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Elections and Political Mobilisation:
The Hong Kong 1991 Direct Elections

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To my parents

who struggled to bring up their children
during the harsh and difficult years of
post-war Hong Kong

ABSTRACT

Previous studies of the first direct elections to the Hong Kong Legislative Council (LegCo) in 1991 were largely focused on the effect of the Tiananmen Incident on voters' choice, neglecting the domestic dimension of social conflict evolving within Hong Kong from the 1970s. Adopting the social cleavage approach, the present thesis argues that two electoral cleavages, centre-periphery and collective consumption, were important by 1991. It, therefore, explores the international, social and political contexts within which the 1991 LegCo direct elections took place in order to explain the political alignments and electoral cleavages during the period 1982-1991.

First, the study examines the Sino-British attitudes towards political reforms in Hong Kong and the development of the centre-periphery cleavage in the 1980s as the two countries negotiated the transfer of sovereignty. Second, the expansion of the Hong Kong Government's activities and its privatisation programmes are analyzed in order to describe the increasingly intimate relations between government and society and to show that, as a result, conflicts evolved over issues of collective consumption. Third, the emerging competition at the time of the 1991 elections is discussed with reference to political mobilisation and alignments during the previous decade. Fourth, the electoral market of 1991 is examined to explain voters' choice. Finally, the election results are analyzed to demonstrate that two electoral cleavages, centre-periphery and collective consumption, played a significant role.

The data used in this study were collected from: official documents, such as the Hong Kong Government Gazette, the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the Basic Law, the Hong Kong Census and By-census reports, the annual reports of various government departments; opinion polls and one exit poll of the 1991 LegCo direct elections; personal interviews with leading political leaders; campaign materials and election debates on television; and newspaper cuttings.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

LIST OF TABLES

Tables

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Scope and Purpose

Political change in Hong Kong in the 1980s and 1990s has its uniqueness. First of all, it is clear that Hong Kong will never become an independent state after the "decolonisation" process. The Chinese Government, whether under the rule of the Kuomintang (KMT) or the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has never failed to assert its sovereignty over Hong Kong and has claimed to be able to restore it when she thinks fit. Unlike other British colonies, therefore, the transfer of power is not from the colonial government to the native people but to another sovereign state-- China. Thus, the normal Westminster decolonization process leading to the establishment of a parliamentary sovereign state would not happen in Hong Kong. The destiny of Hong Kong was finally fixed in 1984 when Britain agreed to return Hong Kong to China in 1997.

Second, there has been a lack of widespread nationalist movements in Hong Kong since the 1940s. Without the intense mobilisation in society witnessed in the independence movements of other decolonising colonies, Hong Kong has failed to have an integrated political force and a popular leadership to represent the people's views and interests, and to provide a vision of change. On the one hand, the traditional and economic elites have been isolated from the masses for decades and it would be very difficult to enlist support from the masses because of differences in values and interests between them. On the other hand, the newly emerging middle-class political activists do have some social support, but they are rather loosely

organized and not equipped well with the "will and might" to challenge the political status quo.

Third, the "pre-emptive" political reforms in the 1980s initiated by Britain have unleashed the "frozen" political force.[1] At the organisational level, group-building efforts attempted by the political activists were induced in the early 1980s by the expected devolution of power as stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 and the Chinese promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" after 1997. This gave an institutional push to defrost the "frozen" political forces and eventually created a political market through which various political groups compete among themselves for the devolved political goods. At the individual level, the mass public was suddenly exposed to the still-in-the-making political market and subject to frequent political mobilisation drives by the political activists. Their political horizons were, in one way or another, extended, because "politics" was no more a taboo in society. The demystification of politics had removed psychological hurdles and eventually made society prone to political mobilisation. Moreover, the enfranchised public was reminded to think politically by the periodic advent of elections. More important is that the reform from above created a situation where the political power devolved orderly to the local society. This development contradicted the wishes of the Chinese Government. Any reforms, without the blessing of the Chinese Government, would not be accepted because Beijing questions the motive behind the reform and wants as little change in political structure as possible in the transitional period. But the ball is not in the Chinese court. The British Government still has the legitimate right to initiate as well as carry out its own policy in the transitional period, although consultation with China is required as stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. Moreover, the situation was

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[1]The word "frozen" is used to describe the rather static nature of the politics of Hong Kong before the 1980s. See Peter Harris, *Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucratic Politics* (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1978), p. 132.

further complicated by the fact that the democrats[2], whose political value and orientation differed from that of the Beijing Government, especially after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, were supported by the majority of Hong Kong voters in the 1991 Legislative Council (LegCo) first-ever direct elections. Out of the 18 directly elected seats of the LegCo, the democrats won 16. More important was the fact that none of the leftist candidates got elected.[3] It is very strange to have such a complicated and subtle relationship among the colonial government, the colonized, and future sovereign state of the colonized.

Under such peculiar circumstances, how to comprehend the collective behaviour of the Hong Kong voters and the results of the 1991 LegCo direct elections are, thus, important topics to explore.. Individuals do not live in isolation. They are social beings and, thus, cannot avoid interaction with the society. So, individual behaviour has its social and contextual dimensions. In other words, the electoral choice of voters, though made individually, has something to do with the specific social configurations and conditions which prevailed at the election time. With this understanding in mind, what this thesis plans to study is the identification of the social cleavage lines that help shape the voters' choice and serve as the basis of mobilisation during the 1991 LegCo direct elections. It also attempts to explore the following related questions: what specific social conditions in the 1980s contributed to the salience of particular cleavage lines among the political elites? How these cleavage lines structured the development of political groups (parties) in the 1980s? Under what political conditions, do these political groups establish linkage and network with the electorate? How effective are the mobilisation efforts of these political groups? What implications do these cleavages have for the future political

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[2]The democrats are those who support faster pace of democratisation and who advocate more welfare to the low-income groups and the poor. The democrats mostly come from the new middle-class of professionals, intellectuals, social workers, lawyers, and so on.

[3]*Oriental Daily News*, 17 September 1991, p. 3; *Sing Tao Jih Pao*, 17 September 1991, p. 23.

change of Hong Kong in general, and the development of party system and electoral competition in particular?

The period 1981-91 is chosen for the present study for several reasons: only the reforms in the 1980s have changed the franchise system to allow mass participation; only the expansion of the franchise has transformed Hong Kong's political ecology significantly and paved the way for the emergence of electoral politics; and only in the period under study do we witness the widespread political mobilisation that has never been seen in the history of Hong Kong.

Literature Review

Given that universal suffrage in Hong Kong was only introduced at the district level in 1982 and at the central level in 1991, it is not surprising to find that there were not many academic electoral studies in the 1980s. As one study has suggested, there were altogether 67 voting behaviour surveys in the period 1970-91, and nearly half of them (N=32) were conducted in 1991.[4] Furthermore, most of them were conducted by civic or community groups, or commissioned by the mass media. The objective of the former to conduct voting behaviour survey was to mobilise the mass public's electoral awareness, while that of the latter was to attract readers' or audiences' attention by predicting the winners in the electoral "horse races". Thus, nearly all of these surveys are descriptive in nature rather than explanatory. As shown in the same study, only nine voting surveys (with reports) were conducted by academics.[5] Nevertheless, over twenty articles on the 1991 elections were added to the stock of voting studies in Hong Kong in late 1992 and 1993.[6]

Among this literature, it appears that only one research paper seeks to analyze the electoral expression of social contradiction and its relations with electoral support. It was conducted by Leung Sai-wing and published in 1993 under the title "The

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[4]Louie Kin-sheun and Wan Po-san, *Voting Behaviour of the Hong Kong Electorate: A Review of the Past Studies*, Paper submitted to Steering Group on Study of Voting Behaviour, Committee on the Promotion of Civic Education, Hong Kong, March 1992, p. 27, appendix 2. (Copy supplied by Louie Kin-sheun to me on 15 June 1993.)

[5]*Ibid.*, pp. 22-4.

[6]These included: Rowena Kwok, Loan Leung and Ian Scott, eds., *Votes Without Power: The Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections 1991* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992); Jermain T.M. Lam and Jane C.Y. Lee, *The Political Culture of the Voters in Hong Kong: A Study of the Geographical Constituencies of the Legislative Council in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: City Polytechnic of Hong Kong, 1992a); Jermain T.M. Lam and Jane C.Y. Lee, "Allegiance, Apathy, or Alienation? The Political Culture of Professional Constituency Voters in Hong Kong," *Issues & Studies* 28,7(1992b):76-109; Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds., *Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993).

'China Factor' in the 1991 Legislative Council Election: The June 4th Incident and Anti-Communist China Syndrome".[7] Leung argues that "it was the socialization of alienation through political events, with the June 4th Incident as the climax, during the transitional period of Hong Kong that resulted in the besieging of pro-China candidates by an anti-Communist China sentiment and in the landslide victory of the democratic camp in the 1991 [LegCo] direct election."[8] Furthermore, Leung also indicates that some Hong Kong people, especially the younger generation, have evolved an "anti-Communist China syndrome". The syndrome that he refers to is "an integrated set of political attitudes, with the distrust of the Chinese government as the centrifugal force, from which other related political attitudes, or even political actions, are derived."[9]

The popular reason advanced to account for the landslide victory of the democrats, especially those of the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK) and the Meeting Point (MP), in the 1991 first-ever LegCo direct elections was the Tiananmen Incident complex or the "anti-Communist China syndrome" among the Hong Kong voters. It is true that the events in the Tiananmen Square in 1989 had reinforced the Hong Kong people's long-term distrust of the Communist Chinese Government, and thus contributed to their support for the democrats' candidates. But it might not be the sole factor in shaping the voters' electoral choices. What is left untouched are the domestic political contradictions and their linkages with China. In the mid-1980s, two conflicts seem to occupy the domestic political scene. First, the political conflict between the Hong Kong Government, the conservatives[10] and the leftists[11] on the

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[7]Leung Sai-wing, "The 'China Factor' in the 1991 Legislative Council Election: The June 4th Incident and Anti-Communist China Syndrome," in Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds., *Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993), pp. 187-235.

[8]*Ibid.*, p. 192.

[9]*Ibid.*, pp. 219-20.

[10]The conservatives are those who support the political status quo and want as little political reform as possible, who also value the efficiency of the market and

one hand, and the democrats on the other, over the political reforms in the transitional period, as well as between the conservatives and the democrats over the future political model of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region (HKSAR). Second, the conflict between the Hong Kong Government and Hong Kong society over the privatisation scheme and related measures. The picture becomes more complicated because of China's growing involvement in the domestic politics. It is a logical development as Hong Kong becomes part of China after 1997. The problems are: under what conditions do the two sides meet with each other, and what attitude does the Chinese Government adopt to frame the new political relationship and order between herself and Hong Kong.

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oppose greater spending on welfare. The conservatives mostly come from the business sector, rural and local communities.

[11]The term "leftists" is used, throughout this thesis, to denote those people or organisations that are affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or its related organisations, and also those who are the supporters of the CCP.

Theoretical Framework

It is useful to clarify a number of terms and concepts, such as democratisation, political cleavage, political mobilisation, partisan alignment, and so on, which have been the subject of academic debate, so as to provide a theoretical framework for this study.

Democratisation and Elections

As advanced by Samuel P. Huntington, there are several conditions contributing to the democratisation of the non-democratic regimes. They are:[12]

a.   declining legitimacy and the performance dilemma;

b.   economic development and economic crises;

c.   religious changes;

d.   new policies of external actors; and

e.   demonstration effects or snowballing.

Although the relative significance of the above-mentioned objective conditions may vary, Huntington has included in his analysis a subjective dimension of democratic transition, that is, the "will and skill" of political leaders throughout the democratisation process. To borrow his words,

> General factors create conditions favorable to democratization. They do not make democratization necessary, and they are at one remove [sic] from the factors immediately responsible for democratization. A democratic regime is installed not by trends but by people. Democracies are created not by causes but by causers. Political leaders and publics have to act. . . .[13]

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[12]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman & London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), pp. 45-106.

[13]*Ibid.*, p. 107.

What is democratisation, then? Put simply, democratisation denotes the process of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. In the process of democratisation, Stein Rokkan has identified four sequential thresholds:

a. legitimation: the recognition of the right of petition, criticism against the regime, and the protection of the rights of assembly, expression, etc;

b. incorporation: the granting of equal right to choose representatives to the opposition and their potential supporters;

c. representation: the lowering of institutional barriers for the representation of the opposition; and

d. executive power: the opening of the executive organ to legislative pressure, or the direct influence of the legislature on executive decision-making.

The emergence of competitive mass politics depends on the crossing of the first two thresholds, while the institutional development of mass politics relies on the crossing of the last two thresholds. The lowering of one threshold would sooner or later generate pressure on the change of the other, but the transition to other higher thresholds would not be automatic.[14]

Furthermore, Rokkan has also suggested "four steps of change" in the process of electoral mobilisation:[15]

a. incorporation: the inclusion of the former disfranchised publics;

b. mobilisation: the mobilisation of the enfranchised in electoral contests;

c. activation: the encouragement of direct participation in public life; and

d. politicisation: the intrusion of national parties into local elections.

Although scholars and the public have different interpretations of the word "democracy" and the exact constitution of democratic rule, one thing that can be certain is the minimum institutional requirement that the top decision-makers should be elected periodically by means of an open, fair, popular and competitive election.

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[14]For details and related political changes, see Stein Rokkan, *Citizens, Elections, Parties* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), pp. 79-96.

[15]*Ibid.*, p. 227.

If we use this ideal criterion to measure Hong Kong's political reforms implemented to date, we can only describe the moves so far as "liberalisation" rather than "democratisation" of the colonial structure; for liberalisation means "the partial opening of an authoritarian system short of choosing governmental leaders through freely competitive elections".[16] In the context of Hong Kong, although only 18 seats, out of 60 seats, are opened for direct election and the post of chief executive is still not determined by means of election, the 1991 LegCo direct elections can be regarded as a competitive one because the participants, whether candidates or voters, are free to enter or exit the election. The distribution of the remaining 42 members are as follow: 3 official appointed members, 18 non-official appointed members, and 21 elected members through functional constituency.

Whatever it may be, liberalisation or democratisation, once the competitive elections and universal franchise have been put in place in a state, the institutional threshold of political participation will be lowered. The absorption of the newly mobilized persons into the "network of electoral institutions" may have a "deinstitutionalizing effect" on the existing political order. As a result, the "decay of institutionalized patterns of behavior" has given the original, excluded politicians an opportunity of jockeying for power through the newly instituted competitive electoral system.[17] Subsequently, modern mass political parties would be formed to fight the electoral battle. Through the help of political parties, the public have been, in one way or another, incorporated into the national political process. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner have aptly described the situation:

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[16]Huntington (1991), *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[17]Adam Przeworski, "Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization the Source of Decay?" *American Political Science Review* 69 (1975):49-67.

Where the suffrage is greatly restricted, local electoral committees are simply not needed; where it is expanded, the need to woo the masses is strongly felt. What was once a struggle limited to an aristocratic elite or small groups of notables now becomes a major drama in which large segments of the citizenry play an active role.[18]

The most controversial and critical issue during the transition seems to be "the production of contingent consent" on a set of election rules that the ensuing national elections will be based upon.[19] All the concerned parties will try to shape the election rules to their favour, "for the party that wins the transition election plays a key role in the consolidation of democracy, often writing a new constitution, deciding the fate of the old guard, and rewriting the 'rules of the game'".[20] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter highlight three critical dimensions in finding such consent of procedural democracy:[21]

a.   eligibility of participants and threshold for representation;

b.   electoral formula ("workable majorities" vs "accurate representation"); and

c.   "the structure of offices for which national elections are held" ("parliamentarism" vs "presidentialism").

At a "founding election", it is said that the election outcome would be highly uncertain because of the inexperience of voters in choosing candidates, weak identity

[18]Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, "The Origin and Development of Political Parties," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 9.

[19]Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 59.

[20]"Transition election" is "the first national electoral contests which follow the restoration of political freedom". See Nancy Bermeo, "Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and Portugal," *Comparative Politics* 19 (1987):213.

[21]O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

of voters with parties, unclear candidates' image, and the unreliability of survey results.[22]

Nancy Bermeo, however, has proposed three structural factors that may have "the strongest effect" on the outcome of the "transition election":[23]

a.   the patterns of regime transformation: revolution or reform;

b.   the class configurations; and

c.   the critical role of semiopposition.

The term "semiopposition" is used by Juan Linz to describe groups "that are not dominant or represented in the governing group but that are willing to participate in power without fundamentally challenging the regime" and thus, can be considered as "Being partly 'out' [of] and partly 'in' power".[24]

Concept of Political Cleavages

If the statement "politics arises from the existence of cleavages" is assumed to be true,[25] then, social cleavages exist in every political community, no matter what the form of government or political system may be. The problem is by what means can we identify these cleavages. Probably, elections may provide the

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[22]"Founding elections" means "for the first time after an authoritarian regime, elected positions of national significance are disputed under reasonably competitive conditions". See *ibid.*, pp. 57 & 61.

[23]Nancy Bermeo, "Redemocratization and Transition Elections: A Comparison of Spain and Portugal," *Comparative Politics* 19 (1987):213.

[24]Juan Linz, "Opposition in and under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in Robert A. Dahl, ed., *Regime and Opposition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 191-2.

[25]Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, *The Analysis of Political Cleavages* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 21.

appropriate occasion to detect them, as elections are said to serve as "a measure of social divisions" and "provide information on the extent to which society is organised and divided by such factors as religion, class and ethnicity".[26] This is particularly the case in "competitive" elections.

Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor have defined cleavages as:

the criteria which divide the members of a community or subcommunity into groups, and the relevant cleavages are those which divide members into groups with important political differences at specific times and places.[27]

Ronald Inglehart indicates that if a political community is divided into groups that particularly favour certain policies and parties for a period of time, political cleavages are said to be present. He described political cleavages as "relatively stable patterns of polarization" in a political system.[28]

As political conflicts are of different natures and forms in different societies, political cleavages will then be organized along different bases of social divisions. The following scholars have put forward various types of cleavages.

Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan suggest four critical cleavages:

a. subject-dominant culture (centre-periphery);

b. church-government (church-state);

c. primary-secondary economy (land-industry); and

d. workers-employers (worker-owner).

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[26]Martin Harrop and William L. Miller, *Elections and Voters* (Hampshire: MacMillan, 1987), p. 173.

[27]Rae and Taylor (1970), *op. cit.*, p. 1.

[28]Ronald Inglehart, "The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Societies," in Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck, eds., *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 25.

The first two and the last two cleavages are the direct products of national and industrial revolutions, respectively.[29]

Rae and Taylor have differentiated three types of cleavage:[30]

a. ascriptive (race or caste);

b. attitudinal ("opinion" cleavages as ideology or preference);

c. behavioral ("act" cleavage elicited through voting and organizational membership).

Huntington suggests that three major cleavages will develop when society moves from being industrial to postindustrial:[31]

a. group cleavage: that is divisions between declining and rising social forces; between declining forces; and between rising social forces in terms of social status, economic position, and numerical strength.

b. institutional cleavage: that is party conflict, legislative-executive conflict, state-national conflict, executive bureaucracy-mass media conflict.

c. ideological (political goals and values) cleavage: that is between modern and traditional groups; among modernizing groups of bourgeoisie, the military, and intellectuals over values of development, efficiency, and egalitarianism.

In the past decade, the literature on electoral cleavage is mainly divided over the discussion of production-based (class) and consumption-based (sectoral) cleavages. Before the late 1970s, class voting research had received wide acceptance in Western academic circles, especially in Britain. In the late 1970s, this trend was challenged by Patrick Dunleavy, who incorporated the concept of consumption cleavages in

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[29]Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignment: An Introduction," in Seymour Lipset and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Party System and Voter Alignments* (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 14.

[30]Rae and Taylor (1970), *op. cit.*, p. 1.

[31]Samuel P. Huntington, "Postindustrial Politics: How Benign Will It Be?" *Comparative Politics* 6 (1974):163-191.

explaining electoral behaviour.[32] Dunleavy argues that with the expansion of state activities and state intervention into the consumption process, sectoral cleavages (collective vs individualized consumption) would emerge and crosscut the existing class cleavages. Hence, class voting may decline and give way to accommodate sectoral voting. The sectoral cleavage model is basically developed out of the thesis of collective consumption in urban politics advanced by Manuel Castells in 1972.[33]

Inglehart argues that the value-based polarization of materialist-postmaterialist issues has entered into the political arena.[34] He suggests that when the postmaterialist issues, such as environmentalism, the women's movement, the peace movement, the consumer advocacy movement, come to the centre of political debates, the materialist reaction of much of the working class would be stimulated to reassert the traditional materialist value of economic growth, security, and law and order. This may help to neutralize the class-based cleavage and eventually pave the way for electoral and partisan change. Parties of the Left will be divided over the postmaterialist issues and, thus, suffer a net flow of support to the Right. This perspective is also known as the "new politics thesis".[35]

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[32]Patrick Dunleavy, "The Urban Basis of Political Alignment: Social Class, Domestic Property Ownership, and State Intervention in Consumption Processes," *British Journal of Political Science* 9 (1979):409-443; Patrick Dunleavy, "The Political Implications of Sectoral Cleavages and the Growth of State Employment: Part 1, The Analysis of Production Cleavages," *Political Studies* 28 (1980):364-383; Patrick Dunleavy, "The Political Implications of Sectoral Cleavages and the Growth of State Employment: Part 2, Cleavage Structure and Political Alignment," *Political Studies* 28 (1980):527-549.

[33]Manuel Castells, *City, Class and Power* (Hampshire: MacMillan, 1978), chapter 2.

[34]Ronald Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics* (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977); Inglehart (1984), *op. cit.*

[35]Oddbjorn Knutsen, "Political Cleavages and Political Alignment in Norway: The New Politics Thesis Reexamined," *Scandinavian Political Studies* 9 (1986):235-263.

In a review article discussing cleavage models, Arend Lijphart has included foreign policy, regime support, participatory democracy, and ecological dimensions on the top of those types proposed by Lipset and Rokkan.[36]

Political Mobilisation, Political Party
and Partisan Alignment

Although there are various types of cleavage, as mentioned above, only a few of them may find electoral expression and serve as the basis for partisan alignment (see Figure 1). The salience of particular cleavages may depend on the availability and nature of political cleavages presented at the time of introduction of universal franchise. Given that the election results would decide who or which party has the mandate to rule within a pre-defined period of time, and the legitimacy to allocate or distribute political goods and social resources, different political forces would align with those of similar values to form political groups or parties and mobilize people for electoral support. Thus, political parties would act as an agent to politicise the cleavages and to mobilize them for electoral support.

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[36]Arend Lijphart, "The Cleavage Model and Electoral Geography: A Review," in R.J. Johnston, F.M. Shelley, and P.J. Taylor, eds., *Developments in Electoral Geography* (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 143-50.

Mobilisation, here, is conceptualised as:

a composite process involving several stages:
(a) the existence of values and goals requiring mobilization.
(b) action on the part of leaders, elites or institutions seeking to mobilize individuals and groups.
(c) the institutional and collective means of achieving this mobilization.
(d) the symbols and references by which values, goals and norms are communicated to, and understood as well as internalized by, the individuals involved in mobilization.
(e) the process by which mobilization takes place in terms of individual interaction, the creation and change of collectivities and structure, the crystallization of roles, the effect on subsystems and their boundaries.
(f) estimates of the numbers of people (or proportion of a population) mobilized and the degree of such mobilization for different sectors or strata of the population.[37]

In other words, political mobilisation "is to be considered as differential commitment and support for collectivities based on cleavages".[38]

The seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* provided the theoretical linkage between cleavage structure, party systems, and voter alignment.[39] They argued that the incorporation of rank-and-file voters into the electoral process as a result of the introduction of universal franchise in most European countries and the presence of social cleavages in the political community would help to shape the development of party systems. Political parties are said to be an "agent of conflict and instrument of integration". On the one hand, a political party is only a "part" of the political system; it needs to compete with others for power. Conflict, thus, is hard to prevent. On the other hand, when a party is engaged in the established political game, it certainly works to mobilize voters to support its own cause. As a result of such mobilisation, the former, loosely knitted local community would be integrated with the national political process.

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[37]J.P. Nettl, *Political Mobilization: A Sociological Analysis of Methods and Concepts* (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), p. 33.

[38]*Ibid.*, p.126.

[39]Lipset and Rokkan (1967), *op. cit.*, pp. 1-64.

Alan S. Zuckerman argues that the nature and extent of political cleavage depends on the interplay between party leadership and the "variable strength of the social bonds". The term "social bonds" is described as "tightly knit networks of interaction" in which "most individuals interact with others on many dimensions and exist within variably bound groups". Therefore, its meaning is different from Karl Marx's concept of class. He also argues that only politicized networks of interaction would give rise to the persistent political divisions, and political divisions would be either widespread or persistent, and vice versa.[40]

Political parties make use of the media and the "tightly knit networks of interaction" to convey their respective value systems and policy positions to the public. In order to differentiate from other political parties, the traditional view of conducting election campaigns has been said to adopt a "direct confrontation" method and focuses on the party difference over a set of issues or policies. But Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie point out that parties actually tend to emphasise selectively their "own" issue or policy areas.[41] That is what they call the "saliency theory" of party competition.

As a result, social or economic divisions that have found political (electoral) expression may serve as the basis of cleavage, cutting or cross-cutting the electorate into several slices. Party competition and electoral battles would, then, be fought along these lines of cleavage. Although Lipset and Rokkan have claimed that the Western party system has been frozen for nearly half-a-century, actually the shift of the cleavage line may cause the realignment of political forces.[42] Parties that have responded adequately to the new shift and absorbed the new cleavages into their own

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[40]Alan S. Zuckerman, "New Approaches to Political Cleavage: A Theoretical Introduction," *Comparative Political Studies* 15 (1982):137-40.

[41]Ian Budge and Dennis Farlie, "Party Competition: Selective Emphasis or Direct Confrontation? An Alternative View with Data," in Hans Daalder and Peter Mair, eds., *Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), pp. 269-72.

[42]Lipset and Rokkan (1967), *op. cit.*

programmes will survive. Parties that have failed to adapt will witness a significant decline of electoral support and fade away eventually. Electoral volatility may then happen and pave the way for dealignment or realignment of political forces. The study of electoral volatility (change, dealignment, realignment) therefore has received much attention from students in the field.[43]

The ebb and flow of a particular social cleavage will cause a long-term change in the party system. As suggested above, the rise of postmaterialist values in Western Europe has crosscut the parties of the left. The line of reasoning is that when a party fails to respond to the emerging critical cleavages, the decline of electoral support may be expected, and those parties that can represent the new cleavage may witness a significant gain of vote.

But the same logic would not apply to the type of election that has taken place in a "non-competitive" system. Since the whole exercise of election is devised to legitimatize the pre-determined outcome, the electoral result would not really reflect the societal cleavages. There is no such thing as partisan alignment and party system

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[43]Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ian Budge, "Electoral Volatility: Issue Effects and Basic Change in 23 Post-War Democracies," *Electoral Studies* 1 (1982):147-168; David Butler and Donald Strokes, *Political Change in Britain: the Evolution of Electoral Choice*, 2nd ed. (London: MacMillan, 1974); Herome M. Clubb, W.H. Flanigan, and N.H. Zingale, *Partisan Realignment: Voters, Parties, and Government in American History*, Westview Encore ed. (Boulder: Westview, 1990); Ivor Crewe and D. Denver, eds., *Electoral Change in Western Democracies* (Beckenham: Croom Helm, 1985); Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Pail Allen Beck, eds., *Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment?* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Robert H. Salisbury and Michael MacKuen, "On the Study of Party Realignment," *Journal of Politics* 43 (1981):523-530; James L. Sundquist, *Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States*, rev. ed., (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1983).

change in that kind of election. So, some scholars describe this as "state-controlled" elections.[44]

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[44]Guy Hermet, "State-Controlled Elections: A Framework," in Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquie, eds., *Elections Without Choice* (London: MacMillan, 1978), pp. 1-18; for elections in socialist states, see Robert K. Furtak, ed., *Elections in Socialist States* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990a).

Organisation of the Thesis

Following on from this introductory chapter (Chapter One), the remainder of the thesis is organised as follows:

Chapter Two: Historical Setting: The State and The Society

The political context under which the political reforms in the 1980s took place is examined. Topics included are: the nature of the Colonial state, the social compositions and their political orientations, the reasons for no serious challenge to colonialism, and the unusual decolonisation process in the early 1980s. By putting in this context, subsequent developments can be properly comprehended.

Chapter Three: The Rise of the Centre-Periphery Cleavage

This chapter charts the development of centre-periphery cleavage in the 1980s, in which the contradiction between the British-Hong Kong Government and the Hong Kong society was gradually transformed to that of the Chinese Government and Hong Kong society. The focal point is the pace and direction of liberalisation or democratisation in the transitional period. Attempts are also made to examine the efforts of all the concerned parties to mobilise support for their favoured political models before and after 1997.

Chapter Four: Government Expansion and Collective Consumption Cleavage

This chapter demonstrates the expanding activities of the Hong Kong Government and the formation of the collective consumption cleavage. The reason for privatisation since the mid-1980s is also examined and the example of public housing programmes is used to illustrate the trend of privatisation. The more the government intervenes in the society, the more the impact of the government policies upon the society; the more the government policies grow in scope and depth, the higher the proportion of people being drawn into the political process. As a result, any change in policy direction will meet with protest from the affected sector(s) and any move to privatize the collective consumption goods, such as public housing, hospital service, education, and so on, will cause shifts in electoral support.

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Chapter Five: The Development and Alignment of Political Forces

This chapter examines the various stages of development of political forces within Hong Kong and their alignments since the 1970s. The structural factors leading to the transformation of pressure groups into election-oriented political groups is also studied. Social origin of the political forces and their ideology as well as policy location are examined so as to ascertain the nature of the forces and the political (electoral) universe in which the electorate weigh each political force and cast their votes accordingly. By tracing the origins and the alignment of various political forces in the 1980s, a budding party system emerges.

Chapter Six: Political Mobilisation and Electoral Choices

This chapter focuses on the mobilisation efforts the relevant electoral participants had made in the 1991 LegCo direct elections, including both the Chinese and the British Governments. The reason for including this chapter is to provide the immediate context wherein the electors are exposed to the universe of the political market during an intense election campaign period. Through the media reports and features, individual voters may acquire the relevant information for deliberation. At the same time, we can identify the issues or policies that the candidates and parties want to stress and sell to the electorate.

Chapter Seven: Analysis of the 1991 LegCo Direct Elections Results

By the help of survey and aggregate data, this chapter explores the election results of the 1991 LegCo direct elections and tries to comprehend the result within the theoretical framework mentioned above. The former includes exit poll and survey of electoral behaviour. The latter comprises the 1991 Census and electoral return data.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

This chapter argues the presence of two electoral cleavages, i.e. the centre-periphery and the collective consumption cleavages, in the 1991 LegCo direct elections, and examines various possible scenarios that may occur in the future electoral competition in Hong Kong.

Figure 1.1 Cleavage Transformation

N

Social or Economic
Divisions

N-1

Political Cleavages

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL SETTING:

THE STATE AND THE SOCIETY

Hong Kong as a British Colony

The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong comprises three parts: the Island of Hong Kong, the Kowloon Peninsula, and the New Territories. Hong Kong Island and Kowloon were ceded in perpetuity to Britain in 1842 and 1860, respectively. The New Territories were leased to Britain for a period of 99 years from 1898.

Like other British colonies, Hong Kong is headed by a powerful governor, who is formally appointed by the Queen (King) of the United Kingdom.[45] The Governor is supported administratively by the Government Secretariat.[46] Before the 1980s, the highest level of the government bureaucracy was dominated by non-Chinese expatriates. As in other colonies, an appointed Executive Council and Legislative Council (ExCo and LegCo) have been set up to advise and assist him to rule the colony.[47] Although the power is highly concentrated in the Governor's

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[45]For an introduction to Hong Kong's political system, see Norman Miners, *The Government and Politics of Hong Kong*, 5th ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991).

[46]The Government Secretariat was known as the Colonial Secretariat before 1976.

[47]For the development of the British colony's legislature before the Second World War, see Martin Wight, *The Development of the Legislative Council 1606-1945*

hands, he is kept under the supervision and co-ordination of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.[48] In fact, Britain has seldom intervened into the local affairs, except for those matters related to security and foreign relations, since the Second World War. This is especially the case after the granting of financial autonomy in 1958. Mr John Walden, the former Director of Home Affairs who retired in 1980, outlined the relations between the British and the Hong Kong Governments as follows:

> . . . the British Government gave the Governor of Hong Kong and his small team of civil servants an almost unfettered hand in the way they governed Hong Kong. The Government, though colonial in origins, was in no sense a creature of the British Government. . . . Britain rarely tried to exert pressure upon the Hong Kong Government.[49]

In addition, the Governor himself has generally been a British civil servant without any vested interest in Hong Kong and has been subject to a fixed term of service. Because of such a peculiar relationship, the Hong Kong Government is operated actually by bureaucrats who are insulated from public pressure. Nevertheless, "the well-meaning traditional paternalism of British Colonial Governors" would be to care about the welfare of the colonial people.[50]

Under the pressure to have more overseas markets as a result of the tremendous enhancement of productive capacity brought about by industrialisation since the sixteenth century, the British traders, like their counterparts in other

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(London: Faber & Faber, 1946). The LegCo has started to have elective elements since 1985.

[48]The Hong Kong Government was supervised by the Colonial Office until the re-organisation in 1968. Since then, the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office have merged to form the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

[49]John Walden, *Excellency, Your Gap is Growing! Six Talks on a Chinese Takeaway* (Hong Kong: All Noble Co. Ltd., 1987), p. 89.

[50]John Walden, *Excellency, Your Gap is Showing! Six Critiques on British Colonial Government in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Corporate Communications Ltd., 1983), p. 9.

European countries, had travelled to Asia for the sake of trade expansion. The colonisation of Hong Kong was, therefore, initiated by British traders and arose solely out of economic considerations. It seems quite normal that the ensuing colonial government has often come under the influence of those who have a vested interest in trading with China. Their influence can be well reflected in their nearly exclusive appointment to the LegCo and the ExCo.[51] Furthermore, these traders maintained strong ties with Britain.[52] The presence of these metropolitan capitalists dominated the input from society in the early period of colonial rule, probably up to the 1920s.[53]

Accompanying the establishment of the Crown Colony was the flourishing of the entrepot trade and relevant economic development. By taking advantage of the economic boom, some indigenous businessmen promptly adapted to the newly emerged economic order and gradually built up their sphere of influence. In order to accommodate the emerging indigenous economic forces, the Hong Kong Government has resorted to co-opting the Chinese elite by appointing them to prestigious positions at various levels of government. This corporatist approach of politics is reflected in the appointment of them to the LegCo and the ExCo in 1880 and 1926, respectively.[54]

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[51]A full list of the appointed ExCo and LegCo members before 1941 can be found in G.B. Endacott, *Government and People in Hong Kong 1841-1962: A Constitutional History* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1964), pp. 250-3.

[52]G.B. Endacott, *A Biographical Sketch-Book of Early Hong Kong* (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1962), pp. 157-62.

[53]Chan Wai Kwan, *The Making of Hong Kong Society: Three Studies of Class Formation in Early Hong Kong* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), chaps 2-4.

[54]For the background leading to the appointment of Chinese LegCo and ExCo members, see Endacott (1964), *op. cit.*, pp. 89-96 & 135-49; also, T.C. Cheng, "Chinese Unofficial Members of the Legislative and Executive Councils in Hong Kong Up to 1941," *Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 9 (1969):7-30.

The predominant position of the traders and big business representatives in the state structure has been maintained up to the present, though the pool of appointment was extended to the "new rich" and middle-class professionals in the mid-1970s. Some scholars have argued that the state power seems to be used to protect and enhance the privileges of the capitalist class.[55] An often-quoted sentence reads: "Power in Hong Kong . . . resides in the Jockey Club, Jardine and Matheson, The Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and the Governor--in that order."[56] H.J. Lethbridge also argues that: "It is a Colony run today--though this is not a result of deliberate Government policy but faute de mieux--for a small group of Chinese and European businessmen, experts in the technique of making money."[57] This line of reasoning is in line with the Marxist argument that the capitalist state is only "a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie".[58] That means the state does not have its own autonomy at all.

But we would argue that in order to maintain the capitalist mode of production, the state would have to act in contradiction to the will of some capitalists. In analyzing post-colonial societies in South Asia, Hamza Alavi has put forward his thesis of the "plurality of economically dominant classes" of metropolitan bourgeoisie, indigenous bourgeoisie and landed bourgeoisie that have regulated and controlled the military-bureaucratic oligarchies through "the needs and demands, the logic, of peripheral capitalism".[59] That means that the bureaucratic state may have a leverage

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[55]S.N.G. Davies, "One Brand of Politics Rekindled," *Hong Kong Law Journal* 7 (1977):44-80.

[56]Richard Hughes, *Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time: Hong Kong and Its Many Faces*, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976), p. 23.

[57]H.J. Lethbridge, "Hong Kong Under Japanese Occupation: Changes in Social Structure," in I.C. Jarvie and Joseph Agassi, eds., *Hong Kong: A Society in Transition* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 127.

[58]Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (Middlesex: Penguin, 1967), p. 82.

[59]Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," *New Left Review* 74 (1972):59-82; also, "Authoritarianism and Legitimation of State

to balance the interests of the above-mentioned economic classes and has thus enjoyed "relative" autonomy as far as it proceeds according to the "structural imperative of capital". That means the state is able to enjoy autonomy, though it may be a "relative" one.[60]

Although the Hong Kong Government is rather free from mass (electoral) pressure, there are occasional conflicts with the businessmen over the question of taxation. On the one hand, Britain seems to be reluctant to take up all the financial cost of running the colony, but, on the other, the capitalists want to pay as little tax as possible and to maintain a "minimal" government. This kind of conflict often surfaced in the early colonial period.[61] Although Hong Kong is a capitalist state, she seems to enjoy a certain degree of autonomy in the face of capitalists' challenge. Several examples can be cited to illustrate this point.

First of all, despite the resistance from both the shipping companies and its own officials, the state insisted on building the state-owned railway which connected Hong Kong with Canton in the mid-1900s. The then Hong Kong Harbour Master was quoted as saying the following in 1906:

> It is a work which those who favour it appear to think will bring new prosperity to Hong Kong. But as the Colony depends entirely upon shipping for its existence I do not feel so hopeful, neither do I see its value or necessity.[62]

Even up to 1934, the shipping companies, which were dominated by European capitalists, still complained about the unfair competition of the state-owned railway.

Power in Pakistan," in Subrata Kumar Mitra, ed., *The Post-Colonial State: Dialectics of Politics and Culture* (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), 19-71.

[60]Eric A. Nordlinger, *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State* (Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), especially chaps. 1 & 2.

[61]Endacott (1964), *op. cit.*, chaps. 3 & 4.

[62]Cited by S.G. Davis, *Hong Kong In Its Geographical Setting* (London: Collins, 1949), p. 131.

Second, despite competition from a British firm, the Hong Kong state granted a contract of HK$5,000 million to a Japanese consortium for the construction of the Mass Transit Railway in 1973.[63]

Third, contrary to its economic philosophy of laissez-faire, the Government initiated a massive public housing scheme in the early 1970s. The state intervention into the collective consumption process has the effect of stabilizing workers' wages and then maintained its cheap labour edge in the world market.[64]

Fourth, following a decade of social protest and movement as well as the flourishing of pressure groups, the state started to co-opt and accommodate the emerging new middle-class critics in the early 1980s by appointing them to various advisory committees and carrying out partial reform of its political structure. In the eyes of the metropolitan and indigenous capitalists, these emerging forces would do harm to the free economy, as they stand for the provision of "free lunch" and the establishment of some form of welfare state.

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[63]Kuan Hsin-chi, "Political Stability and Change in Hong Kong," in Lin Tzong-biau, Rance P.L. Lee and Udo-Ernst Simonis, eds., *Hong Kong: Economic, Social and Political Studies in Development* (New York & Kent: M.E. Sharpe & Wm Dawson, 1979), p. 151.

[64]For the change of government policy in the early 1970s, see Alvin Rabushka, *The Changing Face of Hong Kong: New Departures in Public Policy* (Washington, D.C. & Stanford: American Enterprise Institute & Hoover Institution, 1973); for the role of government in economic development, see Jonathan R. Schiffer, "State Policy and Economic Growth: A Note on the Hong Kong Model," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 15 (1991): 180-96.

State Development in the Pre-1945 Period

In the century beginning from the establishment of the colonial state in 1841 to the eve of the Japanese occupation in 1941, there was no substantial social demand on the Hong Kong Government, with the exception of the conflict between the earlier Governors and the business community over the problem of taxation. As a whole, the population living there by 1941 did not regard Hong Kong as their permanent domicile but rather as a temporary residence for the sake of economic betterment and emigration. Therefore, the society was of a transient nature in this period of time. Moreover, Hong Kong has served as a doorstep or supporting base for the British and later Chinese businessmen to advance their economic activities in mainland China. Acting as an entrepot, the function of the Hong Kong Government was largely confined to maintaining law and order, and the basic port and communication facilities.

Given the least degree of integration, the state relied on a narrow strata of socio-economic elites to communicate with the society which is largely composed of ethnic Chinese.[65] The co-option of the prominent social and economic figures into the ExCo, the LegCo, the Sanitary Board (SB)[66] and other advisory bodies served to enhance the efficiency of the Hong Kong Government. The Hong Kong Government started to appoint non-official members of LegCo and ExCo in 1850 and 1896 respectively. Indirect election of LegCo non-official members was also instituted in 1884, though it was not a formal process.[67] The General Chamber of Commerce and the non-official Justices of the Peace each elected one nominee whose name would be put through by the Governor to the Secretary of State in Britain for

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[65]H.J. Lethbridge, *Hong Kong: Stability and Change* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1978), chaps. 3-5.

[66]The Sanitary Board was set up in 1883 and was, later, replaced by the Urban Council (UrbCo) in 1936.

[67]Miners (1991), *op. cit.*, p. 129, n1.

appointment.[68] The SB also had its non-official and elected members in 1886 and 1888 respectively. But the franchise of the SB was very restrictive and its function was largely confined to the maintenance of public health. In the New Territories, the Hong Kong Government first adopted the principle of indirect rule through village elders, but this was gradually replaced by a district administration system with District Officer as the administrative head there. The state has co-opted the local landed figures through the Heung Yee Kuk (Rural Consultation Committee) since 1926. It has served as an informal senior advisory council and acted as the sole representative body for the indigenous residents there.

After the Japanese occupation in the period 1941-45, the British returned to Hong Kong and reinstalled the pre-war administrative structures there. But what was different from the pre-war period was the readiness of the British-Hong Kong Government to carry out political reform in the mid-1940s. Sir Mark Young, the then Hong Kong Governor, announced his intention to reform the colonial political structure in 1946, but the ensuing developments within and without Hong Kong contributed to the dropping of the plan. Chapter 4 will deal with this point in more detail.

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[68]Endacott (1964), *op. cit.*, pp. 102-3.

A Chinese Society Under British Rule

The Hong Kong people, especially the Chinese, have long been described as politically apathetic. Living in a "borrowed time" and a "borrowed place",[69] most of the Hong Kong Chinese are said to have emphasised material values, social stability, and short-term time horizons.[70] In addition, they are submissive to authority and lack civic consciousness and a sense of belonging. The submissive attitude of the Chinese people was well described by Lin Yu-tang, a famous scholar, in 1938:

> There is so much of this virtue (of patience) that it has almost become a vice. The Chinese people have put up with more tyranny, anarchy and misrule than any Western people have put up with, and seem to have regarded them as part of the laws of nature. In certain parts of Szechuan [Sichuan] the people have been taxed thirty years in advance without showing more energetic protest than a half-audible curse in the privacy of the household. Christian patience would seem like petulance compared to Chinese patience . . . We submit to tyranny and extortion as small fish swim into the mouth of a big fish.[71]

These orientations owe much to the cultural roots of Confucism and the tumultuous situation in China, particularly in Guangdong Province, from where most of the old Hong Kong Chinese originated. They came to the colony to avoid turmoil in China and seek a better living as well as economic opportunity. Most new-comers from China were labourers, less educated and not wealthy, except those who fled from Shanghai in 1949. The estimated population just before the Japanese occupation in 1941 was 1,600,000, but there was only 500,000 to 600,000 population when the

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[69]These terms are borrowed from Richard Hughes's book, *Borrowed Time, Borrowed Place: Hong Kong and Its Many Faces*, 2nd rev. ed. (London: Andre Deutsch, 1976).

[70]See Lau Siu-kai, *Society and Politics in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1982), pp. 68-72.

[71]Lin Yu-tang, *My Country and My People* (London, 1938), p. 44; quoted in N.J. Miners, "Hong Kong: A Case Study in Political Stability" *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 13 (1975):32.

British returned to the colony in 1945. In the late 1940s, there was an influx of refugees because of the civil war in China and the estimated population rose to 1,800,000.[72] The population figure doubled by the mid-1960s and amounted to 3,708,920 in 1966.[73] They found Hong Kong to be a promised land, compared with the situation and their life in China. Although the colonial structure is far from perfect and just, it provided a stable environment that was badly needed. With this in mind, they did not bother to challenge the colonial system.

From the mid-1960s, the socio-economic condition has begun to change. The post-war economic boom has failed to narrow the gap between the wealthy and the poor. As Ronald Hsia and Laurence Chau indicated:

> Despite the progress made in the 1960's, the distribution of household income in Hong Kong remained highly unequal in 1971. The top quintile of households received 51 per cent of the total income, the lowest quintile got less than 6 per cent, and the next lowest had only 10 per cent. At a low level of overall income, these figures imply a fairly widespread poverty. On a per capita basis, our calculations show that 138,000 persons had a monthly income of less than $50, and another 766,000 had to make do with less than $100. By any standard, these are very poor people indeed.[74]

Furthermore, the working hours were long, usually ten to twelve hours a day and seven days a week in the 1950s and 1960s. As Edward Szczepanik wrote in 1958:

> . . . Sunday[s] are very seldom observed, and as a result, work in the Colony goes on almost without interruption the whole year round, often without machines stopping even at night.[75]

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[72]Hong Kong Government, *Hong Kong Annual Report 1954* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1955), p. 16.

[73]Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 1993 Edition* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1993), p. 11, Table 2.1.

[74]Ronald Hsia and Laurence Chau, *Industrialisation, Employment and Income Distribution: A Case Study of Hong Kong* (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 185.

[75]Edward Szczepanik, *The Economic Growth of Hong Kong* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 73.

Although their average wages increased 73% in the period 1958-65,[76] it was unlikely to ease their distress caused by the wide gap between one's aspiration and the hard reality.[77] The people's upward mobility through education was also very limited. Only 3,900 university places were available in 1966 and about 1.7% of the population aged over 5 in the 1960s received university education.[78] In addition, it was reported that:

> In 1967, 980,000 pupils were enrolled in schools, but more than 150,000 children of primary school age were unable to attend school and only 39% of 10-14 year olds [sic] and 13% of 15-19 year olds [sic] were enjoying secondary education.[79]

Though the term "sweated labour" is rather an emotional expression, it seems to reflect the feeling of the Hong Kong workers, especially the young workers. In addition, most of them lived in a very congested environment. As described by an official report in 1963:

> The people in these [post-war] buildings may well present a more serious health hazard, and bring up their children mentally, socially, and physically more handicapped or stunted than if they had been in controlled or even uncontrolled squatter shacks on the hillsides."[80]

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[76]*Kowloon Disturbances 1966, Report of Commission of Inquiry* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1967), pp. 5-6.

[77]I.C. Jarvie, "A Postscript on Riots and the Future of Hong Kong" in I.C. Jarvie, ed., *Hong Kong: A Society in Transition* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 365; for a brief description of the life of the workers, see Joe England and John Rear, *Chinese Labour Under British Rule: A Critical Study of Labour and Law in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1975), chap. 4.

[78]See *Hong Kong Social & Economic Trend 1964-1974* (Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, 1975), pp. 58 & 61. The population of 1966 is 3,708,920. This figure can be found in *Hong Kong 1986 By-Census, Main Report Vol. 1* (Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, 1987), p. 16.

[79]William Heaton, "Maoist Revolutionary Strategy and Modern Colonialism: The Cultural Revolution in Hong Kong" *Asian Survey* 10 (1970):844.

[80]Quoted in L.F. Goodstadt, "Urban Housing in Hong Kong, 1945-63" in Jarvie (1969), ed., *op. cit.*, p. 281.

Although the Hong Kong Government had tried its best to provide more resettlement squatter huts, the pace was far behind the demand as there was an enormous influx of refugees from China. According to the estimation of Edvard Hambro in 1954, there were about 385,000 refugees (17.1% of the whole population) in Hong Kong.[81] But only 54,559 persons were resettled in cottage resettlement areas and multi-storey resettlement estates by the government in the same year.[82] Furthermore, according to the 1961 Census report, one-fifth of the urban population lived in housing built of temporary material or in accommodation not designed for domestic use.[83]

Under such "a grey industrial world", anomic violence was born. The "social disequilibrium" of Hong Kong, thus, appeared to provide "a logical choice" to start a revolution.[84] As Sir David Trench, the then Governor of Hong Kong, commented in 1967: ". . . trouble can flare up over any minor matter--a football match or anything else--and it would be foolish to pretend otherwise."[85] The fare increase of the Star Ferry Company in 1966 and the labour strikes of 1967, thus, triggered off a series of protests and riots.[86] Nevertheless, the "China factor" also contributed to the intensification of the conflict. Being inspired by the Cultural Revolution in

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[81]Edvard Hambro, *The Problem of Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong* (Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1955), p. 162.

[82]Commissioner for Resettlement, *Annual Departmental Report 1972-73* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1973), p. 30.

[83]Quoted in Goodstadt (1969), *op. cit.*, p. 280.

[84]Heaton (1970), *op. cit.*, pp. 840-847.

[85]Quoted in *Ibid*, p. 840.

[86]For the government account of the 1966 and 1967 riots, see *Kowloon Disturbances 1966, Report of Commission of Inquiry*; and *Hong Kong 1967* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1968), chap. 1. For the communist view of the 1967 event, see *The May Upheaval in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: The Committee of Hongkong-Kowloon Chinese Compatriots of All Circles for the Struggle Against Persecution by the British Authorities in Hong Kong, 1967).

China at that time and the resulting left-lean policy towards Hong Kong, the local leftists (communists) played a leadership role in the 1967 riots.

After the two riots, the colonial government began to take steps to cool down the tension, namely by the passing of several labour legislations, the reorganization of the Labour Department, the setting up of the Labour Advisory Board and so on.[87] Besides, the colonial government has come to recognise the fact that there was a large communication gap between the government and the governed. Thus, a series of administrative reforms were carried out, namely the implementation of the City District Officer Scheme, the proposal of setting up an ombudsman, and the reorganization and reform of the Civil Service.[88]

In the 1970s, the Hong Kong Government expanded its activities in social services. The "Ten-Year Housing Programme" and the nine years of compulsory education have signified this tendency.[89] Accompanying these changes were the emergence of social conflicts and the changing perception toward politics. After surveying the nature of social conflicts for the period 1975-1986, one study revealed that:

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[87]England and Rear (1975), *op. cit.*, pp. 5-9.

[88]For details, see Ian Scott, *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989), pp. 106-170; also, Brian Hook, "The Government of Hong Kong: Change Within Tradition" *China Quarterly* 95 (1983):491-511. For the political implication of the City District Officer Scheme, see Ambrose King Yeo-chi, "Administrative Absorption of Politics in Hong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass Roots Level" *Asian Survey* 15 (1975):422-439.

[89]For various aspects of change in government policies in the 1970s and early 1980s, see Joseph Y. S. Cheng, ed., *Hong Kong in Transition* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1986).

The observable pattern of social conflicts in Hong Kong during the period 1975 to 1986 has definitely pointed to an increasing trend of social conflicts which have extended to issues relating to quality of life and civil and political rights. More social conflicts are resorted to for the articulation of sectoral and local interests, with the demands increasingly aiming at long-term institutional changes and non-material rights. . . . Besides, participants are getting more and better organized. The presence of more permanent groups of one form or another is becoming a significant feature of social conflicts.[90]

Another study also recorded a change in attitude towards politics:

While still maintaining a largely anti-political or apolitical predisposition, the Hong Kong Chinese are somehow able, in their values, to lessen subscription to the ideas of political omnipotence, political omniscience and political omnipresence. . . .

The sense of political powerlessness is still the most potent factor in perpetuating political lethargy among the Hong Kong Chinese, but they have become more aware of the multitude of means available to get access to the government, particularly those influence tactics that contain some amount of unconventionality and confrontation. . . .[91]

These slightly attitudinal and behavioral changes may probably reflect the emergence of a new generation composed of mostly the local-born Hong Kong people. According to the 1986 By-census figure, nearly 60% (approximately 3,203,165) of the population was born in Hong Kong.[92] Their life style as well as value systems had developed to a point that is not hard to detect, and is easily differentiated from their mainland compatriots.[93]

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[90]Anthony Cheung Bing-leung and Louie Kin-sheun, *Social Conflicts in Hong Kong, 1975-1986: Trend and Implications* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991), p. 53.

[91]Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi, *The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1988), pp. 115-6.

[92]*Hong Kong 1986 By-Census, Main Report Vol. 1*, p. 18.

[93]Hugh D.R. Baker, "Life in the Cities: The Emergence of Hong Kong Man" *China Quarterly* 95 (1983):469-479.

Colonialism Without Serious Challenge

During the past one and a half century of colonial rule, Hong Kong has passed through the high tide of nationalism elsewhere without any significant challenge from within. It is also surprising to learn that there has been nearly no significant massive national or anti-colonial movement, except the great labour strikes in the 1920s. It seems to many people that this is impossible. But the fact is that it has not only survived but also provided an extended period of stability and prosperity at times when China repeatedly falls into political chaos and social turmoil, especially after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Why is this so? The answers are probably found in the peculiar domestic condition of Hong Kong and its delicate relations with China.

First of all, the colonial power has set up its state structure over a "barren rock", where only about 2,000 people were said to live before 1841 and nearly all of them were engaged in some form of farming and fishing.[94] Their life might well be described as "a primitive, arcadian existence devoid of any ambition beyond their daily wants".[95] Furthermore, Hong Kong was located at the periphery of the Qing imperial state. To borrow Michael Mann's concept of state power, Qing China by and large maintained the despotic power rather than infrastructural power there.[96]

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[94]For the social history of early Hong Kong society, see Chan Wai Kwan, The Making of Hong Kong Society: Three Studies of Class Formation in Early Hong Kong (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991); Tsai Jung-fang, *Hong Kong in Chinese History: Community and Social Unrest in the British Colony, 1842-1913* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Frank Welsh, *A History of Hong Kong* (London: Harper Collins, 1993); for a Chinese view, see Chan Kai-cheung, "History," in Choi Po-king and Ho Lok-sang, eds., *The Other Hong Kong Report 1993* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1993), pp. 455-483.

[95]R.C. Hurley, *Picturesque Hong Kong and Dependencies* (Hong Kong: Commercial Press, 1925), p. 21.

[96]Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms and Result," *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie* 25 (1984): 185-213.

Second, accompanying the coming of the colonial government was the institutionalization of the capitalist order and development. The idea of acquiring a small piece of land at the mouth of the Pearl River was out of consideration of facilitating trade with China. Naturally, Hong Kong society was shaped to provide the necessary infrastructure in fulfilling this function, such as the development of the transportation facilities, a corresponding legal system, and the spreading of the value of the rule of law. On the other hand, material incentives and the betterment generated in the process of capitalist development have compensated for the loss of statehood which has not been well developed and perceived among the indigenous Chinese population at that moment. There is a widespread Chinese old saying that has well reflected the Chinese attitude toward the government: "Whoever becomes the emperor (ruler), we all have to pay rates (in kind)". Furthermore, Hong Kong has enjoyed a rapid economic growth rate since the late 1950s. For the period 1961-1981, the Gross Domestic Product grew at the average rate of about 9.9% annually in real terms, and at 7.4% per capita.[97]

Third, most of Hong Kong's population came to reside there well after the set up of the colonial government.[98] That means they are voluntarily subjected to alien rule. Why do they do so? To a large extent, it is the tumultuous situation in China that helps to explain it. When there is social unrest or political instability in China, there will be a influx of people from Canton or nearby provinces into the British colony. Once social order in China has been restored, they move back to their homeland. This was often the case before the establishment of the PRC in 1949. The influx of people (refugees) therefore was served as a barometer of the stableness of domestic order in China. Furthermore, the capitalist society of Hong Kong has provided the economic opportunity for people originating from the dislocated rural region of China. Given this transient nature, it is difficult for them to develop their identity with Hong Kong. Nor do they seek any social or political reform to the

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[97]Miners (1991), *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[98]John P. Burns, "Immigration from China and the Future of Hong Kong," *Asian Survey* 27 (1987):661-82.

colonial structure. They only regard Hong Kong as their temporary abode just for the sake of security and economy.

Fourth, the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949 and the subsequent restless political campaigns as well as social dislocation and economic stagnation have driven those who live in the colony with a higher standard of living to have little chance to have any romance of nationalism. Furthermore, Hong Kong has been used as an economic and political shelter for those who escaped from the political turmoil in China. This is especially the case after 1949. Although subjected to an alien rule, the Hong Kong Chinese are quite instrumental and pragmatic toward the colonial government. Any national movement aimed at driving out the colonial state will eventually be integrated with its communist mother state. In the face of this dilemma, an old Chinese saying seems aptly applicable: "Among the evils, choose the least one". Under such circumstances, it is easier for the local-born Hong Kong Chinese to develop a separate Hong Kong identity.[99]

Fifth, the co-option of the local Chinese elite has contributed to the stability of Hong Kong. Through the synarchical rule, prominent Chinese residents have, in one way or another, been absorbed into the administrative system and have become a part of the colonial establishment. Through such a device, a certain level of elite integration has been achieved.[100] Furthermore, the Hong Kong Government quite promptly adjusted to the changing environment of Hong Kong once she found the system inadequate or government policy unacceptable to the governed. The timely introduction of the City District Office Scheme in 1968 just after the riots of the pro-China leftists is an example at hand.

Sixth, the China factor. Although the Nationalists and the Communists renounced the three "unequal" treaties signed by the Qing government and vowed to restore the sovereignty of Hong Kong at any time, they have adopted a cautious and

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[99]see Baker (1983), *op. cit.*, pp. 469-79.

[100]see King (1975), *op. cit.*, pp. 422-39.

pragmatic approach to solving the issue. As long as the colonial status quo continues to make a contribution to China, Hong Kong would remain as it was. Mr Zhou Enlai, the former Premier of the People's Republic of China, was quoted as describing the special role of Hong Kong as "a weather station, an observation point, a meeting place, and a suitable place for things which must be launched and radiated".[101] Moreover, the basic policy of the Beijing Government toward Hong Kong since 1949 has been: "Make long-term plans, utilise to the full". This is also known as the "eight-word guiding policy" within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). According to Huang Wenfang, Deputy General Secretary of the Hong Kong Branch of the New China News Agency (NCNA) before his retirement in August 1992, the meaning of the "eight-word guiding policy" is:

> "Make long-term plans" refers to the fact that Hong Kong will not be taken back in the near future. Of course, since the central government decided in 1981 to take back Hong Kong after 1997 this part now requires a different kind of explanation.

> "Utilise to the full" refers to making use of all Hong Kong's beneficial conditions to serve China, in particular its economic construction.[102]

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[101]Quoted in Huang Wenfang's memoirs (extracts), *Eastern Express* (Hong Kong) 6 July 1994:6. Huang Wenfang was the Deputy General Secretary and Head of the Taiwan Affairs Department of the Hong Kong Branch of the New China News Agency (NCNA) before his retirement in August 1992. He is very familiar with Beijing's Hong Kong policy as he was one of the two Chinese Communist Party members assigned to work on Hong Kong affairs in the late 1940s.

[102]Huang Wenfang's memoirs (extracts), *Eastern Express* (Hong Kong) 6 July 1994:6.

