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PLATO'S THEORY OF MAN
IN RELATION TO HIS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

THIS THESIS IS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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ABSTRACT

It can be said that for Plato theory of man and political philosophy are tautologous. This study of Plato's theory of man points to the fact that a key concept in understanding Plato's political philosophy and man comes from the same source, that is, the concept of *metaxy*. The idea of *metaxy* is derived from the appreciation of the dialectic movement of arguments, speeches in the dialogues. The oscillation is argued to have been designed by the author of the dialogues in order to guide the reader to experience the existential moment with regard to the nature of the soul. The investigation of the *Statesman*, the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus*, the *Symposium*, and the *Lysis*, shows that the nature of man lies in the soul whose nature is *metaxy*. As regards the Platonic theory of the tripartite soul in the *Republic*, self-knowledge and the art of statesmanship are inseparable in the same way that the study of the soul and the city are intertwined. The philosopher must become king or statesman. As regards the idea of the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony in human nature in the *Laws*, dialectic and language of the philosopher-king are educational and political at the same time. The interplay of Dionysiac and Apollonian effects play an important role in understanding the *metaxy* of human nature and politics, or man and the city. However, the *metaxy* of politics entails the politics of *metaxy*, which renders a hermeneutic freedom to the reader, that is, he is free to choose or decide what kind of interpretation he is about to take or leave. Besides, the thesis claims a solution, which results from its study of human nature in the dialogues, to the enigmatic geometric riddles in the *Statesman* and the *Republic*.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is twofold. One is to render a study of Plato's theory of man in relation to his political philosophy. The idea with regard to the relation between the concept of human nature and politics in this thesis is a traditional one. It is based on the assumption that a political thinker derives his political ideas from his conception of human nature.¹ The title of the thesis has been anticipated by John Wild's *Plato's Theory of Man* which was published in 1946.²

According to Strauss, Wild is said to be moved by the historicist and teleological spirit of Marx and Heidegger rather than Plato as his work seems to present 'systematic anticipation of the future' and the 'historic nature of (the) transcendental inversion'.³ Moreover, he 'has not merely grossly failed to give a not too grossly misleading picture of Plato's views, and especially of his political views,' but 'has also supplied the numerous enemies of Plato and of Platonic studies with the strongest weapon for which they could wish'.⁴

Wild renders a too rational and rigid interpretation

¹ This idea has been put forward by Forbes and Smith. See, I. Forbes and S. Smith (eds.), *Politics and Human Nature*, London, 1983.

² John Wild, *Plato's Theory of Man: An Introduction to the Realistic Philosophy of Culture*, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1946.

³ Leo Strauss, 'On a New Interpretation of Plato's Political Philosophy', *Social Research*, 13, No. 3 (September), 1946, p. 356.

⁴ Strauss, *ibid.*, p. 367.

of Plato's political philosophy. His interpretation of the ideal city turns to support what Popper and other critics accused Plato of being totalitarian.⁵ Like Marx,

⁵ Consider, for example, 'The Structure of the State', in Wild, *Plato's Theory of Man*, *opcit.*, pp. 102-102: 'The legislative process cannot endure in a community threatened by general illiteracy, internal revolution, or external invasion. Hence the nature society demands first of all, the conserving agencies of tradition and education to maintain the plan. These have a preventive and a corrective aspect. The schools and mimetic arts, by means of admonition and images, protect the law against the inborn confusion and ignorance of succeeding generations, while the judges and the courts protect it against violations which arise in spite of such precautions. If possible they correct the malformation of soul in the offender. If this is not possible, they seclude him from the rest of society, and thus attempt to avoid contagion.' Many scholars have attacked Plato in a variety of ways in connection with anti-democratic and illiberal attitudes. In his well-known *Plato Today*, R.D.S. Crossman castigates Plato by saying: 'Plato's philosophy is the most savage and most profound attack upon liberal ideas which history can show' (Crossman, 1937, p. 32). The second, after Crossman, and most successful criticism ever made comes from Karl Popper. Experiencing the totalitarianism of the Nazi political programme during the Second World War, Popper finished his *magnum opus* on the sociology of politics, the *Open Society and its Enemies* to welcome the end of the war. He accused Plato's political programme of inspiring prototype of totalitarianism and utopianism: Plato is the ideologue of totalitarianism. Regarding Plato as an enemy of the open society or democracy, Popper interpreted Plato's dialogues as the political propaganda of an Old Oligarch arguing '(m)en must be taught that justice is inequality' (Popper, 1945, p. 195). A.D. Winspear read Plato from a once-fashionable Marxist socio-historical approach and concluded that Plato was one of the leisured class (Winspear, 1956). Following Winspear with a refining and profound integration of the method in history of political thought, Wood and Wood considered Plato in the light of his social context or social class and established it as the origin of his political theory from which they argued that Plato was an apologist, a rationalizer of the declining aristocracy against the *polis* whose 'important component of the ideology shared by the Socratics with many aristocrats was a deep-rooted hatred of democracy' (Wood and Wood, 1978, p. 3). Similarly, Plato was portrayed by G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, a Marxist social and economic historian, as 'an arch-enemy of democracy, anti-democratic in the highest degree...one of the most determined and dangerous enemies that freedom has ever had who sneers at democracy as involving an excess of freedom for everyone' (de Ste.

he seems to regard social factors to be the cause of evil.

Croix, 1981, pp. 71, 412, 284). Plato's account of democracy and the democratic man in the *Republic*, far from portraying democracy, represents only a 'grotesque caricature of at any rate the one fourth-century democracy--that of Athens'; moreover, de Ste. Croix argues that democracy in fact 'was particularly stable and showed nothing of the tendency to transform itself into tyranny which Plato represents as a typical feature of democracy' (*ibid.*, pp. 70-71, 412). George Klosko agrees that 'to some extent Plato's hostility to democracy can be attributed to his economic and social background.. (t)hroughout his writings Plato reveals many of his class's attitudes and biases..(m)any of his criticism of the Athenian system--and of democracy in general--were common to his class, and it should be realized that much of what he says along these lines is coloured by an almost inbred hatred of these features of his state' (Klosko, 1986, p.10). With the rise of post-structuralism and linguistic turn, Plato's dialogues have been lately understood by those of the oralist approach as evincing his preference for an abstract ethics, attempted in literal discourse which is 'sparse, abstract, immobile', in contrast to the 'copious, warmly human, participatory character of its oral counterpart' (Ong, 1982, p. 166). In defense of the practical, situation-ethics of the Greek oral tradition, E.A. Havelock criticises Plato's dialogues as the founder of 'an abstract of moral absolutes' (Quoted in Gentili, 1988, p. xvii). Although this criticism from the oralists is aimed at the revolutionary impact of Plato's writings rather than the man himself, nevertheless the consequence of this kind of interpretation is far more serious. Psychologically, it supports and enlivens the preceding attacks on Plato's authoritarian and totalitarian mentality which have been regarded as revealing a grotesque attitude towards the Athenians. Finally, all these comments and criticism above can be concluded precisely in L.B. Carter's words that 'Plato, in his way of life and thought, was absolutely untypical of Greek life,..he would have been regarded by the man in the street..as a "layabout", and a "crank"' (Carter, 1986, p. 186). See R.H.S. Crossman, *Plato Today*, London, 1937; Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Vol. One: *The Spell of Plato*, 1945; A.D. Winspear, *The Genesis of Plato's Thought*, New York, 1956; Ellen Meiskin Wood and Neal Wood, *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory: Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle in Social Context*, Oxford, 1978; G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Class Struggle in Ancient Greek World*, London, 1981; George Klosko, *The Development of Plato's Political Theory*, London, 1986; W.J. Ong, *Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word*, London, 1982; Bruno Gentili, *Poetry and Its Public in Ancient Greece: From Homer to the Fifth Century*, trans. A. Thomas Cole, Baltimore, 1988; L.B. Carter, *The Quiet Athenian*, Oxford, 1986.

So controlled socialisation can cleanse the canvass of the city. When Glaucon joins Socrates in constructing the ideal city, he reflects what he himself regards to be desirable. Likewise, Wild, who believes that Man is a rational animal, anticipates in his ideal city only the citizens who are similar to himself, that is, a rational man.⁶ Wild is accurate in portraying what the life of a rational soul would be like. However, the rational soul is not complete with regard to the Platonic tripartite soul. He argues that all men are philosophers and sophists while in the dialogues the philosopher and the sophist are of different natures.⁷ For Plato, the philosopher-king rules for the sake of the happiness of all classes. For Wild, it seems that the philosopher-king rules for the sake of his rational and ascetic way of life. He seems to believe that society in reality can be free from change if a well-planned political ideal has been implemented. He seems to forget that Socrates said that no existing cities are suitable for a philosophic nature.⁸ He is not aware that he himself might be accused of what he accused the historian of philosophy. He accused them of uselessly consuming 'the precious time and energies of the community in consciously trying to demonstrate that this task (*history of philosophy*), committed to their charge, is non-existent or impossible'.⁹ His case is probably worse since he 'unconsciously' argued that his task was a practical and realistic one.¹⁰

⁶ Wild, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

⁷ Wild, *op. cit.*, p. 275.

⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 497a-b). The translations of Plato's dialogues and letters referred to in this thesis will be taken from *Plato in Twelve Volumes*, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

⁹ Wild, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

¹⁰ He regards his work as 'an introduction to the realistic philosophy of culture'. Wild, *op. cit.*

For Strauss, writing about Plato's theory of man is already antithetical to Platonic understanding¹¹, since Plato never wrote a book on other people's 'theories of man'.¹² It is an ironic remark about anyone who claims to write a book on Plato's man. With regard to his criticism, Strauss might have recourse to the fact that Plato never wrote or said anything about this important subject on his own but 'what are now called his are the work of a Socrates embellished and modernized'.¹³ While Plato is anonymous, Socrates never puts forward any definite view. Reading between the lines of Strauss' commentary, the purpose of the dialogues is to inspire the reader to search for self-knowledge. With regard to Strauss' judgement, Wild's work fails to fulfil this task.

Like its predecessor, this thesis cannot escape from such criticism as regards 'writing about other people's theories of man'. If writing a book on Plato's or anyone's theories of Man implies self-ignorance, then, self-knowledge would have emerged from 'writing about one's own understanding of man'. This thesis originated in the problem of self-ignorance. It is concerned with writing about the view of Man of Plato. In search for Plato's man, one becomes blind; one never sees Plato. The view of the man one pursues is the view of the anonymous. As Plato is anonymous and Socrates does not answer but only questions, one is left with the anonymous; one is left with the transparent; one is left alone with oneself; one is left with a mirror.¹⁴ The paradox is inevitable for when one

¹¹ Strauss, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-367.

¹² Strauss, *op. cit.*, p. 333.

¹³ Plato, *Epistle II*, (314c).

¹⁴ Cf. Plato, *Alcibiades I*, (132d-133b):

Socrates: 'Consider in your turn: suppose that, instead of speaking to a man, it said to the eye

writes about Plato's man, one just writes about one's own understanding of Man. The difference lies between the author who realises this situation and the author who does not.

That is, the second purpose of the thesis is to render a work on Plato's man from a different authorial stance to its predecessor. That is, the author realises that to write about Plato's man is to write about his own self-understanding. That is why a chief argument in the thesis is that the theme of the dialogues is the search for self-knowledge. There are two movements with regard to the search for self-knowledge: one is Socratic inspiration; the other is Platonic inspiration. The former is the search for self-knowledge in the dialogues in a literal

of one of us, as a piece of advice--"See thyself,"--how should we apprehend the meaning of the admonition? Would it not be, that the eye should look at something in looking at which it would see itself?...Then let us think what object there is anywhere, by looking at which we can see both it and ourselves.'

Alcibiades: 'Why, clearly, Socrates, mirrors and things of that sort.'

Socrates: 'Quite right. And there is also something of that sort in the eye that we see with?...And have you observed that face of the person who looks into another's eye is shown in the optic confronting him, as in a mirror, and we call this the pupil, for in a sort it is an image of the person looking?...Then an eye viewing another eye, and looking at the most perfect part of it, the thing wherewith it sees, will thus see itself...But if it looks at any other thing in man or at anything in nature but what resembles this, it will not see itself..Then if an eye is to see itself, it must look at an eye, and at that region of the eye in which the virtue of an eye is found to occur; and this, I presume, is sight...And if the soul too, my dear Alcibiades, is to know herself, she must surely look at a soul, and especially at that region of it in which occurs the virtue of a soul--wisdom, and at any other part of a soul which resembles this?'

sense, namely, a textual self-knowledge. The latter is the search for self-knowledge of the author in relation to the dialogues.

With regard to the nature of the relation of the concept of man and the construction of political theory, it is believed that the former assists one in understanding any political ideas set forth in the dialogues. Plato's concept of man has been differently understood. Sextus derives a funny picture of Plato's man from the enigmatic passage in the *Statesman* by saying that Plato's man is 'a wingless animal, with two feet and broad nails, receptive of political science, *epistemes politikes*'.¹⁵ Sextus intentionally interpreted Plato literally because he intended to discredit the useless seriousness of philosophy, since the task of the Sceptic is 'to expose the folly of every form of positive doctrine'.¹⁶

Sextus also gives another sceptical remark with regard to the description of man as a rational animal. He said that 'that "man is a rational animal" does not give a sound description of the notion of "man" because "god" also is a rational animal'.¹⁷ It would be a very useful remark for Wild if he had a view about the gods like the Greeks. A modern man who seems to disbelieve or not to believe at all the existence of the gods in the same way as the Greeks did, that is, 'god' is *zoon logikon*, would easily ascribe 'being rational' to himself and mankind.¹⁸

¹⁵ Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians*, trans. R.G. Bury, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1935, (Book I 281).

¹⁶ Sextus, *ibid.*, 'Introduction', p. vii.

¹⁷ Sextus, *op. cit.*, (Book I 238).

¹⁸ A modern man calls himself *Homo sapiens*. However, some argue against that ascription that 'in the course of time we have come to realize that we are not so reasonable after all as the Eighteenth Century, with its worship of reason

The interpretation of Plato's man affects the interpretation of his political philosophy. Popper who regards Plato's political philosophy as an inspiring prototype of totalitarianism and utopianism is convinced that Plato possesses no concept of humanity or mankind.¹⁹ He believes that Plato intends to universally apply his political ideal to all mankind. Popper not unlike Wild never thought that the *Republic* of Plato is strangely pedagogic and therefore un-Socratic.²⁰ The difference lies in that they have opposite tastes of the same view which they similarly derived from their interpretation.

With regard to this kind of accusation, there is a point to be noticed as regards the Greeks and their attitudes to mankind. There is some evidence that the Greeks possessed the idea of humanity.²¹ However, the ancient Greek ethnocentrism is also evident.²² The Greeks thought they were superior to the barbarians.²³ Plato might not possess the concept of humanity as Popper has accused. Alien to his contemporaries, he is not ethnocentric. In the *Republic*, Socrates told Glaucon that

and its naive optimism thought us'. J. Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play-Element in Culture*, London, 1980, 'Foreword'.

¹⁹ Popper, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-119.

²⁰ See Barrie A. Wilson, 'Plato: Some Inconsistencies', in *Hermeneutical Studies: Dilthey, Sophocles and Plato*, Lewiston and Lampeter, 1990, p. 125

²¹ Herodotus, *The Histories*, trans. Aubrey de Selincourt, Harmondsworth, 1986, (Book III 35-38, 97-98), pp.218-219, 245-246).

²² See Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-definition through Tragedy*, Oxford, 1991.

²³ Edith Hall points to some exceptions with regard to the political situation between the states. From this, the ideas of 'Barbaric Greeks' and 'Noble Barbarians' are regarded to be a political use. See Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-223.

until philosophers become kings or kings become philosophers, 'there can be no cessation of troubles, for our states, nor, I fancy, for the human race either'.²⁴ From this, it can be inferred that Plato either possesses some idea of humanity or does not have any at all. He might, as Popper understood, possess only the picture of the just man and the city which his political ideal is founded on and presupposed.²⁵ If the picture of the just man is regarded as only Plato's idea of man, then, how can the passage 588c-d in Book Nine of the *Republic* be accounted for? In the passage, the picture of man has been described:

'Mould, then, a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beast that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths..Then fashion one other form of a lion and one of a man and let the first be far the largest and the second second in size..Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to grow together..Then mould about them outside the likeness of one, look within but who can see only the external sheath it appears to be one living creature, the man.'²⁶

This portrayal of man as such has been regarded as the task of a cunning artist.²⁷ From the passage, man seems to be rather beastly. The picture of man in the dialogues then turns out to be twofold, that is, good and bad, just

²⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book V 473d), trans. Paul Shorey, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969. See also the *Republic*, (Book V 471b-c): 'I agree that our citizens ought to deal with their Greek opponents on this wise, while treating barbarians as Greeks now treat Greeks.'

²⁵ Popper, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-119.

²⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book IX 588c-d).

²⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book IX 588c).

and unjust.

In this regard, the problem of man in political theory can be deemed a dilemma. Saying that man is good by his nature, *tabula rasa*, seems to imply that the good nature means spotlessness or blank in a new born child. A new born child is like a white cloth. He or she is incapable of doing evil things. To be sure, at that age, he or she is incapable of almost everything. Here, there is perhaps a confusion between the good and incapability. A different view argues for similarity between man and animals with regard to their common expression of aggression, territorial protection etc. From this view, it can lead to the fact that man differs from animals in degree not in kind.

In order to resolve the problem of the dilemma of dualism, Simone Weil has derived from Plato's dialogues the concept of man as a being in 'between the human and the divine'.²⁸ Weil has recourse to *metaxy* in Plato's dialogues. For Weil, ' "the *metaxy* form the region of good and evil"; they ' "are the relative and mixed blessings" of home, country, tradition, and culture "which warm and nourish the soul",... (i)n short, they are those human things that mediate our existence "in-between" the Great Beast and God'.²⁹ So 'the human' in the phrase is referred to Plato's the Great Beast as portrayed in the image of many-headed beasts. With regard to Weil's biography, she had been oscillating between the spiritual world of Christianity and the materialistic version of the world of Marxism.³⁰ Undoubtedly, she identifies Christianity with the divine and Marxism with the Great Beast. In her escape

²⁸ Mary G. Dietz, *Between the Human and the Divine: The Political Thought of Simone Weil*, Totowa, New Jersey, 1988.

²⁹ Dietz, *ibid.*, p. 111. See also, Simone Weil, *Gravity and Grace*, London, 1952, p. 133.

³⁰ Dietz, *op. cit.*, 'The Dilemma of Worldliness', pp. 3-20.

from the dilemma, she found that the truth of the Platonic doctrine rejects 'earthly illusion and a Christian love of God'.³¹ The Platonic *metaxy* is the answer to the dilemma of thought. This thesis studies thoroughly the Platonic notion of *metaxy* from which the understanding of Plato's theory of man and political philosophy is essentially derived. In general, the *metaxy* in this thesis is similar to what is conceived in Weil's works. However, it is not identical.

The study of the problem of Man at this time can be regarded as a return to a prejudiced question.³² Since modernity has been identified with the progress of scientific and technological advances over the past, its disillusion and disenchantment with the sacred world had been regarded as its distinct enlightenment. Indeed, modern science has found its own Man. The man of modern science is no longer a fallen creature of sin. Man is no longer a mystery, since, thanks to Charles Darwin, it was declared that mankind had evolved from apes, and also, according to Friedrich Nietzsche, God was declared dead. To be sure, Man is dead as well, to the extent that human nature has been deemed a precarious concept, a myth of metaphysical and religious tradition. Man has no essence. He can be anything and also nothing. Man paints himself in the image he creates, putting on masks made by himself or others.³³

³¹ Dietz, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

³² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future*, in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, Walter Kaufmann (trans. and ed.), New York, 1968, 'On the Prejudice of Philosophers', p. 199.

³³ With regard to this point, Rorty advocates: 'We ironists hope, by this continual redescription, to make the best selves for ourselves that we can.' Richard Rorty, *Contingency, irony, and solidarity*, Cambridge, 1989, p. 80.

Scientific explanations have been taken for granted as the sole legitimate discourse on the human being. No matter what kind of discipline it is, it would be regarded as groundless if it did not associate itself with the scientific method. Even philosophy itself, here in the case of Nietzsche, also bases itself, albeit partly, on scientism.³⁴

³⁴ Scientism in social and political sciences is the Kantian legacy. Kant thought that all questions can be answered if a fundamental question has been solved, namely, 'What is Man?'. Kant hoped that this could be done in his 'anthropology from a pragmatic point of view'. However, the Kantian attempt to combine and unify diverse knowledge about human beings in conjunction with his distinction of *phenomena* from *noumena* entails the separation and reconciliation between philosophy and science. Kantian transcendental philosophy yields the impossibility of all metaphysics. Ironically, empirical science becomes philosophical and philosophy becomes empirical. Moreover, his attempt to secure a firm ground for any future metaphysics effects the reverse since *noumena* are inaccessible; therefore the only sensible and practical methodology of human understanding is positivism and empirical science whose object of study are *phenomena*. In this respect, metaphysical philosophy must either crumble down or transform itself into a philosophy of empiricism. Kant's anthropology fails to achieve what he demanded of a philosophical anthropology. Whether the interpretation of Kant's philosophy be right or wrong, however, his legacy bequeathed to Western philosophy comes to opposing results which Kant himself never anticipated before. Philosophy was going to lose its metaphysical ground. In response to Kantian enigmatic dichotomy of *noumena* and *phenomena*, Hegelian idealism and Schopenhauerian existentialism emerged. Hegelian philosophy in its extreme form, swung towards the realm of the thing-in-itself. Schopenhauer was well aware of the one-sidedness of both materialism and idealism. He argued that each position cannot make its argument plausible by dispensing with the other. Subjective and objective do not form a continuum. According to him, the answer to the problem of subject-object dichotomy lies in man himself. Human will as thing-in-itself is metaphysical and man himself is only phenomenon of this will. This is how Schopenhauer extended Kant's teaching about the phenomena of man and his actions by interpreting that all phenomena in nature are founded upon the will.

Also, if nature consists of *natura naturata* and *natura naturans*, then man is nature herself, since the will of man here is the will-to-live that objectifies itself in the phenomenon of the body. And through the objectification of

the will, the life of the whole of mankind is likewise to be found in it both as regards its empirical and its transcendental significance. With regard to the will-to-live, man differs from other animals only in degree not in kind.

In consequence, Schopenhauer distinguishes what is so unique in man, namely self-consciousness and consciousness of the existence of other beings. This kind of wonder which Schopenhauer traced back to the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition as a very philosophical emotion presupposed in everyone was generalised as a universal aspect of mankind. From this, Schopenhauer visualised man as an *animal metaphysicum* who has 'a predominantly strong metaphysical need'. Although there are two kinds of metaphysics, namely, one for the philosopher, and the other for the mass, that does not matter insofar as the wise and the ignorant are different from each other in degree. Man is an *animal metaphysicum*, in other words, man is the person who wonders at himself and the world; given that, he cannot dispense with some kind of explanation to console his metaphysical insecurity and this cannot be anything other than a metaphysical explanation purporting to lead to metaphysical truth.

For Schopenhauer, the way to truth is no longer impossible, like that of Kant, but man has to know himself. Schopenhauer's Will as ultimate self-knowledge has rendered not new knowledge but tautology. Nietzsche resented Schopenhauer's thesis of the will as the ultimate truth in the world. To argue that truth is realised when the will itself has become known by man indicates to Nietzsche that 'Schopenhauer only did what philosophers are in the habit of doing---he adopted a popular prejudice and exaggerated it' ('On the Prejudice.', *opcit.*, p. 215). 'How can man know himself?', this question was posed by Nietzsche to challenge all previous attempts at understanding the being of man. Particularly, his aim was directed against those thinkers who believed that metaphysical and cosmological truth could be revealed once the answer to the question of human nature had been revealed: 'All philosophers have the common failing of starting out from man as he is now and thinking they can reach their goal through an analysis of him' (*Human all too Human*, pp. 12-13). Nietzsche criticises that kind of view regarding man as an *aeterna veritas* which originates with Descartes' searching for certainty in *ego cogito ergo sum* (Heidegger, 'The Cartesian.', pp. 102-103) has obsessively influenced many past thinkers to 'involuntarily think of man as something constant in the midst of all flux, as a sure measure of things' (*Human.*, p. 103).

As regards the interpretation of Kant's philosophy, see Herbert Schnadelbach, *Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933*, translated by Eric Matthew, Cambridge, 1984, pp. 219, 220, 66-108, 218, 221-222. For the influence of Kant upon the merging of empiricism and positivism in modern social

The results of recent scientific researches appear to indicate that man and animals differ in degree not in kind.³⁵ Paradoxically, the research on human behaviour

scientific theory, see Jeffrey T. Bergner, *The Origins of Formalism in Social Science*, Chicago, 1981, pp. 11, 19. Also see Arthur Schopenhauer's criticism of Kantian philosophy in *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. One, translated by E.F.J. Payne, New York, 1958, pp. 418-419, 415, 425, 434-437, 417-417 'On the Fundamental View of Idealism', in *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. Two, translated E.F.J. Payne, New York, 1958, pp. 12-13; Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, *Social Action and Human Nature*, translated by Raymond Meyer, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 42; Peter Langford, *Modern Philosophies of Human Nature: Their emergence from Christian Thought*, The Hague, 1986, p. 75. See Immanuel Kant, *Introduction to Logic: An Essay on the Mistaken Subtlety of the Four figures*, translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London, 1963, @ 186, 184, 185; *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, translated by M.J. Gregor, The Hague, 1974, pp. xiii, xi; *Metaphysical First Principles of Natural Science*, translated by E.B. Bax, London, 1883, A 382; *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, 1929, B2-10; *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, translated by Lewis White Beck, Indianapolis, 1950, @ 265-266. For the idea of Schopenhauerian Man, see Arthur Schopenhauer, 'On Man's need for Metaphysics', in *The World as Will*. Vol. Two, op. cit., pp. 179, 177, 173, 174-175, 172, 160, 171, 164, *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, translated by K. Hillebrand, London, 1888, pp. 180, 183, 'On the Fundamental View of Idealism', op. cit., pp. 10, 13, 16, 'The World as Will: First Aspect', in *The World as Will*, Vol. One, op. cit., p. 125, 'The World as Will: Second Aspect', in *The World as Will*. Vol. One, op. cit., pp. 289, 124, 276, 'On Religion', in *Essays and Aphorisms*, selected and translated by R.J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth, 1970, p. 344; Langford, op. cit., p. 88. Concerning Nietzsche, see Friedrich Nietzsche, 'On the Prejudice of Philosophers', op. cit.; Martin Heidegger, 'The Cartesian Cogito as Cogito Me Cogitare', in *Nietzsche*, Vol. 4, translated by J. Stambaugh, D.F. Krell, and F.A. Capuzzi, New York, 1982, pp. 102-110.

³⁵ Stephen R.L. Clark observes that 'the unity of mankind (the biological taxon) does not rest in the possession of a common nature, but in being a breeding population such that my ancestors and my descendants alike may be yours as well' (Clark, pp. 17-33). ' "being human," "Clark emphasises, 'remains a concept of folk taxonomy' (ibid., p. 28). Tim Ingold, a social anthropologist, remarks similarly that if humanity were defined as *Homo loquens*, 'a natural kind including all animals with language and speech, we could have to admit the possibility both of

turns out to be an attempt to discover what is inhuman in human. It is difficult to draw a demarcation line between human and non-human. It seems that the more advanced our scientific knowledge is, the less natural our species is put forward. Human nature is conceived as only a myth or an egoistic prejudice of the species.³⁶ Man differs from

individuals of human parentage "dropping out" of human kind, and of individuals of non-human parentage "coming in" (Ingold, 1988, p. 6). Balaji Mundkur, a molecular and cell biologist, argues that the explanation of religiosity in human behaviour lies not in the sociocultural aspects of human nature (such as cultural diversity, as many social and cultural anthropologists believe), but that in fact it is just a phenomenon of physiological sensitivity to specific environmental stimuli innate in individuals of even the lowest animal species (Mundkur, p. 151). He summarises that 'explanations (of religiosity) rooted in biochemical genetics, organic evolution and the neurophysiology of subconscious (and sometimes conscious) behavioural tendencies take priority, but acquire meaning only against a background of interpretations derived from sociocultural anthropology' (*ibid.*, p. 178). See T. Ingold (ed.), *What is an Animal?*, Manchester, 1988; Stephen R.L. Clark, 'Is Humanity a natural kind?', Ingold (ed.), *ibid.*; Balaji Mandkur, 'Human animality, the mental imagery of fear, and religiosity', in Ingold (ed.), *opcit.*

³⁶ The rise of sociobiology refutes the idea of human nature as a unique species. Sociobiology is properly viewed as an excellent adjunct to evolutionary theory. Its theoretical and empirical base is almost exclusively that of neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory and research. Edward O. Wilson, the founder of this new science of man, argues that 'human nature is just one hodgepodge out of many conceivable' (Wilson, 1978, p. 23). Although it is true that human behaviour is controlled by our species' biological inheritance the gene-pool that constitutes a shared human nature--yet ecological factors interact with that biological characteristic and influence the evolution and changes of living animals, including human beings. Not only do we need to take into account innate nature (i.e. genetic traits) in understanding living beings but also the external nature of the social context in which they live and interact. The difference between man and animals is in degree not in kind. Wilson reinforces his argument by showing that the brightest chimpanzees, by means of American sign language, 'can learn vocabularies of two-hundred English words and elementary rules of syntax, allowing them to invent such sentences as "Mary gives me apple"' (*ibid.*, pp. 25-26). So the symbolic behaviour once claimed to be one of the exclusively human traits must be

animals in degree not in kind.

Plato's dialogue which deals with the division between man and animals is the *Statesman*. The discussion of the *Statesman* in this thesis shows that the division between man and animals has to be made by having recourse to the geometric square root which conveys a meaning of dynamism. Also, the argument of the Eleatic Stranger with regard to the fallacy of the criterion of a rational animal, *zoon logikon*, which does not distinguish between a crane and man³⁷ would call attention to those sociobiologists whose

dismissed. Also, the label of man as *Homo faber* is no longer justified since 'maps of chimpanzee tool-making..might be placed without notice into a chapter on primitive culture in an anthropology textbook' (*ibid.*, p. 31). Nancy M. Tanner's research supports that of Wilson that humankind is identified with the biological taxon, connected synchronically in a complex web of ecological interdependencies, and diachronically in the all-encompassing genealogy of phylogenetic evolution. She is convinced that though culture is the human adaption towards outside nature, it was not a movement out of animality but an extension of its frontiers: modern humans are no less "animal" than Australopithecines or chimpanzees (Tanner, pp. 127-140). Arguing along the same lines as Wilson that humankind is in degree not in kind different from other non-humans, the inability of speech of chimpanzees originating in the size of their brains, which are only one-third as large as our own (Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 25) in order to stipulate our indissoluble connection with our pre-human past Tanner refers to Clifford Geertz 'as the *Homo sapiens* brain is about three times as large as that of the Australopithecines, the greater part of human cortical expansion has followed, not preceded, the "beginning of our culture' (Tanner, *op. cit.*, p. 136). See Edward O. Wilson, *On Human Nature*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978; Nancy M. Tanner, 'On Becoming Human, Our Links with our Past', in Ingold (ed.), op. cit. Sociobiology enormously attracts the attention of all kinds of academics and non-academics. See John Bonner, 'A New Synthesis of Principles that underlies all animal societies', *Scientific American*, 233 (October) 1975, pp. 129-131; Pierre L. Van den Berghe, 'Review of Sociobiology: The New Synthesis', *Contemporary Sociology*, 5 (6) 1976, pp. 593-600; Nicholas Petryszak, 'The Biosociology of the Social Self', *Sociological Quarterly*, 20 (Spring) 1979, pp. 291-303; John Baldwin and Janice Baldwin, 'Sociobiology: A Balanced Biosocial Theory', *Pacific Sociological Review*, 23 (January) 1980, pp. 3-27.

³⁷ Plato, *Statesman*, (263d-e).

argument has been supported by their behavioural research of the brightest chimpanzees.

While science keeps on proving that the nature of human is animal, philosophy under Nietzschean influence keeps announcing the end of everything including the question of Man. Nietzsche's view of man has been strongly influenced by Darwinism and the rise of biologism as a rigorous science.³⁸ He argues that man cannot be totally understood since 'man is the animal that is not yet established, as it were an embryo of the man of the future. Man cannot be 'a sure measure of things'. In fact, what has been regarded as human nature by the philosopher is 'at bottom no more than a testimony as to the man of a very limited period of time'.³⁹ It is their lack of historical sense that makes them fail to be aware that 'man has become'.⁴⁰

With the exhaustion of metaphysics resulting from Kantian legacy, the concept of human nature has been regarded as obsolete. Aiken comments about the present

³⁸ Schnadelbach, *op.cit.*, p. 100. See also, Nietzsche, 'Anti-Darwinism' in *The Will to Power*, translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, edited by Walter Kaufmann, New York, 1967, p. 364.

³⁹ Nietzsche, *Human all too Human*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁴⁰ *Op. cit.* For Nietzsche, the problem of man can be propounded in the following way: 'Everything essential in the development of mankind took place in primeval times, long before the four thousand years we more or less know about; during these years mankind may well not have altered very much. But the philosopher here sees "instincts" in man as he now is and assumes that these belong to the unalterable facts of mankind and to that extent could provide a key to the understanding of the world in general: the whole teleology is constructed by speaking of man of the last four millennia as of an eternal man towards whom all things in the world have had a natural relationship from the time he began. But everything has become: there are no eternal facts, just as there are no absolute truths.'

situation of philosophy that 'above all, it seems, the anti-metaphysical age'.⁴¹ Under Nietzsche's influence, Heidegger argues against any metaphysical question as a prejudiced question. The efforts made to determine 'the essence of man' are metaphysical.⁴² That kind of metaphysical question concerning human essence Heidegger calls ' "Humanism": for this is humanism: to reflect and to care that man be human and not un-human, "inhuman", i.e. outside of his essence'.⁴³ Neither Marxism nor Christianity escapes Heidegger's attack on the metaphysical foundations.⁴⁴ Heidegger as well as Nietzsche declines the question of human nature as such insofar as there is something more than man. For Nietzsche said that man cannot be the measure of things since he is an unestablished animal. Michel Foucault, in his essay on Nietzsche, argues in the same light that 'nothing in man--not even his body--is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men'.⁴⁵ Jacques Derrida proposes that now it is time for 'the Ends of Man' or, in fact, the end of metaphysical man. Mankind has come to an end since from now on man has no goal, no ends to achieve as he used to struggle in the past.⁴⁶

⁴¹ H.D. Aiken, 'Introduction', in *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century Vol Three: Contemporary European Thought*, op. cit., p. 4.

⁴² Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', in *Philosophy in the Twentieth Century Vol. Three*, op. cit., p. 198.

⁴³ Heidegger, 'Letter on Humanism', op. cit., p. 196.

⁴⁴ Op. cit., p. 197.

⁴⁵ Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected essays and interviewed*, translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, Oxford, 1977, p. 153.

⁴⁶ See Jacques Derrida, 'The Ends of Man', in *Margins of Philosophy*, translated by A. Bass, Chicago, 1982, pp. 109-136.

Consequently, humankind is not as 'essential' as one had understood, but has become what it is by a transition from a non or pre-human stage, then logically from the evolutionary point of view---Stephen R.L. Clark summarizes that the 'notional barrier between human and post-human (so to speak) is just as porous'.⁴⁷ Man is not a being but a becoming, always in transition. Then we seem to be convinced of what Clark put so well:

'If humankind (biological taxon) is at most only an accidental unity, and if humanity (the normal essence which serves us well enough at the level of liberal political theory) is only a collection of those traits which we expect to see in those whom we choose to judge according to human standards, then the UNESCO insistence on "the unity of mankind" can only be a moral and political programme, not a report upon a relatively unknown species.'⁴⁸

The concept of human nature becomes a hollow proclamation. Not unlike other political concepts such as liberty, equality, sovereignty, the state, etc., human nature becomes a term not of science but of ideology-- 'a phrase that men use to legitimize institutions and practices that preserve the privileges of a given class, race, or sex at the expense of the rest of mankind'.⁴⁹ The problem of Man which has been taken so seriously for ages is no longer a *philosophia perennis*. Hence, it implies that if any obsession with the problem remains someone's grave concern, his presupposition would be regarded as anachronistic and also a prejudice, alien to his contemporaries. A question might be posed to him; Why

⁴⁷ Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁴⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 28-9.

⁴⁹ David J. Levy, *Political Order: Philosophical Anthropology, Modernity, and the Challenge of Ideology*, Baton Rouge, 1987, p. 2.

is he so seriously concerned with the problem of Man which is now regarded as obsolete in the modern age?

Indeed Nietzsche's immense nihilistic impact upon the thinkers of our time is a phenomenon. In the conclusion of this thesis, Nietzschean influence is accounted with regard to the music of Dionysus, the god of wine, the disguised stranger whose song and dance seems discordant, irritating, and unbearable to the Apollonians who possess the opposite kind of music. Nietzschean music once rendered a Dionysiac effect. Cups of wine which intoxicated drinkers was once a kind of *pharmakon*. However, it is argued that a *pharmakon* can become poisonous. The philosopher-king whose art of statesmanship is derived from the understanding of the nature of the soul and the city would determine when 'Dionysus and wine-drinking' is useful and when it is not. When the music of Dionysus turns out to be poisonous, the philosopher-king will call for the music of Apollo. The demise of the question of man as a *philosophia perennis* originated in the Dionysiac effect of Nietzschean music. The return of the question of man here can be regarded as a Dionysiac effect to an Apollonian and an Apollonian effect to a Dionysian. The return of Man is regarded as situated in the politics of *metaxy*.

With regard to the problem of Socrates in Plato's dialogues, this thesis bases itself on the assumption that Socrates becomes a famous figure in the history of philosophy because of Plato's literary genius. The attempt to separate a historical Socrates from a Platonic Socrates cannot be successful with regard to our meagre historical evidence. Recently, Burnyeat's criticism of I.F. Stone's *The Trial of Socrates* is a good witness to this point.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ M.L. Burnyeat, 'Did Stone Solve the Socrates Case?', *The New York Review of Books*, Vol. XXXV, No. 5, March 31, 1988, p. 18. I.F. Stone, *The Trial of Socrates*, London, 1988. See also, John Burnet, 'The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1916, p 243; David

Whatever effect the dialogues have on the reader in the direction of questioning, this is the impulsive element in Platonic inspiration. Under his literary genius and incisive understanding of the nature of oral and literate discourse in relation to the nature of man resulting in the peculiar form of the dialogues in the interplay between jest and earnest, Plato creates a work that embraces major possible explanations given by Plato scholars to the problem 'why did Plato write the dialogues?'⁵¹ First, as some scholars believed, they were written in an intriguing way that would allow their author to present unorthodox points of view and to exonerate himself from the fate of Socrates or Protagoras.⁵² Secondly and significantly, it is intended to effectively inspire and guide potential philosophic nature to the good. Thirdly, if the Platonic writings are regarded as a work of a philosopher-king, then, it is intended not only to inspire philosophic nature but also to deter the rise of undesirable ones. The Platonic writings are regarded as engaging in the politics of the soul.

The next two chapters discuss the meaning of the 'Socratic Mission'. They are a general discussion of the dialogues as a whole. They demonstrate the Socratic ignorance is Socrates' irony. It is a part of the Socratic *elenchus* which is aimed at 'making shame' of the interlocutor. Shame is related to acknowledgment of self-

Grene, *Greek Political Theory: The Image of Man in Thucydides and Plato*, Chicago, 1950, p. 103; W.K.C. Guthrie, *Socrates*, Cambridge, 1971, pp. 5-6; C.D.C. Reeve, *Socrates in the Apology: An Essay on Plato's Apology of Socrates*, Cambridge, 1989, p. xiii.

⁵¹ Charles L. Griswold, Jr., 'Introduction', *Platonic Writings Platonic Readings*, New York, 1988, p. 2.

⁵² Protagoras was put on trial and expelled from Athens because of his outrageous writing on the gods. He died by drowning on a sea voyage after leaving Athens. Griswold, Jr., 'Plato's Metaphilosophy: Why Plato wrote Dialogues', in Griswold, Jr., *ibid.*, p. 143.

ignorance which is a point of departure in pursuit of self-knowledge. The Socratic mission is concerned with the care of the soul. Chapter Three ends with Socrates' claim that he was one of the few in Athens who practised the art of statesmanship. The *metaxy* begins to conceive itself in Chapter Four. It analyses the search for the chief concern of the statesman which has been done in quite a circuitous way. The analysis of the dialectic division and geometric finishing in the process of searching for man as the statesman's chief concern answers the problematic use of the geometric square root in the dialogue. Human beings are potentially animal. The discussion continues to investigate the essence of man which separates him from other animals. The *Cratylus* is brought into the discussion as regards its discussion of the name of Man. The theory of the correctness of names plays an important role with regard to the name of Hector and Astyanax whose names ironically do not correspond to their nature. In the dialogue, the discussion reveals the oscillating movement between the realm of the human and the realm of the divine. There is an analysis of Socrates' ironic claim of Euthyphro's divine possession in the *Cratylus*. The *Euthyphro* and some related dialogues are discussed as regards the epistemological condition of the poets and the sophists.

Chapter Five renders the interpretation of the name of Man, *anthropos*, against the context which results from the discussion in the previous chapter. The interpretation of the name of Man has to be done with regard to the rhythmic movement between the human and the divine and the analysis of the name of Orestes' lineage in association with Hesiod's myth of the races. What results from the interpretation is that man differs from animals because he partakes of divine quality, that is, *anathrei*, 'being able to look up at'. However, the problem arises when Socrates gave his linguistic analysis of *soma* and *psuche* as

Hermogenes raised immediately after the name of Man had been explained. The soul which Socrates explained is incompatible with his analysis of the name of man. This chapter concludes with a chimerical picture of man and the request to return to the examination of the nature of the soul.

Chapter Six elaborates Book One and Two of the *Republic* with regard to the origin of the theme of the study of justice in the soul in the image of the city. Chapter Seven discusses the image of justice in the city as the enlargement of the justice in the soul. The city consists of three classes in the same way that the soul is tripartite. All three classes and their counterparts are indispensable to the existence of the city and the soul. The second half of the chapter starts with the discussion of Book Eight of the *Republic* in which Socrates in the spirit of the Muses narrated the four major types of the imperfect polities. The beginning passage of Socrates' speech is interpreted in relation to Diotima's speech in the *Symposium*. The concept of 'procreation' is significant with regard to the account of the generation of the imperfect souls and cities. The analytic description of Socrates's speech on the imperfect polities and souls begins Chapter Eight. The discussion moves from the decline of an aristocracy and aristocratic man to timarchy, oligarchy, democracy and then tragically ends when the tyrannical life emerges. Man and the city are considered to be in the either/or state, that is, if they are not just, they are unjust. The description of the decline of a polity and a man casts light on the cause of their decline which lies in the love of the immortality of what they regard to be the good.

Chapter Nine starts by examining whether the nature of the soul is discord or harmony. It turns to the *Phaedo* and the *Phaedrus*. Both are generally understood to contain a

major discussion of the nature of the soul. The nature of the soul is not harmony since it is self-motion. The soul is moved by love. Love is the essence of the tripartite soul. Each part of the soul has different objects of love. With regard to the soul as a whole, there are two kinds of love which are likened to the image of a pair of winged horses and the charioteer. The nature of the soul is proved to be *metaxy*. Section Four of the chapter can be regarded as the essence of the thesis. It gives a comprehensive picture of the meaning of *metaxy* as the understanding of the nature of the soul which is regarded as the idea of the good when the soul understands itself and apprehends the cause of all things. The elaboration of this includes the discussion of the allegory of the Cave and the Divided Line. The interpretation in this section also renders a key answer to understanding the geometric riddle of the perfect number in the beginning of Socrates' speech on the imperfect polities in Book Eight of the *Republic*.

Chapter Ten returns to discuss the notion that the Socratic mission is political. It explains the relationship between man and politics by having recourse to what has been discussed with regard to the just and unjust city and man in previous chapters with reference to Averroes's commentary on Socrates' speech of the unjust polities. Man and the city are self-motion. They are moved by the power of love of each element and each class. The dynamism in man and the city is political. The idea of the pleasurable perception of rhythms and harmony of man which is introduced in the *Laws* is taken into account as regards the understanding of the movement of politics in the soul and the city. It leads to the discussion of the signification of the twofold meaning of theatre in relation to Dionysus and Apollo, and the chorus. The idea of mimetic action and 'sympathetic magic' are brought to assist the understanding of human perception of harmony and

rhythm.

Chapters Eleven and Twelve are concerned with the unity of the art of statesmanship and philosophy. As the art of statesmanship originates from self-knowledge, it returns to meticulously discuss the *Statesman* as in itself a practice of the art of statesmanship. The knowledge of the art of statesmanship, the statesman, the philosopher, and its practice is inseparable.

Apart from formally summarising what has been said, the concluding part turns to the Platonic inspiration and reminds the reader of the ironic situation of the Platonic dialogues. Irony comes to the fore. It points to the *metaxy* of man and politics which entails the politics of *metaxy*.

CHAPTER TWO

The Pursuit of the Socratic Mission: What are the questions presupposes?

The Aeschylean tragedy tells its audience that there never exists a straightforward solution to any kind of conflict, whether it be ideas or persons, human and divine, since 'no one, no idea, is ever wholly good or bad; the most that can be said is that there may be a preponderance of good on a particular side at a particular time'.¹ For Aeschylus only the democratic *polis*, 'where freedom of argument and voting allows all sides of the truth to be brought to light', could end a long suffering of the 'irreconcilable blood-feud of the House of Atreus'.² Although a final decision of the democratic *polis* seems to be the key to individual and communal salvation, however, Sophocles' 'tragic hero' whose 'unconquerable will and unquenchable pride..carries his refusal to bend either to Fate or to circumstances to the extent of resisting both the gods and the *polis*' reflects 'the clash of individual personality with the claims of the *polis*'.³ His plays portray a conflicting nature between man and the city, between a reason of man and *raison d'etat*. Compared with Aeschylus, the Sophoclean tragedy is understood to have 'shifted to reliance on individual heroism rather than civic solidarity as the only final bulwark against an incomprehensible, perhaps hostile, universal order, the Aeschylean bond between individual, city and cosmos has

¹ John B. Morrall, 'Political Ideas in Greek Tragedy', *Polis*, 1979, p. 8.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.

been though perhaps reluctantly, snapped'.⁴ For Sophocles, like Aeschylus, there is no simple solution to the problem of human life, individual and communal. Unlike Aeschylus' faith in the democratic *polis*, Sophoclean tragedy tells us that individual heroism instead of the *polis* is the answer. For Aeschylus and Sophocles, the problem can be said to lie in a dilemma between good and good, that is between an individual's and the others'. However, it becomes a conflict between bad and bad in Euripides. Euripidean tragedy regards the human condition as being one of inevitable suffering. Moreover, the *polis* 'accentuates rather than relieves' it.⁵ It seems that tragedy ends itself tragically in Euripides' pessimism where 'the tragic and democratic visions collapsed together'.⁶

The search for the good then starts where tragedy ends itself tragically. The problem of human life exists because man regards what satisfies him as desirable, and its opposite as undesirable. What is desirable is regarded as good, *agathos*, and its opposite, bad, *kakia*. There are three possibilities which can be said to put an end to human problems. First, when what is undesirable has been completely abolished from human life. If that is not possible, then, the second alternative is that human problems would no longer exist when man finds no difference between what is desirable and what is not desirable, or 'what is and what is not'. Again, if that is not possible, the final solution offers that human problems would discontinue if human life no longer exists. But if there is a possibility that the problems still continue somewhere beyond, then, the other, yet unknown, alternative must be looked for.

However, whatever the solution might be, it is

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 12.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 15.

undeniable that the search as such is necessarily derived from the fact that man desires what is good. And what is good makes him happy because it fulfils his desire. It is the care of the self that makes man desire what is good and avoid what is bad. Man has his self-interest to take care of. So it seems that self-love is a natural human activity. Colts or calves are to be looked after by a horse-trainer or a husbandman for their welfare. For the care of human beings, Socrates is said to have been searching for the one 'who has knowledge of that kind of excellence, *aretes*, that of a man and of a citizen?'⁷ Socrates investigates the problem and situation concerning the education and the perfection of man as a man and as a citizen. Of course, virtue and the good are what man regards as desirable. But what are those things called the good, *agathon*, and virtue, *arete*? Socrates asks for the explanation of them from those people who are supposed to know the answer.

I

Arete and *agathon* are said to be 'the most powerful words of commendation used of a man both in Homer and in later Greek,' implying 'the possession by anyone to whom they are applied of all qualities most highly valued at any time by Greek society'.⁸ For example, *agathos* and *arete* in Homeric usage are closely associated with qualities and skills mostly conducive towards success in war and in protection of one's families and dependants in peace. Such qualities are military prowess and craftiness which Adkins

⁷ Plato, *Apology*, (20a-b).

⁸ A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values*, Chicago and London, 1975, pp. 30, also pp. 31, 156.

calls competitive excellences.⁹ Also, in Homeric society, one can see that the *agathos* and *arete* of men evidently differs from that of women.¹⁰ Following this, it can be said that their usage varies with the context to which they belong.¹¹ According to Homeric values, what are regarded as the quiet qualities such as moderation, *sophrosyne*, justice, *dikaiosyne*, prudent, *pepnumenos* or *pinutos*, beauty, *kalon*, are necessary for men to possess in order to be *agathos*.¹² However, after the seventh century B.C., the demand for these quieter qualities as virtues increases.

As regards moderation, *sophrosyne*¹³, Helen North

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹⁰ Adkins concludes that in Homeric society 'to be *agathos*, one must be brave, skilful, and successful in war and in peace; and one must possess the wealth and (in peace) the leisure which are at once the necessary conditions for the development of these skills and the natural reward of their successful employment'. With regard to the different requirements in men and women, 'Homeric women may be effectively censured for actions which Homeric heroes have a strong claim to be allowed to perform'. See Adkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37.

¹¹ As Alasdair MacIntyre argues following Adkins's study that as the word *agathos* is ancestor for our *good*, '(s)o in our ordinary English use of *good*, "good, but not kingly, courageous, or cunning" makes perfectly good sense; but in Homer, "agathos, but not kingly, courageous, or clever" would not even be a morally eccentric form of judgement, but as it stands simply an unintelligible contradiction.' See Alasdair MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric age to the Twentieth Century*, London, Melbourne and Henley, 1986, p. 6, and especially Chapter II: 'The Prephilosophical History of "Good" and the Transition to Philosophy'.

¹² Adkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38, 43-46, 61. To be sure, these quiet values are not completely valued but they are just less valued with regard to Homeric society.

¹³ Hugh Lloyd-Jones agrees with Helen North that the term *sophron* which is rare in Homer and absent from early lyric really acquires importance in *Theognis*. He comments that *sophron* should be understood as 'safe-thinking' not 'prudence' or 'moderation'. *Sophron*, as Lloyd-Jones

shows that 'by the middle of the sixth century, it had been recognized as the characteristic excellence of the Athenian citizen in time of peace, celebrated in epitaphs together with arete, the corresponding virtue in time of war'.¹⁴ Also, justice, *dikaiosyne* is identified with arete in Theognis' *Elegies* whose date is assumed to be around the sixth and fifth centuries.¹⁵ However, the term *sophia*, wisdom, is still regarded as a desirable quality. But, like *agathos* and *arete*, the meaning of *sophia* is viewed differently with regard to the changing context of *agathos* and *arete*. Of Homeric *arete*, *sophia* is regarded as one of

perceives, is 'the kind of thinking that protects one from *hybris*..(w)hen one bears in mind the ineradicable tendency of the Greeks, once they have tasted wealth or success, to become intoxicated by it, the practical value of this moral concept becomes obvious' (p. 53). He also warns that it might not be as North argued for the increased importance of the concept during the seventh and sixth centuries since one 'cannot really be sure that changes of fortune (in 700-600) were commoner then than, say, during the ninth and eighth centuries; the occurrence in Homer of terms like *pinytos*, *pepnymenos*, *echephron*, should warn us against too easy an acceptance of such an explanation' (p. 177). See Hugh Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*, Berkeley and London, 1971; Helen North, *Sophrosyne: Self-knowledge and Self-restraint in Greek Literature*, Ithaca, New York, 1966.

¹⁴ North, *ibid.*, p. 150.

¹⁵ Adkins, *op. cit.*, p. 78. At 145-48 in Theognis' *Elegies* runs like this:

'It's better, Kurnos, to be poor and good Than rich and crooked, if you have to choose. All excellence, *arete*, amounts to being just, *dikaios*, and real gentlemen, *agathos*, obey the rules.'

Hesiod and Theognis, translated by Dorethea Wender, London, 1985. Helen North argues 'the poems of Hesiod, the product of a nonheroic, peasant culture, set up a new standard of *arete*, in which the value of measure, restraint and self-control is enormously enhanced...(t)he life of the peasant is supportable only by the exercise of the cautious and prudent virtues, just as the life of the little Boetian community is tolerable only when justice and *eunomia* (good order) exists.' North, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

the qualities of *agathos* as it refers to a skilled counsellor.¹⁶ In this sense Odysseus is a good example. He is understood to be a favourite of Homer since he is both brave and sagacious. His *sophia* lies in his prudent counsel and craftiness with which lying and deception are indispensable.¹⁷

This quality of *sophia* is still highly valued even in the fifth century.¹⁸ As North points it out in Euripides' fragments. Contrary to its traditional values, this *sophia* is no longer aimed at assisting the *agathos* to defeat his enemy in war. Through one's speech, his *sophia* is expected to 'ward(s) off evil deeds, preventing battles and civil strife, since such actions are fair both for the entire city and for all the Hellenes'.¹⁹ So it seems that the development of a new system or assessment of human excellences after Homer has culminated in the emergence of a set of key ideas around the sixth to fifth century.²⁰ It is generally regarded later as a canon of cardinal virtues. Superficially, it is a mixture of the traditional and the new values. Courage, *andreia*, and wisdom, *sophia*

¹⁶ Adkins, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

¹⁷ Homer, *Iliad* (19.154), translated by E.V. Rieu, Harmondsworth, 1978, p. 358. See Herbert Jennings Rose and Charles Martin Robertson, 'Odysseus', in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, ed. N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard, Oxford, Second Edition, 1989, pp. 746-747.

¹⁸ Adkins compares Aeschylus' use of the term *sophos* in the fifth century with the Homeric usage. See Adkins, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

¹⁹ North, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73.

²⁰ North states that the earliest recorded reference to this canon of cardinal virtues can be found in Pindar's eighth Isthmian Odes which is dated 478 B.C. It was later canonized by Plato. See North, *op. cit.*, p. 25. Gadamer also agrees that these are not Platonic but traditional virtues. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, New Haven and London, 1986, 'The Polis and Knowledge of the Good', p. 64.

prevails along with the pioneering values, namely, temperance, *sophrosyne*, and justice, *dikaiosyne*.²¹

II

As has been said above, the requirement of human values varies according to its context, that is to say, its social and political conditions. The supposedly new values such as *sophrosyne* are quite a case. *Sophrosyne* is said to

²¹ According to this view, it seems that justice had no significant parts in terms of human excellences before this period. To be sure, Arlene W. Saxonhouse remarks that the scholars are divided into two camps with regard to the view of Justice in Homer and later Greeks. She said that 'the debate perhaps reached its peak with Hugh Lloyd-Jones's claims that the Justice of Zeus was there from the beginning of Greek literature, rejecting the views of such scholars as E.R. Dodds and A.W.H. Adkins' (p. 44ff). E.A. Havelock also argued for the rarity of the abstract noun *dikaiosyne* before Plato. Lloyd-Jones criticised Adkins' method of study as a 'lexical-anthropological approach'. In his criticism, he says '(i)nstead of starting with the assumption that the early Greeks were rational men whose processes of thought were like their own, scholars began to approach them as anthropologists may approach the primitive peoples whom they study, tending to consider them as beings whose feelings and thoughts were radically different from those of modern men' (p. 157). To judge the early Greek culture as primitive 'is a mistake...the Homeric poems...were the product of a long tradition,..had in most respects evolved far beyond the primitive stage, (t)he thought world of the early Greeks was indeed different from our own; but like ourselves they were reasonable human beings, and were able to take account of the basic factors that determine the condition of human life in a way different from, but not necessarily in every way less rational than ours' (p. 157). To be sure, whatever the truth may be, it is indisputable that the problem of justice emerged before the time of Plato. See Arlene W. Saxonhouse 'Thymos, Justice, and Moderation of Anger', in Catherine H. Zuckert (ed.) *Understanding the Political Spirit: Philosophical Investigations from Socrates to Nietzsche*, New Haven and London, 1988; Hugh Lloyd-Jones, *opcit.*; E.A. Havelock, *The Greek Concept of Justice*, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1978.

have developed itself beyond its Homeric beginnings and the first great expansion of its meaning 'coincided with..the flowering of the Athenian *polis* and the birth of tragedy'.²² Tragedy partly originated from that context of Athenian *polis* which in turn gives rise to *sophrosyne*. Likewise, the formation of the idea of justice as *arete* in the *polis* is attributable to the birth of Greek tragedy.²³

The birth of tragedy in Greece partly results from the fact that the traditional heroic values from Homeric society fail to respond to the new requirements of the Athenian *polis*. Also it is derived from the conflict between the values.²⁴ The conflict arises from the confrontation between the old values and the new demands when 'the heroic individual encountered the restrictions imposed by the world order---whether manifested in religion or in the framework of the *polis*'.²⁵ In other words, the emergence of political life followed by the birth of tragedy²⁶ in Athens gives birth to a new requirement with

²² North, *op. cit.*, p. 150, and see also Chapter II 'Tragedy', pp. 32-84.

²³ J. Peter Euben, *The Tragedy of Political Theory: The Road not Taken*, New Jersey, 1990, pp. 67-68.

²⁴ Martha C. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, Cambridge, 1986, 'Part I: Fragility and Ambition', pp. 23-83.

²⁵ North, *op. cit.*, pp. 32, 150.

²⁶ With regard to the interplay between tragedy and politics, Morrall suggested that: 'Tragedy reached its classically mature development...as an artistic reflection of this political and social *isegoria*....The theatre rather than the hill of the assembly was the arena on which the ideology of the democratic *polis* was formulated, explored and subjected to criticism and revision...Athenian tragedy itself is an integral expression, and probably the most comprehensive and profound one, of Greek Democracy examining itself and its place in the whole universal order. It is the earliest of such attempts at political self-analysis by and for a community in the history of

regard to what is good and desirable for the city and for men as her citizens. Against this is the traditional epic hero whose purpose is individual, self-interested, personal honour or glory. According to this new context of political life, the epic hero is regarded as being politically irresponsible. A Homeric heroic warrior, *agathos*, then has to be politicised in response to his new environment.²⁷ At this stage, some said that it is the origins of political theory in ancient Greece.²⁸

According to its new context, the substance of old Odyssean craftiness which was once regarded as a usual thing in a Homeric Greek²⁹ was to be transformed. The

political thought, and it was to remain one of the most unique'. Morrall, *opcit.*, p. 3.

²⁷ For the essay on the inadequacy of the epic hero---the epic hero as being politically irresponsible---regarding the rise of new values of political aspects in classical Greece and the politicisation of the epic hero and the heroicisation of politics, see Blair Campbell, 'The Epic Hero as Politico', *History of Political Thought*, Vol. XI, Issue 2 Summer 1990, pp. 189-195.

²⁸ See J. Peter Euben, 'The Battles of Salamis and the Origins of Political Theory', *Political Theory*, Vol. 14 No. 3 August 1986, pp. 359-390. With regard to the theme of the relationship of Greek tragedy and politics, after Helen North who first conceived the importance of their relationship, this idea has been affirmed later on by many studies. For example, David K. Nichols said '(t)ragedy illuminates man's precarious position..(i)t show the limits within which his actions must fall, and that includes his highest act, political philosophy...(m)an's thought may take him to these limits, but, in a sense, only tragedy can indicate what lies beyond'. David K. Nichols, 'Aeschylus' *Oresteia* and the Origins of Political Life', *Interpretation*, August 1980, Vol. 9 No. I, p. 89. See also, John A. Wettergreen, 'On the End of Thucydides's Narrative', *Interpretation*, Vol. 9 No. I August 1980, pp. 93-110; J. Peter Euben (ed.), *Greek Tragedy and Political Theory*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, 1986.

²⁹ Some classicists argue that qualities of craftiness such as lying are not an unusual thing in a Homeric Greek. See Herbert Jennings Rose and Charles Martin Robertson, 'Achilles' in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4-5.

art of rhetoric and eloquence seem to take the place of those heroic competitive values, namely, military prowess and craftiness.³⁰ Moreover, it was sometimes included in the canon of cardinal virtues.³¹ However, the idea of context is just a paradigmatic unit of historical analysis. A boundary of a context is in fact hard to determine. There is always an enclave between two contexts or more.³²

³⁰ 'Martial virtue, then, no longer had anything to do with *thymos*, but consisted in *sophrosyne*---a complete mastery of the self, a constant striving to submit oneself to a common discipline, the coolness necessary to restrain those instinctive pressures that would risk upsetting the discipline of the formation as a whole'. Jean-Pierre Vernant, *The Origins of Greek Thought*, London, 1962, p. 63.

³¹ North, *op. cit.*, pp. 72,73. She writes '(i)t is remarkable for being the only passage in Euripides in which all four of the cardinal virtues are mentioned, and is even more remarkable for adding as a fifth, not *eusebeia*, but eloquence... (t)he addition of eloquence to the canon is peculiarly fitting for the spokesman of sophistic rhetoric, but for us the greatest significance attaches to the choice of *sophrosyne* as a quality in the man who can best lead the *polis*'.

³² The criticism of the contextual fallacy is perceptively made by Ben-Ami Scharfstein. See Ben-Ami Scharfstein, 'The Contextual Fallacy', in Gerald James Larson and Eliot Deutsch (ed.), *Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy*, New Jersey, 1988, pp. 84-93. Also, the dilemma of context in philosophical hermeneutic suggests two possibilities that either the interpreter who can never find an absolute agreement or understanding of the past must understand himself as a tolerant intellectual adventurist or he who can attain a certain understanding of the past though it will never be an impartial one, must be aware of and appreciably value his own prejudices formed by his own contextual tradition as a bridge between the horizon of the present and that otherness of the past. The former position belongs to Ben-Ami Scharfstein whose position can be comprehensively understood in his latest book, *The Dilemma of Context*, New York, 1989. See especially pp. 62-66 with regard to the problem in distinguishing different levels of context. As to the latter, it is the idea of the fusion of the horizons of history put forward by Hans-Georg Gadamer. Scharfstein regards Gadamer's position as 'humane optimism' whose 'decision to go hermeneutic is only the beginning of wisdom and of probably renewed misunderstanding' (Scharfstein, *The Dilemma of Context*, *op.cit.*, pp. 165-166). Concluding his own argument, Scharfstein ends his book as follows: 'To

Thus there cannot be absolute separation between a Homeric Greek and a fifth century Athenian. The persistence of traditional values such as the qualities of daring, strength and success can be found among the works of some fifth century poets. But in peace such qualities are valuably expressed not in the battlefield but in the games.³³

With regard to the inculcation of these Homeric and new values in the ancient Greek society, the role of the poet as the educator is eminent and influential.³⁴ The

put it metaphorically, we and they see each other through different eyes and are shadows of another, in the sense that each is a distorted semblance of the other...We cannot see one another in the round or believe in one another's full reality, but we cannot cut ourselves loose from one another. But if the shadows are ever joined, maybe these doubles can be multiplied into something more like a full humanity; or maybe this too is an impossible dream, though we seem to see something like it happening in front of our eyes' (Scharfstein, *opcit.*, p. 193). With regard to the understanding of the past and the present in accordance with the operation of one's prejudices, Gadamer explains that '(w)hatever is being distinguished must be distinguished from something which, in turn, must be distinguished from it... (t)hus all distinguishing also makes visible that from which something is distinguished... (w)e have described this as the operation of prejudices... (w)e have started by saying that a hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices that we bring with us.... the horizon of the present is being continually formed, in that we have continually to test all our prejudices... (a)n important part of this testing is the encounter with the past and the understanding of the tradition from which we come.... (h)ence the horizon of the present cannot be formed without the past... (t)here is no more an isolated horizon of the present than there are historical horizons'. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, London, 1981, pp. 272-273.

³³ Adkins, *op. cit.*, p. 159. Adkins refers to Pindar's *Pythian Odes*, 11. 49: 'Any man becomes happy, *eudaimon*, and a theme for poets who conquers (in the games) by means of his hands or the *arete* of his feet, and wins the greatest of prizes by his daring and strength'.

³⁴ E.A. Havelock has shown that poetry regarded as preserved communication in ancient Greece functions as an encyclopedia and a source of the Hellenic intelligence. See E.A. Havelock, *Preface to Plato*, Oxford, 1963,

conflict between these overlapping values arises among the works of poets who interpret and modify Homeric epics according to their self-understanding in relation to their social and political context.³⁵ Then the Homeric heroes such as Achilles and Odysseus have been called into question and re-interpretation with regard to the terms 'agathos and arete'. As some say, in some of the later legends after Homer Odysseus is considered to be 'a cowardly rascal' though originally he is undoubtedly supposed to be 'a real local chieftain'.³⁶ It indicates that lying becomes unacceptable--if it really was ever acceptable, as some scholars argue, that it was once an unusual thing in a Homeric Greek.³⁷ Although Achilles' detestation of lying is evident in Homeric epic, however, his prowess and his furious and ungovernable passion, on which the whole plot of the *Iliad* turns, are regarded as 'politically irresponsible and too self-interested' according to the sixth and fifth centuries context.

Both an Odysseus and an Achilles could possibly cause hubris in a social and political context other than their own. To be sure, originally the characteristics of each of them, Achilles and Odysseus, are already opposed to each other. Apart from the problem of parachronism of these Homeric values, the values *per se* are self-contradicting

especially Part I, 'The Image-Thinkers', pp. 3-193. See also the *Republic*, Book II, 337e-379a, and especially Book X at 598e: '...since some people tell us that these poets know all the arts and all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all things divine...'; *Protagoras*, 339a.

³⁵ See Morrall, *op. cit.*, and also, Herbert Jennings Rose and Charles Martin Robertson, *op. cit.*

³⁶ For example, see Nichols, 'Aeschylus' *Oresteia* and the Origins of Political Life', *op. cit.*

³⁷ Herbert Jennings Rose and Charles Martin Robertson, 'Achilles', *op. cit.* Consider Euripides' famous passage in *Hippolytus*, 612: 'The tongue hath sworn; but the soul is unsworn yet'. It has been often referred to in the dialogues. For example, see *Symposium*, 199a.

with regard to whether Achilles' arete or Odysseus' arete makes a person become a real *kalos agathos*. Who really is a *kalos agathos*, Achilles or Odysseus?³⁸

III

However, as just stated, the boundaries of contexts can never be definite. In a particular context, in some situations, the values of other contexts which are different either in time or in place or both are possibly called for. At least, it can be argued that 'Homeric values retained their hold as late as the fourth century...'.³⁹ Though it also might be the case that such values would continue to exist and affect human minds and actions longer than one could imagine.⁴⁰ To quote Adkins again, if in Homeric society 'to be *agathos* one must be brave, skilful, and successful in war and in peace; and one must possess the wealth and (in peace) the leisure which are at once the necessary conditions for the development of these skills and the natural reward of their successful employment', then, the persistence of these values in the fifth and fourth centuries is evident as K.J. Dover argues from his study of Greek popular morality in that period that 'in ordinary Greek usage *agatha*, "good thing", and *kaka*, "bad thing", often denote respectively material

³⁸ As this question is posed by Socrates in Plato's *Lesser Hippias*.

³⁹ Blair Campbell, 'Paradigms Lost: Classical Athenian Politics in Modern Myth', *History of Political Thought*, Vol. X Issue 2 Summer 1989, p. 199.

⁴⁰ Given the fact that the emergence of heroic values are not universal but historical, virtually, such values still prevail in the twentieth century modern society. Machismo and heroism can be found everywhere. Films, literature, and art of that kind have been produced to serve their audience.

comforts and discomforts'.⁴¹

In this respect, the terms do not seem to connote any moral sanction at all. They convey the meaning of what is just regarded to be beneficial. In truth, Adkins has given some explanation of the general usage of these terms as regards their moral and amoral functions since Homer:

'Agathos, kakos, and their synonyms are relevant to this discussion in the masculine and feminine forms, since, as they comment on the excellence of human beings, they may claim to be moral terms. The neuter forms *agathon* and *kakon* have no such claim to say of an action "it is *agathon* (*kakon*) to do x" is simply to say that it is beneficial (harmful) to do x, without passing any moral judgement on the rightness or wrongness of x.'⁴²

With this regard, from our point of view, the term *agathos* or the good seems to have possessed since then a double standard in itself regarding the moral good; if it is deemed as a problem, then, it seems to exist since the earliest records of Greek history. However, one cannot be certain that it really had ever been a problem at all in Homeric society. On the contrary, it is likely a case that any conflicts deriving from the problem of a double standard of the good never occurred since 'Homeric values, however, suit Homeric society, inasmuch as they commend those qualities which most evidently secure its existence,...when the protection of oneself and one's

⁴¹ Dover gives some examples from Aristophanes: *Ecclesiazusae* 893, '"experience something *agathos*" = "have an enjoyable sexual experience" (an old woman is boasting of her skill), *Frogs* 600, "if there's anything *khrestos*" = "if anything nice turns up", GVI 320.2 (*Eretria*, s. VI/V) "He has given few *agatha* to his soul" = "He worked hard and lived frugally" '. K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle*, Oxford, 1974, p. 52.

⁴² Adkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

associates is in question, moral error and mistake are not and cannot be distinguished in many cases, while competitive excellences completely override the quieter moral virtues in cases where they can...⁴³ But one can be assured that around the fifth century such a problem emerged as a result of the persistence of Homeric systems of values against the emergence of other systems of values deriving from the development of its society. Clearly, it is this problem of the good, the conflicting moral values which Socrates perceived and then set forth his mission in life to examine it. It is thus discernible that Socrates has wittingly centred all his questions around the problem, that is, the problem of human life.

IV

With regard to his serious concern for the problem of human life, a century later, Socrates was considered by Aristotle to be a man who 'was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions'.⁴⁴ Later on, looked back on as a historical and influential figure in the history of the development of Greek knowledge, he was deemed the 'hinge for most subsequent thinkers'⁴⁵, as Cicero wrote in 45 B.C.:

⁴³ Adkins, *opcit.*, pp. 53, 54. He is convinced that 'moral responsibility' has no place in Homeric society. Cf. p. 52.

⁴⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, (Book I 987b1-5), *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Vol. II, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Princeton, 1984, p. 1561.

⁴⁵ I.G. Kidd, 'Socrates' in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. VII and VIII, ed. Paul Edwards, New York, 1972, p. 480.

'....from the ancient days down to the time of Socrates, who had listened to Archelaus the pupil of Anaxagoras, philosophy dealt with numbers and movements, with the problem whence all things came, or whither they returned, and zealously inquired into the size of the stars, the spaces that divided them, their courses and all celestial phenomena; Socrates on the other hand was the first to call philosophy down from the heavens and set her in the cities of men and bring her also into their homes and compel her to ask questions about life and morality and things good and evil.'⁴⁶

It is evident that, concerning the problem of *arete* and *agathos*, Socrates asks what the good is, what virtue is and whether it can be taught.⁴⁷ These principal questions permeate almost all of the dialogues.⁴⁸

Whatever the meaning of *arete* and *agathos* might be, according to the traditional values, *arete* was believed to be an endowment in a nature, *phusis*, of man.⁴⁹ And in the fifth century such an idea still persisted in the works of

⁴⁶ Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, (V.iv. 10), Cambridge Massachusetts, Loeb Classical Library, 1966, p. 435.

⁴⁷ It can be said to be a kind of hermeneutic problem of the good which is derived from the changing contexts. See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, op. cit., pp. 146-147.

⁴⁸ The introduction of this kind of question in the dialogues, particularly in the *Republic*, has been regarded by Adi Ophir as a Platonic politics of power-knowledge play. He criticises that it is just a trick of the author to ask these questions in order to lead his audience to 'higher questions, which ultimately lead to the question of the good, at the dialogue's centre'. Other dialogues also imply the same intention. But the question of the good has not been answered and is always suspended. See Adi Ophir, *Plato's Invisible Cities: Discourse and Power in the Republic*, London, 1991, pp. 8 and also 6, 147-148.

⁴⁹ See A.W.H. Adkins, *From the Many to the One: A study of Personality and Views of Human Nature in the Context of ancient Greek Society, Values and Beliefs*, London, 1970, p. 79, see also Chapter IV.

poets such as Sophocles, Euripides, Aeschylus, and Aristophanes.⁵⁰ For instance, as regards the origin of the idea of self-control, *sophrosyne*, the latest among the three great Athenian tragic poets, 'Euripides is firmly of opinion that *phusis* plays the chief role'.⁵¹ For example, *sophrosyne* is seen as the gift of the gods which a man is naturally endowed with.⁵² To be sure, the term *phusis* used by the poets in the fifth century refers to 'the parentage from which an individual has sprung'.⁵³ Therefore, a nature, *phusis*, of one man can differ from the others. A nature of a man possibly comprises his physical characteristics, social class, social and ethical qualities, and virtues. To talk about a man's nature always implies a reference to the lineage of his family. According to this view, if a man is said to possess a quality, that quality is believed to be passed on from his parents to him.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Adkins, *From the Many to the One*, *ibid.*, pp. 79-81. However, in Aeschylus, one can also find new values in support of the democratic ideas. See Cynthia Farrar, *The Origins of Democratic Thinking*, Cambridge and New York, 1988, pp. 30-31, 35.

⁵¹ North, *op. cit.*, pp. 73, 74-75. However, some evidence in Euripides' works indicate inconsistency in his application of the term to the Greeks and the barbarians. Edith Hall has shown in her work that it reflects the political situation of the relationship between Athens and other Greek and non-Greek cities. See Hall, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-222.

⁵² Consider 'May *sophrosyne*, the fairest gift of the gods, cherish me', in Euripides' *Medea*, (635-636). See Adkins, *From Many to the One*, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

⁵³ Adkins, *From the Many.*, *op. cit.*

⁵⁴ For example, the passage at 1259 in Sophocles' *Ajax*, Adkins remarks 'Agamemnon brusquely tells Teucer to remember who he is by *phusis*, the illegitimate son of a Greek nobleman and a foreigner; to which he replies (1301) that his mother may have been a foreigner, but that she was *phusei* a queen', and '...an individual may by cowardly by *phusis*'; 'in Euripides' *Nauch*, Alcmaeon concludes that it is true that from *esthlos* fathers *esthlos* children spring, and from *kakos* fathers children who are like the *phusis* of

Contrary to the traditional values found in the works of the poets, there also exists the idea that virtues can be taught, which is advocated by the sophists. Surely, the sophists purport themselves to be able to impart virtues to people.

As mentioned above, in response to the development of social and political condition, a change of values system must be called for. The development of democratic institutions at Athens from the time of Solon to Periclean democracy was responsible for the development of the sophistic movement.⁵⁵ With regard the rise of Athenian democracy in the sixth and fifth centuries, 'the sophists,' said Kerferd, 'were supplying a social and political need'.⁵⁶ The possibility of the invention of the politics of democracy of classical Athens lies in the emergence of the humanistic tradition which originated in the idea of freedom and equality, importantly, the ideas of autonomous self, the theory of historical understanding of human nature, and the theory of measuring man.⁵⁷

The development of Athenian political constitution was intertwined with the humanisation and the democratic

their father,' and 'a barbarian has a barbarian *phusis*'. See Adkins, *From Many to the One*, *op. cit.*, p. 80. As regards the inconsistent application of the term nature and its positive and negative connotations to the Greeks and the non-Greeks, see Hall, *op. cit.*, Chapter V, 'Epilogue: The Polarity Deconstructed', Section I and II, 'Barbaric Greeks and Noble Barbarians', pp. 201-223.

⁵⁵ G.B. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement*, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 15-17.

⁵⁶ Kerferd, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

⁵⁷ Cynthia Farrar, *op. cit.*, cf. Anaxagoras's cosmic autonomy, pp. 41-43; Democritus' autonomous self, pp. 237-239; Thucydides' history and human understanding, pp. 135-137, 151, 127-131, 136; Protagoras' theory of 'man as a measure', pp. 44-106. See also Kerferd, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-20; and also, E.A. Havelock, *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics*, New Haven, 1957.

politicisation of power and knowledge. This results in the ascendancy of the place of man in the cosmos. Man is no longer just a puppet of the Olympian gods, as the idea of man as a self-willed being is proposed in the work of Thucydides. His work points out that man can understand what happened in the past and what will happen in the future by understanding himself, namely, human nature. Historical understanding reveals human nature and vice versa. Historical impetus does not originate from divine power. It lies in human nature. Man can understand himself through history, the continuum of past, present, and future. As it has been expressed in Thucydides' well known passage: 'It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future'.⁵⁸ This can be viewed from the modern point of view as the attempt of man in supplanting divine power as regards the latter's supposed omniscience and omnipotence. To be omniscient and omnipotent, man searches for something which is equivalent to the eye of the gods.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Thucydides, *The History of Peloponnesian War*, (Book I 22), translated by Rex Werner with an Introduction and Notes by M.I. Finley, Penguin Classics, London, 1983, p. 48.

⁵⁹ History and other human sciences can be regarded as the attempt of human power towards divine knowledge and power as in the myth of Panoptes. See Michel Serres, 'Panoptic Theory', in Thomas M. Kavanagh (ed.), *The Limits of Theory*, Stanford, 1989, pp. 25-47.

By and large, the Greeks in the fifth century were fermented in this atmosphere. It was conducive to the rise of adventurous spirit. With this spirit, those whom we might have called 'philosophers, scientists, historians, or thinkers' by our standard have contributed to the development and broadening of the scope of human knowledge and experience. The more the scope of knowledge is broadened, the more they realise that what they thought to be nature, *phusis*, is just the norm or convention, *nomos*.

For instance, around the sixth century, Xenophanes of Kolophon reacted 'against the view of the gods which the poets had made familiar' by denying the anthropomorphic gods.⁶⁰ What men understood to be the nature and image of the gods were just the reflection of themselves. In the *Satires*, Xenophanes says:

'Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame and disgrace among mortals, stealings and adulteries and deceivings of one another. But mortals deem that the gods are begotten as they are, and have clothes like theirs, and voice and form. Yes, and if oxen and horses or lions had hands, and could paint with their hands, and produce works of art, as men do, horses would paint the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen, and make their bodies in the image of their several kinds. The Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed; the Thracians say theirs have blue eyes and red hair.'⁶¹

In the fifth century, the understanding of the importance of the idea of *nomos* became more vivid in Herodotus when he experienced those practices and behaviour

⁶⁰ John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, 4th edition, London, 1930, p. 112.

⁶¹ Xenophanes, *Satires* (11-16), in Burnet, 'Early Greek Philosophy', *ibid.*

of other tribes which would never be permitted in his own. With regard to what an anthropologist might call 'cultural diversity', Herodotus explains:

'In view of all this, I have no doubt whatever that Cambyses was completely out of his mind; it is the only possible explanation of his assault upon, and mockery of, everything which ancient law and custom have made sacred in Egypt. For if anyone, no matter who, were given the opportunity of choosing from amongst all the nations in the world the set of beliefs which he thought best, he would inevitably, after careful consideration of their relative merits, choose that of his own country. Everyone without exception believes his own native customs, and the religion he was brought up in, to be the best; and that being so, it is unlikely that anyone but a madman would mock at such things. There is abundant evidence that this is the universal feeling about the ancient customs of one's country.'⁶²

Herodotus realised how important custom, *nomos*, is and what it can do, as he said he agreed with Pindar's statement regarding *nomos* as 'king of all'.⁶³ He expresses the view that whatever one understands to be a universal truth or nature, *phusis*, of things is probably merely a custom of one's country. To be sure, it does not mean that Xenophanes and Herodotus believe that all things are just set of beliefs or convention. For Xenophanes, the gods or divinity do exist. But divine nature is not understandable for men since it is 'neither in form like unto mortals nor in thought'.⁶⁴ Although Herodotus showed that men distinctly differ from one another with regard to custom and physical appearance; men behave very

⁶² Herodotus, *The Histories* (Book III 37-38), p. 219.

⁶³ Herodotus, *The Histories* (Book III 39), p. 220.

⁶⁴ Xenophanes, *Satires* (23), in John Burnet, *op. cit.*

differently, and some are believed to be even biologically different as Herodotus himself believed though wrongly that semen of the Indians and the Ethiopians 'is not white like other peoples, but black like their own skins'.⁶⁵ Despite differences among these tribes, he still regarded them as human beings.⁶⁶ To be sure, this presupposes some idea or preconception which he possessed concerning a common characteristic of a being called man, that is to say, the nature of man. But, whatever view of human nature he took, unfortunately, he did not state it in his work.

To be sure, it seems that the more the Greek thinkers in the sixth and fifth century realised that what they thought was nature was convention, the more they were determined to discover what nature was, and the harder they found it to achieve that goal. Conceivably, it can be said that this is a departure of an endless project of man's will-power over nature or, in other words, divine power. Also, at this point, it is understandable that the situation gives birth to what is called the *nomos-phusis* controversy in the fifth century.⁶⁷

Generally, the debate involves a number of different

⁶⁵ Herodotus, *The Histories* (Book III 101,2), p. 246.

⁶⁶ The difference between the Greeks and some Indian tribe is quite distinct. As some Indians ate their parents' corpses while this practice was impossible for the Greeks. Despite this, Herodotus still respected them as human beings. See Herodotus, *The Histories* (Book III 38), p. 219.

⁶⁷ G.E.R. Lloyd states that '(i)n Greece, one distinction that was certainly drawn by the end of the fifth century, at least, was that between what is "natural" (*phusis*) and what is "customary" or "conventional" (*nomos*)...'. Also Kerferd remarks that '(i)t has long been recognised that two terms, *nomos* and *phusis*, were of great importance in much of the thinking and arguments in the second half of the fifth century B.C.'. See G.E.R. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy: Two types of argumentation in early Greek Thought*, Bristol, 1966, p. 211; G.B. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

areas such as ethics, the origins of civilisation, the origins of language etc.⁶⁸ With regard to the topic of virtue in the *nomos-phusis* controversy, the sophists espoused the idea contrary to that of the poets that virtues or human excellences, *arete*, is not inherent in human nature. In fact, man can acquire it through conventional education. Anyone regardless of his background can become a *kalos agathos* by learning 'the art of success' from the sophists. Also, it has been suggested that 'success' should be understood in political terms.⁶⁹ Since with freedom in the political context of Athenian democracy, through political power any citizen can achieve fame, time, and glory, *kleon* which are what people regarded as desirable. That confirms the interwoven relationship of the rise of democratic thinking and the rise of the sophistic humanism.

From above, it can be inferred that both complemented each other and espoused at least the idea of equality of man in social and political terms in conjunction with the idea of the teachability of virtue. With regard to the principle of equality, *isonomia*, Jean-Pierre Vernant states '(t)he democratic current went further when it defined all citizens, without regard to fortune or quality, as "equals" having precisely the same rights to take part in all aspects of public life'.⁷⁰ In sum, democratic thinking pronounces that all citizens are equal into which the sophistic humanism weaves the idea regarding virtue that they are indiscriminately teachable.

The problem of virtue, *arete*, in the *phusis-nomos*

⁶⁸ Lloyd, *op. cit.*

⁶⁹ See C.J. Rowe, 'Plato on the Sophists as Teachers of Virtue', *History of Political Thought*, Vol. IV No.3 Winter 1983, pp. 409-410, 7n.

⁷⁰ Vernant, *op. cit.*, p. 97.

controversy in the fifth and fourth centuries can be said to be attributable to the conflict between the traditional Homeric values and the later values in the fifth century. It is clear that those who had been regarded as wise men, *sophoi*, in the fifth century 'reflect the great debate over the relation of *phusis* to *nomos* ("convention")'.⁷¹ It seems that this conflict can be generally understood to be between the sophists who held the view that virtue is teachable and the poets and others who contended that virtue must be naturally endowed.⁷² In contradistinction to Euripides' view on the origin of *sophrosyne*, one of the most famous sophists Protagoras, who closely associated with Pericles and had for sometime gained popularity from the majority of the Athenian people, claimed that *sophrosyne* is 'a part of what he call(ed) *politike techne*....not a gift of nature but is acquired and therefore accessible to all'.⁷³ With regard to the acquisition of virtue, the sophists insisted that men can acquire virtue through education which the sophists claimed to possess and also the ability to teach such human excellences, *paideuein anthropous eis areten*; they set themselves up as *paideuseos kai aretes didaskaloi*'.⁷⁴ But, for the poets, virtue which comes from nature can only be inspired by divine power and of course like the sophists' self-claimed quality purported themselves only to possess such divine inspiration.⁷⁵

⁷¹ North, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁷² To be sure, apart from the poets, there were also others such as soothsayer, prophet who argued for divine power in this respect. See the *Apology* (22c) and *Euthyphro* (3d-e).

⁷³ North, *op. cit.*, p. 87. See *Protagoras* (319a).

⁷⁴ Rowe, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

⁷⁵ See the *Apology* (22c); *Ion* (533d-535a, 542a-b); *Euthyphro* (3d-e); *Cratylus* (385e, 391c-d, 396d-e, 407d, 409d); also consider *Cratylus*, 425d-e in relation to *Ion*, 542a-b: '....unless you think we had better follow the

Hence, as a contextualist would argue, it can be said that the question and answer with regard to Socrates and the dialogues resulted from the social and political context which has been described.⁷⁶ The problem of virtue derived from the conflict of the changing contexts bears upon Socrates' mission. Possibly, his problems of virtue should not have been related to the similar problems of men in different contexts. Then his answer, if there is any, probably should not be regarded as the right answer to the questions posed in the twentieth century. In the same respect, our proposition cannot be an answer, or at any rate could not be the right answer, to Socrates' problems which might have been answered otherwise.⁷⁷ However, the contextualist's argument is infallible only if the boundaries of contexts can be precisely delineated.

Against the sixth and fifth century Athenian social and political background, a modern reader can probably understand Socrates better than Socrates might have understood himself, provided that he himself had never been aware of such problems of virtue which originated from the

example of the tragic poets, who, when they are in a dilemma, have recourse to the introduction of gods on machines.'

⁷⁶ Cf. R.G. Collingwood, *An Autobiography*, Oxford, 1978, p. 31: 'I began by observing that you cannot find out what a man means by simply studying his spoken or written statements, even though he has spoken or written with perfect command of language and perfectly truthful intention. In order to find out his meaning you must also know what the question was (a question in his own mind, and presumed by him to be in yours) to which the thing he has said or written was meant as an answer'.

⁷⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 31-32: 'It must be understood that question and answer, as I conceived them, were strictly correlative. A proposition was not an answer, or at any rate could not be the right answer, to any question which might have been answered otherwise.'

discrepancy between two or more value systems of his own city, that is, Athens and her citizens. Different systems of ideas or value systems are attributable to different characters of men and to different histories. That is to say, as Neal Wood points out that 'since Plato, however, we have labored under the delusion that the philosopher is completely dispassionate', then his contextualistic approach which he has taken to study John Locke, 'seems to be true of other philosophic greats beginning with Socrates, every past thinker was a philosophic partisan and a partisan philosopher, not a detached, disinterested, and transcendent truth-seeker'.⁷⁸ Necessarily, to understand Socrates, one must take into account his social and

⁷⁸ Neal Wood is one of the historians of ideas who argues for scholarship of the contextualistic approach in the study of social and political thought. His view and position with regard to philosophy and philosophers indicate that:

'Philosophers, however, are far from being neutral spectators of the "games" of human life. As participants in that life, the meaning of their philosophy and its implications for action can only be fully grasped by establishing its links with the social context. Any attempt to divorce philosophy from social life, to lift it from its social setting as if it were wholly transhistorical, is an attempt to transform it from a living human creation into a sterile and scholastic exercise. Thus, my social analysis of Locke's *Essay* is in effect a case study designed to show something of the relationship between political and philosophic commitment'.

See Neal Wood, *The Politics of Locke's Philosophy: A Social Study of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Berkeley, 1983, pp. 3-4, and also his article, 'The Social History of Political Theory' in *Political Theory*, 6 (August 1978), pp. 345-67. And cf. Richard Rorty, J.B.S. Schneewind and Quentin Skinner (ed.), *Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of philosophy*, Cambridge, 1984, 'Introduction', pp. 1-14.

political background in relation to those of others in society.

Socrates' concern for the problems of virtue inevitably involves the problem of education, *paideia*. Among others, the role of educator in Socrates' time is eminently in the hands of the sophists and the poets. Therefore, concerning the problem of education some of the main figures in the dialogues are the sophists and the poets.⁷⁹ The whole dialogues can be considered as Socrates' mission. It is not only concerned with the sophists and the poets but also all 'the wise, or those who know' what the good and virtue are. Those who know what the good and virtue are must possess the knowledge of the good and virtue. But there is confusion and disagreement regarding what the good and virtue truly are, who really is a wise man.

