AUTHORITARIANISM IN 20TH CENTURY GREECE
Ideology and Education under
the dictatorships of 1936 and 1967

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UMI Number: U062733

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ABSTRACT

This study examines the authoritarian ideology and educational policy of two dictatorial regimes of 20th century Greece: the Metaxas' dictatorship of 1936-1941 (the 4th of August regime); and the military junta of 1967-1974 (the 21st of April regime). Although viewed comparatively, the regimes in question are shown to have been different, due to crucial differences stemming from their contemporary international and domestic settings. Moreover, their ideologies were shaped by the way dictatorial rulers perceived and interpreted their reality. Influenced by the inter-war fascist context, the 4th of August regime tried to accommodate a radical fascist rhetoric to a nationalistic and traditionalist set of beliefs. Metaxas' perception of reality was exemplified in his educational policy, through which the dictator unsuccessfully tried to mobilise from above the youth, on the imported model of the fascist youth movements. The 21st of April regime contrasted sharply with the post-war international liberal environment, while its ideology was marked by the distinct and often contradictory mentalities of the colonels. The contradictions and inconsistencies of the military mind were reproduced at the educational level, as the military rulers attempted to demobilise a highly organised youth, to reverse the previous liberal educational reforms and to appoint loyalists to key posts. So, while the 4th of August saw the legitimation of its authority in the use of an openly authoritarian discourse and the mobilisation of the youth, the 21st of April regime, by contrast, torn by the conflicting mentalities of its military rulers, sought legitimacy through clientelistic networks of support and the demobilisation of the youth.

To my mother

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

AEI   *Anotata Ekpaideftika Idrymata* [Higher Educational Institutions]

B-A   Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism

EDA   *Enomene Demokratike Aristera* [United Democratic Left]

EEE   *Ethnike Enosis "Hellas"* [National Union "Greece"]

EENA   *Hellenike Enosis Neon Axiomatikon* [Union of Young Greek Officers]

EON   *Ethnike Organose Neolaias* [National Youth Movement]

ERE   *Hellenike Rizospastike Enosis* [Greek Radical Union]

IDEA   *Ieros Desmos Hellenon Axiomatikon* [Sacred Bond of Greek Officers]

INTRODUCTION

Greece, a country at the periphery of European developments or at the semi-periphery of world developments, has been greatly influenced by the major western models of political and social organisation. The 19th century saw the import of democratic forms of organisation, the drafting of a constitution, the introduction of a party-based parliamentary system and the predominance of liberalism. The 20th century saw the introduction of mass politics, the strengthening and modernisation of Greek civil society, the industrialisation of the economy. While democratic institutions have been violated in several instances -by foreign interferences, absolutist royal tendencies, the interventionist role of the military, the clientelistic behaviour of politicians, disrespect for constitutional forms- the country, throughout most of its existence as an independent state, has been functioning under the rule of competitive politics, representative institutions and universal suffrage. Twice, democratic parliamentary rule was interrupted by prolonged dictatorial rule during the course of the 20th century; in 1936 by the 4th of August Metaxas regime and in 1967 by the 21st of April military junta. Both cases reflected clearly the ills of Greek parliamentary democracy and revealed a tendency towards dictatorial forms of political domination.

My interest in this project relates to the nature of the two dictatorships. It is comparative in nature, in that it seeks to view the two cases, both in relation to each other, and in relation to other similar authoritarian regimes abroad. The comparative value of Greek domestic developments, in general, has attracted the attention of many social scientists. Based on the semi-peripheral, semi-developed status of the Greek polity and society, the country has been seen to approximate in many respects to the other European countries of the Mediterranean basin and to the more advanced countries of . Latin America,. as regards the existence of similar levels of political and economic development. Based also on a common historical experience the country has been viewed comparatively with the other . Balkan. states. This is done in order to show the similarities of different

settings, the fragility of democratic institutions and the tendency towards dictatorial forms of political authority.[1]

The two Greek dictatorial regimes of 1936 and 1967, specifically, have been compared with other contemporary authoritarian cases, with similar socio-economic and politico-ideological features. As such, the dictatorship of Metaxas has been seen in the context of fascism and has been associated with the existence of a number of contemporary authoritarian regimes of the inter-war period. The Metaxas regime has been seen to imitate the Italian fascist and the Nazi regimes and to approximate to the inter-war imposition of the Salazar and Franco dictatorships, in the Iberian peninsula, and to resemble the conservative authoritarian regimes of the Balkan countries. Similarly, the dictatorship of the military junta has been seen in connection with the Spanish and the Portuguese dictatorships, and the post-war Latin American military interventions.

The inter-war fascist context

The subject of fascism has generated a number of scholarly studies on the socio-economic origins, the mode of political domination, the character of the social base, the role of the leader or the particular ideology in fascist regimes. Although most theorists on fascism are able to come up with some notions of what the fascist phenomenon stood for, the application to the particular cases becomes more problematic. As such, on the one extreme, there have been those who have not hesitated to label most of the 20th century European authoritarian dictatorships as fascist, while on the other, there have been those who have mostly and solely identified fascism with the Italian and the German regimes.

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[1] Very representative of such a comparison is Mouzelis' *Politics in the Semi-Periphery* in the context of early parliamentarism and late industrialisation in the Balkan and Latin American societies. The writer discerns similar political and socio-economic trends in the development of these societies and offers his methodological tools for a comparative cross-regional understanding of the political development of two broad areas, as a paradigm for the further understanding of other semi-peripheral or peripheral cases.

Function of the regime: Fascism and monopoly capital

The ease with which marxist writers see fascism in every form of authoritarianism is expressed in most marxist analyses of dictatorial regimes and reflects a more monolithic and mechanistic approach to the phenomenon. On the other hand, the inter-war communists were the first to point out the danger of international fascism, the first to form an organised resistance to it and the first to come up with a systematic conception of the phenomenon. Their views originated in the Third International's discussions on fascism, which defined the guide-lines of subsequent marxist approaches. By and large, marxists regarded fascist regimes as the dictatorial agents of monopoly capital, dominant at the particular inter-war period of capitalist development, the result of contradictions within capitalist societies. The definition of the phenomenon is based on the idea that:

> *Fascism is the open, terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist*
>
> *and most imperialist elements of finance capital. The accession to power of fascism*
>
> *is not an ordinary succession of one bourgeois government by another but a*
>
> *substitution of one state form of class domination of the bourgeoisie by another*
>
> *form -open terrorist dictatorship.* [2]

More elaborate marxist theories, like that of August Thalheimer, based on Marx's *18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, focused on the similarities between the Bonapartist type of dictatorship and the fascist regime, and examined the role of the petty-bourgeoisie as the social base of fascism, the crucial role of the leader, and the role of fascist ideology, the expression of the frustrations of the petty-bourgeoisie and the peasantry. It was recognised by them that fascist state power acquires a certain form of autonomy in its relation to bourgeois domination, as Marx was the first to admit as early as the 1860s.[3]

Poulantzas, the most representative of the neo-marxist theoreticians of fascism, regarded fascism as a form of the "exceptional capitalist state", distinct from Bonapartism and the military dictatorships, and identified fascism with the regimes of Italy and

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[2] From Dimitroff's reports to the Congresses of the Comintern, in Poulantzas *Fascism and Dictatorship*, p. 97 and Kitchen *Fascism*, pp. 7-8

[3] August Thalheimer's views are discussed in Payne's book *Fascism; Comparison and Definition*, in Kitchen *op.cit.*, pp. 71-82, and in Poulantzas *op.cit.*, pp. 59-62.

Germany.[4] He also rightly distinguished between fascism, as a mass movement before the seizure of power, and fascism, as a special form of dictatorial regime. He saw the evolution of fascism in terms of the equilibrium in the class struggle, the relationship between the petty-bourgeoisie and big capital. He examined the specific institutional features of the fascist state and their political function in the class struggle, ie. the reorganisation of the state apparatuses and the use of the ideological and the repressive mechanisms, under fascist regimes. But ultimately for Poulantzas, the prime function of fascism was to encourage the economic, political and ideological domination of monopoly capital. The extent to which marxist and neo-marxist thought has influenced Greek thought on the nature of dictatorial regimes will become evident in the following presentation of the main approaches to the Greek dictatorial cases.

Political domination: Totalitarianism

On the liberal side of the spectrum, we distinguish the theory of totalitarianism, according to which totalitarian dictatorships are the autocracies of modern 20th century societies, their aim being to *"remould and transform the human beings under their control in the image of a totalitarian ideology "*. The most prominent and characteristic cases of totalitarianism are the regimes of Nazi Germany and Stalinist Soviet Union.[5] The basic features of totalitarian dictatorships are 1. an elaborate ideology, 2. a single mass party, 3. a system of terror, 4. the monopolistic control of the mass media, 5. the monopoly of weapons and 6. a central control of the economy.[6] This analysis places its emphasis on the repressive and terrorist nature of the organisation of state power and discerns the intention of totalitarian regimes to control every possible aspect of human life in a given society, its morale, its culture, its education, its economic structures. One of the most important characteristics of totalitarianism relates to the adoption and diffusion of a radically new

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[4] Nicos Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship*, Verso edition,1979.

[5] Hannah Arendt in her book *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and Carl Friedrich with Zbigniew Brzezinski *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, developed the theory of totalitarianism, a very fashionable theory in America in the 1950s given the extent of anti-communism in the American ideological discourse. In that sense totalitarianism has been considered by many as a "cold war" term.

[6] Brezinski, *op.cit.*, p.22.

ideology which embraces all aspects of social, political and cultural life. This is mainly

realisable through the systematic use of propaganda tactics, which makes it, *par excellence*,

the phenomenon of 20th century authoritarianism.

While the theorists of totalitarianism distinguish this particular form of dictatorship

from other forms of dictatorships, they concentrate mostly on the totalitarian organisation

of state power, ie. the regimes' ability to totally control and transform societies through

coercive and terroristic means, or through the constant and systematic use of the mass

media. In that sense, they are able to view the Stalinist and the Nazi cases comparatively,

while at the same time they ignore such important features as the mode of production, the

organisation of the economy, the role of private ownership, which were widely different in

the two cases. The role of totalitarian ideology, for instance, is viewed by Hannah Arendt,

as the means to control the masses and legitimate the use of terror, its specific content

being of secondary importance. She believes that the real nature of totalitarian ideologies is

revealed in the role that these ideologies play in totalitarian domination.[7]

A more systematic definition of totalitarianism is offered by Juan Linz, according to

which, totalitarian regimes are characterised by a "monistic centre of power", "a more or

less intellectually elaborate ideology" and "active mobilisation through a single party and

many monolithic secondary groups".[8] The role of the totalitarian ideology -a holistic

conception of man and society coupled with the systematic manipulation of the ideological

heritage-, the role of the totalitarian party -a unique type of social organisation in modern

societies, the concentration of power in the hands of the leadership and the cult of the

personality, and the use of terror as a useful but not necessary instrument of social control,

are all considered the defining characteristics of totalitarianism by Linz.[9]

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[7] Arendt, *op. cit.*, pp.468-474.

[8] Juan Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes" in *Handbook of Political Science*, pp.191-192.

[9] The analysis of totalitarianism in the Chapter "Totalitarian Systems", *ibid*, pp.187-252.

Social base: Mobilisation of the middle classes

One of the most distinctive features of fascism was the large number of people attracted by the fascist ideology and party-organisation, who formed the social base of fascist regimes. Most of the analysts stressing the social base aspect of fascist regimes believe that fascism was the result of a radical middle-class movement or the frustration of atomised individuals within industrialised societies.[10] This analysis, based on Durkheim's concept of "anomie", places the emphasis on the way individuals and groups respond to social changes and social crises. As a society modernises, social conflicts are generated due to the uneven rate of modernisation. Fascism is a middle-class movement which aims at the prosperity of the middle classes, a middle way between the extremes of big capital and the organised labour.

> *In those countries in which the middle classes have suffered the effects of*
>
> *particularly traumatic changes, their "displacement" and "availability" may cause*
>
> *their mobilisation through political movements which provide the basis for*
>
> *fascism.....The basic raison d'etre of the regime is to consolidate a state of affairs*
>
> *considered able to enforce, for a considerable period of time, both lower class*
>
> *"demobilisation" and a moratorium on all aspects of modernisation that may*
>
> *threaten the interests of the coalition, even at the cost of prolonged economic*
>
> *stagnation.*[11]

Fascism: A complex phenomenon

It is difficult to refute or disregard completely, any of the above mentioned theories, given that each one of them attaches importance to a particular aspect of the fascist phenomenon, based on scientific and empirical investigation.[12] Although when examined

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[10] People such as Bloch, Lipset, De Felice, Arendt among others have contributed to the development of this theory.

[11] Gino Germani, "Political Socialisation of Youth in Fascist Regimes", in *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, p.340.

[12] My presentation of the main theories on fascism has been highly selective and I have chosen only those which might be relevant to the subsequent analysis on the Greek phenomenon. Stanley Payne in his book *Fascism*, presents the wide variety of approaches to the fascist phenomenon which shows the interest which such a theme has generated and at the same time, the very vagueness which surrounds such a term. According to Payne fascism has been seen as: 1. a dictatorial agent of monopoly capital (marxists), 2. a 20th century form of Bonapartism (Thalheimer), 3. the unique radicalism of the middle classes (De Felice),

separately they may present shortcomings, viewed comparatively these analyses are helpful in appreciating all the aspects of fascism. By and large, fascism is a phenomenon of developed capitalist states, triggered by severe socio-economic crisis, which in the cases of industrialised economies, comes as a response to an organised working class movement; its power alliance combines the fascist party leadership, the traditional elites of industry, banking and the military; its social base is quite heterogeneous, composed of the economically underprivileged and dissatisfied members of society, ie. peasantry, urban poor, intellectuals, students and army officers; its social function is to transform to a certain degree capitalist property relationships and, at the same time, to ensure the social and economic domination of the capitalist class; it is a terrorist regime, fiercely anti-communist, which rejects parliamentary democracy and allows no political opposition. Above all fascism uses an all-encompassing ideology to manipulate its mass following. Through the means of party mobilisation, it involves different sectors of the population in the support of a distinctively aggressive nationalistic discourse. As such the phenomenon of fascism acquires a timeless methodological value, while, at the same time, it is commonly regarded as historically specific, in that it is linked with the international historical conjuncture of the inter-war period.

The inter-war period saw a variety of types of authoritarian domination in different national settings, of a conservative, radical or fascist orientation, varying from the Italian fascist and Nazi regimes, to the milder dictatorships of the Balkans supported by the monarchy. While all inter-war dictatorships were fiercely opposed to the Stalinist example and were highly nationalistic, they differed in their structure and balance of power, the degree of social support which they enjoyed and their ideological discourses. The international predominance of fascism, however, manifested itself in the wide influence of fascist ideology and mode of organisation on most of the countries of Europe during the

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4. the consequence of unique national histories, 5. the product of cultural or moral breakdown, 6. a unique "meta-political" phenomenon (Nolte), 7. the rise of the amorphous masses (Parsons, Arendt), 8. 20th century totalitarianism (Friedrich, Arendt), 9. the result of extreme neurotic and pathological impulses (Adorno), 10. resistance to modernisation, 11. a consequence of a certain stage of socio-economic growth or phase in the development sequence. (p.177).

inter-war period. The existence of fascist political movements in almost all the European states shows the degree of internationalisation of the fascist phenomenon.

One of the striking characteristics of inter-war fascism was the seductive character of its ideology, its ability to attract the masses by offering them radically new ideals and expectations. While an indigenous and organised set of ideas was professed in the model cases of Italy and Germany, and was adopted whole-heartedly by other European fascist movements, most authoritarian regimes of the inter-war period resorted, in one way or another, to the importation and incorporation of disparate fascist themes in their political ideologies. In that sense, the distinction between the adoption of a fascist ideology by fascist regimes and movements, and the use of a fascist rhetoric by many inter-war authoritarian regimes, is crucial to the understanding of the influence of the fascist ideological discourse during the inter-war period. By fascist ideology, we mean mostly a systematic and all-embracing doctrine which claims to provide a complete and universal alternative theory of man and society to the already existing ideologies of liberalism and communism, and to derive therefrom a programme of political action. Its main themes included an aggressive nationalism, fierce anti-communism, a hostility towards democracy and liberalism, a cult of the leader and an obsession with collective organisation. Although from an intellectual point of view fascist ideology was a remarkable amalgam of disparate conceptions -and even claimed to be anti-intellectual-, its specific content was able to win massive popular support. The influence of fascist ideology was most prominent in the model regimes of fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, where it became the official state ideology, as well as in the model movements of the Romanian Iron Guard, the Spanish Falange, and the Hungarian Arrow Cross. On the other hand, various fascist themes were imported and widely professed by most of the authoritarian regimes of the inter-war period, of a radical conservative or merely a monarchist-conservative nature, which did not claim to be fascist. In this case we are talking of the use of a fascist rhetoric, the importation of fascist ideas by non-fascist regimes and their incorporation into the domestic authoritarian ideologies.

To complicate the study of fascism further, the relationship between authoritarian regimes and fascist movements was even less uniform. The model cases of Italy and Germany aimed at subordinating the fascist and Nazi movements to a centrally controlled party bureaucracy. The authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe, committed for the most part to a fascist rhetoric, adopted a different mode of social organisation and political domination. The relationship between the fascist movements and the authoritarian right in many parts of Eastern Europe and the Iberian Peninsula took various forms. In some countries already existing fascist movements were suppressed by the authoritarian regimes -in Romania King Carol persecuted the members of the Iron Guard, in Portugal Salazar eliminated the "National Syndicalists" of the Rolao Preto . In others, fascist movements were used as a necessary complementary power base, in Spain the Falange was among the forces which supported the regime of Franco and became temporarily dominant in his right-wing coalition, between 1936 and 1942, and in Romania, the Legionari of the Iron Guard participated in the coalition government of General Antonescu in 1940-1941 (one of the few fascist movements to come to power and form a government). In some countries, such as Portugal and Greece, youth movements on the fascist and Nazi models were created from above, by dictatorships of a non-fascist character.

Hence, fascism, a rigo rously nationalistic and xenophobicpolitical ideology, acquired international appeal, although the way in which fascist influences were imported and incorporated into various distinct national contexts makes the comparative study of fascism a difficult project to pursue. Even nowadays, with a massive literature on the phenomenon and the existence of various methodological tools for such an analysis, there is no dominant theory on fascism, and neither is there any agreement as to which can be considered the model case. As Guy Hermet argues, model of fascism as such does not exist. Instead he labels the Italian case as a "fascist prototype", which did not manage to attain its ideological goal of the totalitarian organisation of Italian society; the Nazi case as one which approached most closely the ideal type of fascism, achieving a relative approximation between totalitarian Nazi ideology and practice, characterised by the imposition of radically new institutional mechanisms to serve the dictatorial functions of

the state; the Franco period of 1937-1945 is referred to "pseudo-fascist", and the Spanish fascist experiment "fascism by imitation".[13] What is more important in an examination of inter-war fascism is to appreciate the appeal of its ideological and organisational aspects throughout the European continent, as was shown by the adoption of various fascist aspects of ideology and mobilisation by regimes which could barely be characterised as fascist, as was the case with the Metaxas dictatorship.

Greek literature on the 4th of August regime

While fascist regimes in the most industrialised parts of Europe originated in periods of severe socio-economic crisis and working class demands, in Greece, at the accession of the 4th of August regime in 1936, there was neither such an economic crisis, nor an organised and threatening working class movement. Although fascist dictatorships and most inter-war authoritarian regimes were preceded by strong fascist parties and youth movements, in inter-war Greece, apart from a few insignificant groups, there was no such influential movement. Similarly to its European counter-parts, the Greek dictatorial power structure involved an alliance of the traditional industrial elites, banking capital and the military, but unlike fascist regimes, it lacked the powerful base of a fascist party leadership. Whereas fascist ideology had penetrated all European societies either through party activists or through intellectuals, inter-war Greece lacked the influence of a fascist ideology or fascist intellectual thought. Whilst most fascist or "pseudo-fascist" regimes enjoyed support from some sectors of the population or parts of the political world, the Greek dictatorship came to power in a climate of apathy on the part of the Greek people and of feebleness on the part of the political world. Whereas most authoritarian regimes were personal dictatorships of powerful and/or charismatic personalities, Metaxas lacked charisma, and his power was mostly based on the King's acquiescence.

Despite the differences with the fascist context, the 4th of August regime was affected by many influences from abroad, adopted much of the radical element in its

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[13] Guy Hermet, "La Dynamique du Fascisme" in *Aux Frontieres de la Democratie*, PUF, Paris 1983, pp. 125-149.

government policy from its fascist counterparts, and imported many fascist ideological themes, although its nationalism was void of fascist extremities. The Greek dictatorial leadership made use of a strong and repressive police force which, however, never reached the totalitarian levels of terror achieved by Nazi Germany. The distinctive characteristic of the 4th of August regime was its effort to impose a youth movement from above, on the model of the fascist and Nazi youth movements, in order to create a social base and to legitimise its authoritarian rule.

Such differences and similarities have obfuscated the nature of the 4th of August regime, and the Greek dictatorship has been given labels ranging from "fascist", to "quasi-fascist", to "reactionary", and even "military dictatorship", leading to a complete confusion as to what Metaxas' rule really was. Above all, the dictatorship of Metaxas was the result of parliamentary crisis in inter-war Greek political life, marked by the polarisation of the political parties, the interventionist role of the military in politics, the inability of the professional politicians to form political alternatives, the peoples' disaffection with party-politics, in a society divided by regional, clientelistic and social conflicts.

A fascist regime

The first approach to the Greek authoritarian phenomenon considers it in terms of the crisis of the liberal parliamentary system, the frustrations of the petty-bourgeoisie in Greece and the latter's contempt for the way parliamentarism was worked. Richter, based on Nolte's analysis on fascism, concentrates on the political, organisational and ideological structures of Greek fascism and claims that the regime of Metaxas was a fascist regime[14] (despite Nolte's negation of the fascist nature of the Greek case). The persistent features of the Greek political context, according to Richter, were the existence of oligarchic parliamentary structures and the "petty-bourgeois mentality" of the Greek voter. Although there was never a pre-existing fascist party to support the dictatorship, the petty-bourgeois mentality of the Greek people, and their contempt for the way parliamentary politics

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[14] Heinz Richter, *1936-1946 Two Revolutions and Counter-Revolutions in Greece*, Vol.1, Athens 1975, pp.58-73.

worked, was a sufficient social base for the subsequent consolidation of fascism in Greece. The existing structures of the oligarchy allowed for the direct transformation of the clientelistic parties into fascism without the need of a mass movement. (p. 67) The dictatorship was a response to the international crisis which had affected the Greek economy, to the weakening of oligarchic parliamentarism and to the social unrest of the disaffected people. Due to the latter, Metaxas had to resort to the use of a fascist ideological discourse, identical to the Italian fascist discourse, as a safety valve for the taming of social unrest. (p 68) The "Fuhrerprinzip", the youth movement, the fascist rhetoric, the security battalions and some socialist measures were the means to calm the working classes, on the one hand, and to woo the petty-bourgeoisie, on the other. (p.69)

Although Richter never defines the economic base of the Greek petty-bourgeoisie, he persistently refers to the latter's acceptance of the 4th of August regime. It is thus never clear whether he talks of an economically dominant petty-bourgeois class or of a powerful petty-bourgeois mentality, characteristic of a distinct class consciousness. The petty bourgeoisie as a social force is a heterogeneous social formation, its class interests cannot be clearly defined, and its ideology comprises an amalgam of diverse and at times contradictory elements. Richter implicitly identifies passive acceptance of the dictatorship by the Greek petty-bourgeoisie with the active support of the Italian people for Mussolini's institutions, thus separating fascism from its party-organisational and aggressive nationalistic aspect. He supports such a claim by stating that *"while the existence of a fascist movement is crucial to an understanding of western European fascism, this does not apply in the Greek case".* (p.67) However, one of the main features of fascism was the active ideological mobilisation of a heterogeneous class base. The *passive* support of the petty-bourgeoisie, by itself, does not constitute the social base of fascism, given that such a support can be given to all forms of authoritarian regimes, including to military dictatorships which are by no means fascist in character. Moreover, Richter provides no evidence for his claim that the petty-bourgeoisie was so tired of clientelistic practices as to lend its support to a fascist rhetoric; on the contrary, as he himself points out, *"the Greek people were deeply anti-fascist, pro-British and anti-monarchist".* (p.71) What was the

need then for a fascist *"anti-capitalistic and anti-plutocratic rhetoric"* to calm down the middle classes, in what he recognises was a *"non-fascist society"*. As to the clientelistic aspect of Greek politics, clientelism by itself is not accountable for political changes, as Richter seems to suggest, as it is a form of political association, a political relationship which reinforces conflicts but does not create them. It is a phenomenon which is common to both oligarchic parliamentary democracies and authoritarian regimes and is not, by itself, transformable into fascism or any other type of authoritarian regime.

Some Greek leftist historians have also labelled the Greek regime as fascist, influenced directly by the marxist conception of the phenomenon. According to them, the 4th of August regime had all the internal and the external characteristics of a fascist dictatorship, ie. dictatorship of the oligarchy, repression, suppression of democratic liberties, propaganda against bourgeois democracy, parliamentarism and social-communism, and the effort to create a youth movement.[15] Their analyses are a mechanical application of the original marxist approaches, and reflect no particular elaboration of the internal specificities of the Greek inter-war dictatorship. Elefantis, on the other hand, employs the marxist methodology of fascism in order to disprove the fascist nature of the Metaxas regime and considers it a mere dictatorial rule.[16] There is no question in the mind of the author that *"Greece during the 1930s was dictatorialised but it was not fascistised"*. (p 201) While the Greek dictatorship took place in a period of the international dominance of monopoly capital, in   inter-war Greece monopoly capitalism was not the dominant mode of production; on the contrary, we observe *"the coexistence of pre-capitalist,*

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[15] Linardatos, *The 4th of August Regime*, Athens 1988, p.96 and Psyroukis, *Fascism and the 4th of August Regime*, Athens 1975. Andrikopoulos examines the phenomenon of Greek fascism in terms of military authoritarianism which had its roots in the period of Metaxas. According Andrikopoulos, the army during the inter-war period was divided between the militarist, pro-German faction and the monarchist pro-British faction of Greek officers. While he points out that a mass fascist movement was never developed in Greece, the model of fascist control was created during the period of Metaxas and flourished later during the post-war period in the hands of a small military faction within the army. The dictatorship of Metaxas, according to Andrikopoulos, was supported by the pro-British king, the real leader of the dictatorship, banking and industrial capital, while the leader Metaxas had no particular power base and a fascist ideology which was never accepted in Greek society. Hence Andrikopoulos sees the existence of fascism in Greece at a time when the fascist forces were defeated in the rest of Europe. Andrikopoulos identifies the fascist phenomenon in Greece with military authoritarianism, in general, as a type of modern control, identified with the militaristic faction within the army.(*The Roots of Greek Fascism*, Athens 1977). Fascism is more than a dictatorial seizure of power, a distinction often neglected in many parts of the Greek literature on authoritarianism. It may have been supported by the army in Germany and Italy, but neither one of them were military dictatorships, by whatever means one attempts to define this latter phenomenon.

[16] Angelos Elefantis, *The Promise of an Impossible Revolution*, Athens 1979.

capitalist and monopolistic forms of production". (p.186) Fascism, according to Elefantis, requires the fascistisation of the petty-bourgeoisie[17] and the peasantry, from an ideological and an organisational point of view, which was not the case in Greece, given that the pre-existing fascistoid organisations operated at the level of mere *"thuggery, strike-breaking and 'parastatism'"* . During the 4th of August regime all we had was a *"vulgar fascistoid gabble"* . (p.199) There was neither monopoly capitalism at the socio-economic level, nor fascistisation at the ideological/organisational level.

A *"quasi-fascist"* regime

A second approach, which concentrates on the balance at the elite level, emphasises that a strong dictator was able to impose his personal domination, and radically transform Greek society from above. Jon Kofas claims that the 4th of August dictatorship evolved from a conservative rule into an extreme authoritarian state ,"a quasi-fascist state".[18] At the initial stages, the regime rested necessarily on the power of the king and of the military establishment. Two years after his seizure of power, Metaxas was able to consolidate his authority vis-a-vis the king and to introduce the second phase of the regime, the "quasi-fascist phase". (p.vii) It was then, according to the author, that Greek society was radically transformed.

Kofas' analysis is a typical example of the traditional Greek historiography, which focuses on individual leaders, and sees political developments as the results of their actions, while the masses are perceived as manipulated and repressed individuals. Kofas' inability to grasp basic theoretical concepts leads him to the constant use of the terms "fascist", "quasi-fascist" and "extremely authoritarian" to describe the character of Metaxas' rule, while his misreading of the empirical evidence leads him to false conclusions such as *"The dictator incorporated all institutions of the country under the 'Resurgent State'. The economy, the labour and agrarian organisations, the press the*

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[17] Elefantis recognises the existence of a highly developed Greek petty-bourgeoisie, which he identifies with the classes of tradesmen, craftsmen and un-productive wage-earners of the private and especially the public sector. (p.186).

[18] Jon Kofas *Authoritarianism in Greece*, Columbia University Press, 1983 .

church, education and practically every institution in Greece was radically transformed by the end of 1938". (p.207) In other words, we are supposed to believe that the 4th of August regime managed to impose a totalitarian rule over the whole of Greek society, and that fascist totalitarianism, so incomplete in the "prototype" Italian fascist case, succeeded in radically altering Greek institutions between 1939 and the end of the Metaxas dictatorship.

A reactionary regime

D. H. Close, by comparing the 4th of August dictatorship with five different authoritarian regimes of the inter-war period, - those of Hitler, Mussolini, Petain, Salazar and Franco - presents a meaningful attempt at a comparative study of the character of the Metaxas rule.[19] Based on Stanley Payne's analysis of fascism,[20] he divides the authoritarian regimes of the inter-war period into two main categories: "fascist" and "reactionary". The German and the Italian cases fitted the fascist category, and the other four, while sharing some elements with the fascist type, were basically reactionary in character. He presents the similarities and the differences between the six regimes, by pointing out the conservative and the radical elements in their ideas and practices, implicitly connecting the radical elements with fascism, and the conservative elements with reaction. Or better, while fascist regimes were very radical in their approach towards society at large, reactionary regimes shared both radical and conservative elements. The regime of Metaxas, on the one hand, established an unprecedented police-state, was anti-parliamentary, created a youth movement and showed a concern for the economically underprivileged (radical elements) and, on the other hand, promoted the privileges of the bourgeois classes, was supported by financial and business circles and was based on the anti-Venizelist state machinery (conservative elements).

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[19] D.H. Close, *The Character of the Metaxas Dictatorship; An International Perspective*, Centre of Contemporary Greek Studies, 1990.

[20] See Stanley Payne's *Fascism; Comparison and Definition*, where the writer distinguishes fascist movements from the non-fascist authoritarian right, and sees three faces of authoritarian nationalism, ie. fascism, radical right and conservative right. (pp.16-17).

Close's distinction between fascists and reactionaries is based on the regimes' attitudes towards "revolution", "nationalism", "religion" and the "official elites". Thus reactionary regimes were anti-revolutionary, non-expansionary in their nationalism, with a pacific foreign policy, they extolled the virtues of a religious, puritanical morality and, finally, they respected the official establishment -civil service, officers of the armed forces and police, the judiciary and the academic world. Fascists on the other hand, had a revolutionary dynamism, they pursued territorial expansion, they were openly anti-clerical and atheist and they showed no respect for the ethos of the state officials. (pp.11-15)

Close's analysis of the 4th of August regime is a sufficiently documented and fruitful comparison with other contemporary regimes, such as is rarely or only roughly made by other analysts, who concentrate exclusively on the Greek case. Close is able to identify the differences between the natures of the various regimes, and is able better to appreciate what is fascist and what is not about their ideology and practice. At the same time he draws attention to the special amalgam of ideas and policies of the inter-war regimes; while some of them were not fully-fledged fascist cases, they were able to adopt some radical fascist elements in their ideologies and dared to pursue some extreme policies, which were not congruent with their conservative nature.

While the differences between fascist and reactionary regimes are quite clear-cut in Close's work, the writer fails to give his definition of reaction. Therefore, we are expected to take the specific ideas and policies of the regimes as the definitional characteristics of his terms "fascists" and "reactionaries". A discussion on a reactionary regime has to specify what exactly "it was reaction to". A reactionary attitude is usually connected with a negative response to a "perceived" unacceptable previous situation. This may imply that a reactionary opposes a radical change or reform, wants to re-establish a political order which has been overthrown by radicals, or wants to avoid an alternative perceived as negative.   Nazi attitudes, although radical in most respects, were also significantly counter-revolutionary and reactionary, with respect to the country's recent traumatic past, the experience and frustrations of the First World War and the socio-political crisis of the 1930s. Moreover, fascist ideology, more than anything else, was a synthesis of negations

towards well established international ideologies. In the Greek case, Close fails to indicate whether the regime of Metaxas was a reaction to the previous Venizelist state, or to the potential alternative of communism. The reactionaries' attitudes towards nationalism, for instance, were hardly reactionary, given that Metaxas' pacific and defensive foreign policy could hardly be seen as reactionary, constituting as it did a continuation of the previous foreign policy. As Close himself points out *"the reactionary leaders were like any other conventional statesmen in being guided by a level-headed calculation of national interests and viewing domestic stability as more important than foreign expansion"* . (p.11) The same was true of the attitudes towards religion and the state bureaucracy, in that the 4th of August regime's support for the Church and its respect for the previous hierarchies reflected a conventional attitude towards the status quo, with no will to change the previous conservative nature of the state establishment. The Spanish regime of Franco, on the other hand, was still more reactionary, due to the deep divisions in Spanish society during the civil war and the preceding radical policies of the Republican government.

Be that as it may, the term "reactionary" cannot be considered a category in the classification of authoritarian regimes, as it mostly refers to the type of ideology adopted and the particular policies pursued by a given regime. It can also used to describe a right-wing parliamentary regime which holds reactionary attitudes with regard to a previous more radical system of beliefs. Usually reactionary regimes, as such, are unable to provide specific alternatives, they are backward-looking and rarely innovators of any type of change. As will be shown later, in the case of the 21st of April regime, the military junta was of a much more reactionary nature than the 4th of August regime, and the bulk of its ideology and policy was oriented towards the negation and reversal of the previous Centre-Union reforms, and an all-embracing reaction to the 1960s socio-political mobilisation.

Contradictions among the hegemonic forces

There is a tendency to view the dynamics of the Metaxas regime as a result of the conflicting interplay between the hegemonic forces, at the elite level. The conflict is personified in the different attitudes and perceptions of the king, on the one hand, and the dictator Metaxas, on the other. The king, influenced by his admiration for the British liberal system, regarded the coup as an authoritarian interval, and stressed the provisional character of the dictatorship. Metaxas regarded the dictatorial form of government as the most appropriate political form, being influenced by the authoritarian international context. This difference in attitudes reflected, according to Alivisatos, the different orientations of the pro-German and the pro-British factions of the Greek dominant classes.[21] The competition between these two took form within the context of the political and economic influence of the two Great powers, Germany and Britain, over Greece. Both factions, however, were in agreement as to the abolition of parliamentary institutions at that particular point in history.

The basic contradiction, according to Alivisatos, was between the attraction of the fascistoid discourse of the dictatorship, on the one hand, and the country's strategic position in relation to the liberal democracies of the West, on the other. The "New State" of Metaxas, claims that author, was characterised by a lack of popular support and an ideological and organisational confusion, which prevented it from imposing a fascist ideology on Greek society. The ideology of the 4th of August regime never managed to rise above the level of *"chanting of slogans and propaganda "*, marked by a *"vulgar anti-communism, a moralistic anti-parliamentarism and a vague nationalism "* and remained at the level of *"an ideological and organisational empiricism"*, according to which the formulation of governing principles remained constantly on the agenda. (p.110)

The post-war liberal context

The Greek dictatorship of 1967 took place within the post-fascist international context, marked by the dominance of liberal democracy in the countries of Western Europe

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[21] Nicos Alivisatos, *Political Institutions in Crisis, 1922-1974*, Athens 1986.

and the imposition of communist rule in the countries of Eastern Europe. The only remnants of the fascist formula in Western Europe, the Spanish and the Portuguese dictatorships, survived the post-war transition to the western liberal context by abandoning the fascist elements of their political philosophy, and by becoming part of the Western European, anti-communist capitalist bloc. The 21st of April regime, a post-war "liberal" dictatorial regime, has been viewed in the context of right-wing military regimes in the more developed parts of the developing world, and has been mostly compared with the Southern European dictatorships of Spain and Portugal, and with the Latin American Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes, while it has also been confused with fascism. Let it be said at the outset that the use of the term "liberal", does not imply any connection with liberal politics practiced in pluralist democracies, with their emphasis on political freedom, the defence of human and constitutional rights, and a stress on welfare economics. On the contrary, the regimes we are about to examine had nothing to do with the promotion of such liberal issues. By "liberal", in the post-war authoritarian context, we mostly want to emphasise the regimes' connection with the Western capitalist bloc, their antipathy towards communism, and, in particular, their contrast with the anti-liberal rhetoric of the inter-war fascists. By and large, the "liberal" authoritarian regimes of Western Europe and Latin America focused on the promotion of market economic activity, supported close links with domestic capitalist elites and foreign capital, favoured the private sector of the economy and held pro-Western affiliations in their foreign policy. Indeed most of the right-wing military regimes intentionally used the euphemistic term "liberal" to point out the benign character of their rule, to cover the repressive aspects of their authority under the veneer of a constitutional legality.

The difference with the fascist context

The comparison of the post-war "liberal" dictatorial regimes of Southern Europe and Latin America with the inter-war European dictatorships has been unavoidable, due to the special role of the military as a supporting pillar of these regimes in both cases, and the fiercely anti-communist character of all these dictatorships. Let it be said, at the outset, that

the two historical periods presented wide differences both at the national and the international levels. All the inter-war dictatorships were in one way or another vulnerable to fascist influence, in terms of ideology, style and the attraction of more extreme solutions. Most of them enjoyed the legitimising support of the monarchy. They were torn by ethnic, linguistic and cultural conflicts, which aggravated social tensions. During the inter-war period there was a compromise between the fascist radical authoritarianism and the conservative right-wing authoritarianism, leaving in many countries the blurred and confused image of "fascistoid" dictatorships. Whether one likes to call the authoritarianism of the inter-war period fascist or not, the fact remains that it was a special type of authoritarianism in a completely idiosyncratic style of domination and with a distinct ideological and organisational structure.

On the other hand, the post-war period saw a radically different international context, marked by the military defeat of international fascism, the decline of the European imperialist powers, the onset of the bipolar cold-war period, higher levels of growth in the western economies, greater levels of organisation and mobilisation within western civil societies, and the internationalisation of capitalist production. The legitimate post-war international alternatives were limited to the division between liberalism vs communism. At the domestic level, the Southern European and Latin American dictatorships lacked the legitimising pillar of the monarchy, the ethnic and cultural conflicts of the societies of inter-war Europe (with the exception of Spain) and the influence of a fascist authoritarian framework, and were placed under the dominant US sphere of influence. They imposed their authoritarian rule in the midst of higher levels of economic growth and industrialisation, more modernised civil societies, the unequivocal acceptance of liberal capitalism and the fierce opposition to communism.

The exceptional state

Poulantzas considers the distinction between the two authoritarian cases of the inter-war fascist and the post-war military regimes and regards them as different forms of the "exceptional capitalist state". The prime function of fascism, according to Poulantzas,

was to encourage the economic, political and ideological domination of monopoly capital. Extending his functionalist analysis of authoritarian regimes to the post-war dictatorial regimes of Southern Europe, the author emphasises the relationship between the nature of the regimes and the stage of international capitalist development which had been reached in the post-war era, and the particular phase of imperialism.

> *The question can only be posed accurately by studying both the political crisis to which the exceptional state is a response, and the particular kinds of political crises to which its specific forms correspond. But this requires, first of all, an analysis of the question of the historical period of capitalist formations within which these political crises and exceptional regimes occur. To avoid foundering in abstract typology, we have to make clear that the kinds of political crises which produce any given form of exceptional regimes, still have features which vary according to the period in which they arise. Nineteenth-century differs from twentieth-century Bonapartism, and the same is true for military dictatorships and fascism.* [22]

Moreover Poulantzas argues that the post-war military dictatorships of Spain Portugal and Greece, a different form of the "exceptional state", coincided with a new type of industrialisation, dependent on foreign capital. The character of these dictatorial regimes was marked, at the internal level, by the conflict between two factions of the bourgeoisie, the "domestic bourgeoisie" and the "comprador bourgeoisie". Poulantzas sees the domestic divisions and strategic differentiations of endogenous capital in the light of a polarisation between those who leaned towards American capital and those who leaned towards the ascendant European capital. The domestic bourgeoisie sought closer links with the EEC, as a counter-weight to the US comprador connection, whose interests were overwhelmingly promoted by the dictatorial regimes.[23] The reorganisation of the state apparatuses, however, entailed contradictions and increasing tensions, which had the effect of setting under way the processes which led to the overthrow of these regimes. While the

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[22] Poulantzas, *Fascism and Dictatorship*, p.16.
[23] Nicos Poulantzas, *The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Spain, Portugal, Greece*, New Left Books 1976.

fascist regimes were militarily defeated, the military dictatorships' downfall was caused by their inherent contradictions.[24]

Poulantzas' analysis has been criticised in that it does not establish the existence of a domestic bourgeoisie and the latter's conflicts with the comprador, which he sees as the dynamic behind the rise, and collapse of these regimes. It is also seen as an economistic analysis, in that Poulantzas tries necessarily to find an economic reason for every transformation in the political superstructure. Moreover despite the author's intention, there is a "dysfunctionalist bias" inherent in his approach to military dictatorships, in that he emphasises the internal contradictions of the military dictatorships, and a "functionalist bias" in the analysis of fascist regimes, the latter, having been functional for monopoly capital, collapsed because they were defeated militarily.[25]

The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian model

The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian (B-A) model, based initially on the conception of Guillermo O'Donnell, was prevalent in the more advanced Latin American countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, and has largely influenced the perception on the Latin American military dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s. As with the exceptional state model, this analysis searches for socio-economic structural determinants in the dynamics of the post-war liberal dictatorships. Their rise is connected with the inter-play of three crucial aspects of socio-economic growth: (a) the exhaustion of the Import-substitution-industrialisation (ISI) phase and the need for the "deepening" of industrial production. (b) the mobilisation of the popular sector and (c) the growing importance of "technocratic roles" in these societies. The B-A systems were exclusionary and non-democratic, in character, and their dominant coalition included high-level technocrats, military officers

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[24] He claims that increasing tensions and divisions within the state itself -ideological state apparatuses (ISA) and repressive state apparatuses (RSA)- resulted from ideological and political differences between the power bloc and a state personnel predominantly recruited from the petty-bourgeoisie and the peasantry. These contradictions within the state apparatuses of the military dictatorships resulted in the overthrow of these regimes "*by virtue of their accumulation and condensation*", ie. internal splits within the ISA - Church, education, Press, legal system- and the RSA itself. See Poulantzas, *The Crises of the Dictatorships: Spain, Portugal and Greece*, pp.90-126.

[25] For a critique on Poulantzas' analysis see Bob Jessop, *Nicos Poulantzas*, pp 280-281, and Nicos Mouzelis, *Facets of Underdevelopment*, pp.132-133, and "Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war Greece" in *New Left Review*, No 76, March-April 1976, pp.78-79 .

and civilians, and was associated with foreign capital. These regimes were, in some respects, dynamic and forward-looking, in that they sought for a fundamental restructuring of the domestic economy, particularly in its relationship to foreign capital. The bureaucratic-authoritarian model has been extended to cover the later Franco period in Spain and to several of the inter-war dictatorships in eastern Europe. However, with respect to the latter cases, there is the distinction between the bureaucratic-military-oligarchical power alliance of the inter-war dictatorships and the bureaucratic-technocratic-military coalition of the post-war Latin American dictatorships. I shall not dwell on any critique of O'Donnell's B-A thesis, as this has been amply done by numerous authors, with respect to the model's methodological value and its applicability in the different Latin American countries. Despite criticism, the B-A model remains a very systematic and powerful analysis of post-war Latin American development.[26]

Right-wing military rule

The above presentation shows the lack of a systematic comparative framework, as was the case with fascism, in which to incorporate the post-war "liberal" dictatorships. The distinctive feature of post-war liberal authoritarianism, and a common point among the various military dictatorships of the more developed semi-periphery, lies in the crucial role of the army in politics and the officers' tendency to intervene in the political process and to assume the role of political rulers. A whole range of analyses, concentrating on the role of the military in politics and the state of civil-military relations in different national contexts, have tried to view comparatively the various cases of military interventions in politics and the dynamics behind the military regimes. While these works present as broad a range of theories as the cases involved, there are some very general common themes on the subject of right-wing military rule. Robert Pinkney, for instance, believes that right-wing military governments are most commonly found in the economically more developed countries of the Third World -Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, South Korea, Turkey- while the

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[26] See Guillermo O' Donnell, *Modernisation and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, for the original analysis, and the *New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, by David Collier (ed), for the application, the extension and the critique of the model.

phenomenon of armies actually taking over governments belongs mainly to the second half of the 20th century. He then identifies some of the common themes of right-wing military attitudes, such as: (a) exclusion from power or repression of working-class groups or groups favouring equality; (b) preference for the private sector; (c) willingness to pursue policies which lead to greater social inequality; (d) discouragement of popular participation in politics; (e) pro-western foreign policies; (f) use of anti-communist and anti-socialist rhetoric; (g) appeals to traditional values extolling such institutions as the family, the church, past national glory; (h) claims to legitimacy based on the need for "order"; (i) close links with civilian landed and capitalist elites; (j) the involvement of soldiers in business activity; (k) a free market orientated economic policy, as regards the internal economy, and in relation to foreign capital.[27] Such common attitudes give a very general impression of most right-wing military regimes and clearly distinguish them from the authoritarian cases of the inter-war period.

Greek literature on the 21st of April regime

The intervention of the 1967 military regime came at a time when Greek society was markedly different, in terms of its level of organisation, mobilisation and modernisation, from what it had been in the inter-war period. The 21st of April regime was a reaction to the socio-political mobilisation of the 1960s and the crisis of the post-war parliamentary system. Unlike the B-A regimes of Latin America, the 21st of April regime did not originate in an economic crisis, and its power structure did not include a coalition of politicians, technocrats and the military. The military junta alienated the professional political world and included in its ranks mostly military officers and a few loyal civilians. The 21st of April regime was a typical case of a collective military dictatorship, distinct from the personal character of the 4th of August regime. Apart from the very early stages of the dictatorship, the Greek authoritarian regime did not even enjoy the legitimising support of the King. Unlike the regimes of the inter-war period, the regime did not employ a consistent authoritarian ideology, apart from an extreme anti-communist rhetoric. On the

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[27] Robert Pinkney, *Right-Wing Military Government*, London 1990, pp.14-21.

contrary, it tried to present a pseudo-liberal ideology, to match its pro-Western foreign policy and its free-market orientated economic policy, similar to the Iberian and the Latin American dictatorships. The 21st of April regime did not attempt to create a party or a youth movement, but ruled mostly through the means of repression and the exclusion of any opposing tendencies.

The 1967 military dictatorship has been analysed by many authors and journalists, but due to its recentness, most of the analyses have largely reflected the ideological predilections of the writers rather than a more systematic approach. It has been seen in the context of   US hegemony over Greek internal affairs, in the context of post-war neo-fascism and for what it was, a military coup d'etat, distinct from both fascism and totalitarianism.

A US satellite

An interpretation much favoured by Greek analysts of a communist affiliation, regards the military dictatorship of 1967 in the context of the post-war superpower conflict and   behind-the-scenes machinations of   US agencies. It is mostly through the spectrum of US hegemony and the country's subordinate position, that the nature of the dictatorship is best appreciated. Analysts of such an orientation go as far as to characterise the military junta as a totalitarian and fascist form of political rule. It was established and sustained by the Americans in order to promote US interests in the Mediterranean basin, given that the strategic, geopolitical location of the country was vital to American military planning.[28] This type of approach leaves little room for an examination of the domestic elites' choices, and does not consider their ideological allegiances and policies, which are seen as being exclusively dictated by the superpower. Naturally such an analysis is totally insufficient, in that it minimises the importance of the domestic variables and focuses on factors outside the country's internal domain. However, the fact remains that even in cases of high superpower dependence, there is always some room for domestic manoeuvre, at

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[28] See Nicos Psyroukis, *History of Modern Greece (1967-1974)*, Athens 1983. He claims that the imposition of the military dictatorship was encouraged by the US administration in order to achieve the partition of Cyprus. Once this goal was accomplished in 1974, the junta lost its *raison d'etre* and collapsed, being of no more use to the Americans.

least to the extent that such an international interference is accepted and supported by domestic forces. Although the US acted as a sustaining and legitimating pillar of the Greek and the Latin American dictatorships, just as the Soviet Union sustained the eastern European and the Third World dictatorships of a communist orientation , to attribute the preponderant role to the secret machinations of powerful international agencies is both hard to prove and to disprove. Superpowers, in the post-war period, tried by various ways to secure the allegiance of their "satellite states", while at the same time those "satellites", to a greater or lesser degree, allowed such interference. Be that as it may, it is all too clear that during the post-war period the United States played an exceptionally interventionist role in Greece's internal affairs at the political, economic and ideological levels. The US, through its contribution   the victory of the anti-communist forces during the civil war, secured a major posihon in the political and economic development of post-war Greece and was a powerful pillar of the 21st of April regime.

A neo-fascist dictatorship

According to other analysts, the 21st of April regime was characterised as "neo-fascist", a post-war form of the inter-war fascist regimes. Its main pillars of support were the military, the Security Police, the secret agencies and the "para-state" organisations.[29] Moreover, in order to strengthen their claim, the supporters of the neo-fascist theory argue that there were connections between the 21st of April regime and the collaborators from the period of the Nazi occupation, and also with people who had been associated with the Metaxas regime and with neo-fascist organisations in Italy or Germany. Since neo-fascist regimes lacked the inter-war type mass parties, they had to rely on the most reactionary and militaristic forces of their respective societies. Those who argued the neo-fascist character of the Greek regime, saw Greece's neo-fascist counterparts in the dictatorships of Spain, Portugal and the Latin America military regimes, all of them similarly backed by the "hegemonic classes" and the imperialist powers. The extreme anti-communism of these

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[29] Stavros Zorbalas, *Neo-fascism in Greece (1967-1974)*, Athens 1978 and Giuseppe Gandi, *Neo-fascism in Europe*, Athens 1975.

post-war neo-fascist regimes was considered to be the common link with and the main legacy of the inter-war fascist ideology.

While there have indisputably been neo-fascist movements in many post-war western, capitalist societies, to label an authoritarian regime "neo-fascist" requires more proof than some international neo-fascist connection. In fact it is completely erroneous to speak of the existence of neo-fascist regimes at all, given that such movements have not succeeded in capturing power. The phenomenon of neo-fascist movements which have spread all over Europe, the United States and South Africa has been a reality since the military defeat of fascism, and has taken the form of conspiratorial groups, movements and parties. Especially currently, in many European countries, neo-fascist tendencies have acquired frightful proportions.[30] Characterised by fanaticism in their beliefs, the neo-fascists concentrate mostly on the use of a racist, anti-Semitic and highly nationalistic rhetoric, and do not have a consistent ideology as was the case with the all-embracing and influential inter-war fascist ideology. Moreover, the racist rhetoric of the neo-fascists is different from that of their predecessors, aimed at immigrant workers more than Jews, who are currently blamed for economic problems such as unemployment. As regards Greece, it would be difficult for a country which barely produced any fascist organisations during the period of fascism, to have neo-fascist groups after the defeat of fascism. To call the regime of the 21st April regime fascist or neo-fascist is a misreading of the military junta's authoritarianism and attributes an ideological consistency nonexistent in the minds of the military rulers.

A military coup d' etat

Among the few systematic analyses of the nature of the military dictatorship, that of Hariton Koryzis, tried to place the Greek case in the wider typology of authoritarian regimes.[31] Having clearly distinguished the Greek military dictatorship from totalitarian

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[30] Among the most commonly known are the National Democratic Party (NPD) in West Germany, the Italian Social Movement (MSI), and the currently powerful National Front in France and the Freedom Party in Austria.

[31] Hariton Koryzis, *The Authoritarian Regime*, Athens 1975.

and fascist regimes, Koryzis claimed that the 1967 dictatorship was a coup d' etat, exclusively military in character, a typical case of a military dictatorship, whereby a faction of military rulers tried to institutionalise a "dictatorialised democracy" or a "democratic dictatorship". The Greek inter-war coups d' etats, on the contrary, were connected with political parties or movements and the army officers intervened in the political process, either backed by or in collaboration with politicians. They never assumed political power directly as was the case with the military junta. (p.147) Koryzis concluded that the instigators of the 1967 coup d'etat, motivated by personal interests and ambitions, ruled by conspiratorial means, their main effort being to promote the interests of the military within the power structure.

The two authoritarian cases compared

While the subject of the two Greek dictatorial regimes has been approached in quite a large variety of ways, their comparative nature has not been adequately analysed. Where such comparison has been undertaken, it has not been the central issue in most works, and has basically concentrated on similarities between the two dictatorships, leaving the impression that the dictatorship of Metaxas had in many ways been the precursor of the 1967 military junta or that the Metaxas dictatorship influenced the ideology and policies the 1967 military regime. Apart from some broad and obvious generalisations regarding the authoritarian exercise of power, the specificities of the two dictatorships have never been viewed in a comparative way.

The dictatorship of Metaxas, a regime during the inter-war period of fascist authoritarianism in Europe, was a personal rule, enjoying the support of the king, the senior hierarchy of the military establishment and the official anti-Venizelist elites, dominant at that particular historical juncture. The dictatorship of the military junta, on the other hand, was a military dictatorship, in that for the first time a group of Greek military officers became state rulers, in a period when west European liberal democracy was dominant. They were both right-wing conservative dictatorships, of an exclusionary,

repressive, anti-communist and anti-parliamentary character. Both cases meet Juan Linz's widely accepted definition of authoritarianism, according to which:

> *Authoritarian regimes are political systems with limited, not responsible political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilisation, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader, or occasionally a small group, exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.* [32]

According to this definition, authoritarian regimes are regarded by Linz in the light of three very important aspects. Firstly, they allow a degree of limited pluralism, unlike the almost unlimited pluralism in democracies, on the one hand, and the complete lack of pluralism -"monopolistic control" by the central authority- in totalitarian regimes, on the other. Secondly, the specific nature of their belief system is of a non-elaborate ideology, as opposed to the more or less intellectually elaborate totalitarian ideology -a "holistic conception of man and society". Thirdly, they have a limited level of political mobilisation, tending to encourage political apathy and the demobilisation of the population, or a limited and controlled mobilisation, as opposed to the active one encouraged, and controlled by totalitarian elites.

Based on these defining characteristics of authoritarianism, Linz offers a typology of authoritarian regimes, a number of sub-types -"bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes", "organic statism", "mobilisational authoritarian regimes", "post-independence mobilisational regimes" and "post-totalitarian authoritarian regimes"- ideal types in the Weberian sense which do not fully correspond to any particular regime but approximate to one or another case. Of these types, the "mobilisational authoritarian regime" type, and the "bureaucratic-military authoritarian regime" type are relevant to the two dictatorships in question. The mobilisational authoritarian regimes existed during the inter-war period, and were "*the outcome of the fascist mobilisation of a variety of interests and ideological and emotional commitments among the citizens of the democracies in crisis in the Europe of the inter-war years.*" (p.279) Fascism, according to Linz introduced a mobilisational, populist

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[32] Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", *op.cit.*, p.264.

component, with some types of voluntary political participation, inspired by ideological discontent with the status quo and demanding social change, which differentiated authoritarian mobilisational regimes from other types. While in the cases of the mobilisational authoritarian regimes the rulers tended to rely on ideological formulations to sustain the mobilisational organisation, in the cases of bureaucratic-military rule, one can mostly only speak of the mentalities of the rulers and should pay less attention to the ideological formulations of such regimes. (p.320) Bureaucratic-military authoritarian regimes are composed of a coalition in which army officers predominate, who lack commitment to a specific ideology, but who act pragmatically within the limits of their bureaucratic mentality. Moreover, they do not tend to create a mass party. (p 285) Fascist mobilisational authoritarian regimes are "*less pluralistic, more ideological and more participatory than bureaucratic-military regimes....further from liberalism, from individual freedom from political constraint but closer to offering citizens a chance to participate, less conservative and more change oriented*". (p.321)

The 4th of August regime incorporated many elements of the fascist mobilisational authoritarian type, with respect to its ideology, and its attempt at mobilisation. It also shared some characteristics with the bureaucratic-authoritarian type with respect to the composition of its elite structure. The 21st of April regime, on the other hand, shared a few characteristics with the bureaucratic-military cases, with regard to the lack of a coherent ideological discourse and of an active mass party, although the predominance of military officers in the elite structure, and the lack of high-level technocrats clearly differentiates it from the B-A regimes of Latin America.

Both dictatorships followed previous domestic socio-political and ideological crises. Each of them responded in a particular way to the perceived crises in which they intervened. The differences in the dominant international environments, the pre-existing socio-economic context and the level of the previous political and ideological crisis determined the internal logic of each dictatorial intervention, i.e., the way authoritarian power was exercised, organised and linked with society, as well as the nature of the belief system which sustained its power. I shall be viewing these issues through the examination

of two inter-related aspects of Greek authoritarianism, the use of authoritarian ideology and the control over the education of the youth.

Authoritarian belief system: Ideologies vs mentalities

Dictatorial rulers, once in power, are forced to create an alternative base of legitimacy to replace that of the democracies they have destroyed, since they cannot base their rule solely on mechanisms of coercion and fear. Legitimacy is what is required in order to achieve a measure of support and consent from civil society, offering justification for the ruler to rule and contributes to the maintenance of authoritarian power. It relates to the peoples' support and compliance, based on a conviction of the rightfulness of the regime and of the ruler's commands. While authoritarian elites regard their intervention as necessary and inevitable, they feel compelled to persuade the people of the "beneficiary" character of their rule. The ideological formula is deemed necessary for the legitimation of all authoritarian regimes and, for that reason, dictatorships make a constant use of the ideological means of communication. Every dictatorship attempts to justify its imposition, to legitimate its exceptional nature of domination and to stabilise its rule on the basis of an authoritarian ideological discourse. Hence, the dictatorial elites make ample use of a garrulous rhetoric, in order to achieve the necessary popular acceptance of their supporting authoritarian ideologies or even myths. By authoritarian ideology we mean the set of ideas espoused by the authoritarian elites and their theoreticians by which they interpret their current reality, justify their actions and define their goals.[33] The specific system of ideas which is imposed upon civil societies, reflects the rulers' perception of their contemporary economic, social, political and cultural environment.

Inter-war authoritarian regimes relied extensively on the adoption of an ideological discourse for the interpretation of their environment, and claimed to hold an all-embracing political philosophy. Indeed a relatively large amount of research has been devoted to

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[33] According to Mark Hagopian, the specific functions of ideologies under authoritarian rule consist in: a. the interpretation of reality, b. the mobilisation of the social sectors and c. the legitimation of authoritarian rule.(*Ideals and Ideologies of Modern Politics*, pp.7-10.) Another function of ideology, according to Schapiro, prevalent in totalitarian regimes, is "the inducement of moral anaesthesia by means of ideology", the neutralisation of the masses by means of ideology in order to direct the hatred of the masses against a particular class or race. (Leonard Schapiro,*Totalitarianism*, Macmillan 1972, p.57)

fascist ideology and its influence throughout Europe, and it has been treated as one of the main ideologies of the 20th century. Post-war liberal dictatorships, on the other hand, lacked a consistent system of beliefs and their ideologies reflected clearly the mentalities of the rulers. The subject of mentalities, as an important determinant of social and political behaviour has been scarcely examined by analysts, due to the difficulty of carrying out an empirical analysis of it. While ideologies which form a theoretical framework have been studied systematically by several influential schools of thought, the study of mentalities is more empirical and thus much more difficult to detect and prove. Yet, it is a concept useful in many discussions of the way rulers and anonymous masses perceive their social environment and highly explanatory of the way certain ideas and attitudes have endured through time and space. According to Theodor Geiger

> *Ideologies are systems of thought more or less intellectually elaborated and*
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> *organised, often in written form, by intellectuals, pseudo-intellectuals, or with their*
>
> *assistance.Mentalities are ways of thinking and feeling, more emotional than*
>
> *rational, that provide non-codified ways of reacting to different*
>
> *situations.....Mentality is intellectual attitude; ideology is intellectual content.* [34]

Michel Vovelle, a historian of mentalities, examines the history of collective behaviour in its relation to the endurance of certain mentalities towards religion, death, and culture in general. He perceives history in the context of the autonomy of the mental universe and the latter's irreducibility into economic and social factors. He considers the notion of mentalities as wider in scope than the notion of ideology.

