

THE DIPLOMACY OF LIBERATION: THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF
THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS OF SOUTH AFRICA, 1960-1985

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ABSTRACT

Most previous studies of the ANC have concentrated on its role in black South African politics since it was banned in 1960, and its efforts to wage armed struggle from outside the country. Since the early 1980s most research has concentrated on its increasing support within the country. In contrast, the focus of my research is the ANC's international relations.

At the time the ANC was forced into exile in 1963-64 it had operated for nearly half a century as a political organization. This political legacy, together with its international relations in exile, has continued to influence the development of the ANC's structure, ideology, and strategy.

The immediate physical survival of the ANC was its main priority after 1964. The thesis first describes the development of the ANC's External Mission, its offices around the world, and growing international support network. In exile the ANC was transformed into a revolutionary national liberation movement. Its military wing claims to be fighting a war for national liberation. The ANC also has political objectives it seeks to achieve in the international system: firstly, to mobilize international solidarity against apartheid, support for mandatory sanctions and the diplomatic isolation of South Africa; secondly, to translate this general international opposition to apartheid into support for the ANC as the sole legitimate representative of the people of South Africa.

These objectives have been pursued in the Organization of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations, and in relations with the Western and Communist powers. The thesis explains the development of the ANC's relations with each of these organizations, movements, and states and assesses their role in the ANC's international relations.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

"The cardinal points of foreign policy are opposition to war and an uncompromising stand for world peace, and opposition to colonialism and White domination...[We] must look for allies...[and] we must ask...the following regarding any prospective ally: (1) Is this country or group in the imperialist camp or in the anti-imperialist camp? (2) Is this country or group for equality or for racial discrimination? (3) Is this group pro-African or anti-African freedom? (4) Is this country or group anti-colonialist?

Report to the ANC National Executive Committee, 1954.

"South Africa shall be a fully independent state, which respects the rights and sovereignty of all nations; South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the settlement of all international disputes by negotiation-not war."

The ANC's Freedom Charter, 1955.

"In the wake of the victorious revolution a Democratic People's Republic shall be proclaimed in South Africa. This shall be a fully independent state which respects the rights and sovereignty of nations. South Africa shall strive to maintain world peace and the settlement of international disputes by negotiation-not war...Democratic South Africa shall take its place as a member of the OAU and work to strengthen Pan-African unity in all fields. Our country will actively support national liberation movements of the peoples of the world against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. Diplomatic relations will be established with all countries regardless of their social and political systems on the principle of mutual respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity."

"Revolutionary Programme of the ANC:An Analysis of the Freedom Charter," National Consultative Conference, Morogoro, Tanzania, 1969.

The ANC was founded in 1912 to unify Africans against white encroachment on their rights.¹ It operated as a reformist pressure group on white politics until the National Party came to power in 1948.² The following year it developed a Programme of Action which represented a fundamental change in the ANC's policy and method. The movement was no longer content with the amelioration of social conditions resulting from racist laws, but now advocated a universal franchise in order to change these

laws and adopted the methods of non-violent civil disobedience.

The implementation of apartheid during the 1950s led the ANC to initiate a series of country wide demonstrations and as a result it became the largest mass movement in black South African politics. The extension of apartheid to Coloureds and Indians led to growing cooperation between the ANC and the political organizations of other race groups, and for the first time, open campaigning with the Communist Party of South Africa.

These multi-racial efforts culminated in the formation of the Congress Alliance in 1955.³ The ANC's leadership of the Alliance led to the controversial transformation of the ANC's more exclusive African nationalism into a more broadly based South African nationalism enshrined in the Freedom Charter. This Charter committed the ANC to the formation of a non-racial society based on democracy through a universal franchise, an economy based on social equity, and a foreign policy based on non-alignment and opposition to colonialism and imperialism.⁴

The ANC's transition to a more broadly based nationalism and its willingness to cooperate with Indians, Coloureds, and whites through the Congress Alliance led a small (but vocal) "Africanist" minority within the ANC to break away in 1958 and form the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) in April 1959. The PAC complained that the Congress Alliance was dominated by whites and communists since many of its white members used to belong to the CPSA. It was

committed to an exclusive black African nationalism and Pan-Africanist ideology.⁵

The ANC's domestic opposition to apartheid led the movement to make plans for the creation of an External Mission to lobby for international support, but the banning of the ANC in 1960 after the Sharpeville shootings forced it to form the External Mission before the plans were completed. Forced underground, sections of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP) formed a military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (the Spear of the Nation), and abandoned the ANC's commitment to non-violence. The leaders of these organizations were either captured in 1963 at Umkhonto's headquarters in Rivonia, a suburb of Johannesburg, or forced into exile. Since this time the ANC has become a revolutionary national liberation movement and Umkhonto claims to have started to fight a "people's war" for national liberation.

1.1 Reasons for This Study

The study of South African foreign policy has been about what white South Africans think about the Republic's relations with the rest of the world [Vale 1985].⁶ When James Barber's book on South Africa's foreign policy was published, it was criticized by the The African Communist, the SACP's theoretical journal, for ignoring the ANC's foreign policy conducted through its External Mission as an important aspect of South Africa's international relations [The African Communist 1974:118-120].

Barber's study, one of the first in the field, can not be faulted for examining only the white minority government's foreign policy. At that time the "conventional approach" to foreign policy analysis defined a state's foreign policy as the product of the people in power and conducted by a small elite group of specialists. In many respects this remains the dominant approach.

This "conventional approach" meant the study of South African foreign policy was about the Republic and its behaviour in the international system. The most immediate black contribution to South Africa's foreign policy was mainly through what Rosenau calls a "reactive linkage" between domestic policy (the implementation of apartheid and black resistance) and the consequences of these activities for the Republic's foreign relations [Rosenau 1969:45].

The state-centred emphasis of the "conventional approach" meant the literature on foreign policy was more concerned with how the results of the linkage between domestic and foreign policy narrowed South African foreign policy options than how this linkage was constructed in the first place [Barber 1973:130; Jaster 1980]. It did not examine how the changes in the international system had come about, which caused South Africa's isolation and limited its policy options. These changes were accepted as a "given" part of the international environment in which South Africa's foreign relations operated.

The role of South African blacks in the international system only became important after the liberation movements were banned, prominent exiles left the country, and

Afro-Asian states joined them in publicity and information activities overseas designed to mobilize support for South Africa's isolation in international affairs.⁷

These changes opened up an area of study related to foreign policy analysis: the ways in which the liberation movements, Afro-Asian states, and international organizations contributed to the changes in the international environment which constrained South Africa's limited foreign policy options.

It is the neglect of this area of research which led to The African Communist's complaint. The "ANC and its allies have had a major impact on foreign policy," the journal contends, through "the call for an international boycott of South Africa and the beginning of guerrilla struggle" [The African Communist 1974:119].

This thesis examines the international relations of the ANC since the movement was banned in 1960 in an effort to begin to redress the deficiency in the international relations literature on the role of South Africa's black's in foreign policy. Some analysts have studied the ANC's relations with the SACP and the Soviet Union, but this is only one part of the ANC's international relations. No previous study has examined the ANC's foreign policy and tried to locate its relations with Communist countries in the context of its entire network of international relations.

Another reason for studying the ANC's international relations is an anomaly in the study of black South African politics. The re-emergence of the ANC in the early 1980s

represents one of the most significant factors in South African politics, but the ANC has operated as an exile movement outside the country for twenty-five years. Most recent study of the ANC has only focused on the domestic factors which have contributed to the movement's increasing important role inside the country [Karis 1983].

Although the ANC began as a reformist African nationalist organization, in exile it became a revolutionary national liberation movement. This transformation involved a number of changes in political strategy, structure of the movement, process of decision-making, composition of its membership, and choice of domestic and international allies. How the ANC's legacy of political involvement as a reformist nationalist movement has continued to influence the ANC, and what the ANC has become since it was forced into exile, is a result of the influence of the ANC's international relations on the ideology, strategy, and structure of the movement. No previous study of the ANC has examined how these factors are related in order to present a coherent picture of the kind of political movement the ANC is today.

A third reason for studying the ANC's international relations is to begin to redress a deficiency in the literature on revolution and guerrilla warfare which either discounts (or ignores) the international dimension of armed struggle. Although the Vietnamese strategist Vo Nguyen Giap, in People's War, People's Army, pointed to the importance of a liberation movement's foreign policy in mobilizing international support for the struggle, particularly in influencing public opinion in the enemy's country, little

systematic attention in the literature has been given to the international dimension of the armed struggles waged by liberation movements [Baylis 1975:144].

This dimension of revolutionary struggles examines the role of a liberation movement's international relations in the revolution. It has always been an important aspect of the ANC's strategy. In fact, it was the legacy of the ANC's faith in international public opinion to take significant action against apartheid which may have led it to under-estimate the necessary preparations needed to undertake genuine revolutionary action, and to over-estimate the kind of support the international community was really willing to give its struggle.

A fourth reason for studying the ANC's international relations is to contribute to an understanding of the process of post-revolutionary state transformation. The international system comprises not only states, but increasingly a variety of non-state actors such as liberation movements and multinational corporations.

Little detailed study has examined the ways liberation movements constitute a unique kind of actor in the international system. They could be called "transformative actors" because they usually start as a nationalist movement in domestic politics, begin their "career" in the international system in exile as a liberation movement, and if they are successful, become another kind of international actor, a new revolutionary state.

This transformation in the international system from liberation movement as a non-state actor to governing

political party in an independent state is often part of the broader problem of managing the transition to socialism in new revolutionary states, but is treated mainly as a problem of domestic politics [Muslow 1986]. The way a liberation movement's international relations affects the transition to statehood, and the way it continues to influence the process of state-building once political power is attained, has not been thoroughly explored in the literature on post-revolutionary states.

The possibilities for post-revolutionary transformation are partly determined by the international dimension of the armed struggle. The way a liberation movement's previous international links affect the process of who attains state power, as part of what constellation of social forces, has an effect on the transition to statehood, and on the process of state-building. The very nature of the process by which a liberation movement attains state power may alter the kind of possibilities for state-building open to the movement-cum-political party once it has become the new government.⁸

These questions have become central to the direction of South African politics and are part of a continuing debate over strategy within the ANC (see Chapter 4). Another reason for studying the ANC's international relations is to indicate the ways its international links may influence the kind of political transition to majority rule that will take place, and the actual possibilities open to South Africa's new rulers of transforming the post-apartheid state.

1.2 The Objectives of This Study

Liberation movements do not have a foreign policy in the "conventional" usage of the term because foreign policy making is considered to be the preserve of the state [Frankel 1963:1; Reynolds 1980:35]. Foreign policy is defined as the attitude of one state toward other states and international actors and involves a course of action which the state pursues toward them [Berridge 1987:164; Plano and Olton 1982:6].

If the "conventional" definitions are expanded to describe liberation movements, then the foreign policy of the ANC as the term is used in this thesis can be defined as the political stance it takes in the international system toward other liberation movements, states, and international organizations; the objectives it seeks to achieve in the international system; and the strategy it adopts in order to pursue them.

This study of the ANC's foreign policy tries to define what the ANC's international objectives are, describe what the ANC is doing at the international level to achieve them (what could be called its diplomacy), and explain why the ANC has behaved in the way that it has in the international system [Clarke and White 1989:4,5].

Diplomacy is only one of the instruments of a state's foreign policy. It is the means of by which official representatives conduct peaceful relations [Barber 1979:6].⁹ In this narrow sense it acknowledges that states have common as well as conflicting interests; it is an institution of

the international system. Even in this formal sense diplomacy is important to the ANC. When Oliver Tambo speaks before the General Assembly, or meets with members of the European parliament these actions confer a form of status and legitimacy on the ANC because of the importance of these institutions in diplomacy.

Liberation movements (until their struggles attain a particular status) obviously do not have access to governmental officials to conduct relations in the conventional way the term diplomacy is used, but it can be applied as a description of the means by which foreign policy is conducted. If the term is used in this way the ANC's diplomacy consists of the non-violent methods by which its foreign policy is conducted (propaganda, publicity and information, conferences, personal contacts, speeches).

Because diplomacy can function as an institution of the international system it is usually distinguished from what Berridge calls the "instruments of conflict" (secret intelligence, force, economic statecraft, and propaganda) [Berridge 1987:164; Plano and Olton 1982:241]. In contrast, the role of diplomacy in the ANC's foreign policy is different from its role in a state's foreign policy. Diplomacy is an instrument of conflict because the ANC's foreign policy objectives are an adjunct to armed struggle.

In addition to the armed struggle waged by Umkhonto, the ANC also wages a diplomatic campaign to publicize and inform the world community about the evils of apartheid, to mobilize international support for the isolation of South Africa in international relations, to gain financial,

humanitarian and military support, and to gain international legitimacy as the sole legitimate representative of the people of South Africa. These are the objectives of the ANC's foreign policy.

Although this thesis does not examine the armed struggle waged by Umkhonto in any great detail, once the ANC did launch its armed struggle its foreign policy objectives became the international dimension of its revolutionary strategy. The fact that this is a correct interpretation of the ANC's foreign policy objectives was demonstrated in 1984 when they were formally integrated into a four-dimensional revolutionary strategy of people's war (see Chapter 4). Hence, they could be called the "foreign policy of people's war."

Propaganda is another one of the instruments of conflict, but it is an alternative to the use of force [Berridge 1987:112-114]. Both the South African government and the ANC use propaganda as part of their diplomacy, but only the South African government's propaganda has been studied [Berridge 1987:131]. The ANC's efforts to explain the realities of apartheid is only one objective of its information and publicity. Although the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Front Line States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Communist countries have agreed with the ANC's general objectives, this thesis also examines the issues on which the ANC has disagreed with them. Hence, another objective of the ANC's propaganda is to explain its policy positions to its supporters and fellow-travellers (see Chapters 5 and 6).10

Another aim of ANC propaganda is to influence the terrain on which political discourse about South Africa is conducted. Determining the vocabulary of political debate is a form of power. The way the ANC uses opposition to economic sanctions as an indication of support for apartheid, or its use of the General Assembly's pronouncement that apartheid is a crime against humanity (even though this judgment has no status in international law) are examples of its attempt to influence the parameters of permissible discourse. This objective is particularly important as one way of evaluating the success of the ANC's foreign policy objectives (see Chapter 10).

The ANC has pursued its foreign policy objectives on the African continent both in the OAU, and in its relations with African states, particularly the Front Line States in southern Africa. It has also pursued them in a various international organizations such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the United Nations, in its relations with Western countries, and in its relations with Communist powers. The ANC's activities with these organizations, states, and movements is the substance of its international relations. This thesis describes the development of the ANC's relations with each of these organizations, states, and movements and explains its role in the ANC's foreign policy.

1.3 Methodological Considerations

Finding primary source materials for the study of the ANC's external relations is not a problem. The External

Mission produces a series of magazines, pamphlets, news sheets, and even books. They publicize many of its international activities quite extensively, or at least acknowledge that they have taken place. ANC publications are an important source of information to describe what it has been doing at the international level.

It is the proper interpretation of ANC materials which poses the major problem for analysis. ANC publications do not explain, for example, why a high level delegation went to Vietnam to visit the defense minister, but merely indicate that the visit took place. Hanoi is a long way from Lusaka just to make a courtesy call to a long standing ally so how is this event to be explained?

How the kind of information derived from ANC materials is used to answer this question depends on the purpose of the study. This thesis is about the ANC's international relations; and not about the more general topic of international mobilization against apartheid. The study of the PLO and world politics by Kirisci [1986] covers many of the same topics included in this thesis such as the United Nations and relations with the Communist and Western powers, but his theoretical and methodological assumptions are quite different. Kirisci's work is "a study of the mobilization of support for the Palestinian cause," but support and mobilization for a cause is not the same thing as support for a particular liberation movement, whether it is the PLO or the ANC. It is in the interests of the PLO or the ANC to portray these issues in their diplomacy as if they were the same thing, but they are different.

At particularly violent periods in South Africa's history, such as at the time of Sharpeville or the Soweto uprising, the ANC (or the PAC) were able to ride the crest of a great wave of deep international outrage against apartheid. The more difficult issue to evaluate is how successful the ANC has been in transforming this general opposition to apartheid into particular recognition of the ANC as the only legitimate representative of South Africa's people.

The approach adopted in this thesis accepts the ANC as a state-in-waiting. It is movement-centred as much as "conventional" foreign policy analysis is state-centred. It adapts the literature on foreign policy analysis to the study of the foreign policy of a liberation movement. The merit of this approach is that it keeps the subject, the ANC, firmly in view. The Global Politics approach (Vasquez, Keohane, Nye, Rosenau) which Kirisci adopts in the study of mobilization for the Palestinian cause is forced to use support for the Palestinians as a surrogate for support for the PLO (and vice versa), but the PLO's actual foreign policy and its diplomacy gets lost.

This approach requires some important modifications of foreign policy analysis if it is to be applied to a liberation movement. Foreign policy analysis takes the existence of the state for granted. The period of independence and the development of statehood are examined as part the national characteristics and perceptions which make up the domestic determinants of foreign policy.

In contrast, the existence of the ANC, indeed its re-emergence in the 1980s, as the leading liberation movement can not be taken for granted. Its banning in 1960 and the arrest of nearly the entire high command of its military wing in 1963 devastated the movement and eliminated any effective opposition to apartheid for a decade. The immediate physical survival of the ANC was its primary concern in 1960, and certainly in 1963 the continuation of armed struggle seemed to be in doubt. How the ANC organized itself in exile, initially to maintain its existence and then later to carry on armed struggle and achieve its foreign policy objectives is a central aspect of its international relations.

This means the creation of the ANC materials used in this study as sources of information is as much an issue in its international relations as their proper interpretation. In other words, the development of the ANC's information and publicity organs is itself an outcome of its foreign policy. Chapter 8 examines the international politics of ANC information and publicity. This section describes how ANC materials are used in this thesis.

The official organ of the ANC is its monthly magazine, Sechaba, which in Xhosa means "the nation." Sechaba superseded the South African Freedom News which began in 1961 and was published in Dar es Salaam. The Publicity and Information Bureau from about 1963 published Spotlight on South Africa; a weekly current affairs digest. In 1976 it was superseded by the ANC Weekly News Briefing which is a London-based weekly clipping service of the South African

(and British) press.¹¹ ANC headquarters in Lusaka publishes Mayibuye, a smaller circulation bulletin. It was not published between 1969-1974 due to the financial cut backs for information and publicity following the reorientation in strategy after the Morogoro Conference (see Chapter 4). Various sections of the ANC also have their own magazines. The Women's Section publishes Vow (Voice of Women) from Morogoro, Tanzania. The Youth and Students Section publishes Forward at the ANC headquarters in Lusaka. The military wing, publishes a monthly journal called Dawn.

The articles in Sechaba are used in this thesis to indicate three aspects of the ANC. First, authoritative pronouncements of official policy. This group includes statements, declarations, and pronouncements issued in the name of the national executive which are reprinted in the magazine and copies of speeches by national executive members or position statements presented to conferences sponsored by international organizations. The thesis assumes that these articles accurately reflect the view point of the national executive committee, the ANC's highest ruling body. The fact that many of them were originally presented at international organizations and then printed in the ANC's propaganda organs indicates they are conscious interventions in the debate about South Africa among its supporters, fellow-travellers, and the international community in order to gain support for its positions.

Second, publicity and information propaganda. This group includes articles on apartheid and South African politics, descriptions of ANC participation at various

international conferences, biographical articles on important ANC personalities, and articles on aspects of ANC history. These articles present the ANC's view point on particular issues of the day and are used to mobilize international support by its supporters against South African government propaganda.

Third, articles that represent certain tendencies within the ANC and are indications of internal debate. This group includes editorials, discussion articles, and book reviews. Many of the articles in the smaller circulation magazines also fit in this category. The ANC is a political movement; not a political party. It encompasses a wide variety of views within certain ideological limits: a commitment to one person-one vote, non-racialism, united front strategy, and anti-imperialism. Apart from this broad set of commitments there are differences over theory, strategy, and economic policy. The appearance of certain articles are interpreted in this thesis as an effort by these tendencies to gain a wider hearing for their views both within the ANC and in the wider world of solidarity movements.

In addition to ANC materials, most of the other primary and secondary sources used in thesis provide background on the main components of the ANC's international relations: the Organization of African Unity, the Non-Aligned Movement, the United Nations, and the Communist and Western powers. For example, the ANC's disagreement with the OAU over revolutionary strategy only becomes apparent in the context of the OAU's policies toward liberation movements. The

significance of the ANC's disagreement with the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence only becomes clear in the context of the differences between the Soviet Union and China over revolutionary strategy.

1.4 Theoretical Considerations

In this thesis ANC materials are divided according to the three functions described in Section 1.3 (official policy, propaganda, internal debates). They are interpreted in the context of the broader elements which affect the ANC's international relations; what could be called the ANC's Foreign Policy System [Clarke and White 1989:28,31].

Its essential features indicate the relationship between the main components of the ANC's international relations (see Appendix 5.1).¹² As the term is used in this thesis, therefore, system is merely a heuristic device used to organize the main components of the ANC's international relations. It merely outlines a relationship between components which is described in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.

Appendix 5.1 specifies the main characteristics of the international system which affect the ANC's foreign policy. Each of these characteristics and the foreign policy component it influences is examined in a separate chapter of this thesis: inter-African divisions reflected in the OAU (see Chapters 5 and 6); non-alignment and ideological divisions in Third World politics (see Chapter 7); the Sino-Soviet split and East-West relations (see Chapter 8);

and the support the United Nations gives to the objectives of liberation movements and its receptivity to their participation in UN decision-making (see Chapter 9).

These international characteristics have had a major influence on the ANC's attributes:the legacy of its political principles and traditions, ideology, strategy, structure, and foreign policy orientation at the time it went into exile. Although no state is self-sufficient, the main difference for a liberation movement in exile is that the attributes which affect the development of its capabilities for armed struggle and its diplomacy must be acquired:territory and sanctuary in exile, financial, material, and military resources.

The CONDITION OF EXILE, the demands and expectations of its major HOST COUNTRIES (Zambia and Tanzania and later the Front Line States), and major PATRONS (the Soviet Union and its allies) have influenced the development of the ANC's ideology, structure, strategy for armed struggle, and foreign policy. Tanzania and Zambia, the ANC's main host countries, have provided the basic necessities of exile existence (sanctuary and humanitarian assistance). The Soviet Union and its allies have provided the ANC with military training, education of cadres, and humanitarian and material assistance. The Nordic states the United Nations have provided the majority of the ANC's other forms of assistance.

The characteristics of the international system have also constrained the ANC's diplomacy. The Front Line States have supported the ANC's general anti-apartheid objectives

in the UN, the OAU, and the Non-Aligned Movement. At times, the ANC was at odds with the OAU and the Front Line States over liberation strategy and priorities of armed struggle. When the ANC has differed with them it has lobbied for its views in private discussions and used its propaganda organs to gain support for its positions, but in the end it has been forced to acquiesce to their decisions.

The Sino-Soviet split forced the ANC to take part in Third World debates and issues irrelevant to the liberation struggle. East-West detente and peaceful coexistence altered international relations between the superpowers at the same time the ANC tried to accelerate the armed struggle. None of these disagreements appreciably altered the ANC's relations with its socialist allies; it had no real power to influence these states and it had nowhere else to turn for support, especially military assistance.

So far nothing has been said about what constitutes an "outcome" for the ANC's foreign policy. The determination of the outcomes of foreign policy is one of the least developed aspects of the literature on foreign policy analysis. The characterization of a state's foreign policy as "economic pressure," "diplomacy," or "war" (common in much of the literature) explains very little. The outcome of a state's foreign policy is more specific and consists of statements, declarations, orders, contacts, conversations, publicity handouts, visits, replies to letters and so ad infinitum [Clark and White 1989:33,34].

Section 1.3 pointed out that for the ANC the source materials for these activities, i.e. how this information is

communicated is itself an outcome of its foreign policy. Therefore, the means of communication must be evaluated in addition to the specific content of the information that is conveyed. This approach is adopted through out this thesis. It is particularly important in understanding the ANC's relations with the OAU (see Chapters 5 and 6), and when evaluating its relations with the Communist powers (see Chapter 8).

This approach shows that the key link between the ANC's capabilities and its foreign policy choices is domestic developments in South Africa and regional developments in southern Africa. These components have as a great an influence on its strategy, structure, and international relations as have the characteristics of the international system. Although the ANC's attributes and the characteristics of the international system affected its capabilities, the way these factors affected the ANC's foreign policy choices depended on whether the issue was one of the core interests of its foreign policy.

Because of the degree of dependence on external sources of support, this is perhaps a surprising conclusion, but the ANC's main objective is the liberation struggle inside South Africa. Its primary reason for operating at the international level (apart from the initial problems of survival) is to augment armed struggle inside South Africa. The ANC's leadership of the struggle was challenged by the developments in the black labour movement, the Black Consciousness Movement, and by religious opposition to apartheid by the South African churches. Its ability to

adapt its strategy and structure to changing domestic and regional conditions following the Portuguese coup, the Soweto uprising, and as a result of South Africa's destabilization were a major factor in explaining its re-emergence in the 1980s. Although the ANC's ability to successfully make these changes depended on its network of external support, its choices regarding revolutionary strategy and foreign policy were primarily based on its core interests.

END NOTES

1. The South African Native National Congress (SANNC) was formed in 1912 and in 1934 changed its name to the African National Congress. When a period in the ANC's history before 1934 is mentioned the term ANC is still used to maintain consistency, but the reader should recognize that the organization's real name at that time was the SANNC.

2. The ANC was the first modern political movement although strictly speaking, other political movements emerged prior to the founding of the ANC. See Odendaal [1983] and Marks [1986:48].

3. The CPSA was banned in 1950 and in 1953 the Congress of Democrats was formed and became the political home of many former communists [Lodge 1983:69]. The Congress Alliance included the ANC, the Coloured Peoples Congress, the South African Indian Congress, and the Congress of Democrats.

4. This summary is based on Luthuli [1962], Mandela's writings on the Freedom Charter [ANC 1985], and the ANC 1962 Policy and Programme. It states that although the nationalization of the mines, the banks, and of monopolies is envisioned by the Charter, "It is important to note that this demand falls far short of the proposal for a Socialist society envisaged in the programme of the British Labour Party which demands the nationalization of the 'means of production'" [ANC 1962:20].

5. The PAC has maintained these claims, but in the contingencies of exile has welcomed those whites, Coloureds, and Indians who are strongly opposed to communism or at least the variety espoused by the South African Communist Party (which they refer to as "Stalinism"). During the time of intense Sino-Soviet rivalry in the 1960s the PAC turned

to China for support and espoused "Maoism," but in exile its External Mission has been dominated by internal feuding dissipating the movement's diplomatic activities abroad and diminishing its support within South Africa (see Chapter 7). In London, the PAC appears to be sponsored by the Trotskyite Revolutionary Communist Party of Britain Marxist-Leninist which prints and publishes its materials.

6. South Africa's future, Peter Vale contends, "will be determined by what blacks think." In the study of South African foreign policy, "little or no attention has been directly given to the issue of the role of South Africa's blacks in the international system" [Vale 1985].

7. The title of Jack Spence's early Chatham House essay, Republic Under Pressure, aptly summarizes the dramatic results of the effect of South Africa's domestic policies on its foreign policy. Spence remarks, "It may appear surprising that little has been said about the attitude of the non-white majority to questions of foreign policy." Although he acknowledges that the ANC and the PAC have had "a clearly defined foreign policy in opposition to that of the government," on the whole they "have been absorbed in the domestic struggle, and their policies, if not their ideological links with independent African states, inevitably reflect this preoccupation." Their primary international task has been "mobilizing support for effective action against South Africa and would no doubt, if pressed, express a preference in favour of a neutralist foreign policy given African majority rule" [Spence 1965:42-44].

8. The argument of Cohn [1987] is similar in relation to the founding of Israel and is the source of my insight on this point. Astrow [1985] argues Zimbabwe is a "revolution that has lost its way" because of the nature of the transition to black rule.

9. Nicolson [1950:7,28,101] is even more precise. It is the art of negotiating agreements between sovereign states in a ratifiable form. Plano and Olton [1982:241] define diplomacy as the "practice of conducting relations between states through official representatives."

10. It is, perhaps, worth bearing in mind the description in Fowler's Modern English Usage: "propaganda is not unnaturally mistaken for a Latin neuter plural = things to be propagated; it is in fact an ablative singular from the title Congregatio de Propaganda Fide = Board [of Cardinals] for Propagating the Faith [Fowler 1983:486].

11. It differs from Barry Streek's South African Press Clips in that the articles are edited while the Streek's clipping service reproduces articles exactly as they were printed.

12. Appendix 5.1, with considerable modifications, is based on a diagram in Russett and Starr [1981:193].

CHAPTER 2

THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF EARLY ANC STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE

"There are people beyond South Africa who sometimes hear what we say. All we can do is try to shout to the world. All I can do is to help us shout louder."

Chief Albert Luthuli, Let My People Go [1962:93].

"In no other territory where guerrilla operations have been undertaken has the international situation been such a vital factor operating against the enemy."

"Operation Mayibuye," ANC Guerrilla Warfare Plan, 1962.

Since the ANC was founded it has recognized the international community has an important role in assisting its domestic efforts to change South Africa's racial policy. The two areas where the ANC has concentrated its diplomatic efforts are Britain, as the former colonial power, and international organizations. The ANC was founded to unify African opposition to Britain's proposed Union of South Africa which would restrict African political rights and allow the new government to make changes in African land tenure arrangements. In 1909 African leaders (who three years later would form the ANC) sent a delegation to Britain to protest these changes [Jordan 1984:44-13; Benson 1966:20,21].

Shortly after the ANC was founded (1913-14) a second delegation went to Britain to present its case against South Africa's changes in African land tenure rights [Walshe 1970:50,51; Benson 1966:32]. A third delegation travelled to Britain in 1919 and also went to the Versailles Peace Conference where it lobbied against Prime Minister Smuts' proposal to give the administration of German South-West

Africa to South Africa as part of the new League of Nations mandate system [Stanbridge 1980:68; Benson 1966:41,42].

After Sharpeville, the first country South African political exiles went to was Britain. It was not only their natural place of refuge, but also a target for their anti-apartheid campaigns because of Britain's strong economic links with South Africa (see Chapter 10).

South Africa's racial policies were first raised as an issue at the United Nations because the ANC and South African Indian Congress (SAIC) acted together with the Afro-Asians states, particularly India, to bring the issue of apartheid before the General Assembly. The ANC was particularly aware of the international dimension of domestic resistance since its transition to a strategy of non-violent disobedience in the 1940s and the development of mass action campaigns in the 1950s.

Even though ANC strategy turned to sabotage as a prelude to armed struggle, it maintained its faith in the role of the international community. Military operations were combined with the External Mission's efforts to isolate South Africa and cut it off from the world economy. The ANC had reasons for its early optimism: Albert Luthuli's Nobel Peace Prize raised the ANC's international stature, South Africa was expelled from the Commonwealth, and Afro-Asian states were beginning to adopt measures against South Africa.

The Rivonia arrests forced the ANC into exile and ended any significant anti-apartheid activity for a decade. The reconstitution of the movement in exile led to a even

greater reliance on the actions of the international community while Umkhonto made preparations for armed struggle, but in these efforts the ANC was bitterly disappointed.

Consequently, the ANC developed closer links with other liberation movements and with the Communist powers. These links were not only necessary for the reconstitution of the ANC in exile and for military preparations, but became an important part of the ANC's international support network in the face of Western opposition to sanctions and the UN's inability to take any meaningful action against apartheid.

2.1 The International Dimension of Passive Resistance

The ANC formed a united front with the SAIC, in the 1940s to protest the Asiatic Land Tenure Act. Its passive resistance campaign was accompanied by an ANC and SAIC delegation to the United Nations. Dr. A.B. Xuma, the President-General of the ANC, Abdulla Kajee, a dominant figure in the Natal Indian Congress, and Hyman Basner, a Natives' representative in the Senate and member of the Communist Party lobbied at the UN during its first session in Paris. The ANC focused on the status of South-West Africa and the High Commission territories [Benson 1966:111].

The SAIC was founded by M.K. Gandhi and developed close links with the Indian Congress Party.¹ Partly through these ties, and contacts with the ANC at the United Nations India took a strong interest in South Africa.² The joint domestic campaign by the ANC and the SAIC was accompanied by India's

boycott of South African goods (the first country to do so) and its actions in the General Assembly in December 1946 [Bissell 1977:10,16; Segal 1961:430,431]. It was the attack on South Africa at the UN by India, "with assistance, by lobbying, from the representatives" of the ANC and SAIC "which introduced a new phase of international involvement in South African race relations" [Kuper 1971:454]. Subsequently, Yusuf Dadoo, then President of the Transvaal Indian Congress, lobbied delegates at the 1948 session of the General Assembly [Segal 1961:64].

During the Defiance Campaign in 1952 the ANC and SAIC made efforts to mobilize international public opinion against apartheid. Inside South Africa visitors, world personalities, journalists, and distinguished authors from overseas were all briefed by the ANC [Tambo 1966:224].

Outside the country the ANC concentrated on the United Nations. "The [D]efiance [C]ampaign of the ANC and the SAIC now received echoes in New York. For the first time in the history of the United Nations, South Africa was now to be arraigned specifically for her racial policies as a whole" [Pachai 1971:187] Z.K. Matthews, who was in the United States at the time, regularly lobbied at UN headquarters. He wrote to the Secretary-General to place the issue of apartheid before the UN's Ad Hoc Political Committee, but was denied permission because of South Africa's protests [Nelson 1975:137].³ The U.S. government also put pressure on Matthews not to appear before the Committee and prevented Nelson Mandela from visiting the United States. So during

the 1950s the ANC increasingly saw the U.S. as a major country which protected South Africa [Nelson 1975:145].⁴

At the prodding of India South Africa's racial policies were dealt with through the UN's conciliation and good offices procedures established for the peaceful settlement of disputes for the first time. A Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa was set up during the Defiance Campaign to help the two states find a solution [Bissell 1977:24].⁵ The ANC and SAIC sent memoranda to the Commission [Nelson 1975:137,138]. During the Campaign the ANC also made contacts in the United States with George Houser who formed the Americans for South African Resistance (the precursor to the American Committee on Africa) [Nelson 1975:141,152].

It was at Nkrumah's All-Africa People's Conference in 1958, during the publicity accompanying the Treason Trial, that the ANC first called for the economic boycott of South African goods [Luthuli 1962:187,195]. This call was reiterated the following year by President-General Luthuli at the ANC's last conference before it was banned [Keesings 1960:17266; SAIRR 1961:54].

Under Luthuli's leadership this call was linked to the ANC's commitment to non-violence [Luthuli 1962:186,193]. An economic boycott, Luthuli argued, "represents our only chance of a relatively peaceful transition from the present unacceptable type of government" (emphasis in the original) [Luthuli 1962:185].

Apart from a principled commitment to non-violence, the main reason the ANC supported an economic boycott was its belief that South Africa's prosperity was based on cheap

black labour and on international trade [Luthuli 1962:185,186]. It was the world boycott and the withdrawal of foreign capital, Luthuli asserted, "which jolts them worst" [Luthuli 1962:187].

He dismissed the South Africa Foundation as an all-white organization formed after Sharpeville to protect the "business interests of white business moguls" [Luthuli 1962:195].⁶ Although Luthuli acknowledged the hardship a boycott would cause Africans, he believed that if the boycott was a method which could shorten the duration of conflict then "the suffering to us will be a price we are willing to pay" [Luthuli 1962:186].

In the language of international relations literature the ANC was "idealist" because of its faith in world public opinion and international organizations to help bring about change in South Africa. According to Jordan Ngubane, many members of the ANC considered the UN to be one of the primary means by which they could bring international pressure to bear upon the government. They had faith that the UN would act in their behalf because of the Charter's commitment to equality and justice.⁷ In a speech before the UN's Special Political Committee during the Rivonia trial, Oliver Tambo hinted that in 1958 the efforts to seek international pressure on the South African government through a boycott of South African goods was the ANC's last attempt at peaceful change before the transition to violence became inevitable. He also claimed this was why the External Mission was formed, but the reasons were more complicated than this (see Chapter 3) [United Nations 1963:104].⁸

By the time of Sharpeville the international publicity following the Defiance Campaign and the Treason Trial meant the world's interest in South Africa was aroused to cause even greater world-wide condemnation of South Africa's actions [Tambo 1966:224]. The economic crisis following Sharpeville only reinforced the ANC's faith in international public opinion and the importance of an economic boycott to end apartheid.

2.2 The Evolution of ANC Strategy After 1960

After Sharpeville the ANC was forced underground. Sections of the ANC and the SACP began the plans to create Umkhonto while Oliver Tambo established the External Mission (see Chapter 3).⁹

Umkhonto's choice of strategic sabotage as the "first phase" of armed struggle was linked to the ANC's tradition of non-violence [Meli 1988:147], and its faith in the international community. By choosing symbolic "hard" targets (e.g. government buildings, the economic infrastructure, and military installations) it hoped to bring the government to its senses, rather than be forced to escalate the conflict from sabotage to open revolution.

Selective sabotage was a strategic necessity as much as a deliberate moral policy of graduated warfare. It made a virtue out of a necessity; the ANC simply lacked the training and military supplies necessary for guerrilla warfare in the early 1960s [Bunting 1975:268]. Very few Umkhonto personnel had military training.¹⁰ Ronnie Kasrils,

an early Umkhonto member, has explained "The sabotage campaign was intended to give us experience in this new form of struggle...We waited expectantly for the return of those who had gone abroad to acquire the advanced skills of warfare. On their return, it would be time for the launching of the armed struggle proper" [Sechaba 1986:2; Feit 1971:242,243].

The ANC needed trained Umkhonto militants to implement "Operation Mayibuye," its guerrilla warfare plan [Carter and Karis interviews 1963-64; Nelson 1975:242,243]. In 1961 the national executive decided the new External Mission should cooperate with Umkhonto in making arrangements for military training in case the decision to escalate the armed struggle from sabotage to guerrilla warfare was made [Karis, Carter, Gerhart 1977:648; Benson 1966:256].

Nelson Mandela, the commander-in-chief of Umkhonto, made a secret tour of Africa in early 1962. Contrary to some previous accounts, this was a "Umkhonto mission" to help make the necessary training arrangements [The African Communist 1986:25].¹¹ On 11 January 1962 Mandela was smuggled out of South Africa to attend the conference of the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East and, Central Africa (PAFMECA) which met in Addis Ababa in February.¹² At this stage, with the beginning of the liberation struggles in other southern African countries, the ANC was still optimistic about the prospect of guerrilla warfare in South Africa. In his speech Mandela asked, "What role should PAFMECA play to strengthen the liberation movement in South Africa and speed up the liberation of our country?" Although

he specifically thanked those PAFMECA states (Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Tanganyika) which imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions, he asserted, "It would be fatal to create the illusion that external pressures render it unnecessary to tackle the enemy from within" [Mandela 1978:121].

Mandela did indicate the areas where international action could help the struggle. World pressure could weaken South Africa's international position. South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth, its expulsion from the ILO, and the call for mandatory sanctions at the UN were examples of the kind of action he was thinking about. World opinion, Mandela claimed, had "hardened" against South Africa. "It has become clear to us," he said, "the whole of Africa is unanimously behind the move to ensure effective economic and diplomatic sanctions against" South Africa [Mandela 1978:120].

Like later ANC leaders, Mandela exaggerated the support which African states were willing to give the liberation struggles in southern Africa. He gave the examples of the All Africa Peoples Conference in Accra (1958), the Positive Action Conference (April 1960), the second CIAS (June 1960), and the Casablanca (January 1961), Monrovia (May 1961), and Lagos (January 1962) conferences to indicate Africa's anti-apartheid commitment, but Africa's rhetoric did not translate into strong action [Mandela 1978:120]. The conferences Mandela mentioned took place at a time when African international relations was coalescing into "moderate" and "radical" blocs divided not only over rival

interpretations of African unity, but also over whether an isolationist or accomodationist policy should be adopted toward the struggles in southern Africa [Zartman 1966]. They came together to form the OAU, but rhetoric aside, at the cost of taking a firm stand on African liberation (see Chapters 4 and 5).

The ANC counted on world opinion to be combined with its domestic mass action campaigns to bring adequate pressure to bear on the government. Domestic campaigns would be carried out in conjunction with international pressure generated by the activities of the South African United Front (see Chapter 3) [Karis, Carter, Gerhart 1977:358]. In fact, Nelson Mandela and Govan Mbeki, in their Rivonia testimony, assert that the Front's primary objective was to compliment the internal strategy of the liberation movements [Mandela & Mbeki testimony Rivonia Sabotage Trial Reel 3:49; Nelson 1975:174]. The All-In African Conference which organized the three day strike in May 1961 reiterated the ANC's "call on democratic people the world over" to support diplomatic and economic sanctions, and claimed apartheid "constitutes a threat to international peace" [Lodge 1983:231, 232; Mandela 1978:96].¹³

During his Rivonia testimony Mandela seemed to indicate that international action would result after mass action provoked domestic repression. International sympathy and pressure on the government were expected, he claimed, "if mass action were successfully organized, and mass reprisals taken" [Karis, Carter, Gerhart 1977:648].¹⁴

Umkhonto's developing strategy combined the ANC's non-violent tradition and its faith in the international community with selective sabotage. Mandela hinted at the change in strategy in his PAFMECA speech.¹⁵ While he was on his tour Arthur Goldreich was visiting the Soviet Union (see Chapter 8). Shortly after both men returned to South Africa clandestine leaflets began circulating in the black townships announcing "a radical change in outlook and methods" of the ANC [West Africa 1962:447].¹⁶ At the Lobatsi conference, quickly convened after Mandela's arrest in 1962 (see Section 2.3), the ANC reaffirmed its strategy of mass action and international pressure, but these actions were now to be accompanied by military action. The conference explained the internal ANC should contribute "mass political action" because "political agitation is the only way of creating the atmosphere in which military action can most effectively operate. The political front gives sustenance to the military operations" [Karis, Carter, Gerhart 1977:748].

Lobatsi emphasized the role of the External Mission in coordinating the international action to accompany the domestic struggle. The conference noted, "internal and external situations favour us. The revolutionary mood of the people is growing. The hatred of the policies of this Government by the progressive world is also growing. Our External Mission has done magnificent work in exposing the immoral policies of the Nationalists abroad and in enlisting the sympathy of the democratic world." The conference pointed to the resolutions at the United Nations to impose

sanctions, the PAFMECA conference, and decisions by other Afro-Asian conferences.¹⁷

Umkhonto's strategy was aimed at the maximum impact on the South African economy by provoking international action. In his Rivonia testimony in 1964, Mandela said Umkhonto's sabotage of the economic infrastructure of the country would "scare away capital" and "in the long run be a heavy drain on the economic life of the country, thus compelling the voters of the country to reconsider their position" [Karis, Carter, Gerhart 1977:647].

The ANC's first plan for guerrilla warfare was called "Operation Mayibuye" ("come back"). The status of this plan in ANC strategy is a controversial issue in ANC historiography.¹⁸ Although particular aspects of Operation Mayibuye were still under discussion at the time of the Rivonia arrests, the general strategic framework of the plan fit into the ANC's evolving three-part strategy of mass action, guerrilla warfare, supported by international action. A monthly ANC news sheet from Cairo in April 1963 outlined this basic strategy: in order to seize power political agitation could create the atmosphere for effective military action by Umkhonto [SAIRR 1964:12].

"Operation Mayibuye," resembles this general strategy. An internal guerrilla force would be joined by external guerrillas landed in South Africa from the sea.¹⁹ These two groups would begin a combined "massive onslaught of selected targets. At the same time the internal ANC would increase sabotage and agitation in order to broaden the opportunities

for ordinary people to participate in the struggle [Lodge 1983:238].

The third part of "Operation Mayibuye" emphasized the international dimension of armed struggle. "In no other territory where guerrilla operations have been undertaken," the plan states, "has the international situation been such a vital factor operating against the enemy" [Karis, Carter, Gerhart, 1977:762]. Umkhonto's strategic disadvantages would be offset by diplomatic and economic sanctions, and international support, mainly from African and socialist countries. Although Umkhonto was "faced with a powerfully armed modern state with tremendous industrial resources," the plan said "the State is isolated practically from the rest of the world, and if effective work is done, will have to rely in the main on its own resources." Although "the people" possessed few arms, and had limited military training, "A proper organization of the almost unlimited assistance which we can obtain from friendly Governments will counter-balance its disadvantage" [Karis, Carter, Gerhart 1977:762].

The plan for "Operation Mayibuye" then established the international dimension in which guerrilla warfare in South Africa would take place: "Although we must prepare for a protracted war we must not lose sight of the fact that the political isolation of South Africa from the world community of nations and particularly the active hostility toward it from almost the whole of the African Continent and the Socialist world may result in such massive assistance in various forms, that the state structure will collapse far

sooner than we can at this moment envisage.²⁰ Direct military intervention in South-West Africa, an effective economic and military boycott, even armed international action at some more advanced stage of the struggle are real possibilities which will play an important role" [Karis, Carter, Gerhart 1977:762].

The role of the information and propaganda activities of the External Mission can be seen as part of the international dimension of the armed struggle waged by Umkhonto. The "effective work" the plan alludes to in order to diplomatically and economically isolate South Africa was a major role of the External Mission. While Umkhonto waged guerrilla warfare propaganda diplomacy was supposed to work for a complete economic boycott of South Africa which would be supported by the international trade union movement. At the United Nations, the ANC was supposed to be "raising a storm" in order to persuade the Organization to militarily intervene to prevent South Africa's annexation of South-West Africa.

If "Operation Mayibuye" had gone ahead as scheduled it may have provoked the kind of domestic crisis inside South Africa which could lead to foreign intervention (similar to the UN's action over Korea). Arguably, Umkhonto did not need to "win" a guerrilla war in South Africa to be successful; merely provoking action by the great powers through the UN would have been sufficient justification for the plan [Segal 1963:317; Bunting 1969:471; Halpern 1965:453].

Umkhonto's strategy acknowledged the ANC's non-violent tradition and maintained its faith in international public

opinion. Like Luthuli it acknowledged the importance of South Africa's international economic links as the main reason for the refusal of the Western powers to take effective action. The difference was that now sabotage was expected to have a more direct effect on the confidence of foreign investors than relying on non-violent mass action alone. After the formation of Umkhonto the ANC no longer considered economic sanctions to be the peaceful means of promoting political change argued by Luthuli; economic sanctions became an adjunct to armed struggle.

In the early 1960s the ANC was encouraged by the support for South Africa's isolation which came from a variety of sources. First, in October 1961 Luthuli received the Nobel Peace Prize. The External Mission, and anti-apartheid organizations allied to the ANC had lobbied for the prize so that the award implied a kind of "propaganda coup" for the ANC. The Afrikaans press viewed it as "part of the international offensive" against South Africa. It raised the international status of the ANC, especially in the West [Karis,Carter,Gerhart 1977:657,692].

Second, the External Mission played a role in getting South Africa to leave the Commonwealth (see Chapter 3), and Nigeria played a key role in getting South Africa expelled from the ILO [Mandela 1978:120].

Third, the All African People's Conference, PAFMESCA, the OAU, Caribbean countries, and the Non-Aligned Movement all supported sanctions; confirming South Africa's growing status as the "polcat of the world" [SAFN 1964a:6].

Finally, the first major break through at the United Nations occurred in 1962 when a resolution on sanctions was passed in the General Assembly for the first time [Benson 1966:240; SAFN 1964a:6]. The External Mission could be particularly pleased for playing an important role in mobilizing African support for the resolution. The timing of the UN session, when France agreed to a cease fire with Algeria in March (leading to independence in July), could not have been better. Shortly after the cease fire agreement Tambo and Resha "left London to mobilize international action to prevent an 'Algerian situation' developing in South Africa." Tambo went to New York to lobby at the UN for mandatory sanctions and Resha toured Africa to discuss methods to secure the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly [West Africa 1962:447].

The ANC's UN appeal to help prevent the possible executions of the Rivonia trialists was also successful, but these efforts turned out to be the limits of UN action. The ANC, devastated after the Rivonia arrests could do little else besides continue to call for sanctions, but the Western powers were strongly opposed to them. All the anti-apartheid forces at the United Nations could do was institutionalize the issue by creating a Special Committee on Apartheid which held conferences and provided the ANC with new forms of access to the UN system (see Chapter 9).

By the late 1960s the ANC was exasperated by the lack of concrete UN action. During an appearance before the Special Committee in 1968 Oliver Tambo complained, "The least that the United Nations can do is to enforce

compliance with its resolutions by all Member States and to consider appropriate action against those countries which undermine these decisions" [United Nations 1968:7]. Because of the UN's failure to meet the ANC's expectations the ANC gave it declining attention after 1967.²¹

The UN's inability to take positive actions and steadfast Western opposition to sanctions contributed to the ANC efforts to build other, more supportive, international connections with other liberation movements (see Section 2.4) and Communist countries (see Chapter 8).

2.3 The Impact of Sharpeville and Rivonia

The events between Sharpeville and Rivonia have been extensively covered in the literature.²² None of these works, however, relate the history of this period to the ANC's propaganda. This section assesses the impact of Sharpeville and Rivonia on the ANC's strategy and structure in the context of how the External Mission's information and publicity presented these events to the world.

The South African government's response to Umkhonto's sabotage at the end of 1961 was to pass stronger security legislation the following year.²³ By this time Mandela returned from his overseas trip, and continued to organize underground, but the ANC received a severe set back when he was arrested in August 1962 [Bunting 1969:115,216].

Ten days later Oliver Tambo convened an emergency meeting of the representatives of the External Mission in Dar es Salaam [Bunting 1975:271]. The semi-official ANC

history by Francis Meli, the editor of Sechaba fails to convey the sense of urgency within the ANC following Mandela's arrest [Meli 1988:150]. At the time of the conference the ANC's South Africa Freedom News stated the aim of the meeting was "to consider the new situation" in South Africa "with special reference to the recent arrest of Nelson Mandela" [SAFN 1962:2].

The ANC bravely claimed the M-Plan (a plan designed by Mandela in 1959 for operating underground based on house to house, street to street cell organization) had "transformed the ANC into a new organization-an organization of the people," but the reality was that by 1962, in spite of Govan Mbeki's success in making the plan work in the Eastern Cape (one the regions where the ANC was particularly strong), the plan was still unevenly implemented through out the country [SAFN 1962:1; Bunting 1975:273].

It is important to properly understand the organizational aspects of the Dar es Salaam conference. At this time, before Rivonia, the ANC was not an organization in exile. The External Mission existed separately from the ANC underground. Only after Rivonia when the ANC was forced into exile did the External Mission assume the responsibilities of the entire ANC (see Chapter 3). In retrospect, the ANC labeled 1962 as "a year of re-assessment and regrouping" [SAFN 1963:1]. The ban on the ANC was having its affect on the organization and strategic planning between the ANC underground and the External Mission. This meeting brought together key members of the underground with the main ANC representatives abroad.

At this time the ANC's two leading external representatives, based in London, were Oliver Tambo and Robert Resha [Bunting, 1975:270]. At the Dar es Salaam meeting they were met by Mzwai Pilliso from the Cairo office, James Hadebe, and Tennyson Makiwane, then chief ANC representative in Dar es Salaam after being expelled from Ghana the year before. The meeting reinforced the transition in strategy toward guerrilla warfare, considered "special recommendations from the underground headquarters" of the ANC. It also made "far-reaching decisions" to affect the External Mission [Africa Digest 1962:64; Bunting 1975:271]. It laid the plans for "determined and concerted international action to rid the world of the apartheid scourge" [Africa Digest 1962b:99; Segal 1962:37].

This meeting was followed up on 28-29 October 1962 even while Mandela's trial was in progress, by ANC's first major conference since 1959 to discuss strategy, clandestine structure, and the role of the External Mission. It was held in Lobatsi, Bechuanaland and included about sixty members from the ANC underground and its external representatives [Halpern 1965:290]. Representatives from External Mission included Oliver Tambo, Makiwane, Pilliso, Mabhida, and Jonas Matlou. Joe Matthews came from Basutoland where he and Dr. Arthur Lethele administered ANC funds. The delegates from inside South Africa included Moses Kotane, M.B. Yengwa, Govan Mbeki, and Dan Tloome [Bunting 1975:272]. Delegates came from rural areas in the Transkei, Sekhukhuneland, Zululand, Zeerust, and from various urban centres [Feit 1971:250,270]. Chris Hani (now Deputy-Commander of Umkhonto)

joined Umkhonto in 1962 and was one the leaders from the Western Cape who attended the conference [Gastrow 1987:108].

A number of major political and strategic issues were discussed. The dangerous political situation inside South Africa, and the newly-passed Sabotage Act were of concern because of the failure of an ANC anti-pass campaign to take place as planned in June. The role of the External Mission, and the role of trade unions, women, and youth in ANC strategy were high on the agenda [Karis, Carter, Gerhart 1977:746-754; African Digest 1962a:99; Nelson 1975:165,166].

At the Lobatsi conference the ANC began to plan for "the liberation of South Africa" in earnest [Halpern 1965:430]. The existence of a "specialized military wing" identified as Umkhonto was openly linked to the ANC (called the "mass political wing") for the first time. This was a point with diplomatic consequences. Because of the ANC's non-violent history at first it did not admit Umkhonto was its military wing. Yusuf Dadoo, speaking in Nairobi in March 1963, warned that in view of South Africa's intransigence "an organization was reported to be carrying on a campaign of sabotage. He said he was afraid this could not stop at sabotage and might lead to an armed struggle" [Africa Recorder 1963:468,469]. Dadoo knew perfectly well what organization was carrying out the sabotage. The extension of the range of sabotage targets was considered [Feit 1971:208].

The conference was concerned about the External Mission's liaison with its offices in Dar es Salaam, London, and elsewhere. Now that the South African United Front had

broken up earlier in the year (see Chapter 3) it was important for the ANC to open up its own offices [Bunting 1975:271]. It was at this time that it was decided that Moses Kotane should leave the country to help Oliver Tambo in the External Mission [Sechaba 1978f:54-56]. Reportedly, "one sphere in which it was felt that his experience could be put to good use was in combating the machinations of the PAC which had been making mischief everywhere since the dissolution of the United Front" [Bunting 1975:276].

One of the resolutions of the Lobatsi conference was for the national executive to review and make fresh recommendations for the use of the economic boycott [Afro-Asian Bulletin 1962a:18-20]. The Lobatsi conference decided the External Mission's campaign should emphasize: (a) lifting the ban on the ANC and other outlawed organizations, (b) lifting the State of Emergency in the Transkei, and (c) the release of all political leaders and freedom fighters imprisoned, banned, banished or otherwise subject to restrictions for political reasons [Meli 1988:153].

Umkhonto's National High Command was arrested in July 1963 at Liliesfarm near Rivonia, just outside Johannesburg. At first the South Africa Freedom News played down the affect of the Rivonia arrests, claiming they "will cause some organizational dislocation," but denied that the policy had smashed underground political activity [SAFN 1963a:1,2]. "No one should underestimate the seriousness of the blows which the resistance movement has received," the ANC later admitted. It bravely went on to assert, "no amount of

repression can put an end to the struggle of an enslaved people" [SAFN 1963c:1,2]. The ANC tried to rally its supporters with news sheets and slogans ("The ANC is Alive...The ANC Shall Never Die!"), but in reality the movement now depended on the activities of the External Mission to mobilize international support for economic sanctions in order compensate for the destruction of its underground. A month after the arrests the South Africa Freedom News declared, "Our colleagues outside South Africa, in Africa and the rest of the world, are acting surely to cut Verwoerd off from his friends [i.e the Western powers]. When he is alone and helpless, we will finish him off!" [SAFN 1963b:2].

About a decade later the ANC acknowledged that the ninety-day detention law, passed in May 1963, "caught us unprepared" and contributed to the Rivonia arrests [Sechaba 1971k:14]. In spite of the sporadic implementation of the M-Plan, the membership of the ANC and the structure of the ANC had not really made the transition to operating the ANC as a clandestine underground movement. Sechaba explained, "we had not yet devised a tight conspiratorial method of work which made it extremely difficult for people to know more than they were entitled to" so through torture and betrayal the ANC underground was effectively destroyed between 1963-65 [Sechaba 1971k:14; Tambo 1987:41; SAFN, 1963d:1; SAFN 1964:1; Mell 1988:160].

The London-based Department of Information and Publicity published an official Short History of the ANC in the early 1970s. It acknowledged that after the Rivonia

arrests, "We needed urgently to learn the lessons of conspiracy," it was imperative "to act resolutely to restore our organizational machinery and repair the damage created by these arrests," but the remaining leaders such as Wilton Mkwayi were soon arrested [ANC 1970:24; Sechaba 1971k:14].

Only after the ANC re-emerged in the 1980s has it been willing to acknowledge how serious the set backs of the 1960s were for the movement. This openness may be a sign of greater self-confidence as more and more sections of the international community consider the ANC to be the most likely alternative to the South African government. Ronnie Kasrils, an early Umkhonto member candidly acknowledged, "We had to learn the hard way about mastering clandestine methods" [Kasrils 1986:3]. Rivonia was a "great setback to our plans," and after the arrests "our leadership was imprisoned or forced into exile, and our movement at home crippled" [Kasrils 1986:3].

At the time Sechaba underestimated how "seriously disrupted" and "hampered" the communication and coordination between the internal ANC and the External Mission were after Rivonia [Sechaba 1971k:14,15]. The ANC effectively became an exile organization although the movement does not accept this designation. It considers its offices around the world to be the "external mission" of an internal organization. "We represent an external mission of the ANC whose tasks mainly, when it was set-up, was to mobilize international support for our organization functioning underground within the country," Secretary-General Alfred Nzo explained after the Morogoro Conference. "The task of rebuilding and

reconstructing our internal machinery fell temporarily [sic] on the external mission...This did not mean that the ANC has now established itself as an exile organization" [Nzo 1972a:17-20]. In fact, that is exactly what happened. "After the Rivonia Trial," Francis Meli acknowledges, "the External Mission became the leadership of the ANC" [Meli 1988:160].

Significant political activity did not occur until the beginning of worker militancy in 1973-74, and the uprising by youth and students in Soweto in 1976 [Sechaba 1971k:14,15; Kasrils 1986:3]. The subsequent decade, from 1964 to 1974, was the most difficult period in the ANC's history. The External Mission assumed a new role; it became the ANC in exile. It was effectively cut off from domestic events. The ANC was reconstituted at its "provisional headquarters" in Tanzania and Umkhonto developed its main training bases in Tanzania, and Zambia. During this time the ANC and the SACP became even closer organizations, and with the help of the Soviet Union and its allies transformed the ANC into a national liberation movement preparing to fight a people's war (see Chapter 4).

In the face of this separation, the upturn in the South African economy (evident by the end of 1962), more severe security legislation, and the expansion in the South African military it appeared to many observers at the time that only concerted international action could change the course of events in South Africa [Legum 1964; Segal 1964].

The academic case in support of sanctions was provided by the first conference on Economic Sanctions Against South Africa in London in 1964 organized by Ronald Segal. Tambo

gave the opening address and the conference confirmed, as far as the ANC was concerned, that short of direct military intervention the only effective way of exerting pressure on South Africa from outside was through the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions [Segal 1964]. The conclusions of the conference were used to promote sanctions by the OAU and UN (see chapter 9) [SAFN 1966d:7].

The ANC appeared worried that the liberation movement could become so isolated from events it was no longer considered an essential element in the resistance. In an editorial on "The Role of International Action," a few months after the London conference, the South Africa Freedom News explained the relationship of these activities to resistance inside South Africa. "International action supplements internal action," the Lusaka-based magazine bravely explained, "it can never be its substitute. Many supporters and sympathizers with the struggling African people have tended to isolate and enlarge upon the role of international pressure on South Africa. Erroneously, this pressure is regarded as the sole means whereby an end can be brought to apartheid" (emphasis added) [SAFN 1964b:7].

The ANC set up its "provisional headquarters" outside the country at Morogoro, one of its military bases in Tanzania. Military training and planning were resumed, but Umkhonto had little success in infiltrating guerrillas into the country in the mid-1960s (see Section 2.4). There was little else the ANC could do except call for economic sanctions. "It would be wrong to conclude," Oliver Tambo insisted at an American academic conference in the

mid-1960s, "that it is too late to influence the trend of events in South Africa by way of external pressures." Like Luthuli, Tambo was sure South Africa's isolation would shorten the duration of the conflict [Tambo 1966:224].

2.4 Cooperation Among Liberation Movements

While the ANC's was making plans for guerrilla warfare and establishing the External Mission it began to develop closer relations with the MPLA and FRELIMO.²⁴ These two Portuguese movements, along with the liberation movements in the other Portuguese territories (i.e. CLSTP in Sao Tome and PAIGC in Guinea Bissau), formed an alliance in April 1961 called the Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Territories (CONCP) [Marcum 1969:160].²⁵

The ANC held a meeting with Marcelino dos Santos, the Secretary-General of CONCP at the time of CONCP's consultative council in Rabat in June 1962 [Marcum 1978:13].²⁶ The ANC agreed with CONCP to "pursue their cooperation" and to "tighten their links" [Marcum 1969:283].

The MPLA formally decided to pursue greater cooperation with other liberation movements at its first national conference in Leopoldville in December 1962. The conference reorganized the political direction of the movement by emphasizing greater publicity and diplomacy. The MPLA decided to seek wider links with sympathetic states, international organizations like PAFMESCA, and with liberation movements like the ANC [Africa Digest 1963:168].

This policy had immediate benefits for the MPLA. The ANC supported the MPLA at a time when Roberto's GRAE was the only movement in Angola supported by the OAU and it had won most of Africa's diplomatic support, even from the "radical" African states in the Casablanca bloc.²⁷ The ANC's view was that Roberto formed the FNLA in March 1962 (and announced GRAE in June 1963) because he was not ready to cooperate with the MPLA. He could not sustain the war against the Portuguese, so by 1965 the initiative passed to the MPLA [Sechaba 1968a:5].

The ANC's Policy and Programme published by the External Mission in Dar es Salaam later that year pointed to the importance of cooperation between liberation movements even before the OAU was formed. The Policy and Programme stated, "Mutual cooperation between white governments on this part of the continent makes it imperative for our liberation movements to seek unity and common action on matters of common interest" [ANC 1962:38]. The Policy and Programme argued that a "practical step in that direction would be the immediate establishment of a consultative machinery to exchange information and experiences and to discuss mutual problems as often as they arise" [ANC 1962:38].

CONCP seemed to have functioned as the kind of consultative organization which the ANC envisioned. It was formed to coordinate revolutionary strategy in the Portuguese territories, but in fact most guerrilla campaigns were based on local timetables and conditions [Marcum 1979:182]. Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO's first president, more

accurately described CONCP as a forum for discussion and cooperation in the areas of research, diplomacy, and information [Mondlane 1969:210].²⁸ In spite of the ANC's recommendations, no formal consultative machinery with FRELIMO and the MPLA was actually established. Only informal meetings took place for military or political purposes on an ad hoc basis. After the transition to guerrilla warfare in 1963-64 ANC strategy emphasized the simultaneous development of wars of national liberation in all the white-ruled countries, and this strategic vision was behind its desire for greater cooperation between liberation movements (see Chapter 5).

The ANC's first real effort at close cooperation with another liberation movement was its military alliance with ZAPU formed in 1967. On 13 August 1967 Umkhonto we Sizwe and the forces of ZAPU "engaged" Rhodesian security forces in Rhodesia in the area of the Wankie Game Reserve. A communique was issued on 19 August by Oliver Tambo Deputy-President of ANC and James R.D. Chikerema the Vice-President of ZAPU which announced the formation of a military alliance [Sechaba 1967t:5].²⁹

In explaining the alliance, Oliver Tambo stated, "Military alliance is a big word. But it's not as if we sat down and signed a great big document with clauses and terms. We have had close political relations with ZAPU, and these developed into relations at the military level, until we were in a position to fight together. This close alliance is the first of its kind one can recall in the liberation movement. In no previous instance has there actually been

fighting by Freedom Fighters drawn from different territories" [Sechaba 1968a:1-3].³⁰

One of the ANC's military objectives was to open up a supply route into the country. Umkhonto needed to solve its logistical problems of getting equipment and personnel from its bases in Tanzania and Zambia into South Africa [Sechaba 1971:15]. Its attempts in 1965 had been a failure.³¹ The ANC believed this could be accomplished through greater cooperation between liberation movements [Sechaba 1971k:15].

Contrary to expectations, once Bechuanaland became independent in October 1966 (as Botswana) there was even less of a possibility of trying to infiltrate Umkhonto combatants through the country. The newly independent country recognized that it needed to remain on good terms with its powerful southern neighbour so the ANC turned to Rhodesia. Rhodesia could help "procure and secure routes to South Africa," and it was "to be one of the many routes the movement had decided to use in its efforts to get cadres" into South Africa [Sechaba 1971k:15; Tambo 1987:42].

Another reason for the alliance was the growing military cooperation between Portugal, Rhodesia, and South Africa (what the ANC referred to as the "unholy alliance" in its propaganda). Increasingly, South Africa intervened in the liberation struggles, particularly in Rhodesia and Namibia [ANC 1971:25, 26].³²

The Wankie campaign may have also been the a result of internal pressure from Umkhonto soldiers for greater military action. ANC-ZAPU strategy was for a programme of externally-led sabotage. Once training did start, the

Umkhonto soldiers in the training camps "who had finished their training" became "itchy for action and physical confrontation" [Sechaba 1971k:15; Lodge 1983:299].³³ By all accounts the Wankie campaign was a disaster. The combatants were caught by the Rhodesian security forces and the ANC was unable to open up its new supply line [IISS 1971:58; Rake:1968]. It is difficult to believe how morale was heightened by the campaign, but this remains the ANC's public position on this episode in its history.³⁴

On the Zimbabwean side, a factor which may have "pulled" ZAPU toward the alliance with the ANC was its competition with ZANU. ZANU's military wing, ZANLA, had just launched its armed struggle ("the second Chimurenga war") in April 1966. ZAPU may have felt it had to become more actively engaged in military operations and was therefore more open to forming a direct military alliance with the ANC than the CONCP movements.

It is not clear why the ANC felt the formation of a formal alliance with ZAPU, announced in public, was necessary to solve its logistical problems. Covert cooperation could have secured the same benefits without giving the governments of Rhodesia and South Africa the propaganda reasons to justify their increasing cooperation. This suggests that military considerations were only one of the reasons for the alliance. A likely explanation for why the alliance was announced in public was OAU pressure on the ANC to form a united front with the PAC. The alliance with ZAPU could demonstrate the ANC's commitment to African unity

and this is exactly what the ANC claimed at the OAU (see Chapter 5).

Although there was some dissension regarding the alliance at the time, it appears the decision to enter into an alliance with ZAPU was mutually arrived at in April 1967 [Meli 1988:162]. The ANC states, "It was a decision taken after long and frank discussion. Members of [Umkhonto] took part in these discussions and the decision was generally welcomed" [Sechaba 1971:15].

The SACP says its central executive committee "was totally unaware of the Zimbabwe events of 1967 until they hit the world's press" [Lodge 1983:299]. The SACP has had a leading role in Umkhonto and in formulating ANC strategy since the ANC turned to armed struggle. It is hardly credible that such "long and frank" discussions could have taken place about the alliance and the proposed Wankie operations without the knowledge of the SACP.

A more likely explanation is that the SACP disagreed with the Wankie campaign, and afterwards used its failure as a reason for the consolidation of its strategic and ideological perspectives within the ANC at the Morogoro Conference (see Chapter 4). Joe Slovo's subsequent critique of Cuban guerrilla strategy in The African Communist explained the SACP's criticism of the kind of battles the ANC-ZAPU were engaged in [Slovo 1968:37-54; Slovo 1969:46-61]. If OAU pressure was a contributing factor in the Wankie campaign, then its failure added another reason for the ANC's re-organization at Morogoro because of the

External Mission's reliance on diplomatic considerations to determine military policy (see Chapter 5).

The failure of the Wankie campaign did not change the ANC's view on the need for more formal arrangements between liberation movements; on the contrary at the Morogoro Conference the ANC strengthened its call for more alliances between movements.³⁵ The Conference declared there was an "urgent need of establishing a properly organizational alliance" between the ANC, ZAPU, FRELIMO, MPLA, and SWAPO because the current situation in South Africa demonstrated the "correctness of the ZAPU/ANC alliance." The Conference reiterated that the ANC-ZAPU alliance "is a vital part of our strategy" [Sechaba 1969e:10,11].

In spite of the growing cooperation between Portugal and South Africa, the CONCP movements were not willing to enter into the kind of formal military alliance which existed between the ANC and ZAPU. FRELIMO's Eduardo Mondlane, in his book The Struggle for Mozambique, pointed to the ANC-ZAPU alliance as the "best example" of the cooperation and unity between liberation movements to date (1969), but he was not willing to join FRELIMO with the ANC in a similar alliance [Mondlane 1969:211].

The ANC finally developed closer links with other liberation movements in southern Africa through a liberation alliance system called the Khartoum alliance, but this still fell far short from the kind of cooperation the ANC wanted.³⁶ An "International Conference of Solidarity with the Peoples of Southern Africa and the Portuguese colonies" was held in Khartoum in January 1969. It was sponsored by

two Soviet-related international communist front organizations, the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization and the World Peace Council [Sechaba 1969:3-10].

Like other conferences of front organizations, the Khartoum Conference included more individuals than official state delegations.³⁷ Representatives from the Havana-based Tricontinental Conference, the Labour Party in Britain, the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and the International Defense and Aid Fund also attended the Conference, indicating the extent of the ANC's growing international support network [Sechaba 1969:3]. African states were notable for what the The African Communist, called their "inexplicable absence" [The African Communist 1969:7].³⁸ The ANC was clearly pleased by the Conference because of the important role given to the participation of liberation movements in its deliberations compared to its limited participation in other international conferences (see Chapter 5) [Mayibuye 1969a:3].

The Khartoum alliance is the key to understanding the ANC's African international relations. The alliance established the ANC's "natural allies" among liberation movements [Martin and Johnson 1981:14]. It drew the CONCP liberation movements, i.e the MPLA, FRELIMO, and the PAIGC and the ANC together into a wider regional alliance system of southern African liberation movements [Marcum 1978:224].³⁹

In response to these efforts China attempted to form an alternative alliance system. A short-lived rival alliance to CONCP, called the Congo Alliance, was formed in the early

1960s, and later after the Khartoum Conference, an anti-Khartoum alliance was formed by the liberation movements supported by China including the PAC and ZANU (see Appendix 5.2).

The Khartoum alliance was formed partly through political affinity, and partly through Soviet initiative [Marcum 1978:224]. The ANC's links with the CONCP movements began very early, in 1962, when the ANC was still planning the transition to armed struggle and before the Sino-Soviet split had forced liberation movements to choose between the two Communist powers (see Chapter 8).

A definite political affinity developed between the ANC and the CONCP movements prior to the Khartoum Conference. In the case of the ANC and the MPLA, each movement was committed to non-racialism and was plagued by a racialist rival. The anti-communist FNLA's opposition to the membership of mesticos in the MPLA was remarkably similar to the PAC's opposition to the ANC's cooperation with whites and communists. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the PAC's active opposition to the ANC's political campaigns was similar to the UPA/FNLA's violent opposition to the MPLA.⁴⁰

Each of the CONCP movements and the ANC were also committed to the formation of a broadly based united front strategy. In part this strategy was based on the non-racialism of the movements, but it was also based on a common opposition to regionalism and tribalism. In addition to non-racialism, each of the CONCP movements came to share a common commitment to Marxism, and anti-imperialism which distinguished them from their rivals (UPA/FNLA and UNITA in

Angola, COREMO and UDENAMO in Mozambique) [Lodge 1983:298; Martin and Johnson 1981:14,15].

According to FRELIMO's Machel, the alliance did not mean these movements shared a common ideology, but they all had progressive ideas [Martin and Johnson 1981:14]. In fact, the "comradely cooperation" between the MPLA, FRELIMO, and PAIGC was also based on a common interpretation of the political content of the revolution, which the Marxist elements within the ANC also came to share.⁴¹ The year before the ANC announced its commitment to a people's war at Morogoro, Sechaba explained the Portuguese movements believed the formation of a people's army was "crucial" to the armed struggle which was increasingly described as a people's war [Sechaba 19680:6].⁴²

Sechaba said there were domestic and international dimensions of fighting a people's war. "Internally, the revolutionary organization[s] stress the need to break down tribalism, local loyalties and prejudices," in order to form a truly national liberation movement. Externally, the liberation movements "express their solidarity with revolutionary struggles everywhere, in particular in Vietnam," and in their neighbors South Africa and Rhodesia. These movements stressed "that their struggle is not a racial one but a political one, their struggle is not with the white man but with imperialism" [Sechaba 19680:6].

The Khartoum Conference was more important in determining the political orientation of the ANC's two other allies, ZAPU and SWAPO. Prior to Khartoum both movements were involved in pragmatic cooperation with liberation

movements aligned to the Congo alliance or the anti-Khartoum alliance.

ZAPU and SWAPO became part of the Khartoum alliance because of their links with the ANC. The liberation movements in Rhodesia never had the internal coherence of FRELIMO or PAIGC [Gann and Henriksen 1981:47,48]. ZAPU reportedly made its first contacts with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s through the ANC, and became linked to the Khartoum alliance system because of the ANC-ZAPU military alliance [Golan 1988:271; Gibson 1972:164; Slater 1975:272].⁴³ An issue which also made relations between the ANC and ZAPU more likely was the history of the two movements. ZAPU was formed in 1962 and ZANU broke away the following year. The fact that ZANU had only a few brief months of legal existence before both movements were banned was similar to the PAC which also had a short legal existence before it was banned. The ANC could not be seen to be supporting a "splinter movement" in a way that would lend legitimacy to the PAC. The ANC and ZAPU also had a history of faith in international public opinion to affect their struggles [Day 1967:53; Hutchison 1975:236]. In African diplomacy it contributed to the image of the ANC as a "moderate" organization, something which the PAC tried to exploit in its diplomacy (see Chapter 3).

In the early 1960s SWANU was allied to the ANC through the South African United Front (see Chapter 3) while SWAPO participated in limited cooperation with UNITA and the PAC.⁴⁴ Its early overtures to China led the Soviet Union to increasingly support SWAPO.⁴⁵ SWANU's decline contributed to

the ANC's links with SWAPO.⁴⁶ SWAPO's commitment to armed struggle in 1966, and growing military relations with Algeria and the Soviet Union reinforced its growing relations with the ANC. SWAPO's growing links with the Soviet Union slowly affected its international relations. Although SWANU was an early member of AAPSO and attended the new Havana-based Tricontinental Conference as the representative of South-West Africa, the following year it was replaced by SWAPO [Gibson 1972:124,125].

The Khartoum alliance helped SWAPO to further disengage from the pro-Chinese liberation movements aligned to the Congo alliance [Marcum 1978:224,225]. Six months after the ANC's Morogoro Conference SWAPO held a consultative conference in Tanga, Tanzania which the ANC attended. The ANC and SWAPO claimed partnership in a "broad anti-imperialist struggle" in southern Africa, and set as goal the development of a closer alliance between the two movements [Sechaba 1970m:19].

In addition to consolidating the ANC's relations with these other liberation movements, the ANC's participation in the Khartoum alliance was important for its international relations in a number of ways. First, it was an important component of the ANC's international legitimacy. A Khartoum Conference document called "Guidelines for Solidarity Movements" recognized only liberation movements supported by the Soviet Union as the "sole official and legitimate" liberation movements [Sechaba 1969b:3]. Each alliance system only extended cooperation to its constituent movements and recognized them as the only legitimate representative of its

peoples. The movements in the other alliance system were invariably called "puppets," dependent on the support of an external patron for its existence [Morris 1974:312; Bender 1983:6]. In this way the Khartoum conference helped establish the basis for the international legitimacy and solidarity for the ANC, the MPLA, FRELIMO, ZAPU, and SWAPO.

Second, the Khartoum alliance assisted the ANC's diplomacy. These liberation movements often lobbied together as a bloc at international conferences and at meetings of international organizations such as the OAU, the UN, and the Non-Aligned Movement [Marcum 1978:224].⁴⁷ They were consistent participants at the meetings and conferences of revolutionary organizations, particularly the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (see Chapter 8). The Khartoum Conference was also helpful because it fully endorsed the diplomatic agenda of the ANC and its allies. It called for mandatory economic sanctions and the treatment of guerrilla fighters as prisoners of war.

Third, the Khartoum Conference was important to the ANC because of the formation of a network of assistance to the liberation movements through revolutionary organizations. An ad hoc Mobilization Committee was set up in Cairo to coordinate international assistance to liberation movements composed of representatives from the six movements, AAPSO (which already had its headquarters in Cairo), and the World Peace Council [Marcum 1978:224,225; Afro-Asian Peoples 1969:53-55]. The Mobilization Committee channelled information and funds to the Khartoum-allied liberation

movements and was widely regarded as an effort to bypass the OAU's Liberation Committee [Marcum 1972:383].

CONCLUSION

The linkage between South Africa's domestic politics and its foreign policy did not just happen; it was made through the activities of the Afro-Asian bloc and the liberation movements. The ANC's activities combined the non-violent (and reformist) traditions of political liberalism [Kuyper 1957; Robertson 1971] with the idealist faith in world public opinion and international organizations.

It maintained these traditions even after the transition to armed struggle. Umkhonto's policy of selective sabotage was to be accompanied by international action mobilized through the activities of the External Mission to isolate South Africa and cut it off from its economic life line. The idea that apartheid South Africa continues to exist only because of its Western supporters and its links to the international economy is a constant theme in ANC publicity. It is a broadly based position encompassing both the Marxist element within the ANC and moderates such as former President-General Luthuli.

The Rivonia arrests made the ANC even more reliant on international action to end apartheid, although the movement was reluctant to acknowledge this dependence. In spite of early hopeful international signs of support, real effective action by the United Nations came to nothing. The Western

powers were opposed to sanctions and the UN was incapable of enforcing its own resolutions.

The ANC's initial hopes for the OAU, like its optimism over the UN, were soon dashed. It received limited support from the OAU's African Liberation Committee just at the time it launched the armed struggle with ZAPU in 1967 (see Chapter 5).

The ANC went elsewhere for support. The Khartoum Conference was an indication of its growing dissatisfaction with its reliance on world public opinion and international organizations for effective action against apartheid. The belated recognition of this fact led to the re-organization of the ANC at the Morogoro Conference a few months later (see Chapter 4). The resolutions at the Khartoum Conference declared that in the future "the forms of solidarity must be different" from actions at the United Nations. There would no longer just be "appealing vaguely to world opinion," but emphasis on "practical support" to the liberation movements [The African Communist 1969:13-24].

The material support the Khartoum alliance gave the ANC was crucial because the changes in organization and strategy at its Morogoro Conference put the ANC on the path toward people's war. The diplomatic support which the Khartoum alliance facilitated became an important component of the ANC's efforts to confront South Africa's foreign policy which became increasingly aggressive during the 1970s.

END NOTES

1. In 1946 Dadoo became president of the Transvaal Indian Congress and in 1947, along with G.M. Naicker, went to India where they met with Gandhi. Together they toured some of the areas torn by rioting following the partition [Segal 1961:430]. Sechaba asserts that Dadoo was Gandhi's "personal correspondent on South African affairs" (what ever that means) and recommended Dadoo's leadership of the SAIC [Sechaba 1969:11].

2. Sechaba states [1967:8], "It was the South African Indian Congress which first requested the Indian Government to raise the urgent question of discrimination in South Africa at the UN in 1946. The SAIC assisted the ANC's President-General, Dr. Xuma, by putting him in touch with the Indian delegation at the UN. Sir Maharaja Singh, the Permanent Representative of India in New York (and the former Indian High Commissioner to South Africa) led the opposition to South Africa's annexation of South-West Africa in 1946. The lobby was successful; the General Assembly rejected South Africa's request to annex South-West Africa by a vote of thirty-six to nothing [Nelson 1975:65,67; ANC 1971:15]. According to Nelson [1975:67,147] the relationship between the ANC and the SAIC was initiated by the SAIC. They frequently submitted joint communications to India, but the relations between the two organizations were complicated by some opposition in the ANC to closer contacts with the SAIC. Nelson does not comment on the fact that the leading members of the SAIC were also key members of the CPSA.

3. Z.K. Matthews wrote to Trygve Lie, the Secretary-General, in July 1952 "asking for an opportunity to place the grievances of the African people before the UN." The subject of South Africa was raised by 18 states, led by India in the Ad Hoc Political Committee (the precursor to the Special Political Committee), and Liberia raised the issue of Z.K. Matthews appearing before the Committee [Matthews 1981:161-167].

4. According to George Houser, the Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa, the U.S. government put significant pressure on Matthews not to appear [Interview with Nelson:1975:137].

5. The Commission on the Racial Situation in South Africa operated until 1955. South Africa withdrew from the UN and the Commission was abolished at South Africa's request as a condition for its participation. It published reports which were sent to the General Assembly's Ad Hoc Political Committee then led by India [Bissell 1977:19,20].

6. The actual word in the text, "monguls," is a misprint. The South Africa Foundation's official history states, "What also emerged very clearly from Sharpeville was the inadequacy of official public relations techniques" so news

became "fact and fable." Anton Rupert urged the Foundation to consider as soon as possible the appointment of a "qualified" Coloured person as a Foundation official because "particularly at a time of racial unrest, [it] would effectively counteract adverse criticism that the Foundation had been created merely to sponsor the views of Whites of South Africa" [Gerber 1973:29,30].

7. This point is based on an interview with Ngubane by Nelson [1975:66:138].

8. "In 1958, the people of South Africa had become convinced that if nothing was done to bring pressure to bear on the South African government in addition to their own efforts, they would be compelled as a last resort to rebel against tyranny and oppression" [Nelson 1975:143].

9. These plans were made without President-General Luthuli's knowledge. When he discovered that a military wing had been formed he reportedly remarked, "When my son decides to sleep with a girl, he does not ask for my permission, but just does it. It is only afterward, when the girl is pregnant and the parents make a case, that he brings his troubles home" [Bunting 1975:268,269].

10. The issue of the ANC's transition to violence is adequately covered from within the liberation movement by Bunting [1975:266,267], Meli [1988:146-149] and Mandela [1978]; by uncritical observers [Benson 1966:236,254; Benson 1986:110], and with sympathy but greater academic detachment by Lodge [1983:231-255]. Jack Hodgson, who fought in North Africa as part of the famous desert rats army unit, and Joe Slovo, who saw the actions of the Italian partisans fighting with the underground Italian Communist Party were two of the white communists with military training.

11. Feit [1971:231] assumes Mandela was on a Umkhonto mission. Karis, Carter, and Gerhart [1977:666] deny this is the case, saying Mandela travelled abroad as a representative of the ANC. During Mandela's trip he arranged for military training for recruits and scholarships for African students [Benson 1986,:114; Mandela 1978:164].

12. This was not the first time the ANC had attended a PAFMECA conference. Tennyson Makiwane attended the PAFMECA conference in Mbale, Uganda in October 1960 [Cox 1964:38]. Mandela's stop over in Ethiopia was part of wider to tour of North and West African states he made with Oliver Tambo to make arrangements for military training before going to Britain. He met with President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, President Modibo Keita of Mali, President Leopold Senghor of Senegal, President Sekou Toure of Guinea, and President Tubman of Liberia. The PAFMECA conference was hosted by Haile Selassie, and the ANC was invited to attend so Oliver Tambo arranged for Mandela to address the conference. Tambo, writing in the Introduction to a 1973 collection of Mandela's writings, expresses surprise at Mandela's

appearance in Ethiopia, but this does not appear to be correct [Mandela 1973]. Benson [1986:111] states Tambo arranged for Mandela to attend the conference. After Mandela's tour of North and West African states he and Oliver Tambo flew to London. Mandela returned to Algeria (where he met Col. Boumedienne commander-in-chief of the FLN forces and Ahmed Ben Bella, and then travelled to East Africa. There he met Julius Nyerere, Rashidi Kawana, the Prime Minister of Tanganyika, Haile Selassie, General Abboud President of the Sudan, Kaunda, Milton Obote, and Oginga Odinga. Mandela met the first group of Umkhonto recruits that had slipped out of South Africa for training in Ethiopia on their return to Tanganyika [Benson 1986:115; Mandela:1978:165].

13. Only the Security Council could decide mandatory economic sanctions should be imposed against South Africa and the basis for this decision was Chapter 7 of the Charter which determined that a country had to be a threat to international peace and security (see Chapter 9). The ANC adoption of the formula was a way of exerting diplomatic pressure for economic sanctions.

14. It was the severe repression following the May 1961 stay-a-way campaign which led members of the ANC and SACP to form Umkhonto [Lodge 1983:231,232; Bunting 1969:215]. Sechaba's account compresses the these separate forms of struggle and says when the ANC "embarked on armed struggle as its primary strategy" in 1961 it did not abandon mass action and other forms of non-violent struggle [Sechaba 1969k:21].

15. Mandela acknowledged the existence of Umkhonto without directly relating it to the ANC, but said "planned acts of sabotage against Government installations introduce a new phase in the political situation and are a demonstration of the people's unshakable determination to win freedom whatever the cost" [Mandela 1978:124].

16. The ANC's Policy and Programme stated [ANC 1962] that the ANC "is an organization of a new type created to meet the new complex and difficult situation and conditions arising from foreign domination and exploitation."

17. The actual reference confusingly refers to the "All-In African" conference, and the "Asian" conference. This may refer to the third All-African People's (not All-In) Conference in Cairo in March 1961, and the third AAPSO conference in Moshi Tanganyika in February 1963 which was the first international conference Duma Nokwe and Moses Kotane attended after they left South Africa [Bunting 1975:276]. Although the Lobatsi conference was in October 1962, the ANC leaflet on the conference was not issued until 6 April 1963 [Karis,Carter, Gerhart 1977:748].

18. Although the police found 200 copies of "Operation Mayibuye" at Lilliesfarm, at the Rivonia trial the ANC

claimed Operation Mayibuye was a draft plan to be used only as a last resort [Walter Sisulu testimony, Rivonia Sabotage Trial; SAIRR, 1965, p. 28]. The plan was prepared by Arthur Goldreich, a member of Umkhonto's Technical Committee, in April 1963 (i.e after he returned from the Soviet Union) for consideration by the ANC's National Executive Committee. Although Goldreich was a member of both the SACP and Umkhonto, he was not a member of the ANC's national executive. A number of committees on intelligence, external planning, logistics, and transport were set up, and reports from these committees were ready by 30 May 1963 [Feit 1971:62]. The plan was examined by the ANC's national executive and Umkhonto's National High Command in May, but it was not adopted by either of the organizations because they were divided on the matter. The major disagreement appears to have been over logistics since parts of the plan were referred back to the logistics committee for further consideration. Another disagreement seems to have been with ANC members who hoped mass action might prove to be effective without guerrilla warfare [Walter Sisulu testimony, Rivonia Sabotage Trial, SAIRR 1965:28]. Sisulu, in his Rivonia testimony, claimed not to know who wrote the plan. Govan Mbeki said the plan was drawn up by Goldreich [Feit 1971:211,212].

19. There clearly were logistical problems for a sea-based infiltration of the South African countryside which may be why the plan was referred back to the logistics committee (see End Note 18). Military and police units were used in suppression of Pondoland revolt in 1960 and in 1961, and army and navy units took part in patrolling the Cape Peninsula during the disturbances of March 1960 [Bunting 1969:423,469].

20. It was argued by a controversial witness at the Rivonia trial, Bartholomew Hlapane, a member of the SACP's central committee who participated in discussions on "Operation Mayibuye," that the SACP's central committee agreed to send J.B. Marks and Joe Slovo abroad to discuss the plan (it should be noted he became quite "anti-communist" after he agreed to testify for the state) [Feit 1971:296]. The notion of some kind of foreign intervention is consistent with Goldreich's authorship of the plan. The fact that Moscow turned down his request for direct intervention means this was not the kind of intervention he expected when he wrote the plan. The need for these discussions to secure the necessary external intervention is consistent with the published version of the plan and subsequent events: both Marks and Slovo left South Africa at the end of May 1963. Marks went to China in June 1963, and Slovo may have gone to the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe [Afro-Asian Bulletin 1963:69].

21. Based on Nelson [1975:206] interview with Mary-Louise Hooper, Luthuli's former secretary at the time with the Committee of Conscience against Apartheid, New York. She testified before the Special Committee on Apartheid in 1966.

In a more general way the Congo crisis also contributed to the ANC's diminishing view of the United Nations (i.e. the sense that "the West got away with it") [Segal Interview 1989].

22. This history is readily available in Benson [1966], Bunting [1969], Feit [1971], Gerhart [1978], Karis, Carter and Gerhart [1977], and Lodge [1983].

23. The General Law Amendment Act (27 June 1962), commonly called the Sabotage Act) [Horrell 1971:65,66,74; Karis, Carter, Gerhart 1977:663-666].

24. As early as 1958 the ANC reportedly began to explore the possibility of an "alliance" with nationalist movements in Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesia. The evidence for this is an interview with Ngubane by Nelson [1975:142].

25. Actually, CONCP included UDENAMO, until this movement was merged with MANU and UNAMI to form FRELIMO in June 1962.

26. CONCP had its headquarters in Rabat, Morocco. It established a joint consultative council, with Joaquim Pinto de Andrade of the MPLA as president, and a permanent secretariat with Marcelino dos Santos of Mozambique as secretary-general.

27. Zaire (formerly Congo-Kinshasa) recognized GRAE in June 1963, partly because of president Cyrille Adoula's friendship with Roberto. This forced the MPLA to close down its office in Leopoldville (the MPLA then went to Congo-Brazzaville), and in July 1963 the OAU recognized the GRAE as the sole legitimate liberation movement after the ALC reported back from a fact finding mission [West Africa 1963c:779; West Africa 1964b:203]. This led countries like the UAR, which had previously supported the "left wing" MPLA, to switch official recognition to Roberto's GRAE along with the majority of OAU states [Mansfield 1965:100].

28. It operated more as a "publicity center and clearing house" for communications and information between the various liberation movements and published reports on the territories as part of their coordinated diplomatic efforts in international organizations [Marcum 1978:11].

29. The alliance became embarrassing to the ANC once Chikerema, along with Nkomo, the African Chiefs, Sithole, and Muzorewa joined Smith in negotiations (see Chapter 6).

30. A few years later, after the Morogoro Conference, the ANC defined the alliance "as a political association of the two organizations which shared a common historical task—the freeing of our part of Southern Africa from white minority rule. Our friendship flourished and became consolidated into a political-military alliance, unique in Africa," and referring to the Wankie Campaigns, "our brotherhood became

sealed in blood at the hands of the enemy" [Sechaba 1970c:2].

31. According to the Minister of Justice 85 persons had been arrested in 1965 trying to return to South Africa after having had military training abroad [Johns 1973:283].

32. Shortly before Rhodesia declared its unilateral independence in November 1965, the South African Police deployed their military personnel in the country [Sechaba 1968e:3]. The following year SWAPO's armed struggle began, and the South African Defense Force built up a military base in the Caprivi Strip, the part of South-West Africa bordering Zambia. South African helicopters used this base for violations of Zambian airspace during intelligence gathering missions [ANC 1971:24]. The ANC was careful in its public announcements to shift the blame for the growing conflict in southern Africa on to the South African government rather than the actions by the liberation movements. "Mischief makers want to suggest that South African troops only entered the scene after the discovering the presence of ANC guerrillas in the area [ANC 1971:29].

33. The ANC claimed one of the main results of the Wankie battles was that the morale of the Umkhonto soldiers was "raised to new heights [ANC 1971:29]. The impatience in Umkhonto's camps may be borne out by the reports by dissidents that surfaced in 1968, but the most malign interpretation they gave to the reasons for the incursions, to eliminate dissidents is unlikely in view of these other factors.

34. The campaign's failure was one of the reasons for the Morogoro Conference (see Chapter 4). Davies, O'Meara, and Dlamini admit, "Criticism of the Wankie campaigns was widespread within and outside the ANC" [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini, 1984, p. 289]. After the Soweto uprising, ANC Speaks still found it necessary to reprint Sechaba's glowing account of the battles [ANC 1977:131]. After refusing to discuss the success or failure of the campaign Meli states, "for the first time since the nineteenth century, armed clashes took place between the white rulers and the oppressed black people in our region...they saw white soldiers run in panic. This was of great psychological and political significance [Meli 1988:162].

35. Kenneth Grundy, in interviews with the ANC in London shortly after the Morogoro Conference, stated "ANC officials are enthusiastic about the long-range possibilities of such an alliance" [Grundy 1971:114].

36. Two years after the Khartoum Conference the ANC stated in its official history, "The ANC also [in addition to the alliance with ZAPU] sees the need of urgently establishing a properly organized alliance with the other movements in southern Africa" [ANC 1971:26].

37. The conference included 200 delegates from 54 countries including a delegation from the South Vietnam National Liberation Front, but China was excluded. The Assistant Secretary of the OAU, Algeria's Mohammed Sahnoun, also attended the conference.

38. The absence of most African states was quite understandable because of the Conference's Soviet sponsorship. AAPSO was the most common front organization which African states participated in, but those states that did participate usually sent low level delegations (see Chapter 8).

39. Robert Resha, led the ANC delegation and met with leading representatives from the CONCP-allied liberation movements including Neto, (MPLA), Cabral (PAIGC), and Mondlane (FRELIMO).

40. In 1963 Roberto admitted he had ordered his UPA/FNLA units to annihilate MPLA combatants and the conflict between the two movements continued even after independence [Somerville 1988:29,32]. If an actual guerrilla war had started in South Africa it is reasonable to assume that the political animosity and competition between the ANC and the PAC would have assumed violent proportions as similar conflicts did in Angola and Rhodesia.