It is a serious concern for a serious man to know what the good and virtue are and who is a wise man. But if a man knows what the good and virtue are and what a wise man is, then, he must possess the wisdom, the knowledge of the good and becomes a wise man himself. Then the possession of the wisdom is presumably regarded to be good and excellent in itself. That is why Socrates kept asking such questions, in order to search for the ultimate answer and to make himself wise and better. Probably this is partly the origin of the preconception that wisdom or knowledge is the good and vice versa. From this aspect, Socrates can in practice be deemed not so different from the sophists with regard to his search for the good through learning,

⁷⁹ Socrates discusses about the ideas of the sophists or converses with the sophists in the *Apology*, the *Lesser Hippias*, *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Euthydemus*, *Cratylus*, the *Republic*, *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Greater Hippias*. Equally, the poets and the question of their knowledge are dealt with in the *Apology*, *Ion*, *Cratylus*, *Phaedrus*, the *Symposium*, and the *Republic*.

paideia. But like the poets, he claims that what reminds him of his self-ignorance and inspires him to search for wisdom comes from the divine power of his daemonic voice.

In the dialogues, Socrates always brings the *nomos-phusis* debate into his discussion of the problem of virtue. The *Cratylus* clearly reflects Socrates' apprehension of the situation with which these two popular beliefs play an important role with regard to the theory of knowledge. One of them can be said to be the alternative of the other. Discussing the origin of names with Hermogenes and Cratylus, Socrates first introduced Protagoras' theory of man as the measure of all things. Right after the refutation of Protagoras' theory, Socrates then had recourse to Homer and the other poets as an alternative authority to the sophistic theory.⁸⁰ If one does not like the way the sophist taught about names, then one 'ought to learn from Homer and the other poets'.⁸¹ Also, it is more often than not that one refers to divine power as the origin of his knowledge or ability when he could not find any other justified explanation for his acquisition of such knowledge.⁸²

In all the dialogues, Socrates' cross-examination concerning the origin of virtue centres around these two main positions. Apart from the problem of the origin of virtue, the crisis of the interpretation of the meaning of virtue itself which occurs in the city of Athens with an enclave of Homeric values and a rise of new system of values, has come to light. From this, one can understand why Socrates has to pose such questions to those particular people.

⁸⁰ Plato, *Cratylus*, (385e-386a, 391c-d).

⁸¹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (391c-e, 393c-394a).

⁸² Plato, *Ion*, (541e-542b).

In the *Charmides*, Socrates' interlocutors are Charmides and Critias. Charmides is a very handsome young man who has been considered to excel his friends not only in appearance but also in his virtue, that is, temperance, *sophrosyne*⁸³, and Critias is an experienced man, who claimed that he knew perfectly well the meaning of *sophrosyne*,⁸⁴ With regard to courage, *andreia*, as a virtue for young men, Socrates discusses this problem with Laches and Nicias who are supposed to know better than anyone else what courage is since both of them are eminent Athenian generals.⁸⁵ In the *Lysis*, Lysis and Menexenus are very fond of each other. So Socrates examines the nature of love and friendship, *philia*, with both of them because they are in love with each other.⁸⁶

In the *Euthyphro*, Socrates met the prophet Euthyphro who purported that his knowledge of the nature of piety, *eusebeia*, surpassed everyone.⁸⁷ Hippias, a renowned sophist, has his reputation for teaching and orating numerous subjects such as mathematics, astronomy, grammar, poetry, music, and the history of the heroic age etc.⁸⁸ Moreover, he boasted that he was able to impart virtue to any young man.⁸⁹ In the *Greater Hippias*, Socrates requests him to tell about the beauty, *kalon*, since he claimed he knows and can teach young men what noble or

⁸³ Plato, *Charmides*, (157d).

⁸⁴ Plato, *Charmides*, (162c-e).

⁸⁵ Plato, *Laches*, (189c).

⁸⁶ Plato, *Lysis*, (206d, 207c).

⁸⁷ Plato, *Euthyphro*, (4e-5a).

⁸⁸ Plato, *Greater Hippias*,, (366c, 367d, 367e, 368b); *Lesser Minor*, (285c, 282e, 283c, 284a-b, 285c, 286a, 287b, 291a); *Protagoras*, (318e).

⁸⁹ Plato, *Greater Hippias*,, (283c).

beautiful pursuits are.⁹⁰ Again, in the *Lesser Hippias*, with regard to the topic of the hero in Homer's epics, Socrates asked Hippias to explain to him why and in what respect Achilles, the hero of the *Iliad*, is considered to be finer and better than Odysseus of the *Odyssey*.⁹¹

Besides Hippias, Socrates also met Ion, the rhapsode, who also professed his expertise in Homer. Ion told Socrates that he understood every single topic in Homer better than anyone.⁹² But none can compare with Gorgias of Leontini and Protagoras of Abdera who attracted Socrates' lengthy conversations. Gorgias, one of the most influential of the sophists, teaches rhetoric, the art of persuasion, which by virtue of its power can make other people do anything for you.⁹³ Protagoras seems to be more highly regarded than Gorgias, particularly at Athens. He was Pericles' friend and had been appointed to draw up a code of laws for Thurii, a new colony of Athens in 444 B.C. In the *Protagoras*, its beginning scene is made to show how special and popular Protagoras, 'the wisest of Socrates' generation', is in the eyes of the Athenians.⁹⁴ He was regarded as one of the earliest and most successful of the sophists. Moreover, he was strongly confident in his sophistry and, unlike other sophists, never refrained from calling himself a sophist. He even ascribed sophism to Homer and other poets.⁹⁵ Distinguishing himself from other men of the same trade, he claimed that virtue was teachable and the most important of all virtues that he taught was the art of politics which consisted of 'good

⁹⁰ Plato, *Greater Hippias*,, (286a, 287b).

⁹¹ Plato, *Lesser Hippias*, (363b, 364b).

⁹² Plato, *Ion*, (530c, 536e).

⁹³ Plato, *Gorgias*, (452e).

⁹⁴ Plato, *Protagoras*, (309a-311a).

⁹⁵ Plato, *Protagoras*, (316c-317c).

judgement in one's own affairs, showing how best to order one's own home; and in the affairs of one's city, showing how one may have most influence on public affairs both in speech and in action'.⁹⁶

In the *Euthydemus*, Socrates argued with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, the sophists from Chios, who claimed to teach virtue 'in a pre-eminently excellent and speedy manner', and that virtue is the art of disputation, *eristikos*.⁹⁷ Hermogenes and Cratylus disagree on the theory of name in the *Cratylus*. They argue for their own positions which in a sense represent as stated above the *nomos-phusis* controversy and also the ideas of the prominent thinkers of their time, namely, Parmenides and Heraclitus as regards to the theory of names as the source of knowledge of things.⁹⁸ Socrates was asked to join the discussion.⁹⁹ In the *Republic*, Socrates and Cephalus started the fire of debate on the meaning of justice, *dikaiosyne*, and then passed it on to the others. Socrates said he respected Cephalus because one can learn from an elderly man who had experienced many things in life.¹⁰⁰ Also, in that dialogue, Socrates discussed the problem of justice with Polemarchus, Thrasymachus, Glaucon and Adeimantus. In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates examined the problem of knowledge itself with his resemblance, the young Theaetetus who had been highly praised by his teacher, Theodorus for his 'marvellously fine qualities'.¹⁰¹ In this dialogue, Socrates meticulously discussed Protagoras's theory of knowledge, namely, man as the measure of all things. In

⁹⁶ Plato, *Protagoras*, (318e).

⁹⁷ Plato, *Euthydemus*, (271c-272b, 428d).

⁹⁸ Plato, *Cratylus*, (402a-c, 440c-d, 428d).

⁹⁹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (383a).

¹⁰⁰ Plato, the *Republic*, (328d-e).

¹⁰¹ Plato, *Theaetetus*, (144a-b).

the *Parmenides*, Socrates had a chance to discuss the doctrine of ideas and the doctrine of being with Parmenides, the great Eleatic philosopher to whom such doctrines belong. In search of the meaning of the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher, Socrates met the Elean Stranger who, as a follower of Parmenides and Zeno, was supposed to be a philosopher¹⁰² to discuss with his

¹⁰² Plato, the *Sophist*, (216). When Theodorus told Socrates that the Elean Stranger was a follower of Parmenides and Zeno and he was a real philosopher. He was likely to regard the Elean Stranger as a philosopher in the same sense as Parmenides and Zeno. But the way the Elean Stranger undertook and conducted his philosophical topic and investigation was quite different from Parmenides. If the Elean stranger is a philosopher, he must be a philosopher of different kind, or probably not a philosopher at all. Parmenides, Zeno, and the Elean Stranger have been called philosopher who as the lover of wisdom searches for knowledge and wisdom. Those who are called philosopher are not necessarily philosophers. One should not forget that it is Theodorus not Socrates who assumed that the Elean stranger as a follower of the philosopher, Parmenides and Zeno, was also a philosopher. Stanley Rosen rightly comments that '(e)ven if we are to take Theodorus's identification as valid, we still do not know what it means to be a philosopher...(i)f we did, of course, there would be no need to enter into conversations on the nature of the sophist, and thus, of the philosopher as well..(t)here is no reason to doubt Socrates' high regard for Parmenides, but a companion of a philosopher is not himself a philosopher, even assuming that we know what a philosopher is' (Rosen, 1983, p. 62). While John G. Gunnell suggests that the Elean Stranger is 'Plato or true philosopher described in the *Theaetetus* who moves like a stranger in Athens' (Gunnell, 1968, p. 160). Against this, Rosen argues that if what the Stranger was to say is just a repetition of the Eleatic doctrine, and not of a doctrine originated by the Stranger, then '(t)hose who regard the Stranger as Plato's "mouthpiece," while at the same time expressing confidence in Plato's scrupulous honesty, are surely faced with a problem here: How can the Stranger be Plato's as well as the Eleatic mouthpiece?...(i)f we say that Plato is here indulging in dramatic license, what is the exact extent of that license? How do we know the contexts in which the license may be applied and in which it is invalid?..(i)t seems to me fairly evident that the Stranger's doctrines, as we are about to hear them, are not attributable to any known Eleatic school...(i)t is equally evident that we do not know, and cannot prove conclusively, to what extent, or in what sense, the Stranger is a lightly disguised Plato' (Rosen, opcit., p. 67). To be sure, the

problem of identification actually exists. The chaotic confusion of the terms *sophist-sophistes*, wise man-*sophos*, and particularly *philosopher-philosophos* employed before and after the time of Socrates and Plato, in the transitional period of the sixth-fourth century is evident. In the *Protagoras* 337d, Hippias who is generally understood to be a sophist calls Protagoras, Prodicus, Socrates, and himself wisest men, *sophotatous*. While Socrates and young Hippocrates know exactly that Protagoras whom he is going to meet is a sophist (Plato, *Protagoras* 312a). Of course Socrates believes that he himself is not a sophist. The sophists themselves have been easy, perhaps too much, to be identified. But to distinguish a non-sophist from a sophist is another matter. For instance, an ordinary person, Callias' door-keeper, could not discriminate between who is a sophist and who is not (Plato, *Protagoras* 314c-d). Those who are in the intellectual circle itself perhaps could identify who is who. For instance, Theodorus, who himself is a sophist in mathematics, regarded Parmenides and Zeno as philosophers in the *Sophist* 216a. While talking to Socrates, Protagoras openly regarded himself as a sophist and also was able to point out others, past and present, who were the sophists despite their disguises (Plato, *Protagoras* 316d-317b). At 152e in the *Theaetetus*, conversing with Theaetetus, Socrates also classifies Parmenides together with Protagoras, Heraclitus, Empedocles, Epicharmus and Homer under the general name of *sophoi* or wise men. It is possible that Socrates when talking to young Theaetetus might have been called Parmenides and others by the term which is generally employed by ordinary people to refer to those wise men whom they could not distinguish between. To be sure, the term *sophist* can refer to a wide variety of specialists. As in G.E.R. Lloyd's study, the term *sophist* itself is originally used non-pejoratively and even in Plato, too, when it refers to other professions such as geometers, doctors, sculptors, painters etc. And the sophists of professions as such accept money for instruction which from this it is often used as 'the defining characteristic of a sophist' (Lloyd, 1989, pp. 93-4ff). Lloyd does not entirely agree. He argues that '(i)t is, rather, fee-taking for teaching such subjects as "virtue" or excellence, *arete*, for which Plato reserves his bitterest attacks. Then Lloyd concludes that an odium of the term *sophist* in Plato's day 'owed much to Plato himself' (Lloyd, *opcit.*, pp. 92, 94). Surely, this kind of confusion and indecision with regard to the use of the terms must be the problem for the Athenians. Despite the actuality of the problem, the Athenian people might not have taken it as seriously as Socrates or Plato whose grave concern is the education and welfare of young men. This is hardly a problem at all for the sophists themselves whose main concern is to compete with one another and gain fame and fortune. On the contrary, the problem generates the atmosphere congenial to their

profession (Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement*, *opcit.*, pp. 15-17; also, Havelock, *The Liberal Temper in Greek Politics*, *opcit.*). To be sure, this kind of atmosphere and democracy intertwine and complement one another. However, it is so serious a problem that Plato should have composed the trilogy of the *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, and the *Statesman* in order to remind the reader of the existence of this problem and to open a forum of discussion on it. It can be also argued that those who think themselves as real philosophers might be upset and badly affected by such a situation and then need to justify and clarify their own position against the sophists as, before Socrates and Plato, Heraclitus criticised Pythagoras for claiming himself as a philosopher, and Zeno is believed to have written a book *Against the Philosophers* which is aimed at Pythagoras (W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1987, pp. 417, 204). To that extent, to discriminate between a philosopher and a sophist, Plato can be understood to do that in the *Sophist* and perhaps in the dialogues as a whole starting from the *Apology*. They might be deemed as the apology of a philosopher. This is quite plausible with regard to the confusion of the meaning between the sophist and the philosopher. Then, what can we say about the *Statesman*? Does it also imply that a real philosopher must be simultaneously a true statesman, and to defend his position as a true statesman, the author needs a dialogue on the matter? That may be the reason that another dialogue in which the Elean Stranger is expected to discuss on the meaning of true philosopher is unnecessary since after the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* the reader should be able to point out what a sophist is and what a true statesman is, and by that reason, he will be able to identify a true philosopher and a true statesman, or, in other words, a philosopher-king. Whether this hypothesis is true or not, it depends on what role the Elean Stranger is supposed to play in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*. To identify what the Elean Stranger is, Plato leaves it as kind of riddle to be solved by the reader. However, at this stage our concern is to argue that the Elean Stranger is a wise man, *sophos*, because to say that the Elean Stranger is a wise man is one thing, but to specify him as a sophist or a philosopher is another matter which requires a further discussion. What one can be certain here is that among other things he should have been generally understood to be a wise man. To judge what he is and to interpret what he argues is our later concern. Here the point is just that Socrates meets the Elean Stranger as a wise man from whom he expected to learn something as he has stated his mission in the *Apology*. See Stanley Rosen, *Plato's Sophist: The Drama of Original and Image*, New Haven, 1983; John G. Gunnell, *Political Philosophy and Time: Plato and the Origins of Political Vision*, Chicago, 1987; G.E.R. Lloyd, *The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science*, Berkeley, 1987. As

look-alike, Theaetetus, and his namesake, young Socrates in the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*.

Philebus represents the hedonistic interpretation of the good in the *Philebus* in which Socrates discussed the problem of the good with Protarchus, a protagonist of the position. Finally, in the *Laws*, three elderly persons from three cities, namely, the stranger from Athens, Clinias from Crete, and Megillus from Sparta, discussed the nature of the laws, *nomoi*. In Hellas, Crete and Sparta were highly regarded on account of their laws and customs.¹⁰³ Clinias and Megillus who had been living all their life under such admirable *nomos* were expected to be able to relate what the good laws were. They claimed their own laws originated from the divine lawgivers, that is, Zeus in the case of Crete, and Apollo in the case of Sparta.¹⁰⁴ Both polities were believed to be in Socrates' favourite model of good government.¹⁰⁵ The Athenian Stranger seems to play the part of Socrates in the dialogue by examining Clinias and Megillus.¹⁰⁶

regards the argument that the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* have been written as the answer to the problems, 'Who is the sophist? Who is the statesman? and Who is the philosopher?', which are originated in the *Apology*, see Mitchell H. Miller, Jr., *The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman*, The Hague, 1980, pp. 1-3.

¹⁰³ Plato, the *Republic*, (544c); *Laws*, (631b, 683a).

¹⁰⁴ Plato, *Laws*, (624a).

¹⁰⁵ Plato, *Crito*, (52e-53a).

¹⁰⁶ Many scholars suggest that the Athenian Stranger is Plato or his mouthpiece. Theodor Gomperz argues that Plato himself takes part in the colloquy behind the transparent mask of the Athenian Stranger (Gomperz, 1969, pp. 229-230). Ernest Barker seems to believe that the Athenian Stranger is Plato's mouthpiece (Barker, 1947, pp. 339-340). A.E. Taylor suggests that the Athenian Stranger might be Plato himself (Taylor, 1978, p. 465). Also, Shorey has the same opinion (Shorey, 1965, p. 310). W.K.C. Guthrie said that the character of the Athenian Stranger is remarkably un-Socratic. He also takes him as Plato's mouthpiece

(Guthrie, 1978, pp. 323-324). Robert W. Hall regards the Athenian Stranger as Plato's spokesman (Hall, 1981, p. 90). A different view can be found in the other group of Plato commentators who believe that the signification of the characters in the *Laws* is intended to be symbolic. Werner Jaeger perceives that Plato's choice of the characters in the *Laws* is symbolic in order to join the Dorian and the Athenians natures in a higher unity (Jaeger, 1986, p. 218). David Grene's opinion does not differ from Jaeger as he argues that when a Spartan, a Cretan, and an Athenian are confronted with the task of constructing a system of laws for a new state, a political question is to be raised outside the drama (Grene, 1965, p. 158). Although older men from three cities are also considered to be symbolic figures, Eric Voegelin in regard to the myths of cosmic cycles in the *Statesman* and the *Timaeus* regarded them to reflect the end and the beginning of the course of the Hellenic history (Voegelin, 1957, pp. 228-230). George Klosko said as much the same as Jaeger when he writes 'the choice of interlocutors is, as always symbolic, as the political principles espoused are based on combining features from the Athenian and Doric (i.e. Spartan and Cretan) polities' (Klosko, 1986, p. 198). Only Leo Strauss comments that 'the Athenian Stranger occupies the place ordinarily occupied in the Platonic dialogues by Socrates' (Strauss, 1972, p. 52). Strauss is convinced that the *Laws* gives an opportunity to the reader to see 'what he (Socrates) would have done in Crete after his arrival,' since 'we are entitled to infer that if Socrates had fled (from Athens), he would have gone to Crete' (Strauss, 1988, p. 33). Thomas L. Pangle follows Strauss and gives the reason that in the *Laws* the reader is able to learn 'what Socrates would have said and done if his quest for self-knowledge, and his friendships, had ever allowed him the leisure to engage in giving advice to political reformers-- and if he had ever found himself in the appropriate circumstances' (Pangle, 1980, pp. 378-379). Theodor Gomperz, *The Greek Thinkers*, Vol. III, Plato, London, 1969; Ernest Barker, *Greek Political Theory: Plato and His Predecessors*, London, 1947; A.E. Taylor, *Plato: The Man and his Work*, London, 1978; Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said*, Chicago, 1965; W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. V, Cambridge, 1978; Robert W. Hall, *Plato*, London, 1981; Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, Vol. III, *The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato*, New York and Oxford, 1986; Grene, *Greek Political Theory: The Image of Man in Thucydides and Plato*, op. cit.; Eric Voegelin, *Plato*, Baton Rouge, 1966; Klosko, *The Development of Plato's Political Theory*, op. cit.; Leo Strauss, 'Plato: The Laws' in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (ed.), *History of Political Philosophy*, Chicago and London, 1972, *What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies*, Chicago, 1988; Thomas L. Pangle (trans.), *The Laws of Plato*, Chicago and London, 1980.

CHAPTER THREE

The Question of Self-Knowledge: Know Thyself

Clearly, Socrates' crucial target is those whom people called 'the wise'. The sophists claimed that under their supervision, young men would become better and more successful by learning virtues or human excellences from their teaching. The possession of such knowledge of human excellences is believed to enable its possessor to achieve whatever he desires in his life.¹ The sophists are convinced of their own art, *techne*, that it is the most important of all regarding human excellences. But, which one of them is actually the desirable virtue with regard to the most happiest life of man, whether it be the art of persuasion of Gorgias, or Protagoras' political art, or Hippias' all-round skills, or Euthydemus' art of disputation? And if it is really a kind of knowledge and also teachable, why 'our best and wisest citizens are unable to impart this excellence of theirs to others'.²

¹ See Plato, *Laws*, (686e-687c). That is to say, it is political power. In particular, the new political values in the context of Athenian democracy which have been set forth by Gorgias, Protagoras, Euthydemus emphasise rhetoric rather than the art of generalship as once believed to be the highest quality in Homeric society. To a certain extent, Socrates himself seems to be endorsing the changing characteristics of the values when he appropriated the sixth century Hesiod's myth of the races that the heroic race (of the fifth century) is wise and clever orators and dialectician, being 'able to ask question'. Therefore, the heroic race 'proves to be a race of orators and sophists'. Cf. Plato, *Cratylus*, (398d).

² Plato, *Protagoras*, (319e-320a). Here, Socrates refers to Pericles' unsuccessful training of his young son. Also, at the *Laches* 179c-d, Lysimachus and Melesias are highly concerned with their son's education. Though their fathers are renowned for their noble deeds, but they do not know how and what to educate their own children. See the *Meno*, (93c-94e).

Against this, Socrates asks whether virtue is really teachable.³ Possibly, virtue is no knowledge and not teachable. Furthermore, it could have been what the poets took for granted that virtue is a quality inherent in human nature; but it is not human nature in general. Virtue is inherited through a lineage of one's family like physical characteristics. If one follows the way the poets understood the nature of man, he must believe that '(a) king's son will probably be a king, a good man's good, a handsome man's handsome and so forth; the offspring of each class will be of the same class'.⁴ But those who are familiar with Homer cannot overlook a fallacy of this poetic stance. In the case of Hector and his son Astyanax, a king's son does not become a king. However, there was also a case that a king's son becomes a king. The poets' idea of human nature is fallible. It can only be contingent on chance, *tuche*. As regards Socrates' response to this idea of inherent virtue of man, at the *Republic* 502a-b, arguing for the possibility of the philosopher-king, he asks:

'Will anyone contend that there is no chance, *tuchoien*, that the offspring of kings and rulers should be born with the philosophic nature?'⁵

From this, it can be said that Socrates shares a similar view with that of the poets, since he seems to argue that the offspring of kings or rulers should have possessed the quality or virtue which enabled its ancestors to be what they were. Moreover, the philosophic quality is said to be endowed by nature. However, following a

³ Plato, *Protagoras*, (319b-320b); *Meno*, (70a).

⁴ This is what Socrates claims to be a poetic theory of the correctness of names which belongs to Homer. Plato, *Cratylus*, (393c-394a).

⁵ Plato, the *Republic*, (502a).

possibility of a birth of philosophic-kingly nature, Socrates then puts further:

'And can anyone prove that if so born they must necessarily be corrupted? The difficulty of their salvation we too concede; but that in all the course of time not one of all could be saved, will anyone maintain that?'⁶

Apparently, this passage implies the emphasis of the influence of nurture over the nature of man. Good nature can be corrupted by bad nurture.⁷ Human nature alone is not self-sufficient. It needs a good and suitable care to develop itself towards perfection. On the one hand, Socrates leaves the matter to nature, *phusis*, and luck or chance, *tuche*, for a man to be endowed with virtue. On the other, he seems also to call for a right nurture or education, *paideia*. It is not a work of Nature but human design. This design can be largely implemented through laws and convention, *nomos*. In the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger states that there are three principal forces which control human affairs, namely, chances and accidents of all kinds, *tuchai de kai symphorai*, God and art, *techne*. The point in concern for the Athenian Stranger is that like the art of the pilot, the physician, or the general, human life would be better with the art of life co-operating with the other two factors.⁸ Hence, with regard to the manner of his search for virtue, Socrates' position is neither sophistic nor poetic. It seems to be an in-between position. As it has been observed by Barrie A. Wilson that with regard to the intellectual battle of the time, Socrates' position is quite perplexing whether he is taking 'a stand...between the new humanism (expressed in the

⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (502a-b).

⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (490d, 491e-492a, 500d); *Laws*, (747d).

⁸ Plato, *Laws*, (709a-c).

thinking of atomists, Protagoras, and the new art and medicine) versus the old Olympian religion with its rites and rituals,' or 'he is striking out in a different direction, sure to anger both sides in this debate'.⁹

I

The ambiguity of his position is illuminated in the *Meno*. Particularly concerning the problem of teachability of virtue, the discussion in the dialogue results in an ambiguous character. At the first stage, Socrates proposed what Pindar and other poets said about virtue and other things which implied that virtue cannot be learnt or sought but only recalled by nature.¹⁰ Also what Socrates arrived at in the first half of the dialogue is his proof to Meno that the learning of the truth of all things is really a matter of recollection, *anamnesis*.¹¹ Anyhow, concerning virtue itself, it has been proved to be wisdom, *phronesis*, if it is really good, *agathoi*. But if virtue is wisdom, then, it must be knowledge, *episteme*, since there is nothing good that has not been embraced by knowledge.¹² It is at this second stage that Socrates transposed the nature of virtue to the sophist's position.

If virtue is knowledge, then, 'good men cannot be good

⁹ Wilson, *Hermeneutical Studies: Dilthey, Sophocles and Plato*, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

¹⁰ Plato, *Meno*, (81d).

¹¹ Plato, *Meno*, 82a-86b).

¹² Plato, *Meno*, (89a, 87d).

by nature'.¹³ To be good, a man must be educated. Therefore, what is inferred at this stage contradicts the earlier result. Virtue is now proved to be knowledge and therefore teachable.¹⁴ But this hypothesis could not go further. It is stuck when it seems that there never exist such teachers of virtue.¹⁵ If it cannot be taught, then, it is not to be regarded as knowledge.¹⁶ Then the position of the argument reverts to what Socrates has taken before, that is, that of soothsayers and prophets and all of the poetic stance.¹⁷

If 'virtue is found to be neither natural nor taught,' and it seems that no one can explain how one can get virtue, then, Socrates concludes that it must be 'imparted to us by a divine dispensation without understanding in those who receive it,' as the Spartans rightly praised a good man by calling him a divine person.¹⁸ The problem still remains. The contradiction exists though with regard to the earlier premiss that virtue is good and the good is always embraced by knowledge. Unless virtue by divine dispensation is not good, the contradiction still remains. But virtue cannot be virtue if it is not good. Then what really is virtue? Hence it is necessary to return to the fundamental problem before asking in what way virtue comes to mankind, namely, the quest for the meaning of virtue. In this respect, the argument has come full circle as it happens in most of the dialogues.

The virtue that Socrates intends to investigate is the

¹³ Plato, *Meno*, (89b).

¹⁴ Plato, *Meno*, (89c).

¹⁵ Plato, *Meno*, (89e-94d).

¹⁶ Plato, *Meno*, (99a).

¹⁷ Plato, *Meno*, (99d).

¹⁸ Plato, *Meno*, (99e, 99d).

virtue of man *qua* man regardless of sex, age and social status. It seems that Socrates attempts to search for the virtue that goes beyond its context, whether it be Homeric or of Socrates' time.¹⁹ After listening to Meno's enumeration of the virtue of a man, a woman, a young and an elderly, Socrates said:

'Well now, there is this that I want you to tell me, Meno: what do you call the quality by which they do not differ, but are all alike?...Is it only in the case of virtue, do you think Meno, that one can say there is one kind belonging to a man, another to a woman, and so on with the rest, or is it just the same, too, in the case of health and size and strength? Do you consider that there is one health...Or, wherever we find health, is it of the same character universally, in a man or in anyone else?'²⁰

Following this in the *Meno*, temperance and justice are supposedly presented as virtues necessary to anyone's success in managing anything.²¹ To be sure, after Socrates' examination, it appears to Meno that other virtues such as courage, wisdom etc. are indispensable as well.²² Each of them is just a part of virtue. What Socrates wants is to search for virtue that 'runs through them all' since he is looking for virtue *qua* virtue of man *qua* man. It is proved to be quite an enigmatic task. Each virtue can sometimes complement and sometimes conflict with

¹⁹ Nussbaum suggests that Plato searches for goodness without fragility through *techne*. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-233.

²⁰ Plato, *Meno*, (72c, 72d).

²¹ Plato, *Meno*, (73a-c).

²² Plato, *Meno*, (73d-e).

another.²³ Moreover, it contradicts itself as the meaning of each virtue is differently interpreted by different people. It cannot even be flawlessly defined by any single interpretation.

For example, with regard to the search for the meaning of *sophrosyne*, whether it is natural or taught, both Charmides, a young man who is believed to have a good nature, and Critias, a man of experience, could not answer Socrates without ambiguity what *sophrosyne* is. From the discussion in the *Charmides*, *sophrosyne* might have been understood to be a kind of quietness ; but cleverness is a quickness of the soul not a quietness. Since quiet life will not be more temperate than the unquiet, therefore, *sophrosyne*, cannot be quietness , because quietness is good and not good. But as a virtue, *sophrosyne* has to be always good. Then *sophrosyne* might be modesty. But according to the great poet, Homer, modesty is not good for a needy man. This statement has been quoted by Socrates again in his discussion on courage in the *Laches*, 201a-b.

Therefore, *sophrosyne* cannot be modesty since it effects sometimes a good result and sometimes bad. It has been generally understood that doing our own business is temperance. But in a well-ordered state, a person should not weave and scour his own coat, and make his own shoes, and his own flask and scraper, and so on. Then it cannot be *sophrosyne*. A good citizen of Athens must attend the assembly and care for public affairs. However, one might argue that the meaning of *sophrosyne* must be understood in the sense that only doing good and honourable things of one's own business is to be taken into account. But the good is found to be too loose a terminology. A temperate man can be ignorant of his *sophrosyne*. He cannot be sure

²³ Cf. Chapter Twelve, the task of the statesman or the philosopher-king is to weave together and harmonise these virtues.

of the result of his action whether it is good or bad to himself and others. His work might be good in its nature. But its consequence is uncertain. Though his intention might be good. Then a man can be temperate or wise but does not know himself. Hence, self-knowledge has to be the essence of *sophrosyne*. Accordingly, *sophrosyne* should be 'Know thyself'. If so, it must be a kind of knowledge, *episteme*. It differs from other knowledge in that its concerned object is itself. *Sophrosyne* alone is an *episteme* of other and *episteme* of itself. Given its existence, the question is 'what good can this knowledge do to us?' In the end, the argument has been led round a circle with regard to the problem of the good.

In the *Laches*, Socrates said that the art of fighting is generally supposed to be courage.²⁴ Since Homer, it has been actually regarded as one of the virtues. But people like Laches and Nicias who are the generals are themselves at a loss to give Socrates the meaning of courage. What Socrates wants to know about courage is not just what has been exercised in the battle field. He needs to arrive at a general understanding of courage which embraces all kinds of business i.e. politics, disease, poverty etc. Such courage is supposed to be not only something against pain or fear, but also mighty to contend against desires and pleasures.²⁵ Accordingly, it is sensible to say that courage is a sort of endurance of the soul. However, not every kind of endurance is courage, since as a virtue, courage must be a very notable quality. Endurance of the soul can be either wise or foolish. The foolish one is evil and hurtful. Only the wise one is good and noble. Hence courage must be wise endurance of the soul. But what is the wise endurance? The person who is deemed to have such wise endurance should be he who knows

²⁴ Plato, *Laches*, (190d).

²⁵ Plato, *Laches*, (191d).

how to be safe and profitable in his activities i.e. spending money in a way that he will acquire more in the end. Since one who has knowledge or skill of anything in which he is engaging is not so courageous as the other who lacks it. But this kind of endurance can yield an undesirable consequence ; it might be a foolish endurance.

To continue the discussion, Socrates lets courage be defined as wise endurance. If so, courage must be a kind of wisdom, *sophia*. Should it be a kind of wisdom it could have been the knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything. The doctor knows what is to be dreaded in diseases. But no one calls him by that a brave man. So this definition must be further explained. It is not only to tell what is healthy and what is diseased but to tell whether health itself is to be dreaded by anyone rather than sickness, and in some case, to decide whether some sick men should never arise from their beds whilst some others are better to live. Precisely, courage is the knowledge of what is to be dreaded and what is to be dared. However, this knowledge seems to belong to some god rather than human beings.

Return to the definition of courage as the knowledge of what is to be dreaded and what is to be dared. It can be argued that wild beasts and other animals can be included under the title of courage if they possess such knowledge as well. But the fearless and thoughtless and the courageous are not the same thing. Following this, courage must also be the prudent acts. Also, it can be inferred from above that courage is wisdom, temperance, justice etc. And what is to be dreaded must be future evils, and what to be dared must be future goods. This knowledge must have comprehension of the same things, whether or not it is in future, past or present. The argument is returned to the beginning again as it arrives at the meaning that courage is wisdom, temperance, justice

etc. which are virtue as a whole. And courage is eventually a kind of knowledge concerning all goods and evils at every stage.

II

Similarly, with regard to the discussion on the problem of traditional virtues, all 'those who know' whom Socrates conversed with have been confused by Socratic investigation. Mostly, the arguments put forward have gone round in a circle, always defeated by self-contradiction, and ended up with same problem they started with, namely the ontological problem of the good and the virtue. Also, apart from the traditional virtues such as courage, wisdom, justice, temperance, piety, new kinds of virtue which the sophists purported have been investigated. The new virtue is publicly pronounced to be the kind of skills or art which can be taught. Generally speaking, these new virtues can be encapsulated under the same title of the art of rhetoric and politics. Gorgias and Protagoras are the protagonists of this new theory. Nevertheless, it is evident that the same problem is still unanswerable.

In the *Gorgias*, Gorgias claims that his art of rhetoric dealt with the greatest of human affairs and the best.²⁶ Since anyone who possesses this ability can make other people do anything for him.²⁷ In other words, his art renders its possessor the power of governing mankind.²⁸ Gorgias said that those who learn his art will

²⁶ Plato, *Gorgias*, (451d).

²⁷ Plato, *Gorgias*, (452e).

²⁸ Plato, *Meno*, (73c).

become like himself, that is, the rhetorician. If the art of rhetoric is virtue, it must be good and just. Those who possess the good and the just must be good and just himself.²⁹ But as it happened to other arts, there are those who wrongly used the art of rhetoric. Then Gorgias is made to contradict himself. First, since he stated that he was not responsible for his students' wrong use of the art. At the same time, he argued that his art dealt with the greatest good and he can make his students become good and just. Secondly, the art of rhetoric cannot be virtue for man since it is incoherent for a child or a slave to possess the power of ruling. Socrates refutes Gorgias and his supporters' view of the good and proves that the art of rhetoric like politics is base and is not an art but just a habit of producing a kind of gratification and pleasure.³⁰

Protagoras' theory is that virtue is teachable and the virtue he can impart is the art of politics. According to his theory, man is endowed by nature with political virtue, *politikes aretes*, which is comprised of particular parts such as justice, courage, temperance, and piety. This civic virtue enables man to 'band themselves together and secure their lives by founding cities'.³¹ Although men believed that everybody partook of the virtue, he did not regard it as natural or spontaneous, 'but as something taught and acquired after careful preparation by those who acquire it'.³² He supports his argument by stating the fact that the Athenians did punish or sanction the wrong-

²⁹ Plato, *Gorgias*, (460a-b).

³⁰ Plato, *Gorgias*, (462c-d, 463d). From 463d onwards, Socrates undertakes to refute Gorgias' hedonistic view of the good and proves that to suffer wrong is better than to do wrong.

³¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, (322b).

³² Plato, *Protagoras*, (324c).

doers not for the sake of their crimes but for the prevention of any wrong-doing in the future. It is because the Athenians shared the view that virtue is procured and taught. Protagoras points to the fact of the process of socialisation of the society from early childhood till the last day of one's life. Punishment for any transgression beyond the boundaries of laws is a correction, *euthunai*, for man. He argued that society will do otherwise if it has no belief in the teachability of virtue. And the body of the *polis* itself or everyone in the society is a teacher of virtue to the extent of his powers since every man is endowed with such nature. Furthermore, the reason why many sons of good fathers turned out so meanly lies in the fact that society did not make enough zealous and ungrudging effort to instruct each other. If the society does so well, the good will not be more likely than the bad to have sons who are good. Everyone will all be good. However, those who have been regarded as the most unjust person in the society will be more just than those who have never been reared or educated among human laws and society. For this reason, the society needs someone who excels others in showing the way to virtue to assist people to become good. Socrates said he is convinced by Protagoras' speech that there is human treatment by which the good is made good.

However, he poses the same question which he does in other dialogues that whether Protagoras deemed that virtue is a single thing and the qualities such as justice, temperance and so on were parts of it. Protagoras answered that those qualities are like the parts of the whole face not the parts of gold. And it is possible that some partake of justice but not of wisdom which means that someone could be brave but unjust and some just but unwise. Socrates uses the same reasoning in making knowledge indispensable to all good qualities i.e. temperance, wisdom. What is good must be embraced by what is opposite to folly or ignorance, namely, knowledge. Meanwhile,

Protagoras argued that each quality differs from one another. The discussion has been led to the point that wisdom, justice, temperance, and holiness are one thing. If a person partakes of one quality of virtue, it means that he has partaken of virtue as a whole. Possessing such civic virtue in perfection by nature, a man needs no education. Protagoras could not agree to this because it would damage his theory that man has some part of virtue which can be complemented by his teaching. But in denying the unity of virtue, Protagoras commits altogether to the negation of the idea that virtue is knowledge, which in fact makes virtue unteachable. In silence, he admitted the fallacy of his argument in the end of the dialogue. Strangely, resulting from Socrates' cross-examination, his position and that of Protagoras interchanges in the end of the dialogue.

Even when Socrates himself has to meticulously discuss the problem of justice in the *Republic*, it is well known that the dialogue ends itself at the ambiguous position in which Socrates' defence of his definition of justice is too problematic to render any straightforward conclusion. Also, the discussion on the problem of the good itself as being conversed in the *Philebus* returns to its starting point after the lengthy discussion.³³

In sum, it can be argued that in most of the discussions in the dialogues Socrates makes things ambiguous.³⁴ The argument always comes full circle.³⁵

³³ Plato, *Philebus*, (66d-e).

³⁴ Such dialogues are the *Charmides*, the *Laches*, the *Lysis*, the *Euthyphro*, the *Lesser Hippias*, the *Major Hippias*, the *Ion*, the *Gorgias*, the *Protagoras*, the *Meno*, the *Cratylus*, the *Republic*, the *Parmenides*.

³⁵ Apart from what have been stated, one can find this situation in most of the dialogues, for instance, see the *Laws*, (688b); *Lysis*, (213c); *Philebus*, (19a).

Socrates cross-examines and defeats his respondents by 'making weaker arguments appear to be stronger'.³⁶ Also his position is obscure. It seems to incessantly oscillate between the polarity of the arguments. Mainly, it is between the sophists and the poets. In other words, it moves between the realm of man and the realm of the gods. Virtually, he attacks both positions which belong to those whom people mostly and generally regarded as 'those who know'.

II

Socrates defeats and debunks 'those who know'. His force of interrogation, *elenchus*, brings them to an impasse. The dialogues portray different kinds of characters of man with regard to their reactions to what they have been brought into.³⁷ Among other things, there is one thing in common in their experience. The effect of Socratic *elenchus* or *Socratic docta ignorantia* in disguise has been described as the flat torpedo sea-fish or the Daedalus which bewitches and benumbs anyone who experiences it.³⁸

To be sure, it is probable that someone might argue

³⁶ Plato, *Apology*, (18b-c).

³⁷ The dramatic element of the dialogues is essential in which each character such as Charmides, Critias, Thrasymachus, Anytus, Crito, Meno, Cephalus, Polemarchus, Phaedrus, Adeimantus, Glaucon etc. has his personality and has different kinds of response to Socratic *elenchus*. See also Michael C. Stokes, *Plato's Socratic Conversations: Drama and Dialectic in Three Dialogues*, London, 1986, 'Introduction: Platonic questions', pp. 1-35.

³⁸ Plato, *Meno*, (80a); *Euthyphro*, (11d).

for a close affinity of Socrates and Euthydemus. However, in spite of its resemblance to Euthydemus' art of refutation, *eristike*, which conveys the meaning 'contest, fond of wrangling or arguing', Socratic *elenchus* essentially differs from it. One of the functions of the *Euthydemus*, is to clarify this matter. The reader cannot help telling himself that what he experiences from the exhibition of Euthydemus' art of refutation is immensely reminiscent of Socratic *elenchus*. Plato lets the reader know Euthydemus' intention in practising his art.³⁹ It is aimed at winning the argument and displaying its power. Also, the reader has been openly and generally informed that Socratic *elenchus* originated in his ignorance and his search for wisdom. Perhaps, it is Socratic irony. But we know that the sophists aim at gaining fame and glory to which Socrates is not attracted. Therefore, Socrates must aim at something different from that of the sophists which indeed distinguishes Socratic *elenchus* from the sophist's *eristic*. *Eristic* is just a little game 'because if one learned many such things or even all of them, one would be no nearer knowing what the things really are, but would be able to play with people because of the different sense of the words, tripping them up and turning them upside down, just as someone pulls a stool away when someone else is going to sit down, and then people roar with joy when they see him lying on his back'.⁴⁰ Therefore, Socrates raises the question that what good the art of refutation brings about:

'Find it, my good fellow, No, we were in a most ridiculous state; like children who run after crested larks, we kept on believing each moment we were just going to catch this or that one of the knowledges, while they as

³⁹ Plato has Dionysodorus inform Socrates of what Euthydemus' intent is. See Plato, *Euthydemus*, (275d-276e).

⁴⁰ Plato, *Euthydemus*, (278b-c).

often slipped from our grasps. What need to tell you the story at length? When we reached the kingly art, and were examining it to see if we had here what provides and produces happiness, at this point we were involved in a labyrinth: when we supposed we had arrived at the end, we twisted about again and found ourselves practically at the beginning of our search, and just as sorely in want as when we first started on it.⁴¹

In appearance, it is difficult to differentiate Socratic *elenchus* from Euthydemus's *eristic*. The difference lies in the intention of the master of the art. And the possession of the knowledge of how to use the art and what good the art can make is the decisive factor in distinguishing Socrates from Euthydemus. As one would never 'get advantage from all other knowledge, whether of money-making or medicine or any other that knows how to make things, without knowing how to use the thing made'.⁴² Similarly, the art of refutation can be made useful only when its practitioner knows how to use it. How did Socrates use his *elenchus*?

Socratic ignorance reduces his audience to perplexity and also makes them similar to itself, that is, being ignorant.⁴³ Socratic *elenchus* compels them to acknowledge the inadequacy of their knowledge. They are forced to submit to something which is beyond their putative

⁴¹ Plato, *Euthydemus*, (291b-c). See also the *Republic*, (453d): 'What a grand thing, Glaucon,' said Socrates, 'is the power of the art of contradiction!...many appear to me to fall into it even against their wills, and to suppose that they are not wrangling but arguing, owing to their inability to apply the proper divisions and distinctions to the subject under consideration...They pursue purely verbal oppositions, practising *eristic*, not dialectic on one another.'

⁴² Plato, *Euthydemus*, (289b).

⁴³ Plato, *Meno*, (80a).

knowledge. What is more important is that it seriously affects their self-understanding or self-interpretation. Their previous self-images are proved to be fictitious. Apart from having been perplexed about the truth of the things concerned, they become puzzled about the being of their own selves when they just found out that they happen to be not what they understood themselves to be, that is, not being wise but ignorant. This effect is shame, *aischune*. It is a feeling which one has when one thinks of himself as being deteriorated. To feel ashamed is to be or to do what one would not like to be or to do. If everyone desires good as it has been generally stipulated in the dialogues.⁴⁴ Then one feels ashamed when one does or becomes what is opposite to what he regarded as good.

Regarding the meaning of shame, in one of the scenes in the *Phaedrus*, Socrates has to wrap up his head while he renders a speech in praise of a non-lover to Phaedrus since it will be shameful or embarrassing, *aischune*, for him for two reasons: first, to give such a blasphemous speech that denigrated the divine power of love of Aphrodite and Eros; second, to render a more beautiful, wiser, and better speech than he is normally capable to do.⁴⁵ He is ashamed to be what he himself is not. He satirised those who are not what themselves really are but think they are.

⁴⁴ Plato, *Euthydemus*, (278e): 'Do all we human beings wish to prosper? Or is this question one of the absurdities I was afraid of just now? For I suppose it is stupid merely to ask such things, since every man must wish to prosper.' See also Plato, *Protagoras*, (358b); *Philebus*, (20d), *Meno*, (77c), *Gorgias*, (468).

⁴⁵ Plato, *Phaedrus*, 237a. However, Socrates' irony has to be taken into consideration in order to interpret this dramatic situation. Claiming his ignorance as usual (235d), Socrates ironically replies to Phaedrus that the speech he is to give is not his own but it belongs to someone else whom he forgot because of his stupidity. Therefore, if the speech happens to be better or blasphemous, Socrates is not to be praised or blamed. As it is well known of his irony that he never intends to be either sacrilegious or wise.

Socratic *elenchus* is intended to induce shame. With regard to this, Robert E. Cushman, in the end of his book, has summarily emphasised the signification of *elenchus* in Socratic method by evoking the original meaning of the term:

'The primary meaning of the verb *elegcho* seems to have been "put to shame". In Plato's usage the original meaning is retained, but discourse, or cross-questioning, becomes the instrument for inducing shame. If the *elenchos* "confutes," it does so by convicting of error through putting respondents to shame--shame over contradiction among their own confessed opinions. We have endeavoured to show that the genius of dialectic lies in its power, first, to win acknowledgment of self-contradiction, then to procure consent to the "leading," not merely of the argument, but to deep-lying and obscured convictions. Thus, in the case of Polus and Gorgias, Socrates' fundamental aim was to arouse from slumber true opinions which each feigned to disavow but really believed (*Gorgias*, 474b, 482b-c). His purpose was to exhume truth buried under rationalisation so that men would acknowledge it, if for no other reason than "for very shame" (*Republic*, 501e; *Gorgias*, 508b). Because the *elenchos* has the power, of revealing a man's disagreement with himself....'⁴⁶

A man's disagreement with himself is possible if only the other self within him emerges. In the situation, a man feels frustrated since he is like being in-between two selves. The self that he used to be unconsciously proud of has crumbled whilst the other which newly emerges is

⁴⁶ Robert S. Cushman, *Therapeia: Plato's Conception of Philosophy*, Westport, 1958, pp. 308-309. Consider also the *Laws*, 647a: 'And often we fear reputation, when we think we shall gain a bad repute for doing or saying something base; and this fear we (like everybody else), I imagine, call shame.'

shamefully incapable, *aischros*, *kakos*. Nobody can relate the experience under Socratic influence better than Alcibiades in his praise of Socrates in the encomium of love in the *Symposium*. As it is generally understood that Alcibiades was highly renowned not only for his tremendous brilliance but also his physical beauty. The Athenians considered nobody to have a better and more promising future than he. Alcibiades was the most remarkable young man in terms of qualities or virtues. However, under the spell of Socrates, he confesses:

'For when I hear him I am worse than any wild fanatic; I find my heart leaping and my tears gushing for that the sound of his speech, and I see great numbers of other people having the same experience....the influence of our Marsyas here has often thrown me into such a state that I thought my life not worth living that you can call untrue. Even now I am still conscious that if I consented to lend him my ear, I could not resist him, but would have the same feeling again. For he compels me to admit that, sorely deficient as I am, I neglect myself while I attend to the affairs of Athens. ..And there is one experience I have in presence of this man alone, such as nobody would expect in me,---to be made to feel ashamed, *aischunesthai*, by anyone; he alone can make me feel it.'⁴⁷

With regard to shame and its effect of self-contradiction, Cushman comments that Socratic elenchus makes Alcibiades confess his 'profound "shame" and confronts him with the question "whether he could continue in his divided existence'.⁴⁸ Socrates has been compared to a mythical Marsyas, a guardian deity who is also

⁴⁷ Plato, the *Symposium*, (215e-216c). Cf. Cicero, *Disputations*, (III. xxxii.77 - xxxiii.79). See also David Grene, *Greek Political Theory*, op. cit., pp. 103-104.

⁴⁸ Cushman, op. cit., p. 194.

musical. In the same manner that his daemonic voice, his personal guardian deity, forbids him to do or to think in a certain way, Socrates drew his interlocutors back from the slumber of their illiberal self-understanding of the good. They could no longer be assured of what they thought to be virtuous and good.

With his philosophical discourse as a Marsyasic musical gift, he casts spell on them. With his interrogation, Socrates brings the respondents with him through the journey of thought. Starting with the state of ignorance of Socrates and the state of knowing of his respondents, the dialectic discussion comes round a circle, arriving at the point of beginning. But what is called the point of beginning is not the same point where they started. It is not a return. It is an arrival. They arrive at the state of ignorance.⁴⁹ Those who used to think they knew something realise that they do not know or could not take for granted their knowledge. It is a point of beginning of another journey of thought which the travellers would depart again with a different kind of presupposition and also a different kind of question. The emergence of a new presupposition is intertwined with the emergence of a new question.

III

As stated above, Socratic *elenchus* is not aimed at merely refuting his respondents. It is not the art of

⁴⁹ Julia Annas states in her introduction of the *Republic* that the Socrates interrogation shakes one's complacency and leaves a void which is all too plausibly filled by scepticism. See Julia Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic*, Oxford, 1985, p. 21.

disputation like Euthydemus' *eristic* which is aimed at victory rather than truth. Socratic *elenchus* is dialectic method. It is conducted in regard to the search for the nature of the things in question. It is understood that Socrates regards the dialectician as 'a man who can take account of the essential nature of each thing'.⁵⁰ Dialectic is 'asking and answering questions with the highest degree of understanding' which by its procedure 'proceeds by the destruction of assumptions to the very first principles'.⁵¹ Dialectic corresponds to the method of investigation that Plato states in the *Seventh Epistle* that the nature of the first principle can be acquired by the way of up and down asking and questioning on the subject.⁵² Therefore, in his investigation, one of Socrates' intentions is to evoke a return to the examination of the account of the essential nature of things, 'to give great care and great attention to the beginning of any undertaking, to see whether one's foundation is right or not'.⁵³

Since the first principle of a thing renders itself a firm base.⁵⁴ That is why prior to the question of the teachability of virtue, the nature of virtue or its being itself has to be investigated.⁵⁵ The virtue in concern is human excellence. Furthermore, it is not subject to any particular person. It is the virtue of man *qua* man.

This is the reason why he has been regarded as the first who directs the philosophical examination towards the

⁵⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (534b).

⁵¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (534d, 533c).

⁵² Plato, *Seventh Epistle*, (343d-344a)

⁵³ Plato, *Cratylus*, (436d-e).

⁵⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (511b).

⁵⁵ Plato, *Meno*, (100b); *Protagoras*, (361d).

problem of human life. According to Socratic dialectic method, the notion of the good cannot be separated from the notion of the self. When the notion of the good has been challenged, it also affects the notion of the self to which it has emerged from and pertained. It is inevitable that the question of the good is dialectically led to the question of the self. As regards the effect of the dialectic of Socratic investigation, Edward G. Ballard comments that 'Socrates suggested that "one will come to know himself by investigating the relations among notions such as knowledge, virtue, pleasure, the good" '.⁵⁶ To this point, Helen North as well agreed that with regard to the problem of the origin of virtue is involved in at least two aspects of this debate: first, 'whether it comes from nature or education,' which inevitably links itself to 'the equally fundamental question of what human nature is really like when it is revealed by suffering or ill treatment'.⁵⁷

It can be inferred that Socratic *elenchus* in the form of dialectic investigation effects shame to his respondents in order to lead them to self-examination. In other words, Socrates' search for the knowledge of the good necessarily presupposes the search for self-knowledge. The search for self-knowledge emerges only from the emerging uncertainty of the notion of one's self.⁵⁸ The previous self which claimed the knowledge of the good is succeeded by the self which confesses its ignorance.⁵⁹ From this, a new

⁵⁶ Edward G. Ballard, *Socratic Ignorance: An Essay on Platonic Self-knowledge*, The Hague, 1965, p. 48.

⁵⁷ North, *Sophrosyne*, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.

⁵⁸ A further discussion of this point can be found in Chapter Ten.

⁵⁹ Derek Parfit has argued for the fallibility or self-defeating of the Self-interest Theory. However, this thesis argues that the human self exists in its own right. The care of the self is quite essential. But the nature of the self is found in metaxy. Only the dialectic self which is derived from the logic of metaxy can render a prudent

presupposition now arises with the search not yet for the good but first for self-knowledge. In this way, other kinds of knowledge must come after self-knowledge. Since that whether those other knowledges are proved to be wholesome or not depends on the knowledge of the self to which they pertain. Socrates in the *Phaedrus* expresses his overriding concern for the understanding of self-knowledge. When asked whether he believed in the myth of Boreas and Oreithyia, he replies that although he heard also of the rational or scientific explanation of the incident, he has no leisure for that kind of thing. He states that reason that since 'I am not yet able, as the Delphic inscription has it, to know myself; so it seems to me ridiculous, when I do not yet know that, to investigate irrelevant things'.⁶⁰

As we know, what can be drawn from Socrates' discussion is that he aimed at a general concept of virtue rather than a virtue. Of course, this presupposes a general concept of man. In the discussion on the problem of the abstract idea of the one and the particular many with Parmenides in the dialogue of his namesake, Socrates remarked that he would be amazed 'if anyone could show in the abstract ideas, which are intellectual conceptions, this same multifarious and perplexing entanglement which you described in visible objects'.⁶¹ Of course, as regards the Eleatic doctrine, Parmenides and Zeno praised

care of the self. I argue that as regards Parfit's thesis, in order to arrive at its so-called non-religious ethics, one has to start from or take his momentarily existential self as a point of departure. In other words, he has to start from his self-love, desires, or the care of his self-interest. As it can be put in Platonic statement at the *Republic*, 511b: 'Taking one's right opinion as a springboard in search for the good'. See Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons*, Oxford, 1984.

⁶⁰ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (229b-230a).

⁶¹ Plato, *Parmenides*, (129a-130a).

Socrates for his argument in quest of such abstract ideas. Parmenides asked Socrates again whether he really believed that there were such things. Socrates replied that 'I have been very much troubled, Parmenides, to decide whether there are ideas of such things, or not'.⁶² It seems that Socrates was in pursuit of such conception although he was yet indecisive whether there existed such abstract ideas of man or other things. Also, Socrates had not yet abandoned Heraclitus' theory of motion and not-being, that is, everything is in flux. In essence, he discussed the strength and weakness of both theories of Parmenides and Heraclitus.⁶³

The debate between these two positions is inconclusive. The *Cratylus* conceivably represents the debate between Parmenidean and Heraclitean accounts of the origin of names. The discussion comes a full circle as usual. But it seems that Socrates left to *Cratylus* and Hermogenes, and perhaps the reader, to continue further discussion on their own and to decide themselves whether either theory was true.⁶⁴ Similarly, the *Parmenides* inconclusively ends itself in the condition that 'if the one is not, nothing is' and 'whether the one is or is not, the one and the others in relation to themselves and to each other all in every way are and are not and appear and do not appear'.⁶⁵ However, we know that Socrates said

⁶² Plato, *Parmenides*, (130b-c).

⁶³ Plato, *Cratylus*. Hermogenes seems to represent Heraclitean view whilst *Cratylus* takes a Parmenidean position.

⁶⁴ At the *Cratylus*, 440c-d, Socrates concludes the discussion that with regard to Heraclitean position: 'Perhaps, *Cratylus*, this theory is true, but perhaps is not. Therefore you must consider courageously and thoroughly and not accept anything carelessly..'

⁶⁵ Plato, *Parmenides*, (166c).

that he often dreams that there are such absolute ideas.⁶⁶ The search for self-knowledge situates itself in such a bewildering state. It incites wonder which caused Theaetetus dizziness.⁶⁷ In the *Meno*, wonder, *thaumazein*, as the effect of the Socratic *elenchus* or the torpedo's shock reduces a person who experiences it 'to the perplexity of realising that he did not know, and had left a craving to know'.⁶⁸ It is the only beginning of philosophy, a sign of being a philosopher.⁶⁹

IV

The situation mentioned above is a starting point to which Socrates guides his audience. It is a right or true opinion, or the *doxa*, which is not inferior to knowledge. A right opinion as well as knowledge could guide a man to the good.⁷⁰ Although one is ignorant of what he is going to search for, it does not mean that if he does not know what he is searching he would not be able to recognise it if he has found it. Since he 'who does not know about any matters, whatever they be, may have true opinions, *aletheis doxai*, on such matters, about which he knows nothing?'.⁷¹ As the only alternative to knowledge, a right opinion emanates from what

⁶⁶ Plato, *Cratylus*, (439c).

⁶⁷ Plato, *Theaetetus*, (155c).

⁶⁸ Plato, *Meno*, (84c). Cf. Diotima's speech in the *Symposium*, 207d.

⁶⁹ Plato, *Theaetetus*, (155d).

⁷⁰ Plato, *Meno*, (98b).

⁷¹ Plato, *Meno*, (85c).

'the reason itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics, treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footholds, and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all...'⁷²

Socrates' mission is to go about the city to cross-examine people, especially those who know. In his mission, he makes others become like himself, namely, ignorant and wondering about their own self-knowledge. Then the embarkation on the search for self-knowledge results from Socratic encounter. Meno said to Socrates that his ignorance has made others become ignorant like himself. In making others like himself reminds one of what Socrates said to Meno at the end of the same dialogue that '...if through all this discussion our queries and statements have been correct, virtue, arete, is found to be neither natural, *phusei*, nor taught, *didakton*, but is imparted to us by a divine dispensation, *theia moira*, without understanding in those who receive it, unless there should be somebody among the statesman, *toioutos ton politikon andron*, capable of making a statesman of another'.⁷³ Also, consider further in the *Gorgias*, in his debate with Callicles on the meaning of justice and the true statesman, Socrates remarks that 'I think I am one of the few, not to say the only one in Athens who attempts the true art of statesmanship, and the only man of the present time who manages affairs of state, *alethos politike techne kai prattein ta politika monos ton nun*'.⁷⁴

⁷² Plato, *the Republic*, (511b); See also the *Meno*, 99c where Socrates said 'And if not by knowledge, as the only alternative it must have been by good opinion.'

⁷³ Plato, *Meno*, 99e.

⁷⁴ Plato, *Gorgias*, (521d).

Moreover, insofar as the above discussion is concerned, what emerges as the effect of Socratic *elenchus* is a right opinion. Again, Socrates at the end of the *Meno* informs the reader that 'the statesman perhaps concerns himself only with good opinion, *eudoxia de to loipon gignetai*,' since it is the only means which statesmen employ for their direction of states...⁷⁵ Apparently, it seems that the mission of Socrates is political. In doing so, Socrates practices the art of statesmanship, *politike techne*.

Hence, it can be concluded here that to make one feel ashamed of oneself and to perplex him about his own self in order to search out oneself is to practice the art of politics or statesmanship. This illuminates the statements often made elsewhere in the dialogues that politics is the affair which concerns itself mostly with the self or the soul.⁷⁶ From this, Socrates' mission is more comprehensible. It helps one understand his statement in the *Apology* in a meaningful way particularly when he says:

'For know that the god commands me to do this, and I believe that no greater good ever came to pass in the city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property more than for the perfection of your souls, *chrematon proteron mede outo sphodra os tes psuches*, or even so much; and I tell you that virtue, *arete*, does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all other good things to man, both to the individual and to the state,'

and, in the *Euthyphro*,

⁷⁵ Plato, *Meno*, (99c).

⁷⁶ Plato, *Gorgias*, (464b). In the *Statesman*, its argument confirms that the object in concern of the statesman is man. This is explained in Chapter Four. See also, the *Laws*, 650b.

'(f)or the Athenians, I fancy, are not much concerned, if they think a man is clever, provided he does not impart his clever notions to others; but when they think he makes others to be like himself, they are angry with him...'⁷⁷

No one is wiser than Socrates. He knows something which others do not bother to know, that is, that the unexamined life is not worth living.⁷⁸ That is the reason why he is a gadfly for Athens and her people. Also, from this, Alcibiades' regarding Socrates to be Marsyas comes to light. Marsyas is regarded as a guardian deity. Likewise, Socrates is a divine gift in a form of a gadfly to the city. Marsyas was musical because he was a musician. Likewise, Socrates is musical in regard to his philosophical discourse. Marsyas challenges Apollo to a contest in music. But Socrates challenges the slumber of the Athenian people. In conclusion, the search for self-knowledge is now understood as an aim of Socratic 'political' mission. Significantly, the findings of our discussion evolves itself into the following discussion incident to the study of the concept of man in the dialogues, namely, the examination of the knowledge of the statesman.

⁷⁷ Plato, *Apology*, (30a); *Euthyphro*, (3c).

⁷⁸ Plato, *Apology*, (38a).

CHAPTER FOUR

Man and Animals

The *Statesman* is concerned with the search for the nature of statesman, *politicus*. It is a sequel of the *Sophist* in which the search for the sophist has been launched. The Stranger¹ who undertook the leading role in conducting the discussion, as he did before in the *Sophist*, cross-examined the young Socrates, who, in this dialogue had his turn after Theaetetus to give answers. The Stranger carried on the investigation in a dialectic manner, namely, making division in two classes in equal proportion. After they had arrived at the art of statesmanship as a commanding art, they continued to discuss the kind of object the art of statesmanship would be concerned. To be sure, at this point, it is surprising that such a long discussion was needed in order to point out what the object of the statesman is.² It is evident that chief concern of the art of statesmanship could not have been anything else but man.

I

Actually, the Stranger was aware of this point.³ He knew *ab initio* that there were two ways to achieve what

¹ John Gunnell suggested that the Stranger represents Plato himself. John Gunnell, *Political Philosophy and Time: Plato and the Origins of Political Vision*, op. cit., p.160.

² This is the point where diaeresis begins. The diaeresis takes place in order to meticulously treat the art of statesmanship. See Harvey Ronald Scodel, *Diaeresis and Myth in Plato's Statesman*, Gottingen, 1987.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

their discussion was aimed at, namely the shorter or the longer ways.

The Stranger first directed the discussion in the longer way which 'is more in accord with what we said a while ago about the need of making the division as nearly in the middle as we can,' that is to say, the dialectic division.⁴ Although the audience can easily conceive what the final division was going to be since the statesman's chief concern must be man. However, the point of departure began with the most general and simple, but irrefutable, of all facts that 'of the whole class, some have life and others have no life.'⁵ Of course, the part of the living objects had been chosen as being related to the statesman's art. The Stranger went on dividing the living beings into the breeding and nurture of 'a single animal and the common care of creature in droves,' and let the young Socrates consider which group the statesman should supervise. Of course, the statesman had more resemblance to a man who tended a herd of cattle or a drove of horses.⁶ Then the stranger proposed to call the art of caring for the many living creatures 'the art of tending a herd or something like community management'.⁷ The young Socrates did not oppose this. The Stranger said he was very pleased with the young Socrates' consent and he also stated further that if the young man could preserve this impartial attitude towards names, he would turn out richer in wisdom when he was older.⁸ Furthermore, the Stranger further asked him whether he could see that the art of herding was twofold. Bearing in mind all the time that the subject in question was a human being, the young Socrates did not hesitate to

⁴ Plato, *Statesman*, (261b).

⁵ Plato, *Statesman*, (261b).

⁶ Plato, *Statesman*, (261d).

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ Plato, *Statesman*, (261e).

answer at that moment that 'one kind is the care of man, the other that of beasts'.⁹

Although the Stranger praised the young Socrates' willingness and courage in giving that answer, he pointed out that the young man had made a mistake in dividing things in the following way. The Stranger explained his method that since when a class is divided into its subdivisions, each subdivision must necessarily also be a portion of the total class of which it is declared a subdivision; but a portion is not necessarily a true subdivision of a class.¹⁰ That the class of man was a single small part of the many larger ones of the herds of living beings had been set off by the young Socrates against all the important sections which he had left out. The cause of error originated in the desperate hurry and the presupposition wrongly fixed only on man as the whole class against other living beings. As the Stranger said to the young Socrates 'you hurried the discussion along, because you saw that it was leading towards man...you removed a part and then thought that the remainder was one class because you were able to call them all by the same name of beasts.'¹¹ The Stranger also gave another example of a wrong division that most Greeks made. That is to say, instead of dividing the human race into male and female,

'they separated the Hellenic race from all the rest as one, and to all the other races, which are countless to one another, they give the single name barbarian, because of this single name, they think it is a single species.'¹²

⁹ Plato, *Statesman*, (262a).

¹⁰ Plato, *Statesman*, (263b).

¹¹ Plato, *Statesman*, (262b, 263c).

¹² Plato, *Statesman*, (262d).

In fact, the division of man into male and female is more accurate in the same way that numbers can be divided into odd and even numbers. Also, this method of division presupposes the Stranger's idea. To separate so soon the class of man from the other species of animals is rather anthropocentric¹³ since other animals capable of thought such as the crane or any other like creatures would give names in the same way as the young Socrates did:

'It might in its pride of self oppose crane to all other animals, and group the rest, men included, under one head, calling them by one name, which might very well be that of beasts.'¹⁴

Here, the young Socrates adapted his method of division with reference to names, since the Stranger had once warned him not to be too much restricted by the principle of names if he intended to attain the truth of the matter.

II

Thus the Stranger urged his interlocutor to adhere to the longer path of division because 'it is safer to proceed by cutting through the middle, and in that way one is more likely to find classes, this makes all the difference in the conduct of research.'¹⁵ The Stranger then continued by dividing of all animals into tame and wild.¹⁶ Of course, with men as the object in mind, he chose to start with the tame animals. Then the herds of tame animals then

¹³ Scodel argued that this discrimination reflects the egocentricity of the Greeks and perhaps of human beings themselves. See Scodel, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

¹⁴ Plato, *Statesman*, (263d).

¹⁵ Plato, *Statesman*, (262b).

¹⁶ Plato, *Statesman*, (263e).

were again divided into land-herding and aquatic-herding. Instead of the latter, the art of land-herding surely belongs to the art of statesmanship. Once again, it had been subdivided into the tending of flying and walking animals. The statesmanship must be sought in connection with walking animals. At this stage, the Stranger disclosed that there were two paths heading the same direction: the longer and the quicker. Then he allowed the young Socrates to choose whichever of the two he wanted, since they had nearly arrived at the final stage, whereas it had been difficult to go by the shorter way at the beginning or at the middle of the search as the young Socrates had attempted to do. The young Socrates said absurdly that he wanted to carry on using both ways. This point can be explained. He understood that the search needed a right way of division, whilst he himself was rather hasty and knew what the final answer must be. The Stranger replied that the divisions could be only be made one at a time. Then the longer way was taken up again this time as the first of two choices given to the young Socrates.¹⁷

The tame walking animals had been divided into the ones with horns and the hornless.¹⁸ With regard to man, the art of statesmanship must concern the tame hornless walking animals. Then the Stranger made a further division; the mixing and non-mixing breed.¹⁹ The mixing breed consisted of animals such as horses and asses. Certainly, it had to be the non-mixing breed that was under the care of the statesman. Up to this point, the conclusion of the discussion was that the statesman should

¹⁷ See Scodel's comments on this point, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-3.

¹⁸ Plato, *Statesman*, (265b).

¹⁹ Compare this to the argument concerning the theory of names in the *Cratylus*, 394a-b that the offspring of a species must be named after its parents.

care for the tame gregarious non-mixing breeding animals. Before reaching the proposed object, namely man, the final division was more peculiar than the previous ones. The Stranger asked for the authority on geometry in making this last division, since both his interlocutors, the young Socrates and Theaetetus, were students of geometry. This ultimate separation was intricately made in terms of geometrical construction. To be sure, the Stranger had in mind the division between the two-footed and the four-footed animals. Although he should have proposed right away as he did before, nevertheless, he created an intrigue in his division by resorting to geometrical knowledge. He said that it could be divided 'by the diameter...and again by the diameter of the square of the diameter.'²⁰ At first, the young Socrates could not understand what this technical division was about; then the Stranger asked him: 'Is the nature which our human race possesses related to walking in any other way than as the diameter which is the square root of two feet?'²¹ Indeed, man is a two-footed animal. And the nature of the remaining species is the diameter of the square of the side of the square root of two feet, which is the square root of four feet.

Why did the Stranger need to have recourse to the analogy of the square root of two and four feet in his dividing man from animals?²² The clue was in the next passage when the Stranger said that a famous joke had

²⁰ Plato, *Statesman*, (266a-b). This is the well-known enigmatic passage in the *Statesman*. It has been long argued

and remains controversial. See Malcolm Brown, 'Plato on doubling the Cube: *Politicus* 266AB, in *Plato, Time and Education: Essays in Honor of Robert S. Brumbaugh*, Brian P. Hendley (ed.), New York and London, 1989, pp. 43-60.

²¹ Plato, *Statesman*, (266b).

²² It is possible that this is a kind of riddle which was commonly practised or played in the fifth and fourth centuries. See Lloyd, *The Revolution of Wisdom.., op. cit.*, p. 280.

arisen from the division that 'our human race shares the same lot and runs in the same heat as the most excellent and at the same time most easy-going race of creatures.'²³ Along the line of these divisions, man also has his share in all larger parts of living beings, from the largest class of animals, walking-flying, tame-wild, single-collective. The Stranger seemed to use this geometrical division in half-jest and half-earnest which means that sometimes it can be taken seriously and sometimes not. Regarding this as a playful element in the author of the dialogue, many scholars believe that the geometric analogy signals the similarity between man and pigs.²⁴ It can be also true that this might be a tease to Theodorus, the geometrician, and his disciples, the young Socrates and Theaetetus; for the Stranger seemed to pretend to resort to geometrical knowledge in order to reach the final division. To be sure, that final division did not seem to be difficult at all. Geometrical knowledge seemed to be rather redundant. It should have been used just to tease the geometers.²⁵ However, if the final division was not

²³ Plato, *Statesman*, (266c).

²⁴ See J.B. Skemp, *Plato's Statesman: A Translation of the Politicus of Plato with introductory essays and footnotes*, London, 1961, p. 139; Scodel, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-6; G.R.F. Ferrari, *Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus*, Cambridge, 1990, p.19.

²⁵ Jacob Klein argued that the reader could not ignore the fact that 'the stranger does two things while performing this last division, [h]e is immensely playful in referring to the geometrical skills of Young Socrates and Theaetetus (glancing smilingly at Theodorus, perhaps) by identifying the walking power of human beings with the diagonal of a square of two feet and the walking power of the four-footed tame and gregarious animals, namely, pigs, with the diagonal four feet..' However, Klein leads his argument to the point that the geometrical skills indicated that the art of statesmanship exists in all levels no matter it is King Odysseus or the swineherd Eumaeus. His interpretation is however compatible to what is argued in this thesis. See Jacob Klein, *Plato's Trilogy, Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman*, Chicago and London, 1977, pp. 152-3.

as easy as it appeared to be, the introduction of geometrical knowledge into this final stage must be taken more seriously than many people would have thought. When geometry has to be taken seriously, no one can do it better than a geometrician. If Theodorus and those young geometricians failed to understand the reason for having recourse to geometrical knowledge in the final division, then the Stranger's teasing would mean a serious humiliation to them as regards their claimed authority on geometry.

III

The correlation of the square root of two feet and four feet is quite significant. One square foot which is a square having its sides all equal to the length of one foot, has its diagonal of the square root of two feet. That square can possibly by its potential in terms of geometrical power generate another square on its diagonal, which results in having its diagonal of the square root of four feet. This means that despite the final separation of man and the rest of animals, man still has an inherent nature of the potential animality.²⁶ The human-animal bond is indissoluble with regard to the geometrical dynamic.²⁷ Moreover, this potential has an enormous

²⁶ This point will be discussed further with regard to the concept of metaxy of human nature. Cf. the *Republic*, (Book VI 511d-e).

²⁷ The ancient Greeks had no specific term for square root. Instead, they used 'dunamis' to convey the same meaning. In general, *dunamis* means power, might, strength which associate with body or outward influence. Also, it has been used to connote 'any natural gift that may be improved, and may be used for good or ill' and 'a capability of existing or acting, virtual existence or action, as opposite to actual'. As Paul Shorey remarked that from the study of its history, the mean of *dunamis* is various 'from potentiality to active power discriminated'.

impact. If man as a two-footed animal has the inherent nature of a four-footed one, then the demarcation line between man and animal would never be clear. If this reasoning is reversed, then man and four-footed animals then still belong to the undivided class of tame gregarious animals. That is why the Stranger said, following his final division, that the 'human race shares the same lot and runs the same heat as the most excellent and at the same time most easy-going race of creatures.' There exists in human beings both nobleness and base. Therefore, 'it is not unreasonable that they arrive last, who are the slowest.'²⁸ The use of geometrical skills helps to explain this peculiar condition, something which normal language cannot do.²⁹

By making a division in this way, man is regarded as a part of the whole class of living beings.³⁰ Considered from this point of view, the anthropocentric self-deception and pride become less intense. As the Stranger said that the discussion in making the division in the Statesman 'have shown more clearly the truth of that which we said yesterday in our search for the sophist.'³¹ The dialectic method of argument 'pays no more heed to the noble than to

See Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, ninth edition, 1989; *Plato, The Republic*, translated by Paul Shorey., Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969, (Book V 477c).

²⁸ *Plato, Statesman*, (266c).

²⁹ Consider the *Republic*, (Book VII 527b): 'Their language [geometry] is most ludicrous..for they speak as if they were doing something and as if all their words were directed towards action,...whereas in fact the real object of the entire study is pure knowledge,' and also 'That it is the knowledge of that which always is and not of a something which at some time comes into being and passed away'.

³⁰ See the *Gorgias*, 516b-c.

³¹ *Plato, Sophist*, (227b).

the ignoble, and no less to the small than to the great, but always goes on its own way to the most perfect truth.³² However, there is a limit which has been stated in the *Republic*. The knowledge of geometry is one of those that the philosophic nature requires in order to be able to contemplate the essence of beings. But it is not suitable for understanding the genesis or becoming.³³ Geometry is intended to be used to understand the being of man not his becoming. This means that one cannot apply geometric reasoning to understand the genesis of mankind, since its logic possibly entails that mankind used to be what it is not at the moment, and is also becoming something which will be totally different from what he is now. In other words, mankind is in motion and flux. We might have been evolved from beasts and might be becoming something else other than man.

With regard to this philosophic interpretation of geometric application, it seems that despite his renowned title of geometrician, Theodorus could not comprehend this seemingly playful riddle; neither could his disciples.³⁴

Following this, the Stranger illustrated the other, shorter way to reach the final stage. Before the Stranger

³² See the *Statesman*, 266d and the *Sophist*, 227b.

³³ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book VII 526e-527b). At 526e, it runs as follows: 'Then if it compels the soul to contemplate essence, it is suitable; if genesis, it is not.' With regard to somewhat similar point, Michael Davis also argued that 'Platonic philosophy is for the sake of recognition, not prediction; it is eidetic and not genetic.' See Michael Davis, *Ancient Tragedy and the Origins of Modern Science*, Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1988, p. 157.

³⁴ Mitchell H. Miller, Jr. points out that without philosophical review of geometric assumption, Theodorus and the young Socrates could never understand this meaningful final division. Miller, Jr., *The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman*, op. cit., p. 4.

pointed out to the young Socrates these two approaches towards the same direction, the result of the division had been the walking animals. Now, he just divided them right away into biped and quadruped. However, the human race had not yet come to the fore since it still fell into the same division as the feathered animals. It required another division between the featherless and the feathered biped classes. Then, at last, the same conclusion has been reached i.e., that the object of the statesman's concern is man.³⁵

Though leading in the same direction, namely man, it does not mean, as the Stranger stated in advance, that both paths do not make a difference in the conduct of research. Regarding the shorter way of division, the walking animals were divided into biped and quadruped. It actually needed one more division before it could arrive at human beings. If, at this stage, in the shorter way, the Stranger used the same analogy as he did at the final division in the longer path, namely the diagonal of the square root of two and four feet, to divide the walking animals, then the result would be that the class of the feathered and featherless walking animals which includes such diverse animals as chicken and man. Also, if the same explanation concerning the dynamic of the two-footed animals towards the four-footed ones is to be applied to this class, then it is not only man but also chickens that possess this special potentiality. However, the Stranger who conducted the examination in both paths, could follow the shorter way only after his longer and significantly more meaningful method had been satisfactorily accomplished.

³⁵ Plato, *Statesman*, (266e).

IV

According to the use of the square root at 266a-b in the *Statesman*, its implication of the tie between human beings and animals is intriguing. With his potentiality, *dunamis*, it can be said that man simultaneously shares and yet does not share a common characteristic with animals. However, in the *Theaetetus*, with regard to knowledge and sensations, Socrates pointed out a nature which is shared by man and animals. It is understood that by nature, from the moment of birth, man and animals have sensory perception through sensory organs.³⁶ It is a kind of bodily experience that they partake of. Therefore, should there be any difference between them in terms of that experience, and should the difference between them be counted only on physical terms, then the difference must be understood in terms of degree, not in kind.

In the dialogues, the essence of all living beings does not lie in the body. Their essence originates with psyche.³⁷ This basic view of psyche in relation to the

³⁶ Plato, *Theaetetus*, (186c).

³⁷ the *Phaedo*, 105c; the *Timaeus*, 34c; the *Laws*, Book X, 892a, 892b, 985c, 896d, 899c, Book XII, 959a, 967b, 967d; the *Epinomis*, 988d. Cf. the *Republic*, Book III, 403d: 'I do not believe that a sound body by its excellence makes the soul good, but on the contrary that a good soul by its virtue renders the body the best that is possible.' However, Adkins propounds some problems of inconsistency regarding the use of the term psyche in the dialogues. As in the *Apology*, Socrates is said to be quite agnostic about life after death whilst his eschatology is evident in the later dialogues. With regard to this point, I understand that Adkins' interpretation of the dialogues seems to be of what E.N. Tigerstedt called 'genetic approach'. This kind of interpretation inevitably leads Adkins to take Plato's fully developed view of the psyche as its culmination in his eschatology. Moreover, as a man in the age of scientific reason, Adkins does not have a stomach for the use of myth in conjunction with logos as Plato practised the interplay of mythos and logos in his earnest-playful

body has been regarded to be a general one among the Greeks.³⁸

In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates stated in his palinode that 'every body which derives motion from without is without

genre of writing. Plato always has his Socrates be aware of this incredulity of the tales or myth he was going to employ. Also, Socrates, before he was about to relate that kind of story, always gave his excuse that the tales were not his own but came from some other sources such as divine inspiration, the Muses, and wise men or women. His excuse is that myth is used for the sake of the good purpose. For instance, in the *Gorgias*, 527a, he said that the old wife's tale of the afterlife should be acceptable so long as there is no better explanation than this with regard to the good life. What should be noticed is that in the *Gorgias*, Socrates stated his pretext for the introduction of the tale or such a mythical speech whilst the dialogue itself concerns the examination of rhetoric or the art of persuasive discourse. Also, to be sure, in the *Phaedrus* 229b-e, Socrates reiterated his agnostic position when he was asked whether he believed in the existence of the monsters or nymphs, or he rather accepted the scientific explanation from those sophists and natural philosophers. As it has been shown, neither would be in his concern unless it helps him to understand himself, namely, it helps him to achieve self-knowledge. Moreover, according to Adkins' logic of interpretation, Plato's position must be 'either this or that' with regard to given opposing arguments. Apart from this, in the *Crito*, 47e, Adkins found that Socrates was not as accustomed to the use of the term *psyche* as he had in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* which he believes that its author should have acquired the linguistic usage direct from Socrates himself. This could be a sound problem for anyone who tries to figure out a historical Socrates from Plato's Socrates. See Adkins, *From the Many to the One*, op. cit.; E.N. Tigersted, *Interpreting Plato*, Uppsala, 1977.

³⁸ See E. Rohde, *Psyche: The Cult of Souls and the Belief in Immortality among the Greeks*, W.B. Hillis (trans.), eighth edition, New York and London, 1966: David B. Claus, *Toward the Soul: An Inquiry into the Meaning of 'psuche'* before Plato, New Haven and London, 1981; Adkins, *From the Many to the One*, op. cit. Adkins remarks that the view that *psyche* is the essence of life, mankind and animals, had been firmly held by people from all walks of life since the time of Homer. It can be said that 'doctors, nature-philosopher, ordinary Greeks..be one Pythagoras, atomist or man in the street' shared this view.[Adkins, op. cit., pp. 128-9, 14]

psyche, but that which has its motion within itself has psyche'.³⁹ To be sure, for the Greeks the presence of psyche was ascribed not only to mankind and animals but also plants.⁴⁰ In the dialogues, with regard to psyche, the concern for human psyche dominates the concern for the psyche of animals or plants. However, there are many passages in the dialogues which discuss animal behaviour.⁴¹ The only reason one can think of should lie in what has been discussed in the *Statesman* namely that 'our human race shares the same lot and runs in the same heat as the most excellent and at the same time most easy-going race of creatures'. Thus, it can be argued that by virtue of the use of the square root in locating the place of human beings among other living beings, any knowledge of animal behaviour conducive to the understanding of human nature must be taken into account.⁴²

The difference between man and animals is mentioned three times in three different dialogues: the *Phaedrus*, the *Cratylus*, and the *Laws*.⁴³ In the *Phaedrus*, particularly in one of the passages in the palinode, the discussion about psyche plays a preliminary role with regard to the understanding of human nature. It is at this point that the knowledge of human psyche distinguishes man from animals. Indeed, with regard to human psyche, man has distanced himself from animals. The distance between man and animals constitutes an illumination of the position in

³⁹ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (245c, 245e).

⁴⁰ Adkins, *From the Many to the One*, op. cit., p. 128.

⁴¹ It is evident in the *Republic*, the *Statesman*, and the *Laws*.

⁴² As Paul Shorey stated in his commentary on the *Republic* with regard to the discussion about animal behaviour that '[f]or the use of analogies drawn from animals..Plato is only pretending to deduce his conclusions from his imagery'. Paul Shorey, *the Republic of Plato*, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 433ff.

⁴³ Plato, *Phaedrus*, 249b; *Cratylus*, 399c, the *Laws*, 653e.

nature where each of them belongs. The human position can be measured in relation to the position of the animals.

According to the understanding of man in relation to animals, it is said that 'a human psyche may pass into the life of a beast, and a soul which was once human, may pass again from a beast into a man.'⁴⁴ The characteristics of human psyche lie in its experience of truth. With this distinctiveness, a demarcation line between man and animals comes to light: 'For the soul which has never seen the truth can never pass into human form.'⁴⁵ To be sure, another passage which is pertinent to this point appears in the *Cratylus*. The *Cratylus* is thematic in the investigation of the theories of names. Undoubtedly, the *Cratylus* contains, among other things, the passage with regard to the name of man, *anthropos*. However, the passage in question is quite enigmatic with regard to its context. To make this point comprehensible, it is necessary to meticulously examine the nature of the context in question.

V

Prior to his account of the name of man--*anthropos*--Socrates made an excuse for the source of his knowledge of the etymological development of these names. He said that it was derived from divine inspiration.⁴⁶ It was because he had spent all that morning with Euthyphro before he met

⁴⁴ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (249b).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ With regard to the position of Socrates in the *Cratylus*, Friedrich Schleiermacher remarks '[t]he *Cratylus* has at all time given much trouble to the good and sturdy friends of Plato' as regards both playful and serious elements of Plato/Socrates. See Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato*, translated by William Dobson, New York, 1973, p. 228.

Hermogenes and Cratylus. He claimed that divine inspiration caused by Euthyphro's speech drove him to eloquence, and cleverness. Moreover, if he was careless, before the day was over, he would become wiser than he ought to be.⁴⁷ The name Euthyphro mentioned in the Cratylus should be connected to Euthyphro, the character in the dialogue of its namesake.⁴⁸

In the *Euthyphro*, Euthyphro is said to be a soothsayer. He claimed that he possessed knowledge of divine law.⁴⁹ In the *Cratylus*, his superhuman wisdom is said to be caused in turn by divine inspiration.⁵⁰ In effect, it is a chain of divine inspiration, a Euripides' magnet or Heraclea stone.⁵¹ Actually, under divine inspiration, Socrates should have been out of his mind when giving a speech of any kind.

Socrates' condition under divine madness reminds the reader of what he himself first stated in the *Apology* that 'what the poets composed they composed not by wisdom but by nature and because they were inspired, like the prophets

⁴⁷ Plato, *Cratylus*, (396c, 399a).

⁴⁸ Someone gives a hypothesis that Euthyphro mentioned in the *Cratylus* should be the same person in the dialogue bearing his name. H.N. Fowler suggests: '[o]f Euthyphro nothing further is known. He might be identical with the Euthyphro who appears in the *Cratylus* as a philologist addicted to fanciful etymologies.' Also, with regard to the fact that both dialogues were written by the same author, there should not be any reason to deny a possible connection between the mention of Euthyphro in a dialogue and the actual character in another. Plato, *Phaedrus*, translated by H.N. Fowler, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1977, p. 4.

⁴⁹ Plato, *Euthyphro*, (3e, 4e).

⁵⁰ Plato, *Cratylus*, (396e, 399a).

⁵¹ See the *Ion*, 533d.

and givers of oracles'.⁵² Particularly, this criticism has been elaborated in the *Ion*. In that dialogue, Ion's expertise on Homeric epics was revealed during his discussion with Socrates. Ion, who was boastful about his poetic art purported that he was the best rhapsode on Homer. But it has been shown that he did not understand what he recited since he seemed to have 'taken away his mind' and been 'not in his sense'.⁵³ Without this divine possession, he 'is powerless to incite a verse or chant an oracle'.⁵⁴ Of course, he never thought before that he himself did not really understand the subject on which he claimed to be an expert. At the end of the dialogue, given the choice between 'dishonest and divine', he abandoned his boastful claim of being an artist, *technikos*, and did not hesitate to choose to call his knowledge divine.⁵⁵ He did not hesitate to be regarded as a person who had lost his senses and did not actually understand what he was doing or performing. Moreover, he regarded this position as being far nobler than being an artist. It seemed to be better for him to be possessed by an external force, namely divine power, than to confess that he himself had been claimed to possess what he did not actually possess and had been purported to know what he did not actually know. In other words, he preferred self-deception to self-knowledge.

With regard to a similar situation, Socrates differs from Ion in the *Cratylus*. He ostensibly confessed that the speech he was about to give was inspired by divine power. Unlike Ion, he must have had something in his mind as regards his setting up the scene. The reason is that in the case of divine madness like that of Ion, his impressive

⁵² Plato, *Apology*, (22c).

⁵³ Plato, *Ion*, (534a-c).

⁵⁴ Plato, *Ion*, (534b).

⁵⁵ Plato, *Ion*, (542a).

speech had not originated from his own knowledge but from divine power. Then, of course, he is not responsible for what he has not done consciously and intentionally. Also, he could not understand why the speech had to be made in that way. When he was questioned, he could not answer what he really meant to say. Moreover, it is unlikely that he who himself disowns his professional art can impart to others what he does not possess. So, it seems that he just let babbling sounds flow from his mouth.⁵⁶ However, for a person like Socrates, who is said to always express his own awareness of divine influence, it renders the opposite effect, since no one under divine madness as such would be able to remind other people mindfully. Throughout the conversation, Socrates kept telling Hermogenes about the parts of his speeches which were or were not from human but divine knowledge.⁵⁷ Hence, he should be fully responsible for all what he said.

At the beginning of his discourse about names, the names of sophists, that is Protagoras and Euthydemus, were introduced. Protagoras' theory that 'man is the measure of all things' and Euthydemus' 'all things belong equally to all men at the same time and perpetually' were brought in order to conceptualise Hermogenes' hypothesis of theory of names.⁵⁸ Despite the compatibility of the sophists' theories and Hermogenes' hypothesis, they were however abandoned because they contradicted Hermogenes' basic

⁵⁶ Cf. the *Charmides*, 162e: '...because he who does not understand the meaning of the meaning of the definition of temperance himself then thinks that the author likewise did not understand the meaning of his own words'. In the *Charmides*, Critias was described by Socrates 'just as a poet might quarrel with an actor who spoiled his poems in reciting them'.

⁵⁷ Plato, *Cratylus*, (392b, 396d-e, 397c, 399a, 401a, 407c-e, 409d, 410e, 411b, 413d, 415a, 415e-416a, 418a, 420d, 420e).

