keeping opportunistic outsiders such as rent-seeking politicians, at bay.

These benefits notwithstanding though, the bulk of the evidence provided above shows that AAU has encountered many of the same problems as UNDP in its efforts to put SHD/PCD approaches into practice in Uganda. These include difficulties influencing wider Ugandan policy or governance

issues through proactive advocacy work; persistent North-South tensions and an inability to foster a sense of national ownership over SHD/PCD approaches or those reforms accompanying its adoption; a tendency to 'go it alone' rather than collaborating closely with fellow development actors or the Ugandan government (a problem more pronounced within AAU and within UNDP-Uganda); and a tendency to protect organizational interests (e.g., by 'pushing pre-set development agendas', 'doing what is easiest' and being careful not to 'offend powerful stakeholders') even when such organizational interests undermine core SHD/PCD goals like fostering genuine partnership, participation, and self-reliance.

ii) Action Aid-Uganda's Implementation of SHD/PCD in the Buwekula DA

To observe the constraints faced by AAU at the grassroots level, I carried out an in-depth analysis of its *Buwekula* (ABP) DA in Mubende District. ABP was chosen as a case study not only because it was one of AAU's older DAs but also because its multi-sectoral development approach and recent shift towards an integrated methodology and both self-reliant and participatory development is commensurate with the principles of SHD/PCD. In addition, ABP was deemed easier to study than the *Mityana* DA which was already phasing out at the time of my arrival as well as a more typical AAU DA than the *Kamuli* which AAU was implementing on behalf of the World Bank as a unique experiment. The remaining DAs in Bundibugyo and Apach were discarded since the former focussed exclusively on women and literacy and the latter was not fully operational at the time of my visit.

The *Buwekula Programme* began in 1989. Its main development objective was to assist socially and economically disadvantaged communities to take responsibility of their own development needs and to gain access to development opportunities and sustainable improvements in their living

conditions. In the case of ABP, this is achieved through four inter-linked interventions: i) empowering communities and building their capacities to develop, plan, implement and assess their own development initiatives; ii) providing support in basic health, education, water and sanitation and agricultural extension services; iii) building and rehabilitating community infrastructure such as roads, clinics, schools and water tanks; and iv) helping communities to improve their economic base and entrepreneurial skills and potential through business training and credit and savings schemes. By the time of my visit in 1995, ABP cited among its achievements the training of over 300 PDC members in development planning, project formulation and the formulation of evaluation indicators; the construction of over 200 classrooms, training to over 140 teachers, and the establishment of over 70 literacy centres with 4,000 persons taught in the area of education; the immunization of 2, 918 children in 1994 alone, 320 health courses, and the training of over 200 Community Health Workers and 105 Traditional Birth Attendants in the area of health; the construction of over 50 water sources and the rehabilitation of over 500 Km of feeder roads and 92 bridges, thereby making 42 villages accessible in the area of infrastructure; the initiation of 69 tree nurseries between 1989-1994 and the training of 800 farmers on environmentally-sound farming practices by 1993 (30% had adopted some of these practices) in agriculture; and the identification of 80 groups for potential credit and savings schemes and financial management training to 35 of these groups in the area of business promotion. (The development objectives of ABP are summarized in **Table 6.5.** and the 22 project sites I visited in the DA with the help of my Research Assistant, Mr. Edward Ssekayombya, are illustrated in **MAP II.**)

The sections which follow analyzes to what extent ABP has achieved its programme objectives and explores some of the obstacles which the programme has encountered at the broader institutional, inter-organizational, intra-organizational and community levels.

a) Broader Institutional Constraints

Lack of Access to Local Supplies, Markets or Services

As was the case at UNDP, AAU's effectiveness in carrying out SHD/PCD approaches in the Ugandan countryside have also been set back by a series of broader institutional constraints. Lack of access to regular transport, markets or local inputs and services were frequently cited as major obstacles to development by both ABP staff and beneficiaries. Having lived in Mubende District for almost two months, I directly observed how, inadequate roads (especially during the rainy season) made access to remote communities virtually impossible; how the lack of major local markets meant that young boys from rural areas cycled a full day in order to be able to transport 4 bunches of *Matoke* (the green bananas which constitute Ugandans' main staple) to the central market in Mubende town; and how a lack of rural store outlets or repair services meant that spare parts or supplies took months to arrive from Kampala. These economic institutional constraints impaired ABP's operations in a number of ways: The erratic supply of electricity meant that ABP's 15-plus lap-top computers had to be individually operated on expensive batteries; the paucity of local repair services meant that ABP's photocopiers were usually out of order; and the absence of efficient local banking services or spare parts meant that ABP staff spent much of their time travelling to Kampala to repair vehicles, procure spare parts, or perform simple financial transactions. These activities absorbed tremendous time and energy and elevated the costs of every day transactions for the ABP project and the Buwekula community.

Limited Access to Productive Assets and Local Government Support

ABP beneficiaries also remarked that their communities' and personal development were hindered by lack of access to productive assets. [83] Many

respondents also specifically complained that they lacked government assistance in this area and invariably suffered at the hands of ineffective and corrupt government officials and local leaders who furthered their personal, family and tribal interests, at the expense of the wider community. In fact, according to a study carried out by the government of Mubende District, the area's planned development activities were often hampered by the local government's own incompetence and malfeasance, including problems of embezzlement due to poor financial accountability, weak political leadership, and low morale resulting from poor internal communication, confusion over the role of RC/LCs and government departments, weak planning and tax collection capacity, inappropriately trained manpower, and excessive bureaucracy and delays in pay. [84]

None of these grievances are surprising and most of the broader institutional constraints mentioned above have been already identified in previous chapters. What is different, however, is that AAU dealt with many of these wider institutional constraints by running its own, virtually autonomous development operations and thus bypassing existing Ugandan institutions. In the case of ABP, this has involved maintaining its own fleet of vehicles and accompanying mechanics; building up its own extensive system of office computers, printers and photocopiers; supplying its own staff clothing, lunch and security services; and generally running a self-contained operation with its own strict rules and procedures. On the positive side, this directly operational approach has led to a tightly-run ship with little room for laxity by staff or fraud by outsiders. On the down side, as shown above, the approach has restricted collaboration with others and left little time or money to challenge wider policies or institutional constraints. On top of this, the available evidence shows that ABP's directly operational and self-sufficient approach to DA-work has implied large numbers of office-based staff in Mubende town (As shown in **Table 6.6**, even after staff cutbacks, only ABP 17 staff members--15 FDWs

and 2 Area Managers--spent most of their time in the countryside while the remaining 34 regular ABP staff and 7 informal workers oversaw logistics in ABP's Mubende Office.) and extremely high administrative/logistical costs. (As **Table 6.7** shows, over 86% of ABP's costs in 1995 went towards the DA's administrative/logistical maintenance.) [85]

b) Inter-Organizational Constraints

Considering what has already been said about AAU's tendency to 'go it alone' and directly to control operational activities in its rural DAs, it should not be too surprising that the *Buwekula* Programme has not faced as many inter-organizational complications as UNDP. Although this may well change as ABP begins to forge more links with non Action Aiders, at the time of my visit, the main source of ABP's inter-organizational problems seemed to be its isolation from fellow development actors, government officials and Mubende town itself.

Limited Interaction Between ABP Beneficiaries and Non Action Aiders

Although AAU had already committed itself to increasing its interaction with different development actors both within and beyond its DAs, during my visit to ABP, not only did I not encounter any other development agencies implementing development activities in the Kasambya or Kitenga Sub-Counties in which the *Buwekula Programme* operated, but, as noted above, ABP staff seemed unaware of neighbouring development programmes taking place in Mubende District. [86] Furthermore, when I asked ABP beneficiaries what other agencies or actors contributed to their development, most pointed out that, aside from sporadic support from their RC/LCs, they were not in regular contact with other Ugandan or international development actors. [87] Of course, it is true that the number of agencies present in Buwekula have been few. It is also quite plausible

that respondents may have under-reported their collaboration with non-Action Aiders in fear that doing otherwise might cause them to lose the support they were receiving from AAU. If this is the case, this finding is itself important for it confirms that encouraging beneficiaries to establish contact with other development or community actors is not an objective which has been given major priority at ABP.

Weak Links or Collaboration Between ABP and Local Government

ABP's relations with local government and encouragement of beneficiaries to increasingly engage their government was equally weak. During my first interview with Mr. Isaac Mudoi, Chief Administrative Officer for Mubende District, he remarked that AAU had never been very transparent or forthcoming about what it was doing in its two DAs in Mubende District (i.e., *Mityana* and *Buwekula*). He further noted that, in response to AAU's tendency to over-concentrate its development efforts in specific DAs, his government had intentionally pulled back from those DAs in which AAU was involved. [88] Although the decision to pull back its public services may seem logical from the perspective of a government with limited resources, the effects of this decision were to leave AAU playing a "gap filling" role for government in DAs such as ABP, while at the same time isolating ABP beneficiaries in Kitenga and Kasambya and thus putting them in even greater risk of being left in limbo upon ABP's departure.

When I spoke to Mr. Mudoi during a follow-up visit, he remarked that, AAU's relations with his government were improving and that, for the first time, a government official had sat in on AAU meetings; that AAU was itself beginning to attend District government meetings; and that ABP's Coordinator (along with staff from UNDP-HABITAT and other donors) had participated in the formulation of Mubende's first District Plan under decentralization. However, Mr. Mudoi still worried that, because AAU had

created a privileged minority in its DAs and began to consult government and grassroots communities only near the end of its involvement in Mubende, once AAU actually phased out of Mubende District, a large gap would be left both in terms of personnel and capacity. Dr. Emmanuel Mawajje, RC/LC V Chairman for Mubende District, also praised AAU for making a greater effort to collaborate with local government after a tensions had erupted between the two due to the government's initial hopes that AAU's assets would be considered District property. However, like Mr. Mudoi, he remarked that, had ABP worked in a collaborative manner from the outset, its long-term development impact in Mubende could have been much greater.[89]

To be fair, since the creation of *Parish Development Committees* (PDCs) in late 1995, ABP had been creating closer links with lower level RC/LC members, some of whom were themselves PDC members and whom I found present in special PDC and community planning sessions. Nevertheless, if the above testimonies are any indication, it would seem that, despite some improvements, AAU's relations with government remain lukewarm. As already noted, this is largely attributable to AAU's continued distrust of government--a feeling which has been no doubt propelled by the ineffectiveness and corruption often associated with the Ugandan government as well as by AAU's own awareness of the great gulf which exists between its own well-equipped programmes and the government's meagre resources. The continuing distrust between ABP and Ugandan government largely explains why, to this day, ABP does not plan jointly or co-implement programmes with government [90], let alone open up its accounts or disburse funds through government. AAU's preference for keeping at 'arms-length' from government is most evident in ABP's determination to create a parallel PDC structure of its own which duplicates many local government development functions rather than working through the existing RC/LC structure, even though, as one AAU manager pointed out, ABP never carried out a comprehensive study which showed that the RC/LC structure would not be

effective nor was there ever a consensus among ABP beneficiaries that PDCs were preferable to the existing RC/LC structure. Instead, conceded the manager, the notion of forming PDCs was pre-conceived by AAU staff before the idea was debated with communities and was largely motivated by AAU's desire for a standardized system which was easily managed throughout AA. [91]

Tensions Between ABP and Mubende Townspeople

By talking to residents in Mubende town and thus transcending what Robert Chambers calls 'project bias', I discovered that ABP's relations with Mubende's townspeople were even weaker than those with government. Conversations with residents from Mubende town (e.g., a local business-women, a local Reverend, a local School Master, etc.) revealed not only that many town residents still did not know what exactly AAU did, but that many felt wrongfully excluded as a result of AAU's unilateral decision that Mubende town would not comprise part of the *Buwekula* DA even though ABP's Office would be in the town and, in the view of the town's residents, ABP's rural beneficiaries were not necessarily poorer than Mubende's townspeople, many of whom had legitimate development needs of their own. [92]

c) Intra-Organizational and Project-Level Constraints

Reinforced Inequities and Inability to Reach the Poorest

As was the case in UNDP, AAU has faced many implementational setbacks at the intra-organizational and project level. Chief among these has been ABP' inability to universalize services and to, therefore, end up reinforcing geographic and wealth inequalities within the *Buwekula* DA. The first way in this has been done is through the unequal treatment of residents in Mubende town and the countryside--a decision which, as we saw above, has caused resentment and alienation among Mubende townspeople.

A second factor which may have reinforced social and geographic inequalities is AAU's decision to concentrate ABP's assistance on only one of five Counties in Mubende District (i.e., Buwekula County), to work only in two of Buwekula's 6 sub-Counties (i.e., Kitenga and Kasambya sub-Counties) as ABP's selected areas of work even though both of the selected sub-Counties are known to be far less poor than sub-Counties such as Butoloogo and Kiyuni which are far more remote from Mubende town and the Kampala-Mubende-Fort Portal road. By choosing to work only in rural areas, and even then, in only two out of six sub-counties in Buwekula, ABP may well have caused greater disharmony within Mubende District and resentment by those who were excluded. On this point, it is important to note that although, according to AAU documents, Mubende District's Administrator approved ABP's choice of sub-Counties [93], as pointed out by Mr. Mudoi in the Mubende District Office, it had been the hope of his government that AAU would spread out beyond Kitenga and Kasambya rather than aggravating inequalities by creating an enclave of privilege within the chosen sub-Counties. [94] It is also worth noting that, since 1996, AAU has succeeded in being more inclusive of surrounding communities by selecting smaller districts and building DAs (e.g., such as the *Apach* DA) which rely less on AAU staff activities and more on those of the existing community.

Lastly, but very importantly, my field work revealed that the various community groups formed by or supported by ABP in the *Buwekula* DA, including PDCs, have themselves failed to incorporate the 'poorest of the poor'. This inadequacy is largely explained by the fact that most groups (e.g., Health Committees, Parent-Teacher Associations [PTAs] or School Management Committees) address issues or involve training activities which require high levels of literacy, organizational capacity, access to information, transport and spare free time--all rare qualities among the poorest in

rural Uganda. The other reason though, has to do with ABP's own organizational interests and its concern with, above all, meeting time-lines and quantitative targets imposed by managers in Kampala and stakeholders in AA-London. It is these organizational imperatives which explain, for instance, why ABP's agricultural programme which was intended to give extension services and technical assistance to individual cultivators and pastoralists through farm special visits (i.e., what ABP calls a concentrated "batch" methodology) focused on farmers with access to productive assets (e.g., access to sufficiently fertile land and to some farm labour and implements) and who therefore have enough room to manoeuvre and to assume the economic risks needed to generate assured results. [95] It is for the above reasons that many of the beneficiaries in ABP's various groups are either educated professionals (e.g., teachers, public servants), strategically situated persons with clout or a leadership role in the community (e.g., RC/LC Chairmen, church leaders), or persons with sufficient capital and assets (e.g., local businessmen, better-off farmers) to take full advantage of ABP's targeted activities such as its agricultural extension programme and ABP's recently established Savings and Credit Groups. It is for these reasons that ABP's groups draw on the same small pool of volunteers for activities--a problem reflected in the considerable amount of cross-membership which exists between groups. [96]

To be fair, even the poorest and most marginalized members of the *Buwekula* DA have benefited at least indirectly from ABP's contributions to universal social service delivery (e.g., ABP's support to immunization for all children and mothers in Buwekula) and the improvement of indivisible public infrastructure (e.g., ABP's assistance in the area of road improvement, the construction of schools, health clinics and water valley tanks). All the same, it is accurate to point out that, the much more select nature of ABP's targeted technical assistance and training activities have excluded the poorest of the poor in the Buwekula DA,

including those economically dispossessed, socially marginalized, the old and disabled, recent migrants and outsiders. The inequitable nature of ABP's groups and targeted beneficiaries first became apparent during my field visits when I noticed that most of the group members we were meeting with were well-educated, spoke English well and played overlapping leadership roles in the community. These impressions were later confirmed during discussions with selected Poverty Focus Groups (i.e., community members identified as being amongst the 'poorest of the poor' during wealth rankings and PRA exercises conducted by ABP and community members themselves). During these Poverty Focus Group discussions, respondents told us that, as marginal members of the community, they were not an integral part of the various community groups formed or supported by ABP in Kitenga and Kasambya; that they were generally excluded from ABP's training sessions and concentrated (batch) farmer assistance programme; and they in fact rarely felt comfortable showing themselves at public meetings, approaching ABP staff, let alone voicing their grievances to local politicians, since, in their words, they were much "too embarrassed to bother such busy people with their concerns". [97]

With respect to ABP's agricultural programme, an internal survey carried out by ABP staff in 1993 confirms that, although ABP's concentrated farmer methodology had always maintained that its target group were farmers cultivating less than 3 acres, in actuality, only 60% of those reached by the survey fell under that category. The survey also showed that a very low proportion of female-headed households (less than 5%) were contacted intensively through ABP even though female-headed households comprised over 18% of DA households and were among the poorest farmers in the DA. [98]

Hierarchical Decision-Making Within ABP and Limited Community Participation

Another area in which ABP's grassroots development efforts have fallen short of SHD/PCD aspirations is in fostering genuine participation among staff and beneficiaries. Contrary to AAU's intentions of delegating development planning, implementation, and evaluation responsibilities to programme beneficiaries and regardless of whether one defines participation in a maximalist or minimalist fashion, at the time of my visit in 1995, it was predominantly AAU and ABP managers who were calling the shots.

There are many areas in which I found evidence of this trend. The first and most obvious was the manner in which AAU's management dealt with ABP' methodological shift in early 1995. My field visits to over 20 ABP project sites revealed that none of the respondents we spoke had been consulted about the need or desirability of the transition until after the decision was made by AAU and ABP managers; none had been involved in determining ABP's new development objectives or the types of organizational structures or training which would be required for the new methodology; and none were consulted about the timing or pace of the transition. Hence, while ABP's management undoubtedly made important strides by informing programme beneficiaries that major changes would be forthcoming at ABP and while many beneficiaries noted that they supported ABP's shift towards a more integrated and participatory approach to development, there is no mistaking that the impetus for the decisions made during the transition emanated entirely from AAU rather than from programme beneficiaries. This finding was later substantiated by an ABP staff member who acknowledged that ABP managers had decided what forms ABP's methodological changes would occur and which group activities would be terminated before informing the beneficiary community about their decisions via RC/LC meetings and household visits. [99].

One of the worse effects of the limited involvement of ABP beneficiaries in the methodological changes which took place at ABP became obvious in the process of my field work when I discovered that many beneficiaries were extremely confused about the logic or nature of ABP's methodological shift and felt little ownership over the process. [100] These problems were later confirmed by ABP's own internal evaluation of the process. [101] The other negative consequence of ABP's limited consideration of beneficiaries' views *before* it carried out its methodological changes was that, several of the beneficiaries we spoke to were upset over the abrupt manner in which former sectoral activities had been terminated by ABP. Agriculturalists in particular were concerned that the sudden termination of intensive household visits and of the technical advice they used to receive from ABP would hurt their farm productivity. And, community groups such as ABP's Traditional Birth Attendants expressed distress at the manner in which their training had been cut short even though many of them were still unable to put their skills into practice since they had only received two out of the three required training sessions and were still waiting to receive the medical kits they had been promised. [102] In addition, some community groups pointed out that, if ABP now expected them to voice their concerns or put forward their development proposals to the newly-created PDCs or to local government, instead of simply terminating groups' activities, ABP should have considered how it could train them in project identification and design, as well as in fundraising and lobbying. [103]

Finally, my field research also revealed that ABP staff had themselves felt that their concerns had not been sufficiently taken into account during ABP's methodological transition which resulted in an unexpected number of staff cut-backs, especially at the lower-levels. [104] From the perspective of several ABP staff members in Mubende, once the methodological changes at ABP got under way, senior-level AAU managers from Kampala and London were able to "hijack the agenda" and to utilize the

opportunity to dramatically cutback ABP's personnel which AA's top brass in Kampala and London feared was become too large and expensive to be justified to AA stakeholders. [105] By the time of my visit in mid 1995, unexpected staff cutbacks and the precarious job situation at ABP was causing tremendous distress among ABP field staff and affecting both staff morale and productivity as many of the ABP's more qualified personnel were leaving the programme in search of secure employment elsewhere. [106]

The above examples of poor consultation and the limited participation of both programme staff and beneficiaries coincide with John de Coninck's own findings that the planning culture at AAU is top-down, overly centralized, and bureaucratic in nature. [107]

When probed as to why, despite attempts to the contrary, AAU managers continued monopolizing the decision-making process at ABP, much of the evidence points the finger at organizational interests and the pressure to keep to budgetary deadlines and planning guidelines set by AA managers in Kampala and the UK. Actually, it is precisely organizational imperatives which obstructed the first planning cycle of ABP's newly-created PDCs in December 1995 when, due to strict planning and budgetary deadlines emanating from AA-UK, ABP forced all PDCs to submit their project proposals before they were complete. The consequence was that ABP staff and PDC members had to gloss over complex poverty analysis and integrated planning issues and rush what would normally have been a gradual learning and consensus-building process. This, according to an internal AA memo, meant that "the participatory planning process at AAU was to a large extent derailed by AA's own planning and budgeting system", and that, far from identifying their own priorities, objectives and indicators, the planning process at ABP was largely dictated by AA. This, adds the memo, has forced beneficiary communities to resort to designing familiar projects (i.e., predominantly infrastructural projects like building schools) rather than

carefully analyzing the community's wider development needs and coming up with a broader range of solutions different from those identified by 'agency-led' planning processes in previous years. The rushing also meant that communities acquired little ownership or understanding of the planning process they had just undergone and, as a result, found themselves having to 'revisit' basic development concepts and objectives after their PDC projects had already been designed and approved by ABP. [108]

Limited Staff Skills and the Difficulty of 'Breaking Old Habits'

Another finding to emerge from my study of ABP was that PDC members were not only having difficulties analyzing complex poverty issues or planning, implementing and evaluating integrated development efforts, as stipulated by the SHD/PCD approach.

Instead, we found that, because under ABP's new integration methodology, staff members' Terms of Reference were much broader than they had been under the sectoral methodology, ABP staff were finding that they lacked the experience as well as the integrated planning, time-management, priority-setting and mobilization skills needed to carry out development initiatives in a holistic and participatory fashion rather than simply 'doing things' for beneficiaries as had previously been the case. The troubles faced by ABP in making the transition towards the new integrated methodology came through during our interviews as several FDWs commented that, whereas under the sectoral methodology, they had known exactly what to do since they simply monitored specific sectoral activities using quantitative indicators, under the integrated methodology, they explained, they were uncertain about how to do everything in the Parish at once and to break away from former sectoral biases; to develop qualitative impact indicators; and to accustom beneficiaries used to close supervision and periodic home visits to no longer expect AA to provide all the answers. [109]

In essence, and as several ABP managers themselves pointed out, because integrated poverty analysis and planning can be a very complex area of work and because ABP staff are mainly school teachers and nurses with little previous experience in policy analysis or integrated development planning, budgeting, or evaluation, it was proving very difficult to bring the notion of integrated development down to the project or community level and for staff to develop the skills required to carry it out, especially with such limited training and in such a short period of time. [110]

My own analysis of the situation confirmed the frustrations expressed by ABP staff that the training they had thus far received to adapt to the new integrated methodology was inadequate both in length of time and content. For example, the 65-page training manual designed by ABP to facilitate staff members' transition into the new integrated methodology is mostly organized by sectoral areas and covers as many as 25 sub-headings, each containing only a few paragraphs on very specific yet basic sectoral information (e.g., basic principles of animal husbandry, what is immunization? skin diseases, ear and eye infections, registration of illiterates, how sponsorship works, what makes a good and bad photograph, what is a business, simple record keeping, etc.). The only section in the manual which offers any information conducive to integrated planning and management is the Monitoring and Evaluation section which is only two pages long and again fails to go beyond basic principles (e.g., under the sub-heading on planning the manual asserts that "planning is very important and good planning determines a good monitoring system").[111]

On a more promising note, during my field research, I was able to attend or to learn about AAU training sessions for its staff in the areas of "training of trainers", "PRA skills", and "community-based monitoring and evaluation systems". These training sessions did cover areas related to integrated development planning as well as a considerably stronger

skills-building component than ABP's previously mentioned training manual. Nevertheless, as the sessions' trainers have themselves have pointed out in their evaluation of the training sessions, because the training has generally been quite short (3-5 days on average), they have had to be given to large numbers of AAU staff from different locations at once, because the training has come so late in the projects' history, and because the levels of understanding on basic aspects of planning and monitoring and evaluation issues, need considerable development among most AAU staff, they have not been as effective as initially hoped. [112]

On the basis of the concerns expressed above, it would seem that, ABP's newly integrated methodology expects staff to simultaneously perform multiple roles requiring entirely different skills. For example, under ABP's new integrated methodology, FDWs are expected to perform top-down, tedious and regulatory activities such as child registration, letter and photo collections in order to meet AA-UK's accountability requirements to sponsors while at the same time engaging in equally time-consuming but bottom-up and participatory planning processes with beneficiary communities. The two types of activities are not only geared towards opposed goals (i.e., regulation vs. self-determination) but also require diametrically opposite skills and behaviours (i.e., top-down behaviour vs. participatory behaviour). Together, the above difficulties reveal that, whereas ABP's transition towards an integrated methodology was quite possibly a needed change, it was perhaps unrealistic to expect sectoral experts used to directing others and performing managerial tasks to be attuned to the development priorities or indigenous knowledge of poor beneficiaries who have themselves become accustomed to being told what to and who are getting mixed signals about how far AAU is willing to go in sharing its authority and regulatory control with poor communities.

Limited Monitoring and Evaluation or Evidence of Long-Term Development Impact

Aside from assessing ABP's impact on process-based indicators such as participation and local ownership, it is important to determine the longer-term social and economic impact of the *Buwekula Programme*. This can be done in a number of ways. One of these is to measure the effects which AAU's presence in the *Buwekula* DA has had on social indicators such as life expectancy, literacy, school enrolment, etc. Unfortunately, according to the major independent assessment done of the *Buwekula* DA, "process and long-term impact indicators (at ABP) are insufficient to gauge the long-term impact of the Programme" and in the rare instances where data is available, ABP's impact on social indicators has turned out to be negligible. [113] ABP's lack of evidence of long-term social impact is partly due to the major policy changes which have occurred in the lifetime of the *Buwekula Programme*, but as noted in de Coninck's assessment of ABP, it is also the consequence of AAU not having consistently gathered the type of data which would have been needed to show clear impact on wider social indicators.

For example, after a thorough analysis of the documentation available in the *Buwekula Programme*, I discovered that although ABP did carry out a comprehensive Baseline Survey just before ABP's initiation in 1989, no comparable follow-up survey was carried out in the DA. Instead, what ABP had on file were detailed monthly reports containing quantitative indicators on specific project outputs in each parish (e.g., According to ABP's March 1995 Monthly Report, that month in Kasambya Parish, sponsorship photo updates were done in primary schools, each village elected 3 representatives to their PDC, and 4 iron sheets were delivered to the Bulonzi Adult Literacy Centre) or extensive statistics on personnel and operational support issues (e.g., days of sick leave taken by ABP staff, meals served, monthly cost of ABP's medical scheme for staff that month,

etc.) aimed mostly at fulfilling AA-Kampala and AA-UK accountability demands [114]. I was in addition shown rough notes from wealth ranking exercises conducted in some DAs as well as some occasional staff write ups on existing socio-economic data in the DA [115] and more aggregated, yet still mostly quantitative statistics in AAU's annual reports (e.g., Out of 500 PDC members targeted for training, 300 attended regularly, out of 65 new classrooms planned, 30 were roofed, two health units began operations, etc.--these are the types of data which are summarized in **Table 6.5.**) [116] In the final analysis though, none of the secondary summary statistics or output and parish-specific data of the type described above were sufficient to assess changes in Buwekula's social indicators before and after ABP.

Another perhaps more concrete, way of assessing the socio-economic impact of the ABP Programme is to look for signs of improvements in income through improved trade, business or agricultural activity or the generation of new employment or skills resulting from AAU's interventions in Buwekula.

With respect to income-generation, because with the exception of the creation of Credit and Savings Groups rather late in the *Buwekula* programme, ABP's activities have concentrated on social service provision and infrastructure, the programme's effect in this sphere has been insignificant and, at the time of my visit, was being hampered by ABP's reluctance to give beneficiaries access to either credit or start-up capital. [117] In agriculture, while some of the concentration farmers visited did claim to have increased their farm yields and incomes by applying some of the farming skills imparted upon them by ABP, none of the respondents we spoke to could offer specifics on the improvements they had experienced. [118] Furthermore, ABP's own agricultural adoption survey shows that the attendance at ABP farm training sessions had been quite low (though better for residentially-based courses) and that the external education trips provided through ABP's agricultural programme had been far

too few for farmers to truly internalize new techniques. And, to top it all off, the same survey shows that while some of ABP's concentration farmers had adopted innovative agricultural practices such as mulching, pest control and soil conservation, the rates of adoption were very low and, in actuality, many of the practices adopted had been acquired from sources other than AAU. [119] To this day, the impact of ABP's agricultural programme remains inconclusive due to a lack of data since, as noted above, the DA's comprehensive 1989 Baseline Survey was never followed-up with a survey of equal scale); since, as we discovered during our field visits, beneficiary farmers do not necessarily assign monetary values or discuss family income with outsiders; and since the headway ABP was beginning to make with its concentrated farmer batch methodology (e.g., recruiting innovative farmers to act as 'motivators' and accustoming farmers to accept technical advice and to attempt new farming techniques) were lost in the process of ABP's transition towards a new integrated methodology in 1995. By the time of my arrival in Buwekula, ABP no longer had the specialized staff, transport or time to follow-up on what farmers were doing. Finally, with respect to new income generated through increased trade, according to one of ABP's managers, after conducting an informal survey which proved that trade levels had indeed increased in the area, the results showed that the increases in trade in Buwekula were not attributable to ABP's presence but rather to the construction of the main Kampala-Mubende-Fort Portal road which had allowed easier transport of foodstuffs to other cities. [120]

As for new skills and employment-generation, while the presence of the ABP Office in Mubende town may have created some new demand and employment in the town through AA staff members' consumption, this is unlikely to have generated significant employment given ABP's self-sufficient nature, the fact that higher-paid staff were usually brought from Kampala and that, by 1995, ABP had cut its staff by half. With respect to employment opportunities generated directly as a result of ABP's

development activities in Kitenga and Kasambya, once again, these are unlikely to be have generated substantial employment given that, at least until the time of my visit in 1995, other than forming Credit and savings groups and training them on basic accounting skills, ABP had not had an economic programme. As such it had neither been involved in introducing new economic activities with greater value added, the promotion of non-traditional agricultural activities, or in facilitating access to productive assets, start-up capital or credit to beneficiaries. As a result of ABP's minimal involvement in the economic sphere, during my field research I found that most beneficiaries in Kitenga and Kasambya were still mostly involved in the same traditional agricultural activities which they had been involved in at the time of Buwekula's 1988 Baseline Survey (i.e., predominantly, the cultivation of Matoke, beans, or potatoes, with some farmers engaged in poultry and egg production.) The number of our respondents active in non-traditional agricultural activities (e.g., bee-keeping, silk worm production, or flower growing, etc.) were conspicuously small and those engaged in non-agricultural economic activities of potentially greater value added (e.g., brick-making, bread-making, fruit juice or vegetable oil production, crafts-making, etc.) were even rarer.