> *Mentalities include a system of mental realities which are unformulated, apparently*
>
> *meaningless and which lead an underground existence at the level of unconscious*
>
> *motivation....By their undeniably vague nature, mentalities are more adaptable and*
>
> *capable of responding to the needs of a research undertaken without*
>
> *presuppositions.* [35]

Moreover, Markoff adds that

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[34] See Juan Linz "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", p.267.
[35] Michel Vovelle *Ideologies and Mentalities*, Polity Press 1990.

An ideology is a more or less elaborate doctrine which embraces the holder with

sufficient force, which is sufficiently elaborate in its details and which has

sufficient coherence that it can seriously constrain behaviour. A mentality, on the

other hand, is more a set of attitudes than a cognitive structure, more a global

orientation than a detailed guide, in short, not a set of deep and clear

commandments to which action must adjust. In that sense we are talking of a

construction of a pseudo-ideology to be thrown off as circumstances dictate. [36]

Linz, in his study of authoritarian regimes, recognises the importance of mentalities in the examination of authoritarian ideas and suggests the concept for the purposes of political science. He argues that

the elusiveness of mentalities, the mimetic and derivative character of the so-called

ideologies of authoritarian regimes, has limited the number of scholarly studies of

this dimension of such regimes, although the mentalities of the rulers, not having to

be equally explicit as the ideologies, might reflect more the social and political

realities. [37]

In the light of this distinction, I shall be comparing the authoritarian ideas of the two regimes and the way dictatorial rulers interpreted their contemporary reality, justified the imposition of their rule and set their main goals as governmental authorities. In the case of the 4th of August regime, the dominant fascist ideological discourse inspired the leader of the regime, and he incorporated many of its elements into the inter-war Greek nationalistic discourse. Against a climate of the influence of fascism, on the one hand, and a pluralist nationalistic domestic debate, on the other, the ideology of the 4th of August regime reflected much more than the mentality of the dictatorial elite but it was much less than a consistent ideological framework. It was an amalgam of various influences of fascist, conservative and reactionary origins. In the case of the military junta, while most analysts speak of a "pseudo-ideology" -an inconsistent ideological context-, it is more accurate to speak in terms of the mentalities of the military rulers, their attitudes rather than

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[36] See Markoff/Baretta "Professional Ideology and Military Activism in Brazil", pp.184-185.
[37] See Linz, *op.cit.*, p.269.

their perceptive ability. The 1967 military mentalities were indicative of the officers' own military mind, their attitudes towards the civilian elites and the military's internal ideology. Against a liberal international climate, on the one hand, and a modernised but highly polarised domestic context, on the other, the military elites imposed their puritanical, anti-communist, clientelistic and conspiratorial military mind, their contempt for civilians and a pseudo-liberal facade, ie. an amalgam of disparate mentalities and contradictory goals.

Authoritarian education of the youth: Mobilisation vs demobilisation

Education, part of the wider network of the state ideological apparatuses, according to the Marxist vocabulary,[38] and part of the wider network of the means of political socialisation, according to liberal terminology, reflects the specific ideas diffused by the dominant political elites and the way state power is exercised. Education being the principal means for the spread of ideas and values among the youngest members of society, is particularly important for the survival of authoritarian regimes. Dictatorial educational policies clearly reflect, directly and indirectly, the authoritarian ideas of the dictatorial elites, and are often the clearest guides as to their long-term political aims. They reproduce the mind of the rulers, their intentions as political governors, their limited choices, their specific strategies and the contradictions within the power structure. But most important, they reflect the existence or not of an ideology, in the form of an authoritarian pedagogy.

Authoritarian regimes more than anything else aspire to dominate and manipulate education, by centrally controlling its administration, and by censoring and directing the content of knowledge. On top of this, inter-war authoritarian regimes attempted to manipulate the education and socialisation of the youth through the promotion of a controlled political activism, ie. mobilisation of the youth into youth movements, on the basis of new ideologies and new pedagogies. Ideological mobilisation, under authoritarian rule, usually refers to the recruitment of political militants who would participate in the political activity of a political party or a social movement created and controlled by the

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[38] Althusser who discusses extensively the distinction between ideological state apparatuses and repressive state apparatuses, regards the function of the educational state apparatus as the dominant ideological mechanism in capitalist social formation. See "On the Reproduction of the Conditions of Production", pp. 135-149.

regime. Charismatic leaders, orators, preachers, and journalists can be the true originators of ideological mobilisation, and their role is deemed necessary for the success of a party or a movement.

Goran Therborn introduces two relevant modes of ideological mobilisation "*mobilisation by revival*" and "*mobilisation by example*". The first is achieved on the basis of the past, of what has existed, of past experiences, values, symbols and so on. It refers to the nationalist mobilisation, mostly used by reactionary and counter-revolutionary regimes. An authoritarian regime can either approach the past in a positive way and glorify certain elements in the history of the nation or it can place the emphasis on the negative side of immediate past developments. The fascist ideological mobilisation offered a therapy to the inter-war crisis by resorting to the revival of past values and emphasising successful historical events. The second type of ideological mobilisation, according to Therborn, is a very potent source of mobilisation and links directly domestic developments to the influential international ones. The historical cases of the French revolution, the October revolution, the fascist regimes and movements, the Chinese and the Cuban revolutions are some exemplary events, which have been influential sources of the latter type in different national contexts. Ideological "mobilisations by example" usually fail because the constellation of forces is hardly ever the same in the different national contexts.[39]

The regime of Metaxas did not create a mass movement on the model of the fascist ideological mobilisation. He tried however to mobilise the Greek youth by creating a Greek youth movement, importing the fascist model of youth organisation, "mobilisation by example" , into the Greek inter-war context. On the other hand, "liberal" dictatorships, due to the absence of an overall ideological framework, aim instead at the demobilisation of the youth and the promotion of political apathy. They are highly exclusionary in character, and seek legitimacy through economic achievements and "pseudo-liberal" policies, rather than mass parties and youth movements. The military junta of 1967, in the educational field, aimed at a "demobilisation by reaction", of an already mobilised student movement.

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[39] See Goran Therborn, *The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology*, Verso 1980, pp. 121-123 .

Control was achieved through the promotion of clientelistic channels of support, a clear example of "authoritarian clientelism".

Based on the concepts and methods presented above, the following project will focus on a comparative examination of authoritarian ideas and education in the two dictatorships in question and will rest on the following structure:

1. Greek ideology and education: In an introductory chapter, the main features of the development of Greek ideology will be presented, in a historical perspective. The traditional themes of history, religion and language will be introduced in the context of the Greek nationalist discourse, as these were developed, articulated and affected by the dominant European influences, during the development of the 19th century independent state. This will be accompanied by an examination of the main features of Greek education during the course of the same period. (Chapter 1)

2. The inter-war period: Some "background factors"[40] are deemed necessary for an appreciation of the ideological and mobilisational character of the Metaxas regime: A domestic inter-war socio-political climate divided along ethnic, geographical and class lines, polarised by the schism of Venizelism versus anti-Venizelism, in the search for a new nationalist ideology; the lack of an influential fascist ideology and an organised fascist movement, contrary to most inter-war European societies; the ideas of the leader Metaxas prior to the imposition of his authoritarian rule; the elite structure of the regime and the counter-balancing role of the King. (Chapter 2)

3. The ideology of the 4th of August regime: The 4th of August regime's interpretation of inter-war realities reflected the international fascist influence, the rhetorical strengthening of Greece's traditional elements and some reformist/populist innovations. It will be seen in relation to the Italian and German models and the Iberian and Balkan cases. (Chapter 3)

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[40] I have borrowed the term from David Collier in his comparative examination of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes, which refers to explanatory variables that contribute to the understanding of the major differences among the various national socio-political settings, the previous contexts of crisis, in order to understand the differences between the dictatorships. See David Collier, "The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Model: Synthesis and Priorities for Future Research" in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, pp.385-392 .

4. The mobilisational aspect of the 4th of August regime: The regime's policy towards the youth involved the imposition of a youth movement accompanied by the use of a fascist rhetoric directed at the youth, and the authoritarian and centralised control of the educational mechanisms. (Chapter 4)

5. The post-war period: The "background factors" included the post-war exclusionary parliamentary state, the anti-communist ideological discourse and the autonomous role of the military apparatus within a society in the process of modernisation and political mobilisation during the 1950s and 1960s. The military mind was marked by fierce anti-communism, apparent royalism, factionalism, interventionism and conspiratorial behaviour. The power structure of the 21st of April regime was based on a faction of the army which intervened in politics but lacked any connections with the civilian elites. (Chapter 5)

6. The mentalities of the 21st of April regime: The military mentalities of the dictatorial rulers were reactionary towards the earlier process of mobilisation; puritanical in the promotion of traditional values; pseudo-liberal in the imposition of a constitution; clientelistic towards those civilians who were included in the regime; and conspiratorial towards army officers and the Church. (Chapter 6)

7. The demobilisational aspect of the regime: The regime's policy towards the youth involved the reproduction of military attitudes in education: puritanical towards their perception of the youth; reactionary towards the mobilised student movement and the intellectuals; authoritarian in their control of education; clientelistic towards the appointment of regime people; and pseudo-modernising, as was dictated by the objective necessity for educational reform. (Chapter 7)

8. Conclusion: Some comparative points regarding the two regimes. (Chapter 8)

The aim of the present volume is to contribute to the *comparative* understanding of authoritarianism. It is a comparison across authoritarian regimes, in general, and across the two Greek authoritarian regimes, specifically, the comparative nature of which has been seriously ommitted by all the analysts of the Greek authoritarian experience. In this comparative approach, the international context of authoritarianism will be of vital importance, in that both regimes will be seen in the context of other contemporary authoritarian cases, abroad. Moreover, the comparative presentation of the background climate will contribute to a better understanding of the specificities of each regime. It will be shown that different political, socio-economic and international conditions, in one and the same country, may support different types of authoritarian regimes, when these latter occur. It will be evident that the two dictatorships shared many common themes when compared with similar authoritarian cases and, at the same time, they presented unique features when viewed in the light of the specific domestic historical conjuncture that led to their rise and stabilisation.

The central focus of this study is to show the relevance of ideology to the understanding of authoritarian regimes. It will be seen how authoritarian ideologies expressing the rulers' perceptions of their contemporary realities can either be shaped into intellectual discourses, reflecting the influence of international authoritarian ideologies, or can remain in more unorganised thought-systems, reflecting the peculiarities of the rulers' mentalities. The relevant field of education expresses clearly the ability or inability of dictatorial elites to shape an authoritarian pedagogy and to mobilise or demobilise their respective youths. The concept of clientelism will be introduced in the context of non-democratic societies, as was actually practiced in the field of education.

The following analysis rests primarily on its comparative, synthesising ambition rather than on an extensive empirical, primary research. The aim is mostly to present a satisfactory comparison of the two cases, rather than come up with previously undiscovered primary evidence. Most historical findings are based entirely on secondary sources, research monographs, analyses in books and articles on various journals. These have been reviewed, selectively and critically, in the comprehensive presentation of the

different historical realities. However, the use of primary and archival research has also been deemed necessary and has been pursued extensively regarding the fields of ideology and education.

The ideas of the 4th of August regime are taken from the public speeches of Metaxas and his ideologues, the personal diary of the dictator and the regime's periodicals and journals, given that the press policy of the regime was extensive and systematic during the period 1936-1941. For the more recent 21st of April regime, the material is abundant, varying from personal memories to publications, covering a wide range of issues. The ideas of the military junta were found in the public speeches of the military rulers, in the few theoretical documents of some theoreticians, in the Greek and foreign press, during the period 1967-1974, and in the personal memories of supporters and dissidents. Moreover, very valuable were a few personal interviews with military officers who, through their personal account of the military's internal ideology, were able to convey the post-war military way of thinking.

Regarding the field of education in general, there are a number of alternative sources in the analysis of governmental policy. Public speeches in Universities and schools, ministerial councils concerning the drafting of laws, the actual legislature, the school curricula, the content of textbooks and the publications of pedagogists can be part of a vast primary research material.

With respect to the regimes in question, both dictatorships lacked any pedagogues, specialists in the field of authoritarian education with long-term organised perceptions. As will be shown, Metaxas, himself not a pedagogue, took over the ministry of education, and for the most part consulted non-fascist supporters, while the military junta resorted primarily to loyalism based on political and not necessarily ideological support. Therefore, the texts by relevant ideologues were very limited and not radically different from the previously applied ideas on education. The short duration and the non-totalitarian character of both dictatorships did not allow for the overall transformation of textbooks, which is why their content is not particularly accounted for in the following analysis.

The method of research on education was mostly based on the actual legislature of the periods 1936-1941 and 1967-1974, the clearest indicator of the rulers' ideas, intentions and policies. The abundance of relevant laws will testify to the indecisiveness and vagueness with which the dictatorial rulers approached education. At the same time, the legislature on education is very representative of the conflicts regarding the actual orientation to be adopted. Finally, a few interviews with professors and students, discredited by the regime, were very helpful for a more vivid understanding of the general climate in Greek education during the period of the military junta.

Chapter 1: IDEOLOGY AND EDUCATION IN A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: GREECE 1821-1922

The development of a state ideology in independent Greece

The national consciousness of the Greek people preceded the creation of an independent Greek nation-state. Under the intellectual predominance of the Greek Orthodox Church, common history, religion and language united the Greeks during the Ottoman domination. Towards the end of the 18th century, Greek national consciousness, through the influence of a Greek diaspora merchant class and the work of Greek intellectuals, influenced by the ideas of the Enlightenment, was transformed into a nationalist drive for the revolutionary purpose of the creation of an independent nation-state.

As a newly formed nation-state, 19th century Greece struggled to ascertain its political and economic position within a constantly changing international environment, divided into a few large competitive Empires, themselves the battlefields of conflicting nationalist ideologies. It was a period when most revolutionary movements in Europe combined ideas of nationalism, liberalism and secularism. Nationalism, the *"child of the double European revolution "*, was the result of the industrial revolution, initiated in England, and of the political and ideological revolution, originated in France.[1] The ideas of the Enlightenment were a strong stimulus to the revival and organisation of the European nationalist ideologies. They were the main influence on the thought of the Greek diaspora and of the Greek intellectuals, through their contact with the West and its secular ideology. Nationalism was then perceived as *"a state of mind, permeating the large majority of people which recognises the nation-state as the ideal form of political organisation."* [2]

Two names stand out as principally linked with the new revolutionary ideas, Adamantios Korais and Rhigas Pheraios. Both of them typify the pre-revolutionary "intelligentsia" which contributed to the transformation of Greek national consciousness

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[1] This is one of the central ideas in Hobsbawm' s book *The Age of Revolution*, Abacus 1977.

[2] Definition of Nationalism offered by Hans Kohn in *The Idea of Nationalism*, Macmillan 1961.

into an organised set of ideas, combined with a political revolutionary strategy. Korais was

directly inspired by French revolutionary thought and looked to the intellectual heritage of

Greece, as the basis of a new independent nation. As a consistent advocate of Western

thought, he idealised the classical world of the ancients, he supported the idea of the

historical connection between the ancient and the modern Greeks, while he underrated the

importance of the Byzantine and Ottoman eras, which he considered backward-looking and

obscurantist periods of history. He disputed with fervour the ideological omnipresence of

the Christian Orthodox Church and in its place he professed the freedom of political and

religious beliefs, the devotion to the ideas of the French and American revolutions, the

application of liberalism in the economic sphere, the existence of a stronger legislative

power in relation to the executive, and was against any monarchical form of government.[3]

Parallel to Korais' westernised ideas, Rhigas Pheraios' dream to establish a federation of

free people in the Balkans, following the political organisation set out by the example of

the French revolution, stood as the ideological forerunner of an *"early obscure and

possibly pan-Balkanist movement* ".[4] In this Balkan federation, the hegemonical role was

attributed to the Greeks due to their economic, religious and intellectual superiority among

the Balkan subjects of the Porte. The sources of inspiration for his work were the classical

Greek ideals, the Byzantine tradition and modern Western ideas.

The development of the Greek nationalist ideology, the way it was organised and

nurtured among the Greek people was directly linked with the position of the Greek

diaspora in various European centres, during the pre-revolutionary period. The existence

of Greek merchants, settled in minority communities within the Ottoman Empire and

abroad, and coming into close contact with Western thinking, was of great importance.

Moreover, the influence of Greek language and culture in the Balkans, the predominance

of the Greek element in the Patriarchate of Constantinople, had led to the "Hellenisation of

the Balkans", in financial, social, educational and ecclesiastical affairs, a sort of Greek

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[3] Further analysis of the Greek Enlightenment and the contribution of Korais is provided by Demaras in *The Greek Enlightenment*, Athens 1989 and by Kondylis in *The Greek Enlightenment; The Philosophical Ideas*, Athens 1988.

[4] See Hobsbawm's *op.cit.*, p.174.

cultural and economic superiority, during the course of the 18th century,[5] which largely

explains the early demands for independence for the Greek nation, compared to the other

Ottoman subjects.[6]

With the achievement of independence,[7] the first task was to create an independent

national government that would settle important political issues, vital to the nation-state's

existence and survival. Emphasis was laid on the form of political organisation and the

institutionalisation of political life. The goal was the formation of a modern state following

Western political ideas and forms of organisation. The first acts of the new state were to

create a new administrative system, a new judicial system independent of church

interference, a new educational system under the auspices of the state, a new codification

of the law, the organisation of a national army and a new legal setting for religious affairs.

At the ideological level, the organisation and the strengthening of national consciousness

was required in order to support the new political establishment; ie. the creation of an

official state ideology. This meant the settlement of the vital issues that defined the meaning

of Greek nationality, so persistent throughout the centuries. The building of an

independent nation-state, therefore, led to the creation of a new "state ideology", a

common denominator of Greek society, within or without Greece's boundaries.[8]

The formation of a modern Greek national ideology for the independent nation-state

is generally seen as the struggle between forces tied to the previous status quo, sceptical of

any Western-oriented changes, and forces heavily influenced by the ideas of the

Enlightenment, as they were set out by their foremost representative, Korais. It is seen by

most analysts in the context of a cultural dualism which made its impact on the subsequent

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[5] The term "Hellenisation" is used by several analysts of the Greek case, in order to indicate the superior position of the Greeks in their relation to the other nationalities of the Ottoman empire.

[6] Before the Greek national uprising, a large scale Serbian national revolt against the Ottoman rule had been launched in 1804 by Karadjordje, who seized Belgrade and proclaimed himself prince of Serbia (1808-1913). However in 1813, the Ottoman forces occupied Serbia and destroyed the forces of Karadjordje, only to grant partial autonomy to the Serbs in 1815.

[7] The creation of the Greek independent state was officially proclaimed by the Great Powers in the 1832 Treaty of London.

[8] Elli Skopetea in The "Kingdom-Model" and the Megali Idea , (Athens 1988), offers an excellent account on the development of the national identity in the years 1830-1880, based on primary material of the period. She presents the main elements of the dominant Greek ideology, the product of a conflict between domestic forces, concentrating basically on the European identity of the Greeks, as perceived by the Greeks of the independent state.

ideological development of the new state; the ideas of the influential western international

environment, on the one hand, and the ideas of a long already existing cultural Greek

tradition which had been preserved and nourished by the Church under the tolerance of the

Ottoman authorities. At its most extreme, it grew out of the conflict between two schools

of thought; one emphasised the Eastern Orthodox character of Greekness; the other

emphasised modern secular ideas and the evocation of the ancient classical spirit. As Smith

has eloquently put it, the history of the Greek state can best be understood as the conflict

between "*two ideals of the nation, the territorial vs the ethnic, and two models of national*

integration, the civic vs the genealogical cum religious ". The first followed the ideas of the

French Revolution, the second followed the Orthodox Byzantine tradition of the Greek

"ethnie";[9] a fight between the forces of the preservation of the cultural tradition and the

progressive/modernising forces of a western orientation.[10] Moreover, it has been

attempted by many authors of the 19th century Greek period, to relate the development of

the Greek ideology to the existence of a Greek bourgeoisie strongly influenced by the

liberal centres of Europe and in opposition   to the more traditional pre-capitalist forces

within Greece.[11] While it is true that the dominant bearer of western liberal ideology was

the diaspora merchant class and not a domestic bourgeois class, the ideology of the

diaspora bourgeoisie was in itself characterised by striking contradictions.[12] Hence, the

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[9] Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Basil Blackwell 1986, pp.145-146.

[10] The crudest developmental theories regarding the Third world context, saw the dichotomy "tradition-modernity" as a unilinear path from the first to the second, in that all countries of a third world development travel historically through the same stages, ending up in modernity and development. They see the two elements of the dichotomy as a zero-sum game, whereby by achieving modernity they eliminate tradition.

[11] This approach was followed by the Marxist tradition, and the Greek marxists, who, at one point in Greek history, saw the Greek development as a process of revolutionary stages, in the ultimate effort to advance socialism. See Skliros *Our Social Problem*, Athens 1907, where he wrote his account of the Greek social development. Skliros was the first Greek marxist to state plainly that only the complete liberalisation and Europeanisation of Greek society would be able to provide the country with the objective conditions for the transition to socialism; an application of historical materialism in the Greek case. Skliros' example was later adopted by Kordatos, who, during the 1920s perceived the 19th century ideological conflicts, as the social struggle between the forces of feudalism and the bourgeoisie. Kordatos, *Demoticism and Intellectualism*, Athens 1974.

[12] The Greek diaspora tried to get incorporated socially and ideologically within the bourgeoisie of the societies in which they lived, and they were not able to form a conscious bourgeois ideology, but simply imitated the foreign way of living; on the other hand, they tried to preserve the basic elements of their Greek national identity and some traditional aspects of their cultural past. Their ideological contradictions were further exacerbated by the different geographical areas in which they lived and prospered. There was a different type of Greek diaspora ideology in the countries of the West and a different ideology in the diaspora under the Ottoman occupation. See Dertilis, *Social Transformation and Military Intervention 1880-1909*, Athens 1977, p.78.

social and ideological cleavages were not so clear cut, and the Greek ideological and

political reality was much more complex than a fight between the romantic eastern tradition

and the modern western liberalism. As Salvador Giner argues *"the cultural polarisation

represented by the dichotomy of religious traditionalism versus liberal radicalism entailed

more opposing sets of attitudes than are explicit in its two terms"*. He correctly sees it as a

more agonising and contradictory process whereby *"polarisation created a duality and a

cleavage that consumed energies and paralysed minds"*. [13]

The ideological discourse within the new state reflected the way the various Greek

socio-political forces incorporated the influences from the western models of development,

and the latter's articulation with the already existing elements of Greek cultural identity.

The varieties, differences and conflicts between the various dominant western European

societies had a decisive impact on 19th century Greek development and presented a far

from homogeneous Western political model.[14] To be sure, this contradictory process of

ideological formation was the result of the importation of different dominant western

influences, a combination of western models of organisation and the imitation of western

[13] Salvador Giner, "Political Economy, Legitimation, and the State in Southern Europe", *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:Southern Europe*, The Johns Hopkins University Press 1986, pp.31-32. Similar to Giner, Tsoukalas claims that the "tradition-modernity"division, according to which models of institutionalisation imported from the west contradicted the romantic visions of resistance and Greek authenticity, was a pseudo-dilemma. Instead, the Greek ideological context was characterised by a contradictory amalgam of pre-capitalist cultural themes and liberal economic and political choices, the result of the Greek incorporation into the world capitalist system and the peripheral development of countries such as Greece. The weakness of Greek civil society and the lack of liberal forces with genuine liberal interests differentiate the Greek case from the European ones. In the Greek context, the two poles of the dichotomy were articulated in a contradictory and polarised way, as opposed to the smoother and more constructive articulation in western societies. See "Tradition and Modernisation; Some general questions" in *Hellenism and Hellenicity*, pp.37-48.Moreover, Milios sees the development of Greek nationalist ideology not as the result of the peripheral status of the Greek economy in the international system, but of its high degree of incorporation within the capitalist system, the advanced development of the Greek commercial and shipowning bourgeoisie, which pursued the nationalistic scheme in order to promote its interests; there remains however the problem of whether the diaspora bourgeoisie formed part of the Greek independent society or of the countries where they lived and prospered which Milios does not manage to solve very convincingly. Hence Milios sees the nationalist ideology as the domination of the bourgeois political ideology over the previous religious and "communal" ideologies. He sees the transformation of the modern Greek state as the transition from the asiatic mode of production to the capitalist mode of production, the development of a system of capitalist class domination. *The Greek Social Formation; From Expansionism to the Capitalist Development* , Athens 1988.

[14] Many analysts in their effort to juxtapose the western influence with the eastern Greek context, present the European influence as a more or less homogeneous influence and fail to recognise that the various European societies adopted a different perception of the 19th century liberal context. Moreover, the British, French or German powers viewed differently their relationship with the Greek independent state and movements such as the English Philhellenism, the French perception of the classical thought, the German adoration for the ancient spirit or the various anti-Hellenic expressions were all incorporated differently in the domestic ideological discourse.

styles of living with persistent historical domestic cultural mentalities, pre-independence

forms of political organisation and patterns of behaviour, which had been dominant during

the Ottoman period. The result was an accommodation between the various tendencies, an

amalgam of different ideological and cultural styles and the political implementation of

what many authors have called "oligarchic parliamentarism".

Religion: The State and the Church

The first important transition from the Ottoman era to the independent state context,

in the ideological field, was the displacement of the previous dominant role of the religious

priesthood in transmitting and disseminating the national cultural values, the essence of the

Greek common identity. The new independent national authorities acquired the role of

diffusing the new cultural social values and ideals of rational planning and social

education.[15] In most 19th century Western European societies, the secularisation of the

national states had changed radically the role of their Churches and religions. Churches

were weakened while many religious organisations lost their political and educational

functions and much of their land and wealth.[16] In the words of Althusser, while the

Church, in the pre-capitalist historical context, was the dominant ideological apparatus,

which concentrated in its hands not only religious functions, but also educational ones -

functions of communication and "culture"- with the French Revolution the dominant role

of religion in the ideological sphere was replaced by new state ideological apparatuses.[17]

Equally in independent Greece, with the advent of western secularism, the role of the

Church in determining the national consciousness of the Greeks was weakened. While the

religious sentiment during the Ottoman occupation held the dominant role in Greek

ideology, with the import of the western secularist ideology the religious issue became an

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[15] See Anthony Smith's mention of the "new priesthood" in *op.cit.*, pp. 157-161. Skopetea (*op.cit.*, p.433) attaches primary importance to the thinking of the Greek intellectuals of the period since after all "*the construction of the national history, the transformation of the language, the organisation of education...and the very criticism on the Greek development, formed a 'par excellence' intellectual competence*". Although it is problematic to talk of a professional intelligentsia in the 19th century Greek context, the development of the independent national identity involved a serious debate among Greek intellectuals.

[16] See Smith, *op.cit.*, p. 158.

[17] Louis Althusser, "On the Reproduction of the Conditions of Production", in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, pp. 143-144.

essential element in the new official ideological discourse, one of the important cultural themes but not the dominant one.

The first open conflict which erupted in the new free society had to do with the Church's position vis-a-vis the State. The issue was of an urgent character for three reasons; first, as previously mentioned, the Greek Orthodox Church had held a predominant position in Greek national life during the Ottoman period;[18] second, the Western ideological secularist orientation of the independent state regarded the church as subservient to the state; and, third, the authorities of independent Greece demanded a break with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, due to the latter's dependence on the Ottoman authorities.[19]

Under the rule of the Bavarian Regency, a new Ecclesiastical Constitution, promulgated in 1833, declared the independence of the autocephalous Church of Greece from the Patriarchate and established the Holy Synod as its highest organ. This signalled the first rupture with the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Further state policies interfered in the Church's organisational and financial affairs and placed the religious establishment under the power of an extensively authoritarian state. The Greek church was transformed into an ideological battlefield between secular and Orthodox, traditional influences. The secular influences, dominated by the spirit of the western Enlightenment demanded the total autonomy of the Greek church from the Patriarchate and the subordination of the Church to the power of the State. The traditional forces demanded greater autonomy from state intervention and close links with the Patriarchate. The latter's principal aim was to prove that the Greek Church, although independent, was close to Orthodox Christianity, and it was not willing to make any concessions to the Catholic Church.[20] The turmoil in ecclesiastical matters lasted until the Patriarchate recognised the independence of the Greek

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[18] George Arnakis in his article on "The Role of Religion in the Development of Balkan Nationalism" examines the contribution of the Greek Orthodox Church in preserving Christianity in the Balkans and in the transition of the Balkans from its mediaeval antecedents to the era of nationalism. See *The Balkans in Transition*, University of California Press 1963.

[19] On the relation between the Ottoman Authorities and the Greek Patriarchate, see Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity*, Cambridge University Press 1968, and Kitsikis *The History of the Ottoman Empire*, Athens 1988.

[20] See Demaras, *The Greek Romanticism*, Athens 1985, p.375.

Church in 1852.[21] Although the negotiations were far from easy, the result was an accommodation between the two sides; on the one hand, state interference in religious affairs was institutionalised; on the other hand, Orthodoxy proved a durable factor in the formation of ideology within Greek society, and retained a relatively strong role in the choices of the national authorities.

The religious issue within Greek society has been one of the utmost importance for an understanding of the general cultural national context, as well as of the role of the Greek Church within the socio-political environment. Historically, the relationship between the Orthodox Church and the secular state has been an issue of nervous cooperation. The political and ideological divisions between leaders and parties were always reflected in the ecclesiastical sector, and clerics were always compelled to take sides in the political debates. In this respect, the instability of Greece's political life was manifested in Church matters with politicians intervening to appoint figures loyal to the political leadership to the Church hierarchy.[22] The government tended to control the Church through: the creation of new constitutions; the imposition of Archbishops loyal to their policies; the control of the Holy and the Hierarchical Synods.[23] The ideological role of the Church was subsequently supportive of the established status quo, being sceptical of any radical changes that could threaten its position as an ideological mechanism and an influential political force.

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[21] The best historical account of the relation between Church and State in Independent Greece is made by Charles Frazee in his book *The Orthodox Church and Independent Greece 1821-1852*, Cambridge University Press 1969. Elli Skopetea focuses on the failure of the forces of Enlightenment to influence the subsequent development of religious matters in Greece. Skopetea argues that the Greek religious domain was the only ground which allowed for the conflict between the progressive forces of the Enlightenment and the traditional forces of orthodoxy. The result was the failure of the forces of the Enlightenment to bring about changes in the Church establishment, which preserved thereafter its conservatism. She claims later that the role of the Church was degraded from the carrier of ideology to an element of the dominant ideology (*op.cit.*, pp.132-134). She fails to appreciate however, that this in itself marks a major cultural transformation and proves the impact of the Enlightenment on Greek ideology.

[22] A typical case was the inter-war period in church affairs when the alternation in power of the Venizelists and anti-Venizelists was reflected in the subsequent appointments of loyal bishops to the Church hierarchy, by the political leadership.

[23] See Charles Frazee, "Church and State in Greece" in *Greece in Transition*, Zero London 1977.

Language: The problem of "diglossia"

The second element of national identity, language, had already been a cause of discontent among different social forces, during the pre-revolutionary period. The problem stemmed from the lack of a single, homogeneous Greek language; on the one hand, the Patriarchate and the educated aristocracy in Constantinople favoured the use of the archaic language; on the other hand, the people used a popular Greek idiom. Throughout the period 1780-1820, there was a major disagreement over the language issue between the Patriarchate, and the flourishing Greek merchant class. The latter demanded the establishment of a single official Greek language which would overcome the problem of "diglossia". Korais tried to reconcile the different tendencies, by professing a "middle way" and creating a single purified language, the result of the combination of the two; this meant simplifying the archaic language and cleansing the popular language from foreign words and expressions.[24]

Following independence, the pre-revolutionary disagreement between the different tendencies became latent. There was a reconciliation between the Church/Phanariot aristocracy and the merchant classes over the language issue. The katharevousa became the official language of the State; the popular idiom continued to be the language of the simple uneducated people. However, the katharevousa used by the State was, far from what Korais had initially advocated, full of archaic forms. Katharevousa, the language of the State and the educated, which was used by the privileged social strata, became the symbol of social ascendancy for the lower classes. "Diglossia" was institutionalised in Greece with the use of two languages and was best reflected in the existence of two schools of thought among intellectuals; the culturally western-dominated Ionian school, which supported the popular-demotic language and tradition, and the Phanariot/Patriarchate school which supported the archaic language and tradition. The language issue was brought to the forefront of the ideological battles towards the end of the 19th century and after, and was tied closely to the pressing demands for educational reform. [25]

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[24] On the language issue during the pre-revolutionary period see Kordatos *Demoticism and Intellectualism*, Athens 1974, pp. 11-66, a marxist perspective on the language question, and Tsoukalas *Dependency and Reproduction*, Athens 1985, pp.532-551, a neo-marxist perspective.

[25] This will be treated separately in the following pages on education.

History: Interpretation of the Greek past

The third cultural question in the debate over the formation of the Greek national consciousness concerned the perception of the country's past, the official history of the Greek nation. Much importance was attached to the identification of the modern Greek state with the roots of the Greek nation. As Demichel points out *"the history of Greece is ancient and very recent, at the same time "*.[26] The modern history of Greece involved the creation of a modern state, based on western forms of political organisation on a nation where the ancient, Byzantine and Ottoman historical legacies weighed heavily on the present. The task was to define the historical significance of these legacies and their relevance to the new independent state. It was assigned to the historians to reveal and present the unexplored aspects of the nation's past and to the state officials to choose the most glorious aspects among them, in order to create a national history that Greek people would be proud of. As Smith points out, the rediscovery of the national self was not merely an academic matter; it became a *"pressing practical issue, vexed and contentious, which could spell life or death for the nationalist project of creating a nation "*.[27]

The Greek understanding of Greek history was, to a large extent, the reflection of the European perception of Greek history and, at times, that perception, in large measure, determined gravely domestic attitudes towards the nation's past. Perceptions of Greek history during that period were greatly influenced by the attitudes of the European Enlightenment towards the Greek antiquity. It was the conviction of the Europeans, that the age of reason and logic was a direct decendent of the ancient Greek thought while the Medieval period in Europe, including the Byzantine and Ottoman rule in the East, were backward looking and regressive. During the period of Bavarian rule, a German interpretation of the ancient Greek spirit, resulted in a strong predisposition towards the neo-classicist style, a result of their admiration of the ancient past. Modern Greek history, as interpreted by the Bavarian school of thought, was considered to be the direct heir of

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[26] Andre et Francine Demichel *Les Dictatures Europeenes*, Paris 1973, p.56.

[27] Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p.148.

ancient Greek history. According to the Bavarian perspective of Greek history, the

Macedonian, Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman pasts were simply ommitted.[28]

In the late 1840s and the 1850s in Greece, we observe the appearance of a

domestic, more pluralistic approach to historiography, regarding the matter of Hellenism.

The immediate causes for this had to do with the anti-popular and authoritarian Bavarian

rule, the termination of European Philhellenism, as had been expressed by the English and

French during the War of Independence, and Fallmerayer's provocative arguments as to

the Slavic origins of the Greeks. These factors consequently generated a turn towards

"Helleno-centrism" in Greek thought, a more Greek perspective on the country's history.

Greek intellectuals in their effort to refute Fallmerayer's theories and prove the European

character of their identity to the Europeans and to themselves, embarked on an examination

of Greek history, re-evaluating and analysing more deeply the organic characteristics that

constituted Greek nationality.[29]

The ideological "restoration" of the Greek past came with the historians Zambelios

and Paparrighopoulos, both of whom professed the idea of continuation in history and the

unity between different historical phases. Paparrighopoulos' *History of the Greek Nation*

was the first major modern Greek presentation of the national history, which dealt with the

specifics of Greek history, presented in continuum, Ancient-Byzantine-Modern. He thus

contributed to the ideological "redress" of the Byzantine period which automatically

became not just a part of Greek history but also a symbol of the Christian element within

Hellenism. At the same time, he also stood against the European dominance in the Greek

historical perception by presenting a Greek version of the Greek past.[30]

To summarise, the settlement of cultural issues, during the first decades after the

achievement of independence, and the framing of an official state ideology involved a

conflict between various intellectual forces and took a different form with each cultural

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[28] On the Bavarian influence with respect to the matter of Greek history see Demaras K., *op.cit.*, pp. 325-348, and Skopetea, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-204.

[29] See Vergopoulos *The Agrarian Question*, Athens 1975, pp. 297-315 and Demaras, *op.cit.*, pp. 405-452.

[30] See Demaras' *Paparrighopoulos* (Athens 1986) where he examines the life and the work of the historian, as well as the historical context which influenced and shaped the ideas of Paparrighopoulos.

issue; it took the form of a Church vs State conflict in religious matters; archaic vs popular language in language matters; ancient vs medieval past with regard to the present's relationship to the past. Clearly the final solution was an accommodation between the different points of view: the state interfered in the country's religious establishment, while the Church retained a strong role in the ideological field, in the first case; katharevousa, the middle way between the archaic and the popular language was institutionalised within the context of "diglossia", in the second case; the continuity of Greek history was affirmed by the national historian Paparrighopoulos, in the third case.

Nationalism: The "Megali Idea" and the territorial implications

The common cultural elements of Greek identity and their survival was linked to the existence of the non-liberated diaspora Greeks within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. Their liberation shaped and sustained an ambitious nationalist scheme which managed to hold the Greeks ideologically together until the 1920s. The central focus of the Megali Idea was the expansion of Greek territory to include all the Greeks with a common national identity. As Gellner points out, the existence of a "diaspora nationalism" places the acquisition of territory as the foremost objective of nationalism, the first and perhaps its main problem. [31]

The Megali Idea as a concept was officially introduced into the Greek ideological, nationalistic language by Kolletis in a speech in the Assembly in 1844. The immediate cause which gave rise to such a concept was a political controversy over who should be considered an "indigenous" Greek as opposed to an "outsider" Greek, in the context of the making of a new constitution. The Megali Idea can be defined as the Greek people's will to identify the Greek Nation with the Greek State. Initially, it took the form of a very ambitious project of territorial expansion whose aim was to achieve a *"Greater Greece of three continents and five seas "*. The idea was that the Greek borders should encompass all the Greek communities within the Ottoman Empire, in the Balkans, Asia Minor and North Africa, where Greek merchant capital, Greek language and culture were predominant. It

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[31] Ernest Gellner *Nations and Nationalism*, Blackwell 1983, p.101.

looked to its centre in Constantinople and aimed to substitute the Ottoman Empire with a

Hellenic Empire, heir to the Byzantium. It started as a will to spread the Helleno-Christian

civilisation in the backward-looking East. The Greek nation was thus seen as the civilising

model for the East, as it had been centuries before, the model for the West.

The Megali Idea may be considered to be a vivid expression of Romantic

Nationalism which governed Greek ideology throughout the whole of 19th century. This

romantic spirit was also connected with Western Romanticism and was adjusted to the

ideological discourse within the Greek context.[32] Its nostalgia for past glory, affinity

towards Medieval values and the strong role of religious beliefs helped shape the core-

values of the Megali Idea. The most characteristic element of Greek romanticism was the

idea of unity that it inspired; unity in both historical time and geographical space.

Paparrighopoulos, the national historian and the central figure in Greek romantic

historiography, affirmed this principle of unity in history, ancient-Byzantine-modern,

which presented perfectly legitimate demands for the acquisition of territories, where the

Greek culture had flourished during the classical and Byzantine periods. The notion of

unity in space was strengthened by the fact that affluent Greek merchants continued to

spread Greek cultural and economic hegemony over the same territory.[33]

The ideology of the Megali Idea, due to its vague and ultra-nationalistic character,

was able to create a consensus among the Greek population and to diminish the influence

of the class character of the various conflicting social demands. The actual strategy for its

implementation, however aroused a lot of disagreement as to the way in which the

territorial gains would be made. Different political actors proposed different strategies to

realise the same dream, a reflection of the political divisions within Greek society. A first

strategy, held initially by the "French" and the "Russian" parties favoured the acquisition

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[32] The movement of Romanticism in Europe which dominated the first half of the 19th century had replaced the previous age of the Enlightenment. Its anti-bourgeois, anti-materialistic character professed a tendency for change, a nostalgic feeling for the past. The Medieval period, neglected by the intellectual forces of Enlightenment, was re-evaluated under the new era of Romanticism, accompanied by a new interest in Christian faith. The Greek war of Independence had gained the support of many romantic intellectuals in Europe, who considered the Greek struggle against the oppressor a myth inspiration for all nationalists and liberals everywhere in Europe. On the movement of European Romanticism, see Eric Hobsbawm *The Age of Revolution*, pp.307-335.

[33] The idea of unity, according to Demaras in *The Greek Romanticism*, (Athens 1985) is central in the analysis of the Romantic movement in Greece.

of new lands through the participation in Balkan conflicts, which might result from possible Ottoman defeats in international wars. A second strategy, held by the "English" party, promoted the idea that the Greek kingdom should reach a level of economic, military and administrative maturity before it embarked on the realisation of any irredentist ambitions. A third strategy, held by the Greeks in Constantinople, favoured Helleno-Ottoman cooperation, believing that the economic and cultural hegemony of the Greek Patriarchate and of the Greek aristocracy in Constantinople would inevitably result into the displacement of the Ottoman hegemony.[34]

While the Megali Idea lasted for almost a century, its content varied or evolved according to international and domestic developments. During the period of the duet of Prime Minister Kolletis/King Othon, the vision of the Eastern Greek Empire with its centre in Constantinople, heir to the Byzantine Empire, was the predominant expression of the Megali Idea. The Crimean war was the first major blow to the over-ambitious form of the dream since it signalled the birth of other competitive Balkan nationalisms.[35] Thereafter the Megali Idea was not solely connected with the Ottoman position in the Balkans but with the position of the other nationalisms in the area, as well. In particular, Bulgarian nationalism was perceived as the most competitive Balkan nationalism, backed as it was, by the Russians, and this resulted into the addition of the anti-Slavic dimension to the external threat which at times outweighed even the Turkish one. The competition and hostility among the Balkan peoples, with the single exception of the First Balkan war, ruled out any hope of Balkan cooperation against the Ottomans. Trikoupis' political leadership, during the 1880s, tried to connect the Megali Idea with western style capitalist development, in his effort to forward policies that would create an integrated national and economic whole

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[34] See Antonis Liakos,*Italian Risorgimiento and the Megali Idea* , Athens 1985, pp.93-97. A current, relatively anachronistic, supporter of Helleno-Turkish cooperation and of the creation of a confederation of the two countries, Kitsikis believes quite fanatically that the Greek expansionist desire of the Megali Idea was the product of European imperialism which resulted in a "racist mentality of the modern Greek man" towards the barbarian Turk. Dimitris Kitsikis, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, p.152. Although a prolific _ writer, however, Kitsikis is so obsessively influenced by his personal wishes that his analysis is of little historical value.

[35] On the repercussions of the Crimean war in Greek politics and ideology see Antonis Liakos' *op.cit.*, Gerasimos Avgoustinos' Consciousness *and History*, New York 1977, and Theodoros Tatsios' *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897*, New York 1984. For the connection between the Crimean war and the birth of Balkan nationalisms see Barbara Jelavich' *The History of the Balkans*, Vol.1, Cambridge University Press 1984, and M.S. Anderson's *The Eastern Question*, Macmillan 1987.

under the aegis of private capital. The new nationalism of Trikoupis centred geographically in the areas around the Aegean and was based on the popular language and the popular tradition. [36]

Overall, the Megali Idea had both a "realistic/understandable" and a "romantic/utopian" side to it. The Greek desire to expand was realistic in that it was founded on the wish to include the large number of ethnic Greeks living outside Greek boundaries within a greater Greek state, i.e., Greek communities which flourished and prospered economically out of the country. The enlargement of Greece's territory to include the whole of the Greek community was presented as a prerequisite for the country's further successful socio-economic and political development. The same dream, the product of the romantic nationalistic climate in 19th century Greece, was also unrealistic, firstly because the Greek army, considering its level of professionalism and organisation, was not equal to such a grand scheme, and secondly, because of the country's weak economic and diplomatic position.

Indeed, the Megali idea received major blows throughout the period when it was popular in the 19th century, which were caused by a series of major defeats at times of international crises. The Crimean War in 1854, the 1866 revolt in Crete, the Greek participation in the Russo-Turkish war in 1878, the 1886 Balkan crisis which resulted from Bulgarian expansionist aims and finally, the severe defeat in the Greco-Turkish war of 1897, produced important set-backs to the Greek nationalist, irredentist plans. All the above crises involved, among other international issues, attempts by the Greek authorities to achieve the objectives of the Megali Idea, which finally failed due either to the Great Powers' reluctance to support Greek demands, compounded by Greek foreign policy miscalculations or to competition from the similar territorial claims of other Balkan nationalities. The crisis of 1897, the most severe of them all, left the Greeks with the bitter taste of defeat, and was followed by a wider crisis in the political, economic and military

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[36] Trikoupis is considered the first Greek moderniser-politician influenced by the period of European capitalist expansion. See Vergopoulos and his chapter on "Renewed Nationalism" in the *History of the Greek Nation*, Vol. 14, pp. 56-60. Trikoupis favoured a development based on private capital, on the English model, Deligiannis his political competitor favoured the path of statist capitalism, a development patronised by a strong state, i.e., the civil servants, the bureaucracy and the military.

spheres during the first decade of the 20th century which led to a major organised intervention by the military in politics, in 1909.

The period from 1909 to 1922 marked the near-realisation and the final defeat and disappearance of the Megali Idea. During his period in power Venizelos profited from international circumstances, namely the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. As a result of the Balkan wars Crete, parts of Macedonia and Epirus and the islands of the northern Aegean were incorporated. The First World War brought new opportunities for the incorporation of more territories, only this time consensus regarding participation in the war was not achieved. It was this very issue of participation in the war that resulted in the division of Greek society into two factions. The monarchical side supported neutrality, the Venizelist side supported participation on the side of the Entente. Two completely opposite national strategies defined the essence of "Dichasmos" (National Schism), the politics of the period, at a time when the ideology of the Megali Idea was approaching its limits. While the Balkan wars and the disintegration of the Ottoman empire after the first world war secured the enlargement of Greece's territory, the 1922 Asia Minor disaster signalled the final end of any aspirations bared upon the Megali Idea, offering the tragic epilogue to the unattainable and unrealistic dream which had excited the Greek nation for a century, but had ultimately proved to be beyond Greek capabilities. Thereafter, Greek nationalists abandoned their territorial ambitions and the inter-war period was characterised by the search for a new Greek identity within confined and stable boundaries, with the majority of the Greek ethnics living within the territory of the Greek state.

The development of state education in independent Greece

One of the most important tasks for the authorities of the independent Greek state was the creation of an educational system. Due to the ideological affinity towards Western political ideas and practices, policy-makers attributed a special role to education, as the state's most important ideological apparatus, for the reproduction of the new official ideology and the substitution of the previous dominance of the Church in educational matters. With the independence of the Greek nation-state, a fundamentally different

educational system was introduced. 19th century Greece saw the development of all three levels of education, primary, secondary and higher, of a highly classicist orientation, under the authority of a highly centralised state, which assured access to all social classes. The period after the 1880s saw the first organised attempts to reform the system, with a remarkable intellectual battle over the issue of education, at the core of which was the language issue.

The Centralised, Classicist and "Democratic" Character of Greek Education

A major purpose of state education was to consolidate national consciousness and contribute to the achievement of national uniformity and consensus. As was the case with the wider political organisation of the independent state, the main influence came from the enlightened West, as to the nationalistic and liberal character of education, perceived as crucial for the subsequent survival of the Greek nation-state.[37] The principles behind the educational system, implemented during the Bavarian period of absolutist monarchy, were based on a combination of the Bavarian and French models, themselves based on Napoleonic principles of a strong, centralised and liberal state. The Bavarian authoritarian bureaucracy, introduced the centralised system of education, whereby a wide range of educational matters were controlled by the central government, in the form of the Ministry of Education. This political interference was to remain a perennial feature in the way government education policy was to be exercised subsequently.[38] This left little room for administrative, cultural or pedagogic initiative at the subordinate or local levels.

The organisation of primary and secondary education as set up by the Bavarians remained unchanged, in general terms, for almost a century. It consisted of a seven-year

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[37] The initial rhetoric of the independence fighters was very optimistic and liberal as to the establishment of a "free and constitutionally guarranteed education for boys and girls, for the making of free-willed and responsible citizens". Demaras A., The Reform which did not Take Place, Vol. 1, Athens 1988, p.kz'.

[38] One typical example of the highly centralised authority was a 1844 law which enhanced the power of the ministry to transfer professors and teachers at its own convenience. This type of provision was frequently used by various ministers for political purposes, an issue of distress to the school and University staff. It gave the minister the power to transfer teachers and professors by a mere ministerial decision. If one considers the fact that during the period 1833-1862 the ministry saw 77 changes of ministers and 60 ministers of education, one is able to appreciate the extent of the abuse of such a law and to explain why the teaching personnel were forced to submit to the will of the political rulers. Demaras A., op.cit., p.104 and Skopetea, op.cit., p.140.

compulsory primary education ("demoticon"), followed, after 1837, by a seven-year

secondary education (the "Hellenicon", an imitation of the German "Lateinische Schule",

and the "Gymnasium"). Primary education was free and compulsory, and of a "democratic

character" with no institutional restrictions on the right to education. At the higher

educational level, the creation of the Greek University (founded in 1837), was initially

based on the School of Archaeology and the Architectural School.[39] The most striking

characteristic of the organisation of Greek education was its one-dimensional character.

Lack of autonomy at the different levels of education resulted in a unilinear path whereby

each level was the continuation of the previous one; primary education prepared the pupil

for the secondary level which in turn was a preparation for higher education.

The classicist orientation, so dear to the Bavarians during their rule, remained

another perennial feature of Greek education and found notable expression in the

glorification of Greece's ancient past. It was reflected in the school programmes, in which

an over-emphasis on classical lessons worked to the detriment of technical and practical

learning. The purpose of the Greek University was to preserve the unity of the Greek

nation and to transfer the lights of Western civilisation to the "backward-looking East".[40]

The nationalistic and civilising purpose of Greek educational mechanisms was justified by

the geopolitical position of the country, the legitimacy of modern Greece's link with the

ancient past and the fact that Greek culture had been predominant in many parts of the

Ottoman Empire and continued to be so in a large number of educational and cultural

centres. The Greek University financed heavily by the rich Greek diaspora, was looked

upon by all Greeks, in the country and abroad, as the main regulator of Greek intellectual

development.[41]

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[39] This was an indication of the Bavarian love of antiquity, and the Bavarian rule saw the erection of major neo-classical buildings in Athens.

[40] The civilising function of the University resulted in the early politicisation of Greek higher institutions and the active involvement of the students in the country's political affairs. For the 19th century history of the Greek Students see Lazos, *The Greek Student Movement; 1821-1973*, Athens 1987.

[41] While the educational system of the independent state was highly centralised, the educational system of the diaspora was basically private, communal or ecclesiastical, and its finance was mainly undertaken by the Greek bourgeoisie abroad under the intellectual guidance of the Church. Until the 1870s, one can still talk of a Greek cultural domination in the Balkans, related to the Greeks' economic superiority. Following the 1870s and the rise of Balkan nationalisms, there was an educational/cultural competition among the various Balkan nationalities. Thereafter, Greek educational policies concentrated in the areas of Macedonia,

The 19th century in Europe was a period of rapid educational development, and by mid-century the existence of mass education and of adequate institutions of higher education were perceived as increasingly crucial for the development of industry. In a period of capitalist expansion in northern Europe and Liberal America, it became clear that the need to grasp and exploit the potential of science necessitated a substantial expansion of educational systems.[42] As was the case with the import and introduction of foreign forms of political organisation, so the development of the educational system in Greece came early and was of a mass character. So public and free education infiltrated quickly throughout the population.[43] Equally, secondary and higher education increased substantially at a rate disproportionate to the country's industrial development, the student population of the Greek Universities, and the number of Greek students in foreign institutions of higher education, was unusually high compared with the developed nations of the West.[44] Despite the expansion of education, the country was lagging behind the developed nations in industrial development, while the educational system perpetuated the non-industrial character of the Greek economy by emphasising a classicist orientation, at the point of discriminating against studies of a more practical -commercial, agricultural and industrial- character.[45]

Education was, at all levels, accessible to all social classes from the beginning. Lacking a class character, Greek education became the basic means to social ascendancy for the Greek peasant classes. The acquisition of a degree, "a diploma", paved the way to

Thrace, Epirus and Asia Minor and struggled through school mechanisms to preserve the importance of Greek culture.

[42] Between 1840 and the 1880s the population of Europe rose by 33% but the number of its children attending schools by 145%. (*The Age of Capital*, Abacus 1985, p.118).

[43] The rate of illiteracy, although high by European standards was progressively dropping in Greece, during the second half of the 19th century. From 90.95% in 1830 it dropped to 69.20% in 1879, and 50.20% in 1907, for the male population; for the female population the percentages were much higher. Indeed, around the 1880s and after, while the rate of illiteracy remained higher than the countries of the developed West, it was lower than the rates in the Balkan countries and the Iberian Peninsula and similar to the Italian one. (Tsoukalas, *Dependence and Reproduction*, p.394).

[44] Tsoukalas talks, on the one hand, of an "over-education" at the secondary and higher levels and, on the other, of relatively high percentage of illiteracy, a very contradictory phenomenon which led to the deep cultural differentiation of the Greek population. (Tsoukalas, *op.cit*, on secondary education, pp.397-403, on higher education,pp.430-435).

[45] Indicative of the classicist orientation was the conviction that only the classical gymnasium was equiped to provide the University with students, while even graduates from commercial gymnasia had to be taught Latin before entering University. Demaras A., *op.cit.*, pp.134-136. Greece had presented the highest percentage of law students in the whole of Europe, another indication of the counter-productive character of higher education and its lack of practical orientation.

employment in the state sector. The katharevousa idiom, the official language of the state, became a distinctive sign of literacy and social status. The classicist/anti-vocational orientation, the free access to education, the one-dimensional character of all three levels and centralised control, created an educational system, traditional and authoritarian in character, democratic and accessible in form, another typical accommodation of the various 19th century Greek ideological forces.

At the same time, the educational apparatus reflected, reproduced and perpetuated the nationalistic orientation of the Greek state, inspired, during the 19th century, by the unrealisable Megali Idea. Its principal expression was the dominant Helleno-Christian spirit which formed the basic value of Greek education, a remarkable combination of reverence for the nationalist classicist glorious past and the Christian orthodox religious culture promoted during the Byzantine period. The nationalist character of education took the form of emphasis on past glories. In schools, ancient and Byzantine Greek histories were taught excessively at the expense of modern Greek history. History was neither critically appraised nor questioned but merely learned by heart. The most glorious aspects of the past were selected while shameful and degrading moments of history were ommitted. The teaching of the ancient texts was characterised by an overwhelming emphasis on grammar and syntax and not on a critical appreciation of the classical ideas, which reflected the difficulty in connecting the imported modern forms of democracy with the ancient Athenian democracy. The religious character of education was equally overwhelming. While the position of the Church was significantly weakened, on the whole it managed to keep a stronghold in the Greek educational system. The religious establishment concentrated on the practice of various symbolic acts -compulsory morning prayers, school attendance at Sunday Mass, the predominant position of religious instruction in the school curicula- which reinforced its position and made its role unchallengeable.

Demands for reform: The "demoticist" movement

As had been the case with the religious issue during the 1830s and 1840s and the debate over national history during the 1840s and 1850s, the language question and the field of pedagogy offered the battleground for a fierce ideological conflict towards the latter part of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th. Having secured the democratic character of education, the result of organisational forms imported from abroad, rather than a long ideological and social struggle, as was the case with the more advanced European countries, Greek struggles over education, centred around the ideological/cultural content of education. The content of school curicula, the pedagogical methods and the language question took the predominant position in the ideological debate which became very acute and polarised, among politicians and intellectuals.[46]

The authoritarian nature of the Greek educational system, the excessively classicist orientation, the lack of practical training, the lack of teaching staff, the inadequacy of accommodation led to the disfunctionality of the educational system and occasionally to student uprisings. While the educational system had worked during most of the 19th century without any major alterations, the deficiencies of public education had become a matter of urgent attention by the 1880s. The initiative for educational reform came mostly from intellectuals who, inspired by the ideas of the "new enlightenment" in Europe[47] started to show a lively interest in Greek popular tradition and Greek popular language. As we have already stated, the international situation by the 1880s had changed radically and there was a need to re-define the content of Greek national identity, which was by now in competition with the emerging Balkan neighbours. The generation of the 1880s was the first to fight for the introduction of liberal reforms in the cultural and educational fields in order to assist the modernisation of society and demanded the recognition of the demotic language as the official language of the state.[48] Given that the central focus of the conflict

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[46] Tsoukalas, *op.cit.*, p. 516.

[47] Its expression in European education was marked by the massive advance of popular education, the dramatic retreat of traditional religion and the promotion of social sciences. See Hobsbawm, *The Age of Empire*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1987, p. 262.

[48] The foremost intellectual of this generation Psycharis wrote his book *To Taxidi* (The Trip) in 1888 which became the bible of modern demoticism in the fight against katharevousa and for the introduction of a popular idiom throughout the whole Hellenic world.

among Greek intellectuals became the demotic language issue, the new movement was labeled "demoticism".[49]

The need for educational reform was also recognised by the authorities, and the period after 1880 saw the drafting of a series of new laws, which were however never implemented.[50] The general idea behind the drafting of these laws was to liberalise the educational system, to adjust the system to the needs of economic development and to introduce vocational studies. But it was the language question which took the predominant position in cultural and educational debates among intellectuals, and thus remained an unsettled issue throughout most of the 20th century, at times very polarised positions being adopted, on the one side, by extreme supporters of the demotiki and, on the other, by extreme supporters of katharevousa.

The first decade of the 20th century marked the emergence of the first Marxist thinkers in Greece who joined forces with the liberal intellectuals in a common effort to combat "*traditionalism and reaction*". Their aim was the bourgeois transformation of Greek society, as the necessary intermediate stage before socialism. They too participated in the spread of the demoticist movement. This common strategy took shape in the formation of the "Omilos" (Educational Society), the purpose of which was to promote the use of demotic language. The reformist changes demanded by progressive intellectuals can be summed up as follows: change in the socio-ideological orientation of the educational system to reflect principles of bourgeois liberalism; creation of a truly "popular" primary

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[49] On the demoticist movement and the role of the liberal and socialist intellectuals see Kordatos *op. cit.*, Anna Frangoudaki *Educational Reform and Liberal Intellectuals*, Demaras A., "On Education" in the *History of the Greek Nation*, Vol.15, pp.489-494, Vergopoulos *op. cit.*, pp.315-383.

[50] In 1877 and 1880, two draft laws of the ministry proposed the abolition of the Hellenikon and its substitution by six years of gymnasium, the introduction of a modern Greek course and the founding of a Teachers' College. It was the first attempt at the vague liberalisation of education but was not realised in legislation. In 1899, a new draft law proposed the elimination of ancient Greek from the demotico, the introduction of new courses, including agricultural courses. The 1899 draft laws were the first attempt to reorientate all educational levels towards a more vocational education which would coexist with the dominant religious and nationalistic education. They were a more systematic approach than the 1877 attempts and of a more general nature. Although these drafts were discussed in the parliament, they were not implemented. In 1913, under the Venizelos government, the most liberal approach to reform drafted by the pedagogist Glynos, demanded an autonomous and uniform primary education, a practical orientation for education, education for women, a new type of a 3-year vocational "civil school", and of a 6-year gymnasium. Neither were the draft laws of 1913 implemented. Oddly enough the issue of the demotiki language did not feature in any of these proposals. The same themes of this last draft were to be repeated in subsequent decades in the 1920s, 1950s and 1960s. See Frangoudaki, *Educational Reform and Liberal Intellectuals*, pp.17-34.

education; special concern for those excluded from the benefits of education; an end to the

predominance of the classicist element; a combination of educational and language reform.

The second decade of the 20th century saw an ever greater consensus among

socialist and liberal intellectuals which culminated in the collaboration of the socialist

Glynos, and the liberals Delmouzos and Triantafyllides, three major pedagogues, in the

1917 Venizelist educational reform. The reform of 1917 introduced the demotic language

for the first time in Greek education, new reading books were introduced at the primary

level, written in the demotic, and a new, progressive and anti-authoritarian pedagogy was

institutionalised. It was the first and single time that the demoticist ideas dominated entirely

educational thinking.[51] It was a short-lived one that went down with the Venizelist party at

the elections of 1920. There was a strong reaction against the liberal reforms on the part of

social sectors which fought for the use of katharevousa and the preservation of the

previous status quo in the cultural and educational field. The pillars of these traditional and

conservative policies were the Philosophical Faculty, the Church and the Press. The fight

between reformers and anti-reformers divided sharply the ideological life of the nation at

the beginning of the 20th century, and left a strong legacy of reforms and counter-reforms

to the subsequent educational development of the country.[52]

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[51] The 1917 reform concentrated mostly on primary education and the new reading books, which were introduced, are still regarded highly by many pedagogues, and are considered among the most appropriate for primary pupils, and of significant historical value. (See Frangoudaki, *The Textbooks of the Demotic School*, Athens 1977). The 1917 reform also created new administrative positions, founded a School for the history of the arts, introduced new syllabi for the first three years of primary education, and created a department of Chemistry at the University of Athens.