⁵⁸ Plato, *Cratylus*, (384d, 385e).

conviction.⁵⁹ For Hermogenes could not deny that he himself firmly believed that very few good men existed whilst the bad were many.⁶⁰ Then, concerning the investigation of the correctness of names, the Protagorean method of investigation was again proposed by Socrates. However, Hermogenes refused to accept it since he rejected the teaching of Protagoras.⁶¹ Notably, to replace the sophist, Socrates then suggested the poets, Homer in particular.⁶² Homer was regarded as the greatest poet of all, who was believed to have given his work 'great and wonderful information about the correctness of names'.⁶³ From this, Socrates stated that it was more appropriate for him and his interlocutors to be concerned only with the names given by human beings⁶⁴; especially since Hermogenes preferred the poet's authority to the sophists', that is he preferred Homer to Protagoras. With regard to the investigation of names, there were two kinds of name in Homer, namely of the same things one called by the gods and the other called by men. Strangely, Socrates started with a scene of the war between the gods which he regarded as an example of name-giving:

'the river in Troyland which had the

⁵⁹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (386e).

⁶⁰ Plato, *Cratylus*, (389a-390e, 391b).

⁶¹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (391c).

⁶² The sources of knowledge in the *Cratylus* can be said to be thematic in the physis-nomos controversy. The sophistic movement is regarded to be the origin of Greek humanism whose source of knowledge is claimed to be derived from art, *techne*, and knowledge or virtues can be taught. The poets represent the opposite idea that knowledge or wisdom is divine and endowed naturally not to everyone and it cannot be transferred. In the *Cratylus*, Protagoras and Euthydemus represent the former, and Homer and Hesiod the latter.

⁶³ Plato, *Cratylus*, (391d).

⁶⁴ Plato, *Cratylus*, (392b).

single combat with Hephaestus [the god of fire], whom the gods call Xanthus, but men call Scamander'.⁶⁵

The gods-given names were said by Socrates to be 'too high for us to understand'. Only those of men could be understood. Socrates specifically started with the names Scamander and Astyanax as the names given by human beings. It was the name of the same person who was the son of Hector and Andromache. For 'it is more within human power to investigate' and to understand what kind of correctness a name-giver ascribed to the object.⁶⁶ In distancing human beings from what is beyond human knowledge and then being restricted to what really belongs to the mortals, it just drops a hint that man should know himself as regards his place in the universe.⁶⁷

Accordingly, what had been discussed were the names of the human characters in Homer.⁶⁸ However, the course was changed when Socrates came to names of Atreus, Pelops, and Tantalus.⁶⁹ It is from this point on that Socrates becomes involved with the names of the gods which were supposed to be beyond human understanding. Not the god-given names but the names of the gods themselves had been brought into the discussion.⁷⁰ So it seems that the discussion appeared to be so arbitrary that the speaker was led to concern himself with the gods. On the other hand, as it will be revealed below, it was intentional since,

⁶⁵ Plato, *Cratylus*, (391e).

⁶⁶ Plato, *Cratylus*, (392b, 401a, 425c).

⁶⁷ Cf. 'Know thyself as know his place as a mortal' in Eliza Gregory Wilkins, *Know thyself in Greek and Latin Literature*, New York and London, 1979.

⁶⁸ Plato, *Cratylus*, (392c-395d).

⁶⁹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (395b-c).

⁷⁰ Plato, *Cratylus*, (395e-396c).

after this, the discussion once again descended from divine to human names. However, at this stage, it seems that the speaker unknowingly concerned himself with the examination of the names of the gods. Also, his speech about the gods appears to be very eloquent and impressive. Of course, as it had been chosen earlier by Hermogenes, the eloquent and beautiful speech had a poetic effect, that is the effect of divine madness. Socrates' speech fascinated and impressed his interlocutors, as if the whole situation of this engagement and eloquent discourse on the story of the gods had been inspired by divine power.⁷¹ Being well aware of this situation, Socrates told Hermogenes:

'I am convinced that the inspiration came to me from Euthyphro the Prospaltian. For I was with him and listening to him a long time early this morning. So he must have been inspired, and he not only filled my ears but took possession of my soul with his superhuman wisdom. So I think this is our duty: we ought to-day to make use of this wisdom and finish the investigation of names, but to-morrow, if the rest of you agree, we will conjure it away and purify ourselves, when we have found some one, whether priest or sophist, who is skilled in that kind of purifying.'⁷²

In contradistinction to Ion, Socrates never boasted that he possessed the art of interpretation, *techne*, or that he was an expert on Homer, as Ion regarded himself to be.⁷³ In contradistinction to Socrates, Ion, at his impasse, switched to claim divine madness at the end of the dialogue since he could not accept that he was dishonest having purported to possess virtue concerning his authority

⁷¹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (395d).

⁷² Plato, *Cratylus*, (396d-e).

⁷³ Plato, *Ion*, (530c-d, 539e, 541b).

on the divine poet, Homer. Had he accepted that he knew something he actually did not know, it would have saved him from the self-deception that he pretended to be wiser than he actually was. However, Ion preferred not to appear ignorant than to be ignorant but honest with himself. For he was unable to accept his ignorance. When one applies this situation to Socrates, Socrates is said to have claimed ignorance. Thus, in this regard, it might be true that Socrates really is ignorant as he claimed himself to be. On the other hand, it might be possible that his self-claimed ignorance is just playful or ironical.

Following this, Socrates made a strange remark about divine influence; at that moment he thought he had had a clever thought, and, if he was not careful, before the end of the day he would likely be wiser than he himself ought to be. With regard to this point, if divine power could make him wiser than he was, he should have preferred to be careless otherwise it would not be able to make him wiser. There is a point to be noticed in that statement. Socrates said that divine power would make him wiser than he 'ought to be'. This just implies that he preferred to be what he was. Otherwise he would not emphasise 'ought to be', *eti temeron sophoteros tou deontos genesthai*. To be sure, he had stated earlier that he must have a purge or purification the day after. But, as he said, he might become wiser if he was not careful on the day the conversation took place. Of course, if he really did not want to become wiser than he ought to be, he should have been purified before the end of the day. If there really was a need for such purification of divine power. As it appeared later, it was unnecessary. Divine influence deserted Socrates not a long while after.⁷⁴ Accordingly, it is evident that Socrates had not become wiser than he ought to be. In fact, being unable to solve the problem of

⁷⁴ Plato, *Cratylus*, (409d).

names, that divinely inspired Socrates is said at times to turn himself to resort to the power of human knowledge. That is, he turned to his own contrivance.⁷⁵ At this point, some scholars argued that Socrates even ridiculed the power of divine madness as a source of wisdom for human beings.⁷⁶ Perhaps the whole discourse was his own contrivance. Without any purification taken, the fact that Socrates was able to remain what he was, namely, not wiser than he ought to be, lies in his self-knowledge and carefulness. However, since he was well aware of his ironic claim of divine possession on that day, therefore, he must have a particular message. Also, if there was to be any purification at all, it must be done with his own skills or knowledge. However, if there was any divine power at all, it must be the daemonic voice which he always referred to. The daemonic voice urged him to 'know himself'.

With regard to divine inspiration, Socrates and Ion had different attitudes. Ion thought that it was far nobler to be called divine.⁷⁷ Socrates, under his excuse of divine possession, thought of having his soul purified of such divine power: 'but tomorrow, if the rest of you agree, we will conjure it away and purify, katharoumethai, ourselves'. Also, a priest or sophist had been summoned to purify the soul. Usually, a priest, ieres, who was believed to have special communication with the gods, should of course be expected to be capable of conjuring

⁷⁵ Plato, *Cratylus*, (409d, 416a).

⁷⁶ Schleiermacher said that Socrates regarded 'this species of wisdom [divine power] as an inspiration quite foreign to him,' and it was abrogated when he 'educed a similar sense out of opposite words,..and appealed in one place to barbarian origin or the destructive effects of time, and subsequently declared this himself to be excuse of one who would avoid giving any regular account'. See Schleiermacher, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

⁷⁷ Plato, *Ion*, (542b).

divine possession.

Also, a request for a sophist has a significant implication. Sophists were understood to derive their knowledge from teachable skills, *techne*, not divine power. It is human knowledge which sophists purported to be able to impart to their students.⁷⁸ In asking for a sophist, Socrates should have meant that the speech inspired by divine power could be replaced or conjured away by its opposite power, that is human skills or knowledge, if there is really a sophist 'who is skilled in that kind of purifying' as regards the investigation of names.

Indeed, after that, against a diviner such as the inspired poets, the name of Anaxagoras was brought into their discussion on three significant occasions in order to give an account of some names which became problematic⁷⁹; and it should have been quite well known to the Greeks in Socrates' time that Anaxagoras, with special regard to his natural philosophy of the sun and the moon, was regarded as an atheist and later had been sentenced for blasphemy against the gods of Athens. Nevertheless, as regards Socrates' calling for the sophist, one should not forget that he had just stopped resorting to one of sophistic authority, that is, Protagoras.

VI

⁷⁸ As it has been clearly shown in the *Protagoras*. Protagoras argued for teachability of virtue. After listening to Protagoras' speech, Socrates ironically said 'I used formerly to think that there was no human treatment by which the good were made good, but now I am convinced that there is'. See the *Protagoras*, 320d-328d, 328e, also Cf. the treatment of similar subject-matter in the *Meno*.

⁷⁹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (400a, 409a-b, 413c).

In the *Protagoras*, it is said that Protagoras proudly announced that he was a sophist. He claimed that others were afraid to be called sophists because of their fear of the prejudice against the title.⁸⁰ Protagoras regarded sophistry as an ancient art which famous wise men in various subjects had practised for a long time, for example Homer, Hesiod, Simonides in poetry, Orpheus, Musaeus in mystic rites and soothsaying, Agathocles and Pythocleides in music⁸¹---but his own skills were quite extraordinary compared with those of others. He claimed to excel others in 'the gift of assisting people to become good and true'.⁸² He taught men to be better.⁸³ Precisely speaking, he taught them to be good citizens, *agathous politas*, by imparting virtue or the art of politics, *politiken technen*, to them.⁸⁴ Moreover, he assured his customers that every drachma they paid him could be guaranteed to produce a successful and excellent result.⁸⁵

It is generally understood that Socrates was not convinced by such sophistic claims. In fact, he stood up against sophistry.⁸⁶ Hence, it can be inferred that

⁸⁰ Plato, *Protagoras*, (317b).

⁸¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, (316d-e).

⁸² Plato, *Protagoras*, (328b).

⁸³ Plato, *Protagoras*, (317b).

⁸⁴ Plato, *Protagoras*, (317b, 318e, 328a-b).

⁸⁵ Plato, *Protagoras*, (328b).

⁸⁶ To be sure, Socrates did not oppose all those whom Protagoras regarded as one of the sophists. It seems that for Socrates some professional sophists were legitimate to charge fee. As from his discussion on 'Sophia and the Sophistic Debate' G.E.R. Lloyd argued that 'the acceptance of money for instruction hardly provides a satisfactory criterion'. [Lloyd, *The Revolutions of Wisdom*, op. cit., p 93ff.] The historical evidence Lloyd referred to comes from the *Protagoras* 311b. There, Socrates seemed to be

Socrates did not actually intend to have the sophist purify divine possession. In truth, he symbolically used sophistic humanism at that particular moment to counteract the effect of divine madness from which the poet claimed his knowledge to have originated; and this counteraction

concordant with the convention that some professionals such as doctors or sculptors should earn money from their wisdom, skills or craftsmanship as in the case of Hippocrates, Polyclitus, or Pheidias. [See *Protagoras*, 311b] 'Acceptance of money for instruction in such technai as medicine or sculpture,' said Lloyd, 'was a well-established and uncontroversial practice.' [Lloyd, *op. cit.*, p.92] Thus Socrates' anti-sophism does not fall in the criterion of charging fee. If one studied with Hippocrates or Polyclitus or Homer, certainly, he was likely to become a doctor or a sculptor or a poet. There is nothing wrong with that. But when Socrates asked young Hippocrates what he would become after studying with Protagoras who purported to teach virtue in the art of politics. The answer was he would become a sophist.

Perhaps, this implies that it requires one to be a sophist in order to be a good citizen, kalos kai agathos. Of course, if to be a sophist, one is required to attain a true wisdom, then, it should be quite plausible. But it is not acceptable if one becomes good and wise only by paying money for the instruction of virtue and the good, arete, agathon. [Cf. *Alcibiades I*, 119a: 'as I can tell you that Pythodorus son of Isolochus, and Callias, son of Calliades, became wise through that of Zeno; each of them has paid Zeno a hundred minae, and has become both wise, sophos, and distinguished.] Then the point of criticism with regard to sophistry is rather that 'fee-taking for teaching such subjects as "virtue" or excellence, arete'. [Lloyd, *op. cit.*, p. 92ff.] At this point, someone might argue that there is a problem of values caused by the overlap between the use of the terms arete and agathon employed in Homeric society and that of the fifth century and after. [See Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, *op. cit.*] However, if there really exist such a problem, it is not inaccurate to follow Lloyd's study that 'not the only the verb *sophizesthai* originally used non-pejoratively...but the same is true of the noun *sophistes*'. [Lloyd, *op. cit.*, p. 93] But he argued that 'it is to the author of the dialogues that the odium of the term sophist, by which Protagoras is made to concede that most people of his profession did not risk to call themselves, owned much'. [Lloyd, *op. cit.*, p. 94ff.] Indeed, before meeting Protagoras, Socrates is said to have warned young Hippocrates by describing the sophist as 'really a sort of merchant or dealer'. [See *Protagoras*, 313c-e.]

between the two is vice versa. To be sure, he was against both the sophist and the poet.⁸⁷

Socrates ostensibly and symbolically resorted to sophistic humanism in order to descend from the divine tide to a human level. In the human realm, human wisdom came into play. Seemingly, it is a kind of sophistry the sophist practised; but, in depth, it is not. It must be that 'human wisdom', in which Socrates said he had confidence. In the meantime, to be sure, elsewhere Socrates has been said to have alluded to his 'daemonic voice' as his guidance.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ In the *Protagoras*, it is not only the sophists who were mainly attacked by Socrates but also the poets. As well as the sophists, Socrates criticised the lack of responsibility of the poets with regard to their reference to divine inspiration that 'one cannot question on the sense of what they say; when they are adduced in discussion we are generally told by some that the poetry thought so and so, and by others, something different, and they go on arguing about a matter which they are powerless to determine'. [*Protagoras*, 347e-348a] Divine inspiration is just a self-effacing means. Socrates urged his interlocutors to search for his own position with reference to his own self-conscious, that is, 'it is the sort of person that I think you and I ought rather to imitate: putting the poets aside, let us hold our discussion together in our own persons, making trial of the truth and of ourselves.' [*Ibid.*]

⁸⁸ See the *Apology*, 30e, 31d; *Euthyphro*, 3b. From the *Apology*, 30e, 31d, he claimed a *posteriori* that since he believed in spiritual activities therefore he believed in spirits or daemons: 'If I believe in spiritual beings, it is quite inevitable that I believe also in spirits.' [the *Apology*, 27c] To be sure, his line of reasoning is based on the premise that 'there is no human being who believes that there are things pertaining to human beings, but no human beings.' [the *Apology*, 27b] It is fascinating that Socrates in defence of his theism had to give the underpinning premise stipulating the existence of human being as the basis of the existence of the gods. The interplay between man and the gods plays an important role in the dialogues. In reverse, if Socrates did not believe in spiritual activities, that is, he denied the existence of the gods, then, his atheism entails the non-existence of human beings as well. Essentially, according to Socrates, the belief in the existence of man and the belief in

From above, it can be inferred that Socrates' discourse of names was intentional and well-planned.⁸⁹ It was planned to move his interlocutors and the reader up and down between the two ends of the continuum, that is, between divine and human. It is evident from the beginning of the *Cratylus* that the discussion started by having recourse to the sophist and then shifted to the divine authority of the poet, namely from Protagoras, Euthydemus, Anaxagoras to Homer and Hesiod. Protagoras can be regarded as a symbol of the power of humanism whilst Homer represents divine power.⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the whole discussion of the names in regard to a poetic method of investigation, though initially mentioning first the names of the god of fire, Hephaestus, and the god of water, Xanthus or Scamander, is said to depart formally from the names given by men, that is, Scamandrius and Astyanax. Then, it oscillates up and down between the divine and human realms. Finally, it seems to stop intriguingly where it started, but in a different form. That is, it terminates at the terms *pur* and *udor* which were the human versions of fire and water in contradistinction to the beginning, which departed with Hephaestus and Scamander, the names of the gods of fire and water.⁹¹ Of course, the meaning of this transition should be significant.

Moreover, if the reader is careless enough, he would easily fail to notice some very important points with

spirits appears to be mutually inclusive.

⁸⁹ This point has been argued before by Schleiermacher. See Schleiermacher, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

⁹⁰ To be sure, Heraclitus was also mentioned. But he was not used to counterbalance divine power of the poets. On the contrary, it is said that Homer, Hesiod, and Orpheus in regard to the names of the essence of things and the lineage of the gods 'agree with each other and all tend toward the doctrine of Heraclitus'. [*Cratylus*, 401d-402c]

⁹¹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (392a-409d).

regard to these names: Hephaestus, Xanthus or Scamander, and Astyanax or Scamandrius. Socrates might have chosen these names under double divine possession, that is under the influence of Euthyphro's divinely inspired speech. If so, he should not be able to give the reason for his own action or speech; but that is not the case. What Socrates did is ironical. He knew very well what he did. To be sure, there can be various grounds for his choice of the names. The names Astyanax or Scamandrius might have been chosen because they both are the names of the same person, and, perhaps, Scamandrius is related to Scamander. Scamander was chosen because it had two names, one of divine origin and other of human. Hephaestus might be chosen because of no other good reason than that it happened to be in the same passage when Homer narrated the names of Xanthus.

The better and resourceful context for understanding Socrates can be found if the reader is not forgetful of the context that is correlative to the speech of his in question. In regard to the names of the gods, as he claimed that he took the poet as his guide and also later he was possessed by Euthyphro's divine speech. Then we should turn to the *Euthyphro* in order to find any possible related clue to explain why Socrates chose those names. First, Hephaestus was chosen from the context in which he was in battle with Xanthus. Moreover, the context of the war between Hephaestus and Xanthus was just a sub-context in its greater one in Homer's *Iliad*. And the context is Chapter XX whose subject-matter is about 'the Gods go to War'.⁹²

VII

⁹² Homer, *The Iliad*, translated by E.V. Rieu, Harmondsworth, 1978, Book XX.

In the *Euthyphro*, Euthyphro claimed that he knew what was the meaning of holiness, piety, and divinity. Being asked by Socrates to explain it, he answered that holiness and piety was 'what is dear to the gods'.⁹³ It is in this regard that he thought he was pious with regard to his prosecution of his father for murder in the same way that Zeus had slain his father, Cronus.⁹⁴ For Euthyphro believed that 'there was really war between the gods' as it was told by the poets. Here, one of them was Homer.⁹⁵ The other was Hesiod whose genealogy of the gods depicted their vices and crimes, infanticide and parricide in particular, and Euthyphro tried to follow this divine path.⁹⁶ On the other hand, Socrates could not accept such a description of the gods.⁹⁷ However, he said that he would be able to accept it if Euthyphro persuaded him to agree to his theory of holiness, since holiness was said to be 'what is dear to the gods'. The gods were also believed to be in conflict and to make war against one another. Then it was possible that what was loved by one god was despised by another. Therefore, it was inevitable for one to 'perform an act that is pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronus and Uranus, and pleasing to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera, and so forth in respect to the other gods, if any disagrees with any other about it'.⁹⁸ In consequence, such a definition of holiness could not be

⁹³ Plato, *Euthyphro*, (7a).

⁹⁴ Plato, *Euthyphro*, (5e-6a).

⁹⁵ In the *Republic*, Book X, 598e, Socrates said: 'have we not next to scrutinize tragedy and its leader Homer, since some people tell us that these poets know all the arts and all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all things divine?.'

⁹⁶ Cf. *Republic*, (Book II 379b-378a).

⁹⁷ Plato, *Euthyphro*, (6b); the *Republic*, (Book II 377c-d, 378a-b).

⁹⁸ Plato, *Euthyphro*, (8a-b).

valid so long as the relationship between the gods remained in such condition. In the end, it shows that Euthyphro could not find a satisfactory definition of holiness for Socrates. Actually, Socrates found that the 'definition has come round to the point from which it started'.⁹⁹ So no one knew what holiness really was.

In the *Cratylus*, as regards Socrates' claim of being under Euthyphro's divine inspiration, the gods in concern must be the gods which were described by Euthyphro in the *Euthyphro*. Moreover, it can be supported by a signal given to the reader when Socrates took Hephaestus and Xanthus in the battle scene as his point of departure. It means that, from the beginning Socrates intended the reader to perceive that even the gods in Homer could not be taken for granted with regard to their principle of name-giving since they were always in a state of war with one another.¹⁰⁰

With regard to names given by man in Homer, Socrates intended the same consequence. This is understandable with no reference to Euthyphro, since Socrates stated that it was within human power to investigate those kind of names. What is needed is the relevant background of the *Iliad* which Socrates referred to in his analysis of the names. Astyanax or Scamandrius were the names of Hector's son. Regarding the search for the correctness of names, Socrates asked Hermogenes which of the boys' names Homer thought was the right one.¹⁰¹ Hermogenes could not answer. Then he asked again whether men or women, with regard to a class in general, were wiser. Hermogenes answered that men were

⁹⁹ Plato, *Euthyphro*, (14e).

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *Republic*, (Book II 378d): '..and the battles of the gods in Homer's verse are things that we must not admit into our city either wrought in allegory or without allegory.'

¹⁰¹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (392b-c).

wiser.¹⁰² Socrates stated further that Homer narrated that the child of Hector was called Astyanax by the men of Troy. Also, Homer regarded the Trojan men to be wiser than the women.¹⁰³ From this, he conjectured that the other name could have been used by women. Then he asked Hermogenes again whether Homer shared the same opinion that the Trojan men were wiser than the women. Hermogenes said it was so. Socrates then inferred from this that Homer should have thought too that 'Astyanax was more rightly the boy's name than Scamandrius'.¹⁰⁴ He explained the reason by referring to what Homer said as regards the name Astyanax, that 'he alone defended their city and long walls'.¹⁰⁵ From this, he concluded that '...as it seems, it is right to call the son of the defender Astyanax, Lord of the city, ruler of that which his father, as Homer says, defended'.¹⁰⁶ This reason seems to be very clear to everyone, including Hermogenes.

However, it was still very obscure for Socrates, as he stated that he could hardly comprehend it. He asked

¹⁰² With regard to this matter, cf. *Republic*, (Book V 451e-453b, 455d-e. Glaucon believed that men were stronger than women. Socrates did not deny that there was by nature a great difference between men and women. However, with regard to the nature of human soul, men and women had equal chance to become the philosopher-ruler. As the *Republic* 455d-e runs as follows: 'Then there is no pursuit of the administrators of a state that belongs to a woman because she is a woman or to a man because he is a man. But the natural capacities are distributed alike among both creatures, and women naturally share in all pursuits and men in all---yet for all the woman is weaker than the man.' And also at 456a: 'The women and the men, then, have the same nature in respect to the guardianships of the state, save in so far as the one is weaker, the other stronger.'

¹⁰³ Plato, *Cratylus*, (392c); Homer, the *Iliad*, XXII, 506.

¹⁰⁴ Plato, *Cratylus*, (392d).

¹⁰⁵ Plato, *Cratylus*, (392d); Homer, the *Iliad*, XXII, 507.

¹⁰⁶ Plato, *Cratylus*, (392e).

Hermogenes again whether the young man himself really understood what had been explained with regard to the name of Astyanax. This time, Hermogenes withdrew his previous answer. Socrates then pointed out the fact that Homer also gave the name to Hector. At this point, one seems to understand what Socrates actually wanted to understand. He wanted to investigate Homer's principle of the correctness of names.¹⁰⁷ He said he had found a clue for the reason why Homer gave the names of Hector and Astyanax to that father and son. As regards the terms Hector and Astyanax, both were Greek names and had a similar meaning. That *anax* in Astyanax means lord and *ektor* in Hector means holder, conveyed nearly the same message. They were names of kings: 'for surely a man is holder of that of which he is lord; for it is clear that he rules it and possesses it and holds it.'¹⁰⁸ Therefore, what Socrates discovered in Homer's theory of names was that the correctness of names given to anything must correspond with the nature of the object to be named. Then Socrates seemed to support this theory by referring to some natural event. He stated that with regard to lions, and horses, one would definitely 'call a lion's offspring a lion and a horse's offspring a horse'.¹⁰⁹ From this, he inferred that similarly 'the same reasoning applies to a king; a king's son will probably be a king, a good man's good, a handsome's handsome, and so forth'.¹¹⁰ This is what Socrates regarded as a clue. It is a clue to the principle of names that 'the offspring of each class will be of the same class, unless some unnatural birth takes place; so they should be called by the same names'.¹¹¹ And it is by

¹⁰⁷ Plato, *Cratylus*, (393b).

¹⁰⁸ Plato, *Cratylus*, (393b).

¹⁰⁹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (393c).

¹¹⁰ Plato, *Cratylus*, (394a).

¹¹¹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (394a).

this principle that Hector and his son had been given their names.

In truth, it is hardly the case that Socrates' message to the reader is that the poet was a reliable source in regard to the correctness of names. Taking into account Hector and Astyanax in its original context and what Socrates had warned at 393c, the hidden message can then be brought to light. Hector and Astyanax were said to be names of kings, but, according to the *Iliad*, their fatal destiny was so well known. It was regarded as the most tragic scene that drew the great epic to its end. Prince Hector, the eldest son of King Priam of Troy, could not live long enough to be enthroned as his father's successor. He was disgracefully killed in the battle. Also his body was subjected to shameful outrage as Achilles dragged his mutilated body behind his chariot round the walls of Troy and back to the Greek ships. A similar fate was suffered by his son, as the name Astyanax means a king. Moreover, as Andromache lamented, the name was understood literally by the Trojans who saw in him as the one defence of their city and long walls. Ironically, he became an orphaned child 'cut off from his playmates, beaten, jeered, and driven from the feast'.¹¹² In archaic and classical ages the fall of Hector and his son was regarded as the symbol of the Sack of Troy.¹¹³ Indeed, it is very ironical for Hector and Astyanax to bear such names. And Socrates pointed out that Homer must be responsible for such ironic name-giving. It is evident that what happened to Hector and Astyanax was contrary to Homer's own principle of the correctness of names, because, in this case, a king's son was not a king and a king was not a king.

¹¹² Homer, *Iliad*, XXII, 489-498.

¹¹³ See 'Hector' and 'Astyanax', *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, op. cit.

VIII

From above, it can be inferred that Socrates intended to conspire against the theory of names of Homer and the poets who followed him. In fact, in the *Iliad*, Astyanax was the name which had been used by most people except Hector, since he had given the name Scamandrius to his son.¹¹⁴ Socrates told us that men who were believed to be wiser than women also called the son of Hector by the name Astyanax.¹¹⁵ To be sure, it was true, as Homer said in the *Iliad*, XXII, 506, that the Trojan men called him by that name. However, it was Socrates who concluded on his own accord that women would call the boy Scamandrius. Actually, Andromache, the mother of the boy, also called her son 'little Astyanax'.¹¹⁶ It was Hector who called his son Scamandrius. Whether other Trojan women called the boy differently from what the men called him, this point of course is beyond reasonable doubt. Socrates actually intended to ascribe this intentional preference of the name Astyanax to Homer. It was the target of Socrates' latent attack. Moreover, at 393c, he gave a hint to Hermogenes who nevertheless could not understand it. The hint was given after Socrates stated that the offspring of animals, including man, should be named after their natural parents, or they must be named after their own class in cases of unnatural birth as 'a horse brings forth a calf, the natural offspring of a cow, it should be called a calf, not a colt'.¹¹⁷ After this, he then warned:

¹¹⁴ Homer, *Iliad*, VI, 401.

¹¹⁵ The logical fallacy of the division between men and women in terms of intelligence should be intentional. What use is it for? It is employed in order to lead the argument to the point that Astyanax was a more correct name than other name.

¹¹⁶ Homer, *Iliad*, XXII, 500 and 506.

¹¹⁷ Plato, *Cratylus*, (393c).

'...keep watch of me, and do not let me trick you; for by the same argument any offspring of a king should be called a king; and whether the same meaning is expressed in one set of syllables or another makes no difference; and if a letter is added or subtracted, that does not matter either, so long as the essence of the thing named remains in force and is made plain in the name.'¹¹⁸

Homer should not have given such names to Hector and Astyanax if he really had that measure as his correctness of names as Hermogenes believed that he did. Of course, this would remind the reader of the beginning of the dialogue where the conversation began when Hermogenes asked Socrates to join the discussion with him and Cratylus since he himself did not understand why Cratylus said that his name could not be Hermogenes, even if mankind called him by that name.¹¹⁹ The name Hermogenes means 'son of Hermes', who had traditionally been regarded as the patron deity of traders, bankers, and the like. However, Hermogenes the man hardly corresponded with Hermogenes the name. He was not successful as a money-maker; neither was he a good contriver of speech as regards the meaning of Hermes as 'he who contrived speech'.¹²⁰ With regard to the correctness of names, Hermogenes should not have acquired such a name in the same way that Hector and Astyanax should not have been given their names, which do not correspond to their real nature.¹²¹

According to the principle of name with reference to natural birth, Hector and Astyanax were found to be

¹¹⁸ Plato, *Cratylus*, (393c).

¹¹⁹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (383a-b).

¹²⁰ Plato, *Cratylus*, (408b).

¹²¹ To be sure, it transpires later that the name of Cratylus is also ironical to his real nature.

unnatural to the nature of their ancestor, King Priam. They could not become kings--but that is not the point. The trick that Socrates intended a careful reader to be on guard against is his application of the principle of name with reference to natural birth and to qualities such as kingship, *basileia*, beauty, to *kalon*, and the good, to *agathoi*. The problem is whether such qualities and status can be transmitted from one generation to another in the same way that a lion's offspring is a lion, and a human being's offspring is human.¹²² The question of whether Homer really had this principle of name as Socrates ascribed to him can be kept aside. To ask whether the work of Homer and his followers pointed to the direction that these endowments were intrinsically transferable is rather the concern of our study.

Socrates uses the term *nature*, *phusis*, as a key concept which underlies his logic of application of the principle of name.¹²³ Nevertheless, it cannot be proved that Homer really took that position with regard to the principle of name. However, the implication in his work in the case of Hector and Astyanax might have directed the audience to be convinced that what had been reported in Homer was true; or, perhaps, it was even directed to say that even Homer himself might have possessed that point of view. However, such an interpretation of the concept of nature can be said to be crystallized as the traditional values in the fifth century. As it can be found in the works of renowned poets such as Sophocles, Euripides,

¹²² See Plato, *Cratylus*, (394c-e, 397b).

¹²³ Plato, *Cratylus*, (393c). With regard to the term *nature*, it is said that Homer used it once in the related term, that is, *phue* which means 'growth, stature'. That the term is used 'especially of outstanding physical appearance, is more frequent'. However, the term had not been found in the majority of the writings of the seventh and sixth centuries until the fifth when it turned to be used more frequently and became important. See Adkins, *From the Many to the One*, op. cit., p. 79.

Aeschylus, and also Aristophanes.¹²⁴

¹²⁴ Adkins, *From the Many to the One*, op. cit., pp. 79-81. As he points that 'the word may also refer to the parentage from which an individual has sprung' [ibid.] With regard to the passage 1259 in Sophocles' *Ajax*, Adkins remarks

'Agamemnon brusquely tells Teucer to remember who he is by *phusis*, the illegitimate son of a Greek nobleman and a foreigner; to which he replies that his mother may have been a foreigner, but she was *phusei* a queen,'

and

'in Euripides', Alcmaeon concludes that it is true that from *esthlos* fathers *esthlos* children spring, and from *kakos* fathers children who are like the *phusis* of their father,'

and

in Sophocles, *Ajax* 472, '..an individual may be cowardly by *phusis*', or in Euripides, Nauck 139, 'a barbarian has a barbarian *phusis*'.

Particularly, in Euripides, it has been said that 'the generalisation that human beings differ in their *phusis* is expressed'. This implies that a social class, noble or low, what had been regarded as social and ethical qualities, virtues, and even barbarity, of a man are attributable to his parent's nature. This usage is closely connected with the root of its meaning, that is, 'birth, to be born', *gennaios genos*. In fact, all desirable qualities can be put under one category, that is, virtue. The meaning of virtue comprises 'all those qualities in a man which made for success in Greek society and which could confidently be expected to secure the admiration of a man's fellow-citizens, followed in many cases by substantial material rewards'. [Kerferd, *the Sophistic Movement*, op. cit., p. 131] This is why in the fifth century, the debate on the teachability of virtue under the controversial topic of *phusis-nomos* culminated when the rise of sophistic humanism confronted the existing traditional poetic values. Also, it is to be noticed that with regard to barbarity as a natural quality, the Stranger in the *Statesman* 262d, regarded this view as a prejudice among the Greeks in dividing men into Greeks and barbarians. Moreover, some qualities such as courage or prophetic power were regarded to be naturally endowed. These human qualities which had been understood to be inherent in human nature in the eye of some poets in the fifth century were invariably treated

Socrates' ironic scene of the tragedy of Hector and Astyanax helps to shed light upon the limit of his logical reasoning, when it was applied to such a very ambiguous subject, that is to say, to regard kingship, beauty, and the good, as transferable fixed inborn qualities, *phusis*. However, one cannot incontestably argue that Socrates was completely against that point of view of the poets. To be sure, he was also sceptical about the rise of its opposing view, namely the idea of nature in sophistic humanism.¹²⁵

as being 'unchangeable, inescapable influence on behaviour, and hence outside the scope of praise and blame'. See, Adkins, *From the Many to the One*, op. cit., pp.79-82.

¹²⁵ Adkins ascribed this view to what he called 'the New thought of the sophists' whose idea of nature, *physis*, is used to contrast what is real and basic with what is merely conventional [*From the Many to the One*, op. cit., pp. 80-81.] The sophists emphasised the possibility of *nomos* in developing human personality and excellence more than human nature. But there existed the ongoing debate upon the meaning of *nomos* and *phusis*. The problem is that *nomos* and *phusis* had been variably understood. As regards human excellence, *arete*, it is a grave concern for those who really cared about the welfare of human beings in general, and the youth in particular, to understand whether human excellence at its best should be understood with regard to *nomos* or *phusis*. Of course, the reader would easily recognise its influence in the dialogues as Kerferd said 'the discussion of the relationship between nature and *arete*, leads directly to what was one of the major themes of discussion both in the second half of the fifth century B.C. and in very nearly all of the earlier dialogues of Plato, namely the question whether *arete* or virtue can be taught' [Kerferd, op. cit., p. 13]. To be sure, I argue that actually it is not just the relationship between nature and *arete*. It is the interplay between the influence of *phusis* and *nomos* upon human excellence that have been taken into discussion in the dialogues. Whatever solution the dialogues offers with regard to this problem is inevitably connected to what kind of concept of man it envisages. It can be said that Socrates' position is neither sophistic nor poetic. For instance, in the *Charmides*, Socrates showed that he seemed to emphasise both nature and nurture as important factors with regard to development of human personality and excellence. At 157e, he told young Charmides that 'it is only right, Charmides, that you should excel the rest in all these respects; for I do not suppose there is anyone else here who could readily point to a case of any two Athenian houses uniting together which would be likely to produce handsome or

This should be the reason for this aspect of the scene with regard to the search for the correctness of names in the *Cratylus*. That is, Socrates incited the reader to be aware of and sceptical towards the matter of *phusis-nomos* with reference to human excellence. It transpires that neither the gods nor human beings in Homer can be regarded as a reliable authority with regard to the correctness of names. Moreover, it renders the account that Homer, as a divine poet, did not understand what he had composed. As regards our concern of the correctness of names, the names given in his work were inconsistent with the principle of names with reference to natural birth. Yet, despite this shortcoming in Homer's god-given and man-given names, the theory of correctness of names that argues for a name to be given to anything according to its own essence is unscathed, provided that two factors can be fulfilled. First, the essence of a thing to be named really exists, and, secondly, the knowledge of its nature or essence is accessible.¹²⁶

To sum up, the interpretation of Socrates' irony in the *Cratylus* illuminates significant points in context as an indispensable prerequisite to understanding the passage in question. First, Socrates effaces himself behind divine power and then ostensibly takes sophistic humanism as an antidote to divine possession. Secondly, he again effaces himself behind the sophists in order to descend from divine to human realm, in which he in effect has recourse to his own contrivance, namely 'human wisdom', as it has always been referred to elsewhere. Thirdly, he does not actually need a priest or a sophist to purify himself, *katharsis*,

nobler offspring than those from which you are sprung, *gegonas*.' But then at 158b, he just cast his doubt to that view when he stated 'but if your nature is really rich...blessed is the son that your mother has borne in you.'

¹²⁶ Plato, *Cratylus*, (439-440c).

from divine possession, since he seems to be able to take care of himself so that he does not have to become 'wiser than he ought to be'. Fourthly, under ironic divine possession, Socrates' discourse departs from the divine names of Hephaestus and Scamandrius [fire and water] and terminates at the human terms of fire and water, *pur* and *udor*. As a consequence, the discourse seems to oscillate strangely between divine names and human names. That the realm swayed from divine to human signals an important aspect of seemingly mutually inclusive relationship between the realms. Fifthly, Homer has been proved to be an unreliable authority with regard to name-giving. Neither the gods nor men in the traditional belief can be taken for granted. Sixthly, Socrates brought into the reader's concern the problem of human excellence in relation to the *physis-nomos* controversy. The last point is that Socrates' use of irony and his exposition of fallibility in Homer and divine power should not be understood at its face value.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ The purpose of Socrates' irony is not just to expose the ignorance of others. As John Burnet remarks: 'Is it only that Socrates' sole business in life was to expose the ignorance of others? If that had really been that all, it is surely hard to believe that he would have been ready to face death rather than relinquish his task' [Burnet, 'The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul', *op. cit.*, pp. 242-3]. Of course, the playful element with regard to his claim of divine possession is undeniable. Schleiermacher agreed that when Socrates said he was to follow Euthyphro's divine inspiration, he was in jest. [Schleiermacher, *op. cit.*, p. 233] However, he argued that in the *Cratylus* 'an ironical whole and a serious investigation are strangely interwoven with one another' [*ibid.*]. To be sure, Socrates himself after all expressed that he did not follow Euthyphro. He told Cratylus who asked whether what he had said was under Euthyphro's divine inspiration that

'I myself have been marvelling at my own wisdom all along, and I cannot believe in it, [s]o I think we ought to re-examine my utterances, [f]or the worst of all deceptions is self-deception'. [*Cratylus*, 428d]

Also, with regard to serious and playful element in the dialogues as a whole, the authorial stance points to the

search for more serious meaning in playful gesture in the dialogues. Plato stated in *Epistle VII* that a serious man never treats the subject in his concern so seriously that he really means what he literally writes. He might have thought of something better otherwise ' "then surely" not the gods, but mortals "have utterly blasted his wits." '[*Epistle VII*, 344c-d] To be sure, *mutatis mutandis* this passage comes from Homer's *Iliad* in which, against Antenor's advise of surrendering Helen to the enemy, Paris retorted:

'I take exception to that speech of yours. You might have thought of something better. But if you mean what you say, and seriously propose this move, the gods themselves must have addled your brains'. [*the Iliad VII* 357-60, and *XII*, 231-4]

In the *Seventh Epistle*, Plato changed from the gods to mortals as the cause of this oversight. Perhaps, in the *Cratylus*, since Socrates pronounced that his speech had been under the spell of divine power, therefore, it should have been more appropriate to blame the gods rather than the mortals for the error and fallacy with regard to the correctness of names. As Socrates' speech has been said to start with divine power and end with the term fire and water because either Euthyphro's horses or his muse had deserted Socrates, or the terms were too difficult [*Cratylus*, 407d, 409d]. Nonetheless, that is not the point. Socrates did not believe in Homer's story of the gods as it had been believed by Euthyphro, namely the gods involved themselves with evils and crimes [*Euthyphro*, 6a-b]. For Socrates, the gods must associate only with what was good. Thus, divine power could not be responsible for errors and mistakes which mortals committed. Man must be responsible for what he has done. With regard to Socrates' fallacy in the *Cratylus*, it must be intentional. Since what he had done had been well-planned. Furthermore, it is often stated elsewhere that 'no one errs voluntarily'. With this regard to Socrates, if there be such a man who errs voluntarily, he should be wiser and more powerful than other who are unintentional [*Lesser Hippias*, 376a-b]. Also, in the *Republic*, when one intentionally imitates someone who is unworthy of himself, 'he will not wish to liken himself in earnest..except in the few cases where he is doing something good...[h]is mind disdains them, unless it be for jest' [*Republic*, Book III 396d]. With regard to similar view, Alexandre Koyre also argued that the reader 'is right..in perceiving that Socrates is poking fun, [b]ut he is wrong if he believes that philosopher is making fun of him, [t]he modern reader is wrong, if he forgets that he is the reader of the dialogues, not Socrates' interlocutors, [f]or though Socrates often has his fun at

the expense of his interlocutors, Plato never mocks his reader' [Alexandre Koyre, *Discovering Plato*, New York and London, 1945, pp. 3-4]. Hence, there certainly exists a special motif for Socrates to use irony and fallacy. And it will be comprehensible when we restore this context to the passage which together they can become so mutually useful as to make its complete picture.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Human and The Divine

It is against the above discussion that the passage in question in the *Cratylus*, which has been said to be pertinent to the *Phaedrus* 249b, is to be interpreted. Both passages render the idea of the difference between man and animals.

After rendering the speech on the gods, demigods or heroes, then it was the turn for the discussion of the name of man, *anthropos*. Socrates gave his etymological analysis of the name as follows:

'the name "man", *anthropos*, indicates that the other animals do not examine, or consider, or look up at, *anathrei*, any of the things that they see, but man has no sooner---that is, *opope*---than he looks up at and considers that which he has seen. Therefore of all the animals man alone is rightly called man, *anthropos*, because he looks up at, *anathrei*, what he has seen, *opope*.'¹

Before this, Socrates had remarked that the term 'anthropos' was more difficult than others², but with his ironic 'divine inspiration' he was able to render its account.³ It has been mentioned that this account is pertinent to the passage 249b in the *Phaedrus*. Indeed, the passage in the *Phaedrus* might help to shed light on its counterpart in the discussion of the name of man in the *Cratylus*. The *Phaedrus* 249b runs like this: 'For the soul which has never seen the truth can never pass into human form'. In the *Cratylus*, the difference between man and

¹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (399c).

² Plato, *Cratylus*, (398e).

³ Plato, *Cratylus*, (399a).

animals is said to be attributable to his peculiar quality, that is, *anathrei*--'to look up at'. These two passages can be related to one another in the sense that the experience of truth in the human soul is relevant to '*anathrei*' in human nature. In other words, man's capability of '*anathrei*' and his exclusive experience of truth in the soul are interrelated. That is to say, man's capability of '*anathrei*' is inherent in the nature of the human soul. However, it is not quite as simple as it seems to be, and as its relevant contextual interpretations have evidently shown. Thus, Socrates' explanation of the term 'man' under his self-claimed divine power needs a very careful interpretation in conjunction with its meticulously studied context.

It has been argued that Socrates' irony is aimed at something better than just to expose the ignorance of others. Divine inspiration is also his intentional fallacy. In fact, he said such suprahuman wisdom could be utilised. So, what had resulted from divine power must be carefully interpreted.

Under divine inspiration, the signification of the term anthropos is said to lie in a certain quality of man which is quite distinct from animals. Also, it was explained that the term had undergone 'a change of that sort'.⁴ It is the change of letters that made the name different, by sight and sound, from its original form.⁵ However, earlier it had been argued that according to the principle of name with reference to the nature of things, the meaning of the term must be intact despite its various

⁴ Plato, *Cratylus*, (399b).

⁵ Plato, *Cratylus*, (399a-b): '...we often put in or take out letters, making the names different...and we change the accent.'

changes⁶; but a person who possesses the knowledge of the correctness of names is not confused with such a change of letters. He would understand the true meaning of the name

'just as the physician's drugs, when prepared with various colours and perfumes, seem different to us, though they are the same, but to the physician, who considers only their medicinal values, they seem the same, and he is not confused by the additions.'⁷

For instance, having no letters in common, the names Hector, Astyanax, and Archeopolis simply meant the same thing, namely 'king'. In the same way, the names Agis, Polemachus, and Eupolemus conveyed the meaning of 'general', or 'physician' in the case of Iatrocles and Acesimbrotus.⁸ Likewise, the same principle should be applicable to the term *anthropos*. That is, first, whatever different forms it had undergone, certainly, its original meaning cannot be missed by 'the one who knows about names'. Secondly, its original meaning can be regarded as being veracious, provided that it is derived from the true understanding of the nature of man. According to the empirical aspect of the nature of living beings, to a certain extent the law of nature makes no leap, *natura non facit saltus*, and 'the natural offspring of each species, genos, is after its kind'.⁹ It is from this that Socrates' line of reasoning has been drawn to underly the principle

⁶ Plato, *Cratylus*, (394a): '..variety in the syllables is admissible, so that names which are the same appear different to the uninitiated.'

⁷. Plato, *Cratylus*, (394a-b). As regard the matter of playful and jest element in authorial stance, Schleiermacher argued that Socrates' etymological examination of names had been carried out in jest. See Schleiermacher, *op. cit.*, p. 231. But I regard it as a playful/jest mixture.

⁸ Plato, *Cratylus*, (394c).

⁹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (393c).

of the correctness of names. No matter what a species is called, its nature remains what it is. If it is right to call a lion's offspring a lion and a horse's offspring a horse, then any offspring that was born from a human being should be called a human being. And whatever names our species has been given, its essence would never be affected by just linguistic change.

Accordingly, Socrates applied this principle to the names of the characters in Homer's work; Astyanax was Hector's son; Hector was King Priam's prospective successor. With reference to certain social values in the fifth century, it was believed that Hector and Astyanax were by nature born to be kings. So the names had been given in accordance with their nature; but, as discussed above, it is disputable as to ascribe ambiguous qualities such as kingship, beauty, etc., to human nature. However, the other aspect of name which should be taken into consideration is their common name. They had been called by the common name 'man', anthropos. With regard to the principle of name, Astyanax must be named after his parents. If Hector was a human being, then Astyanax must acquire the same name in the same way that one's offspring is named after its kind, except when it is born contrary to its own nature, namely prodigies or decadence.

After discussing the names of Hector and Astyanax, Socrates concluded that, according to the principle of name, the denomination of the offspring of a kind should be after its kind; or it must be called after its own class if it was born differently from the class of its parents:

'For instance, when an impious son is born to a good and pious man, ought he not, as in our former example when a mare brought forth a calf, to have the designation of the class to which he

belongs, instead that of his parent?''¹⁰

Then he gave some more examples of the names in order to support that principle of name. He rendered the list of names by selecting the name of Orestes as his starting point. Why did it have to be Orestes?¹¹ There are two possibilities: first, usually, any Greeks who were familiar with the story of the Trojan War, might have expected to hear a similar discussion with regard to the names of the characters of the other party in the *Iliad*. Secondly, as regards the law of nature that the offspring should be named after its parents or should be named after its own class in the case of unnatural birth, Socrates' departure with Orestes would be quite interesting with regard to the investigation of the name of Orestes and his lineage of family. Since although Orestes was human, however, it had been said that he descended from divine ancestors.

I

The name of Orestes was regarded as a correct denomination. Its meaning of 'mountain man' correctly

¹⁰ Plato, *Cratylus*, (394d). To be sure, this analogy is fallible.

¹¹ Different views have been given for this. David K. Nichols gives the reason for the birth of political wisdom as the terminator of the conflicts in family life concerning parricide and infanticide in Orestes' lineage which was originated in his divine ancestors' evils and crimes. The story of Orestes signifies the descending decadence from divine to human realm. And the chain of evils stopped when political wisdom emerged in the human realm. See David K. Nichols, 'Aeschylus's *Oresteia* and the Origins of Political Life', *op. cit.*

corresponded to the nature of Orestes himself.¹² Then, the name of Agamemnon, the father of Orestes, was discussed, since the investigation had been conducted in accordance with the principle of name with reference to the nature of things. Therefore, each name was to be traced using its lineage. Following this, Socrates traced up and examined the names of Orestes' ancestors, namely from Agamemnon to Atreus, Pelops, Tantalus, Zeus, Cronus, and Uranus. Agamemnon signified 'admirable for remaining', Atreus for 'stubbornness, fearlessness, and ruinous acts', Pelops for 'one who sees only what is near', Tantalus for 'the most wretched and balancing', Zeus for 'the author of life, ruler and king of all, through whom all living beings have the gifts of life', Cronus for 'the purity and unblemished nature of mind', and Uranus for 'looking at the things above'.¹³

Remarkably, Socrates' explanation of the names and the nature of the divine name-holders was contrary to what had been regarded as the traditional account, which was originated in Hesiod's Theogony. According to the Theogony, Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus committed infanticide, parricide, and other evil crimes. However, Socrates regarded his own contrivance of the account of the names as being appropriate to their individual natures.

To be sure, the significance of the name of Orestes in the context of the ancient Greek theatre has to be taken into account. As Jean-Pierre Vernant comments 'the story of Orestes expresses in the form of tragedy the conflicts that disrupt family life, particularly those which set man and woman against each other within the home: the conflicts between man and wife, son and mother, the paternal and

¹² Plato, *Cratylus*, (394e).

¹³ Plato, *Cratylus*, (394b-396d).

maternal lines'.¹⁴ Therefore, the reader of the *Cratylus* should have expected from Socrates a reference to Orestes and his lineage of family in this notorious aspect with regard to the innate evil of the family. However, the meaning of each name had been explained; but, in regard to the common nature shared by the parents and offspring of the same class in relation to the principle of name, nothing had been mentioned in the course of the investigation. Moreover, it seems that all of the members of Orestes' lineage were either prodigies or decadence with regard to the nature of their parents. For their individual natures differed from one another although they were from the same family. Viewed from the aspect of natural inheritance with regard to the individual nature of its members, it should have been said that each belonged to a different class from their parents; each possessed his own individual nature. However, to a certain extent, Orestes' lineage can be divided into two categories: one is Orestes' human ancestors, whose nature in a way can be said to be of the same kind, namely an evil nature; the other is Orestes' divine origin. The nature of Orestes' divine ancestors obviously differed from their human descendants. It is because Socrates interpreted nature of divinity in such a purified way. Such interpretation has caused doubt in the reader's mind. Since Socrates did not give any comments concerning the result of his application of the principle of name to Orestes' family. Of course, giving the example and investigation of the names of Orestes' lineage of family in such manner seems to be unreasonably

¹⁴ Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Myth and Thought among the Greeks*, London, 1983, p. 138, see also pp. 134-5. In the *Statesman*, 268e, in his discussion on the search for statesmanship, the Stranger gave the example of the statesmanship in the myth of the revolution of the universe which he said came from the story of the quarrel between Atreus and Thyestes. And this story was said to be well known among the Greeks. Also, the story of decadence of the human race is to be discussed in Chapter Eleven with regard to the free will of man in the age of Zeus since he has freedom to rule and take care of himself.

wasteful and aimless. What he stated after this was

'if I remember the genealogy of Hesiod and the still earlier ancestors of the gods he mentions, I would have gone on examining the correctness of their names until I had made a complete trial whether this wisdom which has suddenly come to me, I know not whence, will fail or not'.¹⁵

However, if we take an alternative, as mentioned above, in regard to the name 'anthropos', and apply and subject it to the similar method, then the meaning of the analysis of the correctness of the names of Orestes' family would come to light. In the same way that the names of Hector and Astyanax had been investigated, apart from the name 'Orestes', the son of Agamemnon was called by the common name of 'man'. According to the principle of name in concern, Agamemnon, Atreus, Pelops, Tantalus, Zeus, Cronus, and Uranus should be understood to be human; but we know that Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus were divine beings not human. Then the trace of the names from the human to the divine realm renders significant interpretative effects.

First, there is a metamorphosis in the lineage of the family; Tantalus, who was human, *anthropos*, was the offspring of Zeus and Pluto, the divine. This transitional point was began with Tantalus. Although he was born a human being, he later became immortalised by his crime. Secondly, as regards the ancestral lineage, man, anthropos, can be said to descend from the divine realm. This descendant should be regarded as a decadence not a pedigree. Thirdly, it nevertheless hints at a relationship between man and the gods. To be sure, most of the prominent characters in Homer can be said to be in one way or another related to the gods.

When Socrates rendered his account of the names of the

¹⁵ Plato, *Cratylus*, (396c-d).

gods, namely Zeus, Cronus, and Uranus, it is exactly at this point that he pointed out to others that his speech was inspired by divine power. He ironically admitted that the speech was possible because of divine power, since he, who was just a mortal, was ignorant of that divine knowledge with regard to the account of the names. Whatever he said about the names and nature of the gods resulted from divine inspiration. In fact, as once stated, it was divine power, according to Euthyphro's account, that took over Socrates; but we know that Socrates effaced himself behind his ironic divine possession. With regard to the names of the gods, Hephaestus and Xanthus, in the *Cratylus* 391e, Socrates' irony enables the reader to interpret the gods with regard to Euthyphro's account of the nature of the gods. Euthyphro believed in the story, as told by the poets, that the gods were in a state of war. As discussed before, one of the poets is Homer whose epic distinctly portrayed the war between the gods. The other poet well known for his genealogy of the gods is Hesiod. His genealogy depicts particularly the aspect of crimes and vices of the gods, parricide and infanticide in particular.¹⁶

II

In analyzing the names of the divine ancestors of Orestes, Euthyphro's gods had led Socrates to explain their names with reference to their evil nature, in the same way that the nature of Orestes, Agamemnon, Atreus, Pelops, and Tantalus had been explained. In contradistinction to Hesiod's account of the evils of the gods, Socrates'

¹⁶ Adkins believed that with regard to the ancient Greeks, the story of the gods as such was originated with Hesiod. And, also, the creation of mankind would be better known to a Hesiodic than a Homeric audience. See Adkins, *From the Many to the One, op. cit.*, p. 50.

interpretation turned out to render quite a sublime essence to the nature of the gods. It is highly possible that Socrates intended to contrast his own understanding of divine nature with that of Hesiod. For a moment later, Hesiod's name was introduced into the discussion.¹⁷ Also, it affirms that Socrates would never unintentionally commit blasphemy by subscribing to such a hideous account of divine nature. Socrates was ironic with regard to his excuse of divine power. Again, if he would ever be possessed by any divine power, it must be his daemonic voice. Since these daemonic spirits were regarded as his guardians, the account of the names of the gods had been interpreted accordingly. That is, divine nature associated only with the good.

After discussing the names of the gods, Socrates then began to investigate the term 'god', theos, which means that he wanted to examine the common name for the gods not their proper name.¹⁸ In the same way that Hector, Astyanax, Orestes, Agamemnon, Atreus, Pelops were called man, Zeus, Cronos, and Uranus were called god. Socrates gave the reason for the change from the proper name to the common or generic name: since the proper names discussed earlier were quite inappropriate and proved deceptive. The given names had not corresponded to the nature of the name-holders. The names were given as if they were 'names of ancestors or they were the expression of a prayer'.¹⁹ Therefore, it was better to disregard it and then

'find the correct names in the nature of the eternal and absolute; for there the names ought to have been given with the greatest care, and perhaps some of them were given by a power more divine

¹⁷ Plato, *Cratylus*, (397e).

¹⁸ Plato, *Cratylus*, (397d).

¹⁹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (397b).

than that of man.²⁰

In speaking of the names of the eternal and absolute nature, Socrates should have meant the generic term which represents the class or species of things. That is, it is the search for the understanding of the being itself.²¹

As said before, Socrates' etymological analysis of the nature of the correctness of names can be said to have been made in jest. This investigation might not be taken seriously in terms of philological values.²² It must be taken as Socrates' contrivance in pursuit of something more important than just the exposition of the ignorance of others or a philological contribution.

Unexpectedly, despite given under divine power, the term 'god' had quite a scientific explanation. The term was said to have originated from the term 'thein' which meant 'running' since the Greeks originally worshipped sun, moon, earth, stars, and sky. They observed the nature of the movement of the universe. That is why they had called them 'theous', gods, ever since, though afterwards they gained the knowledge of other kinds of gods.²³ However, following this, Socrates pretended that he did not know what to consider, following his analysis of the term god. It is from this point that the term suggested by Hermogenes seemed to be in accordance with the descending order in

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ In other words, it resembles the meaning of 'concept' or *ennoia*, or forms as thoughts, *noeton*, of God or Man.

²² See Scleiermacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-9, 233.

²³ Plato, *Cratylus*, (397d). Paul Shorey suggested that the Greeks called sun, moon, and so forth 'god' after the barbarians. See Paul Shorey, *the Republic of Plato*, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

Hesiod's myth of the races.²⁴

This reference to Hesiod is not arbitrary. Since Socrates himself had mentioned his name twice; the first time immediately after his discussion of the names of Orestes' family, and the other after Hermogenes told him to consider the term 'daimones' following the term 'god'.²⁵ Though Hermogenes in turn seemed unaware of the source which enabled him to answer Socrates, what was to be considered next to the term 'god' was spirits, daimones. He said confidently that he knew very well that the story

²⁴ It should be added here that, according to Vernant's study of Hesiod's myth, the sequence of the races of man in the myth should be understood with regard to a cyclical pattern rather than the usual interpretation of chronological order. He argued for the substitution of structural pattern for chronological one. He said

'[t]he ages succeed one another to form a complete cycle, which, once completed, starts all over again, either in the same order, or, more probably, as in the Platonic myth in the "Politicus", in reverse order, so that cosmic time is unfolded alternately, first in one direction and then in the other. Hesiod laments the fact that he himself belongs to the fifth and last race, the race of iron, and at that point expresses the regret that he has not died earlier or been born later. This remark is incomprehensible in the context of human time that is continuously degenerating, but it makes perfect sense if we accept that the series of ages is a recurring renewable cycle, just like the sequence of the seasons.' [Vernant, *Myth and Thought among the Greeks*, op. cit., p. 6]

Vernant argued that Hesiod's myth of the races contains instructive purpose. To be sure, with regard to Platonic myths in the *Republic*, the *Statesman*, and elsewhere, their purpose is also instructive. See further discussion with regard to the myth of the revolution of the universe in the *Statesman* in Chapter Eleven.

²⁵ Plato, *Cratylus*, (396c, 397e).

of the golden race or spirits was the first race of men to be born as regards the first in the chronological order of the myth of the races.²⁶ It is possible that the influence of Hesiod's myth had permeated the minds of the Greeks in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., as an ordinary young man like Hermogenes could easily recall it despite the lack of exact knowledge of its origin.²⁷

However, neither way affects Socrates' investigation, since he took into account the myth with regard to its structural order in order to render some interpretative effects. He mentioned Hesiod's name in order to remind his interlocutor and also the reader of the further content of Hesiod's myth, which he was to examine. Also, it is quite probable that he intended his reader to think of the genealogy of man in the myth in comparison to his investigation of the names of things with regard to the nature of their essence, since all five races narrated in the myth were the class of mortal men. Hesiod also employed the word 'mortal man', *meropon anthropon*, to represent each one among all five races; each race was man in succession to one another. Respectively, they were the race of the gold, the silver, the bronze, the hero, and, finally, the iron which was regarded as the contemporary

²⁶ Plato, *Cratylus*, (397e).

²⁷ H.D.F. Kitto said that Hesiod's myth of Prometheus 'offered ample material' to the fifth century poet viz., Aeschylus. See H.D.F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy: A Literary Study*, London, 1961, p. 104. It is most likely that the myth of the races had been equally regarded. However, in saying that Hesiod's myth was well-known to the Greeks, it does not necessarily mean that everyone or most of them had to seriously take the story of the myth. To a certain extent, the situation with regard to the belief in the myth perhaps is not unlike the belief in the story of Eden or the Bible of people in modern time. In the most extreme case, some might argue that this kind of myth in the fifth century can hardly be taken seriously by the Greeks, particularly the Athenians. See John Burnet, 'The Socratic Doctrine of the Soul', *op. cit.*, p., 249.

one.²⁸

III

Hesiod intended his *Works and Days* to be an instructive discourse which offered a practical ethos for anyone in society. The myth of the races forms a part of the *Works and Days*. Therefore, it must be understood with regard to the author's intention. Hesiod said that the myth delineated 'how the gods and mortal men sprang from one source'.²⁹ According to the myth, *daimones* or spirits were regarded as the golden race, which is the first race of men to be born. They were believed, as Hesiod narrated:

'to live in the time of Cronos and...lived like gods without sorrow of heart, remote and free from toil and grief...and [they were] kindly, delivering from harm, and guardians of mortal men; for they roam everywhere over the earth, clothed in mist and keep watch on judgements and cruel deeds, givers of wealth; for this royal right also they received.'³⁰

It is this context which Hermogenes said he could not recall. He remembered only that the spirits were the first race of men. However, Socrates assisted his memory by citing what Hesiod said about the spirits. Following this, Socrates' interpretation of this passage must be taken into careful consideration, since it contains quite a significant message.

²⁸ Hesiod, 'Works and Days' in *Hesiod and Theognis*, translated by Dorothea Wender, Harmondsworth, 1985, 110-175.

²⁹ Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 108.

³⁰ Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 113-5, 123-7.

To be sure, before proceeding further, one has to take into consideration Socrates' interpretative position in relation to the text and its authorial intention. Socrates' interpretation has to be regarded as an appropriation of the myth for his specific purpose.³¹

³¹ Among other dialogues, this interpretative position is developed in the *Lesser Hippias*. The dialogue concerns the discussion on the judgement on the personality of Achilles and Odysseus in Homer. Imposing on self-understanding and self-responsibility, Socrates asked Hippias to stop imputing to Homer any criticism which he himself as the interpreter of, or the authority on Homer put forward with regard to Achilles and Odysseus. What Socrates asked more is that an interpreter should merge in one his own position and the authorial position of the text in concern. As he urged Hippias that

'Let us drop Homer, since it is impossible to ask him what he meant when he made those verses; but since you come forward to take up his cause, and agree in this which you say is his meaning, do you answer for Homer and yourself in common'. [*Lesser Hippias*, 365c-d]

This interpretative practice entails a conflation of speech and truth of the interpreter. Also, it invokes from him courage, self-responsibility, and self-commitment. Courage is quite essential since a particular text and its author might at one time or another be regarded [by the society] to be authoritative, incontestable, and even infallible. Confronting such a text, the courageous interpreter would be able to break through the prejudice of the society and penetrate into the text without any prejudice. In course of his study of the text, conflicts between himself and the text might occur. He then has to take into his careful and critical consideration what the text says to him. He will defy some points of the text to which he himself cannot agree. But when he finds what is congenial to his own nature, he will endorse or reenact it at all costs. After all this, there arrives his own interpretation of the text, in other words, his textual appropriation. With regard to Homer and Hesiod, the poets were respected by the Greeks as the authority on many important aspects and the divine source of knowledge. In particular, Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were taken as the source of traditional values, laws, ethos, eschatology, and social knowledge. It is from this point that Socrates imposed this interpretative practice. In this regard, I regard Socrates' position in the *Lesser Hippias* as being applicable to his interpretation of Hesiod in the *Cratylus*.

According to his interpretation, the golden race was not made of gold. Actually, it was made of goodness and beauty. In a similar regard, the iron race was not made of iron. The iron race was identifiable to the men of our time with regard to the pattern of birth and mortality.³² To be sure, Socrates' point of argument in saying that the golden race was not made of gold is derived from the fact that the iron race or our race was not made of iron either. From this point, he argued that Hesiod's myth could not be interpreted literally.

Socrates said further that since the good and the wise were mutually inclusive, so the spirits which were good must also be wise and knowing, daemones. It is precisely from the term 'knowing' or in Greek 'daemones' which the name of spirits or daimones was originated. However, in the myth, Hesiod had his golden race share several qualities with the gods. Such common qualities enabled the golden race to live its life 'without sorrow of heart, remote and free from toil and grief, miserable age rested not on them'. Socrates interpreted that such a divine quality which generated such a quality of life was in fact the quality of being good and beautiful. Hence, in this regard, the connection between the gods and the spirits is their participation in the goodness and beauty. To be sure, it was the Olympian gods who had been said to beget and make the golden race.³³ The spirits can be said to be the offspring of the gods.

Then, if the investigation of the name of the eternal and the absolute really followed Hesiod's original pattern, the next thing to be considered had to be the race of silver. However, the dialogue shows that Hermogenes

³² Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 175-195. See also Vernant, *Myth and Thought*, *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 18.

³³ Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 110.

skipped over to the fourth in the order. He jumped to the heroic race without any mention of its two preceding ages, namely the races of silver and bronze.³⁴ Of course, anyone familiar with Hesiod's myth should be wondering about the absence of the other two. Generally speaking, with regard to the grounds for the spirits being taken up after the gods, one can speculate that, first, as regards the hierarchical order in the general attitude of the ancient Greeks, the ontological status of spiritual beings is sequential to the gods which were regarded as to the ultimate, highest authority. Secondly, according to the myth, the fact that Hesiod made the golden race or the spirits the first race of mortal men which was created by the gods, means that chronologically speaking the spirits can be regarded as the second race, *genos*, next after the gods.

To be sure, it is apparent that the omission of the silver and the bronze can be taken into account in the same line of reasoning as regards both the hierarchical and chronological orders.³⁵ Hesiod said that all these four races, namely, golden, silver, bronze, and hero were regarded as the predecessors of mankind, that is to say his own generation.³⁶ Therefore, apart from the common name '*anthropos*' which underlies all five generations or kinds of man, they had also individually been called by other names according to their individual natures.

³⁴ Plato, *Cratylus*, (398c).

³⁵ Superficially, the interpretation in that line seems plausible. But Vernant has proved it to be inadequate and incomprehensible with regard to Hesiod's instructive intention in the *Works and Days*. See Jean-Pierre Vernant, *Myth and Thought.*, *op. cit.*, Chapter I and II. At this stage, I give an interpretation with regard to its traditional viewpoint. However, later, I will apply Vernant's interpretation to understanding Platonic myths of the races and the revolution of the universe in the *Republic* and the *Statesman* respectively.

³⁶ Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 175.

IV

The golden race, which was the first generation had been described as 'pure spirits dwelling on the earth', since they were said to become 'spirits' and guardians of man in their afterlife. In this regard, they were honoured as a royal right, *geras basileion*.³⁷ The race of silver which came second had some similar and different aspects with regard to its predecessor. With regard to the life of the silver race, it could never be equal to that of the golden race with regard to both body and spirit. They did not live in the age of Cronos but in the age of Zeus who annihilated them out of anger, which had been aroused by impiety and misdeeds. For they had been 'sinning and wronging one another, and not serving the immortals'.³⁸ Thus they lived life in sorrow because of such evils which had originated in immoderation. Nevertheless, after Zeus destroyed them, they were later named 'blessed spirits' of the underworld and 'yet honour attended them also'.³⁹

The race of bronze which had also been omitted in the discussion was said to be terrible and strong because of their propensity to 'the lamentable works of Ares and deeds of violence'.⁴⁰ Despite their invulnerability, they destroyed one another with their own seemingly unconquerable strength. Their life then passed to Hades, and 'left no name'.⁴¹ According to the myth, nothing had been said about whether they had been honoured at all.

³⁷ Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 121-127.

³⁸ Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 135-139.

³⁹ Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 140-142.

⁴⁰ Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 145.

⁴¹ Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 152-3.

At this point, the interpretation to be derived from what has been discussed above will cast light upon the reason for the omission of the two races from the discussion. As the gods and the spirits had already been examined, then we know that the golden and the silver had some common qualities. That is, both were called 'daimones' in their afterlife. The difference lies only in their destination, that is, the golden spirits' abode was on the earth whilst the silver dwelled in the underworld. It is in this regard that one was called 'epichthonian daemons' and the other 'hupochthonian daemons'.

Nevertheless, they had been commonly called by the name 'spirits'. The term was regarded as the name of the eternal and absolute. Also, the term 'spirits' had been analyzed in the discussion of the golden race. So there was no need to discuss this common name again in the case of the silver. For the silver shared the common quality of being 'spirits' with the golden and bore the same common name, since the chief concern in the latest investigation of names is the examination of the nature of the name as such. Therefore, it can be said that the term 'spirits' in the eye of Socrates has the nature of the eternal and absolute as it is evident in the description of the term itself. However, with regard to the race of bronze, it had been said that the life of such a race left no name after they had passed away. They had not been honoured or respected. Their name had not been remembered or immortalised.⁴² Therefore, the name of the race of bronze had been omitted because its essence was not eternal and absolute. In this regard, the above interpretation explains why Hermogenes selected the term 'hero' to consider next after the 'spirits' and omitted the silver and the bronze.

⁴² Compare this to the love of immortality in Diotima's speech in the *Symposium*, 207d-208b.

With regard to the dramatic situation in the *Cratylus*, Hermogenes' action in this particular scene, namely raising the quest for the examination of the term 'hero' in line after the spirits, was quite independent of Socrates' influence; although it is true that it was Socrates who drew Hermogenes towards Hesiod's myth as he should have conceived very well the young man's presupposition with regard to the story of the myth. Socrates might have rightly speculated that after his examination of the term 'god' Hermogenes would regard the term 'spirits' to be considered next after 'god'; but his optional turn for the heroic race was not under Socrates' influence. It can hardly be derived from anything but the own decision of the young man himself, and a possible account for such a decision has already been discussed above.

With regard to the dialogue as a dramatic construction, Hermogenes's role is as Socrates' interlocutor. In this role he can be made to assist Socrates in one way or another with regard to the advancement of the conversation or the movement of the dramatic scene in pursuit of the purpose of the author. All characters are constructed to guide the reader to arrive at something the author aims at. In this regard, Hermogenes was made to act or speak in accordance with the direction of the author.

He could also be made to act or speak differently from what he had been made. To be sure, following the original pattern in Hesiod's myth, Hermogenes could have been made to ask Socrates to consider the names of the silver and the bronze; and with regard to the name of the silver race, Socrates could have replied that it was unnecessary to repeat the discussion about the term 'spirits'. Also, with regard to the name of the bronze, he should have answered that it was impossible, since the bronze had no other name which could be put under the class of the name in concern,

namely the name of the eternal and absolute.

Another possibility was that Socrates could have been made to react to the omission of the two races in Hermogenes' suggestion. He could have asked Hermogenes to explain why he had left out those two races. Socrates could have done so if he would not have been able to complete his examination of the names without taking into consideration the two missing races. Also, Hermogenes could have been reminded of his omission, if their absence really upset Socrates' plan; but there had not been any reaction from Socrates with regard to this matter. Hence it can be inferred that Socrates' silence or non-reaction towards Hermogenes' omission implies Socrates' consent of the omission.

The consent, derived from the interpretation of Socrates' non-reaction towards Hermogenes' omission or non-action with regard to the names of silver and bronze has of course been allowed by the author of the dialogue. As mentioned above, the cause of Hermogenes' action or non-action had been left unexplained in the dialogue. Then the speculation for a possible reason has been made to serve this purpose. Here, the reader has discovered another level of intention in relation to Hermogenes' intention and Socrates' consent. With regard to the obvious absence of the explanation of this important matter, which is obviously not to be left unexplained, the non-action of the characters is evidently the action of the author.

The intention ascribed to Hermogenes' non-action can hardly be applied to the author's action, since at the end of Book Three of the *Republic*, the same author has his Socrates speak of the myth of the races which this time it did not leave out those two races.⁴³ Contrariwise, the

⁴³ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book III 414e-417b).

race of heroes which came after the golden in the *Cratylus* had not been mentioned in Socrates' tale of the human race in the *Republic*. He clearly admitted that although his tale was a lie, it nevertheless was necessary as regards the education of the young and the welfare of the *polis*. To be sure, the discussion of such a matter of the *polis* and its citizens in the *Republic* was originally taken as an illustrative instrument to understanding justice in the human soul.⁴⁴ Therefore, it could be that the omission of the heroic class serves that particular purpose with regard to the authorial intention in the *Republic*. Hence, the omission of the silver and the bronze should be regarded in a similar respect. That is, it must be intended to effect a particular interpretation.

v

It is generally understood that the *Cratylus* as a whole concerns the discussion about the problems of the principle of name. Two main theories have been taken under scrutiny; one is the theory of the natural correctness of names; the other is based on the conventional agreement and the changes of the meaning of names. At the end of the dialogue, the conclusion is reached that neither one nor the other was justified. The result is that 'realities are to be learned or sought for, not from names but much better through themselves than through names'.⁴⁵ In this

⁴⁴ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book II 368c-369a).

⁴⁵ Plato, *Cratylus*, (439b). If the search for the nature of things is carried on through names, then, it will face the problem of obscurum per obscurum. It means that the object in question has to be explained or understood with reference to different names or languages. Different names or languages are regarded as the example of what is being examined. It is inevitable that even the example itself needs a further example. The need for the example of the previous example will be infinitely endless. Compare this

respect, our concern about the discussion of the term 'anthropos' with reference to the theory of the natural correctness of names might be useless since all theories discussed in the *Cratylus* have been said to be invalid. Also, the discovery of realities cannot be accomplished through the study of names. At this point, one recalls Schleiermacher's comments that one cannot attempt to derive a serious interpretation from Socrates' etymological examination of names in the *Cratylus*. Schleiermacher believed that Plato intended to construct a playful Socrates to discredit any claim of linguistic representation of realities and truth.⁴⁶

The argument for the playful element is evident but not totally convincing. As argued before, Socrates' irony and fallibility contain not only intrinsic value but also something beyond that. Again, the action and non-action of Socrates and Hermogenes resulted from the literary action of the author. Prior to the discussion of the name of the eternal and absolute nature, it has been argued that the author's literary action has rendered some remarkable points. The most outstanding points are the following: Socrates' self-effacement under divine possession, the underlying aspect of the oscillation between divine and human realms, and the lineage of the human race. It is under the divine-human oscillation that the discussion of the names of the gods, spirits, hero, and man, have been examined.

Under divine power, the proper names of the gods, namely Zeus, Cronos, and Uranus had been described differently from what Hesiod ascribed to the nature of the gods in the *Theogony*. Therefore, we should consider the

point to the *Statesman*, 277d-e.

⁴⁶ See Schleiermacher, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-9, 233.

analyses of the terms such as gods, spirits, hero, and man, with regard to divine power as well. Considered under divine power, it comes to light why the spirits have been interpreted as being good, beautiful, and wise. It is for a similar reason that the silver race or the spirits of the underworld has been left out, since the good, beautiful, and wise could not live its life in such a foolish, immoderate, and impious way.⁴⁷ Furthermore, we know that the name of the eternal and absolute nature, which Socrates was investigating, should be generated by divine power. Therefore, with regard to the search under divine power, the essential reason for the absence of the bronze race is not only because it had no other name, but also because the quality of the race itself is not qualified to be included in the class of the name given by divine power.

It is notable that both the silver and the bronze lacked the same virtue, namely self-temperance, since self-temperance, *sophrosyne*, is said elsewhere to be one of the essential composite virtues of justice. Without it, individuals and the *polis* will come to self-destruction.⁴⁸ It is this point which disqualified them from the list of the name of the eternal and absolute nature. In other words, they had been excluded from what I hereafter call the 'divine circle'.⁴⁹ Therefore, it seems that, with regard to the authorial intention, the reason for the

⁴⁷ Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 135-140.

⁴⁸ Without self-temperance, Socrates told Glaucon that both *polis* and *psuche* 'will not await their destruction at the hands of others, but will be first themselves in bringing it about'. See the *Republic*, Book II, 375c.

⁴⁹ Cf. the *Republic*, Book III, 416: 'Gold and silver, we will tell them, they have of the divine quality for the gods always in their souls, and they have no need of the metal of men nor does holiness suffer them to mingle and contaminate that heavenly possession with the acquisition of mortal gold, since many impious deeds have been done about the coin of the multitude, while that which dwells within them is unsullied.'

omission of those races involves the criterion of virtue rather than anything else.⁵⁰

It is in this regard that Hermogenes was made to skip to the heroic race, to which Socrates gave consent by his silence. However, it seems quite unclear why this was done. The interpretative effect which the author aims at from this scene will come to light if we consider further how appropriate Socrates was in his analyses of the term 'hero' and 'man'.

Originally in the *Works and Days*, Hesiod described this fourth race of men as follows:

'nobler and more righteous, a god-like race of hero-men who are called demi-gods,...Grim war and dread battle destroyed a part of them, some in the land of Cadmus at seven-gated Thebe when they fought for the flocks of Oedipus, and, some, when it had brought them in ships over the great sea gulf to Troy for rich-haired Helen's sake..they lived untouched by sorrow in

⁵⁰ The order in Hesiod's myth of the races has been approached in the same manner that Vernant points out that

'[i]f the race of gold is called "the first", it is not because it arose one fine day, before the others, in the course of linear and irreversible time, [o]n the contrary, if Hesiod describes it at the beginning of his account, this is because it embodies virtues---symbolized by gold---which are at the top of a scale of nontemporal values'.

See Vernant, *op. cit.*, p. 6. Cf. also the *Republic*, Book III, 392a: 'we have declared the right way of speaking about gods and daemons and heroes and the other world'; and with regard to the ideal city, see also Book IV, 427b: 'The founding of temples, and sacrifices, and other forms of worship of gods, daemons, and heroes; and likewise the burial of the dead and the services we must render to the dwellers in the world beyond to keep them gracious.'

the islands of the blessed along the shore of deep swirling Ocean,..far from the deathless gods, and Cronos ruled over them; for the father of men and gods released him from his bonds.⁵¹

Socrates appropriated this by translating it into his own version. He said that the term 'ērōs' was originated from 'eros' or love because 'a god fell in love with a mortal woman, or a mortal man with a goddess' to which the heroes were born.⁵² Socrates' hero is not a warrior who fights boldly in the battlefield as the Homeric or Hesiodic heroes had been.⁵³ He argued that with his knowledge of the old Attic pronunciation, the term can be understood better because the heroes were 'wise and clever orators and dialecticians, able to ask questions, *erotan*, for *eirein* is the same as *legein*, speak'.⁵⁴ For this reason, Socrates pointed out that when the term hero was pronounced in the Attic dialect, 'the heroes turn out to be orators and askers of questions'.⁵⁵ Hence the heroic race instead of being brave and noble fighters, proved 'to be a race of orators and sophists'.⁵⁶ For Socrates' hero, speech

⁵¹ Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 158-169b.

⁵² Plato, *Cratylus*, (398c, 398d).

⁵³ With regard to the changing values of human excellence from Homeric warring state to the fifth and fourth centuries *polis*, see North, *op. cit.*,; Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, *op.cit.*,; Morrall, 'Political Ideas in Greek Tragedy', *op.cit.*; Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy*, *op. cit.*; Blair Campbell, 'Paradigms Lost: Classical Athenian Politics in Modern Myth', and 'The Epic Hero as Politico', *History of Political Thought*, Vol. X Issue 2 Summer 1989, and Vol. XI Issue 2 Summer 1990.

⁵⁴ Plato, *Cratylus*, 398c, 398d. Cf. 390c-d. Socrates's hero is indeed a dialectic hero who is at once name-giver and law-giver since dialectic, language and laws are inseparable.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Plato, *Cratylus*, (398e).

becomes his mighty sword, debate is his battlefield, and his victory is to successfully persuade his opponents.⁵⁷

Following this, it was Socrates himself who introduced the term 'anthropos' for the next investigation. Again, he reminded others of his condition under divine possession. As we know, Socrates' account of this race is completely different from what had been told in Hesiod with regard to the iron race. However, as regards the order and pattern of his examination of these names, it is obvious that Socrates' 'anthropos' takes the place of the iron race in Hesiod's myth.

Hesiod said that the iron race was the present human race. It was undesirable since life was so miserable, although 'some good mingled with their evils'. The fatal annihilation of the race was pending, because all the evils which Hesiod regarded as a sign for Zeus to come to destroy them were not far-fetched. Such evils were family feud, ingratitude, war, lying, injustice, etc. All these were evident in any society.⁵⁸ It was Hesiod's instructive purpose in intending his work to be ethical canon or ethos of men in the society.

Although the iron race had no other name, however, we understand very well that the race was supposed to be our human race, namely mankind 'anthropos'. There are some misgivings with regard to the inclusion of this term in the divine circle. Firstly, if the silver and the bronze had been excluded from the discussion because of their lack of virtue, then the iron race should have been omitted as well, since it seemed to be far worse than the others.

⁵⁷ Cf. 'Politicizing the Hero' and 'Heroicizing Politics: Adaptations' in Blair Campbell, 'The Epic Hero as Politico', *op. cit.*, pp. 196-202. See also the love of immortality of the hero in the *Symposium*, 207d-208b.

⁵⁸ Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 180-195.

Secondly, in explaining the term, Socrates is said to state strangely that 'anthropos' was different from other animals because of its quality of being able to 'look up at things', *anathrei*. Thirdly, despite our understanding of some particular purpose for his appropriation of Hesiod's myth, Socrates' interpretation of this human race did not leave any trace of the Hesiodian iron race at all. It differs from his interpretation of the golden and heroic races, which we could find some reference to in the original text. Fourthly, it seems that the investigation of names in relation to the divine circle ends with 'anthropos'. For Socrates reverted to the discussion of the proper names after he finished his examination of the meaning of 'anthropos'.⁵⁹

VI

Up to this point, after the long examination of the context of the discussion in the *Cratylus*, the particular passage on 'anthropos' can now be fully comprehended. This particular and whole with regard to the contextual precondition of the search for 'anthropos' can be understood to complement each other. Also, it can be argued that apart from what has been generally ascribed to the *Cratylus* as its main subject-matter, namely the discussion on the theory of names, its deeper motif, which underlies the dialogue as a whole, is the guidance for the search for self-knowledge: that is, the understanding of human nature. In particular, it is situated in Socrates' interpretation of the term 'anthropos'.

The oscillating movement between the divine and human realm is intended to indicate a certain connection between

⁵⁹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (401b).

human and divine. The theory of natural correctness of name entails a natural tie between the same species or class whose offspring are named after their parents. The name of Orestes was deliberately chosen to testify to the theory. Two significant factors with regard to 'Orestes' have to be taken into account: firstly, in the context of the ancient Greek theatre, Orestes was symbolic of the tragedy of family life which involved conflicts, infanticide and parricide in both lines of ancestors; secondly, Orestes' lineage was descended from the gods who had committed the first crimes. However, moving the trace of lineage upwards, it cannot be said that the name of Orestes and his families completely satisfied the aspect of the natural tie in the theory, although Orestes and his human ancestors seemed to share a similar nature. However, under divine inspiration, the analysis of the names of the gods had been given in a new light which differed from its original story in Hesiod's *Theogony*. Zeus, Cronos, and Uranus in Socrates' interpretation disrupted the innate characteristics of the lineage. Nevertheless, the fact that Orestes was a descendant of Zeus, Cronos, and Uranus is intact. With regard to the theory of natural correctness of name, the examination of Orestes signifies the interrelatedness of human and divine. This point had been taken as a means to form a part of the oscillating movement between the two realms.

After the search arrived at Uranus, the top of Orestes' lineage, the investigation was shifted from the proper name---Zeus, Cronos, Uranus---to the common name, that is, 'god'. The term 'god' had been said to be the name of the eternal and absolute nature. Meanwhile, the name of Hesiod was introduced in order to invoke in Hermogenes or the audience a presupposition of the original account of the myth of the races. Taking for granted the presupposition of the myth, the order of the pattern in the myth was employed in order to descend from the divine to

the human realm again. Swaying from divine to human this time, the common name or class of being was investigated, but under divine power, the class of being to be considered must only be those in the divine circle. The divine circle is assessed with regard to the criterion of virtue. The myth of the races had been appropriated by Socrates in order to induce these following interpretative effects.

First, the spirits were metaphorically called the golden race because they were good, beautiful, and wise. Secondly, the heroic race, which was also wise and clever, was proved to be 'a fighter with speech as his mighty sword'. Thirdly, man or *anthropos* possessed peculiar virtue, namely 'anathrei', 'to look up at and consider what he has seen'. Fourthly, man was therefore included in the divine circle with regard to this virtue. Hitherto, in sum, Socrates' use of irony, fallacy, and ludicrous, abnormal demonstration in this context led us to infer that humanity can be partly said to share a divine quality as regards his possession of the virtue.

However, this account is not without ambiguity, since it can be drawn from the investigation of Orestes and his lineage of family that the possible grounds for man's divine connection is deduced from the fact that Orestes was descended from divine ancestors. As said before, the name of Orestes was taken to testify to the theory of natural correctness of name. The theory itself was developed from a given example of the names of Hector and his son, Astyanax. Both names were taken as an example of the natural tie of the same class with regard to parents and their offspring. The natural birth produced an offspring of the same class as its parents. If the birth was contrary to nature, the offspring must be named after its own class not the class of its parents, for example a calf born to a horse should be called a calf not a colt since it was an unnatural offspring. In the same way, the first

generation of Orestes' human ancestors should be regarded as the unnatural offspring of divine parents. Of course, they had to be named after their own class. Moreover, according to the myth of the races, the races had been created by the Olympian gods. The myth was intended, as Hesiod said, to show 'how the gods and mortal men sprung from one source'. Thus the myth could possibly in one way or another generate the belief that men were literally descended from the gods.⁶⁰ With regard to this application of the theory of name to the story of Orestes in Homer in conjunction with Hesiod's myth, it is therefore possible to infer that the human race was divine because they were literally the children of the gods.

Nevertheless, a careful analysis holds the reader back from such a conclusion. First of all, it concerns logical fallacy of which we said Socrates had given a hint.⁶¹ It lies in the grounds of the theory against which Orestes' lineage was testified, and the analysis of Orestes was followed by the introduction of Hesiod's myth into the discussion. According to the theory of name, with regard to Orestesian context, Orestes and his human ancestors were regarded as 'unnatural descendants' of their divine ancestors, and so was 'anthropos' in the myth. Although he was included in the divine circle, man could not be said to be equated with the races of the hero and the gold, let alone the gods themselves.

To be accurate, the spirits, the hero, and man should be regarded only as subdivisions of divinity in the same way that man in the *Statesman* has been said to be a subdivision of animals.⁶² Particularly, with regard to the line of argument in the *Statesman*, human beings were

⁶⁰ Hesiod, 'Works and Days', *op. cit.*, 108.

⁶¹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (393c).

⁶² Plato, *Statesman*, (261b, 266c).

regarded as the non-mixing breed. However, animals such as horses and asses were the opposite kind to human beings with regard to their cross-breeding. Therefore, an unnatural birth is possible only in certain kinds of animals. For human beings, it is not possible.

Concerning the theory of name, it is true that a natural offspring should be named after its parents and an unnatural one after its own nature. As a non-mixing breed, man will never experience an unnatural birth as such. Accordingly, the offspring and parents of human kind must be true to their own class, namely the human race. Socrates himself also stated elsewhere that he did not believe that man was born of an oak or a rock as it had been told in Homer, but of human parents only.⁶³ Therefore, it is a mistake to derive from this the idea of the possibility of the metamorphosis of the gods and man. In this regard, Homer's Orestes and Hesiod's myth cannot be taken literally into account in understanding Socrates' interpretation of 'anthropos'. In addition, Socrates' account of the term 'god' has to be regarded as a gesture to impede any undesirable interpretation. That is to say, if the reader had been intended by the author of the dialogue to interpret 'man's divine connection' in such manner, then, as regards the term 'god', Socrates should not have been made to give quite an absurd analysis, which was completely alien to the situation of his divine possession. He should have interpreted the word in a religious context rather than in such a scientific

⁶³ the *Apology*, 34d. Cf. Homer, *Odyssey*, 19, 163. Penelope asked Odsseus: 'However, I do press you still to give me an account of yourself, for you certainly did not spring from a tree or a rock, like the man in the old story.' It was believed that the gods or nymphs sprung from a rock or wind.

fashion.⁶⁴ As mentioned before, with this scientific version, the reader would be encumbered to make a straightforward connection between divine and human. So, in what way is man's divine connection to be understood?

VII

First of all, it is important that Socrates' meaning of 'divine' differs from Homer's and Hesiod's. As argued above, Homeric and Hesiodian understanding of the term had been appropriated by Socrates with regard to his study of Orestes and the myth of the races. However, the emergence of the Socratic divinity generates ambivalent interpretative effect.⁶⁵ At any rate, it is certain that

⁶⁴ Plato, *Cratylus*, (397d). In the *Republic*, Book VI, 508a -b, it shows that Socrates knew that what the Greeks regarded as their gods, the barbarians called them stars.