Unusual Decolonisation in the Early 1980s

Regarding the constitutional future of her remaining colonies (dependent territories), Britain made clear its guiding principles in 1968 that:

> . . . Britain will always adhere closely to the cardinal principle to which we have adhered in the past--that the wishes of the people concerned must be the main guide to action--it is not and never has been our desire or intention either to delay independence for those dependencies who want it or to force it upon those who do not.[103]

As will be detailed in Chapter 3, the continuous British rule of Hong Kong has been hinged on the will of the Chinese Government. Any political reforms leading to the drastic change of Hong Kong political structure seemed to invite Chinese intervention. This has long been regarded as one of the reasons not to carry out constitutional reforms since the late 1940s. As the former Governor, David Trench, wrote in 1971: "China has made it pretty clear that she would not be happy with a Hong Kong moving towards a representative system" and Hong Kong "has to be either firmly under an old-style colonial government or lose her identity".[104] But, in the midst of the surge of the 1997 issue, the establishment of elected District Boards by the Hong Kong Government at the district level in 1982 signified a revision of the former cautious policy. Some political observers regarded the move as a preparatory stage for the ensuing decolonisation process, but others saw it as a logical step to take as the original local administration system had proved to be ineffective.[105] Whatever the reason(s) behind the local reform in 1982, it was not

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[103]Quoted in George Drower, *Britain's Dependent Territories: A Fistful of Islands* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1992), p. xiv.

[104]David Trench, *Hong Kong and Its Position in the Southeast Asia Region* (Hawaii: East-West Center, University of Hawaii, 1971), p. 5; quoted in Lo Shiu-hing, "Democratization in Hong Kong: Reasons, Phases, and Limits," *Issues & Studies* 26 (May 1990):102.

[105]Jeremiah K.H. Wong, "Separatism and Convergence: Pattern of Administrative Adaption in the New Territories," in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed., *Hong Kong in the 1980s* (Hong Kong: Summerson, 1982b), pp. 13-21; C.B. Leung, "Community Participation: from Kai Fong Association, Mutual Aid Committee to District Board,"

be followed by the usual path of decolonisation through transferring power to an independent state, where parliamentary government is operated through periodic elections and universal franchise.[106] It is because neither the Chinese Government would allow Hong Kong to gain independence, nor do the majority of people in Hong Kong want it.

As mentioned before, one of the components of Hong Kong--the New Territories--is bound by a lease treaty which stipulated that the New Territories will be restored to China's sovereignty in 1997. Although Britain had asserted the validity of the various treaties when the question of Hong Kong's future was first raised in early 1980s, she would definitely know that without the New Territories it would be very hard for Hong Kong to survive, because the New Territories cover over 90% of the land mass of Hong Kong, has nearly 42 percent of the population living there, and has most of the industrial sites located there.

The chance to go independent diminishes when the view and policy of the Chinese Government is added to the above objective constraints. As mentioned before, the position of the Chinese Government, whether it is the Nationalist or the Communist, has been very clear that Hong Kong is a part of China ceded/leased to Britain under various "unequal treaties" signed by the Qing Dynasty in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the People's Republic of China wasted no time in declaring her policy toward Hong Kong once she was admitted to the United Nations in 1972:

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in Cheng, ed. (1982b), *ibid.*, pp. 152-70.

[106]For the transfer of power and decolonisation process, see Charles Jeffries, *Transfer of Power: Problems of the Passage to Self-Government* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1960); J.M. Lee, *Colonial Development and Good Government* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967), chapter 5; D.G. Austin, "The Transfer of Power: Why and How," in W.H. Morris-Jones and Georges Fischer, eds., *Decolonisation and After: The British and French Experience* (London: Frank Cass, 1980), pp. 3-34; John Darwin, *Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World* (Hampshire: MacMillan, 1988); Norman Miners (1988), *op. cit.*

The questions of Hong Kong and Macau belong to the category of questions resulting from the series of unequal treaties which the imperialists imposed on China. Hong Kong and Macau are part of Chinese territory occupied by the British and Portuguese authorities. The settlement of the questions of Hong Kong and Macau is entirely within China's sovereign right and do [sic] not at all fall under the ordinary category of colonial territories. Consequently they should not be included in the list of colonial territories covered by the declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and people. With regard to the questions of Hong Kong and Macau, the Chinese [G]overnment has consistently held that they should be settled in a appropriate way when conditions are ripe . . . .[107]

As mentioned above, anticipation of the Chinese objection to political reforms had prevented the British-Hong Kong Government from carrying out political reforms since the late 1940s. But the situation was changed in the mid-1980s after the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 and the Chinese promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" after 1997. Given the incompatibility between a "high degree of autonomy" after 1997 and the colonial political structure, it become necessary to reform the colonial structure so as to prepare Hong Kong to exercise autonomy after 1997. It is believed that the reforms proposed in the 1984 White Paper on the development of representative government appeared to have the blessing of the Chinese Government at first. But later China withdrew its support, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 3. Nevertheless, the political reforms did provide a push to politicize part of the population. In the three-tier legislature elections in 1991, the respective number of direct elected seats (universal suffrage) of the District Boards, Urban Council, Regional Council, and Legislative Council are 274 (out of 441), 15 (out of 40), 12 (out of 36), and 18 (out of 60); the total number of direct elected seats is 319 and the total number of candidates is 587.[108] Supposing that each candidate,

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[107]Quoted in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, *Hong Kong In Search of Future* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 54.

[108]The District Boards' figures are supplied by the City and New Territories Administration in 22 July 1993; the Urban and Regional Councils', and the Legislative Council's figures are compiled from the electoral data supplied by the Registration and Electoral Office, Constitutional Affairs Branch, Hong Kong Government Secretariat in early 1992.

on average, had been assisted by a hundred campaign workers, there would have been an involvement of fifty-nine thousand people. Furthermore, the number of registered voters grew tremendously from about 40,000 in 1979 to about 1,910,000 (about 50% of the eligible electors) in 1991. The turnout of the 1991 Legco direct election was about 750,000 (nearly 40% of the registered voters).[109] As a result, through the partial opening-up of the three-tier legislature and the electioneering process, more and more people got involved in politics.

Meanwhile, the social fabric or composition of Hong Kong is quite different from other British colonies when they were embarking on the road of decolonisation. As reported in the Hong Kong 1991 population census, there are all together 2.8 million working population. Among them, twenty-three per cent are managers, administrators, and professionals. Nearly two-thirds of the working population served in the tertiary sector.[110] Over 11% of the population aged 15 or above (N=4,370,365) had received some sort of tertiary education (degree and non-degree courses), and another 31% had finished their upper secondary or matriculation education.[111] Given the above figures, it seems that no other decolonising colony has had a matching quality and quantity.

Decolonisation is not merely the transfer of political sovereignty to a new state; it involves also a social and economic restructuring process.[112] As a result,

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[109]The figure of the registered voters may not be accurate as the electoral roll has never updated since 1982. One must be cautious in interpreting the figure as there was a large scale internal population movement throughout the 80's as well as an average of fifty thousand emigration (approximate sixty thousand people emigrated in 1990) since 1983. See *Hong Kong 1986 By-Census, Graphic Guide* (Hong Kong: Census and Statistics Department, 1987), p. 22; and *Hong Kong Annual Report*, various years (Hong Kong: Government Printer).

[110]See *Hong Kong 1991 Population Census: Basic Table for District Board Districts* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1992), p. 34.

[111]See *Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics*, 1992 ed. (Hong Kong: Government Printer), p. 199, Table 15.1.

[112]Darwin (1988), *op. cit.*, pp. 5-17.

each of the social forces will try hard to shape it to their own advantage. But the hard fact is that not all the participants carried equal weight in deciding the final product. In addition, the reform has different meanings to different social classes. Their respective attitude towards the reform in or before 1984 were as follows.

First of all, the businessmen do not want any change in the way of governing. In general, they view the reform with scepticism. Some of them argued that the existing British administration[113] and non-intervention policy have contributed to the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. So, why bother to change it. Nonetheless, the business circle is not a homogenous entity. We can roughly differentiate it into the following sub-groups: the European "hongs" and metropolitan capitalists, the indigenous Chinese capitalists (including both the traditional and the New Rich), as well as the small and medium size firm-owners. The first sub-group may probably be more willing to tolerate reform; the second sub-group seems to be reluctant to accommodate reform; and the last sub-group may be hard to assess because of its number, diversity and being rather inactive in politics. Given that these sub-groups have a close economic relationship and interest with China and the fact that their privileges are well assured in the existing and future political structure,[114] their attitude toward political reform may tend to be conservative. That means no reform if possible; if not, favour "gradual" and "orderly" change.[115]

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[113]Nearly half (49.3%, N=463) of the directorate posts were occupied by expatriates in 1986. And nearly three-quarters of all expatriates were employed in the following six departments: Police (1,098), Engineering (344), Government Secretariat (191), Building (163), Legal (155), and Judiciary (111). See John P. Burns, "Succession Planning and Localization," in Ian Scott and J. P. Burns, eds., *The Hong Kong Civil Service and Its Future* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 96.

[114]For an account of the intimate relations of the British colonial government and the capitalists, see Chan (1991), *The Making of Hong Kong Society*, chaps. 2-4.

[115]For the views of the business circle, see Lydia Dunn, "Hong Kong after the Sino-British Declaration" *International Affairs* 61 (1985):197-204.

The middle class has grown out of the rapid social and economic development since the 1970s and comprised mainly managers, technocrats, accountants, social workers, doctors, lawyers, professors, and administrators. The size of this class doubled more than twice from 141,860 (7.7% of the working population) in 1976 to 315,945 (11.9% of the working population) in 1986.[116] Accompanying the growth of the size is the rise of their political awareness. Some of them want some kind of political reform because the pre-reformed political structure has limited their chance of participation, and the policies that the colonial government adopted favour the business class at the expense of their own interest (taxation is an example at hand). Some of them also think that their contribution to society has barely matched their political influence. As a result, several interest groups were established in the late 1970s and early 1980s, such as the Hong Kong Observer (HKO), the Hong Kong Affairs Society (HKAS), and the Meeting Point (MP). On the whole, they seem to favour reform but in a gradual and non-violent way. This newly emerging middle class has played a significant role in the campaign for democracy since the mid-1980s.

The general public and the working class still remain politically apathetic. For them, the notion of democracy is so remote that it will make no immediate difference to their life. They work as hard as their predecessors so as to earn a living. Although some of them are quite attentive to public affairs, they are not keen to articulate their interests or participate politically. So, they get used to being the passive actor in the political arena. In addition, the trade unions are loosely organized and have limited bargaining power.[117] Nevertheless, they will easily be mobilized if their interest and living is at stake. The vigorous protest against government's policy of importing foreign labour is a recent example. Through the active role of the social workers, the "grass roots" are likely to become more

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[116]Alvin Y. So and Ludmilla Kwitko, "The New Middle Class and the Democratic Movement in Hong Kong," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 20 (1990):384; also *Hong Kong 1986 By-Census, Main Report, Vol. 1*, pp. 32 & 38.

[117]England and Rear (1975), *op. cit.*, chaps. 5 and 13.

organized than before.[118]   Moreover, 34 social workers and social work administrators were elected members of the District Boards, Urban Council and Regional Council in 1988.[119] In general, social workers have tended to support the underprivileged class and the poor as the former regard the poverty and misfortune of the latter as a structural issue, not an individual one. Thus, social workers often resort to direct action to pressure the government to adopt a more interventionist policy or a policy with redistributive effect so as to redress the social injustice and inequality resulting from the market failure.[120]

How far the decolonisation process can go will depend on the outcome of the negotiation between China and Britain, with the Hong Kong people playing a secondary role in the process. The Sino-British negotiation and the subsequent Basic Law drafting processes could be regarded as competition among China, Britain, and the Hong Kong people to shape the political order of Hong Kong both before and after 1997. We now turn to the efforts of all concerned parties and the rise of the centre-periphery cleavage in that context.

[118]C.K. Wong, "The Advocacy Role of Social Work in a Changing Political Environment: Its Dilemmas and Challenges in Hong Kong," *Community Development Journal* 25 (1990):399-404; Joe Leung, "Community Development in Hong Kong: Contributions Toward Democratization," *Community Development Journal* 21 (1986):3-10.

[119]Mok Bong-ho, "Influence Through Political Power: The Emergence of Social Workers as Politicians in the Recent Political Reform in Hong Kong" *International Social Work* 31 (1988):251.

[120]Wong Chack-kie, *Social Work and Social Change: A Profile of the Activist Social Workers in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993), pp. 17-27.

CHAPTER III

THE RISE OF THE CENTRE-PERIPHERY CLEAVAGE

The destiny of Hong Kong in the early 1980s was at the crossroads. The emergence of the 1997 issue had raised the question of whether this tiny Hong Kong would remain a British Colony or not after 1997. After more than two years of negotiation, Britain agreed to hand all of Hong Kong back to China in 1997. The Sino-British Joint Declaration signified the resolution of conflicting claims to sovereignty over Hong Kong, but not the assurance of close cooperation in the transitional period. The question of who has the final say in the lengthy transitional period of 12 years, from the effective date of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in May 1985 to the actual transfer of power in July 1997, has proved to be an explosive one. The first controversial issue that emerged after the signing of the Joint Declaration was the pace and the extent of the democratic reforms in the transitional period.

The British "pre-emptive" political reforms in the mid-1980s had first created a political "seller" market, and then a "buyer" market in which the demand for democratic reforms has kept growing, especially after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. From the outset, the Chinese Government has doubted the motives behind the reform and seemingly regards it as a British "conspiracy" to obstruct the smooth restoration of sovereignty. Understandably, Beijing wants as little political reforms as possible in the transitional period. Adding to this was the growing support for democratic reforms within Hong Kong society after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989.

The different attitudes of China, Britain, and segments of the Hong Kong people toward democratisation have been reflected in their respective attitudes and supports of the pace of democratic reform before 1997 and the different political models after 1997. Hence, three contradictions have been present: between the Chinese and British Governments, between the Chinese Government and Hong Kong people, and between the British Government and Hong Kong people. The interplay of these contradictions would have a significant impact on the subsequent formation of electoral cleavage. Through the political mobilisation in the past decade, the various political forces have established a linkage with their potential supporters. As a result, their difference would spill over to the electorate and would then contribute to the emergence of cleavage lines.

Given the decisive role played by China in shaping both the pre- and post-1997 political order, the contradiction between Beijing and Hong Kong would become paramount and thus contribute to the development of centre-periphery electoral cleavage over the proper relationship between the "centre" Beijing Government and the "periphery" Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) after 1997, i.e. dependency or autonomy. For those who support the Beijing Government's stance towards and ideas about the HKSAR's pace of democratisation and degree of autonomy, we can describe them as "pro-centre grouping". For those who support the faster pace of democratisation and a higher degree of autonomy regardless of the Beijing Government's view, we can describe them as "pro-periphery grouping". Needless to say, the usage of the term "centre" and "periphery" only denote the superior-subordinate political relationship between China and Hong Kong, and does not apply to their economic relationship. Neither these two terms carry the same meaning as those used in the dependency theory. We now turn to the detailed examination of the evolution and emergence of the centre-periphery cleavage.

This chapter aims at examining the rise of the centre-periphery cleavage resulting from the dynamic shift of the contradictions between the British Government, the Chinese Government, and the Hong Kong people in the context of the reversion of sovereignty and the political reforms of the 1980s. First of all, we

examine the conflicts and compromises of China and Britain in settling the question of Hong Kong, and the responses from the Hong Kong people towards the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Second, the rivalry of various political forces over the pace of democratic reforms in the political reforms debates since the mid-1980s. Their respective stances and considerations will also be explored. Third, the clash of the democrats with the Chinese Government and the conservatives in the Basic Law drafting process will be used to demonstrate the rise of the centre-periphery cleavage. The successive mobilisation efforts of the concerned parties will also be studied.

The Settlement of the 1997 Issue

The uncertainty that loomed over the future of Hong Kong since the late 1970s had not been new to Hong Kong. Whether the Nationalist or the Communist Government was in power, the three treaties that helped create the Crown Colony of Hong Kong had been regarded as "unequal" and thus, had to be nullified "when the time is ripe".[121] Furthermore, as mentioned in Chapter 2, over 90% of the Hong Kong territory is subject to a 99 years lease which will expire in June 1997. It was not so surprising that Hong Kong had been described by one observer as a "borrowed place" where people lived on a "borrowed time".[122]

The time had come to conclude a clear and formal settlement of the peculiar status of Hong Kong when the expiry date of the lease of the New Territories was approaching. Because of the fact that the Hong Kong Government does not have legal power to grant land leases in the New Territories beyond July 1997, most of the economic activities would be disrupted if no new arrangement with the PRC was acquired well before 1997. The anxiety of the business community in Hong Kong had prompted the Hong Kong Government to act. Under such circumstance, Sir Murray MacLehose, the then Hong Kong Governor, travelled to Beijing in 1979 to discuss the matter with China's then Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping. When he returned to the Colony, the Governor told the public that Mr Deng had asked the Hong Kong investors "to put their hearts at ease". But Sir Murray had failed to convey the message at that time that China would reclaim the sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997.

Later in May of the same year, the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Song Zhiguang reiterated the official position that "Hong Kong is part of China" and "when

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[121]For the China's Hong Kong policy, see Chan Lau Kit Ching, "The Hong Kong Question During the Pacific War," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 2 (1973):56-77; Peter Wesley-Smith, *Unequal Treaty 1898-1997* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1980); Kevin P. Lane, *Sovereignty and the Status Quo: The Historical Roots of China's Hong Kong Policy* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1990).

[122]Richard Hughes, *Hong Kong: Borrowed Place, Borrowed Time* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1968, 1st ed.; London: Deutsch, 1976, 2nd ed.)

the lease expires, an appropriate attitude would be adopted in settling the question".[123]   In contrast to the vague attitude of the Chinese Government, the British and Hong Kong Governments wanted to have an early settlement of the status of Hong Kong by pressing for formal talks between Beijing and London.

Regarding the talks, a Chinese official was quoted as saying: "It has been the Socialist policy to allow Hong Kong to stay as it is. We did not ask for the talks. Britain did."[124] Regardless of the question of which side wanted the talks, the visit of the British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, to Beijing in 1982 had paved the way for subsequent formal negotiation between Beijing and London over the future of Hong Kong.[125]   Although China and Britain had different views on the validity and legality of the three treaties concerned, a joint statement was released on 24 September 1982 when Mrs Thatcher concluded her Beijing trip:

> Today, the two leaders of the two countries held far-reaching talks in a friendly atmosphere on the future of Hong Kong. Both leaders made clear their respective positions on the subject.
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> They agreed to enter into talks through diplomatic channels following the visit with the common aim of maintaining the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong.

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[123]Quoted in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed., *Hong Kong In Search of a Future* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 246.

[124]Quoted in Paul Wilkinson, "Hong Kong: a One-Way Ticket to an Unknown Destination," *Government and Opposition* 18 (1983):447-8.

[125]For an account of the Sino-British negotiation process, see Robert Cottrell, *The End of Hong Kong: The Secret Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat* (London: John Murray, 1993). Also, Ian Scott, *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989), Chap. 5; T.L. Tsim, "1997: Peking's Strategy for Hong Kong" *World Today* 40 (1984):37-45; Cheng (1984), *op. cit.*, chaps. 1 & 2; Dennis Duncanson, "The Anglo-Chinese Negotiations" in Jurgen Domes and Shaw Yu-Ming, eds., *Hong Kong: A Chinese and International Concern* (Boulder: Westview, 1988), pp. 26-41.

The Setting of the Sino-British Negotiation

The setting of the negotiations was to have an overwhelming effect on the strength and bargaining strategy of the negotiators. For the British Government, the whole setting did not favour her. First of all, the uncertain situation had made the governing of Hong Kong more difficult, as any unfavourable developments would promptly have an adverse effect on the incumbent British-Hong Kong Government. The immediate concern of the British-Hong Kong Government was the continuing effective governing and sound economic development of Hong Kong. Any development that may jeopardise the above concerns would be avoided by the British-Hong Kong Government. The British Government was being tied down by "the realization that Deng Xiaoping was absolutely serious in his declared determination to allow Hong Kong to be ruined if necessary in order to regain full Chinese sovereignty."[126]

Second, the institutional setting also did not favour Britain. China denied any representative from Hong Kong the right to join the Sino-British negotiation, as Beijing stressed that the negotiation is between two sovereign states and the whole process should be kept confidential. In addition, Beijing regards the Hong Kong Chinese as her nationals and thus, the Chinese Government claims that she represents her compatriots in Hong Kong. Under this circumstance, the question is: who does the British Government represent?

Third, from the geographical considerations, Britain had no way to defend Hong Kong in both military and economic terms. Hong Kong is totally different from the Falklands, where no such question of expiration of lease existed and, more importantly, military defence was viable. In addition, the international climate was against the continuance of colonialism. Moreover, the decision-makers in London were very clear that the British interest and importance, both economic and strategic,

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[126]Michael Yahuda, "Hong Kong's Future: Sino-British Negotiations, Perceptions, Organization and Political Culture," *International Affairs* 69 (1993):252.

vested in Hong Kong was relatively declining when compared to the 1960s or before. The breakup of the British Empire, the detente of East-West relations as well as the open door policy of China contributed to the lessening of the importance of Hong Kong.

Fourth, Britain's claim of the validity and legality of the three nineteenth century treaties that formed the basis of Britain's rule over Hong Kong put London in a weak and hard position to defend. If the claim were accepted by China, would the whole of the New Territories be logically handed back to China on the expiry of a 99-year lease? Given that the New Territories cover over 90% of the land territory of Hong Kong, the survival of the remaining tiny area seems not viable.

As a result, the British negotiators were fighting not only an uphill battle but also a no-win one because Britain would not agree to rule Hong Kong after 1997. The second best option for London to take was to try to fight for a better terms for the reversion of sovereignty. Because of the reliance on Beijing to produce an acceptable mutual agreement, London adopted a cooperative approach towards the negotiation. Sir Percy Cradock, the architect of Britain's China policy from late 1970s to early 1990s, had defended the policy in 1994 that:

> Cooperation does not mean automatic acquiescence in China's views. Tough negotiation has always been necessary and has always been practised. But it does mean recognising that unilateral action and confrontation with China are more damaging to Hong kong in its special circumstances than a negotiated settlement and are therefore inconsistent with our responsibility to do our best for the territory. The long-term welfare of Hong Kong must be the sole criterion.[127]

Conversely, Beijing seems to have a free hand in dealing with London over the sovereignty of Hong Kong. Taking advantage of not being responsible for direct ruling and the low cost of any immediate economic crisis at the time of negotiation, China exploited the situation skilfully. On the one hand, Beijing knew that timing

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[127]Percy Cradock, "China, Britain and Hong Kong: Policy in a Cul-de-sac," *World Today* 50 (1994b):92.

was in her favour. The time pressure on the British Government would be tremendous as the negotiation hinged on an extended period of time. Besides, China had threatened to announce unilaterally the plan to recover the sovereignty of Hong Kong if agreement could not be reached by September 1984.

On the other hand, Beijing tried to remove the fear of the Hong Kong people by appealing to nationalism, and by promising "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" and "no change for fifty years after 1997". The idea of "one country, two systems" was put forward by China as a guideline for the subsequent reunification of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau.[128] Under the "one country, two systems" concept, Hong Kong will retain her own capitalist system for 50 years after 1997. Hong Kong is also promised a high degree of autonomy, except in defence and foreign relations.[129] Moreover, only Hong Kong people will qualify to rule Hong Kong.[130] Such arrangement seems to aim at wooing the Hong Kong people to accept the hard fact of the transfer of sovereignty, and at maintaining the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong during the transitional period and beyond.

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[128]See Byron S.Y. Weng, "The Hong Kong Model of 'One Country, Two Systems': Promises and Problems," *Asian Affairs* 14 (1987-88):193-209.

[129]See Article 3 and Annex I of the *Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Question of Hong Kong* (thereafter the Joint Declaration); and the *Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China* (thereafter the Basic Law).

[130]The Hong Kong people are being defined as "people who have lived in Hong Kong for seven years, accept Hong Kong as part of China and accept that China is the only legitimate Chinese government." Quoted in Lane (1990), *op. cit.*, p. 94; also understood as "patriotic compatriots" whom "China would not require all to favour China's socialist system but who must love the motherland as well as Hong Kong". Quoted in Duncanson (1988), *op. cit.*, p. 34.

The Sino-British Negotiations, 1982-84

Diplomatic talks had started after the visit of Mrs Thatcher in September 1982. But no significant advance was made as Britain had insisted that the negotiation should be based on the legality of the treaties concerned. That means London was only ready to discuss the lease issue of the New Territories but not the Hong Kong issue as a whole. For Britain, Hong Kong island and Kowloon Peninsula (south of Boundary Street) was ceded to her in perpetuity and is a part of Britain. Furthermore, Britain argued that only the continuous "presence" of the British could contribute to a more stable and prosperous Hong Kong. The view of the British Government more or less reflected the ideas of the Hong Kong business community.

Understandably, China had persistently asserted her claim of sovereignty over Hong Kong by stating that the "unequal treaties" had no binding force and advocating the return of Hong Kong as a whole in 1997. In reacting to Mrs Thatcher's claim of "Britain's moral responsibility and duty to the people of Hong Kong" in September 1982, the New China News Agency (NCNA) made clear the Chinese position in an article entitled "Our Solemn Stand on the Question of Hong Kong" maintaining that:

> Hong Kong is part of China. The treaties concerning Hong Kong signed in the past between the British government and the Qing dynasty were unequal treaties which the Chinese have never accepted. It is the sacred duty of the Chinese government and the Chinese people to recover sovereignty over Hong Kong. This has all along been the just stand of our people on this issue.
>
> The British Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, however, once again emphasized on 27 September 1982 in Hong Kong that the Sino-British treaties concerning Hong Kong signed in the previous century were still 'valid' and so were still 'binding'. This is something which the Chinese will never accept.
>
> It must be pointed out that the aforementioned treaties are unequal treaties imposed on China in the wake of the nineteenth-century British imperialistic policy which manifested itself in the invasion of China by the use of 'gun-boat diplomacy'. Those treaties are ironclad proof of the plundering of Chinese soil by British imperialism, and have, since their existence, been considered by the Chinese as illegal and invalid.
> . . .

. . . .

> Mrs Thatcher also brought up the point of Britain's 'moral obligation'
> to the Hong Kong people. It is our belief that the Hong Kong issue is
> part and parcel of the People's Republic of China with its one billion
> people (including the Chinese living in Hong Kong), and, as such, falls
> within the confines of China's national sovereignty and interests. Only
> the People's Republic of China, being the country with sovereignty
> over Hong Kong, is entitled to say that it has obligations to Hong
> Kong.[131]

This loud and clear stance had brought home the message that China would not make any concession on Hong Kong's sovereignty. It was regarded by Beijing's leaders as a subject of principle allowing no compromise.

As mentioned in the previous section, the setting and timing of the negotiation had prevented Mrs Thatcher from acting boldly. Although Mrs Thatcher's initial claim of the validity of the treaties was quite forceful during her meeting with Deng Xiaoping in September 1982, no high-profile position had been taken, nor was a strong-worded statement delivered, by the British Government after that. The first few months of the negotiation could be described as standstill and fruitless as both sides showed no sign of compromise.

The breakthrough came in March 1983 when Britain softened her position over the sovereignty of Hong Kong. Any longer delay in the arrival of a mutually acceptable agreement would be detrimental to the social stability and economic prosperity of Hong Kong. Britain was also tied down by the fact that the British-Hong Kong Government is responsible for the continuation of effective governing of Hong Kong. Mrs Thatcher confessed in her memoirs that she wrote a letter to Mr Zhao Ziyang, then Prime Minister of the PRC, stating that:

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[131]Quoted in Cheng, ed. (1984), *op. cit.*, pp. 55-6.

Provided that agreement could be reached between the British and Chinese Government on administrative arrangements for Hong Kong which would guarantee the future prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, and would be acceptable to the British Parliament and to the people of Hong Kong as well as to the Chinese Government, I *would be prepared to recommend* to Parliament that sovereignty over the whole of Hong Kong should revert to China.[132] (italics origin)

As a result, Britain and China entered a new phase of negotiation of substantial matters in July 1983. In the early rounds of negotiation in this phase, Britain tried to convince Beijing by playing up the "economic" cards and stressed that some form of British administrative presence in the post-1997 Hong Kong would be vital to the stability and prosperity in both the transitional period up to 1997 and beyond.[133] In response to a question whether Britain "hope to keep a British presence" in Hong Kong, Mrs Thatcher said:

Well, these kind of things are exactly what we're now negotiating about. And obviously we think that the British link is very, very important indeed, because it is partly responsible for the kind of success we've had in Hongkong.[134]

Britain changed its tone and tried to separate "jurisdiction" from "sovereignty". That means Britain gave up its sovereign claim to China but maintained the right to administer Hong Kong. This idea was also not accepted by China. These new efforts made by the British Government had not only failed to convert Beijing, but also sparked off the so-called "megaphone diplomacy" characterized by a series of criticism from the local leftist newspapers and unions. From Beijing's point of view, sovereignty and administration were indivisible. These

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[132]Quoted in Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (London: Harper Collins, 1993), p. 489; see also Cheng (1984), ed., *op. cit.*, p. 30; H.K. Lamb, *A Date with Fate* (Hong Kong: Lincoln Green, [1985]), p. 20.

[133]Scott (1989), *Political Change and the Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong*, p. 179-80.

[134]Quoted in Cheng (1984), ed., *op. cit.*, p. 44.

rising differences had given a blow to the economy of Hong Kong. The Hong Kong dollar had been driven to the record low of $9.55 against the US dollar in late September 1983. In order to rescue the fall of the Hong Kong dollar, the currency board system has been restored by pegging the Hong Kong dollar with that of the United States at an exchange rate of HK$7.8 for a US dollar.

Facing the tremendous pressure from the financial crisis and subsequent social instability, London had made a further concession before the fifth round of negotiations held on 19 October 1983.[135] Mrs Thatcher conveyed to Beijing that "we envisaged no link of authority or accountability between Britain and Hong Kong after 1997."[136] Subsequently, the destiny of Hong Kong was almost fixed when Sir Geoffrey Howe, then British Foreign Secretary, made it plain and public after his Beijing trip on 19 April 1984 that:

> The terms of an agreement between the British and Chinese Governments still have to be worked out, but it is right for me to tell you now that it would not be realistic to think of an agreement that provides for continued British administration in Hong Kong after 1997.[137]

After twenty rounds of negotiation, the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong was finally initiated in September 1984. In the Joint Declaration, Britain formally returned Hong Kong's sovereignty to China with effect from 1 July 1997. In return, China had promised to set up a special administrative region in Hong Kong with "high degree of autonomy" (except for foreign and defence affairs) and no change of life style for 50 years after 1997. In the transitional period, "the Government of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong with the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and social stability; and that the Government of the People's Republic of China will

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[135]Tsim (1984), *op. cit.*, p. 37.

[136]Thatcher (1993), *op. cit.*, p. 490.

[137]Cited by Unofficial Members of Executive and Legislative Councils Office (UMELCO), *Annual Report 1984* (Hong Kong: UMELCO, 1985), p. 6.

give its cooperation in this connection" and a Sino-British Joint Liaison Group will be set up to "ensure a smooth transfer of government in 1997". In section I of Annex I, the future HKSAR political system will be:

> The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be directly under the authority of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China and shall enjoy a high degree of autonomy. Except for foreign and defence affairs which are the responsibilities of the Central People's Government , the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication. . . .

> The government and legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be composed of local inhabitants. The chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government. Principal officials (equivalent to Secretaries) shall be nominated by the chief executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and appointed by the Central People's Government. The legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by elections. The executive authorities shall abide by the law and shall be accountable to the legislature.

In evaluating the Sino-British Joint Declaration, Mrs Thatcher highlighted "three main advantages":

> First, they [the Joint Declaration] constituted what would be unequivocally binding international agreement. Second, they were sufficiently clear and detailed about what would happen in Hong Kong after 1997 to command the confidence of the people of Hong Kong. Third, there was a provision that the terms of the proposed Anglo-Chinese Agreement would be stipulated in the Basic Law to be passed by Chinese People's Congress: this would in effect be the constitution of Hong Kong after 1997.[138]

Although the terms of the Joint Declaration would be adopted in the Basic Law, the successful conversion would largely rely on the goodwill as well as the

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[138]Thatcher (1993), *op. cit.*, p. 492.

same comprehension of the letter and spirit of the Declaration. Subsequent developments proved neither.

Institutional Barriers of Representation

The negotiations were structured as if it was only a matter of two concerned sovereign states. On the insistence of Chinese Government, the British Government agreed to keep the negotiations in strict confidence and on a bilateral basis.[139] Direct participation from the Hong Kong people was, thus, prevented. The lack of direct participation could be remedied if there was a sound representation system in place before the negotiation started. Unfortunately, no such kind of mechanism was available. Because of such structural constraints, the opinion of Hong Kong would only be relied on the negotiators from both Governments to represent and take care.

On the British side, the Governor of Hong Kong acted as a member of the British delegation. Voices from within Hong Kong had to rely on the Executive Council (ExCo), which had been granted an advisory status from the second phase of the negotiation in July 1983. In a statement issued by the British Prime Minister's Office following the visit of all the ExCo members to London on 1 July 1983, Britain "reaffirmed their commitment to Hong Kong and their aim of seeking arrangement which would be acceptable to Parliament, to China and to the people of Hong Kong" and also "emphasised the importance which they attach to the advice of the Executive Council which would continue to be sought throughout the course of the talks".[140] But the Hong Kong mass public could hardly regard the ExCo members as representative of their interests because the latter were nominees of the Governor and

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[139]David Bonavia, *Hong Kong 1997* (Hong Kong: South China Morning Post, 1985), pp. 102-104; quoted in Yahuda (1993), *op. cit.*, p. 257.

[140]Cited by UMELCO, *Annual Report 1984*, p. 3.

so insulated from the society.[141] The closed colonial political structure, more or less, contributed to the wide spread of such kind of feelings.

On the Chinese side, Hong Kong deputies to the National People's Congress, representatives to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the Hong Kong branch of the New China News Agency (NCNA) and local leftist organizations had constituted the major channels of reflecting public opinion in Hong Kong. It seemed to many Hong Kong people that the above-mentioned channels were far from adequate and had been regarded as not as neutral as they claimed to be. Without the necessary and widespread legitimacy in the eyes of the Hong Kong people in general, the representation and effectiveness of these channels were seriously called into question.

Furthermore, Beijing had rejected the "three-legged stool" concept totally. The concept was first used in 1971 to describe a tripod of consent among China, Britain and Hong Kong people in maintaining the stability of Hong Kong, and later borrowed to denote the three legs of China, Britain and Hong Kong in supporting the stool of Hong Kong's future after 1997.[142] The conflict was stirred up when the then Hong Kong Governor, Sir Edward Youde[143], was asked who represents the people of Hong Kong in the Sino-British negotiations when he returned to Hong Kong from London on 7 July 1983. He said: "I represent. I am the Governor of Hong Kong . . . Indeed I represent the people of Hong Kong; who else would I represent?"[144]

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[141]Yahuda (1993), *op. cit.*, p. 256, n15.

[142]See the interview of Mr Denis C. Bray, the then Secretary for Home Affairs, Hong Kong Government, in *The Nineties Monthly* 180 (January 1985):26; Cheng (1984), ed. *op. cit.*, pp. 219, 231-2; H.K. Lamb (1985), *op. cit.*, p. 29-33; Peter Harris, "Hong Kong Confronts 1997: An Assessment of the Sino-British Agreement," *Pacific Affairs* 59 (1986):48, n10.

[143]Sir Edward Youde passed away in office during a trip to Beijing in late 1986.

[144]Quoted in H.K. Lamb (1985), *op. cit.*, p. 29; see also Lane (1990), *op. cit.*, p. 97.

Beijing reacted the next day by stressing that the Hong Kong Governor was a member of the British delegation. Moreover, the Director of the Government Information Service, Mr Peter Tsao, was denied a visa for accompanying the Governor to the Beijing talks. The Chinese stance had been understood to be that only the Chinese Government has the right to act on behalf of the Hong Kong people.

Later on, Beijing had also challenged the status of the Unofficial members of both the ExCo and the LegCo as representatives of Hong Kong people. When receiving Sir S.Y. Chung, Miss Lydia Dunn and Mr Q.W. Lee, who visited Beijing at China's invitation, on 23 June 1984, Mr Deng Xiaoping discredited them deliberately by stating that they were there in their private capacities. Mr Deng was quoted as saying: "The Sino-British negotiations will not be subject to external interference" and "As for the so-called 'three-legged stool' situation, we only recognise two legs. There is no third leg". After the meeting, Miss Dunn was said to be surprised "at Deng's initial reference to our individual capacity."[145]

Given the prevention from participation in the negotiations and the lack of a effective representation mechanism, the Hong Kong mass public seem to have little faith in the resulting Sino-British Agreement.

The Shifting of Aspiration

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Hong Kong people had held a quite optimistic view toward the future of Hong Kong. They believed that China would let Hong Kong remain as it was because of the fact that the Government of the PRC had tolerated the Colony for the past several decades, especially in the years of the Cultural Revolution, as well as because of the importance of Hong Kong in

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[145]*Far Eastern Economic Review* (*FEER*), 5 July 1984.

accomplishing her goals of "Four Modernisations". Therefore, they were of an opinion, though somewhat subjective, that the status quo would be maintained after 1997. According to a survey released in March 1982, over three-fourths of the respondents indicated that the probable outcome of the future of Hong Kong after 1997 would be either to maintain the status quo or to become trust territories.[146]

As mentioned before, Beijing would not accept any form of British presence after 1997 and this stance was straightforward and not negotiable. The hope to maintain the status quo was dashed as Beijing put across the above message vigorously and firmly during the initial phase of negotiations. In order not to disappoint and frustrate her compatriots in Hong Kong, Beijing put forward the plan of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" (*gangren zhigang*[147]).

This strategic move by the Beijing leaders had quite succeeded in shaping the preferences of Hong Kong people, as well as offering a hope, at least at the moment, of Hong Kong people governing themselves. In response to the question of what the meaning of Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong was in an interview with *Newsweek* on 23 January 1984, the then Deputy Director of the Hong Kong branch of the NCNA, Mr Li Chu-wen said:

> The demand for democracy on the part of Hong Kong's people is fully justified and should win the sympathy of all those with democratic aspirations -- including the Chinese. If Hong Kong prefers direct elections to determine its officials, then it should strive for that, and it will have the support of the Chinese people.

In early 1984, members of the LegCo had adjusted their attitudes toward the Sino-British negotiations from the one of waiting passively for the outcome to the one

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[146]Quoted in Cheng (1984), ed., *op. cit.*, p. 85.

[147]The term "*gangren zhigang*" is believed to be coined by the then Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of China's State Council, Mr Liao Cheng-zhi, in January 1983 when receiving a visiting group of Hong Kong New Territories village leaders. Before that day, the concept was widely floated in Hong Kong, but the exact wording had not been fixed.

of being more active in asserting their right to discuss the matter before London and Beijing have arrived at any agreement. This was largely in response to London's decision to withdraw from Hong Kong in 1997.[148] Under such a condition, Mr R.H. Lobo, Senior Member of the LegCo, introduced a motion to debate the issue in public on 14 March 1984. The motion reads as follows:

> This council deems it essential that any proposals for the future of Hong Kong should be debated in this council before any final agreement is reached.

During the debate, LegCo members seemed dissatisfied with the way the Hong Kong people were being treated by both Britain and China. For example, Mr Alex Wu used the term "arranged marriage" to denote the treatment Hong Kong people had received; Dr Ho Kam-fai refuted those who regarded the "Lobo motion" as the re-emergence of the "three-legged stool" concept; Mr Stephen Cheong shared the view of Dr Ho and added that the LegCo members were not fighting to have a final say in the negotiations; and Miss Maria Tam argued that the LegCo has the legal status to debate the future of Hong Kong.[149]

When Sir Geoffrey Howe, then Foreign Secretary, had made it clear on 20 April 1984 that Britain would retreat from Hong Kong in 1997, the unofficial members of the ExCo and the LegCo issued a position paper arguing that the acceptability of the would-be Sino-British Agreement depended on its:

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[148]Sze Ma Yee, "The Negotiation of Hong Kong Future with All Glories Goes to Deng Xiaoping," *Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly* 91 (1984):37-39. (in Chinese)

[149]Quoted in *UMELCO Annual Report* 1984, pp. 4-5.

(i) containing full details of the proposed administrative, legal, social and economic systems applicable after 1997;

(ii) providing adequate and workable assurances that the terms of the Agreement will be honoured;

(iii) stating that the provisions of the Basic Law will incorporate the provisions of the Agreement;

(iv) guaranteeing that the rights of British nationals will be safeguarded.[150]

Furthermore, Sir S.Y. Chung, Miss Lydia Dunn and Mr Q.W. Lee visited Beijing at China's invitation and met with Mr Deng Xiaoping and Mr Ji Pengfei on 23 June 1984. In the meeting, they made three recommendations to maintain stability and prosperity of Hong Kong both before and after 1997:

(i) . . . the Agreement:
--must be very detailed; it must provide clear and precise definitions of all aspects of Hong Kong's existing systems;
--must be mutually binding as between the two signing countries of China and Britain;
--must contain a provision stipulating that the Basic Law of the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong will be based on the terms in the Agreement. . . .

(ii) In order to enhance confidence, we believe that the Basic Law should be drafted in Hong Kong. It should be included in the Constitution of China after the approval by the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC). . . .

(iii) . . . If the Chinese leaders understand the anxiety of the people of Hong Kong and would agree to the establishment of an insulating mechanism, like a dam, between Hong Kong and China, confidence in Hong Kong would be greatly increased. We, therefore, propose the establishment of a Committee consisting of Chinese people of international standing and reputation. This Committee will be appointed by the Government of China. Their responsibility would be to monitor or advise the drafting, and implementation of, and subsequent amendments, if any, to the Basic Law.[151]

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[150]*Ibid.*, p. 56.

[151]*Ibid.*, pp. 57-8.

The strong wording in the above quotation did not bring much fruit. As mentioned before, Mr Deng Xiaoping opted to play down their capacities and denied that there was any confidence crisis in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, a strong distrust of Chinese Government could be detected from the lines. And this probably reflected the state of mind of many Hong Kong people, at least at that moment.

In addition, after the initialling of the Joint Declaration on 26 September 1984, Hong Kong people were invited to submit to the Assessment Office their views on it. One submission from an individual seemed to reflect the powerlessness and actual feeling of the Hong Kong people:

> I belong to the middle income group who do not have the means to emigrate to other countries and because I was born and educated in Hong Kong I would wish to stay in Hong Kong. For the purpose of your statistics you can classify me as one of those who would accept the draft agreement but I hope you will also take into account that I only accept it with much reluctance and with many reservations about the feasibility of its implementation. My heart is not truly at ease and I have no full confidence in our future. The whole thing has not been a very fair play to us because we have not had any say and there is no other alternative than not to have an agreement at all.[152]

From the above we could see some of the Hong Kong people adjusted to accept whatever arrangements reached by Britain and China on their behalf. Retreating from their high hopes of maintaining the status quo under British rule, they now came down to the earth by accepting, though somewhat reluctantly, the reality that Hong Kong had to return to China in July 1997. The remaining thing they could do was to press for an agreement that promised to keep the existing systems unchanged and then have it codified in the Basic Law, which is the mini-constitution of Hong Kong after 1997.

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[152]Assessment Office, *Arrangements for Testing the Acceptability in Hong Kong of the Draft Agreement on the Future of the Territory. Report of the Independent Monitoring Team* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1984), p. 19.

Their hope and faith for the future of Hong Kong relied on whether the promise of "high degree of autonomy" and "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" under the roof of "one country, two systems" would be actually put into practice. Gone was the possibility of having any form of British presence after 1997; thus, the question of how to perfect and realize the concept of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" became paramount.

The Rivalry Over the Democratisation
of Hong Kong

The idea of developing "representative government" in Hong Kong was a recent one. Only after the issue of 1997 had been raised in the early 1980s, did the British Government make public its intention to have some sort of political reform in Hong Kong. To a certain extent, the late arrival of decolonization was due to the complicated political situation of Hong Kong.[153] Unlike other British colonies, Hong Kong was unlikely to become an independent state. The Chinese Government, whether the Communists or the Nationalists, had never given up its sovereign claim over Hong Kong. Any constitutional reform must take into account the reaction of the Chinese Government.

The long-overdue reform of the "Victorian" colonial structure seemed to get China's blessings as stated in the Joint Declaration. Up to the conclusion of the Joint Declaration, there was no elected element, be it direct or indirect, in the Legislative Council. But the Joint Declaration stipulates that the chief executive "shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally" and the legislature "shall be constituted by elections". Although there would be reform on the political structure, two outstanding questions remain: when to introduce such reforms, and who has the final say on the pace and direction of the reform. These two questions seem to be separated from each other at the first glance, but they are indeed highly related. If Britain and China had arrived at a consensus on the extent of the reform, the question of timing becomes less problematic. If not, the timing becomes critical as China would prefer no or limited change during the transitional period. Furthermore, the consensus between Beijing and London on the extent of the political reforms would be vital for building up a basis for Hong Kong's autonomy that would endure after 1997.

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[153]For the normal process of decolonisation, see Norman Miners, "The Normal Pattern of Decolonisation of British Dependent Territories" in Peter Wesley-Smith and Albert H.Y. Chen, eds., *The Basic Law and Hong Kong's Future* (Hong Kong: Butterworths, 1988), pp. 44-54.

Britain seemed to think that she would be responsible for preparing the reform during the transitional period given that the proposed reform was in line with the Joint Declaration. Britain also thought that her sovereignty over Hong Kong would last until 1997, though China would be consulted in the implementation of the Joint Declaration. Furthermore, "the British and Hong Kong Governments appear to have interpreted the Chinese acceptance of central elective institutions for the S.A.R. [Special Administrative Region] *from* 1997 as also acquiescence in their progressive introduction in the interim period to lay the groundwork for full internal autonomy after the reversion of sovereignty."[154] (italics origin)

China appeared not to share the same view as Britain. As the following sections will reveal, Beijing wanted to get hold of the pace of reform by stressing that the reform would better converge with the Basic Law which is still under drafting. China could not accept the pre-determination of the Basic Law by the political reforms initiated by the British Government. Furthermore, China seemed to regard the right of being consulted by Britain in the implementation of the Joint Declaration during the transitional period as having the right of approval or the veto power.

The divergent views had not only spelt out the difficulty of smooth transition, but also mobilized the local political forces to join in the rivalry. The attempts and bargains made by all these actors (political forces) in shaping the emerging political structure and order have provided the Hong Kong public with an understanding of their political value and stance. This process of development would shape the attitude and behaviour of the public and was bound to have impact on the voters' choice in the ensuing elections.

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[154]Peter Slinn, "The Hong Kong Settlement: A Preliminary Assessment," *International Relations* 9 (1987):11.

Different Attitudes Towards Political Reforms

As mentioned before, the item of political reforms had been put on the political agenda by the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. There was no problem of carrying out reform but the pace and the extent of democratisation did stir up debate and mobilisation among the concerned parties. There were several forces working to shape the political reforms before 1997 and the post-1997 political structure. At the state level, there were only two actors: Britain and China. At the societal level, the following could be identified: the metropolitan capitalists, the indigenous capitalists, the rural gentry, and the new middle class.[155] The alignment and realignment of the above-mentioned forces will probably help shape and explain the emergent social formation and political order in the transitional and post-1997 period. All of them would like to see Hong Kong remain stable and prosper but they have their own ideas and ways to achieve it. Their interests and calculation are so divergent that conflict and contradiction seem inevitable.

First of all, China made clear that Hong Kong would be governed by Hong Kong people and enjoy a high degree of autonomy under the "imaginative" idea of "one country, two systems" after the restoration of Hong Kong sovereignty in 1997. Although the terms "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" and "high degree of autonomy" had often been talked about within Hong Kong society in and before 1985, no operational meaning and relevant procedures of implementation were offered by China at the time. This state of affairs could be attributed to the premature nature of the relevant concepts which were originally aimed at wooing the Taipei Government for reunification. As the situation came to requiring clarification in mid-1980s onwards, Beijing had added qualifications to her promise. Furthermore, Beijing showed that she would like to see as little change as possible before 1997. The adoption of such conservative approach by the Chinese Government seemingly came from Beijing's "suspicion" over the British sincerity at carrying out the pre-

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[155]Kuan Hsin-chi, "Power Dependence and Democratic Transition: The Case of Hong Kong," *China Quarterly* 128 (1991):774-93.

emptive political reforms in 1985 and the resulting so-called danger of restoring power to the Hong Kong people by such reforms before 1997. Furthermore, a long list of reasons were also advanced to explain China's resistance to democratisation:

> (1) the fear that Britain will use it as an excuse to shirk its responsibility of administering Hong Kong until 1997, (2) democratisation will release political forces of such magnitudes that continued rule of the Hong Kong [G]overnment will be difficult or impossible, (3) the injection of elements of uncertainty which would wreck the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong before China is in a position to take over, (4) the possibility that power will be transferred to political groups which are pro-Britain, hostile to China or predisposed to place the interests of Hong Kong before those of China, (5) China being compelled to openly organize politically in order to participate in the competition for the transferred power, thus bringing about detrimental consequences for Hong Kong, (6) democratization will disrupt the capitalist system of Hong Kong by scaring away local and foreign capital and by forcing the government to adopt excessive welfare measures and restrictive economic regulations, (7) the possibility of turning mass elections into occasions for the people of Hong Kong to periodically pass judgments on the popularity of China, and (8) the fear that the 'democratic forces' in Hong Kong will eventually become subversive of political tranquility in China by sheer demonstration effects and by their purposive promotion of Western-style 'democracy' in China.[156]

Because of being "Not sure of Britain's intentions and unable to completely prevent some forms of power transfer from taking place, China for strategic reasons and out of an instinctual predisposition not to leave power to chance, feels compelled to compete in any power-grasping game."[157] Under such a perception, China would try to resist any constitutional change that will let Hong Kong out of her control and would like to maintain the executive-led government and related structures after 1997. This intention was well reflected in the content of the Basic Law. By concentrating

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[156]Lau Siu-kai, *Decolonization Without Independence: The Unfinished Political Reforms of the Hong Kong Government* (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, Institute of Social Studies, 1987), p. 6.

[157]*Ibid*, p. 10.

nearly all the power in the hands of the executive head, China would easily control the use of state power in post-1997 Hong Kong.

For Britain, the best outcome of the negotiation with China was the continuation of the British rule after 1997. As shown in previous sections, Britain had failed to achieve that goal and subsequently agreed to hand back Hong Kong to China in 1997. The remaining questions for the British Government to resolve just before the conclusion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in late 1984 were how to ensure institutionally the continuation of existing freedom and living style after 1997, and how to convince the British Parliament to approve the said Joint Declaration.[158]

As a result, the British Government had swiftly issued Green and White papers in 1984 aiming at the establishment of representative government before 1997. After that, the British concern was whether she could maintain an effective rule over Hong Kong in the transitional period. The unusual 12-year long transitional period has brought out the question as to which government has the ultimate say in that period. The intervention of China in the transitional period aroused British suspicion of the extent of the autonomy the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government will have. The intensive and prolonged controversy over the constitutional reforms and the building of Chek Lap Kok airport have been the typical examples. Democratisation therefore became one of the necessary steps to take, so as to maintain her effective and legitimate rule as well as to counter the expanding Chinese intervention in Hong Kong affairs.

The metropolitan capitalists, the indigenous capitalists and the rural gentry seemed to try to avoid any involvement in the Sino-British dispute. Although their common interests in maintaining the capitalist system in Hong Kong is the same, they have conflict over their respective role and influence in the present colonial state as well as in the future HKSAR state. Accompanying the restoration of Hong Kong to

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[158]John Walden, *Excellency, Your Gap is Growing: Six Talks on a Chinese Takeaway* (Hong Kong: All Noble Co. Ltd., 1987), p. 73.

China is the rise of economic nationalism. The influence of the metropolitan capitalists seemed to be contained and may give way to the indigenous capitalists and the rural gentry as 1997 approaches. Furthermore, due to their extensive investment in China as well as the diminishing power of the British-Hong Kong Government, the indigenous capitalists, the rural gentry and some British businessmen would tend to support China if conflict existed between China and Britain. Nevertheless, the metropolitan capitalists are not without counteracting power. The very success and further development of Hong Kong as well as the economic reform in China hinge on the present and on the supply of adequate financial capital by the metropolitan capitalists, and the latter's strategic position in the world capitalist system.

The new middle class had long been deprived of representation in the colonial state, at least up to the early 1980s. Through the writing of critics in the newspapers and the organisation of protest, the activists in this class have started to challenge the colonial state since the 1970s.[159] They were not satisfied with the colonial political order and wanted to see some sort of democratic reform.[160] They were therefore given the label of "democratic faction". The reunion with China and the maintenance of a high degree of autonomy for Hong Kong after reunion were their political principles in the 1980s, but the latter one seems to have gained more emphasis after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. Although rising to the status of semi-opposition through electoral competition, their vulnerability lies in their limited (though growing) mobilisation capacity and the lack of cohesive leadership.[161] More important than

[159]For the role of the new middle class in the Hong Kong urban movements, see Alvin Y. So and Ludmilla Kwitko, "The Transformation of Urban Movements in Hong Kong, 1970-90," *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 24 (1992):32-43; for a collection of critics written by one of the active pressure groups, the Hong Kong Observers, see their publication *Pressure Point* (Hong Kong: Summerson Eastern, 1981); for the attitude of the Hong Kong Government and her treatment towards the pressure groups in the late 1970s, see Duncan Campbell, "A Secret Plan for Dictatorship," *New Statesman* 2598 (1980):8-9 & 12.

[160]Joseph Y.S. Cheng, "The Democracy Movement in Hong Kong," *International Affairs* 65 (1989):443-62.

[161]Lau Siu-kai, "Institutions Without Leaders: The Hong Kong Chinese View of Political Leadership," *Pacific Affairs* 63 (1990):191-209.

that is whether they have the will to remove the institutional barriers set by the present and future sovereign states.[162] So far, it is the one that can manage to have a plurality of electoral support. Meanwhile, a pro-Beijing faction does exist in this class. They have a close relationship with the Chinese authorities and their organs in Hong Kong. For them, nationalism is more important than the principle of autonomy.

Unlike in other British colonies, the public in Hong Kong seemed to have played a minor and passive role in the politics of decolonisation. Insulated from politics under the colonial rule, discouraged from participation by its future sovereign state, and lacking leadership and organisation, their influence would be peripheral. Their voice could only be heard spontaneously in protest movements and hopefully in elections. This segment of population comprises largely the refugees from China after 1949 and their offspring. Their political orientation toward Communist China is quite negative and their trust in her is very limited.[163] Regarding the political reform, they tended to be crosscut by the national sentiment and the principle of a high degree of autonomy.

Given the closed and concentrated nature of the Hong Kong Government which has developed since 1841 and is likely to remain in place after 1997, the successful jockeying for influence or power of particular social forces lies in their coincidence of interest with the sovereign state. In the meantime, the state may probably be constrained by its paramount aim of capitalist development and therefore may occasionally accommodate demands that seem to have effect on the stability and prosperity of the Hong Kong capitalist society.

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[162]Gideon Doron and Moshe Maor, "Barriers to Entry into a Political System," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 3 (1991):175-88; also, Randall G. Holcombe, "Barriers to Entry and Political Competition," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 3 (1991):231-40.

[163]Huang Wenfang, "My Forty-Two Years of Life and Works in the New China News Agency's Hong Kong Branch" (series and in Chinese) *Eastweek* 90 (13 July 1994):160-164.

While the Sino-British negotiations were still in progress in July 1984, the Hong Kong Government put forward a Green Paper entitled "The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong". One of the aims stated in the Paper is:

> . . . to develop progressively a system of government the authority for which is firmly rooted in Hong Kong, which is able to represent authoritatively the views of the people of Hong Kong, and which is more directly accountable to the people of Hong Kong; . . .[164]

Following the District Administration Reforms launched in 1980-1 which led to the establishment of the consultative District Boards system, the Paper proposed to reform the "central organs of the Government" of the LegCo, the ExCo, the Governor and their relationships with each other.

The move seemed to indicate Britain's decision to further reform the political structure in Hong Kong, though in a very cautious and manageable way. This can be detected from the Green Paper's praise of the existing "consensus politics" and the somewhat less favourable comments on the introduction of direct election. In highlighting the unique feature of Hong Kong's political system, the Green Paper put it in this way:

> The most distinct feature of the present system of government in Hong Kong is that it operates on the basis of consultation and consensus. It is not a system based on parties, factions and adversarial politics but one of broad agreements which seeks to take a pragmatic approach to the problems of the day. . . . The very real advantages of this system, which have enabled Hong Kong to enjoy sustained periods of economic growth and internal stability, must not be forgotten, or lightly thrown aside, in developing plans for the introduction of more representative institutions in Hong Kong.[165]

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[164]*Green Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong* (July 1984), p. 4.

[165]*Ibid.*, p. 8.

Regarding direct election, the Green Paper described it as not a "universally successful as a means of ensuring stable representative government" and it "would run the risk of a swift introduction of adversarial politics, and would introduce an element of instability at a crucial time". On the contrary, the adoption of indirect election, especially in the form of functional constituencies, seemed to have the consideration that "full weight should be given to representation of the economic and professional sectors of Hong Kong society which are essential to future confidence and prosperity".[166]

The then Governor, Sir Edward Youde, had also hinted that the views from Beijing had also been taken into consideration when framing the proposal. In introducing the Green Paper to the LegCo in July 1984, he stated:

> In drawing up our proposals we have had regard to the special circumstance of Hongkong and the need to maintain our good relationship with our mainland neighbour. We have also done our utmost in framing these proposals to ensure that there need be no conflict with the principle of continuity between the systems in force both before and after 1997.[167]

As shown in Table 3.1, the LegCo proposed to have 12 (25%, N=48) and 24 (48%, N=50) indirectly elected members (half from the electoral college and half from functional constituencies) in 1985 and 1988, respectively. In 1991, the number would be raised to 28 (56%) under option 1 and 40 (80%) under option 2. Though there was no proposed change in the ExCo in 1985, the Green Paper had proposed that 4 (25%) and 8 (57%) members would be elected from among the LegCo's unofficial members. Because of the above changes in the LegCo and the ExCo, the Governor would cease to be the President of the LegCo and his power in the ExCo would be reviewed in due course. Furthermore, the Green Paper also indicated that:

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[166]*Ibid.*, p. 9.

[167]*The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong*, Address by the Governor Sir Edward Youde, GCMG, MBE, to the Legislative Council on 18 July 1984, p. 5.

The future method of selecting candidates for appointment as Governor will also need to be considered. One possible development would be for the Governor himself, in his capacity as Chief Executive, to be selected, once the process described in this Paper is complete, through an elective process, for example, through election by a college composed of all Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils after a period of consultation among them.[168]

The question here is whether the release of the 1984 Green Paper preceded the Chinese agreement in the Joint Declaration that the future HKSAR legislature should be constituted by elections. The answer was not, as revealed later by Sir Geoffrey Howe.[169] Although showing her disapproval in private briefing, China at last did agree to include the clause in the Joint Declaration.[170] This pre-emptive move to reform had aroused the suspicion of China which was later found to be detrimental to the close cooperation of both countries during the transition period. (for details, see the following section)

One possible explanation for the pre-emptive move by Britain was the British calculation of pressurising China to adopt the relevant clauses in the Joint Declaration. If adopted, it seemed to smooth the way for the subsequent approval of the Joint Declaration by the British Parliament and the Hong Kong people. In addition, the move also served as the constitutional basis for the succeeding democratic reform as well as "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong".

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[168]*Green Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong* (July 1984), p. 20.

[169]Sir Geoffrey Howe revealed this before the Foreign Affairs Committee, see *Foreign Affairs Committee, Volume II, Minutes of Evidence*, p. 24; cited by Norman Miners, *The Government and Politics of Hong Kong*, 5th ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 25 & 30, n20.

[170]Miners (1991), *ibid.*, p. 25; *FEER*, 29 November 1984.