[52] Some very typical incidents, indicative of the fervour with which anti-reformers reacted against the ideas professed by the liberal intellectuals were: In 1901, the "Evangeliaka" was a reaction by the University, the Church and the Press, to a translation of the New Testament into the demotic language; the attempt was condemned as atheistic and pro-slavic. A student uprising followed and the translation was banned. In 1903, the "Oresteiaka" against the translation and performance by the National Theatre of Aeschylus' tragedy *Oresteia* in the demotic. In 1914, there was a trial, the "Atheika", concerning the opening in 1908 of an experimental school in Volos by Delmouzos; the aim of the school was to educate Greek girls on a modern and vocational basis with lessons in the demotic and only limited teaching of the classics. This was equally criticised by the "reactionary forces" as anarchic, atheistic and socialist. In 1920, the monarchist anti-reform targetted the new reading books of the 1917 reform and the introduction of the demotic language. The new reading books were all burned.

To summarise, the history of the development of the Greek educational system centred on the following factors: A powerful ministry of education, which involved itself in every possible aspect of education; the diaspora, which financed heavily Greek education both in Greece (which was crucial, given that the Greek state was economically incapable of meeting the needs of the country's educational development)[53] and outside; the divisions between various schools of thought, some reformist and others seeking to preserve the status quo. Greek education presented one of the major fields for fierce ideological conflicts among the various Greek political, social and intellectual/cultural forces. The accommodation of these tendencies resulted in compromise settlements whereby the "democratic" and accessible character contradicted with the central authoritarian control; the institutionalisation of "diglossia" left the country divided between the demotic, the spoken language of the people, and the katharevousa, a symbol of social ascendancy; the veneration of the ancient spirit contrasted with the preservation of a strong Christian identity; the high levels of education at the secondary and higher levels contrasted with the high level of illiteracy. The Greeks' efforts to emulate the West and their attempt to incorporate a western-inspired rationality in many ways contradicted their emotionally charged historical values and practices. Much of this was attributable to the cognitive traditions of a country which had not undergone the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, and where, in consequence, the liberal educational system was an alien import.

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[53] As Mouzelis argues, one cannot understand the 'over-inflated" character of Greek education without reference to the Greek diaspora. The latter created the demand for educated men and gave considerable amounts for the development of educational establishments, which is shown by the fact that up to 1870, the state budget for education was much lower than the donations of expatriate Greeks. Mouzelis "Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-War Greece", New Left Review 76, p. 61.

PART I: THE 4TH OF AUGUST REGIME

Chapter 2 : INTER-WAR PERIOD

Background factors to the 4th of August regime

The end of the First World War in Europe marked the final demise of the old Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, their replacement by modern states, the introduction of liberal democracy and the spread of mass politics in all the countries of Europe. Although the beginning of the inter-war period was characterised by optimism as to the future of all the independent nation states of Europe, such hopes were rapidly disappointed due to the failure of most democratic regimes and the consolidation of dictatorial governments. The inter-war period was a period of mass politics, and organised demands for social reforms, the result of ethnic, class or regional cleavages which created severe pressures from below. Fascist authoritarianism appeared a seductive alternative to the threat of mobilisation from below and to the massive influence of the socialist Russian Revolution. The inter-war era saw the organised response to communism by a vast number of right-wing organisations, movements and parties, varying from the conservative right, to the radical and fascist right, in most cases competing through the parliamentary machinery, in others through extra-parliamentary activities and through paramilitary formations.

Inter-war Europe saw the consolidation of anti-communist dictatorships of a fascist, fascistoid, or conservative nature in most countries, to such an extent that the period of 1919-1940 can be characterised as the "Period of the Dictators" in Europe. In some settings fascists or National Socialists achieved, or at least shared, power and established authoritarian regimes (Italy, Germany, Spain) and in others royal or military dictatorships were imposed (Yugoslavia, Romania). The character of each dictatorship was determined by the previous socio-political crisis which led to the imposition of dictatorial rule and the balance of power among the dominant domestic elites. Fascist type of organisation and fascist ideas, related to a certain nationalism and a distinct style of political authority, found fertile ground in many different national settings. Even in the countries with no strong, influential fascist movements, the organisational and ideological aspect of

fascism proved to be particularly influential. What characterised fascism was the centrality of the ideological factor, in offering a new interpretation of the human reality, in the active mobilisation of certain social sectors, and in the legitimation of its extreme authoritarianism.

The dictatorship of the 4th of August regime was the Greek expression of European inter-war authoritarianism, the dictatorial sequence to the social cleavages which the parliamentary system had failed to cope with. The dictatorship of Metaxas, by no means a fascist regime, was one of those dictatorships which having been established and having consolidated itself firmly in power through the support of the monarchy and the military, explored other alternatives of legitimation and attempted, with little success, to transform itself into a mobilisational regime, based on a more or less organised set of beliefs. The particular character of the 4th of August ideology, the incorporation and articulation of various ideological influences was clearly affected by inter-war authoritarianism. Although not an indigenous fascist discourse, the ideology of the 4th of August employed extensively some of the most dominant and influential fascist ideas, regarding corporatism and the omnipresence of the state, as well as dominant fascist forms of organisation, such as the imposition from above of a youth movement, as the future legitimising pillar of the regime. As had been the case with the official state ideology, Greece, due to its peripheral position in relation to the main ideological centres of Europe, at this juncture in its history again felt the need to import and imitate ideas and styles of authority and forms of social organisation.

The ideological aspect of the 4th of August regime was determined by both domestic (national) and external (international) factors and the interplay between these. The fascist/radical element in the nature of the ideology and policy of the regime during the period 1936-1941, as well as its reactionary and conservative side, was determined by three principal factors: The international position of the country economically and strategically; the previous domestic socio-political and ideological crisis; the composition of the authoritarian elite structure. In the following presentation, I hope to show that the regime's ideology and policy were an amalgam of contradictory themes and actions, thus

demonstrating that a single label should not be applied to the 4th of August regime and, at the same time, drawing attention to the internalisation of different influences by the 4th of August authoritarian regime.

The transition from inter-war parliamentary pluralism to the authoritarian regime's limited pluralism was marked by the following aspects which will be briefly examined:

1. The 1936 dictatorship was a response to the previous socio-political crisis of the inter-war Greek parliamentary system, marked by the quest for a new national identity following the end of the century-long influence of the Megali Idea irredentist nationalism. This new nationalist climate determined the authoritarian nationalism in Metaxas' ideology.

2. The ideological context of inter-war Greece was marked by a pluralist circulation of ideas, but the influence of fascist ideology was very limited. Greece lacked an influential fascist or Nazi type movement which might have provided the Metaxas regime with a solid base on which to consolidate its power.

3. The 4th of August regime was primarily a dictatorship backed by the King, a royal dictatorship, enjoying the support of the influential British ally which transferred political power to a minority party leader, largely limiting the latter's ideological choices.

4. The 4th of August ideology bore basically the imprint of one man's ideas. I shall briefly examine the inter-war evolution of Metaxas' ideas, when he was leader of a parliamentary party.

A. The Inter-war Period: Socio-political Crisis and the Quest for a New National Identity

The post-1922 period in Greek history marked the final end of Greek irredentism, and brought social, economic, political and ideological changes in inter-war Greek society. The defeat in Asia Minor in 1922 set the frontiers of the Greek state and settled the question of the inclusion of as much as possible of the Greek people within Greece's boundaries.[1] It was a period of major changes and new divisions within Greek society in

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[1] The final settlement of the nation-state's frontiers took place in 1948 with the recovery of the Dodccanese islands from the Italians.

that the Asia Minor disaster brought a turn in the country's development, marked by rapid capitalist development, political instability and ideological transition. The country's territorial expansion after the Balkan wars and the First World War, the influx of 1.5 million refugees, in a country of less than 5 millions, and the inclusion of the Greek entrepreneurial classes within the boundaries of the Greek state resulted in the overall reorganisation of Greek society. [2]

At the political level, the inter-war period of democratic mass politics, and the rising influence of the middle classes, was mainly characterised by the fragile exercise of parliamentary democracy, the continuous intervention of the military, and the short-lived Republic, and the polarised division of the party-politics between Monarchists and Republicans: the People's party and the Liberal party.[3] The unstable political climate of inter-war Greece included seven military interventions in politics, a series of minor military conspiracies, the Pangalos dictatorship in 1925, seven parliamentary elections in each of which approximately 10 to 13 parties participated and two referenda on the issue of the monarchy.[4]

The role of the military during the inter-war period and its active participation in politics through military interventions and conspiracies determined the non-military character of the 4th of August regime, given that the army was already divided into Venizelist and anti-Venizelist factions. The Dichasmos politics, which began during the first world war, resulted in a Dichasmos in the military as well, which until the second world war, saw the officers divided between royalists and Venizelists. The first faction of royalist officers, was dominant during the periods of 1920-1922 and 1933-1940. The Venizelist military bloc was dominant during the republican period of 1922-1932, when the Venizelists were mostly in power and was in its turn split by minor internal Venizelist

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[2] At the same time, with the exchange of populations, 400,000 Muslims and Bulgarians left the country after the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.

[3] In fact the division Venizelism/anti-Venizelism in itself comprised a series of major and minor parties, among which the two mentioned were the largest. Regarding the monarchist party, some call it "popular" (Andrikopoulos), while others call it "populist" (Mouzelis) and others "People's Party" (Mavrogordatos), all referring to the same "Laiko Komma" of Tsaldares. I will adopt the third term since it a more accurate translation of the Greek term.

[4] The situation is comparable with Portugal, where the period 1910-1926, the republican period in Portuguese history, was also characterised by unstable parliamentary rule: 9 Presidents; 44 governments; 25 uprisings; and a series of military interventions, which established 3 dictatorships.

divisions and disagreements, typical of the political and partisan divisions of the Venizelist political group. The army intervened frequently in politics, always to deliver political power back to the politicians. During the period of the politics of Dichasmos, alternate governments of Royalists and Venizelists pursued their personal promotions and purges, according to their allegiances and affiliations. This special relationship between the army and the politicians brought a relationship of interdependence between the two; the politicians required the intervention of the military to safeguard and stabilise their authority, while the officers needed the politicians to secure their positions and promotions within the army. This situation which prevailed during the inter-war period, signalled the significance of two distinct developments; on the one hand, it secured the crucial and strategic importance of the army to the stability of the political status quo and on the other, it kept military officers far from governmental posts. As long as the military hierarchy was satisfied with the political rulers, they never assumed political power directly since their position within the military establishment was not threatened.[5] The 4th of August regime was supported by the dominant royalist military hierarchy which did not participate, as such, in the governmental alliance.

At the social level, we observe the existence of regional tensions (New Lands vs Old Lands), ethnic tensions (native Greeks vs Refugees and various minorities) and class tensions (bourgeois factions, workers and peasants). The most pervasive division however, related to the party political context of Venizelism vs anti-Venizelism. According to Mavrogordatos, Venizelists represented the entrepreneurial section of the bourgeoisie, the liberal intellectuals, the new peasantry of smallholders, sectors economically and culturally deprived, and the new lands that needed to be incorporated into the Greek state. The anti-Venizelists represented the state officials, the judiciary, the academic world, the Church, the traditional petty-bourgeoisie, the old smallholders, the old lands, those who had so far enjoyed a higher level of opportunities for consumption, education and mobility. The complexity of Greek society in the inter-war period, the allegiances of the different

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[5] The most complete analysis of the role of the military in inter-war politics is presented by Veremis' *The Interventions of the Military in Greek Politics 1916-1936*, Athens 1983.

social sectors and their connection to politicians were related to ideological orientations, clientelistic networks and charismatic appeals.[6] The decline of the democratic regime was undoubtedly due to the inability of the Greek parliamentary system to control the inter-war social tensions. On the other hand, Greek civil society was still relatively weak and was marked by a lack of organised pressure from below. Neither the urban proletariat, nor the poor peasants posessed capable organisational entities which would promote their interest. While the danger from the socially under-privileged in the form of strikes provided the 4th of August regime with the pretext for intervention and legitimated a rhetoric against communism, the politicisation of Greek labour and peasantry along class lines was weak.

At the economic level, the influx of refugees increased the Greek domestic market and offered the Greek economy a cheap labour force. Inter-war capitalist development was combined with agricultural reform, the expropriation of more lands and the increase in the number of small proprietors in the new lands. Greek industry during the period 1923-1938 was marked by rapid growth, the import-substitution phase of Greece's industrialisation.[7] On the other hand, the fact that the position of the country always depended upon international events, and that it was heavily indebted to the great powers, meant that Greece was in a dependent economic position within the international system, and that international fluctuations had severe repercussions at the Greek domestic level. Although the country suffered the effects of the 1929 crisis, by 1933 the economy recuperated, marked by industrial growth and a policy of self-sufficiency. In that sense, contrary to other European cases like Germany, Italy and Portugal, the decline of parliamentary democracy happened in a period of economic upswing.[8]

At the ideological level, the country urgently needed a re-definition of the Greek identity following the end of the Megali Idea and the radical change in Greece's geography

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[6] On the significance of inter-war mass politics, see George Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic; Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece 1922-1936*, University of California Press,1983, the best account so far of the inter-war Greek society.

[7] During this period, the industrial production doubled in value and increased in a 68% rate in volume, Vergopoulos, *Nationalism and Economic Development; Greece in the Inter-War period*, Athens 1978, p. 99.

[8] The upturn was linked with a radical change in Greece's economic relations with the outside world, and a policy of "autarky" connected with an import-substitution in agriculture, acceleration of industrialisation and private capital accumulation; the boost of wheat production and the reduction of the trade deficit in foodstuffs. See Mazower, *Greece and the Inter-War Economic Crisis*, p. 276.

and population. The death of Greek irredentism was followed by various ideological tendencies within the context of ideological pluralism and resulted in the formulation of a variety of ideas as to the new national identity of the Greek nation. Indeed the inter-war ideological climate was one of pluralist intellectual and cultural thought. Ideas of extreme anti-western nationalism co-existed with liberal, socialist and the crudest forms of communist thought. As Vergopoulos argues,

> *the ideological product of the inter-war years was defined by the social differences*
> *and conflicts which culminated, during the final part of the period, in the objective*
> *need of the development of the element of a national identity.....the crisis in Greek*
> *society during the inter-war period, instead of resulting in the creation of a*
> *revolutionary movement, ended with the formation of a broad nationalist modernist*
> *movement, with right and left variations, democratic and monarchic*
> *orientations.The Greek fascism that followed was the logical consequence of this*
> *contradictory nationalism.*[9]

The equally confusing international environment was another factor in the domestic instability. The predominant international influence came from Britain, and there was also increasing influence from fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. In Europe, the new enemy was identified as a class enemy, in the form of organised communism. The 1920s was a period in which communist parties were strong all over Europe, their aim being the dismantling of the capitalist states and their substitution by communist ones. While the fear of communism could easily be justified at international level, especially in countries with stronger and more organised civil societies, in the case of Greece with its level of social development this was debatable.[10] Whether the country was really threatened by the ideas of communism is a question which has aroused contradictory views. Suffice it to say, that the massive influx of the new disadvantaged population and their potential for communist

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[9] Vergopoulos, *Nationalism and Economic Development*, p. 139 and p.150, [in Greek].

[10] Communist movements or a trade-union movements controlled by communists, socialists or liberal reformers did not achieve the kind of influence or massive strength and autonomy that they did in the more advanced countries of Europe. Even compared with the Balkan countries of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, the numerical strength of the communist party was much less in Greece. See Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery*, p. 61. In 1930, according to a Comintern Report, the total membership of the Communist Party was no more than 1,500. Mazower, *op.cit.*, p. 36.

mobilisation was enough to constitute a real threat in the minds of many people. Furthermore, the Communist party's position on the Macedonian question legitimised the belief that communist ideology was anti-national.[11] Hence, the new threat to the country's national security became the communist ideology which was perceived to undermine the socio-economic establishment. Anti-communism became a powerful ideological instrument of legitimation, to fill the ideological vacuum created by the death of the Megali Idea.[12] In 1929, the "Idionymon Act" (Special Law) signalled the official introduction of the anti-communist state, and legitimised authoritarian state practices against those considered anti-nationals.

Within such a domestic and international context, the content of Greek nationalism was re-defined. There was an end to irredentist aspirations, in that the people ceased to demand the expansion of Greece's territory, and, unlike the increasing nationalistic claims of other European countries, all political elites, including the 4th of August leadership, professed a pacifist and non-expansive nationalism.

B. Fascism in Greece: A negligible influence

The distinction between fascist regimes and fascist movements is very relevant to the subject of inter-war authoritarianism. Fascist movements emerged in most European countries and either preceded the fascist regimes (Italy, Germany), participated in the exercise of authoritarian power (Spain) or found themselves in competition with the conservative authoritarian regimes and were suppressed by them (Portugal, Romania).

In Italy, the prototype fasci movements presented their first programmes in 1919 and were initially supported by students and war veterans before the acquisition of power by Mussolini. Despite the local differences between the various fasci, the initial fascist

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[11] In 1923, at the Congress of the Balkan Communist Federation in Moscow, the decision in favour of "*an autonomous and independent Macedonia and Thrace*" was adopted, which the representative of the Greek Communist party accepted and signed. In 1924, the same decision of "*a united and independent Macedonia*" was adopted by the Comintern and the Greek representatives. Only in 1931 was the position of KKE slightly transformed and there was talk of "*an independent*" but not "*united*" Macedonia and, in 1935, it was recognised by the Greek Communist party that the majority of the population in Macedonia was Greek (K.Vasileiou, *Anti* 475, September 20, 1991, pp. 40-43).

[12] George Catephores, "The Construction of the Anti-Communist State" in *The Legislation of the Barbarians*, pp. 31-88.

ideology was a vague amalgam of nationalism and national-syndicalism.[13] Moreover Italy

had a notable intellectual tradition, which inspired the creation and expansion of fascist

ideas. The nationalistic ideas of the Italian poet D' Annunzio, with their emphasis on

Roman history, were easily incorporated into fascist doctrine. Elite theorists such as

Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca professed the country's need for a strong leadership,

calling for a determined drive for power, and adopting an elitist attitude towards the

impulsive masses. Roberto Michels developed his powerful analysis on the "iron law of

oligarchy", referring to the organisation and bureaucratisation of the socialist parties. Elite

theorists claimed the inevitability of a strong leadership, criticized Marxist theory and

practice, attacked liberal democracy and without being open proponents of a fascist

philosophy, they were adopted by many fascist ideologues of the 1920s and 1930s.[14]

Moreover the Italian fascist regime was surrounded by a number of "intellectuals" such as

Gentile, the philosopher of fascism, and Rocco, the originator of the "organic" theory of

the state, who contributed to the systematic making of fascist thought into the official

ideology of the Italian fascist state.

In Germany, equally, a long intellectual tradition going back to the 19th century

paved the way for the Nazi ideology and the creation of the NSDAP the strongest

mobilisational party, the indisputable base of Nazi power. At its birth, the NSDAP was

predominantly lower middle-class party, but it very soon attracted army officers, university

students, intellectuals, peasants and young urban workers, a heterogeneous disaffected

social base, as a result of the first world war and the economic hardships of the inter-war

period. Anti-Semitism, aggressive nationalism, a neo-romantic attitude towards life

together with some socialist overtones constituted the general ideological framework of the

Nazi ideology. Similarly, the Nazis found their intellectual inspiration in 19th century ideas

of philosophers likeNietzsche, elite theorists like Ernst Juenger and composers like

[13] S. J. Woolf "Italy" in *Fascism in Europe* edited by Woolf, pp. 39-63.

[14] For a discussion of the role of elite theorists on fascist ideology, see among others, Eugene Weber's *Varieties of Fascism*, Mark Hagopian's *Ideals and Ideologies of Modern Politics*, Sternhell, "Fascist Ideology" in Laqueur W., ed., *Fascism; A Reader's Guide*, Mosse's *The Culture of Western Europe*, and Dunleavy/O'Leary's *Theories of the State*. See also the original works of the elite theorists, Robert Michels' *The Political Parties*, Vilfredo Pareto' s *The Mind and Society* and Gaetano Mosca's *The Ruling Class*.

Wagner. These were interpreted in such a way as to justify the Nazi racist claims of a pure Aryan society, led by the "new man" would radically change Germany. [15]

The Romanian Iron Guard, under the undisputed leadership of Codreanu for almost 20 years, can be seen as one of the major European fascist movements. It was the only Balkan fascist movement on the model of the Western European ones able to attract a mass following. The movement was consolidated during the 1920s and consisted initially of student groups. In 1927, Codreanu founded the Legion of Archangel Michael, the prototype of fascist organisation in Romania. Its ideology contained anti-Semitic elements, a cultural identification with Romanian Orthodoxy, nationalistic overtones, the cult of the leader, and differed from other fascist movements in its belief in the primacy of the interests of the poor peasant and its demand for a radical land reform. Its anti-Semitism was linked with the existence of an economically powerful Jewish community in Romania. Its social base consisted mostly of peasants, intellectuals and poor University students. Its electoral support reached 16% of the national vote in 1937, but its way to power was blocked by the royalist dictatorship of King Carol who suppressed the movement.[16] The Iron Guard, under the leadership of General Antonescu, was among the few fascist movements to share power, although it was later destroyed by the same leader during the Nazi occupation of the country.[17] Romania was also a country which, during the 1930s, produced a few intellectuals on fascism including Manoilescu, Europe's leading theoretician of practical, developmental authoritarian corporatism, and Cuza, the father of 20th century Romanian anti-Semitism. Indeed, Romanian fascism was a unique case of fascism in Europe given the under-developed character of its economy when compared with countries such as Italy, Germany and Hungary. Its fascism was tied to the specific nationalistic aspirations of the Romanian people, characterised by the exaltation of peasant life, with a country of a large peasant community, and hostility towards the Jews, in a country with a prosperous Jewish community. But the unique feature of Romanian fascism

[15] Mosse, *op.cit.*, pp. 297-298.

[16] See Zeev Barbu, "Rumania", in *Fascism in Europe*, edited by Woolf, pp. 151-170.

[17] Polonsky *The Little Dictators*, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1975, pp. 78-93.

lay in the fusion of Christian Orthodox mysticism and fascism, the emphasis of the Romanian Orthodox heritage with the anti-Semitic, aggressively nationalistic ideas.

Greece neither had a fascist intellectual tradition nor did any fascist or Nazi type movement emerge which could successfully adapt itself to the context of Greek society and challenge the existing alternatives. In Greece, the inter-war social divisions were contained within the rivalry between Venizelism and anti-Venizelism which did not allow for the emergence of a radical movement like fascism. Both leading parties subscribed to a number of authoritarian doctrines and practices and shared the notion of the communist threat. Moreover, the significant role of military intervention in Greek politics functioned as a safety valve against the excesses of the extremes. We are thus left with the examination of individual cases, like that of Metaxas, and the appearance of a few insignificant fascist or Nazi movements whose impact was negligible.

Fascist and National-Socialist movements in Greece were fragmented and they never managed to secure a significant social base. The few movements which appeared were basically influenced by the ideas of German National Socialism, anti-Semitism, anti-communism and militaristic nationalism.[18] The most important of them was the "National Union of Greece" (EEE), founded in 1927, and based in Salonica, a national patriotic organisation, violently anti-communist and anti-Semitic which split in 1933 when trying to turn itself into a political party. A large proportion of its 7,000 members were refugees, ex-soldiers and people who had been in anti-Slav bands in the pre-1912 era.[19] The anti-Semitic movement "National-Socialist Party of Macedonia-Thrace" was of an even minor importance. The 80,000 strong Jewish community (86% of which was concentrated in Salonica) was too small to be the target of a pan-Hellenic anti-Semitic movement.[20] The "National Pan-Student Movement" created by students of the University of Athens was fiercely anti-communist, but had a very small number of members. Finally, the "National-Socialist Party" was founded by the pro-royalist politician Mercouris, but was a poor

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[18] In Andrikopoulos *The Roots of Greek Fascism* , pp. 12-13 and pp. 56-57.

[19] David Close "Conservatism, Authoritarianism and Fascism in Greece, 1915-1945" in *Fascists and Conservatives*, p. 203.

[20] Anti-Semitism erupted twice in Salonica in a 1931 pogrom by the EEE and the newspaper *Macedonia* and in 1933 during a Salonica by-election. Mavrogordatos, *op.cit.*, pp. 253-262.

imitation of Hitler's party. Mercouris was among the very few Greeks to produce a systematic discussion of fascist thinking in his book "The Corporatist State".[21]

Fascist ideology found some admirers among the military, but the principal attraction was not so much to the ideas as to the style of authoritarian leadership. The most vociferous disciple among the military was General Kondyles, a great rival of Metaxas, who in 1924 created his own party based on the principles of Mussolini's fascism. His programme consisted of a promise of "national regeneration", an appeal to military glory, and vague socialist proposals to reform the tax system and remedy the abuses of capitalism.[22] In a visit to Rome in 1935 General Kondyles, expressing his open admiration for Mussolini's political deeds, stated among other things:

> so far we have only seen one man who resisted the Russian enemy, the
>
> Duce.Having created fascism.....he saved the world from a return to
>
> barbarism.....he has created a new regime which was imitated by Germany,
>
> while in all the other nations fascist nuclei will sooner or later prevail. Vive the
>
> Duce.[23]

However Kondyles' fascist predilections should not be regarded as an indication of fascist influence on the general's thought, given that Kondyles was independent-minded, having started by the side of the radical Venizelists and later joining the People's Party. Moreover, although in 1924 he was among the protagonists in the establishment of the Republic and the expulsion of the king from Greece, in 1935 he was the protagonist in the restoration of the Monarchy. Hence he should be regarded as a typical example of an

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[21] The Italian authorities and the Fascist International in their estimates on the various fascist movements in Europe considered Mercouris' movement to be the only one to have the potential to become a genuine fascist party in Greece, provided that it abandoned its admiration for the Nazi organisation and ideals and for Hitler's personality. (Report of the Directory of Political Affairs of the Italian Foreign Office under the title "Foreign Fascist Movements", April 1934). In general, however, the Italian Fascists were not so keen on helping the creation of international fascist movements which might threaten the dominance of the Italian one, and their foreign policy was mostly based on the upsetting of the democratic regimes and the creation of authoritarian dictatorships rather than the creation of strong international fascism. Romain H. Raneiro "The Coup of Metaxas and its Appeal on Fascist Italy" in Greece 1936-1944; Dictatorship, Occupation, Resistance, Flaisher & Svoronos, eds., Athens 1989, p. 33-49.

[22] Close, "Conservatism, Authoritarianism and Fascism in Greece", in Fascists and Conservatives, p. 204.

[23] Eleftherotypia, October 28, 1990, [in Greek].

opportunist military officer who believed in the military's involvement in politics, but vacillated from one ideological tendency to another.[24]

Apart from Kondyles, there were other army people during the inter-war period in Greece, who admired the style of leadership of Mussolini and wanted to see its implementation in the Greek political arena. The dictatorship of Pangalos (June 1925-August 1926), was a case to point in that this Venizelist officer aimed at establishing a personal regime, inspired by the example of Mussolini. His intention was to solve the wide political divisions of the inter-war period, but he ended up in alienating all the political and military forces (even those who had initially supported him) and was overthrown by the then Venizelist officer Kondyles.[25] In several instances during the 1930s, various military officers of a Venizelist affiliation (Plasteras) or not, and politicians had proclaimed their admiration for the authoritarian practices of the West and favoured the imposition of a Greek dictatorship as the only solution to the political crisis. But their rhetoric never went as far as the adoption of a fascist ideology and stopped short of what Veremis calls "demagogic despotism".[26] It was only Metaxas, however, who professed openly his anti-parliamentarian ideas and spoke in favour of a permanent dictatorial regime. However, the continuous military interventions in politics and the anti-parlamentarian practices of many politicians gradually introduced the shadow of a more permanent dictatorship closer to the Greek perception of political reality. Seraphim Maximos, in the introduction to his book *Parliamentarism or Dictatorship* wrote as early as 1928:

> The advocates of a clear parliamentarism are getting fewer. The appeals and
>
> speeches resemble to psalmodies which do not move. The most popular democratic
>
> newspapers of Athens fill their articles with memoirs and images of
>
> Mussolini. They admire his achievements and praise him. The republican army

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[24] As Andrikopoulos says, Kondyles saw himself in the role of a Greek "Duce" and the King in the role of Victor Emmanuel, but was neither trusted by the king, nor by the Greek political parties nor by the British. "The Power Base of Greek Authoritarianism" in *Who Were the Fascists*, p. 575.

[25] The Pangalos dictatorship was followed by parliamentary elections and the formation of a coalition government. The one year survival of the regime was solely due to the factional divisions within the political world and the military and their inability to find a viable alternative. Apart from several authoritarian laws, the dictatorship of Pangalos left no particular impact on Greek society and, on the contrary, gave a boost to the subsequent parliamentary process. See Veremis, *op.cit.*, pp. 123-131, and Mavrogordatos, *op.cit.*, pp. 33-34.

[26] Veremis, *op.cit.*, p.135.

is also filled with prospective dictators who deliberate on the future of Greece

under a "noble" dictatorship (p.7).

Despite dictatorial and authoritarian tendencies in several quarters, fascist ideology never took root in Greek political thought, although a number of Greek politicians and parties were alarmed by it. In the 1930s, following the consolidation of the Italian dictatorship and the rise to power of the Nazis, the Greek communist party in particular, was alarmed by the international expansion of the fascist phenomenon, and called for its defeat, both internationally and in Greece. Greek communists saw the existing anti-communist climate as highly conducive to the establishment of a fascist dictatorship.[27] Debates on fascism among intellectuals centred largely on the international impact of the fascist phenomenon and its influence on Greek internal affairs. But they could never substantiate their claims based on the existence of any influential Greek fascist movement.

C. The power structure of the 4th of August regime: A royal-supported personal dictatorship

One of the most essential aspects of the regime was that it was not simply the personal dictatorship of Metaxas, but was jointly organised by both King George and Metaxas. The very imposition of the regime was based on two decrees signed by the king concerning the suspension of the most important constitutional articles, connected with the exercise of individual and collective liberties, on the one hand, and the dissolution of the Parliament, on the other.[28] Both decrees were blatantly unconstitutional but, at the same time, they followed a long tradition of constitutional violations during the pre-1936 period.[29]

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[27] Noutsos in "The Ideological Components of the 4th of August Regime" in *Historica*, pp. 139-150, where the author discusses the attitudes of the communist forces towards fascism, prior and during the regime of Metaxas.

[28] Royal Decree "On the dissolution of the Third Revisionary Assembly" because it, allegedly, failed to provide the country with a revision of the Constitution or to form a stable and strong government. Royal Decree "On the suspension of the articles 5,6,10,11,12,14,20 and 95 of the Constitution throughout the country".

[29] See Alivizatos' *Political Institutions in Crisis*, on the development of constitutional practices in post-1922 Greece.

Without the consent of the king, Metaxas would neither have been able to attain power nor to retain it subsequently. It was a monarchical dictatorship which derived its power essentially from the King, in a similar way to the other Balkan dictatorships of King Carol in Romania[30] and King Alexander and later Prince Paul in Yugoslavia[31] The King, however, struggled to give the impression that he was over and above the every day exercise of political power, thus distancing himself from the exercise of many authoritarian practices employed by, and the authoritarian ideology of Metaxas.[32] The views of the two people on the nature, duration and governmental policies of the regime differed radically. Their collaboration had its strained moments and was based on a subtle agreement but the supremacy of the King limited the authoritarian style of Metaxas.[33]

At the international level, the 4th of August regime enjoyed the backing of Britain. It has been repeatedly acknowledged that the British were persuaded to sustain the regime through the intercession of the king, who was an ardent anglophile, even though at times they realised that it was becoming excessively authoritarian. The following extract from a memorandum sent from Sir Orme Sargent to Halifax clearly shows the extent of British support:

> *Under the present circumstances, the importance of Greece to Britain is so*
>
> *significant, that we would be justified in preventing a revolution from breaking out,*
>
> *in the present crisis. With respect to the foreign policy of Greece, the current*
>
> *regime suits our interests so well, and if Greece became the battleground for a*
>
> *conflict between various politicians, this situation would offer the Germans and*

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[30] In Romania, the constitutionally powerful King Carol, dominant within the army and the administration, appointed a leader of a minority party, Goga, as Prime Minister in 1937, whom he later dismissed, establishing a more or less personal dictatorship and a government under the patriarch composed of politicians from the other parties. Anthony Polonsky, *The Little Dictators*, pp. 88-91.

[31] In Yugoslavia, King Alexander had suspended the constitution in 1929 and had established a personal dictatorship which after his death was taken over by the Regency of Prince Paul and the Premiership of Stojadinovic.

[32] Similarly in Yugoslavia, Prince Paul was also a supporter of British institutions. Under the premiership of Stojadinovic, the latter tried to establish closer relations with Germany and Italy and adopted some of the fascist rhetoric.

[33] Metaxas in his diary refered constantly to the King's objections to his leadership and policies and had to take account of the King's reactions in most of the political steps that he took. *His Personal Diary*, Vol.4.

the Italians the perfect opportunity for fruitful conspiracies at the expense of

British interests [34]

As with their overall policy during the inter-war period, the British pursued a policy of non-interference which was rather ambiguous, given that they collaborated fully with the regime of Metaxas from an influential position. On the whole they approached Greek politics in a business-like manner irrespective of regimes and governments, so long as the latter did not threaten their dominant position in the Mediterranean.[35]

Those who see the dynamic of   regimes in the context of the contradictions between the various factions of the dominant elites, view the 4th of August regime in terms of a fight between the German sphere of influence represented by Metaxas and the British sphere of influence represented by the King, and the struggle of the British and the Germans to dominate economically Greece and the Balkans in general. Indeed, during the 1930s German capital had penetrated the dependent Greek economy, while, at the same time, there was a substantial restructuring in the external commerce of the country to the advantage of the Germans.[36] These spheres of influence were reflected at the economic, political and military elite levels, which were divided according to their international allegiances and material interests.[37] The leadership of Metaxas and King George, caught in the middle in the international competition of the Great Powers, strove to keep a balance between the two influences. While it is true that King George represented the British sphere of influence and consistently pursued a pro-British foreign policy, it is an exaggeration to claim that Metaxas promoted German interests in Greece, although his ideological rhetoric seemed to imply such an inclination and his personal ideals were closer to the German way of thinking. But Metaxas was also a realistic politician, who had a clear

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[34] Memorandum from Sir Olme Scrgant to Lord Halifax, R 1210/64/19/1939, London 16 February 1939, in Andrikopoulos, *The Roots of Greek Fascism*, pp. 96-97, [in Greek].

[35] Koliopoulos, *Greece and the British Connection 1935-1941*, p. 1.

[36] Similar developments took place in the other Balkan countries of great interest to Germany, Britain and Italy. Overall, the Balkan authoritarian regimes of King Carol and Prince Paul, but not Bulgaria which sided with the Germans, strove to maintain a neutral attitude towards the great powers, a policy of balancing between Germany and the Allies.

[37] Alivizatos sees the conflict as one between the pro-German and the pro-British factions of the dominant classes (*Political Institutions in Crisis*), Andrikopoulos examines the same factions within the military itself (*The Roots of Greek Fascism*), kitsikis sees the division within the political elites(*Greece of the 4th of August and the Great Powers*).

understanding of the country's peripheral status and an ambitious political figure who, more than anything else, sought to promote his personal authoritarian power at the expense of the king. In one of his interviews he stated that:

> *All our interests connect us with the British. Germany is not a Mediterranean*
>
> *power. We are distanced from her by the whole of Central Europe. How is it*
>
> *possible for me to let my feelings influence my foreign policy, contrary to the*
>
> *interests of the country?* [38]

The dictatorship managed to sustain itself mostly due to the lack of a viable political alternative among the Greek political parties. The political world was tired of the previous anomalous political process and therefore displayed a degree of apathy towards the dictatorship which was enough to ensure the endurance of the regime through the years. Greek politicians for the most part, followed a policy of passive acceptance of the authoritarian regime, only presenting unorganised and incoherent political alternatives, having basically accepted the King's supremacy.[39] But most important, passive acceptance towards the 4th of August regime was due to a general conviction that democracy had failed in Greece and Greek society towards the end of the inter-war era was left disunited and disillusioned.

D. The personality of the leader: Inter-war ideological vacillations

The fascist regimes of the inter-war period were among other things dictatorships of powerful and/or charismatic leaders who for the most part enjoyed an unchallengeable authority. Hence, Nazi rule is identified with the personality of Hitler, and the Italian fascist regime with that of Mussolini. Similarly, other authoritarian regimes of the same

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[38] From an interview to the correspondent of the *Sunday Times*, June 24, 1937, stated in Kitsikis *Greece of the 4th of August and the Great Powers*, p. 91, [in Greek]. Being a practical man Metaxas was trying to endear himself to the British and as a dictator he tried to keep a good relationship with both the British and the Germans.

[39] See their memoranda to the King during the dictatorship. The politicians' reaction was limited to the personal initiatives of Kanellopoulos, Mylonas, Papandreou, Kafandaris and Theotokis. It was mostly the leaders of the small political parties who approved/more militancy towards the dictatorship. They were limited however to the clandestine publishing of newspapers or memoranda to the King, their intention being to undermine the King's trust of Metaxas. (*His Personal Diary*, Vol. 4, pp. 255-257.) This does not imply that Metaxas never faced any opposition. On the contrary, in several instances he had to eliminate the opposition coming both from the political elites as well as from the masses (revolt in Crete on the 29th of July 1938).

period were marked by the strong leadership of a dictator as was the case with the prolonged dictatorships of Franco in Spain and Salazar in Portugal. It is a commonplace that each of the above dictators left his personal stigma on these regimes to such an extent that some analysts went as far as to explain the phenomenon of fascism in terms of the personality of the leader. The most fruitful case for such an approach is presented by Nazi Germany, in that the uniqueness of the Nazi state can be largely attributed to the personality and the ideology of Hitler. It is hard to conceive that   Nazi rule could have displayed its specific traits and aggressiveness without the idiosyncratic character of its leader. Most of these explanations have centred on a psychological evaluation of the leader's appeal to the masses. In drawing their psycho-portrait of the leader, many analysts have attributed to him almost supernatural powers, in that he was able to mobilise large mass followings through the appeal of his personalised ideological vision.[40]

Different from the purely psychological approaches, the particular nature of the Nazi state has also been attributed to the exceptional power position of Hitler, following Weber's notion of "charismatic authority". Max Weber's concept of 'charismatic rule' is valuable in comprehending the character of Hitler's power base within the Nazi movement, the growing autonomous force of Hitler's authority within the complex power relations of the Nazi state and the corrosive impact of Hitler's power when superimposed upon a contradictory form of domination.[41]

Naturally in the Greek case we are neither dealing with the same level of radical ideology nor with the same force of repression and destructive capacity as in Germany. The role of a charismatic personality, however, has been used in many instances as a way of understanding Greek politics. The case of Venizelos is a clear example of this, in the sense that his charisma played an integrative and legitimating role for the exercise of his authority while, at the same time, his personality, his party and his ideology were central to the divisions in Greek society during the inter-war period.[42] Metaxas cannot be viewed as

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[40] Reich in his book *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, Adorno in *The Authoritarian Personality* among others, also sections in Kitchen and Payne in their respective books.

[41] Ian Kershaw "Defining the Nazi State" in *New Left Review* 176, pp. 47-67.

[42] See Mavrogordatos' application of the concept of "charismatic leadership" to the personality of Venizelos in his book *Stillborn Republic*, pp. 55-60.

a "charismatic personality" like Hitler and Mussolini, in the context of fascist regimes, and like Venizelos in the context of Greek inter-war parliamentary politics. Metaxas did not even have the intellectual appeal of Salazar, who was a professor, and the theoretician of the national-corporatist state, who established the Portuguese "dictatorship of professors".

A leadership becomes charismatic only when it is recognized as such by its subjects who acknowledge its genuineness and act accordingly.[43] Metaxas was not able to earn the recognition of his authority by the Greek community which alone would have demonstrated a genuine charisma, either during his parliamentary career, or as the powerful dictator of the 4th of August regime. Moreover, as Weber points out, *"charismatic authority is specifically irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules......it repudiates the past and it is in this sense a specifically revolutionary force* ".[44] Metaxas' ideology, as will be shown later, cannot be considered a radical break with the past since he tried to base his doctrine on the traditionally held Greek national values, although he did repudiate the immediate political past.

Although his dictatorship is regarded as a personalistic type of dictatorial power, he is mostly remembered, by those who experienced his rule, as a ludicrous dictator who tried to imitate with little success the ideas of the Italian and German fascist regimes and was obsessed with the Nazi type of youth organisation. To those who did not experience his regime, there is little mention of him in the history books; he will only be remembered as the man who replied with the heroic "NO" ("OXI") to the Italian ultimatum, that preceded the Italian invasion in October 1940 and brought victory over the Italian forces in Albania - which is commemorated by a national holiday every year on the 28th of October. This fact has largely exonerated him in the minds of the Greek people, in spite of his authoritarian practices, for he is remembered as an ardent nationalist who despite his ideological agreement with and admiration of the fascist type of social organisation, heroically opposed   Italian aggression.

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[43] Max Weber *Economy and Society*, p. 242.
[44]*Ibid*, p. 244.

Metaxas' roots were in the aristocracy of the Ionian islands, although he suffered financial hardships as a young person. He graduated from the Military Academy in 1890 and participated in the 1897 Greco-Turkish war. The Greek defeat is said to have affected his ideas on nationalism. His close relationship with Prince Constantine helped him immensely in the early stages of his career.[45] His formative years were in Germany, where he studied for three years (1899-1903), at the War Academy in Berlin and had the opportunity to come into close contact with the German way of thought.[46] His stay in Germany coincided with a period of intellectual debate in Europe, as the intellectual roots of subsequent fascist thought, the notion that materialism, liberalism and democracy had brought about the decay in bourgeois society, were taking shape. It was also the period which saw the formation of the first "Socialist-Nationalist" ideologies in France, Germany and Austria, the direct precursors of the subsequent fascist ideologies, which promoted ideas of new nationalism devoid of economic and social injustices. It is safe to assume that Metaxas was influenced by such ideas, some of which he incorporated into his discourse when he became a dictator but also that his personal sympathies were with the German way of thought and organisation.

His involvement in Greek political life began as the Chief of Staff of the armed forces under Venizelos' government, in 1914. He opposed Greece's entry into World War I, resigned from his post and from then on regarded suspiciously the expansionist ambitions of the Venizelist camp. His disagreement with the Straits Operation brought him into the royalist camp and later into the ranks of the People's party. This made him, in the eyes of his Venizelists enemies, a supporter of the German camp in European affairs, and he was subsequently considered responsible for the failure of the Straits Operation. However, he stuck to his non-expansionist nationalism with remarkable consistency and disagreed once more with both the Venizelists and the Royalists on the issue of the continuation of the Asia Minor expedition. During 1920-1922, when the anti-Venizelist

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[45] According to Veremis, Metaxas' relationship with Prince Constantine, -the prince granted Metaxas a scholarship for his studies abroad, while the latter showed a personal allegiance to the King- was a typical example of the larger patron-client network between army people and politicians that characterized civil-military relations during the inter-war period. See *op.cit.*, p. 86.

[46] Christedes' introduction to *His Personal Diary*, Vol.1, pp 57-59, where the writer informs us that apart from his military studies, Metaxas showed a lively interest in the fine arts, music and literature.

were in power, Metaxas formed a far right royalist opposition, outside parliamentary politics. The first important characteristic of Metaxas' nationalism, which manifested itself very early on, was his fierce antipathy towards Greek irredentist policy, in sharp contrast with the fascist nationalist ideology. He was a supporter of national autarky believing that Greece was in no need of any new lands to promote its economic interests or its political and ideological influence.

Following his political disagreement with the People's party, Metaxas followed a political path of his own and, in 1922, he created his own party, the Free Opinion Party [47], which participated in the electoral arena, on the anti-Venizelist side of the political spectrum, until the start of his dictatorship in 1936.[48] In the initial political programme of his party, Metaxas emerged as an ardent supporter of *"perfect individual and political freedom for the Greek people"* and condemned the undemocratic and illiberal methods employed by the previous governments, both Venizelist and anti-Venizelist. His party allegedly sought the support of the petty-bourgeois classes and the peasants.[49] In 1924, following the proclamation of the Greek Republic, he was among the first anti-Venizelists to recognise openly the outcome of the referendum, and agreed to participate within the new Republican constitutional framework.[50]

In 1926, in a speech against the Pangalos dictatorship, Metaxas spoke in favour of political parties, against the dictatorial methods of Pangalos and opposed the intervention of the military in politics.[51] He also favoured *"genuine and free elections "* as the only means to stabilise the internal affairs and foreign policy of the country.[52] He even went as far as to condemn dictatorial methods as a form of political authority when he said in 1928:

> *There appears the dictatorial solution which is a very dangerous road, since we*
>
> *never know where it leads us. After one dictator there is the next; there is not a*

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[47] Once again I am using Mavrogordatos' translation of the Greek term "Party Eleftherofronon".

[48] Due to his participation in the failed 1923 military anti-Venizelist counter-offensive, he fled the country and did not participate in the 1923 elections.

[49] "The Political Program of the Free Opinion Party", October 13, 1922, in *His Personal Diary*, Vol.4, pp. 778-782.

[50] The People's Party only accepted the result of the referendum in 1933.

[51] Statement made on 15 July 1926, in *His Personal Diary*, Vol.4, p. 827.

[52] Statement made on 1 October 1926, *ibid.*, p. 829.

greater danger today in Greece than the danger of a dictatorship which smashes

every freedom and every feeling. [53]

Such statements and speeches show that Metaxas was not like the other military

officers who had espoused several fascist notions and ideas, for he *successfully* participated

in Greek parliamentary politics and declared himself against any form of dictatorial

authority. His major concern though was the rivalry between the two large parties, the

Liberals and the People's Party, which exacerbated the divisions in Greek society and split

the country into two opposing camps hostile to each other. He believed that,

> *both parties favour their own petty party interests, promising positions and favours*
>
> *to prospective voters. Once in power they manipulate state mechanisms according*
>
> *to their party interests instead of promoting the national interest. The major threat is*
>
> *the fear of communism and anarchism, as the result of this rivalry .*[54]

His solution consisted of *"cooperation between the different political factions and*

compromise between the parties".[55] This concern seemed genuine enough given the fact

that although Metaxas had the opportunity to join either party, he chose to follow his own

political path and create his own party. [56]

From 1933 onwards Metaxas became a radical anti-Venizelist and the major

persecutor of Venizelos himself in the parliament.[57] It was only in 1934 that Metaxas

started to declare openly his resentment towards parliamentary politics and to talk about the

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[53] Statement made on 28 June 1928, *ibid,* pp. 911-912, [in Greek].

[54] Response to Tsaldares on 4 October 1926, *ibid.,* p 831, [in Greek].

[55] Metaxas' "Intervention on the subject of education" from the parliamentary proceedings on 6 December 1927, *ibid .,* p.853.

[56] In the elections of 1926, Metaxas' party gained 52 seats in the parliament against 108 Liberals, 63 of the People's Party, 18 of the Democratic Union, 3 of the Farmers' Party and 9 Communists. That was his major electoral success as a leader of a political party, and shows that he managed to attract a certain percentage of the floating voters at that period, and came close to displacing the People's Party from its central position in the anti-Venizelist camp. He subsequently participated as a minister of Transport in the Coalition government, the "broad" Coalition of "democratic parties" and in the following "partial" Coalition Government of the Liberal Party and the Free Opinion Party. In the elections of 1928 however the party of Metaxas gained only one seat, it went through a total defeat and Metaxas was not even elected as a deputy in his own constituency. Thereafter, his party was a minor party in the electoral and parliamentary arena.

[57] He accused Venizelos of being the instigator of the Plasteras coup on 6 March, 1933. Venizelos for his part accused Metaxas of being the instigator of an attempt to assassinate him. This was followed by a correspondence in the newspaper *Kathemerini* between Metaxas and Venizelos on the real causes of the Dichasmos of the 1910s.There was a marked conflict and ideological divergence between the two men although many historians have talked about the existence of a mutual admiration between them.

bankruptcy of the parliament as an institution. His solution involved "*the exit of parliamentarianism and the emergence of a new, more permanent and strong executive power* ". He argued that it was too late to bridge the gap between the two major political factions, given that "*people did not act logically but were driven by passions which were destined to prevail and to lead the country to more troubles and rivalries*".[58] That was the beginning of his open espousal of anti-liberal and anti-parlamentarian ideas, with a fascist undertone. Parliamentarism, according to Metaxas, had been a political system associated with 19th century capitalism and its economic expression, the free market, had accompanied the rise of the middle classes to power. The capitalism of the 20th century was in need of state intervention to solve the problems created by the shortcomings of the free market economy. Accordingly, the circumstances which gave birth to and bred parliamentarism had ceased to exist. Parliamentarism was incapable of dealing with the new social conflicts and the new problems of free society. "*The problem is no longer how to remain within parliamentarianism, but how to get out of it. Through the door of communism or through the door of the national state* ".[59] The proposed "National State" of Metaxas was based on grand ideals, the carrier of which would be the youth. Given that the Megali Idea had collapsed in its territorial expression, the new national ideal had to be an intellectual re-creation of the Greek civilisation, not connected with any territorial claims. He stated that '*the genius of the Greek people is that they always lived without boundaries. The new ideal, the National Ideal, is common to all Greeks wherever they are*".[60]

From 1935 onwards Metaxas worked hard for the restoration of the monarchy. In the elections of 1935 his party, then named the "Union of the Royalists", received 14% of the national vote and gained 4 seats in the Parliament. It should be stated however that the Venizelist parties did not participate in these elections, which proves that the performance of Metaxas' party was a very meagre one and that the support for his ideas was insignificant.

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[58] From an interview in the newspaper Free Man, on 4 January 1934, *His Personal Diary*, Vol.4, pp. 592-593.

[59] Interview in *Kathemerini*, on 6 January 1934, *ibid* , pp. 593-595.

[60] From Metaxas' epilogue in a series of 70 articles addressed to Venizelos, on 23 January 1935, *ibid*, pp. 611-615.

So it is safe to assume that Metaxas did not have a loyal social base among the Greek population a year before the imposition of his dictatorship.[61] With the restoration of the monarchy and the elections of January 1936 the final stages of parliamentarism were controlled by the King and Metaxas, who worked his way to the top with the support of the King.[62] From minister of War, he became vice-President of the government and with the death of the Prime Minister, he became Prime Minister himself.

It has become evident that Metaxas' personal political ideology was at times controversial and obscure; first, he started by collaborating with Venizelos in the 1910s, while in the 1920s and 1930s he became an ardent anti-Venizelist; second, he accepted the outcome of the referendum on the Republic in 1924 although he had previously been an eager supporter of the king, while in 1935 he urgently asked for the return of the king, creating the Union of Royalists; third, while in the 1920s he was speaking in favour of parliamentary practices and policies of accommodation and appeasement, and against any dictatorial solutions, his attitude towards parliamentarism changed radically in the 1930s, when he was the most active supporter of a permanent dictatorship.[63] Judging from Metaxas' lack of parliamentary "success", he did very poorly in terms of electoral support, with the exception of the 1926 elections. In addition, Metaxas was never associated with any of the minor Greek fascist organisations and sought to dissolve them when he became dictator. His political philosophy was his own and he was not surrounded by a team of political theorists with a consistent fascist political programme. However, he was constantly conscious, even later as a powerful dictator of his lonely position and a very indicative statement made by him, as early as 1935, was a prophesy as to the fate of his own dictatorship:

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[61] Spyros Linardatos in his book *How We Reached the 4th of August Regime* examines in detail the political events a year prior to the imposition of the dictatorship.

[62] "Fortunately" for Metaxas' political career, a number of major political figures died in the first months of 1936. Venizelos, Tsaldares, Kondyles and Demertzes "withdrew permanently" from the political scene, which is considered by many to have been a crucial factor in the subsequent imposition of the dictatorship.

[63] Information on Metaxas' life and ideas prior to his dictatorship can also be obtained from Metaxas' biographers and personal admirers. One such account is Kallonas' work *Metaxas; Student, Soldier, Politician, Fighter, Leader*, Athens 1938.

Are dictatorships the solution? No conscientious dictator would ever give a positive reply to such question. The main deficiency of dictatorships is their inability even to foresee their succession.Successful or not dictatorships are tied up with the fate of the dictator and have no other successor but chaos. [64]

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[64] *His Personal Diary*, Vol.4 , p. 245, [in Greek].

Chapter 3 : THE 4TH OF AUGUST REGIME'S IDEAS OF THE INTER-WAR REALITY

Established at the height of international fascism, the 4th of August regime was contemporaneous with the rising power of the Nazis in Germany. It was the authoritarian sequence to the inter-war domestic socio-political crisis and to the unbridgeable differences between the Venizelists and the anti-Venizelists. Its imposition was helped by the acquiescence of the King, who, at the same time, limited the personal power of a minor party leader, with neither an electoral base nor with the power base of a fascist movement. The 4th of August regime was neither a fascist regime, on the model of Italy or Germany, nor a military dictatorship, on the model of the 1967 military junta; yet it enjoyed the support of the military higher echelons.

In the following pages I shall be viewing the set of ideas adopted by the 4th of August regime, i.e., the way that the founders of the dictatorship perceived the inter-war reality. The official ideology of the 4th of August regime contained both domestic conservative/traditional features and fascist/radical elements. The traditional elements involved the manipulation of the previous ideological status quo, regarding the place of national history, and the orthodox church within the content of nationalism. The fascist and radical elements were seen in the ample dissemination of a fascist rhetoric, the Greek use of imported themes and the implementation of some reformist policies.

To attempt to define precisely the character of fascist ideology is an exceptionally difficult task, as it is to define fascism in general, although it is clear that it consisted in a specific fusion of ideas which were professed passionately by their followers. The task is even more difficult given that the fascist regimes were highly anti-intellectual and opposed any form of theoretical constructions. Fascism was principally characterised by a nationalistic activism, which is why fascist societies were organised militarily and geared towards the prosecution of wars. The ideological allure in each case was the revival of grand civilisations and the birth of the "new man". Parallel to the use of ideology there was the wide use of repressive mechanisms inherent in the exercise of authoritarian power by

dictatorships. The most striking feature of fascist ideology was the negative character of its political philosophy.[1] It has been repeatedly pointed out by various analysts that fascist ideology was based on a set of negations, with respect to a number of social and philosophical questions, concerning the development of society. There was a fundamental negation of the two most widely accepted international doctrines, liberalism and communism, which led fascists to the further negation of a broad spectrum of well established notions of the industrialised nations of Europe, professing their anti-parliamentarism, anti-intellectualism, anti-clericalism, anti-urbanism, anti-materialism, anti-individualism, anti-modernism, among others.[2] Most important, fascists rejected the notion of intellectualism and based their ideas on practical activism rather than on some form of theoretical/philosophical conceptual framework. The proposed fascist alternative, far from being a positive third way to surpass those two established models of social development, consisted in a reaction against the world of matter and reason and the ideas of positivism, a romantic revision of social values and a reactionary turn towards traditional ways of life.[3] Broadly the fascist interpretation of social reality, common to most fascist regimes and movements, consisted in anti-liberalism, anti-communism, an aggressive, even violent nationalism, close control of society and economy by the state, and the extreme exaltation of youth. But more important than theory, was the practical side of fascism, in that fascism promoted a new style of politics based on the principle of strong leadership, mass mobilisation through the party and, ultimately, the aggrandisement of the nation through aggression. The paradox was that although fascist ideology claimed to be a highly nationalistic and xenophobic philosophy, it ended up by attracting international attention and influence.

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[1] What Linz calls the "'anti' character of fascism" and fascism an "anti-movement" in his article "Some Notes Towards a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective" in *Fascism; A Reader's Guide*, op.cit., pp. 3-121.

[2] According to Poulantzas, fascist ideology consisted of an amalgam of contradictory elements, the internal contradictions of fascist ideology, whose articulation was reflected in the practices of the various state apparatuses, with which the petty-bourgeoisie, the main supporter of fascism, could easily identify and therefore grant its support to the fascist elites. Ideological elements such as anti-intellectualism, anti-elitism, nationalism were notions congruent with the petty-bourgeois aspirations. *Fascism and Dictatorship*, pp. 252-256.

[3] On the nature of fascist ideology see among others, Sternhell "Fascist Ideology" in *Fascism; A Reader's Guide*, Weber, *Varieties of Fascism*, Mosse, *The Culture of Western Europe*, Hagopian *Ideals and Ideologies*, and James Joes *Fascism in the Contemporary World*.

Metaxas never used the term "fascist" or "national socialist" to describe his regime's ideology, but made an extensive use of certain fascist rhetorical and organisational themes which he tried to incorporate into the official ideology of his dictatorship. Metaxas above all tried to convince the Greek people that the regime's ideas were something uniquely Greek, based on Greek national ideals, irrespective of the international context of fascism, as was the case with most fascist leaders.

Anti-communism: A conventional authoritarian theme

The idea of anti-communism *per se* was not just a typical feature of fascist regimes given that it has been shared by most of the authoritarian regimes of the 20th century, which did not profess themselves to be communist. It was a common feature of the fascist dictatorships as well as of the post-war dictatorships in Latin America and Southern Europe. Anti-communist feelings were also widely shared by the parliamentary regimes of Western Europe and America as a basic element of their liberal philosophy. The difference was that while authoritarian regimes openly excluded and suppressed communist activities, parliamentary systems have to accept that communists have the right to participate in the democratic process.

Anti-communism, as part of the official state ideology was not introduced by the dictatorship of Metaxas in 1936. In 1929, the Liberal Venizelos government, by the "Idionymon Act" (Special Law) gave anti-communism legal status.[4] Law and practice had already been used by both liberals and conservatives alike to enforce a more authoritarian interpretation by the time the 4th of August regime came to power.[5] What the 4th of August regime initiated, was the blatant and indiscriminate use of authoritarian and repressive practices against communists which were continued, long after its downfall by the post-war so-called democratic governments and, naturally by the military junta. Emergency Law 117/1936 *"On the fight against communism "* of 16 September 1936,

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[4] Law 4229 of 1929 specified that *"whoever intends to promote ideas with respect to the violent overthrow of the status quo or the detachment of part of the Greek territory will be punished"*[in Greek].

[5] During the period of 1929-1934, the application of the Idionymon involved 13,050 arrests, 2400 sentences. and 27 murders of syndicalists and communists. See Newspaper *Eleftherotypia*, October 28, 1990.

provided the anti-communist state of Metaxas with the legal framework within which to act against any sort of subversive ideas or actions, followed by the severe punishment of those involved in them. In practice this law was implemented by the "certificate of social beliefs", the "declarations of recantation", by house arrests, censorship of written or published material, burning of books considered unsuitable by the regime, the use of torture by the military police, exile on remote islands, prisons, and the use of an informer's network by the military police following the example of the Nazi police.

According to the regime's rhetoric, communism was imported from Europe by Greek intellectuals who had come into close contact with the idea while abroad. It had managed to infiltrate the state machinery, the armed forces, education, and had highly influenced sections of the working classes, the peasantry and youth. The very pretext for the imposition of the regime was offered by the imminent workers' strike scheduled on August 5, 1936.

> *The regime has intervened promptly to save the country from a forthcoming*
>
> *disaster.The effervescent situation in Greece is due to the upsurge in communist*
>
> *propaganda, which, having infiltrated the civil service, threatens to paralyse the*
>
> *state machinery, to penetrate the national armed forces, and to cultivate a spirit of*
>
> *anarchism in its ranks.....having absorbed the leaders of the conservative working*
>
> *class and the peasantry, it has caused a series of unjustified strikes, aimed at*
>
> *overturning the social status quo and the disintegration of Greek society.* [6]

So there was nothing fascist or radical in the anti-communist rhetoric of the 4th of August regime, apart from the overt and general purge of all communists and the creation of a secret police on the models of Nazi Germany or fascist Italy. Maniadakis, the chief of Security, established a wide network of informers and borrowed ideas and methods of torture from Himmler and applied them in Greece.[7] He even corresponded with Himmler concerning a common international war against communism.[8]

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[6] Preamble to the first royal decree *"On the Suspension of Constitutional Rights"*, in Linardatos, *The Fourth of August Regime*, p. 34, [in Greek].

[7] See Close "The Police during the 4th of August Regime", in *Greece 1936- 1944, Dictatorship, Occupation, Resistance*, pp. 77-91.

[8] Correspondence between Himmler and Maniadakis, in Andrikopoulos *op. cit.*, p. 86-87.

Anti-parliamentarism: The fascist influence

It was in his explicit ideas on anti-parliamentarism that we observe Metaxas' ideological similarity to the European fascist regimes and the difference between him and the modern dictatorships of the post-war period. The fascist regimes and movements, in their opposition to parliamentary practices in general, declared their faith in the permanent imposition of strong leadership, which would derive its power directly from the people, and would safeguard the interests of the whole nation. Modern post-war "liberal" dictatorships, on the other hand, although they have used dictatorial methods, have tended to avoid the open use of an anti-parliamentary ideology and to declare the necessity of their authoritarian rule for a short period of time, while they promise the return to parliamentary institutions when the political crisis is passed.