41. In November 1978 Oliver Tambo was asked on the ANC's own radio station, Radio Freedom, to compare the programme of the MPLA's first Congress with the ANC's Freedom Charter. He expressly didn't compare them and evaded the question other than to say they were declarations about the future and the objective now was to win power [Mayibuye 1979:3]. A few months later, however, at a AAPSO conference in Lusaka in April 1979 in support of the liberation movements Tambo declared, "What kind of liberation this would be [in South Africa] has, for us in southern Africa, been answered again practically by the realization of people's power in Angola and Mozambique and the process of social transformation which that people's power has started in those two countries" [Tambo 1979:26]. When Oliver Tambo arrived at the airport in Maputo for Mozambique's independence celebrations he was met by a huge banner which read, "FRELIMO Equals ANC" and "Viva ANC, Viva FRELIMO" [Sechaba 1975f:2,3]

42. The Morogoro Conference defined the ANC's struggle as a people's war; and a decade later Mayibuye [1981b:5] reiterated, "Ours is a people's war."

43. Although ZAPU was increasingly supported by the Soviet Union; it was not as reliable as the "core" members of the Khartoum alliance. ZAPU strongly condemned the invasion of Czechoslovakia, saying the invasion was opposed by "all men who believe in national freedom and sovereignty," and moreover, it was an example to those national liberation movements who had been blinded by Russian influence [African

Recorder 1968:2107]. The ANC was more clearly split over the invasion (see Chapter 8).

44. Roberto's GRAE was formed in April 1962, and in October 1963 SWAPO signed a "pact of military collaboration" with the Leopoldville-based GRAE after negotiations between Jacob Kuhangua, SWAPO's secretary-general, and Roberto. SWAPO's following was mainly the Ovambo (Cuanhama-speaking) people that straddle the Angolan and South-West African border, but this remote and sparsely populated region meant that ethnicity was not a major reason for the pact, but more political factors such as its favourable publicity, the illusion of accomplishment, and the fact that South Africa and Portugal were more openly beginning to cooperate in actions to repress African nationalism. The Congo government also agreed that SWAPO should operate from the Congo [West Africa 1963e:1220; Marcum 1969:113-115, 310]. According to UNITA sources, SWAPO "made extensive use of UNITA" in crossing from Zambia through Angola to South-West Africa, although SWAPO received "substantial aid from the Soviet Union" confronted this "operative alliance" with a "particularly sensitive issue" because of UNITA's Chinese support [Marcum 1978:415; Gibson 1972:211,223]. SWAPO's early links with UNITA may have hindered its complete integration into the Khartoum alliance, but the South African intervention in Angola and support for UNITA in 1975 was one of the factors which brought SWAPO and the MPLA closer together. SWAPO was joined by the PAC, and ZANU in what a UNITA publication called "limited scale" collaboration "to coordinate the struggle in Southern Africa" [Marcum 1978:224, 225]. Katjavivi [1988], writing in a UNESCO sponsored series of books, ignores these earlier links in his analysis of SWAPO and SWANU.

45. Jariretundu Kozonguizi (SWANU's president until 1966) began visiting Peking in the early 1960s. SWAPO began getting Soviet support about 1964 because of SWANU's approaches to China. SWAPO's military training began in 1962, and under Nujoma's leadership, Algeria began helping SWAPO in 1966, and with additional Soviet assistance the armed struggle was formally launched in 1966 [Rotberg 1981:208,209].

46. SWANU did not create a guerrilla army under the African Liberation Committee's directions, perhaps because it could still operate openly, albeit with growing difficulties, within the country. This decision cost SWANU its OAU support, and in 1968 the OAU gave its exclusive support to SWAPO (in 1973 SWAPO was recognized by the UN). SWANU was forced to close its Dar es Salaam office although it maintained an office in Cairo. The lack of OAU support and a leadership crisis in 1966 contributed to its further decline at a time when SWAPO was gaining military and political strength [Kiljunen 1981:150].

47. A readily accessible example is the joint statement by James Chikerema (ZAPU), Sam Nujoma (SWAPO), Amilcar Cabral

(PAIGC), and Agostino Neto (MPLA), and Eduardo Mondlane (FRELIMO) read by Oliver Tambo at the fifth OAU Assembly in Algiers in 1968 (see Chapter 5) [Tambo 1987:58-64].

CHAPTER 3

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXTERNAL MISSION AND EARLY ANC DIPLOMACY

"[Oliver] Tambo, [Tennyson] Makiwane, [Robert] Resha, [Arthur] Letele, [Wilton] Mkwayi, [James] Hadebe-their names are heard in many lands, as they travel the earth's surface, sent out to be ambassadors of the [African National] Congress, of the struggle for freedom."

Helen Joseph, If This Be Treason [1963:144].

The ANC started to make plans for an External Mission prior to Sharpeville, but it was forced to implement these plans sooner than expected because of the imposition of the state of emergency. Oliver Tambo was sent abroad to establish the External Mission, to raise funds, mobilize international support against apartheid, and to make the necessary training arrangements for Umkhonto recruits.

The ANC looked up to Ghana as the first independent African state in black Africa, but the formation of the External Mission coincided with Dar es Salaam's emerging role as the hub of the liberation struggles in southern Africa. The ANC and other liberation movements gravitated toward East Africa because of Dar es Salaam's closer proximity to the battle front, and the integrity of the East African nationalist leaders.

Nkrumah's continental Pan-African visions were increasingly fused with his personal political ambitions which now extended to the domination of the liberation movements. The ideological tensions within Nkrumah's government led Ghana to favour the PAC over the ANC. So in addition to issues of strategy and proximity to southern

Africa, the ANC's disillusionment with Ghana led it to move toward Tanzania as the main base for its operations.

The primary objective of the External Mission when it was formed was to mobilize international support to isolate South Africa. This objective was pursued, even before the External Mission was established, in Nkrumah's All-African People's Conference where the ANC called for the boycott of South African goods for the first time. The ANC's efforts through the AAPC came to nothing as the organization became moribund through Nkrumah's political maneuvering.

After the External Mission was formed this diplomatic objective was carried out in conjunction with the PAC through the South African United Front. Its most successful campaign was the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth.

The Front was short lived and split up because the ANC's non-racial ideology. This conflict, which led to the PAC to break off from the ANC in the first place, now became a source of diplomatic competition outside South Africa. The issues of non-racialism and the ANC's communist links which fueled its competition with the PAC inside South Africa now spilled over into its international relations. The ANC's non-racialism became a diplomatic disadvantage in Africa in the heady Pan-Africanist days of the 1960s.

After the break up of the Front the ANC's External Mission established its own offices in Algiers, Rabat, Cairo, Dar es Salaam, and Lusaka in Africa which were also the locations of its main training bases. It established an office in London where much of its early organizational and

publicity work was carried out. These offices comprised the ANC's core diplomatic network until the Portuguese coup and the Soweto uprising which led to the further expansion of the External Mission in Africa, Europe, and Asia (see Appendix 1).

3.1 The Origins of the External Mission

The ANC saw the need for an External Mission before it was banned in 1960; it did not grow by accident, nor was it an immediate response to Sharpeville [Ginwala Interviews 1986,1987]. According to Albert Luthuli Oliver Tambo "left with our prior agreement, and his departure had been intended before the crisis-we wanted a roving ambassador" [Luthuli 1962:198].¹ The preparations for the External Mission were started before the shootings, but they became caught up in the aftermath of the crisis.

The preparations began "in anticipation and recognition [the ANC] would be banned sooner or later" [Ginwala Interview 1987]. The ANC felt that even if the Treason Trial which had been going on since 1956 failed (it ended in March 1961), it would still be banned, so it was still necessary for the ANC to establish a "foreign mission" which "spoke to the world" about apartheid. ANC members had spoken at the United Nations in the past (see Chapter 2), but now the ANC felt it needed a permanent "identified voice" outside the country [Ginwala Interview 1987a].

Its initial representatives were to be Oliver Tambo, then the Deputy President-General, and Jonas Matlou, an

early ANC Youth League member from Sophiatown [Gastrow 1987:306]. Tambo's initial task was to establish the External Mission, raise funds, mobilize support for the ANC's struggle, and give "diplomatic representations" at international organizations [Tambo 1987:39,41; Sechaba 1971:6-11]. Another (and at the time, more secret) task for the External Mission once Umkhonto began its sabotage campaign was to arrange training bases and the necessary funds for Umkhonto recruits [Tambo 1987:41; Benson 1966:256].

It was not unusual for liberation movements to combination military and diplomatic activities in the offices of the External Mission.² The ANC in fact states it "established the External Mission to prepare training places for its cadres. These cadres were to be infiltrated into the country on completing their training and to impart the military skills acquired to Umkhonto units inside the country" [Sechaba 1971:14]. After 1961 the External Mission was instructed to assist Umkhonto with its preparations in case the ANC decided to wage armed struggle [SAIRR 1964:27; Benson 1966:256].

Initially, the ANC looked to Ghana as a base for the External Mission. At a national executive meeting in June 1959 the ANC decided that in the event it was banned Oliver Tambo was to go abroad and set up an office in Ghana [Private Information].

A combination of African politics and geography contributed to the ANC's gravitation toward East Africa instead. The ANC became disillusioned with Nkrumah's Ghana

(see Section 3.2), but the most immediate factor was British policy toward Tanganyika. In December 1959 the British government issued a statement declaring that Tanganyika would be "developed as an African country" [Ginwala Interview 1987]. This meant Tanganyika was going to take a "different path than Kenya" because of the "political strength of TANU and Nyerere," and the ANC thought Tanganyika was also a "possible place" to base its external operations [Ginwala Interview 1987].

Tanganyika was still a United Nations Trust Territory under British mandate in 1960, but it was far enough along the path to self-government and independence to be relatively safe for South African refugees. For the ANC the "first step [was] where." If the ANC could get to Dar es Salaam, its leaders reasoned, the British could be persuaded not to return political exiles to South Africa [Ginwala Interview 1987].

Frene Ginwala, a member of the South African Indian Congress, became the East African representative for Ronald Segal's magazine, Africa South. She left the country to "explore" this possibility with the East African nationalist leadership. So there were "already channels instrumental to [Tambo's] coming out" of South Africa prior to Sharpeville. She was "on site" in Salisbury at the time of the shootings and was one of the "instruments" the ANC used to arrange for Tambo's departure [Ginwala Interview 1987].

India's role in getting passports for South African exiles was a part of its general "solidarity" work for the ANC dating back to the 1940s because of the country's links

with the SAIC. Although Ethiopia and Liberia were independent no African countries in the region were independent, and Ghana had very few overseas offices. India had a trade commission, and a consulate in Salisbury (Ghana did not); and so there were only so many places the ANC could go for help. The ANC relied on the African states or India to provide their people with the proper travel documents, and arrange for Tambo's subsequent appearance at the United Nations (see Chapter 9). Ginwala met the Indian Council General in Kenya, and Salisbury to discuss the necessary arrangements [Ginwala Interview 1987; Segal 1963:297,299].

Thus, Sharpeville "precipitated" the date of Tambo's departure, but in principle the decision he should leave the country had already been taken by the national executive committee the year before he left. The issue was the date, and the "mechanism of departure" [Ginwala Interview 1987].

A problem was "how to get across the Central African Federation." The ANC was aware of how hostile the Federal Government was to South African political refugees because of Alfred Hutchinson's problems in crossing through Federation territory in 1958 [Ginwala Interview 1987; Hutchinson 1960]. Then suddenly Sharpeville occurred. Two days after the shootings President-General Albert Luthuli called for a stay-at-home for 28 March. The same day as the stay-at-home, legislation was introduced in the South African parliament to ban the ANC and the PAC. "It was at this time" the national executive committee of the ANC, "learning that the Government was determined to ban the

[African National] Congress, took an emergency decision." In anticipation of the ban, the national executive committee asked Oliver Tambo to leave the country through Lobatsi, Bechuanaland in order to become a "roving ambassador" for the ANC abroad [Benson 1966:224,225; Segal 1963:279].

The following day a friend told Dr. Yusuf Dadoo the South African police were about to make mass arrests. He left Johannesburg and crossed the border into Bechuanaland, also ending up at Lobatsi. Tambo, Dadoo, and Segal travelled what was to become in the early 1960s an "established escape route" to Ghana from Bechuanaland to Tanganyika. They arrived in Tanganyika in early April, and shortly afterward Nkrumah invited them to visit Accra, to "consult with members of his government there."³ They arrived in Accra toward the end of the month as "guests of the government of Ghana" [Segal 1963:313].⁴

3.2 The ANC and Nkrumah's Ghana

The representatives of the ANC and the PAC who arrived in Ghana after Sharpeville came at a time, when in Nkrumah's own words, his government turned to harsh methods "of a totalitarian kind" in order to rule the country [Austin 1964:2,34,35]. After a plebiscite in April 1960 (which these ANC and PAC members observed) a new republican constitution was adopted which reflected the Convention People's Party's political domination, and the withering away of any effective opposition by giving the government greater authoritarian powers [Davidson 1973:96]. In 1961, as a

result of a severe setback in Ghana's economy, Nkrumah shifted the country toward more "radical" socialist economic policies [Austin 1964:402,403; Davidson 1973:178].

This shift toward "radicalism" led to quarrels among party leaders, and the CPP eventually broke up into warring factions [Austin 1964:402]. Although the changes in domestic politics contributed to the break up of party unity, Nkrumah was too preoccupied with foreign affairs (his conference diplomacy and Pan-African visions) to have time for party politics.

Nkrumah embraced the radicals in the party like Tawia Adamafio, and forced out of power the 1949 "old guard" in the CPP (Komlo Gbedemah, Kojo Botsio, Krobo Edusei, Ako Adjei). After he removed the "old guard" Nkrumah felt increasingly uncomfortable with the radicals, but "these men took office as instruments of his policy, and merely did what they were told [Davidson 1973:185]. These ministers were responsible for developing the Nkrumah personality cult. The economic and political changes, and the resulting ideological tensions within the government, eventually led Ghana to favour the PAC over the ANC.

Nkrumah linked Ghana's domestic problems to his foreign policy agenda. The Congo crisis and now Ghana's economic difficulties reinforced his views on the danger to African states of what he considered to be the external cause of Ghana's economic decline, "neo-colonialism." He became obsessed with his view of Pan-Africanism and continental unity [Davidson 1973: 96, 172-178 ,196, 197, 200,201].

Nkrumah's desire to control Pan-African developments on the continent, extended to the progress of the liberation struggles in southern Africa. This reflected Ghana's changing position in African affairs [Thompson 1969:24]. After 1960 the new independent African states widened Ghana's scope of potential influence both in Africa, and in the world community, but the new states could be independent rivals as well as independent neighbours. This was especially true of the francophone states, which comprised the majority of the new African states in 1960. On a number of key African issues they developed views different from those of Nkrumah. Although decolonization continued, after 1960 he became more diplomatically isolated in Africa.

By the early 1960s the ANC was disillusioned with Nkrumah's Ghana. Partly, this was because of the kind of authoritarian state Ghana had become, but there were other problems complicating the ANC's relations with Ghana. The social difference between many of the South Africans and the Ghanaians was one of the sources of tension. Many ANC members comprised a political elite among black South Africans, and were quite different from the political elite which eventually dominated nationalist politics in Ghana through the CPP [Post 1968:65; Davidson 1973:57,70,89]. ANC members who went to Ghana were in general wealthier, better educated, and "more cosmopolitan" than the CPP people with whom they came into contact such as A.K. Barden, the director of the Bureau of African Affairs, and Tawia Adamafio, the general secretary of the CPP, and then the Minister of Information. These social differences became an

added source of tension once the South Africans learned that the amount of financial support they received was dependent on the amount of praise they gave to Nkrumah [Thompson 1969:223].⁵

Personalities were another source of tension, and further disillusioned the ANC with Ghana. The members of the liberation movements made personal criticisms of Nkrumah's regime. Many of them considered his government appointees "dishonest," or his policies "misguided" [Davidson 1973:189]. They also saw the Nkrumah cult, propagated by Tawia Adamafio, "insulting to their cause," although many of them continued to respect and admire him, attributing these excesses to the men of lesser intentions, if not ability, with whom he surrounded himself in government as he became more isolated [Davidson 1973:189].

A.K. Barden, an ex-policeman who became George Padmore's stenographer, and after his death, the director of the Bureau of African Affairs, was certainly one of the men with "lesser intentions" and "lesser ability." He built the Bureau up with a staff of ex-policeman and ex-serviceman [Thompson 1969:222]. The Bureau was Ghana's main policy instrument for aiding liberation struggles in Africa, but its activities degenerated into training activists for subversion in neighbouring African countries [Dei-Anang 1975:25]. In practice, giving assistance became a way of maintaining ideological hegemony over the liberation movements. The structure was never as formal as the Soviet Union's control of the Communist International, but giving assistance and maintaining control are often part of the

same process. The "bureaucratic politics" involved in Ghana's support for liberation movements became part of Barden's wider actions to gain control over sections of the government so that envy and intrigue became a normal part of Ghanaian politics.

The African Affairs Centre was a subdivision of the Bureau of African Affairs, and played a key role in Ghana's assistance to liberation movements. Its director, Ras Makonnen, was a Guyanese-born committed pan-Africanist.⁶ Since independence, according to Makonnen, various "groups of stragglers" from African countries were "living like kings" in Ghana. Nkrumah felt the government should institutionalize the support network to liberation movements. If Ghana was "going to provide any lead [sic]," Makonnen claims, "it was essential that there should be facilities whereby visiting revolutionaries or freedom fighters could be accommodated and made useful to themselves [sic] and to the development of an African ideology" [Makonnen 1973:212]. The Centre was to be operating before the first All African People's Conference [Makonnen 1973:213]. It provided education and refuge to the "freedom fighters," and became the "residence of most 'freedom fighters' working and living in Ghana" [Makonnen 1973:xxiii, 207]. In practice, it was a means of furthering Ghana's ideological hegemony over the liberation movements.⁷

This ideological hegemony operated in spite of the bureaucratic politics of support for liberation movements. Makonnen, the self-styled "genuine" Pan-Africanist opposed the scheming Barden, but in practice they supported the

liberation movements (or certain movements like the PAC, and not others, like the ANC) for their own ends. Makonnen claims in his memoirs that Barden was "making inroads in my organization, with a view to taking it over" [Makonnen 1973:38]. He felt Barden was undermining Ghana's true Pan-African role in Africa by his lack of genuine commitment and unscrupulous activities. Makonnen says Barden wanted to control the Centre in the same way, as Padmore's stenographer, he maneuvered behind Padmore's back to consolidate his position in order to become director after Padmore's death [Makonnen 1973:208]. "What disturbed relations with a lot of these exiles and the freedom fighters," Makonnen writes "was that Barden was playing a double game more often than not" [Makonnen 1973:219]. Nelson Mandela surveyed the situation on his visit to Accra during his trip abroad in 1962. He wrote in his diary that the Bureau of African Affairs had "turned out to be something quite contrary to what it was meant to be. Barden is systematically destroying Ghana" [Thompson 1969:222].⁸

Ghana's efforts to maintain control of the liberation movements occurred at the same time as the ideological tensions developed within the government over which liberation movements to support within the South African United Front. In addition to the ANC's political disillusionment with Nkrumah's Ghana, this ideological division led Ghana to favour the PAC. The disagreement within the government was over the ideological content of Pan-Africanism, and after 1961 led the ANC to gravitate

toward East Africa for both political and geographical reasons.

The conflict over the ideological content of Pan-Africanism was influenced by the legacy of George Padmore's ideas. Kofi Batsa at this time editor of the CPP newspaper The Spark and Principal Research Officer at the Bureau of African Affairs, argued that the debate over the ideological content of Pan-Africanism became "broadly represented" by the differences between the ANC and the PAC, and these differences were reflected in the government [Batsa 1985:16]. He identified Padmore's stream of Pan-Africanism as "Nationalist Pan-Africanism," and it is this stream which dominated Ghana's foreign policy until his death in 1959. Padmore's form of Pan-Africanism was dominated by anti-communism (he broke with the Communist International in 1936), since he believed it was possible to be anti-imperialist without being a communist.⁹ Batsa identified this form of Pan-Africanism with the PAC which is why, he says, the PAC's president Robert Sobukwe "was more acceptable to Ghana" during the Padmore years [Batsa 1985:17]. The other stream of Pan-Africanism he labeled "Marxist Pan-Africanism," which he identified with the ANC. In this sense Batsa said the PAC was "more moderate," than the ANC, and had its main office in Accra, while the ANC's main offices were in Dar es Salaam and London. "These two themes ran throughout the politics of the period...Throughout a lot of new independence and revolutionary organizations were being founded in southern

Africa and they all took the pattern of the ANC or the PAC"
[Batsa 1985:17].¹⁰

At the Bureau of African Affairs the PAC's publicity secretary, Peter Raboroko became one of the associate editors of Voice of Africa, the Bureau's monthly magazine when it was founded in 1961 [Batsa 1985:16]. In the government, Tawia Adamafio, the Minister of Information and the newly appointed general-secretary of the CPP, one of the "new guard" with whom Nkrumah hoped to make his revolution (after the shift to more radical policies in mid-1961) supported Potlako Leballo and the PAC. A.K. Barden as head of the Bureau of African Affairs also supported the PAC. Ako Adjei, one of the "old guard" (before the switch to more "radical" policies, and who was Foreign Minister until mid-1962), supported the ANC. Kofai Batsa says it was because of these ideological differences that "Nelson Mandela, for example, did not get as much support, as an ANC man, from the Bureau of African Affairs as he would have had otherwise, and eventually he told me he was being messed around so much by these conflicts and by A. K. Barden...that he was going back to South Africa to fight" [Batsa 1985:17]. The ANC reacted against what Ako Adjei called the Bureau of African Affairs "incessant spoon-feeding" [Thompson 1969:223]. The government responded in December 1961 by impounding the passport of Tennyson Makiwane, the ANC's representative of the United Front in Accra, and he was finally expelled [Thompson 1969:223]. He then became the Front's representative in Dar es Salaam [Ginwala Interview 1987a]. According to Colin Legum it was at this time that

the ANC "wrote Nkrumah off" [Thompson 1969:223]. Potlako Leballo, and his wing of the PAC became an avid supporter of Nkrumah among the exile community in Accra, but other PAC leaders such as Nana Mahomo, the PAC's Accra representative in the United Front, "lost all confidence in the regime" [Thompson 1969:223].¹¹

In contrast, Batsa claims he tried to stay on good term with both Mandela and Tambo [Batsa 1985:17]. Writing in 1985, perhaps recognizing the ANC had re-emerged as a leading political force inside South Africa, recalls that as the editor of The Spark, "we moved steadily through the years to the left and toward organizations like the ANC with its stronger anti-imperialist stance." [Batsa 1985:17].

Ghana also attempted to maintain control over the liberation movements by trying to convince them to form a government-in-exile or a united front [Thompson 1969:222]. Support for African liberation was primarily a way for Nkrumah to maintain a role in African affairs at a time when Ghana's influence was declining; it was a way of holding on to regional power.

Ghana first tried to get the ANC and the PAC to form a government in exile. Geoffrey Bing, Ghana's Attorney-General, apparently tried to form a South African government-in-exile which was to be led by Oliver Tambo. The PAC, however, was unwilling to cooperate unless its president, Robert Sobukwe was made the head of the provisional government [Thompson 1969:97].¹² This explanation, however, "reflects poorly on the PAC," and "trivializes the collapse" since it is "looking at

personalities" for the reason. The ANC made a "political decision" not to form a government in exile [Ginwala Interview 1987a]. At this time (after the Commonwealth Conference in May 1960) the ANC was still operating inside South Africa.¹³ Founding a united front or a government in exile was "not a luxury" for the ANC since the External Mission (prior to Rivonia) could still legitimately be described as the "foreign embassy of a home base." A government in exile also had political implications for the ANC: the need for territory, and the problem of becoming a "satellite" within the country you reside in. The ANC was not yet prepared to accept these conditions on its operations [Ginwala Interview 1987a].

Ghana then tried to persuade the ANC and the PAC to form a united front. Makonnen patronizingly says, "the idea was that Ghana should try to bring them together in unity and strength. Often with them, and in the case of other groups they would close their ranks automatically in a foreign country. A kind of defence mechanism operated, and they would say to each other: 'Look, bobo, we are in somebody's country; so tho'we may fight and kill each other outside, don't open up to these people or it will weaken our structure" [Makonnen 1973:218]. Although Makonnen says they had to avoid "dictating how [liberation movements] should act," Ghana's intentions were clear [Makonnen 1973:218]. The attempt to force the liberation movements to form a united front was an attempt to keep the liberation movements under Ghana's control.

Ghana's efforts to create a united front was also a veiled attempt to promote the PAC. Barden was "running hither and thither, detecting critical differences between the parties, and giving his support to the PAC" [Makonnen 1973:219]. Makonnen as director of the African Affairs Centre was also more favourably disposed toward the PAC. Makonnen says he knew some of the PAC people, such as Peter Rabaroko and Peter Molotsi very well, and "one could see that they as a young party, did not have the entangling alliance with the communists that had characterized so many of the ANC boys" [Makonnen 1973:219].

Nkrumah's attempts to dominate the liberation movements also surfaced in Ghana's attempt to control the training of "freedom fighters," and in different views toward the appropriate strategy for the liberation struggle. This was clearly experienced by the ANC delegation to the All African People's Conference in 1958 (see Chapter 2). Nkrumah felt Ghana's struggle should be a model for liberation movements, and that the country should direct the struggles in southern Africa.

The leaders of the liberation movements felt that Nkrumah "failed to understand that a people which does not liberate itself cannot be liberated by any other people, at least in any worthwhile way. They saw this failure to understand their needs and aims in his projects for military intervention" (through the proposed African High Command) [Davidson 1973:189]. The South Africans, in particular, were opposed to his plan for an all-Africa guerrilla force to help the Angolans [Africa Confidential 1962:1].

3.3 The South African United Front

When the representatives of the ANC and the PAC arrived in Dar es Salaam in April 1960, there was "not much talk," since the liberation movements were pre-occupied with the day to day issues of survival [Ginwala Interview 1987a]. Tambo felt that what ever their differences inside South Africa, outside the country the ANC and the PAC should "now work together." At this time he did not see the necessity of a united front" [Ginwala Interview 1987].¹⁵ "Cut off from South Africa, anxious to present a united front, and encouraged by Nkrumah and other African leaders, [the African nationalist leaders] agreed in principle to work together but [also] rejected suggestions for the formation of a government-in-exile" [Karis, Carter, Gerhart 1977:351].

Prior to Rivonia the ANC continued to be active inside the country; it had its own underground structure, and it pursued the armed struggle. If Sharpeville had not occurred so suddenly this structure would have had time to develop more fully, but after Rivonia this was not possible [Ginwala Interview 1987]. Another complicating factor was the fact that some of the constituent member organizations of the Congress Alliance were still legal organizations inside South Africa. The ANC felt it could not abandon this alliance for an entirely new united front [Ginwala Interview 1987].

Ghana's intervention, may have influenced the founding of the Front. An organization or loose collection of offices which became the South African United Front

developed out of suggestions at the first All-Africa People's Conference held in Accra in December 1958. The conference supported an international program to aid liberation of southern Africa and this contributed to the formation of the Front [Nelson 1975:169]. Money raised in Ghana, with Nkrumah's help was used to establish what at first was called the "South African Political Bureau" in 1960 [Africa Digest 1960:36].

The main purpose of the bureau was to gain support for the ANC and its policies through information and propaganda overseas [SAIRR 1961: 286; Africa Digest 1960:36].¹⁶ The bureau had offices in Accra, London, Leopoldville, Cairo, and Addis Ababa [Horrell 1971:96; Africa Digest 1960:36; SAIRR 1961:286].¹⁷ The "South African Political Bureau" was only in existence for about three months, since it led to the formation of the United Front through negotiations in May and June 1960 which absorbed the operations of the bureau [Horrell 1971:96].

After the ANC and PAC leaders arrived in Dar es Salaam they flew to Ghana. At a series of meetings in Accra in April 1960 Tambo was joined by other South Africans, Dr. Yusuf Dadoo, Tennyson Makiwane of the ANC Youth League [Africa Confidential 1960b:4,5].¹⁸ They met Nana Mahomo (Executive Secretary of the PAC) and Peter Malotsi (also of the PAC) to discuss the possibility of forming a united front. A final meeting in Accra later in April 1960 "further consolidated the idea of unity," and was influenced by their meeting with Nkrumah.¹⁹

South African exiles met Nkrumah after their second meeting April 1960. It appears he did not begin to pressure them to form a united front until after the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in May 1960. By this time, however, Nkrumah was quickly losing influence over the South African liberation movements for domestic political reasons and his "soft" line on South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth (see Section 3.4).²⁰

Tambo, Dadoo, Molotsi, Mahomo, and Segal travelled to London together, and arrived on 11 May 1960. Already they appeared to be working together [Africa Digest 1960a:204].²¹ In June 1960 the founding group met, for a third time, in Addis Ababa at the time of the second Conference of Independent African States where they formally decided to establish a united front [Karis,Carter,Gerhart 1977:351].

The founding members met in London where the United Front was officially launched. At this meeting it included not only the ANC, PAC, and the SAIC, but also SWANU. SWAPO also accepted membership but withdrew very shortly afterward [Nelson 1975:169].²² As the ANC representative, Oliver Tambo was joined in London by Tennyson Makiwane. A public statement of the Front's policy was made on 23 September 1960. Nana Mahomo (PAC), Oliver Tambo (ANC), J. Kosonguizi (SWANU), and Dadoo (SAIC) all spoke and appealed for funds. Prior to the London meeting its representatives had toured the provinces, and the various Africa Councils in Britain helped in arranging the meetings.²³

The External Mission was a separate organization from the United Front since many ANC people were not part of the

Front. Before the ANC became an exile movement after Rivonia, it had established offices in various countries, but these missions were separate from the Front's activities [Ginwala Interview 1987].²⁴

At the Addis Ababa meeting plans were elaborated and assignments for Front representatives in particular countries were given. Because only a small number of people was involved, no formal organizational structure with elected officials was established. "It appears that the United Front's operations were intended to be as informal as possible" [Nelson 1975:169]. When the country assignments were allocated an attempt was made to have each of the front's offices staffed by a member of the ANC, the PAC, and if possible the SAIC and SWANU forming a joint-secretariat office. Between July and September 1960 each of the founding members of the Front, except Oliver Tambo, were assigned to an office in either London, Cairo, Accra, possibly New York, and in Dar es Salaam after Tanzania's independence in December 1961 [Nelson 1975:169].²⁵ "Some remote control may be exercised from London by the only real major South African leader outside" South Africa, was Oliver Tambo [Africa Confidential 1960b:5,6].

The fact that Tambo had a "roving ambassador" role may indicate an implicit acknowledgement of his leadership of the United Front. It does not seem this was publically stated because of the rivalry between the ANC and PAC. It is not clear why a United Front office was not also set up in Addis Ababa or Lagos. The Front sent two and three person

delegations to the United Nations, and to various African and Asian countries.

The United Front was formed because both of the leading African nationalist movements in South Africa, the ANC and the PAC, made concessions on which organizations could become members of the Front. The basis of the alliance was the exclusion of multi-racial organizations. The PAC, in spite of its Pan-Africanist stance, agreed to allow the SAIC, which had been part of the Congress Alliance since 1955, to join the Front. The ANC, in spite of its long history of multi-racialism, agreed not to include any white organizations, viz. the Congress of Democrats which had been also part of the Congress Alliance [Africa Confidential 1960b:4,5].

The Front, therefore, was based on the mutual exclusion of organizations which each nationalist movement disliked [Africa Confidential 1960b:4,5]. The mutual concessions were based on the belief that unity between the nationalist movements was crucial for international sympathy in spite of the real ideological differences between them [SACP 1981:276].

3.4 South Africa's Expulsion from the Commonwealth

One of the United Front's first joint diplomatic campaigns involved publicity about the Pondoland uprising in October 1960 [Africa Digest 1960c:backpage; Africa Digest 1960:63,64; Halpern 1965:7]. It also lobbied unsuccessfully for the repeal of the British Nationality Act for South

Africans, but its most successful campaign was South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth [Africa Digest 1961a:239].

In 1961 there was no general agreement to expel South Africa from the Commonwealth. Eric Louw, the Minister of External Affairs, attended the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in May 1960, and the membership issue was handled quite amiably in spite of the fact it was held only two months after Sharpeville.

Following the example of India and Ghana, South Africa expected to become a republic and then reapply for admission to the Commonwealth on the basis of this new status. The purpose of this campaign was to influence the British government and other Commonwealth states not to allow South Africa readmission as a republic. According to the technical provisions of the unanimity convention, one veto was sufficient to exclude South Africa from continued membership so in actuality very limited diplomacy was required to attain this result.

These efforts began after the second Conference of Independent African States in Addis Ababa in June 1960. At this conference African states, led by the Casablanca bloc, accepted the diplomatic campaign of the United Front to isolate South Africa, which included South Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth. "Most of the founding members of the United Front," according to Tambo, were in attendance at this conference and effectively lobbied for these positions" [Tambo 1963].

Following the CIAS conference, the real "pace makers" for South Africa's expulsion was the United Front [Africa Confidential 1961:1-3]. South Africa passed the referendum on becoming a republic in October 1960 and the Front intensified its campaign to expel South Africa. During February 1961, a month before the Commonwealth conference, two delegations from the Front visited African and Asian capitals of Commonwealth countries, and sought the assurance of one or more Commonwealth prime ministers that they would veto South Africa's readmission, but these efforts had mixed results.

In Africa, two primiers fixed appointments with the Front's delegation but later cancelled them. In Nigeria the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (the partners in the coalition government), and the opposition Action group both pressed for South Africa's expulsion, but Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belwea, the federal prime minister, did not see the delegation [Africa Confidential 1961a:1-3].

In spite of instructions to Ghana and Nigeria from the CIAS the previous June, Nigeria did not insist on South Africa's expulsion. There was no mood for a harsh war against South Africa. Nigeria's involvement with the boycott of South African goods, was motivated from the fear of losing ground to Pan-Africanists like Nkrumah [Africa Confidential 1961:1-3].

Although Nkrumah publically supported the liberation movements, prior to this time Ghana's foreign policy did not overtly seek a confrontation with South Africa, in either diplomatic or economic relations.²⁶ Nkrumah valued the

Commonwealth because of the access it gave him to British politicians, and it provided an international forum for Ghana's diplomacy. For these reasons he had no desire to make South Africa an issue in Commonwealth affairs.

In Asia, all the prime ministers saw the Front's delegation, and were sympathetic, but non-committal on how they would vote. After seeing Nehru and Pandit the delegation publically expressed its dissatisfaction at India's non-committal view of South Africa's expulsion, and giving the general impression that Britain should act first. Canada expressed a similar view. In most of the Commonwealth countries it was mainly the opposition parties that were against South Africa's membership [Africa Confidential 1961:1-3].

The United Front was the only South African voice that supported the country's expulsion [Callan 1962:47; The Times 1961:13]. The debate inside South Africa over Commonwealth membership spilled over into the British press. The Anglican Archbishop of South Africa, Joost de Blank, assumed the role of spokesman for black South Africans, and wrote an article in The Times in London supporting South Africa's continued membership. He said the majority of blacks wanted South Africa to remain in the Commonwealth, and he also opposed economic sanctions because of their effect on unemployment among African workers [Callan 1962:47].

President-General Albert Luthuli called for South Africa's expulsion. He sent a cable to every Commonwealth prime minister, and responded to de Joost's positions by an article of his own published in The Times. Luthuli objected

to de Joost posing as spokesman for black South Africans, and said hostile criticism of South Africa was important to persuade Vervoerd not to seek South Africa's readmission. Any other position taken by Commonwealth prime ministers, other than South Africa's expulsion, would be interpreted by black South Africans as an endorsement of apartheid [Callan 1962:47; Karis,Carter,Gerhart 1977:360]. The early account of South Africa's expulsion by Miller [1961] is clearly selective since he discusses the correspondence in The Times, but makes no mention of Luthuli's letter, the activities of the United Front, or the lobbying efforts by the Anti-Apartheid Movement [Minty 1982:37].

When Nkrumah arrived in London for the Commonwealth conference in 1961 it was reported in the Daily Telegraph, that he had "no wish for a showdown" over South Africa [Keesings 1961:17987,18021; West Africa 1961:69]. To be sure, Nkrumah made every effort to appear to be in the forefront of the opposition to South Africa. During the Commonwealth Conference in 1960 he flew out South African exiles from Accra to London for negotiations, but this was just for publicity purposes [Thompson 1969:97].²⁷ In personal negotiations, at least until after the 1960 Commonwealth Conference he did not act in any way to precipitate a crisis over South Africa's continued membership.²⁸

It was only after Nyerere gave Colin Legum, the Commonwealth affairs correspondent of The Observer, a prepared statement to be published the next day supporting South Africa's expulsion (which Legum showed the night

before to Geoffrey Bing, Nkrumah's advisor) that Ghana began to take a hard line on South Africa [Thommpson 1969:172]. It was Nyerere's public intervention, by an article in The Observer, which seemed to tip the scale in favour of South Africa's expulsion.

Inter-African political rivalry was played out in the British press. Nyerere, as head of TANU, stated that if South Africa was still a member of the Commonwealth when Tanganyika became independent at the end of 1961, the new country would not apply for membership [Benson 1963:285,286]. After being upstaged by Nyerere, Nkrumah tried to regain control of the issue, and it was at this time that he began to take a hard line, not only on Commonwealth membership, but also on economic sanctions [Africa Digest 1960:36]. On his return to Accra in June, Nkrumah declared that Ghana could not "sit down and wait indefinitely" for South Africa to change [Thompson 1969:97].²⁹ Ghana supported efforts to exclude South Africa from the Commonwealth and the economic boycott if the country did not change its race policies.

After the Commonwealth Conference Nkrumah tried to bring the liberation movements in South Africa together, but by this time his influence among the members of the United Front was limited [Thompson 1969:97]. They "had not forgotten Nkrumah's caution on the South African question in the Commonwealth" [Thompson 1969:224].

3.5 The Collapse of the United Front

"During the first year of the Front's existence, its members, working together with a minimum of personal dissension and suspicion, found unity to be a great advantage in making international representations. The United Front was strengthened by the evidence of a brief unity at home and won acclaim, especially for its campaign for the exclusion of South Africa from the Commonwealth" [Karis, Carter, Gerhart, 1977:351]. The victory at the Commonwealth Conference in March 1961 created a sense of optimism in the ANC, and it considered South Africa's expulsion to be one of the main achievements of the Front [SACP 1981:276].

Throughout the fall of 1961, however, the domestic rivalry between the ANC and PAC inside South Africa became public, and spilled over into their international cooperation, eventually causing the Front to collapse. Overseas, "the external representatives had tried to represent a unity internationally that existed internally only in the very limited time that preceded the All-In Conference in Pietermaritzburg" in March 1961 [Carter and Karis interviews 1963-64:172]. The PAC eventually pulled out of the conference over the same allegations which led it to break away from the ANC in the first place, i.e. that the ANC leadership was dominated by whites and communists [Lodge 1983:232]. What seems to have really incensed the ANC, the SAIC (and the SACP) is what they described as the PAC's "treasonable" actions regarding the proposed three-day

national strike in May 1961 over the Republic Day celebrations. The PAC withdrew its support at a "vital stage of the campaign," and then sabotaged ANC organizational efforts with anti-strike leaflets. "Any basis for unity in South Africa was thus removed" [SACP 1981:277,278].

The external PAC by this time was split over the principle of participating in a multi-racial united front [Karis,Carter, Gerhart 1977:668]. Once this happened the PAC endangered the ANC's diplomacy. Ghana had expelled the ANC from Accra at the end of 1961, and members of the PAC embraced Nkrumah's conceptions of Pan-Africanism. The PAC was now using the "Voice of Africa" radio facilities, run by Barden's Bureau of African Affairs, in Accra to attack the ANC. In January 1962, at the PAFMECA conference which Mandela attended, the PAC delegates drafted a critical attack on the ANC, and delivered the paper to all the delegates there [Karis, Carter, Gerhart 1977:668].

Later in January the ANC and PAC representatives in Dar es Salaam "announced that the front was dissolved" [Karis, Carter, Gerhart 1977:668]. At the Front meeting in London, attended by the ANC, PAC, SAIC, and SWANU on 15 March 1962 it was formally disbanded [Karis,Carter, Gerhart 1977:668; Africa Digest 1962:160].

Both the ANC and SACP thought further cooperation with the PAC was precarious while these attacks on the ANC were being carried out from Ghana. According to an editorial in The African Communist the ANC could no longer tolerate the PAC's "numerous intrigues and slanders" in Africa and abroad. "Its leaders in exile devote their main efforts to

vilifying and belittling the ANC" and paint "an entirely false picture of the importance of their own organization." The main problem was that "all sorts of well-meaning people outside South Africa are completely misled by this one-sided propaganda" (emphasis in original). The PAC's propaganda, now bolstered by Ghana's Pan-Africanist credentials, was coming to be accepted by "militant anti-imperialists and socialists," so even they were prepared to accept that the PAC "is somehow a 'more radical' alternative to the ANC." Part of the reason the PAC was able to get away with these activities was because the ANC representatives in the Front were silent for fear of disrupting it, but this disruption could no longer be ignored [The African Communist 1962:12].

A number of reasons have been advanced to explain the break up of the Front. First, it was in existence during the time before many of the ANC's leaders (e.g. Duma Nokwe, Moses Kotane, J.B. Marks) left the country. Since many of its decision-makers were still in South Africa where unity did not exist, a diplomatic unity on paper could hardly be effective. In other words, the Front "lacked roots to sustain it" [Carter and Karis interviews 1963-64:172,173]. Some ANC leaders felt that "several of the founders, including some PAC representatives, were interested in preserving this expression of unity, but the lack of organizational harmony within South Africa created pressures they could not contain. The external officials found the divisions embarrassing and a source of serious problems in their assignments" [Carter and Karis interviews 1963-64:172,173].

Oliver Tambo has given a different explanation for the break up of the Front. Since the PAC was a relatively recent organization, founded scarcely a year before unity talks began, it had shallow roots inside the country, and very little international organization. The ANC, on the other had a long history. He suggested that, "PAC officials, in trying to assert their separate identity, were forced to withdraw from cooperative ventures in which their personality would be blended with others." Tambo "denied that apparent divisions between the ANC and PAC in their attitudes toward violence and ideology were meaningful sources of their difficulties. In these areas he stated that there were no meaningful differences between them" [Tambo 1963a; Nelson 1975:173].

3.6 The Diplomatic Rivalry with the PAC

The ANC's diplomatic rivalry with the PAC outside South Africa is as old as its competition with the PAC inside the country. Another explanation for the United Front's break up was the conflicts between personalities in the two movements and the differences in ideology and strategy [Carter and Karis interviews 1963-64:172,173; Segal Interview 1989]. Even though Tambo denies this was the reason for the split, these ideological differences were clearly important and became even more crucial because of the international politics behind the external support for the ANC and PAC, particularly in Africa.

The ANC's non-racialism was a diplomatic disadvantage in the Africa of the early 1960s. It was simply out of step with the "militant" and exclusivist Pan-Africanism espoused by its rival, the PAC which had more in common with the dominant views of African politics at the time.

The fact that Pan-Africanism was going to cause the ANC diplomatic problems was evident as early as 1958. At the first All-Africa People's Conference which took place that December in Accra, the ANC faced the issues which would cause difficulties for its African diplomacy: anti-communism, opposition to its policy of non-racialism, and Nkrumah's attempts to dominate the liberation movements.³⁰

The ANC's delegation was led by the South Africa author, Ezekiel Mphahlele, who went into exile in 1957, and was teaching in Nigeria. When Mphahlele heard about the proposed AAPC conference he obtained Nelson Mandela's permission to represent the ANC at the conference [Manganyi 1983:174]. While the conference was in session Alfred Hutchinson, a school teacher and ANC leader in the Transvaal, arrived and became part of the ANC delegation [Hutchinson 1960:17; Manganyi 1983:174-176]. Mrs. Mary-Louise Hooper, Albert Luthuli's secretary until she was deported, and Dr. R. Mbudu also represented the ANC [Africa Digest 1959:160,161]. Tennyson Makiwane, then in charge of ANC exiles in Accra, attended as an observer [Manganyi 1983:174].

Luthuli's account strangely depreciates the level of the ANC's participation at the Conference. He states,

"Conditions in South Africa prevented us from sending delegates to Accra" [Luthuli 1962:187]. He does not refer to Mphahlele's letter to Mandela asking for authorization to represent the ANC and merely explains, "We had to rely on a 'delegation' of people who were by chance already out of the country, and who did not ever return to report back. Nevertheless, we had informed reports" [Luthuli 1962:187].

Patrick Duncan and his wife (along with Jordan Ngubane) were also there as representatives of the Liberal Party, but the overall South African delegation was under Mphahlele's leadership. According to Mphahlele Duncan resented this. In 1954 Mphahlele had worked for Duncan as a secretary in Basutoland, but now Duncan was his subordinate. According to Duncan's biographer, Mphahlele had to be persuaded not to include an attack on the Liberal Party in the ANC's declaration to the conference (Mphahlele denies this) [Driver 1980:156,157]. In Mphahlele's account, Duncan like most Liberal Party members, "abhorred" the ANC's links with the SACP, and "strongly resented the leadership position accorded the ANC at the conference" [Manganyi 1983:177].

The conference included committees on imperialism, colonialism, and Pan-Africanism. Mphahlele was the convenor of the committee on racialism and discrimination. From the beginning Nkrumah tried to use the conference to extend his influence over liberation movements by determining the content and programme of African liberation, something members of the liberation movements would not accept. Mphahlele felt the conference was "almost ruined from the outset." During a meeting of the heads of delegations the

proposal for a draft agenda declared "the main purpose" of the conference was "to formulate plans and work out the Ghanaian tactics and strategy of the African non-violent [sic] revolution" [Manganyi 1983:176]. At this time the liberation struggle in Algeria was raging and this draft agenda was resented by the Egyptians. Mphahlele struck up a friendship with one of the Egyptian delegates, Dr. Fouad Galal, Nasser's advisor on African affairs. Galal had this part of the agenda deleted, so it was affirmed that the conference "should not be empowered to dictate liberation strategies. Strategies should be tailored to meet the objective conditions peculiar to particular regions and countries" [Manganyi 1983:176; Segal 1962:396].

The goals of the South African nationalists at the conference were listened to [Thompson 1969:61]. Mphahlele discussed the nature of apartheid society, and interestingly, pointed out the important role of women's struggles against apartheid in South Africa [Manganyi 1983:176]. The ANC's lobbying at the Accra conference may have been responsible for the AAPC's strong stand against apartheid. The ANC claims it was "through its representatives at the All-Africa People's Conference at Accra in 1958 who first called for the economic and diplomatic isolation of the racialist authorities" [Sechaba 1967:8].

Luthuli states that the AAPC "made an immense impact" on the ANC and it "attached great importance to the establishing of a secretariat to give permanence to the meetings of African leaders." The ANC looked to the AAPC

"for direction and guidance, for he explained, "For us, and other parts of Africa, freedom is still not around the corner" [Luthuli 1962:187]. After the AAPC the ANC quickly adopted the trappings of Pan-Africanism.³¹ African diplomacy on apartheid, however, became caught up with Nkrumah's diplomatic maneuvering. In spite of the appeals at the first AAPC, very little progress on the boycott of South African goods was made in Africa in the two years since the ANC first called for an international boycott. The issue became more closely intertwined with Ghana's internal politics and diplomacy [West Africa 1958:1215].³²

At first the ANC's historical legitimacy as the main South African nationalist movement gave it an advantage in Pan-African diplomacy. (Secretary-General Walter Sisulu had been invited to the founding meeting of PAFMECA but was unable to attend.³³) This was evident at the AAPC and also at the CIAS two years later. The second CIAS took place in Addis Ababa in June 1960. A delegation of six South African exiles representing the ANC, PAC, SAIC, and SWANU attended as observers, but they were all under the over all leadership of Oliver Tambo [Keesings 1960a:17554]. Tambo's over all leadership of the South African nationalist movement was also recognized at the founding meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement the following year (see Chapter 7).

Mphahlele's assessment of the AAPC regarding the ANC is not shared by other commentators. George Houser, who attended the AAPC as an observer recalls that the ANC was not given an enthusiastic reception. Its "non-revolutionary"

objectives and non-racialism caused other delegates concern [Nelson 1975:149].

Houser's characterization of the ANC as a "non-revolutionary" organization reflected the ANC's main diplomatic problem in Africa during the 1960s. At this time, Ghana's Bureau of African Affairs was responsible for the contact with and training of "freedom fighters."³⁴ The Bureau advocated a type of Pan-Africanism and anti-colonialism which bordered on anti-white racism. When Ronald Segal arrived in Accra, a customs official accused him of killing South African blacks just because he was white [Segal 1963:313]. The problem existed not only in Ghana. Nigeria, for example, stated it would not only refuse to employ any white South African, but would not even give refuge to white South Africans opposing apartheid. The Prime Minister was supported by Chief Akintola, the premier of Western Nigeria, who said the country would find it difficult to distinguish between different types of South Africans [West Africa 1960:516; West Africa 1960a:613].

In the context of the times the ANC's non-racialism (also called multi-racialism in the 1960s) was interpreted as an excuse for continued white domination. Its policy seemed to be too similar to the "multi-racialism" in Kenya [Hughs 1969] and to the "multi-racial partnership" existing in the Central African Federation [Keatley 1963].

The PAC used its ideological difference with the ANC to gain African diplomatic support [Nelson 1975:183,184]. This became clear at the PAFMECA conference that Mandela addressed in early 1962, just before the break up the United

Front. Mandela was "enthusiastically received" at the PAFMECA Conference, but some of the delegates expressed reservations about the non-racial basis of the ANC and were hostile toward the Congress Alliance [Benson 1986:111,112]. According to an entry in Mandela's diary, captured at Rivonia, headed "Political Climate in the PAFMECSA Area," the African states were very anti-white, and objected in principle to the Congress Alliance because of its multi-racialism. The feeling was so strong African states refused to accept either white or Indian Umkhonto recruits, and suggested they be sent to Cuba instead [Feit 1971:232].

African leaders did not understand the ANC's policy of non-racialism, nor its willingness to include communists in the movement. Many African leaders even expressed doubts over whether Africans were actually in control of the ANC. Mandela felt this hostility came from ignorance of South Africa's special conditions and a failure to realize that the leadership came from Africans. "ANC leaders in exile have often expressed concern about the necessity to make clearly evident the 'hegemony' (as one has expressed it) of Africans in the liberation movement.³⁵

These issues were strongly voiced in Ghana where Mandela received his coolest reception [Nelson 1975:183,184].³⁶ Tennyson Makiwane had recently been expelled from Accra because of the way the issue of non-racialism exacerbated the ideological divisions within Nkrumah's govrnment (see Section 3.2). Because of the concern over foreign control of the ANC, Mandela recommended that in order to dispel any doubt over who was in control

the communists in the ANC should maintain a low profile [Nelson 1975:183; Mtolo testimony Rivonia Sabotage Trial, Reel 2:77].³⁷

The group of South African refugees in Accra were susceptible to this kind of philosophy even though it was contrary to the traditions of the ANC. Peter Molotsi, in charge of the PAC refugees in Accra, supported the Africanist philosophy because he felt the United Front needed an anti-white ideology if the struggle in South Africa was going to produce the kind of dynamic antagonism to the white regime necessary to topple it.³⁸ This anti-white racism, was contrary to the ANC's history of non-racialism and the ANC opposed it. In a speech in Dar-es-Salaam Tennyson Makiwane said, "If the United Front were an anti-white organization, the ANC would not be part of it. The ANC stands for non-racialism whether it is inside or outside South Africa" [Africa Confidential 1960b:5]

The Front's anti-white racism posed problems for the ANC's international financial and political support. The Front was receiving assistance from Canon Collins' Christian Action in London and Nyerere's Tanzania and this support was unlikely to continue if the Front took an anti-white stance [Africa Confidential 1963a:5].

It was pressure from the African states mainly Ghana, Guinea and the United Arab Republic which promoted the anti-white racism and Pan-Africanism consistent with their more militant stance in African diplomacy. They supported the PAC. In addition to expousing a similar form of Pan-Africanism, it was "untarnished" by any communist links

and was seemingly more prepared than the ANC to use violence [Africa Confidential 1963a:5]. In order to justify the creation of the PAC its supporters portrayed it as a "genuine" African nationalist organization which is "militant" in its demands and willingness to use violence; compared to the ANC which is portrayed as "radical" because of its communist links, but "moderate" in its demands and methods [SAFN 1965:8-10].

In the early 1960s the PAC's military wing, Poqo ("go it alone"), was involved in more deliberate terrorist activities compared to Umkhonto's selective sabotage, and Africa was getting impatient with the ANC's more limited actions. The ANC was reportedly getting "hurry up messages from the rest of Africa." When Duma Nokwe and Moses Kotane left South Africa in 1963 one of their tasks was to explain to African leaders why the ANC must move slowly and deliberately [Africa Confidential 1963:1-3]. The ANC's firmer ideological roots and diverse international links proved to be of more lasting significance than the fashionable, but short-lived militancy of Pan-Africanism.

The ANC still is sensitive to being tarred with the "moderate" label for fear of losing African support. When a series of "Poqo trials" were conducted in late 1968 the ANC felt compelled to justify why its methods differed from those of the PAC. The ANC's explanation was the classic Marxist rejection of anarchism. The PAC's insurrectionary ideology accurately reflected black anger at white racism ("anti-white chauvinism"), but was described as "self-defeating." Compared to the PAC the ANC was described

as a well organized and disciplined political organization with a clear political programme with cadres trained in underground conspiratorial work [SAFN 1969:8-10; SACP 1981:320-332].³⁹

Although President-General Luthuli's Nobel Peace Prize was generally seen to be beneficial by the ANC, some members were worried about the effects of the prize on the ANC's relations in Africa. They were concerned that it would confirm the impression held by some African leaders that the ANC was a "moderate" organization, more acceptable to white people than to African people [Karis and Carter interviews 1963-64; Nelson 1975:182].

CONCLUSION

The ANC's External Mission was formed in recognition that the international community had an important role in ending apartheid. At the same time, the ANC underground began plans for Umkhonto we Sizwe so the External Mission also had a military function as well; making the necessary arrangements for the training of recruits. The ANC's first diplomatic missions were in the same countries where its military bases were located. X

The ANC's first efforts at mobilizing international support against apartheid was through the South African United Front. It was the ANC's first, and so far only, serious attempt to form a united opposition to apartheid outside South Africa. It publicized apartheid, and lobbied

for economic sanctions and the release of political prisoners.

The Front split over the same issue which led to the formation of the PAC in the first place: the ANC's non-racialism and its communist connections. The PAC's African diplomacy exploited these differences since its brand of Pan-Africanism was more popular in the 1960s than the ANC's non-racialism. Once Ghana began to favour the PAC it became clear the ANC needed to guard its own diplomatic prestige and presence and this could only be accomplished apart from actions with other South African movements. International support for the anti-apartheid cause is not the same thing as support for the ANC. Once the Front broke up the ANC was in competition with the PAC for international legitimacy. Now the same issues which led to the formation of the PAC inside South Africa spilled over into its foreign affairs.

The limited results from this form of alliance, and its bitter break up contributed to the ANC's emphasis on its relations with ZAPU, and other southern African liberation movements in the Khartoum alliance as its "natural allies" in the liberation struggle.

END NOTES

1. "Before Sharpeville, the ANC had sent Tambo, its deputy president-general, out of the country to represent it in Africa and abroad, and the PAC had sent 'Molotsi and Mahomo' [Karis, Carter, Gerhard 1977:350].

2. Although Franz Fanon was the "ambassador" for the provisional Algerian government in Accra, one of his main

tasks was to arrange supply routes to Algeria from African countries south of the Sahara [Caute 1970:64].

3. A picture in West Africa shows these three ANC members, along with Nana Mahomo and Peter Molotsi of the PAC, observing a voting station in Ghana for the plebiscite which ended on 27 April 1960 so they were in Ghana before this date [West Africa 1960:523; West Africa 1960a:551]. In July 1959 Ghana had recognized the de facto Provisional Government of Algeria, and in addition to the South Africans, Franz Fanon also arrived in Accra in April 1960 as a representative of the provisional government, but it is not known whether he had contact with the South Africans [West Africa 1960b:467].

4. Nana Mahomo and Peter Molotsi of the PAC also arrived in Accra about this time, but they arrived separately from the ANC. All five exiles were on special "Commonwealth Citizen" documents issued by the Ghanaian government. At the time, Ghana indicated its intention to issue similar documents to South African refugees unable to obtain passports from the South African government. Under Section 9 of the Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act (1957) citizens of South Africa could enjoy all the privileges and ununities granted under Ghanaian law to British subjects.

5. Based on the Carter-Karis interviews with ANC leaders, Nelson [1975:148] states they felt "that the leadership elsewhere in Africa was not as strong as that in the ANC. Furthermore, there was a widespread belief within the ANC that their leaders were better educated and their organization's entire structure was more sophisticated than that found elsewhere in Africa. This type of superiority made any intensive commitment to the Pan-African movement difficult and also made relations with the nationalist leaders to the north more restrained."

6. Makonnen was treasurer at the famous Pan-African Congress in Manchester in 1945.

7. Makonnen believed the purpose of the Centre was to make Ghana "the vanguard of the African revolution" in the rest of the continent. Ghana needed an "ideological message" to explain at the Centre so the country "should have something to instil" in Africans all over the continent. There was a sense that Ghana, as the first independent black African state, had to provide more than "optimism" to the people in the liberation movements. Their needed to be an ideology to support African freedom [Makonnen 1973:211].

8. In Accra, as the representative of Provisional Government of Algeria, "Fannon [also] witnessed at close quarters some sordid intrigues and power-play" which contributed to the ANC's disillusionment with Nkrumah's Ghana [Caute 1970:60].

9. While Moses Kotane was at the Lenin School in Moscow he met George Padmore. Bunting [1975:60,284] says "Padmore showed signs of anti-Sovietism even in the early 30s, and also tried to make Kotane anti-white, arguing infavour of negro and black separatism...Years later, when on an ANC mission to Ghana after he left South Africa in 1963, Kotane was to find the Nkrumah administration riddled with Padmore's influence, though President Nkrumah himself was very friendly."

10. Closer to South Africa, this is exactly what happened in the politics within the High Commission Territories. The Basutoland African Congress (later Basutoland Congress Party) was founded in 1952 under the inspiration of the ANC but later moved toward the PAC. The Bechuanaland People's Party was organized similar to the ANC in 1960 and later came to reflect the ideological tendencies of the ANC and PAC. The Swaziland Democratic Party, formed in 1962, later merged with the Imbokodvo National Movement and in 1964 adopted the Freedom Charter [Kuper 1971:473; Halpern 1965].

11. However, there does appear to have been some residual respect for Mandela during his trip there in 1962. Even after Makiwane's expulsion from Ghana, Peter Raboroko, the PAC representative in Accra and the editor of the Bureau of African Affairs magazine, Voice of Africa, saw fit to publish a speech made by Mandela during his trip ("We Shall Win," March 1962). Later an article by J.B. Marks was also published ("War Against Apartheid," Sept./Oct., 1965).

12. Based on Thompson's interview with Nana Mahomo, London, November 1965. Ronald Segal recalls a conversation he and Tambo had with Bing. Bing told Tambo that the Ghanaian government thought it was appropriate for the ANC (and not to his knowledge the PAC) to form a government-in-exile. The government was prepared to float a large loan to underwrite the ANC government-in-exile. When Segal asked Bing what would happen if the ANC disagreed with the Ghanaian government Bing replied that that would not be a very good idea. Segal thought it was quite possible Ghana wanted to form a joint ANC-PAC government-in-exile, but was talking to each party separately [Segal Interview 1989].

13. At the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in May 1960 Eric Louw, the Minister of External Affairs, attended on Verwoerd's behalf, would not decide in advance whether a republic of South Africa would remain in the Commonwealth. The republican referendum occurred on October 6, 1960, and at the next Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in March 1961 Verwoerd attended and submitted South Africa's application to remain in the Commonwealth as a republic. When it became clear that South Africa's inclusion in the Commonwealth would lead other members to leave he withdrew South Africa's application, and on May 31, 1961 when South Africa became a republic, South Africa's membership in the Commonwealth ceased.

14. In July 1961 Nkrumah, other Ghanaian ministers, and CCP officials had held discussions at the Ideological Institute with political exiles from South Africa, South-West Africa, and Angola. In January 1962, at a conference of Ghanaian envoys, Kwesi Armah, Ghana's High Commissioner in Britain, complained of a lack of "working machinery" for the liberation movements. Later that month 120 African nationalists from dependent African states attended a three month "Positive Action" course organized by the Ideological Institute and the Bureau of African Affairs. Then in May 1962 a three day conference on "African Freedom Fighters" was hastily organized by the Bureau of African Affairs opened in Accra.

15. Although Helen Joseph has stated Mandela "was arrested soon after Tambo had made his way overseas to inaugurate the United Freedom Front," her compression of two years of the ANC's history into one statement seems to reflect the quick journalistic style of the book written in support of the Treason trialists, rather than attention to historical detail [Joseph 1963:155].

16. The bureau was created "with the objective of carrying out anti-South African government propaganda" [SAIRR 1961:286]. It was established by the leaders of the "banned South African nationalist organizations" to act as a "mouthpiece for their people" [Africa Digest 1960:36].

17. The report [SAIRR 1961:286] taken from the Rand Daily Mail, September 3, 1960 assumes it was Tambo, Makiwane, Make, Dadoo, Mahono, and Molotsi who went to Accra for military training.

18. Makiwane who had left South Africa in 1959 to start an international boycott of South African goods to compliment the domestic boycott which the ANC launched after its annual conference that year. After Sharpeville he became head of the ANC refugees in Accra, and the director of the Boycott Movement (see Chapter 10).

19. According to Nelson [1975:168] Nkrumah may have contributed significantly to the formation of the United Front.

20. This is Thompson's judgement [1969:97]. According to Ginwala [Interview 1987] it was "possible" Nkrumah began to apply pressure to form a United Front after the Commonwealth Conference in May 1960, or that a meeting between the ANC and the PAC took place in Accra in late April 1960 at which time the nationalists were influenced by a meeting with Nkrumah.

21. They held a joint press conference, and called for urgent pressure from the Commonwealth and the United Nations to bring about political change in South Africa [Africa Digest 1960a:204]. On May 14 they attended a joint rally at Trafalgar Square. Tambo and Dadoo (ANC and SAIC), Molotsi,

Make, and Mahomo (PAC) and Ronald Segal spoke. Michael Scott, the Director the Africa Bureau in London, an organization committed to decolonization, also addressed the rally.

22. The SACP's version of which organizations were in the front ignores the fact the SWAPO pulled out of the United Front. It says the Front was made up of the "South-West African organizations (SWANU and SWAPO)" [The African Communist 1962:11]. This is another example of the "swing" position of SWANU and SWAPO in the developing southern African liberation alliance systems since neither movement was firmly integrated in a particular alliance at this time (see Chapter 2).

23. A meeting was held at Central Hall, Westminister which was sponsored by the Anti-Apartheid Movement, Christian Action, the Committee on African Organizations, Movement for Colonial Freedom, and the Africa Bureau. Christopher Mayhew, M.P. chaired the meeting. Mr. Komla A. Gbedemah, Ghana's Minister of Finance from 1954 to 1961, spoke in support of the SAUF's policy against apartheid [Africa Digest 1960:backpage].

24. The United Front's primary purpose was diplomatic, i.e. "just to coordinate international activities." The South African liberation movements felt, "when speaking internationally let us try to speak together" [Ginwala Interview 1987; Segal 1961:430]. The United Front's goals were simple, "to bring international economic and political pressure" on South Africa and to exclude South Africa from the international community. "We believed that by uniting with this purpose we would help and inspire our peoples and bring nearer the victory of their struggles" [SACP 1981:276].

25. Informal representation in the U.S. was accomplished by Mburumba Kerina (SWANU) who wasn't actually a member of the United Front, but was studying in the U.S. Peter Molotsi became the PAC representative for the Front in Accra, Tennison Makiwane was the ANC's representative in the Front in Accra, Nana Mahomo was the London PAC representative for the Front [Segal 1961:167,190].

26. South Africa was invited to the All African Conference initially, and Ghana wanted to establish diplomatic relations with Pretoria, and did not support the boycott movement. During the transition to independence Nkrumah understandably gave priority to normal diplomatic relations rather than to the ideals of Pan-Africanism. Even after independence his early foreign policy was cautious. Throughout Ghana's first year of independence efforts were made to exchange ambassadors with South Africa while it was over two years before diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were established [Thompson 1969:28].

27. Frene Ginwala suggests this may have happened, but she did not think the ANC participated in this, the nationalists that went were "some of the PAC probably," may be the ANC's Tennison Makiwane, who was working out of Accra at this time [Ginwala Interview 1987].

28. Indeed, three months earlier, in May 1961, Ghana rescinded its regulations requiring South African air travellers in transit to sign an anti-apartheid declaration because of Ghana's desire for better relations with Pretoria [West Africa 1961:534]. At the end of 1959 Nkrumah had Ghana's Trade Union Congress drop a plan to boycott South African goods (which was instituted because of Luthuli's call for a boycott) because of his efforts to improve relations with Pretoria [West Africa 1959:975]. After independence in 1957 Ghana almost established diplomatic relations with South Africa [Thompson 1969:97].

29. By July he even suggested the possibility of a trade boycott or economic sanctions against South Africa and in August he declared that Ghanaian importers hurt by the boycott could get help from the government.

30. It was a non-governmental conference so it brought together independent African states, and representatives from political parties, labour organizations, and liberation movements (including Franz Fanon, Holden Roberto, and Patrice Lumumba).

31. Luthuli says the ANC quickly adopted 15 March as Africa Day and all over the country the ANC organized meetings for 15 March 1959. "Africa Day became a new big event on our calendar, and the meetings were well attended in all the larger centres" [Luthuli 1962:187].

32. By the time of the second AAPC meeting in Tunis in 1960, the AAPC's permanent secretariat had done little planning for an African boycott. The details for the proposed diplomatic and economic boycott were to be worked out by the AAPC's steering committee in June 1959. This meeting was postponed until October. The committee became preoccupied with French nuclear testing in the Sahara, and the situation in the Belgian Congo and Nyasaland, although the committee condemned apartheid [West Africa 1959:863]. By this time the AAPC's permanent secretariat was transferred to the Bureau of African Affairs and became part of A.K. Barden's operations.

33. PAFMECA developed in the wake of the Mau Mau rebellion out of attempts by east African nationalist leaders to coordinate their anti-colonial struggles. Even in the 1950s the east African leaders envisioned an extension of the organization to cover southern Africa, and contacted the ANC. The concept of a regional liberation organization emerged in 1954, during an abortive attempt at a conference of Central, Southern and East African leaders organized by Kenneth Kaunda. Kaunda invited Walter Sisulu, the

Secretary-General of the ANC, and other delegates from Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda, Nyasaland, and Southern Rhodesia. Every delegate was refused entry by the immigration officials in the Central African Federation so the meeting turned out to be only an East African affair. PAFMECA's was finally formed in 1958 [Cox 1964:5]. It was events such as this one, and the Federation's later obstruction of the travel north by political refugees from southern Africa that made the break up of the Federation an important intermediary objective in the liberation of southern Africa.

34. After Ghana's independence Nkrumah's invited, the West Indian Pan-Africanist, George Padmore, to became his Advisor on African Affairs. Padmore became head of a specially created Office of the Advisor to the Prime Minister on African Affairs. Padmore died in September 1959, and his office was converted into the Bureau of African Affairs in May 1960. Nkrumah became the first director, and then Kofi Baako, the Minister of Information and Broadcasting took over. A.K. Barden was appointed Secretary, and eventually replaced Baako as director [Africa Confidential 1965:6].

35. On the other hand, the will to believe that Mandela was reverting to an Africanist position at the time of his arrest has left some residue of sympathy for him among members of the PAC" [Karis, Carter, Gerhart 1977:666, 667].

36. The ANC's non-racialism is still misunderstood in Africa and can be a liability in its African affairs. At the Dakar meeting of white South African dissidents (mostly Afrikaners) and the ANC in July 1987 the ANC was forced to defend its non-racialism. When the white group arrived in Accra a Ghanaian journalist sharply asked Thabo Mbeki, "Do you really trust these whites?" Allister Sparks comments, the ANC's "commitment to non-racialism is, in fact, a political liability that is clung to out of conviction and in the face of considerable extremist pressure, both within and outside South Africa" [Sparks 1987:13].

37. There was a generally favourable reaction to the South African United Front. Most ANC officials seemed satisfied with the results of the trip [Nelson 1975:183].

38. According to Segal [1963:276] after the Sharpeville shootings Brian Bunting, the editor of New Age visited Nyanga township "and was ordered by a group of young PAC toughs to take his white face and white paper away at once."

39. More recently Francis Meli has criticized a Scandinavian journalist for for depicting th ANC as a "ordinary reform movement, promoting neither communism nor revolution" [Sechaba 1981:31,32].

CHAPTER 4

STRATEGY, STRUCTURE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE
RE-EMERGENCE OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

"The ANC programmes, especially the Freedom Charter and the Morogoro Conference documents show the continuity and evolution of the policy and ideology of the ANC"

ANC Speaks: Documents and Statements of the African National Congress, 1959-1976 [ANC 1977:9].

"The struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa is taking place within an international context of transition to the Socialist system, of the breaking down of the colonial system as a result of national liberation and socialist revolutions, and the fight for social and economic progress by the people of the whole world."

"Strategy and Tactics of the African National Congress," National Consultative Conference, Morogoro, Tanzania, 1969.

"[O]ur broad movement for national liberation contains both a national and a socialist tendency. Our national democratic revolution has both class and national tasks which influence one another...One of the outstanding features of the ANC is that it has been able to encompass both these tendencies within its ranks, on the basis of the common acceptance of the Freedom Charter as a programme that encapsulates the aspirations of our people, however varied their ideological positions might otherwise be."

ANC Political Report, National Consultative Conference, Kabwe, Zambia [ANC 1985:12].

The imprisonment of the Rivonia defendants in June 1964 marked the transition in ANC strategy from selective sabotage to armed struggle [ANC 1970:24]. The Rivonia arrests did not force a change in ANC strategy as much as the defendants were caught making their preparations for the shift in strategy which now took place without them.

In the early 1960s the ANC was fairly optimistic about its prospects of waging effective guerrilla warfare in South Africa. The indigenous South African experience of rural resistance dating back to the 1940s, and in the Transkei during the 1960s examined by Govan Mbeki in his book The

Peasants' Revolt, seemed to have had a profound influence on the ANC's strategic thinking [Mbeki 1964; Africa Confidential 1976b; Meli 1988:144]. The ANC was also encouraged by the beginning of armed struggles throughout southern Africa and the willingness of newly independent states to support them [Bunting 1969:423,424].¹

Umkhonto's first military operations were carried out jointly with ZAPU in August 1967 as the result of a military alliance between the two movements (see Chapter 2). The ANC considers these operations to be the beginning of its armed struggle [Tambo 1987:52-58]. They were caught off guard by Rhodesian security forces while they were travelling through Wankie Game Park and the operation ended in disaster [Howe 1969; Rake 1968]. This military defeat was a reflection of more serious problems of strategy and organization within the ANC, but the ANC was not the only southern African liberation movement faced with serious problems.

The end of the 1960s was a difficult period for all of the southern African liberation movements. In addition to the military failure of the combined ANC and ZAPU operations was the increasingly open warfare between the liberation movements within Angola and Rhodesia, and the limited success of guerrilla activity by FRELIMO and SWAPO. Africa became increasingly preoccupied with the Nigerian civil war, and the continent's economic difficulties. South Africa's Prime Minister Vorster launched his detente initiative and gained some initial success, partly because the stagnation in the liberation struggles encouraged those African states which were skeptical of armed struggle to begin with, to

seek an accommodation with Pretoria. Economic sanctions against Rhodesia had also failed to bring the promised collapse of the white government. Because of this dire situation the OAU was in the process of reviewing its military strategy for liberation movements, and restructuring its Liberation Committee (see Chapter 5 and 6).

The South African writer Ezekiel Mphahlele was a member of the ANC during the 1950s. After going into exile he recalled discussions he had with Tennyson Makiwane on the state of the liberation movement. Mphahlele's description of the period, although coloured by his own opinions, indicates the kind of stagnation which confronted the ANC by the end of the 1960s.

Mphahlele recalls, "There was a great deal of discussion at the close of the sixties about the liberation struggle-the need for a continuing review of strategy. I felt at the time, and I did not mince my words during discussions, that there had been no progress in exile politics. Part of the problem as I saw it was the dire absence of renewal in the higher echelons of the political leadership. Democratic practices which had characterized our political mobilization at home had been substituted by crass tyranny and intolerance. The politics of exile are the politics of a leadership without an immediate concrete political constituency. The sense of accountability in the absence of direct communion with the home constituency was dissipating and petty wrangles easily developed into serious

conflict. People felt stagnation creeping in to ease out the bouncing optimism of the early sixties" [Manganyi 1983:251].

In order to overcome these kind of difficulties the ANC held a national consultative conference at Morogoro, Tanzania in April 1969. Section 4.1 explains how the ANC reorganized the structure of the External Mission. The ANC reformulated its revolutionary strategy, transforming itself in the process into a national liberation movement preparing to fight a people's war for national liberation.²

The ANC's links with the SACP, and the support of the Soviet Union, and its Eastern European allies were instrumental in the transformation of the ANC into an effective national liberation movement. The nature of the ANC's relations with the SACP and with socialist countries has been the source of considerable academic debate and public polemic since the 1950s. Section 4.2 argues that only by examining the ANC's relations with the SACP in the context of the debate on the national question within each organization is it possible to properly assess the relationship between them.

The ANC's continuing "leftward tilt" since the 1960s led to the expulsion of some members, often under circumstances reminiscent of the split with the PAC. Section 4.3 examines the nature of these challenges to the ANC and the limited diplomatic damage they have caused it.

The expulsions conducted in response to the ANC's policies have had little noticeable affect on the ideology, structure, and international stature and legitimacy of the movement. The ANC was more effectively challenged by three

developments within South Africa: the emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement, the development of militant black trade unionism, and the emergence of increasingly activist churches in the anti-apartheid struggle. Section 4.4 examines how the ANC responded to these challenges in order to re-emerge in the 1980s as the leading liberation movement in the country.

4.1 The Changing Role of the External Mission

After the ANC's underground military structure was destroyed by the Rivonia arrests, the External Mission's objectives eventually became military as well as diplomatic [Mell 1988:160; Tambo 1987:70]. Although the ANC, interestingly, states it "established an External Mission to prepare training places for its cadres," the tasks associated with the armed struggle were not initially the objectives of the External Mission [Sechaba 1971k:14].

The External Mission was founded before the transition to armed struggle and its primary task was to mobilize international support against apartheid (see Chapter 3). What the ANC's Lusaka-based bulletin Mayibuye called the "organizational vacuum" caused by the destruction of Umkhonto's National High Command at Rivonia "was filled by" the External Mission, and so it only took on the additional task of directing the armed struggle after 1963-64 [ACR 1969-70:C149].

The actual impetus for the Morogoro Conference came from Umkhonto. Chris Hani (currently the Political Commissar

and Deputy-Commander of Umkhonto), was Commissar of the Luthuli Detachment during the ill-fated ANC-ZAPU military campaign in 1967. He and other veterans of the campaign persuaded the leadership to hold the Morogoro Conference in order to overcome the ANC's "stalemate position" that had developed by 1969 [Lodge 1985:93]. The Introduction to ANC Speaks, a collection of documents published after the Soweto uprising, alludes to Umkhonto's key role in these events when it states, "The rank and file in the ANC has always participated actively and has contributed positively to the development of policy and ideology of the ANC. The militants of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the ANC, made a tremendous impact on the movement and contributed in the formulation of an ANC politico-military doctrine," and the book later acknowledged that it was the ANC-ZAPU campaigns that "taught us many lessons" [ANC 1977:8].

Umkhonto's disaster in Wankie Game Park, was covered up by Sechaba and the Department of Publicity and Information the best they could with glowing articles on the valour of Umkhonto's combatants, and apparently the failure of these campaigns (and the military alliance with ZAPU) remains a sensitive issue within the movement (see Chapter 6).³

According to Mayibuye the failure of the Wankie campaign, made it clear that the External Mission "as then constituted was not organizationally geared to undertake the urgent task of under-taking the people's war" [ACR 1969-70:C149]. The Lobatsi Conference in 1962 had "emphasized the growing role of the External Mission" [Kwedini 1982:28]. Tambo, in his address to the Morogoro

Conference, acknowledged that in "the past too much emphasis had been placed on international solidarity work which was a carry-over from the former role" of the External Mission [ACR 1969-70:C150].

Looking back on this period, the national executive's Political Report to the consultative conference at Kabwe, Zambia in 1985 said it was after Morogoro that the ANC "fully took into account the fact that our reverses at home," particularly the Rivonia arrests (compounded by the death of Chief Albert Luthuli in 1967) "had imposed on our External Mission, the task of representing and leading our movement as a whole, including its internal units. We had to carry out the process of reconstruction from outside. There were no structures inside the country to receive the units of [Umkhonto] that had been trained outside" [ANC 1985:14].⁴

The Political Report emphasized that in the future there would have to be a better balance between internal work of armed struggle, and external diplomatic and solidarity activities. The most significant result of the Morogoro Conference was "the reorientation of our movement toward the prosecution and intensification of our struggle inside South Africa" [ANC 1985:8]. The Political Report reiterated Morogoro's role in restoring this balance. The Conference "did not seek to underestimate the importance of or downgrade our international work. Indeed it could not, as the work that our movement had done, up to that point in history, provided exactly the rear base from which we would carry out our internal work. The Morogoro Conference sought to ensure that we achieved the proper balance between our

internal and our international struggle, with the internal being primary" [ANC 1985:8]. In fact, the reorientation apparently led to a severe cut back in funds for the Department of Publicity and Information [Sechaba 1971g:10].

This was the official reason the ANC gave for the re-organization of the External Mission after Morogoro. The reasons are more complex than this, involving issues of discipline, morale, frustration in the camps, desertion of combatants after the Wankie debacle, and corruption, but members of the liberation movement disagree on how significant the Conference was for the ANC.⁵ Although Francis Meli, the editor of Sechaba and author of a recent book on ANC history, denies the period was a "moment of crisis" for the ANC, Joe Slovo has remarked, "there were moments at the Morogoro Conference when the very future of our whole movement seemed to be in jeopardy;" the Conference comprised angry men and women who had lost confidence in the members of the ANC's national executive [Meli 1988:163,167]. Meli's treats these issues unsatisfactorily. He refrains from any judgements on the campaign's failure, reaffirms the valour of Umkhonto's combatants, and entirely ignores the growing academic debate on how extensively the ANC's strategy and tactics were revised at Morogoro because of the military failure of the Wankie campaign.⁶

In his address to the Conference Tambo emphasized that the ANC's "immediate task" was to create "a truly Revolutionary Movement" [ACR 1969-70:C150]. This is why Morogoro inaugurated the transformation of the ANC into a revolutionary national liberation movement. "In sweeping

structural changes," it established the Presidential Council and a Revolutionary Council in charge of Umkhonto accountable to the national executive committee [Sechaba 1969f:2]. Its primary tasks were to "intensify the armed struggle," and to "mobilize the masses [Sechaba 1970a:5]. These tasks were in line with what became the ANC's broad strategy, the seizure of power by the people through a combination of armed struggle and mass political action. The Revolutionary Council was still subordinate to the ANC's political leadership.

The creation of a Presidential Council and Revolutionary Council appear to have been part of the streamlining process to improve the efficiency and speed of the decision-making process. The size of the national executive committee was reduced. In 1960 it consisted of 16 persons but the organizational needs of exile increased the number to 23 and now this "unwieldy" number was reduced to only 9 members, all African, in keeping with the ANC's policy as the liberation movement of the most oppressed section of the black majority. The effective collapse in exile of the Congress Alliance led Morogoro to extend ANC membership to non-Africans only in the External Mission, an issue which became controversial in the mid-1970s (see Section 4.3).

What the ANC called the "principle of departmentalization and specialization in the conduct of the struggle" played a role in this division of responsibilities [ACR 1969-70:C150]. The Revolutionary Council was in charge of the military wing. The external ANC still faced

logistical problems in rebuilding its "underground units" inside the country following the devastating losses after the Rivonia arrests and this was the Revolutionary Council's responsibility [Sechaba 1970a:5; Tambo 1970:3].

4.2 The ANC, the SACP and the National Question

The Morogoro Conference marked the transition of the ANC in to a revolutionary national liberation movement, now reflected in its new strategy (people's war) and streamlined structure (Revolutionary Council and smaller national executive). The ANC's close relationship with the SACP was indispensable for this transformation to take place.

Representatives of the ANC and the SACP have been quite candid about the close relationship between the two organizations. The ANC's willingness to work with whites and communists (since many of the SACP's leading members were white) was one of the main reasons for the PAC's break away from the ANC in 1958 [ANC 1963:16]. It was the source of disagreement between the Congress Alliance and the Liberal Party and the PAC inside South Africa through out the early 1960s and caused the breakdown in the United Front after both movements were banned (see Chapter 3).

Although the existence of the ANC's close relationship with the SACP is not in doubt, the content of the relationship is more difficult to evaluate. Only in the most general terms has the ANC expressed what it has gained from it. Perhaps because the ANC's diplomacy only expresses the benefits of its relations with the SACP and socialist

countries, its conservative critics can only see the benefits and not the costs. They describe the SACP's activity with the ANC as a form of "entryism" [Radu 1987:62]. This is the "standard communist tactic" by which they infiltrate an organization and often because of their superior preparation, devotion, and discipline come to occupy the most influential positions in the organization or operate it as a communist "front organization" [Wilczynski 1981:170].

It is argued by these critics that when the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) was banned in 1950 its African members such as Moses Kotane, J.B. Marks, Moses Mabhida, and Govan Mbeki "infiltrated" the ANC, its Indian members like Yusuf Dadoo and Ahmed Kathrada entered the South African Indian Congress, its Coloured members such as James La Guma, his son Alex, and Reg September joined the Coloured People's Congress, and its white members formed the Congress of Democrats which became the political home for many of the members of the CPSA after it was banned.⁷ In other words, the Congress Alliance effectively became a communist front organization [Feit 1971; Radu 1987].

The ANC has never indicated in public at what cost it has maintained its relationship with the SACP. Clearly the main domestic cost has been the unity of the struggle. Since the ANC spent nearly half a century trying to build African unity its willingness to tolerate a break in this unity in the interests of the wider unity of all South Africans opposed to apartheid, indicates the extent of its commitment to non-racialism.

In addition to the domestic costs there have been diplomatic costs to the ANC's close relations with the SACP and the Soviet Union. Not only the break up of the United Front, but also in gaining support in Africa, and in its relations with the OAU (see Chapters 5 and 6) and with the Non-Aligned Movement (see Chapter 7) the ANC's communist connections have put the movement at odds with Africa and other Third World states. Its communist links have harmed its relations with the United States, but the U.S. has shown little interest in South Africa. Among the Nordic states its communist connections were irrelevant, and in the rest of Western Europe they did not become a major impediment to support (see Chapter 10).

The ANC's position on the national question has influenced its views on the role of whites, Indians, and Coloureds in the liberation struggle, i.e. the composition of the ANC's membership, choice of allies, and formation of alliances, and forms of political mobilization and military strategy. In order to gain a proper understanding of the relationship between the ANC and the SACP it is essential to examine the way the national question in South Africa has determined the content of the relationship between these two organizations.

Radu states it was the set backs during the 1940s, mainly the failure of the 1946 miners strike, and the banning of the CPSA in 1950 which led the CPSA "to seek closer involvement with the ANC" [Radu 1987:62]. The CPSA's "closer involvement" with the ANC can not be properly understood apart from the A.B. Xuma's revitalization of the

ANC in the 1940s and developments in the CPSA's own position on the national question during this period.

The ANC's principle of working with non-whites in a united front was developed after the extension of segregation and apartheid to other racial groups in the 1940s led to the so-called Xuma-Dadoo-Naicker pact which specified joint actions between the ANC and the SAIC on matters of common concern. This principle was later expanded by Chief Albert Luthuli during the 1950s culminating in the formation of the Congress Alliance [ANC 1963:18,19; Luthuli 1962].

The Durban riots between Africans and Indians in 1949 were a set back to this new unity and they led to a lengthy discussion of the national question at the CPSA's national conference at the beginning of 1950, six months before the Party was banned [Bunting 1975:163]. The conference report set out the theoretical perspective which was to influence the Party's relations with the ANC in subsequent decades and is quoted at length because, as Brian Bunting [1975:165], a former Central Committee member, has stated "The line of struggle indicated in this Central Committee statement were to become the guidelines for the entire South African liberation movement [i.e. the ANC and SACP] in the following decades" :

The national organizations, to be effective, must be transformed into a revolutionary party of workers, peasants, intellectuals, and petty bourgeoisie, linked together in a firm organization, subject to a strict discipline, and guided by a definite programme of struggle against all forms of racial discrimination in alliance with the class conscious European workers and

intellectuals. Such a party would be distinguished from the Communist Party in that its objective is national liberation, that is, the abolition of race discrimination, but it would cooperate closely with the Communist Party. In this party the class-conscious workers and peasants of the national group concerned would constitute the main leadership" (emphasis added) [SACP 1981:211].

It was the South African government's repression during the passive resistance campaigns of the 1950s, especially the Suppression of Communism Act (banning the CPSA) which brought the ANC and CPSA members closer together. Prior to this time the ANC conducted various campaigns alone, but the June 26, 1950 campaign against the Communism Act was jointly sponsored by the ANC, CPSA, and SAIC; bringing these organizations together for the first time [ANC 1963:19]. Bunting acknowledges that during the Defiance Campaign the position of the former communists in the Congress Alliance "was consolidated, even though they had been ordered to resign" from the Communist Party [Bunting 1975:187].

Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara, academic members of the ANC, and Sipho Dlamini, the ANC's representative in Mozambique, acknowledge that, "The [South African Communist] Party concentrated on working within the various organizations of the Congress Alliance, and transforming them in the direction outlined by the 1950 Central Committee report." This transformation of the Congress Alliance, they claim, is what "led to frequent attacks by the 'Africanist' element in the ANC, who argued that the Congress Alliance was 'Communist dominated'" [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1984:293]. Bunting also acknowledges that the ANC and the Congress Alliance during this period "become in effect, if

not in structure or in name, a movement of national liberation of the nature indicated in the Central Committee statement" [Bunting 1975:165].

At the international level, the Defiance Campaign was launched the year before Stalin's death, so the subsequent shift in Soviet foreign policy after his death toward the support of "bourgeois nationalist" leaders in the Third World, coincided with both the reconstitution of the old legal Communist Party as the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the upsurge in the ANC's mass action campaigns.⁸ It was at this time that many of the ANC's leaders participated in international communist front organizations (or revolutionary international organizations) for the first time (see Chapter 8).⁹

In the editorial of the first issue of The African Communist in October 1959 the SACP explained its cooperation with other nationalist organizations was based on united front principles (this point was reiterated in a statement by the Central Committee in February 1963) [Harmel 1980:135,152]. During the state of emergency following Sharpeville the SACP issued its first public statement in a leaflet which said communists should work within the Congress Alliance [Lodge 1983:233,234]. What exactly a united front meant to the SACP is clear from the view point of Moses Kotane who was the SACP's Secretary-General from 1938 to 1978. According to Eddie and Win Roux (who broke with the CPSA in 1936 over its domination by the Comintern), as far back as the 1930s "Kotane maintained that the Party inevitably destroyed every united front mass organization by

blantly taking control and dominating its policy. This he considered bad strategy...Kotane argued that a united front to be successful must be a real unity in which Africans could act and make decisions and feel that they had genuine power and control" [Roux & Roux 1970:158,159].

Because of the close relations which existed between the ANC and the SACP prior to Sharpeville, the shootings could only intensify an already close relationship. "If anything," Bunting has explained, "the outlawing of the ANC [after Sharpeville] brought about closer co-operation between the Communist Party and the African National Congress than had ever existed in the past, though nothing in the way of a formal pact existed at any time between the two organizations" [Bunting 1975:251,257].

Now that both organizations were banned, the close cooperation between the ANC and SACP was not in the kind of joint campaigns of the past. It became essential for the re-organization of the ANC into a national liberation movement and the administration of the External Mission, and influenced the formation of the ANC's ideology, strategy, and publicity. The ANC became an organization characterized as an alliance of class forces while the SACP remained a separate organization committed to the working class, i.e. both organizations became the kind of organizations indicated by the CPSA's 1950 statement. This is why the theory of the national question can not be separated from any assessment of the ANC's relations with the SACP.

This close cooperation was evident at the Lobatsi conference in 1962 where Oliver Tambo was the only person on

the steering committee who was not a member of the SACP. Govan Mbeki, a leading communist journalist and member of the ANC, presided over the conference. The steering committee consisted of Dan Tloome, a SACP trade unionist since the 1940s and member of the ANC's national executive, acted as secretary and gave the Report of the National Executive Committee, Oliver Tambo gave the Report of the External Mission, and Moses Kotane, the SACP's Secretary-General gave the organizational Report.

"Kotane's ideas were reflected in the final resolutions" which emphasized the importance of creating a disciplined, close knit membership, strongly loyal to the movement. Particular attention was focused the role of youth (an area close to Kotane's heart), "a national programme of political education for our members and people to ensure a high standard of political consciousness and understanding," and the full implementation of the M-Plan [Meli 1988:153].

Both the ANC and the SACP point out that at the Lobatsi conference Tambo indicated he needed Kotane's assistance in the work of the External Mission, and in March the following year he left South Africa (on orders of the SACP) with Duma Nokwe, the ANC's Secretary-General (on orders from Umkhonto's high command), and they joined the ANC's office in Dar es Salaam. Kotane replaced Dr. Arthur Letele as Treasurer-General (he had held this post since 1955), an important change since at this time the ANC, according to Tambo, was in a dire financial condition [Sechaba 1978g:54-56; SACP 1986:6; Uhlig 1986:156].

Prior to the Rivonia arrests the ANC's main source of foreign funding came during the Treason Trial in the 1950s. A Defense and Aid Fund, under the presidency of the Revd. Ambrose Reeves, the Bishop of Johannesburg was formed to pay for the legal expenses of the defendants and provide assistance to their families (the organization was later banned and forced to reconstitute its operations in London). Additional international support came from Christian Action, led by the Revd. L. John Collins [Benson 1966:190,226,275,276; Benson 1986:71].

Operating as a clandestine movement making preparations for guerrilla warfare required other sources of funding and the ANC very quickly came to rely on the SACP's links with the Soviet Union as its major source of foreign funding. It also received some assistance from China until the recriminations of the Sino-Soviet dispute made this impossible (see Chapter 8).

Moses Kotane was assisted in his work at the Dar es Salaam office by Thomas Nkobi (the ANC's current Treasurer-General) who rose to prominence as chairman of the 1957 Alexandra bus boycott committee. He became the ANC's national organizing secretary that year and was instrumental in implementing the M-Plan. Kotane and J.B. Marks were Nkobi's ideological mentors. Lodge [1985:91] argues Nkobi may have joined the clandestine SACP during the state of emergency following Sharpeville because Kotane's biographer, Brian Bunting, mentions that an unnamed member of the Alexandra bus boycott committee who worked closely with

Kotane (then Secretary-General of the Party) joined the SACP in 1960 [Bunting 1975:235].

Nkobi was placed under house arrest in 1963 and left South Africa in April. Together Kotane and Nkobi "established contact with a number of governments and organizations, as Tambo had predicted" [Feit 1971:234]. These contacts and material help offered to the ANC enabled the planning of Operation Mayibuye to be put on a realistic basis. Umkhonto bases for training were established in Africa. By 1964 recruits were sent to China, Cuba, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia for para-military training, and for more advanced training recruits went to the Soviet Union (see Chapter 8).

In fact after the bitter recriminations following the break up of the United Front the ANC preferred its partisan communist links to impartial international organizations. In part this was because the communist sources provided the funds at short notice when they were really needed without a lot of bureaucratic meddling. By 1963 the ANC had chartered six planes to transport ANC refugees to Dar es Salaam at a cost of 1,500 pounds per flight—even after one of the planes was blown up by South African agents [Africa Confidential 1963c:5]. The ANC was given a large number of scholarships to communist countries which were prepared to accept students without previous education to matric standards (see Chapter 8).

The ANC also preferred its communist links because international organizations and charities tended to give equal status to the PAC. The ANC was unwilling to try to

patch up unity with the PAC as a prerequisite for OAU funding (see Chapter 5), and pointedly turned down an invitation to participate with the PAC in a joint political fund sponsored by progressive London-based Movement for Colonial Freedom [Africa Confidential 1963c:5].

In 1965 the ANC held a consultative meeting at its office in Dar es Salaam "to assess the Rivonia Trial and the damage it had caused the ANC's internal underground organization" [Meli 1988:160]. It was about this time, Meli states, that the "working cooperation" between the ANC and the SACP "became a more open alliance and began to be officially acknowledged" [Meli 1988:160].

The Morogoro Conference, like the previous conference at Lobatsi, also showed the close involvement of the SACP in the ANC's administration. J.B. Marks, the Chairman of the SACP, chaired the Conference and was chairman of the national executive committee [Sechaba 1969f:2]. The Presidential Council, actually a small select group of intimates led by the Acting President-General, Oliver Tambo included Moses Mabhida, a leading SACP trade unionist [Sechaba 1969f:2; Simons 1986:50].

A Revolutionary Council was created led by Joe Modise, the Commander of Umkhonto, Yusuf Dadoo, a leading SACP member, became vice-chairman, and Joe Matthews, a leading ANC theoretician, was appointed Secretary, but was replaced about a year later by Moses Mabhida (after Matthews inexplicably resigned from active ANC involvement). Joe Slovo, Reginald September, a former leader of the Coloured

People's Congress, Alfred Nzo, and Thabo Mbeki were also Revolutionary Council members [Africa Confidential 1983:3].

In addition to the re-organization of the administration of the External Mission, the Morogoro Conference indicated the extent of the ANC's reliance on the SACP for its theoretical and strategic thinking. The crisis in the ANC at the end of the 1960s, as Mphahlele indicated, led to a theoretical debate within the ANC. The timely (if not deliberate) publication in 1969 of Class and Colour in South Africa by Jack and Ray Simons, two members of the CPSA, led to an open debate on these issues in Sechaba in which leading ANC and SACP members such as Joe Matthews, Michael Harmel, Alan Brooks, and Francis Meli (then still a student in Leipzig) took part.¹⁰ This was to be the first of many such debates in Sechaba in which different perspectives from within the ANC on important theoretical issues (e.g. the relationship between capitalism and racism, the national question, the role of the middle class, people's power) were openly discussed.