In fact, the release of the Green Paper has been viewed as a logical move to prepare for the subsequent "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong". Sir S.Y. Chung, then senior member of the ExCo, had stated that:

> If there is no problem in the [on-going Sino-British] negotiation, British rule will end on 30 June 1997. China has said to let Hong Kong people govern Hong Kong after regaining sovereignty. At present, Hong Kong is a colony and the Governor--the highest administrator--is appointed [by Britain]. The ordinary people in Hong Kong do wish that the [future] administrator would not be appointed by Beijing, but be elected by the Hong Kong people. Thus, there is no reason for Hong Kong to follow the colonial system in the future. Instead, Hong Kong should follow [to develop] a democratic system. We do not want the Hong Kong Government to continue the existing colonial government until 1996 and then suddenly carry out election. As a result, [we] should use the remaining 13 years to transform [Hong Kong] into a representative government. . . .[171]

In the LegCo's motion debate on the Green Paper, Mr Alex Wu also said: "It is especially sensible for the Green Paper to adopt a gradual approach to achieve the objective of 'Hong Kong people to rule Hong Kong'". Mr Yeung Po-kwan said on the same occasion that: "as there are only 13 years to go before Hong Kong is faced with the reality of 'Hong Kong being ruled by Hong Kong people' in 1997, the introduction of reforms into the government system has become an urgent task which admits of no delay."[172]

Although there was a common understanding of the need to reform the central level of government by introducing elected members to the LegCo first and then to the ExCo, the political community was divided over the way the elected members would be recruited. Those who supported the Green Paper's option of indirect election were mainly ExCo and LegCo members. They argued for a cautious start of political reform so as to maintain stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. Mr Chan Kam-chuen, a Legco member, even hinted that the introduction of direct election

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[171]*The Nineties Monthly* 175 (August 1984):58; original in Chinese, my own translation.

[172]*Hong Kong Hansard*, 2 August 1984:1354 & 1405.

would probably favour the well-organised leftist trade unions. He further reminded those who supported direct election that:

> They should be aware of the Chinese saying (螳螂捕蟬，不知黃雀在後) i.e. the mantis preying a cicada is unaware of the oriole behind it. If they count the number of votes they estimate they would get and compare the figure with what the unions would get, they would discover that it will take a lot of hardwork to canvass for the votes of the disorganised silent majority, bearing in mind that the unions are well organised and may use the votes they can canvass as their powerful political weapons.[173]

The advocates of direct election were UrbCo members, activists of pressure groups, trade unions and grassroots organizations. They united together to form the Joint Conference on the Green Paper on Further Development of Representative Government. The Joint Conference argued that direct election to the LegCo was the key issue of the present political reform and a step to "return governmental authority to the people" as there would be "a democratic and highly autonomous system of self-administration" in 1997. They therefore demanded that there should be no less than one-fifth of directly elected LegCo members by 1988.[174]

The subsequent White Paper, released in late November 1984, opted for a speedy pace of introducing indirectly elected members to the LegCo. Twenty-four (43%) would be returned by indirect election in 1985. Though the Green Paper had not included any option of direct election to the LegCo, the White Paper indicated that the LegCo would have directly elected members in 1988. It seemed worthy to quote here:

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[173]*Ibid.*, pp. 1373-4.

[174]*South China Morning Post* (SCMP), 17 September 1984.

. . . With few exceptions the bulk of public response from all sources suggested a cautious approach with a gradual start by introducing a very small number of directly elected members in 1988 and building up to a significant number of directly elected members by 1997. . . . In summary, there was strong public support for the idea of direct elections but little support for such elections in the immediate future.[175]

With respect to the ExCo and the Governor, no timetable was provided to implement the Green Paper's proposals. Though a ministerial system had been raised before and during the consultation period, the White Paper stated that the issue would be addressed at a later stage because it "raises important constitutional question". Regarding the position of the Governor, the White Paper indicated that: "Any proposals for change in the position and role of the Governor will need to take into account the provisions of the Joint Declaration and these important issues will be considered at a later stage."[176] Nevertheless, the White Paper had proposed to review the Governor's position as President of the LegCo in 1987. As a whole, it is strange to note that the far-reaching reforms outlined in the Green Paper had only been given a start but no definite schedule beyond 1985 in the subsequent White Paper.

China's Pressure to Converge

The optimists in Hong Kong seemed to believe that the coincidence of the timing of the release of the 1984 Green and White Papers, and the initialling of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in late 1984 indicated that London and Beijing had already arrived at certain consensus on political reforms and arrangements during the

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[175]*White Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong* (November 1984), p. 8.

[176]*Ibid.*, p. 11.

transitional period. This false hope was eventually shattered by the high profile the Beijing leaders adopted in the ensuing years of transition.

The rather self-restrained gestures by Beijing leaders in late 1984 up to mid-1985 witnessed an about-turn in late 1985, from the one that emphasized British responsibility to administer Hong Kong up to 1997 to the one that actively spoke out about what Beijing would like or not like to see in the transitional period. As indicated in a previous section, the British pre-emptive move to reform has entailed China's suspicion about the motive behind it. Hence, the director of the NCNA's Hong Kong Branch, Mr Xu Jiatun, gave a warning in a press conference on 21 November 1985 that he "did not want to see major changes in the twelve years [to come], transforming the fundamental system in Hong Kong, and then no more changes in the following fifty years." He further remarked that if Hong Kong wanted to maintain stability and prosperity, it would be better for her to follow the text of the Joint Declaration. He warned that:

> Now we cannot help noticing a tendency of doing things deviating from the Joint Declaration. If there are unexpected changes, I think one should pay attention to question of this kind.[177]

It was believed that Mr Xu wanted to express Beijing's disapproval of the British attempt to introduce further political reforms in Hong Kong as well as to intimidate political activists who were lobbying for a faster pace of democratization. At that moment, the issue of direct election to the LegCo and the installation of a ministerial system were hotly debated in Hong Kong. Beijing seemed to worry that the pre-emptive political reforms would dictate the drafting of the Basic Law, which was to be promulgated in 1990, and thus lessen its command on the political changes in Hong Kong in the transitional period. Moreover, Beijing also regarded the move as a prelude to "transfer power to the Hong Kong people" rather than to China.[178]

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[177]Quoted in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, "Hong Kong: the Pressure to Converge," *International Affairs* 63 (1987):278.

[178]Xu Jiatun, *Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs*, 2 vols. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong United Daily News, 1993), pp. 168-173. (in Chinese)

The sceptical attitude of Beijing toward the political reforms in Hong Kong was further reinforced by the existence of the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865.[179] The Act stated that if a colonial legislature developed to have one-half of its members elected by the inhabitants of the colony, the said legislature would become a "representative legislature" which has the "full power to make laws respecting the constitution, powers, and procedure of such legislature".

Beijing alleged that London, in doing so, would transfer the power to local pro-British political forces. Instead, Beijing stressed that London was bound to restore sovereignty to the PRC's Government, not the people of Hong Kong. Thus, any political reforms in the transitional period should have the approval of the Chinese Government and must converge with the Basic Law.[180] Mr Ji Pengfei, then Director of the State Council's HKMAO, revealed at the end of his visit to Hong Kong on 21 December 1985 that only small changes could be made in the transitional period and all proposed big changes must be discussed by China and Britain as the future HKSAR political system involved not just Hong Kong people but also China and its relations to Britain.[181] He was also quoted as saying:

> The question of Hong Kong's political system after 1997 will be decided by the Basic Law. Reforms of Hong Kong's political system in the transitional period have to take into consideration convergence with the Basic Law.[182]

In fact, he had already put through his message as early as 19 October 1985 when he received a visiting Hong Kong delegation of architects. On that occasion, he expressed Beijing's reservations at the fast pace of political reforms in Hong Kong

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[179]Sun Wai-see, *The Collection of Political Essays of Sun Wai-see* (Hong Kong: Ming Pao Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 102-12. (in Chinese)

[180]*FEER*, 12 December 1985.

[181]*FEER*, 2 January 1986.

[182]*Liaowang*, 30 November 1985; quoted in Cheng (1987), "Hong Kong: the Pressure to Converge", p. 278.

and reportedly said the political system for the HKSAR would be decided by the Basic Law, the drafting of which had just started and which would be promulgated in 1990.[183] Furthermore, Beijing officials seemed to stop using the phrase "*gangren zhigang*" (Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong) any more as Mr Lu Ping, then Secretary-General of the HKMAO, had openly regarded the phrase as "unscientific".[184]

The above Chinese assertions stirred up the question of who was responsible for the Hong Kong administration in the transitional period. As mentioned before, Article 4 of the Joint Declaration stated that "the Government of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the administration of Hong Kong" during the transitional period and China "will give its cooperation in this connection". In refuting his deputy, Alan Scott, who reportedly said in a seminar on 3 October 1985 that the Hong Kong Government will consult Beijing before taking any further political reforms, the then Chief Secretary, Sir David Akers-Jones, had stated clearly that: "The Chinese Government has made it clear it is our responsibility to run Hongkong in the next 12 years. Therefore we don't have to consult them." He further said political reforms would not be a subject for discussion in the Joint Liaison Group (JLG), an organ set up to help effective implementation of the Joint Declaration.[185]

But shortly after Mr Xu's warning, London reportedly conceded to Beijing by promising to discuss the future political reforms in the second meeting of the JLG.[186] On 30 December 1985, Sir David Akers-Jones revealed that the Hong Kong Government would exchange views with Beijing before publishing any proposals for political reforms in 1987 review.[187] Furthermore, the then British

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[183]*FEER*, 31 October 1985.

[184]*FEER*, 13 February 1986.

[185]*FEER*, 17 October 1985.

[186]*FEER*, 2 January 1986.

[187]*FEER*, 16 January 1986.

Foreign Minister with special responsibility for Hong Kong, Mr Timothy Renton, after his visit to China on 24 January 1986, indicated his agreement with Beijing that political changes must "converge" with the Basic Law. Mr Renton further elaborated his idea of convergence:

> We are creating a set of railway lines that lead up to 1997. The Chinese will be creating a set of railway lines that lead on from 1997. The need is to see that those two railway lines meet together at a crossing point.

In contrast to his former statement that London would not interfere with constitutional reforms in Hong Kong, he emphasised that Britain has overall responsibility for the administration of Hong Kong during the transitional period.[188] Apparently, London had opted to co-operate with Beijing by informing the latter before of any political reform plan in the future.

Being faced with China's constant stress on the convergence of political reform in Hong Kong with the Basic Law (mini-constitution of Hong Kong after 1997), on the return of sovereignty and administration to China but not the Hong Kong people, and on the maintenance of the status quo at the time of the conclusion of the Joint Declaration but not that of 1997, as well as with the constraints imposed by the responsibility of maintaining stability and prosperity as well as effective governing of Hong Kong, the British Government seemed to lose enthusiasm for carrying out her "unfinished" political reform at that moment.[189]

The Conflicting Ideas on the Pace of Democratization

The pressure to converge with the Basic Law being drafted called into question Britain's impartiality in reviewing the developments in representative government in

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[188]*FEER*, 6 February 1986.

[189]Lau (1987), *Decolonization without Independence*, pp. 33-40.

1987 and in implementing relevant reforms in Hong Kong. Although the public in Hong Kong had widely debated the relationships between the executive and the legislature, the 1987 Green Paper, released on 27 May 1987, opted neither to discuss it, nor to examine the overall role of the Governor at the moment. The 1987 Green Paper seemed to confine the review to the less controversial topics: the role and composition of the District Boards and the relationship of the Urban Council and urban District Boards, the size and committee structure of the Urban Council, the composition of the Legislative Council, the position of the Governor as President of the LegCo, and the issues concerning technical aspects of elections.

Nevertheless, the Hong Kong Government had pledged to remain in a "neutral and open-minded position" in the review process and urged the public to offer their views on the matter. Mr David Ford, then Chief Secretary, had also told the LegCo when tabling the Green Paper that: "All of them are genuine options. There are no preconceived ideas on the part of the Government. There is no pre-determined outcome." In order to achieve this aim in the four-month long consultation period, a Survey Office had been set up to "collect, collate and report on the public response to the Green Paper". Though the Government had tried to play down the most controversial issue of direct election, by stressing that the review was not completely concerned with that particular issue but the whole political landscape of Hong Kong, the issue of the day was still whether to introduce direct election to the LegCo in 1988.

Before the release of the 1987 Green Paper, Chinese officials had, in one way or another, made known their views on the political reform in general and the issue of direct election in particular. In February 1987, an unidentified Chinese official reportedly indicated that China was against the introduction of direct election in 1988, but would consider allowing it in 1991. The official also charged that the intention of the pro-direct-election group was to resist Communist China by promoting

democracy in Hong Kong.[190] In an address to the Basic Law drafters in April 1987, Mr Deng Xiaoping said:

> I don't believe that introducing direct election now will be good to Hong Kong. The first criterion of Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong is to elect those Hong Kong people who love China and Hong Kong. Does the one-person one-vote [method] elect such kind of people? It is not sure. . . . Introducing direct election in a gradual way [of doing it] is preferred.[191]

In an interview with the *Liaowang* (Overseas) published on 22 June, Mr Li Hou, then Deputy Director of the HKMAO and the Secretary-General of the Drafting Committee for the Basic Law (DCBL), was quoted as saying (but later denied) that direct election in 1988 "will naturally fail to converge with the Basic Law" and "would not be in accordance with the spirit of the Sino-British Joint Declaration".[192] Later in July, Mr Ke Zaishuo, Head of the Chinese side of the Joint Liaison Group, made clear that "we (China) have no significant view against direct election".[193] Probably, Beijing had adjusted its position from the question of "if" to "when". Subsequently, NCNA's officials had reportedly promoted a "political swap plan" of having direct election in 1991 instead of 1988.[194]

The pro-direct-election activists and pressure group leaders (hereafter the democrats) criticised the Hong Kong Government of not living up to its 1984 promise of furthering the developments in representative government. Dr L.K. Ding, a long-time democratic campaigner and the then chairman of the Christian Industrial

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[190]*SCMP*, 6 February 1987.

[191]Cheung Kit-fung, Yeung Kin-hing, Lo Wing-hung and Chan Lu-tze, *No Change for Fifty Years? The Tug of War among China, Britain and Hong Kong over the Basic Law* (Hong Kong: Long-chiu, 1991), p. 109-10; original in Chinese, my own translation.

[192]*SCMP*, 19 and 24 June 1987.

[193]*SCMP*, 11 July 1987.

[194]*Hong Kong Standard* (HKS), 18 September 1987.

Committee, said: "The 1987 Green Paper reflects the sober mood of these times while the 1984 Green and White Papers reflected the euphoria of those times." He further blamed the Green Paper of "souring of a dream that grew out of the Joint Declaration". Mr Thomas Tam, the Chairman of the Hong Kong Policy Review, also criticised the Government for escaping "from its responsibility in overseeing the development of a representative government in Hong Kong after China has indicated very clearly its strong objection to direct election".[195]

On the contrary, the opponents of direct election (hereafter the conservatives[196]) in 1988 stressed the paramount importance of stability and prosperity, and any political reforms should be sure to have convergence with the Basic Law. Mr Vincent Lo, Convener of the Business and Professional Group of the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law (CCBL), said: "Changes in 1988, if any, should only involve the fine-tuning of the existing system and direct election for 1988 would be a premature move as this [sic] will be a new development which may impinge on the Basic Law."[197] Mr Tsang Yok-sing of the leftist Hong Kong Federation of Education had reportedly regarded direct election as a drastic constitutional change that would adversely affect the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong and thus was contrary to the Joint Declaration.[198] Furthermore, chairman of a constituted union of the leftist Federation of Trade Unions argued that "One-man one-vote will not be the aim of democracy, but harmony among Hongkong's people and the promotion of an environment that attracts investments and which is conducive

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[195]SCMP, 28 May 1987.

[196]The term "conservative" is denoted those who favour as little changes in the status quo as possible. The various proposals put forward during the drafting of the Basic Law is summarized in Miron Mushkat's article, "The Political Economy of Constitutional Change in Hong Kong," Asian Economies 75 (Dec. 1990):33-53.

[197]SCMP, 28 May 1987.

[198]HKS, 15 June 1987.

to stability and prosperity" and added that "To the workers, a meal is better than a vote".[199]

The LegCo members were also divided over the issue of direct election. In the motion debate on the Green Paper on 15 and 16 July 1987, 18 LegCo members supported the introduction of direct election in 1988 and a similar number were against it. A similar pattern of opinion was also found in the Regional Council and the District Boards. In the case of the Urban Council, a majority of the speakers in the debate supported direct election in 1988.[200] On the other hand, most of the independent opinion polls had shown that respondents were more inclined to support direct election in 1988 than the opponents, ranging from two to one to three to one in favour of it.[201]

The proponents and opponents were deeply engaged in the "war of public opinion". Each side wanted to have an edge over the other in the hope of tipping the balance in their favour in the Survey Office's opinion collection process. The democrats under the umbrella organisation, the Joint Committee on the Promotion of Democratic Government, launched signature campaigns in supporting their cause. The broadcast during the campaign reads: "There is only 10 years to go before 1997, the future of Hongkong depends on our participation. If we have partial direct elections to the Legislative Council next year, we can participate more in central policy-making and will be in a better position to safeguard our livelihood in Hongkong."[202] This appeal to protect people's rights and interests managed to collect more than 210,000 signatures. In addition, the Joint Committee also placed a political advertisement on 4 September 1987, in which 145 pressure groups, trade

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[199]*SCMP*, 22 June 1987.

[200]Survey Office, *Public Response to Green Paper: The 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government. Report of the Survey Office: Part 1-- Report* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1987), p. 53.

[201]*SCMP*, 30 September 1987.

[202]*SCMP*, 7 September 1987.

unions, and grassroots organisations as well as 864 individuals had shown their support.

On the anti-direct-election side, the leftists made use of their organisation networks in advancing their cause. The Bank of China and its 12 sister banks reportedly told their 10,000 employees to sign a petition to oppose direct election in 1988.[203] The Federation of Trade Unions urged their 170,000 members to sign an anti-direct-election position letter which would be directed to the Survey Office later on. In expressing their opposition to direct election in 1988, eighty-four business organisations and nearly 400 socio-economic elites advertised their stance in several local newspapers on 28 and 30 September, respectively.

The report of the Survey Office released in early November sparked off another wave of criticism towards the Government about its mis-handling of public opinion. The bone of contention between the Government and the democrats was focused on the design and result of the Government-commissioned survey, and the classification of the pre-printed submissions and the signature campaigns. Contrary to all media-sponsored surveys, the Survey Office's survey had found that more respondents were against 1988 direct elections. Furthermore, the wording and ordering of option (4) in a question concerning direct election was called into question. It reads:

> If changes are desirable in 1988, it will be possible to make one or more of the following changes, e.g. increase slightly the number of Official Members, reduce the number of Appointed Members, increase the number of indirectly elected Members or have directly elected Members.

This clumsy and hard-to-understand option received criticism not only from the democrats but also from academics and private polling companies.

In addition, the Survey Office treated the pre-printed submissions as individual submissions but not the signature campaigns. Among the 95,835 individual

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[203]*SCMP*, 7 September 1987.

submissions, 60,706 were against 1988 direct election, of which 50,175 were in pre-printed forms. But only 1,313 out of 35,129 submissions for 1988 direct elections were in pre-printed forms.[204] On the other hand, the signature campaigns, which were overwhelmingly in favour of 1988 direct elections, had collected over 220,000 names of individuals and organisations. But only one signature campaign, which contained 295 names, was against 1988 direct election.[205] On the whole, the views expressed at the Establishment and organisation levels were slightly more inclined to object to the introduction of direct elections in 1988, but there was a quite clear majority supporting 1988 direct elections at the individual level if the pre-printed forms and signature campaigns were treated equally.

As a result, the democrats accused the Government of playing around with the figures so as to bow to Beijing pressure on direct elections. This accusation called into question the integrity and credibility of the Government. In rebuffing the above allegation, Sir David Ford, the then Chief Secretary, warned that: "Those who continue to make them in the misguided belief that they are dealing with a lame duck will learn that they have a tiger by the tail -- and not a paper tiger either."[206] Despite Sir David's warning, the Joint Committee on the Promotion of Democratic Government dispatched delegations to London and Beijing to petition against alleged Government manipulation of public opinion in the Survey Office report. In an open letter addressed to Mrs Margaret Thatcher, then British Prime Minister, Mr Martin Lee, leader of the London delegation, wrote that:

[204]*HKS*, 15 November 1987.

[205]Survey Office (1987), *op. cit.*, p. 57.

[206]*Hong Kong Hansard*, 11 November 1987; *SCMP*, 12 November 1987.

We submit that a decision not to hold direct election next year would be wholly unacceptable to the majority of the people of Hongkong. For the introduction of direct elections is no longer just a question of timing. To most people in Hongkong, it has become an indicator as to whether the British administration is credible and responsible to the people.

We submit that time is of the utmost importance and time is not on our side. If we were to lose precious years just to please the Chinese Government, there is simply not enough time left to evolve progressively an effective democratic government before 1997.[207]

Despite the last-minute effort of lobbying London and Beijing, the hope of the democrats was formally shattered by the release of the White Paper in February 1988. According to the White Paper, only ten directly elected LegCo seats would be introduced in 1991 to replace those presently filled by the electoral college of the District Boards. The fate of 1988 direct elections had already been sealed, but the political forces aimed at reforming the colonial structure shifted their attention to the drafting of the Basic Law and triggered off another round of intense competition among various political groups.

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[207]*SCMP*, 16 December 1987.

The Centre-Periphery Cleavage in the Making

With the British rule over Hong Kong not being extended beyond 1997, and the Chinese promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" and "high degree of autonomy" for 50 years after 1997, there was a need to re-frame the constitutional and political system so as to reflect the corresponding change in Hong Kong's political status. Under such circumstances, the drafting of the Basic Law of the HKSAR was called into play. Because of its paramount importance in regulating the relationships between China and Hong Kong as well as the political life within the future HKSAR, the drafting of the Basic Law would inevitably be a political game in which various political forces would participate to shape the outcome in their favour.

For the democrats and their supporters, they had campaigned for democratic reforms since the mid-1970s, well before the surge of the 1997 issue. They regarded the Chinese promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" in the early 1980s as a timely push to advance their cause. Thus, they viewed the establishment of representative government as a logical development of such promise. Furthermore, it also helped to safeguard their freedom and living style after 1997 and worked as an effective mechanism to ward off unnecessary intervention from China. Regarding the future political model, they advocated a popular and responsive political structure where the executive should be placed under the control of either the legislature or the electorate. In other words, they would like to have a legislature-centred political system.

For the conservatives, although they understood the importance of an open government and the rule of law, their intimate economic relationships with China had dictated their attitude towards the campaigns for setting up representative government. Once the Beijing Government expressed its disapproval of major political reforms in the transitional period in late 1985, the conservatives had to follow suit. Moreover, their privileged and nearly exclusive access to the Establishment would be threatened if political reforms implemented. It was also logical for them to side with the

Chinese Government to counter the advance of the democrats by limiting the scope of democratic reforms, if not totally opposed. A fragmented legislature and a executive-centred political system were thus their ideal model to be fought for in the Basic Law drafting process. In other words, they tried to maintain some form of colonial system or elite rule after 1997.

For the British and Hong Kong Governments, they always found themselves crosscut by the Chinese and the conservatives' pressure for limited, if not definitely no, reform, and the democrats' demand of full democracy. Governing in such a turbulent environment, like Hong Kong in the late 1980s, would not be an easy job. Furthermore, the British-Hong Kong Government also suffered from the diminishing support from the socio-economic elites, the lack of will to govern from the departing senior bureaucrats and the rising welfare demands from the mass public. How to maintain the effective governing in the face of growing intervention from China in the transitional period would be the major question waiting to be resolved. To accommodate and cooperate with China in local affairs, and to open-up partially the political structure through popular elections would be two possible ways to restore the declining legitimacy. But given the incompatibility of these two measures, it was very difficult to maintain the right balance. Nevertheless, Britain seemed to adopt a co-operative attitude towards the transition of power, at least before the appointment of Mr Christopher Patten as Governor in 1992. Sir Percy Cradock wrote in his memoirs that "the policy of co-operation with China for the benefit of Hong Kong, if not the only conceivable policy, is the only one that will allow Britain to leave the stage knowing that it was done its best to fulfil its responsibilities to the six million people in its charge."[208] Regarding the future political model, the British Government tried hard to convert the principles that it had stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration into the operational details of implementation, i.e. a political system where the executive is accountable to the elected legislature.

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[208]Percy Cradock, *Experiences of China* (London: John Murray, 1994a), p. 258.

Needless to say, China would be the host of the game with overwhelming power and influence in the drafting process. Acting as a referee or as an arbiter was all up to China's decision. With China acting as a referee, the political controversy over Hong Kong's electoral reforms might be confined to being a local issue and Beijing might then have a free hand to balance the conflicts between the democrats and the conservatives. But Beijing seemed to opt for the role of arbiter and to support the conservatives as reflected in the Basic Law drafting process. Thus, Beijing intervened in the local political contradictions of the democrats and the conservatives. There were two institutional barriers used to limit the influence of the democrats in the future HKSAR political system. One was to restrict the directly-elected seats of the legislature to a minority in terms of both number and influence. That meant to institute a fractionised and fragmented legislature. The other was to insulate the executive and its agencies from effective checks by the legislature and the mass public. That meant to maintain the executive-centred political system. These basic calculations of Beijing and the conservatives had worked to frustrate the democrats' efforts and reinforced the contradictions between them. After intense mobilisation efforts made by the concerned parties during the Basic Law drafting process and the subsequent polarisation of political forces, the centre-periphery electoral cleavage emerged and played a significant role in the ensuing 1991 direct elections.

The Politics of Appointment

The drafting of the Basic Law would probably be the most pressing task in the transitional period. In his recent published memoirs, Mr Xu Jiatun noted that there were two kinds of opinion within China as to whether Hong Kong people should be invited to join the Drafting Committee for the Basic Law (DCBL). Mr Xu was of the opinion that in order to have the widest support from the Hong Kong people, the

106

DCBL should include a certain number of Hong Kong drafters.[209] Chinese leaders seemed to accept what Mr Xu had suggested. When Beijing released the appointment list of the DCBL in June 1985, 23 (out of 59) members were from Hong Kong. The numerical strength of the Chinese drafters reflects the ultimate decision power rested with the Chinese side.[210] Any piece of legislation would, then, need the approval of the Chinese drafters and in fact, they held the vetting power in their own hands.

Although Beijing pledged to take care of as many sectors of interest as possible, the appointed Hong Kong drafters were mainly recruited from the upper and middle-upper strata of businessmen and professionals. Only two members were from the trade unions: Mr Tam Yiuchung from the leftist Federation of Trade Unions and Mr Szeto Wah from the Professional Teachers' Unions (PTU). In response to comment that the grassroots were under-represented in the DCBL, Mr Xu made clear that in deciding who should be appointed to the DCBL, Hong Kong's historical background and reality had to be considered, and the guiding principle was to maintain Hong Kong's stability and prosperity.[211] That means those who had occupied the strategic locations in Hong Kong society would be the prior targets to be wooed. But Mr Xu later in his memoirs admitted that he was originally planning to use the mainland drafters to counter-balance the businessmen's influence in the DCBL, but he found it unnecessary at the end of the day.[212]

As revealed by several sources, Britain had participated informally in the whole drafting process of the Basic Law through diplomatic channels and the Hong

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[209]Xu (1993), *op. cit.*, pp. 155-6.

[210]For the process of setting up the Basic Law Drafting Committee (BLDC) and Consultation Committee (BLCC), see Scott (1989), *op. cit.*, pp. 298-305; Cheng (1987), "Hong Kong: the Pressure to Converge", pp. 275-6; Lane (1990), *op. cit.*, pp. 119-26; Emily Lau, "The Early History of the Drafting Process" in Wesley-Smith and Chen (1988), *op. cit.*, pp. 90-104.

[211]Cheung, et al. (1991), *op. cit.*, p. 38.

[212]Xu (1993), *op. cit.*, p. 156.

107

Kong Basic Law drafters.[213] Mr Xu claimed that the degree of British involvement in the drafting of the Basic Law was very deep, having examined every paragraph and even particular wording of the Basic Law.[214] Sir Percy Cradock had also indicated the involvement of Hong Kong Government and the ExCo in the drafting process.[215] In addition, Beijing had also invited, but failed to persuade some pro-Hong Kong Establishment and pro-Taiwan figures to join the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law (CCBL).

Besides, two instances had worked to undermine the confidence of Hong Kong people toward the independence and operation of the CCBL which aimed to consult and collect public views on the Basic Law drafts. The first one concerned the sudden withdrawal of the leftist trade unions' support for Mr Lau Chin-shek, Director of the Independent Christian Industrial Committee (CIC), to be one of the seven nominees representing labour in the CCBL. Mr Lau was said to be militant in fighting for labour interest and thus had invited the dislike of the businessmen.[216] Mr Xu admitted in his memoirs that it was he who put pressure on the leftist Federation of Trade Unions not to support Mr Lau.[217]

The second one concerned the election of office bearers of the CCBL. The said election was held immediately after the election of the CCBL Standing Committee's members. Sir Yue-kong Pao, a DCBL Vice-chairman, swiftly proposed seven names to fill the said posts. The seven were regarded as duly elected as

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[213]Paul Fifoot, "China's Basic Law for Hong Kong," *International Relations* 10 (1991):301, n3; Xu (1993), *op. cit.*, p. 154-5; Cradock (1994a), *op. cit.*, p. 233.

[214]Xu (1993), *op. cit.*, p. 155.

[215]Cradock (1994a), *op. cit.*, p. 233.

[216]*Pai Shing*, 107 (1 November 1985):49-51; Emily Lau, "The Early History of the Drafting Process," in Peter Wesley-Smith and Albert H.Y. Chen, eds., *The Basic Law and Hong Kong's Future* (Hong Kong: Butterworths, 1988); Cheung et al. (1991), *op. cit.*, pp. 47-53.

[217]Xu (1993), *op. cit.*, pp. 162-163.

nobody in the meeting had shown their objection at that time. Later, critics challenged the appropriateness of Sir Y.K. to propose the candidates. The constitution of the CCBL had stipulated that the said posts "shall be elected from among members of the Standing Committee". That means Sir Y.K. had no such right. An NCNA official defended the result by saying that consultation was the same as "election from among members". Nevertheless, public pressure brought a new round of election but with the same result.[218] Though this was just a matter of procedure, harm had already been done to the image of and the people's faith toward the drafting process.

Threshold of Representation and Barriers of Entry

Accompanying the establishment of the DCBL and the CCBL was the Sino-British row over the further developments in representative government and the emergence of different interpretations of the Joint Declaration as more and more Beijing leaders put through their own version in the media, especially on the future political system. Their opinion seemed to set the parameter for the drafters.

In elaborating the "accountability" of the executive to the legislative, Mr Mao Junnian, an NCNA official and a member of both the DCBL and the CCBL, reportedly said the present executive was already accountable to the legislature, in the sense that the LegCo had the right to question government policies and to vet government finance.[219] In February 1986, Mr Lu Ping indicated that the word "accountable" could mean "clarify, explain and consult" and did not imply that the HKSAR legislature would become the power centre. He further elaborated his idea

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[218]*Pai Shing*, 110 (16 December 1985):6-8 & 58; Emily Lau (1988), *op. cit.*; Cheung et al. (1991), *op. cit.*, pp. 47-53.

[219]*FEER*, 12 December 1985.

later that the HKSAR executive and legislative should check and balance each other, and the latter should not be superior to the former or vice versa.[220]

Mr Li Hou, then Deputy Director of the HKMAO and the Secretary-General of the DCBL, made further clarification in June that the executive should make periodic reports to, answer questions from, submit budgets to, and be impeached by, the legislature, but the two should be of equal status.[221] Furthermore, Mr Deng Xiaoping told the DCBL drafters on 16 April 1987 that he did not support either the installation of a check-and-balance mechanism among the three powers of government, or the immediate introduction of direct elections.[222]

As mentioned before, the attitude of these Chinese leaders towards the political reforms in Hong Kong, in one way or another, coincided with those of the conservative leaders of the Hong Kong business community. The rather sudden and progressive introduction of universal suffrage and direct elections had given a shock to those political figures recruited by the appointment systems. Their privilege and status would then be threatened. Consequently, they tended to oppose liberalization or democratization. Because of such propensity, it is not surprising to find the frequent mutual support between the Chinese and the conservative Hong Kong drafters during the drafting process.

For the emerging democrats, the unreformed colonial system did not provide a fair opportunity for them to compete for political power. Thus, they tended to support a quicker pace of democratization and tried to mobilize support from the underprivileged. The critical questions for their development before and after 1997 are: how far can they remove the institutional barrier of entry and how high the threshold of representation will be. Given the drafting exercise as an institution-

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[220]*FEER*, 20 February 1986.

[221]*FEER*, 26 June 1986.

[222]Xu (1993), *op. cit.*, p. 152.

building process, the democrats would try hard to remove the institutional barrier of entry and to lower the threshold of representation.

Immediately after the establishment of the DCBL and the CCBL, the political elites in Hong Kong had actively participated in the discussion on the future political model of the HKSAR. At one time, the Secretariat of the CCBL had noted that 41 models had already been proposed. These models were later being sorted into 5 alternatives for selecting the Chief Executive (CE) and 4 alternatives for constituting the Legislature in the Draft Basic Law (for solicitation of opinions) released in April 1988. The differences among these alternatives were largely on the methods of nominating and electing the Chief Executive, and on the proportion of directly elected seats in the Legislature.[223]

Among the proposed models, the keen competition was between the Group of 190 and the Group of 89. The "190 proposal" was put forward by the democrats. It suggested that the candidates for the CE should be nominated by the legislature and selected by territory-wide direct election on a one-person-one-vote basis; and the legislature should be made-up of no less than 50% directly elected members, no more than 25% members returned through electoral college, and no more than 25% members returned through functional bodies. Under this model, the legislature, with directly elected members as a majority, would have an edge over the CE as the former have the right to nominate the CE's candidates. As a variant of this legislature-led political system, the legislature would become the political centre of gravity. The low threshold of representation would allow more participation from the wider society and lessen the chance of manipulation.

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[223]Secretariat of the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law (CCBL), *Reference papers for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Draft)*, (Hong Kong: Secretariat of the CCBL of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 1989a), pp. 89-101.

In contrast, the "89 proposal" drew its support largely from the conservative business community and professionals. It proposed that three candidates for the CE position should be nominated by a 20-member nomination committee of the 600-member electoral college and elected by a vote of the same electoral college; the legislature should be composed of 50% members returned through functional bodies, 25% members through direct election and the remaining 25% through the electoral college. Comparatively speaking, the institutional barrier of choosing the CE and the threshold of representation were quite high. By using the electoral college, the eligible participants would be largely confined to the narrow strata of socio-economic elites and the bulk of the mass public would be screened out. The influence from the mass society would also be prevented from playing a role because of its sheer size and proportion (one-fourth of the total). Given the predominance of the socio-economic elites in the selection of the CE and in the legislature, and the coincidence of their interests, the legislature and the CE would then work hand-in-glove and thus contribute to an executive-led political system. The public would be prevented from effective participation.

Time was running short, as there had to be a DCBL-recommended draft political model incorporated into the draft Basic Law which would then be submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress (NPC) for approval as a piece of proposed legislation in early 1989. The political activists in Hong Kong had spared no effort in seeking such compromise but failed at the end of the day. Under such circumstances, Mr Louis Cha, the co-convenor of the Subgroup on Political Structure of the DCBL, proposed the so-called "Mainstream Model" at the Subgroup meeting in Guangzhou on 19 November 1988. The revised form of the "Mainstream Model" passed and the subgroup meeting recommended: the CE shall be first elected by the electoral college and then a referendum shall be held during the third term of the CE to decide whether the CE shall be directly elected from the next term onwards; the proportion of the directly elected seats in the HKSAR Legislature for the first four terms are 27%, 38.5%, 50% and 50%, respectively, and then a referendum shall be held during the fourth term of the legislature to decide whether all its members shall be returned by direct election from the next term onwards.

According to this model, the earliest possible year for direct elections to the CE (five year term) and all the members of the legislature (four year term, except the first two year term) would be 2013 and 2012, respectively. Regarding the timing of introducing a full-fledged directly elected CE and legislature, this model might be considered as the most conservative of all the models proposed.

The "Mainstream Model" aroused a widespread outcry in Hong Kong. The democrats organised a series of protests, ranging from a marathon hunger strike to a mass rally in which the section on the HKSAR's political structure of the draft Basic Law was burned. A group of undergraduates also burned the *Ming Pao Daily News*'s editorials outside the *Ming Pao* Building to protest against Mr Cha's taking advantage of his owner of the newspaper to defend his political model. Although showing their dismay and frustration, their efforts were abortive because of the lack of institutional control of the Basic Law drafters. The effect was to prevent a true reflection of societal preferences in the drafting process. Coinciding with this was the inflexibility of China's Hong Kong policy and its apparent identification with the conservative businessmen's interests. The stage was set for the polarisation of political forces both within and without Hong Kong. The democrats were fighting a no-win battle with the "unholy" alliance of the Beijing Government and the conservatives.

In the midst of protests, criticism and call for revision, the "mainstream model" was finally adopted by the eighth session of the DCBL in January 1989. Furthermore, Mr Cha Chi-min, an influential but conservative businessman, had successfully sought a two-third majority backing in attaching four conditions to the introduction of a referendum in the session. Therefore, the referendum "shall only be held with the endorsement of the majority of members of the Legislature Council, the consent of the Chief Executive and the approval of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. The result of the referendum shall only be valid and

effective with the affirmative vote of more than 30 per cent of the eligible voters."[224]

The effect of the adoption of the most conservative "Cha-Cha formula" was the nearly endless delay in the implementation of full democracy. The four hurdles of getting a referendum to take place could not be regarded as a real progression path at all. Even if the crossing of the first three hurdles were secured, the threshold of the last hurdle was so high as to be unattainable. It was the matter of the adoption of the eligible voters as the basis to calculate the affirmative vote. The effect was that the higher the registration rate and the turnout rate in the referendum, the lower the threshold would be, or vice versa. For example, if there were 10,000 eligible votes, then the minimum vote of getting pass the threshold was 3,000+1 (more than 30% of the eligible voters); if 6,000 (60%) eligible voters got registered and 3,600 voters cast their votes (60%), then the referendum will only be passed if about 83.4% of voters were in favour of it.

The "Cha-Cha formula" might be regarded as another blow to the democrats after the 1987 political review. To those who hoped for the more democratic and open government that was promised, though vaguely, in the Joint Declaration, their hearts were really not at ease. Although Chinese officials had repeatedly said that there would be a chance to revise the conservative "Cha-Cha" political model, harm had already been done to the confidence and trust of the general public and the pro-democrat supporters. As one academic wrote, "by winning a blatantly unfair and political costly battle in the first round of the Basic Law drafting process over the trampled aspiration of the local democratic elements, the PRC unintentionally, but

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[224]Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 100; for the evolution of and comparison between the "mainstream" model and other models, see Secretariat of the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law (CCBL), *Drafting of the Basic Law and the "Mainstream Political Model* (Hong Kong: Secretariat of the CCBL of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 1988).

irrevocably, lost the hearts and minds of the great majority of the Hong Kong people".[225]

Demand for Democracy from Below:
The Tiananmen Effect

The "tug of war" between conservatives and democrats did not end with the inclusion of the "Cha-Cha" formula in the draft Basic Law. At first, the Hong Kong people at large and the political activists in particular seemed to have lost their momentum in further discussing the Basic Law in the second round of the consultation process. But the democratic movement in Beijing and the subsequent tragedy in the Tiananmen Square in June 1989 brushed the political low pressure aside and sparked off another round of political rows over the HKSAR political structure.

The political situation was transformed. The "apolitical" Hong Kong people changed overnight by actively participating in mass rallies to show their support and hope for a democratic China and Hong Kong. It was reported that one million people participated in one mass rally, which was a record-breaking event in the political history of Hong Kong. Leaders of the democrats, now under the umbrella organisation of Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China led by two LegCo members and DCBL's drafters, Mr Martin Lee and Mr Szeto Wah, were deeply involved in the movement. The whole society was scared by the event and demanded a speeding up in the pace of democratic reform. Not only

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[225]Ming K. Chan, "Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making of the Hong Kong Basic Law, 1985-90," in Ming K. Chan and David J. Clark, eds., *The Hong Kong Basic Law: Blueprint for "Stability and Prosperity" under Chinese Sovereignty?* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), p. 16.

the democrats but also the conservatives and Establishment politicians joined hands to work for it.

The ExCo and the LegCo unofficial members, in May 1989, had put forward the "OMELCO Consensus Model", which recommended that the legislature shall have 33.3%, 50%, 66.6% and 100% directly elected seats in 1991, 1995, 1999 and 2003, respectively; and the CE shall be directly elected no later than 2003.[226] The Joint Committee for Promotion of Democratic Government, the flagship of the democrats, also revised the "190 Proposal" and suggested that half of the LegCo seats should be returned by direct election in 1991 and then all in 1995; the CE to be directly elected in 1997.[227]

The reaction of the Beijing Government was tough. By labelling Hong Kong as a "subversive" base aiming to topple the Communist Chinese Government with the aid of global anti-Chinese and anti-communist forces, Beijing's leaders had reinforced their negative image towards the democrats and thus, tightened its Hong Kong policy. As Sir Percy Cradock observed:

> [The] Tiananmen [Incident] revived all Beijing's neuroses about British duplicity and the external threats to the socialist system. . . . It became a more obvious Chinese goal to extend a dominant influence over the territory as rapidly as possible, whatever the undertakings that British rule would continue undisturbed until 1997. . . . Democracy in Hong Kong . . . became a neuralgic issue.[228]

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[226]Office of Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils (OMELCO), *Comments on the Basic Law (Draft)*, (Hong Kong: OMELCO, 1989), p. 23.

[227]Secretariat of the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law (CCBL), *The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (Draft): Consultative Report, Vol. 2.*, (Hong Kong: Secretariat of the CCBL of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, 1989b), pp. 123-4.

[228]Cradock (1994a), *op. cit.*, p. 223.

As mentioned above, the business community was more vulnerable and prone to Beijing's pressure. The conservative business figures also took advantage of Beijing's tough policy to counter the advance of the democratic forces in the future political system. Because of such considerations, the conservative New Hong Kong Alliance (NHKA), led by former ExCo and LegCo member Mr T.S. Lo, proposed a controversial "Bicameral Model" or "One-Council Two-Chamber Model" in which there should be a Functional Chamber comprising mainly indirectly returned members of functional constituencies, and a District Chamber comprising at least 50% directly elected members and the remaining members returned by district organisations. Both chambers would have equal legislative powers and equal number of members. In regard to the selection of the CE, the first two terms would be elected by an election committee and the third term by direct election.[229] In the name of ensuring the equal participation of all walks of life, the "Bicameral Model" in fact had sought to limit the proportion of directly elected seats in the HKSAR legislature. But the actual effect was to decrease the chance of a consolidated democratic force in the legislature by limiting their strength and influence in one of the chambers. With the apparent blessing of China, Mr Lo and the NHKA leaders sold the model vigorously.

The release of the "Bicameral Model" was regarded as a move to counter-balance the "OMELCO Consensus Model" which was considered by China as a British plot to exploit and lead public opinion in Hong Kong in Britain's own interests. Though criticised by many political leaders and media comments, the "Bicameral Model" managed to generate support from some political figures, like ExCo and LegCo member Miss Maria Tam, LegCo members Mr Peter Wong Hong-yuen and Mr James Tien Pei-chun[230], and the leftist Federation of Trade Unions.[231]

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[229]*Ibid.*, pp. 124-7.

[230]*HKS*, 1 September 1989.

[231]*HKS* and *SCMP*, 29 October 1989.

117

Meanwhile, the moderates had also taken an initiative to bring the conservatives and the democrats to a compromise.[232] With the common objective of defeating the "Bicameral Model", the concerned parties decided to enter into negotiation in the hope of seeking a compromise political model in early October 1989. After nearly a month of bargaining, they came out with a "New Compromise Model" or "4-4-2 Model" which recommended that the first legislature (1997) should be made up of: 40% from direct election, 40% from functional constituency election, and 20% from election through an election committee. The second legislature (2001) would have 60% directly elected seats and 40% functional constituency seats; the composition of the third legislature (2005) and whether all the members shall be elected through direct election would be reviewed and decided by the second legislature. Regarding the selection of the CE, the Model suggested that the CE for the first two terms would be elected by an election committee comprising 50% members selected from functional constituencies and the remainder from the Urban Council, the Regional Council and the District Boards; the third CE to be elected by direct election.[233]

Although there was some dissent among the moderates and the democrats, the "New Compromise Model" could be regarded as a great success in producing a common demand on the HKSAR political structure after a four-year-long rivalry and "war of words". The consensus shown by the three camps of moderates, conservatives, and democrats seemed to receive a cool reception by the Chinese officials. These officials had reportedly regarded the compromise exercise as a British plot to manipulate the future political system, and seemed to favour the

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[232]The moderates are comprised of the following political groups: the Tritolaire Academy, the University Graduates' Association of Hong Kong, the Association for Democracy of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Chinese Civil Servants' Association, the Progressive Society of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong People's Association and the New Hong Kong Society. The conservatives is represented by the Business and Professional Group of CCBL led by Mr Vincent Lo. The democrats is represented by the Joint Committee for Promotion of Democratic Government led by Mr Martin Lee and Mr Szeto Wah.

[233]Secretariat of the CCBL (1989b), *op. cit.*, pp. 139-41.

"Bicameral Model" because "business interests would be protected".[234] In response to the question of whether the DCBL would accept the "New Compromise Model", Mr Xu Jiatun declined to give a straight answer, but stated that "Any models will have to take the long-term interest of the territory into account. If there's no stability, can there be prosperity and advancement?"[235] It was understood that China would not accept the "New Compromise Model" because Beijing has often regarded the swift introduction of direct election as detrimental to the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong.

Among the models floated at the time, the "Bicameral Model", the "OMELCO Consensus Model", and the "New Compromise Model" were the most discussed within Hong Kong, and the latter two models seemed to have had more support than the first. In anticipation of Beijing's likely rejection of the "OMELCO Consensus Model" and the "New Compromise Model", some members of the Group of 89, like Dr Philip Kwok and Mr Hu Fa-kuang, proposed the "Assorted Model" in mid-November 1989. This model tried to integrate the "Bicameral Model" with the "New Compromise Model" by proposing to install a "separate vote counting" mechanism under which a simple majority of both groups of members from the functional constituencies, and of members from direct election and the election committee should be sought for the passage of those motions and bills, or amendments to government bills introduced by individual legislative members. The model also proposed that the first three legislatures should have 65 members; 25 from the functional constituency, 25 from direct election, and the remaining 15 from the election committee. It seemed that separate vote counting would have the effect of keeping the directly elected members at bay.

Although a handful of models had been floated, even fewer had a hearing at the meeting of the DCBL's Subgroup on Political Structure. At its last meeting held on 20 January 1990 in Guangzhou, the Subgroup adopted a rather conservative "New

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[234]*HKS*, 20 September 1989.

[235]*SCMP*, 29 September 1989.

Mainstream Model" which was proposed by a mainland drafter and recommended that the first legislature should have 30 seats (50%) from functional constituencies, 18 seats (30%) from direct election and 12 seats (20%) from the election committee; and separate vote counting be installed.

Immediately after the passage of the said model in the meeting, four Hong Kong drafters, namely Dr Raymond Wu, Miss Maria Tam, Mr Wong Po-yan and Mr Cha Chi-man, called a press conference to express their discontent at the passage of the "New Mainstream Model". They claimed that no Hong Kong drafters had given their consent and only one Hong Kong drafter had supported separate vote counting. This gave an impression that all Hong Kong drafters had fought against the slow pace of introducing direct election. Dr Raymond Wu also claimed that the rather high-handed manner on the Chinese side in putting through the "New Mainstream Model" made the Hong Kong drafters act rubber stamps. But later it was reportedly disclosed that Hong Kong drafters had tabled three models at the meeting, of which two models suggested the same number of directly elected seats as the "New Mainstream Model" and the remaining one proposed even fewer directly elected seats in the second and third legislature than the "New Mainstream Model". Instead, their opposition seemed to target separate vote counting, which was a variant form of the "Bicameral Model" proposed by the New Hong Kong Alliance.[236]

As mentioned before, Britain agreed to be involved in the drafting of the Basic Law because this could help to smooth the transfer of power and to ensure the faithful implementation of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Given such arrangements, both Governments had to sort out the electoral arrangements for the 1991 and 1995 elections and the "through train" method of transferring power in 1997. Beijing and London engaged in behind-the-scene-bargaining in early 1990. According to the seven diplomatic documents disclosed by both London and Beijing on 28 October 1992, the two Governments discussed and exchanged views on the proportion of directly elected seats, the composition of the electoral committee, the introduction of

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[236]Cheung et al. (1991), *op. cit.*, p. 190.

separate vote counting, the restriction of foreign nationals serving in the legislature and so on.[237]   In regard to the number of directly elected seats, London had asked for 24 (40%) in 1995 by preparing to limit it to 18 in 1991. But Beijing had insisted that there would be 20 (30%) directly elected seats in 1997 (1995), 24 (40%) in 1999 and 30 (50%) in 2003. London had agreed subsequently to Beijing's counter-proposal. In explaining his judgement on the deal, Sir Percy Cradock wrote:

> . . . more democracy was not, as increasingly claimed, an infallible protection against Chinese pressure if Chinese were bent on that course. To be of real worth, our arrangements had to stick after 1997; that required Chinese acquiescence. . . . I saw little chance of extracting agreement for 20 directly elected seats in 1991 from Beijing in its ugly mood at the time. . . .[238]

The ninth plenary session of the DCBL held in mid-February 1990 had sealed the fate of the nearly five-year-long row over the political structure of the HKSAR. The "New Mainstream Model" passed at the subgroup meeting in January was adopted with the following amendments: there were to be 20, instead of 18, directly elected seats in 1997; separate vote counting would be applied only to those bills, motions, and amendments to government bills introduced by individual legislative members; and the limit of foreign nationals in the HKSAR legislature was set at 20%, instead of 15%, of its total.

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[237]These diplomatic documents were released in the midst of intense conflict between London and Beijing over the political reform proposals initiated by the new Governor Chris Patten in his first annual address to the LegCo.

[238]Cradock (1994a), *op. cit.*, p. 228.

The Price to Pay

The Chinese promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" under the roof of "one country, two systems" had fascinated most of the Hong Kong people in the early 1980s. For some Hong Kong people, the pledge seemed to be a safeguard against Communist rule after 1997. For others, it offered an opportunity to develop democracy.

But subsequent developments have disappointed Hong Kong people, especially during the drafting of and consultation on the Basic Law--the future mini-constitution of the HKSAR. China seemed to have no faith in the political reforms that had been "engineered" by the British-Hong Kong Government, fearing knock-on effects in China. This attitude may well be reflected by her conservative attitude towards the pace of democratic reform in the transitional period and the political structure of the future HKSAR. On the one hand, China, supported by the conservatives, tries to contain the budding democratic forces by limiting the number of political posts returned by universal franchise. Out of 60 members of the HKSAR legislature, only 20 in 1997, 24 in 1999 and 30 in 2007 will be elected by geographical constituency, the rest will be returned by functional constituency. On the other hand, China followed more or less the colonial structure of concentrating power in the HKSAR executive, which is hardly checked by the legislature. Moreover, through the use of the electoral college, China would probably exert a tremendous influence on choosing the HKSAR executive head. The basic Law stipulates the process of selecting the chief executive as follows: nominations will only be made among the members of the Election Committee that is selected mainly from the businessmen, professionals, and local political figures; upon nomination, only those members on the Committee have the right to vote; finally, the appointment of the executive head will be confirmed only by the Chinese Government.

The clash of the democrats and their potential supporters with the Chinese Government was further intensified as the first two took a different view on the nature of the democratic movement in China in 1989. After regaining her control of the

capital, the Chinese Government openly criticised those who supported the democratic movement; it also regarded Hong Kong as a subversive base working to undermine communist rule in China. Given such negative feelings towards both the representative government and the democrats in Hong Kong, China will try in every way to shape the political reform in her favour and to contain the growing influence of the democrats.

From China's point of view, Hong Kong had better developed her economic potential, but not "bourgeois" democracy. If Hong Kong becomes a democratic polity, China will not only find it harder to control the development of Hong Kong, but also feel the pressure of change from within China.

The decision-makers in Beijing, thus, come under cross-pressures of economic prosperity, autonomous government and possible models of unification on the one hand, and loss of control over Hong Kong as well as threat of domestic "peaceful evolution" on the other. In such a situation, China opts to play safe by establishing a political structure that may allow the conservative businessmen and local figures to counter-balance the emerging democratic forces.

For the democrats and their potential supporters, the mis-handling of the Tiananmen Incident and the adoption of the not-so-popular political model in the Basic Law by the Chinese Government seemed to serve as a basis of political mobilization. Coupled with the widespread distrust of the Communist Chinese Government among the Hong Kong people, the centre-periphery cleavage would then find mass electoral support and may be transformed to become part of the electoral cleavage system, where the periphery (the democrats) has emphasised local autonomy while the centre (the conservatives and the leftists) stressed compromise with the central Chinese Government and nationalist feeling.

Table 3.1

Comparison of 1984 Green and White Papers

A) LegCo's Composition:

	Green Paper:					White Paper:
	1984	1985	1988	1991 (1)	1991 (2)	change in 1985
Electoral College*	0	6	12	14	20	12
Functional Constituen-cies	0	6	12	14	20	12
Appointed Members	29	23	16	12	0	22
Official Members	18	13	10	10	10	10
TOTAL	47	48	50	50	50	56

* It is composed of Urban Council, (new) Regional Council and District Board members.

B) ExCo's Composition

	Green Paper			White Paper
	1984	1988	1991	
Elected by LegCo	0	4	8	No Change in 1985 and no timetable for implementation
Appointed Members	12	8	2	
Ex-officio Members	4	4	4	
TOTAL	16	16	14	

CHAPTER IV

GOVERNMENT EXPANSION AND THE COLLECTIVE
CONSUMPTION CLEAVAGE

This chapter will discuss and analyze the trend of government expansion and development in Hong Kong since 1945, the rise of privatisation politics, and the emergence of the collective consumption cleavage, focusing on the development of both the state and the society itself as well as their dynamic relationship in the period 1945-91. First of all, the phases of the development of the colonial administration and its relations with the society of Hong Kong in the period under study will be traced and examined. Second, contrary to the generally accepted view of "positive non-interventionism", the expansion of the Hong Kong Government, in terms of both structural and functional aspects will be probed empirically. Third, the reasons for and impact of privatisation of the social service programmes on the government-society relations as a whole and on electoral politics in particular will be investigated.

Development of the Hong Kong Government

Hong Kong has retained its colonial status for over 150 years. In general, its governmental structure experienced no significant transformation, nevertheless the Hong Kong Government adapted to the ever-changing foreign and domestic environments by adjusting its relationships with the society of Hong Kong and its neighbouring country, China. As will be discussed in the following sections, the China factor has been the most influential one in shaping the political development of Hong Kong. For illustrative purposes, three phases could be identified to examine this process of adjustment.

The First Phase, 1945-67

The period from 1945 to 1967 could be classified as the first phase of development. In this period, the nature and the composition of the society underwent significant changes. What made this period different from the pre-1945 period, as examined in Chapter 2, was the growing significance of the external factors: the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and the coming of the Cold War in the late 1940s. Several impacts could then be identified. First of all, the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Mainland China had made Hong Kong into a "refugee society". Second, some of them came from Shanghai with their capitals, skills and machineries which had proved to be indispensable for the later industrial development of Hong Kong. Third, the imposition of the United Nations' embargo against the PRC after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 forced Hong Kong to replace its declining entrepot trade with industrial development, especially in manufacturing industry. Taking advantage of the abundance of cheap labour and the world market situation, Hong Kong has succeeded in its export-led economic growth. Fourth, the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the late 1940s and the possible spill-over of the Chinese civil war into Hong Kong had contributed

partly to the dropping of Governor Sir Mark Young's proposal for post-war democratic reforms.

The worsening of living standards and social order caused by the influx of refugees had alerted the Hong Kong Government to take active measures to alleviate the growing social problems. How to house the ever-growing refugee population was the most pressing problem remaining to be solved in the early 1950s. The Hong Kong Government allowed the refugees to build their temporary huts elsewhere in the first instance. But a fire in Shek Kip Mei in December 1953 forced the Government to engage in providing housing in resettlement estates. As shown in Table 4.1, the population of the multi-storey resettlement estates went rapidly up, from around 8,000 in 1954 to nearly 1.2 million in 1973. There were several reasons advanced to account for government intervention in housing,[239] but one of the reasons would be that the political status of Hong Kong became clear in the mid-1950s as the PRC, the then newly established regime in China, had made no plan to take over Hong Kong in the near future. As a result, the British-Hong Kong Government could continue her governing over Hong Kong and thus could afford to undertake long-term planning. This massive resettlement scheme proved to be decisive for the subsequent social stability and economic development of Hong Kong.

These societal changes had coincided with an adjustment in the Hong Kong Government, though a minor and not a structural one. Originally, pushed by the British Labour Government and echoing the international climate of decolonisation, the Hong Kong Government attempted to reform its own government structure by proposing to set up an elected municipal council. The idea was put forward by the then Governor, Sir Mark Young, in 1946 (the Young Plan) and the Municipal Council Ordinance 1949 was also gazetted on 3 June 1949. But subsequent developments within and without the society seemed to work against the plan. First of all, the continued British rule over Hong Kong was called into question by the

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[239]M. Castells, L. Goh and R. Y-W. Kwok, *The Shek Kip Mei Syndrome: Economic Development and Public Housing in Hong Kong and Singapore* (London: Pion, 1990), p. 18.

founding of the PRC in 1949. The uncertainty was whether the new Chinese Government would allow the colonial status of Hong Kong as it was. Second, the influx of large numbers of refugees from China had made Hong Kong into a "refugee society" where the lack of citizenship and sense of belonging among the refugees would prove to be detrimental to the successful operation of representative government. Third, the arrival of the Cold War in Asia in the early 1950s and the ensuing United Nations' embargo against China had re-ordered the priority of Government concerns from political reforms to those of security and economic issues. Fourth, the possible spill-over of the struggle between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) into Hong Kong electoral politics would undermine the security of Hong Kong. Last but not least, the resistance of the unofficial LegCo members to the Young Plan and the unenthusiastic attitude of Sir Mark's successor, Sir Alexander Grantham, meant the reform plan lacked institutional support. Because of such developments, the plan was shelved at the end of the day.[240] The Urban Council did reintroduce its elected members in 1952 (two out of total 13), but the elections carried little significance and consequence because of the Council's limited jurisdictions.

Meanwhile, the Hong Kong Government expanded its activities for the sake of people's welfare, social stability and economic development. As mentioned above, the Hong Kong Government took a more active role after the political status of Hong Kong became clear in the mid-1950s. Amid the rapid economic growth, the Government seemed to accelerate its capacities to facilitate further economic development and at the same time to handle the contradictions that had been aroused by the rapid economic and social changes. The expansion of government activities

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[240]For details, see Steven Tsang Yiu-sang, *Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and Attempts at Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1945-1952* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988).

can be viewed as an expanding network of organization in which more and more people as well as resources were being included and involved in these activities.[241]

The process of government expansion can be traced back to the late 1940s. Judging from the record of the official reports and papers released since then, a pattern of government expansion could be unearthed. But it should be pointed out here that the official reports or papers are used to show the concern of the Government in that particular area and period of time, and may not imply that the corresponding Government efforts or commitments would then be followed. From the late 1940s up to 1968, the Government engaged in creating right infrastructure for economic development by initiating some sort of planning and regulation. Starting from the postwar overall planning and reorganization of the administration in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Hong Kong Government began to solve the pressing problems of housing and education.[242] Public works on infrastructure had also been planned, like the expansion of the Kai Tak Airport and the construction plan

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[241]Bo Strath and Rolf Torstendahl, "State Theory and State Development: State as Network Structure in Change in Modern European History," in Rolf Torstendahl, ed., *State Theory and State History* (London: Sage, 1992), pp. 12-37.

[242]Patrick Abercrombie, *Hong Kong: Preliminary Planning Report* (n.p., [1948]); N.G. Fisher, *A Report on Government Expenditure on Education in Hong Kong 1950* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1951); Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Hong Kong Salaries Commission* (Singapore: Government Printer, 1949); Hong Kong Government, *High Education in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1952); Hong Kong Government, *Report on Technical Education and Vocational Training* (Hong Kong: n.p., 1953); Hong Kong Government, *Rent Control* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1953); Hong Kong Government, *Final Report of the Special Committee on Housing 1956-1958* (Hong Kong: n.p., 1958); Hong Kong Government, *Statement on Government's Policy on the Re-organization of the Structure of Primary and Secondary Education* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1963); Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Fulton Commission 1963* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1963); Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Working Paper on Government Policies and Practices with Regard to Squatters, Resettlement and Government Low Cost Housing* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1963); Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Finance of Home Ownership Committee* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1964); Hong Kong Government, *Review of Policies for Squatter Control, Resettlement and Government Low-Cost Housing* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1964); Hong Kong Government, *Education Policy* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1965).

for a cross-harbour tunnel.[243] Moreover, the Government provided a more active role in economic development by coordinating a federation of industries and despatching trade missions overseas.[244] In the early 1960s, the Government expanded its activities in the economic sphere by carrying out an export credit insurance scheme and planning to set up a central export development council.[245] Meanwhile, efforts were also devoted to reforming the banking system and measures

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[243]Hong Kong Government, *Papers on Development of Kai Tak Airport* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1954); Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Inter-Departmental Working Party on the Proposed Cross-Harbour Tunnel* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1956).