It is possible to argue, on the other hand, that ABP's support to concentration farmers may have improved the income and therefore the employment capacity of some of these farmers (although existing agricultural adoption surveys show that there is no conclusive evidence of increased farmer income in Buwekula) and that ABP's community groups have themselves generated new employment (e.g., some of ABP's groups receive a modest salary or benefits (e.g., fees are paid to Literacy Instructors and bicycles are given to masons involved in Water Valley tank construction). Nevertheless, when we consider that membership in ABP community groups has been quite exclusive and that many ABP groups (e.g., motivators for new farming techniques and PDCs) work with no remuneration whatsoever, it is

obvious that, even if some income or employment has been generated by ABP groups, it has been minor, unevenly distributed, and unlikely to be sustainable after ABP's departure. Moreover, the fact that some ABP groups received benefits which others did not may have exacerbated tensions between them and reinforced their dependence on ABP as many of the groups which had not initially receive funds from ABP began demanding them. [121]

These limitations notwithstanding, there is no denying that, in a few instances, ABP has created general conditions or furbished community groups with skills which over the long-run may prove to be transferable into self-employment opportunities. For instance, employment prospects for teachers and nurses in Buwekula may improve in the future (or already may be improving though the data is still unavailable), at least indirectly, thanks to ABP's contribution to the revitalization of social services and infrastructure in the *Buwekula* DA. In addition, according to one ABP manager knowledgeable about economic issues in Buwekula, some groups trained by ABP (such as Traditional Birth Attendants, for instance) were beginning to succeed surviving on their own even after ABP's shift towards an integrated methodology by beginning to charge fees to clients in exchange for services. Regrettably, many other ABP groups (e.g., HIV/AIDS Counsellors, Women's groups) who had not been furbished with skills that were as easily tradable in the market-place were finding it difficult to translate their skills into possible forms of income or employment [122]. And, in yet other cases, while ABP group members were taught skills which were potentially transferable to other areas (e.g., ABP's Water Committees' brick-making skills are easily transferable into home construction), because ABP passed on its construction skills mostly onto already-trained masons rather than to unskilled persons and brought much of the manual labour it used to build water wells from other zones, the project's brick-making training is unlikely to have improved the income or employability of previously unemployed local workers in the *Buwekula* DA. [123] This is not to

deny that a handful of masons did do well from the brick-making skills they acquired through ABP. Alas, as AAU managers concede, the NGO has no comprehensive evidence of improved employment or of the transfer of skills by ABP group members (masons or others) to persons beyond the group. [124]

Finally, some AA in the UK in particular have argued that, even if ABP has not visibly improved income or employment in the *Buwekula* DA, its activities would surely have at least enhanced the organizational and management skills of group members supported by ABP. [125] I did attempt to follow up on this possibility during my second trip to Uganda. However, after consulting with the relevant AAU staff, they remarked that while they themselves suspected that ABP's (and indeed other DAs') development activities may have enhanced the organizational capacity of beneficiary groups, AAU had never carried out studies to test this premise and that, as such, they had no conclusive evidence indicating that community groups supported by AAU had ever used the management and organizational skills they had learned from AAU to overcome other local problems. [126] AAU's lack of evidence of development impact in areas such as organizational capacity has undoubtedly been aggravated by AAU's tendency to focus its monitoring and evaluation efforts on concrete and quantitative outputs (e.g., number of schools built) rather than on longer-term impact indicators of process-based outcomes. Unfortunately, my own field research was much too short to measure organizational impact effectively. However, the above-mentioned setbacks were confirmed by our select survey of ABP groups which showed that, despite having become more adept at being part of groups and debating the causes of poverty in their communities, there were few known examples of ABP groups having seized on skills or opportunities given to them by ABP to launch major initiatives or actions of their own. [127] This, of course, brings us directly to the question of ABP's effects on the empowerment, self-reliance and long-term sustainability of its beneficiaries, all of which are core components of the SHD/PCD paradigm.

Limited Long-Term Empowerment, Self-Reliance and Sustainability

Determining the impact of ABP's SHD/PCD efforts in terms of the empowerment and self-reliance generated among beneficiaries and the long-term sustainability of programme activities is not an easy task. Furthermore, as noted earlier, AAU's deficient monitoring and evaluation methods have meant that the NGO itself lacks evidence on the long-term impact of its programmes' process-based outcomes. Determining the effects of ABP on empowerment, self-reliance and long-term sustainability in a conclusive manner probably requires spending much more time living in the Buwekula community and comparing AAU-RC/LC relations than I was able to do during my field work. Still, from my study of beneficiaries, it is possible to extract some clues about ABP's effectiveness in these areas.

With respect to the empowerment of poor Ugandans, for example, we have already noted that ABP has enhanced the capabilities of some members of the Buwekula community by passing on mulching and grafting skills to selected farmer households, providing training to local teachers, passing on better sanitation and maternal health care practices to Health Workers and Traditional Birth Attendants, showing Credit and Savings Groups how to keep financial records, and training PDCs to identify the causes of poverty, community development needs and possible project solutions. We have also seen that some ABP beneficiaries have started small initiatives using the skills they learned from ABP (see endnote # 130 for example). However, from the discussion which has ensued, we also know that such initiatives have not generated significant new income or employment and have proven unsustainable when beneficiaries have been left on their own.

At the same time though, my field visits to over 20 ABP groups and select households have shown that ABP beneficiaries have had difficulties resolving problems and taking on new initiatives of their own. First,

when beneficiaries were asked how the development problems which they currently faced could be resolved, most automatically assumed that ABP should resolve these ("we need loans from AAU", "AAU should pay school fees for orphans", "AAU should provide school books at subsidized costs", "AAU should provide the iron sheets needed to finish buildings", "AAU must open up an account for our group so as not to tempt our treasurer" [128]). Secondly, both during field visits and observation of ABP community planning sessions we noticed that ABP beneficiaries had serious difficulties identifying the root causes of poverty, deprivation and injustice in their communities and were still far from thinking in terms of their own rights or from identifying possible structural and institutional solutions to development problems ("we have not considered the possibility of obtaining more [secure] land as we do what we can with what we have" or, "we do not see how the community will obtain subsidized materials once AA leaves" [129]). Instead, we found that ABP beneficiaries had become accustomed to tending to the symptoms rather than the causes of their underdevelopment and that, even then, they expected AAU to deal with these. ("it is up to AAU to tell us how to solve things" or, "we fear that not having experts around may mean things no longer get done" [130]). These findings are complementary to comments by development expert Stan Burkey who noted that AA "tells people what they need and then goes and provides it even though people need to analyze the causes of their own poverty". [131]

In short, its would seem that dependence on AAU has become a more natural reflex among ABP beneficiaries than relying on their indigenous knowledge, or experience or ingenuity. This should not be too surprising given people in extreme poverty by definition lack the confidence ("we did not tell AA that we did not like the methodological changes because people lacked the courage"), time, energy or know-how ("people do not do not contribute new ideas"), organizational or leadership trajectory (e.g., "people do not want to help those in other areas or tribes", no one takes

the promises of leaders seriously") to analyze complex and sometimes highly technical or sensitive poverty problems on their own and expecting them to do so without the support of experts may simply be unrealistic. [132]

In addition to the above enquiries, I tried to ascertain the extent of the empowerment of ABP beneficiaries by asking them whether they generally felt more confident as a result of their participation in ABP and whether they believed that they would be capable of continuing to develop the area after ABP's planned departure from the DA in the year 2001. Some respondents did say that they would try to keep their skills and activities alive, albeit at a more modest scale, once ABP left Buwekula. However, during the interview process, some of these same respondents implored AAU to stay in the DA since they feared that, without the NGO's presence, the community would lack the funds and confidence needed to develop the area ("if the community believes AAU is not attending to something, they will neglect it too"; "once AAU leaves, RC/LCs are unlikely to help our Parish unless bribed"; and "we would like AA to stay until infinity." [133])

Judging from the responses given above, it would seem that, thanks to ABP's support, community members in Buwekula have indeed become adept at mobilizing the community, organizing meetings, discussing sensitive poverty issues (e.g., gender dimensions of development), and at carrying specific tasks (e.g., organizing PDC elections). These achievements should not be underestimated, especially since vivid debate is something which clearly distinguished AAU-supported groups from those supported by UNDP, for example. On the other hand though, there is little evidence from my research that ABP beneficiaries have become 'empowered' either in terms of launching their own initiatives, having gained a greater awareness of their own human rights or the structural causes of their poverty, or in terms of having gained new confidence to try to resolve some of their problems, to express voice with local politicians, and indeed, to hold ABP accountable

to them. It is true that to expect an NGO to even begin to move a poor community in this direction is perhaps too much to ask. And yet, this is indeed what the 'empowerment' discourse pursued by SHD/PCD and DD thinkers assumes is possible and what NGOs such as AAU claim to be capable of doing in LDCs like Uganda. However, as we have seen, the reality is often something quite different. In the case of the *Buwekula Programme*, for instance, AAU's presence in the area may have turned into a double-edged sword: on the one hand, ABP has undeniably passed on much needed skills to ABP beneficiaries. Yet, on the other hand, ABP beneficiaries have, in the process, become dependent on AAU funding and accustomed to AAU attending to their problems and have thus been artificially shielded from addressing the challenges of underdevelopment on their own. In fact, my interviews with ABP staff revealed that many of them struggled with what they termed the ABP community's "dependency syndrome" and worried that because AAU had done things for people for so long, they had become passive over the years. [134]

Finally, my study of ABP offers some useful insights about the long-term sustainability of AAU's development work in the *Buwekula* DA. First of all, the autonomous and self-sufficient manner in which ABP has funded and managed its work in the *Buwekula* DA,and its reluctance to jointly plan or implement with government or to link up with other development actors is making it difficult to create a sense of ownership in the DA or to find alternate sources of funding for ABP activities after AAU's departure.

An equally contentious issue is the long-term sustainability of the PDCs established by ABP in mid 1995. As previously mentioned, the PDC structure was conceived by AAU as a means of helping it realize its long-term goal of ceasing to be operational in Buwekula and other DAs. The role of the PDC is to spearhead all community development undertakings in the Parish. As such, each PDC is charged with community mobilization, the coordination and supervision of all development activities, and the

prioritization of PDC development activities. PDCs also serve as the major link between ABP and the community, are responsible for AA-related activities in the DA such as sponsorship, and serve as the budget holders AAU funds allocated to the community. In the case of ABP, 15 PDCs were established--one per Parish. Each RC/LC I village elected a man and a woman who was both a full-time resident in the village and had no less than primary 7 education to take part in their PDC. Below the PDC are supposed to be various Intermediaries including: 2-3 Community Development Workers (CDWs) per Parish. CDWs are both recruited and supervised by PDCs and paid a monthly bonus of about 20,000 Ugandan Shillings--about US$ 20--to support the PDC's work and to eventually take over from ABP staff once AA leaves the area; Project Committees (e.g., Water Groups, School Management Committees, etc.) in charge of proposing and overseeing projects; an Area Forum (i.e., a PDC Executive in each sub-county. All PDC members elected in a sub-County then select a PDC Executive composed of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and 2 Committee members. The RC/LC III Chairman and ABP's Area Manager in the sub-County are ex-officio members to the PDC Executive); and a DA Forum which discusses longer-term strategic issues and is to be comprised of representatives from the community, government, and other players respected in the area, all selected by ABP on the basis of merit. The PDCs and their various intermediaries should work alongside the ABP Office and receive only minimal supervision from ABP's now smaller team of 15 FDWs--one per parish. It is expected that PDC members, intermediaries and RC/LCs will merge into one strong Parish structure by 2001, as shown in the diagram in **Table 6.8.** [135]

As can be deducted from the above description, there are some serious shortfalls in ABP's PDC structure. The first is that the PDC structure duplicates and adds more layers of committees into what was already described in Chapter 4 as an overly complex RC/LC structure. The second weakness is that because the PDC gets its mandate, funding, and directives

from AAU, its loyalties and accountability lies with a foreign agency that will soon leave the area rather than with Ugandan institutions or communities. The third caveat with the structure is that because, at least in the short run, ABP staff have kept tight control of PDC budgets, have been slow at getting the Area and DA Forums into operation, and have been the ones to determine the pace and content of most of the PDC's training and planning, the PDCs' dependence on AAU was very high while their links with RC/LCs and local actors other than AAU was minimal. Lastly, to assume, as ABP has, that all local institutions will merge into the PDC or that the various actors involved in the PDC structure will be capable of running such a complex and ambitious structure in a self-sufficient manner after AAU's departure from the area, may simply not be realistic given the limited time, money, legitimacy or skills of PDC members and the numerous committees already in existence throughout the Ugandan countryside.

Even though the PDCs are still new and I did not conduct in-depth research on ABP-RC/LC relations, the tensions which were beginning to arise from PDCs' duplication of many RC/LC roles were already becoming apparent during my last visit. Indeed, during our field research, several ABP beneficiaries remarked that the PDCs were being seen mainly as agents of AAU [136] and that the community was having serious doubts about the motivation and capacity of PDCs to continue their development work after the termination of ABP's rigorous monitoring systems, technical expertise and training, subsidized materials and sponsorship funding--especially given that PDCs worked on a volunteer basis, had limited technical, management and evaluation skills, spare time, means of transport (e.g., most PDC members do not even have bicycles), or experience in working with communities in a participatory fashion. To the above, respondents added the problem of PDCs' questionable accountability to the community [137] and their limited legitimacy other than their links to AA. As one group of respondents aptly put it: "PDCs derive their strength from all the money

which AA puts into them. Once AA leaves, the PDC will collapse." [138] Ironically, by refusing to (at least until the time of my visit) to allow PDCs to determine their own training needs, to manage their project and sponsorship moneys directly [139], to establish permanent mechanisms to ensure the downward accountability of PDCs to communities [140], or to make ABP's own plans and budgets transparent to PDCs, beneficiaries or the government, ABP has revealed a lack of trust in its own PDC structure. At present, although ABP tells beneficiaries how ABP generally uses its money, recipients do not receive periodic reports from ABP since ABP managers "do not think the community would understand these" [141], nor, according to a senior AAU official in Kampala, does AAU plan to make its budget transparent to beneficiaries as "they would have difficulties accepting that over 50% of the budget goes towards administration". [142]

Finally, although PDC and RC/LC membership overlap in some parishes, the fragile legitimacy of the PDC mechanism vis-a-vis the RC/LC system and ABP's past isolation was putting the two mechanisms at odds with one another. Hence, during my last trip to Uganda, ABP staff and PDC members both informed me that the PDC's planning and project formulation process was running into problems since, as the entities elected by all Ugandans and responsible for disbursing decentralized government funds, RC/LCs did not want to channel funds into PDC projects which were not their own. [143] A senior ABP manager elaborated by noting that, because District politicians had decided to channel their funds directly to the Village level (RC/LC I) in order to win votes during an electoral year, they had, in the process, bypassed ABP's PDCs which operated at the Parish (RC/LC II) level. [144]

iv) Community and Beneficiary-Level Constraints

Due to its close monitoring and regulation mechanisms, AAU has significantly diminished community-level problems associated with free-

loading, shirking or embezzlement. Since most ABP-supported groups have clearly defined membership criteria, carefully monitored project and training activities, rarely involve the exchange of cash, it would have been difficult (and not particularly desirable) for opportunistic outsiders to join ABP-supported groups unnoticed or to use for predatory purposes. Similarly, because ABP staff members were closely monitored and were never given cash to purchase goods since these were directly procured by the project's inventory department, or in the case of petrol, were bought by presenting ABP coupons at the local gas station, there were few instances of rent-seeking behaviour by staff. However, ABP did encounter many of the other community-level constraints experienced by UNDP in rural Uganda.

The Differentiated, Exclusive and Self-Interested Nature of Community

One trait of rural Ugandan communities which proved to be a major hindrance to UNDP's implementation of SHD/PCD goals such as equitable and participatory development which was equally evident in the case of ABP is the highly differentiated, exclusive and self-interested nature of rural Ugandan communities. It is these phenomena which partly explain why ABP's concentration farmers had difficulties passing on their farming techniques to persons other than tribe or family members, why the poorest members of the *Buwekula* DA felt marginalized from ABP's development efforts as well as from their own communities [145], and why some ABP beneficiaries feared that PDCs too would end up favouring friends. [146] The hierarchical nature of Ugandan society is equally evident in the difficulties ABP-supported groups had forging links with other development actors or communities and in the remoteness of some PDCs from their communities. In an internal memo, AA-UK staff themselves express concern that local ownership of PDCs was never determined by AAU, that the participation levels in PDC meetings were low (about 50%), and that PDCs' representability of the poor and their downward accountability towards the community was uncertain. [147] The above all show

how internal differentiation and tribal, elitist and self-interested community behaviour can obstruct otherwise sound development efforts. Yet, as John de Coninck points out in his evaluation of ABP, AAU has not "sufficiently taken into account differences within (Ugandan) communities" and wrongfully assumed "that these communities are homogeneous".[148]

Lack of Time, Skills, Transport, or Access to Key Inputs

During my field visits, the poorest members of Buwekula noted that, aside from being socially ostracized, they lacked money to pay for school fees or membership in ABP-supported groups; had no access to fertile land and few surplus crops to sell in the market; and that many of them did not even have the good health or physical mobility to attend public community meetings [149]. Even better-off community groups in Buwekula worried that, given their limited access to inputs or technical advice from ABP staff, they would continue making mistakes like introducing fish into the community's newly purified Water Tank or buying the wrong medicines since they could not read the labels the bottles. [150] PDCs themselves cautioned that, without a bicycle to travel on or a free lunch after spending hours at project meetings, they could not continue volunteering for ABP.

On the basis of the above, a number of important lessons can be drawn about AAU's efforts to implement SHD/PCD approaches at the grassroots level in the *Buwekula* DA. The first lesson is that AAU's implementation of SHD/PCD approaches in ABP has been afflicted by broader institutional, inter-organizational, intra-organizational and community-level constraints. However, by operating its own ship in a fairly autonomous fashion and putting in place a series of close monitoring and regulation systems, ABP has managed to contain most of the problems of malfeasance originating from the community-level and to bypass many of the worse cases of governmental opportunism and the turf battles faced by UNDP at the inter-organizational

level. AAU's isolationism in its DAs is partly understandable once one considers that when projects like ABP started in Buwekula in 1989, there were few other development actors in the area and government services were virtually dormant. Regrettably, ABP's 'arms length' attitude towards government and other development partners and cautious distrust towards beneficiaries may have reinforced the dependence of ABP beneficiaries upon AAU instead of empowering them to be self-reliant. And, even though since 1995 ABP has been trying to work in a more integrated and participatory fashion, the bulk of the evidence above shows that, SHD/PCD goals such as achieving greater equity, participation/empowerment, self-reliance and sustainability have often been displaced or met only to a limited degree.

VI. Conclusion: The Baroque Science and River Polluting Phenomena Revisited: A Case of Deja Vu

As this chapter has shown, there are differences in the way in which AA and UNDP have implemented SHD/PCD. We have seen, for example, that AA is a much smaller, more operational and grassroots-oriented development agency than UNDP. For AA, this has implied a much stronger rural presence and greater proportion of technical staff based in the Ugandan countryside than UNDP. AAU's more autonomous and 'hands-on approach' to development has also meant fewer problems related to staff or community-level shirking, free-loading or corruption, fewer opportunities for capture by middle persons and politicians, and fewer hassles in dealing with turf-conscious fellow development actors. On top of this, AA's wise decision not to oversell the novelty of SHD/PCD, to impose definitions of the paradigm or to shift its ideological position on it, saved AA from much of the conceptual confusion and criticism UNDP was subjected to.

On a less uplifting note, AAU's directly operational, mostly service-delivery and rather solitaire and DA-based approach to development has cost the NGO in terms of wider potential impact in both the economic sphere and

at the broader policy and institutional level, especially within senior governmental decision-making circles in Kampala. Moreover, despite the finding that AA suffered from a lack of informed theory (while UNDP could be said to have suffered from too much emphasis on deficient theory), regardless of whether an agency engages in complex conceptual debates head on or not, in the end, neither AA or UNDP were able to escape the repercussions of the incomplete, vague, contradictory, and sometimes unrealistic and impractical nature of SHD/PCD goal. Neither agency, for instance, has been able to deal with the unknown nature of the links between the core components of SHD/PCD or the paradigm's lack of a clear prioritization of development interventions. Similarly, neither agency has been able to reconcile the difficulties of simultaneously achieving SHD/PCD's goals which may well be in tension with one another (e.g., advocating greater self-reliance while at the same time pushing a pre-defined SHD/PCD agenda; or, influencing wider policies and institutional arrangements while at the same time achieving flexible and grassroots-based participation and fulfilling managerial donor demands for greater top-down regulation and concrete evidence of development). Nor, for that matter, has either agency been able to deal with the discrepancies which exist between the SHD/PCD paradigm's ambitious aspirations in theory and the reality of the constraints present in practice: e.g., implementing a complex and holistic development paradigm in a participatory manner while relying on staff and beneficiaries with limited abstraction skills, experience in integrated planning and development agencies and conservative stakeholders with top-down management styles and reluctant to cede control.

The difficulties created by SHD/PCD's own internal tensions and the gap between SHD/PCD theory and practice afflicts both HQ and the field. However, as was the case in UNDP, it is the field level which was left carrying the burden of simultaneously carrying out SHD/PCD goals such as policy advocacy and grassroots participation and of putting the ambitious

goals of the SHD/PCD paradigm into practice in the less than ideal conditions of the Ugandan countryside. All of the above would seem to confirm, that it may be fallacious to assume that development agencies like UNDP or AA have the necessary autonomy or organizational structures needed to bring about a major paradigmatic shift in development or that the necessary conditions exist in the wider system of international development cooperations or in poor communities such as Uganda to realize the more ambitious goals of the SHD/PCD agenda. The above findings also remind us that, as stated in the *Baroque Science Phenomenon*, lofty goals which seem harmonious from afar and desirable in theory can be impractical when the gap between theory and practice remains too large. This gap is one which neither AA or UNDP have been able to close. The main difference is that while UNDP placed its emphasis on theory which turned out to be incomplete and out of touch with reality, AA's emphasized practice which was not informed by good theory and therefore lacked a conceptual framework to generalize and learn wider policy lessons from its field experience.

Empirically speaking, this Chapter shows that despite having contributed to Ugandans' well-being through its support of social service delivery and by training select community groups, like UNDP, AA has faced major difficulties realizing the more transformational goals of the SHD/PCD agenda, including influencing wider development debates, policies or institutional arrangements conducive to 'Sound governance'; introducing flexible, integrated and collaborative forms of development cooperation; or fostering North-South partnerships characterized by strong ownership, beneficiary participation, self-reliance and long-term sustainability.

As stated in the *River Pollution Phenomenon*, AA has seen its commitment to SHD/PCD displaced by AA's tendency to attend to organizational interests. In the case of AA, these organizational interests take many forms, including: a tendency to increase the NGO's profile, mandate and power

base (e.g., getting AA involved in new forms of policy advocacy even though southern counterparts were not consulted; expanding AA's budgets by replicating blueprints such as REFLECT even though this went against principle of community self-determination; or keeping the money moving by imposing unrealistic planning and budgetary deadlines which undermine participation); a tendency to give into pressures from powerful stakeholders (e.g., AA's agreement to its Board of Trustees' restrictions on advocacy work even though the decision undermined AA's policy-influencing capacity); the tendency to do what is easiest and most feasible (e.g., by working with better-off beneficiaries rather than reaching the poorest; sticking to familiar projects and rules and targets rather than allowing beneficiaries to choose from a wider set of options; or avoiding rent-seeking problems by refusing to work with government or to give cash to beneficiaries even if such decisions inhibit the formation of North-South partnerships and local ownership); and finally, a tendency to hide shortfalls or the complexity of development (e.g., the reluctance of AAU staff to admit to the large proportion of AAU's budget spent on administration/logistics). Of the four organizational interests, the latter two prevailed at the programme/field level where the pressures to put SHD/PCD into practice were strongest, while the former manifested themselves more at the policy level and in AA HQ where the desire of AA's Board of Trustees to acquire profile and to please sponsors were strongest.

Of course, as was found to be the case in UNDP, not all of the difficulties of implementing SHD/PCD are attributable to organizational factors. In the case of AA, while organizational weaknesses and interests help to explain why the NGO did not pursue SHD/PCD goals to the fullest within its programmes, it is broader contextual factors (e.g., lack of access to knowledge, assets, or markets) and institutional constraints (e.g., in effective local government support) which largely explain why, even when agencies pursue SHD/PCD goals, their development programmes fall

short of expectations. Moreover, organizational interests at AA were not homogeneous but varied depending on the group of actors one spoke to within the NGO; AA's decisions were not always guided by organizational interests (e.g., AA's decision to decentralize its operations went against the agency's tendency to do what is easiest and most feasible); nor did organizational interests at AA always run counter to SHD/PCD goals (e.g., AA's decision to become more involved in policy influencing work coincides with the SHD/PCD goal of promoting 'Sound governance').

Finally, this Chapter's findings have important implications for various existing literatures. For instance, my finding that NGOs like AA have difficulties reaching the poor, fostering partnerships, participation, empowerment, working in a sustainable fashion, or influencing wider policies, fit the writings of NGO experts like Tendler, Smillie, Edwards/Hulme and Sogge et al. The Chapter also brings to mind the work of Clay and Schaffer, Ferguson and Hancock in the International Development Cooperation Literature and Bardach and Sieber in the Implementation Process Literature, all of whom concur that organizations' tendency to expand their mandates, keep the money moving, set targets and deadlines, listen to the most powerful stakeholders, and cover up any errors, can displace initial policy and programme goals. My analysis of AA's implementation of SHD/PCD approaches also shows that, even when an agency has tight monitoring and regulation mechanisms to protect itself against high transaction costs or rent-seeking behaviour--the chief concern of the NIE, development problems rooted in undemocratic and top-down development--the main concern of DD thinkers) remain a constraint. Most importantly though, this Chapter elevates the existing SHD/PCD Literature to a new dimension by showing how the conceptual deficiencies of the SHD/PCD paradigm can undermine its operationalization globally and nationally and how the romanticism of the SHD/PCD agenda and the persistent gap between reality and theory and make its implementation by even a small and grassroots-oriented NGO infeasible.

ENDNOTES:

1. Keith Rennie. *Action Aid-Uganda Handing Over to the Community II*. Page 17. Consultancy carried out in July 1994 (Phase I) and September 1994 (Phase II). Second Consultancy Report, London: AAU. Autumn 1994.

2. See, for example, John Clark's Democratizing Development (1991 Op. Cit.) and the series of books edited by Edwards and Hulme (1992 and 1996, Op. Cit.).

3. See: Action Aid. *Trustees' Report and Accounts: 1996*. Pages 4-5 London: AA HQ., 1996. And, Action Aid. *Bringing A Better World Closer. Annual Report 1996-1997*. London: AA HQ, 1997.

4. Interview # 60.

5. Respondent familiar with the upper echelons of AA.

6. Action Aid. *Annual Review 1992-93; Annual Review 1993-94*. London: Action Aid HQ.

7. Action Aid. *Regionalisation: Regionalisation Working Group Final Report*. Page 14. London: Action Aid HQ, February 1, 1995.

8. Action Aid-Uganda. *Annual Report: January-December 1994. Kampala:* AAU Office, January 1995.

9. Action Aid-Buwekula. *ABP Methodology*. Internal Document by Buwekula DA staff. Buwekula: AA-Buwekula, January 21, 1995.

10. Action Aid-Uganda. *1994 Action Aid Uganda Annual Report*.Kampala:AAU,January 1995.

11. See: Action Aid-Uganda. *Programme Development Department Working Document*. Kampala: AAU, March 17, 1995; and Action Aid-Uganda. *1995 Budget for the Action Aid-Uganda Programme*. Kampala, AAU, 1995

12. Action Aid. *Task Force Report on Working with Local Institutions*. Page 2 International Division. London: Action Aid HQ, September 20, 1993

13. See, for instance, interview # 60, 75, 101.

14. Action Aid. *Regionalisation: Reginalisation Working Group Final Report*.Pages 3,4. Op. Cit.

15. Interview # 73, 75.

16. Respondent familiar with top upper echelons of Action Aid. UK. 1995.

17. Interview # 75.

18. Interview with middle-level manager at Action Aid HQ. London, UK, 1997.

19. Interview # 69 and 70.

20. Interview # 60, 101.

21. Nigel Twose. *Giving People Choices: Action Aid and Development*. London: AA HQ, International Division, July 1994.

22. Action Aid. *The Human Face of Development. Annual Report 1995-1996*. Page 10. London: AA HQ, 1997.

AA managers I spoke to noted that AA was moving towards SHD/PCD (Interview # 73) and becoming a "catalyst for change rather than just an implementor" (Interview #71).

23. Action Aid. *Impact Assessment Report: Report to Trustees 1996*. Pages 6-7. London: AA HQ, 1996.

24. Action Aid. *Programme Development Division (PDD): 1997 Work Plan Summary*. London: AA HQ, 1997.

25. Action Aid. *Africa Strategy Paper*. London: AA HQ. May 1996.

26. Interview # 60.

27. Action Aid. *Impact Assessment Report: Report to Trustees 1996*. Pages 2, 4. Op. Cit.

28. Action Aid. *Action Aid International Advocacy Strategy 1996-1998*. London: AA HQ, International Advocacy Department, March 1996; And Action Aid; And, Action Aid. *The Human Face of Development: Annual Report 1995-1996*. Pages 12-14. Op. Cit.

29. Action Aid. *PDD 1997 Work Plan Summary*. Op. Cit.

30. Action Aid-Uganda. *Action Aid-Uganda: Annual Report January-December 1994*. Annex V. Kampala: AAU, January 1995; And, Action Aid-Uganda. *1997 Plan and Budget Management Summary*. Page 2. Kampala: AAU, February 1997.

31. Action Aid-ABP. *Action Aid Buwekula Project Long-Term Perspective 1995-2001*. Buwekula: AA-Buwekula, 1995.

32. Action Aid. *An Update on DA Programming Methodologies*. Internal memo on the progress of the AAU CP. London: AA HQ, obtained March, 1997.

33. Action Aid-Uganda. *Action Aid-Uganda: 1996 Annual Report*. Op. Cit.

34. By 1997 the AAU's PDD Unit was planning to spend a total of 274,000 British Pounds. This is a three-fold increase from the PDD's expenditures in 1995 which were about 239,000 British Pounds. (Refer to: Action Aid-Uganda. *1997 Plan and Budget. Management Summary*. Kampala: AAU, 1997; And, Action Aid-Uganda. *1995 Budget for the Action Aid-Uganda Programme*. Kampala: AAU, 1995.)

35. Griffiths, Martin. *Moving Forward in the Nineties*. London: AA HQ, August 1992. London, UK.

36. For a traditional definition of AA's mandate, see: Action Aid. *Action Aid's Approach to Rural Development*. Section 1.1.1. London: AA HQ, December 1990.

37. Interview # 60.

38. Interview # 72.

39. Senior managers at the AAU Office in Kampala noted that they had not heard messages on SHD/PCD from UNDP.

40. Interview # 101.

41. Interview with middle-level manager at Action Aid HQ. London, UK, 1997.

42. Action Aid. *Africa Region Strategy*. Pages 1 and 2. Op. Cit.

43. In its *1996 Annual Report*, AAU confirms that its lack of adequate resources and skills and the still limited visibility of its non-DA work have hindered its efforts to move beyond traditional service delivery work in Uganda. (Action Aid-Uganda. *Action Aid-Uganda: 1996 Annual Report*. Page 26. Op. Cit.)

44. Confidential memo, Action Aid-Uganda Office. Kampala, Uganda, 1995.

45. Interview # 73.

46. Interview with respondent familiar with the upper echelons of Action Aid.

47. Interview # 69.

48. Interview with middle-level manager in the Buwekula Programme. Mubende, Uganda, November 1995.

49. Interview with staff member in the Programme Development Department (PDD) in the Action Aid-Kampala Office, Kampala, Uganda. June 1995.

50. Internal memo from AA HQ in London.

51. This observation has been confirmed by AA's own internal assessment of its setbacks in the area of policy advocacy. Ibid. Page 9.