The debate on the nature of African nationalism in South Africa and its relation to class struggle led the ANC at Morogoro to accept the SACP's views on these keys strategic issues. The ANC adopted the SACP's theoretical perspective on the national question, i.e. that South Africa is a form of "colonialism of a special type" [ANC 1969:12]. This theory builds on the CPSA's 1950 Central Committee statement and was first formulated in the SACP's official programme, "The Road to South African Freedom" adopted at its fifth national conference in 1962 [SACP 1981, 284-319].

According to this theory South Africa is an "internal colony" in which the white colonizers exploit the colonized blacks in the capitalist system [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1984:289].

At Morogoro the ANC also accepted the SACP's two-stage theory of revolution, based on Lenin's booklet, Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution. The blending of these two theories, evident at Morogoro, meant that one of the "central tasks" of the Conference was "organizing and leading the South African National Democratic Revolution," the first stage in Lenin's two-stage theory, which would bring liberation to the Africans, the most oppressed section of the black majority [Sechaba 1969f:2].

The second stage is Lenin's theory is the transition to socialism. The Conference adopted a main Political Report called "Strategy and Tactics of the South African Revolution" which was partly written by Joe Slovo, one of the SACP's main theoreticians and leading Umkhonto member [Lodge 1985:94]. The ANC's "Strategy and Tactics" document at Morogoro emphasized the "special role" of the working class as the "guarantor" that this transition to socialism would take place and states the working class "constitutes a [distinct and] reinforcing layer in [of] our [struggle for] liberation and Socialism" [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1984:289].¹¹

The "theory of colonialism of a special type" had been a part of the ideological training of ANC youth for some time. It was evident at an International Seminar on Racism

sponsored by the TANU Youth League and the World Federation of Democratic Youth in Dar es Salaam in May 1966.¹²

It took some time after Morogoro to consolidate the SACP's perspective on the national question and the two-stage theory within the ANC. In the early 1970s the ANC was still coming to terms with the strategic implications of the national question in South Africa. The consolidation of the ANC's theoretical perspective at Morogoro among South African youth and students was becoming increasingly important because the development of black consciousness inside South Africa which challenged the ANC's tradition of non-racialism. Black consciousness organizations such as the South African Students Organization (SASO) shunned participation in liberal multi-racial student organizations.

Inside the ANC a new "Africanist" tendency emerged, and the ANC held a special extended national executive meeting in August 1971 to examine the differences within the ANC and the implications of domestic developments for ANC policy [Sechaba 1971m:18-22; ANC 1985:11]. The meeting re-asserted the ANC's commitment to non-racialism, and tried to reach an accommodation with black consciousness leaders, but were rebuffed. The group within the ANC eventually formed the "African Nationalist" faction and was subsequently expelled (see Section 4.3).

The national executive meeting called for the strengthening of the ANC's own Youth and Students Section [Sechaba 1971m:22; de Braganca and Wallerstein 1982:103]. The revolts on black university campuses over the next few years were to swell the middle ranks of the ANC [Barrell

1988:56]. It was essential for these university students to become educated in ANC history, ideology, and policy. In August 1971 the Youth and Students Section had held its first summer school in Beichlingen, GDR organized by the local wing of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization [Sechaba 1971:8-15]. The purpose of the conference was to consolidate ANC youth in exile into the liberation movement in view of the organizational and ideological changes adopted by the Morogoro Conference. Sechaba's article on the summer school explains, "it was clear that the perspective set for us by [the Morogoro] conference had not been sufficiently clearly understood by all our cadres and that there was a critical need to organize an education programme which would serve to make our policy clear at all levels our movement both within and outside the country" (emphasis added) [Sechaba 1971:8].

The decisions at Morogoro were aimed at turning the ANC into a revolutionary national liberation movement, but the youth and students did not completely grasp the organizational and ideological implications of this change. The problems of organization were similar to when the ANC made the transition from an open legal movement to a clandestine underground organization in the early 1960s. Now there was a failure to consistently carry out these changes and ANC leaders needed to elaborate more clearly Morogoro's ideological perspectives. The ANC's "chief task" emphasized at the summer school was to build a "centralized, compact organization of trained revolutionaries-trained both militarily and politically-an underground clandestine

network which would carry out the main organizational and military tasks of the armed political struggle" [Sechaba 1971:8]. Apparently Kotane's recommendations on cadre policy at the Lobatsi conference, almost rendered irrelevant by the events following Rivonia, were not sufficiently implemented, or more likely, the changes inside South Africa in the early 1970s now allowed the ANC to begin to implement its cadre policies for the first time.

The national executive meeting in 1971 recognized that the youth and students had emerged as a powerful potential revolutionary force but ANC's political perspectives and ideology had to be disseminated if they were to become a central component of the liberation movement. The GDR summer school emphasized that political education was essential, but by the early 1970s the ANC "had not developed a sufficiently consistent and elaborated cadre policy" [Sechaba 1971:9]. An effective cadre policy, it was argued at the seminar, "should be geared both to educating ourselves for the present phase of the struggle and which should also bear in mind the needs-both political and technical-of the South Africa which would be ours after the revolution" [Sechaba 1971:9].

Although the ANC adopted the SACP's two-stage revolutionary theory after Morogoro, it was felt at the GDR summer school there was a failure among the youth in the movement to understand fully the character of the present phase of national struggle (i.e. the national democratic revolution bringing majority rule). The phases of national and class struggle (i.e. the second stage bringing socialist

revolution) were too mechanically separated because of the failure to emphasize the ANC's long-term perspectives [Sechaba 1971:9].

At the international level, the reorientation of the ANC's External Mission toward armed struggle (Section 4.1) and the development of closer links with the SACP (Section 4.2) occurred at a time when the struggle against white supremacy in southern Africa became deflected by the OAU's internal politics. Liberation movements were forced to conduct "patron-hopping" diplomacy among African states in order to secure the necessary legitimacy with the OAU's Liberation Committee if the funds and material were to continue. After the OAU's failure to provide crucial funds during the Wankie operations the ANC effectively wrote off the OAU as a reliable source of support (see Chapter 5).

The ANC had already formed a military alliance with ZAPU, but it now developed closer cooperation with the MPLA, and FRELIMO through the Khartoum alliance set up a few months before the Morogoro conference (see Chapter 2). The main thrust of the Khartoum Conference was to gain greater mutual diplomatic support and solidarity for the liberation movements and greater material support for waging armed struggle. In order for the ANC and these other movements to "stabilize" their support network and get on with the armed struggle they became part of a wider web of revolutionary international organizations, consolidated at the Khartoum Conference. Consequently, they were able to rely less on the OAU for financial support because of their links with the Soviet Union and its allies.

The "basic objective" of these organizations, the ANC claimed at Morogoro, was "the mobilization of the people against imperialism," and [the ANC] participates as fully as it can in [their] activities" [Sechaba 1969e:6]. "Not only do we join the powerful mass of mankind fighting precisely what we are fighting," it argued, "but we are able to disseminate information about our struggle thereby winning and strengthening ourselves and our allies and obtaining both moral and material support for our struggle [Sechaba 1969e:6]. The ANC, possibly in a reference to its own support, described these organizations as a "life belt to those who are still battling in the storm against the racialists, colonialists and fascists" [Sechaba 1969e:6].

The ANC's relations with revolutionary international organizations although important at a time when it was supported by very few countries, were far more problematic than the exaggerated claims at Morogoro indicate. Because the main concern of these organizations was to support Soviet foreign policy, they became preoccupied with the Sino-Soviet split. South Africa was a low Soviet anti-imperialist priority until after the Portuguese coup in the mid-1970s (see Chapter 8). The revitalization of the ANC following the Soweto uprising increased the movement's international stature and provided new opportunities of support in Western countries (see Chapter 10).

4.3 Internal Reaction Against the Turn Toward the Left

The ANC's closer relations with the SACP and the Soviet Union in the post-Rivonia period provoked only limited internal discord. By this time most of the leaders of the Congress Alliance were in London (although some of the member organizations such as the SAIC were never banned) and tried to maintain the existence of the Alliance in exile.

The only casualty caused by the ANC's closer cooperation with the SACP was a split in the Coloured People's Congress in September 1965. The president, former Cape Town city counsellor Barney Desai, and another office holder, Cardiff Marney, accused the ANC of being "racialistic" by excluding non-Africans from policy making discussions, and making the ANC too closely aligned to the Soviet Union. Reg September, the CPC's Secretary-General supported the ANC while Desai and Marney started to make contacts with the PAC [SAIRR 1966:109; Africa Confidential 1966:5].

The diplomatic consequences could have been serious for the ANC, especially in Britain. The ANC was instrumental in founding the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the leading British pressure group supporting economic sanctions (see Chapter 10). The PAC and the CPC were threatening to disrupt its activities by challenging the "correctness" of its strategies. If South African exiles disagreed what should be done, whose view was the British public supposed to support? [Africa Confidential 1966:5].

After the Morogoro Conference the ANC's united front strategy, i.e. the definition of the movement as an alliance of class forces, the central role given to the working class, and its anti-imperialist commitment were endorsed during important meetings of the national executive in 1971 [Sechaba 1971m:19-22], 1973 [ANC 1977:134-144], and 1975 [Sechaba 1975c:12,13; Tambo 1975:6,7; Nzo 1975a:14-18].

It was after Morogoro that the ANC's "continuing leftward turn" provoked internal opposition [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1984:289]. There had been desertions from the training camps and members of the External Mission had left the movement before (most notably Joe Matthews shortly after Morogoro), but this was the most serious division within the ANC since the split with the PAC at the end of the 1950s [Lodge 1983:303,304].

The group called itself the ANC (African Nationalists), but the ANC referred to the faction as the "gang of eight," a derogatory reference to the purges in China after Mao's death. The group included some of the ANC's main diplomats such as Tennyson Makiwane, the Deputy-Director of International Affairs, Jonas Matlou, and Alfred Kgokong, the Director of the Department of Information and Publicity, and Robert Resha's widow.

The bitterness of the dispute and the close similarity to the PAC's arguments suggests personalities were involved as much as ideology [Africa Confidential 1976:3]. The dispute broke out into the open in 1974 at Robert Resha's funeral. In contrast to the high profile which Sechaba gives to the obituaries of most high ranking ANC personnel,

Resha's obituary was a bland notice on the back cover of the magazine [Sechaba 1974c].¹³ Resha's treatment by the Department of Information and Publicity was slightly ironic since it was Resha, in his capacity as Director of the Department of International Affairs, who castigated Barney Desai's role as a "splitter" for effectively the same criticisms which the ANC (African Nationalists) faction now made at his funeral [SAFN 1965b:1-8].

At the heart of the arguments of these top ANC diplomats, reminiscent of the reasons given for the PAC's formation in the late 1950s was disagreement over the national question: it was claimed that the ANC was dominated by "white leftists" and replaced "genuine nationalism" by "class struggle" [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1984:289]. They were critical of Tambo's leadership, the absence of democratic consultation, and the dilution of the ANC's traditional politics and ideology caused by "a small clique of non-Africans," i.e. the SACP, who had gained control of the ANC because the "disastrous" Morogoro Conference opened the ANC's membership to non-Africans. This group was the dominant influence on the ANC's strategy and tactics [Africa Confidential 1976:3].

Some of the criticisms are similar to the issues raised by Mphahlele at the end of the 1960s. The criticism of democracy is noteworthy since the entire national executive, including Tambo, resigned in bloc at Morogoro. The only time the Department of Information and Publicity has referred to the Leninist principle of democratic centralism was in its

explanation for the expulsion of the ANC (African Nationalists) faction [Sechaba 1976b:11].

The Secretary-General Alfred Nzo dismissed the faction as a "small, discredited group of dissidents" who are "basically anti-ANC and its allies, and anti the SACP's members participation in the ANC" [ACR 1974-75:B580]. The national executive's statement declared, "Let it be made abundantly clear that the policies of racialism and anti-communism have been, and still are, diametrically opposed to the policies, traditions and practices" of the ANC, and later added, "There certainly will never be an endorsement of the 'suppression' of communists within the ANC" [Sechaba 1976b:11].

At its inaugural conference in 1978 the national executive of the ANC (African Nationalists) issued a statement which included a section criticizing the ANC's foreign policy. The group claimed the SACP has "tied the ANC to the ideological position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in world affairs and had abandoned the pattern of non-alignment to which the ANC has subscribed since the 1950s" [SAIRR 1979:37].

Another very small (Trotskyite) faction within the ANC, the "Marxist Workers' ^WTendency," broke off from the ANC in 1979 (they were formally expelled at Kabwe in 1985). They also claimed the ANC was dominated by the "Stalinist" SACP and the Soviet Union. According to this "workerist" tendency the ANC is dominated by "petty bourgeois" elements, and it has called for the transformation of the ANC into a working

class party with a "socialist programme" [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1984:289].

This group dismisses the SACP as a "Stalinist" organization; only partly for its Soviet links. They see the "Stalinist example" of a communist party which claims to represent the working class, but in actuality sells out the workers in the interests of state power as an indication of the ANC's future direction. They criticise ZANU's settlement in Zimbabwe as a "neo-colonial" solution which sold out working class interests for the sake of majority rule.

The ANC's general reply to these "splinter sects" is based on the standard principles of united front strategy, i.e an alliance strategy which is part of the first, or national democratic stage of Lenin's two-stage theory endorsed by the SACP. At the "present stage" of struggle the ANC is an alliance of class forces forming the broadest possible front of "democratic" and "progressive" forces against apartheid. [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1984:291].

These tensions also led to a greater debate on the national question within the ANC (see below), and a deepening of the ANC's own theoretical perspective on these issues by its academics which was facilitated by seminars sponsored by the Govan Mbeki Fund and the University of Amsterdam [van Diepen 1988; Wolpe 1988].

4.4 Re-organizing the External Mission for People's War

Beginning in the early 1970s the ANC was faced with three potential challenges to its leadership of the

liberation struggle from within South Africa: the emergence of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), the development of militant trade unionism, and the emergence of the Christian churches as an influential and significant force in the anti-apartheid struggle.

The Black Consciousness Movement was a polycentric force encompassing a variety of student organizations, women's organizations, church groups, and trade unions. The BCM was banned in October 1977, and after a year and a half of trying to come to an accommodation with the ANC and PAC the representatives of the BCM in exile formed two organizations. In early 1979 a small group associated with the Soweto Students Representative Council formed the South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRCO) under Nigerian sponsorship [Africa Confidential 1979c:backpage]. Particularly worrisome to the ANC was SAYRCO's contacts with the PAC and ANC (African Nationalists) faction. Some of its cadres were sent for training, supposedly with the PLO in Lebanon, and its members may have had connections to the Silverton bank seige, but nothing has been heard of the organization since the early 1980s [ACR 1979-80:B799].

A more substantial Black Consciousness Movement of South Africa in exile was formed in June 1979 with offices in London, New York, Bonn, Lesotho, and Central Africa to complement the banned or detained leaders inside the country. Before the BCM's banning and subsequent exile the ANC had recognized the BCM as a genuine force within black resistance, but was wary of it developing as an independent force in black politics.

The ANC felt it needed to "get on top of" internal political movements such as the BCM and South African Students Organization and integrate black consciousness principles with the non-racialism of the Freedom Charter [Selby 1973:20,21; Sechaba 1973b:2-5; Sechaba 1973e:4,5]. The ANC's inability to take advantage of the changes in the early 1970s was implicitly recognized at the national executive meeting in Lusaka in August 1971. The ANC effectively acknowledged that the "new" militant demands were the ones the ANC had been making for years [Sechaba 1971m:20; Johns 1973:293].

The ANC was anxious to incorporate the black consciousness influences among students, church people, and teachers into the movement. Tambo, in his annual address for 1972, talked about why it was important to "mobilize our black power" [Tambo 1972:21-5; ANC 1977:131-34]. At the same time, the ANC was worried about the development of anti-white racism and disagreed with the creation of separate black organizations. It stressed unity among the oppressed people, but pointed to the inclusion of democratic whites in the struggle. A statement after a national executive meeting in 1973 admitted, "On all these questions and others of a strategic and tactical nature, the voice of our organization is still relatively weak. Yet every day it becomes more urgent that we bring to bear on the situation all the weight of the political experience and maturity of the ANC" [ANC 1977:141].

In the early 1970s the ANC was at risk of losing the revolutionary initiative. Its efforts to influence domestic

events was accompanied by an international campaign to promote the ANC's legitimacy in the struggle. Another one of the recommendations at the August 1971 national executive meeting stated the External Mission's international work should move away from the condemnation of apartheid and be directed toward support "for our armed struggle based on the acceptance of the ANC as the sole representative" of South Africa's people and "as an alternative government" [1971m:22].

Looking back on this period, the Political Report to the Kabwe Conference remarked, "Already, the idea was beginning to emerge among some circles, particularly outside the country, that the BCM could consolidate itself as, at worst, a political formation to replace the ANC and, at least, a parallel movement enjoying the same legitimacy as the ANC. It was of primary importance that we should deny our opponents any and both of these possibilities" [ANC 1985:12].¹⁴

The ANC's attempts to seek common ground with the BCM in the early 1970s was rebuffed. The BCM exile leaders were critical of the ANC's leadership, policy, and strategy [ACR 1976-77:B812; SAIRR 1978:39]. Many of the BCM exiles were disillusioned by the disunity between the ANC and PAC and wanted to be the main force behind the unification of the different South African exile communities [SAIRR 1980:55; A.R.B. 1979b:5311B]. They criticized the ANC for being "afraid of competition from a new generation of anti-apartheid militants," and were worried about the "stranglehold" which the (they claimed mainly white) SACP

had on the ANC, arguing, "we have nothing against Marxism, but we want to know who controls the organizations" [ACR 1979-80:B798-799].

The ANC dismissed the new organization as "divisive," since however well intentioned, the attempt to create another organization would "divide the revolutionary forces" and "mislead" the people [ACR 1979-80:B807]. The ANC did, however, participate in a conference in October 1979 with the PAC, SAYRCO, and the Anti-Apartheid Movement. The conference determined that capitalism was the main problem in South Africa and the ANC expressed the fear that the emphasis on colour and "bourgeois nationalism" by the BCM would result in a future South Africa dominated by capitalism and imperialism [SAIRR 1980:55,56].

The South African government's efforts by the late-1970s to attract the support of the black middle class led the national question to re-emerge as a major theoretical question within the liberation movement. It led the BCM to rethink its position on the relationship between national and class struggle, and Sechaba, for example, had major discussion articles on the national question, the role of the middle class, and the national democratic revolution at this time.¹⁵ A voice from the past Neville Alexander, a leader of the former Non-European Unity Movement and now the Black Forum tried to sow ideological confusion when he published an ideological book in 1979 condemning the ANC/SACP's theory of colonialism of a special type [Nosizwe 1979; Sechaba 1980a:29-31]. Hence, in exile the BCMSA's changing ideological positions, its internal divisions, and

financial difficulties led many leading BCM personalities such as Barney Pityane and Cedric Mayson, to join the ANC. Inside South Africa the philosophy of black consciousness re-emerged in the formation of AZAPO and the Black Forum, both groups taking positions on the national question at odds with the ANC/SACP two-stage Leninist theory.

Black trade unionism emerged as a new political force after mass strikes broke out in 1973. By the late 1970s the continuing labour unrest led to the legalization of black trade unions due to the proposals of the Wiehahn Commission.¹⁶ At first unions concerned themselves mainly with "economistic" (worker-related) issues, but in 1983 the onset of recession, rising inflation, and unemployment was accompanied by the introduction of the Botha government's tricameral constitutional proposals. This led to a shift from the factories to the streets of the townships. The recognition that political activism would have to be combined with trade unionism led to the formation of COSATU in November 1985 [Smith 1987:96-98].

COSATU soon developed contacts with the ANC and its labour affiliate from the Congress Alliance, SACTU. In fact, a SACTU telegram was read out at COSATU's inaugural meeting [Smith 1987:98]. Only four months later, in March 1986, representatives from COSATU went to Lusaka for discussions with the ANC and SACTU. A communique issued after the talks stressed the ANC's leadership of the national liberation struggle: it was asserted that "the question of political power cannot be resolved without the full participation of the ANC" and that the people of South Africa recognize the

ANC as "the overall leader and genuine representative." Both the ANC and COSATU "agreed" that the solution to the political problems South Africa included both majority rule and "economic emancipation." This involved some form of unspecified distribution. The ANC accepted COSATU as "an important and integral part" of the "democratic forces in our country" [Sechaba 1986a:11].

The communique papered over more complex practical questions such as the relationship between COSATU and SACTU other than to say "there was no contradiction what soever" between them; suggesting by its very forthrightness the existence of a conflict.¹⁷ The ANC and SACTU firmly support COSATU; calling in Oliver Tambo's words for all democratic trade unions "to unite under the umbrella of COSATU" [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1988:458]. The communique called for the "widest possible unity of trade unions in our country" [Sechaba 1986a:12].

The ANC claims SACTU cadres operated underground within the existing unions and outside them in order to bring the ANC's broader perspective into the new union movement [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini, 1984:331; 1988:458]. COSATU, however, is not controlled by the ANC or SACTU. Observers note the youthfulness of the federations delegates and leading officials. "They clearly revere the older exiled or jailed leaders-but they feel that they themselves are the movement on the ground" [Smith 1987:98]. How COSATU, "as a representative of our working class" relates to the SACP, which consciously adopts the role of the vanguard party of the working class was also ignored in the communique.

At this stage of the struggle it was important for the ANC that COSATU acknowledged its political leadership. This was accomplished through the 1986 communique, and the following year at COSATU's conference in July 1987 the federation adopted the Freedom Charter. It interprets the Charter's economic passages, however, differently from the ANC and SACP. Their official position is that the Charter is not a blue print for socialism [ANC 1985a]. COSATU's General-Secretary Jay Naidoo, however, described it as a "guide to democracy and socialism," adding that COSATU's "immediate task" was to "develop a coherent working class understanding of the Charter while encouraging the fullest discussion on democracy and socialism within the federation ranks" [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1988:461].

Clearly over the long term differences will emerge over strategy, tactics, and indeed objectives: how the ANC as an alliance of class forces will deal with COSATU as a representative of the working class once the actual political bargaining begins is impossible to determine. The two-stage theory does not guarantee that national liberation will be followed by socialist transformation. This is what concerned the "Marxist Workers Tendency of the ANC" and led to their expulsion at the Kabwe Conference. This action may be an indication of things to come.

"Workerist" forces within COSATU reportedly had reservations about the 1986 meeting with the ANC and SACTU [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1988:460]. COSATU's acceptance of the Freedom Charter in July 1987 followed its earlier acceptance by unions within the federation, mainly the

National Union of Mine Workers, the Food and Allied Workers' Union, and the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA). At the July 1987 conference NUMSA's support for the Freedom Charter was coupled with a resolution calling for the adoption of a Workers' Charter and its delegates pressed (unsuccessfully) for the incorporation of the Freedom Charter into the Workers' Charter [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1988:461].¹⁸ In so far as this issue concerns the ANC, however, it is a future battle. What matters in the short term is that COSATU has deferred to the ANC's political legitimacy, it is aligned to the non-racial forces inside the country (e.g. the UDF), and has adopted the ANC's legitimating political symbols such as the Freedom Charter.

The church's struggle against apartheid since 1960 emerged through the Christian Institute of Southern Africa (formed in 1963), the South African Council of Churches, and through black theology as a component of the philosophy of black consciousness. In spite of a history of strong religious support, the strong Marxist theoretical orientation in which much of the ANC operates made it difficult for sections of the movement to come to terms with authentic religious opposition to apartheid and the integration of religious people into the movement.¹⁹ The ANC as an organization has not developed a theological reflection on apartheid. Theologians inside South Africa have formulated such a critique, but elements within the ANC remain wary of any kind of theological perspective which could challenge the Marxist content of the ANC's revolutionary theory.²⁰

The Christian Institute, adopted a strong anti-apartheid position during the 1970s and the re-emergence of mass-based organizations in the 1980s is linked to the increasingly activist South African Council of Churches. In this context, the church struggle against apartheid was not a dimension of the liberation struggle which the ANC could ignore, and after the 1983 re-organization (see below) it created a Department of Church Affairs in order to be kept informed about (and influence) church developments. In this context, Francis Meli used the Christian Institute as an example of the ANC's united front strategy. "The history and evolution of the Christian Institute," Meli explained, "teaches us that revolutionaries make a mistake when they think that revolutionary changes can be made by revolutionaries alone. We, as a liberation movement, must work in alliance with all patriotic forces in the most diverse spheres of activity. That is even if we do not agree with them on everything" (emphasis added) [Sechaba 1982 29-32; Meli 1988:188,189].²¹

The ANC's effectiveness in bringing each of these potentially autonomous forces of domestic resistance under the banner of the ANC, the conversion of notable black consciousness leaders to the ANC's tradition of non-racialism (both inside and outside South Africa), the growing militant black trade union movement, and the increasingly vocal religious opposition to apartheid, through the wide ranging support given to its official programme, the Freedom Charter, contributed to the ANC's

re-emergence as the most widely supported (although by no means the only) force in black South African politics.

A full account of how the ANC's tradition of non-racialism (symbolized by the Freedom Charter) re-emerged in South African politics is beyond the scope of this chapter; although these events can not, perhaps, be separated from the re-emergence of the ANC itself. By the early 1980s the increasing effectiveness of Umkhonto in attacking targets as part of its strategy of "armed propaganda;" the formation of a loose group of civic associations, students organizations and trade unions in the wake of the Soweto uprising which endorsed the non-racialism of the Freedom Charter rather than black consciousness; the revival of the Natal Indian Congress and the Transvaal Indian Congress; and the growing prevalence of ANC symbols in resistance politics all pointed to the ANC's re-emergence as the dominant liberation movement inside the country [Sutter 1985:234; Murray 1987:207-213].²²

The Natal and Transvaal Indian Congress were involved in forming the United Democratic Front (UDF). The UDF, the most broadly based mass organization since the Congress Alliance in the 1950s, was formed in August 1983 [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1984:296]. It was an internal South African initiative to resist the the government's local and national reform plans embodied in the new constitution and local community councils, both ANC targets [Barrell 1984:6-20].

The most extensive re-organization in the ANC's structure since the Morogoro Conference took place in 1983 in response to these domestic changes. It re-oriented ANC

strategy and gave greater scope to the movement's diplomacy. The structures created by the Morogoro conference were dismantled. A series of political, military and co-ordinating committees replaced the Revolutionary Council. A Political Committee was created to liaise with political and worker activities inside South Africa.²³ A Military Committee was formed to co-ordinate the externally-directed activities of Umkhonto.²⁴

A joint Political Military Council (PMC) co-ordinates the activities of the Political Committee and the Military Committee. It comprises the executives of both of these committees. Because of past organisational problems, the ANC's planning document stated, "one of the central aims of this [new] structure is to clearly pin-point responsibility and accountability through unambiguous distribution of tasks" [Sechaba 1983:1]. This may be an allusion to the Political Military Council which divided the activities of the now defunct Revolutionary Council between the Political Committee and the Military Committee.

The National Working Committee links the national executive with the Political Military Council. The External Co-ordinating Council, and its sub-committees co-ordinate the ANC's external work, and is also run from the headquarters in Lusaka. The Council includes members from the Women's Section and Youth Section, and the External Information Department.²⁵

Although the 1983 re-organization had primarily military significance, it also placed greater importance on propaganda, publicity, and information. A new post, as head

of a Department of Information and Publicity, was created and filled by Thabo Mbeki, Govan Mbeki's son.²⁶

It is significant that parallel to the ANC's emphasis on intensifying the military struggle, has been the extension of its politics and propaganda efforts, i.e. diplomacy. This other front was improved by the 1983 re-organization which has enabled the movement to capitalize on the unrest since September 1984 by translating the need for change in South Africa into support for the ANC as the alternative to the present government.

The re-organization in 1983 was an attempt by the ANC to head off the kind of divisiveness which characterized the ANC's relationship with the Black Consciousness Movement in the mid-1970s. The political momentum which began with the Soweto uprising possibly could have been consolidated into broad-based resistance a lot sooner had the ANC more skillfully absorbed and accommodated these new influences.

The ANC's re-organization occurred about the same time a draft of the new tricameral constitution was passed in parliament (September 1983), and a national referendum on the constitution was held among white voters (November 1983). The elections for the Coloured and Indian chambers of parliament were held in late August 1984, and the ANC's strategy to make "the apartheid system unworkable and the country ungovernable" was first broadcast on "Radio Freedom" (Addis Ababa) in the beginning of September 1984 [ACR 1984-85:B743].

The primary task of the newly formed Political Committee was to liaise with political and trade union

groups in South Africa. In its public statement on the re-organization, the ANC stated it wanted to "perfect" its organizational structure "in line with our developing situation." The ANC said it wanted to "mobilize more and more of our people into the revolutionary struggle headed by the ANC" [Sechaba 1983:1]. At this stage, the ANC may have been cautious of the UDF, mindful of the problems which the Black Consciousness Movement caused for the unity of the struggle under the ANC's leadership. The ANC was wary of an autonomous rival black opposition movement emerging in South Africa which it could not guide, control, or even accommodate. So a vital task of the Political Committee was to guide the political consciousness of black youth, and now the emerging mass organizations like the UDF, and community groups, toward the ANC.

The 1983 organizational changes were reflected in the statement on ANC strategy given by President Tambo in his annual message broadcast on Radio Freedom at the beginning of 1984. Tambo outlined the "Four Pillars of our Revolution" to be the following: (1) the vanguard activity of the underground structures, (2) united mass action, (3) armed struggle waged by Umkhonto, and (4) the international drive to isolate South Africa and gain world-wide moral, political, and material support for the struggle [Tambo 1984:4]. This broad conceptual vision of the components of the ANC's struggle was reaffirmed at the Kabwe Conference [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1988:443].

Because of this re-organization the ANC was better prepared for the uprising which began in September 1984 than

it was for the Soweto revolt. The Political Report at Kabwe acknowledged that "in 1976-77 we had not recovered sufficiently to take full advantage of the situation that crystallized from the first events of June 16, 1976. Organizationally, in political and military terms, we were too weak to take advantage of the situation created by the uprising" [ANC 1985:19].

At a time of unprecedented unrest within South Africa, and increasing regional violence in southern Africa the ANC held its national consultative conference in June 1985 in Kabwe, Zambia. At Kabwe the ANC endorsed a "council of war" strategy, and reorganized the Political Military Council as a War Council to direct the people's war [Africa Confidential 1985:1]. An account of the conference in The African Communist describes the whole conference as a "People's Parliament and a Council of War" [Hlanganani 1985:23]. For the first time a people's war was a real possibility in South Africa. A suggestion to create a "council of war" 15 years ago by Joe Matthews was rejected by the national executive [Lodge 1983:301].

The SACP alliance with the ANC was consolidated at Kabwe, evident in the movement's re-organization and greater role given to the working class in ANC strategy. This in fact is what the SACP claims [Africa Confidential 1985:1; Hlangani 1985:28]. Mabhida, the Secretary-General of the SACP, became a chairman on the PMC (before his death in March 1986). Joe Slovo, the Chairman of the SACP, and Cassius Make (a member of the national executive and a high ranking Umkhonto commander, became members of the War

Council.²⁷ Joe Slovo now joining Moses Mabhida on the national executive so the two leading SACP members were on both the national executive and the War Council.

According to the ANC's theory of the revolution articulated at Kabwe, the black working class now took the "leading role" in the revolution rather than the "special role," the view initially taken at the Morogoro conference. This confirmed "an ongoing swing to the left" within the ANC [Barrell 1985:7; Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini 1988:443].

CONCLUSION

The fact that most liberation movements begin as nationalist movements, and resort to arms only after severe state repression leaves them no other alternative, is the common history of most of the southern African liberation movements [Davidson, Slovo, Wilkinson, 1977:10,11]. Both the ANC and the PAC were forced into exile after Sharpeville. Each movement formed an underground military wing committed to armed struggle and an External Mission to gain diplomatic and material support. By the mid-1980s the ANC had gained domestic legitimacy as the most widely supported political movement among South Africa's black population, and increasingly, international legitimacy as the most likely alternative government after the end of white rule.

The success of the ANC's transition from a reformist African nationalist organization to a revolutionary national liberation movement needs to be explained in view of the

failure of the PAC, the ANC's most serious rival, to effectively make this transition, and the collapse in exile of the Non-European Unity Movement, a smaller Trotskyite rival to both movements.

The ANC's successful transformation into a national liberation movement involved a number of changes in the ANC's ideology and strategy, the structure of the movement, process of decision-making, membership, and choice of domestic and international allies. Any explanation for the success of this transition must consider the political options in the international system open to the ANC at the time of Sharpeville, and later when it was forced into exile, the political options available after the Rivonia arrests. The new international opportunities presented to the movement in the 1970s, and later, in the early 1980s described in subsequent chapters, were built on this previous success and its increasing international stature.

Changes in strategy after Sharpeville led to the first stage of armed struggle, selective sabotage, and required a new structure for operating underground, formulated in the M-Plan, but imperfectly implemented. Preparations for the second stage of armed struggle, guerrilla warfare, formulated to some extent in Operation Mayibuye, was accompanied by the development of new international allies, the socialist countries, which provided the necessary finance and training, and various independent African countries which provided the necessary training bases.

The devastating losses following Rivonia required the External Mission to assume the task of leading the military

wing in addition to handling the ANC's diplomacy as the ANC was reconstituted as an exile movement. The ANC's relations with the socialist countries became essential for the reconstitution of the movement in exile and the beginning of externally-led insurgency operations from bases established in friendly African countries.

The need for a new structure for the movement, different from the External Mission's diplomatic role, was belatedly recognized after the failure of the Wankie campaign at the Morogoro Conference. The re-organization of the ANC and the reformulation of strategy at Morogoro was accompanied by the development of even closer relations with the SACP and socialist countries, now more clearly reflected in the ANC's ideology, strategy, and international relations. It now participated in an alliance system with other southern African liberation movements supported by the Soviet Union and became involved in a network of Soviet supported international revolutionary organizations.

The cost of these close communist associations in African diplomacy at the OAU and in the Non-Aligned Movement during the 1960s and 1970s were more than off set by the financial and material support which the ANC received from the Soviet Union and its allies. Greater political struggle, always an emphasis of ANC strategy, became a real possibility following the Soweto uprising. This domestic factor and the independence of Mozambique and Angola contributed to the formulation of the ANC's strategy of "armed propaganda" between 1977 and 1984. The rise of mass-based organizations in the wake of the Soweto uprising

was accompanied by greater military action by the ANC's military wing making the combination of armed struggle and political struggle a real possibility for the first time since the 1960s. These domestic changes were accompanied by greater international legitimacy for the ANC among African states and even Western countries.

The possibility of joining military and political struggle, and the Botha government's reform plans led to the 1983 changes in strategy and organization. The ANC was prepared to take advantage of the opportunities the beginning of the revolt in 1984 presented the movement, and the possibility of people's war for the first time led to the second national consultative conference in Kabwe, Zambia in 1985. By this time the ANC's stature both within South Africa and without became so undeniable the ANC was gaining an opening to the Western governments for the first time.

END NOTES

1. There was reason for the ANC's early optimism since the liberation struggles were being intensified throughout southern Africa. During 1961 the ANC not only began its campaign of selective sabotage in South Africa (one week after Tanzania's independence), but a guerrilla war in Angola led by the MPLA began in February. Congo-Brazzaville (now the People's Republic of Congo) became independent in 1960, and offered its territory as a base for shelter and assistance to the liberation movements operating in Angola. Tanzania offered its territory to FRELIMO after independence for shelter and assistance for the struggle in Mozambique. Ghana and Ethiopia offered bases to the ANC and after the Algerians came to power in 1962, they offered military training to numerous liberation movements including the ANC after Mandela made the necessary arrangements during his secret trip. Zambia offered similar facilities to the southern African liberation movements after independence. By 1968

a 2,000 mile revolutionary front stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Oceans became the battle ground against white supremacy in southern Africa [Parker 1968-69:3].

2. In actuality, Morogoro confirmed in public changes in organization and strategy which had already taken place in the ANC: "Comrades and supporters may well wonder why it has only now been possible to give expression to an organizational necessity which arose some years ago. The answer lies in the scientific fact that there is always a time lag between the demands of history and the development of social forces except at that precise moment of revolutionary change when both factors coincide perfectly to advance society to a new, and qualitatively different, higher plane" [Mayibuye 1969d:2; Meli 1988:163].

3. ANC Speaks continued to covered up the disaster by using the same stories [ANC 1977:117-134]. Davies, O'Meara, and Dlamini acknowledge the failure of the Wankie campaign, and admit "Criticism of the Wankie Campaign was widespread within and outside the ANC" [1984:289].

4. This is an interesting admission since the accounts of the arrests published in South Africa Freedom News cited in Chapter 1 make the arrests appear much less consequential for the movement than they actually were.

5. In April 1968 James Hadebe was expelled by the national executive for "counter-revolutionary activities" [Sechaba 1968h:2]. In July 1968 a group of Umkhonto combatants fled from the military base in Tanzania to Kenya and asked for political asylum. They complained of extravagant living by the commanders, tribal favouritism, and the strict doctrinal acceptance of pro-Soviet positions which allowed no scope for disagreement. The allegations by these dissidents are no doubt exaggerated in order to justify their actions, but they are symptomatic of the rank and file pressures, which the ANC acknowledges, led to the Morogoro Conference. The most malign interpretation of the Wankie debacle is that it was staged as a suicide mission to remove dissidents! [SAIRR 1972:95; Gibson 1972:69-72]. The joint ANC-ZAPU operations were undertaken at the same time the ANC was receiving strong pressures from the OAU to form a united front with the PAC, and a more likely contributing factor to the Wankie campaign was the ANC's efforts to convince the OAU it was actively engaged in armed struggle with reliable (i.e. ZAPU and not the PAC) allies (see Chapter 5).

6. Lodge [1983a] and Fatton [1984] argue that the ANC's Political Report at Morogoro, its "Strategy and Tactics" document was a rejection of Cuban guerrilla warfare techniques of "foco."

7. Although the published history of Indian and Coloured politics for the period since 1945 is limited, there is a problem with this kind of chronology of events. Surely the rise to prominence in Indian politics of such noted communists as Yusuf Dadoo and M.P. Naicker can be explained in the context of the struggles within Indian politics and the requirements for united action by black resistance without resorting to Radu's conspiracy theory that the organizations within the Congress Alliance were purposely created as communist front organizations [Radu 1987:63].

8. It is not possible to say with any degree of certainty how the shift in Soviet foreign policy toward "bourgeois nationalist" leaders may have contributed to the reconstitution of the SACP in 1953. Stalin died in March and Harmel states, "By the beginning of 1953 a national conference was convened" which created the SACP [Harmel 1980:88]. It is also not possible to determine with any certainty how the shift in Soviet foreign policy and the developing Sino-Soviet split may have lead to the creation of the SACP's new theoretical journal, The African Communist. Bruce Larkin and Richard Lowenthal point out that Moscow withdrew its aid from Chinese nuclear development projects in June 1959, and Soviet technicians were withdrawn from Chinese economic development projects in August. The African Communist appeared in October as a organ for the whole of tropical Africa [Larkin 1971:50].

9. Radu asserts the failure of the Defiance Campaign is what led to the ANC to go to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and participate in communist front organizations [Radu 1987:63]. His analysis does not acknowledge the shift in Soviet foreign policy which took place during this period providing the ANC with new opportunities, nor does he consider the radicalization in black politics as a response to the extension of racial discrimination to all non-white races through apartheid during this period as adequate factors to account for the development of the ANC's non-racialism.

10. This debate can be followed in Matthews [1970:22,23]; Harmel [1970:22,23]; Meli [1970:22]; and Brooks [1970:20,21].

11. There appears to be a textual variation in different versions of the "Strategy and Tactics" document on this key issue of the role of the working class and the ANC's commitment to socialism which would be unimportant except for the fact that it has led to a dispute between Robert Fatton and Thabo Mbeki, who states clearly that "the ANC is not a socialist party. It has never pretended to be one, has never said it was, and is not trying to be" in the Canadian Journal of African Studies [Mbeki 1984:609]. Mbeki's statement is accepted at face value by Adam and Mooley [1986:96]. The version of the "Strategy and

Tactics" cited by Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini is different from the version printed in ANC Speaks. The ANC Speaks version is cited by Fatton, and is the version which appears to be the original, printed in the ANC booklet, "Forward to Freedom:Strategy, Tactics and Programme of the African National Congress of South Africa" [ANC 1969]. It is this original version which Mbeki claims "is clearly a printing error" and uses this alleged error to deny that the ANC is a socialist party [Mbeki 1984:609].

12. James Hadebe, then the Director of the ANC Bureau of Youth and Students, explained in his talk on South African history, "The combination racism, capitalism and imperialism has created South Africa into a colony of a special type" [SAFN 1966:1-11]. South Africa's "outward movement" in foreign policy (or the "imperialist nature" of the regime, as Hadebe explained it), was a necessary result of South Africa's internal colonialism [SAFN 1966:1-11]. This theme was later asserted throughout the Information and Publicity Department's publications on South Africa's detente policy during the 1970s (see Chapter 6).

13. Helen Joseph [1986:173] remarks, "I was aware of [Robert Resha's] resistance to the new policy of the external ANC of admitting non-Africans to membership. I knew this would have angered Robert deeply because of his inflexible African nationalism and his conviction that the ANC should remain the leading political organization with an exclusively African membership. Other races should, as always, be welcomed in the struggle for liberation but not as members of the ANC. Robert lost his fight against this new policy and died a tragic, lonely and embittered man, rejected by many of those who, for nearly thirty years, had been his leaders and his colleagues in the struggle to which he had devoted his life. He would never submit to what he thought was wrong and he paid a high price for his stand."

14. Particularly in Western countries, the BCM (like the PAC during the early 1960s) gained Western support as an organization that was "militant" in its opposition to apartheid, but was anti-communist and therefore less "radical" than the ANC. Because the Western powers were interested in the BCM for this reason the ANC condemned Western diplomacy as an effort to create a "third force" opposed to the ANC and genuine liberation [ANC 1985:12]. The failure of Western diplomacy toward the PAC and the BCM is an area for further investigation.

15. These discussion articles can be followed in Sechaba [1980f:2-8]; [1982f:19-23]; [1983a:19-23], and in Jordan [1983:23-38].

16. At the same time black workers were granted official status as urban residents (while tightening up the influx controls on migrant workers) through the Riekert

Commission's recommendations on manpower utilization [Smith 1987:97,98]. The government's attempt to divide urban blacks workers from migrant workers and rural blacks posed important strategic questions for the liberation movement's attempts at unity in struggle, but that is a separate issue.

17. SACTU was never formally banned, but by 1964 its leaders were all forced into exile [Davies,O'Meara,Dlamini 1984:331]. Other affiliates to the Congress Alliance such as the the Transvaal Indian Congress and the Natal Indian Congress were also never banned and in the current political climate were revived. Similarly, in strictly legal terms, there is nothing preventing SACTU from becoming resuscitated. The fact it has not been revived suggests a greater degree of independence in the current labour movement than the ANC wishes to acknowledge. Another reason why the March 1986 meeting was so important.

18. It will be important to follow NUMSA's role in COSATU as an indicator of possible friction between COSATU and the ANC. At its inaugural conference in May 1986 NUMSA accepted the Freedom Charter only as "a good foundation stone on which to start building our working-class programme." NUMSA asserts that only if the struggle is led and controlled by the organized working class "will the demands of the Freedom Charter (minimum demands for a democratic society) be fully and completely exercised in the lives of the working masses of our country" [Work in Progress 1987:9]. This does not mean there isn't common ground between these groups. At a meeting in early July 1989 between the ANC and the Mass Democratic Movement there was deep concern about Western initiatives. "The hard liners are worried," Richard Dowden writes, "that the Soviet Union may join a new contact group and abandon support for their position. The replacement of apartheid with a modified form of capitalism is not what they have been fighting for" [The Independent 1989].

19. After the death of President-General Luthuli in 1967, M.B. Yengwa (Luthuli's associate in Natal), was one of the few remaining religious voices actually in the ANC. At a conference in November 1988 a leading black South African theologian told me that when he first came to London in the 1970s the ANC did not quite know what to make of him:they could not deny that he was a genuine opponent of apartheid, but his opposition was based on religious grounds.

20. Theological reflection on apartheid inside South Africa by the Christian churches since 1960 led to the creation of the Christian Institute. It jointly sponsored with the South African Council of Churches the Special Project on Christianity in an Apartheid Society (SPRO-CAS) in the early 1970s. Most recently some theologians have formulated the Kairos Document (1985),

similar to the Barmen Declaration and the perspective of the "confessing church" during Nazi Germany, but sections of the ANC remain wary of the churches role in the struggle [Lamola 1988:7-11].

21. At a less theoretical level, Joe Slovo's recent comment is pertinent: "There are only two sorts of people in life you can trust-good Christians and good Communists" [The Independent 1988].

22. The prominence of the Natal Indian Congress in the boycott of the Indian Council elections in 1981 was accompanied by leading ANC personalities such as Albertina Sisulu (Walter Sisulu's wife) and Albertina Luthuli (Albert Luthuli's widow) in public addresses in which ANC symbols, including the Freedom Charter, were prevalent. The Transvaal Indian Congress was revived in May 1983 to boycott the constitutional proposals for the tricameral parliament. The Soweto daily newspaper, The Post, started a "Free Mandela" petition drive in 1980 which was accompanied by an appreciation of the Freedom Charter. Oliver Tambo, in his annual address, declared 1980 as the Year of the Charter. The newly formed Congress of South African Students (COSAS) officially adopted the Freedom Charter, and the Free Mandela Committee with branches all over South Africa was started to commemorate 20 years of his imprisonment in 1984 [Murray 1987:213].

23. The Political Committee was chaired by John Nkadieng, a member of the national executive, and the former ANC representative to Mozambique. In 1983 the Political Committee included Andrew Masondo, the National Political Commissar, and head of security. Joe Jele, one of the ANC's former chief diplomats, then head of the Department of International Affairs was also a member.

24. The Military Committee was chaired by Joe Modise, the commander of Umkhonto we Sizwe. Chris Hani, the Military Political Commissar was also a member [Africa Confidential 1985:2].

25. The External Information Department is headed by Francis Meli, the editor of Sechaba.

26. Mbeki is a member of the national executive, and prior to this position he was Tambo's political secretary. Since this promotion, Mbeki has generally been regarded as the likely successor to Tambo, so it may be significant that he oversees the ANC's publicity and information activities. Tambo may have wanted to guarantee an official policy line, consistent with his views, coming out of ANC headquarters in Lusaka. Since the death of Johnny Makatini in December 1988 Mbeki has become head of the Department of International Affairs; increasingly an important position because of the ANC's growing international stature in the West.

27. Make joined the Revolutionary Council in the late 1970s and was a high ranking MK commander on the PMC until his assassination in July 1987.

CHAPTER 5

THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE STRUGGLE: THE ANC'S RELATIONS WITH
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

"The independence of... countries in Africa... and the actions of the OAU is part of our struggle for we are part of that struggle for independence. We believe... that Africa will only have won that struggle when imperialism has been eliminated from every part of the continent. We have always believed in this concept of Pan-Africanism. That is why we have attended every conference meant to bring together the people of Africa..."

Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC [Tambo 1972:6]

The creation of the OAU was the main symbol in world affairs of Africa's emergence from colonial domination. Even at the beginning the reality was different from the symbol. In order to create the OAU African states exchanged Nkrumah's Pan-African vision of continental unity for a functional definition of African unity based on economic and technical cooperation [Mayall 1973].

The political compromise which made this exchange possible committed African states to a "radical" commitment to African liberation on the rest of the continent, particularly in southern Africa. The OAU gave diplomatic support to the principle of armed struggle as a legitimate foreign policy objective of African states. This theme was enshrined in the OAU's Charter and it was reiterated in the pronouncements of the annual meeting of the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government [Dube 1971; Cervenka 1977].

A number of liberation movements including the ANC attended the founding meeting of the OAU in Addis Ababa and had high hopes for the new Organization.¹ The ANC

delegation, like most liberation movements present at Addis Ababa, strongly supported African unity because it felt the OAU would strongly support the liberation struggles in southern Africa [Africa Digest, 1963c:31,32]. "We have never doubted," Oliver Tambo said at the time of the conference, "that singly the African independent nations supported us in our struggle to be free. But at this conference we received, for the first time, an outspoken token of support from the very top, from the heads of state themselves, speaking in unity...The first value of the conference resolutions is that it gives us access to funds with which to fight. We have never had this before, and to that extent we are materially better off in our struggle. Beyond that it places at our disposal all the facilities and other forms of assistance which the African states individually or collectively can offer, including the training of our people in special skills which can be employed within the country...This is the value of the Addis Ababa summit conference [SAFN 1963a:1].

The OAU's practical commitment to African liberation came through the formation of an African Liberation Committee which provided the financial and material support to liberation movements engaged in armed struggle. Although the ANC was optimistic about the help it could receive from the Committee, it was realistic enough to put aside the rhetoric of African politicians and knew that no Africa-wide liberation army would be converging on southern Africa. After the Liberation Committee's first meeting in Dar es Salaam in June 1963 Tambo commented, "I do not myself

contemplate that an army of liberation will move on South Africa...nothing as crude as that," but the OAU's support would be important to the struggle [SAFN 1963a:1].

It was through the Liberation Committee that the ANC was to have its most frequent, and direct contacts with the OAU. The ANC and the other liberation movements were part of a successful lobbying effort to get Dar es Salaam chosen as the headquarters of the new Committee, but shortly after the Committee's founding there were doubts about its composition and expertise.² The Liberation Committee's first Executive Secretary, Sebastian Chale, came from Tanzania's Ministry of External Affairs and previously worked in New York at Tanzania's Permanent Mission to the United Nations. According to Africa Confidential there was some "disenchantment" with the Committee, particularly by the South African liberation movements which felt there were too many people on the Committee who received their freedom through discussions with the British and consequently underestimated the preparations necessary for armed struggle [Africa Confidential 1963d:1].

This disenchantment was only the beginning of the ANC's disillusionment with the OAU and its Liberation Committee. The ANC was soon struggling to be heard, struggling to have its view point understood and accepted, and struggling to get from the Liberation Committee even the minimum financial support it was promised.

When the OAU was founded liberation movements had a marginal role in the formation of policy on southern Africa because of the subordinate role they were given in its

decision-making. Section 5.1 examines the limitations put on their involvement in the OAU's deliberations.

Shortly after the OAU was formed the ANC began to disagree with many of its policies toward liberation movements. The ANC's first disagreement was over its recognition and united front policy. It resented the Liberation Committee's persistent efforts to force it to form a united front with the PAC at a time when its rival was so fraught with internal divisions it was unable to pursue armed struggle. Section 5.2 examines the OAU's attempts to convince the ANC to form a united front and its reasons for resisting this policy.

The ANC's second disagreement was over liberation strategy. The OAU's decisions on strategy gave a priority to the liberation struggles in Guinea Bisseau, Angola, and Mozambique; considered to be the "weakest link" in the imperialist chain of African territories. According to the ANC this "domino theory" of liberation in which one country's freedom would strengthen the struggle in the next territory, making South Africa the last country in southern Africa to be liberated, not only put the armed struggle in South Africa at a strategic disadvantage in terms of finance and material, but it also underestimated the extent of South Africa's "imperialist" expansion and domination of the region. Section 5.3 examines the ANC's differences with OAU strategy.

The Liberation Committee's continuing failure to provide adequate funding to the ANC, and its determined effort to dictate policy regarding a united front led to

different perceptions between the OAU and the ANC regarding the working of the Committee. The OAU partly blamed the rivalry between liberation movements as the reason for their limited success. The ANC complained about inadequate funding, bureaucratic meddling, and high handed treatment by the Liberation Committee. Section 5.4 discusses these complaints.

5.1 The Structure of OAU Decision-Making and the ANC

The organs of the OAU concerned with African liberation policy were the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, and the African Liberation Committee. The Assembly is the OAU's highest policy-making organ. It has the constitutional authority to formulate policy on all issues, including liberation. It makes the final decision on the Council of Ministers' recommendations and resolutions regarding liberation policy [Dube 1971:33; Mangwende 1979:62,63].³

The Council of Ministers includes the foreign ministers of all member states. It discusses the report of the African Liberation Committee in detail and is responsible for the implementation of the Assembly's decisions. The Council is important for liberation strategy because it is able to make the decisions of the Committee binding OAU policy [Dube 1971:33; Mangwende 1979:62].

The Liberation Committee includes the foreign ministers of the member states of the Committee, and (after changes in policy) other member states which wish to attend its

meetings [Mangwende 1979:60].⁴ It has three Standing Committees; on Information, Administration, and General Policy which collects information from the liberation movements and publicizes their achievements; on Finance which deals with requests from liberation movements for financial assistance; and on Defense which deals with requests for material aid and weapons. These Select Committees and the Executive Secretariat meet at least once (and usually twice) a year. They prepare reports and documents on the armed struggles which include the submissions from the liberation movements, and they examine the report of the Executive Secretariat [Mangwende 1979:58-60].⁵

The OAU comprised independent states run by nationalist movements-cum-political parties jealous of their new sovereignty. ZANU's Witness Mangwende [1979:43] has noted that all the OAU officials he interviewed regarded liberation movements to be "sovereign personalities," but this description had very little bearing on the actual role of liberation movements in the OAU.

Although it accepts them as the legitimate representatives of their peoples in colonial territories, they were given a subordinate status in OAU decision-making. The subordination of liberation movements by African states dates back to the first Conference of Independent African States in June 1958. In the preparations for this conference Nkrumah insisted that there be no representatives from the dependent territories since he did not want the issue of

liberation to divert attention from the wider issue of Pan-African unity between independent states.⁶

Unlike PAFMECA which included independent states and nationalist movements in its membership, liberation movements were not members of either of the OAU's main organs, nor were they members of the Liberation Committee [Dube 1971:28; Cox 1964]. This subordinate status meant they could only participate in the OAU's deliberations as petitioners and observers. The ANC, for example, sent a delegation to the OAU's founding meeting and a six member "petition team" went to the second Assembly in Cairo. It has attended every Assembly since then.⁷

At the OAU's founding meeting in 1963 liberation movements were admitted only as petitioners, and a single spokesman tradition quickly developed. This meant that all liberation movements were not allowed to speak even if they came to the Assembly, but one speaker was chosen from among them [Wolfers 1976:187]. Oliver Tambo, for example, was chosen as the spokesman for the joint statement by the ANC and the Khartoum-allied liberation movements (ZAPU, SWAPO, MPLA, PAIGC, and FRELIMO) at the Algiers Summit in 1968 (this statement is discussed in Section 5.2).

The meeting of the Council of Ministers was usually held directly before the meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The activities of liberation movements at these meetings were aimed at gaining the support of particular states. Representatives of liberation movements recognized by the OAU went to the Council meetings in order to lobby delegates and were given logistical help in holding

private consultations with foreign ministers [Wolfers 1976:187; Mangwende 1979:62].

The ANC clearly resented its subordinate status in the OAU's main organs. Possibly, in a fit of pique over the results of the Algiers Summit (see below), the ANC's feelings toward the OAU surfaced the following year in Mayibuye's commentary on the Khartoum Conference. It stated Khartoum was different "from the conferences we have been attending these last few years." Mayibuye emphasized, "For the first time the leaders of the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies and southern Africa ran the show. It was unlike the numerous occasions when they paced up and down the corridors outside conference halls whilst discussions of their situation and their vital interests took place inside. They were spared the humiliation of wearing on their jacket lapels, tags reading 'petitioner' [Mayibuye 1969a:2,3].

The ANC blamed the initial success of Vorster's dialogue initiative a few years later (see Chapter 6) partly on the exclusion of liberation movements from the OAU's deliberations. At the height of the controversy Sechaba stated the ANC had consistently warned African states that South Africa was a threat to the "African Revolution" and a "base" of counter-revolution. Instead of heeding its warnings, the "views of liberation movements have been ignored" [Sechaba 1971i:3]. Sechaba called for the admission of the liberation movements "to the relevant councils of the OAU. That way we will see a healthy strengthening in the forces against imperialist intervention in Africa. It will

also ensure rapid progress in the liberation of the South" [Sechaba 1971d:2,3].

The single spokesman practice was not changed until the Assembly of Heads of State and Government met in Rabat in 1972. After this meeting representatives of liberation movements were allowed to speak and participate in the drafting of resolutions that affected their vital interests, and attend closed sessions of the Assembly [ACR 1972-73:A50]. They were also able to attend the Council's proceedings as observers [Wolfers 1976:187].

Even after these new provisions, liberation movements did not always find that their interests were adequately heard. At the Summit in Monrovia in 1979, for example, South Africa's destabilization of southern Africa was overshadowed by other issues.⁸ Nkomo was chosen to be the spokesman for all the liberation movements so afterward Sam Njomo and Oliver Tambo held a joint press conference [Margolis 1979:53,54].

The changes at the Rabat Summit also determined that liberation movements could participate in the Liberation Committee as observers. So for the first time they attended the twenty-first ordinary session of the Liberation Committee in Accra in January 1973 [Amate 1986:233,234]. After the opening speech and report by the Executive Secretary-General the movements were usually allowed to address the Committee, present memoranda, outline their success and problems, and indicate their requirements [Mangwende 1979:59,60]. Some of these statements were later printed in Sechaba and are used as sources for this chapter.

Liberation movements attend joint meetings of the Standing Committees as observers, but they also "advise" the Committee on matters pertaining to its particular struggle [Mangwende 1979:59].

Another factor limiting the participation of liberation movements in OAU deliberations was lack of interest by the delegates. Some of the delegates at the Assembly of Heads of State tended to "keep the representatives of liberation movements at a distance," and their only relevance to the Assembly was "their presence-apart from largely stock resolutions" [Wolfers 1976:186].

OAU policy on South Africa, and policy toward liberation movements was mainly determined by the larger issues of African diplomacy and they very often had little to do with South Africa. The Nigerian civil war led to a stormy debate at the Summit Conference in Algiers in September 1968. Oliver Tambo's address to the Conference acknowledged that OAU support was "vital" to the liberation movements, but he also admitted, "we are affected by every crisis that this mighty organization goes through" [Sechaba 1968q:1-3].⁹ More recently, Tambo has criticized the OAU for its "pre-occupation" with the conflicts in Chad and the Western Sahara while ignoring the real conflicts in southern Africa [The Times 1984:4].

In general, the contribution of liberation movements to the process of OAU decision-making was limited even though they were directly affected by its decisions. The diplomatic activities of liberation movements "appeared to lie on the margin" of the OAU's deliberations [Wolfers 1976:187]. In

spite of the changes after the Rabat Conference which gave the ANC greater access to the OAU its opinions were not accepted and its disagreements with OAU policy and administration continued.

5.2 OAU Recognition Policy and United Fronts

The liberation struggles in southern Africa were conducted by rival movements fighting each other in addition to white supremacy. They were not only moving farther apart, but were becoming polarized into antagonistic liberation alliance systems with each side supported by either the Soviet Union or China (see Chapter 2) [Marcum 1978:75].

These movements competed with the OAU for legitimacy and support. The OAU wanted to guide, if not control them to guarantee their efficient use of its limited resources, and it developed various criteria for determining which movements it would officially recognize as legitimate, and support through its Liberation Committee.

Resolutions at the founding meeting of the OAU in May 1963 established the principle of "common action fronts" between "national liberation movements" in order to better "coordinate" their efforts, "strengthen the effectiveness of their struggle," and make the best "rational use" of the Liberation Committee's assistance [Dube 1971:29; Amate 1986:284].¹⁰

At the first meeting of OAU foreign ministers in Dakar in August, three months later, the priorities for the newly formed Liberation Committee were established. First, the

Committee's main function was to try to bring about united fronts between rival liberation movements in the same territory. Second, the Committee was to distribute funds to these movements, and at the same time help them establish educational and military training centres [West Africa 1964:858]. Only movements recognized by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government (on the basis of recommendations by the OAU Secretariat) were eligible for aid from the Special Fund set up to finance armed struggles. This recognition was based on their willingness to form a united front [Dube 1971:35; Woronoff 1970:314].

Promoting united fronts between rival movements turned out to be one of the most difficult tasks facing the OAU and the Liberation Committee [Amate 1986:241].¹¹ The Committee established a number of good will missions in the early 1960s in order to bring unity between the rival southern African liberation movements, particularly in Angola and Rhodesia, but efforts were also made to unify the ANC and PAC.¹²

The Liberation Committee's threat to cut them off from its funds may have had some initial effect on the PAC. In contrast to the ANC, it was in dire financial difficulties [Africa Confidential 1963c:4].¹³ A week after the conclusion of the Dakar foreign ministers meeting in 1963 the PAC issued a statement in Dar es Salaam saying it was willing to form a united front with the ANC. The statement indicated the PAC's willingness to submit proposals to the Liberation Committee "by which unified positive action" between the ANC and the PAC "could be affected" in line with the call for

African unity at the OAU's Addis Conference [African Recorder 1963:562].

After the first United Front collapsed in 1962 (see Chapter 3) another short-lived united front was reportedly formed in August 1963, but it broke down by the beginning of 1964 [SAIRR 1964:59,64].¹⁴ The Liberation Committee set up a good-will mission to try to get the ANC and the PAC, to form a united front in June 1964, shortly before the OAU's Cairo Summit [Africa Digest 1964a:35; West Africa 1964c:674]. A united front was established, but it only lasted for a few months [A.R.B. 1964a:96C; Dube 1971:38].

The Council of Ministers meeting in Cairo before the Summit regretted "the continued existence of multiple rival liberation movements...in spite of the effort of the Committee of Liberation to reconcile them" [Woronoff 1970:205]. At the time, the West Africa correspondent considered the OAU's sole recognition of GRAE in Angola, the "de facto" recognition of ZAPU as the sole legitimate movement in Rhodesia, and the military efforts of the PAIGC as the OAU's few successes [West Africa 1964:858].

"Since the days when the first united front between" the PAC and the ANC "failed," West Africa explained, "there have been few points of agreement between these two major movements." Possibly betraying the magazine's own Pan-Africanist preference, the correspondent continued, "each [movement] at Cairo revealed splits or divergences within its own ranks" [West Africa 1964:858]. In fact, it was only the PAC which was noticeably in disarray at this time.¹⁵

The Liberation Committee's problem of forming a united front between the ANC and PAC (in addition to the more immediate problem of uniting the Angolan and Rhodesian movements) continued after the second Summit in Cairo in 1964. The Council of Ministers meeting in Lagos in June 1965 was deeply concerned about united fronts between liberation movements, and asked the neighbouring states in southern Africa for assistance [Woronoff 1970:240]. At the Council meeting in Accra in October 1965 the resolution on South Africa invited "the South African liberation movements to concert their policies and actions and intensify the struggle," and appealed for states to "lend moral and material assistance to the liberation movements" [Woronoff 1970:288].

The PAC's internal problems continued even though the OAU tried to patch the PAC together again, and get the ANC to form a united front. At the eleventh ordinary session of the Liberation Committee in Kampala in July-August 1967 the Committee suspended all further assistance to the PAC until it convened an executive meeting to resolve the differences in the leadership to the satisfaction of the Committee's Executive Secretary [Amate 1986:278].

Under pressure from the Liberation Committee to resolve its leadership crisis the PAC convened an executive meeting in Moshi in September 1967. It responded to the appeals of the OAU and agreed to form a common action front with the ANC. At the twelfth ordinary session of the Liberation Committee in Conakry in January 1968 the PAC informed the Committee of its intentions and the Committee decided to

restore its assistance [Amate 1986:278]. The agreement did not last long and in June 1968 the leadership split again into two factions [Amate 1986:278; Africa Confidential 1968a:4].

In July 1968 the Liberation Committee met in Algiers and completely lost its patience with the PAC. It complained of "great confusion in the movement" [Woronoff 1970:300]. It withdrew all OAU financial support until the movement sorted itself out [Africa Confidential 1968a:4]. At the Algiers meeting the Committee also withdrew its support for GRAE in Angola and agreed to "immediately" increase its aid to the PAIGC, FRELIMO, the MPLA, and SWAPO. The decision to withdraw its support from the PAC and GRAE, according to the Liberation Committee, was "part of a move to withdraw aid from movements considered 'unrepresentative' and 'inefficient'" [ACR 1968-69:622].

Finally, in September 1968 Zambia banned the PAC; reportedly because of its subversive intentions within Zambia [Africa Confidential 1968a:4]. The official explanation was that it "had engaged in futile activities which had dissipated efforts against" South Africa [SAIRR 1969:18].¹⁶

The ANC's refusal to form a united front seemed to be confirmed by the PAC's perpetual leadership disputes, but the OAU continued to put pressure on the ANC. The ANC's refusal was similar to the refusal of liberation movements in other territories to form a united front with its rival movements [Amate 1986:241-316].

Because rival liberation movements throughout southern Africa refused to unite, the OAU was forced to adopt a second best policy of supporting only those movements which seemed to be involved in actual armed struggle [Kapungu 1975:138]. This policy unfortunately led to the loss of life for propagandistic reasons. Rival movements, according to Kapungu, "in order to gain the support of the OAU, had to seem to be fighting. So armed men were sent into the territory at precisely the time an OAU organ was about to meet. Guns would be fired and the leaders of the liberation movements would go to the OAU and claim to be waging an armed struggle" [Kapungu 1975:138]. The OAU almost encouraged this kind of behaviour from them because of its uncritical acceptance of their reports.¹⁷

The ANC's alliance with ZAPU was announced at a time when it was under increasing pressure from the OAU to form a united front. If the situation Kapungu describes was as prevalent among the liberation movements in southern Africa as he suggests, then it is likely the OAU's pressure on the ANC was one of the factors contributing to the formation of the alliance and the start of the Wankie campaign [Kapungu 1975:139].¹⁸ It helps to explain why the alliance was announced in public. One of the ostensible reasons for the alliance was to infiltrate South Africa from Rhodesia, but this objective could just as easily have been achieved without a public announcement (see Chapter 2).¹⁹

The ANC's publicity stressed the alliance showed its commitment to African unity which suggests this was one of the motivations behind making the alliance public. It was

announced in August 1967, shortly after the eleventh ordinary session of the Liberation Committee in Kampala. A month later, at the Council of Ministers meeting in Kinshasa, the OAU made a special point of encouraging the activities of liberation movements along the lines of the ANC-ZAPU alliance, but it still maintained the ANC and PAC should form a united front [Africa Confidential 1967:6-8].²⁰ It appealed to the liberation movements "to find a basis for unity, co-ordination and co-operation...in their struggle to liberation their country," especially in Rhodesia [Woronoff 1970:255].

After refusing to form a united front it was important for the ANC to retrieve the "moral high ground" in its propaganda at the OAU.²¹ A joint ANC-ZAPU statement at the Kinshasa Summit in September 1967 emphasized, the alliance is "based on the fact that the entire peoples of southern Africa have common enemies and common objectives. Their success in smashing the bulwark and bastion of racialism, fascism and colonialism depends on their firm co-operation and solidarity. This alliance is an expression in action of the fundamental spirit of Pan-Africanism and an historical implementation of the basic tenets of" the OAU [ANC 1970:5].

The ANC emphasized it was not only involved in guerrilla operations, but undertook them through a military alliance with another liberation movement, ZAPU, which "received primary support from the" Liberation Committee. Thus, the ANC was upholding the OAU's own principles of cooperation and coordination between liberation struggles [Woronoff 1970:300].

This same point was made in a different way to the ANC's supporters in its propaganda organs and in the African press. Its main response to the OAU's repeated calls for a united front was to reiterate its willingness to form a united front, but only with genuine revolutionaries, in other words with ZAPU and not the PAC [Mayibuye 1968b:7]. The only African unity that mattered was a united front "in the battle field" and at that moment the ANC was involved in a military alliance with ZAPU [Mayibuye 1968a:5].²² The African Communist, commenting on what it called the OAU's "exhilarating revival" after the Kinshasa Summit, claimed "To no small degree this transformation must be ascribed to the presence and activities of the joint delegation of ZAPU and the ANC, whose fighting men were demonstrating on the battle fields of Zimbabwe that African unity and freedom are not pious abstractions but vital realities, only to be got and held by blood and sacrifice" [The African Communist 1968:5].

The ANC argued its case in the highest OAU organs. Tambo was chosen to be the spokesman for the Khartoum-allied liberation movements at the Algiers Summit in September 1968. He made the most out of the recent ANC-ZAPU military campaign in an effort to gain OAU support for the ANC's view of unity between liberation movements. Tambo referred to the ANC's military alliance with ZAPU and emphasized how it "has been acclaimed" by the OAU. He also pointed to the ANC's cooperation with CONCP as "a welcome development is the growing unity, cooperation, and coordination of the struggles" in southern Africa [Sechaba 1968q:1-3].

Tambo claimed in his Algiers address "we are at war" against South Africa and its "imperialist" allies, and the struggle was being intensified. These movements were training and building "liberation armies," and developing highly efficient underground movements in the white-ruled countries. The ANC "is engaged in the intensive preparation for the extension of the armed struggle already in progress in Zimbabwe" [Sechaba 1968q:1-3].

Tambo used the OAU's recent suspension of assistance to the PAC and its praise for the ANC-ZAPU alliance as a bid for recognition of the ANC as the only legitimate movement in South Africa. He claimed in his Algiers address it "is in our humble opinion vital that such support must be given to real movements that are effective and have the support of the masses" (emphasis added). The OAU must decide, he said, between those movements which are real and "those that are bogus and corrupt." In a more overt effort to persuade the OAU to accept the sole legitimacy the ANC and its allies (i.e. not the PAC, ZANU, UNITA and the FNLA) Tambo warned that the "technique of apparently revolutionary organizations sponsored by imperialists to disrupt established movements is one to be watched with extreme care" [Sechaba 1968q:1-3]. Later, in November, the ANC called on the OAU to "settle the question of unrepresentative splinter groups who receive assistance but have no worthwhile use for it other than dividing the oppressed people" [Sechaba 1968n:3]. The Morogoro Conference explicitly called Roberto's FNLA, Mugabe's ZANU, Savimbi's UNITA, and the PAC "spurious stooge organizations" created

and maintained by the "imperialist" powers [Sechaba 1969e:4,5].

The Liberation Committee's response to the ANC's efforts was to appoint a subcommittee to investigate the disagreements within the PAC's leadership. The Committee's report on the PAC was submitted to the fourteenth meeting of the Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa in early 1970. It led the OAU to recognize the Leballo faction of the PAC as the "genuine and legitimate leadership of the PAC" [Amate 1986:279]. The Committee "now stepped up its pressure on the ANC and the PAC to form a common action front." It appointed a subcommittee consisting of Algeria, Tanzania, and Zambia (the same subcommittee which had reported on the PAC's leadership dispute) to reconcile the ANC and the PAC [Amate 1986:280].

The subcommittee met with the ANC and PAC several times but made no progress. The PAC reportedly proposed discussions on forming a united front which were rejected by the ANC.²³ "[T]he ANC leaders who had from the first taken the position that they could not commit their movement without first consulting their top leaders inside South Africa would not budge from this position" [Amate 1986:280].

The Liberation Committee passed some strictures on both movements at the Committee meeting in Benghazi, Libya in January 1972. The Liberation Committee's report to the Council of Ministers meeting in Rabat six months later, in June, praised the principal liberation movements in the Portuguese territories, but was "seriously critical" of the ANC and the PAC. The report expressed its "disappointment

and indignation at the rather poor level of progress of the liberation struggle conducted" by both movements. It claimed the poor situation was due in part to the "unwillingness" of the two movements to "forge a strong united front against the common enemy." It called on the OAU Secretariat, the governments of Tanzania, Zambia, and the two movements "to undertake a thorough study of the present conditions of the struggle in South Africa and to formulate a fresh strategy which would help towards successful pursuit of the liberation war" [ACR 1972-73:C41,C42].²⁴ At Rabat the Council of Ministers resolution on the Liberation Committee's report reiterated "the urgent necessity for liberation movements fighting within the same territory to close ranks and form a united front for mobilizing the masses inside the territory and intensify the armed struggle" [ACR 1972-73:C15].

At an extended meeting of the national executive held in Lusaka in August 1971 the ANC stated its opposition to pressure by the Liberation Committee to form a united front. Contrary to OAU policy it directed the External Mission to begin pressing for the sole recognition of the ANC. The national executive said it "fully supports the clarion call for a united Africa and a united national liberation movement. We repeat this call to all South African revolutionaries. But, we warn against the opportunistic creation outside South Africa of formations devoid of substance and intended merely to serve either the purposes of convenience for the supporters of our cause, or worse still, in the interest of favourable publicity [Sechaba

1972c:17-20]. At the same time, the national executive's resolutions on external solidarity said the External Mission's work should be reoriented "away from mere moral condemnation of apartheid by the people of the world, and to direct it towards committed support for our armed struggle based on the acceptance of the ANC as the sole representative of our struggleing people and as the alternative government for South Africa" [Sechaba 1971m:22].

In 1972 the ANC admitted it had "been adamantly resisting" various attempts by the Liberation Committee to form a united front [Sechaba 1972c:17-20]. Secretary-General Alfred Nzo, in a Sechaba interview reiterated that the ANC supports unity within the OAU and among liberation movements, but Nzo explained, "The ANC has a long history of seeking and actually working for the unity of all revolutionary forces inside South Africa. We have followed this policy in our External Mission as well." "We cannot also close our eyes," he continued, "to the fact that what is known as the PAC externally has disintegrated into so many warring factions that any talk of a [PAC] raises the question: what PAC? We therefore think that any call for unity with the PAC which presupposes the dissolution of the ANC and the creation of a new organization with members of both the ANC and the PAC will do more harm to the South African cause than good" [Sechaba 1972:17-20].

At the Liberation Committee meeting in Accra in January 1973 a new liberation strategy for southern Africa called the "Accra Declaration on the New Strategy for the Liberation of Africa" was adopted which kept up the pressure

on the two movements to form a united front.²⁵ The Accra Declaration noted that no liberation war had so far been won from abroad solely by "elements in exile" and said it was necessary to unify liberation movements within each territory and proposed united fronts for this purpose. The Declaration proposed the continuation of aid to liberation movements recognized by the OAU for a determined period, and at the end of this period, recognition would only be given to the movement which showed itself to be the most successful in armed struggle. Aid would be cut off from the rival movements [ACR 1973-74:A33; Amate 1986:295].

The issue of a united front was raised at the twenty-third ordinary session of the Liberation Committee in Yaounde in May 1974. The representatives from Zambia and Tanzania on the subcommittee indicated they wanted to resign because they had "found the work impossible, as one of the two movements [i.e the ANC] had declared unequivocally that it would have no dialogue with the other" [Amate 1986:280]. The Committee would not accept defeat and instead expanded the subcommittee by adding Ghana and Egypt. It asked the subcommittee to continue its efforts to reconcile the ANC and the PAC [Amate 1986:280].

Although the PAC's international image had improved during the early 1970s, it still suffered from an internal leadership dispute [Stanbridge 1980:94; Amate 1986:280,281]. In spite of the PAC's divisions, the OAU still maintained its recognition of both movements. The OAU Summit Conference in Mogadishu in June 1974 reiterated that both the ANC and the PAC (and SWAPO) were "the authentic and legitimate

representatives of the people of their territory" [ACR 1974-75:C9]. The Summit Conference in Port Louis, Mauritius, held in 1976 in the wake of the Soweto uprising, promised to both the ANC and the PAC "maximum political, economic, and military assistance to enable them to execute the armed struggle" [ACR 1976-1977:A68].

By the end of the 1970s the PAC was in danger of loosing its recognition by the OAU. The Liberation Committee became "radicalized" by the admission of Mozambique and Angola, strong allies of the ANC though the Khartoum alliance. Machel opened the way forward at the Liberation Committee's meeting in Maputo in January 1976. He sought a new approach to recognition policy by declaring the "correct line of action is to recognize only one liberation movement and exclude the rest." Drawing on an analogy of the Angolan civil war he claimed, "we provide the enemies of Africa with the opportunity of using the least representative and ideologically weaker movements to undermine the process of liberation" [A.R.B. 1976:3887,3888; ACR 1976-77:A73]. This effort did not succeed and the Committee maintained an even handed approach to both movements. The ANC appreciated Machel's support. Sechaba publicized his speech [Machel 1976:32-37], and the Committee's communique [Sechaba 1976c:38,39].

In February 1978, during the Liberation Committee meeting in Tripoli, "progressive" African states inside the Committee (such as Angola and Algeria) unsuccessfully tried to get the ANC granted recognition as the sole legitimate liberation movement in South Africa. Like Machel, they

pointed to the Angolan civil war as an example of the problems when more than one liberation movement in a country is recognized [Africa Confidential 1978:8; Africa Confidential 1978a:3].²⁶

Possibly because of this additional support from within the Committee, the ANC became increasingly irritated whenever the issue of a united front was raised by the OAU [Amate 1986:280]. At the Tripoli meeting the ANC said the united front had become a perennial issue and it now wanted to "be more forthright, to say that the matter needed no more pursuing because it could only be discussed back in South Africa where," the ANC asserted, "the question of unity did not pose any problem, because the people were solidly behind the ANC." Furthermore, the ANC said the issue of unity between the two movements is a matter for them to work out since they have an "inalienable right to control their own destiny including the right to decide with whom to unite, when and how and for what purpose." In conclusion, the ANC told the Committee, it "is prepared to work with other organizations fighting against the apartheid regime provided such organizations operate under the leadership of the liberation movement, which is the ANC" (emphasis added) [Amate 1986:280].

The Liberation Committee was not put off by the ANC's blatant refusal to defer to its authority. Its meeting in Dar es Salaam in June 1978 reiterated the call for a united front. In order to facilitate this the subcommittee was expanded (it now included Mozambique, Kenya, Libya, Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Tanzania, and Zambia) and the Liberation

Committee called on them to renew their efforts to unite the two movements [A.R.B. 1978:4874C; Amate 1986:280]. The PAC was enthusiastic about unity, but the ANC again put forward reasons why unity was out of the question [Africa Confidential 1979b:1].

The PAC's consultative congress in Arusha at the end of June 1978, successfully prevented the ANC's African allies from getting it de-recognized by the OAU. The PAC called on the OAU to assist its efforts to get the ANC to form a united front and the Council of Ministers meeting in Khartoum in July 1978 accepted the PAC's proposals [ACR 1978-79:B689]. They recommended that the South African liberation movements should form one body, its ad hoc committee should "study the problems of unity" between the ANC and PAC, and "to find an acceptable formula that will ensure the unification of all the fighting forces in the country" [ACR 1978-79:C17].

After the meeting the PAC accused the ANC of having a "hegemony complex," and the ANC accused the PAC of being run by black racists and having no place for white communists [SAIRR 1979:38]. David Sibeko, the director of the PAC's Foreign Affairs Committee, claimed the OAU had prevented an "expensively-orchestrated campaign launched at the PAC and Azanaia's Black mass organizations by a certain European power [i.e. the Soviet Union] which is seeking exclusive recognition for the ANC in the OAU" [ACR 1978-79:B869].²⁷

The bitter outcome of the Khartoum Summit led the ANC to reassert the importance of its links with the Soviet Union. The ANC's national executive, after receiving the

report by its delegation to the Khartoum Summit issued a statement which said "the hope for the future of our continent lies in the further deepening of the anti-imperialist content of the African revolution. This presupposes that the contribution and the positive role of the socialist countries and the progressive forces of the world should not only be appreciated but also defended." The ANC, the statement continued, was "ready to strengthen its fraternal relations with all the progressive forces on the continent as we consider this task very vital for the interests of the African revolution and the general anti-imperialist movement" [Sechaba 1978i:43,44].

Although for different reasons, the Liberation Committee had now lost its patience with both the PAC and the ANC. The Executive Secretary, at the Liberation Committee's meeting in Dar es Salaam in January 1979, called on the Committee to try to bring about a settlement of the differences between the two movements. He said the Committee would soon have to decide between them: the splits between the movements in Rhodesia and South Africa eroded their strength [A.R.B. 1979:5115AB].

The PAC's leadership dispute remained unresolved and culminated in the assassination of David Sibeko in June 1979, shortly after the Liberation Committee's meeting in Dar es Salaam [A.R.B. 1979b:5290AB]. The OAU still insisted that they form a united front [Amate 1986:281].

The public recognition of the ANC's "armed propaganda" campaign inside South Africa and its support within the Liberation Committee led the ANC's allies to make another

attempt to get it accepted as the sole legitimate liberation movement. Oliver Tambo (and SWAPO's Sam Nujuma) attended a meeting of the Front Line States in Maputo in March 1982 which strengthened the possibility that the OAU might drop its recognition of the PAC (see Chapter 6) [Karis 1983:208,209].

Although these efforts did not succeed, the OAU finally moderated its support for the PAC in the face of the ANC's successful military actions. At the Summit in Addis Ababa in June 1983 the resolution on South Africa specifically called the ANC "the vanguard of the national liberation movement," and attributed the "intensification of the armed struggle" to its military wing [Sechaba 1983i:15-17].

In view of the PAC's dire internal disputes and limited engagement in armed struggle the OAU's commitment to unity between the ANC and the PAC needs to be explained. According to the OAU's initial policy, it was willing to settle for supporting only one liberation movement. In Angola the OAU recognized Roberto's GRAE in 1964, and only later broadened its support to the MPLA when it was more successful militarily.²⁸ The Liberation Committee's initial activities were more concerned with preventing the PAC from "crumbling to pieces" than with forming a united front with the ANC [Dube 1971:46].

At this time the PAC was split apart by its first of many leadership disputes and the correct policy in terms of the OAU's own principles would have been to recognize only the ANC. It could be argued that at this time the ANC was also incapacitated because of the Rivonia arrests and the

ability of either group to lead black resistance was in doubt. In the 1970s when the PAC was still plagued by leadership disputes and the ANC's "armed propaganda" campaign was beginning to have an effect, the OAU still refused to recognize the ANC as the leading liberation movement.

The OAU's commitment to the PAC and the Liberation Committee's efforts to bring the ANC and PAC together can be explained by a number of factors. First, the OAU's commitment to unity resulted from the limited military success of both movements.²⁹ The PAC was in disarray. Although the ANC was more active militarily (or atleast more active preparing guerrilla fighters in its training camps) it was not making any significant progress. What was supposed to be the beginning of armed struggle, the Wankie campaign, failed.

It increasingly became evident that the duration of the South African struggle would be much longer than the liberation struggles in the Portuguese territories or the rest of southern Africa. The outcome of the struggle in South Africa, and the political content of the South African revolution was so indeterminate that the OAU felt both movements represented legitimate constituencies inside South Africa. Each movement had patrons outside the country among the African states and to varying degrees supporters in the international community to keep it in existence. Although the PAC was weaker than the ANC outside the country and inside, it was accorded hospitality by Liberia, Lesotho, and Tanzania (and more ideocyncratically, by Amin's Uganda and

Libya) [Africa Confidential 1978:8]. Until the late 1970s when the ANC's "armed propaganda" campaign began and its allies started to apply pressure from within the OAU for the PAC's de-recognition, no one knew which liberation movement would come out on top since neither movement was making any progress.

Second, the bureaucratic politics of support for liberation movements between the Liberation Committee and the OAU Secretariat worked against the sole recognition of the ANC. When the Liberation Committee was formed the "radical" states, i.e. the former members of the Casablanca bloc, succeeded in turning the Liberation Committee into the OAU's most important organ, second only to the Assembly of heads of State, and on a par with the Council of Ministers. The Liberation Committee was given autonomous status within the OAU in order to maintain secrecy of its operations, and was responsible only to the Assembly of Heads of State. Its meetings were closed to non-member states, and the powers of the Liberation Committee's Executive Secretary exceeded those of the administrative Secretary-General of the OAU [Cervenka 1977:46].

This degree of power was resented by the Secretariat and by states which were not members of the Liberation Committee and they obstructed the implementation of official liberation policy. The attempt to force rival liberation movements to form united fronts as a precondition for assistance failed because of the opposition of many of the liberation movements, particularly those in Angola, Rhodesia, and South Africa.³⁰ Instead, the OAU decided to go

ahead and disperse the Liberation Committee's funds based on the criteria of a movement's degree of support inside the country and more active involvement in armed struggle while at the same time trying to unify rival movements [Amate 1986:242,243].

When ever the Committee tried to exercise some choice between liberation movements based on the criteria of domestic support and military effectiveness complaints always arose from the rival movement and its African supporters in the Secretariat [Woronoff 1970:317]. OAU policy broke down because of the preference of African states for particular movements which shared their own policies, interests, and ideology [Cervenka 1977:47; Tekle 1988:55; Kapungu 1975:139; Amate 1986:290].

After the debate on the Liberation Committee at the Cairo Summit in 1964, it was expanded from nine to eleven members. A clear trend towards support for certain, more "revolutionary" movements became evident within the Committee (the ANC and its allies the PAIGC, MPLA, FRELIMO, ZAPU, and SWAPO), but the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat would not choose between rival movements [Woronoff 1970:317; Dube 1971:33].

The Committee's support for these movements put it in an "almost permanent controversy" with the Secretariat and the Council of Ministers [Woronoff 1970:317]. The "moderates" in the OAU complained about the Liberation Committee's actions, and it was "cut down to size" by making it subordinate to the Assembly and Council of Ministers [Cervenka 1977:63]. The reforms in the Liberation Committee

after the Algiers Summit in September 1968 and the Addis Ababa Summit in February 1969 changed its structure by eliminating most of the provisions regarding secrecy which the liberation movements thought was particularly damaging (see Section 5.4). They allowed a greater number of states to participate in the Committee, and be informed about its activities [Woronoff 1970:318-319; ACR 1968-69:618-619; ACR 1969-70:C3].

Because of these organizational changes the Liberation Committee strengthened its position vis-a-vis particular African states, but this was not viewed favourably by the Secretariat in Addis Ababa. After 1976 the Committee became more identified with the policies of Tanzania and Mozambique than with those of the Secretariat which it considered to be a conservative, weak, and indecisive body. The ascendant liberation movements in the 1970s were the movements most strongly supported by the Soviet Union (ZAPU is the exception). Moderate states such as Liberia and Egypt resented the growing strength of what they perceived to be the "pro-Soviet" movements on the continent [Africa Confidential, 1979b, backpage].

Another way the Liberation Committee strengthened its position was through Africa's Middle East connections. It developed closer ties with the PLO because of the growing cooperation between South Africa and Israel. This allowed Arab states to support the Committee more fully than many black African states which led it to take a more militant line against South Africa and Israel.³¹ This was in direct conflict with the other OAU's main organs where "moderate"

states still had a majority [Cervenka 1977:63]. Liberation movements, therefore, were a valuable ally to the "radical" states within OAU politics. The ANC's increasingly overt anti-Zionist propaganda was one of the ways liberation movements assisted the "radical" states in the Liberation Committee and gave greater support to the ANC and its allies.

Third, the PAC's black nationalism (and its ideological heir, the Black Consciousness Movement) had more in common with the heady African nationalism on the continent than the ANC's commitment to non-racialism [Gerhart 1978]. One of the ways the OAU distinguished between liberation movements was the content of African nationalism and the ANC's non-racialism was at odds with the experience of most African states. It put the ANC at a diplomatic disadvantage in Africa (see Chapter 3).

Finally, another factor which alienated the ANC from the OAU's main organs was the fact that the movements favoured by the Liberation Committee were strongly supported by the Soviet Union. Because the PAC combined anti-communism with black nationalism it was able to maintain its support within the OAU: the PAC appeared more "militant," in its opposition to apartheid, but was less "radical" than the ANC in its ideology (see Chapter 3). The ANC's attendance (and that of its allies) at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana was particularly divisive within the OAU. At the Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa in February 1966 the more moderate African states wondered why they were giving money to a Liberation Committee that dispensed it to

movements which attended international conferences that condemned most of them as outposts of neo-colonialism and prime candidates for revolution. Nearly all the African states except Zambia and Tanzania said they would no longer contribute to the Liberation Committee [Amate 1986:227].³²

5.3 Disagreement with the OAU's Liberation Strategy

The Liberation Committee held its fourth session in June 1964, a month before the Cairo Summit, at its headquarters in Dar es Salaam [Africa Digest 1964a:35]. Members of the liberation movements, including GRAE's Holden Roberto and the ANC's Oliver Tambo, attended its opening session [West Africa 1964c:674]. The Committee agreed that the Portuguese territories should receive the first "serious attention" in the struggle, and therefore, a standing committee was formed to mediate between rival liberation movements, and coordinate and supervise the armed struggles in these areas.

Although the priority of dealing with the Portuguese movements was essential because of the deep divisions between them, especially in Angola, this decision put the ANC at a strategic disadvantage. Because of the Liberation Committee's funding problems (see Section 5.4), the Cairo Summit had a full debate on the Committee which included a debate on strategy. The ANC presented a memorandum on strategy to the Assembly of Heads of State. It candidly told the Assembly "we are opposed to this [domino] theory" of liberation [de Braganca and Wallerstein 1982:119,120]. The

ANC reiterated its opposition to the "domino theory" in its memorandum to the second Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement which met in Cairo later that year [SAFN 1964:4].

The ANC's statements to these international organizations included a number of themes which it continued to expound to its supporters through various articles in Sechaba, its official magazine and Mayibuye, an ANC bulletin. Its statement to the Cairo Summit argued that Rhodesia's military preparations and the increase in Portuguese troops in Angola and Mozambique "are part of a grand strategy intended not only to suppress the national liberation movement throughout this entire area but also to confront the independent African states." In view of the increasing military cooperation between South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal the effective down-grading of armed struggle in South Africa meant that a "peaceful, prosperous, powerful" South Africa "free of involvements in a struggle for survival" will delay the liberation of the other white ruled territories. "For these reasons we are opposed to the strategic theory that the intensification of the struggle in South Africa must await the liberation of southern Rhodesia and Mozambique and Angola. Indeed, to starve the South African liberation movement of assistance pending the liberation of other territories is, in our view, to play into the hands of the unholy alliance of" South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal [de Braganca and Wallerstein 1982:119,120].

In an almost prophetic warning of South Africa's destabilization policy in the 1980s, the memorandum said South Africa "will intervene in one way or another in the arena of battle in southern Africa and Mozambique." It "will find this easy if [it] does not have a greatly intensified struggle to contend with in South Africa itself" [de Braganca and Wallerstein 1982:119,120].

The ANC was clearly unhappy with the OAU's strategic priorities. The memorandum concluded by saying that in the interests of armed struggle throughout southern Africa it would make sure the South African government "is kept very busy whether we get increased aid [from the OAU] or not" [de Braganca and Wallerstein 1982:119,120].

The essence of the ANC's alternative strategy was indicated by Oliver Tambo in an address commemorating the formation of Umkhonto at the end of 1969, just a few months after the ANC's major conference in Morogoro. The objective of the liberation movements should be to "capture the citadel of white supremacy," South Africa itself [Tambo 1970:2,3].

Issues of African liberation dominated the Rabat Summit in June 1972. One of the most significant developments was making the Portuguese territories the first priority because they were considered to be the most vulnerable, and a success in liberation would boost the morale in the other struggles [Cervenka 1977:57; ACR 1971-72:A49].

At the time of the Summit Sechaba published a detailed analysis of the OAU's liberation strategy which set out to show "the illusory nature" of the "domino theory" of

liberation. Interestingly, the article was based on the developing literature in international relations on regional state systems. It attempted to draw the relevant conclusions regarding revolutionary strategy from South Africa's "imperialist" role in the southern African system.³³ It emphasized that any notion that South Africa would be a "neutral actor" in the armed struggles in Angola, Rhodesia, and Mozambique was based on a "complete disregard to what [South Africa's] security interests are and how these have been determined and will continue to determine her future course of action." South Africa's security was based on the security of its allies, Rhodesia and Portugal, and South African foreign policy, therefore, was based on the interaction of these white states in the southern African system [Sechaba 1972d:3-6].

The Liberation Committee meeting in Accra in January 1973 which formulated the OAU's new strategy set out to implement its priorities. It determined that the largest amount of the Liberation Committee's funding would go to the liberation of the Portuguese territories [Cervenka 1977:58,59; A.R.B. 1973:2714-15].

The MPLA, as a strong ally of the ANC, recognized the inter-relationship between the struggles in southern Africa. Its first leader Agostinho Neto, denounced the "domino theory" in an interview in the MPLA magazine, Angola in Arms, shortly after the Accra Liberation Committee meeting, and referred to the OAU's major decisions on strategy taken at Rabat. This interview was reprinted in Sechaba. "Our idea in MPLA is that it is not very good to separate the parts of

the liberation struggle in Africa," Neto declared. "It is necessary to open different fronts in Africa; in Rhodesia, South Africa and so on...If not we shall always be in a weak position. I don't agree that it is necessary to liberate first one country, then to go on to another. It is necessary to struggle everywhere using every means possible" [Sechaba 1973:c21].

South Africa's response to the Portuguese coup in 1974 and the impending independence of Mozambique and Angola was to launch its detente initiative. In April 1975 the Council of Ministers called a special extraordinary session to examine Africa's response to South Africa's detente policy. This was the first special session to deal with South Africa since the OAU was established. The ANC saw the crisis in African diplomacy because of South Africa's detente as a vindication of its views on strategy. Oliver Tambo, in his address to the session stated, "The OAU, in our opinion, must adopt a strategy which recognizes not only the indivisibility of the enemy, but also the dominant role of the South African regime in the area" [Mayibuye 1975a:7]. Clearly, the ANC's view that South Africa threatens the stability of southern Africa has been borne out by subsequent events.³⁴

5.4 The OAU's Financial and Administrative Constraints

The Liberation Committee's recurrent financial and administrative problems were the third area of disagreement between the ANC and the OAU. In addition to the ANC's

disregard for its united front policy, and disagreement with its priorities over strategy, the Liberation Committee's persistent financial difficulties made it an unreliable source of support.³⁵

At the first Council of Ministers meeting in Dakar in August 1963 it was pointed out that contributions to the Liberation Committee's Special Fund for the year were lacking although they were eventually paid in full. At the second Council of Ministers meeting in Lagos in February 1964, prior to the Cairo Summit, the Committee's spending priorities were questioned [Wolfers 1976:174,175].