[244]Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Advisory Committee on the Proposed Federation of Industries* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1958); Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Hong Kong Trade Mission to Australia* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1961); Hong Kong Government, *Report of Working Party on the European Common Market* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1963); Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Hong Kong Trade Mission to the Middle East, 27th Dec. 1962--22nd Jan. 1963* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1963); Hong Kong Government, *Report of Hong Kong Government Trade Mission to the Common Market Countries, October 1963* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1964); Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Trade Mission to the East Africa* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1965); Hong Kong Government, *Hong Kong Trade Mission to Cyprus* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, [1966]); Commerce and Industry Department, *Report of the Hong Kong Commercial Mission to Caribbean Countries, Nov.-Dec. 1958* (Hong Kong: n.p., 1958); Commerce and Industry Department, *Report of the Hong Kong Commercial Mission to West Africa, Jan.-Feb. 1960* (Hong Kong: n.p., 1960).

[245]Hong Kong Government, *Report of Working Party on Export Credit Insurance* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1963); Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Working Committee on Export Promotion Organization* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1965); R.A. Freeman, *Report on an Export Credits Insurance Scheme for Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1964).

adopted to increase her productivity.[246] The Government also expanded its scope of social and medical services.[247]

The Government's regulative capacities over the society has also extended as more corruption, drug addicts and criminal offences were reported.[248] Its activities seemed to cover more than before, but its penetration and integration capacity into/with the society have still lagged behind the pace of economic and social development. The failure to alleviate the widespread social frustration caused by corruption and relative deprivation had irritated the public and had paved the way for developing social unrest.[249]

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[246]H.J. Tomkins, *Report on the Hong Kong Banking System and Recommendations for the Replacement of the Banking Ordinance 1948* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1962); Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Working Committee on Productivity* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1964).

[247]Hong Kong Government, *Development of Medical Services in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, [1963]); Hong Kong Government, *Aims and Policy for Social Welfare in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1964); Hong Kong Government, *Report of Advisory Committee on Clinics* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1966); Hong Kong Government, *A Report by the Inter-Departmental Working Party to Consider Aspects of Social Security* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1967); Council of Social Services, *Working Together: A Survey of the Work of Voluntary and Government Social Organizations in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1958); K.L. Gill, *'Recreation for Young People': A Survey* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1966).

[248]Hong Kong Government, *The Problem of Narcotic Drugs in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: n.p., 1959); Hong Kong Government, *Reports of the Standing Committee and the Advisory Committee on Corruption, 1960-61* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, [1961]); Hong Kong Government, *The Report of the Advisory Committee on Gambling Policy* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1965); Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Governor in Council of the Working Party set up to Advise on the Adequacy of the Law in Relation to Crimes of Violence Committed by Young Persons* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1965).

[249]For the corruption in Hong Kong, see Rance P.L. Lee, ed., *Corruption and Its Control in Hong Kong: Situations Up to the Late Seventies* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1981); H.J. Lethbridge, *Hard Graft in Hong Kong: Scandal, Corruption and the ICAC* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1985); Peter Harris, *Hong Kong: A Study in Bureaucracy and Politics* (Hong Kong: MacMillan, 1988), chap. 6.

After the dropping of the Young Plan, the Hong Kong Government underwent some minor adjustment in this phase, for example, the granting of financial autonomy by Britain in 1958 and the increase of LegCo's non-official members from 8 to 13 in 1964.[250] The pre-war political institutions and the socio-economic composition of members largely remained unchanged. The non-official seats in the ExCo and the LegCo were so often occupied by the "Princely Hong", the wealthy families, and the like. Although a working party was set up in April 1966 to "explore and advise on practicable alternatives for the development of an effective and convenient system of local administration in Hong Kong", its proposals were not adopted at the time.[251]

Communication with society still relied on the narrow strata of social elites whose reach and understanding of the grass-roots is arguably minimal. For the Chinese community, the Hong Kong Government relied on the traditional Chinese organisations, like the Tung Wah (voluntary organisation comprised solely of prominent Chinese elites), the Po Leung Kuk (the Society for the Protection of Women and Girls) and the Kaifongs (neighbourhood organisations), to enlist support and thus, enhance its efficiency of governing. But this system was later proved to be not effective in channelling contacts between the Government and society, especially at a time of rapid social and economic transformation. Although there was demand for political reform in the colony, the response from the then Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Lord Perth, was that:

> Her Majesty's Government consider it undesirable that there should be any radical or major change in the present constitutional position in Hong Kong. . . . This does not, however, preclude the possibility of minor modifications, within the framework of existing principles, in the composition of the Legislative Council or the Urban Council.[252]

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[250]It was the first time for the LegCo to have its non-official members in a majority (if the Governor was excluded).

[251]Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Future Scope and Operation of the Urban Council* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1966).

[252]*SCMP*, 30 October 1960; quoted in Endacott (1964), *op. cit.*, p. 200.

It was a fact that there was seldom strong demand for political reform in terms of both scope and intensity, but it does not follow that the population was fully satisfied with what was going on in the society. The widespread corruption in the Government, especially in the Police Forces, the economic exploitation which was bound to happen in the process of capitalist development, the unbearably congested living environment and the sense of relative deprivation were some of the reasons which contributed to social frustration and resentment, especially among the low-income groups. Although this state of affairs would be tolerated by many ex-refugees who fled the communist rule in China, the local-born Hong Kong people were finding it more difficult to accept it as normal.

Given that the population was largely apolitical and without effective organisation, its grievances needed to be reflected by the social elites whose critical position in the government structure was so vital in channelling communications between the Government and society. Unfortunately, they were mostly insulated from the public. Because of such an institutional barrier, the discontent seemed to be redressed only by extra-constitutional means, as when the Star Ferries proposed a 5 cents (Hong Kong Currency) fare increase in 1965. After hot public debate on the issue, riots broke out in April 1966. The 1966 riot came quickly to an end, but the ensuing 1967 riot disrupted the societal order totally. Although the latter was inspired by the Cultural Revolution in mainland China and led by the local leftists, domestic problems had a role to play in these two riots. The time had come to make some reform or adjustment in both the structure and policy of the Hong Kong Government.

The Second Phase, 1968-81

The Hong Kong Government, having learned from the two riots in the 1960s, had taken actions to improve the situation by carrying out local administrative reforms

as well as embarking on intervention in both the production and the collective consumption processes. A study to reform the local administration had already been carried out before the outbreak of the riots in 1966 and 1967.[253] But the touch-and-go situation at that time made it hard to hold back any longer. After the two riots, a City District Office Scheme (CDO) was swiftly implemented and an office was established in each of the administrative districts in 1968.[254] The principal aim of this scheme was, to quote the directive to City District Officers in 1968, "to provide the public with a local manifestation of the Government in your person."[255] Afterward, several local institutions were also established. The City District Committees and Area Committees were set up in 1972, and the District Management Committee (consisting only of representatives from various Government departments) in Kwun Tong in the early 1970s. Mutual Aid Committees which developed at the block level were also established in 1973, and gradually replaced the role played by the traditional Kaifong associations.[256] With the development and growth of new towns in the New Territories, there was an urgency to set up a new local administration. As a result, the District Advisory Boards were set up in 1977 and the Town Management Committee was also established in the New Territories in the late 1970s.

Furthermore, after the release of the McKinsey Report in 1973, the reorganization of the central administration was launched to enhance its efficiency and

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[253]Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Future Scope and Operation of the Urban Council* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1966); Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Working Party on Local Administration* (Hong Kong: Government Press, 1967).

[254]Secretariat for Chinese Affairs, *The City District Officer Scheme* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1969).

[255]*Ibid*, cover page.

[256]Aline K. Wong, *The Kaifong Associations and the Society of Hong Kong* (Taipei: Orient Cultural Service, 1972).

effectiveness in policy planning.[257] The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) was established in 1974 in order to fight against the widespread corruption within and without the Government. Moreover, adjustments in the LegCo were noted: the elimination of the informal practice of appointing two elected nominees from the Justices of the Peace and the General Chamber of Commerce in 1974, the introduction of a de facto non-official majority in the LegCo in 1976, and the reorganization of the Office of the Unofficial Members of the Executive and Legislative Council (UMELCO) in 1970 so as to deal with public complaints more effectively instead of establishing the publicly-advocated Ombudsman office.[258]

At the same time, the Hong Kong Government began to put more emphasis on labour legislation in order to regulate the tense relationships between employers and employees. Attempts were also made to improve the living quality of the mass public. With the appointment of the new Governor, Sir Murray MacLehose, in 1971, Hong Kong had entered the so-called "MacLehose era" that was characterised by massive government intervention in the collective consumption process of housing, education, and health care. The promise was to provide adequate low-rent public housing, nearly free medical care, free nine-year education, and so on.[259] Thus,

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[257]Hong Kong Government, *The Machinery of Government: A New Framework for Expanding Services* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1973).

[258]Renamed as the Office of the Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils (OMELCO) in 1986; Miners (1991), *op. cit.*, pp. 129, n1 & 151-2; Tsang, (1989), *op. cit.*, p. 70.

[259]For MacLehose's policy statement, see his annual speech to the LegCo on October 18th 1972; for more information, see the following: Hong Kong Government, *Social Welfare in Hong Kong: The Way Ahead* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1973); Hong Kong Government, *The Five Year Plan for Social Welfare Development in Hong Kong, 1973-78* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1973); Hong Kong Government, *The Further Development of Medical and Health Services in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1974); Hong Kong Government, *Secondary Education in Hong Kong over the Next Decade* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1974); Hong Kong Government, *Integrating the Disabled into the Community: A United Effort* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1977); Hong Kong Government, *A Programme of Social Security Development in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1977); Hong Kong Government, *Services for the Elderly* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1977); Hong Kong Government, *Development of*

the government expansion in the provision of social service programmes had the effect of integrating the public with the government policy.

The significant economic growth and the massive provision of social services had contributed to the improvement of living standards. Nevertheless, several social movements took place in this phase. They were the Movement for Defending Sankaku, the Campaign for Demanding Chinese as an Official Language, the Golden Jubilee Affairs, and so on.[260] The activists in these movements mostly came from university students, social workers and teaching sectors. Other young professionals also began to criticize the colonial structure and some of its policies.[261] Furthermore, the number of social conflicts in the mid- and late 1970s was rising as the Government increased its regulative activities in the society, especially in the land resumption process.[262]

As the government expanded its activities in terms of both scope and intensity, the demand from the newly emerging professionals to participate in the governing process was also growing. The elected members of the then only partially-elected Urban Council put forward their proposals for reforming the UrbCo and the

Personal Social Work among Young People in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1977); Hong Kong Government, _The Development of Senior Secondary and Tertiary Education_ (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1978); Hong Kong Government, _Social Welfare into the 1980's_ (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1979); Hong Kong Government, _Primary Education and Pre-Primary Services: White Paper_ (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1981).

[260]For more details, see Hong Kong Federation of Students, ed., _A Review of the Student Movements in Hong Kong_ (Hong Kong: Wide Angle, 1983). (in Chinese).

[261]Hong Kong Observers, _Pressure Points_ (Hong Kong: Summerson Eastern Publishers, 1981).

[262]Anthony Cheung Bing-leung and Louie Kin-sheun, _Social Conflicts in Hong Kong, 1975-1986: Trend and Implication_ (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991).

representation system in 1969 and 1979.[263] The Government responded to the former demand only by adjusting minimally the balance of the elected and appointed members (abolishment of the 6 ex-officio seats), and by granting the council's financial autonomy in 1973.[264] But the nature and the scope of power remained unchanged. The latter demand had to wait until the mid-1980s for its partial adoption by the Hong Kong Government. The demands by the elected members of the UrbCo in 1979 were to phase out the appointed members in the UrbCo, to introduce universal franchise, to extend UrbCo's jurisdiction and to replace LegCo's appointed members with elected ones, or institute a fully elected municipal council. They ended their petition with the following lines:

> **Unless the Urban Council is reformed, and that urgently, this only public body with elected representatives of some of the people will die a natural death.** The bureaucracy will then take over, policies will be passed and put into effect without opposition of any kind, and the stage will be set for the next round of disturbances caused by frustration. The people are being blatantly exploited by Government business-policy-makers and big business and monopoly concerns of private origin. **No Community can continue indefinitely if it ignores the interests of the silent majority of its citizens.**[265]

In regard to constitutional reform, the British-Hong Kong Government seemed to be constrained by the Chinese attitude towards the status of Hong Kong. As mentioned in Chapter 3, China regarded Hong Kong as part of China. This was reflected in her prompt declaration, when admitted to the United Nations in 1972, that Hong Kong and Macau are not colonies but part of China, and her request to have them removed from the list of colonies. That means no self-determination would be possible and that was understood to limit the potential for democratic reforms.

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[263]Urban Council, *Report of the Reform of Local Government* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1969); B.A. Bernacchi, et al., *The Hong Kong Urban Council: The Case of the Elected Member* (n.p., 1979).

[264]Colonial Secretariat, *White Paper: The Urban Council* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1971).

[265]Bernacchi, et al. (1979), *op. cit.*, p. 12; bold in origin.

This phase was quite different from the previous one in the sense of the growing direct influence of the PRC in the domestic development of Hong Kong. When the then Governor MacLehose visited Beijing in 1979, he was told by Mr Deng Xiaoping that China would resume the sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997, when the lease of the New Territories expired. The emergence of the 1997 question forced the British Government to enter negotiations with the PRC over the future of Hong Kong. Subsequently, the Sino-British Joint Declaration was agreed in 1984, and the drafting of the Basic Law (the mini-constitution of Hong Kong after 1997), which was promulgated in 1990, began in 1985. Both documents set the parameters and basic principles of the political and social life in both the transitional period and for the 50 years after 1997.

The coming to the stage of China constrained the will and policy options of the Hong Kong Government in the transitional period. On the one hand, the British-Hong Kong Government has the legitimate right to exercise its own rule by judging what measures needed to be adopted in maintaining the "stability and prosperity" of Hong Kong. On the other hand, the British-Hong Kong Government had to work closely with China to sort out the detailed plan of power transfer. Given the sensitivity and complexity of the matter, it was not difficult to imagine that the right balance was hard, if not impossible, to hold.

The Hong Kong Government continued its unfinished political reforms in the 1980s by publishing a series of Green and White Papers concerning the development of district administration and representative government.[266] The establishment of

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[266]These are: *Green Paper: A Pattern of District Administration in Hong Kong* (June 1980); *White Paper: District Administration in Hong Kong* (January 1981); *Green Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong* (July 1984); *White Paper: The Further Development of Representative Government in Hong Kong* (November 1984); *Green Paper: The 1987 Review of Developments in Representative Government* (May 1987); *White Paper: The Development of Representative Government: The Way Forward* (February 1988).

the partially elected District Boards (1982) and Regional Council (1986), while the injection of indirectly and directly elected members into the LegCo in 1985 and 1991 enlarged the scope for political participation. As indicated in Chapter 3, this development was unwelcome to Beijing and the conservative business community in Hong Kong. On the one hand, the introduction of elections in the LegCo received opposition and criticism from Beijing. Beijing seemed to believe that the British and Hong Kong Governments had engaged in a conspiracy of transferring power to pro-British Hong Kong people, rather than to China. The retention of some forms of political influence after 1997 through the institution of representative government was said to be the British motivation behind the conspiracy. On the other hand, the conservative business community did not like greater democracy because it undermined their privileged access to the government structure, and would lead to high taxes resulting from the pressure of the directly elected elements for greater spending on social welfare. Moreover, their intimate economic ties and interests with China also dictated their attitudes towards political reform.

Two events in this period had proved to be detrimental to the confidence of Hong Kong people, the anti-nuclear movement in 1986 and the suppression of the democratic movement in China in 1989. The former issue arose with China's decision to build a nuclear plant in Daya Bay, which is only fifty kilometres away from Hong Kong, provoking fierce opposition from the Hong Kong public.[267] Even though one million people signed petitions objecting to the nuclear plant project, China nevertheless proceeded with the project. The other was the Tiananmen Incident of 1989. The suppression of the democratic movement in China had given a serious shock to the Hong Kong people. It was reported that about one million Hong Kong people had taken to the streets to show their dismay and disapproval of what the Beijing Government had done in the Tiananmen Incident. Their confidence in the imaginative "one country, two systems" formula and their faith in the promise of "high degree of autonomy" were shattered. Furthermore, the non-responsive

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[267]For details, see Herbert S. Yee and Wong Yiu-chung, "Hong Kong: The Politics of the Daya Bay Nuclear Plant Debate," *International Affairs* 63 (1987):617-630.

attitude towards Hong Kong's public demands in the former event and the high-handed suppression of the popular democratic movement in the latter had, in one way or another, deepened the tensions in the already strained Sino-Hong Kong relations and the polarisation of the political forces within Hong Kong. The details of the alignment of Hong Kong political forces will be examined in Chapter 5.

At this juncture, different political groups within Hong Kong had reached a consensus on speedy democratic reform. The original 10 direct elected seats in LegCo in 1991 were expanded to 18. This was contradictory to the Chinese arrangement that was stipulated in the then draft Basic Law. For Beijing, the claim of conspiracy appeared to be further substantiated by the following moves of the Hong Kong Government: the introduction of the Bill of Rights, the British Nationality Selection Scheme, and the announcement of the new port and airport building programme. For the British and Hong Kong Governments, these measures were aimed at restoring the confidence of the Hong Kong people and the business community after the Tiananmen incident. The "brain drain" issue well reflected the loss of confidence among the Hong Kong people and it was estimated by the Government that 62,000 people emigrated overseas in 1990.[268] The mistrust between China and Britain seemed to have reached a point of no return.

After decades of socio-economic development in Hong Kong, a significant demographical transformation in both composition and quality was evident. The local-born population in Hong Kong had steadily increased over the years. The respective figures of local born population for 1961 and 1991 were 47.7% and 59.8%.[269] The education qualifications of the population were also improving to a large extent. The percentage of population aged 15 or above and finished upper-

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[268]Ronald Skeldon, "Emigration, Immigration and Fertility Decline: Demographic Integration or Disintegration?" in Sung Yun-wing and Lee Ming-kwan, eds., *The Other Hong Kong Report 1991* (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1991), p. 235.

[269]Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong Statistics 1947-1967* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1969), p. 22; Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong 1991 Population Census: Basic Table for District Board Districts* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1992a), p. 34.

secondary education, and degree education were 15.4% and 2.6% in 1971, and 26.8% and 5.9% in 1991, respectively.[270] The professionals and administrative workers were growing rapidly, from 7.7% in 1976 to 23.1% in 1991.[271] The GDP per capita had grown from less than HK$3,779 in 1966 to over HK$111,721 in 1991 in current market prices.[272]

Since the mid-1980s, the Hong Kong Government has tried to privatize some of its social services programmes like housing. The timing of privatization coincided with the structural transformation of the Hong Kong economy, from a manufacturing to a service based economy. Furthermore, there was a trend by Hong Kong manufacturing industry to relocate its production lines to the Pearl River delta where abundant cheap labour could be hired to increase their products' competitiveness in the world market. The decision of the Hong Kong Government to import foreign labour also frustrated the already suffering workers. The above changes hit the workers quite seriously, because most of them were living in public housing estates and were lacking the necessary quality to find jobs in the growing tertiary sectors. These developments mobilized the grassroots for participation and thus set the stage for the rise of local activists in the embryonic electoral politics. The electoral dynamic of the 1991 LegCo direct election will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. Now, we turn to the empirical examination of the expansion of the Hong Kong Government.

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[270]Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics, 1992 Edition* (Hong Kong: Government Printer 1992b), p. 199, table 15.1.

[271]Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong 1986 By-Census, Main Report Vol. 1* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1987), p. 38, Table 34; Census and Statistics Department (1992a), *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[272]Census and Statistics Department, *Estimates of Gross Domestic Product 1966 to 1993* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1994), p. 10.

Empirical Analysis of Government Expansion

In examining the role of the state in France, Britain, West Germany, Canada and the United States, Anthony King found that the latter was "strikingly different" from the rest in providing public services.[273] He contended that:

> the pattern of American policy is what it is, not because America is dominated by an elite (though it may be); not because the demands made on government are different from those made on governments in other countries; not because American interest groups have greater resources than those in other countries; not because American institutions are more resistant to change than those in other countries (though they probably are); but rather because Americans believe things that other people do not believe and make assumptions that other people do not make. More precisely, elites, demands, interest groups and institutions constitute neither necessary nor sufficient conditions of the American policy pattern; ideas, we contend, constitute both a necessary condition and a sufficient one.[274]

The American idea that King referred to was "*the State plays a more limited role in America than elsewhere because Americans, more than other people, want it to play a limited role*". (italic in origin) He further summarized the American beliefs and assumptions about government as follows:

> free enterprise is more efficient than government; government should concentrate on encouraging private initiative and free competition; government is wasteful; governments should not provide people with things they can provide for themselves; too much government endangers liberty; and so on.[275]

What the Americans thought about the appropriate role of government might probably be the same as in Hong Kong. One would not fail to find the readiness of

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[273]Anthony King, "Ideas, Institutions and the Policies of Governments: A Comparative Analysis, Parts I and II, III," *British Journal of Political Science* 3 (1973): 291-313, 409-423.

[274]*Ibid.*, p. 423.

[275]*Ibid.* p. 418.

the Hong Kong mass public to accept the official ideology of "laissez faire" and later "positive non-interventionism".[276] It was true that the Hong Kong Government restrained itself to a minimal role in most aspects of economic activities. Her basic role was to maintain a system that could ensure and facilitate fair economic exchange and transactions. But these official ideologies had gone, in one way or another, when Hong Kong had entered the "take-off" stage of economic development in the 1960s. There were plenty of theories advanced to account for the state expansion.[277] Modern state-building and the corresponding capitalist economic development seemed to contribute to the expansion process of the government. In this period of

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[276]The phrase "positive non-interventionism" was coined by Sir Philip Haddon-Cave, the former Financial Secretary from 1971 to 1981. For his view, see Philip Haddon-Cave, "The Making of Some Aspects of Public Policy in Hong Kong," in David Lethbridge, ed., *The Business Environment in Hong Kong*, 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. xiii-xx.

[277]Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National State in Western Europe* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 3-83; David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of the Public Economy: A Comparative Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 72 (1978):1243-61; Patrick D. Larkey, Chandler Stolp and Mark Winer, "Theorizing About the Growth of Government: A Research Assessment," Journal of Public Policy 1 (1981): 157-220; Peter Flora and Jens Alber, "Modernization, Democratization, and the Development of Welfare States in Western Europe," in Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds., *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Books, 1981), pp. 37-80; Franz Lehner and Ulrich Widmaier, "Market Failure and Growth of Government: A Sociological Explanation," in Charles Lewis Taylor, ed., *Why Government Grow* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), pp. 240-60; B. Guy Peter and Marin O. Heisler, "Thinking About Public Sector Growth: conceptual, Operational, Theoretical, and Policy Considerations," in Charles Lewis Taylor, ed., *Why Government Grow* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983), pp. 177-97; Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter B. Evans, "The State and Economic Transformation: Toward an Analysis of the Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 44-77; John A. Hall, "State and Economic Development: Reflections on Adam Smith," in John A. Hall, ed., *States in History* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 154-76; Su-Hoon Lee, *State-Building in the Contemporary Third World* (Boulder: Westview, 1988); Robert Hanneman and J. Rogers Hollingsworth, "Refocusing the Debate on the Role of the State in Capitalist Societies," in Rolf Torstendahl, ed., *State Theory and State History* (London: Sage, 1992), pp. 38-61.

expansion, the government involved itself deeply in constructing a system that would facilitate economic development. Later on, the government intervened in the consumption side of the production process by introducing massive social services programmes so as to deflate the social conflicts that had been aroused in the capital accumulation process. Furthermore, for late developing countries like Hong Kong, the demand for government intervention in the economic sphere has an additional feature: to have "independent" rather than "dependent" economic development. Following this line of thinking, the sections below will describe and discuss the process and the consequences of government expansion in Hong Kong, in terms of both structural and functional aspects, since the 1950s.

The Structural Expansion of the Hong Kong Government

The structural expansion of the Hong Kong Government could be detected from the growing number of Government organs since the 1950s. Starting from the central level was the growth of both the Secretaries in the Government (Colonial) Secretariat and implementation departments (see Table 4.2). The number of Secretaries in the Secretariat grew from 10 in 1969 to 15 in 1974 after the reorganisation in that year, then expanded to 21 in 1990. The growth of the Secretaries could be seen as the increased regulating capacity of the Hong Kong Government. The growth rate of departments between 1969 and 1980 did not match that of the Secretaries, but there was more than 30% increase in number in the 1980-1990 period.

Given the nature of the Hong Kong Government and the stress on government by consultation, the representation system did not change much up till the early 1980s. The higher the council was located in the power hierarchy, the less the change in its nature and composition (see Table 4.3). Although the non-official members in the ExCo outnumbered the official members after 1966, recruitment still

relied solely on appointment by the Governor. Constitutionally speaking, it is at the governor's pleasure to recommend whoever he wishes to appoint. People from wealthy families, big business firms and the like were so often appointed up till the late 1970s.

The LegCo non-official majority appeared in 1964 (exclusive of the Governor) and in 1976 (inclusive of the Governor). The LegCo seemed more ready for adjustment than the ExCo. Simply put, the location of the LegCo in the power hierarchy is less important than that of the ExCo because the latter is part of the executive. As a result, the institutional barrier in the LegCo to reform was smaller than that of the ExCo. Unlike the ExCo, the number of LegCo official and non-official members grew from 15 (exclusive of the Governor) in 1947 to 60 in 1991, and the non-official members alone grew from 7 in 1947 to 57 in 1991. Moreover, the method and the pool of recruitment were similar to those of the ExCo. Constitutional change had been introduced to the LegCo when twenty-four members were opened to elections on the basis of the functional constituency and electoral college in 1985, and the number increased to twenty-six in 1988. The directly-elected seats of the LegCo were only instituted in 1991. Originally, the Government had indicated in the 1984 White Paper that there might be direct elections in the LegCo in 1988. But the 1988 White Paper concluded that although the introduction of direct election into the LegCo "would be a logical and desirable" step, the timing would be more suitable in 1991 rather than 1988, "given that opinions in the community on this issue are so clearly divided." (p.9) The decision had understandably invited vigorous protest from the democrats. Details of this development will be taken up in Chapter 5.

Before the introduction of some forms of election in the LegCo in 1985, the Urban Council (UrbCo) had had its direct elected members before the Second World War. But its limited jurisdictions--mostly confined to public health, recreational and cultural affairs--had rendered the UrbCo's election insignificant. The UrbCo held its first post-war election in 1952 with two directly elected members and since then the number has risen steadily from 4 in 1953, 8 in 1956, 10 in 1965, 12 in 1973, and

finally 15 in 1983 (see Table 4.4). This increase was counter-balanced by the corresponding increase in the number of appointed members in the Council. The 1973 reform resulted in the withdrawal of the official members, and the seats in the council were equally assigned between the appointed and elected members, each side having twelve seats (fifteen in 1983). And only in 1989 would there be a chance to have a non-appointed majority when ten representatives from the District Boards were being introduced. The UrbCo's elected members had continually sought reform of the political system since the 1950s, especially those of the Reform Club's members. When the pressure for reform had built up to a certain level, the Hong Kong Government responded to it by marginally adjusting the number of elected seats and the function of the Council. For example, starting from the mid-1960s, there was consistent push to have a Great Hong Kong City Council with wider franchise and powers than the then UrbCo. Two reports had been published in 1966 and 1969.[278] The Government made some concessions to the demand in 1971 by granting the UrbCo financial autonomy and the right to levy rates.[279] Some minor functions were added, but its powers and its relationship with the central Government remained unchanged as a whole.

The Regional Council (RegCo) was set up in 1985 when the new towns in the New Territories flourished. Its functions and powers are similar to those of the UrbCo and mainly confined to public health, recreational and cultural affairs. The administration of the New Territories was different from that of the urban area because of the different legal basis of British rule between the ceded territory of Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, and the leased New Territories. After the lease of the New Territories to Britain in 1898 for 99 years, the Hong Kong Government adopted

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[278]Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Ad Hoc committee on the Future Scope and Operation of the Urban Council* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1966); Urban Council, *Report of the Reform of Local Government* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1969).

[279]Colonial Secretariat, *White Paper: The Urban Council* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1971).

an almost non-interventionist policy towards the newly leased territory.[280] By setting up minimal government institutions there, the Government relied very heavily on the village elders in running the rural area. But the situation changed rapidly as the Government started to develop the New Territories in the 1960s. The then District Officer's jurisdiction was gradually shared with those central Government departments involved in development. The Heung Yee Kuk had played a significant role in communicating with the Government and the native residents. But given the Heung Yee Kuk as a statutory representative body for the native residents, the new immigrants from the urban area had little chance to participate if they wished to do so. The emerging new communities in the New Territories thus highlighted the need to reform the local administration system there. As a result, a local administration reform was initiated and implemented: the creation of the District Boards (DBs) in 1982 and the RegCo in 1985. Since then, the three-tier legislature has evolved, but the destination was not clear as there was scarcely any consensus among Britain, China and the local political forces on the timing as well as the procedure to arrive at the widely accepted goal of democratisation. In 1991, the RegCo were made up of 12 appointed and 12 directly elected members, 9 representatives from the DBs, and 3 ex-officio members from the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen of the Heung Yee Kuk (see Table 4.4). Regarding the District Boards, there were nineteen (eighteen before 1985) DBs and 441 DB members in 1991. The percentage of directly elected members increased from 27% (132 out of 490) in 1982 to 62% (274 out of 441) in 1991 (see Table 4.5).

In contrast to the development of representative government or local administration, the growth in consultation networks was spectacular. From thirty-one in 1947, the number of advisory bodies and committees increased to 277 in 1991, nearly nine times those of 1947 (see Table 4.6). But there were variations in the growth rate among different types of advisory body. From 1970 to 1980, the annual growth rate for "the statutory bodies", "the permanent non-statutory bodies with official and non-official members", "the permanent non-statutory bodies with official

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[280]Endacott (1964), op. cit., pp. 126-34.

members only", were 4.1%, 7.5%, and 1.1%, respectively. In the period 1980-88, the growth rates for the first two kinds of bodies declined, especially for the non-statutory ones with official and non-official members. In contrast, the non-statutory ones with official members only, increased. The respective figures were 3%, 2.5%, and 5.8%. But the trend was just the opposite during the period 1988-91. The first two kinds of bodies (the statutory bodies, and the permanent non-statutory bodies with official and non-official members) increased significantly and had a 5.2% and 4.9% growth rate, respectively. The official non-statutory bodies experienced minus 0.9% growth rate. The details of these ups and downs in the growth rate are beyond the scope of this study, but one point that should be stressed is that the Government had reinforced its incorporation (absorption) capacity in the late 1980s.

The Hong Kong Government regarded this consultation system as an effective one, and it was believed by many others that it could avoid the "unnecessary" debates and confrontations found in Western democracy. The members of all these bodies were nominally appointed by the Governor. In fact, some boards' and committees' members were first elected among the concerned parties and then recommended to the Governor for appointment. Some were ex-officio members because of their positions in relevant activities. Through this particular channel, the Hong Kong Government would co-opt most, if not all, of the socio-economic elites into its consultation networks. The Government granted them the social status as well as the power of influence in anticipation of their support in the governing process. In return, the social elites were willing to cooperate as long as the Government could provide what they wanted. As a result, the efficiency of the Hong Kong Government would then be enhanced. The growth of this network had facilitated the penetration of the government into society and the integration of the social elites with the government. But once again, like other political appointments, the less organised and under-privileged sectors in the society were so often left out in the membership. More important was the fact that many government policies, whether welcomed or not by the public, were based on the recommendation of the advisory bodies concerned. In fact, this could enhance the transparency of the Government as well

as enable it to avoid taking direct responsibility in certain controversial and sensitive policy areas.

Let us take the Transport Advisory Committee as an example, when the application for a fare increase by the franchised transportation company is first considered by the Committee and then recommendation made to the Transportation Branch of the Government Secretariats and later the ExCo for adoption. If the recommendation and its subsequent adoption go against the opinion of the public, the Committee's members might more or less lose their credibility, and their roles might be doubted by the public. The Government can, therefore, avoid direct conflict with the mass public. Moreover, the issue of conflict of interests has long been the focal point of public discussion because many committee members are coming from the business sector. Thus, the neutrality of the committee's recommendation might be questioned by the public. Miss Maria Tam's scandal is a case in hand (details in Chapter 5).

The Functional Expansion of the Colonial State

Accompanying the growth of the government structure was the expansion of the number of public employees. The study of public employment has often faced the problem of availability of data. This was also the case in Hong Kong. Conceptually, there is a different coverage to the following two terms: "public employees" and "civil servants". The former were those who were directly or indirectly employed by the government, but the latter only involved those who were directly hired by the government. That means the employees in the voluntary or quasi-official organisations which received government funding or subvention were regarded as public employees. Ideally, the data on public employees, rather than that of the civil servants, are more suitable to measure the size and the growth rate of the public sector. This was especially true in Hong Kong as some of the social services

were delivered by non-governmental agencies with annual financial support from the Government, e.g. member agencies of the Council of Social Service. Others were former Government but now privatised programmes which had been granted capital investment by the Government, e.g. the Housing Authority. Still others were those which were funded by the Government but had their own personnel policy, e.g. the Tourist Association.[281] But so often, there was a lack of the accurate figures for that kind of public employee other than that of the civil servants. Nevertheless, the number of civil servants might be regarded as the fundamental one that could shed some light on the growth of the government employment.

As shown in Table 4.7, the strength of the civil servants grew from about 53,000 in 1963 to a little more than 190,000 in 1991. A gain of more than 3.5 times the figure of 1963. Once again, the growth rate varied in different periods. The average annual growth rates for the period 1963-73 and 1973-84 were 7.0% and 8.1% respectively. But the trend of growth did not continue thereafter and dropped significantly to 1.7% in the period 1984-91. Moreover, the growth rates among different function areas were not the same. In the period 1963-73, there were four function areas with two-digit annual growth rate. The order of annual growth rates were: social welfare (22.0%), policy planning (19.1%), extractive agencies (15.7%) and housing (11.1%). In the period 1973-84, policy planning and extractive agencies continued to enjoy a two-digit growth rate. The respective percentages were 12.5% and 11.6%. The disciplinary forces also acquired a two-digit growth rate of 13.2%. Only policy planning had a record of over 5% growth in the period of 1984-91. The above personnel statistics appeared to demonstrate the relative greater expansion in the function areas of policy planning, extractive, and law enforcement, at least in the period of 1963-84. The relative low growth rate experienced in the 1984-91 period was probably due to the fact that the Hong Kong Government came across financial constraint caused by the public work projects and social investments on the one hand,

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[281]Norman Miners, *The Government and Politics of Hong Kong*, 5th ed. (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 101-106.

and the unstable government revenue imposed by the uncertainty of the future of the Territory on the other.

In general, the growth of revenue and the growth of expenditure of Hong Kong in the post-war period was remarkable but with variation. First of all, the growth of revenue and the growth of expenditure in 1992, in current market price (constant prices not available in the said annual report), was more than 1235 and 1091 times the figures of 1947 respectively (see Table 4.8). For the whole period of 1947-92, the average annual growth rate of revenue and expenditure was 18.6% and 17.8% respectively; but there was a wide variation in terms of comparison yearly and periodically. The respective ranges of revenue and expenditure growth were -2.2% (1984) and 100.1% (1948) for the former, and -2.2% (1968) and 70.1% (1981) for the latter.

The revenue growth rates for the periods of 1947-67, 1967-73, 1973-84 and 1984-92 were 18.7%, 20.5%, 23.6% and 16.1% respectively. Meanwhile, the respective expenditure growth rates were 17.3%, 16.9%, 26.3% and 13.8%. There were only a few occasions of minus growth rate of revenue and expenditure: 3 for the former (in 1954, 1983 and 1984) and 4 for the latter (in 1954, 1968, 1976 and 1984). The Hong Kong Government adhered to a conservative fiscal policy of balanced budgeting and thus accumulated an enormous surplus of HK$57,280.6 million (equivalent to GBP4,773.4 million, if GBP1 = HK$12) up to 1992 (in current market price).[282] Only on seven occasions (1947, 1960, 1966, 1975, 1983, 1984 and 1991) had there resulted a negative balance at the end of the financial years.

The Government's extracting capacity improved steadily over the post-war period. As shown in Table 4.9, the percentage of the actual revenue in term of the gross domestic product was on the rise, from 11.9% in the period 1967-73 to 13.1%

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[282]For the role and policy of successive Financial Secretaries in the post-war period, see Lo Cheng Sik-sze, *Public Budgeting in Hong Kong: An Incremental Decision-Making Approach* (Hong Kong: Writers' & Publishers' Cooperative, 1990), pp. 66-79.

in the period 1984-92. This meant that the growth of revenue was faster than that of the GDP, and more and more resources were extracted from the society and placed at the disposal of the Government. This aggregated growth rate did not necessarily imply that the same would go to individual revenue sources. Some components of revenue would contribute more than others to the course of development, or vice versa. Furthermore, different growth rates among revenue sources indicated that one or more sectors in the society had been drilled more than the rest. As shown in Table 4.10, the land revenue (excluding property tax and estate duty) contributed more than 23% on average during the period 1947-92, with the range from 7.1% in 1988 to 48.4% in 1981. The period 1973-84 recorded an average contribution of 28.7%, but the ensuing period 1984-91 decreased more than half of that in 1973-84 and took up only 13.7% of the total actual revenue.

Why was this so? The rapid decline in the yield from land sales seemed to be one of the most promising reasons (see column 2 in Table 4.10). The share of land sales reached its peak in the early 1980s (37% in 1981 and 29.4% in 1982) and then fell rapidly from the mid-1980s, with an average share of 0.5% in the period 1988-91. The sudden and swift fall of land sale shares since the early 1980s might be attributed partly to the political uncertainty in the early 1980s and partly to the sharing of the land sale revenue with the Chinese Government since the coming into force of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in May 1985. Annex III of the Joint Declaration laid down the details of land leases arrangements during the transitional period of 1984-1997. Article 6 of the Annex III stipulated that:

> From the entry into force of the Joint Declaration until 30 June 1997, premium income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government from land transaction shall, after deduction of the average cost of land production, be shared equally between the British Hong Kong Government and the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government. All the income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government, including the amount of the above mentioned deduction, shall be put into the Capital Works Reserve Fund for the financing of land development and public works in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government's share of the premium income shall be deposited in banks incorporated in Hong Kong and shall not be drawn on except for the financing of land development and public works in Hong Kong . . . .

The revenue from land sale for the period 1985-1992, which was credited into the Capital Works Reserve Fund (Works Account), amounted to HK$465,028.7 million and represented a drain of average 6.7% of the actual revenue in the said period (see Table 4.11). This was very likely to have a financial consequence on the Government fiscal system.[283] Although the Hong Kong Government could still be the one to decide how to spend its own share, the programmes which were financed should be of a public works nature. That meant the Hong Kong Government lost the flexibility of using this sum of money to finance other general expenses and thus had to tighten its budget and expenditure or cut back some social commitments.

In ensuring the availability of the necessary funding for other expenditures, the revenue from other taxing sources had to yield more. As shown in Table 4.9, the share of internal revenue climbed significantly from 32.7% in the period 1950-73 to 54.9% in 1984-88 and 61.6% in 1988-91. Among the items within the heading of internal revenue, as shown in Table 4.12, the share of salaries tax grew at a rapid rate. The salaries tax contributed only 9.5% in average in 1958-73, and steadily rose to 15.6% in 1973-84, and finally reached 23.8% in 1984-91. Comparatively, the share of stamp duty, and property tax and estate duty became smaller. The share of stamp duty decreased more than 5% in average from 1958-73 to 1984-91, and the share of property tax and estate duty was down 8.5% in the respective periods. The contribution from profits tax grew from 44.9% in 1958-73 to 49% in 1973-84, but eventually dropped to 45.8% in 1984-91.

As shown in Table 4.13, the net of salaries tax had extended widely with a significant growth of total taxpayers from little more than 255,500 in 1982 to 1,070,000 in 1991. That meant, on average, more than 90,000 persons were being drawn into the net yearly in the said period. Furthermore, a differential growth

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[283]Before 1982, revenue from land sales had been set aside for fiscal reserves. But the then Financial Secretary Sir John Bremridge, successor of Sir Philip Haddon-Cave, used it for expenditure. See Y.W. Sung, "Fiscal and Economic Policies in Hong Kong," in Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed., *Hong Kong in Transition* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 130.

between the standard rate taxpayers and the single taxpayers, in terms of both number and share of final tax contribution, was noted. The standard rate taxpayers increased from 18,600 in 1982 to nearly 33,800 in 1987, and then expanded to over 100,000 in 1991, but the respective share of final tax had first declined from 54.2% to 45.5% and then went up to 55%. The respective figures for the single taxpayers was 147,700, 447,300 and 517,500, and the share of final tax was 12.7%, 19.5% and 18.1%. Sub-dividing the period into two, the difference between the standard rate taxpayers and the single taxpayers was more apparent. The former expanded from average yearly growth of 3,000 in 1982-87 to nearly 16,600 in 1987-91, but the latter descended from nearly 60,000 to over 17,500 respectively.

As a whole, the growing number of standard rate taxpayers seemingly imply that more and more individuals and families (mostly middle or lower-middle income groups) that were not liable to pay the standard tax rate before had to pay more tax then, especially in the period of 1987-91. Though one would argue that the expanding population of taxpayers was the result of the real growth of income, the fact remained that personal and related tax allowances were not growing at the same pace as the income and inflation rate. As shown in Table 4.14, Column G, only on three occasions (1981/2, 1982/3, and 1983/4) did the amounts of personal allowances (without additional allowance) catch up with the inflation rate.

Government Contraction and the Collective Consumption Cleavage

Accompanying the growing extractive capacity of the Hong Kong Government was its expansive and exclusive role in providing most of the social and economic services. The growing government expenditure on social services programmes carried with it the redistributive effect. For example, the provision of free nine-year education could reduce parents' financial burden and thus increase the share of bring-home money. The same logic would also apply to other fields of government provisions. For example, the public works projects of the transportation system could facilitate the internal movement of goods and services, and thus lowered the cost of economic activities. James O'Connor differentiated the former type of government provisions as social consumption, the latter as social investment.[284] Manuel Castells termed the former as collective consumption.[285] Patrick Dunleavy highlighted the difference between the collective and individualized forms of consumption in the following three "politically significant ways":

> (a) Collective consumption in advanced capitalist societies is typically concerned with services provided by the state apparatus, . . .

> (b) . . . individuals' location in these consumption processes is no longer directly determined by market forces. . . .

> (c) Collective consumption processes create an inter-subjective basis for the development of political action. . . .[286]

Following the above framework, this section will only deal with the collective consumption aspect of the expenditure as it was believed to be the fundamental factor in politicizing the grassroots since the mid-1980s in the context of Hong Kong.

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[284]James O'Connor, *The Fiscal Crisis of the State* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973), pp. 5-10.

[285]Manuel Castells, *City, Class and Power* (Hampshire: MacMillan, 1978), chap. 2.

[286]Patrick Dunleavy, "The Urban Basis of Political Alignment: Social Class, Domestic Property Ownership, and State Intervention in Consumption Processes," *British Journal of Political Science* 9 (1979):418.

The spending capacity of the post-war Hong Kong Government witnessed a steady growth and at a rate faster than that of the GDP. We can see from Table 4.15 that there was an average of nearly 2% growth from 1967-73 to 1973-84 and 1984-92. Only in 1970, 1971, 1972, 1977 and 1989 did the ratio between actual expenditure and the GDP fall a little below 10%. The steady growth of the government expenditure appeared to be related to the expanding role of government in the collective consumption processes. As shown in Table 4.16, the aggregated social services expenditures were 41.5% in 1973-84, 44.5% in 1984-88 and 45.7% in 1988-92, with a overall average of 43.1% in the period of 1973-92. Only on 3 occasions (1973, 1974 and 1982) did the figure fall below 40% of the total actual expenditure. The components of the social services expenditure had all more or less experienced some sorts of growth, with higher growth rates in social welfare and housing.

Nearly 45% of the total social services expenditure took the form of subvention to the statutory or appropriate social institutions to deliver the social provisions concerned. As shown in Table 4.17, about one-fifth of the total expenditure was spent on the subvention of social services. Besides, there was a trend of growing proportion of subvention since the mid-1980s. The average percentage of social service subvention was 18.4% in 1973-84 and 21.6% in 1984-92. The financial year of 1991-92 reached the highest with more than one-fourth of the total expenditure being dispersed through subvention. A lion's share (more than three-fourths) of the subvention was taken up by the heading under education which included subvention of the Universities and Polytechnic, and the Vocational Training Council. This picture was not completed because housing had not been included in the above-mentioned figures. Due to the lack of comparable data, the capital expenditure of public housing by the Government and the Housing Authority were used as an estimation of its share of subvention of the total actual expenditure. As shown in Table 4.18, the share was almost 10% in average in 1977-92. As a result, it was estimated that no less than one-third of the total expenditure was delivered through the statutory bodies or other social organisations.

Although claiming not to be a welfare state, the Hong Kong Government, in fact, provided some basic social services which were indispensable to the stability and the economic development of Hong Kong, as well as to the betterment of the material life of the Hong Kong people. In other words, the Government had intervened in the private consumption process so as to provide a sector of population with some protection against the usual logic of market forces. In so doing, a favourable environment for investment and economic production would be maintained and enhanced. Having this strategic thinking in mind, the Hong Kong Government set the priority for intervention. Different from the Western experience of the welfare state, the prior target of intervention was the social services but not social security programmes.[287]

The Government intervention in the private consumption processes of medical care, housing and education had the effect of turning the original private goods and services into a public or collective ones. The direct effects of these measures were the stabilisation of wages and price systems, and the suppression of the inflation rate. In so doing, the pressure to ask for a salary increase from the workers would effectively lessen, and thus, part of their consumption could be insulated from the influence of the market. That means their living would be hit only slightly compared with others by the rising living standard and inflation rate, which usually prove to be the normal phenomenon of a rapid developing economy. As long as the Government could manage stable supply funding, the above-mentioned effects would be maintained. But the ups and downs of the economic growth rate or the financial stringency provoked by the competing programmes of spending, worked to erode the Government's fiscal power. Consequently, budget-cutting or privatisation might be logical solutions.

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[287]Peter Flora and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds., *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick & London: Transaction Books, 1981).

In explaining the trend of privatisation in Hong Kong, Anthony B.L. Cheung put forward the "government off-loading" thesis.[288] This thesis regarded privatisation as a move the Hong Kong Government adopted in reaction to its growing incapabilities in the face of increasing Chinese intervention in the transitional period. Besides this political explanation, we would argue that the fiscal crisis resulting from the high reliance of government revenue on land sale and the constraint of use on such revenue by the Sino-British Joint Declaration, would be responsible for the privatisation drive.

The trend of privatisation is well reflected in the publication of a discussion paper entitled *Public Sector Reform* released by the Financial Branch of the Hong Kong Government in February 1989. The Government sought "a change in the attitude and approach to the spending of public money in order to improve efficiency and give a better service to the public . . . by adapting and developing the structures and procedures that already exist".[289] The paper proposed a pricing system on government services. As a result, some government services were classified as "support" or "commercial" services and subject to partial or full cost recovery.[290]

As mentioned before, the Hong Kong Government experienced the expected financial stringency caused by the designated use of the revenue from land sale and the slowing down of the growth of the GDP since the mid-1980s. The situation grew

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[288]Anthony B.L. Cheung, "Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong: Trends and Limitations," paper presented at the conference Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong: Progress-To-Date and Future Directions, Hong Kong, 26 March 1991, pp. 12-14.

[289]Hong Kong Government Financial Branch, *Public Sector Reform* (1989), Preface; quoted in Anthony B.L. Cheung, "Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong: Trends and Limitations," paper presented at the conference Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong: Progress-To-Date and Future Directions, Hong Kong, 26 March 1991, p. 1.

[290]For a discussion on the pricing system, see Anthony B.L. Cheung, "Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong: Trends and Limitations," paper presented at the conference Public Sector Reform in Hong Kong: Progress-To-Date and Future Directions, Hong Kong, 26 March 1991, pp. 8-10.

worse when the Government committed itself to the expensive port and airport plan, the massive expansion of the education programme, and others in 1989.

As a result, one can easily distinguish a trend of privatisation of some collective consumption programmes. Housing, medical and health services, and education have, in one way or another, embarked on the road of privatisation since the mid-1980s. Among the list, housing appeared to be the most controversial one as housing might be regarded as more basic in the sense of its recurrent nature and the sums of money involved. It was reported that the household expenditure on housing ranged from 19% for the lowest income groups to 36.5% for the highest income groups in 1989-90 of their respective monthly income, and the average was 25.6%.[291] Furthermore, it was estimated that nearly half of the population were living in public housing estates. Given the scale and its importance in urban politics, we now turn to discuss the privatisation process of public housing.

The Housing Authority has been responsible solely for the provision of low-rented public housing since the launching of the Ten-Year Housing Programme in the early 1970s by the then Governor Murray MacLehose. Since then, more and more public housing estates have been constructed to house the low income families. Through the Public Works Department, public housing estates were constructed and then handed to the Housing Authority when finished. The cost of construction was largely shouldered by the Government through its general revenue account, but the Housing Authority had to pay the interest and amortisation of the capital expenditure to the Government as well as to take up all the management and maintenance cost. In fact, the Government had often absorbed the deficits when they were presented at the end of each financial year. Because of such special financial arrangements, the Housing Authority could manage to maintain the low rent policy. According to one study, it was estimated that the amounts of government subsidy which the public housing residents received was HK$840 million in 1976 and HK$6,528 million (in

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[291]Census and Statistics Department (1992b), p. 141, Table 10.5.

real terms) in 1981.[292] The impact on the household's consumption patterns was said to be "substantial" and estimated to increase; "on the average, housing consumption by 120 percent and non-housing consumption by 17 percent" with the welfare cost of about 25 percent in 1979.[293] Rents in public housing had been very stable up to 1981. The respective rent per square metre for the former resettlement estates, the Housing Authority Blocks, and a tenement floor in the private market was HK$3.31, HK$6.14 and HK$18.84 in 1976; but the corresponding figures were HK$4.36, HK$6.6 and HK$55.9 in 1981.

The growing government expenditure and subsidy in social services would only be continued provided that the necessary revenue was in place. But the high economic growth rate in the 1970s slowed down in the 1980s and the future of Hong Kong was put into doubt as the 1997 question emerged in 1979. Thus, the fiscal condition of the Hong Kong Government also encountered the same problem of uncertainty. As mentioned before, the uncertainty about the political future in the early 1980s had plagued both the property market and land sales. A decrease in revenue from the land-related sources followed. Under such circumstances, the continuation of massive social services programmes was not possible. Furthermore, as mentioned before, the Hong Kong Government was restrained by the land arrangements stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration which came into effect in 1985.

Even before the reorganization of the Housing Authority in 1988 which made her a self-financed statutory body with Government capital investment, some measures of privatisation were already planned and put into practice.[294] First of all,

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[292]Li Si-ming and Yu Fu-lai, "The Redistributive Effects of Hong Kong's Public Housing Programme, 1976-86," *Urban Studies* 13 (1990):249-60.

[293]Fu-lai Yu and Si-ming Li, "The Welfare Cost of Hong Kong's Public Housing Programme," *Urban Studies* 22 (1985):138-9.

[294]Hong Kong Government, *A Review of Public Housing Allocation Policies* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1984); Hong Kong Government, *Green Paper on Housing Subsidy to Tenants of Public Housing* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1985); Hong

the rent policy underwent significant changes after the centralisation of housing management into the hands of the Housing Authority in 1973. Before that date, rents for Government Low-Cost Housing estates and resettlement estates were based on "historic costs".[295] That means "rents were fixed by Government to cover land and building costs amortized over 40 years as well as management and maintenance costs."[296] In 1973, rents for all public housing had to be reviewed biennially and no more than 10% increase could be allowed. In the early 1980s, rents were charged, on average, at 5-7% of the household income of the tenants. But in 1987, rents were fixed at no more than 15% of the median household income of the tenants, and the percentage soared to 18.5% for new buildings after 1992. In addition, the tenants in the redeveloped resettlement estates were liable to pay the new rents which were several times higher than before.

Second, the adoption of double-rent policy in 1987 for the tenants whose income exceeded twice the Waiting List Income Limit (the maximum income limit for applicants for public housing flats) and had already been living there for more than 10 years; they were subject to double rent. In its first year of application, 22% of the target tenants (N=41,000) were required to pay double rent. It is expected that more and more tenants will be required to pay double rent, because the revision of the Waiting List Income Limit does not match up with the inflation rate of that year. For example, the average growth rates of the Waiting List Income Limit were 22.6% in 1982-84 and 7.3% in 1984-91 at current market price, but the respective inflation rate, in terms of the Consumer Price Index (A), is 7.8% and 8.8%.[297]

Kong Government, *Report of the Committee on Housing Subsidy to Tenants of Public Housing* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1986); Hong Kong Government, *Report of the Working Party to Review Public Housing Rental Policy* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1986).

[295]J.C. Morris, "Administration and Finance of Public Housing," in Luke S.K. Wong, ed., *Housing in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Heinemann, 1978), p. 69.

[296]*Housing Authority Annual Report* 1973-74:10.

[297]Census and Statistics Department (1992b), *op. cit.*, p. 140, Table 10.3.

Third, tenants and potential tenants of public housing have been offered favourable terms in purchasing flats from the Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) and the Private Sector Participation Scheme (PSPS). These included the low interest rate, high mortgage limit (90% of the purchase price, and later up to 95%), long repayment period (15 years at first and later 20 years), no income limit and restriction of property ownership. Later on in 1988, an interest-free loan (the Home Purchase Loan Scheme) was introduced to help the tenants to purchase flats in the private sector with the condition that they have to evacuate from their public housing flats. Meanwhile, the prices for the HOS's and PSPS's flats have been pegged with the private market prices and usually at a discount of 30-40% of the latter. As the prices of private property skyrocketed, so did the HOS's and PSPS's flats.

The decision to undertake privatisation sparked off waves of tenants' protests and thus, to a certain extent, helped to politicise the grassroots. According to one study, 169 cases of social conflicts (19.2% of the total, N=882) were of a housing nature during the period 1975-86, of which 36 cases were related to public housing rent.[298] Regarding the modes of action, housing conflict stood out as the most "violent" one because it took the form of protest and mass rally more often than other social conflicts.[299] This is very important to urban politics as the universal franchise had only just been introduced to the Hong Kong political system. The newly-born politicians have taken advantage of the privatisation issue (not only housing) and rallied considerable constituency support in the course of election campaigns. The details of the election appeals by the various political groups will be discussed in Chapter 6.

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[298]Cheung and Louie (1991), *op. cit.*, pp. 13-4, Tables 3 & 5.

[299]*Ibid.*, p. 29, Table 19.

Table 4.1

The Authorized Population of Cottage Resettlement Areas and
Multi-storey Resettlement Estates, 1954-73

Year	Cottage Resettlement Areas	Multi-Storey Resettlement Estates
1954	45906	8653
1955	58224	66598
1956	70393	105404
1957	73704	139797
1958	77546	158662
1959	81640	196958
1960	82482	246821
1961	87519	292371
1962	79656	373274
1963	73377	462582
1964	82899	544156
1965	74729	681134
1966	74702	770869
1967	72484	861213
1968	72986	967184
1969	68058	1030022
1970	57585	1077094
1971	55825	1100277
1972	50293	1154792
1973	49907	1183677

Source: Commissioner for Resettlement, *Annual Department
Report 1972-73*, appendix 5.

Table 4.2

The Number of Central Government Secretaries and Departments 1969-90

Year	Secretaries	Departments
1969	10	39
1974	15	39
1980	16	42
1985	19	47
1990	21	55

*Figures are including those which have the equivalent status in both the Government Secretariat and other Departments.

Sources:
1. For 1969, see G.C. Hamilton, *Government Departments in Hong Kong: 1841-1969* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1969);
2. For 1974 and after, see Government Secretariat, *Civil and Miscellaneous List*, various years.

Table 4.3

Changes in Composition of the Executive Council and the Legislative Council, 1947-91

| Year | ExCo | | LegCo | | | | |
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1947	6	6	8	7	-	-	-
1952	6	6	9	8	-	-	-
1964	6	6	12	13	-	-	-
1966	6	8	12	13	-	-	-
1972	6	8	14	15	-	-	-
1976	6	8	19	22	-	-	-
1977	6	8	20	24	-	-	-
1978	6	9	20	24	-	-	-
1980	6	9	22	26	-	-	-
1981	6	9	22	27	-	-	-
1983	6	11	18	29	-	-	-
1984	6	10	16	30	-	-	-
1985	6	8	10	22	12	12	-
1986	6	10	10	22	12	12	-
1987	5	9	10	22	12	12	-
1988	5	9	10	20	14	12	-
1989	5	10	10	20	14	12	-
1990	5	10	10	20	14	12	-
1991	5	9	3	18	21	-	18

A = ExCo Official Members (inclusive of ex-officio members)
B = ExCo Non-official (Appointed) Members
C = LegCo Official Members (inclusive of ex-officio members)
D = LegCo Non-official (Appointed) Members
E = LegCo Elected Members through Functional Constituency
F = LegCo Elected Members through Electoral College
G = LegCo Elected Members through Geographical Constituency

Source: *Hong Kong Annual Report*, various years.

Table 4.4

The Composition of the Urban Council and the Regional Council, 1947-91

Year	UrbCo				RegCo			
	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
1947	5	6	–	–	–	–	–	–
1952	5	6	2	–	–	–	–	–
1953	5	6	4	–	–	–	–	–
1955	6	6	4	–	–	–	–	–
1956	6	8	8	–	–	–	–	–
1965	6	10	10	–	–	–	–	–
1973	–	12	12	–	–	–	–	–
1983	–	15	15	–	–	–	–	–
1985	–	15	15	–	12	–	9	3
1986	–	15	15	–	12	12	9	3
1989	–	15	15	10	12	12	9	3
1991	–	15	15	10	12	12	9	3

A = UrbCo Ex-officio Members
B = UrbCo Appointed Members
C = UrbCo Elected Members through Geographical Constituency
D = UrbCo Representatives from District Boards
E = RegCo Appointed Members
F = RegCo Elected Members through Geographical Constituency
G = RegCo Representatives from District Boards
H = RegCo Ex-officio Members (the Heung Yee Kuk)

Note: The number of UrbCo's ex-officio members are inclusive of the Chairman before 1973. Since 1973, Chairman and Vice-chairman are elected among members.

Sources:
1. For 1956 and before, Colonial Secretariat, *Civil Service List*, various years;
2. For 1965 and after, *Hong Kong Annual Report*, various years.

Table 4.5

The Composition of the District Boards, 1982-91

Year	A	B	C	D	E	F
1982	167	134	132	27	30	490
1985	-	132	237	27	30	426
1988	-	141	264	27	-* (30)*	432* (462)*
1991	-	140	274	27	-	441

* From 1 April 1989 to 31 March 1991, 30 Urban Council members are no longer the District Boards' members.

A = Appointed Official Members
B = Appointed Unofficial Members
C = Elected Members
D = Rural Committee Chairmen
E = Urban Council Members
F = Total

Source: supplied by the City and New Territories Administration, Hong Kong Government on 22 July 1993.

