

Malawi And The Politics of Foreign Aid

By: Lemson Samson Chitsamba

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Abstract

Malawi's behaviour in international relations has been interpreted largely in terms of the country's economic needs. The conventional argument has been that the country's foreign and domestic policies were adopted for reasons of making the country attractive to donor countries and organizations. This argument is so prevalent that it is even reflected in the titles of some books and articles on Malawi's post-independence political and economic history. For example, a pamphlet kept by the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) Library is titled: "Malawi: Foreign Policy and Development".

This thesis proceeds on the premise that foreign aid has not been the main objective of Malawi foreign and domestic policies. Accordingly, it looks critically at the alleged link between foreign aid and the country's foreign and domestic policies. It finds that the conventional argument is supported with evidence which is erroneous in many cases or at least partial and tries to show that the effects which the politics of foreign aid have exerted on Malawi are quite different from those which are assumed by the conventional argument.

By contrast, the argument of the thesis is that Malawi's foreign and domestic policies are not the result of the politics of foreign aid. Rather they are the product of the style and perceptions of the country's leadership.

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It would be almost impossible to mention various senior officials and colleagues for helping in various ways. In any case it would be unnecessary to mention them. Enough to say that their help is greatly appreciated and apart from their help none of them bears any responsibility for the study or the manner in which any information has been interpreted in the thesis. Responsibility falls totally on me.

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Chapter One

Introduction

The thesis is a critical examination of the prevailing conviction that the need for foreign aid accounts for Malawi's behaviour in international relations. Therefore, the task in this chapter is to state in detail this argument and indicate how it is to be considered in the subsequent chapters. This exercise is preceded by a discussion of some key concepts which include foreign aid and its political character and effectiveness.

The exercise is also followed by a discussion of the nature of foreign policy, the concept of dependence, and the method of approach to the subject. The nature of foreign policy is discussed largely to indicate the manner in which the foreign policies of African countries are looked at in this thesis. Similarly, the concept of dependence is discussed to indicate the manner in which it is treated in the thesis.

Definition of Foreign Aid

Foreign aid is obviously the key concept in the thesis and requires, therefore, considerable attention.

It consists of many categories such as non-official as opposed to official foreign aid. Not every category of foreign aid will receive attention here. For example, the study will not pay much attention to the non-official aid. This is not to say that Malawi does not receive this type of foreign aid. On the contrary, Malawi receives a lot of non-official, or unofficial, foreign aid. Some of its charity organizations, particularly the Christian Service Committee of the Churches in Malawi (C.S.C.), the Malawi Red Cross Society, and the Lions Club, receive aid from sister charity organizations abroad such as the British OXFAM or Christian Aid or the International Red Cross Committee in Geneva. Such aid is used on small community development projects in the country such as digging boreholes, purchase of school desks, and the construction of youth hostels in towns.

However, this category of foreign aid will not be considered here because it is small in amount compared to the amount of foreign aid which is channeled through the Malawi Government. For example, the C.S.C., which is a sort of non-official aid receiving agency of the country, received in 1979, \$2 million worth of foreign aid which is nothing compared to \$80.6 million of foreign aid which the Malawi Government received from abroad during the same year.¹ Therefore, its omission need not create a serious gap in the thesis.

The category of foreign aid which will be considered is the one which is called official foreign aid. This is the aid which is from one government to another and also consists of two types. One part of it is called food aid and another is called the official development aid or assistance (O.D.A.). Food aid invokes its own politics, the politics of food aid. Though official, it will not receive attention here because Malawi did not receive food aid until early 1988 when it signed a food aid agreement with the United States worth some \$10 million. Similarly, military aid will not be considered because Malawi has hardly received any such aid.

O.D.A. is the type of aid which will receive most attention. This is the largest proportion of all foreign aid which goes to Malawi. It, too, is sometimes categorised into financial and technical aid, a categorisation which is not important at this stage of the discussion. It will be considered as just one category of aid until considerably later in the thesis.

Whatever category one considers, foreign aid, as John White points out, refers to a "heterogeneous collection of transactions".² For example, the term is used to mean loans, grants, donations, and secondment of personnel. However, it has two distinctive features. The first is movement, which is described as a transfer, or a flow, the former being the more accurate description since foreign

aid does not automatically and continuously go to the receiving countries. People have to move the resources, such as books, funds, and vehicles to mention a few from one country to another at intermittent intervals.

The second distinctive feature is concession or the helping element. This is the more important feature and is understood in terms of the way the resource is to be used (strings), repayment period, and the interest to be paid. It is greater when strings are fewer, period is longer, and interest is lower. This is what distinguishes aid from other economic transactions such as financial gifts, commercial loans, and private investment. Bauer's argument that:

"... although the term foreign aid is now so widely used that it would be pedantic to eschew it, either gifts or doles would be preferable on logical grounds as description of these transfers because these words do not prejudge the effects of aid",³

cannot be accepted since unlike gift or dole, all foreign aid carries some strings and a greater proportion of it has to be repaid. Most foreign aid is tied to projects or to procurement of goods from the donor country. Some of it has even to be repaid with interest. For example, Malawi's debt-repayment burden in 1985 amounted to 44 per cent of the country's export revenues. A gift or a dole ceases to be such once it takes on strings such as these.

Therefore, foreign aid is defined here as the transfer of resources on concessional terms. This transfer takes place usually from one government, the donor, to another, the recipient. No doubt, this definition lacks technical precision. The expression, "donor government" and "recipient government", make it worse. This is because some scholars of foreign aid are after precision. For example, White points out that the word, "donor", is misleading since aid includes loans and further argues:

"In our discussion of donors, we narrowed the focus from donor countries and their general interest vis-a-vis developing countries, to donor agencies and their specific interests vis-a-vis other institutions. Similarly in a discussion of recipients, it is necessary to narrow the focus from the interest of developing countries in improving their standard of living - rather their composite and conflicting interests in this respect - to recipient institutions and their specific interests vis-a-vis other elements of poor countries "societies"

This suggestion is, indeed, followed up by Andrew Hewitt and Jonathan Kydd.⁴ Apparently, the point is that one has to be precise about who receives or gives aid. This presupposes that the giving of aid is as important an activity to the aid givers as is the receiving of aid to the aid receivers. White seems to see a symmetry of aid

institutions or aid handling processes between the givers and the receivers of aid; that is he assumes the existence of an aid-handling agency in each development country. However, there seems in reality to be no such symmetry of aid institutions or aid-handling process because aid fostering is an important activity to developing countries. An asymmetry of aid institutions, or aid-handling processes, is the order of the day between the givers and the receivers of aid.

On the one hand, many aid givers disburse most of their aid through one governmental agency such as the British Overseas Development Administration (O.D.A.), United States Agency for International Development (U.S.A.I.D.), or Canadian International Development Agency (C.I.D.A.). On the other hand, many aid receivers get aid through a couple of government departments. For example, in Malawi, a number of government departments including the Treasury, the Department of Economic Planning and Development and the Ministry of Justice, to name a few, are involved in the process of handling foreign aid. The same is probably the case in many other aid receiving countries.

In short, White's suggested precision is unnecessary. The practice varies. The definition is adequate in so far as it indicates the subject to be considered. Therefore, the expression, "donor country" will be used in this study interchangeably with the expression, "donor government" as also will the expression, "recipient country" be used interchangeably with the expression, "recipient government".

The Political Character of Foreign Aid

Despite their heterogeneous nature, these concessional resource transfers have attracted considerable attention in terms of whether they are political or humanitarian. The controversy has lingered on for some time and is unlikely to be resolved because of the heterogeneous nature of these transfers.

The expression, "the politics of foreign aid", in the title of the thesis indicates the direction into which popular opinion has merely swing on this question these days. "By its nature, however, aid is highly political" says Guy Arnold who, struck by a disparity between negligible development on the ground and the amounts of foreign aid which have poured into Africa, goes on to assert that foreign aid "is now big business, whether it solves problems of development is another matter."⁵ The "basic long range goal", says L. D. Black, "is political" and "is not for economic development per se." The current literature on foreign aid is littered with the assumption that foreign aid is political. In short, foreign aid is said to be not humanitarian but political.

The political character of foreign aid is assumed to be influenced by selfish motives on the part of foreign aid donors. "Donor countries" says Arnold, for example, "provide aid for reasons of self-

interest."⁷ "The reasons that Egypt gets so much", pointed out the Economist, "is that the Carter administration established at the time of the Camp David Agreement in the late 1970s that Egypt should be regarded by getting roughly as much as Israel."⁸ A West German Minister also told a Malawian audience that his Government "provides developmental aid on the basis of moral responsibility as well as on the basis of far-sighted political considerations."⁹ Perhaps an American President expressed the point better. He said:

"Let us remember that the main purpose of aid is not to help other nations, but to help ourselves."¹⁰

In short, foreign aid, is said to be political because donors are said to provide it for their own selfish motives. Therefore, the politics of foreign aid refer to intrigues, or selfish motives, for which donors provide aid.

However, the self-interest argument, is an exaggeration. Not every item of foreign aid is provided on the basis of the donor's self-interest. Moreover, it is not easy to associate selfish motives with every instance of foreign aid such as Band Aid and the British emergency food distribution to the starving masses in Ethiopia in 1985. Vincent Cable makes a detailed dissent to this self-interest argument. He writes:

"But this effort tends to detract from the problems of the majority of human beings in developing countries, and a large majority of the poorest, who live in rural areas in a small number of populous Asian countries. It is not obviously a British national interest to assist in alleviating this distress. The absolute poor scarcely impinge on the government of their own countries let alone on the international order. If there is a case for the British Government to be more involved in alleviating their poverty it is in the first instance a moral one, it is best not to pretend otherwise."¹¹

This is definitely a powerful anti-self-interest argument. It emphasises the point that not all foreign aid is political. Some of it is humanitarian.

This thesis assumes a political character to the foreign aid which is to be considered for two reasons. The first is that there is no intention to settle the question of whether foreign aid is humanitarian or political. As a result, the motives for which donors are said to give foreign aid to Malawi are taken for granted. No effort is made to investigate them. For example, the thesis does not look into the reasons for which the World Bank, or West Germany, gives foreign aid to Malawi. Such motives are assumed to be political in keeping with the manner in which Malawi's behaviour in international relations is often explained. The point is

to see if foreign aid has, indeed, exerted the sort of influence which it is said to have had on Malawi.

The second reason is that the thesis is concerned with official foreign aid which is part of government activities. As such, it is reasonable to expect it to be influenced by, from time to time, the political character of government. For example, a recipient government may accept a certain amount of foreign aid simply to demonstrate that it really wants to maintain friendly relations with a particular donor government although it may, at the same time, have been offered a similar amount of foreign aid on better terms elsewhere. Similarly, a donor country may feel that it should promote its exports abroad through use of its aid. For example, a British Minister was quoted as saying: "...it is right at the present time to give greater weight in the allocation of our aid to political, industrial, and commercial considerations alongside our basic developmental objectives".¹² In other words, the category of foreign aid under consideration is deemed political also because governments try, from time to time, to make some political gain out of it.

The foregoing does not mean that foreign aid is deemed political more or less as writers like Arnold do. What it means is that governments try to make political gains out of aid regardless of whether the aid was, in the first instance, disbursed for selfish motives. Clearly, this is different from saying that aid is provided for

self-interest reasons. It does not exclude the possibility that aid is in some cases provided as a matter of routine or the possibility that aid is also provided in the first instance for reasons other than selfish motives.

In short, the type of foreign aid under consideration is assumed to be political partly because it makes it easier to examine the sort of influence which foreign aid is said to have had on Malawi and partly because it is true that governments try, from time to time, to make political gains out of aid. It is only in this limited sense that the thesis will attribute a political character to the type of foreign aid under consideration.

Foreign Aid Effectiveness

Similarly controversial is the question of foreign aid effectiveness. Discussion of effectiveness or lack of it presupposes that foreign aid has the power to enable one to realize one's objectives. Such an assumption reflects the popular belief that money is power or that money can buy anything. The controversy has arisen because it is by no means certain that foreign aid has, indeed, such a power.

The expression "foreign aid effectiveness" has two aspects. One of them is utility. The power of foreign aid to cause anything is obviously not important per se. What is important is the power of foreign aid to bring about something which is desired. For example, in the medical field, any medication is

regarded as ineffective if it does not cure a patient even though it may cause other effects in the patient. Similarly foreign aid is not effective if it does not enable a donor, or a recipient, to achieve its objectives.

The foregoing means that foreign aid can bring about two sets of effects or influences. These are unintended and intended effects. The latter are clearly instances of foreign aid effectiveness. Their identification requires an advance knowledge of the objectives for which foreign aid is provided or accepted. This is indeed appreciated in project evaluation. For example, the USAID insists on defining clearly the objectives of any project for which it is called upon to finance.¹³

The other important aspect is complexity. A little reflection shows that the concept covers a very wide scope. It can be political, economic, humanitarian, or commercial depending on the context in which it is to be considered. This means that it is necessary to specify the foreign aid effectiveness with which one is concerned. Obviously economists are concerned with foreign aid's economic effectiveness while foreign policy analysts at least ought to be concerned with foreign aid's political effectiveness.

It may be contended whether it is indeed necessary to specify the foreign aid effectiveness with which one is concerned. The answer is, yes. Failure to do so gives

the misleading impression that one is concerned with foreign aid effectiveness in all these aspects; economic, political, humanitarian, and commercial. Moreover, the political objectives for which foreign aid is sometimes said to be disbursed can contradict the economic objectives for which a recipient country may receive foreign aid. Certainly, foreign aid which is intended to prevent a recipient country from industrializing should not be expected to promote economic development in the recipient country. Thus there is a case for specifying the foreign aid effectiveness with which one is concerned.

The debate which is currently going on among the foreign aid experts illustrates the problems which arise out of the failure to recognize the complexity of the concept. The talk is simply about foreign aid effectiveness. "Is foreign aid effective?" or, to put the question in the terms in which it is expressed, "does foreign aid work"? Bauer probably provoked the controversy when he argued that "foreign aid is plainly not indispensable to economic progress, and is indeed likely to obstruct it", an argument the last part of which raises doubts about foreign aid economic effectiveness.¹⁴ On the other hand, Robert Cassen has argued that a greater proportion of foreign aid has been effective, an argument which also implies that foreign aid works.¹⁵

These arguments by Bauer and Cassen need to be read with care because they can be quite misleading: not that

both Bauer and Cassen are misquoted here but that these arguments can be interpreted several ways. For example, Cassen's argument can be interpreted as meaning that foreign aid has also been politically effective while it is actually intended to mean only that foreign aid has been economically effective; that is, it has brought about some desired economic results. Indeed Cassen's argument is based partly on a study which enquired whether foreign aid has promoted economic development in Malawi.¹⁶

Obviously foreign aid political effectiveness is what is of relevance to this thesis. This is often taken for granted and sometimes even exaggerated by many writers. For example, on the 40th Anniversary of the United Nations, an American Senator was quoted as saying:

"Twenty years ago, Washington decided to open an Embassy in every new nation. A fine gesture, but it did not improve America's standing with all those nations. It would do no harm to close a few of them. Let these governments pick up their foreign aid not in their capital cities, but at the U.S. Mission in New York. It would provide an opportunity to talk politics off the floor as we say in the Senate".¹⁷

The passage was part of the Senator's suggestion on how to make the United Nations less anti-United States. It provides incidentally a good contrast between the potency

of foreign aid, the new instrument of foreign policy, and the potency of diplomacy, the old instrument of foreign policy. The Senator clearly believes that foreign aid is the more effective instrument especially if it can be used in the manner he suggests.

Statements which reflect such faith in the potency of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy abound. For example, James McManus, reported:

"Both the Foreign Office and airline are aware of the threat, but for the moment, it is felt unlikely that the Zimbabwean leader will take such drastic action as banning British Airways from his airspace.

One reason is that British aid is running at £16 million a year and the military training team is providing invaluable service to the Zimbabwe National Army".¹⁸

Foreign aid is here expected to make President Mugabe unable to fulfill his threat.

The American Senator and McManus both had in mind the behaviour of the recipient governments. However, other writers go beyond that. They believe that foreign aid can influence even the behaviour of the general public in the recipient countries. For example, Dr. N. McMaster claimed:

"Delay was, I feel, part of the tragedy of the failure of Professor Lule's Provisional Government after the fall of Amin. While outsiders waited for evidence of success before giving aid, many within the country vainly awaited manifestations of such support. Thus mutual failure was half-anticipated."¹⁹

The expression, "many within the country", is ambiguous; it could mean Ugandans or foreign diplomats who were resident in Uganda then. McMaster obviously meant the Ugandan public because the gist of his article was that had the donor countries then indicated levels of foreign aid commitments to Uganda, the Ugandans would have supported Professor Lule's Provisional Government. How this might have enabled Professor Lule's Government to survive opposition from the tanzanian troops who were in the country' capital, Kampala, at that time, is for McMaster to say, but the point of interest here is his belief that foreign aid would have had such an effect even on the Ugandan public.

In other words, many writers firmly believe in the potency of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy. The assumption is that foreign aid is politically effective, that is, that it brings about desired political outcomes.

Though relevant, foreign aid political effectiveness per se is not the main concern of this thesis. There is no intention to enquire whether foreign aid is indeed politically effective. Such an exercise would require knowledge of donor political objectives. Therefore, the concern here is with foreign aid impact. For example, the thesis looks at the impact which foreign aid is said to have had on Malawi. Foreign aid political effectiveness will be of concern only as one of the assumptions underlying the issues which are to be examined in the thesis.

The Concept of Dependence

Faith in the potency of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy now lies at the heart of a perspective, or framework, of political analysis called, "dependence". Now a portion of international politics is explained in terms of dependence. This was first cast in general economic terms and evidence in support it is sought from various aspects of economics such as international trade, foreign investment, and foreign aid. However, some writers are now putting emphasis on foreign aid. For example, writing about the "North-South Dialogue", which is about relations between the developed and the developing countries, Arnold believes that foreign aid is the major ingredient of the "Dialogue".²⁰ Neil Richardson also suggests that "foreign aid may be the leading edge of dependence, nurturing a more malignant form of the syndrome."²¹ Leon Gordenker correctly

interprets views of certain writers as meaning that "foreign aid establishes a dependent relationship".²² In other words, foreign aid is seen by some writers as the cornerstone of dependence.

The concept has found favour in Africa where a concept of neo-colonialism which has a similar meaning has long been in use. Each concept is used to mean that the sovereignty of the African states is not real, but is something of an illusion because relations between the African states and the former colonial powers remain basically the same. It is true that there are some minor differences between the two concepts. Neo-colonialism is a political concept and refers, at least in terms of how its author, the late President Nkrumah of Ghana, sometimes used it, to attempts by the former colonial powers to subvert the sovereignty of their former colonies. On the other hand, dependence is a socio-economic concept, that is a concept which is meant to cover economic, cultural and political issues. It posits a dominant/subordinate relationship. However, the two concepts are now used practically as synonyms.

Malawi is one of those countries which are taken as excellent examples of dependence. "There are several African countries", says Gerald Helleiner, (among them Rwanda, Burundi, Niger, Upper Volta, Somalia, and even such countries as Malawi and Tunisia) with an extraordinary degree of dependence.²³ Kathryn Morton, indeed,

examines Malawi's relations with Britain in terms of aid and dependence.

Though popular, the dependence perspective has many flaws. The first is vagueness. Indeed, Bauer summarily dismisses its "sister-concept", neo-colonialism, on the ground that it obscures rather than illuminates issues.²⁴ The various ways by which dependence has been defined illustrate his point. for example, Christopher Hill defines it as "the undoubted fact that those countries that are without hope of escaping from poverty or low international status share a very real condition of reliance on the developed world".²⁵ This definition contains the element of poverty which is also emphasized by Gerald Helleiner who says that "one may well wonder whether the word "dependence" adds anything to one's understanding of the Third World's essential dilemma of poverty and powerlessness."²⁶ To Christopher Hill and Helleiner, at least, dependence and poverty are synonyms.