⁶⁵ Compared to the traditional values, it can be understood as an innovation, a new kind or set of knowledge. With regard to the epistemological situation in the fifth and fourth centuries, G.E.R. Lloyd says 'innovations are possible, occur, and are even inevitable within what is still conceived as an unaltered tradition'. [Lloyd, *The Revolutions of Wisdom*, op. cit., p. 52] His argument, which has referred to Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science, is based on the fact that 'innovation with no tradition at all would produce unintelligibility'. [Lloyd, op. cit., p. 50] This is perhaps the reason why Socrates had to shelter his own interpretation behind Homeric and Hesiodian values. Viewed from this angle, his position therefore remains conservative in comparison with sophists and other thinkers such as Anaxagoras, Protagoras. On the other hand, it is undeniable that his version of 'divine' is obscure and rather wipes out the possibility of the concept of 'divine' itself. Since his idea of divine dispenses with anthropomorphism and personification. Instead, it has been mystically portrayed in terms of qualities and virtues such as unity, good, beauty, wisdom etc. For Socrates' contemporary audience, this would have possibly incurred a loss of their long established polytheism. For the fundamentalist, Socrates might have appeared to be an atheist while the moderate and the rationalist would regard him as an agnostic. Hence, his

with regard to Socrates' understanding man could not be connected to the divine in an Homeric and Hesiodian sense. The divine connection in Socrates is concerned with a certain quality or virtue. However, a new form of divinity cannot be easily understood without recourse to something that is familiar or akin to our usual understanding. The term 'god' had been scientifically explained, but the meaningful explanation began with the analysis of the term 'spirits'. Then, the spirits dominantly played a decisive role in Socrates' divine circle. Next to this was the hero, which was said to possess virtue close to that of the spirits. The spirits were said to be good, wise,--- *agathon, phronimoi, kalon*,-- and beautiful while the hero was wise, *sophos*, but man was said to possess the virtue of being able to 'look up at things', *anathrei*. It is not unreasonable to speculate about the connection between man's *anathrei* and the qualities of the spirits and the hero.

Socrates is said to assert that 'every good man, whether living or dead, is of spiritual nature, and is rightly called a spirit,' and 'the heroic race proved to be a race of orator and sophists'.⁶⁶ Then it can be inferred that the succession of the races of the spirit, the hero, and man are not to be understood in chronological order as in the course of linear and irreversible time.⁶⁷ For a man who was good, is said to be of spiritual nature and therefore he was called a spirit. A man who was wise and clever at speech and was able to ask questions was called a hero. It has been argued that they had been all

mystic divinity casts its spell of indecision on the audience, past and present. To be sure, from this, the reader is reminded of the problem of the trial of Socrates.

⁶⁶ Plato, *Cratylus*, (398c, 398e).

⁶⁷ See Vernant's study of the myth in the *Statesman* as the example with regard to the unchronological order of the pattern in the myth. Vernant, *op. cit.*

classified under the divine circle. The spirits and the hero have been said to be certain races, *gene*, of man, *anthropos*. An 'anthropos' was called a spirit or a hero if he was good or wise. Therefore, with regard to his place in the divine circle, man, with his essential nature, *anathrei*, could become a spirit or a hero. *Anathrei* then was the essential potential in human nature with regard to the other two in the divine circle.

However, it is not clear what this putative virtue means.⁶⁸ It is remarkable that with regard to the divine-

⁶⁸ The significance of the term has not been seriously attended. Recently, its importance has been taken into account by a renowned medieval scholar, Umberto Eco. In his latest book, the *Limits of Interpretation*, he states in regard to the passage in concern that

'In the light of this version of the myth, we can understand better all the arguments that Plato lists in the Cratylus in order to support the theory of motivated origin of names. All the examples of motivation he gives concern the way in which words represent, not on things in itself, but the source or the result of an action. Take the example of Jupiter. Plato says that the curious difference between nominative and genitive in the name Zeus---Dios is due to the fact that the original name was a syntagma expressing the usual action of the king of gods: "di' on zen," the one through whom life is given. Likewise man, *anthropos*, is seen as the corruption of a previous syntagma meaning the one who is able to reconsider what has been seen.

The difference between man and animals is that man not only perceives but also reasons, thinks about what has been perceived. We are tempted to take Plato's etymology seriously when we remember that Aquinas, facing the classical definition of man as a rational man, maintained that "rational", the *differentia* that distinguishes man from any other species of the mortal animals, is not an atomic accident, as it is usually believed. It is the name we give to a

human connection, the highest and the lowest in the lineage seem to have some relationship with regard to the meaning of their names. At 396c, the name 'Uranus' was analysed:

'the upward gaze is rightly called by the name *urania* (*ouranis*), looking at things above (*oro ta ano*), and the astronomers--philosophers--say, that from this looking people acquire a pure mind, and Uranus is correctly named.'

It is evident that the essential quality of man, *anthropos*, seems to be related to the nature of its oldest divine ancestor, namely Uranus. It is quite reasonable that the divine quality which remains in the lowest race in divine circle is this quality of 'looking up at things'. If what the god does is called divine, then, when man imitates what the god did, what he has done can be called divine as well. Euthyphro imitated what he believed the gods had done, and he thought he was pious with regard to his own self-understanding or interpretation of the meaning of piety and divinity. Socrates might have understood this. With regard to this matter, Leo Strauss made this point in his comments on the *Euthyphro*:

sequence of actions or behaviors through which we infer that human beings have a sort of otherwise imperceptible and fundamentally unknown substantial form. We detect that humans are rational because we infer the existence of such a quality--in the same way in which a cause is inferred through its usual symptom---by considering the human activity of knowing, thinking, and speaking (*Summa th. I.* 79.8). We know our human spiritual potencies "*ex ipsorum actuum qualitate*," through the quality of the actions of which they are the origin.'

See Umberto Eco, *The Limits of Interpretation*, Bloomington, 1990, p. 200. However, he interprets 'anathrei' as the rational capability.

'If we accept the current stories as such records, we learn that the oldest god is Uranos, the grandfather of Zeus. The only possible way of being pious in the sense of doing what the gods do, the only way of being safely pious along Euthyphro's lines, is to do what Uranos did, or to imitate Uranos. But what did Uranos do? He hurt or damaged his children. He damaged the young. In Greek the saying is, he corrupted the young. That is to say, precisely by corrupting the young would Socrates be pious. Or the other way round, the pious Socrates chooses the only pious way, picking the oldest god as his model, and therefore corrupts the young. Yet Uranos is not only a personal god, he is also heaven. And we know from other personal dialogue that virtue can be identified with imitating heaven.'⁶⁹

Strauss is right as regards the point that piety is in a sense 'to imitate what the gods do'. It can be argued that not only Euthyphro but also Socrates believed in this concept of piety, since Strauss said that one can find the support for this idea of virtue in relation to the imitation of heaven in some of the personal dialogues. However, Strauss seems to go too far in arguing that Socrates chose to be pious by 'corrupting' the young, since 'to imitate the gods' was 'damaging' to their children. To be sure, such an interpretation of the gods could never be Socratic. He never said that he agreed with the story that the gods committed crimes and associated themselves with such evils. He also said that if he ever wronged anyone, it was unintentional. If what Strauss argued is true with regard to Socrates' imitation of the gods in that sense, the way Socrates defended himself in the *Apology* would become meaningless. If he was ever blasphemous, it was against the gods who committed crimes and evil deeds.

⁶⁹ Leo Strauss, 'On the Euthyphro', in *The Rebirth of Classical Rationalism*, Thomas Pangle (ed.), Chicago, 1989, p. 201.

That is the reason why he appropriated Homeric and Hesiodian versions of the gods.⁷⁰ That is also the reason why he purified the Homeric and Hesiodian gods by analysing their names in such a manner. For Socrates, to be pious, man 'looks up at things and acquires a pure mind' so as to imitate the nature of his oldest divine father, Uranus, 'the upward gaze'.⁷¹

VIII

In regarding 'anathrei' as human potential in connection to a divine quality, such treatment of the term is reminiscent of the term 'dunamis' used in the final division between man and animals in the *Statesman*.⁷² Apart from power, might, and strength, the meaning of *dunamis* connotes 'any natural gift that may be improved, and may be used for good or ill'. It is necessary to turn to what was discussed at the beginning with regard to the connection between man and animals. In the *Statesman*, with no irony of divine inspiration, we have discovered a human nature which is related to animals. Here, in the *Cratylus*, it is with the spell of divine power that man is interpreted to be more akin to divinity than to animals. Hence, on the one hand, it has arrived at a picture of man with an animal tie and, on the other, man with a divine

⁷⁰ At the same time, it seems that Strauss tries to appropriate what the Athenians accused Socrates of impiety.

⁷¹ If one would apply this to Socrates in this context, then, it would be that Socrates imitated the gods by imitating them in this sense as he purified their names and 'looked up at things' in order to 'acquire a pure mind'.

⁷² Cf. the *Menexenus*, 237d.

tie. It seems that the *Statesman* and the *Cratylus* contradict one another with regard to the account of the nature of man. But it is not so.

In the *Statesman*, apart from the portrayal of man in relation to animals, the Stranger also implied that man partook of not only animal but also divine connection. Employing the art of weaving as an analogy to explain the art of statesmanship with regard to the education of men, he said '[f]irst it binds the eternal part of their souls with a divine bond, to which the part is akin, and after the divine it binds the animal part of them with human bonds'.⁷³

As regard the *Cratylus*, after it was explained that 'anthropos' was different from any other species with reference to his divine potential, Hermogenes is made to raise an immediate question concerning the human soul and body.⁷⁴ Here, Hermogenes represents the view of common sense. Since the fact that man has two essential parts, namely soul and body, is generally understood by the Greeks, Socrates had interpreted 'man' in such a peculiar style. Then, Hermogenes' curiosity, regarding the way in which Socrates would explain the human soul and body with reference to the account he had given on 'anthropos', is conceivable. However, what Socrates gave as the meaning of soul and body is far from compatible with what he had discussed about man---the contradiction is deliberate. The account of the term 'psyche' had been given twice. First, it was said to be contained in the body as 'its cause of its living, giving it the power to breathe and reviving it'. The second, which is more scientific than the latter, is derived from the doctrine of Anaxagoras and is that the

⁷³ Plato, *Statesman*, (309c).

⁷⁴ Plato, *Cratylus*, (399d).

soul of the mind carries or holds the nature of all things.⁷⁵

It is quite evident that both accounts have been given in a scientific fashion which even Hermogenes himself could easily notice. Of course, this sort of explanation is hardly congenial to a diviner such as Euthyphro and his followers. With regard to this, Socrates ironically said that the first account would not please them as much as the second, although the second was more scientific than the first. As for the body or 'soma', in the Orphic tradition, it had been described as 'an enclosure to keep the soul safe, like a prison'.⁷⁶ Since the Orphics believed that 'soul is undergoing punishment for something'.⁷⁷

If the soul really was, as Socrates explained, the cause of living or the holder of the nature of all things, then it would damage his description of man, since his investigation of the term soul does not discriminate between the human soul and others. Meanwhile, the explanation of the body in the Orphic tradition cannot be said to be consistent with his interpretation of the soul. The Orphic tradition confines itself only to the story of man or anthropogony. Therefore, the Orphic body can be rightly understood only in the context of its particular purpose with regard to the soul. Then, in mixing the Anaxagorean interpretation of the soul with the Orphic version of the body, Socrates has rendered a chimera to the reader. To be sure, the Orphic body might have agreed with Socrates' analysis of man, but it is not compatible with the Anaxagorean materialistic explanation of the soul.

⁷⁵ Plato, *Cratylus*, (399e-400a).

⁷⁶ Plato, *Cratylus*, (400c).

⁷⁷ Burnet argued that Socrates' soul came from two sources, one is Anaxagoras, and the other is the Orphics. See John Burnet, 'The Soul in the Socratic doctrine', op. cit., p. 251.

Indeed, Socrates himself said that 'it seems actually absurd that the name was given with such truth', as Anaxagoras had argued.⁷⁸

It is only to some extant that Socrates could agree with Anaxagoras' thesis. As regards the doctrine of Anaxagoras, Socrates in the *Phaedo* told his friend, Cebes, in his discussion about the immortality of the soul, that at the time he first heard a man reading in Anaxagoras' book that 'the mind arranges and cause all things,' such an idea was quite appealing to him.⁷⁹ However, after a careful examination of the text, he found that Anaxagoras 'made no use of intelligence, and did not assign any real causes of the ordering of things, but mentioned air, and ether, water and many other absurdities' as the causes.⁸⁰ He expected that if the doctrine was true, the mind, in arranging things, must arrange everything and establish each thing as it is best for it to be.⁸¹ The doctrine of Anaxagoras, then, was regarded as inadequate with regard to the purpose which Socrates looked forward to.

There were two major explanations which he searched for. First, it was the reason for the things to be as they were. For instance, if the earth was flat or round, the cause and the necessity of it had to be explained. Second, in respect to the first, the explanation of the cause and the necessity of the generation or destruction of things had to be made in pursuit of a particular purpose which was the nature of the best or most excellent of the things themselves.⁸² In this respect, the doctrine of Anaxagoras

⁷⁸ Plato, *Cratylus*, (400b).

⁷⁹ Plato, *Phaedo*, (97c).

⁸⁰ Plato, *Phaedo*, (98c).

⁸¹ Plato, *Phaedo*, (97c).

⁸² Plato, *Phaedo*, (97c-e).

was inadequate. Moreover, it imposed a contingency on the nature of things.

The chimerical combination of the interpretations of the soul and the body certainly precipitates a change of the mood in the audience towards the recent analysis of 'anthropos' with a divine connection. For man has been interpreted as being different from other animals; but when the question of the soul and the body arises, the reader must think twice before subscribing to that description of man, since the soul and the body comprise the essential nature of all living beings.

If the reader is to pursue the description of man as such, of course he has to find the explanation of the human soul and body, which differs from that of other animals. If the soul was believed to be the cause of man's living as well as of other species', then there should have been an explanation as to why a human is said to differ from other animals because he possesses special potential, *anathrei*. However, Socrates intended the reader to be puzzled by proposing Anaxagorean explanation of the soul since it did not differentiate man from animals; nor did it contribute any answer to the problem concerning the purpose of the generation or destruction of beings. Instead of explaining the body in Anaxagorean or Democritean fashion, Socrates in reverse, adopted the Orphic tradition, which rendered quite a meaningful explanation of the term 'body' as regards its purposive existence of the soul. To a certain degree, this seems to be in accord with the description of man, if the reader conflates these two ideas together in his interpretation.

From this point, I therefore argue that it is from the effect that Socrates undertook to guide the reader up and down along the divine and human realms. When the reader seems to be able to grasp a certain message at a certain

moment, Socrates just holds him back from a definite conclusion by presenting another interpretative effect as a counterbalance. This is the reason that the *Cratylus* cannot be said to render a definite description of human in relation to the divine. It also makes the reader cast doubt upon a provisional picture of man, which the text itself has rendered.

If the *Statesman* and the *Cratylus* do not contradict each other, then the reader is faced with a picture of man with a dichotomy of opposite natures, namely divine and animal. To be sure, in the *Cratylus*, in regarding man as being different from other animals with regard to his virtue, Socrates did not state the cause of this virtue. Also, in the *Statesman*, we know that man is a subdivision of other species. The Stranger employed dialectic method to differentiate man from other beings. The bond between man and animals is entailed by the application of the geometric square root to his final division. We do not know anything more than that. At this point, in order to proceed from this stage, we again turn to what has been stated earlier namely that the essence of all living bodies lies in their souls. Concerning the discussion of the soul, we will turn to the *Phaedrus*. According to Socrates' palinode, firstly he stipulated that self-motion was the essence of the soul. Secondly, as it has been referred to before, a soul which has never seen the truth can never pass into human form. Then, to investigate the meaning of divine and animal ties in human nature, it is necessary to examine the human soul as a source of this picture of man with seemingly contradicting natures. Indeed, the examination of the soul can be regarded as the search for self-knowledge.⁸³

⁸³ Charles L. Griswold, Jr. argued that the term psuche in ancient Greek functions 'as the noun corresponding to our self'. Charles L. Griswold, *Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus*, New Haven and London, 1986, p. 2.

CHAPTER SIX

Introduction to the City and Man

Among the Platonic corpus, the *Phaedo*, the *Phaedrus*, and the *Republic* have been understood to contain major discussions on the human soul. The *Phaedo* can be regarded as one of the trilogy of Socrates' apology; the other two are the *Apology* and the *Crito*.¹ The *Apology* can be regarded as his defence against the public accusation, namely from the Athenians as a whole, while the *Crito* and the *Phaedo* can be taken as his defence against any misunderstanding from his friends, since he decided to choose the death penalty against the will of his friends.² On the last day, he conversed in his usual way with friends while the final moment was approaching. What had been discussed was pertinent to what was happening. They discussed the life and death of the philosopher.³ Of course, the topic concerning the nature of the soul was inevitably brought into the discussion.

As regards the *Phaedrus*, its main theme is the discourse of love. In fact, it can bifurcate into two equally important discussions: one is the subject of love; the other is about the nature of the discourse. Actually, the latter is a discourse about discourse or a discourse about itself. Therefore an argument in the *Phaedrus* points to the fact that to understand these two subjects, namely love and discourse, it is essential to understand the

¹ The dialogues as a whole however can be regarded as Socrates' apology. Since all major problems which had been debated in the trial have been brought to meticulous examination in the dialogues.

² Plato, *Phaedo*, (62b, 69e).

³ Plato, *Phaedo*, (60b-c, 61c-e).

nature of the soul.⁴

In the *Republic*, *Politeia*, it is generally understood that what it discussed and searched for is justice.⁵ Generally speaking, the movement of the dialogue undulates in the way that the discussion of the problem of justice departs from the question of the nature of justice and injustice of a man⁶ to the question of the nature of justice and injustice of a *polis*⁷, and then returns to the justice and injustice of a man. The latter is finalised by the myth of Er.⁸ There is doubtless a connection between the *polis* and man in regard with justice and injustice. The relationship between the two emerges as the justice of a man can be more easily understood when one observes the justice of a *polis* as a whole.⁹ It is assumed that the nature of man in one way or another resembles the nature of the *polis*. What has been found or observed as a composite

⁴ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (245c, 276a, 271a-272b, 270c).

⁵ W.K.C. Guthrie argues regarding the title of the dialogue that 'the Greek title of the work (misleadingly represented for us the English form of the Latin *Res publica*) means "The State or On Justice", and its subject, not merely ostensibly but in reality, is the nature of justice and injustice and their consequences for the just and the unjust man.' He also suggests that the double title 'On Justice' or rather 'On the Just Man' might possibly come from Plato himself. W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, Vol. IV, Cambridge, 1987, p. 434, ff.

⁶ That is the conversation of Socrates and Cephalus, see the *Republic*, Book I, 328c-331e.

⁷ Plato, *Republic*, (Book II 369d-435a, Book V, 449a-457d, 472d to Book VI, 503b, Book VIII and IX).

⁸ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book X). Guthrie comments that '[t]his is stated at an early stage, and despite digressions and subordinate themes (of which the establishment of the imaginary state is the chief), Plato in this most skilfully constructed work is always bringing us back to it'. See Guthrie, *op. cit.*

⁹ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book II 368d-369b).

of elements of the *polis* is expected to be found in a man as well. It is expected to exist in the human soul.¹⁰

Therefore, Guthrie's comments on the title of the dialogue is convincing when he argued that it is ostensible.¹¹ Certainly, the main concern of the dialogue is not the discussion about the State or Republic. To follow Guthrie, one must go beyond its title and regard justice and injustice as its theme. Undoubtedly, it is one of the composite of elements of the work itself. Nevertheless, its title still remains significant. It is not only ostensible but also ironical.¹² Irony is nevertheless Platonic than Socratic.

Politeia means 'civil polity, a constitution of state, form of government'¹³; if a study of the nature of a *polis* is equated with a study of the nature of a man, and the essence of man has been emphasised as being his soul, then, with regard to its title, the dialogue is actually gravely concerned with a man rather than a *polis*, which is comprised of many people. In other words, its title is ironical in the sense that instead of the many, the work itself just has its particular regard for the one. It concerns the study of forms or characters of man or his soul. Nevertheless, what constitutes a form or character

¹⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book IV 434c-435c).

¹¹ See footnote 5.

¹² In her study of the politics of the soul in Nietzsche, Leslie Paul Thiele found that this aspect of Nietzsche's work has been adumbrated by Plato's *Republic*. She says '[i]ndeed, the manifestly political aspect of the *Republic*, that is, the theorization of the city, is ostensibly proposed as the attempt better to discover the justice of a man's soul'. See Leslie Paul Thiele, *The Politics of the Soul: A Study of Heroic Individualism*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1990, p. 51.

¹³ Liddell, H.G. and Scott, R., *A Greek-English Lexicon*, op. cit.

of a man is neither his individual nature nor his society. In fact, both are inseparable and indispensable. Then, a character of a man and a constitution of a *polis* are intertwined and interrelated.¹⁴ Therefore, the *Republic* or *Politeia* is the study of such an interrelationship. To be sure, this does not mean that we subordinate justice and injustice to our newly emerged concern as the theme of the dialogue. Rather, the pursuit of one is incident to the other, and vice versa, since the justice of a *polis* and the justice of a man are inseparable insofar as such interrelationship is concerned.

In this regard, the *Republic*, as the longest dialogue of all, can be considered in its own right the most valuable source for an examination of the human soul. Hence, it is to be taken as presiding over other dialogues with regard to the matter in concern. Meanwhile, since they contain more distinctive discussions about the soul than the rest, the *Phaedo* and the *Phaedrus* play a major supporting role in helping to illuminate the soul as portrayed in the *Republic*. Also, the relation and application of the concept of the soul to other practical social, political and philosophical problems can be found in other dialogues.

I

Socrates related that Polemarchus caught sight of Glaucon and himself as they were starting for town after having worshipped the Goddess¹⁵ and seeing the procession

¹⁴ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book I 329e-330a).

¹⁵ In his translation of the *Republic*, Shorey suggests that the goddess is presumably Bendis.

of the citizens in the festival at the Piraeus.¹⁶ Noticing Socrates and Glaucon from a distance, Polemarchus sent a boy to ask them to wait for him. When Polemarchus arrived, Socrates found that they were also accompanied by Adeimantus, Niceratus, and a few others who had been to the procession as well. What Polemarchus first said to Socrates was that he thought Socrates and Glaucon were heading towards the town and were about to leave Polemarchus and friends who resided near the Piraeus. Socrates confirmed what Polemarchus had said. Polemarchus was willing to have Socrates and others stay there overnight at his house, since he planned to converse with Socrates. His intention was evident, since, when arriving at Polemarchus' place, Socrates noticed that seats were set up ready for a discussion. The seats had been placed in a circle. Also, a group of people happened to be there already, like an audience awaiting an exhibition piece.¹⁷

This is the reason why Polemarchus was so determined to have them with him that evening. He said he would not let them go unless they were able to overpower him and his party. Though Socrates asked Polemarchus if persuasion could possibly be an alternative to the use of force he had just imposed. Apparently, it appears that so long as no one listened, the use of speech would inevitably turn out

¹⁶ The Piraeus was long walls which had been built by the instruction of Pericles as regards the Athenian imperialism in the sea territory. It was the joint between the port and the polis. The aliens like Cephalus who came to trade their business usually lived around the Piraeus. See Oswyn Murray, 'Donald Kagan: Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy', *The Times Literary Supplement*, April 12, 1991 No. 4593, p. 8.

¹⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 328b-c). The term 'exhibition piece' is borrowed from G.E.R. Lloyd as he translated from *epideixeis* as performances of any skills and knowledge which one performs and compete with one another in front of the public. Here, the torchlight race on horseback can be said to be an exhibition piece. See Lloyd, *The Revolutions of Wisdom*, *op. cit.*, pp. 61, 89 ff.

to be useless. Gluacon understood this point very well as he was the one who admitted this to Polemarchus.¹⁸ Unfortunately, it was impossible for Socrates and Glaucon to counterbalance Polemarchus in terms of physical force. To be sure, we know that Socrates would never have recourse to such force. Yet, neither could any such force ever subdue him. As a lover of discourse, it was only the power of speech that could be used with him or used by him.¹⁹ However since he was so insistent about his demand, Polemarchus announced that he would never listen to anything. No one knows what would have happened if Adeimantus, brother of Glaucon, and Plato, who was accompanying Polemarchus, had not intervened at the right moment.²⁰

Adeimantus also wanted Socrates to stay for a discussion. He had the same desire as Polemarchus did, But the way he approached Socrates was better than Polemarachus. What Adeimantus did was successful since he could get what he wanted without having recourse to the use of force. Moreover, from his intervention, each of them acquired what should be given to each other. In the situation, whether he knowingly did what he did or not, in practice he rendered to each his due. Polemarchus' demand worked. As regards Socrates, persuasion had been employed

¹⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 327c).

¹⁹ In the *Phaedrus*, Phaedrus is said to be a lover of discourse. Also Socrates confessed that he was a lover of discourse. As lovers of discourse, both used it in each turn to bargain with each other as regards their desires for the beautiful speech of love.

²⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 329a). Socrates said with regard to individual characters of the two brothers, Adeimantus and Glaucon, that they complemented one another and always assisted each other. See further discussion about the nature of high spirited element and the nature of rational element of the soul. These two elements require one another as regards the education of philosophic guardian.

instead of the force with which Polemarchus had initially threatened him.

Adeimantus persuaded Socrates that during that evening there would be a torchlight race on horseback in honour of the goddess. This was effective because Socrates seemed to be tempted by this new kind of exhibition. He asked whether the participants in the torchlight carried torches and passed them to one another as they raced with the horses. Polemarchus, who seemed to realise how effective Adeimantus' approach was, then joined in with Adeimantus' persuasive speech. He replied that what Socrates thought about it was correct, and he and Glaucon should stay there, since, apart from that, after dinner, they could go and see not only the torchlight race but also a night festival, where they could meet and talk with many young men.²¹ Consequently, Glaucon was then inclined to stay as Polemarchus requested. Socrates did not oppose the suggestion of his companion. However, one may wonder whether Adeimantus actually knew Socrates well enough to know what should and what should not be applied to him; or it was just because he really thought the torchlight race could possibly attract Socrates to stay for it. Polemarchus acted harshly towards Socrates and Glaucon because he wanted them to stay. He said he would never listen to Socrates if he tried to persuade him to let them go. The reason that Polemarchus said he would not listen to Socrates at that moment was because he hoped to have a chance to listen to him later on if what he aimed at was successful. Therefore, his position seemed ironical as he refused to listen in order to listen. Also, one would be sceptical if Socrates had genuinely been attracted by the torchlight race in itself, as we know that after all none of them had any chance to go out to see it. Since that night they had been attached to a serious discussion about

²¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 228b).

justice and injustice, which, by the length of that conversation, should have taken quite a long time.

The first conversation in the house was the one between Cephalus, the father of Polemarchus, Lysias, Euthydemus, and Socrates. It appears that the topic of a serious discussion about justice and injustice, which took place later, was spontaneous. The problem of justice and injustice was generated in a short greeting conversation between Cephalus and Socrates.²² It became so ablaze with his conversation with Socrates that his son Polemarchus in exasperation broke in to join the argument. Suddenly Cephalus then said wittily that he bequeathed the whole argument to his son and excused himself for being unable to continue the discussion, since he had to attend the sacrifices.²³ Socrates asked whether Polemarchus was the heir of everything that belonged to his father. Cephalus, during his strangely precipitate leaving replied with a laugh that it must be so.²⁴ Accordingly, the discussion about the problem of justice had been passed on from Cephalus to Polemarchus as a bequest from a father to his son. Cephalus' witticism about his bequeathing does not seem to be serious at all. To be sure, the jest actually contains a significant message.

²² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 328c-331d).

²³ With regard to the timing and the sacrifices, Julia Annas argued that at the time Cephalus was about to set off, the sacrifices should have been over. She raised this point to indicate that Plato had contempt for the money-lover like Cephalus who was not serious to discuss the subject as such. The old man just tried to escape from it since he was insincere with regard to what he had said. See Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's*, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-20.

²⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 331d).

II

Cephalus was known as a rich man²⁵, and as a father of children, he said he would practice what his ancestors had done before, namely, he should leave the property to his children.²⁶ His great grandfather bequeathed as much property to the grandfather of the present Cephalus as he now possessed. Then, Cephalus, the grandfather, had multiplied the property many times which Lysanias, Cephalus' father, had received but had reduced below that which Cephalus had made so far. For he had added up the amount which was lately 'not less but some slight measure more than his inheritance'.²⁷ Also, with that amount of property, he told Socrates that he was quite content if he could leave his sons just that. Hence, one can see that Cephalus' wealth did not start from scratch. As regards this, Socrates said that it could be the reason why most people were not convinced when Cephalus said that neither age nor money was the cause of true happiness.²⁸

People who were concerned about money would have thought that a wealthy man like Cephalus could have many consolations for his old age.²⁹ Moreover, for those who did not earn all their money from scratch but had inherited their property as capital like Cephalus, money would not be taken as seriously as those who were poor or had to struggle from nothing.³⁰

²⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 229e).

²⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 330b).

²⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, *ibid.*

²⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 329d).

²⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 329e).

³⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 330c).

So it was hard to believe that Cephalus would hold fast to his saying if he was poor.³¹ In response to this, Cephalus replied that Socrates was right that those people would never accept what he said. Of course, he could not totally disagree with that criticism. He accepted that there was some truth in it. However, he alluded to Themistocles' response to a man from Seriphus, that the fact that a man had made his name was not attributed either to the city or the place he came from, or to himself; it must be because of both the city and the man himself.³² Similarly, according to Cephalus, this could be applicable to himself and other people:

'And the same principle applies...to those who not being rich take old age hard; for neither would the reasonable man find it altogether easy to endure old age conjoined with poverty, nor would the unreasonable man by the attainment of riches ever attain to self-contentment and a cheerful temper.'³³

³¹ For example, Annas believed that according to Plato, Cephalus could not be happy without his money. A point has been made that the Republic was written later than the time it depicted. From this, she argued that

'Plato was writing for an audience that knew that the security based on wealth which Cephalus had spent his life building up, and which is so much stressed here, was wholly illusory: only a few years later, when Athens fell, the family was totally ruined, Polemarchus executed and Lysias driven into exile,...[m]oney cannot prove even the kind of security it promises, and a life devoted to the pursuit of money is a life whose highest priority is something which can be lost through the actions of other people,...[t]hese are enough malicious touches in Plato's picture of Cephalus to show us that we are being presented with a limited and complacent man.'

See Annas, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

³² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 329e-330a).

³³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 330a).

As regards old age, he said that some of his friends lamented their loss of vigorousness which deprived them of the pleasures of many things they used to enjoy. They regarded it as a loss of the greatest things in their life.³⁴ On the contrary, there were also those who welcomed their declining years, thinking that this would release them from passions and bring them a really happy and peaceful life. He alluded to Sophocles, the famous poet of his time, who announced that old age was a good sign, since 'the fierce tensions of the passions and desires relax,..and we are rid of many and mad masters'.³⁵ With regard to this view, Cephalus said 'I thought it a good answer then and now I think so still more'.³⁶

Therefore, for Cephalus, old age and wealthiness could not be the real cause of either happiness or suffering. In fact, according to Cephalus' experience, the final cause originated in the character of the man himself. As he told Socrates:

'But indeed in respect of these complaints and in the matter of our relations with kinsmen and friends there is just one cause, Socrates---not old age, but the character of man, *tropos ton anthropon*. For if men are temperate and cheerful even old age is only moderately burdensome. But if the reverse, old age, Socrates, and youth are hard for such dispositions.'³⁷

From this, Socrates asked Cephalus that if what he said was true, then, what benefit could the property give

³⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 329a).

³⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 329c-d); *Phaedo*, (86c, 94c); *Philebus*, (47a); *the Laws*, (645b, 644e).

³⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 329c).

³⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 329d).

to its owner at all. In his reply, Cephalus talked about man's anxiety about death, and the tales of the underworld.³⁸ When a man began to realise that he was going to die, he could not help thinking anxiously of the story of the underworld that 'the men who have done wrong here must pay the penalty there'.³⁹ It was a story which he might once have laughed at. For those who had done many evil things, this anxiety would haunt him terribly for fear of what would happen to him after his death; but the good man who had been just and pious all his life would have, as Pindar said beautifully, a 'sweet companion with him, to cheer his heart and nurse his old age, accompanieth Hope, who chiefly ruleth the changeful mind of mortals'.⁴⁰ And it was only to the good man that Cephalus argued that the possession of wealth was of most value⁴¹, because, with his own property, the man would not by any means commit fraud or cheat others, and he would not be in debt to 'a god for some sacrifice or to a man for money'.⁴² Hence, being conscious of no wrongdoing, the good man had nothing to be afraid of with regard to his afterlife; and this was the great service of wealth to the good man who possessed

³⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 330d).

³⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, *ibid.*

⁴⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 331a).

⁴¹ Socrates should have agreed to this idea if a man is good because he is wise and vice versa. See the *Euthydemus* 281b-c, Socrates says:

'Then in God's name, does any benefit come from the other possession, without intelligence and wisdom. Could a man get benefit, possessing plenty and doing much, if he had no sense--would he not benefit more by doing little, if he has sense? Just consider. If he did less he would make fewer mistakes, if he did less badly he would be less miserable.'

⁴² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 331a-b). Annas criticised this idea for its discrimination against the poor as it implies that 'it is very hard for the poor to be just throughout his life'. See Annas, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

it.

III

At this point, with regard to what Cephalus just stated, Socrates took this chance to ask whether or not he could come to a conclusion with reference to what Simonides said that justice was 'truth-telling and paying back what one has received from anyone'.⁴³ However, against that definition of justice, there was a case that one should not return weapons borrowed from a friend who was in his right mind but became mad later and demanded them back. He should not tell the truth to the mad man either.⁴⁴ In response to the point Socrates raised, Cephalus agreed that no one would do such things. Thus, it seemed that such a definition of justice could not be true, since any action which was complied with it was sometimes just and sometimes unjust.

Before we had a chance to hear what Cephalus was going to reply, it was at this moment that Polemarchus broke in. It was this point which was the starting point for a long journey of the dialogue on justice and injustice. The argumentation started in the form of a legacy bequeathed by a father to his son.

The conversation between Socrates and Cephalus stopped there. It was the conversation which seemed to originate from certain intentions of both Cephalus and Socrates. In the beginning, Cephalus first stated that his desire for the pleasures of good talk and his delight in such pleasures increased in the same measure that his bodily pleasures declined.⁴⁵ We know that he had just a brief

⁴³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 331c).

⁴⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 331d).

⁴⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 328d).

moment conversing with Socrates. However, he transferred the whole argument to his son to continue. To be sure, as he initially asked Socrates not to refuse to be a companion to those young men in the house, it implies that Cephalus would be very pleased if Socrates stayed and conversed with these young men and his son in particular, to whom he was to bequeath all his possessions. At the same time, Socrates at first replied that he himself also enjoyed talking with the very aged, because he believed that 'we have to learn of them as it were from wayfarers who have preceded us on a road on which we too, it may be, must some time fare---what it is like---is it rough and hard going or easy and pleasant to travel'.⁴⁶ He then decided to learn from Cephalus what he experienced and what he felt at his old age. Cephalus was well aware that his view would hardly be convincing, particularly his story of the tale of the underworld which appeared in the final part of his conversation with Socrates. To be sure, they were also his last words to the reader since his role in the dialogue had just finished at this stage. Nevertheless, he was willing to relate to Socrates what he wished to hear. Strangely, one would notice the similar pattern with regard to Cephalus' speech in Socrates' speech. As in the end of the dialogue, Socrates' last speech rendered the story of the myth of Er. He said he had to refer to such a story though he hesitated to do it. However, like Cephalus, Socrates' last words to his interlocutors and to the reader of the Republic was the story of the underworld. What Socrates learnt from Cephalus was that the final cause of happiness and unhappiness lay in the character of the man himself, not his age or wealth. The possession of property could be more valuable to the good man than the bad man. That is why Cephalus said it would be just to bequeath his wealth to his sons; but we know that it was not only money he was to bequeath to his son. He had already just bequeathed his

⁴⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 328e).

uncompleted discussion with Socrates to Polemarchus. Such was the argument with regard to the problem of justice. The legacy of the argument, as it should be assumed, should have been another thing which Cephalus regarded as far better than the legacy of wealth, since wealth was not the true cause of happiness. Cephalus knew that there were other things superior to that. Then, would Cephalus as a father, not bequeath to his son what he regarded as the true cause of happiness, which should be the most desirable of all?

Therefore, it should be hidden in this legacy of the argument, which he left Polemarchus to continue with Socrates, whom he requested earlier to be the companion to his son. Cephalus bequeathed the argument to his son before the property because wealth should be bequeathed after the knowledge of how one can make use of it. Cephalus said he bequeathed the argument to his son right after he saw that his son could no longer remain silent as he heard Socrates refuting what he thought to be the true definition of justice, which was derived from what his father had said. Also, it seemed that his father gave no sign of inconvenience with regard to Socrates' refutation. This of course caused anger in Polemarchus. The legacy of the argument about the problem of justice and injustice lies in the realm of deeds and words as Polemarchus was incited to anger by the conversation of his father and Socrates. It is not only a mere argument but also the state of emotion, namely anger, which arises in a person when he feels that there is something wrong or unjust. This is Cephalus' legacy to his son with regard to a father's care for his son's well-being. To be sure, the problem of justice originated from the problem of a good life, which Socrates first put to Cephalus in the beginning

of their conversation.⁴⁷ After Cephalus already had what he aimed at, we know that he departed them in a good mood. Also, Socrates did not object to or criticize Cephalus' urgent departure. As the final cause had been said to be attributable to the character of man, then the legacy of the argument must be in one way or another related to the understanding of the character of man.

IV

Socrates continued his discussion with Polemarchus with regard to the definition that justice was 'to render each his due'. This idea of justice was believed to belong to Simonides.⁴⁸ Although the phrase looked simple and straightforward, however, its meaning could be ambiguous. Socrates ironically claimed ignorance and asked Polemarchus, as he was the defender of such a definition of justice, to explain the wisdom of Simonides.⁴⁹ A wise and divinely inspired poet like Simonides should have meant something different from the idea that justice was 'to return weapons and tell the truth to a mad man because these things were due to him'. The phrase he used must have had a hidden message.⁵⁰ Polemarchus was not successful; he could not defend his position against self-contradiction. One by one, Socrates cross-examined what

⁴⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 328e). Socrates said 'And so now I would fain learn of you of what you think of this thing, now that your time has come to it, the thing that the poets call "the threshold of old age." Is it a hard part of life to bear or what report have you to make of it?'

⁴⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 331e).

⁴⁹ Socrates regarded Simonides as one of the sophists in the *Protagoras*, 316d.

⁵⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 331e, 332a).

Polemarchus proposed.⁵¹

Polemarchus' solution to the problem of the mad man was that the application of this definition of justice had to be subject to two kinds of relationship between human beings, that is, the friend-foe relationship, since we would never be harmed by our friends and we would never harm anyone but our enemies.⁵² Therefore, it was just to render what was appropriate to men in regard to the friend-foe relationship. That is to say, the just man must benefit his friends and harm his enemies. If so, Socrates inferred that justice could be useless in peace time when there was no enemy. It would become useful in relation to the uselessness of the things it kept safely. The just man must be skilful in evil deeds as well as good ones. Also, it was still a question of how one knew who was his true friend and enemy, since 'men love those who seem to be good and dislike those who seem bad to them'. Also, it appears that when we harm our enemy whom we regard as bad, justice, as a human excellence in reverse, makes a man worse than other people by the standard of human excellence. In other words, justice makes a man unjust and goodness makes a man bad.

Therefore, Socrates concluded that what Polemarchus tried to explain could not be justice and the just. It was wrong to understand wise men by interpreting the meaning of justice in such a way. It was impossible for the wise men like Simonides or Bias or Pittacus or any other to say and bless such a thing. Otherwise, they should not be called

⁵¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 332b-336a).

⁵² Some scholars argue that Polemarchus presented Homeric view of justice. See Adi Ohr, *Plato's Invisible Cities: Power and Discourse in the Republic*, New York and London, 1990, p. 52. See also Havelock, *The Greek Concept of Justice*, op. cit., pp. 189-92; Alan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato*, translation with notes and an interpretative Essay, New York, 1968, pp. 316-25.

wise men if they really meant what they said.⁵³ Socrates suggested that others should continue the search for justice.⁵⁴ However, one should understand that the definition of justice with reference to the friend-foe relationship is still intact if one does not mistake the fallacy of Polemarchus' interpretation for the conception of justice.

At this point, it was the turn of another character in the dialogue, namely Thrasymachus. He was said to be very much annoyed by the way Socrates refuted Polemarchus. He attempted several times to break in. Socrates described Thrasymachus' reaction to his discussion with Polemarchus as 'gathering himself up like a wild beast Thrasymachus hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to pieces'.⁵⁵ It was Socrates who approached and conducted the discussion which generated such a fierce resentment. Although Socrates and Polemarchus could not yet find an unqualified definition of justice, they could nevertheless at least repudiate what was not justice. Thus, it seems that they should have had a presupposition in their minds of what ideal justice should be. It was their presupposed idea of justice that violated Thrasymachus' understanding of justice. Thrasymachus of course possessed his own idea of justice to the same extent that Polemarchus did. Otherwise, they would not be so angry when their ideas of justice were shaken.

Socrates said that he would have lost his voice if he had not looked at Thrasymachus before the man became so fierce. This means that if Socrates had not seen Thrasymachus in peace before, he would have been shocked by

⁵³ As regards Socrates' perception of Simonides, see the *Protagoras*, 317d.

⁵⁴ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book I 335e-336a).

⁵⁵ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book I,336b).

the revelation of such a bestial side to character. After that, Thrasymachus asked Socrates to stop playing his 'Socratica docta ignorantia' and express his own view of justice. Socrates insisted on claiming ignorance and gave another of his familiar excuses that he never wronged anyone intentionally.⁵⁶ Thrasymachus said this was Socrates' trick, his well-known irony. He ridiculed the fact that Socrates could ask the questions and refute others' answers but had no courage to give his own view. However, Socrates succeeded in persuading Thrasymachus to give his own view of justice with a rather paradoxical condition. The condition was that if his answer was better than and differed from what had been stated, then the ignoramus had to suffer by learning from the other who knew the true answer.⁵⁷ Being so confident that he would win the argument himself, Thrasymachus mocked Socrates by saying that he must pay as a fine, of a sum of money to study the meaning of justice from him.⁵⁸

Thrasymachus' definition of justice was 'the just is

⁵⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 336e). This principle has been first inserted in the *Apology*. The reader usually found it in most of the dialogues, especially in the *Lesser Hippias* where it has been meticulously discussed.

⁵⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 337d).

⁵⁸ Annas said that this can be an interpretation of the meaning of Simonides' justice as regard 'to render each his due'. Since Thrasymachus demanded that what was due to him with regard to his engagement with Socrates must be the payment of some money. While Socrates who was poor could not be just in this regard. This point is based on her argument which she once made in regard to the idea of justice proposed by Cephalus. Annas seems to try to point out the inadequacy of Cephalus' idea of justice. See Annas, *op. cit.*, p. 19. However, it can be said that this points to the fact that Thrasymachus and Socrates differed with regard to what they desired. Thrasymachus aimed at materialistic reward. Socrates of course hoped to achieve the best result of the discussion. If he was ironical, then, he must aim at something better and of course he did not want to lose his argument to Thrasymachus whose definition of justice was unacceptable to Socrates.

nothing than the advantage of the stronger'.⁵⁹ The power of this idea of justice of course had been shown in Thucydides' the Melian dialogue in his *History of Peloponnesian War*. It was pointless for the weak to appeal to any other law than the law of nature in which the stronger was always right and just.

What did Thrasymachus mean by 'the stronger'? It was a fact that a man could be regarded to be stronger than others in terms of body or of mind. Of course, Thrasymachus should have been aiming at a person who was superior to others in both ways. With regard to such a person, he should have meant the ruler of a city. However, with regard to Thrasymachus' statement, Socrates stated that he did not understand what Thrasymachus really meant when he used the term 'stronger'. In fact, there is a considerable discrepancy between Socrates and Thrasymachus with regard to their conceptions of the term which actually engenders and also underlies the whole argument between them.

V

The question Socrates put to Thrasymachus might have been taken as a jest when he asked Thrasymachus whether he aimed at the strength of the body to which the meat would be advantageous as in the case of Polydamas the pancratiast. If so, the flesh of beeves should be regarded as the object in question, namely justice. Also, to be sure, the flesh could not only be the interest of the stronger as Thrasymachus had posited since it was

⁵⁹ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book I 338c). This position is also discussed in the *Laws*, 714b-715d.

advantageous to the weaker body as well.⁶⁰ In asking this kind of question, we understand that Socrates did not intend to make a joke. In fact, he intended to check whether or not Thrasymachus had meant it in the same way that he understood it as regards the use of the term 'stronger'.

In our previous discussion, we have inferred that with regard to the body, man differs from other animals just in degree not in kind. What makes man distinct from other living beings lies in the essence of the soul. Here, of course, Socrates should have understood the meaning of the stronger to have been a person who is stronger in a human way not an animal one, that is, the excellence of the soul. Since, if justice is the interest of the stronger body, then, what is advantageous to the fiercest and strongest bestial living being can be regarded as justice. Then, it implies that in posing the question in this manner, Socrates should have expected to hear or to make Thrasymachus refer to 'the stronger' of the soul.

Thrasymachus did not think in the same way that Socrates did. He thought in the same way that many people would have thought. That is, the stronger was just the stronger, a man who was more powerful than any other man. It was not surprising that he answered Socrates by referring to the most obvious image of the stronger, that is, a man or a group of men who ruled others. To put it more precisely, the stronger was the ruler of a city.⁶¹ He argued that the ruler held power and was strong and it was the truth that any ruling body, whether it be a democracy, oligarchy, or tyranny, always enacted the laws with which people had to comply, and served the interest of the ruler. Therefore, the interest of the stronger was the

⁶⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 338d).

⁶¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 338d-e).

justice of the city.

However, Thrasymachus admitted to Socrates that it was true that no one was infallible. From this, Socrates asked whether Thrasymachus denied that it was possible that sometimes a ruler might mistake his own disadvantage for an advantage. Thrasymachus replied that Socrates' argument was pettifogging, since he did not intend his meaning of ruler in the sense that Socrates tried to mislead to. In order to prevent such linguistic misunderstanding in their debate, Socrates had to ask again what he actually meant by the ruler and the stronger.⁶² Thrasymachus said it was the ruler as the ruler that he had in his mind. In this respect, it seems that there were two different concepts of ruler in their discussion, which generated this discrepancy.

To be sure, from the beginning of the discussion, Thrasymachus never conceived of the difference between the existing ruler and the ideal ruler when he started his argument that justice was the interest of the stronger. However, the ruler, the physician, the calculator, and any other craftsmen in reality were not infallible. Therefore, this dimension of the concept of the ruler necessarily undermined Thrasymachus' argument if he continued to refer the meaning of the term to the existing ruler. Then, he was forced to shift from 'his loose way of speaking' with regard to what he said namely that all were liable to err⁶³, to the other dimension of the term, that is, the realm of the perfect or ideal, in order to be able to keep his argument intact.

The ideal ruler was understood by Thrasymachus to be

⁶² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 340b).

⁶³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 340e).

'the ruler in the very most precise sense of the word'.⁶⁴ It was the ruler qua the ruler, since any one who erred in ruling could not be called the ruler. In effect, the realm of ideal had, in a way already been stipulated in the nature of language itself.⁶⁵ If Thrasymachus intended the meaning of the stronger in his argument to be the perfect, infallible ruler, then the meaning of justice had to be of the ideal as well. To be sure, it was generated from Socrates' dialectic method that entailed Thrasymachus' movement from one realm to another. This oscillating movement of course reminds us of what we have discussed earlier regarding Socrates' discussion of the theory of names in the *Cratylus*. It is the same movement, that is, the movement between the realm of the divine and the human.

It was at this point that Socrates shifted Thrasymachus' argument from human justice to divine justice. In the realm of the perfect or divine, the ruler was infallible and so was justice. To be sure, it was justice of the divine that Socrates had imposed since his discussion with Polemarchus, that is, justice as human excellence never harmed or led to deterioration of anyone. In fact, as Socrates argued, Thrasymachus had given nothing new to the definition of justice. He had just added the term 'the stronger' to the previous answer which he himself had forbidden.⁶⁶ For Thrasymachus had implicitly referred his meaning of ruler to that of the realm of the ideal or what was regarded in its 'very most precise sense of the word,' *akribei logo*. Then Socrates continued his

⁶⁴ Plato, the *Republic*, *ibid.*

⁶⁵ As Plato criticized the stiffness of the language in the *Epistle VII*.

⁶⁶ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book I 339a).

investigation from such a premise.⁶⁷

Having been imposed on by his own argument, Thrasymachus conceded to Socrates that the physician, in a precise way of speaking, was a healer of the sick not a moneymaker, and also the pilot was not a sailor but a ruler of sailors.⁶⁸ Moreover, in such a realm, the advantage of any art and artist was nothing but to be as perfect as possible. However, the ideal art and artist were already perfect in themselves. Then the art must be aimed towards the perfection of something else rather than of itself. Therefore 'to provide for this, then, what is advantageous, that is the end for which art was devised'.⁶⁹ Then medicine in this precise sense of the word was considered the advantage of the body not of itself. Hence, Socrates argued that the art of the stronger and the stronger himself did not 'consider or enjoin the advantage of the stronger but every art that of the weaker which is ruled by it'.⁷⁰ Of course, from this, Thrasymachus' definition of justice seemed to suffer 'a reversal of form'.⁷¹

However, Thrasymachus did not surrender. In arguing against Socrates, he then raised the example of the shepherd by asking Socrates to consider that the actual reason why the shepherd takes care of the welfare of a

⁶⁷ At this point, Plato has Cleitophon and Polemarchus discussed this point in order to elaborate the problem in Thrasymachus' argument. As Annas comments that 'Cleitophon's suggestion sounds a bit naive, but we can take it as an attempt to close the gap threatening to open between Thrasymachus's two formulations in terms of the stronger and of the ruler'. Annas, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁶⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 341c-d).

⁶⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 341e).

⁷⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 342c).

⁷¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 343a).

flock of sheep was just in the pursuit of his own interests. This was also true as regards the attitude of the ruler towards the ruled. The ruler lived happily since he had been served by his subjects who had complied with the laws which they thought just, though in fact they had been unjustly enacted with reference to the interest of the ruler.

At this point, Thrasymachus clarified his theory of justice. Justice was actually the interest of the unjust man who was stronger and therefore ruled. The unjust man had been able to take advantage of the just man because the latter was honest, straightforward, and simple-minded. The more unjust a man was, the happier his life would be, since it was more often than not that small criminals could hardly escape detection while the full scale of injustice as in the form of the tyrant not only eluded exposure but also was said to be happy. Moreover, his life had been blessed by his own subjects and others who heard his story. So it was the fear of suffering wrong and not the fear of committing crimes that caused one to revile injustice. Then Thrasymachus confirmed that 'injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and more masterful thing than justice,...and...it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just'.⁷²

VI

Again, Socrates had to point out to Thrasymachus that he was still confusing the two opposing realms. In the realm of the ideal or that of the 'precise sense of the word,' the art of the shepherd was concerned with nothing

⁷² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 343c).

but the welfare of his flock of sheep.⁷³ To be sure, it was the wage-earning art that could be said to be responsible for making profit from sheep farming produce. Each art yielded a particular benefit. It was in fact the art of wage-earning that accompanied all other arts i.e., medicine, pilot etc., which yielded the benefit only to the subject which concerned each of them, that is, medicine-health, pilot-safety at sea. In this regard, a person would not become a doctor because he earned wages, neither would we call a man who was paid for his practising medicine a wage-earner. Therefore, it was not in the art of ruling in every form that sought for its own benefit, since no true ruler of his own will would bother to rule or

⁷³ This analogy of the shepherd and his tending of the herds of animals is problematic. As Michel Foucault points this out and examines it in details in his *Towards a Criticism of 'Political Reason'*. See Michel Foucault, 'Towards a Criticism of "Political Reason" in *The Tanner Lectures On Human Values* 1981 Vol. II, Sterling M. McMurrin (ed.), Salt Lake City and London, 1981, pp.223-254. Foucault is right as he observed Plato's different treatment with regard to the analogy of the shepherd in the *Critias*, the *Republic*, and the *Laws* on the one hand, and the *Statesman* on the other. Foucault said 'Plato thrashes it out in the *Statesman*'. Also, according to Foucault, Plato solved the problem of the analogy [Foucault, *ibid.*, p.232].

With regard to this problem, it can be said that Plato was aware of it. In the *Republic*, it was Thrasymachus who introduced this analogy to support his argument. What should have been derived from the analogy of the shepherd is that the shepherd feeds and takes care of his sheep because he will slaughter them in the end anyhow. However, Socrates found his way out by dividing between the art of the shepherd and the art of money-making. From this, the art of shepherd is left with the art of tending animals by itself. This method of division is dialectic as regards its search for the first principle or essence of the things in concern. In the *Statesman*, it is obvious that Plato really 'thrashed it out' as Foucault commented. The Stranger pointed to the fact that, with regard to the myth of the revolution of the universe which is related to the story of Atreus, the descendants in the Orestes family, the gods' care of the herds of men which resembled the care of the shepherd for his animals cannot be the art of the statesman. See further discussion in Chapter Eleven.

hold the office in order to benefit other people. That was why money or honour had to be laid down as a return for the work of the ruler or those who held the office. Some were satisfied with money, and others with honour, but the good man reproached both. Therefore, for him, only a certain kind of penalty would possibly constrain him to rule. That is to say, if he did not rule, he would in turn be ruled by those who were inferior to him. Paradoxically, the good man was encouraged to rule through fear of being ruled by an inferior one.⁷⁴

Of course, the inferior one always wanted to rule in order to take advantage of other people for his own self-interest. Then the good man had to fight for himself and won the battle in order to prevent the inferior from having control over him. For, when the inferior ruled, he was a worse ruler. So this seems to imply that the best ruled in order to protect himself as well as others who were like him; and when the best man ruled, justice prevailed because the best regarded justice to be advantageous to him. Also, the one who ruled must be the stronger. If the best was the stronger, which is as it should be, then, at this point, Socrates seems in a way to concur with Thrasymachus's theory. Although, it seems to contradict what he had proved just a short while ago that the stronger ruled for the sake of the benefit of the weaker.⁷⁵ Accordingly, the question here is whether or not Socrates and Thrasymachus shared a similar understanding of the following terms such as 'the good and the bad, the stronger and the weaker, and the best and the worst'. Socrates seemed to be aware of this problem although he by no means conceded defeat, as he said he would reserve the dispute over Thrasymachus' theory that justice was in the

⁷⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 345d-347d). The discussion on the paradox of courage and fear can be found in the *Laches* and the *Laws*.

⁷⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 342c).

interest of the superior for another occasion. It is understood that this is not a serious problem since he might possibly have shared with Thrasymachus the definition as it has been suggested. What is more important is that Thrasymachus stated that the unjust life was better than the just life, which indicated the discrepancy between their views on the terms in question.⁷⁶ It has to be after the question of the happiness of the just and the unjust lives had been examined, in which Thrasymachus' views on these terms, namely, virtue, vice, good, bad, wise, ignorant were investigated, that Socrates would be able to return to discuss the original problem of the definition.

VII

Virtue, *arete*, was normally desirable while vice, *kakia*, was not. It is very doubtful what a man would view of virtue and vice if he argued that the unjust life was better than the just. Justice was assigned to be a kind of virtue not vice.⁷⁷ From this, people expected justice to render justice to benefit them. However, in his argument, Thrasymachus should have thought that injustice rendered benefit and justice did not. If so, then justice in his view must be vice and injustice virtue. Could justice be vice? This is the theme of the questions Socrates put to Thrasymachus.

Indeed, for Thrasymachus, thinking in terms of profit, anything, whatever it might be, that did not return benefit for what one had done must be regarded as vice. Therefore

⁷⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 347e).

⁷⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 348e-349a).

its opposite had to be regarded as virtue. If justice paid, it was virtue. If it did not, it was vice. So it is mostly that case that injustice rather than justice returned the benefit. In fact, Thrasymachus' view was not too complicated to comprehend. He just called what was conventionally regarded as justice injustice, and injustice justice. However, it seemed that in that context there existed a double standard of justice and Thrasymachus sometimes referred to one and sometimes to another. The idea of the double standard of justice perhaps was unconscious and unacknowledged by Thrasymachus. On the other hand, it might be possible that he intentionally seemed to prefer the confusion to the clarification of those two standards of justice which Socrates tried to make him distinguish between.⁷⁸ One was the conventional view of justice according to which one expected everyone but himself to act. The other was called the natural justice which one discreetly and secretly practised.⁷⁹ Thrasymachus regarded anyone who practised and believed in the conventional justice as 'a most noble simplicity or goodness of heart, *euetheia*'.⁸⁰ Whether the term 'goodness of heart' was literally intended, or was ironically used with a pathetic regard, depends upon the standard of justice referred to. With a view to the conventional justice, such a person was truly good-natured. However, according to the other, like that of Thrasymachus, he was just simple and foolish.⁸¹ In a sense, the existence of

⁷⁸ The unjust man can exploit others in the society on the condition that the society has double standard of justice. Cf. this point in Adi Ophir, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-72.

⁷⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 358a).

⁸⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, *ibid.*

⁸¹ A man might have really admired someone or something if it is congenial to his standard of moral values, provided he has only one standard. As regards the double standard of justice, if it possible for a person to

the double standard of justice in individuals or the public blurs the demarcation line between justice and injustice. The term 'innocence' possibly conveys twofold connotations. Also, the use of irony in one way or another emerges and becomes possible because of the existence of individuals or the public who had a double standard of justice. The degree of irony correlates with the degree of hypocrisy.

However, Thrasymachus could not admit that the unjust man had 'badness of heart' as Socrates asked him whether it should be the case as the unjust man was opposed to the just who was said to have 'goodness of heart'. With regard to his own view of justice, namely the natural justice, injustice in the conventional sense could not be 'badness of heart', since it rendered what was due to him, that is, all kinds of the pleasures as such. Instead, any person who benefited from what he had done, no matter how he did it, was understood to have 'goodness of judgement', *euboulia*.⁸² Moreover, the unjust man could be regarded as being absolutely intelligent and good, *phronimos kai agathos*, when he had accomplished total injustice, that is, assuming political power and ruling over men and cities.⁸³ It is the fullest scale of exploitation that a man can do with regard to his self-interest by which the most happiest life can be made possible. At last, Thrasymachus' view of virtue and vice came to the fore. Injustice was a kind of

experience a state of self-conflict. For instance, in front of a group of people who possess a certain kind of values of justice opposed to his, the person might be refrained from expressing his true judgement towards what he himself would actually regard as admirable or deplorable while other people go against or accept it. But he would enjoy recalling highly or merely be upset about it when he was by himself. See the *Laws*, (Book II 655d-656b).

⁸² Plato, the *Republic*, (Book I 348d).

⁸³ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book I 349d).

virtue and wisdom, and justice was the opposite.⁸⁴

Socrates said he was surprised that Thrasymachus held such a view, since, as regards the conventional view in the double standard of justice, most people would admit that injustice was profitable but vicious and disgraceful.⁸⁵ For them, injustice rendered both pleasures and shame. However, such an oxymoron did not seem to exist in Thrasymachus' explanation of injustice; for Thrasymachus had not shown any hesitation in putting injustice in the category of virtue and wisdom while others would hold back from that position. Socrates regarded Thrasymachus' view as more problematic than the conventional one, since self-contradiction in a person's thoughts or actions would cast doubt or uncertainty upon himself. It is more likely for one with such self-conflict to wonder about, *thaumazo*, and rethink the truth of what is in question than those who do not have such doubts. The fact that there was no sign of self-conflict in Thrasymachus that made Socrates say that he now absolutely believed that Thrasymachus really meant what he said otherwise he should not have talked in such manner in front of many people who held opposite views to him.⁸⁶

Socrates proceeded to examine whether there was actually no inconsistency in Thrasymachus' argument. He highlighted a particular point. In fact, this point

⁸⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 348e).

⁸⁵ As regards this point, Socrates said later in his speech on the imperfect souls and cities that in democracy the meanings of moral values have been reversed. People regarded the good as bad and so on. Things were miscalled. See the *Republic*, (Book VIII 560-1); the *Laws*, (Book II 661b).

⁸⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 348e-349a). The origin of self-conflict with regard to a nature or habit of a person in relation to the public is elaborated in the *Laws*, Book II.

underlay the argument that the unjust man took advantage of the just man because he was better than the other who was simple-minded, foolish and incapable. In this regard, Thrasymachus might have thought that all men desired the same good such as the pleasures of wine, women, feasts, and the like. He took for granted that the reason for a person not to act like others in pursuit of what was generally regarded to be the good, lay either in the person's stupidity or incapability, or both. He did not believe that the just man might have a different kind of knowledge which could generate a different view of the good. Thus, the reason for a person acting differently or perhaps absurdly could be the disparity in the view of the good rather than stupidity or incapability.

That is why, with regard to this point, Socrates asked Thrasymachus whether it was the just men or the unjust men who wished to outdo other people, *pleonektein*.⁸⁷ Thrasymachus answered that it was only the unjust men who could outdo other people, both just and unjust, for his own advantage.

With regard to the just man, he never competed with others like himself, because they all had the same idea of the good. Also, the just man could not surpass the others like him with regard to the perfection of their knowledge in the same way that the musician or the physician would not compete with others in tuning a lyre or prescribing nutrition, if they really were the true musician or physician.⁸⁸ However, the musician or the physician would of course outdo those who had no connection with music or

⁸⁷ Desmond Lee explained that it is difficult to reproduce the term in translation. He suggested the words such as 'get better of', 'outdo', 'do better than', as no single English term is appropriate. See Desmond Lee, *The Republic of Plato*, Harmondsworth, 1981, p. 92ff.

⁸⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 349d-350a).

medicine.

In that respect, the just man would only get the better of only the unjust. However, as regards all forms of knowledge, the knowledgable man would outdo the ignorant but not his like, namely those who understood what he understood. The knowledgable man was surely regarded as wise whilst the other was ignorant. Also, the wise man was generally regarded as good and the ignorant as bad. Therefore, the bad man and the ignoramus would try to overreach both the knowledgable man and the ignorant like himself.⁸⁹ Thrasymachus stated earlier that only the unjust would outdo both the just and the unjust men. For this reason, he was subject to the severe force of the argument to contradict himself that 'the just man turned to be the wise and good, and the unjust the bad and ignorant'.⁹⁰

Consequently, Thrasymachus was said to feel ashamed. It was also reported that no one had seen him in such state before.⁹¹ In effect, from this, he seemed to give up his position. He stated that he could not defend his position if he was not allowed to use longer speeches than Socrates imposed. However, with regard to his personality, surprisingly, he seemed to surrender very easily and quickly, for Glaucon noticed and mentioned later that Thrasymachus was now like a serpent which just had been charmed.⁹²

As justice turned out to be good and wise, Socrates then went on to examine that whether or not, in enslaving

⁸⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 350b).

⁹⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 350c).

⁹¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 350d).

⁹² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 358b).

another city, a city needed to combine justice with it. To this, Thrasymachus said that needs of the city depended on whether justice or injustice was regarded as wisdom. His reply indicated that he began to regard other different views as possible alternatives to his own view. Socrates proved that it was not possible for any function to be well accomplished if it had been carried out without justice. In contradistinction to the unjust man, the just man would not compete with his like, but he would make friends with others like him and he was also a friend to himself. In this regard, it was justice that brought 'oneness of mind and love'.⁹³ Likewise, a city would perform her own function well if there had been justice to unite all elements in herself so that they would not be against one another. In other words, justice enables the city not to be an enemy to herself.

Of course, this was applicable to all other things, collective or individual. Furthermore, everything had its own specific function. When the best of its function had been carried out, it would be regarded as the virtue of such a thing. Then, 'whatever operates will do its own work well by its own virtue and badly by its own defect'.⁹⁴ With regard to the soul, its function was concerned with 'management, rule, deliberation, and the like, and also life'. Without this, nothing in the world could ever be accomplished. Then, the soul would govern well with its own virtue; so the virtue of the soul should be something that brings unity and love to itself.

Following this line of argument, Thrasymachus at last had to admit that the excellence or virtue of the soul must be justice and its defect injustice.⁹⁵ As said earlier,

⁹³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 351d).

⁹⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 353c).

⁹⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 353e).

we presumed that Socrates expected Thrasymachus to explain his theory of justice that 'the stronger' must be understood with reference to the soul not the body. To be sure, what Socrates arrived at was not that the excellence of the stronger was justice; it was the virtue of any soul regardless of its strength or weakness. Then, any just soul and any just man 'will live well and the unjust ill'.⁹⁶ Also, one who lived well should be blessed and happy. Therefore, justice could not be understood to 'pay to be miserable, but to be happy,' and 'never can injustice be more profitable than justice'.⁹⁷ So it seems that what Thrasymachus had argued for the happiness of the unjust life was dialectically refuted by Socrates.⁹⁸

Although Socrates had successfully proved what the consequences of justice and injustice should be, he confessed that the meaning of justice was still unknown since he hastened to concern himself with the consequences of justice before completing the discussion on its cause, namely justice itself. Although justice had been proved to be virtue and wisdom, it could not be regarded as a better answer to the original problem. Socrates admitted that after all he knew nothing. He insisted that it was necessary to know what justice was before one could know whether it was really virtue or not, and whether its possessor was or was not happy. Otherwise, the kind of happiness it rendered to the just life would remain obscure although we know that justice brought happiness to the just soul and the just man.

⁹⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, *ibid.*

⁹⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 354a).

⁹⁸ It is not a substantial victory. Michael C. Stokes stated that it is the dialectical defeat of Thrasymachus. See Michael C. Stokes, 'Adeimantus in the Republic' in *Justice, Law, and Method in Plato and Aristotle*, Spiro Panagiotou (ed.), Edmonton, Canada, 1987, p. 62.

VIII

It is this problem that caused Glaucon to step into Thrasymachus' position. Glaucon's nature or personality was described as 'always an intrepid enterprising, spirit in everything'⁹⁹, though he hardly believed that the life of the unjust man could be far better than that of the just man. However, he could not be content with Socrates' dialectical victory over Thrasymachus' untimely surrender. Glaucon and his brother Adeimantus were seriously concerned about the problem of justice. They strongly intended to search for the truth of the matter. In pursuit of the argument, the reasoning and the language of the argument from both sides should have been set forth so that anyone could consider which one was indisputable.¹⁰⁰ So, the Thrasymachian argument must be carried on.

Glaucon decided to renew and elaborate Thrasymachus' position at its best in order to find out the truth about justice and injustice. In the meantime, he expected to hear a better defence from Socrates. Also, Glaucon argued that there were three kinds of goodness which rendered benefits to men; first, there was the good that one chose for its own sake not because of its consequences; secondly, there was the good that one loved both for its own sake and

⁹⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 357a). Glaucon's character is identifiable to the nature of the timocratic man in Socrates' speech of the imperfect souls and cities in the *Republic*, Book VIII. Mary P. Nichols points that Glaucon's 'the most manly' character enables him to accept the speech on communism with regard to Socrates' answer to one of the three waves of problem concerning the education of the philosophic guardian for women and children. Mary P. Nichols, 'Spiritedness and Philosophy of Plato's Republic' in *Understanding the Political Spirit: Philosophical Investigations from Socrates to Nietzsche*, Catherine H. Zuckert (ed.), New Haven and London, 1988, p.58.

¹⁰⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 358b, 362e).

for its consequences; thirdly, there was the good that one welcomed not for itself but only for the rewards and other benefits that accrued from it.¹⁰¹

Socrates said that justice must belong to the good, which someone aspiring to happiness must love both for its own sake and for the sake of its consequences.¹⁰² It seems that Glaucon was aware of the double standard of justice as he argued that the majority of the people believed that justice belonged to the good which one practised only for the sake of its consequences, though he possibly suffered from the practice itself.¹⁰³ With reference to Socrates' recent argument that the virtue of the soul was justice, Glaucon said that he desired 'to hear what each of them, justice and injustice, is and what potency and effect it has in and of itself dwelling in the soul, but to dismiss their rewards and consequences'.¹⁰⁴ Socrates was urged to give the answer if he really intended to defend his case.¹⁰⁵

Thrasymachus' argument was then expounded by Glaucon in the following way. First, as once argued, there existed the double standard of justice, namely natural and conventional justice. According to the former, one preferred to commit injustice rather than suffer it. The conventional justice emerged from the agreement made by those weaker ones who could not commit injustice but indeed suffered from it. In contradistinction to the conventional justice, the law of natural justice allowed the stronger to do wrong and reap benefits with impunity. For, when the

¹⁰¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 357b-c).

¹⁰² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 358a).

¹⁰³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 358a).

¹⁰⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 358b).

¹⁰⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 357b-c).

weaker was wronged, he could not revenge himself.

Glaucon said that in view of these two kinds of justice, there existed the double standard of justice where one would prefer others to be just while he himself would secretly commit injustice whenever he had the chance. Only a mad man would make such a compact with anyone if he had power to do and get away from injustice, since it was believed that no one would do justice out of his own will but because it was necessity. Glaucon argued that there would be no difference between the just man and the unjust man if they could do wrong with impunity. Having such a chance, everyone would become a Gyges whom nobody ever suspected since by his magic ring he became invisible whenever he committed any crimes. Given this condition, if the most just man who was really simple and noble could hold his course unchangeable unto death even though he was mistaken for the unjust one all his life, while the most unjust man with his crafty expertise not only escaped detection but secured for himself the greatest reputation for justice, then one could be assured that the man was just not only for the consequence of justice such as honours and other rewards but also for the sake of justice itself. Following this, Glaucon concluded that not until these two kinds of life could each be separated in such a condition, the judgement as to which of the two was the happier could not be justly made.¹⁰⁶ Otherwise, the truth might have been as people said that 'so much better they say is the life that is prepared for the unjust man from gods and men then that which awaits the just'.¹⁰⁷

Following this, Adeimantus also came forward to continue where Glaucon had left off. He clarified and complemented his brother's speech. Like Glaucon, with a the idea of the double standard of justice in his mind, he

¹⁰⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 358e-361d).

¹⁰⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 362c).

argued that people taught their children to be just not for the sake of justice but for its consequences. It had been taught that one should pretend to be just but not to be really just, since justice itself was regarded as being unpleasant and laborious whereas injustice was pleasant and easy to win. Speaking about the gods in relation to the just man and the unjust man, Adeimantus stated that the just man was praised and believed to be blessed by the gods. Also, the rewards for his justice would be extended further to his children's children, whilst the unjust man was said to suffer for his evil deeds in the house of Hades as it had been related by the great poets, Homer and Hesiod. However, 'another kind of language about justice and injustice employed by both laymen and poets' conveyed different message. It said that if the gods really existed, they must be unjust and discriminate towards men, since, by means of sacrifices, the unjust men who were richer than the just men could attract the better care from the gods. Otherwise, many good men should not have faced such misfortunes and tragic life.¹⁰⁸ It was believed that only the gods could penetrate human minds.¹⁰⁹ They knew who was pretentious and who was genuine. So how could they disappoint the good men unless they were unjust themselves?

Perhaps the gods were indifferent to human affairs. If so, men did not need to bother themselves with eluding the eye of the gods. Moreover, men should do and indulge themselves with what could pay them better, and that was injustice not justice. Adeimantus then affirmed the idea that no one was willing to be really just. There could be no other reason for those men to praise justice than their lack of power to practise injustice without impunity.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. the *Laws*, (Book X 906b-d).

¹⁰⁹ See Michael Davis, 'Politics and Madness' in *Greek Tragedy and Political Theory*, J. Peter Euben (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp.143-4.

Therefore, justice was called forth by those who were either inferior because of their old age or lack of manly spirit, or it was because they were just divine by nature. Previously, no one had ever commended justice or censured injustice both for its consequences and more for its own sake as Socrates had asserted, since, without its rewards, justice itself seemed to be useless and undesirable. On the contrary, with regard to rewards, injustice was reasonably more attractive than justice.

Finally, Adeimantus concluded that it was from all these points that he and Glaucon were impelled to complete the unfinished argument started by Thrasymachus. Also, they had to ask Socrates, who had passed his entire life in the consideration of this matter, to render them a better argument on justice. He said that no one would believe that justice was better than injustice until Socrates could prove that justice by itself, dwelling in a man's soul, was the greatest good in itself and injustice the greatest of all evils in itself, regardless of their consequences, and by that means, a man would be his own best guardian for justice and against injustice.¹¹⁰

So, it seems that in the circumstance Glaucon and Adeimantus could not produce any stronger argument for justice. Even then, without a good reason, they said that they could not accept that result either. So far, the stronger argument was that justice without rewards was undesirable. However what Socrates argued was that one chose to be just for the sake of justice and for its consequences. Moreover, the highest priority regarding

¹¹⁰ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book II 363d-367e). Compare this point to 360c: 'And in the end, I suppose, they seize the citadel of the young man's soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honourable pursuits and true discourses, which are the best watchmen and guardians in the mind of men who are dear to the gods.' See also the *Laws*, Book X, 961d; the *Phaedo*, 113d.

benefits lay in justice itself not its consequences. To be sure, what Socrates argued so far makes one recall what Cephalus had stated earlier with regard to the matter of life and happiness. Cephalus did not regard old age or wealth as the cause of happiness and unhappiness.¹¹¹ That both could be either very useful or useless depends on the character of man. To be sure, from the discussion, Socrates concluded that the excellence of the soul was justice. Also, we all know that the soul was regarded as the essence of man. Therefore, at this point, justice and the character of man are conflated to the extent that the discussion of the character of man is indispensable to the search for justice, and to understand the character of man, it is necessary to understand the nature of the soul. The search for the understanding of the nature of the soul is indeed the search for man's self-knowledge.

¹¹¹ Also compare this to what Socrates stated in the *Apology*, 30a-b: 'For I go about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property more than for the perfection of your souls, or even so much; and I tell you that virtue does not come from money, but from virtues comes money and all other good things to man, both to the individual and to the state.' See also the *Euthydemus*, 280b-c.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Just City

In defense of justice, it seems that Socrates had to search for the soul. However, from the inception of the search, Socrates did not state that it was a search for the soul. Actually he said that he was to search for justice in man.¹ During the search, he said he had to resort to a particular kind of method. For example, a person with myopia would find it rather difficult to read small letters from a distance, particularly when he was not yet familiar with the words or the group of letters. On the other hand, if he had observed that 'these same letters existed elsewhere larger and on a larger surface,' then it would be easier for him to recognize them at a distance, no matter how it appeared.²

So in searching for justice in man, it would be quite difficult for someone who could not easily recognise justice, since he would not yet know exactly what justice was. Therefore, the search for justice would be easier to undertake in a city which consisted of a great number of men and was therefore larger. After that, one could then 'examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less'.³ An individual to be examined cannot possibly be anyone other than one's own self. As, during the search for justice in the *polis*, Socrates said that 'what we thought we saw there we must refer back to the individual man,' and 'we shall thus expect the individual also to have these same forms in his soul, and by reason of identical affections of these

¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 368e).

² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 368d).

³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 368e-369a).

with those in the city to receive properly the same appellations'.⁴ Therefore, to examine one's self in order to find out whether it has such quality discovered in the city is to examine one's soul.

To familiarise oneself with an easier object before undertaking a more difficult seems to be a part of the method of the search. For the same reason, the search for the statesmanship and sophistry in the *Statesman* and the *Sophist* employs a method similar to the one used in the search for justice in the *Republic*.⁵ However, there is a logical reverse between the methods in the *Republic* and in the *Statesman*. In the *Republic*, one was recommended 'to look for the quality of justice in the states, and then only examine it also in the individual, looking for the likeness of the greater in the form of the less'. In its reverse, looking for the same kind of activity with regard to the statesmanship in the *Statesman*, one had 'to see in another small and particular example the nature of example in general, with the intention of transferring afterwards the same figurative method from the lesser things to the most exalted eminence of the king'.⁶ Also, the method of hunting the sophist is that one should take some lesser thing and try to use it as a pattern for the greater.⁷ To be sure, that what is larger is easier to find than what is smaller perhaps cannot be taken for granted as the main reason. So the reason that justice of a city which was larger was easier to discover than that of an individual which was smaller seems to be inadequate.

⁴ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book II 434d-435a).

⁵ Plato, *Statesman*, (277e-278d); *Sophist*, (218d-e).

⁶ Plato, *Statesman*, (278e). Jacob Klein comments that despite their different level, the knowledge of the king and of the pig-breeder is the same thing. Klein, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-3.

⁷ Plato, *Sophist*, (218d-e).

With regard to the analogy of the city and man, there should have been other reasons. For, choosing justice in a city as a larger example for justice in man, the reason could not lie only in the virtue of the size or quantity of the city. It must also lie in the virtue or the nature of the city itself. Why must the analogy be the city and man?

To answer this, we have to go back to what has led us here. The investigation of justice in man originated from Glaucon and Adeimantus' request for a defense of happiness of the just soul. Such a request was necessitated by the argument between Thrasymachus and Socrates. Thrasymachus put forward his argument because he was exasperated by the way Socrates conducted his discussion on the problem of justice with Polemarchus. The problem of justice originally emerged from the discussion between Socrates and Cephalus with regard to happiness and justice. Cephalus' view of happiness was opposed to Thrasymachus'. According to Cephalus, the primary cause of happiness lay in the character of man. The usefulness of wealth and age depended on the character of man. However, he also argued that a man was happy not because of either himself or wealth and age; both were important. As we know, in supporting of his argument, he alluded to Themistocles' reply to the Seriphean that 'neither would he himself ever have made a name if he had been born in Seriphus nor the other if he had been an Athenian'. In other words, that a man became what he was was attributable to his city and the man himself. As argued above, Socrates' argument was quite congenial to that of Cephalus, namely Socrates' justice and Cephalus' character of man. Then, such a relationship between the city and man is indissoluble in the same way that the quest for justice of a city is inseparable from the quest for justice of a man and vice versa.

Therefore, first of all, the most significant motif for Socrates in introducing the analogy of the city and man is probably similar to what Cephalus alluded to and regarded as generally applicable to man with regard to his life and happiness.⁸ Next to this, Thrasymachus is said to have referred to the study of man by way of political contexts to explain that by 'the stronger' in his argument he meant the ruler of the city.⁹ Also, the absolute rule of the unjust man, namely tyranny, would render absolute happiness. So another reason for the use of the analogy of the city and man is that in order to refute the idea of the stronger as the ruler of the city employed in Thrasymachus, Socrates had to prove in the same way that the stronger man as the ruler of the city ruled or governed for the sake of justice, in which, apart from rendering happiness to himself, it benefited the others in the city altogether. The third reason is drawn from the *Phaedrus* which points out that 'to tell what the soul really is would be a matter for utterly superhuman and long discourse, but it is within human power to describe it briefly in a figure'.¹⁰ That is why in the *Phaedrus* the soul has been described as an image of the composite nature of a pair of winged horses

⁸ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book II 330a). It is interesting that Torsten J. Andersson points out modern element in Plato as regards the sociological approach to the interpretation of man in the use of the analogy between the city and man in the *Republic*. However, it seems that although Plato should have been conscious of this interrelationship between man and society, he intended not to expose it unreservedly. Incidentally, Anderson does not refer at all to Cephalus from whom the idea seems to be initiated. Instead, he just argues that this pattern of the study of man in a political context has been first referred to by Thrasymachus at 338d-339a, 343b-344c. See Torsten J. Andersson, *Polis and Psyche: A Motif in Plato's Republic*, *Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis*, 1971, pp. 15-17. The sociological element may exist in Plato. But his philosophical foundation is definitely not sociologism.

⁹ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book II 338d-339a, 343b-344c). See Andersson in footnote 8.

¹⁰ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (246a).

and a charioteer.¹¹ Following the similar reason, then, in the *Republic*, in investigating the soul, the image of a city has been likened to the soul.

The last reason of the study of the soul by the image of the city is an educational one. In the *Statesman*, when the young Socrates said he could not understand what the Stranger had explained about his method of the search for the meaning of statesmanship, the Stranger replied that it was a human plight to need another example for the very example.¹² The Stranger seemed to imply that what he had discussed about the statesmanship was already a good example of what it was, but it was still deficient to the young Socrates who required another good example for the one already given. Then he gave another example in explaining his manner of examination. He explained that children needed to familiarise themselves with some letters before they could recognise them in a more difficult form of syllables. Presumably, the method in the *Republic* is similar to that in the *Statesman*. The forms of the city, just and unjust, are taken as the easier example of the forms or nature of the soul, after one has gradually familiarised oneself with what can be easily understood. He then could recognise justice and injustice in his soul.¹³

Furthermore, as we know, Socrates studied not only the origin of the city itself but also examined its changing political constitutions. Certainly, that kind of investigation contributes directly to the investigation of

¹¹ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (246a). The image of the soul as the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer in the *Phaedrus* is to be brought into discussion afterwards to complement the image of the soul as the city.

¹² This point is related to the problem of self-knowledge which is to be discussed later.

¹³ Plato, *Statesman*, (277d-e, 278a-e).

the nature of the soul if one takes the *Phaedrus* into account. In the second part of the *Phaedrus*, the theory of speech and writing is discussed from which the dialogue leads to the demand of the understanding of the nature of the soul as a prerequisite for the good discourse.¹⁴ However, 'without knowing the nature of the whole man,' one cannot 'acquire any appreciable knowledge of the nature of the soul'.¹⁵ Following the Hippocratic method, Socrates argued that in search for the nature of the soul one must

¹⁴ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (269e-270b).

¹⁵ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (270c). In search of the nature of the soul, Phaedrus mentioned the Hippocratic tradition which employed inductive method, namely to study human body in general, to discover human nature. With reference to the Hippocratic tradition, Walter Hamilton remarked that 'it is not possible to identify the source of Phaedrus' statement in the numerous extant works attributed to Hippocrates.' But W.H.S. Jones commented in his translation of Hippocrates' *Nature of Man* that 'Galen is convinced that the first section (of the *Nature of Man*) is referred by Plato in the famous passage in the *Phaedrus*..' However, Jones also let us know that some scholar like E. Littré believed that Plato referred to *Ancient Medicine* not to *Nature of Man*. Apart from this, R.B. Levinson pointed to other matter such as breeding at 747c-d in the *Laws* which he regarded as Hippocratic influence on Plato, particularly from *On Airs, Waters, and Places* whose part dealt with the topic of human types in connection to the climate. The comprehensive comment with regard to Plato's method in the *Phaedrus* and Hippocrates is rendered by Ludwig Edelstein. He argued that Hippocratic method and Platonic dialectic are compatible since

'Hippocrates considered the body an organism; medical practice he based on the knowledge resulting from the comprehension of the scattered particulars into one concept and the division of the whole in turn into its natural species, or, to use Platonic language, on dialectic'.

See Plato, *the Phaedrus and Letters VII and VIII*, translated by Walter Hamilton, Harmondsworth, 1985, p. 90; Hippocrates Vol. IV, *On the Universe*, translated by W.H.S. Jones, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. xxvii; R.B. Levinson, *In Defense of Plato*, Cambridge, Massachusetts 1953, p. 222; *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, Ludwig Edelstein, 'Hippocrates' in N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard (eds.), *opcit.*, pp. 518-519.

consider

'first, whether it is one and all alike, or, like the body, of multiform aspect; for this is what we call explaining its nature,...and secondly,..what its action is and toward what it is directed, or how it is acted upon and by what..'.¹⁶

That is to say, with the examination of the soul through the image of the city, the study of the genesis of the city and its multiform of political life constitutes the understanding of the nature of the soul. Socrates told Phaedrus that Thrasymachus or anyone who seriously taught the art of rhetoric would 'first describe the soul with perfect accuracy'.¹⁷ However, when Thrasymachus appeared in the *Republic*, which is the only dialogue with which he had direct contact with the reader, it is Socrates himself not Thrasymachus who undertook such a task propounded in the *Phaedrus*. To be sure, none of the sophistic rhetoricians in the dialogues discussed the soul in the way that Socrates did. So this should have been Socrates' ironical remark against the sophists. If Socrates in the *Republic* really followed all his own instructions stated in the *Phaedrus*, that is, apart from those two measures quoted above he also rendered his discourse of the just soul in accordance with the third of the theory of good speech and writing, he must have

'classified the speeches and the souls and must have adapted each to the other, showing the causes of the effects produced and why one kind of the soul is necessarily persuaded by certain classes of speeches, and another is not'.¹⁸

¹⁶ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (270d, 271a-b).

¹⁷ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (271a).

¹⁸ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (271b).

If so, this means that in reading Socrates' discourse of the soul the reader must also bear in mind that Socrates rendered it in relation to the nature of the character of the soul of each of his interlocutors. Again, at this point, we notice the emphasis on the interrelationship between justice and the character of man.

II

Polis and Psyche

'The origin of the city,' said Socrates, 'is to be found in the fact that we do not severally suffice for our own needs, but each of us lacks many things'.¹⁹ And from this the city is originated:

'As a result of this, then one man calling in another for one service and another for another, we, being in need of many things, gather many into one place of abode as associates and helper, and to this dwelling together we give the name city or state...'²⁰

First of all, the basic needs were the provision of food for existence and life, housing, and clothing, and to fulfil such needs everyone needed one another to produce what one was unable to do of his own accord.²¹ For one man was naturally fitted for one task and another for another. So, first, it has been said that there existed such a desire which the city was able to fulfil. However, had such a desire and its fulfilment been the only essence

¹⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 369b).

²⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 369c).

²¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 369b-372b).

of the city, Glaucon strongly resented that it could not be the description of the city of man. Rather, it was the city of pigs.²²

To be sure, Glaucon and Adeimantus did not deny the existence of such a desire, but it was insufficient to represent a human city. Then Socrates asked what more Glaucon had to add to what he had just described. Glaucon replied that it was the custom, by which he meant the things which make human life more enjoyable than just the level of basic necessities. Such luxuries enabled them to 'recline on couches, if they are not to be uncomfortable, and dine from tables and have made dished and sweetmeats such as are now in use'.²³ If it could be regarded as another existing desire, then it must differ from what had been stated earlier. Socrates agreed and commented that if that was the case, then, what they were considering was not merely the origin of the city or the state of necessity, but the origin of a luxurious city or the healthy state.²⁴

With regard to this second desire, a healthy city could become a fevered one. In such a city, everything would no longer be confined to necessities. After their basic needs had been fulfilled, some men would not be content with their usual way of life. It had to be embellished in response to an unnecessary desire, for example,

'couches will have to be added thereto and tables and other furniture, yes, relishes and myrrh and incense and girls and cakes..(and for) houses and garments and shoes..we must set painting to work and embroidery, and procure gold and ivory and similar

²² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 372d).

²³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 372d-e).

²⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, *ibid*.

adornments'.²⁵

And it was from this kind of desire that many new classes of profession in the city were derived. In a luxurious city, there was a need for the classes of huntsmen, sculptors, painters, musicians, poets, rhapsodists, actors, chorus-dancers, contractors etc. Also, husbandry and livestock became necessary in response to the exceeding consumption.

Following that, of course, doctors were much more in demand than before. Therefore, with regard to this condition, the city had to be enlarged to serve the further need which exceeded the requirements of necessity in the city. Proceeding in this pattern, the city then was likely to dispute over the ownership of the territory from which war with its neighbour inevitably followed. It was that kind of the city which first gave birth to war and its catastrophic consequences.²⁶

Following this, the city was required to have its own army. As regards the stipulation of the origin of this city, 'it is impossible for one man to do the work of many arts'.²⁷ To be sure, this business of fighting was a kind of art and profession.²⁸ Moreover, the art of war was regarded as the greatest of all arts, since without it, no one could enjoy the wealth and luxuries produced by all other arts because they could have been taken away from him by other stronger ones. Then the city required the existence of another special class, that is, the guardians of the city. Being the greatest of all arts, 'it would

²⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 373a).

²⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 373b-e).

²⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 374a).

²⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 374b).

require more leisure than any other business and the greatest science and training'.²⁹ Like all other arts, the art of war needed natural propensity, practising and training from childhood. Since no man could become an expert of any art on that very day he started to perform it.

Socrates then continued to discuss this special class in details. First of all, there was the question of what kind of nature was suitable for the guardianship. Socrates asked his interlocutors to consider the similarity between the nature of a well-bred hound for the watch-dog's work and the nature of a well-born lad. He explained that such a nature should possess the qualities such as keen perception, quickness, and strength³⁰; but to fight well, another quality was needed which was supposed to be the most important quality of all. That was courage, *andreion*.³¹ To be sure, for any creature, whether it be horse or dog or any other, in order for it to be brave, it must be high-spirited, *thumos*, every soul became fearless and unconquerable in the face of everything.³²

With such qualities, the guardians were guaranteed to fight well against their enemies. However, they might possibly have done the same thing to their own people. Since, with regard to those qualities residing in their nature, nothing guaranteed that they would only be savage to their enemies and be kind to their friends. Such a nature reminds one of the virtue of the race of the bronze in Hesiod's myth of the races investigated by Socrates in the *Cratylus*. As discussed earlier, we understood that the

²⁹ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book II 374e).

³⁰ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book II 375a).