52. Action Aid. Based on internal Action Aid Document. London, UK, 1997.

53. Action Aid. Internal memo. 1997.

54. See: *The Reality of Aid Project: Final Report of an Evaluation Commissioned by Action Aid on Behalf of the Reality of Aid Project*. Report by Stephen Baranyi and Lilly Nicholls. March 3, 1998.

55. Interviews carried out with *Reality of Aid* network members in preparation for the final evaluation report for the *Reality of Aid* Project. January 1998.

56. Action Aid. Internal Memo. 1997.

57. For example, interview # 73, 94, 105.

58. Action Aid. Action Aid-UK Internal Memos. London, UK. 1997.

59. Respondent familiar with upper echelons of Action Aid.

60. Interview # 67.

61. Action Aid-UK. Internal Memo. London, UK. 1997.

62. Interview # 75.

63. Interview # 85, 139, 77.

64. Interview # 73.

65. Interview with senior manager in AAU's PDD in Kampala.

66. Interview with senior manager from the PDD in AAU's Kampala Office.

67. Interview # 91.

68. Comments by managers in AAU's Kampala Office and in the *Buwekula* DA.

69. Action Aid-Uganda. *Programme Development Department Working Document*. Kampala: AAU, March 17 1995.

70. Presentation by Ms. Sara Mangali, Assistant Director and Head, PDD, Action Aid-Uganda to Action Aid HQ. London, UK. November 8, 1996.

71. For example, during my study of the AAU CP, I learned of at least one instance in which an AAU staff member was demoted and one instance in which another was reprimanded for suspected lack of transparency and integrity.

72. In Uganda, I observed first-hand how within a few months, the AAU CP provided training to its staff in *Participatory Rural Appraisal* (PRA), gender awareness training, and Training of Trainers (TOT) techniques.

73. Within the time of my visit to the AAU Country Programme, several AAU staff members participated in exchange visits both within and beyond Uganda. The latter, included among others, attendance of special training courses provided by the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) from the University of Sussex at Makerere University, exchange visits by AA staff from one DA to another, and outside trips by AAU staff to Malawi, Zaire and the UK.

74. Interview # 139, 137, 206 respectively.

75. Former manager in the Action Aid-Uganda CP.

76. With a staff of over 6,000 overall, including 1,000 UNDP New York HQ is also considerably larger than AA HQ in London which houses a core staff of 200 plus 100 sponsorship and public education mobilizers in the UK regions. One can also note that, on the whole, with over 130 field offices and an overall staff of 6000, UNDP is a much larger and a more spread out organization than AA which, has 20 field offices and an overall staff under 3,000.

77. Of course estimates of exactly how many of ABP's staff directly service the community vary depending on whether one considers staff providing various support services in Mubende town (e.g., the Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, the Sponsorship Team, or the Technical Support Unit) as contributing directly or not to beneficiary activities. In my own calculation I have only included FDWs and Area managers as among those ABP staff who directly service grassroots communities since, from my experience, they are the only ones who travel to the countryside on a daily basis.

78. Internal Action Aid-Uganda Memo Prepared by Action Aid-Uganda's Financial Unit. 1995.

79. Interview # 64. Mr. Goyder specified that while AAU's seclusion was decreasing somewhat in Kampala, it remained a problem in rural DAs.

80. A respondent familiar with the AAU CP noted that the NGO passed up important opportunities to work with other development agencies, including an offer from the *African Development Bank* (ADB) in the Bundibugyo DA. Although, according to the respondent, the two agencies shared a similar poverty eradication philosophy and their differences were reconcilable, AAU turned down the opportunity for collaboration. (Interview with former AAU Manager.)

81. Interview # 81. John de Coninck who himself conducted a major evaluation of AAU's *Buwekula Programme* in 1994, expressed surprise that AAU had not invited local government officials to take part in the *Buwekula Programme*'s 1994 Review.

82. Former AAU manager.

83. ABP beneficiaries often cited lack of shovels, spades, nails, cement, drugs, veterinary services, or secure land titles to reasonably fertile land as major sources of underdevelopment in their communities. (Views expressed during a Community Planning Session in Kitenga Sub-County, May 17, 1995. and during field visits. Buwekula DA, Mubende, Uganda, June 1995.).

84. Mubende District Local Government Office. *Mubende District Council Training Programme*. Pages 8-11. Mubende: Government of Mubende, November 1994.

85. As **Table 6.7** shows, the breakdown of ABP's budget in 1995 is as follows:

-Personnel costs: 342,020 Ugandan Shillings
(e.g., salaries, staff allowances, training, medical, lunch costs, etc.)
-Transport costs: 111,005 Ugandan Shillings
(e.g., fuel costs, vehicle repairs, licences, insurance, etc.)
-Office costs: 54,153 Ugandan Shillings
(e.g., rent, furniture, water, electricity, printing, stationary, courier services, consultancies, legal/audit fees, hospitality/entertainment, etc.)
-Capital costs: 10,050 Ugandan Shillings
(e.g., Equipment)
-Direct costs: 81,837 Ugandan Shillings
(e.g., Direct community costs in ABP's various multi-sectoral projects)

86. ABP's distance from fellow development actors became evident when I discovered that ABP did not know that UNDP's CMP-HABITAT Programme was also operating out of Mubende District or that some of its own FDWs worked as volunteers for Quaker Services Norway's *Change Agent Programme*.

87. The exception to this trend was an ABP Women's Group in Kasambya Sub-County within Kasambya Parish which recalled that the YWCA had visited the area with plans to put up a community centre but had never returned. (Interview # 122). One community also noted that an American organization had come to the community but left soon afterwards. Finally, some community groups did note that the local government had helped them with road construction and that some RC/LCs had provided some funds for development activities.

88. Interview # 113.

89. Interview # 206.

90. As Mubende District's Agricultural Officer pointed out, while ABP is now more likely to send them copies of reports or to arrange some farm visits through the District's Agricultural Extension Office, joint-planning or working in the field together is still unheard of. (Interview # 207)

91. According to the respondent, ABP should have carried out a consistent survey of the community's preference for RC/LC or PDCs and to have experimented by having some Parishes' development plans led by RC/LCs and others' led by PDCs so as to able to gather objective comparative (control) data on the pros and cons of each system. (Interview with AAU manager).

92. Interviews # 205-211.

93. Action Aid Uganda. *Baseline Survey Report for the Buwekula Project (Kasambya and Kitenga Sub-Counties)*. Page 4. Mubende: AA-Buwekula, conducted March 1988.

94. Interview # 113.

95. An external assessment of the concentrated (batch) farming methodology used in the *Buwekula* and *Mityana* DA's, warns AAU that its goals of targeting "the poorest of the poor" might be unrealistic and generates only small agricultural returns in LDCs such as Uganda where the bottom third of the population is often incapable of making significant agricultural progress due to lack of sufficient resources. (Geddes, Angus. *Mityana and Buwekula Agricultural Support Programmes*. Page 60. Report on a Consultancy to Action Aid-Uganda, 21 January-21 February 1992. Chatham, Kent: Natural Resources Institute, Chatham, Kent, UK, 1992).

96. I noticed the problem of cross-membership during my field work as I began to see some of the same faces reappearing in the different ABP groups I visited. This problem was later confirmed by other studies of the ABP Programme (See, for example, John de Coninck. Page 19. Op. Cit.).

97. Poverty Focus Group Discussion: Interview #136.

98. Action Aid-Buwekula. *Buwekula DA Agricultural Adoption Survey*. Pages 1-4. Conducted by Mr. Med Makumbi, then Monitoring and Evaluation Officer for ABP. Mubende: AA-Buwekula, June 1993.

99. Interview with ABP staff member. Mubende, Uganda.

100. For example, some of the respondents we spoke to asked us why the number of ABP staff in their area had been reduced; others asked when ABP would once again commence the sectoral activities it had halted in their area; others wanted to know what the PDC did exactly; and, hardly any of the community members we spoke to could say what ABP's new development objectives were.

101. ABP's internal evaluation of the effect of its methodological changes confirmed my own field findings that many ABP community members were confused about the exact nature, rationale or the structures put in place under ABP's new integrated methodology. (See: Margaret Logosi. *Findings of Evaluation of Mile One*. Internal ABP document given to me by Ms. Margaret Logosi, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Mubende: ABP Programme, December 1995.)

102. ABP's internal evaluation of the new integrated methodology later confirmed that ABP beneficiaries were becoming increasingly apprehensive about what would happen to the various sectoral activities which ABP had previously launched. (Margaret Logosi. *Findings of the Evaluation of Mile One*. Ibid).

103. Interview # 118.

104. According to an ABP manager, the extensive lay-offs which took place at ABP during 1995 affected mostly lower-level field staff. In fact, all but one of ABP's senior Area Managers (i.e., in the health sector) were able to protect their jobs since most of them formed part of the Management Committee created to decide on the firings. (Middle-level manager at ABP in Mubende)

105. Interviews with AAU staff in Mubende and Kampala, Uganda.

106. During my 6-week stay in ABP, 2 out of 15 FDWs quit their positions in search of more secure employment. In both cases the workers were women, thereby bringing the share of ABP's already low proportion of female FDWs down to less than a third of field staff.

107. John de Coninck et al. *Op. Cit.*

108. Internal memo produced by Action Aid-UK, 1995.

At the time of my follow-up visit to the ABP DA, although PDC members had already designed their own development projects, ABP staff were still spending much of their time explaining basic development planning principles (e.g., what a development objective is, what a development indicator is, etc.)

109. Interview with FDWs, ABP Programme. Mubende, Uganda.

110. Interviews with AAU managers. Kampala and Mubende, Uganda.

111. Action Aid-ABP. *Draft ABP Training Manual to Guide the Transition into the New Integrated Methodology*. Mubende: AA-Buwekula, Given to me by Margaret Logosi, ABP Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, July 1995.

112. Action Aid-Uganda. *Report of the Training Workshop on Community-Based Monitoring and Evaluation Systems*. Training Session facilitated by Daniel Ticehurst (consultant) and Med Makumbi (AAU) in Bundibugyo, 8-12 May, 1995. Kampala: AAU, 1995.

113. John de Coninck et al. Pages 14 and 15. Op. Cit.

According to the above one assessment of ABP's development impact, preliminary figures indicate that, in spite of the support provided over the years by ABP, the rate of growth in school enrolment is virtually the same in ABP and non-ABP areas and that the drop outs levels remain very high in both.

114. Action Aid-Buwekula. *Monthly Report for Action Aid-Buwekula Project (ABP)*. Compiled by ABP staff. Mubende: AA-Buwekula, March 1995.

115. For example: Action Aid-Buwekula. *Poverty Issues Which Need Consolidation as Raised on 10.3.1995*. Internal ABP Memo. Mubende: AA-Buwekula, 1995.

116. Action Aid-Uganda. *Action Aid-Uganda 1996 Annual Report*. Section 4.1.2 on the Buwekula Programme. Kampala: AAU, 21st February 1996.

117. Long after my departure from Uganda, ABP staff were still equivocating over whether to give credit to ABP's Credit and Savings Groups. (Informal conversation with former AAU staff member visiting the UK. 1996.)

118. During my field visits I did witness a few instance of farming innovation (e.g., one ABP-supported concentration farmer had managed to breed a unique variety of passion fruit using the grafting skills passed on to him by ABP and was now constantly visited by buyers from Kampala) and some ABP-supported concentration farmers did claim that farming techniques taught them by ABP (specifically, weeding, better crop spacing, grafting, and the creation of contours to reduce erosion) had increased their crop yields and the price they fetched for crops in the market place. However, most farmers visited had no record of the improvements nor could they say exactly how much their income had increased due to ABP's support and advise.

119. Action Aid-Buwekula. *Mubende Agricultural Adoption Survey: June 1993. Mubende: AA-Buwekula, Report by Med Makumbi, then Monitoring and Evaluation Officer for ABP, 1993.*

120. ABP Manager. Mubende, Uganda.

121. John de Coninck. Page 18. Op. Cit.

122. During my last visit, AAU was considering granting credit still existing ABP community groups (e.g., Women's Groups) in order to give them an economic boost and thus keep them in existence. (Interview with ABP Manager)

123. Interview with Action Aid-Uganda professional in Kampala.

124. Interview with ABP manager and professional from the AAU Kampala Office. Both interviewed in 1995.

125. Interview with AA professional from London HQ after my first trip to AAU.

126. As one AAU staff member noted, while AAU knew of cases in which, for instance, members of School Management Committees and Parent-Teacher Associations supported by ABP had ousted corrupt school masters, they had no evidence suggesting that such actions were a result of ABP training or that the action had been a collective one as opposed to an individual initiative. (Interview with AAU professional from the Kampala Office.)

127. During our field work we specifically asked ABP beneficiaries for examples of ways in which they had been able to take advantage of ABP's training opportunities. From these conversations we learned that some of them had taken the initiative to use the brick-making skills learned in ABP's Water Committees to build their own homes, while others had tried to duplicate some of the small innovations they had witnessed during AAU-supported exchange visits (e.g., using metal pipes rather than wooden ones as bridges, using fuel-saving cooking stoves, and adopting basket-weaving techniques observed from other groups during exposure visits). Nevertheless, most of these initiatives were very small, involving an individual or a family rather than a large collectivity and, once we probed further about the results of these initiatives, most groups many conceded that they had not been able to take the initiatives too far once left on their own as they had soon ran into a series of structural problems (e.g., bad weather, lack of fertile land, inputs, tools, transport, to markets, or expert advice, etc.).

128. Interview # 121, 123, 133, 117, 124.

129. Interview # 127, 134.

130. Interview # 124, 131.

131. Interview # 76.

132. The above comments are derived from interview # 123 and three group discussions heard during a joint Community-ABP planning session in Kitenga sub-county. May 17, 1995. Kitenga, Mubende, Uganda.

133. ABP beneficiary responses from interviews # 118, 119, 130, 133.

134. Interview with ABP FDW.

135. See: Action Aid-Buwekula. *ABP Methodology*. Mubende: AA-Buwekula, January 21, 1995; And, Action Aid-Buwekula. *Action Aid Buwekula Project (DA2) Long-Term Perspective 1995-2001*. Complied by ABP Staff. Mubende: AA-Buwekula, December 1995.

136. Interview # 122.

137. For example, a Women's Group in Kasambya noted that they had doubts about their PDC's honesty with money and about its accountability to the their community but noted that they had not told this to AA since they did not want to create a rift. (Interview # 121).

138. Interview # 133.

139. As one ABP manager explained, PDCs would not be given their own budgets but would instead have to present individual receipts to ABP for specific costs incurred and ABP would verify whether they were acceptable and would given them money on an item-by item basis.

140. At present ABP does not know how PDCs inform their communities of project decisions or whether this is done in a democratic fashion since formal mechanisms have not been created to ensure downward accountability from the PDC to the community. (Interview with professional from the AAU in Kampala.)

141. Senior manager from ABP. Mubende, Uganda.

142. Interview with Senior AAU Official. Kampala, Uganda.

143. Interview # 211.

144. Conversation with senior ABP Manager. Mubende, Uganda.

145. During our field work we learned that there were many reasons why concentration farmers had been unable to pass on their newly-acquired farming skills to others. Concentration farmers themselves often blamed the disinterest and laziness of fellow farmers who, they argued, were unwilling to practice labour-intensive activities such as weeding. However, members of the Poverty Focus Groups we spoke to argued that better-off "concentration farmers" simply did not consider it convenient or worthy of their time teaching such skills to the poorest farmers. (Interview # 125 and 136)

146. Interview # 123.

147. Internal memo. Action Aid-UK. London, UK, 1997.

148. John de Coninck et al. Pages 17 and 18. Op. Cit.

149. Interview # 136.

150. Interview # 119 and 136.

Table 6.1: Action Aid's Vision and Mission:

ACTIONAID

ACTIONAID's Vision

ACTIONAID is an
organisation dedicated to the
proposition that absolute poverty
can be substantially reduced and
is ultimately eradicable through
concerted action, and that it has
a significant part to play
in this process.

ACTIONAID's Mission

ACTIONAID
exists to help
children, families
and communities to
overcome poverty
and secure lasting
improvements in
the quality of
their lives.

MAP 1: Map of Action Aid's Development Areas in Uganda in 1995



Source: Child Health and Development Centre/ UNICEF, Uganda

Mityana DA

Buwekula DA

Kamuli DA (Was Finishing in 1995)

Bundibugyo DA

Apac DA (Was under Initiation in 1995)

Table 6.2: Organizational Chart of Action Aid Headquarters in London (As of January 1997)



Spou Source: Programme Development Division (PDD). Action Aid Headquarters. London, Uk. January 1997

Table 6.3: Action Aid Uganda's Annual Budget for 1995

BUDGET 1995 JANUARY TO DECEMBER

£'000 STERLING

ACTIONAID UGANDA — TABLE E (2) — 1995

EXPENDITURE/INCOME ANALYSIS

11-Nov-94 01:18 PM		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
DA/PROJECT No	Name	OPENING RESERVES 01-Jan-95	BUDGET PROG. EXPEND.	APPOINTMENT CENTRAL INDIRECT OVERHEADS	GROSS EXPEND.	SPONSOR-SHIP UK	SPONSOR-SHIP SPAIN	FUNDRAISING DIVISION		OFFICIAL UK	OFFICIAL SPAIN	LOCAL	GOODS IN KIND & OTHER	TOTAL INCOME	REALLOCATION NATIONAL FUND	REALLOCATION FLEXIBLE FUND	BUDGET CLOSING RESERVES 31-Dec-95	BUDGET CLOSING RESERVES (MTHS EXP)
DA1	MITYANA	190	(344)	(95)	(439)	394								394		50	195	5.33
DA2	BUWEKULA	213	(402)	(112)	(514)	499				23				522			222	5.18
DA3	BUNDIBUGYO	(17)	(231)	(64)	(295)		153			180				333			21	0.83
DA4	APAC	0	(134)	(37)	(172)	84		22						86	48	36	0	0.03
NON DA1	KAMULI	93	(619)	0	(619)							526		526			0	0.00
NON DA2	MITEP	17	(49)	0	(49)					25		7		32			0	0.11
NON DA3	TASO	70	(215)	0	(215)			85		152				237			92	5.14
NON DA4	PUBLIC POLICY	41	(66)	(12)	(78)									0	42		5	0.78
NON DA5	FPR (NRI)	1	(11)	(4)	(15)							13		13			(0)	(0.35)
NON DA6	STRATEGIES FOR ACTIO	42	(94)	(5)	(99)			38		54				92			35	4.26
NON DA7	OTHER INITIATIVES	8	(18)	(3)	(21)	14								14			1	0.37
NON DA8	MICRO PROJECTS	0	(15)	(3)	(18)			19						19			1	0.66
NON DA9	CDA IMPACT STUDY	4	(18)		(18)					15				15		9	10	6.35
NON DA10	SINGLE SECTOR 1	0	(48)	(6)	(52)			18						18	7	42	15	3.59
CENTRALLY INCURRED INDIRECT OVERHEADS			(341)	341	0													
TOTAL PROG. COSTS		662	(2,603)	(0)	(2,603)	971	153	182		450	0	546	0	2,301	97	139	597	2.75
NATIONAL FUND			XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX	139	19							158	(158)	XXXXXXXXX	0	
FLEXIBLE FUND			XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXX	139	XXXXXXXX							139	XXXXXXXXX	(139)	0	
ADMIN AND SPONSORSHIP			(276)		(276)	139	19	18		39				215	61	XXXXXXXXX	0	0.01
		662	(2,879)	(0)	(2,879)	1,388	191	200		489	0	546	0	2,814	0	0	597	2.49

Table 6.4: Organizational Chart of the Action Aid-Uganda Office in Kampala

Total Staff at Time of My Visit mid 1995: 39 Staff

16 Technical/Professional Staff

23 Administrative, Support Staff



KEY :

C D.....COUNTRY DIRECTOR	F C.....FINANCIAL CONTTROLLER	DD.....DEPUTY DIRECTOR
HRD.....HUMAN RESOURCE DEV	ACD.....ASSISTANT TO COUNTRY DIR.	AKP.....KAMULI
FIN.....FINANCE	SFA.....STRATEGY FOR ACTION	VT .....VISION TERUDO
ABP.....BUWEEKULA PROJECT	CSO.....COMPUTER SUPPORT OFFICER	MTP.....MITEP PROJECT
RECPT....RECEPTION	K.STF.....KITCHEN STAFF	TASO....TASO NGO
DRV.....DRIVERS	SPN.....SPONSORSHIP	TECH....TECHNICAL
AMP.....MITYANA PROJECT	FPR.....	I A.....INTERNAL AUDIT
BAP.....BUNDIBUGYO PROJECT	M & E....MONITORING & EVALUATION	P A.....PERSONAL ASSISTANT
KAO.....KAMPALA ADMIN OFFICER		

Source: Human Resources Department. Action Aid-Uganda. July 1995

MAP II: MAP of Projects/Groups Visited in the Buwekula Development Area (DA)



Table 6.5: Key Features of the Buwekula Development Area :

Programme Traits:	Development Objectives:	Highlight of Achievements:
Duration: 1988-2001 **Annual Budget:** **At time of Study in 1995:** £402,000 (£159,000 in overhead) **Expected During 1997:** £565,000 Pounds (£96,000 in support costs) **Geographic Scope:** Kitenga & Kasambya Sub-Counties from Buwekula County in Mubende District **Target Beneficiary Population:** 15 Parishes 114 Villages with estimated Population of 74,490 **Sectors Covered:** **After 1995 Methodological Changes:** Education, Health (Includ. HIV/AIDS), Water & Sanitation, Agriculture, Savings and Credit, gender, some research **Chief Inputs:** **Before Methodological Changes in 1994/5:** 67 Staff; 45 Motorcyles, 4 trucks, 1 tractor, 1 bus, 2 station wagons **At Time of Study in mid-late 1995:** 41 Staff,31 Motorcycles, 4 trucks, 1 tractor, 1 bus, 1 station wagon **Total Child Sponsors:** **At Time of Study in 1995:** 6,200 Sponsors	**Chief Development Objective:** To assist socially and economically disadvantaged communities to gain access to development opportunities & sustainable improvements in their living conditions. And, To have beneficiary communities that are fully integrated and collectively responsible for development activities in their area and capable of adjusting to changes in their macro and micro environment. **Specific Objectives:** The above is to be achieved through a strategy based on 4 inter-linked objectives: **1. Community Capacity Building:** This consists in empowering communities to take charge of their own destiny by training them in development planning, implementation and assessment techniques. **2.Improvement in Social Services:** This involves continuing providing support in basic health and education, water sanitation & agricultural extension services **3.Infrastructure** This involves continuing to build and rehabilitate roads, clinics, schools and water tanks in the community **4.Economic Capacity:** This involves helping communities to improve their economic base and entrepreneurial skills through business training in credit & savings schemes.	**Major Achievements:** Community Capacity: Over 300 PDC members & 200 Implementation Committee members were trained in development planning & have produced own projects & indicators Social Services: ABP's cumulative achievements by the end of 1995 included: In education, built over 200 classrooms, gave courses to over 140 teachers & established over 70 literacy centres with 4000 taught (1) In health, ABP immunized 2, 918 children in 1994 alone (2), held 320 health courses &trained over 200 Community Health Workers & 105 Traditional Birth Attendants In Infrastructure: ABP has rehabilitated over 500 Kms of feeder roads & 92 bridges, making 42 villages accessible & built 50 water sources Economic Capacity: In agriculture, between 1989-1994, ABP started 69 tree nursuries,trained over 800 farmers on environmentally-sound farm practices. By 1993, 30% of targeted farmers had adopted some new practices In Business, ABP identified 80 groups for potential credit and savings scheme & trained 35 groups on finanial management & accounting techniques

Table Notes:
(1) This is believed to have contributed to improvements in the literacy rate for persons over 14 years old from 32% in 1988 to 50% in 1993, a well as to local school enrollment from from 32% in 1988 to 50% in 1993.
(2) ABP's involvement in immunization of mothers and children is believed to have helped to increase the coverage of immunized children from 1% to 73% during the years in which AAU was involved in the DA.

Table 6.6: Organizational Chart of the Buwekula DA

ABP ORGANISATION STRUCTURE - 1995



ABP ORGANISATION STRUCTURE TOWARDS END OF THE PROJECT



Plus 7 informal Workers in 1995= 41 Total ABP staff : 23 technical /field staff
18 Administrative/Logistic staff member

PROJECTED STAFF LEVELS

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
Rural -based: AREA I	6	6	6	2	2	0	0
Rural -based: AREA II	11	11	11	5	5	0	0
Mubende-based: TSU	3	3	3	3	3	3	2
Mubende-based: SPONSORSHIP	2	2	2	2	1	1	1
Mubende-based: FAD	3	3	3	2	2	1	1
Mubende-based: OPS	9	9	9	5	4	4	2
Mubende-based: TOTAL	34	34	34	19	17	9	6

Table 6.7: The *Buwekula Programme*'s (ABP's) Annual Budget for 1995

26/01/95 (UG SHS '000's)

BUWEKULA PROJECT ABP

ACCOUNT DESCRIPTION	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
SALARIES MAT.STAFF	14,079	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	14,093	11,112	169,1[illegible]
ALLOW/NATIONAL STAFF	8,160	8,091	8,501	8,499	8,842	8,902	8,504	8,162	8,631	8,[illegible]97	8,229	14,178	106,919
RECRUITMENT COSTS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRAINING COSTS	1,022	576	1,250	345	159	0	527	0	0	0	0	0	3,377
FIELD/LUNCH ALLOWANCES	806	806	806	806	806	806	921	921	921	921	921	0	9,441
STAFF TEAS/LUNCHES	474	474	474	474	474	474	474	474	474	474	474	474	5,688
GRATUITIES MAT.STAFF	893	307	1,099	0	1,268	2,829	2,673	3,243	737	1,264	0	1,328	15,555
STAFF MEDICAL SCHEME	946	952	955	955	955	955	955	955	955	955	955	967	11,467
STAFF CLOTHING	1,648	185	630	0	1,204	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,467
CASUAL LABOUR	176	176	176	176	176	176	179	180	179	179	179	176	2,128
SECURITY EXPENSES	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	480	486	482	5,762
CHRONIC DISEASE/AIDS COSTS	0	50	0	50	0	50	0	50	0	8,050	0	50	8,300
PERSONNEL COSTS	28,596	26,192	28,466	25,880	28,459	28,767	28,808	28,560	26,473	34,715	25,332	31,769	342,020
FUEL COSTS	4,467	4,467	4,467	4,467	4,467	4,467	5,181	5,181	5,131	5,181	5,181	5,181	57,682
VEHICLE REPAIRS	1,466	1,466	1,466	1,466	1,466	1,466	1,790	1,790	1,790	1,790	1,790	1,790	19,538
MOTOR CYCLE REPAIRS	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000	1,043	1,043	1,043	1,043	1,043	1,043	12,256
VEHICLE HIRE	53	53	53	53	53	53	65	65	65	65	65	62	706
LICENCE,INSURANCE,ROAD TOLLS	4,301	973	395	1,300	0	998	244	0	1,301	483	650	0	10,645
INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,334	0	0	1,334
PERDIEMS/TRAVEL ALLOWANCES	810	488	414	527	394	471	449	544	450	544	452	529	6,072
LOCAL TRAVEL/PUBLIC FARES	136	869	136	159	160	141	170	162	162	150	156	159	2,565
TRANSPORT COSTS	12,233	9,316	7,931	8,972	7,540	8,616	8,942	8,785	9,992	10,592	9,331	8,755	111,005
WATER & ELECTRICITY	155	155	155	155	155	155	155	155	155	155	155	153	1,858
TELEPHONE/FAX COSTS	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	450	5,400
POSTAGE/COURIER SERVICES	10	434	434	1,510	10	1,278	10	434	434	10	10	433	5,007
PRINTING & STATONERY	4,673	2,001	2,126	2,122	1,718	1,718	0	0	0	0	0	0	14,358
HOTEL/GUEST HSE EXPENSES	90	96	92	93	93	93	101	101	101	101	101	101	1,157
MISC.OFFICE COSTS	251	251	251	251	251	251	251	251	251	251	251	245	3,006
BANK CHARGES	350	350	350	350	350	350	350	350	350	350	350	350	4,200
AUDIT FEES & EXPENSES	0	4,377	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4,377
LEGAL FEES & EXPENSES	250	250	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	500
HOSPITALITY/ENTERTAINMENT EXP	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	516
REPAIRS/FURN/EQUIP	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	112	1,344
REPAIRS BUILDINGS	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	600
RENT OF BUILDINGS	842	842	1,472	842	842	882	882	882	882	882	882	882	11,014
SPONSORSHIP PHOTOGRAPHY	101	0	0	100	100	0	149	0	0	109	100	0	659
GENERAL CONSULTANCIES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
INVENTORY CE 500	107	0	0	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	157
OFFICE COSTS	7,484	9,405	5,535	6,128	4,174	5,362	2,553	2,828	2,825	2,513	2,554	2,819	54,153
MAINTAIN DATA BASE	0	0	0	750	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	750
ESTABLISHMENT OF LIBRARY	0	0	16	0	285	59	0	0	14	0	0	12	385
METHODOLOGY STAFF TRAINING	0	405	0	0	56	0	0	0	0	0	56	55	572
PROGRAMME DEVELOPMENT	241	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	241
ABP CONTY TRAINING IN DEVT	2,307	2,728	849	101	557	335	557	0	335	0	0	0	7,769

Table 6.7....Continued....

(UG SHS '000's)

BUWEKULA PROJECT — ASIP

ACCOUNT DESCRIPTION	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	TOTAL
ASP CONTY AGT DEVELOPMENT	269	212	108	385	0	386	0	0	0	0	0	0	1,360
ASP EXTENSION OF AGRIC SKILLS	347	0	0	0	0	298	0	0	300	0	0	0	945
ASP WOMEN TRAINING IN IGS'S	0	0	0	68	0	0	0	0	0	68	0	0	136
ASP IMPROVE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT	0	4,421	619	620	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5,660
ASP LITERACY & NON FORMAL EDUC	1,450	1,904	1,859	1,301	400	390	0	0	365	0	0	365	8,034
ASP IMPROVE WOMEN EDUCATION	54	0	189	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	243
ASP IMPROVE TEACHER SKILLS	789	0	735	730	366	734	366	0	734	0	0	0	4,454
ASP IMPROVE PHC SERVICES	620	1,105	1,070	959	1,723	1,462	1,001	27	598	444	27	135	9,171
ASP FEEDER ROAD MAINTANANCE	154	154	827	154	165	192	430	299	307	356	0	0	3,038
ASP BUILD & IMPROVE SCHOOLS	798	798	1,363	1,393	1,775	2,048	1,182	887	607	60	50	0	10,961
ASP BUILD/IMPROVE HEALTH UNITS	2,021	394	905	1,565	282	282	180	603	422	422	0	0	7,076
ASP DEVP/PROTECT WATER SOURCES	1,948	1,449	3,237	3,238	2,881	975	596	596	596	596	596	657	17,365
ASP BUILD/IMPROVE CONTY CENTRE	573	581	416	416	201	0	215	0	215	0	215	0	2,832
ASP IMPROVE FARM STRUCTURE	0	0	0	0	204	102	102	437	0	0	0	0	845
NOT IN USE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIRECT COSTS	11,571	14,151	12,191	11,680	8,895	7,261	4,629	2,849	4,493	1,946	964	1,229	81,837
COST OF EQUIPMENT	6,025	4,025	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10,050
CAPITAL COSTS	6,025	4,025	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10,050
TOTAL COST CENTRE	65,909	63,089	54,123	52,660	49,068	50,028	44,932	43,022	43,786	49,766	38,111	44,568	599,065
CHECK TOTAL	65,909	63,089	54,123	52,660	49,068	50,028	44,932	43,022	43,786	49,766	38,111	44,568	599,065

Table 6.8: The *Buwekula Programme's* (ABP's) Community Structure in 1995 and 2000

Community Development structure 1995



Community Development Structure towards end of ABP (2000)



Source: Action Aid-Buwekula. *Action Aid Buwekula Project (DA2) Long-Term Perspective 1995-2001*. Page 16. Compiled by ABP Staff. Mubende, Uganda. December 1995.