On the other hand, Joel Gregory, defines dependence as "the result of unequal relationship where the weaker of the parties is dominated by the stronger."²⁷ The element of poverty is absent and "unequal relationship" is posited as the important element of dependence. White similarly leaves out poverty and defines dependence as a condition of constraint in which the "dependent" power is unable to make certain domestic choices within some

recognized and conventionally accepted range of options, unless some sort of permissive or enabling action is taken by the dominant power, and in which such constraints are very unevenly distributed between the two."²⁸ The important element in this regard is not poverty or unequal relationship but unevenly "distributed constraints." This reads like a summary of what Neil Richardson calls "asymmetrical interdependence" which he equates with dependence.²⁹ Dos Santos, a leading exponent of concept, defines it as "a situation in which the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which the former is subjected."³⁰ Here, the important element is "situation".

In short, dependence is said to be "poverty", "unequal relationship", "unevenly distributed constraints", "asymmetrical interdependence", and "situation", terms some of which are themselves vague. Other definitions which have not been quoted here put emphasis on "structural rigidities" or "imbalance". If dependence is each one of them, what exactly is its meaning?

The second flaw is that features of dependence manifest themselves also in the relations among the developed countries themselves. For example, a British Econometric Forecasting Association, recently predicted that "a sharp dollar depreciation would cut economic growth in Britain".³¹

This is because, as Lord Cromer was also to explain later, the "Smithsonian Accord of 1973 endows one national currency, the U.S. dollar, with the role of benchmark against which the market value of all other national currencies should be measured."³² Perhaps Enoch Powell, in a more exaggerated sense, recently made a similar observation. He wrote:

"On September 21 this year the American Government issued summons to the finance Ministers of three European nations and Japan to attend a meeting at 24 hours' notice to receive instructions. Without exception they dropped whatever they were doing - the British Chancellor of the Exchequer dashed from an E.E.C. financial conference at Strasbourg - flew to Washington. There they were told that the value of the dollar against their respective currencies was too high and that unless they took immediate steps to reduce it, the United States would retaliate by penalizing, or excluding their exported goods. Without a murmur they submitted and filed out".³³

Such an observation uncomfortably suggests that the concept is also applicable to relations between the developed countries themselves. Indeed, Dudley Seers expressed this view. He wrote:

"No European can fail to hear some echoes in dependency of our problems. While structural

rigidities are not the same as in Latin America, they are conspicuous here too - especially in countries geographically on the periphery of Europe, such as Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey, but also to some extent Finland, Britain, and Italy. Such rigidities have been evidenced as in Latin America - though not quite so drastically - by chronic inflation and persistent deficits. Moreover, these countries are increasingly dependent on the core of Europe and all, even the most advanced, have been heavily penetrated by foreign based transnational cooperations."³⁴

However, to apply the concept to relations between the developed countries, as Seers implied, is to defeat the very purpose for which the concept is advocated; that is to distinguish relations between the developing and the developed countries from relations between the developed countries. Therefore, the other problem with the application of the concept is the arbitrariness in which it has to be applied.

Finally, the third difficulty which the application of the concept of dependence also raises in practice, is that it overlooks competition among the developed countries. The validity of the concept requires one to visualize relations in totality between the developed countries, on one hand, and the developing countries, on the other. For example, Jan Jorgensen talks about the

Ugandan economy as being "subordinate to world economy"³⁵ while Christopher Hill talks about the poor countries as having reliance on the "developed world". However, this gives the false impression that the world consists of a "developed economy" interacting with a "developing economy". The developing economy is then seen either in totality or in its parts to be dependent on the developed economy for a host of things, particularly foreign aid. Seen in that context, there is indeed much to be said for the concept.

However, the real world is different. Some developing countries, particularly those in Asia and Africa, are geographically remote to the developed countries. While this is a disadvantage in terms of copying and adoption of modern technology, the distance actually gives them, certainly the developing countries in Africa and Asia, some freedom of action. They can change at least from one donor to another with relative ease. For example, Somalia shifted its friendship from the Soviet Union to the United States in 1977 and Egypt similarly not only chased out hundreds of Soviet Union advisers after the 1973 Arab/Israeli War but also began to receive massive United States foreign aid after the conclusion of the Camp David Agreement in 1978. Very few Latin American countries can do so without risking American military intervention. In other words, the relative remoteness of the African countries from the

major powers, makes the African friendship available to the highest bidder.

Moreover, the developed world is not monolithic. It consists of a number of economies which fiercely compete with each other. This also means some freedom of action for each developing country. Indeed, it explains why the Cuban sugar industry has survived years of American embargo and also accounts for the "economic miracles" of Taiwan and South Korea, and the up-coming ones of Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, events and possibilities which cannot be accounted for in terms of the concept of dependence.

In short, dependence is here also dismissed as a vague concept which is arbitrarily applied and which overlooks competition among developed countries. This is not a novel conclusion. Sanjay Lall makes the same argument. He wrote:

"we conclude, therefore, that the concept of dependence as applied to less developed countries is impossible to define and cannot be shown to be casually related to a continuance of underdevelopment. It is usually given an arbitrarily selective definition which picks certain features of a much broader phenomenon of international capitalist development, and its selectivity only serves to misdirect analysis and research in this area."³⁶

This is the manner in which neo-colonialism, or dependence, will be treated in this thesis.

Some Views About the Foreign Policies of African States

Since foreign aid is seen to bestow a dependence status upon its recipients, it follows that the developing countries are "dependence states". This in turn raises the question of whether the foreign policies of such states are really foreign policies. One conception of the foreign policies of African states indeed has it that the policies are not foreign policies in the conventional sense, but are merely declaratory because a disparity is said to exist between the "operational" and "declaratory" levels of these policies.³⁷ Peter Calvert even goes so far as to say that the foreign policy of a developing country is an illusion.³⁸ By "declaratory policy" is meant a policy which is a mere "pronouncement", or a mere expression, of national aspirations which is not supported by deeds or actions. The corollary of this is that the foreign policies of the non-African states are foreign policies in the conventional sense because their "declaratory" and "operational" levels are said to match. The "declaratory" argument, in other words, claims that it is only the stated intentions of African Governments which are in most cases not matched with action in foreign affairs.

It is true that the "declaratory" level of the foreign policies of some African states sometimes falls

short of the operational level. One has only to go by some of the statements which some African states make particularly in multilateral fora like the United Nations General Assembly or the Assembly of Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.). However, Malawi has been a challenge to this "declaratory" conception of the foreign policies of African States. This is because it has matched its stated intentions with deeds. As a result, there has been a difference of opinion on whether its foreign policies are merely "declaratory." McMaster, despite the title of her thesis on Malawi's foreign relations, clearly thought that they are "declaratory". For example, she wrote:

"Dr. Banda's foreign policy, using policy here in the sense of his preferences about the direction and manner in which Nyasaland's foreign relations should develop, and his pronouncements about situations within the international system was an integral part of his concept of national interest."³⁹

Indeed, the appropriate title of her study ought to be; "Malawi: Declaratory Policy and Development." On the other hand, the supervisor of her thesis held the opposite view. For example, he wrote about Malawi's external relations:

"...unlike the situation elsewhere, however, there is a fairly close alignment between the operational and declaratory levels at which policy is conducted,

between, that is, what the state does on a day-to-day basis and President Banda's more general pronouncements about external relations."⁴⁰

The supervisor's observation is correct. The existence of the Malawi Embassy in Pretoria, the South African Embassy in Lilongwe, and the 1966 Malawi/South Africa trade agreement are all evidence that Malawi has matched its declared intentions with deeds. McMaster's own thesis, despite her argument, is, in a sense, also evidence that Malawi's policies are not mere "pronouncements" since the thesis is about Malawi's dealings with the Portuguese who were in Mozambique, with South Africa, with Rhodesia, and with Malawi's other neighbours.

However, the point in this chapter is not that Malawi's policies are different from those of other African countries but that the concept of "a declaratory policy" is not a sound one. The concept raises the question whether the disparity between the "declaratory and the operational" levels of policy is evident only in the foreign policies of African states. The answer has obviously to be in the negative because disparities between the "operational" and the "declaratory" levels of policy are also evident in the foreign policies of many non-African states. For example, Henry Kissinger, in reference to the Soviet Union told the United Nations General Assembly:

"We shall pursue the relaxation of tensions on the basis of strict reciprocity. We know the difference

between posturing and policy; we will not encourage the belief that anyone can benefit from artificial tensions."⁴¹

This was clearly a reference to a disparity in the "declaratory" and the "operational" levels of the foreign policy of even the Soviet Union. It might be contended that such disparities are observed more in connection with the foreign policies of African states than in connection with the policies of non-African states. However, to do so is to beg the further question of an acceptable criterion on the basis of which such judgment can be based. How is one to come to that conclusion? Therefore, the view which is entertained in this thesis is that the "declaratory" concept is unnecessary and is arbitrarily applied to the foreign policies of African states.

Another conception of the foreign policies of African states has it that those policies are not foreign policies in the conventional sense but are "mere pronouncements" made for domestic consumption. John Howell observed that "it would appear that where foreign policy issues touch directly on primary Kenyan interests - say national security, national development - the overt radicalism of Kenya's broad international policy is subjected to considerable restraint." This observation is often cited as supporting evidence of this conception of the foreign policies of African states."⁴² Its corollary is that the foreign policies of non-African states are formulated

and implemented without domestic considerations. This view of African policies probably accounts in part for the foreign aid interpretation of Malawi's behaviour in international relations. This is because such a view implies that scholars should concentrate their attention on the domestic factors of the foreign policies of African states.

Like the "declaratory argument", this conception also raises the question of whether domestic considerations are a feature peculiar to the foreign policies of African states. This again is a question which can be settled only on the basis of an acceptable criterion, the absence of which gives rise to the same charge of arbitrariness. This is because domestic considerations also enter into the formulation and implementation of the foreign policies of non-African states. For example, President Carter's human rights foreign policy was clearly an attempt to assure the American public that American values are not neglected in the formulation and implementation of the country's foreign policies.⁴³ To take another example, President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union said:

"I strive naturally, for the essence, the main directedness of the Soviet state's foreign policy to be understood better. Like the foreign policy of any state, it is determined first of all by internal requirements."⁴⁴

Moreover, one would expect the opposite to be probably the case with regard to the foreign policies of

African states. The said "mere pronouncements" on international issues are made by the African leaders probably for external consumption. This is because, with a high rate of illiteracy, a much smaller section of the public in most of the African states would really understand such things as "non-alignment" or the "East/West confrontation." Therefore, the conception exaggerates the importance of domestic factors in the formulation and implementation of the foreign polices of African states.

Finally, still another conception of the foreign policies of African states has it that the foreign policies of African states are not foreign policies in the conventional sense because the African states are, allegedly, not in a position to influence the "external environment". John White summarized the argument better.

He wrote:

"In general, it is characteristic of relatively weak countries that they must take the composition of their external environment as given. The Government, operating in the field of external relations, has to use as best it can those elements of which the external environment happens willy-nilly to be composed. As conventionally understood, changing or sustaining the external environment is the aim of foreign policies. They have policies for manipula-

ting the way in which the external environment encroaches upon the domestic."⁴⁵

This passage raises an interesting question concerning the difference between "changing" and "manipulating" the external environment. Apparently, there is a difference between the two. Its disarming expressions are "as conventionally understood" and "In this conventional sense." It is by no means clear what White meant by these expressions. By them, he was probably referring to the opinions of certain scholars of foreign policy. Probably among them were those of Rosenau who, in one of his works, says that "attempts to exercise control over the environment constitute" foreign policy⁴⁶ and also says, in another of his works, that foreign policy is "the authoritative actions which Governments take or are committed to take, in order either to preserve the desirable aspects of the international environment, or alter its undesirable aspect."⁴⁷ The expressions, "the environment" and "the international environment" reflect the assumption of an external environment operating uniformly irrespective of whether it is a weak or strong state. Rosenau repeats this in his more elaborate definition of foreign policy. He wrote:

"Such an enumeration seems best begun with the premise that at the heart of foreign policy is a concern with sequences of interaction, perceptual and behavioural, which span national boundaries and which

unfold in three basic stages. The first or initiatory stage involves the activities, conditions, and influences - human and non-human - that stimulate national actors to undertake efforts to modify circumstances in their external environments. The second or implementative stage consists of the activities, conditions, and influences, through which the stimuli of the initiatory stages are translated into purposeful actions directed at modifying objects in the external environment. The third, or response stage denotes the activities, conditions, and influences that comprise the reaction and the objective of the modification attempts. The three stages so defined encompass reflectively the independent, intervening, and dependent variables of foreign policy analysis."⁴⁸

As a definition of foreign policy, it is a poor demarcation of the subject matter. True to the prevailing belief that such entities as Lonrho, or the Mobil Oil Company, are also important actors on the international scene, it does, indeed, blur the importance of governmental decisions and encompass almost everything which criss-crosses the national boundaries. However, foreign policy is a governmental activity and cannot properly be understood without attaching importance to governmental decisions. What followed the death of 35 Italian football fans after a stampede in 1985 by English football fans in Belgium was, indeed a sequence of interaction which spanned

almost all the international boundaries in Western Europe. However, one is also struck by the ease and swiftness with which the British Government decided to let a group of some of the English football fans face trial in a court of a foreign power. No doubt this was possible for the House of Lords to do because the Foreign and Commonwealth Office obviously had nothing to do with the incident in the first place. One only needs to contrast this with what the Green Peace incident affecting New Zealand and France led to. The latter was clearly a foreign policy matter.

The definition will receive further attention later. At the moment, the point relates to the assumption in the passage of an external environment operating uniformly with respect to each state and overpoweringly to small states, an argument which is expressed more forcefully by Christopher Clapham who writes:

"At one extreme, there are states such as Swaziland or Lesotho which are so closely tied to South Africa that they are scarcely in a position to have a foreign policy at all..."⁴⁹

Though forceful, this argument overlooks frequent complaints by some Western powers against the politicization of some specialized international organizations allegedly by the developing countries and the adverse economic consequences of the activities of the oil-

exporting countries' cartel for the past decade. Plainly, it was a handful of African states which really brought about the collapse of the Portuguese empire world-wide in the middle of the 1970s. Such profound changes in the external environment brought about by the weak states can only be overlooked to satisfy biased analysis of foreign policy. Moreover, the argument is a sad retrogression on an issue in foreign policy analysis which was thoroughly dealt with by Harold and Margaret Sprout in their article, "Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics."⁵⁰ It is so in so far as it implies that the external environment operates the same way with respect to each state. It raises anew the question of the definition of the environment and its relevance in decision making.

The view subscribed to in this thesis is that of the Sprouts, which in simple terms says that the importance of environmental factors in decision making consists of two parts.⁵¹ The first part is a set of factors, physical as well as cultural, which environs, or surrounds, the decision makers of a state or institution. The factors could be lack of access to the sea or the existence of an obnoxious regime in a neighbouring country. The Sprouts call the set of such factors, "operational environment." The other part is the decision maker's perceptions of their operational environment. The importance of the environment in decision-making comes only when the "operational environment" is perceived by the decision makers and after having been perceived is

taken account of in the decision-making process. The question of perception will receive attention latter, but it is important to note that what the Sprouts mean, in essence, is that the importance of environmental factors in decision-making is largely a matter of human judgment.

The foregoing means that the importance of environmental factors in decision-making can sometimes be overlooked or down-played by the decision makers. It also means that the "operational environment" varies in relation to each state. The existence of Apartheid in South Africa is clearly an important environmental factor for Lesotho, Swaziland, and, indeed, many other countries in Southern Africa. On the other hand, the existence of Lesotho is itself an important environmental factor for South Africa because Lesotho, so long as it exists, is a potential operational base of African Nationalist guerrillas against Apartheid in South Africa. Such environmental factors are not strictly speaking important to the United States, or the Soviet Union, and are not of their making.

The foreign policies of the United States and the Republic of China (Taiwan), illustrate the point better. On the face of it, both countries are committed to fighting Communism. However, a close look at the objectives of their foreign policies shows an interesting difference between the attitudes and goals of the two countries towards communism. The United States is

committed to eradicating communism per se wherever it is whereas Taiwan is committed to eradicating only Chinese Communism. Were the Mainland Chinese to give up communism, Taiwan would see its present anti-communism crusade as having come to an end while the United States would see its present anti-communism crusade as having come to an end only after communism had been eradicated everywhere in the world.⁵²

In short, the external environment varies with respect to each state. This is because it has partly to do with local circumstances for each state. To paraphrase Bertrand Russell's "qualitative description of Epstein's law of gravitation", each state finds its own external environment.⁵³

The thesis regards the foreign policies of African states as foreign policies in the conventional sense. Accordingly, it treats Malawi's foreign policies as foreign policies and not as illusions, or mere pronouncements of the country's President. Naturally this raises the question of the definition of foreign policy. How then is the nature of foreign policy to be understood in this thesis? The expression, "foreign policy", includes two words each of which is not easy to explain. However, to simplify matters, by "foreign" is meant here anything which has to do with whatever is beyond a country's national borders. This leaves policy which is the more difficult word to define. One thing to say about it, is

that it has to do with problems or issues. This is because it is problems, or issues, which raise the need for policy. In the case of foreign policy, problems or issues are sometimes called the external stimuli or even the operational environment. In short policy has to do with problems, particularly in government which is largely a problem solving oriented institution.

For example, in government the operational slogan is: "better any decision than no decision."⁵⁴ In fact, policy is simply another term for decision, or a term for a certain type of decision. As Hilsman emphasises: "what is decided is policy."⁵⁵ Where there are decisions in government, there may be policy or policies, but certainly there is no policy where there are no decisions in government.

However, not every decision is policy. Some decisions merely explain how something or how certain things should be done. Such decisions are guidelines or operational procedures. Policy is that decision of the government which demands certain action. It involves choice in that it permits certain activities at the same time that it forbids, or shuns, others and sometimes has explicit objectives which are defined in reference to a problem. Therefore, foreign policy is a government decision which demands the performance of certain activities in relation to a country's operational environment.

The "Foreign Aid Argument"

Some writers explain Malawi's behaviour in international relations on the basis of the country's need for foreign aid. Their focus is on foreign aid and the country's foreign and domestic policies are seen as resulting from the country's need for foreign aid in order to achieve development. Implicit in all this are the assumptions that foreign aid is politically effective and that development is an overriding priority of the Malawi Government. In a nutshell, this is the "foreign aid argument" which is to be considered in this thesis. It posits a link between the politics of foreign aid and Malawi's foreign and domestic policies.

The argument is so prevalent that it permeates almost all post-independence political literature on Malawi. "The emergence of one of the most conservative political regimes in Africa in the 1960's from a country with one of the most militant nationalist movement", says John McClacken, "took place because of Malawi's dependence on the south",⁵⁶ a point which is also maintained by Speck who says "that Malawi has been increasingly attracted into the southern orbit is a result, above all else, of economic factors".⁵⁷ "As he saw it", says Derek Ingram about the President of Malawi, "the only hope of improving his people's lot was to cooperate with the White South."⁵⁸ The list of such arguments can easily be extended.

It is true that the arguments in the foregoing paragraph attribute economic motive to Malawi's behaviour in the Southern African regional politics. However, emphasis is often placed on foreign aid. For example, Henry Richardson claims that Malawi was attracted by South African offers of foreign aid. He writes:

"It is orchestrating its expanding influence with a subtle harmony of technical assistance, liberal trade arrangements, soft loans and massive propaganda efforts punctuated by an occasional threatening blast of military retaliation under the guise of rigorous and consistent anti-communism. To a small nation in urgent need of vital resources, it is a siren's song not easily resisted."⁵⁹

This emphasis on foreign aid is centred on Malawi's new capital city project. The argument is that Malawi turned to the south in order to get South African foreign aid for the construction of its new capital city. It seemed to the President, says Philip Short, "that the only country which might be willing to take the risk of this magnitude, if he could offer enough in return, was South Africa which badly needed a breakthrough in its outward looking policy."⁶⁰ David T. Williams, despite his misgivings with this emphasis on foreign aid for explaining the policy, expresses the same point more succinctly, saying that the President "was much obligated to South

Africa for that country's assistance in removing Malawi's seat of Government from Zomba to Lilongwe."