It was these problems which led the Assembly of Heads of State to have a full debate on the Liberation Committee during the Cairo Summit. The report of the Committee was the major topic, although it was overshadowed by the public clash on the issue between Nkrumah and Nyerere [A.R.B. 1964:107]. The Cairo Summit made efforts to put the Committee on a more secure financial footing, but after 1963-4 contributions steadily declined [Wolfers 1976:176,178,179].

The Kinshasa Summit in September 1967 was dominated by the Nigerian civil war, but the problems of the liberation movements were still an important issue. The joint statement by the ANC and ZAPU was highly critical of OAU policy. In the first six months of 1967-68 the Liberation Committee reportedly promised the ANC \$80,000, but it received only \$3,940 [Johns 1973:277].³⁶ This was at a time when the ANC-ZAPU alliance was formed and the Wankie campaign had just started. The joint ANC-ZAPU statement candidly told the

Assembly, "This is the moment when the Organization of African Unity must either carry out its obligations of giving firm support to the efforts of smashing and destroying its worst enemies, or be responsible for the reversal of the glorious African Revolution" [ANC 1970:7]. It candidly reminded the Assembly that various OAU declarations "define the full commitment of this organization to the liberation struggle in quite distinct terms," but "we are constrained to point out with all due respect, and quite frankly, that material support and facilities for our struggle fall far too short of the demands for the struggle against Rhodesia and South Africa" [ANC 1970:7,8].

While the ANC appealed directly to the OAU the External Mission was called upon to gain greater material support for the Wankie operations from its supporters. In a "Statement to External Offices" published as a supplement to the September 1967 issue of Sechaba the ANC admitted, "We urgently need funds and every available thing. We need to be strong and self-sufficient" [Sechaba 1967p:5].

The Kinshasa Conference admitted there had been vary little progress in dealing the problems of the Liberation Committee.³⁷ Instead of dealing with these problems the OAU shifted the blame to the liberation movements. At the Algiers Summit in September 1968 there was a growing impatience by many African states with the futility of personal squabbles among liberation movements which spend a lot of the Liberation Committee's money, but made vary little progress in the armed struggle. A ten percent

increase in the funding was passed by the Committee, but was thrown out by the Assembly for this reason [Africa Confidential 1968:4].

The ANC was also unhappy with the Committee's interference in the way liberation movements were engaging in armed struggle. It was particularly upset during the Wankie operations. In an article first published in Mayibuye, and later reprinted in Sechaba, the ANC indicated the nature of its problems. It appealed over the heads of the Committee directly to the OAU. One of the "dangers," as the ANC saw it, was the creation of a "formidable bureaucratic machinery which is quite remote from the day-to-day difficulties confronting liberation movements" yet they are told to defer to personnel in the Liberation Committee who assume a status greater than that of a head of state. It wanted the OAU to protect the liberation movements "against arbitrary actions" by Liberation Committee staff [Sechaba 1968d:17].

The ANC was also concerned about leaks in the Western press (i.e. "imperialist propaganda agencies") because they revealed "intimate knowledge" about the liberation movements (see Section 5.1).³⁸ It wanted the staff of the Liberation Committee investigated by the Secretariat because of the disappearance of memoranda and other documentary material which they were required to submit [Sechaba 1968n:3]. Another reason for the limited funds to liberation movements which the ANC did not emphasize as much as these other issues was corruption in the Liberation Committee.³⁹

In what appears to be an attempt to blame the OAU for the debacle of the ANC-ZAPU operations in Rhodesia, the ANC complained about the need to "impress on some independent African states the urgency of our needs. Red tape and protocol delays have cost us many lives already when essential logistical supplies could not be forwarded owing to some odd regulation" [Sechaba 1968n:3]. Oliver Tambo, in his statement to the Algiers Summit in 1968 also seemed to blame the failure of the ANC-ZAPU operations on the OAU bureaucracy. He explained that "the aid and assistance needed in the war are considerable. And it is not just a question of the volume which must be commensurate with the demands of the struggle, but more and more we are now confronted by the need for speed. The situation in the fighting zones is constantly changing. Africa must therefore find means to ensure that there are swift responses to requests for help and in the facilities provided" [Sechaba 1968q:1-3].⁴⁰

CONCLUSION

In contrast to the ANC's initial expectations, it quickly became disillusioned with the OAU. Its initial apprehensions were based on the limited access liberation movements had to OAU deliberations on issues which affected their vital interests. Serious disagreements emerged between the ANC and the OAU as early as the second Summit in Cairo. The ANC differed with the OAU over its united front policy and liberation strategy which were complicated even further

by the OAU's administrative and bureaucratic constraints on its support for liberation movements.

Throughout the ANC's relations with the Liberation Committee it has been on the defensive. The PAC attempted to assume the "moral high ground" by accepting the Committee's prerogatives on a united front, but its "perennial leadership struggle and personality clashes" complicated the Committee's efforts to forge unity between them as much as the ANC's adamant refusal to even consider the prospect of unity [Amate 1986:277,278].

What John Marcum has called "politics of unity" among the Angolan liberation movements helps to explain the attitude of both the ANC and PAC toward the OAU's efforts to bring them together. A liberation movement like the PAC desires to form a united front with its rival movement when it is weak or in danger of eclipse. A movement like the ANC accepts unity when it is ascendent, but is confident of using the united front to its advantage (as in the case of the first united front in 1962). The ANC subsequently shunned a united front when it considered itself to be in a strong enough position to achieve ascendancy of the liberation struggle alone [Marcum 1969:206].

The ANC resisted the OAU's efforts to dictate which political groups it should cooperate with; insisting the Congress Alliance was the genuine united front inside South Africa. Its alliance with ZAPU and cooperation with CONCP indicated its commitment to African unity where it really counted-on the battlefield.

Maintaining legitimacy with the OAU as an authorized liberation movement was important to the ANC if it was going to maintain the support of African states and participate in the OAU's anti-apartheid diplomacy. OAU legitimacy was also important if the ANC was going to maintain the support of the Non-Aligned Movement (see Chapter 7) and the United Nations (see Chapter 9) [Amate 1986:283].⁴¹

The ANC's lack of support from the Western powers has been one of its explanations for why it turned to the Communist countries for assistance. In addition, after the OAU's lack of support when it launched armed struggle in 1967-68, it gave up its faith in the OAU's ability to provide financial and material assistance.⁴²

The limited support the ANC received from the OAU meant the only extensive and reliable source of assistance for its armed struggle was the Communist powers. The ANC now moved to consolidate its relations with other liberation movements through a liberation alliance system organized at the Khartoum Conference (see Chapter 2) and increasingly relied on the Soviet Union and its allies for material, financial, and diplomatic support (see Chapter 8).

END NOTES

1. Including the ANC and PAC in South Africa (although the PAC was not on the "official list" it sent a four person delegation), the MPLA and UPA in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique, and ZAPU in Rhodesia. The ANC's main diplomats at the meeting were Oliver Tambo, Duma Nokwe, Robert Resha, Tennyson Makiwane and Joe Matthews [Kessing's 1963:19468; West Africa, 1963b:533; Horrell 1971:103; Cervenka 1977:15].

2. The ANC and the other liberation movements influenced the location of the headquarters of the Liberation

Committee. Because of the dissatisfaction of the movements with Nkrumah's Ghana, they were involved in an intense lobbying effort for Dar es Salaam to be chosen rather than Accra. "It [was] argued by one of the ANC representatives," in the Carter and Karis interviews, "that this objective caused [the liberation movements] to engage in an intense lobbying effort that was concentrated on Ben Bella himself. The emphasis on liberation, the proposal for the Liberation Committee, and the form of African support for this effort, he argue[d] can be traced to its origins in the proposals they placed before the Algerian delegation" [Carter and Karis interviews 1963-64; Nelson 1975:170]. Ben Bella proposed Dar es Salaam. Modibo Keita supported this proposal because of its proximity to the struggles and nominated the first states to be on the Committee. These prompt, neat proposals "must have represented prior consultation outside the plenary, and both his and Ben Bella's suggestions reflected lobbying by the liberation movement's representatives present in Addis Ababa at the time" [Wolfers 1976:165,166].

3. This brief description of the OAU's decision-making on liberation draws on the studies by Mangwende [1979] and Amate [1986] and Dube [1971] in order to highlight those aspects which directly relate to liberation movements. Although Mangwende's work is based on valuable interviews, perhaps as a consequence it fails to put the evolution of the OAU's policy-making on liberation in historical and political perspective. This is necessary because the structural changes indicated in this chapter resulted from inter-African political pressures.

4. See Section 5.2 for a discussion of the changes in the Liberation Committee and how they affected the ANC's competition with the PAC among African states.

5. The exact title and composition of each Standing Committee has changed since 1963. For a description see Amate [1986:215,216] and Dube [1971:36].

6. Although the All African People Conference on unliberated territories was scheduled to follow the CIAS, in December 1958, CIAS initiated the diplomatic distinction between states and liberation movements which was carried over into the OAU and was detrimental to the interests of liberation movements. How detrimental this distinction was became clear when South Africa was invited to attend CIAS, but declined the offer! [Thompson 1969:83].

7. The Cairo delegation included the main members of the External Mission at the time: Mzwai Pilso, the ANC's Cairo representative, Robert Resha and Tennyson Makiwane, two of its roving ambassadors, J.B. Marks, a representative from the office in Dar es Salaam, Maindy Msimang, the London representative, and Johnny Makatini, the Algiers representative [Spotlight 1964]. Because of Nyerere's strong stand in the Commonwealth which led to South Africa's

expulsion, the ANC's chief representative in Dar es Salaam, James Hadebe, hoped that Nyerere would play an important role at the Cairo Summit [Spotlight, 1964].

8. Tanzania's role in the overthrow of Amin, Egypt's peace treaty with Israel, and the status of the Western Sahara.

9. What particularly worried the ANC at the time of the Biafran secession was the secrecy and confidentiality of materials they had submitted to the Liberation Committee. A former Nigerian civil servant was Assistant Executive-Secretary of the Liberation Committee charged with the planning of "wars of liberation." He joined the rebel Biafran government and apparently was one of its diplomats in Lisbon. The ANC was worried its confidential plans would get to South Africa through covert links with the Biafran government [Sechaba 1968c:17].

10. The formation of the African Liberation Committee and its "common action front" policy developed out of the concerns expressed by the African states which provided the bases for rival movements which were now quarrelling and fighting among themselves. Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula of Zaire and President Abbe Fulbert Youlou Congo supported rival Angolan movements, and President Sekou Toure of Guinea and President Leopold Seneghor of Senegal backed rival movements from Guinea-Bisseau and Cape Verde. These leaders urged that bringing the liberation movements together should be a prerequisite for the OAU's assistance. Prime Minister Ben Bella disagreed because of Algeria's different experience. He said the two movements fighting in Algeria agreed to form a united front, but if a front had been a precondition for assistance Algeria would not have attained independence. The creation of the Liberation Committee responsible for receiving, coordinating, and distributing assistance was the compromise worked out at the Addis Ababa conference in 1963 [Amate 1986:212,213; Dube 1971:43].

11. Although the OAU anticipated that the Liberation Committee's main task was to finance and advise armed struggles, in fact a major part of the activities of the OAU Secretariat and the Liberation Committee were engaged in trying to unify rival movements [Cervenka 1977:x,45- 47; Dube 1971:29].

12. A good will mission was set up in May 1963, right after the OAU was formed, to reconcile the Angolan movements [West Africa 1963c:779]. The Liberation Committee's first meeting in June 1964 determined that Angola, Mozambique and Portuguese Guinea would receive the first "serious attention" [Africa Digest 1964:35]. This chapter focuses on South Africa, but the OAU was so busy trying to patch up unity between the Angolan and Rhodesian movements it did not have much time for South Africa.

13. According to Africa Confidential Nana Mahomo and Patrick Duncan received very little financial support on

their June 1963 trip to the United States [1963c:4]. In contrast, a number of ANC and SACP representatives went to the Soviet Union and China in 1963. The ANC, even at this early stage, had greater financial and organizational support than the PAC (see Chapter 8). In Dar es Salaam the ANC had a large well-staffed office on the corner of Lumumba Street and Arab Street. Its daily tasks were to help the flow of ANC refugees and keep in contact with the Liberation Committee. In comparison, the PAC was so short of funds it could not pay the rent or the telephone bills; and its office consisted of one room and a passage down an alley-way; and most important of all, it did not have the means to help PAC refugees [Africa Confidential 1963:2].

14. This report is by Stanley Uys in the Sunday Times (Johannesburg), August 26, 1963. It is doubtful the Liberation Committee was closely involved in this effort since its first meeting was not until June 25, 1963 in Dar es Salaam [Amate 1986:214]. The Committee's first Executive Secretary did not assume office until October 1963 [Amate 1986:215].

15. The Liberation Committee called for the ANC to form a united front with the PAC at a time when the movement was plagued by its first of many leadership disputes, and the morale and corruption at its headquarters in Maseru was so great many PAC members were defecting to the ANC [Lodge 1983:308,309]. Although, in 1965 friction emerged between the General-Secretary of the Coloured People's Congress (CPC), Reg September, and its President, Barney Desai. The CPC was allied to the ANC through the 1955 Congress Alliance. When it collapsed in exile September joined the ANC and Desai moved toward the PAC [SAIRR 1966:109].

16. It was more than a banning; some PAC combatants were ambushed by Zambian troops and arrested. Potlake Leballo, the PAC leader and 46 PAC members were deported to Tanzania.

17. "The OAU seemed to be satisfied by the victories of the moment and very often swallowed hook, line and sinker some of the propagandistic reports of the liberation movements," encouraging the firing of a gun rather than revolutionary preparedness [Kapungu 1975:139].

18. The most malign interpretation of the Wankie debacle is that it was staged as a suicide mission to remove dissidents [SAIRR 1972:95; Gibson 1972:69-72]. Another explanation is that it was a response to the idleness, agitation and restlessness in the Umkhonto camps [Lodge 1983:299].

19. The SACP's criticism of the "foco" theory of revolution also suggests external pressure from the OAU may have been a reason for the Wankie operations. Kapungu states that in order to make a show of fighting before OAU meetings, "Men were sent to fight in areas where there had been no preparation of the minds of the local residents" (emphasis added) [Kapungu 1986:138]. This description is consistent

with the criticisms of the Wankie campaign. The "foco" theory of revolution, based on the Cuban experience, relied on a military "generator" of mass resistance rather than on more long term political mobilization. It was criticized by Joe Slovo in The African Communist and in the ANC "Strategy and Tactics" document which Slovo co-authored (see Chapter 2).

20. In early 1967 the ANC explained its position on unity in the liberation struggle, in Mayibuye, the ANC's Lusaka-based magazine, this time prompted by the call for a united front by the (Trotskyite) Non-European Unity Movement. The statement claimed the ANC was not, in principle, opposed to forming a united front, but the reasons for the failure of united fronts in the past needed to be addressed by the various movements, and the current state of affairs in the liberation movements had to be considered. In short, the ANC believed the PAC and the Unity Movement were undisciplined movements which lacked integrity, and were weakened by leadership and organizational crises. For the ANC, the Congress Alliance formed in 1955 was the real united front [Sechaba 1967d:10,11; Sechaba, 1969i:10-13]. The OAU's Accra Declaration in 1973 stated the Liberation Committee would not give assistance to splinter movements, yet the twenty-third session of the Liberation Committee in January 1975 gave 25,000 pounds to the Unity Movement (and 15,000 pounds to UNITA and 2,000 pounds to FROLIZI in Rhodesia) [Amate 1986:296]. So what was the ANC to think about the OAU's commitment to African unity?

21. See Chapter 1 on the use of propaganda in the ANC's foreign policy.

22. Tennyson Makiwane, then the the ANC's Chief Representative in Lusaka asserted, "To those who sincerely want unity we say; 'To the battle field.' That is where united action is needed most" [Mayibuye 1968:4].

23. Agence France Press reportedly indicated on January 21, 1971 that the ANC agreed to hold talks in Moshi, Tanzania on creating a united front [YICA 1972:286]. In view of the analysis in Section 5.2 this report is clearly in error. According to Radio Dar es Salaam on February 16, 1971 the Executive Secretary reported to the Liberation Committee it proposed to unify the liberation movements in Rhodesia and South Africa. The PAC proposed to hold discussions with the ANC to form a united front [A.R.B. 1971:2007AB].

24. The development of this issue can be followed in A.R.B. 1972:2495; A.R.B. 1972a:2335.

25. Ironically, the new strategy called for armed struggle in southern Africa to be considered as a whole, and said the activities of liberation movements should be coordinated, something the ANC has called for since 1962, and was the basis for its cooperation with the CONCP alliance of

Portuguese liberation movements and military alliance with ZAPU (see Section 5.3) [ANC 1962:38].

26. Africa Confidential [1978a:1] puts a geo-political cast on these events by arguing it was the "pro-Moscow states" within the Liberation Committee which moved to have the PAC de-recognized. These states (or as former liberation movements, in the case of FRELIMO and the MPLA) have been staunch ANC allies for a long time and their efforts to end the PAC's legitimacy in the OAU can be explained apart from any affiliation with the Soviet Union. It appears that Africa Confidential's pro-PAC sympathies leads it to interpret events in ways likely to enhance the PAC position when other explanations are possible [Africa Confidential].

27. David Sibeko's view point on Soviet activity behind the Liberation Committee is the same as the analysis in Africa Confidential examined in End Note number 26; further confirmation of Africa Confidential's pro-PAC bias.

28. But at a time of intense fratricidal warfare between the two movements.

29. Writing in 1974-75 Kapungu remarks, "In reviewing OAU documents, one is struck by the absence of any mention of guerrilla activity by the South African liberation movements" [Kapungu 1975:150].

30. Kapungu, explains, "Each movement hoped the OAU would recognize it; at times, because of the support given to various movements by some African governments and some non-African states [i.e. the Communist powers], there was a mood of defiance and even contempt for the OAU in the ranks of the liberation movements" [Kapungu 1975:138].

31. At the twenty-fourth ordinary session of the Liberation Committee in January 1975 gave 20,000 pounds to the PLO as a symbolic "manifestation of Africa's solidarity" with the Palestinian people [Amate 1986:299].

32. As a result, the Liberation Committee's budget for 1966-67 was suspended. The Council of Ministers rejected the Committee's budget estimates so no assistance was to be given to liberation movements. The Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee was instructed to tell the liberation movements to stop their "indiscriminate travelling" (a reference to Havana) and to refrain from doing anything that would interfere with the member states of the OAU [Amate 1986:228]. This is the political background to the OAU's dismal financial support to the ANC just at the time it launched its armed struggle in 1967 (see Section 5.4).

33. The literature on regional systems can be followed in Zartman [1967]; Bowman [1968]; Shaw [1973].

34. See Hanlon [1986] and Johnson and Martin [1986].

35. Amate acknowledges, that the allocations liberation movements received from the Liberation Committee "constituted only a very small fraction of what they were spending on their operations. And the little that they received from the Liberation Committee was irregular and unpredictable" [Amate 1986:292].

36. According to Amate in the financial year 1967-68 the Liberation Committee allocated the ANC 5,200 pounds and the PAC 1,750 pounds; 36,000 to South Africa for the purchase of material and equipment; for office-maintenance and publicity it allocated 6,000 to South Africa [Amate 1986:290,291].

37. The OAU hoped to meet the Committee's financial problems by enlarging its budget, and a committee of military experts was also appointed to advise the committee on military strategy. Following the Algiers Summit in 1968 an article on the OAU in The African Communist complained, that "central to the malaise affecting the OAU is the whole question of how seriously the independent states tackle the new force of guerrilla struggle being waged by the liberation movements in southern Africa. The increasing scale of the armed struggle and its long term strategic implications are vital for the future of Africa and should be treated as such" [Zanzolo 1969:16]. The African Communist was not very hopeful that the debate on the Liberation Committee at the Council of Ministers meeting in Algiers would solve the Committee's problems; in fact some of the reforms it felt were deliberately designed to paralyze the Committee [Zanzolo 1969:16].

38. Kapungu acknowledges that some members of the Liberation Committee "hob nob with the southern African regimes" and have a "peculiar way of keeping secrets" so that the regimes know the plans of the liberation movements in advance [Kapungu 1975:143].

39. The author presented an earlier draft of Chapter 5 to a seminar at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies on 14 June 1989. A visiting academic from Karl Marx University in Leipzig, GDR attended the seminar. She was stationed in Dar es Salaam during the 1960s and said the real reason why the liberation movements had such limited funds was because the Liberation Committee spent so much of the money on cars and furniture.

40. Looking back on 1968 Mayibuye complained, "The armed struggle for liberation in southern Africa continues to be waged under unnecessary handicaps caused by bureaucratic attitudes of governments" [Mayibuye 1969:1]. In the ANC's statement to the African Liberation Committee in meeting in Benghazi, Libya in January 1972 Alfred Nzo said, "we consider the progressive world, and especially independent Africa, as our most stable rear. In that sense, the consistent activisation of our rear to give us, who are in the front line, uninterrupted and adequate practical and material support as our enemy receives from their rear,

constitutes one of the significant factors in the pace of the development of our struggle. As yet, we can say, the level of activisation of this rear is, in relation to our needs, vary low. This is the fact of the situation, however, unpalatable it may be, though of course, we wish to do no injustice to those countries and peoples of Africa in particular, who have borne their full share" [Sechaba 1972h:14-18].

41. The ANC needed to stay on good terms with the OAU and gave the OAU ritual praise as "Africa's Pillar of Strength," on its twentieth anniversary, but Chapter 5 makes the hollowness of these remarks clear [Mayibuye 1983a:9].

42. Lodge [1983:300] suggests the same general point.

CHAPTER 6

THE STRUGGLE CONTINUES: THE ANC AND AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

"From the day that the first Pan-African Conference was held it has been axiomatic that Africa is one, that no part of Africa can regard itself as free so long as any part is unliberated."

ANC editorial after the OAU Council of Ministers meeting, Addis Ababa, February, 1975 [Mayibuye 1975:2].

South African foreign policy during the late 1960s and early 1970s posed a serious challenge to one of the central diplomatic objectives of the ANC's External Mission, the isolation of South Africa in international affairs. The efforts by the liberation movements and the Afro-Asian states to isolate South Africa after Sharpeville was modestly successful [Spence:1965]. South Africa's relations with the Western powers were particularly affected; they were now determined by its relations in Africa [Jaster 1980:18]. In order to break out of this isolation South Africa began to normalize its relations with black Africa.

South Africa's overtures to African states were not only a challenge to the ANC. They also posed a threat to Africa's stand against South Africa in the OAU and the UN's campaign for economic sanctions. This chapter examines how the ANC's diplomacy at the OAU responded to South African foreign policy. Subsequent chapters examine how the Non-Aligned Movement (see Chapter 7) and the UN (see Chapter 9) responded to South African foreign policy in the context of the ANC's relations with these organizations.

South Africa's first attempt to end its isolation was through an "outward movement" initiated by Prime Minister

John Vorster. The first two countries that were the object of this policy were Lesotho and Malawi, but it soon expanded into a "dialogue" with many other African states as they considered establishing relations with Pretoria. Section 6.1 examines how the ANC responded to South Africa's "outward movement" and "dialogue" policy.

South Africa's dialogue with other African states collapsed because of its opposition to majority rule and its intervention in Angola. A more serious challenge to the ANC came from the intensification of the liberation war in Rhodesia. The Front Line States were willing to enter into detente with South Africa in order to resolve the struggles in Rhodesia and Namibia; leaving the liberation of South Africa until last by separating it from the resolution of these other struggles. Section 6.2 examines how the ANC met the diplomatic challenge posed by South Africa's detente policies over Rhodesia and the nature of its disagreement with the Front Line States.

The independence of Angola and Mozambique was followed by the Soweto uprising. These events led the ANC to reformulate its strategy and start its campaign of "armed propaganda." It moved its military operations closer to South Africa's borders than they had ever been before. Following the independence of Zimbabwe South Africa combined a policy of seeking cooperative relations with its neighbours through a constellation of southern African states with the deliberate destabilization of the region. This brutal policy led to a non-aggression pact with Mozambique, the Nkomati Accord. Section 6.3 examines how the

ANC's intensification of armed struggle and South Africa's destabilization contributed to the rise in the ANC's stature among the Front Line States and in the OAU.

6.1 The Challenge of the "Outward Policy" and Dialogue

A few months after John Vorster became prime minister, in January 1967, Lesotho's Chief Leabua Jonathan, became the first African leader to visit South Africa. Before Lesotho and Botswana became independent the ANC had warned the international community about their economic vulnerability as South Africa's neighbours [SAFN 1965a:4]. After Chief Jonathan's visit an editorial in Spotlight on South Africa, the ANC's weekly news digest, ridiculed the trip. "Notwithstanding our advice, Africa is nowadays being frequently embarrassed by the humiliating regularity with which some people who should know better have gone cap-in-hand to beg for crumbs from the aggressor's table" [Spotlight on South Africa 1967:2,3]. The editorial continued by criticizing Lesotho and the other neighbouring territories for supplying migrant labour to South Africa.¹

In an article in Sechaba entitled, "Our Policy Toward Our Neighbours," the ANC claimed it supported the "complete" independence of the High Commission territories because their independence brought blacks inside South Africa closer to independence. It understood the special geographical, political, and economic factors facing these neighbouring states, but "strongly disapprove[d] of their attempts to appease" Pretoria [Sechaba 1967v:6,7].

"We have never deceived ourselves that the struggle in South Africa would be won by boycotts alone," the editorial continued, "What we have requested the world to do is to stop the dialogue with South Africa in all forms." Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, the ANC then warned, should not "get into the way of this powerful revolutionary current" [Sechaba 1967v:6,7].

South Africa's relations with Malawi began toward the end of 1966. After a secret loan for various development projects, Malawi openly criticized OAU policy on South Africa. Through out 1967 other trade and financial arrangements were made and Malawi's President Banda visited South Africa in May 1967.² The day before the Kinshasa Summit began, Malawi established diplomatic relations with South Africa.

The ANC expected the OAU to take strong and swift action against the dissident diplomacy of Lesotho and Malawi. It underestimated the possible scope for a diplomatic breach in South Africa's isolation. A few months after President Banda's trip to South Africa, Alfred Kgokong, the ANC's Director of Publicity, stated "We expect the leaders of Africa to take stern measures at the next OAU [S]ummit [Conference in Kinshasa, Zaire in September, 1967] to stop such disregard of voluntary adopted resolutions by member states" [Sechaba 1967g:back of front page].

In an effort to forestall more defections, Zambia and the UN's Special Committee on Apartheid sponsored an "International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in southern Africa" in Kitwe in July 1967,

two months before the Kinshasa Summit [Y.U.N. 1967:119-123]. It was attended by 32 governments, and observers from various international organizations. In keeping with OAU policy, only representatives from liberation movements recognized by the OAU were allowed to participate, but this meant both the ANC and PAC were there.

The conference condemned South Africa's economic and financial "inducements" to African states to break ranks with African isolation of South Africa (a reference to Malawi). It reiterated the call for sanctions against South Africa, Rhodesia, and Portugal, and affirmed the central role of the United Nations in the diplomatic campaign against the white minority regimes. The Kitwe conference supported two issues which would later be taken up by the General Assembly. Apartheid was called a crime against humanity and the UN was asked to approve of armed struggle as a legitimate way to overcome racist rule (see Chapter 9).

Contrary to the ANC's expectations, the OAU was slow to react to the early diplomatic defections of Lesotho and Malawi. In part, this was because the Kinshasa Summit was more concerned about the outbreak of the Nigerian civil war and its diplomatic consequences for Africa. The primary discussions on the liberation struggles in southern Africa concentrated on the problems of the African Liberation Committee, and disagreements between rival liberation movements, rather than the impact of Vorster's "outward policy" [Africa Confidential 1967:6-8].

Vorster's real intentions became clear when he indicated the security dimensions of South Africa's "outward

policy" in a speech to the House of Assembly in September 1970. He announced South Africa's willingness to form a "non-aggression pact" with any African state on the basis of goodwill between states [Geyser 1976:28; Barber 1973:264,270].³

Other African countries became "dazzled" by Malawi's achievements, and encouraged by France, many francophone African states expressed an interest in establishing diplomatic relations.⁴ Houphouet-Boigny, the President of the Ivory Coast, formally launched a "dialogue" with South Africa at a press conference in Abidjan in November 1970. South Africa became "wildly optimistic" about a breakthrough into black Africa [ACR 1971-72:A69].

The kind of dialogue which Houphouet-Boigny embarked on, however, was not exactly the unconditional commitment to better relations which South Africa hoped for, and which the ANC feared. Houphouet-Boigny proposed to launch a "peace mission" to get agreement from the other African heads of state to "help the South African whites to enter into dialogue with their own blacks." This mission would not be an independent initiative with Pretoria, but would operate only through, and in cooperation with the OAU, after consulting with the other members of Organization Commune Africaine et Mauricienne [ACR 1971-72:70; Ajala 1985:8].

Vorster's "outward policy" was challenged by thirteen African states at the fifth summit conference of Eastern and Central African states in Lusaka in April 1969. The conference produced a strategy document called the "Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa" [ACR 1969-70:C39-45]. It was

subsequently adopted as official OAU policy, but it differed from the ANC's objectives in three ways.

First, at a time when the ANC had launched its armed struggle, the Lusaka Manifesto emphasized peaceful means of changing southern Africa.⁵ If the white-ruled states recognized the principles of human dignity and equality, then change could come about non-violently even at the cost of some compromise on how long it would take for change to occur. The African states "would [then] urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle" (paragraphs 5 and 12). The Manifesto, however, reiterated the need for economic sanctions if there was no indication the country would abandon apartheid [ACR 1969-70:C41,C42; Jaster 1983:3].

Second, and possibly more worrying to the ANC, the Lusaka Manifesto undermined one of the ANC's main diplomatic positions: that South Africa was an illegal regime; a topic which the liberation movements subsequently pursued at the United Nations (see Chapter 9). The Lusaka Manifesto acknowledged that South Africa was "itself an independent sovereign State and a member of the United Nations... On every legal basis its internal affairs are a matter exclusively for the people of South Africa" (paragraph 20). In endorsing the Lusaka Manifesto, African states, put South Africa in a different category from the Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia, "implying that the same justification for providing rear bases for guerrilla wars did not exist in South Africa's case" (Lusaka Manifesto paragraphs 13 and 16) [Martin and Johnson 1981:134,135].

Third, implicit in the Lusaka Manifesto was the separation of the South African struggle from the struggles in Rhodesia and Namibia. This policy was later endorsed by the Front Line States and the OAU, but was contrary to ANC military strategy and diplomacy (see Chapter 5).

If the ANC felt strongly about the Lusaka Manifesto's interpretation of OAU strategy and South Africa's legal status its complaints were not voiced loudly. In fact, in public the ANC said very little about the Manifesto.⁶ Compared to the reportage which Sechaba usually gives African diplomatic conferences, the magazine remained surprisingly silent. It was left to Mayibuye, the ANC's smaller circulation Lusaka-based bulletin, to comment on the outcome of the Conference. In an editorial entitled, "Tribute to Lusaka Summit," Mayibuye candidly acknowledged the ANC's "pessimism" and "despondency" over many events in Africa, but asserted its "joy and satisfaction" at the "outstanding" outcome of the Lusaka Summit [Mayibuye 1961c:1].

For the ANC the major achievement of the Conference was that it put a break on the development of relations with South Africa by African states and reiterated the call for economic sanctions if South Africa did not end apartheid. Regarding sanctions the Lusaka Manifesto re-asserted the ANC's basic position as African policy and that was the outcome the ANC emphasized; it expressed its disagreements with the Lusaka Manifesto without directly referring to the document (see below).⁷

The ANC's strongest allies at the Conference were President Kaunda and President Nyerere which is probably why it refrained from directly criticizing the Manifesto.⁸ Right at the outset of the Summit President Kaunda gave southern Africa the attention the ANC thought it deserved. Kaunda put the Nigerian civil war, "and above all, the white minority, fascist-racist regimes of southern Africa as matters of priority to be tackled urgently by Africa as a whole" [Mayibuye 1969c:1].

Mayibuye particularly pointed to a comment by Julius Nyerere, that Britain and France (and the ANC included South Africa) have more representatives at OAU conferences than Africa herself to emphasize the danger of too much open access to information about liberation struggles (there are too many "handouts of information to the enemy"). The ANC had raised this issue at the previous OAU Summit in Algiers in 1968 (see Chapter 5). It now pointed to South Africa's dialogue as an example of the enemies of the "African Revolution" within the OAU.⁹ "Is it not," Mayibuye asked, "time independent African countries weeded out the treacherous elements and debarred them from further participation in conferences until truly free governments replace the present bunch of traitors?" [Mayibuye 1969c:1].¹⁰

The sixth Summit Conference of East and Central African States met in Khartoum in January 1970. The conference agreed that South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia had spurned the Lusaka Manifesto, and consequently the conference supported increased aid to the liberation movements [A.R.B.

1970:1631A]. The ANC's earlier disagreement with the Lusaka Manifesto became clear for after the Khartoum meeting, Sechaba commented it was with "considerable relief" that the ANC received the news that the strong diplomatic stand against apartheid "is now to be followed up by increased aid to the liberation movements" [Sechaba 1970f:2]. The ANC said, "It would be wrong to deny that the violent cross currents which have swept across Africa in the past few years have tended to hamper our effort in building our liberatory machine. In some cases governments have fallen to be replaced by others with less enthusiasm for the eradication of white supremacy on our continent [e.g. Keita in Mali] in others, the stress of working out new policies in difficult conditions have led some states into a greater concern with internal problems than those of the continent as a whole [e.g. Nigeria]. We must repeat what we have always adhered to...the responsibility for freeing our country is our own and that we must face the dangers and difficulties.. cooperation of other African states is vital both for material and moral support without which our struggle will be seriously hampered" [Sechaba 1970f:2].

South Africa was a major subject of the Addis Ababa Summit in September 1970, but the lack of a firm position on South Africa could hardly be reassuring to the ANC. The Conference endorsed the Lusaka Manifesto concerning dialogue, but there was a lack of a unanimity among OAU states on resolutions condemning arms sales to South Africa by the NATO states, a central concern of the ANC and its CONCP allies, and on resolutions on the decolonization of

southern Africa. This dissent was an "ominous sign of the split among OAU members, as regards the confrontation between independent Africa and the white ruled countries" [ACR 1969-70:A35,36].

By mid-1971 it looked like South Africa's attempt to end its isolation in Africa might be successful. In April Houphouet-Boigny indicated he wanted to visit South Africa. In March the Ghanaian Foreign Minister said he wanted to go, and in August the President of Madagascar also indicated he wanted to go visit the Republic [A.R.B. 1971a:2190C]. The Afrikaans newspaper, Die Beeld, had listed twelve potential African states that were interested in dialogue including the Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana, Upper Volta, Niger, Dahomey, Togo, Mauritius, and Malagasy [Turok 1971:9,10].

By this time the ANC was clearly worried about the prospect of a dialogue with South Africa gaining acceptability among African states. It identified Tanzania and Zambia as the key states necessary to derail the dialogue initiative because of their firm commitment to African liberation. Writing in Sechaba at the time of the conference, Ben Turok stated "If these states are indeed ready to talk to Vorster there is a serious leapfrog over the stubborn resistance of Tanzania and Zambia. Furthermore, if these states should press the matter in the OAU then Zambia's and Tanzania's important role in aiding the liberation war in the South may be more difficult." What particularly worried Turok, was what he called the "middle group" of African states, i.e. those states which had not

officially supported or condemned dialogue, but were silent over the issue. "What, we want to know," Turok asked, "are the others thinking" [Turok 1971:9,10].

The issue of dialogue with South Africa dominated the seventeenth session of the Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa in June 1971. The Council took the unusual step of debating the question of dialogue in public, and the debate began with statements by the liberation movements directly affected by the discussions, the ANC, PAC, and SWAPO. In an effort to blunt Vorster's dialogue policy, the ANC's memorandum to the session emphasized that dialogue was "part of a carefully coordinated strategy to gain economic openings, undermine African unity, and cut off support for the liberation movements" [Sechaba 1971h:9; Sechaba 1971i:3].

At the time of the eighth Summit Conference in June 1971, held a few days after the ministerial Council meeting, a lengthy article in Sechaba emphasized the military and economic threat South Africa posed to the rest of Africa [Gervasi 1971:15-21]. For the ANC "South Africa's outward policy [was] a spider web of involvements that compromises and will ultimately destroy black leaders who become entangled in it" [Grundy 1973:249,250; and see Appendix 5.3].

The Council of Ministers meeting in June 1971 totally rejected any proposed dialogue with South Africa. Houphouet-Boigny condemned the OAU's decision went ahead with his proposed visit to South Africa in August [ACR 1971-72:A71-80]. Banda also visited South Africa in August,

and justified his visit by saying he wanted to see things for himself, but he went out of his way to support the South African government. In an indirect reference to the ANC and PAC, he attacked South African fugitives [sic] who, he said, "blatantly spread untruths about South Africa overseas" through offices in Lusaka, Addis Ababa, Dar es Salaam and New York [A.R.B. 1971a:2190].

On the first day of Banda's visit, the ANC office in Algeria issued a statement on Radio Algiers denouncing the visit as "high treason to the whole of Africa." The ANC demanded that Malawi be expelled from the OAU. Algeria's government supported newspaper, El Moudjahid, described Banda's trip using similar language [A.R.B. 1971a:2191A].

The week following Banda's visit, the ANC's national executive committee held an important meeting in Zambia. Its report bluntly asserted South Africa's outward policy was a "desperate bid to win new markets for its products and capital" combined with a policy of "naked aggression," bribery, and "outright economic blackmail" [Sechaba 1971m:20,22]. It explained that "the present economic crisis facing South Africa and the Western imperialist countries tends to increase the economic penetration of Western capital into South Africa, and South Africa is embarking on an imperialist path aimed at political, economic and military domination of the African continent" [Sechaba 1971m:22].

The report asserted the goals of the dialogue policy were, viz., the isolation of the ANC, the entrenchment of white minority rule, the disruption of African unity, and

the subversion of the "African revolution." It hailed the "principled stand" recently taken by the OAU's June 1971 Summit which "overwhelmingly rejected attempts to engage in a dialogue" with South Africa "at the expense of their oppressed South African brothers" [Sechaba 1971m:22].

By early October 1971 the dialogue group included the Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Malawi, Uganda, and Ghana. These states met in Lesotho during its fifth anniversary of independence. After the celebrations the Ivory Coast's Foreign Minister made a three day visit to South Africa. The seventh Summit Conference of East and Central African States met in Mogadishu, Somalia in the middle of October and was strongly critical of these developments [ACR 1971-72:C18]. The delegates, led by Kaunda and Nyerere, issued the Mogadishu Declaration which stated there was "no way left to the liberation of southern Africa except armed struggle." The Declaration also asserted the way to genuine dialogue was through the peoples of the countries of southern Africa being involved themselves. Significantly for the ANC, the conference granted OAU recognized liberation movements observer status to all its future meetings [ACR 1971-72:C18].

The ANC was far more vocal in its support for the Mogadishu Declaration than the Lusaka Manifesto. Secretary-General, Alfred Nzo, called the Declaration, a "revolutionary document," and expressed the hope it would not only lead to more material, political, and moral support for the liberation movements, but would also serve as a rallying point for all revolutionary African states and

liberation movements to close their ranks. Since the 1971 Summit Conference rejected dialogue, Nzo said South Africa and its "imperialist allies" pursued an unprecedented campaign to defeat the OAU and its decisions. This is why South Africa "constitutes a grave threat to the very existence of the OAU as the instrument for building continental unity and a base for the total liberation of territory still under colonial or white minority domination" [A.R.B. 1971b:2248C].

The ANC was suspicious of the motives of African states which wanted dialogue with South Africa from the beginning. Soon after Houphouet-Boigny launched his dialogue with South Africa Sechaba asked, "Can it be that these states are genuinely undertaking a reappraisal of the southern African scene or are other factors at work"? The ANC was sure British, and especially French imperialism were actually behind the dialogue with South Africa [Sechaba 1971b:2,3]. The ANC particularly pointed to the Ivory Coast, Malagasy, Niger, and Dahomey who all had close relations with France as the reason why the dialogue initiative had gained such momentum [Sechaba 1971d:2,3].¹¹

The whole dialogue episode, as far as the ANC was concerned, merely underscored the role the Western "imperialist" powers in perpetuating white minority rule in southern Africa. Viewed from this perspective, it is not surprising that the break in the African position on isolating South Africa coincided with the coming to power of conservative governments in the United States and Britain. Under the Nixon Administration, the U.S. adopted a policy of

constructive engagement toward South Africa [Coker 1986]. In Britain, the Conservative Party came to power in June 1970, and considered relaxing the arms embargo and informal trade boycott with South Africa [Hughs 1970-71:A3-A10].

The Council of Ministers meeting in Addis Ababa in February 1972, and the twentieth session of the Liberation Committee in Kampala, Uganda emphasized increased African support for the armed struggles in Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bisseau. By the time of the Rabat Summit in June 1972 dialogue had faded as an issue. On the contrary, the issue of liberation dominated the conference [ACR 1972-73:A47].

The ANC attended the eighth Summit Conference of East and Central African states which was held in Tanzania in September 1972. The conference hailed the Mogadishu Declaration as a sign of Africa's firm commitment to crush colonialism and imperialism [A.R.B. 1972b:2591A]. The document the ANC submitted to the conference, entitled "South Africa Threatens Peace in Africa" succinctly summarized its view [Sechaba 1972h:21-24]. Repeated OAU statements have drawn attention to NATO's collaboration with Portugal and South Africa. The ANC's report asserted South Africa was "accommodated within imperialist global strategy" which was maintained by "collective security pacts," and "non-aggression pacts" [Sechaba 1972h:21-24]. Since the late 1960s the ANC has drawn attention to South Africa's growing links in Latin America, particularly the calls for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization similar to NATO, and the report

warned African states about this possibility (see Chapter 7).

The collapse of dialogue by the time of the Rabat Summit led Vorster to concentrate on southern Africa where there were unresolved problems of South-West Africa and Rhodesia. Vorster wanted to consolidate South Africa's position in the region by finding regional solutions to regional conflicts that were consistent with South Africa's security interests [Geldenhuys 1984:39]. After South Africa's military intervention in Angola in 1975 there was little realistic prospect of a South African dialogue with other African states.

6.2 The Challenge of Vorster's Policy of Detente

The Portuguese coup in April 1974 altered the balance of power in southern Africa by bringing independence to Guinea-Bisseau in September 1974, to Mozambique in June 1975, and to Angola in November 1975. The success of armed struggle in these territories gave tremendous hope to the liberation movements in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. South Africa's Prime Minister, John Vorster, was quick to assess the implications of this change for South Africa's security. Six months after the coup in Portugal, in October 1974, he publically launched his detente initiative.¹²

In order to respond to this initiative the presidents of the independent states in southern Africa (Nyerere of Tanzania, Kaunda of Zambia, Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana, and after independence, Machel of Mozambique and Neto of

Angola) came together, initially on an ad hoc basis, to form a regional security grouping and negotiating alliance known as the Front Line States [Ispahani 1984; Jaster 1983]. Later, after the collapse of detente because of South Africa's invasion into Angola, the Front Line States became a crucial negotiating alliance during Vorster's renewed efforts at detente because of the Anglo-American initiatives on Rhodesia.

The pace of events in southern Africa after 1974 affected the ANC's strategy and diplomacy as much as they affected South Africa's security and foreign policy. The struggle in Rhodesia, and to a lesser extent Namibia, became the next crisis areas to be covered by a combination of South African, African, and Western diplomacy.

The ANC was keenly interested in the nature of the Rhodesian settlement because the way that crisis was resolved could directly affect the struggle in South Africa. The ANC often disagreed with the negotiating strategy adopted by the OAU and the Front Line States over Rhodesia, and like Rhodesian liberation movements themselves, was extremely suspicious of Western motives in proposing a settlement through detente with South Africa.

The twenty-fourth session of the African Liberation Committee took place in Dar es Salaam in January 1975 as the new strategic situation in southern Africa was developing. A new strategy, embodied in the Dar es Salaam Declaration, called for the intensification of the armed struggle in Rhodesia and Namibia, and recommended that the OAU should give priority to these struggles, but added inexplicably,

"at the same time the struggle and offensive against [apartheid] must be intensified at all levels" [A.R.B. 1975:3483BC].

The OAU's priority of the Rhodesian and Namibian struggles and the willingness of the Front Line States to engage the South African government were criticised by the ANC. The Front Line States contacted South Africa only because they felt Vorster's cooperation was necessary for a Rhodesian settlement. Vorster's agenda for detente, however, included more than black rule in Rhodesia. He wanted to end South Africa's isolation and extend South Africa's financial and trade links in Africa (and as a result end its isolation in the West as well).

The Council of Ministers meeting in February 1975 was preoccupied by Prime Minister Vorster's trip to Liberia which ended the previous day. According to a report by the ANC's Secretariat written by Secretary-General Alfred Nzo, "It became clear from the very beginning of this meeting that the imperialist supporters of the apartheid regime were determined to direct the attention of the Foreign Ministers to the initial 'successes' of the new 'detente' policy so as to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and confusion among those African states that had hitherto stood firm against any contact with the fascist regime in our country. Reports were literally pouring in of the contacts Vorster had made with countries such as Liberia and the Central African Republic amongst others" [Nzo 1975a:17]. The report accused the Western press of "exaggerated" stories of divisions between African states, and a disinformation plot suggesting

that at least twenty African countries were supporting South Africa's admission to the OAU [Nzo 1975a:18].

Because of this situation the ANC delegation decided to directly intervene through a public address from the rostrum on the first day of the conference. Then, two days later, the ANC distributed an open letter by Alfred Nzo addressed to the chairman of the Council of Ministers to all delegates attending the conference, and to the local and foreign press agencies [Nzo 1975a:18].

Nzo's letter drew attention to the visits between South Africa and other African states which "have become too frequent to be ignored" [Nzo 1975:2,3]. The Central African Republic, in fact, was absent from the meeting because government ministers went to South Africa instead! Nzo called the OAU's attention to Vorster's "counter-revolutionary aims," which were similar to the ANC's criticisms of Vorster's dialogue a few years earlier. South Africa, he asserted, wanted to divide African states, isolate the liberation movements, and placate national and international public opinion through its bantustan policy, i.e. by granting 'independence' to homelands like the Transkei [Nzo 1975:2,3].

At the end of the ministerial meeting two resolutions were unanimously adopted. The first, proposed by Algeria's Foreign Minister, M. Bouteflika, called for a special ministerial meeting in Dar es Salaam in April to find ways of halting Vorster's detente initiative because African states lacked specific instructions from their governments. The second resolution, specifically on South Africa, warned

against South Africa's attempts to "confuse and divide" African states. It affirmed Africa's solidarity with the people of South Africa, and called on African states to condemn apartheid and the bantustan policy [A.R.B. 1975a:3520C].

In preparation for the ministerial session in April, a meeting of the ANC's Revolutionary Council and its national executive committee took place in March 1975 at Morogoro. It appears to have been a meeting of major importance for the future strategic direction of the ANC after the Portuguese coup. In his presidential address to the national executive, Oliver Tambo drew attention to the "dazzling pace" of events from the Lisbon coup to the installation of a transitional government in Mozambique, and asserted, "we, the ANC, have to identify our position." Apparently the meeting was called at very short notice. The attendance of so many people was, according to Tambo, "a sign of vigour and vitality, if it is a sign [sic] of nothing else." Tambo said "It means at least politically, the ANC is yet a force." He acknowledged the ANC's past failures with disarming honesty; "may be [the ANC is] illmanaged, poorly directed and badly led-but still a force" [Tambo 1975:6].

Tambo explained the national executive must give "political coverage" to the Revolutionary Council, and "guidance" to the special Council of Ministers meeting next month. "Much has happened in Africa to require of us to re-state the objectives of our struggle. In this connection," Tambo said, "the forthcoming OAU meeting is 'not about 'detente.' It is a meeting about the goals and

future of our struggle... It is a meeting about the future of Africa...to initiate the onslaught on the strong hold of white minority rule in Africa" [Tambo 1975:7].

The national executive meeting took place before the OAU meeting "to let the voice of our people be heard on what we are fighting for, what support we need, and who we consider to be our comrades-in-arms and allies in that struggle." The ANC was "genuinely disturbed by current developments in which the South African regime features with such prominence and to appeal to them to leave the world and our own people, in no doubt as to their known commitment to the total liberation" of South Africa [Tambo 1975:7].

Tambo lashed out against Vorster's detente, and the complicity of the Western powers with South Africa. "An intensive, concentrated propaganda campaign with echoes in Africa, America, and Western Europe, has been unleashed on our people, designed to make them relax to false hopes of 'change' within the general context of a spirit of so-called detente, whereby fascism, with all its unchanging nature is expected by some miracle to a make a voluntary and even unsolicited surrender of its power and domination in peaceful response to demands by some spokesmen" [Tambo 1975:7].

The national executive issued a Declaration which elaborated on some of the themes Tambo discussed in his address. The Portuguese coup created a "new situation," the Declaration explained, characterized by "the emergence of conditions that not only favour the passage of the initiative into our hands," but demand that the ANC "seize the

initiative" [Sechaba 1975c:12]. The change in the balance of forces is what is behind the "many-sided counter-revolutionary offensive" led by the USA, the other Western powers, and South Africa. It includes many African states in "what amounts to collaboration with the counter-revolution" by acting contrary to the positions of the OAU. "This situation demands immediate, decisive and principled action" by the ANC, the OAU, the UN and the world-wide solidarity movement to "beat back the enemy's counter-offensive." The OAU and the international community should reaffirm the ANC as an authentic representative of South Africa's people, condemn the bantustan programme designed to break apart African unity and isolate the liberation movement, continue to isolate South Africa, and recognize the legitimacy of armed struggle [Sechaba 1975c:13].

The ninth extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers met in Dar es Salaam in April 1975 as Algeria requested. Oliver Tambo led the ANC delegation which included Josiah Jele, head of the Department of International Affairs, Johnny Makatini, the representative in Algeria, Florence Mophosho, a senior member of the woman's department, Secretary-General Alfred Nzo, and Moses Mabhida, a member of the national executive and Secretary-General of the SACP. The ANC also distributed a series of position papers on bantustans, education, and unions [Sechaba 1975c].¹³

Nyerere opened the meeting with an address that firmly called for South Africa's continued isolation. He echoed Tambo's words declaring, "This conference is not about so-called dialogue or detente with South Africa. This conference is about the liberation of southern Africa" [A.R.B. 1975b:3583ABC]. It endorsed the Dar es Salaam Declaration drawn up at the Liberation Committee's twenty-fourth session in January 1975. This conference produced a major policy document, "African Strategy in Southern Africa," which was based substantially on ideas advanced by the government of Tanzania. The strategy separated the struggle in Rhodesia and Namibia from the struggle in South Africa, and gave priority to the struggle in these two territories. It had the additional backing of the main Front Line States Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique (in spite of FRELIMO's close links with the ANC through the Khartoum alliance). The initiative by the four presidents of Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique was endorsed by the OAU [ACR 1975-76:A66].

The ANC differed with the strategy of the Front Line States in three ways. First, it disagreed with the priority the strategy gave to the struggles in Rhodesia and Namibia [A.R.B. 1975b:3583, The Times, 1975]. The ANC called attention to the Dar es Salaam Declaration, formulated by the Liberation Committee in January 1975. It (incorrectly) interpreted the Declaration to mean the various armed struggles in southern Africa were indivisible, and recognized

the dominant role of South Africa in the region. In fact, the Declaration gave a priority to the struggle in Rhodesia, Namibia, and then South Africa which is the position which the Front Line States adopted [Amate 1986:300].

Oliver Tambo, in his address to the meeting asserted what has been the ANC's strategic position since the early 1960s, "The OAU in our opinion, must adopt a strategy which recognizes not only the indivisibility of the enemy, but also the dominant role of the South African regime in the area" [Mayibuye 1975a:7]. Tambo called for simultaneous liberation wars in Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa [A.R.B. 1975b:3583 ABC].

Second, the ANC denounced the "detente" talks between Vorster and the presidents of the Front Line States as a "betrayal" of African interests [ACR 1975-76:B580]. The OAU in 1975 was still behind the initiative begun in October 1974 by Kenneth Kaunda and endorsed by the Front Line States to find a peaceful solution to the problems in southern Africa in terms of the Lusaka Manifesto. Kaunda was more closely involved with Vorster in these negotiations, although in the end they were aborted. In March 1975 Vorster said there had already been fifteen meetings between Zambia and South Africa since October 1974 [ACR 1975-76:A39]. Kaunda also opposed the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola on behalf of the ANC's ally, the MPLA, since he preferred a "moderate" pro-Western government in Angola [Martin and Johnson 1981:233]. This made Kaunda particularly vulnerable, and the

Soviets encouraged the ANC and SWAPO to accuse him of "making secret deals with the enemy." In fact, he was in constant contact with the other Front Line States during his negotiations, and the OAU was simultaneously engaged in strengthening the liberation movements if the talks failed [Legum 1977:15].

The ANC had every reason to be concerned about the direction detente between Kaunda and Vorster was moving. Tambo was fulsome in his praise for Nyerere in the opening of his address to the Dar es Salaam meeting, but mentioned nothing about Kaunda [Mayibuye 1975a:4]. Both Nyerere and Machel also expressed their doubts about Kaunda's talks with the South Africans. The whole exercise was based on a remarkable document drawn up by Zambian and South African officials known as the "detente scenario" entitled "Towards the Summit:An Approach to Peaceful Change in southern Africa" [Martin and Johnson 1981:138]. It began by quoting paragraph 20 of the Lusaka Manifesto which acknowledged South Africa's legal legitimacy. It called on Mozambique to carry out obligations it was later forced to acknowledge with the signing of the Nkomati Accord a decade later. In recognition of South African economic assistance to Mozambique, the detente scenario included assurances by the Front Line States that there would "be no ANC or other insurgent activities directed against South Africa from their territories, namely from either Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, or Rhodesia." The detente scenario also called for SWAPO to effectively

renounce armed struggle in exchange for being allowed to resume "normal political activities" in Namibia [Martin and Johnson 1981:141].

Third, at the special OAU session in Dar es Salaam the ANC took issue with the paragraph 20 of the Lusaka Manifesto. The ANC denied that South Africa was an independent or a sovereign state ("as some people want us to believe"). Oliver Tambo's address to the meeting included a lengthy explanation of the SACP and ANC view that South Africa was a colony of a special type [Mayibuye 1975a:4].

An extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government was held in Addis Ababa in January 1976 to consider the crisis in Angola. Although Angola became independent in November 1975, the subsequent outbreak of civil war and the South African and Cuban intervention led to disagreement in the OAU over whether the MPLA government should be recognized as the legitimate government of the country. Some leaders of the Front Line States, such as Kaunda and Sir Seretse Khama did not support Neto's MPLA. Kaunda even opposed Cuba's intervention. John Stockwell, the chief of the CIA task force on Angola in 1975, argues the South Africans were encouraged to intervene with the encouragement of Savimbi's UNITA, after Savimbi conferred with Kaunda, Mobuto, Houphouet-Boigny, and Senghor [Martin and Johnson 1981:233; Stockwell 1978]. Nyerere, however supported the MPLA, and both Mozambique's new FRELIMO

government, and the ANC also strongly supported the MPLA at the extraordinary session.

Secretary-General Alfred Nzo delivered the ANC's statement to the extraordinary session. The ANC firmly supported its ally in the Khartoum alliance, the MPLA, and clearly identified the enemy in Angola to be "world imperialism" which seeks to "reverse the gains" of the Angolan revolution [Nzo 1976:6].

Nzo identified the struggle in Angola with "the whole future of the African Revolution." He identified South Africa's intervention in Angola as "a fresh manifestation" of its attempt to dominate the region: military intervention, the "outward policy," detente, and non-aggression pacts were all part of the same policy. Nzo emphasized that "on many occasions" the ANC has warned the OAU that South Africa is "seeking to destroy the South African liberation movement to, divide Africa, and to subject her to neo-colonial domination." He called on the OAU to support the MPLA, and dismissed calls for a government of national unity (involving the other liberation movements) as a imperialist maneuver contrary to genuine independence [Nzo 1976:6].¹⁴

The conference proved to be inconclusive. The vote on admission of the MPLA government was deadlocked, and the meeting adjourned without adopting a resolution on the issue. The following month AAPSO sponsored an "International Conference of Solidarity with the Struggle of the People of Angola and the MPLA" in Luanda. At least 80 countries and

organizations and movements, including the ANC attended the conference.¹⁵ Later that month the OAU recognized the MPLA government after three states changed their mind, giving a clear majority to those states in favour of admission.

In 1976 the ANC became more concerned over the direction detente was taking when U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger directly became involved in the events in southern Africa. After the collapse, in August 1975, of the Victory Falls talks between Smith and the representatives of some of the Rhodesian liberation movements (organized by Vorster and Kaunda) the Front Line States met in February 1976 in Quelimane, Mozambique. They unanimously decided a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia was no longer possible and supported armed struggle. The U.S. was concerned that the escalation of armed struggle could lead to a greater role for the Communist powers in southern Africa unless it became actively involved in the search for a peaceful settlement in Rhodesia.

The swift, and from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy, unexpected changes in southern Africa after the Portuguese coup, and the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Angola led to a complete reorientation of American foreign policy in the region. In April 1976 the U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, arrived in Nairobi on the beginning of an Africa tour. He met with Nyerere in Dar es Salaam, and after meeting with Kaunda in Lusaka, announced a major shift in American policy in support of black majority rule.

The Front Line States gave Kissinger support to explore the prospect of negotiations with Vorster over a Rhodesian settlement which began with an initial meeting with Vorster in Bavaria in June 1976, and a follow up meeting in Zurich in September.

After the Kissinger's meeting with Vorster in Zurich the Front Line States met in Dar es Salaam to consider the results of the meeting, and whether the American initiative should continue. This was the first time Agostinho Neto joined the group as the new president of Angola.

At the September meeting the Front Line States were faced with a growing body of evidence that the ANC was a powerful influence inside South Africa. The Soweto riots had erupted in June, Tambo called for the extension of strikes in August, and the evidence of the youth leaving South Africa was that they were influenced by the ANC.¹⁶ These activities raised the ANC's stature in Africa and contributed to the adoption of new procedures by the Front Line States. Liberation movements were now invited to present their views and were instructed to submit progress reports to future Summit Conferences [Africa Confidential 1976:6].

Kissinger's African "shuttle diplomacy" between the Front Line States, Rhodesia, and South Africa continued throughout September against the back drop of continuing urban violence and industrial unrest in Soweto and Cape Town. Vorster wanted to reduce the political pressure on South Africa.

The result of this diplomacy was that Kissinger and Vorster persuaded Ian Smith to accept the principle of majority rule at the end of September in accordance with general principles which Kissinger had worked out in consultations with the Front Line States. Smith's acceptance led to the Geneva conference which began at the end of October against a back drop of escalating fighting in Rhodesia and Mozambique. The Geneva conference was adjourned in mid-December, but did not reconvene.

The ANC was worried about Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy" for a number of reasons. First, according to Secretary-General Nzo, U.S. diplomacy "seeks to cut the umbilical cord directly linking the national liberation movements of the African peoples to the world socialist system, especially the Soviet Union, Cuba and the progressive forces of the world" [Nzo 1978:58].

Second, the kind of political outcome which the U.S. wants in Africa is "neo-colonialist" and "pro-imperialist" because their goal is to safeguard Western economic and strategic interests. This concern was directly linked to plans for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization involving South Africa with military regimes in Latin America which the ANC continued to warn Africa about (see Chapter 7).

Third, Kissinger is "the foremost representative of U.S. monopoly capital," and the purpose of his diplomatic efforts are to create favourable conditions for the penetration of U.S. "neo-colonialism" into Africa [Nzo 1978:58].

The election of the Carter Administration in November 1976 effectively meant the Ford Administration was a care-taker government during the Geneva conference. At almost the same time as the governmental transition in Washington, Dr. David Owen became Britain's new Foreign Secretary after the death of Anthony Crosland.

Owen had a direct interest in southern African problems, and strongly supported Anglo-American cooperation in southern Africa. His personal commitment to majority rule and human rights were shared by the new Carter Administration which opened the way for what became a new joint Anglo-American initiative on Rhodesia. This initiative was launched in March 1977, and after discussions in Washington in April, Dr. Owen travelled to Dar es Salaam, Pretoria, and Salisbury with the first draft of the Anglo-American proposals. After initial rejection by the Patriotic Front, these proposals were modified, and a revised set of proposals led to a joint trip to southern Africa by David Owen and Andrew Young, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, in August 1977 to discuss them with the Front Line States, the Patriotic Front, Sithole, Muzorewa, and Vorster.¹⁷

In April 1977 a Front Line States Summit Conference between Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia was held in Luanda, Angola to discuss the developments in southern Africa, particularly Owen's trip and the Anglo-American proposals for Rhodesia. The leaders of the Patriotic Front, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe attended the conference. In

addition Sam Nujoma of SWAPO, and Oliver Tambo of the ANC attended the meeting, but its main concern was the situation in Rhodesia [A.R.B. 1977a:4383B].

In an interview in Luanda right after the summit, Oliver Tambo explained the ANC should join the meetings of the Front Line States because their position on vital issues concerned South Africans [Sechaba 1977b:7-14]. Although in the ultimate analysis, Tambo acknowledged, it is what the people of Zimbabwe want, and that is what influences the Front Line States, he was quite concerned about their relations with South Africa. "[T]here has always been something odd," he said, "about the fact that consultations over Rhodesia should be seen to require the involvement of Vorster, who certainly does not represent the majority of the people of South Africa, least of all the black people. At the same time, however, it didn't seem necessary to involve the leaders of the people he oppresses, those he treats as foreigners to his regime. I think to a great extent this irregularity was corrected in having the Luanda meeting" attended by the ANC and SWAPO as well as the leaders of the Patriotic Front. "I think this balances out the picture-these are the people who are concerned about what is happening in any given part of southern Africa" [Sechaba 1977b:7-14].

What worried the ANC about the willingness of the Front Line States to deal with Vorster and the Western powers was the real aims of Western strategy regarding South Africa, and whether the Front Line States would actually be able to

control the developments in such a way that the liberation of South Africa was not jeopardized by the negotiations over Rhodesia and Namibia. The detente scenario document clearly shows the ANC had ample cause to be concerned. Its longstanding fear was the "domino theory of liberation" which left South Africa until last. Western strategy, according to the ANC, was to tell Vorster, "see reason over Namibia and Zimbabwe and we'll leave you in peace," a position particularly attractive since he was negotiating at the time of the Soweto uprising. Tambo actually denied that Vorster was pressuring Smith to accept a negotiated settlement along the lines of the Anglo-American proposals for majority rule [Sechaba 1977b:7-14].

The ANC's real fear was that the "whole exercise is to get the world to accept the Vorster regime as having fulfilled its tasks on Zimbabwe. He then hopes he can reasonably be left to introduce necessary changes at his convenience over a period, and of course, he's not going to grant-he might have to give-but he's not going to grant majority rule in anybody's life time" [Sechaba 1977b:7-14]. Kaunda, in fact, made it clear he wanted Vorster to take the credit internationally for detente if it was successful because he wanted to "sell" Vorster to Africa as a moderate and reasonable ruler [Martin and Johnson 1981:142,143]. Kissinger asserted that he made no deals with Vorster, no "trade off" on South Africa was a part of the negotiations on Rhodesia.¹⁸

The ANC was also worried that the Front Line States, by adopting a negotiating strategy which separated the Rhodesian and Namibian struggles from the South African struggle, could end up pursuing policies which undermined the struggle in South Africa. This strategy, advocated by the Front Line States, was adopted at the ninth extraordinary session of the OAU Council of Ministers in February 1975. The recent Anglo-American proposals on Rhodesia and Vorster's detente made the ANC deeply concerned about how a Rhodesian settlement would affect events in South Africa. "This summit," Tambo explained, "was also important because there is a very obvious attempt to treat the situation in South Africa not only as being different from that in Zimbabwe and Namibia, but even as a settled situation that calls for no radical change except 'improvements' here and there in the area of human rights, fundamental human rights. This line is being pursued by the imperialists with very great vigour and the objective is to isolate the oppressed in South Africa, to perpetuate the status quo and to focus Western attention on Zimbabwe and Namibia as being the final problems that await resolution. But in fact [i.e. contrary to the Lusaka Manifesto] the situation in South Africa is inseparable and is not different from the situation in the other two territories" [Sechaba 1977b:7-14].

The ANC apparently made its position clear to the Front Line States, but they agreed to differ. Significantly, Tambo said afterwards the meeting stressed the indivisibility of

the struggles in southern Africa, the identity of the issues, "except for matters of emphasis." In other words, the ANC still disagreed with the Front Line States over the priority of finding a Rhodesian settlement over the struggle in South Africa. Tambo delicately glossed over the disagreement and added, the "mood of the meeting" was in relation to intensifying the struggle in all three territories; it "certainly underlines the fact that the Front Line States must now regard and place South Africa firmly on their agenda in spite of the "intense topicality of the Zimbabwe situation" [Sechaba 1977b:7-14]. The problem for the ANC was that the Soweto uprising coincided with the intensification of the negotiations over Rhodesia; otherwise South Africa would have been the main concern of the Front Line States.

The Anglo-American plan was finally published in September 1977. It was rejected by Smith, and dismissed for being a "colonialist" settlement by the Patriotic Front, although it was adopted by the UN Security Council. The OAU's acceptance of the Patriotic Front, and Smith's rejection of the Anglo-American proposals led him to begin negotiations in early 1978 for an "internal settlement" leading to majority rule by the end of the year.¹⁹

6.3 Destabilization and the Nkomati Accord

After the independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980 the South African government stepped up its economic and military destabilization of southern Africa while at the same time it

pursued its policy of seeking economic cooperation through a southern African "constellation of states" [Jaster 1986; Thomas 1987].

Destabilization became a primary concern of the ANC because one of its objectives was to prevent South Africa's neighbours from offering infiltration routes and military bases to the ANC.²⁰ The ANC only realized the main benefits of its relations with the MPLA and FRELIMO through the Khrtoum alliance after the independence of Angola and Mozambique. At the diplomatic level, these new revolutionary states strongly supported the ANC in the Organization of African Unity (see Chapter 5), in the Non-Aligned Movement, and in the Front Line States (see also Chapter 7).

At the military level, Angola and Mozambique became crucial to the development of the ANC's revolutionary strategy. The ANC's post-Soweto strategy of "armed propaganda" began in 1977 (and lasted until 1984 when the ANC says it began people's war) [ANC 1985:22]. Many of Umkhonto's actions during this period were highly dramatic sabotage and bombing attacks aimed at increasing the ANC's level of visibility and prestige inside South Africa [Lodge 1983a:153-195; Jaster 1986:16].

This domestic strategy was accompanied by an international campaign for the recognition of the ANC as the sole legitimate representative of South Africa's people. In July 1977 the ANC's national executive held a major meeting to consider the new conditions and strategy for what it

called the "post-Soweto period." In describing the ANC's international stature, the national executive's report said the position has now been reached when the ANC can not be ignored "even by the Security Council of the United Nations" and the Front Line States invite the ANC regularly to their sessions. The report concluded that "a campaign for the eventual exclusive recognition of our organization as the sole representative of our people will be launched by our International Department on behalf of the entire revolutionary movement and the External Mission should be 'fully geared' for this task" [Sechaba 1978:1,2].

Angola gave its support firmly to the ANC and it established relations with the ANC at the time of independence. Leading ANC and SACP members (Ruth Mompati and Moses Mabhida) attended the opening ceremony of the transitional government in February 1975 at the invitation of the MPLA, and spoke of the "good working and comradely relationship with the MPLA for many years" [Sechaba 1975b:23].²¹ Neto emphasized during Angola's independence celebrations that the MPLA's victory was part of the victory of other liberation movements, and adopting the ANC's position on strategy, said the liberation of southern Africa was indivisible [Sechaba 1976:12].

The ANC's main training bases were set up in northern Angola in 1977. After FRELIMO's victory in Mozambique, and the consolidation of the MPLA's power in Angola, the ANC reportedly sent key personnel to make the necessary military

arrangements. Joe Slovo and Cassius Make, the Deputy-Secretary of the Revolutionary Council, opened the ANC's office in Luanda in April 1977, and helped to organize the ANC's bases [SAIRR 1978:38; Africa Confidential 1979:3; Sechaba 1987c:29].

There are five training camps in northern Angola which hold between 2,000 and 8,000 Umkhonto combatants ²². These camps are provided by the Angolan MPLA government, but the training is given by East Germans, Cubans, and Soviet instructors. They are designed to be economically self-sufficient.²³ In the early 1980s there were reports of frustration in the camps because of the emphasis on ideology as a part of the military training.²⁴ Tambo has admitted the ANC had to deal with disciplinary problems.²⁵

Developments in Angola were closely connected to the ANC's relations with Cuba. Six months after military preparations began in northern Angola, in October 1977, Oliver Tambo went to Havana to discuss the role Cuba could play in the liberation struggle [The Times 1977:5]. The following year, Alex LaGuma, a South African author who was also a key member of the ANC and the SACP, went to establish an office in Havana [Sechaba 1978h:63]. The impetus for opening the office was the importance of Cuban soldiers in Angola. The ANC wanted to explain to the Cuban people the important role Cuban soldiers played in liberation struggles in Africa, and wanted to keep Castro fully informed about

southern African developments as they related to the ANC's activities [SAIRR 1979:35,36].

The ANC's relations with the new FRELIMO government of Mozambique were complicated by the country's proximity and economic dependence on South Africa. All the evidence points to Mozambique as the main route through which Umkhonto combatants tried to enter South Africa although the ANC denies it had bases in the country.²⁶

In January 1975, five months before Mozambique's independence, AAPSO representatives from Cyprus, Egypt and the Soviet Union, and a representative from the ANC, Joe Nhlanhla, went to Mozambique at the invitation of FRELIMO [Sechaba 1975a:12,3]. One of the topics discussed was the kind of status the ANC would have in an independent Mozambique. The following month Oliver Tambo said in an interview that there was "a gap between what FRELIMO will do for us and what we would like them to do." The new FRELIMO government was keenly aware of its economic dependence on South Africa and wanted to adopt a pragmatic foreign policy toward the country. Later in February Vorster assured FRELIMO that South Africa was not opposed to an African government in Mozambique, but warned against the country becoming a "spring board" to attack South Africa [ACR 1975-76:B282].

It appears that Machel gave Vorster the necessary assurances. In May 1976 on Radio Lisbon, he backed away from support for armed struggle saying Mozambique's development would be an example for peaceful change in South Africa.²⁷

Machel's assurances do not seem to be supported by subsequent events. Key ANC personnel were reportedly sent from London in 1977 to set up operations in Mozambique.²⁸ The ANC was planning to intensify urban guerrilla warfare in the wake of the Soweto uprising, and sought to use independent Mozambique as a neighbouring state to base its operations. It wanted to smuggle unarmed trained fighters into South Africa who would be supplied with weapons by other routes [SAIRR 1979:35,36]. The ANC's own analysis of its sabotage strategy for the period 1977-1982 implicitly supports this view, acknowledging that the majority of attacks were concentrated in the northern Transvaal and Natal, the provinces adjacent to these two states [Sechaba 1983:1-3].

The strategy of the Front Line States separated the struggles in Namibia and Rhodesia from South Africa. These former struggles were identified as anti-colonial struggles for independence fought by wars of national liberation, but South Africa was acknowledged to be a sovereign state with whom Mozambique was required to be a good neighbour (FRELIMO accepted paragraph 20 of the Lusaka Manifesto). FRELIMO broke off relations with Rhodesia during the independence struggle, but it did not break off relations with South Africa; in fact it expanded relations [Libby 1987:204-229].

Libby [1987:276] explains the Nkomati Accord by pointing to FRELIMO's constitution which subordinates its "internationalist duty" of supporting liberation movements to consolidating the revolution within Mozambique [Henderson

1978:276]. He considers the Accord to be a triumph of Mozambican diplomacy, but he offers no explanation for why it was necessary if Mozambique was not fulfilling its internationalist duty; providing bases for ANC guerrillas [Libby 1987:228]. FRELIMO, according to Hanlon, accepted the ANC as the sole legitimate liberation movement in South Africa but recognized it had to remain on good terms with the government; it did not allowed bases in Mozambique [Hanlon 1984:259].

It appears Mozambique was trying to be both a good neighbour and an internationalist ally. The evidence of this chapter and subsequent events contradict Hanlon's account of Mozambican policy before the Nkomati Accord. After the January 1981 raid on the Matola suburb of Maputo, Hanlon contends Mozambique changed its policy. It felt South Africa responded to its good neighbourliness by attacking the country. FRELIMO now fully backed the ANC. There was a mass rally in Maputo on 14 February, 1981 two weeks after South Africa's raid on Matola [Tambo 1982:13-19]. Machel, with Tambo at his side, publically offered his full support to the ANC for the first time. FRELIMO now turned a "blind eye" to the infiltration of ANC guerrillas and political cadres [Hanlon 1984:260].

In fact, after the Matola raid FRELIMO's support for the ANC was less fulsome than Hanlon asserts. Privately, Machel already suggested he would limit the ANC's activities if Pretoria stopped supporting the Mozambican National

Resistance (MNR) [A.R.B. 1981a:6084A, The Economist 1981:39]. By late 1983 he asked the U.S. to see if South Africa would accept a reproachement.²⁹ The combination of drought, and a civil war in Mozambique between the FRELIMO government and the MNR led Mozambique to sign the Nkomati Accord in March 1984 and by June the ANC had transferred about 800 of its members to other bases [Jaster 1986:27,28].

The acrimonious rupture in relations between the ANC and Mozambique caused by the ANC's expulsion soon became public. Tambo accused Mozambique of being little more than another one of South Africa's bantustans, and Machel pointedly noted that FRELIMO had "installed" its guerrillas in Mozambique's "forests, not in exile" [Jaster 1986:55].³⁰

In Rhodesia, the pace of the war increased after the Patriotic Front was formed in October 1976. Rhodesia became the main concern of the Front Line States, and apartheid was pushed into the background for the time being. ZANU had the most guerrillas in the field, and effectively became the leading liberation movement. At the Front Line States summit conference in Dar es Salaam in September 1976 Robert Mugabe asserted ZANU's leadership of the struggle, and they tacitly accepted this was true [Africa Confidential 1976a:6].

ZANU's leadership of the liberation struggle posed awkward problems for the ANC because of its military alliance with ZAPU. The ANC had repeatedly taken ZAPU's position, that ZANU was merely a "splinter movement" and a tool of the imperialists.

The ANC recognized the formation of the Patriotic Front, but its publicity followed the lead of ZAPU in analyzing events in Rhodesia.³¹ Although military cooperation had ceased to be effective by the mid-1970s (because of internal divisions in ZAPU), the alliance still existed. It became increasingly embarrassing after ZAPU's Nkomo nearly negotiated an agreement with Smith in 1975, and later when Chikerema, who had announced the formation of the alliance with Tambo, joined Muzorewa's African National Council. The ANC slowly began to reassess its relationship with ZAPU. Privately, leading ANC members acknowledged that ZANU had the most effective guerrilla army and deserved support for its military performance [Africa Confidential 1976a:6].

Stoneman and Cliffe [1989:184] assert Zimbabwe's "initial cool attitude toward the ANC" was related to the ANC's alliance with ZAPU and ZANU's links with the PAC through the southern African alliance system and its rival Communist backers (see Chapter 3). Although ZANU was supported by China, it tried to solicit support from the Soviet Union, but was turned down because of the Soviet Union's respect for the ANC-ZAPU alliance.

In fact, after independence the nature of these links do not appear to have harmed the ANC's representation in Zimbabwe, but they did hurt the Soviet Union. In 1979, even before Zimbabwe's formal independence, the ANC opened an office in Harare [Sechaba 1981g:30,31]. The Soviet Union had to wait until February 1981 before it was given permission to

open up an embassy, but even then the only contacts in the country Soviet officials were allowed to make were through official political channels [Albright 1983:80]. The alliance between the ANC and ZANU apparently remains a sensitive issue for the ANC.³²

Although South Africa's destabilization did eventually lead to the deterioration of relations between the ANC and Mozambique, destabilization was also one of the contributing factors to the ANC's rise in stature among the Front Line States. Although the ANC was affected by the Front Line States' diplomacy in the struggle for Zimbabwe, South Africa's destabilization brought the ANC directly into their security concerns, and made consultations with the ANC more pertinent. Like in Zimbabwe where the Front Line States eventually acknowledged ZANU's leading role in the liberation struggle, the Front Line States since the Soweto uprising gradually acknowledged the ANC's leading role in the struggle inside South Africa. Although not totally ignoring the PAC, one result of South African destabilization was a rise in the ANC's stature among the Front Line States since one of the reasons for destabilization was the ANC's growing military effectiveness.³³

The high point of Mozambique's support for the ANC came at the summit meeting of the Front Line States held in Maputo in March 1982 [Hanlon 1984:260]. Oliver Tambo and Sam Nujumo took part as official participants through out the meeting.

According to the final communique they agreed South Africa was involved in "an undeclared war" of "military aggression and economic sabotage in southern Africa and pointed to the ANC as the main liberation movement leading the struggle [Sechaba 1982c:6-8].

The Maputo communique also stated, "in South Africa under the leadership of the ANC the people through strikes and armed actions are vigorously rising against apartheid." The Front Line States agreed "to intensify their material and diplomatic support" for the ANC and SWAPO "so they can intensify the armed struggle" [Sechaba 1982c:6-8; A.R.B. 1982:6373C; Karis 1983:208,209]. The communique indicated that priority should be given to building closer relations between the ANC and the individual Front Line States so after the meeting Tambo made a six-state tour of the region [SAIRR 1983:32].

The ANC attended the Front Line States summit meeting held in Lusaka in April 1984, one month after the signing of the Nkomati Accord. The final communique significantly referred to the struggles "led by" the ANC and SWAPO, and supported Mozambique's continued moral, political, and diplomatic support for the ANC. It explained that both the ANC and SWAPO have an "external wing" because the political repression in Namibia and South Africa does not allow them to operate inside South Africa and Namibia. "The international implications of the problems with which the liberation movements are contending," the communique explained, "also

requires international diplomatic and political activity, together with offices with representatives in other countries. The Front Line States reaffirm their recognition of these external operations of the movements and reassert their intention to give shelter to them" [Sechaba 1984a:3-6].³⁴

The diplomatic support which the Front Line States increasingly gave the ANC strengthened the possibility that the OAU might only recognize the ANC as the sole legitimate liberation movement in South Africa, and drop its joint recognition of the PAC. The official communiqus of the Front Line States increasingly referred only to SWAPO, and to the ANC as the leading liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa. Both the OAU (see Chapter 5) and the UN (see Chapter 9) increasingly recognized the ANC's prominence in the struggle.

CONCLUSION

South Africa's outward movement, dialogue, and detente with African states significantly challenged the ANC's main diplomatic objective of isolating South Africa. It also posed a threat to African unity and to the UN's campaign for mandatory economic sanctions. During the period of the outward movement and dialogue the ANC received the support of its two main African allies in the OAU and the Conference of East and Central African States, Tanzania and Zambia. They

were able to blunt South Africa's efforts to break out of its isolation.

Even though there was a agreement between the ANC and its allies in the OAU over the general objective of liberating southern Africa and isolating Pretoria, differences over strategy emerged between them. During South Africa's outward movement and dialogue period the Lusaka Manifesto indicated the OAU's willingness to consider peaceful change in southern Africa if it was still possible bring fundamental change. This search for peaceful change was seemingly contradicted by the intensification of the ANC's armed struggle.

The ANC disagreed with the OAU's "domino theory" of liberation which led to the separation of the southern African liberation struggles. This theory put the ANC at a disadvantage in the funding priorities of the Liberation Committee (see Chapter 5). The ANC also felt this theory was detrimental to African diplomacy on southern Africa.

The Front Line States emerged as a regional negotiating alliance. Its willingness to separate the Rhodesian and South African struggles be engaging Pretoria in detente in order to find a settlement in Rhodesia was dangerously close to supping with the devil as far as the ANC was concerned. For the ANC detente violated the OAU's commitment to isolate South Africa and it under-estimated South Africa's regional hegemony. It also disagreed with the Lusaka Manifesto's acceptance of South Africa as an independent sovereign state.

The ANC tried to influence OAU policy on these issues in a number of ways. First, it tried to influence decisions by directly attending the OAU ministerial meetings and the Summit Conferences. In an observer capacity the ANC presented its position statements, and at various times circulated memoranda, and background papers on particular topics.

Second, the ANC (and SWAPO) directly participated in the conferences of the Front Line States; unlike the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement where they were only given observer status. The greater participation these liberation movements (the communiqus do not indicate that the PAC participated) in the deliberations of the Front Line States, compared to their lesser role in the OAU meant these liberation movements were increasingly treated as governments-in-waiting by the other states in the region.

Third, the ANC tried to affect public opinion in Western countries through its own information and publicity. The ANC's official magazine, Sechaba, is one of the movement's main propaganda organs used to influence public opinion, particularly in Western countries (see Chapter 8). At the time of South Africa's outward policy and during the period of detente the magazine had lengthy articles on the danger of South Africa's policies to the liberation struggle and to Africa. These organs were also an important way for the ANC to explain its differences with the OAU to its supporters.

Once Angola and Mozambique became independent the ANC had new allies in the OAU and in the Front Line States. These

states supported the ANC's armed struggle by providing training bases and sanctuary which were instrumental to launching its "armed propaganda" phase of struggle. They also lobbied for the ANC's greater legitimacy in the Liberation Committee and in the Front Line States.

Statehood confers new obligations on states, even new revolutionary states: nation-building and social transformation could not wait until the liberation of South Africa. The national interest of independent Mozambique (and later Zimbabwe) took precedence over the liberation of South Africa.

For the ANC, South Africa's destabilization and the Nkomati Accord confirmed its criticism of OAU strategy: South Africa was a threat to all of Africa. Until the "citadel" of racism was captured no country in southern Africa would be safe to develop policies of radical state transformation.

The ANC's greater stature among the Front Line States and in the OAU was accompanied by the growing realization that South Africans themselves would have to liberate their country. According to various commentators one of the results of the Nkomati Accord was the ANC's shift away from large scale bombing attacks to a more broadly based strategy which tried to incorporate the new developments inside South Africa [Jaster 1986; IISS 1986]. In fact, the Nkomati Accord only reinforced a shift in strategy that had already taken place because of the reorganization in 1983 (see Chapter 4). Indeed, the struggle would continue.

END NOTES

1. "Yes, Africa is degraded by those who supply slave labour to the South African mines in exchange for trade and other economic traffic north of the Zambezi [River]; even those who float South African companies in independent Africa and pass them off as 'investment by international consortium' need not pull such flimsy wool over our eyes. The South African white minority regime is desperate and Africa must stand firm against it" [Spotlight on South Africa 1967:2,3].
2. In March 1967 Malawi and South Africa signed a trade agreement. After contributing the funds for a new capital at Lilongwe, the South African Industrial Development Corporation offered loans to build a railway between Malawi and northern Mozambique.
3. Although the notion of non-aggression pacts with African states was a new departure for South Africa's foreign policy, the idea that such pacts could contribute to southern Africa's security actually originated with Zambia. At the time of Zambia's independence the Rivonia trial was still in progress, and Kenneth Kaunda the new president, offered to sign a non-aggression pact with South Africa. If Nelson Mandela and the other Rivonia trialists were released and sent to Lusaka, Kaunda agreed to prevent Zambia from becoming a base for ANC guerrillas [West Africa 1964f:1269].
4. This dialogue group was led by the Ivory Coast, and eventually included the Central African Republic, Dahomey, Gabon, Ghana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Swaziland, and Upper Volta.
5. Oliver Tambo's annual address in January 1968, "Call to Revolution," declared "Now freedom shall be achieved by means of the gun....There can be no compromise with the fascists" [La Guma 1972:17].
6. Mangwende [1979:79] states, "The liberation movements rejected the Lusaka Manifesto." They felt its emphasis on peaceful change undermined armed struggle, and at best proposed a "neo-colonial" solution. Mangwende adds, "Yet without exception, they refrained from openly campaigning against the document." Colin Legum [1970:13] also points out that the liberation movements strongly reacted against the Lusaka Manifesto because it preferred a peaceful solution. The movements were worried the document indicated African states was weakening in their commitment to liberation.
7. "Through out the conference the spirit of discussion and agreement by consensus was noteworthy in the final analysis, this is more lasting than paper agreements" [Mayibuye 1969c:1].

8. Mangwende [1979:79] comments that, "perhaps" the reticence of the liberation movements to criticize the Lusaka Manifesto was influenced by the fact Tanzania and Zambia, "their greatest benefactors," supported it.

9. What the ANC meant by the term "African Revolution," or at least what then Deputy-President Tambo meant by the term was spelled out in his annual New Years address, "Call to Revolution," in January 1968 in which he stated, "The African Revolution which began after the Second World War reached its climax in 1960 when the largest number of African states achieved their independence" [La Guma 1972:19]. Clearly, the writer of this Mayibuye editorial identifies the Revolution with more than decolonization and independence (see End Note number 10).

10. After the coup against Modibo Keita of Mali Mayibuye provided a searching editorial asking, "How could a progressive government be overthrown with such apparent ease?" and "Why cannot Africa learn to defend its Revolution and its leaders?" Using Cuba and Vietnam as examples, Mayibuye argued that the state must have deep roots in the masses of the people which lead them to defend the revolution (the ANC would no doubt add Nicaragua today). The bulletin concluded, "It is not enough to win political independence without at the same time deeply involving the masses in the difficult but urgent task of winning economic independence. Perhaps it is not enough merely to inherit the state institutions of the former imperialist masters but to destroy them completely and rebuild afresh new institutions genuinely immersed in and representative of the masses and of the Revolution" (emphasis added) [Mayibuye 1968e:1,2].

11. The criticism of the OAU for its failure to advance the "African Revolution" by the Marxist element within the ANC is similar to the views expressed by Elenga M'buyinga of the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), one of Africa's oldest and most radical nationalist movements: the OAU has no perspective on the problems of neo-colonialism "because it is itself a product of neo-colonialism" [M'buyinga 1982:9].

12. Detente began through a speech delivered in the South African Senate and a dramatic speech at the United Nations by R.F. (Pik) Botha, South Africa's UN ambassador. These speeches, and the positive response by Kenneth Kaunda were part of a carefully orchestrated detente "scenario" worked out in advance by Vorster and Kaunda in order to find a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian and Namibian problem [Martin and Johnson 1981:Chapter 8].

13. The ANC was optimistic because of the international situation. The shift in the balance of forces in southern Africa, and the fact the liberation movements in Vietnam and Cambodia appeared to be "on the verge of final victory," the

ANC asserted "the international and continental conditions have created a situation most favourable for the success of armed struggle" [Sechaba 1975d:4].

14. The Political Report at the Kabwe Conference explained, "We took the positions that we must defend the MPLA as the proven representative of the people of Angola, assert the legitimacy of the Peoples Republic of Angola, as well as support the right of the people of this country to determine their own path of development [i.e. the "non-capitalist path"] and to establish their own system of international relations. In this way, supporting the positions of the MPLA, we came out against the notion of a government of national unity that would have legitimated the puppet UNITA and FNLA. We stood for the immediate expulsion of the Pretoria invasion force from Angola and fought against all imperialist intervention" [ANC 1985:15]. It is not inconceivable that the ANC's rationale for supporting the MPLA could have implications for its own struggle. Supporting the MPLA rather than a government of national unity is consistent with the ANC refusing to join in a government with its rivals, the PAC, Inkatha, or any other organization that may emerge inside the country.

15. Angola's new president, Agostinho Neto, emphasized the crucial role of international solidarity to the liberation struggle in a speech to the conference. "Diplomatically," he said, "they paved Angola, MPLA, the Angolan people's revolutionary vanguard, to become internationally known and increase its prestige. Hence Afro-Asian solidarity has always been an essential factor for liberation" [Neto 1976:17-19].

16. Youths that had fled Soweto in June ended up in Dar es Salaam. They acknowledged, "Our parents used to tell us that there was an ANC, and when we knew of all the things that had been started by the ANC we knew it was our duty to continue with the struggle." They said they had received ANC literature, and "when we read those leaflets we felt that now it was our time" [Africa Confidential 1976a:6].

17. Apparently, Alfred Nzo was right. The U.S. even acknowledged neo-colonialism was its intentions. When U.S. ambassador Andrew Young became involved in the Anglo-American proposals he reportedly remarked, "the USA has but one option, and that is neo-colonialism," and explained, "as bad as that has been made to sound, neo-colonialism means the the multinational corporations will continue to have a majority influence in the development of the productive capacity of the Third World. And they are, whether we like it or not" [Stoneman and Cliffe 1989:29,30]. Young certainly defined the term correctly, but the ANC and other progressive forces in Africa had no intention of surrendering the fight for a more radical social transformation of African society so easily.

18. Soon after Kissinger's diplomacy, almost to fulfill Nzo's claim that he represented "monopoly capital," a Citibank consortium began to raise a \$100m loan for South Africa, although this proposal was later dropped for a bigger loan arranged by a consortium of French bankers [Legum 1977:43].

19. The "internal settlement" was with Muzorewa's United African National Council (UANC), Sithole's ZANU (renamed ANC-S), and Chief Chirau. When this agreement was announced in mid-February 1978 it was condemned by the Front Line States and subsequently the Security Council, the OAU, and the Commonwealth. It was seen as an act of betrayal by "Smith's black collaborators," but it was recognized as an important step forward by the governments of Britain and the U.S.

20. Destabilization became a major concern of the Front Line States because one of its objectives was to increase the dependence of other states on South Africa in order to give the country greater leverage over its neighbouring states.

21. When the ANC's Secretary-General, Alfred Nzo, addressed the extra-ordinary meeting of the OAU meeting in Addis Ababa in January 1976 to determine the recognition of Angola, he stated the ANC's ties with the MPLA are "based on a common outlook with regard to the struggle against imperialism and sentiments of mutual solidarity" [Nzo 1976:3,4]. The ANC, Nzo continued, is "basing itself on an intimate knowledge of [the MPLA] from its very founding conference" [Nzo 1976:8].

22. The camps are located at Quibaze, Pango, Malange, Viena, and Caxito [ACR 1984-85:B748]. The ANC's secretary-general Alfred Nzo, has acknowledged its main bases are in northern Angola (in addition to the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the GDR, although North Korea and Bulgaria also help) [Distelheim 1986].

23. They are planned as self-sufficient units so they include agricultural projects which are adjacent to the military camps. Military training lasts for up to two years, and the most promising Umkhonto recruits are sent to the Soviet Union for more specialized training.

24. Many of the new recruits who have left South Africa following the Soweto uprising have come to the ANC, not because of a commitment to Marxism, but because they see the ANC as the only organization capable of waging war against the South African government [Africa Confidential 1981:1].

25. In an interview with Radio Freedom Tambo admitted, "When any of [our members] offend we do something about it, and we do not allow them to play tricks. But we do justice, full justice...In dealing with any individual in our organization

we are guided by the principles of justice" [Mayibuye 1981:4].

26. The ANC's official explanation is that it does not need bases in neighbouring countries because Umkhonto is rooted among the people inside the country [Mayibuye 1984a:4,5].

27. He explained, "South Africa is going to change its policy, and there will be no aggression. It is necessary for men to all colours and races to walk, live, and work together. This is a struggle in itself and there is no need for weapons with political work, much political work, our country will become an example" [ACR 1975-76:B282].

Shortly before independence the South African Consulate-General was closed in Maputo only to reopen under the guise of a trade mission. South African railway officials remained at their offices in Maputo's port, and South African technicians continued to work at Caborra Bassa dam [ACR 1975-76:B282].

28. This group included Ronnie Kasrils, Reg September, Albie Sachs, Ben and Mary Turok, Alan Brooks, Fred Dube, and Joe Slovo's wife, Ruth First [SAIRR 1979:35,36; Gastrow 1987:297]. First was the director of the Research at the Centre for African Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University until she was killed in August 1982.

29. Oliver Tambo led an ANC delegation to the fourth FRELIMO congress in Maputo in April 1983 [Sechaba 1983h:18-20]. Tambo's speech at the Congress emphasized the "revolutionary alliance" between the ANC and FRELIMO, and the ANC's solidarity with the PLO, POLISARIO, and the guerrillas fighting in East Timor, and Latin America [Tambo 1983:3-8].

30. The ANC's national executive met on the day of the signing of the Nkomati Accord and issued a statement which, without actually mentioning the Accord by name, indicated that its primary objective was to "isolate the ANC in southern Africa," "to emasculate the ANC," and to "liquidate the armed struggle." The ANC pointed to the Maputo Front Line Summit in 1982 which acknowledged the leadership of the ANC and called for more support to the liberation movements as the correct policy [Mayibuye 1984:4].

31. The ANC acknowledged, "ZAPU and ZANU have had their mutual prejudices pruned down by years of hard march through the jungles of the armed liberation struggle. They have also sobered to the fact that the independence of Zimbabwe cannot be delivered to a divided national army, as comrade president Nkomo has put it. As democratic people we can afford several political parties but we cannot afford a divided national army" [Sechaba 1978b:45-55].

32. In October 1987 a book of Oliver Tambo's speeches to commemorate his seventieth birthday was reportedly withdrawn because of its references to the ANC's alliance with ZAPU. The book was edited and compiled by his wife, Adelaide, and with the assistance of Ben Turok. The ANC reportedly wanted to "tone down" and "sanitize" the references to the early relationship with ZAPU [South African Press Clips 1987:8].

33. The Sasol and Silverton bombings and the attacks on police stations preceded the Matola raid. Then, on 28 January, 1981 the government announced a general election and two days later the raid occurred [A.R.B.1981:5922C,5956B]. After the Nkomati Accord the IISS's Strategic Survey titled its relevant section "Response to the ANC:Destabilization" [IISS 1986:190-192].

34. The presidents of the Front Line States at the April 1984 summit in Lusaka also gave their "total unqualified commitment to the liberation struggles" in Namibia and South Africa. Both the ANC and SWAPO appealed for aid. The presidents listened sympathetically, but the guerrillas could not get any thing more than further political and moral support [A.R.B. 1984:7203].