Chapter 7: Conclusion: Letting the People Lead

"One great thought can change the dreams of the world" he said
"I think I know that one already. Tell me another" I responded
An imperceptible smile rose to his face.
"One great action, lived out all the way to the sea,
can change the history of the world."

Ade to Azaro, the Spirit Child [1]

I. Major Research Findings and of Lessons Learnt

This thesis has provided an in-depth account of how two different types of international development organizations (UNDP and AA) have gone about putting the SHD/PCD paradigm into practice in Uganda and beyond. This last Chapter synthesizes the thesis' major findings, points to important lessons and insights which can be drawn from UNDP's and AA's experiences, and analyses both theoretical and empirical implications.

A) Core Empirical Findings and Insights

1 - This thesis has shown that both UNDP and AA have made genuine efforts to introduce SHD/PCD approaches at the conceptual, organizational and programmatic levels as well as to reorient their thinking and work in HQs as well as at the national and field level in Uganda. The previous chapters also illustrate that both UNDP and AA have contributed towards alleviating poverty in Uganda through the reconstruction of local infrastructure; the regeneration of rural service-provision; the provision of technical training and organizational skills; and, in the case of UNDP, through the financing of community-level income-generating activities. In doing this, both agencies have undeniably reduced peoples' suffering, enhanced their capabilities, and given Ugandans opportunities which would not otherwise have been available to them. Because the research did not generate sufficient data on cost-effectiveness, it is impossible to make definite assertions about whether NGOs are more efficient than UN agencies in the delivery of their outputs. If anything, the data gathered seems to

show that both UNDP and AA spend vast amounts of money on administration and logistical costs. However, because AA generally hired fewer expensive international consultants and kept most of its offices and staff in less expensive rural areas, it is quite possible that AA delivers more grassroots-level community services per unit of money than UNDP.

The above contributions notwithstanding though, the bulk of the evidence in the thesis reveals that, both UNDP and AA have had serious difficulties moving beyond traditional service-delivery, technical training and agricultural extension, or palliative development interventions. Consequently, in the final analysis, both agencies have failed to realize core SHD/PCD goals such as producing development intervention which are integrated, flexible, and sustainable over the long-run; influencing wider institutional arrangements and policies conducive to 'Sound governance'; fostering greater equity and reaching the 'poorest of the poor'; strengthening collaboration between donors; reinvigorating North-South partnerships and creating a genuine sense of ownership within LDCs; and ensuring the full participation and empowerment of beneficiaries. On this point, it is useful to note that the evidence provided in the thesis suggests that because of its status as an inter-governmental organization and hence its access to global fora and nation-states, UNDP has generally proven more adept than AA at influencing wider development debates and gaining the attention of governments, especially at the global level. Because of its operational and grassroots nature, AA on the other hand, can be said to have performed better than UNDP when it came to working closely with and carefully monitoring project grassroots-level activities in the Ugandan countryside. In this respect, the two agencies' comparative advantages do seem to be complementary. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the bulk of the evidence in the thesis shows that neither UNDP or AA have realized the more transformative elements of the SHD/PCD agenda or challenged the status quo and existing national and global power relations

to the extent which Diane Elson argues is necessary to make the transition from *capability-building* to actual *capability use*.

2 - A second empirical finding is that, due to its directly operational, grassroots-based, highly regulated, and autonomous approach to development, AA faced fewer inter-organizational conflicts rooted in the territoriality of different development actors or community-level problems related to rent-seeking among Ugandan government official or beneficiaries. UNDP's development interventions in Uganda, conversely, were much more urban-based, dispersed, technocratic, and politically-dependent, and, as such, the UN agency encountered more difficulties than AA in operationalizing SHD/PCD in a focussed manner and more conflicts with fellow UN donors and opportunistic behaviour by Ugandan government and community beneficiaries.

3 - Another significant finding is that, although both UNDP and AA partly adopted SHD/PCD approaches for similar reasons--i.e., to enhance their respective agencies' profile and competitiveness in the existing system of international development cooperation, the two agencies' conceptual approach to promoting SHD/PCD ideas did differ. AA HQ, for example, was considerably less interventionist than UNDP HQ when it came to conceptual matters. As a result, AA staff experienced less confusion resulting from the sheer abstractness, incompleteness and vagueness of the SHD/PCD paradigm and from the top-down imposition and shifting positions on SHD/PCD than was experienced at UNDP, where field practitioners felt particularly confused about the meaning of SHD/PCD ideas and pressured to find ways of operationalizing the complex SHD/PCD paradigm into practice in Uganda.

And yet, despite these differences and the fact that UNDP's woes are largely rooted in too much emphasis on imprecise theory that does not sufficiently connect to practice while AA's difficulties emanate from too much emphasis on practice that is not informed by theory, the available

evidence shows that, in the final analysis, both agencies have had trouble filling the gap between SHD/PCD theory and practice. Both agencies, for instance, have found themselves struggling to understand the prioritization and exact nature of the links between core *Human Development* components; grappling with the trade-offs and often contradictory nature of some Human Development goals:. For example, fulfilling the prerequisites of flexible learning and managerialism at once or simultaneously achieving wider policy influence and grassroots participation--especially difficult tasks for AA, or balancing the promotion of 'Sound governance' and the South's right to self-determination--a particularly delicate challenge for UNDP. Both agencies have also had to reconcile the idealism of SHD/PCD ideals with the reality of the constraints present in their own development agencies, the system of international development cooperation, and LDCs like Uganda. While problems of territoriality and recipient rent-seeking behaviour were the most prevalent constraints at UNDP in this latter case, isolationism and limited organizational clout were the major setbacks at AA. All of the latter are components of what in my thesis I describe as the *Baroque Science Phenomenon*. (Refer to **Table 7.1** for a summary of the manifestations of the *Baroque Science Phenomenon* at UNDP and AA)

4 - The last parallel between UNDP and AA's SHD/PCD experiences is that both agencies have found themselves displacing core SHD/PCD goals in favour of organizational interests whenever the two have been at odds with one another. (i.e., what I call the *River Pollution Phenomenon*) In both agencies, furthermore, organizational interests have taken similar forms, including: a tendency to increase the agency's mandate, functions and power-base in order to keep the money moving and to ensure continued programme expansion; giving into pressures from the most influential stakeholders in order to avoid resistance; doing what is easiest and most feasible in order to show quick and concrete results and to adhere to agency regulations, deadlines

and targets; and, concealing errors, not measuring impact, or underestimating contextual, institutional and organizational obstacles so as to sustain an image of success. Despite the fact that these four forms of organizational interests differ, they all share the same underlying cause: the need for organizational continuity and control.

Although the *River Pollution Phenomenon* is not meant to be a predictive model, some general patterns of organizational behaviour are discernible from the research. For example, while the two first two types of organizational interests described above prevailed in UNDP and AA HQs where the pressure to expand the agency's niche and mandate and to satisfy powerful northern stakeholders was strongest, the latter two organizational interests seem to have manifested themselves more strongly in Uganda where field staff were under particular pressure to show that the ambitious goals of the SHD/PCD agenda were indeed implementable and could produce error-free results under tight time-lines and budgets. To the above one can also add that, as an inter-governmental agency accountable to over 170 nation-states, UNDP is generally much more concerned than AA with pleasing its wide array of international stakeholders. On the other hand, as an operational agency, AA was generally much more concerned than UNDP with doing what is easiest in order to show results on the ground. As the previous chapters have shown, all of the above-mentioned organizational interests manifested themselves both within UNDP and AA. However, the available evidence also shows that, as an inter-governmental agency whose survival largely depends on its ability to balance conflicting pressures from northern and southern nation-states, UNDP was most influenced by the need to please powerful stakeholders. On the other, as a predominantly operational, highly regulated and autonomous grassroots NGO, AA was influenced most by pressures to adhere to agency rules and procedures and to do what is easiest so as to show quick and concrete results. (**Table 7.2** shows how organizational interests manifest themselves at UNDP and AA).

The above having been said, a few qualifications are in order about the role of organizational interests at UNDP and AA. The first qualification is that there is no such thing as a single or a perfectly coherent organizational interest. In fact, the previous chapters showed that there were opposed interests in competition with one another, both within UNDP (e.g., northern donors promoting the 'Sound governance' agenda versus southern recipient governments safeguarding LDCs' national sovereignty) and AA (e.g., policy and professional development staff promoting advocacy work and participatory development versus the Board of Trustees and financial, marketing and sponsorship staff favouring alleviatory social service delivery). Within each agency, however, either the power (e.g., the power of AA's Trustees) or the noise of the resistance (e.g., the G-77 very public and embarrassing campaign against UNDP in the UN and the media) of a particular group can explain why some organizational interests can end up dominating and influencing agency decisions more than others. A second qualification is that organizational interests need not always be at odds with SHD/PCD. For instance, UNDP's and AA's interests in becoming more actively involved in 'Sound governance' debates is a good example of how UNDP's and AA's organizational goals can coincide with core SHD/PCD goals. Similarly, in the previous chapters, one also finds examples of instances in which UNDP and AA pursued alternate pathways by taking stances which in many ways ran counter to their organizational interests (e.g., the decision by UNDP and AA HQs to decentralize and cede more control over programme decisions to field staff and Ugandan recipients.)

B) Core Theoretical Findings and Insights

1 - Theoretically speaking, the first theoretical lesson to emerge from my thesis is that, a novel and promising idea on its own, however inspiring it may be, is not enough. As Ade points out to Azaro above, while ideas are the foundation of all human dreams, they change very little unless they

can be operationalized into action. In the case of SHD/PCD, neither scholars or the international development community have sufficiently questioned the implementability of such ideas or assessed their development impact either globally or in particular LDC settings. Yet my own research suggest that, despite constituting a *bona fide* development paradigm which transcends excessively economistic visions of development and past market versus state dichotomies, SHD/PCD is not easily implementable in a comprehensive form. This is theoretically significant not only because it opens up the whole debate about the feasibility of the SHD/PCD paradigm but also because it draws our attention to the realization that ideas alone are not sufficient to bring about improved human conditions.

A related conceptual insight emerging from the thesis is that good ideas can emerge anywhere and need not (and in fact often do not) originate from the grassroots level or the poor themselves. As such, they should not be judged on the basis of their pedigree but rather in terms of their potential to bring about social change and enhance peoples' lives. At the same time though, my thesis also shows that how widely and openly ideas are allowed to evolve and the extent to which they are shared (rather than imposed) upon social actors is instrumental in determining whether national and local leaders, agency staff and beneficiaries develop their own understanding of ideas and decide to pursue them as their own.

A corollary to the above finding is that, because in addition to being a paradigm which offers a unique understanding of how some aspect of the world works, SHD/PCD is also a doctrine which offers particular ideas about what should be done--i.e., a prescription for action [2], SHD/PCD is probably too ambitious too be perfectly realizable. For these reasons, there is always bound to be a gap between theory and practice--no matter how well those ideas have been internalized or how well intentioned and competent the actors put in charge of their implementation. By setting out

to implement SHD/PCD, UNDP and AA have no doubt set themselves a Herculean task. After all, creating fully accountable service provision institutions, reaching the poorest 10% and organizing them to design programmes and influence major policies is something which even we, in advanced Western societies, have not been able to achieve. This means that, in my thesis, I am putting UNDP and AA to the toughest test possible--a test which no other development agency has passed to date.

3 - Thirdly, my findings emphasize the centrality of the role of organizations in development processes. As the instigators of changes in the 'rules of the game', development organizations have their own momentum, power base, and agenda. During interviews, respondents from various international development agencies claimed that their biggest impediments were contextual (e.g., environmental decay, war, etc.) or broader policy constraints (e.g., structural adjustment policies, unfair terms of trade under globalization, etc.) beyond their sphere of influence.

What my own research reveals, on the other hand, is that international development agencies' own organizational interests and limitations are crucial determinants of development success and often at the root of development experiments gone astray. In fact, it is largely organizational imperatives and the pressure to continue to grow and to improve their agency's global profile and marketability which lead development agency managers and field staff to over-emphasize contextual and structuralist explanations for their under-performance; to often displace or dilute the importance of SHD/PCD components in their development interventions; to sustain a series of contentious assumptions about their agencies' presumed autonomy, organizational capacity or transformative capacity, the supposedly symmetrical and harmonious nature of the existing system of international development cooperation and North-South relations, the supposedly undifferentiated, solidaristic and

omniscient nature of beneficiary communities in poor LDCs such as Uganda; and to generally overlook the conceptual deficiencies and limited operationalizability of the SHD/PCD paradigm. However, this does not dismiss other contextual or broader institutional and policy-related variables which affect the ultimate impact of those development interventions which UNDP and AA actually decide to pursue. Thus, I recognize that, in actuality, many of the problems facing UNDP and AA emanate from the nature of their stakeholder communities in the wider system of interactional development cooperation rather than from within the agencies themselves. I also recognize that Uganda's protracted civil war and the inequitable, tribalistic and clientelistic nature of rural Uganda are historical and cultural hindrances to development as is the Ugandan government's draining military expenditures, limited public investment in human development, and a still inefficient and sometimes corrupt civil service. My concern then, is with the *interface* between contextual factors, wider institutional and policy factors and organizational ones.

Also on the topic of organizational factors, it is important to emphasize that, by showing how the implementation of SHD/PCD ideas is undermined by a combination of the conceptual deficiencies, internal contractions and romanticism of the SHD/PCD paradigm; broader contextual, institutional, and policy constraints; and organizational limitations and interests, the argument put forward in this thesis attempts to go beyond theories of organizational imperatives which place the burden of poor implementation on either the technical problems or organizational interests of agencies themselves. (**Table 7.3** provides a 'wiring diagram' of the various factors hindering the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches).

4 - Fourthly, this thesis shows that, because of their need to fulfil their own interests, international development organizations may not be natural catalysts of paradigmatic change or challengers of the status quo

either globally or nationally. Furthermore, contrary to the view that NGOs are more altruistic, solidaristic, and better at reaching the poorest or fostering participation, empowerment, and long-term sustainability, my findings show that, in Uganda at least, international NGOs like AA are as prone as multilateral agencies to stray from the more transformative goals of the SHD/PCD agenda. Moreover, as noted above, operational international NGOs like AA may be even be less adept than multilateral organizations at influencing wider policy debates, gaining access to decision-makers or collaborating closely with other development actors and their development interventions may be less sustainable over the longer-term as a result.

5 - Finally, I found that equity and democratic processes and issues of conflict and self-interest are all important considerations in international development. To adherents of the *Democratic Development School* (DD) (for example, Robert Chambers, David Korten, Michael Chernea and Stan Burkey), the key to development lies in the ability of organizations to promote equity, participation and to empower the poor and marginalized in LDCs. My thesis confirms the validity of these concerns since socio-economic inequity (especially lack of access to productive assets) and undemocratic and unaccountable political structures were shown to undermine the ability of the poor to launch their own economic activities or voice their needs, while paternalistic, top-down and rigid organizational structures within development agencies reinforced dependency on outsiders.

Nevertheless, I also show that there is much which the DD School of thought does not explain. DD thinkers do not, for example, explain why it is that, despite genuine efforts to do so, development organizations often prove unable to work in a flexible, participatory or democratic fashion, or to truly empower beneficiaries. They also do not recognize that broad-based participation is not easily achievable when the poor lack not only the resources but also the specialized knowledge, organizational skills,

confidence or free time needed to take part in multiple community meetings requiring tireless consensus building and both complex and highly technical planning and decision-making. Nor for that matter, does the DD school of thought address the reality that genuine North-South partnership and community collaboration is difficult to achieve in the context of an international system of development cooperation which, far from being harmonious and egalitarian, is riddled with internal rivalries and asymmetrical relationships between donors and beneficiaries. Finally, the DD School assumes that beneficiary communities are naturally solidaristic and altruistic even though most of my evidence and much of the development literature suggests the opposite. This does not mean that there is no collaboration among the poor in Uganda. Quite the contrary, the Ugandan people could not have survived 30 years of repression and civil strife had it not been for the compassion and mutual support they have given one another. Nevertheless, my findings show that, far from elites having a monopoly on exploitative, rent-seeking and corrupt behaviour, the poor too can be elitist, exclusive of those outside tribal or family circles and exploitative of the weakest among them. This should not shock us. Given how poor some communities are in LDCs, it is to be expected that the more astute or better positioned to take advantage foreign aid opportunities will do so. What the neo-Marxist and Freirean-inspired DD School fails to take into account, is that opportunism is not restricted to elites.

The ideas of the *New Institutional Economics* (NIE) are instructive here. To NIE thinkers (e.g., Ronald Coase and Douglass North in Economics and Elinor Ostrom, Samuel Paul and E.A. Brett in the field of international development), human self-interest is essential to understanding why development processes involve such high transaction costs and why donors' themselves may prove ineffective at ensuring that both staff and beneficiaries do not engage in shirking, free-loading or corrupt behaviour. What NIE thinkers fail to sufficiently take into consideration though is

that much of the failure of development, and indeed the desperation of the poor, is itself propelled by the extreme inequities, authoritarianism, and the paternalism of LDC societies and the top-down nature and rigidity of development agencies themselves. Hence, it is only when insights from the two schools of thought are brought together--as they are in this thesis--that we begin to understand that, in addition to the lack of resources and power (as emphasized by the DD School), SHD/PCD in LDCs is equally hindered by the rent-seeking behaviour of governments and the poor themselves (as noted by NIE thinkers) and reinforced by organizational interests. In short, there is no reason why participatory development work cannot be complemented with expert-led guidance. However, even then, the findings in this thesis reveal that the applicability of both the DD and NIE frameworks may be limited when applied to very poor LDCs such as Uganda, where both schools' assumptions that the society's political, legal and economic institutions are evolved enough to allow for a fairly equitable distribution or resources and knowledge, democratic and legitimate political structures and democratic processes, accountable social service providers and experts, and effective regulation and rule enforcement.

C) Empirical and Theoretical Contributions of the Thesis

1 - In this thesis, I have tried, perhaps for the first time, to examine the conceptual deficiencies of the SHD/PCD paradigm and the tensions present between its aspirations and real-life constraints. (i.e. the *Baroque Science Phenomenon*). While my findings do not reveal much which is not already known in the development community, they do confront SHD/PCD's conceptual limitations by drawing out their implications for the operationalization and long-term development impact of SHD/PCD.

2 - Secondly, my research links the promotion of SHD/PCD approaches to institutional and organizational factors and shows that the contentious

assumptions which international development agencies make about development processes, the system of international cooperation, and about their own organizational capacity, coupled with their own interest, seriously hinder their ability to implement the SHD/PCD approach. (i.e., what in my thesis I call the *River Pollution Phenomenon*). This, once again, is not new in either the international development cooperation, implementation process or the institutional literatures. However, my work has traced how and why these interests have actually undermined the operationalization of the SHD/PCD paradigm and how organizational imperatives influence development agencies' adoption and interpretations of new ideas as well as the way in which such agencies deal with contextual and broader institutional and policy factors. I also show that this issue and the resulting implementation problems have not been sufficiently addressed in the SHD/PCD Literature. Still, it is important to remember, that the *Baroque Science* or the *River Pollution Phenomena* are do not, and indeed are not meant to, provide precise predictions.

3 - Thirdly, the comparative approach in my thesis allows me to compare how both a multilateral development organization and an international NGO go about putting these ideas into practice. My findings that neither type of international development agency is particularly effective at challenging the status quo is not too surprising since these constraints have been described in the recent NGO Literature. What is surprising is that few comparisons of the pros and cons of different types of development organizations exist and that so little of this accumulated wisdom has been taken into consideration by NGOs and donors eager to implement SHD/PCD.

4 - Fourthly, my thesis attempts to add value not only by complementing four different literatures (i.e., the International Development Cooperation/NGO Literature; the SHD/PCD Literature; a stream of the Implementation Process Literature; and two schools of thought from the Institutional Literature), but also by reconciling the claims of both the

Democratic Development and the *New Institutional Economics* while at the same time testing the empirical applicability of their assumptions to LDCs such as Uganda. Incorporating insights from a multiplicity of literatures has allowed me to show how an eclectic conceptual approach can be helpful for analyzing the implementation and impact of new development approaches.

5 - Finally, I was able to trace the operationalization of SHD/PCD from paradigm to policy as well as from policy to programme and thus to complement theoretical and empirical evidence at the global, national and grassroots levels as well as from a conceptual, policy, organizational and programme/project perspective. My review of the literature confirmed that much of the discussion about SHD/PCD approaches has remained at the level of generalities or has consisted of econometric dissections of the HDI, with no comprehensive study of both SHD/PCD theory and practice in particular organizations or country settings done to date. Although the inside information which I gathered on UNDP's and AA's SHD/PCD efforts globally and in Uganda will never be fully complete, this study makes a major attempt to begin to fill the existing void in the literature.

II. The Wider Applicability of the Thesis' Findings: Similarities and Differences with Parallel Development Experiences

Of course, even if the above research claims are valid, we still have to ask whether they apply to other organizations, developing countries, or development experiences. The qualitative nature of my research means that statistical measures can not be used to prove that the agency and country examples I have studied constitute a microcosm representative of the international development community at large. For these reasons, I would never claim that the patterns I discovered in UNDP's and AA's implementation of SHD/PCD approaches in Uganda are bound to occur in the two agencies' development efforts elsewhere. Moreover, because I know of no other in-depth comparative studies on SHD/PCD completed to date, I can not say whether my thesis findings are generalizable beyond Uganda.

However, I would argue that the bulk of the evidence available does suggest that the problems I identified in my thesis are in fact quite common in development and, on that basis, feel comfortable asserting that my findings are relevant to other cases. This claim can be substantiated in three ways. First, the one study found which does compare the impact of a UN development agencies and an NGO in Sri Lanka and in the area of humanitarian aid has begun generating results similar to my own. [3] Second, the various independent assessments of UNDP and AA's work [4] and the literature on Uganda and international development cited int the thesis also supports my conclusion. Third, in this chapter, I complement my findings with those of UNDP's and AA's development experiences elsewhere.

A) The Wider Applicability of the UNDP Experience

My review of UNDP's SHD/PCD efforts outside of Uganda reveals that some UNDP programmes have produced some relatively successful cases but many others have been undermined by the constraints I identified in Uganda.

i) Relatively Successful Cases of UNDP's Promotion of SHD/PCD

The Philippines, Bolivia, El Salvador, and Malawi are the four Country Programmes which UNDP cites as relatively successful examples of its efforts to implement SHD/PCD approaches. UNDP's assessments of these programmes suggest their success is explained by four sets of factors.

a) Firstly, exceptional leadership, analytical capacity and risk-taking by UNDP's RRs and other staff are important in determining the success of SHD/PCD initiatives in these countries.
[e.g.,] In Bolivia, UNDP's RR recruited dynamic young staff with strong analytical competencies in thematic and governance issues.
[e.g.,] In El Salvador, the UNDP RR was a talented consensus-builder who won the respect of both the government and the guerrilla and acted as a 'neutral broker' between the two.
[e.g.], In Malawi, the diplomatic community's esteem for UNDP's RR allowed him to establish a weekly forum attended by ambassadors and donors as well as influential fora on the democratic transition.

b) Securing access and the direct involvement and ownership of top-level national decision-makers and building on existing national

initiatives while at the same time encouraging a process of wide consultation and meaningful debate on SHD/PCD are other criteria for effectively promoting SHD/PCD in these countries.
[e.g.,] In the Philippines, the *Human Development Network* formed in 1992 served as a forum for development scholars, practitioners and NGOs and eventually formulated the *Philippines Human Development Report*. Although the forum was initially facilitated by UNDP, it later elected as its own convenor a respected former economic planning minister. The *Presidential Commission to Fight Poverty* was later made the major counterpart in the implementation of the *Philippine Human Development Report* and President Ramos himself was asked to launch it.

c) Designing a well-focussed SHD/PCD strategy which does not shy away from taking on the new areas of work and the most prescient development issues in the country, even if political, is another prerequisite for SHD/PCD success.
[e.g.,] In Malawi, UNDP identified 'Sound governance' as its priority and focussed its CP on democratization, decentralization and popular participation in districts and local areas even though traditionally, its work had been neither policy-linked or localized.
[e.g.,] In El Salvador, UNDP linked the need for better socio-economic conditions and effective political institutions to the peace-keeping process, and became involved in political work by giving technical and institution-building assistance to the *Human Rights Ombudsman's Office*, supplying UN Volunteers for the *United Nations Observers Mission to El Salvador* (ONUSAL), and taking risky policy positions such as highlighting ex-combatants' need for access to land, credit and foreign aid, even though UNDP had spoken out on such problems.

d) Finally, new space and political will to change must be exhibited by recipients if SHD/PCD initiatives are to gain momentum.
[e.g.,] In Bolivia, the government had already passed the Law of Popular Participation giving civil society a greater role in shaping the country's new development vision.
[e.g.,] In El Salvador, the government had previously agreed to give the international community and UNDP a central role in the peace-making process through the ONUSAL peace-keeping mission. [5]

The above examples are instructive not only because they illustrate that UNDP has been more successful than it was in Uganda in implementing SHD/PCD approaches but also because much of the above evidence corroborates my own findings. It confirms, for example, that factors which were not present in Uganda--such as a well-focussed and politically audacious SHD/PCD strategy; strong national ownership of SHD/PCD ideas and efforts at all levels; collaborative and participatory development processes which incorporate a wide range of social actors; and recipient governments responsive to the will of the people, are core elements of effective SHD/PCD. When such conditions do not exist, it must be UNDP's priority to focus on creating such conditions as much as focusing on producing small

concrete and identifiable outputs. It may well be, of course, that there are countries in which such conditions do not exist and where reactionary recipient governments are determined to resist any foreign or civil society efforts to bring them about. Under such circumstances, international development agencies like UNDP may have to recognize that SHD/PCD may not be viable at the moment and that it is preferable for it to contribute to traditional service provision rather than to abandon the poor in that LDC.

ii) Less Successful Cases of UNDP's Promotion of SHD/PCD

Yet, most evidence shows that UNDP's Uganda experience is not atypical

UNDP's own *Series on Sustainable Human Development* confirms that many of the implementation constraints and mistakes I identify tend to repeat themselves elsewhere. The review of UNDP's SHD/PCD efforts in Sudan, for instance, points out that the *Area Development Scheme* (ADS) pioneered by the Government and UNDP to respond to harsh drought conditions in a participatory and integrated manner failed to ensure the meaningful involvement of communities since ADS experts often assumed that they knew the solutions to problems and imposed these in a top-down manner. [6] Similarly, UNDP's review of its efforts in Guinea confirms my own findings that the limits to the development community's knowledge about appropriate development interventions is much greater than what is openly recognized. [7]

I was also able to obtain more revealing evidence on these issues in certain countries. Discussions from a *Sub-Regional Seminar on Human Development in Africa*, for example, suggest that in other impoverished African countries, UNDP has discovered that SHD/PCD efforts have often been UN-driven rather than demand-driven; that UNDP's promotion of SHD/PCD has duplicated other national initiatives and overburdened UN and government personnel; and

that, even in Malawi, a success story, coordination between development actors promoting SHD/PCD approaches leaves much to be desired. [8]

In Costa Rica, evaluations of UNDP's and HABITAT's Community Management Programme (CMP)--a Programme similar to the one I studied in Uganda--shows that even in an LDCs with much higher *Human Development* levels, UNDP's community empowerment efforts have run into difficulties in creating a sense of ownership among local government officials and beneficiaries; in convincing the recipient government that CMP is more than a means of equipping and staffing their ministries; in altering paternalistic behaviour and reducing community-based conflicts and distrust; in reaching the poorest of the poor, the disorganized or uneducated; and in resisting the tendency to produce quick results and to absorb vast amounts of programme funds and staff time on administrative outputs and procedures. [9]

Finally, even in El Salvador where UNDP's political work is often depicted as a success story, independent assessments reveal that UNDP's close relationship with the government has meant that UNDP could not establish a sufficiently strong working relationship with Salvadorean civil society, including NGOs and the former FMLN guerrilla, both of whom played a central role in overseeing the country's peace accords. In addition, UNDP's fixed and slow-moving procedures and five-year planning cycles proved inappropriate for peace-keeping and peace-making work which requires flexibility and responding quickly. [10] As in Uganda then, UNDP's rigid organizational structure and dependence on traditional governments stakeholders undermined its capacity to assume the role of social change.

B) The Wider Applicability of the Action Aid Experience

A review of AA's wider experiences reveals that many of the implementation constraints I found are prevalent elsewhere as well.

i) Relatively Successful Cases of AA's Promotion of SHD/PCD

With respect to AA's work in Uganda, it is true that AAU's newer DAs in *Bundibugyo* and *Apach* are smaller and less administration-heavy than the *Buwekula DA.* In *Bundibugyo*, furthermore, by building its interventions around women's literacy circles, AA made a conscious effort to focus on one of the poorest groups in Uganda--i.e., illiterate women--from the start of the programme. In Apach, AAU has moved into new territory by not only allowing community beneficiaries to elect their own Community Development Planning Forums (COMFACI), by making COMFACIs accountable to a Beneficiary Forum (BENIFORA) and allowing beneficiaries to select community facilitators and to help evaluate AA's work in the DA from the start. [11] And, in the *Kamuli* DA, AAU was willing to work on behalf of a multilateral organization and be part of the Ugandan government's PAPSCA initiative.

Evidence from other countries corroborates AA's claims that it has overcome many of the problems I found in Uganda. AA-India directly supports indigenous NGOs like SAMBHAV involved in political campaigns such as the human rights of bonded workers and has gone as far as to put SAMBHAV in charge of running a DA [12]. In Kenya, AA works actively with existing community structures. [13] And in Bhola, Bangladesh, AA has been praised for measuring the long-term socio-economic impact of its interventions through the *Survive, Avoid Malnutrition, Attend School and Read Index* (SAMISARI) which involves beneficiaries in the collection of data on survival, nutrition and literacy indicators in the communities, as well as for transcending traditional service delivery as early as the late 1980s. The latter was achieved by extending credit and accounting skills to the poor through small savings and credit groups of five people (*Shomitis*) which keep their own accounts, make their own financial decisions and rely on group pressure to ensure repayment of loans and rule compliance by the group. [14]

Clearly then, in other Ugandan DAs and CPs, AA has been more effective at targeting the poorest of the poor, being part of larger governmental poverty-eradication efforts, and has made strides in resolving problems such as poor long-term impact evaluation, lack of interventions in the economic/financial area, duplicating existing community structures, or failing to involve other partners or beneficiaries.

ii) Less Successful Examples of AA's Promotion of SHD/PCD

However, there is also ample evidence suggesting that the obstacles I identified still prevail in other AA DAs and CPs.