This "foreign aid argument" is the content of a pamphlet which is titled: "Malawi: Dialogue and Development."⁶² Its author, or authors, chose to remain anonymous apparently to enhance the authenticity of the information and validity of the argument in it. As most development activities in Malawi are financed with foreign aid, the title might as well have read; "Malawi: Dialogue and Foreign Aid", "Dialogue" being one of two words by which Malawi's policy towards South Africa is known. Thus, the pamphlet links Malawi's policy of "Contact and Dialogue" to foreign aid considerations. The argument is that this policy was adopted, and has been pursued, for reasons of obtaining foreign aid from South Africa.

Richard Hall apparently found confirmation in the operation, or implementation, of the policy. He wrote:

"In financial terms, this has paid off for Malawi. Banda's plans for moving his capital from Zomba in the extreme south of Malawi to the more central town of Lilongwe were condemned by an economic team from Britain. The team said the idea was wasteful. So the South Africans were invited to make a study and Vorster sent up one of his advisers, Dr. L.S. Rutenback. This time, the response was favourable and Pretoria went further - it offered Malawi

£4,700,000 loan to build the new capital. Private investment followed and Banda could boast an economic upsurge in a country which three years before had been called a rural slum."⁶³

In short, Malawi's behaviour in Southern African politics is explained in terms of its desire to obtain foreign aid from South Africa.

The pamphlet confines the argument to Malawi's behaviour in Southern Africa. On the other hand, Carolyn McMaster extends it to Malawi's behaviour in international relations in general. Her book is also titled: Malawi: Foreign Policy and Development, linking the country's foreign policy to foreign aid consideration.⁶⁴ Her argument is that Malawi adopted, and has pursued, the foreign policy it has been following for reasons of attracting foreign aid. For example she wrote:

"Malawi's participation in the global international systems is modest, the main objectives of her foreign policy with respect to countries outside Africa being to achieve the maximum development benefits from these contacts through loans and grants, technical assistance, private investment and assured markets for her agricultural produce."⁶⁵

McMaster's suggestion of how the policy should be considered, in keeping with her emphasis on foreign aid,

leads her also to link the country's economic policies to foreign aid considerations. For example, she suggests that "because these contacts are primarily economic ones, the extent and nature of the link can most conveniently be considered in the context of an examination of the direction of Malawi's economic development since independence."⁶⁶ In keeping with this suggestion, she argues that "the course of development pursued in Malawi has not been accompanied by a socialist philosophy such as that outlined in President Nyerere's Arusha Declaration or by a declaratory commitment to the nationalization of foreign enterprises."⁶⁷ This latter quotation is from a paragraph which comes in her book immediately after a subheading: "Attracting Aid and Foreign Investment."⁶⁸

Thus the country's foreign policy is here presented as being just one of the country's policies which have been pursued for foreign aid considerations. The others are the economic policies. These are also said to have been adopted, and to have been pursued, for similar reasons. Kapota Mwakasungura agrees with her. "Is it coincidental", he inquired, "that in the same year as the World Bank moved into Malawi with a big bang Malawi officially proclaimed it would adopt a capitalist path to development?", an inquiry which clearly portrays the Malawi Government as having adopted a capitalist economic policy in order to woo the World Bank to itself.⁶⁹ Mwakasungura elaborated the point. He wrote:

"....the realization of such a strategy of development has inevitably meant relying heavily on foreign sources of capital to finance rural development programmes and consequently on pandering to the material needs of those foreign sources of finance..."⁷⁰

In short, Malawi's economic and development policies are often presented as having been adopted to make Malawi attractive to donor countries and organizations.

This alleged link between the country's policies and foreign aid touches on the question of perception. Obviously, this is an important element in decision-making. For what is decided upon depends in the first instance on whether it had been perceived. As decision is currently an important analytical concept in foreign policy analysis, it is not surprising that this question has received considerable attention in some studies.⁷¹

According to psychologists, a perception consists of two important elements. These are a stimulus and an interpretation. The former is said to be capable of several interpretations while the latter presupposes an agent which can be a person or a dog. When presented with a stimulus, a person selects an interpretation which makes sense to him. He selects one interpretation without being aware of several other possible interpretations of the stimulus.⁷²

The foregoing means that when one perceives, one is involved in an exercise of choice without being aware of it. Naturally, this raises the question of how a particular interpretation of stimulus gets selected. Again, the experts say that an interpretation of a stimulus gets selected on the basis of one's existing personal values or beliefs.⁷³ An interpretation of a stimulus which is consistent with one's beliefs, or system of beliefs, gets selected and may be acted upon.

This in turn means that the importance of any factor in decision-making is largely a matter of human judgment. It is up to the decision-makers whether to attach importance to foreign aid or a country's geography in decision-making. The alleged link between foreign aid and the country's foreign and domestic policies implies that the Malawi decision-makers, particularly the President, attached importance to attracting foreign aid in the formulation of the country's foreign and domestic policies. This is apparently evident from the quotations which are made from some statements made by the President, alleged origin of the country's foreign and domestic policies, references to certain events, the interpretation made from the role of geography in the policy-making of the country, and the allegedly capitalist nature of the country's economic system and development strategy.

The alleged link between the country's foreign and domestic policies and foreign aid confines the role of foreign aid to that of influencing the perceptions of the Malawi decision-makers. It leaves some scope for the decision-makers' initiative. At least, the decision makers are assumed to have made the decisions. However, the "foreign aid argument" goes further than that. It also projects the Malawi Government as having merely been endorsing policies particularly the economic policies, which in practice, are said to have been made by foreign experts.

For example, the foreign experts, in the first place, are said to have proffered "tough advice" to the Malawi Government. "He has been fortunate," claimed a Times correspondent in reference to the President, "in being generally well advised by the large number of white expatriates who continued to work in Malawi."⁷⁴ Here almost every expatriate is portrayed as having advised the President. "Official help from outside," said the Economist, "has been most effective where tough advice has been taken by African Governments (Malawi and Botswana in the 1970s, Ghana and Zambia recently)."⁷⁵

In the second place, the foreign experts are said to have exercised disproportionate influence. A forward note to Andrew Ross's article claims that the "expatriate civil servants and advisers retained quite a disproportionate political importance (by comparative standards) since the

incumbent ministers are in general singularly ill-equipped to initiate or supervise coherent, consequent developmental policies." ⁷⁶ This means that expatriates have been de-facto decision-makers.

The expression, "tough advice", and "disproportionate political importance" are euphemisms for saying that the expatriates were the ones who formulated policy. "The reality of the second half of the century", Gordenker wrote, "is that economic and social programs may have steadily eroded the margins of de facto domestic jurisdiction." ⁷⁷ The economic and social programs which are seen to have eroded part of the domestic jurisdiction are those recommended by the international personnel, according to Gordenker. Hodder Williams makes this point explicit in connection with Malawi. He wrote:

"Nevertheless the impact of the expatriate community must have been considerable especially in the crucial period immediate after independence when long-term strategies in both domestic and foreign policies were established." ⁷⁸

This is an argument which at least suggests that the expatriates influenced the country's foreign and domestic policies. Mwakasungura is similarly explicit. He wrote:

"The record of British "aid" to Malawi after independence and the amount of influence at the

highest levels of government exercised by the officials has been well told by Kathryn Morton. Others have written about the role played by expatriates in determining policy direction and even the choice of priorities...in development."⁷⁹

The word, "aid", is put in the passage in inverted commas. No doubt this is intended to indicate that what it refers to is not aid at all but something else. A footnote explains that the last sentence of the passage refers to Henry Richardson's article, part of which has also been quoted here. Therefore, the point is that Morton and Richardson are the ones who say that Malawi policies were decided upon by the expatriates.

No doubt there is an element of misinterpretation of Morton's book and Richardson's article which Mwakasungura refers to. However, there is much in support of what Mwakasungura says about what the two authors wrote concerning Malawi. Mwakasungura himself belies that the expatriates made the country's economic policies. For examples, referring to the domination of Malawi's civil service by British expatriates in the early days of the country's independence, he says that the "British took full advantage of the situation to introduce their pre-independence plans and to shelve the 1962-65 Development Plan which did constitute a people's plan with its emphasis on peasant agriculture." "It is no wonder,

therefore," he went on, "that a discredited agricultural policy pursued throughout the colonial period with disastrous effects on African development was now being revived."⁸⁰ This point is echoed by Simon Thomas who says that the President "returned to the colonial master farmer policy, although it was now called the Achikumbe (progressive farmer) policy."⁸¹

In short, the British expatriates are said to have proffered "tough advice", "retained quite a disproportionate political importance", and "reintroduced their pre-independence development and agricultural policies." In other words, the expatriates played the role of de facto decision-makers of the country.

This is as far as the "foreign aid argument" goes. It consists of three distinct but related arguments. These are:

1. That Malawi's foreign and domestic policies were adopted and have been pursued for reasons of making Malawi attractive to donor countries and organizations;
2. That, in addition to have been adopted for foreign aid consideration, the country's economic and development policies are said to have themselves been formulated and decided upon by the British expatriates, and

3. That the British expatriates were de facto decision-makers of the country.

Underlying the arguments is the assumption that development is an overriding priority of a developing country's government. Leon Gordenker makes this assumption explicit. "Because economic development is the very stuff of politics - the kernel of crucial decision - in many less developed countries (L.D.C.)", he says, "the work of international organizations necessarily and increasingly touches on controversial delicate national issues."⁸² Therefore, if the expatriates made the country's economic and development policies, they were Malawi's de facto decision-makers.

This is the "foreign aid argument" with which the thesis is concerned. It will be examined in all its three aspects. To that end, attention will centre on the evidence which is often cited in support of it as well as the assumption underlying it. In addition, a look at the sort of impact which foreign aid really has had in Malawi will be made with a view to seeing if it tallies with the "foreign aid argument".

The Approach To The Subject

The thesis reflects a state-centric approach to international politics. By state-centric approach is meant the assumption that sovereign states are the chief

actors of international politics. A sympathy for this approach runs through the thesis as is attested to by the criticism earlier against Rosenau's definition of foreign policy. The reason for it is largely the result of the nature of the subject-matter of the thesis.

As already explained, the thesis is concerned with that type of foreign aid which passes from government to government. It is true that part of the foreign aid to be considered is from the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (U.N.D.P.), African Development Bank (A.D.B.) and the European Economic Communities (E.E.C.) to the Malawi Government. Although these organizations have policies of their own, the funds which they give to developing countries as aid come in the first place from governments and are much influenced by the views of the rich countries which provide their funds. The aid which they provide is, as a result, regarded as part and parcel of official aid. In other words, the context of the thesis is state-centric largely because the thesis is an analysis of state interaction.

The treatment of the data in the thesis is a simple one. Efforts are made to relate the meaning of this of that idea or claim to this or that known and available item of information on Malawi. In short, the method is simply that of a critical analysis of ideas and facts in search of the truth. Its purpose is to clear the way for a study which hopefully others will undertake to provide a correct and accurate understanding of Malawi's behaviour in international relations.

Organization

The thesis is divided into six chapters and a conclusion. The introduction forms the first chapter of the thesis. This is followed by chapter two which will examine the evidence often cited in support for the alleged link between foreign aid and the country's foreign policies. Implicit in the discussion will be the question of perception. This will receive some attention at the end of the chapter. Similarly chapter three will look at the evidence which is often cited in support for the alleged link between foreign aid and the country's economic policies.

Chapter four will examine some alleged affects of Malawi's foreign and domestic policies. Attention will centre on some misconceptions about Malawi as a recipient of foreign aid. In a sense, the discussion will be a consideration of additional evidence which apparently also supports the alleged link between foreign aid and Malawi's foreign and domestic policies.

Chapter five will look at the role of foreign experts in Malawi. Attention will centre on the evidence which is often cited in support for the argument that foreign experts were the ones who decided on Malawi's foreign and domestic policies particularly the economic policies. In other words, the chapter will look at an issue which goes beyond the question of perception. It will touch on the

question of the role of bureaucracy in decision-making. Finally, chapter six will look at the major assumptions of the "foreign aid argument". These are the assumption that development is the "stuff of politics" in developing countries and the assumption that foreign aid is politically effective. In addition, the chapter will look at the impact which foreign aid indeed has had in Malawi.

The conclusion will not only summarize the important points to be covered in the thesis but also spells out further important issues which can only be touched upon in the thesis. In all, the thesis is a critical examination of the effects which the politics of foreign aid are said to have had on Malawi.

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Chapter TwoForeign PoliciesIntroduction

This chapter looks at the evidence which is often cited in support of the alleged link between foreign aid and Malawi's foreign policies. To that end, it will look at some quotations from speeches made by the President of Malawi, the origin of the policies, some events, and the country's geographical position, all of which are often cited as evidence for the alleged link between foreign aid and Malawi's foreign policies.

The discussion is divided into four parts. The first part is an explanation why the chapter will deal with several foreign policies rather than with one foreign policy. The second part is a consideration of Malawi's African policy which is less well known. The third part is a consideration of the evidence which is often cited in support of the alleged link between foreign aid and the policy of "discretionary alignment and nonalignment." Finally, the fourth part is a consideration of the evidence which is often cited in support of the alleged link between foreign aid and the policy of "contact and dialogue."

Several Foreign Policies

The expression, "foreign policies", indicates that several rather than one policy will be considered in this chapter. This means that the discussion will be unorthodox for two reasons. The first reason is that Malawi will be presented as having followed several foreign policies at the same time. This will be done largely as a matter of convenience. Otherwise it is fully appreciated that this way of looking at foreign policy as a phenomenon is not in keeping with the common practice in foreign policy analysis in which each sovereign state is assumed to pursue only one foreign policy. For example, one often reads about British foreign policy rather than foreign policies.

The second reason is that the talk about Malawi's foreign policies has some merit. The practice of looking at each sovereign state as if it pursues only one foreign policy reflects a time when the international political system consisted of a handful of sovereign states most of which were in Europe. One sovereign state could then handle the affairs concerning the other sovereign states under one policy; the foreign policy. The affairs concerning other peoples or territories were handled under other policies. For example, in addition to foreign policy, Britain had a "dominion policy" under which the affairs concerning Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, were handled; and a "colonial policy" under which affairs

concerning the likes of what is now Malawi, Kenya, Zambia, and Tanzania, to mention a few, were handled.

However, this practice is no longer valid because the international political system has enormously expanded to the far corners of the globe. It is no longer valid to view a great power like Britain as if it were pursuing only one foreign policy. Those who still do so run the risk of ignoring reality. For example, are the British refusal to impose sanctions against South Africa and the British advocacy of sanctions against Libya, part and parcel of one foreign policy? Are not these two separate foreign policies? These are some of the questions which now arise out of the long established practice of looking at each sovereign state as if it pursues only one foreign policy.

The procedure in this thesis is different. Foreign policy being a response to a problem, a country is accordingly seen to pursue sometimes several foreign policies at the same time and sometimes just one foreign policy depending upon the number and type of problems which it faces. Therefore, this thesis presents three foreign policies which Malawi has followed since its independence.

Malawi's foreign policies have been the policy of "discretionary alignment and nonalignment", the policy of "contact and dialogue," and the African policy. Each is a

policy because it has focused on a distinct problem as will be shown later in the thesis. No doubt it can be contended that the three policies can be aggregated, or lumped together, into one, the foreign policy of Malawi, so that each is treated merely as aspects of the foreign policy of Malawi. McMaster indeed does this. For example she says that "Malawi's policies towards Southern Africa comprise only one aspect of her overall foreign policy....."¹ However, the results are quite unsatisfactory. The expression "Overall foreign policy," is clearly a recognition on her part that the policy of "contact and dialogue" has been a distinct foreign policy. Therefore, the three policies will be discussed here separately.

African Policy

On its own, the African Policy has nothing to do with the argument under consideration here. It is going to be considered because it is often seen as merely part and parcel of the "contact and dialogue" policy. For example, McMaster calls it the declaratory level" of the latter policy.² It is considered here in order to throw some light on Malawi's membership of certain Pan-African regional economic groupings, particularly the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), which apparently poses a problem to some scholars. For example, Don Lee Sparks regards it as a change in the "contact and dialogue" policy.³

The policy was adopted at the time that the question of African Unity was a topical issue. It was Malawi's response to the demands for immediate creation of a continental political union, a kind of a "united states of Africa", proposed by President Nkrumah of Ghana and supported by President Sekou Toure of Guinea. All African leaders agreed on the question of African Unity. The point of difference among them was the method of approach to the idea. Some led by Nkrumah advocated a revolutionary approach, the immediate creation of a continental union, while others advocated an evolutionary, or functional approach. The latter approach entailed the creation of regional cooperation, or economic communities, which would serve as the building blocks of the envisaged continental union. Therefore, those that favored this approach opposed the revolutionary approach.

Adverse Developments To African Unity

The merits and demerits of each approach are beside the point. Of relevance is the fact that the contest between them was one of the important political issues to which Malawi had to address itself at the time that it attained independence. Malawi indeed did so. For example, an official publication stated:

"We feel, however, that in order to achieve the final objectives of a United Africa, we should first develop and build on the human ties which exists

between ourselves and our neighbours, with some of whom we share a common origin, despite the artificial divisions between us created by the boundaries of a colonial era."⁴

This is the African policy. Though functional in approach, it accepted the idea of a united Africa.

Short and McMaster alleged that Malawi paid only a lip service to the question of African Unity while in actual practice paying more attention to Malawi's economic interests. For example, McMaster argues:

"On the declaratory level, this policy was marked by broad proclamation of faith in the principles of non-alignment and African Unity, but at the operational level, his policies were clearly defined in terms of Nyasaland's interests which he saw primarily as strengthening her economic position."⁵

This is a false allegation. The truth is not that Malawi did not genuinely believe in African Unity but that some developments adversely affected the question of African unity itself. Among them was the phenomenon of military coup and counter-military coup. Country after country on the continent fell to the military beginning in the late 1960s. This raised the question of legitimacy of many governments on the continent. Since membership of the OAU makes it almost impossible for a country to avoid inter-

mingling with another African country which it might wish not to recognize, a practice was established whereby recognition was bestowed on states rather than on governments. The latter are regarded as a matter for the people of the state or states concerned, a device which masks serious differences among the African states. In other words, the effect of this development was the freezing of the question of African unity.

Nationalist fission was another development which also adversely affected the question of African unity. This started with an attempted breakaway of the Katanga (now Shaba) Province from the rest of what is today Zaire. Although it did not cause disunity among the African countries, it was the first nationalist breakaway on the continent. The attempted Biafran secession from the Federation of Nigeria was another. This caused divisions among African countries. Some countries recognized Biafra; others refused to do so. Malawi refused to recognize Biafra and clung to the idea of Federal Nigeria. Meanwhile, the question of African unity further receded into oblivion.

The third development was the phenomenon of subversion carried by one African country against another. In part, this was the result of ideological differences. After some years of independence, some African countries came to embrace the socialist ideology while others followed the capitalist ideology. Since the latter ideology is

association with the former colonial powers, those African countries which followed it earned the derisive name of "neo-colonialist" while those that embraced the socialist ideology came to be regarded, "the progressives", despite their relative poor economic performance. To be regarded as "neo-colonialist" was, and still is, tantamount to be declared legitimate for subversion. Therefore, the result of the inter-African subversion was a further distraction of the attention of African states from the question of African unity.

Finally, the formation of the Organization of African Unity (O.A.U.), was another development which, paradoxically, also contributed towards the freezing of the question of African unity. The Organization was formed as a compromise between the revolutionary and the functional approaches to achieving African unity, a sort of interim measure prior to a realization of the cherished goal of a united Africa. However, the Organization has had the opposite effect. Going by the proceedings of the Organization's summit meetings the preoccupation is not with what steps should be taken towards African unity but with how to make the most out of the Organization. In other words, the Organization has so far functioned not as a means to unity but as an end in itself, a policy instrument at the disposal of each member state. As a result, the O.A.U. shares the current frustrations of multilateral organizations in general: impotency on

political issues and even threats of withdrawal from it by some of its member states.

With the fading of the question of African unity on the continent's political landscape, Malawi's African Policy also came to be less active or less known. For example, Malawi questioned on several occasions whether some African leaders, particularly those that Malawi saw as being engaged in subversion against other fellow African states, genuinely believed in the question of African unity.⁶ However, this did not mean that Malawi abandoned its faith in African unity. The policy only came to be less publicized simply because the question of African unity itself ceased to be important as a result of these developments.