CHAPTER 7

THE ANC AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT

"I believe [the African National] Congress, in general, follows the foreign policy of Nehru; we wish to be neither East nor West, but neutral; and we welcome co-operation from those on either sides who will help to further our aspirations for freedom in a democratic set up. If we get more support from the East than from the West, it is not our fault."

Albert Luthuli, President-General of the ANC, 1955.

The ANC is "non-aligned in terms of East-West, developing trade with all countries of the world, strengthening trade links, so maintaining the lines of trade for mutual benefit... We will work very closely with the rest of the African continent, and certainly with the countries of southern Africa...And we would be a very influential country in the world."

Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, 1985.

Beginning in the late 1940s non-alignment, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism became the main political forces in the emerging independent countries which are now called the Third World. These states were worried about the escalation of the Cold War which could lead to nuclear conflict, and nationalist movements in dependent countries called for decolonization, independence, and the end of imperialism. These demands formed the basis for Afro-Asian solidarity.

The Afro-Asian bloc at the UN first came into existence in 1950 over the Korean War, but the first major political expression of solidarity by Third World states was the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April 1955. At the Asian Relations Conference held in 1947, a forerunner to Bandung, the Natal Indian Congress which M.K. Gandhi created

in 1894, was given an invitation on Nehru's advice, but no group from South Africa was able to attend [Jansen 1966:47].¹ The Bandung conference was the ANC's first introduction to Afro-Asian politics.

The Non-Aligned Movement's membership is essentially limited to states. Most liberation movements have attended conferences as either guests or observers, and it is on this basis the ANC has attended the movement's meetings since it was formed.

The Bandung conference gave definition to some of the earliest principles of Afro-Asian solidarity, non-alignment, anti-colonialism, and anti-imperialism. The "Bandung Spirit" became the legitimating principle for subsequent meetings which led to the creation of two rival Afro-Asian organizations, the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), founded in 1957 to which the ANC belongs, and the Non-Aligned Movement which began in 1961, which the ANC has attended as a guest or observer, but is not a member.

The ANC's membership in AAPSO complicates its activities with the Non-Aligned Movement. The meaning of non-alignment and anti-imperialism, the relationship between them, and whether the socialist countries are the "natural allies" of the Non-Aligned Movement has been debated throughout its history. This debate took on particular significance once countries joined the movement which were led by liberation movements which had fought wars of national liberation before

attaining independence, and once Cuba was allowed to assume the leadership of the movement.

ANC publications, like the pronouncements of AAPSO, use the terms non-alignment and anti-imperialism in a way consistent with the use of these terms by the Soviet Union and its allies in the Third World. The ANC has been an ally of Cuba and other socialist states within the Non-Aligned Movement which advocate the partisan definition of these key terms, but in their usage these socialist countries differ from most of the countries in the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Non-Aligned Movement strongly supported the liberation struggles in southern Africa. Its international actions against apartheid are directed at mobilizing support in the United Nations and in the OAU.

Non-aligned solidarity and action against apartheid is not the same as international recognition of the ANC as the sole legitimate representative of the people of South Africa. The Non-Aligned Movement also acknowledges the PAC as a legitimate representative of South Africa and the PAC has attended various non-aligned meetings as an observer (although ANC publications never acknowledge this fact). During the 1970s the Non-Aligned Movement also acknowledged the legitimacy of the Black Consciousness Movement because of its support within the country.

7.1 ANC Participation in the Non-Aligned Movement

The Non-Aligned Movement was founded in Belgrade in September 1961, a year after the ANC was forced into exile. This founding meeting was one of the first international conferences the ANC attended. At the time of the Belgrade conference the ANC was still part of the South African United Front and it formally attended the conference in its capacity as a representative of the Front. It was one of nineteen liberation movements present, all of which were from Africa [Jansen 1966:295]. In theory, the member movements of the Front, the ANC, PAC, SAIC, and SWANU, were supposed to campaign together, but Oliver Tambo was the only member of the Front at Belgrade.

Non-aligned documents indicate little detailed awareness of the particularities of black South African politics. Tambo was designated the vice-president of the "African National Movement," and, the representative of the PAC, SAIC and SWANU (which at this time was allied to the ANC in the Front rather than SWAPO).²

At a time when the ANC was consolidating itself outside the country, and had limited international stature the Non-Aligned Movement was one of the few international organizations (in addition to AAPSO and increasingly the UN) which allowed the ANC to present its case against South Africa.

It took the Non-Aligned Movement a while to determine its policy toward liberation movements. The Preparatory

Meeting for the second Summit Conference held in Colombo in March 1964 began to define non-aligned policy. A sub-committee was created to make recommendations on the participation of nationalist movements, provisional governments, and liberation movements. Nationalist movements in colonial territories and liberation movements were now "welcome to present their views" and the host country was instructed to "give them all facilities to do so" [Singham and Hune 1986:88].³

Although the Colombo Preparatory Meeting recommended that liberation movements should participate in non-aligned deliberations, there was some dissension among member states on the proper status of liberation movements within the Non-Aligned Movement [Singham and Hune 1986:88]. It is this disagreement which held up the participation of liberation movements in the Cairo Summit.⁴ The Conference resolved some of the dissension regarding the status of liberation movements. A recommendation particularly important to the ANC was the legitimating role the movement gave to the OAU in determining which provisional governments in Africa were to be accorded membership. This recommendation effectively legitimated the PAC's participation in non-aligned conferences in addition to the ANC.

Non-aligned policy on the participation of liberation movements was more fully determined at the Preparatory Meeting before the Lusaka Summit held in Dar es Salaam in April 1970. At this meeting the decision was taken to give

liberation movements such as the ANC a limited role in non-aligned deliberations by granting them observer status [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:I:166].⁵

The agenda at the Dar es Salaam Preparatory Meeting included a request for participation by the liberation movements [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:I:166]. A number of delegates felt the liberation movements should be allowed to participate in non-aligned meetings as full members since it was "unacceptable" for the movement to deal with the problems of decolonization, apartheid, racial discrimination without the participation of the "interested parties most directly concerned" [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:I:168].

This view was rejected. The Dar es Salaam Preparatory Meeting agreed that African liberation movements recognized by the OAU and those of Asia recognized by organizations and Asian states should be heard during the meetings and conferences of the movement, but they could not participate as full members. On the question of whether liberation movements should be present at Summit Conferences, the meeting agreed that, pending a decision being taken on the subject at the Conference by the Heads of State, liberation movements should be permitted to remain in the conference hall during the whole of the meeting at which their statements were to be made.

The liberation movements agreed to the conditions at the Preparatory Meeting in Dar es Salaam. At the third non-aligned Summit in Lusaka the ANC, PLO, SWAPO, FRELIMO,

MPLA, ZAPU and ZANU were what Sechaba called "guest speakers" and only addressed the conference in this capacity [Sechaba 1971a:8-11; Tambo 1987:64-69].⁶ The guest group also included representatives from AAPSO, FRELIMO, UNITA, the PAC, Austria, and Finland. Only the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, the UN, and the OAU were classified as observers [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:I:80,81].

The ANC has attended non-aligned meetings longer and more frequently than the PAC, and its delegations have consistently been larger than PAC delegations [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:I:131].⁷ At all Summit Conferences the ANC has participated as an observer, or it has participated as a guest at smaller non-aligned meetings.⁸

Singham and Hune contend the participation of liberation movements at non-aligned conferences as observers "is an important part of the functioning" of the Non-Aligned Movement because their statements provide up-to-the-date information of progress of the struggle, an indication of their needs "enabling the non-aligned to formulate action on their behalf at the United Nations." Liberation movements benefit by sharing their experiences of struggle with other movements and can gain the advice and support of non-aligned states [Singham and Hune 1986:104].

Liberation movements could not participate as full members even though the movement accepted them as the authentic and legitimate representatives of their peoples and supported armed struggle. The perfunctory participation of

liberation movements in the Non-Aligned Movement was only slightly less limited than their participation in the early years of the OAU when a representative of only one of the southern African liberation movements spoke on behalf of all of the movements (see Chapter 5).⁹

When the ANC attended non-aligned meetings as observers it was called upon to make a statement to the Summit Conference, but could not participate in its deliberations.¹⁰ It was outside the main conference sessions that the ANC held useful meetings with non-aligned leaders. During the Algiers Conference, for example, the heads of the liberation movements had meetings with Castro, Nyerere, and Gandhi [Sechaba 1974a:14]. It was under these conditions that the ANC addressed the meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:I:168; A.R.B. 1970a:1737,1738A].

7.2 The Non-Alignment and Anti-Imperialism Debate

The ANC's intervention in the theoretical debate over non-alignment and anti-imperialism began with the ANC's anti-imperialist interpretation of the Bandung Conference. It continued with its partisan interpretation of non-alignment which implied that the Soviet Union was the "natural ally" of the Third World.

The Bandung Conference was conceived as meeting of independent Afro-Asian states, and no other political movements were invited.¹¹ Bunting's glowing account of the

ANC's presence at Bandung ignores the fact that the secretariat to the Conference determined that observer status would not be granted to representatives of nationalist movements [Bunting 1975:206-213]. Many movements such as the ANC and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) went anyway, and accommodation was provided for them [Jansen 1966:187]. Moses Kotane, a leading member of the ANC's national executive and the General Secretary of the SACP and Ismail Ahmed (Maulvi) Cachalia, a leader of the Transvaal Indian Congress "managed to attend" the conference as ANC and SAIC observers [Sechaba 1978a:55].

Kotane's attendance at what Sechaba called the "Bandung Conference of Non-Aligned States" helped, according to the magazine, to "integrate the ANC into the world-wide anti-imperialist movement of our times" [Sechaba 1978a:55]. This anti-imperialist interpretation of both the political impact of Bandung and subsequent non-aligned developments was adopted by AAPSO and is an example of the anti-imperialist emphasis within the Non-Aligned Movement.¹²

The ANC's memorandum to the second Summit Conference in Cairo in 1964 explained "What We Understand by Non-alignment," but its definition was at odds with the interpretation of non-alignment adopted by the Conference because of its partisan support for the Soviet Union and its allies. The ANC contrasted the aggressive intentions of the "Western imperialist powers led by U.S. imperialism" with the "positive action to promote world peace and prevent war" by

the Warsaw Pact [SAFN 1964a:1,2]. The clear intention of the ANC's memorandum at the Cairo Conference was to support the Soviet Union and its allies within the Non-Aligned Movement (on the ANC's foreign policy and the Soviet Union see Chapter 8).¹³

At the third Summit in Lusaka in 1970 the ANC emphasized that it was "non-aligned but committed" [Sechaba 1971a:8-11]. What the ANC meant is evident by its statement to the Conference. It said the "pretexts" for South Africa's aggressive policies in Africa, viz., internal social policies which displease it, "fighting communism," and being "asked" to intervene were similar to the "pretexts" which the U.S. used to intervene in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and in an apparent reference to the Marshall Plan, "slightly less openly, Greece" [Sechaba 1971a:9].

The role of socialist countries in the Non-Aligned Movement has been a controversial one. At issue was the ideological content of non-alignment. Did socialist countries have a right to call themselves non-aligned if they adopted a definition of non-alignment that was primarily anti-imperialist and effectively anti-Western, as opposed to the traditional definition of non-alignment as primarily a position of equidistance between both the East and the West? In his closing remarks to the Algiers Conference in 1973 President Boumedienne paid homage to the Russian Revolution and the emergence of the "Socialist camp" as one of the important factors aiding the growth of national liberation

movements in colonial territories and in minority-ruled states [ACR 1973-74:B12,B13]. It is not socialist support for armed struggle which has been controversial within the movement, but the partisan support for the Soviet Union by its socialist members.

The period between the Havana Bureau Meeting (May 1978) and the Belgrade foreign ministers meeting (July 1978) was a time of intense lobbying to get Cuba removed as the host country for the sixth Summit because of its open commitment to Marxist-Leninist doctrine as a socialist state and close alliance with the Soviet Union.

At Belgrade the foreign ministers were divided on the very concept and orientation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Tito condemned the new forms of domination in the non-aligned world (and in contrast to the ANC later at the Havana Conference), and he condemned the increasing level of Soviet and Cuban interference in Africa: what he called the "new forms of colonial presence or of bloc dependence, for influence and domination." After three days only two countries (Tanzania and Afghanistan) to some extent expounded the Cuban thesis that the Soviet Union was the "natural ally" of the Non-Aligned Movement; over twenty other speakers reiterated the view that it should remain politically independent and anti-bloc in orientation [A.R.B. 1978:4943C].

At the foreign ministers meeting in Belgrade various alternatives to Cuba's chairmanship of the movement were discussed. Cuba's proposed chairmanship and its recent

intervention in Angola on behalf of another socialist state raised the issue in a new form. The ideological differences within the Non-Aligned Movement threatened to cause a schism [Singham and Hune 1986:178].

The ANC had recently opened an office in Havana, and Cuban advisors were involved in training Umkhonto recruits in the newly established bases in Angola (see Chapter 8). The ANC's close military relations with Cuba and this political challenge to Cuba's leadership explains the ANC's strong support for Cuba's role in the Non-Aligned Movement.¹⁴

The ANC strongly defended Cuba at the Conference of Solidarity with the Struggle of the African and Arab Peoples Against Imperialism and Reaction, held in September 1978 in Addis Ababa, a few months after the Havana Bureau Meeting. The Addis Ababa conference was held at the time of the Camp David peace talks. Alfred Nzo, the ANC's Secretary-General, spoke about the forthcoming Summit in Havana.

The "imperialist powers," Nzo said, "seeks to create a reactionary bloc within the non-aligned movement." They distort Cuba's role in the movement by saying its participation is incompatible with non-alignment. The forthcoming Conference "must advance the anti-imperialist positions of the Non-Aligned Movement so as to strengthen the world wide movement for peace, international security, and social progress" [Nzo 1979:4].

In Asia and Latin America, Nzo noted, imperialism is "fighting a rear guard battle" because imperialism is in a

world wide crisis [Nzo 1979:4]. "In contrast," Nzo said "the ever growing political and economic might of the socialist community, the great upsurge of the national liberation movements and the heightened struggle of the working class and other progressive forces in the imperialist countries themselves have fundamentally altered the balance of forces in favour of the forces of peace, democracy, national and social liberation" [Nzo 1979:2]

"Those who pursue the policy of anti-Sovietism under the guise of the reactionary concepts of 'super powers' and 'hegemonism,' Nzo asserted, "are causing great harm to the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, and anti-racist struggle in Africa and the Middle East [Nzo 1979:4]. This was a direct attack on the Yugoslav interpretation of non-alignment. According to this view non-alignment is a policy of striving for a position of equidistance between the superpowers. They are both considered to be imperialist powers and non-alignment opposes all forms of foreign domination and hegemony [Cervenka 1980-81:A54]

The sixth Summit Conference was held in Havana in September 1979. By this time the Non-Aligned Movement comprised practically the entire Third World, with Yugoslavia the only European member. It was held at a time when Cuba's political and military profile in Africa was the lowest since its intervention in Angola in 1975 [Cervenka and Legum 1979-80:162-172].

Cuba used the conference to try to increase its credibility with some of the moderate members of the movement which were critical of its military intervention in Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977-78. In contrast to Algeria's pronouncements at the 1973 Summit, Cuba's pledges of support to liberation movements was "conspicuously absent" from Castro's public statements in 1979 in the run up to the conference and he spoke more about international solidarity [Cervenka and Legum 1979-80:162-172].

The ANC's profile was higher than at any previous non-aligned Conference. Oliver Tambo led the delegation, and during the opening of the conference, the ANC spoke first on behalf of all the national liberation movements, and then again later, representing itself speaking on South African issues.

The major issue of the conference was the ideological content of non-alignment. The Cuban position, supported by many progressive states, the ANC and other liberation movements was that non-alignment is primarily anti-imperialist, effectively anti-Western, and that the Soviet Union was the "natural ally" of the Third World. The definition of "hegemony" was crucial to this debate. Cuba interpreted hegemony to be "Yankee imperialism" or "Chinese dirty tricks," while Yugoslavia interpreted hegemony to mean Soviet domination as well [Cervenka, 1980-81:A54; Singham and Hune 1986:180-186].

Tambo, in his address to the conference defended Cuba's role in the Non-Aligned Movement, although he stopped short of explicitly endorsing Cuba's thesis that the Soviet Union was the "natural ally" of the movement. He said Cuba as chairman "is precisely what gives the victims of imperialist domination great hopes about this conference and the future." Tambo defended the gains of the new revolutionary struggles such as in Nicaragua, which attended the conference for the first time as a full member, but he also pointed to Jose Marti in Cuba, and looked back historically to Argentina facing British gunboats in the nineteenth century, Vietnam's early refusal to ratify a treaty to become a French protectorate, and to the British battle of Isandlwana in South Africa in 1879 to explain his own view of non-alignment. "In essence," Tambo said, "we have all been struggling against the same forces, and we have all been fighting for the same thing, the right for our peoples to self-determination, to control their own land and wealth, to establish their own political systems and govern their own countries, to organize the economic and social relations in their society according to their own precepts and ethic, to live in peace guaranteed by an equitable world system of economic relations" [Tambo 1979:12-19].

What Tambo meant by an equitable world system was clear by his allusion to the Algiers Summit and the Lima Declaration at the non-aligned foreign ministers meeting in August 1975, which the ANC had attended. This meeting had set

the platform for the debate in the General Assembly in 1974-75 for the New International Economic Order [Tambo 1979:12-19].

Tambo asserted the centrality of national liberation to the principle of non-alignment. He said "world wide support for the struggle for national liberation is a striking feature of international concern for justice, human dignity and peace. In turn the national liberation movements feel a natural identity with the cause of liberation everywhere in the world." This was the basis for the ANC's solidarity with the Nicaraguan revolution and the PLO's struggle [Tambo 1979:12-19; Singham and Hune 1986:210].

The Final Declaration pointed to the revolutions in Nicaragua, and Iran, and the new treaties in Panama as positive factors in the international situation. The Declaration's emphasis on the "essence" of non-alignment was in fact a carefully worked out compromise between the Cuban and Yugoslav views. The Declaration said non-alignment involved the "struggle against imperialism, colonialism, apartheid, racism including Zionism, and any form of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as the struggle against great power or bloc policies" (emphasis added) [Cervenka and Legum 1979-80:34-38].

The Political Declaration did not include any reference to Cuba's "natural ally" thesis. This was part of the ideological compromise worked out during the conference. It did include a number of issues important to the ANC's

diplomatic objectives. The Declaration emphasized that the criteria for membership in the Non-Aligned Movement, agreed to in Belgrade in 1961, included the consistent support for national liberation movements [Cervenka and Legum 1979-80:C41,42].

The ANC has supported socialist revolutions and the new socialist states in the Non-Aligned Movement because they have brought tangible benefits to the ANC. The independence of Angola and Mozambique are obvious examples, but in addition the three new revolutionary governments at the Havana Conference, Grenada, Iran, and Nicaragua, all broke off diplomatic relations with South Africa. Havana's Political Declaration praised these actions and commended the decision by Iran's new revolutionary government to suspend oil shipments to South Africa, something the ANC had asked the Shah to do twenty years ago [Sechaba 1967e:6]. Two months after the Conference, in November 1979, Alfred Nzo led an ANC delegation on its first "working visit" to Iran. The ANC made later visits to Grenada and Nicaragua.¹⁵

The seventh Summit Conference was held in New Delhi in March 1983. The main tensions at the New Delhi Summit were the debate over the ideological content of non-alignment and differences over the future direction of the movement. A group calling themselves "like-minded countries," which were basically Western and capitalist in orientation such as the ASEAN states and Pakistan in Asia, and Zaire and Morocco in Africa, and Jamaica and Peru in Latin America coalesced in

opposition to the Marxist-Leninist and socialist members of the movement [Singham and Hune 1986:310].

The "like-minded countries" met together in New York prior to the Summit Conference, and in New Delhi continued the attack on Cuba's role in the movement. Oliver Tambo led the ANC delegation to New Delhi and spoke to the conference.¹⁶ He defended Castro, the outgoing president of the movement, and praised his "stubborn refusal to bow to imperialist blackmail," which he said, "constitutes a concrete expression of a fundamental principle of non-alignment" [Sechaba 1983b:9-14].¹⁷

The Non-Aligned Movement clearly distinguished between socialist support for national liberation struggles and Cuba's thesis that the Soviet Union was the "natural ally" of non-aligned states. The New Delhi Political Declaration supported Cuba's role in Angola. It was critical of the U.S. policy of constructive engagement and insisted that there was no linkage between Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops [A.R.B. 1983a:6786-6787]. The Final Declaration asserted "the struggle of the peoples of Southern Africa for self-determination is an integral part of the individual struggle of the people of the world against all forms of oppression, domination, inequality and discrimination" [ACR 1983-84:C14-21].

7.3 Non-Aligned Support for Armed Struggle

Apart from the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement was the other major international organization in the 1960s to support armed struggle. It would take the UN another decade to effectively come to the same positions as these two organizations (see Chapter 9).

In the early years the Non-Aligned Movement was of limited relevance to ANC diplomacy because East-West relations dominated its activities. Although the Belgrade Conference occurred one year after Sharpeville and its resolutions expressed opposition to racial discrimination, the main concerns of the Conference were nuclear disarmament and the division of Germany. The Conference was held only a month after the Berlin Wall was built, and in this period of East-West tension the main preoccupations of the conference was the danger of nuclear war and the division of Germany [Jansen 1966:306]. The liberation struggles in Algeria and Angola were mentioned, but despite African protests all other African issues were lumped together in a call for the "immediate termination" of colonialism [Jansen 1966:304].

By the time of the second Summit in Cairo in October 1964 the liberation struggle in Algeria was victorious, and the OAU had just been formed.¹⁸ The increase in African membership and changes in geo-politics contributed to a shift in the Non-Aligned Movement's international relations. "A thaw in the Cold War and the increase in national liberation struggles resulted in more attention being given to

anti-colonialism than to the East-West conflict which had pervaded the Belgrade Conference" [Singham and Hune 1986:89,90].

The Cairo Conference defined the Non-Aligned Movement's defense of armed struggle for national liberation. It declared "the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible" and affirmed the right of colonized peoples to self-determination and the right to take up arms against colonial powers that continued to deny their "natural aspirations" [Singham and Hune 1986:92].

The Lusaka Summit in 1970 indicated that the most serious international issues were Western intervention in Third World conflicts and the liberation of southern Africa [Singham and Hune 1986:107]. Summit Conferences usually consider the concerns of the host country. The ANC's provisional headquarters is in Lusaka, and the capital has been the home of many other liberation movements, but surprisingly little attention was actually given to southern Africa at the Conference. The Lusaka Declaration at the end of the conference stated "The forces of racism, apartheid, colonialism and imperialism continue to bedevil the world," but there was no particular reference to the liberation struggles in southern Africa [ACR 1970-71:C37-C43].

The Non-Aligned Movement's strong defence of armed struggle was reasserted at the Algiers Summit in 1973. Algeria's national liberation movement, the FLN, was admitted to the movement's first Summit Conference in Belgrade

[Singham and Hune 1986:120]. Algeria has been a long standing ally of the ANC since the early 1960s when some of Umkhonto's first training camps were set up there shortly after independence. Now independent Algeria was a symbol that the goals of non-alignment and national liberation were an integral part of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Algeria's President Houari Boumedienne defended armed struggle in his opening address and linked national liberation with non-alignment. Liberation movements, he said, "have been compelled to take up arms for their national liberation," but he added, "armed struggle must be supplemented by political and diplomatic action" [Sechaba 1974:20,21].

A Declaration on the Struggle for National Liberation at the Algiers Conference firmly indicated the movement's support for the right of armed struggle by people under foreign domination. It indicated the increasingly wide international recognition of the liberation movements as the sole legal representatives of their people, and said these liberation struggles were in the interests of non-aligned states to preserve their own independence. Because of "callousness" and "ruthlessness" the Western powers supported the white minority regimes through NATO so the non-aligned states should step up its military and political aid to the liberation movements and allow them to open up offices in their capital cities [A.R.B. 1973b:2977AB]. For the ANC the Algiers Conference "was an unqualified success. According to

Sechaba, "it showed a deep understanding of our problems and a sincere desire to help eradicate racism in South Africa" [Sechaba 1974:22].

The fifth conference of non-aligned foreign ministers meeting in Lima in 1975 called on the movement to implement the Declaration of the Struggle for National Liberation formulated at the Algiers Summit Conference. It especially supported the call for "maximum support" to the people of South Africa for intensified armed struggle and the creation of a Support and Solidarity Fund to increase the effectiveness of liberation movements (see Appendix 2) [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:III:1256,1257]. The Political Declaration at the Colombo Conference in 1976 affirmed the non-aligned countries' support for armed struggle [Singham 1977:244; Jankowitich and Sauvant 1978:II:840].

At the New Delhi Summit in 1983 Tambo explained why the struggle for decolonization and national liberation was an essential aspect of the struggle for and world peace. The "national liberation movements," he asserted, "though engaged in armed struggle, are an intrinsic part of the international struggle for peace: for security, the right to social and economic development and peace are dependent upon the attainment of independence... It was this common understanding between independent sovereign states and national liberation movements that took the ANC to Bandung and Belgrade and has led to our continued participation in your deliberations since then. Thus the struggle against

colonialism has been a primary objective of this movement, and must remain in the agenda until the last vestiges of alien rule are removed. By definition we are fellow combatants of people fighting for national independence, peace and security everywhere" [Sechaba 1983b:9-14].

7.4 Non-Aligned Movement and ANC Diplomacy

The Non-Aligned Movement itself could do very little for the ANC. It was important to the ANC because it became a kind of "clearing house" for Third World diplomacy on a number of key southern African issues of great concern to the ANC in two other international organizations: the UN and the OAU.

The ANC and the Non-Aligned Movement also had similar diplomatic concerns in many regions of the world. Both the ANC and the Non-Aligned Movement condemned the complicity of the Western powers in the maintenance of apartheid through trade, foreign investment and military collaboration. In the Middle East the Non-Aligned Movement shared the ANC's concerns about Iran's petroleum trade with South Africa under the Shah and Israel's military relations with South Africa. In Latin America the Non-Aligned Movement called for the end of economic and diplomatic links with South Africa and supported the ANC's condemnation of a possible South Atlantic Treaty Organization linking South Africa to Latin America in a security pact. In the Caribbean the Non-Aligned Movement supported the ANC's call for the end of rebel sports tours to South Africa.

The importance of international organizations in campaigning against apartheid dates back to the Bandung Conference. Bissell claims Bandung was the first international gathering outside the United Nations to deal with apartheid in a "substantive fashion" [Bissell 1977:20, 21]. In fact, Bandung hardly dealt with racialism and apartheid at all and black delegates played only a minor role in the conference [Kimche 1973:72; Jansen 1966:212,213].

Bandung was an important step in anti-apartheid diplomacy because the participants recognized that Afro-Asian diplomacy against South Africa should primarily be directed at the United Nations if effective international action was to occur on apartheid (see Chapter 9).

The Non-aligned Movement influenced the development of anti-apartheid diplomacy at the United Nations in a number of ways. First, non-aligned conferences were often used to develop common positions on southern African issues at the UN. The fifth Conference of Foreign Ministers meeting in Lima in 1975, for example, called for the non-aligned caucusing group at the United Nations to work for both the expulsion of South Africa and the granting of permanent observer status for South African liberation movements recognized by the OAU [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978 III:1256,1257]. They also condemned South Africa's bantustan programme which would lead the Transkei's independence in 1976 [ACR 1975-76:C33].

Second, the non-aligned states increasingly formed a caucusing group at the UN in order to influence the General

Assembly's agenda on these issues [Peterson 1986:40]. A number of the resolutions of Summit Conferences were incorporated into UN resolutions and the Summit Conferences endorsed UN resolutions on southern Africa.¹⁹ The Colombo Summit also called on the Non-Aligned Movement to cooperate with the UN Special Committee against Apartheid "in its efforts to mobilize international public opinion in support of the struggle for liberation" [Jankowitich and Sauvant 1978:II:840].²⁰

Third, non-aligned conferences often include topics not directly related to South Africa's isolation, but which were relevant to ANC diplomacy. The meeting of non-aligned foreign ministers in Georgetown, Guyana in August 1972, for example, included Working Papers on better non-aligned coordination at the United Nations, and a Working Paper on Decolonization [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:II:698].

At the organizational level, the OAU has attended non-aligned Summit Conferences as an observer since the Cairo Conference. The Preparatory Meeting in Dar es Salaam in April 1970 for the third Summit Conference stressed the need for greater coordination between the Non-Aligned Movement and the OAU in other international organizations (see Chapter 5) [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:I:172]. The Final Declaration issued at the end of Summit Conferences often express their support for OAU resolutions on southern Africa.²¹

The Non-Aligned Movement's support for OAU initiatives on southern Africa is far greater than the level of

rhetorical solidarity. Often, the Movement supports specific elements of the OAU's diplomacy. This has been particularly noticeable in the OAU's efforts to block major South Africa's foreign policy initiatives.²² This combined non-aligned and OAU diplomacy is therefore of great concern to the ANC.

The Non-Aligned Movement became an important source of support for the ANC's efforts to prevent the success of South Africa's efforts at dialogue and detente. At the time of the Lusaka Summit in September 1970 African diplomacy was concerned about the early success of South Africa's dialogue policy and the possible sale of arms to South Africa by Britain and France [ACR 1970-71:C37-C43].

The MPLA's Neto was the last speaker to open the Lusaka Conference on the first day. He spoke to the delegates on behalf of all of the liberation movements (an indication of the limited extent to which liberation movement could actually participate in the conference) [A.R.B. 1970b:1877]. At the OAU Summit held earlier in September Zambia's President Kaunda proposed to lead a delegation to Western countries to persuade them not to sell arms to South Africa. Neto asked the conference to appoint two representatives from the liberation movements to join the proposed OAU tour (this did not happen).²³

The fifth non-aligned foreign ministers meeting in Lima in August 1975 opposed South Africa's detente and instructed non-aligned ambassadors in Western countries to pressure these countries to isolate South Africa, support economic

sanctions and the arms embargo, and to expel South Africa from the United Nations [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978 III:1256,1257].

During the period of dialogue and detente the Dar es Salaam Preparatory Meeting in April 1970 and the Colombo Summit in 1976 supported the Lusaka Manifesto's formula for peaceful change in southern Africa. The Colombo Summit also supported the ninth Extraordinary Session of the OAU Council of Ministers in April 1975. This meeting led to the Dar es Salaam Declaration which endorsed the initiative by Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, and Mozambique to negotiate with South Africa to achieve a transfer of power in Rhodesia and Namibia (see Chapter 5) [ACR 1975-76:A66; Singham 1977:244]. Colombo's Political Declaration affirmed the non-aligned countries' support for armed struggle if the white-minority regimes did not accept the Lusaka Manifesto's offer of peaceful change [Singham 1977:244].

Since its founding the Non-Aligned Movement has supported the ANC's objectives of mandatory economic sanctions and the freeing of political prisoners. The ANC has not had to lobby for support on these general issues.²⁴

The ANC's primary concern in the Non-Aligned Movement was to draw attention to the role of the Western powers in southern Africa. The ANC's statement to the Dar es Salaam Preparatory Meeting in 1970 claimed South Africa's main allies, the "imperialist powers" of Britain, the US, France, Portugal, West Germany, and Japan have helped South Africa

became a "dangerous aggressive and expansionist state" in Africa [Sechaba 1970h:8; ACR 1970-71:C37-C43]. At the Algiers Summit in 1973 the Non-Aligned Movement's commitment to the struggle against apartheid was embodied in the Resolution on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in South Africa which was submitted by the ANC and unanimously adopted by the conference [Sechaba 1974:19]. It called for increased assistance to the "South African Liberation Movement" (stated in the singular since the PAC also attended the conference), and support for diplomatic and economic sanctions. It condemned South Africa's military expansion, and its Bantustan programme [A.R.B. 1973b:2979B].

The ANC's main concern in the Middle East was South Africa's relations with Israel. Repeated non-aligned declarations have condemned the Western powers, and Israel for their collaboration with South Africa by supply arms and helping the country develop nuclear weapons.²⁵

By the early 1970s the ANC was concerned about the growing strategic interests between South Africa and certain Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and after 1973, Chile) which seemed to converge in the proposal for South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO). At the Dar es Salaam Preparatory Meeting in April 1970 it claimed the SATO proposal was "part of the sinister plot against the national liberation struggle and national independence in Africa, Asia, and Latin America" [Sechaba 1970h:8,9].²⁶ The Political Declaration at the Colombo Summit

Conference in 1976 warned non-aligned states about South Africa's cooperation in a South Atlantic Treaty Organization [Singham 1977:248].

South Africa's activities in the Atlantic Ocean made the ANC concerned about its activities in the Indian Ocean. It was particularly worried about Mauritius where South Africa was developing trade relations, and more recently in the Seychelles where South African mercenaries participated in an aborted coup d'etat.²⁷ The notion of Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was first raised at the Cairo Summit in 1964 and has been an issue at most Summit Conferences [A.R.B. 1983a:6786-6787AB].

7.5 The Non-Aligned Movement and Support for the ANC

The Non-Aligned Movement helped the ANC with its general objective of isolating South Africa. In contrast to AAPSO, it has not supported the ANC in its rivalry with the PAC. The Non-Aligned Movement has adopted the OAU's recognition policy on liberation movements so both the ANC and the PAC are invited to non-aligned meetings as observers. The language of non-aligned resolutions is similar to UN resolutions (see Chapter 10). They advocate support for the "oppressed people of South Africa" or the "South African liberation movement," but stop short of identifying either the ANC or the PAC.

At the Cairo Conference the non-aligned states recognized the nationalist and liberation movements as the "authentic representatives" of the colonial peoples and

called on colonial governments to negotiate with the leaders of these movements [Singham and Hune 1986:92]. Significantly for the ANC, it did not specify which movements or organizations the governments should negotiate with in states where there were rival claims to representative legitimacy.

The Algiers Summit in 1973 explicitly recognized SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of Namibia's people [ACR 1973-74:C56,C57].²⁸ The Colombo Summit in 1976 also gave its explicit support to SWAPO, and following the OAU's policy, to the African National Council in Rhodesia [Singam 1977:244, 245].

In the wake of the Soweto uprising and the rise of the Black Consciousness Movement the non-aligned states did not wish to choose the winners in the South African revolution. The Summit's Political Resolution extended its greetings to "the South African liberation movements and to all those struggling against apartheid, particularly the Black consciousness movement in South Africa and to all those imprisoned, restricted, or exiled for their struggle against apartheid" [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:II:839]. The Political Resolution called on all states and organizations to increase their assistance to "the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements," but did not mention the ANC and the PAC [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:II:840].

The Havana Summit's Final Declaration stressed that the struggle in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was continuing in spite of the

internal settlement and it supported the Patriotic Front. It supported SWAPO against South Africa's occupation of Namibia, but there was no specific mention of the ANC or of South African liberation movements in the Final Declaration [Cervenka and Legum 1979-80:C34-C38].

By acclamation the New Delhi Summit in 1983 adopted "A Message of Support and Solidarity with National Liberation Movements" [Sechaba 1983b:11]. The message specifically referred to the PLO and SWAPO which was recognized as the "sole, authority and legitimate representative" of Namibia's people [ACR 1983-84:C14-21]. Both the PLO and SWAPO have been non-aligned members since 1979.

There was only a general statement of support to the "South African Liberation Movement" in New Delhi's Message of Support and Solidarity. Although the Final Declaration, in the wake of Umkhonto's "armed propaganda" campaign, specifically congratulated the ANC for "spectacular victories," it urged non-aligned states "to increase their assistance to the liberation movements of South Africa recognized by the OAU, to enable them to further intensify the struggle" (emphasis added) [ACR 1983-84:C14-21; A.R.B. 1983a:6786-6787AB].

7.6 ANC, Front Line States, and the Non-Aligned Movement

The New Delhi Bureau Meeting in 1977 recognized the Front Line States "as [the] strategic rear base for the liberation movements in southern Africa," and it reaffirmed

the movement's "solidarity" with these states. It called on the international community to help the Front Line States "contribute effectively to fight for liberation" [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:IV:2082].

At the Havana Bureau Meeting in May 1978 a decision was made to hold a special meeting to discuss the situation in southern Africa. An Extra-ordinary Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement's Co-ordinating Bureau was held in Maputo, Mozambique at the end of January 1979. It was attended by most of the Co-ordinating Bureau and OAU members. It was the first ministerial meeting to be held in the capital of a non-Bureau member. The struggle in Rhodesia was reaching its peak and the Bureau Meeting indicated the degree of non-aligned support to the struggles in southern Africa by the late 1970s [Singham and Hune 1986:193]. Its purpose was to develop a common position within the Non-Aligned Movement on the struggles in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa [A.R.B. 1979a:5150C,5151].

Singham and Hune contend that members of the Non-Aligned Movement in the region suggested that southern Africa be treated as a "total zone of conflict" rather than separate apartheid in South Africa, majority rule in Rhodesia, and independence for Namibia into distinct issues [Singham and Hune 1986:193]. Strictly interpreted, this position violates official OAU policy, and it is doubtful the diverse southern African countries in the Non-Aligned Movement collectively

supported this position although it has been the ANC's strategy for twenty-five years (see Chapters 5 and 6).

The relationship between the states in the region is more complicated than Singham and Hune indicate. Non-Aligned countries ruled by former liberation movements such as Angola and Mozambique, which are strong ANC allies, supported this position when they were still liberation movements. Angola, which is inextricably bound to political events inside South Africa because of the ANC training camps inside the country, still recognizes the relationship between the region's liberation struggles in a kind of "total war" strategy. Mozambique, however, because of its proximity to South Africa has changed its position on strategy and has backed the OAU's official "domino theory" of liberating one country at a time which practically means treating Rhodesia and Namibia as separate issues (see Chapter 5).

The southern African liberation movements, including the ANC and PAC, attended the Maputo Bureau Meeting, along with representatives of various international organizations. The meeting allowed the Front Line States, the liberation movements and the Non-Aligned Movement to "develop a joint strategy" toward South Africa and Rhodesia. This was becoming particularly important because the Patriotic Front, i.e. really the Mugabe's ZANU component of the front, was beginning to win the war [Singham and Hune 1986:194].

President Machel opened the conference. His address set the tone for the meeting, although it was too extreme for

some of the delegates such as Yugoslavia [A.R.B. 1979a:5150c,5151]. He asserted the Non-Aligned Movement was a decisive force in anti-imperialist struggles and the fight for national independence. Aware of the criticism over Cuba's role in the movement, he pointed to the socialist support for liberation movements, saying, there was a "natural alliance between the liberation movements and other world progressive forces" [Singham and Hune 1986:194; Machel 1979:12]. Machel claimed imperialism was the common enemy found in Israel and South Africa, and he saw "imperialist maneuvers" in the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe internal settlement and in the Anglo-American proposals [Machel 1979:14]. The ANC supported Machel in this view.²⁹

Since Mozambique was a key Front Line State and a new member of the Non-Aligned Movement, Machel's strong vocal support for the ANC was particularly important for the movement's growing international legitimacy. Machel asserted, "South African people under the leadership of the ANC are steadily gaining in awareness and waging an heroic struggle against the Pretoria regime," and he called for greater coordinated action for support for the Patriotic Front, SWAPO and the ANC [Machel 1979:14]. Machel, however, stepped back from exclusive recognition of the ANC. He proposed that SWAPO and the Patriotic Front be admitted as full members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and this proposal was strongly supported by Cuba, but his proposal did not include the ANC [Cervenka and Legum 1979-80:A165,A166].

In fact the Non-Aligned Movement's approach toward the liberation movements in Rhodesia could not have pleased the ANC. The Non-Aligned Movement explicitly accepted the OAU's policy on united fronts in its relationship with rival liberation movements, and resisted great power interference in its policies towards these movements. It was effectively Mugabe's ZANU which was winning the war in Rhodesia and forcing the government to the negotiating table, yet it was both movements through the Patriotic Front (which included the ANC's ally, ZAPU), which was recognized by the non-aligned states and not just ZANU. In the ANC's publicity and information there is no hint at the level of ZANU's military success. Sechaba continued to rely on ZAPU for its information on Rhodesia and only interviewed ZAPU leaders until after ZANU's election victory when Mugabe appeared on Sechaba's front cover. In public, however, the ANC was forced to shift its partisan support for Nkomo's ZAPU and acknowledge the Patriotic Front.³⁰

The ANC could be pleased by the movement's support for its basic view on the political economy of southern Africa which indicated that South Africa was a threat to all of Africa. The non-aligned states asserted, "South Africa was the last bastion of imperialism and as such was being used by transnational corporations and other big monopoly groups to systematically exploit all of southern Africa" [Singham and Hune 1986:194]

As a result of the non-aligned meeting in Mozambique the movement's members saw the direct effects of South Africa's destabilization of a neighbouring country. Many states committed themselves to providing more assistance for the struggle in southern Africa. The Maputo Communique emphasized the actions the non-aligned states could take at the UN in support of the liberation struggles in the region and give more support to the Front Line States [Singham and Hune 1986:194].

CONCLUSION

This chapter has stressed four themes in the Non-Aligned Movement's relations with the ANC. First, it has examined the limited participation of liberation movements in non-aligned deliberations. Even though the movement accepts them as the legitimate representatives of their peoples and supports the armed struggles they are waging liberation movements only participate in non-aligned conferences as observers or guests.

The limited status of liberation movements in the Non-Aligned Movement indicates the jealousy with which new states guard their independence and sovereignty. It also indicates the anticipated ideological problems which would arise if these movements were accorded higher status in the movement. The choice between rival African liberation movements is actually a choice for the ideological orientation of that future independent African state. The

choice is even more controversial because its geo-political implications can not be avoided.³¹

Second, this chapter has examined the ANC's intervention in the theoretical debate over non-alignment, anti-imperialism, and national liberation. The ANC's intervention in this debate was crucial to its interests because of the implications of the debate for the Non-Aligned Movement's support for national liberation movements. The ANC was as wary of a definition of non-alignment which undermined support for liberation struggles as it was of a definition of peaceful coexistence which limited Soviet support for national liberation (see Chapter 8).

Apart from a general support for world peace, the concerns expressed by the Yugoslav position on non-alignment are irrelevant to the ANC's interests. What matters to the ANC is that the Western powers have sided with South Africa in the struggles in southern Africa, and they have subverted the liberation struggles waged by the ANC's allies in Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East. The Soviet Union, its allies, and Cuba have supported the ANC's interests and the progressive and socialist states in the Non-Aligned Movement express these same concerns. It is for this reason that liberation movements such as the ANC are the allies of the non-aligned progressive states which want to steer the movement in a more anti-imperialist, and effectively anti-Western, direction. So far the majority of non-aligned states have resisted these efforts. The ANC's ideological

position is supported by only a small number of states in the movement.

Third, even though most non-aligned states do not support the ANC's ideological position, the movement remains important to the ANC. It supports the ANC's main diplomatic objective, the isolation of South Africa. It also acts as a "clearing house" for Third World diplomacy in the OAU, the UN, and more recently the Front Line States.

At a time when the ANC was consolidating itself outside the country, and in the 1970s when the movement had limited international stature the Non-Aligned Movement was one of the few international organizations which allowed the ANC to present its case against South Africa. The ANC (and admittedly the PAC) benefit from the movement's general opposition to apartheid as part of its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist commitment. Observer status has allowed the ANC to present its particular interests to the non-aligned states and influence the kind of diplomatic support they give to its anti-apartheid diplomacy. The ANC's particular position on the kinds of sanctions it would like to see implemented, warnings about South African activities in southern Africa, in Latin America, Asian and the Indian Ocean, and in the Middle East have all been reflected in non-aligned positions on southern African issues. The Non-Aligned Movement has been an important vehicle to mobilize anti-apartheid diplomacy in the United Nations and in the OAU.

Finally, the ANC's observer status within the Non-Aligned Movement is an indication of its failure to convince the movement of its right to exclusive international legitimacy. It endorsed only the African National Council or the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia. The Non-Aligned Movement has accorded full membership only to South Vietnam's provisional government, the PLO, and SWAPO.

In other words the Non-Aligned Movement has given sole legitimacy only to liberation movement's without serious rivals, and has adopted the OAU's policy toward African liberation movements. It has been forced to follow the lead of the Front Line States in developments in southern Africa. The rivalry between the ANC and the PAC is an impediment to the ANC's greater participation in the Non-Aligned Movement. The OAU has effectively operated as a "diplomatic break" on the ANC's closer relations with the movement.

END NOTES

1. This is contradicted by Pachai [1971:211] who state that Yusuf Dadoo and G.M. Naicker attended the conference, but Jansen's argument is based on conference documents.
2. Sam Nujoma, SWAPO's representative, was listed separately. Marcellino Dos Santos, representing CONCP, also attended [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:I:29,30].
3. The sub-committee's immediate recommendations were to invite Nyasaland (Malawi), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and British Guiana (Guyana) to the Summit Conference in Cairo.
4. According to the non-aligned records the ANC did not send observers to the second Summit Conference, but it did submit a memorandum (see Section 7.2) [SAFN 1964a:1-6].

5. Non-Aligned documents have a category called National Liberation Movements as part of the Record of Participation. The categories of "observer" and "guest" appear separately.

6. In fact the ANC's status at non-aligned conferences had changed. In Belgrade the ANC was classified as an observer, but in Lusaka the ANC was demoted and classified as a guest. The change in the ANC's status is surprising. The conference was held in the capital where the ANC has its provisional headquarters and the ANC sent one of its largest diplomatic delegations to a non-aligned conference: Oliver Tambo, Tennyson Makiwane, Duma Nokwe, J. Mtungwa, J.B. Marks and M. Msimang [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978 I:131]. It may not be possible to draw any firm political conclusions from the different designations of guest or observer that the ANC was given at non-aligned meetings. There is not any significant difference in how the ANC functions at non-aligned meetings because of the different designations.

7. The ANC delegation to Algiers Conference in 1973 included Oliver Tambo, James Stuart, M.P. Naicker, the Director of Information, George Mbele and Florence Mophosho, while the PAC sent only a two person delegation [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:I:392]. The ANC was the only liberation movement to attend the sixth conference of the non-aligned ministers of foreign affairs in Colombo in August 1976 (it was granted observer status). The Arab League, Islamic Conference and the UN were the international organizations which attended as observers [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:III:1362]. The ANC attended a non-aligned Special Conference of Developing Countries on raw materials in February 1975. The meeting was held in Dakar, and two of the ANC's diplomats from the Dakar office, Bruno Saliwa and Felix Ntsane, represented the ANC [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:IV:2055]. The Colombo Summit Conference created a permanent Co-ordinating Bureau. Under Sri Lanka's leadership the Bureau met regularly in New York at the United Nations and also outside the UN in a number of cities, particularly New Delhi and Havana [Singham and Hune 1986:162,163,170]. The ANC was the only liberation movement to attend the Co-ordinating Bureau meeting in New Delhi in April 1977 [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:IV:2081]. The ANC, PAC, and MPLA attended the fifth conference of foreign ministers in Lima, Peru in August 1975 as observers [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:III:1213]. Both the ANC and the PAC attended the seventh non-aligned foreign ministers meeting in Belgrade in July 1978 as observers [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:VI:10]. The ANC's representatives were Johnny Makatini, the head of the Department of International Relations, and Cap Zungu, the Chief Representative in London [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:VI:76]. The ninth conference of non-aligned foreign ministers was held in New Delhi in February 1981. The ANC and PAC attended as observers. The ANC delegation included Johnny Makatini, the head of the Department of International

Relations, S. Molifi, the Chief Representative in New Delhi, and Mrs. A.M. Maimang, the Deputy-Chief Representative in New Delhi [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:VI:376].

8. The ANC and PAC attended the Preparatory Committee Meeting in Georgetown, Guyana in August 1972 [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:II:690,691]. Liberation movements accorded recognition or consultative status by the OAU or the Arab League were invited as guests and also included the African National Council (Rhodesia), SWAPO, PAIGC, FRELIMO, ZAPU and ZANU, and AAPSO attended as guests [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:I:690,691; Singham and Hune 1986:110-12]. This was the first Preparatory Meeting which the PAC had attended [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:II:696,697].

9. The exceptions are the South Vietnamese Liberation Front and the PLO (and more recently SWAPO) which participated in the Non-Aligned Movement as full members (equal with states) rather than as observers like most of the southern African liberation movements.

10. The ANC was one of the fifteen liberation movements and political parties which attended the fourth non-aligned Summit Conference in Algiers in September 1973. The ANC, PAC, PLO, MPLA, PAIGC, FRELIMO, SWAPO, ZAPU, and ZANU attended as observers and made statements [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:I:190]. The Colombo Summit held eight sessions and in the first six sessions general statements were heard by observer countries and the ANC [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:IV:2125].

11. The Central African Federation (not the political parties opposed to the Federation) was formally invited to the Bogor Conference in December 1954 to show no racial bias, and to the Bandung Conference the following year, but the Federal government did not reply to the invitation [Jansen 1966:174,187].

12. Whether Bandung was a prelude to Belgrade is part of the debate over the origins of the Non-Aligned Movement and depends on what ideological emphasis the interpreter wishes to give to the movement [Singham and Hune 1986:67; Jansen 1966:2,223]. Typical of the way AAPSO (and the ANC) try to legitimate AAPSO's Afro-Asian credentials is Tambo's speech to the AAPSO solidarity conference in Lusaka in April 1979, "The Spirit of Bandung," when in fact the founding of AAPSO had nothing to do with the Bandung Conference [Tambo 1979:25-30].

13. The ANC referred to the Warsaw Pact's "decisive role" in preventing Western aggression against Egypt during the Suez Crisis, but ignored the invasion of Hungary; it referred to the way the Soviet Union "acted in a glorious and sober manner to prevent the U.S. war mongers from pushing the World

into the abyss of a thermonuclear war" during the Cuban Missile Crisis, but ignored the placing of missiles on the island [SAFN 1964a:1].

14. During this time tense before the Havana Summit Francis Meli, the editor of Sechaba, defended the role of Cuba and the socialist countries in the liberation struggle. In a book review examining the "Lessons of Angola," Meli asserted, "The power of proletarian internationalism, especially the support rendered by the Socialist countries to those fighting for national independence and social progress is invincible...The Socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, are our natural allies in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, racism and apartheid in our continent" (emphasis added) [Sechaba 1979a:31,32].

15. Nzo hoped Tambo would shortly lead a "high powered delegation" [Sechaba 1980:17]. In the event, it was the PAC almost a decade later, which eventually took over the old South African embassy building in Tehran [Tehran Times 1986]. Shortly after the revolution in Grenada the ANC Youth and Students Section attended an International Students Seminar in St. George on "the struggle against Apartheid, Fascism and Reaction" [Sechaba 1980h:21,22]. Nzo led the ANC delegation to Nicaragua in 1984 [Sechaba 1984c:24]. Tambo led an ANC delegation to Nicaragua in 1987 [ANC 1987a].

16. In 1983 India was going to be host to both the Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth Conference, two international organizations important for pursuing South Africa's diplomatic isolation. In January, two months before the New Delhi Summit, Oliver Tambo led an ANC delegation for high level discussions with the Indian government and heads of the Afro-Arab missions. The main topics of the discussions was India's support for the Front Line States and diplomatic support for South Africa's isolation [Sechaba 1983b:15,16; ACR 1983-84:A244,A245].

17. For an ANC commentary on the New Delhi Summit see Mayibuye [1983:5-7].

18. Because the ANC submitted a memorandum to the Cairo Conference the Non-Aligned Movement's records may be incorrect. Mzwai Piliso and Alfred Nzo set up the ANC's Cairo office earlier that year it would have been easy for them to attend as observers.

19. Resolutions at the Cairo Conference were later adopted at the UN: the suspension of diplomatic relations with Portugal because of its repression in Mozambique and Angola, and relations with South Africa because of apartheid. The Declaration at the Colombo Summit Conference in 1976 supported the General Assembly resolution declaring South Africa to be an illegitimate state and apartheid a crime

against humanity (Res. 3411 G) [Singham 1977:246]. The New Delhi Bureau Meeting in April 1977 affirmed the General Assembly's condemned South Africa's bantustan programme. The Transkei became independent the previous year and now the second homeland, Bophuthatswana, was scheduled for independence in about six months time, in December 1977.

20. The Political Declaration at the Colombo Summit called attention to the International Seminar Against Apartheid in Havana in May 1976, the International Symposium on Zionism and Racism in Tripoli in July 1976, and the World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination to be held in Accra in 1977. These conferences were linked with the Movement's support for the General Assembly which declared Zionism to be a form of racism (Res. 3379 of 1975), support for the International Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1963), and the International Convention on Repression and Punishment for the Crime of Apartheid (1977) [Singham 1977:248].

21. The Cairo Conference supported the OAU's proposal for a special bureau within the OAU Secretariat to implement sanctions in Africa [A.R.B. 1964b:164; Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:I:72]. The Cairo Conference called apartheid a threat to world peace and endorsed the call for economic sanctions against South Africa made at the second OAU Summit Conference held in Cairo two months before the non-aligned Summit (July 1964) [Singham and Hune 1986:92; Cervenka 1981:A50]. The non-aligned states also endorsed the "relevant" resolutions at the OAU Summit Conference in Port Louis, Mauritius in July 1976 [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:II:840,841].

22. The Colombo Conference was particularly sensitive to internal developments in Namibia and South Africa. In 1975 South Africa started constitutional negotiations inside Namibia without SWAPO (the Turnhalle conference), and inside South Africa the Transkei's independence was scheduled to take place in a few months time. The Declaration claimed the "pretext" of South Africa's "outward looking" diplomacy was to help the imperialists create divisions in the anti-imperialist fronts and liberation movements with the "evil intention" of establishing "spurious independence" in Namibia, Rhodesia, and in South Africa through Bantustans [Singham 1977:241,245].

23. Neto said it was "scandalous" that such a "flagrant inequality" of military equipment should go from the Western powers to Portugal and South Africa compared to the meagre military aid which is given to the liberation movements. He appealed for practical help; saying immediate aid was needed rather than pious resolutions. He urgently called for more money, arms and equipment [A.R.B. 1970b:1879,1880,1881A].

24. The first three days of the Cairo Conference in 1964 were overshadowed by Tshombe's unwanted arrival. The fact he received military aid from South Africa reinforced the ANC's claim that South Africa was a threat to all of independent Africa. The Cairo Conference's Final Declaration strongly opposed racial discrimination; it condemned apartheid as a form of genocide and a violation of the UN's Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The Rivonia Trial ended a few months before the Cairo Conference and it called for the release of South African political prisoners [A.R.B. 1964b:164]. Boumedienne's programme for the Non-Aligned Movement's support for liberation movements at the Algiers Summit in 1973 included, first, activities to mobilize international public opinion to identify with the liberation struggles. Second, aid liberation movements by providing information, opening offices in their countries and providing visas for members from liberation movements. Third, non-aligned member states should enforce economic sanctions against South Africa. Finally, the movement should work for the release of South African political prisoners [Sechaba 1974:21,22]. The Final Declaration of the New Delhi Summit in 1983 called attention to the UN International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions Against South Africa in 1982 and the upcoming Paris Conference on Sanctions in April 1983 [ACR 1983-84:C14-21].

25. See declarations of the Colombo Summit Conference. The Political Declaration at the Havana Summit in 1979 emphasized that the Middle East and southern Africa were the two main regions where national liberation struggles were still being waged and that Israel and South Africa were the main obstacles to liberation and peace in these regions.

26. M.P. Naicker, the first editor of Sechaba, attended the seventh congress of one of the main revolutionary organizations, the International Organization of Journalists, meeting in Havana the following year, in January 1971, and spoke about these developments. He criticized the complicity of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay with South Africa [Naicker 1971:12-14].

27. The ANC's Chief Representative in New Delhi first raised the issue of the extension of South Africa's role in the Indian Ocean at an AAPSO conference in New Delhi [Moola 1975:9,10; Singham and Hune 1986:307,308]. In 1980 the ANC presented a paper on "South Africa and the Indian Ocean" at a New Delhi conference on "Peace and Security in Asia" organized by the World Peace Council [Sechaba 1980e:14-16]. The ANC has developed relations with the revolutionary government in the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) which has spearheaded anti-apartheid diplomacy in the OAU [Sechaba 1978d:17-27; Sechaba 1981k:10,11]. It is also supported by the Communist Party of Reunion [YICA 1985:24].

28. The Algiers Summit Conference called on non-aligned states to support SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of Namibia's people in conformity with a similar OAU resolution, and to give material, diplomatic and moral support to SWAPO [ACR 1973-74:C56,C57].

29. In an interview with T.G. Silundika, ZAPU's Secretary for International Relations, Sechaba talked about the "hypocrisy of the Anglo-American proposals" [Sechaba 1979:22].

30. By this time even AAPSO, perhaps because of ZAPU's limited Soviet sponsorship at this point, had given up its partisan support for ZAPU. Shortly after the non-aligned Bureau Meeting in Maputo, in April 1979, an AAPSO conference in support of the liberation movements and the Front Line States was held in Lusaka. It pledged its support to the ANC, SWAPO and the Patriotic Front [Sechaba 1979d:20-24].

31. The debate over which Cambodian delegation to accord recognition (e.g. Prince Sihanouk or General Lon Nol) and the question of the participation of South Vietnam's provisional government indicates the problems which would arise if liberation movements were accorded full membership status.

CHAPTER 8

THE BENEFITS AND LIMITS OF PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM: THE ANC'S RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNIST POWERS

"The suggestion that Africa is about to be taken over by the Russian or Chinese Communists smacks of down right racism. [This] suggests that the Africans are paying the supreme sacrifice in the current armed struggle in Southern Africa not for themselves and the future of their children but for someone else."

Tennyson Makiwane [Sechaba 1969:10].

The ANC's relations with the SACP and with communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union and its allies, is the most controversial aspect of the movement's international relations in many Western countries. Many analysts such as Duignan [1985], Campbell [1986a], and Radu [1987] contend the ANC is for all intents and purposes a front organization for the South African Communist Party (Duignan and Campbell), or has already become a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party in all but name (Radu). They argue it is enmeshed a wide network of international communist front organizations, and its relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc is a simple patron-client relationship. In return for financial and material support from the Soviet bloc the ANC follows "every twist and turn of Soviet policy" and is as loyal to Moscow as any Warsaw Pact regime [Duignan 1985:294; Radu 1987:74].

On the opposite end of the political spectrum, Francis Meli, the editor of Sechaba has criticized the "right-wing politics and ultra-leftism" of Tom Lodge. Although in domestic politics Lodge disagrees with observers who contend the ANC is dominated by the SACP and is merely a front organization,

In international politics Lodge adopts this same position and explains the ANC's support for Soviet foreign policy only in terms of the assistance it receives from the Soviet Union [Meli 1984:23,24]. The problem with Meli's criticism is that he offers no alternative explanation for the ANC's foreign policy.

What is missing from both these perspectives is an analysis of how the ANC's foreign policy objectives are related to the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and its allies. This chapter examines the ANC's relations with the communist powers from the view point of its needs and interests in the international system. It first describes the kinds of assistance the communist powers have provided the ANC: propaganda and information resources (Section 8.1), education and training of cadres (Section 8.2), financial assistance (Section 8.3), and diplomatic support (Section 8.4). The rest of the chapter examines how the Sino-Soviet dispute affected the ANC's international relations (Section 8.6), and finally, how sections of the ANC have approached Soviet foreign policy debates (Section 8.7).

8.1 International Politics of ANC Information and Publicity

The ANC's general world view emphasizes its anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist commitment. This commitment is genuine and is an essential part of how the ANC wants to present itself to the world.¹ The ANC's opposition to colonialism and imperialism is part of its heritage as a

nationalist movement and can be found in the writings of former President-General Albert Luthuli and the speeches of Nelson Mandela, neither of whom with any credibility can be called a communist [Luthuli 1962; Mandela 1978].²

The ANC's foreign policy was also influenced in an anti-imperialist (effectively anti-Western) direction by three other factors. First, the failure in the 1960s of its diplomacy, in conjunction with other pressure groups, to influence world public opinion and Western governments (in the aftermath of the Sharpeville shootings and the Rivonia arrests) to impose economic sanctions against South Africa. Many ANC members, including President-General Luthuli, explained the reluctance of the Western powers to impose sanctions on South Africa to be a direct result of the fact that South Africa's major trading partners were the Western countries and that South Africa was integrated into the world economy (see Chapter 2).³

Second, the failure of the United Nations to take any meaningful action led to the ANC's disillusionment with international organizations. The Khartoum conference explicitly made this clear. The ANC consolidated its links with Soviet sponsored revolutionary organizations which were willing to aid the armed struggle after Morogoro (see Chapter 2).

Third, the unreliability of the OAU became clear when the Liberation Committee failed to provide the necessary funds and material during the Wankie campaign in 1967 (see

Chapter 5). This also contributed to the consolidation of the ANC's links with the Soviet Union and its allies. They were its only real source of financial and military support.

It is for these reasons that the ANC's anti-imperialist commitment was evident in its publications before 1969, but after Morogoro it became a more central feature of the publications of the Department of Information and Publicity.⁴ In part, this can be explained by the consolidation of the ANC's alliance with the SACP at Morogoro and the fact that key Marxist personnel within the ANC take a strong anti-imperialist position. Tom Lodge has argued, "There is no question that there is a strong Marxist element within the ANC and that the ANC lines itself up with anti-imperialist forces" [Cowell 1986:5].

The ANC's anti-imperialist perspective can also be explained by the fact that the main publications of the Department of Information and Publicity are produced by the SACP element within the ANC in conjunction with the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

One of the main ways the GDR helps the ANC is in the printing of its publications. The printing of Sechaba, the "official organ of the African National Congress," is at the GDR's expense and is one of its major contributions to the ANC (the GDR also publishes at its own expense the SACP's theoretical journal, The African Communist).

The ANC now has over twenty missions throughout the world and each month bulk consignments of Sechaba go to each

of these missions. Subscribers include public and university libraries (mostly in North America, Britain and the Nordic countries), and to embassies, political organizations, journalists, and individuals, mostly in English-speaking countries [Sechaba 1987b:27].

Sechaba has been printed by the GDR's Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the domestic wing of AAPSO, since 1967 [Sechaba 19811:2-4]. The editor of Sechaba has always had close connections with the SACP or the GDR. The first editor, M.P. Naicker, was a well regarded trade union official and journalist and had an overlapping membership in the SACP, the Natal Indian Congress, and the ANC.

The GDR's links with Sechaba were strengthened when the magazine's current editor, Dr. Francis Meli, became editor in 1977 after Naicker's death. Meli is a historian by training, having obtained his Ph.D. from the Karl Marx University in Leipzig through a dissertation on the Comintern's policy toward Africa. He is the author of various articles in The African Communist and Sechaba, and has recently published a history of the ANC [Meli 1988]. Since Sechaba is the "official organ" of the ANC, part of Meli's job as editor is to maintain the correct editorial line. Many of the major books published on South Africa are reviewed in the magazine and he is the author of most of these reviews.

Socialist countries also participate in the training of ANC mass media workers and journalists [Cervenka 1980-81:A142]. Sechaba's first editor, M.P. Naicker, and the

South African writer and ANC activist, Alex La Guma, were participants in the International Organization of Journalists based in Prague [Naicker 1971:12-14; Sechaba 1972i:38,39]. A South African Journalists' Circle was formed within the IOJ which includes the editor of Sechaba (first Naicker and now Meli) in order to develop a common "anti-imperialist" perspective in journalism [Naicker 1971:12-14]. In 1983 the South African Journalists Circle and the Association of Journalists of the GDR signed a five year agreement to develop a common approach in journalism [Sechaba 1983c:22,23]. This includes the training of ANC journalists, some of which takes place with ADN, the GDR's state news agency [Cervenka 1980-81:A142].

Through IOJ ANC journalists have participated in conferences and seminars through out the socialist community of states including Havana, Hanoi, Managua, East Berlin, and of course, Moscow.⁵ ANC journalists and South African writers with ANC connections such as Alex LaGuma (ANC representative in Cuba), Lewis Nkosi, Ezekiel Mphahlele, and the poet Mazizi (Raymond) Kunene (ANC representative in Britain, and later in Europe, during the 1960s) have also participated in conferences in the Soviet sponsored Afro-Asian Permanent Writers Bureau.⁶

The GDR's role in producing Sechaba and training ANC journalists is an important part of the GDR's general African foreign policy of supporting liberation movements. West German diplomacy in Africa during the 1960s and early 1970s

led to a convergence of interests between the ANC and the GDR which contributed to the ANC's participation in its activities.

Until the Basic Treaty between the Federal Republic and the GDR in November 1972 settled the issue of diplomatic recognition of both states, the GDR was denied recognition by the "Hallstein Doctrine" which forced African states to choose between the two Germanies in their foreign relations. The GDR could not compete with the Federal Republic's economic aid to Africa so its main opportunity for influence in Africa was to support liberation movements.

The diplomatic rivalry between the FRG and the GDR in Africa and the ANC's campaign for economic sanctions led (and still leads) to a common interest between the ANC and the GDR in disseminating propaganda with the interest of undermining West German diplomacy by pointing to the growing economic ties and military and nuclear collaboration between West Germany and South Africa [Cervenka 1980-81:A142]. Both the ANC and the GDR needed international status and legitimacy. The ANC supported the GDR's claims for diplomatic recognition and its interpretation of the main events in the Cold War, and the GDR supported the ANC's call for economic sanctions and helped the ANC with publicity and the education and training of journalists and cadres.

Although Sechaba's editorial line on foreign policy issues is related to its strong SACP and GDR connections, Radu is incorrect when he claims "the ANC has been as

consistently loyal to Moscow's policy line as any Warsaw Pact regime" [Radu 1987:74]. The rest of this chapter shows the specific policy areas where Radu and other analysts have exaggerated the ANC's adherence to Soviet foreign policy.

There are also limits to Sechaba's editorial support for the GDR and the Soviet Union's foreign policy compared to the support given by the SACP's The African Communist. In spite of the GDR's participation in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia as part of the Warsaw Pact, Sechaba was silent on the issue compared to SACP statements both before and after the invasion [SACP 1981:364-366]. In general, the ANC's views on the invasion became too entangled in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the ANC's rivalry with the PAC, and personality and power struggles within the ANC to draw any accurate conclusions about the ANC's actual views on the matter (see Section 8.5).

Sechaba was also silent on the invasion of Afghanistan and the crushing of Solidarity in Poland. The Kabwe Political Report, in the context of imperialist policies to "roll back socialism," referred only to the "complicated situation that arose in Poland," and the "offensive against democratic Afghanistan," hardly an unambiguous endorsement of Soviet policy toward either country compared to the SACP's fulsome support for Soviet policy [ANC 1985:27; SACP 1981:467-469].

8.2 Assistance in Education and Training of ANC Cadres

The SACP was instrumental in forming Umkhonto. Through the SACP the Soviet Union and its allies helped to put Umkhonto on a sound financial base right at the start of armed struggle. While Mandela made the arrangements to set up training bases for Umkhonto cadres during his Africa tour in 1962, Arthur Goldreich, a member of the SACP and Umkhonto went to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for the same purpose. Although his trip was supposed to obtain military assistance for Umkhonto, including explosives for sabotage, Goldreich tried to convince the Soviets to directly intervene in South Africa [Feit 1971:232]. They declined and only promised military assistance.⁷ Reportedly, they gave Goldreich \$2.8 million on his tour [Davis 1987:16]. Braam Fisher also acknowledged during his trial that the SACP was an important conduit for bringing foreign funds into the country [Davis 1987:16].

More direct appeals were also made. Oliver Tambo says he went to the Soviet Union for the first time in 1963. He does not acknowledge he was accompanied by Moses Kotane and Duma Nokwe, although Bunting [1975:212] states the three of them went together. According to Tambo he received \$20,000 from the Soviet Union after going to the United States in 1960 where he received nothing [Uhlig, 1986:156]. In fact, this does not appear to be true. The American funds he received were used for the All-In Africa conference in 1961 (see Chapter 10).

Prior to the Sino-Soviet split China was also an important source for training and funds. After going to the Soviet Union in 1963 Tambo travelled to China where he received some funds [Uhlig 1986:156]. Both J.B. Marks and Joe Slovo, on instructions from the Central Committee, left South Africa at the end of May 1963.⁸ J.B. Marks, who along with Oliver Tambo was responsible for supervising Umkhonto's activities abroad, went to China.⁹ He arrived in June, ostensibly for a rally commemorating South African Freedom Day sponsored by the Chinese-African Peoples' Friendship Association, and the Solidarity Committee connected to AAPSO [Afro-Asian Bulletin 1963:69].¹⁰

Key ANC personnel were trained at the Nanking military Academy in 1962 including Johnny Makatini, the director the Department of International Affairs (before his death in 1988); Joe Gqabi, the ANC's Chief Representative in Harare who was assassinated in 1981; and Chris Hani, Umkhonto's current Deputy-Commander [Gastrow 1988:191; Mayibuye 1981a:3,4; Sechaba 1989:31].

Soviet bloc para-military training took place in Cuba, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (about 60 people in each country including Joe Modise, Umkhonto's current commander, who was trained in Czechoslovakia in 1963). For more advanced training recruits went to the Soviet Union (Modise went for further training and returned to Tanzania in 1964) [Africa Confidential 1965:2; Gastrow 1987:191].

Umkhonto training bases in Africa in the early 1960s were mainly in North Africa. By 1964 recruits were being trained in Egypt (about 25), in Algeria (about 50-70), and smaller numbers in Ethiopia, Ghana (organized by the Bureau of African Affairs, but with Soviet instructors), in Morocco and Tanzania [Africa Confidential 1963d:1; Africa Confidential 1965:2; Feit 1971:234].

The Chinese and Soviet financial and training arrangements appear to have been the preliminary work for bringing the ANC's main training camps closer to the arena of struggle by basing them in Tanzania (which became independent in 1961) and in Zambia after independence in 1964. According to Anatoly A. Gromyko, the Director of the Institute of African Studies, Arms, ammunition and some Soviet training personnel began arriving at newly established Umkhonto bases in Tanzania and Zambia in 1964 [Campbell 1986:41,91].

These changes may also have been in conjunction with the evolving policy toward liberation movements by the newly formed OAU. Although Dar es Salaam gained stature as the "home" of most southern African liberation movements after independence, the headquarters of many movements was to be transferred to Zambia after it became independent at the end of 1964 [Africa Confidential 1963d:1]. The ANC kept an "office" in Dar es Salaam and its military bases in Tanzania, but its "provisional headquarters" was moved to Lusaka (see Appendix 1).

After the Rivonia arrests the ANC needed to consolidate itself in exile and try to wage an externally-led insurgency campaign. The Soviet Union and its East European allies, particularly the GDR, provided the crucial financial assistance and the training and education to ANC cadres.

An important intermediary in this kind of socialist support were international communist front organizations (or revolutionary international organizations as they could be called), particularly the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) and its national Solidarity Committees in member states. Particularly important to the ANC were the Solidarity Committees in the GDR, the Soviet Union, and to a much lesser extent in other East European countries which provided a variety of kinds of help to the ANC mentioned through out this chapter.

In the mid-1960s the ANC became increasingly disillusioned with the OAU's Liberation Committee because of the political conditions it put on assistance (see Chapter 5). Its participation in AAPSO became a more crucial source of support because of its exclusive recognition of the ANC. AAPSO had competition when the OAU's new Liberation Committee was formed and the leading Casablanca bloc states, Algeria (a staunch ANC ally), the United Arab Republic, and Guinea held "a very secret meeting" of the AAPSO Secretariat in Cairo on 9 June 1963 to discuss help to the southern African liberation movements in an attempt to bypass the Liberation Committee [Africa Confidential 1963a:5,6].

AAPSO (along with the World Peace Council) jointly sponsored the Khartoum Conference of southern African liberation movements in 1969 which set up a special Mobilization Committee to provide assistance to liberation movements which also bypassed the OAU [Afro-Asian Peoples 1969:53-55; Afro-Asian Peoples 1969a:19; Marcum 1972:383].

South African political refugees first began to leave the country in the 1960s. The practice was started that refugees at the reception centres in towns in Bechuanaland and elsewhere had to declare their allegiance to either the ANC or PAC in order to go on to Lusaka and Dar es Salaam [Africa Confidential 1965:1].

ANC student work was mainly concerned with obtaining scholarships for these recruits to study abroad, mostly to communist countries which provided a large number of scholarships. These countries were prepared to accept students without previous education to matric standards. Already by 1964 170 students from the ANC's headquarters in Dar es Salaam were studying in communist countries [Africa Confidential 1965:2].

Sometimes the ANC Youth and Students Section held summer schools, such as the summer session sponsored by the GDR's Solidarity Committee in order to consolidate Morogoro's ideological perspectives among young recruits (see Chapter 4) or the first ANC students conference held after the Soweto uprising in Moscow in August 1977 [Sechaba 1978a:25-29].

Because of the large number of secondary and high school students which left the country at the time of the Soweto uprising more than arranging scholarships and holding a summer school were needed [Sechaba 1978a:25-29]. The GDR's Solidarity Committee helped to build the ANC's education centre on a site at Mazimba, Morogoro on land donated in 1977 by the government of Tanzania [Cervenka 1981-82:A195, A196]. The enlarged complex built in the early 1980s included the Solomon Maglangu Freedom College (SOMAFCO), named after an Umkhonto activist, and the Charlotte Maxeke Child Care Centre, named after the founder of the ANC's Women's Section. In 1982 the education complex had a budget of \$5.5 million [Harden 1985].

In 1978 a Department of Education and Culture was created as part of the ANC's response to the growing black educational crisis [Sechaba 1979k:23-26]. The crisis in education and the growing importance of township youths in the struggle "demanded a system of education," Sechaba explained, "which was an integral part of the revolutionary movement" [Sechaba 1979k:23]. The Department of Education and Culture determined at its first meeting in October 1978 that a primary objective of education policy was "to prepare cadres to serve the national liberation struggle" [Schaba 1979bk:24]. Since many of the youth and students coming into the movement after Soweto came from black consciousness organizations and not the ANC's tradition of non-racialism,

one of the principle aims of education policy was to educate students in ANC ideology and philosophy.

In order to develop the ANC's cadre policy a second summer school was held in Balatonzemes, Hungary in August 1980 [Sechaba 1980g:27-29]. After SOMAFCO was finished the new complex developed organizational links with the Political Department in Lusaka [Davis 1987:63]. It is reported that students at SOMAFCO are closely supervised, taught, and guided by a complex network of agents linked directly to Lusaka [Davis 1987:62,63]. Curriculum is fashioned by the commissars and teachers to reflect ANC goals. Subjects include the history of the struggle and an ANC-oriented survey of world affairs [Davis 1987:65]. All students receive ANC publications and are taught to think along the lines of ANC ideology, i.e. to embrace its commitment to non-racialism [Davis 1987:64]. SOMAFCO was the site of a major youth and students conference in 1982, where the ANC formulated its major cadre policy [Sechaba 1982:11].

Assistance in the field of education for students and (although Sechaba does not admit it) the military training of cadres is one of the GDR's main contributions to the ANC [Sechaba 19811:2-4]. The Eastern bloc, particularly the GDR, helped in education and training, but gave very little direct financial assistance (see Section 8.3).

In September 1981 Tony Mongale, the ANC's Chief Representative in the GDR, acknowledged that an "increasing number of our cadres" are being trained in the GDR "in

various educational fields" [Sechaba 19811:2-4]. The major fields appear to be Law, engineering, and natural science [Sechaba 1979:25-28]. In part, this may be a cover for the military training of Umkhonto recruits. According to Africa Contemporary Record Umkhonto recruits in the Soviet Union are openly identified with the ANC and the SACP, but in the GDR they train in civilian clothing under the cover of doing courses in agriculture at an agricultural training centre trained by East German and Soviet advisors [ACR 1984-85:B748].

According to ANC interviews (Nzo, Mbeki, Maharaj) the largest amount of non-military aid which the ANC gets from the Soviet Union is 150 university scholarships (and then medicine, food, and military trucks) [Witas 1985]. It is estimated that between 300 and 400 students receive scholarships a year to study in Soviet bloc universities [Davis 1987:62; Uhlig 1986a:156]. Karl Marx University in Leipzig, where Francis Meli was educated, must certainly educate quite a number of ANC students, at least enough to warrant a two-day seminar [Sechaba 1979:25-28]. In the Soviet Union student activities are carried out in conjunction with the Soviet's Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, an affiliate of AAPSO, the Africa Institute, and the Young Communist League [Sechaba 1968k:1-5].

The less publicized support socialist states give the ANC is military training to cadres [Sechaba 19811:2-4]. According to Secretary-General Alfred Nzo, the Soviet Union,

Cuba, the GDR, and Angola provide the main training facilities for the ANC with North Korea and Bulgaria helping to a much lesser extent [Distelheim 1986]. Nzo did not mention Czechoslovakia which has been involved in the training of ANC cadres since 1963 when Joe Modise, Umkhonto's current Commander-in-Chief, was trained there [Gastrow 1987:191].

For at least some Umkhonto recruits there is a country specialization in the progression of training: to Mozambique (before the Nkomati Accord) for political strategy, to Angola for weapons training, to the Soviet Union for general training including a platoon commanders course in tactics and artillery and an advanced infantry course for officers [Temko 1986:7; ACR 1984-85:748]. The best Umkhonto recruits are sent to the GDR for more advanced studies in communications, sabotage, topography, map reading, military engineering, political theory and what is called "conspiracy work" [Temko 1986:7; Cervenka, 1980-81:A148,A149].

The GDR's involvement in the military and political structures of ANC (and SWAPO) is part of its broad policy of military and security assistance in the form of advisors, party organizers and media experts to most of the Afro-Marxist regimes in Africa [Cervenka 1981-82:A196-197]. Neues Deutschland, the state-controlled paper in the GDR, claimed in July 1981 that 850 African freedom fighters were training in the GDR most were from the ANC and the SWAPO [Cervenka 1981-82:A195].

8.3 Socialist Financial Support to the ANC

It is impossible to ascertain the degree of the ANC's financial dependence on socialist countries. Even if such an accounting ledger could be drawn up, the political conclusions that would be drawn from it are not straight forward. If the actual amounts on a yearly basis are not possible to get, analysts have tried to at least estimate the general proportions of aid from different sources. Estimates vary wildly when there are no hard figures and figures are not directly comparable when they come from different sources.

Alfred Nzo has acknowledged that the ANC receives 24 million pounds (about \$38 million) from the Soviet Union annually in arms and other facilities [Distelheim 1986]. Depending on the exchange rate, this is a little less than the \$50 million, which is what Davis estimates as Umkhonto's budget [Davis 1987:66]. The Swedish ambassador in Lusaka estimates that the Soviet Union contributes about \$6 million to the ANC, mostly in weapons [Mufson 1986:22]. Davis estimates the ANC's non-military budget to be another \$50,000; so the entire ANC budget is estimated to be around \$100 million [Davis 1987:72].

Mufson estimates the ANC's annual budget to be roughly \$25 million to \$40 million a year [Mufson 1986:22]. Mufson's figures, although quite different from the estimate by Davis, is actually close to the figure given by ANC spokesman Tom Sebina. In 1985 he estimated the ANC's budget to be between \$20-30 million per year [SAIRR 1986:6]. These figures

probably represent only the ANC's non-military budget. If Nzo's figure is accepted as a general figure for the ANC's military budget then the estimates by Mufson and Sebina make sense and is comparable to the figure Davis gives for the ANC's total budget.

The ANC has a variety of non-communist sources of support. According to the Swedish ambassador in Lusaka, Sweden gives the ANC about \$6 million per year [Mufson 1986:22]. Uhlig estimates the Scandinavian states together give the ANC about \$20 million a year [Uhlig 1986]. The UNHCR gives the ANC about \$10 million per year [Mufson 1986:22]. UNDP, the UN's funding arm for WHO and FAO education and development projects, gives the ANC about \$1-2 million a year [YUN 1978:833; YUN 1980:236, 237; YUN 1982:306,307; YUN 1984:168; This adds up to about \$32 million a year so if Davis's general amounts are accepted, nearly all of the ANC's military budget is provided by communist sources and two-thirds of the ANC's non-military budget is provided by the Scandinavian countries and the United Nations. Smaller amounts are provided by the Netherlands, Austria, the World Council of Churches, Oxfam, various Catholic aid agencies, and India [Davis, 1987:73; Uhlig 1986a].

The aid the Eastern bloc states give the ANC appears to be mainly in kind because of the severe foreign exchange problems in these countries. The Polish Solidarity Committee has paid for shipping of Scandinavian food, medical supplies, clothing on Polish vessels directly to the ANC and other

liberation movements, presumably leaving from East German ports (in the past Dutch and Italian ships have also been used) [ACR 1973-74:A91].11

Examples of the in kind gifts socialist countries give to the ANC is the fertilizer, cloth and equipment for SOMAFCO donated by the GDR's ambassador in Dar es Salaam, the \$50,000 worth of equipment donated by the GDR's Solidarity Committee, and passenger vehicles donated by the Soviet ambassador in Dar es Salaam [ACR 1984-85:B749]. It is no wonder that an ANC instructor at SOMAFCO has said, "to the students, socialist countries are food, clothes, transport-everything they need" [Davis 1987:59].

Clearly, the ANC is strongly dependent on the socialist countries for its military support. It also depends on socialist countries for much of its education and training, and gets important in kind aid in the form of material and supplies. This is not a very surprising conclusion, although it must be emphasized, it is not based on any hard figures. The ANC, however, has always admitted the tremendous ("selfless") support it receives from the socialist countries; as it has been quite open about its close links with the SACP. Any more exact accounting of ANC finances is not likely to change this general conclusion.

8.4 Diplomatic Support from Socialist Countries

The socialist countries have given the ANC diplomatic support in a variety of ways. This section examines the

extent and the limits of this support. At the United Nations the Soviet Union and its East European allies have not only strongly supported economic sanctions in the General Assembly, but have supported "virtually every resolution condemning the South African government's racial policies" [Campbell 1986:89].

Socialist countries have also supported more controversial resolutions on issues related to ANC interests. The GDR was admitted to the United Nations along with West Germany in September 1973 and since that time it has been one of the ANC's strongest allies at the UN. It was one of the first states to ratify the Convention on the Persecution and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid when it was adopted by the General Assembly in 1973. In October 1978 the GDR was also one of the twelve states which submitted to the General Assembly a draft resolution on the controversial Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (see Chapter 10).

The GDR, Hungary, and the Soviet Union (Ukraine SSR) are members of the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid [Finley 1988:227]. They are the only European states which have been willing to participate in the Special Committee's work and actively support the Special Committee's activities [West Africa 1963a:393; A.R.B. 1966:582BC; Cervenka 1980-81:A151]. Socialist countries have hosted various meetings and conferences of the Special Committee.¹² The ANC, as part of

its more active role at the UN, participated in each of these events (see Chapter 10).

The ANC's first diplomatic contacts with communist countries at the multilateral level took place through international revolutionary organizations. The ANC takes seriously the role of women, youth and students, and writers and intellectuals in the struggle for national liberation and actively tried to use communist front organizations as a source of diplomatic support for its objectives. Each of these social groups has a separate section of the External Mission devoted to the development of its revolutionary role (e.g. Youth and Students Section, Women's Section, SACTU, Department of Education and Culture). At the international level each of these sections had connections with its similar international revolutionary organization (e.g. World Federation of Democratic Youth, Women's International Democratic Federation, World Federation of Trade Unions, Afro-Asian Permanent Writers Bureau).

The ANC developed international links with the Communist powers for the first time as part of solidarity and trade union activities in communist front organizations in the mid-1950s. The Soviet Union's reassessment of "bourgeois nationalist movements" after Stalin's death in 1954 led Soviet foreign policy to actively support these movements in the Third World even if they were not communist.

Walter Sisulu, Duma Nokwe, Leslie Massina, Lilian Ngoyi were the only ANC national executive members to participate

in communist front organizations prior to 1960. The other participants either belonged to a combination of the ANC Youth League (Makiwane, Kathrada), SACTU (Mkwayi), the CPSA (Kathrada, Massina, Mkwayi, Ngoyi), or later joined Umkhonto (Kathrada, Mkwayi) [see Appendix 5.4].

These organizations became more important to the ANC when the External Mission was formed, especially after 1964 when the ANC became an exile movement (see Appendix 5.5), but their primary benefit has been to provide the ANC with financial and material assistance. The diplomatic use of front organizations as a means of isolating South Africa and gaining international legitimacy have been far more limited (in spite of the extensive coverage the activities of these organizations receive in Sechaba).

First, the limited value of front organizations is evident in the ANC's African diplomacy because of the minimal role of AAPSO in African affairs. The early rivalry between AAPSO and Nkrumah's All-Africa Peoples Conference was over Nkrumah's attempt to keep Middle East issues out of African diplomacy. Ghana's support for the PAC and the gradual decline of Nkrumah's "conference diplomacy" helped to make AAPSO a key African international organization for ANC activity. AAPSO firmly supported the ANC in addition to supporting economic sanctions and armed struggle, but compared to the OAU (which shared the ANC's sanctions agenda, but also gave legitimacy to the PAC) it had very little support in Africa because of its communist backing.¹³ In the

1960s AAPSO's anti-imperialist priorities were consistent with Nasser's wider foreign policy, but after the Six Day War in 1967 (about the same time as the beginning of the ANC's armed struggle) it was mainly concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict [YICA 1974:576].

Second, in relation to the ANC's more general anti-imperialist diplomacy, the activities of communist front organizations marginalized South Africa as an issue until after the Portuguese coup, by which time they were too weak to be of much benefit. Revolutionary international organizations became dominated by the Soviet Union by the early 1960s. The diplomatic goals of these organizations came to reflect Soviet foreign policy objectives. In the Third World, in addition to limiting Chinese influence, the East-West focus of Soviet foreign policy meant the other Soviet goal in front organizations was to challenge U.S. foreign policy. Fighting apartheid was a low anti-imperialist priority compared to European security issues, Vietnam, and the Middle East (see Appendix 3).

The paradox of ANC diplomacy was that the very success of its campaign to isolate South Africa marginalized the issue in communist front organizations. By the early 1970s the isolation campaign had, within limits, been successful. At the diplomatic level it has been expelled from nearly all international organizations. It was shunned by NATO and could conduct only covert political and military links with Western

powers, and economic sanctions of various kinds were imposed.¹⁴

Consequently, in southern Africa there was nothing like direct U.S. military intervention (Cuba and Vietnam), or highly visible aid to a regional ally (Israel) to make the issue a priority in the struggle against imperialism. Portugal's direct link with NATO allowed the MPLA and FRELIMO to claim that the Western powers shared responsibility for Portugal's African wars. Once South Africa began to help Portugal and Rhodesia the ANC could plausibly also claim there was an "unholy alliance" supporting white supremacy in the region, but this was not much compared to direct or indirect intervention by the United States, the world's leading imperialist power, in regions of the world considered more important to the Soviet Union.¹⁵

At the bilateral level, the ANC has developed close official relations with a number of socialist countries. These governmental contacts have been a particularly important attribute of the ANC's international stature because until recently the ANC has been routinely ignored by Western governments except in Scandinavia. "If we want to go to Moscow," an older ANC member has explained, "they will meet us at the airport. If we want to go to New York, we will have to beg for a visa, if we can get one at all. A lot of it is as simple as that" [Uhlig 1986:156].

The ANC's governmental links with the GDR are closer than with any other country in Eastern Europe. Each of the

ANC's visits are usually high level including Hermann Axen, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Part (SED), the ruling party in the GDR, and members of the Politbureau. The ANC also has regular visits with party delegations, trade unionist, and youth organizations.¹⁶ The ANC has visited other East European countries and meets with their leaders [ACR 1980-81:B774].¹⁷ According to Sechaba, however, the ANC did not make its first official visit to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria until 1979.¹⁸

Socialist countries, particularly the GDR, have held a number of festivals and conferences as another form of diplomatic solidarity with the ANC. These festivals and conferences are particularly significant part of the GDR's diplomacy. Compared to Soviet support (which is mainly through government channels), what is particularly noteworthy about the GDR's support is the open public involvement in ANC solidarity. The Soviet Union makes little effort to involve the public directly in its aid-giving or solidarity appeals, whereas in the GDR schools and factories regularly participate in collecting money and goods in kind [Steele 1983:173].

These GDR solidarity activities are centred on a theme particularly vital to the ANC's diplomatic interests. A number of conferences and seminars have been held in the GDR on issues related to sanctions and South Africa's diplomatic isolation, West Germany's economic, military, and nuclear collaboration with South Africa, South Africa's violation of

the UN Declaration of Human Rights, and the granting of prisoner of war status to Umkhonto soldiers. Each of these themes has relevance to the mobilization of international support against apartheid beyond the community of socialist states, especially at the UN. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the GDR has been crucial in organizing these activities which often include ANC national executive members and the ANC's Youth and Students Section.¹⁹

The ANC, has attended the celebrations of the Great October Socialist Revolution since the late 1960s [Sechaba 1968k:2]. It has attended the CPSU Congresses in 1971, 1976, and 1981, but on these occasions the PAIGC and SWAPO have been given, to some extent, preferential treatment. The PAIGC was the only southern African liberation movement to address a Congress (1971). The ANC and the other movements addressed party organizations. The ANC also attended the decennial celebrations of 1972 and 1982; the PAIGC spoke at the first and the ANC and SWAPO at the second [Golan 1988:273,289].

Like other southern African liberation movements, the ANC makes regular visits to the Soviet Union at least once or twice a year [Galan 1988:288]. The visiting delegations are usually led by high level personnel such as President Tambo, Secretary-General Nzo, and the director of the Department of International Affairs (Josiah Jele, and later, Johnny Makatini). They are usually the guests of the Soviet Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Committee [Galan 1988:273]. They meet with Boris Ponomarev, the leader of the Central

Committee's International Department and R.A. Ul'ianovskii or K.N. Brutents, both deputy heads in the Third World section of the Central Committee's International Department. On one occasion (1971) the ANC met party secretary K. Katushev [Golan 1988:273].²⁰ ANC leaders also met with Podgorny during his 1977 Africa trip [Golan 1988:288].

While in the Soviet Union ANC leaders often make use of Radio Moscow to present their views of the South African situation. These broadcasts have a degree of reciprocity since they usually include an expression of the ANC's support for a particular current issue in Soviet foreign policy such as the condemnation of China's invasion of Vietnam.²¹

8.5 ANC Diplomacy and the Sino-Soviet Split

The ANC's External Mission was formed at a time when it was still possible to talk about world communism as a coherent international movement committed to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. The differences between the Soviet Union and China which would later turn these two communist powers into bitter rivals were beginning to surface, but there was no indication these differences would affect their support for liberation movements.

In the wake of Khruschev's signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the Soviet Union became increasingly faced with a major security threat and ideological challenge to its leadership of the world communist movement by China. It openly tried to split political parties throughout the

Third World which increasingly began to divide into those which took a pro-Soviet or pro-Chinese line [Larkin 1971:63; Steele 1983:131].

"The most clear cut of these cases [was] South Africa. China had taken pains to accord the [PAC] and [ANC] equal treatment, but the [SACP], with an important stake in the [ANC], took the Soviet side in the dispute" [Larkin 1971:17]. The Sino-Soviet split forced the ANC to choose between the two communist powers at the same time it was trying to recover from the devastating losses following Rivonia.

Due to the SACP's close Soviet ties, the ANC's decision to support the Soviet Union, may have seemed like the natural choice for it to have made, but it was not quite as simple as Larkin suggests. The internal politics of Umkhonto are difficult to ascertain, but because of their background in the Mpondoland peasant revolt, Durban members of the SACP in Umkhonto tended to take a Maoist line in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Other SACP members were also impressed (Lodge says mistakenly so) with the possibilities for peasant rebellion [Lodge 1983:234]. The earliest foreign training of some of Umkhonto's recruits such as Joe Gqabi, who had first hand experience of the Pondoland uprising in the Transkei, and Johanny Makatini who later became head of the Department of International Affairs, were in China [Lodge 1983:235].

Other factors tended to "push" the ANC in the Soviet direction. China's purchase of South African maize during this period, and allegations that South Africa was China's

largest trading partner in Africa, despite repeated denials, certainly influenced the ANC, but probably were not decisive.²² Yusuf Dadoo, during a trip to India, simply denied that the charges were true [Africa Recorder 1964a:902]. Domestic developments in China also led the ANC in the Soviet direction. The Cultural Revolution turned China inward and between September 1966 and the end of 1968 so few delegations from liberation movements went there [Ogunsanwo 1974:232].

In spite of these factors which led the ANC to support the Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet dispute, the pressure to adopt a hard-line pro-Soviet position remained unsettling within the military wing, and in the External Mission. The evidence provided by dissident ANC members must be treated circumspectly, but the Umkhonto recruits who fled to Kenya in 1968 from a military training camp in Tanzania issued a statement in 1969 in which they complained about the way the Sino-Soviet dispute had affected ANC policy: "Whoever spoke against the Kremlin and its policies was branded a deviate Maoist and revisionist, or alternatively an imperialist, and branded a fifth columnist, who was against the liberation of South Africa" [Gibson 1972:71]. China ceased to accept Umkhonto recruits for training as the Sino-Soviet dispute worsened, and by 1969 another group of Umkhonto deserters claimed that recruits that had returned from China were kept under surveillance for traces of Maoism [Gibson 1972:67].

The Sino-Soviet dispute also led to divisions within the External Mission.²³ Although Sechaba was silent on the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, it was left to Mayibuye to publish an ANC statement, a month later, justifying the Warsaw Pact's action. The statement was made by Secretary-General Duma Nokwe who first noted, "The Socialist countries are great supporters of the liberation struggle," and hoped their support would "remain unimpaired" by the events in Czechoslovakia [Mayibuye 1968d:13].

This was a time of intense Sino-Soviet rivalry and the invasion of Czechoslovakia was strongly condemned by the PAC [News and Views 1968:12]. This may have put pressure on the ANC to say something even though there were internal disagreements regarding the invasion.