Within Uganda, senior AAU staff acknowledged that, when the COMFACI started discussing development priorities in the *Apach* DA, better-off community members managed to promote their own interests (usually infrastructural and large construction projects such as schools) at the expense of the development concerns of the poorest who preferred projects with direct individual economic benefits since they knew that even if schools were built they could not afford school fees. [15]

In the *Kamuli* DA, while a Mid-Term Evaluation praised the programme's rigorous record-keeping, accounting and computerized information gathering, the same report also noted that the preoccupation with rigorous monitoring and with meeting targets was also responsible for the heavy administrative burden felt by DA staff who complained that because they had to fill in forms for virtually everything they did, they in turn had no time to analyze the vast amounts of data gathered. The DA's top-down monitoring and management procedures were also found to have suppressed the sensitivity of staff towards community feedback. Rather than involving communities in decisions, members of the Kamuli evaluation mission observed that *the DA's* consultation meetings were sporadic, overly long, and assumed

the form of 'one-way monologues' by staff. Finally, although in *Kamuli* AA worked through the *District Development Committee*, because there was never a wide enough range of influential local actors (e.g., women, chiefs, RC/LC chairs) actively involved in all phases of the programme, the *DA's* chances long-term sustainability may still turn out to be quite limited. [16]

In the *Bundibugyo* DA, AAU has faced problems similar to the ones I found in ABP. According to a report by Daniel Ticehurst, because AAU had failed to implement Community-Based Monitoring Systems (CBMES) in *Bundibugyo* from the outset and because CBMES was being externally imposed upon the DA, it was very difficult to ensure that beneficiaries had ownership of the new system of evaluation and that, at a time of cut-backs, the DA had sufficient staff with the integrated planning and evaluation skills needed to absorb the CBMES training. Ticehurst warns AAU against assuming that identifying indicators with communities is the panacea to more serious problems like weak communication between RCs/LCs and AA's PDCs. [17]

Finally, an external evaluation of four of AAU's DAs (*Kamuli, Buwekula, Bundibugyo* and *Apach*) carried out by Williams and Davis confirmed that the interests of the poorest were not represented by AAU's PDCs and that, in addition to having been instigated by AA rather than communities, CBMES was placing strains on beneficiaries' already restricted time and resources. [18]

In Kenya, a 1996 review of three of AA-Kenya's oldest DAs (*Kibwezi, Kyuso* and *Ikanga*) reported that although PRA techniques were used to identify the poorest of the poor during the initiation of the AA-Kenya CP, in the end, the NGO spread its interventions across several sectoral groups rather than concentrating on the empowerment of the poverty-focussed groups it had identified in its PRA exercise. The same study further notes that, since

the beneficiaries in AA-Kenya's DAs were now dependent on AA; since institution-building in the DAs was still in its infancy; and since the DAs had not ensured that community leaders were trained in the management of the DA, AA-Kenya's DAs were not prepared for AA's upcoming phase out. [19]

In a review of the AA-Nepal CP carried out between 1995-1996 AA acknowledges that, despite its contribution to improvements in infrastructure, service-delivery, and group formation and training, because of moving goal posts and the absence of detailed intra-household information on beneficiaries changing living standards, AA-Nepal had no evidence indicating whether its interventions had improved the well-being of poor Nepalese. With respect to participatory evaluation, the study notes that, "despite the use of participatory methods and the involvement of various sections of the communities in the process, impact assessment study had been undeniably managed and was owned mostly by AA-Nepal." [20]

Finally, even in Bangladesh, one of AA's model CPs, an external assessment by Sarah White exposes a series of implementation constraints similar to my own. White claims that the *Shomitis* created by AA-Bangladesh in Bhola have proven incapable of incorporating the poorest members of the community since they are incapable of paying group loans in time. The study further argues that, the profit made through the IGAs supported by *Shomitis* was minimal since loan levels and time-lines which are unilaterally set and enforced by AA are insufficient. According to the study, this has created high turnover rates in *Shomitis* since members who need bigger loans must leave the group to seek high interest loans from local lenders. Finally, although *Shomitis* varied depending on the conservativeness of the area, White found little evidence of significant *Shomiti* involvement in tackling wider social issues (e.g., female *Shomiti* members continued giving profits to their husbands and sons, while exploitative lenders continued

operating since *Shomiti* loans were too small to stop group members from having to simultaneous take out high-interest loans elsewhere. [21]

The above examples demonstrate that although Uganda is a tough test for UNDP's and AA's implementation of SHD/PCD, the constraints which I identified in Uganda are not atypical and that my findings, therefore, have a wider applicability and relevance. However, these findings are based on limited evidence and more extensive cross-regional and multi-organizational studies are clearly required, given the seriousness of the problems found.

III. What is to be Done? Alternatives for Letting the People Lead

If we accept that the conceptual, institutional and organizational constraints to the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches exposed in my thesis are pervasive, we must then ask what is to be done?

i) Change at the Level of Theory

To start, my thesis shows that the difficulties of implementing SHD/PCD go beyond organizational or technical matters since much of the problem lies with the idealism and conceptual deficiencies of SHD/PCD ideas and the fact that there will always be a gap between theory and practice. Still, there are rules of thumb, or what Bardach calls 'bumper stickers', which can mitigate the worse effects of SHD/PCD's conceptual shortfalls.

The first such rule is to become aware of the conceptual deficiencies of those theories or models which one intends to put in practice. As Daniel Moynihan wisely points out, in order to surmount a theory's internal ambiguities and contradictions, these must first be perceived. Luckily, says Moynihan, there are normally warning signs (e.g., development actors' confusion over SHD/PCD's theoretical origins and ideological position).

The second rule is to avoid putting theories into practice on a large scale until they have been sufficiently tested and to avoid overselling such ideas or acting as though they are achievable in a short time span.

The third rule is to keep things simple. According to Bardach, this can be done by ensuring that experts do not design programmes which are overly complex or overly dependent on high levels of competence, coordination, or consensus building which are difficult to attain or at best unpredictable. To keep such programmes on track, programme designers and implementors may need to contemplate different scenarios and possible emerging constraints at each stage of the process as well as to develop indicators to constantly measure the programme's progress and impact.

The fourth rule is to bring theory and practice closer together by ensuring that theorists developing new ideas have access to newly emerging empirical evidence from the field and that practitioners (including front-line staff and beneficiaries) give feedback on the feasibility of newly emerging ideas and are given ample opportunity to influence such ideas.

Finally, both theorists and practitioners should avoid over-optimistic projects, expecting impossibly high levels of participatory decision-making with no expert guidance or monitoring. They should also avoid, at least initially, implementing their programmes in agencies where 'institutional gymnastics' will be required or in country settings where the cultural and institutional conditions make the implementation of such ideas especially difficult. In cases where extreme poverty means that there is no choice but to implement the ideas in such countries, it is imperative that theorists and practitioners do not romanticize the reality of the conditions in LDCs and that they be aware of the political problems of social action and the displacing effect of organizational interests. [22]

However, changing the behaviour theorists and practitioners is not enough. major changes are also requires in at least three other realms.

ii) Change Within Development Agencies and the Existing System of International Development Cooperation

First, within development organizations and the system of international development cooperation in which they operate. As DD proponents such as Robert Chambers point out, such organizational changes should involve more flexible, participatory, and bottom-up decision-making within development agencies as well as more collaborative partnerships with southern counterparts and within the wider system of international development cooperation. My findings show that when ideas are imposed in a top-down fashion, when development actors constantly engage in turf-protection, and when field staff and beneficiaries are treated in a paternalistic fashion, they are less likely to understand or feel ownership of development efforts and their dependence and tendency to view outsiders are sources of easy money is more likely to increase as a result.

On the other hand, as NIE advocates such as E.A. Brett rightly point out, promoting participation, diversity, and flexibility is an expensive process, it is not as easily achieved as DD thinkers assume, and even then, it is not a panacea. In addition to democratic and participatory reforms, development agencies require highly skilled and competent staff which can provide guidance and leadership, effective regulatory systems to control rent-seeking behaviour, and rigorous monitoring and evaluation to gauge the progress and impact of interventions and to advise beneficiaries. [23] The ideal then is to find a balance between some central control and local autonomy and to develop mechanisms of accountability between the two.

In short, the organizational prescriptions of DD and NIE proponents are complementary and should be carried out hand in hand. Michael Edwards has effectively combined proposals inspired by both NIE and DD thinkers by

advising the *British Overseas Aid Group* (BOAG) to not only become more democratic in its development work but by suggesting that it introduce regulatory measures to closely monitor the international development profession as well. Among Edwards' most promising DD-related recommendations are his suggestions that NGOs shift from upward accountability to multiple accountability by allowing southern partners to become Board members of northern NGOs and that international development agencies open themselves to 'reverse evaluation' by allowing themselves to be evaluated by southern counterparts. As part of his NIE-related reforms, Edwards recommends the certification of all NGO workers before they are allowed to work in the field, social audits and the publication of a 'Good Donor Guide' to encourage good practice in development agencies, the establishment of an Advertising Standards Authority to monitor misleading charity advertising, and an NGO Ombudsman to arbitrate disputes. [24]

The above recommendations are taken a step further by E.A. Brett who notes that, to ensure that development agencies serve the interests of the poor, programme beneficiaries must be put in a position where they can exert leverage on those assisting them. This implies creating accountability mechanisms which give beneficiaries access to full information about donor agency resources and expenditures. I also means giving beneficiaries genuine options for *voice* (e.g., creating mechanisms and fora where beneficiaries can openly question programme parameters and influence the choice of targets, schedules or personnel without fear of loosing agency support) and *exit* (e.g., allowing recipient governments and beneficiaries to choose between competing development agencies and alternative programmes without having to forego the assistance). [25]

Unfortunately, all of the above is easier said than done, especially when one considers that the assumptions of DD and NIE thinkers rarely exist in the poorest LDCs and that no development agency I know of has been

willing to give up their monopoly over development interventions, to open up agency files and accounts to outside scrutiny, or to be transparent about their development impact or cost-effectiveness. Nor for that matter, has the wider system of international development cooperation proven capable of introducing standards and incentives for greater accountability and collaboration in international development or of establishing mechanisms to monitor development agency performance and to guarantee civil society actors participation in international fora or development debates. At the same time, major strides have been made in the implementation of SHD/PCD and, if sufficiently pressured, international development agencies may carry out additional reforms, even if not in their immediate interest.

iii) Change At the National, Institutional and Policy Levels

However, one lesson which comes through strong and clear in my thesis it is that the international development community alone can not--and should not--single-handedly promote, let alone impose, SHD/PCD approaches. No amount of 'organizational tinkering' within development agencies or even within the wider system of international development cooperation can bring about the kinds of broader institutional and national policy reforms needed to create an enabling environment for the comprehensive implementation of SHD/PCD. This means that international development agencies need to look beyond their own backyards for solutions and be willing to take political risks in order to play a catalytic role in bringing about social transformation both globally and in LDCs. There is a growing consensus, even within inter-governmental financial organizations like the World Bank, that policy-level and broader institutional reforms are essential for bringing about development. Clear and enforceable rules of the game in institutional arrangements, open and competitive markets, democratic, tolerant and accountable government, and an inclusive and diverse civil society are all desirable elements of national and global institutions.

In Uganda, significant advances have been made in terms of national reconciliation, democratization, liberalization, decentralization, and civil service reform. There is no denying, furthermore, that Ugandan democratic processes and freedoms are much more advanced than elsewhere in Africa. Nevertheless, the institutional foundations necessary for SHD/PCD still have far to evolve. To this day, the majority of Ugandans live in poverty with no access to reliable health care or affordable education, state patronage and corruption continue to undermine Uganda's economy and the Museveni regime's evasion of competitive elections by all parties on equal terms and its slowness in designing a national poverty reduction strategy has dwarfed the evolution of a strong civil society capable of speaking out, mobilizing en masse, and holding Ugandan leaders to account. It is these policy and institutional shortcomings which need to be addressed in Uganda. Of course, the World Bank has pointed out, the future of Africa must be largely determined by Africans. [26] However, if the international community is serious about upholding the principles of *Human Development*, it is legitimate for it to also attempt to influence both developed and developing societies to move in that direction.

As an inter-governmental organization, the UN in particular has the legal basis and legitimacy for constructing a shared view of social justice in the world. As Chris Brown points out, "if diversity entails that states have the right to mistreat their populations, then it is difficult to see why such diversity is to be valued." [27] Socio-economic norms though can not be imposed by a few northern governments or development agencies. Instead, a genuine process of dialogue and negotiation must take place between North and South [28] and consensus built around what ideas like SHD/PCD mean and what they imply for the future of international development assistance and for 'Sound governance' at the national level.

At the global level, this may require the international development community to put in place an institutionalized mechanism for dialogue and coordination as well as incentives and sanctions which encourage the collective promotion of SHD/PCD rather than expansionist behaviour among donors or recipient government departments. This might be achieved, for example, by requiring all parts involved in international development cooperation to account to one global entity which is comprised of representatives from northern and southern governments and civil society and which, almost like the Court of International Justice, has the right to set development cooperation standards and monitor performance in areas such as North-South dialogue, coordination and conflict resolution. To have sanctioning power such an entity would have to have the right to penalize non-compliant actors and funds to reward good practice.

At the national level, the donor community may have to agree to be coordinated by one recipient government department using uniform foreign aid standards for all donors and with the right to make accountability demands from the donor community and to allow open bidding for or to reject particular development projects. Donors also need to be given incentives to create national fora or formal mechanisms which involve previously excluded southern politicians and civil society actors previously in SHD/PCD efforts early on in the process and to stretch the parameters of what are considered safe development interventions. The latter could be achieved by encouraging donors to constantly push traditional nation-states to embrace the more transformative elements of the SHD/PCD agenda and to push themselves as donors to move beyond apolitical and time and budget-restricted development interventions. For their part, recipient governments will themselves have to be encouraged to support the more ambitious aspects of the SHD/PCD paradigm and to diversify their links and accountability to civil society. Rather than achieving this through direct conditionality, the donor community might consider offering substantial

additional funds, not dissimilar to the Global Environmental Facility [GEF] to both donors, recipient governments, and civil society actors working with one another on innovative wider policies and institutional efforts.

iv) Counter-Hegemonic Resistance From Within Civil Society

And yet, he institutionalization of a liberal economy and competitive and accountable democracy are not sufficient conditions for creating an environment conducive to SHD/PCD either globally or in LDCs. As post-Marxist scholars have pointed out and as those of us living in pluralist democracies in the West well know, periodic elections, respect for the rule of law, and even the decentralization of power to local authorities do not necessarily address the inequitable and exploitative nature of existing economic and power structures in our societies or in the global system. This is partly because neo-Liberalism and its logic of unfettered competition is in tension with the democratizing goal of social equity [29], but also because, when neo-Liberalism and pluralist democracy are implanted in LDC societies plagued by extreme socio-economic differentiation, tribalism, and patronage, they perpetuate existing asymmetries. This occurs because, despite their political equality, neo-Liberalism and pluralist democracy are economically exclusive and leave the majority of the poor in LDC societies to rely on existing patron-client relationships to reduce their sense of alienation and gain access to benefits in the depersonalized and omitting world of modern global capitalist democracy. [30]

In short, the neo-Liberal economy and pluralist democracy do not address the structural causes of disparity and marginalization or the need for a socially responsible and collective stewardship--if not for a redistribution--of wealth and power in society. [31] My evidence confirms that neither the Ugandan state or international development organizations such as UNDP and AA have been particularly effective at challenging the

inequality and injustice of existing economic and power relations either in Uganda or in the global economy. This means that the impetus for social transformation must emanate from a third realm: that of civil society and especially social movements, networks and alliances of peoples's organizations which directly represent the poor.

A strong indigenous and global civil society has many potential benefits for the promotion of SHD/PCD approaches. First of all, as Laura Macdonald explains, personal empowerment of the type delivered by international development agency projects do not necessarily lead to participation in the wider political system or create the long-term conditions for a more participatory and egalitarian society. [32] Secondly, it is only once individual capacity-building is complemented with collective action involving cross-sectoral linkages and national-global alliances, that the poor can begin to build up their ability to express *voice* and to press for social change. Finally, development efforts spawned directly by people power are more likely to enjoy a local ownership and to be sustainable over the longer-term. In essence, social movements and peoples' organizations are key to keeping governments and international development agencies accountable and provide a much-needed counterweight to the politicking and organizational interests which have undermined SHD/PCD efforts thus far. It is important then, that international development agencies not only help the poor develop individual technical and organizational capacities, but directly help strengthen people-power.

It is for these reasons that post-Marxists like Ernesto Laclau and Chantale Mouffe argue that it is the 'new social movements' with their discourse on egalitarianism and citizenship rights (rather than the proletariat, as in days past) which will deepen the democratic revolution in the developing and developed world. [33] As Ronnie Lipschutz elaborates, civil society is increasingly drawing strength from its heterogeneity and

developing a power base in the various transnational political networks and global alliances it can tap into. [34] This means that, in addition to promoting 'Sound governance' and strengthening civil society in LDCs, international development agencies can contribute by promoting global democratization within the system of international development cooperation.

Promoting global democratization and strengthening peoples' movements though, need not imply denying the importance of state action. According to political thinkers like Roniger, Held and Touraine, an enlightened civil society does not necessitate the demolition of the state, but rather its legal constraint and subjection to public accountability. [35] Still there is no denying that a strong civil society may be destroyed by repressive governments since its goal is undeniably to change such regimes. As Robert Cox notes, forces in civil society have strong counter-hegemonic potential and aim to mobilize those people who seek an alternative. [36] To thinkers like Cox, although the struggle for change and resistance in the next Millennium will take place primarily in civil society, international development organizations have an important role to play. Hence, Cox calls on the Janus-faced UN to not only link up with the state-system but to fulfil its dual role by becoming an interlocutor between the two. Furthermore, since the poor can not build counter-hegemonic forces without external support, Cox calls on all donors to not only provide technical support to those left at the margins but to create mechanisms to let the people lead and to directly support counter-hegemonic forces representing the poor by helping to build their technical, organizational and policy influencing abilities until they secure a seat at the table.

The agenda for change presented above is an ambitious one involving a series of theoretical, organizational, institutional, policy and civil society reforms In an ideal world, changes would occur in each of these realms. Yet, even if progress is made in one of them, there could be

positive ripple effects on the others. My thesis has concentrated on the early years of SHD/PCD's implementation but the SHD/PCD paradigm is still young and running strong. There is ample time and opportunity for change. Whether changes occur in any of the realms described above will depend on the ability of international development organizations and recipient governments driven largely by the need for self-perpetuation, as well as poor of beneficiaries and other stakeholders to develop a longer-term vision of their interests. As shown throughout this thesis, this will not be easy nor is it these actors' natural inclination. However, there is no denying that much progress has already been made and with mounting pressure, the tide will be all that more difficult to roll back and change will become in the interest of the actors involved.

ENDNOTES:

1.Ben Okri, Songs of Enchantment. P. 294. London: Vintage Publishers, 1994.

2. Refer to Christopher Hood's and Michael Jackson's book, Administrative Argument. Chapter 2. Aldershot, Hants, UK: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1991.

3. Ms. Margrit Hauer, a PhD Candidate at the *Centre for Voluntary Organization* at the London School of Economics and Political Science is currently carrying out doctoral research on the role of a UN agency (UNHCR) and select NGOs in the area of humanitarian aid in Sri Lanka. As noted by Ms. Hauer at a presentation of my work on October 30, 1997, her preliminary research results coincide with mine in that the agencies she is studying are also having trouble influencing policy, collaborating, reaching the poorest of the poor.

4. Most relevant are: Martin Godfrey's consultancy on UNDP's poverty eradication work; the Centre for Development Research's overall assessment of UNDP's capacity to carry out SHD/PCD approaches; and John de Coninck's assessment of AA's *Buwekula* Programme.

5. For an account of UNDP's efforts to implement SHD/PCD in the Philippines, El Salvador, Bolivia and Malawi, refer to the Country Strategies for Social Development for the four countries published in the *UNDP Series on Sustainable Human Development*. New York: UNDP HQ, January 1995.

See also: *UNDP Through the Lens of Sustainable Human Development : A Brainstorming Workshop in Bolivia*. UNDP Headquarters. New York, New York, USA. October 1994. And, Terence Jones. *The Case of Malawi: Poverty to Equity in Politics and Economics*. Paper presented by Terence Jones, UNDP Resident Representative and UN Coordinator in Malawi at *Participation and Empowerment: Good Governance and the Development Process*, A Conference held at the London School of Economics and Political Science. London, UK, February 15-16, 1996.

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10. Montgomery, T.S. *The UN and Peace-Making in El Salvador*. North-South Issues. A North-South Centre Publication, University of Miami. Volume IV. No. 3, 1995.

11. Interview # 202.

12. Interview # 69.

13. Interview # 70.

14. Action Aid-Bangladesh. *Are We Reducing Poverty?* Monitoring and Evaluation Status Report for Trustees Up to June 1995. Dhaka: AA-Bangladesh, Sept. 1995.

15. To supersede this problem, AAU was hoping to find ways of convincing the poorest members of Apach's COMFACI to push forward their own needs in the next year of the programme. (Interview # 202).

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18. Williams, W. and Davis, R. *ODA/Action Aid Impact Assessment Study: The Uganda Case Study*. First Draft. London: ODA/AA-UK, April 1997.

19. Action Aid-*Kenya: DA Participatory Programme Review Part II*. IA Exchanges. Highlights from Action Aid's Impact Assessment and Programme Learning (IAPL) Department. London: AA HQ, Winter 1996.

20. Action Aid. *Impact Assessment--Action Aid-Nepal's Experience*. IA Exchanges. Highlights from AA's Impact Assessment and Programme Learning Dept. Op. Cit.

21. Sarah White. Pages 21-38. Op. Cit.

22. These rules of thumbs are inspired by the work of Moynihan, Pages 167-203. Op. Cit. and Bardach, Pages 268-283, Op. Cit.

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25. E.A. Brett. *Participation as Accountability in Development Administration.* Op. Cit.

26. Ishrat Husain. *The Evolving Role of the World Bank: The Challenge of Africa*. Page 30. Paper prepared by Ishrat Husain, Chief Economist, Africa Regional Office of the World Bank, for the 50th Anniversary of the World Bank. Washington DC: The World Bank, 1996.

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30. Luis Roniger. *The Comparative Study of Clientelism and the Changing Nature of Civil Society in the Contemporary World*. Pages 8-12. in Luis Roniger and Ayse Gunes-Ayata (Editors). Democracy, Clientelism, and Civil Society. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994.

31. In her analysis of *Human Development*, Diane Elson argues that if redistributing assets is not possible, then at least those who exercise property rights or economic power should be expected to meet certain social obligations to society. What society needs then are mechanisms of collective stewardship which make this possible. (Interview # 11a)

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34. Ronnie Lipschutz. *Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergency of Global Civil Society.* Millennium. Volume 21. Number 3. Page 389. 1992.

35. Luis Roniger. Page 7. Op. Cit.

36. Robert Cox. Page 107. Op. Cit.

Table 7.1: Manifestations of the Baroque Science Phenomenon (BSP) in UNDP & AA

Features of BSP in SHD/PCD	Manifestations of BSP at UNDP	Manifestations of BSP at AA
1.Abstracteness, vagueness in meaning of SHD/PCD	**Overall: *******	**Overall: ****
	HQ: **	HQ: *
	Field: ***	Field: *
	Both agencies have problems understanding SHD/PCD but UNDP is more pressured to do so, especially in the field	
2.Unknown links, weights & prorities between core components of SHD/PCD	**Overall: ****	**Overall: ****
	HQ: *	HQ: *
	Field: *	Field: *
	Both agencies are unsure about linkages/weights/priorities of SHD/PCD's components or how they relate to work in the HQ and the Field.	
3.Internal tensions & trade-offs between core components of SHD/PCD	**Overall: ******	**Overall: *******
	●Managerialism vs. flexible learning *	●Managerialism vs. flexible learning **
	●Policy advocacy vs. grassroots participation *	●Policy advocacy vs. grassroots participation **
	●Conditionality on governance issues vs. self-determination **	●Conditionality on governance issues vs. self-determination *
	HQ:**	HQ:**
	Field:**	Field:**
	Both agencies face tensions between core SHD/PCD components UNDP faces most tensions between conditionality on governance issues and self-determination, while AA faces its most serious tensions between policy advocacy and grassroots participation and betwen managerialism and flexible learning. The tensions manifested themeselves in HQ and the Field	
4.A gap between the theory of SHD/PCD and real constraints found in practice	**Overall: ***********	**Overall: ***********
	●Unequal N-S partnership; *	●Unequal N-S Partnership; *
	●Do it alone tendency *	●Do it alone tendency **
	●Donor Territoritality; **	●Donor Territoritality *
	Ltd.org. capacity; *	Ltd. org. capacity; *
	Ltd. org access/clout *	Ltd. org. access/clout **
	●Recipient/beneficiary ** rent-seeking behaviour	●Recipient govt/beneficiary * rent-seeking behaviour
	●Ltd. beneficiary skills * or free time	●Ltd. beneficiary skills * or free time
	HQ:*	HQ: *
	Field:********	Field: ********
	Gaps between theory & practice occur in both agencies, in HQ and the Field. However, while UNDP suffers from too much emphasis on theory, AA suffers from too much emphasis on practice. In both agencies, the Field carries the heavist burden of filling the gap and is affected most by Ugandan and beneficiary-level constraints	
NB: * = degree of importance of the factor in question		

Table 7.2: Manifestations of the River Pollution Phenomenon (RPP) Within UNDP & AA

Features of RPP	The RPP within UNDP	The RPP within AA
1.A Tendency to do what is easiest & most feasible	Overall: *** •Accessible/trainable benef. * •Narrow range of options * •Follow rules/targets *	Overall: **** •accessible/trainable benef. * •Narrow range of options * •Follow rules/targets **
	HQ: *	HQ: *
	Field: working with accessible/trainable beneficiaris and pre-defining options at CMP **	Field: esp. bypassing govt in order to make implemenation easier at ABP ***
	Both agencies do what is easiest. Rules & targets are pushed from HQ but are internalized and have the hardest effects in the Field. As an operational agency, AA is most concerned with meeting targets--a pressure evident in the aborted training process in ABP's PDCs.	
2.A tendency to increase the agency's mandate and power base for the sake of self-preservation	**Overall:** ** •Expand budget/keep$moving * •Add new functions *	**Overall:** ** •Expand budget/keep$moving * •Add new functions *
	HQ:esp. add new functions ***	HQ: esp. add new funtions ***
	Field: esp. expand budget: * e.g., expansionism of intermediary NGOs in the Africa 2000 Network/MPP	Field: esp. keep $ moving * e.g., AA's imposition of unrealistic deadlines upon PDCs or its quick replication of the generously World Bank-funded REFLECT Programme in order to keep the $ moving.
	Both agencies enlarge their mandate & power-base. Expansionism and pressures to expand budgets emanated largely from HQs but were also felt quite strongly in the Field which felt they had to spend the money quickly in order not to lose their budgets	
3.A tendency to listen to the most powerful stakeholders who can exert the harshest sanctions	**Overall:** *****	**Overall:** ***
	HQ: e.g., the influence of the G-77 on UNDP ***	HQ: e.g, the influence of ** to AA's Board of Trustees on AA HQ
	Field: **	Field: *
	In both agencies, listening to powerful stakeholders was stronger in HQ where their Boards are based. The tendency was also stronger at UNDP which accounts more directly to nation-states in the UN, fellow UN agencies, & recipient governments.	
4.A tendency to simplify development complexities	**Overall:** **** •Cóver up errors	**Overall:** *** •Cover up errors
	HQ: *	HQ: *
	Field: e.g., MPP's cover up of embezzlement in its IGAs ***	Field: **
	Both agencies idealized development. In both, the field was most active in concealing the difficulties of working with the poor as they dealt with them more directly. Because of its larger number of projects & lack of rigorous M&E, UNDP was more susceptible to error cover-ups.	

NB: * = degree of importance of the factor in question

Table 7.3:

Towards a Wiring Diagram of the Factors Hindering the Implementation of the SHD/PCD Paradigm in Uganda and Beyond



From Paradigm to Practice: The Politics and Implementation of Sustainable Human Development in Uganda

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Methodological Appendix:

I. Research Design and Data Collection Methods Utilized in the Thesis

A) Key Features of the Research Design Utilized in the Thesis

My doctoral thesis relies on a 'qualitative research' methodology. As consultants from *Social and Community Planning Research* (SCPR) point out, "qualitative research is an attempt to present the social world in terms of the concepts, behaviours, perceptions and accounts of the very people is it about." [1] As Bryman and Burgess explain in Analyzing Qualitative Data, qualitative research can not be reduced to particular techniques or stages. Instead, it is a dynamic process which links together problems, theories and methods; which often involves alternate interaction between conceptual and empirical work; and which sometimes incorporates both deduction and induction at the same time. [2] In addition, notions of validity, reliability, generalizability and representability which are so central to quantitative research and scientific laboratory experiments, cannot be established to the same degree in qualitative research since the latter is not numerically-based. In qualitative research, the emphasis is on in-depth investigation of issues and, as such, the researcher tends to focus more on human perceptions, insights and interpretations as opposed to statistical correlations or calculations of probabilities or direct causality. [3] This, however, should not be taken to mean that qualitative research has no structure or rigor. Quite the contrary. Because in qualitative research one is exploring deeply-held human convictions and perceptions which are difficult to get at, it is imperative that the researcher identify key guiding research principles and design a research framework which allows for the consistent collection of difficult to access data as well as for the constant meshing of empirical data collection and theoretical reflection which is so vital in qualitative research.

In my own doctoral work, I have opted for a 'grounded theory' approach to qualitative research based on the work of Glaser and Strauss. [4] As Bryman and Burgess explain, grounded theory is essentially "the discovery of theory from data collected on a particular issue." From data categories established over time, the researcher attempts to reflect on major insights and to draw out associations and trends emerging from the data until he/she eventually comes up with an emerging theory which is itself tested out in the field. In actuality, the grounded theory approach is a reiterative process in which the researcher travels back and forth between data and theory as he/she tries to ensure that the emerging theory fits the evidence found and that the evidence available is itself properly grounded in existing theory. [5] Although in grounded theory, much of the theoretical reflection occurs during or near the end of the data collection process, the researcher will usually have at least some theoretical insights about his/her subject matter before heading to the field. [6]

In my own doctoral research, I followed steps very similar to those utilized in grounded theory. First of all, following the advice of William Whyte, I did a considerable amount of conceptual reflection before starting my primary research. Hence, in 1994, even before conducting any interviews, I had read a considerable amount of the SHD/PCD, International Development Cooperation, Implementation Process, and Institutional literatures relevant to my research; had done a considerable amount of thinking about what the parameters and core research questions of my study would be; had selected which international development agencies I would be analyzing; and had generally identified the kinds of development issues and SHD/PCD variables which I was most interested in exploring. In similar vein, before commencing my fieldwork in Uganda in mid 1995, I already had developed a general idea of the schools of thought which were most relevant to my work and of the theoretical premises which would need to be tested once I was on the ground. For instance, even before departing for Uganda,

I knew that the claims of what I have in my thesis termed the *Democratic Development School* of thought and the *New Institutional Economics* would need to be further tested and empirically substantiated once in the field. Nevertheless, as stipulated by the grounded theory approach, it was only after I had collected my first data sets in the UK, New York, Washington and Uganda, that I began to flesh out the initial hypotheses which later became the my thesis's core argument. Furthermore, it was only after re-testing my initial hypotheses during a second set of field trips to New York and Uganda in late 1995 and early 1996 and receiving feedback on my initial ideas from my colleagues and supervisors that I was able to refine my initial theoretical insights. Clearly then, my doctoral research strategy borrows directly from grounded theory approach and has strong parallels with Bryman's and Burgess' framework approach' which was itself inspired by grounded theory. The specific steps I followed during my research process are described in detail in **Table A1**.

In addition to relying on qualitative research and a grounded theory framework, my research design has a number of other features worthy of mention. The features of my research design are summarized in **Table A2**.

To start, it is worth noting that the thesis utilizes a multiplicity of data collection and interpretation methods--i.e., what Bulmer and Warwick call 'methodological integration'. [7] Hence, while most of the data in the thesis is based on unstructured interviews, participant observation, focus group discussion and document analysis techniques commonly used in qualitative research, when appropriate, the thesis uses quantitative data such as official statistics on public expenditures and foreign aid flows, development indicators and data on development agency budgets, to get the point across. The multiple data collection methods used in the various research phases are discussed in the next section and summarized in **Table A3**.

Other integral features of my doctoral research include reliance on 'fieldwork', a strong 'action research' component and, a considerable amount of 'case study research' involving 'multi-site studies'.