The Triumph of Functionalism

Though somewhat frozen, the question of African unity was not entirely abandoned on the continent. In some form, it has been transferred by default from the O.A.U. to a United Nations Regional Commission for Africa (E.C.A.). The latter is what is actively promoting African unity in the form of economic integration. A look at the reasons for which the E.C.A. was formed would be a digression. Suffice it to say that promoting economic integration on the continent is one of its main tasks. It is true that the African heads of state and government met in their economic summit in 1980 in Lagos, Nigeria, during

which they decided among other things, to create an African common market by the turn of the century. However, the Plan of Action in which this decision is contained was drafted by the E.C.A. officials.

The United Nations regional commission has achieved some successes in carrying out this task. These include the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a Central African Common Market which covers Congo, Central African Republic, Gabon, Zaire, Equatorial Guinea, and Sao Tome et Principe, and the Preferential Trade Area (P.T.A.) of Eastern and Southern African States. These are successes, not so much in terms of economic performance such as promoting inter-African trade but at least in terms of bringing the countries together by means of a binding treaty or agreement. In part, these are due to the demonstration effect of the success of the European Economic Communities (E.E.C.) everywhere. Also they are due to the fact that economic integration is a relatively less sensitive issue than political integration.

Outside the E.C.A., efforts were also made to create an economic grouping now known as the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). Its task is to enable its member states to reduce their "economic dependence on other states including South Africa." Going by what has been done so far, it is, perhaps, the most advanced economic integration unit on the continent. It has

implemented an impressive number of transport and telecommunications projects which are bringing its member states closer together.

In other words, the adverse developments recounted earlier had the effect of merely freezing the question of African unity. While completely discrediting the revolutionary approach, they made the functional approach to the issue more attractive or widely accepted. ECOWAS, P.T.A., S.A.D.C.C., and the Central African Common Market are all evidence of the triumph of the functional approach and of the survival of the idea of African unity. Though in a less glittering fashion, the idea is alive. The next step towards it could very well be the envisaged common market for the whole continent.

Malawi is a member of both the P.T.A. and S.A.D.C.C. Its membership of the latter has puzzled some scholars. It is commented upon as if Malawi were the only member of SADCC which has economic ties with South Africa. For example, Don Lee Sparks wrote:

"Malawi finds itself in a curious role in the Southern African subsystem. It maintains extensive economic relations with South Africa, yet it has also joined a regional grouping (Southern African Development Coordination Conference - SADCC) whose major goal is to try to redirect these economic ties in the

region away from South Africa and towards each other."

This is a misleading passage. As can be seen from it, it presents Malawi as if it were the only member state of SADCC which has economic ties with South Africa. That is wrong. For example, Joseph Hanlon shows that many other member states of SADCC also have economic ties with South Africa, ties some of which are even more extensive and binding than those which Malawi has with South Africa.⁸ It also treats economic integration as if it were the same as normal economic ties. Trade between Malawi and any other country can still take place regardless of the distance which may exist between Malawi and the country concerned. However, economic integration such as that advocated by SADCC is a different matter. This takes account of the distance and location of the countries concerned. Three of the countries which make up SADCC are Malawi's immediate neighbours. It is only logical that Malawi has to be in SADCC and there is nothing curious about that.

Finally, Malawi membership of SADCC as mentioned earlier, has also been seen as a change in its policy towards South Africa. For example, Sparks also wrote:

"Malawi's participation and support of SADCC, however, signals a change in its basic economic orientation within the subsystem. For the first

time in its history it has seriously begun to look North for its economic ties."⁹

Although the expression, "basic economic orientation" is ambiguous, the passage clearly implies two things. The first is that Malawi had never addressed itself to the question of African unity. The second is that Malawi's policy of "contact and dialogue" has been about promoting Malawi's economic ties with South Africa. The President, says McMaster, "has evidently accepted the concept of an economic community of some form in Southern Africa, encompassing Malawi."¹⁰ Both these claims are wrong.

It is understandable that writers like Sparks reflect a lack of knowledge of Malawi's commitment to African unity. Perhaps matters would have been different had the question of African unity remained a topical issue. However, the fact that Malawi's Africa policy has not been well known is not evidence that Malawi had never addressed itself to the question of African unity. The policy has been less known because the question of African unity itself has not been as topical as it was before the formation of the O.A.U. Otherwise, Malawi has remained committed to the idea of African unity. This is why it is a member of both P.T.A. and SADCC.

The passage also reflects lack of understanding about the main objective of the policy of "contact and dialogue." It is true that Malawi does not endorse the imposition of

sanctions against South Africa and prefers to maintain its trade with South Africa. It is also true that partly as a result of the policy, trade between Malawi and South Africa has increased. However, the policy of "contact and dialogue" has had nothing to do with the promotion of Malawi's economic ties with South Africa. The policy has been about the "problems of black and white" in Southern Africa, about how best to approach such problems. The increase in trade between the two countries has been an incidental development to the policy.

In short, Malawi's belief in African unity accounts for Malawi's membership of Pan-African groupings such as the P.T.A. and S.A.D.C.C.

"Discretionary Alignment and Nonalignment"

The "discretionary alignment and nonalignment" policy has been one of the country's two major policies. The other is the well known policy of "contact and dialogue" which will be considered later. Compared to the Africa policy, this has been somewhat better known although less so than the policy of "contact and dialogue". Its focus has been on the East/West relationship. For example, a paragraph of a speech made by the President of Malawi reads:

"On the relationship between East and West, there is nothing new I can say. On this subject, Malawi's

policy is well known. It is not one of dogmatic non-alignment. It is a policy of discretionary alignment and nonalignment."¹¹

The words "discretionary alignment and nonalignment", have been and will be kept in inverted commas. This is to indicate that they have been quoted from the speech from which the foregoing quotation was made. The four words, moreover, will be kept together for reasons of accuracy. Philip Short in his book, Banda, left out the last two words and presented the policy simply as "discretionary alignment."¹² This is incorrect as it can be seen from the foregoing quotation. Such a presentation amounts to distorting the policy since it prejudgets Malawi's alignment on the question of East/West relations.

Quotations from President's Speeches

The "discretionary alignment and nonalignment" policies are one of the country's policies which are said to have been adopted in order to make Malawi attractive to foreign aid. Apparently, the point is that the country's President was influenced by the availability of foreign aid, particularly in the West, into adopting this policy. The evidence which is often cited in support of this argument are some quotations made from the President's speeches. For example, Philip Short quotes the President as follows:

"Only if the West were to treat me like de Gaulle treated Sekou Toure would I be forced to look elsewhere."¹³

As it stands, this shows the President's preference for Western donor countries to Eastern donor countries. It gives the impression that the President was clearly committed to alignment with the West for reasons of foreign aid.

However, placed in the full context of the statement from which it was made, the sentence has a different meaning and is not evidence that the President was pre-committed to alignment with the West for reasons of foreign aid. This is because the context makes it clear that the statement was made for reasons other than that of attracting foreign aid. For example, the full paragraph from which the sentence was quoted reads:

"They call me a "communist." I could never be a communist because I consider myself to be a good Presbyterian. These are incompatible. I will not look to the East for economic help to Nyasaland as long as I can get help from the West. Only if the West were to treat me like de Gaulle treated Seko Toure would I be forced to look elsewhere."¹⁴

As can be seen from this passage, the sentence was part of the denial of the charge that the Malawi leader was a

"communist." This was at the time that some white settlers in Southern Africa were trying to discredit the nationalist cause in Malawi. Any slightest indication of a willingness to accept aid from the East on the part of the President would have been construed as evidence that he was a communist.

On another occasion, the President was actually asked if he would accept aid from Russia. The inquiry was not intended to determine whether he preferred Western aid to Eastern aid. Rather it was an attempt to extract from him evidence to support the charge which was made by the White settlers in Central and Southern Africa that he was a "communist." For example, the interviewer put emphasis on the word, "yourself", in his question. This prompted the Malawi leader to emphasize that "he would rather have dollars, or pounds, but if they were not forthcoming he would accept roubles rather than let his people starve."¹⁵

In short, these two quotations, on their own, do indeed, mean the President's preference for Western aid to Eastern aid. However, the quotations are made from the two statements which had nothing to do with the President's preference for aid from any particular bloc. Both statements were an emphatic denial of the charge that he was a "communist."

The charge that the President was a communist was a serious one which could not be taken lightly. This was because the West was at that time in the grip of, to use former President Carter's phrase, "inordinate fear of communism."¹⁶ As Sir Geoffrey Howe recently put it:

"In 1960 Macmillan saw the issue of the second half of the 20th century as whether the uncommitted peoples of Asia and Africa will swing to the East or to the West."

This was precisely the time during which the question of Malawi's independence was being considered and the same Macmillan was the British Prime Minister who was to make the hard decision of dissolving one of the most cherished postwar British colonial schemes - the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland - to pave the way for Malawi's independence. The white settlers were clearly raising the "communist" charge in order to influence Macmillan's mind on the question of Nyasaland's secession from the Federation. Therefore, foreign aid was not on the President's mind when he made the two statements. It was the implication of the effect of the charge on Nyasaland's demand for independence, not foreign aid, which prompted him to make them.

The Origin of the Policy

Another evidence which is also often cited in support of the argument under consideration is the origin of the

policy. When writers like McMaster and Short argue that the policy was adopted for foreign aid considerations, they are, in part, expressing the belief that the policy was thought out and adopted well after Malawi gained independence. This belief is, indeed, made explicit with regard to the policy of "contact and dialogue." It is made implicit with regard to the policy of "discretionary alignment and nonalignment. Apparently this is because it is only after the attainment of independence that a country starts receiving foreign aid.

This is one of the problems which the foreign aid argument presents. When was the policy of "discretionary alignment and nonalignment" formulated and adopted? Was it after the attainment of independence? It is true that the policy was adopted as soon as Malawi attained independence. However, the President had explained the policy in full before the country's independence. The first time that he did so was in April 1961, three years before the country's independence. At that time, the country's independence was by no means a foregone conclusion. The British Government had not by then made up its mind to dissolve the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Therefore, the President was preoccupied, not with foreign aid, but with the achievement of the country's independence.

It is true that the foregoing does not completely exclude the possibility that foreign aid might, all the

same, have been uppermost in the mind of the President. For example, the President has often stated that he planned the move of the country's capital and the construction of the country's lakeshore road while he was in detention in Gwelo (now Gwelu) in present day Zimbabwe. These are among the many other major projects which have, indeed, been implemented in the country. However, it is still inconceivable that foreign aid was uppermost in his mind because it was not certain then that the country would achieve independence.

The last part of the last sentence of the foregoing paragraph contradicts what many writers say about African independence. It implies that Malawi's independence was not inevitable while the popular view is that the European colonial powers were committed to a programme of giving independence to their colonial peoples after the second World War. Richard Hall goes so far as to say that "in a score of countries independence had been a gift from metropolitan countries resolved to shed their imperial burdens."¹⁸ This is probably intended to produce a sense of complacency among the public in African countries or to ridicule the African leaders who assumed power on the day on which the countries became independent. If the independence were really a gift, a manna from heaven, it follows that such leaders are, or were, nothing but opportunists.

No doubt Richard Hall's argument is an exaggeration. However, what he says is in keeping with the belief of many scholars that the independence of African countries was inevitable after the second world war. This belief is held for three reasons. The first one is the growth of liberalism in Britain. This is said to have begun in the 19th century and to have undermined then the only effective means for maintaining empires - the massacre of recalcitrant natives. "The moral sensitivity -", says Brian Lapping, "- of the most powerful nations, expressed by the reluctance of their leaders to be publicly revealed as mass murders, brought the end of the empire."¹⁹

The second reason is said to be the War of American Independence. This is said to have given rise to the principle of self-determination. More important, Britain is said to have learnt from that war the lesson that "iron rule from the imperial capital leads to revolt, war and humiliation." This, in turn, is said to have led to the adoption of a colonial policy which put emphasis on the eventual granting of self-government to the colonies.²⁰ Peter Dalleo seems to attest to this. "One hallmark of British colonial policy in Africa," he wrote, "was the tradition of a steady devolution of political power aimed at eventual self-government."²¹

The third reason is said to be the second world war. "The bankruptcy brought on by the 1939-45," says Brian Lapping "-was the principal reason why the British empire

ended so much more quickly than anyone expected."²² This argument is fully embraced by many leading African scholars. The second world war", Ali Mazrui wrote, for example, "was an important divide in respect of Africa's history." "There is widespread consensus", he continued, "that the war contributed towards Africa's political liberation."²³ The word, "political", is printed in small letters. In doing so, Mazrui obviously intended to remind readers that the liberation of Africa is incomplete at the economic level.

How is the the second world war said to have contributed towards Africa's "political" independence? The answer which is often given to this question is that the war undermined Europe's capacity to hold on to the empire. Mazrui wrote, for example:

"The war facilitated Africa's transition to modern statehood partly by undermining Europe's capacity to hold on to the empires. Britain was exhausted and also impoverished by the time the war ended. France had been humiliated by Germany. Related to this exhaustion and impoverishment of Western Europe following its own fratricidal war was the destruction of the myth of European invincibility in the eyes of the colonized peoples. Suddenly somebody noticed in Bombay that the Emperor's clothes of modern technology were not clothes at all - the British Raj was naked. And when the Indians started pointing fingers and

exposing the nakedness of their emperor, other subject peoples elsewhere heard it too."²⁴

In short, African independence is said to have been inevitable because of the growth of liberalism in Britain, the colonial policy which emphasized the eventual granting of self-government to the colonies, and the second world war which undermined Europe's capacity to hold on to the empires and destroyed the myth of European invincibility in the eyes of the colonized peoples.

The claim that liberalism undermined the means by which empires were maintained is obviously false. For example, Lapping traces this effect of liberalism on the empire to as far back as the days of Gladstone's premiership of Great Britain.²⁵ That was actually the time when European empire-building in Africa was just about to start. For example, the Cape Colony in South Africa was established and maintained largely by means of extensive extermination of the Khoisan people.²⁶ In 1915, the British suppressed the Chilembwe rising in Nyasaland by killing some 900 people and, as Lapping acknowledges, France managed to maintain its rule over Madagascar by massacring 30,000 recalcitrant natives as late as 1947.²⁷ Liberalism did not undermine the means by which empires were maintained.

As for the liberal colonial policy, Dalleo and many other writers mistake form for substance. It is true that

beginning with the late 1920s, British colonial policy towards East and Central Africa became very liberal in form. It emphasized the paramountcy of "native interests" over those of the white settlers.²⁸ However, in practice, colonialism in East and Central Africa was being strengthened. The Central African Federation comprising Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland was to create a white settler-dominated colony with a dominion status in Central Africa which would have become a reality were it not for the 1959 state of emergency in Nyasaland.

Finally, the second world war did indeed contribute towards the liberation of Africa. However, the manner in which it is said to have done so is a sheer misinterpretation. The argument is valid to a small number of colonies particularly India and Burma. To colonies in Africa, the argument raises more questions than it answers. If the war undermined Europe's capacity to hold on to the empires, why did the Indonesians have to fight a bloody war against the Netherlands for their independence? Why did the Algerians similarly have to fight a bloody war against the supposedly "weakened and humiliated" France? If Europe's capacity to hold on to the empires collapsed by the end of the second world war, why did decolonization in Africa take so long after the end of the war and at the time that Europe is regarded to have practically recovered economically from the ravages of the war? Moreover, many of the trouble spots in the empires after the war were of the type which could easily be dealt with by an army

brigade or so. Is it really true that in the late 1950s and early 1960s Britain, or France, were incapable of dispatching an army brigade to the trouble spots in the empire? Obviously that is not true.

The second world war did indeed contribute towards the liberation of Africa, not by weakening the European colonial powers versus many of the colonial peoples, but by bringing home to the European colonial powers the full implications of empire in modern times. The successful Japanese offensive on parts of the European empires in Southeast Asia meant that an imperial power would have to fight everywhere any time that there might be another major war. This would be true particularly for Britain which had a worldwide empire.

Moreover, the advent of nuclear weapons led Britain to embrace a policy of preventing the occurrence of another major war. In part, this meant dismantling the empire. The onslaught of the cold war years during which the superpowers saw almost every political issue around the world in terms of their total confrontational relationship also created a sense of urgency in dismantling the empire.

The foregoing does not mean that the European countries decided to dissolve their empires soon after the war or soon after the beginning of the cold war. It does not mean that. What it means is that the major powers saw

each colonial issue as a potential source of a major conflict among them. By coincidence, many of the colonial issues occurred at the time that the coldwar was at its height. For example, Peter Wright, the former British Intelligence Officer, has revealed that Prime Minister Eden halted his invasion of the Suez Canal in 1956 because of some threats from the Soviet Union which the British Intelligence Officers detected through the bugging of the Egyptian Embassy in London.²⁹ In other words, decolonization in Africa came about because colonial peoples just happened to have stepped up their demands for independence at the same time that European countries were pre-occupied with the cold war.

Therefore, there was nothing inevitable about African independence. Indeed the dissolution of a greater part of the British empire in Africa had to do with some specific decisions especially those made by Ian Macleod and Harold Macmillan in response to events which confronted them then, foremost of which, was the state of emergency in Nyasaland.³⁰ There was nothing inevitable about their decisions. Macmillan's own famous "Wind of Change" speech in Cape Town, South Africa, makes all this clear.

After years of frustrations, the people of Nyasaland decided in 1958 to step up their demands for independence. That decision was a gamble, the success of which was not guaranteed. This is only to say that Malawi's independence in 1961 was not a foregone conclusion.

Reference To Certain Events

Still more evidence which is often cited in support of the link between "discretionary alignment and nonalignment" policy and foreign aid are references to certain events. A passage in McMaster's book illustrates the point. She argues that the President:

"has enunciated three principles which govern Malawi's foreign policy: non-interference in the affairs of other countries, judgment of individual situations on their own merits rather than by the alignments of the countries involved, and willingness to accept the aid of any country prepared to help Malawi. In practice, however, her trade and aid partners are almost without exception non-communist countries, and the hand of financial friendship extended from the People's Republic of China was spurned."³¹

The link between foreign aid and the policy in the passage is not obvious. It is noticeable only after a closer look at the passage. For example, the passage has two parts, the first of which ends with the expression, "to help Malawi." That part is what McMaster called "declaratory policy". The rest of the passage is obviously what she regards as the country's real policy. The point in the passage is clearly that since Malawi's

pattern of both its external trade and aid is with the West, Malawi is aligned with the West.

There are details in the passage which require a little more attention. The word "enunciated", is misleading. The Malawi Government has "enunciated" such "principles." The first "principle" in the passage is actually a well known principle which is found in the United Nations Charter and all that the Malawi Government has done is simply to endorse it. The rest of the said "principles" in the first sentence of the passage are actually what the Malawi Government itself has presented as policy, that is the policy of "discretionary alignment and nonalignment."

The last sentence of the passage provides information, part of which is presented in a misleading manner. Malawi's pattern of external trade is typical of most of the former British colonies in Africa. There is nothing peculiar about it. Communist China's offer of aid was turned down by Malawi because of the conditions which were attached to it. It was not turned down simply because it came from China. Therefore, the country's pattern of external trade and aid is not necessarily proof of Malawi's alignment with the West.