³¹ Plato, the *Republic*, *ibid.*

³² Plato, the *Republic*, (Book II 375b).

virtue of the race of bronze lay in their propensity to 'the lamentable works of Ares and deeds of violence'. Nevertheless, with their own unconquerable strength, they destroyed themselves. We also know that Socrates, under divine possession, did not discuss this race since it had left no name and received no honour at all. Furthermore, the nature of the guardians also reminds us of Polemarchus' proposition of what had been assumed to be the Homeric view of justice, that is, one should harm only one's enemy and benefit one's friends. Such a nature did not enable the guardians of the city to differentiate friends from enemies. To ask the guardians to have both gentleness and great-spiritedness at one time in their nature was perhaps illogical and impossible, but lacking either one, the city never had its good guardians.

III

However, Socrates argued that it could be possible since one could find such a mixture of gentleness and great-spiritedness in the natural disposition of the dog. Without any acquaintance or bad experience with both good and bad men, the dog was said to be gentle to its familiars and those whom it recognised, but it was angry to strangers.³³ It was generally understood that by nature the dog was able to distinguish between its friend and enemy better than any other animal including man. Socrates showed that despite its seeming self-contradiction, such a nature already existed in nature.³⁴ Further, Socrates

³³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 375c-e).

³⁴ To be sure, we should not forget that, generally, the arguments in the dialogues have been conducted with logical rigidity. However, what has been regarded as impossible in the realm of arguments and speeches or linguistically structured thought, is not necessarily impossible in the realm of reality. Before having recourse to the analogy of

stated that the dog could be distinguished from other creatures on the basis of 'the known and the unknown'. From that, he inferred that it was 'an exquisite trait of his (the dog's) nature and one that shows a true love of wisdom, *philosophon*'.³⁵

To be sure, the analogy of the nature of the dog is not to be taken too seriously. The dog's natural reaction to men cannot be taken for granted with regard to its accuracy and consistency.³⁶ Furthermore, as Mary P. Nichols observes, the watchdog nature is unlike the philosophic nature in that '(a) philosopher can indeed define his own and the alien by knowledge and ignorance, but he does not rest content with what he already knows,' and 'he does not resemble the dog or the guardian in repelling the unknown'.³⁷ Following that, she also argued that taking the nature of the dog too seriously, one might

the nature of dog as an example of a possibility of such dichotomy, Socrates admitted that the requirements of such nature resembled impossibilities (see the *Republic*, Book II, 375d). This is supposed to mean that it was impossible in logical terms. Then, to escape from the impasse, he found the solution to this problem from the empirical realm in the same way that he once did in the *Cratylus*, 393c, with regard to the natural offspring of each species.

³⁵ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book II 376b). So it seems that a dog was by nature philosophic. To be sure, the comparison between the nature of the good guardian--with philosophic nature--and a dog should be intended to avoid the logical and linguistic impasses in the argument (see footnote 34) and interconnect the guardian--not yet equipped with philosophic nature---to the philosophic nature to which the natural disposition of a dog was metaphorically employed as a transit, more than to take such an analogy precisely and seriously.

³⁶ Paul Shorey quoted Huxley that 'The dog who barks furiously at a beggar will let a well-dressed man pass him without opposition'. He seemed to agree that Plato is not quite serious with regard to this analogy of the dog and philosopher. See Paul Shorey (trans.), *Plato's the Republic*, *op. cit.*, p. 172ff.

³⁷ Nichols, 'Spiritedness and Philosophy of Plato's *Republic*', *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

have risked himself in attributing 'static character to the philosopher'.³⁸ To another extent, the dog can be trained to be hostile or friendly to certain types of men. It might also be possible that with regard to this latter aspect the guardian is expected by nature to be teachable for the same purpose. Nevertheless, to argue again, the most significant reason for a comparison of philosophic nature to that of the dog is to prove that the dichotomy of the opposite qualities is possible and exists. Such a twofold quality is said to have its grounds in philosophic nature. Hence, it is necessary to add another quality to the guardian's nature if he is to really be a good guardian who will never take advantage of his own people or friends. That quality is the love of wisdom or philosophic nature. Then, with all the qualities such as the love of wisdom, high spirit, quickness, and strength in the guardian's nature, the city will have its good and true guardian.³⁹

Then we know that after this there is a long digression from the description of the city to the education of its guardian. The guardian was supposed to have a philosophic nature similar to the analogy of the dog. Also, like the dog, the guardian had to be trained to recognise what he was supposed to know in order to be able to distinguish between what was to be friendly and what was not. Then, it was the education, *paideia*, that the guardian needed with regard to his specific function in the city. It can generally be assumed that the discussion on the education of the guardian has occupied the considerable part of the dialogue, namely from the end of Book II to Book VII. To be sure, in Book IV, in his examination of the five major imperfect characters of the soul, Socrates started to shift to the analogy of the political constitution of the city. In the beginning of Book V, due

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 376b).

to the request from Polemarchus, Adeimantus, and some others, the discussion of the imperfect political constitutions had to be interrupted by a return to the discussion on the three waves of paradox, that is, the education of the guardian women, their children, and the realisation of the ideal city, followed by the discussion on the nature of the philosophic-ruler in Book VI and his education in Book VII. Then, three books later, the discussion of the imperfect political polities and their degrees of happiness in life had its turn in Book VIII and Book IX. In the beginning of Book X, the mood was changed by Socrates' introduction of the topic of the art of imitation. Finally, after this, the discussion on the soul was resumed and concluded both in itself and also the dialogue with the story of the myth of Er. Although it is generally known that Book VII concerns the education of the philosopher, however, it can be regarded as the extension of the education of the guardian, or the further requirement for the guardian, if he really was to be a true and good guardian of the city. The need for the nature of both the guardian and the philosopher as the required quality of the good and true guardian culminates in the idea of the philosopher-king as an essential for the ideal city and individual. As it appears in Socrates' famous speech that

'unless either philosophers become kings in our states or those whom we now call our kings and rulers take to the pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, and there is a conjunction of these two things, political power and philosophic intelligence, while the motley horde of the natures who at present pursue either apart from the other are compulsorily excluded, there can be no cessation of troubles for our states, nor for human race either'.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book III 473d).

Undoubtedly, the best form of political constitution is the ideal city where the philosopher-king rules.

Socrates had depicted that justice prevailed in the city when it was ruled by the philosopher-king. However, its realisation remained a question of whether an existing city could become just like the just city, *kallipolis*, in Socrates' speech, or whether the discourse on the just city could be translated into practice. It was the nature of the just city to be governed by the philosophic guardian. In theory, what can be regarded as a city is a city which can become just or unjust. A city is still a city although it transforms itself through various forms of political constitution; but with other kinds of government, of course, it cannot be just, if there is only one model of the just city as Socrates argued. Hence, if a city is not just, it must be unjust. Socrates should have continued his rendition of the city and man analogy, but he just digressed to discuss the education of the guardian as regards the way to realise the philosophic guardian in the city. To this effect, it seems that Socrates was aware of the misgivings concerning the possibility of the just city in accordance with the possibility of the philosophic guardian.⁴¹ After that, around the end of Book IV and the beginning of Book V, Socrates was interrupted by Adeimantus and Polemarchus as he was going to resume the discussion on the imperfect polities.⁴² Again, after a long detour and after successfully achieving the realisation of philosopher-ruler in speech⁴³, Socrates finally returned to his uncompleted depiction of the other kind of the city

⁴¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 376d). As Adeimantus responded to Socrates' digression that he certainly thought that the discussion on the philosophic guardian and his education would lead them to the desirable end.

⁴² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book IV 449a-450a).

⁴³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book V 541b).

in Book VIII. It is the city without a philosopher-king which Socrates regarded as imperfect. Although there were many forms of imperfect city, only four types which corresponded to four major types of existing political constitutions were brought into the discussion.

IV

If the understanding of the city and the understanding of the soul are correlated, then the depiction of the soul would be as follows: the origin of the city was portrayed in the image of the origin of the city. The soul was in motion like the city whose desires by nature were evolving. In Book II, when Socrates first discussed about justice in the city, the city with its evolving desires began to develop into the just city, but at the end of Book IV and the beginning of Book V, Socrates started to discuss the imperfect or unjust cities which actually took place in Book VIII and IX. In the discussion, the just city was moving towards injustice, as it will be revealed in the course of this study that the soul as well as the city is in fact always in motion towards either justice or injustice.

From Socrates' discussion of the just and unjust cities in Book II, VIII, IX, it can be inferred that the just soul was the soul whose its rational element was in power and took control of other elements, namely spirit, necessary and unnecessary desires. In the same way that the city became just when 'philosophers become kings or kings become philosophers'.⁴⁴ In discussing the imperfect polities, unlike his discussion of the just city, Socrates

⁴⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 376b, Book V, 473d).

said that he like Homer had to invoke the spirit of the Muses, that is, the goddesses 'playing with us and teasing us as if we were children addressing us in lofty, mock-serious tragic style'.⁴⁵ The story begins with the fragility of justice and ends with the tragic life of tyranny. In this regard, it is inferred that the just soul as well as the just city were subject to change like 'everything else that has come into being, destruction is appointed'.⁴⁶ The decline of the just soul originated in the loss of harmony in itself, as the just city declined because of the decay of its ruling race, philosopher-ruler, which was derived from the unseasonable breeding of the race itself.

The cause of the decay of justice in the soul also lay in its ruling element, namely, rational part. The lack of harmony of the ruling part was a crucial factor for the decline of the state, since its decline would not be possible despite a rise of dissension, *stasis*, 'so long as the ruling class is at one with itself, however small it be'.⁴⁷ That means that even the ruling part in its unity and harmony was more powerful than the other elements although its number was only one or fewer than the others which were the majority. Actually, the ruling part could never be more powerful than the others in physical or quantitative terms. As Socrates refuted Callicles in the *Gorgias* that by nature the many were more powerful than the one⁴⁸, so the one must be better and more powerful only in terms of wisdom and knowledge. Since without wisdom, the

⁴⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 545d-e).

⁴⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 546a).

⁴⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 545d).

⁴⁸ Plato, *Gorgias*, (488d).

other qualities were prone towards fallibility.⁴⁹ It is in this respect that the one is said to be stronger and more powerful than the many.

At this stage, a point to be taken into consideration is that in reflecting the nature of the soul in the image of the city, Socrates stated that the decline of the ideal city resulted from the decay of its ruling class; and the ruling class deteriorated because of their unseasonable breeding which engendered the decadence of their next generation. Although the ruling class was wise, their untimely procreation could not be prevented by their 'reasoning combined with sensation'.⁵⁰

If the image of the soul is likened to the image of the city, then the soul takes place of the city. The city declined because its ruling class deteriorated. Then the soul decayed because its ruling part was weakened. But when Socrates in the spirit of the Muses said that the decline of the ruling class of the city originated in their unseasonable breeding, then, a problem arises: How is the decline of the ruling part of the soul to be understood with regard to its corresponding city?

It is notable that the cause of the decline of the polities throughout the discussion lay essentially in the unseasonable procreation of its ruling race. First of all, the ideal city fell when the nature of the offspring deviated from their parents, namely philosopher-rulers. Even the best of them did not possess the same qualities their ancestors did. They became the rulers of the city by virtue of their lineage not by their own merit. In other words, they were the illegitimate children and heirs of

⁴⁹ As this theme of argument permeates the whole dialogues.

⁵⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 546b).

their parents. To unravel the problem of interpretation with regard to the transformation of the soul corresponding to the city, two relevant factors need to be brought to our attention. First, it is the Homeric style of telling the story to which Socrates said he had to have recourse. The second point lies in his reference to procreation as the determinant agent of the transformation.

Invoking the Muses as the authoritative inspiration can be regarded as the poetic style of giving speech or telling a story as it appears in Homeric-Hesiodic tradition. First of all, it is a poetic strategy as regards its effect of persuasive purpose. By concealing himself through the imitation of different characters, the poet is able to inspirit and variegate his work. The main intent of these poets as described by a Greek thinker in the fifth century is to 'exaggerate the importance of their theme,' and 'are less interested in telling the truth than in catching the attention of the public,' while their 'authorities cannot be checked' and also their 'subject-matter, owing to the passage of time, is mostly lost in the unreliable streams of mythology'.⁵¹ Homer was said to proceed with his work both 'by pure narration and by a narrative that is effected through imitation'.⁵² He likened himself to another in a speech which bore an imitation of the one to whom he likened himself.⁵³

What should be taken into consideration with regard to his narration through imitation is his invocation of the Muses in the beginning of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. He claimed that it was not himself but the Muses who assisted his rendition of the story. It was the Muses who possessed

⁵¹ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, Harmondsworth, 1983, Book I, 21.

⁵² Plato, the *Republic*, (Book III 392d-396e).

⁵³ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book III 393c).

the vision of the whole story. As in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, what Homer stated preceding the story itself is 'Let us begin, goddess of song..' and 'The hero of the tale which I beg the Muse to help me tell..This is the tale I pray the divine Muse to unfold to us..Begin it, goddess, at whatever point you will'.⁵⁴ Furthermore, what has been said by the poets is the narration of past, present, and future things.⁵⁵ The imitation of different kinds of people together with the narration of past, present, and future events in the poetic work, presuppose the suprahuman quality which the poets did not possess. They had to have recourse to divine authority in enhancing their works. To imitate a man in his speech and action presupposes a knowledge of his self-interpretation. To imitate men of either different or same times and places presupposes omniscience and ubiquity. These qualities are divine not human. For instance, in his analysis of one of the Greek plays, Michael Davis points out that:

'Athene can not only see Odysseus; she can also see Ajax. That Athene can "see," without looking...Athene apparently sees not only Odysseus's actions, the tracking, but also sees his intentions, his wish to find out whether Ajax is "within or not within."...What Odysseus cannot see and must learn by signs, what it takes a god to see, is the inside of Ajax. The action of Ajax is utterly unintelligible without this first scene.'⁵⁶

What is so exiting and attractive about the poetic

⁵⁴ Both are quoted from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* of the Penguin Classics texts.

⁵⁵ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book III 392d).

⁵⁶ Michael Davis, 'Politics and Madness', *op. cit.*, pp. 143-144. The emphasis is mine. Compare the *Republic*, Book II, 363. Adeimantus expressed that the gods could see inside the human soul.

work is that one seems to partake of divine vision whereas in reality he would never perceive other people beyond their appearances and never have such a total understanding of events. The appearance and essence of things demarcate the line between divine and human power. To a certain extent, it can be said that in real life a man lives with a certain degree of uncertainty. Conflicts and quarrels can be said to originate in misconstruing appearances and signs of actions of one another. On the other hand, the inability to penetrate others' essence can defer or prevent such problems as well. However, one enjoys oneself and compensates what one cannot have in reality by transposing oneself into the poetic realm. In such a realm, the poet ascribes divine qualities to his reader. Unknowingly and unconsciously the reader is able to read the minds of other people and have teleological knowledge of all things in the poetic realm. It is in this respect that the poetic work is intrinsically fascinating, and the poets are likened to the gods in pursuit of their poetic purpose, namely, the pleasure of their audience. The more the audience enjoys, the more the poet gains fame and glory.

In the discussion of unjust cities, Socrates compared himself to Homer who was in turn compared himself to the Muses in telling the tale. The *Iliad* can be said to be a tragic story of Achilles, the hero. In the story, Homer presents his narration through imitation of various characters, both human and divine. The discussion of unjust cities concerns itself with the tragedy of the predestined journey of justice to injustice. It is the story of a life of a city, past, present, and future. Also, it is the narration of the appearance as well as the essence. Socrates discussed the appearance and essence of the city. The essence of the city is its rulers and citizens, and the essence of the citizens is the story of their souls. Socrates likened himself to Homer with regard to his partaking of 'the eye of the gods'. It is the eye

which like that of Athene can see without 'looking' both without and within, appearance and essence.⁵⁷ Such an eye can see present, past and future of the unjust life. In a way, Socrates' narration is an imitation of the evil. Moreover, it is an imitation of the poet whose aim concerns mostly the pleasure of the audience.

Concerning divine inspiration, it has once been argued that it is Socrates' irony. Also, Socrates stated in the *Republic*, Book III with regard to the imitation of speech and action of a man of the right sort that

'when he comes in the course of his narrative to some word or act of a good man he will be willing to impersonate the other and feel no shame at that kind of mimicry..(b)ut when he comes to someone unworthy of himself, he will not wish to liken himself in earnest to one who is inferior..'⁵⁸

In the Platonic writings, Socrates is praised as the wisest and most righteous man of his time.⁵⁹ Socrates himself must be regarded as 'a man of the right sort'. Also, he said with regard to the musical part of the education of the guardian in Book III that Homer, Euripides, and other poets should excuse him for banning their works for 'not that they are not poetic and pleasing to most hearers, but because the more poetic they are the less are they suited

⁵⁷ Socrates often used the phrase 'even the blind can see' in the *Republic*. See the *Republic*, Book I, 416d, Book II, 548a, 550d. 'Seeing without looking' implies understanding without reading. In reverse, it implies that reading does not necessarily lead to understanding. It even suggests that reading books or texts of some subject-matter does not necessarily make the reader understand it. This reading situation can be regarded as problematic only at the point of transition between oral and literate communication of a society.

⁵⁸ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book III 396c-d).

⁵⁹ Plato, *Phaedo*, (118a); *Epistle VII*, (324e-325a).

to the ears of boys and men who are destined to be free'.⁶⁰ However, he likened himself to such poets who were not responsible for their works since their source of knowledge came not from themselves but divine power. Also he banished them from the ideal city for the stated reason.⁶¹ However, Socrates just committed it by bringing what he himself told others to forbid. Of course, there is an exception. One compares himself to the inferior

'where he is doing something good..but will be embarrassed both because he is unpractised in the mimicry of such characters, and also because he shrinks in distaste his mind disdains them, unless it be for jest'.⁶²

V

In his invocation of the Muses in the *Phaedrus* in giving the speech in praise of the non-lover, Socrates had to cover his face because he said he was ashamed to render that kind of speech, but he had to do it for some good reason. Similarly, it is known that Socrates said that the Muses he invoked played with the audience and teased them as if they were children and addressed them in a serious-playful-tragic manner. Socrates rendered his discourse of unjust cities in the spirit of the Muses, the poetic goddesses. Since the speech was given in such a tragic-poetic style, colourful and embellished as it was, its metaphorical forms need to be interpreted.⁶³

⁶⁰ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book III 386b).

⁶¹ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book III 386b, Book VIII 568a-d).

⁶² Plato, the *Republic*, (Book III 396e).

⁶³ Cf. the interpretation of the high-flown tragic-poetic style in the *Republic*, Book III, 413b. Socrates said that men were unwillingly deprived of true opinions, but

Furthermore, his discourse on the tragic life of the soul must be regarded as both serious and playful towards the audience. Also it means that his partaking of 'the eye of the gods' must be considered accordingly. As it is understood that Socrates never claimed to possess divine authority in the same way that the poets did, his vision of the life of the soul, past, present, and future which is derived from his share of the divine vision must be regarded as a playful and earnest element of his speech. Since his daemonic voice only bade him refrain from some actions and reminded him of his ignorance, it is the poetic divine which has been claimed to be omniscient and ubiquitous. As regards the good which is to be taken as the reason for this action of Socrates, it is argued that the action is taken in pursuit of his mission, namely the pursuit of self-knowledge. And it is revealed during the course of this chapter that his invocations of the Muses in the *Phaedrus* and the *Republic* are attributable to the pursuit of the good, that is, self-knowledge.

Consequently, as regards the idea of procreation as a determinant agent of transformation of the city and the soul, it must be interpreted in the light of Socrates' ironic invocation of the Muses. As it has been discussed above, the idea of procreation is metaphorical. However, in the spirit of the Muses, it is half-serious and half-playful, and this means that it can be interpreted literally and metaphorically. One thing which Socrates did

willingly of evil. The he put it in metaphorical terms that 'and doesn't this happen to them by theft, by the spells of sorcery or by force?' which Glaucon did not understand. So Socrates replied 'I must be talking in high tragic style, by those who have their opinions stolen from them I mean those who are over-persuaded and those who forget, because in the one case time, in the other argument strips them unawares of their beliefs'. However, in some case, this poetic style would make things easier to understand. See the *Meno*, 76e.

not state in his tale of the unjust cities is what procreation normally presupposes. This might be regarded as a silly question, however, its answer renders a clue to the problem of interpretation concerning the connection between the decline of the ruling class in the city and the ruling part in the soul. The explanation of the idea of human procreation is discussed by Socrates in the *Symposium*. In his speech of love, he related to his friends what he had learnt from Diotima, a Mantinean woman who was specially skilled in the subject of love.⁶⁴ Diotima said that procreation originated from love, *eros*.⁶⁵ The cause of love and desire lay in the yearning for immortality and the good which was indissoluble 'since love loves good to be one's own forever'.⁶⁶ All men desired what was good because the acquisition of the good made them happy. Diotima regarded this as the ultimate answer since 'we have no more need to ask what end a man wished to be happy'.⁶⁷ With this regard, the love of the immortality of the good engendered procreation and care of the offspring.⁶⁸ Diotima stated further that for men this might have been understood to be the result of rational calculation. Actually, for animals as well as human beings, the cause could be explained in the same way:

'...the mortal nature ever seeks, as best it can, to be immortal. In one way only can it succeed, and that is by generation; since so it can always

⁶⁴ Plato, *Symposium*, (201d). With regard to Diotima, Gilbert Highet comments '(i)t is impossible to say whether Plato's fiction had any basis in fact, since we have no independent testimony'. See Gilbert Highet, 'Diotima', in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, op. cit. So this implies Plato's own invention.

⁶⁵ Plato, *Symposium*, (206a-e).

⁶⁶ Plato, *Symposium*, (206e-207a).

⁶⁷ Plato, *Symposium*, (205a).

⁶⁸ Plato, *Symposium*, (207c-d).

leave behind it a new creature in place of the old. It is only for a while that each live thing can be described as alive and the same, as a man is said to be the same person from childhood until he is advanced in years; yet though he is called the same he does not at any time possess the same properties; he is continually becoming a new person, and there are things also which he loses, as appears by his hair, his flesh, his bones, and his blood and body altogether. And observe that not only in body but in his soul besides we find none of his manners or habits, his opinions, desires, pleasures, pains or fears, ever abiding the same in his particular self; some things grow in him, while others perish. And here is a yet stranger fact: with regard to the possessions of knowledge, not merely do some of them grow and others perish in us, so that neither in what we know are we ever the same persons; but a like fate attends each single sort of knowledge. What we call conning, *meletan*,⁶⁹ implies that our knowledge is departing; since forgetfulness is an egress of knowledge, while conning substitutes a fresh one in place of that which departs, and so preserves our knowledge enough to make it seem the same. Every mortal thing is preserved in this way; not by keeping it exactly the same for ever, like the divine, but by replacing what goes off or is antiquated with something fresh, in the semblance of the original. Through this device, Socrates, a mortal thing partakes of immortality, both in its body and in all other respects; by no other means can it be done'.⁷⁰

The ephemeral nature yearned for the eternal with particular regard to the good. Socrates said that he was very doubtful as to whether what Diotima told him could

⁶⁹ *Meletan* can be understood as 'recollection'. In Hamilton's and Cairns' edition of Plato's dialogues, Michael Joyce translates 'studying'.

⁷⁰ Plato, *Symposium*, (207d-208b).

really be true. Diotima discovered what Socrates was being sceptical about, that is, whether her argument could be universally applicable, since not all men seemed to regard 'procreation' as the way to immortality. Diotima confirmed that the argument still held good if Socrates carefully considered the influence of 'the love of winning a name, "and laying up fame immortal for all time to come" '.⁷¹ Thus she explained to Socrates that it was because of the desire 'to win deathless memory for valour' that 'Alcestis would have died for Admetus, or Achilles have sought death on the corpse of Patroclus, or your own Codrus have welcomed it to save the kingdom of his children'.⁷²

The signification of 'procreation,' *genesis*, cannot be confined to its literal term as 'producing offspring' in man and animals. It can also refer to 'generation' in the soul. Apart from pregnancy in body, there is also pregnancy of the soul since 'there are persons who in their souls still more than in their bodies conceive those things which are proper for soul to conceive and bring forth'.⁷³ Alcestis, Achilles, Codrus and other heroes and heroines sacrificed their lives for their beloved in pursuit of an immortality which they regarded to be nobler than just immortality by means of procreation. What was generated from this kind of pregnancy of the soul were prudence, *phronesis*, and virtue, *arete*, in general. The begetters of these qualities were all the poets and the others who were regarded as 'inventors', *euretikoi*. Justice, *dikaiosyne*, and moderation, *sophrosyne*, were regarded as the best part of prudence since they were concerned with the order and regulation of the cities and

⁷¹ Plato, *Symposium*, (208c).

⁷² Plato, *Symposium*, (208d).

⁷³ Plato, *Symposium*, (208e-209a).

families. .⁷⁴

Diotima said that pregnancy with these qualities happened to a man whose soul was divine. He would never 'beget upon the ugly bodies' but only the beautiful, *kalon*. He would welcome the copulation of the soul rather than body particularly with the one whose soul 'is fair and noble and well-endowed'. The two souls were combined in one. Erotic intercourse of one's soul took place through the communication with another's by means of dialogue as Diotima suggested; 'in addressing such a person he is resourceful in discoursing of virtue and of what should be the good man's character and what his pursuits, and so he takes in hand the other's education'.⁷⁵ The 'offspring' begotten from this union of the soul were virtues which were 'fairer and more deathless' than other kinds of offspring. She taught Socrates that 'every one would choose to have got children such as these rather than the human sort' since 'men in this condition enjoy a far fuller community with each other..and a far surer of friendship, *philia*'.⁷⁶

VI

Regarding this significance of Socrates' invocation of the Muses and his application of the idea of procreation as the agent of the transformation of the city, the decline of

⁷⁴ Plato, *Symposium*, (209a-b).

⁷⁵ Plato, *Symposium*, (209b-c).

⁷⁶ Plato, *Symposium*, *ibid*. With regard to the pivotal role of Platonic eros as the cause of generation of the self and the soul, Alford gives a useful interpretation. See C. Fred Alford, 'Metaphysical Selves, Real Selves', in *The Self in Social Theory: A Psychoanalytic Account of Its Construction in Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rawls, and Rousseau*, New Haven and London, 1991, p.19.

the soul in the image of the polities in his discourse is to be interpreted in such a light. The ruling part of the just soul no longer combined with the beautiful. The unseasonable breeding in the ruling class of the city produced undesirable offspring which were no longer identical with their begetters.

Likewise, when the ruling part of the soul did not seek to unite with its like, the hybrid was begotten. What it had begotten were not prudence, justice, and moderation, as it once generated and nurtured. The soul was declining from what it once was, namely it was departing from justice. It could not distinguish what was to rule from what was to be ruled. It failed to differentiate the gold from the silver, the iron, and the bronze as the metals had been classified in Hesiod's myth of the race. It confused itself with regard to what and how to rule and to run the politics of the soul. The new generation of the ruling part weakened and no longer held its power. It was illegitimate with regard to its ruling status. It should have been like its parents as it had been named after them, but its quality hardly corresponded to its name.⁷⁷

The decline of the soul started from this point when its ruling part was 'not one with itself'. The Muses of Socrates told that change would not be possible despite the rise of dissension, provided that the ruling part had unity in itself. It can be inferred from this that conflicts could occur in the just soul. Dissension is not the only factor of the origin of the decline since it can be dissolved by the unified ruling part. The problem lies in its weakened ruler. In the circumstance, when dissension arises, it seriously affects the ordering of the soul. The decline and dissension of the soul proceeds from this

⁷⁷ Cf. what has been discussed in Chapter Four and Five as regards the theory of the correctness of name in the *Cratylus*.

inception where the tale of the life of the unjust soul begins. It is the story of the conflict and power between the elements in the soul, that is, reason, spirit, and desires, or, in other words, the continual struggle among the races--the gold, the silver, and the iron and the bronze.

The underlying reason for employing the method of the study of the soul in the image of the city is attributable to the fact that justice in man is hardly conceivable because like small letters they might be too difficult for a myopic person to read, but it is easier if before he examines the smaller, he has observed that these same letters exist elsewhere larger and on a larger surface.⁷⁸ The larger stage where justice exists is the city. Therefore, in Socrates' detailed discussion of the unjust polities of the city, there exists the meticulous description of the life of the unjust soul. There are three levels of explanation to comprehend in Socrates' speech. First, it is the life of the city. Next, it is the life of men in the city. Lastly, it is that life of the soul of these men in the city. The presupposition of the study of the city is the study of the soul. In search for the soul, Socrates first transposes the reader to a larger screen, that is, the city. Then he descends to the lower, smaller level, that is, men and their interrelationship; and the reader had been brought to the presumably smallest level which is the aim of the search, namely, the soul.

Resulting from this examination of all levels in the city is the descriptive analyses of the life of the soul. It is like a view through a microscope. Macrocosm of the city reflects microcosm of human soul. Following the description of each polity is the description of its

⁷⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 368d).

corresponding character of man and his soul.⁷⁹ To follow Socrates' instruction, when one has familiarised himself with justice and injustice in a larger screen, that is, the city, then, he can recognise them in a smaller one in any size or unity of society such as the community or family, and, eventually, of course, the smallest unit of the city, namely, an individual soul.

⁷⁹ As said once, Leslie Paul Thiele acknowledges in her study of Nietzsche's politics of the soul that the concept of the multiple soul was not Nietzsche's but Plato's invention. She said that it is as old as political philosophy: 'Plato's "city in speech" of the *Republic* is the macrocosmic description of what Socrates discerns in the souls of his interlocutors' (Thiele, *op. cit.*, p. 51). Also she points to the similarity between Plato and Nietzsche:

'(n)ot unlike Plato, he (Nietzsche) would clothe his philosophy in political attire. For the language that best facilitates the description and analysis of the soul is political. The world of politics serves as a conceptual and terminological resource for the "readers of souls."..Nietzsche observed that organization, cooperation, and patterns of domination--in short, politics--allow pluralities to bear the appearance of unities. This is true for the human community no less than the community of the self. The politics of statecraft and soulcraft are analogous. The city is the soul writ large' (Thiele, *opcit.*, p. 52).

See Thiele, *op. cit.*

CHAPTER EIGHT**The Imperfect Polities and the Imperfect Souls:
From Timarchy to Tyranny; The Fall of the Lineage**

The just polity is the city which is governed by the philosopher-king/s. The number of rulers does not matter as long as they are at one with themselves. Such a polity is symbolised by aristocracy. When such rulers decline as discussed above, they are challenged by others. In other words, when the power of the gold and the silver had lessened, the iron and the bronze began to aggrandize themselves. Pulling against one another, the soul has to compromise with the rising powers, spirit and desires which represent honour and wealth. In between its transformation from the rule of wisdom to the rule of wealth or from aristocracy to oligarchy, the spirited element comes to the fore and takes control of the soul. Timocracy is the name of this condition of the soul. From this, Socrates concluded that with regard to the rule, *kratountos*, of the high-spirited element 'in us', the most conspicuous feature of this form of polity is 'contentiousness and covetousness of honour'.¹ At this point, there is supporting evidence that what Socrates described in the level of the city is in fact an analogy of the soul. As regards the passage at 548c, in Lee's and Cornford's translations, the predominance of the high-spirited element in timocracy has been emphasised as one of the elements 'in us' as in Lee's, and 'of our human nature' as in Cornford's. It is quite important with regard to the interpretation of the signification of the analogy of the soul and the city. Also, it is necessary to consider the term *kratountos* as in this context it has been translated 'predominance' by Cornford and Shorey. *Kratethesomai*, and

¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 548c).

'rule, hold sway' as in *krateousin*, and also 'the ruler' as in *kratountes*. With regard to these connotations, the term helps the reader to understand more fully Socrates' rendition of the analogy between the politics of the soul and the politics of the city.²

Timocratic soul is said to be generated from unseasonable breeding. Portrayed in the level of family life, he is a son of a good father who 'lives in a badly governed state and avoids honours and office and law-suits and all such meddlesomeness and is willing to forebear something in order to escape trouble'.³ His mother, who resents his father's behaviour tried to guide him towards the different aims of life which are related to the pursuit of honour and wealth. It is notable that Socrates began his first description of the life of men in already 'badly governed state'. Also, he portrayed dissension between his parents. In other words, the parents are regarded as the ruler or guardian in the family; but they are not in harmony. A question arises then 'Is badly governed state a cause or effect of the disunity of the parents?'

If the city represents the soul and its ruling part represents the parents, then, the answer is that as soon as the unseasonable breeding takes place, the unjust polity also begins its life. It is stated that the young son 'is not by nature of a bad disposition but has fallen into evil communications'.⁴ His rational part has been cultivated by his father whilst his appetitive and passionate elements have been influenced by his mother and others. The new

² See Plato, *The Republic*, translated by Desmond Lee, Harmondsworth, 1981; *The Republic of Plato*, translated by Francis Macdonald Cornford, Oxford, 1945; Plato, *Republic*, II, translated by Paul Shorey, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1963. A Greek-English Lexicon, Liddell and Scott, *op. cit.*

³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 549c).

⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 550b).

generation of the soul is said to have to compromise within himself the conflicting elements and 'turns over' its 'government' to the intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit' and becomes a timocratic soul.⁵ Again, the application of the political phrase such as 'turn over the government' emphasises Socrates' intentional employment of the method of the study of the soul in the political condition of the city.

Declining from the philosophic nature, the timocratic soul begins to neglect the Muses, 'paying too little heed to music and then to gymnastics'.⁶ To be sure, earlier in Book II, music and gymnastic were regarded as the essential education of the true guardian, especially music as the education of the soul.⁷ However this first generation of the declining soul has not entirely abandoned music. Bequeathed to him by his father, the love of music and speech still prevails as the legacy from a father to his son⁸, but now the soul itself is no musician or rhetorician since it is preoccupied with gymnastic and other trainings of the same sort due to its predominance of the spirited element in the soul; and in due time the love of music would leave the soul completely. In this regard, the timocratic soul with its unphilosophic guardian is no longer a lover of wisdom. When philosophic nature is detached from the guardian, or wisdom from spirited element, 'intelligence is then no longer combined with simplicity and sincerity'. The soul becomes insecure with regard to the intelligence of other souls. So it never allows any intelligent being to take part in its rule; but

⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 550a-c).

⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 546d).

⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 376e).

⁸ Compare this character to Polemarchus. Also consider the bequeathing of the argument from Cephalus to his son.

it just aggrandises its power by recruiting those of a similar quality to itself in order to become a reign of 'high-spirit and simple-mind..better suited for war than for peace'.⁹ Its justice would be useless in the time of peace but useful in war time. It reminds us of Polemarchus' definition of justice with reference to friend-foe relationship. With this quality, the timocratic soul is self-willed and has a lack of culture. In this regard, it would be able to realise the difference between itself and others in hierarchical terms with regard to honour and physical power unlike the educated or the rational one which is conscious of its superiority and inferiority in terms of power of knowledge.¹⁰

I

While partaking of the divine vision, Socrates let the reader perceive that the destiny of the declining soul is tyranny after falling from aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, and democracy. That is why the city has been portrayed in its dynamism. The city or the soul is in the process of self-motion towards its destiny. Now it is moving itself through timocracy towards oligarchy; or the soul is declining towards the reign of desires via the reign of spirit. The sign of the transition from one generation to the other is foreseeable in its existing condition of the soul with regard to its elements viz. reason, spirit, desires. The timocratic soul is said to be a mixture of good and evil, that is, a mixture of some of the qualities of the previous generation of the soul---aristocratic soul---and some of the oligarchy towards which

⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 547e).

¹⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 549a).

it is inclining.¹¹

Oligarchy is a political polity that is based on a qualification of property.¹² It is the rule of wealth. The previous generation of the timocratic soul is 'not being poor, but by nature rich in itself'. That is why it could control its desires. Lacking reason, the soul feels itself to be poor and prone to wealth and property. The soul becomes lenient and lets the desire for wealth arise in itself. However, some of the qualities of its previous life which still exist make its ruler, the spirit, respectable, and refrain from other kinds of work and money-making. For this reason, as 'running away from the law as boys from a father', the soul has to enjoy surreptitious pleasures and is prodigal of others' wealth.¹³ On account of the soul's neglect of music, it has not been cultivated to abstain from enjoying that kind of pleasure by persuasion but by force. From this, it necessitates the transition of the soul.

At this point, the explanation of the transition of the polity and the transition of its corresponding character of man is combined in Socrates' speech.¹⁴ Here, again, the combination confirms the understanding of the soul in the image of the city. Socrates separately discussed the nature of the polity and the nature of the man of its counterpart, but in explaining the transition of both of them, there is only one rendition of the explanation of the timocratic to the oligarchic type of

¹¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 547d-548c).

¹² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 550c). Plato seems to be the first Greek political thinker who officially gives this definition to oligarchy although it might have been already generally understood by the Greeks.

¹³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 548b).

¹⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 553a).

man. This implies that the explanation of the transition of man can account for his omission of the explanation of the transition of the polity and vice versa.

In the timocratic-oligarchic transition, the pattern of change recurs again. Diotima's speech on love of the immortality of the good as the cause of generation of both body and soul still holds true, and the unseasonable breeding is the cause of the decline of both kinds of generation. Out of love of immortality, the timocratic soul begets its offsprings. As it regards honour and passion as the good, therefore, it aims at generating what is like itself. However, the timocratic soul itself originated from the unseasonable breeding. The unseasonable breeding was started a long time ago by its ancestors. This has affected its lineage of descendants.¹⁵ The timocratic soul could not eternalize its timocratic quality. Its next generation turns out to be oligarchic.

In the beginning, the offspring of the soul imitates its timocratic begetters. With uncertainty in political life, it can happen that the reign of the spirit does not effect desirable consequences to its holder. On the contrary, it brings tragic destiny to the man, suddenly being 'dashed, as a ship on a reef, against the state, and making complete wreckage of both his possessions and himself'.¹⁶ The young soul becomes disenchanted with honour, since it held the principle of love of honour

¹⁵ Cf. the original evils in the ancestors of Orestes which seemed to have cursed all his lineage of family. The offsprings of each generation in Orestes' family were decadent. They could not be named after the nature of their parents as regard the principle of name with reference to natural birth. This is related to the analysis of the term *anthropos* and the names of Orestes' family in Chapter Five. This point will be discussed again later.

¹⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 553b).

because it followed its guardians. Also, neglecting music like its previous generation, it did not understand the reason for the love of honour. Therefore, anything it has practised in pursuit of honour is effected by force or familiarity not by understanding or persuasion. Now it realises that the pursuit of honour has rendered nothing but disaster. It is the predominance of high-spirit and its love of honour in its previous life that makes him forfeit all possession of wealth and property. Being disillusioned by the transience, insubstantiality and fragility of honour, then, with regard to his reconsideration of what goodness and happiness are, it holds that only wealth is the good that brings true and lasting happiness. Hence, it 'will then established on that throne the principle of appetite and avarice, and set it up as the great king in his soul'.¹⁷ From this, the young timocratic soul develops into an oligarchic soul which lets its appetite element rule itself.

Now the oligarchic soul starts its life. As a predominant part, the new ruling class will force the dwindling principles, namely the rational which once presided over the others in its previous aristocratic life, and high-spirit which used to be in power in timocracy,

'to crouch lowly to right and left as slaves, and will allow the one to calculate and consider nothing but the ways of making more money from a little, and the other to admire and honour nothing but riches and rich men, and to take pride in nothing but the possession of wealth and whatever contributes to that'.¹⁸

This indicates that besides the ruling class, that is, desires, all other elements such as reason, spirit, in the

¹⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 553c).

¹⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 553d-e).

soul still exist; but they are subdued and exploited by the rule of desires. Man of the oligarchic soul is still 'clever' and 'courageous', but his cleverness and courage are forced to serve its master, namely, to fulfil the desires. The oligarchic soul uses its reason to make as much profit as possible. It is courageous to do anything to attain these goals which the aristocratic or timocratic souls dare not to do. It is afraid or ashamed of being poor. That is why Socrates said that the oligarchic soul which lacks education, *apaideusia*¹⁹, lets the appetite part which is 'the blind god of wealth' be the 'leader of the choir and first in honour'.²⁰ The ruling part of the soul is metaphorised as the leader of the choir since when any element of the soul presides over the others, it leads them to 'sing the same song and dance the same movements'.²¹ Also, it is obvious that the oligarchic soul enjoys and appreciates the oligarchic song, dance, and chorus. It praises its like and deprecates others in the same manner that the timocratic soul recruited those of the high-spirit and simple-minded but never allowed the

¹⁹ The terms *paideia* and *musike* seem to be interchangeable in Socrates' speech from Book III onward. See the *Republic*, Book VIII, 546d, 548c, 549a, 554c. With regard to this point, Werner Jaeger with reference to Plato's the Laws explained the interplay of these terms with regard to the function of poetry in the ancient Greek society that '(t)he poet's duty is to educate the young,' and 'Plato emphasizes the identity of poetry and *paideia*,' since '(p)oetry and music, if they do that properly, can truly be called *paideia*'. See Werner Jaeger, *Paideia*, Vol. I, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp. 247-8; Vol.II, pp. 542, 230. See also E.A. Havelock, 'The Preliteracy of the Greeks', in *The Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences*, Princeton, New Jersey, 1982 p. 187.

²⁰ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book VIII 554b).

²¹ Speech and action can be regarded as song and dance and different characters have their own music with which they sing and dance in accordance. This point in relation to the analogy of chorus and its leader has significant implication in the politics of the soul. This is to be discussed in the next chapter.

intelligent to take part in its rule.²²

II

With regard to the oligarchic soul, the desires in its congenial atmosphere develop themselves into what Socrates called 'the appetite of the drone'. Metaphorically described so, it is a desire to gain the most profit by making the least efforts. It effects another two kinds of drone comparable to 'the beggarly and the rascally' in the city.²³ Of course, beggars or rascals and their like can be said to be derived from men whose souls have been predominated by this kind of desire. The beggarly type can do nothing but live on charity. The rascal is discernible if one looks to 'guardianships of orphans' since these kinds of men would try every way to do injustice with impunity. Generally speaking, a general oligarchic soul has a potential to develop itself into either the rascally or beggarly type. Both are regarded as dependants of the city, making no contribution at all.

Socrates compared a person of the beggarly type to a drone which lives on the honey made by other working bees. Though he used to be wealthy and seemed to belong to the ruling class, but in reality he was only a consumer of goods, 'neither he was ruler nor helper in the state'.²⁴

²² See the *Republic*, Book VIII, 548a. The significance of the chorus and the expression of approval and disapproval towards certain kinds of music and dance are discussed in Book II of the *Laws*.

²³ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book VIII 554c).

²⁴ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book VIII 552b). With regard to this analogy, Cornford refers to the account of the drones' life in Plato's time by referring to Aristotle's *History of Animals*, ix, 40. Aristotle puts bees into different

This type of man, like a stingless drone, is harmless. He can be seen in the city as one of the beggars, while there are some of them who like robber-bees are armed and dangerous. Socrates said that beggars and criminals can be easily found in oligarchic polity though the latter have to conceal themselves from the surveillance of the authority. It can be said that these kinds of men were generated from 'a defective culture and bad breeding and a wrong constitution of the state' as well as the soul.²⁵

With regard to an oligarch who has the potential to develop into the rascally type, however, the existing better part, *epieikeia* or reasonableness, in his soul rationalised this evil desire, *kakas epithumias*, making him cunning and scheming. That reason sometimes inhibits him from revealing his evil desires and it is not because it knows that 'it is better not' to commit crimes, but it is because of his fear of being debunked of his 'good image'. It is not reason, *logo*, but necessity and force, *anagke kai phobos*, that restrains him.²⁶ So although such a soul is mainly under the rule of desire, there exists an internal dissension within himself. His reasonableness and his appetite of the drone are pulling against one another.

categories. As to the drones which are 'the largest of all, but devoid of sting, and lazy', (Book IX, 40, 624b25-30), he describes that they '..make no honey, but subsist, they and their grubs also, on the honey made by the bees' (Book IX, 40, 624a17-22). If the king-bee dies, the drones reared by the bees are understood to be more spirited although they do not really have stings but they have the wish to use it. There are other species of bee, namely, the robber-bee. The robber-bee and the drone not only do not work but also damage the work of other bees. Being so-called the robber-bee, it also, after spoiling its own combs, finds a chance to spoil others' unnoticed. It is from the nature of the drones and the robber-bees which a certain type of man in oligarchy has been drawn upon. See Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

²⁵ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book VIII 552d-e).

²⁶ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book VIII 554d).

Accordingly, torn between the two, he is 'a double man' possessing conflicting personalities. In appearance, he seems to be just and good and more respectable than many others because of the inhibition of his evil desires, but in his soul there is no unison and harmony. Also, disillusioned with honour, he would never spend money for such things, 'fearing to awaken his prodigal desires and calling them into alliance for the winning of the victory'.²⁷ Fighting in his oligarchic style, the man is always defeated. However he is able to save and accumulate his property.

'As time goes on, and they advance in the pursuit of wealth, the more they hold that in honour the less they honour virtue.'²⁸ The city or the soul predominantly values most the possession of wealth as a qualification of the ruler. As regards the city, it is only the rich who hold office whilst the poor are excluded, although some of them are capable of ruling.²⁹ The oligarchic polity generates the rich and also the poor which comprises beggars and rascals. Inevitably the city is split into two, that is, 'a city of the rich and of the poor, dwelling together, and always plotting against one another'.³⁰ The city/soul is now moving toward change. In the same manner, the nature of the oligarchic soul itself is its immanent barrier to its stability. Socrates said that the manner of change, which is easily noticed even by the blind man, was originated in its 'insatiate greed for that which it set before itself as the good, the attainment of the greatest

²⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 555a).

²⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 550e).

²⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 551b). Poverty or wealth is not the criteria for the art of statesmanship. See the discussion in Chapter Twelve.

³⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 551d).

possible wealth'³¹, and the nature of the soul is not only incompatible to sobriety and temperance but also discouraging their possibility.

With this regard, the subsequent generation of the oligarchic soul transforms itself. In the father and son analogy, the oligarchic father breeds his son in his own way. With regard to its pursuit of wealth, the oligarchic father forces his son to inhibit his desires for pleasures which he regarded as useless and nonsensical, since his love of wealth predominates all other things. In pursuit of the accumulation of wealth, he is stingy and reduces all the unnecessary expenses.

Here, Socrates pointed out that all kinds of desire, including the sexual one, can be put into two categories, that is, necessary and unnecessary ones. The necessary desires are those that cannot be diverted or suppressed. Their satisfaction is beneficial and necessary to men. The appetite for bread and the desire to relish the taste are a good example. Men enjoy eating it because of its nourishment and taste. The desire to enjoy food is regarded as necessary insofar as it contributes to fitness; but the unnecessary desires exceed that level of human necessity. It is in fact the desires from which 'a man could free himself from youth up, and whose presence in the soul does no good and in some cases harm'.³² It not only undermines the body but also hinders the attainment of intelligence and sobriety of the soul.³³ From this, Socrates said that it was evident that those who were called the drones in an oligarchy preoccupy themselves with

³¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 550d, 555b-c). It is notable that in the *Republic*, the analogy of the blind man has been referred twice. See also 465d.

³² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 559a).

³³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 559b-c).

unnecessary desires whilst the oligarchs themselves were stingy because of their love of wealth.

The son of the oligarchic father has suppressed his unnecessary desires for all his early years until one day he experiences that kind of pleasure from 'the drones and associates with fierce and cunning creatures who know how to purvey pleasures of every kind and variety and condition'.³⁴ This is exactly the starting point of the transformation of the oligarchy in his soul into democracy. As mentioned above, the oligarchic polity has an internal war inside itself, splitting into two opposing parties. Likewise, the oligarchic youth experiences a similar effect, since it has been suppressed by force not by reason in living his life in such an illiberal way. Although it seems to follow its begetters' footstep very well, however, it is so vulnerable and susceptible. Like an unhealthy man who suddenly fails ill when he encounters 'just a slight impulse from outside,' the young son would be feverish when he first tastes those luxurious pleasures. After this, having no reason to control the desires, he then keeps on enjoying and indulging himself with his uncontrollable desires.

At this stage, he can either be swayed back to his original condition by the oligarchic influence either from his own father or other kin, or espoused by the democratic element to go on and eventually establish a complete democratic character in his soul. Sometimes, even controlled by his oligarchic father, yet in the end the son still breaks the chain due to the lack of true education of his father and temptation of the variety of pleasures outside.³⁵

³⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 559d).

³⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 560a-b).

III

From this, the life of the oligarchic soul has ended at the point that its next generation of the soul develops itself to democracy. The democratic soul loses all the power of the better element within itself since the part that just ascends the throne exerts the power of its 'braggart discourses' to 'close the gates of the royal fortress within him and refuse admission to the auxilliary force itself, and will not grant audience as to enjoy to the words of older friends in private life'.³⁶ In democracy, language and definition are used in contradiction to what they used to be. The democratic man would reverse all the meanings. He calls reverence and awe folly, temperance/lack of manhood, moderation and orderly expenditure/rusticity and illiberality, insolence/good breeding, licence/liberty, prodigality/magnificence, and shamelessness/manly spirit.³⁷

That is to say, the transformation from an oligarchic to a democratic character lies in the change from restriction to necessary desires to liberation and unleashing of the unnecessary desires. However the democratic man will not be in such a frenzied condition so long. When he grows older, he returns to his normal state 'receiving back a part of the banished elements'. Nevertheless he does not revert to oligarchy. In truth, the man establishes and lives his life in a democratic style, as the democratic polity treasures freedom and equality more than anything else. In his soul, the democratic man also regards and treats everything in the like manner corresponding to the polity he belongs to.

³⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 560c).

³⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 560d-e). It is not surprising if they would regard justice as injustice as Thrasymachus did in the first book of the *Republic*.

That is he would not

'accept or admit into the guard-house the words of truth when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise from honourable and good desires, and others from those that are base, and that we ought to practise and esteem the one and control and subdue the others; but he shakes his head at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed..'³⁸

The democratic man is indiscriminate in his treatment of the necessary and unnecessary desires. Good and evil are equally fostered. With this regard, it is remarkable that the love of freedom and egalitarianism of the democratic man engender the unsettling and uncertainty of his democratic behaviour. Since he indiscriminately regards all in equal terms, therefore, all elements in his soul are treated equally. They are all able to express and reflect themselves. Then it is not surprising that the democratic man would indulge his desire of the day:

'now wine-bibbing and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of the flute, and again drinking only water and dieting; and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and neglecting all things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with philosophy, (a)nd frequently he goes in for politics and bounces up and says and does whatever enters his head; (a)nd if military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion in his existence'.³⁹

Comparing this with its preceding characters, the

³⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 561c).

³⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 561c-d).

democratic man seems relatively volatile. However this kind of life is highly treasured as the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness which he would cling to till the end of his life. At the same time, with regard to its corresponding polity, 'most people would..judge it to be the best form of society' like a most beautiful and colourful fabric'.⁴⁰ Socrates ended his description of the democratic man by stating its great charm and spell that

'he is a manifold man stuffed with most excellent difference, and that like that city he is the fair and many-coloured one whom many a man and woman would count fortunate in his life, as containing within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities'.⁴¹

But no matter how beautiful and good it appears to its citizens, democracy cannot be saved from change. It faces the same destiny to which oligarchy and other predecessors have been drawn. The predominant quality of the polity is its imminent barrier to its stability. The polity is virtually self-destructive. Democratic virtue draws a life of democratic soul to a close. For democracy, liberty is the highest quality of all. Since it has been regarded as the good, then, to gain it as much as possible means the greatest good.

⁴⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 557c). Plato has insight into this kind of democratic polity in relation to its citizens when he said that it is a most attractive of all societies. In fact, democracy has been regarded by all political camps as the best form or the least evil form of government. Both capitalism and socialism purport to be on the track of democracy. Even more, they claim to be more genuinely democratic than one another. This affirms Plato's political understanding as regards the nature of the political constitution of the city and man.

⁴¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 561e).

That is why the ruler of democracy could not be anyone but demagogues who like 'bad cupbearers' are ready to intoxicate their thirsty subjects by providing them with excessive 'unmixed wine' of liberty. The ruler of the soul is ready to yield to any rising element in order to aggrandize itself, unlimited desires and self-indulgence. Those who 'do not dispense the liberty unstintingly' are chastised and accused of being 'accursed oligarchs'. The ruler in such a polity who is ready to indulge his subjects in every way is commended and honoured in public and private. In other words, the polity highly regards 'rulers who resemble subjects and subjects who are like rulers'.⁴² With regard to excessive liberty, the city/soul becomes lawless and loses itself in 'anarchical temper'. The order of the structure and relationship between men in the city and also between the elements in the soul crumble down. There no longer exists a demarcation line between things:

'the father habitually tries to resemble the child and is afraid of his sons, and the son likens himself to the father and feels no awe or fear of his parents, so that he may be forsooth a free man, (a)nd the resident alien feels himself equal to the citizens and the citizens to him, and the foreigner likewise, (t)he teacher in such case fears and fawns upon the pupils, and the pupils pay no heed to the teacher or to their overseers either,...the young ape their elders and vie with them in speech and action, while the old, accommodating themselves to the young, are full of pleasantry and graciousness, imitating the young for fear they may be thought disagreeable and authoritative'.⁴³

The excess of liberty culminates in that identity and

⁴² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 562d-e).

⁴³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 563a-b).

difference of the slaves and masters, men and women, and, finally, men and beasts disappears from the city.⁴⁴ The total effect of this condition renders 'the souls of citizens so sensitive that they chafe at the slightest suggestion of servitude and will not endure it'.⁴⁵ In this respect, it seems that indecision and confusion come to the fore and are also favourably regarded as the reflection of the state of genuine freedom. No master and no law, written or unwritten, that is to say, prevails in the city. All are free from any kind of repression and surveillance, and it is 'the excess and greed of this and the neglect of all other things that revolutionizes this constitution too and prepares the way for the necessity of a dictatorship'.⁴⁶

Socrates said that any excess of anything is most likely to effect 'a corresponding reaction to the opposite' especially in politics. The love of wealth in oligarchy brings about an impoverished state and people. In a like manner, the result of extremity of freedom is slavery in the same regard of the individual and the city. And so, 'tyranny develops out of no other constitution than democracy---from the height of liberty, the fiercest extreme of servitude'.⁴⁷

IV

The politics in democracy is to be taken into account with regard to its transformation. In theory, democracy

⁴⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 563c).

⁴⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 563d).

⁴⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII, 563e-564a).

⁴⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 564a).

can be made into a tripartite division. First, having originated from oligarchy, the class of drones still prevails but is much more dangerous due to the licence of the polity. With this regard, they, together with those stingless drones as their followers, become powerful and dominate the others. Considerably, in democracy, the fiercest part of it is said to 'make speeches and transacts business' while the rest of them form themselves into a mob of chorus ready to cheer their leaders and tolerate no dissent of their opponents.⁴⁸ Then the second group is the capitalist class, 'the most abundant supply of honey for the drones,' which is derived from the 'most orderly and thrifty natures' of those who are pursuing wealth. The last one comprises 'all cultivators of their own farms who possess little property'.⁴⁹ It is the largest in number when it meets in the assembly, and it would do so only to get 'a share of the honey' after 'the men at the head' already have 'the lion's share for themselves'.

For, the rich who did not get to have a share but have actually been plundered by others are compelled 'to defend themselves with speeches in the assembly and any action in their power'. Regardless of the truth, those in that position are always charged with being the enemy of democracy or the oligarchs with revolutionary plans against the people. Particularly in democracy, this is the most economical use of political strategy to destroy enemies.⁵⁰ In its political battle, a demos always 'puts forward one man as its special champion and protector and cherish and magnify him'. It is in this respect that the tyrant arises.

⁴⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 564d).

⁴⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 565a).

⁵⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 565b).

Socrates compared the origin of tyrant with the legend of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia that 'he who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced up with those of other victims is inevitably transformed into a wolf'.⁵¹ In the same way, the tyrant first supported by the majority of the people executes or banishes anyone in the name of the assembly or people's court. Under such a circumstance, a champion of the people at his peril might sometimes either be destroyed in the same way he destroyed others, or become the absolute tyrant. Having been through such experiences, the people become more concerned for the safety of their protector than ever. They, 'fearing for the tyrant but unconcerned for themselves, grant him full protection and bodyguard'. The tyrant who now becomes like a wolf not only slays the enemy of democracy or the rich but also starts to devour and exploit his own people. The excess of freedom and desires of the city conclude in its tragic end. They are under tyranny where the 'protector does not lie prostrate, "mighty with far-flung limbs," in Homeric overthrow, but overthrowing many others towers in the car of state transformed from a protector into a perfect and finished tyrant'.⁵² Tyranny is now in its perfect form and begins life.

In order to understand the nature of the tyrannous soul, it transpires that the unnecessary desires have to be taken into consideration. Socrates explained that this kind of desire exists in every human being.⁵³ It is lawless and shameless, but as being a kind of unnecessary desire it can be as well controlled by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason. This desire becomes distinct when other elements in the soul are not in action. For example, as sometimes in sleep, when the

⁵¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 565d-e).

⁵² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 566c).

⁵³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 572b).

better elements of the soul slumber, such a desire bestirs itself in dreams in which a person does many shameful things that he himself in reality will never do. However it would be lulled to rest in a man whose body and soul are in a good and sober condition, 'and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts'.⁵⁴ When it has been released and developed until it becomes stronger and subdues all other parts in the human soul, it indicates that a life of a tyrannous soul begins, and the transformation from the democratic man to the tyrannical man is generated from the ascendancy of these desires.

As regards the democratic soul in the image of men in democracy, he is a person who has to compromise between the enforcement of his thrifty, oligarchic father and the influence of luxurious pleasures of the drones in society. He lives a moderate life between these two tendencies: 'he lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor lawless'. His son is supposed to have the same experience as his father, that is, living his life in moderation in between the conflicting influences. His father might have attempted to draw him towards the moderate life while the opposite tried to pull him towards the lawless appetite. His father was successful in maintaining his moderation because he has been pulled by a strong, thrifty, oligarchic father. However in the case of the second generation of democratic soul, he is pulled by the moderate, democratic father on the one hand, and by those with lawless appetites on the other. It is most likely that he loses his balance and swings to the appetitive side which 'engender his soul a ruling passion to be the protector of his idle and prodigal appetites, a monstrous winged drone'.⁵⁵ Socrates described the condition of tyrannous soul that

⁵⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 571e-572a).

⁵⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 572e-573a).

'when the other appetites, buzzing about it, replete with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the pleasures that are released in such revelries, magnifying and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings, why then the protector of the soul has madness for his bodyguard and runs amuck, and if it finds in the man any opinions or appetites accounted worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside'.⁵⁶

Also, Socrates said that with regard to the madness and frenzy of a tyrannical temper, it is comprehensible why love, *eros*, has been identified with the tyrant. Those who attempt to rule over not only men but the gods are regarded as mad men. In this respect, the tyrant is not considered different from these men, the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal.⁵⁷ Inevitably in responding to his insatiable desires, the tyrannical man would exhaust his parents' resources in order to get all needed pleasures. Corresponding to the polity, the soul is said to dare to harm its begetters or commit parricide if necessary. This means that the tyrannous soul would spare nothing of its parental legacy or quality. As it can be observed that the timocratic, oligarchic, or democratic souls still keep half of its parental quality in addition to its rising qualities. For example, the timocratic soul has a character sharing both what it is derived from and what it is moving towards, namely, aristocracy and oligarchy.

Without any force to counteract the insatiable greed, the tyrannous soul becomes freely obsessed with anything it desires. It exhausts everything in extremity as if it is

⁵⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 573a-b).

⁵⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 573c).

in love with such things. For this reason, Socrates called it 'the indwelling tyrant Eros, *eros turannos endon*'.⁵⁸ The soul of the tyrant Eros uses all of its power to fulfil its desires. For this reason, it has become identifiable with power and madness.⁵⁹

The tyrant starts to exhaust his parents' resources. To get what he wants, he robs, steals or even commits parricide if his parents resist him. From his own family to others' and finally his own city, he becomes the autocrat, the absolute tyrant of the city.⁶⁰ He inevitably gets rid of his own friends who once helped to establish his power but later resented his dictatorship. Finally, it would turn out that the tyrant has neither friends nor foes. Also, it is evident that courage, wisdom, and wealth in others threaten his security and safety. '(A)nd such is the good fortune that, whether he wishes it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against them all until he purges the city.'⁶¹

It is a purgation of the best in order to keep the worst qualities in the city and also in the soul. It is necessary for him to have 'base companions who hate him' otherwise he has to forfeit his tyrannical life. No matter how badly he needs someone who can be real 'friends' or 'trusties' to him, he could never find them since his tyranny destroys or keeps those people away. He is surrounded by 'the drones', the hangers-ons, who do anything for money. For this reason, the tyrant 'never

⁵⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 573d).

⁵⁹ Adi Ophir comments that 'the relation between Eros and the will to power was well known to the Greeks'. See Adi Ophir, Plato's Invisible Cities: Discourse and Power in the Republic, Routledge, London, 1991, p. 31.

⁶⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 574c-575d).

⁶¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 567a-c).

knows what it is to be the friends of anybody' throughout his life.⁶² This kind of tyrannous soul can only be either master or slave. It never tastes freedom or true friendship. With regard to its nature of insatiable desires, the soul is always prone towards the unlimited power to become the master of all. On the other hand, in living with such desires in the soul, he in reverse is dominated like a slave since it is untamable and cannot be befriended.

At this point, Socrates confirmed to Adeimantus that it was no wonder that most people who associated with the tyrant had to appease him. To support this, he digressed to discuss Euripides and the importance of tragedy. Tragedy was esteemed as a storehouse of wisdom. And Euripides who was the wisest of tragedians profoundly announced that '(t)yrants are wise by converse with the wise'. The poet probably meant that 'these associates of the tyrant are wise'. Socrates stated further that Euripides and other poets probably were very wise in praising the tyrant's absolute power as godlike and so and so forth.⁶³ In this respect, Socrates said that the poets of tragedy must excuse him and his friends in disallowing them their ideal city or the others with a similar political constitution because of their flattery of the tyrant. While they could go round to other cities

⁶² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 576a).

⁶³ John B. Morrall comments on Euripides' *Orestes*, c. 710-713 that his comparing the power of the tyrant to the gods could not be regarded as a compliment. Also, from Helen North's study of *sophrosyne*, it has been pointed out that in Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, the ambition of the tyrant in competing or equalizing with the gods can be regarded as 'hybris' in opposite to 'sophrosyne'. See Morrall, *op. cit.*,; North, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-84. Hence, the comparison between the tyrant and the gods should be understood in the same respect. Euripides' words might be ironic and sarcastic in order to be able to simultaneously save himself wisely from persecution and to be able to express the intended meaning.

'collecting crowds and hiring fine, loud, persuasive voices,' and drawing 'the polities towards tyrannies and democracies'.

Tyranny and democracy respectively are the polities which mostly pay and honour these poets. It has been argued that tragedy and its function respond very well to the nature of political freedom and equality of democracy⁶⁴ and the nature of arbitrariness of tyranny. Particularly the latter, the tragic poet can be glorious and famous if he could satisfy the tyrant's self-complacency; but in the end, such poets would find themselves incapable of appeasing adequately these polities whose pride has been boosted by these poets themselves.⁶⁵

Finally, the long journey of the life of the city and the soul has come to its tragic end. It is far too late for the demos to protest after it realised 'to its cost what it is and what a creature it begot and cherished and bred to greatness, and that in its weakness it tries to expel the stronger'. Indeed, tyranny inevitably leads to 'a very parricide' when it enslaved and devoured its own people who like its parents gave birth to it. Ending in tragedy, the city and the soul finds itself in such a condition that

'the demos trying to escape the smoke of submission to the free would have plunged into the fire of enslavement to slaves and in exchange of that excessive and unseasonable liberty has clothed itself in the garb of the most

⁶⁴ John B. Morrall, *op. cit.*, He suggested '(t)ragedy reached its classically mature development..as an artistic reflection of this political and social isegoria (equality of opportunity to influence political decisions by free speech)'.

⁶⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 568a-d).

cruel and bitter servile servitude'.⁶⁶

The tyranny is understood to be the most evil and also the most miserable. However Socrates said that not everyone thought so since in its setting condition for the birth of tyranny which was democratic 'the many have many opinions'.⁶⁷

After finishing the description of the imperfect cities, Socrates confirmed his method of the study of the soul in the image of the city again that what had been stated about the city was applicable to the soul in respect of virtue and happiness.⁶⁸ Then, from 576d to 588a, he proved that the life of the just man was happier than the unjust. The degree of happiness was measured by the distance of a certain unjust character of the soul from the just one. The life of a tyrant has been proved to be seven hundred and twenty nine times more painful than that of a just man, since the three elements of his soul have descended through five imperfect types.⁶⁹ With regard to the above discussion of the just and the unjust city and soul, it seems that the decline of the soul is inevitable as regards the beginning passage in Socrates' speech: '...since for everything that has come into being destruction is appointed'. Here, the questions arise. First, does Socrates possess a teleological view of the soul, that is to say, the inevitable decline of the just to the unjust soul? Secondly, what is the nature of the soul

⁶⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 568e-569c).

⁶⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 576c).

⁶⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 576d).

⁶⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book IX 587). That is to say, the soul descends from aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy to tyranny. It is also possible that the use of number is Socrates' ironical response to Thrasymachus' disposition for quantitative benefit.

regardless of its justice or injustice since what has been discussed about the soul so far is only concerned with either the just and the unjust souls?

V

To discuss these problems, it requires one to reconsider the origin of the just and the unjust souls. In the *Republic*, Book II, Socrates depicted what the just city and soul was. Although the city started its life with its basic desires, it does not mean that any organization which possesses only the desires can be called a city. In the same way, any soul which only has such desires cannot be a human soul. In the meantime, Socrates has proved that a just soul is the one which possesses three elements, that is, desires, spirit, and reason, and all are ruled by the rational part. With regard to the nature of the soul and the nature of the just soul, Raphael Demos' distinction between a complete and perfect individual helps the reader to understand the matter. According to Demos, a complete individual is one who 'possesses all three parts of the soul, and perfect with respect to a given part when the latter is fully developed'.⁷⁰ The soul which consists of these three parts can be called a human soul. Therefore, by nature the soul is tripartite.

As a perfect individual is one whose soul is ruled by rational part, then it is possible that a complete soul might be either perfect or imperfect. It depends which

⁷⁰ Raphael Demos, 'Paradoxes in Plato's Doctrine of the Ideal State', Classical Quarterly, 7, 1957, pp. 163-164. Demos's article deals with the paradox that if the ideal state consists of ideal men, then, these men need no state. But if the ideal state consists of un-ideal individuals, 'how can one legitimately call a community perfect when so many of its members are imperfect?'

part of the soul rules. As mentioned above, there is only one form of the just soul or city where reason unites with power whilst there are many types of imperfect or unjust soul or city. For this reason, a complete soul has two possible potentials, that is, just and unjust. It can evolve itself into either just or unjust forms. As regards the just soul, Socrates portrayed that each element of the soul needs one another and each knows its place whether it should be ruled or should rule in order to achieve justice. Reason and spirit alone cannot live without desires. Desires and reason need courage and vigour from the spirit. Desires and spirit cannot function properly without reason. With regard to the 'proper function' of the elements of the soul, it is necessary that the soul should be ruled by reason. In his description of the just city, Socrates pointed out the hierarchical importance in reverse from the lower to the higher classes of the city. Likewise, with regard to the just soul, reason must predominate other elements. Nevertheless, all elements are indispensable with regard to the nature of the soul, a complete individual. The just soul is the soul which has completed its evolution towards what Socrates has described.

As regards the unjust soul, Socrates spoke in the spirit of the Muses that it declined from the just soul. It means that the just soul is not immutable. The unseasonable breeding is the cause of the decay of the soul. As discussed above, reasoning combined with sensation of the philosopher-ruler cannot prevent this untimely procreation. Here, an important question arises. What causes this unseasonable breeding?

Socrates said that the unseasonable breeding occurred when the guardians missed the geometrical number which is determinative of better and inferior births.⁷¹ Although

⁷¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 546d).

it has been worked out differently, that geometrical number has been generally agreed to be two hundred and sixteen, a minimum period of human gestation; but as argued above, the terminology can be understood in both regards as the pregnancy of the body and the pregnancy of the soul. Of course, with regard to the former, it is obvious that a normal birth of a human offspring needs at least two hundred and sixteen days of pregnancy according to the Greeks at that time. The number should have been already known too well.

Actually, if it is only Socrates' intended message, there is no need for him to give such a complicated geometric puzzle just in order to present that number. The result is not as important as the way it has been arithmetically solved. The solution would render some meaning which must be concerned with the pregnancy of the soul. Unfortunately, the problem of the number remains unsolved with regard to a definite way of calculation. However, what has been suggested by Adam will be discussed later in connection with the idea of the good.⁷²

The cause of the decay of the soul can be assumed to emanate from the cause of its generation, that is, the love of immortality. Timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny declined because of their love of what they

⁷² Adam has worked out the figure 216 by way of $3^3 + 4^3 + 5^3$. Adam also referred to Aristotle who cubed the size of the triangle, 6, which also renders the same number. A recent interesting diagram of the number with regard to the elements and characters of the soul can be found in Brumbaugh's *On the Mathematical Imagery*. However, it much more concerns with the explanation of the number 729 with regard to the happiness of the just man and the suffering of the tyrant than with the geometrical number in passage 546a-c. See James Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, edited with critical notes commentary and appendices, Book VI-X, Cambridge, 1965, pp. 264-318; Robert Brumbaugh, 'Republic, VIII-IX: On Mathematical Imagery', in *Platonic Studies of Greek Philosophy: Forms, Arts, Gadgets, and Hemlock*, Albany, New York, 1989, pp. 81-88.

regarded as the good or the virtue for themselves. Timocracy loves honour, but honour brings it down, also wealth, freedom, absolute power and self-indulgence in the case of oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny respectively. For this reason, it seems to be an anti-climax to say that the love of reason itself is the cause of decay. This is supported by what has been said by Socrates that 'the men you have bred to be your rulers will not for all their wisdom ascertain by reasoning combined with sensation, but they will escape them, and there will be a time when they will beget children out of season'.⁷³ It is an excess of the love of the immortality of the 'good' which causes the decay of the soul from aristocracy to tyranny.⁷⁴ According to Socrates' speech on the imperfect cities and the imperfect souls, it seems that apart from the three elements the soul by nature possesses the love or desire for the immortality of the good. It presupposes the dynamism of all three parts of the soul. For this reason, the just soul inevitably declines after it has lived its life for a period of time. That is why Socrates talked about the father who seemed to be too good and could not keep a balance with the need of his own family, or the timocratic father whose love of honour brought disaster to his family and also disillusioned his son who had been forced to love and treasure honour without proper music or education, or the oligarchic father whose family had lived a frugal life until his son broke the chain and became the lover of freedom instead of the lover of wealth; and the democratic man whose love of freedom could not control his son who was dominated by an insatiable greed for anything and became a madman or a tyrant if he was fortunate enough to be a leader of the greedy mob.

⁷³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 546b).

⁷⁴ This implies that the love of reason alone cannot be regarded as the love of the good and justice.

Tragically, it seems that Socrates has given the reader a teleological view of the fatalistic nature of the soul. This would not be the case if Socrates' invocation of the Muses to render this tragedy of the soul is taken into consideration. It is the divine power that Socrates had recourse to. In truth, it is 'the eye of the gods' or the panopticon.⁷⁵ Possessing the panoptic view, Socrates

⁷⁵ With regard to the origin of the panopticon, Michel Serres writes:

'Let us speak of the peacock, a bird twice monstrous, which wears so many feathers, and such long ones, that it cannot fly. As though evolution had made a mistake, by excess, it shows us a hundred eyes we dream can see, but know cannot. When it struts, it shows an ocellated tail on which it exposes only feather eyes. Let us speak of those eyes.

One day the peacock crossed Hermes' path, who was then called Argus, a man who could see everything. Argus had, they say, two pairs of eyes, one in front on his face like everyone, another in the back of his head. No dead angle. Others say he had a hundred eyes, fifty in front and as many as on his neck. Still others say he had an infinite number of eyes strewn everywhere on his skin. Clairvoyant at the beginning of the tradition, he is a figure who becomes at the end of his fantasmatic growth pure eye, an ocular globe of eyes, a skin tattooed by eye-shapes. Growth and fantasy often accompany each other. Argus sees everywhere and is always watching. He sleeps with only one pair of eyes at a time or with only half his eyelids closed. Half asleep, half awake. The best of those watchers of the earth and the air, he deserves his nickname of Panoptes, the panopticon.'

See Michel Serres, 'Panoptic Theory' in *The Limits of Theory*, Thomas M. Kavanagh (ed.), with an Introduction, Stanford, California, 1989, pp. 25-26. The attempt of achieving the panopticon or the eye of the gods has been commenced with the prophets, soothsayers, seers, augurs, and later with the poets. The sophists and their treatment

could have an overview of the whole journey of the life of the unjust soul. For a man with an ordinary eye cannot foresee the totality of events. Socrates 'dreams he can see, but knows he cannot'.⁷⁶ Without the Muses, Socrates could not purport himself to be capable to see the past, present, and future of the life of a soul. In the spirit of the Muses, the discourse must be treated as half-serious and half-playful like a fairy tale for children. With regard to the fairy tale, the devil could become powerful if the children behave badly and the angel would rescue them if they are good. Likewise, a life of the unjust soul might or might not happen in the way that Socrates had related. To do justice to Socrates, one cannot ascribe teleologism to Socrates' view of the soul, as he always reminds his interlocutors of his ignorance. The only wisdom he possessed, if it be wisdom at all, is human not divine.⁷⁷ The speech on the unjust soul is one that can see within without 'looking'. Socrates never claimed to know anything except his self-knowledge, that is, 'he knows himself that he does not know'.

of human subjects can be regarded as a similar attempt. Actually, the birth of the human sciences with particular regard to History is definitely intended to achieve this panopticon. The panopticon superficially seems to be originated in the will to know and the will to truth. In fact, it is indirect search for self-knowledge.

⁷⁶ The phrase is borrowed from Michel Serres' 'Panoptic Theory.' See footnote 75.

⁷⁷ Plato, the *Apology*, (20a).

CHAPTER NINE

The Nature of the Soul: Know Yourself-See Yourself-See Your Soul: Metaxy as the Nature of the Soul

As regards the question of the nature of the soul, as stated above, it can be said that there is an 'either/or' situation that if a complete individual is not just, it must be unjust, and if not unjust, it must be just. Another problem is that, as it has been inferred in the above discussion, justice and injustice in the soul originate from the same cause, that is, the love of the immortality of the good. Also, there is always dissension between the elements of the soul which the rational part has to control. For, as long as the ruling part is one with itself, the rising dissension can effect no change at all. Moreover it seems to imply that the soul by nature is in a self-conflicting condition. Its ruling part has to struggle against the other elements in order to maintain its governance. However, the just and the unjust souls can be distinguished by its ruling part, but they do not differ from each other with regard to the origin of their generation: both are said to be endowed with eros; it is the love of the immortality of the good. This leads the reader to a problem somewhat similar to what Demos proposes in his article, that is, the paradoxes in the ideal city¹: first, how the ideal city can be perfect if it is composed of un-ideal individuals; secondly, as a need for the city exists only because human beings are deficient, if the ideal city is composed of ideal individuals, then, the ideal men need no city.² Likewise, one can apply the same set of questions to the study of the nature of the soul. Can the soul be just if the other elements apart from the

¹ Demos, *op. cit.*

² Demos, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-165.

rational part are unjust? Why must the just soul have a 'ruling part' at all if all are already just?

The first problem to be dealt with is 'Is the nature of the soul self-conflict?' The previous argument shows that the unjust soul declined from the just soul. To be sure, it can be said that the just soul developed from the unjust soul as well. A complete individual whose ruling part is not the rational part cannot be called the just soul. It is unjust. However, if the soul has developed itself and attains justice later, then it becomes just. In this regard, the just is generated from the unjust and the unjust from the just. Thus, it seems that the nature of the soul is not in harmony. And justice in the soul is just a short interval between the endless war.

In the *Phaedo*, it has been argued that if knowledge is recollection or the soul is immortal, the soul cannot be a harmony.³ Socrates in the *Phaedo* supported his argument by referring to the examples he also gave in the *Republic*. The rational part of the soul sometimes opposes the desires by drawing it away from eating or drinking. Also, he quoted the passage in the *Odyssey* xx, 17, 18, with regard to the conflict of the spirited element and the others in Odysseus: 'He smote his breast, and thus he chided his heart: "Endure it, heart, thou didst bear worse than this"?'⁴ The conflict in the soul is evident that

'it could never, if it be a harmony, give forth a sound at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other conditions of the elements which compose it, but that it would follow them and never lead them'.⁵

³ Plato, *Phaedo*, (94e).

⁴ Plato, *Phaedo*, (94d); the *Republic*, (Book III 439-441c).

⁵ Plato, *Phaedo*, (94c).

However harmony emerges in the just soul when reason rules and guides the others, and the result is that 'each part keeps to its own task and is just, and likewise that each enjoys its own proper, pleasures and the best pleasures and so far as such a thing is possible, the truest'.⁶ For this reason, in the just soul, each part is just with reference to one another, and they are just as long as its ruling part is reason. If reason is weakened or does not care to rule for the happiness of the whole, the soul then becomes unjust. This is the reason why the just soul needs governance by reason; if the other elements are just, they have not become just of their own accord, since by nature, spirit and desires love honour and wealth respectively. Only the wisdom-loving part loves knowledge which can guide the soul as a whole to justice and the good.

I

The most significant factor which causes the decay of the soul is not the desires but the love of the immortality of the good in itself.⁷ The effect of love, as stated before, is twofold, namely good and evil. With such love,

⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 586e-587a).

⁷ Love or eros is the essential force of life, but Aristotle overlooked the signification of love in this respect. He just emphasised rationality and rationalisation. As C. Fred Alford comments with regard to the power of eros as the beginning that '(s)ince it is the demanding, erotic, needy, desiring aspects of the self that make it such a problem, Plato's account is superior for my purposes, as it begins at the beginning, Aristotle tends to rationalize the passions, downplaying the demanding, demonic desires of the self, making them on the whole safer'. See C. Fred Alford, *The Self in Social Theory: A Psychoanalytic Account of Its Construction in Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Rawls, and Rousseau*, New Haven and London, 1991, p. 19.

the soul yearns for the absolute truth, good, justice, happiness etc. It is a starting point for every soul no matter which part of it rules. With love guided by reason as its ruling part, the soul searches for the true wisdom. With others, the love of the immortality of the soul takes for granted as the truth anything that it understands to be the cause of its pleasures and pains. For spirit and desires, honour and/or wealth are taken as the good, and the truth. Socrates stated with regard to this dark side of the love of the immortality of the soul that:

'The evil is that the soul of every man, when it is greatly pleased or pained by anything, is compelled to believe that the object which caused the emotion is very distinct and very true; but it is not, (t)hese objects are mostly the visible ones, are they not?'⁸

For this reason, Socrates pointed out that 'the soul is most completely put in bondage by the body'.⁹ In the *Phaedo*, he discussed with his friends what life and the soul are in the eye of philosophy. In the dialogue, he identified the body with some elements which he later analyzed in the *Republic* as spirit and desires.¹⁰ Honour and wealth are concrete things which the soul, especially the spirited part and the desires, easily clings to.

Indeed, it can be inferred that two kinds of love exist, namely, one guided by reason, the other guided by the other elements in the soul. If there are two kinds of love, then there must be two kinds of lover. With regard to this point, the discussion on the lover's speech in the

⁸ Plato, *Phaedo*, (83c).

⁹ Plato, *Phaedo*, (83d).

¹⁰ C. Fred Alford argues that Plato's invention is to impose desires into the soul. See C. Fred Alford, *The Self in Social Theory*, op. cit.

Phaedrus comes to the fore. Three lovers' speeches have been presented in the dialogue. Although the first one was called the speech of the non-lover, it is clear that such a speech emanates from the mind of the lover. To be sure, it is a written speech, since Phaedrus who recited Lysias' speech intended to show Socrates the effective rhetoric of a lover as regards the persuasion of his beloved. It indicates that for Phaedrus, who seemed to fall in love with Lysias' speech of the non-lover, a true lover must conceal his love in order to successfully conquer the heart of his beloved.¹¹

Therefore, the speech of the non-lover is no doubt a speech of the lover in disguise. This was understood by Socrates himself who in his own and better version of the speech of the non-lover revealed a hidden intention of the lover behind Lysias' speech of the non-lover.¹² Having been asked for comments on Lysias' speech, Socrates criticised the fact that Lysias seemed to be repetitious in saying many things about the same subject. He just did it in 'youthful fashion' trying to 'to be exhibiting his ability to say the same thing in two different ways and in both ways excellently'.¹³ The gist of the speech is only that after praising the calm sense of the non-lover and blaming the madness of the lover, the argument requires the audience to favour the non-lover.¹⁴ In this regard, irony and calm sense in Socrates' speech points to the fact that

¹¹ Phaedrus is the lover of discourse. He has been swayed by the love speeches. Nussbaum says 'Phaedrus, too yields to the influence of beauty and is moved by wonder (257c), (f)rom having been the critical and rationalistic "speaker" of Socrates' first speech (244a), he becomes the loving and yielding boy to whom the maniac second speech is spoken'. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*, op. cit., p. 204.

¹² Plato, *Phaedrus*, (237b).

¹³ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (235a).

¹⁴ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (236a).

he is just another lover in disguise like Lysias. His love speech is behind his dialectic speech of critical cross-examination. He is a lover of discourse and also a philanthropist. Of course, he has love for a young man like Phaedrus¹⁵, but his love differs from Lysias' love.

Also, as said above, Lysias' speech is just a speech of a lover in disguise. Virtually, the intention of the author does not differ from the lover speech. That is why Socrates said that Lysias wanted to show that he was able to say the same thing in two different ways and differently in both ways. Hence, Phaedrus requested Socrates to give a non-lover speech which is 'better than that in the book (of Lysias) and no shorter and quite different'.¹⁶ Before rendering the speech, Socrates had to cover his face because he said he was ashamed to give such a speech which he thought was blasphemous to the god of love.¹⁷

In his speech, Socrates pointed out that first of all the definition of love, its nature and its power must be explained, otherwise it would cause confusion since both the lover and the non-lover seemed to desire the same thing, that is the beautiful. Then, love must be a desire of the beautiful. However, man had two leading and ruling principles.¹⁸ At this point, the discussion of the love speech can be conflated with the discussion of the soul in the *Republic*. Two leading and ruling principles referred to here are the rule of reason and the rule of the other elements in the soul. Socrates in the *Phaedrus* stated with regard to these two principles that 'one is the innate desire for pleasures, the other an acquired opinion which

¹⁵ See Nussbaum, *op. cit.*, pp. 204, 232.

¹⁶ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (235d).

¹⁷ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (237a).

¹⁸ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (237d-e).

strives for the best'.¹⁹ What he explained about them is reminiscent of what he described in Book VIII-IX of the *Republic*:

'These two sometimes agree within us and are sometimes in strife; and sometimes one, and sometimes the other has the greater power, (n)ow when opinion leads through reason toward the best and is more powerful, its power called self-restraint, but when desire irrationally drags us toward pleasures and rules within us, its rule is called excess, (n)ow excess has many names, for it has many members and many forms; and whichever of these forms is most marked gives its own name, neither beautiful nor honourable, to him who possesses it'.²⁰

Those whose love are guided by desires appear in various forms. Those who are lovers of food are called gluttons. This is applicable to many other things. In the *Republic*, these various types can be put under four major forms or unjust souls or polities, that is, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. So this kind of love can be understood as

'the desire which overcomes the rational opinion that strives toward the right, and which is led away toward the enjoyment of beauty and again is strongly forced by the desires that are kindred to itself toward personal beauty, when it gains the victory, takes its name from that very force'.²¹

Socrates then described the lover of this kind who was regarded as a slave to pleasure. Such a lover would never

¹⁹ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (237e).

²⁰ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (237d-238a).

²¹ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (238c).

endure the beloved who was better than himself or his equal, because if the beloved was wiser or stronger than him, he would not be able to exploit and enjoy the pleasures from him. He would turn his beloved into a slave to his own desire. After he had exploited everything from his beloved, he would just desert him for another fresh one. This kind of lover would take vengeance if his beloved disappointed him. More importantly, he would keep his beloved away from philosophy which could lead him to wisdom. For it in turn would make his beloved despise his tyrant Eros.²² He loved his beloved just as the wolf loved the lamb.²³

Socrates ended his speech without discussing the other half, that is, what was good about the non-lover. This surprised Phaedrus since he expected to hear what Socrates would say about the non-lover, so that he could compare it to Lysias' speech. Socrates replied that there was no reason to make a long speech since the non-lover possessed all the opposite advantages to those in the lover. Socrates did not want to continue the speech since he was ashamed and afraid of blaspheming the gods of love. For he believed that 'if Love is, as indeed he is (the son of Aphrodite), a god of something divine, he can be nothing evil'.²⁴ Actually, the kind of love which had been stated in Lysias' speech and the speech of Socrates is just a kind of love which had been led by the ruling desires in the soul. The non-lover is just a lover in disguise. Socrates said that one should learn about true divine love before 'falling in love' with the non-lover who was in fact a kind of tyrant Eros.

²² Plato, *Phaedrus*, (239b). Compare tyrant Eros in the *Republic*, (Book IX 573b-e).

²³ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (241d).

²⁴ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (242e).

II

To purify and recant his blasphemous speech, Socrates had to render another speech on divine love. He accepted that the lover was regarded as a mad man, and madness was generally understood as evil²⁵, but it is a gift of the gods, the greatest blessing which had been sent to man through madness.²⁶ If not, the term 'mania' would not have been connected with the noble arts.²⁷ It must be the same reason that love had been identified with madness. It must be given by the gods for the greatest happiness of human beings.²⁸

A good example was the divine madness in the inspired poet. It could be regarded as a gift of the gods to the poet. However, it has been understood that Socrates criticised the divine inspiration of the poet, because the poet lost control of himself when he produced his work. He could not tell where his art came from. He assumed that it must come from divine power. In the same way, for

²⁵ At this point, Nussbaum comments that

'(c)learly the pre-*Phaedrus* dialogues do attack mania as a "simple evil", a state of the person that cannot lead to genuine insight and one that, more often than not, produces bad actions, (m)ania is called a species of viciousness at *Republic* 400b2 (cf. *Meno* 91c3, *Rep.* 382c8), (i)n a number of passages it is linked with excessive appetite--gratification, or wantonness (*hybris*, *Rep.* 400b2, 403; *Crat.* 404a4), (i)t is linked with delusion, folly, and the "death" of true opinion in the *Republic* 539c6, 573a-b (cf. 382e2, *Tim.* 86b4, *Ps. Pol. Ref.* 416a22)'.

See Nussbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

²⁶ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (244a).

²⁷ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (244b-e).

²⁸ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (245b-c).

Socrates, love was the king of divine inspiration or divine madness in the human soul. It could be said that love existed in the nature of the soul. No one could explain why it was so. If there be any particular reason, Socrates could see no other reason than that it must be meant for the greatest happiness of man.

The third speech in the Phaedrus is Socrates' palinode in response to his previous blasphemy. He argued that in order to understand love, it needed to take account of the nature of the soul. There were two kinds of soul, divine and human.²⁹ In the realm of the gods, the soul possessed these qualities, namely absolute justice, beauty, wisdom, goodness. The only pilot of the divine soul was reason.³⁰ For a human soul, by nature yearned for the good and the beautiful.³¹ It could be more comprehensible if it was likened to the composite nature of a pair of winged horses and a charioteer.³²

A chariot was moved by the power of a pair of winged horses; so winged horses represent the elements of the soul by which the soul was moved. That the soul was moved by its own elements means that it is self-moving.³³ The driving force of the life of human beings derives from the winged horses or all elements of the soul. In fact, each element of the soul can be regarded as a kind of desire. The rational part of the soul possesses a love of wisdom; the power of the spirited part lies in its love of honour; and the desires love pleasures generated from wealth and the like. These elements are dynamic because love

²⁹ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (245c).

³⁰ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (247d-e).

³¹ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (252a-257b); *Symposium*, (210d-212a).

³² Plato, *Phaedrus*, (246a-b).

³³ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (246c).

permeates them all. One of the winged horses is said to be noble and of a noble breed: 'a friend of honour joined with temperance and modesty, and a follower of true glory,... ..guided only by the word of command and reason'.³⁴ It represents the love of reason or the rational part of the soul. The other represents the love of pleasures or desires: 'a friend of insolence and pride,...shaggy-eared and deaf, hardly obedient to whip and spurs'.³⁵

The wing is said to be the only part that partook of the nature of the divine. Therefore, 'the natural function of the wing is to soar upwards and carry that which is heavy up to the place where dwells the race of the gods'.³⁶ The wing signifies that the human soul once experienced the truth. Also, that is why the soul loved what was beautiful and good which partook of the divine beauty and good, and only such a soul passed into human form.³⁷

When the soul saw the likeness of the divine qualities, it fell in love with the objects. The soul was

³⁴ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (253d-e).