The political sensitivities of the time led to some degree of ideological supervision of ANC publications. One clear example was in September 1968 when the ANC's Lusaka-based small weekly bulletin, Mayibuye, published an article comparing the U.S. Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba with the Soviet Union's blockade of Berlin. In the the following issue of Mayibuye Alfred Kgokong, the ANC's Director of Publicity, effectively retracted the one offending sentence by a twelve sentence "correction" justifying the Soviet actions in Berlin [Mayibuye 1968c:5; Mayibuye, 1968f:9,10].

The Kgokong correction incident (which occurred shortly after the Soviet invasion) shows the GDR's political sensitivities, and at the ANC's Morogoro Conference the

following year the Political Report only made a vague reference to justify the invasion because of "acts of provocation" in Czechoslovakia by reactionary forces [Sechaba 1969e:4].²⁴ A few months later the group within the ANC which was opposed to the invasion (and possibly wanted to form a united front with the PAC) issued a statement in the Tanganyika Standard praising the People's Republic of China on its twenty-first anniversary. The statement claimed the links between the people of China and the people of South Africa "would continue to grow" and that the establishment of the People's Republic was "a monumental and indelible achievement in the struggle for national independence and world peace" [Hutchinson 1975:239,240].

This group became the ANC (African Nationalist) faction which broke away in 1974. Alfred Kgokong, who was the ANC's Director of Publicity before Sechaba was started in 1967, was a member of the ANC (African Nationalist) faction. He was suspended from the national executive because of his attempt to organize an "anti-leadership faction" before the Morogoro Conference [SACP 1981:410].²⁵

Kgokong's possible unease about the Soviet line following the invasion of Czechoslovakia and his pre-Morogoro attacks on the ANC leadership explain why he was replaced by M.P. Naicker as Director of Publicity a short while after Sechaba was started. Because of the bitter recriminations following the split there has been little public acknowledgement of his earlier role in the movement.²⁶

Political disputes involve personalities and power struggles as well as substantive issues. Because of the way these events are inter-related it is wise to be cautious about making any definite political conclusions about ANC's views on the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Communist front organizations were supposed to be a main agent of communist influence in the Third World, but instead they became the main forum for Soviet and Chinese rivalry for the allegiance of liberation movements. The ANC's involvement in international communist front organizations was affected once China began to support the PAC.²⁷ A main Soviet objective was to gain control over communist front organizations in an effort to undermine Chinese influence. In addition to mobilizing international support against South Africa, one of the ANC's primary diplomatic goals in these organizations was to isolate the PAC. Because the PAC was increasingly supported by China, the Soviet goal of limiting China's influence and the ANC's goal of eliminating the PAC in international affairs (and gaining international legitimacy for the ANC) converged in a common policy between the Soviet Union and the ANC in front organizations.

The AAPSO was the main revolutionary organization whose activities were affected by the Sino-Soviet split [Kimche 1973:157]. After the ANC's Cairo office was set up, AAPSO which had its headquarters in Cairo, was the main front organization in which the ANC participated (see Chapter 3).²⁸

The Sino-Soviet rivalry broke out into the open at the eighth AAPSO Council Meeting in Moshi in February 1963 over competition between AAPSO and the World Peace Council for influence in Latin America [Kimche 1973:160-162; YICA 1966:518]. Oliver Tambo led a high level ANC delegation to the Moshi assembly which included Robert Resha, Tennyson Makiwane, Duma Nokwe and Moses Kotane [Tambo 1963:8-12]. Along with India, the ANC supported the Soviet position which insisted that WPC observers be given a hearing and a say in which organizations to invite to Latin America. The Soviets, Egyptians, and African delegates wanted a new organization in Cairo to absorb AAPSO (and incidently, eliminate the need to hold AAPSO's next Plenary Assembly in Peking in 1967).

The Chinese and the Cubans wanted to leave AAPSO intact and establish a new organization in Havana to act as a liaison between AAPSO and Latin America [YICA 1966:451-454]. In the event, the Chinese position to widen AAPSO's framework to include Latin America was adopted and a committee was set up to make preparations for a tri-continental conference for the creation of the Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization (ALAAPSO) in Havana [Kimche 1973:160,166,198-213].

The Moshi conference was one of the first meetings where the Chinese openly tried to split political parties. The ANC was able to block the PAC's request for membership, but the Sino-Soviet split was now beginning to affect the ANC's vital

interests in these organizations [Africa Confidential 1963:1].

One of the worst clashes between the ANC and the PAC occurred at ALAAPSO's inaugural conference in Havana in 1966 which heightened the level of antagonism between the two movements. Those liberation movements already recognized by AAPSO, which meant the ANC and the CONCP movements, were admitted. Their rivals, which included the PAC and the Non-European Unity Movement sent delegations, but were not admitted. The Cubans went through elaborate precautions to prevent the PAC from publicizing its presence.²⁹ The PAC's rejection from ALAAPSO was reinforced when its formal application to join AAPSO was rejected in April. Yusumzi Make in the PAC's Africanist News and Views condemned ALAAPSO's resolutions on South Africa as unrealistic and made a series of personal attacks on ANC or SACP members. Alfred Kgokong, the ANC's Director of Publicity responded in kind with a vitriolic article on "The Political Immorality of the PAC" in the ANC's Dar es Salaam-based magazine, South Africa Freedom News [SAFN 1966:1-3].

By the mid-1960s the rivalry between the Khartoum and Congo liberation alliance systems became part of the propaganda war between the ANC and the PAC as it spilled over into revolutionary organizations. The invective against the ANC by the PAC and its allies, the Bechuanaland People's Party, the Swaziland Progressive Party, and SWANU was maintained in joint statements which made repeated attacks on

the "modern revisionism" of the ALAAPSO's Havana meeting through the Hsinhua News Agency in Peking. These statements labeled Cairo as the centre of the pro-imperialist splitters which the ANC and its allies SWAPO, FRELIMO, and ZAPU were compelled ("deem it their duty") to defend in a joint statement [SAFN 1966b: 9,10].

SWAPO was still developing its international alignments and the ANC's solid position in AAPSO made the ANC an important ally for SWAPO in communist front organizations. At AAPSO's Nicosia Council Meeting in 1967 a clash between China and the Soviet Union ostensibly took place about where to hold the fifth Plenary Assembly (in Peking or Algiers) but much of the time was taken up by the credentials of rival delegations. The Chinese and the pro-Chinese delegations walked out after the SWANU representative was expelled at the Nicosia meeting. The Basutoland Congress Party, which was aligned with the PAC, walked out in protest against the refusal to seat SWANU because South-West Africa was already represented by SWAPO. After the Chinese and their allies walked out of the Nicosia meeting AAPSO lost any pretense it may have had as an organization promoting Afro-Asian unity [Kimche 1973:269]. It now represented only those movements supported by the Soviet Union. Subsequently, the BCP and SWANU issued a statement condemning the "Soviet revisionist clique" which had assumed control over AAPSO [YICA 1968:653].

Once the Sino-Soviet split had effectively divided international revolutionary organizations another way the ANC

supported the Soviet Union was by simply attending meetings. The ANC supported the Soviet Union in the Afro-Asian Peoples Permanent Writers Bureau. The AAPWB was started in 1966 and was an early casualty of the Sino-Soviet dispute. It quickly split into two sections, one pro-Soviet branch was based in Cairo where Yusuf el-Sebai, the secretary-general of AAPSO was also its secretary-general, and the other pro-Chinese branch, was based in Peking. At the time of the split, the ANC's statement defending Cairo from the attacks made by the Hsinhua News Agency in Peking said the AAPWB-Cairo, "although temporarily based in our continent [sic]," would "galvanize the anti-imperialist outlook of genuine African writers" [SAFN, 1966b:11].

The ANC participated in the ten-member Permanent Bureau of the Cairo branch [YICA 1971:753]. ANC representatives Mazizi Kunene and Ambrose Makiwane, and the South African writer, Lewis Nkosi, participated in the third Afro-Asian Writers Conference sponsored by the AAPWB-Cairo in Beirut in March 1967 which dealt with the themes of literature and struggle [Sechaba, 1967i:17,18]. The fact that the primary purpose of the conference was the Sino-Soviet competition was apparent from the general criticism of the conference that there was too much emphasis on politics at the expense of literature [YICA 1968:749].

The ANC also supported Soviet policy in front organizations through favourable publicity. Sechaba's coverage of front organizations, understandably, emphasized

the ANC's participation and its reportage usually exaggerated the importance of these meetings in world politics. Articles favourably explained Soviet Union's foreign policy objectives at these meetings.³⁰

Although the ANC supported the Soviet Union in international communist front organizations, it was not happy with the way the Sino-Soviet split diverted them from their main role in combating imperialism. After the Nicosia Council Meeting the ANC's magazine, Spotlight on South Africa, warned "unless the anti-imperialist forces are united, the lot of the oppressed African majority in southern Africa will become more and more unbearable and dangerous" [Spotlight 1967a:2,3].

South Africa Speaks, a Cairo-based ANC magazine, gave a lengthy analysis of the way the split was affecting the liberation movement. It declared, "Up to even a year ago [i.e. the time of the Moshi Assembly] we were so to speak [sitting] in on what we believe were ideological differences within the international communist movement, sincerely believing that this was not our concern," but now the differences over Marxist theory have spread to communist front organizations [South Africa Speaks 1964:5].

South Africa Speaks admitted, "The national liberation movement in Africa has been thrown into disarray," and in reference to the PAC it said, people who "have not yet reached a high standard of political consciousness" are "being used as instruments of spreading a certain line

connected with this controversy-a line that can only succeed in dividing the forces of the fighting peoples rather than consolidating their unity against the treachery of colonial domination" [South Africa Speaks 1964:5]. The editorial concluded, the questions [this great dispute] raises "should never have been internationalized" [South Africa Speaks 1964:5].

AAPSO's Moshi Assembly, ALAAPSO's Havana Conference, and AAPSO's Nicosia Council Meeting clearly showed that the ANC's rivalry with the PAC had become a part of the Sino-Soviet rift by the time of the Morogoro Conference. In addition to the ANC's experiences of the devisiveness within communist front organizations, the Conference occurred during the time of armed border clashes between China and the Soviet Union. Significantly, at the same time the ANC was drawing closer to the SACP through an alliance and consolidating its links with the Soviet Union, the Political Report at Morogoro asserted, "One of the greatest tragedies of our time has been the discord in the Socialist camp which has weakened the main shield of the peoples against imperialism" [Sechaba 1969e:8]. The ANC criticized the way this division spilled over into revolutionary international organizations, especially AAPSO. The "potency and effectiveness" of these youth, students, women, trade union organizations, the Report asserted, "have been unfortunately reduced at a critical time" [Sechaba 1969e:8]. These organizations were wasting time on disruptive activities which divided newly independent states, socialist

countries and national liberation movements while the enemy grew stronger [Sechaba 1969e:8].

These organizations "are not platforms for ideological and interstate disputes," the Report asserted, "but are an anvil where all anti-imperialists should try to forge their common weapon to fight imperialism. Difficulties there might well be between members of the anti-imperialist movement but these must never be made to appear more important than the historic and common duty of destroying the monster of colonialism in all its forms" [Sechaba 1969:8].

In spite of the ANC's reliance on the SACP, the tone of its Political Report regarding the Sino-Soviet split is in marked contrast to the SACP's strong support for the Soviet Union since the beginning of the dispute [SACP 1981:335-344]. The SACP's Central Committee meeting in 1967 spoke in strong partisan terms of China's "breakaway" from the principles of proletarian internationalism and Marxism-Leninism, its "villification" of Soviet leaders, personality cult, absence of "socialist legality," and the "disruptive tactics" of the Maoist group in international organizations [YICA 1968:525-528]. In contrast to the ANC's Political Report at Morogoro, at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in 1969 J.B. Marks, the SACP chairman, accused China of border provocations and of withdrawing support from the ANC and giving aid to the PAC, whom Marks described as "a group of right-wing renegades" in collusion with the CIA [Harmel 1980:162].

The ANC's disagreement with the Soviets over the Sino-Soviet rivalry in front organizations was not carried out in the open. At times, the ANC clearly adjusted its message on the Sino-Soviet dispute to the audience it was addressing. Alfred Nzo's partisan statement on Soviet radio in 1969, that the struggle in South Africa was being sabotaged by "Maoist agents" using the PAC, is one such occasion. Yusuf Dadoo attended the CPSU Central Committee meeting in June 1976 and stated, "the experience accumulated by us in Africa shows that the Maoist policy does great damage to the national liberation movement" [ACR 1976-77:B816,B817].

These statements are in contrast to the tone of the Political Reports at the Morogoro and Kabwe national consultative conferences. Statements from these Political Reports and the ANC's subsequent foreign policy should be accepted as having a greater degree of veracity than partisan statements or interviews given for specific political purposes.

What particularly worried the ANC was the way "imperialism," i.e. the Western powers, could use the division between the Communist countries to divide "genuine" liberation movements by "engineering" splits within the movements. At the time of Morogoro, Tennyson Makiwane, Deputy-Director of the ANC's Department of International Affairs in some of the ANC's own propagandizing, accused the West of engineering the split between ZAPU and ZANU and the

split between the ANC and the "so-called" PAC. "These splinter bodies," he claimed, "failed to win the support of the people" [Makiwane 1969:11].

Morogoro's Political Report was strident in its criticism of "charlatans and political careerists and renegades of all kinds" for being "frantically recruited and exaulted as revolutionaries and true representatives of the people" by the Western powers, and for attempting to "establish organizations which were merely factions or cliques" [Sechaba 1969e:8].

This warning became particularly relevant after the split with ANC (African Nationalist) faction and the Black Consciousness Movement in exile were formed. The Western powers were impressed with both movements as possible anti-communist alternatives to the ANC. At the Kabwe Conference the ANC warned that the West was trying to form a "third force" to undermine the genuine struggle for liberation (see Chapter 4) [Makiwane 1969:11].

The ninth AAPSO Council Meeting was held in November 1970 shortly after the coup d'etat in Libya which brought Col. Qadafi to power in what in Sechaba called the "new revolutionary capital" of Tripoli [Tambo 1971:4]. Oliver Tambo led the delegation to the Council Meeting. Libya, according to Tambo, had now joined the "vanguard of the anti-imperialist forces." Conscious of the damage the Sino-Soviet split caused at the eighth AAPSO Council Meeting in Nicosia, Tambo asked the meeting to "initiate a new and

powerful campaign to sink all differences, and forge a solid united front to all anti-imperialist forces" [Tambo 1971:4,5]. It was too late to patch up an Afro-Asian unity that no longer existed [Kimche 1973:169].

A combination of factors led China to begin opening up to the ANC. By the early 1970s the Sino-Soviet split had rendered most front organizations moribund. Soviet control of the major front organizations such as AAPSO, the WPC, and WFDY gave very little scope for Chinese activity. The American debacle in South-East Asia with the fall of Siagon and the increase in Soviet military capability by the mid-1970s which enabled the Soviets to dispatch troops to Angola and the Horn of Africa led the Chinese to consider the Soviet Union a more dangerous enemy than the U.S. [Yahuda 1983:200]. The PAC's decline in the 1970s made the Chinese wary of supporting it; reported claims in the late 1970s that the PAC was still receiving Chinese aid appear to have been incorrect [ACR 1979-80:A29]. This is understandable since Chinese support for the PAC gave them very little leverage in front organizations or any other tangible diplomatic gains.

In 1975, at the same time an editorial in the People's Daily claimed the Soviet Union was "far more dangerous" than the United States Oliver Tambo and Johnny Makatini were invited to visit China by the Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. They had discussions with Vice-Premier Chen Wu Kuei, and even met with Prince Sihanouk leader of Cambodia's government-in-exile, shortly before he returned as

the nominal head of the government of the newly proclaimed Republic of Kampuchea [Sechaba 1975e:35].

In January 1979 the ANC met another delegation from China led by Vice-Premier Li Hsien Nien, and China, according to ANC Secretary-General Alfrd Nzo, expressed its "readiness" to "normalize" relations with the ANC on the basis of China's support for the ANC's struggle, the ANC's policies, and "a common hostility to imperialist domination," a position consistent with the ANC's support for a united anti-imperialist movement [Nzo 1979a:13,14].

In February, however, China invaded Vietnam which ended the reprochement between the ANC and China. In a statement on behalf of the national executive the ANC Secretary-General accused China of "naked aggression" and said the invasion demonstrated that China'a approach to the ANC was not "genuine," but "constituted an attempt to organize the ANC into a reactionary front spear headed against the world progressive forces" led by the Soviet Union [Nzo 1979a:13,14].

Nzo claimed the ANC's international relations, were based on loyalty "to the principles of unity and solidarity among all forces fighting racism, colonialism, Zionism, fascism and imperialism." Because the ANC is "convinced that honest dealings must underline our own system of international relations," he explained, the ANC condemned China's invasion of Vietnam [Nzo 1979a:13,14]. This official statement at the time of the invasion was followed up by

similar statements during the ANC's subsequent diplomatic visits.³¹

By the early 1980s the immediate impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute over Vietnam had subsided and the ANC-Chinese reproachement was resumed. Premier Zhao Ziyang met with ANC and SWAPO leaders in Lusaka in December 1982 during an eleven state "good will" African tour [A.R.B. 1983:6716B,6717A].

8.6 The ANC, SACP and Soviet Foreign Policy Debates

Another way the Sino-Soviet split affected communist front organizations was over revolutionary strategy: what was the main characteristic of the current epoch, the struggle against capitalism or the struggle for national liberation [Light 1988:184]. When this theoretical issue was applied to Soviet foreign policy the central concern was the relationship between peaceful coexistence and national liberation.

East-West relations is the primary concern of Soviet foreign policy. At the twentieth CPSU Party Congress Khrushchev reformulated the "theory of the inevitability of war" between the capitalist and communist worlds to mean war was no longer inevitable. This change in Soviet foreign policy led to a change in revolutionary theory which became a central issue in the Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Third World because it was detrimental to liberation movements. Later, under pressure from the Chinese, the Soviet position changed.

Although peaceful coexistence was possible between capitalist and communist states just wars of national liberation remained inevitable because the nature of imperialism had not changed [Light 1988:182].

Because the ANC has such strong Soviet backing it understandably criticized the PAC at the time of the ALAAPSO Conference in Havana for not accepting the Soviet interpretation of peaceful coexistence [SAFN 1966a:4]. Gibson contends that in ALAAPSO, the ANC (along with Egypt and India) were important Soviet allies because they "argued for unity based on the maintenance of Soviet hegemony over the world's revolutionary movements. They rejected attacks on the concept of peaceful coexistence, the keystone of Soviet foreign policy" [Gibson 1972:124,125].

Maintaining support among liberation movements for the Soviet interpretation of the relationship between peaceful coexistence and national liberation was clearly important to Moscow because of its rivalry with China. In October 1966 a seminar on "African National and Social Revolution" was held in Cairo which all the Soviet supported liberation movements from southern Africa attended. The ANC and the SACP were represented by J.B. Marks, the leader of the SACP and Michael Harmel [African Communist 1967:14; Africa:National and Social Revolution, 1967].³² Subsequent conferences on revolutionary strategy for liberation movements were also held which the ANC attended.³³ All these conferences were subject of bitter

criticism by the PAC and its other pro-Chinese allies in the southern African alliance system.³⁴

By the 1970s official Soviet theory to support struggles of national liberation began to contradict the national image Soviet foreign policy wanted to project during the era of detente [Light 1988:222,247]. In other words, at the same time the ANC was preparing to fight a revolutionary people's war after the Morogoro Conference, the Soviet Union actually began to down play such wars in its foreign policy because it antagonized the Western powers. In fact, as one public indication, no African liberation struggle was mentioned in May Day slogans until 1977 [Golan 1988:288].

There is some indication that by the early 1970s the ANC became increasingly concerned about how peaceful coexistence and detente would affect the Soviet support for the South African liberation struggle. It has always been tentative in openly voicing its disagreements with the Soviet Union, and it can take a while for differences to emerge. The ANC's disagreement with the Soviet interpretation of peaceful coexistence came out into the open at the WPC's World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow in October 1973. Its large delegation included national executive members Alfred Nzo, Moses Mabhida, and Ruth Mompati, and M.M. Moola, its India representative [Sechaba 1974b:6].

Sechaba's report of the conference papered over the differences regarding peaceful coexistence and national liberation. The Commission on National Liberation at the

Congress prepared a document on "National Liberation: the Struggle Against Colonialism and Racism" and the ANC submitted a document to the commission on "South Africa and International Peace." According to Sechaba, "frank discussions" took place, but its report adopted the Soviet position which stated peaceful coexistence pursued by socialist countries is compatible with support for national liberation struggles [Sechaba 1974b:2-9].

Sechaba's account of the ANC's disagreement with the Soviet position did not emerge until the following year, at the large (500 members) WPC Council Meeting in Sofia, Bulgaria in February 1974. The meeting was pre-occupied with how detente would affect the WPC's operations, and the regional commissions on Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America did not hold their sessions until the third day (an indication of their limited importance compared to East-West relations). The main purpose of these sessions was to declare official WPC policy to liberation movements [YICA 1975:637].

The ANC's document to the Sofia meeting, called "Peaceful Coexistence, National Liberation and National Independence" candidly challenged a fundamental position of Soviet foreign policy. It asserted revolutionary national liberation movements find it difficult to "support the theory of peaceful coexistence among states of different social systems, whilst at the same time they are fighting life and death struggles for freedom and independence" [Sechaba 1974d:10]. In fact, this is actually the same position which

the PAC adopted at the time of the first ALAAPSO conference in Havana which the ANC at the time so strongly criticized.³⁵

The rapid changes in the mid-1970s began a period of more extensive Soviet involvement in Africa which made this disagreement irrelevant. The Portuguese coup, and the prospect of independence in Mozambique and Angola, and the Soweto uprising increased the prospect of radical change in southern Africa. The more intensive Soviet interest is reflected in the fact that African liberation struggles were mentioned in May Day slogans in 1977 for the first time when Zimbabwe, Namibia and lastly, South Africa were singled out. This occurred from 1977 to 1979 and then disappeared [Golan 1988:288]. Soviet objectives in southern Africa during this time were to increase support to liberation movements (mainly ZAPU and SWAPO), the development of self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist states in Mozambique and Angola was reflected in the development of the Soviet theory of "states of socialist orientation," and Soviet policy openly opposed Chinese and Western policy in the region [Somerville 1984:102].

Even during this period the Soviet Union's enthusiasm for revolution in South Africa was measured, and the ANC's real "natural allies" among communist countries were the GDR and Cuba, and of course its long standing regional allies Mozambique and Angola. When Tambo met Podgorny during his Africa trip in 1977 he said the Soviets were always willing to increase their military assistance to the ANC when they

were asked, but this comment was not reported in the Soviet media [Golan 1988:288].

The ANC's response to changes in the balance of power in southern Africa was to launch its "armed propaganda" offensive in preparation for people's war, the next stage of armed struggle. Its "natural allies" in this preparation were the GDR and Cuba, Angola and Mozambique, and to a lesser extent, possibly Vietnam. In the wake of the Soweto uprising the ANC began to consolidate a pattern of military relations with its main communist allies for the next phase of armed struggle. The ANC's skuttling of its recent reproachement with China during this time should be understood in the context of these vital preparations; any overtures toward China which could complicate these operations were not worth the risk.³⁶

After FRELIMO's victory in Mozambique and the consolidation of the MPLA's power in Angola, the ANC and SACP reportedly sent key personnel to establish bases in these countries. Oliver Tambo went to Cuba to discuss the role Cuba could play in the liberation struggle (see Chapter 6).³⁷

The ANC has had close relations with the GDR since the 1960s, but it was not until this time of greater military preparations, in November 1978, that the ANC opened up an office in East Berlin [Sechaba 19791:24]. The ANC's Chief Representative became Anthony Mongale, who prior to this posting was the ANC's diplomat in Rome between 1972-1978 (at the Kabwe Conference he was elected to the national

executive). Mongale's earlier comments about the increase in the GDR's training of cadres in the late 1970s helps explain the opening of the Berlin office (see Section 8.2).³⁸ It was during this time that the ANC began to make more public trips to the Eastern bloc (see Section 8.4).

Tambo also led a high level ANC delegation to Vietnam in 1978 and met with Major-General Vu-Xuan-Chiem, Deputy Defense Minister [Mayibuye 1978:1]. In late 1979 an ANC delegation led by Alfred Nzo met with the Commander-in-Chief of the Kampuchean armed forces [Sechaba 1979p:22].

The dramatic increase in Umkhonto's activities in the late 1970s brought no significant strategic changes for the ANC. Its attempt to base its operations first from Mozambique and then Swaziland failed because of South African aggression (see Chapter 6).

By the early 1980s the Soviet Union had become disillusioned with the revolutionary prospects in southern Africa. One indication of this was the disappearance of May Day slogans from 1980 to 1982 (they reappeared with a specific mention of Namibia, South Africa, and the Palestinians from 1983 to 1985) [Golan 1988:273].

Changes in Soviet foreign policy were also reflected in Soviet theoretical debates on national liberation struggles. One way of de-emphasizing liberation struggles in Soviet foreign policy was through the debates in Soviet literature on the prospects of these struggles [Hough 1986].

In addition to the ANC's disagreements over peaceful coexistence and national liberation, elements within the ANC and SACP disagreed with Soviet policy over the prospects of development for states along the "non-capitalist path" or "states of socialist orientation." By the late 1970s the SACP, or at least some its leading theoreticians such as Joe Slovo, differed with the official Moscow line on the progress of revolution in Africa. After the set backs in the late 1960s and early 1970s Soviet foreign policy was willing to support "bourgeois nationalist leaders" of independent African states (which corresponded with peaceful coexistence at the geo-political level), but South African communists "expressed critical views of the standard position taken by the organized world communist movement" [Turok 1987:42]. What concerned Slovo, Turok, and other South African communists was the way in which theoretical debates on the character of the African Revolution and concepts such as "non-capitalist path," "national democracy," and "states of socialist orientation" could be used "as a basis for questioning the prospects of the African Revolution" [Turok 1987:42].

By the early 1970s elements within the ANC and SACP became aware of how foreign policy and Marxist theoretical debates were being used to jeopardize the liberation struggle in South Africa. There was little they could do to change the situation except disagree within in the broad contours of Soviet foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

Any assessment of the ANC's relations with the communist powers must distinguish between the core foreign policy interests of the ANC and the core foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union and its allies. Where there has been a clear convergence of interests the ANC has unhesitatingly supported Soviet foreign policy because it advances the ANC's interests. This is evident in the close cooperation between the ANC and GDR in undermining West German foreign policy (and Western policy generally) because of its economic and military contacts with South Africa, and in the ANC's cooperation with the Soviet Union in limiting China's influence in Africa because of its relations with the PAC (or in the late 1970s, its ally Vietnam). Third World revolutions in Nicaragua, Iran, and Grenada have brought benefits to the ANC because of their support for sanctions. The ANC's adoption of the Soviet ideological line in the Non-Alignment Movement is understandable because of Cuba's support for the ANC and because this view coincides with the ANC's campaign against Western economic links with Pretoria.

Where the interests of ANC and Soviet foreign policy have diverged the ANC has followed the Soviet line reluctantly and disagreed in private. This was evident in the partisan political use of revolutionary international organizations, the marginalization of South African issues, and the down grading of liberation struggles because of peaceful coexistence.

Like most liberation movements when they are forced to justify their communist links, the ANC's constant complaint in the Western media is that they had no choice, but to go to the communist countries for support since nothing was forthcoming from Western countries. Nearly all the ANC's military support comes from the Soviet Union and its allies. The ANC accepted Soviet military support in the first place because it offered what was unavailable elsewhere, namely weapons. Tambo has said, "We can not boycott the Soviet Union. It is willing to help. A liberation group does not have the luxury of selecting" [Harden 1985a].

In the providing of education and training, material assistance, and diplomatic support the GDR has been the ANC's strongest socialist ally. The main way this assistance has been delivered to the ANC is through the Solidarity Committees of AAPSO in socialist states.

Apart from military support, education and training is the main legacy socialist countries will leave for a post-apartheid South Africa. The kind of socialist education which ANC cadres have received will certainly influence the kind of programmes and policies a new South Africa adopts, but after decades of apartheid (and Western opposition to sanctions) an anti-capitalist bias exists across the black political spectrum in South Africa [Siluma 1986:9]. The ANC's foreign trained cadres can only influence an already existing debate within the country on the socialist transformation of post-apartheid society [Raine 1986:9].

In the mid-1960s Africa Confidential warned the Western powers, "The ANC is now led by a group of serious men who are strongly committed to the left. They are trained if only because it is the Communist countries who offer enough student places, sizeable cadres of educated men who will tend to agree with their political analysis (some of course will reject it). If the struggle against South Africa goes on as long as we think it will without result there will be a large body of these men. Western countries could draw several morals from this-including the deduction that the freedom fighter movements are almost certainly to move further and further leftwards" [Africa Confidential 1965:2]. The prophesy of Africa Confidential has now come true. If the Western powers do not like the kind of post-apartheid society the ANC may want to create they have no one to blame but themselves.

END NOTES

1. For an important statement see Nzo [1970:8-11] which was reprinted in ANC Speaks [ANC 1977:74-84]. Anti-imperialism was presented as a central component of the External Mission's foreign policy in a recently published collection of Oliver Tambo's speeches, writings, and interviews [Tambo 1987:64-69].
2. Although the Soviet Union has a anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist foreign policy which supports national liberation movements and the independence of colonies, none of these positions are inherently communist or pro-Soviet.
3. Some kind of analysis of how economic factors directly determine politics must be defined as part of a Marxist interpretation; otherwise if it is admitted that in some general way that economics influences politics are we all Marxists now?

4. In 1970 the ANC issued the second edition of a pamphlet entitled "A Short History of the African National Congress" through the London-based Department of Information and Publicity. The new edition situated South African history and the ANC's history firmly in the context of international capitalism and imperialism [ANC 1970]. Although it is not acknowledged, the pamphlet was in fact the second edition of any earlier history of the ANC published by the ANC's headquarters in Dar es Salaam shortly after the Rivonia Trial began [ANC 1963]. The first edition emphasized anti-colonialism and the early efforts by Africans at resistance to colonial occupation.

5. In 1980 Sechaba was awarded the Julius Fucik Medal of Honor by the IOU, named after a Czech communist who was killed by the Nazis [Sechaba 1980d:1,2]. A year later the Medal went to Govan Mbeki [Sechaba 1981a:24].

6. In 1970 Alex LaGuma (along with the MPLA's A. Neto) received the AAPWB's Lotus Prize for literature [Sechaba 1971c:8,9].

7. The evidence for this point comes from [Walter Sisulu testimony Rivonia Sabotage Trial Reel 3:271; Govan Mbeki testimony Rivonia Sabotage Trial Reel 3:104; Nelson 1975:184].

8. A controversial witness at the Rivonia trial argued that the SACP's Central Committee agreed to send J.B. Marks, the chairman of the SACP, and Joe Slovo abroad to discuss Umkhonto's draft guerrilla warfare plan, Operation Mayibuye. Although this can not be confirmed, the need for these discussions to secure the necessary external support is consistent with the published version of the plan.

9. Slovo possibly went to the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc states such as Czechoslovakia to make the necessary arrangements for the further training of recruits.

10. The Afro-Asian Bulletin, an AAPSO publication, interestingly, called Marks the chairman of the ANC's national executive [Afro-Asian Bulletin 1963:69]. Mandela states that after returning from his trip abroad in 1962 he recommended to the ANC that the movement should send a mission to socialist countries to raise funds. He says he was told such a mission was sent after his conviction in November 1963 [Mandela 1978:171].

11. According to an East German captain who jumped ship in Hamburg in July 1980 it is at the port of Rostock where arms and ammunition being sent to liberation movements are loaded on to ships under cover of darkness after the harbour is sealed off by police [Cervenka 1980-81:A148,149].

12. Sessions of the Special Committee were held in East Berlin in 1974 [Sechaba 1974f:39]. In 1981 the GDR hosted the Special Committee's "International Seminar on Publicity and the Role of Mass Media in International Mobilization Against Apartheid" [Sechaba 1981j:11-14]. In 1979 the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and the Africa Institute hosted the Special Committee's seminar on "Role of Public Opinion in Support of the Struggle of the Peoples of Southern Africa Against Racism and Colonialism" in Alma-Alta, the capital of Kazakhstan [Sechaba 1979:11-15]. In 1983 the Special Committee went on a trip to Moscow at the invitation of AAPSO for consultations on the international campaign against apartheid [ACR 1983-84:B810].

13. At AAPSO's founding meeting in Cairo many of the states which had attended the original Bandung Conference refused to send delegates for this reason [Kessings Contemporary Archives, 1958, p. 6000]. In spite of Nasser's sponsorship, AAPSO was not particularly supported by the Africa's new leaders in the 1960s [Africa Confidential 1960a:2]. Until the OAU was formed African leaders seem to concentrate on the Casablanca and Brazzaville conferences since the delegates at the AAPSO meetings were second rate. AAPSO's participants were merely delegates from particular countries (or liberation movements as in the case of the ANC) and not government representatives [Africa Digest 1958:164, 165].

14. A voluntary arms embargo has been in effect since 1963 meaning no open military links are allowed, the British were forced to renegotiate the Simonstown Agreement.

15. The ANC's interesting use of the term "unholy alliance" goes back at least as far as the early 1960s when Albert Luthuli used the term to denigrate a succession of Botha-Smuts, Hertzog-Labour Party, Hertzog-Smuts governments [Luthuli 1962:85].

16. Josiah Jele, director of the ANC's Department of International Affairs attended the eighth SED Congress in 1971 [YICA 1972:288]. Oliver Tambo and Alfred Nzo led a high level ANC delegation to a "friendship visit" to the GDR in November 1972 for discussions with members of the SED and the Central Committee [Sechaba 1973f:13,14; YICA 1972:270]. The year 1978 was important to the ANC because it was designated by the UN as International Anti-Apartheid Year. Oliver Tambo led ANC delegations twice to the GDR in 1978. The first visit was in May and he was accompanied by Josiah Jele. They met with Erich Honecker the Secretary-General of the SED, central committee members and members of the Politbureau involved in the GDR's committee for the International Year [Sechaba 1978f:38-41]. Tambo led a second visit in November 1978 to open up the ANC's East Berlin office and met with Secretary H. Axen, Kurt Seibt, the President of the Solidarity Committee [Sechaba 1979b:24]. Tambo met with Honecker during

his Africa trip in February 1979 [Sechaba 1979e:12,13]. Tambo met with GDR officials again in 1980 [Cervenka 1980-81:A150]. In August 1984 Tambo went to the GDR to accept an award for Mandela, the "Star of International Friendship," and he met with Honecker [Sechaba 1984d:19,20].

17. In March 1972 Secretary-General Alfred Nzo met with Secretary-General Ceausescu along with the leaders of the MPLA, FRELIMO and SWAPO during Ceauseu's first African tour [YICA 1973:270; ACR 1972-73:A99]. An ANC delegation to Poland in 1974 [ACR 1973-74:A91].

18. In June 1979 Tambo led a ANC delegation to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria for the first time [Sechaba 1979i:25-27].

19. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization of the GDR published a memorandum on the "Bonn-Pretoria Alliance" [Sechaba 1967n:16,17]; A conference in East Berlin in May 1968 organized by Solidarity Committee looked at Southern Africa along the lines of scientific socialism [Sechaba 1968k:12,13]. ANC Secretary-General Duma Nokwe delivered three lectures on the ANC's approach to the struggle for national liberation [Nokwe 1968:14,15]. GDR organized a Youth and Students Section summer school in August 1971 [Sechaba 1971c:8-15]. The Solidarity Committee organized a photo exhibition on the ANC's anniversary in 1972 [Sechaba 1972b:13]. The Solidarity Committee also sponsored conferences with the UN Centre Against Apartheid.

20. In December 1974 an ANC delegation led by Alfred Nzo met with Boris Ponomarev [Sechaba 1975:14; ACR 1974-75:A81]. J.B. Marks, a member of the ANC's national executive and chairman of the SACP attended the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in 1969 [Marks 1969:16; YICA 1970:799]. Marks, Tambo, and Nzo attended the 24th CPSU Congress in 1971 [YICA 1972:287,288]. Nzo visited Moscow in November 1973 and met with Ponomarev for "the purpose of extending cooperation between the CPSU and the ANC." Dadoo led a SACP delegation to Moscow also in November 1973 and conferred with Ponomarev and M.A. Suslov, the key "ideological secretary" [YICA 1974:266,267]. Nzo led an ANC delegation to meet with the Ponomarev and the Central Committee in December 1974 [Sechaba 1975:14]. Podgorny met with the ANC during his Africa tour in March 1977 [Morison 1977-78:A94; A.R.B. 1977:4376B]. In October 1978 Tambo led delegation to Moscow for talks with Boris Ponomarev, and again in December 1979 [YICA 1980:xxix]. Alfred Nzo and Josiah Jele led an ANC delegation to Moscow in November 1980 [ACR 1980-81:B774].

21. In Radio Peace and Progress broadcast from Moscow in May 1979 Nzo declared people in southern African know who their enemies are, and "they knew that the USSR was their natural

ally;" in a number of statements he also criticized China [ACR 1978-79:B868]. In November 1980 Radio Moscow interviewed Josiah Jele who described "the Great October Socialist Revolution as the greatest event of our time." Jele also spoke in and stressed importance of students in the liberation struggle [ACR 1980-81:B774].

22. Evidence come from a variety of sources including the South Africa Foundation, the official Yugoslavian news agency, a Kenyan memorandum to the OAU, the Kenyan Minister of Commerce and Industry, and the Times of Zambia [Africa Recorder 1963a:522; 1964:846; 1965:992; 1965a:662; 1967:1594; Larkin 1971:106].

23. It was also at this time that James Hadebe, the ANC's chief representative in Dar es Salaam, was expelled from the ANC for "counter-revolutionary activities" [Sechaba 1968h:2].

24. The Political Report to the Kabwe Conference over a decade later (republished in Sechaba) only made passing reference to the "so-called freedom fighters from Czechoslovakia." The main emphasis of the statement, however, indicated the ANC's clear disdain for Czech refugees who chose to go to "apartheid South Africa" and gave a propaganda coup to the South African government [ANC 1985:7].

25. According to the SACP Kgokong was a member of the Party during the 1950s, but his views changed and he was subsequently expelled for using the Party as a base for "tribalist" and "factionalist activity" against the ANC [SACP 1981:414].

26. Naicker's obituary published in Sechaba and the SACP's pamphlet "65 Years of Struggle" omit this sensitive period, saying Naicker was forced to leave South Africa in 1965 and became the ANC's first Director of Publicity and Information [Sechaba 1977a; 1977d; SACP 1986]. A later biographical article in Sechaba describes how Naicker was appointed External Director of Information and Publicity and set up and edited Sechaba "almost single-handed" [Sechaba 1987a:30].

27. The leader of the PAC, Potlake Leballo, first visited China in 1965. In communist front organizations the PAC's actions showed the Chinese strategy of forming a "united front from below" in operation, i.e. exploiting an existing liberation struggle simply to build up a pro-Chinese faction at the expense of other liberation movements [ACR 1968-69:47].

28. Some of the ANC's most prominent diplomats from its offices in Cairo and Dar es Salaam such as Robert Resha, Alfred Kgokong, Tennyson Makiwane, and Mzwai Piliso were among the most active African delegates in AAPSO. It is noteworthy that each of these ANC diplomats, apart from Mzwai

Pilliso, formed the ANC (African Nationalist) faction which complained about the ANC's support for Soviet foreign policy.

29. At the time of the Press statement at the conclusion of the conference the Cubans offered the PAC delegation a tourist drive around the island so they would not be there [Africa Confidential 1966:5].

30. Sechaba's coverage of the WFDY's controversial ninth World Youth Festival in Sofia in 1968 covered up the divisions among the delegations from China, Cuba, Albania, Algeria. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was personally condemned by the WFDY's president, but Sechaba did not cover this aspect of the conference [YICA 1968:715].

31. In June 1979 Tambo led an ANC delegation to Hungary, Czech, Bulgaria where both delegations "expressed their unreserved support for the policy of the Soviet Union and other countries in the Socialist community" against Chinese "provocations" against Vietnam [Sechaba 1979:25-27]. In November 1979 the South African Journalists Circle participated in an executive committee meeting of the IOJ which took place in Hanoi to express its solidarity with Vietnam; it condemned China as a real threat to the revolutionary gains of the Indo-Chinese people [Sechaba 1980c:13-16].

32. The Cairo conference in 1966 was initially supposed to be held in Accra under the auspices of the World Marxist Review and the CPP's The Spark, but the coup ousting Nkrumah forced a change in location.

33. An international conference in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution was held in Baku, Azerbaijan on "The Great October Socialist Revolution and the National Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America" [YICA 1968:769]. A symposium on "Leninism and National Liberation" was held in Alma-Ata, Kazakhstan in October 1969 [YICA 1970:319].

34. Two days after the Cairo conference, a cable from Cairo printed in the New China News Agency Bulletin violently attacked the conference's participants as "modern revisionists." It was signed by the Chinese Communist Party, the Basutoland Communist Party, Bechuanaland People's Party, Swaziland Progressive Party, and significantly, the PAC, ZANU, and SWANU [YICA 1966:467,468].

35. Nimrod W. Sejake, in Azania News states, "Apart from the international scene of states with different systems coexisting peacefully as it is generally and loosely debated by certain people, can the workers in individual capitalist countries coexist peacefully with the system of exploitation and oppression? No. This is impossible. Armed revolution will

come. To accept the theory of peaceful coexistence ...is to deny revolution [Azania News, April, 1966 cited in SAFN 1966a:3].

36. The ANC's response to China's invasion, it could also be argued, was just the response of a good Soviet ally. The ANC had long-standing relations with Vietnam through international communist front organizations and it was clearly impossible for the ANC to ignore the invasion in order to improve relations with China. During the Vietnam War the ANC strongly supported the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam [Sechaba, 1967b:1,2; Kgokong 1965; Kgokong 1967]. Robert Resha, a member of the ANC's national executive and one of its leading diplomats, in a letter to the general council of AAPSO accused the U.S. of "pressurizing" African states to "keep silent" on Vietnam at the United Nations in exchange for U.S. support for African position at the U.N. on South-West Africa [Sechaba 1967c:1]. During the beginning of the Paris peace talks in 1969 the ANC linked up with other anti-imperialist organizations such as the Movement for Colonial Freedom to support Vietnam's position at the conference [Sechaba 1969:9,10]. In early 1973 Alex La Guma, a leading member of the ANC and the SACP, was part of a delegation to Hanoi of members of the World Peace Council [Sechaba 1973f:28,29].

37. The impetus for opening the office was the importance of Cuban soldiers in Angola. The ANC wanted to explain to the Cuban people the important role Cuban soldiers played in liberation struggles in Africa, and wanted to keep Castro fully informed about Southern African developments as they related to the ANC activities [SAIRR 1979:35, 36].

38. Tambo attended the opening of the new office which also included government representatives and representatives from the ruling of SED. Tambo used the trip to "consult" with members of the government, Politburo and Central Committee of the SED [Sechaba, 1979:24].

CHAPTER 9

ANC DIPLOMACY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

"It was at the insistence of the ANC that sanctions as a mode of struggling against the South African regime came to be considered at the United Nations. Thanks to the vigilance and consistent support of the African states as well as Asian and Socialist countries, the UN has taken a correct position in adopting resolutions supporting sanctions against South Africa."

Oliver Tambo, Sechaba, April 1968.

South Africa is the source of two of the oldest disputes at the United Nations; the international legal status of South-West Africa (called Namibia by the General Assembly since June 1968) and the question of apartheid, the Republic's own racial policies.¹ Although these disputes have been the major source of tension between the UN and South Africa since 1946 and led the General Assembly to support mandatory economic sanctions in 1962, it is only comparatively recently that the UN has taken a hostile attitude toward the country by supporting the South African liberation movements and endorsing the armed struggle they are waging against the government.²

One of the reasons for the creation of the ANC's External Mission was for a more permanent diplomatic presence for mobilizing international solidarity against apartheid. The ANC had an "idealist" faith in the capability of international organizations to help their struggle, and the United Nations was an important focus for its activities. Although the ANC has lobbied at the UN on an ad hoc basis since 1946, when the External Mission was formed in 1960 it

did not have direct access to UN organs to present the ANC's case against apartheid (see Chapter 2).

The main problems which the ANC (like most other liberation movements) faced at the UN were first, access to the UN's organs in order to inform the international community of its grievances against apartheid, and second, participation in UN decision-making on South Africa. How the question of apartheid was defined at the United Nations indicated which organs examined the issue and therefore the kind of access the ANC (and PAC) had to the UN system (see Appendix 5.6). Section 9.1 examines how the transformation in the way the UN handled the question of apartheid since 1960 led to the changes in the kind of access the ANC has had to the UN.

The Security Council is of central importance to the ANC's international objectives because only the Council can implement mandatory economic sanctions, apply a mandatory arms embargo (Chapter 7 of the UN Charter), or suspend or expel South Africa from the UN (Articles 5 and 6). Section 9.2 examines the ANC's role in the Security Council's decision-making.

The greater access and participation liberation movements have gained in the UN's deliberations is a result of the greater support for liberation struggles within the UN. Section 9.3 examines the UN's support for armed struggle in South Africa. The legitimacy of armed struggle has raised the international prestige of the ANC, and Section 9.4

examines the implications of permanent observer status for the ANC's UN diplomacy. The ANC's observer status is closely related to the challenge to South Africa's credentials and Section 9.5 examines the ANC's role in this challenge its implications for the ANC's diplomacy.

During the 1960s the General Assembly's anti-apartheid diplomacy shifted to the Security Council and the Assembly created two subsidiary bodies (the Special Committee on Apartheid and the Special Unit on Apartheid) to help bring pressure to bear on the Western permanent members of the Council to apply economic sanctions. Appendix 4 describes the development of these bodies and the ANC's role in their activities.

This chapter concentrates on the ANC's involvement in UN diplomatic activities directly related to the question of apartheid. In order to keep it a manageable length, it avoids the ANC's UN activities regarding the Namibia dispute and its involvement in the UN's humanitarian programmes for southern Africa. Nor does it offer a description of all the ANC's UN activities. It examines only those key aspects of the UN's activities which involved the ANC; it does not examine the UN's entire international campaign against apartheid .

9.1 The Institutional Framework of ANC Diplomacy

South Africa's racial policies were originally examined as an international legal dispute between India and South Africa stemming from legal agreements for indentured labour.

The ANC, of course, made no direct contribution to these deliberations because the issue was defined as a dispute between Member States. This dispute led to the first way the question of apartheid was discussed in the General Assembly: as a problem of constitutional interpretation. At issue was whether the General Assembly was competent to examine South Africa's domestic racial policies because of the domestic jurisdiction clause in the UN Charter, Article 2 (7), allegedly prohibited the United Nations from examining the domestic affairs of a Member State [Bissell 1977:24; Higgins 1964:85-93].

In retrospect, the April 1960 Security Council debate on South Africa following Sharpeville (occurring the same year as the influx of new African states) was a watershed in South Africa's relations with the UN because the debate legitimated the claim by the UN's Africa Group, the Afro-Asian bloc, and South African liberation movements that apartheid was more than an issue of domestic South African politics because of its potential to cause racial conflict. The discussion of South Africa's domestic policies by the Security Council effectively meant the Western powers finally conceded that apartheid was a legitimate international moral issue [Stultz 1987:31].

The Security Council's consideration of apartheid also indicated the limitations on the structure of the UN system for anti-apartheid diplomacy because of the restricted access liberation movements had to the system. The issue of access

was related to the issue of status. Where a particular issue was discussed in the UN system determined the level of "international status" the issue possessed. It gained initial international status by just becoming an item on the General Assembly's agenda, but most items were allocated by the Assembly's General Committee to one of its Main Committees such as the Fourth (Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or Decolonization) Committee, or as in the case of the question of apartheid since the 1940s, the Special Political Committee (formerly called the Ad Hoc Political Committee) [Kaufmann 1980:30].

If the issue was very important the General Committee allocated it directly to the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, or if it was seen as a possible threat to international peace it was examined directly in the Security Council [Kaufmann 1980:31]. This is what happened with the question of apartheid in 1960, when for the first time in the UN's fifteen year history of discussing the issue, it was raised in the Council.

None of the southern African liberation movements were invited to participate in the Security Council's discussions after Sharpeville. Oliver Tambo, in fact, was denied access to the Council when he left South Africa. One of the first things he did after leaving South Africa in April 1960 was cable Dag Hammarskjold, the UN Secretary-General, from Bechuanaland to request an appearance before the Security Council [Segal 1963:284]. He was turned down and appeared

before the Assembly's Fourth (Decolonization) Committee in November instead, but in connection with the December 1959 riots in Windhoek and not Sharpeville.³

In 1963 the Security Council formed a Group of Experts to investigate ways of supporting peaceful change in South Africa (see Appendix 5.10). Its investigations included meetings with the South African liberation movements and this was the first time the ANC (Tambo) participated in the Council's activities [West Africa 1964g:389; Y.U.N. 1965:102]. The ANC did not participate in its activities again until the early 1970s when it began to petition the Council more regularly (see Section 9.2).

Part of the problem was how the question of apartheid should be addressed at the United Nations. Although apartheid involved the issues of racial discrimination and oppression it was not easily defined as a colonial issue because it involved a sovereign independent state (although increasingly the ANC has challenged South Africa's international legal status, see Section 9.5). The dispute over South-West Africa, Southern Rhodesia, or Portugal's African colonies were routinely brought before the Assembly's Decolonization Committee and the Trusteeship Council by petitioners from nationalist movements. South Africa was different and petitioners from the ANC (the PAC and Unity Movement) seldom appeared before the Decolonization Committee, but when they did appear it was in reference to South-West Africa or Southern Rhodesia (see Appendix 4).

The ANC did not testify on South Africa to any of the UN's Main Committees or principal organs until 1963. At the time of the Rivonia Sabotage Trial, Oliver Tambo appeared as a petitioner before the Special Political Committee the day before the Trial was scheduled to begin (see Appendix 5.11) and Tennyson Makiwane appeared as a petitioner before the newly formed Special Committee on Apartheid a day after the trial started (see Appendix 5.8) [Kessings 1964:2001]. Both the ANC and the PAC, however, appeared only rarely before the SPC until both movements were given observer status in 1974 (see Section 9.4). Anti-apartheid solidarity movements such as the International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF) and the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) and communist front organizations (AAPSO and WPC) aligned to the ANC more frequently petitioned the SPC (see Appendix 5.11).

Most of the ANC's UN activities were confined to the Special Committee on Apartheid's Sub-Committee on Petitions until early 1974 when the ANC was given observer status in the Special Committee. The subject of the ANC's communications and petitions to the Sub-Committee concerned four areas of the ANC's diplomatic activity: information about the implementation of apartheid policies (especially in the early 1960s), the general political situation in South Africa, the need for economic sanctions, and the call for the release of South African political prisoners. Although the PAC's activity with the Sub-Committee concentrated on these same concerns, most of the main single-issue non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) involved in anti-apartheid solidarity which petitioned the Sub-Committee were aligned to the ANC, i.e. Canon L. John Collins and IDAF, Denis Brutus and SAN-ROC and the World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners, and Revd Ambrose Reeves and Christian Action (see Appendices 5.7 and 5.8).

The allocation of time to a particular issue in the Special Political Committee also indicated its level of status. By the early 1970s South Africa's racial policies became the main subject of the General Assembly's Special Political Committee (SPC). The Palestine question was shifted from the SPC to the General Assembly, and apart from considering aid to refugees this allowed more time for the SPC to concentrate on South Africa [Peterson 1986:35].

Since Member States presented draft resolutions to the SPC before they came before the General Assembly, it was the focus for the major political debates over apartheid. The composition of the SPC was the same as the General Assembly so debate in the SPC was a political reflection of the General Assembly's feelings, and it became clear that radical action against South Africa proposed by the Africa Group (in the early years dominated by the former Casablanca bloc states) and the Special Committee on Apartheid, was not supported by the majority of Member States. Compromise resolutions were agreed upon which resulted in the large margins of support in the General Assembly [Bissell 1977: 31,32,49,50,53,73].⁴

After occupying a period of time on the SPC's agenda it became necessary for an issue, if it was important enough, to gain the next level of status by being discussed directly in the General Assembly. This was supposed to bestow a "prestige of its own" on an issue, and by the late 1970s the question of apartheid was dealt with in the General Assembly [Kaufmann 1980:31]. By this time liberation movements had gained such international legitimacy that both Arafat and Tambo addressed the Assembly (see Section 9.4). Representatives of organizations with a special interest in the apartheid question (such as the ANC), however, are still heard in the SPC [Kaufmann 1980:35].

9.2 The ANC and Decision-Making in the Security Council

The Group of Experts appointed by the Security Council in 1963 interviewed the ANC as part of its deliberations, but the evolution of decision-making in the Security Council has provided a new opportunity for liberation movements to present their views. Since 1964 the Council has moved away from the confrontational voting which had previously characterized its procedures. Its emphasis on consensus-building methods before an issue is discussed during a session has led to a greater role in decision-making for the President of the Council [Kaufmann 1980:44]. The President regularly participates in confidential consultations before a question is brought before a session, and these consultations now often include liberation movements the

President has decided are a party to the conflict; giving these movements a form of international legitimacy. Liberation movements, Kaufmann explains, "are now in some cases treated on a basis similar to that of a state party to a conflict. They have also been allowed to participate in the discussions of a question before the Council [Kaufmann 1980:46].

During the Security Council session in March 1977 the non-permanent members of the Council in the Africa Group introduced a far reaching resolution on South Africa which was held over until the October 1977 session (the session which led to the imposition of the mandatory arms embargo). Rikhi Jaipal, the President of the Council during the October session, consulted the ANC as part of the negotiations (he does not mention the PAC). In an article examining the role of the President of the Council in consensus building Jaipal recalls, "During consideration of the South African problem it was necessary for me to be in touch with the representative of the African National Congress, as I was with the [PLO] during consideration of the Palestine question" [Jaipal 1981:158,159]. In the context of discussing the wider role of liberation movements in the Council Jaipal explained, "The role of national liberation movements has come to be increasingly important. As members of the Council respond variously to the aspirations and urgings of the liberation movements, the movements themselves are obliged to recognize the realities and accept the limitations of

Security Council actions. While there are no established centres of power in the Council, regional groups wield significant influence on members, as was the case with the Arab and Africa group in October [1977]" [Jaipal 1981:158,159].

The problem which confronts the Security Council, especially with regard to liberation movements, is that it is not always obvious who the parties to a conflict are when more than one movement claims to be an "authentic" representative [Kaufmann 1980:45]. In spite of this problem, Kaufmann explains, "These movements are now in some cases treated on a basis similar to that of a state party to a conflict. They have also been allowed to participate in the discussions of a question before the Council" [Kaufmann 1980:46].

The ANC first appeared before the Security Council in conjunction with other African liberation movements during the Council's special session in Addis Ababa in February 1972 (see Appendix 5.9). Most of the ANC's subsequent invitations to participate before the Council are related to particular South African issues such as Prime Minister Vorster's detente policy (1974), the Soweto uprising (1976), the banning of anti-apartheid organizations in the wake of the Soweto uprising (1977), the South African intervention in Angola (1979), the raid in Lesotho (1982), and the war in Namibia (1983 and 1985). The ANC's appearances before the Council on

each of these occasions was balanced by the appearance of a PAC representative.

The participation of liberation movements such as the ANC in the UN's decision-making has provoked some controversy among Member States and among scholars of international organizations. The problem for the ANC is that neither the Charter nor the Security Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure make specific provision for the participation of liberation movements or other political organizations in its deliberations [Bailey 1988:345]. The Jewish Agency for Palestine, the Arab Higher Committee, and most contemporary liberation movements including the ANC, have all been invited to participate in the Security Council under Rule 39 which states, the Security Council may invite persons "whom it considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information in examining matters within its competence" [Bailey 1969:379]. During the 1940s the Preparatory Commission inserted Rule 39 into the Provisional Rules of Procedure in face of opposition from the U.S., and the U.S. has continued to oppose the participation of liberation movements, particularly the PLO, in the Council's deliberations [Bailey 1988:344].

The participation of "individuals claiming to represent substantial bodies of opinion is a controversial part of the Council's activities" [Bailey 1988:131]. In the first 25 years of the Council's operations only nine people other than officials from UN bodies were invited to participate in the

Council's deliberations, but decolonization during the 1960s and the increase in the number of Third World states in the General Assembly led to a change in the composition and procedures of the Security Council.

Following Afro-Asian pressure, a 1963 amendment to the Charter by the General Assembly (which came into effect in August 1965) increased the Council from 11 to 15 members, i.e. an increase from six to ten non-permanent members. Third World states were also given a larger proportion of the non-permanent seats which meant the Africa Group, the largest caucusing group in the UN, could play a more important role in the Council's proceedings. It normally has three members on the Council [Kaufmann 1980:46]. This procedural change affected the politics of the Council [Luard 1979:18]. The change in composition allowed African states (and the Third World) to use this procedural change to give liberation movements greater access to the Council.

Non-Permanent Members of the Security Council

Before 1963

2	Latin America
1	Middle East
1	Eastern Europe
1	Western Europe
1	Commonwealth

After 1965

5	Africa (3) and Asia
1	Eastern Europe
2	Latin America
2	Western Europe

The number of affirmative votes required to pass a procedural resolution was also raised from 7 to 9, effectively decreasing the proportion needed to pass a resolution [Luard 1979:14]. As a result of these changes

neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union could secure the necessary 9 votes for a procedural decision without the support of at least half the non-permanent members (the largest number from Africa or Asia), and these non-permanent members could secure the passage of procedural resolutions without the affirmative votes of any of the five permanent members of the Council [Bailey 1981:43].

These changes in the composition of the Security Council "led to a much more acquiescent attitude to requests from individuals to be allowed to address the Council, especially representatives of nationalist parties and liberation movements" [Bailey 1981:44]. Beginning with SWAPO in 1971 liberation movements were invited to participate in the debates which affected their vital interests (see Appendix 5.9) [Bailey 1988:131; Bailey 1981:44]. The following year "this concept was widened" to include NGOs when representatives from the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and the All-African Council of Churches were allowed to address the Council [Bailey 1988:139].

These changes allowed the Africa Group to make invitations to liberation movements to come before the Council because the permanent members could no longer determine the Council's decisions on procedural matters. By the time of the Soweto uprising the ANC and the PAC had participated in the Council's deliberations twice before (see Appendix 5.9). It was only natural when the Security Council held its emergency session on 18 June 1976 to discuss the

Soweto uprising that both movements were invited to come before the Council by the African states on the Council. In fact, the statements by both representatives was more concerned about the dangers of apartheid than the particular violence that had prompted the meeting. When South Africa's Ambassador to the UN, Pik Botha, tried to refute their charges, the representatives from the two movements were invited back "to further substantiate their case" [Jackson 1981:146,147; A.R.B. 1976b:4063A].

As important, if not more crucial, than the content of these speeches was the international legitimacy the ANC gained from its participation in the Council. Sechaba's report of the ANC's national executive meeting in July 1977 stated, "a position has been reached when the ANC view point cannot be ignored 'even by the Security Council of the United Nations' and the front line states invite the ANC regularly to their sessions. The national executive committee, therefore, concludes that a campaign for the eventual exclusive recognition of our organization as sole representative of our people will be launched by our International Department on behalf of the entire revolutionary movement and the External Mission should be 'fully geared' for this task" [Sechaba 1978:1].

Bailey, in his major study of the Security Council's procedure, asserts the Council issued many invitations "without much regard" for the UN Charter or the Council's own Rules of Procedure [Bailey 1988:125]. He states

disapprovingly, soon the Security Council was "inviting anyone whom the majority of members wished to hear" [Bailey 1988:139]. In the aftermath of the Soweto uprising this included representatives from the World Council of Churches (1977), the Christian Institute in South Africa (1977), Donald Woods, the former editor of the Daily Dispatch in East London (1978), and during the uprising on the Vaal triangle, Desmond Tutu (1984) (see Appendix 5.9).

Bailey is clearly against the participation of liberation movements in the Security Council's deliberations. He considers their participation in the Council contrary to the UN Charter and the Council's own Rules of Procedure [Bailey 1988:139]. Nicholas points out, however, the UN is an established political institution "which must be understood through its politics as well as its constitution" [Nicholas 1975:vii]. The primary reason for allowing liberation movements such as the ANC to participate in the Security Council's deliberations is to bring greater pressure to bear on the Western powers to implement mandatory sanctions under Chapter 7 of the Charter which only the Council can do. The ANC (and PAC) first participated in the Security Council in February 1972 during the Council's special session on African affairs in Addis Ababa; held at the OAU's request because of the limited progress in southern Africa in spite of the UN's efforts [Abby Farah 1981:98; A.R.B. 1972c:2390A]. Abdulrahim Abby Farah, Somalia's ambassador and the President of the Security Council during the session, has explained, "To the

African group, it was extremely important that the leaders of the African liberation movements be given every possible opportunity to express their views in international forums when debates on the territory they represented were taking place. The Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa would provide these leaders with a unique and convenient opportunity to speak on behalf of the peoples of their territory at the highest international level" [Abby Farah 1981:109].

The ANC representative and the representatives of the other liberation movements spoke to the Council under the provisions of Rule 39, and the U.S. objected to the use of the Rule for this purpose by the Council in Addis Ababa. The then U.S. Ambassador, George Bush, allowed the meeting to proceed after he "ascertained" the people would speak as individuals "and not be identified by the organization they represent, and that the request to speak went through the regular channels by contacting Council Members [Abby Farah 1981:110].

The use (Bailey would say abuse) of the Council's Rule of Procedure has implications for the kind of legitimacy which the Council confers on particular liberation movements. All liberation movements are not treated alike in the Security Council. Each of the southern African liberation movements (e.g. the ANC, PAC, SWAPO) were invited before the Council on the basis of Rule 39, by which persons (representing political movements) are invited to speak

because of their competence related to the matter under discussion. The PLO, however, has come before the Council on the basis of Rule 37, which means the PLO has already been invited to participate with the same rights as a Member State of the United Nations [Kaufmann 1980:46].

9.3 The International legitimacy of Armed Struggle

It took the United Nations longer to come to the point of supporting armed struggle than the OAU which supported armed struggle since its inception in 1963, and the Non-Aligned Movement which firmly declared at the Cairo Summit the following year all "colonized peoples may legitimately resort to arms" if the colonial powers remained intransigent [Wilson 1988:95].

In 1965 the General Assembly recognized "the legitimacy of the struggle by the peoples under colonial rule" and called for greater assistance to liberation movements, but the ambiguous use of the word "struggle" meant Member States interpreted the term as they liked [Res. 2105 (XX)] [Wilson 1988:95]. After surveying the period, Wilson concludes, "in spite of resolutions recognizing the legitimacy of various 'struggles', in the late 1960s there was still strong disagreement on exactly what kind of 'struggle' was being accepted as legitimate" [Wilson 1988:96,97]. After the tenth anniversary of the Declaration on Colonialism in 1970 the Assembly's language began to change and increasingly

resolutions recognized the legitimacy of struggles for national liberation [Wilson 1988:97].

In addition to the ANC's greater participation in the UN's decision-making, the General Assembly began to support armed struggle in South Africa. The evolution of the Assembly's position toward armed struggle was in response to the refusal of the Western powers, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, to implement mandatory economic sanctions. The report of the Special Committee against Apartheid in 1966 asserted that sanctions were the only possible method of peaceful change in South Africa. Otherwise, the people of South Africa "were left with no choice but to resort to other means to defend their freedom and dignity," and if violent conflict did break out, it would be the responsibility of the Western powers "which had constantly refused to co-operate in the search for a peaceful solution" [Y.U.N. 1966:83].

This has remained the Special Committee's position regarding economic sanctions. Through its investigative reports and contacts with the liberation movements it has remained abreast of the developments in southern Africa. In 1968 Africa Contemporary Record described the area a region of "expanding guerrilla warfare" [Parker 1968-69:53]. At the end of the year the Special Committee on Apartheid called attention to the decision of the South African liberation movements to engage in armed struggle and to South Africa's growing intervention in other southern African liberation

struggles [Y.U.N. 1968:100]. The General Assembly called upon all Member States to provide assistance to what it termed "the South African liberation movement," although it ignored the existence of the ANC and PAC as two separate movements. It called the guerrillas "freedom fighters" and this language was used repeatedly in subsequent years [Res. 2396 (XXIII)] [Res. 2506 B (XXIV) November 1969; Res. 2671 B (XXV) December 1970]. The following year the General Assembly reaffirmed its support for the "South African liberation movement" and called on the Special Committee "to hold consultations with representatives of this movement" [Res. 2506 (XXIV) November 1969].

In 1972 the General Assembly supported armed struggle in South Africa for the first time by referring to the legitimacy of struggle "by all available means" [Resolution 2923 E (XXVII)]. This support was reiterated in subsequent resolutions [Res. 3324 E (XXIX) 1974; Res. 3411 G (XXX) 1975]. The General Assembly again called on the Special Committee to "hold consultations" with the southern African liberation movements, but for the first time the Assembly acknowledged the difference between the ANC and the PAC by specifying consultations with only the movements recognized by the OAU [Res. 2923 C (XXVII)]. This call was reiterated in subsequent years [e.g. Res. 3151 B and D (XXVIII)].

The specification that the Special Committee's should consult with only OAU-approved liberation movements was the result of concerns expressed by Latin American delegations

that the vagueness of previous resolutions endorsing African liberation movements could lead to external intervention by foreign countries. Peterson explains, "by quiet diplomacy they succeeded in getting later resolutions written so endorsement applied only to groups recognized by the [OAU]. This meant that groups supported by a single outside power would not enjoy the same legitimacy as long-standing, widely supported groups formally recognized and aided by the OAU [Peterson 1986:219].

In 1975 the General Assembly asserted for the first time that the South African liberation movements contributed to the "purposes of the United Nations" [Res. 3411 B (XXX)]. In the wake of the Soweto uprising the General Assembly identified the UN with the struggle "for the seizure of power by the people", and asserted that the riots "leave no alternative to the oppressed people of South Africa but to resort to armed struggle to achieve their legitimate rights" [Res. 31/6 I (1976)].

The independence of Zimbabwe and especially Mozambique contributed to the ANC's military strategy (see Chapter 6). The increase in bomb blasts in the northern Transvaal and Umkhonto's spectacular attacks on South Africa's petroleum facilities at Sasolburg and Secunda in 1980 led the General Assembly the following year to single out the ANC for special commendation for "intensifying the armed struggle against the racist regime" [Res. 36/172 17 December 1981].

9.4 Gaining Permanent Observer Status

So far the ANC's main role in the UN's international campaign against apartheid was limited to providing information to the Sub-Committee on Petitions and to some of the other subsidiary committees, and appearing at UN-sponsored "solidarity day/week" activities, conferences, and seminars (see Appendix 5.14). Participation in UN activities only conferred limited international legitimacy on the movement. The ANC like the other liberation movements had no right to participate or testify [Wilson 1988:117]. They were invited as private persons invited to give information within their field of competence and shared the same status as other petitioners from anti-apartheid solidarity organizations, journalists, NGOs and IGOs, and even individual South Africans representing just themselves. This point was clearly made by Ambassador Bush when the movements petitioned the Security Council and appeared under Rule 39 of the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure (see Section 9.2).

This limited status was completely unacceptable to the ANC and other liberation movements and the PAIGC's Amilcar Cabral and FRELIMO's Marcellino Dos Santos were "particularly adamant" about this point [Wilson 1988:117]. At the same time the General Assembly was moving toward support for armed struggle, its relevant subsidiary committees (i.e. the Committee of Twenty-Four and the Decolonization Committee) began extending permanent observer (rather than petitioner)

status to the main OAU-approved liberation movements, but in a way which demonstrated the unique nature of the South African struggle: observer status was granted only to the movements in Namibia, southern Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies; not, as the Africa Contemporary Record seems to suggest, to all OAU approved liberation movements, until 1974 (see Section 9.4) [ACR 1972-73:C43].

At the end of 1971 the Assembly approved the Committee of Twenty-Four's request to allow African liberation movements to participate "whenever necessary and in an appropriate capacity, in its deliberations relating to these territories" [Res. 2878 (XXVI) 10 December 1971; Wilson 1988:118]. In 1972 the Committee of Twenty-Four granted observer status to SWAPO [Y.U.N. 1972:559-561]. During 1973 observer status was extended to the FNLA, MPLA, FRELIM, PAIGC, ZAPU, and ZANU [Y.U.N. 1973:741; Y.U.N. 1973:120].

In 1972 the Committee of Twenty-Four also suggested to the Fourth (Decolonization) Committee that the liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies, i.e. ZAPU, ZANU, FRELIMO, and PAIGC (divisions among the movements in Angola posed difficulties) in consultation with the OAU, should be granted observer status (later including also SWAPO). In September 1972 by a vote of 62 to 32 (with 19 abstentions) the Fourth (Decolonization) Committee rejected a proposal by the representative from Ireland requesting the meaning of "observer status" be defined by the United Nations Legal Counsel. This action led to South Africa's withdrawl

from the Fourth Committee [Y.U.N. 1972:592; ACR 1972-73:B3555,B406,C43; A.R.B. 1972b:2613C].

These beginning shifts of UN policy toward southern African liberation movements had already taken place by the time of the International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid held in Oslo, Norway in April 1973. The conference, jointly sponsored by the Special Committee against Apartheid and OAU indicated the extent of the cooperation between the two international organizations on African liberation. It called for the liberation movements to be recognized "as the only legitimate representatives of their peoples," and asked for this role to be "legitimated and universalized by all international organizations" [ACR 1974-75:C36]. These conclusions, in fact, were emphasized by Tambo in his speech to the conference [Tambo 1973:6,7].

Because South Africa was not the main concern of the Fourth Committee and the Committee of Twenty-Four the ANC (and PAC) were not granted observer status in these UN committees. It was the developments in the Fourth Committee and the Decolonization Committee, however, which led the ANC and PAC to be granted observer status in the General Assembly's main subsidiary body dealing with South Africa, the Special Committee against Apartheid, on 21 March 1974 (the anniversary of the Sharpeville shootings) [Zuidwijk 1982:224; Sechaba 1974h:23; GAOR, XXX, Supp. No. 22 (A/10022), para. 121]. This decision was in pursuant to the

General Assembly's resolution at the end of 1973 acknowledging that the liberation movements recognized by the OAU were the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the people of South Africa and authorizing the Special Committee to work closely with these movements [Res. 3151 G (XXVIII December) [Zuidwijk 1982: 224].

Observer status means it is unnecessary for them to address the Special Committee as petitioners; they "have a ready forum any time they wish to speak." The Special Committee's annual reports after 1973 no longer listed in summary form the communications received and the petitioners heard by the Sub-Committee on Petitions. Observer status and the involvement of the liberation movements in the Special Committee's "conference diplomacy" indicated a trend away from the hearing of petitions since the movements had access to the Committee in these other ways [Zuidwijk 1982:228].

The Special Committee's report in 1975 states it took "further steps" to "associate" the ANC and PAC "more closely with its work," but the degree of greater contact appears to be at an informal level. The report's examples of the movement's greater involvement (days of solidarity and attendance at international seminars) the ANC and PAC had already participated in when they only had petitioner status. The Special Committee's report concludes, "The Special Committee consulted with [the ANC and PAC] on a number of occasions on various aspects of its work." It is the on going inter-change between the permanent representatives of the

liberation movements, now with offices at UN Headquarters in New York, with the Special Committee which observer status has provided that indicates the extent of the change in status of these movements [GAOR, XXX, Supp. No. 22 (A/10022), para. 21; GAOR XXXI, Supp. No. 22 (A/31/22, Vol. I, para. 160]. By 1977 the ANC and the PAC were full participants in the Special Committee's work. They addressed its meetings, participated in its conferences, and accompanied the Special Committee's delegation on overseas trips [GAOR, XXXII, Supp. No. 22 (A/32/22), paras. 149-153].

In the General Assembly's Main Committee which did concentrate on South Africa, i.e. the Special Political Committee, the ANC was granted permanent observer status in 1974 at the request of the Special Committee against Apartheid. Permanent observer status was also granted to the PAC at the same time (see Section 9.4). By 1975 the ANC (and the PAC) were invited to participate in the SPC's debate on South Africa as a whole [Y.U.N. 1975:138].

The following year, in October 1976, the question of apartheid was dealt with directly in the plenary session and the president of the ANC (Tambo) and one of the PAC's main diplomats (Sibeko) addressed the General Assembly for the first time [Tambo 1977:6-17]. The representative from Mali, the spokesperson for the Africa Group, had asked that the debate on apartheid be transferred from the SPC to the General Assembly to permit debate at a substantive level, and the Assembly authorized the ANC and PAC to participate in the

debate. The representative from South Africa was absent from his seat during the session, and the Special Committee asserted that by the participation of the ANC and PAC the representatives of the great majority of South Africa's people were being heard in the Assembly for the first time [Y.U.N. 1976:124]. Tambo addressed the Assembly again in 1982 and the ANC's permanent UN observer, Johnny Makatini addressed the Assembly 1983 [Sechaba 1982:2; 1984:7-11].

The unprecedented access to the plenary session by members of liberation movements (also extended to Yasser Arafat) did not go unchallenged. The United States and the Netherlands, speaking on behalf of the nine states in the European Economic Community, expressed reservations on the ground that the plenary Assembly had traditionally been reserved for the presentation of views by Member States, and not by observers or other political parties. The Western states maintained the liberation movements should be given a full hearing, but in one of the Assembly's Main Committees [Y.U.N. 1976:124].

During the debate on the question of apartheid the following year the General Assembly decided, in consultation with the OAU, that the ANC and PAC could "participate in the discussions in the plenary and that organizations with a special interest in the question be permitted to be heard by the Special Political Committee." The ANC's permanent representative, Johnny Makatini, and the PAC's representative, David Sibeko participated; supported by Zehdi

Labib Terzi, the PLO's permanent UN representative [Y.U.N.1977:151].

Even if there was disagreement over the extent to which liberation movements such as the ANC should participate in the UN's deliberations, it could be argued the Western powers were now willing to acknowledge that the liberation movements have a legitimate role in the UN's decision-making on matters which affected their vital interests. This in itself would be an important admission of the change which has taken place in the UN since Oliver Tambo first petitioned the Organization. It is more likely that the increasing role of liberation movements in the UN's deliberations is one more reason, among many others, for the declining importance of the UN in Western diplomacy [Luard 1979:2,3; Harrod and Schrijver 1988].

9.5 Challenging South Africa's UN Credentials

The Credentials Committee is one of the General Assembly's main Procedural Committees. The Committee considers the credentials of a particular Member State; it usually does not pass judgement on the legitimacy of a particular delegation. It issues credentials to the government in power, although South Africa (1974, 1979, and 1981), Israel, and Chile have been recent exceptions [Kaufmann 1980:31].

South Africa's credentials were first challenged in the General Assembly's Credentials Committee in 1965, but this

motion and subsequent attempts to get South Africa's credentials declared invalid were rejected by the Committee. By the early 1970s pressure from a number of sources contributed to the challenging of South Africa's credentials at the UN. The International Conference in Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid held in Oslo in April 1973 called for the international legitimacy of liberation movements in all international organizations and in June, on the anniversary of South African Freedom Day (June 26), Oliver Tambo called on the UN to reassess South Africa's status with the Organization. Tambo's message began by recalling the ANC's international appeal for African rights started at the Versailles Peace Conference at the conclusion of the First World War (see Chapter 2). Tambo now pointed to South Africa's invalid claim to represent the majority of South Africans, its failure to live up to the principles of the Charter, its contravention of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, and most controversially, he claimed South Africa had violated the UN Convention on Genocide [Sechaba 1973h:5,6].

In October 1973 the General Assembly, for the first time [by a vote of 72:37 (13 abstentions)] over ruled its own Credentials Committee that determined that South Africa's credentials were in order, and rejected South Africa's credentials. In spite of the vote, the President of the session, Leopoldo Benites of Ecuador, ruled that the South

African delegation should continue to participate in the work of the Assembly since it is only the Security Council which can suspend or reject a Member State's rights and privileges (Articles 5 and 6) [A.R.B. 1973c:3030C]. In December 1973 the General Assembly went even further than merely suspending South Africa. It declared the South African government did not represent the people of South Africa and that the liberation movements recognized by the OAU were the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people [Res. 3151 (XXVIII) G].

By mid-1974 the ANC and PAC had gained observer status in the Special Committee on Apartheid and the Special Unit on Apartheid [Sechaba 1974h:23]. South Africa survived another challenge to its credentials in May when the Credentials Committee again rejected the credentials of the South African delegation. The President of the plenary session, Leopoldo Benites upheld the ruling that the Committee's action could not unseat the South African delegation. He said the decision by the Committee was tantamount to a vehement condemnation of South Africa's apartheid policies, but it did not affect South Africa's rights as a UN member [A.R.B.1974:3248B].

In June the OAU Summit conference in Mogadishu called on the Africa Group at the UN to work for South Africa's expulsion at the next plenary session, and in September the General Assembly rejected South African delegation's right to take its seat. The General Assembly asked the Council to examine South Africa's membership for the first time and the

ANC and PAC made a special appearance before the Security Council in October (see Appendix 5.9). Both movements also called for South Africa's expulsion when they appeared as observers before the Special Political Committee (Appendix 5.11).

South Africa was saved from expulsion by negative votes by the Council's Western permanent members at the beginning of November. Later that month it was suspended from the UN by the General Assembly and the country ceased to make contributions to the UN budget [A.R.B. 1974a:3446; SAIRR 1980:652,653]. Following South Africa's suspension from the 1974 session South Africa decided not to participate in the 1975 session in order to avoid another Assembly suspension resolution.

There was unease among some African delegates following South Africa's expulsion. It was feared South Africa was beyond the reach of its critics. Lesotho's Foreign Minister predicted that the campaign to expel South Africa would end after the OAU decided not to support Israel's expulsion from the UN [A.R.B. 1975c:3778A].

The Special Committee, however, kept up the pressure. It called for an oil embargo and its Seminar on South Africa held in Paris in May declared South Africa should be expelled and reasserted the right of the liberation movements to represent the country [ACR 1975-76:B611].

The Special Committee and the OAU sponsored an International Seminar on the Eradication of Apartheid and in

Support of the Struggle for Liberation in South Africa in Havana in May 1976. Its Programme of Action called apartheid a crime against humanity and declared the national liberation movements as the "authentic representatives of the great majority of the people of South Africa" [Res. 31/6 J]). The ANC attended the conference and gave it great coverage in its magazine [Sechaba 1976c:11-63]. At the OAU's summit in Port Louis, Mauritius in July 1976 both the ANC and the PAC rejected the status of the Republic of South Africa as an independent state and the OAU set up an African legal commission to Study South Africa's status in international organizations [ACR 1976-1977:C7].

The General Assembly's expulsion of South Africa was accompanied with an invitation to the ANC and PAC to participate in the UN as permanent observers. In a resolution adopted by consensus at the beginning of December the Assembly decided to "invite as observers, on a regular basis and in accordance with earlier practice, representatives of the national liberation movements recognized by the OAU [i.e. ANC, PAC, SWAPO, ZAPU, ZANU, FRELIMO, FNLA, MPLA] to participate in the relevant work of the Main Committees of the General Assembly and its sub-organs concerned, as well as conferences, seminars and other meetings held under the auspices of the UN" [Res. 3280 (XXIX) 10 December]. Some of the Western powers, notably Belgium, France, West Germany, the United Kingdom and even the Netherlands expressed reservations on this change of policy. They argued the

presence of the ANC and PAC did not imply recognition of these movements [Y.U.N. 1974:121].

The bureaucratic politics of recognition of liberation movements at the UN indicates that the southern African liberation movements were given less privileges than the PLO. The PLO received observer status the month before [Res. 3237 (XXIX) 22 November 1974] and SWAPO was granted observer status in the General Assembly in December 1976 on terms similar to those of the PLO [Res. 31/152 20 December 1976]. The southern African movements could participate as observers sessions of the Main Committees when they "relate to their countries" and they now had the right to make speeches.

The PLO and SWAPO participate in the General Assembly as state observers. They have been given the right to take part in the General Assembly debates on any issue and even address the Assembly although in practice they confine their comments to issues relevant to their struggles [A.R.B. 1974b:3475BC; Wilson 1988:119].

The ANC and PAC were also to be given a small subsidy to maintain their offices, but this was a controversial issue in the Assembly. Finding the necessary funding for the New York offices of the ANC and PAC was a problem. At the OAU Council of Ministers conference in Port Louis, Mauritius in July 1976 the resolution on South Africa requested the Africa Group at the United Nations and the African Liberation Committee to "take steps to ensure the active presence at the UN...of South African liberation movements recognized by the OAU"

[ACR 1976-77:C7]. The General Assembly in November authorized the Special Committee against Apartheid to take the necessary steps to ensure that the ANC and PAC can maintain offices in New York at United Nations Headquarters; a request which was reiterated in subsequent resolutions [Res. 31/6 I (1976)].

It was not until December 1979, amid strong Western (and to some extent Latin American) opposition, that the UN approved the grants to finance two New York offices for the ANC and the PAC "in order to ensure the due and proper representation" of South Africa through its liberation movements [Res. 34/93 II] [Race Relations Survey 1979:652,653]. The resolution proposed to spend \$180,000 for two years, 1980-81, to finance the offices of the ANC and PAC. The paragraph on the resolution relating to the budget was passed by a margin of 111:9 with 21 abstentions. The U.S. felt it was "unwise" and "illogical" for the UN to offer financial assistance to support movements which aim to overthrow the government of a Member State. Costa Rica claimed it was dangerous for the UN to finance offices of organizations outside a Member State and the Netherlands did not believe the South African liberation movements could claim to represent the people of South Africa. Canada, France, West Germany, and Australia also objected to the funding of the offices [Y.U.N. 1979:182].

South Africa considers its membership in the United Nations to be worth the country's effort and expense even if it receives so few tangible benefits because of the functions

of UN membership in the international system. UN membership is a seal of independence, a sign of international recognition and legitimacy and this is the real reason for South Africa's continued efforts to remain in the Organization. Given the kind of pressure for the recognition of the liberation movements, Barratt rightly concludes that if South Africa withdrew from the UN and closed down its permanent mission "it might be easier for the ANC to take its place and thus achieve a greater degree of recognition, legitimacy and support than it already has" [Barratt 1985:198]. Appendix 4 shows that this is exactly what has already happened in some of the Specialized Agencies.

Obtaining a permanent mission in New York at UN Headquarters was an important achievement for the ANC in itself. It also conferred international legitimacy and status on the movement and the struggle it is pursuing, and it provided a central point for the ANC's liaison with the UN's Specialized Agencies [Appathurai 1985:94].

A permanent observer mission also provided the ANC with the opportunity to directly confront South Africa's diplomacy. Although it is repeatedly prohibited by the General Assembly from participating in the Assembly's work it is still a Member State and is entitled to all the rights and privileges which accompany membership. It is for this reason that ending South Africa's UN membership is an important ANC objective.

Although South Africa may have few formal relations around the world, at UN Headquarters it has access, on an informal basis, to the vast diplomatic corps of all the states in the world [Berridge 1985:xvi]. South African statements on issues are circulated as official UN documents and it has access to the UN press corps. Its statements to the media are often the statements it would have made in the General Assembly, so its positions are still known and widely disseminated at the UN [Barratt 1985:199].

Although many states are hostile to South Africa, there is considerable interest in South Africa's positions on southern African issues and according to South African diplomats, its press conferences are always well attended. Many countries, particularly African countries have very little access to official information on South Africa other than at the UN because of the country's isolation. Barratt estimates that South Africa's mission "is able to do [its work] more effectively in New York than in a national capital, in view of the wider audience and the special interest in South African issues at the UN" [Barratt 1985:199, 200].

CONCLUSION

The ANC's diplomacy at the UN has been confronted with the problem that the provisions of the Charter relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes do not reflect the changes in the nature of conflict in the international system and the

change in the basic nature of international relations since the Second World War. In this chapter these differences were expressed as issues of constitutional interpretation: in the pressure of the General Assembly (through the Special Committee against Apartheid) on the Security Council to implement mandatory sanctions (Appendix 4), the participation of liberation movements in the Security Council (Section 9.2), the consistency of the UN's support for armed struggle with the UN's support for the peaceful settlement of disputes (Section 9.3), and the attempts to have South Africa either suspended or expelled (Section 9.4). These matters of constitutional procedure were used to mask complicated political questions on the fundamental nature of international society.

Since the Charter was written ideas about what constitutes armed conflict and what entities in international relations can wage such conflict has changed [Wilson 1988:1] The UN's structure was based on the assumption that the main actors in international relations were states and the main source of international conflict would be armed conflict between states [Bailey 1982:20]. Most of the armed conflict since 1945, however, has not corresponded to this classical view of war, but has involved the dissolution of colonial empires and the right of various peoples and groups within states to self-determination [Wilson 1988:1; Bailey 1982:17; Luard 1968:Chapter 6].

The UN's structure has not adapted to this change in the nature of international conflict nor the growth of liberation movements as new actors in the international system which advance these claims in international society. "A major problem for the United Nations," Bailey asserts, "has been that international peace has often been endangered by the aspirations and actions of entities other than states, and that the Organization is so constructed that its organs prefer to deal with states rather than with dissident political organizations, insurgent groups, liberation movements, communal minorities, and the like" [Bailey 1982:21].

Since the beginning of decolonization in the 1950s the UN Charter has provided limited access to specific individuals and representatives of NGOs (such as liberation movements) to UN organs through established petitions procedures for the Trusteeship Council and the Assembly's Fourth Committee [Zuidwijk 1982:191]. The subsequent development of the Committee of Twenty-Four, the Special Committee on Apartheid, and the Special Unit on Apartheid reflected the inadequacy of UN structures provided by the Charter to incorporate the changes in the nature of international conflict, and the proliferation of NGOs and their growing international role in UN decision-making.

A UN structure which gave access to representatives of liberation movements only as "victims" of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism could not adequately express

the aspirations and needs of liberation movements for international recognition as the authentic representatives of their peoples fighting wars of national liberation against racial and colonial oppression. The UN recognized this limitation and liberation movements gained permanent observer status. Hence, "Somewhere between governments and non-governmental organizations, liberation movements have become, in their own particular way, a participant in United Nations decision-making [Kaufmann 1980:95].

The UN's growing support for armed struggle in wars of national liberation and the greater participation of liberation movements in UN decision-making reflects the UN's attempt to make the Organization more responsive to the changing nature of war and the development of new actors in the international system. The laws of war were also based on the view of war as armed conflict between states. The changes in the nature of war and the nature of the international system has also affected the laws of war [Wilson 1988:1]. If international relations can no longer adequately be defined as relations between states, increasingly it is seen that international law (may) apply to entities in the international system other than states, such as liberation movements [Wilson 1988:2].

Since the 1960s the ANC has called for the release of South African political prisoners, their humane treatment, and the granting of prisoner of war status to Umkhonto combatants under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. These demands

are, as Oliver Tambo (and academic scholars) have pointed out, in keeping with the general trends in international humanitarian law even if specific aspects of the problem are debatable [Sechaba 1981:30; Wilson 1988].

Since 1974 the ANC (and PAC) and other liberation movements recognized by the OAU and the Arab League have participated in the international conference convened by the Swiss government to consider the two Draft Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions submitted by the International Committee of the Red Cross [Wilson 1988 128]. These Draft Protocols became the 1977 Protocols which accepted the legitimacy of wars of national liberation (in some circumstances) and the treatment of combatants in wars of national liberation as prisoners of war. The ANC signed Protocol I in November 1980 which binds it from attacks on civilian targets and treatment of captured South African soldiers as prisoners of war [Sechaba 1981:29,30; Lodge 1983:359]. Subsequently the ANC has started an international campaign to accord prisoner of war status to Umkhonto combatants [Sechab 1982:30].

END NOTES

1. The struggle for Palestinian rights and the situation in the Middle East are the UN's other longest disputes [Bennett 1988:107-114].

2. As recently as the year before Sharpeville South Africa's Foreign Minister was elected to the vice-presidency of the General Assembly as the agreed Commonwealth candidate [Barratt 1985:195].

3. The activities of SWANU, South-West Africa's first territory wide political movement, also demonstrates the creation of "linkage politics" by a nationalist movement. SWANU led a mass protest in 1959-60 following the forced removal of Africans from the Windhoek Old Location (the African township adjacent to the capital). This led to the Decolonization Committee's activity, and Oliver Tambo was invited to take part in its proceedings because he was supposed to visit Windhoek after the protests began in December 1959. Tambo was asked to take legal action to prevent the deportation of four African leaders. On his arrival, however, he was intercepted by the police, and because he did not have a permit to enter the territory he was instructed to take the next plane back to Johannesburg [Africa Digest 1960d:111,112]. He did, however, interview Sam Nujomo, who took a leading role in the demonstrations and was then one of the representatives of the Ovambo People's Organization which at the time was in an uneasy political alliance with SWANU (the OPO became SWAPO in mid-1960 because of the rivalry with SWANU, then very active at the UN).

4. It is for this reason that analysis based on a quantitative evaluation of voting patterns in the General Assembly on the question of apartheid distorts the actual political sentiments of Member States. A more detailed study of the SPC is needed to gain an accurate picture of the opinions of Member States regarding apartheid and what should be done about it.

CHAPTER 10

ANC DIPLOMACY AND THE WESTERN POWERS

"I left South Africa in 1960. It was in the United States that I went first to ask for assistance and to address meetings-addressing Americans, asking them for support. But we received no real response. I only went to the Soviet Union in 1963, and when I got there, in the first instance, I said we needed some funds. They gave us some. I'd never handled so much money before-it was only \$20,000. I went to China after that, and they gave us money. We asked for it. They didn't come and say, 'Do you want money?' - we asked for it, we needed it."

Oliver Tambo, 1986 [Uhlig 1986:156].

"Britain is the source of our misery in southern Africa-and thus we have a special appeal to make to the people of Britain."

Oliver Tambo, 1982 [Child 1982:12].

"The United States has an unbroken record of support for the racist regime... As far as the position of the U.S. is concerned, our expectations are very low."

Wellie Nhlapo, director of ANC Youth and Students Section [Uhlig 1986:158].

Apart from the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), and to some extent the Netherlands the ANC has received very little support from the governments in Western Europe or the United States and Canada for its international objectives. It is the various Socialist, Social Democratic, and Communist parties in Western Europe and the Socialist International which have most consistently supported the ANC's international objectives. In contrast to the OAU, the United Nations, and the Non-Aligned Movement, these states and political parties have supported the ANC's claim to be the sole authentic representative of the people of South Africa, in addition to supporting economic sanctions.

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the ANC's diplomacy in Western countries. It identifies the organizations aligned to the ANC, the issues around which the ANC has tried to mobilize support, and assess its success in gaining support for these issues. Since the subject of this chapter, therefore, is not mobilization against apartheid in Western countries, but the ANC's relations with these countries it necessarily offers an incomplete view of anti-apartheid activities in these states.

This chapter is also incomplete in another way. It only examines the ANC's public diplomacy in the West. The private world of casual contacts with Foreign Office or State Department officials, i.e. underground diplomacy, is not included. In part, this is because information of this kind is difficult to obtain; but just as importantly it is difficult to evaluate how these contacts effect foreign policy decision-making. In terms of the ANC's interests whatever contacts have been maintained behind the scenes they clearly have not fundamentally affected British or American foreign policy toward South Africa: from its perspective both countries firmly support Pretoria. The major reason for concentrating on the ANC's public diplomacy is that it has not even been examined before. Only then can the impact of its underground diplomacy be properly evaluated.

Different countries are more important to South Africa as trading partners, than to the ANC as supporters of its international objectives. This chapter therefore gives

differential treatment to Western countries based either on their importance to the ANC because of their humanitarian and diplomatic support, or their importance to South Africa as trading partners and hence as a major target of ANC publicity and information.

Britain is the major country examined in this chapter. "It, more than any other Western country, has the largest historical responsibility for a political system that allowed the policy of apartheid to develop" [Hanlon and Omond 1987:135]. As the colonial power, it was Britain which allowed the formation of a Union which purposely excluded the majority of South Africans and helped set the stage for the formation of the ANC two years later. Britain's economic stake in South Africa is also the largest of any foreign country [Hanlon and Omond 1987:135; Hill 1982:90-93].

Just as important, Britain, as the former colonial power, was the first Western country where ANC activists fled after Sharpeville. By the mid-1960s the influx of South African political exiles was reportedly affecting the ANC's office in London.¹ The largest group came from the SACP and the Congress of Democrats. A number of SACP members were reportedly instructed to leave South Africa. Moses Kotane and J.B. Marks went to Dar es Salaam. Joe Slovo was reportedly told to go to Eastern Europe. Brian Bunting became the Tass correspondent in London. Michael Harmel became the editor of The African Communist in London, and Jack Hodgeson and Yusuf Dadoo also went there [Africa Confidential 1963c:5; Harmel

1980:97; SACP 1986:16].² At the same time they arrived the ANC replaced Raymond Kunene, its London representative, who belonged to the Africanist section of the movement. He had done much to broaden the ANC's left-wing image [Africa Confidential 1963a:5,6].³ Kunene later became the chief representative for Europe.

Britain remained a major target of the ANC's publicity. Apart from its first headquarters in Dar es Salaam (and later Lusaka), London was the main office of the ANC's External Mission. It was where its Department of Information and Publicity was based. The ANC received "natural" support from the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Communist countries. Most of the ANC's propaganda, therefore, was aimed at Western countries which had the closest links with South Africa. Its purpose was to inform the public about apartheid (an important aspect of its work in the early 1960s) and mobilize support for the isolation of South Africa.

London's role as a major place of refuge for South African exiles also meant their personal political disagreements spilled over into the British public and into the British press. South African political issues sometimes became linked with local London politics distracting attention from their criticism of Britain for its role in maintaining apartheid. In 1965 a split occurred in the Coloured Peoples Congress in exile between secretary-general Reg September and president Barney Desai. Desai joined the PAC and September later became the ANC's chief representative

in London. A major reason why the ANC (African Nationalist) faction broke away from the ANC was the decision at Morogoro to allow non-Africans to join the External Mission. This decision greatly affected the London office where a number of the workers from the old Congress Alliance were white, Coloured, or Indian. They could now join the ANC so it is not surprising that the African Nationalist faction was formed in London (see Chapter 4).⁴ The Marxist Workers Tendency of the ANC and its South African Labour Education Project (SALEP) is also based in London where it is trying to make inroads into radical student politics. It claims to have the support of the workers and students inside South Africa and denigrates the ANC's Lusaka-based leadership.⁵

The ANC's official governmental contacts with some Nordic countries date back to the 1960s, but until quite recently its diplomacy in most other Western countries has mainly been confined to activities with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) related to anti-apartheid solidarity. The aim of this kind of work involves pressure on the national government to change its policy toward sanctions against South Africa, and secondarily, to support the ANC with humanitarian assistance.