Philip Short made references to certain events as evidence in support of the alleged link between foreign

aid and the policy of "discretional alignment and nonalignment." He wrote:

"Conversely, Malawi's Western orientation grew stronger. After a visit to Berlin in the middle of 1965, Banda pronounced himself in favour of the re-unification of Germany, and subsequently advocated it at the United Nations. West Germany showed its appreciation by increasing its aid and making available funds for the construction of the first stage of the lakeshore road, the "Great Kamazu Highway," as it came to be called. De Gaulle, whom Banda met at about the same time, proved altogether a wilier ally, and his request for finance for the Nacala railway was courteously refused. But France did make available technical assistance, and Banda afterwards paid eulogistic tribute to the General's statesmanship. By 1966 Malawi's relations with the United States had normalized, and after Banda's declaration that he supported Johnson's Vietnam policy "150 per cent," aid and friendship flowed more strongly than ever. Denmark continued to provide development aid, and Israel technical assistance. And in 1968, after Banda had paid a state visit to Formosa, the Nationalist Chinese expanded their agricultural training schemes in Malawi. Britain, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank all made available substantial development loans, and Britain

also made annual grants-in-aid to cover Malawi's budgetary deficit."³²

Malawi, as can be seen, is here presented almost as if it embarked upon a successful crusade for foreign aid. Unrelated events, some quoted out of their sequence, are in the passage juxtaposed to create the maximum impression of a Malawi in quest for foreign aid. The "support for German reunification," the "150 per cent support for President Johnson's Vietnam policy", and the visit to Formosa", for example, are all presented as having been undertaken for reasons of acquiring foreign aid. The rest of the other donors are presented as if they were almost falling upon each other in haste to reward Malawi for its alleged alignment with the West. The passage, in short, creates the impression that the policy of "discretionary alignment and nonalignment" was undertaken for reasons of attracting foreign aid.

Some of the pieces of information and the events which are distorted in the passage require a little more attention. Others require detailed attention. The British grants-in-aid will receive fuller attention at a latter stage in the thesis. For the moment, it is enough to say that the aid was part of the outcome of the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Britain did not give the assistance in response to Malawi's policy of "discretionary alignment and nonalignment." The corollary of this is that Malawi did not have

to adopt such a policy in order to receive the British grants-in-aid.

Further, the United Nations Development Programme has a membership which is divided into two parts: the donor member states and the recipient member states including Malawi. The latter are the beneficiaries of the organization's resources. In addition, the organization has a resident representation in almost every recipient member state. What this means is that Malawi did not have to adopt the policy of "discretionary alignment and nonalignment to solicit for the organization's assistance. Malawi got, and still gets, assistance from that organization by virtue of being its recipient member state. In fact, Malawi, as Gordenker points out, has not been a favorite recipient of the organization's aid.³³ For example, the UNDP aid to Malawi in 1987 was a mere pittance of \$2 million.

As for the African Development Bank, one has only to bear in mind that the Bank was created to provide to its member states soft loans for infrastructure and industrial development. This is because such development activities are not looked upon with favour by the Western donor countries. Malawi as a member state is entitled to receive loans from that Bank and did not have to adopt "discretionary alignment and nonalignment" to get them.

Several other details in the passage similarly require some attention. With regard to the French refusal with their aid, one needs only to note that Malawi is not on the list of the recipients of French aid, not because de Gaulle provided altogether a "wilier ally", but because France regards any former British colony as "England's business" and not theirs. The "visit to Formosa", too, requires little attention. Suffice it to say that the visit was undertaken for reasons other than foreign aid which, indeed, did not even feature in the communique that was issued at the end of the visit. With Israel, one has only to recall that Israel had a technical assistance programme in most of the African countries up to the 1973 Arab/Israeli war. Malawi was not special then in relation to the Israeli technical assistance. Finally, Denmark was and still is an important donor of foreign aid to Malawi. However, Denmark often coordinates its policies with those of Sweden which is known for its policy of neutrality. Therefore, it is doubtful if it gave, or gives, aid to Malawi in response to Malawi's policy of "discretionary alignment and nonalignment." That Nordic country probably does so out of the desire to assist Malawi.

The two distortions in the passage which require detailed attention are those concerning German re-unification and the "150 per cent support for President Johnson's Vietnam policy." With regard to the former, the word, "advocated", in the passage is misleading. It gives the impression that Malawi was the only country which called

for German re-unification at the United Nations General Assembly. The truth was that German re-unification was one of the items concerning divided sovereignties which were each year placed on the agenda for the General Assembly. The others were the question of Korea which is still unresolved in terms of representation in the United Nations, the question of Vietnam, and most important of all, the question of the representation of China in the United Nations. Member states used to express their views on these issues each year. What Malawi did was similarly to express its views on these issues. The following are the relevant passages in the speech which the Malawi President made:

"In my view, the government in Peking, that is the Government of Mao-Tse-Tung, should be recognized by the United Nations, by this Assembly, by the Security Council as legal Government of China now,"³⁴

and with regard to Germany:

"Therefore, history, logic, justice and fair play leave Malawi with no choice but to recognize the Government in Bonn as the legal Government of Germany."³⁵

So the support was accorded not only to German re-unification but also to Chinese re-unification. The reasons for which Malawi called for the recognition of the Government

in Bonn as the legal Government of Germany, and of the Government in Peking as the legal Government of the whole China were, for China:

"The Government in China, the Government in Peking exercises an effective authority and control over a vast area of China and a vast population. She exercises authority and control over an area of 4,300,000 square miles and population of 700,000,000 or some claim 760,000,000 people. The Government in Formosa on the other hand, exercises authority and control over a very small area and a very small population in comparison. The area which the Government in Formosa exercises authority and control is only 13,800 square miles and the population is only 10,000,000 people."

Under these circumstances Malawi has no choice. I have no choice. Justice and fair play demand that the Government in Peking presided over by Mao-Tse-Tung be recognized as the legal and rightful government of China."³⁶

For Germany:

"In Germany there is a government in Bonn, the government of Federal Republic of Germany which exercises authority and control over the area of 95,000 square miles and a population of 54,000,000

people. There is another government in East Germany, the Government of the German Democratic Republic which exercises authority and control over an area of 41,000 square miles and a population of 20,000,000 people. Here the problem is much simpler than in China. The Government in East Germany, the Government of German Democratic Republic did not exist during the Second World War. It is not a founder member of the United Nations as the Government of Formosa is. It exercises authority and control over an area and population smaller than the area and population over which the Government of Federal Republic of Germany exercises authority and control.³⁷

It is true that West Germany was by then an important donor of foreign aid. In comparison, the People's Republic of China was not. Therefore, to attribute Malawi's support for German re-unification to foreign aid considerations is to be selective in the treatment of available information. The manner in which Malawi supported both the Chinese re-unification and German re-unification was the same and the reasons given for the support were also the same. The People's Republic of China is Communist while the West German Government is capitalist. Therefore, the support can only be attributed to the President's perception of the issues and not to foreign aid considerations.

Finally, with regard to the "150 percent support of President Johnson's Vietnam policy", one has only to bear in mind that this is a quotation from a statement which the President made in the context of improving relations between Malawi and the United States. Relations between the two countries were cool and began to warm up at the time that the statement was made. It would have been correct to associate the statement with foreign aid considerations if relations between the two countries were normal in the first place. As this was not the case, the statement focused on further improvement in the relations between the two countries and not on foreign aid.

That the policy has had nothing to do with foreign aid is borne out by that it focuses on the East/West relationship which was confrontational then. The President's speech in Cairo also stated:

"But if African states are to strengthen the hand of the United Nations and to make it more effective in its endeavour, for peace and human progress and advancement, they must at all times steer clear of automatic alignment with one bloc or the other. I say this because no one power or group of powers is always right. Equally, no one power or group of powers is always wrong. For example, in the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, the British, French and others, were wrong in attacking Egypt over the Suez Canal question, and the Russians and the Americans were

right in not joining the British, French and others in their attack on Egypt. So wrong were the British in fact, that even some members of the British Commonwealth condemned them and supported Egypt, and the British Government fell over the issue.

"Yet the Russians belong to one bloc, the Eastern bloc. They are the leaders of the Eastern bloc. The Americans belong to the other bloc, the Western bloc. They are the leaders of the Western bloc. And very often they take opposing sides on major issues in international affairs. But in 1956, on the Suez Canal question, they saw eye to eye.

"More recently, in 1960, over the Congo crisis, again the British, the French and the Belgians were wrong in their implicit support for Tshombe when Tshombe wanted to take away Katanga from the Republic of Congo. And the Russians and the Americans were right in insisting that the political and territorial integrity of the Congo state must not be interfered with. Here again you had the Russians and the Americans who are traditionally in opposing camps coming together, agreeing on an issue of international importance, while the supposed traditional allies, the British, the French, and the Belgians on the other hand, and the Americans on the other, were divided and took stands on opposing sides."³⁹

The policy of "discretionary alignment and nonalignment" actually had nothing to do with foreign aid considerations. This is borne out by the fact that the policy was presented as the right policy for Africa at the first O.A.U. Assembly of Heads of State and Government in 1964, in Cairo, Egypt. For example, the President, then the country's Prime Minister, said before the Assembly:

"Thus in my view, no African state should ally itself permanently or automatically with one bloc or the other; because neither bloc, the Western bloc nor the other, the Eastern bloc, is always right or always wrong. Each bloc is sometimes wrong, sometimes right. And the only wise policy and wise course for any African statesman and any independent African state to take or follow is to judge each international issue strictly on its own merits at any given time. This means using discretion. It means common sense; uninfluenced either by this ideology or that."³⁸

Some of the heads of state and government probably did not heed this policy. All the same it was presented as the right policy for African states. Therefore, it cannot sensibly be supposed that the President, in so doing, was telling his fellow African leaders how best to attract foreign aid from the Western donor countries. Quite contrary to the argument by McMaster, Short, Williams, and the anonymous author of the pamphlet, the President was

here alerting Africa to the dangers of permanent and automatic alignment with any of the existing great power blocs.

In short, the Suez Canal and the Congo Crisis were clearly perceived by the President as evidence that even Africa was not immune from the cold war, or the great power rivalry. Therefore, the "discretionary alignment and nonalignment" policy has been about the East/West confrontational relationship and has had nothing to do with the question of attracting foreign aid to Malawi.

"Contact and Dialogue" Policy

The policy of "contact and dialogue" is the other foreign policy of Malawi which is also said to have been adopted for reasons of attracting aid to Malawi. Though the best known, it has not been properly understood. For example, David Williams regards it as Malawi's detente with South Africa.⁴⁰ This is correct only if detente means merely keeping contact with anyone. However, detente means the easing of relations or thawing of relations. It presupposes the existence of tensions between two countries. Understood in this way, detente cannot mean the same as Malawi's policy of "contact and dialogue" since no tension in the sense of a confrontational relationship existed in the first place between Malawi and the countries towards which the policy has been directed.

The expression "contact and dialogue", is also kept in inverted commas. This is also to indicate that the expression has been quoted from the President's speech which expounded the policy. The relevant part of it reads:

"I will tell the Honourable House what is of use. Two words, contact, dialogue, those are the two things. Contact between us the African leaders North of the Zambezi and further elsewhere on our continent and leaders of white people to the south of us in the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique and Angola, Portugal itself in Europe.

'Dialogue between us the African Leaders North of the Zambezi and further elsewhere in our continent and leaders of white opinion to the South of us in the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, is, in my opinion, what is of use, indeed, what is useful. Not denunciations from a distance thousands of miles away in Addis Ababa, London, New York, not shrieking our heads off, calling for boycott and isolation of the whites in south Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique, and Angola, not uttering empty idle and childish threats which we ourselves know we cannot implement."⁴¹

This is the part of the President's statement in Parliament from which the expression "contact and dialogue", has been quoted.

The policy is largely the basis on which Malawi's behaviour in international relations has been interpreted. The alleged link between foreign aid and the other two policies considered earlier, to some extent, arises because these other policies are lumped together with, or treated merely as aspects of this policy. However, the policy focuses only on the problems of black and white in Southern Africa. It is concerned with the question of Apartheid in South Africa, and with colonialism in Namibia, and was concerned with colonialism in Angola and Mozambique and the unilateral declaration of independence (U.D.I.) in Rhodesia. It has had nothing to do with the question of Korea or the cold war. "Discretionary alignment and nonalignment is the policy which was addressed to these other issues.

Quotations from President's Speeches

The alleged link between foreign aid and the policy of "contact and dialogue" is also often demonstrated by means of some quotations from the President's speeches. The frequently quoted speech to this end is the one which the President made in Cairo in 1964. For example, McMaster interpreted it as follows:

"At the O.A.U. Heads of State Conference in Cairo, Dr. Banda made it clear that although Malawi's particular position subjected the country to conflicting demands, he would not support measures, even on the declaratory level, which other O.A.U. members felt would further the liberation of the states still under white dominion, if such measures, in his estimation, would threaten Malawi's development priorities, or her sovereignty."⁴²

McMaster is here giving equal emphasis to both "development priorities and Malawi's sovereignty." This is a misinterpretation of the speech. It did not mean that. The relevant part of it read:

"But having said that, it is necessary to point out that not all independent African states are in the same position to help those countries which are not free and independent as much as they should or as much as they wish. Colonial history and colonial geography has placed some countries in a much more favorable position to help than others. Some of the independent African states are almost helpless to help others by geographical position. Malawi, my own state, is one of these countries. Zambia, when it becomes independent on October 24 will be one of them. And Basutoland when it becomes independent in 12 or 18 months time from now will be still another.

Malawi and Zambia have been denied ports of their own by colonial history and colonial geography. Neither Malawi nor Zambia owns a port. They use a port or ports of neighbouring territory or territories which is or are under the control of a foreign power. They could not export a single product, agriculture or mineral, without the goodwill or the tolerance or sufferance of the power owning or claiming to own and controlling the territory in which the ports are situated.

"Therefore, while I feel strongly against imperialism and colonialism in any form; while I am just as anxious as anyone in this conference to help our brothers and sisters still under colonial rule in neighbouring territories, Malawi's power, my own power, to help, is limited and circumscribed by geographical position. I am quite certain that it is not the will or wish of anyone in this assembly that in order to help his brothers and sisters still under colonialism and imperialism a man must cut his own throat. I am equally certain that it is not the policy of the Organization of African Unity that in order for any country to be a good and loyal member of this Organization, that country must cut its own throat.

"I am saying all this because I want to make it quite clear here at this conference that the geographical

position of Malawi makes it impossible for me and my country to sever alliance, diplomatic, economic, and cultural with a certain power now still controlling great portions of our continent. I cannot promise here that I and my country will be in a position to carry out to the letter any resolution which demands total severance of all relations, diplomatic, economic and cultural with that power.

"This is not because I do not agree with any such resolution; not because I do not want to help my brothers and sisters now still under colonial rule in that territory, but simply because it would be impossible for me and my country to carry out such a resolution to the letter without economic strangulation of Malawi, and with economic strangulation would come political strangulation. The government would fall and there would be chaos; another Congo. Is that what anyone wants in this Assembly? I do not think so."⁴³

As can be seen from the passage, there is no mention of development priorities. The flow of thought clearly led to the last sentence of the passage. From the last sentence, it is clear that what was uppermost in the mind of the President was not economic benefits but the survival of the new state of Malawi itself. The President, was clearly concerned, not with the economic chaos as such, though that in itself would be bad enough,

but with the political consequences which would result from economic chaos.

Perhaps the most misquoted of the President's speeches which apparently provides irrefutable proof that the policy was undertaken for foreign aid reasons is the one from which the expression, "Alliances with the devil", has been adopted by a host of writers. For example, a sub-heading of chapter V of McMaster's book reads: "Alliance With The Devil."⁴⁴ Similarly Gail-Maryse Cockram's book has a sub-heading which reads: "South Africa and Malawi - "The Devil's Disciple",⁴⁵ an article by Edwin Munger bears the title: "Trading With The Devil," and the Washington Post and Herald Tribune also carried an article titled, "Alliance with The Devil."⁴⁶ The following passage from McMaster's book illustrates how the speech in question is often misinterpreted:

"In the short term, there were two specific objectives which he wished to fulfill by closer association with the white states. The first was Portuguese agreement to the construction of a new rail link to Nacala; the second was the financing for the project and for the move of the capital to Lilongwe. It was with reference to the latter that Dr. Banda declared, as early as January, 1966, that "I am sending delegations to some countries I need not mention.....I don't mind alliance with the devil."⁴⁷

This is a misquotation of the speech. The President actually said as follows:

"Well, we are going ahead with the capital whether anyone agrees with us or not. (Applause) (pointing to Mr. Blackwood) you see, I may be sending you to London to see some of your friends, and even to some places which I need not mention on that capital, or on this country, I don't mind alliance with the devil himself. (Applause) so that I want to make it quite clear that we are going ahead with the capital, whether anyone agrees with us or not."⁴⁸

The statement was made on 18th January, 1966 in Parliament. This is what it meant. What was clearly intended to be a pre-emptive scathing remark, a give, at anticipated criticisms against what Malawi was about to do is misinterpreted and offered as proof of the President's penchant for foreign aid. Whatever interpretation which one makes, the speech refers to dealings which Malawi was about to make with some countries. Therefore, it refers to what is incidental to policy and not to the determinant of policy because the policy of "contact and dialogue" was already in place by 1966, as will be shown here.

The Origin of the Policy

The alleged link between foreign aid and the policy of "contact and dialogue" is also demonstrated by means of

the origin of the policy. This is placed well after the country's attainment of independence. The policy is said to have originated in the late 1960s. Apparently it was adopted in response to South Africa's offers of foreign aid. For example, Adekunle Ajala wrote:

"While this psychological warfare was going on, South Africa, as the undisputed leader of the white redoubts, embarked on measures to prop up the regimes of Rhodesia and the Portuguese colonies as well as make inroads into Pan-African United Front. The easiest prey in this battle to win over Black Africa was Malawi."⁴⁹

The expression, "easiest prey" is interesting. It is not clear what exactly Ajala has in mind. For example, it is not clear the sense in which Malawi, and not say, Zambia, Tanzania, and indeed Nigeria, was the easiest prey. However, Ajala is possibly implying that Malawi was the one country which felt obliged to respond to South Africa's outward looking policy in the late 1960s. Thus, he implies that Malawi's policy of "contact and dialogue" originated in the late 1960s in response to South Africa's outward looking policy which included offers of foreign aid to African countries. The pamphlet written by the anonymous author makes the point explicit. A passage in it reads:

"It was only in 1966 that Malawi sought to open relations with South Africa. The immediate cause was Dr. Banda's desire to build a new capital city in the centre of the country."⁵⁰

In other words, the pamphlet firmly links the policy to the construction of the country's new capital in 1966.

Naturally, Malawi was not in a position to adopt a foreign policy prior to the attainment of its independence since the pursuance of a foreign policy by a country presupposes independence. The three foreign policies which have been considered here were indeed adopted soon after independence. However, the policies were formulated prior to the country's attainment of independence. For example, the 1964 Cairo speech which was referred to earlier, explained the policy before the O.A.U. Assembly of Heads of State and Government. As this was just a few days after Malawi's attainment of independence on 6th July, 1964, the speech is itself proof that the policy was formulated a few months prior to the country's attainment of independence.

In short, the origin of the policy was not in the late 1960s. The policy was clearly formulated prior to Malawi's independence and was not adopted as a response to South Africa's outward looking policy.

Geography and the Making of Policy

Further, the alleged link between foreign aid and the policy is demonstrated by means of the role which the country's geography is said to have played in formulation of the policy. The geography is said to have left Malawi with no choice but to adopt the policy of "contact and dialogue." Here is a sample of statements which make such claim:

- (1) The Guardian stated that Malawi's relations with the white south have been determined largely by its geography", geography is here said to have determined policy; ⁽⁵¹⁾
- (2) David Humphrey says that Malawi's options are severely constrained by her geographical position", geography is here said to have constrained options"; ⁽⁵²⁾
- (3) Richardson says that "with half of its territory lying in the lap of the Portuguese - landlocked Malawi has been increasingly drawn to the white-dominated states of Southern Africa", geography is here seen to have drawn Malawi towards the south, ⁵³ and
- (4) Hunter says that "harsh realism dictates Malawi policies", geography is here said to have dictated the policies. ⁵⁴

In short, these statements present the country's geography as having determined Malawi's relations with the south, "constrained options", "drawn Malawi towards the south", and "dictated policies". Harold and Margaret Sprout call such statements, "deterministic" or "environmentalist" rhetoric; that is, statements which ascribe human-like purposes to non-human factors.⁵⁵ Here such statements will in short be termed "deterministic" interpretations of the role of a country's geography or operational environment in policy making.