The overtly anti-parliamentary stance of Metaxas, a radical element in the regime's ideas, contrasted sharply with Greece's previous experience of and predilection for parliamentary government and party politics. It was also the main point of disagreement between the two instigators of the dictatorship. The King considered the regime as an interlude, a temporary diversion from parliamentary democracy, as a means to provide the country with the strong leadership so badly needed at that time of political instability. At the same time, having lived in England and having been educated there, he was an admirer of English traditions and practices and favoured the British influence in domestic Greek politics. This was a similar case to that of Prince Paul and Stojadinovic in Yugoslavia, in that the former was Western educated and lacked a real understanding of Yugoslav politics, while the latter, as Prime Minister, introduced fascist style institutions and pursued a policy of rapprochement with Italy and Germany.[9]

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[9] In fact, Prince Paul did not particularly feel at home in Serbia and showed greater understanding towards the Croats. This led Serbs to regard him as not a "proper Serb" and say that he had no real understanding of Yugoslav politics. On the other hand, Stojadinovic's fascist inclinations received hardly any support and were resented by many Serbs who leaned towards France and Britain. Prince Paul was forced to dismiss Stoyadinovic in 1939 after the German invasion in Czechoslovakia, due among others to the fear that a similar development would take place in multi-national Yugoslavia. See Polonsky, op.cit., pp. 102-106.

Metaxas was a military man, educated in Germany, an admirer of Prussian militarism, who saw the imposition of the dictatorship, from the very beginning, as a more or less permanent affair, which he declared openly in his speeches.[10]

Parliamentarism was the system of the middle classes and flourished at a period

when capitalism kept the economic development of society and the development of

the state separate......Capitalism itself, has abandoned the system of free

competition, to request the state's protection.....Nowadays the States exercise

totalitarian control over the economies, and in which case parliamentarism is too

weak a system to respond to the new problems in the people's lives. We have

witnessed its downfall in many countries of Europe. [11]

The dictator saw a strong connection between communism and parliamentarism, the "second evil" of Greek national politics, in that both ideas were the result of intellectualism which had come from abroad and had contaminated Greek society. His ideas on parliamentarism and liberalism, discussed above, had been quite clear since 1934, when Metaxas had declared that he was in favour of a dictatorial organisation of power and a strong executive. Parliamentarism, according to the 4th of August regime's ideology, represented, through the political parties, the interests of the political oligarchy; it was a system which promoted the petty interests of politicians; it was the cause of the Dichasmos, the division of the Greek people into opposing factions; through its practices, it had brought the country to the verge of communist take-over.

In Greece, according to Metaxas' ideas, constitutional rights had been given to the people prematurely, after independence was won, and this had been detrimental to the progress and the development of the country. Under the Greek parliamentary system, the legislative, executive and judicial powers clashed with each other while there was an urgent need for an arbiter over and above these powers, to promote the national interest.[12] The

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[10] From the beginning of his regime, Metaxas stated that the regime was there to stay in power indefinably. In Linardatos, *op.cit.*, p. 85, and in *Four Years of Metaxas' Rule*, Vol. 4, p. 209.

[11]"Where was Greece Driven by Parliamentarism"in *Four Years of Metaxas' Governing*, Vol. 4, pp. 184-196, [in Greek].

[12] In *Kathemerini*, January 6, 1934, *His Personal Diary*, pp. 593-595, [in Greek].

right to vote, instead of being a sacred right used for the good of the nation, was used

solely as a means to attain personal ambitions and interests.[13] On the contrary,

> the State of the 4th of August regime is formed by the people united, not any more
>
> divided into parties or groups, one people with a single desire, wherethe king is
>
> the bearer of the national will and with a head of government who does not belong
>
> to any parties .[14]

Inter-war nationalism: The aggressive fascist context

Fascist movements were, above all, nationalistic, fighting against the

internationalist tendencies of both liberalism and communism. Nationalism however was a

concept neither invented nor solely employed by fascists. It is based on a specific in-

terpretation of common cultural values which during the 19th century found its political

expression in the formation of the nation-states in Europe. It was its aggressive and violent

aspect which in the cases of Germany and Italy provided the ideological framework for a

remarkably authoritarian organisation of power and a different perception of their nations'

foreign relations with other states. More important was the notion of "the nation" as a

living organism, omnipresent, over and above all individuals. Fascists tried to create what

amounted almost to a religious faith in the power of the national state for which everyone

should be ready to sacrifice his entire existence. Important in the development of fascist

nationalism was the specific perception of history, which was very selective in its

emphases and interpretations.

The case is most clearly illustrated with Germany, by far the most destructive

nationalist state of the inter-war period. Nationalism during the period of Nazi rule was

interpreted in a radically different way than had previously been the case. Germans were

taught by the Nazis to read their history in a very selective way, to perceive the role of

religion differently and to adopt a new understanding of the idea of the "nation" closely

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[13] His similarity to Salazar's position on parliamentarism is striking, the latter declaring that with the exception of some of the northern countries of Europe, "*parliamentary democracy has become a despotic domination of the nation by political parties*", in Hugh Kay, *Salazar and Modern Portugal*, p. 70.

[14] Speech in Jannina, June 13 1937, in "The Ideological Content of the National State of the 4th of August" in *Four Years of Metaxas' Rule*, Vol. 4, edited by the Ministry of Press and Tourism, No. 35, p. 139.

connected to the concept of the "race". The interpretation of history served the Nazis' imperialistic designs and had a manipulative purpose. It involved the selection of the most glorifying aspects of the country's past while the role of heroic personalities was considered the driving force behind grand historical events. This encouraged Germans to regard their leader as a hero, to try to imitate his example and ultimately to make heroes out of themselves. Moreover, Nazi interpretation of history legitimated the country's grandiose foreign policy aspirations and the belief that the destiny of the German nation was to acquire a superior position in world affairs, under the guiding force of its leader who would change the course of the German history for the better. The radically new aspect of the Nazi interpretation of history was that it was studied in close connection with racial biology. This allowed the Germans to view themselves as a superior race compared with the other races and provided justification for the condemnation of the Jewish race as the most harmful race in the world.[15]

Hitler's "ethnic-biological interpretation" of history, in other words, was expounded in parallel with racial issues, and totally rejected the previous "socio-political" or "socio-economic" approaches of marxists and liberals. The Nazi interpretation of German history reflected very clearly the Nazi attitude towards nationalism, characterised by fanaticism, aggression and hate towards suspicious enemy races which were perceived to threaten the existence of the German race. The nation's history was composed principally of warfare while the warrior-type hero became the symbol of the new cultural identity. Moreover the Germans largely underestimated the role of religion in that their faith had to concentrate on the adoration of the nation. The Nazi aim was to superimpose the ideal of the nation on individuals and to suppress class, religious or any other divisions within German society. As Mosse has rightly put it the essence of the Nazi ideology was "the reduction of individual ideas to generally held notions; Jews or Slavs (the enemy

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[15]In Blackburn's book *Education in the Third Reich; Race and History in Nazi Textbooks* (State University of New York Press, 1985), there is a very interesting account of the way Nazi ideas penetrated school textbooks. See also Mosse's article on "National Socialism and the Depersonalisation of Man" in the *Culture of Western Europe*, pp. 357-373.

races) were seen as abstractions, robbed of all individuality, the anti-type to the Aryan

abstract ideal ".[16]

The Italian type of fascist nationalism also emphasised the glorification of past events, militaristic and aggressive, and accordingly justified a foreign policy of territorial expansion. Italian nationalism adopted the exaltation of the Roman era and aimed at the creation of a New Roman Empire in which Mussolini perceived his role as the New Caesar. So Italian, fascist nationalism saw its "historic mission" in its rightful position of influence in the Mediterranean sphere and so justified further imperialist, i.e., goals like the Abyssinian and Albanian invasion. It lacked however the racial element so important in Nazi nationalism, at least until 1938 when Mussolini was forced by Hitler to adopt some racial policies for the sake of good foreign relations with the Germans. Racism however was never embedded in Italian culture and could not infiltrate the mentality of the Italians.

A case in which anti-Semitism was prominent was the Romanian Iron Guard. However, Romanian anti-semitism was not racist in the Nazi sense, for Romanians did not have any scientific notion of enemy races in their ideology. It should rather be seen in the context of traditional Romanian xenophobia, which had to do with the country's historical occupation by great powers (Ottomans, Austro-Hungarians and Russians) and with the prosperity of the middle class Jewish community in a country with a great number of poor peasants.[17]

The Spanish fascist nationalism of the Falange was the distinctive feature which distinguished the movement from the other radical or conservative parties in Spain. It was the Falangist programme of imperial expansion that gave the Falange its special character, the drive for imperialist adventures in the African, Portuguese and Latin American directions, the last of these intended to be more economic and cultural in character. The policy of Franco however, was never expansionist, although his administration included

[16] Mosse *Nazi Culture; Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich*, New York 1981, p. 270.
[17] Zeev Barbu, "Psycho-Historical and Sociological Perspectives on the Iron Guard, the Fascist Movement in Romania" in *Who Were the Fascists*, p. 383.

Falangist members, but a cautious one of non-intervention in the world war and a realistic one, given the country's weak economic position following the end of the civil war.[18]

Portugal, under Salazar, a case resembling more the Greek regime, pursued a self-contained form of nationalism, in the context of her position of isolation from the rest of Europe. The period of Portuguese history most widely glorified by the regime was the period of colonisation when Portugal assumed the role of civilising the new lands, spreading Roman and Christian values. Portugal did not follow the German, Italian or East European expansionist creed, although she had territorial grievances against Spain and Britain.[19] Far from professing an imperialist/expansionist attitude in the European sphere, she was more concerned with her existing colonies in Africa -Angola and Mozambique- and, following the principle of national autarky, she pursued a policy of exploitation of African labour.[20]

Greek nationalism under the 4th of August regime: A defensive perception

The principal feature of Greek nationalism, in stark contrast with the Italian and German fascist regimes and similar to the Portuguese one, was Metaxas' self-contained, non-aggressive nationalism. It is in the 4th of August regime's perception of nationalism that we observe the fascist influences, and in the regime's actual policy that we discern the conservative essence of Metaxas' intentions. His idea of the nation, in agreement with his political philosophers Koumaros and Mantzoufas, was defined as,

> a living organism with its own civilisation. It comprises a total of people connected
>
> by social, historical, physical, biological and psychological relations. The nation
>
> consists in the unity of the past, the present, and the future. It is not identified with
>
> the numerical strength of the living people because it is a historical reality, the

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[18] See Herbert Rutledge Southworth, "The Falange: An analysis of Spain's Fascist Heritage" in *Spain in Crisis*, edited by Paul Preston, The Harvester Press, 1976, pp. 1-22.

[19] Gallagher, *Portugal; A Twentieth Century Interpretation*, Manchester University Press 1983, p. 95.

[20] On Portugal see Antonio de Figueiredo *Portugal Fifty Years of Dictatorship*, Penguin 1975, Gallagher's *Portugal; A twentieth Century Interpretation*, and "Conservatism, dictatorship and fascism in Portugal, 1914-1944" in *Fascists and Conservatives*, and Hugh Kay *Salazar and Modern Portugal*, 1970. Metaxas frequently referred in his speeches to the ideological connection between himself and Salazar.

product of a historical evolution over many generations, the unifying element of

which is national consciousness. [21]

It was influenced by Gentile's elitist and organic conception of the nation, according to
which the nation was distinguished from the living people, in that it was an idea above
individuals and social groups and whose will could be identified with that of the single
leader:

It may be possible that the will of the nation is not identical to the totality of the

people nor even with the majority but only with a minority or just one person. [22]

In this way the theorists of the regime hoped to justify the imposition of the rule of
one leader over the whole of the population by identifying his will with the will of the
nation at large. The masses were presented as misguided by the ideas coming from abroad
while Metaxas and his government embodied the true national spirit which they tried to
pass on to Greek society. Still, in theory, the concept of the nation remained vague, the
task of which was to create a cultural "Third Greek Civilisation". This reflected the
regime's intention to concentrate on domestic stability and outweighed any idea of activist
or aggressive territorial expansion, as well as the country's realisation of its peripheral and
weak international status.

Metaxas pursued a peaceful foreign policy based on a pacific relationship with the
Turks and the Balkan neighbours, with no Greek claims on any new territories.[23] On the
other hand, he was very much concerned with the existing Greek frontiers which he tried
to safeguard by enhancing the strength of the army. He was to put that concern into
practice in 1940, by successfully defending Greece's against the invasion of a country he
had so much admired. His type of nationalism could be labelled "defensive nationalism",
as opposed to the "aggressive" German and Italian types. His non-imperialistic policy was
supported by the majority of the Greek population, given that the Asia Minor disaster and

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[21] From the periodical *The Youth*, extract from an article "On the Nation", October 1939, p. 3, [in Greek]

[22]"The Political Philosophy of the National State" in *The New State* , 1939 and in Alivisatos' *Political Institutions in Crisis*, pp. 120-121, and in "'Nation' vs 'People' after 1940" in *Hellenism and Hellenicity*, pp. 83-84, [in Greek].

[23] Indeed, the foreign policy expeditions were divided between the King and Metaxas, in that the first dealt basically with the country's relations with the Western powers while the second concentrated on the promotion of Balkan cooperation and neutrality.

the subsequent population exchange had ended the Megali Idea territorial project in the minds of the Greek people.

Although Metaxas' nationalism was not racist, in the Nazi sense, it discriminated against the minorities within Greece, in Macedonia and Thrace. His discrimination against Slavo-Macedonians was the most systematic repression of a minority ever in Greece.[24] The methods of Hellenisation of the Northern Greek minorities included the stern prohibition of the use of the Macedonian dialect, a ban on Bulgarian songs, the compulsory display of the Greek flag on national holidays, the foundation of mixed schools for Slavophones and Turkophones, while the minorities were compelled to paint their houses' walls in the national colours of blue and white.[25] On the other hand, the Metaxas regime did not discriminate against Macedonia's Jews and during his period there was a relaxation of the previously harsher treatment of them.[26]

"Third Greek Civilisation": The Metaxist Megali Idea

The Third Greek Civilisation, the grandiose project of the 4th of August regime, aspired to be the major national ideal of the Greek people. It was intended to be a combination of the two previous Greek civilisations, the ancient and the Byzantine. Such hyper-charged rhetoric and the use of over-ambitious schemes are better appreciated in the context of the various nationalistic ideologies of the inter-war period. Hitler sought the international primacy of the Aryan race, Mussolini looked for the revival of past Roman glory, Szalasi of the Arrow Cross talked of the "new Hungarism" and of Hungarian imperial expansion, and Salazar sought the creation of the "New Era". On the other hand,

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[24] As Mavrogordatos argues, this was ironical given that the Slavo-Macedonian minority had massively voted for Metaxas in the 1926 elections. This discrimination resulted in the subsequent siding of the Slavo-Macedonians with the Bulgarians during the 1941-1944 occupation of Greece and then with Yugoslav communism. See Mavrogordatos, *op.cit.*, p. 252.

[25] Eleni Mahaira, *The Fourth of August Youth*, p. 44.

[26] In fact the conditions of the Jews are said to have improved under Metaxas who forbade discrimination against them. This, according to Close, was also due to the dictators' connections with the old lands where ethnic discord was negligible, and his anti-Venizelist political legacy according to which the ethnic minorities of Northern Greece were regarded as potential supporters of the anti-Venizelist camp (although this was not the case with Slavo-Macedonians). See Close in *Fascists and Conservatives*, p 208 Even his rhetoric towards the Jews was mild and in a speech at the University of Salonica, he thanked "*our fellow-citizens the Israelites for having so readily conceded part of their cemetery for the construction of new University buildings, despite their religious difficulties*" in *Four Years of Metaxas' Governing*, Vol II, p 122

Metaxas' perception of Greek civilisation was also reminiscent of the 19th century classicist and highbrow orientation and the ambition that the independent Greek state would civilise the peoples of the East.

Accordingly, great importance was attached to the past in the formation of the regime's ideology. As with all authoritarian regimes, the 4th of August regime adopted a selective interpretation of past achievements by promoting specific features of Greek history and underestimating others considered non-suitable to the regime's ideological ambitions. The ancient civilisation was seen as *"high in intellectual and artistic achievements but lacking religious faith"*, while the Spartan political organisation and discipline was preferred to the Athenian democracy.

> *Democracy, the system of the ancient Athenian society, is characterised by*
>
> *mediocrity. The leaders of democratic regimes are only mediocre human beings,*
>
> *servants of the sovereign masses, while what societies need are superior beings to*
>
> *lead their nations. Democracy derives its strength from amorphous and misguided*
>
> *masses.* [27]

The Spartan model, on the other hand, -a similarity to the Nazi ideal-*"brings out the best qualities in the human character"*.[28] These qualities are *"self-discipline, austerity, obedience and courage to struggle in life"*. The model of ancient Sparta was presented as the model for a disciplined freedom, (*"the key to the progress of the totality "*).

The second Greek civilisation, the Byzantine one, was admired for its deep religious faith, and for its creation of a strong state but its intellectual achievements were not seen as being as great as those of the ancient Greeks.[29] The Third Civilisation would succeed in both intellectual and religious achievements and would combine elements of the two previous ones. Ancient Athens was the model in cultural matters, ancient Sparta and Macedonia the models in social and national matters, and Byzantine Hellenism was the model in religious and political matters.

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[27] *His Diary*, Vol.4, p. 456, [in Greek]

[28] (Speech in Sparta, May 20 1937), *Four Years of Metaxas' Governing*, Vol.4, p. 186.

[29] (Speech to the students of Athens University on 20 November 1937), *ibid.*, p. 86.

The bearers of the Third Greek Civilisation were the Ministry of the Press and Tourism, the Ministry of Education, the Departments of Administration and Self-Administration and the Youth Movement. Although the regime attached major importance to Greek cultural development, as an essential part of the Third Greek Civilisation, Metaxas never created a ministry of Culture, despite suggestions to do so from advisers such as Nikoloudis, who was influenced mainly by Italian organisation concerning culture.

Fascists liked to claim that they achieved a "cultural revolution", a radical intellectual break with the past. Their ideas were largely based on a nationalist interpretation of Rome's glorious past. In that sense Marinetti's idea that the culture of Italy should be permeated by the concept of "Italianita" was adopted by the fascists.[30] There was an urgent demand for the creation of an original Italian culture on which to base the regime's ideology and the political education of the youth. Mussolini, who was personally interested in the new fascist culture created the National Fascist Institute of Culture, the Royal Academy of Italy and the new Ministry of Popular Culture, under the surveillance of the Party and the State. It should be noted however that Mussolini was not involved in art and culture as such. Instead of art for art's sake, he substituted the idea of art for the state's sake. Fascist culture should be created in such a way as to serve the purposes of the fascist state. It was also characterised by a desire to break with the recent past, to stand against internationalist intellectual ideas, and to promote a new self-sufficient Roman culture.[31] The use of public symbols, ceremonies and propaganda marked fascist Italy's development in the arts, literature and education. The Italian fascist regime, despite its intentions, never attained complete totalitarian control over the cultural life of the nation, unlike the control imposed by Goebbels on German cultural life, and left some room for independent cultural developments, a sort of "imperfect totalitarianism".[32]

Metaxas firmly believed that the creation of the new civilisation was the task of the whole Greek population, under the guidance of an enlightened leader.

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[30] Cannistraro, "Mussolini's Cultural Revolution: Fascist or Nationalist" in the *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1972, p. 119.
[31] *ibid*, p 125
[32] Braun Emily, "Mario Sironi and a Fascist Art" in *Italian Art in the 20th century* , p. 173.

The development of civilisation is the work of a whole people guided by the

animating spirit of a leader who acts through the state and social mechanisms,

inspires the masses and rules directly and personally. [33]

In place of a ministry of Culture he created the Ministry of Press and Tourism on

26 August 1936 (Emergency Law 45/1936). The responsibilities of the ministry varied

from the "enlightenment" of public opinion, to the handling of the Greek and foreign

press, art, theatre, cinema, music, radio, congresses and exhibitions and the general

propaganda of the regime. The publishing activities of the ministry involved the printing of

a large amount of material to promote the 4th of August ideas. Under the surveillance of

the ministry of Press, the regime imposed a policy of massive book prohibitions and book

burnings of the works of writers like Freud, Zweig, Heine, France, Bernard Shaw,

Darwin, Dostoyevski, Gorky and others whose ideas were considered liberal democratic

or Marxist. The regime imposed censorship on such Greek Classics as Thucydides and

Sophocles, the Epitaph and Antigone being the prime examples. As regards the press, the

regime pursued a policy of imprisonment or exile towards opposition journalists while

only favourable newspapers continued to exist and favourable articles were allowed to be

published. It even imposed censorship on musical records. The imposition of the 4th of

August regime cut the free dialogue and the ideological discourse among liberal and

socialist intellectuals by imposing a total ban on socialist thought, while liberals had to

carry on clandestinely.[34]

With regard to art, the regime adopted a different rhetoric to the Italian fascist

regime, the "art for art's sake". Education in art was to be promoted so that people would

be able to distinguish *"the beautiful from the ugly, the good from the evil"*. *"The purpose*

of art ", professed the regime, *"consists in the creation of a better environment for our*

everyday life and in the expression of our feelings and ideas in a beautiful and immortal

way ". There was a constant allusion to the cultural and artistic achievements of the ancient

civilisation which had created the concept of art.

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[33] Letter to Nikoloudis, 24 August 1939, *Metaxas' archives.*
[34] Mario Vitti *The 1930s Generation*, p. 51.

Emergency Law 1215/1938 created the Athenian "House of Art and Literature" for

the promotion of literary and artistic works and the organisation of seminars, exhibitions,

concerts and festivities. The regime also paid much attention to the advancement of the the-

atre and supported the Royal Theatre and various independent theatres financially. It

founded the Lyrical Stage and the open-air theatre in Salonica.[35] In April 1938, it opened

an exhibition at the Zappeion cultural centre under the label "Joy and Work". Overall, the

regime believed that culture had a substantial role in bringing about of the Third Greek

Civilisation and, therefore, pursued a highly patronising control over the cultural activities

of the period. But the highly professed "aesthetic development of the individual" was

limited by the regime's severe censorship and by its simplistic and divisive notions of what

was "good", "pretty" or "ugly".

Through its semi-official periodical the "New State", the regime tried to promote

the ideas of its "intellectuals" concerning Greek cultural matters ranging from articles on

plastic arts, to music, theatre, and literature. The periodical "The New State"[36] served as a

type of semi-official ideological organ of the regime, it reflected the fascistoid nature of the

regime's ideology and was the main vehicle of the intellectual supporters of the regime and

the originators of the various fascist ideas. The periodical drew on various ideas and

experiences from abroad and used them in the creation of a specifically Greek ideology. It

was used in the dissemination of official propaganda and as a mechanism for the creation

of public consent. The subject matter of the periodical was divided into the two large

categories of "politics" and "culture". The writers of the articles were mostly the

ideologues of the regime, the members of the government, and various European

intellectual supporters of the fascist ideology.[37]

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[35] *Four Years of Metaxas' Governing*, Vol 2, pp. 208-210.

[36] The periodical lasted from September 1937 until March 1941 and published 43 issues. Its precursor the newspaper "The New State" was first issued in 1932 and had served the pre-electoral campaign of General Kondyles and had shared his ideas on the corporatist organisation of the state.

[37] On the periodical "The New State", see Panos Kokkinos, *The Fascistoid Ideology in Greece*. It is interesting to note that distinguished Greek intellectuals, such as the the painter Gikas, the photographer Nelly, the actress Kotopouli, the archeologist Marinatos, among many others contributed in one way or another in the periodical.

Religion: The ambivalent institution in inter-war authoritarianism

There was a very strong position reserved for the church in the 4th of August regime's ideology, as one of the basic pillars of Greek civilisation. The atheist and anti-clerical elements of fascist ideology were totally absent from the Greek discourse, the Greek regime belonging to the same category as the dictatorships of Portugal and Spain, where Catholic culture had considerable force and religion was a powerful bulwark of tradition and nationality.

The Church's pre-eminent position in Portugal could not be challenged by any concept of the nation, and it retained a very special position within Portuguese society, creating what many analysts have labelled Portuguese "clerical fascism".[38] It controlled the educational system and most of the intellectual life and placed its emphasis on traditional Christian values and institutions. Salazar, himself a deeply religious person, regarded Catholicism as a force of civilisation in the country's relationship with its African colonies. Equally Franco had to take into consideration the deep Catholic feeling of Spanish society in the exercise of his authority and the implementation of his policies. During the Spanish civil war, references to religion were used to gain the support of traditional and conservative forces in Spanish society against the Republican threat. The Catholic tradition was a constant element in the official ideological language of Franco's Spain. However, there was always a somewhat antagonistic relationship between the nationalist-syndicalist elements within the ruling group and the Catholic elements. The powerful organisation Opus Dei eventually managed to supplant the dominant role of the Falange and achieved a significant role in the exercise of power. In Spain however while the higher hierarchy of the Catholic Church was one of the basic pillars of the Franco regime, the lower ranks of the clergy constituted a serious force of opposition and acted as a restraint on the excesses

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[38] Mosse referring to the Portuguese, Spanish and the Austrian cases. *op. cit..* pp. 354-356 He states that in these countries, Catholicism played a major role in fascist doctrines and catholic morality prevailed in their social theories. Based on this notion of "clerical fascism", Gallagher claims that the corporatist regimes of Salazar and the Austrian Dolfuss bore striking similarities in that they developed in two small agriculturally based countries, overshadowed by a larger powerful neighbour and dominated by a single metropolitan centre; their leaders were not right-wing adventurers but conventional professional men from smallholding peasant backgrounds, both of them devout Catholics who rejected the secular writings of Hitler and Mussolini. *op.cit.*, pp. 96-97.

of dictatorial power.[39] Moreover, the Italian fascist regime's relationship with Catholicism remained very ambivalent in that while the leading figures of the Italian power elite claimed to be atheists and anti-clericalists, the regime was forced to take into consideration the strong position of the Church in Italian society and to make compromises in its ideological position towards the religious issue.[40]

As Linz argues, the special position of the Catholic Church in many authoritarian societies and the legal status of many of its organisations provided by the concordats between the Vatican and the rulers allowed priests and laymen a certain degree of autonomy to serve as channels for the opposition sentiments of various social classes, cultural minorities, etc and for the emergence of new leaders. This was due to the transnational character of the Catholic religion which enabled it to voice the concerns of the hierarchy, their moral indignation at injustices, and to assert the autonomy of religious organisations and the freedom of its priests. The Church as an institution outlasts any regime even those with which it becomes identified at a particular historical moment, and is generally able to disengage itself from the regime and regain its autonomy when signs of crisis appear.[41]

The omnipresence of religion continued to be influential in the orthodox countries of inter-war Europe. Even in the genuine fascist movement of the Iron Guard, fascist ideology rejected anti-clericalism. The movement's identification with Romanian orthodoxy was among the prominent and quite distinctive features of its ideology. Naturally, orthodox religion played a pivotal role in the Third Civilisation of the 4th of August regime. The traditional element in the regime's philosophy was reflected in its perception of the role of religion. *"Religion seeks the truth in faith, through belief in the religious ideals of Greek Orthodox Christianity, in the expression of man's dependence on God ".[42]* Equally, the rhetoric of Metaxas' regime emphasised *"the strengthening of the role of the Church and the elevating of the clergy, aimed at the consolidation of the*

[39] On the role of the Spanish Catholic Church during Franco's dictatorship see Demichel, *Les Dictatures Europeenes*, pp. 223-225.
[40] Milza/Berstein, *Le Fascisme Italien*, pp 256-261
[41] See Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", pp. 272-273.
[42] From the Periodical *The Youth* , "On Religion", p. 5.

religious sentiments which have preserved Greek civilisation for centuries", [43] through the actual exercise of control by the ecclesiastical hierarchy, as had also repeatedly been the policy of previous governments. The ecclesiastical policy of the 4th of August regime aimed to control the Church hierarchy, to draft a new Church Constitution which would define the relationship between Church and State, and to promulgate a law against foreign missionaries and their churches. Only the official Church was given support by the Metaxas regime, and the activities of other, foreign Churches were restricted.[44] Metaxas founded the Apostolic Mission in order to increase the Church's influence and took measures to improve the administration of church property and to raise the educational level of the clergy. The revival of the religious spirit and awareness of the Christian ethics were perceived as important factors in the rhetorical struggle against materialism. Existing measures such as compulsory church attendance on all children and the authoritarian dismissal of many teachers for alleged irreligion were pursued consistently by the regime, as their way of strengthening the religious sentiment of the Greek people.[45] The church hierarchy, in its turn, supported the 4th of August regime since it brought stability to the nation and it did not threaten the important position of the Orthodox Church within Greek society.

The fascist New State: Corporatist organisation

The imposition of dictatorships in Europe was seen as the solution to the acute crisis brought about by social conflicts, in that they would be neutralised by an authoritarian centralised state power. In theory, the fascist State aspired to become a totalitarian organism, controlling every aspect of the society, the economy and culture, a centralised power devoid of governmental instabilities and the previous oligarchic corruption. Most of the European authoritarian regimes enacted rules to reflect the aspiration of a classless society and to create an integrated, national economic structure

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[43] One of the fundamental goals of the 4th of August regime when it rose to power. "The Major Aims of the 4th of August Regime" in the *Four Years of Metaxas' Governing*, pp. 206-216.

[44] Frazee, "Church and State in Greece" in *Greece in Transition*, p. 144. During the period of Metaxas Orthodox Christians accounted for 75% of the population of Greece, while the remaining 25% included Catholics, Protestants, Jews and Muslims. See Mahaira, *op.cit.*, p. 57.

[45] Close, "Conservatism, Authoritarianism and Fascism in Greece" in *Fascists and Conservatives*, p. 206.

under the authoritarian supervision of the State, whether this was called "National-Socialist", "National-Syndicalist" or "National Corporatist". The creation of a "National-Socialist State" in Nazi Germany, aimed at the alleviation of the impact of the political and economic crises created during the period of the Weimar Republic. The solution to social rivalries consisted in the strengthening of the middle classes, the regulation of relationship between capitalists/owners and workers and the restructuring of other aspects of social welfare policy.[46] The "National-Syndicalist State" in Italy aimed even further, at the political organisation of Italian society through various corporate organisations, controlled by the state, which would form the National Council of Corporations to displace the Chamber of Deputies.[47]

The ideas of corporatism found their expression in inter-war authoritarian regimes and were professed religiously by several leaders. Corporatism was seen in the state's tendency to inhibit the formation of autonomous groups and related to the state's hostility towards the autonomous organisation of certain social groups. State corporatism means that,

> *spontaneously formed interest groups and associations are not merely controlled from above, they are outlawed and replaced by a limited number of authoritatively recognised groups that interact with governmental apparatuses in defined and regulated ways.* [48]

Salazar, the ideologue of the "National-Corporatist State", was the first to introduce his ideas on corporatist organisation and the development of a corporatist economic structure. Portuguese corporatism consisted in the creation of the "Estatuto Nacional do Trabalho" to replace the trade unions and workers' associations and the creation of the Corporate Chamber to form the regime's upper house.[49] In reality however, corporatism proved to be an illusion in practical terms and most countries which professed

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[46] From Stefanides' articles on National Socialism on the periodical *The New State*, January 1939 and February 1939. Also in the reproduction of his articles on the book *The Social Question*, December 1989.

[47] Guy Hermet emphasises the difference with Nazi Germany, in that there was no intention to create an all-powerful state on the Italian model, but rather to transfer the power of the previous Bismarckian centralised state to the new Nazi party. "Passe et Present: Des Regimes Fascistes et Nazi au Systeme Communiste" in *Totalitarisme*, pp. 140-142.

[48] Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery*, p. 75.

[49] Figueiredo *op. cit.*, p. 69.

anti-capitalistic forms of economic policy in favour of the underprivileged, ended up creating a form of state-sponsored capitalism.[50]

The Greek model of the corporate state and class regulation: A populist rhetoric and practice

In their particular context, Metaxas and his political associates drew up their socio-economic and political philosophy borrowing elements from various fascist corporatist theories which centred around the idea of the construction of the "New State". Metaxas is said to have studied the German, Italian and Portuguese cases when considering such matters as the corporate economy. In semi-peripheral countries such as Greece where the role of the state was all-embracing, and the state sector controlled a large proportion of the national resources, a turn towards an authoritarian centralised state by a dictator was not such a radical move.

Metaxas' application of theories of the corporatist state to Greece was rather static and unimaginative and for the most part imported from foreign models. While fascist corporatism was anti-capitalistic in that it aimed at freezing society at a particular stage in its development, i.e., the level of social development brought about by the market forces and its replacement by new forms of economic organisation, the Metaxist interpretation of such development lacked the complications of the corporatist varieties and was based on a rather simplistic conception of Greek society. Greek society, according to Metaxas, as a result of the previous policies of democratic governments, was divided into three categories: First, the individualists who did not care about anything that happened to the other members of society and only sought their personal gain; second, those who suffered financially and wanted to damage society at large in return for their suffering; third those who really cared about Greek society, the "true nationally-minded Greeks".[51] The ambition of the regime was to strengthen the third category in order to include the whole of the Greek people, and to eliminate the first two categories. This would only be achieved through the suppression

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[50] Similarly in Germany old capitalist elites were effectively protected and retained their old influence.

[51] *The Ideas of Metaxas on Greece and Hellenism*, Athens 1952 [in Greek]

of individualism and the super-imposition of a strong State which would regulate all aspects of economic, political and cultural life. Most pronounced was the rhetoric on the promotion of the economic interests of disadvantaged sectors and the economically underprivileged.

The goal of the regime was the transformation of the state into an efficient and compact corporate state which would control the behaviour of the various classes within the framework of self-sufficiency. The state would be in direct contact with the representatives of the various classes and would intervene in the labour-capital conflict and the peasant-landowner conflict to bring about the harmonisation of their relations. The policies to be pursued by the Greek corporate state included control and appeasement of the labour movement through the manipulation of the leadership of the Labour Unions, giving a minimum wage and social insurance to the workers and imposing collective bargaining and compulsory arbitration. The State would also forbid the right to strike and suppress the freedom of the Trade Unions. The intention was that all workers should be made to join official unions controlled from above. On the other hand, the capitalists were asked to make as many concessions as they could to the workers. Metaxas aimed at the reorganisation of the Labour Unions and the replacement of their leaders by his own agents.[52]

Metaxas professed the hierarchical division of society, in the form of a pyramid. At the base of the pyramid were the peasants. They had to be "pure" and healthy. They were the first and direct creators of economic goods. They should stay in the countryside in order to remain happy and should not be "*slaves of the cities*". The corporate state policy towards the peasants was to create Peasants' Houses composed of the agricultural co-operatives which were created by a 1939 law.[53] The regime also sought to increase production and the variety of crops in order to achieve self-sufficiency, to improve irrigation, to reduce and alleviate peasant indebtedness, to distribute wasteland, to improve railway and road communications.

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[52] On Metaxas' labour policy see Linardatos *The 4th of August Regime*, pp. 111-141, Kofas *Authoritarianism in Greece*, pp. 64-76, and Andrikopoulos *The Roots of Greek Fascism*, pp. 28-32.
[53] Close, *The Character of the Metaxas Dictatorship*, p. 8.

Although Metaxas had, in 1935, condemned the high degree of state intervention in the Greek economy and in society and had demanded a more liberal and market-oriented approach in the government's economic policy, as a dictator he strengthened state authoritarianism and intervention.[54] The state, according to the regime, should not be confined only to the regulation of relations between employers and workers or landowners and peasants, but it should extend its effort to the regulation of the whole national economy, intervening in the distribution of wealth and creating a welfare system. Greek society, according to Metaxas, should not be divided into classes with conflicting interests but into complementary professions with complementary interests. But ultimately Metaxas saw the real division in Greek society in the existence of nationally-minded Greeks and non-nationally minded Greeks, the true cause of social conflicts. In this sense, Metaxas had a highly homogeneous conception of society, static and tidy, with the myth of national harmony as its end-goal.

The state was, according to the regime's principles, an omnipresent organism with the right to intervene in all aspects of the economy and polity, transcending social classes, political parties and interest groups. It was considered a living organism, the expression of the organised society which existed over and above the individual, and not a rational mechanical construction as in the liberal conception. The New State was to be composed of a united people, nationally-minded, guided by the King, the highest archon and a non-party leader of the government. Man as an individual had no rights separate from the "totality" which was embodied in the state.

Totalitarianism was seen by Metaxas, as the best form of government to serve the "national realities".[55] Greece, according to the regime' ideology, lacked the ruling class which it needed, one which would be national and highly educated; "the state class with

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[54] Vergopoulos, *Nationalism and Economic Development*, pp. 81-83. Greek economic thought, in general, during the 1930s was insisting on the philosophy of the free market economy at a time when the theory of state intervention was becoming prevalent abroad.

[55] His personal admiration for totalitarian models of organisation was evident in a statement in his "Notebook of Thoughts" which he wrote on the 2nd of January 1941, a few days before he died: "*Greece thanks to the 4th of August Regime became a anti-communist State, an anti-parliamentary State, a totalitarian State*". He was, however, disappointed with the Italian and the Nazi regimes which in his opinion "*had started on purely ideological grounds and ended up on expansionist and selfish grounds....their anti-communism and totalitarianism were fake*". See *His Personal Diary*, Vol.4, p. 553.

national ideals". The aim was the creation of a "totalitarian state class" above classes and parties which would secure the interventionist character of the state and would correspond better to the needs of 20th century capitalism.[56] Contrary to Metaxas' totalitarian intentions, the ideologue Mantzoufas denied the totalitarian character of the New State and contrasted it with the totalitarian nature of the Italian and German counterparts claiming that,

> *the concept of the Nation precedes that of the State and is not identical to it, since*
>
> *the notions of freedom, property and private initiative do not correspond with those*
>
> *professed in the truly totalitarian states.[57]*

The corporatist philosophy of the 4th of August regime ended up as a mere populist rhetoric aimed at the peasants' and workers' support and the cause of disagreements within the government between the pro-German and the pro-British ministers.[58] The corporatist orientation of the Greek regime, similar to the Portuguese regime, used corporatism in order to control social demands, to reinforce the already existing social order and not to change it radically, as did the National Socialists and National Syndicalists. Instead of an elaborated corporatist theory, the ideas of the regime produced a populist rhetoric focusing predominantly on ideological themes such as the antagonism between the 'people' and the 'establishment', the "poor" versus the "rich", the "nationally minded" vs the "not-nationally minded", the "hard-working" vs the "idle", manichaistic conceptions of society which in practice reinforce divisions rather than alleviate them. Moreover, populist leaders are hostile towards any intermediary institutions and place, their emphasis on the direct, relationship between the leader and the people, tending to stress the leader's charisma.[59] In that sense Metaxas pursued a type of direct communication between himself and the people, by-passing any other institutional mechanisms and even refusing to create a state

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[56] Alivizatos *The Political Institutions in Crisis 1922-1974*, p. 124.

[57] Mantzoufas, "Nation, State, Law", in *The New State*, Athens, May 1939, p. 249.

[58] This is well illustrated by the case of Zavitsianos, the most prominent Greek theoretician of the corporate state, the vice-president of Metaxas' government and the first minister of Finance, known also for his German sympathies. Six months after the imposition of the dictatorship, Zavitsianos tried to contract a substantial loan with Germany for the renewal of military equipment which was rejected by the king, as changing radically Greece's relations of dependence, and was sacked from the government. See Kitsikis, *Greece of the 4th of August and the Great Powers*, pp. 59-61, and Alefantis, *op.cit.*, p. 182.

[59] Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery*, pp. 78-80.

mass party. His constant concern for his popularity forced him to impose another feature of international fascism, i.e., the "Fuhrerprinzip".

The Leadership principle in the Greek case: A "phony" charisma

The application of the "Fuhrerprinzip" to the Greek case was clearly an imitation of the fascist regimes of Germany and Italy. The adoration of the leader, on the Hitler and Mussolini models, was very dear to the dictator. He systematically pursued direct communication with the masses by organising a series of rallies and speeches in all parts of the country and consistently tried to diffuse his ideas through publications, lectures etc. He portrayed himself to the masses as the "Great Governor", the "First peasant", the "First worker", a "Great Hellene", the "Leader" of the youth movement, a benevolent ruler concerned with the hardships of the disadvantaged. His ideologues depicted his will as identified with the will of the nation.[60] An array of propaganda methods was used in order to persuade the populace of the necessity for a leader in the Greek national context. The attempt to mystify the genius and the personality of the leader was based upon an identification between Metaxas and other historic personalities such as Odysseus, Lycurgus, Kolocotronis and Kapodistrias.[61] In addition this was accompanied by regular declarations of admiration coming from people loyal to the regime, in their portrayal of the leader's personality and deeds.

The miracle of the rebirth of the whole nation -the Metaxas miracle-, was

accomplished thanks to the firm will, the deepest patriotic inspiration and the

indomitable vigour of Ioannis Metaxas. His assistants in this major task, which

laid the foundations of the Third Hellenic Civilisation were not just his ministers

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[60] The political philosophers of the regime, Mantzoufas and Koumaros, tried to place Metaxas' authority within a legal framework in their article "The Fundamental Constitutional Principles of the New State" in *The New State*, 1938 which defined the powers of the Prime Minister in his relation with the king and the Ministers.

[61] One such example, the book of Zavitsianos *The Two Great Kephalonites Born in Ithaki: Odysseus and Metaxas* where the writer finds startling similarities between the two in psycho-intellectual characteristics, in Christina Avlami, "The Use of History by the Theoreticians of the 4th of August Regime" in *Istor*, p. 129.

but the whole of the Greek people, the latter having sensed the high mission of the

leader, entrusted to his brave hands the destiny of the country. [62]

Adoration of the leader, in the Greek case, had nothing genuine about it but simply reflected once more the international fashion and the important role of the leaders in the various inter-war authoritarian regimes abroad. But Metaxas' charisma was minimal, and all he could hope for was the support and loyalty of some faithful persons who did not share his ideas but rather saw their political ascendancy through the dictator's power,[63] and of a few would be intellectuals.[64] The attempt to achieve a people loyal to the dictator was complicated by the fact that Metaxas was very suspicious of his collaborators' personal ambitions and struggled throughout the course of the dictatorship to get rid of all those with personal motives and those who were too loyal to the King and thus created problems for the exercise of his authority.[65] The majority of Metaxas' personal followers during his dictatorship had previously been rich or well-off businessmen or newspaper publishers. Metaxas, due to the lack of people associated with his ideas, was partly forced to associate himself with bureaucrats who had long experience in their respective fields, who came from the previous liberal world.[66] He also had a close relationship with a select circle of financial and business magnates, to help with the financial and industrial affairs of the state and to lead the economic and social welfare ministries. Still, his dependence on this circle of wealthy, self-seeking and possibly corrupt backers was not so much out of

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[62] *Four Years of Metaxas' Governing,* Vol. 4, pp. 297-298.

[63] Diakos is said to have been one of his closest associates and the chief go-between the dictator and the financial and business circles. Nikoloudis the minister of the newly founded Ministry of Press and Propaganda declared his belief in the victory of totalitarianism in Greece and pointed to the similarities of the Greek regime with the other fascist regimes of Europe.(Nikoloudis' speech to the Metaxas' youth, on 7 June 1938) He was chiefly responsible for the censorship of all types of publications. Kotzias the newly appointed Minister-Governor of Athens was an example of an adventurist politician who started with the Free Opinion party, switched to the Liberals, in 1934 became the mayor of Athens and in 1935 was an overt supporter of Hitlerism in Greece. He had also attempted to found a youth movement on Hitler's model in Greece before the imposition of the dictatorship. Kotzias had the closest links with the Germans, had visited Germany several times and was known in Berlin to be the "perfect advertiser" of the Nazi ideology in Greece. (Renate Meissner "National Socialist Germany and Greece during the Metaxist Dictatorship" in *Greece 1936-1944,* p 53) Kanellopoulos, the son of a wealthy family and the leader of the youth movement, was also devoted to Metaxas and shared many of the dictator's ideas.

[64] Mantzoufas and Koumaros the ones who provided for the constitutional legality of the 4th of August regime. Aristos Kambanis was the editor of the regime's main periodical *The New State.*

[65] See Linardatos *op. cit.,* pp 42-55 on the different tendencies within the government.

[66] People like Zavitsianos and Hatzykyriakos who had been ministers under the Venizelist governments, and established Bank cadres, such as the Venizelist administrator of the Bank of Greece Tsouderos, were consulted and employed by Metaxas. In the area of education, the dictator asked for the help of the well-known liberal intellectual Manolis Triantafyllides in the drafting of the demotic grammar.

conscious choice but the result of his personal isolation and lack of a strong base of social support and the need to create a powerful circle around him.[67]

The following extract from a report by Waterlow to Halifax in 1938 shows the extent of Metaxas' popularity and the regime's poor social base:

Whatever Metaxas has done for this country, it has not benefited his regime in any way; his creative achievements, which in two and a half years have changed the face of Greece, are never praised. There is for the most part, a whining consent when they are mentioned. But an ungrateful people, which approves passively, given that there is no other option but anarchy, and which is ready to believe the worst of its leaders, is a poor foundation for the New State.[68]

Reading through the personal diary of the dictator, one is able to appreciate the character, the worries and the ambitions of the leader. He seems to have been a person with strong convictions and a firm belief in the authenticity of his ideas; an ambitious leader concerned with the strengthening of his personal power, suspicious of his associates in the government, of the king and of the foreign powers and a very devoted head of his family. He saw himself as the saviour and the natural leader of the Greek nation and he distinguished himself from the amorphous and illiterate masses. But Metaxas was neither a Hitler nor a Venizelos despite his desperate effort to be like them. At the most he was respected by the members of the regime, although it is quite difficult to tell whether his people really admired him for his qualities or simply flattered him in order to promote their own personal ambitions.

Metaxas and Salazar: Similar patterns of behaviour

In their brand of authoritarian ideology and their styles of personalised leaderships, Metaxas and Salazar had much in common. They were both realistic leaders who fully appreciated their countries' peripheral and weak international status, and they both chose the adoption of a cautious ideological discourse, marked by traditional, conservative and

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[67] See Close *The Character of the Metaxas Dictatorship*, p. 7.

[68] Report 10301/726/19/1938 from Waterlow to Halifax, on 19 December 1938 in Andrikopoulos, *op.cit.*, pp. 94-95, [in Greek].

imported fascist elements. Portugal, in the geographical periphery of the European continent chose a policy of isolation and national autarky in the context of the competing European powers. Metaxas, in a different geographical periphery chose neutrality and a policy of accommodation between the various influences of the European powers. Both leaders promoted close relations with Britain and Germany and pointed to their ideological differences with the Italian fascist models. They showed no willingness to create a party-state and were hostile towards any party concept, even towards the pre-existing domestic fascist organisations. They did not go in for the systematic persecution of ethnic minorities and dissociated themselves from any notion of anti-Semitism. Both countries possessed a secure national identity which was not threatened by alien minorities or foreign influences. Both leaders, devout Christians, chose to preserve the traditional elements in their respective cultures: religion, family and national history. They pursued a defensive and cautious nationalism, based on traditionally held cultural values and aimed at discipline and order indicative of their will to avoid radical solutions. They adopted a paternalist style of authority and extensively used an anti-plutocratic and populist rhetoric. Unlike the dominant charismatic personalities of the inter-war period, neither of them had a specifically charismatic appeal, but they promoted the picture of the "*romanticised medieval paternalist figure*" and were marked by a "*fatal teaching mentality*", keen on publishing their speeches, ideas and interviews in endless volumes.[69] Both aspired to a high concentration of personal power in their hands. Their aim was merely to strengthen existing social values and traditional modes of behaviour rather than to originate a radically new social order. They both used the traditional state machinery to centralise economic controls and promote economic growth, and Metaxas adopted many principles from the Salazarist corporate state. While they were both supported by the religious and the monarchist establishments their governments were divided between pro-Allied and pro-German sympathies. They both created their own youth movements, with compulsory membership, EON and the "Mocedade Portuguesa" which both suffered the stigma of the official patronage.

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[69] Hugh Kay, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

Chapter 4 : THE 4TH OF AUGUST REGIME'S EDUCATIONAL POLICY

So far we have examined the ideological factor, the system of ideas held by the 4th of August authoritarian regime. We have seen the 4th of August elite's perception of the inter-war reality, its idiosyncratic interpretation of social, political, economic and cultural issues, in its effort to justify the exceptional and repressive character of its rule and to propose an alternative political philosophy. An important function of authoritarian ideology, however, is to mobilise society around its beliefs, using specific institutional mechanisms as means of political socialisation. Since the 4th of August regime was unable to create a mass movement, the mobilisational aspect of the Metaxas regime was exclusively carried out through the imposition from above of a youth movement, the "bearer of the regime's ideas", the "creator of the Third Greek Civilisation" and potentially the active base of the regime.

The mobilisational aspect of the 4th of August regime clearly reflected the international fascist environment of the inter-war period. Fascist regimes, due to the centrality of the ideological factor to their legitimation, embarked on a systematic campaign of political socialisation of their respective populations, through the employment of the party machinery and the constant use of mass media propaganda. One constant theme of fascist ideologies was the extreme exaltation of the youth's potential, while a significant feature of their political socialisation process was their interest in the fascist education of the youth through the youth movement and at school.

The political socialisation of the youth by the 4th of August regime consisted, on the one hand, in the imposition from above of the youth movement on the German and the Italian models, and on the other, in the manipulation of the educational system, through the implementation of a centralised educational policy. The first of these represented the foremost fascist aspect of the regime, reflecting the influence of international fascism on the Greek case, and should be seen in close association with the other fascist contemporary youth movements. The second came about through the evolution of the dictatorial regime's educational policy and was affected mainly by domestic factors and contemporary ideas on

education in Greece. These ideas were actually implemented in a series of reforms and counter-reforms that had tormented Greek education during the inter-war period. The political socialisation of the youth and the educational policy of the 4th of August regime should be seen in the light of three determining factors: The international fascist context of political socialisation through the use of the youth movement and the manipulation of the educational system; the inter-war domestic Greek context of intellectual pluralism and pedagogical deadlocks; and the previously examined development of Greek education, with its highly centralised and classicist orientation.

The first was decisive in the leader's attempt to establish a mobilisational authoritarian regime; the second was indicative of the perpetuation of the same deadlocks in a clearly authoritarian context; the strengthening of the third may be seen in the context of the limited pluralism preserved by the regime. Taking the above factors together indicates that the political socialisation of the youth by the 4th of August regime was neither solely fascist nor reactionary as has been pointed out by most analysts, but a combination of fascist, conservative and reformist elements which reflected at the same time, the mind of the leader, the limits on his power, the influence of international ideas, and the unstable and transitional character of the inter-war period.

A. Ideological mobilisation of the youth

The functional role of the fascist youth: Contradictions and conflicts in the process of political socialisation

Fascist ideology claimed to be revolutionary and a radical break with the past. In the promotion of their revolutionary ideas the fascist regimes saw young people as their allies, the bearers of their new ideologies. The youth, according to fascist ideology, had a specific social function to fulfil in the realisation of the fascist revolutionary programme. The youth was seen by the fascist regimes as their prospective social base and was perceived as having a key role in the maintenance and the future stabilisation of fascism at large. The young generation, being the most malleable part of society, in terms of its

responsiveness to new ideological themes, was believed to be the most flexible recipient of and the future carrier of the new ideology. The fact that the younger people did not have any ideological connection with past doctrines and practices made them, in the eyes of the fascists, a more fertile social sector for the infiltration of new ideologies.

Fascist regimes systematically pursued a process aimed at the political socialisation of the youth, based on the manipulation of the educational system on the one hand, and the control of the youth organisation, on the other. The fact that students played an active role in the development of fascist movements in countries like Italy, Germany, Spain and Romania, offered a fertile ground on which the dictatorial regimes could expand their already existing movements. The fascists saw the creation of the future fascist elite and of the new totalitarian class as coming from among the ranks of the youth. Both functions, that of the creation of a prospective social base for the regime and that of the recruitment of the new political elite, aimed at the long-term stabilisation and legitimation of fascist political authority.

The process of political socialisation of the youth, however, entailed contradictions inherent in the nature of the fascist regimes. As Gino Germani suggests, there was a contrast that stemmed from the need to foster some degree of active participation of youth, on the one hand, and the necessity of maintaining totalitarian controls, on the other. There was a "*clash between certain methods required to induce youth mobilisation and the need to maintain a strict control on all dangerous deviations* ".[1] This was reflected in a strained relationship between the State-party, as a national entity, and the youth movement, as one of the principal expressions of this entity, which was related to the control of the Party over the youth organisation.

Major conflicts involved the network of political socialisation within capitalist societies which the fascist regimes inherited when they came to power, i.e., school, church, family and liberal youth organisations. The conflicts arose in large measure due to the particular importance attached by fascists to each one of them, in the process of fascist political education. Fascists attached great importance to the establishment of a single

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[1] Gino Germani "Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Regimes: Italy and Spain" in *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* edited by Huntington and Moore, p. 343.

national youth movement, which would be the sole and true carrier of fascist ideology, and so the fascist youth organisation came into conflict with these other institutions. This was resolved in practice by suppressing and ultimately eliminating all the previous youth organisations, in a totalitarian organisation of the society, or by merging some of them into the new dominant fascist one, within the context of authoritarian limited pluralism.

While it was feasible, by simple acts of law and the use of repression, to eliminate the influence of the various liberal organisations, many problems arose in the fascists' efforts to suppress and diminish the importance of such enduring institutions as the family, the school and the church. First, fascism aspired to be totalitarian, and the control of the family, the most private institution of socialisation entailed a totalitarian inspired change of all individual attitudes and values. Second, fascism was anti-liberal and the control of the schools, the basic bearers of the liberal tradition, necessarily relied on a radically altered and consistent new fascist pedagogy. Third, fascism was anti-clerical and the control of the Church, a powerful source of fundamental belief for individuals, ran the risk of alienating large sectors of the population.

Hence there were unavoidable clashes between the youth movement and the other institutions, especially in countries where the latter held an important position in the development of their young people. This was natural given that the youth organisation emerged as a newcomer in these societies and sought to challenge the position of the other institutions which were used to enjoying a relative degree of autonomy in the process of the political socialisation of the youth. With the exception of Nazi Germany, where the Nazi State achieved a near-realisation of its aim of a totalitarian control over the various mechanisms of political socialisation, the fascist regimes had to take into consideration these other institutions in the formation of their ideology and the implementation of governmental policy. Hence, for instance, fascist Italy made concessions to the powerful Catholic Church, Romanian fascism incorporated in its ideology the Orthodox sentiment of the religious Romanians, while Spanish, Portuguese and Austrian authoritarianism formed a peculiar blend of Catholic clerical fascism.

Inter-war authoritarian cases of youth socialisation: Germany, Italy, Spain

The priority of Nazi state policy was to instil the ideas of the regime into the the youth. It was therefore necessary to infuse the Nazi interpretations of nationalism, anti-communism and anti-liberalism into the young people's minds and to activate them in the defence of Nazi ideals. The aspiration of the Nazi regime to be a truly totalitarian regime meant the moulding of the characters of the youth and the instillation of certain behavioural characteristics. Through the shaping of young peoples' characters and minds, the leaders would be able to manipulate their views and control their actions.

The youth in the German case had to be strongly nationalistic, recognising the nation as the highest entity, for which they should be prepared to sacrifice their lives. There was a priority attached to the production of healthy bodies, next to which the intellectual capabilities only came second. There was a fundamental concern with the fitness of both the body and the character. The young character had to develop the strength of will and decision, as well as discipline. The Spartan mode of life was the model of discipline and obedience to be followed. Ideas of racial supremacy -anti-Semitism above all-, obedience to the national community, glorification of the leader, the belief in heroes, suppression of individualism, had to be adopted by every boy and girl.[2] In essence young people had to work as a whole, while the ideas and desires of the separate individuals had to be suppressed, so as to form a united and nationally aggressive youth.

The main aim of National Socialist policy was to have a single Hitler Youth. By the end of 1933 all youth organisations were either banned or incorporated into the Hitler Youth. In 1939 a Hitler Youth Law made youth service compulsory. The NSDStB was the students' association and aimed at controlling the entire student body. The role of the SS was to select from among the youth, the future political elite. Even in the case of the German youth, however, where a high degree of conformity was achieved, there were clashes between the various sectors of political socialisation: between the youth movement and the families given that the youth activity did take the children away from their homes; and deviant behaviour within the Youth itself with the creation of opposition groups in the

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[2] On the new value system of the Nazi educational pedagogy, see Blackburn *Education in the Third Reich,* New York Press, 1985.

ranks of the Hitler Youth. The creation of sub-cultures within the National Socialist ideology demonstrated that even the Nazis were not completely able to control on a totalitarian basis the whole of German society.[3]

Italy is the country which can be taken as the model of fascist political socialisation given the 20-year long duration of the Mussolini dictatorship. The regime aimed at the imposition of total loyalty to the values of the nation, submission to an all-powerful state and to the Duce and the bringing about of a New Roman Empire based on the traditions of the past Roman glory. The youth in Italy had to be physically fit, to possess the martial spirit, to be disciplined and brave. Like in Germany, there was a fascist youth organisation prior to the regime's accession to power, (Avanguardie) which was transformed by the regime into the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB). In 1926, this was to be the official youth institution of the Italian state, supervised by the ministry of Education. Its aim was the physical and moral education of the youth.[4] Physical and military training were given special emphasis as well as ideological indoctrination. The University youth organisation was called the Gruppi Universitari Fascisti (GUF) which became, eventually, the only Italian students' association. In the case of Italy, there was a large network of fascist organisations and institutions, with rather complicated administrative apparatuses, which aimed at the political indoctrination of the youth in general, and specifically at the selection of a political elite.[5]

In Spain several militant fascist groups were created among the youth, providing significant support for the fascist Falange. A fascist-syndicalist group existed within the Universities of Spain before the outbreak of civil war, with the formation of the SEU (Syndicato Espanol Universitario) in 1933, soon after the creation of the Falange. This was to constitute one of the solid bases of the fascist Falange which in 1939 sided with the conservative forces in the imposition of the dictatorship. During the first decade of the dictatorship, the SEU monopolised effectively all student activities through the use of a

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[3] Detlev Peukert, "Youth in the Third Reich" in *Life in the Third Reich* edited by R. Bessel, pp. 25-40.

[4] This was later (in 1937) called Gioventu Italiana del Littorio (GIL) and was placed under the direct control of the party national secretary

[5] On the issue of the Italian fascist youth see Minio-Paluello *Education in Fascist Italy*, pp. 132-152, Ostenc Michel *L'Education en Italie pendant le Fascisme* pp. 233-270, and Gino Germani *op.cit.* pp. 344-359.

University Militia. The Falange achieved control over the political education of the youth, the SEU and the mass of students and tried to impose strict conformity to the principles of the Falange. Given that the Franco government was a coalition of right wing forces, the domination over the means of political socialisation was a joint fascist, conservative right-wing and Catholic venture. Therefore the aim was to instil a strong National-Catholic-Syndicalist spirit in the youth.[6] A series of laws passed by the Franco regime insisted on compulsory religious instruction at all levels of education, the creation of a Youth Front participation in which was compulsory for all pupils in primary and secondary education, in the spirit of the Falangist doctrine.[7]

The fascist/mobilisational aspect of the 4th of August regime: The Youth Movement

Given the limits on his personal power as dictator and a lack of a social base for his regime, Metaxas turned to the example set by the contemporary fascist regimes, deciding that the creation of a youth movement on the fascist model was the only way for him to acquire the social base he lacked. The example of how other fascist regimes went about the mobilisation of their youth had a great effect upon the direction which Metaxas took, in that he opted for the creation from above of a youth movement, as a principal means of mobilising the Greek youth. The indoctrination of the youth through the youth movement was the main expression of the fascist influence on Greece, but the way in which the movement operated in practice demonstrated that this type of imported organisation was inappropriate to the Greek case, and the youth movement disintegrated after the dictator's death. It proved impossible to achieve youth mobilisation from above without the slightest inclination from below.

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[6] See Germani for similarities between Italian and Spanish fascist education. Although Germani accepts Linz's definition of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, he is quite lenient in describing Italian fascism as an example of totalitarian political socialisation, while he believes that the Spanish regime had achieved a fascist authoritarian political socialisation. Salvador Giner in his article "Power, Freedom and Social Change in the Spanish University, 1939-75" in Preston's *Spain in Crisis*, pp. 183-211, also calls the period 1939-1954 the "fascist period" in higher education in that the Falangists controlled the University mechanisms.

[7] Demichel, *Les Dictatures Europeenes*, p. 255.