When I speak of 'field work', I am referring to the process of engaging in primary and hands-on research at the site of my area of interest. In Anthropology and much of Development Studies, field work traditionally involves scholars based in the West investigating less developed societies unfamiliar to them. [8] On the one hand, my fieldwork in Uganda, where I spent a total of five months (from April-July 1995 and later from November-December 1995) fits this conventional style of development research since, throughout this time, I was an outsider living among people from another culture in an effort to understand a society different from my own. On the other hand though, my doctoral fieldwork is atypical of much of that undertaken in Development Studies or Anthropology in that, on top of visits to Africa, my field work involved spending the summer of 1994 working within UNDP's *Human Development Report Office* (HDRO) in New York in order to learn about the agency's organizational culture and to identify key players in the promotion of SHD/PCD, as well as additional field work in the UK, Washington DC. and New York, where I spent considerable time interviewing key respondents in academia, NGOs, the World Bank and the UN between 1995-1997. This combination of fieldwork at the global as well as at the national and local levels is what allowed me to fully trace the operationalization of SHD/PCD from its initial conceptualization in the headquarters of international development agencies down to its implementation in LDCs.

It is also important to explain that, even while doing conventional fieldwork in Uganda, my role differed from the sometimes extractive research role played by 'safari scholars' in LDCs since my fieldwork in Uganda had a strong 'action research' component. Alan Bryman defines

'action research' as research in which the investigator and the client (i.e., the host organization) collaborate in the diagnosis of a problem and in which the research undertaken can then be put to use by the host organization. [9] Admittedly, in the case of my own research, I maintained the upper hand in the preparation of the research design as well as in the interpretation of the data collected both at the global level and on the ground in Uganda. Nevertheless, throughout the research process, I made a conscious effort to incorporate a strong 'problem-solving' component into my work in order to ensure that the research findings proved directly relevant and useful to UNDP and AA. Furthermore, while on the ground in Uganda, I held various working meetings with UNDP and AA staff to ensure that their research interests were reflected in my own research design, to keep them informed about my research progress, and to obtain their feedback and suggestions on projects or persons to visit during the research. Perhaps even more importantly, both UNDP and AA were given detailed end-of-research reports which either contained concrete recommendations' or identified general areas in need of improvement in each agency. Despite this collaboration though, both UNDP and AA granted me considerable autonomy and at no point ever subjected my research to the approval (or censorship) of the agencies.

Another feature of doctoral research was that it was organized around 'case studies'. Case study research normally entails the investigation of a small number of cases. In my own research, my case studies consisted of two different types of development organizations: a multilateral development agency--UNDP and an international Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)--Action Aid. The logic behind using two organizational case studies was to test whether a smaller and more autonomous non-governmental development agency (i.e., AA) was better equipped to carry out SHD/PCD approaches than a much larger, more hierarchical and politically-dependent inter-governmental development organization (i.e., UNDP). The reasons why

UNDP and AA were chosen as case studies is explained in Chapter 1. In addition to studying two separate development organizations, my case study research in Uganda also involved 'multi-site studies' of development projects carried out by UNDP and AA in Uganda. Within UNDP, I carried out 20 visits to project sites, beneficiary groups and individuals within three major development programmes: The *Africa 2000 Network*, the *Micro Projects Programme to Combat Aids* (MPP), and the *Community Management Programme* (CMP). In the case of AA, I paid visits to both the *Kamuli* and the *Buwekula* Development Areas (DAs) but concentrated my multi-site studies on the *Buwekula* DA, where I visited 20 projects sites beneficiary groups and individuals.

A final feature of my research design is that it relies on what the literature calls 'non-probability sampling techniques'. Unlike 'probability sampling' where one calculates the exact chances of a person being selected to be part of a sample, in non-probability sampling, the researcher uses his/her own judgement and research interests to select of his/her chosen sample. This means that the researcher can neither guarantee randomness in the selection process or specify the chances of a particular person being chosen to form part of that same sample.

In my own research, I utilize two types of non-probability sampling. In the first technique: i.e., 'purposive sampling', the researcher selects those persons who will be studied or interviewed in the research on the basis of the chosen parameters or conceptual requirements of his/her study. For example, in my own research, I intentionally interviewed international development scholars and experts closely associated with UNDP's HDRO since I knew such persons were most likely to be familiar and to provide useful insights about SHD/PCD approaches. And, while in Uganda, I specifically selected nationally-based development scholars and experts respected for their in-depth knowledge of Ugandan development issues; donors known for

either their clout or their commitment to SHD/PCD-type principles; government officials familiar with development efforts and the development agencies I was studying; and, beneficiaries known to have been participated in UNDP and AA SHD/PCD projects. Each of the above is an example of purposive sampling in that my choice of informants was determined by my chosen research focus and interests rather than on the basis of calculated probability as is more commonly the case in quantitative research. In the case of the second sampling technique: i.e., 'snowball sampling', the researcher relies on one individual informant to lead to another. This sampling technique was essential in my interviews with elite respondents such as top-level UN functionaries and government officials to whom access would have been unlikely without personal contacts or recommendations. [10]

The key features of my research design are summarized in **Table A2**, at the end of this methodological appendix.

B) Data Collection Methods Utilized in the Four Phases of Research:

My doctoral research was carried out over four different phases and consisted of mainly four types of data collection methods commonly used in qualitative research. The data collection methods used during the four research phases are described below and summarized in **Table A3.**

i) Literature Review and Document Analysis

The first phase (October 1993-1994) of my doctoral research consisted mainly of a comprehensive literature review and of document analysis. While my literature review and document analysis took place mostly during the first year of my research, I have reviewed old material and read new books and studies throughout the research.

The purpose of my initial literature review was threefold: Firstly, to familiarize myself with the various social science literatures which might offer theoretical insights for my own research (i.e., especially but not exclusively, the SHD/PCD, International Development Cooperation, Implementation Processes, and Institutional literatures); secondly, to gain a deeper understanding of the conceptual logic, theoretical underpinnings and ideological tenets of the SHD/PCD paradigm; and, thirdly, to obtain historic and empirical information on development trend and the impact of foreign aid and different development policies and interventions in LDCs.

In addition to studying various theoretical literatures and scholarly works, the first phase of my research also involved document analysis of more conjunctural and policy-related information, including analyses of international declarations such as the *Declaration of the Copenhagen Social Development Summit;* of strategic reports such as the UN Secretary-General's *Agenda for Development;* and of major policy statements by international actors such as the G-77. I have also made a conscious effort to access internal agency documents (e.g., James Gustave Speth's *Initiatives For Change*, UNDP's main mission statement for the nineties); internal consultancy reports and assessments (e.g.,the Centre for Development Research's evaluation of UNDP entitled: *Assessment of UNDP: Development Capacity for Sustainable Human Development*); and more general studies of development cooperation conducted by major donors (e.g., the European Centre for Development Policy and Management's and the Overseas Development Institute's study of international development cooperation entitled, *European Union Aid Agencies: Comparative Management and Effectiveness*). The analysis of the above documents has been instrumental in helping me gage the extent to which SHD/PCD ideas have penetrated development policy and practice.

ii) Unstructured Interviewing:

'Unstructured interviews' were undoubtedly the cornerstone of my data collection methodology. While in a structured interview, the researcher asks mostly pre-set and close-ended questions, and while in a semi-structured interview, the researcher may mix pre-set close-ended questions with pre-set open-ended questions [11], the interviews I conducted during my own research were 'unstructured' in that they were based on a set of general themes and topics from which more specific questions would emerge in the course of the interview itself. The purpose of this interview style is to develop a rapport and to establish a situation of trust with the informant early on in the interview so that the researcher is able to delve into more sensitive issues relating to the respondent's' motives, perceptions and concerns further along the interview. It is for this reason, notes Robert Burgess, that some investigators regard unstructured interviews as "conversation with a purpose." [12]

In my own research, I carried out 211 unstructured interviews, most of them during the second (interviews with international-level informants from November 1994-January 1996) and third (Fieldwork in Uganda during May-July 1995 and November-December 1995) phases of my doctoral research, although select interview were also during the fourth phase of the research (Write Up and Last Follow-up work from 1996-1997).

During my unstructured interviews, I would walk into the interview with what has been referred to in the literature as an 'agenda of topics' or a 'topic guide' [13], outlining the general set of topics/issues which I hoped to address during that particular interview. To facilitate matters, in my own case, I developed a generic topic guide for each of the general cluster of informants I intended to interview. [14] These topic guides were generally quite comprehensive and covered from 8-12 topics of interest.

Just before each interview and depending on the respondent's known area of expertise and those issues for which I felt I still needed additional evidence, from the larger set of themes/topics, I would select a small sub-set of possible themes/topics to cover with the particular informant I was preparing to interview. Then, during the interview process itself, I would focus on even a smaller set of questions with each particular informant. On this point, it is important to note that while I did pre-select possible sub-set of topics for discussion before going into an interview, the actual interview was always left sufficiently open and flexible to give the respondent leeway in taking the conversation in directions which he/she deemed important. Lastly, although my topic guides were sometimes quite detailed and did often contain sample questions in them, for the sake of spontaneity, I would rarely use the questions as they were written in the topic guides during my interviews. Instead, the questions I had written in my topic guides mostly functioned as prompts or as a back-up should I draw a blank during the interview. For these reasons, each of my unstructured interviews has its own momentum and focus.

In terms of probing techniques, I followed one of two patterns: the 'investigative probe' or the 'in-depth probe'. In the investigative probe, the interviewer starts with a very general topic and from there branches out into various smaller but related topics. The pattern is very similar to that of moving from the tree trunk towards the branches of a tree. In the in-depth probe, the interviewer once again starts with a very general topic but rather than moving laterally into various other topics, he/she delves as deeply as possible into one particular issue. The latter process is akin to that of slowly peeling an onion until one gets closer and closer to its core. Both investigative and in-depth interviewing are based on unstructured interviewing techniques, it is only the type of probing and the focus of the topic being followed up which differs. [15] In my own interviews, the type of probing which I would pursue would depend largely

on the kind of respondent I was dealing with. For instance, in cases where the respondent had been sought for his/her breadth of knowledge about the topic at hand (e.g., this was often the case in interviews with well-known international development scholars or experts), I would follow an investigative style of probing in which I moved laterally from topic to topic in an effort to tap into the broad range of interests and expansive knowledge of the informant. On the other hand, in those cases where I was interviewing someone mostly due to their familiarity with a very particular set of issues or group of actors (e.g., a development agency programme officer overseeing a specific project), it was not unusual for me to cover a restricted set of topics and to explore a specific issue more deeply.

Finally, on the subject of security and academic discretion, it is worth noting that because unstructured interviewing involves exposing personal views and perspectives, the kind of data collected can be very sensitive. For example, during my own research, many UNDP and Action Aid staff revealed attitudes or behaviours (such as an aversion to honest and rigorous evaluation) within their organizations which are incriminating, while Ugandan government officials pointed to issues (such as runaway military spending) and tendencies (such as that towards corruption) which are extremely controversial. In both cases, the information revealed by the informants was critical to my research findings yet, had the information been directly attributed to the respondents, it may have put their jobs and, in some cases their safety, in jeopardy. It is for this reason that while most respondents were interviewed 'on the record' [16], some were given the option of having their responses quoted without direct attribution. Because of the sensitive nature of the information exchanged during some of the interviews, I opted not to tape record my interviews. Furthermore, given the rugged nature of my Uganda fieldwork, taping interviews in remote rural villages would have been logistically difficult and awkward for local villagers. To compensate for the lack of tape-

recorded information, I have taken fairly detailed notes during interviews and kept such notes in personal interview books; in those cases where respondents have turned out to be key informants, I transcribed my interviews into orderly and computerized transcripts; and in those cases in which particular respondents have requested a written record of our interview, I have mailed them a summary transcripts of the interview so that they could carefully check for accuracy and provide modifications. In all, about half of my respondents received copies of summary interview transcripts and about a fourth of them returned them with detailed feedback and suggested modifications.

The situation was rather different in the case of my Uganda-based interviews, where Ugandan respondents themselves cautioned me against transcribing interviews into computerized form and mailing back such sensitive material to a country where mail still arrives to general Post Office Boxes and therefore there are few guarantees that the package would land in the appropriate hands. With respect to project beneficiaries, it made little sense to send interview transcripts to community members with no formal mailing addresses at all, especially since many of them had difficulties reading English. However, I have kept detailed hand-written accounts of all my Uganda-based interviews in special fieldwork books. And, as mentioned above, both UNDP's and AA's offices in Kampala and all the programme coordinators who gave me access to their projects were sent copies of my end-of-trip evaluation reports to their agencies. Moreover, UNDP, AA, and key respondents were sent my first working paper based on my research and published by LSE's *Centre for the Study of Global Governance*. [17]

iii) Focus Group Discussions:

Most of the interviews I carried out during my doctoral research involved individuals. However, during the third phase of my research

(i.e., my fieldwork in Uganda), about half of my meetings with project beneficiaries took the form of 'focus group discussions'. In some instances, these focus group discussions took place in the presence of an AA or UNDP staff persons while, in others, the discussions were led by myself, assisted by my research assistant. The main advantage of focus group discussions is that they allow the researcher to meet a much larger number of project beneficiaries and to witness community members interacting and engaging in discussion with one another and UNDP and AA staff. The caveat is that the researcher can not follow-up on the views of particular individuals during the sessions; that the views of the weaker members of the group may be muffled by more domineering group members; or that, in some cases, government and development agency staff themselves take over the discussion. [18] Interestingly though, getting a glimpse of these kinds of interaction problems was itself very useful for my research as it enabled me to observe first-hand the kinds of power relations and tensions which existed within beneficiary groups. Still, it is worth noting that focus group discussions are not completely natural or spontaneous situations, but rather events orchestrated especially for the benefit of donors or visiting researchers, as was the case during my visits. In fact, one of the most difficult things during my Uganda fieldwork was observing beneficiaries in their own natural setting. (This problem is addressed in section III, A, iv of the methodological appendix).

iv) Participation Observation:

The last data collection method utilized in my doctoral research was 'participant observation'. I relied on participant observation to gather data during all three phases of my research. Generally speaking, I engaged in two different forms of participant observation: 'full participant observation' and 'semi-participant observation'. In both cases, my role as participant observer was open rather than covert.

My role as a full participant observer took place during the my first phase of research, when I spent two months as a consultant in UNDP's HDRO in New York in the summer of 1994. During this period, although everyone in UNDP's HDRO knew that I was a doctoral student doing research on the topic of SHD/PCD, I played the role of full participant observer since as a full-time and UNDP-paid consultant, UNDP assigned me to research pre-determined topics and to establish contact with specific UN and UNDP Offices in preparation for the publication of the HDRO's *1995 HDR* on gender and development and expected me to partake in all of the daily activities of UNDP's HDRO. Yet, because much of the behaviour I was observing during this consultancy was directly relevant to my own doctoral research on SHD/PCD approaches, my greatest challenge during this period was to ensure that I wore my 'HDRO consultant hat' as opposed to my 'autonomous researcher hat' during work meetings. Juggling the two roles (a public one as a consultant and a private one as a doctoral researcher engaged in full participant observation) proved very taxing at times, as I was frequently meeting key players in the promotion of SHD/PCD approaches, but had to restrain myself from interviewing these players for the time being. On the other hand, the advantage of my full participant observer position was that it allowed me to gather many documents relevant to my research; to directly observe how persons within the HDRO interacted with one another, with other development experts and UN officials, and with the field; and to gage how the HDRO was regarded by others within UNDP and the UN at large. In the process, I learned about the tensions and concerns plaguing UNDP and the HDRO and the constraints both faced in their efforts to push forward the SHD/PCD agenda. Lastly, working within the UNDP office in New York enabled me to make a number of strategic contacts in UN headquarters. I subsequently managed to interview many of these well-placed contacts and several became key informants.

In contrast to the 'insider role' I played from within UNDP's HDRO in the summer of 1994, my role I played during my fieldwork in Uganda in the third phase of my research (May-July 1995 and November-December 1995) was much closer to that of a semi-participant observer. During my assessment of UNDP's and AA's development efforts in Uganda, I was given considerable access to the work of the two agencies and enough flexibility to chat with agency staff freely, to eat lunch among them, and to walk in and out of both agencies' Kampala offices on a regular basis. Furthermore, during my field visits to remote rural projects, because I usually travelled to the countryside with UNDP and AA staff and shared with them the rigours of road travel and the proximity which comes from travelling together all day in remote areas, I was able to forge a personal rapport and to closely observe staff behaviour over time. This kind of access clearly enabled me to observe first hand the actors' behaviour, attitudes and the way in which they communicated with local community leaders and beneficiaries.

Nevertheless, unlike my consultancy work in the HDRO in New York, while I was in Uganda, I was clearly not considered part of the regular staff and both UNDP and AA employees were well-aware that my chief role in the field was to conduct my own research as opposed to having to do the same work which was expected of them--hence my description of my role during this phase as that of a semi-participant observer. As can be expected, because I was not entirely 'one of the gang', some UNDP and AA staff in Uganda viewed me suspiciously and, consequently, either held back information or tried to put the best foot of the agency forward during our conversations. However, as my field research progressed, I discovered that an equal number of staff persons saw me as a possible conduit for voicing staff concerns and, as a result, were willing pass a considerable amount of confidential information my way. In other words, being viewed as an 'outside researcher' by staff may have opened some doors as well as closed others.

In the final analysis, the simultaneous inclination of some staff to 'hide things' and that of others to 'reveal things' probably cancelled each other out and, in the end, allowed me to gather both positive and negative information and views about UNDP's and AA's work in Uganda. The main shortfall of the 'outside researcher' role I played in Uganda was that while, on the one hand, I had considerable access to UNDP's and AA's work and was able to observe the behaviour of both agencies' staff fairly closely, on the other hand, I was not able to spend extended periods of time observing particular Ugandan communities or beneficiary groups. My status as an outsider and the transient nature of both UNDP's and AA's work with beneficiary groups meant that I rarely stayed in remote communities for an extended period of time or saw such communities when they were not making special preparations to receive 'outside guests'. Of course, the elaborately orchestrated receptions UNDP and AA staff and myself received upon our arrival in beneficiary communities were themselves very instructive and revealed the cultural gulf and power discrepancies which existed between development agency staff and project beneficiaries as well as the artificial forms which these agencies' development interventions sometimes took. It is because I am well aware of the restricted interaction I had with beneficiary communities during my Uganda fieldwork that, throughout my Uganda research, I made a conscious effort to seek out the views of local Ugandans officials and residents. I have also made it clear that my study of the implementation of SHD/PCD approaches in Uganda is primarily intended as a study of the effectiveness of foreign assistance in that country as opposed to a study of Uganda at large.

Table A3 at the end of this methodological appendix summarizes the various data collection methods utilized during the four phases of my doctoral research.

II. Organization, Interpretation and Abstraction Methods Used in the Thesis

As previously mentioned, one of the key features of my doctoral research design is that it is based on qualitative research techniques. As can be expected then, the techniques I used to organize, interpret and to abstract from my data are techniques commonly applied to qualitative data. The qualitative research techniques used to analyze my data included:

- Ordering, clustering and grouping data to detect general issues.
- Patterning and categorizing data to detect specific trends.
- Factoring: i.e., dividing data on the basis of certain factors.
- Synthesizing: i.e., grouping information in order to make key patterns stand out and to find sub-patterns within major patterns.
- Tracing Networks through charting: i.e., making flow charts to figure out how information and decision-making systems operate within certain organizations.
- Mapping: i.e., drawing maps of agencies' areas of operation and projects.
- Association: i.e., searching for associations between certain variables in order to detect similarities and differences between case studies.
- Conceptualization: i. e., thinking about new phenomena made evident by the data.
- Hypothesizing: i.e., coming up with novel explanations for new phenomena found.
- Abstracting: i.e., reflecting about how the research findings relate to existing theoretical frameworks. [19]

One or several of the above qualitative techniques for organizing, interpreting and abstracting from data were used at one point or another in my doctoral research. All of the techniques are part of the 'grounded theory' approach discussed earlier and are described further in **Table A1.**

III. The Reach, Strengths and Weaknesses of the Research Methodology:

A) The Strengths of the Research Methodology:

i) Analyzing SHD/PCD Approaches from an International, National and Local Perspective:

One of the greatest strengths of my doctoral research methodology is that it traces the translation of SHD/PCD from paradigm into practice at the global, national and local levels. My doctoral thesis attempts to

achieve this by conducting research and interviewing international community actors in power centres like London, New York, and Washington DC., while at the same time carrying out national and local-level fieldwork in Uganda where, I not only interviewed Kampala-based development experts, donors, government officials, and UNDP and AA staff, but also assessed selected development programmes in the Ugandan countryside and spoke to those local residents and beneficiaries directly affected by UNDP's and AA's development efforts in remote rural areas. A multi-level analysis has allowed me to trace the evolution of SHD/PCD ideas from their inception as a new paradigm in the North, to its operationalization into Ugandan government policies, and its eventual implementation into specific development programmes and projects in local Ugandan communities. By carefully following this trajectory, I have been able to identify the various constituents and opponents of SHD/PCD approaches, crucial North-South frictions regarding the desirability of SHD/PCD approaches, and the key implementational obstacles hindering the promotion and implementation of SHD/PCD approaches at the global, national and local levels. The obvious drawback of such a multi-level approach is that the time spent interviewing elite informants in Western Universities, UN embassies and development agency headquarters, is essentially time not spent doing field work in poor Ugandan communities and vice-versa. In other words, in a multi-level analysis, the researcher makes significant gains in terms of widening his/her scope but must in return sacrifice some of the detail and time spent doing intensive community-level fieldwork. In my work, I have tried to balance these two elements by spending as much time doing national and local-level fieldwork as I have conducting global-level research.

ii) Methodological Integration Through the Use of Multiple Data Collection Methods:

As already noted above, another advantage of my research design lay in its use of an integrated approach to data collection. The first

advantage of using multiple forms of data collection was that it allowed me to continually cross-check the reliability and objectivity of the information I was being given by key informants. In some cases, I did this by putting the same question to informants from different sectors or agencies (e.g., when a former AA manager in Kampala told me that AA tended to make major decisions on behalf of beneficiaries in a top-down matter, I raised the issue with an independent consultant who had carried out an assessment of AA's projects in Uganda but had no reason to have a personal grievance against AA the way the first informant had given his unpleasant departure from AA). In other cases, I simply cross-checked informants' views by relying on another data collection technique altogether (e.g., while attending an AA training session for a *Parish Development Committee* (PDC) in the *Buwekula* DA in Mubende District, through participant observation, I was able to directly witness AA workers dominating decision-making meetings with project beneficiaries). In each of the examples above, the use of multiple data collection methodologies gave me a way of cross-checking the reliability of my informants' information. The second advantage of methodological diversity in data collection is that it allows the researcher to fill information gaps which one type of data alone can not fill. (e.g., during my research, many respondents pointed out to that despite its cuts in administration and personnel, AA-Uganda's overhead costs remained very high. Although I suspected that this information might be accurate given the large fleet of cars, computer equipment and administrative staff which I had observed on he ground, it was only once an AA manager in Kampala unexpectedly gave me access to internal agency budgets and accounts that I was able to fill this information gap.

iii) Going Beyond the 'Project Bias':

Another positive aspect of my research design is that, in order to avoid what Robert Chambers has termed the 'project bias' [20]--i.e., the

tendency to interview only project staff or beneficiaries during field work--I have made a conscious effort to talk to a wide range of actors not directly benefiting from UNDP or AA projects. I achieved this in two ways.

The first was by interviewing a range of development scholars and experts, donors, and both national and local government officials, an community residents often overlooked by project evaluators--as evident by UNDP's and AA's surprise at my spending much of my research time speaking to persons not directly associated with their projects. Talking to a range of actors not directly working for either UNDP or AA, gave me valuable insights into the way outsiders viewed the effectiveness of UNDP and AA, while putting senior staff in both agencies a position in which they had to recommend non-project persons to speak to, taught me a considerable amount about the restricted interactions which these agencies sometimes have with Ugandan civil society at large. It was my own responsibility, of course, to ensure that I confirmed any critiques of the agencies given to me by outsiders UNDP and AA staff. Despite UNDP's and AA's initial uneasiness about my speaking to outsiders, in the end, both agencies were grateful to learn about the way their agencies were viewed by other development actors.

The second way in which I went beyond the project bias was by informally soliciting the views of local residents in those Ugandan communities in which I visited UNDP and AA projects. Sometimes, these encounters involved impromptu conversations with store owners and local business women. But, in other instances, I would consciously seek out and formally interview local priests, school masters, or persons from neighbouring development projects about their views of UNDP and AA's contributions. Once again, local residents were initially surprised that I would be interested in their opinions but, once approached, would relax and offer useful insights into UNDP's and AA's relations with local dwellers who were not necessarily part of these agencies' beneficiary community.

iv) Taking Advantage of Being Foreign, Young and Female:

The last advantage of my research was an aspect which was not pre-planned: i.e., my status as a young foreign female. The main benefit of being relatively young and female was that UNDP and AA managers and programme coordinators felt less threatened by my presence. This was further helped by my insistence that, far from considering myself a development expert, I was there to learn from Ugandans themselves. This attitude put to rest project managers' original fears that I was there to 'correct their work', while being female made it easier to be less of an imposing figure as well as to bond with female Programme Coordinators and field staff, many of whom had been graduate students in England and appreciated company while on the road. Finally, being a woman may have made it easier to interact with and arouse the curiosity of project beneficiaries, many of whom posed questions about why 'my husband was not with me' and 'why I did not yet have children'. Answering lifestyle questions such as these not only served to break the ice and develop to develop a rapport with beneficiaries intimidated by the presence of an outsider, but it also ensured that the interview process was not too unidirectional. Interestingly, through community members' personal questions, I also managed to learn more about the concerns in the minds of poor Ugandans. Lastly, I found that being white and a foreigner (known in Uganda as a *Muzungo*) was overall beneficial to my research. As mentioned above, being a *Muzungo* did mean that I could not visit communities without disturbing every day routines or sit in local RC meetings without going unnoticed. Still, being a *Muzungo* also made it was easier not to become embroiled in sensitive (and sometimes violent) community disputes at the local level and being a foreigner associated with a well-known British University proved to be an advantage in gaining access to senior government officials and well-known scholars in Kampala. [21]

B) The Weaknesses of the Research Methodology:

i) The Language Barrier:

In the case of my Ugandan fieldwork, although most urban and middle-class Ugandans have a good command of English, I did need to rely on a translator when interviewing poor respondents in remote rural villages. [22] As Martin Bulmer rightly points out, when a researcher has to have questions translated into another language, the scope for error inevitably increases [23]. I compensated for this language barrier in two ways. One was to learn some basic Lugandan (the language of the Baganda people and the most common dialect used in the region around Kampala). Although my knowledge of Lugandan remained basic, greeting community members and asking them basic things in their own language helped put respondents at ease. The second manner in which I dealt with the language barrier was to work with Ugandan research assistants with work experience in remote rural areas. In the case of my AA research, my research assistant was himself a former AA field worker familiar with the region I was visiting, while in the case of UNDP, my research assistant had considerable experience doing community-level research in remote Ugandan villages. In both cases, using research assistants turned out to be helpful. For one, while my researchers translated my interview questions to community members, I had more time to think, to observe peoples' behaviour, and to write down my responses. Secondly, my research assistants furnished me with valuable cultural information about the communities we visited and provided useful feedback on my initial impressions and hypotheses.

ii) Time and Money Constraints:

One of the most constraining aspects of my research design was no doubt the limited amount of time an money available to conduct fieldwork

either in New York/Washington DC.. or in Uganda. In New York and Washington DC., the high costs of living in hotels in such expensive cities meant that my research trips had to be restricted to 2-3 weeks each and that I had to be very selective in my interviews and to concentrate on respondents who were quite knowledgeable about SHD/PCD ideas and their promotion. In Uganda, although accommodation was cheaper, transportation costs, the payment of a research permit from the Ugandan government, and the salary and maintenance fees for research assistants meant that interviews had to be conducted even during weekends and that the research focus had to be on the effectiveness of international development agencies rather than on the history and evolution of Ugandan society at large.

iii) Staff and Beneficiary Confusion About my Dual Role as Consultant and Researcher:

Another disadvantage which I faced during my fieldwork in Uganda, was that very few of the rank and file in UNDP and AA were properly informed about the exact nature of my mission. As such, although top-level managers in both agencies' offices in Kampala gave me considerable access to agency information and allowed me to carry out my research in a fairly independent manner, specific programme coordinators and field-level staff remained suspicious of my presence and fearful that I had been sent by agency headquarters to 'keep an eye on the field'. Ironically, the aloofness of the rank and file at UNDP and AA turned out to be partly beneficial for my research as it gave me the freedom to explore issues and to talk to people to whom field staff members would have been unlikely to point me to had I been relying more heavily on their guidance. On the other hand though, had UNDP and AA informed field staff and beneficiaries better about my research and encouraged them to become more involved, the research findings which I submitted to both agencies at the end of my work may have been more widely disseminated and discussed among field staff. [24] Unfortunately, as an independent PhD student, I had no say over the way in which UNDP and AA

incorporated field staff in my research and had to be careful not to influence too much the natural behaviour of the subjects I was studying.

iv) The Risk of Affecting Results: Beneficiaries' Funding and Leadership Expectations:

Another problem outside researchers face when studying poor communities is that project beneficiaries may expect them to provide the community with much-needed expertise and funding. During my visits to remote Ugandan villages, community members would blatantly ask for advice on complex technical matters. Under such circumstances, it was very difficult not to fall into the trap of playing the role of 'omniscient development expert' and, in the process, influencing the community's development process rather than merely observing it. When truly pressured, I would try to give as neutral a piece of advice possible; usually something to the effect that it was important to 'collaborate with one another'. [25] Even more problematic, when visiting poor communities, some group members would expect me buy their goods (baskets, clothing, artifacts, etc.) or assumed that I was coming to the community to distribute new project funds and prepared long written wish lists of the kinds of assistance and items the community needed. My main concern with being expected to either provide funding or advise communities during my field visits to local projects was that, simply by coming to the community, I was changing peoples' expectations and thus increasing the potential for bias in their responses. After all, if beneficiaries thought I had funds to give out, they might exaggerate their problems in order to increase their chances of obtaining additional funds. I dealt with this problem by explaining to respondents early on in our meetings that I was a student and therefore had no funding to provide. I did, however, emphasize to communities that I would be presenting an evaluation report to the development agency I was studying and that, by voicing some the community's opinion and concerns, that evaluation report might in influence agency

policies and practices. Judging from the balance of both positive and negative comments given by respondents during our field visits, it would seem that my efforts to neutralize the worse biases of Ugandan beneficiaries were relatively successful.

v) Possible Observational Biases and Absorption of Respondents' Impressions:

One of the most common critiques of qualitative research is that, because the researcher is collecting data about personal views and perspectives, he/she can end up absorbing the concerns and grievances of respondents. This problem of observational bias, observes Colin Robson, is especially rife when the researcher comes into the research situation with his/her own set of personal biases. [26] Much to my surprise, during my research, I found that rather than being drawn to the views of international development experts whose own backgrounds and development roles were closer to my own, I developed stronger affection towards field-level development workers and community mobilizers who seemed to be the ones who went out on Mopeds and were willing to become drenched in rain and mud in order to reach remote communities, while at the same time receiving very little pay or say over strategic decisions made it their respective development agencies. To deny the admiration and respect I developed for Ugandan field development workers and community mobilizers during my research would be to deny that, as a researcher, one unavoidably develops emotional attachment to those persons one studies and sympathy for the difficult predicaments which many of them find themselves in. This, however, need not mean that the researcher loses his/her objectivity in the research process. In my own situation, for instance, because my role as an outside researcher so clearly separated me from the role played by field development workers and community mobilizers and because my being a *Muzungu* never permitted me to fully partake in community meetings (such as *Resistance Council*--RC/LC meetings, for instance) or the daily routines of poor

Ugandans, I never found myself confusing my own role with theirs or absorbing their grievances. In fact, when in my thesis I write about the perspectives or concerns of UNDP or AA field development workers and community mobilizers, I always specify that these sentiments are those of my respondents and not necessarily my own. Furthermore, in order to counter what might have turned into a potential bias towards the field and the grassroots community level, throughout my research and in the text of the thesis itself, I have always juxtaposed those perspectives coming from the field with views expressed in agency headquarters as well as by Ugandan politicians and scholars. In each case, my goal has been to show that divergent views exist and to draw out the wider implications of such discrepancies, rather than to take sides.

vi) Sorting Out Vast Amounts of Wide-Ranging Data:

The last disadvantage of qualitative research is that it results in vast amounts of data: in my case, piles of academic articles and conjunctural documents, 211 sets of interview notes, and hundreds of pages of observations from primary fieldwork in the UK, Geneva, New York, Washington DC. and Uganda--all material which has had to be carefully recorded, summarized, re-read, organized and analyzed. To make things even more difficult, unlike quantitative research where research assistants can be hired to carry out surveys, input data into a computer and to subsequently analyze it using statistical packages, because in qualitative research one is looking for abstract conceptual insights rather than statistical correlations, qualitative material can rarely be analyzed by machine or by a researcher other than its chief designer. [27] There is no denying that the process of recording, organizing and interpreting the great amount of data gathered through my research was both a time-consuming and extremely difficult task. However, by following the steps of the 'grounded theory' approach described above, I did manage to gradually

identify important trends and hypothesis in my empirical data and to abstract conceptual and theoretical insights from these.