Table 4.6

The Number of Government Advisory Bodies, Selected Years

Year	A	B	C	D
1947	–	–	–	31
1948	–	–	–	43
1954	–	–	–	50
1957	–	–	–	60
1958	–	–	–	62
1970	71	34	17	122
1975	79	46	17	142
1977	89	49	16	154
1978	98	51	18	167
1980	103	62	19	184
1984	118	67	22	207
1985	120	68	22	210
1986	123	69	22	214
1987	128	72	27	227
1988	131	76	29	236
1989	136	76	28	240
1990	148	90	29	267
1991	158	91	28	277

A = Statutory Bodies
B = Permanent Non-Statutory Bodies with Official and Non-official Members
C = Permanent Non-Statutory Bodies with Official Members Only
D = Total Number of A, B and C

Sources:
1. For 1958 or before, Colonial Secretariat, *Civil Service List*, various years;
2. For 1970 or after, Government Secretariat, *Civil and Miscellaneous List*, various years.

Table 4.7

The Growth Rate of the Civil Servants (Actual Strength) by
Selected Function Areas, Selected Years

Year	A	B	C	D
1963	6770	4636	2504	491
1964	7527	5006	3099	581
1965	8266	5217	3609	608
1967	9033	5478	4329	748
1968	9523	5447	4781	833
1969	9711	5586	4769	952
1971	10661	5596	5072	1254
1972	11103	5789	5269	1424
1973	11981	5784	5279	1573
1974	12605	5763	6180	1833
1975	13407	5829	6536	2087
1976	13956	5736	5789	2063
1977	.14712	5548	5621	2159
1978	15314	5630	6046	2271
1979	15857	5715	6560	2560
1980	16421	5484	7200	2532
1981	17595	5661	8101	2676
1982	18977	6148	10373	2817
1983	20398	6760	11198	3073
1984	21884	6976	11364	3073
1985	23604	7062	11049	3139
1986	24500	7048	11065	3070
1987	25642	7193	11564	3247
1988	26587	7292	11943	3512
1989	26852	7354	12176	3751
1990	27888	7432	12554	3856
1991	28744	7396	12580	3883

Annual Growth
Rate for:

	A	B	C	D
63-73	7.7	2.5	11.1	22.0
73-84	7.5	1.9	10.5	8.7
84-91	4.5	0.9	1.5	3.8
84-88	5.4	1.1	1.3	3.6
88-91	2.7	0.5	1.8	3.5

A = Health
B = Education
C = Housing
D = Social Welfare
E = Government Secretariat
F = Police, Fire, Custom and Excise, Immigration, and
    Correctional Service
G = Inland Revenue and Treasury

Table 4.7 (Continued)

Year	E	F	G	TOTAL
1963	352	12000	686	52955
1964	375	13194	720	57809
1965	455	13805	775	60181
1967	768	16660	936	69150
1968	778	17225	1039	72936
1969	645	17990	1157	75444
1971	967	19240	1541	81438
1972	1146	19229	1708	84495
1973	1024	20106	1761	89941
1974	1254	21283	1890	95284
1975	1035	25039	1980	104291
1976	1245	25758	2152	104157
1977	1386	28109	2294	108385
1978	1532	31007	2401	115674
1979	1689	32887	2748	122838
1980	1875	35374	2956	129217
1981	1808	37299	3429	139252
1982	2462	40157	3875	154034
1983	2605	47154	3995	166569
1984	2429	49282	4003	170051
1985	2818	50536	4039	172641
1986	2847	51696	4087	174946
1987	3057	53033	4201	179053
1988	3275	54293	4371	182843
1989	3507	55710	4272	186054
1990	3255	56323	4184	188393
1991	3318	56041	4325	190448

Annual Growth
Rate For:

63-73	19.1	6.8	15.7	7.0
73-84	12.5	13.2	11.6	8.1
84-91	5.2	2.0	1.1	1.7
84-88	8.7	2.5	2.3	1.9
88-91	0.4	1.1	-0.4	1.4

Notes:
1.   Redistributive agencies = A, B, C, D
2.   Policy planning = E
3.   Law enforcement agencies = F
4.   Extractive agencies = G

Sources: compiled from Government Secretariat, Civil Service Branch, *Civil Service Personnel Statistics*, and Colonial Secretariat, Establishment Branch, *Personnel Statistics*, various years; figures are as April for 1975-91; as January for 1963-74.

Table 4.8

The Actual Revenue and Expenditure of Hong Kong, 1947-92

Year	Revenue (HK$M)	(%)	Expenditure (HK$M)	(%)	Balance (HK$M)
1947	82.1	-	85.6	-	-3.5
1948	164.3	100.1	127.7	49.2	36.6
1949	194.9	18.6	160.0	25.3	34.9
1950	264.3	35.6	182.1	13.8	82.2
1951	291.7	10.4	251.7	38.2	40.0
1952	308.6	5.8	275.9	9.6	32.7
1953	484.6	57.0	411.8	49.3	72.8
1954	396.9	-18.1	355.4	-13.7	41.5
1955	434.5	9.5	373.3	5.0	61.2
1956	454.7	4.6	402.5	7.8	52.2
1957	509.7	12.1	469.5	16.6	40.2
1958	584.2	14.6	532.7	13.5	51.5
1959	629.3	7.7	590.0	10.8	39.3
1960	664.6	5.6	710.0	20.3	-45.4
1961	859.2	29.3	845.3	19.1	13.9
1962	1030.5	19.9	953.2	12.8	77.3
1963	1253.1	21.6	1113.3	16.8	139.8
1964	1393.9	11.2	1295.4	16.4	98.5
1965	1518.3	8.9	1440.5	11.2	77.8
1966	1631.7	7.5	1769.1	22.8	-137.4
1967	1817.8	11.4	1806.1	2.1	11.7
1968	1899.5	4.5	1766.0	-2.2	133.5
1969	2081.1	9.6	1873.0	6.1	208.1
1970	2480.7	19.2	2032.2	8.5	448.5
1971	3070.9	23.8	2452.2	20.7	618.7
1972	3541.3	15.3	2901.4	18.3	639.9
1973	4936.3	39.4	4299.6	48.2	636.7
1974	5240.8	6.2	5169.2	20.2	71.6
1975	5875.3	12.1	6255.2	21.0	-379.9
1976	6519.3	11.0	6032.2	-3.6	487.1
1977	6898.5	5.8	6590.9	9.3	307.6
1978	9534.5	38.2	8996.9	36.5	537.6
1979	11766.0	23.4	11090.1	23.3	675.9
1980	15905.6	35.2	13872.3	25.1	2033.3
1981	29124.3	83.1	23593.5	70.1	5530.8
1982	32916.2	13.0	27778.2	17.7	5138.0
1983	31097.6	-5.5	34597.8	24.6	-3500.2
1984	30399.7	-2.2	33393.1	-3.5	-2993.4
1985	36342.5	19.5	36901.8	10.5	-559.3
1986	41241.0	13.5	39798.2	7.8	1442.8
1987	43869.6	6.4	39927.7	0.3	3941.9
1988	55641.4	26.8	44022.0	10.3	11619.4
1989	65780.6	18.2	48952.6	11.2	16828.0
1990	74365.2	13.1	69661.6	42.3	4703.6
1991	82674.5	11.2	82837.2	18.9	-162.7
1992	101456.4	22.7	93401.1	12.8	8055.3

```
TOTAL NET BALANCE                          57280.6

Annual Growth
Rate For:
1947-92        18.6                17.8
1947-67        18.7                17.3
1967-73        17.6                14.5
1973-84        21.6                24.1
1984-92        14.4                12.3
```

Note: The actual revenue and expenditure may be a bit different from those of the Reports due to the rounding of each item of revenue and expenditure.

Sources:
1.   For 1975-1992, *Annual Report of the Director of Accounting Services*, various years;
2.   For 1947-1974, *Annual Report of the Accounting General*, various years.

Table 4.9

Total Actual Revenue and the GDP, 1966-92

Year	Revenue	GDP	REV/GDP
	(HK$ million)		(%)
1966	1631.7	13718	11.9
1967	1817.8	14817	12.3
1968	1899.5	15758	12.1
1969	2081.1	18520	11.2
1970	2480.7	22040	11.3
1971	3070.9	25384	12.1
1972	3541.3	30638	11.6
1973	4936.3	38483	12.8
1974	5240.8	45066	11.6
1975	5875.3	47086	12.5
1976	6519.3	60173	10.8
1977	6898.5	69683	9.9
1978	9534.5	81623	11.7
1979	11766.0	107545	10.9
1980	15905.6	136775	11.6
1981	29124.3	164762	17.7
1982	32916.2	185728	17.7
1983	31097.6	206217	15.1
1984	30399.7	247933	12.3
1985	36342.5	261070	13.9
1986	41241.0	298515	13.8
1987	43869.6	367603	11.9
1988	55641.4	433657	12.8
1989	65780.6	499157	13.2
1990	74365.2	558859	13.3
1991	82674.5	641136	12.9
1992	101456.4	742582*	13.7

Annual Growth
Rate For:

1966-92		12.7
1967-73		11.9
1973-84		12.9
1984-92		13.1

* Provisional figure.

Sources:
1. For the revenue, *Annual Report of the Director of Accounting Services* (1975-1992), and *Annual Report of the Accountant General* (1947-74), various years;
2. For the GDP, Census and Statistics Department, *Estimates of the Gross Domestic Product 1966-92* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1993).

Table 4.10

The Main Components of Actual Revenue, 1947-92
(in percentage)

Year	A	B	C	D	E
1947	0.2	3.0	8.3	11.5	14.8
1948	5.5	2.2	6.1	13.8	23.6
1949	3.0	2.7	7.7	13.4	36.2
1950	1.8	2.9	7.3	12.0	27.5
1951	2.0	4.5	9.3	15.8	29.3
1952	1.5	5.5	9.7	16.7	32.4
1953	1.1	3.9	7.0	12.0	33.3
1954	1.5	5.7	9.5	16.7	40.4
1955	2.7	5.8	9.1	17.7	38.7
1956	3.0	6.9	10.9	20.9	33.9
1957	2.9	7.3	11.1	21.4	32.3
1958	4.5	7.3	11.2	22.9	31.6
1959	4.9	7.9	11.9	24.7	31.0
1960	3.4	7.7	12.8	23.9	29.1
1961	7.3	7.2	11.7	26.2	27.6
1962	8.8	6.9	11.3	27.0	31.0
1963	16.6	7.0	10.3	33.8	27.8
1964	14.0	7.7	10.4	32.1	30.0
1965	8.8	8.3	11.0	28.1	32.4
1966	4.5	9.8	13.7	28.0	32.3
1967	2.7	8.7	13.6	25.0	33.3
1968	2.2	9.0	14.8	26.0	33.1
1969	1.9	9.3	14.3	25.5	33.8
1970	4.9	9.5	12.7	27.1	33.7
1971	8.8	9.4	10.9	29.2	34.1
1972	7.6	10.1	10.4	28.0	36.9
1973	13.6	8.5	7.9	29.9	39.2
1974	6.1	7.7	7.0	20.8	43.3
1975	4.9	8.2	6.9	20.1	44.3
1976	5.3	6.3	8.2	19.8	44.4
1977	8.1	4.7	9.0	21.7	51.4
1978	19.2	3.9	7.6	30.7	45.9
1979	17.1	5.3	6.9	29.2	47.6
1980	17.9	8.4	5.6	31.9	48.0
1981	37.0	8.0	3.4	48.4	38.6
1982	29.4	11.1	3.2	43.6	43.2
1983	16.2	9.5	2.2	28.0	47.6
1984	7.5	8.7	3.8	19.9	49.0
1985	11.7	6.6	3.4	21.7	49.2
1986	9.4	4.0	4.3	17.7	53.8
1987	1.7	4.1	2.7	8.5	59.6
1988	0.8	3.8	2.5	7.1	62.9
1989	0.6	8.3	2.3	11.2	61.6
1990	0.3	9.8	2.2	12.3	61.3
1991	0.3	7.1	3.7	11.0	60.6
1992	0.4	4.5	3.4	8.3	63.0

```
Annual Growth
Rate For:
1950-91        7.7      7.2      8.3     23.2     40.4
1950-73        5.5      7.4     11.0     23.8     32.7
1973-84       15.2      7.5      6.0     28.7     45.2
1984-91        4.0      6.5      3.1     13.7     57.3
1984-88        6.2      5.4      3.3     15.0     54.9
1988-91        0.5      7.3      2.7     10.4     61.6
```

A = % of Land Sale
B = % of Land, Rents, Property and Investment
C = % of Rates.
D = % of Total Land Revenue (exclusive of property
    tax and estate duty).
E = % of Internal (Inland) Revenue.

Sources: *Annual Report of the Accountant General*, and
Annual Report of the Director of Accounting Services,
various years.

Table 4.11

Capital Works Reserve Fund (Works Account) and the Actual
Revenue, 1985-92   (HK$ million)

Year	Capital Works Reserve Fund (Works Account)	Actual Revenue	%
1986	586.4	41241.0	1.4
1987	2330.9	43869.6	5.3
1988	3513.4	55641.4	6.3
1989	6393.0	65780.6	9.7
1990	7457.8	74365.2	10.0
1991	4002.5	82674.5	4.8
1992	9074.4	101456.4	8.9
TOTAL	33358.4	465028.7	
AVERAGE			6.7

Sources: Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong Annual
Digest of Statistics*, 1992 Edition, p. 119; and *Annual
Report of the Director of Accounting Services*, various
years.

Table 4.12

Selected Components of the Inland Revenue, 1958-91
(in percentage)

Year	A	B	C	D
1958	8.1	14.1	19.1	39.3
1959	7.0	12.2	14.3	44.4
1960	7.5	14.5	13.8	43.6
1961	8.1	16.7	12.2	45.1
1962	7.4	17.7	17.2	40.4
1963	7.9	15.8	17.1	40.9
1964	8.1	15.5	15.1	43.6
1965	7.8	15.8	13.8	45.8
1966	8.8	12.1	14.7	46.9
1967	9.6	10.7	14.3	47.2
1968	12.3	8.2	13.9	47.2
1969	12.8	10.0	11.5	47.5
1970	12.4	11.8	9.9	48.9
1971	12.2	12.6	9.3	50.1
1972	12.7	16.9	8.2	48.6
1973	9.5	36.9	6.5	38.1
1974	12.5	20.4	8.4	50.9
1975	15.9	11.6	7.3	54.2
1976	16.1	13.2	7.3	51.5
1977	16.8	12.1	9.5	48.3
1978	17.1	11.2	8.1	50.3
1979	18.1	13.6	6.5	47.3
1980	16.7	12.2	6.5	50.2
1981	13.3	18.3	5.2	48.9
1982	11.9	15.2	7.6	48.5
1983	15.9	9.4	7.4	52.9
1984	23.0	7.4	6.2	47.0
1985	23.7	6.6	6.6	47.5
1986	24.8	7.8	5.0	46.8
1987	25.5	11.9	5.5	42.2
1988	22.8	15.2	4.0	44.7
1989	21.4	12.8	3.3	48.6
1990	23.2	12.1	3.2	47.1
1991	26.4	12.0	3.6	42.8

Annual Growth
Rate For:

	A	B	C	D
1958-91	14.6	13.7	9.5	46.7
1958-73	9.5	15.1	13.2	44.9
1973-84	15.6	15.1	7.2	49.0
1984-91	23.8	10.7	4.7	45.8
1984-88	24.0	9.8	5.5	45.6
1988-91	23.4	13.0	3.5	45.8

A = Salaries Tax
B = Stamp Duty
C = Property Tax and Estate Duty
D = Profits   Tax   (Corporations   and   Unincorporated
       Businesses)

Source: Commissioner of Inland Revenue, *Annual Departmental Report*, various years.

Table 4.13

Some Statistics of Salaries Tax, Selected Years

| Year | Standard Rate Taxpayers | | Single Taxpayers | | Total Number of Taxpayers |
	Number	Share of Final Tax	Number	Share of Final Tax	
1982	18606	(54.2%)	147730	(12.7%)	255579
1987	33771	(45.5%)	447360	(19.5%)	686928
1991	100170	(55.0%)	517524	(18.1%)	1070022
Annual Growth For:					
1982-91	9062.7		41088.2		90493.7
1982-87	3033.0		59926.0		86269.8
1987-91	16599.8		17541.0		95773.5

Source: Commissioner of Inland Revenue, *Annual Departmental Report*, various years.

Table 4.14

Personal Allowances and Inflations, 1973/74-1991/2

Year	A	B		C	D
1973/4	10,000	-	-	10,000	18.2
1974/5	10,000	-	-	10,000	14.4
1975/6	10,000	-	-	10,000	1.2
1976/7	10,000	-	-	10,000	3.4
1977/8	10,000	(2,500)	15	10,000	5.8
1978/9	10,000	(2,500)	15	10,000	5.9
1979/80	10,000	(2,500)	10	10,000	11.6
1980/1	12,500	(2,500)	0	15,000	15.5
1981/2	15,000	(7,500)	0	22,500	15.4
1982/3	20,500	(7,500)	0	28,000	10.5
1983/4	20,500	(7,500)	0	28,000	9.9
1984/5	20,500	(7,500)	0	28,000	8.1
1985/6	20,500	(7,500)	0	28,000	3.2
1986/7	20,500	(8,500)	0	29,000	2.8
1987/8	29,000	(5,000)	10	29,000	5.5
1988/9	29,000	(7,000)	10	29,000	7.5
1989/90	32,000	(7,000)	10	32,000	10.1
1990/1	32,000	(7,000)	0	39,000	9.8
1991/2	34,000	(7,000)	0	41,000	12.0
1992/3	39,000	(7,000)	0	46,000	-

Table 4.14 (continued)

Year	E	F	G
1973/4	-	-	-
1974/5	11,820	1,820	1,820
1975/6	13,522	3,522	3,522
1976/7	13,684	3,684	3,684
1977/8	14,149	1,649	4,149
1978/9	14,970	2,470	4,970
1979/80	15,853	3,353	5,853
1980/1	17,692	2,692	2,692
1981/2	20,435	-2,065	-2,065
1982/3	23,582	-4,418	-4,418
1983/4	26,058	-1,942	-1,942
1984/5	28,637	637	637
1985/6	30,957	2,957	2,957
1986/7	31,947	2,947	2,947
1987/8	32,842	-1,158	3,842
1988/9	34,648	-1,352	5,648
1989/90	37,247	-1,753	5,247
1990/1	41,009	2,009	2,009
1991/2	45,028	4,028	4,028
1992/3	50,431	4,431	4,431

A = Personal Allowances with Additional Allowance in Bracket
B = Percentage that Additional Allowance Subject to Clawback
C = Personal Allowances
D = Inflation Rates
E = Amounts of the Sum of Personal Allowances X (1 + Annual Inflation Rate)
F = E minus A
G = E minus C

Source: Tang Shu-hung, *The Public Finance of Hong Kong in the Late-Transitional Period* (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1992), pp. 58-59. (in Chinese)

Table 4.15

The Actual Expenditure and the GDP, 1966-92

Year	Expenditure (HK$ million)	GDP	Exp/GDP (%)
1966	1769.1	13718	12.9
1967	1806.1	14817	12.2
1968	1766.0	15758	11.2
1969	1873.0	18520	10.1
1970	2032.2	22040	9.2
1971	2452.2	25384	9.7
1972	2901.4	30638	9.5
1973	4299.6	38483	11.2
1974	5169.2	45066	11.5
1975	6255.2	47086	13.3
1976	6032.2	60173	10.0
1977	6590.9	69683	9.5
1978	8996.9	81623	11.0
1979	11090.1	107545	10.3
1980	13872.3	136775	10.1
1981	23593.5	164762	14.3
1982	27778.2	185728	15.0
1983	34597.8	206217	16.8
1984	33393.1	247933	13.5
1985	36901.8	261070	14.1
1986	39798.2	298515	13.3
1987	39927.7	367603	10.9
1988	44022.0	433657	10.2
1989	48952.6	499157	9.8
1990	69661.6	558859	12.5
1991	82837.2	641136	12.9
1992	93401.1	742582	12.6

Annual Growth Rate For:
1966-92			11.8
1967-73			10.4
1973-84			12.2
1984-92			12.2

Note: for GDP only, 1991's estimates are subject to revision; 1992 are preliminary estimates.

Sources:
1. For GDP, Census and Statistics Department, *Estimates of Gross Domestic Product 1966 to 1992;*
2. For expenditure, *Annual Report of the Accounting General,* and *Annual Report of the Director of Accounting Services,* various years.

Table 4.16

Consolidated Account Expenditure by Selected Functions,
1971-92 (in percentage)

Year	Social Welfare	Health	Educa- tion	Housing	Labour	Total Social Services
1971	1.6	10.1	20.4	8.4	0.3	40.8
1972	2.0	10.3	20.2	7.4	0.3	40.2
1973	2.3	9.8	18.3	6.4	0.3	37.1
1974	3.0	9.0	20.0	6.7	0.3	39.0
1975	4.1	8.4	17.4	10.1	0.2	40.2
1976	5.5	8.5	19.6	10.1	0.3	44.0
1977	5.0	8.8	19.5	8.4	0.3	42.0
1978	4.4	8.2	18.0	11.2	0.3	42.1
1979	4.5	7.9	16.2	14.2	0.3	43.1
1980	4.6	7.9	15.9	15.6	0.2	44.2
1981	4.0	7.6	15.3	16.8	0.4	44.1
1982	4.2	7.3	14.2	13.3	0.3	39.3
1983	4.8	7.4	14.3	13.8	0.3	40.6
1984	5.0	7.7	14.9	14.5	0.3	42.4
1985	5.6	8.3	17.4	13.3	0.3	44.9
1986	5.7	8.7	17.4	12.7	0.3	44.8
1987	5.8	9.1	17.5	12.1	0.3	44.8 ,
1988	5.9	9.3	17.1	13.1	-	45.4
1989	5.9	8.8	17.5	15.1	-	47.3
1990	5.8	8.9	15.9	14.1	-	44.7
1991	6.1	9.8	16.9	13.0	-	45.8
1992	6.4	10.0	17.4	11.6	-	45.4
Annual Growth Rate For:						
1973-92	4.9	8.6	17.0	12.3	0.2	43.1
1973-84	4.3	8.2	17.0	11.8	0.3	41.5
1984-92	5.8	9.0	16.9	13.3	-	45.1
1984-88	5.6	8.6	16.9	13.1	-	44.5
1988-92	6.0	9.4	17.0	13.4	-	45.7

Source: *The Budget: Speech by the Financial Secretary*,
various years; figures for the period 1971-80 are adjusted
by the Government.

Table 4.17

Subventions of Selected Social Service Programmes
(Recurrent and Capital Expenditure)

Year	A	B	C
	(HK$ million)		
1973	719	4299.6	16.7
1974	1001	5169.2	19.4
1975	1173	6255.2	18.8
1976	1303	6032.2	21.6
1977	1449	6590.9	22.0
1978	1711	8996.9	19.0
1979	2044	11090.1	18.4
1980	2584	13872.3	18.6
1981	3596	23593.5	15.2
1982	4361	27778.2	15.7
1983	5627	33060.2	17.0
1984	6382	35346.3	18.1
1985	7679	36086.9	21.3
1986	8556	40845.1	20.9
1987	9858	42703.7	23.1
1988	10957	48375.1	22.6
1989	12113	56592.1	21.4
1990	14432	71366.5	20.2
1991	18116	85556.7	21.2
1992	23598	92191.4	25.6

Annual Growth
Rate For:

1973-92			19.8
1973-84			18.4
1984-92			21.6

Table 4.17 (continued)

Year	D	E	F	G
	(HK$ million)			
1973	550.3	110.1	12.8	2.6
1974	795.9	134.1	15.4	2.6
1975	909.4	168.9	14.5	2.7
1976	1030.7	167.0	17.1	2.8
1977	1138.7	187.2	17.3	2.8
1978	1313.7	239.8	14.6	2.7
1979	1575.2	283.7	14.2	2.6
1980	2007.9	341.4	14.5	2.5
1981	2780.4	476.3	11.8	2.0
1982	3275.1	629.3	11.8	2.3
1983	4255.2	793.0	12.9	2.4
1984	4796.2	912.3	13.6	2.6
1985	5845.3	1004.1	16.2	2.8
1986	6492.5	1103.8	15.9	2.7
1987	7544.9	1268.1	17.7	3.0
1988	8294.8	1425.3	17.1	2.9
1989	8997.2	1521.7	15.9	2.7
1990	10534.9	1812.7	14.8	2.5
1991	13013.0	2296.5	15.2	2.7
1992	15041.4	5593.8	16.3	6.1
Annual Growth Rate For:				
1973-92			15.0	2.8
1973-84			14.2	2.5
1984-92			15.9	3.1

A = Total Subvention
B = Total (Gross) Expenditure & Equity Investment
C = % of A/B;
D = Total Education Subvention
E = Medical Subvention
F = % of D/B
G = % of E/B

Notes: Total Education Subvention = the total amounts under the headings of Education, University and Polytechnic, and Vocational Training Council.

Sources: Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong Annual Digest of Statistics*, 1983 Edition, p. 111, Table 8.3 and 1992 Edition, p. 120, Table 8.3.

Table 4.18

Capital Expenditure of Public Housing and Total Actual
Expenditure, 1977-92   (HK$ million)

Year	A	B	%
1977	240.0	6590.9	3.6
1978	483.0	8996.9	5.4
1979	1175.5	11090.1	10.6
1980	1797.2	13872.3	13.0
1981	2982.8	23593.5	12.6
1982	3460.3	27778.2	12.5
1983	3602.6	34597.8	10.4
1984	3459.6	33393.1	10.4
1985	3117.0	36901.8	8.4
1986	3187.4	39798.2	8.0
1987	3514.9	39927.7	8.8
1988	4598.2	44022.0	10.4
1989	5839.3	48952.6	11.9
1990	7223.4	69661.6	10.4
1991	7642.4	82837.2	9.2
1992	7411.5	93401.1	7.9

Annual Growth
Rate For:

1977-92	9.6
1977-84	9.8
1984-88	9.2
1989-92	9.9

A = Government's and Housing Authority's Capital
     Expenditure on Public Housing
B = the Total Actual Expenditure

Sources: calculated from *the Housing Authority Annual
Report*, various years; and *Annual Report of the Accountant
General*, and *Annual Report of Director of Accounting
Services*, various years.

CHAPTER V

THE DEVELOPMENT AND ALIGNMENT OF
POLITICAL FORCES

This chapter examines the development and nature of various political forces and their alignment and realignment since the 1970s so as to understand the orientation of political groups emerging in the early 1990s and their respective positioning in the budding party market in the 1991 LegCo direct elections. First of all, the background prior to the period under study will be examined so as to put the subsequent development of political groups into context. Second, the emergence of pressure groups in the 1970s will be analyzed against the rapidly changing socio-economic developments. Third, the alignment of political forces and the rise of electoral parties by stages resulting from the political reforms in the 1980s will be studied. Fourth, the budding party system just before the 1991 elections will be charted.

Political Groups Before the 1970s

Two kinds of political groups could be differentiated during the period from the end of the Second World War to the early 1970s. One was the exogenous, ideological political parties of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The other was the endogenous, electoral-oriented political groups of the Reform Club of Hong Kong (RCHK) established in 1949 and the Hong Kong Civic Association (HKCA) formed in 1954. Basically, these two kinds of political groups differed in their priority political concerns. The first two were mostly concerned with Chinese national politics, while the last two mostly concentrated on Hong Kong local politics. Needless to say, their influence on Hong Kong would not be the same as the KMT and the CCP, which have, at one time or another, been the ruling parties of China; while the RCHK and the HKCA had only managed to have several of their members sitting in the local Councils.

The Kuomintang and The Chinese Communist Party

The presence of the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Hong Kong has long been considered a sensitive issue. If both of these two parties adopted a high profile attitude toward Hong Kong affairs, the British-Hong Kong Government would find it very hard to govern. Thus, the Hong Kong Government wanted to avoid the presence of two power centres at one time within Hong Kong. Because of such considerations, the KMT and the CCP were not allowed to have open and legal existences in the territory, except for the former in the brief period of 1945-1949.

On the contrary, the KMT and the CCP have used Hong Kong as a stepping stone to support their respective activities on mainland China or on Taiwan and they seldom showed keen interest in local politics. Thus, the presence of these two parties

may not be regarded as a "direct challenge" to the British-Hong Kong Government, but rather a "potential threat". Given the overwhelming population of Chinese, the British-Hong Kong Government would feel a great security pressure as these two parties could easily mobilize the Hong Kong Chinese to drive away the alien British-Hong Kong Government. In addition, the rivalry between these two parties within the territory would give rise to serious internal security problems.[300] This was especially the case in the early 1950s when the retreated Nationalist Army organized subversive activities against the newly established CCP's regime from within Hong Kong, and when conflict between the core supporters of these two parties broke out in 1956. Furthermore, the rivalry of these two parties had indeed entailed diplomatic embarrassment for the British and Hong Kong Governments. For example, the handling of an aeroplane explosion by the British-Hong Kong Government in 1955 had been criticised fiercely by the Communists; in this case a bomb was planted by KMT agents on a plane which Mr Zhou Enlai, the then Chinese Prime Minister, was supposed to be using.[301]

The victory over Japan in the Second World War was accompanied by the rising influence and prestige of the KMT in the territory. Many of the mass media, labour unions, local schools and Chinese community organizations came under the influence of the KMT. But the KMT's membership did not match with her rising status. In 1947, a drive to recruit 50,000 members was kicked off but subsequently only attracted 8,000 to 10,000 to join.[302] By the late 1940s the influence of the KMT was declining rapidly as the CCP marched to win the Chinese civil war.

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[300]Steve Tsang Yui-sang, *Democracy Shelved: Great Britain, China, and Attempts at Constitutional Reform in Hong Kong, 1945-1952* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 136-138.

[301]For the CCP's view on the issue, see Huang Wenfang, "My Forty-Two Years of Life and Works in the New China News Agency's Hong Kong Branch" *Eastweek* 91 (20 July 1994):161-164. (series and in Chinese)

[302]Tsang (1988), *op. cit.*, p. 52.

Nevertheless, the KMT maintained a certain level of support up to the early 1970s, because the population at that period comprised mostly refugees and the first generation in Hong Kong, who tended to have negative feelings toward the Communist Chinese Government and a more accommodative attitude toward the Nationalist Government in Taiwan. Against this background, many schools, "kaifong" associations and local community organisations were dominated by these people. During the 1967 riots, the KMT's supporters (the rightists[303]) helped the British-Hong Kong Government to counteract the advance of the leftists by providing protection to those workers who opted not to take part in the local CCP's inspired strikes. However, the influence of the rightists declined thereafter. The aging of the leadership, the emergence of the local-born Hong Kong Chinese, and the diplomatic breakthrough by Communist China (which joined the United Nations in 1971 and established full diplomatic ties with the United States in 1979) contributed to the decline of KMT influence.

Before 1949, the chief task of the CCP in Hong Kong was, more or less, the same as that of the KMT after 1949, which was "to support their struggle for power in China without overtly breaking the laws of the colony."[304] Like the KMT, the CCP did not involve herself deeply in local politics and has been described as adopting an appeasement policy toward the Hong Kong Government before 1949. After becoming the governing party in China in 1949, the CCP's activities in Hong Kong were still very low-key, though there was a propaganda campaign against the British-Hong Kong Government in early 1952.[305] Although there were still other conflicts between Britain and Mainland China in this period, no significant mobilization of national feeling against the Colonial Government by the CCP was recorded. This can be attributed to the pragmatic CCP's policy which allowed the

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[303]The term "rightists" is used, throughout this thesis, to denote those people or organisations that are affiliated with the Kuomintang (KMT) or its related organisations, and also those who are the supporters of the KMT.

[304]*Ibid.*, p. 85.

[305]*Ibid.*, pp. 175-182.

status of Hong Kong to remain as it was. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the basic policy toward Hong Kong has been "Make long-term plan, utilise to the full." Besides, the CCP also appeared to adopt a low profile in recruiting members in Hong Kong and was estimated to have only 5,000 members in Hong Kong in the early 1990s.[306]

Nevertheless, this policy had come under challenge in the mid-1960s when the Cultural Revolution in China spilled over into Hong Kong leading to a series of riots and bomb attacks. After the 1967 riots, the CCP suffered from the loss of support from her "compatriots" in Hong Kong and the uncovering of the underground network there.[307] The drastic drop in the readership of the CCP- and PRC-sponsored "patriotic" newspapers could be used to illustrate their unpopularity in Hong Kong after the 1967 riots. According to Mr Kam Yiu-yu, the former NCNA's party secretary for the press front and editor-in-chief of the communist *Wei Wen Pao*, the total sales of the six "patriotic" newspapers amounted to about 500,000 and occupied half of the market before the 1967 riots, but declined significantly afterwards. He indicated that the total sales of three of these "patriotic" newspapers had dropped from around 120,000 to 10-20,000 after the 1967 riots.[308] It would take several decades to remedy the wounds the 1967 riots had done to the Hong Kong people.

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[306]Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 1993-94* (Washington: Brassey's, [1993]), p. 150.

[307]Xu Jiatun, *Xu Jiatun's Hong Kong Memoirs* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong United Daily News, 1993), pp. 144-145.

[308]Kam Yiu-yu, "The Memoirs of Kam Yiu-yu: The History of the Ebb and Flow of the Chinese-side Newspapers in Hong Kong," *Contemporary Monthly* 19 (1992):88. (in Chinese)

The Reform Club and the Civic Association

During the period from 1950 until 1982, there were two prominent political groups participating in the electoral contest for the UrbCo elected seats: the RCHK and the HKCA. A lion's share of the candidates in the pre-1982 UrbCo election was fielded by these two traditional political groups. According to one study, the two political groups had put up 33 of the 37 successful candidates between 1955 and 1967.[309]

Regarding the membership of these two groups, the Reform Club claimed to have over 40,000 in 1974 and the Civic Association was quoted to have about 10,000 in 1973.[310] These groups had managed to attract citizens to join, especially the RCHK. Mr Brook Bernacchi, the RCHK's chairman, had revealed that his club had 35,000 members in 1969, of which 11,000 were workers, 7,700 hawkers, 7,400 businessmen, 3,200 fishermen, 3,100 farmers and 1,200 drivers.[311] Unfortunately, not all their members were entitled to vote because of the restricted franchise. Thus, it is interesting to note that the numbers of voters in each of the UrbCo elections in the late 1960s and early 1970s only amounted to around 10,000.

In response to the plea made by the then Governor, Sir Mark Young, to carry out political reforms in the late 1940s, the RCHK was formed mainly by a group of British and Chinese professionals aiming at pushing for a quicker pace of democratisation. The RCHK had regarded itself as "an unofficial opposition incessantly putting up constructive criticisms on the side of the Hong Kong citizens thereby prodding Government into action or quicker action for social and political

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[309]J. Stephen Hoadley, "Political Participation of Hong Kong Chinese: Patterns and Trends," *Asian Survey 13* (1973):607.

[310]Reform Club of Hong Kong, *Silver Jubilee Anniversary Souvenir Publication, 1949-1974* (Hong Kong: Reform Club of Hong Kong, 1974); Hoadley (1973), *op. cit.*, p. 607.

[311]Brook Bernacchi, *Reform Club 40-Year History: A Brief History*, [1989], p. 3. Supplied by the Reform Club of Hong Kong.

reforms".[312] The RCHK had repeatedly proposed not only to reform the UrbCo by expanding its scope and power, and introducing a wholly elected Municipal Council, but also to institute a certain number of elected seats in the LegCo. In March 1953, the RCHK had gathered 12,000 signatures demanding the introduction of two elected seats to the LegCo.[313]

Unlike the RCHK, the HKCA took a rather moderate approach to Hong Kong politics. Formed mainly by Chinese professionals and school teachers, it stressed social and economic reforms that brought about "Stability and Progress", and placed political stability higher than that of "radical progress".[314] The HKCA confessed that:

> . . . we advocate that Government should be more open to the suggestions of the people, that the Urban Council should be given greater responsibility . . . and that there should be elected membership in the higher Government councils. . . . This does not mean in any sense that we in the Civic Association advocate self-government or independence. We do not wish to interrupt the tranquility and peace that we at present enjoy in Hong Kong, and we do not dream of taking over the central power in government.[315]

The HKCA further regarded the Hong Kong Government as a "Benevolent Dictatorship", who "always made laws and regulations to suit its own immediate purpose without carefully examining its later possible consequences."[316]

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[312]Reform Club of Hong Kong (1974), *op. cit.*

[313]Reform Club of Hong Kong, *Election Chronicle 1953* (Hong Kong: Reform Club of Hong Kong, 1953); Reform Club of Hong Kong, *10th Anniversary, 1949-1959* (Hong Kong: Reform Club of Hong Kong, [1960]).

[314]*The Hongkong Civic Association 20th Anniversary (1954-1974) Commemoration Issue*, p. 4.

[315]P.F. Woo, "My Eight Years in the Chair of the Civic Association," in the *Hong Kong Civic Association 10th Anniversary (1954-1964) Commemoration Issue*, pp. 2-3; quoted in Aline K. Wong, Political Apathy and the Political System in Hong Kong," *United College Journal* 8 (1970-71):9.

[316]*The Hongkong Civic Association 20th Anniversary (1954-1974) Commemoration Issue*, p. 2.

Accompanying the failed attempt to secure political reforms at the central level and the new challenge of the HKCA's moderate appeal was the RCHK's failure to enlist substantial social support for its own reform plan. The RCHK, thus, reacted by deflating its demands and by developing a political coalition with the HKCA. In 1960, the RCHK and the HKCA jointly dispatched a delegation to London to discuss the constitutional reform of Hong Kong. According to Mr Hilton Cheong-leen, the HKCA's chairman and a member of the delegation, the joint delegation had asked for an increased number of UrbCo elected seats, the institution of elected representation to the LegCo, the establishment of a convention which would require the Governor to appoint a certain proportion of the LegCo elected members to the ExCo, and the gradual relaxation of the highly restricted franchise.[317]

The unfavourable response from London was anticipated. There were several reasons for this. First of all, the domestic order in Hong Kong in the 1950s was still not so secure, as the KMT and the CCP were still engaged with each other and periodic confrontations between their supporters exploded. The riots, as stirred up by the rightists, in Tsuen Wan and Kowloon areas in 1956 were a typical example. The deterioration of domestic order would invite Beijing intervention and the subsequent possible Chinese take-over. Second, as demonstrated in the abortion of the Young Plan in early 1950s, the established elites, including the unofficial members of the LegCo, were not in favour of any reform. For them, any reform would mean an influx of keen competitors to the political game and thus erode away their exclusive access to political power. Third, the lack of widespread demands and supports from the mass public led the Hong Kong Government to see no urgency to introduce such reforms. Most of the population were still struggling to make both ends meet and their immediate concerns were thus mostly of an economic nature. Demands for political reforms were still limited to the small circle of professionals.

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[317]Hilton Cheong-leen, *Hong Kong Tomorrow: A Collection of Speeches and Articles* (Hong Kong: n.p., 1962), pp. 19 & 25.

Later in January 1961, in response to London's refusal to carry out reforms, the RCHK and the HKCA signed a coalition agreement for four years to press for the realisation of the said reforms. Though having a consensus on constitutional reforms, the cooperation between the two was not a smooth one and later in 1965 the coalition formally broke down. According to the RCHK's allegation, it was partly the insincere HKCA's move to support their opponents in the 1964 UrbCo election that contributed to the dissolution of the coalition.[318]

The resistance of the British-Hongkong Government to reform of the UrbCo and to the introduction of elected members to the LegCo had not only worked to discredit the UrbCo as an effective mechanism to redress social grievances but also to discourage the social elites from participation. Although the Government had recommended the relaxation of the franchise restriction in 1965 and finally reformed the UrbCo in 1973, the powers of the reformed UrbCo were still limited, only taking care of public recreation and amenities, cultural affairs, and some minor regulating power, such as the licensing of hawkers.[319]

Before 1965, the franchise was largely confined to those who knew enough English and who were teachers, taxpayers, jurors, and members of the defence force or the auxiliary services. But, there were altogether 23 categories of persons, mostly professionals, recommended to be added to the franchise lists in 1965.[320] It was

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[318]Reform Club of Hong Kong (1974), *op. cit.*

[319]Colonial Secretariat, *White Paper: The Urban Council* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1971).

[320]The 23 categories defined in the 1965 Working Report were:
1. Persons on the Jury List;
2. Persons who would be qualified for Jury Service but for being over 60, deaf, blind or similarly infirm;
3. Teachers;
4. Taxpayers;
5. Members of the Defence Force and Auxiliary Services;
6. Pensionable Officers of the Hong Kong Government and Civil Service Pensioners;
7. Barristers-at-Law and Solicitors in actual practice and their Clerks;

reported that in deciding which category of persons would be eligible for the franchise, the following criteria had been used:

(a)   that the category should be one which makes a valuable
        contribution to Hong Kong through
        (i) service to the community; or
        (ii) professional knowledge and skill; or
        (iii) educational standard;

(b)   that a person's claim to belong to that category should
        be relatively easy to establish and check.[321]

After the expansion of the franchise, it was estimated to have a 200,000 potential electorate. Only 13% (N=26,275) and 17% (N=34,392) of the potential electorate went to register in 1967 and 1969, respectively. Furthermore, as indicated in Table 5.1a, the electorate in the 1952 only amounted to 9,000 and increased very slowly to about 34,000 in 1981.

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8.   Medical Practitioners, Dentists;
9.   Editors, Reporters, Photographers, Commentators;
10.   Chemists and Druggists;
11.   Clergymen, Priests, Monks;
12.   Professors, Lecturers, Full-Time Students, Graduates of the University
        of Hong Kong and the Chinese University of Hong Kong;
13.   Pilots, Navigators;
14.   Engineer;
15.   Postmaster General;
16.   Nurses;
17.   Official and Unofficial Justices of the Peace;
18.   Persons on the Current Rating List;
19.   Architects;
20.   Auditors;
21.   Persons who are Members of some Professional Bodies;
22.   Holders of School Certificates, Matriculation Certificates, General
        Certificate of Education "O" Level Certificates, and technical college
        certificates; and
23.   Persons on the existing Electoral Register.

For details, see *The Report of the Working Party on the Urban Council Franchise and Electoral Registration Procedure* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1965), pp. 7-16.

[321] *The Report of the Working Party on the Urban Council Franchise and Electoral Registration Procedure* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1965), p. 3.

After studying electoral participation in the UrbCo elections, one observer suggested that the low rate of participation was, in some senses, quasi-rational and concluded that:

> With politics separated from economics, the pay-off schedule of the political "game" is such that it remains a pastime, a hobby for those who have the time, energy, and inclination to engage in it. Its rewards may be gratifying to some, but they are modest and non-material. It is politics without power, a sanitized and safety-inspected simulacrum of the real thing, completely divorced from the dynamism of Hong Kong's economy.[322]

Another scholar attributed the political indifference of the Hong Kong people not to the cultural factor, but to the electoral system adopted:

> . . . the political indifference of the local Chinese cannot be understood as some residue of a traditional preference for a paternalistic form of government. Instead I have argued that the political apathy of the local population must be explained within the context of the present [1970] electoral system, i.e. the part the local people are allowed to play in the political scene.[323]

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[322]Hoadley (1973), *op. cit.*, p. 616.

[323]Aline K. Wong, "Political Apathy and the Political System in Hong Kong," *United College Journal* 8 (1970-71):20.

The Period of Pressure Group Politics

Since the late 1960s, a handful of pressure groups have come into play in Hong Kong and they have largely championed the cause of the under-privileged. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Government adopted a more active attitude toward the society from the 1960s. Thus, the conflict between the Government and society over the distribution of social resources grew significantly as the latter was becoming more and more affected by government decisions and policies. Given the closed nature of the political structure and the predominant business influence in it, a communication gap existed between the government policy-makers and the affected citizens.

According to one study, the number of urban social conflicts had risen from 6 in 1950-59 and 31 in 1960-69, to 188 in 1970-79.[324] These conflicts were at first largely concerned about the clearance of slum areas and its compensation, and the inadequacy of community facilities, but later had also kept an eye on some high-level policy issues, such as the overall distribution of housing resources, the issue of rent-fixing for public housing flats, the monitoring mechanism of public utilities, and so on. Although the pressure groups' activities were usually small in scope and weak in intensity, the social activists had gradually built-up their images as well as secured a certain amount of social support. This kind of asset later proved to be indispensable when electoral politics came into play.

The rise of pressure group politics has not only transformed the political landscape of Hong Kong but also prompted the government to set up a "new and secret body" called the Standing Committee on Pressure Groups (SCOPG), which reportedly aims to coordinate "government surveillance of any protest or campaigning group and of mounting counter-attacks" and to "undermine, co-opt or coerce" such

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[324]Lui T.L. and Kung K.S., *Urban Movements and Politics in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Wide Angle, 1985), p. 63. (in Chinese)

groups.[325] The Hong Kong Government seemed to care most about the infiltration of the Chinese Government and the CCP. In addition, the social climate of the 1970s had mobilised people to identify with communist China because the latter had made a breakthrough on the international stage. The acquisition of the China's seat in the United Nations and her rapprochement with the United States by the PRC in the early 1970s had boosted up her acceptability in Hong Kong. The growing identification with China in the society and the rise of an anti-colonial mood had made it more difficult for the colonial Hong Kong Government to govern. Understandably, the security issue gained prominence on the agenda of the Hong Kong Government. Under the circumstances, it was logical for the Hong Kong Government to adopt measures to cope with the problem. Unfortunately, the growing pro-China sentiments had coincided with expanding conflicts between the Government and the society as the result of the expansion of government activities since the late 1960s. Any challenge from the political activists would, more or less, be interpreted as an advancement by the communists. This was reflected in the rather harsh comments made in the SCOPG's reports. This unfortunate coincidence had proved to be detrimental for the development of an "independent" political force within Hong Kong.

Among the 11 pressure or community groups mentioned in the SCOPG's confidential reports, the Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee (CIC), the Hong Kong Professional Teachers' Union (PTU), the Society for Community Organisation (SoCO) and the Hong Kong Observers (HKO) have enjoyed popularity in the media and in their respective community.

The CIC was formed in 1967 to "enhance the workers' movements" in Hong Kong and represented the emergence of an independent force in the labour

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[325]Duncan Campbell, "A Secret Plan for Dictatorship," *New Statesman* 2598 (1980):8; Campbell's article was widely reported in Hong Kong's media, such as *SCMP*, *HKS*, and *Ming Pao Daily News*, on 13 December 1980.

movement.[326]   By organising seminars, demonstrations, press conferences and petitions, the CIC has been deeply engaged in the fight to protect workers' interests and has earned the reputation of the "Robin Hood of labour". Moreover, the CIC regarded its role as "to set ways and means to make distributive justice a permanent feature of our (Hong Kong) society".[327] Thus, its engagement in other sorts of campaigns was just a logical development, such as the Coalition Against Bus Fare Increase and the Committee fighting for raising personal tax allowances in 1981. The SCOPG's report said the CIC's activities were "biased and counter-productive" and commented that:

> The CIC's intervention in trade disputes not only usurps the role of the Labour Department but complicates issues, feed erroneous ideas into workers' minds, and render them less amenable to conciliation. Their criticism has always been destructive.[328]

The PTU is one of the most active trade unions in Hong Kong. Its former chairman, Mr Szeto Wah, had succeeded in fighting with the government for a reasonable salary scheme for the Certificate Masters in early 1970s and in supporting the sacked teachers who protested against the alleged corruption of the Golden Jubilee School's Principal in 1977. These events had earned him and the PTU a reputation in the teaching profession. In the 1970s, the PTU had been regarded as a "radical" trade union for it tended to use the "uncommon" methods of strike, petition and sit-in as its campaign instruments. Mr Szeto has also been considered as a leftist because of his uncompromising attitude in challenging the government authority and his alleged link with the NCNA's Hong Kong Branch.[329] Moreover, Mr Xu Jiatun

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[326]In 1991, the CIC was under the leadership of Mr Lau Chin-shek, a directly elected LegCo member since 1991, who had joined the CIC in 1972.

[327]*HKS*, 21 March 1981; Benjamin Leung and Stephen Chiu, *A Social History of Industrial Strikes and the Labour Movement in Hong Kong, 1946-1989* (Hong Kong: Social Sciences Research Centre, University of Hong Kong, 1991), pp. 55-8.

[328]Campbell (1980), *op. cit.*, p. 9; *HKS*, 28 January 1981.

[329]Mr Szeto Wah has a younger brother working in the NCNA's Hong Kong Branch.

revealed in his memoirs in 1993 that Mr Szeto had asked to join the Chinese Communist Party, but without Xu supplying details.[330] In reacting to this allegation, Mr Szeto has denied it squarely.[331] Because of such uncompromising attitudes and the alleged close relations with the NCNA, the SCOPG's report had labelled the PTU as "a Chinese communist united front target and several of its official [sic] . . . have had contact with leading communist educationalists [sic]" and had seen "long-term danger of communist infiltration".[332] We could not comment on whether the PTU or Mr Szeto has any connection with the CCP or the Chinese Government because of the lack of information. But one thing sure is that in a highly de-politicized society like Hong Kong, any move to challenge the existing political order will be labelled as a "radical" and "leftist" whatever the cause one is fighting for. Nevertheless, when the LegCo functional elections were first introduced in 1985, Mr Szeto was supported by the PTU and finally was elected with an overwhelming majority.

Besides, the SoCO was well-known for its skills in organising residents and its confrontational attitude, at least according to the Government, in protesting against the inadequacy of government policies. The SoCO gave help to the under-privileged and marginal communities by organising them to fight for their own cause. As Mr Fung Ho-lap, then director of the SoCO, claimed: "[the] SoCO seldom speaks on behalf of the people. In fact, we help them to speak on their own with dignity and confidence. Pressure comes from the people, not from the pressure groups."[333] Mr Fung also attributed the formation of the SoCO in 1971 to the inspiration of the three main world-wide movements at the time, which were welfare rights movement, secularisation of religion, and community development movement; it aimed to enhance the sense of community of the Hong Kong people and to consolidate

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[330]Xu (1993), *op. cit.*, pp. 149-150.

[331]*Hong Kong United Daily News*, 14 June 1993:2.

[332]*HKS*, 28 January 1981.

[333]*HKS*, 9 June 1982.

residents' forces through organisation and action to fight for their own rights.[334] The SCOPG's report had made it known that the SoCO had "no subversive motive", but that there was a real danger "that [the] SoCO may be able to start organising people to achieve certain objectives, but it may turn out that the group so organised may eventually do something completely beyond the control of [the] SoCO".[335]

The HKO was formed in 1975 by a handful of Chinese professionals and its stated objectives included: to press for more government response to the needs of Hongkong residents and to organise research on issues of public interest.[336] By publishing articles in both English and Chinese newspapers, they made their views known to the general public and the concerned government departments. Though they were vocal in criticising government policies and maltreatments, they are not an action-oriented group. In fact, to quote a term from the Home Affairs Department report, the HKO is "an intelligentsia representative group".[337] In the SCOPG's report, the HKO was being assessed as having great potential for "infiltration among the educated young" and thus "can be dangerous if the HKO should assume a biased attitude one-tracked mind in their interpretation of social issues".[338] But the political situation has changed since the arrival of Mr Christopher Patten in 1992 as the new Governor of Hong Kong. Two former active members of this group have been appointed as LegCo members in late 1992.[339]

Other active pressure groups at the time also included: the Hong Kong People's Council on Public Housing Policy (HKPCPHP) and the Social Workers'

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[334]*Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly* 52 (July 1981):29-30.

[335]*HKS,* 28 January 1981.

[336]Hong Kong Observers, *Pressure Points: A Social Critique*, 2nd ed., (Hong Kong: Summerson, 1983), p. 211.

[337]*Ibid.*, p. 214.

[338]*HKS*, 28 January 1981.

[339]They are Miss Anna Wu and Miss Christine Loh. See *Eastern Express* 17 June 1994:1.

General Union (SWGU). The HKPCPHP was formed in 1978 with the help of the SoCO and other social organisations which aimed to reflect the will of the public housing residents and to monitor the works of the governmental Housing Authority.[340] The SWGU was formed in 1980 with a membership of over 700, one-fourth of the total social workers in Hong Kong. Many of the SWGU's leaders were active participants of the social and residents' movements in the 1970s.

The mushrooming of the community groups indicated that the conflicts between the Government and society had grown to a point where some sort of coordination would be desirable because of the adverse impact Government policies would have. As shown in Chapter 4, as the Government administered more aspects of society and the economy in the 1970s, any dissatisfaction with the policies and their implications would necessarily take a political form, especially as the Government had established new institutions to reflect its new interventionism. The urban redevelopment programmes, the land resumption plan, and related compensation schemes had had, in a sense, a destabilising effect on the then rather harmonious political order. Because of such developments, the mass public were more prone to political mobilisation when their interests were at stake. Although small in size and weak in mobilisation power, these community groups had been providing a training ground for the social activists who were then equipped with the necessary skills in organising the masses and the psychological readiness to confront the authority during their fights with the Government in the 1970s.

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[340]Hong Kong People's Council on Public Housing Policy (HKPCPHP), *HKPCPHP: 10th Anniversary souvenir Publication, 1978-88* (Hong Kong: HKPCPHP, 1988), p. 7. (in Chinese).

<u>Political Alignment in the 1980s</u>

The emergence of the 1997 issue and the subsequent Sino-British negotiations over the future of Hong Kong served to provide a new direction to the political development of Hong Kong. The commitment to providing a "high degree of autonomy" and the promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" by Beijing after 1997, and London's decision to open up partially the colonial political system by instituting a representative government there, created a wave of political group formation in Hong Kong. As explained in Chapter 4, the society in the 1980s had also transformed itself as Hong Kong advanced into being an international financial and business centre. Coupled with this were the improvements in living standard and education opportunity, the growing proportion of the local-born population, and the emergence of the new middle-class of professionals.

The "induced" expectation and aspiration of the "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong through democratic means" at first ran high, but later diminished as Beijing's subsequent negative response to the political reform initiated by Britain, aiming at the institution of an independent and open legislature in the transitional period, became clear. Nevertheless, once the competitive elections have been put in place, whatever the proportion of seats returned by universal suffrage, the rules of the political game would be forced to change in the long run. Based upon the "supply" of institutional change in various political reform packages, there would be "demand" on the existing political forces to adjust. The more power was released through competitive elections, the easier the barrier of entry would be removed and the lower the threshold of representation would be possible, and thus, the stronger the pressure on the political forces to develop mass-oriented parties, or vice versa. Although the opportunity was there for the development of political groups or parties, the sudden introduction of the universal franchise and related political reforms had given no time for the pressure groups to penetrate deeply into society and to build-up their organisational strength. The condition was even worse because more and more middle-class professionals decided to emigrate, especially after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The middle-class professionals played the leadership role in the

democratic movement elsewhere, but, in the case of Hong Kong, their participation was minimal. Even for those who participated actively, some of them were lacking the will to fight in the face of tremendous Chinese pressure. Added to this was the inexperience of the political activists that led to internal divisions and the adoption of a flawed strategy.[341]

The development of political parties in Hong Kong was prone to China's and Britain's influence and pressure. As mentioned before, the sceptical attitude of Beijing leaders towards political reforms since the mid-1980s imposed hurdles on the road of democratisation; they, also, intervened in local politics by siding with the conservatives in Hong Kong. The strategic move to side with the conservatives was dictated by their promise of "one country, two systems" and "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong". Under these circumstances, any move to mobilise the local communists or the leftists openly would be interpreted as a move to shatter the promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong"; and any move that would put the privileges of the established elites at risk would drive away the business tycoons whose contributions were very vital to the economic prosperity of Hong Kong. It was logical for the Beijing leaders to seek a trustworthy alliance that would be under her reach and prone to her pressure in the transitional period. As illustrated in Chapter 3, the Chinese Government at first adopted a more positive attitude towards democratisation before the conclusion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in late 1984 so as to soften the resistance of Hong Kong people, but changed gradually to a tougher one and later even sided with the conservatives. Being supported by the Chinese Government, the conservatives mobilised themselves to form political groups in order to counter the emergence of the grass-roots democrats. Nevertheless, the conservatives were not a homogenous force in terms of status and location in the political establishment, let alone their conflicting economic interests. Thus, the conservatives failed to produce a unified political group in the period under study, as demonstrated later in this section.

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[341]Alvin Y. So and Ludmilla Kwitko, "The New Middle Class and the Democratic Movement in Hong Kong," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 20 (1990):388-94.

On the British side, her traditional co-opted partners in Hong Kong were those who came from the big business firms and the wealthy families. This state of affairs was challenged by the rise of the new middle-class in the 1970s and the 1997 issue in the 1980s. The established elites were firstly on good terms with the British-Hong Kong Government before 1985, but later distanced themselves gradually from it because China would become the boss after the reversion of sovereignty in 1997. This was especially the case when Britain was at odds with China. In order to boost up her legitimacy in the transitional period, Britain has to co-opt those who could represent the mass public through the introduction of direct elections. The pace of such reforms would not be so bold so as to alienate the established elites and not to overload the government when the demands from society grew significantly once the direct elections were in place. To strike the delicate balance was not an easy job, especially in the turbulent environment of the late transitional period. So, the British and Hong Kong Governments were torn by the conflicting demands from the established elites and the democrats, as seen in the 1987 review, let alone the pressure from China. Thus, the prime concern of the British and Hong Kong Governments was to ensure the smooth transfer of power.

In the context of the 1980s, three stages of development could be differentiated. First, the political groups formed between 1982-85 appeared to respond to the upsurge of the 1997 issue as well as the introduction of universal suffrage at the lower tier of the legislature--the District Boards. Given the uncertainty of Hong Kong's political future and the limited power enjoyed by the District Boards' members, the incentives to form political groups were, thus, not large enough. As recorded in the following section, the political groups formed in this period were largely organized by social activists, who played an active role in the pressure group politics of the 1970s. Little effort from the established elites to organize was recorded. Election coalitions also appeared, but they only enjoyed a very short life span.

Second, in anticipation of the reform of the central government as the result of the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the subsequent political row over the pace

and direction of democratization in the 1987 Review and the drafting of the Basic Law, the established elites had begun to mobilize. Furthermore, the revision of the Beijing's negative attitude towards party politics to a more positive one, as examined in Chapter 3, had given a push to group formation and mobilisation. As mentioned before, some groups formed in this period appeared to have blessings from Britain and China, like the Progressive Hong Kong Society (PHKS). Besides, the political groups formed by social campaigners in the previous stage had consolidated by merging with each other.

Third, from 1989 onwards, political events outside Hong Kong, had given a further push to party formation. The Tiananmen Incident in 1989 had served as a mobilizer, with the Hong Kong public reacting to seek a faster pace of democratization. Before the incident, most of the mobilisation efforts by the concerned political groups relied heavily on personal networks and thus their penetration into the society was very limited. The outburst of emotional feeling during the Tiananmen Incident had provided an opportunity for the concerned political forces, especially the democrats, to extend their networks of mobilisation on a bigger scale. In addition, the political structure of the future HKSAR was finalized as the Basic Law was promulgated in early 1990 and the increase in directly-elected seats from 10 to 18 in the 1991 LegCo elections. All these developments had, in one way or another, provided the social and political impetus for consolidating the existing political groups.

The Pre-Mobilisation Stage, 1982-85

During the period 1982-85, numerous political groups declared their formation. Shortly after the visit of the then British Prime Minister Mrs Margaret

Thatcher to Beijing in late 1982, two "political discussion groups"[342] had come into being--the New Hong Kong Society (NHKS) and the Meeting Point (MP). Probably, these two groups were the first to accept the return of Hong Kong to China and the idea of Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong through democratic means after 1997. The NHKS, comprising mainly young graduates who had recently graduated in the early 1980s, offered a detailed plan to implement the idea of Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong in early 1983 and had discussed it with the officials of the State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. The NHKS's stance toward the future of Hong Kong might be summarised as: "reunion, self-rule, democracy, and reform".[343]

Although declaring "the identification with the Chinese nation not equivalent to the identification with any existing regime or political party", the MP had still failed to escape the "pro-Beijing" label as it strongly supported Beijing's cause in restoring Hong Kong sovereignty after 1997. Their stance was not in line with the political mood of the time when the Sino-British negotiation had just started in late 1982. Not only championing the value of reunion with China, the MP had also demanded a reform of the colonial political system so as to pave the way for subsequent democratic self-rule after 1997. In addition, the MP also advocated social reform. According to Mr (now Dr) Yeung Sum,[344] then vice-chairman of the MP, "The present [social] situation in Hongkong is unequal and unreasonable. That's why we cannot accept that the status quo should remain".[345] And he later also argued that: "the aspirations of this generation is not going to be met by the existing system

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[342]The term "political discussion groups" is used to denote those political groups whose activities are highly confined to the discussion of government policies and social issues, and thus their mode of participation is not action-oriented.