Regime rhetoric: A healthy and disciplined youth

Much of the regime's rhetoric on the youth issue was clearly imported from abroad, from the German and the Italian examples. The primary function of Greek youth, according to Metaxas' fascist rhetoric, was to bring about an intellectual form of Greek nationalism, the "Third Greek Civilisation". Young people had to have faith in their Greek identity, their Greek traditions and ideals and to consider Greece as their "Great Mother". A creative and energetic life was expected of the youth. It was even claimed that *"a man, when he is a mere spectator of life, is a useless creature in the present society, an unnecessary burden "*, reminiscent of the Nazi approach but fortunately only adopted in rhetoric. Influenced by the fascist notions of fitness and health, the leader tried to promote the exaltation of the lively youth. The exaltation of youth, while a prominent feature of the fascist ideology, was an integral part of a wider inter-war perception of the role of the youth. Youth organisations, whether of a liberal, fascist or communist nature, flourished during the inter-war period in most European countries. Similarly, the 1930s intellectual climate in Greece included emphasis on the promotion of an active and healthy youth, contrary to the pessimistic perception of the intellectuals of the 1920s.[8] Metaxas professed a militaristic and very activist attitude towards life, clearly imported from the Italians and Germans, to accompany his "defensive" type of nationalism. Young people had to be healthy, strong and athletic and to possess a distinctive cultural education. The dictator was much more interested in developing an idealistic youth, which would create the vague "Third Greek Civilisation", with a theoretical knowledge than one that could sustain itself materially and contribute to the nation's well being.[9] He stated that,

our basic task is to cultivate the general intellectual level of our youth; to transfer to

the young people all this ammunition which will make them distinguished people

who will not live like animals in their humble and materialist life, but who will feel

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[8] In the 1930s, a new group of intellectuals attempted to adopt a more robust perception of Greek reality in the influential "Generation of the 1930s" as they are commonly known. This comprised a group of literary people with ambitions about the future and their intention to break with the past status quo.Ironically, Metaxas, the liberal poet Elytis and the communist poet Ritsos all from a different perspective, ended up by glorifying the same virtues of youth, health and joy. Vitti, *op.cit.*, p. 198.

[9] *Four Years of Metaxas' Governing*, Vol. 2, p. 59.

the necessity of a higher, spiritual life given that the soul is in constant need of its

own nutrition.[10]

Metaxas' paternalistic and highly moralistic teaching concentrated on behavioural characteristics such as discipline, obedience, struggle, the willingness to fight, decisiveness, which, he thought, would better enable the Greek youth to defend the country's traditions and ideals. As such, the youth had to work together as a whole and not as separate individuals. They had to have courage, audacity, and conviction in order to be able to prosper, since only *"through struggle, which is the greatest pleasure in life, can man realise the true meaning of life"*. The youth could discover the new ideals by referring to traditional national values. The fundamental ideals which the youth had to fight for, were "the King, the Country, the orthodox religion, the family and the 4th of August regime". The most sacred ideal was devotion to the principles of the New State.[11] In this way, Metaxas tried to reconcile the traditionally influential beliefs of the Greek people under the centralised supervisory authority of the 4th of August state. By retaining and strengthening the already dominant classicist orientation of Greek education, he presented the Greek youth with a selective classical interpretation of the national past.

EON: The Greek application of fascist mobilisation

As has been stated in the previous chapter, inter-war Greece lacked an influential fascist movement or a powerful fascist student movement. With the exception of the insignificant "National Pan-Student Movement" at the University of Athens, fascist ideas made no impact among the Greek youth. Due to the lack of a State-party and a social base which could support the 4th of August regime, the youth organisation was seen by Metaxas as the only party of his regime and the only way to strengthen his personal authority and challenge the power of the King. Metaxas aimed to put his thoughts regarding the youth movement into practice with the formation of "Ethnikos Organismos Neolaias" (EON), (the National Organisation of Youth), which he hoped would become

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[10] "The Art within the Context of EON", periodical *The Youth.*, p. 3 [in Greek].
[11] "The Leader and the Youth" in *Four Years of Metaxas' Governing*, Vol.2,
p. 58.

the "party" of the regime. While the style and organisation of the youth movement were clearly imported from the Italian and German models of youth organisation, the leadership struggled to present EON as a uniquely Greek organisation which had nothing to do with the Italian youth of Mussolini, a Greek system which had its roots in ancient Athens, Sparta and Macedon.[12] Emergency Law No 334, (November 1936) brought EON into existence. Article 3 declared:

> *The aims of EON are the profitable exploitation of leisure time from work or from school in order that the young people may promote their physical and intellectual training; the development of national morale and faith in religion; the creation of a spirit of cooperation and solidarity among them; and a prompt professional orientation relevant to each one's natural capabilities* [in Greek].

Further articles of the law referred to the organisation's rules, regulations, operations and finances. The movement was organised militarily into battalions, companies, platoons and squads, and a whole network of services. The members were divided into rank-holders: phalangites and pioneers. Those who were affiliated to Greek educational institutions or to the military were permitted to join EON. Applicants had to be between 14 and 25, Greek Christians, *"faithful to the principles of the 4th of August regime "*. Membership was voluntary in theory, but after 1938 it became practically compulsory. A Central Committee composed of the Ministers of Education, Railways, Public Assistance and the Minister-Governor of Athens was set up to draft laws and regulations for the organisation and to supervise its operations and finances.

The first EON sector was created in Salonica and was composed of the members of the previous fascist National Union (EEE). In Athens EON was initially formed by members of the anti-communist National Pan-Student Movement. In January 1938, EON had only 15,000 voluntary members in all the country.[13] It was during this year that Metaxas realised the failure of his youth project and decided that he had to fight personally

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[12] Nicos Tsailakopoulos, *The National Organisation of the Youth is a Greek and not a Foreign Institution*, edited by EON, 1940.

[13] The first organised phallanx was created in Patras by Diakos, its swearing in took place on 31/12/1937, a year and a half after the emergency law on the formation of the EON. See Linardatos *The 4th of August Regime*, pp. 153-154.

for its future success. He met the resistance of the King and the minister of education, among others, as to the organisation's tactics and methods of recruitment. The main reaction came from prince Paul, the General Leader of the scouts, who objected to the submission of the liberal scouts movement to EON. Furthermore, the King suspected that Metaxas aimed at controlling the youth movement in his effort to strengthen his personal power.

Towards the end of 1938, it was impossible to escape membership in the organisation. It was made compulsory, for all young people who qualified, to join. The movement extended gradually to include all the cities of Greece. Emergency Law 1798/1939 "*On the National and Moral Education of the Youth* " viewed the school and University educational mechanisms in close association with EON, under the supervision of the State. Any other organisation with the same purpose officially ceased to exist, including the previous minor fascist movements. In addition the Scouts' movement, one of the most important institutions under the King's jurisdiction, which was organised on the British model, was incorporated into EON.[14] It was during this period that Metaxas started taking a more direct personal interest in EON, through appearances and speeches. His speeches after 1938 had a more commanding force and he directed a markedly populist rhetoric towards the youth. Although Metaxas had achieved the consent of the king concerning his youth project, he was still very careful to remind the people that the king was the head of the state. By 1940, EON numbered just over a million members. On 30th March 1940 there were 1,030,314 of whom some 600,000 were in primary and secondary education.[15]

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[14] December 11, 1938, according to Metaxas, was the "day of the miracle" when the palace gave its consent and an Italian style festivity took place in an Athens park, in the presence of the prince and the princesses. Prince Paul agreed to become the "General Leader" of the youth movement, Princess Frederica the "Honorary Commander-General" of the EON's girls' division and Princess Irene the "Honorary Inspector-General". Metaxas had thus achieved the consent of the king for the project. See *His Personal diary*, Vol. 4, pp. 303-304.

[15] Linardatos, *op.cit.*, p. 169.

Political indoctrination within EON: A fusion of ideas

Metaxas and the "intellectuals of the regime" embarked on a systematic socialisation process through speeches, "hours of indoctrination" (Wednesday afternoons), the magazine "Youth", leaflets and lectures on a variety of issues. The topics included lectures on nationalism, capitalism, parliamentarism, communism, state intervention, multi-party systems, the role of the family (the meaning of marriage, the importance of the mother, the way parents should bring up their children), religion, school, the arts and sciences. There was an effort to project a metaphysical adoration of the leader, who was presented as a divine personality with supernatural qualities. The instructors of the youth were usually gymnastics' teachers and military officers. A *Preliminary Draft for the Organisation of the Youth* outlined EON's methods of organisation and the duties of its members. Courses for boys included military drill, air raid defence, political enlightenment, propaganda, hygiene, athletics, topographical orientation, map making, signalling and reading. The girls' activities were limited to nursing, cooking and housekeeping.[16]

The regime's position towards the role of the woman in society was very characteristic of its traditionalist character and, in agreement with the other fascist and conservative authoritarian regimes of the inter-war period, it considered the woman to be *"the ornament of the house". "The aim of the woman is to create and to look after the family all the time "*,[17] and only if additional money was needed by the family, was women's work legitimised. In order to protect the girls from their association with boys, the regime abolished the mixed schools, *"since mixed schools were part of the moral decadence of the Greek family, the corruption of many school-girls and the loosening of the male character of the school-boys"*. Women intellectuals were considered by the regime as a product of western feminism while the ethics of Greek society taught that the woman is only a basic ingredient for the continuation of the Greek race.[18]

The position of the National Youth was in principle complementary to that of the Church, the school and the family, and at the same time self-sufficient in that it consisted

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[16] kofas, *Authoritarianism in Greece*, p. 95.
[17] "The Leader and the Youth", *op.cit.*, p. 129.
[18] Mahaira, *op.cit.*, pp. 72-76.

of a united whole with a single national aim. The National youth was composed of

Christians and professed the practice of the Greek Orthodox religion. It was both a

national and a religious organisation. EON and the school were claimed to be mutually

supportive but they also retained their distinctive characters in that,

> *the school does the intellectual training, EON does the moral and physical*
>
> *training; the school is compulsory, EON voluntary; in school there are social*
>
> *inequalities, in EON there is social uniformity".*[19]

The Greek family should entrust its youth to the movement, for parents should dedicate

their children to the nation and agree with their education by EON.

> *The family is the factory where human love and morality between people are*
>
> *constructed. It is the basis for the formation of a healthy society. There is a special*
>
> *relationship between the Greek family and the Greek nation. Family ties are*
>
> *subordinated to the citizen's duty to the state.* [20]

Overall, "*the family creates the human being .....the school carries out their education...*

the Church does the religious training.....EON teaches how to struggle and fight". The

state, the church, the family and the school together should participate in the upbringing of

the children.[21]

Political practice of EON: Patronage and corruption

The rapid growth of the youth movement was due to official coercion and

patronage. By identifying EON with the interests of the nation, the regime tried to justify,

at a moral level, its intimidating practices in order to recruit those who did not want to

collaborate with EON. Registration in EON became compulsory for school children and

those who refused to join were faced with severe sanctions, like expulsion from school or

difficulty in finding work. On the other hand, free uniforms and free admission to the

cinema, official parades and recreational activities, as defined by the law, were used to

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[19] "The Leader and the Youth", *op.cit.*, p. 108, [in Greek].

[20] "On Family" in *The Youth*, October 1939, p. 11, [in Greek].

[21] "The Leader and the Youth", *op.cit.*, pp. 151-152.

woo the youth.[22] They used blackmailing tactics, promises for jobs in public positions and other financial compensations for those who were reluctant to join. For the cadres there were more solid attractions in the form of pay, allowances, the use of cars and access to official patronage. Emphasis on appearances, costumes, parades, fascist greetings, songs, hymns and festivities, very much inspired by the Italian and German examples, accompanied the organisation of the movement. Members used to wear blue uniforms, they saluted the leader with the Roman salute and bore the emblem of the organisation, the double axe.

Contrary to Metaxas' declared aim of overcoming the mentality of petty-party behaviour, which had condemned the country to social divisions, he created a new party which operated in the same manner, with clientelistic networks and abuses of power. Moreover, there was a close collaboration between the military police, the armed forces and EON and the latter was heavily used as a sort of a youth police. A whole network of informers connected with the military police observed the actions of the members. Maniadakis, who declared that he admired the aims of the youth organisation and considered it the best creation of the 4th of August regime, was personally involved in the recruitment of its members.

Despite the authoritarian character of the youth movement and its imitation of the Nazi and fascist models, the regime did not try to create a bellicose youth, on the model of the Italians or the Germans, but placed a greater emphasis on the youth's incorporation into the movement through games, athletics, cinema, holidays, excursions, which reflected the milder character of the Greek youth organisation compared to its foreign counterparts. It concentrated mainly on the youth's leisure time and reproduced to a large extent the conservative ideology of the inter-war period by cultivating the concepts of nationalism, anti-communism, love of the King, religion and family.[23]

The Greek youth movement was a source of friction between various social sectors who competed in the political education of the youth. The very issue of the status of the

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[22] "Emergency Law 1510", *The Official Newspaper*, 8 December 1938.

[23] Similarly the *Mocedade Portuguesa* imposed a compulsory participation for those between 7 and 14, concentrated mostly on leisure activities, religious instruction and the adoration of the leader Salazar, and lacked the aggressive character of the Italian, German or even the Spanish youth movements.

youth organisation in Greek society brought a disagreement between the King and Metaxas. Furthermore, the relationship between EON and the schools was seen differently by Metaxas and the Minister of Education, Georgakopoulos, which resulted in the latter's dismissal and the take-over of the Ministry by Metaxas himself in 1938.[24] The influence of the movement on the children was of concern to their families. In other words the imposition from above of a youth movement which did not originate with the grass-roots was bound to create reactions, in a country were the family and the church controlled to a large degree the social upbringing of its youth. As the next extract shows, the existence of the youth movement created a lot of anxiety in many Greek social circles:

EON is developing at such a pace that it threatens the family, the immovable

foundation of Greek life....oral instructions were given to teachers to threaten the

pupils with expulsion if they did not agree "willingly" to register with the

movement.......parents in general tremble at the effects of the organisation on the

youth's morale and health......The attempted imposition of the youth movement on

the school population is essentially an attempt to substitute the negative social base

of the regime, by a positive sentimental base. But this long-term policy includes an

offensive against family life, one of the most sacred things in Greek culture. [25]

Overall, the National Youth Organisation was a costly and at times a counter-productive organisation which could not be imposed on the Greek mentality. Huge sums of money were spent on uniforms, parades, office rentals, furnishings and salaries for the organisation's officers, financed by the public treasury.[26] Although the formation of a youth movement was achieved and its membership expanded during the duration of the 4th of August regime, it never constituted the army which would defend the country during a

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[24] The immediate cause of the disagreement between Georgakopoulos and Metaxas lied in the election of the Archbishop of Athens. Georgakopoulos and the Palace supported Damaskenos for the post, Metaxas supported Chrysanthus. In the end Metaxas appointed his preferred candidate while he also dismissed Georgakopoulos from the ministry. The disagreement between the two however was more fundamental given that Georgakopoulos, a man who was loyal to the palace had more radical disagreements with Metaxas on the way educational policy was conducted and its relation to the youth movement.

[25] R 10301/726/19/1938, from Waterlow to Halifax, 19 December 1938, in Andrikopoulos, *op.cit.*, p. 94, [in Greek].

[26] Linardatos talks extensively about the extravagant ceremonies organised for the purposes of demonstration, the incredible amounts of money spent on all sorts of meaningless activities, which at times ended in a complete disarray, and the organisation's numerous financial and sexual scandals. See *op.cit.*, pp. 183-203.

war, as intended by its creator. On the contrary, the outbreak of war exposed its incompetence and inefficiency and brought the collapse of the organisation. Most of its members joined the subsequent resistance movements which were mostly organised by the leftist forces.

B. The manipulation of the educational system

During his premiership, Metaxas declared that he attached a primary importance to education and considered the Ministry of Education to be a very crucial government post. Due to the shortness of its tenure of power, the regime had no long-term affect on Greek pedagogy, and its ideas regarding education did not have time to materialise and have a lasting effect. Neither did the regime offer any alternative to the existing educational framework, the classicist orientation and the centralisation of governmental authority being retained. There were merely some minor fascistoid innovations and some personal notions of the leader himself. The regime imposed a series of emergency laws, concerning completions and minor or major alterations to the already existing legal educational framework. The educational philosophy of Metaxas should be seen as a mixture of fascist pedagogy within the already existing domestic context of reforms and counter-reforms of the Greek educational system.

Fascist educational pedagogy: Italy and Germany

One of the contradictions in fascist regimes was that although they stressed the role of the youth in connection with the perpetuation of their authority, they were unable to create a new pedagogical/educational framework, on which to base their new educational policies. This was basically due to the fact that fascism emphasised the activist part of its ideology at the expense of theoretical frameworks, which explained why they so consistently favoured the promotion of active and energetic youth organisations and regarded suspiciously any education received at school or University. The latter were mostly seen as sources of subversion, given that they promoted the critical appreciation of scientific or social issues. Moreover, authoritarian regimes of a fascist or other dictatorial

nature, showed a marked distrust towards intellectuals, and any form of liberal or autonomous thinking. The school and University are the vehicles of the liberal intellectual traditions in Western societies, so inimical to any form of autocracy and oppression as professed by the dictatorships.

Again the Italian case was the best example of a model fascist educational system, characterised by the existence of a certain pedagogical framework, a series of educational policies and a succession of debates, discussions and disputes on the role of education within fascist society during the twenty years of fascist rule. The pedagogy adopted by the Italians during the Mussolini regime was initially based on the fascist philosophy of Gentile, the first minister of Education. Gentile, the main philosopher of fascism, proposed a strongly nationalistic training, with a more efficient control of the state over education. He insisted on the promotion of classical education Latin and Greek thinking-, literature, poetry, art, music, religion and history in school curicula- which would be based on a true understanding, rather than the memorising of the material. The real revolution in education, according to Gentile, was to take place in the relationship between and collaboration of teachers and students; *"the work of the teacher consists in bringing his pupils into his own sphere of thought and making them share in his enlightened life"* .[27]

Gentile's philosophical and intellectual approach towards life demanded the advance of an all-embracing culture in the curiculum. He gave prominence to Latin, philosophy and literary history. He introduced artistic education on a much larger scale. He supported the teaching of religion only as a first step, to be followed by other philosophical conceptions and studies. The first fascist innovations brought in by Gentile involved the introduction of a new hierarchical system following the sequence: Minister-Supervisors-Headmasters-Teachers; the revision of the curicula of elementary, post-elementary and secondary education; a freer hand to higher education; the introduction of special examinations at the various stages of education; a rationalisation of teaching appointments,

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[27] Minio-Paluello *op.cit.*, p. 71.

involving a reduction in the number of teaching and lecturing posts, so as to achieve greater efficiency.[28]

The real fascistisation of education however, was not advanced during the period of Gentile, given that his philosophical and idealist stance towards schooling and the educational system in general, was in sharp disagreement with the activism of the fascists. Fascist education consisted, according to the anti-intellectualists, in the militarisation of education, the adoration of the "Duce" and an extreme form of nationalism. Fascist education meant the passionate love of the student for his country, for which he should be ready to sacrifice his existence. The Italians saw the development of education within the wider context of the national cultural development. This required that all of those involved in the process of political socialisation, who had a crucial role in the nation's cultural development, should be enthused with fascist ideals. According to fervent fascists the teachers had to be fascists themselves and not even apolitical or agnostic, but *"the missionaries of the fascist faith"* (a "totalitarian" view on education).[29]

It was during the 1930s that the regime embarked upon a more totalitarian control of education, under the minister De Vecchi. He introduced military education in schools and ended the relative autonomy of the higher institutions. He believed in the complete control of the State over education. The next minister of education, Bottai tried to alter many of Gentile's policies and was very critical of the latter's reforms. He aimed to bring the schools within the party and syndicalist organisation. Bottai tried to fascistise Italian education by placing a "new humanism" in the school charter; schools, GIL and GUF were to be united as one instrument of fascist education; education should consist of studies of a more practical and scientific nature and emphasis should be laid on courses of physical education, manual work and military preparation, rather than the already existing classical education, under the guidance of the state.

During the 20 years of fascist rule in Italy the educational system was stressed by continuous alterations and reforms. There was never a consistent philosophy on which to

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[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 64-122.
[29] Ostenc, *op.cit.*, p. 168.

base the new educational scheme; instead, the old system was re-shaped. The administrative machinery preserved many functions almost intact although it became more centralised. New types of schools were created while older ones were abolished. What was totally new about Italian fascist education was the creation a number of youth organisations and their relation with the school mechanisms.

In Germany, the Nazis viewed education only as a means of accelerating progress towards the regime's political goals. The purpose of education was to glorify the racial supremacy of the German nation. The Nazis introduced into the school curiculum a number of new courses such as family sociology, race theory and practice, genetics, population policy, and colonial politics among others.[30] Physical education was placed at the centre of the schools' programmes because of its value in building character and discipline, as well as in helping in the military preparation for national aggrandisement. The content of Nazi school-books glorified the leader, emphasized the old romantic Germanic tradition and made extensive use of heroic historical personalities.

Domestic inter-war Greek education: An unstable process

As has been pointed out, the inter-war period was a period of ideological transition, in a country that had to come to terms with its new size and its enlarged population. The domestic intellectual climate in the inter-war period entailed a plurality of intellectual ideas in that a whole range of intellectuals from the traditionalists and conservatives, to the liberals and socialists involved themselves in the development a new understanding of the current Greek situation and the search for the meaning of Greekness. Similarly in educational matters the period 1922-1928 saw 34 governments and 25 ministers of education pursuing often contradictory policies. It was a period of reforms and counter-reforms and half-baked attempts to overhaul the educational system. Reaction against the imposition of the demotic language and against change away from the classicist orientation, demands which had occupied the Greek pedagogues for the previous four decades, continued to be high on the agenda. In 1925, the liberal pedagogue Delmouzos was

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[30] Friedrich and Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 156.

criticised for his alleged attempts to undermine religion, language, morality and national consciousness. As he was the director of the Marasleio Teacher's College, the issue came to be known as the "Marasleiaka". The Marasleiaka was the last battle in which the liberal and socialist intellectuals fought on the same side. The year 1927 marked an end to the unity of the reformist intellectuals, the official split of the reformist Educational Group "Omilos", between the liberal intellectuals and the socialist intellectuals, who followed thereafter competing and hostile paths.[31] While the issue of the demotic language had been a common demand of reformist intellectuals, and had not been a party political issue, following the split of the reformist intellectuals, it was party-politicised and the demotic language came to be identified as a radical demand, professed by the socialists.

The inter-war period period saw the first conscious attempt to reform education and break with the dominant previous educational trends. The 1929 reform, produced by the liberal government of Venizelos, was the first comprehensive and consistent educational scheme, which tried to create a school based on the principles of liberal democracy, in accordance with the aims of national integration and capitalist development. It involved changes in primary and secondary education as well as in the higher institutions (Law 5343/1932).[32] The Venizelist liberal reform lasted until the electoral defeat of the Venizelist party by the conservative Right. An emphasis on classicism was once again established by the anti-Venizelist government, as a way of suspending the reforms of the Venizelist period. The period 1932-1936 saw alterations to the previous policies of education regarding the language issue and the school curiculum. [33]

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[31] This is best illustrated by the case of the liberal Delmouzos and the communist Glynos in Frangoudaki's *Liberal Reform and Liberal Intellectuals*. Delmouzos was considered to have expressed the ideological deadlocks of the liberal intellectuals who directed their attacks against communist thought and practice, and refused to perceive Greek society in terms of class divisions, choosing to adopt the "utopian road" to the Supra-class State. For Frangoudaki, the neutrality of the Greek liberal intellectuals, their fight against communism, and plutocracy and their passivity in the face of the excesses of the anti-communist regimes, paved the way for the 4th of August regime's ideas.

[32] The 1928-1932 reforms included among others: abolition of hellenikon, division into six years of primary and six years of secondary education, creation of practical and agricultural gymnasia, compulsory teaching of the demotic language in the demotiko, six years of compulsory education, introduction of mixed schools in primary education, creation of lower vocational schools after the primary education, new curicula for secondary education, introduction of voluntary courses, new provisions for the education of the teaching staff, the reorganisation of higher institutions.

[33] A new programme for the gymnasium in 1935, a return to the old classicist orientation and abolition of various courses introduced by the previous reform.

Education under the 4th of August regime

Against the backdrop of the unstable development of Greek education in the inter-war years and the context of influential fascist ideas on education, the educational policy of the 4th of August regime proved to be full of contradictions. It was an amalgam of fascist tendencies, in mimicry of the fascist models; reactionary tendencies, with respect the previous liberal Venizelist reform; conservative tendencies, in the perpetuation of a classicist content. It involved the imposition of a more centralised authority, so as to be able to deal with every possible aspect of education, and included some reformist tendencies reflecting the personal views of the dictator.[34]

The mind of the leader: A fusion of authoritarian, traditional and reformist ideas

Unlike the plural intellectual context of inter-war Greece and unlike fascist Italy, the 4th of August regime had barely any intellectuals of its own, especially in the field of education. The ideas on Greek education had been expressed mostly by the leader himself, who in his speeches used to present some personal thoughts on how education should be conducted. It would be a futile exercise to try to analyse the consistency in his thought, given that Metaxas was not a pedagogue. He just had some strong feelings about the function and purposes of education. His ideas and intentions reflected slightly the influence of the foreign fascist school of thought, and of the intellectual climate of the 1930s, but mostly his personal authoritarian predilections and his will to control the educational mechanisms. On the day that he took over the ministry of education he stated to the teachers:

> *From all the teachers, I expect full support. I would like to reveal to you a certain*
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> *aspect of my character which, due to my age I cannot change any more. I can*
>
> *discuss with anybody, in the process of making a decision and I allow discussion*

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[34] We can divide chronologically the 4th of August regime's educational policy into two periods: The first under the minister Georgakopoulos until November 1938; this included emergency laws with minor alterations and completions of the previous anti-Venizelist educational laws. The second period under the ministry of Metaxas included the attempt to impose more radical innovations in education and coincided with the enforcement of the youth movement on social life.

and objection freely. But once I have taken a decision, most of the time irrespective

of your opinions, this decision is definite and unchangeable and nothing in the

world can make me withdraw. It goes without saying that, during the

implementation of my policies, nobody in the world can stop me......Therefore

knowing this aspect of my character I ask you to comply with it, which I am sure

you will do.......This is my will which coincides with the interests of the

education of the youth and of the State in general. [35]

Metaxas saw the role of the teachers in the context of his own militaristic, hierarchical and authoritarian mentality and it is quite interesting to note the wide differences with Gentile's approach on the subject.

The teacher has to dominate, direct and impose his opinion on pupils. Primary

importance should be attached to national education; by learning of the past glories

of the Greek nation, the children will be able to imitate their ancestors. Religious

feeling has to be developed vis-a-vis the national......Knowledge has to be used for

creative and productive work. The main task of the teacher is to generate respect,

discipline and religious feeling in the children, to create true Greeks out of them and

to mould their character so that they become energetic and creative.[36]

Metaxas often attacked in his speeches the idea of the social advancement of the Greeks through their studies at the University. He professed a more altruistic conception of higher education, according to which students should study for the promotion of science as such, and not for their personal materialistic ambitions.

Science seeks the truth through the means of dialectics, reason, proof, experience,

observation and experiment. The University is the temple of science and not a

professional school. Studies are to be done for the sake of science and not for the

sake of a degree for the purpose of gaining money and social ascendancy. [37]

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[35] From a statement to the teachers when Metaxas took over the Ministry of Education on 29 November 1938, *Metaxas' diary*, Vol. 4, pp. 303-304, and reproduced in Demaras A., *op.cit.*, pp. 189-190, [in Greek].

[36] Speech to the teachers on 28 October 1938, *Four Years of Metaxas' Governing*, [in Greek].

[37] Speech on 20 November 1937, at the University of Athens, in *Metaxas' Speeches*, Vol. 1, p. 284, [in Greek].

He was however always concerned with the damage that scientific knowledge could do to the regime. He was afraid that too much knowledge could result in *"arrogance and presumption "* in the students, with negative repercussions for the survival of the 4th of August regime's principles. He always attributed, as he put it, *"greater importance to the development of human character than the development of scientific knowledge "*. This reveals a real contradiction within the ideology of the regime, in that although it wanted to promote a new civilisation based on intellectual achievements, it saw the need for limits on such knowledge, which should be imposed by the regime itself.

Despite his authoritarian predilections and his conservative stance, paradoxically, on the language issue Metaxas became an ardent supporter of the demotiki, the foremost reformist aspect of his educational policy, an element of his "idiosyncratic idealism".[38] A few days after he became minister of education he set up a committee composed of demoticists, most of them discredited by the anti-Venizelist circles, to draft the new grammar of the demotiki. He assigned to the well known liberal pedagogue Triantafyllides (then a Professor at the University of Salonica, and one of the instigators of the 1917 Venizelist educational reform) the supervision of the new grammar, the first one ever written in Greece. He personally wrote the introduction, which was never published. He introduced the parallel teaching of demotic and katharevousa in schools, in both oral and written work. In this sense Metaxas, who in his speeches and his diary used a mixture of both idioms, became the first demoticist minister of Education. His personal views on the language issue are shown by the following passage:

> *I have never thought of imposing any constraints on the language. It would not be possible for our national Government to be against the language in which our greatest poet Solomos wrote our national anthem. The demotic will continue to be taught in the primary school and in the last two forms it will be taught together with katharevousa, since the latter is a reality which the modern Greek man will meet in his life, in the courts, in official documents, in sciences and even in the Press......I believe that the contribution of our literary people will be conducive to*

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[38] Close, *The Character of the Metaxas Dictatorship*, p. 12.

the wider spread of the demotic......The misfortune has been that the upper class

has so far tried to confound demoticism -a clearly national language- with

communism.[39]

The leader's persistence with demotiki may be attributed either to his will to win

over some liberal support, or to his personal antipathy towards the established and out-

dated ideas of the Philosophical Faculty.[40] Be that as it may, Metaxas' flexibility towards

the language issue showed that he did not hesitate to consult and employ liberal

intellectuals concerning the direction of specific educational matters or even more general

cultural matters as is shown by the cultural content of the regime's periodical *The New

State.*

The organisation of education: Authoritarian centralism

There are two important aspects to fascist educational philosophy. The first relates

to the creation of a youth movement, whose stages follow closely those of the educational

system. Youth movements and schools were intended to be connected in both fascist and

semi-fascist regimes, and the control of the former over the latter was deemed necessary.

As such, the foremost fascist and radically new aspect of Metaxas' educational policy was

the compulsory organisation of the school children into the youth movement, as has

already been discussed earlier in the chapter. The second fascist feature relates to the

omnipresence of the State in all national affairs, including state interference in all aspects of

educational policy. Centralisation of the educational system was thus increased by fascists

in their effort to control the administrative bodies, the content of the syllabus and the

behaviour of both teachers and professors, pupils and students. Education became a means

by which the state sought to create a youth inculcated with the principles of the 4th of

August regime.

While some would argue that the extreme centralisation of authority was a mere

expression of the fascist influence on the Greek regime, the whole history of Greek

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[39] *His Personal Diary*, Vol.4, p. 281, [in Greek].

[40] See the article "How the Demotic Won the Dictatorship" in the newspaper *To Vima*, 29/12/91.

education is one of state manipulations of the educational system. The centralising

tendency in educational matters had been a perennial feature in educational policy since

Greek independence. It was not only a characteristic of fascist influenced regimes.

Moreover, centralisation of power is used by all dictatorial regimes in their effort to prevent

deviations in the intellectual world. Metaxas increased the degree of state control over

educational matters at the level of higher, secondary and primary education. The main

instances of his intervention in education were: the suspension of the autonomy of the

institutions of higher education; control over the publishing of school-books; the tightening

of control over the central administration.

At the level of higher education, centralisation manifested itself in the suppression

of the institutional autonomy of the Universities and the imposition of a greater degree of

intervention in university matters by the minister.[41] The legal framework for the

centralisation of power in the hands of the minister was enacted by emergency law

1430/1938 (October 22, 1938), which abolished the previous Venizelist law 5343/1932

altogether.[42] The regime carried out, within its legal framework, the dismissal of

professors,[43] the abrupt abolition of courses and the introduction of new ones, the

installation of regime people in university places, the creation of new Chairs on the basis of

a new electoral system for professors.[44]

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[41] The conflict between free thinking and state control manifested itself clearly in the context of the University. The regime met with resistance from a poorly organised student movement, which in a number of instances expressed its disagreement openly with demonstrations. An example of such an occasion was the centenary of the University in April 1937 when the students demonstrated against the fascist dictatorship. Similar incidents happened in Salonica in November of the same year. See Lazos, *Greek Student Movement*, pp. 257-262.

[42] Emergency Law 970/1937 of 26 November 1937, was the first attempt to revise and complement law 5343 of 1932, without however any radical alteration. According to the 1938 law the minister could decide upon the occupants of the University Chairs without reference to the opinion of the Faculties (article 50, paragraph 2), whereas previously these could be created only on the accord of the Senate and the appropriate Faculty. The minister could appoint assistant professors or readers upon the introduction of new courses, if he judged that there was a specific scientific reason that required the teaching of such courses. (article 50, paragraph 6) He could also appoint Full, extraordinary, or assistant professors among candidates who received the 1/3 of the professors' votes, instead of the 2/3 previously stated by law 5343/1932 (article 63, paragraph 1) Assistant professors "after a year of successful service" were able to become full professors. Emergency Law 1895/1939 on the 16th of August 1939 organised accordingly the University of Salonica.

[43] According to the same law the age of retirement for professors was altered from 70 to 65, complemented by the removal of certain professors who did not comply with the principles of the regime.

[44] New Chairs were created in "Ydrology and Medical Climatology" to which Fokas, a relative of Metaxas, was appointed and in "The General Principles of the New State" to which the friend of Metaxas, Koumaros was appointed.

Emergency Law 886/1937 brought under the supervision of the Prime Minister the Panteios School of Political Sciences which became one of the higher educational institutions. The purpose of the school consisted in the formation of leading cadres, the education of civil servants and the indoctrination of the students according to the principles of the 4th of August regime (paragraph 1). The administrative council was directly controlled by the minister of education (paragraph 2), who could intervene at any time to appoint new full, extraordinary or assistant professors and teachers (paragraph 3). The School was divided into the Department of Political and Historical Sciences and the Department of Economic and Social Sciences (paragraph 4).[45]

The model for this type of school of political education can be found in Italy where a new department was added to those already existing in the Italian Universities: the Department of Political Science (Facolta di Scienze Politiche). In addition to that, Schools for Political Training (Corsi di Preparazione Politica Per i Giovani) were created and involved in the selection of the highest party and government elites. They were accompanied by a number of courses, seminars and lectures, oriented towards all levels of education for the purpose of a more systematic fascist political training in the school system.[46] In Spain the Institute of Political Studies and the Faculty of Economics and Political Science imitated the example of the Italian National Centre for Political Training, and were committed to the indoctrination in the principles of Spanish national autarky combined with the fascist rhetoric employed by the Franco dictatorship.

The second element in the centralisation of authority involved control over the printed material. Emergency Law 952/1937 founded for the first time in Greek educational history, the Organisation for the Publication of School Books, under the control and supervision of the Ministry of Education. The purpose of this organisation was the publication and distribution of books, approved by the Ministry, for the schools, universities and libraries, for the purpose of the *"moral and spiritual education of the youth"*.

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[45] A third emergency law 953/1937 regarding higher education modified the status of the Teachers' Training Colleges, which became part of the higher educational establishment, which the regime justified by the special significance it attributed to the education of teachers and their relation to the pupils. The purpose was naturally to place the institution under the control of the ministry.

[46] Germani, *op.cit.*, pp. 346-347.

A similar law could again be found in Italy, enacted in 1928, which imposed the use of state books for all stages of elementary schools. All the state books in Italy, from then on, exalted the spirit of war, obedience, love for the country and hymns to the Duce.

The 4th of August regime tried to attain greater administrative control over primary and secondary education by augmenting the number of supervisory councils and inspectors. The highest supervisory and administrative authority over primary and secondary education belonged to the Minister of National Education, exercised through the new central department of the Ministry, the "Supreme Counsil of Education". This was composed of 5 permanent members and held the administrative and disciplinary authority in all educational matters. Elementary and Secondary education was divided into "Educational Regions", controlled and supervised by Regional Inspectors and General Inspectors, Supervisory Councils of Elementary and Secondary Education and Higher Supervisory Councils in a strict hierarchical order.[47] The Greek style of administration of an authoritarian and hierarchical structure was again reminiscent of the Italian hierarchical educational system.

Primary and secondary education: A series of contradictory and indecisive laws

In the field of primary and secondary education, the regime repeatedly changed its policies, often radically altering its own earlier acts. With its Italian counterpart, education under the 4th of August regime suffered under a series of contradictory laws whereby the regime tried to achieve a greater degree of control over the two levels, to retain the classicist character of education and at the same time to introduce new forms of practical and professional training in agricultural or commercial fields. While in 1937 it brought back the four-year demotico and created two stages of secondary education (5 and 3 years respectively), in 1939 it divided secondary education differently (periods of 6 and 2 years respectively).

The first important change in secondary education came with emergency law 770/1937 which involved the substitution of the Venizelist 6-year gymnasia by the new 8-

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[47] Emergency Laws 767/1937 and 1296/1938 in the *Official Newspaper*.

year gymnasia. Secondary education was to be divided into a lower level 5-year course and a higher level 3-year course, the latter of a classical, practical, commercial or agricultural orientation. The former aimed to offer a general education while the latter a scientific preparation for higher special studies. The demotico was limited to a four-year course.[48] Secondary education was only composed of the new gymnasium, the practical lyceum and the civil schools. The rest of the previously created institutions of secondary education were abolished.[49] Emergency law 1800/1939 laid the foundation for the "civil schools" for both sexes. These were intended to have 3-year courses, while the previous 5-year civil schools were to be abolished.[50] Their education was of a professional and practical nature. They included several types of subject: commercial; agricultural; crafts; womanly arts and housekeeping for women. A degree from the civil schools gave access to lower public positions, secondary vocational schools, the infant school teacher-training college or the Higher Housekeeping School for women.

The 8-year gymnasium was changed by emergency law 1849/1939 which heralded the foundation of the "new type" 6-year gymnasium, abolishing the previous 8-year and 5-year gymnasia of 1937. The "new type" gymnasium was followed by a 2-year lyceum, practical or classical. The former aimed to give a general education, better than that of the previous gymnasia while the latter aimed to prepare pupils for higher education. Typical of the regime's uncertainties and contradictions in its policy towards secondary education were a series of conflicting decrees in 1939.[51]

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[48] The first two years of the gymnasium, the previous 5th and 6th forms of the demotico, were given new curicula by the royal decree of 8-2-1939; the use of demotic together with the katharevousa was adopted while the teaching of ancient Greek was to be introduced in the second form of the gymnasium -the 6th form of the previous 6-year demotico. The programmes of the gymnasia were very much the same as those of the 1935 programmes. The course in civic education was abolished from the 6th form of the girls' gymnasium. Instead there was an effort to promote courses like housekeeping, women's crafts and baby nursing in girls' education.

[49] The regime abolished all the semi-gymnasia, the lower agricultural schools and the higher girls' schools created by the previous Venizelist reforms.

[50] Civil schools were first founded by law 5874/1933, on a 5-year basis, for pupils with a certificate from the 4th form of the demotico. Under Metaxas they were entered following the examination at the end of the 4-year period of primary education.

[51] On 14 February 1939, the regime issued the new curiculum for the first two forms of the 8-year gymnasium, on 22 April 1939 a reproduction of the curiculum for the old-type 6-year gymnasiums and on 3 November 1939 they issued the new curicula of the "new type" of 6-year gymnasia. See Noutsos, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

While a series of laws were enacted, the orientation of the school curicula was very much the same as that envisaged by the People's Party programme of 1935. Some innovations included the introduction of the subject of "National and Moral Education" in the programmes of all schools, private and public, 4 hours per week in each form.[52] A considerable priority was attributed to religious instruction in public education. The most important difference was that lessons in gymnastics became a major subject together with ancient Greek, modern Greek and maths. The elevation of gymnastics in the school curiculum was intended to enhance the *"fabrication of healthy and active bodies"* and was a clear imitation of the Nazi and Italian obsessions with physical education. The regime aimed at the revival of the ideal type of a useful citizen with a "healthy body and soul". In addition to this, Emergency Law 2057/1939 founded the National Academy of Physical Education to educate the teachers of Physical education in the theory and practice of their subject. The Committee of the Olympic Games was re-organised by Emergency Law 2018/1939, so as to facilitate the regulation of Greek athletics. Metaxas appointed himself the "General Leader of National Athletics", proving once more that when he was interested in a promotion of a certain policy, he would take over the responsibility personally. The regime augmented the number of gymnastics' teachers, assisted the foundation of athletic clubs and set aside large sums of money for the construction of school drill halls.[53]

To summarise, although Greece experimented with some of the influential fascist notions during a brief period in its inter-war history, the ideas of the 4th of August regime died with its leader, with the advent of the second world war. Although not an ideology as such, the 4th of August regime's ideas expressed more than the mentality of the leader but were far less than the authoritarian ideology adopted by Italy and Germany, during the same period. The heterogeneous character of the leading elite, the dominance of the anti-Venizelist state and the timid participation of liberal bureaucrats and professors determined

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[52] Minor changes were made to the hours offered in the weekly programme for modern Greek, foreign languages, natural sciences and maths. As in the 1935 programme, there were no voluntary courses, contrary to the Venizelist programme of 1931, which had included Latin only on a voluntary basis, a situation which was ended by the 1935 school programme. *ibid*, pp 57-104

[53] Mahaira, *op.cit.*, p. 99.

the authoritarian context of limited ideological pluralism. What united all these was not fascism but the conviction that democracy had failed in Greece and had left society disunited and pessimistic. In that sense, the ruling elites were able to put up with the leader's fascist inclinations, as long as these did not threaten radically their dominant positions within the state.

The major innovation of the 4th of August regime was the introduction of a foreign model of youth organisation, the foremost fascist aspect of the regime's relationship with civil society. However, the imposition from above of a mobilisational regime followed the already established tradition of clientelism and corruption, while its organisation turned out to be a poor imitation of the fascist experience. Education under the 4th of August regime retained its classicist and markedly centralised orientation. The attempt by the dictator to introduce the demotic on a national scale, the major reformist policy of the regime in the educational field, was not welcomed by the dominant elites in the Church, the Academy, and among the politicians and the Press, and lasted for only two years.

By the end of the inter-war period there had been no major changes in the field of education which was marked by: a high degree of illiteracy (27% of the whole population, and double that for women);[54] a rising percentage of school drop-outs (10% of the entire population did not graduate); teacher shortages (a ratio of sixty four students to one teacher, nationwide); and a lack of vocational education, whereby the students of philosophical, theological and law studies outnumbered significantly those in the technical schools and academies.[55] The notable features of Greek education, -diglossia, classicism, centralisation of authority- would continue to strain the Greek educational system in the post-war period, a period of higher levels of modernisation and an impressive expansion of education among the young.

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[54] We should note that the level of illiteracy, although still high by the standards of developed western countries had dropped from what it had been in the 1920s: 36% for men and 64% for women in 1928.

[55] Kofas, op.cit., p. 85.

146

PART II: THE 21ST OF APRIL REGIME

Chapter 5 : POST-WAR PERIOD

Background factors to the 21st of April regime

The end of the second world war saw the military defeat of the fascist regimes and the end of inter-war European fascist authoritarianism. It also signalled the decline of the great European powers, the end of European imperialism and the emergence of the superpower bipolarity between the liberal United States and the communist Soviet Union, and their respective spheres of influence world-wide. This new international political and ideological polarisation was underpinned by the antagonism between the countries of Western Europe which saw the consolidation of liberal parliamentary rule, and the communist dictatorships of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Spain and Portugal, the only remnants of the fascist era, while retaining their authoritarian anti-communist stances, achieved their transition to the post-war period under the personalistic rules of Franco and Salazar, due mainly to the aloofness of these countries in the face of international developments. In many respects, the dictatorship of Spain and to a lesser degree that of Portugal constituted the "prototypes of the post-war liberal dictatorships", the "initiators of the post-fascist formula", supportive of the capitalist mode of economic domination, demobilisational rather than mobilisational, basing their legitimacy on their economic performance rather than on an ideological mobilisation.[1]

Post-war Greek development stood in many respects as a microcosm of the international bipolarity, exemplified by the prolonged civil war in the 1940s, and the victory of the liberal over the communist forces. Weakened economically by the world war and the civil war which followed it, and divided by acute political conflicts, Greece saw the subsequent establishment of an exclusionary, and repressive anti-communist parliamentary system during the 1950s and 1960s, within the patronising sphere of the United States, which heavily interfered in the development of post-war Greek internal affairs. The imposition of the 1967 military junta and of seven years of authoritarian rule marked the

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[1] From the inter-war period of fascistoid/Falangist domination the "National-Syndicalist phase" (1937-1945), the post-war Franco regime established a Catholic domination, the "National Catholicist phase" of Opus Dei influence (1945-1957) while the later period of the regime was a period of modernisation and technocratic rule. Guy Hermet, *Aux Frontieres de la Democratie*, pp. 143-149.

epilogue of the post-war anti-communist state, while its collapse signalled the beginning of a more pluralist democracy. The 1967 military regime was primarily notable for the fact that for the first time in Greek history, the military assumed the role of political rulers. The 21st of April regime, a clear case of a military dictatorship, was neither a fascist, nor a mobilisational authoritarian regime, on the model of the inter-war regimes of Italy, Germany, and the movements of the Balkan and Iberian peninsulas. It was not a personalistic type of authoritarian rule on the models of Franco and Salazar dictatorships, or even of the Chilean case of Pinochet, despite the attempts of the dictator Papadopoulos to impose his personal rule over the military junta. It was not a neo-fascist regime, bearing no ideological similarities to the post-war neo-fascist movements in Western Europe. Its power structure lacked the support of the King and the conservative political world, so vital to the survival of the earlier Metaxas regime, and enjoyed the backing solely of a powerful military faction. The 1967 military junta bore few similarities to the bureaucratic-military models on the South American continent. Its power-bloc did not include a coalition of high-level technocrats, military and civilians, as was the case with the post-1964 period in Brazil, the periods 1966-1970 and the post-1976 in Argentina and the post-1973 period in Chile, where the main motivation was provided by the changing structural requirements of their respective economies. On the other hand, the Greek regime did in some respects resemble to its contemporary Latin American counterparts, in the importance of the US support-role, in their demobilising and exclusionary character, and in the use of an anti-communist discourse.

The 21st of April regime lacked an organised system of beliefs, an authoritarian ideology to interpret its surrounding reality, and to mobilise social sectors. At the most, the military junta resorted to constant justifications of its repressive tactics, torn by ideological contradictions and different points of view among its elite. The ideological justifications of the military junta, far from presenting an alternative ideological framework to the already existing one, were a sum of various controversial and individualistic military mentalities, with minimum common points of reference among the top officers. Before examining the

specific beliefs held by the military rulers, their disparate mentalities should be seen in the light of the following introductory factors:

1. The 1967 military dictatorship was a sequence to the 1960s socio-political crisis of the parliamentary system, marked by an exclusionary state and the dominance of an anti-communist ideological discourse. This post-war climate formed the general ideological framework on which the military rulers based their vague ideological consensus.

2. The 21st of April regime's ideology derived from a sum of military mentalities which reflected the post-war military mind, the result of the officers' own military socialisation and their connection with the political world. The individualistic beliefs and attitudes of the officers who made up the elite of the 21st of April regime were characterised by fierce anti-communism, typical of the military's post-war internal ideology; a tendency towards conspiratorial and clientelistic behaviour which could be seen in their relations with the civilian elites; a "new professionalism" which derived from US influence.

3. The 1967 military dictatorship was a type of collective authoritarian rule, supported by a limited military faction which neither enjoyed the support of the king nor of the political world. This collective style of leadership resulted in differences in opinions, as to the specific purpose and character of the regime.

A. The post-war period: Exclusionary parliamentarism, socio-economic modernisation and the anti-communist discourse

The end of the second world war and the defeat of international fascism, was followed by a prolonged and bloody civil war, which further exacerbated the already dire economic situation which had resulted from the world war, polarised Greek politics and ended with the formation of a post-war state with a fiercely anti-communist ideology. The post-war period in Greece was marked by economic recovery in the 1950s and the rapid economic development of the 1960s, the gradual modernisation of Greek society, the political domination of the right wing, the dominant and interventionist role of the American superpower and a new concept of nationalism.

The period of post-war parliamentary rule was a period of semi-democracy, where political power was largely exercised by the powerful allies of the parliamentary right, the monarchy and the armed forces. The actual political practice was marked by the exclusion of the communist party from participating in the Greek political process, political discrimination against those associated with communists, control over the trade union movement, violations of the constitution, the active use of repressive mechanisms (police, military, paramilitary organisations). The political power of the anti-communist state rested on the triarchy of Crown-Parliament-Army. The king at times seemed to perceive his powers to be limitless and, frequently overstepping his constitutional rights, he constantly intervened in party-politics and/or pursued a personal policy.[2] The right, through parliamentary and extra-parliamentary activities, i.e., manipulations of the electoral system, pre-election frauds and intimidation tactics, managed to secure its position in government for 11 uninterrupted years (1952-1963) and to pursue authoritarian policies to its own benefit. The army not solely concerned with matters of external security, frequently played the role of the military police in internal security matters, through the parallel networks of secret military groups.

At the ideological level, the legacy of the civil war changed the meaning of Greek nationalism and permitted the use of an anti-communist ideology by the political authorities, as the official and dominant state-national discourse. After the transitional nationalistic phase of the inter-war period and the polemic concerning a quest for a national identity, post-war nationalism came to be identified almost exclusively with the threat posed by an external communist threat, from the northern Balkan neighbours. The domestic expression of this was the fear of an internal communist threat. The international environment of the Cold war during the 1940s, 50s and 60s helped to sustain the legitimacy of such an ideology. One of the main preoccupations of the post-war anti-communist state was to create a powerful official ideological framework to justify the exclusionary practices of the political system. According to this, Greek society was divided roughly in two large categories, those who were nationally-minded and those who were

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[2] On post-war constitutional practices and violations, see Alivizatos, *op.cit.*, pp. 203-271.

not, a broad schism between communists and anti-communists. Ideological polarisation meant rigidity on both sides of the spectrum, so that on the anti-communist side the dissemination of information was subjected to strict control by the governing authorities, while on the other side, communist intellectuals were under the firm control of the clandestine party apparatus. Dogmatism prevailed on both sides and contrary to the short but constructive dialogue during the first two decades of the 20th century between the liberal and the socialist intellectuals, such a cooperation became unthinkable during the post-war period.[3]

Despite the deficiencies in the democratic process and the ideological polarisation, the Greek economy during the 1950s and 1960s recovered rapidly from the repercussions of the second world war and the civil war, due mainly to massive American aid, western capital and direct foreign investment. During the late 1950s, and especially during the 1960s, the rates of growth of the Greek economy were impressively high.[4] The main characteristics of post-war economic development were the boosting of the manufacturing sector, the shift in investment from light consumer goods to durable and capital goods, the change in the structure of exports from agricultural to industrial goods and a significant concentration of capital in industry.[5] Despite the impressive rates of economic growth, the main elements of Greece's pre-war socio-economic structure continued to dominate, marked by the powerful state sector, the inability to develop technologically the agricultural sector and the ever-increasing power of shipping capital. The state sector continued to provide the bulk of the employment for the majority of the middle and lower classes. Although the economic changes of the 1960s did not affect in any radical way the peripheral status of the Greek economy in relation to the developed world, they brought about some qualitative changes in the standard of living of the Greek population and strengthened the degree of social organisation within civil society.

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[3] Tsoukalas "Ideological Impact of the Civil War" in *Greece in the 1940s*, pp. 339-341.

[4] The 1960s recorded an all-time high rate of growth, and the Greek economy, together with the Spanish one, had the highest rates in Europe of an average 7%. Babanasis/Soulas, *Greece at the Periphery of the Developed Countries*, p. 21.

[5] Mouzelis, "Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-War Greece", pp. 66-68.

Most crucial in the post-war development of Greek society was the overwhelming role of the US hegemony: in the economic field the intervention of US capital helped the recovery of the Greek economy and at the same time resulted in the country having a dependent economic status; in the political field, American domination meant serious US interference in the running of state affairs; in the strategic/military field, the geographical position of Greece meant that it was crucial to America's superpower interests in the Balkans and the Middle East, which increased the role of the military and, due to the massive military aid which was received, strengthened the institutional autonomy of the military in politics; in the ideological field the victory of liberalism over the alternative model of communism in the western world and the existence of an acute international polarisation justified the existence of exclusionary and authoritarian parliamentary rule in Greek politics. The patronising role of the Americans was decisive in the political development of post-war restrictive capitalist democracy in Greece. By supporting politically, economically, militarily and ideologically the anti-communist Greek state, they secured an ally at a geographically strategic post.

The role of US power in supporting the anti-communist state and, subsequently, its dubious attitude towards the junta was a major similarity between the Latin American dictatorships and the Greek regime. However, the paramount influence and the all-embracing character of US intervention was much more overwhelming in Latin America than it was in Greece, where the European influence on the political, economic and ideological spheres counter-balanced the American hegemony. Indeed, the 1960s brought the Greek economy and society closer to the European mainstream, and were marked by increasing Greek economic links with the European economies and the country's involvement with the EEC, a powerful alternative to the paramountcy of US domination.

While the economic recovery of the 1950s favoured the authoritarian power structure of the monarchy-army-parliamentary right and the predominance of the anti-communist ideological state, the economic modernisation of the 1960s brought the strengthening of Greek civil society and the exhaustion of the anti-communist ideology. The 1960s saw the rise of the reformist Centre Union government to power, and of its

popular leader George Papandreou, who allowed for the political mobilisation of previously excluded social sectors, demanded the democratisation of Greek civil society and the reorganisation of the power structure, thus challenging the political domination of the post-war triarchy.[6] The Centre Union professed a more radical political philosophy, including the relaxation of the anti-communist ideology, the loosening of repressive mechanisms in the countryside, the organisation of social groups free from control by the right wing forces, a new radical educational reform and the submission of the armed forces to civilian control. The mobilisation of the mid-1960s offered the main cause for the military to intervene in politics and to assume the role of political governors.[7]

The advent of the military junta, in the context of the immediately preceding political turmoil, was presented as a political necessity by the powerful military apparatus which sought to safeguard its threatened position within the state. The years 1965-1967 were a period of government instability, political machinations and royal interferences, which the military officers perceived as sufficient deadlock to justify their intervention.[8] The 1967 coup can be seen as the radical redistribution of political power within the triarchy in favour of the military, but most important, as the failure of the "post-war guided democracy".[9] Mouzelis argues that the major impetus for the establishment of the military dictatorship came basically from within the army and was directly linked to the threat that the growing political mobilisation posed to its dominance within the prevailing exclusionary state. The Greek colonels intervened from above principally to defend their own position within the state.

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[6] Striking is the similarity between the Greek Centre Union and the Chilean Christian Democrats. The latter in 1964 provided an ideological alternative to liberal capitalism and Marxist socialism, trying to break the polarisation of Chilean politics. Their programme promised the incorporation into the nation's political life of sectors that had previously been excluded. The new Centre in Chilean society in the 1960s sought to undermine the previous politics of clientelism and to institute more rational planning schemes. The similar political mobilisation of the 1960s in Chile revolved around Frei's Centre party of the Christian Democrats. See Arturo Valenzuela, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Chile*, pp 34-36

[7] The rising popularity of Papandreou's son Andreas, on the leftist side of the Centre Union, exacerbated the perception of a threat in the eyes of the anti-communist forces. The anti-American, anti-NATO, pro-independent ideology of the young Papandreou was the more radical reaction to the excesses of the post-war political arrangement and the continuous interference of the United States.

[8] For a detailed account of the period prior to the imposition of the military regime see Linardatos *From the Civil War to the Junta*, Vol. 5.

[9] Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974-1983" in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*, p.145

154

Confronted with the rising tide of political mobilisation, repressive parliamentarism

characterised by the throne-army-parliament alliance, in which the army was

dominant- could no longer survive. Either parliament, through its opening to the

masses, had to become the dominant force in this triarchy- in which case the army

would lose its leading position with inevitable internal consequences for those

holding posts within it. Or else the army had to prevent this by the overall abolition

of parliamentary rule.[10]

Similar to the 4th of August regime whose intervention coincided with the 1930s economic recovery from the effects of the Great Depression, the military junta intervened in a decade of rapid economic development. The decline of the post-war parliamentary democracy happened in the midst the 1960s economic boom and not in the context of economic stagnation, as in most post-war Latin American cases. In Latin America perennial structural problems of high inflation, balance of payment problems and a high degree of dependence on the international economy, exacerbated social tensions to such an extent that parliamentary institutions were not able to cope.[11] Both Greek dictatorships show that simple correlations between economic slump and political crisis do not apply to the Greek case for the explanation of dictatorial interventions.

It was a high level of political mobilisation and radicalisation of the masses which existed in the Greece of the 1960s, which determined to a large degree the reactionary intervention of the military junta and which distinguished it from inter-war Greek society and the Metaxas response to the political crisis which he perceived. Greek civil society in the 1960s was much more organised and integrated than it had been in the 1920s and 1930s. On the other hand, the inter-war period was a period of ideological transition and intellectual pluralism, while the post-war period was one of authoritarian anti-communism and exclusionary pluralism. The regime of Metaxas was the authoritarian sequence to the

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[10] Mouzelis, "Capitalism and Dictatorship", p. 80.

[11] Military regimes in Latin America occurred in the context of accelerating prices, falling economic growth rates and decline in the inflow of direct foreign investment. In 1973 for instance, Chile suffered from a 150% annual rate of inflation, the demoralisation of the private sector under Alliende's nationalisation scheme, a hugely augmented public sector, an extended black market, which led to the new orthodox economic policies of General Pinochet. See Robert Kaufman, "Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule", in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, pp. 190-196.

deadlocks of the inter-war political schism, while the military junta was the sequence to the exhaustion of the exclusionary, semi-democratic state.

The post-war anti-communist state provided the military rulers with the general framework on which to base their anti-communist discourse and develop their repressive and exclusionary methods. The immediate political instability gave them the pretext for intervention and the impulse to protect their interests from any future threats by strengthening the role of the military in the political sphere. However, the strong upward surge of the Greek economy and the lack of an economic crisis in the 1960s meant that they could not convincingly use developmentalist economic language as an excuse for intervention. On the contrary, the powerful role of the military in the most advanced Latin American societies was connected to the new technocratic alternatives being offered for the remedy of the structural imbalances. The ideological framework of the 21st of April regime was mostly composed of anti-communist generalities in their extreme post-war usage, which formed the main point of consensus among the officers of the military junta. But most important, it was basically marked by the existence of disparate military mentalities, inherent in the Greek military mind, the result of the officers' own process of political socialisation and their particular connection with the political world.

B. The post-war Greek military mind

The behaviour of the military within a given political environment and the officers' ideological beliefs are the result of the position of the military sub-system within the political system itself, at a primary level, and the result of certain institutional characteristics of the military establishment, at a secondary level. The latter relates to the social composition of the officer corps, their military education, structure and hierarchy, and the self-perceptions and career objectives of the officers, which are all directly determinant of the military mind. It is therefore necessary to understand some central characteristics of the post-war military mind, how these characteristics shaped the military's response to developments in a political system and, most important, the mentalities and attitudes of the officers. Based on the special relationship between

politicians and army officers, on the one hand, and on the internal institutional characteristics of the military corps, the latter forms its own internal ideology, a differentiated system of beliefs, which shapes its particular attitude towards socio-political events. The officers' perceptions of the notions of man, society, history, religion, the nation-state and their role within it, as well as the organisation of the military are interpreted by military officers differently from other social sectors. The unified, hierarchical and centralised system of military organisation and education comes into contrast with the pluralistic process of debate within democratic societies and imposes a distinct set of beliefs on all military officers, a selective and specifically militaristic interpretation of social and political realities.[12]

The history of civil-military relations in Greece has seen a series of military interventions in politics which showed that, apart from the military's role as the guardian of the nation-state against any external threats, military officers were also concerned with the domestic political scene and perceived the balances at the level of the political elite to be directly relevant to their own corporate interests. Greek military interventions were never connected with radical demands for socio-economic reforms but mostly centred upon demands for political changes. The 19th century was marked by the weak professionalism of the military and their limited power over internal political affairs.[13] The "1909

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[12] Most characteristics, typical of the professional military ethic, have their roots in the very profession of the soldier and are directly relevant to the formation of the military mind. According to Huntington, the military mind is "*pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession*". The military man holds a pessimistic view of man and regards the weaknesses in human nature as crucial in social developments and conflicts among nations (Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 59-79). Janowitz translates the above notions of the military mind into relevant ideological themes recurrent in the professional and political ideology of the military officers. These include a strong sense of nationalism and national identity with pervasive overtones of xenophobia, a strong puritanical outlook and an emphasis on anti-corruption and anti-decadence, and the acceptance of collective public enterprise as a basis for achieving social, political and economic change. Janowitz correctly stresses that military officers are more interested in organisational forms than in ideological justifications and tend to be anti-introspective even when they have intellectual interests. Their rhetoric is marked by a "bold assertiveness" and they consider themselves "doers rather than thinkers". Their mentality seems to be a mixture of half-developed but strongly held ideology and a deep sense of pragmatic professionalism. (Janowitz, *Military Institutions in the Developing Countries*, pp. 139-143.)