³⁵ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (253e). Nussbaum argues that both are important as 'we require the co-operative engagement of our non-intellectual elements in order to get where our intellect wants us to go, (t)he power of the whole is a *sumphuton dunamis*, a 'powerful naturally grown-together' (246a).' See Nussbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

³⁶ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (246d-e).

³⁷ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (249b). It can be said that human beings possess what can be put in Kantian terms as 'synthetic a priori and analytic a priori'. Since man must 'understand a general conception form by collecting into a unity by means of reason the many perceptions of the senses'. For example, this can be those of mathematical and geometrical knowledge. Such knowledge is said to be acquired by means of recollection since the soul once beheld it when it journeyed with God, as Socrates demonstrates in the *Meno* that a slave boy is able to solve a geometrical problem without any previous knowledge.

regarded as insane because it could not control itself and did not understand its condition. It did not realise that it was yearning for the divine qualities which it experienced once before. In that condition, the desires or the unruly horse became wild and forced his mate and the charioteer to approach the objects in order to propose the joys of love, but the other horse or reason was obedient to the charioteer. If the charioteer was unable to control the unruly horse, it meant that the holder of the soul 'gives himself up to pleasure and like a beast proceeds to lust and begetting'.³⁸ On the other hand, if the unruly horse had been tamed and guided towards the divine, then, 'the growth of the feathers begins'.³⁹ After the full growth of the wing, the charioteer could, with such wings, drive his chariot upward to the divine realm.

III

From this, the nine characters of man are categorised according to the degree of absorption of divine nature, in other words, the degree of their being able to control the unruly horse of desires. 'The soul that has seen the most shall enter into the birth of a man who is to be a philosopher or a lover of beauty, or one of a musical or loving nature'.⁴⁰ This type is what has been called aristocratic in the *Republic*. Its soul is ruled by reason. The second one is a timocratic or kingly nature such as a lawful king or a warlike ruler who are highly spirited and regard honour as the highest virtue. From the third to the ninth, the souls are dominated by necessary and unnecessary desires. These types of men are mostly found in oligarchy,

³⁸ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (251a).

³⁹ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (251c).

⁴⁰ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (248d).

democracy, and tyranny. Such are politicians⁴¹ or business men, hard-working gymnasts, prophets, poets and some imitative artists, craftsmen or husbandmen, sophists or demagogues, and tyrants.⁴² Amongst these, it is said that only the philosopher has wings since this type of man 'is always, so far he is able, in communion through memory with those things the communion with which causes God to be divine'.⁴³ Although the others have no wings, they however have potential to grow them in the future if they live their lives justly. At the end of his *palinode*, Socrates argued that between the two kinds of love one should turn to the love of wisdom or philosophy because it is divine and true.⁴⁴

Socrates stated that each character can become better or worse depending on whether it lives its life justly or unjustly.⁴⁵ That is why the human soul is said to fall when it can no longer follow the divine as its wings become heavy.⁴⁶ When Socrates said 'a human soul may pass into the life of a beast', he meant that the soul declines from justice to injustice, from the rule of reason to the rule of spirit and the rule of desires. On the other hand, 'a soul which was once human, may pass again from a beast into a man' means that a man can become better if he lives his life justly by moving towards the rule of the better elements in his soul.⁴⁷

⁴¹ Of course, it is not the politician in Socratic sense as stated in the *Gorgias*, 521d.

⁴² Plato, *Phaedrus*, (248d-e).

⁴³ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (249c).

⁴⁴ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (257b).

⁴⁵ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (248e).

⁴⁶ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (248c).

⁴⁷ Plato, *Phaedrus*, (249b).

From the soul, in the image of the charioteer with winged horses, love can be more comprehensible with regard to its two different kinds of horse. They represent two different kinds of love, and a discourse of the one is to be countered by a discourse of the other which is good and divine. That is, as Martha C. Nussbaum rightly argues, the *Phaedrus* is presented as a *apologia* for *eros* and it is a work in which a more complex view of these motivations has been worked out and some of them are accepted as good since 'it can be a constituent of an orderly and pious life dedicated to understanding of the good'.⁴⁸ The lover and the non-lover speeches in the *Phaedrus* dialectically interplay with one another. They in fact can be regarded as a springboard to the love of *metaxu* asserted by Diotima in the *Symposium*.⁴⁹

However, with regard to two opposing forces, it entails the changeability of the soul. The changeability of the character of the soul also affirms its nature of self-motion. It cannot be said that the soul is always in a state of self-conflict, since, if the soul is always in a state of internal war within itself, then life would not be worth living.

In the *Phaedo*, Socrates' friends understood that he chose to die. He also asked Cebes to tell Evenus the poet to 'come after him as quickly as he can', that is, to follow his death⁵⁰, but Socrates was not asking anyone to commit suicide. Suicide is not permitted until god, who is the guardian of man, 'sends some necessity upon him'.⁵¹ Apart from this, committing suicide is unphilosophical.

⁴⁸ Nussbaum, *op. cit.*, pp. 203, 213.

⁴⁹ See also Nussbaum, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

⁵⁰ Plato, *Phaedo*, (61b).

⁵¹ Plato, *Phaedo*, (62c).

For, anyone who has any worthy interest in philosophy like Socrates must prepare himself for death not suicide. Socrates proved that the soul is immortal and death is not miserable as other people thought. Following the proof of the immortality of the soul and the recollection of knowledge, his argument entails that neither harmony nor discord is the nature of the soul.⁵² However, as Hans-Gorg Gadamer rightly analyses there is proof in the *Phaedo* that the soul can have harmony and lose it.⁵³ Hence, what should be comprehensible as regards the nature of the soul is that it is always self-moving towards either justice or injustice. It oscillates between these two realms, but the nature of the soul itself is neither just nor unjust.

IV

The Good

Know Thyself-See Yourself-See Your Soul: Metaxy as the Nature of the Soul

It can be inferred from the above that the nature of the soul is neither just nor unjust. Its nature is in an intermediate condition, *metaxu*. From the above, it has already been demonstrated that justice in man emerges when his soul is led by the rational part. Injustice is present in the soul whenever it is ruled by the other elements. In the discussion on the education of the guardian of the just city, Socrates replied to Adeimantus that what is greater

⁵² Plato, *Phaedo*, (94c).

⁵³ He argues that in the *Phaedo* Plato intended that 'the soul must be thought of as Socrates thinks of it, that is, by departing from our human self-understanding'. See Hans-Gorg Gadamer, *Dialogues and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato*, translation with introduction by P. Christopher Smith, New Haven and London, 1980, pp. 31-32.

than justice and also is the greatest of all things is the idea of the good; since without the idea of the good, other knowledge becomes useless.⁵⁴ The just soul is required to understand the idea of the good since

'the just and the honourable, if their relation and reference to the good is not known, will not have secured a guardian of much worth in the man thus ignorant, and my surmise is that no one will understand them adequately before he knows this'.⁵⁵

So Socrates is requested to explain what the idea of the good means in the same way that he has set forth the nature of justice, temperance, and the other virtues. He stated that no one would pursue justice if there is no good in it.⁵⁶ Most people prefer to seem to be just and honourable rather than to really be so. They pretend to be just because they think that an appearance would render the good to them. For the good itself, people would never desire what just resembles the good. They desire what is really the good, since what resembles the good can satisfy no one. Before proceeding to the discussion of the good, Socrates made an excuse that he feared that he might fail to give an adequate explanation and that in his eagerness he might turn out to be a laughing-stock.⁵⁷ Actually, this adumbrates what Socrates in his parable of the Cave described the person who after ascending the Cave to see the Sun and its true nature returned to the Cave again and appeared to be pathetic and ridiculous in front of his fellow-men.⁵⁸ Also, it is understood that Socrates was

⁵⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 504e-505b).

⁵⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 506a).

⁵⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 505a-b).

⁵⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 506e).

⁵⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 517a, 517d).

ridiculed by Glaucon for his first account of the good.⁵⁹ This means that he was aware that his explanation of the good might seem ridiculous to Glaucon who like the men in the Cave could not apprehend the significance of the analogy. Also, it implies that he might have been one who has experienced what is beyond the Cave, that is, the Sun itself. As he was aware of this, he said that what he could talk about was only the offspring of the good, not the good itself. The explanation of the offspring of the good, is regarded as the interest which is due to his friends because he could not give them what they really wanted, that is, the account of the good itself.⁶⁰ Before proceeding, he asked them to listen carefully otherwise he could deceive them unintentionally 'with a false reckoning of the interest'.⁶¹

Socrates explained that things can be put into two divisions. First, there are the things that are regarded as beautiful or good when they have been predicated 'to be'. Second, it is the qualities of the beauty or the good themselves which many things partake of and are then called beautiful or good. The first one is what has been seen but not thought while the other has been thought but not seen. With regard to the former, it is visible because of its faculty of being able to be seen and because of men's faculty of being able to see. Man can see with his eyes. The latter is intelligible because of its existence in the intelligible region and also because of faculty of reasoning in human soul. However, in the case of visible objects, they need the presence of light in order to be visibly seen. What makes human vision see best and visible things be seen is nothing but the sun. So the sun is regarded as the cause of vision although it itself is not

⁵⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 509c).

⁶⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 506e).

⁶¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 507a).

vision.

The eye is the most sunlike of all the instruments of sense. It receives the power which it possesses as an influx, as it were, dispensed from the sun. In the same way that the sun is the cause of vision but not vision itself, Socrates urged that his friends should understand what he meant by the term 'offspring' of the good 'which begot to stand in a proportion with itself'. In the realm of the visible, the offspring of the sun is sight and vision. In a similar respect, the offspring of the good in the intelligible region is knowledge and truth.⁶² Moreover, Socrates argued that the sun not only 'furnishes to visibles the power of visibility but it also provides for their generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation'.⁶³ Following this, the idea of the good in the image of the sun must be understood accordingly to possess the same quality.

IV.I

At this point, Gadamer suggests that the idea of the good can be interpreted that it, 'without having "being" itself, is said to give being, to *einai kai ten ousian* (being and reality), to what is known in thinking'.⁶⁴ He states further that following the interpretation of the allegory, a problem arises with regard to the special status of the idea of the good. He says 'the comparison forces us to take this ascent beyond being in such a way

⁶² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 508c-509a).

⁶³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 509b).

⁶⁴ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, translation and with an introduction and annotation by P. Christopher Smith, New Haven and London, 1986, p. 89.

that the good becomes the "cause" of the being of the many ideas, (b)ut of course the question remains: "cause" in what sense?⁶⁵ With regard to this problem, Gadamer offers his interpretation as follows:

'The word "cause" (*aitia*), which we know as the fourth genus of the *Philebus*, is not used here---either for the sun or for the idea of the good, (o)n the contrary, the text moves in the semantic field of *dynamis* (power): *parechein* (allowing), *pareinai* (standing by), *proseinai* (being present), (t)he rendering of the good that Socrates gives (511b) makes unequivocally clear that here the good is interpreted as *tou pantos arche*, the "starting point (principle) of everything.'⁶⁶

The fourth class in the *Philebus* concerns the cause of the combination of two things with regard to the good, namely pleasure and reason. In the dialogue, two theories have been proposed as regards the nature of the good. *Philebus'* hedonism argues for pleasure as the essence of the good. During the course of the discussion, it has been proved that neither reason nor pleasure alone can be regarded as the nature of the good. As Socrates suggested at the beginning of the discussion that to pursue for the truth not just a victory in argument, any alternative besides these two ideas should be taken into consideration, so he proposed that the third class might be the cause; it is the combination of pleasure and reason.

However, the cause of such a combination has to be counted as the fourth class.⁶⁷ The cause of this combination or addition has been stated before in the

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

⁶⁷ Plato, *Philebus*, (22d-23d).

Phaedo as regards the multiplication of numbers.⁶⁸ Such a cause is not what Socrates meant in the *Republic* with regard to the idea of the good. To follow Gadamer's line of reasoning, what Socrates referred to is the 'starting point of everything'. With regard to this point, one is reminded of what Plato said in the *Second Epistle*. It shows his serious concern for the significance of the understanding of the original cause of everything. He mentioned in his letter to Dionysius the problem of the nature of the first principle. According to the letter, Dionysius was not satisfied with his demonstration of the nature of the first principle.⁶⁹ It is quite possible that the message requires careful interpretation.⁷⁰ The importance of this principle is evident as Plato stated that the problem of this nature of the first principle 'is the cause of all the trouble, and if that be not expelled from a man, he shall never genuinely find the truth'.⁷¹ From the *Republic* and the *Second Epistle*, it appears that there is a connection between the idea of the good, the truth, and the nature of the first principle. It can be inferred that the good consists of the truth of the nature of the first principle which is the truth of all things.

As the good has been regarded as the 'starting point of everything', then the question of 'what is it like?' is still unclear. The courageous Glaucon expressed his scepticism. He wondered whether Socrates had omitted something from his explanation. Indeed, Socrates admitted to him that he has omitted a great deal. Also, he still

⁶⁸ Plato, *Phaedo*, (96c).

⁶⁹ Plato, *Epistle II*, (312d).

⁷⁰ Plato said he would never write any discourse on the truth or the nature of the first principle. He regarded those who write anything on the subject as being ignorant of themselves. See the *Epistle II*, 312d; the *Epistle VII*, 341b.

⁷¹ Plato, *Epistle II*, (313a).

insisted that he would have 'to pass over much, but nevertheless so far as it is at present practicable' he 'would not willingly leave anything out'.⁷² What has been omitted must be quite important with regard to the truth of the nature of the first principle itself, but, as Socrates asked for an excuse from his friends, it is not practical to discuss it. Also it is likely that the reason that Socrates did not discuss the matter is similar to the reason which has been given by the author of the dialogues.⁷³

Before investigating the problem of the nature of the first principle of all things, the term 'everything' should be taken into consideration. As argued above, there are two realms of beings, that is, the visible and the intelligible. From this, Socrates' further explanation departs. Suppose that both realms are divided by a line. The visible realm consists of two levels, that is, physical objects themselves and their shadows and images. In this realm, it is understood that the sphere of the objects themselves which are the originals of the images is true and also differs from the other whilst the other is related to the original in the same way that the realm of opinion is related to that of knowledge. In the realm of the intelligible, the objects themselves in the visible realm are in turn regarded as images. Socrates explained this by referring to students of geometry and mathematics who took for granted as absolute assumptions the odd and even numbers, geometric figures, three forms of angles etc., and proceeded from these assumptions through a series of consistent steps to the conclusions which they set out to find.⁷⁴ The investigation of this division can be put in modern terms as an empirical knowledge. It can be

⁷² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 509c-d).

⁷³ Plato, *Seventh Epistle*, (342a-344d).

⁷⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 510c-d).

undertaken by mathematical reasoning, *dianoia*. In the realm of the intelligible, the investigation is taken toward the numbers or the figures themselves. It is the inquiry of the forms per se. This part can be understood by the power of dialectic. In this realm, it treats

'its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses, underpinnings, footings, and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all, and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, making no use whatever of any object of sense but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas'.⁷⁵

IV.II

From this, Glaucon said that so far as he understood with regard to the account given by Socrates, the aspects of the reality and the intelligible are distinguished by the fact that the latter which can be understood by the power of dialectic is truer and more exact than the former which is perceivable through empirical science. With regard to the aspect of reality, as in Socrates' reference to numbers and figures, like the mental habit of geometers and the like mind, what they use to approach it is not reason, *nous*, but mathematical reasoning, *dianoia*, or understanding which is in between opinion and reason. Then Socrates summed that up in the realm of the intelligible: four affections occur in the soul in hierarchical order as follows: intelligence or reason--dialectic, understanding or mathematical reasoning--*dianoia*, belief--*pistis*,

⁷⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 511b-c).

illusion or conjecture--eikasia⁷⁶, And these four sections must be arranged 'in a proportion, considering that they participate in clearness and precision in the same degrees as their objects partake of truth and reality'.⁷⁷

After this point, Socrates started to render the imagery of the Cave. It can be interpreted in connection with what Socrates just delivered with regard to the intelligible realm. What the people in the image of the chained prisoners in the cave first saw are just the shadows of themselves and other things. They take the shadows for granted as reality so long as their necks and legs have not been released from the fetters.⁷⁸ In this condition, they regarded what they saw as 'being' the objects themselves. As the imagery goes on, it transpires that men in different conditions regard what they see as 'being'. When any of them were freed from fetters and were able to move around and lift up their eyes, at first they could not understand the light of the fire which makes possible the visibility and shadows of the objects. Due to the pain caused by the dazzle and glitter of the light, he turns back to the shadows and still regards them as something more real than real objects in the light, since he was at a loss and could not yet discern what he just had a chance to see.

However, if he were compelled to look at the light of the fire itself, and also if 'someone should drag him thence by force up the ascent which is rough and steep, and not let him go before he had drawn him out into the light of the sun,' then, such would be so painful to him. His eyes would be filled with the beams of the light 'so that

⁷⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 511d).

⁷⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 511e).

⁷⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VII 515b-c).

he would not be able to see even one of the things we call real'.⁷⁹ After some habituation, he realises that what he formerly regarded as being are merely shadows or illusions, since he is not able to see the actual things which are the origins of the shadows in the light of the sun. At this stage, he believes that the objects which he has just perceived are true beings which he is able to distinguish from images. Of course, in the light of the sun, first, it is very easy for him to discern the shadows and then the likeness or reflections in water of men and things. He might have regarded these images as the beings themselves. Later he is disillusioned when he can look at the objects themselves. Again, he is convinced that what he now sees is the truth of the beings, but he goes on to contemplate further the appearance in 'the heavens and heavens itself, more easily by night, looking at the light of the stars and the moon, than by day the sun and the sun's light'.⁸⁰ When he is finally able to look upon the sun itself and see its true nature, then he can infer and conclude that the sun is the cause of everything he has seen.⁸¹

The imagery of the cave in fact is an analogy of the intelligible in the image of the visible. Its conclusion is that the sun is the cause of everything. With its light, shadows and visibility become possible. Things become visible because of the light of the sun. Things are what men understand them to be in relation to different levels of the light of the sun. From this, it can be linked to the above four sections. The men in the cave would never think that the shadows they are seeing are illusion until they have seen the light and the things themselves. Shadows are 'being' to such men. Likewise, although they realise what shadows are, they would however

⁷⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VII 515e-516a).

⁸⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VII 517a-b).

⁸¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VII 517b-c).

take for granted what are not shadows as 'being'. They would do so until they have found out that it is only belief. Not until they are able to see the sun itself and see its true nature, would they still take something for what it really is. Hence, for men in all conditions in the cave, there exists 'being'. In every level of 'being', the sun is the cause of all.

As mentioned above, the image of the sun is likened to the idea of the good. It has been said that truth and reality are comparable to the light of the sun which enables us to see what objects really are. The light of the sun is not the sun itself in the same way that truth and reality are not the good itself. The sun is neither the light nor the visible, but it 'furnishes to visibles the power of visibility and also provides for their generation and growth and nurtures though it is not itself generation'. Likewise, the good is said to give being to what is known in thinking, without having being itself. Socrates suggested that the comparison of the image of the sun should be applied to the soul both in the beginning and in the end of his speech on the good. At the end, he told Glaucon, who asked what had been omitted, that '(a)nd if you assume that the ascent and the contemplation of the things above is the soul's ascending to the intelligible region, you will not miss my surmise, since that is what you desire to hear'.⁸²

Since the soul is concerned with the intelligible realm, as in our earlier discussion of the transformation from justice to injustice and the nature of the soul, it shows that in each life or generation of the soul such as aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny, there exists what each regards as the good and the truth of being. It is demonstrated that the transformation of the

⁸² Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VII 517b, 508d).

soul occurs because the soul is self-moving. The soul has self-motion because of the power of love in accordance with its tripartite elements. After the investigation of the nature of the soul, it transpires that the soul is the cause of being. The soul not only gives being to what is known in thinking but also nurtures and grows beings which it gives without having being itself, as it has been put in the form of an analogy of the relationship between the parents and the way they nurture their son. A particular type of soul emerges from its previous form. The soul gives values, meaning, truth, and good etc. to what it experiences. And all the values and meanings it gives are in accordance with its ruling part.

IV.III

Thus, the good is derived from the knowledge of the nature of the soul. Our earlier argument entails that the nature of the soul is neither just nor unjust; it oscillates between both realms. The nature of the soul is neither good nor evil; it is in between, *metaxy*. The knowledge of the nature of the soul as *metaxy* is the good which is greater than justice. It is beyond justice and injustice. The soul is the cause of everything, and to understand this, the eye of the soul has to be able to see itself. The soul projects 'being' to other beings, and the self-knowledge of the soul emerges when it projects in reverse to itself so that it can understand itself. As both just and unjust souls exist, then there are also two kinds of eye of the soul which each see things differently, but they are regarded as one of a kind when they are compared to the third kind of eye which sees itself. The third eye of the soul emerges to look after itself with regard to what is good. As Socrates concludes

'..in the region of the known the last thing to be seen and hardly seen is the idea of the good, and that when seen it must needs point us to the conclusion that this is indeed the cause of all things of all that is right and beautiful, giving birth in the visible world to light, and the author of light and itself in the intelligible world being the authentic source of truth and reason, and that anyone who is to act wisely in private or public must have caught sight of this'.⁸³

So now it is comprehensible why the just and honourable with no relation and reference to the good 'would not have secured a guardian of much worth in the man thus ignorant of the good'.

Returning to our earliest problem concerning the geometrical riddle of the perfect number for human breeding, the solution can now be drawn from our understanding of the whole picture of the soul. What has been worked out from the riddle is the equation $3^3+4^3+5^3 = 216$. The result points to a minimum period of human gestation, but that concerns only one side of human being, namely the physical. As a man consists of body and soul, so the riddle must also be interpreted with regard to the soul. In our discussion of the just and the unjust souls, a prerequisite to the understanding of the five characters of man which embrace the just and the unjust types is the knowledge of the tripartite soul. Without this, the apprehension of the governance of the soul in relation to the five types of polities is hardly possible. As regards our recent discussion of the idea of the good, it transpires that there are four levels of beings caused by the good. These four stages of being in the realm of the visible are obvious to everyone with regard to the sun as the cause. It requires just a normal sense-perception.

⁸³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VII 517c).

However, in the realm of the visible, the soul is regarded as the agent with regard to the understanding of these different conditions of being in relation to intelligence, mathematical reasoning or understanding, belief, and illusion. The degree that these conditions of being can be understood is attributable to the extent that a particular element in the soul rules over the rest. Also, in reverse, a different governance of the soul would interpret these four conditions of beings differently. What we have now is the sequence of numbers three, five, and four with regard to the tripartite soul, the five characters of man, and the four kinds of being respectively.

In the *Republic*, these numbers in fact have been brought into the discussion in chronological order; that is, the tripartite soul comes first followed by the idea of the good which renders the four levels of being, and the five characters of man. In the geometrical riddle, number three and four are easily noticeable, but with regard to what Socrates said, what he was going to render was the perfect number with regard to human procreation. The perfect number is the clue for the reader to go further from the basis of what he already possesses, that is, three and four. Before this, Socrates had already told us to consider the idea of the good in a form of a divided line, and this can be now taken as a clue with regard to a side of a triangle. In geometry, three and four in the context of the perfect number are the sides of the Pythagorean Triangle, the first possible right-angled triangle whose hypotenuse is the rational number 'five'. Three, four, and five can be understood with regard to the nature of the soul, that is, the tripartite elements, interpretation of beings, and characters of the soul.

Actually, this kind of interpretation of the

geometrical riddle was initiated by Robert S. Brumbaugh⁸⁴, but he has not explained the signification of the cube root. Three is a determinative number. As the tripartite soul oscillates between the rule of its three elements, this power of self-motion also determines the other numbers, that is, four and five to oscillate in relation to the ruling power of the soul, and this is where the cube root 'three' comes from. That the number 216 results from $3^3+4^3+5^3$ renders a picture or the understanding of the nature of man.

As stated before, the result 216 is less important than the equation itself. Furthermore, this equation is not to be interpreted in a teleological sense, since at the *Republic*, 527a-b, it is argued that geometry is not suitable for the understanding of the genesis or becoming. It is intended to be used to understand the being of man not its genesis or becoming. Therefore, the equation is the answer in itself already. So the nature of man can be understood in relation to this equation. Moreover, the number 216 can be worked out in another way.⁸⁵ The area of the triangle whose sides are 3, 4, 5 is 6, and if it is made solid as in solid geometry, it also turns out to be 216. To make it solid, it needs to be cubed. Three or tripartite soul is so important in this regard. In potentiality, man possesses this metaphoric number of 3, 4, 5. To make a solid state of the triangle is to combine these numbers in one as a whole of a human being, and the cube of six furnishes a complete understanding of human nature. This is the origin of the statement which states that 'this entire geometrical number is determinative of

⁸⁴ Brumbaugh, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-87.

⁸⁵ See James Adam, *the Republic*, Appendices to Book VIII, Part III, pp. 306-308.

this thing, of better and inferior births'.⁸⁶ With regard to the analysis of the better and inferior births, it is to be discussed in relation to the art of statesmanship in the next chapter, since the art of the statesmanship concerns the care for human beings.

IV.IV

It has been argued before that the soul is self-motion whose prime mover is love. It oscillates between justice and injustice. Justice has only one form whilst injustice is pluralistic. Hence, the soul moves between the one and the many.⁸⁷ A complete man can be either a perfect or an imperfect man. Actually, he must be either perfect or imperfect. If he is not one, then he must be the other. Therefore, a man is 'the one and the many', since the one and the many or justice and injustice are already his potential. If the one exists, then the many must also exist. That is why in the discussion on the one in the *Parmenides*, the conclusion has been drawn from the lengthy discussion that 'the one and the others in relation to themselves and to each other all in every way are and are not and appear and do not appear'.⁸⁸ If the one is being, then, the many is also being. If the one is not-being, then, the many also is not-being.⁸⁹ This is also the reason why the argument--that things which 'are not' exist and has to be counted as one class among the many classes

⁸⁶ Plato, *Republic*, (Book VIII 546c).

⁸⁷ The good is *metron*. See the *Philebus*, 64e-65a.

⁸⁸ Plato, *Parmenides*, (166c).

⁸⁹ Compare this to the *Statesman*, 284-285c.

of being--has been put forward in the *Sophist*.⁹⁰

The attempt to separate everything from everything else is not only not in good taste but also shows that a man is utterly uncultivated and unphilosophical. Man is neither being nor not-being. He is the one and the many at the same time. Also, he is 'being and not-being' at once. He is *metaxy*. The man who has ascended the cave to see the sun itself returns to the cave after all. It is inevitable, because he is human not divine. Human is neither bestial nor divine; that is why Socrates posed the question to Menexenus:

'Tell me, I beg of you, if evil is abolished, will it be impossible any longer to feel hunger or thirst or other such conditions? Or will hunger exist, so long as men and animals exist, but without being hurtful? Thirst, too, and all other desires--will these exist without being bad, because the bad will have been abolished? Or is this a ridiculous question--as to what will exist or not exist in such a case? For who can tell'.⁹¹

Man feels hunger as a hurt, and is also benefited by it.⁹² Theodorus said to Socrates that if Socrates could persuade all men of the truth of what Socrates said as he did to him, 'there would be more peace and fewer evils

⁹⁰ Plato, *Sophist*, (258b-e). In his study of the problem of the linguistic inconsistency with regard to the one and the many in the *Sophist*, Francis Jefferey Pelletier concludes 'this is not paradoxical--there is no Russell-like contradiction here,..(i)n either case, we can see why Plato is truly said to have "shown that not-Being is, in the same sense that Being is," and therefore to have disposed of Parmenides' Problem'. See Francis Jefferey Pelletier, *Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not-Being*, Chicago, 1990, p. 148.

⁹¹ Plato, *Lysis*, (220e-221b).

⁹² Plato, *Lysis*, (221a).

among mankind'. To this, Socrates answers

'it is impossible that evils should be done away with, for there must always be something opposed to the good; and they cannot have their place among the gods, but must inevitably hover about mortal nature and this earth'.⁹³

In the *Statesman*, man and beasts are divided by a geometrical method, that is, the diameter of the square of the side of the square root of two feet, which is the square root of four feet. Man and beasts are just 'a square root' away. In employing a geometrical method to divide man and beasts, it turns out that man is and is not separated from animals. Man can become beasts in many forms. A symbolic imagery of such a soul is portrayed in the image of

'one of those natures that the ancient fables tell of, as that of the Chimera or Scylla or Cerberus, and the numerous other examples that are told of many forms grown together in one'.⁹⁴

The picture of the dark side of man is made comprehensible when one 'moulds a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beast that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths'.⁹⁵ The whole man is conceivable when one puts an image of a lion and an image of a man together with the image of the wild beasts just mentioned. The lion represents spiritedness while the beasts represent unlimited forms of desires. The largest is the beasts, next to this is the lion, and the smallest in size is the rational which is represented by the image

⁹³ Plato, *Theaetetus*, (176a).

⁹⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book IX 588c).

⁹⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book IX 588c).

of a man. These images are united into a single image of a human being. Therefore, 'to anyone who is unable to look within but who can see only the external sheath it appears to be one living creature, the man'.⁹⁶

In conclusion, the nature of man is *metaxy*.⁹⁷ The tripartite soul has love as its prime force to move or oscillate itself between justice and injustice. In the *Cratylus*, Hesiod's myth of the races has been appropriated to render the fact that man differs from animals with regard to its potential of 'looking up at', *anathrei*. Man looks up at the good which is divine. Socrates told his interlocutors that the name of Uranus who is the father of Cronos can be originally referred to 'looking up at the things above'.⁹⁸ Man possesses this divine element when he looks up at things. When he sees things, he sees them more than animals do. He searches for something more than just what animals see. In his looking up at things, he wonders and searches for the truth and the good. Values and meanings have been given to things man has seen. They are variable and changeable, but one thing which is quite important is there is always a space or a lag between what he thinks about the objects and the objects themselves. This can lead one to the point that theory and practice cannot be united in reality. In a sense, utopianism is inherently in human nature. It makes man 'look up at things'. However, utopianism can be either just or unjust, since utopianism originates from love: it is the love or desire for the good.

⁹⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book IX 588d-e).

⁹⁷ Consider Plato's only view on man in the *Epistle VI*, 323b: '..and though man has his good qualities, he is, with rare exceptions and in the greater part of his actions, quite changeable..for nothing human is altogether stable'. See also the *Phaedo*, 90a.

⁹⁸ Plato, *Cratylus*, (396c).

In the *Statesman*, man is said to be not completely separated from animals. Man is neither divine nor an animal. Man is man. To be a perfect man is to know oneself as a man neither divine nor an animal. The self-knowledge of human nature of *metaxy* guides one to love neither what is nor what is not. Diotima taught Socrates that a true love is the love of *metaxy*, and any love or desire which is neither good nor bad will exist even if the bad things no longer exist.⁹⁹

⁹⁹ Plato, *Lysis*, (221b)

CHAPTER TEN

Self-Knowledge and the Politics of the Soul

Socrates: 'And in the matter of honours and office too this will be his guiding principle: He will gladly take part in and enjoy those which he thinks will make him a better man, but in public and private life he will shun those that may overthrow the established habit of his soul.'

Glaucon: 'Then, if that is his chief concern, he will not willingly take part in politics.'

Socrates: 'Yes, by the dog, in his own city he certainly will, yet perhaps not in the city of his birth, except in some providential conjuncture.' *the Republic*, (Book IX 592a).

The mission of Socrates is political. Socrates stated in the *Gorgias* that he is 'one of the few in Athens who attempts the true art of statesmanship, and the only man of the present time who manages affairs of state'.¹ The purpose of his mission seriously concerns 'the care of soul'. To care for one's soul is to know oneself. The search for self-knowledge is the essence of Socrates' mission. Socrates regarded this as the art of the statesman. It is indisputable that the statesman's chief concern is man. A true statesman is required to understand the nature of man.² The understanding of human nature is indispensable to statesmanship. The statesman is generally understood to be more involved with politics than with any other profession, and the art of politics must be the art of statesmanship. Also, the statesman must be a law-giver. In the search for the best laws for the city in the *Laws*, it is argued that it is important to discover the nature

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, (521d).

² That is why, in the *Statesman*, a seemingly unnecessary discussion of what is the statesman's chief concern is necessary though the answer itself is quite simple. At first, the Eleatic Stranger does not allow the young Socrates to answer right away that man is the greatest concern of the statesman until a dialectic division and a geometric riddle have been completely brought into the investigation. Since the discussion in the *Statesman* itself attempts in practice to guide the reader to the understanding of the nature of man.

and condition of men's souls since it is 'one of the things most useful to that art whose task it is to treat them'.³ That art is the art of politics.⁴

For Socrates, the art of politics is the art 'which has to do with soul'.⁵ From this, it seems that Socrates should have regarded himself as a statesman. His political mission and his idea of a statesman and politics seem quite peculiar. It is generally understood that he never undertook to become involved in Athenian politics.⁶ Of course, compared to the conventional politics of Athens, Socrates' politics seems to be quite unconventional.⁷ In truth, Socratic politics seems paradoxical and ambiguous. So this chapter will concern the elaboration of such politics. It will cast light upon the interrelationship between the Socratic concept of man and politics.

From the previous chapter, the essence of man is shown to lie in his tripartite soul whose love or eros of the immortality of the good is the prime force of human life. With regard to the tripartite soul, there are three kinds of love, namely, the love of wisdom, the love of honour, and the love of pleasures. The rational part of the soul which possesses the love of wisdom is identified with 'human' whilst the other two are metaphorised as bestial, that is, the lion and the many-headed monsters. However, a complete man is a mixture of all these elements. Only a man whose rational part dominates the others is just. Therefore, there exists only one form of just man, but the forms of the unjust are many. However, it can be said that

³ Plato, *Laws*, (650b).

⁴ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 650b).

⁵ Plato, *Gorgias*, (464b).

⁶ Plato, *Apology*, (31d).

⁷ See Carter, *The Quiet Athenians*, op. cit.

in general there are two forms of life, namely the just and the unjust. Love can be considered with regard to these two forms of life. The predominance of the love of honour or the love of pleasures generates injustice in anyone who possesses either kind of soul. So it can be re-concluded that with regard to these two general forms of human life there are two kinds of love, that is, the love of justice and the love of injustice; but it is said that the love of justice cannot be secured without the knowledge of the idea of the good. Lacking understanding of the idea of the good, the just soul inevitably transforms itself into various kinds of injustice as they have been portrayed in the four main forms of governance, that is, timarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny.

With regard to its nature, the soul is self-motion. It is neither in harmony nor in discord. Although an internal war or self-conflict seems to exist in the human soul, however, rhythm and order as a divine gift from Apollo and the self-motion help relieve suffering and disharmony in the soul. However, it oscillates between harmony and discord, the just and the unjust lives.

With regard to its love of the immortality of the good, each life of the soul, just or unjust, has its own appreciation of and attachment to the values of what it regards as the good. To be sure, different characters of man in relation to its particular ruling part of the soul have different interpretations of the truth and the good. The simile of the Cave is an example of human nature in relation to epistemological difference. Justice in the soul cannot be secured until the love of wisdom as its ruling part arrives at the understanding of the idea of the good. Only such a soul which is able to see itself as the true cause of being is good and just. The eye of the just or the unjust soul alone cannot see the truth. Only this emerging third eye which sees within and without itself

through its nature of justice and injustice can achieve self-knowledge.

The self-knowledge of the soul or the nature of the soul can be understood as *metaxy*. The soul now understands its nature of self-motion which oscillates between one and the other. Simultaneously, it realises the cause of justice and injustice, harmony and discord. With the third eye established in the soul, the soul can realise that it is stationary and moving at the same time. This point has been made before in the *Republic*⁸, and pleasure and pain originate with this motion of the soul.⁹ The self-knowledge of the soul as *metaxy* generates a neither/nor position which never inclines 'the perpendicular to right or left or forward or back' as in the middle position is achievable through 'know thyself'; and 'justice' originates from the understanding of the nature of the soul.

At this point, Socrates' explanation of the term justice under his irony of divine inspiration in the *Cratylus* comes to light. There are three reasons which he believes to be the origin of the term justice. First, it is the motion of some element which passes through all the universe and by means of which all created things are generated. This element is said to be very rapid and subtle. Secondly, justice is said to be the sun because the sun alone superintends and passes through all things. This version of justice is modified so that actually it is

⁸ The argument at 436c-437a is intended to prove the plurality of the soul. It shows that it is not possible for the same thing at the same time in the same respect to be at rest and in motion. From this, it is inferred that the soul is tripartite. However, with regard to the soul as a whole not its composite parts, the example of a man whose top appears stationary whilst his body revolves indicates the simultaneous rest and motion of the soul.

⁹ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book IX 583d-584c).

not the sun but its heat which permeates all things. The last reason is Anaxagorean who argued that justice is the mind, *nous*, for the mind is ruled by itself, is mixed with nothing and orders all things and passes through them.¹⁰ These three versions of justice complement one another if they are compared with the earlier discussion of the nature of the soul. With regard to the self-motion, the cause of being, the simile of the sun, and the Anaxagorean self-ruling mind, the element in question is the Socratic soul. 'Justice' emerges in accordance with the understanding of the nature of the soul.

How is Socrates' idea of man related to his politics? Also, in what way is the Socratic mission political?

I

The interrelationship between man and politics can be understood in the light of the analogy of the city and the soul. In the previous chapter, it has been argued that Socrates analyzed the nature of the soul in the image of the city. The city has been metaphorically understood to represent the soul. However, in Socrates' speech in the spirit of the Muses, it is undeniable that there exists some element of a difference between the city and the individual. As argued before, in the spirit of the Muses Socrates' speech can be interpreted both literally and symbolically. Literally, it is quite obvious that the speech portrayed the interrelationship between the city and the soul. The city and the soul are inseparable in the same way that the study of the different characters of man is indispensable to the study of the different polities of the city. The study of the character of man has to be

¹⁰ Plato, *Cratylus*, (412d-413d).

interpreted against its context, namely, its relation to its city. The city here embraces all social and civil units and organisations from family to government. This is confirmed by Socrates' speech on the origin of the city. It is indisputable that a human life never emerges and lives by itself with no contact with other human lives. Even a test-tube baby in one way or another has to be raised by human beings.

Hence the inseparability of the individual and the city necessarily blurs a demarcation line between nature and nurture. It is evident that an early nurture of a person cannot be regarded to be less influential than his nature. To be sure, the degree of influence of the city which is to be regarded as the nurture of individuals, is not restricted to the stage of childhood of a person although the early influence would leave a much more deeper imprint on a young soul. With regard to this point, G.K. Browning rightly states that

'man cannot and should not be seen outside this context, an individual's values and aspirations are shaped comprehensively by the political community he inhabits, (t)he "natural" habitat for Plato's "democratic" is the democratic state'.¹¹

Generally, it is logical to say that democracy nurtures democratic character. However, the 'first democratic man' did not originate from democratic polity. He originated from oligarchy. Moreover, democracy is potentially a birthplace of tyrannous man. Actually, this point will be discussed later.

Although such a context is unquestionably

¹¹ G.K. Browning, 'Plato and Hegel: Reason, Redemption and Political Theory', *History of Political Thought*, Vol. VIII No. 3 Winter 1987, p. 389.

indispensable with regard to the study of man, however, the interrelationship of the city and man must always be interpreted with regard to human nature. That is to say, one needs to consider how the city affects or nurtures the tripartite soul of its citizens. Before proceeding with the study of the influence of the city over man, it is necessary to clarify the nature of the city.

II

In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates gives the example of nine occupations of people with regard to the extent of their partaking of divine nature. However, it would be ridiculous to state that he believed there existed no more than these occupations in the city. For instance, he did not mention a physician.¹² However, all kinds of occupation and people can be re-grouped according to the nature of their souls. They can be divided into three general classes in accordance with the tripartite soul.

What can be regarded as a city must consist of these three classes in the same way that a complete man must have a tripartite soul. The three classes reflect three essential elements of the soul. On the other hand, the tripartite soul entails the existence of the three classes. If the three classes are essential elements of the city, then, it can be inferred that human nature or the nature of the tripartite soul entails the existence and nature of the city. Lacking one of the three, it is no longer a city, or

¹² It is possible that these nine occupations might be easily recognised in Athenian society. Usually, an occupation of a person reflects his interest or what he regards as his chief concern. A man's chief concern should be what he loves or desires. This argument is valid on the condition that a man is free to choose any occupation he wants.

a community of human beings. A community with desires only is nothing but a 'community of pigs' as Glaucon remarked after Socrates' unfinished account of the ideal city which had then arrived at just one class in the city.¹³ Each class represents the kind of individuals whose ruling parts in their souls are similar. Philosophers are said to be those whose souls are dominated by the love of wisdom. Guardians are the class of the lovers of honour. The other class is ruled by the love of pleasures, or necessary and unnecessary desires.

Indeed, the discussion of the nature of the city is just a reverse study of the city in the image of the soul. Also, the forms of political constitution can be understood with regard to the characters of man. As Socrates said to Glaucon before he proceeded to give the speech on the imperfect polities:

'Are you aware, then, that there must be as many types of characters among men as there are forms of government? Or do you suppose that constitutions spring from the proverbial oak or rock and not from the character of the citizens, which, as it were, by their momentum and weight in the scales draw other things after them'.¹⁴

Thus, like the characters of the soul, the ideal or the just city is one whilst its unjust forms are many. The ideal city corresponds to the just man. The just man's soul is ruled by its rational part. When the rational part rules, it means that wisdom and power are united. The just man is a philosopher-king for himself for this reason, and the ideal city is ruled by one or a class of such philosopher-rulers. The city is much the same as the soul regarding to its power of self-motion. To render the

¹³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book II 372d).

¹⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 544d-e).

example of the forms of government of the city in speech, the four main types of government are taken into account. In speech, each form of the inferior types of government is rather static and vivid and therefore easily grasped, although in reality the city is as dynamic as the soul. When it is in motion from one form to another, its shape, form, boundary and texture in reality is not as distinct and contrasting as when it is at rest in speech. With regard to this point, Averroes' comments are perceptive as he clarifies the transformation of polity:

'He¹⁵ makes known which governance is most opposite (to the virtuous governance; and makes known [which may be set down as being between these two governances--i.e., the virtuous [and that] which is most opposite) to it--being of the rank of intermediaries between the extreme; and how these intermediaries are arranged with respect to the extremes, as is the case with the other opposites that have more than one intermediary between them and still are distinct. An example of this is the colour white. Black is its opposite. Between the one and the other there are intermediaries; these, however, are arranged--i.e., some are (closer) to white and some are closer to black. It is evident that if this is also the case with governance, the transformation of the two extremes that are as opposite to each other as can be will consist in their first turning into the intermediaries, and at that also according to the arrangement of the intermediaries. That is, they first turn into the closest of the intermediaries, then, into that follows it, (until) it turns into the extreme that is most opposite (to it)'.¹⁶

¹⁵ Averroes is referring to Plato.

¹⁶ Averroes, *On Plato's Republic*, trans. with an introduction and notes by Ralph Lerner, Ithaca and London, 1974, 'The Third Treatise: 79.25-80.10. This passage matches Averroes' general metaphysical theory of the cyclic and recurrent nature of the universal itself.

In this respect, in reality, the number of the imperfect forms of the city as well as the number of the characters of man are various and many more than the given four examples. Between aristocracy and tyranny, there must exist the intermediaries between the intermediaries of each one. In this regard, Averroes' example of colour is very appropriate, as, of all the colours, there are three primary ones which all the other colours evolve around. Indeed, the tripartite soul and its various forms can be understood with regard to the nature of the three primary colours and their generation of the others by means of their interaction.

Suppose the colour of timarchy is green. Its shades are, for example, emerald green and olive green. In its self-motion, it can shade into the intermediary between itself and its becoming colour which at this stage it is hard to distinguish one from the other. That is why timarchy can be regarded as a base of oligarchy, oligarchy a base of democracy, and democracy a base of tyranny, and vice versa. Also, seen from this point of view with regard to the shade of colour, despite many different aspects between British and American democracies, they nevertheless are in the same shade of colour. The polity transforms into timarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny when its political power has been respectively taken over by those lovers of honour, lovers of gain, lovers of freedom, and lovers of extremity.

Whenever the city neglects or devalues its philosopher, there arise restlessly internal wars from which its polity inevitably declines. However, as argued above, a city as well as a complete man must consist of three elements. Although the philosopher or the rational part might be devalued or suppressed, however, it still exists in the city and the soul. If the suppression of philosophy, which is the activity of the philosopher, were

to continue unabated, in other words, if the other classes were predominant in the city, then, the pattern of the decline of the city from timarchy through oligarchy, democracy to tyranny would be inevitable. Lacking philosophy, the city is dated with endless internal wars. The other two classes would never have real friendship with each other. Moreover, one class not only fights with another but also fights within itself. Not until philosophic intelligence is united with political power, 'there can be no cessation of troubles for our states, nor for the human race either'.

III

The city has various forms of polity. They are either just or unjust. A contemporary polity of a city can be regarded as democracy, timarchy, oligarchy, or tyranny. On a popular level, a political constitution of a city is judged from 'Who Gets, What, When, and How'.¹⁷ The criterion is drawn from the measure of the major control and the assumption of such power, but with regard to the essential composite elements, the city nevertheless possesses the elements of democracy, oligarchy, timarchy, tyranny, and even aristocracy. Since the city is composed of citizens of various characters, namely, timocrats, oligarchs, democrats, tyrants, and aristocrats, when any of these characters takes control of the city, of course it is easier to notice such a dominant one, while the others are unclear. In American democracy, there nevertheless are some communists in the same way that some democrats exist in the Republic of China.

¹⁷ This is Lasswell's popular definition of politics. See Harold D. Lesswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How*, New York, 1936.

In the unjust soul or polity, it is more often than not that the rational part or philosophers are hardly noticeable. That is why Socrates needs to seek justice in man by having recourse to its larger counterpart in the image of the city. In the image of the city, it is clear that three classes exist in the city in much the same way as the soul is tripartite. Furthermore, with regard to the nature of dynamism of the city, it can be inferred further that the city is in potentiality of becoming any one of the polities with regard to its three classes of citizens. At this point, some might pose a teleological question of the origin and destiny of the city. The answer is that the study of the nature of the city should not be viewed either from its static or dynamic position, since the truth of it cannot be said to be either one or the other. The point of departure is in the middle, the in-between position. The study of the origin of government should start at the point that the position of the city is *metaxy*. It is moving towards either goodness or badness. To try to assume a spatio-temporal polity of the city in a certain point of time and space as its reality is to mistake a particular for its whole, although the study of the particular is a starting point for the whole; this point is evident in the Athenian Stranger's speech. He states to Clinias and Megillus that

'Now, what are we to say about the origin of government? Would not the best and easiest way of discerning it be from this standpoint?...That from which one should always observe the progress of States as they move towards either goodness, *arete*, or badness, *kakia*....The observation, as I suppose, of an infinitely long period of time and of the variations therein occurring....Tell me now: do you think you could ever ascertain the space of time that has passed since cities came into existence and men lived under civic rule?...During this time, have not thousands upon thousands of States come into existence, and, on a similar

computation, just as many perished?
 And have they not changed at one time
 from small to great, at another from
 great to small, and changed also from
 good to bad and from bad to good?¹⁸

With regard to this point, Eric Voegelin has argued for what he calls the Platonic *metaxu*. It is 'neither the temporal dimension' nor 'the dimension of an eternity' in which the story of the quest originates and moves. It begins 'somewhere in the in-between of the two...the dimension symbolised by Plato as the *metaxy*'.¹⁹

IV

The city consists of individuals. Each individual possesses a tripartite soul. The character of a man can be understood with regard to the ruling part in his soul. The number of the character of man corresponds to the number of elements in his soul. Generally speaking, there are five characters of man. Aristocratic and timocratic types correspond respectively to the governance of the love of wisdom and the love of honour in the soul. Oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannous characters result from the predominance of the love of pleasures which consists of necessary and unnecessary desires. To be sure, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny are the main characters among the countless ones of the soul of predominating desires which departs from oligarchy via democracy and terminates at tyranny. Then, to be more precise, the city consisted of men of these different characters, but no matter how many

¹⁸ Plato, *Laws*, (Book III 676a-c).

¹⁹ See his thesis of the Platonic *metaxy* in Eric Voegelin, *Order and History*, Volume Five, *In Search of Order*, Baton Rouge and London, 1987, '6. The Story Begins in the Middle: The Platonic Metaxy', pp. 27-28.

characters appear to exist in a city, however, they can be put into three main types of the characters of the soul from which they originate. It is for this reason that the nature of the city is said to consist of three classes of men in the same way that a human soul is tripartite. Also, with regard to the stipulation that human nature in respect to its self-moving, tripartite soul is *metaxy*, it is pointless to attempt to look for a state of nature of man or the city other than to look at man and the city, as argued above, from the position of *metaxy*.

The nature of man determines the nature of the city. The tripartite soul entails three classes of men in the city, but men also have characters. When the love of wisdom takes control over the others in the soul, it generates an aristocratic character. When aristocratic individuals take control of the city, the polity of the city is aristocracy. This is also applicable to other characters in relation to their corresponding polities. It is in this sense that the characters of men generate the polities of the city; but where do the different characters of men that effect the polities of the city originate from?

In explaining the cause of influence over a particular type of man, Socrates stated that:

'We know it to be universally true of every seed and growth, whether vegetable or animal, that the more vigorous it is the more it falls short of its proper perfection when deprived of the food, the season, the place that suits it...So it is, I take it, natural that the best nature should fare worse than the inferior under conditions of nurture unsuited to it...Then, Adeimantus, shall we not similarly affirm that the best endowed souls become worse than the others under a bad education? Or do you suppose that great crimes and unmixed wickedness spring from a slight nature and not from a vigorous one corrupted by its

nature, while a weak nature will never be the cause of anything great, either for good or evil?'²⁰

It is evident from the above passage that two factors are conducive to the formation of certain characters. One is the nature of individuals. The other is the nurture or education. Although it is understood that the concept of man or human nature is universal, however, man is different from one another with regard to individual 'vigorousness'. In this respect, men differ from each other not in kind but in degree. That is why two men in the same environment can be quite different from each other. At this point, Cephalus' reference to Themistocles' argument comes to light, namely that 'neither would Themistocles himself ever have made a name if he had been born in Seriphus nor the Seriphian if he had been an Athenian'.²¹

With regard to the definition of education, what Socrates referred to could not be confined to what is generally called 'formal education'. What can be regarded as formal education in the time of Socrates and Plato is the teaching of the sophists; but, according to Socrates, not even the sophists' teachings could have so much influence upon the formation of men's characters. As Socrates pointed out to Adeimantus:

'Or are you too one of the multitude who believe that there are young men who are corrupted by the sophists, and that there are sophists in private life who corrupt to any extent worth mentioning, and that it is not rather the very men who talk in this strain who are the chief sophists and educate most effectively and mould to their own heart's desire young and old, men and

²⁰ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 491d-e).

²¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 329e-330a).

women?²²

However, their teachings are only a part of such education. Here, the education which has a greater effect upon men originates from the public. It cannot be any particular individual sophists who are responsible for the corruption of the young. Socrates defended himself in the *Apology*, saying that it was impossible for him to corrupt the young as regards the charge pressed on him. In truth, it is the Athenian public as a whole which has to take the responsibility. The influence of the public is everywhere. The power of the public can be noticed in many events. The exertion of the power of the public over an individual has been elaborated by Socrates:

'when the multitude are seated together in assemblies or in court-rooms or theatres or camps or any other public gatherings of a crowd, and with loud uproar censure some of the things that are said and done and approve others, both in excess, with full-throated clamour and clapping of hands, and thereto the rocks and the region round about re-echoing redouble the din of the censure and the praise. In such case how do you think the young man's heart, as the saying is, is moved within him? What private teaching do you think will hold out and not rather be swept away by the torrent of censure and applause, and borne off on its current, so that he will affirm the same thing that they do to be honourable and base, and will do as they do, and be even such as they?'²³

Socrates ascribes importance to the public or the

²² Plato, the *Republic*, (Book VI 492a-b).

²³ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book VI 492b-d). Cf. *Alcibiades I*, (135e): Socrates: 'I should like to think you will continue to do so; yet I am apprehensive, not from any distrust of your nature, but in view of the might of the state, lest it overcome both me and you'.

many, *polloi*, with regard to the formation of the characters of the young more than the sophists. He even regards the public as 'the educators', *paideutai*.²⁴ He stated that the public as the educators 'impose by action when their words fail to convince'.²⁵ It can be said from the above that the public is powerful and influential with regard to its relationship with individuals. Individuals can be swayed by public influence. However, with regard to this relationship, one has to consider not only the public by which power has been exerted, but also the individuals whom such power influences. That is to say, one has to understand the individuals as the subject of power. Meanwhile, with regard to 'who plays the power, it is not possible to identify "who" the public is and "who" is responsible for the exertion of the power. The public qua public is the subject who exerts such power and influence. With regard to its 'invisible subject', such public power can be deemed as 'power with no subject'. It must be in this respect that Socrates regarded this kind of power to be more significant and influential than that of the individuals such as the sophists, since it is easier to detect and counter-balance the power with a subject which is more tangible than the power of an unidentifiable

²⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 492d).

²⁵ Plato, *the Republic*, *ibid*. Plato's awareness of the influence of the public over human personality does not differ from 'socialisation' in modern sociological term. With regard to this point, Lord Annan in his intellectual history of post-war Britain points to the significance of the social institutions with regard to the formation of generations of 'the Establishment'. He said that the Establishment, as Alan Taylor called, is 'the network of people and institutions with power and influence who rule the country' and 'every activity breeds its own Establishment, the Jockey Club, the benchers of the Inns of Court, the General Council of the TUC'. Noel Annan, *Our Age: The Generation that Made Post-war Britain*, London, 1990, p. 14.

subject.²⁶

V

First of all, it might be silly to state that rock and sand can never be under such influence of the public in the same way that individuals can. Hence, the matter in concern lies in human nature that engenders the possibility of such a power relationship. In Book Two of the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger discussed the education with respect to law-giving. He stated that children first learn to differentiate between good and bad through pleasure and pain since 'in children the first childish sensations are pleasure and pain'.²⁷ For this reason, children experience pleasure, love, pain, and hatred although they are not yet able to understand or 'grasp a rational account' of their experiences. After having been rightly trained with reference to what pleasures and pains they should love or hate, and after being able to grasp the rational account, these children can be said to have been educated. But the right discipline in pleasure and pain is said to wear off in the course of human life.

At this point, the Athenian Stranger said that the gods in pity for the human race thus born to misery granted them

'as companions in their feasts the Muses and Apollo the master of music, and Dionysus, that they may at least set right again their modes of

²⁶ Cf. Michel Foucault, 'Two Lectures', in *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and other writings 1972-1977*, edited by Colin Gordon, translated by Colin Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham, Kate Soper, London, 1980.

²⁷ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 653a).

discipline by associating in their feasts with gods'.²⁸

In fact, such a divine gift is 'the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony' which man perceives in his action and movement. It has been said to be endowed to the nature of human beings not any other animals.²⁹ It is the nature of every young creature to be incapable of 'keeping either its body or its tongue quiet' but to be 'always striving to move and to cry, leaping and skipping and delighting in dances and games, and uttering, also, noises of every description'.³⁰ Then, it is said that the divine gift in accordance with our nature

'cause us to move and lead our choirs, *chorous*, linking us one with another by means of songs and dances; and to the choir they have given its name from the "cheer" *charas*, implanted therein'.³¹

At this point, it is necessary to understand the meanings of Apollo, Dionysus, Muses, and Choir with regard to rhythm and harmony in the context of the public power as the educators and education.

Apollo together with the Muses have been understood as the god and deity of music.³² Music is said to comprise both song and dance which deal with postures and tunes.³³ As Apollo and the Muses are the leaders of music, its postures and tunes deal with rhythm and harmony. Since,

²⁸ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 653d).

²⁹ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 653e, 664e-665a).

³⁰ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 653d, 672c, 673c, 642a).

³¹ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 653e-654a).

³² Plato, *Cratylus*, (405a, 406a).

³³ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 655a).

with regard to the name of Apollo in the discussion of the etymology of names in the *Cratylus*, Socrates stated that

'his name and nature are in harmony,..he is a musical god...with reference to music we have to understand that *alpha* often signifies "together," and here it denotes moving together in the heavens about the poles, as we call them, and harmony in song, which is called concord;..this god directs the harmony, making them all move together, among both gods and men'.³⁴

In music of ancient Greece or in a play of modern time, postures are concerned with gestures while tunes are concerned with diction.³⁵ In other words, it concerns words and deeds, *logos* and *ergon*. With regard to human perception, 'postures and tunes' are the only means through which man expresses and communicates with one another. Led by the Apollonian guidance, man prefers order to disorder in his movement, that is to say, man naturally seeks rhythm and harmony in his verbal and physical movement. It is also said that rhythm and harmony in movement renders him 'pleasurable perception'. Here, a question arises, 'from what is this pleasure originated?' It requires one to consider the meaning of choirs or chorus as it has been said that in rhythm and harmony, Apollo and the Muses would cause man to move and lead his choirs. As choirs or chorus means 'bands of dancers and singers'.

With regard to this context, rhythm and harmony must be understood in terms of grouping. In a musical or dancing performance, it is delightful and enjoyable for the audience to see the dancers or the singers synchronize

³⁴ Plato, *Cratylus*, (405c-e).

³⁵ Plato, *Laws*, I, translation and with notes by R.G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, 1984, p. 96ff.

their movements. To be sure, whatever the performers do to attract the audience, they must do it in one way or another rhythmically and harmonically, since rhythm and harmony render a kind of pleasure. It is the pleasure which arises in those who are the spectators of such rhythmic and harmonious performances. On the other hand, the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony also emerges in those who themselves create rhythmic and harmonious performances. In this regard, both the spectators and the performers enjoy the pleasure of rhythm and harmony. At this point, there emerges another kind of pleasure of rhythm and harmony which derives from the concord of both sides, the performers and the spectators. They together enjoy the pleasure which they partake in its generation. It is the emerging rhythm and harmony among the band of the performers and the spectators from which the pleasure emanates. It is for this reason that the value of music, as the Athenian Stranger indicated, is understood by most people to consist of 'its power of affording pleasure to the soul'.³⁶

Nevertheless, it is more often than not that despite its rhythmic and harmonious quality a performance fails to please the audience. A discord then arises in such a situation. Generally, the audience would regard any performance which fails to please them as a 'a bad performance', and any which pleases them as a 'good performance'. To be sure, such value judgments depend on both the nature of the performance and the nature of the audience. A performance can be either 'good' or 'bad'. This entails that music which possesses the quality of rhythm and harmony can be judged as either good or bad. Also, there might possibly be a case that not all the audience totally agree about the same performance. However, the majority of the audience is regarded as the

³⁶ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 655c).

real voice of the audience. As argued earlier, one could not identify who the audience is. In the meantime, a group of performers is easily identifiable in the same way that individuals are the subject of the power of the public. It is said that Apollo and the Muses are given to be 'our fellows' in the dance. Then, it can be said that this pleasurable perception in fact is inherent in human nature. With regard to this perception, it renders men 'periods of respite from their troubles' as they can enjoy themselves in rhythm and harmony or in their choirs.³⁷ This can be the reason why the Athenian Stranger suggested that the term choir, *chorous*, possibly derived from cheer of joy, *chara*; and, in the *Cratylus*, Socrates stated that '*chara* (joy) seems to have its name from the plenteous diffusion of the flow of the soul'.³⁸

Dionysus is the god of wine and orgia who presides over the celebration with wild dancing, drinking and partying.³⁹ In Book One of the *Laws*, the Athenian Stranger has made his point that the drinking party, *symphosia*, can be regarded as an educational institution in the same way that Clinias and Megillus, the Cretan and the Spartan, regarded common meals as part of military training in their countries, that is, a social institution can render either harm or benefit to people who participate in it. With regard to any kind of activity, the Athenian Stranger asserts:

'In my opinion all those who take up an institution for discussion and propose, at its first mention, to censure it or commend it, are proceeding in quite the wrong way. Their action is like that of a man who, when he hears somebody

³⁷ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 653d).

³⁸ Plato, *Cratylus*, (419c).

³⁹ *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, N.G.L. Hammond and H.H. Scullard (ed.), Oxford, second edition, 1989, p. 352.

praising cheese as a good food, at once starts to disparage it, without having learnt either its effects or its mode of administration---in what form it should be administered and by whom and with what accompaniments, and in what condition and to people in what condition'.⁴⁰

Thus, good or bad results depend on how a social activity is conducted.⁴¹ Likewise, the drinking party which is one of such social institutions can be either beneficial or harmful. Whatever results it renders, the drinking party can be regarded as having influence over anyone who joins it. Drunkenness originates from drinking; also, it is a matter of fact that drunkenness 'intensifies pleasures and pains and passions and lusts'.⁴² He who drinks becomes

'more jovial than he was before, and the more he imbibes it, the more he becomes filled with high hopes and a sense of power, till finally, puffed up with conceit, he abounds in every kind of license of speech and action and every kind of audacity; without a scruple as to what he says or what he does'.⁴³

The drunkard 'is uplifted above his normal self' and listens to no one since he now regards himself as 'competent to rule both himself and every one else'.⁴⁴ The drunkard is audacious because his soul is oblivious to itself. In truth, he has 'little control of himself'.⁴⁵ The fiercer his appearance is, the softer his soul becomes.

⁴⁰ Plato, *Laws*, (Book I 638c-d, also 640e-641a).

⁴¹ Plato, *Laws*, (Book I 638c-639d).

⁴² Plato, *Laws*, (Book I 645d-e).

⁴³ Plato, *Laws*, (Book I 649b).

⁴⁴ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 671a-b).

⁴⁵ Plato, *Laws*, (Book I 645e).

At this stage, his soul 'become softer and more ductile, even as iron when it has been forged in the fire'.⁴⁶ As a consequence, the person arrives 'at the same condition of soul as when he was a young child'.⁴⁷ 'It appears, then, that not only the greybeard may be in his "second childhood," but the drunkard as well'.⁴⁸ Drunkenness renders pleasure to the soul as well as softness. In this condition, the person is easily led to sing or dance any kind of music. Since any learning which is accompanied by 'the element of charm' or pleasure is more effective than that which is not. This kind of softer and jovial disposition makes 'the moulding of the soul' possible. It is therefore in this sense that drunkenness is educational. However, a drinking party is indispensable to the educational drunkenness as such. According to the Greeks, drinking is impossible without the giver of wine. 'Dionysus,' said Socrates in the *Cratylus*, 'the giver of wine (*oinos*), might be called in jest Didonysus, and wine, because it makes most drinkers think (*oiesthai*) they have wit (*nous*) when they have not'.⁴⁹ With this regard,

⁴⁶ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 666b-c).

⁴⁷ Plato, *Laws*, (Book I 645e).

⁴⁸ Plato, *Laws*, (Book I 646a).

⁴⁹ Plato, *Cratylus*, (406c). See also Marcel Detienne, *Dionysos at large*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989; Leo Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy?*, op. cit., p. 31: 'Why does the Platonic dialogue about politics and laws begin with such an extensive conversation about wine?...The talk about wine-drinking is a kind of vicarious enjoyment of wine, especially since wine-drinking is a forbidden pleasure. Perhaps the talk reminds the two old interlocutors of secret and pleasurable transgressions of their own. The effect of the talk about wine is therefore similar to the effect of actual wine-drinking; it loosens their tongues; it makes them young; it makes them bold, daring, willing to innovate. They must not actually drink wine, since this would impair their judgment. They must drink wine, not in deed, but in speech.'

Dionysus, the god of wine, is understood to be one of the gods who partakes of the education of human beings.

VI

The power of the public as the educators of individuals has to be understood in the context of the interpretations of Apollo, Dionysus, the Muses, and chorus. The gifts of Apollo, Dionysus, and the Muses are understood to render pleasure to the mortals. Man is endowed with such a nature which enables him to have 'periods of respite from troubles'. To enjoy the pleasure of music, men follow their leading gods. The pleasure can be derived from their partaking in the Apollonian or Dionysian choirs. At this point, Jaeger's account of the emergence of the worships of Apollo and Dionysus in ancient Greece renders a good explanation. He stated that despite the violent contrast of Apollo and Dionysus:

'the Greeks obviously felt that these gods had something in common---which, in the age when we find them jointly revered, was their power to affect the souls of their worshippers...It might almost be said that Apollo's spirit of order, clarity and moderation could not have sunk so deeply into men's hearts if the wild excitement of Dionysus, sweeping away all civic *eukosmia*, had not first broken the ground. The revolution and resettlement gave the Delphic religion such authority that it came to command all the constructive energies of Greece'.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, Volume I, Archaic Greece: The Mind of Athens, trans. from the second German edition Gilbert Highet, New York and Oxford, 1965, p. 167.

Jaeger also argued that the reason that the Greeks joined in the festivals of Apollo and Dionysus lies in the miserable life of man. Since 'the fortune of mortal men is as changeable as the day'.⁵¹ Therefore, for the Greeks, the self-indulgence or self-forgetfulness of Dionysiac intoxication 'which was complementary to the severe restraint of Apollo's creed' was regarded as one of the paths to happiness by escaping from the 'tragic realization into the inner world of their own souls'.⁵² In this respect, Jaeger's interpretation seems to echo what the Athenian Stranger said in the Laws. However, it is not clear yet how the public is related to the education of men with reference to the gods and human nature.

There are two ways of approaching this problem. First, one must consider the popularity and significance of the theatre and poetry which was believed to have originated from the gods. Apollo and Dionysus are regarded as the significant figures with regard to the Greek theatre. It is said that '(t)he dramatic element in the religion of ancient Greece manifested itself most prominently in the connect worship of Apollo, Demeter, and Dionysus'.⁵³ It originated from the fact that '(i)n the earliest times of Greece, it was customary for the whole population of a city to meet on stated occasions and offer up thanksgivings to the gods for any great blessings, by singing hymns, and performing corresponding dances in the public places'.⁵⁴ Later, the function of theatre and

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Opcit.*, p. 168.

⁵³ John William Donaldson, *The Theatre of the Greeks*, A1.5 treatise on the History and Exhibition of the Greek Drama, London, 1860, p. 9. See also Chapter I 'The Religious Origin of the Greek Drama', pp. 3-11, and Chapter II 'The Connected Worship of Dionysus, Demeter, and Apollo', pp. 12-26.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

poetry in ancient Greece developed itself to be part of public education or instruction.⁵⁵ Education or instruction means both to maintain and to change ethos, laws and other social and political values in the city.⁵⁶ As Jaeger explained in his study of the ancient Greek culture the importance and influence of theatre and poetry to the Greeks:

'It worked by suggestion on the audience, to make them feel the passion portrayed on the stage as vividly as if they were their own. This applies even more to the citizens who made up the chorus: by rehearsing for a whole year, they grew into the roles which they were to portray. The chorus was the high school of early Greece,....It was not for nothing that the institution of *chorodidascalia* preserved in its name the word which means "instruction". Since the performances were infrequent and highly ritualized, since the state and the whole population were interested in them, since each band of performers in eager competition with others devoted themselves for a year to practising the new 'chorus' which the poet himself prepared for the great day, and since a number of poets competed every year to win the crown of tragedy, it is no exaggeration to say that the tragic festival was the climax of the city's life'.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Donaldson, *op. cit.*, pp. 27, 28; Havelock, *Preface to Plato*, *op. cit.*; 'The Preliteracy of the Greeks', in *The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences*, New Jersey, 1982, pp. 185-207; Bruno Gentili, *Poetry and Its Public in Ancient Greece: From Homer to the Fifth Century*, trans., with an introduction by A. Thomas Cole, Baltimore and London, 1988, p. 3.

⁵⁶ Cf. North, *Sophrosyne*, *opcit.* According to Kitto, '(t)he technical history of Greek Tragedy is largely an account of the efforts to make the Chorus an integral part of a continually changing system'. See H.D.F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy: A Literate Study*, London and New York, 1981, p. 55.

⁵⁷ Jaeger, *Paideia I*, *opcit.*, p. 248.

In a sense, with regard to this educational role, the influence of the theatre in ancient Greece is comparable to the influence of the mass media such as newspaper, radio, television, cinema in modern times; but modern mass media seem to be less powerful than the ancient theatre⁵⁸, since the plays of the ancient theatre were performed in front of the public and they were regarded as 'the climax of the city's life ' as Jaeger called it. Particularly, the festivals of the Great or City Dionysus were the most important for the Athenians.⁵⁹ During the performance, messages were passed on to the audience. They consisted of

⁵⁸ For example, Leo Aylen expressed that from making two television films of Plato dialogues it helps 'to clarify the difference between the drama of fifth-century Athens and almost all other western dramatic writing, including the later Greek'. Leo Aylen, *The Greek Theater*, London and Toronto, 1985, p. 7. Gentili also stated that 'Greek poetry differed profoundly from modern poetry in content, form, and methods of representation'. Gentili, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

⁵⁹ Pickard-Cambridge explains the importance of the City Dionysia, saying that it 'was derived not only from the performances of dramatic and lyric poetry but from the fact that it was open to the whole Hellenic world and was an effective advertisement of the wealth and power and public spirit of Athens, no less than of the artistic and literary leadership of her sons, (b)y the end of March the winter was over, the seas were navigable, and strangers came to Athens from all parts for business or pleasure,...before the performance of the tragedies began, the orphaned children of those who had fallen in battle for Athens, such as had reached a suitable age, were caused to parade in the theatre in full armour and receive the blessing of the People,..the festival was also made the occasion for the proclamation of honours conferred upon citizens or strangers for conspicuous service to Athens; and it was a natural time for the visits of ambassadors from other states for business requiring publicity, (t)he festival was a time of holiday; prisoners were released on bail to attend the festival and sometimes took the chance of escaping, (t)he Law of Euegoros, quoted by Demosthenes, forbade legal proceedings and distress or taking of security for debt during this and some other festivals; but the date of the law is unknown, and it is possible that in the fifth century the holding of an assembly was not excluded'. See Sir Arthur Picard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals at Athens*, revised by John Gould and D.M. Lewis, second edition, Oxford, 1968, pp. 58-59.

ethos, codes of behaviour, laws, social and political values, and, most of all, the meaning of human excellence. It is true in a sense that the influence should be said to come from the poets who created the plays.⁶⁰ It is also true that the contents of early Greek music and poetry were concerned with serious matters, to do with human life. As already discussed in an earlier chapter, it 'had been concerned for centuries with the dispute about the highest arete and the greatest good in life'.⁶¹

VII

In general, poetry was regarded as the enactment of the ethos of the ancient Greek society which must not be understood to be a literate society until the last third of the fifth century before Christ.⁶² Havelock argued that

⁶⁰ As this argument has been made in Jaeger. Cf. *Euthyphro*, 6b-c. Gentili points out that Jaeger's weak point lay in its overemphasis on the individual aspects of the educational process and in its claim that the Greek educational model might provide an ethical norm for our own time. He also argued that 'a new factor in the relation between poet and public which emerges in lyric, as opposed to epic, has to do with the specific character of the audiences involved, which from time to time must be seen as limited to the members of a given social group or milieu'. See Gentili, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

⁶¹ Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, Vol. III, The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato, trans. from the German by Gilbert Highet, New York and Oxford, 'Plato's Laws' p. 230. See also A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, *op. cit.* For the tragic poets' rendition of the problem of the conflict of human excellences, see Morrall, 'Political Ideas in Greek Tragedy', *op. cit.*; Renford Bambrough, 'Greek Drama', in *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Vol. III, Paul Edwards (ed.), New York and London, 1967, p. 386.

⁶² Havelock, *The Preliteracy of the Greeks*, *op. cit.*, p. 185. Pickard-Cambridge also suggested that in Athens around the fifth and fourth centuries, '(t)here were books, but

the 'words, melody and dance' of the ancient Greek plays were the means through which their cultural tradition was preserved.⁶³ Here, it is quite necessary to take Havelock's thesis into consideration in order to elaborate the power and significance of the public with regard to education. In the context of oral society, theatre and poetry are quite significant with regard to what is called 'the audience situation'. In such a context, to enjoy the pleasure of poetry, individuals cannot divorce themselves from the audience situation which is dependent upon the oral communication and at least the repetition by group of persons.⁶⁴ The performances were occasioned by the festivals in honour of the gods.⁶⁵ With regard to this

probably not more than a tiny fraction of the audience possessed them'. See Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*, op. cit., p. 276.

⁶³ Havelock, 'The Oral Composition of Greek Drama', in *The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences*, op. cit., p. 312. Donaldson stated that the custom of performing song and dance as the worship of the gods which later became the institution of the Greek theatre was first practised in the Doric states. Music and dances in such warring states such as Sparta and Crete were the channel through which not merely the encouragement of a taste for the fine arts but also military discipline and the establishment of a principle of subordination had been preserved. See John William Donaldson, *The Theatre of the Greeks*, op. cit., pp. 27, 28.

⁶⁴ Havelock, *The Preliteracy of the Greeks*, op. cit., p. 203. Havelock said that reading had not yet been taken into *mousike* which was central to the education of the Athenian upper classes in the first half of the fifth century.

⁶⁵ There were two major kinds of festivals in Athens. One is what Pickard-Cambridge calls the Lesser festivals which comprise three festivals, the Anthesteria, the Lenaia, and the Rural Dionysia. The Anthesteria which was the oldest of the festivals of Dionysus at Athens was performed about the end of February. The Lenaia roughly took place in January and the rural Dionysia in December. The other is called the great or City Dionysia which was the last of the Athenian festivals of Dionysus to be instituted. It took place by the end of March. See Arthur Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*, op. cit., pp. 10, 25, 42, 58.

'audience situation', the way the plays do not affect the individuals is not as important as the way the audience affects its members. In this respect, what is more important than the influence of the poets is the reaction of the audience to the performances. Any ideas or messages in the plays would be less effective without the response of the audience. Although an individual can assess the works of the poets, however, the judgement of the public or the audience is more significant in terms of influence and power. Any ideas or messages which annoy the public can be censured, but fame and glory can be awarded to anyone whose works win the majority of the public.

It is quite necessary to reiterate the importance of the dramatic festivals by meticulously presenting a picture of the events. In the festivals, performances each day could go on continuously from dawn until evening. The size of the audience was said to be very large by modern standards for dramatic performances, which was about 14,000-17,000 spectators.⁶⁶ The audience included women and boys.⁶⁷ The spectators were required to purchase tickets.⁶⁸ From this, it can be assumed that the performances were in popular demand and there were immense fees for famous actors and poets. With regard to the atmosphere in the theatres, Pickard-Cambridge explained '(t)here is no reason to doubt....that most of the audience

⁶⁶ Pickard-Cambridge, *The Dramatic Festivals at Athens*, *op. cit.*, p. 263. He argued that the size of the audience would never have been 30,000 spectators as Plato stated in the *Symposium*. He assumed that Plato was influenced by the conventional figure of the population of Athens which was around 30,000 people.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 267, 265. He also suggested that there were also slaves in the audience, but the number should not be very many.

⁶⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 267. It is said that five drachmae is the highest price for a ticket.

took its playgoing seriously'.⁶⁹ If the audience was in a bad mood, they could 'hiss off' an actor and his play after one after the other or even violently eject them from the theatre.⁷⁰ Even physical violence which was legally an offence was possible in the theatre. That is why there had to be special officers who had the uneasy task of controlling the situation.⁷¹

So it can be said that the reaction of the audience may have been wild and hysterical. They could have emotionally responded to individual lines or passages which were mainly prompted by moral reasons. In this respect, it is evident that the audience were quite serious and sensitive with regard to their social-political and moral sentiments.⁷²

The dramatic festivals were spectacular. What appealed to the audience of the Greek theatre was attributable to its form and methods of presentation. Presented in a festive performance, the Greek theatre rendered a possible moment of joy for a congregation to the members of the audience. As argued before, the audience

⁶⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 274.

⁷⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 273, 272. Pickard-Cambridge refers to the passage in Demosthenes that an actor or a poet could be forced to retire. The audience sometimes used dried fruits and confectionary to pelt actors whom they did not like. Their hissing was sometimes accompanied by the noise of heels kicking against the seats.

⁷¹ *Opcit.*, p. 273.

⁷² *Op. cit.*, p. 275. While there is no doubt about the Athenians' seriousness towards the plays, however, the matter of the degree of intelligence of the Athenian audience as a whole is in question. With reference to the contents of the plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Aristophanes, Pickard-Cambridge believes that the Athenian audience 'must have possessed on the whole a degree of both seriousness and intelligence' (p. 277). Gentili argues that particular plays could be presented to specific social groups. See Gentili, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

derived pleasure not only from the rhythm and harmony of the choric performance in the plays but also from the rhythm and harmony which was prompted by their own 'choric' or collective expressions of shared sentiments responding to the performance. Moreover, the Greek drama in its form of *mousike* which combines words, melody, and dance makes its performance so influential and powerful.⁷³

What the poetry without melody and dance cannot do but *mousike* can is arouse *pathos* in the audience.⁷⁴ For the Greeks, different types of music---in melodic sense---were believed to have in themselves the power to influence men's characters and emotions.⁷⁵ As regards dancing, it is said that its place in 'Greek culture and its various manifestations was much more important than it is in modern life'.⁷⁶ The ancient Greek dancing is a 'language to be learned, and in which to communicate'.⁷⁷ The rhythm and harmony of both music and dancing in the plays is evident in its choric performance of the chorus. Then, with regard to its psychological effect on the audience, one has to take into account the importance of the function of chorus as part of the form of presentations.

As stated earlier, the chorus is a band or group of

⁷³ Gentili, *op. cit.*, p 24: 'Mousike was felt to be the most efficacious of all the arts that the educator had at his disposal'.

⁷⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 24-25.

⁷⁵ Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.*, pp. 259, 260: 'For instance, enharmonic melodies (which were normal in tragedy) made men brave'.

⁷⁶ Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

⁷⁷ Aylen, *The Greek Theatre*, *op. cit.*, p. 28. That is why some poets were not only good at composing but also at dancing. Sophocles was an example. Pickard-Cambridge stated that Sophocles was himself 'an accomplished dancer, who "danced with a lyre" round the trophy erected after the battle of Salamis'. Pickard-Cambridge, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

singers and dancers. Its performance with regard to the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony influences the audience in terms of mimetic effects. The Athenian Stranger said that 'whenever the choric performances are congenial to them in point of diction, tune or other features,...then these performers invariably delight in such performances and extol them as excellent'.⁷⁸ This happens to the audience as well. The function of the chorus in its Dorian origin was to establish a principle of subordination in the public. Later on, in the theatre, its function was not far from its original use. The rhythm and harmony in the choric performances presuppose a leader of the chorus. The leader was 'either the musician or some fugleman among the dancers, who set the example to the others', for instance, 'to lead off the lament'.⁷⁹ In this respect, the audience appreciated rhythm and harmony derived from the chorus's corresponding to the leader. Unconsciously, the audience were in turn guided at that moment by the chorus as a whole which assumed a leading role by setting an example to the audience. The audience would respond to the chorus's guide. Following the chorus as a leader, the audience would cheer or hoot at a character. Then, not much different from its original stage, the function of the chorus in the theatre was intended to move the audience. Gentili calls this effect 'sympathetic magic'. He analyses that the chorus is an imitation of life and this

're-creation is so vivid and faithful that it involves the audience to the point where everyone present would say that he himself is the one speaking--so well executed are the words and the chorus sings, (i)mitative performance and ceremonial ritual combine in a kind of sympathetic "magic" that identifies

⁷⁸ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 655d-e).

⁷⁹ Donaldson, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

chorus with audience'.⁸⁰

It is not surprising that in most of the Old Tragedy plays the chorus played the part of the public, community, the City, or a band of sympathetic spectators.⁸¹ What is most important with regard to the purpose of the performance of a poetic text is to link the emotion of the text with that of the audience or to attune the audience to the textual mood; and this emotional relationship between the audience and the performances is indispensable with the idea of mimesis. Mimesis is understood as 'the imitative process that is transmitted to the audience and then itself imitated and reenacted in the form of sympathetic emotional response'.⁸² Gentili perceives that 'pleasure is one of the aspects or functions of mimesis itself'.⁸³ Actually, the original sense of mimesis is 'the enactment of deeds and experiences, whether human or divine'.⁸⁴ Indeed, mimesis cannot be confined to the imitative process of the audience in the dramatic experience. The imitative process can take place anytime and anywhere. Mimetic action or its total concept of impersonation involves a combination of rhythm, melody, gestures, words, and sometimes costume.⁸⁵ In other words, mimetic effect in real life involves characters or personalities of people. It can be said that music and dance in real life or on stage are inherently

⁸⁰ Gentili, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁸¹ See H.D.F. Kitto, *The Greek Tragedy*, *op. cit.*, pp. 160, 260, 264. Kitto said about the change of the chorus in the New Tragedy that it no longer has 'independent status in the play, as representing humanity or the City, but becomes either a useful Confidante or a nuisance (p. 341)'.

⁸² Gentili, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

⁸³ Gentili, *op. cit.*

⁸⁴ Eva C. Keuls, *Plato and Greek Painting*, Leiden, 1978, p. 24. She also argues that this original sense of mimesis was never lost in Plato.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

mimetic.

VIII

As regards mimetic effect in theatrical experience, what Gentili understood about the inseparable relationship of the idea of mimesis in poetics and its deriving pleasure does not differ from the Athenian Stranger's theory of the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony in human nature. So, imitation or learning accompanied by pleasure in the chorus in this poetic-theatrical sense becomes a kind of education or *paideia* or socialisation of a culture of tradition in the city. With regard to this point, Gentili perceptively explains:

'Given a poetics posited in this fashion on an identification of the psychological processes involved in execution and reception, poetry became the principal means for integrating the individual into his social context. The poetics of mimesis accordingly took on the character of a true aesthetics of performance, in which the audience's "horizon of expectation" played a primary role. Poetic performance, whether epic or lyric, was conceived as more than a means for allowing audiences to see themselves in the mirror of mythical or contemporary events; it could also serve to arouse in them a new perception of reality and broaden their awareness to include the new modes of social and political activity which new needs and goals demanded'.⁸⁶

With regard to the horizon of expectation of the audience, one has to understand that the success of the poets is to win the votes of the audience; and to do so,

⁸⁶ Gentili, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

the poets must aim at producing most pleasurable works for the audience. For the notion of pleasure was generally regarded as the essence of all Greek poetics from Homer to the tragedians. To succeed in producing such effects, a poet must be able to understand his audience's background and catch their mood. The poet is supposed to have awareness of his audience's 'horizon of expectation'.⁸⁷ In this regard, the poet produces his work in response to the taste of the public. Some messages in a performance are intended to arouse 'pathos', to intoxicate the audience to an extreme frenzy, but the most important strategic element in Greek drama which helps to accomplish the effectiveness of poetic purpose is its chorric performance.⁸⁸

Indeed, it is from this angle that the chorus was regarded as the carriers of the cultural tradition.⁸⁹ The

⁸⁷ In fact, the horizon of expectation is applicable to both kinds of audience, dramatic and literary. H.R. Jauss stated that 'the possibility of objectifying such a horizon of expectation is a precondition for the possibility of giving to one's conception and presentation of literary history the specific form of historicity that is appropriate to it'. Jauss' full expression of 'horizon of expectation' is cited in Gentili's *Poetry and Its Public* (p. 55f). The instance of this 'horizon of expectation' is perceivable in the successful productions of the Rambo genres movies at the high time of a revival of American patriotism in Reagan's time. In contrast, the presentation of the Vietnam War and its aftermath in numerous films such as the *Deer Hunter* and *Apocalypse Now* were once mostly welcomed by the American public with regard to its desire to reflect its own repentance.

⁸⁸ The role of the chorus in a sense is still operative in poetic text of the modern time. In radio or television programmes and films, the chorus is used in different forms. Sometimes it is subtly performed. In radio or television comedy, the chorus is easily detectable in its spasmodic laughter background, *claqueur* or canned laughter. Or in the game show, there is a signal or indicator for the studio-audience to applaud or cheer and so on and so forth in order to excite and call for sympathetic emotional response from the home-audience.

⁸⁹ Havelock, 'The Oral Composition', *op. cit.*, p. 312.

chorus is led by its leader who sets the example to others. The chorus in effect influentially guides the audience, provided that the audience approve of the concerned messages. When the audience becomes 'high or extremely frenzied' with regard to any particular part of the performance, they might be unaware of their own choric performance. They now become a chorus themselves. Any members of the audience with strong personalities who are the first to 'either loudly applaud or hoot at' a character can be said to play the leading role of choric behaviour of the whole audience. When the majority of the audience is concurrent and become the chorus themselves, it becomes powerful and alienates the minority or individuals. In that situation, a discord arises among them which generates displeasure opposite to the pleasurable effect of harmony. An individual who becomes alienated from a difference between himself and the majority might have to suppress an expression of his own taste and conform with the others. There are also some who, uncertain of their own predilection, might unconsciously follow the majority since at the moment it is more pleasurable to join the chorus of the whole audience by which he as its immediate part of the whole is being pressurised.

The influence and power of the chorus of the audience is much stronger than that of the theatrical chorus, since it is not just a drama but real life. In this respect, individuals are absorbed into the public. With regard to this relationship between the public and individuals, it can be said that an individual person either lives his life in conflict with the public if he tries to maintain his own values and beliefs or even character which are opposed to others, or lives 'a peaceful and happy life' if he shares similar attitudes or behaviour with the public. A leader of the chorus might be wrongly mistaken for a powerful figure. In the theatre, undoubtedly the chorus must follow its leader's guide, but in real life, the majority of the

audience does not necessarily follow a first striker of approval or disapproval. Even the leader can win the support of the majority of the audience. The power of the majority lies not in the leader. Power emerges and originates whenever there arises the oneness of the many. In sum, the education in ancient Greece can be understood with regard to the conception of rhythm and harmony and the pleasurable perception of the quality in human nature which reflect themselves in the Greek theatre as the worship of Apollo who is identified with the harmony of music and dance, and Dionysus who represents the frenzy of song and dancing and intoxication. In this respect, it is the public not the poets who play the decisive role of educator with regard to the Greek theatre.

However, the influence of public behaviour cannot be confined to their reactions toward the theatre. The evidence from both the *Republic* and the *Laws* points to the influence of the public at large although their influence at dramatic performances is quite distinct with regard to the significance of the poetry as 'the carriers of their cultural tradition'. As quoted earlier, in the *Republic* when Socrates is speaking about the public, he refers to the public behaviour in assemblies, courts, theatres, camps or 'any other public gathering of a crowd'.⁹⁰ Also, the passages in the *Laws* show that the Athenian Stranger could not restrict his application of man's divine gifts of rhythm and harmony with respect to his education to the audience situation at the theatrical stages.⁹¹ To be

⁹⁰ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book VI 492b-d).

⁹¹ Consider the *Laws*, (Book II 656b). In *Preface to Plato*, Havelock argued that Plato himself invented the notion of mimesis as an imitation of the moral character of an original. See Havelock, *Preface to Plato*, op. cit., p. 57ff. Disagreeing with Havelock, with reference to the *Republic*, (Book III 400ab), Gentili believed that Plato referred such theories to 'Damon's ethico-musical notion of song and dance as "imitation of life (*biou mimemata*)---a recreation through different rhythmical and musical

sure, apart from dramatic performances, other kinds of performance in front of the public can also be regarded as public exhibitions, *epideixis*, particularly the sophistic exhibition.⁹²

The sophists as well as the poets claimed possession of the knowledge of human excellence, but the way the poets present their ideas is effectively decisive with regard to the nature of learning accompanied by pleasure. Moreover, the earlier argument in the *Laws* concerning social institutions emphasises the importance of any social institution with regard to its good and bad effects⁹³; and what is most important is that the public influence over individuals begins since their early childhood. That is to say, the public has continuously exerted its influence upon the individuals in 'the theatre of life'. The theatre of life is everywhere; so is its importance. With regard to this point, John Gunnell's interpretation renders a similar account.⁹⁴ Greek theatre and drama is just a reflection and imitation of the reality of the theatre of life. It is just a part of a larger context of the theatrical stage of human life. Some also argued that the Greeks in the fifth

genres of differing human characters and moral attitudes'. See Gentili, *op. cit.*, pp. 249f, 52. With regard to my concern, Gentili and Havelock both confirm that Plato is aware of the idea of mimesis in relation to the theatre qua theatre and the theatre as a stage of human life.

⁹² See Lloyd, *The Revolutions of Wisdom: Studies in the Claims and Practice of Ancient Greek Science*, op. cit., pp. 93-108.

⁹³ Plato, *Laws*, (Book I 638c-d, 639a, 640d-e).