The formation of anti-apartheid NGOs in Western Europe and North America proliferated as a result of five major events in black South African politics: the Treason Trial (1956-1962), Sharpeville (1960), the Rivonia Sabotage Trial (1963-64), the Soweto uprising (1976), and the continuing

unrest since the uprising on the Vaal triangle (1984-1985). During the Treason Trial of mainly ANC activists Christian Action set up the Defense and Aid Fund led by Canon L. John Collins to help with the legal expenses of the accused and provide assistance for their families [Collins 1967:11].

In Sweden the Fund for the Victims of Racial Oppression in South Africa was founded in 1959 by the Social Democratic and Liberal Parties. A Boycott Movement was also formed in Britain in 1959 and renamed the Anti-Apartheid Movement after Sharpeville. The Swedish South Africa Committee, a second Swedish organization set up following Sharpeville, became very active in the boycott of South African goods. A private Norwegian South Africa Committee was established to help South African refugees in 1962.

The British solidarity organizations often worked together and during the Rivonia Sabotage Trial in 1963 they formed a joint committee along with Amnesty International to work on related South African issues [West Africa 1962c:1461]. After the Defense and Aid Fund was banned from South Africa it moved to Britain and with anti-apartheid groups in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, West Germany, Switzerland and Ireland formed the International Defense and Aid Fund [Sechaba 1974e:18].

Anti-apartheid solidarity organizations were formed later in the United States than in Western Europe because of the U.S. preoccupation with the Vietnam war and the difficulty in mobilizing the wider sections of the black

community on foreign policy issues. TransAfrica was founded in 1977 following the Soweto uprising and the Free Nelson Mandela Committee during the latest uprising.

In the early 1960s the primary objective of the ANC's publicity and information was raising the level of political awareness among the public about apartheid. The main problem the External Mission confronted in 1960 was ignorance about South Africa's racial policy. The importance of information and publicity at this early stage of the ANC's diplomacy in Western countries can not be underestimated. ANC novelist, Alex LaGuma, stated that in his experiences talking to audiences in the United Kingdom and in other countries he was often "faced by incredulous people who expressed doubts about the shocking truth of racism in South Africa. Surely you must be exaggerating? Certainly it can't be really as bad as all that?" [LaGuma 1972:11].

The ANC's first objective was to demonstrate that apartheid was such a uniquely evil policy (similar to fascism and nazism) it required special international action, the imposition of economic sanctions by the United Nations. In Britain, specific information and publicity organizations, such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement, were formed to mobilize domestic political support against apartheid and for economic sanctions, and specific humanitarian organizations such as the International Defense and Aid Fund (IDAF) produced information and publicity to finance its support for South African detainees and political prisoners and their families.

The activities of these anti-apartheid NGOs were supported by NGOs more broadly committed to anti-colonial and anti-imperialist solidarity operating as a lobby movement in the colonial power for the freedom of the colonies. In Britain this type of organization included the Africa Bureau, the Movement for Colonial Freedom, the Committee on African Organizations, and the Council for Freedom in Portugal and the Colonies [Calvocoressi 1964:293, 294; Crisis and Change 1965]. A complete examination of the European Left's attitude toward southern Africa is beyond the scope of this chapter. Because these organizations took a strong anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist position on Cuba, Vietnam, and Israel/Palestine during the 1960s and 1970s (i.e. prior to the Portuguese coup) they could not give complete attention to the struggle against apartheid (see Appendix 3).

ANC diplomacy in Western countries has always been concerned with the position Western states adopted concerning sanctions at the United Nations because only the Security Council can implement mandatory economic sanctions (see Chapter 9). Western countries, particularly Britain, the United States, France (the permanent members on the Security Council) and West Germany have extensive economic relations with South Africa.⁶ They are, from the ANC's perspective, "collaborators" with the South African government by upholding apartheid through trade, finance, and military cooperation.⁷ Because three of the Council's five permanent members are among South Africa's largest trading partners

these countries are crucial in the ANC's efforts to implement sanctions against South Africa and they have been the principal targets of the ANC's publicity in Western countries.

Western European communist parties most supportive of the ANC have been the Communist Party in Italy, and the Communist Party of Great Britain (which has close links with the SACP), and the French Communist Party, but the general decline of communist parties in Western Europe has meant these parties have had a marginal influence on gaining the support of public opinion for the ANC. In France, the ANC's more helpful links have been with the Socialist Party which provides the funds for its Paris office, but the Socialist government's attitude toward economic links with South Africa has not been appreciably different from previous governments.

In Britain, the ANC's most natural constituency has been with the Labour Party, but the Labour Party's actual policies toward South Africa when the Party was in power does not lead to great optimism in the ANC on what another Labour government will do regarding South Africa.

The ANC's relations with the United States needs to be examined separately from its relations with Western Europe. The way the American civil rights struggle, domestic black politics, and the U.S. preoccupation with anti-communism, a peculiar aspect of American political culture, have combined in the United States to lobby against apartheid makes U.S. anti-apartheid organizations and their relations with the ANC

not readily comparable to the ANC's experiences in Western Europe.

10.1 Humanitarian Assistance

According to the UN's Special Unit on Apartheid, for countries with limited economic links with South Africa, such as in Nordic countries, the focus of political activity was persuading governments to make grants to particular liberation movements [Sechaba 1974e:17,20]. Since the early 1960s Nordic countries have provided humanitarian assistance to South African refugees to finance educational activities and to support political detainees and other people in need because of their opposition to apartheid. Most of this official government aid was multilateral, given to the United Nations and dispersed through either the UNHCR and UNRWA, or the UN Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa and the UN Trust Fund for South Africa. In fact, the Nordic countries have been the most consistent and largest contributors to the Training Programme and Trust Fund (see Appendix 5.15).

By the late 1970s Nordic countries were giving aid directly to the ANC (and its allies, SWAPO and ZANU) (see Appendix 5.16). Widstrand contends the money Scandinavian countries gave to liberation movements was not large in absolute terms (about \$1 million per year), but it was important because it was direct assistance to these movements

from the Nordic governments; therefore conferring a kind of legitimacy on the movements [Widstrand 1970-71:A87].

In the mid-1960s Sweden's ruling Social Democratic government began a shift to a more radical aid policy and began to support more radical regimes in the Third World [Stanbridge 1983-84:A250]. As part of this shift, Sweden's multilateral aid was decreased and more direct aid was given to liberation movements. Swedish government aid to the ANC began during the budget year 1972/73. Since that time Sweden has given K360 million to the ANC [Budget 1989:100].

In 1968 Sweden's Foreign Minister, Torsten Nilson, announced Sweden's intention to give study grants to members of African liberation movements [A.R.B. 1968:1274]. The following year the Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen) developed a general policy to give aid and material support to "victims of apartheid." According to this policy Swedish aid had to be consistent with the UN domestic jurisdiction principle [Article 2(7)] of non-interference in another country's internal affairs [Leys 1978:66].

The Norwegian Parliament (Storting) first started the Committee to Aid Refugees from Southern Africa in 1963 [Norwegian government 1988:2]. In 1977 it began to give direct support to southern African liberation movements particularly the ANC (although after pressure the PAC also received support) for the first time. Norway did not give direct aid to the ANC and PAC until 1977 "because it could not be said that South Africa was in a colonial situation.

Instead, aid to South African refugees and other victims of apartheid rule" was channelled through the UN and other NGOs [Norwegian government 1988:10]. Bilateral links with specific liberation movements, as opposed to "victims of apartheid," was considered to be inconsistent with the UN's principles of domestic jurisdiction [Leys 1978:66,67].

This policy was reassessed in 1977 in view of the tensions in southern Africa. The Storting determined that aid would now be given to OAU-approved liberation movements, i.e. the ANC and the PAC [Norwegian government 1988:10]. A distinction developed between external organizations (which required OAU approval) and aid to internal organizations which did not require it. In addition to the liberation movements some of Norway's humanitarian assistance was channelled through NGOs to the "legal Black consciousness-raising movement" [Norwegian government 1988:10].

Denmark first became active in supporting liberation movements in 1972. Under a Social Democratic government it established a special fund within the Danish budget to assist them [A.R.B. 1972d:2419].

Finland, under a centre-left coalition government led by the Social Democrats, developed a similar fund within the budget for direct aid to liberation movements in 1974 [A.R.B. 1974c:3182]. In March 1978 the Finnish parliament committed itself to giving direct humanitarian assistance to the ANC [Sechaba 1978e:42-44].

Since the 1960s the rest of Western Europe has given minimal assistance to the ANC. Military success boosted the publicity of the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, and affected the mobilization efforts against apartheid among the ANC's main allies in Western Europe. In Scandinavia during the early 1970s it was difficult to recruit workers to anti-apartheid campaigns because there was an upsurge of interest in the Portuguese territories where the liberation movements were "scoring real success in the military struggle" [Sechaba 1974e:20].

After the Portuguese coup and the Soweto uprising, the ANC was presented with new opportunities in Europe and the movement extended its contacts and mobilization work on the continent. Italy gives no governmental assistance to the ANC and the ANC's main links for humanitarian support and solidarity are through the Italian Communist Party and progressive organizations. The Movimento Liberazione e Sviluppo in Italy promoted a scholarship programme for ANC members, vocational training in agriculture for refugees and shipment of medicines. The city of Reggio-Emilia, after signing a pact of solidarity with the ANC, sent a freighter of supplies for the ANC, SWAPO, and the Patriotic Front [Leonard, 1983:47].

The policy of the Netherlands toward the ANC has been surprisingly ambivalent. In the early 1970s under a Conservative-Christian Democrat coalition the Netherlands supported dialogue with South Africa and maintained friendly

relations with Portugal (in early 1971 the government was embarrassed by a sizable gift to the World Council of Churches' Programme to Combat Racism by Queen Juliana) [Roskam 1971:10,11]. In 1973 the government announced during the budget debate it would allocate funds for humanitarian assistance to liberation movements in response to a UN resolution calling for assistance [Res. 2918 (XXVII)]. This aid would be given through multilateral or regional organizations. The Netherlands also began to work with other European countries to persuade Portugal to leave Africa [ACR 1973-74:C79].

In the after math of the Soweto uprising, in October 1977, the ANC (Oliver Tambo, Thomas Nkobi) met the Dutch prime minister and members of the cabinet for the first time. They were promised assistance for ANC combatants in Angola and at the ANC's growing complex at Morogoro, Tanzania [SAIRR 1978:39]. In fact a Dutch solidarity organization, the Angola Medical Committee in the Netherlands, raised all the funds necessary for the construction of the ANC's Health Centre at Morogoro, and the Holland Committee on Southern Africa has sent emergency funds to Umkhonto combatants (Leonard says refugees) in Angola [Leonard 1983:47; Sechaba 1984b:15]. The ANC-Holland Solidarity Hospital at Morogoro was opened in May 1984.⁸ At the beginning of 1978 the University of Amsterdam awarded Rivonia trialist Govan Mbeki an honorary doctorate for his book, South Africa: The Peasant Revolt, and two years later its Board of Directors created the Govan Mbeki Fund for

further research on apartheid by ANC scholars and activists [Sechaba 1978c:24,25].

10.2 Economic Sanctions and an Arms Embargo

Anti-apartheid NGOs operating in Western countries, understandably, often took up the apartheid issue in ways which related the issue to its own national politics and depended on the political stance toward apartheid taken by its government. According to a report on West European anti-apartheid movements published by the UN's Special Unit on Apartheid the main focus of political action in the countries which were South Africa's major trading partners such as Britain was ending economic and military "collaboration" with the government [Sechaba 1974e:20].

These issues were taken up, according to the report, "at the express request of the liberation movements" rather than providing assistance in the form of funds and equipment. Since the report to the Special Unit was written by the Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement which is aligned to the ANC (and not the PAC), this effectively meant the ANC [Sechaba 1974e:20]. The report, implicitly admits this, when it acknowledges many of the anti-apartheid groups were set up in consultation with the liberation movements [Sechaba 1974e:17]. "[On] the relationship between anti-apartheid groups and the liberation movements," the Special Unit's report concludes, "it can be said that the policy of the former is determined broadly by the latter. Basically, it is for the liberation movements

themselves [i.e. the ANC] to make the demands, and for anti-apartheid groups to respond" [Sechaba 1974e:20].

In Britain, the early issues which confront the ANC were arms sales (after British-made Saracen armoured cars were used during Sharpeville), trade, and the Simonstown Agreement. In France and West Germany it was trade and arms supplies (by 1970 France was South Africa's main arms supplier). In the United States the issues in the 1960s were the NASA's missile and tracking station in South Africa, naval ships using South African ports (after the incident over the black crew on shore leave from the air craft carrier Independence), and the gold pricing policy [Legum 1968-69:35; Karis 1979:327]. In the U.S. trade and investment as an issue did not appear until the 1970s when the issue was taken up by American church groups.

The ANC's campaign for an international boycott of South African goods was related to the founding of the Anti-Apartheid Movement. The ANC's campaign began before the movement was banned, and before the ANC established its External Mission. The ANC first called for an international boycott through its delegation to the All-African People's Conference in Accra in December 1958 (see Chapter 3). The following year, in April 1959, the ANC held its last legal annual conference in South Africa. As a result of this conference the ANC launched a "domestic" boycott of "Nationalist" goods, i.e. goods produced by companies which supported the National Party, and so mainly Afrikaner

companies.⁹ At the annual conference Albert Luthuli appealed to the international community for an international boycott of South African goods. He repeated this appeal in his Nobel Peace Prize lecture in Oslo, Norway in 1961 [Stoltenberg 1978:107].

Tennyson Makiwane, an early ANC Youth League member, was sent out of South Africa by the ANC later 1959 in order to mobilize international support for the boycott. In Britain, two months later, in June 1959, a number of organizations, initially led by the Committee of African Organizations came together to form a more broadly based Boycott Movement in response to Luthuli's call. Makiwane became the Boycott Movement's director, and Christian Action provided the funds for Makiwane to become the full-time organizer of the movement.

Early support came from various political parties and anti-colonial organizations which were to become the ANC's primary means of influencing British public opinion and government policy. The movement was sponsored by public figures from Britain's main opposition parties, the Labour Party and Liberal Party, the Trade Union Congress (TUC), and the arts. It did not suggest a consumer boycott alone could bring the end of the regime, but recognized real action would have to come through mandatory sanctions imposed by the UN with the support of South Africa's main trading partners [Minty 1982:28].

One of the movement's early successes was to launch an international campaign in Britain for a one-month boycott in March 1960. Its first leaflet proclaimed, "Boycott Slave-Driver Goods," and quoted the ANC's 1959 annual conference resolution which called for trade unions, co-operatives, and the public "to act in solidarity with the oppressed people of South Africa." The purpose of the one-month boycott was "to focus national action in a concentrated period." The campaign began on 28 February, 1960 at a mass rally of over 20,000 people in Trafalgar Square, the site of the South African Embassy. The rally was addressed by Hugh Gaitskell, the leader of the Labour Party (who met with Nelson Mandela two years later during Mandela's trip abroad) [Sechaba 1967w:9].

Representatives from the Boycott Movement spoke all over Britain and were able to get the co-operative stores to withdraw South African goods from their shelves. The movement, according to Sechaba, raised the consciousness of the British public on the issue of apartheid. The campaign developed rapidly. There was a grass roots group of support in "virtually every town and city throughout Britain" [Sechaba 1967w:9]. This may have been true, but the actual boycott during the month of March had very little effect on South African imports; in fact imports of South African fruit increased that month [Kessings 1960b:17529].

More importantly, the controversy surrounding the Boycott Movement's campaign led a number of journalists and

television crews to go to South Africa to investigate apartheid. On 21 March, 1960 the Sharpeville shootings occurred. Because a large contingent of the international media were already in South Africa at the time of Sharpeville, within hours of the shootings the entire story was broadcast around the world. The shootings caused such an increase in the level of public indignation it was a turning point in the apartheid dispute at the United Nations (see Chapter 9).

In the aftermath of the shootings the Boycott Movement changed its name to the Anti-Apartheid Movement. Since Sharpeville the AAM has worked to mobilize British public opinion in support of economic sanctions. It has repeatedly testified before the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid (see Chapter 9), and has maintained its close relations with the ANC.

The ANC's initial campaigns in Britain for economic sanctions and an arms boycott occurred while the Conservative Party was in power. The Labour Party returned to power in October 1964, but the subsequent economic crisis and the broader strategic framework of British foreign policy did not appreciably alter Britain's policy toward South Africa. In November 1964, a month after Labour came to power, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced Britain would abide by the voluntary arms embargo imposed by the Security Council the previous year, but it omitted ammunition and other supplies in terms of the Simonstown Agreement. The government was

worried about the strategic difficulties of supporting its troops in the Far East if the Agreement was terminated and the Suez Canal was closed (as it was from October 1965-April 1957 and June 1967-June 1975) [African Recorder 1965b:962; African Recorder 1965c:1199].

During Britain's balance of payments crisis in 1967 the currency devaluation was accompanied by tremendous spending cuts at a time when British troops were still "East of Suez" and Simonstown was useful to the navy. The Labour government not only was unwilling to cut Britain's economic links with South Africa, but Anthony Crosland, then President of the Board of Trade, staunchly opposed sanctions and defended Britain's trade with South Africa [Legum 1968-69:22,23]. Sechaba commented that since coming to power in October 1964, Labour "has shown itself to be no less interested in the profits of apartheid," claiming that since Labour came to power there has been a "veritable scramble for South African trade." The Labour Party supported the arms embargo, but "its implementation has been too timid, incomplete, and too late" [Sechaba 1968m:15-18].

Back in opposition by 1970, Labour was hard pressed to justify its policies toward South Africa when Denis Healey, the former Minister of Defense, explained Labour's policies in a Sechaba interview [Sechaba 1971:14-16]. In opposition Labour opposed the new Conservative Party's proposed arms sales to South Africa, and in May 1971 Labour's national executive for the first time supported an appeal for "moral

and material aid" for South African liberation movements [Legum 1971-72:A96]. The ANC started a massive publicity campaign against the strategic importance of the Cape sea route and the importance of the Simonstown base [Sechaba 1970i:3-6; 1970j:6-9; 1971f:2,3; Gervasi 1971:16-24].

When Labour returned to power in February 1974 the South African arms issue threatened to split the Party. A Royal Navy task force heading for the Far East was set to go to port in Mombasa after going to South Africa first. African states apparently took this calmly, surprising the Foreign Office which did not receive a single protest, but it started a row within the Labour Party resulting in the termination of the Simonstown Agreement by the end of the year [A.R.B. 1974d:3411C-3412ABC]. Later Labour governments (Wilson in October 1974 and Callaghan in April 1976) refused to press for mandatory economic sanctions. In opposition, Labour has been committed to mandatory sanctions since the mid-1980s [Hanlon and Omond 1986:136].

The ANC has also had mixed relations with the British trade union movement. ANC or SACTU representatives have attended TUC conferences (J.B. Marks, former president of the African Mine Workers Union), and since the re-emergence of South African trade union activity in 1973 SACTU has participated in trade union conferences organized by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement [Sechaba 1973g:23-26]. The TUC in Britain has not fully endorsed the ANC's trade union affiliate, SACTU, and in the past it has been willing to

support trade unions in South Africa which the ANC and SACTU oppose [Sechaba 19681:7,8; Sechaba 1969j:13,14]. After much mutual recriminations (SACTU also accused British unions of having funds invested in South Africa) SACTU and the TUC were on better terms by the 1980s; effectively because the TUC adopted SACTU's general political position without formally endorsing the union [Sechaba 19701:32,33; Sechaba 1982a:11-17].

The Nordic countries are firmly committed to the UN arms embargo against South Africa. Norway was a member of the Security Council in 1963 when it adopted a recommendation to member states to implement a voluntary arms embargo, and together the Nordic states have firmly supported the mandatory embargo imposed in 1977. The mandatory embargo was enforced in Nordic countries through national legislation [Norwegian government 1988:2].

The Nordic countries acknowledge (in contrast to most other West European countries) that there are "serious loopholes" in the 1977 embargo which need to be closed, and they oppose the transfer of nuclear technology to South Africa [Stoltenberg 1978:108, 109]. The World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa is based in Oslo.

The Soweto uprising led Nordic countries to take firmer action against South Africa. A Norwegian initiative led the Nordic foreign ministers to decide, in September 1977, to appoint a working group to develop a joint policy of economic

sanctions. During a foreign ministers meeting in March 1978 a Nordic Programme of Action was established to discourage new investment, prevent cultural and athletic contacts with South Africa, and increase aid to the liberation movements. The Programme was revised and expanded in 1985, revised again in 1988 and is now entitled the Nordic Programme of Action Against Apartheid. The new Programme includes a trade boycott of South Africa and operates within the framework of the United Nations [Norwegian government 1988:4,5].

10.3 International Solidarity and Legitimacy

Although gaining international legitimacy as the sole representative of the people of South Africa is a general ANC objective, it became a more important focus of the External Mission's work after the Soweto uprising [Sechaba 1978:1]. In contrast to the United Nations, the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement which accept the legitimacy of both the ANC and the PAC, it is among the Social Democratic, Socialist, and Communist governments and parties in Western European countries where the ANC has gained the most support for its claims to exclusive legitimacy. West European countries, particularly in Scandinavia, have given the greatest humanitarian assistance to the ANC have also developed the closest bilateral relations with the movement.

The ANC has gained international legitimacy and prestige from a number of West European governments including Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, Finland and Ireland [Leonard 1983:97].

Since the early 1960s it has received direct support from Nordic governments for its diplomatic objectives. In fact, Sweden's former Prime Minister Olof Palme, in his last official speech before he was assassinated, pointed out that he had known Oliver Tambo for more than twenty years [Palme 1986:59,64].¹⁰ Tambo first had direct talks with the prime ministers of Norway, Sweden, and Denmark in August 1962. These talks led the Nordic governments to formulate a common foreign policy toward South Africa which included support for economic sanctions and coordination of their policies at the United Nations. The development of this "united Nordic front regarding the South African issue" has continued [Norwegian government 1988:3]. In March 1978 the Finnish parliament "voted unanimously on the recognition of the ANC as the only authentic representative of the South African people" [Sechaba 1978e:42-44].

The Nordic states have consistently tried to work for change in South Africa through the United Nations [Africa Recorder 1962:328,329; African Recorder 1963d:486]. Sweden played a key role in the Security Council efforts in the early 1960s to find a means of peaceful change in South Africa through its Group of Experts led by Alva Myrdal (see Appendix 5.10). Nordic states have been involved with UN activities aimed at mobilizing support for its international campaign against apartheid. In 1973 Norway hosted a UN and OAU conference on economic sanctions [ACR 1973-74:C36-40]. During 1978 in conjunction with the UN's International

Anti-Apartheid Year an ANC delegation led by Oliver Tambo and Josiah Jele, head of the Department of International Affairs went to Finland, Norway, and Denmark.¹¹ The mission met with the prime ministers of all three Nordic states and also included meetings with trade unionists, political party leaders, and solidarity organizations. "The visit to Scandinavia," Sechaba concluded afterwards, "was another proof of the growing prestige of the ANC and this poses new responsibilities on our movement especially at this stage of the revolution" [Sechaba 1978e:42-44]. The ANC participates in conferences sponsored by Nordic states such as the international seminar in Maputo in April 1978 on "Educational Alternatives for Southern Africa" [Development Dialogue 1978:2:79].

In the wake of the Soweto uprising European foreign ministers agreed to coordinate their views on South Africa, and in September 1977 formulated a Code of Conduct for European multinational corporations with subsidiaries in South Africa [ACR 1977-78:C49-C55; Hill 1982:106-109]. In 1979 Tambo led an ANC delegation to Ireland, organized by the Irish Anti-Apartheid Movement, in conjunction with International Anti-Apartheid Year. Tambo used the trip to put greater pressure on European governments to end their relations with South Africa. He met with the Irish Foreign Minister who promised the ANC humanitarian assistance during their talks and he met representatives from trade unions and solidarity organizations. Tambo characterized the European

Economic Community as the "life blood of apartheid," and dismissed the EEC's new Code of Conduct for European multinationals operating in South Africa as "meaningless and irrelevant," and called for the complete isolation of South Africa through mandatory sanctions [Sechaba 1979f:20,21].

The ANC's relations with Italy began in the early 1970s. In some ways Italy acted as a forward diplomatic base for the ANC and other liberation movements to operate within the European Left through links with the Italian Communist Party and other Italian progressive organizations. This was important in the early 1970s because the ANC's European diplomacy emphasized NATO's complicity in Portugal's African colonial wars. This issue was crucial to the liberation movements, but until after the Portuguese coup it was not a major concern to the European Left (see Chapter 8).

A conference in solidarity with FRELIMO, MPLA, and PAIGC was held in Rome in June 1970 to help mobilize support in the European Left for the southern African struggles [Marcum 1978:229]. A special issue of Sechaba was devoted to covering the conference, and the magazine pointed to a certain lack of interest found in the European Left regarding the problems of the liberation movements [Sechaba 1970k:2-5]. The Rome conference was jointly sponsored by AAPSO and the World Peace Council and was one of the few activities which communist front organizations sponsored for southern Africa in the early 1970s (see Appendix 3).

The conference's Political Report pointed to the successful actions by trade unions in Sweden, Italy and Britain in getting these countries to withdraw financial support from Portugal's Caborra Basa dam project in Mozambique. Sechaba pointed out the Rome conference was the first time the legal status of the liberation movements as representatives of respective peoples was raised at such an international level [Sechaba 1970k:2-5].

Although the ANC's activities in Italy began through links with the Italian Communist Party, the ANC's participation in subsequent conferences in Italy shows how much the movement has gained support from political parties across the Italian political spectrum. Another solidarity conference was held in Reggio Emilia, near Bologna, in November 1978 (one year before the Lancaster House settlement for Zimbabwe), and a second solidarity conference was held in Rome in February 1982. Its theme, after the break down of the Geneva talks on Namibia, was "against racism and apartheid in South Africa and for the independence of Namibia." It included leading Italian politicians from all the major political parties [Sechaba 1982d:13-18].¹²

At a more symbolic level, in Italy the city of Reggio Emilia signed a pact of solidarity with the ANC in 1977 [Sechaba 1977c:49-51]. Rome and Athens awarded Nelson Mandela honorary citizenship in 1983. Similar acts of solidarity occurred throughout Britain.¹³ Sechaba commented, "During the last few years, governments and other organizations through

out the world have come to accept the ANC as the real representative of the people of South Africa, the only serious opponent of the racist regime and an alternative force for future power in the country" [Sechaba 1983d:16].

The Socialist International, an international organization of Social Democratic and Socialist parties, gave early support to the campaign for South African sanctions and the arms embargo in 1963 [African Recorder 1964b:670]. At the institutional level, support for the ANC's international legitimacy is reinforced by its links with the Socialist International which has allowed the ANC access to important West European leaders such as Willy Brandt, Olaf Palme, and Francois Mitterrand [Africa Confidential 1978b:4].

The Socialist International held its bureau meeting in Madrid in October 1977, in the aftermath of Steve Biko's murder. In a statement signed by Willy Brandt, the leader of the SPD, and Anker Joergensen, Prime Minister of Denmark, Kalevi Sorsa, Prime Minister of Finland, Francois Mitterrand, the leader of the French Socialist Party, and cabinet members from Belgium and West Germany the Socialist International recognized the ANC and SWAPO as the authentic liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia and "urged all member parties to intensify solidarity work for the liberation movements of southern Africa-especially by supporting the African National Congress of South Africa" [Sechaba 1978d:17,18]. Now that the Social Democratic parties "have committed themselves to strong international action against

apartheid," Sechaba warned, "they will be judged by their actions in the future" [Sechaba 1978d:18].

This support for particular southern African liberation movements was part of the Socialist International's broader shift away from its Euro-centric focus toward the Third World. This shift was more vividly indicated the following year when it held its bureau meeting in Dakar; the first time it ever held the meeting in the Third World [A.R.B. 1978b:4839C, 4840A].

The ANC's cooperation with the Socialist International also became a factor in the ANC's relations in southern Africa. At a conference in Arusha in 1984 a new phase began in its cooperation with the Front Line States, the ANC and SWAPO [ACR 1984-85:176].

The development of democracy in Spain and the election of the Socialist Party to power has been beneficial to the ANC, and has given it another base of support in Western Europe. The Socialist Party and the recently unbanned Spanish Communist Party have developed links with the ANC. A delegation from the ANC, the Patriotic Front, and SWAPO attended "Africa Week" celebrations in Madrid in December 1977 and met with Socialist Party and Communist Party leaders [Sechaba 1978d:17-23]. During 1978 Spain launched an export drive to South Africa emphasizing machinery, plastics and electronics [ACR 1977-78:B955]. Two years after the Socialist Party came to power the Spanish government refused to meet with P.W. Botha during his European tour in 1984, and met

with a delegation from the ANC, led by Francis Mell, the editor of Sechaba, instead [Sechaba 1984e:16].

In France, the experience of the resistance fighting fascism during the Second World War and the struggle against the French war in Algeria were natural reference points for anti-apartheid solidarity among intellectuals such as Sartre and Henri Alleg, and the French Communist Party [Sechaba 19671:4,5; Sartre 1967:10,11; Sechaba 1971e:15]. The French trade union movement (CGT) has contacts with the ANC's trade union affiliate, SACTU [Sechaba 1972:10]. The Comite Francais Contre l'Apartheid was formed in 1964 after a visit by leaders of the liberation movements [Sechaba 1974e:18]. The Comite in France works with the ANC in the same way the AAM and ANC cooperate in Britain; mainly sponsoring conferences to inform the French public and mobilize support for economic sanctions and the arms embargo. It has also worked with prominent South African exiles such as Breyten Bretenbach [Sechaba 19671:4,5].

In the Netherlands the Comite Zuid-Afrika (CZA) was created as a broadly based movement comprising various political parties. CZA originally favoured dialogue with South Africa, but South Africa's growing repression "led more and more people to realize that no distinct line can be drawn between humanitarian and political assistance" [Sechaba 1974e:18]. The difficulty of putting dialogue into practice led some anti-apartheid groups such as CZA to "come to take a position in line with the policies of the liberation

movements-i.e. disengagement" [Sechaba 1974e:19]. CZA split into the Defense and Aid Fund Netherlands for fund raising for humanitarian purposes, and the Netherlands Communist Party set up the Anti-Apartheid Beweging Nederland (AANB) for political action before the Dutch churches took up the issue in the 1970s [Sechaba 1974e:19].

In Belgium the ANC has met with representatives of the major political parties and with representatives of the European Community. In 1981, under a Christian Democrat-Liberal coalition, Tambo met the Belgian Foreign Minister and was received by the EEC Commission where he addressed the ambassadors of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific members of the Lome Treaty [ACR 1981-82:B723; The Courier 1982]. The ANC also has links with the Socialistische Solitariteit, the Fund for Development and Cooperation associated with the two Socialist Parties (flemish and french speaking) in Belgium [Sechaba 1984:18,19].

Another source of political support for the ANC has been the World Council of Churches (WCC). The ANC's links with the WCC date from the early 1960s.¹⁴ M.B. Yengwa, the secretary of the African Congregational Church in Durban, was a close aide of Albert Luthuli's in the provincial ANC in Natal. He represented the ANC at the WCC meeting which drew up its Programme to Combat Racism which was launched in January 1970.

What made the WCC's actions so important was its direct intervention in politics: the purpose of the Programme was to

combat racism, i.e. it was not a welfare fund for the "victims of apartheid" (this was covered by other WCC departments). The Programme was aimed at raising the level of awareness and strengthening the organizational capability of those confronting racial oppression. The WCC has taken a strong stand against racism since it was founded in 1948, and in contrast to the political activities of the communist front organizations (see Chapter 8), southern Africa was recognized as a priority because of the overt and intense nature of racism in the region [ACR 1970-71:C226-C237; The Times 1970].¹⁵

The most controversial aspect of the Programme was its Special Fund set up in September 1970 to be used by the southern African liberation movements. The Luthuli Memorial Foundation was set up with this initial grant from the WCC to inform world public opinion about alternatives to apartheid, to do research, and to assist victims of apartheid. The WCC's priorities for the Programme to Combat Racism indicate its greater support for the ANC and NGOs aligned to the ANC than for the PAC [Sincere 1985:21; Morris 1974:301] (see Appendix 5.17).¹⁶ The WCC has also supported the ANC's CONCP allies (MPLA and FRELIMO) rather than its rivals, UNITA and the GRAE in Angola.

In this way the WCC and the Socialist International are part of the ANC's network of international contacts which have reinforced its status in the international system and given humanitarian support to the ANC and its allies. These

links with the WCC have implications for the ANC's struggle because of the re-emergence of the church as a major area of struggle in the 1980s (see Chapter 4).

10.4 The Nordic States, the ANC, and the United Nations

Stanbridge contends, "It is largely because of support to liberation movements that the Scandinavian countries gained their international image of being 'progressive' aid donors" [ACR 1983-84:A253]. He argues this image masks a complex reality because the trading policies of the Nordic states toward South Africa do not correspond with the official position on sanctions. South Africa is one of the Nordic state's most important trading partners [Stanbridge 1983-84:A252,A286; Cervenka 1974:39-42].

Another area in which the position of Nordic states towards South Africa is more complex, which Stanbridge does not mention, is the nature of the support the Nordic states give liberation movements such as the ANC at the United Nations. Chapter 9 examined the UN's declaration of apartheid as a crime against humanity, its gradual endorsement of particular OAU-supported liberation movements, and acceptance of armed struggle. In contrast to the support which these issues receive by most Third World states, the Nordic states have joined the European Community in their reluctance to endorse these declarations in the General Assembly. Western states have uniformly argued that many of these declarations are either contrary to the Charter's provisions or presumes

the General Assembly has authority in matters which the Charter reserves for the Security Council (a position often supported by the UN's legal counsel).

Both the Nordic states and the European Community have expressed reservation about declaring apartheid a crime against humanity. In fact, the Nordic states have not been consistent on this issue. Following the conclusions of the international seminar on apartheid in Brasilia in 1966 (see Chapter 9) they supported the Assembly's resolution which declared apartheid a crime against humanity and criticized the Western powers for collaborating with South Africa [Res. 2202 A (XXI); Y.U.N. 1966:87].

They abstained, however, on the subsequent resolution on the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid [Res. 3068 (XXVIII) 1973]. The representative of Finland, speaking on behalf of the Nordic states, explained they abstained because of reservations with regard to the adoption of an international legal instrument making apartheid subject to universal jurisdiction, but he emphasized this decision in no way altered the long-standing commitment of the Nordic states to the struggle against apartheid [Y.U.N. 1973:100] (see Appendix 5.18).

The Netherlands expressed a similar reservation on the initial resolution in 1966. Its representative stated the provisions of the resolution exceeded the Assembly's powers since it was the prerogative of the Security Council to

declare a particular state a threat to international peace and security [Y.U.N. 1966:87].

The Nordic states and the European Community have not supported the Africa Group's attempt to have South Africa suspended or expelled from the General Assembly. After the ANC and PAC were granted observer status, the Assembly attacked South Africa's credentials, claiming the country did not have the right to represent the people of South Africa [Res. 3411 G (XXX)]. In the prior debate on South Africa's credentials in the SPC the representative of Sweden, Olaf Rydbeck, noted that ways of "creating effective pressure" on South Africa have been under discussion for more than a decade, but "in his delegations view, a formal review of credentials could not involve judgement as to whether a government had a legitimate popular mandate or not" [Press Release GA/AH/1278 10 October 1974]. In the Assembly this resolution was not supported by the European Community or the Nordic states. The representative of Sweden said his country did not support the resolution because it singled out for condemnation particular countries and implicitly legitimated the use of force [Y.U.N. 1975:146,153].

Many Nordic states have given humanitarian support exclusively to the ANC and its allies. They have not supported the General Assembly's attempt to give both of the South African liberation movements sole legitimacy [Y.U.N. 1977:172] (see Appendix 5.18).

10.5 Limited Support for Armed Struggle

In the early years the provision of humanitarian assistance to "victims of apartheid" (UN language) and political mobilization against apartheid was separated from support to particular liberation movements engaged in armed struggle because of the issue of violence. Many early anti-apartheid supporters, while convinced of the immorality of the policy, would not accept the next step, the legitimate use of violence to change the system. This early support, according to the report on anti-apartheid movements to the Special Unit on Apartheid, was "largely confined to moral support, expressed in resolutions, public meetings and information material," but in the mid-1970s, at the same time the UN was beginning to support liberation movements and accept the legitimacy of armed struggle (Chapter 9), "the [anti-apartheid] movements were able to promote greater public understanding for material support to the liberation movements" [Sechaba 1974e:19].

While NGOs involved in anti-apartheid solidarity began increasingly to identify with the armed struggles waged by the liberation movements, this shift has not been supported by the European Community or the Nordic states. The governments of these states still make a distinction between humanitarian support for "victims of apartheid" (an early category for UN assistance programmes) and support for armed struggle.

The Nordic states and the European Community either voted against or abstained on a resolution in 1970 which called for the isolation of South Africa in all spheres of international relations and declared the legitimacy of the struggle waged by the South African liberation movements "by all available means at their disposal" [Res. 2671 F 1977 (XXV)]. The representative of Sweden, indicating the kind of distinctions important to the Nordic states on South Africa, explained that he was gratified that some of the SPC's resolutions were adopted almost unanimously, particularly those resolutions relating to the arms embargo and humanitarian assistance. What concerned Sweden, he explained, was the call to isolate South Africa "in practically every aspect of international relations and the paragraph endorsing the use of violence" [Y.U.N. 1970:152]. Subsequent resolutions making similar claims were also not supported by the European Community or the Nordic states [Res. 2923 E 1972; Y.U.N. 1972:106] (see Appendix 5.18). Finland and Sweden voted against the draft resolution for the Decade to Combat Racism in 1978 because of its reference to armed struggle [Y.U.N. 1978:664].

After the Soweto uprising the General Assembly reaffirmed the legitimacy of the struggle in South Africa in terms that were almost a direct statement of ANC strategy, i.e. "by all available and appropriate means, including armed struggle-for the seizure of power by the people" [Res. 33/183 L 1978; Y.U.N. 1978:214]. This resolution, and subsequent

resolutions adopting the same terms were also not supported by the Nordic states nor the European Community because of their endorsement of violence [34/93 A 1979; Y.U.N. 1979: 179,189] (see Appendix 5.18).

10.6 Benign Neglect: the ANC and the United States

The civil rights movement and the Cold War hysteria in the U.S. provided the context for the development of U.S. policy toward Africa, and South Africa in particular, during the 1950s and early 1960s. Later, these experiences dominated American perceptions of the struggle in South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s. These aspects of American political culture differed so significantly from the ANC's own experience in South Africa that it remained on the margin of American politics until the late 1970s, but by that time it was so deeply sceptical of its reception in the U.S., that it was difficult for the ANC to make use of its new political opportunities. Only by the mid-1980s was it coming to recognize its potential to influence the U.S. foreign policy debate on South Africa.

The Cold War influenced the way in which the coalition of trade unions, white liberals, and churches came together in the U.S. to form the civil rights movement. At this time the demands for civil rights was gaining a sympathetic hearing in the Democratic Party, yet many white Americans easily equated civil rights with communism. The Communist Party of the United States adopted a classic united front

strategy in order to organize black Americans against European colonialism and American imperialism. The civil rights movement, like the American labour movement during this time, was soon purged of its communist members. In order to safe guard the domestic gains in civil rights many black Americans felt a strong need to demonstrate their loyalty to America at home by supporting America's anti-communist foreign policy of containment abroad.

The American Committee on Africa (AMOA) and the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) were among the "mainstream" civil rights organizations founded during the 1950s by American clergymen with a growing interest in Africa [Metz 1988:165]. The Congo crisis, the rural resistance in Pondoland in the Transkei, and the Sharpeville shootings turned the interest of concerned black Americans toward Africa, and southern Africa. The American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA), started in 1962, brought together prominent civil rights activists including Martin Luther King, the president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Roy Wilkins, executive-secretary of the NAACP for the first time.

ANLCA repeatedly called for American support for African liberation movements, particularly in the Portuguese colonies, and condemned South Africa's racial policies, but by the late 1960s it became a moribund organization; after trying to mediate in the Nigerian civil war, and the coups,

poverty, and ideological struggles led to American disillusionment with Africa [White 1981:87].

The rise of groups expousing an assertive affirmation of black identity (Malcolm X, Stokeley Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Franz Fanon) often combined with support for radical nationalist politics in the Third World, particularly armed liberation struggles in southern Africa, alienated mainstream black organizations which tried to influence policy by operating within the American political system [White 1981:88]. Many black academics challenged the apolitical stance of the African Studies Association and tried to get the ASA to support liberation movements [White 1981:89].

Divestment and sanctions against South Africa did not become a significant issue in American politics until the early 1970s with the formation of the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers' Movement, which the ANC followed with great interest [de Crespigny 1971:5-7; Sechaba 1972f:16,17]. The movement called for an end to all Polaroid sales in South Africa and the demand that any profits should go to finance the South African liberation movements [White 1981:89]. By 1971 it led the Polaroid Corporation to implement the "Polaroid experiment" in an effort to ameliorate conditions for black South Africans while still conducting business in South Africa [Coker 1986:80-83; Karis 1979 335,349].

In the early 1970s the role of American corporations in South Africa split the American civil rights movement at a time when Nixon's new Africa policy emphasized a "tilt"

toward support for white minority regimes in southern Africa. The corporate reformism of liberal American capitalism argued that the best way to support change in South Africa was through greater corporate responsibility (in the 1970s this was the position of both the Republican and Democratic parties; Herman Nickel, Andrew Young, Jimmy Carter).

Both conservative and liberal Americans interpreted South Africa as a civil rights struggle rather than a struggle for national liberation [Palmberg 1978:138]. A more radical policy of corporate disengagement was increasingly supported by groups which ordinarily would make strange bed-fellows: church groups, Marxists, and radical groups which argued capitalism reinforced apartheid and the U.S. should support liberation movements.

Corporate reformism began with the "Polaroid experiment" and later found expression in the Sullivan Principles adopted by major U.S. corporations in March 1977 in the wake of the Soweto uprising [Karis 1979:349,350]. Roy Wilkins the director of the NAACP accepted the Nixon Administration's policy of "selective involvement" in southern Africa and expressly opposed violence. The American Committee on Africa was firmly against Nixon's "tilt" toward South Africa [Sechaba 1972e:20].

Sechaba gave periodic coverage to the growing debate on South Africa within the U.S., but in this essentially American domestic political debate the ANC had very little actual input since its links in the U.S. were on the margin

of mainstream black politics. Its contacts with the black community were not with older, more moderate sections of the leadership associated with the NAACP and the Southern Christian Leadership Association, but with the "young radicals" represented by H. Rap Brown, chairman of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, Huey Newton's Black Panther Party which had been transformed by Marxism-Leninism and supported armed struggles throughout the world, and Angela Davis [Sechaba 1967s:7; Sechaba 1970k:14-18; North 1971:10,11].

Since all of these organizations rejected the structure of the American political system they had no influence on policy making. While these organizations could offer the ANC "solidarity," none of them had any influence on the U.S. policy making process regarding economic sanctions, disinvestment, or support for the ANC.

The State Department maintained high level contacts with the ANC and other southern African liberation movements throughout the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations.¹⁷ Tambo's statement cited at the beginning of this chapter stating he received very little assistance during his tour of the U.S. in 1960 is not entirely accurate. In his speech to the Smith College Faculty Club in 1963 Tambo said the All-In Conference in Pietermaritzburg in March 1961 was financed largely from funds raised during his trip to the United States [Tambo 1963a; Nelson 1975:160].

The ANC's contacts with the State Department, however, ended with the coming to power of the Nixon Administration. Unfortunately for the ANC, Nixon came to power about the time the ANC began the armed struggle in earnest. U.S. policy began to "tilt" toward South Africa at about the time a Conservative government came to power in Britain ready to expand links with Pretoria.

It seemed to the ANC that the major Western powers were making a concerted effort to roll back African liberation: South Africa was the lynch pin of Western imperialism. "We find ourselves," a Sechaba editorial stated, "more and more certain that the struggle for national liberation in South Africa is a vital link in the chain of struggles now being waged by the people of the world" [Sechaba 1972g:14,15].

The ANC was particularly concerned about American foreign investment and U.S. gold pricing policy. It interpreted the arrangement leading to an increase in the gold price in the early 1970s as part of a wider political understanding between U.S. "imperialism" and South Africa [Sechaba 1970:g11-13]. One of the constant factors in U.S. policy toward South Africa, according to the ANC, has been its economic support for the regime. It helped South Africa out of a financial crisis after Sharpeville and it continued to support the government [Sechaba 1968r:15-18].

The Congressional Black Caucus was formed after the 1970 congressional elections, but it dealt mainly with domestic

issues. It was recognized that another organization was necessary to handle foreign policy toward Africa and the Caribbean, and in 1977 TransAfrica was formed [Metz 1988:170].

Domestic public opinion became more aware of apartheid in the post-Soweto period which helped the ANC enter the mainstream of black American politics. By the end of the 1970s the ANC had developed links with TransAfrica whose executive director, Randall Robinson, had been Martin Luther King's chief-of-staff [Sechaba 1979n:22,23]. In June 1981 TransAfrica sponsored the ANC and SWAPO on a tour of the United States which put the ANC in contact with mainstream black leaders such as William Gray, Julian Bond, Coretta Scott King, and playwright James Baldwin [Sechaba 1981f:23-27].

The ANC also began reaching out to church groups. According to Dr. Wyotte T. Walker, the minister of Canaan Baptist Church in Harlem, Oliver Tambo and Johnny Makatini helped form the International Freedom Mobilization Against Apartheid. It was an organization of black churches from 38 states and 52 cities against apartheid and racism founded in April 1979 [Sechaba, 1979o:24]. These religious leaders rejected the corporate reformism inherent in the Sullivan Principles and called for immediate disinvestment and passed a resolution declaring "its unequivocal support for the national liberation struggle" led by the ANC [White 1981:96].

As long as this debate divided the black community the ANC remained on the margin of black American politics, and American politics generally. By the late 1970s, however, it became evident the advocates of disengagement had won and the ANC's position effectively became the mainstream position in black American politics. New opportunities arose for the ANC in the U.S., but the ANC was slow to use them to its advantage.

Surprisingly, given the ANC's history, it had no real links with the American church groups opposing apartheid until the late 1970s. In the one other area where it could have built constructive links, the American labour movement, it broke bridges rather than built them. At a time when the new policy of "constructive engagement" by the Reagan Administration was again "tilting" the U.S. toward South Africa and the Denton Commission was publicizing the ANC's communist links by refurbishing the old arguments of the 1960s for new uninformed audiences of the 1980s, the ANC appeared particularly sensitive [Sechaba 1982e:2]. In terms reminiscent of communist propaganda, the ANC accused the AFL-CIO of trying to subvert the South African labour movement by being a tool of the CIA [Sechaba 1982h:1,2; Coker 1986:189].

The ANC maintained its links with Angela Davis, and small American anti-imperialist organizations on the fringe of politics.¹⁸ Even in the early 1980s the ANC reportedly eschewed publicity.¹⁹

CONCLUSION

At the most basic level, it would be easy to say that the ANC has failed in its objectives since the Western powers have refused to implement mandatory economic sanctions. Although this is certainly true, it is more difficult to assess its influence in Western countries. The ANC's main objective was, in effect, to shift the terrain on which the political discourse on South Africa was conducted. The methodological problem confronted in this chapter was how to estimate the shift in the political terrain, and how to assess the ANC's contribution to this shift.

Many of the anti-apartheid NGOs in Western countries are aligned to the ANC and have played the major role in information and publicity on apartheid. In a country like Britain, where the ANC, the Anti-Apartheid Movement, and the International Defense and Aid Fund are so inter-related it perhaps serves no real purpose to distinguish between them: neither of these NGOs has ever taken a policy position different from the ANC, in fact they follow the ANC's lead.

In Nordic countries where the ANC is supported at the highest governmental level, clearly the perspectives of the movement influence the humanitarian concerns of these countries, although as this chapter has pointed out, there are specific policy areas of disagreement.

Since 1960 Western governments, international banks, and multinational corporations have all been put on the defensive. Until the mid 1980s when the South African economy

declined and the "hassle factor" had grown sufficiently to convince many corporations that doing business in South Africa was more trouble than it is worth, foreign corporations adopted the arguments of liberal capitalism to justify their continued operations in South Africa.

By the mid-1980s these arguments were not proven false as much as they were simply shown to be irrelevant: the demands for skilled labour had forced the repeal of so much of the segregation legislation and so many corporations had left South Africa to undermine any notion that further disinvestment would accomplish very much more change.

END NOTES

1. The South African Parliament passed the ninety day detention law in June 1962. This led to the increase in political refugees coming to London [Africa Confidential 1963c:4-6].

2. Sam Kahn also came to London. Harold Wolpe and Arthur Goldreich came to London after their escape from prison.

3. Because of Africa Confidential's pro-PAC bias this story must be treated circumspectly. It is exactly the kind of propaganda one would expect from the PAC and its Liberal Party allies, but that does not mean it is completely untrue. This thesis has mentioned the ANC's relations with particular countries in order to gain an over all picture of its international relations, but its primary focus has been the ANC's relations with international organizations. More detailed research is needed on the relations between the offices of the External Mission and the host countries in which they operate. This chapter points out that apart from relations with the Nordic countries, the ANC's relations with Western governments has been minimal, and especially in the United States, until quite recently its contacts remained on the fringe of the American political spectrum. Although the links between South Africa and Western countries made the ANC's task of gaining support difficult, ideologically motivated anti-Western sentiments within the ANC may have

made the development of Western support even more difficult for the movement than otherwise would have been the case.

4. No history of the London-based Anti-Apartheid Movement exists, and most of what has been written is an uncritical recital of past campaigns [Work in Progress 1985; Minty 1982]. For the often byzantine world of anti-apartheid solidarity (e.g. the City of London Anti-Apartheid Movement's break away from the Anti-Apartheid Movement) see Kitson [1986].

5. Based on personal attendance of a SALEP talk at the University of London Students Union, February 1989. It was advertised that the ANC would also be present, but no one showed up (the ANC does not share platforms with splinter groups). The SALEP representative made no mention of the fact that the group had been expelled from the ANC. He claimed SALEP had links with the National Union of Metal Workers (which is possible given NUMSA's socialist stance) and COSATU. He drew a distinction between the workers and students inside South Africa and the exiled ANC leadership in London and Lusaka who were out of touch with the grass roots demands for socialist revolution. SALEP uses the ANC's popularity in order to influence student politics in the University of London.

6. The two other permanent members of the Security Council (the Soviet Union and China) already support sanctions.

7. In its view trade, foreign investment, arms sales, and nuclear collaboration strengthen South Africa's ("capitalist") economy, and therefore, the apartheid system.

8. It handles over 3,500 consultations a month through its out patient department, half of which are for Tanzanians from the surrounding area [ANC:1989:24].

9. e.g. Rembrandt cigarettes, the tobacco company owned by the Afrikaner capitalist, Anton Rupert. Hence, Rupert's involvement in the founding of the South Africa Foundation with other South African businessman aimed at overcoming the "inadequacy of [the government's] official public relations techniques" after Sharpeville [Gerber 1973:15,29]. Another aspect of the ANC's domestic boycott of "Nationalist goods" included potatoes produced through the farm labour system.

10. The occasion was a speech to the Swedish People's Parliament against Apartheid, 21 February, 1986.

11. The delegation also included Sobizana Mngqikana, the ANC's Chief Representative in Scandinavia, Anthony Mongale, Chief Representative in Italy, and Ruth Mopati, the ANC's representative in the Women's International Democratic Federation, Berlin (GDR).

12. The conference included the Ugo Vetere (PCI), the mayor of Rome, Giulio Andreotti (Christian Democrat), former prime minister and then head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Italian parliament, Roberto Costa (Liberal), Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Enrico Berlinguer (PCI), Pietro Longo (Social Democrats), Galloni (Christian Democrats) [Sechaba 1982d:11-18].

13. In 1983 the London borough of Greenwich granted the freedom of the city to Mandela, Harlow in Essex named an avenue after him, and Hull in Yorkshire gave Mandela's name to an ornamental garden opposite William Wilberforce's house [Sechaba 1983j:11,12].

14. The Rev. Z.R. Mahabane, Secretary-General of the ANC during the 1920s, attended an international missionary conference in Nigeria in 1958 (along with Alan Paton). Although he had withdrawn from active leadership he remained as the ANC's chaplin [West Africa 1958:75]. Z.K. Matthews, former provincial president of the ANC in the Cape, became secretary of the Africa division of the WCC in 1961, and represented the WCC at international conferences [Matthews 1981:168, 206, 208-209].

15. Very early in the southern African liberation struggles, in 1961 at the New Delhi Assembly, the WCC passed an admittedly controversial resolution, which declared its support for the liberation movements in southern Africa [Sincere 1984:19].

16. During the next decade (1970-1980) the Programme to Combat Racism gave greater support to the ANC than the PAC. The ANC and ANC related organizations (Luthuli Memorial Foundation and SACTU) received \$347,500 compared to the \$162,000 which was given to the PAC (see Appendix 5.17). In 1984 alone, the WCC Special Fund gave \$70,000 to the ANC to "unite and lead the oppressed people of South Africa," and only \$30,000 to the PAC (and \$100,000 to SWAPO for legal aid and "publicity and information work") [Sincere 1984:21].

17. J. Wayne Fredricks was the deputy to G. Mennen Williams, assistant secretary of state for African affairs during most of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. In mid-1989 Fredricks told the author that he kept in contact with the southern African liberation movements during this period. In particular, he remembers almost resigning over the European Desk's opposition to his contacts with FRELIMO's Eduardo Mondlane. These kind of State Department contacts, although an interesting area for further research, comprise the underground diplomacy which is not the major topic of this thesis. It is difficult to evaluate how these informal contacts affected the making of U.S. foreign policy. Although it could be argued they did influence U.S. support for the voluntary arms embargo in 1963, it is more likely that such

high profile policy decisions were determined by larger political considerations than the legitimate struggles waged by liberation movements.

18. e.g. the All-People's Congress, and the American Indian Movement [Moorhead 1985:10-14].

19. Its London office reportedly refused to help one of the leading television networks with a documentary on Winnie Mandela [Kitson 1986:265,266].

CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSION

"It is not enough...for a government to marshal national public opinion behind its foreign policies. It must also gain the support of the public opinion of other nations for its foreign and domestic policies....A nation, for instance, that embarks upon a policy of racial discrimination could not help losing the struggle for the minds of the colored nations of the earth....At this point...the traditional distinction between foreign and domestic policies tends to break down..for whatever a nation does or does not do is held for or against it as a reflection of its political philosophy, system of government, and way of life."

Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations [1973:148,149].

Revolutions, Mao Tsetung reminds us, are not dinner & parties or essays in scholarly journals; they are violent insurrections that are, in a way, difficult for the non-revolutionary writer and reader to grasp [Sky and Collier 1986:819; Mao 1954:I:28].¹ This study of the ANC's External Mission and its foreign policy has no doubt imposed a degree of order on events that was not always there when they occurred. This is an inevitable part of trying to bring some degree of coherence to the writings, speeches, conferences, and meetings which make up the ANC's international relations.

While any description involves a process of selecting the relevant facts, and therefore, can not be separated from explanation, sections of this thesis have been more descriptive than explanatory. The main reason for this is that so much of the material is new. The basic events in the ANC's international relations needed to be described before further research into individual aspects could be done. It was felt at the outset that providing a framework to guide

this research was more beneficial than examining only one aspect of the ANC's international relations when so little work had been done in the area. In this sense the conclusions are provisional: only by seeing the ANC's foreign relations as a whole is it possible to understand its individual parts, but further research into these parts gives the whole greater depth.

Chapter 1 identified the ANC's main foreign policy objectives. Its first and most immediate objective was to maintain its physical survival in exile and, and this was identified as an important aspect of its international relations. Section 11.1 emphasizes that the ANC's survival and the development of the External Mission was based on its success in forming a broadly based international support network.

The ANC's second objective was to mobilize international support for mandatory economic sanctions, and the isolation of South Africa from all spheres of international activity. This objective could be called the general anti-apartheid agenda which was not unique to the ANC. The PAC's international strategy was the same although even in exile in Britain in the early 1960s it disagreed with specific ANC campaigns for tactical political reasons just as it disagreed with particular ANC campaigns inside South Africa before both movements were banned. This thesis has not examined the PAC's foreign policy in any depth because it was not the main subject of research. It has only been referred to because of

the way the diplomatic rivalry between the two movements became a dimension of the Sino-Soviet split in Third World politics.

It is claimed by the ANC and its supporters that this general anti-apartheid agenda is non-ideological so it can mobilize support from across the political spectrum. Joe Slovo has explained, "In this day and age there is no struggle which can be separated from the international context, but in the case of South Africa the international factor plays a unique role; because the evil of apartheid, like no other issue, cuts across the world ideological divide" (emphasis added) [Slovo 1986:28].

This approach, rooted in the ANC's commitment to non-racialism, is the basis for its united front strategy inside South Africa and it is an essential part of its diplomacy and propaganda outside the country. The ANC seeks to build as widely based an anti-apartheid coalition in the international community as it can by appealing to as broad a range of constituencies as possible. It becomes, "all things to all men" in order to bring as many people as possible to support its cause.² Section 11.2 evaluates the ANC efforts to isolate South Africa in the international system.

The ANC's third international objective is the exclusive support for the ANC as the sole legitimate representative of the people of South Africa. This objective, in addition to diplomatic (as opposed to material) support for armed struggle, could be called the specific ANC foreign policy

agenda. Although this objective has been more difficult to achieve, Section 11.3 examines why the ANC has been more successful than its rivals in gaining exclusive legitimacy.

This thesis is not an exhaustive study of the ANC's international relations. Section 11.4 indicates some of the limitations of the study and some of the areas for further research.

11.1 Solving the Problem of Physical Survival

After twenty-five years the ANC is still in exile. It is for this reason Joseph Lelyveld, the former South Africa correspondent for The New York Times, has said the ANC "may be one of the world's least effective" liberation movements which has "little to celebrate beyond its survival" [Lelyveld 1985:328]. The physical survival of a liberation movement in exile should not be treated so disparagingly. Compared to the exile history of the PAC, the Unity Movement, or the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania in Exile, the ANC's survival (and its re-emergence) should not be taken for granted.

The immediate physical survival of the ANC was its first priority after Sharpeville, and especially later when it was forced into exile after the Rivonia arrests. At this time even the continuation of armed struggle was in jeopardy. The ANC's recovery (and the relative decline of other exiled black political actors) is a result of the way its strategy, structure and international relations helped it to organize itself externally, initially to maintain its existence, and

then to continue armed struggle and achieve its foreign policy objectives.

Apart from the London office where the Department of Information and Publicity was based, the ANC's initial choice of African states to set up offices for its External Mission was influenced by which states would give it sanctuary and provide territory for Umkhonto's training bases, ideological affinity for the ANC, the geographic proximity to South Africa, and OAU policy.

The early places for sanctuary and the training of Umkhonto recruits developed offices for the External Mission after the dissolution of the South African United Front: Tanzania, Zambia, Egypt, Algeria (except Morocco and Ethiopia). The ANC's disenchantment with Nkrumah's Ghana occurred at a time when a political opening for liberation movements developed in East Africa so geographic proximity and ideological affinity contributed to the choice of Dar es Salaam as the ANC's first provisional headquarters. Later, it shifted its operations closer to the proximity of struggle by developing most of its training bases in Tanzania and Zambia, and it moved its provisional headquarters to Lusaka. These changes were influenced by the domestic policies of the ANC's main host countries, Tanzania and Zambia, the policies of the OAU's Liberation Committee, and possibly the prerogatives of its main military supplier, the Soviet Union.

Although it was not acknowledged at the time, the diplomatic and military aspects of the External Mission over

lapped; and particularly after Rivonia the External Mission took on the added task of directing the armed struggle. These functions reflected the evolution of ANC strategy: the External Mission's efforts to isolate South Africa and mobilize support for economic sanctions became the international dimension of the armed struggle waged by Umkhonto. In other words, ANC diplomacy became the pursuit of armed struggle by other means.

After establishing an external base for sanctuary and training the ANC's financial survival was another part of its basic problem of existence. Its sources of funds for humanitarian assistance, armed struggle, and the information and publicity of the External Mission was another essential aspect of its international relations.

Unlike the PAC, the ANC was fortunate to have an initial support network dating back to the 1950s in Britain, and through the SACP, the Soviet Union and its allies. In Britain the International Defense and Aid Fund and Christian Action were instrumental in providing legal aid to political activists inside South Africa and providing aid to political refugees.

After Sharpeville the ANC became intimately connected with the Anti-Apartheid Movement which mobilized international public opinion against apartheid. The ANC's non-racialism, although initially an impediment to its support in Africa apart from PAFMECA, assured it continued Western support which would have been jeopardized if it had

adopted the PAC's more exclusive brand of nationalism. The ANC also benefited to a lesser extent from the activities of the more general London-based anti-colonial organizations operating in the 1960s.

Through the SACP the ANC also developed contacts with the Soviet Union, and dating back to the 1950s, a variety of revolutionary international organizations. These links were immediately helpful to the ANC after Sharpeville in the transportation of refugees and the provision of educational scholarships in Eastern bloc states. After Rivonia this communist support was crucial to establish Umkhonto as a fighting force. Later, the ANC was supported by the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committees in African, Asian or socialist states, the domestic counterpart to AAPSO, and through local communist parties and youth organizations. The GDR in particular became an important source of material and educational support. After the Khartoum Conference its Mobilization Committee provided assistance to the ANC and the CONCP liberation movements.

The ANC also developed links with certain Western political parties. In Britain it developed links with the Labour Party and the Communist Party (which has close links with the SACP). The ANC developed links with the Socialist Party in France, and the communist parties in France and Italy. Its main humanitarian and diplomatic support in Western Europe came from the Nordic countries. At first most Nordic assistance was multi-lateral and distributed through

the UN assistance programmes or Nordic church organizations. By the 1970s many Nordic states had developed bilateral relations with the ANC and gave it direct humanitarian assistance.

It took longer for the ANC to develop useful links in the United States. In part, this was because its contacts both in the black community and in the rest of the political system were mostly on the fringes of main stream American politics. Black America, to the extent that it was interested in South Africa at all, was more responsive to the PAC's black consciousness philosophy than the ANC's non-racialism. The ANC's communist connections were also an impediment to developing closer links with more main stream organizations in the black community and in the wider political system.³ Until the degree of the ANC's support within South Africa became undeniable, various anti-apartheid groups in the U.S. repeatedly gave their support to black consciousness-type organizations in an effort to develop a (non-communist) "third force" in order to out flank the ANC.

In the United States the ANC did develop links with the American Committee on Africa which remained impartial on the ANC's rivalry with the PAC. Another reason for its difficulties in the U.S. was the U.S. preoccupation with other issues, mainly the Vietnam War and the Middle East. U.S. public opinion did not develop a real interest in South Africa until after the Soweto uprising. By this time the political changes in the black community and the formation of

new organizations such as TransAfrica, and the myriad of church-related divestment groups gave the ANC wider access to the American political system.

The ANC also benefited from the UN's humanitarian programmes for southern African political refugees. It also developed links with the World Council of Churches for humanitarian assistance and diplomatic support through its Programme to Combat Racism. Although both the ANC and the PAC have benefited from WCC support, it has generally given larger grants to the ANC. This source of support also reinforced the ANC's links with the CONCP liberation movements because the WCC also preferred it to UNITA and GRAE in Angola.

11.2 South Africa's Economic and Diplomatic Isolation

Even while the ANC solved its immediate problems of physical survival after Sharpeville (and particularly after the Rivonia arrests) the isolation of South Africa in international affairs was still an important foreign policy objective of the External Mission. The ANC's anti-apartheid objectives were successful in world politics because they became part of the general anti-colonial agenda in international organizations. These organizations were used to articulate and aggregate anti-colonial interests and the end of white-minority rule in southern Africa was identified with these interests.⁴

As decolonization and independence progressed the composition of the United Nations changed. It became dominated by the new states from the Third World, one-third of which were African. This transformation led to a change in the structure and function of the UN which contributed to the General Assembly's willingness to show a greater interest in southern Africa. The emergence of the Africa group and the non-aligned states as important blocs at the United Nations which influenced the formation of General Assembly resolutions was one of the most important events for the ANC's general anti-apartheid agenda in international relations.

These changes allowed the External Mission to use international organizations (particularly the UN) to publicize the evils of apartheid, keep track of political prisoners, and promote South Africa's isolation in international affairs. The South African liberation movements, key South African exiles, and the main anti-apartheid solidarity organizations aligned to the ANC (IDAF and the AAM) were all heavily involved in its activities. The UN system, particularly the Special Committee on Apartheid, provided the ANC with the resources for a vast anti-apartheid information and propaganda network. It maintained the pressure against the "normalization" of South Africa's diplomatic relations and kept the Western powers on the defensive regarding their South African connections.

The ANC wanted the UN, quite beyond its capacity (and quite possibly contrary to the constitutional prerogatives of its Charter), to become an instrument of coercion to force the Western powers to implement mandatory economic sanctions by setting the General Assembly against the Security Council. Even when the Special Committee on Apartheid was formed with this implicit role, its ineffectiveness soon became apparent because it was powerless to force states to implement its resolutions. Because of the ANC's "idealist" view of international organizations it had exaggerated expectations of what the UN could contribute to the struggle, and so by the late 1960s it became disillusioned with its inability to implement sanctions. UN diplomacy could make only a limited contribution to the struggle; real change would come about through armed struggle. So support would have to come from elsewhere: the Soviet Union and its allies.

At the level of public diplomacy the OAU has remained one of the ANC's strongest allies, but the actual policies of its member states toward South Africa and its relationship with the ANC tells a far different story. The OAU's common African response to South Africa's outward policy, detente, and destabilization was an essential part of its diplomatic image, but it masked deep divisions among African states on the actual policy they should follow toward South Africa. This lack of commitment, which had its origins in the ideological compromise which led to the founding of the OAU in the first place, was evident in the limited funding for

the Liberation Committee, the degree of African trade (albeit covert) between South Africa and African states, and was the reason for the initial success of South Africa's outward policy and detente.

The ANC's African diplomacy, often working with its strongest regional allies, Zambia and Tanzania, struggled to bring African states back to their initial position of isolating South Africa. In this way the ANC cast itself in the role of prophet calling the OAU back to its opposition to neo-colonialism and founding principles of support for African unity and African liberation.⁵ In fact, the main problem the ANC's African diplomacy faced was that it took the OAU's principles more seriously than many African states.

At a time when the ANC had little international status the Non-Aligned Movement was an important forum within which it could present its views. It was an important arena for developing a consensus position on South African issues in the Third World which was later reflected in General Assembly resolutions. Non-aligned interests and ANC interests converged on many foreign policy issues in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East.

Revolutionary international organizations also supported the ANC's general anti-apartheid agenda. Although the ANC certainly appreciated this support at a time when it had very little support in other international organizations, these revolutionary organizations had little influence in international affairs. The role of revolutionary

organizations as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy deflected these organizations from their role as an arena for expressing the aspirations and concerns of liberation movements. They become pre-occupied with the Sino-Soviet dispute and issues more relevant to Soviet foreign policy.

11.3 The ANC's International Status and Legitimacy

Umkhonto's initial strategy envisioned selective sabotage as the first stage in a graduated shift toward guerrilla warfare. This selective strategy turned necessity into a virtue because of its lack of military training in the early years, but by the mid-1980s it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain because of the internal pressures of young black cadres to take the struggle into the white areas.⁶

It is difficult to believe ANC strategy was really based on the expectation that a combination of selective sabotage and economic sanctions would bring the collapse of the South African government.⁷ According to all available accounts Umkhonto's recruits are trained in the "conventional" methods of guerrilla warfare (see Chapter 8). If selective sabotage was not meant to spill over into classic guerrilla warfare at some future stage of the struggle than in any meaningful sense what were Umkhonto's combatants trained to do in South Africa?

Umkhonto's failure to start a guerrilla war has meant that the actual function of the ANC's commitment to armed

struggle and its "army" of trained Umkhonto combatants is symbolic. In the post-Soweto period Umkhonto's attack on large targets as part of a strategy of "armed propaganda" revitalized its influence among the black community inside South Africa and served as a conduit for youthful militants who were outraged, but had no way of channeling their anger toward effective political or military action. The ANC provided the military training, and just as importantly, the political education.

The ANC's four-fold approach to struggle announced at the time of the Kabwe Conference when many of the townships were in revolt was an attempt to bring together, at least at the theoretical level, externally-led armed struggle with what by all accounts was mainly (but not necessarily entirely) a domestically-led insurrection in the townships.⁸ In other words, to a considerable extent the shift in strategy after the 1983 reorganization (announced at Kabwe) was an implicit recognition that the more traditional guerrilla warfare strategy followed after the Morogoro Conference had failed.

Although the Kabwe Conference announced the transition in strategy to people's war, the change in geo-political relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and the settlement in Namibia requiring the removal of ANC bases from Angola has meant the prospect of real guerrilla warfare in South Africa is more remote than ever before. This indicates a new role for the ANC's commitment to armed

struggle: Umkhonto, quite apart from any effective military pressure on the government, has become a symbolic bargaining chip in any future negotiated settlement (and therefore, presumably easier to give up).

The release of Nelson Mandela, the unbanning of the ANC "and other political organizations" (this phrase is usually attached, but begins with the ANC), and the involvement of the ANC in any future negotiations are no longer just domestic political demands; they have become international demands: they are the prerequisites for the removal of South Africa's pariah status not only by the international community (in some sense represented by the United Nations), but increasingly by the main Western powers.

How did this situation, which certainly did not exist at the time of Sharpeville in 1960, nor even after the Soweto uprising in 1976 come about since the ANC has been so ineffective in waging armed struggle? This thesis has argued it was the ANC's ability to adapt its strategy, structure and international relations to the changing conditions inside the country which led to its re-emergence in the 1980s.

Because the ANC's political re-emergence can not be separated from its international relations, its links with the Soviet Union and its allies have been the most closely studied aspect of its international relations. Conservative critics argue the ANC operates as an instrument of other players in the international system. They consider it to be a surrogate for Soviet foreign policy in the Third World.

This perspective is static and linear; it adopts a simplistic either/or approach to political development: in the 1940s the ANC is supposed to have started down the communist path, it became a "front organization" for the SACP by the 1960s, and by the 1980s was a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party in all but name.

The interaction of the ANC's strategy, structure, and international relations examined in this thesis presents a different, more dynamic, picture. The ANC's relations with the SACP and the Communist powers change depending on the ANC's needs and interests, and the oscillations of its international and domestic legitimacy. It is these factors, and not its connections with Moscow, which are the final determinants of ANC policy.

The ANC gained initial international status because of the cause it represented. It is a recognized exponent of the general anti-apartheid agenda which up to a certain point spans the ideological divide, as Joe Slovo indicated.

One of the main goals of the ANC's diplomacy in the 1960s was the modification of decision-making procedures in international organizations. The ANC, like other liberation movements, felt it was entitled to participate in the decision-making in the OAU, the UN, and the Non-Aligned Movement on issues which directly affected its interests.

International organizations have allowed the ANC greater access to their decision-making than it had in the early 1960s. It regularly participates in their deliberations and

presents its views and this is one of the indications that liberation movements have greater participation in the international system. In none of these organizations, however, does the ANC's status resemble that of a state. The dominant characteristic of decision-making in these organizations is the persistence of state sovereignty. Particularly in the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement, which comprise nationalist or liberation movements which have become the governments of newly independent states, the metaphysics of sovereign statehood confers on them new interests and responsibilities which alter their relations with their former comrades-in-arms. The ANC's disagreement with the OAU's united front policy and liberation strategy indicated how little influence it had on issues which directly affected its interests. The Lusaka Manifesto and detente with South Africa over the Rhodesian settlement indicated the differentiation of interests between the Front Line States and the ANC.

Until after the Soweto uprising the development of the ANC's international relations, particularly its relations with the Soviet Union and its allies, was more important for the continued existence of the movement than its support inside the country. The development of the External Mission and the reconstruction of the movement in exile, the development of its military bases and the launching of armed struggle were crucial to its physical survival and the waging of armed struggle.

The initial resurgence of black protest in the early 1970s through the Black Consciousness Movement and the growth of militant trade unionism posed a threat to the ANC's leadership of the struggle as much as they provided new means of continuing it. By the time domestic black protest was revived in the 1970s the ANC's exiled existence was more assured and its international support network was firmly established.

Most of its humanitarian support came from the Nordic states and the United Nations. The Soviet Union and its allies gave the ANC military assistance and partisan diplomatic support, even though at times it fell short of exclusive recognition. In Western Europe the ANC gained exclusive diplomatic support from the Nordic states, the Socialist International, and gained more general diplomatic support from a variety of Socialist, Social Democratic and Communist parties.

It was in the OAU, the organization in the ANC's own back yard so to speak, which was its main impediment to gaining exclusive recognition in the international organizations that normally would have been its natural constituency, the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement. The OAU's recognition policy meant both the ANC and PAC were described as legitimate South African liberation movements. Its internal politics led the OAU to maintain its support for the PAC long after the PAC's leadership disputes and internal squabbles made it a moribund political and

ideological force.⁹ These other international organizations adopted the OAU's recognition policy which put a break on their exclusive recognition of the ANC. For a long time UN terminology remained deliberately vague and did not recognize the existence of two separate movements; it referred only to "victims of apartheid," or "the South African liberation movement." The Non-Aligned Movement's resolutions also rarely referred to either of the South African liberation movements.

In the early 1970s domestic developments in black politics (distinguished from white politics and apartheid policy generally) began to play a more important role in the ANC's deliberations (evidenced by the topics in national executive meetings). Now domestic South African developments became important to the survival and expansion of the movement as new, young articulate voices could challenge the ANC's leadership of the struggle in exile. The ANC's international legitimacy and support was now increasingly based on its degree of domestic legitimacy.

The ANC's re-emergence in the 1980s, although initially fostered by the Umkhonto's "armed propaganda" activities after the Soweto uprising, is not based solely on military effectiveness (e.g. limpet mines and sabotage attacks). It is more deeply rooted and more broadly based than the underground cell structure of the military wing would probably allow. It is evident in the formation of mass-based non-racial organizations based on the Congress traditions which developed when the ANC was a legal political

organization and is evident in the proliferation of ANC symbols. The more active participation of the churches in the struggle (including, significantly, the official break with apartheid by the NGK, the main Afrikaner church) has reinforced and legitimated the ANC's non-racial traditions drawing even more whites into the struggle than ever before.¹⁰

Since the ANC's re-emergence its leadership of the struggle has been recognized in various General Assembly resolutions and by the Front Line States, all of whom are also members of the Non-Aligned Movement. They have recognized the ANC's leadership role and have increasingly asked its leaders to participate in their deliberations.

It is the ANC's historical legacy as the main nationalist movement in the country, its continued existence and expansion in exile (in contrast to its rivals), and the breadth of its international and now domestic support which have propelled it into greater international legitimacy as a significant actor in South African affairs. Although the ANC is still banned and its headquarters is in exile, at the political level it no longer functions as an exile movement, but is an integral part of domestic South African politics.

11.4 Limitations of This Study

Apart from the analysis of the Communist powers in Chapter 8 this thesis has not stressed the motives and actions of other governments in their relations with the ANC.

The ANC's bilateral relations with its host countries and the relations between the offices of the External Mission and the countries where they are based has not been examined in any depth. Its relations with Zambia and Tanzania are particularly important. They have been the ANC's strongest supporters, but the ANC has clearly disagreed with many of the policies they developed toward liberation. The internal debate in the Nordic countries, particularly in Sweden where the ANC has unrivaled influence on Swedish policy, and in Britain where it works closely with the AAM require further research.

The ANC's relationship toward the Middle East, particularly Zionism, Israel, and the PLO needs further examination because of Israel's links in Africa in the early 1960s. Arthur Goldreich a fervent Zionist and early Umkhonto strategist, was involved in Palmah the elite shock troops of the Haganah. After the Six Day War he reportedly gave lectures on strategy and "eulogies on Zionism" to the Umkhonto guerrillas [Gibson 1972:72,73]. It is also argued that the Umkhonto's M-Plan for an underground cell structure drawn up by Mandela and its command structure was modelled largely from Irgun's experience [Davis 1987:79; Mufson 1986a]. The way the Arab-Israeli dispute affected the ANC has not featured in this thesis, but this evidence, the prominence of South African Jews (admittedly some of them anti-Zionist) in the struggle [Shimoni 1980], and Israel's early support for African aspirations are all factors which

suggest this is area for further research. South Africa's links with Israel because of the number of South African Jewish immigrants is a controversial issue within Israeli politics [Chazan 1987].

The adaptation of the strategy of the Jewish underground in Palestine is an area which may relate to the broader issues of Umkhonto's strategy. Chapter 8 mentioned differences in Umkhonto regarding Maoist strategy. Although Mandela was trained in Algeria and many recruits were training there, ANC strategy did not resemble Algeria's experience [Mufson 1986a]. This is another factor which may indicate Umkhonto's early eclecticism regarding revolutionary methods. It is possible Cuban guerrilla strategy only came into prominence with the reformulation of Umkhonto after the Rivonia arrests.

The ANC's relations with Cuba is only one aspect of its activities in Latin America. Caribbean states were in fact some of the first countries to boycott South African goods. South Africa's developing Latin American relations made the ANC concerned about the region. The ANC supported Allende's Chile, and has links at various levels in Venezuela, Brazil and Uruguay. It supports the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front in El Salvador and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. The spread of democratic governments in Latin America brought the ANC greater opportunity to limit South Africa's influence, and to increase its own links in those societies that were becoming more open and concerned about

human rights. A strong international stand against apartheid (as a political symbol) was one way of breaking with the previous regime and legitimating its new democratic credentials.

The period of the ANC's history covered in this thesis ends just as it has re-emerged as a major actor in South African politics. What the ANC represents and what kind of organization it has become since it was forced into exile is an increasingly important issue in South African politics. The ANC owes very little to the OAU or to the Western powers for its continued existence and diplomatic success. Apart from the Nordic countries, the Communist countries and progressive Third World states have been its strongest supporters. So far the ANC may have been a reliable Soviet ally, but it has often been a disgruntled one; it is not the kind of ally Moscow can pin its hopes on for gaining significant influence in southern Africa. The increasing distance between the ANC and the Soviet Union since Gorbachev came to power is entirely in keeping with the history of their relations.

Although various observers have described the ANC's re-emergence, this thesis offers an explanation for its revival in the 1980s. It asserts the successful interaction of the ANC's strategy, structure, and international relations led to its remarkable recovery. Although the PAC may be a moribund organization it still exists. As negotiations between the ANC and the South African government become

increasingly likely, the PAC could re-emerge as the umbrella under which all anti-negotiation forces converge, but these efforts will fail because of the increasing breadth and depth of the ANC's non-racial traditions (now with the support of the churches). In the face of this kind of "militant" black nationalism, the growth of "radical" trade unionism, and possibly the emergence of more violent tribalism (e.g. Buthelezi's Inkatha and the Afrikaner right) the Nationalist government and the ANC will find they have more to gain by building a new common society than by destroying the old separate one.¹¹ South Africa may yet prove to be the twentieth century's greatest revolutionary disappointment.

END NOTES

1. And lest a liberal sympathizer with the struggle be weak-kneed about the resort to violence, Mao assures us revolutions are not gentle, temperate, kind, courteous, restrained, or magnanimous affairs [Mao 1954:I:28].

2. This approach is not based on duplicity, but is only a tactical admission, followed by all politicians, that the message should be shaped to the particular audience which is going to receive it. Hence, this point is based on a paraphrase of one of St. Paul's principles of evangelism which can be applied to any propaganda: "I have become all things to all men so that by all possible means I might save some" [I Corinthians 9:22].

3. Typical of the American liberal perspective is New York Times correspondent Joseph Lelyveld who describes the ANC as, "Compromised by its readiness to condone repression anywhere in the Soviet sphere-in exchange for training and arms-it remains the broad, true church of black politics" (emphasis added) [Lelyveld 1985:328].

4. This chapter adapts Archer's analysis of the role and function of international organizations to liberation movements [Archer 1983:153-159].

5. It could be objected that the prophetic analogy is not appropriate, but the series of Sechaba editorials at this time illustrate the nature of the biblical allusions: "Banda's treachery" (like Esau selling Malawi's birthright of freedom for a pot of South African porridge), "supping with the devil," "Beware the temptor," "Dialogue is Betrayal."

6. Armed struggle is only one component of the ANC's four-fold strategy, but its priority leads to the issue of whether the shift will be made to hit "soft targets." It is one of the issues separating the young cadres from the old guard. During a Weekly Mail visit to Lusaka one of the old guard stated, "I fear that this is an argument that people like me are beginning to lose" [ANC News Briefing 1988:2; Lodge 1985b].

7. The way ANC strategy has influenced South African national security policy (defence, civil defence, police, and counter-insurgency) is beyond the scope of this thesis. One way selective sabotage and its "armed propaganda" campaign has directly influenced civil defence policy is through the development of the "national key point" programme in order to protect non-military installations necessary to the smooth functioning of the country [Frankel 1984:100].

8. During the insurrection in 1986 Tambo admitted at the Paris conference on economic sanctions, "Our lines of communication have been very poor indeed...I think in the nature of things it will take time for information to filter through." Interestingly, as a possible indication of what constellation of political forces may eventually emerge, Tambo also admitted that most of the ANC's information on the uprising came from the Progressive Federal Party. It is for this reason, he said, "we thought [the reports] would have some authority. But I regret we have not been unable to follow it up" [Meisler, 1986]. The analysis of Chapter 4 suggests Tambo may not have been quite as in the dark about the insurrection as he indicated, for understandable reasons, to the Western press.

9. Once people such as Patrick Duncan (white), Barney Desai, (Coloured), and Ahmed Gora Ebrahim (Indian) joined the PAC the ideological justification for the existence of the movement as an exponent of Pan-Africanism was lost. In exile the PAC's slogan of "Africa for the Africans" has redefined "African" to mean anyone who gives himself to Africa (thereby including whites, Indians, and Coloureds). It is not clear what this really means in practice inside South Africa and how it differs from the ANC's non-racialism. Sometimes the difference between the ANC and the PAC is justified on strategic grounds: the ANC supports a unified non-racial struggle throughout the process of liberation, while the PAC supports only black unity in struggle for a non-racial South Africa after liberation (this is the essence of the black

consciousness position). While this difference in strategy clearly exists inside South Africa (e.g. AZAPO), it is arguable whether it justifies the duplication of UN assistance programmes, the UN's dual recognition of both movements, and current official OAU policy outside the country. These arcane ideological disputes may be examined more profitably as one of the psychological aspects of the exile condition described by Marcum [1972] than as an aspect of the exile movement's international relations.

10. e.g. the growth in the number of conscripts not reporting for military service and the increasing number of people of all races participating in protests. Other important factors are the number of ANC-Afrikaner contacts (academics, students, and politicians), the ANC's increasing contacts with lower governmental officials (e.g. the recent legal conference in Oxford when the ANC met with a number of South African judges), and meetings with business people and bankers. The proliferation of these exchanges suggests an increasing qualitative shift in the perceptions of the white minority and an increase in the ANC's domestic legitimacy. The ANC is optimistic that these kind of exchanges will continue and that it will be able to create further cleavages in the "white ruling bloc" [ANC Sources].

11. See [Thomas 1987:121,122] where I make this same point.

APPENDIX 1

ANC REPRESENTATION ABROAD

This section describes the chronological development of the offices of the External Mission from the dissolution of the United Front to the early 1980s. The offices described in greater detail comprised the ANC's main diplomatic network during the time when most of the developments in its international relations examined in this thesis took place. The political factors and issues of strategy contributing to the founding of the ANC's offices after 1974 are examined in the relevant chapters.

After the United Front broke up in March 1962 the ANC needed to establish a firmer presence outside the country. The PAC had already established a London office in early 1961, but the ANC avoided a separate office because it thought it would lead to disunity and the break up of the Front [Tambo 1963].

In early 1962 the ANC set up offices, and the rudiments of an external structure in Algiers, Rabat, Cairo, Dar es Salaam, Lusaka, London, and possibly Havana [Tambo 1963; Bunting 1975:276]. There are no ANC references to a Havana office until an office was opened in 1978, but the SAIRR [1965:108,109] and Benson [1966:265] list Cuba as one of the missions abroad. Benson also lists Accra, but this may be a reference to the ANC's United Front office. The ANC people who were originally part of the United Front's external activities, now stayed on as part of the External Mission [Tambo 1963].

What Tambo does not acknowledge is that after the dissolution of the United Front the first offices of the External Mission, apart from the office in London, were set up in countries where the ANC had its training bases: Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Zambia, and Tanzania. Mandela's African tour occurred before the break up of the Front so whether or not this was the intention, as a result of his training arrangements and the break up of the Front in early 1962 ANC offices were established in a number of sympathetic countries.

Bunting [1975:276] acknowledges that by the time the Front broke up, "Plans to open an ANC office in Algeria were already far advanced, at the invitation of the Algerian Government." During Mandela's 1962 trip abroad he travelled to London where another ANC office was set up and he met the opposition parties in Parliament. Afterward he went to Algeria where he met Col. Boumedieune, commander-in-chief of the FLN. Ben Bella invited Mandela to Oudja, the headquarters of the Algerian Army of National Liberation. The FLN opened its training camps in Oudja to South Africans, and in fact Mandela took a short course in guerrilla warfare before returning to South Africa [Benson 1986:114].

After independence the ANC's Algiers office was opened by Robert Resha. After the completion of the Treason Trial in

early 1961 he was sent out of the country to join Tambo in the External Mission. Johnny Makatini joined him in 1964. According to Sechaba, "the two made a dynamic partnership. Algeria, which hosted many liberation movements, mainly from Africa, and including the [PLO], was a beehive of political activity involving solidarity support for the liberation struggle." As a result of their joint work, "the status of the ANC in Algeria rocketed" [Sechaba 1989:32]. When Resha became the director of the Department of International Affairs in 1966 Makatini succeeded him as Algiers Chief Representative [Spotlight 1964:6,7].

The close relationship between military training and diplomatic work was also evident in the establishment of the ANC's office in Rabat. Johnny Makatini became the ANC's first representative there in 1962. Makatini, an early Umkhonto recruit, was the leader of the first group of guerrillas from Natal who left South Africa for military training. Makatini led part of the Natal group to Morocco and was instructed to remain in the country to receive new recruits. This was the beginning of his diplomatic work and where he learned enough French to have access to both the anglophone and francophone worlds. Because of his knowledge of French he extended his activities to ANC solidarity groups in France, and to Western Europe.

Rabat was also the headquarters of CONCP which the ANC was aligned with (see Chapter 2). Makatini worked with the leaders of other CONCP movements; especially Marcelino Dos Santos of FRELIMO, Dr. Agostinho Neto of the MPLA, and Amilcar Cabral of PAIGC [Sechaba 1989:31,32].

The ANC's "provisional headquarters" was at first set up in Dar es Salaam. At first Tennyson Makiwane ran the office after being expelled from Ghana as the ANC's representative in the United Front. In 1964 James Hadebe took over as Chief Representative and was helped by Thomas Nkobi, and Dr. Arthur Letele, the former Treasurer-General. These people were supported by some of the ANC's high ranking staff J.B. Marks the chairman of the SACP, and ANC Secretary-General Duma Nokwe and the new Treasurer-General Moses Kotane after they left South Africa in 1963 [Africa Confidential 1963b:2].

Tanzania moved the headquaraters of the liberation movements out of Dar es Salaam in 1964. The ANC kept an office there, but its temporary headquarters was moved to Morogoro, a small town west of the capital [Gibson 1972:67; Nelson:200; Ginwala Interview 1987]. Morogoro was in fact one of the ANC's four military bases in Tanzania. The other bases were located at Kongwa, Mbeya, and Bagamoyo [Lodge 1983:298].

The ANC opened another office in Lusaka after the independece of Zambia which eventually became the ANC's new "provisional headquarters." In part this was due to the OAU's policy toward liberation movements, but it was also because of considerations of strategy and Soviet support (see Chapter 8). Tennyson Makiwane became Chief Representative in Lusaka [Sechaba 1967a:6]. Vincent Khumalo became Deputy-Representative. He joined "Radio Freedom," the ANC's

radio unit in Lusaka and broadcast in Zulu. Khumalo became Chief Representative in Dar es Salaam after Hadebe's expulsion in 1968 (see Chapter 8) [Sechaba 1974a:28].

After the Egyptian revolution, Cairo became the home of most of the nationalist movements in North Africa, and south of the Sahara. Egypt gave them space, money and broadcasting time on Cairo radio for Africa programmes. [Mansfield 1969:147]. Any nationalist movement involved in the struggle against colonialism was given facilities to open an office and a salary of one hundred Egyptian pounds a month and free airline tickets. Egyptian policy was not to choose between rival movements and both the ANC and PAC opened offices [Mansfield 1965:100].

The ANC's Cairo office was opened in September 1964 with Mzwai Piliso as Chief Representative. After Alfred Nzo was released from prison in February 1964 he left the country to join the External Mission and became Deputy-Representative [Spotlight 1964:6,7; Sechaba 1981:31,32; Sechaba 1967:3].

Egypt was the most developed country in Africa except for South Africa and Cairo became an important centre for the ANC's relations with Communist countries and with the Third World. The same year the ANC opened up its Cairo office both the OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement held their summit conferences there.

Cairo was also the headquarters of AAPSO, in which the ANC was an active participant (see Chapter 8). It was also the headquarters for the aid which the Mobilization Committee of the Khartoum alliance gave to liberation movements (see Chapter 2).

As a result of its AAPSO connections in Cairo the ANC also developed links to Asia, opening up an office in New Delhi in September 1967 [Sechaba 1968b 13-15]. It was jointly funded by the Indian Association of Afro-Asian Solidarity and the Indian government [ACR 1970-71:A110-A113].

Alfred Nzo became the ANC's Chief Representative and worked along Ismail Cachalia, the former leader of the Transvaal Indian Congress [Sechaba 1967 backpage; Sechaba 1968 13-15]. Nzo was recalled to the ANC's "provisional headquarters" in Morogoro two years later to become Secretary-General [Sechaba 1981:31,32; Sechaba 1967:3; Karis, Carter, Gerhart, 1977a:15]. He was replaced by Moosa Moola as Chief Representative [Sechaba 1974b:51-55].

Most of the ANC's organizational and publicity work, was done through its London office [SAIRR 1965:8]. Oliver Tambo and Robert Resha, were the ANC's main "roving ambassadors" but were initially based in London. By 1964 they were assisted by Maindy Msimang and Reg September, the president of the Coloured People's Organization [Africa Confidential 1972:4-6]. At the time of the Rivonia arrests a number of key SACP people left South Africa and came to London. The influx of SACP personnel reportedly led to some dissention in the ANC's London office (see Chapter 10).

In addition to obvious political and financial factors, one of the constraints on the External Mission was limited

personnel. The Rivonia arrests and security sweep the following year led to the largest exodus of political refugees not seen again until the Soweto revolt in 1976, and contributed to the expansion of the External Mission. In addition to the personnel already noted, key members of Umkhonto including Ronnie Kasrils, Joe Modise, Cassius Make, and Chris Hani left South Africa at this time.

The External Mission expanded again at the end of the 1970s following the independence of Mozambique in June 1975, Angola in November 1975, the Soweto uprising in 1976. Now offices were opened in Luanda, Lagos, Maputo, Harare, and Dakar. In Western countries the Mission was extended to New York, Toronto, Stockholm, and Rome; and in Communist countries to Berlin (GDR), and Havana.

The 1980s brought a further extension of ANC offices; in Western countries (Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Australia); in Communist countries (Soviet Union); in Africa (Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Madagascar), and in Asia (Japan).

The ANC's international representation is fairly limited. It currently has about twenty-nine missions around the world, not including the headquarters in Lusaka. In comparison, the POLISARIO fighting in the Western Sahara has already gained diplomatic recognition for an independent Saharawi Democratic Republic from 64 countries, and from the OAU [Christian Science Monitor 1986].

The ANC's 29 missions are different from formal diplomatic representation as the "sole legitimate representative" of the people of South Africa. It has attained this formal diplomatic recognition only from Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland, and Ireland [Harden 1985].

ANC REPRESENTATION ABROAD

The ANC has representation in the following countries:

AFRICA	EUROPE	AMERICAS	ASIA/PACIFIC
Algeria	Belgium	Canada	India
Angola	Denmark	Cuba	Australia
Egypt	East Germany	USA	Japan
Ethiopia	Finland		
Kenya	France		
Madagascar	Italy		
Nigeria	Netherlands		
Senegal	Norway		
Tanzania	Soviet Union		
Zambia	Sweden		
	United Kingdom		
	West Germany		

APPENDIX 2

NON-ALIGNED FINANCIAL SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN LIBERATION

At the Cairo Conference non-aligned states were encouraged to give political, moral and material assistance to liberation movements, but the Movement itself did not create a special fund for this purpose for over a decade. The Lusaka Summit agreed to include a campaign against South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia and provide more efficient and greater material aid to liberation movements, but by contributions to the OAU's Liberation Committee [A.R.B. 1970a:1879-1881A].

It was the Declaration on the Struggle for National Liberation at the Algiers Summit in 1973 which first called for the creation of a special non-aligned Support and Solidarity Fund to increase the effectiveness of the struggle waged by liberation movements [A.R.B. 1973:2977AB]. President Boumedienne said the Non-Aligned Movement should not just take "official stands," but should give them material support [Sechaba 1974:17,21].