[13] The history of military interventions goes back to the 19th century, the first important military intervention in Greek politics took place in 1843 when army people in co-ordination with politicians obliged King Othon to grant a constitution to the Greek people, to rid the country from the Bavarian/Austrian army which had surrounded the king upon his arrival in Greece and to end the period of absolute monarchy. (See "The Revolution of the 3rd September 1843", in *History of the Greek Nation*, Vol. 13, pp. 89-94.) Greek officers and politicians had common complaints against King Othon's absolutist tendencies in his exercise of power and both these forces acted in a concerted effort to minimise the excesses of the monarchist power in order to constitutionalise the exercise of political authority. In

revolution" signalled the first major intervention of middle-ranking officers in politics and inaugurated a series of military interventions in political life during the course of the 20th century.[14] The inter-war period, a period of continuous military interventions in politics institutionalised the semi-autonomous character of military interventions, although they did not result in military dictatorships, whereby the army officers intervened in order to hand political power either to the Venizelist or the anti-Venizelist politicians. In the tradition of these semi-autonomous transitional military interventions, the dictatorship of Metaxas was not a military authoritarian regime although it needed the support of the anti-Venizelist military hierarchy for its survival. The post-war period, however, saw the development of a completely autonomous role for the military in the political power bloc, the legacy of its victory over the communist forces during the civil war, which resulted in the consolidation of military rule in 1967.

Based on an ample examination of the Greek civil-military relations, one might stress four particular aspects, relevant to the post-war military mind and the mentality of the officers/rulers. The post-war military mind was characterised by:

- the development of a rigorous nationalist anti-communist orientation, the legacy of the civil war and the officers' participation in it;

- the factionalist and clientelistic mentality of military officers, the result of their relationship with politicians;

1862 the military, in agreement with the politicians, intervened again, succeeded in ousting King Othon and demanded another constitution. The Constitution of 1864 reflected the liberal ideological tendencies of Europe at the time. Both coup d'etats, in 1843 and 1862, brought about important political institutional changes in agreement with the general civilian sentiments. (See Papakosmas, *The Military in Greek Politics*, pp. 15-32.) The initiative, however, in the 19th century military interventions rested mainly with Greek politicians and enjoyed no autonomous character as was the case with the 20th century military interventions.

[14] The "Goudi coup" was the result of an initiative by military officers, disaffected by the 1897 Greek international defeat, who demanded a better organisation of the Greek armed forces along with more general national and political demands. It was an intervention by lower-ranking military officers and its symbolic significance would be exploited in the rhetoric of the Colonels' regime after 1967. This 1909 initiative by the newly formed Military League ended with the accession of Venizelos to power and a new era in Greece's national development in the foreign, political, social, economic and ideological spheres. The character of this military intervention has been the subject of a wide discussion among analysts of various ideological opinions for its considerable subsequent domestic implications. Most Marxist analysts have labelled the intervention a "bourgeois revolution" according to which the political leader Venizelos secured the ascendancy of the bourgeois class in politics. See Vournas, *Goudi; The 1909 Movement*, Athens 1957 and Kordatos' *History of Modern Greece*, Athens 1958.

- the adoption of a "new professional" mentality based on notions about internal war

(against communist, anti-national elements) and the desirable form of domestic

development, the impact of the international US influence within the army; and

- the paramilitary/conspiratorial attitude of the secret organisation IDEA, the direct

antecedent of the military junta.

All these characteristics were reflected in their subsequent ideological perceptions, as

rulers, and their particular policies, as governors.

Military nationalistic ideology: Fierce anti-communism

Historically, the most important characteristic of the Greek military mind has been

its vague nationalistic orientation, the military being perceived as the country's guardian

from external threats and the defender of the national tradition. Although the nationalistic

orientation of a state's army becomes an ambiguous concept in multi-ethnic societies, as

currently in Yugoslavia, in more homogeneous countries such as Greece, the role of the

national army has been identified with the interests of the nation-state. The Greek military

fought, as a unified body, against the external enemies that threatened the survival of the

country. In that respect the Greek army was crucial in the formation of the country's

foreign policy, while international developments, largely determined by international wars,

influenced the army's nationalistic identity.

The military during the 19th century was the principal expressor of Greece's

irredentist aspirations.[15] It participated in a sequence of international crises and suffered

the humiliation of the 1897 defeat, which led to the post-1909 reorganisation of the Greek

military. In the first decades of the 20th century, the Greek army fought successfully in the

Balkan wars, was victorious in the first world war, on the side of the Allied Forces, and

was greatly influenced by the Asia Minor disaster in 1922. The death of the Megali Idea in

1922, marked the final end of Greece's irredentist ambitions, changed the

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[15] After independence and during the 19th century, the army was composed of military officers, educated in the School of Army Cadets -created in 1828-, where Greek irredentism was emphasised, given that the country was in its process of geographical expansion. During the 19th century however the military was not a highly organised body and was used mainly in order to chase bandits or to repress revolts. Preparation for war was for the most part occasional and sporadic.

nationalist/irredentist orientation of the army, and saw the development of a semi-autonomous character in the military interventions in politics. The transitional period in Greek ideology marked a transition in the army's nationalistic role, and a new interest by the military officers in matters of domestic political development.

In the post-war period the national enemy was called communism, and the Greek army stood as the principal defender of the country's interests against the internal and external communist threat. The Greek civil war and the defeat of the domestic communist forces, the subsequent membership of the NATO alliance and the fact that Greece's Balkan neighbours were communist, changed radically the nationalistic character of the military ideology and defined its overwhelmingly anti-communist orientation both with regard to the international and the domestic scenes.

The Greek army cleared of all republican/Venizelist officers presented the image of a united, loyal, royalist body.[16] Selection to the officer corps after 1944 was based on a rigourous test of nationalism, as defined in the post-war Greek domestic climate, which meant loyalty to the king and stern opposition to communism and anyone with similar ideas. Through military schools, journals and conferences of highly specialised content, the military carried several principles and values to the new recruits which aimed at isolating them from any civilian influences and protecting them from the contagion of any radical thought which could potentially threaten the anti-communist status quo.[17] The education provided for the military was no more based on the principles of the Megali Idea irredentist plan but on the principles of nationalism within the context of the international

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[16] The 1935 failed coup of the Venizelists against the Royalists, marked the beginning of the final exclusion of the republicans from the army ranks and failed ultimately to restore the liberals into power. During the period of Metaxas, the period when the Greek army was in the Middle East, and the civil war in Greece, the army was cleared of the liberals/Venizelists and was composed almost exclusively of anti-Venizelist royalists.

[17] Abrahamsson argues that the effect of the military education is crucial to the political socialisation of military officers. Military education diffuses a body of theoretical doctrines and implants ethical values as to behaviour which is related to the military feeling of solidarity and corporateness. In other words, the military system has a decisive impact on the attitudes and values of military professionals and the existence of a particular military culture whose main features are the *"nationalistic, authoritarian, alarmist and conservative nature of the military mind"*. Nationalistic in that it centres around the security of the state, authoritarian in that it is impatient with dissent, inexpert in the art of persuasion while democratic procedures are not relevant in the context of the military characteristics of obedience, hierarchy and order. (See Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalisation and Political Power*, pp. 59-100.) Abrahamsson offers some useful insights on the particular features of the military profession although his analysis mainly covers the cases of Sweden and the United States where a high degree of homogeneity and uniformity is deeply embedded in the military organisation.

cold war.[18] The enemy was not only to be found outside the country but most importantly was also inside the country, in the form of the communist ideology and communist political organisation. While the existence of a communist threat was a political reality to virtually all the liberal political forces, it was intentionally exaggerated by the military mind, in accordance with its "*subjective professional bias*"[19] and was subsequently stressed as the main cause of the abrupt military intervention of 1967.[20]

Military officers tend to over-emphasise their military virtues of bravery, discipline, obedience and dedication to the national interest. The defense of national ideals in the mind of the Greek military officers coincided with the defense of traditional Greek values, the "Helleno-Christian spirit". Greek officers believed that the Army was the embodiment of national ideals, identity and consciousness. They felt that they represented and lived by a set of superior moral values. To them the military profession was a repository of Greco-Christian ideals. The Greek officers' self-image contained an underlying element of puritanism and a religious moral certainty. Their conservatism was more cultural than political, one of form rather than substance.[21] Moreover Greek military officers cultivated a self-perception inspired by contempt for officers who involved themselves in political activity and the conviction that the army was more virtuous, heroic, pious than any civilian group. They all condemned interventions in principle, but made special exception for particular coups when it suited them.

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[18] The ideological indoctrination of the recruits involved an extensive censorship of their reading material, and their own radio station which was not submitted to any governmental control, was based on programmes of a clearly political and partisan character. (See Meynaud, *op.cit.*, p. 352.) Broadcasting centres in every major military unit, special time allotted in training schedules for National Ethical Instruction of the troops, lectures in politics and the ideology of international communism, newspapers and journals, constituted the systematic methods of indoctrination of the post-war military mind. (See Kapetanyannis' unpublished Ph.D. thesis, *Socio-Political Conflicts and Military Intervention; The Case of Greece: 1950-1967*, p. 116.)

[19] Based on Huntington's use of the term, according to which the military professional holds the responsibility for the security of the state and thus is inclined to stress the continuing nature of the threats to the security of the state. Huntington observes the existence of a *"subjective professional bias "*, in the sense that at times the military man will see threats where actually no threats exist and that *if he errs in his estimate, it should be on the side of overstating the threat........The objective realities of international politics only partially determine the military estimate of the situation.* See Huntington's "The Military Mind: Conservative Realism of the Professional Military Ethic" in *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 59-79.

[20] It should be mentioned that such fears and beliefs within the military were also aggravated by the right-wing sectors of Greek society, such as the press, which up until the moment of the military intervention, insisted that the country was at the threshold of another communist takeover.

[21] Kourvetaris & Dobratz *Social Origins and political Orientations of Officer Corps in World Perspective*, p. 30.

During its post-war development the military acted as a political institution which in connection with political parties and pressure groups performed in one way or another a variety of political functions. The military apparatus through its control of the intelligence and security services, had a considerable hold on the mass media, performed wider functions than merely ensuring the external security of the country, and became the guardian of the domestic political anti-communist status quo. From 1940 until 1967, the army was presented as a united anti-communist/royalist force which participated extensively in the exclusionary politics of the post-war state.

The post-war broadening of the social base of officers' recruitment increased rather than decreased the latters' political involvement.[22] The requirements of the civil war meant the lowering of the Military Academy's standards of recruitment and resulted, for the first time, in the establishment of a system of free education. As people from poorer backgrounds could now study in the Academy, there was a distinct difference in class origin between officers who had graduated before and after the war. While the urban area was under-represented in the army officers from the semi-urban and rural areas were somewhat over-represented. The post-war army, being dominated by officers of peasant background, embraced middle class values with enthusiasm. But they also developed a sense of isolation which was due to the widening gap between their own social importance and that of other prominent professionals, technocrats and businessmen in the 1960s, contrary to their Latin American counterparts who developed closer links with the technocratic-civilian elites. Greek military officers adopted an amorphous mentality made up by active resentments against threats to their discipline, their military honour and the politicians who often threatened their interests. As Veremis states,

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[22] While during the second half of the 19th century, the army had been composed mainly of the offspring of noble families and had enjoyed the King's patronage, the 1909 military intervention signalled a radical change in the army's composition. There followed a sharp increase in officer recruitment and admissions to the Military Academy. In order to realise the Greek irredentist aspirations, Venizelos mobilised the country's civilian and military forces and within a period of three years, he tripled the armed forces from 60,000 in 1909 to 170,000 on the eve of the First Balkan War in 1912. (See Kourvetaris, "Greek Service Academies; Patterns of Recruitment and Organisational Change" in *The Military and the Problem of Legitimacy*, Harries-Jenkins & van Doorn, eds, p. 125.) Following these developments the army became thereafter a means for social ascent for the officers of petty-bourgeois and peasant origins.

A sense of inferiority among officers vis-a-vis civilian elites was compounded by

their frustration at missing out on the development bonanza. Their role in the Greek

civil wars between nationalist and communist forces became their chief claim to

prominence, and they strove to perpetuate the memory of the confrontation long

after its culmination in 1949 .[23]

Military factionalism: The clientelistic mentality

In presenting the officers' corps as nationalistic/anti-communist and loyal to the king, one runs the risk of presenting the military as a unified body, with a private code and values, which was not the case in Greece and particularly in the military's relationship to civilians. The Greek military was not a unified body with a coherent set of attitudes and principles, with respect to the political development of Greek society. On the contrary, military officers perceived the political environment through the spectrum of the different factions and groups to which they belonged. The military institution was internally a divided and factionalised corps, with allegiances to different political rulers and different political ideas as to the position of the military within the power establishment. The result was the creation of a special clientelistic relationship between army officers and political rulers.

The clientelistic aspect of the military mentality relates to the special relationship between politicians and army officers, a relationship of interdependence between the two, whose principal nexus was a network of mutual help. Politicians secured their military clients' corporate interests and army officers guar anteed their allegiance to their political patrons, a situation which had its roots in the inter-war period.[24] This special relationship between officers and politicians determined the politicisation of the Greek officer corps and resulted in the soldiers' disrespect for the parliamentary process and constitutional forms

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[23] Veremis, "Greece and Nato: Continuity and Change", in *Nato's Southern Allies*, p. 248.

[24] Veremis' analysis of the military establishment during the inter-war period is based on the existence of a clientelistic network among politicians and military officers. During the whole of the inter-war period a special relationship developed between army people and politicians who needed the support of each other for their existence. Veremis sees the creation of patron-client networks between politicians and the army hierarchy and between the army ranks themselves. See his book *The Intervention of the Army in Greek politics 1916-1936*, Athens 1983, and his article "Some Observations on the Greek Military in the Inter-War Period, 1918-1935" in *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.4, No.3, May 1978, pp. 527-541.

and the disrespect of politicians towards the military hierarchies, which they frequently overturned in order to secure their military power bases. Moreover, clientelistic allegiances superseded the strongly held internal ideology of the military, despite the vital importance of the latter to the unity of the officer corps. A whole network of patron-client relationships was created between politicians and officers and among officers themselves, the latter forming their political affiliations according to private gains, personal interests and advancement. The actual practice of such clientelistic relationships resulted in the engagement of military officers in conspiratorial tactics, and this caused the sceptical attitude which soldiers tended to have, both towards politicians and their fellow officers. The extensive involvement of military officers in conspiracies was largely explained by their professional insecurity. A system of patronage, very typical of the country's political development was thus adopted within the army as well, which ceased to be solely and unconditionally the country's guardian in face of external threats, but pursued its own corporate interests, while factions and individuals within the army did the same.

During the post-war period, deliberate endeavours were made by political leaders to develop and perpetuate the clientelistic networks within the military upon which they could rely, if and when the more traditional sources of support were exhausted.[25] Domestic political forces allowed the ultra-conservative factions in Greek society to take over complete control of the military and repressive mechanisms and thus contributed to the development of the armed forces' autonomous role within the political sphere. The officers' personal progress was secured through their allegiance to the conservative political establishment which largely explains their interference in politics in 1967. As Veremis has aptly put it:

> *In no profession other than in the armed forces was allegiance to the crown or to*
>
> *conservative members of government more vital to personal advancement.*
>
> *Paradoxically, this very dependence of the officers on royalty or political patrons*
>
> *became a source of resentment even among those who were most eager to profit*

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[25] Constantine Karamanlis, for instance,the leader of the ERE conservative party largely relied upon clientelistic connections in the military and police forces to win the elections of 1961. See George Zaharopoulos, "Politics and Army in Post-War Greece", in *Greece Under Military Rule*, p. 24.

from it. Officers formed clandestine organisations in order to purge the army of

leftist elements, while simultaneously promoting their own corporate interests and

waiting for the opportunity to assert their autonomy .[26]

The international influence: The "new professional" mentality

The major influence on the post-war military was the important role of the United

States in Greek domestic political affairs and the country's participation in the NATO

international security alliance. This brought about the institutionalisation of a military

machine dependent   US interests. The patronage of the United States encouraged a new

professional mentality within the military and offered the officers the ability to assume as

their primary function counter-insurgency roles and civic defence.[27]

During the 19th century and the first part of the 20th century, the

professionalisation of the Greek military had remained at relatively low levels.[28] Although

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[26] See Veremis, "Greece and NATO" p. 248.

[27] Stepan's distinction between the "old professionalism of external warfare" and "new professionalism of internal warfare and national development" basically applied to the Brazilian and Peruvian cases, may be applicable to the Greek case, to a certain extent, especially as a result of the legacy of the civil war during the 1940s and the army's extensive participation in it. In theory, this means that the army's focus shifts from interstate conflict to domestic war which encourages a different pattern of civil-military relations. (Stepan, "The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Expansion", p. 49.) The classic formulation of military professionalism and its relation to the political activity of the military by Samuel Huntington, rests on the assumption that a professionalised army concentrates all its efforts to perfect its fighting ability, becomes a "politically sterile and neutral" servant of the state, functionally specific and unconcerned with domestic political events, with a technocratic outlook. Technical innovations and achievements lead to the professionalisation and democratisation of the military and its further neutrality in politics. (Huntington, *The Soldier and the State.*) Contrary to this approach, Janowitz believes that the technology of the military in the new nations maximises its propensity to intervention in domestic politics given that the capacity of the military to intervene in domestic politics derives from its distinctive military format, i.e., its control over the instruments of power. (Janowitz, *Military Institutions in the Developing Countries.*, pp. 107-108.) New professionalism, a phenomenon of the developing countries, lies in the assumption that there is a fundamental inter-relationship between civil and military spheres, "*with the military playing a key role in interpreting and dealing with domestic political problems owing to its greater technical and professional skills in handling internal security issues....the new professional military man is highly politicised* " (Stepan, "The New Professionalism", p. 51.)

[28] Trikoupis was the first Greek leader who introduced some form of organisation to the Greek army in the 1880s. Being a liberal minded politician he made the first genuine efforts to set the foundations of a professional military organisation. He abolished by law the right of an officer to actively engage in politics; he managed to secure a 40 million drachma loan from France for the army's needs; he established a system of compulsory military service for the armed forces; he created new military schools and expanded the military academy; he sent a number of officers abroad for further military training, among other measures concerning the organisation of the Greek army. (See Kourvetaris "Greek Service Academies; Patterns of Recruitment and Organisational Change", p. 124.) Although Venizelos later tried to professionalise and organise the Greek armed forces, military frustration over the Asia Minor disaster, the series of coups and counter-coups during the inter-war period and intense military factionalism did much to weaken the professionalisation of the Greek military services, which on the eve of Metaxas' dictatorship was characterised by military officers as "lamentable". Metaxas attempted to modernise and unite the army

the Greek military had obtained professional advice, weapons and supplies from the French, British and Italian, these inducements were neither persistent nor massive enough to professionalise the services. The scale and duration of the American military and economic aid that flowed in through the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan (proclaimed initially in June 1947) had a decisive impact on the professionalisation of the Greek military.[29]

Due to the military assistance of the United States during the post-war period the Greek military became   one of the professional armies of the West.[30] Many military officers lost the old heroic pre-war mentality associated with the Balkan wars and the Albanian expedition of 1940 according to which the officer was first a "cavalier" and then a professional. Under NATO influence, through high wages, lengthy trips abroad and co-education with foreign officers, the military mentality changed radically. There was an international cast of military officers who having interests in common, lived like the diplomats: a "new military aristocracy". The narrow identity of the army devoted to the defence of the national frontiers was substituted by a wider identity as part of an "international family".[31] Through their influence over the Greek military establishment, the United States managed to place the country into the inferior position of a client.

behind the king but, with the declaration of war, it was evident that the army lacked substantial technical equipment and manpower.

[29] Greece's total receipts through the Plan were 1.7 billion dollars in economic aid (loans and grants) and 1.3 billion dollars in military aid between 1947 and the 1960s. See Veremis' "Greece and NATO", p. 231.

[30] Janowitz suggests that a gradual transformation has taken place in the countries of the Western world from the heroic self-image of the military person to the managerial self-image, a result of technological and nuclear innovations in their armies. The modern military man seeks to combine traditional national heroic values with scientific management. He is a bridge with the past and is concerned with the drawing upon cultural values, real or imagined. (*The Professional Soldier*, pp. 139-143.) Based on this distinction Kourvetaris suggests, after a series of interviews with military officers, that, in the Greek case, there is a synthetic self-image of the military professionals composed from indigenous cultural/social influences and exogenous western managerial professional influences; a fusion of the "heroic" self-image and the "specialist-technical-managerial" self-image. (See Kourvetaris "Professional Self-Images and Political Perspectives in the Greek Military", *American Sociological Review* 36, 1971.) The officers' self-image however should not be taken at face-value given that military people tend to exaggerate the heroic character of their identity, to downgrade the corporate identity of their social group and tend to justify their intervention in politics out of the highest objective of the national salvation. As Markoff rightly points out "*Social scientists must examine the self-interpretation of social actors but it does not follow that these interpretations must be also theirs*". (Markoff/Baretta, "Professional Ideology and Military Activism in Brazil" p. 186.) Moreover, perceptions are subjective and it is difficult "*to draw the line between self-deception and deliberate misrepresentation*" (Veremis,"Veto and Impasse", *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, p. 42.) On the other hand although self-images involve a considerable amount of wishful thinking, it would be too simplistic to disregard the weight of national ideals in the officers self-perceptions and concentrate exclusively on their self-seeking motives.

[31] See Karagiorgas, *From the IDEA to the Junta*, pp. 9-10.

American policy towards Greece was dictated primarily by defence considerations. American missions favoured politicians eager to cooperate but lacking in stature and principles, outspoken advocates of strong-armed efficiency, sometimes even preferring authoritarian regimes.[32] The operations of the Greek army were coordinated and supervised by the Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group (JUSMAPG) which advised that the military be isolated from the rest of society and protected from the ideological contagion which could destroy the unity of the forces. Many Greek officers shared this view and believed that for the sake of operational effectiveness the army should become an autonomous body answering only to its foreign advisers. Skills in ideological warfare and intelligence were carefully disseminated among officers who would later use them to promote their corporate interests. But most important, US involvement in Greek domestic affairs had its repercussions on the military mentality, given that military expenditure and technological innovation in the military field were given a high priority in the national budget, thus giving the military a strong sense of their importance in relation to other sectors.

Similarly, in the Latin American context, where the presence of the US was overwhelming, the US government's aim during the post-war cold war period had centred around the attempt to export anti-communist ideology and with it the emphasis on counter-insurgency, and through military arms, financial and technical assistance and extensive educational programmes, the United States achieved a monopoly of control over other foreign military missions in Latin America. Relations between the US and the domestic military never reached the extent in Greece that they did in Latin America, and neither did Greece have anything comparable to the Brazilian War Academy.[33]

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[32] See Veremis, "Greece and NATO", p. 249.

[33] In the case of Brazil, the military relations between the two countries were more than close. Through their interference in the *Escola Superior de Guerra*, the US advisory mission secured a firm hold on the education of the Brazilian officers. The school brought military officers into close contact with civilians and established a wide field of education. The contribution of the Brazilian School of War in creating the new military ideology of "national security and national development" was paramount and the school's concern with Brazilian political, economic and social life. It resulted in the politicisation of the Brazilian officers and the latters' connection with the civilian and technocratic elites. The central idea of the Brazilian military ideology was that development and security issues were inseparable. See Stepan, *The Military in Politics*, pp. 172-187.

The creation of IDEA: Paramilitary and conspiratorial behaviour

In many developing countries, the expansion of the political activity of the military rested on and was facilitated by the internal paramilitary police control system. These mechanisms provided a basis for social and political control and increased the ability of political regimes to maintain their power.[34] Post-war Greece saw the emergence of paramilitary organisations which functioned with the secret backing of the national government and were held widely responsible for the forceful exclusion of leftist groups from the political process. The dictatorship of the colonels was connected to the existence and the activities of such paramilitary forces, in the exercise of the anti-communist political authority. These forces were said to exist within the larger context of a so-called "para-state", the "hidden", unofficial state behind the official Greek state. The existence of conspiratorial officers' cliques within the military establishment meant the breakdown of civilian supervision and control, a dangerous decline in discipline and widespread factionalism within the army.

Post-war Greece saw the development of an influential paramilitary organisation, known as IDEA ("Holy Bond of Greek Officers"), whose members effectively imposed their domination over the army and the whole of the Greek political establishment in 1967. Although the IDEA never enjoyed high membership among army officers, it managed to create an influential paramilitary conspiratorial organisation and to secure the necessary posts and connections to enable its subsequent intervention in politics.[35] The history of the IDEA had its roots in the period of the German occupation of Greece. It was originally formed by Greek officers in Palestine under the name of the "Union of Young Officers" (ENA) and in October 1944 was transformed into the IDEA, an ideologically "pure" union of officers, who wanted to promote their corporate interests. In their initial proclamation, the members of IDEA asked for the *"forceful exclusion from the armed forces of officers*

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[34] Morris Janowitz, in his analysis of the military institution in developing nations, examines the role of paramilitary forces and police agencies in the internal coercion of such nations and their relationship to the military power bloc. Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, 1977.

[35] See Veremis, "Veto and Impasse", pp. 29-30.

with internationalist beliefs and nationally doubtful convictions".[36] They considered as their model the "revolutions of 1909 and 1936" and were obsessed with the "imminent communist danger". IDEA was not a royalist organisation and in their programmes there was never any mention of their faithfulness to the king. Royalist officers never became members of IDEA. In that respect, the IDEA officers initiated a latent antagonism within the ranks of an apparently anti-communist/royalist military between the royalists, on the one hand, and the militaristic/ultra-conservative officers, on the other.

Unavoidably IDEA developed into an interest group for the promotion of the corporate interests of a group of officers who accepted as members only those who shared their ultra-conservative political philosophy. Many members of the IDEA were educated in the United States, they had espoused "new professional" doctrines of "*anti-insurgency and internal security* ". Having managed to secure crucial posts in the Greek Intelligence Service they were considered the main link with the CIA. They managed to infiltrate and to influence the policy of party leaders, Church figures and foreign powers. IDEA was a closed club of faithfuls to its vociferous slogans, its oath, full of fanaticism, in the post-war period. The members of this club formed a paramilitary organisation, in which the members assisted each other with the objective purpose of occupying the whole pyramid of the hierarchy from bottom to the top.[37]

Their power and influence became apparent in 1951 when, as an act of support to their leader, Marshal Papagos, they staged a coup, but due to the latter's refusal to participate in it, a military dictatorship was avoided, while the subsequent electoral victory of Papagos and his secure position, tamed the IDEA officers. Thereafter, the IDEA organisation ceased to exist, but its ex-members, by maintaining their hard-core principles, continued as the ultra-rightist faction of the army and were ready to intervene as soon as they perceived a threat coming from the non-rightist elements in the political world. In 1958, the ex-IDEA officers, following the achievement by the leftist EDA of a 24% percentage of the national vote, formed a new paramilitary organisation called EENA

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[36] Stavrou, *Allied Politics and Military Interventions*, p. 116.
[37] Karagiorgas, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

("Union of Young Greek Officers") under the leadership of Papadopoulos, which in subsequent years pursued a reactionary and at times violent policy towards the progressive-leftist political elements in Greek society. The organisation of IDEA due to its conspiratorial activities during the post-war period, became the subject of discussions in parliament and criticism from the press.

The immediate causes for the breakdown of democracy in Greece and the army's determination to intervene directly in the political process came after the 1964 electoral victory of the Centre Union, when right-wing parliamentary domination was threatened by the centre-left political forces. In the context of a major threat to the post-war anti-communist political arrangement, the military hierarchies, and more specifically the ultra-conservative forces of the military, felt that they had to intervene in politics. [38]

C. The power structure of the 21st of April regime: A military-supported dictatorship

The military intervention of 1967 grew out of conspiratorial activities of two different military groups: the "big junta" of the generals and the "small junta" of the colonels. Although the army was in agreement as to its intervention in parliamentary politics, at that particular historical point, it was divided on the question of the nature of the established regime. The big junta of royalist, higher-ranking officers decided to stage their coup on the 24th of April 1967, in order to present the king with a "fait accompli". It was a coup planned by the top elite of the military, a sort of "palace coup", which would respect and maintain the hierarchy of the military apparatus under the higher political command of the king. A second coup d'etat of April 1967 was master-minded by the "small junta", a group of colonels with a common IDEA background, with strong anti-royal and anti-communist sentiments, who were from a lower social background than the

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[38] The Prime Minister of the Centre Union tried to diminish the influence of the reactionary ex-IDEA members within the army by sending them to remote military posts away from the army centres. Moreover, the activities of ASPIDA, an anti-IDEA, leftist conspiratorial army organisation and an alleged sabotage of Evros created a climate of a communist threat within the army itself. For a detailed presentation of these events. (See Linardatos *From the Civil War to the Junta*, Vol. 5.) To a large portion of the army officers this type of situation, aggravated by governmental instability, created a sense of threat for the nation as a whole and an aversion towards parliamentary tactics.

members of the big junta, which they set for the 21st April, in order to pre-empt the forthcoming coup of the royalist generals of the "big junta".[39] This coup, planned by middle-ranking officers proved to be the more successful and organised.[40] The deep political disagreements between the two army factions became apparent with the accession of the military junta to power.

Apart from the deeper ideological differences between the two conspiratorial factions of the military, there was also an immediate corporate reason which had to do with the promotion structure of the post-war army. While career advancement is a slower process in times of peace, a "promotional freeze" had generated dissatisfaction among young career officers who accepted the 21st of April coup more easily and resented the interference of politicians in their professional careers.[41] This climate of discontent among military officers helps to explain why many officers, during the dictatorship, chose to accept the junta in exchange for higher military posts, governmental or other administrative positions.

The April coup d'etat involved a declaration of a "state of siege" which suspended basic constitutional rights and imposed martial law. It was blatantly unconstitutional since neither the king nor any minister of the previous civilian government was conscious of this act; it was imposed without the knowledge of either the prime minister or the king.[42] While

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[39] Of the 12 members of the 1967 coup d' etat, 7 were members of the Military Academy class of 1943 and 4 had graduated with the class of 1940, having entered the Academy during the Metaxas dictatorship; all of them came from peasant or lower middle class backgrounds, from villages or small towns, and were sons of peasant farmers or petty government functionaries. 5 of the 12 had been faithful IDEA members and there is a strong possibility that all 12 had belonged to that organisation at one time or another. The "small junta" of the IDEA officers having been informed about the exact big junta plan intervened promptly on the 21st to place political power in the hands of middle- ranking army officers. Details of the conspiracies of the two juntas are discussed among others, in Karagiorgas' op.cit., in Degiannis' The Trial, and in S. Gregoriades' The History of the Dictatorship Vol.1.

[40] A main feature of the 1967 coup was the fact that it was bloodless and it did not meet resistance from the rest of the officers. The coup d'etat managed to get on top of eleven thousand Greek officers in a single night which reveals the secrecy and high organisation of the conspiracy.

[41] During the civil war, due to the need for more military officers, standards were lowered and many officers were held up at the bottom, with few chances for promotion, while the number of top posts was limited. The top leadership at the time of the coup belonged to the pre-war group while the majority of low- and middle-ranking officers belonged to the post-war group. The level of corporate dissatisfaction is shown by the fact that prior to the 1967 coup, 200 captains had formed an association for the advancement of their personal interests. Mouzelis "Capitalism and Dictatorship in Post-war Greece", p.74 and Politics in the Semi-Periphery, p. 144.

[42] The manner in which the coup was carried out showed that the middle-ranking officers who organised the coup had fewer connections or ties of loyalty to individuals or institutions outside the army than the other higher-ranking conspirators and therefore a lack of support from a political elite for the stabilisation of their rule. Edward Feit in The Armed Bureaucrats, p. 122.

initially the colonels succeeded in getting   King Constantine's acquiescence, following

the failed attempt by the king at a second coup d'etat on December 13 1967, the king fled

the country. However, the junta did not immediately abolish the monarchy, instead

imposing the regency of Zoitakis. It had however lost   royalist support, and alienated a

large proportion of the army.

The seven-year military rule was mainly the affair of a certain faction within the

army, led by a small band of conspiratorial officers. The other two services tolerated the

Colonels' regime, but never harboured any warm feeling toward it.[43] The collective type

of political authority exercised by a certain faction of the military and the attempt by the

leader of the "Revolutionary Council",[44] Papadopoulos, to transform the military

dictatorship into a personalistic type of dictatorial/presidential rule, resulted in conflicts

within the power bloc, whereby officers in the government attempted to use their posts to

further their own political interests.

The military junta having seized power, did not stop thinking and acting in a

conspiratorial way, lacking the necessary political organisation or experience to be able to

pursue a sound governmental policy. The military junta carried out a purge of senior

officers, offered accelerated promotion to those at the bottom of the hierarchy, while with

the military in government there were ample opportunities for patronage. Following the

king's coup attempt in December 1967, the officer corps was purged of all royalist

elements to a degree that adversely affected the operational capabilities of the armed

forces.[45] Most of the officers supported the coup knowing that their chances of promotion

would increase given the numerous dismissals that would inevitably follow:

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[43] Note the difference with the Chilean case where the coup installed a four-man junta of the army, the air force, the navy and the paramilitary police. Also in 1966 the Argentinean coup was planned by the chiefs of staff of the three armed forces, rather than by one faction within the military. On the contrary, the 1976 military intervention in Argentina did not enjoy unity in the armed forces and the 1976-1983 regime can be seen as "semi-factional". See Guillermo Makin "Argentina: The Authoritarian Impasse" in *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, p. 160.

[44] The highest executive organ of the military government composed of the initiators of the coup.

[45] Some three thousand officers in all were retired or dismissed between 1967 and 1972, while congestion in the middle ranks reached a high level. By 1974, officers of the ranks of lieutenant and captain formed 43% of the entire corps, while those in the middle ranks of major and colonel amounted to no less than 54%. (See Veremis, "The Military" in *Political Change in Greece: Before and After the Colonels*, Featherstone & Katsoudas, eds., p. 220.) Much of the blame for the Cyprus debacle in 1974 was due to the weak organisation of the Greek armed forces which were debilitated because their most skilful officers, belonging to the higher ranks, refused to cooperate with the military rulers.

The new means of advancement was the overthrowing of the hierarchy. Discipline

collapsed. Higher officers were transformed into puppets in the hands of the lower

officers. Very capable officers were dismissed on the grounds that they were not

liked by the conspirators. [46]

On the whole the colonels neutralised the danger of a counter-revolution either from

the military or the political world by establishing a system of informers, who belonged to

all social groups, from the very top down to servants and porters, thus enabling the regime

to control the pro-royalists and anti-royalists, the Church, financial circles and the Armed

Forces. Within the civil service, the military government carried out an extensive purge of

several thousand unreliable or opposition elements, replacing them with retired army

officers, soldiers and their kin and introducing into each ministry and bureau a military

"watch-dog" to monitor the activities of the civil servants.[47] The situation was similar in

the officers' corps and as one general has aptly put it,

In every military unit in the country, there was a governmental officer, with the

rank of the captain, imposed by the military regime, who told his superiors how to

conduct their military affairs. The most important value of the military institution is

discipline, which was abolished by the regime of Papadopoulos. If discipline

does not exist then the army loses its character and its tenacity. [48]

For their part the politicians of the right and the left were overwhelmingly against

any collaboration with the dictatorial regime, even when the junta, in its effort to liberalise

its authority, asked for the partnership of ex-politicians. The military governors' proposals

to the politicians that they should participate in a partly civilianised government were all

rebuffed.[49] Instead, the military rulers, during their seven years in power, tried to act as

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[46] See Karagiorgas, *op.cit.*, p. 61, [in Greek].

[47] On the relationship between the military rulers and the civil bureaucracy see Danopoulos' "The Military and Bureaucracy in Greece, 1967-1974" in *Public Administration and Development*, Vol. 8, pp.219-231, where he argues that the military as political governors, due to the nature of their military profession, which emphasises discipline and strict subordination, created an atmosphere to which the less regimented and more give-and-take oriented bureaucrats had difficulty becoming accustomed.

[48] Personal interview with General Nikiforos Karavellas, November 1990, [in Greek].

[49] Karamanlis, from France, had stated from the beginning that he would only be involved in Greek politics once the military had completely stepped aside. Kanellopoulos, the leader of the conservative party and Mavros the leader of the centre union had openly voiced their disagreement with the liberalisation measures. Averoff of the conservative party was one politician who wanted to act as a bridge between politicians and the junta. The rest of the political personalities were either exiled in the country or abroad

civilian governments and to persuade the populace of their capabilities to rule better than the civilians whom they had replaced. Their experience as professional soldiers however did not provide the military rulers with the necessary skills to be effective initiators of political change.[50] Although the military rulers tried to act as civilians in their policy-making, the mentality of their professional soldier hampered them. The military background did not provide the military rulers with sufficient organisational and educational skills, or adequate political flexibility to pursue or even to formulate government policy. While in other cases, there may be increased transferability of the professional officers' skills to domestic political activity, the Greek military profession, showed a limited ability to bargain and to communicate, skills which are crucial if political power is to be retained.[51] Moreover, Greek military officers had a tendency to be "anti-politics" and even to be hostile to politicians and politics groups, because they distrusted the bargaining process of party politics and tended to believe that any problem is amenable to a direct and simple solution. Such contradictions came to be more than obvious in the military rulers' perception of the Greek realities, while all the specific features of the Greek military mind were reproduced in both their ideological discourse and their policy towards the youth.

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and/or had formed resistance movements. The only notable cases of collaborators included Pipinelis, the foreign affairs minister, and Markezinis, the puppet prime minister in 1973.

[50] This was most clearly seen in their inability to produce a stable government. During seven years of military rule, there was a sequence of six different governments and seven partial reshuffles. Kremmydas, *The People of the Junta after the Dictatorship*, pp. 215-228.

[51] Morris Janowitz, *Military Institutions and Coercion in the Developing Nations*, p. 116.

Chapter 6 : THE 21ST OF APRIL REGIME'S IDEAS OF THE POST-WAR REALITY: MILITARY MENTALITIES

The ideas of the military junta reflected the "mentalities and prejudices" of the post-war military officers, the guardians of the official anti-communist state. It was a sum of contradictory themes expressing the personal views of the various officers participating in the "Revolutionary Council", and of those associated with them. These themes did not constitute an ideology as such, but a type of "pseudo-ideology", unable to present a coherent authoritarian discourse in order to mobilise society and legitimise authoritarian rule. The absence of an authoritarian ideology, the lack of coherence in the guiding principles, and above all, the mentality of the rulers, the military elite, were serious obstacles to the process of mobilisation and attempts to encourage participation. Instead, the ideological priority and the political practice of the regime aimed at the depoliticisation of the masses in order to leave them politically apathetic.

The various military officers held some vague ideological notions in common. These general ideological commitments included their rhetorical attachment to the traditional Greek values of the Helleno-Christian civilisation, hostility to the threat of Pan-Slav communism and to the heresies of Western neo-anarchism. These vague, commonly held notions were presented as if they constituted the ideology of a united elite, thus papering over the conflicting tendencies within the junta. Due to the inability of the military junta to achieve unity in its ideology, the regime tried to create a constitutional legitimacy based on a new constitution, a type of a "pseudo-liberal regime", following the model of the constitutional democracies of Western Europe. Ultimately, the military regime was unable to provide itself with any sort of ideological or constitutional legitimacy, and this resulted in conflicts within its ranks and the downfall of the military regime.

Disregarding their own internal ethos and their highest military values of discipline, obedience and the unity of the military corps, the military rulers sought to impose their will through conspiratorial tactics and evinced a total disrespect towards the previous hierarchies, the military itself, the Church, the civil service and the educational apparatus.

Due to the lack of an organised political base, the junta aimed to impose its own clientelistic network of people ιη the policy-making machinery, which typically reflected their post-war patterns of para-military behaviour, and to create a new political establishment to replace the previous one. In the place of an ideological legitimation, the Greek military regime based its connection with civil society on the imposition of a clientelistic network of people loyal to the regime, a clear case of authoritarian clientelism. Overall, there was an unbridgeable gap between the rhetoric of the military rulers and their actual practice, between their declared predilections and their political actions, which became even more apparent in the educational field where their ultra-conservative rhetoric contrasted with the urgent need for modernisation, following the other advanced liberal industrialised societies.

Right wing military ideology

A model case of a right-wing military ideology, as such, as with fascist ideology, does not exist, given the variety of military interventions in politics in various parts of the world, and the variety of national contexts within which interventions occur. Some common themes however do appear in the various cases, points of convergence between the different right-wing dictatorial military regimes. In general, military governments evoke the danger to the social or political order, in their effort to justify their intervention in politics. Law and order, therefore becomes the main rhetorical objective, which indicates the vagueness of military's conception of its function when it takes on the role of authoritarian ruler. In most cases the danger to the political order is really a cover for their own corporate vulnerability and the objectives of law and order mean the securing of their position within the power bloc.

A prevalent theme in right-wing military ideology is the ample use of an anti-communist and anti-socialist rhetoric, which leads them to the outright repression of perceived subversive persons and social groups. They identify their nationalism with the promotion of traditional values, the exaltation of national military glory and the emphasis on traditional institutions such as the family and the Church. At the extreme, their

nationalism reaches the level of xenophobia and the exaggeration of foreign threats which endanger the national identity. The right-wing nationalism of the military however, has never attained the racist proportions of fascism, or the imperialistic/expansionist tendencies of the fascist inter-war regimes. If military rulers engage themselves in external wars, as was the case with 1974 Greece and 1982 Argentina, this is in order to distract the people's attention from the internal problems which threaten their stability as governments. In both cases, the external warfare led to the revelation of the military's inability to govern effectively and the overthrow of military regime.

Contrary to the fascist antipathy towards parliamentarism and liberalism, right-wing military regimes emphasise the temporary character of their rule and promise a return to liberal democracy. Most important, however, has been the lack of an international authoritarian context, an acceptable authoritarian alternative, which provided the inter-war authoritarian regimes with some sort of legitimacy. Looming in the background was always the international dominance of liberal democracy, which was never contested and which resulted in the most notable contradictions between the military's rhetoric and its dictatorial practice. Overall, military regimes tend to set forth very vague objectives in order to mask their inability to form a specific political strategy. On the other hand, the lack of an assertion of specific, articulate and explicit commitments facilitates their ideological adaptation to changing conditions.

Due to the abnormal character of military intervention, a rupture with the previous parliamentary development, military governors feel compelled to make a wide use of the ideological apparatuses, in order to justify the exceptional character of their authority. But they lack the systematic use of fascist propaganda methods and are therefore unable to adopt the mobilisational aspect of fascist regimes. Thus their main effort is to demobilise and depoliticise their respective populations, to promote a general apathy. They are therefore torn between an accepted limited pluralism and a need to keep an authoritarian control over the harmful deviations. As the Greek case of the 21st of April regime will show, all these elements attest to the lack of an ideological framework, the inability to employ ideology in order to interpret reality, to mobilise society or to legitimise their rule,

while, on the contrary, they use a constant rhetoric for the justification of the authoritarian exercise of power.

"Revolution": The junta's explanation of the coup d' etat

The military rulers rejected the descriptions of fascism, totalitarianism, and even dictatorship, as an explanation of the nature of their intervention, while they used the term "revolution" to such an extent, that it became a very common word in the official vocabulary of the military regime, and was perpetually used by the military officers and their intellectuals, in their effort to persuade the populace of their intention to alter radically the political life of Greece. The leaders of the 21st April intervention and their theorists, also rejected the notion of the "coup d' etat", and presented their intervention as a necessary "revolutionary change", brought about by a group of nationally-minded, middle-ranking officers.[1] Their political revolution aimed at the salvation of the country from "*chaos and red totalitarianism* " and at a "*national renaissance*" in the political, intellectual, social and administrative life. Furthermore, the term "revolution", was defined more "*as an attitude of mind and a moral stand, an expression of the soul rather than as a material expression* "[2] and in no sense did it go against the established status quo, but only against the corrupt political parliamentary system. They defined their action as,

> *the dynamic seizure of power by a dynamic minority which seizes power in order*
>
> *to exercise it. In a revolution, those who carry out the dynamic seizure of power*
>
> *reflect the wishes, hopes and ideals of the larger masses.* [3]

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[1] The actual intervention took place on the basis of the NATO project "Prometheus", which foresaw military intervention in politics in the case of a perceived communist threat. At the top of the conspiracy stood the triumvirate: Colonel Giorgos Papadopoulos, Brigadier General Stylianos Pattakos, Colonel Nikolaos Makarezos, who acted in agreement with the Revolutionary Council formed by Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels and Lieutenant Generals. According to the verdict by the special court, appointed after the downfall of the military junta, 24 officers had planned and executed the overthrow of the parliamentary government. The members of the triumvirate were charged as "instigators and leaders of the rebellion". (*The Trial* by Degiannis)

[2] Newspaper *Eleftheros Kosmos*, 21/11/72.

[3] See Giorgos Giorgalas' *The Ideology of the Revolution*, the main ideological document on the purposes of the dictatorial regime, p. 5, [in Greek].

The revolution was also classified as political and not social or economic. The intention of the military was to change neither the social and economic status quo, nor the liberal system, and was to encourage private initiative and private property.

> It is a political revolution which has swept away the old political establishment; the old parties, the electoral fiefs, the political oligarchies, the mentalities, the inner-relations and the organisations of our political world. [4]

Moreover the military officers perceived themselves,

> as children of the working class, not from any aristocracy or plutocracy, but from petty-bourgeois and peasant families and they compose the most sensitive parts of the national consciousness. [5]

Although they presented their "revolution" as one which enjoyed the acceptance of the people at large, they also proclaimed the inferiority of civil society vis a vis the military body by claiming that,

> the people accept the revolution on the basis of their instincts and intuition, without having realised the necessity or the cause of it, but when the revolution develops and reaches its aims, then the people can realise its necessity, faced with a "fait accompli". [6]

As was the case with the Metaxas regime, the 1967 dictatorial rulers expressed their aversion to the political establishment and the way parliamentary politics were conducted, not in the context of an internationally organised anti-parliamentarian and anti-liberal philosophy, but in the context of their own disrespect for politicians, which had marked their behaviour during the post-war period, and of the threat to their power position within the post-war political establishment. It was clear however form the beginning that the Greek military rulers had a very vague perception of what their role was, as political governors, and a sense of confusion as to their particular goals as policy-makers.

> Who are we? We belong to no political party and are not disposed to favour one political group or another. We belong to the working class and we remain on the

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[4] Ibid., p. 6.

[5] Ibid., p. 3.

[6] "Theoretical Positions on the Revolution" by K.Vryonis in Thesis kai Ideai, May 1968, p. 5, [in Greek].

side of those of our brother Greeks who are least well-off. We are activated solely

by patriotic aims and we hope to abolish deprivation, to cleanse public life and to

create a healthy basis so that the country may quickly return to a normal

parliamentary life. Our essential object is social justice, equitable distribution of

income, the moral and material resurrection of all society and particularly of the

peasants, the workers and the poorest classes. [7]

Anti-communism: The conspiratorial attitude of the military mind

The "threat from below" is the common denominator in all right-wing military regimes, whether of a personalistic character like the Pinochet, Salazar and Franco regimes, of a bureaucratic-authoritarian type, as in Argentina and Brazil, or of a purely military authoritarian type, as with the Greek case. It is the vague theme that holds the authoritarian coalitions together and supplies them with the constant justification of their exercise of authoritarian rule. In the Latin American cases, the Cuban Revolution provided the actual example of a communist takeover, the case to be avoided at any cost.[8] In the Greek case, the Balkan neighbours and the proximity of the cold war in Europe remained a permanent reminder and pretext for the anti-communist rhetoric.   The strongest element in the official ideology of the post-war state was anti-communism, which was perceived as the major enemy of the nation as a whole, and to the armed forces in particular. This was the principal legacy of the civil war of the 1940s, and was fuelled by the international climate of the cold war. In this respect, the military junta had nothing new to offer in the anti-communist orientation of their official discourse. The military rulers, and their ideologues, deliberately exaggerated the danger of such a threat, despite the fact that the dictatorship coincided with a the period of relative detente internationally, towards the end of the 1960s.[9]

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[7] William McNeil, *The Metamorphosis of Greece Since World War II*, p. 120.

[8] Robert Kaufman, "Liberalisation and Democratisation in South America", Unpublished draft, September 21, 1984, p. 6.

[9] The officers' education during the post-war period aggravated their anti-communist hysteria, having been done by ex-communist theoreticians who had lived in the countries of Eastern Europe and had become the wildest opponents of socialism. Among such ex-communists Giorgos Georgalas, Theofylaktos Papakonstantinou and Demetres Tsakonas had been the military propagandists and were subsequently

I shall merely present a recent statement by Zoitakis, the Regent of Greece during the period 1968-1972, concerning the way the military regarded communism in Greece, to illustrate the typical military perception:

KKE is an ally to our enemies. One such example is the civil war when the communists were helped by the Bulgarians and other communist states. The danger to the country is not the external but the internal one. It is the Greek communists that we have to eliminate in the first place, and then we can consider the external enemies. In the School of General Education, where military people were educated, a lecturer by the name of Stavrides, an ex-communist who had lived in the Soviet Union used to tell us about the strategy of communism. International communism strives to attain its dominance in all the countries of the world by following three stages: the first stage is the creation of a united front by collaborating with ideologically similar parties, in order to attract followers and increase its influence through the means of propaganda; the second stage is to collaborate with the government in order to infiltrate the state apparatus; the third stage is to overturn the government through secret illegal machinations and to attain the exercise of power and the imposition of communism. The best way to avoid communism is to prevent communists from having any contact with the other parties so that the communist movement is left isolated.

Greece has suffered more from communism than other countries. The first round with the communists took place during the occupation, with the creation of ELAS; the second round came in December 1944, with the attempt by the communist movement in Athens to seize power; the third round was during the "mob war" of 1946-1949. A few years later the party of George Papandreou initiated a collaboration with the communists. The communists started infiltrating the state apparatus, they terrorized the people of the countryside. They even infiltrated the army by creating the ASPIDA; the rest of the officers were very worried about the situation. In 1967, the communists were ready for the fourth round. The situation

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employed by the junta with the task of placing the authoritarian discourse into a more systematically organised form.

was ungovernable and that justified the government of the 21st of April in its

suppression of the fourth communist attempt to seize power. [10]

What interests us here is the way the anti-communist idea influenced the mentality

of military officers, who felt above all that their corporate interests were threatened by the

relaxation of the post-war anti-communist state. The military perceived communism as a

threat to the country and to their existence as a corps, and were not at all interested in the

philosophical analysis of marxist theory. They saw an element of conspiracy, very

common in their own way of thinking, in the process by which communism infiltrated

state mechanisms and, most importantly, the military apparatus.[11]

Concerning the actual practice of anti-communist policies, at the domestic level, the

junta devoted all its effort to the creation of an exclusionary and repressive state apparatus,

aimed against those who were communists or with communist affiliations. At the foreign

policy level, however, the Greek dictatorship restored diplomatic relations with Albania

and China, encouraged commercial and economic deals with the Soviet Union and Eastern

European states, and kept a low profile and good neighbourly relations with the Balkan

countries and the Eastern bloc, under the pressure of the international climate of detente.

Whatever the anti-communist hysteria at home, the regime stated through its propagandist

Georgalas, that Greece belonged to the West, to NATO, that it wanted peace and

cooperation internationally and the legitimacy of the international status quo.

Anti-westernism: The puritanical xenophobia of the military mind

The second negative perception in the military's way of thinking involved hostility

to the western world, to what was seen as its neo-anarchism, and to the modern western

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[10] Personal Interview, November 1990, [in Greek].

[11] The rhetorical persistence of the emphasis on a communist threat was common to all military officers from those who opposed the 1967 military intervention to the hard-core anti-democrats. General Zoitakis was among the mildest in contrast with Colonel Ladas who in his innumerable speeches used the wildest descriptions when he referred to the phenomenon of communism. Ladas attacked both internal and international communism and his allusions to the December events during the Greek civil war were very descriptive in horrific details of tortures, killings and fights, in his struggle to prove what crimes were committed by the *"murderers, the criminals, the human-like beasts of KKE"*. ("Speech to the Students of Athens", 10/12/70, in *Ladas' Speeches*, p. 31.) The leader Papadopoulos presented communists as much worse than the Nazi occupiers, stating that *"the victims of the Greek communists were greater in number than those of the Germans"* (*Our Creed*, Vol. 1, p. 27).

values and life style. The military regime of 1967 did not object to the ideas and practice of economic liberalism and capitalism, given the international ideological acceptance of western liberal ideology and Greece's position within the western capitalist bloc. Moreover, the military's role in the victory over the communist forces in the 1940s and its position within the post-war power structure, as the main guardian of the anti-communist state, testified to its capitalist predilection. On the other hand, the extremely puritanical orientation of the military mentality, focused on an attack against western cultural values, and obstructed the officers' ability to accept any new movements, innovations, or modern expressions of the western world. In his book, *The Crisis of the Consumerist Society*, Georgalas, the main propagandist of the 21st of April regime, makes an outright offensive against the values of the western world, against the practices and ideas of the western youth, whose decadence was expressed in the events of 1968 in France, the hippies in the United States and the various anarchists and nihilists of western societies. The notion that there was a conspiracy against the cultural self-sufficiency of the Greek nation and against the regime of the 21st of April sprang both from hostility to eastern communism and to the decadent values of the west, such as the hippies' movement, anarchism, nihilism, eudemonism, which was common to the way of thinking of all the junta officers and to the theoreticians of the regime.

> *Greekness and Christianity, the two sources of Greek life, were covered by the leaves of 'Europeanism', which has resulted in the fact that the Greeks have been drinking the muddy water of European atheism and anarchism- and nowadays of modernism......Our national heritage will either vanish within the western European mob or it will win and will have the lead.* [12]

Colonel Ioannis Ladas, a hard-core military officer, a fervent anti-liberalist and anti-communist went even further in condemning western modern civilisation in all its intellectual forms:

> *The Greeks are threatened by insignificant subjects who, through the press, the cinema and the theatre, among other means, bring to our society the decay of other*

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[12] See E. Papadopoulos, *The Portrait of a Leader or Five Years of Revolution*, Athens 1972, p. 8, [in Greek].

societies, to our people the corruption of other peoples and to our values the

filthiness of other values. It consists of an organised traitorous conspiracy against

Greek civilisation. [13]

The gap between rhetoric and practice is even more pronounced here, given that the junta actually pursued the complete opposite of what it professed. Contrary to the officers' anti-consumerist rhetoric, the military governors promoted a consumerist attitude for the majority of the Greek population, based on the import of luxurious goods from abroad, while 30% of the total national savings went on the construction of luxurious and semi-luxurious buildings.[14] The military junta abolished all limits on the supply of consumer loans. As to the junta's anti-westernism and distrust of western decadent values, the regime, through the promotion of tourism (and the intensive construction of hotels), brought these values into close contact with the most remote and isolated parts of the country and introduced the peasant community to foreign ways of life.[15] Borrowing for tourist hotels and facilities went up six times during the period 1967-1973. By pursuing policies aimed at the encouragement of consumerism and the development of tourism, the regime struggled to give the impression of prosperity, thus hoping to induce political apathy among the population and to secure the regime against any reaction from the various social sectors.

The nationalism of the junta: The vague and out-dated theme of "Helleno-Christianism"

Against the threatening values of the eastern communist and the western consumerist worlds, the military put forth the values of the "Helleno-Christian civilisation". Both Greek dictatorial regimes made ample use of the nationalist and religious

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[13] See *Ladas' Speeches*, p. 47, [in Greek].

[14] Each year the country spent approximately 150 million dollars on the import of luxurious goods; the total of imports quadrupled during the period 1967-1973, creating a huge deficit in the state budget. See Dionysis Karagiorgas' "The Economic Consequences of the Military Dictatorship" in *Politis* 1, 7/9/74, pp. 41-45.

[15] The military's purist and moralistic rhetoric was contradicted in actual fact by the massive inflow of hippy tourists into various summer resorts, while as regards their sexual morality, their period was characterised by the explosion of pornographic periodicals on open view in the kiosks and the massive production of pornographic films for export to the countries of Western Europe.

elements in Greece's cultural heritage, expecting that emphasis on such themes would strengthen the support for their regimes from traditionally-minded Greeks. Since nationalist and religious feelings are essential elements in the Greek cultural identity, the dictatorial regimes tried to convince the people that the national and religious parts of their Greek identity were in danger and needed to be safeguarded by a nationally-minded authoritarian government. The dictatorship of Metaxas took place in a period of a wider philosophical anxiety in Greece, regarding the rediscovery of the Greek identity, following the rapid changes of the 1920s, and coincided with the international climate of authoritarian fascist (aggressive or defensive) nationalism. Although Metaxas' dream of the creation of the "Third Greek Civilisation" sounded hyperbolic and excessive, it was typical of the European nationalisms of the day.

The military junta, on the other hand, promoted the theme of "Helleno-Christian Greece" as their main idea, in a period of economic, political and cultural cooperation among the countries of the Western world. Its evocation was another expression of the narrow traditionalistic military mentality and the officers' metaphysical fear of the cooperation and inter-connection between different cultures. The Greek nationalist spirit was perceived by the military to be in a continuous historical struggle against the conspiratorial activities of the different cultures surrounding the Greek nation. The officers' inability to form a coherent nationalist philosophy, resulted in the production of a series of nonsensical rhetorical statements, typical of their ill-based intellectual skills and of their ideological confusion, for example: "*The Greeks have always been Greeks of Greece, Greeks of the Greek nation*".[16] The ideological motto of the junta government was expressed in the "*Greece of Christian Hellenes*". A Greek-Christian person should be "*philopatris* " (to love his country), "*philonomos*" (to abide by the law), "*leventis* " (a brave and "macho" figure), a high moral person, proud, hospitable and a "good Christian", he should go to church, pray etc. The military officers believed that they possessed such qualities and offered themselves as exemplary models to the Greek people.

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[16] Papadopoulos in his "Speech to the Students of Salonica", 29/3/69, in *Our Creed*, Vol. 2.

The officers' perceptions of history are of crucial significance under military regimes, given that the significant role played by the armed forces in the development of the nation and the great responsibility of the army in the shaping of the nation's destiny gives military regimes rich opportunities to legitimise and justify their interventionist role in politics, by emphasising the importance of the armed forces in the nation's history. The military mind regards history, in general, and military history, specifically, as "*the most effective means of teaching war during peace time* ". The military ethic places unusual value upon the "*ordered, purposive study of history* ".[17] It tends to emphasise the importance of force as opposed to ideological and economic historical facts.

Following a very subjective interpretation of history the colonels and their intellectuals never ceased to compare the 1967 military intervention with the Greek revolution of 1921, to symbolise the "heroic character of the 1967 revolution" with the coup of 1909 in Goudi, the only real similarity being that the latter had also been also instigated by lower and middle-ranking officers. Colonel Ladas' fanatical rhetoric was an extreme case of the bellicose perception of history, as when in his speeches, he identified history with military history, and perceived Greek history exclusively as a sequence of military events: "*I have to fight in life in order to achieve Salaminas, Marathons, '21s and '40s, since only these events offer historical vindication to struggles, to peoples and to Nations*". The same Colonel went so far as to believe that Greece was surrounded by enemies and that the destiny of the youth ("*beyond education which is useless in the long run*") was to be ready for war, since war was inevitable given that "*there has not been any generation who lived without her own battle.......History shows that the Greek man exists only when he proves to the others the superiority of his existence*".[18] Ladas' ideas represented an extreme perception of the historical process, but even the best that the theorists of the regime could come up with was a very simplistic perception of the world history:

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[17] See Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, p. 64.
[18] "Speech to the Students of the Pedagogical Academy of Larisa", 27/11/71 in *Ladas' Speeches*, p. 83, [in Greek].

The basic theme in European history has been the continuous fight of the Greek

civilisation against the asiatic totalitarian spirit, which was later transformed into a

European fight against Asia and lately against communism .[19]

"New Democracy": The alleged transitional character of the junta regime

Most military rulers deny the authoritarian character of their regime and, in order to convince the people of the benevolent nature of their rule, claim the temporariness of their tenure of power and declare their allegiance to the true principles of democracy. While Metaxas declared openly his distrust for liberal democracy and his admiration for totalitarianism, the military rulers could not admit such a purpose and justified their intervention as a necessity for the creation of a "healthy democracy" or the "new democracy", as they called it. They sought to persuade people of their allegiance to the principles of democracy.

The revolution of the 21st April regime did not overturn democracy since this was

nonexistent in reality. It was abolished by the irresponsibility of the enemies of

freedom, the corruption of most of the rulers, the deep undermining of the

institutions, the unscrupulous cooperation with the enemies of the country, and the

wholesale infiltration by the latter through the body of our national

organism........The 21st of April revolution overthrew this situation and is

considered an anti-dictatorial, anti-totalitarian regime for the purposes of true

freedom.......True democracy is legal freedom, a power which is limited by the

Law, is bound by the institutions and controlled by Public Opinion .[20]

Like most of the post-second world war military dictatorships in Latin America, the military junta promised a return to democracy as soon as the government judged that the time was ripe for it.[21] The leader Papadopoulos frequently announced that he would personally decide when *"the level of maturity of the Greek people "* was right for a return

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[19] See Giorgalas, *The Ideology of the Revolution*, p. 44, [in Greek].

[20] See *The Ideology of the Revolution*, pp. 36-38, in Greek].