[343]New Hong Kong Society, *New Hong Kong Society: 1st Anniversary Souvenir Publication* (Hong Kong: New Hong Kong Society, 1983), p. 2. (in Chinese)

[344]Dr Yeung Sum is a LegCo member and Vice-Chairman of the Democratic Party, which was formed by the merger of the UDHK and the MP in 1994.

[345]*SCMP*, 19 October 1982.

which has been accepted in the past".[346] The group's faith and principles rested on the New Three Principles of the People, that is nationalism, democracy, and people's livelihood.[347] This group comprised mainly of young academics and social workers who graduated from local universities in the 1970s; many of them had been student activists during their university years.

The Hong Kong Affairs Society (HKAS) was formed in February 1984 and mainly comprised of professionals and academics who graduated in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The HKAS had highlighted its role of "think tank" by focusing its activities on research and study of government and social policies which, in return, could enhance citizens' political awareness and provide an analytical framework for policy judgement. In addition, the HKAS had also organised public seminars and invited speakers of different viewpoints to exchange ideas and to share their views. Though it had facilitated the flow of ideas and narrowed the misunderstanding among different walks of life, this kind of approach had been criticised as too academic.[348]

Quite contrary to the research-oriented HKAS, the Hong Kong People's Association (HKPA), formed in November 1984, had openly declared that "we shall encourage Hongkong people to participate in public affairs and exercise their right to vote" and "we shall support able men and women to stand for election". The group felt that discussion in an age of rapid political transformation was not enough and they, therefore, stressed the importance of participation. Although stressing active participation, the HKPA did not regard itself as a political party. The initial proposers of the group had included many respected people, like Mr Lo King-man,

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[346]*HKS*, 10 February 1983.

[347]*Wide Angle Monthly*, 160 (January 1986):74-5. The term "Three Principles of the People" was used by Dr Sun Yat-sen, a respected Chinese revolutionary leader and Provisional President of the Republic of China in 1911, to describe his own political philosophy.

[348]Yip Tze-chin, "The Political Wake-up of Hong Kong's New Generation of Intelligentsia," *Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly* 92 (1984):42; *Pai Shing*, 84 (16 November 1984):7.

vice-president of the Hong Kong Polytechnic; Mr Anthony Neoh, a barrister; Dr Luk Yan-lung, an historian; Dr (now Professor) Wong Siu-lun and Mr Lee Ming-kwan, sociologists; Mr Vincent Ko, District Board's member; and so on.[349]

The social composition of the above-mentioned political groups was quite homogenous in the sense that they were mainly came from the middle-class strata and had received university education elsewhere. The NHKS and the MP were more inclined to uphold the principle of nationalism and regarded the reunion with China as compatible with the development of democratic government in Hong Kong. Their romantic nationalist feeling led them to minimise incompatibility of an authoritarian communist state and democratic government. As for the HKAS and the HKPA, they tended to be concerned more with practical social problems and emphasised the importance of participation. Comparatively speaking, the members of the HKAS and the HKPA were more "establishment" than those of the MP and the NHKS.

In this period, there was no effort made by the established or business elites to organise. One possible explanation for this condition could be the uncertainty of how much political power would be devolved and its pace of devolution, and their privileged access anyway to the government structure. The opportunity cost of forming political groups was, thus, very high. Understandably, they would adopt a wait-and-see attitude until the dust settled, i.e. the political settlement of Hong Kong by the then on-going Sino-British negotiations.

This low profile attitude also applied to the leftists, for different reasons.[350] Their cautious approach reflected the sensitive situation of Hong Kong. On the one hand, Hong Kong people had still not accepted the ways the leftists employed in the struggle with the British-Hong Kong Government during the 1967 riots. Any active mobilisation of the leftists had, in one way or another, stirred up the fear of the local

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[349]*SCMP*, 4 December 1984; Yip (1984), *op. cit.*, pp. 40-1.

[350]Ng Yin, "The Outlook of the Hong Kong Multi-Parties Politics," *Cheng Ming Monthly* 92 (June 1985):46-8. (in Chinese)

community and impaired their confidence. On the other hand, the promise of Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong seemed to inhibit the leftists from engaging actively and openly in forming political groups. Otherwise, the offer of self-government by the Hong Kong people after 1997 would be self-defeating.

Nevertheless, the leftist Federation of Trade Unions (FTU) had encouraged its members to register and vote in the 1985 District Boards' elections.[351] Later, the member unions of the FTU had publicly supported 10 candidates to run in the 1985 District Boards' elections.[352] Five were elected; but, according to Mr Albert C.C. Lam, then Deputy Regional Secretary (Hong Kong and Kowloon), there were another 45 elected candidates (out of total 237) with a pro-Beijing background or stance.[353]

Moreover, an umbrella organisation called the New Territories Association of Societies (NTAS) had been formed in April 1985. The group was headed by a local China National People's Congress member, Mr Lee Lin-sang, and its member organisations were comprised primarily of rural community groups. Influential Heung Yee Kuk members and prominent rural leaders, such as Mr Lau Wong-fat, Mr Chan Yat-sun and Mr Wong Yuen-cheung, were invited to serve as honorary presidents. The group declared that it would not nominate candidates in future elections, but would rather give support to individual members.[354]

As indicated before, the rightists had in the past been a significant player in Hong Kong politics, but then declined significantly. Nevertheless, the Nationalist

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[351]*SCMP*, 24 May 1984.

[352]*Sing Tao Jih Pao*, 14 February 1985.

[353]Leung Chun-man, "The Criteria of Appointing District Boards Members and the Training of Leaders Capable for Governing Hong Kong: An Interview with Mr Albert C.C. Lam," *Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly* 97 (1985):4, (in Chinese); also, Cheung Tak-shing, "An Overall Review on the District Boards Elections," *Wide Angle Monthly* 151 (1985):21. (in Chinese)

[354]*SCMP*, 19 April 1985.

Government has maintained a certain level of political involvement in local politics. In the 1985 District Board elections, the Taipei authority had claimed that 53 "liberal anti-communist" persons had been elected; but according to Hong Kong government sources, only 5 elected DB members had a pro-Taipei background.[355] Nevertheless, the rightists have managed to return one LegCo member in the functional constituency of labour since 1985.

Election coalitions had appeared just shortly before the 1985 District Board elections. The "Group of 12" in the Central and Western District had aimed to take all the elected seats in the relevant constituency. This group had involved members from the Hong Kong Observers, the Hong Kong Affairs Society, the Hong Kong People's Association and the Meeting Point; but they claimed that their involvement was in an individual capacity. This might be interpreted as the lack of consensus within each of these political groups over their respective role and positioning in the ever-changing political system. Also in the list of members was Mr Carl Tong, then appointed Legislative Councillor.[356]

Another ad hoc election coalition was formed in the Eastern District with 12 serving DB members and an appointed Legislative Councillor, Mr Chan Ying-lun. This group seemed to gain support from the North Point Kaifong Association, mutual aid committees and owners' corporations.[357] Quite contrary to the above coalitions that were based on a single district, a group of 17 young people had grouped together to seek election in different districts. This coalition had drawn its members from political groups, like the New Hong Kong Society and the Public Policy Research Centre, and local concerned groups on people's livelihood. And they pledged to play a role in the democratisation process during the transitional period.[358]

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[355]Cheung (1985), op. cit., p. 20; Leung (1985), op. cit., p. 4.

[356]SCMP, 29 December 1984 and 15 February 1985.

[357]HKS, 3 January 1985.

[358]SCMP, 2 January 1985.

By the time of the 1985 District Boards elections, most of the above-mentioned political groups and coalitions had, in one way or another, supported or nominated their members to run in the elections. As shown in Table 5.2, the success rate of candidates with group backing was quite high. Except those of the RCHK and the HKCA, the rate ranged from 80% to 100%. The rather good performance of group-backed candidates seemed to have a demonstration effect on other political activists. But the uncertainty of the political structure of the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), which was still waiting to be framed at the time, had made it difficult for political activists to chart their path of advancement in the power structure. The limited powers of the District Boards and the Urban Council had provided not enough incentive for those who had already occupied the key position in the political structure, like the appointed unofficial members in the ExCo and the LegCo, or for those who had already acquired prominent status in their own career, to participate. Whether to join the electoral competition or to wait for government appointment would be up to individual's choice, but indeed it is a hard choice.

The Mobilisation Stage, 1985-1989

This stage of development differed from the previous one in several aspects. First of all, the political future of Hong Kong was fixed after Britain and China reached an agreement in late 1984. The Sino-British Joint Declaration signified not only the reversion of sovereignty from Britain to China, but also the eventual power devolution as implied in the Joint Declaration, i.e. the introduction of elections to the LegCo and possibly the ExCo, as demonstrated in Chapter 3. Second, the established elites began their mobilisation drive to form political groups because the then existing political recruitment method had to change from the exclusive appointment to the elections. Third, the resistant attitude of the Chinese Government towards party politics had started to be revised to a more accommodating one in late 1988. This

helped to remove the major hurdle to forming political groups. Fourth, as mentioned before, the Daya Bay anti-nuclear movements in 1986, the 1987 political review, and the drafting of the Basic Law from late 1985 onwards had, in one way or another, stimulated the alignment of political forces and exposed the whole society to the immense mobilisation efforts of the concerned political forces.

Shortly after the initialling of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in December 1984, four more political groups declared their formation in this period: the Progressive Hong Kong Society (PHKS, February 1985), the Association of Democracy and Justice (ADJ, April 1985), the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (ADPL, October 1987), and the New Hong Kong Alliance (NHKA, May 1989). As examined in the following paragraphs, the PHKS and the NHKA were formed by the prominent figures from the political and economic establishments whose political outlook was quite conservative, while the ADJ and the ADPL were led by the active social activists who had championed social justice since the 1970s. Besides, the PHKS and the NHKA stood for the interests of the business sector and wanted to maintain the status quo. The ADJ and the ADPL represented the grass-roots' interests and worked towards the coming of representative government.

After planning for six months in the dark and reportedly having London's and Beijing's understanding, Miss Maria Tam, a heavy weight political figure who had maintained good ties with local community leaders and was then concurrently ExCo, LegCo, UrbCo and DB member, and later also Basic Law drafter, had declared the formation of the Progressive Hong Kong Society (PHKS) in March 1985 with Dr Philip Kwok of the Wing On Group as vice-chairman.[359] The PHKS was different from the above-mentioned groups because it aimed to build-up a cross-sector political group and attempted to integrate the loosely knit political forces of the establishment. Probably, this was the first time in Hong Kong history that the established elites had

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[359]For the rise of Miss Tam, see Au Yung Bun, "The Emergence and Breakthrough of Miss Maria Tam," (in Chinese) *Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly* 100 (1985):14-16, 88.

engaged overtly to form political group. The formation of the PHKS also represented their awareness of the inevitable reform of the then rather closed political structure. It enlisted supports from a variety of social sectors as well reflected in the its promoters' list. Among them were (title was as of March 1985): Mr Cheung Yan-lung, LegCo member and prominent rural leaders; Mr Gerry Forsgate, vice-chairman of the UrbCo; Dr Raymond Wu, president of the Medical Association; Mr Kan Fook-yee, chairman of the Hong Kong Institute of Land Surveyors; Mr Leung Chun-ying, a chartered estate surveyor; Mr Vincent Lo, Mr Kenneth Fung, Mr Victor Fung, Miss Veronica Wu and Dr J.K. Lee, entrepreneurs and offsprings of renowned families; Mr Lam Chak-piu and Mr Tong Kam-biu, UrbCo members and social activists; Mr Chan Pun, Miss Lee Fung-ying and Mr Lee Kai-ming, leaders of the Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions; Mr Wong Wai-hung, chairman of the Federation of the Civil Service Unions; Dr Edward Chen, director of Hong Kong University's Centre of Asian Studies; and others.[360] Mr Denis Bray, former Secretary for Home Affairs, reportedly joined the group.[361]

Although not regarding itself as a political party because of the sensitivity of the term in Hong Kong society and the resistant attitude of the Beijing Government towards party development in Hong Kong in mid-1980s, the PHKS was de facto the most influential and powerful combination of individuals with an eye on the power vacuum left behind in the devolution process. Echoing the PHKS's stated aims "To encourage and support its members to take part in the administration of public affairs in Hongkong", Miss Tam had personally supported 30 candidates in the 1985 DB elections, of which 27 were elected.[362] It was also reported that the PHKS had over 80 members serving in major Government advisory bodies, including 5 LegCo members, 8 municipal council members and 49 DB members in late 1988. In addition, 5 members had served in the Basic Law Consultative Committee and

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[360]*HKS*, 27 March 1985.

[361]*SCMP*, 15 May 1985.

[362]*SCMP*, 10 and 16 March 1985.

another 2 in Basic Law Drafting Committee.[363] Attempts to enlist support from other political groups, like the Meeting Point, the Hong Kong Affairs Society and the Civic Association, were also tried.[364]

Some leaders of the rival democratic camp, such as Rev. Lo Lung-kwong, Dr Ding Lik-kiu, and Mr Lau Chin-shek, had given birth to the Association of Democracy and Justice (ADJ) in mid-1985. This was the first step for the various pressure groups to maximise their resources and effectiveness for political participation. As Dr Ding, veteran democratic reformer who had led an ad hoc delegation to London to ask for the reform of the colonial political structure in 1984, made clear, "There will be fewer pressure groups in their conventional form. Future pressure group leaders are bound to work within the system itself instead of as outside critics of Government policies" and "It's time to go into politics and exert direct influence on Government policies". The ADJ, therefore, was an election-oriented association aimed "at promoting the spirit of democracy and social justice while upholding the prosperity and stability in Hongkong".[365]

The democrats had further organised and merged to form a bigger coalition after the forming of the ADJ. Several pressure groups, such as the ADJ, the New Hong Kong Society, the Hong Kong People's Council on Public Housing Policy, the Society for Social Research, the Septenrio Academy, and the Sham Shui Po Concerned Group on People's Livelihood, had met together to discuss possible merger with each other. After several months of discussion and preparation, the Hong Kong Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood (HKADPL) was formally established in October 1986 with Dr Ding Lik-kiu as chairman, Mr Fung Kim-kei and Mr Lee Wing-tat as deputy chairmen. The significance of its formation was the integration of the grass-roots activists into a more organised and politically-

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[363]*SCMP*, 3 December 1988; *HKS*, 28 January 1989.

[364]*SCMP*, 30 March and 10 May 1985.

[365]*SCMP*, 6 April 1985.

oriented group. It also laid the foundation for subsequent development of the democrats.

The HKADPL had about 100 members including an UrbCo member, two RegCo members and 9 DB members at the time of founding. Among others, the HKADPL aimed "to advocate a rational distribution of social resources and to improve the quality of life of the lower and middle social strata".[366] The group believed that "People's livelihood will not be improved without democratic and equal participation in political life".[367] Thus, they actively worked with other democrats in demanding the introduction of direct elections to the LegCo in 1988 and the adoption of the "190 Proposal" in the still-drafting Basic Law. Furthermore, the democratic groups of the HKAS, the MP, and the HKADPL had altogether supported 75 candidates, over 30% of the total (N=264), in the 1988 DB elections.[368] The first two democratic groups had only supported 7 candidates in 1985 DB elections (see Table 5.2).

In contrast, some younger business and social figures, like LegCo members Mr Allen Lee, Mr Stephen Cheong and Mrs Selina Chow, had adopted a cautious approach. They represented the "liberal" wing within the established elites whose judgement on political group formation differed from those of the PHKS. They were more inclined to form a political party and were the more "liberal" in their outlook among the established elites in early 1980s. Their idea of forming a political party was said to have developed in May 1983 when Mr Lee had led a delegation of young professionals to Beijing. The leaders of the delegation formed the backbone of the planned party. Also involved in the plan were three LegCo members: Mr Chan Ying-lun, Mrs Rita Fan and Mr Martin Lee. Their plan did not materialise at this

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[366]*SCMP*, 30 April 1986; Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed., *The Road to Political Participation: Collected Essays of the Hong Kong Association of Democracy and People's Livelihood* (Hong Kong: Wide Angle, 1989), p. 13, (in Chinese).

[367]*HKS*, 27 October 1986.

[368]Kwan Siu-wah, "Hong Kong Walks Quietly into the Era of Party Politics," *Ming Pao Monthly* 267 (March 1988):6-7. (in Chinese)

period. This was partly due to their lack of first hand information on the current political development and this coloured their judgement. The information flow was blocked because none of them were either ExCo members or Basic Law drafters in this period, except Mr Martin Lee who actually had broken away from this clique at the very beginning of the Basic Law drafting process and joined hands with the democrats because of the clique's non-action orientation to party-building. As a result, they decided to adopt a wait-and-see attitude and stressed the importance of timing and political climate in forming a party. As a result, Mr Cheong said that they wanted "to wait for the decision on the basic law drafting committee and joint liaison group" because "We don't want to be groping in the dark".[369]

Given that Mr Xu Jiatun, then Director of the Hong Kong Branch of the NCNA, had overtly aired its disapproval of constitutional reforms in the transitional period in late 1985, their plan to form a political party was therefore given up. When announcing the decision to shelve the plan temporarily until the 1987 political review, Mr Allen Lee was quoted as saying: "There was Chinese resistance on any local party formation and going opposite to China is not very wise". And he further added that "It's still too early to form a party because we don't know the outcome of the 1987 review" and " It won't be too late to organise one then when direct elections are to be introduced".[370]

Regarding the trend of forming political groups in early 1985, the Hong Kong Government seemed to hold an encouraging attitude and welcomed the move. Sir Edward Youde, the then Hong Kong Governor, had reportedly regarded the trend of party formation as a natural development and said "Don't get stuck with the labels (of party), look at the objectives". He further added that those groups formed at the time had the objective of assisting in maintaining the stability and prosperity of Hong Kong. Sir Sze-yuen Chung, then senior member of the ExCo, also recorded his acceptance of political parties and said: "When we talk about democracy, we cannot

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[369]*SCMP*, 31 March 1985.

[370]*HKS*, 29 December 1985; *SCMP*, 30 December 1985.

avoid that people have different views and therefore we cannot avoid that people will form parties."[371]

But Beijing seemed not to favour the introduction of party politics in Hong Kong. Chinese officials voiced their opposition to party politics on several occasions. Following the warning of Mr Xu Jiatun in late 1985, Mr Lu Ping, then Secretary-General of HKMAO, had reportedly told a group of LegCo members that Hong Kong could not and should not have its own political party.[372] When touching on the issue of Chinese Communist Party activities in Hong Kong, Mr Li Hou, then deputy-director of the HKMAO, had said: "If other political parties have already been set up, then I can't say whether the Chinese Communist Party members would act openly or not."[373]

The signal was clear, as expounded in the SCMP's editorial that "Hong Kong could be playing with fire if party politics were allowed to develop in the future Special Administrative Region". The editorial went on:

This is the first time that China has set down a clear line on party politics. Hongkong must realise that politics could never develop here on traditional Western party line by excluding the communist party. . . . The course towards Westminster-style politics would mean an open invitation for politicking of a potentially destructive kind, in the sense that struggles for the seat of government with the certain (and only) winner being the Communist Party could extinguish the spirit of the Joint Declaration, which calls for Hongkong people ruling Hongkong. . . . Those who espouse the cause of party government should be admired for their direct and broad-minded approach to representative politics. But they would be wise to consider whether such politicking would serve exclusively Hongkong interests.[374]

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[371]*SCMP*, 11 April 1985.

[372]*HKS*, 1 February 1986.

[373]*SCMP*, 3 June 1986.

[374]*SCMP*, 4 June 1986.

But Beijing's negative attitude toward party politics seemed to soften in late 1988. It seemed that China had came to see the inevitability of having organisational support once the direct elections were put in place. In response to whether the political party would have a bad influence on the future political structure, Mr Li Hou said the forming of political organisations was inevitable and would be further developed as Hong Kong would have elections, especially direct elections. He also employed intentionally the term political organisation instead of political party as he had objected to the term in June 1986.[375]   By using the term "political organisation", China seemed to convey the message that political organisations in Hong Kong would not be allowed to become the ruling party of the HKSAR, and thus, avoided the usage of the term "political party" which may have the meaning of ruling in the Western democratic polities. In January 1989, Mr Xu Jiatun had conveyed his view to political activists in Hong Kong, including then drafter Mr Martin Lee, that they were free to form political organisations. This move seemed to give tacit approval for the formation of political parties.[376] Later, Mr Xu had reportedly qualified his message by stating that political parties formed in Hong Kong would be prohibited from advocating the independence of Hong Kong or engaging in anti-communist activities.[377] This might be interpreted as the no-go areas that the Chinese Government would not tolerate. That means the development and presence of political parties in Hong Kong would not threaten the socialist system and communist rule in China. But the developments after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 had invaded these no-go areas and had, thus, strained the Sino-Hong Kong relations.

Being relieved from the pains of party-phobia, various political forces once again embarked on the road of party-building. At least four groups of political activists were on their way in late December 1988 and early 1989. Their major proposers were: Mr Stephen Cheong Kam-chuen, Mr Martin Lee, Mr Lo Tak-shing, and Mr Lau Chin-shek and Mr Cheung Man-kwong. First of all, Mr Cheong,

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[375]*Ta Kung Pao*, 23 November 1988.

[376]*HKS*, 27 January 1989.

[377]*HKS*, 16 February 1989.

"Group of 89" member, had revived Mr Allen Lee's abortive party plan in December 1988. The core members were, more or less, the same as those of 1985, except Mr Allen Lee and Mr Martin Lee.[378] It was believed that the political status of Mr Allen Lee, then senior member of the LegCo, had prevented him from overtly participating in the plan. Mr Allen Lee had been the key contender against Miss Maria Tam within the political establishment and this prevented him from merging with the PHKS or coordinating to form a new group.

Second, as mentioned earlier, because of contrasting attitudes towards direct elections and political reforms with Mr Allen Lee's group since 1985, Mr Martin Lee, then LegCo member and Basic Law drafter, had come out with his own party plan announced in late December 1988.[379] Mr Martin Lee had been a vocal democracy reformer and a campaigner against undue Chinese interference in the Basic Law drafting process. He revealed that he would opt either to start a new party or merge with some or all of the following political groups to form a new one: the Joint Committee for Promotion of Democratic Government, the MP, the HKAS, and the HKADPL. At the same time, the "Big Three" democratic groups of the MP, the HKAS and the HKADPL had also tried to hammer out a merger plan.[380]

Third, Mr Lo Tak-shing[381], a vice-chairman of the Consultative Committee for the Basic Law and former ExCo and LegCo member, was said to have discussed with some of the "Group of 89" members, like Dr Philip Kwok, Dr Raymond Wu, and Mr Kan Fook-yee, the possibility of forming a party in early March 1989. Miss

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[378]*SCMP*, 3 December 1988.

[379]*SCMP*, 31 December 1988.

[380]*HKS*, 7 January 1989.

[381]Mr Lo Tak-shing is a grandson of Sir Robert Hotung whose family has close ties with the Establishment of Hong Kong. In 1985, he suddenly resigned from the posts of ExCo and LegCo member in protest at London's failure to accept its responsibility toward the Hong Kong people by giving them the full British passports. The resignation was the first of its kind in the one and a half centuries of British rule.

Maria Tam, chairwoman of the Progressive Hong Kong Society, was also reportedly involved.

Fourth, Mr Lau Chin-shek of the CIC and Mr Cheung Man-kwong of the PTU had engaged in forming a bigger "democratic league" in March 1989. Being frustrated by the slow progress of the "Big Three" merger plan and the reach of such party if it succeeded, the two proposed to develop "a political party with strong grassroots support" with membership between 100,000 and half-a-million.[382]

Among the above political forces, only Mr Lo's group had transformed its plan into action before Tiananmen Square events in June 1989. The New Hong Kong Alliance (NHKA) was formally established in May aiming "to work for the resolution or compromise of conflicting interests". The move had signified the first big step in formal party-building by the conservative clique amongst the established elites. But the leaders of the PHKS, like Miss Maria Tam, did not join the NHKA. One of the reasons advanced by Miss Tam for not joining was the incompatibility of the NHKA's aim at influencing government policies and her own role as ExCo member.[383] It was believed that Miss Tam was still involved in it informally. The division of labour between Mr Lo and Miss Tam had been described as: " T.S. [Mr Lo] has got the brains and Maria [Miss Tam] is the worker ant--it's a perfect match".[384] Nevertheless, the NHKA's general committee had 32 members, of whom 21 were from the "Group of 89" and 10 from the PHKS, and at least 6 belonged to both "Group of 89" and the PHKS. In order to clear away the impression of being led by a single leader, the Alliance decided to elect a honorary secretary instead of a chairman. Mr Lo Tak-shing, was elected honorary secretary, LegCo member Mr

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[382]*SCMP*, 21 March 1989.

[383]*Oriental Daily News* 9 March 1989, p. 3.

[384]Quoted in *SCMP* 4 March 1989, p. 15.

Peter Wong Hong-yuen as treasurer, Miss Veronica Wu and Dr Raymond Wu as press secretaries, and UrbCo member Mr Pao Ping-wing as recruitment officer.[385]

The Consolidation Stage, 1989-Present

The suppression of the democratic movement in June 1989 and the subsequent labelling of Hong Kong as a "subversive" base by the Chinese Government had created a confidence crisis and intense concern about China's and Hong Kong's future. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the whole society of Hong Kong was shocked by the Tiananmen Incident and the democrats had become deeply engaged in supporting the democratic movement in Beijing. The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China (HKASPDMC) was formed under the leadership of prominent democratic figures, Mr Szeto Wah and Mr Martin Lee, right after the military crackdown in Beijing. By organising rallies and a donation campaign, and participating in smuggling the key leaders of the Chinese democratic movement out of mainland China, the democrats became the prime target of Chinese verbal attacks because the no-go areas of party development, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, set by the Beijing Government had been invaded by the democrats. Reinforced by the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the liberalisation of Eastern Europe in late 1989, the then Beijing leadership was desperately worried about its regime security, the possible peaceful evolution from within, and the "subversive" role of Hong Kong.

As a result, the party-building efforts cooled down because some political activists began to adopt a low-profile attitude at the time. As one democrat recorded there was difficulty in having incumbent municipal councils and district boards

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[385]*HKS* and *SCMP*, 2 May 1989.

members to seek re-election in 1991 elections.[386] The party-building efforts also suffered from the exodus of the middle-class, like the professionals, intellectuals, social workers, and so on. An estimated 62,000 Hong Kong people emigrated to overseas in 1990. Nevertheless, the June 1989 events had stimulated the passive Hong Kong people to think afresh about their destiny which had long been controlled by others and about the closeness of their relationship with China.

The Tiananmen Incident, ironically, initially delayed the emergence of a budding territory-wide party system which had gone through nearly ten years of alignment, dealignment and realignment of the various political forces and groupings. But, once the situation had become stable in late 1989, the trend to form political groups was restored. On the democrat side, the prominent role played in supporting the democratic movement in China had further reinforced their image and popularity among the Hong Kong people. But, on the other hand, their relationship with the Chinese Government had totally deteriorated as the democrats had condemned the way the Chinese Government suppressed the democratic movement.

The official *People's Daily* carried a commentary entitled "No Sabotage of the One Country, Two Systems Policy Tolerable" on 21 July 1989, issuing a strongly worded warning to those democrats who played a significant role in supporting the democratic movement in China, accusing them of engaging in subversive activities, and condemning them for planning to form a political party in Hong Kong. Because of such developments, the idea of forming a united democratic party seemed to be blocked by the Chinese hostility towards it and the very survival of that party after 1997. The China factor coincided with the unresolved conflicts over ideological orientation, and the nature and timing of the new party among key participants had contributed to the slow progress of forming a new democratic party.[387] In addition,

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[386]*SCMP*, 3 September 1989.

[387]*SCMP*, 6 August 1989; Wong Fu-wing, "The Background and Problems of Forming Political Party Among 'Democratic Groups'," *Contemporary* 11 (10 February 1990):23-4, 12 (17 February 1990):28-9, 13 (24 February 1990):28-9, (in Chinese); Lo Wai, "Mr Fung Kin-kee Forms Another Democratic Group,"

self-centred calculation also played a role. To quote Dr Ding Lik-kiu's words, "Some of the liberals [democrats] say the time is not ripe for political parties. Others are reluctant to give up their hard won identities for the sake of a bigger group".[388] Because of such differences, the MP and the HKADPL later opted not to join the new democratic party--the United Democrats of Hong Kong (UDHK), and retained their separate group labels and identities. Nevertheless, some members of these two groups, like Dr Yeung Sum, did join the new democratic group.

Although the pressure from China was felt, the democrats did manage to form a new political organisation, though still not calling itself a political party, with their decision not to dissolve other democratic groups. The UDHK seemed to be taking shape in late 1989 and was formally established in April 1990 with about 210 founding members.[389] The UDHK was chaired by Mr Martin Lee with Mr Yeung Sum of the Meeting Point and Mr Albert Ho of the Hong Kong Affairs Society as Vice-Chairmen at the time of founding. Members mainly comprised professionals, lawyers, social workers, educationalists, and so on. Both Hong Kong Government and NCNA's officials were invited to attend the founding ceremony but they were not present. It was because China had regarded some leaders of the UDHK as "subversive" and thus, the Hong Kong Government officials wanted to distance themselves from the conflict. Because of the overlapping leadership with the HKASPDMC, the UDHK stressed in its founding declaration that:

> The UDHK, being a local political organisation, will focus its attention
> on local affairs. It will not seek to participate or be involved in the
> politics of the Central People's government or of other regions in the
> People's Republic of China.

The intentional separation of the HKASPDMC and the UDHK did not bear fruit because the Chinese Government treated these two groups as if there was no difference between them.

Contemporary 21 (21 April 1990):38-9, (in Chinese).

[388]*HKS*, 15 May 1989.

[389]*Contemporary*, 6 (30 December 1989):29-30.

While the negotiation among "core" democratic groups and individuals was in progress, the Hong Kong Democratic Foundation (HKDF), first initiated by LegCo member Mr Jimmy McGregor and subsequently chaired by LegCo member Dr Leong Che-hung, declared its formation in October 1989 with support from leading foreign businessmen, like Hari Hariela, Ian Tomlin, Matthew Oram and Kewlram Sital.[390] Mr Martin Lee was reportedly involved in the plan but later opted not to play an active role in the HKDF because he had deeply involved himself in a party bid with the "Big Three" and other leading democrats. The HKDF could be viewed as the conservative clique of the democratic forces. Their business interests seemed to prevent their merger with the grass-roots oriented democrats, and the adoption of confrontational attitude towards China. In its manifesto, the HKDF regarded itself as "an independent, multi-racial, multi-cultural political organisation . . . committed to developing a pluralistic democracy in Hong Kong" and it aimed "to shape government policy in order to make Hong Kong a more open, progressive society in which all people can share the fruits of its success".[391]

On the conservative side, a split emerged as the New Hong Kong Alliance (NHKA) proposed to adopt the "Bicameral Model" in the future HKSAR's legislature in late August 1989.[392] This move, as mentioned in Chapter 3, had caused a head-on confrontation with the supporters of the "4-4-2 Model", which was supported by such members of the "Group of 89", like Mr Vincent Lo. Five pro-Beijing members of the NHKA, including Mr Lo Tak-shing, had even tried to block the adoption of the "4-4-2 Model" by the "Group of 89" as a compromise with the democrats and the moderates. One of them reportedly concluded that the compromise "is aimed at using democracy to resist China" through the early introduction of universal suffrage.[393] Subsequently, some key members of the NHKA, such as Mr Peter Wong Hong-yuen,

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[390]SCMP, 21 October 1989.

[391]HKDF, *Manifesto: Hong Kong Democratic Foundation Towards a Democratic, Stable, Prosperous, Just and free Society*. Supplied by the HKDF.

[392]SCMP, 28 August 1989.

[393]SCMP, 19 and 20 September 1989.

Dr Raymond Wu, Miss Veronica Wu, and Dr Philip Kwok, quit the alliance in early 1990.[394]

Because of this split, the conservative camp needed to develop another political group to prepare for the 1991 elections. The backbone of the planned group mainly comprised members from the Progressive Hong Kong Society and the "Group of 89", like Miss Maria Tam, Mr Hu Fa-kuang (former appointed LegCo member), Dr Raymond Wu and Dr Philip Kwok. Miss Maria Tam was believed to be acting as a locomotive of the planned group. The group appeared to have difficulty in attracting prominent businessmen to join. Her rivals, Mr Allen Lee, Mr Stephen Cheong and Mr Vincent Lo had, in one way or another, showed that they would not join the group.[395] The planned group further suffered from the charge of Miss Tam's alleged conflict of interest and her reportedly censoring of a reporter tracing her case in mid-1990.[396] The accusation not only damaged her public image but also hampered her coalition-building efforts for the planned group.[397]

Miss Tam had been regarded as "a political penny stock broker" who appeared to enjoy trust and acceptance from both the Beijing and the Hong Kong Governments.[398] She had engaged in bridging the "territorial conservatives" of the big businessmen and the "local conservatives" of community leaders and attempted to consolidate an influential conservative party so as to counter the surge of the

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[394]*SCMP*, 6 January 1990.

[395]*Pai Shing*, 228 (16 November 1990):34.

[396]Miss Maria Tam was accused of owning a certain amount of shares of a taxi company and the holding company of a bus company while chairing the Transport Advisory Committee.

[397]Stephen Lung-wai Tang, "Political Markets, Competition, and the Return to Monopoly: Evolution Amidst a Historical Tragedy," in Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds., *Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1993), pp. 283-4.

[398]*Ibid.*, p. 269.

democrats after the mid-1980s.[399]   Because of her important role in the party-building drive, the outbreak of the scandal had contributed to the low acceptance of the planned group by the mass public.   Nevertheless, the planned group had gone through the crisis and formally declared the formation of the Liberal Democratic Federation (LDF) in November 1990 with Mr Hu Fa-kuang as chairman, Miss Maria Tam and Dr Philip Kwok as vice-chairpersons.   The LDF's members were recruited mainly from the business community, professionals and local community leaders.

The group led by Mr Allen Lee and Mr Stephen Cheong Kam-chuen did not manage to form a mass party before the 1991 LegCo elections.   One of the reasons was the transformation of this group into a close government coalition after the downfall of Miss Maria Tam in 1990.   The Government had, thus, relied on this group to guard against the expected surge of the democrats in the LegCo after 1991 direct elections.   Under the leadership of Mr Allen Lee, the Cooperative Resources Centre (CRC) was formed after the 1991 LegCo elections and comprised mainly the appointed members of the ExCo and the LegCo.   In fact, the CRC became the pro-Government force in the LegCo.   Because of the arrival of the new Governor Mr Christopher Patten and the subsequent "resignation" of the CRC's members from the ExCo in 1992, and the definite abolishment of the LegCo's appointed seats in 1995, the CRC was forced to develop a mass-oriented political party.   As a result, the CRC was transformed into the Liberal Party in early 1993.

Up to the moment of the 1991 elections, the election-created political groups were still small in scale in terms of membership (see Table 5.3).   The membership of those formed before the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 had ranged from 20 to 50 (except the MP), and those formed after that event usually had about or over 150 members (except the NHKA).   It seemed that political forces had undergone realignment in the late 1980s and had merged into a comparatively bigger coalition for fighting the 1991 electoral battles.

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[399]*Ibid.*, pp. 280-1.

The Budding Party Market in the Early 1990s

After more than a decade of development, various political forces had, in one way or another, consolidated and gradually undergone an institutionalisation process sparked off by the political reforms in the mid-1980. Two rival camps of political forces had been consolidated: the conservatives and the democrats. As shown in previous section, the conservatives comprised mainly the established elites and its allies in the local community. They were of the opinion that the unreformed political system before the 1980s had served Hong Kong well and why bother to change it. By siding with the Chinese Government from the mid-1980s, the conservatives tried hard to scale down the pace and scope of democratisation and thus, contained the growth of the democrats. Their reasons to adopt a resistant attitude towards political reforms were the possible loss of their privileges and exclusive access to political power and influence, and the uneasiness of the projected growth of the tax burden as a result of the welfare approach of the democrats. They often hold a cooperative attitude towards Beijing for business reasons, and thus are labelled as "pro-Beijing". Their approach to change largely relied on the building of a patron-client network, in which the patrons (the established elites) and the clients (the local community leaders) were threaded together by power brokers or go-betweens. This had the advantage of forming a political group within a short period of time, but the lack of direct communication between the patrons and the clients, and the limited reach of the clients' personal network proved to be not an effective way to mobilise support and to develop the cohesiveness of the group. Furthermore, the group would suffer if the power brokers lost his/her credibility in the public eye.

On the democratic side, they acted as an anti-establishment force and urged the Government to carry out social reforms in the 1970s and the political reforms in the 1980s. They were inspired by the promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" and the eventual devolution of power resulted from the Sino-British Joint Declaration and embarked on the road of political group-building. They were pro-China in the sense that some of the leading democrats, like Dr Yeung Sum and Mr Szeto Wah, were the first batch of social activists to advocate the return of Hong

Kong to China when the 1997 issue was first appeared in the early 1980s. But their differences over the pace and scope of democratic reforms emerged gradually from the mid-1980s. The Beijing leaders and the democrats had confronted each other in the Daya Bay anti-nuclear movement and the drafting of the Basic Law, and their relationship totally deteriorated after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. Comparatively speaking, they were more organised than the conservatives, but their mobilisation strength and organisational development were hampered by the lack of institutional support and favourable political conditions conducive to the growth of party politics. Although their demands for democratic reforms only received support from the small attentive middle-class professionals, their role of fighting for the grass-roots' interests had a wider acceptance in the mass public.

The conflict between the conservatives and the democrats of the day was mainly over the composition of the legislature, and the timing and pace of introducing direct elections. The release of two sets of Green and White Papers in 1984, and 1987 and 1988 had provided the occasions for various advocate groups to mobilise their respective supporters. Through wide media coverage and the mobilisation efforts of concerned groups, the attentive public was no longer confined to a small group of people.

In the mid-1980s, the conflict between the conservatives and the British-Hong Kong Government, on the one hand, and the democrats, on the other, had added a new dimension. China had intervened in the internal conflict of Hong Kong over the pace and direction of democratization. In the 1987 political review, the Hong Kong government had been accused by the democrats of instituting a political structure that would not be controlled by the public but instead by the already privileged well-to-do people through the introduction of functional constituency elections and the not-so-significant portion of directly elected seats in the legislature.

But this contradiction has been transformed to one between the Chinese Government and the democrats, as Beijing adopted a cautious but more restrictive attitude towards the political reforms. Beijing's stance was well reflected on the

occasion of the 1987 political review and in the drafting process of the Basic Law. By adopting a conservative stance, Beijing seemed to put all the political forces under her reach and manoeuvre. By siding with the business tycoons and turning down the democrats' demands, the Chinese Government engaged itself in a head-on confrontation with the democrats. The intervention of China had provided an opportunity for the conservatives to exploit its strategic economic role in the transitional period to counter the emergence of the democrats. The Tiananmen Square events blew away any remaining possibility of cooperation between the Chinese Government and the democrats.

The orientation of various political forces in the budding party market in the early 1990s can be summarised by using the two dimensions of differences in redistribution and democratisation. First, the redistribution issue had long been a bone of contention in the territory. From the outset, the democrats and the leftist trade unionists had fought for a reasonable distribution of social resources and asked for the Government to adopt policies with redistribution effects. By contrast, the conservatives from the establishment, such as the bureaucrats, the business tycoons and the appointed unofficial ExCo and LegCo members, have tended to uphold the capitalist mode of market distribution. Second, the democratisation issue has also divided the political community since the mid-1980s. The democrats asked for faster pace of democratisation, but the conservatives and the leftists wanted it slower. The respective positioning of the various political groups can be roughly sketched in the following Figure 5.1.

Figure 5.1 The Budding Party Market in 1991: A Sketch

Democratisation
+

UDHK

MP   HKADPL

HKDF

Privatisation
+   -

FTU

LDF

NTAS

NHKA

-

Table 5.1a

The Electorate of the UrbCo and the RegCo, and Population
of Hong Kong, 1952-91

Year	UrbCo (A)	RegCo (B)	Population (C)	A+B/C (%)
1952	9,000	-	-	-
1953	8,000	-	-	-
1954	13,700	-	-	-
1955	14,583	-	-	-
1956	15,638	-	-	-
1957	19,305	-	-	-
1959	23,584	-	-	-
1961	26,039	-	3,129,648	0.83%
1963	25,932	-	-	-
1965	29,529	-	-	-
1967	26,275	-	3,708,920*	0.71%
1969	34,392	-	-	-
1971	37,788	-	3,936,630	0.96%
1973	31,284	-	-	-
1975	34,078	-	-	-
1977	37,174	-	4,402,990**	0.84%
1979	31,481	-	-	-
1981	34,381	-	5,109,812	0.67%
1983	707,489	-	-	-
1986	998,177	443,363	5,495,488	26.23%
1989	1,045,073	558,975	-	-
1991	1,124,292	731,151	5,674,114	32.70%

* 1966 By-Census's figure.
** 1976 By-Census's figure.

Sources:
1. For electorate's figure: compiled from the data
   supplied by the Registration and Electoral Office,
   Constitutional Affairs Branch, Government Secretariat,
   Hong Kong Government.
2. For the population of Hong Kong, see Hong Kong Annual
   Digest of Statistics, 1992 ed., p. 11, Table 2.1.

Table 5.1b

The Electorate of the District Boards, 1982-91

Year	Electorate
1982	893,493
1985	1,412,877
1988	1,610,998
1991	1,855,443

Source: compiled from the data supplied by the Registration and Electoral Office, Constitutional Affairs Branch, Government Secretariat, Hong Kong Government.

Table 5.1c

The Electorate of Various Composition of the LegCo, 1985-91

Year	Electoral College	Functional Constituency	Direct Election
1985	433	46,645	-
1988	466	61,052	-
1991	-	69,825	1,916,925

Source: compiled from the data supplied by the Registration and Electoral Office, Constitutional Affairs Branch, Government Secretariat, Hong Kong Government.

Table 5.2

Performance of Political Groups in 1985 District Boards
Elections

Group Name	Nominations	Elected	%
Hong Kong People's Association	8	8	100.0
Meeting Point	4	4	100.0
Hong Kong Affairs Society	3	3	100.0
Eastern Coalition	11	11	100.0
Group of 12	12	10	91.7
Hong Kong People's Council on Public Housing Policy	11	9	81.8
Professional Teachers' Union	30	24	80.0
Reform Club	33	17	56.7
Civic Association	54	21	36.4

Note: The above figure does not reflect the fact that some
candidates had received support from more than one group.

Source: Leung Chun-man, "The Criteria of Appointing
District Boards Members and the Training of Leaders Capable
for Governing Hong Kong: An Interview with Mr Albert C.C.
Lam," (in Chinese) *Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly* 97
(1985):4-6.

Table 5.3

The Membership of Selected Political Groups

Name	Membership		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Hong Kong Observers	50	30	-
New Hong Kong Society	20	20	-
Meeting Point	190	190	127
Hong Kong Affairs Society	50	100	-
Hong Kong People's Association	30	20	-
Progressive Hong Kong Society	-	150	-
Hong Kong Association of Democracy and People's Livelihood	-	160	140
New Hong Kong Alliance	-	36	-
Hong Kong Democratic Foundation	-	340	-
United Democrats of Hong Kong	-	520	600
Liberal Democratic Federation	-	150	208

Sources:
(1) Yip Tze-chin, "The Political Wake-up of Hong Kong's New Generation of Intelligentsia," (in Chinese) *Hong Kong Economic Journal Monthly* 92 (1984): 40-43;
(2) Fong Wah, "Hong Kong Political Organizations: Easy to Form But Difficult to Grow," (in Chinese) *Ming Pao Monthly* 26 (April 1991):8-9;
(3) *Open Magazine* 75 (March 1993):50-1, (in Chinese).

CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL MOBILISATION AND ELECTORAL CHOICES

This chapter examines the immediate electoral context within which the formal and informal political participants tried to shape the electoral choice of the voters in the 1991 LegCo direct elections, and the concerns and considerations of the electors as reported in various opinion polls. The participants had tried hard to convince the electorate to support them. Their values and opinions would be transmitted through their respective media and personal networks. Given the amplification effect of the media and personal networks, the society would be, in one way or another, mobilized and politicized. On the one hand, the electorate was then exposed to an immense bombardment of electoral information and their vote choices would then be shaped. On the other, the electors' concerns and issue orientation would more or less shape the candidates' policy stance and political attitudes. First of all, the constraints of the 1991 LegCo direct elections will be highlighted. Second, the attitude of the British-Hong Kong and Chinese Governments towards the elections will be discussed. Third, the value and policy stance the candidates wanted to convey during the campaign period from early August to mid-September 1991 will be examined. Campaign materials and debates on the television will be used as the basis of observation. Fourth, the concerns and considerations of the electorate will be discussed so as to see whether there was a match of views and priorities of issues between the candidates and the electors.

The Constraints of the 1991 LegCo Direct Elections

The first-ever direct elections to the LegCo signified a milestone in the political history of Hong Kong not only because of the establishment of an institutional linkage which provided a more direct representation for the mass public, but also because it was a transitional step leading to a fully-fledged legislature with an independent base and role that will remove it from the executive's direct influence and will enable it to wield decisive power within its own jurisdictions, i.e. the passage of the Government's bills and the annual scrutiny of the Government's budgets. These powers would be effective weapons to pressure the Government to make compromises if there were a clear majority of opinion within the legislature.

Needless to say, the LegCo direct elections in 1991 did not serve to change the Government and to transfer the executive power from one party to another. That means no executive power was to be transferred to the winner of the LegCo direct elections. The executive-dominated political structure, which is formally not subject to any electoral pressure, would still be in place whatever the result of the elections. There was no hope of winning the LegCo elections and becoming the ruling party of Hong Kong. So the 1991 LegCo direct elections could not be regarded as having the same degree of significance and importance as those in former British colonies elsewhere when Britain decided to grant them independence through the institution of a Westminster-type of government.

But, in fact, the 1991 LegCo direct elections would strengthen the representativeness of the legislature and the input from the mass society. If viewed from a structural perspective, the introduction of direct elections to the LegCo would, in one way or another, challenge the legitimacy of the non-elected executive and may transform the relationship between the legislature and the executive in the long run. But the rather long-term nature of such a change, coupled with the negative Chinese attitude towards a stronger legislature, did contribute to the low key evaluation of the 1991 LegCo direct elections by the mass public. For the mass public, the 1991 LegCo direct elections only had a symbolic meaning of exercising civic rights rather

than an electoral game devised to empower those among the attentive public to shape the political landscape of the transitional Hong Kong. "Votes without power", as the title of a book on 1991 LegCo direct elections suggested, seemed to represent their perception towards the said elections.[400]

Furthermore, the formal design and composition of the LegCo has prevented the emergence of a majority party in the legislature. There are four kinds of membership in the LegCo: 3 ex-officio members, 18 appointed members, 21 elected members from functional constituency elections, and 18 elected members from geographical direct elections. This composition had contributed to not only a fragmented legislature but also a lack of keen participants in the direct elections. Most of the prominent politicians, like Mr Allen Lee and Miss Maria Tam, saw no urgency about joining the 1991 direct elections. In answering the question why he decided not to stand in the 1991 LegCo direct elections, Mr Allen Lee, then an ExCo and senior LegCo member, revealed in 1993 that the then Governor Sir David Wilson had advised him not to join the said election, as he would reappoint him so as to maintain the continuity of the LegCo. Mr Allen Lee later stated that his decision to accept Sir David's offer was a wrong one.[401]

This contributed to quite an unbalanced picture in which the potential candidates from the Establishment and the conservatives relied on government re-appointment or functional constituency elections. On the other hand, the democrats concentrated their efforts on the geographical constituency direct elections. As a result, the electoral market had been further distorted as if the democrats had dominated the direct elections game. This distorted picture further gained ground from the fact that the democrats had altogether nominated over 20 candidates for the LegCo direct elections (see Tables 6.1 and 6.3).

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[400]Rowena Kwok, Joan Leung, and Ian Scott, eds., *Votes Without Power: The Hong Kong Legislative Council Elections 1991*, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1992).

[401]Interview with Mr Allen Lee, 1 July 1993, Hong Kong.

Although the party market has been growing and evolving in the decade of the 1980s, the organisational strength and mobilization power of the political groups still remained elementary. This was reflected in the difficulties the political groups faced in recruiting candidates to stand in the 1991 LegCo direct elections. No single political group managed to nominate enough candidates in all 9 LegCo constituencies. The UDHK was no exception. Although nominating a total of 14 candidates and contesting in full in 5 constituencies, the UDHK needed to form a coalition with the MP in three constituencies and had only one nominated candidate in the Kowloon West constituency. The LDF had nominated only 5 candidates in 4 constituencies, the HKADPL nominated 3 candidates in 2 constituencies, the MP nominated 3 candidates in 3 constituencies, the NHKA nominated 2 in 1 constituency, the HKDF nominated 1 candidate in 1 constituency. Three candidates in 3 constituencies had the apparent support of the leftist backing. (see Table 6.2)

The democrats had failed to arrive at a nomination list acceptable to all sides and a grand election coalition because of their different attitudes towards the Beijing Government after the Tiananmen Incident, their ideological differences and personality conflicts. The HKADPL held a relatively soft attitude towards Beijing and a more welfare-oriented ideology, while the UDHK adopted a rather confrontational attitude and a more middle-class political orientation. The MP's attitude towards Beijing was closer to that of the HKADPL, while its political ideology was nearer to that of the UDHK. Even more, the HKADPL's candidates had engaged in a head-on competition in 2 constituencies with other democrats' candidates, in which one competed with a UDHK's candidate and the other competed with candidates from the UDHK-MP coalition. On the conservative side, any coalition effort was hampered by Miss Maria Tam's scandal (discussed in Chapter 5) and the lack of urgency and incentive, created by the nature of the political system, to join the direct election game. They were further impeded by their "freshness" in wooing and pinning down grass-roots organisation networks. Therefore, it seemed that a territory-wide conservative election coalition had failed to emerge in the 1991 LegCo direct elections. The leftists seemed to be constrained by the unfavourable political climate at the time and adopted a low-profile attitude in nominating

candidates. Mr Tsang Tak-shing, the chief-editor of the communist paper, *Ta Kung Pao*, claimed that:

> There was no organized fielding of candidates. For the eighteen seats contested in the direct elections, there were only three candidates from *established pro-Beijing [leftist] circles*, and they had all decided to run on their own initiatives. There was *no Chinese official attempt* to contact more would-be candidates with enticement to run.[402] (italic mine)

This above assertion was only half true. It was true that only three candidates were came from the "established pro-Beijing circles" and there was "no official Chinese attempt" to field more candidates, but the Beijing Government had strategically supported, through the NCNA's Hong Kong Branch, those who competed against the UDHK's candidates, as will be demonstrated in the next section. Furthermore, the electoral campaigns of the leftists and its supported candidates were fought with vigorous support from the Chinese and the leftist establishments in terms of both funding and manpower (for details, see the following section). The leftist FTU mobilised one thousand "voluntary workers" to help promote voter registration in three possible running LegCo constituencies in June 1991. The FTU also planned to make a home visit to every voter in the Kowloon Central constituency, which political activists had long regarded as a "liberated area" because of the alleged popular support and influence the FTU enjoyed there.[403]

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[402]Tsang Tak-shing, "On Chinese Official Attitudes towards Legislative Council Elections 1991," in Jane C.Y. Lee, W.N. Ho, and Jermain T.M. Lam, eds., *A Report of the Conference Proceedings on Politics and 1991 Elections in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: City Polytechnic of Hong Kong, Department of Public & Social Administration, 1992), p. 44.

[403]*Ming Pao Daily News*, 24 June 1991.

<u>Political Mobilisation:</u>

<u>Chinese and British-Hong Kong Governments</u>

The Hong Kong Government had put enormous efforts into the 1991 direct elections so as to ensure its success. The significance of success would not only help to prove the wisdom of introducing direct elections but also provide a chip for London to bargain with Beijing that more direct elected seats should be introduced before 1997. London's calculation had been embedded in the secret diplomatic exchange in February 1990 when China and Britain came to an understanding that there should be no less than 20 directly elected seats in the LegCo in 1995. The words "no less than" had hinted that London might raise the issue afterwards if she saw fit. The British Foreign Minister with special responsibility for Hong Kong stated in September 1990 that the Basic Law could be amended so as to accommodate the current developments in Hong Kong.[404] Even as late as early September 1991, Prof. Wang Gungwu, then an ExCo member, urged Hong Kong people to demand more LegCo directly-elected seats from the Chinese Government if the turn-out rate reached as high as 60% in the LegCo direct elections.[405] What mattered here was the linkage between the voting turn-out in the 1991 LegCo direct elections and the possible increase of directly-elected seats in 1995.

The slogan that the Hong Kong Government employed in urging people to vote was: "vote: it's power in your hands!"[406]. On the surface, this catchword is quite attractive and it implies that significant change could be possible if one did go to vote. But this claim did not match up with the then political reality as less than one-third (18 seats) of the total LegCo had been set aside for direct elections. Numerically speaking, a political force could manage to command a majority of the directly elected seats but still remained as a minority in the whole legislature. This

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[404]*Bauhinia Magazine*, 2 (November 1990):11.

[405]*HKS*, 14 September 1991.

[406]This phrase was found in the Government's election advertisements in the major printed media.

short-term calculation and the negative Chinese attitude towards a stronger legislature had made the mass public feel that there existed a credibility gap.

On the Chinese side, the stance was very clear. No such link existed and the Basic Law could not be amended before it was put into practice in 1997. Two days before the designated polling day, an official statement from the State Council's HKMAO, put through by the semi-official China News Service, remarked:

> Over a period of time recently, [some people in] Hongkong have time and again given such view -- If the Legislative Council direct elections succeeded and there is a high turnout, [we should] demand China quicken the pace of democracy and give more directly elected seats in 1995. . . . It is absolutely impossible and an unrealistic fantasy that the composition of the legislative assembly can be amended before 1997.[407]

It warned that the LegCo constituted in 1995 would have to be dissolved in 1997 if the composition was not in accord with the stipulations of the Basic Law.

Beijing had, in one way or another, expressed openly her view that she would like to see the election of those who love China and Hong Kong, support Hong Kong's reunion with China and the Basic Law in the LegCo direct elections. Beijing had also made it clear that the election of democrats' candidates would do no good to the already strained Sino-Hong Kong relationship and reminded Hong Kong voters to be careful in choosing which candidates to vote for. In commenting on whether to vote for the pro-China candidates, a signed article in the NCNA affiliated *Bauhinia Magazine,* which was widely cited by other media, stated that:

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[407]Quoted in *SCMP*, 14 September 1991.

In the present stage of Hong Kong, if the so-called "pro-China" means accepting the Chinese government, supporting "one country, two systems", the Basic Law and the unification of China, and advocating the strengthening of communication and cooperation between Hong Kong and mainland, then what is the problem? . . . Taking into consideration of the political reality [of reunion with China], voters should demand them to love their country, to accept or at least not to confront and even not to subvert the Chinese government when choosing political representatives to participate the governing of Hong Kong. . . . Some politicians in Hong Kong have regarded themselves orally as "not anti-China", and have only criticised some Chinese Communist Party's measures towards Hong Kong. But as a matter of fact, their behaviours are not so simple. . . . they have lobbied western countries to apply economic sanctions towards China, . . . they have set-up political organisation that aimed at subverting Chinese government . . . if people like this become Legislative Councillors, do they promote accord cooperation between Hong Kong and mainland? Do they contribute to the smooth development of Hong Kong? . . . Based upon the intimate and in-dividable relationships between Hong Kong and mainland, and the future of Hong Kong, it is worthy to consider from the angle of the above questions what kinds of people have to be chosen to institute the Hong Kong legislature.[408]

In order to minimize the democrats' chance of being elected, Beijing seemed to adopt a united-front strategy of supporting the local leftists and non-democrat candidates. An internal document drafted in September 1990 highlighted the following strategies:

1.   to mobilise all possible forces, including those of the pro-Beijing, and apparently moderate but pro-Beijing groups, to participate in the 1991 LegCo elections;

2.   to encourage and support business and professional organisations, like the LDF and the NTAS, to participate so as to minimise the democrats' chances of being elected or at least to prevent them from being elected uncontested;

3.   owing to the fact that there are various factions within the democrats' camp and the lack of consensus toward China, we can adopt differential treatment toward the democrats' camp; in the hope of isolating and challenging the anti-

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[408]*Bauhinia Magazine*, 12 (September 1991):13; my own translation.

communist figures, like Martin Lee and Szeto Wah, to the maximum degree, we could conditionally support the Meeting Point's and the HKADPL's candidates in those constituencies where the strength of the democrats has prevailed and we do not have suitable candidates to nominate;

4. given that they are not anti-communist, we could also conditionally support candidates from the British-Hong Kong establishment, whether they are pro-British or not.[409]

These strategies seemed to match the repeated urging of Chinese officials, i.e. Mr Li Hou and Mr Zhou Nan, during 1990 that businessmen should get organised and participate in the 1991 three-tier legislature elections.[410] Mr Lu Ping had also publicly supported the left-wing Federation of Trade Unions' participation in the 1991 elections.[411] In addition, the Beijing Government had reportedly been involved in the electoral campaign by giving money to the left-wing LegCo candidates. The maximum amount the Beijing-supported candidates could receive was HK$100,000 and the "money would be channelled by Chinese companies in Hongkong through the Federation of Trade Unions". It was also reported that staff of China-run enterprises, i.e. the Bank of China and China Travel Service, had also been drafted in to campaign for the left-wing candidates.[412]

Beijing's fear of the growth of the democrats was further fuelled as the UDHK, the flagship of the democrats' camp, urged the Governor to appoint ExCo members in proportion to the seat-share that the relevant political groups and individual candidates received in the LegCo direct elections.[413] Though article 55

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[409]Yip Chi-chao, "The Chinese Deployment Towards the 1991 Direct Elections," *Hong Kong Economic Times*, 12 September 1991. (in Chinese, my own translation)

[410]*Sing Tao Jih Pao*, 18 February 1990; *Bauhinia Magazine*, 2 (November 1990):11.

[411]*Ming Pao Daily News*, 11 March 1991.

[412]*Ming Pao Daily News*, 12 September 1991; *SCMP*, 15 September 1991.

[413]*Ming Pao Daily News*, 24 June 1991.

of the Basic Law has stipulated that the HKSAR chief executive should appoint ExCo members from "among the principal officials of the executive authorities, members of the Legislative Council and public figures", Beijing showed its dislike of the democrats' move. The negative response could be seen as a move to prevent the UDHK, especially those who had a close relationship with the HKASPDM, presumably Mr Szeto Wah and Mr Martin Lee, from acquiring more influence or popularity in the transitional period.

Political Mobilisation:

Candidates and Its Affiliated Groups

Given the embryonic form of party competition in Hong Kong, one cannot rely only on the electoral platforms of the participating groups to understand their respective value orientation and policy stance. Thus, in addition to the electoral platforms of various groups, campaign materials distributed by the candidates themselves should also be employed. But there were problems in locating a comprehensive set of campaign materials as there were several waves of releases with various timings and scope of distribution. It has proved impossible to record and examine all the candidates' messages and communications targeted at their respective voters. Therefore, some kind of judgement is required to select representative items for analysis.

The platform or campaign leaflets may provide the necessary background information for the voters to have an understanding of the candidates. But it is rather a static form. Therefore, their debates on the television were also included. Three sets of direct election debate programmes were prepared and broadcast. These included Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK), the Television Broadcasting Limited (TVB), and the Asia Television Limited (ATV). This could supplement the rather dry campaign leaflets and provide an arena in which candidates could challenge one another as well as highlight what they wanted to sell to their potential supporters. Furthermore, according to an opinion survey, an overwhelming member of respondents (71.6%) had learned about their own candidates through the following three channels: campaign material (28.6%), television (27.2%), and newspaper or magazine (15.8%).[414]

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[414]*SCMP*, 10 September 1991, p. 7.