Malawi's operational environment consists of several important components. Together, they constitute a delicate operational environment in relation to the country's policy making. The first component is obviously the size and shape of the country. It is narrow and longish with some parts of it being as narrow as 50 miles or 75 kilometres. The second component is that the hub of its modern communication and economic activity is still in a place, called Blantyre, in the south of the country. This is less than a hundred miles or 125 kilometres from either the eastern or western border with what was, at the time of the country's attainment of independence, Portuguese Mozambique. It is true that many infrastructural changes have now taken place in the country, but Blantyre together with two neighbouring tea-growing districts of Thyolo and Mulanje still bear the imprint of modern Malawi.

The third component is that all of Malawi's major exports are agricultural. These include tea, tobacco, sugar, and groundnuts. They are, in economic terms, low value exports which necessitate the use the shortest and most reliable routes to the world markets. Finally, the fourth component consisted in itself of two parts. The first was the use of the Port of Beira which was governed by the 1950 Convention between Portugal and Britain.⁵⁶ The second was the use and ownership by Malawi of the Lower Zambezi Bridge, then said to be the longest water bridge in the world, and the Trans-Zambezi Railway in Mozambique up to a point on Malawi's southern border. According to a South African by the name of Rhoodie, the bridge was sold to the then Portuguese Government of Mozambique.⁵⁷ Together with the railway line and the use of the port of Beira, it constituted the fourth component of geography.

Each of these factors enhances the significance of the other so that it makes sense to regard them as constituting the country's geography, in this case, geography being a short-hand for the country's problems of landlockedness. For example, the agricultural exports necessitated the use of shorter routes to the sea which, in terms of the concentration of modern economic activity in the south of the longish country, meant the trade routes to the south.

The foregoing is the country's geography which is relevant to the foreign policy making of the country. It is true that it was perceived by the country's decision-makers when they were formulating the country's foreign policies. It is also true that after perceiving it, the President decided to take account of it in the formulation of the policy of "contact and dialogue." For example, a Government publication stated:

"We cannot at this stage contemplate severance of these links imposed upon us by our geography."⁵⁸

Indeed, the policy of "contact and dialogue" is in tune with the country's geography.

However, this does not mean that the "deterministic interpretation" of the country's geography in relation to policy making is correct. It is not. Such an interpretation overlooks the historical relativity of the problem. For example, the British Protectorate of Nyasaland operated almost as if it did not have the problem of geography. It is true that the problem of landlockedness was there but the 600-year-old Anglo-Portuguese Alliance enabled Nyasaland to have an easy access to the sea through the Portuguese-controlled Mozambique. What brought the problem into importance in relation to foreign policy making was the emergence of the state of Malawi: the first African state to emerge in the then still Anglo-Portuguese dominated southern Africa.

This made the country cease to be a beneficiary of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. Therefore, Malawi had to find on its own a modus operandi with the Portuguese-controlled Mozambique. In other words, geography was not in itself important. What suddenly gave it importance was the emergence of Malawi as an African state.

In addition, some information is available which points to the possibility that geography might not have been fully taken into consideration. This is because some of the country's leaders held views which clearly mean that they would not have put much importance to geography in the policy making of the country. For example, one of them put on record the view:

"Portugal would not close its ports to Malawi's massive fee-paying traffic without doing harm to her own economy in Mozambique, nor can South Africa and Rhodesia expel their thousands of Malawi workers, some of whom are highly skilled and experienced without wrecking their own economies."⁵⁹

This is a viewpoint which also endorsed by some experts. For example, McMaster says in her book:

"The benefits of the existing links were not after all, one-sided. Neither South Africa nor Rhodesia accepted Malawian workers as an act of charity. The Malawians were known to be hard workers and were not

a long term responsibility for the governments.

Malawi was a convenient outlet for Rhodesian goods, and Mozambique benefited financially from the transit trade through Beira."⁶⁰

The appalling unsoundness of these arguments is incredible. The crucial point in both of them is, "mutual benefit arrangement". How indispensable this is thought to have been to South Africa and Rhodesia is by no means clear. For it does not take a sophisticated mind to appreciate that this was a false argument. It is true that South Africa did not recruit Malawian labour out of charity. However, one has to bear in mind that both South Africa and Rhodesia also had domestic black labour deliberately kept in reserve. In addition, they had Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland and Botswana from which they could make up any shortfall arising from cessation of their labour recruitment in Malawi.

As an outlet of Rhodesian goods, Malawi was not also important. Rhodesia had alternative outlets. In fact, South Africa was Rhodesia's most important outlet of its goods. Malawi's allegedly "massive fee-paying traffic" was similarly unimportant to the Portuguese in Mozambique. In fact Jorge Jardin provided an answer to this. For example, using 1966 Port of Beira Statistics, he described Malawi as a small market of about 60,000 tons of fuel a year as compared to 180,000 tons of fuel a year for Zambia and 400,000 tons of fuel a year for what is now Zimbabwe.⁶¹

However, the foregoing is a mere digression. The passage is quoted here to show that there were such arguments about the country's geography. These indicate that the geography might not have been fully taken account of in the making and implementation of the country's foreign policies. In this regard, the Sprouts' interpretation of the role of geography in policy making is fully in tune with Malawi's experience. The country's geography became important only because the country's President, unlike some of the other leaders of the country, not only perceived the geography but also decided in his best judgment to take account of it in the formulation of the policy of "contact and dialogue".

Arising from the "deterministic interpretation" of the country's geography in relation to foreign policy making is a certain conception of the policy of "contact and dialogue". Because of its being in tune with the country's geography, the policy is seen as the least cost or easiest option for Malawi. For example, McMaster makes a comparison of Malawi's situation with that of Botswana with a view to demonstrating that Malawi chose the easier option.⁶² Mwakasungura endorses this view and claims that "Malawians were prepared to sacrifice a lot", meaning that the policy of "contact and dialogue" does not involve any sacrifice.⁶³ Richardson expressed the "least cost argument" better. He wrote:

"A strong argument can be made for the premise in the short run that friendship with the south is the only course open to Malawi that is in the economic interests of its people."⁶⁴

This argument rests on a superficial treatment of the relative costs of the policy. It implies an emphasis on the magnitude of the cost of the alternative option. However, what is important in foreign policy formulation is not simply the magnitude of the cost but its incidence. This is because almost any policy option involves a sacrifice. The important question is not about how much is the cost but about who actually pays the price for a decision or who actually meets the consequences of a decision. Therefore, the correct way of assessing the relative cost of the policy is not to make a comparison between Malawi and any other country. That leads to glossing over some important differences. It is to consider where the incidence of the cost of alternative policy options falls. This is what will be attempted here.

The alternative to the policy of "contact and dialogue" had been that of boycott and isolation of the then Portuguese Mozambique and Angola, of Rhodesia, and still of South Africa. This is the policy which is endorsed by the O.A.U. A modified version of it is what McMaster recommends for Malawi.⁶⁵ This thesis has no intention to prescribe policy for Malawi. That is the business of the Malawi decision makers. Therefore, it

confines itself to considering where the incidence of cost of the policy option which McMaster recommends falls and where the incidence of cost of the policy of "contact and dialogue" falls.

No doubt a good example of the policy option favoured by McMaster is that which was followed by independent Mozambique towards South Africa before the Nkomati Accord. South Africa used to call it, "a hostile but pragmatic policy" which consisted of cooperation at the economic level but hostility at the political level with the target country.⁶⁶ Paradoxically, it presupposes internal political stability in the target state. This is because the target country is expected to separate political hostility from economic cooperation. This is what McMaster recommends in her book that Malawi should have adopted. In practice, it would have meant that only the country's Minister of Transport and Communications should deal with the Portuguese in connection with Malawi's use of the Port of Beira and the Railway lines in Mozambique. On the other hand, the Malawi Minister of External Affairs would be expected, not only to shun but also to blast the Portuguese and other colonialists in the subcontinent at the O.A.U., the Commonwealth, and United Nations meetings.

Where then would have the incidence of cost of "contact and dialogue" and of "hostile but pragmatic" option fallen? For "contact and dialogue", the cost would have been

and has indeed been, political. The O.A.U., as stated earlier, favours the policy of boycott and isolation and would have no doubt been happier if Malawi had adopted at least a modified version of this policy. For example, another anonymous writer argued:

"The issues with regard to Portugal are at two levels. The more sophisticated Africans worry that by not "just living with, but loving" the Portuguese, Malawi's prestige in Pan-African circles is very low."⁶⁴

The adoption of the policy of "contact and dialogue", in short, involved going against the popular positions in the O.A.U. This is the political cost which some of the country's leaders found unacceptable. Its incidence fell directly upon the country's decision makers.

It is true that unlike that of the "hostile but pragmatic" option, the cost of "contact and dialogue" is easy to assess because it is the policy which Malawi has followed. However, the former is now possible to assess for two reasons. The first is the availability of the experience of some of the southern African countries which have followed the "hostile but pragmatic" option. The second is the availability of some information on what might have been the Portuguese reaction. On the basis of these two pieces of information, it is possible to get at least an impression of what might have been the cost of the alternative option.

The Mozambiquan experience shows that the South Africans have ignored economic cooperation and have, instead, heeded political hostility between the two countries because they have themselves faced internal political instability. The result has so far been almost catastrophic only on the Mozambiquan side. Since they similarly faced internal political instability soon after Malawi's independence, the Portuguese would have also heeded only the political hostilities. Indeed, Jardin also stated in his book what might have been undertaken by the Portuguese. He wrote:

"However, not all was running smoothly in senior circles of Lisbon. It was also contended that Malawi was double-dealing by furthering Pan-Africanism of which Dr. Banda was supporter, while pretending to keep normal relations with Portugal.

In my frequent visits to Lisbon, that first six months of 1973, I felt the weight of these pressures extended on the government. Among them stood out the influence of General Costa Gomes who during his term in Mozambique as Military Commander had already postulated extreme retaliatory measures against the neighbouring African countries.

All the while, sabotage actions were taking place one after the other along the border with Malawi against the railway line of Matarara to Moatize which served

the huge Cabora Bassa hydro-electric project and the coal mine. The road from Tete to Zobue was now the target of terrorist actions, although it carried essential supplies to Zambia."⁶⁸

In short, the Portuguese would probably have reacted against Malawi more or less like the South Africans have done against Mozambique. Therefore, the incidence of the cost of the "hostile but pragmatic" policy would have fallen directly on the ordinary people.

In terms of magnitude, the cost of the "hostile but pragmatic" option would, indeed, have been quite unacceptable. However, its incidence would not have fallen on the leaders. Instead, it would have fallen directly on the ordinary people. For example, it would have been the ordinary people in border districts of Malawi, Mangochi, Mulanje, Thyolo, Nsanke, Chikwawa, Ntcheu, Dedza, Lilongwe, and Mchinji who would have had to stomach the Portuguese ammunition or suffer the consequences of Portuguese military reprisals. Perhaps this is what Mwakasungura refers to when he claims that "Malawians were prepared to sacrifice a lot."

No doubt, the leaders would have been concerned with the suffering of the people. Nonetheless, they would not have felt the brunt of the policy directly. At the same time, they would have received sympathy from and gained popularity in Pan-African circles. This means that

the incidence of the cost of the option would not have fallen directly on the decision makers. Therefore, from the decision making point of view, the "hostile but pragmatic" option was actually the easier to take.

On the other hand, the incidence of the cost of the "contact and dialogue" option has fallen directly on the country's decision makers. The Malawi government have publicly acknowledged this. They have accepted the consequences of the option. Therefore, from the decision-making point of view, the "contact and dialogue" option was the more difficult one to take by the decision-makers because the incidence of its cost fell directly upon them. It required special courage on the part of the country's leadership. The fact that some of the country's leaders found it unacceptable is a case in point.

This means that the "deterministic" interpretation of a country's geography in relation to decision making obstructs rather than facilitates an accurate understanding of the policy making of a country. Therefore, it is not surprising that those who interpret Malawi's geography that way think of the policy of "contact and dialogue" as the easier option and have mistaken the acquisition of foreign aid as the main objective of the policy.

References To Certain Events

Finally the alleged link between foreign aid and the policy of "contact and dialogue" is supported with references to certain events. A passage from Ajala's article, part of which was quoted earlier illustrates the point. It reads:

"Before the end of 1966, Malawi started secret contacts with the South Africa regime in an effort to secure a loan for her development projects including the building of a new capital. As soon as there were indications that the aid would be forthcoming, Malawi started to attack openly the O.A.U. policy on apartheid. The immediate outcome of this was the signing of trade agreement between Malawi and South Africa in March 1967. This was quickly followed by South African financial and material aid for installing strong radio transmitters in Malawi. The day before the O.A.U. summit began in Kinshasa, Malawi established diplomatic relations with Apartheid regime. Shortly afterwards, South Africa offered Malawi a loan to build a railway linking Malawi with Northern Mozambique."⁶⁹

The passage is littered with distortions some of which are quite amusing. In the first instance it also places the origin of the policy late in 1966. As already stated, this is incorrect. The policy was adopted

immediately after the country's attainment of independence. The "secret contacts" referred to by Ajala, if at all such contacts took place, were incidental to and not the start of the formulation of the policy. Moreover, the sentence contains inaccuracies. What Malawi did was to accept a South African offer of assistance for the construction of its new capital. Malawi did not seek from South Africa a "loan for its development projects". Malawi's development projects are financed mostly with foreign aid. For development projects Malawi at that time approached not South Africa but the World Bank, U.N.D.P., and the donor countries which did not include South Africa.

The second sentence is amusing. Malawi is said to have "started attacking openly the O.A.U. policy on Apartheid" as soon as it saw that South Africa's foreign aid would be forth coming to it. Of course, this in keeping with Ajala's belief that Malawi's policy of "contact and dialogue" was undertaken in order to attract South African foreign aid to Malawi. However, the allegation is false. As Ajala would know, there was then no such a thing as the O.A.U. "Policy on Apartheid". There was the O.A.U. policy towards all the Southern African problems: Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, and South Africa. In fact, the topical issue then was the U.D.I. in Rhodesia and later, Mozambique. South Africa's Apartheid was very much in the background.

The third sentence is curious. A trade agreement is said to be the out-come of Malawi's open attacks against the "O.A.U. policy on Apartheid." Apparently South Africa was so pleased with Malawi's attacks against the "O.A.U. policy on Apartheid" that it just invited Malawi to sign a trade agreement. No such thing took place. The trade agreement was the result of deliberate negotiations between the Governments of South Africa and Malawi. It had nothing to do with Malawi's attacks against the O.A.U. The fourth sentence is also inaccurate. The South African donation was a transmitter for a sub-studio station of the country's Broadcasting Corporation (M.B.C.) at the foot of Zomba Mountain in the south of the country. The powerful national and regional transmitters of the Corporation came from West Germany and the United States.

Finally, the rest of the sentences in the passage need no further attention because they merely juxtapose facts, or events which were quite unrelated to each other and some of which Ajala takes out of their sequence. For example, the establishment of the diplomatic relations between Malawi and South Africa, was not deliberately made to coincide with the O.A.U. summit in that year. These were two events which simply happened that way. There was no significant relationship between them.

Conclusion

Underlying the evidence which has been considered so far in this chapter is the question of perception. The

"foreign aid argument" says that the perceptions of the country's decision makers were influenced by geography and by the availability of aid in other countries. The question of geography had already been considered at length in connection with the policy of "contact and dialogue." The point to be stressed is that the effect of geography on the perceptions of decision makers does not preclude human judgment and did not have that effect even in Malawi's case. Indeed it is itself subject to human judgment. The rest of the evidence examined is cited to demonstrate the manner in which the availability of aid in donor countries allegedly influenced the perception of the country's President.

The question of foreign aid influencing the perceptions of the Malawi authorities is what needs to be summarised in a little more detail. Applying the psychological analysis, the "foreign aid argument" means that the President of Malawi first perceived the availability of foreign aid and then decided to acquire it. He then formulated and adopted policies which would enable him to do so. This is how the formulation of the policies of "discretionary alignment and nonalignment" and "contact and dialogue" would be explained psychologically by the advocates of the foreign aid argument."

According to psychology, the sharper, the message, the easier it is perceived. In terms of the question under consideration, this means that the well known donor

countries and organizations easily influence the perceptions of the decision makers in the aid recipient countries. No doubt, the President of Malawi is and was aware of the countries and organizations in Europe and North America which are important as donors of foreign aid. However, it is doubtful, to say the least, if at all, that the President, as he is often supposed, really perceived Portuguese-controlled Mozambique, U.D.I. Rhodesia, and even South Africa as sources of foreign aid to Malawi. It is doubtful if he perceived them that way because these countries were not even potential donors of aid.

Because of the loans and some aid which it has given to Malawi, South Africa is now regarded by some writers as a foreign aid donor. However, compared to Japan, Denmark, or Canada, South Africa is not yet an aid donor. If the importance of foreign aid in the formulation of Malawi's foreign policies lay in influencing the perceptions of the President, then Malawi should not have followed at least the policy of "contact and dialogue" because more foreign aid has since then been available in countries other than those in Southern Africa. Moreover foreign aid should have by now influenced the President's perceptions away from South Africa to more lucrative sources of foreign aid if foreign aid did indeed influence his perceptions into formulating and adopting the policy of "contact and dialogue." The fact that Malawi has not changed its policies is its proof that these policies were not adopted for reasons of attracting foreign aid to Malawi.

Sweden has been one of the major contributors towards the late 1970s foreign aid boom and is an important donor of foreign aid to a number of countries in Southern Africa. No doubt Sweden provides aid to some Southern African countries for a number of reasons. However, one of them is clearly a recipient country's type of policy towards South Africa. "The concentration of the Nordic Development Assistance to Southern Africa", read a Policy Statement of Nordic Countries, for example, "should, besides the obvious economic needs of the region, also be seen against the background of the overall foreign policy orientation of Nordic countries in the region; i.e. to support and strengthen the independent states and to combat apartheid and minority rule in South Africa and Namibia."⁷⁰ Therefore, the distribution pattern of the Swedish aid to the region is a reasonable basis for examining the contention that the availability of foreign aid influences the perceptions of the decision makers in a foreign aid recipient country.

In connection with a military coup in Lesotho in 1985, Sweden revealed the main motive for which it provides aid to Southern African countries. For example, Borger, a Swedish proponent of "dependency theory," reported in 1986 that Sweden had warned the military government of Lesotho that Sweden's "involvement in Lesotho would be cut drastically if the new Government now aligns itself too closely with Pretoria."⁷¹ The distribution pattern of the Swedish foreign aid to South Africa, therefore

is a very useful means for testing the contention that the availability of South African foreign aid influenced the perceptions of the Malawi decision makers.

Table I on the next page shows figures of Swedish aid to Southern African countries. Apart from Swaziland, the recipients are clearly countries with espouse policies other than that of Malawi towards South Africa. Moreover, the aid figures are quite impressive and attest to the importance of Sweden as an aid donor.

The foregoing means that Malawi should have been swayed away from its current foreign policy towards South Africa if the availability of foreign aid does indeed influence the perceptions of decision makers in a foreign aid recipient country. That Malawi has not done so is, therefore, a matter which raises doubts about the validity of the claim that the perceptions of the Malawi authorities were influenced by the availability of South African foreign aid at the time that they formulated the country's policy of "contact and dialogue."

In other words, the claim that foreign aid influenced the perceptions of Malawi's President at the time that he formulated the country's foreign policies does not stand closer examination. At least the distribution pattern of Swedish foreign aid to Southern Africa has not so far swayed Malawi away from its policy towards South Africa.

TABLE I

TABLE I

Swedish Foreign Aid To Eastern And Southern Africa In \$Million

	64	65	66	67	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	
Botswana					0.1	0.3	0.5	1.2	4.7	6.9	8.4	10.2	10.7	13.0	14.8	13.2	15.2	13.2	11.6	11.0	7.3	16.3	
Kenya	0.12		1.47	2.69	3.8	2.8	3.7	7.7	12.1	17.5	18.9	22.3	18.0	14.3	24.4	28.4	14.5	14.7	15.2	14.2	9.7	14.5	
Lesotho					0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.9	0.7	2.5	2.3	1.4	3.5	3.8	3.8	2.1	3.4	2.6	2.9	6.7	
Malawi															0.1								
Swaziland					0.1	0.6	0.2	0.8	0.7	1.5	2.2	2.3	1.0	3.1	0.8	1.6	4.1	1.2	0.8	3.4	0.6	2.5	
Tanzania	1.07	1.62	2.72	2.20	8.6	7.0	11.2	17.0	31.9	34.4	54.8	51.3	57.4	64.2	93.4	78.1	76.5	73.8	69.3	55.1	49.0	106.4	
Uganda	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01												1.4	2.4	3.8	0.4	0.7	0.2		1.9
Zambia		0.03	0.13	0.16	0.3	0.4	1.0	1.5	2.3	6.1	14.8	7.1	24.3	19.4	23.9	31.1	28.8	27.5	29.4	20.4	22.9	44.9	

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) Annual Reports of Financial Flows To Developing Countries.