[21] Similarly General Pinochet had announced in 1974 that the military would remain in power for no more than five years, turning out to be one of the longest dictatorships in the Southern Cone. Skidmore/Smith, *Modern Latin America*,
p. 142.

to the electoral, party system. Papadopoulos used to refer to the country, *"as a sick patient, who needed to be operated on by the surgeons of the 21st April Revolution and was put in a plaster for the process of recovery"*. [22]

The constitutional framework: The pseudo-liberal facade

Whereas inter-war mobilisational authoritarian regimes were mostly based on their ideological formulations, post-war authoritarian liberal regimes, relied mostly on the imposition of a legalistic framework, by enacting constitutions after the liberal model, and demanding obedience on the basis of their own legal authority. This is what is known as the "rational-legal" formula of legitimation under military regimes which is based on the adoption of a set of constitutional and procedural principles. Hence military rulers try to base their new form of authoritarian rule on the rational-legal legitimacy, of imposed authoritarian pseudo-liberal institutions. As Nordlinger argues,

There are various ways in which the praetorians have provided themselves with a constitutional-democratic facade: a national legislature that can do little more than discuss and approve legislation introduced by the government; elections for national, state and local officials that are restricted to officially approved candidates; elections for the presidency featuring a single candidate; plebiscites in which the government asks for and 'receives' the approval of more than 90% of those who cast their ballots; and the 'civilianisation' of the regime, whereby the head of governmentsheds his uniform in order to look more like a constitutional president or prime minister. But whatever form it takes, such a facade does not provide a legitimising mantle. [23]

The military junta was an authoritarian regime existing in the western, liberal sphere, in a world in which western liberal values were accepted and legitimised, with the exceptions of the authoritarian regimes of Spain and Portugal. Much of the preoccupation of the military regime was to persuade its international partners of the necessary and non-

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[22] It was said that George Papadopoulos wanted initially to become a medical doctor while many of his colleagues believed that his obsession with clinical images, drugs and operations was the result of his deep rooted disappointment. "Who's Junta", in *Hellenic Review*, June 1969, p. 28.

[23] See Nordlinger's *Soldiers in Politics*, pp. 133-134.

exceptional character of the regime. Evidence of that was their perseverance in the construction of a liberal constitutional framework. The main concern of the military was to avoid relinquishing political power, and although they promised a return to "democratic rule", at the same time they imposed a constitutional framework which gave the armed forces a permanent and legal share in future governments. The Greek junta struggled to persuade the Greek people and the outside world of the democratic intentions of the military rulers. Judging from its rhetoric, it would appear that they were respectful of individual liberties and committed to the application of the laws. The Greek military constitution was based, theoretically, on universal suffrage and the sovereignty of the people and it even included clauses providing for the existence of political parties.[24]

As regards the Constitution, the dictatorship was divided into two periods: from September 1967 until June 1973, the "royalist phase" and from June 1973 until July 1974, the "presidential/parliamentary phase". On September 29, 1968 the junta organised a referendum on a new constitutional framework, which according to military official records, was accepted by 91.87% of the Greek population. The classical parliamentary system was preserved, while the role of the king in relation to the government and the armed forces was diminished. Administrative autonomy was provided for the armed forces, and the government was excluded from matters directly involving the personnel of the armed forces. A very strong position was secured for the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces within the decision making process, by making him a sort of uncontrollable "super-minister" within the "Council of the Nation". The concept of national defence was defined as vaguely as possible, so as to allow the intervention of the army whenever the circumstances demanded it. The application of the 1968 constitution was a marked contrast between the letter and the actual practice and the regime ended up by being "*a monarchy without a king, a liberal regime without liberties and a parliamentary system without a*

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[24] Similarly, the Portuguese constitutional framework was republican and conservative in character, with the use of western classical democratic principles to disguise its authoritarian nature. See Demichel, *Les Dictatures Europeenes*, for a comparative study of the Portuguese, Spanish and Greek dictatorial constitutional frameworks.

parliament".[25] Its basic intention was to achieve a measure of international and domestic

support and, at the same time, to secure the role of the armed forces in politics.

A new constitution in 1973, following the Navy conspiracy of May 23, 1973,

introduced the new powerful office of "President of the Republic", directly elected by the

people every seven years, and abolished the Monarchy.[26] The regime declared a

referendum, similar to the 1968 one, on July 29 1973, for the approval of the new

constitution, according to which the prime minister Papadopoulos and the leader of the

armed forces, Angelis, became president and vice-president of the "Republic" respectively,

and included among other things, clauses on the role of parliament in the future and the

degree of democratisation. The second military constitution was full of contradictions, in

its effort to emphasise the power of the president and, at the same time, to preserve the

parliamentary character of the regime. The central purpose of the new constitution was to

define the relationship between the president and the army.[27]

The referendum on the constitution was followed by the lifting of the state of

emergency throughout the country, the granting of a general amnesty to political prisoners

and the recognition and application in practice, for the first time since 1967, of

constitutionally guarranteed rights. That was the first attempt by the junta to liberalise and

civilianise its authoritarian rule, by appointing on ex-politician Markezinis, one of the very

few politicians willing to collaborate with the military rulers, as premier. The liberalisation

phase was short-lived and ended with the student Polytechnic uprising in November

1973.[28]

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[25] *Ibid.*, p. 200.

[26] Traditionally the navy was a royalist stronghold and the main source of military opposition to the military government. The navy conspiracy showed the reluctance of the royalist forces to accept the dictatorship and forced the colonels to do away with the royal institution altogether. At the December 1974 referendum, under the parliamentary government of Karamanlis, the monarchy was abolished once and for all, showing that the colonels feelings towards the monarch were not sharply different from the Greek public's at large. Indeed, in retrospect, it is often been said that the only positive contribution of the military junta was the fact that it prepared the ground for the abolition of the monarchy.

[27] According to the interim provisions Papadopoulos was to remain president until 1981 and it was his responsibility to appoint the leaders of the army, the navy and the air force and the eleven permanent members of the Constitutional Court, an institution on which depended the future formation and the constitutionality of the political parties.

[28] On the Greek dictatorial constitution see the relevant chapters in Alivizatos, *Political Institutions in Crisis, 1922-1974*, Catephores, *The Legislation of the Barbarians*, Gregoriades, *op.cit.*, Demichel, *op.cit.*, Anastasiades, "Constitutional Stage-Designing and Ideology of the Dictatorship" in *Anti* 344, pp. 21-28.

Other attempts to demonstrate the liberal intentions of the regime and its loyalty to the western liberal model included the formation of an Advisory Committee on Legislation in January 1971, composed of 56 individuals selected by the prime minister from a short list "voted" by a college of 1,240 electors, who were regime nominees to local government, professional and union organisations -the mini parliament which discussed draft laws but had no authority to generate legislation. Moreover, the regime tried to create parties which would compete in elections, as was the proclaimed intention in the new Constitution, but it was not clear whether the newly formed parties would constitute governmental or opposition parties.[29] Yet despite the liberal facade, the military governors were unable to respect their own legal formulae, which came into broad conflict with the authoritarian structure of their authority. By closing off opportunities for mass participation, political competition and the public airing of demands they were contravening the very laws from which they had proposed that their constitutional legitimacy would derive.

Political socialisation under the military regime: Limited pluralism and the promotion of mediocrities

The 1967 junta made an ample use of the ideological mechanisms and engaged in the dissemination of their ideas through speeches, journals, newspapers, radio and television.[30] It is at this level that we observe the inability of the regime to create a new political discourse or even to articulate its intentions, regarding some of the more basic ideological and cultural questions. One of the initial acts of the military governors was their decision to censor a long list of printed publications, i.e., books, newspapers and periodicals. The first official act came from the ministry of education (12/5/67), which forbade the circulation of 647 books by both Greek and foreign authors (mostly marxist, historical and literary works), 44 periodicals and 83 newspapers.[31]

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[29] The new parties were the Greek Cultural Movement (EPOK) and the Social Union of Scientists. McDonald, "The Colonels' Dictatorship", in *Background to Contemporary Greece*, pp. 290-291.

[30] It is ironic that both radio and television in Greece started their lives during periods of authoritarian rule. Radio broadcasts commenced in 1936, and television came with the colonels. See Katsoudas, "The Media: the State and Broadcasting" in *Political Change in Greece*, p. 189.

[31] See Nicos Molyviatis "The Junta's First Act on Censorship", *Anti*, 19/4/91, pp. 28-29.

The relationship between the junta and the press was a very delicate one for the colonels, who did not trust the journalists but thought that they could manipulate them through the fear of terror, on the one hand, and the use of promises, on the other. Their conspiratorial mentality extended to the way they perceived the role of the press. As McDonald points out,

> *the Colonels mistrusted the press and were afraid of it. They had an image of*
>
> *publishers as ruthless, unscrupulous press barons prepared to do or say anything*
>
> *to turn a profit and they believed newspapers to be manipulative instruments*
>
> *irresponsibly influencing public life from behind-the-scenes.*[32]

Preventive censorship was lifted in October 1969 and the Book Index was abolished in the Summer of 1970. In their place a very severe and meticulous Press Law was imposed, with the threat of stiff sentences on any writer or newspapermen who might offend the colonels.[33] The result of this press policy was, on the one hand, that rumours, which tended to form the basis of peoples' information, flourished, while on the other hand, the press used insinuations, transpositions and metaphors which it would be difficult for the authorities to prosecute. Foreign Press and foreign radio stations, like the BBC, and Deutsche Welle were the main objective and uncensored sources of information for the Greeks.

The person responsible for the regime's propaganda was Georgalas,[34] who suggested the creation of a Central National Office of Propaganda, which would finance the publication of books, periodicals and newspapers. His personal conviction was that there should exist a limited degree of pluralism in the diffusion of information which

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[32] McDonald, *Pillar and Tinderbox*, p. 30.

[33] See Rodis Roufos "The Culture and the Military" in *Greece under Military Rule*, p. 155.

[34] Georgalas was appointed the junta's junior minister in charge of public relations, propaganda and Press services. Georgalas, a professional propagandist, became the regime's chief spokesman, and the prime intellectual of the 21st of April regime. A communist in his youth he was educated in propaganda methods as a communist refugee in the countries of Eastern Europe. Following the death of Stalin he defected to the opposite camp and became "special adviser to the Higher Military Administration for National and Political Indoctrination" and editor of an army journal "Sovietologia" (Soviet Studies). (Robert McDonald, "Typoktonos Tyranny" in *Anti*, 344, p. 30.) He was a fervent anti-communist, attacking at the same time the values of the modern western consumerist society. He was assigned the task of popularising the aims of the Revolution.

would prevent strong reactions against the regime. Theophylactos Papakonstantinou, the regime's press director and one of the ministers of Education (November 1, 1967-June 20, 1969) wrote the book "Political Education", which was distributed at all stages of primary, secondary and higher education and was considered religiously as the statement of the political philosophy of the regime.[35]

The military made use of some so-called theorists, all people loyal to the regime, who aimed at placing the official ideology into a more organised theoretical framework. In desperate need of theoreticians, the junta realised the hopes of several second-class authors who were writing to argue in its favour and to deliver speeches in support of it. For all these "pseudo-intellectuals", the "Helleno-Christian" theme was at the core of their ideas. Some newspapers and periodicals which were set up during the period, offered the space for their ideas. As such, the regime's newspaper *Nea Politeia* had only a very limited circulation and influence.[36] In addition, a new publishing house, the *Neos Kosmos* (New World) published titles such as the memoirs of the daughter of Stalin and books and articles on how repressive communist methods were. Finally, the periodical *Theses and Ideai* aimed to become the intellectual standard bearer of the regime and "to promote a radically new perception of society", a similar effort to the 4th of August's *Neon Kratos*. As Clogg argues,

> *the regime's principal spokesmen and theorists have deliberately been allowed to*
>
> *speak as much as possible for themselves, although in trying to tabulate their*
>
> *thinking in a reasonably intelligible form, there is a danger of making the regime's*
>
> *ideology sound more coherent than it in fact is. For the speeches of those*
>
> *empowered to theorise on ideological matters contain numerous inconsistencies,*
>
> *ambiguities and downright obscurities.*[37]

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[35] Papakonstantinou, a former militant communist, and an author of two books on marxism, had abandoned the communist party during the period of Metaxas' rule and became a fanatic anti-communist thereafter. Although he had initially declared himself to be against the military intervention, he was very soon among the principal propagandists of the 21st of April ideology.

[36] Another ex-communist Savvas Konstantopoulos was the editor of the pro-junta newspaper *Eleftheros Kosmos* (Free World), founded six months before the coup.

[37] See Clogg, "The ideology of the Revolution of 21st April 1967" in *Greece Under Military Rule*, p. 51.

The most important thing to be realised about the cultural awareness of the military officers was their lack of connection with such matters, due to their own one-sided and limited education. Even in cultural matters, they applied their clientelistic mentality, compensating loyal officers with administrative posts.[38] Contrary to Metaxas' sensitivity on such matters, the military junta flattered popular taste, promoting football and bouzouki nationwide as Greece's most precious cultural activities.[39] Most leading Greek intellectuals during the period of the military regime either chose silence rather than submission to censorship, or fled abroad. An art-historian and critic, Alexander Xydis wrote about this situation:

> *Discrimination against, and attacks upon, the most important currents in modern art*
>
> *are increasing....Mediocrity alone is recognised, because it alone is harmless,*
>
> *poses no problems, lacks impetus, looks backward.* [40]

On the other hand, the junta tried to create an illusory climate of freedom in cultural matters by allowing the controlled circulation of ideas. Neutral art and literature were tolerated in order to give a liberal facade to the regime.[41]

Factionalism within the military junta: Hard-liners vs soft-liners

The previous section was devoted to the selection of some representative themes, the points of agreement among the officers, and the military's ideological effort to present itself as having a unified body of ideas, the official ideological framework of the regime. Despite the apparent ideological unity among the leaders of the military regime, with respect to some very general and vague ideas and objectives, the junta was a military

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[38] The directorship of the National Opera, for instance was awarded to a Brigadier of tanks. McDonald, "The Colonels' Dictatorship", p. 277.

[39] See Katsoudas, *op.cit.*, p. 195.

[40] See Andrews Kevin' *Greece in the Dark*, p. 31.

[41] It is interesting that, Axelos talks of a publishing "eruption" during the second period of the dictatorship starting in mid-1970 shown by the plethora of new publishing houses and the reconstruction and reorganisation of the already existing ones. "*The gain in this period, over and above its negative aspects, was extremely important. Because for the first time in Greek history, there was the appearance of such publishing variety, and for the first time in the field of the circulation of written ideas there was an extraordinary concentration of people*". It was the period of the beginning of the end of the cultural, ideological monopoly exercised by the traditional left and the traditional right in the movement of ideas and books, the crumbling of their post-war unchallenged hegemony and the beginning of a limited pluralism in the diffusion of ideas that would affect the subsequent decade. Loukas Axelos "Publishing Activity and the Movement of Ideas in Greece" in *The Journal of Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol xi, No 2, Summer 1984, pp. 5-46.

power bloc composed of a number of middle-ranking officers, most of them with a personal perception of the purposes of the regime. The mentalities and ideological commitments of the various leading officers are better understood through an appreciation of their differences, and the different mentalities behind the various tendencies. Contrary to

Metaxas'personalistic authority and the man's personal ideological influence on the 4th of August regime's ideas, the non-personalistic and collective character of the 1967 dictatorship (despite the fact that Papadopoulos tried to impose his personal authority on the rest of the military elite and the Greek society as a whole), resulted in the diffusion of a variety of personal points of views and differences between the officers, and their inability to present a coherent ideology. This led to the derision of their pseudo-ideology which was composed of a mishmash of opinions often contradicting one another. Each officer who regarded his position as central within the power structure, tried to impose his personal mark on the wider official ideological framework, which therefore became a "medley" of ideas and perceptions. In that respect, the military junta never managed to give the impression of an ideologically united body of officers that might have contributed to the ideological justification of their rule. On the other hand, the vagueness of their mentalities and prejudices blurred the lines of cleavage in the coalition, allowing the rulers to retain the loyalty of disparate elements. Contrary to the unified stance of the royalist officers in supporting the regime of Metaxas, the military junta, during the period 1967-1974, faced contradictions at the level of the military elite and ideological disagreements as to the role of the military governmental affairs.

Common to almost all military regimes of a collective character is the broad division between the "hard-liners" and the "soft-liners". The first believe in the permanence of military rule and condemn the ills of democratic politics, while the second seek some degree of constitutional or electoral legitimation, eventually favouring the partial civilianisation of the government and attempting some liberalising measures. Contrary to the hard-liners, soft-liners promise some form of democracy for the future, as a necessary development of their authoritarian rule.[42]

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[42] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, "Political Life after Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Transitions", Unpublished Document, pp. 24-28.

The most characteristic tendency of the junta's hard-liners, the neo-fascist

tendency, identified itself as the ideological successor of Metaxas' ideology. It was openly

opposed to bourgeois democracy and parliamentarism, favouring, in some cases, the

ideology of national socialism and fascism and proclaiming the permanent rule of the

military regime. This faction supported the creation of a fascist youth movement, an idea

which was not implemented due to the more general rejection of fascism among the

majority of officers and specifically to Papadopoulos' personal veto.[43] Takis Plevris, a

theoretician of this tendency espoused such fascist notions in his book The *Anti-Democrat*,

where he openly voiced his support for the imposition of a fascist dictatorship in Greece.[44]

The neo-fascist rhetoric resembled in many respects, the ideas and rhetoric of Metaxas in

professing the indefinite duration of military rule.[45] Colonel Ladas once said to a prisoner:

"*We talk about democracy, but we do it only in order to calm the Scandinavian fools. This*

word excites them." [46] Each representative of this orientation however, perceived the

fascist notions in his own idiosyncratic way, a very typical case being Lieutenant General

Aslanides, the General Secretary of the Ministry of Sport. He believed that social and

political problems would only be solved with arms and that young people should

concentrate on football without any worry over politics or ideologies, while the primary

role would be attributed to the satisfaction of material needs. He stated that,

> thanks to sport, the man is more pure. If the body is not pure, man has complexes
>
> which end up in revolting behaviour. Sport makes him a better person......Every
>
> Sunday the people vote for the government. Before, the pools brought in 2 million
>
> drachmas every week; now it brings in 15 million .[47]

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[43] See Mcletopoulos "On the Ideology of the Colonels" in *Anti* 344, p. 35.

[44] In 1960, Plevris had created the *4th of August* organisation, which achieved a very small membership. It was only to its connections with the leading member of the junta Colonel Ladas, the most notable supporter of this tendency that this tendency acquired some significance. Its periodical, the *4th of August*, circulated freely and published articles by members of the regime such as Ladas. Plevris was appointed by the junta, as professor in the School of General Education of the Army, in the School of the Army Cadets and the City Police and Gendarmerie and he took over the organisation and education of his youth movement, *Alkimoi*. Plevris was also intimate with Pino Rauti, of the Italian Social Movement, the Italian neo-fascist party. See *Neo-fascism in Greece*, Athens 1978, p. 135.

[45] There was also a link, although this was not officially admitted, between this tendency and war-time Nazi collaborators. Former officers in the *Security Battalions* created during the occupation, obtained important posts under the regime. See "Athenian", *Inside the Colonels' Greece*, p. 118.

[46] *L'Express*, 945, 18-24 Aout, 1969.

[47] *Ibid*, [in French].

Another faction of hard-liners, led by Lieutenant Colonel Ioannides, the "invisible dictator" who overthrew Papadopoulos in 1973, held no particular doctrine, and became dominant during the latter stage of the junta period, assuming power immediately after the Polytechnic uprising. They believed in the indefinite continuation of military rule, objected to the 1973 liberalisation policies of Papadopoulos and viewed the "revolution as incomplete". Ioannidess and his group' s rhetoric resembled the rhetoric of Libya's Kaddafi and the group came to be known as the "Kaddafites". They accused Papadopoulos of the betrayal of the the revolution, of corruption and of having close links with big business and the Americans.[48] This tendency completely lacked any political strategy and brought about the tragic political epilogue of the military junta, by leading the country to a political and economic disarray.

Another ideological tendency within the regime, of which Tsakonas was the principal ideologue, was connected with traditional religious beliefs. Tsakonas had been a sociologist in Bonn and a propagandist in the Greek military academies. He became a professor in the Greek University during the period of the junta, and was made Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1970. This tendency favoured close relations between the army and the church, and emphasised Hellenocentrism and Orthodoxy. It professed to be anti-capitalist and against the former Greek parliamentary system. This tendency was rejected by the junta given that it was believed that it would lead lead to a third world-like theocratic socialism.[49] Close connections with the Orthodox Church were advocated by several members of the junta, the most vociferous being the other member of the Triumvirate, Brigadier Pattakos, a member of the religious brotherhood, *Zoi* (Life), an organisation which had close links with the regime and influenced the regime's policy in Church and educational matters.[50]

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[48] See Kitsikis, *The Third Ideology and Orthodoxy*, Athens 1990, p. 281.

[49] See Meletopoulos, *op.cit.*, p. 36.

[50] Pattakos had been given the command of the Armed Units in Athens and because of holding this position at the country's nerve centre, he was initiated into the junta's conspiracy. His speeches were infamous for their incoherence and contradictions while he held confused ideas about issues concerning human rights, liberties and democratic concepts of government. For example, in a speech at the Athens Stadium he said: "*People of Greece; Remember Leonidas' heroic words to the Persians.....Remember Constantine Paleologue's answer to the Turks........Remember Metaxas' proud NO to the foreign ultimatum.......And hear the new credo of the 21st of April! Halt or I'll shoot*" (See "Who's Junta", *Hellenic Review*, September 1968). Pattakos' rhetoric, full of inconsistencies, was typical of the regime,

The soft-liners within the military junta were those who voiced liberal ideas on economic policy and supported the eventual democratisation of the regime. Colonel Makarezos, a member of the triumvirate, was the officer responsible for the regime's connections with the senior politicians. He was considered the "intellectual" officer of the junta, holding only a bachelors' degree in economics and was assigned the government ministry of Co-ordination. The retired Lieutenant Colonel Stamatelopoulos advocated the army's return to barracks, and the leaving of politics to civilians as soon as order was restored and a constitutional framework in place. He and his group believed that the role of the armed forces should be limited and they were called the "parenthesis closers". This last group seems to have been the smallest and was effectively neutralised quite early on.[51]

Against the background of these various tendencies, Colonel George Papadopoulos, the "leader of the revolution", tried to transform the dictatorship into a personalistic type of rule and to act as a bridge between the hard-liners and the soft-liners. Papadopoulos had been an artillery officer without a distinguished combat record,[52] and had held a post in the Greek Intelligence Service (KYP). He was recognised as a capable conspirator and was open in his admiration for dictators, something which earned him the nickname among his fellow IDEAists of the "Nasser of Greece".[53] People who knew him well stated that he was a man

> disposed towards conspiracy.......never a sincere royalist and neither a sincere friend of the allies nor a dedicated anti-communist. He is a plotter and he uses with great ingenuity all the tricks of the trade, all he has learned in Intelligence and Information bureaux, an excellent spy. [54]

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and he was considered a ludicrous personality even within the military ranks. He and Ladas were the main military rivals of Papadopoulos in the formulation of an "ideology" for the regime.

[51] See Danopoulos' "From Military to Civilian Rule in Contemporary Greece" in *Armed Forces and Society* 10, 1984, p. 235. Stamatelopoulos resigned to become a critic of the regime when transferred from his position as a Secretary-General at the ministry of Communications to the job of the director-general of the National Tourist Organization. Robert McDonald, "The Colonels' Dictatorship",p. 276.

[52] Three months in the Greek-Italian War and six months in the Greek Civil War, much less than his other colleagues, some of whom had had an active fighting career in the Resistance, in the Near-East, in Italy and in Korea.

[53] See Danopoulos, *Warriors and Politicians in Modern Greece*, 1984, p. 58.

[54] Descriptions from people who knew Papadopoulos personally in "Who's Junta", pp. 28-29.

Papadopoulos favoured the partial civilianisation of the 21st April regime and the creation of a civilian-military system based on the 1968 constitution. He perceived a strong and permanent role for the armed forces in Greek politics, based on and guaranteed by a constitutional framework. Papadopoulos was among those who favoured the exercise of an authoritarian power, promising a great deal for the future in the way of liberalisation, and creating a general confusion as to his real purposes.

Within the junta there were marked disagreements among officers as to the way government policy should be conducted. Papadopoulos, who had his own personal ambitions, hoped to weaken the position of the other officers within the Revolutionary group and to strengthen his personal rule in both the government and the army.[55] So he pursued a policy aimed at the separation of government and military, forcing all the officers in the government and the general secretariats of the ministries to resign from the military.[56] This process of the politicisation of the officers, a way of minimising reaction from the army, especially after the royal coup of 1967 and the departure of the King Constantine from Greece, triggered disagreements and conflicts among the various officers, who aimed at strengthening their own position in the government, some of who favoured a collective type of authority like Ladas, Pattakos and Makarezos.[57] Moreover, there was a substantial circle of junior officers who had secured the regime's control over the armed forces, and had themselves formed cliques, divided between those who supported Ladas' idea of a permanent authoritarian rule and those who supported Lieutenant General Angelis -the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and a close associate of the dictator Papadopoulos himself- who wanted to progress towards the restoration of elected government under the new guided constitution.[58]

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[55] in 1970 he managed to enhance his position vis-a-vis the other officers and became, at the same time, the President of the government, the minister of government policy, the minister of Foreign Affairs, the minister of Defence, the minister of Education, and later nominated himself as Regent.

[56] Royal Decree, February 16, 1968, *The Official Newspaper*.

[57] Through changes in the officers' governmental posts Papadopoulos aimed to weaken the position of those officers who hoped to strengthen their personal authority within the junta. Ladas for instance was transferred in December 1968 from the post of Secretary-General in the ministry of Public Order to the post of Secretary-General at the ministry of the Interior under the more loyal Pattakos. See Gregoriades *op.cit.*, pp. 233-259.

[58] Robert McDonald, "The Colonels' Dictatorship", p. 275.

The ideas associated with the 21st of April regime were typical of a right wing military discourse, clearly reflecting the mentalities of the "military mind" and the effort of its members to perpetuate the ideological themes of Greece's post-war, right wing political life. The main themes used by the Greek military were an appeal to the values of the Hellenic nation, a call for the preservation of the "authentic" Greco-Christian tradition and an extensive use of anti-communist and anti-anarchist slogans. The goals, as vague as the themes, involved the restoration of a "new democracy" and the creation of a "healthy" and "regenerated" political system. The presentation of such themes reflected, on the one hand, the puritanical and narrowly nationalistic orientation of the post-war Greek military mentality which, at times, reduced the traditional national cultural values to the level of the absurd and, on the other hand, the inability to form a political programme, to replace that of the overthrown parliamentary governments. As Clogg argues,

> To attempt to define a coherent ideology underlying the actions of the Greek
> military regime is a somewhat futile exercise for the very good reason that such an
> ideology simply does not exist. What does exist is a pseudo-ideology or, more
> accurately, a number of pseudo-ideologies which the Colonels, or rather their
> ideologues, have hastily thrown together as the regime has steadily retreated from
> its initial justification for the coup. [59]

Comparable cases of right wing military ideas in Latin America presented as many similarities as differences in their respective ideological discourses. In Argentina, the Ongania government (1966-1970) held similarly vague commitments to purge the politically divided Argentine society, to end inflation and to exploit the productive potential of the country's economy. His policy was pursued through a stabilisation programme and the attraction of foreign capital. Similarly in Brazil, stabilisation programmes with authoritarian controls were adopted by the military elite. In the case of Chile, the Pinochet regime professed a total opposition to the previous parliamentary pluralism and state interventionism in economic matters, adopting the notions of authoritarian democracy and the market oriented economy, the Chilean dictatorial regime being the Latin American

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[59] Clogg, "The Ideology of the Revolution of the 21st of April regime", p. 36.

experiment of the "Chicago economic theories". Pinochet tried to halt government

intervention in the economy, promoting his "nation of entrepreneurs", importing the strict

monetarist model together with "laissez-faire" doctrines.[60] Hence, the more advanced Latin

American countries, right-wing military ideology employed a mixture of developmentalist

themes and national security doctrine, indicative of the bureaucratic-authoritarian nature of

the regimes. Some cases revolved around the notion of state enterpreneurship, as in

Brazil,[61] while others aimed at the dismantling of the state's economic activities, such as

Chile. All of them however declared their long-term developmental goals of economic

stabilisation and growth, under the guidance of a highly exclusionary and authoritarian

state.

The instrumental perception of power: Corruption and clientelism

Military rulers tend to justify their coups on the ground that their civilian

predecessors were dishonest, corrupt and self-serving. They profess their aversion

towards the corruption of politicians, and attack the clientelistic system with its basis in the

promotion of personal interests. They consequently project the officers' image as honest,

incorruptible and self-denying, resort to the excessive exaltation of their puritanical virtues

and attribute a great importance to formalistic appearances which might persuade the

population of the honesty of their ideas.[62] However, contrary to their rhetoric, military

rulers usually fall prey to similar kinds of clientelistic practices in their effort to create an

artificial support for their rule.

Unable to persuade on purely ideological grounds and incapable of respecting their

own legal/constitutional formulae, the military junta of 1967 resorted vastly to clientelistic

means of gaining support, a perennial theme in the military's relationship with politicians.

Having absolutely no support from the previous political world, the military rulers tried to

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[60] Skidmore/Smith, *Modern Latin America*, pp. 142-143.

[61] In Brazil, the period of the Costa e Silva government was marked by a successful recovery of the economy and the military regime could base its legitimacy on the so-called Brazilian "economic miracle of the period 1967-1974, a growth at an annual rate of approximately 10%.

[62] As will be shown later in the junta's educational policies military governors tried to enforce a dress code, prayers in the schools, and laws on sexual morality which were considered of great symbolic importance by the regime.

create a new political environment based on promises and positions, the only persuasive formula left to the regime, intent as it was on institutionalising its rule. The Greek military regime never managed either to attract the political world or to create cleavages among the politicians of the pre-dictatorial right. It only achieved superficial contacts with politicians and cooperated with the most conservative elements of the church, the throne, big capital, the workers' syndicates and with ambitious people from social groups such as professionals, peasants, and those looking for advancement. It approached all these through clientelistic networks, offering gifts and promises in return for support. The most typical application of the clientelistic and short-term political mentality of the military junta could be seen in the military rulers' policy towards the military institution at large. They created a military power base on clientelistic networks and kinship, restricted for the most part to reliable army officers, their relatives and associates. Each officer or tendency within the power bloc aimed at the promotion of its own people, in order to stabilise its position at the higher levels of political power. These ambitions led to the evolution of a conspiratorial climate within the military, which became the practice also in the exercise of governmental power, according to which one faction intrigued against the other faction by illegitimate and underhand means. The result of such authoritarian clientelism was the disappearance of the basic values upon which the military establishment is based: order, hierarchy and discipline. The policy of clientelism of the military junta was characterised by the dismantling of the previous military hierarchies, in order to create new ones subservient to the military rulers.

> *The Armed Forces were not occupied with their profession. Others tried to guess*
>
> *the wishes of the junta and to please them in order to secure their position. The*
>
> *officers of yesterday, who had come out of their barracks, occupied public*
>
> *buildings and posts in public administration, expelled the directors, took their*
>
> *positions and launched an arbitrary administration, unprecedented in a civilised*
>
> *country.*[63]

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[63] Karagiorgas, *op.cit.*, p. 125, [in Greek].

Contrary to the Chilean case, where a belief in the notions of order and discipline and the maintenance of an effective hierarchy and military unity under General Pinochet's leadership accounted for the long duration of the latter's personal dictatorship,[64] the military junta disregarded totally these principles and fell victim to its own internal factional struggles.

The body of military officers who came into close contact with the exercise of political power, enjoyed higher pay, new uniforms, a new style of life which removed them from their military profession and allowed them to indulge in the excesses of political power. Moreover, as has been the case with similar military regimes, Greece's military rulers viewed political power in purely instrumental terms, as a means to further their own goals and, being no less corrupt than the previous civilians, they tried, while in power, to enrich themselves. They found themselves enjoying power for power's sake, as well as high status and material rewards that go with it. They were consequently highly reluctant to give up the privileges of high governmental office by returning to the barracks. As a Group Captain of the Air Force wrote on November 28, 1973, a few days after the second coup by Ioannides, in his report to the Chief of the Air Force:

Political power corrupts those who exercise it. Politicians come and go but this is

their job. When the army exercises political power, it gets corrupted and the

damage is irreparable. Since 1967, the paths of army and people have been

separated with unpredictable consequences for the Nation. People tolerate us out of

fear. In a little while, however, they will be objecting to us .[65]

Clientelism and conspiracy in the regime's relation with the Church

A clear example of clientelism, conspiracy and factionalism could be seen in the junta's policy towards the religious establishment. The colonels sought to control and

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[64] Through political manoeuvring Pinochet achieved supreme authority and the initially military regime in Chile ended up by being a highly personalistic regime, under the overwhelming domination of one leader. Alongside the removal of many of his peers, the control of promotions and a close watch on the security service, he tried to legitimise his rule mostly by means of referenda. In times of crises, Pinochet used to rely more on his personal advisers than on the military junta, which acted only as a weak legislative body. Pinkney, *op.cit.*, pp. 58- 60.

[65] See Kakaounakis, *2650 Days and Nights of Conspiracy*, p. 73, [in Greek].

manipulate the church hierarchy in order to secure the consent of the religious establishment. As in other fields, the military mentality was prevalent in the Church policy of the 1967 regime, which was also characterised by conspiratorial/clientelistic methods and the overthrowing of the existing hierarchy. The result of such a policy was that the Church, during the 1967-1974 period, was identified in the eyes of the Greek people with the military regime.

In May 1967, following the colonels' coup, a second coup took place in the Church when the Holy Synod was dismissed by the junta and the Archbishop Chrysostomos was forced to resign on the grounds that the law of retirement should be extended to cover all the bishops of Greece. A new Synod was formed, composed of people sympathetic to the regime, while the archbishopric was assigned to a protegee of the palace Ieronymos Kotsonis, the choice of the military junta.[66] A new constitution for the Church was imposed, which spelled out in detail the role of the Church in national matters. Papadopoulos claimed that the new charter would allow more freedom to the Church in deciding upon personnel, the education of the clergy and the control of its finances and property. As was the case with all the liberal documents of the junta, the actual application of the Charter was postponed indefinitely, in that whereas it provided for the supreme authority of the Hierarchical Synod, the first meeting of the Synod was scheduled for 1972. The constitution enabled Papadopoulos to oversee those aspects of church life viewed as important to the state while allowing the internal affairs of the church to be administered by the archbishop and the synod. Several church ministers were dismissed for claiming the document illegally centralised power in the hands of the archbishop and the synod. There was strong opposition to Ieronymos within the church.[67] His legacy, however, was an impressive one, in that he broadened educational opportunities for the

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[66] Ieronymos Kotsonis was a previous member of the brotherhood "Zoi" which played a vital role during the military dictatorship, due to its connections with prominent military officers (a type of a Greek Opus Dei). In order to get rid of the 87-year old and sick archbishop Chrysostomos, the military officers as soon as they assumed power, visited him in hospital with a letter of resignation, ready for signature. Due to the archbishop's refusal to resign, the junta issued emergency law 3, 1967, on retirement at the age of 80. Then the New Holy Synod, composed of bishops loyal to the junta, voted for the new archbishop Ieronymos. Sakellariou, "Church-Junta", in *Anti* 344, pp. 17-20.

[67] On the Church policy of the junta see Frazee, *op.cit.*, Fischer, Rondholz, & Farandos, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Greece (1936-1974)*, pp. 113-122, Sakellariou, *op.cit.*, Mouratides, *The Schizophrenic Ecclesiastical policy of the Dictatorship.*

clergy; but since he was supported by a dictator he never managed to unite all the bishops behind his programme. He was criticised for his relationship with the military junta, ie. for having collaborated with them and for having created his own clique within the church.[68]

The overthrow of Papadopoulos included another conspiratorial rearrangement in the church's organisation and leadership. The 1973 coup by Ioannides ignored the principle of canonicity in church affairs, replaced unwanted bishops created a new Holy Synod and elected a new Archbishop.[69] A decree in January 1974 convoked what was termed a major synod of the hierarchy to draw up yet another constitution, to choose a new archbishop for Athens and a Holy Synod and to rule on the "uncanonical" acts and appointments made since 1967. The new Archbishop Seraphim and his synod began the scrutiny of the bishops appointed during the time of Ieronymos and by early summer several had been deposed. The new Archbishop who had collaborated with Ieronymos during the period of the previous military junta, rejected and acted against the same policies he had helped to implement.[70]

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[68] In his autobiography Kotsonis claimed to have accepted the post from the junta because the church needed deep changes with regard to the education and specialisation of the clergy, the decentralisation of the church's administration, the finances and property of the church and the raising of the clergy's prestige. He admitted that when the military government made concessions to the church, it expected as a reward the unreserved support of the church hierarchy. He recognised that the junta dismissed many clerics from their posts, based on their political convictions and complained that there were deep divisions within the Church and clerics who were strongly opposed to his leadership. Ieronymos Kotsonis, *The Drama of an Archbishop*, Athens 1975.

[69] The new dictator Ioannides had also a deep personal hatred for the archbishop Ieronymos Kotsonis.

[70] An interesting point in the history of the post-dictatorial church is that archbishop Seraphim, the choice of the Ioannides junta, is still the archbishop of Greece having survived through the conservative government of the 1970s, the socialist government of the 1980s and beyond. He is currently criticised by many Church people, for having created his own clique just like his antecedent had done and for his authoritarian attitude in many church issues.

Chapter 7 : THE 21ST OF APRIL REGIME'S EDUCATIONAL POLICY

The educational policy of the military junta stands as one of the most representative expressions of the mentalities of the rulers and their total lack of ideology. A blend of militaristic nationalism, conspiratorial clientelism and puritanical authoritarianism, typical of the Greek military mind, found its practical expression in the regime's policy towards education. An amalgam of reactionary practices -towards the previous liberal and reformist domestic climate- and measures aimed at necessary modernisation, -on the model of the western industrialised nations- were implemented in a series of lengthy laws, based on short-term political intentions.[1] For the most part, the military rulers, based on their own belief system, treated the sensitive sector of education in the same way that they handled the military apparatus. Isolated from the previous political world and secluded from any intellectuals and pedagogues, the military rulers interfered in educational matters through conspiratorial and clientelistic methods, overthrowing the previous educational hierarchies, establishing new educational networks, relying on opportunistic supporters and promoting mediocrities to crucial educational posts.

The educational policy of the 21st of April regime consisted of the demobilisation of the youth, and of the student movement in particular, the complete disrespect for intellectuals and the exercise of a centralised authoritarian governmental policy, mostly through the imposition of a long series of laws. The military junta's attitude to the youth and the educational institutions, in general, was directly affected by the previous climate brought about by the reforms of the Centre Union and the student mobilisation, and by the international context of 1960s student mobilisation.

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[1] Typical of the military regime's undecided and vacillating educational policy was the appointment of 8 ministers and 8 junior ministers of education each of a different professional background in seven years of military rule: Among others, K. Kalambokias, a member of the Supreme Court of Justice, Th. Papakonstantinou, the regime's political theorist, G. Papadopoulos, the leader of the Coup d' Etat, Nikitas Sioris, a businessman and an economic adviser, N. Gantonas, a military officer, one of the ring-leaders of the regime, P. Sifnaios, the civilian minister of the Markezinis government, during the Polytechnic uprising and P. Christou, ex-rector of the University of Salonica, and very unpopular among the students, who assumed the ministry during the last phase of Ioannides, all these contributed to the climate of general incompetence in educational matters.

Conflicts in the process of political demobilisation under post-war liberal dictatorships: Authoritarianism vs modernisation

As we have seen, fascist regimes are torn by their internal contradictions and actual conflicts inherent in the process of the fascist mobilisation of the youth. These arise out of the necessity to actively involve the youth while preserving a totalitarian control over the dissemination of ideas. Post-war right-wing authoritarian regimes in semi-peripheral societies such as Greece, the Iberian peninsula, and the more economically developed Latin American countries, governed within an international climate of accepted liberalism and advanced capitalism, and within a domestic climate of more advanced, organised and mobilised societies. In the cases of the prolonged dictatorships of Spain and Portugal, both dictatorships, while in power, had to come to grips with the developing international and domestic contexts, and with the educational advances in their respective societies: the drop of illiteracy; the organisation of Universities; the mobilisation of the student movements, within the wider domestic authoritarian context of accepted limited political and cultural pluralism. Both Iberian regimes, during the post-war period, became more pragmatic than ideological, especially after their phase of consolidation was over and after the defeat of fascism and the discrediting of fascist ideology. In Spain, the inter-war ideological domination of the Falange eroded, especially after 1959 when the Catholic Opus Dei displaced the Falangists from power and led the country into a more pragmatic neo-capitalism. Salazar, on the other hand, kept his population more isolated from the liberal turn of post-war Europe in order to sustain his personal authority and to keep away as far as possible the international influences of advanced liberalism.

In the Latin American context and in Greece, on the other hand, the military intervened at a time when more advanced levels of social and economic organisation had already been attained. In the more developed Latin American countries the post-war period was marked by the modernisation and industrialisation of their respective economies, the breakdown of the traditional monopoly of the Catholic Church in the ideological field and the decisive impact of the secularising and modernising forces of liberalism. They developed a high degree of industrialisation, high urban concentration, social

differentiation and a relatively more organised and autonomous civil society. This was accompanied by educational advances and reforms, lower levels of illiteracy, higher levels of enrollment in primary and secondary education, the better organisation of the Universities and a more politicised student population.

The intervention of the military in politics cut short the educational advances and reforms, due to the military rulers' attempt to control the intellectual world. But, caught in the middle of a rapidly modernising world, these military regimes were torn between their authoritarian/reactionary predilections and the objective need to modernise. Having accepted the liberal rules of the game, military regimes were divided between the need to demobilise and depoliticise an already mobilised and politicised intellectual world, and the objective necessity to pursue liberal reforms in education, as required by the needs of capitalist development. While modernisation in advanced capitalist societies is the product of democratic education, in authoritarian "liberal" regimes of limited pluralism, the need for modernisation comes into conflict with the necessity to control the intellectual dialogue. In a period of the internationalisation of information, marked by the rapid spread of international liberal ideas, the task of control became even more difficult for military regimes to achieve.

Some social scientists believe that the military can be an effective bearer of modernisation and development in developing and under-developed countries. Based on the military's monopoly of force and its organisational unity and through its connection with the latest technological military achievements, they believe that the military is able to use its position in government to bring about modernisation. This is mostly explained by the fact that the army in these societies has been influenced by contemporary military technology. The argument is supported by Lucien Pye, who went as far as to say that in some cases "*the officers often find that they are in tune with intellectuals, students and those other elements in society most anxious to become a part of the western world*". [2] Such generalisations may be partly true in some underdeveloped, post-colonial societies, or in developing countries such as Turkey, where the military has admittedly played the

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[2] Lucien Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernisation", in *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*, p. 77.

role of moderniser and nation-builder. However they can also be misleading, in that they present the military as a unified and disciplined body, isolated from the larger social and political divisions, and at the same time they overestimate the intellectual capabilities and rationalism of soldiers.

The reality is, however, different and the actions of military regimes regarding universities, teachers and student movements are heavily influenced by the fact that soldiers are generally isolated from them, resulting in the military's perceptions of Universities as centres of subversion requiring drastic purges. Hence, the classic military reaction to the educational system is to cancel any university autonomy, to intervene in the schools and colleges and to dismiss personnel. Although universities are the places which suffer most under such policies, primary and secondary schools are also affected. For the most part repressive mechanisms are used in the universities, towards professors and students, while ideological mechanisms and indirect indoctrination are used in primary and secondary schools. Unavoidably, in the course of their rule, military regimes are also faced with the necessity to expand the educational system and the school and university population of their countries, while at the same time seeking to maintain control over it through a variety of repressive means. This process generates contradictions at the elite level and in the elite's relationship with the educated population.

Even in the bureaucratic-authoritarian cases of Brazil and Argentina, the connections between the military and the business community and technocrats, did not prevent the army from acting as an anti-modernising force, contrary to the needs of the country to modernise. The Latin American military authoritarian governments included military and civilian elites with radically different world views in the decision-making process. The armed forces highlighted the danger to national stability and security, prevailing before their intervention and emphasised national, military achievements. Religious groups emphasised the priority of religious education and the promotion of traditional religious values. Economic advisers, who saw the link between the educational system and the needs of the economy, gave special attention to free economic activity, emphasising the positive contribution which private enterprise could make to development

and the negative effects of state control.[3] The balance of power varied from country to country, and while in authoritarian Argentina the Catholics were allowed to run education, and the business and the technocrats took over the economic ministries, in Chile Pinochet's ideology of "privatisation" penetrated the school system, with its emphasis on the technological and business fields at the expense of humanities and social sciences.[4] Be that as it may, post-war western military dictatorships were nevertheless faced with the apparently contradictory tasks of, on the one hand, achieving order and, on the other, of promoting a sound economic policy.

The Greek military junta was the victim of its own factional divisions and clientelistic practices and the fact that the military had access to modern technology did not push it in the direction of modernisation and rational decisions on education. Due to the military's lack of an alternative ideological framework, the military rulers ended up contradicting their own pronouncements, violating the constitutional provisions which they intended to give them legitimacy and support from the student world, and presenting an unbridgeable gap between rhetoric and practice. What is mostly remembered of the military's impact on education is the reactionary and out-dated character of their educational philosophy.

The post-war educational climate: Reform and mobilisation

The rapid socio-economic development of the late 1950s and 1960s was not matched by corresponding advances in the educational field, leaving an urgent need for reform in the educational system, to accompany the capitalist development of Greek society. While there was a quantitative advance in the number of educated people, at all three levels, this was hardly accompanied by any qualitative advances. The old features of the centralised Greek education system, the classicist orientation, language diglossia, lack

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[3] These different tendencies at the policy-making level are expressed in the cases of B-A rule in O'Donnell's analysis "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy" in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, pp. 285-318, and in the specific field of educational policy in Sanders, "Education and Authoritarianism in the Southern Cone", in *TGS-1-81, South America*, 1981/No. 12, p. 11.

[4] Sanders, *op.cit.*, p. 12.

of vocational training persisted, as they had done since Greek independence.[5] The content of knowledge was equally backward-looking and retrograde. While the advanced western societies saw an even further development of social sciences and humanities, in Greek higher institutions the topics of sociology, political science and contemporary history were regarded with suspicion, due to the damage it was believed they could do to the status quo. The teaching of history in schools, reflected the one-sided approach of the post-war political elite: modern Greek history terminated abruptly with the First World War, while the inter-war period, the resistance to the Germans and the recent civil war events were omitted, as if they had never happened. As had always been the case with the nation's · ambivalent approach towards its past, the post-war state authorities regarded suspiciously the recent past, and its examination provoked polarisations, disagreements and divisions. The Greek reading books for the early forms of primary education never ceased extolling the values of the family, religion and Greece's heroic military history.[6] Moreover, the subjects of mathematics and physics continued to enjoy only secondary status in the school curiculum. In many respects the reality of post-war education was a regression to the state it had been in prior to 1929, and the main aim of education, as was defined in the 1952 constitution, was to "create honest citizens within the framework of the Greco-Christian civilisation".[7] Finally, the percentage of GDP spent on education was very low, at around 2%, similar to the levels in Spain and Portugal, compared to around 5% in other western European countries. The level of expenditure on research and development was even lower, at around 0.2%.[8]

Towards the end of the 1950s, came the first timid post-war attempts at transforming school programmes and reorganising education towards a more technocratic

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[5] In 1958, 273,000 pupils were in general secondary education as opposed to only 35,000 in vocational education. Moreover, in 1962-63, classical gymnasia accounted for 74% of the·total student population, vocational schools 20.3%, merchant schools 2.9%, schools of foreign languages 1.9%, naval gymnasia 0.6% and schools of household economy 0.3%.

[6] An interesting study of the primary education reading books is given by Frangoudaki in her book,*The Textbooks of the Demotic School*, where the writer argues that primary education during the period 1954-1974 disseminated an ideology loaded with "feudalist" values, regarding such matters as family, work, religion and history.

[7] Tsoukalas, "Ideological Impact of the Civil War", in *Greece in the 1940s*, p. 336.

[8] Stefanos Pesmazoglou, *Education and Development in Greece, 1948-1985*, p. 144.

orientation.[9] However such attempts were half-baked and due to the strong demands by the liberal-minded intellectuals, education became one of the hottest issues again during the first half of the 1960s. A major development in the post-war period in the educational sphere was related to the increase of the Greek student population, its organisation and its politicisation. Slowly during the 1950s and more intensely during the 1960s, the student movement started to mobilise and demanded specific changes in the educational system.[10] Demands associated to changes in administrative matters, the school curicula, the creation of new schools of higher education, the inadequacy of the teaching staff, the improvement of technical education, previously topics for distinguished intellectuals and pedagogists, had been taken up by students and intellectuals alike, within the context of an increasingly organised student movement.

The accession of the Centre Union of George Papandreou to power in 1963 resulted in the enactment of a comprehensive and all-encompassing educational reform, a response to the needs of the capitalist economy, on the one hand, and the demands of the student movement, on the other. The Centre Union's educational reform was the most radical so far in the development of Greek education and involved reorganisation at all three educational levels. Some measures were reminiscent of the 1929 reform (when Papandreou was minister of education), but the majority of them went even further, to reflect the changes which had occured in Greek society since the war. Among the most significant were the expansion of the institutions of higher education, changes in the forms

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[9] In 1957, a "Commission on Education" was constituted to examine the needs of the Greek educational system. Its resolution involved demands on the teaching of the demotic language, the creation of a new University, the adequacy of the teaching staff, closer links between economy and education and the need to create technical schools. In 1958, Industrial Colleges were upgraded to the higher educational level and in 1959, new technical colleges were created in Athens and Salonica. In 1961, a new programme for secondary education modified the previous one which had been based on the 1935 program of the People's Party.

[10] In 1952-55, the first student mobilisations were connected with the Cyprus issue and in 1957-58 student associations were founded officially. In 1957 was the first Pan-Hellenic Conference of Students, in 1962 was the beginning of student uprisings, and the demand for 15% of the national budget to be spent on education (7.5% went to education) became nationwide. In 1963 came the formation of the National Students Union of Greece (EFEE), at the Fourth Conference of Greek Students, with a demand for the "Rebirth of Education", emphasising issues such as the language, the illiteracy levels and specific higher educational issues. See Christos Lazos, *op.cit.*, pp. 315-340.

of primary and secondary education, new curicula, the introduction of the demotic and the emphasis on vocational education.[11]

The junta found itself faced not only with a democratic reformist climate and the rising tide of student mobilisation at home, but with a period of student uprisings in other European countries and in North America, which it feared might make an impact on the Greek student movement. The international youth situation of the 1960s differed radically from that of the 1930s in form, content and organisation. While during the inter-war period the European fascist youth organisations made a positive impression on Metaxas, inducing him to form a similar movement in Greece, the late 1960s student demonstrations in the US, France and Germany among other countries, made a negative impression on the 1967 military regime, in that the latter tried to avoid their potentially revolutionary effects on Greek society. While in the fascist case, we have noted the manipulation of the youth's revolutionary fervour by the inter-war authoritarian regimes, in the case of the post-war period, the youth's revolutionary fervour was not open to any manipulation by the state, and the organised youth maintained its autonomy, making it very difficult for the authorities to impose any control on them. Initial demands for educational reform grew into

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[11] Law 4379/1964, prepared by Papanoutsos, a famous liberal pedagogist, covered a wide range of issues concerning the primary and secondary levels of education: free public education provided at all levels; the extension of compulsory education to nine years; the division of secondary education into two stages, the gymnasium and the lyceum, of three years each; official recognition of demotiki, elevated to the status of katharevousa; reformation of the curicula in primary and secondary education; more emphasis given to mathematics and the natural sciences; teaching of ancient texts from translations while original texts studied only at the lyceum; introduction of new courses in secondary education, such as economics, sociology, philosophy and law; a marked reduction in the emphasis on classics and an increase in the hours devoted to modern Greek, foreign languages, physics and mathematics; the introduction of voluntary courses at the lyceum; Latin on a voluntary basis at the lyceum to be studied only by those who intended to specialise in theology, literature and law; abolition of half-term semester examinations in secondary education; introduction of a free meal service for primary school children; reorganisation of the entrance examinations for higher education; the school leaving certificate (Akadimaiko Apolytirio) could be taken from some fifty provincial examination centres instead of, as previously, only in Athens and Salonica. In addition the Centre Union government pursued the formation of the Universities of Patras and of the Philosophical Faculty of Jannina; the Teachers' Training College was reorganised and its period of study extended from two to three years to improve the quality of the teaching personnel; the Athens Educational Institute was set up to undertake fundamental research into Greek educational and pedagogical issues. In 1966 a draft law on higher education proposed the connection of economic development with the role of the University, gave a further emphasis to the creation of new Universities, and challenged the strong and authoritarian institution of the Professor's chair. The general character of the educational provisions was a clear sign of a need for a radical government intervention in educational matters which needed to be reorganised and put on a different basis. For information on the Centre Union educational reform see relevant chapters in Alexis Demaras, *The Reform Which did not Take Place*, Vol 2, and "On Education" in the *History of the Greek Nation*, Haralambos Noutsos, *Programmes of Secondary Education and Social Control 1931-1973*, Spyros Linardatos, *From the Civil War to the Junta*, Vol. 5, and Vrychea/Gavroglou, *Attempts to Reform Higher Education 1911-1981*.

demands for social and political change. In France they led to the weakening of the authority of de Gaulle's government. Student demonstrations in the United States included demands on the country's foreign policy in Vietnam. In the authoritarian case of Spain the student fervour of the 1960s contributed to the subsequent weakening of the Franco regime. Even in the long established one-party state of Mexico, the 1968 student demonstrations led to a fierce confrontation between students and troops, developing to a crisis for the nation's political system and the bankruptcy of the PRI monopoly in power. Student action in various European and American countries seemed to pose a threat to the established order and, as Daniel Cohn-Bendit, the leader of the French student movement in 1968 argued:

> *The student, at least in the modern system of higher education still preserves a*
> *considerable degree of personal freedom if he chooses to exercise it.....when a*
> *minority of students takes conscious advantage of their freedom to attack the*
> *established order, they can become a catalyst activating a larger section of the*
> *population.*[12]

Regime rhetoric: An anarchistic and dangerous youth

The 1960s climate, domestic and international, defined the regime's perception of the youth and the military rulers confronted the youth with scepticism, fear and aversion, regarding them as a type of disobedient social group that needed to be constrained. The regime's principal propagandist, Giorgos Georgalas, regarded the youth as vulnerable to the ideas of communism and anarchism, as a result of frustration that had led young people to disobedience and a desire to overturn the status quo. In the *Crisis of the Consumerist Society* he stated that:

> *The youth is turning towards other leftist orientations, with a tendency to anti-*
> *conformism.....Although, the new generations are being educated and exposed to*

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[12] See Daniel Cohn-Bendit in "The Student Revolt" in *Obsolete Communism: The Left-Wing Alternative*, p. 47.

more knowledge, they remain immature and are being seduced by the idea that they

are entitled to impose their opinion. [13]

The younger generation and especially the students *"who are unbearably bored"*, were considered a persistent bearer of a revolting tendency influenced by *"well fed intellectuals"*.[14] This is the analysis of a theoretician of the regime, who was not a military person, but totally shared and expressed the military's scepticism towards the youth. His attack was directed towards the western youth and its anarchism, and his whole work was pervaded by a negative attitude towards the youth and a romantic perception of earlier generations. The conversion of the international student movements from orthodox marxism to more radical forms of revolutionary action, inspired by the examples of Mao, Castro or Che Guevara, had persuaded Georgalas in the early 1970s that communism had ceased to be a major threat, and he perceived that anarchism had come to hold greater attraction for young people, given that

communism seeks to take advantage of a situation in which decadence has taken

root, but when communism had itself been discredited there is a revival of

anarchism.

Among the military, colonel Ladas' rhetoric was the most reminiscent of Metaxas in his alleged adulation of the youth and his superficial belief in its potential. It was obvious, however, that his only purpose was to encourage an extreme anti-communist and anti-liberal discourse and he simply wanted to fanaticise the youth rather than to organise it. He declared that *"the youth has a historical mission in life and it should not bother with politics, economics or any social events"*[15] and that *"the first task of the youth is to build characters with qualities rather than deficiencies"*.[16] He considered the youth to be misled by marxism, liberalism, anarchism, "hippiism". There were also some ridiculously fanatical references to the youth with their long hair and *"the things that these people symbolise, a movement of decay and immorality"*. He asserted that *"the state should*

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[13] See *op.cit.*, pp. 80-86, [in Greek].
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 139.
[15] See *Ladas' Speeches*, (8/4/71), p. 44.
[16] *Ibid,.* (7/12/71), p. 87.

intervene to do something about this phenomenon".[17] The military rulers addressed the young people, students and pupils, in a patronising manner as their mature fathers who were able to sympathise with and understand their worries and to guide them in the right direction.[18]

Apart from the reactionary rhetoric of the regime regarding the youth, the laws passed by the regime showed most clearly the military's attitudes in pedagogical matters. Royal Decree 702/69 was a typical example of an attempt to impose a dry, unimaginative mentality on to pupils at a very sensitive and susceptible age in primary education. A few articles from this decree were very representative of the officers' way of thinking:

- Regarding writing ability, it was stated that *"the teacher should insist that the pupils write in their notebooks in clean, equal size, calligraphic and legible letters"*,

- Regarding reading ability, that *"the teacher should be careful that fairy tales should not arouse the imagination of the children to any extreme degree"*,

- Regarding measuring ability, that *"the quantitative illustrations should be optically easy to measure, so that in the presentation of the number '9' one should arrange the circles in the following manner :*

000	or	0000	*and not*	0			0	
000		0		0	0	0	0	
000		0000		0			0	0"

- Regarding religious instruction, that *"the intention is to intensify the religious feeling of the pupil and is not the objective study of the subject"*,

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[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 169-172. While such statements may not have sounded uncommon even in some western countries at the time, their adoption as the official language of a country, professed constantly by state officials, indicated the one-sided approach of the military junta and its overwhelmingly reactionary attitude towards all youth demands.

[18] Papadopoulos often mentioned in his speeches that his own father had been a teacher, which he thought brought him closer to the needs of the youngsters. It should be noted however that the education of the dictator was very poor in that he did not get his degree in the Polytechnic school and could not speak any foreign language, at all. ("Who's Junta", *Hellenic Review*, 1968) He used a paternalistic tone in his speeches and tried to give the impression that he was very understanding of the young people's wishes. His effort however fell short of an ability to persuade them and in 1972 after a series of student demonstrations he openly declared in a public speech *"if I'd had the people behind this strike in my armed unit, I'd have smashed their heads in with a revolver"*. McDonald, "The Colonels' Dictatorship", pp. 288-289.

- Regarding musical instruction, that "*the musical education should compose of ecclesiastical hymns to be chanted in the schools, folk and patriotic songs, some of them referring to the peasant life and the struggle of our people*".

Naturally history concentrated on the wars of ancient, Roman, Byzantine and modern times and the existence of international enemies threatening the life and survival of the Greek nation."*The narration of history has to be natural, graphic and gripping.....while the pupils have to attend the national commemorations of those who have died in wars and should look after "tidying up" of heroes*" (!).

This law, meticulously worked out and covering every single detail of primary school life, was full of allusions to religion, laid emphasis on formalistic primary learning, and left no room for teachers' initiative. It represented a very interesting example of the pedagogical beliefs of a military government and of its ignorance of child psychology. As if to emphasise the puritanical character of the military mentality, the military rulers imposed a ban on the wearing of miniskirts,[19] beards and long hair; compulsory church-going for pupils and teachers, the ceremony of saluting the flag every morning in all schools, and the compulsory carrying of satchels by schoolchildren.[20] These measures reflected a belief, common in the military, that the success or failure of an educational system can be judged by the appearance and external characteristics of the students, and betrayed a total lack of any philosophy regarding educational matters.

Education under the 21st of April regime

The legacy of the educational changes of the 1960s weighed heavily on the military junta's policy-making, which exposed immediately the reactionary and anti-modernising character of the officers' ideological preferences on the issue of education. The 1964 educational reform and the 1960s mobilisation of the student movement were the two main features of a decade which had signalled a radical change in the orientation of Greek education, both being symptoms of the modernisation of post-war Greek society. At the

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[19] Very similar to the infamous law of 1926 on the length of skirts by the one-year dictatorship of Pangalos, probably the only aspect of that dictatorship which is still remembered.

[20] See Demaras A.,*op.cit.*, p. 132.

same time, the issues raised by these two developments determined the main priorities of the junta in its initially negative and reactionary educational policy. The immediate reactions of the military junta to the state of education were to block the previous democratic/liberal reform of the Centre Union government of George Papandreou, to pursue an extensive purge of anti-regime university professors and school teachers and to curtail the liberties of the student movement. In their place, they imposed a tighter governmental control at all three levels of the educational apparatus, appointed regime people, the majority not particularly acquainted with educational matters, to high administrative and educational posts, and created an infamous "student code of behaviour". The military junta tried to demobilise and depoliticise the already politicised student movement through the penetration of loyal people into the student unions and councils, their aim being to create an a-political student body, indifferent to the regime's authoritarian policies.