⁹⁴ Gunnell, *Political Philosophy and Time: Plato and the Origins of Political Vision*, op. cit., 'The Platonic Restoration: The *Laws*', p. 218: 'Existence in terms of life lived as a ritual play is the principle of the educational system of the *Laws*.'

century before Christ were aware of this fact.⁹⁵

IX

The theatre of life is our second approach to the public as the educator with regard to the concept of Apollo and Dionysus. In the theatre of life, the music of life consists of speech which can be seen as song, and action as dancing. When a person speaks or acts, he might just do it according to his own habits or imitate what he has seen or learnt. That is why it has been stated that 'all music is representative and imitative'.⁹⁶ When the human life is placed and viewed in a theatrical context, everyone becomes a performer in his own right. He might be either an actor or a member of the chorus. With regard to the musical interrelationship of the performers, the Athenian Stranger explains:

'Inasmuch as choric performances are representations of character, exhibited in actions and circumstances of every kind, in which the several performers enact their parts by habit and imitative art, whenever the choric performances are congenial to them in point of diction, tune or other features (whether from natural bent or from habit, or from both these causes combined), then these performers

⁹⁵ This has been argued by Gentili. It is said that 'the actual activities of the poet---devising and constructing---are thus conceived as mimesis---the imitation of nature and human life, (c)onscious formulations of this idea appear as early as the fifth century, presenting imitation either as a re-creation, through voice, music, dance, and gesture, of the actions and utterances of men and animals---or, with more specific reference to the figurative arts, as the production of an inanimate, visible object that is a realistic replica of something living'. See Genitli, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

⁹⁶ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 668a).

invariably delight in such performances and extol them as excellent; whereas those who find them repugnant to their nature, disposition or habits cannot possibly delight in them or praise them, but call them bad. And when men are right in their natural tastes but wrong in the former, then by their expressions of praise they convey the opposite of their real sentiments; for whereas they say of a performance that it is pleasant but bad, and feel ashamed to indulge in such bodily motions before men whose wisdom they respect, or to sing such songs (as though they seriously approved of them), they really take a delight in them in private.⁹⁷

The language the Athenian Stranger employed in this passage is theatrical. What he stated seems to be concerned with the musical interrelationship of the performers in the theatre qua theatre. However, if it has been carefully considered in the context of the theatre of human life, the passage would be rather more intelligible. It is pointless to talk about the nature of the habits of the performer in conflict with that of the others or the chorus if its context is theatrical, since those in a theatrical performance do not act according to their real personality but to a script. However, the matter becomes serious if it is placed in real life. From the above passage, the Athenian Stranger portrays the picture of conflict between one's nature or habits and the others'. Stated differently, it is the conflict between an individual and the public, or the one and the many. To put it in the context of the study of self-knowledge and politics, it is at the deepest level, the conflict between the soul and the city. However, the state of conflict cannot be ascribed to the nature of the relationship of the soul and the city, as the nature of the soul and the nature of the city is neither in conflict nor in harmony. Either

⁹⁷ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 655d-656a).

can occur. It depends on the nature of each of them. The soul and the city will be in harmony insofar as one's nature or disposition corresponds to another's. The soul and the city will come into conflict with each other when their natures differ from one another.

As stated earlier, the nature of the soul and the nature of the city correspond to one another, that is to say, the correspondence between the tripartite soul and the three classes of the city. Their natures are self-motion. The city as well as the soul oscillate between two forms of life, just and unjust. The unjust types of the soul are as many as the unjust political constitutions of the city. Four major characters of the unjust forms are distinguishable, namely, timarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. Justice is attributable to only one form of governance of the city and of the soul, the rule of wisdom or the city of the philosopher-ruler. The conflict arises when a particular type of soul finds itself alienated amongst a society of different ones in the same way that a society of a certain kind is conscious of its lack of harmony when it finds out that there is a single alien amongst its members.

Already mentioned in the discussion of Socrates' speech on the unjust polities in the spirit of the Muses, each type of soul and city possesses its own aesthetic appreciation. Each judges what is good and beautiful according to what each regards as the good. What each regards as the good is determined by its ruling part of the soul or the ruling class of the city.⁹⁸ Therefore, with regard to music, each type of soul and city praises a type of music whose song and dancing responds to its idea of the

⁹⁸ This point has been clarified in the discussion of the good in relation to the Sun simile, the analogy of the Divided Line, and the allegory of the Cave in 'The Good: Know-Thyself--See Yourself--See Your Soul: Metaxy as the Nature of the Soul' in Chapter Nine.

good. For instance, the oligarchic soul enjoys and appreciates the oligarchic song and movements. Any speech and action are judged according to its oligarchic edifice. The oligarchic soul uses its reason to make as much profit as possible. It is courageous to do anything to attain these goals which the aristocratic or timocratic souls dare not to do. The oligarch is afraid or ashamed of being poor. The concept of goodness, courage, wisdom, beauty, justice and other virtues are interpreted differently by different types of souls and cities.

It is notable that when one takes control over the other two elements in the soul, the latter still exist but have to follow the direction of their master or ruler; that is to say, a man with an oligarchic soul can be 'clever' and 'courageous' since rational and spirited parts still exist in his soul; but they are forced to serve its master's desires. In this respect, the application of the idea of the interconnection of the chorus and the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony in human nature to the understanding of the nature of the characters of the soul and the city is evident when Socrates said that the oligarchic soul has 'the blind god of wealth' be its 'leader of the choir and first in honour'.⁹⁹ A ruling or a most powerful element of the soul at a particular time is metaphorised as the leader of the choir since when any element of the soul presides over the others, it leads them to sing the same song and to dance the same steps and movements which have been reflected in the whole personality of a person. However, the four major types of imperfect soul or city are just the archetypes which, as Socrates said in the end of Book Four of the *Republic*, are 'worth while to take note' although the forms of evil or injustice are infinite. One should not expect to find an absolute 'oligarchic' or 'democratic' character in reality.

⁹⁹ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book VIII 554b).

As discussed earlier at the beginning of this chapter, this point has been made clear by Averroes in the Third Treatise of his interpretation of Plato's *Republic*. Averroes applies the analogy of colour in order to comprehend the possibility of infinite varieties of human characters and political constitutions. Hence, the extent of discord between conflicting characters has to be understood with regard to their relative density and consistency. This can be illuminated by modifying Averroes' analogy of colour. Suppose each element of the soul has its own colour; the rational part is red, the spirited part is yellow, and the desires are blue. When the aristocratic man is declining, it loses its density of redness and turns toward the yellow timocrat. In between the two major colours of red and yellow, there are a number of intermediate colours. The sharp contrast or, say, conflict between the red and the yellow is apparent, but it will be lesser if it is the interaction between the approaching-yellow red and the yellow instead of the red and the yellow or the red and the blue; and this is applicable to the general understanding of the social and political interaction of man. Again, one has to bear in mind that the application of the analogy of colour to the tripartite soul is just theoretical or archetypal. In reality, the character of a man is a mixture of these three colours, and it is a fact that from the mixture secondary colours and very much more have been effected. Therefore, in a sense, apart from its four major types, it can be said that the characters of individuals are as colourful as the colour, which varies within the cycle of the interaction of its tripartite soul, or the mixture of primary colours.

interaction is applicable to a human being since his early childhood. 'Every young creature,' said the Athenian Stranger, 'is incapable of keeping either its body or its tongue quiet, and is always striving to move and to cry, leaping and skipping and delighting in dances and games'.¹⁰⁰ This human condition presupposes the existence of rhythm and harmony.¹⁰¹ Rhythm and harmony are said to be able to render pleasure to man. Man is said to be given the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony by Apollo and Dionysus. With this perception, the sympathetic magic emerges.¹⁰² So pleasure originates in the moment of sympathetic magic. Rhythm and harmony are indispensable to the idea of mimesis. Imitation or mimesis entails the interaction of at least two parties. Also, its mimetic situation necessitates a prime mover or 'the leader' as in the case of the choric performance, since the original sense of mimesis is said to be the enactment or copying the appearance of deeds and experiences.¹⁰³ The 'enactment by dramatic means' is said to be how mimesis was originally referred to. Furthermore, dramatic means constitutes 'an indissoluble combination of rhythm, melody, gestures, words and, occasionally, costume'.¹⁰⁴ In this

¹⁰⁰ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 653e).

¹⁰¹ In his study of Dionysos, Detienne has recourse to Plato's *Laws*. He writes: 'A newborn is a frenzied little animal, crying and gesticulating without rhyme or reason and imbued with an instinct to jump (to *kata phusin pedan*), always ready to jump or leap. Without this instinct neither rhythm nor harmony would exist.' From this he derives his argument for the physiological basis which reflects itself in 'Dionysos' sovereignty over festivals and over the righteous elderly'. Marcel Detienne, *Dionysos at Large*, op. cit., 'The Heart of Dionysos Bared', p. 58.

¹⁰² The term is used by Gentili in his study of the psychological effect of the chorus in Greek theatre. This has already been discussed earlier.

¹⁰³ Keuls, op. cit., 'Plato's Mimesis Doctrine', p. 24.

¹⁰⁴ Keuls, op. cit., p. 29.

respect, music or drama which consists of song and dance are inherently mimetic.¹⁰⁵ The theatre of life can be equally interpreted with reference to mimesis and the perception of rhythm and harmony. From this, it can be said that human activity which comprises speech and action--song and dance---is inclined towards rhythm and harmony rather than chaos and discord.

If rhythm and harmony are preferred because they render pleasure, then, it can be inferred that their opposite is undesirable because it effects displeasure. When a member of the chorus imitates or follows the others or the leader of his team, rhythm and harmony emerges. Likewise, when a person follows or imitates what other people he is among do, such imitation renders rhythm and harmony. In the Greek theatre, music and choreography were invented by the poet. In the theatre of human life, speech and action in a particular situation can be influenced by the emotional response and values of the majority of the people at particular time and place. In that situation, a person who possesses different tastes from the others' might have to hide his real sentiments by conforming with them. He has to praise or despise what they praise or despise. Of course, he has to contradict his own self to conform with the others. In doing so, he has to suffer from self-disorder in exchange for the pleasure and delight of rhythm and harmony which is derived from his imitation of the others. Moreover, in his conformity, he is rewarded by being accepted as a member of the group. He is regarded as a good man by those to whose 'good' values he is committed. In this regard, conformity renders security from which the pleasure in turn is derived. In a sense, that conformity renders security presupposes the possibility of insecurity in the non-conformer. A person will be secure if he becomes a conformer by accepting the

¹⁰⁵ Keuls, *op. cit.*

norms or values of the others.¹⁰⁶ In the beginning, he was insecure when he confronted others whose behaviour was alien to his. With regard to the fact that he becomes secure when he accepts the values of others, it can be said that his insecurity and self-conflict originate in the uncertainty of his own beliefs or values. His own edifice varies with the ruling part of his soul. When they are challenged by the counterparts of the others, the possibility and degree of his insecurity and self-conflict are dependent upon the solidity and cohesiveness of the ruling part of his soul. As Socrates stated at the beginning of his speech about the decline of the city and the soul that it is the simple and unvarying rule, 'that in every form of government revolution takes its start from the ruling class itself, when dissension arises in that, but so long as it is at one with itself, however small it be, innovation is impossible'¹⁰⁷; but when the ruling part of the soul is shaken by the influence of others, self-conflict or discord emerges.

With regard to his pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony, a prolonged state of insecurity and self-conflict is of course undesirable. The soul has to seek to resume its harmonious and secure state. It can do so either by self-submission or self-defence. In the former, the soul loses its 'identity' which contradicts the others in exchange for a mutual harmonious relationship without and within itself. It is in such a state that the one is assimilated, *omoioousthai*, into the others.¹⁰⁸ However, such a description of the process of assimilation

¹⁰⁶ Consider an advertisement about the public transport in the United Kingdom. It rightly indicates the power of the public over any individuals whose conduct differs from the majority: 'Try disappearing into the crowd while the whole crowd is staring at you'.

¹⁰⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 545d).

¹⁰⁸ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 656b).

seems rather mechanistic and ingenuous with regard to the conscious manifest exertion of force and coercion of the many to the conscious submission of the one. In truth, as stated above, the possibility and degree of contradiction and assimilation depends on the character of the soul of an individual and of the public. For instance, sustained interaction is necessary in the case of individuals of 'stronger character'. Furthermore, the influence of thought and ideas through speech and action can affect, willy-nilly, a person's soul. It is in this regard that Socrates warned young Hippocrates before he went to see Protagoras:

'When you buy victuals and liquors you can carry them off from the dealer or merchant in separate vessels, and before you take them into your body by drinking or eating you can lay them by in your house and take the advice of an expert whom you can call in, as to what is fit to eat or drink and what is not, and how much you should take and when; so that in this purchase the risk is not serious. But you cannot carry away doctrines in a separate vessel: you are compelled, when you have handed over the price, to take the doctrine in your very soul by learning it, and so to depart either an injured or a benefited man.'¹⁰⁹

This can be applicable to what a person experiences from the public in general. Whether or not the influence is intentional, it inevitably affects the soul. Since Socrates argued in the *Theaetetus* with regard to the theory of knowledge that the human soul is like a block of wax which

'is the gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that whenever we wish to remember anything we see or hear or think of in our own minds, we hold this

¹⁰⁹ Plato, *Protagoras*, (314a-b).

wax under the perceptions and thoughts and imprint them upon it, just as we make impressions from seal rings'.¹¹⁰

It is for this reason that the public or the many plays an important role in educating or assimilating an individual or the one. For, a person who is living amongst the people of a certain kind of character can be possibly assimilated into such a character of the larger whole.

Placed in this context, every man is always related to others in an 'I and Thou' relationship. All but himself are 'others' to him, and he himself simultaneously takes the part of 'others' to another. Accordingly, men start this twofold relationship with one another from the time they are born. Ever since, a man is continuously influenced by others through which his 'self' or 'being' or 'personality' or character is formed. Also, he as one of the many takes part in forming the other self.¹¹¹

¹¹⁰ Plato, *Theaetetus*, (191c-d). With regard to the sensitivity of human sense-perception, Freud even argues: 'we close our most important sensory channels, our eyes, and try to protect the other senses from all stimuli or from any modification of the stimuli acting on them. We then fall asleep, even though our plan is never completely realized. We cannot keep stimuli completely away from our sense organ nor can we completely suspend the excitability of our sense organs. The fact that a fairly powerful stimulus will awaken us at any time is evident that "even in sleep the soul is in constant contact with the extracorporeal world...there is a great number of such stimuli, ranging from the unavoidable ones which the state of sleep itself necessarily involves or must tolerate from time to time, to the accidental, rousing stimuli which may or do put an end to sleep. A bright light may force its way into our eyes, or a noise may make itself heard, or some strong-smelling substance may stimulate the nucleus membrane of our nose.' Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, translated and edited by J. Strachey, London, 1954, p. 83.

¹¹¹ A similar account of this has been already stated by John Rawls that it is the fact that 'the members of community participate in one another's nature,' through which 'the self is realized in the activities of many selves.' C. Fred Alford requotes Sandel's citation of John

As regards the passage 'every young creature is incapable of keeping either its body and its tongue quiet', it can be interpreted that they are mostly seeking a rhythmic and harmonious condition. It presupposes their great insecurity. Of course, the young are the most insecure of all since what they essentially need is security and certainty. They at the earliest moment of their life are still puzzled and wondered about everything they experienced.¹¹² Tautologically speaking, a sign of insecurity and uncertainty and frenzy in a newborn child indicates the absence of opposite qualities. As stated before, insecurity and uncertainty originates in the uncertainty of one's values or beliefs. Such a state originates in the lack of solidity and cohesiveness of one's soul. Its inclination towards rhythm and harmony in an external relationship with others presuppose that it needs 'others' to inform or confirm its self-knowledge. It can be inferred that this original insecurity which causes man to be inclined towards rhythm and harmony signifies the

Rawls in *The Self in Social Theory*, op. cit., p. 52. See also, Michael Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 150-151, and John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971, p. 565.

¹¹² Detienne's study of Dionysus seems to follow the same direction. However, his argument does not extend as far as mine, since he only refers to 'fear' and insecurity in human beings instead of the problem of self-knowledge. His argument regarding the physiological basis is exemplified by an interesting case of the nursing of infants. He stated that the reason why nurses rock their infants, which is called kinesitherapy, is homeopathy since human beings, child or adult, 'are all subject to fears, to certain weaknesses of soul, and "when mothers want to put fractions babies to sleep, the remedy they exhibit is not stillness but its very opposite, movement---they regularly rock the infants in their arms---and not silence, but a tune of some kind....Hence, when such disorders are treated by rocking movement the external motion thus exhibited dominates the internal, which is the source of the fright or frenzy, (b)y its domination it produces a mental sense of calm and relief from the preceding distressing agitation of the heart'. Marcel Detienne, *Dionysos at Large*, op. cit., p. 58.

absence and the search for self-knowledge in a human being. It is from this point that the saying, 'all men desire good', is inferred, since the knowledge of the self presupposes the knowledge of the good for itself as regards the self-interpretation of the values of the good as it has been discussed in the simile of the Sun, the analogy of the Divided Line, and the imagery of the Cave. So, with regard to human nature, that is to say, the tripartite soul and its self-motion, what the Athenian Stranger said comes to light: 'the human race thus born to misery'. What is given to relieve man of this misery is the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony, since it helps men to overcome or forget their suffering, *epiponon*, and insecurity and uncertainty. However, it can be only temporary since the soul is always in motion. A seeming state of harmony of 'the middle course, *meson*', taken as a resolution to the conflicting characters could make one take it for granted as an Archimedean point of self-knowledge.

CHAPTER ELEVEN**Philosopher becomes King**

In the light of the above discussion, Socrates' speech on the decline of the city and the soul becomes more comprehensible. In Chapter Seven, the procreation and the relationship within a family have been argued to be a metaphoric generation and interaction of the soul since the city was likened to the image of the soul. However, it was also argued that in the spirit of the Muses, the content of the speech can be interpreted both literally and metaphorically. Here the literal interpretation becomes meaningful in connection with Socrates' idea of the public as the educators and the Athenian Stranger's speech on the nature of the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony. From this, it will reveal that both metaphoric and literal interpretations of Socrates' speech on the declining city and soul not only complement but are also indispensable to one another.

The story in the speech begins with the unseasonable breeding of declining aristocratic parents in a declining aristocratic polity. As argued before, the decline started as soon as the unseasonable breeding took place. Socrates portrayed the conflicting personalities of the father and the mother. A child born to them is said to be aristocratic in his origin or 'by nature', but having been brought up in such an opposing atmosphere which is said to be undesirable, he has to seek a rhythmic and harmonious solution. Sooner or later, he develops his own personality or 'second nature'. 'Under these two solicitations he comes to a compromise and turns over the government in his soul to the intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man haughty of soul and covetous of

honour'.¹ At this point, Alford's study of Plato's political psychology explains that the son in the process of being torn in two directions 'will seek some sort of psychological compromise' by taking 'a middle course, resigning "control of himself to the middle element and its competitive spirit" '.² A son of a declining aristocratic family becomes a timocratic man.

From this, it is evident that when applied to other points in the dialogues, the argument that 'everyone besides himself is his "others"' can be said to fit itself in quite well. The son is viewed as the individual psyche against his others, namely his father and mother. The influence of others over a person starts in his early childhood; that is to say, the need for others as a consequence of his self-uncertainty and self-insecurity begins as soon as one is born. With regard to the nature of the perception of rhythm and harmony, one can imagine a child who repeats certain behaviour which attracts his parents' approval or affection, but for what is disliked by his parents, the child has to compromise between himself and his 'others' either by avoiding his expression of such behaviour in front of his parents or by obliterating it.

In this regard, the others act as though they are a mirror reflecting what the child himself looks like so that he can recognise himself as in Lacan's 'mirror stage of development', *le stade du miroir*. According to Lacan's theory, the psychological development of the mirror stage takes place during the period of six months to two years of

¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 550b).

² Alford, *The Self in Social Theory*, op. cit., p. 65.

Alford

argues further for the problem of mental frustrations in the Athenian society deriving from the 'oral narcissistic dilemma' of a son who has to take a male version of his mother's path. As a psychoanalyst, Alford believes that Plato is conscious of this problem and his work seeks a solution for such a problem. See also, pp. 65-68.

age. Alford refers to 'Lipstick experiments' and the like to support Lacan's timing of the mirror stage. Alford explains that when 'the child's nose is smeared with lipstick and he is placed before the mirror, it being presumed that if he responds with embarrassment he must recognise himself, generally support Lacan's theory'.³ In the same way that the child physically recognises himself with a self-painted red spot on his nose in a mirror, the individual psyche psychologically recognises its partial self-image by reactions from the others towards the expression of its ideas or sentiments. His expression represents himself to the others like a child who colours his nose with lipstick. A child will never know what he himself looks like or will never be aware of himself as a self object without a mirror. Likewise, he will never be able to learn or to be aware of his self-image without its reflections from the others.

However, unlike a mirror, people of different characters render different reflections. Moreover, such reflections of people have influence upon a person. As regards the three elements of the soul, each type of the characters of the soul influences a person by attracting and encouraging its counterpart and attacking or terrorising the others. Both sides, namely the one and the many, are not *tabula rasa*. It seems to be a war-like situation between the hidden nature in the tripartite soul of an individual in interaction with the five characters of men whose souls are ruled by one of those three elements. It is in this regard that, as stated elsewhere, the city and the soul are in a state of self-motion oscillating between harmony and discord. In that condition, it can be said that whether or not it is conscious of what it is doing, each type of character nurtures its counterpart in the soul of one another. When torn between opposing

³ See Alford, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

influences, a person reconciles himself and others by developing himself an intermediate nature. Otherwise, he has to surreptitiously enjoy the pleasure of his own taste, that is to say, he has to pretend to praise or blame what the others do.⁴

The middle course, *meson*, as a resolution to such conflicts has been said to be a developmental process or assimilation in the transformation of the city and the soul in Socrates' speech in Book Eight of the *Republic*.⁵ This is quite compatible with Averroes' analogy of the opposite colours and their intermediate elements. Also, when a person who has been through the situation of conflicting influences reconciles such a state of disorder by developing an intermediate character, he could have thought that he had discovered his real self. Also he would have told himself that his self-knowledge had been achieved. Presumably, it happens to a timocrat, oligarch, democrat, or tyrant who emerges from conflicting parenting. Nevertheless, whenever assimilation is impossible with regard to uncompromising parties, it entails a revolution or violent upheaval.⁶ As stated before, the possibility

⁴ Cf. Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 548b). As regards a timocratic son of declining aristocratic parents: 'And will they not be stingy about money, since they prize it and are not allowed to possess it openly, prodigal of others' wealth because of their appetites, enjoying their pleasures stealthily, and running away from the law as boys from a father'.

⁵ Cf. Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 547b, 550b). At 547b Socrates says 'When strife arose, the two groups were pulling against each other....contending against one another, they compromised'. Also consider what he states at 550e: 'May not the opposition of wealth and virtue be conceived as if each lay in the scale of a balance inclining opposite ways?'.

⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 551b, 557a, 567a-569a). Socrates specifically refers to the transformation from oligarchy to democracy and from democracy to absolute tyranny.

and degree of conflict is dependent upon the solidity and density of the character of the soul of both sides. In other words, it depends on whether a type of character is the nature of a person, or it has been so long and firmly established in the soul until it becomes his second nature. With regard to the latter, Socrates emphasised the significance of education by means of imitation in his discussion of the education of the guardians: 'Or have you not observed that imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle down into habits and (second) nature in the body, the speech, and the thought?'⁷

I

With regard to the city as a context in which a person develops and realises his 'nature', his first context is his own family. He develops his first nature from his interacting relationship with his parents or guardians. Next to this might be his neighbours or his peer-group. He might confront his own habits or disposition or nature with that of the others and then has to be either assimilating, conforming or resisting. The scope of context can expand from a small unit of the city such as a family to the city or the global context as a whole.⁸ With regard to harmony and assimilation, it is observable that people of a country have a national or cultural identity. Considered in terms of political culture, each country is said to possess its own distinct political aspects. However, it is evident that they can be put into four categories of the

⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book III 395d).

⁸ This point can be understood with regard to the idea of context and the fusion of historical horizon in Gadamer's hermeneutics. When a person of a culture experiences different cultures, a fusion of the two is required for the possibility of an intercommunicative action of cultural diversity.

imperfect polity. As stated earlier, the criterion for a certain type of polity is drawn from the measure of its major control and assumption of political power. This portrays its dominant characteristics with regard to totality and harmony. But as also stated before, with regard to discord and contrariety, it is also evident that in a certain polity, whatever it may be, there exist different degrees of democrats, oligarchs, timocrats, and even tyrants. If it is the case that the existence of these types of character of men correspond to the nature of the tripartite soul, then, their existence must also presuppose the existence of a philosophic-ruling or aristocratic type of man.

The above lengthy discussion has shown how the public significantly plays the educating role in accordance with the interpretation of the theatre of Apollo and Dionysus in relation to human nature. In the theatre of life, the audience is the public as a whole. In truth, the public as a whole constitutes the city. The public is in fact the city, and the city as well as the public cannot be identified. It is not far from being true to argue that the public everywhere is the educator of man in the community. With regard to the existence of the just and the unjust types of the soul in the city and the existence of the influences of the just and the unjust city in the soul, it can be said that the war without and within the soul and the city is between good and evil. Hence, with regard to the influence of the city as such over the soul, the Athenian Stranger commented that 'yet what blessing could we name, or what curse greater than that of assimilation which befalls us so inevitably?'⁹ Surely, it must be a curse when

'a man who is living amongst the bad habits of wicked men, though he does

⁹ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 656b).

not really abhor but rather accepts and delights in those habits, yet censures them casually, as though dimly aware of his own turpitude,'

which

'(i)n such a case it is, to be sure, inevitable that the man thus delighted becomes assimilated to those habits, good or bad, in which he delights, even though he is ashamed to praise them.'¹⁰

But it will become a great blessing whenever it begets 'children of seasonable breeding'.¹¹

After all, with the understanding of the public influence in connection with the interpretation of the Apollonian and Dionysian gift, in accordance with the nature of the tripartite soul, the simile of the Sun, the analogy of the Divided Line, the allegory of the Cave, the five types of the just and unjust city and soul, then, Socrates' speech on the mysterious perfect number at 546b-c in the *Republic* can be fully comprehended. The meaning of the number 3, 4, 5 has been discussed in Chapter Nine. Here the meanings of 'dominating and dominated' and 'the assimilating, *omoiounton*, and dissimilating, *anomoiounton*' and 'the waxing and the waning' can be interpreted against the context of the interrelationship of the city and the soul.

In that context, the public or the others of good character can influence or dominate an individual who is dominated to develop the character as such. From that, the assimilation of the individual into those others follows, while the others of bad character could not dominate his soul, namely, he is dissimilated from them. As a result of

¹⁰ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II, 656b).

¹¹ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 656c).

a number of assimilations and dissimilations, the power of certain elements of the tripartite soul 'waxes and wanes', that is to say, they undergo alterations of increase and decreases. If the interrelationship of the city and the soul carries on in that manner until he can understand himself with regard to the relation of the symbolic number 3, 4, 5 and human nature, then, it will render harmony and the good to the soul. This geometrical number in accordance with the understanding of the interrelationship of the city and the soul is said to be determinative of the generations of better or inferior characters of the soul. Clearly, this twofold consequence of the influence of the public underlies the earlier contention of the Athenian Stranger that every form of social institution or the city as a whole can render either harm or benefit to people who participate in it.¹² In this regard, the city is regarded as the parents or the rearer of its citizens.¹³

II

From above, it is clear that between the city and the soul, there exists a power relationship. As once stated in an earlier discussion, the nature of the city and the soul is in a sense in a state of war; firstly, there is the war within the soul itself; secondly, there is the war within the city. As regards the latter, it is the war between the one and the many in the soul, as there are three classes in the city corresponding to the three elements in the soul. In such a relationship, the like always attracts its like

¹² Plato, *Laws*, (Book I 638c-d, 640e-641a).

¹³ It can be said that from this point Socrates derives his defense of the city as the begetter and educator of his 'self'.

both in the city and in the soul.¹⁴ With regard to the like, the like in the soul and its counterpart in the city can strengthen one another in the same way that what is unlike itself in the city can dominate and weaken the unlike in the soul and vice versa. With regard to the difference, their relationship is either one dominates or is dominated by another. It is the master-slave relationship. With regard to this domineering relationship, there are two contradictory ways to approach it. This point has been made by Socrates to Callicles in the *Gorgias*.¹⁵ First, it is believed that by nature what is greater by quantity dominates what is lesser as regards 'those who make the laws to keep a check on the one, the many are superior to the one'. However it has been also argued that by nature what is lesser but better and superior can dominate what is greater but worse and inferior as 'one wise man is often superior to ten thousand fools'.

Although they are in a warlike relationship, however, it is quite ironical to state that such a conflicting state which is derived from human ontological insecurity and uncertainty of the self is inclined towards unity and harmony as a relief; but only harmony in the just soul whose self-knowledge has been achieved is invulnerable. Harmony emerges when like is united with like. The unity of the likes takes place either when two or more of a kind meet and strengthen one another, or when what is unlike has been conquered or dominated by its rival so that its counterpart can become the dominant like itself. From this, it can be inferred that the explanation of the internal war of the city or its civil strife actually can

¹⁴ In the discussion of the education of the guardians in the *Republic*, Adeimantus consents to what Socrates asked him whether the like always summons the like. See the *Republic*, (Book IV 425c).

¹⁵ Plato, *Gorgias*, (488d, 490a).

in a way be reduced to the war of the soul. The politics of the city is the politics of the soul. When it is said that one has to conquer oneself, it means that one has to strengthen a certain part and weaken the others in one's soul, since there are the conditions of 'being partly self-superior and partly self-inferior' in the soul and in the city.¹⁶ Furthermore, it can be stated that when one is waging war within oneself, at the same time, one is waging war against the others in the city. As when he is fighting against himself, it is inevitable that he is strengthening the power of one and weakening the others in the tripartite soul. Being situated in the city, the element in his soul which has become powerful strengthens its counterpart in the city. Similarly, when one is waging war against the others in the city, one is making war within oneself.

It is pointless to ask the questions 'what is the state of nature or the beginning of the city and the soul?' or 'when did such a war begin?' or 'who ruled in the beginning?' to which only unfounded answers can be given. It is more practical to state that, as argued above, the point of departure of the city and the soul always begins at the point of metaxy, the intermediate state. Any starting point other than the point of metaxy is inconceivable in the same way that there will never be a clean canvas for artists to trace the lineaments of the ideal constitution in practice, since it will never be possible for the multitude to become aware of the value of philosophy and to be convinced that 'no city could ever be

¹⁶ Plato, *Laws*, (Book I 627a-b). Clinias stated that the reason for the tradition of common meals in Crete and Sparta lies in their raison d' etat, since he believed that all states were involved ceaselessly in a lifelong war against one another'. Accordingly Cretan laws had been made to serve this purpose. From this point, then, the Athenian Stranger logically drew his argument from the state of war of the city to the state of war of the soul. See *Laws*, (Book I 625c-626e).

blessed unless its lineaments were traced by artists who used the heavenly model'.¹⁷ With regard to the nature of the many and the public as the educator, it has been said that no existing polity 'is worthy of the philosophic nature'.¹⁸

In such a powerful and dominating relationship between the city and the soul, it transpired that power and domination were exerted either to 'invigorate' something or 'counteract' the others. In such a relationship, the existence and survival of some quality presupposes the preservation and nourishment of its own quality and the protection and prevention of itself from the others. Such a situation necessitates the entrance to the politics of the philosopher, since the chief penalty for him is to be governed by someone worse if he will not himself hold office and rule.¹⁹ Also, the return to the Cave of the one who has seen the sun itself is inevitable. He has to return to live his life amongst the others in the cave.²⁰ In this sense, it can be stated that philosophy becomes political because of its self-love.

On the other hand, philosophic nature as a kind of quality always loves and yearns for the union of itself and its like. It can be derived that from love the soul becomes pregnant and generates another soul similar to what it loves and unites itself with²¹, but it has been shown that there is no good reason for the need for the union

¹⁷ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 500e-501a).

¹⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 497b).

¹⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 347c-d).

²⁰ Otherwise, Socrates would have given his advice that the enlightened person should not laugh unthinkingly when someone has to go through the transition from one realm to another. See *the Republic*, (Book VII 517a-518b).

²¹ See Diotima's speech in *the Symposium*, (206c-212a).

with the like of the same qualities such as the wise, and the good, since they are already perfect and therefore self-contained. Also, the unity of the opposite qualities such as the bad and the ignorant would render damages and harmful results instead of benefit. Furthermore, it is impossible for the bad to be a friend to the good. So as regards the love for its like of philosophy, its reason has to be made comprehensible.

III

Socrates has clarified this point in the *Lysis*. The dialogue discusses the nature of friendship, *philia*. In the dialogue, Socrates explains the meaning of true friendship which emerges only in the philosophic relationship. As the philosopher is the lover of wisdom, his position is neither wise nor ignorant:

'We may say that those who are already wise no longer love wisdom...nor again can those be lovers of wisdom who are in such ignorance as to be bad; for we know that a bad and stupid man is no lover of wisdom. And now there remain those who, while possessing this bad thing, ignorance, are not yet made ignorant or stupid, but are still aware of not knowing the things they do not know.'²²

What follows this is that the position of the philosopher is *metaxy*: he who is 'as yet neither good nor bad'.²³ The friendship between the philosophers is possible since 'neither is opposite friend to opposite, nor like to like,' and 'in the soul and the body and

²² Plato, *Lysis*, (218a).

²³ Plato, *Lysis*, (218b).

everywhere, just that which is neither bad nor good, but has the presence of bad, is thereby friend of the good'.²⁴ A further question is posed concerning the utility of such friendship of those 'neither good nor bad'. It has been shown that it is 'the nature of the good---to be loved because of the bad by us who are midway between the bad and the good, whereas separately and for its own sake it is of no use'.²⁵ And it can be inferred that the benefit which arises from the friendship of 'the neither good nor bad' lies in their common desire for what is desired, that is, the good.

However the good exists because of the bad as in the case of the existence of medicine for the sake of disease. So such cannot be the good in the sense that the philosopher desires because their friendship will no longer be possible after evil things are abolished. On the other hand, it is impossible for evil to be abolished as long as hunger or thirst exist.²⁶ However, the neither/nor position is said to be capable of enduring in the absence of the bad and the good. So the friendship of such a position is said to be derived just from its desire for its like.

With regard to the point of the good in relation to the bad, as Socrates has already warned, one must be very careful not to be deceived²⁷, As one is a friend of medicine which is a good thing because of disease which is a bad thing. One who needs medicine must be sick or unhealthy, but those who are healthy are healthy because they are free from disease. As their bodies are free from

²⁴ Plato, *Lysis*, (218b-c).

²⁵ Plato, *Lysis*, (220d).

²⁶ Plato, *Lysis*, (221a).

²⁷ Plato, *Lysis*, (219b-c).

disease, they do not need medicine whose goodness exists for the sake of the bad of disease and unhealthiness. Accordingly those who are healthy are neither good nor bad in such terms of relationship between the good and the bad. To be healthy, those who are healthy do not need medicine. What they need is just to preserve their neither/nor position. It is only when they have a disease that medicine must be called for. In this regard, the good which the neither good nor bad position desires is the preservation of its quality. Apparently, it can be said that Socrates would say 'the good is what is neither good nor bad'. Thus Socrates needs to be indirect about this point in order not to be trapped in a linguistic paradox. So, for the neither good nor bad, the good is useless whilst the bad is harmful. With regard to the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony, the like always desires the like for such a purpose. So it is only from the relationship between the like of itself, that is, the neither good nor bad, that benefit can be derived. Therefore, the neither good nor bad desires, in fact, belong to one another in pursuance of its own good.²⁸

Therefore, it can be said that the philosopher enters politics because of eros. It is his desire or eros for the

²⁸ That is why after his warning in the *Lysis*, 219b-c Socrates leads his argument to another cause of friendship which the good whose existence is possible because of the bad no longer takes part in. What has been arrived at is that desire is the cause of friendship. Such desire is originated from the fact that one is the like or belongings of another. From this, Socrates leads to the point that whether he should maintain that 'the good itself belongs to every one, while the bad is alien? Or does the bad belong to the bad, the good to the good, and what is neither good nor bad to what is neither good nor bad'. (*Lysis*, 222c) He said after this that he had come to a logical impasse, but he then, like the professional pleaders in the law courts, asked his listeners to perpend the whole of what has been said. The problem cannot be solved unless one could not understand the point which Socrates warned with regard to the meaning of the good in relation to the bad, and the good in itself.

love of wisdom or the good which is neither good nor bad and neither wise nor ignorant, in other words, *metaxy*. His *eros* can be understood in two categories. First, it is out of self-love because he has to protect and preserve himself or his own quality. Secondly, it lies in his desire for the like of the same quality in others. With regard to the latter, some comment that it is the obligation of the philosopher to enter politics in order 'to pay a debt'.²⁹ However, among other things, the *raison d' etre* of his political practice is not just for the interest of himself but for the city as a whole in the same way that his ruling part takes power for the interest of the whole soul and not for the interest of any particular part.³⁰ Actually, almost the whole discussion of Book I of the *Republic* is attributable to the scrutiny of the logical feasibility of the argument.³¹

Preceding the discussion of the nature of the justice of the city and the soul, its prologue stipulates that the ruler who is stronger must rule for the benefit of the ruled if he is a real ruler. At the beginning of the

²⁹ Stanley Rosen, 'The Good', in *Nihilism*, New Haven, 1968, p. 161ff. He states that two reasons for the philosopher's engagement in politics are 'either out of self-protection or to pay a debt'. Either point, self-protection or returning what is due to others, proves that the Platonic dialogues, or perhaps the *Republic* in particular, are far from being apolitical. This view is supported by John Burnet's remark on a discrepancy between Pythagorean and Platonic concepts of philosophy. Despite the Pythagorean influence, the meaning of philosophy in the dialogues is not just 'a "purification" and a way of escape from the "wheel" '. Burnet argues that Plato was well aware of the danger derived from an attitude of philosophy which could 'degenerate into mere quietism and "otherworldliness" '. Seeking to avert this, Plato 'insisted on philosophers taking their turn to descend once more into the Cave to help their former fellow prisoners'. John Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 83.

³⁰ See Plato, *Statesman*, (296e-297a).

³¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 339c-353e).

debate between Socrates and Thrasymachus, Socrates bantered with Thrasymachus by twitting the meaning of the term 'stronger' in his argument. The stronger becomes the stronger in physical strength. So the interest of the stronger which lies in what benefits the body as flesh is the interest of Polydamas, the pancratiast. As mentioned elsewhere, Socrates would have thought of the soul rather than the body with regard to what would be regarded to be human. Thrasymachus had been long overdue to give the answer which Socrates intended him to give. At the end of the debate, Thrasymachus was made to concede that justice was the virtue or the excellence of the soul. To be sure, he never said that justice was the interest of the body. What he actually meant was that justice was the interest of the stronger man who is stronger than anybody in every way, but the 'stronger man' in Thrasymachus was defeated by 'the stronger man' in Socrates' speech.

To be sure, Socrates never said that justice was the interest of the body. What he actually meant was that justice was the interest of the stronger. We know that what he said is that justice was the virtue of the soul, since the soul has the function of 'ruling' without which a man could never accomplish anything. Justice presupposes oneness and love because the just would never outdo the just. The just does not outdo the just in the same way that the wise would never get better of the wise and the one who knows about music would never think to get the better of his like with regard to the tuning of a lyre; But the just would outdo the unjust as the wise would do so to the ignorant. Certainly, the more would outdo anything less than itself but not its like in the same way that the superior would never let anything inferior be over itself. Only like is allowed to govern like since it is not different from that when it governs itself. The stronger always governs the weaker until there is no difference between them. Then, therefore, it seems that justice must

be the interest of the stronger. Here the stronger is the stronger man, and the stronger man is the one who has the stronger soul. Therefore, it has come full circle to the point that justice is the interest or virtue of the soul.

However, Socrates argued in the case of the body that the flesh could not be the only advantage for the stronger. It benefits both the stronger and the weaker. It seems also true that justice must be the interest of both the stronger and the weaker souls. The just does not harm or worsen the unjust by outdoing it since the just would never deteriorate anything. To be sure, it must render only benefit. The musical outdoes the unmusical for the reason that it cannot let what is unmusical be mistaken for what is musical. When the unmusical can differentiate between what is and what is not musical, then, it will no longer mistake 'what is not' for 'what is'. The unmusical will then pursue the musical path, because it desires to be musical otherwise it would never purport to be musical.

IV

Hence the musical cannot 'mind his own business'.³² He cannot leave the unmusical to itself. To put it another way, the musical has to dominate the unmusical in pursuance of itself, namely, the quality of being musical. To subject the unmusical to itself, the musical does so with the virtue of its own existence, that is, rhythm and harmony which is the essence of music. Similarly, the just city enslaves or dominates the unjust with its own virtue, that is, justice. The musician enslaves the unmusician because of his love of music and his being musical. The just city enslaves the unjust because of its love of

³² Plato, *Apology*, (37e).

justice and its being just. In this sense, one subdues one's opponent because of one's self-love which is the love of a certain quality.

As stated above, if justice is the interest of both the stronger and the weaker soul, then, it seems that justice is the interest of everyone regardless of the extent of his strength or weakness. As the weaker is weaker, and the stronger is stronger, then, justice could not render the same benefit at the same time to persons of different types. The interest of the stronger is not to let himself be governed by the inferior, but the interest of the weaker is to let himself be governed by the stronger so that he will become better and stronger. Therefore, although justice renders benefit, it does so with regard to what is due to what kind of the character of man he is. Such a conclusion reminds one of the earliest stage where Socrates asked Cephalus whether justice is, as it had been generally referred from Simonides' phrase, 'to render each his due'.³³ Such a phrase which has been pulled apart from its context can cause ambiguity and arbitrary interpretation. It implies that Socrates had attempted to ascribe his own interpretation to this popular and seemingly sufficient definition of justice. Moreover, it is ironically disclosed in the process of the discussion itself that the definition of justice as the interest of the stronger is still intact. Socrates had not attacked the definition itself. Actually, he had strengthened it by vindicating the appropriate meaning of the term stronger. That is why it has been stated that the 'stronger' in Socrates is stronger than that in Thrasymachus. However if the interest of the stronger is the interest of the philosopher, justice is not only the interest of the philosopher but also the interest of the others. The philosopher perceives that the three classes in the city

³³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 331e).

are indispensable to one another in the same way that the whole soul necessarily consists of the three elements. Thus the philosopher rules for the sake of all, and the justice of the philosopher is the justice of all.

The power relationship of the city and the soul originates in the conflict and harmony continuum which is in turn generated by human insecurity and uncertainty of self-knowledge. It has been argued that the philosopher is regarded as the musical and just. As a true musician, he is said to 'always be found attuning the harmonies of his body for the sake of the concord in his soul'.³⁴ So unlike the false harmony of the imperfect city and soul, the just city and the just soul of the philosopher are hardly oscillated between the conflict and harmony continuum, since his music always guides him to philosophy, and his philosophy always keeps him musical and harmonious. The Muses and music for him originated from *mosthai* which means searching, and philosophy. Also the origin of the name of Apollo denotes harmony and concord. This has been consummated by his understanding of the term Dionysus as being derived from *oiesthai* because a Dionysian effect makes one think and have wit.³⁵

Harmony in the soul of the philosopher is achieved via his search for self-knowledge which renders him the understanding of human nature and the nature of the good as *metaxy*. Only the philosopher understands the necessity of the existence of the tripartite soul and its corresponding forms in the city. It is only in this regard that he in his politics attempts to harmonize the city in the same manner that harmony in his soul has been reached. When the philosopher engages in politics, it is not conventional

³⁴ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book IX 591d).

³⁵ Plato, *Cratylus*, (405d-406c).

politics. In essence, it is the politics of the soul. As justice and the metaxy of the good never damages anything, therefore, it can be said that the governance of the philosopher-ruler is based on friendship in accordance with his understanding of the nature of the city and the soul. The rule of the philosopher as a genuine statesman renders harmony to the city as a whole. As the Athenian Stranger asked his warlike interlocutors from the warring cities:

'For imagine a man supposing that a human body was best off when it was sick and purged with physic, while never giving a thought to the case of the body that needs no physic at all! Similarly, with regard to the well-being of a State or an individual, that man will never make a genuine statesman who pays attention primarily and solely to the needs of foreign warfare, nor will he make a finished lawgiver unless he designs his war legislation for peace rather than his peace legislation for war.'³⁶

Summarily, it is by nature and of necessity that the philosopher has to practise his politics of the soul. To be a philosopher is to be the statesman at once. Politics is inherent in philosophy and vice versa. It is in this regard that philosophy and politics are inseparable. If the philosopher does not rule, he will inevitably degenerate. What follows is the tale of the decline of the imperfect city and soul. The philosopher who does not rule will produce a generation of decadence, but as soon as he establishes his rule within himself, the *kallipolis* begins its life, and the starting point of the ideal and just city emerges. He has to prove himself the best in both war and philosophy.³⁷

³⁶ Plato, *Laws*, (Book I 628d).

³⁷ At Book VIII, 543a of the *Republic* Socrates said: '...and that the rulers or kings over them are to be those who have approved themselves the best in both war and philosophy.'

From above, it can be inferred that whoever knows what the philosopher is knows what the statesman is and vice versa. Accordingly, the knowledge of that statesman is equivalent to that of the philosopher.³⁸ So the dialogue which concerns itself with the discussion of philosophy more than any other dialogue must be said as well to be the prologue to the study of the statesman. That dialogue is the *Republic*. At this point, the philosopher-king emerges. His philosophical understanding informs him of the nature of the city and the soul. It distinguishes between 'what is and what is not', i.e., harmony and discord. At the same time, the philosophical spirited or kingly element in his soul forces him to protect and preserve justice in his soul and the city by entering politics.

It is said that when a person engages in politics, he practises politics in his own way. He would do it with regard to his own self-interpretation of the nature of man and society. A crude example is that an oligarch will use his financial resources in exchange for political office and power which in turn must be instrumental in increasing his wealth. Likewise, when the philosopher engages in politics, he practises it in a philosophic style. Since his art of politics is derived from philosophy, it informs him of the nature of man and the city. At the same time, the art of politics as such in turn secures its foundation, that is, philosophy. In this regard, in its full

³⁸ The realms of the knowledge of the statesman and the philosopher are intertwined. As, in the *Republic*, the search for justice in the soul must be done in the image of the city. In the *Statesman*, the study is just in reverse. The art of the statesman first of all requires understanding of the nature of man. Furthermore, the study of the art of statesmanship must begin from its smaller to larger scale. That is, it has to start from one's self-rule. This will be further discussed in what follows.

development and totality, philosophy is in fact 'political philosophy'. Politics in which political philosophy is practised is the politics of the soul.

In the *Gorgias*, 521d, Socrates told Callicles that he thought he was one of the few who practised true statesmanship. At the end of the *Meno*, after the conclusion had been reached that 'virtue is found to be neither natural nor taught', however, Socrates stated that it can be realisable if 'somebody among the statesman is capable of making a statesman of another' appears. Furthermore, Socrates, in the *Euthyphro*, 3c, expresses that 'for the Athenians, I fancy, are not much concerned, if they think a man is clever, provided he does not impart his clever notions to others; but when they think he makes others to be like himself, they are angry with him.' Of course, the person whom the Athenians referred to is Socrates himself. In this regard, as stated earlier, the mission of Socrates is political. Socrates is practising the art of politics when he 'goes about and interferes in other people's affairs'.³⁹

With regard to the nature of the power relationship between the city and the soul, it is not surprising that the study of the soul is inseparable and indispensable to the study of the city. All social institutions can be regarded as the city. What has been regarded as the city or the public is the 'others' which form the power relationship among individuals. In a sense, the polity of the city reflects itself in its laws. All the laws, *nomos*, either encourage or discourage people to do something and not others. In other words, it forms and nurtures something and inhibits others, as the characters of the Spartan and the Cretan citizens differed from that of the Athenian. The Cretans were more like the Spartans than the

³⁹ Plato, *Apology*, (31c).

Athenians, since they had been brought up in the city which possessed certain character of the laws.⁴⁰ Laws cannot be confined to what has been officially legislated. It is necessary that the art of statesmanship concerns itself with such laws as all social activities constitute. Of course, in a way, one can understand the laws of a polity by analyzing the way its people have a drinking party or a common feast.⁴¹

All social institutions can render good or bad effects which form the second nature of men. Rightly conducted, it would generate good characters in men. Such arts of directing or conducting social activities for the best purpose is political philosophy. The task of the philosopher-king is to cultivate his like quality in those who possess the potential to become like himself. If we regard Socrates as a man who practises political philosophy, then, to understand what political philosophy is, one needs to observe what Socrates does or refrains from doing.

As regards the meaning of the statesman, the dialogue of its namesake concerns the search for a statesman. It is in one of the two of the whole dialogues when Socrates keeps silent and listens to the discussion between the Eleatic Stranger and his interlocutors. With particular regard to Socrates, it should be unusual to regard someone's silence as disapproval of what he is listening to. What is peculiar in the *Statesman* lies in its method of the search. Under the search for the statesman in its microcosm which is its underlying method, there are the dialectic division between man and animals, the myth of the revolution of the universe and the art of weaving.⁴²

⁴⁰ Plato, *Laws*, (Book I 625a-b).

⁴¹ As these social institutions were discussed in the *Laws*.

⁴² Plato, *Statesman*, (261b-266d, 268d-277d, 279b-311c).

Nevertheless, it is still unclear what exactly the statesman is. Then the Eleatic Stranger employs the art of weaving to exemplify the art of statesmanship. The reason for the use of the art of weaving is that 'it is always easier to practise in small matters than in greater ones.'⁴³ Therefore, one is expected to understand the art of statesmanship from the study of the art of weaving. In fact, the discussion of the art of weaving itself preoccupies more than half of the space in the dialogue. However, what the Eleatic Stranger brought into the discussion in his search for the statesman seems to generate the opposite effect to what he intended. His conduct of the discussion seems superfluous and irrelevant. Nevertheless, the Eleatic Stranger is well aware of 'irritating impatience' which occurs from such analyses.⁴⁴

As shown in Chapter Four, the dialectic and geometric division presupposes the requirement of the statesman's knowledge of human nature. The Eleatic Stranger did not give an immediate reply to the young Socrates when he answered that the statesman's chief concern is man, since the statesman needs to know not just the name but the essence of man. That is why such a method of division has to be employed. That 'the nature of human race is not related to walking in any other way than as the diameter which is the square root of two feet' is just the clue which required special interpretative attention. With regard to the power, *dynamis*, of geometric application, there is an animal element in man which makes him in potentiality bestial. However, at 309c, the Eleatic Stranger said that man possesses a divine bond as well. Surely, this dichotomy would inspire someone who would never be content with such an enigma to investigate further

⁴³ Plato, *Statesman*, (286b).

⁴⁴ Plato, *Statesman*, (277c, 286b-c).

the truth of the matter.

As regards the myth of the revolution of the universe, what is conspicuous lies in its intended contrast between the age of Cronus and the age of Zeus. What man in the age of Cronus has signifies what man in the age of Zeus lacks. In turn, it also tells us what man in the age of Zeus possesses and what man in the age of Cronus lacks. The different conditions of the two ages presuppose different conceptions of the statesman. Moreover, the Eleatic Stranger admitted that there was a great error in the exposition of the king and the statesman in the story of the myth. The point is absurd with regard to the fact that it was the Eleatic Stranger himself who introduced the myth into the discussion. He could have corrected earlier what he later regarded as an error. Also, if the art of weaving or clothes-making is regarded as a perfect example of the art of statesmanship, then, it should have been brought into the discussion since the beginning of the dialogue so that they should have bothered themselves with such 'too long and irrelevant talks'.

Such discursive methods which were regarded by the Eleatic Stranger as examples conducive to the understanding of the art of statesmanship are not easily comprehensible. So it seems that his 'very example requires another example'.⁴⁵ An example is still necessary as the Eleatic Stranger states that

'it is difficult to set forth any of the greater ideas, except by the use of examples; for it would seem that each of us knows everything that he knows as if in a dream and then again, when he is as it were awake, knows nothing of it all'.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Plato, *Statesman*, (277d-e).

⁴⁶ Plato, *Statesman*, (277d).

He states further that he has just touched upon the problem of human experience with regard to knowledge, *episteme pathos*. That is the problem of an *obscrum per obscurius* or the infinite regression of the reference of the unknown.⁴⁷ The young Socrates could not understand the meaning of the art of statesmanship which has been likened and exemplified in the previous examples, namely, the division between man and animals, and the myth of the revolution of the universe. He still needed a further exemplification. With regard to this problem, the situation might be easier if the Eleatic Stranger had given right away the definition of statesman; for instance, when one has been asked to explain what justice is, one might answer that justice is 'giving one his due' or 'the interest of the stronger' etc. However as it has been shown elsewhere, any straightforward definition is hardly free from being ambiguous. The situation turns out to be that those who answer do not understand what they say. However they seem to know the matter in concern since they can linguistically express its meaning; but, for the Eleatic Stranger, a decisive factor lies not in those who seem to possess the knowledge. One cannot judge what a person is by taking for granted what he claims or has been claimed to be. The sophist or the statesman or the philosopher is someone who practises his art or apprenticeship not one who claims the title. In this regard, the world of language or names can be regarded as only a dream. With regard to the Eleatic Stranger's problem of discursive methods in the *Statesman*, it can be made more comprehensible by the use of the following example.

If a physical trainer has been requested to explain the meaning of a physical trainer, he might say that a physical trainer is someone who knows how to keep the human

⁴⁷ See the *Cratylus*, 439b. This point has been discussed in Chapter Four.

body fit and strong. Anyone who has listened to that answer might think that he himself also knows what a physical trainer is. He can give the same answer to anyone who asks a similar question to the one he used to ask the physical trainer. At a linguistic level, he can be equally regarded as a physical trainer in the same way that the physical trainer is physical trainer, since he can speak like a physical trainer. However, concerning the practice of the art of physical training, he is far from being a physical trainer if he does not know what to do. Moreover, it would be ironical if that 'physical trainer' is also unhealthy. So it seems that when the physical trainer is asked to explain what a physical trainer is, he has to show it in practice, and the person who asks or would like to know what a physical trainer is cannot be said to 'know' it merely by seeing the expert practise his art.

In this sense, 'to really know means to train to become like'. In this regard, therefore, to know what the statesman is means one has to train oneself to become a statesman. Also, our recent argument entails that to train to become a statesman is at once to train to become a philosopher.⁴⁸

VI

The way the Eleatic Stranger conducts the discussion with regard to the search for the statesman does not invoke Socrates' disapproval. As it has been argued that Socrates

⁴⁸ With regard to this point, the Eleatic Stranger also states that the investigation of the statesman is undertaken to make one 'a better thinkers about all subjects'. He should have meant the philosopher. In J.B. Skemp's translation of 258d of the *Statesman*, the term philosopher has been used in this context. See Plato, *The Statesman*, trans. J.B. Skemp, London, 1961.

practises his philosophical apprenticeship and the art of statesmanship, and the Eleatic Stranger's conduct of discussion in search of the statesman is not opposed to Socrates, then, it can be inferred that when the Eleatic Stranger conducts the discussion, he at the same time practises the art of statesmanship and philosophy. When a philosopher-king practises his art, he has to be certain that a person whom he discusses it with understands his meaning and would not abuse his knowledge. He has to be responsible for what he has done.⁴⁹ Hence, when he tries to produce his like, he at the same time has to prevent the generation of any undesirable quality.

Also, as discussed before, all social institutions are said to have twofold effects. Accordingly, the art of statesmanship involves every level of social activity in which in turn the practice of the art of statesmanship can be found. It is in this regard that the Eleatic Stranger urged that the search for the art of statesmanship must begin by trying 'to see in another small and partial example the nature of example in general, with the intention of transferring afterwards the same figurative method from lesser things to the most exalted eminence of the king'.⁵⁰ Contrary to the method in the *Republic*, this method in the *Statesman* is argued to be 'always easier to practise in small matters than in greater ones'.⁵¹

Actually, this kind of method is initiated in the search for the sophist in the *Sophist*, 218d-e. He states that some lesser thing can be taken and used as a pattern for the greater since 'what example we set before us which is well known and small is no less capable of definition than any of the greater things'. Then sophistry can also

⁴⁹ This point is discussed in the *Gorgias*, (460c-d).

⁵⁰ Plato, *Statesman*, (278e).

⁵¹ Plato, *Statesman*, (286b).

be found in every level of social activity. With regard to this method, namely the search for what is practised rather than who practises it, it helps save a person who is searching from being attached to a nominalistic fallacy. From this, it is possible that the statesmanship or sophistry might not be found in those who have the namesakes but in those who have been called differently. In this regard, the one who has been called 'statesman' may not be the philosopher unless he practises the art of statesmanship. So the statesmanship in a king or in a swineherd must be equally regarded.⁵² Ironically, those who have been regarded as the rulers could have been just the servants of the city. Pericles and Cimon and Miltiades and Themistocles had been accepted by the people as their distinct statesmen. Socrates stated that he never blamed them for regarding themselves as the servants of the city since they provided those things which the caterers would have done to their masters. Socrates satirically remarked that they were free men who 'voluntarily put themselves in the position of servants'.⁵³ Nevertheless, not only these people but also others such as priests, and people of the

⁵² Klein, *Plato's Trilogy: Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Statesman*, op. cit., p. 153. This point has been inferred from what the Eleatic Stranger said in the *Sophist*, 227a-b, with regard to the method in concern. He said that one should 'honour them all equally and do not in making comparisons think one more ridiculous than another, and do not consider him who employs, as his example of hunting, the art of generalship, any more dignified than him who employs the art of louse-catching, but only, for the most part, as more pretentious'. This point also supports what Socrates discussed in the *Cratylus* regarding the theory of names. As discussed in Chapter Four, there is an ironical element with regard to the name of Hector and his son. They were 'king' as they had been called. Also, the beings whose name 'man, *anthropos*' may not deserve such denomination if they lack human quality. As in the *Statesman*, 266a-c, according to the Eleatic Stranger's application of a seemingly unnecessary geometric method to the division between man and animals, the demarcation line between human and animal is in the position of metaxy.

⁵³ Plato, *Statesman*, (289e).

assembly always 'lay claim to the art of statesmanship'⁵⁴, since with regard to virtue, they were incapable and they could not even prove themselves good citizens. The statesman must aim at 'diverting her (the city) desires another way instead of complying with them---in persuading or compelling her people to what would help them to be better'.⁵⁵ The statesman must be the one who really possesses 'political philosophy' not the one who 'merely seems to possess it'.⁵⁶

We know from Chapter Three that Socrates' mission is to make his interlocutors wonder about themselves and their self-knowledge so that the search for self-knowledge can begin in those who have been inspired. To be sure, the search for self-knowledge is inspired by the search for the good which in turn is what the search for self-knowledge will lead to. However, that is the substance of Socrates' mission. It is then true that a purpose in the art of statesmanship must also be to inspire the search for self-knowledge and the good; but political philosophy informs those who practise it about the nature of the soul and the city. From that, the philosopher-king is aware of the different conditions of the soul as well as the city, as it has been stated that 'the discovery of the natures and conditions of men's souls---will prove one of the things must useful to that art whose task it is to treat them; and that art is the art of politics'.⁵⁷

So the knowledge of the nature of man is a prerequisite in the art of statesmanship. In his practice, he will differently approach different kinds of men in

⁵⁴ Plato, *Statesman*, (290c-291b).

⁵⁵ Plato, *Gorgias*, (515d-517d).

⁵⁶ Plato, *Statesman*, (293c-d).

⁵⁷ Plato, *Laws*, (Book I 650b).

order to make another one like himself, the person in question must achieve what the philosopher-king has achieved, that is, the understanding of the good and human nature. Therefore, the philosopher-king practises his art in order to guide the person in question to achieve it. Thus, it is for this reason that the dialectic and geometric division between man and animals and the myth of the revolution of the universe were employed to inspire further a deeper and more serious examination of human nature and the care of human beings which are the statesman's chief concern. As the significance of the application of the square root to the understanding of human nature has been already meticulously discussed and frequently referred, here the message in the myth of the revolution of the universe is to be comprehended.

With regard to human life in the age of Cronos, necessity does not exist. The gods rule and tend the herd of human beings, but their relationship is comparable to one between man whose nature is more divine, and animals of a different and lower species like a shepherd and a flock of sheep. However, man in the age of Zeus lives without the care of a God-shepherd. The condition and relationship of men in the age of Zeus are different from the previous age. The concept of happiness in the two ages is incommensurable. It is impossible to say which kind of life is more blessed. Man in the age of Cronos might have regarded life without necessity and difficulty as ideal and happiest. The relationship is much more like the life of animals under the care of human beings in the age of Zeus. In such a Arcadian society or under the care of God, it is said that:

'there were no states, nor did men possess wives or children; for they all came to life again out of the earth, with no recollection of their former lives. So there were no states or families, but they had fruits in plenty

from the trees and other plants, which the earth furnished them of its own accord, without help from agriculture. And they lived for the most part in the open air, without clothing or bedding; for the climate was tempered for their comfort, and the abundant grass that grew up out of the earth furnished them soft couches.⁵⁸

From above, the Eleatic Stranger remarked that the rise of the statesman among men in the age of Cronus was hardly possible, since 'no necessity had hitherto compelled them'.⁵⁹ Also, philosophy never comes into being. If men in such an age lack philosophy, he would never have had through possession of some peculiar power 'in any respect beyond his fellows perceptions tending towards an increase of wisdom'. Everything has been under the control of the gods. One doubts that for that reason in the age of Cronus the gods care for the mortals. However, the reason has not been stated. Moreover, it does not state whether men in such an age are willing or unwilling to be in the care of the gods. Also such care seems to be the care of the body, and men in such an age seem to be able to concern themselves with their bodies rather than their souls. In a way, the gods seem like the caterer rather than the ruler, since the care of the gods is absolute. The gods know that the good for the mortals is nothing but food and shelter. By nature, men are under the gods' control regardless of their will. Perhaps, this is the only necessity existing in the age of Cronus.

⁵⁸ Plato, *Statesman*, (272a-b).

⁵⁹ Plato, *Statesman*, (274c).

VII

In another sense, it is much more like the relationship between the tyrant and his subjects. Accordingly, the Eleatic Stranger concludes that if men in the age of Cronus lived their lives in such a condition, then, there would have been more happiness in the age of Zeus where men were free and had to take care of themselves.⁶⁰ However, what is more important is man in the present time as the Eleatic Stranger said 'let us pass those matters by, so long as there is no one capable of reporting to us what the desires of the people in those days were in regard to knowledge and the employment of speech' because 'the reason why we revived this legend must be told, in order that we may get ahead afterwards'.⁶¹ So the story of human life in the age of Cronus is intended to contrast the nature of man in both ages which in turn makes one realise one's own condition and search for what is the good for them with reference to their human condition.

To be sure, preceding the age of Zeus, there existed another age. When the age of Cronus completed itself, the universe revolted and the earth turned backwards because of fate and innate desire. What came after was the age of men in which the gods 'let go their care'. Injustice and all the elements of harshness in the animals emerged from great disorder effected by the revolution of the universe. When men became separated from the guidance of the divine pilot, they deteriorated and mingled 'but little good with much of the opposite sort' instead of great good and little evil as they did in the beginning. They were led to destruction in the end, and the divine power then took its

⁶⁰ Plato, *Statesman*, (274d).

⁶¹ Plato, *Statesman*, (272d).

place again and restored order and made it immortal and ageless.⁶²

The myth has rendered two opposite kinds of life, purely divine and purely bestial, before it comes to the age of man of the present time. What human life in this age would be, the myth told us that 'there is less to say and it is more to our purpose'.⁶³ In the reign of Zeus, man is supposed to be the ruler of his own course, *autokrotora*.⁶⁴ All necessities exist. With regard to all difficulties in material condition, men need to develop skills and knowledge which it had been told of in the old traditions that all these were given to men by Hephaestus and Prometheus. They have to learn to provide themselves what they need and lack. Then it has been said that 'from these has arisen all that constitutes human life'. The myth came to the conclusion that with regard to the condition of human life in our time which

'the gods had failed them and they had to direct their own lives and take care of themselves, like the whole universe, which we imitate and follow through all time, being born and living now in our present manner and in that other epoch in the other manner.'⁶⁵

In the reign of Cronus, men were under the care of the gods, but no one knows whether they were happy and enjoyed their lives in the same way that men in the reign of Zeus did. In the unnamed age, men became wild and bestial and mingled more with evil than the good, but men of the present time are free to live their lives. It can be said

⁶² Plato, *Statesman*, (273b-e).

⁶³ Plato, *Statesman*, (274b).

⁶⁴ Plato, *Statesman*, (274a).

⁶⁵ Plato, *Statesman*, (274d).

that they had been through 'good and evil' lives which they are now free to imitate. They might struggle to imitate either one of the opposite manners of living.

Man in the time of Zeus was free to choose his own path. As regards the line of succession of each age in the myth, it is not, as Jean-Pierre Vernant argues, 'linear and irreversible time'.⁶⁶ Before telling the tale, the Eleatic Stranger stated that the tale 'is the portent connected with the tale of the quarrel between Atreus and Thyestes'.⁶⁷ The source of the myth can be said to come from Homer. Atreus, the son of Pelops and the father of Agamemnon, is the ancestor of Orestes. The tale of Atreus and Thyestes is about the feud in the family. In other words, it can be regarded as genocide. The story of Orestes comes from Homer's great epic. As a consequence of the evil from the genocide, the sun turned back on its course in horror when 'Atreus served up to Thyestes the flesh of the latter's own children'.⁶⁸ In the myth of the revolution of the universe, the time of an age elapses or turns backwards because of the evil of itself. The tale of the bloodshed between brothers and the myth of the revolution of the universe can be connected to Hesiod's myth of the races⁶⁹, as they tell of the cause of the change in the nature of each age of human beings; but as stated above, man in the present time has the free will to choose his own manner of life. The time in the myths in both the *Statesman* and the *Cratylus* is cyclical. Vernant's study points out that with regard to the myths in the

⁶⁶ See Vernant, *Myth and Thought among the Greeks*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁶⁷ Plato, *Statesman*, (268e).

⁶⁸ Herbert Jennings Rose, 'Atreus' in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

⁶⁹ In Chapter Five, the conflation of these two stories can be found in Socrates' etymological analysis in the *Cratylus*.

Statesman and the *Cratylus*, it is incomprehensible in the context of human time to be continuously degenerating, 'but it makes perfect sense if we accept that the series of ages is a recurring renewable cycle, just like the sequence of seasons'.⁷⁰ 'To be or not to be' one or another kind of life is of the free will of man. What has happened can recur. As the Eleatic Stranger said 'Of the portents recorded in ancient tales many did happen and will happen again'.⁷¹ Man in the reign of Zeus could choose to be like one of the preceding ages.

However, in doing so, he just forgets himself that he by nature is not 'man' of the other ages. But what he could do is imagine and understand what life would be if he lived in any one of the other ages, either of Cronus or the unnamed ages. He might not be able to think or understand the condition of life in the same way that man in that condition thinks and understands. He might not be able to understand such different conditions of life better than men in those conditions understand; but he can understand and think of what kind of life he will have and what he himself would be if he lives in such different kinds of conditions of life with his present and existing nature. He can imagine that in the age of Cronus he is unable to enjoy his life with his family in the same way that he does now, although he knows that his life will be less painful and toilsome.

In the unnamed age, he can, or perhaps would never like to, imagine what a chaotic and violent life he would experience. In the myth, the meaning of such evil is not elaborated, but man in age of Zeus can think of it at hand. Man in the age of Zeus can think and imagine himself to be

⁷⁰ Vernant, *Myth and Thought among the Greeks*, op. cit., p. 6.

⁷¹ Plato, *Statesman*, (268e).

in other epochs because these epochs already exist in his present life. It is possible for him to understand men in other ages if he and they are of the same nature or race. That is the destiny of man in the reign of Zeus which 'is less to say and it is more to (his) purpose'. He might also be able to understand those men in the 'past' better than they understood themselves if those men could not realise the nature common to his and theirs in the same way that he now understands. However, man of the present time might not be able to understand those men in the past better than they understood themselves if he could not realise the nature common to his and theirs in the same way that men in the past understood, but he might be able to understand those men in the past exactly the same way that they understood themselves if he and they all understood the common nature of man. He would never be able to understand either those men in the past or men of his own time if he failed to understand and appreciate their common nature. When he understands and is able to appreciate the common nature of man, he can understand others, who either understand or do not understand the common nature of man, as they understand themselves as 'human being'. That common nature of man is *metaxy*. Hence, it would be a great mistake to regard the gods' care in the reign of Cronus to be the art of statesmanship for man in the reign of Zeus. As the Eleatic Stranger asserts that

'the form of the divine shepherd is greater than that of the king, whereas the statesmen who now exist here are by nature much more like their subjects, with whom they share much more nearly the same breeding and education'.⁷²

⁷² Plato, *Statesman*, (275c).

IX

As stated above, the care for men in the reign of Cronus centres upon physical needs. Such care is absolute and necessary. If men in the age of Zeus have to live their life under such care, they would be situated in the kind of relationship between a shepherd and a flock of animals. It is more likely that they would regard their guardian as a dictator or a tyrant rather than a statesman. But one cannot say that the gods are tyrannous to men in such an age since the nature of those men is unfree and perhaps they never thought that they lacked something in their lives. Men in the age of Zeus had to provide themselves with what they needed. Under such necessity, they had to fulfil their physical needs of their own accord, but what they needed was not only physical fulfilment, but the care of their own selves or souls. It is the soul which is self-moving and free to choose its own destiny. Self-motion in the soul presupposes its power, *dunamis*, which is driven by *eros*. Every soul loves the good and what is good, but men have to drive and direct their own chariot-psyche.

In this regard, men in our age need the art of chariot-driving like the pilot of the gods in the age of Cronus. The art of statesmanship fulfils this aspect which men need, and the art of statesmanship is supposed to be found in all men since they by nature have 'to direct their own lives and take care of themselves'.⁷³ To rule oneself, one must first understand oneself. The search for self-knowledge is then essential. The knowledge of human nature is necessary. That is why the Eleatic Stranger has to conduct the division between man and animals in such a peculiar way.

⁷³ Plato, *Statesman*, (274d).

With regard to the politics of the soul, the statesman applies his knowledge of human nature at the same time that he attempts to guide someone to the understanding of human nature. However, the nature of man is *metaxy*, man is neither divine nor bestial although at some time he might be more divine or more bestial. Furthermore, there are different types of soul. So, in this regard, when the art of statesmanship is practised, it has to be at once defending and producing, and with regard to the *metaxy* of human nature, the art of statesmanship cannot only be determined by the voluntariness of its subject. It depends on the character of the subject. It has been explained that the art of those who use compulsion is regarded as tyrannical whilst the voluntary care of voluntary bipeds is called politics or the art of statesmanship. This point seems to be a loophole through which someone can mistake the statesman for the tyrant. It is true that the statesman can use compulsion, but it is not the use of physical force and terrorism like that of the tyrant. Paradoxically, the compulsion in the art of statesmanship is exerted in his persuasive speech. To be sure, it does not mean that the tyrant is ignorant of sophistry, rhetoric in particular.

Sophistry and philosophy are very close to each other. They concern themselves with the pursuit of virtues, the good, arts and knowledge. They are practised by means of discourse. Their terminology and vocabulary are never too far from being similar, though form and substance of philosophy are so much different from presentation of sophistry. Undoubtedly, people are easily confused between the sophist and the philosopher as the Athenians mistook Socrates for a sophist. So the trilogy of the search for the understanding of the sophist, statesman, and philosopher is made in order to investigate the matter. With regard to a seeming similarity like two different objects behind the same screen, the tyrant and the sophist

can be mistaken for the statesman and the philosopher. What makes the statesman completely different from the tyrant is his love and care for the people. The tyrant's care for his subject is as involuntary as the subject's respect for tyrant, though it is difficult to differentiate true love and care from false ones. The demarcation line between the statesman and the tyrant does not seem very clear. However, they differ very much from one another with regard to the purpose of the care of their subjects. With regard to the statesman's care, he intends to make another like himself who can rule and take care of himself, but the tyrant cares for his subject in order to exploit and suppress him as long as he can.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Statesman

The discursive methods, namely, the dialectic division between man and animals, and the myth of the universe, are said to be examples of the art of statesmanship. This is like teaching children to read the letters by making them recognise 'the several letters well enough in the short and easy syllables so that they could make correct statements about them'. Then, if in other syllables, 'they are in doubt about those same letters', then, 'the easiest and best way to lead them to the letters which they do not yet know' is

'to lead them first to those cases in which they had correct opinions about these same letters and then to lead them and set them beside the groups which they did not yet recognize and by comparing them to show that their nature is the same in both combination alike, and to continue until the letters about which their opinions are correct have been shown in juxtaposition with all those of which they are ignorant, (b)eing shown in this way they become examples and bring it about that every letter is in all syllables always called by the same name, either by differentiation from the other letters, in case it is different, or because it is the same'.¹

The common elements in the discursive analyses are like the letters which were intended to be recognized by those who are interested in the search for the art of statesmanship. The common element in the dialectic division and the myth of the universe can be said to be

¹ Plato, *Statesman*, (278a-b).

concerned with the understanding of human nature, since the statesman is generally understood as one who rules and takes care of the herds of human beings. To be able to give the best care for human beings, the statesman is required to understand human nature. The understanding of human nature is the proper science of the statesman.² Attaining self-interest presupposes the knowledge of the self.³ This common element is like the letters which are set as the examples which those who learn are expected to be able to recognise when they are 'transferred to the long and difficult syllables of life'⁴; as those who conversed with the Eleatic Stranger are treated 'as if they were children,' since 'they however are not much too old for children's tales.'⁵

As said above, the young Socrates could not understand the message in the discursive analyses of the Eleatic Stranger, and the examples required examples and the art of statesmanship itself is the art of weaving. The study of the art of weaving is not taken just for its own sake. The Eleatic Stranger asks that 'when a pupil is asked of what letters some word or other is composed, is the question asked for the sake of the one particular word before him or rather to make him more learned about all words in the

² After finishing the dialectic division, the Eleatic Stranger said 'when that division is made and the art of herding human beings is made plain, we ought to take the statesmanlike and kingly man and place him as a sort of charioteer therein, handing over to him the reins of the state, because that is his own proper science, *episteme*.' See the *Statesman*, 266e.

³ Plato, *Alcibiades I*, (132c). See also Michel Foucault, *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, Patrick H. Hutton (ed.), London, 1988, pp. 25-26.

⁴ Plato, *Statesman*, (278d).

⁵ Plato, *Statesman*, (268e).

lesson?⁶ Certainly, it is for the sake of understanding all subjects like a group of pupils learning their letters to understand all words. Apparently, at this point, as it has been argued before, it emphasises the inseparability of the art of statesmanship and philosophical apprenticeship.

I

The Eleatic Stranger claims that the art of statesmanship can be made comprehensible in the study of other trivial arts. At random, the art of weaving wool is chosen for the purpose.⁷ What is the purpose? The Eleatic Stranger says 'no man of sense would wish to pursue the discussion of weaving for its own sake; but most people, it seems to me, fail to notice that some things have sensible resemblances which are easily perceived.'⁸ In the art of weaving as well as in others, there are aspects of action, that is, it is either for or against something.

Regarding both purposes, appropriate material should be selected in accordance with different situations. To make certain kinds of garments, certain kinds of methods must be used with regard to the nature of the material. In order to fasten together all the materials, some need extraneous matter such as liquids and cement whilst others do not. The latter which results from the art of weaving is called clothes. Thus clothes-making is the purpose of the art of weaving. Clothes are made as protective coverings. One practises the art of weaving in order to produce clothes to protect oneself. In this regard, the art of weaving as well as others is instrumental in serving

⁶ Plato, *Statesman*, (285c-d).

⁷ Plato, *Statesman*, (279b).

⁸ Plato, *Statesman*, (285e).

this purpose. Accordingly, what the statesman does with regard to his statesmanship is producing something for his defense. In the process of weaving, the art of weaving consists of other arts. It is said that all production necessarily involves two arts, namely, the arts of contingent and actual cause.⁹ The former is 'those arts which do not produce the actual thing in question, but which supply to the arts which do produce it the tools without which no art could ever perform its prescribed work'.¹⁰ In the case of weaving, the arts of contingent cause are those that produce the tools that 'partake in the production of clothing,' whereas those which involve 'washing and mending and all the care of clothing' are of actual cause.¹¹ With regard to the latter, such arts further require other arts in accomplishing their task.

The arts of carding and spinning concern themselves with composition and division. Composition and division could not be possible without the art of measurement.¹² There exist two kinds of measurement to which the art is to be applied. They are the measurement of quality and quantity.¹³ With regard to the measurement of quality, in practising it, what one ought to do is that:

'when a person at first sees only the unity or common quality of many things, when all sorts of dissimilarities are seen in a large number of objects he must find it impossible to be discouraged or to stop until he has gathered into one circle of similarity all the things which are related to each other and has included them in

⁹ Plato, *Statesman*, (281d).

¹⁰ Plato, *Statesman*, (281e).

¹¹ Plato, *Statesman*, (281e-282a).

¹² Plato, *Statesman*, (283d).

¹³ Plato, *Statesman*, (285b).

some sort of class on the basis of their essential nature.¹⁴

This description of the art of measurement in the art of weaving reminds one of the dialectic division between man and animals.¹⁵ It explains why the square root has to be applied at the final division between man and animals. Humanity could not be separated from other species by quantitative measurement. One must understand the quality of being human. The quantitative measurement cannot tell the difference between man and animals. It only renders the idea that man is 'tame, gregarious, non-cross breeding, featherless bipeds'.¹⁶ The art of measurement has to pursue the division of things in terms of quality until the essence of each particular thing can be found. As there exist two ways of measurement which are both indispensable. Thus the art of measurement must distinguish qualities such as greatness and smallness with reference not only to the relationship between each of the qualities but also to the standard of the mean, *metron*¹⁷. Since the latter alone would yield the result of the non-existence of all beings whilst the former by itself would render the impractical result,¹⁸ the statesman would never exist if the search for him is conducted through the measurement made in terms of his relation to others. The

¹⁴ Plato, *Statesman*, (285a-b).

¹⁵ The art of measurement is itself the art of dialectic. See *Statesman*, 286d-287a.

¹⁶ Plato, *Statesman*, (265e-266e). Sextus Empiricus takes this quantitative analysis as Plato's criteria of man. He criticised the fallacy of this concept of man that 'Plato gives a worse definition of Man than the others when he states that "Man is a wingless animal, with two feet and broad nails, receptive of political science" '. Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Logicians I*, 281.

¹⁷ Cf. the discussion of the good as *metron* in the *Philebus*, 64e-65a.

¹⁸ Plato, *Statesman*, (283e-284a).

existence of statesmanship will be meaningless and impractical if it has been measured with regard to the standard of the mean alone. It has been regarded also that 'if this is not admitted, neither the statesman nor any other man who has knowledge of practical affairs can be said without any doubt to exist'.¹⁹

With regard to the art of actual and contingent causes in the art of statesmanship, the Eleatic Stranger further divides it by means of the art of measurement into seven general classes. It is said that neither state nor statesmanship could ever exist without these arts.²⁰ As regards their close relationship to state and statesmanship, it is possible that those who practise those arts will claim their share in statesmanship. Such arts are carpentry, pottery, bronze-working, generalship, painting, decorating, music, medicine, husbandry, cooking, hunting, gymnastics, etc., which fall under either one of these seven classes, namely, first, the art of actual cause in each art, then, the classes of instrument, receptacle, vehicle, defence, plaything, and nourishment. These arts can be said to be concerned with the property in tame

¹⁹ Plato, *Statesman*, (284c). Also at 284d, the Eleatic Stranger says:

'That sometime we shall need this principle of the mean for the demonstration of our present purpose good and sufficient is, in my opinion, magnificently supported by this argument---that we must believe that all the arts alike exist and that the greater and the less are measured in relation not only to one another but also to the establishment of the standard of the mean. For if this exists, they exist also, and if they exist, it exists also, but neither can ever exist if the other does not.'

Compare this to the *Parmenides*, 166c: 'The one and the others in relation to themselves and to each other all in every way are and are not and appear and do not appear.'

²⁰ Plato, *Statesman*, (287d-289c).

animals which are included in the heading of the art of herding or nourishing. Therefore, the class of slaves and servants in general is left to be considered.²¹

Slaves and servants are the people who practise the art of service. This class consists of voluntary and involuntary slaves. What is to be considered is the voluntary one, since the other would never make any claim to any share in statesmanship; neither would those voluntary labourers be for hire. However, the statesmanship would be claimed by merchants or those who 'carry about and distribute among one another the productions of husbandry and the other arts, whether in the domestic market-places or by travelling from city to city by land or sea, exchanging money for wares or money for money'.²² Next is the class of heralds and those 'who become by long practice skilled as clerks and other clever men who perform various services in connexion with public offices'.²³ Further, it is the class of the priests or prophets and those who regard themselves as 'interpreters of the gods to men'.²⁴ Then, it is the class of sophists which is the large crowd of people of very mixed races; some are like lions and centaurs and other fierce creatures and some like satyrs and the weak and cunning beasts. That 'they make quick exchanges of forms and qualities with one another' makes it most difficult to separate them from the statesman.²⁵ They practised conjuring something elusive and non-existent. These people with the arts of service which is just the art of contingent causes to the art of statesmanship more than any others 'set up claims against

²¹ Plato, *Statesman*, (289c-e).

²² Plato, *Statesman*, (289e).

²³ Plato, *Statesman*, (290b).

²⁴ Plato, *Statesman*, (290c).

²⁵ Plato, *Statesman*, (291a-c).

the king for the very fabric of his art,' 'just as the spinners and carders and the rest claims against the weavers'.²⁶

This dialectic dividing the contingent from the actual cause in the art of statesmanship can be related to the story in the myth of the revolution of the universe. These arts would be redundant in the age of Cronus since the gods would have already provided everything which these men tried to practise their arts to attain. These men cannot be regarded as practising the art of statesmanship. They are either the servants or the tyrants of the city. We do not know for what reason the gods care for their subjects, but we know the reason of those men in the age of Zeus. They paid their service in order to get what they wanted, and what they wanted was of the same kind as what they gave.

II

Hence, from above, the statesmanship should be determined by neither the art of nourishment nor the art of service nor the quantitative measurement. So it can be inferred that the number of the ruler, his wealth or poverty, the voluntariness or involuntariness of his subjects, and his rule with or without written laws cannot be taken as the criterion of the statesman.²⁷ Only the art of statesmanship must be the distinguishing feature, namely, the forms of government must be distinguished solely by the presence of the art of statesmanship *per se* in the same way that philosophy differentiates the philosopher from the sophist. With regard to the number of

²⁶ Plato, *Statesman*, (289c).

²⁷ Plato, *Statesman*, (292c).

the rulers, whether it is the rule of the one, the few, or the many, each form of government can be divided into two opposites with regard to the presence or absence of the art of statesmanship. That is, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy can be differentiated from tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy although the number of the rulers of these polities remains the same. However the art of statesmanship could be found only in 'one or two or very few men' but never in the multitude.²⁸ The multitude in the city could never acquire the art of statesmanship in the same way that the desires in the soul could never acquire philosophy since the desires as well as the multitude love and regard pleasures as the good. However, as it has been previously shown, it will be a mistake to interpret that the art of statesmanship must be found in those who hold the ruling offices of monarchic or aristocratic polities, since the statesman is the one who really possesses the art of statesmanship; it does not matter whether he is a ruler or a private citizen.²⁹

The statesman and his art can be compared to the physicians and their practice of the art of medicine. As long as they exercise their art, they are always regarded as physicians 'whether they cure us against our will or with our will, by cutting us or burning us or causing us pain in any other way, and whether they do it by written rules or without them, and whether they are rich or poor'.³⁰ As regards the absence of laws in the rule of the statesman, the Eleatic Stranger explains that 'for the differences of men and of actions and the fact that nothing in human life is ever at rest, forbid any science whatsoever to promulgate any simple rule for everything and

²⁸ Plato, *Statesman*, (292e-293a).

²⁹ Plato, *Statesman*, (293a-d, 259b).

³⁰ Plato, *Statesman*, (293b-c).

for all time'.³¹

Moreover, the inflexible nature of law is opposed to the nature of philosophy, since the context which is congenial and appropriate for the nurture of philosophy must be where those with a philosophic nature have the freedom to search for virtue and the good. Such has to be done through the dialectic method in which questioning and answering must be carried on until it reaches the nature of the first principle. However the nature of law and its enforcement are 'like a stubborn and ignorant man who allows no one to do anything, contrary to his command, or even to ask a question, not even if something new occurs to some one, which is better than the rule he has himself ordained'.³² The statesman would never put himself under any law. In fact, he is the law-maker himself since he knows what is just and what is unjust. Although the statesman understands that such limitation in the nature of law would never make the rule by law 'the most perfect right', yet he has to 'legislate for the majority and in a general way only roughly for individuals' because no one 'could sit beside each person all his life and tell him exactly what is proper for him to do'.³³ Of course, no statesman would 'ever put obstacles in his own way by writing laws,' 'if he were able to do so'.³⁴ The purpose of law-making is to maintain justice in the city, but what it can do is just imitate as closely as possible the perfect pattern of justice in the rule of philosopher-king. As the nature of the city and the soul is self-moving, laws like a physician's prescription have to be changed in accordance with the changing condition of the patient.

³¹ Plato, *Statesman*, (294b).

³² Plato, *Statesman*, (294c).

³³ Plato, *Statesman*, (295a-b).

³⁴ Plato, *Statesman*, (295b).

Moreover, the statesman understands that his 'laws' which have been issued for the situation when he 'is going away and expects to be a long time absent from his patterns or pupils' can be changed or opposed by other laws 'if the scientific law-maker, or another like him, should come' to the city.³⁵

At this point, with regard to law-changing, a problem arises. The Eleatic Stranger said that to change the old laws and make better ones, the people in general said that it must only be done by means of persuasion.³⁶ However the art of statesmanship cannot be restricted to the willing of the subjects. Whatever the statesman has done, no matter if it was violent or contrary to the written precepts, should not be regarded as an 'unscientific and baneful error'.³⁷ So the power of the statesman can be regarded as absolute. Here, the Eleatic Stranger urges that it is at this point that a serious problem has to be pointed out.³⁸ The problem originates in the attempt to imitate the art of statesmanship. As it is just an imitation without any possession of the true art of statesmanship, it inevitably oscillates between the extremities of the dictatorship of the one and the dictatorship of the many. Paradoxically, it swings from what has been negated as the arbitrary rule of the charlatan who claims to possess a rule or special knowledge of his own to what seems to be the legitimate lawful government whose laws and judgements in every subject have been decided and sanctioned by the arbitrary power of the disqualified many.

³⁵ Plato, *Statesman*, (295c, 295e-296a).

³⁶ Plato, *Statesman*, (296a).

³⁷ Plato, *Statesman*, (296b-297b).

³⁸ Plato, *Statesman*, (297c).

It has been stated what existing forms of government can do with regard to the art of statesmanship is merely to imitate it as closely as possible; but the imitation of absolute power is incommensurable to the actual practice of the art of statesmanship which possesses knowledge of the good and wisdom. They do not benefit the city. They damage the city. The abusive power of the imitators inevitably incites discontentment amongst the subjects which finally leads to revolution and the overthrow of that reign of absolute power. Following this, the absolute power of the single or very few experts can no longer be accepted in order to prevent such an extreme abuse of power. Power or authority not only in politics but also any other field has to be decided or judged in the last analysis by the general assembly of the people. They will never allow anyone to do anything contrary to the laws which have been made by the assembly. Of course, they purported to know by nature what political virtue such as justice is.³⁹ Now the dictatorship of the one completes its transformation into the dictatorship of the many. 'Anyone who is found to be investigating the art of pilotage or navigation or the subject of health and true medical doctrine...contrary to the written rules,' would be regarded as

'a star-gazer, a kind of loquacious sophist, and secondly anyone who is properly qualified may bring an accusation against him and hale him into court for corrupting the young and persuading them to essay the arts of navigation and medicine in opposition to the laws and to govern the ships and the sick according to their own will.'⁴⁰

³⁹ As Protagoras flatters the people by stating that they are naturally endowed with a share of the sense of justice.

⁴⁰ Plato, *Statesman*, (299b-c).

For they thought that nothing was wiser than the laws which had been given by them.

III

Hence, it can be understood that the imitation of the just rule of the statesman by those existing rulers who lack the understanding of the art of statesmanship is easily prone to corruption and abuse of power. The dictatorship of the one has been regarded as an arbitrary rule. The dictatorship of the many is the rule of the 'lawfully lawless many'. The latter of course ruins a philosophical investigation of many important subjects, particularly, the art of statesmanship. However, the violation of some laws which have been carefully made and approved by the people causes greater ruin than the imperfect laws to some other ordered activity.⁴¹

However, the real statesman would change the laws 'when he thought another course was better though it violated the rules he had written and sent to his absent subjects'.⁴² The art of statesmanship restores itself by the plasticity of itself. It modernizes itself by making itself viable to be re-enacted and developed by those of a different time and place who possess a philosophic-kingly nature like his. To put it differently, it enables the statesman to communicate with his 'absent subjects'.