Gap: (1) 1968 figures were not available in the O.E.C.D. Reports

(2) Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland figures start from 1969. Two of them became independent in 1968.

NOTES

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Chapter Three

Economic Policies

Introduction

This chapter looks at the evidence for the alleged link between foreign aid and the Malawi economic policies.¹ The discussion will centre on Malawi's economic system and development strategy. These policies present no problems for discussion here because, unlike the foreign policies, they have not been treated as "illusions".² It is true that there have been some criticisms against them, particularly the country's agricultural policies.³ However, the criticisms have not been that these policies are "illusions" but that they are not appropriate for the country.

In addition, the chapter will look at the relation between these policies and technical aid which is the secondment of personnel from a donor government to a recipient government. The issue to consider is the claim that these policies were decided upon by foreign experts. In other words, the discussion will also touch on an issue which goes beyond the question of perception. It will be the start of the consideration of the role of foreign experts which will receive fuller attention in the fifth chapter.

The discussion is in two parts. The first part is a consideration of the evidence which is often cited in support of the alleged link between foreign aid and economic policies. The second part is a consideration of the evidence which is often cited in support of the claim that Malawi's development strategy was decided upon by foreign experts.

Economic System

At the time they gained independence, the African states were concerned with two economic issues. The first issue was the question of economic system and the other was the question of economic development. The latter will be considered later. For the moment, attention will turn to the question of economic system.

The question of economic system is concerned with the place of the individual in an economy. It is about ownership of property or the means of production in a country, about whether it is the individual who should, or the state which should, own property or means of production. According to economic theory, a capitalist system is one which embraces the principle of private ownership of property while the socialist system is one which embraces the principle of state ownership of property. In between these two economic systems is an economic system which is a mixture of private and state ownership of property. Therefore, it follows that

The discussion is in two parts. The first part is a consideration of the evidence which is often cited in support of the alleged link between foreign aid and economic policies. The second part is a consideration of the evidence which is often cited in support of the claim that Malawi's development strategy was decided upon by foreign experts.

Economic System

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capitalist policies promote and protect a capitalist economy, or economic system, while socialist economic policies promote and protect a socialist economy, or economic system. Since the Western economies are generally regarded as capitalist and are, indeed, the major sources of foreign aid, it follows that a developing country which embraces capitalist economic policies would be favoured by the donor countries and organizations.

Quotations from the President's Speeches

Some of the evidence which is often cited in support of the alleged link between foreign aid and the country's economic policies is the capitalist description of the policies. This is done on the basis of quotations from some speeches made by the country's President. For example, The Times quoted the President as saying:⁴

"I personally don't like communism and I do not believe in it. But I understand it and know why it came about in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."

This was a part of a statement which the President made when he received in audience members of a Romanian delegation in Malawi. It portrays the President as a firm believer of capitalism. Mwakasungura also quoted him, telling a Malawi Congress Party Annual Conference that:

"On the subject of different systems of government and economics - Communism, Socialism, and Capitalism - I am glad that you have decided that whatever our neighbors may do or say, the only practical system of government and economics is that which passes for capitalism."⁵

Mwakasungura made this quotation in support of his claim that the President spoke in a language consistent with the World Bank "philosophy". Andrew Ross similarly wrote that the President told a meeting of the Malawi Tea Association that nationalization "would be suicide for Malawi."⁶ In short, the evidence is in part the claim that Malawi's economic policies are capitalist. This claim is in turn used as evidence for the argument that the country's domestic policies were adopted for foreign aid reasons.

The quotations look like evidence only because they are made out of context. It is true that the Malawi Congress Party made a decision on the question of the country's economic system at its annual conference in September, 1968. However, foreign aid was not the reason for which the decision was made. For example, foreign aid did not even feature in the deliberations among the Party delegates, nor did it feature at an earlier conference at which the issue was also considered. The latter conference was a political educational conference of the Party which was convened exclusively to consider the

different socio-economic systems existent in the world then. That the decision was not made for foreign aid reasons is, perhaps, amply demonstrated by the reasons for which the party education conference was convened. These were the prevailing world situation and some developments in neighbouring countries.

The prevailing world situation was the superpower confrontational relationship arising from the ascendancy of a communist ideology which led the world to be divided into two blocs: Eastern and Western blocs. Cuba had emerged from a Batista regime and was moving fast along the socialist path to development as also was the new state of Algeria in North Africa. In North Vietnam and North Korea, national reunification issues were similarly being pursued on the basis of socialist programmes. The fashion, among the emerging states, was to go socialist. This created pressure upon the other newly independent states to indicate their alignment. In political terms, it meant that a new state had to align itself with the East, with the West, or with none. In economic terms, it meant that a new state had to embrace socialism, capitalism, or a mixture of socialism and capitalism. Like many other new states, Malawi had to make a choice among these three economic systems.

The second factor, perhaps the immediate cause of the Party's decision, were developments in the neighbouring countries.⁷ To the north, Tanzania adopted the Arusha

Declaration which set it on a socialist path to development. To the West, Zambia adopted the Mulungushi Declaration which also set that country on a humanist path to development. Even in far off Uganda, a Common Man's Charter which would have set that country on a socialist path to development was adopted. For Malawi, the question then was: which way to go?

In short, the two important factors were the ascendance of the socialist ideology in the world and the adoption of some varied versions of this ideology in the neighbouring countries. It was these developments rather than foreign aid which accounted for the convening in May 1968 of the Party political conference on the question of what economic system the country should follow.

It is true that these two factors do not preclude the possibility that foreign aid might have also influenced the Party's choice of the economic system for the country. Therefore, hypothetically, it can be legitimately contended that the choice was made with a view to enhancing Malawi's prospects of securing foreign aid. However, such a hypothesis is not valid because, as already pointed out, foreign aid was not on the agenda of the conference and did not feature in the deliberations among the Party delegates. Moreover, the politics of foreign aid is really a matter among a handful of people, usually civil servants, in the developing countries so that it cannot sensibly be assumed that the delegates went

to the conference conscious of the country's requirements for aid.

If there were anyone who might have gone to the conference conscious of the country's need for aid, then it must have been the President himself. Obviously, he was the most important factor in the decisions at the conference. Indeed, the President had, on other occasions, made speeches which explained in great detail the differences among the different economic systems in the world. One other such occasion was the Party political conference already referred to and another was a meeting at a debating club in Zomba, the country's former capital, as far back as April, 1964. If at all foreign aid had in advance influenced the perceptions of anyone at the September 1968 Party conference, then that someone must have been the President. Therefore, the question which needs to be considered is that of whether foreign aid was indeed uppermost in the President's mind when he addressed the Party conference.

However, even if one concentrates attention on the President, there are still not sufficient grounds to suppose that foreign aid influenced the Party decision. For example, the President did not even make any reference to foreign aid in his speech. In addition, capitalism was not exactly what he preferred. An examination of the speeches which he made at the time shows exactly what he preferred and what the Party decided upon.

When looking at his speeches, one finds an interesting, delicate balance of thought in them. Therefore, one has to be careful when quoting them. For example, the balance of thought is sometimes in a paragraph or between paragraphs in a speech. Sometimes, the balance is between two different speeches. A good example is a paragraph in a speech to the 1968 Party conference in May. Its second sentence reads:

"Therefore, I do not believe in either communism or socialism for Malawi - I believe in capitalism."⁸

Left on its own, this sentence indeed gives the impression that the President was advocating here a full blown capitalism for the country. However, this would be to misunderstand the President because the next sentence in the paragraph balances it. It reads:

"But I believe in honest and fair capitalism - that is the cooperation between private enterprise and the government."⁹

This clearly takes much of the heat out of the full blown capitalism he is supposed to espouse. Similarly, another paragraph in the speech to the September Party Conference creates a misleading impression if left on its own. It reads:

"Therefore, I am not afraid of the word, capitalism, at all. Here in Malawi, we cannot afford anything else. Where are the rich people for us to tax? We have got no millionaires here. Therefore, we cannot afford it."¹⁰

As can be seen, this gives the impression that full blown capitalism was also being advocated here for the country. However, this would be to misunderstand the President because the next paragraph provides balance to it. This reads:

"But even in America, rigid capitalism is no longer permitted. The Government has certain control. In Britain, it has even more control. So here, too, we will not let capitalism run wild and get away with murder in this country. Capitalism under control and regulated, but capitalism just the same, not communism or socialism."¹¹

This clearly put in an important qualification to the capitalism which Malawi would follow. It was what the leader preferred and what the Malawi Congress Party decided on.

The speech at the debating club in Zomba actually elaborated on the sort of system which Malawi would follow. A paragraph of it reads:

"For myself, if I may be honest and frank with you, I prefer the kind of economic and political life, or political and economic system, which they have in Britain and the Scandinavian countries. Under the economic and political system, such as operates in Britain and the Scandinavian countries, the state has a great deal of power of control over business and businessmen, but without owning all the means of production and distribution and without power of conscription over both capital and labour, except in times of war. As I have stated, in Britain, the state owns some means of distribution, such as airways and railways. Outside and beyond this control, business and businessmen or individual citizens are free to do what they like. They have a choice. In Russia, it is not a question of just exercising control at all. There, the state is the owner of everything and it orders you what to do. There is no question of persuasion first and control afterwards. No. From the very beginning, you are ordered what to do, whether it be to till the land or to work in the factory."¹²

Clearly, this was the sort of socio-economic system which the President actually preferred. It is a mixed economic system in which the state and private enterprises would cooperate.

Finally, another example of the balance of thought in the President's speeches is discernible in connection with the question of nationalization. A brief statement which was published in a journal called World Development reads, for example:

"Last year, the Companies Act was amended to give the government power to initiate discussions with these firms on the question of local participation. In view of some of the fears expressed, I emphasize that this amendment was designed solely to facilitate emergence of mutually acceptable arrangements. There can be no question of using it as a sort of back door nationalization, a policy we do not entertain in Malawi.

"On the other hand, Malawi must not and cannot be allowed to be anyone's commercial or industrial colony."¹³

The thought in this passage balanced in another statement on nationalization, a part of which reads:

"I just wanted to make that remark, Mr. Speaker, so that anyone who thinks, if say, "we are pulling out, we are going to be left in the lurch, in the air," they are deceiving themselves. I organized the Development Corporation so that whenever private enterprise is hesitant or afraid, the Government itself, through the Development Corporation can go

in. This is not state socialism, but, if private enterprise is afraid and hesitant, I will be forced to introduce in this country state socialism or the alternative.

"I am not going to wait. We want development in this country, and we are going to develop this country by all means, by all ways open to us. Private enterprise, if private enterprise is willing; state enterprise if private enterprise is afraid and hesitant."¹⁴

The passage, if not read very carefully, gives one the impression that the Malawi Government would go for outright nationalization. This, indeed, is the impression which some observers got from it. However, such an impression is incorrect because the passage makes it clear that nationalization would be carried out only if private enterprise would be afraid and hesitant to operate in Malawi. Otherwise, the Malawi Government has indeed shunned nationalization as was made abundantly clear in the statement quoted earlier.

In short, the quotations are taken out of context and distort the President's thoughts. The president expressed preference for a mixed economy and not for a capitalist economy. Therefore, these quotations are not a sound evidence for the argument that these policies were adopted

to make Malawi attractive to donor countries and organizations.

The Nature of Malawi's Economic System

The other evidence which is also cited in support for the argument that the country's economic policies were adopted for foreign aid considerations is the nature of Malawi's economy, or economic system. For example, the economy is described by some writers as capitalist or market-oriented. "We shall also examine some of the policy options open to the government," wrote Thandika Mkandawire, "given its resource-based, international conjuncture, and the capitalist mode of production,"¹⁵ a point which is endorsed by Mwaskasungura who also wrote:

"... the organization of production has been geared towards a fetish of capitalist methods of production and marketing."¹⁶

"Countries which have followed a more market-oriented strategy," wrote Acharya, a World Bank expert, "includes Ivory Coast, Kenya, and Malawi."¹⁷ In short, Malawi's economy is said to be "open", "market-oriented", or "capitalist".

Some of these quotations are indeed mere descriptions of the country's economic policies. However, it will be recalled that the capitalist label is used by some

writers, including McMaster and Mwakasungura, as evidence that the country's economic policies were adopted in order to attract foreign aid.¹⁸ Therefore, the question which has to be considered now is whether Malawi's economy has really been "capitalistic".

That the country's economy has, or economic policies have, not really been capitalist is a point which is made even by some observers. "Policies to enhance agricultural and industrial performance," reported an International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.) representative, "focus on a restoration of liberal market-oriented economic and financial policies, and particularly on appropriate price and production incentives to encourage private sector production," a surprising comment in the light of the claims examined earlier.¹⁹ Andrew Meldrum also reported that although the President "professes to be an advocate of free enterprise, the I.M.F. team found his control of the economy excessive."²⁰

This observation is not new. For example, Simon Thomas wrote at the beginning of the 1970s that the President "has at the same time led a movement towards large scale enterprise which, given its political backing, might be more accurately described as quasi-state capitalism." He went on:

"While large Western enterprise has been encouraged, there has been no hesitation in setting up state

enterprises, taking shareholdings in private enterprise, or outright nationalization."²¹

Holder Williams made a similar observation. He wrote:

"The conservatism of Malawi can be overstressed. In recent years, there has been a growing programme of central control. The wholly government - owned Malawi Development Corporation, and Malawi Railways control between them upwards of 30 per cent of the country's economy."²²

Of late, Kydd and Christiansen have put it plainly "... that economic policy in Malawi has been much less market-oriented than Acharya would have us believe."²³ Thus some writers think that the country's economy, or economic policy, has not been as market-oriented as other writers say.

What is one to make of these conflicting views about the nature of Malawi's economy or economic system? The answer here is that the conflicting views attest to the point which was made earlier in this discussion; that is the point that the President expressed preference not for a capitalist economy but for a mixed economy. The latter is what the country's economy actually has been. A look at it shows just that.

The main features of the country's economy are public and private enterprises. The word "public" is used here in a Malawian sense. It means the same as "state", "statutory", or "parastatal" when used in reference to economic enterprises. Of these three words, "public" and "statutory", are the most popular terms in Malawi, the word "statutory" being the term frequently used by the Government. Therefore, by public enterprise is meant enterprises which are owned by the State or enterprises in which the state owns a controlling interest, or majority shares. On the other hand, by private enterprise is meant those enterprises in which the State owns no share.

A study of these features of the economy can conveniently be done by dividing the economy into external and domestic sectors. The former is essentially the country's agricultural sector. This is the mainstay of the country's economy because it is the main foreign exchange earning sector for the country. Its products include tobacco, tea, sugar, and ground nuts, a list which in the past also included cotton and rice. The sector can also be subdivided into sub-sectors: the small holder sub-sector and the estate sub-sector. The former sub-sector comprises almost the whole 80 per cent of the rural population of the country. The participants in this sector are called small holders because they produce crops for home consumption and for sale on small holdings of land ranging from three to even ten acres per person.

Together, they produce all the ground nuts and cotton for export and almost half the country's tobacco export.

As the mode of production is geared towards private gain, the small holder sub-sector is indeed market-oriented. The farmers retain what they produce or retain what they earn by selling the surplus of what they produce. The main public element in this sub-sector is the government controlled marketing operation. This is in the form of a statutory body (or QUANGO, to use the late 1970s popular term in Britain), called the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), which purchases all the small holder crops and sell them on the world market. The Corporation was created to act as a countervailing force to a monopsonistic situation, that is a situation of a few buyers facing the numerous small holder producers. This is the only public element. Otherwise, the sub-sector is by and large indeed market-oriented.

The estate sub-sector is small in terms of its participants, but produces more than half of the export crops, tobacco and tea. The holding in this sub-sector is really large and ranges from twenty-five acres to even a thousand acres. It has expanded quite considerably in the independence era because many local Malawians are now participants in it. These new estate owners, like the old ones, are independent producers and are not supported with foreign aid. In fact, most of them own estates outside

the integrated development project areas. Their market operations are capitalist. For example, each one of them sells his crop directly on the country's auction floors, one of which is among the largest and most modern in sub-Saharan Africa. However, their mode of production is mixed. While many of the estate owners are indeed private individuals and companies, the state is also an estate owner, in fact, one of the largest, through ADMARC which owns many tea and tobacco estates.

In summary, the agricultural sector is mixed in terms of mode of production and marketing. However, the private enterprise in it is larger than the public enterprise.

In comparison, the domestic sector is smaller than the agricultural sector in terms of foreign exchange earnings. However, the sector is larger than the agricultural sector as a domestic revenue-generating sector. For example, the Government gets most of its revenue through duties and surtax levied on imports and manufactured goods. Because of the size of the public enterprise in it, it can conveniently be subdivided into public and private sub-sectors.

The public sub-sector has seen the fastest growth since the country's attainment of independence and is the basis of development planning in Malawi. Its parts are the Government itself and the Government-owned companies, the statutory bodies, including ADMARC. The

Government's involvement is in the form of development projects, including the large integrated rural development projects which are a form of large government economic intervention.

The statutory bodies are also a form of Government involvement in the country's commercial sector. Unlike the integrated rural development projects, they are a sort of indirect state involvement in the economy in that the corporations are run autonomously of the Government. The largest of them are ADMARC and the Malawi Development Corporation (MDC). Through them, the Government owns majority shares in a host of companies called MDC and ADMARC subsidiaries. To these two statutory giants and their subsidiaries have to be added other equally important statutory bodies like the Electricity Supply Commission of Malawi (ESCOM), the Blantyre and Lilongwe Water Boards, Malawi Housing Corporation (M.H.C.), Malawi Railways, and Air Malawi, to mention a few. Together, they form quite a substantial public enterprise.

The private sub-sector has also grown quite considerably since the country's attainment of independence. However, its pace of growth has been slower than that of the public sub-sector and its symbol of growth was, up to 1984, a locally-based private company called Press Holdings. This has its own subsidiaries and stands head and shoulder with the statutory giants, ADMARC and MDC. Other private companies include LONHRO and its

subsidiaries, Mandala Motors, the British and American Tobacco Company (B.A.T.) and a mechanical engineering company called, Brown and Clapperton Limited. In addition, most of the wholesale and retail trade are in private hands, mostly Asians. Together, these form quite a substantial private enterprise though probably smaller than the public enterprise.

This large public enterprise did not come about as a result of a deliberate nationalization policy. On the contrary, the Malawi Government has all along shunned nationalization. Rather, the public enterprise grew out of a swift pace of economic development which the country has experienced since the attainment of independence. It is true that the country has also received substantial private investments from abroad. However, these foreign private investments, to say nothing of local private investments, could simply not cope with the pace of economic development which has taken place in the country. Therefore, the Government had to move in through ADMARC and MDC. This is why the public sector is also large.

This means that neither the capitalist label nor the socialist label would be accurate as a description of Malawi's economy. Malawi simply has a mixed economic system which is more or less like the one for which the President expressed a preference during the early years of Malawi's independence. Therefore, the nature of the

country's economy is often mistakenly cited as evidence for the argument that the country's economic policies were adopted to attract foreign aid.

Development Strategy

Among the economic policies which are said to have been adopted for reasons of foreign aid is the country's development strategy. This is also seen to be capitalist or market-oriented. The Malawi Government, Mkandawire wrote, "has been remarkably consistent in pursuance of a capitalist path of development."²⁴ This is a point which was also made by David Humphrey, former lecturer at the country's University. "In development terms," he wrote in connection with the President's long stay in America and Britain, "this appears to have been a significant factor in the formulation of an essentially capitalistic development strategy for the country..."²⁵

The issue to be considered at the moment is not that this policy was undertaken in order to attract foreign aid. That has already received adequate attention in the discussion. What is to be considered now is the argument that this policy was decided upon by foreign experts, particularly the country's ex-colonial civil servants.