The educational policy of the 1967 military regime, during the seven years of its tenure of power, was marked by three distinct dimensions regarding education, typical of the military's connection with the intellectual world:

1. Initial negative/reactionary attitude towards pre-1967 educational context characterised by the repeal of the 1964 reform, the purge of anti-regime intellectuals from the educational establishment and the demobilisation of the student movement;

2. the imposition of the dictatorial centralised state authority on to the educational apparatus and their infiltration through clientelistic promotions of regime people to crucial school and University posts;

3. some half-baked modernising innovations designed to aid the country's development.

The mixture of negative/reactionary, authoritarian/clientelistic and reformist/modernising dimensions demonstrated the incoherence of the military junta's policy towards the youth, which, at the same time, reflected the military mind, the isolation of the military rulers from the civilian world, and the country's post-war socio-economic development and the climate of international liberalism.

The general educational directives proposed by the military rulers included vague objectives which were interpreted by the military in a specifically authoritarian manner but

also indicated their own attitude towards the need for modernisation of the inadequate educational system:

> *The nationalist orientation of education; purification and elevation of the teaching*
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> *staff; the need to meet as far as possible immediate needs; offering to all youth the*
>
> *same opportunities in education; the systematic creation of the preconditions for the*
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> *expansion, modernisation and development of education at all levels.* [21]

A.The reactionary dimension of the 21st of April Regime

Repeal of the 1964 Reform: the meticulous regression to the pre-1964 position

The first and immediate reaction of the military rulers was to reverse the specific changes initiated by the 1964 reform and bring the education system back to its pre-1964 status. Thus they believed that the goals of order and stability would be better achieved, since they perceived the previous changes as threatening the viability of their regime.[22] This reaction was another example of the normal pattern of forward and backward steps in Greek educational development, a further aspect of a vicious circle of reform and counter-reform which had troubled the history of Greek education. It was also reminiscent of the reaction to the 1929 reform by the People's Party and the dictatorship of Metaxas during the 1930s.

Emergency Law 129/1967 "On the Organisation and Administration of Education" completely and systematically reversed the 1964 reform. Rhetorically it was based on the concept of the "Helleno-Christian" spirit and it represented the outright abrogation of most

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[21] See Papakonstantinou's *Politiki Agogi*, translation from "Traditionalism and Reaction in Greek Education" in *Greece Under Military Rule*, p. 133.

[22] Similar initial reactionary educational policies were pursued by most Latin American dictatorships. In Chile pre-coup educational reforms had been carried out by the centrist government of Frei and the socialist government of Alliende. As was the case with the Papandreou government, the Frei administration in 1965 introduced reforms at all three educational levels and greatly increased the expenditure on education. Alliende sought to reform the educational system so as to make it more egalitarian, providing education for the workers as well as for the elites. As in the Greek case, Chilean education was highly politicised, especially at the University level, marked by intense student activism and the increase of the student Marxist movement. The regime of Pinochet acted strongly against such developments and his educational policy was a reaction against the previous democratisation of the educational system. The Frondizi period in Argentina (1958-1962) had inaugurated a pluralist system of education, with enormous emphasis on science and technology, followed by Ongania's Catholic, nationalistic and authoritarian orientations. Thomas Sanders, *op.cit*, pp. 6-7.

of the previous changes.[23] A new scheme was introduced which changed once again the orientation of secondary education,[24] and abolished the concept of "general education" which had guided the spirit of the 1964 reform. The Pedagogical Institute, created in 1964 to conduct pedagogical and psychological research, with the intention of elevating the standard of teaching in Greece, was abolished, and all of its members were dismissed or demoted.[25] This Institute, which had attracted the participation of famous Greek scientists, was abolished because, according to the military rulers, its spirit was "*contrary to the national traditions and the long history of the Greek people* ".[26] In its place the pre-1964 Higher Council of Education was re-established, according to the 1914 regulations, and was given overall supervision of educational matters. A further decree which provided for the entry of 10% of those sitting the September examination into higher education on the basis of their "*high moral character and irreproachable behaviour*",[27] was not applied, but all candidates were required to have a "*certificate of good conduct*" in order to be admitted. (Royal Decree 454/67, article 5) A free meal service for primary schoolchildren was abolished and measures concerning the appearance of pupils in schools strictly applied.

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[23] Return to six-year compulsory education, a school leaving age of 12 instead of 15 (article 3); abolition of the lyceum and re-imposition of the pre-1964 unified gymnasium divided into the lower and higher gymnasia, one of a classical orientation, and the other of a vocational orientation; return to the system of exams which the previous system had abolished; simple katharevousa was recognised as the only official language of instruction to be taught from the fourth grade in school (Article 5). The period of teacher training was reduced from three years to two (article 13). They also abolished the baccalaureat and returned to the previous system of entrance examinations.

[24] The curriculum of the gymnasia based on law 129/67 did away with the new school-books introduced by the 1964 reform, and published under the surveillance of the Pedagogical Institute and replaced them with textbooks published before 1963, similar to those which had existed before the reform of 1929, and re-introduced the half-year semester examinations; they re-imposed Latin as a compulsory language once again, increased the hours of studies of ancient Greek and reduced the hours of mathematics and modern Greek; they abolished courses such as the "Elements on the Democratic System", "Education of the Citizen", "Introduction to Sociology" and "Elements of Economic Science", and replaced them with courses such as "the principles of the 21st of April regime". Ancient Greek was given a renewed emphasis at the expense of modern languages and all the voluntary courses were abolished; the teaching of ancient Greek, through passages of 10 to 15 lines was re-introduced without the substantial analysis of the content, but based on the study of grammar and syntax. The demotic language was only to be taught during the three first years of primary education. (See Decision by the minister Kalambokias published in the newspaper Vima, 13/6/67). In 1969 a new programme for secondary education was introduced to replace the previous 1967 one. For all three types of secondary education (classical, vocational, economic) the curicula were meticulously defined by the new program, without offering any major change, but only a rearrangement of the hours of the study of ancient Greek and the hours of maths and physics while the priorities remained on classical and religious courses. (Royal Decree 702/69, 31/10/69, *The official Newspaper*)

[25] See Dimos Anastasiou "L' Enseignement Grec et son Demantelement par la Junte" in *Les Temps Modernes*, p. 184.

[26] Declaration of the Minister, in the newspaper *Eleftheros Kosmos*, (30/6/67).

[27] Article 4, Law 40/67 "On the Entrance Examinations for Higher Institutions", *The Official Newspaper*.

Long lists of banned books were circulated by the Ministry of Education, while booksellers who continued to sell the forbidden books made themselves liable to imprisonment under the 1912 law "On the establishment of a state of siege". Among many curious items included on the list were George Finlay's *History of the Greek Revolution* and an edition of Constantine Paparrighopoulos' book *History of the Greek Nation*, the author of the latter having been one of the principal ideologists of the concept of "Helleno-Christian civilisation".[28] Even pre-school kindergarten books were stamped before military censors would allow their circulation.[29]

It should be noted, however, that in general, the school textbooks approved by the junta were not radically different from their predecessors' books, i.e., the pre-1964 textbooks. In the history textbooks there were a few additions and changes concerning modern Greek history so as to provide the necessary justification of the military intervention. Greater emphasis was put on periods of warfare in the study of Greek history, thus presenting the national history as a series of military victories, and giving the army the leading role, the heir to the ancient spirit and guardian of the national heritage. In the history textbooks the depiction of the splendour and glory of war was pursued systematically while the underestimating of other important political and intellectual accomplishments, revealed the one-sided military perception of history.[30]

As to the language issue, the colonels allowed the use of demotiki in the first three forms of primary education, under the general provision that it should be *"void of extremities and idioms, and corresponding to the perceptive capacity of the pupils in these forms "*; in the other forms the use of katharevousa was imposed strictly.[31] Contrary to Metaxas' favourable predisposition towards the demotiki, military rulers used to call the demotic a *"semi-barbarian Turko-Hellenic language"*.[32] They employed their own version

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[28] See *Hellenic Review*, August 1968, pp. 25-26.

[29] Moreover Royal Decree 95/69, which imposed the centralisation and the control over the University textbooks was used as a means to enhance the central power of the state over the dissemination of University knowledge.

[30] See Alki Kyriakidou-Nestoros "George Papadopoulos, History and the Teaching of History to the Greek children" in *Anti* 26-27, 6/9/75, pp. 18-22.

[31] From personal experience as a pupil in the 4th form of primary education in 1971, the transition from the demotiki of the 3rd form to the katharevousa of the 4th form was very frustrating for the majority of pupils.

[32] Polychronopoulos *Education and Policy in Greece*, Vol. II, p. 546.

of katharevousa in their speeches, legal documents, and regime books, and at times their language did not even make sense. Due to their own poor educational achievements, they perceived the use of the katharevousa idiom as a sign of education, as a status symbol, reminiscent of the 19th century perception of the language issue.

Demobilisation of the youth: "Stick and carrot" tactics

The regime's policy towards the youth, based on the above set of ideas, involved the dissolution of all youth organisations of every political persuasion, be it the "Lambrakis youth movement" which was connected with the Centre-Left, or the EREN, the youth organisation of the Conservative party, ERE.[33] School pupils at primary and secondary school level were not allowed to attend any youth organisations with the exception of the Greek Scouts, the youth section of the Greek Red Cross and the Sunday Schools. Moreover, school communities, involved in various sorts of extra-curicula activities, were not allowed to exist at all by the junta.[34] In 1968 the dictatorship created a special department in the General Secretariat of the Prime Minister under the title "Direction of the Youth" (law 551/20-9-68), which aimed at the formation of a special policy on the supervision of the youth, the student movement and its various organisations. It involved the financing of supervisory councils and the publishing of magazines in the government's effort to control the student movement.[35] The only attempt by a few members of the military elite to create a youth organisation was the formation of *Alkimoi*, whose leadership was given to Plevris, the leader of the "*4th of August* movement, but it had no appeal within the military circles at large.

The regime issued Law 93/1969 "On the Rights and Duties of the Students" creating the "Student Code", involving sanctions for disobedient students. This was a clearly and explicitly disciplinary and intimidating document, after the style of the 1929 "Idionymon", with similar vocabulary and ideas concerning students. The disciplinary

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[33] On April 30, 1967 the governmental newspaper *Eleftheros Kosmos* proclaimed that the government had dissolved the EDA party, the Lambrakis youth, EREN and EDHN, while a few days later Angelis, the Leader of the General Army Staff, ordered the dissolution of 279 organisations and associations. See Andreas Lentakis, "Staff for the Fascistisation of the Youth, in *Anti* 18, p. 32.

[34] Message from the Minister Kalambokias in the Newspaper *Eleftheros Kosmos*, 13/5/67.

[35] Lentakis, *op.cit*, p. 22.

punishments in cases of offences such as the dissemination of subversive ideas, incitement to strike and disrespect for the principles of the state varied from reprimand to permanent expulsion from all institutions of higher education.[36] Article 120 and 123 stated that,

> *a student will be punished if he aims at the implementation of ideas having as an obvious goal the overthrow, by whatever means, of the existing social regime or tries to convert others to those ideas, or propagates such ideas in whatever way and by whatever means, or propagandises ideas of organisations aiming at detaching a part from the whole of the State.....students intending to call students of one or more schools, or a group of students to a meeting should, 24 hours in advance, in writing, ask for permission from the Rector stating the place the day and the hour as well as the purpose of the assembly....otherwise they will be punished.* [37]

The policy towards the students was a policy of "stick and carrot tactics". On the one hand, the regime tried to intimidate them by promulgating authoritarian laws such as the "student code of behaviour" and others concerning the interruption on the deferment of military service for disobedient students.[38] Police surveillance and police informers among the students were used to control university life and to suppress the student movement, and there were even threats not to grant passports, scholarships and tuition fees, to students in foreign countries. On the other hand, the abolition of the "certificates of good conduct", the offers of free books, scholarships, exam accommodations, interest-free loans, free medical care, new halls of residence, were used among other things, to woo the students. The military rulers intended through the Governmental Commissioner and the Committees appointed to run the Student Unions, to exercise an overall control over student movements and to tame any tencencies to mobilise.

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[36] The 5-member Disciplinary Council set up by a decision of the Minister of National Education was composed of 4 professors and the Government Commissioner (article 122).

[37] Translation taken from the article "Education: A Farewell to Freedom" in the *Greek Report*, February 1969, pp. 5-6.

[38] Laws 720/1970 and 1347/1973. The second followed the student uprising in the Law School in 1973, as the dictatorship tried to get rid of the revolutionary students and especially the leadership of the student movement, through the promulgation of intimidating laws.

Purges of professors and teachers

A significant authoritarian feature of the military regime's educational policy was the harassement of the educational hierarchies, the dismissals and purges of professors. One of the Ministers of Education, Theophylactos Papakonstantinou declared in one of his speeches that:

> *The National Revolutionary Government, considering the modernisation and*
>
> *reorganisation of education as one of its principal objectives, has judged that it*
>
> *should begin with the cleansing of its highest level. For it is at this level that the*
>
> *intellectual and scientific leadership of the nation is moulded.* [39]

A series of Constituent Acts defined the conditions according to which the teaching staff might be considered disloyal to the regime and so be dismissed or forced to resign. The purge of school teachers, while on a relatively small scale, was highly selective, concentrating on the leadership of the profession, in order to terrorise the rest and deprive them of their leadership.[40] The purge of University professors was also achieved by the lowering of the retirement age from 70 to 65, while deans and rectors could also be appointed directly by the ministry, without the application of the normal electoral procedures.[41] The junta obliged professors to sign "declarations of loyalty" to the regime.[42]

> A series of ministerial acts dismissed long lists of professors on the grounds that
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> *they have in a number of ways in the course of their professional and social lives*
>
> *attacked the established political and social order and its institutions. They have*
>
> *carried out propaganda in favour of communism or furthered its objectives and, in*
>
> *a general way, followed in political matters the subversive and anti-national line of*

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[39] See "Greek Education on the Operating Table Part 1" in *Hellenic Review*, Vol. 1, No 2, July 1968, p. 12.

[40] During the whole of the dictatorship 56 professors and readers, 90 teachers at the secondary school level of education (out of 10,000 teachers), 211 at the primary school level (out of 30,000 teachers) and 13 administrative employers of the Central Service were dismissed.

[41] The *Official Newspaper*, No 30, January 27, 1968.

[42] Furthermore the military junta based on Constituent Act No 5 "On the Cleansing and Restoration of Order in the Higher Educational Institutions" stipulated the suspension for six months or more of University Professors by a simple decision of the President or Vice-President of the Government and the Minister of Education, when among others "*professors do not comply with the established social status quo and the national directives*" (articles 1&2).

the communists ....indulged in manifestations and activities in favour of a certain

political party, have in a number of ways canvassed support for that party, have

morally supported and approved every demagogic and political activity of the

students,

and in general been guilty of *"political activism, professional incompetence or moral*

turpitude " which justified their dismissal.[43] With the purges of the professors the regime

aimed at the lowering of the public perception of the whole academic body by including

allegations of corruption (financial, sexual etc) among the purported reasons for the

dismissals, which reflected the military's disrespect towards and fear of the intellectuals.

The long list of dismissed professors included a large number of distinguished intellectuals

in various scientific and educational fields. Many of them were offered chairs in European

and American Universities, which they accepted and fled the country.

B. Stabilisation of authoritarian rule

Administration of Education: The centralisation of authority

The Constitution of 1968 stated that the general directives of national educational

policy to be, as prescribed by law, after consultation with the National Council of

Education.[44] The competence of the National Council of Education was to give its opinion

on the general guidelines on educational matters, its aims, mission and ideological

orientation. This was composed of the Archbishop of Athens, the President of the

Constitutional Court, the Leader of the Armed Forces, the President of the Academy of

Athens, the rectors of the Universities of Athens and Salonica and of the Polytechnic of

Athens, and the senior General Inspector of Secondary Education.[45] The Church

hierarchy, specifically, intervened in a number of ways and at several instances to prevent

these changes in education not favourable to the Church, or to promote others.[46] The

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[43] Translation from "Greek Education on the Operating Table".

[44] Articles 2&3 which were additions to the previous 1952 Constitution.

[45] Law Decree 793/1971 (1/1/71) "On the National Council of Education" in *The Official Newspaper*.

[46] This is repeatedly stated in Archbishop Ieronymos' personal account in *The Tragedy of an Archbishop*. Moreover, the church's influence was guarranteed by the ex-Brigadier Pattakos, deputy Prime Minister of Greece during the junta period and a member of the Triumvirate, who had grown up in the "Zoi" sphere

jurisdiction of the government Commissioner was also prescribed constitutionally and defined by law.

Law Decree 651/1970 (29/8/70) "On the organisation of general education and the administration of its personnel" defined the Higher Educational Council as the highest administrative and supervisory body under the minister of education. Whereas the previous Institute of Education had four members specialising in the problems of technical/vocational education, the National Council of Education had only one seat for a representative of technical education, which could be filled by someone with no specialist technological or economic training. By contrast, teachers of theology had two seats on the Council.[47] In each educational region one gymnasium was to be promoted into a model gymnasium, attended by the selected "best" pupils. A whole series of inspectors were to supervise the functioning of the educational system and to report on its development.

Clientelistic appointments: The infiltration of regime people into education

The regime appointed regime people to the professors' and the teachers' Unions so as to be able to control their actions and decisions. The vacant seats created by the series of dismissals in the Universities were filled by people "*in agreement with the social status quo and national ideals*".[48] The new professors were chosen by the ministry of education and the military government. Governmental control over the institutions of higher education became stifling, reaching its peak with the infamous institution of the Government Commissioner, and with the appointments of retired army officers to higher educational institutions. The Government Commissioner exercised state surveillance over higher educational institutions by seeing that laws and governmental policies were being applied. He was present at the meetings of the various administrative bodies, he offered his opinion

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which acquired a very significant role in church and national matters under the junta. This overtly puritanical church organisation contributed to the imposition of some of the most prudish education measures enforced by the regime, such as the ban on beards for schoolboys, miniskirts, draconian film censorship, etc. ("Zoi, Sotir, the Greek Bishops and the Junta" in *Hellenic Review*, Vol 1, No 4, p 27)
[47] See *Hellenic Review*, August 1968, p. 26.
[48] 46 professors and readers were appointed at one stroke by the regime without any elections or normal procedures, most of them not meeting the adequate prerequisites for such positions. See Solon Gregoriades, *History of the Dictatorship*, Vol. 1, p. 115.

and made propositions (Law Decree 180/69, 30/4/69).[49] The institution of the Government Commissioner was written in the constitutions of both 1968 and 1973. The military government intervened in the elections of professors either by refusing to appoint the choice of the competent schools, or by making appointments without any electoral procedures.[50] Moreover, the minister could announce the occupant of a vacant seat whenever he wished to do so.[51]

Following these purges and the subsequent appointments of regime people, there was a long list of professors, readers and assistant staff who collaborated with the military junta, aiming at their personal professional ascendancy. The military governors, in their effort to intervene in the affairs of the Higher Education, received a positive response from some University professors. By appointing professors, the so-called specialists, to the ministries, the military elite tried to give a technocratic outlook to the government. 19 professors became ministers or Deputy ministers, while other professors became general secretaries of ministries, general directors, prefects, governors of Banks, presidents of administrative councils etc.[52]

The collaboration of some professors with the military rulers took various forms: There was cooperation over ideology and propaganda, with publication of pro-government books and articles, laudatory speeches and membership of pro-dictatorship associations; the task of the security police in the University was facilitated by the passing on of information on students and professors; people who were highly regarded by the regime were appointed and promoted; students were sent to disciplinary councils of the AEI. The

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[49] Furthermore, Royal Decree 322/69 (17/5/69) defined the details on the seat of the Commissioner and the people working around him in the Universities of Athens and Salonica, the Polytechnic of Athens, the Higher Agricultural School of Athens, the Higher Industrial School of Athens and Salonica, and the Higher School of Fine Arts. While the post of the Governmental Commissioner had first been introduced in 1931, the aims, content and the person responsible in this post changed completely under the dictatorship. The person appointed became a sort of a police inspector in the Universities.

[50] See Giorgos Papademetriou, "The Legislation of the Dictatorship Regarding the Educational Institutions" in *Politis* No 2, June 1976, p. 21.

[51] Law Decree 429/1970 "On the Proclamation of a University Seat". Law Decree 672/70, (14/9/70) stated that deans and rectors were no longer elected by their respective Senates but were appointed by the ministry from a list of three candidates chosen by the Senates. The same principles were applied for the assistant teaching staff based on Law 553/68. All the candidates had to submit their applications for appointment to the ministry of education accompanied by a signed curriculum vitae on their and their families' political convictions and affiliations.

[52] See Demetres Daveas, "The Facts about the Cooperation of AEI Professors with the Dictatorship" in *Politis* No 2, June 1976.

cooperation of many professors with the junta and the appointment of regime people to AEI places created a serious problem for those responsible for the post-dictatorial cleansing of the Universities of collaborators, the "de-juntafication".[53] All those who were dismissed from their University posts during the junta period were automatically reinstated. All those directly appointed to posts by the regime without being elected to their posts by the Faculties were dismissed.[54]

The equivalent in the educational establishment of the "para-state" and the paramilitary organisations of the post-war period, which had such an important role in the imposition of the 21st of April regime, were the "para-student" organisations, which played an active role in the destabilisation of the parliamentary climate, in general, and the demobilisation of the student movement, in specific. The EKOF (National Social Organisation of Students) had actively participated in the University environment as a counter-balance to the growing centre and left wing student movement during the 1960s. EKOF had been the creation of the conservative government of ERE, and had been supported financially by that government.[55] It was composed of hard-core conservative students against the growing tide of Centre-Left student mobilisation. During the period of the junta, EKOF was the only student organisation which was not dissolved, while the military rulers made extensive use of previous EKOF members in crucial ministerial, prefectural, diplomatic and other posts.[56]

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[53] A long list of 92 professors and readers was charged by the Special Disciplinary Council and were either convicted or acquitted of the charges. See *ibid.*, pp. 23-28.

[54] Henry Wasser "A Survey of Recent Trends in Greek Higher Education" in *The Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, Vol. VI, No. 1., Spring 1979, p. 87.

[55] See Lentakis "Para-state Organisations: ERE's Boomerang" in *Anti* 17, p. 17, on the existence of financial and communication links between the government party, ERE, and the student organisation, EKOF The former financed the latter's newspapers, played its rents in Athens and Salonica and organised its indoctrination tours throughout the country.

[56] Some characteristic promotions of EKOF members to powerful posts were, among others, the case of Lakis Ioannides who had been the president of EKOF in Salonica during the period 1965-1967 and had published student periodicals in which he had invited opinions of people such as the Metaxist Maniadiakis. During the dictatorship of 1967 he became an attache at the Embassy in France, he published the periodical *Ideai*, was the President of the Cultural Movement of the Greek Youth in Western Europe and wrote several books. Another ex-member, Pavlos Manolopoulos, president of EKOF during the period 1960-1963, became a prefect and in 1970 a minister of Labour. (See Lentakis, *ibid.*, pp. 20-22.)

C. The need for modernisation

The immediate and foremost concern of the junta was the control of education and the imposition of its own conspiratorial-clientelistic network so as to control and depoliticise the student body, in specific and the intellectual world, in general. The accession of the regime coincided with a period of industrialisation which had started in the 1960s and continued with the advent of the military government to power.[57] The junta was forced to respond to the new situation created by the process of industrialisation by introducing changes in the country's education system to correspond with its educational needs.[58] The educational policy of the military junta involved, on the one hand, the need to control the school and university mechanisms and, on the other, to introduce innovations which would modernise the Greek educational system. These two priorities resulted in a controversial type of policy by which authoritarian measures, typical of the military's mentality, were mixed with modernising westernised notions, which expressed necessary and unavoidable choices at the elite level, the country being part of the industrialised western European society.

Towards the end of the 1960s, came the first organised response by the World Bank to the matter of technical education in Greece. Its primary findings concerned the inability of technical education in Greece to respond to the needs of the diversification of the economy.[59] A new institutional arrangement came into existence in 1970, with law

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[57] Economic growth in the secondary sector continued during the junta and in 1973, the gross product of this sector reached a peak of a rapidly increasing development, which had started from 1958. Similarly employment in the secondary sector increased dramatically and a change in the composition of industrial production took place as well. See Stefanos Pesmazoglou, *Education and Development in Greece 1948-1985* , pp. 205-212.

[58] Similarly in Spain the period 1965-1971 was characterised by an anti-democratic modernisation of the educational mechanisms, as a response to high levels of industrialisation, economic growth, foreign tourism, and urbanisation. The period saw the decreasing influence of traditional Catholicism, the increasing number of University students after a long period of relative stagnation in University enrollments. The response of the government was the implementation of a plan of educational development which recognised the anachronisms of the Spanish educational system and demanded increased educational budgets. (Spain was spending only 2.46% of its national income in education -among the smallest percentages in Europe). See Salvador Giner, "Power, Freedom and Social Change in the Spanish University, 1939-75 in *Spain in Crisis*, pp 195-202.

[59] See Pesmazoglou's references to the "Staff Appraisal Report of the World Bank". It was stated that Greece spent the lowest amount in Europe on industrial and technological research and placed its emphasis on the traditional sectors of nutrition and textiles. (*op.cit.*, p 301) The lack of technical and professional education contributed to the production and reproduction of the already existing traditional structures of the Greek economy, without creating the circumstances for the development of technically advanced and dynamic sectors. (*op.cit.*, p 331)

652/1970 (29/8/70) "On the creation of KATE for Technical and Professional Education" based on the World Bank report, and with the financial assistance of the Bank to respond to the need for specialised studies in agriculture, industry, health and the processing of food.[60] On the other hand, the creation of KATE was also indispensable to the absorption of the surplus of candidates for higher education, which could potentially have created social pressures.

In 1971, a "Committee on Educational Matters", composed of professors loyal to the regime, investigated the state of education in Greece. Its suggestions included the raising the number of mandatory years of education to eight, the abolition of entrance examinations to the gymnasium, and the need to develop further the level of technical and professional education. It was suggested that secondary education should be divided into two cycles, a lower one of two years and a higher one of four years. With respect to the teaching of the Greek language, the Committee proposed the use of the demotic up to the sixth year of primary education, and the simple katharevousa in the six-year gymnasium. In these propositions there appeared to be a similar liberal ideological orientation to that of the 1964 reform, although the liberal ideological climate was clearly missing from Greek society. Parallel to that Committee, another Committee on Higher Educational matters proposed the diversification and expansion of the institutions of higher education, on the one hand, and a long list of administrative changes, ie the meticulous control of the higher educational institutions by the National Council of Education, composed of members appointed by the ministry, clauses on the powerful role of the Government Commissioner and on the control of the student movement, on the other hand, most of them authoritarian in character.[61] Such proposals were accompanied by a few measures such as the creation of the University of Jannina, composed of Schools of Philosophy, Physics and Mathematics, which were previously departments of the University of Salonica,[62] and the creation of the Universities of Thrace and Crete and the department of Chemistry in Salonica in 1973, to meet the needs of the chemical industry there. In addition, a new

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[60] It involved the creation of five Centres of Higher Technical Education in the cities of Athens, Salonica, Patras, Larisa and Heraclio in Crete.

[61] Vrychea/Gavroglou, *Attempts at Reform of Higher Education, 1911-1981*, pp. 68-71.

[62] Law Decree 746/70, (12/12/70), *The Official Newspaper*.

educational curriculum for secondary education was prepared in the same year, including

elements of the 1964 programme, which was never applied. [63]

In general, the rhetorical tendency of the military governors during the 1970s was to create a constitutionally legitimate, self-administered university which in reality was controlled and suppressed by the government, and a modern school system which in reality was strictly supervised. As was the case with the "liberal constitution" of the junta (which was not respected), so it was in the field of higher education where the junta was unable to adhere to rules and constitutions. The military regime tried hard to present a legitimacy based on a constitution and a series of liberal legal documents, which it only partially applied, trying to combine modernisation with methods of control, intimidation and demobilisation. This type of policy led to the student uprising in the Law School in February 1973 and the Polytechnic revolt in November 1973, the latter being the most notable organised opposition to the military regime to originate from civil society. It signalled the beginning of the last phase of the military regime, and it certainly brought about the immediate downfall of the Papadopoulos dictatorship and his overthrow by the hard-core faction within the junta. The student grievances at first concentrated on internal matters such as democratic elections and free discussions on their educational curriculum, demanding their democratic rights as members of the Greek University community, but expanded by November 1973 to include open demands for the fall of the military junta, thus rejecting any liberalisation measures coming from a military government.

A period of apparent frustration and contradiction between the two imperatives, modernisation and authoritarian control, characterised even in the latter stage of the hard-liners, immediately after the Polytechnic uprising. During that last period, it had become plain that the higher educational apparatus was very much politicised, despite the intentions of the military rulers, and presented the regime with the most serious source of opposition. Hard pressed to discover the causes of the revolutionary student mobilisation, the hard-

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[63] See Noutsos, op.cit., p. 290. According to the same author, the 1967 provisory programme of secondary education was the one which reflected the ideological and political orientations of the newly established regime and tried to do away with the 1964 liberal and radical reform of the Centre Union government. The subsequent programmes of 1969 and 1973 were an attempt by the dictatorial regime to re-introduce the spirit of reform initiated in 1964 and abolished in 1967. (p 285)

liners took part in a series of nine ministerial councils between February 1974 and June 1974, "On Youth". Among the variety of opinions, some ministers tried to associate the student anti-dictatorial struggle with the movements of Western Europe and the ills of the consumerist society, while others blamed unemployment, the decreasing influence of the Church and the lack of ideals. But most important were the propositions on reform of the AEI, which ranged from very reactionary and backward-looking ones, along the lines of the first dictatorial policies, to some very radical innovations, which included among others, the abolition of university chairs, student participation in the administration of the AEI, the reevaluating of the professor's work every seven years, the introduction of marxist philosophy in teaching, the need to use the modern Greek language and changes in technical education and the infrastructure of the University apparatuses.[64] None of these suggestions was ever implemented by the hard-liners, within the economically frustrating climate of 1974, but they revealed the conflict of opinions and influences in military regimes and the contradictory process of their incorporation under conditions of limited authoritarian pluralism.

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[64] Proceedings of the Ministerial Councils on educational matters in Sarafianos/Loverdos "From the Dictatorship until Today" in *Anti* 442, 13/7/90, pp. 54-56.

Chapter 8: CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapters, I have been dealing with two periods of dictatorship in Greek political history, which had an openly authoritarian discourse and political practice. The common denominator was the abolition of parliamentary institutions during the course of both these authoritarian regimes. I concentrated on the ideological domain of the authoritarian regimes, the perceptive, interpretative and rhetorical ability of the dictatorial elites, on the one hand, and on the crucial field of education, which directly reflected these ideas, on the other. Common to the two regimes were their attempt to manipulate the ideological sphere through their discourse, emphasising traditional elements in their ideas, adopting a one-sided perception of history, stressing their anti-communist orientation, suppressing the freedom of social and political organisation, censoring free speech, pursuing anti-parliamentary and exclusionary forms of authoritarian domination. Also in common was their aim to pursue an authoritarian educational policy, reacting to previous attempts at reform, controlling all levels of education, purging professors from their chairs, and banning youth associations. Despite these features, similar to every type of authoritarian rule, the two regimes perceived differently the nature of their rule, interpreted differently the Greek past and their contemporary realities, proposed different forms of political organisation, perceived the role of the youth in a radically different manner and faced different conflicts over their educational orientations.

I carried out an extensive analysis of the Greek historical context in ideological and educational matters, as well as of the immediate background as regards the domestic and international settings of the two regimes, in order to show the similarities in and differences between the influences on the ideas of the two regimes and their connection with the field of education. The Greek ideological context centred around the issues of the Greek identity -religion, history, language and nation-, under conditions of guided democracy, imported parliamentary rules and dependent economic development. In the field of education, which had similarly imported characteristics, the emphasis was on classicist, religious and generally non-vocational studies. Under nominally democratic

institutions, Greek ideology and education progressed in a context of pluralism, which allowed lively and, at times, fierce debates concerning the role of religion, the perception of history, the essence of nationalism, the adoption of a common language and the orientation of education.

With respect to the climate immediately preceding the onset of the two regimes, one can observe wide differences in the domestic and international context, and this directly affected the orientations and ideological choices of the dictatorial elites. The domestic climate that preceded the 4th of August regime was marked by a pluralist democratic process of mass politics, with the Liberal Venizelist party and the royalist, anti-Venizelist People's Party alternating in power. The background climate to the 21st of April regime was marked by the existence of an exclusionary and authoritarian parliamentarism, with the dominance of right-wing forces in power. The international climate surrounding Metaxas' rule was marked by the influence of international fascism. The international context of the military junta was marked by the acceptance of liberalism. The dictatorship of Metaxas was the authoritarian reaction to the previous climate of inter-war socio-political instability in the country's domestic affairs. The 1967 military junta was the authoritarian reaction to the exhaustion of the post-war anti-communist exclusionary state, and to the mobilisation of Greek society. The power structure of the 4th of August regime was based on the personal power of the dictator, enjoying the King's acquiescence, with a civilian government, the support of the dominant anti-Venizelist elites and of the military hierarchy. The power structure of the military junta was based on the collective leadership of a certain faction of the military, enjoying support neither from the king nor the civilian political world. The ideas of the 4th of August regime reflected largely the mind of the dictator Metaxas, while those of the 21st of April regime reflected the minds of the military officers.

The ideological perceptions of the two authoritarian regimes differed widely. The regime of Metaxas gave great emphasis to the ideological legitimation of the dictator's rule and, for that reason, he embarked on the adoption and the diffusion of an ideological discourse which was largely influenced by the powerful fascist philosophy. The 21st of April regime's authoritarian discourse, reflected merely the mentalities of the military

rulers. Similar differences are observed in the way the two regimes perceived the world of education, the role of intellectuals and the position of the youth within Greek society. Their rhetoric towards the youth was very indicative of their authoritarian ideas, whether they were conservative, reactionary or, even, reformist as regards the previous domestic context and the contemporary international influences. The educational policies pursued by the two regimes, were very different with an emphasis on the mobilisation of the youth in the case of the 4th of August regime, and on the demobilisation of the youth and the imposition of authoritarian clientelism, in the case of the 21st of April regime.

Authoritarian ideas: 4th of August ideology vs 21st of April military mentalities

The 4th of August regime, by giving the impression of unity at the elite level, made an extensive use of the ideological mechanisms and tried to propagate a new authoritarian ideological framework. Metaxas' regime was an authoritarian regime at the periphery of the European ideological centres, which felt the pressure to imitate, incorporate and manipulate dominant ideological themes and styles. This was exemplified by the adoption of some new fascist ideas and forms of organisation, on the one hand, and the pursuance of some reformist policies connected with the fascist corporatist state, on the other. While the ideas of the 4th of August regime did not enjoy the consistency and the all-embracing character of the fascist and Nazi ideologies, they sought to encompass a large number of issues, regarding the form of political system, the organisation of the economy and society, and the cultural standing of the nation.

The international climate of the time was crucial to the ideological orientations of the 4th of August regime. The authoritarian ideological alternative in Europe, in the form of the model fascist regimes in Italy and Germany, the fascistoid regimes in the Balkans, and the Iberian Peninsula, and the fascist movements in almost all the countries of Europe offered many things to imitate for the 4th of August regime, in its ideological interpretation of the existing reality. Most important, the international existence of authoritarian fascism

served as a legitimising pillar to the regime's perception of reality and to its mobilising ambitions.

International fascism employed a particular ideological discourse within a concrete historical international context, and its influence was apparent in most European countries. It consisted in the articulation of various ideological themes, prevalent in most 20th century western societies, such as nationalism, ethnicity, religion, anti-communism and anti-parliamentarism. In each national environment these influential fascist themes acquired a different significance, corresponding to the specific socio-economic, political and ideological circumstances that preceded the dictatorships. Thus, in the German context, the legacy of the wartime defeat, the country's subsequent inferior international status, the instability of the Weimar Republic and an economy in ruins produced a Nazi ideology which consisted of an aggressive and anti-semitic form of nationalism, advocated the adoption of openly totalitarian ideas and practices, concerning all aspects of public and private life, and enjoyed a high degree of popular consent and organisation. In the Italian context, the aftermath of the first world war was marked by the failure to fulfil its irredentist ambitions, by the revolutionary dynamism of the working classes, and by the political deadlocks of the Italian parliamentary system, which led to the formation of the prototype fascist ideology. Fascism in Italy evolved in the time-span of 20 years, its ideology appeared both idealistic and pragmatic, but it never achieved, despite its intentions, the totalitarian dimension of the Nazi example. It emphasised the omnipresence of the state, it downgraded the anti-Semitic and stressed the imperialist aspect of Italian nationalism. In Spain, authoritarianism was the reaction to the ascendancy of Liberals in power and to the subsequent bloody civil war which had sharply divided and polarised Spanish society. Spanish authoritarianism was mainly connected with the influential ideological role of the fascist Falange, which was dominant during the first period of the Franco regime. It gave an influential position to the Catholic Church, while at the same time it avoided the aggressiveness of the Nazi and fascist models and pursued a neutralist and more pragmatic foreign policy during the second world war. In Portugal, unstable parliamentarism, military interventions and a very weak economy confined the Salazarist

nationalist ideology within the national frontiers and colonies of the country. The Salazar regime attached great importance to the corporatist organisation of the economy, while, at the same time, it retained the traditional features of Portuguese culture.

The Greek case has been mostly seen in the light of the influence coming from the model cases of Italy and Germany, and in the light of its similarities with the countries of the Balkan and the Iberian peninsulas, with emphasis on the resemblances between the leadership style of Metaxas and Salazar. Naturally, the history of the Iberian peninsula had been very different from that of the Balkans, in that the first was composed of two historically imperialist states, with strong national identities, at the periphery of the main European developments; while the second was composed of a number of hostile nationalities and states, previously subjects of the Ottoman Empire, with a strong Ottoman historical legacy and a peripheral position, similar to that of the Iberian peninsula. However, the development of Greece, the oldest independent nation-state in the Balkans, did have some things in common with Portugal and Spain, in terms of its socio-economic experiences, political divisions and ideological polarisations, especially during the second half of the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th century, which makes them, in many respects, comparable. Political life in the Spanish, Portuguese and Greek cases was marked by clientelistic relationships, in a context of electoral politics, an army with a heavily political role and a series of military interventions.

The 4th of August regime imported fascist ideas, which centred on the adoption of the leadership principle, open anti-parliamentarism and the corporatist organisation of the state. The lack of a pre-existing indigenous fascist culture, however, exposed the imitative and derivative character of the regime's ideology, whose application contrasted with the lack of social support for such fascist notions. The leadership principle, a mere imitation of the fascist model contrasted with the non-charismatic personality of Metaxas. Anti-parliamentarism rested on the dictator's belief in the bankruptcy of Greece's parliamentary institutions, and on the public's belief in the exhaustion of the previous, polarised parliamentary system, and not on any more elaborate theory of the defects of liberalism, as was the case with fascism. The development of the corporatist state was in any case

characterised by the overwhelming power of the state in national life. Its application by Metaxas ‹consisted› of little more than a populist rhetoric towards peasants and workers and the timid adoption of some reformist policies. Anti-communism, the other fascist component, shared by both liberals and fascists everywhere, not just in the Greek case, had already been excessively employed by the domestic parliamentary political forces of the inter-war period, and the Metaxas regime had nothing new to offer apart from a more organised and repressive police state.

The Greek nationalism of the regime, on the other hand, although it reflected the grandiose megalomania of the other inter-war authoritarian nationalisms, did not contain any aggressive or imperialistic resonance, but expressed the pragmatic beliefs of the dictatorial leadership. Moreover, the 4th of August regime's nationalism did not include any racist or anti-Semitic components, due to the lack of significant minorities within the Greek boundaries and the small number of Greek Jews. The foremost inter-war national tension had been confined to the relationship between native Greeks and the refugee new-comers refugees, but this was principally expressed within the wider political division of the inter-war National Schism of Venizelism vs anti-Venizelism. But the inter-war refugees were ethnic Greeks and not a hostile alien minority, and so did not provoke a racist ideology. The Metaxist Third Greek Civilisation centred on the promotion of traditional Greek values, the king, the family and the orthodox religion, and rested on a selective interpretation of Greek history, expressing the intellectual perceptions of the leader and his theoreticians. The 4th of August regime perceived the development and modernisation of Greek society as coming through the promotion of Greek tradition, and it was fearful of the modernising influences of the materialist western civilisation. It was somewhat static in its perception of the future and retrograde in that it ‹sought› inspiration in the glorious Greek and Byzantine past.

In contrast with the ideological content of the 4th of August regime, the 21st of April regime did not achieve anything that could be called an ideological discourse and its pronouncements were mainly marked by the mentalities of the military rulers. Such mentalities were based mostly on the officers' attitudes towards social and political

realities, which were determined largely by the particularities of the Greek military mind and the general anti-communist ideological context of the post-war period, and not on any elaborate ideological interpretation of their contemporary reality. The mentalities of the military rulers were characterised by fierce anti-communism, both internal and external, a puritanical xenophobia towards western culture, and a vague and out-dated "Helleno-Christianism". Their main objectives involved the restoration of law and order, a typical theme in their own professional socialisation. Greece's military rulers did not have adequate connections with the technocratic-bureaucratic elites and therefore lacked the developmentalist language of the Latin American military dictatorships. The collective character of the military junta resulted in ideological differences between hard-liners and soft-liners, and the military rulers were never able to arrive at a unity of purpose. Their rhetoric regarding the transitional and democratic character of the military regime, and the necessity to construct a new constitution, never enjoyed a full consensus among the military rulers and the 1973 attempts at liberalisation met with a counter-coup by the hard-liners.

While the international climate acted as a legitimising pillar to the authoritarian ideas of the inter-war regimes, the post-war authoritarian regimes existed in the Western sphere of influence and within the context of the unquestioned legitimacy of pluralist and liberal democracy, and these international links with advanced, stable, and democratic industrial societies served to undermine the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes, given that they were subjected to scrutiny in the light of these liberal influences. This contributed to the undermining of the legitimacy of the military regimes, offering to their citizens the alternative liberal political model and encouraging them not to give their full allegiance to the authoritarian regime.[1] In the case of the Greek military junta, the western democratic values of the industrialised societies sharply contrasted with the backward-looking, puritanical and stratocratic mentalities of the military elites.

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[1] See Laurence Whitehead in his article "International Aspects of Democratisation" in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Comparative Perspectives*, where the writer assesses the weight of the international organisations' reactions to the authoritarian regimes of Southern Europe and Latin America, and their pressures to democratise.

Lacking a pre-existing ideological framework, and within a liberal international context, the mentalities of the military rulers and their strongly-worded rhetoric were constantly at variance with their actual practice. The anti-communist, anti-western, puritanical, narrowly nationalistic and religious rhetoric of the military elite contrasted sharply with the consumerist and western orientated policies, their own corrupt political practices and their instrumental perception of power. The constitutional framework, which represented their claim to liberal credentials, was not implemented or respected by them. The only attitude common to all the military officers who intervened in 1967, was their ideological allegiance to the principles of the post-war official anti-communist discourse. Their intervention was a last and desperate effort to save the anti-communist political arrangement from the danger of a more westernised and open liberal discourse, which would have allowed for the existence of a greater pluralism in the realm of ideas, and would have threatened their central position as the guardians of the state. The military junta, by taking the post-war anti-communist discourse to a farcical and absurd extreme, helped Greek people to realise better the deficiencies and the fanaticism of such an ideology and revealed the dangerous political consequences of the existence of such extremities.

Authoritarian education: Ideological "mobilisation by example" vs "demobilisation by reaction"

Although the regime of Metaxas did not try to create a mass party on the model of the fascist mass movements, the ideological mobilisation of the Greek youth was clearly a case of an "ideological mobilisation by example", on the model of the fascist youth movements in Europe. The inter-war concept of a mobilised youth context made a great impression on Greek authoritarian policy, in that the dictator attempted the ideological mobilisation of the youth on the basis of a blatantly authoritarian discourse, and the imposition of a fascist youth organisation, intended to be the future pillar of the regime.

The ideological mobilisation of Metaxas' regime represented the effort of a dictator to activate the youth around a traditionalist, nationalist discourse in a manner and with an organisation totally alien to Greek society and experience. However, such mobilisation

from above required a certain level of pre-existing youth mobilisation from below, which was non-existant in the inter-war social context. The derivative character of the 4th of August regime's ideas, the lack of a pre-existing domestic fascist organisational context, the limits placed on the power of the dictator by the king and the lack of a charismatic leader, were the main impediments to the successful spread of the youth movement and the decay in the mobilisational component of the 4th of August regime. With respect to the educational policy of Metaxas, the leader simply reproduced the previous wavering between reformist and counter-reformist tendencies.[2] The authoritarian control by the state, the introduction of gymnastics lessons, as an element of primary importance in education, the promotion of the demotic language and the contradictory laws concerning the educational curicula demonstrated that the regime's thinking on education expressed an amalgam of various ideas, and that it was unable to overcome the previous instability in education.

Contrary to the 4th of August attempts at mobilisation, the military mentalities of the leaders of the 21st of April regime and the complete lack of an ideological framework presented serious obstacles to a mobilisation from above of the 1960s youth population. Instead the military regime faced a student mobilisation from below and, consequently, aimed at its "demobilisation by reaction", and the depoliticisation of the Greek youth, as the optimum level of consent. Through a complete disrespect towards the previous

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[2] There is a tendency among analysts of educational matters, to see Greek educational reforms and counter-reforms in the context of an endless effort to promote a bourgeois transformation in education which, due to the strong role of the traditional forces, failed to materialise. Noutsos, for example, in a rather mechanistic, class reductionist interpretation of educational developments in Greece from the 1930s believes that the struggle over education was directly connected to the struggle between the conservative and liberal factions of the bourgeoisie. The first professed the classicist orientation while the second espoused a more practical one in educational matters. The turn towards classicism following the defeat of the Venizelist forces in 1932, Noutsos believes, was clearly due to the political and ideological domination of the conservative faction. Similarly, the traditionalist leaning of the 21st of April regime educational policy is seen as a result of the weak ideological and political position of the domestic bourgeoisie (the concept as defined by Poulantzas) and its inability to impose its domination. (Noutsos, *Programs of Secondary Education and Social Control, 1931-1973.*) In that sense, political and ideological phenomena are solely viewed in terms of the interests of the economically dominant classes. It is, in the words of Mouzelis, as if the dominant classes are "*omniscient and omnipotent anthropomorphic entities mysteriously regulating everything on the political scene.*"(Mouzelis, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery,* p. 200.) To perceive debates over ideological and educational matters as the conflict between the various fractions of capital, means that the ideological choices within the Greek national context were reduced to a polarised conflict between traditional and modern, capitalist and pre-capitalist feudal social forces, both of them adequately aware of their perceived interests. The ideological struggle, however, is not a clear conscious struggle of dominant class factions, especially in peripheral civil societies with weakly organised social forces.

educational hierarchies, the banning of most youth associations, the suppression of the student movement, the promotion of loyal regime people to crucial posts, the military junta sought to control the educational system. While the educational policy of the 4th of August regime was mostly guided by influential international ideas and the leader's personal inspirations, that of the military junta was a series of laws void, for the most part, of any ideological orientation, but very significant of the rulers' mentalities, aiming at the promotion of demobilisation based on mediocrity and political apathy.

The contradictions in the military elite's educational policy became more acute, given that the regime coincided with a period of industrialisation and economic growth in the country, which required an urgent modernisation of the educational mechanisms as well. The military government proved unable to form a coherent policy of modernisation in education. This was due to the military mind of the rulers, on the one hand, which was ill-suited to act as a policy-maker in an area outside its competence, and to the fact that the military rulers alienated themselves completely from the previous political establishment and their civilian associates. The contrast between the perceptions of the military mentality and the need for a more rational orientation in the educational apparatus had its effect on education as a whole, resulting in a contradictory policy of control, demobilisation and misconceived modernisation.

The military junta's educational policy revealed the inability of the military to act as an energising force for modernisation and to make rational decisions, as a governmental entity. While the military, in more under-developed societies may be able to act as a modernising force, in more developed polities, and civil societies such as Greece, the military is incapable of bringing about any change at all. As Huntington points out, the military can be both an energising force and a retarder of social change, depending on the country's stage of development.[3] However, to examine the ability of the military to bring about social change as compared to the abilities of civilian governments, views modernisation as the final end, irrespective of the specific means used for its achievement and falls into the trap of viewing the military as a professional, neutral force which

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[3] Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 219-221.

intervenes quite naturally in the political process because of the irresponsibility of the civilians.[4] As Valenzuela claims *"it is simply a distortion of reality to conceive of the civilian side in the same light as the military side"*. This is not so, he believes, because civilian rule involves a multiplicity of institutions and state structures, within the framework of a whole range of formal and informal rules and mechanisms of conflict and accommodation which define the interaction of groups and individuals in a society. The military in power, on the other hand, is by definition an abnormal situation. It is only a single authoritarian institution, which imposes its rule from above and keeps under control the other institutions.[5] Even in the Latin American cases of the military-technocratic-civilian elite coalitions, with a relatively high civilian participation and a sufficient degree of initial consensus, eventually B-A rule came to lose the consensus within its elite structure and to rely solely on mechanisms of coercion.[6]

The Greek junta of 1967 established by a military coup by more or less isolated middle-ranking officers who enjoyed neither the support of the conservative right, nor connections with established and well-known Greek technocrats. Despite their attempt to present the regime as having technocratic outlook, most technocrats of the period of the junta had a meteoric rise at the advent of the regime, and had no previous experience or recognition by Greek society. In the field of education the gap between civilian capabilities and military capabilities was even more accentuated. While the military rulers were forced

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[4] Danopoulos has concentrated on the effectiveness of the military decision-making process and the ability of the regime to convince the public of its capacity to make rational decisions and to perform to their expectations. He asserts that the military regime failed to enlist the commitment and the allegiance of the Greek people, due to its inability to implement effective policy and to attain the goals it had set itself to bring about. It also failed to manage conflict within its own ranks, as well as conflicts within the socio-political and administrative arenas. Under such circumstances the making and implementing of efficacious decisions became problematic. This led to the "incongruity, incoherence and inconsistency of decisional behaviour", which prevented the military from acting as rational governors and attaining the goals they had set when they intervened. See Danopoulos and Patel, "Military Professionals as Political Governors: A Case of Contemporary Greece" in *West European Politics*, May 1980, pp 188-202.

[5] See Valenzuela, "A Note on the Military and Social Science Theory", pp. 132-143.

[6] The members of the ruling coalition, according to O' Donnell, had, at the beginning of the authoritarian period, approximating interests and they supported each other in the imposition of authoritarian rule. During the course of the dictatorships, however, their interests diverged and the army lost its initial support from the middle classes, the local and the transnational bourgeoisie, and became isolated form the rest of society. Therefore, the authoritarian state had to rely exclusively on the legitimacy of fear and coercion. O' Donnell's analysis stands as an interesting argument of how tensions within the ruling elite cannot be reconciled internally and lead to an eventual liberalisation, a democratic opening, or to violent overthrow of the military regimes. "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the Question of Democracy" in the *New Authoritarianism in Latin America*. pp. 285-318.

to adopt modernising policies, their domination within the power structure, given the lack of a pluralist discourse and the absence of cooperation from the civilians of the previous political world, resulted in a contradictory series of laws. The dictatorship of Metaxas, on the other hand, came closer to such a ruling coalition, of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime type, since the dictator enjoyed the support of the conservative anti-Venizelist right and made use of established professionals from the period before the dictatorship. Most of the ministries during the Metaxas regime were allocated to people with no political experience but with professional expertise in the relevant area. By contrast, the military junta discriminated against the whole of the political spectrum, from civilians of the right, to those of the extreme left. Unlike Metaxas' regime, which in the main, only excluded communist factions from the political process, and even made use of politicians of a liberal bent in the government, the military junta was unable to woo civilians and promoted a series of people who were loyal to the military rulers, but who did not necessarily share the authoritarian ideas of the regime and were simply interested in their personal advancement, and who therefore complied with the regime's dictatorial policies, i.e., authoritarian clientelism.

Authoritarian clientelism

The subject of clientelism has enjoyed a vast amount of literature, as a particular mode of social and political organisation in semi-peripheral and peripheral societies. The specific cases of Latin American and Southern European clientelism have also provoked works by many authors, within the context of electoral participation and parliamentary forms of political organisation, permeated by clientelistic, informal and reciprocal agreements. As Mavrogordatos points out,

> *although clientelism does not require electoral politics, it develops at a tremendous pace once liberal institutions and mass suffrage are introduced into a predominantly peasant society, which is totally unprepared to adopt them in their original meaning and content, but quite prepared to adapt them.* [7]

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[7] Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic*, p 11

Hence the subject of clientelism has been seen in the context of the way electoral politics functioned in these societies. In many respects, the Greek political system can be seen as a constitutional democracy superimposed upon a traditionalist clientelistic polity, a society where modern patron-client ties have permeated modern institutions.[8] Moreover the tendency has been to regard clientelism and the advent of military intervention in association, whereby the collapse of civilian politics is associated with the corruption of politicians, and the army comes to power in order to act against the clientelistic practices of the politicians.

Equally significant is the existence and perpetuation of clientelism as the basic source of regime stability in non-electoral authoritarian regimes. As Legg argues, political clientelism may be nurtured by electoral competition, but this has not precluded its vigorous existence elsewhere. Non-elective officials, regardless of level, location, or specific function, can act as patrons with or without electoral politics.[9] Most relevant to our analysis is the non-ideological aspect of clientelism. Clientelism is deliberately non-ideological since it rests on benefits, inducements and personal loyalties, informal networks and secret agreements. Patrons seek specific favours for their clients, in return for specific demands, in systems where general ideological formulations and programmes remain weak.[10] This therefore has great appeal to the dictatorial rulers and their civilian connections, as government is not based on party programmes or specific ideologies, but on the mere demand of unconditional solidarity.

As Clapham and Philip argue, on the issue of authoritarian clientelism[11]:

The institutionalisation of a military regime depends on its capacity to acquire

civilian allies who are willing to accept subordination to military leadership, in

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[8] Keith Legg, "Political Change in a Clientelistic Polity: The failure of Democracy in Greece", in *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 1973, Vol. 1, p. 223.

[9] Keith Legg, *Patrons, Clients and Politicians: New Perspectives on Political Clientelism*, Working Papers on Development, Institute of International Studies, University of California, pp. 41-42.

[10] Peter Flynn, "Class, Clientelism and Coercion: Some Mechanisms of Internal Dependency and Control" in the *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, XII, July 1974, Number 2, p. 139.

[11] To be distinguished from "repressive clientelism", a situation prevalent in the colonial countries of Africa and Asia, in the process of social transformation, referring to a coercive response to the assault of modernity, the attempt to get something for nothing with impunity. See Rene Lemarchand, "Comparative Political Clientelism: Structure, Process and Optic", in *Political Clientelism, Patronage and Development*, Eisenstadt & Lemarchand, Contemporary Political Sociology, Vol. 3, 1981, p. 17.

exchange for some share in running the state and especially some shares in the

benefits which it provides.

The relationship is one of a purely clientelistic character which may be defined as

a transactional arrangement in which the military patron offers some of the

resources derived from its control over the state and in return receives political

support from the civilian client...These subordinate clients must not be sufficiently

strong and independent to be able to threaten the military's power.[12]

In other words, authoritarian clientelism under military regimes describes the relationship between military patrons and military and civilian clients. It may offer material rewards to favoured civilians without giving them much involvement in national political decisions, and as such it is a way of by-passing politicians and parties.[13] Authoritarian regimes, lacking a coherent ideological framework and based on the short-term benefits they can offer to clientelistic networks of support, miss political strategy, and while they are strong in the short-run, they tend to be very vulnerable in the long-run. As Salvador Giner has aptly put it, in the Southern European authoritarian context,

recruitment into the sphere of state employment tended to become more pragmatic

than ideological.......Members of the service classes -mayors of towns, high and

middling civil servants, university professors- were asked to express allegiance to

the official doctrine, yet what was decisive was their personal royalty to the chief or

arbiter of the reactionary coalition and their explicit compromise not to question the

legitimacy of the dominant political arrangement. [14]

The clientelistic, non-ideological form of association with civilians was the principal way in which the 1967 military regime attempted to underpin its legitimacy. Due to the lack of an ability to form a coherent ideological framework for the legitimation of their authority, the military rulers resorted to mechanisms of clientelism, as a way of promoting political apathy and passive acceptance of their authority from civil society. A clientelistic type of legitimation by itself, when not sustained by party or electoral

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[12] See Clapham/Philip, *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, p. 12.

[13] See Pinkney, *Right-Wing Military Government*, p 45

[14] Salvador Giner, "Political Economy, Legitimation and the State in Southern Europe" in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*, p. 28.

mechanisms, is only a short-term strategy in the context of modern, western military regimes and proves insufficient in the longer term due to the short-term nature of the reciprocal agreements. Moreover, clientelistic politics were exacerbated by the factionalism of the military junta, where each member tried to promote his personal status at the expense of the rest, and therefore was connected with conspiratorial practices, as well.

Clientelism, the non-ideological formula, was amply used in the predominantly ideological field of education, in that the military junta tried to control and manipulate the educational apparatus through the use of loyal people, acceptable to the regime, in order to control, rather than to modernise Greek education. This is not to say that the 4th of August regime acted against the clientelistic tendencies of the Greek polity, although Metaxas' rhetoric might have suggested that. Indeed, Metaxas too appointed some of his personal sympathisers to University posts, although he never attained the levels of clientelism of the military junta. Some distinguished academics were not purged and were allowed to retain their positions. In the case of the 4th of August regime, the ideological mobilisation of the youth was superseded by clientelism within the youth movement. Clientelism and corruption permeated the youth movement to such an extent that even the dictator was appalled by it. Many cadres of Neolaia saw their participation in it as a way of gaining personal promotion, in the form of high pay, allowances and access to official patronage. In the case of the 21st of April regime, on the other hand, the gap left by the lack of any ideology was completely filled by clientelistic practices. Authoritarian clientelism in the case of the military junta educational policy aimed at the complete overthrowing of the previous educational hierarchies, the imposition of regime people in high posts and the eventual creation of a new educational establishment in accord with the mentalities of the rulers.

In the end, neither dictatorship was able to legitimise its authoritarian rule, either by means of ideological mobilisation or through the practice of clientelistic politics; they merely exacerbated the existing ideological polarisations and deadlocks in the educational field. Moreover, neither dictatorship enjoyed the support of the youth or of the intellectuals, who sought a more pluralist context for their expression. Although the Greek dictatorial rulers proclaimed themselves to be the true champions of Hellenism, they failed to persuade the people that their aims and programmes were what was required, they were unable to overcome the previous political deadlock, and they were unsuccessful in their attempt to penetrate and mobilise Greek civil society. Each of them, however, managed to survive for some years, i.e., four in the case of the 4th of August regime and seven in the case of the 21st of April regime. They were able to prolong their rule due to the lack of more attractive political alternatives, the stability of their rule being based mostly on passive acceptance of the people. As Przeworski argues, what matters for the stability of a certain political system is the presence or absence of preferable alternatives. A regime does not collapse unless and until an alternative is presented in such a way as to give people a real choice. There can be regimes which can last for a long time and be illegitimate, surviving by the sheer threat of force and coercion.[15] This was true of Greece, in that in neither case was there a viable alternative offered by the civilian political world. In the end, external events acted as catalysts for the downfall of the two regimes. The 4th of August regime collapsed due to death of the dictator and the German occupation of the country. The 21st of April regime was marked by internal discord within the military elites; it finally collapsed in the face of the disaster in Cyprus.

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[15] Adam Przeworski, "Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy" in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, p. 47.

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Didaskalikon Vima

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Hellenic Review

Kathemerini

L' Express

Neon Kraros (The New State)

Newsweek

Theseis kai Ideai (Theses and Ideas)

Politis

Neolaia (The Youth)

Vima

INDEX

APPENDIX

List of Interviews

1. Desypris Thanassis, General, interviewed on November 12, 1991.

2. Karavellas Nikiforos, General, interviewed on November 17, 1991.

The General was offered a ministerial position by the military rulers which he refused. He was not purged by the junta from the military corps.

3. Papoutsakis Christos, editor of the periodical *Anti*, interviewed on November 10, 1991.

One of the most vociferous dissidents of the military regime, the editor published the first issue of the periodical in 1973, which was immediately banned from circulation and the editor imprisoned.

4. Pappa Elli, writer, interviewed on December 16, 1991.

Mrs Pappa had been a pupil and a reluctant member of EON during the Metaxas dictatorship and was a dissident during the military regime.

5. Rokkos Pandelis, professor of Mathematics at the Athens Polytechnic School, interviewed on October 30, 1991.

The Professor was among the first to be purged by the military junta and fled to France where he continued his teaching career.

6. Vidalis Orestis, General, interviewed on October 15, 1991.

The General, totally rejected the advent of the military regime, he was discredited by the military rulers, he fled the country to the United States where he published a series of articles and organised anti-dictatorial conferences.

7. Wassenhoven Nausica, architect and sociologist, interviewed on October 26, 1991.

Mrs Wassenhoven was a student at the Athens School of Architecture, during the military regime.

8. Zoitakis Georgios, interviewed on November 13, 1991.

A General then, he was the junior minister of National Security in the first military government and "Regent" from 13/12/67 to 21/3/72.