Thus the just city under the rule of the philosopher-king is governed without any written laws. The imitation of the rule of the philosopher-king is of course not as

⁴¹ Plato, *Statesman*, (300a-b).

⁴² Plato, *Statesman*, (300c-d).

just and perfect as the ideal city itself. However, it renders forms of government which can be regarded as less difficult to live with'. Although all but the ideal polity are difficult, they can be ranged from the hardest to the easiest ones. As said before, there is only one form of just city, that is, the rule of the philosopher-king. It is distinguishable from other polities by presence of the art of statesmanship. The art of statesmanship differentiates the just from the unjust polity. Among the unjust or imperfect polities, what distinguishes one from the others is the principle of lawfulness and lawlessness.⁴³ With the existence of good written rules in the polity, the rule of the one, the rule of few, and the rule of the many are respectively called monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Tyranny, oligarchy, and also democracy stand in opposition to their counterparts with the rules of good written laws.

With laws, monarchy is the best among these forms of government while democracy is the worst. Since the many are weak and ignorant by nature, therefore the laws which reflect their characters and desires are inferior to the laws of the one or the few who are better and wiser. They are superior to the many in the same way that the rational and the spirited parts are superior to the desires. Democracy with laws can become the totalitarianism of the general will if one views the assembly of the people in the Rousseau-esque manner. It restrains what the general will regards as alien or different from what it desires or likes. However, without laws, the rule of the one is the worst since tyranny is the most powerful in all respects. Political power which is in the hands of only one person is more dangerous than in the rule of the few or the many. Decision-making made by one person is of course quicker and more effective than those made by the many. If it is made

⁴³ Plato, *Statesman*, (302b-e).

with a good judgement, it is the best, but if it has been made by a madman, the consequence are disastrous. So the lawless democracy makes life in the city most desirable.⁴⁴ In this regard, it can be said that with regard to the theory of knowledge, an anarchistic method or epistemology should be preferred to anything else in democracy. Therefore, the rule of the one is the best polity of all with laws while the rule of the many is the best polity of all without laws.

However, to rule with laws is to rule the city by imitating as closely as possible the rule of the true statesman or the philosopher-king. To be sure, as mentioned above, such a rule is a rule without laws. The nature of its plasticity is derived from its underlying knowledge of human nature of *metaxy*. Thus its plasticity can accommodate itself to the nature of the city and man. However, with regard to the rule by laws which aim at imitating this flexibility of statesmanship,

'if they were to do this without science, they would be trying to imitate reality, they would, however, imitate reality badly in every case; but if they were scientific, then it would no longer be imitation, but the actual perfect reality of which we spoke'.⁴⁵

This means that to rightly imitate the statesman, one must become like the statesman himself. The imitation, *mimesis*, of the object becomes the object itself. It is no longer an imitation. If it is not successful, the imitating polity or ruler would achieve only the forms of government which are guided by good written laws. In contradistinction to this, it also implies that the

⁴⁴ Plato, *Statesman*, (303b).

⁴⁵ Plato, *Statesman*, (300e).

statesman successfully makes another like himself. At first, it might be called an imitation. The imitator would first learn to recognise each letter in simple and short syllables. Until he understands and is able to distinguish certain letters in long and difficult syllables of life, then he is no longer the imitator but the statesman himself. Again, when certain forms of government, namely, the rule of the one, the few, and the many, rightly imitate the art of statesmanship, they would respectively be called monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. On the other hand, a ruler becomes a tyrant

'when he acts in accordance with neither laws nor customs, but claims, in imitation of the scientific ruler, that whatever is best must be done, even though it be contrary to the written laws, and this imitation is inspired by desire and ignorance'.⁴⁶

Also, the rules of the few and the many in this respect have to be called oligarchy, and democracy.

IV

When the philosopher-king rules, it is said that all the five names of governments, that is, monarchy-tyranny, aristocracy-oligarchy, and democracy become only one.⁴⁷ They become one under the rule of the best polity of the philosopher-king. On the contrary, these five names but six forms of government arise when

'men are not contented with that one perfect ruler, and do not believe that there could ever be any one worthy of

⁴⁶ Plato, *Statesman*, (301c).

⁴⁷ Plato, *Statesman*, (301b).

such power or willing and able by ruling with virtue and knowledge to dispense justice and equity rightly to all, but that he will harm and kill and injure any one of us whom he chooses on any occasion, since they admit that if such a man as we describe should really arise, he would be welcomed and would continue to dwell among them, directing to their weal as sole ruler a perfectly right form of government'.⁴⁸

Here, a very significant stage has been reached. The imperfect polities arise because of two reasons. First, no one believes in the possibility of the rule of the philosopher-king. Secondly, if people think that there is such a man, they will install him as their sole ruler to look after their well-being. The paradox in the passage 301b-d is apparent. At first, all forms of government are reduced to one when the rule of philosopher-king takes place. Secondly, those forms of government again arise because although people do not believe in the possibility of the philosopher-king, however, when they think they found such a man, they let him take control over them as 'sole ruler a perfectly right form of government'. The second statement consists of two seemingly self-contradicting parts. One is opposed to the actualization of the rule of the philosopher-king whilst the other seems to be supporting it. With regard to the latter, all other forms of government should rather have been resolved to a single polity; but they are said to come into existence when the people let someone whom they thought was a perfect king rule over them.

If one can distinguish certain letters in rather long and unfamiliar syllables and if one can understand that the art of statesmanship like the art of weaving is at once defending and producing, he should be able to point out this paradox. Furthermore, he should have also been able

⁴⁸ Plato, *Statesman*, (301c-d).

to understand that what seemed to be paradoxical in the Eleatic Stranger's statements actually is not so. He should have been able to see through the smokescreen which is used to cover something and prevent it from reaching those who are prone to abuse it. Also, he should have been able to distinguish between a star-gazer, a kind of loquacious sophist and a real statesman. That is, he should have been able to recognise that it is Socrates who was the only one or one of the few, who practised the true art of statesmanship.

If one can distinguish the care of the gods in the reign of Cronus and the care of the statesman in the reign of Zeus, he would definitely understand why there is no paradox in the two statements. People always have faith in the seeming art of statesmanship in the age of Cronus. They expect the perfect ruler to look after their welfare. They mistake the image of the shepherd for the statesman. They mistake themselves for the herds of animals. They never examine the identity and difference between themselves as human beings and other animals, although the first thing which has been discussed in a strange manner is the dialectic and geometric division between man and animals.

The second point in the discussion is the two kinds of relationship with regard to the care of the shepherd-gods for the herds of animal-cum-man and the care of the human-statesman for the herds of his human-fellows. They forgot that in the reign of Zeus man had to rule and take care of himself. Therefore, when the people found someone whom they regard to be a perfect ruler and then let the person rule them, at that moment, they start to give birth to a tyrant. The tyrant and the slave are a perfect match. One presupposes the other. When the people do not rule and take care of themselves but look to someone to look after them in the same way that the gods in the time of Cronus

looked after their subjects, they turn themselves into slaves. When slave emerges, its tyrant or master is not far from being true. The absence of belief in the possibility of the philosopher-king presupposes the absence of belief in self-rule, since the essence of the philosopher-king is first and foremost self-knowledge and self-rule. In this regard, the absence of this kind of belief presupposes the coming into existence of slavery and tyranny. Their misunderstanding of the nature of man is conducive to misunderstanding the theory of the rule of the philosopher-king. That is why when they think they have found a perfect ruler, they let him take control over themselves. From this, a vicious cycle begins. It begins at the point where the Eleatic Stranger urged the young Socrates to return to the simile of the physician and the noble captain of a ship and use it 'to help us to discover something'. Also, apart from the discovery of the truth of the art of statesmanship, it points to, as it has been discussed, the reality of the origin of the disbelief of the possibility of the idea of the philosopher-king which in turn generates trust in the justice and fairness in the rule of laws of the many. All these originate in the lack of the art of statesmanship which actually is the lack of philosophy. The absence of both is the absence of self-knowledge.

The true statesman never rules in the same way that those in the rules of the one, the few, and the many do. The city of the statesman is first and foremost established in the soul, since his primary political engagement is the politics of the soul. As Socrates replies to Glaucon who was yet very sceptical about the possibility of the *kallipolis*:

'Well, perhaps there is a pattern of it (the ideal city) laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen. But it makes no difference

whether it exists now or ever will come into being. The politics of this city only will be his and of none other.⁴⁹

When the statesman rules, he makes another like himself, and at the same time he is cultivating the like, he keeps away the unlike. In the politics of the soul, the political action of the philosopher-king is to nurture a philosophic-kingly nature like his and defend it against the rise of the influence of others.

V

The art of statesmanship must be separated from other arts such as the art of service and the art of rhetoric. Without its supervision, the art of service and the art of rhetoric are purely sophistic.⁵⁰ The art of statesmanship can be said to be the art which supervises all other arts. It controls and rules all other arts.⁵¹ It is 'the power of determining' what to learn, whom, how, and when to persuade, with whom, how, and when to wage war, and what is to be judged as justice or injustice, when to be courageous or moderate, etc. In other words, the art of statesmanship is concerned with the knowledge of the good. The knowledge of the good is the knowledge of beauty, proportion, and truth.⁵² The understanding of the truth of the nature of man leads to the knowledge of the measure of human action. When human action is undertaken with regard to the measure, *metron*, it brings about beauty in the same way that

⁴⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book IX 592b).

⁵⁰ Cf. the *Gorgias* and the *Philebus*, 58a-59a.

⁵¹ Plato, *Statesman*, (304c).

⁵² Plato, *Philebus*, (65a).

rhythmic and harmonious song and dance are beautiful. The mixture of these three leads to the good.

The art of statesmanship renders the measure and harmony for those virtues which oppose one another.⁵³ It integrates all virtues. For instance, courage has been proved elsewhere to be in conflict with self-control, since sometimes one needs to be courageous and sometimes to be moderate. Self-restraint and freedom are apparently opposed to each other.⁵⁴ So it is quite appropriate to liken the art of statesmanship to the art of weaving. The art of statesmanship renders measure and harmony to all these virtues by weaving them together in one 'in the manner in which it combines the threads, and the kind of web it produces'.⁵⁵ It integrates all particular virtues into a single whole. The measure and proportion of wisdom, courage, self-control culminate in justice, a single whole virtue which originated in a harmony of the particular virtues.⁵⁶ All these virtues are regarded as the four cardinal virtues. Justice, self-control, courage, and wisdom are mutually inclusive.

With regard to the art of statesmanship, the

⁵³ Plato, *Statesman*, (306a-311c).

⁵⁴ Athens is regarded in western political history as the birthplace of democracy. She represents freedom and liberty. At the same time, Socrates, the most well-known man in the city is regarded as a man of virtue and righteousness. He has been praised for his self-control as it appears in the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon. However, what is ironical is that Socrates' life and thoughts have been symbolized as a free mind whilst the Athenians have been said to display their bigotry and prejudices as regards the charges they pressed on Socrates. This is an interesting paradox concerning the dispute between man and the city.

⁵⁵ Plato, *Statesman*, (305e-306a).

⁵⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book I 428b-432b).

philosopher-king knows when he should be highly-spirited or when he should control himself, and when he should mind his own business or when he should not. As stated before, according to the true statesman or the philosopher-king, justice benefits himself and others. However, different kinds of men gain different benefits. Justice cannot be indiscriminate towards different kinds of men. Otherwise, it cannot be just. In a sense, it can be said that justice is 'what has been given to each his due'. To be sure, different kinds of men have different interpretations of the meaning of interest. The interest of the philosopher-king is of course incommensurable to that of the others. The justice of a certain polity and a certain type of soul is incommensurable to one another, but only the justice of philosopher-king can render 'each his due'.

Like a Homeric hero, the justice of timarchy and a timocrat is based on friend and foe relationships regardless of right and wrong. Courage and endurance in fighting for friends against enemies override any other kinds of virtue. For timarchy and a timocrat, courage or high spirits rule over reason and desires. Oligarchic and democratic polities and their counterpart individuals treasure what they desire more than anything else. An oligarch honours wealth. A democrat honours freedom. So the definition of justice can be put in the phrase 'give each his due'.

As regards oligarchy, the city should let anyone who is capable of running his business reap the full benefits. The city must protect individual rights and also enforce particularly commercial laws. The laws of contract and copyright are essential so that anyone who breaks the laws must be punished and fined. Otherwise, the business of the oligarchs would not be possible. Timarchy and a timocrat never take for granted such an idea of justice in the oligarchic and democratic sense of 'give one his due'. In

a timarchic polity, although someone is capable of making a profit, the profit is not guaranteed to be returned to him, since the profit and any other kinds of valuable things should be allocated on the basis of friend-foe relationships. Political power in timarchy is based on physical and military strength. To be sure, political power everywhere seems to base itself on such a condition. However, in oligarchy, wealth can be purchased for physical and military strength. In other words, warriors sell themselves for money and wealth since in oligarchy wealth is regarded as the highest virtue.

The love of pleasures develops itself from the love of wealth to the love of freedom. The love of freedom is just the love of anything which one could think of from time to time. For this reason, democracy is a most colourful and lively piece of fabric. In fact, the only virtue which effaces itself behind others is self-indulgence. Nevertheless, a presiding virtue in society seems to swing from one to another in accordance with its swinging and volatile temper and character of the city and its members. However, its underlying virtue is based on a liberal conception of justice which protects both the positive and negative versions of liberty. In this sense, democratic justice is stipulated in a situation that each one minds his own business. As freedom and liberty have been treasured more than anything else, it is inevitable that democracy and a democrat regard all men as equals. It indiscriminately imposes its egalitarian view on all human beings.

In such a 'free society', it is possible that someone who is stronger in a Thrasymachean sense takes a most advantageous position from such a character of the democratic majority.⁵⁷ Tyranny and a tyrant are a witness

⁵⁷ Thrasymachus has a tyrannical character. See Annas, *op. cit.*, p.302.

to the naivety of political ideology or the illusion of democratic egalitarianism. The concept of justice in tyranny which culminates in that justice is in the interest of the stronger in the city. With regard to this concept of justice, such a human city is not different from the world of animals.

To be sure, no other single polity, namely, timarchy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny differs from the animal world. The imperfect polities are always in flux. Timarchy is prone towards oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. The decay originates in their deficient self-definition. Their self-understanding is inadequate with regard to the understanding of the tripartite soul as a whole. The lack of their true self-understanding as human beings is regarded as 'a kind of vice which gives its name to a condition; and it is that part of vice in general which involves the opposite of the condition mentioned in the inscription at Delphi,' that is, 'Know thyself'.⁵⁸

Only the self-understanding or self-knowledge of the philosopher-king leads to a complete and perfect concept of man, as honour, wealth, liberty, and self-indulgence are not a cause of true happiness for the philosopher-king. The philosopher-king therefore does not compete or fight against other classes for such things. Only his justice could render 'each his due, so the question is 'how can he accomplish his idea of justice?' Although he does not have such assets to give to the others, however, he has his philosophical discourse or speech which fulfils what the others expect to achieve; but it is a fulfilment of the *kallipolis*, the city in speech or the city of *logos*. It is first and foremost the city of the soul.

At the same time, the discourse will protect the

⁵⁸ Plato, *Philebus*, (48c-d).

philosopher-king and his city against the rise of decay which originates in the unseasonable mixture of the elements of the soul and the unseasonable mixture of the classes of the city. For this reason, the justice of the philosopher-king can be said to render what is due to one who has the potential and nature to become another philosopher-king or statesman. With regard to this point, earlier in the chapter, it has been said that the philosopher-king enters the politics of the soul in order to preserve himself and the like quality in others and to defend against the influence of the other kinds. In saying that in the politics of the soul, the philosopher-king searches for and cultivates his like, it does not mean that the like has to be united with the like in the sense that a timocratic soul or the others are united with their like. It has been already inferred from the discussion in the *Lysis* and the *Symposium* that the reason for a friendship or a unity of human beings must be based on the concept of the *metaxy* of man, that is, 'a neither good nor bad loves a neither good nor bad'. They search for each other in order to fulfil the part they lack. That is why it is argued in the *Statesman* that a certain character must not be separated from its opposite. The unity of the like with the like in the simple sense, that is, 'of the bad with the bad or of the good with the bad', cannot be a serious work of the art of statesmanship.⁵⁹ For this reason, self-control must never be separated from the courageous one.⁶⁰

VI

At the end of the *Statesman*, the Eleatic Stranger

⁵⁹ Plato, *Statesman*, (309e).

⁶⁰ Plato, *Statesman*, (310d-311a).

concludes his discussion of the art of statesmanship with the idea of procreation and the art of weaving. With regard to the idea of procreation, one has to resort to the earlier interpretation of the idea of procreation in Book VIII of the *Republic* and the speech of Diotima in the *Symposium*. The idea of procreation has twofold meaning, socially and individually. They are intertwined. The like should not be united with its like as the Stranger states that

'(t)he fact is, they act on no right theory at all; they seek their ease for the moment; welcoming gladly those who are like themselves, and finding those who are unlike themselves unendurable, they give the greatest weight to their feeling of dislike....(t)he decorous people seek for characters like their own; so far as they can they marry wives of that sort and in turn give their daughters in marriage to men of that sort; and the courageous do the same, eagerly seeking natures of their own kind, whereas both classes ought to do quite the opposite.'⁶¹

The reason for the unity of the opposite kinds lies in the fact that the unity of human beings with similar characters or virtues leads to the self-aggrandizement of such virtue which goes beyond its proportional measure. The decay, which commences from the decline of timarchy to tyranny is good evidence. When the extent of the virtue goes beyond a proper limit, *hubris* emerges. As said before, this condition originates from love and terminates at love. But it is a negative kind of love which terminates itself in utter madness. The Stranger explains this in the case of a pair of virtues of courage and self-control that

'because in the nature of things

⁶¹ Plato, *Statesman*, (310c-d).

courage, if propagated through many generations with no admixture of a self-restrained nature, though at first it is strong and flourishing, in the end blossoms forth in utter madness, (b)ut the soul, on the other hand, that is too full of modesty and contains no alloy of courage or boldness, after many generations of the same kind becomes too sluggish and finally is utterly crippled'.⁶²

The extremity of any particular virtue leads the city and the soul to *hubris* and then decay. Indeed, when the city and the soul are in such a condition, they becomes unjust, since justice originated in the measure and harmony. When any virtue presides over the others and becomes too extreme because of self-ignorance of either the city or the soul, it causes injustice in the city and the soul. In contradistinction to this, when a courageous soul 'lays hold upon such truth, made gentle, and would it not then be most ready to partake of justice?'⁶³

Through his discourse, the philosopher-king has exerted the power of justice. Discourse, speech, or *musike* directly affects the soul. Therefore his philosophical discourse affects the soul of all of his audience. For those with aristocratic nature, the discourse will guide them to the perfection of the soul. For the others, namely, timarchic, oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannous, the discourse will render each of them his due. It means that what each of them acquires from the discourse depends upon the potential of his own. The extent that philosophical discourse can guide each of them toward the justice of the soul depends upon the nature and development of each one. In this sense, justice primarily benefits the soul not the body. The benefit of justice is internal

⁶² Plato, *Statesman*, (310d).

⁶³ Plato, *Statesman*, (309e).

rather than external. Only a person who has justice in his soul knows and appreciates what benefit and happiness it confers upon him.⁶⁴

In this regard, the discussion of the nature of justice in the *Republic* has been argued to be

'suggesting a new perspective on justice; a perspective which takes seriously the idea that justice is a human virtue, not merely an artificial' or a social one, Socrates clearly believes that justice is an essential component of what enables human beings, whether as individuals or as groups and communities, to lead a good and flourishing life, (i)n this regard "Socratic" justice departs from ordinary or conventional ideas about it.'⁶⁵

Again, only the justice of the philosopher-king renders each member in the society his due. Each one has what he needs according to the nature of his soul. Such an idea of justice in the city of the true statesman differs from other kinds of justice in other cities, because the true statesman or the philosopher-king recognises

'justice as an enabling condition in human beings and communities' and does not only "limit justice to the role of guarding the rights of individuals" but also "include within justice a knowledgeable concern with how our actions and arrangements affect the

⁶⁴ As Kimon Lycos rightly interprets Socratic justice that it 'had to be 'internal' to this flourishing in the sense that it involved the application of reason, a distinctive capacity of the human life form, to the life-form itself and to its relation to other life-forms'. Kimon Lycos, *Plato on Justice and Power: Reading Book I of Plato's Republic*, London, 1987, p. 173.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

realisation of human capacities in people".⁶⁶

In this regard, the philosopher-king is unjust if he does not exert his power of justice to render each his due. In other words, he will never be just if he does not enter the politics of the soul.⁶⁷ His politics is aimed at preserving and cultivating his like, namely, the philosophic-kingly nature, and arresting the change from timarchic, oligarchic, and democratic characters into tyrannous one. From his point of view, the city as well as the soul consists of three indispensable classes. He does not detest the existence of the others. On the contrary, he is aware of the interdependence of each of them. Furthermore, his understanding of the metaxy of human nature enables him to realise that by nature all men are at the position of 'neither good nor bad'. He has his love for them all. It can be said that his politics is based on such a concept of friendship in relation to the nature of metaxy. He goes round the city and questions the people. With regard to his concern for the city affairs in this sense, he is a philanthropist.⁶⁸

Through his art of statesmanship, he creates a special

⁶⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 174.

⁶⁷ At this point, Lycos ends his study of Socratic justice by stating that '(t)here is, after all, a sense in which it is unjust not 'to render to each what is due, (a)nd the factors which sustain our present perilous world-situation prevent us from rendering 'what is due' to human beings as such---the power, not merely the right, to flourish and realise their potential.' Lycos, *op. cit.*, p.174.

⁶⁸ At *Euthyphro*, 3d, Socrates says: 'But I fear that because of my love of men, *philanthropias*, they think that I not only pour myself out copiously to anyone and everyone without payment, but that I would even pay something myself, if anyone would listen to me.' See also, Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy? and other Studies*, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

bond amongst them. With regard to his understanding of nature of the *metaxy* in the soul as well as the city, his politics is concerned with rendering measure, *metron*, to each element in the soul and each class in the city.

VII

Consequently, the art of statesmanship is aimed at weaving together the opposing and conflicting characters in the city and the soul. As recently mentioned, the mention of the idea of procreation at the end of the *Statesman* has a twofold implications which actually are intertwined. At the level of the individual or the soul, with the art of statesmanship the philosopher-king cultivates and balances the elements in the soul of the young. At the same time, this affects the social level in the city. When an individual knows himself, he becomes a just element in the city. At the social level, when the philosopher-king binds together the three classes or characters of man in the city with his philosophic discourse which is able to give each of them his due. Then justice in the city emerges.

Each class possesses its own virtue or its interpretation of the highest good. Socrates stated in Book IV of the *Republic* that justice is left over after all these virtues, namely *sophia*, *andreia*, and *sophrosyne*, have been considered. All the three classes need a good proportional mixture of all these virtues in the same way that the tripartite soul needs it in order to be just. That justice originates in this general concord of reason and emotion which becomes virtue.⁶⁹ The understanding of this nature of the soul and the city is not *sophia* as it represents other kinds of knowledge which has been applied

⁶⁹ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 653c).

to the knowledge and skills of the sophists. At this point, Socrates is said to 'replace *sophia* with *phronesis*'.⁷⁰ This kind of understanding or knowledge is prudence, *phronesis*.⁷¹ Each class realises its place and recognises the others in the city in the same way that each element realises its place and recognises the others in the soul.

With the art of statesmanship which originates in the true understanding of self-knowledge of man as *metaxy*, the philosopher-king is able to bind the city and the soul together and creates the bonds amongst them. These bonds are possible through the philosopher-king's *musike*. In cultivating another statesman like himself, the philosopher-king's

'whole business of the kingly weaving is comprised in this and this alone, in never allowing the self-restrained characters to be separated from the courageous, but in weaving them together by common beliefs and honours and dishonours and opinions and interchanges of pledges, thus making of them a smooth and, as we say, well-woven fabric, and then entrusting to them in common for ever the offices of the state'.⁷²

⁷⁰ Zdravko Planinc, *Plato's Political Philosophy: Prudence in the Republic and the Laws*, 1991, p. 61.

⁷¹ Socrates in the *Republic* has been generally regarded by some scholars to be too idealistic as regards his political utopianism. At the same time, Plato as the author of the dialogue has been similarly regarded. The utopianism, Zdravko Planinc says, is the most important feature of Plato's idealism as it 'is said by his critics to be its lack of prudence or *phronesis*. With regard to this point, Planinc's recent book on Plato's political philosophy argues for the evident presence of prudence as a essential feature in his political philosophy. See footnote 70.

⁷² Plato, *Statesman*, (310d-311a).

Also from this, all classes in the city are bound together by the kingly science which

'had drawn them together by friendship and community of sentiment into a common life, and having perfected the most glorious and the best of all textures, clothes with it all the inhabitants of the state, both slaves and freemen, holds them together by this fabric, and omitting nothing which ought to belong to a happy state, rules and watches over them'.⁷³

The city under the rule of the philosopher-king is like the texture just described, but the first and foremost piece of fabric which the philosopher-king has to weave is a fabric of the soul of the individual, since the individuals are the foundation of the city. Justice and injustice in the soul can be studied in its larger context of the city. The beginning of justice and injustice in the soul is also a starting point of justice and injustice in the city. In this regard, the care of the self is also the care of the city as a whole in the first and last instance.

When one takes a good care of oneself by oneself, it means that the person needs nobody to look after him. Then he is a full master of himself. There is no need for any tutor or guardian if he has founded his own guardian in himself. Socrates answered Lysis as to why his father did not allow him to do anything he would like to do. A father or a guardian will let a son do anything on his own when he considers that his son has 'a better intelligence than himself,' then he will entrust him with himself and all that is his. Next, when he has taken good care of his own household, his neighbour will do the same as his father, that is, he will entrust him with 'the management of his house, as soon as he considers (him) to have a better idea

⁷³ Plato, *Statesman*, (311c).

of its management than himself'. In the last instance, Socrates said to Lysis that it is the city and the people who 'will entrust you with their affairs, when they perceive that you have sufficient intelligence'.⁷⁴ It is in this regard that the great king of the city originates from the great king of one's soul. Indeed, it is self-knowledge that is the origin of the art of statesmanship and vice versa.

Therefore, the dialogue that has been assumed to be missing as regards the trilogical search for the sophist, the statesman, and the philosopher is actually not missing. The starting point of the search is at the *Sophist*, 217a. The search for the statesman continues in the *Statesman*. However, there is no dialogue on the philosopher. Some speculations have been made as regards the 'missing dialogues'. It has been said that the dialogue is either lost or has never been written at all. If the latter be the case, it must be unintentional, since Plato makes Socrates be well aware and insists right at the beginning of the *Statesman* that the trilogical search must not be stopped 'until we have finished with them'. Considered in the direction of the argument in this thesis, such a dialogue actually exists. The dialogue on the philosopher inherently co-exists with the dialogue on the statesman.

Mitchell H. Miller argues that 'philosopher' has just concealed itself from the nonphilosophical ones whose misinterpretation is harmful rather than beneficial.⁷⁵ To realise it, it seems that insight and careful interpretation are required. Following Miller's argument, Plato reserves the message on the meaning of the philosopher for those who have a philosophic nature. With

⁷⁴ Plato, *Lysis*, (209c-e).

⁷⁵ Miller, Jr., *The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman*, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

regard to the principle of *mimesis*, Plato should have intended anyone with a philosophic nature to understand and imitate what he has understood and practised. In similar respect, Miller also regards the *Statesman* as being mimetic in which Plato was, 'even while concealing the philosopher-king and urging the rule of law for "the many," nonetheless hoping that the stranger's educational "instructions" would eventually overcome the need for the concealment,' and '(t)hough it would occur not through Plato himself but rather through "someone else like him" (295e), such an overcoming would be...Plato's true return and restoration.'⁷⁶ She thus concludes that the *Statesman* itself is a means to a 'philosopher'.⁷⁷ Her argument supports the point just made concerning the unity of the philosopher and the statesman or philosophy and politics.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 118. See also the *Statesman*, 285e-286a:

'the greatest and noblest conceptions have no image wrought plainly for human vision, which he who wished to satisfy the mind of the inquirer can apply to some one of his senses and by mere exhibition satisfy the mind.'

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 'The Statesman Itself as a Means', pp. 114-118.

⁷⁸ Also, with regard to this view, it can be inferred from what Socrates said in the *Republic*, Book VI 497b-c, that no existing form of society is good enough for the philosophic nature but it will reveal itself only to 'the best polity as it itself is the best.' As discussed earlier, the polity or the *polis* consists of men. So when 'the best polity' is mentioned, it must be referred to the character of man as such. And the meaning of the *polis* does not necessarily mean the people as a whole. It is 'others' in relation to the individual.

CONCLUSION

The Metaxy of Politics: The Politics of Metaxy

Socrates's aspiration is to know what a good life is. The Socratic ignorance is irony.¹ He knows that he does not know. Since he knows he is ignorant therefore he keeps asking the questions. He puts the questions to those who think they know. All the questions put forward by Socrates lead to an enigmatic question of the good. With the Socratic *elenchus*, those who know become puzzled. They become ignorant. They are ashamed. Some are angry because of the *Socratic docta ignorantia*. It seems that Socrates knows something but claims ignorance in order to humiliate or outsmart them. It seems that he is just crafty in playing with words. What he has done does not seem serious. However, it is not playful. It is neither serious nor playful. That neither serious nor playful activity is Socrates' mission.

I

The Socratic mission transfers ignorance to other people. That is, others become ignorant like himself. He insults them by touching their spirited parts. He arouses

¹ Irony, *eironeia*, in other ancient Greek use is said to 'involve an intention to deceive'. See C.D.C. Reeve, *Socrates in the Apology*, Cambridge, 1989, p. 5ff. Reeve also gives other examples of the views on Socratic irony. According to Quintilian, Socratic irony means 'something contrary to what is said to be understood?' However, Vlastos's view is congenial to this study as he argues that it is ' "complex" irony in which "what is said both is and isn't what is meant'. See Gregory Vlastos, 'Socratic Irony', *Classical Quarterly* 37, pp. 79-96. See also Dilwyn Knox, *Ironia: Medieval and Renaissance Ideas of Irony*, Leiden, 1989, Part Two: *Ironia Socratica*, pp. 97-126.

their love of knowledge. In this regard, he generates a will to know. Also, when one's beliefs of what he regards as the most important things such as justice and the good have been shaken, he is then perplexed and puzzled about his self-understanding or self-interpretation. The question of the good inevitably leads to the question of self-knowledge. One's acknowledgment of self-ignorance is a starting point for one's search for self-knowledge. The search for self-knowledge is intertwined with the search for virtue and the good. Wonder is a sign of the beginning of philosophy of a philosopher. The Socratic mission inspires a philosophic nature in pursuit of man's self-knowledge, that is, human nature.

The essence of man is the soul. Human soul is tripartite. It consists of a rational part, a spirited part, and desires. The soul is self-motion because it is moved by Eros or love. Therefore, the soul is moved by the love of reason, the love of honour, and the love of pleasures. Discord and harmony take place as regards the struggle among these elements of the tripartite soul. Aristocratic, timocratic, oligarchic, democratic and tyrannical characters result from the struggle for power among the three elements of the soul. The imperfect polities are in flux. These characters of man reflect themselves in the domination of one class over the others in the polity. Thus political constitutions can be understood to be corresponding to those human characters or types of the soul. Harmony in the imperfect polities is just a temporary condition for impending discords like the saying 'peace is just an intermission of the endless war'.

Only the soul which is presided over by the love of reason has a right opinion to pursue justice and harmony. However, justice is meaningless without the understanding of the good. The idea of the good is conceivable in the nature of the soul. The nature of the soul is *metaxy*. The

understanding of the nature of the tripartite soul and its *metaxy* discloses the secret of the Platonic geometric number and calculation for a perfect number of a seasonable breeding of human beings. The numbers 3, 4, and 5 are related to the tripartite soul, the Cave, the Divided Line, and the imperfect polities which are all aimed at describing human nature. Human nature can be encapsulated in the concept of *metaxy*. Man in relation to bestial nature is explained in the geometric analogy of the square root, *dunamis*. The nature of man cannot be understood in the state of knowledge of 'either/or'.² If the question is 'Is Man to be or not to be?' then, 'to be and not to be' is the answer.

Philosophy and the art of politics are intertwined. Man is also the essential object in concern for the statesman. Self-knowledge and the knowledge of human nature is the object of the art of statesmanship. The philosopher is the statesman and the statesman is the philosopher. The true politics is concerned with the care of the soul. The philosopher is the true statesman in a sense that he is one who is the king of the city; first of all, it must be the city of his soul. To preserve his philosophic-kingly nature, the philosopher must enter politics and become the statesman. To preserve justice in his soul, he must become a philosopher-king. The politics which the philosopher-king realises and engages in is the politics of the soul. Engaging in the politics of the soul, the philosopher-king preserves his quality as well as

² Bernstein calls this 'the Cartesian Anxiety'. He states that it is originated in Descartes' search for a foundation or Archimedean point. The Either/Or dilemma is that 'either there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos'. Richard J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis*, Oxford, 1983, p. 18; see 'The Cartesian Anxiety', pp. 16-20. This dilemma, I argue, can trace back to Parmenides and Heraclitus.

cultivating his counterpart in others who have potential. In preserving and cultivating such a nature, he at the same time deters the self-aggrandizement of other qualities.

Political constitutions correspond to the types of human characters. In turn, human characters can be influenced by the polity of the city they live in. The polity is the public as a whole. Besides oneself, all are 'the others' for him. A polity always consists of three main classes in the same way that a soul is tripartite. Sometimes an individual is among democrats or oligarchs or timocrats, or tyrants and their followers. Politics is more or less everywhere when one is with 'the others'. Even when he is alone but is still thinking about 'the others' which he has experienced. The philosopher-king prevents the influence of 'the others' which are alien to his nature. At the same time he protects himself, he cultivates the philosophic-kingly nature in the others. The politics of the soul is within and without at the same time.

The philosopher-king uses discourse and dialectic as his tools and weapons to fight in his politics of the soul. As *Mousike* directly affects the soul. As regards his art of politics, there will never be one single speech for all human beings. The philosopher-king is restricted by no laws. It depends on each individual character. Although his speeches might be many, however, their essence is one. The art of statesmanship penetrates all other arts. Its form might be different but its substance is the same, that is, to preserve what is good and change what is bad. The philosopher-king seeks and gives birth to his like. Socrates regards his as the art of midwifery. The metaphor is evident in the *Phaedrus*, the *Symposium*, and the *Republic*.

Laws, *nomos*, are essential in the politics of the soul. As *nomos* embraces almost everything from a codified system of laws itself to values and all kinds of social institutions. It can be said the public is the law and vice versa. The philosopher-king is also a law-giver.³ A law-giver is actually a name-giver. Since a name-giver possesses the knowledge of the nature of things. A name-giver must be a dialectician. Since a dialectician understands the nature of language and knows how to use it. Language is a fundamental social institution of man. In a sense, it can be said that language itself is the *polis* and *nomos*.⁴ The way people use their language has importantly affected their thinking and behaviour. Moreover, spoken and written languages are more influential than any other kinds of language. As stated before, as a *musike*, it renders direct impact on the soul.⁵

Socrates creates his *kallipolis* from speech, *logos*. In the ideal city, the meaning of things has been used differently from the city in reality. Things have been named differently. Justice and the good have been differently interpreted. To be sure, different polities have different kinds of language. Each polity has its own language. A citizen of a certain polity has been brought up with a language of that polity. In this regard, the

³ Plato, *Cratylus*, (388c); *Statesman*, (278b, 279b, 309b).

⁴ Jean-Jacques Rousseau regards language as the first social institution. See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'Essay on the Origin of Languages' in *The First and Second Discourses, together with the Replies to Critics and Essay on the Origin of Languages* edited and translated by Victor Gourevitch, New York, 1986, pp. 240.

⁵ Rousseau, *op. cit.*, p. 242. He says '(i)magine a situation where you know perfectly well that someone is in pain; you are not likely to be easily moved to tears at the sight of the afflicted person; but give him time to tell you everything he feels and you will soon burst into tears. Only thus do the scenes of tragedy produce their effect.'

city moulds her people. In turn, when someone has created a city of his own language or speech, and then successfully secures it, it is the first step towards the city in reality. That is why Socrates said that it is not illogical to have a *kallipolis* in speech.⁶

In his city, the philosopher-king gives laws to his citizens. Such laws, *nomos*, are given under the supervision of the art of statesmanship. It is aimed at nurturing the philosophic-kingly nature and ruling over people of other classes. The philosopher-king employs speech which is a kind of logically structured language in constructing his city and edificing the laws. The purpose of structuring the city and laws is to render justice and harmony amongst the citizens in the city. Justice and harmony of any other kinds of polity are imperfect and prone towards decay and corruption.

In order to make one become a citizen or to make one create a new city of justice and harmony, first, the philosopher-king has to debunk the edifices of values of the other polities. In this regard, each person is a city of his own and a city is just a reflection of a person of a certain character. As regards any edifice in any polity, it in one way or another contains its own logic and consistency as all edifices are linguistically constructed. Of course, a good citizen of one country would be a bad citizen of another.⁷ It is harmonious and just in the eye

⁶ Plato, *the Republic*, (449a-c).

⁷ From this it can be drawn that a good citizen in some state would be a bad citizen in the others. Then, as Aristotle first realised, there arises the question 'whether the excellence of the good man is the same as that of the good citizen'. He said: 'the considerations already adduced prove that in some states the good man and the good citizen are the same, and in others different. When they are the same it is not every citizen who is a good man, but only the statesman and those who have or may have, alone or in conjunction with others, the conduct of public affairs'.

of the city and her citizens who are of course dominated or presided over by some quality which has been regarded as a highest value or virtue;⁸ For no one would ever dare to be sceptical or criticise the existence of the virtue. The edifice and foundation of such a polity then survives.

The philosopher-king attacks such values. He makes the others sceptical towards their own system of thought. He agitates their harmony and truth and wakes them up from slumber. Then their souls become shaken and chaotic. They become void.⁹ Their souls become 'softer and more ductile, even as iron when it has been forged in the fire'.¹⁰ They become as if they were young children. The philosopher-king intoxicates them with the drink of speech. The drunkenness of the soul is conducive to 'the moulding of the soul'.

The Dionysiac turn of the philosopher-king pours them drinks of speech till they become wild and are ready to do and think what they would never do in their normal state. The Dionysian wild dancer wakes up and challenges the harmonious and well-ordered state of those people who can be regarded as Apollonians. It is observable that Socrates starts his 'drinking party' by touching on what seems to be the strongest point of his interlocutor. Ironically, what one takes for granted to be one's own strongest point is just one's most vulnerable part. Likewise, in the *Laws*,

Aristotle, *Politics*, (Book III 1277b30-1278b4), *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Vol. Two, edited by Jonathan Barnes, New Jersey, 1984. See also, Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁸ With this regard, *logos* or speech, account, reason of things of a polity and its citizens can be regarded to be political. Man as an animal which possesses *logos* can be in this regard related to the idea that man is a political animal.

⁹ Annas, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

¹⁰ Plato, *Laws*, (Book II 666b-c).

the Athenian Stranger starts his discussion with the Cretan and the Spartan by raising the question concerning the laws. For the Cretan and the Spartan, the question of the laws could not be any question for them , the people whose cities were praised by the Greeks as the birthplace of the best laws. However, the more they take their excellence for granted , the more their minds become insolent and bigoted.

II

The politics of the soul begins with the god of wine. As Strauss observes '(w)hy does the Platonic dialogue about politics and laws begin with such an extensive conversation about wine? But this means that wine-drinking educates to boldness, to courage, and not to moderation, and yet wine-drinking was said to be conducive to moderation.'¹¹ He rightly interprets that they are men who are so proud of their own laws , they would never be sceptical towards their edifice of traditional values. Apart from their old age, they were law-abiding citizens of law-abiding cities. One cannot expect anyone more conservative and more traditional than the elderly of the Dorian states. Surely, 'their very virtue becomes a defect,' said Strauss, 'if there is no longer a question of preserving old laws, but of seeking the best laws or introducing new and better ones'.¹² While discussing the wine-drinking which was forbidden in Crete and Sparta, the Cretan and the Spartan have been unconsciously immersed in the drinking-party not in action but in speech.¹³ When they arrived at a certain stage, one can see that the

¹¹ Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy and Other Studies*, op. cit., p. 31.

¹² Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies*, op. cit., p. 31.

¹³ Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies*, op. cit.

introduction of new laws was undertaken. At the end of the *Laws*, after their introduction of new laws in speech had been completed, the Athenian Stranger said that the Cretan would be deemed 'the boldest' of all his successors if he paid good attention to the matter of law-giving.¹⁴ Finally, the Cretan even asked the Spartan to join together to found a new state in order to realise the best laws they had just constructed in speech. They who were the most conservative with regard to their laws then became open-minded and courageous enough to found new laws for a new city. They would be regarded as Dionysians. The Apollonians became Dionysian and adventuristic.

In the *Laws*, the Dionysian nature plays quite an important role. The Athenian Stranger plays a Dionysian role. The Athenian Stranger makes his interlocutors reconsider the good aspects of wine-drinking and drinking party. Drunkenness becomes useful. Also, the Athenian Stranger discusses the names of Apollo and Dionysus. He acts as if he were the god himself, namely, Dionysus. Should he be Dionysus, this god is the giver of speech not wine. He renders a kind of drunkenness which 'makes most drinkers think, *oiesthai* they have wit, *nous* when they have not'.¹⁵ The Athenian Stranger represents a Dionysian character or a *proxenus*.¹⁶ He has introduced what has

¹⁴ Plato, *Laws*, (Book XII 969b).

¹⁵ Plato, *Cratylus*, (406c).

¹⁶ The contents of the *Laws* in relation to the description of Dionysos made by Detienne indicates a high possibility for the Dionysiac role of the Athenian Stranger. Detienne states that 'Dionysos' personality is deeply colored by his status as stranger.....He is always a stranger, a form to identify, a face to uncover, a mask that hides as much as it reveals. But coming as a *xenos* into the territory of another city, Dionysos demands to be treated socially as any stranger would be treated in Greece....A private citizen, an ordinary individual takes it upon himself to receive and protect a stranger on his travels. The *proxenos* was a local citizen who looked after foreign interests in a Greek city-state. Perhaps it was because

been done or what he has done and thought in Athens to the foreigners in the foreign land.¹⁷ It is most likely for the reader to think that he represents Socrates and does what Socrates would have done if he had travelled or been exiled to his favourite city where he was expected to go and live.¹⁸

Nevertheless, a Dionysian disposition is hardly a complete philosophic-kingly nature. Although a Dionysian nature seems to be antithetical to an Apollonian one, however, the gods were thought to complement one another. The Cretans and the Spartans or the Dorians in general have been understood to be the origin of the public choruses. The public choruses made them disciplinary and subordinating. Their music and chorus were made for a military purpose. That kind of cultivation first originated in the Dorian states. It had been later

Dionysos, the travelling god, was associated with this institution that he chose a companion by the name of Proxenos.....But this Delphian Proxenos of Dionysos is entirely naked and has a snub nose, thick lips, and two pointy ears. He is thus a satyr serving as proxenus for his master, who for once appears to be wearing the mask of a god in his home, at variance with his character of perpetual wanderer and stranger.....In his most memorable epiphanies, Dionysos is equally strange and a stranger. He is the Stranger who brings strangeness' (Detienne, pp. 10, 11, 12). Dionysus makes people frantic, mad, or intoxicated. See Marcel Detienne, *Dionysos at Large*, op. cit.

¹⁷ As the Greek word *xenos* means strange and foreign. Detienne said that ' "foreign" here refers not to the non-Greek, the barbarian who speaks an unintelligible tongue, but to the citizen of a neighboring community...(i)n order to be called *xenos*, a stranger therefore had to come from the Hellenic world, ideally consisting of those who shared "one blood, one language, and common sanctuaries and sacrifices" '. The Athenian Stranger is a *xenos* to the Cretan and the Spartan as much as they are to him. See Detienne, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁸ Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy? and Other Studies*, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

received by Athens.¹⁹ It is said that Dionysus travelled from afar and was accepted by Apollo at Delphi. Dionysus joined together with Apollo at Delphi. He brought with him strangeness, madness, and defilement.²⁰ However, his cult continued there in a less frenzied form.²¹ It was tamed by Apollo. Madness, strangeness, and defilement gives license to total freedom as it has been said about the rite of Dionysus.²² With regard to this, it can be said that the Dionysiac effect liberates one from himself. Thus Dionysian nature can be identifiable with freedom whilst Apollonian nature is associated with conformity and obedience. It is in this regard that the Dorians can be said to be more Apollonian than the Athenians. Also the Athenians are Dionysian.

Philosophy is the love of wisdom. One may think he has arrived at wisdom, or already experienced so many things in his life, he might think that he no longer needs to learn more. Like the Spartans and the Cretans, they took for granted not only their own laws but also their life-long experiences. The sophists think they possess some kind of wisdom or virtue. They do not need to learn anything any more. They were teachers not learners. With regard to education, *paideia*, this Apollonian nature needs a Dionysian one to liberate itself from stubbornness and intractability. In this respect, the Dionysian effect is

¹⁹ Donaldson, *The Theatre of the Greeks: A Treatise on the History and Exhibition of the Greek Drama*, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 27-29, 31; see 'Apollo' and 'Dionysus' in Betty Radice (ed.), *Who's Who in the Ancient World*, London, 1982, pp. 61-62, 105-106.

²⁰ Detienne, *op. cit.*, pp. 14-20, 23.

²¹ Radice, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

²² Aylen, *The Greek Theatre*, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

like a *pharmakon*.²³ 'It is the purifying aspect of Dionysos,' said Detienne, 'that is accentuated in the violent parousias of Baccheios or Baccheus, (t)he more insanity is unleashed, the more room there is for catharsis.'²⁴ It makes room for something new. It frees oneself for the relation with oneself and the pursuit of self-knowledge.²⁵

In the dialogues, Socrates sings and dances with Dionysian music. He is a pain in the neck, a gadfly of the city. He has been regarded as a mad man in the eye of the Athenian.²⁶ His way of life is said to be untypical of Greek life.²⁷ Nevertheless, the Athenian way of life under political democracy seems to be liberal and in a sense already more Dionysian than Apollonian. Why did Socrates think that the city still needed a Dionysiac dance

²³ Detienne states that 'in the same spirit Dionysos is said to have made us a gift to wine, a drug (*pharmakon*) so precious that in the city of the Magnetes it is to be administered in its pure state to the elderly, to whom it will bring "initiation and recreation" (*telete* and *paidia*)'. Detienne, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

²⁴ Detienne, *op. cit.*, p. 21. Aristotle points out this kind of effect of tragedy. See Radice, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

²⁵ This sentence is borrowed from Jacques Derrida's *Dissemination*. See Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, translated by Barbara Johnson, London, 1981, 'Plato's Pharmacy', pp. 67-68.

²⁶ The character of Socrates had been characterised as a funny and weird man in the *Clouds* of Aristophanes.

²⁷ L.B. Carter regards Socrates to be a quietist who was not concerned with politics as other Athenian people were. Carter also writes: 'Socrates, it seems, is an *apragmon*, but a very special case. He is debarred from political involvement, from addressing the assembly, by his divine sign. Yet he feels impelled to go about questioning their accepted notions of commonly held ethical qualities---courage, and so on---but above all, wisdom and justice. He himself does not regard this as in *apragmon* existence. Socrates is in fact both *apragmon* and not. He is a case on his own. (p. 185).' Carter, *The Quiet Athenian*, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

whilst the Athenians were dancing and singing in a Dionysian style? Why does a Dionysian way of life still need to be awakened by a Dionysian, strange and mad man?

Of course, Dionysus is quite essential with regard to the incitement of a will to know. The birth of tragedy is said to have originated in Athens. It is also said that Dionysus gave birth to tragedy. Also tragedy and democracy have been said to be intertwined. For that reason, Athens flourished and was famed for wisdom and liberty. The Athenians very well recognised and enjoyed this privilege. They appreciated and also defended the Athenian way of life. The evidence is supported by their determination and endurance through the Persian Wars at Marathon and Salamis and the Peloponesian War.²⁸ Apparently freedom was the most impressive characteristic of Athens. Freedom is the highest virtue of such a democratic polity. The city of Athens in fact was built up not of sand and stone but of her own citizens whose essential character was democratic.

If the oligarch has the blind god of wealth as his leader of the choir and first in honour, then, the democrat becomes blind and obsessed with the god of freedom and frantic situations. It is Dionysus. Athens was a place where one could find all kinds of people, all characters of men. There were many different things that the Athenians believed. Generally speaking, they were free to believe in anything, and to admire or to criticise it. It seems that

²⁸ On the fight for self-rule, T.A. Sinclair comments that 'the right to have one's own laws and the chance to have a constitution for one's own city were regarded as one of the greatest prizes of the victory over the Persians,' and '(o)n their respect for freedom, the barbarian was quite incapable of seeing why the Greeks should fight if no master forced them, or why they would not simply come to terms with the invader'. See T.A. Sinclair, *A History of Greek Political Thought*, London, 1961, p. 35.

the virtue of the Athenian people lay in their tolerance.²⁹ They tolerated one another because they all worshipped freedom and expected nobody to interfere when they were doing something or nothing. In such a democracy, one can do anything provided that it does not violate the implicit agreement of the city. The hidden rule of the city was embodied in the spirit of freedom and equal rights. Everyone is for himself. It is believed that nobody rules over the others, since no one is by nature superior than another. One can learn and choose what he would like to be. But in the last instance, concerning what a good life is, one should learn from the people of the city.³⁰ That is to learn to be democratic. In such a city, anything goes. On that basis, it is seriously believed that man can do whatever he likes and his way of life is to be proudly praised as 'the life of the pleasure and freedom and happiness' and the man 'cleaves to it to the end'.³¹ Such is the faith of the Athenian people. It is the faith in such a way of life that they would never let anyone challenge. The faith in liberty and freedom becomes a dogma. At this point, a Dionysian becomes an Apollonian.

In this regard, Socrates in Dionysiac spirit seems to offend and shake the Athenians in the most serious way. He challenges the virtue of city. He defies the love of freedom of Athens which has become the tyrant Eros. Dionysiac effect in permanence is nothing but madness. It is no longer a therapeutic *pharmakon*. It becomes a

²⁹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VIII 558b).

³⁰ Plato, *Meno*, (93a). Anytus represents the people's general view that one can learn the good from good men, *kaloi kagathoi*, of older generation. See *Protagoras*, (320d-328c, 327d-e).

³¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (561d).

poisonous *pharmakon*.³² Dionysiac effect in extremity leads one to chaos and instability. In such a condition of the soul, harmony will never be attained. Scepticism, for example, results from the extremity of Dionysiac effect. Scepticism becomes a dogma when it never allows any idea to be established. Nevertheless, the established idea could become a dogma as well.

In this regard, it can be said that Heraclitean or Protagorean doctrines are in one way or another under Dionysiac effect whilst Parmenidean thinking is prone towards Apollonian nature. Although Dionysus and Apollo seemed to be opposed to each other, however, they are two sides of the same coin. Both are musical. Each is a kind of music which consists of a certain kind of song and dance. Each has its own leader and choruses. Each reflects a certain phase of the life of the soul. Each is just a far end of the same continuum. If the soul cannot understand its nature, it will endlessly oscillate between these two poles.

For instance, a Dionysian man will never stop at any point of knowledge. He keeps struggling and learning all the time. He keeps dancing. His dancing style never repeats. He keeps dancing differently until he could not find a different mode of dance. He then dances strangely and wildly. His dance becomes chaotic, until he either becomes mad or thinks that he has achieved some kind of wisdom. As regards the former, his music becomes unmusical. It loses balance, harmony and rhythm. As regards the latter, he becomes Apollonian. He does not

³² As Derrida argues: 'Pharmacia (*Pharmakeia*) is also a common noun signifying the administration of the *pharmakon*, the drug: the medicine and/or poison. "Poisoning" was not the least usual meaning of "pharmacia." Antiphon has left us the logogram of an "accusation of poisoning against a mother-in-law" (*Pharmakeias kata tes metryias*).'*Pharmakon* acts as both remedy and poison. See Derrida, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

keep pace with the search for different styles of song and dance any more. He becomes an Apollonian without a Dionysian nature. He seems to be peaceful and harmonious with himself. He will be, as in the case of the Cretan and the Spartan in the *Laws*, in that Apollonian slumber until he is awakened by a stranger who comes with strangeness and defilement, that is, is one with Dionysian music.

To be sure, the Dionysian effect needs to be tamed. As in the legend, Dionysus, who had come from afar was accepted by Apollo at Delphi. Although his music continued at Delphi, it is 'in a less frenzied form'. To be sure, what has been left unsaid is that Apollo was then accompanied by Dionysus after his arrival. If Dionysus continues at Delphi 'in a less frenzied form', then, Apollo should have become more 'frenetic' than ever. Dionysus and Apollo complement each other at Delphi. The complement of Dionysus and Apollo at Delphi renders a peculiar condition. It is a state of *metaxy*. *Metaxy* has been proved to be the understanding of human soul. In that state, the positions of Heraclitus and Parmenides converge.³³

III

In the dialogues, the movement of Socrates' music or speech is not only Dionysian but also Apollonian. In fact, he is Dionysian to a Apollonian and he is Apollonian to a Dionysian. His musical movement is identifiable with the art of politics, and his politics is concerned with the

³³ It appears in the concluding statement in the *Parmenides* 166c: 'Then let us say that, and we may add, as it appears, that whether the one is or is not, the one and the others in relation to themselves and to each other all in every way are and are not and appear and do not appear.'

soul. Then, his politics of the soul is based on what has been called 'the pleasurable perception of rhythm and harmony' in human nature. Socrates starts the discussion in the dialogues by touching on what his interlocutors think are their strongest points. Moreover, he contrasts the other's strength by putting forward his own ignorance. By doing so, Socrates makes the other sing and dance his own music. The Socratic ignorance makes this possible. When the other starts to sing and dance his own music, the Socratic ignorance seems to be a good chorus to its leader.

In appearance, the ignorant Socrates does not know how to sing and dance beautifully. Since he does not know the best and most beautiful music. That is why he is searching for a leader of the chorus. He makes himself ready to be a good chorus for any leader. The Socratic ignorance in fact is its own music. It rouses and cheers the soul of the other. It starts by first making itself in harmony and rhythm with the others. Put in modern terms, it boosts one's ego. At this stage, Socrates is Apollonian. He seems to be in order and harmony with the others. At other times, when his ironic ignorance is noticeable or his interlocutor is on guard against it, his cross-examination becomes wild and exasperated. At this stage, Socrates is Dionysian. In consequence of both effects, his interlocutor then reveals what kind of music his soul corresponds to, whether it be timarchic, oligarchic, democratic, or tyrannical. The music of the Socratic ignorance lets the music of the other play. In the course of the discussion, the Socratic ignorance becomes the Socratic *elenchus*. It becomes strange, wild, mad and nonsensical in the eye of the other. His argument becomes elusive. It moves the interlocutor up and down, back and forth, and left and right. It moves between the 'realm of the human and the divine'. In reverse, his interlocutor starts to dance to the music of Dionysian Socrates. Now he needs to be tamed. He needs to be Apollonised but, of

course, not permanently. One has to be moved up and down, back and forth, and left and right, between the realms of the divine and the human, or, in fact, between Apollo and Dionysus. Since the ideal state to be attained is the state of *metaxy*.

A good example that delineates what has been explained above is the movement and the form and substance in the *Republic*. As regards the story of the dialogue, some would say that the forum has forfeited the festival. The torchlight race on horseback seems to have been forgotten. Actually, Socrates did not forget what he said he was interested to do. He decided to stay on because Adeimantus had suggested something which he said attracted him. Adeimantus said besides the torchlight race, Socrates could after dinner go out and see the sights and have a good talk with a lot of the lads.³⁴ Although he stated the reason for his stay, however, everyone knows that his love of speech and discussion transcends his desire for that festive pleasure.

Actually, Socrates enjoyed seeing and participating in the torchlight race. He did not miss it at all. It is not a festive torchlight race. That kind of pleasure cannot interest Socrates. Actually, what Socrates has is a philosophical one. The torch has been lit when the fire of argument has been started in the mind of Polemarchus. Considered in this light, the discussion between Socrates and Cephalus is the cause of the fire. Socrates' ignorance makes Cephalus play his music. Of course, it is not a visual light or fire. It is a fire in the soul. Indeed, the discussion is Socrates' entertainment at the festival of Bendis as Thrasymachus satirically commented.³⁵ It is a light that a blind man can see. It causes anger and

³⁴ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book I 328a-b).

³⁵ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book I 354a).

doubt in the soul of the listeners.

When Cephalus seemed to lose his argument to Socrates as regards the definition of justice, it incites anger, *thumos*, in Polemarchus who broke in to defend the view of justice which he shared with his father. He became a leader of the music. Then the torchlight was passed to Thrasymachus when the argument between Socrates and Polemarchus annoyed his understanding of justice. Socrates' ignorance annoyed him. Thrasymachus took turns with the leader of the chorus. He cannot let it go since it strongly affects what he regards to be justice. He cannot let something, which he regards as injustice, win. Then the torchlight was taken over by Glaucon and Adeimantus who saw that it was unjust to merely satisfy themselves with Socrates' unfinished discussion of the nature of justice. They took over Thrasymachus' position although it was not their own beliefs because they regarded that it was unjust not to exhaust the problem of justice from both Thrasymachus' and Socrates' position. All of them were seriously and personally concerned with the problem of the nature of justice. Each has possessed his own understanding of justice, in other words, a personal justice.³⁶

However, a personal or particular justice cannot be separated from a general one. No one ever thinks of his justice as a personal one. The justice man conceives for himself can be said to be the justice of Zeus, that is, the justice for all. So it is not difficult for Socrates to move the argument up to heaven or the divine realm. When the problem of the nature of justice has been raised, it affects everyone. The problem of the nature of justice touches the essence of man, that is, the soul. Basically, the problem of justice is involved with what is right and

³⁶ Andersson, *Polis and Psyche*, op. cit., p. 77.

what is wrong. What is right and what is wrong are related to what one deserves and what one does not deserve. Man thinks of what he deserves in the same way that he thinks of what he desires and what he does not desire. When one has to take something one thinks he does not deserve, or he has been deprived of what he has or should have had, he complains that it is not right. When he complains about this, he has his reasons and he can explain and argue for what he regards to be just. However, he would never have formulated or thought rationally or logically about justice and injustice in whatever sense if he lacks the rational part in his soul.³⁷ In this regard, the problem of justice affects the tripartite soul as a whole. When any version of justice either in speech or in action differs from one's own account of justice, it causes annoyance or even anger. It touches the spirited part of the soul. The spirited part in alliance with what the soul judges just makes man react. Sometimes it is allied with desires but sometimes with the rational part.³⁸ On many occasions, the conflicts between desires and the rational part take place. Justice in whatever account can be said to emerge when these three elements in the soul have been harmonised. In this sense, justice is personal or individual. The struggle for power and harmony in the soul is political.

IV

Nevertheless, the city is a reflection of the soul and the soul is a reflection of the city. With regard to this nature, the problem of justice inevitably welds together the personal and the general, that is, the city and man are intertwined. The problem of justice has to be considered

³⁷ Plato, *Laws*, (Book XII 967b).

³⁸ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book IV 439e-440d).

in two joining dimensions, that is, the *polis* and the *psuche*.

Only in the soul of the philosopher-king do true justice and harmony exist. He is the master of the soul as well as the city. He is the king of the city as he renders justice and harmony to the city. The philosopher-king renders justice to each his due. Socrates creates the *kallipolis*, the ideal and just city in speech and thought. In the just city, everyone is happy since each has been granted what he desires.³⁹ The justice of Socrates' ideal city in speech renders his interlocutors what they expect in accordance with the degree of their own ability to attain justice and the good.

The Socratic ignorance arouses one to play his music. One starts to sing and dance his own music in Dionysian movement. A timarchic Glaucon derives from Socrates' ideal city a communistic model of his desirable city in accordance with his character. With regard to his character, his spirited part tells him that a city which has been built up only to serve human desires cannot be a human city but a city of pigs. However, his spirited part is not able to tell him that such a communistic plan is unrealistic and inhuman. He would see that it is not a human city if only his rational part presides over his spirited one. Socrates unleashes Glaucon's excessive spirited part.

The programme of the ideal city has gone too far. In the dialogue, no one questioned its impracticality. When the first description of the origin of the city came out, Glaucon whose speech represented the spirited part in his soul questioned and criticised it as a city of pigs. When the city life became luxurious, the spirited part was

³⁹ Plato, the *Republic*, (Book IX 586e).

introduced to protect the city. But the unlearned spirited part could become harsh not only to its enemy but also its people. Then the love of reason or philosophic nature could tame the spirited part. The philosophic nature helps the guardian discriminate between friend and enemy.

In the discussion of the education of the guardian which commenced in Book III, the nature of the tripartite soul was explained with regard to the virtue of its particular part, namely, wisdom, courage, and self-control. Justice then originated from the harmony of these virtues. Then the discussion of the plan for the ideal city followed. After this, in the course of the construction of the ideal city, Socrates occasionally reminded his interlocutors to return to the starting point of the discussion, that is, the justice in a man and its analogy of the city. Glaucon forgot to examine himself.⁴⁰ His soul was too much preoccupied with the ideal city or the justice in a city. He welcomed the austerity and inhuman solution. The spirited Glaucon still sang the timarchic music but rather in a Dionysian style.

After all, Socrates' conclusion of his plan for the ideal city seems to be an anti-climax and ambiguous when he said that the city could be found nowhere, and,

'perhaps, there is a pattern of it laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen, (b)ut it makes no difference whether it exists now or ever will come into being, (t)he politics of this city only will be his and of none other'.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Planinc, *Plato's Political Philosophy: Prudence in the Republic and the Laws*, op. cit., pp. 65-117.

⁴¹ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book IX 592).

Socrates moves his interlocutors up and down. Swinging between Apollonian and Dionysian conditions, they become puzzled. Socrates always leads the argument to come in a full circle. One returns to where one started. This causes them to ask themselves the question which they never thought would be relevant. This is a result of the interplay of Dionysus and Apollo, the gods of music. Socrates brings philosophy from heaven. The Platonic dialogues carry its audience up to heaven and down to earth. It brings 'the gods' down from heaven and moves the 'beasts' up from the earth. As a person in the allegory of the Cave has been forced to ascend the cave to see the light of the sun and the sun itself and then descend to live among his fellow-prisoners. The soul is always in motion. But there is a certain point for human understanding of human nature. That is *metaxy*.

Socrates lights the torchlight and passes it on to his interlocutors. Socrates sings and dances in Dionysian-Apollonian music. It is the Socratic inspiration. The Socratic inspiration becomes the Platonic inspiration when Socrates becomes Plato's leading character in his dialogues. The dialogues light and pass on the fire to the reader. The Platonic inspiration lights up the fire for the search for self-knowledge. It arouses man to know himself.

However, the relationship between Socrates and his interlocutors differs from the relationship between Plato and his audience. The reader of the dialogues has not been cross-examined. He just follows the cross-examination and free questioning of Socrates in a book. The cross-examination is not actual. It is dramatised. It is just a scene, although he might try to answer the questions. When he fails, he will not be as ashamed as one who is in the actual scene. Reading is a private situation. In 500-400 B.C., it was an innovation in Athens. According to

Havelock, ancient Athens could not be legitimately regarded as a literate society until the time of Plato.⁴² Not until then can reading be viewed as a standard practice, 'as it indeed had become when Plato grew up'.⁴³ The impact of this literate revolution in Greece is very important and greatly influential. In the transition from an oral to a literate society, 'truly private communication of preservable information becomes possible only under conditions of developed literacy, only the documented word can be pursued by individuals in isolation'.⁴⁴ The wider audience is possible for Plato's dialogues whilst the author did not need to be present himself. Moreover, later generations such as ourselves possibly become his audience. Plato is our absent author while we are his absent reader.⁴⁵

The hermeneutic effect between the Dialogues and its reader, past and present, is not affected by reading either silently or aloud. Neither would it be affected by the

⁴² He argues: 'Only in the last third of the fifth century is the average Athenian taught letters in such a way as to begin to pick up a script and read it through. It follows that the testimonies drawn from fourth-century authors will take literacy for granted, for it has now been achieved.' Lloyd observes that '(i)n Plato's day references to learning how to read and write as part of primary education are commonplace'. Havelock, 'The Preliteracy of the Greeks', *op. cit.*, pp. 188-189; Lloyd, *The Revolutions of Wisdom*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

⁴³ Lloyd, *The Revolutions of Wisdom*, *op. cit.*

⁴⁴ Lloyd, *The Revolutions of Wisdom*, *op. cit.*

⁴⁵ Compare the *Statesman*, 300c: 'And yet we said, if we remember, that the man of knowledge, the real statesman, would by his art make many changes in his practice without regard to his writings, when he thought another course was better though it violated the rules he had written and sent to his absent subjects.'

physical differences between ancient and modern books.⁴⁶ Because its dramatic effect is still there. It enables the reader to visualise the scene and the characters in the Dialogues. It is a stage-play being performed in the soul of the reader. Dionysian and Apollonian elements are present in the movement of reading. The Dialogues are like a theatrical play. It is a performance. Unlike a theatrical play, reading is an individual pursuit. There is no chorus. The reader does a choric performance himself. He is both audience and actor/actress at the same time. He is also a hero and a villain. All characters are visualised by himself. Of course, reading effects mimetic action. *Mimesis* leads to sympathetic magic. The Dialogues like a theatrical performance bring the reader pleasure which is one of the aspects or functions of *mimesis* itself. The Dialogues are like a play. It is a serious play. The reader might be sympathetic with any character in the Dialogues. In saying so, its meaning is rather that the reader is sympathetic with what a character said or acted. The characters in the Dialogues speak in response to the Socratic *elenchus*. In the argument, each reveals his own position. He reveals what type of man he is. So the argument of each character can be regarded as his kind of music to which he himself loves to sing and dance. The sophists are elusive, their music is intended to please the audience. However, they think that the music they sing can catch the majority of the audience. It can be said

⁴⁶ Reynolds and Wilson point to the fact that there is some inconvenience of reading the book in a roll form. They say: 'The form of the book was a roll, on one side of which the text was written in a series of columns. The reader would unroll it gradually, using one hand to hold the part that he had already seen, which was rolled up; but the result of this process was to reverse the coil, so that the whole book had to be unrolled again before the next reader could use it. The inconvenience of this book-form is obvious, especially when it is remembered that some rolls were of considerable length.' L.D. Reynolds and N.G. Wilson, *Scribes & Scholars: A Guide to the Transmission of Greek & Latin Literature*, London, Second edition, 1989, p.2.

that they love to sing and dance to the music which the people love. In turn, the reader of the Dialogues favours the speech which invokes his sympathy. The reader then identifies his position with the position of his favoured character. It seems that a hero emerges when the reader identifies himself with a character.

V

It appears that Socrates is the hero of the Dialogues. Socrates is Plato's hero. The others are the opponents. It is most likely that the reader identifies himself with Socrates, a dialectical hero.⁴⁷ But Socrates' speech is *elenchus*. He questions more than answers. Although he sometimes gives explanations, he does it in quite an ambiguous way. It has been stated in a mythic form or allegory. Despite this, the reader is quite likely to assume beforehand that Socrates is his hero, since it has been generally said that Socrates is a hero. How can one identify one's position with Socrates? Rather, he is a pain in the neck for the reader as much as his interlocutors in the Dialogues. In this regard, it seems that the reader unconsciously takes Socrates' position as his villain. Since the reader intends to defeat Socrates rather than his interlocutors. The reader wants to win and stop the Socratic *elenchus*. The reader unconsciously sides with Socrates' interlocutors, especially with one whose music invokes his sympathy.

The characters in the Dialogues represent types of soul. When Socrates just asks questions and the reader cannot find the answer from Socrates, he looks for the answer from the answer of the interlocutors. Sometimes the

⁴⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy', in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, op. cit., p. 91.

answer seems silly. Sometimes it makes the reader think that it should be the best answer he ever had. Sometimes, although it is a clever answer, however, the reader knows that that answer is against what he regards as the good. Sometimes, the answer is a moral one, however, it is so simple and naive. All the answers in one way or another are timarchic or oligarchic or democratic or tyrannical. In other words, they represent the ruling part of the tripartite soul. As the reader unknowingly sides himself with these arguments in order to defeat Socrates. He has been led through different types of music of different types of the soul. That is to say, the three elements in his soul have been touched and tested. The reader has pleasures when a moment of sympathetic magic emerges. He identifies himself with one of the characters. He is a chorus for that character. Mimetic action follows. He is annoyed and ashamed when the argument has been defeated by the Socratic *elenchus*. He has been made ashamed by a book not a person. He is ashamed by himself.⁴⁸ The reader then cannot help accepting his defeat. He then swings to Socrates' position, because it is more logical than the logic of his favoured argument. Then his rational part of the soul has come to the fore. He has to accept his logical inferiority unless he can find a better argument to supersede Socrates'. It is evident that Socrates arouses the reader to extreme frenzy. He incites the reader's will to answer. A will to answer presupposes a will to know. He arouses a philosophic part of the reader as well as his interlocutors. The more he experiences this effect, the stronger his rational part grows. The movement is obvious in the *Republic*. The city has ascended from the city of pigs, to the city of the guardian, and the city of

⁴⁸ Michel Foucault comments that '(i)n the *Alcibiades I*, the soul had a mirror relation to itself, which relates to the concept of memory and justifies dialogue as a method of discovering truth in the soul'. Michel Foucault, 'Technologies of the Self', in *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*, op. cit., p. 31.

the philosopher. With regard to this point, some would regard that

'(f)or Plato this means that it has tamed the beastly for the sake of the divine but while the erotic desires of a tyrant find their satisfaction within an earthly city, and Pisthetairos builds an absurd city in heaven in order to satisfy his, Plato would satisfy the philosopher's sublimated desires in the rational, all-too-rational city he established, 'in heaven, perhaps', but in a different kind of heaven, for sure'.⁴⁹

It is true that a 'too rational reader' would be satisfied with Plato's 'the rational, all-too-rational city'. However, he could not find a clarified 'rational' and consistent answer from Socrates' speech. When he is asked to give an answer, he puts it in a mythic and allegorical form. It is a *muthos* not a *logos*. The high hope of the rational reader droops. What is too rational cannot be Plato's ideal city. The ideal city cannot be too rational. Barrie A. Wilson points to inconsistencies within the *Republic*. He argues that 'the inconsistencies and discrepancies do not constitute a philosophic failure, but fulfil a philosophic objective: to drive people to critical thinking'.⁵⁰ It has been argued that Plato 'is

⁴⁹ Ophir, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁵⁰ He gives the reason that 'there is no criticism of the pedagogical system. Like many other things in *The Republic*, it seems "fixed," forever, without change or mechanisms for change, a Parmenidean permanence. The discussion does not proceed, should the educational or political structure be shaped in this or that way to achieve certain objectives. Rather the discussion presents a *fait accompli*: society must be fashioned in this or that way. It is not in any sense exploratory, nor does it use questioning to uncover and critically examine the alternatives....There is, additionally, no stress on imagination or creativity. There is none of the tremendous artistic and creative sense for which Plato himself was noted in designing and composing his dialogues. It is indeed ironic that the rich artistic

representing his hearers/readers with a discussion designed to elicit their views on the nature of the ideal society'.⁵¹ At many times, the reader detects the self-forgetfulness of the interlocutors. There is an ironic element in the dramatic scene. The reader is able to notice it since he is the third party. However, if he understands what Plato is trying to do with dialogical form, irony, dialectic, and dramatic scene, he should be able to look at the relationship between himself and the Dialogues.⁵² He should go beyond the text and look at

genre--dialogue, story, myth, allegory--in which the proposal is itself presented would not itself be the result of the curriculum propounded by *The Republic*...Nowhere is there an emphasis on the kind of questioning exhibited by Socrates'. Barrie A. Wilson, 'Plato: Some Inconsistencies' in *Hermeneutical Studies: Dilthey, Sophocles and Plato*, op. cit., pp. 128, 125.

⁵¹ Wilson, op. cit., p. 126.

⁵² With regard to this point, Tullio Maranhao said: 'Reading Plato's dialogues in the present times of strong individualism, we are inevitably struck by the power of the individual and his voice, his logical maneuvers revealing the workings of his reason and his passions (desire, jealousy, spite, or pride), thereby subordinating the content of the communication to the speaker's personage. In Plato's dramas of knowledge, the meaning-content being discussed is also expressed in the speakers' attitudes in such a way that, for example, in a discussion about the meaning of love, the defenders of the opinion that lovers will be better off by loving less than they are loved have a selfish conduct in the dialogue; in turn, those who advocate love beyond a theory of supply and demand make a greater contribution to the conversation, often becoming the thread that keeps the dialogue flowing (Socrates' role). Albeit contemporaneously read with an emphasis on the individual's personality, the Socratic leadership was not personal. It was based on the ideal of a democratic communication in which social hierarchies should be displaced, making room for pure argument. Asymmetries such as those between guest and host, famous and obscure, known and unknown, wise and ignorant, rich and poor, or handsome and ugly should not influence the evaluation of arguments. The best argument should not be determined by reason, which was independent of those values from which social asymmetries sprang.' Tullio Maranhao (ed.), *The Interpretation of Dialogue*, Chicago, 1990, 'Introduction', p. 7.

himself.⁵³ If he reads the Dialogues with a torchlight or a reading-lamp, a written justice will never be found. He has to read it with a torchlight in his soul. Only this enables him to 'see without looking'. The *Phaedrus* points to the need to go beyond writing. Writing has its own weakness and limit. The *Cratylus* leads us to go beyond names and languages. Language has defects.⁵⁴ These two dialogues are antidotes to any possibility of 'dogmatizing Plato's Dialogues' and 'dogmatizing one's own thinking' against *metaxy*. Reading the dialogues is an ironic moment. The reader is required to go beyond the names of the dialogues. When one reads the *Laws*, he just found out that the 'lawless' is the origin of the lawful. When he reads the *Republic*, he just deals with an individual. The *Apology* therefore is not just an apology. Also when one reads other dialogues, one has to go beyond their names and look through their music into their souls. The ironic situation further asks the reader to return to himself. With regard to this effect, it is unqualified to conclude that Plato completely denies writing.⁵⁵ It is the written dialogues which are regarded as a Platonic answer to *metaxy*.

With regard to Plato's political philosophy, it is evident that the Delphic inscriptions which consist of other famous maxims apart from 'Know thyself' such as 'nothing in excess' and 'measure is the best' have great influence on Plato himself. It is not surprising that he

⁵³ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p.127. Wilson quotes Drew Hyland's *Why Plato Wrote Dialogues*. See also Leo Strauss, 'On Collingwood's Philosophy of History' in *The History of Ideas: An Introduction to Method*, Preston King (ed.), Croom Helm, 1983, pp. 174-175.

⁵⁴ Plato, *Epistle II*, (312d, 313b); *Epistle VII*, (341b, 342b -344e).

⁵⁵ Berel Lang said that Plato is against literary practice. Berel Lang, *Writing and the Moral Self*, New York and London, 1991, p. 29.

is found to be the first who meticulously studies and establishes the Delphic inscriptions. Although the earliest reference to 'Know thyself, *gnothi sauton*' is found in fragments attributed to Heraclitus, however, Eliza Gregory Wilkins who thoroughly studied the history of the interpretation of 'Know thyself' in Greek and Latin literature shows that 'Plato is the first to tell this story of the meeting of the Seven Sages at Delphi, and it has been suggested that he was responsible for the establishment of the canon'.⁵⁶ 'Know thyself' must be regarded as playing the pivotal role in understanding Socrates' mission in the Platonic dialogues. Behind the ironical ignorance of Socrates the Socratic wisdom lies, namely, self-knowledge. In the light of the theme of 'self-knowledge,' in the study of the *Phaedrus*, Charles L. Griswold, Jr. shows that the profusion of issues set forth not only in the *Phaedrus* but also in the Platonic dialogues as a whole can be unified by the concept of self-knowledge not the theory of Forms as it has been conventionally understood.⁵⁷

The Platonic dialogues read in the light of the search for self-knowledge highlights the interplay between the irony of Socratic ignorance and the irony of the knowledge of the other characters. To put it another way, the Platonic dialogues with regard to the irony of Socrates reflect the forgetfulness of the self of others. The dialogues as drama portray and reflect the real situation in human life. Thus, as Griswold rightly argues, 'to read the Platonic dialogues as complex images or mirrors of human reality is ultimately to demand that the interpretation of a Platonic dialogue be guided by the

⁵⁶ Wilkins, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁵⁷ Griswold, Jr., *Self-knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus*, *op. cit.*, pp. 2, 15-16, 240. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*, *op. cit.*, 'The Question at Issue', pp. 7-32.

standard of self-knowledge.⁵⁸ Also, it can be argued that irony thus plays a significant part in reading the Platonic dialogues.⁵⁹ It can be inferred from above that the search for self-knowledge by the emerging paradoxical position of a person who knows that he does not know encapsulates a new presupposition and a new question in concern.

It is clearly evident that 'Know thyself' is differently interpreted along the history of Greek and Latin encounters and even in Plato's time. Wilkins differentiates various interpretations of the term in Greek and Latin literature as follows: know thyself as know your measure, know thyself as know what you can and cannot do, know thyself as know your place, know thyself in relation to *sophrosyne*, know thyself as know the limits of your wisdom, know thyself as know your own faults, know thyself as know you are human and mortal, know thyself as know your own soul.⁶⁰ To be sure, the Platonic 'Know thyself' embraces these all listed aspects.

The reaction in response to the questions in the dialogues reflects the nature of the self. One starts to know oneself by knowing one's self-reflection. Self-reflection begins with self-consciousness. One is conscious of what one is with regard to the first layer of the self. One has to understand what type of man he is. He might be oligarchic or democratic etc. Indeed it is hard to state definitely what type of man he is. It is polyarchic. Then he recognises a deeper layer of the self, that is, the nature of the tripartite soul. However, it is still moving. It does not cease there. He then realises that love lies at the centre of the soul. Still the soul

⁵⁸ Griswold, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 239.

⁵⁹ See also Griswold, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp. 10-15.

⁶⁰ Wilkins, *op. cit.*

is moving. The search for self-knowledge is the search for the nature of the soul. The search for the nature of the soul is like the search for the essence of an onion by peeling off its skin. It is multi-layered. All are counted.⁶¹ The search will never stop unless he has found out that at the time he is watching the soul in motion, he is already at the point which he is yearning for. However, the justice is that each knows himself according to his own ability. As Griswold, Jr. said '(e)ven though the reader approaches the *Phaedrus* with the desire to know himself, it may still turn out that the text is incoherent, different readers may still arrive at differing interpretations'.⁶² Only a philosopher-king who springs from the most excellent nature and 'the stream chances to be turned into that channel,'⁶³ arrives at that point of *metaxy*.

If Plato is regarded as a philosopher-king, then, the Dialogues can be regarded as his prescription for his absent subjects. The Dialogues are a mirror of the soul. They reflect what one is.⁶⁴ Also reading is a kind of *nomos*. Inside the Dialogues, there exists a world of ideas. It is a kind of reenactment, *mimesis*, of real action in reality. The Dialogues as a part of the public or the *polis* affects its reader. The text as a world of

⁶¹ C. Fred Alford argues that Plato obliterates self-consciousness for self-knowledge. He does not state clearly what it means. See C. Fred Alford, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-55. From this, I interpret self-consciousness as a self-realisation of the self in social and political term in its relation to other citizens in the city. Truly, to attain self-knowledge one needs to obliterate or go beyond the level of his understanding of self-consciousness. Like a man descending from seeing the sun, his self-knowledge enables him to carry on his social and political life with understanding.

⁶² Griswold, Jr., *Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus*, *op. cit.*, p.240.

⁶³ Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VI 495b).

⁶⁴ Cf. Plato, *Alcibiades I*, (132c-133c).

idea affect the soul slowly but profoundly. In the textual world, the politics of the soul goes on. Different texts exist as various as the types of the soul. For the past two thousand years, Plato becomes Platonism. It becomes dogmatic. Plato would welcome anyone who wakes the philosopher up from the slumber of rationalism, anyone who unmasks the tyranny of philosophy with regard to its rationalism⁶⁵, anyone who defies the tyranny of philosophy with method⁶⁶, anyone who wakes the philosopher from 'moral-all too moral' tradition, anyone who dares to attack the idea that Socrates originated Platonism, anyone who attacks Platonism and any foundationalism when the two are no longer therapeutic *pharmakon* and becomes a disease⁶⁷. Plato welcomes a Dionysian⁶⁸ when he is needed and he tames or Apollonises him when he has gone too far. The statesman always welcomes his like; even his written or unwritten laws are violated by that new statesman.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Cf. 'Mass Deception as Enlightenment', in T.W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming, New York, 1972.

⁶⁶ Cf. Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method*, London, 1975.

⁶⁷ Cf. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, Oxford, 1983.

⁶⁸ Detienne says '(d)espite his aversion to disrespectful, myths, Plato, in the midst of his elderly companions, gives him a warm welcome. He even draws from him a lesson for his philosophy of education: Dionysos is to lead the chorus of the elderly---but not the retired. For in Plato the elderly attain political and religious maturity. In *Laws* Dionysos is shown wreaking vengeance for the *mania* he has suffered by inventing for the human race the *baccheiai*, or Bacchic ceremonies, as well as all manner of entranced dancers (*manike...choreia*)'. Detienne, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

⁶⁹ As the Eleatic Stranger said in the *Statesman*, 295e: 'But he who has made written or unwritten laws about the just and unjust, the honourable and disgraceful, the good and the bad for the herds of men are tended in their several cities in accordance with the laws of the law-makers, is not to be permitted to give other laws contrary to those, if the scientific law-maker, or another like him, should come! Would not such a prohibition appear in truth as ridiculous as the other?' Consider Nietzsche, 'The Birth

VI

'Then neither will the true natural art of statecraft ever voluntarily compose a state of good and bad men; but obviously it will first test them in play, and after the test will entrust them in turn to those who are able to teach and help them to attain the end in view; it will itself give orders and exercise supervision, just as the art of weaving constantly commands and supervises the carders and others who prepare the materials for its web, directing each person to do the tasks which it thinks are requisite for its fabric.' (Plato, *the Statesman*, 308d-e)

'Do we not know, then, that the statesman and good law-giver is the only one to whom the power properly belongs, by the inspiration of the kingly art, to implant this true opinion in those who have rightly received education,...But we may say that in those only who were of noble nature from their birth and have been nurtured as befits such natures it is implanted by the laws, and for them this is the medicine prescribed by science, and, as we said before, this bond which unites unlike and divergent parts of virtue is more divine.'

(Plato, *the Statesman*, 309-310)

Is it true that three classes exist in the society corresponding to the tripartite soul? If some readers believe it, is there any of them who after reading the Dialogues thinks that he himself does not belong to the philosophic-kingly class? Are they all the philosopher-

kings?

Human nature might not be as portrayed in the Dialogues. Human nature might be a *tabula rasa*. Socialisation might be the only way of educating human beings. The *metaxy* of the soul and the city might just be a Platonic gimmick to indoctrinate the people. Perhaps Platonic political philosophy is really Platonism. Perhaps the Dialogues are used to indoctrinate the people by leading to some particular question. The introduction of this kind of question in the dialogues, particularly in the *Republic*, has been regarded by Adi Ophir as a Platonic politics of power-knowledge play. He criticises that it is just a trick of the author to put forward these questions in order to lead his audience to 'higher questions, which ultimately lead to the question of the good, at the dialogue's centre'. Other dialogues also imply the same intention. But the question of the good has not been answered and always suspended.⁷⁰ From the study of the *Republic*, Ophir deconstructs Plato's seriousness by demonstrating that the search for ultimate truth is based on deception. He however understands that the deconstruction could not be possible without a will to truth, that is, it is not possible if one does not take part in the game Plato invented, or 'without sharing his love for truth'.⁷¹ But only a will to know, as Ophir follows Foucault, can tell that Platonic questions and Platonic truth are deceptive. Ophir concludes under the shadow of Nietzsche by saying that Platonism lasts too long because we are too human. We are human which have been too human in the sense of Schopenhaueran *animal metaphysicum*. That is why 'we too take our fire from the same ancient

⁷⁰ See Ophir, *Plato's Invisible Cities: Discourse and Power in the Republic*, op. cit., pp. 8 and also 6, 147-148.

⁷¹ Ophir, op. cit., p. 166.

source'.⁷² Ophir leaves the reader who has read his study on Plato's discourse and power in the Republic with Nietzsche:

'But you will have gathered what I am driving at, namely, that it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science rests -- that even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless antimetaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine. - But what if this should become more and more incredible, if nothing should prove to be divine any more unless it were error, blindness, the lie - if God himself should prove to be our most enduring lie?'⁷³

Accordingly, the Dialogues are still able to light the fire in us.

If what has been told in the Dialogues is just a lie, then, the tripartite soul and three classes of men do not exist. Justice might be just the interest of the stronger. Nietzsche's words can be taken as a truth if it defeats Plato. Plato's words have been stronger for a long time. The interest is that many have been enslaved by his power of discourse.⁷⁴ Plato might regard himself to be a

⁷² Ophir, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

⁷³ Nietzsche, *The Gay Society*, (344), quoted in Ophir, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

⁷⁴ 'And those in turn who wallow in ignorance and craven humility it places under the yoke of slavery'. Plato, *the Statesman*, 309a. Compare Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison*, trans. A. Sheridan, New York, 1979, pp. 102-103. Foucault's citation comes from Servan's *Le Soldat citoyen*: 'A stupid despot may constrain his slaves with iron chains, but a true politician binds them even more strongly by the chains of their own ideas...The link is all the stronger in that we do not know what it is

philosopher-king. Or he might regard those who believe in the idea of the philosopher-king as his inferior. For he is the one who creates the philosopher-king. He creates not discovers it. Plato might be a Superman in the eye of Nietzsche while Nietzsche might deem himself a superman as well; or he might deem himself as someone who is superior to any who believe in the idea of Superman. Man might be divided into two groups, one the Superman, the other the herds. Perhaps, unarmed herding animals must be highly organized since their survival depends on staying close to a leader and swiftly following directions. Or the latter might be just a puppet of the former. Or perhaps Plato and Nietzsche are the philosopher-kings. The Dialogues might be just a genre of writing, a kind of music.⁷⁵ The study of Plato's theory of man in relation to his political philosophy here is just a written image. It can be either/or. When one is sceptical about the nature of justice or the idea of three classes in the city. He might turn to the search for the nature of the soul and the city. When he starts to visualise the origin of the city, then the shadow of Platonic political philosophy and his politics of the soul returns. Justice is the interest of the stronger soul. The Platonic discourse might be just Plato's politics of the soul. The idea of *metaxy* might be nonsensical. Perhaps, one never understands it. A man accepts that he does not know and does not understand this aristocratic arcane discourse. As Plato's political philosophy which leads only its philosophic-kingly natured participants to self-knowledge and self-rule, is democratic among aristocrats. A common man fails to understand Plato's theory of man. Must he be logically forced to say

made of.'

⁷⁵ Richard Rorty advocates this idea. See Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony and Solidarity*, Cambridge, 1989, 'Private Irony and Liberal Hope', pp. 73-95; 'Philosophy as a Kind of Writing: An Essay on Derrida', in *Consequences of Pragmatism*, Sussex, 1982, pp. 90-109.

that incidental to his failure he has to lose his self-knowledge as well? The virtue is not teachable because no one could legitimately claim the title of the master of virtue. However, it is teachable when one becomes the master of himself.

The *metaxy* of the politics of the city and the soul entails the politics of *metaxy*. The *philosophia perennis* remains. The music starts again. One is to be ready to swing and move up and down, back and forth, left and right. Sometimes it is bright and sometimes it is dark.

'But a sensible man would remember that there are two distinct disturbances of the eyes arising from two causes, according as the shift is from light to darkness or from darkness to light, and, believing that the same thing happens to the soul too, whenever he saw a soul perturbed and unable to discern something, he would not laugh unthinkingly, but would observe whether coming from a brighter life its vision was obscured by the unfamiliar darkness, or whether the passage from the deeper dark of ignorance into a more luminous world and the greater brightness had dazzled its visions. And so he would deem the one happy in its experience and way of life and pity the other, and if it pleased him to laugh at, his laughter would be less laughable than that at the expense of the soul that had come down from the light above.'

(Plato, *the Republic*, (Book VII 518a-b).

A sensible man laughs alone with himself. Now it is conceivable why Socrates drives drunk and slumberous Agathon and Aristophanes to admit that 'a fully skilled tragedian could be a comedian as well'.⁷⁶ A Socrates can laugh at his own 'tragic-comic life'. He effaces his

⁷⁶ Plato, *Symposium*, 223d.

laughter behind his irony. His irony makes us wonder. He wishes anyone who understands his irony to join his music. To be sure, he is the one who leads choruses of Dionysian and Apollonian music, but not vice versa.

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