The Colombo Conference in 1976 supported the Algiers resolution calling for the Solidarity Fund to liberation movements and increased aid to the Front Line States [Singham 1977:247]. It authorized the non-aligned group at the United Nations to convene a pledging conference during the thirty-first session of the General Assembly in 1976. Much of the preliminary work was done by the Working Group for the Fund organized at the New Delhi Bureau Meeting in April 1977 [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:IV:2405-2407].

The Working Group for establishing the Support and Solidarity Fund met in New York in November 1976 [Jankowitsch and Sauvant 1978:IV:2405-2407]. It acknowledged the existence of a number of other funds related to southern Africa's needs such as the UN Trust Fund for Southern Africa, the OAU Assistance Fund for the struggle against colonialism and apartheid, the Liberation Committee's fund, and the OAU Fund for the placement and education of refugees.

The Non-Aligned Movement's Fund was to have five purposes. First, to provide assistance to the liberation movements. Second, to channel humanitarian and other assistance to people under racist rule. Third, to undertake publicity for the cause of the liberation in Southern Africa. Fourth, to provide educational facilities in non-aligned countries for students under racist rule. Finally, to provide other assistance such as medical supplies and agricultural equipment. The administration of the Fund would consist of an Administrative Council of five non-aligned countries chosen by the movement's Co-ordinating Bureau, and significantly, assisted by the office of the OAU's Executive Secretary in New York and the Special Committee on Apartheid.

By June 1977 the Fund had collected less than \$700,000. Significantly, the largest donors were Vietnam and Yugoslavia (see below). Vietnam was a long standing ally of the ANC.

Yugoslavia, perhaps because of its ideological disagreements with liberation movements, felt it had to prove to them it was possible to be genuinely non-aligned, and still committed to liberation.

THE NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY FUND, SELECTED
COUNTRY DONATIONS AS OF 30 JUNE 1977

Cuba	\$10,000
Iraq	\$50,000
Nigeria	\$50,000
Libya	\$20,000
Senegal	\$40,000
India	\$30,000
Qatar	\$10,000
Tanzania	\$32,000
PLO	\$5,000
Kuwait	\$10,000
Vietnam	\$175,000
United Arab Emirates	\$15,000
Yugoslavia	\$100,000
Zambia	\$6,000
plus other states	-----
	\$621,000

From Jankowitsch and Sauvant [1978:IV:2408].

APPENDIX 3

SOUTHERN AFRICA AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST FRONT
ORGANIZATIONS

The ANC's conservative critics claim it advances Soviet foreign policy interests because it is involved in various communist front organizations. Much more research needs to be done on the role of these organizations in the Third World, but Appendix 3 indicates how unimportant they are to the ANC's core interests.

The visible breach in the UN's voluntary arms embargo against South Africa by the Western powers and the growing dialogue between South Africa and various African states were two of the most serious foreign policy challenges which faced the ANC in the 1970s, but the OAU (and not AAPSO) was the main organ in African diplomacy on this issue. Apart from rhetorical support, neither AAPSO nor the WPC actively took up these issues because of their adherence to the Soviet's anti-imperialist agenda (Vietnam and the Middle East). After the Six Day War in June 1967 and the Tet offensive six months later in the beginning of 1968 the struggle of the South Vietnamese Liberation Front in Vietnam, and the Arab-Israeli dispute became the two dominant issues in Third World politics which concerned front organizations. Unfortunately for the ANC and ZAPU, the wars in the Middle East and Vietnam distracted attention from the ANC-ZAPU campaigns in Rhodesia a few months later.

In early 1972 the ANC's diplomatic activity was aimed at halting Vorster's dialogue initiative and preventing British and French arms sales to South Africa. AAPSO held its fifth Plenary Assembly in Cairo in January. Mzwai Piliso, from the Cairo ANC office, led the ANC delegation to the Assembly. Even Sechaba's account indicated the main concern of the Assembly was not southern Africa, but the war in Indochina and the crisis in Indo-Pakistani relations which led to the creation of Bangladesh (the ANC supported the Indian invasion of East Pakistan).

Apart from supportive press releases and articles in Afro-Asian Peoples, AAPSO's magazine, AAPSO's diplomatic activity on the arms embargo and dialogue was meagre compared with its activity on Vietnam and the Middle East. In Indochina the Ho Chi Minh trail on the border of eastern Laos became an important supply line for North Vietnam after the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970 and communist front organizations were primarily concerned with holding "emergency conferences" to support "the Indochinese peoples" (Cairo, 1972) [YICA 1973:580]. In 1973 AAPSO and the WPC held a "Conference on Peace and Justice in the Middle East," in Bologna, Italy and hosted various "day of solidarity" with Arab peoples and African women [YICA 1974:576].

Although the ANC (Tambo), the MPLA (Neto), and FRELIMO (dos Santos) were all members of the WPC's Presidential Committee (which guides the Council between sessions), the

WPC during this key period of South African foreign policy kept to its mainly pro-Soviet agenda. It emphasized anti-imperialist solidarity, but there was only limited activity on issues relevant to the ANC. In March 1972 AAPSO and the WPC sponsored an international seminar in New Delhi on "Imperialism, Independence and Social Transformation in the Contemporary World" which the ANC and other Soviet supported liberation movements attended [Sechaba 1972a:15,16]. Alex La Guma accompanied Oliver Tambo to the WPC Presidential Committee meeting in Santiago, Chile in October 1972. The committee, understandably, was concerned about US pressure on Chile, but significantly, it did appeal to the United Nations to accept the PAIGC, the MPLA, FRELIMO, SWAPO, ZAPU, and the ANC as the "only authentic representatives of their peoples." The committee also asserted these liberation movements should be "represented in all the bodies of the United Nations as observers at least," but the WPC has little influence at the UN although it frequently testified on southern African issues in its committees [Sechaba 1973d:18,19].

Communist front organizations gave the ANC little diplomatic support on another key ANC issue, the recognition of Umkhonto's guerrillas as prisoners of war. The ANC used front organizations to press this issue, but the organizations themselves did not very little to promote it. Apart from a letter circulated by Professor Steiniger, Director of the Institute of International law of the Humboldt University, East Berlin, in 1969 through AAPSO arguing the case, AAPSO did very little. The front organization which should have picked up the issue, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, did raise the issue at its ninth Congress in Helsinki in March 1970, but little more was done [YICA 1971:749-751; Hutchison 1975:239]. The IADL was more concerned with human rights violations in Franco's Spain and Pinochet's Chile, American "atrocities" in Vietnam, and Israeli "aggression" in the Middle East [YICA 1969:992,993; YICA 1975:617].

Front organizations begin to pay greater attention to southern Africa after the the Portuguese coup in April 1974 opened up greater revolutionary possibilities for the region. This was reflected in numerous solidarity meetings and conferences by AAPSO and the WPC. By the end of the 1970s the Camp David peace accords, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, and the Soviet Union's unfulfilled revolutionary expectations in southern Africa threatened a return to the traditional East-West agenda these organizations. Hence, the fact front organizations were dominated by the Soviet Union and the European Left's lack of interest in southern Africa until after the Portuguese coup made these organizations unimportant to the ANC's foreign policy interests.

APPENDIX 4

THE ANC AND THE UN'S INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST APARTHEID

By the mid-1960s anti-apartheid diplomacy at the UN was faced with a series of problems. First, the South African liberation movements needed greater and more consistent access to the UN system than the Decolonization Committee and Committee of Twenty-Four would allow. Second, the Africa Group was faced with the difficulty of getting its (more radical) resolutions passed in the SPC, and the Western permanent members of the Security Council were preventing the implementation of mandatory economic sanctions. Third, these diplomatic problems occurred while the South African government was in the midst of a large military build up, implementing more repressive security legislation, and touting its "separate development" programme as South Africa's answer to African demands for self-determination as a central plank of its foreign policy.

The difficulties in the SPC meant the Africa Group in the General Assembly needed a secure beach head from within the United Nations to pressure and persuade Member States, the principal organs, especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, to adopt the Africa Group's viewpoint on South Africa [Bissell 1977:31,32]. The Africa Group, following a proposal made by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement to the United Nations, mobilized support in November 1962 for General Assembly to create a Special Committee on Apartheid [Res. 1761 (XVII)] [Minty 1982:31].

The UN Charter allows the General Assembly to create "subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its functions" (Article 22) and the Special Committee on Apartheid was created as one of its subsidiary committees. Subsidiary bodies like the Special Committee allows the General Assembly to do more work and more detailed investigation of problems between sessions [Peterson 1986:160; Bissell 1977:55]. Each year its investigative reports suggested how the General Assembly could achieve its "already pre-determined goal," the implementation of economic sanctions [Peterson 1986:16]. These reports examined various aspects of the South African economy and political situation [Benson 1966:249].

The Special Committee was mandated to present its yearly reports either to the General Assembly, or more importantly since the implementation of mandatory economic sanctions is the Council's responsibility, the Security Council. In this way the Special Committee made sure the issue of apartheid is kept before both the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Because the Security Council can not dismiss the Special Committee's reports without adequate justification, the Council was forced, or more importantly the major Western permanent members on the Council were forced (as South Africa's largest trading partners), to justify why they would

not implement sanctions. This provision has helped narrow the parameters of permissible international discourse on South Africa.

The Special Committee was created with a definite mandate; to collect testimony and petition the views on apartheid from various individuals and organizations. This objective provided the definite institutional support for petitioning the UN regarding South Africa's racial policies. The Fourth Committee and the Committee of Twenty-Four were dominated by regular colonial problems. Oliver Tambo's appearance before the Decolonization Committee after Sharpeville was the ANC's only appearance before the Committee (see Appendix 5.12). When either the ANC or PAC appeared before the Committee of Twenty-Four it was in the context of the struggles in either Namibia, Southern Rhodesia, or the Portuguese territories (see Appendix 5.13). The Special Committee, through its Sub-Committee on Petitions, provided a new way for South African liberation movements like the ANC (also its labour affiliate SACTU) and the PAC to have direct and consistent access to the United Nations system.

The Special Committee was also given the role of reviewing apartheid policies when the General Assembly was not in session, and to monitor the sanctions debate at the UN. These functions are mainly carried out by the Sub-Committee on Information on Apartheid. These two Sub-Committees provide an opportunity for single issue NGOs involved in anti-apartheid solidarity work like the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and the International Defense and Aid Fund, and multiple-issue NGOs involved in anti-apartheid solidarity work such as the and the World Council of Churches, and international communist front organizations such as the World Peace Council to participate in the Special Committee's activities (see Appendices 5.7 and 5.8) [Bissell 1977:57,58].

By mid-1963 the General Assembly "had recommended virtually to the limits of its powers" even by establishing the Special Committee on Apartheid. The concentration of diplomacy now shifted to the Security Council [Bissell 1977:67,68]. In fact, most Committee members saw the purpose of the Committee "as a prod to further action by the Security Council" [Bissell 1977:75,76]. Although it may be debatable whether the General Assembly is constitutionally permitted to pressure the Council in this way to investigate situations which it considers may endanger international peace, this has been the Special Committee's role since it was formed (the San Francisco conference determined that the Assembly can not require the Council to investigate a problem because this would cause a conflict between the two main organs) [Bissell 1977:195].

The Western powers consistently frustrated the implementation of the Special Committee's objectives in two ways. First, in an effort to engage the Western powers in the Special Committee's work, the Committee decided to enlarge

its membership to include South Africa's trading partners, but they steadfastly refused to become involved in the Committee at all [A.R.B. 1966:582BC]. Second, the Western powers which were the permanent members of the Security Council (U.S., Britain, and France) vetoed all economic sanctions resolution which reached the Council and any attempt to have South Africa either suspended or expelled from the Organization.

Consequently, the Special Committee attempted to publicize the evil of apartheid and the need for economic sanctions through investigative reports, seminars, and conferences. These efforts began with the International Conference on Sanctions held in London, in April 1964 organized by Ronald Segal and sponsored by the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain [Segal 1964]. The conference included the ANC (Tambo), various African leaders, academic experts, and the Special Committee on Apartheid. It concluded (to the participant's satisfaction, if not the satisfaction of outside observers) that economic sanctions were feasible and workable. Its detailed reports and recommendations were later sent to Special Committee on Apartheid for consideration by the General Assembly.

In September 1966 the Special Committee, in consultation with the General Assembly's Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) Committee and the Economic and Social Council's Commission on Human Rights organized the first UN-sponsored International Seminar on Apartheid in Brasilia, Brazil [Y.U.N. 1965:103]. This conference determined that the UN has "a fundamental interest in combating the doctrine of apartheid," and following the conclusions of the International Conference on Economic Sanctions held in London, set the tone for future UN activity [Y.U.N. 1966:81].

It asserted that economic sanctions implemented under Article 41 were "indispensable, urgent, and feasible," a conclusion which is constantly reiterated by the UN in all subsequent conferences and seminars and by the South African liberation movements [Y.U.N. 1966:81]. The conference provided the liberation movements greater opportunity for participating in UN diplomacy. Both the ANC (Robert Resha) and the PAC (Peter Raboroko) attended the conference as observers which made recommendations directly applicable to the diplomatic and humanitarian campaigns of both liberation movements [Y.U.N. 1966:81]. The participation of the ANC and PAC was continued at subsequent conferences and seminars. At a time when the main UN activity of these movements was with the Special Committee's Sub-Committee on Petitions, they provided another opportunity for them to participate in UN activity.

The Special Committee's subsequent report in October followed closely the recommendations of the Brasilia seminar. Because of the UN's "special interest" in South Africa, the report proposed an "international campaign against apartheid" as part of an organizational change to make the UN system more responsive to the Special Committee's anti-apartheid

activities [Y.U.N. 1966:82]. The report also called for the creation of a special information centre on apartheid within the UN Secretariat to assist UN organs involved in the international campaign increase public awareness of the evils of apartheid and what should be done [Y.U.N. 1966:82; Bissell 1977:107]. These recommendations were endorsed by the General Assembly, and at the Assembly request the Secretary-General established a Special Unit on Apartheid in 1967 directly within the UN Secretariat, in the Department of Political and Security Affairs [Res. 2144 (XXI) October 1966].

In December 1974 the Special Committee was reorganized and its name changed to the Special Committee "against Apartheid" rather than "on Apartheid" to reflect the new direction of UN activity on South Africa away from information "on apartheid" to mobilization and confrontational activity "against apartheid" by supporting the armed struggles waged by the national liberation movements (see Section 9.3). In 1973 the Special Committee's Sub-Committees had already been combined to form the Sub-Committee on Petitions and Information, and the Working Group on the United Nations Resolutions on the Question of Apartheid (set up in 1968) became the Sub-Committee on the Implementation of United Nations Resolutions and Collaboration with South Africa [Finley 1988:233].

In 1975 the Special Unit on Apartheid was also reorganized as the UN Centre Against Apartheid to concentrate on the UN's new direction [Res. 3411 (XXX) November 1975]. It administers in consultation with the Special Committee a Trust Fund for Publicity against Apartheid for this purpose [Res. 3151 C (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 but established by the Secretary-General in January 1975].

The Centre prepared special studies on obstacles to effective action "against apartheid" and organized international seminars and conferences drawing together those NGOs and IGOs with an interest in its international campaign against apartheid [Finley 1988:242]. They investigated general humanitarian issues related to South Africa such as human rights abuses, racial discrimination, colonialism, and more specific issues such as women and children under apartheid, economic sanctions, nuclear collaboration, multi-national corporations, the oil embargo, and the alleged "alliance" between South Africa and Israel (see Appendix 5.14). The ANC (and PAC) often participated in these activities since they provide the academic and intellectual support for the ANC's main international objectives: mandatory economic sanctions, the release of South African political prisoners, the granting of prisoner of war status to Umkhonto combatants, the implementation of a mandatory arms embargo, and the isolation of South Africa from international sport.

Some of the General Assembly's principal organs and Main Committees became involved in the Special Committee's international campaign against apartheid. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) was one of the first organs to take

action when it expelled South Africa from its Economic Commission for Africa in July 1963 [Y.U.N. 1963:19].

The ECOSOC's Commission on Human Rights created a Sub-Committee on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities. The purpose of neither the Commission or the Sub-Commission was to investigate abuses in particular countries, but by the late 1960s both ECOSOC's Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities were involved in investigating racial discrimination and the violation of human rights in South Africa. At the Special Committee's request, it formed an Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts to investigate the trade union rights in South Africa and the torture and ill treatment of prisoners. The Working Group's brief, to receive communications and hear witnesses, provided an other opportunity for the ANC and other liberation movements to participate in the UN's anti-apartheid activities [Y.U.N. 1967:84; Y.U.N. 1968:102]. The inquiries into apartheid (and later Chile) were the only "widely popular targets" for investigation by ECOSOC and no real action on the violation of human rights in other countries occurred [Luard 1979:64,66,67].

An important part of the anti-apartheid work of the Assembly's Third Committee (in conjunction with ECOSOC's Commission on Human Rights) was the UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted by the General Assembly in December 1965 [Res. 2106 (XX); Lerner 1980:6]. Apartheid is the only form of racial discrimination to which a specific article is devoted (Article 3) in addition to being mentioned in the Preamble (para 9) and goes a long way toward outlawing apartheid [Lerner 1980:10,40-43,211]. By 1978 forty-six states had ratified the Convention.

The Convention on Racial Discrimination was a "small breakthrough" for states concerned with the "implementation" of the UN's pronouncements on human rights since the Universal Declaration in 1948 [Luard 1979:65]. The Convention created a Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) which devised a procedure for individuals to petition CERD regarding alleged violations of the Convention [Lerner 1980:82-88]. The Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain has petitioned the Committee, but in relation to the situation in Southern Rhodesia, not South Africa. Other liberation movements such as the ANC (Zimbabwe) and the POLISARIO, and communist front organizations have also petitioned the Committee [Zuijdwijk 1982:346]. In order to publicize the Convention the Third Committee recommended to the General Assembly that 1971 should be declared as the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination to help publicize these important changes in international politics [Res. 2544 (XXIV) December 1969] [Y.U.N. 1969:106].

CERD held a World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination in Geneva in August 1978. The Conference could

have been a constructive platform to start the UN's Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and it could have helped the ANC's diplomacy because its Programme of Action contained several recommendations related to apartheid [Lerner 1980:210]. Unfortunately, the World Conference diminished its diplomatic importance by linking Zionism with racism [in terms of Res. 3379 (XXX)]. The U.S., Israel, and several NGOs refused to attend, the European Community, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand with drew from the conference, and the Nordic countries attended, but disassociated themselves from its Programme of Action [Lerner 1980:205,209,210; Bennett 1988:320,321]. The ANC (Treasurer-General Thomas Nkobi) participated in the Second World Conference in August 1983 [Nkobi 1983:3-11]. It was held at the end of the Decade to Combat Racism, but its political elements prevented either the conference or the Decade from helping the ANC's diplomacy in any meaningful way [Bennett 1988:320,321].

Particularly important for the ANC's diplomacy was the Third Committee's Draft Convention on the Support and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. Apartheid, in fact, is the only form of racial discrimination singled out in an international Convention [Lerner 1980:211]. The Draft Convention was adopted and opened for signature and ratification in November 1973 [Res. 3068 (XXVIII)]. The Convention formally declares apartheid a crime against humanity violating the principles of international law. It also declares organizations, institutions, and individuals committing the crime of apartheid to be criminals (opening up the prospect for a war crimes trial after liberation) [Lerner 1980:211; ACR 1973-74:3464; A.R.B. 1973d:3089]. The Convention on Apartheid goes considerably further than the Convention on Racial Discrimination, and by March 1982 sixty-six states (from Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa and some communist states not including any West European states) have expressed consent to be bound by the Convention through ratification or accession.

More directly relevant to the ANC was the UN's proclamation of 1978, the same year beginning the Decade to Combat Racism, as the International Year Against Apartheid. Tambo helped inaugurate the International Year at UN Headquarters in New York on 21 March, the anniversary of Sharpeville. Tambo's speech, comparing apartheid with fascism, was less controversial than the Decade's pronouncements on Zionism [Tambo 1978:26-30].

Upon the Special Committee's recommendation, the General Assembly called for the UN's Specialized Agencies, especially the ILO, WHO and UNESCO to participate in the Special Committee's work in December 1963, in the first year of the Committee's operations [Res. 1978 (XVIII)]. The seminar on apartheid in Kitwe, Zambia in 1967 sought to draw together the Specialized Agencies, the liberation movements and the NGOs into a world-wide information campaign against apartheid which in subsequent years held various

international conferences and seminars [Y.U.N. 1967:121; Sechaba 1967q:14-16].

The role of the Specialized Agencies was three-fold. First they were asked to give humanitarian assistance to South African political refugees. At first, South African refugees obtained education and training in existing UN Africa programmes of UNESCO, ILO, WHO and FAO [Bissell 1977:116]. Security Council's Group of Experts published their recommendations in 1964, and the following year two special UN funds for humanitarian and educational assistance to refugees from South Africa (and later also Namibia) were established; a UN Trust Fund For Southern Africa and a Programme for Education and Training Abroad of South Africans were established [Y.U.N. 1965:117; Bissell 1977:74,75]. They are now administered by the Centre Against Apartheid.

Second, South Africa was to be expelled from the Specialized Agencies, and if possible, replaced with representatives from the liberation movements. This issue, Luard suggests, is "perhaps the issue most bitterly and long fought out in the UN and in their agencies" [Luard 1979:146]. Afro-Asian pressure in the Specialized Agencies was sufficient to expel South Africa from many of them, or to have South Africa withdraw. South Africa withdrew from ILO in mid-1963 and was replaced by the ANC's labour affiliate, SACTU [African Recorder 1963c:485; Luckhardt and Wall 1980:388,389]. In June 1975 the ANC was granted observer status at the ILO's annual conference in Geneva. The ILO determined that liberation movements recognized by the OAU and the Arab League could be granted observer status. It became obvious how interchangeable the ANC and SACTU had become in exile when SACTU was denied observer status, but reapplied as ANC representatives and were admitted. John Gaetsewe, SACTU's secretary-general, spoke in the name of the ANC [SAIRR 1977:299]. South Africa withdrew from FAO and WHO in 1964 [Luard 1979:147]. The ANC now participates in WHO's Regional Committee for Africa [Sechaba 1980:19-20]. By 1973 UNESCO, ILO, FAO, the International Telecommunications Union, and the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organization had granted observer status to liberation movements [Res. 3118 (XXVIII); Wilson 1988:119].

Third, the Specialized Agencies were to be enlisted in the Special Committee's international information campaign against apartheid. UNESCO agreed to investigate the educational, scientific, and cultural affects of apartheid [Bissell 1977:97]. By March 1964 the ILO and WHO had observers at Special Committee sessions and UNESCO, FAO, and even the International Atomic Energy Agency occasionally sent observers [Bissell 1977:96].

Thus, in the absence of action by the Security Council, the Special Committee broadened its international campaign and tried to gain the support of as many outside organizations as possible for its activities, particularly the UN's Specialized Agencies, and IGOS and NGOs. Bissell asserts its purpose was to overwhelm the Western permanent

members of the Security Council with the sheer force of numbers. "In this sort of campaign," he asserts, "each organization, governmental or non-governmental, became one more valuable soldier" [Bissell 1977:110,111].

The actual content of the work done by these organizations suggests a more substantive contribution to the ANC's objectives than Bissell's dismissive comments suggests. The wheat must be sorted from the chaff. Amid the UN's paper work, endless conferences, and repetitive (and unenforceable) resolutions an international environment conducive to the struggle for national liberation in South Africa and the international legitimacy of the ANC has been created. Gone are the days when British (or German or French) government officials can dismiss sanctions simply by saying politics and economics are separate; trade (is either covert) or must now be justified either by saying sanctions hurt blacks most, or that international capitalism undermines apartheid. The argument that arms sales to South Africa for "external threats" to its security are legitimate is no longer tenable. Overt nuclear collaboration is unthinkable. Most significant of all, opposition to apartheid no longer means opposition to racial segregation but the end of white minority rule. Bissell's own political stance leads him to undervalue the contribution which the investigative reports on human right abuses in South Africa, monitoring security legislation and the conditions for prisoners and detainees, and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Crime of Apartheid, have contributed to this change in the international environment since Sharpeville.

SOLIDARITY ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE UN'S INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST APARTHEID

- 1968 International Year for Human Rights
 - International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (21 March)
- 1971 International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination
- 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. Res. 3068 (XXVIII).
- 1973 Decade of Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. Res. 3151 D(XXVIII), 3324 D (XXIX).
- 1975 Draft Declaration on Fundamental Principles Governing the Use of Mass Media in Strengthening Peace and International Understanding and in

Combating War Propaganda, Racism and Apartheid:
UNESCO General Conference. December.

1976 Day of Solidarity with South African Political Prisoners (11 October). Res. 31/6 C.


1976 International Day of Solidarity with the Struggling People of South Africa (16 June). Res. 31/6 I.

1976 Programme of Action against Apartheid. Res. 32/105 Annex.


1977 Protest Week against Apartheid (January). Res. 32/105 C

1978 International Anti-Apartheid Year. Res. 32/105 B, Res. 33/183 B.

1978 Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racism, Apartheid and Incitement to War:UNESCO General Conference. 28 November.



APPENDIX 5.1
FOREIGN POLICY SYSTEM OF THE ANC




APPENDIX 5.2

SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION ALLIANCE SYSTEMS

	CONCP	Khartoum	Congo	Anti-Khartoum
Sao Tome	CLSTP			
Guinea-Bisseau	PAIGC			
Mozambique	FRELIMO		UDENAMO	COREMO
Angola	MPLA		FNLA	UNITA
South Africa		ANC		PAC
SWA			SWAPO	
Rhodesia			SWANU	
			ZAPU	ZANU

APPENDIX 5.3

THE ANC'S VIEW OF SOUTH AFRICA'S OUTWARD POLICY



From the front cover of Sechaba, January 1971
[Grundy 1973:250].

APPENDIX 5.4

ANC PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS PRIOR TO 1960

Ahmed Kathrada

Sent by the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress to the World Youth Festival held in Berlin, GDR in 1951. After the Festival represented the Students Liberal Association of Witwatersrand University at the International Union of Students Congress in Warsaw, Poland. Invited to work at the headquarters of the World Federation of Democratic Youth in Budapest for nine months. Returned to South Africa in 1952. In 1953 elected to the executive committee of the WFDY (in absentia) and the South African Peace Council, the domestic wing of the World Peace Council. Became a member of Umkhonto's national high command and arrested at Rivonia.

Tennyson Makiwane

Early ANC Youth League member who left South Africa illegally in 1959 to be the Youth League's representative at AAPSO's first Afro-Asian Youth Conference in Cairo in February 1959. [Segal 1963:167].

Leslie Massina

ANC national executive member since 1952, became the secretary of the African Lanuderers, Cleaning and Dying Workers Union in 1952, and in 1954-55 left South Africa illegally to "attend important international trade union conferences and to visit England, the Soviet Union and other (East) European countries" [Joseph 1963:156, 157; Karis, 1977:77].

Wilton Mkwayi

Secretary of the African Textile Workers Industrial Union, sent overseas during the state of emergency following Sharpeville in 1960 to "represent militant non-white trade unions in other [countries], to win support for the liberation struggle in the free trade union world outside South Africa" [Joseph, 1963:177,178]. Became early Umkhonto member and following the Rivonia arrests, led Umkhonto in 1963-64 until he was arrested [Kasrils 1986:3].

Lilian Ngoyi

Joined the ANC in September 1952; elected to the national executive of the South African Federation of Women and became its president in August 1956. Also official of the "native branch" of the Garment Workers' Union. She became a member of the Transvaal ANC's executive and head of the ANC's Women's

League. In 1954 elected to the national executive and elected a delegate of the World Congress of Mothers held in Lausaane, Switzerland in June 1955 by the Wormen's International Democratic Federation. Invited to tour Communist countries and travelled to the Soviet Union, China, East Germany, and England [Segal 1961:205; Joseph 1963:166,167].

Duma Nokwe

Secretary of the ANC Youth League, led the ANC youth contingent to the fourth World Youth Festival in Bucharest, Romania in 1953 held by the WFDY. With Walter Sisulu the ANC's first Secretary-General, toured the Soviet Union and China, other countries in the Eastern bloc (and possibly, on this or another trip, England and Israel) [Sechaba 1978:31-40; Joseph 1963:169].

APPENDIX 5.5

ANC PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1960

Dan Cindi

AAPSO's deputy secretary-general.

J.B. Marks

An early member of the Presidential Committee of the WPC, the leadership body of about 45-50 members which governs the organization between WPC Council sessions (which have 500 members) and meets every two years.

Joe Matthews

Before he left active participation in the ANC in 1969, was one of the 16 vice-presidents of the IADL [YICA 1966:515].

Thabo Mbeki

M.A. Sussex University in Economics; military training in the Soviet Union in 1970; assistant secretary of the Revolutionary Council; contacts with International Students Conference, the International Union of Students, the WFDY, the International Union of Socialist Youth and the World Assembly of Youth.

Francil Mell

Editor of Sechaba and a member of the ANC's national executive committee is an executive member of the International Organization of Journalists [Sechaba 1980a:1,2].

Sindiso Mfenyana

One of the secretaries attached to the Bureau of the WFDY. The Bureau is involved in the WFDY's day to day operations [YICA 1968:713]. He is also head of the WFDY's regional commission for Africa [YICA 1971:724].

Florence Mophosho

The former leader of the ANC Women's Section, was the African Secretary at the WIDF at its headquarters in Berlin, GDR. The WIDF Bureau and Secretariat are supposed to implement the decisions of the WIDF's Congress which meets every four years [Sechaba 1970b:16,17; YICA 1968:726].

Alfred Nzo

The ANC's Secretary-General is one of AAPSO's eight vice-presidents and one of the vice-presidents of the WPC [YICA 1984:431].

Denis Sibeko

A member of the WFDY Secretariat. The ANC Youth League has been affiliated to the WFDY since the 1950s.


Mark Shope

Former general secretary of SACTU and ANC branch chairman in Johannesburg is one of the 79 deputy members of the WFTU's General Council (there are also 86 full members). The Council is not a policy-making body and meets every two years [YICA 1868:483]. Since 1953 SACTU has been affiliated to the WFTU.


Oliver Tambo

Replaced Marks in 1969 as the South Africa representative on the WPC's Presidential Committee [YICA 1970:741]. By the early 1970s Tambo was joined by FRELIMO's Marcelino dos Santos, the MPLA's Neto, and Yusuf al-Sebai from the United Arab Republic and the general-secretary of Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization [YICA 1966:478; YICA 1968:697].

THE ANC AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Standing Committees of the General Assembly
and Other Subsidiary Bodies

THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM



APPENDIX 5.7

COMMUNICATIONS FROM ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS TO THE
SUB-COMMITTEE ON PETITIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON
APARTHEID, 1963-1973

<u>Communication</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Organization</u>	<u>Subject</u>
Memorandum	15 March, 1963	Transvaal Indian Congress	Apartheid
Letter	7 May, 1963	Patrick van Rensburg	Sanctions
Letter	24 May, 1963	ICFTU	SA situation
Memorandum	13 May, 1963	PAC	SA situation
Letter	24 April, 1963	Union of Australian Women	
Memorandum	25 April, 1963	AAM	
Letter	26 April, 1963	PAC	
Letter	20 May, 1963	Eureka Youth League (Australia)	
Letter	11 June, 1963	Melbourne Unitarian Church	
Statement	June, 1963	Peace Pledge Union (London)	
Letter	9 September, 1963	Barry F. Mayson, N.Y.	
Letter	28 June, 1963	Ambrose Reeves	Sanctions
Letter	18 June, 1963	O. Becu, ICFTU	Sanctions
Letter	19 July, 1963	Africa Bureau	Sanctions
Declaration	9 July, 1963	Finnish Association of Attorneys	Discrimination
Letter	18 July, 1963	WFTU	Expel SA
Statement	26 July, 1963	PAFMESCA	Prisoners
Cable	26 July, 1963	African Trade Union Federation	Expel SA
Statement	30 July, 1963	Int'l Commission of Jurists	Judiciary
Letter	20 July, 1963	Shipyard Workers' Union (Denmark)	Sanctions
Letter	13 August, 1963	ANC	Walter Sisulu
Memorandum	6 September, 1963	Int'l Commission of Jurists	UN Charter
Statement	27 August, 1963	WCC Assembly	Discrimination
Letter	16 August, 1965	Maindy Msimang, ANC	Prisoners
Letter	20 August, 1965	Ian Henderson, IDAF	Prisoners
Letter	7 July, 1965	Theodore E. Brown, American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa	
Letter	22 April, 1966	Canon L. John Collins, IDAF	Banning IDAF
Letter	7 June, 1966	Mary Benson	Braam Fisher
Memorandum	6 August, 1966	R.L. Langston, Alexander Defense Committee, N.Y.	Prisoners
Letter	1 September, 1966	Denis Brutus, SAN-ROC	
Letter	2 September, 1966	Matthew Nkoana, PAC	Prisoners

Letter	14 September, 1966	Barney Desai, PAC	Prisoners
Letter	3 October, 1966	Rev. Ambrose Reeves, Christian Action	
Letter	7 October, 1966	Mrs. Mary-Louise Hooper and Mrs. Wendell Foster, Committee of Conscience against Apartheid, N.Y., American Committee on Africa (ACOA), University Christian Movement	
Letter	10 May, 1967	Canon L. John Collins, IDAF	
Letter	26 April, 1967	A.P. O'Dowd, Anti-Apartheid funding Movement (AAM), U.K.	
Letter	2 June, 1967	David Sibeko, PAC	Prisoners
Letter	21 July, 1967	Canon L. John Collins, IDAF	Prisoners
Letter	1 December, 1967	A.P. O'Dowd, AAM	Geneva
Conventions			
Letter	9 January, 1968	C.V. Mngaza	Personal
Letter	21 February, 1968	G. Houser, ACOA	Sports
Letter	2 May, 1968	David Sibeko, PAC	Prisoners
Letter	3 June, 1968	Alfred Kgokong, ANC	Campaign
Letter	30 January, 1969	G. Houser, ACOA	Sanctions
Cable	29 March, 1969	Sonia Bunting, World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners	
Letter	27 March, 1969	Sonia Bunting,	Prisoners
Letter	9 May, 1969	ICFTU	SA Situation
Letter	14 May, 1969	J. Murray McInnes, University Church of Christ (Canada)	Prisoners
Letter	30 June, 1969	Reg September, ANC	Prisoners
Letter	19-20 April, 1969	Conference of Trade Unionists on Southern Africa (Oxford)	
Letter	21 June, 1969	Ethel de Keyser, AAM	Sanctions
Letter	2 July, 1969	Canon L. John Collins, IDAF	Police
Letter	22 February, 1970	Ethel de Keyser, AAM	Cabora Bassa
Communication	1 April, 1970	SAN-ROC	
Communication	16 October, 1970	ANC	U.K. Arms Sales
Communication	14 February, 1971	Caroline Hunter, Polaroid Revolutionary Workers' Movement	

Communication	8 March, 1971	David Sibeko, PAC	Gevandale riots
Communication	28 April, 1971	Joe Nordmann, IADL	Detentions
Communication	3 May, 1971	Ethel de Keyser, AAM	Int'l Day
Communication	9 June, 1971	J.J. de Felice, AAM (France)	Arms Boycott
Cable	15 July, 1971	ANC	Sports
Communication	5 July, 1971	IADL	Trials
Cable	16 July, 1971	P. McGregor, AAM (Australia)	Sports
Communication	14 July, 1971	Mrs. Devi Vehkatrathnan, Mrs. Toni Wilcox, Mrs. Christine Vusani	trials
Communication	29 July, 1971	Mrs. Imerglik, Movement against Racism and Anti-Semitism and for Peace	
Communication	2 September, 1971	R.J. Gregory, South Australia Council of the Amalgamated Engineering Union	
Communication	12 September, 1971	P. McGregor, AAM (Australia)	Sports
Letter	22 November, 1971	N.M. Desai, Johannesburg	Personal
Communication	29 October, 1971	Alfred Nzo, ANC	Detention
Telegramme	11 November, 1971	Yousef-el-Sebai, AAPSO	Detention
Communication	21 November, 1971	Ethel de Keyser, AAM	Kidnapping
Telegramme	26 January, 1972	T. Richards, Halt All Racist Tours (HALT, NZ)	
Communication	24 April, 1972	E. Rand, World Peace Council	Apartheid
Letter	7 April, 1972	David Sibeko, PAC	
Letter	17 April, 1972	R. Finlayson, artists (NZ)	
Telegramme	8 June, 1972	Int'l Union of Students	
Communication	5 February, 1974	PAC	
Communication	11 September, 1974	PAC	

Source: annual reports of the Special Committee on Apartheid. After 1973 the Special Committee no longer listed the communications circulated as Committee documents.

APPENDIX 5.8

THE HEARING OF PETITIONS FROM ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS BY THE
 SUB-COMMITTEE ON PETITIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE
 ON APARTHEID, 1963-1973

<u>Date</u>	<u>Organization</u>	<u>Subject</u>
10 May, 1963	Mary Benson	Sanctions
10 May, 1963	G. Houser, American Committee on Africa	Sanctions
6 June, 1963	Horace Mann Bond, American Society of African Culture	
14 June, 1963	Leslie Rubin, SA Liberal Party	Sanctions
8 July, 1963	Patrick Duncan, PAC	Sanctions
10 July, 1963	Tennyson Makiwane, ANC	Sanctions
16 July, 1963	Miriam Makeba, SA singer	Sanctions
22 August, 1963	Barry F. Mason, SA student	Education
19 April, 1965	A.B. Ngcobo, PAC	
7 June, 1965	Canon L. John Collins, IDAF	
6 July, 1966	Mary Benson	
14 Sept., 1966	Franz J.T. Lee	Personal Complaint
27 Feb., 1967	Denis Brutus, World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners	
2 Feb., 1968	Rt. Rev. Edward Crowther, former Bishop of Kimberly	
19 Feb., 1969	Ronald Segal	Sanctions
18 April, 1969	Gail Morlan, Southern Africa Committee, University Christian Movement (USA)	Education
18 April, 1969	Winston Nagan, Virginia Polytechnic Institute	Education
23 March, 1970	Denis Brutus, SAN-ROC	
14 April, 1970	Arthur Ashe, professional tennis player	
20 May, 1970	Abdul Minty, AAM	Sanctions
8 June, 1970	Mary Benson	Torture
3 Feb., 1971	G. Houser, ACOA	
3 Feb., 1971	Ken Williams, Coroline Hunter, Polaroid Revolutionary Workers' Movement	
10 March, 1971	William Johnston, Episcopal Churchmen for South Africa	Sanctions
7 May, 1971	Rt. Rev. Edward Crowther, former Bishop of Kimberly	
19 July, 1971	William H. Booth, Judge, N.Y.	
26 August, 1971	Denis Brutus, SAN-ROC	
no dates given for 1971	Joseph Camilleri, Committee against Arms for Apartheid (France)	

World Peace Council (13 representatives)
Guido Fanti, Regional Government of Emilia
Romagna

19 Jan., 1972	Canon L. John Collins, IDAF
24 Jan., 1972	Rev. Donald Morton, South African exile
31 March, 1972	Robert Resha, Mhlambiso, ANC
18 July, 1972	C. Nteta, IDAF
26 June, 1972	ICARIS
26 June, 1972	American Committee on Africa
26 June, 1972	Committee of Concerned Blacks, N.Y.
26 June, 1972	Rev. K. Carstens, IDAF (USA)
10 Aug., 1972	Barbara Rogers
1 Feb., 1973	Peter Boyd, Southern Africa Defense and Aid Fund (Australia)
28 March, 1973	Winston P. Nagan, Int'l Campaign Against Racism in Sports (ICARIS)
7 Sept., 1973	Denis Brutus, ICARIS
13 Sept., 1973	Rev. W. Sterling Cary and Tim Smith, National Council of Churches

Source: annual reports of the Special Committee on Apartheid. After 1973
the Special Committee no longer listed the petitions heard by the
Committee

APPENDIX 5.9

INVITATIONS TO MEMBERS OF AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS TO PARTICIPATE IN
THE DISCUSSIONS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL, 1946-1985

Date of First Invitation	Subject	Person Invited	Representative of or Description
30 Sept., 1971	Namibia	Sam Nujoma	SWAPO
2 Dec., 1971	So. Rhodesia	Joshua Nkomo	ZAPU
2 Dec., 1971	So. Rhodesia	Revd. Ndabaningi Sithole	ZANU
1 Feb., 1972	Africa	Amilcar Cabral	PAIGC
1 Feb., 1972	Africa	M. Luvualo	MPLA
1 Feb., 1972	Africa	Marelino Dos Santos	FRELIMO
1 Feb., 1972	Africa	Peter Mueshilhange	SWAPO
1 Feb., 1972	Africa	M.K.H. Hamadziripi	ZANU
1 Feb., 1972	Africa	Portlako Leballo	PAC
1 Feb., 1972	Africa	Alfred Nzo	ANC
1 Feb., 1972	Africa	T. George Silundika	ZAPU
1 Feb., 1972	Africa	Abdul S. Minty	AAM (UK)
1 Feb., 1972	Africa	Revd. Canon Burgess Carr	
		All-Africa Council Churches	
1 Feb., 1972	Africa	Johnny Eduardo	N.L.F. of Angola
16 Feb., 1972	So. Rhodesia	Bishop Abel Muzorewa ANC Rhodesia	
28 Sept., 1972	So. Rhodesia	Esmael Mlambo ANC Rhodesia	
5 Nov., 1972	Portuguese Ter.	Marelino Dos Santos	FRELIMO
15 Nov., 1972	Portuguese Ter.	Gil Fernandes	PAIGC
15 Nov., 1972	Portuguese Ter.	Manuel Jorge	MPLA
1 Dec., 1972	Namibia	Peter Mueshihinage	SWAPO
11 Dec., 1973	Namibia	Mishane Muyongo	SWAPO
18 Oct., 1974	UN and South Africa	David Sibeko	PAC
21 Oct., 1974	UN and South Africa	Duma Nokwe	ANC
28 Oct., 1974	UN and South Africa	Noel Mukono	ZANU
28 Oct., 1974	UN and South Africa	T. George Silundika	ZAPU
28 Oct., 1974	UN and South Africa	Theo-Ben Gurirab	SWAPO
30 March, 1975	Namibia	Sam Nujoma	SWAPO
6 June, 1975	Namibia	Abdul S. Minty	AAM (UK)
27 June, 1976	Namibia	Moses M. Garoeb	SWAPO
18 June, 1976	South Africa	Thami Mhlambiso	ANC
18 June, 1976	South Africa	David Sibeko	PAC
28 July, 1976	Complaint by Zambia	O.T. Emvula	SWAPO
19 Oct., 1976	Namibia	Theo-Ben Gurirab	SWAPO
21 March, 1976	South Africa	J. Makatini	ANC
21 March, 1976	South Africa	Portlako Leballo	PAC
21 March, 1976	South Africa	Olof Palme	Sweden
21 March, 1976	South Africa	Abdul S. Minty	AAM
24 March, 1977	South Africa	William P. Thompson	WCC
28 Sept., 1977	So. Rhodesia	Joshua Nkomo	
		Patriotic Front (PF)	

29 Sept., 1977	So. Rhodesia	Callistus Ndlovu	PF
24 Oct., 1977	South Africa	Johnny Makatini	ANC
28 Oct., 1977	South Africa	Horst Gerhard Christian Kleinschmidt Institute	
28 Oct., 1977	South Africa	David Sibeko	PAC
31 Oct., 1977	South Africa	Elias L. Ntloedibe	PAC
9 Dec., 1977	South Africa	Johnny Makatini	ANC
26 Jan., 1978	South Africa	Donald Woods	editor
7 March, 1978	So. Rhodesia	Robert Mugabe	PF
16 March, 1978	Complaint by Zambia	T. George Silundika	PF
20 March, 1979	Complaint by Angola	Mishake Muyongo	SWAPO
22 March, 1979	Complaint by Angola	J. Makitini	ANC
23 March, 1979	Complaint by Angola	David Sibeko	PAC
20 June, 1979	Complaint by Morocco	Madjid Abdallah	POLISARIO
30 Jan., 1980	So. Rhodesia	Tirivafi Kangai	PF
30 Jan., 1980	So. Rhodesia	J. Makitini	ANC
16 Dec., 1982	Complaint by Lesotho	Ike F. Mafole	PAC
16 Dec., 1982	Complaint by Lesotho	J. Makitini	ANC
17 May, 1983	Complaint by Nicaragua	Ahmed G. Ebrahim	PAC
26 May, 1983	Namibia	Lesaoana S. Makhanda	PAC
26 May, 1983	Namibia	Johnny Makatini	ANC
28 March, 1984	Complaint by Libya	Ahmed G. Ebrahim	PAC
15 Aug., 1984	South Africa	Johnny Makatini	ANC
16 Aug., 1984	South Africa	Ahmed G. Ebrahim	PAC
23 Oct., 1985	South Africa	Bishop D. Tutu	
13 June, 1985	Namibia	J. Makitini	ANC
13 June, 1985	Namibia	Ahmed G. Ebrahim	PAC
4 Oct., 1985	Complaint by Angola	Peter Muesihjange	SWAPO
13 Nov., 1985	Namibia	Andimba Toivoja Toivo	SWAPO
30 Dec., 1985	Complaint by Lesotho	Neo Mnumzana	ANC

Source: Bailey [1988:132-138], but his list omitted certain references to the ANC. This appendix is amended by the Y.U.N. 1977:141,147; Y.U.N. 1983:1047; Y.U.N. 1984:158.

APPENDIX 5.10

SUBSIDIARY ORGANS ESTABLISHED BY OR WITH THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1946-1986

Committees of the Whole

<u>Date Established</u>	<u>Resolution</u>	<u>Title or Function</u>	<u>Date of Termination</u>
18 June 1970	Res. 191 (S/5773)	Expert Committee on Measures concerning the Question of Race Conflict in South Africa	27 Febrary 1965
30 January 1970	Res. 276 (S/8601)	Ad Hoc Subcommittee established in pursuance of Security Council Resolution 276 (Namibia)	29 July 1970
18 March 1970	Res. 277 (S/9709)	Committee established in pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia	2 February 1970
29 July	Res. 283 (S/9881)	Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Namibia (re-established)	-----
9 December 1977	Res. 421 (S/12477)	Committee on the question of South Africa	-----

Select Committees composed of a limited number of Member States

29 May 1968	Res. 253 (S/8601)	Situation in Southern Rhodesia	30 September 1970
4 Feb. 1972	Res. 309 (S/10376/Rev. 2)	Group on contacts with the parties concerning Namibia	11 December 1972
2 Feb. 1973	Res. 326 (S/10876/Rev. 1)	Special Mission to Zambia	5 March 1973
23 Nov. 1979	Res. 455 (S/13645)	Ad Hoc Committee on Complaint by Zambia	-----
15 Dec. 1981	Res. 496 (S/14793)	Commission of Inquiry into Complaint by the Seychelles	8 July 1983
28 May 1982	Res. 507 (S/15127/Rev. 1)	Ad Hoc Committee to coordinate the Special Fund for the Seychelles	-----
20 Sept. 1985	Res. 571 (S/17481)	Complaint by Angola	6 Dec. 1985

Individuals

4 Dec. 1963	Res. 182 (S/5471)	Group of Experts on South Africa	20 April 1964
1 Aug. 1972	Res. 319 (S/10750)	Representative of the Secretary-General for Namibia	12 December 1972
14 Jan. 1977	Res. 403 (S/12276)	Mission to Botswana	25 May 1977
25 May 1977	Res. 406 (S/12334)	Review Mission to Botswana	26 October 1977
29 Sept. 1977	Res. 415 (S/12404/ Rev. 1)	Special Representative in Southern Rhodesia	1 May 1978
27 July 1978	Res. 431 (S/12972)	Special Representative for Namibia (Martti Ahtisaari)	-----
21 June 1985	Res. 568 (S/17291)	Mission to Botswana	30 September 1985

Field Operations

29 Sept. 1978	Res. 435 (S/12865)	Transition Assistance Group for Namibia (UNTAG)	13 November
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Source: Bailey [1988:323-330].

APPENDIX 5.11

PETITIONS PRESENTED BY ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS ACTIVE
ON THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICA BEFORE THE SPECIAL POLITICAL
COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1963-1976*

Date	Person	Organization
8 October 1963	Oliver Tambo	ANC
18 October 1963	Bishop Ambrose Reeves	
29 October 1963	Oliver Tambo	ANC
6 December 1966	Mr. Ngcobo	PAC
19 October 1967	Rev. L. John Collins	IDAF
25 October 1968	Rev. L. John Collins	IDAF
5 November 1969	Robert Resha	ANC
10 October 1974	Potlako K. Leballo	PAC*
24 October 1974	Johnny Makatini	ANC*
October 1974		SAN-ROC AAPSO WPC IDAF International Campaign Against Racism in Sports
4 November 1976	R. Chandra George Houser	WPC ACOA
	Tim Smith, Interfaith Centre on Corporate Responsibility Sikose Mji, Black Consciousness Movement Edward Martin Sloan, Conseil queb e cois de la paix	

* At the request of the Special Committee on Apartheid since 1974 the representatives from the ANC and PAC have been invited to participate as observers in the discussions of the Special Political Committee.

Source: GAOR, Summary Records, Special Political Committee; Yearbook of the United Nations, volumes for 1960-1983.

APPENDIX 5.12

PETITIONS PRESENTED BEFORE THE FOURTH COMMITTEE (DECOLONIZATION) OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, 1960-1972*

<u>Year</u>	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Person</u>	<u>Organization</u>
November 1960	South-West Africa	F.J. Kozonguisi Rev. Markus Kooper Mburumba Kerina Jacob Kuhangua Sam Nujoma Van Ismael Fortune Rev. Michael Scott Oliver Tambo	SWANU SWAUNIO SWAUNIO SWAPO SWAPO SWAPO ANC
19 Sept.-20 Dec. 1961	South-West Africa	Ismael Fortune Moses Garoeb Uatja Kaukuetu Charles Kauraisa Markus Kooper J. Kozonguizi J. Kuhangua Z. Ngavirue Sam Nujoma Michael Scott	
1962	South-West Africa	Rev. Michael Scott Potlako K. Leballo Sam Nujoma Jacob Kuhangua Mburumba Kereina J. Kozonguizi	PAC SWAPO SWAPO SWAUNIO SWANU
October 1962	Southern Rhodesia	Michael Scott E. Dumbutshaena N. Sithole J. Chinamono N. Shamuyarira T.J. Hlazo A.D. Butler J. Dombura W.A.F. Burdett-Coutts J.M. Gondo Peter Mushongo P.F. Sithole L. Chiota	ZAPU ZANU ZANU ZANU Independent Multi- racial group Pan-African Socialist Union
21 November 4 December 1962	Portuguese Ter.		MPLA FNLA PAIGC

22 October 1963- 11 November	South-West Africa	Nathanael Mbaeva Rev. Markus Kooper Rev. Michael Scott Brian Bassingthwaighe Moses Garoeb	SWANU SWAUNIO Herero SWA Students
October 1963	Southern Rhodesia	Robert Mugabe T. George Silundika	ZANU ZAPU
November 1963	Portuguese Ter.	F. Lele A. Kita J. Manuel angolaise Eduardo Mondlane D.J. Mabunda J. Sakupwanya de Holden Roberto GRAE H. Galvao Leo de Sousa Antonio de Fonseca Remo de Silva Wolfgang Dan de Souza	Nto-Bako Comite de l'Unite nationale FRELIMO Uniao Democratica Mozambique Nacional
22 Nov.-18 Dec. 1965	Portuguese Ter.	Andre Kassinda Povo Angolano Albert Namk Eduardo Mondlane M. dos Santos	Conselho do FRELIMO CONCP
December 1965	South-West Africa	Sam Nujoma J. Kuhangua Mburumba Kerina Mrs. T.J. Kerina Rev. M. Kooper N. Mbaeuwa	SWAPO SWAPO Nat'l Unity Democratic Org. SWANIO SWANU
October 1966	South-West Africa	Michael Scott Emil Appolus J. Kuhangua Zedekia Ngavirue Utja Kauketu Charles Kauraisa	SWAPO SWAPO SWANU SWANU SWANU
16 Nov.-5 Dec. 1966	Portuguese Ter.	Albert Nank Mario de Andrade C.G. Cambando S. Mohamed Kham	CONCP CONCP GRAE FRELIMO
19-23 Oct. 1967	South-West Africa	J. Kuhangua Gottfried H. Geingob Nathaniel Mbaeva Mburumba Kerina	SWAPO SWAPO SWANUF SWANUF

		Festus U. Mundijua Michael Scott Rights of Man	SWANU Int'l League for the 30 Oct.-10 Nov.
Portuguese Ter. 1967	Uris T. Simango	FRELIMO Matens Gwenjere Francisco Lubota Paul Touba	FRELIMO GRAE GRAE
1968	Namibia	Michael Scott Mburumba Kerina Gottfried H. Geingob	Int'l League SWANU SWAPO
25 Oct.-26 Nov. 1968	Portuguese Ter.	S. Mohamed Khan Migel Murupa	FRELIMO FRELIMO
3 Oct.-3 Nov. 1969	Southern Rhodesia	Kotsho Dube	ZAPU
3 Oct.- 3 Nov. 1969	Namibia	Michael Scott Gidon Gottlieb Mburumba Kerina Veive N. Mbaeva Gottfried H. Geingob Theo Ben Gurirab Hiuona D. Sheepo Katuutire ua Kaura	SWANUF SWANUF SWAPO SWAPO SWAPO SWANU
1969	Portuguese Ter.	Albert Bonaparte Nank S. Mohamed Khan	FRELIMO
5 Oct.-27 Nov. 1970	Namibia	George Houser Mburumba Kerina Veive N. Mbaeva Sam Nujoma Michael Scott	ACOA SWANUF SWANUF SWAPO Int'l League
1970	Portuguese Ter.	Albert Bonaparte Nank S. Mohamed Khan Paul Tomba Francisco Alexandre Students George Houser	FRELIMO GRAE Nat'l Union of Angolan ACOA
11 Oct.-16 Dec. 1971	Southern Rhodesia	Romesh Chandra Lucio Luzzatto E. Randriamihasinoro N. Voshinin I.B. Taba	WPC WPC WPC WPC Unity Movement
		Int'l League.	Michael Scott.
25 Oct.-30 Nov. 1972	Southern Rhodesia	Jane Ngwenya Aaron Ndlovu Richard Hove	ZAPU* ZAPU* ZANU*

27 September 1972	Portuguese Ter.	M. dos Santos Mariano Matsinhu S. Mohamed Khan Amicar Cabral Gil Fernandes Oscar Tei Xeira Arthur X.L. Vilankulu Faustino Arcanjo Kambeu Gwendoline Gumane Romesh Chandra E. Rand... G. Schaffer Canon Raymond Goor	FRELIMO* FRELIMO* FRELIMO* PAIGC* PAIGC* PAIGC* COREMO WPC WPC WPC WPC
25 Oct-30 Nov. 1972	Namibia	Michael Scott Romesh Chandra E. Randriamihasinoro G. Schaffer Canon Raymond Goor	WPC WPC WPC WPC
1972	Namibia	Peter Muesinhange Theo Ben Gurirab	SWAPO* SWAPO*
12 Oct.-20 Nov. 1973	Southern Rhodesia	Edward Ndlovu Mukudzei Mudzi	ZAPU* ZANU*

Source: Yearbook of the United Nations for year 1960-1973.

* After 1972 the liberation movements in Namibia, Southern Rhodesia, and the Portuguese territories in Africa were given observer rather than petitioner status and regularly participated in the committee's deliberations.

APPENDIX 5.13

PETITIONS PRESENTED BY ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS BEFORE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE SITUATION WITH REGARD TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE GRANTING OF INDEPENDENCE TO COLONIAL TERRITORIES (SPECIAL COMMITTEE OF TWENTY-FOUR), 1960-1973*

Date	Topic	Person	Organization
192	South-West Africa	Philip Kgosana K.G. Mofoka Moses Smith Peter Muesihange M. Kerina Jacob Kuhangua J. Kozonguizi Rev. Markus Kooper Rev. Michael Scott	PAC PAC PAC SWAPO SWAPO SWAPO SWANU
March, 1962	Southern Rhodesia	Joshua Nkomo	ZAPU
April, May		Garfield Todd	former prime minister
		Paul Mushonga	Zim. Nat'l Party
12 September 1962	Southern Rhodesia	E.J.M. Zvobgo	Africa Bureau
25-26 March 1963	Southern Rhodesia	Joshua Nkomo	ZAPU
4 April 10 May 1963	South-West Africa	J. Kuhangua J. Kozonguizi Rev. M. Kooper	SWAPO SWANU SWAUNIO
27 May-17 June 1965	South-West Africa		SWAPO PAC
		Federation of Free Trade Unions of South Africa	ANC
		National Unity Democratic Organization	
28 May-16 June 1965	Portuguese Ter.	L.M. Muliata S.K. Njoloma A.J.D. Kapilango Anibal del Melo Z.J. Sakupwanya Eduardo Mondlane L. Kavandame M. Muthemba Amilcar Cabal	behalf of Angolan refugees UPA MPLA COREMO FRELIMO FRELIMO FRELIMO PAIGC
24 May-15 June 1966	Southern Rhodesia	T.G. Silundika E.M. Pasipanodya L.P. Chihota David Mpongo	ZAPU ZANU ZANU ZAPU

May-June 1966	High Commission Ter.	Peter Raboroko P.K. Leballo A.B. Ngcobo S.J. Zwane Ngwane Nat'l lib.	PAC PAC PAC Congress of Swaziland
July 1966	High Commission Ter.	S. Makoto Mrs. Kolisang	Marema-Tlou Freedom Party Basutoland Congress Party
23 May-22 June 1966	South-West Africa	Sam Nujoma Solomon Mifma Peter Nanyemba Andries Booys Claudius Kandjou Moses Smith	SWAPO SWAPO SWAPO SWANU PAC
25 May-22 June 1966	Portuguese Ter.	Daniel Chipenda Luis d'Almededa Jose Ervedosa M. Moutinho de Padua Manuel Aligre Johnny Eduardo Eduardo Mondlane Narciso Mbule Amilcar Cabral Thomas Medinos Mario de Andrade	MPLA MPLA FPLN FPLN FPLN GRAE FRELIMO UNENAMO PAIGC CLSTP CONCP
30 May-20 June 1967	Portuguese Ter.	H. Roberto D. da Silva Luis Lucio Luis de Azeverdo A.P. Matondo P.B. Lulendo E.N. Mbidi F. Lele S. Ladeira-Lumona A. Medina E. Tulengala Gracia Kiala Smart Chata P.J. Gumane Eduardo Mondlane B. Pinto-Bull	GRAE MPLA MPLA MPLA PPA LGTA UNITA Nto-Bako Party Angola CGTA Ngwizani a Kongo CNA CSLA UNITA COREMO FRELIMO FLING
5-15 June 1967	Southern Rhodesia	T.G. Silundika W.H. Chitepo P.L. Chihota Rev. B.H. Zulu	ZAPU ZANU ZANU

7-19 June 1967	South-West Africa	Solomon Mifimo Moses Garoeb J. Kuhangua T.T. Letlake	SWAPO SWAPO SWAPO PAC
8-12 Sept. 1967	South-West Africa	Gottfreid Geingob	SWAPO
6-7 March 1968	Southern Rhodesia	Francis Nehwati	ZACTU
24 June 1968 16 August 1968	Portuguese Ter. Portuguese Ter.	Francisco Lubota B. Pinto-Bull	GRAE FLING
12-23 May 1969	Southern Rhodesia	T.G. Silundika T. Mutizwa P.L. Chihota	ZAPU ZANU ZANU
May 1969	Namibia	Tennyson Makiwane Duma Nokwe Moses Garoeb Sam Nujoma Jane Gool	ANC ANC SWAPO SWAPO

All African Convention and Unity Movement of South Africa

5-23 May 1969	Portuguese Ter.	H. Roberto E. Tulengana G. Kiala Antoine Kiaku Francis Kuta Carlos Rocha Paul Gumane D. Samwimbila J. Chissano	GRAE CNA CNA Nto-Bako Party Nto-Mako Party MPLA COREMO UNITA FRELIMO
May-June 1970	Southern Rhodesia	C.K.D. Chikerema G.B. Nyandoro T.F. Silundika H. Hamadziripi S.V. Mtamhanengwe	ZAPU ZAPU ZAPU ZANU ZANU
4 March 14 Sept. 1971	Portuguese Ter.	B. Adjali Jack Seaton Abdul S. Minty delegate	Project Moz. Project Moz. (Canada) AAM WPC
1971		Abdul S. Minty	AAM
May 1971	Namibia	Duma Nokwe Moses Garoeb Andreas Chipanga Jesaya Nyamu A. Fataar Jane Gool Ray Simons Ahmed Ebrahim representatives	ANC SWAPO SWAPO SWAPO Unity Movement Unity Movement SACTU PAC MPLA

1-28 March 1972	Southern Rhodesia	L. John Collins IDAF Martin Ennals Amnesty Int'l G. Schaffer WPC E. Randriamihasinoro WPC Sean Gervasi Oxford University Abdul S. Minty AAM Mursi Saad Eldin AAPSO
14-28 March 1972	Portuguese Ter.	Martin Ennals Amnesty Int'l E. Randriam... WPC G. Schaffer WPC Gleb Staroutchenko WPC Sean Gervasi Oxford University Sietse Bosgra Angola Committee (Netherlands) Abdul S. Minty AAM Mursi Saad Eldin AAPSO
10-26 April 1972	Portuguese Ter.	Amilcar Cabral PAIGC Corca Djalo PAIGC Sotero Fortes PAIGC Carlos Reis PAIGC Tcherno Ndjai PAIGC Carlos Alberto PAIGC Teixeirade Barros PAIGC Dr. Lucho Robles PAIGC Paulo Jorge MPLA M. Dos Santos FRELIMO Paulo Gumane COREMO Alfred Nzo ANC W.M. Tsotsi Unity Movement Paul Touba FNLA
19-27 April 1972	Southern Rhodesia	Eduardo Ndlovu ZAPU S. Mtambanwngwe ZANU N. Shamnyarira FROLIZI Alfred Nzo ANC Rev. Canaan Banana ANC (Zim) R. Sadomba ANC (Zim)
21 March -12 Augyst 1972	Namibia	L. John Collins IADF Martin Ennals Amnesty Int'l Sean Gervasi Mursi Saad Eldin AAPSO E.S. Rand... WPC G. Schaffer WPC G. Staroutchenko WPC Abdul S. Minty AAM M. Muyongo SWAPO & WPC
April 1972	Namibia	Moses Garoeb SWAPO Alfred Nzo ANC W.M. Tsoti Unity Movement William Nelulu SWANUF

5 April 28 August 1973	Southern Rhodesia	S.V. Mtambanengwe T.G. Silundika E.J.M Zvobgo	ZANU* ZAPU* ANC (Zim)
25-29 June 1973	Namibia	Barbara Rogers Friends of Namibia Committee Patuse N. Appolus	SWAPO*
2 Feb.-2 August	Portuguese Ter. Comte for the Freedom of Mozambique, Angola and Guine	Lord Gifford	
		Sasa Mbala Mesamesa Tshamba Manuel Rebelo S. Manuel da Luz	FNLA* FNLA* MPLA* PAIGC*

Source: Yearbook of the United Nations for 1960-1975.

* After 1973 the liberation movements in Namibia, Southern Rhodesia, and the Portuguese territories in Africa were given observer rather than petitioner status and regularly participated in the committee's deliberations.

APPENDIX 5.14

UNITED NATIONS SPONSORED CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS RELATED TO SOUTHERN AFRICA

1966 International Seminar on Apartheid: Third Committee Brasilia, Brazil. 23 August-4 September. [Robert Resha (ANC), Peter Raboroko (PAC), Lewis Nkosi, Ronald Segal, Leslie Rubin]. Res. 2202 A (XXI), 2307 (XXVII).

1967 International Seminar on Apartheid, Racial Discrimination and Colonialism in Southern Africa: Special Committee on Apartheid and Committee of Twenty-Four. Kitwe, Zambia. 25 July-4 August. [ANC, FRELIMO, PAC, SWAPO, ZANU]. Res. 2307 (XXVII).

1968 International Conference on Human Rights: ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights, Special Committee on Apartheid. Tehran, Iran. 22 April-13 May. Res. 2396 (XXIII).

1971 Seminar on Racial Discrimination. Yaounde, Cameroon. 29 June

1973 International Conference of Experts for the Support of Victims of Colonialism and Apartheid: Special Committee against Apartheid, OAU. 9-14 April. [ANC, PAC, ZAPU, ZANU, MPLA, FRELIMO, PAIGC]. Res. 3151 G (XXVIII).

1975 Seminar on South Africa: Special Committee against Apartheid. 28 April-2 May. Paris, France.

1976 International Seminar on the Eradication of Apartheid and Support for the Liberation Struggle: Special Committee against Apartheid, OAU. 24-28 May. Havana, Cuba. [Tambo, ANC]. Res. 31/6 F, J.

1977 International Conference in Support of the Peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia. 16-21 May.

1977 Second International Trade Union Conference for Action against Apartheid: UN. 10-11 June. Geneva, Switzerland.

1977 World Conference for Action against Apartheid: Special Committee against Apartheid, OAU. Lagos, Nigeria. 22-26 August. [Tambo, John Gaetsewe (SACTU), ZAPU, SWAPO]. Res. 32/105 B.

1978 Symposium on Human Rights. Lesotho. 17 July. [Dilinger, Mac Maharaj, Mfundisi (ANC), FRELIMO].

1978 First World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination: Part of UN's Decade for Action. Geneva, Switzerland. 14-25 August.

1979 Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa: Special Committee against Apartheid. London, England. 24-25 February. Res. 34/93 A.

1979 International Seminar on Children under Apartheid: UN. 18-20 June. Paris, France. Res. 34/93 K.

1979 International Seminar on the Role of Transnational Corporations in South Africa: UN. London, England. 2-4 November.

1980 International Seminar on an Oil Embargo against South Africa: UN. 14-16 March. Amsterdam, Netherlands.

1980 International Seminar on Women and Apartheid: UN. 19-21 May. Helsinki, Finland.

1980 International Non-Governmental Organizations Action Conference for Sanctions against South Africa: UN. 30 June-3 July. Geneva, Switzerland.

1981 International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa: Special Committee against Apartheid, UNESCO, OAU. Paris, France. 20-27 May. [ANC, PAC, SWAPO]. Res. 34/93 C, 35/206 I.

1982 International Conference of Historians: Special Committee against Apartheid, UNESCO. Paris, France. March.

1982 Solidarity Conference with the Women of South Africa and Namibia: Special Committee against Apartheid. Brussels, Belgium. 17-19 May.

1982 Asian Regional Conference for Action against Apartheid: Special Committee against Apartheid. Manila, Philippines. 24-26 May.

1982 Seminar on the Violation of Human Rights in the Palestinian and Other Arab Territories Occupied by Israel: UN. Geneva, Switzerland. December. [Herby Pillay (ANC), PLO].

1983 Symposium on the Role of Transnational Corporations in South Africa and Namibia. February.

1983 International Conference on the Alliance Between South Africa and Israel: Centre against Apartheid. Vienna, Austria. 11-13 May. [Southern African liberation movements not including SWAPO].

1983 Second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination: UN. Geneva, Switzerland. 1-12 August [Thomas Nkobi, ANC Treasurer-General].

1984 Conference of Arab Solidarity with the Struggle for Liberation in Southern Africa: Special Committee against Apartheid, Arab League. Tunis, Tunisia. 7-9 August. [Johnny Makatini leads ANC delegation, PAC].

APPENDIX 5.15

NORDIC MULTILATERAL AID TO SOUTHERN AFRICA
(Illustrative)

Response to First Appeal by the Special Committee on
Apartheid, 1964 [Res. 1978 B (XVIII), 16 December 1963]

Sweden	\$200,000	1965 January
Denmark	\$37,000	1965 June
Netherlands	\$27,000	1965 June
India	\$5,250	1964 November
Pakistan	\$5,000	1965 June
Philippines	\$2,500	1965 August
Greece	\$1,000	1965 July

Source: GAOR, XX, Annexes to Agenda Item 36 (Doc A/5957),
para, 31-34.

UN Trust Fund For South Africa

	1965	1968	1969	1980
Australia				\$20,000
Austria		\$5,000		\$38,500
Belgium		\$20,000	\$20,000	\$32,000
Bulgaria		\$2,000		
Brazil		\$2,000	\$2,000	
Cambodia		\$1,000	\$2,000	
Canada		\$9,259		\$17,241
Cyprus			\$240	
Denmark	\$37,000	\$46,933	\$53,209	\$289,986
Finland		\$10,000	\$10,000	\$91,575
France				\$50,000
Ghana		\$1,000	\$1,000	
Greece	\$1,000			\$4,000
Hungary	\$1,750			
Iceland				\$4,000
India	\$5,250			
Iran			\$3,000	
Iraq	\$2,800			
Ireland		\$1,000	\$1,500	
Italy		\$2,500	\$2,500	
Japan			\$10,000	\$20,000
Liberia			\$6,000	
Malaysia	\$5,000	\$1,000	\$1,000	
Mauritania		\$2,100	\$2,100	
Mongolia			\$500	
Morocco		\$2,000	\$3,972	
Nepal			\$500	
Netherlands	\$27,760			\$231,959
New Zealand				\$7,776
Nigeria		\$1,400	\$1,400	
Norway		\$10,000	\$20,000	\$325,336

Pakistan	\$5,000
Philippines	\$2,500
Poland	\$2,000
	\$3,500
	\$2,000

	1965	1968	1969	1980
Sudan		\$1,500		
Sweden	\$200,000	\$50,000	\$96,689	\$466,200
Thailand		\$1,000		
Tunisia			\$3,000	
USA		\$25,000		\$300,000
UAR			\$2,000	
USSR	\$10,000		\$5,000	
Venezuela		\$1,000		
West Germany				\$70,000

Source: Y.U.N. 1965:113; Y.U.N. 1968:124; Y.U.N. 1969:110,111; Y.U.N. 1980:239.

Programme for Education and Training Abroad of South Africans

	1965	1966	1967	1968	1980
Australia					\$33,150
Austria					\$38,500
Belgium					\$31,000
Cambodia			\$1,000	\$1,000	
Canada			\$23,148		\$258,621
Cyprus				\$476	
Denmark	\$37,000	\$80,000	\$196,252	\$80,000	\$453,104
Finland					\$91,575
France					\$115,000
Gabon				\$408	
Greece			\$6,00	\$3,500	\$8,000
Ireland				\$3,500	\$28,409
Italy			\$12,507	\$12,500	\$15,050
Jamaica				840	
Japan		\$20,000	\$40,000	\$20,000	\$400,000
Kenya		\$2,000		\$2,000	
Liberia		\$5,000		\$5,000	
Libya				\$5,000	
Malawi		\$140		\$140	
Netherlands					\$125,960
New Zealand					\$15,552
Norway	\$25,000	\$13,986	\$81,00	\$43,007	\$860,656
Pakistan			\$2,500		
Spain					\$20,000
Sweden	\$30,000	\$80,000	\$110,000	\$80,000	\$303,030
Switzerland					\$21,084
Turkey				\$5,000	
Tanzania			\$1,000	\$980	
Uganda				\$1,400	

UK	\$70,000	\$170,000	\$100,00	\$227,273
USA	\$75,000	\$75,000	\$25,000	\$1,000,000
West Germany				

Source: Y.U.N. 1965:116,117; Y.U.N. 1967:98; Y.U.N. 1968:124;
Y.U.N. 1980:295.

APPENDIX 5.16

NORDIC BILATERAL AID TO SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
(Illustrative)

SWEDEN (millions of kroner)

1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76

PAIGC			15.0	22.0		
FRELIMO			5.0	15.0		
MPLA			3.5	4.0		
ZANU			0.3	0.9		
ZAPU			0.05	0.05		
SWAPO		0.5	0.6	1.3	5.4	
ANC		0.15	0.25	0.8	4.2	
Total	6.8	7.7	12.0	21.0	33.0	52.0
						46.7

1976/77 1977/78 1978/79 1982/1983 1983/84

ZANU					
ZAPU	20.0				
SWAPO	10.0	20.0		47.0	
ANC	8.0	12.0		32.0	32.0
Total	71.3	60.0	48.0		

Source: ACR 1983-84:A253; Leys [1978:65,66]; Mangwende [1979:244,245].

NORWAY (millions of Norwegian kroner)

1974 1976 1977

PAIGC	5.0		
FRELIMO	5.0		
MPLA	1.25		
SWAPO	0.30	1.5	4.2
ZANU	0.10	----	2.0
ZAPU	0.10	----	1.0
ANC (Zimbabwe)	----	1.5	0.45
ANC	----	----	2.0
PAC	----	----	0.65
Black Trade Unions	----	----	1.25
Other	0.25		

Source: Leys [1978:67].

DENMARK (millions of Danish Kroner)
1977/78

SWAPO	1.04
ZANU	0.50
ZAPU	0.50
ANC	0.20
PAC	0.35

Source: Leys [1978:68].

APPENDIX 5.17

THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
PROGRAMME TO COMBAT RACISM ALLOCATIONS 1970-1971

UNITED KINGDOM	ANGOLA	MOZAMBIQUE	
Africa Bureau	\$2,500	MPLA \$20,000	FRELIMO \$ 5,000
Anti-Apartheid M't	\$5,000	GRAE \$20,000	
IDAF	\$3,000	UNITA \$10,000	
PAIGC	\$20,000	ANC's Luthuli Memorial Foundation	\$10,000
SWAPO	5,000	ZAPU	\$10,000
		ZANU	\$10,000

Source: ACR 1970-71:C2226-237.

PROGRAMME TO COMBAT RACISM SPONSORED BY THE
WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
(allocations for 1970-1980)

SWAPO	\$698,500
ANC	\$295,000
PAC	\$162,000
Luthuli Memorial Foundation	\$32,500 (over four years)
SACTU	\$20,000

Source: Sincere 1984:21,22.

APPENDIX 5.18

SUPPORT FOR THE ANC'S DIPLOMATIC OBJECTIVES IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AMONG THE NORDIC STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
(Selected Resolutions)

Res. 2202 A (XXI) 1966

Declaration of Apartheid as a Crime Against Humanity

FAVOUR: Denmark, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden

AGA(~~M~~T): Portugal, South Africa X

ABSTAIN: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States

Source: Y.U.N. 1966:87.

Res. 2506 A (XXIV) 1969

Support for "Freedom Fighters" as Prisoners of War

AGAINST: Australia, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States

ABSTAIN: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, X
Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden

Source: Y.U.N. 1969:109.

Res. 2671 F (XXV) 1970

Declaration of Apartheid a Crime Against Humanity and Support for the Struggle of the People of South Africa "by all available means at their disposal"

AGAINST: Australia, France, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States

ABSTAIN: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Iceland, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden

Source: Y.U.N. 1970:152.

Res 2923 E (XXVII) 1972

Declaration of Apartheid a Crime Against Humanity and Supports the Struggle "by all available means"

AGAINST: Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States

ABSTAIN: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden

Source: Y.U.N. 1972:106.

Res. 31/6 J 1976

Programme of Action Against Apartheid

FOR: Norway

AGAINST: Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States

ABASTAIN: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden

Res. 32/105 J 1977

Declares "the national liberation movement has an inalienable right to continue its struggle for the seizure of power by all available and appropriate means of its choice, including armed struggle"

AGAINST: Belgium, France, West Germany, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States

ABSTAIN: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden

Source: Y.U.N. 1977:171.

Res. 32/105 K 1977

Declaration Proclaims its "full support of the national liberation movement of South Africa, as the authentic representative of the South African people, in its just struggle"

AGAINST:None

ABSTAIN: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States

Source: Y.U.N. 1977:172

APPENDIX 5.19

ANC BIOGRAPHY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Each biographical entry lists the role leading ANC members have had in the development of the ANC's international relations covered in this thesis. In addition to Karis, Carter, and Gerhart [1977a], Lodge [1985], and Gastrow [1987] it is based on obituaries and biographical articles in ANC and SACP publications, and other articles. It does not give complete information about each person, but only provides the background material necessary for a better picture of the person's contribution to the ANC.

DADOO, Yusuf (1909-1983)

Qualified in medicine at Edinburgh University in 1936; joined the CPSA in 1939. Participated in the 1946 Indian passive resistance campaign, and in 1946 elected president of the Transvaal Indian Congress (the successor to the Transvaal British Indian Association founded by Gandhi in 1903), which led to the famous Xuma-Dadoo-Naicker Pact in 1947. In 1947 along with G.M. Naicker went to India where they met with Gandhi. In 1948 elected president of the SAIC and held this position until 1952 when he was banned. In 1948 left SA to lobby delegates at the UN General Assembly in Paris. Elected to Central Committee of the clandestine SACP in 1953. Left SA in 1960 with Tambo and Ronald Segal; was based in London. Awarded the Order of Dimitrov (Bulgaria); Order of Karl Marx (GDR); the Gold Medal (AAPSO); the Scroll of Honour (World Peace Council); the Decoration of the Hungarian Peace Movement, and the Wielki Proletariat from Poland; buried in Highgate Cemetery in London a few feet from the grave of Karl Marx.

GQABI, Joe (1928-1981)

Involved in ANC Youth League; worked as a photographer and journalist for New Age in the 1950s; as a construction worker helped establish a construction union that joined SACTU; worked with the peasants during the Pondoland revolt in 1960; one of the first four Umkhonto cadres sent to China for military training; returned in 1962. Arrested in Rhodesia in 1963 with a group of twenty-eight cadres who were going out for military training. Deported to SA, served twelve years. Completed sentence in 1975. Arrested in December 1976 as part of "Pretoria twelve," stood trial in 1977, but escaped to Botswana; member of the national executive; Chief Representative in Zimbabwe, 1979-1981; assassinated 3 July, 1981.

HADEBE, James.

Singer, musician, teacher in Sotho and Zulu; a former provincial secretary of the ANC in the Transvaal during the 1950s. Attended the Dar es Salaam conference in 1962; left SA in 1963. In 1964 Chief Representative in Dar es Salaam, and later worked in the Cairo office. In April 1968 expelled for "counter-revolutionary activities" after a national executive meeting in Morogoro.

HANI, Chris. Commissar of Umkhonto

Graduated from Fort Hare University College with a B.A. in Latin and English; his uncle was a member of the CPSA and was school friends with Thabo Mbeki who along with Thabo's father, Govan, was to help shape his understanding of Marxism-Leninism; joined ANC Youth League in 1957; assisted SACTU in Cape Town; attended Lobatsi Conference in 1962; left SA in early 1963 for military training abroad. Commissar of the Luthuli Detachment of Umkhonto in the ill-fated Wankie campaign in 1967. He managed to evade the Rhodesian army by escaping over the Botswana border but spent a year in a prison there before returning to Lusaka. His criticisms contributed to the Morogoro Conference. In the 1970s as a political commissar active in Lesotho in the post-Soweto period as the ANC representative where he narrowly escaped several assassination attempts. He was a principal target in the SADF's 1982 Maseru raid and left the country shortly thereafter.

HARMEL, Michael (1915-1974, pseudonym A. Lerumo).

From 1940-46 he was secretary of the Johannesburg District Committee of the Communist Party; on Central Committee in 1943; editor of Inkululeko, Liberation, Johannesburg representative of New Age, and secretary of the Transvaal Peace Council, local branch of the World Peace Council. Launched The African Communist in 1959; leading role in drafting SACP Programme, "The Road to South African Freedom" in 1962; Left SA in 1963 and was based in London.

KASRILS, Ronnie.

Former student at Witwatersrand University; founding member of Umkhonto; left SA in 1963, apparently based in London.

KHUMALO, Vincent (1924-1974)

Early Umkhonto volunteer in 1961; functionary of External Mission; Deputy-Chief Representative in Lusaka part of radio unit broadcasting in Zulu; Chief Representative in Dar es Salaam after Hadebe expelled in 1968.

KOTANE, Moses (1905-1978)

Joined the ANC in 1928 and the SACP in 1929. Attended the Lenin School in Moscow in 1931, when he returned to SA 1933 elected to the SACP's Political Bureau; became Secretary General in 1939 and held this position until his death in 1978. Served on the committee which drafted the ANC "African Claims" document in 1943; joined the national executive in 1946. In 1949 worked with Selby Msimang and Oliver Tambo on drafting "Programme of Action." Attended Bandung Conference in 1955 as an observer on behalf of the ANC. While he was out of the country visited India, Singapore, Egypt, Thailand, Britain, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, France, and China. In 1958 helped draft the ANC's new constitution. At Lobatsi Conference in 1962 Tambo indicated he needed Kotane's assistance in the work of the External Mission, and in 1963 joined Dar es Salaam office as Treasurer-General (replacing Dr. Arthur Letele). Received the Order of Friendship of the Peoples of the USSR in 1975.

KUNENE, Raymond

ANC writer, poet, and activist; representative in London and later Chief Representative for Europe. Member of the Africanist section of the ANC, later changed his name to Mazisi. Now living in the United States.

LA GUMA, Alex (1925-1985)

ANC writer and activist; on staff of New Age (1955-1962); leading part in preparations for the Congress of the People which drew up Freedom Charter; Chief Representative in Havana (1978-1985); Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian Writers' Union, member of the World Peace Council; Awarded the Afro-Asian Permanent Writers Bureau 1969 Afro-Asian Lotus Prize for Literature; awarded Order of Friendship of the Peoples of the USSR.

LETELE, Dr. Arthur (1915-1966)

Treasurer-General (1955-1960); detained during the state of emergency in 1960, subsequently deported from South Africa. Later went to live in Maseru, then moved to the ANC office in Dar es Salaam. Attended the All African People's Conference in Cairo in March 1961. Later represented the ANC traveling to various European countries.

MABHIDA, Moses (1923-1986)

General-Secretary of the SACP (1978-1986), member of the ANC national executive, vice-president of SACTU, commander and commissar of Umkhonto, secretary to the Revolutionary

Council, one of the chairman of the Political Military Council. Mabhida was ordered by SACTU to leave South Africa two days before the ANC and PAC were banned, on 6 April 1960. He escaped through Lesotho to Botswana where, in September 1960 he was flown with other ANC members and refugees to Accra in a special air lift organized by the government of Ghana. He went to work in Prague at the headquarters of the WFTU as the SACTU representative on 30 September, presented the case of South African workers to the ILO and to other international organizations. In 1963, while Mabhida was still attached to the headquarters of the WFTU in Prague, Tambo instructed him to devote himself entirely to Umkhonto's operations, and he then went to work at the ANC's provisional headquarters in Dar es Salaam.

MAKATINI, Johnstone (1932-1988)

First representative in Rabat in 1962; apparently one of the first Natal recruits to Umkhonto to be trained in China; Representative in Algeria from 1964 to 1972 becoming Chief Representative in Algiers in 1966; Chief Representative at UN from 1977; 1983 head of Department of International Affairs until his death in December 1988. As director of International Department divided his time between UN Headquarters in New York and Lusaka. After Kabwe Conference transferred to Lusaka. He was the best French-speaker at the top of the ANC and often visited Francophone countries. Along with Moses Mabhida were the only prominent Zulus on the national executive. Along with Tambo helped organize Okela, a white underground group linked to the ANC, possibly funded from the ANC in Algiers [Africa Confidential 1978c; Lodge 1983:302,341-342].

MAKE, Cassius Make (d. 1987)

Left SA in March 1964 and for many years was in charge of Radio Freedom in Dar es Salaam. Member of the Revolutionary Council, high-ranking commander of Umkhonto and national executive until his assassination in Swaziland in July 1987.

MAKIWANE, Ambose

Brother of Tennyson, suspended from national executive because of attempts to organize "anti-leadership factions" before Morogoro Conference; helped form the ANC African Nationalists.

MAKIWANE, Tennyson (1933-1980)

Arrested in December 1956 as part of the Treason Trial. After his indictment was withdrawn at the beginning of 1959 left South Africa to attend the Afro-Asian Youth Conference in Cairo on behalf of the ANC and then went to London. Became

director of the newly formed Boycott Movement in January 1960 (and then director of the Anti-Apartheid Movement). Became ANC representative in Accra as part of the South African United Front, and was elected to the steering committee of the All-African People's Conference in June 1960; went to Dar es Salaam office after he was expelled from Ghana at the end of 1961. In early 1970s he was Deputy-Director of External Affairs. He was opposed to Morogoro's policy of allowing non-Africans to join the External Mission. His group, based in Algiers, became known as the Maluti faction, its most prominent leader was Robert Resha [ACR 1980-81:B775]. In March 1976 Makiwane travelled on a Zairean passport to Addis Ababa Ethiopia where he announced the new ANC (African Nationalists) was now the "true" ANC which was revoking the 1969 Morogoro decision to admit whites and Indians to the External Mission. Returned to the Transkei and assassinated in Umtata, Transkei in July 1980 under mysterious circumstances [ACR 1980-81:B876-877].

MATOU, Jonas

Early Youth League member who was supposed to be the ANC's other leading diplomat in addition to Oliver Tambo, but assumed a much lower profile in the External Mission than Tambo, Resha, and Makiwane. He eventually represented the ANC in Ghana, Algeria, and Tanzania. The ANC and its allies are reticent to talk about his involvement, perhaps because he became part of the ANC African Nationalist faction.

MARKS, J.B. (1903-1972)

President of African Mine Workers Union (1943-1952); member of the Central Committee of the CPSA and chairman of the Party (1962-1972); member of the ANC's national executive committee since he became president of the Transvaal branch of the ANC since 1950. At SACP's fifth conference in SA in 1962 elected chairman. Instructed by the Central Committee in 1963 to join ANC's Dar es Salaam office. In October 1964 J.B. Marks and Yosuf Dadoo went to India under the auspices of the Indian Association for Afro-Asian Solidarity, the domestic wing of AAPSO which helped to make preparations for the New Delhi office.

MATTHEWS, Joe

Attorney, educated at Fort Hare University College, Cape before graduating in Law; accused in Treason Trial; member of the national executive; president of the ANC Youth League in the 1950s, escaped to Basutoland during the Sharpeville crisis, and became a practicing attorney in Maseru. Became secretary to the Revolutionary Council after Morogoro Conference, but inexplicably resigned from active involvement shortly afterwards.

MAZIMBA, Reddy

ANC's chief representative in East Africa; worked for ANC Department of Education and Culture.

MELI, Francis (Allan Welemtsha Madolwana)

Born (1942) in Cambridge Location, suburb of East London; involved in ANC Youth League and African Students Association. In 1963 after short time at Fort Hare University College instructed by the ANC to study in the GDR; obtained a Ph.D. in History in 1973 for a dissertation of the Comintern submitted to Karl Marx University, Leipzig. Appointed editor of Sechaba in 1977; at Kabwe Conference elected to national executive.

MFENYANA, Sindiso

Head of the ANC's Department of Professional Bodies, and in 1978 when the Department of Education and Culture was formed, became Coordinating Secretary of the department.

MKWAYI, Wilton

Secretary of the African Textile Workers Industrial Union; sent out of the country by 1960; helped organize Umkhonto; arrested in 1964.

MODISE, Joe. Commander in Chief of Umkhonto.

Born (1929) Old enough to have had some experience of political activity during the 1950s. Lived in Sophiatown at that time, worked as a lorry driver, active in the Sophiatown Youth League's efforts to resist the Western Areas removals, helped to organize a clothing workers' union. Following the banning of the ANC after Sharpeville, became a member of Umkhonto and served on high command. First went to Czechoslovakia for military training and then in 1964 to the Soviet Union. At the end of the year returned to Dar es Salaam to take charge of Umkhonto's military personnel abroad. Member of the national executive, after 1983 reorganization Chairman of the ANC's Political Military Council, and after the Kabwe Conference the War Council.

MONGALE, Tony

Chief Representative in Rome (1972-1978); East Berlin (since 1978).

MOOLLA, Moosa

Mid-1950s served as a joint secretary of the Transvaal Indian Youth Congress; became Chief Representative in New Delhi in 1967.

MSIMANG, Maindy. Chief Representative, London.

Formerly ANC education officer, August 1979.

NAICKER, G.M.

President of Natal Indian Congress in 1945; in 1947 accompanied Dadoo to India where they met Gandhi.

NAICKER, M.P. (1920-1977)

A former official of the Natal Indian Congress, and the Natal editor of New Age; detained during the state of emergency in 1960, and again in 1963; acquitted, but arrested and placed under detention in 1964. After his release, escaped through Bechuanaland in 1965 and was appointed external director of Information and Publicity; became the editor of Sechaba when the magazine began publication in 1967. Member of the executive of the International Organization of Journalists; awarded IOJ prize in 1971 and more prestigious Julius Fucik Medal for journalism in 1976

NHLANHLA, J.

Administrative Secretary of the ANC; member of the national executive.

NKobi, Thomas. Treasurer-General

Member of national executive; possibly joined the SACP during the state of emergency in 1960; left SA in April 1963 to join Dar es Salaam office. In 1968 he was appointed Deputy Treasurer of the ANC in exile and increasingly took over the duties of Treasurer-General from Kotane and became Treasurer-General in 1973. He worked for a long time as a laboratory assistant to Alfred Nzo and lived in Alexandria. He joined the ANC earlier than Nzo but like him rose to high office as a result of his role in the 1957 bus boycott. In 1957 he became the ANC's national organizing secretary; inspired by the veteran Communist leaders J.B. Marks and Moses Kotane.

NOKWE, Duma (1927-1978)

Secretary-General of the ANC from 1958 until 1969. Secretary of the Youth League (1953-1958). Along with Walter Sisulu and

a contingent of Youth League members left SA in 1953 to attend the World Youth Festival in Bucharest as guests of the WFDY; travelled to Israel, England, China and the USSR. Permanently left SA in March 1963 with Moses Kotane to join External Mission in Dar es Salaam on instructions from the Umkhonto's national high command. In 1974 led ANC delegation at the UN advocating SA's expulsion; in 1975 appointed Deputy Secretary-General and Director of International Affairs; often lobbied the OAU.

NZO, Alfred (Secretary-General)

Worked and lived in Alexandra during the 1950s and joined the ANC only in 1957; chairman of Alexandra boycott committee. By 1958 member of Transvaal executive; and was subjected to his first banning order in 1959; then house arrest, 238 days in solitary confinement between 1963 and 1964 when he was released left SA on the instructions of the External Mission. Deputy-Representative in Cairo (September 1964-August 1967); Chief Representative New Delhi (September 1967-June 1969); then recalled to provisional headquarters in Morogoro to become Secretary-General; elected to the position at Morogoro Conference the following month. Plays a conspicuous diplomatic role in ANC delegations to Third World events and Communist countries just like former Secretary-General Nokwe did before him.

PILISO, Mzwai

Head of Intelligence and Personnel Department since 1981; member of the SACP; member of national executive at least since 1969; Chief Representative in Cairo (September 1964-August 1967); frequent delegate to AAPSO meetings; author of various pamphlets on African economic problems, apparently special aide to Tambo in the 1980s, but before then an administrator of ANC facilities in ANGOLA.

RESHA, Robert (1920-1973)

Involved in ANC's Defiance campaign and campaign against the destruction of Sophiatown. When Treason Trial over in March 1961 set out to join Tambo as roving ambassador; apparently against his wishes. Chief Representative in Algiers in 1962 (joined by Makatini in 1964); became director of International Affairs in 1966; placed in charge of activity in Europe and North America; member of first ANC delegation to appear before the Special Committee on Apartheid in August 1963; appeared before the Special Political Committee. An ardent African nationalist, Resha was strongly opposed to the decision to admit non-Africans to the External Mission. Died in London an embittered and lonely man. Resha's death precipitated the formation of the ANC African Nationalist faction at his funeral; his wife at that time general

secretary of All Africa Women's Conference based in Algiers joined the national executive of the new faction.

SEPTEMBER, Reg

Trade unionist, leader of the Coloured Peoples Congress; In July 1963, as a result of the Rivonia trial, left SA along with his wife; worked in the Dar es Salaam office for a short time before coming to London in September 1963. Later became Chief Representative in London, and then the representative for Western Europe in the 1970s. Member of the Revolutionary Council.

SLOVO, Joe.

Born in Lithuania, but his parents emigrated to SA in 1935 when he was nine years old; served in the Western Desert during the war and in Italy with the 6th Armoured Division where (apparently) he became familiar with the anti-fascist struggle of the Italian Communist Party; graduated top of his LLB class at Witwatersrand University; barrister of the South African Supreme Court; joined the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) in about 1940 and by 1946 was a branch secretary; helped draft the Freedom Charter; left SA in June 1963, one month before the arrests of his fellow members of the National High Command at Rivonia in July 1963. Helped to draft the Morogoro's "Strategy and Tactics" document. In 1977 moved to Maputo which remained his base (in addition to Lusaka) until March 1984 when the signing of the Nkomati Accord meant he had to leave. Chief of Staff of Umkhonto; member of Revolutionary Council and from 1983 the Politico-Military Council and from June 1985 the War Council and member of the ANC's national executive. Elected chairman (1986) and then secretary-general (1987) of the SACP.

STUART, James.

A Coloured member of Tambo's Presidential Secretariat; based at headquarters in Lusaka; has held offices in the external bureaucracies of both SACTU and the ANC since 1971. Formerly, ANC representative in Madagascar.

TAMBO, Oliver. President

In 1943-4 helped found the ANC Youth League; member of the national executive since 1949; left SA on March 28, 1960 with Ronald Segal three days before the ANC's banning during Sharpeville crisis. In 1967, on the death of Albert Luthuli, he became Acting President-General of the ANC.

THLOOME Dan.

A Orange Free State Trade unionist, secretary of the African Milling Workers' Union and in 1941 vice-president of the

Transvaal Council of Non-European Trade Unions; SACP member since the mid-1930s and later national executive member, by 1941 vice-president of the Transvaal Confederation of Non-European Trade Unions, editor of the SACP's theoretical journal, Liberation in the 1950s, secretary-bookkeeper of the ANC in 1945 and chairman of the ANC's Orlando branch. In 1947 along with J.B. Marks and Gana Makebeni represented South African workers at the Dakar WFTU conference; 1949 elected to ANC national executive; helped plan the 1952 Defiance Campaign, member of the SACP Central Committee at least from 1961, went into exile in 1964, and from the mid-1970s has worked in the offices of Alfred Nzo and Thomas Nkobi.

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