The campaign materials served to differentiate one (group of) candidate(s) from others and had the effect of helping the voters to choose. As mentioned in Chapter 1, candidates do not need to challenge their competitors in a direct manner; rather, they need only stress different issues to enlist support. For example, the leftists' and the conservative candidates did not challenge the democrat candidates' stance towards the Chinese democratic movement, but highlighted the importance of the need to maintain communication with China. That meant they played up the value of communication with China to counter the democrats' "position" issue of supporting the Chinese democratic movement. According to one study based upon candidates' campaign materials, the issue popularity among the candidates were as follows: social services and public utilities (94.4%, N=51); distribution[415] (90.7%, N=49); political system and political change, and environmental issues (72.2%, N=39); class issues, and law and order (70.4%, N=38); gender issues (68.5%, N=37); urban issues (66.7%, N=36); Sino-Hong Kong relations (57.4%, N=31); growth and stability (53.7%, N=29); Vietnamese boat people (48.1%, N=26); human rights (42.6%, N=23); civil service (7.4%, N=4); others (11.1%, N=6). The top three of the most articulated issues were similar to those of the popular issues mentioned above. They were: social services and public utilities (N=359), political system and political change (N=128), and distribution (N=110).[416]

The candidates would position themselves as close as possible to the issues that attracted the median voters. As a result, it was believed that the popularity of issues articulated by the candidates would be a reflection of the electors' concerns. Popular

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[415]"Distribution" refers, here, to the issues of taxation, the distribution of social resources, and so on.

[416]The figure and percentage in the bracket denoted the number of candidates holding a position on that issue. See Lee Ming-kwan, "Issue-Position in the 1991 Legislative Council Election," in Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds., *Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong), p. 243.

as it was, their respective policy stance might be different from each other. Thus, a survey on their policy stance could help to clarify this.

Although Hong Kong was famous for her low tax policy, the distribution and sources of tax had become one of the sensitive issues since the mid-1980s. As indicated in Chapter 4, the Hong Kong Government experienced a fiscal crisis because of the significant loss of land revenue resulted from the uncertain political features of the early 1980s and the designated use of the land fund by the Sino-British Joint Declaration after 1985. Under these circumstances, the Hong Kong Government had relied on other tax sources to extract the necessary resources. The widening of the salary tax net resulting from the minor, inflation-proof adjustment in personal tax allowances had made more and more people feel directly the tax burden and the impacts of government tax policy. Because of this, the electors wanted to see a lessening of their own tax burden and, therefore, supported some kinds of tax reforms.

As far as taxation reform was concerned, the candidates were quite different in their approaches. Those who have a strong identity with the interest of the grassroots tended to support the taxation reform by demanding the introduction of progressive tax-rate which has a redistributive effect. For example, Miss Chan Yuen-han, a leftist FTU-supported candidate in the Kowloon Central constituency, pledged in her platform "to build-up fair taxation system and to shorten the distance between the wealthy and the poor: oppose the introduction of sales tax, . . . progressive tax rate should be applied to profit tax".[417] Moreover, Mr Lau Chin-shek and Mr Conrad Lam Kui-shing, UDHK-supported candidates, also adopted a similar view in their joint platform that "in order to enhance the redistribution function of the taxation system, we oppose any measures that might put more tax burden onto the low-income citizens" and demanded to increase the profit tax rate, to introduce the capital gains tax, and so on.[418]

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[417]Miss Chan's campaign leaflet of 20 August 1991.

[418]Mr Lau's and Mr Lam's joint campaign leaflet of 1 August 1991.

On the other hand, candidates who themselves were businessmen or who received support from pro-business groups, chose to remain silent or pledged to support the existing simple taxation system with a low tax-rate. No taxation reform was mentioned in the joint platform of Mr Ronnie Wong and Miss Winnie Cheung, NHKA-supported candidates with close ties with the business community and the reported support of the NCNA's Hong Kong Branch.[419] Mr Johnny Wong Chi-keung, LDF-supported candidate and a young solicitor, stated in his platform that he would work hard "to maintain a simple and low tax-rate taxation system, and to create a good investment environment".[420] The same expression also appeared in the LDF's elections platform.[421]

Issues of collective consumption seemed to be the major focus of most of the candidates. As examined in Chapter 4, the Hong Kong Government had intervened in the private consumption process since the early 1970s and had undertaken a series of privatisation drives because of the expected fiscal crisis from the early 1980s. The privatisation of collective consumption--housing, hospital services, education--had the effect of transferring the financial burden back to the recipients of the government services. Because of this, any privatisation move would mean the respective recipients have to pay for the services by themselves. Given the collective nature of the government services, the affected population would be enormous. For example, the change of Government's rent policy, as indicated in Chapter 4, had affected nearly 3 million people who lived in public housing estates. This represented half of the whole Hong Kong population. Because of such large numbers of people involved, the candidates could not afford to ignore them.

Nearly all of the candidates had, in one way or the other, touched on the issues, though their approaches to them might have been different. The spending under the heading of collective consumption, such as housing, education, hospital

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[419]Mr Wong's and Miss Cheung's joint campaign leaflet of 10 August 1991.

[420]Mr Wong's campaign leaflet of 10 August 1991.

[421]LDF's campaign leaflet of 24 July 1991.

service, social welfare, and so on, had been criticised by the business community and the free market advocates as a "free lunch" delivered to those whose appetite would never be satisfied. The "free lunch" thesis was adopted by the conservatives to counter the democrats' advances in enlisting grassroots' support on several occasions of public debate. But it was very interesting to note that the conservatives adopted a quite positive attitude towards the collective consumption issues. For example, Mr Ronnie Wong Man-chiu and Miss Winnie Cheung Wai-sun mentioned in their joint electoral platform that: "Against the pegging of the pricing of public housing and home-ownership flats with those of private housing flats; support the criteria of price fixing that matched with the eligible purchasers' ability to pay".[422] Mr Tang Shiu-tong, a rural conservative candidate of the New Territories West constituency, opposed the planned government policy of requiring patients to pay the cost of their medical treatments in government clinics and hospitals.[423] Like most of the democrats' candidates, Mr Tai Chin-wah and Mr Tso Shiu-wai, rural conservatives in the New Territories West constituency, vowed in their joint platform, "to review the monitoring system and policy of the public utilities so as to avoid creating pressure for inflation".[424]

The candidates from the democrats, the conservatives and the leftists also asked for the government to take care of the living standards of the middle- and low-income groups. Their positions were quite alike, such as in demanding the opening-up of the Housing Authority, the supply of more public housing flats, the abolition of "double rent" policy and the price-pegging of the selling units in public housing estates and home-ownership scheme flats with that of the private market. They also asked for more consumer's rights and a better mechanism for checking various public utilities' service and fare policy.

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[422]Mr Wong's and Miss Cheung's joint campaign leaflet of 10 August 1991.

[423]Mr Tang's campaign leaflet of 27 August 1991.

[424]Mr Tai's and Mr Tso's joint campaign leaflet of 28 August 1991.

Labour issues, like the opposition to the policy of importing foreign labour, the appeal to improve working conditions and industrial safety, the urge to grant trade unions collective bargaining power, the setting up of a central provident fund and so on, also received considerable concern, especially from those candidates who had strong ties with trade unions (for example, UDHK's platform summary; platforms of Miss Chan Yuen-han, Mr Leung Yiu-chung). As well, Mr Lee Wah-ming, MP-supported candidate in the Kowloon East constituency, also stated in his campaign leaflet that "medical and health services are the basic needs of people's livelihood, government then has the responsibility to provide citizens with an extensive, popular and affordable service".[425]

Issues of democratisation also attracted many candidates' attention. Although the mass public did not realise that there is a close relationship between the democratic reforms and their interests, the candidates tried to alert the electors to the existence of such linkage. The more open the political structure, the lower the threshold of representation and the fewer the institutional barriers of entry will be, and the more the chance to actualise one's electoral promise. In addition, in the context of Hong Kong, the establishment of a democratic government had been viewed as a mechanism to ward off the improper intervention from China after 1997. If a full-fledged democracy is indispensable for the above-mentioned goals, efforts should be made to revise the relevant stipulations in the Basic Law so as to accommodate a faster pace of democratic reforms.

Issues of democratisation articulated in the candidates' campaign materials included the pace of introducing direct election to the LegCo, the relationship between the executive and the legislature, and the revision of the Basic Law. As expected, candidates tended to value democracy and advocate a faster pace of democratisation, though some favoured a gradual and cautious approach. For example, Mr Tang Siu-tong stated that while attempts should be made "to fight for the realisation of democratic political structure", "direct election should be introduced gradually to the

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[425]Mr Lee's campaign leaflet of August 1991.

Legislative Council" and "all LegCo seats should be speedily returned by one-person-one-vote elections after Hong Kong people have sorted out their differences and arrived at the consensus".[426] The LDF also pledged to "work for the development of a democratic system".[427]

Some other candidates advocated a faster pace for introducing direct elections and the expansion of elected representatives' power and jurisdiction. For example, Mr David Chan Yuk-cheung of the Hong Kong Island West constituency, an independent candidate with good ties with China, pledged "To quicken the pace of introduction of direct election into the three-tier legislature" and "to strengthen the actual monitoring power of the elected LegCo members towards the government; all major consultative committees and government-run institutions . . . should be chaired by or have representative from the LegCo elected members".[428] Mr Cheng Kai-nam of the Hong Kong Island East constituency, leftist-supported HKCF's candidate, agreed that "all members of the three-tier legislature should ultimately be returned by universal suffrage" and advocated "to strengthen the monitoring function of the three-tier legislature towards government".[429]

In addition to the demand to quicken the pace of introducing direct elections and more power for the elected LegCo members, the democrats' candidates had explicitly demanded that the chief executive should be directly elected, and the ExCo or other independent statutory bodies should be accountable to the LegCo. For example, Mr Leung Yiu-chung of the New Territories South constituency, NWSC-supported candidate, vowed "to fight for: 1. all LegCo seats should be returned by direct elections; 2. LegCo should be the highest decision-making body, ExCo and representatives of other government institutions should be responsible and accountable

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[426]Mr Tang's campaign leaflet of 27 August 1991.

[427]LDF elections platform, 24 July 1991.

[428]Mr David Chan's campaign leaflet of 23 July 1991.

[429]Mr Cheng's campaign leaflet of 10 August 1991.

to the LegCo; 3. Hong Kong chief executive should be returned by direct election; 4. citizens have the right to recall their representatives; 5. Hong Kong citizens have the right to participate in the revision of the Basic Law".[430] Mr Fung Kin-kee and Dr Law Cheung-kwok of the Kowloon West constituency, HKADPL-supported candidates, demanded that "Hong Kong chief executive and members of the legislature should all be returned through the just, open, universal and direct elections; open more channels for citizen participation so as to monitor government effectively".[431] In addition, the UDHK demanded that "the independent non-government authorities and other statutory bodies outside the Executive Branch are fully accountable to the Legislative Council", the proportion of directly elected LegCo seats should increase to 50% in 1995, and "all seats on the Urban Council, Regional Council and District Boards be democratically elected by 1995".[432]

The Sino-Hong Kong relationship was perhaps the most controversial single issue in the 1991 LegCo direct elections. The electoral importance of this issue seemed to relate proportionally to the weight the voters had put on the autonomy of Hong Kong. The phraseology used in the manifestos of the candidates on this issue was more or less being interpreted by voters as the degree of determination of the candidates to stand up for the interests of Hong Kong if they conflicted with those of China. But what would be considered as the best method to achieve the goal--cooperation or confrontation with China. The answer to that question would be subject to interpretation. Therefore, many candidates took up the issue in their platform but with somewhat different attitudes. At the radical extreme, one candidate demanded China reform her political system and vowed to support the pro-democracy movement in China. In Mr Chan Cheong's own words, "to strengthen the unity of people from China and Hong Kong, and to support Chinese people in their struggle to demand democracy; to end the one-party rule of the Chinese Communist Party,

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[430]Mr Leung's campaign leaflet of 8 August 1991.

[431]Mr Fung's and Dr Law's campaign leaflet of 1 August 1991.

[432]UDHK, *1991 Legislative Council Election: Platform Summary.* Supplied by the UDHK.

254

power should be re-directed to people, and to draft democratically a new constitution".[433]

The UDHK seemed to play down the Tiananmen Square events in their election platform so as to make clear that the UDHK was a Hong Kong-based political group. Besides, it was also believed that this was the UDHK's strategy aiming to improve its relationship with China by not directly confronting China on the sensitive subject. Instead, they chose to emphasize the need for communication and cooperation between China and Hong Kong. But they appealed to China to treat Hong Kong people as promised, and pledged to stand firm to protect Hong Kong's interests, and urged revision to the Basic Law so as to accommodate a faster pace of democratisation. In their joint platform, Mr Martin Lee Chu-ming and Mr Man Sai-cheong not only pledged support to the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the basic principle of "one country, two systems", but also demanded that: "Chinese Government should trust Hong Kong people, respect their opinions, and avoid interfering with Hong Kong's internal affairs"; "to communicate progressively with the Chinese Government but to raise active criticism and protest against all those policies and interferences that worked to the disadvantage of the public interests of Hong Kong", and "to demand that the Chinese Government amend the Basic Law so as to implement full democratisation of the political structure".[434]

Some candidates or groups, including the leftists, were of the opinion that confrontation would not work to the benefit of Hong Kong and they advocated the resolution of Sino-Hong Kong contradictions through consultation and communication. In regard to Sino-Hong Kong relations, Miss Chan Yuen-han, the leftist FTU-supported candidate, stated that: "both sides should have an open attitude and analyze things from different angles so as to decrease the differences. China should respect and understand the feeling and aspiration of Hong Kong people, and Hong Kong

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[433]Mr Chan Cheong's campaign leaflet of 29 August 1991. Mr Chan is a Trotskyite.

[434]Mr Martin Lee's and Mr Man's joint campaign leaflet of 15 August 1991.

would also know more about China so as to increase mutual understanding".[435] Mr Tony Kan Chung-nin, an independent, proposed in his campaign leaflet the adoption of the means of consultation and dialogue to solve the contradictions between China and Hong Kong.[436]

Others just stressed the importance of mutual communication; for example, the LDF pledged to "promote closer communication between China, Britain and Hong Kong people to preserve the free economy and capitalism of Hong Kong".[437] Mr Poon Chi-fai of the Kowloon East constituency, an independent, committed himself to "support the strengthening of communication between China and Hong Kong, and uphold the full implementation of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration so as to make sure Hong Kong had a high degree of autonomy".[438]

Different constituencies had different population compositions, thus the candidates treated issues differently. Quite contrary to other UDHK candidates, Mr Lau Chin-shek and Mr Lam Kui-shing of the Kowloon Central constituency, adopted a quite high-profile attitude in publicising their role in supporting the pro-democracy movement in China in 1989, publishing pledges of support from exiled prominent Chinese pro-democracy figures, like Prof. Fang Li-zhi.[439] Given that the Kowloon Central constituency used to be the leftist and the local conservative "sphere of interests" and that many new immigrants from mainland China were living there, it seemed that they tried to take advantage of the dismay and frustration among those who were supporters of the leftists in the past but objected to the way the Beijing Government handled the pro-democracy movement in 1989.

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[435]Miss Chan's campaign leaflet of 20 August 1991.

[436]Mr Kan's campaign leaflet of 15 August 1991.

[437]LDF, *Legislative Council Elections Platform of the Liberal Democratic Federation*, 24 July 1991. Supplied by the LDF.

[438]Mr Poon's campaign leaflet of August 1991.

[439]Mr Lau's and Mr Lam's joint campaign leaflet of 1 August 1991.

Electoral Issues in the Television Debates

The direct election forum on television provided another but more effective channel for the voters to acquire more information on the political background and policy stances of the candidates. The questions and responses of/from the candidates and the moderator had helped to define and redefine the electoral universe through which the electorate received the essential information for judging the differences of stance among the candidates and on which their voting decisions were then based.

The two commercial television stations, i.e. the TVB and the ATV, and the government-run RTHK all produced direct election forums in which all the candidates were invited to join to discuss their platforms with each other on a constituency basis. The series of forums bombarded the electorate nearly every night from late August onwards. In addition, the series of RTHK's direct election forums appeared to have a larger audience because it was simulcast with its own radio channels and on the two commercial Chinese TV channels in the prime time.

From the series of forums, the attentive public and the Hong Kong electorate were highly exposed to different political arguments and policy debates, during which the candidates tried to make clear their stance and attitude towards various issues. Although the issues raised in the forum and the subsequent political discourse had covered a wide range of social and political issues, the most hotly debated and divisive issues appeared to relate to those "position issues" concerning Sino-Hong Kong relations, the revision of the Basic Law's political structure section, the pace of democratisation of Hong Kong, and the death penalty. These issues cut across the candidates and more or less divided them into two opinion groups. On the one hand, the democrats' candidates tended to show a non-compromising attitude to the Chinese Government, to demand the amendment of the Basic Law so as to accommodate the speedy democratisation of Hong Kong, and to support the abolition of the death penalty. On the other hand, the leftist and the conservative candidates appeared to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards Beijing and the Tiananmen Square events, to oppose the amendment of the Basic Law before 1997, and to support the

implementation of the death penalty so as to suppress the rapid growth in the crime rate.

Judging from the debates on television, the issues that related to Sino-Hong Kong relations appeared to be more divisive in the constituencies with leftist candidates.[440] The democrats' candidates tended to adopt a vocal attitude towards the issue by stressing that though the need of communication and cooperation with the Chinese Government was highly plausible, they would not sacrifice the interest of Hong Kong just for the sake of communication. They seemed to place the autonomy and interest of Hong Kong higher than communication with China, and they were even prepared to confront Beijing if necessary. That means they would not compromise the interests of Hong Kong just for the sake of maintaining good relationships with the Chinese Government. Mr Szeto Wah[441] of the Kowloon East constituency asserted that "good relationship" did not mean either "superior and subordinate relationship" or "human and dog relationship".[442]

Mr Lau Chin-shek of the Kowloon Central constituency stated that only after the rightful verdict on the Tiananmen Square tragedy was pronounced would there be a real improvement in Sino-Hong Kong relations. He further questioned the Chinese Government as to why Beijing should be liberated again by the use of tanks and guns in 1989 since the People Liberation Army had peacefully liberated Beijing in 1949?[443] In response to whether the efforts to smuggle the pro-democracy leaders

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[440]Constituencies with leftist candidates included: Hong Kong Island East (Mr Cheng Kai-nam), Kowloon East (Mr Hau Shui-pui), and Kowloon Central (Miss Chan Yuen-han).

[441]Mr Szeto Wah is the chairman of the Hong Kong Alliance of Supporting Patriotic Democratic Movement of China. He has also been a veteran and active social activist since the 1970s.

[442]ATV's KE forum.

[443]TVB's KC forum.

out of China after the military suppression in 1989 should be regarded as a patriotic or an unlawful act, Mr Lau replied that it was a patriotic act.[444]

Mr Szeto Wah also appealed to the Hong Kong electorate to differentiate between "party" and "country", and encouraged the electorate to vote by conscience; summing up in a RTHK's forum, he said:

> Hide one's political stance, urged to forget about the June Fourth [pro-democracy movement], being afraid of talking about China's human right issue and the dictatorship of the one-party-rule [in China]; this is only love the [CCP] party, not the country; we, as human beings, should have the courage and backbone, not to bend to the wind's direction, not to side with the powerful; please vote according to your conscience.[445]

Because of joint-jacket election strategy,[446] Mr Martin Lee appealed to the electorate to choose two "fresh fish" instead of one "fresh fish" and one "dead fish" in the ATV's HKIE forum. The notion of "fresh fish" implied those who could stand up for the interest of Hong Kong; the "dead fish" implied those who could not. In refuting Mr Martin Lee's appeal, the communist newspaper *Wen Wei Pao* published a "letter to the editor" on 13 September that warned electorate not to choose the "fresh fish" because it was a "poisonous fish". The letter stated:

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[444]RTHK's KC forum.

[445]RTHK's KE forum (original in Chinese, my own translation).

[446]In the 1991 LegCo direct elections, a double-seat-double-vote system was adopted. That meant each voters could vote for up to two candidates in his/her two-seat geographical constituency. As a result, the concerned political groups tried to maximise their electoral supports by urging their supporters to cast votes only to the group's supported candidates.

To this gentleman [Mr Martin Lee], what he meant by "fresh" might be about the ability. But because one is able does not necessarily mean he will do a good job and be suitable for a councillor. . . . If we allow those who always seek confrontation to the LegCo, it will definitely be disadvantageous to the legislature's smooth operation, the co-operative relations between Hongkong and the mainland, the atmosphere of prosperity and stability and the interest of voters. These people have been selling that they are fresh fish. But if we look carefully at their words and deeds, it's not difficult to find that "fresh fish are not necessarily good fish". One should never purchase the poisonous fish.[447]

Furthermore, the democrats' candidates also played up the political background of the leftist candidates and exploited the Hong Kong people's feeling of "communist-phobia". A typical example was the dialogue between campaign assistants of Mr Man Sai-cheong and Mr Cheng Kai-nam in the ATV's HKIE forum:

Assistant: Are you a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)?

Mr Cheng: No.

Assistant: Are you a member of the CCP's Youth Group?

Mr Cheng: No.

Assistant: Is the CCP an exclusive one-party-rule party or a democratic political party?

Mr Cheng: The CCP is an exclusive one-party-rule party.

Assistant: How do you feel about the human rights in China?

Mr Cheng: It depends on the actual situation of a country . . .

(Interrupted by the Assistant)

Assistant: You have said human rights are transnational on one occasion, but you now say it depends on a country's situation. Do you advocate the CCP's socialist concept of human rights?

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[447]*Wen Wei Pao*, 13 September 1991; quoted in *SCMP*, 14 September 1991.

When the time came for Mr Cheng to sum up at the end of the forum, he thanked Mr Man's assistant for letting the audience know of his left-leaning stance.

By contrast, the leftist candidates often found themselves on the defensive side of the argument. They appeared to avoid toeing the Chinese Government's line of labelling the 1989 pro-democracy movement as a subversive movement aimed at toppling the existing regime. Although expressing support for the Beijing students who urged the government to take action against the wide-spread corruption, they stopped short of overtly scolding the Chinese Government for using excessive force to suppress the pro-democracy movement. For example, Mr Hau Shui-pui of the Kowloon East constituency recorded his reservations about the military crackdown of the 1989 pro-democracy movement.[448] Miss Chan Yuen-han of the Kowloon Central constituency appealed to the Hong Kong people to adopt plural views in handling Sino-Hong Kong relations and implied that the Tiananmen Square tragedy would not become a hurdle to improving Sino-Hong Kong relations.[449]

Nevertheless, the leftist and the conservative candidates did remain passively defensive. They questioned the uncompromising attitude of the democrats' candidates and their credibility in maintaining a positive relationship with the Chinese Government. For example, Miss Chan Yuen-han challenged Mr Lau Chin-shek as to whether it would be advantageous to have communication with the Chinese Government only after the acquisition of the rightful verdict on the Tiananmen Square tragedy.[450] The democrats' candidates also faced trials from their overlapping leadership and the conflicting roles between the UDHK and the HKAPDM. For example, Dr Yeung Sum was asked how to sort out the incompatibility of the UDHK's and the HKAPDM's attitude towards the Chinese Government.[451]

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[448]ATV's KE forum.

[449]TVB's KC forum.

[450]TVB's KC forum.

[451]ATV's HKIW forum.

On the other hand, in constituencies with no leftist candidates, the divisive issues appeared to be focusing on the issues concerning the pace of democratisation, candidates' track record of protecting grassroots' interest, and questions related to the amendment of the Basic Law. Most of the candidates' positions on issues concerning the quality of life seemed to be the same. But their claims had to be backed up by their past record as well as electors' faith in their credibility to deliver. Therefore, candidates would tend to sell their past community services and their role in fighting for the interest of the constituency and Hong Kong as a whole.

The democrats' candidates played up their uncompromising role of challenging the injustice of the colonial political structure and the domination of capitalists in the Government Establishments. Mr Fung Chi-wood of the New Territories North constituency alleged that the repeated LegCo objection to setting up the central provident fund was the result of the disproportionate representation of businessmen in the LegCo.[452] Mr Lee Wing-tat and Mr Leung Yiu-chung of the New Territories South constituency both pointed to the monopoly of the LegCo by big financial corporations and businessmen and appealed to the grassroots to fight to have their own representatives in it. And Mr Lee also talked about his role as campaigner in the past decade for the above-mentioned sake.[453] The late Mr Ng Ming-yum and Dr Huang Chen-ya also launched similar criticism of the LegCo in their own constituency's election forum.[454] Mr Fung Kin-kee also criticised the closed nature of the Hong Kong Government.[455]

Following the question of the lack of popular control of the government, the logical move was to proceed to the question of establishing a full-fledged legislature and an accountable executive system. The democrats' candidates showed their

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[452]TVB's NTN forum.

[453]ATV's NTS forum.

[454]ATV's NTW and HKIW forums, respectively.

[455]ATV's KW forum.

enthusiasm and demand for a faster pace of democratization, even though it needed amendments to the relevant clauses in the Basic Law. In the TVB's KC forum, Mr Lau Chin-shek (UDHK) asked Dr Dragon John Young (pro-democrats independent) why the campaign for direct elections to the LegCo in 1988 had failed? Dr Young responded that it was China's fault because China feared that the development of democracy in Hong Kong would have an impact on China's democratic movement. Mr Lau also asked Miss Chan Yuen-han (FTU) whether she agreed with the FTU's objection to introducing direct election in 1988? Miss Chan responded that she personally supported its introduction in 1988, and explained that the FTU did agree to introduce direct elections but only differed from the democrats in timing. Mr Lau then reminded the electorate by raising tactically the question of whether those who objected to the 1988 direct elections should bear the responsibility for the decline in living standards in recent years.

In addition, the democrats' candidates were in favour of the amendment of the Basic Law's section on political structure; for example, Mr Martin Lee and Mr Man Sai-cheong of the Hong Kong Island East constituency.[456] In contrast, some candidates expressed reservations or objections to the said amendment, like Mr Ronnie Wong Man-chiu (NHKA) of the Hong Kong Island West constituency.[457]

The following were some of the issues that received support from most of the candidates: the establishment of central provident fund, the strengthening of the mechanism for monitoring public utilities, the determination to fight inflation and the sky-rocketing price of private housing flats, the pledge to improve public transportation, the urge to provide more public housing flats and to abolish "double rent" policy, the demand for abolishing the import of foreign labour and so on. Although the candidates held similar positions on these issues, their past records and exposure helped to differentiate whose pledges and promises should carry more weight. Probably, a guest moderator's question in one direct election forum reflected

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[456]RTHK's HKIE forum.

[457]ATV's HKIW forum.

this line of thinking. The guest moderator asked Miss Winnie Cheung Wai-sun of the Hong Kong Island West constituency whether she had ever got on a bus and if so, when? Miss Cheung hesitated for a few seconds and replied: two months ago. The guest moderator then pursued her to ask how she could get to know the public transportation problems of the Southern District.[458]

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[458]ATV's HKIW forum.

<u>Electors' Concerns and Considerations</u>

From the published opinion poll's findings, the voters seemed concerned about the candidates' political stance and their track record of community service. According to an opinion survey completed by the Hong Kong University's Social Sciences Research Centre, 46.4% of the respondents regarded the candidates' past performance or track record as the most important criteria in selecting who they would support. But the poll had also revealed that the popularity[459] of the candidates was not considered as a major criterion in deciding for whom they were going to cast their support. Only 9.6% of the respondents had said that their vote choice rested on the candidates' popularity.[460] The stress on the candidates' track record but not the popularity of the candidates reflected the maturity of the voters in their vote deliberation process. It also refuted a belief that popular singers would be elected once the direct elections were introduced.

In addition, the voters also appeared to assess the candidates' attitude towards the Beijing Government, especially the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident. In an opinion survey, more than half of the respondents (50.7%, N=791) said they would consider whether candidates supported the 1989 pro-democracy movement in China before deciding whom they vote for. Respondents in the three leftist contested constituencies seemed to place more emphasis on the issue. The respective figures in the constituencies of the KE, the HKIE, and the KC were 59%, 54% and 51%.[461] It seemed that the voters had passed moral judgement on the candidates' courage in resisting Chinese pressure to label the Tiananmen democratic movement as "subversive". This was especially clear for the leftist candidates because of the vulnerability of their dependence on Beijing's or the CCP's support.

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[459]The term "popularity" denoted the candidates or political figures being recognised by the general public based on the reasons other than their past political performances.

[460]*SCMP*, 10 September 1991.

[461]*Sing Tao Jih Pao*, 14 September 1991.

The people's earnest hope for the directly-elected LegCo members, according to one opinion poll, was to safeguard the Hong Kong people's interests first; a considerable percentage had even shown their acceptance of confronting the Hong Kong Government if necessary. In response to the question of what should the new councillors do, 45% of the respondents wanted them to represent Hong Kong people and place the interests of Hong Kong first, even if that entailed confronting the Hong Kong government. Another 45% of respondents had stressed co-operation with the Hong Kong Government in balancing Hong Kong people's interests. Besides, the voters tended to trust (in term of protecting one's interests) the directly-elected LegCo members more. In the same opinion poll, 46% of the respondents trusted the directly-elected LegCo members to look after their interest, while another 12% and 10% trusted the government and LegCo members from the functional constituencies, respectively.[462] Judging from the above data and the limited proportion of directly-elected seats in the LegCo, the voters seemed to have unrealistic expectations of the directly-elected LegCo members. Unrealistic as it was, the voters' subjective projection to have alternative voices in the LegCo could reflect their distrust of the pre-reformed LegCo members and their suspicion over the latter's ability to protect and fight for the interests of the mass public. Their frustration seems to have accumulated to the point where they even accepted a confrontational approach as a means in their conflicts with the Government.

Understandably, the voters had a positive attitude towards the introduction of directly elected members to the LegCo. The respondents in an opinion poll were asked to express their judgement on the possible impact of the directly-elected members on the LegCo. Five choices were offered: more effective in reflecting public opinion and protecting citizen's rights; decelerate the efficiency of law-making process; enhance the transparency of the LegCo; increase the chance of political conflict; and an open-ended option. Over sixty percent (62.8%) of the respondents had chosen the option of "more effective in reflecting public opinion and protecting

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[462]*SCMP*, 15 September 1991.

citizen's rights".[463] Moreover, one-third of the respondents would also have liked to see more directly-elected seats in the future LegCo. When asked whether it is appropriate for the LegCo to have one-third (20 seats) directly elected seats in 1997, 38.8% of the respondents thought it was the right proportion but 33.4% did not.[464] It was believed that the respondents wanted to have more directly-elected LegCo members so as to better protect and fight for their interests.

In response to a survey question "what is the most pressing problem that you would like the Hong Kong Government to pay more attention to?", the respondents listed the following ten problems that concerned them most: inflation (16.5%), Vietnamese boat people issues (11.9%), housing policy (11.2%), Sino-Hong Kong relations (9.8%), crime (8.1%), standard of living (7.3%), economic issues (5.1%), social welfare (4.5%), infrastructural construction (3.6%), and labour and employment (3.4%). This list of concerns shows that most of the voters' concerns were of an economic nature, such as inflation and housing policy, but the Sino-Hong Kong relationship had also attracted much attention from the voters and was among the top five in two previous opinion surveys.[465]

In a nutshell, judging from the candidates' campaign materials and TV debates, as well as from the concerns and consideration of the electors, as reported in various opinion polls, the issues represented by the candidates were quite similar to those exercising the electors. Therefore, issues related to collective consumption, like housing, as well as to the Sino-Hong Kong (centre-periphery) relations, like democratisation and autonomy, were the focal point of contention in the 1991 LegCo direct elections.

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[463]*Tin Tin Daily News*, 27 August 1991.

[464]*Ibid.*

[465]*Ming Pao Daily News* 10 September 1991, p. 5.

Table 6.1

Candidates and Affiliations in the 1991 LegCo Direct
Elections

Constituency	Name	Affiliation
Hong Kong Island East	LEE Chu-ming, Martin	UDHK
	MAN Sai-cheong	UDHK
	CHENG Kai-nam	HKCF
	CHAN Ying-lun	HKDF
	LEUNG Wai-tung, Diana	(HKDF)
	CHOW Kit-bing, Jennifer	--
Hong Kong Island West	YEUNG Sum	UDHK
	HUANG Chen-ya	UDHK
	CHAN Yuk-cheung, David	--
	CHANG Yau-hung, Alexander	LDF
	WONG Man-chiu, Ronnie	NHKA
	CHEUNG Wai-sun, Winnie	NHKA
Kowloon East	SZETO Wah	UDHK
	LI Wah-ming	MP
	HAU Shui-pui	KTMCA
	POON Chi-fai	--
	CHAN Cheong	OR
	LI Ting-kit	TUC
	LI Koi-hop, Philip	(LDF)
Kowloon Central	LAU Chin-shek	UDHK
	LAM Kui-shing, Conrad	UDHK
	CHAN Yuen-han	FTU
	CHAN Chi-kwan, Peter	(HKCA)
	YEUNG Lai-yin, Cecilia	(RCHK)
	YOUNG, Dragon John	(HKAS, UDHK)
	CHEUNG Chung-ming, Justin	--
Kowloon West	FUNG Kin-kee, Frederick	HKADPL
	TO Kun-sun, James	UDHK
	LEE Yu-tai, Desmond	(HKCA, UDHK)
	SIT Ho-yin, Kingsley	--
	LAW Cheung-kwok	HKADPL
	NG Kin-sun	LDF
New Territories East	LAU Wai-hing, Emily	--
	WONG Wang-fat, Andrew	--
	KAN Chung-nin, Tony	--
	LAU Kong-wah	UDHK
	WONG Hong-chung, Johnston	UDHK
	CHOI Man-hing	--
	LEUNG Ka-ching, Eric	--

New Territories South	LEE Wing-tat	UDHK
	CHAN Wai-yip, Albert	UDHK
	LEUNG Yiu-chung	NWSC
	YEUNG Fuk-kwong	(PHKS)
New Territories West	NG Ming-yum	UDHK
	TAI Chin-wah	--
	WONG Wai-yin, Zachary	MP
	TANG Siu-tong	--
	TSO Shiu-wai	LDF
New Territories North	FUNG Chi-wood	UDHK
	TIK Chi-yuen	MP
	CHEUNG Hon-chung	(LDF)
	WONG Chi-keung, Johnny	LDF
	CHOW Mei-tak, Ronald	HKADPL
	TONG Wai-man	--

Abbreviations:

FTU	=	Federation of Trade Unions
HKADPL	=	Hong Kong Association of Democracy and People's Livelihood
HKAS	=	Hong Kong Affair Society
HKCA	=	Hong Kong Civic Association
HKCF	=	Hong Kong Citizen Forum
HKDF	=	Hong Kong Democratic Foundation
KTMCA	=	Kwun Tong Man Chung Association
LDF	=	Liberal Democratic Foundation
MP	=	Meeting Point
NHKA	=	New Hong Kong Alliance
NWSC	=	Neighbourhood and Workers Service Centre
OR	=	October Review
PHKS	=	Progressive Hong Kong Society (dissolved in 1990)
RCHK	=	Reform Club of Hong Kong
TUC	=	Trades Union Council
UDHK	=	United Democrats of Hong Kong

Note: Organisations in bracket represented those candidates who had pervious affiliated with or who has still belonging to the group but did not ran under the group's banner.

Table 6.2

Contest of Political Groups by Constituencies in the 1991 LegCo Direct Elections

	HKIE	HKIW	KE	KC	KW	NT E	NT S	NT W	NT N
FTU				1					
HKADPL					2				1
HKAS				(1)					
HKCA				(1)	(1)				
HKCF	1								
HKDF	1(1)								
KTMCA			1						
LDF		1	(1)		1			1	1(1)
MP			1					1	1
NHKA		2							
NWSC							1		
OR			1						
RCHK				(1)					
TUC			1						
UDHK	2	2	1	2	1	2	2	1	1

Abbreviations:
1) for groups' name, see those of Table 6.1;
2) for constituency:

HKIE	=	Hong Kong Island East
HKIW	=	Hong Kong Island West
KE	=	Kowloon East
KC	=	Kowloon Central
KW	=	Kowloon West
NTE	=	New Territories East
NTS	=	New Territories South
NTW	=	New Territories West
NTN	=	New Territories North

Notes:
1) the figure in the table means the exact number of candidates being nominated by that political group in the constituency;
2) the figure in bracket means those candidates who had been previously affiliated with or who were still belonging to the group but did not ran under the group's banner.

Table 6.3

Candidates by Political Affiliation in the 1991 LegCo
Direct Elections

Name	Number of Candidate
Democrats:	
UDHK	14
MP	3
HKADPL	3
HKDF	1
NWSC	1
Pro-Democrat Independents	5
Conservatives:	
LDF	5*
Rural	3
NHKA	2
Leftists:	
FTU	1
HKCF	1
KTMCA	1
Rightist:	
TUC	1

*Mr Cheung Hon-cheung of the NTN constituency regarded himself as an independent candidate. Nevertheless, the nomination list supplied to me by the LDF included his name.

CHAPTER VII

ANALYSIS OF THE 1991 LEGCO DIRECT ELECTIONS
RESULTS

This chapter examines the election results of the 1991 LegCo direct elections under the theoretical framework introduced above, that is, the emergence of the centre-periphery and collective consumption cleavages. First, a constituency-wide profile of this election results will be discussed. Second, with the help of the 1991 Census data and the TVB's exit poll data, an ecological analysis of the election results at the level of Census' District Board (DB) districts will be presented. Third, with the help of survey data, the effects of various socio-economic factors as well as the individual elector's position towards the issues of centre-periphery relations and collective consumption on vote choices will be examined.

The Profile of the LegCo Direct Elections Result

The first-ever LegCo direct elections held on 15 September 1991 recorded the highest turnout, in terms of both rates and figures, in the electoral history of Hong Kong, although it was quite low in comparison with those of Western democratic polities and newly independent states. Except those of the United States and Switzerland, the turnout rates for the industrialised countries ranged from 69.1% (Spain) to 89.2% (Australia where voting is compulsory) in the period 1985-89. The respective figures for the US and the Switzerland were 52.8% and 46.1%.[466] Regarding the Asian developing countries in the early 1990s, the turnout rates, in general, were lower than those of the OECD countries. The respective turnout rates of Bangladesh, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, and Thailand were 52%, 70%, 71.9% and 59.27%.[467] As shown in Table 7.3, nearly forty percent (39.15%, N=750,467) of the registered electorate went to the polling stations and cast their votes. But in the calculation and interpretation of the turnout rate in Hong Kong it is necessary to take into consideration the following factors: the de-politicized context and its socialization effect, the obsolete electoral roll which has not been updated since the early 1980s, and the high rate of internal movement due to the rapid urbanization of the New Territories. Thus, according to a post-election study, the real turnout was estimated to lie in the range of 47.5% to 51.8%.[468]

Whatever the turnout rate may be, it was certainly the single political event in Hong Kong that attracted the greatest involvement of the local Hong Kong people

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[466]Jan-Erik Lane, David McKay and Kenneth Newton, *Political Data Handbook: OECD Countries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 123.

[467]Inter-Parliamentary Union, *Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections and Developments*, Vol. 25 (Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1991), pp. 39 & 101; and Vol. 26 (1992), pp. 139 & 159.

[468]For the estimation based upon a territory-wide survey, see Louie Kin-sheun et al., "Who Voted in the 1991 Elections? A Socio-Demographic Profile of the Hong Kong Electorate," in Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds., *Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong* (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1993), pp. 32-34.

up to date. In fact, the absolute numbers of voters had increased from about 390,000 in the UrbCo elections in May 1991 to 750,000, but the Hong Kong and Chinese officials, mass media and commentators still focused their discussion on the relatively "low" turnout rate. This agenda of discussion seemed to be set well before the election day by the British-Hong Kong Government's plan to request Beijing to increase the proportion of the LegCo directly elected seats if the 1991 LegCo elections proved to have a high turnout rate (see Chapter 3 for details).

Before examining the results, we should first investigate who did vote in the 1991 LegCo direct elections at the micro (individual) level. Because of the lack of information on the composition of the Hong Kong electorate, the electoral universe of Hong Kong is still not very clear. The Final Register of Electors only contained the electors' sex and age, as well as the address and constituency. As shown in Table 7.1, 52.9% of the electorate were male, and 47.1% were female. With regard to age, the registration rate was not spread in proportion to the 1991 Population Census. The younger generation seemed to have less interest in registering, with only 16.9% of the electorate belonging to 21-30 age group (27.2% Census). Persons in the age groups of 31-40 and 41-50 appeared to have greater enthusiasm to become electors (31.8% and 19.1%, respectively), with around 4% more than their respective figures (27.2% and 15.4%) in the 1991 Population Census. For the age groups of 51-60 and 61 & above, the percentage (14.7% and 17.5%) was much closer to that of the 1991 Population Census (13.2% and 17.1%; see Table 7.2).[469]

Once again, because of secret ballots, we did not have the detailed breakdown of the actual voters in the 1991 LegCo direct elections. Thus, we need to rely on

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[469]A complete enumeration of the population by age, sex, type of household and type of living quarters, and an one-in-seven sample survey of their socio-economic characteristics were adopted in the Hong Kong 1991 Population Census. Therefore, the Census data were significance at any practical level. For details, see Census and Statistics Department, *Hong Kong 1991 Population Census: Main Report* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1993), chaps. 9-11.

survey data to fill the gap. As reported in one post-election study,[470] those who possessed a higher socio-economic status tended to be more willing to vote. That is, the relationship between turnout and education, occupation, and income were found to be highly significant in the LegCo direct elections.[471] Regarding the relationship between turnout and age, it was reported that the turnout rate rose steadily from 56.6% for 21-30 age group and 56.7% for 31-40 age group, to the peak of 57.2% for 41-50 age group, but then declined to 51.8% and 51.5% for age groups of 51-60 and 61 & above, respectively.[472] One thing worth noting here was the rather high turnout rate of the 21-30 age group, despite the group's low registration rate. Besides, those who lived in the government-subsidised home ownership estates (58.5%) tended to turn up more than those who lived in the private housing (55.5%), and public housing estates (53.7%).[473]

Among the 18 elected LegCo members, 16 either came from the democrats or were pro-democrat independents. As shown in Table 7.5, the UDHK succeeded in returning 12 out of 14 LegCo candidates; the MP returned 2 out of 3; the HKADPL 1 out of 3; and one out of the pro-democrat independents. On the other hand, the rural conservatives managed to return only 1 LegCo member.[474] The leftists and the rightists had failed to grasp any seats. With regard to vote share by political inclination, the democrats and the pro-democrat independents had received

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[470]The following discussion on the voters' profile of 1991 LegCo direct elections is mainly based upon Louie Kin-sheun et al., "Who Voted in the 1991 Elections? A Socio-Demographic Profile of the Hong Kong Electorate," in Lau and Louie, eds. (1993), *op. cit.*, pp. 14-31.

[471]*Ibid.*, pp. 20-24.

[472]*Ibid.*, p. 19, Table 12.

[473]*Ibid.*, p. 27, Table 22.

[474]Mr Tai Chin-wah resigned from the post before the formal swearing-in ceremony. He was then under investigation by the police concerning his alleged fraudulent qualifications to practise as a solicitor.

66% of the total actual vote, the conservatives and the pro-conservative independents 19.5%, and the leftists 7% (see Table 7.5).[475]

As predicted by many pre-election polls, the prominent leaders of the HKASPDM and the UDHK were all returned by a very large margin of voters' support. Mr Martin Lee Chu-ming of the HKIE had obtained the territory-wide highest votes of 76,831, three-quarters (74.6%) of the voters in his constituency voting for him. The next three highest candidates in terms of vote share were: Mr Szeto Wah of the KE (70%, 57,921 votes); Dr Yeung Sum of the HKIW (65.4%, 45,108 votes); and Mr Lau Chin-shek of the KC (62.2%, 68,489 votes). (see Table 7.4, Vote Share A)

Furthermore, the UDHK and its coalition partner MP won the top two highest votes in each of the following six constituencies: HKIE, HKIW, KE, KC, NTS, and NTN. Where their combined vote share of these winning candidates in the said constituencies ranged from 70.2% (KE) to 52.8% (NTN) of the total votes cast (see Table 7.4, Vote Share B). Nevertheless, the UDHK's candidates were defeated in the NTE constituency where they had only managed a combined 29.9% of vote and lagged far behind the top three candidates in that constituency.

In fact, who did vote for the democrat candidates? It was reported that the "definite supporters" of the democrats were probably those who "are public housing residents, relatively well educated, non-manual labourers or above, higher income groups and young employees".[476]

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[475]The electoral qualifications for the 1991 LegCo direct elections were: any person who is a registered elector and who has been ordinarily resident in Hong Kong for the 10 years immediately preceding the nomination date is eligible to be nominated as a candidate; and any Hong Kong permanent resident who is 21 years old or over, or any person who is ordinarily resident in Hong Kong for 7 years immediately preceding the date of his/her application is eligible to register as an elector. See the Electoral Provisions Ordinance (Cap. 367), sections 8, 9, and 18.

[476]Tsang Wing-kwong, "Who Voted for the Democrats? An Analysis of the Electoral Choice of the 1991 Legislative Council Election," in Lau and Louie, eds. (1993), op. cit., p. 128.

The landslide victory of the democrat candidates brought home a clear message that the voters wanted to have the possibility of an alternative voice in the LegCo. The result had contributed to the birth of a relatively solid, though still minority, opposition group in the government official- and business-dominated legislature.

The leftist candidates had contested in the following three constituencies: the HKIE, the KE, and the KC, and they all finished in third place. Miss Chan Yuen-han (KC) had secured 44,894 votes (22.4% of the total valid vote in that constituency); Mr Cheng Kai-nam, 29,902 votes (15.6%); and Mr Hau Shui-pui, 21,225 (13.9%). The relative wide margin of votes between the democrat and the leftist candidates seemed to remove the "sure win" thesis that the leftists would have an overwhelming advantage in direct elections. The narrowest margin was that between Dr Lam Kui-shing and Miss Chan Yuen-han. Dr Lam led Miss Chan by nearly 12,000 votes, approximately 5.6% of the total actual vote in the KC constituency. However, relatively speaking, the leftist candidates, in general, showed up better than the conservatives and the independents in terms of number of votes a single candidate received.

The LDF had shown up badly with none of their candidates being elected. Despite being strongly supported by Miss Maria Tam, then an ExCo and LegCo member, Mr Alexander Chang Yau-hung had received less than 10% of the vote in the HKIW constituency. Mr Cheung Hon-chung and Mr Johnny Wong Chi-keung appeared to be closer challengers to the democrat candidates in the NTN constituency, but they still lagged behind by a margin of over 6% of the vote.

The rural conservatives seemed to have maintained certain support in the NTW constituency where Mr Tai Chin-wah had obtained 21.5% of vote and finished in the second place. At the LegCo constituency level, the rural forces seemed to fail

to strike back against the surge of the democrats in their influential New Territories' constituency.[477]

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[477]For an analysis at the District Boards level, see Li Pang-kwong, "An Exploratory Study of the Rural-Urban Cleavage in the 1991 Elections," in Lau and Louie, eds. (1993), *op. cit.*, pp. 317-29.

Ecological Analysis by Electoral Districts

By regulation, the votes cast in each LegCo constituency should be counted and its result announced at that level, and information below that level should not be disclosed. Because of that reason, the returning officers did not declare the details of voting at the polling station level. In order to have a deeper understanding of the effects of local context and its interplay with the availability of candidates with different political background, a district-wide analysis could better serve the purpose. Lacking official poll data at the district level, we are forced to rely on the TVB's exit poll data and demographic data from the 1991 Census to explore possible voting patterns of the Hong Kong voters.

In regard to the 1991 Census data on the CD-ROM, there were basically two kinds of data: one was tabulated along the census tracks and the other was along the DB districts which were the lowest electoral division where the tabulation of census data have been reported. The DB districts were the basic building blocks of the larger LegCo constituency, and some DB districts had one polling station and others had more than one. That meant the LegCo's polling stations might be one level lower than the Census' DB districts. Due to the homogenous demographic composition of most of the DB districts, an estimation on the correlation between the demographic data from the Census and the vote share data from the TVB's exit poll will help explore the missing contextual dimension of voting analysis. On the other hand, 100 polling stations (nearly one-third of the total, N=354) had been chosen as the sample in the TVB's exit poll exercise and nearly one-third of the actual voters were interviewed. In the following pages all the 1991 LegCo constituencies are analyzed.

Among the candidates, four of them could be regarded as democrats or pro-democrat candidates. They were Mr Martin Lee Chu-ming and Mr Man Sai-cheong (UDHK), Mr Chan Ying-lung (HKDF), and Miss Diana Leung Wei-tung (independent and former member of the HKDF). Mr Cheng Kai-nam (HKCF) was the only leftist candidate in this constituency. Miss Jennifer Chow Kit-bing was the only candidate that had no political affiliation at the time.[478] There were altogether 13 sample polling stations in this constituency, of which 9 districts (N01, N02, N03, P05, P06, P08, P09, P11, and P13) did not have public housing estate in them; and only two (P10 and P12) had got a majority of 61.8% and 83.9% of public housing population, respectively. P10 and P12 also had a relative large blue collar population (54.1% and 56.4, respectively) and a rather low percentage of residents receiving tertiary education (4.5% and 4.8%). In contrast, the respective maximum blue-collar population and the minimum tertiary education percentages of the remaining districts were 37.2 (P07) and 12.9 (P12).

As shown in Figure 7.1, Mr Lee had received considerable support in all sample polling stations, ranging from 35.5% (P10) to 45.6% (P08). Mr Man had received an average of 23.9% vote and was in a neck-and-neck competition with Mr Cheng in three polling stations (P07, P10, and P12). The vote share of Mr Cheng fluctuated between 9.8% and 21.3%. Mr Lee and Mr Man had secured far more votes in the middle class districts than Mr Cheng, especially in N02, P06, P08 and P09. But the latter did not outweigh the first two in the working class districts, with only one exception of P10 where Mr Cheng had 4% lead over Mr Man. On the other hand, Mr Chan, Miss Leung and Miss Chow received an average of 9.9%, 7.6% and 2.7%, respectively.

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[478]Miss Chow joined the Liberal Party, which is under the leadership of Mr Allen Lee, appointed LegCo member, and former ExCo member and senior LegCo member, in 1993.

Figure 7.1 Hong Kong Island East: Exit Poll's Vote Share

Percentage of Vote

Polling Stations

-•- CHENG Kai-nam   + CHAN Ying-lun   ✳ Martin LEE
-□- Diana LEUNG   ✕ MAN Sai-cheong   ◆ Jennifer CHOW

Hong Kong Island West

Among the ten sample polling stations, three of the corresponding districts had over three-fourths of the population in public housing. They were Q08 (97.2%), Q09 (74%), and Q10 (78.3%). The remaining were all private housing flats or estates. Over half of the working population of Q09 and Q10 were engaged in blue-collar work and the respective figures were 51% and 57.3%. In addition, these two districts also had the lowest percentage of residents receiving tertiary education and the respective percentages were 5.8 and 3. M01, M05 and Q07 had at least doubled the figure of that of the rest in terms of working population engaged in professional and managerial works (57.3%, 62.1%, and 54.4%, respectively). Some districts had even displayed over five times the difference, such as between M05 (62.1%) and Q10 (11.1%). The same three districts (M01, M05 and Q07) had also had the largest percentage of residents receiving tertiary education and the respective figures were 36.4%, 34.9% and 24.8%.

As shown in Figure 7.2, Dr Yeung Sum (UDHK) showed up as a high flier and obtained one-third of the vote in all polling stations, except Q09 where he secured 25.7% of vote. His campaign partner, Dr Huang Chen-ya, had won an average of 25.1% of vote and led over his vigorous competitor, Mr David Chan (independent), in seven polling stations, all of them middle class districts. But Mr Chan had beaten Dr Huang in the remaining three working class polling stations (Q06, Q09 and Q10) by a narrow margin. Being a keen challenger of Dr Huang, Mr Chan finished the race in third place and obtained an average of 22.1% vote. The electoral support for Mr Alexander Chang (LDF), Mr Ronnie Wong (NHKA) and Miss Winnie Cheung (NHKA) was spread evenly throughout the sample polling stations and they obtained an average of 8.4%, 3.8% and 3.5% vote, respectively.

Figure 7.2 Hong Kong Island West: Exit Poll's Vote Share

Kowloon East

The difference in demographic characteristics among the respective districts of the sample polling stations in this constituency was not as large as that in HKIE and HKIW. In regard to occupation, only one district (S03) had a relative large proportion (30.5%) of working population engaging in professional and managerial work. The percentage of population receiving tertiary education ranged from 3.8% (S10) to 10.8% (S03). Among the ten sample polling stations, six of them had well over three-quarters of public housing population: S04 (96.4%), S05 (99.9%), S07 (74.7%), S08 (98.3%), S09 (85.4%), and S10 (99.4%). These six districts also tended to have more than half of its population as blue-collar workers.

The data in the sample polling stations in this constituency had showed a crystal clear support for the democrat candidates regardless of the demographic characters. As shown in Figure 7.3, Mr Szeto Wah (UDHK) and Mr Lee Wah-ming (MP) had led by a relatively large margin in all the sample polling stations with the biggest difference in S03, the only sample of a middle class district in this constituency. Mr Hau Shui-pui (KTMCA), a leftist candidate who has knitted together his local network over the past twenty years, nonetheless failed badly in his challenge to the democrat candidates. The maximum and minimum difference of vote share between Mr Lee and Mr Hau were 27.5% (S03) and 10.2% (S04), respectively. Mr Poon Chi-fai (pro-conservative independent), then current LegCo member who had close ties with the KTMCA, obtained about 10% of vote in all the sample polling stations. Mr Chan Cheong (OR), Mr Li Ting-kit (TUC), and Mr Philip Li Koi-hop (independent, former LDF member) all lagged far behind.

Figure 7.3 Kowloon East: Exit Poll's Vote Share

Percentage of Vote

Polling Stations

- HAU Shui-pui + SZETO Wah * LI Ting-kit -□- POON Chi-fai

* CHAN Cheong ◆ LI Wah-ming -△- Philip LI

Among the 13 sample districts, 7 of them were largely filled up by public housing population ranging from 74.9% to 99.9%. They were: R04 (99.9%), V07 (89.1%), V08 (99.6%), V09 (97.5%), V10 (74.9%), V12 (99.9%), and V13 (92.6%).[479] Moreover, these seven districts had tended to have a higher percentage of blue-collar workers (ranging from 44.6% to 59.4%) and a lower percentage of tertiary education population (ranging from 3.1% to 9%). By contrast, the respective percentage of R01 and R05 were 30 and 23, and 18.9 and 16.5. Furthermore, R01 and R05 had the highest percentage of professional and managerial population (46.2% and 45.8%, respectively).

Like the KE constituency, the democrat candidates had defeated the leftist candidate in all the sample polling stations with one exception (in V10). As shown in Figure 7.4, Mr Lau Chin-shek (UDHK) did not face much challenge from the leftists and gained around one-third of the total vote in each of the sample polling stations. His campaign partner, Dr Conrad Lam Kui-shing (UDHK), also returned with an average of about 30% vote. Miss Chan Yuen Han (FTU), a leftist candidate, had engaged in a close contest with Dr Lam in two polling stations (R03 and V10), and she had even won one of them (V10). But she lost all the remaining to her target competitor, Dr Lam, with a margin of over 8% on average. Mr Peter Chan Chi-kwan (pro-conservative independent), Miss Cecilia Yeung Lai-yin (pro-conservative independent), Dr Dragon John Young (pro-democrat independent), and Mr Justin Cheung Chung-ming (independent) acquired an average of 6.2%, 3.6%, 2.6%, and 0.9% vote, respectively.

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[479]R03 would be another polling station with an overwhelming public housing population. But because of the lumping of R02 and R03 into a single census DB district, the details of their demographic character could not be traced. Nevertheless, based on my own judgement and the location of the said polling station, the electorate of R03 would be most likely comprise the residents of a public housing estate (Homantin Estates).

Figure 7.4 Kowloon Central: Exit Poll's Vote Share

Percentage of Vote

Polling Stations

- LAU Chin-shek
- Conrad LAM
- CHAN Yuen-han
- Peter CHAN
- Cecilia YEUNG
- Justin CHEUNG
- Dragon John YOUNG

287

Kowloon West

Kowloon West constituency comprises the three administrative districts of Yau Tsim, Mong Kok and Sham Shui Po, and has been regarded as an elderly community with an established record for the lowest turnout rate in previous DB and UrbCo elections. In the eleven sample polling stations, 9 of them had around or above 50% blue-collar working population. Of these 9 districts, 4 had a pre-dominantly public housing population ranging from 73.9% to 94.2% (U06, 78.7%; U08, 94.2%; U09, 73.9%; and U11, 91.4%) and the remaining five were (W02, T03, T04, T05, and U07) all occupied by private flats or estates. Regardless of housing types in these 9 districts, the percentage of population receiving tertiary education tended to be lower, ranging from 3.4% (U08) to 8.2% (T03 and U09). The two outstanding districts in the sample were W01 and U10. These two districts had the highest percentage of population engaging in professional and managerial work (47.7% and 55.9%) and receiving tertiary education (20.2% and 19.7%), and the lowest percentage of blue-collar workers (20.8% and 19.9%).

Mr Frederick Fung Kin-kee (HKADPL) won by a large margin of votes (32.9% on average) in his sphere-of-influence Sham Shui Po districts (U06 to U09 and U11) but engaged in a keen competition with the other three candidates, Mr James To Kun-sun (UDHK), Mr Desmond Lee Yu-tai (independent and former LegCo member) and Mr Kingsley Sit Ho-yin (then current LegCo and Heung Yee Kuk member), in Yau Tsim and Mong Kok areas (see Figure 7.5). Mr To and Mr Lee had competed neck-and-neck in all of Yau Tsim and Mong Kok, and some of Sham Shui Po's polling stations, such as U06, U07 and U08. But Mr To had managed to beat Mr Lee in U09 to U11 and finally won one of the seats in this constituency. Mr To's victory seemed to owe much to his UDHK's affiliation as he had just entered politics in March of that year. Mr Sit had gained support from the Yau Tsim and Mong Kok districts but declined significantly in the Sham Shui Po area. Dr Law Cheung-kwok, Mr Fung's campaign partner, had only acquired a relative high percentage of support in U06 and U08 and done badly in the remaining

polling stations. Only securing considerable support in W01, Mr Ng Kin-sun (LDF) had slid to the bottom in the rest of the polling stations.

Figure 7.5 Kowloon West: Exit Poll's Vote Share

Percentage of Vote

Polling Stations

-- LAW Cheung-kwok + Frederick FUNG * Desmond LEE
-□- NG Kin-sun * Kingsley SIT ◆ James TO

There were four types of district included in the 12 sample polling stations of this constituency: one rural district (C01), two districts of exclusive private flats or estates (D04 and D07), three districts with about 50% public housing residents (C03, D08 and D10), and six districts of over 67% public housing residents (C02, D05, D06, D09, D11 and D12). The private housing districts (D04 and D07) had the higher percentage of population engaging in professional and managerial works (45.2% and 41.8%), and receiving tertiary education (26.2% and 16.8%). By contrast, the remaining ten districts had more blue-collar workers (ranging from 47.8% to 63.7%) and low percentage of population receiving tertiary education (ranging from 3.3% to 8%).

Miss Emily Lau Wai-hing (pro-democrat independent) had led in 7 polling stations with electoral support spreading evenly in both private and public housing estates and securing her highest vote share in the two private housing districts. Like Miss Lau, Mr Andrew Wong Wang-fat (independent with rural support) had drawn considerable support from both the private and public estates, but with a lesser vote share than that of Miss Lau except in two polling stations (C01 and D12). Mr Tony Kan (independent with close ties with rural forces and a Heung Yee Kuk member) had polled well in the only rural district (C01) and in the newly developed districts (C02, C03, D05 and D06) but drew lesser support from the established public housing estates (D09 to D12). By contrast, Mr Lau Kong-wah (UDHK) had secured a considerable support in the established public housing estates (D09, D11 and D12), but polled relatively low in the remaining polling stations. The same also went for Mr Johnston Wong Hong-chung (UDHK) who had only led in one sample polling station (D09). The remaining two independent candidates, Mr Choi Man-hing and Mr Eric Leung Kai-ching, had obtained a vote share of only 0.4% and 0.2%, respectively.

Figure 7.6 New Territories East: Exit Poll's Vote Share

Percentage of Vote

Polling Stations

- Andrew WONG + Johnston WONG * Eric LEUNG
- Tony KAN * CHOI Man-hing + Emily LAU
- LAU Kong-wah

291

This constituency comprises the three administrative districts of Islands, Tsuen Wan, and Kwai Tsing. Tsuen Wan was first developed in the early 1960s, when it was still a pre-dominantly rural area with some small-scale light industrial factories. After three decades of development, Tsuen Wan had become the first rural-converted urban community with a significant but declining rural influence. Because of the rapid growth of population and industry there, the nearby Kwai Tsing areas were also developed to accommodate this expansion. Therefore, these two districts had a predominantly working class and public housing population. By contrast, Islands area has remained a rural community with a small and ageing population.