C) Enhancing the Validity, Reliability, Generalizability/ Representability of My Research Data:

As mentioned at the beginning of this appendix, the notions of validity, reliability and generalizability/representability which are central to determining the robustness of quantitative research can not be established definitively in qualitative research. This is partly because qualitative research is not numerical and, as a result, statistical correlations, probabilities and margins of error are impossible to calculate. But also because the most common form of qualitative research: i.e., the case study, is geared towards generating conceptual insights and theory rather than identifying statistically-proven causal relationships or making generalizations about a wider population on the basis of case study findings. To do so, warns, Alan Bryman, would be to erroneously attribute statistical precepts to qualitative research. According to Bryman, qualitative researchers need not be apologetic about the limited generalizability/representability or predictive value of qualitative data. Instead, he recommends that qualitative research and case studies be judged in terms of the adequacy of the theoretical inferences that they help to generate. As Bryman puts it, "The aim [of qualitative research] is not to infer the findings from a sample to a wider population, but to engender patterns and linkages of theoretical importance." [28] Following this logic, in my own research design, I have placed the emphasis on identifying patterns and phenomena in development agencies' efforts to implement SHD/PCD approaches and on drawing out the theoretical implications of such findings rather than on pretending to find a statistically-proven "blueprint" for the successful implementation of SHD/PCD approaches or proving that the exact same pattern and phenomena will reproduce themselves everywhere. Having said this though, qualitative researchers should still

try to use techniques which enhance--although they can not guarantee--the validity, reliability, generalizability/representability of their data.

i) The Validity of the Data Gathered:

The 'validity' of one's research is normally defined as the degree to which one's study actually measures what it claims to measure. [29] In the research literature this is known as 'construct validity'. Also relevant to most studies is the degree to which the researcher himself/herself or other unusual circumstances influence results. This latter tendency is referred to as 'internal validity'. [30]

In the case of my fieldwork in Uganda, my having been an outside researcher and a foreigner who community members saw as a potential source of funding may well have affected my study's internal validity. As I already pointed out though, throughout my research, I tried to dissuade community beneficiaries and local politicians and residents from exaggerating the development problems present in their communities or the effectiveness of their own development initiatives in the hopes of receiving additional funding by explaining to them that, as a student, I had little or no control over the funding decisions made by the international development agencies I was studying. As mentioned above, given the balance of both negative and positive views which respondents expressed about their communities' development and the role of foreign donors, it is probably safe to assume that, in the end, we did obtain a fairly even-handed view of Ugandan communities' achievements and setbacks.

In addition to presenting myself as an independent (and fairly powerless) researcher in the eyes of respondents, during my research, I tried to enhance both the internal and construct validity of my data through what Robert Burgess calls 'triangulation'. Triangulation refers to

the process of subjecting a research hypothesis or a set findings to a range of complementary testing methods. [31] In my research, I enhanced both my study's internal and construct validity by using various forms of triangulation. The first form is what Burgess refers to as 'methodological triangulation', which essentially refers to the use of diverse yet complementary data collection methods--in other words, what I described above as 'methodological integration'.

The advantage of methodological integration when it comes to enhancing the validity of one's study is that it enables the researcher to measure phenomena using various data collection methods (e.g., in my case, via literature reviews and document analysis, participant observation, unstructured interviewing, and focus group discussions), thereby increasing the chances that one is indeed measuring the phenomena which one claims to be measuring. For example, during my consultancy in UNDP's HDRO, I noticed through participant observation that the interaction/communication between HDRO staff and staff in other UNDP Departments seemed to minimal. Yet, through sporadic observation alone, I had no way of knowing whether the staff relations which I had observed captured the full range of UNDP-HDRO interaction/communication which I claimed to be assessing (construct validity) or, whether the summer period which I had chosen to make my observations was a typical time to observe human interactions within UNDP (internal validity). It is because of these doubts that, when I returned to New York a year later, I decided to use another data collection method altogether (i.e., unstructured interviews with elite informants), to measure UNDP-HDRO interaction/communication. During these latter interviews, my earlier observations about UNDP-HDRO relations were generally confirmed and thanks to the use of an alternative data collection technique, I was able to add new dimensions to my understanding of the issue (I learned, for instance, that UNDP-HDRO interactions varied tremendously depending on the level of the staff or the strength of

personal friendships involved) as well as to ensure that I was measuring the desired phenomena much more in full and during a period which was less atypical than summer vacation.

I have also tried to enhance the construct validity of my data by using numerous indicators and several sets of questions to measure the same variable/ phenomenon. An example of this is shown below:

Variable Being Measured: Beneficiary Participation in UNDP and AA projects:

Indicator 1: Proportion of community involved in UNDP/AA projects/groups:

Multiple Questions Asked:
1. Has the community overall shown much interest in the project/group?
2. Who within the community has shown interest in the project?
3. Who within the community has not shown interest in the project?
4. How many community members attended project/group meetings last time?
5. How lively/active was the project/group discussion last time? How so?

Indicator 2: Degree of community access to project/group membership:

Multiple Questions Asked:
1. Can anyone in the community join the project/Group?
2. What are the project/group's membership criteria?
3. What type of person makes up most of the project/group's membership?
4. Have some types of persons been reluctant/unable to join? Why so?

Indicator 3: Degree of democratic decision-making within the group:

Multiple Questions Asked:
1a.How often are project/group meetings held?
b.Who convenes meetings and how? (e.g., via public poster? word of mouth?)
2. Who decides the agenda of meetings and how?
3. Who does most of the talking at meetings?
4. How are decisions made at meetings? (e.g.,president decides,group vote?)
5. How is information about project/group decisions disseminated?

Indicator 4: Distribution of project benefits:

Multiple Questions Asked:
1. What benefits have been distributed by the project/group thus far?
2. Which group members received the first round of benefits?
3. On what basis did the project/group decide who would benefits?
4. Who is scheduled to receive the next round of benefits? On what basis?

The use up multiple indicators and research questions has helped the construct validity of my research by increasing the chances that I do end up measuring the phenomena/variables which I claim to be studying.

ii) The Reliability of the Data Gathered:

Martin Bulmer defines 'reliability' as the process of ensuring that, if repeated by the same or another researcher at a later point in time, a study would yield the same results on that second occasion. [32] The reliability of one's results is normally highly dependent on the accuracy and consistency with which one's data is collected. A frequent criticism of qualitative and of case study research is that their reliability is low since so much of their findings depend on the capacity, personality and observations of the researcher. These setbacks notwithstanding, there are a number of techniques which the qualitative researcher can utilize to enhance the reliability of his/her research results.

The first technique I used to enhance the reliability of my data in my own research was to spend a lot of time carefully explaining questions which might not otherwise be clear to respondents whose first language was not English. Due to language and cultural differences, we did find that, in some instances, concepts which were of common usage in the West (e.g., notions of accountability and participation) were not necessarily clear to respondents in a rural Ugandan village. However, with the help of my research assistants who also served as translators, I made sure that I translated concepts into ideas more likely to be familiar to the communities we were visiting. For instance, after some trial and error, we were able to explain the notion of accountability to respondents as "a sense of responsibility towards someone" or as "someone they feel they should answer to" and to define participation as "the process of becoming actively involved" in something or "taking an active part in the making of certain key decisions." In both instances, the translation of a very abstract concept into easily understood actions was helped us get our questions across--an achievement later reflected in the thoughtfulness of the answers we obtained from our respondents. Although time-intensive,

this ongoing process of clarification proved instrumental in reducing the chances of 'subject error' [33]--i.e., the chances of error occurring either because of respondents' own misunderstanding of questions asked or because of influence of exogenous events.

During my interviews in Uganda and in the West, I also tried to improve the reliability of my data by reducing the chances of 'subject bias'--i.e., the tendency of respondents to try to please the tester, a common problem in most studies relying heavily on interviews. [34] I essentially discouraged respondents from trying to placate the interviewer with their answers by constantly emphasizing during my interviews that there were no right or wrong answers to my various questions and that I was instead trying to collect a range of impressions. Another method which I used in my research to limit potential damage from subject bias was always to talk to more than one respondent; preferably to respondents working at different levels, as well as from different groups or sectors. Hence, during my research, I not only made a conscious effort to interview scholars, donors, representatives from permanent missions to the UN, government officials, project beneficiaries and local residents, but, within each of these sectors, tried to talk to respondents with a range of personal traits: both men and women; Northerners and Southerners; top-level managers and lower-level staff; intellectuals and practitioners; and groups, as well as families and individuals. Burgess refers to this practice as 'person triangulation'. [35] The main advantage of interviewing a large and varied number of respondents is that the researcher does not rely too heavily on one informant whose information may be unreliable due to the informant's personal biases, or restricted perspective or access.

Throughout my research, I also made a great effort to reduce the possibility of 'observer error' --i.e.,the tendency of the researcher to allow carelessness to reduce the consistency and rigour of his/her

interviewing and observation techniques. I protected myself against this problem by being as consistent and systematic as possible in my approach to collecting data. For example, even though I gave respondents the flexibility to delve into issues of special interest to them during my interviews, I at the same time ensured that my interviewing methodology was consistent and systematic in five ways: i) by asking a small set of common questions (these are identified in my topic guides with an asterisk) and pursuing the same core themes/issues with all respondents from a particular sector/group; ii) by ensuring that questions are put to respondents in as neutral a manner as possible; iii) by presenting myself to all respondents in the same fashion--i.e., as an independent researcher looking for different points of view rather than searching for 'the right answers'; iv) by taking consistent notes and writing summaries of each interview as well as keeping detailed field notes of observations made during meetings or field visits; and v) by applying the same rules of engagement in all interviews (i.e., leaving all questions open-ended whenever possible, avoiding leading answers, never revealing too much private information or personal points of view during interviews, controlling the use of body language or facial expressions which might signal approval or disapproval of certain answers, only sharing information from previous interviews when such information is crucial to the interview probing process, and, sending respondents thank you notes in which I explained the status and possible future uses of the material). Thus, even though my interviews varied from one another and were based on unstructured interviewing techniques, the methodology used followed consistent rules in a systematic fashion.

Finally, in the case of my interviews in rural Uganda where my lack of familiarity with the territory and culture left me vulnerable to 'observer bias' --i.e., the tendency for the researcher to let his/her own assumptions and pre-conceived ideas influence his/her interpretation of events or action--as well as to the problem of subject bias described

above, I compensated for these problems by making sure that I conducted all field interviews jointly with one of my research assistants. Robert Burgess refers to this technique as 'investigator triangulation' and notes that having more than one person investigate the situation enhances the reliability of one's data by permitting the chief researcher to check his/her findings and impressions against those of a second researcher or for the two researchers to collect parallel bits of information. In my case, although I conducted interviews together with my researchers, after the more formal part of our interviews, we would walk around the community observing peoples' behaviour on our own and, at the end of the day, we would discuss alternative explanations of what we had observed that day. During these post-interview chats, my research assistants proved to be particularly adept at asking locally-specific questions (e.g., about the nature of local RC meetings, etc.) which would have generated much more guarded responses had a foreigner asked them.

Hence, even though validity and reliability cannot be perfectly measured in qualitative research, it is possible to utilize a number of the techniques I have utilized in my own research to enhance these.

iii) The Generalizability/Representability of the Data Gathered:

The last important methodological issue addressed in this methodological appendix is the 'generalizability' (a.k.a. 'external validity') and 'representability' of the research findings; that is, the extent to which one's findings apply to a wider population beyond the specific sample or case study explored. Qualitative studies such as mine are predominantly based on case studies and non-probability samples have very limited generalizability and their representativeness is either uncertain or unknown. [36] According to Colin Robson, there are mainly three reasons for this: The first is that the kind of purposive and snowball

sampling on which my study is based is not statistically representative of a universal population. The second problem is rooted in the fact that the real *raison d'etre* of qualitative studies is to explore peoples' inner-most thoughts and to draw out new insights and plausible explanations of phenomena rather than trying to identify universalistic statistical correlations or to establish definite causality. And, thirdly, because qualitative studies such as the one I carried out rely on fairly small case studies and samples of fairly select informants, their generalizability and representability is inevitably restricted. [37] It is with these limitations in mind that Margaret Peil warns against over-generalizing from restricted qualitative studies:

> Too often studies of one village or town are treated as if they represent all villages in the area or all towns in the country. But size, centrality, history, economic base and many other factors mean that each place is to some extent exceptional. [38]

In my own thesis, I address issues of generalizability and representability by conceding that neither my choice of Uganda as a country example, of UNDP and AA as my organizational case studies or, of select UNDP and AA projects sites are statistically representative of a wider population. Furthermore, I never claim that the trends in my research are typical of all LDCs or all UNDP and AA programmes. At the same time though, I do know that my research findings are far from rare.

I have three ways of knowing this. The first way I have of knowing that my research results are not an anomaly rare is through what Colin Robson calls 'direct demonstration' --i.e., by having observed the same phenomena in different circumstances [39]. In my own case, for instance, I know that obstacles such as operationalizing SHD/PCD approaches into holistic and multi-sectoral development initiatives, having difficulties influencing government policy, a proneness towards making decisions on behalf of beneficiaries, or carrying projects which are most likely to

generate quick and measurable results, are not uncommon problems since I observed each one of them in two very different types of international development organizations (UNDP and AA) as well as in multiple UNDP and AA project sites, and while using different data collection techniques. According to Alan Bryman, by comparing one organizational case study to another and teasing out those factors within the two organizations which cause the differences (which is essentially what I have done by comparing my UNDP's and AA's SHD/PCD performance), the researcher is actually putting the replication logic to the test. [40] Robert Burgess refers to this technique as 'space triangulation' --i.e., engaging in comparative analysis in order to test one's results in different contexts and thus adding generalizability/representability to one's data. [41]

The second way in which I have tested the generalizability/ representability of my data is by consulting different sources of information to see whether my research findings are in fact applicable beyond my two organizational case studies or beyond Uganda. Hence, conversations with highly respected Uganda-based Development experts such as John de Coninck, Josephine Harmsworth Andama, Tarsius Kabwegyere and Joy Kwesiga were crucial in helping me learn that many of trends I detected in studies of UNDP and AA in Uganda also applied to other international development organizations based in Uganda. Similarly, my conversations with northern development experts like David Korten, Robert Chambers, and Roger Riddell, all of whom have research experience in a wide range of developing countries, were instrumental in helping me see that many of my research findings also applied to LDCs other than Uganda.

This, brings me to the third and final technique I used to test the generalizability of my findings and that was to explore the existing academic and empirical studies for comparable assessments of similar development problems in different contexts which either confirm or

contradict my own research findings. [42] In this respect, it is important to note that, far from being unusual, many of the development and implementational problems which I draw attention to in my research also feature prominently in the SHD/PCD, International Development Cooperation, Implementation Process, and Institutional literatures which I consulted before going to the field. Exactly how my own research findings reinforce, or in some cases, add to debates in these various theoretical literatures is discussed in Chapter 2 of the thesis. With respect to the non-academic literature, its worth noting that a series of studies and consultancy reports on the issue of international development cooperation at large have also produced findings which resemble my own. Especially useful among these were the studies carried out by the *Overseas Development Institute* (ODI) and the *European Centre for Development Policy Management* (ECPM) on the current estate of international development cooperation; a series of books produced by *Save the Children Fund* and the *Transnational Institute* on the role of NGOs; a series of consultancy reports on UNDP's poverty reduction effectiveness in various countries, including those produced by the *Centre for Development Research* and by Martin Godfrey et al; and a number of studies on AA's work in other countries, including reports prepared by AA HQ and by independent consultants like Sarah White and Winki Williams and Rick Davis . These and other reports are cited throughout my thesis as evidence of both the credibility and wider applicability of many of my research findings. Lastly, it is worth mentioning that, in the conclusion to my thesis, I briefly discuss some UNDP Country Programmes (e.g., in Bolivia, Malawi and the Philippines) and AA Country Programmes (e.g., in Bangladesh and India) which do manage to transcend some of the problems I identify in my thesis and explain why my research findings are not as applicable in these cases. After all, being aware of the limitations of one's research findings is an important as being aware of its wider relevance and a crucial step towards identifying areas in need of further research and reflection in the future.

ENDNOTES:

1. *Social and Community Planning Research* (SCPR), Special course on *Qualitative Research and Unstructured Interviewing*. London School of Economics and Political Science. April 17-19, 1996. London, UK

2. Bryman, Alan and Burgess, Robert. Analyzing Qualitative Data. Pages 1-4. London: Routledge Publishers, 1994.

3. Bryman, Alan. Research Methods in Organization Studies, Chapter 1. London: Unwin Hyman Publishers, 1989.

4. Glaser and Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine Publishers, 1967, as quoted in Robert, Burgess, In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research, Chapter 8. New York: Routledge Publishers, Reprinted in 1991.

5. Bryman and Burgess: Pages 1-6, Op. Cit.

6. Experienced researchers such as William Whyte, writer of the acclaimed study, Street Corner Society, recommend that researchers have at least some 'orienting theory' before going to the field. Such preliminary knowledge, he notes, not only provides a general reference point but also guides the researcher towards data that may prove useful later in the analysis. (Whyte, William. Learning From the Field: A Guide from Experience: Page 250. Newbury Park, California and London: Sage Publications, 1984).

7. Bulmer, M. and Warwick, D.P. (Editors), Social Research in Developing Countries. (See Chapter 1: Page 19). London: UCL Press Ltd., 1993.

8. The history of social science research in the Third World is part of the history of colonialism--a period once known as the era of the 'Safari Scholar.' (Bulmer, M. Page 21, in Bulmer and Warwick [Editors]. Op. Cit.)

9. Bryman, Alan. Page 178, Op. Cit.

10. On sampling techniques, see Robson, Colin. Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner Researchers, Chapter 5. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1993.

11. Ritchie, J. SCPR. *Quality Research & Unstructured Interviewing Course*. Op.Cit.

12. Burgess, Robert. Page 102, Op. Cit.

13. Burgess, Robert. Chapter 5, Op. Cit. or, SCPR *Quality Research and Unstructured Interviewing Course* at LSE, Op. Cit.

14. In all, I developed one generic topic guide for NGO Informants; one for Academics; one for UN officials; one for World Bank officials; one for Permanent Missions to the UN; one for UNDP staff; one for Action Aid staff; one for Ugandan government officials; one for local Ugandan residents; and one for project beneficiaries in Uganda. Copies of these topic guides are provided as part of the supplementary information pack accompanying this methodological annex.

15.Ritchie, J. Op.Cit.

16. There were only half a dozen interviews conducted 'off the record'. Some of these were exchanges which I left 'off the record' either because the respondent was a close personal friend or because the discussion which ensued was closer to an informal conversation than an interview. Unless otherwise stated, all respondents mentioned in the accompanying list of persons interviewed was interviewed 'on the record'.

17. Nicholls, Lilly. *From Paradigm to Practice: The Politics and Implementation of Sustainable Human Development--The Example of Uganda*. London: Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Nov. 1996.

18. Robson, Colin. Chapter 9, Op. Cit.; or, Burgess, Robert. Chapter 5, Op. Cit. for a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of Group Interviewing.

19. For a detailed description of these and other techniques used to analyze qualitative data, see Colin Robson, Chapter 12, Op. Cit.; Bryman, Alan and Burgess, Robert (Editors), Chapter 9, Op. Cit.; and the SCPR *Qualitative Research and Unstructured Interviewing Course* material, Op. Cit.

20. Chambers, Robert. Rural Development: Putting the Last First, Chapter 1: Page 16. London: Longman Publishers, 1983.

21. According to Margaret Peil, foreigner researchers often receive a more cordial welcome than nationals of equivalent status, either due to courtesy to strangers or in response to the implied flattery of being sought out by someone from a distance. (See: Peil, Margaret. Page 75 in Bulmer and Warwick 1993, Op. Cit.). In a country as poor as Uganda, the hospitality of some persons may have also been partly motivated by the expectation for funds, even though it was made clear to all respondents that I was an unpaid student.

22. During my Uganda fieldwork, I relied on two Ugandan research assistants who served as translators and as sources of cultural information and sounding boards for early interpretations of data. (See: Devereux and Hoddinott for a discussion on the pros/cons of using indigenous research assistants. (Devereux, Stephen and Hoddinott, John [Editors]. Fieldwork in Developing Countries. Chapter 2. Hertfordshire, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf Pub., 1992.)

23. Bulmer, Martin. Page 207 in Bulmer and Warwick (Editors) Op. Cit.

24. During my follow-up visit to the AA-Uganda Office, I discovered that while the agency's top managers had widely discussed my end-up-trip Evaluation Report, very few field staff and no beneficiaries had had access to it.

25. Here I was following the advise of Margaret Peil who strongly advises against becoming the centre of attention or playing a leadership role if one wishes to remain an objective observer and learner during fieldwork. (See: Peil, Margaret with contributions by Mitchell, Peter and Rimmer, Douglas. Social Science Research Methods: An African Handbook. Page 164. London: Hodder and Stoughton Publishers Ltd., 1985.

26. Robson, Colin. Chapter 8, Op. Cit.

27. In Analyzing Qualitative Data, Alan Bryman and Robert Burgess rightly point out that because qualitative data is bulky and complex, there is no one singular formula for its analysis or distinct phases of analysis. Instead, they point out, the analysis is more likely to be a continuous process. (See Bryman, Alan and Burgess, Robert. Chapter 11, Op. Cit.).

28. Bryman, Alan. Page 173, Op. Cit.

29. Bulmer, Martin. Page 10, in Bulmer and Warwick. Op. Cit.

30. Robson, Colin. Pages 68-71. Op. Cit.

31. Robert Burgess bases his notion of triangulation on the work of Campbell and Fiske (1959). (See: Burgess, Robert. Page 143-144, Op. Cit.)

32. Bulmer, Martin. Page 10. In Bulmer and Warwick. Op. Cit.

33. See Colin Robson for a discussion of the kinds of errors/biases which reduce the reliability of research. (Robson, Colin Pages 66-68, Op. Cit.)

34. Ibid.

35. Burgess, Robert. Page 143, Op. Cit.

36. Martin Bulmer, Page 11, in Bulmer and Warwick (Editors), Op. Cit.

37. Robson, Colin. Page 402, Op. Cit.

38. Margaret Peil, Page 81. In Bulmer and Warwick (Editors), Op. Cit.

39. For details on how a study's generalizability can be tested through direct demonstration, see Robson, Colin. Page 72, Op. Cit.

40. Bryman, Alan. Page 173, Op. Cit.

41. On the use of space triangulation, see:Burgess, Robert. Page 143, Op. Cit.

42. In his own work, Alan Bryman also recommends checking one's findings against other studies or the academic literature and sees this as a good way of testing the applicability of one's research results beyond the confines of one's own investigation. (See: Bryman, Alan. Page 165-167, Op. Cit.).

Table A1: Methods Used to Record, Organize, and Analyze Qualitative Data:

(The Following Steps are Based on work by Bryman & Burgess 1994/SCPR 1996)

I. Data Recording & Familiarization Methods Used to Identify the Scope of the Reseach and General Topics of Interest in the Early Research Phase:

- Make Impromptu conceptual, empirical and methodological mental notes throughout research process (e.g., by writing notes on peoples' attitudes).

- Write systematic observations of specific events (e.g., by writing detailed observations of training sessions & staff conferences).

- Systematically summarize/assess interviews carried out (e.g., by writing down a detailed account of each interview conducted as well as brief summaries & analysis of each).

II. Data Organization Methods Used to Identify Critical Research Issues:

- Begin identifying recurring themes/issues important to research by indexing interview material. (e.g., I wrote in key issues/themes by hand into each interview transcript and into margins of research field notes).

- Begin drafting typologies of emerging trends (e.g., by keeping an ongoing folder on 'emerging research insights' and making preliminary charts of emerging trends).

III. Interpretation Methods Used to Identify Emerging Trends, Concepts and Insights:

- Begin to establish associations (i.e., similarities/contrasts) between case study results) and to detect key problems/possible solutions in the research topic.(e.g.,by writing cnsultancy Reports for UNDP & AA).

- Begin searching for explanations to problems by toying with key concepts and hypothesis emerging from the research. (e.g., I presented my earliest analytical framework to LSE colleagues for feedback on its cohesion and convincing nature).

- Continue to check the emerging conceptual/analytical framework against the data collected thus far to ensure a fit between the two or explain the discrepancies.

IV. Abstraction Methods Used to Reflect on the Research's Theoretical Significance:

- Begin to link chosen concepts/hypothesis with debates in the broader literature on the topic and to identify ways in which my analysis confirms or goes beyond existing theories in the topic (e.g., I did this by writing a major 'think piece' to generate discussion/feedback from my Supervisors after my first field trip to Uganda, by returning to key relevant theoretical literatures to support my findings and by drawing on new theories/ideas to fill remaining gaps.

V. Verification Methods Used to Test the Robustness and Empirical Accuracy of Analytical/Conceptual Framework, Hypothesis, and Research Methodology Used:

- Return to the field to test the robustness of the existing hypotheses, conceptual and analytical framework and to collect further needed information (e.g., I did this by carrying out second follow-up research trips to Uganda and New York)

- Modify hypothesis/analytical framework in light of the last empirical data gathered and engage in an additional stage of abstraction and conceptualization (e.g., I did this by drafting a major Conference paper after the completion of my research andincorporating the resulting conceptual/empirical critiques into my final analysis.

Table A2: **Key Features of the Research Design for the PhD Thesis:**

Key Features of the Research Design:

- Qualitative Research
- Grounded Theory Approach
- Methodological Integration
- Field Research
- Action Research
- Case Study Research
- Multi-Site Studies
- Purposive Sampling and Snowball Sampling

Table A3: Data Collection Methods Utilized During My Research	
Research Phase	**Data Collection Methods Used**
Phase I: Background Research Preparation Oct.'93 - Oct. '94 in the UK	**Intitial Literature Review** **Document Analysis** **Full Participant Observation** (During Consultancy in UNDP Headquarters, June-Aug.'94)
Phase II: Interviews with International-Level Informants (Nov.'94- April '95 in the UK & Jan'95 & Jan'96 in Washington DC, and New York)	**Unstructured Interviews** (Used Topic Guides to Carry out Investigative & In-Depth Unstructured Interviews with Development Experts in UK & Officials in World Bank & UN)
Phase III: Field Research in Uganda (May-July'95 & Nov-Dec'95)	**Unstructured Interviews** (Used Topic Guides to Carry out Investigative & In-Depth Unstructured Interviews with Dvlp. Experts, Donors, Ugandan Govt. Officials, Local Residents, Action Aid & UNDP staff & beneficiaries in Uganda.) **Focus Group Discussions** (With selected UNDP & Action Aid beneficiaries in Uganda) **Semi-Participant Observation** (Within Action Aid and UNDP)
Phase IV: Write Up & Last Follow Up Work (1996 and 1997)	**Final Follow-Up Work:** Last Unstructured Interviews Publish, Disseminate, get Feedback & Polish Findings

Interviews with UK-Based International NGOs:

November 1994 - March 1996

	Interview Number & Organization:	Respondent/Position:	Place:	Date:
#1	Catholic Institue of International Relations (CIIR)	Dr. Ian Linden, General Secretary	London	Nov.3/94
#2	CARE-UK	Mr. Patrick Sayer Overseas Director	London	Nov.9/94
#3	Save the Children Fund (SCF)	Dr. Michael Edwards, Policy and Research Director	London	Nov.30/94
#4	Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD)	Dr. Nicholas Atempugre, Research Officer	London	Dec.1/94
#5	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD)	Ms. Cathy Corcoran, Head of Projects Dept.	London	Dec.9/94
#6	OXFAM-UK	Dr. Kevin Watkins, Head of Policy Dept.	London	Dec.15/94
#7	One World Action	Mr. Andy Rutherford, Programmes Coordinator	London	Feb.17/95
#8	Christian Aid	Mr. Paul Spray, Policy and Campaigns Director	London	March 3/95

Interviews with UK-Based Development Scholars & Experts

Interview Number & Development Scholar & Expert Inteviewed	Institutional Base:	Place:	Date:
#9 Dr.Paul Streeten	Expert, Human Development Report Office (HDRO) UNDP, N.Y, N.Y. & Professor Emeritus, Boston University, Boston, MA, USA	Washington DC	Jan 16/95
#10 Dr.David Korten	Director, People-Centred Development Forum, N.Y., N.Y., & Former Professor at Harvard University, Boston, MA, USA	Washington DC	Jan 17/95
#11a Dr. Diane Elson	Lecturer, Dept. of Economics, Univ.of Manchester, Manchester, UK	Manchester	April 17/95
#11b Dr.Meghnad Desai	Prof. of Economics, Director, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics & Political Science, London, UK. Expert, HDRO at UNDP, N.Y., N.Y., USA	London	March 8/95 March 23/95 April 25/95
#12 Ms. Pat Holden	Sr. Policy Advisor, Social Policy Div., Overseas Development Administration (ODA), London, UK	London	April 11/95
#13 Mr.John Knight	Sr. Researcher, Institute of Economics, Oxford University, Oxford, UK. Expert to the HDRO at UNDP, N.Y., N.Y., USA	Oxford	April 20/95

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Interviews with UK-Based Development Experts & Scholars

Interview Number & Development Scholar & Expert Inteviewed	Institutional Base:	Place:	Date:
#14 Dr.Frances Stewart	Director, International Development Centre, Oxford University, Oxford, UK. Expert to the HDRO at UNDP, N.Y., N.Y., USA	Oxford	April 21/95
#15 Mr. Roger Riddell	Research Fellow, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), London, UK.	London	April 25/95
#16 Dr. Amartya Sen*	Lamont Professor, Harvard University, Boston, MA, USA. Expert to the HDRO at UNDP, N.Y., N.Y., USA	London	August 10/95
#17 Dr.Hans Singer	Prof. & Co-Founder, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, UK. Expert for the HDRO at UNDP, N.Y., N.Y., USA	Falmer, Brighton	October 18/95
#18 Dr.Robert Chambers	Prof. & Fellow, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, UK.	Falmer, Brighton	June 6/96

* The Conversation with Prof. Sen did not take a formal interview format but was rather as an exchange of ideas.

Interview Number, Informant & Position	Institutional Base	Date Interviewed

Key Informants Interviewed in the World Bank:

(Washington D.C., USA)

#19	Mr. Petter Langseth, Senior Public Sector Management Specialist	World Bank	January 4, 1995
#20	Dr. Caroline Moser, Senior Urban Social Policy Specialist	World Bank	January 5, 1995
#21	Mr. Mike Stephens, Public Sector Management Adviser	World Bank	January 6, 1995
#22	Dr. Alison Evans, Advisor, Education and Social Policy Advisor [Interview off Record]	World Bank	January 6, 1995
#23	Mr. Mamadou Dia, Chief, Capacity Building Division & Africa Technical Department	World Bank	January 6, 1995
#24	Dr. John Mitchell, Public Relations Official	World Bank	January 17,1995
#25	Dr. Lisa Pachter, Liaison Official, World Bank-UN Relations,	World Bank	January 18,1995
#26	Ms. Carmen Malena, Officer, International Economic Relations Division, NGO Unit	World Bank	January 18,1995

Interview Number, Informant & Position	Institutional Base	Date Interviewed
Key Informants Interviewed in the UN System: (New York, USA)		
#27. Ms. Caitlin Weisen, SHD Coordinator, Regional Bureau for Africa	UNDP	January 9, 1995
#28 Mr. M. Nizamuddin, Deputy Director, Technical & Evaluation Division & Chief, PDPR Branch	UNFPA	January 10,1995
#29 Mr. Jan Vandermoordele, Director of the Office for Social and Economic Analysis Interviewed jointly with: Ms. Eva Jespersen, Programme Funding Office	UNICEF	January 10,1995
#30 Ms. Tina Zournatzi, Uganda Desk Officer in Regional Bureau for Africa, UNDP Headquarters [Interview Off Record]	UNDP	January 10,1995
#31 Dr. Selim Jahan, Sr. Policy Analyst & Human Development Report Office (HDRO) Deputy Director	HDRO/UNDP	January 11,1995
#32 Mr. Thierry Lemaresquier, Director, Social Development and Poverty Elimination Division, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS)	BPPS/UNDP	January 11,1995
#33 Dr. Saraswathi Menon, Policy Analyst	HDRO/UNDP	January 11,1995
#34 Mr. Per Arne Stroberg Sr. Sustainable Human Development Officer, BPPS	BPPS/UNDP	January 12,1995

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Interview Number, Informant & Position	Institutional Base	Date Interviewed
Key Informants Interviewed in the UN System:		
(New York, USA)		
#35 Dr. Sethuramiah L. Rao Chief, UN Liaison, External Relations & Executive Board Branch	UNFPA	January 12,1995
#36 Dr. Uner Kirdar, Special Assistant to the Administrator, Former Director, Development Studies Programme	UNDP	January 13,1995
#37 Ms. Janet Nelson, Chief, NGO Division	UNICEF	January 13,1995
#38 Ms. Laura Mourino, Junior Statistician [Interview off Record]	HDRO/UNDP	January 13,1995

Persons Interviewed During Second New York Research Trip:

January 7 - 20, 1996

Interview Number, Informant & Position	Institutional Base	Date of Interview:
#39 Mr. Jean Claude Milleron, Under-Secretary General and Head, Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis	UN Secretariat	January 11, 1996
#40 Ms. Sakiko Fukuda Parr Director, Human Development Report Office (HDRO)	UNDP	January 11, 1996
#41 Ms. Marcia Castro Area Officer and SHD Task Force Member, Regional Bureau for Latin America (RBLA)	UNDP	January 12, 1996
#42 Ms. Nadia Hijab Senior SHD Officer, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS)	UNDP	January 12, 1996
#43 Ms. Ann Grant Counsellor (Social and Economic Development), UK Mission to UN	UN/UK Govt.	January 15, 1996
#44 Ms. Sally Timpson Chief, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS)	UNDP	January 16, 1996
#45 Ms. Sharon Capeling Alajika Chief, Office for Evaluation and Strategic Planning (OESP)	UNDP	January 17, 1996
#46 Dr. Inge Kaul, Director Office of Development Studies, Director of the HDRO until 1994	UNDP	January 17, 1996
#47 Dr. Selim Jahan Sr.Advisor & Deputy Director, HDRO	UNDP	January 17, 1996

Continued....

Persons Interviewed During Second New York Research Trip:

January 7 - 20, 1996

Interview Number, Informant & Position	Institutional Base	Date of Interview:
#48 Ms. Mitra Vaishid Minister and Third Secretary, Indian Mission to the UN with Mr. S.P. Singh IAS, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs, Government of India	UN/Indian Govt	January 18, 1996
#49 Dr. Mabub ul Haq Special Assistant to the Administrator of UNDP & Founder of the HDRO	UNDP	January 18, 1996
#50 Mr.Odyek Agona First Secretary, Ugandan Mission to the UN	UN/Ugandan Govt.	January 18, 1996
#51 Mr.Jairo Montoya Minister for Development Colombian Mission to the UN and Current Representatives of the Non-Aligned Movements	UN/Colombian Govt.	January 18, 1996
#52 Ms.Elizabeth Jacobsen Second Secretary, Norwegian Mission to the UN with Ms. Anne-Birgitte Albrectsen First Secretary, Danish Mission to the UN	UN/Norwegian & Danish Govts	January 19,1996
#53 Mr.R.C. Sersale di Cerisano Minister Plenipotentiary, Economic Affairs, Argentinean Mission to the UN	UN/Argentinian Govt.	January 19, 1996
#54 Mr. Nikhil Chandavarkar Chief, Inter-Agency Coordination and External Policy Office, Bureau for Resources and External Affairs	UNDP	January 19, 1996

Continued....

Persons Interviewed During Second New York Research Trip:

January 7 - 20, 1996

Interview Number, Informant & Position	Institutional Base	Date of Interview:
#55 Mr. John Hope Advisor, Economic & Social Affairs, US Mission to the UN	UN/US Govt.	January 19, 1996
#56 Mr. Rogatien Biaou First Counsellor, Benin Mission to the UN and Chairs, Second Committee (Economic and Financial), UN General Assembly	UN/Benin Govt.	January 19, 1996
#57 Mr.John Ohiorhuan Chief Economist and Chief, Policy and Regional Programmes	UNDP	January 19, 1996
#58 Mr. Jesus Domingo Third Secretary, Philippines Mission to the UN which Chaired the G-77 in 1995	UN/Philippino Govt.	January 19, 1996
#59 Mr. James Gustave Speth, Administrator of UNDP, (1993-present)	UNDP	Interviewed in London, UK, February 2, 1996

Interviews with Action Aid Staff in UK Headquarters:

	Interview Number, Informant & Position:	Place of Interview:	Date of Interview:
#60	Mr. Robert Dodd, Head of Policy and Research Division Director	London	December 14, 1994
#61	Mr. David Archer, Education Advisor	London	Information Meeting: April 12, 1995
#62	Ms. Susan Johnson, Economic Policy Analyst & Formerly, Uganda Desk Officer	London	Working Meeting on: April 12, 1995
#63	Ms. Susan Johnson, Mr. Bob Reitemeier, Manager for Eastern Africa Mr. Nigel Twose, Head of the International Division	London	Feedback on First ABP Evaluation Report & Follow-Up Suggestions November 3, 1995.
#64	Mr. Hugh Goyder, Coordinator, Evaluation and Impact Assessment (Fomerly Head for Western and Southern Africa). Joint meeting with Mr. Shameen Siddiki, Head of Monitoring and Evaluation in Action Aid in Bangladesh	Kampala,	December 2, 1995
#65	Lord Dubbs Member of the Action Aid Board of Trustees	London	March 29, 1996
#67	Mr. Rodney Buse, Chair, Action Aid Board of Trustees	London	April 29, 1996
#68	Mr. Ian MacFarlane, NGO Liaison Officer, UNDP European Office. Action Aid Staff Member seconded to UNDP-Geneva	London	November 7, 1996

Continued....

Interviews with Action Aid Staff in UK Headquarters:

	Interview Number, Informant & Position:	Place of Interview:	Date of Interview:
#69	Ms. Marion Jackson, Head of Marketing (Corporate Strategy), Action Aid-UK	London	December 18, 1996
#70	Mr. Bob Reitemeier, Coordinator, Africa Region, Interntional Division, Action Aid-UK	London	December 18, 1996
#71	Mr. Raj Thamotheram, Head, Advocacy Department, International Division, Action Aid-UK	London	January 13, 1997
#72	Mr. Hugh Goyder, Coordinator, Evaluation and Impact Assessment, International Division, Action Aid-UK	London	January 13, 1997
#73	Mr. Nigel Twose, Director of the International Division, Action Aid-UK	London	February 12, 1997
#74	Dr. Barara Harriss-White, Former member of Action Aid's Board of Trustees	Oxford	April 20, 1995
#75	Mr. Martin Griffiths, Former Director of Action Aid	Geneva	August 28, 1996

Development Experts & Donors Interviewed in Kampala During First Trip (May 1 - July 11, 1995) :

	Interview Number, Informant & Position	Date of the Interview
#76	Mr. Stan Burkey, Coordinator, Change Agent Programme, Quaker Services-Norway	May 8, 1995
#77	Mr. Jamie Balfour-Paul Deputy Country Representative, Oxfam-UK	May 9, 1995
#78	Mr. Tim Lemont, Economic Advisor, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Government of Uganda	May 15, 1995
#79	Mr. Harumna Kyamanywa, Assistant Resident Representative, UNDP-Uganda	May 15, 1995
#80	Prof. Joseph Opio Odongo, Human Development Advisor, UNDP-Uganda	July 4, 1995
#81	Dr. John de Coninck, Head, Community Development Research Network (CDRN)	July 4, 1995
#82	Mr. James Katarobo, Professor, Makerere Institute for Social Research (MISR), Makerere University	July 6, 1995
#83	Dr. Joy Kwesiga Chairperson, Action for Development (ACFODE) and Sr. Lecturer, Women's Studies Dept., Makerere University	July 6, 1995
#84	Mr. Zie Gariyo, Coordinator, NGO Policy Forum, Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Organizations (DENIVA)	July 6, 1995

Continued....

Development Experts & Donors Interviewed in Kampala During First Trip (May 1 - July 11, 1995) :

	Interview Number, Informant & Position	Date of the Interview
#85	Hon. Tarsis B. Kabwegyere Director, External Relations, NRM Secretariat, Republic of Uganda	July 6, 1995
#86	Dr. Babatunde Thomas, Resident Representative UNDP-Uganda and Resident Coordinator, UN System in Uganda	July 10, 1995
#87	Mr. Iradj Alikhani Resident Economist, World Bank, Uganda	July 7, 1995
#88	Dr. John Mwesigwa, NGO Support Officer, Development Division in Eastern Africa, ODA, Uganda [Formerly Deputy Director, Action Aid-Uganda]	July 7, 1995
#89	Mrs. Sara Entiro, Currently consultant on NGO-Government matters. Formerly, NGO Coordinator in the Prime Minister's Office, Uganda Government	July 10, 1995
#90	Mr. Johan Veul, Director, Netherlands Development Organization, (SNV) in Uganda	July 11, 1995

List of Action Aid Staff Interviewed in Kampala & Buwekula During My First Trip

Staff Interviewed in Action Aid, Kampala:

	Interview Number, Informant & Position	Date of the Interview
#91	Mr.Anthony Wasswa, Director, Action Aid-Uganda with Mr. Joffrey Atieli, Deputy Director, Action Aid-Uganda	July 9, 1995
#92	Mr. Peter Kendal, Former Financial Controller, Action Aid-Kampala, Currently, National Director of Inter-Aid-Uganda	July 5, 1995
#93	Ms. Sara Mangali, Assistant Deputy Director, Action Aid-Uganda & Head of Programme Development Dept. (PDD)	June 29, 1995
#94	Mr.Israel Wamala, Advocacy and Research Officer, PDD, Action Aid-Kampala	June 29, 1995
#95	Mr. Med Makumbi, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Action Aid-Kampala	June 28, 1995
#96	Mr. Nick Doyle, Communications Officer, PDD, Action Aid-Kampala	June 28, 1995
#97	Mr. Patrick Okuma, Human Resource Development and Training Officer, Action Aid-Kampala	July 3, 1995
#98	Mr. Mathew Kasuli, Fundraising Officer, PDD, Action Aid-Kampala	July 3, 1995
#99	Ms. Assumpta Tibamwenda, Gender and Research Officer, Action Aid-Kampala & Mityana	May 24, 1995
#100	Ms. Elizabeth Ongom, Programme Assistant, Strategies for Action (SFA), Action Aid-Kampala	May 9, 19995

Staff Interviewed in the Buwekula Project, Mubende District During my First Trip

	Interview Number, Informant & Position	Date of the Interview
#101	Mr. Chris Kiwanuka, ABP Coordinator, Mubende	June 5, 1995
#102	Mr. Pascal Ntanda, Area Manager, Action Aid-ABP, Mubende, Kitenga Sub-County	May 26, 1995
#103	Mr. Francis Oruca, Area Manager, Action Aid-ABP, Mubende, Kasambya Sub-County	June 5, 1995
#104	Mr. Moses Mayende, Water and Infrastructure Engineer, Action Aid-ABP, Mubende	May 26, 1995
#105	Mr. Jeff Readman, Management Advisor, Action Aid-ABP, Mubende	May 26, 1995
#106	Mr. Grace Kasirye, Training Coordinator, Action Aid-ABP, Mubende	May 22, 1995
#107	Ms. Samalie Tibenda, Human Resource Officer and Administration Officer, Mubende	June 8, 1995
#108	Ms. Margaret Logosi, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, Action Aid-ABP, Mubende	June 13, 1995
#109	Ms. Mary Akiror, Sponsorship Administrator, Action Aid-ABP, Mubende	May 22, 1995
#110	Ms. Mary Nabisere, Field Development Worker, Action Aid-ABP Mubende, Kasambya sub-County	May 26, 1995
#111	Ms. Regina Nakayenga, Field Development Worker, Action Aid-ABP, Mubende, Kasambya sub-County	May 30, 1995
#112	Mr. Moses Madoyi, Field Development Worker, Action Aid-ABP, Mubende, Kitenga sub-County)	May 23, 1995

List of Persons Interviewed in Mubende Town During my First Trip*

	Interview Number, Informant & Position	Date of the Interview
#113	Mr. Isaac Mudoi, District Executive Secretary, Mubende District	June 21, 1995
#114	Reverend Kulabirawo, Reverend, Protestant Church of Mubende Town	June 7, 1995
#115	Mr. Frederick Mukiibi Headmaster, Kasenyi Secondary School, Mubende Town	June 13, 1995

* In addition to the above interviews, informal talks also took place with shop keepers, teachers and other members of the public at large in Mubende town.

Field Visits Carried Out During Field Research in Action Aid's Buwekula Project:

Buwekula, Mubende, Uganda

May 30 - June 21, 1995

Interview Number & Group Visited	Location of Visit:	Date of Visit & Mobilizers
WEEK 1:		
#116 Credit & Savings Group	Kitenga Sub-County Bugonzi Parish, Nsengwe Village	May 30, 1995 PM Lilly & Edward Pascal & Teo
#117 PDC Group	Kitenga Sub-County Bugonzi Parish, Kabunyonyi Village	May 31, 1995 PM Lilly & Edward/ Teo N.
#118 Health Committee	Kasambya Sub-County Kabo Parish, Lulembo Village	June 1, 1995 AM Lilly & Edward/ Mary N.
#119 Water Committee	Kasambya Sub-County Kibalinga Parish, Mikisa Village	June 2, 1995 AM Lilly & Edward Patrick M.
#120 Water Committe	Kasambya Sub-County Kirume Parish, Kyamuguluma Village	June 2, 1995 PM Lilly & Edward Patrick M.
WEEK 2:		
#121 Women's Group	Kasambya Sub-County Kirume Parish, Tusitukirewamu Village	June 6, 1995 AM Lilly & Edward Godfrey
#122 2nd Women's Group	Kasambya Sub-County Kasambya Parish	June 6, 1995 PM Lilly & Edward Cranmer
#123 Agriculturalists	Kasambya Sub-County Kirume Parish	June 7, 1995 AM Lilly & Edward/ Godfrey
#124 Women's Group	Kitenga Sub-County Kagoma Parish, Bugalia Village	June 8, 1995 AM Lilly & Edward/ Maria N.
#125 Agriculturalists	Kitenga Sub-County Kalonga Parish, Budibaga Village	June 8, 1995 PM Lilly & Edward/ Enoch

Field Visits Carried Out During Field Research in Action Aid's Buwekula Project:

Buwekula, Mubende, Uganda

May 30 - June 21, 1995

Interview Number & Group Visited	Location of Visit:	Date of Visit & Mobilizers
WEEK 3:		
#126 Pastoralists	Kasambya Sub-County, Bubanda Parish	June 12, 1995 AM Lilly & Edward/ Patrick M.
#127 PDC Group	Kasambya Sub-County, Kibalinga Parish	June 13, 1995 PM Lilly & Edward/ Charles & Robyna
#128 Water Committee	Kitenga Sub-County, Kagoma Parish	June 14, 1995 AM Lilly & Edward/ENOCH
#129 School Mgt. Cttee.	Kitenga Sub-County, Kagoma Parish, Senkulu School	June 14,1995 PM Lilly & Edward/ Maria N
#130 Health Committee	Kitenga Sub-County, Kabyuma Parish	June 15, 1995 AM Lilly & Edward/ Moses M
#131 Credit & Savings	Kasambya Sub-County, Kigando Parish	June 16, 1995 AM Lilly & Edaward/ Noelyn
#132 Two Women's Groups	Kasambya Sub-County, Kigando Parish	June 16, 1995 AM Lilly & Edward/ Noelyn
#133 School Mgt. Cttee.	Kasambya sub-County, Kasasa Parish Muyinayina Village School	June 16, 1995 PM Lilly & Edward/ Nathan
WEEK 4:		
#134 Pastoralists	Kitenga Sub-County Bugonzi Parish, Buswakwera Village	June 19, 1995 AM/PM Lilly & Edward/ Pascal/Teo
#135 Poverty Focus Group	Kasambya Sub-County Kasambya Parish, Bulonzi Village	June 20, 1995 AM/PM Lilly & Edward/ Francis & Patrick M
#136 Poverty Focus Group	Kitenga Sub-County Kalonga Parish, Bwakaggo Village)	June 21,1995 AM Lilly & Edward/ Maria N & Enoch

Interviews Conducted During My Second Uganda Trip:

November 6 - December 12, 1995

Interviews Carrried Out Within Kampala At Large:

Interview Number, Informant, Position:	Place of the Interview:	Date of the Interview:
#137 Ms. Josephine Harmsworth Andama, Director, Human Rights Network & Prominent Development Consultant	Kampala	November 8, 1995
#138 Mr. Alex Loriston, Head, Development Section World Food Programme (WFP)	Kampala	November 27, 1995
#139 Mr. Patrick Fine, Head, General Development Office, USAID in Uganda.	Kampala	December 4, 1995
#140 Mr. Colin Glennie, Senior Programmes Officer, UNICEF in Uganda.	Kampala	December 5, 1995
#141 Ambassador Taliwaku, Head, Aid Coordination Department, Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning, Government of Uganda.	Kampala	December 5, 1995
#142 Dr. Francois Farah, Director, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)	Kampala	December 6, 1995
#143 Mr. Fleming West, Counsellor for Development DANIDA in Uganda	Kampala	December 8, 1995
#144 Mr. Tim Lemont, Economic Advisor, Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning, Government of Uganda.	Kampala	December 7, 1995

Continued....

Interviews Carrried Out Within Kampala At Large:

Interview Number, Informant, Position:	Place of the Interview:	Date of the Interview:
#145 Mr. Peter Sebanjja, Head of Services, The Aids Support Organization (TASO).	Kampala	December 7, 1995
#146 Mr. Ismael Magona, Economist, Social Sector (Health & Water Sanitation), Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning.	Kampala	December 7, 1995
#147 Mr. Nyabongo, Head, National Execution Unit (NEX), Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Government of Uganda	Kampala	December 6, 1995
#148 Ms. Mary Muduuli, Commissioner for Economic Planning, Ministry of Finance & Economic Planning. Government of Uganda	Kampala	December 7, 1995
#149 Ms. Edna Baryaruha Director for Gender, Ministry of Community & Gender Development. with Ms.Jane Mpagi, Commissioner for Women's Programmes, Ministry of Community & Gender Development.	Kampala	December 11, 1995
#150 Mr. Francis Wagaba, Coordinator, Decentralization Secretariat, Ministry of Local Government, Ugandan Government	Kampala	December 11, 1995

Interviews Within the UNDP-Uganda Office:

Interview Number, Informant, Position:	Place of the Interview:	Date of the Interview:
#151 Dr. Joseph Opio Odongo, SHD Advisor, UNDP-Uganda	Kampala	November 8, 1995 & December 11, 1995
#152 Ms. Tamba Baldeh, Deputy Resident Representive UNDP-Uganda Office	Kampala	November 8, 1995
#153 Mr. Alex Rusita, Head, Programme Resource & Management Unit, UNDP-Uganda	Kampala	November 10, 1995
#154 Ms. Mutinta Munyati, Programme Officer for Community Management Cluster 1 (Economic Management & Governance), UNDP-Uganda	Kampala	November 13, 1995
#155 Mr. M.L.Motlana, Assistant Resident Representative & Head of Cluster 1 (Economic Management & Governance), UNDP-Uganda	Kampala	December 4, 1995
#156 Ms. Jessica Kitakule, Programme Officer for Grassroots Enterprises, Cluster 1 (Economic Management & Governance), UNDP-Uganda.	Kampala	December 4, 1995
#157 Mr. Sam Ibanda, Programme Officer & AIDS/HIV Cluster 2 (Environmental Development & Aids), UNDP-Uganda.	Kampala	December 4, 1995

Continued....

Interviews Within the UNDP-Uganda Office:

Interview Number, Informant, Position:	Place of the Interview:	Date of the Interview:
#158 Mr. Haruna Kyamanywa, Assistant Resident Representative & Head, Cluster 2 (Environmental Development & Aids), UNDP-Uganda.	Kampala	December 6, 1995
#159 Mr. John Okello, Resident Economist, UNDP-Uganda	Kampala	December 7, 1995
#160 Mr. Wilson Kwamya, Programme Officer For Employment & Industrial/UNIDO. Cluster 1(Economic Management & Governance), UNDP-Uganda	Kampala	December 7, 1995
#161 Dr. Ghambhir Bhatta, Programme Officer (UNV)& Coordinator, UNV Programme, UNDP-Uganda	Kampala	December 6 & 8, 1995
#162 Ms. Andrea Bauer, Programme Officer (JPO) For Governance Issues Cluster 1 (Economic Management & Governance, UNDP-Uganda.	Kampala	December 8, 1995
#163 Dr.Babatunde Thomas, Resident Representative, & Resident Coordinator of the UN Sytem in Uganda, UNDP-Uganda	Kampala	December 12, 1995

Interviews With UNDP Staff and Beneficiaries in Specific UNDP Projects:

Field Visit to the UNDP-Africa 2000 Network Programme, Fort Portal (Nov.14-17/95):

Interview Number, Informant, Position:	Place of the Interview:	Date of the Interview:
#164 Ms. Mary Jo Kakinda, National Coordinator, Africa 2000 Network	Fort Portal	November 14-17, 1995 & December 12, 1995
#165 Charles Walaga, Regional Coordinator, (Fort Portal) Africa 2000 Network and Micro Projects to Combat Aids,	Fort Portal	November 14-17, 1995 & November 15, 1995
#166 Mr. Vincent Mubiru, Coordinator, Joint Efforts to Save the Environment (JESE), Africa 2000 Network	Fort Portal	November 15, 1995
#167 Ms. Margaret Bamuroho, Beneficiary, Model Farmer, JESE Project Africa 2000 Network	Fort Portal	November 15, 1995
#168 Mr. Kamba, Beneficiary, Model Farmer, JESE Project and RCV Member, Africa 2000 Network	Fort Portal	November 15, 1995
#169 Mrs. Baguma, Beneficiary, Model Farmer, JESE Project, Africa 2000 Network	Fort Portal	November 15, 1995
#170 Mr. James Mkata, Assistant Chief Administrative Officer	Fort Portal	November 16, 1995
#171 Mr. Elias Byamungu, Chief Administrate Officer, NGO and Head, Women's Affairs	Fort Portal	November 16, 1995

Continued....

Interviews With UNDP Staff and Beneficiaries in Specific UNDP Projects:

Field Visit to the UNDP-Africa 2000 Network Programme, Fort Portal (Nov.14-17/95):

Interview Number, Informant, Position:	Place of the Interview:	Date of the Interview:
#172 Godfrey Baziralle Ntawera, District Agricultural Officer	Fort Portal	November 16, 1995
#173 Mrs. Gertrude Rwahouma, Chairperson, Ugandan Women's Efforts To Save Orphans (UWESO), Kabarole Branch	Fort Portal	November 16, 1995
#174 Chiraro Group, Beneficiaries, JESE Project & Africa 2000 Network beneficiaries	Fort Portal	November 16, 1995
#175 Mr. George Kanene, Beneficiary and Project Coordinator, Community Association for Rural Development (CARD), Africa 2000 Network	Iganga	November 24, 1995
#176 Mr. David Nkanda, Beneficiary, Sustainable Agriculture Coordinator, Community Association for Rural Development (CARD), Africa 2000 Network [Also RCI Chair & Mobilizer]	Iganga	November 24, 1995

Interviews With UNDP Staff and Beneficiaries in Specific UNDP Projects:

Field Visit to the UNDP-Micro Projects Programme to Combat Aids, Mbale District (Nov.20-23/95):

Interview Number, Informant, Position:	Place of the Interview:	Date of the Interview:
#177 Ms. Betty Babirye Ddungu, National Coordinator, UNDP-Micro Projects to Combat Aids	Kampala and in Mbale	November 20, 1995
#178 Mrs. Margaret Oruma, Beneficiary and Chairperson, Omukise Yetolere Grinding Mill Group. Implementors & Beneficiaries, Micro Projects to Combat Aids	Hasyule Parish, Mbale	November 20, 1995
#179 All Members, Beneficiaries and Members, Busia Dabuni Women's Poultry Group	Samya-Bugere County, Mbale	November 20, 1995
#180 All Members, Beneficiaries, Unity Group Women's Association & Sewing Group	Tororo Town, Mbale	November 20, 1995
#181 Edith Wakumire, Beneficiary & Head, Uganda Women CONCERN Ministry. Aids Prevention Programme	Bunco Village, Mbale	November 20, 1995
#182 All Members, Beneficiaries and Members, Nabweya Women's Sewing Group	Mbale	November 21, 1995
#183 Mr. Henry Rwigyemera, Deputy Resident District Commissioner (Formerly the Deputy CGR appointed by the President directly.	Mbale	November 21, 1995
#184 Ms. Christine Kumiti, Project Manager, Child Restoration Outreach (CRO), a Dutch NGO.	Mbale Town	November 21, 1995

Continued....

Interviews With UNDP Staff and Beneficiaries in Specific UNDP Projects:

Field Visit to the UNDP-Micro Projects Programme to Combat Aids, Mbale District (Nov.20-23/95):

Interview Number, Informant, Position:	Place of the Interview:	Date of the Interview:
#185 Reverend Isiah, Reverend, Church of Uganda	Mbale Town	November 21, 1995
#186 Mrs. Hadjati Janura Naleeba, RCII Secretary for Women & Former RCIV & Member, District Micro Projects Selection Committee	Mbale Town	November 21, 1995
#187 Selected Members, Beneficiaries and Members, Babulo Walanga Dispensary, Church of Walanga	Mbale	November 21, 1995
#188 Selected Members, Beneficiaries and Members, Double Production Farmers' Association	Mbale	November 21, 1995
#189 Mr. Giles Kahika, Assistant Chief Administrative Officer; Member of the District Micro Projects Selection Committee	Mbale Town	November 22, 1995
#190 Mrs. Ema Duce, District Project Coordinator, UNIDO Small & Cottage Enterprises Project.	Mbale Town	November 22, 1995
#191 Selected Members, Beneficiaries & Members, Bananyole Youth Development Agency (BAYADA) & Carpentry & Joinery Project	Tororo, Mbale	November 22, 1995

Continued....

Interviews With UNDP Staff and Beneficiaries in Specific UNDP Projects:

Field Visit to the UNDP-Micro Projects Programme to Combat Aids, Mbale District (Nov.20-23/95):

Interview Number, Informant, Position:	Place of the Interview:	Date of the Interview:
#192 Mr. Paul Wamala, Regional Coordinator, UNDP-Micro Projects to Combat Aids.	Mbale	November 22, 1995
#193 Selected Staff, Beneficiaries & Implementors Integrated Rural Outreach Programme, SALEM Brotherhood (A German Christian NGO)	Mbale	November 23, 1995
#194 Selected Members, Beneficiaries and Members, Integrated Women's Development Centre Tailoring Project	Tororo, Mbale	November 23, 1995
#195 Selected Members, Malaba Women's Group for Stone Quarrying	Mbale	November 23, 1995

Interviews With UNDP Staff and Beneficiaries in Specific UNDP Projects:

Field Visit to the UNDP-HABITAT Community Management Programme, Mubende, November 28-December 1, 1995

Interview Number, Informant, Position:	Place of the Interview:	Date of the Interview:
#196 Dr. Phil Bartle, Chief Technical Advisor, UNDP-HABITAT Community Management Programme	Kampala	November 25, 1995
#197 Selected Members, Beneficiaries & Members, Kisakyamaria Women's Group for Mushroom Growing	Kisekende Parish, Mubende	November 28, 1995
#198 Selected Members, Beneficiaries & Members, S.S. Light School Project (Members include an RCII Chair & an RCIII Vice-Chair)	Kisenkende Parish, Bageza Sub-Country	November 30, 1995
#199 Business women of Mubende Town, Members, Twekaribe Women's Group; Tusubira Womens' Group; Luka Baanaba Kintu Women's Group & Buda Buwekula Women's Association	Mubende	November 30,1995
#200 Mr.Godfrey Kuruhiira, Regional Coordinator for Mubende, UNDP-HABITAT Community Management Programme	Kampala	December 11, 1995
#201 Mr. Joshua Ouguang, National Coordinator, UNDP-HABITAT Community Management Programme.	Kampala	December 11, 1995

Action Aid-Uganda Follow-Up Interviews and Visits:

Interview Number, Informant, Position:	Place of the Interview:	Date of the Interview:
Action Aid Staff Interviewed in Kampala:		
#202 Mr. Anthony Wasswa, Director, Action Aid-Uganda, with Mr. Joffrey Atieli, Deputy Director, Action Aid-Uganda	Kampala	November 10, 1995
#203 Mr. Joffrey Atieli, Deputy Director, Action Aid-Uganda	Kampala	December 12, 1995
#204 Ms. Sara Mangali, Assistant Director & Head, Programme Development Department, Action Aid-Uganda.	Kampala	December 12, 1995
Persons Interviewed in Mubende Town:		
#205 Mr. Isaac Modoi, Chief Administrative Officer Formerly the DES, Mubende District	Mubende	November 29, 1995
#206 Dr. Emmanuel Mawajje, LCV (Formerly RCV) Chair, Mubende District	Mubende	November 29, 1995
#207 Mr. James Sebudde, District Agricultural Officer Mubende District	Mubende	November 29, 1995
#208 Mr. Med Makumbi, Monitoring & Evaluation Officer for Action Aid-Uganda	Mubende	December 1, 1995
#209 Mr. Jeff Readman, VSO & Management Advisor, ABP Project, Action Aid-Uganda.	Mubende	November 30, 1995
#210 Mr.Chris Kiwanuka, ABP Project Coordinator Action Aid Uganda.	Mubende	November 30, 1995
#211 Parish Development Committee (PDC), Member, Bugonzi Parish PDC Follow-Up Visit)	Mubende Kitenga Sub-County	December 1, 1995

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