In the 13 sample polling stations, two were drawn from Islands area (A01 and A02), five from Tsuen Wan (F03 to F07), and six from Kwai Tsing (J08 to J13). In regard to demographic composition, F04 and F07 had a higher percentage of population engaging in professional and managerial work (25.5% and 32%, respectively) and receiving tertiary education (9.4% and 11.4%).[480] Six districts had an overwhelming public housing population.[481] They were: F05 (94.8%), F06 (87.6%), J10 (99.9%), J11 (68.2%), J12 (91%), and J13 (91.6%). In addition, there was a correspondingly high percentage of blue-collar workers living in these 6 districts, ranging from 53.7% (F06) to 68.2% (J12) and a lower percentage receiving tertiary education, ranging from 3.3% (J10 and J12) to 7% (F06).

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[480]Relatively speaking, these percentage were at the lower end of the scale when comparing with that of HKIE, HKIW, and KC.

[481]R08 might be added to the list, but we are prevented from doing so due to the lumping of R08 and R09 into a single census district. Thus, the details of its demographic composition could not be traced back on the CD-ROM. Based on my judgement and the location of the said polling station, the electorate of R08 would mainly include the residents of the Kwai Fong (public housing) Estate. The lumping of two polling stations within one census district was also found in A01 and A02, but seemed not to cause much problem because of their rural nature.

As shown in Figure 7.7, the three democrat candidates dominated the competition with the exception of the rural A01 and A02, and urban F05. Mr Lee Wing-tat and Mr Albert Chan Wai-yip, both nominated by the UDHK, had led Mr Leung Yiu-chung (NWSC) in all the sample polling stations in Islands and Tsuen Wan areas by a comfortable margin; and the joint-jacket election strategy seemed to be effective. But the situation turned to confusion in Kwai Tsing area where Mr Leung had worked for the blue-collar workers for years and he received widespread grassroots support there. For example, Mr Leung received over half of the total vote in J08. The rather strong working-class image and policy stance of Mr Leung seemed not to be acceptable to the voters in the two middle class districts of F04 and F07. Mr Yeung Fuk-kwong (pro-conservative independent) acquired a significant support from the rural districts and in his sphere of influence, F05. But he was defeated by the democrat candidates in most of the remaining sample polling stations, even in the middle-class districts of F04 and F07.

Figure 7.7 New Territories South: Exit Poll's Vote Share

294

This constituency comprised the two administrative districts of Tuen Mun and Yuen Long. Tuen Mun is a newly-developed satellite town with an overwhelming population of urban migrants who mainly live in high-rise public housing or home-ownership estates. On the other hand, Yeun Long has remained, more or less, a rural community but with a growing population of urban origin. In the 11 sample polling stations, only one sample polling station could really be regarded as a rural district. This might probably under-estimate the electoral strength of the rural forces and has contributed to the presence of a remarkable gap between the official and the exit poll's vote share of most of the candidates. As a result, the weighted poll shares of Mr Ng Ming-yum (UDHK) and Mr Zachary Wong Wai-yin (MP) were both over 3% more than what they actually had; and Mr Tai Chin-wah (rural conservatives), Mr Tso Shui-wai (LDF), and Mr Tang Siu-tong (rural conservatives) were predicted lower than what they actually achieved, ranging from about 1.4% to 3.1%. (see Table 7.6) On the other hand, seven districts were packed with public housing estates. They were (% of public housing population): H04 (98.5%), G05 (90.7%), G06 (78.8%), G07 (76%), G08 (99.9%), G09 (66.7%), and G10 (93.9%). The corresponding percentage of blue-collar workers was probably higher than that of other constituencies, ranging from 60.6% (G09) to 78.7% (G08). Besides, these seven districts also had a lower percentage of population receiving tertiary education, ranging from only 1.2% (G08 and G10) to 3.9% (G09). On the contrary, the remaining four districts had a higher percentage of professional and managerial workers, especially in G11 (24.7%) and H02 (20.5%).

Excluding H03 and H04, Mr Ng appeared to lead in all sample polling stations, with a tremendous support in Tuen Mun where he had engaged in pressure group politics for years. In the seemingly middle class district (G11), Mr Ng had also wielded his third highest electoral support. His campaign partner, Mr Wong, had managed to beat his rival, Mr Tso, in four out of seven of Tuen Mun's sample polling stations. By judging the poll finding in H03, Mr Tai seemed to have tremendous support in rural districts. But the misleading low electoral support of Mr

295

Tai in Tuen Mun might probably be related to his supporters' non-response attitude towards the interviewers of the exit poll.[482] The same might also be applied to the other two rural-supported candidates, Mr Tang and Mr Tso.

Figure 7.8 New Territories West: Exit Poll's Vote Share

Percentage of Vote

Polling Stations

— TANG Siu-tong + TSO Shiu-wai ✳ TAI Chin-wah
🔲 NG Ming-yum ✳ Zachary WONG

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
[482]I gained this impression from the exit poll's interviewers in that constituency.

New Territories North

Like the New Territories West constituency, this constituency was also a rural-converted satellite town developed since the 1970s. It comprises the administrative districts of the North and Tai Po. With the advantage of being near to Shatin, Tai Po had undergone a quicker pace of urbanisation than the North area. Accompanying the urbanisation process was the gradual build-up of public housing and home-ownership estates, and the influx of urban migrants. As noted in the previous chapter, the inadequacy of communal facilities and transportation had given birth to the formation of pressure groups at the local level. Tai Po and the North areas were no exception. Similar to that of the New Territories West, the election battles have usually been fought between the rural conservatives and the urban democrats. There was altogether six contenders in this constituency: Mr Fung Chi-wood (UDHK), Mr Tik Chi-yuen (MP), Mr Johnny Wong Chi-keung (LDF), Mr Cheung Hon-chung (LDF), Mr Ronald Chow Mei-tak (HKADPL and then current LegCo member), and Mr Tong Wai-man (independent).

Seven polling stations had been chosen as samples. Two of them (E04 and E05) were dominated by private-housing flats or estates. The remaining 5 mainly comprised a public housing population, ranging from 60.5% (E06) to 96.7% (B03). The usual correlation of housing type with other demographic characteristics also applied in this constituency. Higher percentage of professional and managerial workers and of tertiary education were found to live in private housing, for example, E04 and E05 had about a quarter of their working population engaging in professional work and about 7.6% population receiving tertiary education. By contrast, the remaining five had tended to have more blue-collar working population, ranging from 54.1% (B01) to 64.7% (B03); relatively lower percentage of professional workers, ranging from 9.4% (B03) to 17.9% (E07) and receiving tertiary education, ranging from 2.3% (B03) to 4.8% (E07).

The joint ticket strategy of Mr Fung and Mr Tik appeared to be effective and they led in the first two places in five polling stations. As shown in Figure 7.9, Mr

297

Tik had drawn his electoral support from the North area while Mr Fung had drawn his support from Tai Po. Their electoral support seemed to cut across housing types and occupation as reflected in their constant support in private housing districts (like E04) and public housing districts (B03). Mr Wong and Mr Chow had acquired support in a quite even manner but lacked a sufficient amount of votes to win. Mr Cheung tended to draw his support in North area (especially in B03) but slid significantly in Tai Po; and this probably reflected the limited reach of his local influence. Mr Tong had remained a low-flyer throughout all the sample stations.

Figure 7.9 New Territories North: Exit Poll's Vote Share

Given that the non-operationalisation of the centre-periphery cleavage (in terms of democratisation and autonomy) by the 1991 Census data variables, the regression analysis of the 1991 Census data could therefore only be employed to discover the effect of contextual factors on voting.[483] As shown in Table 7.7, five independent variables of social and economic structures are introduced. They are: HKBORN, TERTIARY, PUBLIC HOUSING, PROFESSIONAL, and BLUE COLLAR. The dependent variable is the combined votes share of the UDHK and the MP (UDHKMP). The decision not to include the dummy variables of "Leftist" and "Conservative" candidates is taken because (1) there is no territory-wide competition among the democrats, the leftists and the conservatives, and (2) the effects of constituency and dummy variables are unidentified given that all of the leftist candidates and nearly all of the conservative candidates were defeated. Therefore, a choice is made to separate constituencies into those with and those without leftist candidates for regression analysis.

In the three constituencies with the participation of the leftist candidates (N=36 polling stations), as shown in Table 7.8, no variable is entered into the regression line. The possible explanation of this would be the crosscutting effect of the centre-periphery cleavage on the collective consumption cleavage. That means the voters who supported the democrats tended to put more emphasis on the issues of democratisation and autonomy than on the issue of collective consumption in these three constituencies. As shown in Figures 7.1, 7.3, and 7.4, the socio-economic differences of these polling stations seemed to have little influence on the vote share of the UDHK candidates.

For the remaining six constituencies (64 polling stations), the NTE constituency is excluded from further analysis because of the presence of a charismatic pro-democrat independent, Miss Emily Lau Wai-hing, whose political stance is more aggressive and reform-oriented than that of the UDHK and the MP,

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[483]On regression analysis of census data on voting, see T.J. Nossiter, *Communism in Kerala: A Study in Political Adaptation* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1982), chap. 12.

and who received significant electoral supports and even beat the UDHK candidates there.[484] The NTE constituency would therefore be considered as an deviant case. The regression analysis showed that two variables, HKBORN ($R^2 = .11$, $p < .05$) and TERTIARY ($R^2 = .12$, $p < .01$) accounted for 23% of variance in UDHKMP vote share (as shown in Table 7.8). It hints that candidates nominated by the UDHK and the MP appeared to draw more support from the polling stations where higher percentages of population are local-born or have received tertiary education.

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[484]If including the NTE constituency, no variable is entered into the regression equation.

<u>Analysis of Poll Data</u>

In this section, two sets of opinion poll data are employed to estimate the effects of various social and economic variables as well as issue positions on the voters' vote choices.[485] These two opinion polls were commissioned by the *Sing Tao Jih Wan Pao*, the *Hong Kong Standard* and the *Tin Tin Daily News* (for questionnaires, see Appendixes 1 & 2). The first and second polls were conducted, by telephone interviews, from 13 to 19 August and from 7 to 11 September 1991 respectively.[486] The sample pools of these surveys were generated by adding the telephone prefixes supplied by the Hong Kong Telecom with the suffixes, which were selected randomly by computer. The respective successful cases for the first and second polls were 1,000 and 1,007 (out of 14,653 and 8,336). In order to analyze respondents' vote choices, we only select those cases in which the respondents expressed their vote choices for subsequent statistical analysis. Therefore, the respective cases used for analysis in the first and second polls were 569 and 388 (56.9% and 38.5% of the successful cases respectively).

As shown in Table 7.9, the distribution of the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents in the first and second opinion survey data sets do not vary significantly. But one thing we must bear in mind is the difference of sex and age distribution between the 1991 Final Register of Electors and the two opinion polls. In terms of sex distribution, there is about 5% more males in the two opinion polls

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[485]Given that every respondent (voter) has two votes, three types of vote choices are, therefore, being classified: support democrats (two votes casted to democrat candidates), no clear preference (only one of the votes casted to democrat candidates), and not support democrats (none of the votes casted to democrat candidates). The following are being classified as democrat candidates: those nominated by the UDHK, the MP, the HKADPL, the HKDF, the NWSC, as well as Emily LAU Wai-hing, Diana LEUNG Wai-tung, and Dragon John YOUNG. (for abbreviations, see Table 6.1)

[486]The telephone density in Hong Kong was 60 telephones per 100 population by the end of 1991, which was regarded as the highest in South-east Asia. See Hong Kong Government, *Hong Kong 1992: A Review of 1991* (Hong Kong: Government Printer, 1992), p. 292.

than in the 1991 Final Register of Electors. The respective percentages of males in the 1991 Final Register of Electors, the first and second opinion polls are 52.9%, 58.5% and 57.8%. In terms of age distribution, the samples of the two opinion polls are over-represented by the age groups of 21-30, 31-40, and 41-50; and under-represented by the age groups of 51-60, and 61 or above (for details, see Tables 7.1, 7.2, and 7.9).

Given that the research designs of all of the 1991 LegCo opinion surveys do not intend to test the effects of the cleavages of centre-periphery relations and collective consumption on vote choices, the two opinion surveys employed are no exception. In these two opinion polls, only the centre-periphery cleavage could be operationalized by one's attitude towards the increase of LegCo directly-elected seats in the first poll and by one's attitude towards Chinese pro-democracy movement in the second poll. Therefore, we are forced to create a dummy variable as a proxy to measure the effect of collective consumption on vote choices. A dummy variable, CREDIBILITY, is constructed by assigning "1" to those candidates who have a track record of defending grassroots' interests, or whose image and social status are matched with their pledges in their campaign materials to oppose government privatisation programmes, and "0" to the rest of the candidates.[487] It is assumed that those respondents who vote for any one of the candidates in category "1" regard the issue of collective consumption as their major consideration in vote deliberation.

In the first opinion poll, personal monthly income (INCOME), attitude towards LegCo directly-elected seats (SEAT-INCREASE and SEAT-DECREASE), and CREDIBILITY are associated with vote choice, as shown in Tables 7.10a, 7.10b, 7.10c and 7.10d. Those respondents who have a higher monthly income, who support the increase of LegCo directly-elected seats, and who support those

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[487]Candidates being grouped under category "1" included: Mr Cheng Kai-nam, Dr Yeung Sum, Mr Szeto Wah, Mr Li Wah-ming, Mr Hau Shui-pui, Mr Lau Chin-shek, Mr Lam Kui-shing, Ms Chan Yuen-han, Mr Fung Kin-kee, Mr To Kun-sun, Mr Kan Chung-nin, Mr Lau Kong-wah, Mr Wong Hong-chung, Mr Lee Wing-tat, Mr Chan Wai-yip, Mr Leung Yiu-chung, Mr Ng Ming-yum, Mr Wong Wai-yin, Mr Fung Chi-wood, Mr Tik Chi-yuen, and Mr Chow Mei-tak.

candidates that have been judged to have the credibility to defend the grassroots' interest and to oppose the privatisation programmes, tended to vote for two democrat candidates, and vice versa. Sex, age, educational attainment, and birth place do not have an association with vote choice.

In the second opinion poll, educational attainment (EDUCATION), whether candidates support the Chinese democracy movement (SUPPORT), and CREDIBILITY are associated with vote choice, as shown in Tables 7.11a, 7.11b and 7.11c. Those respondents who have a higher educational attainment, who claim to consider whether candidates support the Chinese democracy movement, and who support those candidates that have been judged to have the credibility to defend the grassroots' interest and to oppose the privatisation programmes, tended to vote for two democrat candidates, and vice versa. Sex, age, income and birth place do not have an association with one's vote choices.

In order to estimate the probability of the effect of each of the above-mentioned independent and dummy variables on respondents' vote choices, PROBIT analysis is employed. In the first opinion poll, two sets of dummy variables, SEAT-INCREASE and SEAT-DECREASE, and CREDIBILITY, have been found to have greater probability to have effect on VOTE CHOICE. The respective estimated coefficients are 0.1888, -0.7666 and 0.5574, as shown in Table 7.12. Although the estimated coefficient of SEAT-DECREASE is the highest among the three, its significance level is low ($p > 0.1$). Adding to this is the very small number of respondents ($N=6$) having this kind of political stance (see Table 7.10c). Therefore, it is not reliable to conclude that SEAT-DECREASE has the greatest probability of effecting respondents' vote choices. As a result, the variable of CREDIBILITY becomes the single factor that has the greatest probability of having an effect on vote choice ($p < 0.001$). In other words, other things being equal, the issue of collective consumption has more effect than the issue of democratisation on respondents' vote choices.

On the other hand, two variables, SUPPORT and EDUCATION, have been found to have greater probability to have effect on vote choices in the second opinion poll. As shown in Table 7.13, the respective estimated coefficients are -0.5411 (p < 0.001) and 0.1464 (p < 0.05). Statistically speaking, SUPPORT has a greater probability than EDUCATION to have effect on vote choices. It is interesting to note here that CREDIBILITY does not have the same effect on vote choices as in the first opinion poll (estimated coefficient = -0.0895, p > 0.25). The estimated coefficients of SEX and BIRTH PLACE are -0.1476 and -0.1591, and not at an acceptable significance level (p > 0.15 and p > 0.11).

The above findings demonstrate that the issues of centre-periphery relations and collective consumption have carried more weight than other socio-economic factors in determining one's vote choices. Furthermore, the shifting salience from the collective consumption issue in the first opinion poll to the issue of centre-periphery relations in the second opinion poll could probably be explained in the light of the political climate and electoral campaign in the 1991 LegCo direct elections, which had been mentioned in Chapter 6. First of all, the Chinese Government had helped to reinforce the salience of centre-periphery relations by criticising relentlessly those prominent democrat candidates, Mr Martin Lee and Mr Szeto Wah, who have enjoyed widespread support within Hong Kong. Second, during the course of electoral campaign, the democrat and the leftist candidates competed most strongly with each other over the issue of centre-periphery relations, and seldom over the issue of collective consumption because they held the same view and attitude towards the latter issue.

Table 7.1

Electorate and Hong Kong Population Aged 21 and above by
Sex (%), 1991

Sex	1991 Final Register of Electors	1991 Hong Kong Population Census
Male	52.9	50.5
Female	47.1	49.5
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(1,916,925)	(3,880,542)

Source: adapted from Louie Kin-sheun et al., "Who Voted in
the 1991 Elections? A Socio-Demographic Profile of the Hong
Kong Electorate," in Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds.,
Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong
(Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1993), p. 4, Table 1.

Table 7.2

Electorate and Hong Kong Population Aged 21 and above by
Age Group (%), 1991

Age Group	1991 Final Register of Electors	1991 Hong Kong Population Census
21-30	16.9	27.2
31-40	31.8	27.2
41-50	19.1	15.4
51-60	14.7	13.2
61 & above	17.5	17.1
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(1,899,733)	(3,880,542)

Source: adapted from Louie Kin-sheun et al., "Who Voted in
the 1991 Elections? A Socio-Demographic Profile of the Hong
Kong Electorate," in Lau Siu-kai and Louie Kin-sheun, eds.,
Hong Kong Tried Democracy: The 1991 Elections in Hong Kong
(Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1993), p. 5, Table 2.

Table 7.3

Summary of the 1991 Legislative Council Elections

Constit- uency	Forecast Populat- ion (A)	Registered Electorate (B)	A / B (%)	Turnout (%)
(I) DIRECT ELECTIONS				
Hong Kong Island East	794,900	261,573	32.9	103,028 (39.39)
Hong Kong Island West	540,700	171,052	31.6	68,979 (40.33)
Kowloon East	570,300	217,117	38.1	82,405 (37.95)
Kowloon Central	751,300	287,373	38.3	110,043 (38.29)
Kowloon West	731,500	213,345	29.2	69,483 (32.57)
New Territ- ories East	656,100	197,614	30.1	96,637 (48.90)
New Territ- ories South	742,400	248,045	33.4	91,780 (37.00)
New Territ- ories West	647,600	198,817	30.7	81,468 (40.98)
New Territ- ories North	392,400	121,989	31.1	46,644 (38.24)
TOTAL	5,827,200	1,916,925	32.9	750,467 (39.15)
(II) FUNCTIONAL ELECTIONS				
First Commercial		1,609		911 (56.62)
Second Commercial		2,348		Uncontested
First Industrial		460		Uncontested

306

Second Industrial	1,366	390 (28.55)
Finance	234	Uncontested
Financial Services	694	556 (80.12)
Teaching	38,678	17,034 (44.04)
Labour (2 seats)	378	Uncontested
Social Services	181	Uncontested
Medical	4,031	Uncontested
Health Care	10,636	Uncontested
Legal	1,240	714 (57.58)
Engineering	2,805	1,511 (53.87)
Architectural, Surveying and Planning	1,481	1,039 (70.16)
Accountancy	2,276	Uncontested
Real Estate and Construction	373	Uncontested
Tourism	847	728 (85.95)
Urban Council	40	Uncontested
Regional Council	36	36 (100.00)
Rural	112	Uncontested
TOTAL	69,825 (48,756)*	22919 (47.01)

* Excluding the electorate of 12 uncontested seats.

Source: compiled and calculated from the data supplied by the Registration and Electoral Office, Constitutional Affairs Branch, Government Secretariat, Hong Kong Government.

Table 7.4

Results of the 1991 LegCo Direct Elections

Constituency/Name	Vote Given	Vote Share (A)	(B)
HONG KONG ISLAND EAST			
LEE Chu-ming, Martin*	76831	74.6	40.2
MAN Sai-cheong*	43615	42.3	22.8
CHENG Kai-nam	29902	29.0	15.6
CHAN Ying-lun	19806	19.2	10.4
LEUNG Wai-tung, Diana	15230	14.8	8.0
CHOW Kit-bing, Jennifer	5805	5.6	3.0
HONG KONG ISLAND WEST			
YEUNG Sum*	45108	65.4	34.8
HUANG Chen-ya*	31052	45.0	24.0
CHAN Yuk-cheung, David	29413	42.6	22.7
CHANG Yau-hung, Alexander	12145	17.6	9.4
WONG Man-chiu, Ronnie	6113	8.9	4.7
CHEUNG Wai-sun, Winnie	5821	8.4	4.5
KOWLOON EAST			
SZETO Wah*	57921	70.3	37.8
LI Wah-ming*	49643	60.2	32.4
HAU Shui-pui	21225	25.8	13.9
POON Chi-fai	16625	20.2	10.9
CHAN Cheong	3431	4.2	2.2
LI Ting-kit	3393	4.1	2.2
LI Koi-hop, Philip	865	1.0	0.6
KOWLOON CENTRAL			
LAU Chin-shek*	68489	62.2	34.2
LAM Kui-shing, Conrad*	56084	51.0	28.0
CHAN Yuen-han	44894	40.8	22.4
CHAN Chi-kwan, Peter	14145	12.9	7.1
YEUNG Lai-yin, Cecilia	8257	7.5	4.1
YOUNG, Dragon John	6273	5.7	3.1
CHEUNG Chung-ming, Justin	2158	2.0	1.1
KOWLOON WEST			
FUNG Kin-kee, Frederick*	36508	52.5	28.9
TO Kun-sun, James*	26352	37.9	20.9
LEE Yu-tai, Desmond	21471	30.9	17.0
SIT Ho-yin, Kingsley	18634	26.8	14.8
LAW Cheung-kwok	17145	24.7	13.6
NG Kin-sun	6098	8.8	4.8

NEW TERRITORIES EAST

LAU Wai-hing, Emily*	46515	48.1	26.3
WONG Wang-fat, Andrew*	39806	41.2	22.5
KAN Chung-nin, Tony	37126	38.4	21.0
LAU Kong-wah	26659	27.6	15.1
WONG Hong-chung, Johnston	26156	27.1	14.8
CHOI Man-hing	348	0.4	0.2
LEUNG Ka-ching, Eric	306	0.3	0.2

NEW TERRITORIES SOUTH

LEE Wing-tat*	52192	56.9	32.0
CHAN Wai-yip, Albert*	42164	45.9	25.9
LEUNG Yiu-chung	38568	42.0	23.7
YEUNG Fuk-kwong	30095	32.8	18.5

NEW TERRITORIES WEST

NG Ming-yum*	42319	51.9	29.4
TAI Chin-wah*	30871	37.9	21.5
WONG Wai-yin, Zachary	27243	33.4	18.9
TANG Siu-tong	23389	28.7	16.3
TSO Shiu-wai	20018	24.6	13.9

NEW TERRITORIES NORTH

FUNG Chi-wood*	23267	49.9	27.3
TIK Chi-yuen*	21702	46.5	25.5
CHEUNG Hon-chung	16221	34.8	19.1
WONG Chi-keung, Johnny	15350	32.9	18.0
CHOW Mei-tak, Ronald	7117	15.3	8.4
TONG Wai-man	1429	3.1	1.7

Notes:
1. Vote Share (A) = % of individual vote given over sum of vote cast in that constituency; Vote Share (B) = % of individual vote given over sum of vote cast in that constituency.
2. The symbol "*" denoted the returned candidates.

Source: compiled and calculated from the data bank supplied by the Registration and Electoral Office, Constitutional Affairs Branch, Government Secretariat, Hong Kong Government.

Table 7.5

Vote Share by Political Affiliation in 1991 LegCo Direct
Elections

Name	Candidates	Seats	Vote Share (%)	
Democrats:				
UDHK	14	12	45.1	
MP	3	2	7.2	
HKADPL	3	1	4.4	
HKDF	1	0	1.4	
NWSC	1	0	2.8	
sub-total				61.0
Pro-Democrat				
Independents	3	1	5.0	5.0
Conservatives:				
LDF	5*	0	5.1	
Rural	3	1	5.3	
NHKA	2	0	0.9	
sub-total				11.3
Pro-Conservative				
Independents	6	0	8.2	8.2
Leftists:				
FTU	1	0	3.3	
HKCF	1	0	2.2	
KTMCA	1	0	1.6	
sub-total				7.0
Rightist:				
TUC	1	0	0.2	0.2
Others	9	1	7.2	7.2
TOTAL	54	18	100.0	100.0

*Mr Cheung Hon-cheung of the NTN constituency had regarded
himself as an independent candidate. Nevertheless, the
nomination list supplied to me by the LDF had included his
name.

Source: see Table 7.4.

Table 7.6

Comparison of Official and Exit Poll's Results of the 1991
LegCo Direct Elections

Constituency/Name	Official Vote Share	TVB's Exit Poll (A)	(B)	(C)
HONG KONG ISLAND EAST				
LEE Chu-ming, Martin*	40.2	40.4	40.4	41.1
MAN Sai-cheong*	22.8	23.9	23.9	23.9
CHENG Kai-nam	15.6	14.9	14.9	14.9
CHAN Ying-lun	10.4	9.9	9.9	9.7
LEUNG Wai-tung, Diana	8.0	7.9	7.9	7.6
CHOW Kit-bing, Jennifer	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9
HONG KONG ISLAND WEST				
YEUNG Sum*	34.8	35.8	35.4	36.1
HUANG Chen-ya*	24.0	25.1	24.8	24.7
CHAN Yuk-cheung, David	22.7	22.3	22.6	22.6
CHANG Yau-hung, Alexander	9.4	8.4	8.5	8.5
WONG Man-chiu, Ronnie	4.7	4.4	4.8	4.2
CHEUNG Wai-sun, Winnie	4.5	3.9	4.0	3.9
KOWLOON EAST				
SZETO Wah*	37.8	38.7	38.7	38.6
LI Wah-ming*	32.4	31.5	31.5	32.1
HAU Shui-pui	13.9	14.2	14.2	14.3
POON Chi-fai	10.9	11.0	11.0	10.6
CHAN Cheong	2.2	2.4	2.4	2.3
LI Ting-kit	2.2	1.8	1.8	1.6
LI Koi-hop, Philip	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.6
KOWLOON CENTRAL				
LAU Chin-shek*	34.2	36.0	36.0	36.5
LAM Kui-shing, Conrad*	28.0	29.7	29.6	29.1
CHAN Yuen-han	22.4	21.2	21.0	21.2
CHAN Chi-kwan, Peter	7.1	6.1	6.4	6.2
YEUNG Lai-yin, Cecilia	4.1	3.6	3.5	3.5
YOUNG, Dragon John	3.1	2.6	2.6	2.6
CHEUNG Chung-ming, Justin	1.1	0.9	0.9	0.9
KOWLOON WEST				
FUNG Kin-kee, Frederick*	28.9	28.8	29.6	30.0
TO Kun-sun, James*	20.9	20.6	20.6	20.7
LEE Yu-tai, Desmond	17.0	17.1	16.7	16.5
SIT Ho-yin, Kingsley	14.8	15.1	14.7	14.9
LAW Cheung-kwok	13.6	13.9	14.2	14.0
NG Kin-sun	4.8	4.6	4.2	3.9

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NEW TERRITORIES EAST
LAU Wai-hing, Emily*        26.3        26.0    26.0    26.4
WONG Wang-fat, Andrew*      22.5        22.8    22.7    22.4
KAN Chung-nin, Tony         21.0        19.4    19.5    19.7
LAU Kong-wah                15.1        16.8    16.8    16.6
WONG Hong-chung, Johnston14.8           14.4    14.4    14.5
CHOI Man-hing                0.2         0.3     0.3     0.2
LEUNG Ka-ching, Eric         0.2         0.3     0.3     0.2


NEW TERRITORIES SOUTH
LEE Wing-tat*               32.0        31.4    31.2    30.9
CHAN Wai-yip, Albert*       25.9        25.3    27.1    27.4
LEUNG Yiu-chung             23.7        24.6    23.9    23.8
YEUNG Fuk-kwong             18.5        18.8    17.8    17.9


NEW TERRITORIES WEST
NG Ming-yum*                29.4        32.5    33.6    33.9
TAI Chin-wah*               21.5        20.1    18.6    18.6
WONG Wai-yin, Zachary       18.9        22.2    22.3    21.9
TANG Siu-tong               16.3        13.2    12.4    12.5
TSO Shiu-wai                13.9        12.0    13.1    13.1


NEW TERRITORIES NORTH
FUNG Chi-wood*              27.3        27.9    27.9    28.4
TIK Chi-yuen*               25.5        27.7    27.7    27.4
CHEUNG Hon-chung            19.1        15.6    15.6    15.8
WONG Chi-keung, Johnny      18.0        18.5    18.5    18.2
CHOW Mei-tak, Ronald         8.4         8.7     8.7     8.7
TONG Wai-man                 1.7         1.6     1.6     1.5
```

Notes:
1.   The symbol "*" denoted the returned candidates.
2.   Vote Share = % of individual vote given over sum
     of vote given in that constituency.
3.   TVB's Exit Poll: (A) = revised (weighted) vote
     share in the origin data bank; (B) = vote share
     in the origin data bank; (C) = vote share after
     double-checked by me on the raw data sheets.

Sources: see Table 7.4, and TVB's exit poll.

Table 7.7

Ecological Analysis: Variables in Multiple Regression

Short Label	Full Variable	Form of Variable
HKBORN	Residents Born in Hong Kong as % of Total Population	%
PROFESSIONAL	Professional Workers as % of Total Workforce (excluding armed forces)	%
BLUE COLLAR	Blue Collar as % of Total Work-force (excluding armed forces)	%
PUBLIC HOUSING	Residents Living in Public Housing Estates as % of Total Population	%
TERTIARY	Residents Received Tertiary Education as % of Total Population	%
UDHKMP	Combined Vote Share of the UDHK and the MP as % of Total Vote Cast	%

Table 7.8

Ecological Analysis: Multiple Regression

Dependent Variable	No. of Cases	Stepwise Order Independent Variables & Sign	F-value & Significance Level	R^2
UDHKMP	36	No Variable Entered		
UDHKMP	64	No Variable Entered		
UDHKMP	52	+HKBORN	6.18*	.11
		+TERTIARY	7.48**	.23

* denoted $p < .05$
** denoted $p < .01$

Table 7.9

Socio-Economic Characteristics of Respondents in the First
(13-19 August 1991) and Second (7-11 September 1991)
Opinion Polls

| VARIABLES | OPINION SURVEYS | |
	FIRST	SECOND
SEX		
Male	585 (58.5%)	582 (57.8%)
Female	415 (41.5%)	425 (42.2%)
AGE		
21-25	73 (7.3%)	77 (7.6%)
26-30	172 (17.2%)	151 (15.0%)
31-35	189 (18.9%)	209 (20.8%)
36-40	189 (18.9%)	180 (17.9%)
41-45	106 (10.6%)	132 (13.1%)
46-50	77 (7.7%)	73 (7.2%)
51-55	55 (5.5%)	44 (4.4%)
56-60	42 (4.2%)	41 (4.1%)
61 or above	97 (9.7%)	100 (9.9%)
EDUCATION		
No schooling	44 (4.4%)	43 (4.3%)
Primary	242 (24.2%)	242 (24.0%)
Lower secondary	215 (21.5%)	203 (20.2%)
Upper secondary	293 (29.3%)	294 (29.2%)
Matriculation	42 (4.2%)	46 (4.6%)
College & university	164 (16.4%)	178 (17.7%)
No answer	0 (0%)	1 (0.1%)
INCOME		
No income	245 (24.5%)	254 (25.2%)
HK$3,000 or below	29 (2.9%)	28 (2.8%)
HK$3,001-HK$5,000	118 (11.8%)	103 (10.2%)
HK$5,001-HK$8,000	219 (21.9%)	224 (22.2%)
HK$8,001-HK$10,000	129 (12.9%)	126 (12.5%)
HK$10,001-HK$15,000	147 (14.7%)	145 (14.4%)
HK$15,001-HK$20,000	34 (3.4%)	43 (4.3%)
HK$20,001 or above	68 (6.8%)	72 (7.1%)
No answer	11 (1.1%)	12 (1.2%)
BIRTH PLACE		
Hong Kong	624 (62.4%)	634 (63.0%)
China	335 (33.5%)	332 (33.0%)
Others	40 (4.0%)	39 (3.9%)
No answer	1 (0.1%)	2 (0.2%)
TOTAL (N)	1,000 (100%)	1,007 (100%)

Table 7.10a

Vote Choices by Personal Monthly Income: First Opinion Poll

VOTE CHOICES	INCOME			
	A	B	C	D
Support democrats	89 42.4%	111 53.1%	61 52.6%	16 47.1%
No clear preference	55 26.2%	55 26.3%	38 32.8%	9 26.5%
Not support democrats	66 31.4%	43 20.6%	17 14.7%	9 26.5%
TOTAL	210 100%	209 100%	116 100.1%*	34 100.1%*

N=569, p < 0.05

* due to rounding.

Notes:
A   =   No income and HK$5,000 or below.
B   =   HK$5,001 - HK$10,000.
C   =   HK$10,001 - HK$20,000.
D   =   HK$20,001 or above.

Table 7.10b

Vote Choices by the Increase of LegCo Directly-elected
Seats (SEAT-INCREASE): First Opinion Poll

VOTE CHOICES	INCREASE LEGCO DIRECTLY-ELECTED SEATS	
	Yes	No
Support democrats	119 55.9%	158 44.4%
No clear preference	59 27.7%	98 27.5%
Not support democrats	35 16.4%	100 28.1%
TOTAL	213 100%	356 100%

N=569, p < 0.005

Table 7.10c

Vote Choices by the Decrease of LegCo Directly-elected
Seats (SEAT-DECREASE): First Opinion Poll

VOTE CHOICES	DECREASE LEGCO DIRECTLY-ELECTED SEATS	
	Yes	No
Support democrats	1 16.7%	276 49.0%
No clear preference	5 83.3%	152 27.0%
Not support democrats	0 0%	135 24.0%
TOTAL	6 100%	563 100%

N=569, p < 0.01

Table 7.10d

Vote Choices by Credibility: First Opinion Poll

VOTE CHOICES	CREDIBILITY	
	Yes	No
Support democrats	206 56.4%	71 34.8%
No clear preference	143 39.2%	14 6.9%
Not support democrats	16 4.4%	119 58.3%
TOTAL	365 100%	204 100%

N=569, p < 0.0001

Table 7.11a

Vote Choices by Education: Second Opinion Poll

VOTE CHOICES	EDUCATION			
	A	B	C	D
Support democrats	33 37.5%	38 44.2%	63 50.0%	56 63.6%
No clear preference	44 50.0%	33 38.4%	49 38.9%	29 33.0%
Not support democrats	11 12.5%	15 17.4%	14 11.1%	3 3.4%
TOTAL	88 100%	86 100%	126 100%	88 100%

N=388, p < 0.01

Notes:
A = No schooling and primary level.
B = Lower secondary level.
C = Upper secondary and matriculation level.
D = College and university level.

Table 7.11b

Vote Choices by Consideration of Whether the Candidates Support the Chinese Democracy Movement (SUPPORT): Second Opinion Poll

VOTE CHOICES	WHETHER SUPPORT CHINESE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT	
	Consider	Not Consider
Support democrats	120 58.8%	70 38.0%
No clear preference	70 34.3%	85 46.2%
Not support democrats	14 6.9%	29 15.8%
TOTAL	204 100%	184 100%

N=388, p < 0.001

Table 7.11c

Vote Choices by Credibility: Second Opinion Poll

VOTE CHOICES	CREDIBILITY	
	Yes	No
Support democrats	139 48.4%	51 50.5%
No clear preference	138 48.1%	17 16.8%
Not support democrats	10 3.5%	33 32.7%
TOTAL	287 100%	101 100%

N=388, p < 0.0001

Table 7.12

Estimation of Effects on Vote Choices: PROBIT Analysis of
First Opinion Poll Data

VARIABLE	ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS	STANDARD ERROR
SEX	-.0310	.1223
AGE	.0525	.0891
EDUCATION	.0855	.0658
INCOME	.0348	.0787
BIRTH PLACE	.0488	.1108
SEAT-IN	.1888	.1148
SEAT-DE	-.7666	.6104
CREDIBILITY	.5574	.1139
CONSTANT	4.1330	.3951

N=569

Table 7.13

Estimation of Effects on Vote Choices: PROBIT Analysis of
Second Opinion Poll Data

VARIABLE	ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS	STANDARD ERROR
SEX	-.1476	.1495
AGE	-.0771	.1119
EDUCATION	.1464	.0784
INCOME	.0336	.0950
BIRTH PLACE	-.1591	.1348
SUPPORT	-.5411	.1347
CREDIBILITY	-.0895	.1514
CONSTANT	5.9690	.5314

N=387

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The political configurations at the time that universal suffrage is introduced have a considerable effect on the development and salience of particular electoral cleavages. Once the electoral cleavages have emerged, the electoral market will be structured by the mobilisation efforts of the concerned political groups or parties along these cleavage lines. In the context of Hong Kong, the removal of the institutional barrier of entry by the new political structure stipulated in the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984 paved the way for the entry of the new middle-class professionals into the political arena and this reflected the gradual breakdown of the monopolistic power structure, which the established elites had dominated since the founding of the Crown Colony of Hong Kong. The "1997 issue", therefore, not only signified the reversion of Hong Kong's sovereignty to China, but also the transformation of Hong Kong's political order as a result of the Chinese promise of "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong". At this juncture of transformation, the privatisation of collective consumption programmes and the expanding salary tax net resulting from the drastic decline of land revenues as a result of political uncertainty in the early 1980s and the designated use of the land fund from 1985 alienated the low-income group and the middle-class professionals.

The 1991 LegCo direct elections were, thus, the result of the interaction among various historic and structural factors, such as the widespread distrust of the communist Chinese Government by the Hong Kong people, the rise of new middle-class professionals, the tough Chinese policy towards Hong Kong's democratisation, the privatisation of government services resulted from the fiscal crisis of the British-

Hong Kong Government, and the Tiananmen Incident of 1989. All these events had, in one way or another, structured the political and electoral universe of Hong Kong, from which the enfranchised Hong Kong electors had being nurtured since 1945, and contributed to the salience of the centre-periphery and the collective consumption electoral cleavages in the 1991 LegCo direct elections.

The Centre-Periphery Cleavage

The centre-periphery cleavage denoted, here, the clash of the "centre" dominant Chinese Government with the "periphery" constituted unit(s) of Hong Kong over the pace of democratisation and the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the latter after 1997. Electorally speaking, Hong Kong's political groups and voters could be divided into the pro-centre and the pro-periphery groupings, in which the former stands for a slower pace of democratisation and accepts the degree of autonomy as allowed by China, while the latter supports a quicker pace of democratisation and fights for the maximum degree of autonomy.

The centre-periphery cleavage also reflected the mistrust between the Chinese Government, and the British-Hong Kong Government and the Hong Kong people. On the one hand, the Chinese Government appeared to have the perception that Britain did not wholeheartedly wish to see the reversion of Hong Kong's sovereignty to China and would adopt any measure to prolong the informal British presence in Hong Kong. This conspiratorial perception by Beijing coloured its judgements on the developments in Hong Kong and paved the way for the adoption of a cautious and conservative policy. For example, the political reforms initiated by the British-Hong Kong Government since the mid-1980s have been viewed as a plan to take advantage of the distrustful feelings among the Hong Kong people by planting "pro-British" politicians into the political structure through elections after 1997, and the Hong Kong Government's decision to build a new airport after the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 has been interpreted as a move to transfer Hong Kong's fiscal reserves back to Britain. Because of such an attitude, China tended to assert its authority by claiming, in the name of a smooth transition of power and convergence, to have a "veto" power in the transitional period. The Chinese suspicion and distrust further intensified after the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 when the Hong Kong people came out collectively to protest against the way the Beijing leaders had handled the democratic movement.

On the other hand, the Hong Kong Chinese have held negative feelings towards the communist Chinese Government because most of them are either refugees

or their children, who either had experienced or have been told of the misgoverning of the communist Chinese Government. The historic distrust of the communist Chinese Government had been moderated by the rise of China on the international stage in the early 1970s. China's entry into the United Nations and the Sino-American rapprochement had softened the negative attitude of the Hong Kong people, especially the local-born young intellectuals and university students, towards the Chinese Government.

The emergence of the 1997 issue in the late 1970s, however, had, more or less, challenged their national identification and their related emotional feelings. The possible loss of freedom and existing living style resulting from the reversion of Hong Kong sovereignty to China had placed the Hong Kong Chinese in a very embarrassing position. Their national romance gave way to practical considerations of their way of life. Although China promised to keep Hong Kong unchanged for 50 years and to let Hong Kong people govern Hong Kong after 1997, the trust of the Hong Kong people was not high enough to make their own hearts really at ease. Their suspicion and distrust might have been alleviated if China had made the best use of the symbol of nationalism and handled skilfully its contradictions with Hong Kong society by acting with self-restraint as a referee, rather than as an arbiter, in the local political conflicts between the conservatives and the democrats.

The bone of contention between the Chinese Government and the conservatives, on the one hand, and the democrats, on the other, lies in the pace of democratisation and the degree of autonomy allowed after 1997. As the colonial political structure was given notice with the signing of the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, political reforms were inevitable, but the pace and scope of political reforms in the transitional period was subject to differing interpretation. The mistrust between Britain and China had come into play at this critical juncture in the smooth transfer of power. The reforms aimed at having a full-fledged legislature and a more accountable executive system met with a suspicious reception from the Chinese. In order to control these developments, the Chinese Government asserted that any "major" changes in the transitional period had better converged with the

Basic Law then being drafted. The Sinologists within the British Foreign Office stressed the importance of cooperation with the Chinese Government so as to secure a viable plan, which could extend beyond 1997, for the maximum actualization of the pledges contained in the Joint Declaration. For them, any unilateral move without China's blessing would prove to be short-lived and thus, the confrontational approach would do no good for the continued stability and prosperity of Hong Kong.

The continued prevalence of this cooperative approach had been challenged by the subsequent developments after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989. The upsurge of emotional feeling within Hong Kong at the time brought pressure on the British-Hong Kong Government to do something to stabilise both the social order and the inner psychological uncertainty of most Hong Kong people. The pressure to do more was once again viewed by the Chinese Government as a plot to prevent the smooth transfer of power. Even worse, China seemed to conceive that the joint effort of Britain and other Western countries in sanctioning China and in supporting the pro-democratic Chinese activists was an offensive move to challenge the communist regime in Beijing. Thus, the mistrust and misunderstanding between Britain and China had reached the point of no return.

As for the local democrat activists, they had high hopes of reforming the colonial political system and smoothing the way for subsequent "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" in the early 1980s. This stance had been taken up by various political groups formed during or after the Sino-British negotiations, such as the MP and the NHKS. The demands for democratic government from such groups and political activists had become the prime source of conflict with the Hong Kong Government and the conservatives in the mid-1980s, when the power devolution resulting from the Sino-British Joint Declaration had taken place. Later on, however, the contradiction shifted to one between the Chinese Government and the democrats as a result of the Chinese intervention in Hong Kong domestic politics. This was well demonstrated in the 1987 political review which, under China's pressure, deferred the introduction of direct elections from 1988 to 1991, and the drafting of the Basic Law which adopted a conservative political model after 1997. The

conservative approach to political reforms and the alliance with the conservatives had put the Chinese Government at odds with the democrats. The growing Chinese intervention in local Hong Kong politics had also brought up the question of how high the "high degree" of autonomy for Hong Kong promised by the Chinese leaders and stipulated in the Joint Declaration, would be after 1997. Later in 1989, the Tiananmen Incident had not only politicised the Hong Kong society but also had driven the Hong Kong people to support the democrats' demands for a quicker pace of democratisation so as to minimise the intervention from Beijing after 1997.

The salience of the centre-periphery electoral cleavage in terms of democratisation and autonomy in the 1991 LegCo direct elections is reflected in both the salience of the issue during the electoral campaign process and the defeat of the leftist and the conservative candidates by a significant margin of votes by the leading democrats. The leftists had knitted together their local working class network for decades and believed themselves to have considerable support in the low-income groups.[488] But the ecological data at the LegCo election district level, as shown in Chapter 7, reveals that they actually showed up worse than the democrats in the working class districts. The pro-centre candidates, who strongly stressed a cooperative attitude towards China, obtained even less support than the leftists. By contrast, the democrats' leaders who played both an active role in Chinese and local democratic movements enjoyed the highest electoral support.

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[488]The leftists formed their own political organisation (party)--the Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong--in 1992.

The Collective Consumption Cleavage

The growing intervention of the Hong Kong Government in the private consumption process in the 1970s, resulting from the pressure of further capitalist economic development had two different consequences. First of all, most of the Hong Kong people improved their living standards as a result of massive government provisions of public housing, medical services and education. There was no doubt that most of the Hong Kong people had benefited from it, especially those direct recipients, and appreciated the government's benevolent effort. Second, the affected population under the Government's urban redevelopment scheme, slum clearance and land resumption drive, complained of their poor or unfair treatment and poor compensation from the Government. Although their grievances did not accumulate to the point of explosion, their negative feelings toward the Government would be reinforced and, thus, the Government's efficiency of governing would suffer.

On top of these were the growing costs of living resulting partly from the high land price policy of the Hong Kong Government and the related chain effects of price rises on other daily necessities. In order to keep the tax low enough to attract foreign investment, the Hong Kong Government had to rely on land revenues to support its massive expenditure on infrastructural construction and collective consumption programmes. The disproportionate reliance on land revenues exposed the vulnerability of the Government's fiscal capability. The real challenge had come when the 1997 issues surfaced in the late 1970s. The confidence crisis resulting from the uncertainty over the political future of Hong Kong in the early 1980s had plagued the land and property markets. Because of the sudden decline in land revenues, the Government was forced into either contracting out its activities by cutting back government expenditure and adopting a privatisation policy, or into finding new tax sources to replace the declining land revenues.

The results of the government contraction and the decline of land revenues were the shifting of the financial burden to the low-income group and the middle-class. The effect of privatisation would be tremendous because of the extensive scope

of government provisions in public housing, medical services and education. Even worse, the low-income group further suffered by the transfer of the manufacturing industries to nearby Chinese special economic zones, the import of foreign labour, and the high inflation rates in the mid- or late 1980s. The middle-class also suffered from the expanding salary tax net resulting from Government pressure to replace the loss of land revenues through the minor, inflation-proof adjustment in tax allowance. Understandably, the low-income group and the middle-class would be prone to political and electoral mobilisation, and thus, come to extend the reach of the political activists. Therefore, a territory-wide political market gradually emerged, in which the collective consumption issues became one of the principal concerns of the electors.

Dimensions of Electoral Support

Previous studies on the 1991 LegCo direct elections have been largely focused on the effect of the Tiananmen Incident on the alignment of political forces and on the voters' choice. This thesis develops these studies further by adding the domestic dimension of the social conflicts which have been developed within Hong Kong since the 1970s. The twin cleavages of centre-periphery and individual-collective consumption have been demonstrated as serving as a base of electoral division and political mobilisation.[489] Based upon these twin cleavages, a classification scheme has been constructed to frame the positioning of various political forces, which would contribute to the understanding of the electoral and political dynamics in the transitional period and after 1997. In short, it is possible to construct the following figure, based upon the centre-peripheral (in terms of democratisation and autonomy) and the individual-collective consumption (in terms of privatisation) cleavages, to demonstrate the possible electoral support for various political forces, presuming that the voters are expressing their own free will.

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[489]For stylistic consideration, the term "individual-collective consumption" is used hereafter instead of the similar term "collective consumption" which is used conventionally in the literature and elsewhere in this thesis.

Figure 8.1 Possible Dimensions of Electoral Support

PRIVATISATION

Positive

Conservatives

DEMOCRATISATION AND AUTONOMY

More   Less

Democrats   Leftists

Negative

As shown in Figure 8.1, there are four possible situations:

(1) the voters are positive towards democratisation and autonomy, and hold a negative attitude towards privatisation;

(2) the voters are negative towards democratisation and autonomy, and hold a negative attitude towards privatisation;

(3) the voters are negative towards democratisation and autonomy, and hold a positive attitude towards privatisation; and

(4) the voters are positive towards democratisation and autonomy, and hold a positive attitude towards privatisation.

334

If situation (1) emerges, the democrats are likely to receive more electoral support; if situation (2) arises, the leftists are likely to have more electoral support; if situation (3) emerges, the conservatives are likely to get more electoral support; if situation (4) arises, there is no political force (group), at this moment, to represent this.

The victory of the democrats in the 1991 LegCo direct elections reflected the fact that the majority of voters were concerned about the issues of democratisation and autonomy, but had held a negative attitude towards privatisation. But the show of value or policy preference would not necessarily be accompanied by an infallible commitment to see it actualised at all odds. That depends on whether the cost involved would be bearable or not. Given that the issues of democratisation and autonomy are more sensitive to the Beijing Government, more concerns and pressure from China would then be predictable. If voters put or are forced to put less emphasis on democratisation and autonomy, but still disapprove of the privatisation drive, they may vote strategically for those democrats who are less confrontational with the Chinese Government, or even support the leftists. Situation (4) seems not to be viable because those voters who oppose the privatisation drive would logically have to support more democratisation as only more directly-elected seats could effectively bring enough pressure to halt the privatisation move. The conservatives are fighting an uphill battle because their negative attitude towards democratisation and positive attitude towards privatisation do not match with the interests and demands of the grassroots and the middle-class. Therefore, situation (3) is not likely to emerge in the near future.

The findings and discussion in this thesis have served to explore the development of a cleavage system in Hong Kong and its impact on the alignment of political forces and on the voters' choice in the 1991 LegCo direct elections. Any generalisations and projections must be cautious because of the possible disruption of the political order resulting from the Sino-British disagreement over Governor Patten's political reforms and over the "through train" arrangement for transferring sovereignty in 1997. Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 1, Hong Kong would not

be an independent state, but a special administrative region of the PRC after 1997. Therefore, the attitude of the Beijing Government is critical to any further liberalisation or democratisation of Hong Kong's political system. Nevertheless, Hong Kong's emerging electoral cleavage structure, which is embedded in a particular pattern of social cleavages and conflicts, has been taking shape since the 1970s and will, in my view, probably remain in place after 1997. Other things being equal after 1997, the twin cleavages would have the same effect on voters' choice. How far the Beijing Government will allow Hong Kong to have a limited democracy after 1997 is not certain, but the pressure generated by the cleavage structure and released during the electoral process sets the agenda for public discussion and policy debate both before and after 1997.

Looking into the future 10 or 20 years' political order of Hong Kong, it is very likely that the role played by the Hong Kong people in domestic politics will become more important than before. Two reasons can be adduced: (1) the fading away of the British Government as one of the formal players in shaping the direction and content of political reform in Hong Kong; and (2) free elections have been instituted to elect certain numbers of political posts. Therefore, six developments may emerge: (1) further mobilisation and politicisation of Hong Kong society along the twin cleavages of centre-periphery and individual-collective consumption will become inevitable; (2) the democrats will continue to receive electoral support and will remain as a significant player in the Legislature; (3) tensions and conflicts between the Executive and the Legislature will come to the forefront because of the built-in contradiction of the HKSAR's representation system; (4) the insulation of the Executive from the mass electoral pressure will give rise to a legitimacy crisis for the future HKSAR Government; (5) pressure to reform the "executive-led" government will surface; and (6) the Beijing Government will tolerate demands for political reform so long as these demands do not prevent her from exercising sovereign power over Hong Kong and so long as there is no significant spill-over effect into China.

Things happening outside Hong Kong will also have effect on the liberalisation or democratisation of Hong Kong. First of all, the absorption of the Chinese

economy into the international capitalist system has made China more prone to the influence of the outside world. Given that the success of economic reforms in China is so important for the survival of the Communist regime and the contribution of Hong Kong to that effect is significant, the Chinese leaders would be more cautious and self-restrained in handling the governing of and political demands from Hong Kong after 1997. Second, the succession issue after the death of Mr Deng Xiaoping. Whoever will emerge, Deng's successor seems likely to be a more open-minded and pragmatic leader, who will try to balance conflicting demands in the economic liberalisation process and will also subscribe to the capitalist logic of thinking. Therefore, a more relaxed atmosphere will emerge within China as well as between China and Hong Kong. If the above judgements are right, there will be no drastic change or profound difference before and after 1997. The political order of Hong Kong will not undergo significant change. Although China will be tempted to restrain the pace of democratisation and the depth of political reforms, we do not see democracy in Hong Kong as going backwards after 1997. Optimistic it may be, but it still depends on the "will and skill" of the political leaders of China and Hong Kong to make compromises that would allow a non-zero sum political game to play, which, I think, can bring benefits to both sides as well as to their people.

1991 Legislative Council (LegCo) Direct Election Poll:
First Round (August)

<u>Questionnaire</u>

1.   Will you go to vote in the coming LegCo direct election?

     (   )   yes
     (   )   no
     (   )   not decided
     (   )   don't know

2.   Have you voted in the last Urban or Regional Council elections in May this
     year?

     (   )   yes

               2A.   Could you explain reason(s) why you went to vote?

                     (   )   urged by neighbours, relatives or campaigners
                     (   )   urged by social groups
                     (   )   urged by political groups or party
                     (   )   support my favourite candidate
                     (   )   others (please specify)
                     (   )   don't know

(   )   no

        2B.   Could you explain the reason(s) why you did not go to vote?

          (   )   no time
          (   )   it can change nothing
          (   )   the candidates not known
          (   )   voting will only lead to conflict
          (   )   all candidates are power-seekers
          (   )   candidates returned unopposed
          (   )   others (please specify)
          (   )   don't know

(   )   don't know

3.   What sort of considerations do you have in deciding which candidate(s) you would like to vote for?

          (   )   candidates' capability and record serving the public
          (   )   candidates' academic qualification
          (   )   recommended by neighbour or relatives
          (   )   recommended by social groups
          (   )   recommended by political groups or parties
          (   )   don't know

4.   If today is an election day, which candidates you would like to vote for? (maximum two candidates)

5.   How do you know your favourite candidate?

          (   )   from friends or relatives
          (   )   from the company or social groups you are working for
          (   )   from candidate's campaign activities
          (   )   from mass media
          (   )   from the campaign activities launched by political groups
          (   )   don't know

6. What sort of social problems do you expect your favourite candidate would tackle or be concern with after winning the election?

( ) . law and order
( ) inflation
( ) Vietnamese boat people
( ) social welfare and services
( ) pollution
( ) home profiteering
( ) human rights
( ) imported labour
( ) development of representative government
( ) others (please specify)
( ) don't know

7. What impact does the introduction of direct election to the LegCo have on the operation of Legco?

( ) more easy to monitor government
( ) will affect the efficiency
( ) enhance the weighting of public opinion
( ) increase the chance of political conflict
( ) others (please specify)
( ) don't know

8. There will be twenty directly-elected members in the first legislature of the HKSAR in 1997. Do you think this proportion is appropriate?

( ) yes
( ) no
( ) don't know

    8A. If answer "no", do you suggest increasing or decreasing the number of directly-elected seats?

        ( ) increase
        ( ) decrease

        _____ seats

9. Would you please express your opinion concerning the lowering of voting age to 18?

( ) absolutely oppose
( ) oppose
( ) no ideas
( ) absolutely support
( ) support
( ) don't know

10. Would you mind indicating your sex?

( ) male
( ) female

11. How old are you?

( ) 21 - 25   ( ) 46 - 50
( ) 26 - 30   ( ) 51 - 55
( ) 31 - 35   ( ) 56 - 60
( ) 36 - 40   ( ) 61 or above
( ) 41 - 45

12. How about your educational attainment?

( ) unable to read or write (no schooling)
( ) primary school or below
( ) F.3 level
( ) F.5 level
( ) matriculation
( ) college/university or above

13. Would you mind indicating your personal monthly salary range?

( ) HK$ 3,000 or below
( ) HK$ 3,001 - HK$ 5,000
( ) HK$ 5,001 - HK$ 8,000
( ) HK$ 8,001 - HK$10,000
( ) HK$10,001 - HK$15,000
( ) HK$15,001 - HK$20,000
( ) HK$20,001 or above
( ) no income (retired)

14.   Where were you born?

( )   Hong Kong
( )   China
( )   others (please specify)
( )   don't know

14A.   How long have you lived in Hong Kong?

( )   7 - 10 years
( )   11 - 20 years
( )   21 - 30 years
( )   31 - 40 years
( )   41 years or above

APPENDIX 2

1991 LegCo Direct Election Poll:
Second Round (September)

<u>Questionnaire</u>

1.   How many registered voters in your household?

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2.   Will you go to vote in the coming Legco direct election?

        (   )   yes

                       2a.   Could you explain why you go to vote?
                       (   ) urged by neighbours, relatives or
                                     campaigners
                       (   ) urged by social groups
                       (   ) urged by political groups or parties
                       (   ) support favourite candidate
                       (   ) civic responsibility
                       (   ) expected to influence government policy
                       (   ) other (please specify)
                       (   ) don't know

(   )   no

      2b. Could you explain why you do not go to vote?
      (   ) no time
      (   ) it can change nothing
      (   ) the candidate not known
      (   ) voting will only lead to conflict
      (   ) all candidates are power-seekers
      (   ) not willing to be involved in politics
      (   ) out of town
      (   ) other (please specify)
      (·) don't know

(   ) not yet decided
(   ) not willing to answer

3.   If today is an election day, which candidate(s) you would like to vote for in your constituency? (maximum two candidates)

    _____

    _____

(   ) not willing to disclose
(   ) not yet decided

4.   How many hours did you spend to know the candidates and read campaign materials?

    _____ hrs

5.   Please name the source(s) from which you get to know the candidates? (maximum three, by order of importance)

(   ) election forum hold by government
(   ) election forum hold by private body
(   ) canvassing
(   ) candidates' campaign materials
(   ) election materials sent by government
(   ) mass media
(   ) other (please specify)
(   ) not willing to answer

6. Please name any political group (party) that you have heard of?

7. Please evaluate the political group (party) that you mentioned above. Highest score is 100 and the lowest is 0.

8. Do you believe that the directly-elected Legco councillors have enough power to monitor government or influence government policy-making?

(   ) yes
(   ) no
(   ) not willing to answer

9. Do you consider whether the candidates support the Chinese democracy movement?

(   ) yes
(   ) no
(   ) not willing to answer

10. Have you voted in the last Urban or Regional Council elections in May this year?

(   ) yes
(   ) no
(   ) can't remember

11. Would you mind indicating your sex?

(   )   male
(   )   female

12. How old are you?

( )	21 - 25	( )	46 - 50
( )	26 - 30	( )	51 - 55
( )	31 - 35	( )	56 - 60
( )	36 - 40	( )	61 or above
( )	41 - 45		

13. What is your educational attainment?

( )   unable to read or write (no schooling)
( )   primary school or below
( )   F.3 level
( )   F.5 level
( )   matriculation
( )   college/university or above

14. Would you mind indicating your personal monthly income range?

( )   HK$ 3,000 or below
( )   HK$ 3,001 - HK$ 5,000
( )   HK$ 5,001 - HK$ 8,000
( )   HK$ 8,001 - HK$10,000
( )   HK$10,001 - HK$15,000
( )   HK$15,001 - HK$20,000
( )   HK$20,001 or above
( )   no income (retired)

15. Where were you born?

( )   Hong Kong
( )   China
( )   others (please specify)
( )   don't know

15a. How long have you lived in Hong Kong?

( )   7 - 10 years
( )   11 - 20 years
( )   21 - 30 years
( )   31 - 40 years
( )   41 years or above

16. How many telephone lines do you have?

_____

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