This is a policy which is concerned with a controversial issue: development. So, before examining the evidence which is often cited in support of the argument that the policy was

decided upon by the expatriate officers, some considerable time has to be devoted to the definition of development.

Development refers to economic growth in relation to population growth of the country. The key concept is economic growth which is the increase in the volume of the value-added of goods and services produced in a country in a year. This is measured in terms of the concept of gross domestic product (G.D.P.). Development is said to occur if the increase in it, in G.D.P., is greater than the increase in a country's population. This is called G.D.P. per capita or gross per capita product which can be presented mathematically as $D = \frac{\Delta \text{GDP}}{\Delta \text{PO}}$, where "D" stands for development, the symbol " Δ " stands for the expression, "increase in" and "PO" stands for population.²⁶ If $\Delta \text{G.D.P.}$ is equal to ΔPO , development is said to have not taken place. This is the basic definition of development although it is often subjected to severe criticisms and is regarded as old-fashioned "cold utilitarian calculations."²⁷

Malawi attained independence in 1964 with a low G.D.P. or per capita product of K160 million and a population of 3 million. This was one of the lowest G.D.P.s and the basis on which Malawi has since then been classified by the United Nations as one of the least developed, or during the impolite moments, poorest countries. Since then, the G.D.P. has grown to K2,657.8 million and the population to 8 million by 1987, giving a

gross per capita product of K342.4.²⁸ "Since independence in 1964," says a World Bank report, "Malawi has presented one of the major development successes in Africa." "Although Malawi is a small landlocked country, without major mineral resources, with little manpower, and rudimentary industrial development," the report goes on, "it has been able to increase G.D.P. per capita at almost six per cent a year..."²⁹ This favourable presentation of the country's economic performance by a prestigious Western multilateral institution has naturally provoked some acidic and angry criticisms against the Malawi Government from the opponents of the Government. "In Malawi," Mwakasungura objects, for example, "the present government seems to glory in production statistics..."³⁰

The foregoing criticism is a good reflection of certain views which object to defining development in terms of G.D.P. on the grounds that such a definition of development takes the distribution of the benefits of economic growth for granted. The critics say that the adherents to this definition of development assume that economic growth would on its own trickle down to every section of the country's population. This, the critics say, does not happen in reality. Instead, economic growth can and does take place without benefiting the poor masses in a developing country. This is the ground on which the G.D.P. per capita dubbed, "trickle down theory", is often objected to as a measure of development.³¹ For example, the Brandt Commission argued that "statistical measure-

ments of growth excludes the crucial element of social welfare, of individual rights, and of values not measured by money,"³² a point which is also echoed by Walter Rodney who says:

"In considering the question of development away from the state of underdevelopment, it is of supreme importance to realize that such a process demands the removal of the gross inequalities of land distribution, property holding and income, which are camouflaged behind income figures."³³

How is development to be defined? "It is widely recognized" claims the Brandt Commission, "that development involves a profound transformation of the entire economic and social structure."³⁴

These criticisms against the G.D.P. per capita, though quite noble sentiments, need not be taken seriously. They are merely pious platitudes because when it comes to comparing levels of economic prosperity among states or when it comes to determining what is happening in a country's economy, the tendency is even by the critics themselves, to fall back on the same good old "cold utilitarian calculations"; the G.D.P. per capita. For example, Rodney confessed:

"Nonetheless, the per capita income is a useful statistic for comparing one country with another;

and the developed countries all have per capital incomes several times higher than any one of the recently independent African nations."³⁵

He then went on listing a number of countries in Africa, including Malawi, with their low per capita income figures to show that they have not yet achieved development.³⁶ This tendency to fall back on the G.D.P. as a measure of development is due to the fact that many of those definitions of development which are thought to be better than the G.D.P. per capita vary in emphasis and are vague.³⁷ The "transformation of entire economic and social structure", for example, is vague and lacks the mathematical precision of the G.D.P. per capita and thus cannot serve as an indication of what is really happening in an economy.

Therefore, development is taken here to mean economic growth as measured by G.D.P. This is also the Malawi Government's definition of development as well as the World Bank's. The manner in which Malawi has been going about realizing economic growth each year is what constitutes the operational approach to development, or the development strategy. This is what writers like Thomas and Mwakasungura claim was the work of foreign experts, particularly the British expatriates.

References to Certain Agricultural Schemes

Part of the evidence which is cited in support of the argument that the country's development strategy was decided upon by foreign experts are references to some agricultural development schemes of the country. These are the Achikumbe scheme, a land ownership which has now locally gone on record as Ndunda, the farmers clubs, and development of estate agriculture. These schemes are regarded as a revival of the country's past colonial schemes of "master farmer" and estate agriculture. This, it will be recalled, is the argument which Thomas and Mwakasungura made.³⁸ "Little difference can be seen," Thomas argues, for example, "between the approaches of President Banda and the colonial regime."³⁹ "The Achikumbe", Mwakasungura also argues "were to be the "white guards" of a resurrection of the colonial "master or Progressive Farmers" scheme that the colonial government had assiduously tried to promote without success towards the end of their rule."⁴⁰

Humphrey is the one who started this argument. For example, he wrote in connection with what he regarded as the capitalist nature of Malawi's development strategy:

"This is likely because of the Achikumbe policy outlined earlier by which resources for rural development are being channeled towards commercially most successful small holders who are increasingly

becoming a capitalist farming elite often employing considerable numbers of labour."⁴¹

This is an incorrect assessment, or presentation, of the Achikumbe scheme. However, the point of interest at the moment is that this sentence links the scheme to several other agricultural schemes in the country. The key expressions are "capitalist farming elite" and "employing considerable numbers of labour. These expressions and others in the sentence portray Achikumbe as privileged and progressive farmers able to employ many workers.

Though incorrect, Thomas draws from it and in turn, Mwakusungura draws a lot from Thomas's argument. Both Thomas and Mwakasungura have then proceeded to present the Achikumbe scheme as a revival of past colonial schemes of "master farmer" and "estate farming". For example, Mwakasungura wrote that "the policy choice of a rural development strategy based on estate agriculture by the Malawi Government, therefore, was fundamentally ideological, intended to benefit the few who would graduate into Achikumbe as against the majority of Anthu Wamba (the ordinary people) who would be victims of exploitations."⁴²

Thus the Achikumbe scheme is linked explicitly to estate agriculture and implicitly to the colonial "master farmer" scheme by Mwakasungura. This is done through the use of the expression, "would graduate", which portrays

Achikumbe as being "progressive", a term which Thomas presents as the common feature between a "master farmer" scheme and the Achikumbe scheme. Mwakasungura makes the links among these schemes explicit in another argument which says that the country's President "... assumed the role played by Sir Harry Johnston, that of issuing land ownership certificates to individuals and companies bestowing them the land title of Achikumbe..."⁴³ Sir Harry Johnston was the first Commissioner and Consul-General (Governor) of the British Protectorate of Nyasaland, now Malawi, who is associated with the distribution of land into estates to white settlers or farmers in the country. This means that Achikumbe is a land ownership scheme and a revival of colonial agricultural policies.

In short, Humphrey started the argument that Achikumbe, the colonial "master farmers", and estate farming schemes in Malawi are one and the same scheme. Thomas and Mwakasungura have not only endorsed this argument, but also used it to support their own arguments which say that these schemes are a revival of past colonial schemes of "master farmer" and estate agriculture. It is on this ground that Mwakasungura, at least, explicitly states that the country's development strategy was decided upon by the British expatriates.⁴⁴

The way Humphrey, Thomas, and Mwakasungura confuses these schemes is by attributing a feature of one scheme to

another. The key schemes have been Achikumbe and the "master farmer" schemes. The former is presented as a land ownership scheme, as a "privileged farmers" scheme, as a "progressive farmers" scheme, and as employers of considerable numbers of farm labourers. By doing so, these writers have presented the Achikumbe scheme as being the same as the other schemes. However, a close look at the history of the agricultural sector of the country's economy sheds a different light. ⁴⁵

The country's agriculture in the colonial days consisted of two sub-sectors; the estate agriculture, or farming, and the African agriculture which was sometimes scornfully referred to as "native agriculture".⁴⁶ After independence, they came to be known as "small-holder agriculture". The former was dominated by the white settlers who owned the land on private ownership basis. These produced tea, tobacco, and at one time, tung oil for export. Their holdings are large running thousands of acres and employing hundreds of workers called tenants. Only a handful of Africans or "natives", as they were called, participated in this sub-sector.

The other sub-sector consisted of numerous small holders, some of whom produced such crops as maize and cassava mainly for home consumption. The others grew such crops as tobacco, cotton ground nuts and rice for sale to ADMARC, which in turn exported them. Their land holdings varied in size from less than half an acre to even twenty

acres in some cases. They owned land by custom which was regarded then as belonging to the crown in Britain. The customary land, as it was called, was utilized by the small holders only at the pleasure of the Crown which in practice meant the colonial Government of the territory. They could be dispossessed of it as and when the situation necessitated by, say, the arrival of new European settlers.

Late in the 1950s, the colonial Government introduced the "master farmer" scheme in the small holder agricultural sector. This was a private land ownership and new farming methods scheme. It involved issuance of a deed to a small holder for his holding which varied in size from fifteen to twenty acres. This was surveyed and demarcated, and fenced by the agricultural officials. Once registered, the "master farmer" received preferential treatment in terms of the Government's extension aid services, credit facilities like farm implements and fertilizers, and the marketing of his crops, particularly tobacco and cotton. He was really the privileged farmer that Humphrey talks about. He was like an estate owner in that he owned the land on strictly private ownership basis, but was different from the former because his holding was very small. He could not employ "considerable numbers of labourers" because of the small size of his holding. In fact, the "master farmer" used to employ mostly family labour while the estate owners do indeed employ hundreds of labourers or tenants.

This scheme which was known in the local language, Chichewa, as Malimidwe was aimed at promoting good land husbandry by giving the small holder security of land tenure. However, the scheme fell into disrepute for three reasons. The first reason was that it was used as a means for recruiting, among the small holders, supporters of the now defunct Central African Federation which was bitterly opposed by an overwhelming majority of the country's population. The second reason was that some coercion was used for enforcing some agricultural measures such as soil conservation, crop rotation, and early uprooting of tobacco stalks. As the work on the farm was done largely on a family labour basis, this meant a lot of hard work, failure of which meant paying fines to the Government or three months imprisonment. The third reason was, in the view of the writer, the mistaken belief that Africans practise communal as opposed to private ownership of land. This shut off the authorities from a proper study of the implications of the scheme once its implementation started.

One of the still persistent old myths about Africa is the belief that Africans practise communal ownership of land. Many Africans, particularly the "progressive" or the "patriotic third world scholars", to use Mwakasungura's term, have fully clasped this idea to their hearts and brandish it as a natural favourable condition for building socialism in Africa. By it is meant that the land is regarded as belonging to everyone and that African chiefs

are mere custodians of the land. Europeans regard this form of land ownership as wasteful and uneconomic because, they argue, it does not provide an incentive for an individual to take good care of the land he uses. The "master farmer" scheme was intended to change it.

However, the actual situation, at least in some parts of Malawi, has been different from what the popular myth of communal ownership of land portrays. For example, traditional land utilization in some parts of Malawi fall into two parts. A portion of land in a locality or area is for communal use such as grazing livestock, fetching firewood, and burying the dead. This is the portion of land which is indeed for communal use and not for private use. Another portion of land in the same locality is for private use, such as building one's hut or huts or cultivating crops. Those pieces of land which are put to such private uses are to all intent and purposes regarded as belonging to each of those who utilize the land in that way and it is better not to pretend otherwise. The implication of this for the attempts to collectivise farming at least in some African countries should be obvious.

Moreover, each locality has identified owners known in Chichewa as eni ntunda (owners of land or area), eni nthaka (owners of the soil), or eni dera (owners of the area). These are one or two extended families, members of whom own a portion of the land or area. These are

recognized as owners of the land by virtue of having been the first to settle in the area or the first to cultivate the land. This means that there are two groups of people in each area, the owners of the land and those who are not. The latter are those who came in search of land to settle or cultivate. They are known as akudza or atikhale nao (land seekers). These utilize or used to utilize the land at the pleasure of the former group.

This means two important facts as far as traditional land utilization is concerned. The first is that there have always been owners of land in African society, at least in some parts of Malawi. The second is that individual ownership of land has also always been latent in African societies, particularly African agricultural societies. This became increasingly pronounced as the number of the members of the extended families in ownership of a given piece of land increased. In other words, the communal use of the land decreased as the population of an African agricultural society increased in a locality.

The "master-farmer" scheme was offered to anyone interested and cultivated (not owned) a piece of land large enough to be demarcated into a "master farm." This was largely a matter between an individual and the agricultural officials in a given locality. As a result, the implementation of the scheme blurred the distinction between the "owners of the land" and the "land seekers". The consequences were that the scheme was opposed. It was seen as a scheme designed to take the land away from the

rightful owners. Azunqu afuna kutilanda dziko kudzera msikimu imeneyi (Europeans want to take away our land through this "master farmer" scheme) was the suspicion among the small holders. In brief, this is the history of the agricultural sector of the country's economy.

Upon the attainment of independence, the Malawi Government embarked upon a development strategy which has put emphasis on the small holder agriculture. The first two loans which the Government obtained from the International Development Association (I.D.A.) went to the small holder agriculture. These were used to finance the first two large small holder development projects which are now known as the integrated rural development projects, such as the Lilongwe Land Development Project. In the process of implementing these projects, sub-schemes mushroomed. The need to distribute improved crop seeds and fertilizers led to the emergence of the farmers club schemes while an attempt to reorganize land ownership in the Lilongwe scheme led to the emergence of the Ndunda scheme. Also the need to motivate small holder farmers led to the introduction of the Achikumbe scheme.

The exact origin of these sub-schemes need not receive further attention. This is because the argument by Thomas and Mwakasungura is not that these schemes were initiated by the expatriates, but that the schemes are the same as the colonial "master farmer" scheme. Therefore,

attention is here centred only on whether the schemes are similar to the two colonial schemes of "master farmer" and estate agriculture.

The Ndunda scheme evolved out of the Government's attempt to reorganise land ownership in the Lilongwe Land Development Project area. In its evolved form, the scheme consists of a deed which is issued to an extended family, the members of which are listed in the deed. Each member listed has an equal right to a piece of land which varies in size from two to fifteen acres. Within the Ndunda, the inheritance of the piece of the land passes on to the children and grandchildren of each member listed in the deed. The issuance of the deed and the Government recognition of the family, which is a relatively narrower basis of ownership, are what distinguish Ndunda from the communal ownership of land and its purpose is to make members of the extended family aware that their land is limited.

The implementation of the scheme shattered the long standing myth of communal ownership of land. Its introduction was premised on the prevailing conviction then that the small holders in the area to which the scheme was confined, like other Africans, practised communal, as opposed to individual ownership of land. The new scheme was initially intended to bestow to each small holder private ownership of land. However, the executors of the scheme, some of whom were expatriate project

officials, soon discovered that, contrary to popular belief, there ha all along been owners of land on the basis of a family in every part of the area which was covered by the scheme. The successful implementation of the scheme owes much to the Government's acceptance of this fact. Thomas argued that the scheme was modified because of opposition from the small holders. "To obtain acquiescence from those affected," he wrote, "the government had to alter ownership proposals from an individual to an extended family basis."⁴⁷

It is true that there was initially some opposition to the scheme in its original form. However, the opposition was not to the scheme as such but to its implications. The problem was that it would have led to giving land even to those who did not own land by custom in a locality. This realization led to changes in the implementation of the scheme. Emphasis shifted from treating everyone in a locality as being eligible for land ownership to identifying owners of the land first and bestowing the ownership of land only after everyone in a locality had been consulted to ascertain those who truly deserve to receive land ownership.

The word Ndunda refers to a mold of earth or soil which small holders make to separate one small holder, Munda, from another. The word now has acquired a new meaning. It denotes an area or piece of land for which a deed is issued by the Government to a family, family in a

local sense. The owners of the Ndunda enjoy no privileges and the scheme has so far been confined to the Lilongwe Land Development Project area.

The Achikumbe scheme is an award scheme. It is not a land ownership scheme and was established to encourage farmers to do well in farming. The scheme involved the award, not of a land title, but of a certificate of distinction to a successful farmer, mainly the small holder, regardless of whether such a farmer owned land privately or was in an area covered by a development project. Almost all the recipients of the certificate were small holders, meaning peasants who own by custom one, two, three, or even five acres of land. To qualify for the certificate, they had to produce, on their holding, or Munda, better and increased yields of maize, rice or cotton. The scheme is really nothing more than a system of incentives which can be made operational in any economic system whether socialist or capitalist.

The word, Achikumbe, is a Chichewa word and comes from the verb Kumba, meaning dig or till. The digger is called Mchikumbe, and the diggers, Achikumbe. It is, in this case, used in a figurative sense because digging even in Chichewa does not necessarily mean tilling, or farming. The Chichewa word for tilling or farming is kulima and for tillers, or farmers, alimi. The word Mchikumbe is used because tilling by the country's small holders is done by hand, using a hoe. It looks as if one

is digging. Since this is the harder and energy-sapping part of the small holder's work, the small holder who excels in terms of the size of the holding and the quality and quantity of the yield of crops grown on a Munda is called Mchikumbe, meaning a successful hard worker or farmer. This is why the term was selected for the scheme.

The scheme, unlike Ndunda which is confined only to the area covered by the Lilongwe Land Development Project, is countrywide in its coverage and ownership of the certificate is not, on the contrary, accorded any privileges. It recognizes progressive farming not on the basis that someone has dutifully followed modern methods of farming prescribed to him but on the basis that someone has achieved, by whatever means, increased and better yields of the crops which he grows.

The farmers clubs are voluntary associations which have been set up to facilitate the distribution of farm inputs, particularly in the integrated rural development project areas. The reason was that these projects involved, among other things, distribution of fertilizers and improved crop seeds on a credit basis. Therefore, the small holders were encouraged to form farmers clubs to serve as distribution reference points. Membership is voluntary and carries the privilege of easy access to credit facilities as well as the burden of debt repayment.

Finally, the Malawi Government has also encouraged the development of estate agriculture. What prompted this was the need to diversify the country's tobacco export. For years, Malawi was exporting mainly what is called fire-cured Virginia type of tobacco which was and still is grown by the small holders. Other varieties included flue-cured tobacco, burley tobacco, and sun-cured tobacco. These varieties were grown by the white estate agriculture. They formed a very small proportion of the tobacco export despite the country's potential for these crops.

The colonial era had left the small holders without the skills for growing and handling the flue-cured and burley varieties of tobacco. The flue-cured variety is not a small holder's crop because it requires heavy investment, particularly the flue-curing equipment. Therefore, the Malawi Government either had to increase production of this crop, which meant developing estate agriculture, or leave it out altogether. The burley tobacco is better grown on estate basis, but it can also be grown on a small holder basis. To do it on the latter basis would have taken years before production could reach even a small percentage of the fire-cured tobacco production. Anxious to wipe out a recurrent account budget deficit which was being funded by Britain, the Government took the feasible method available -- the estate agriculture method. As a result, Malawi is now one of the major producers in Africa in all these varieties of tobacco.

Let the "master farmer" scheme be used here as the basic scheme for clarifying the characteristics of these schemes. The following, in summary, is how it compares with the other schemes. To begin with, the scheme carried the privileges of easy access to credit facilities and preferential treatment with regard to the marketing of crops and was a countrywide scheme among the small holders. In that sense, it was like the farmers clubs scheme. However, the scheme was different from the latter because the farmers' club is really nothing more than a mere voluntary association. To interpret the farmers club as a revival of the colonial "master farmer" scheme is to indulge in wild exaggerations.

The "master farmer" scheme was a land ownership scheme among the small holders. In that broad sense, it was like the Ndunda scheme. However, the scheme was different from the Ndunda scheme because it was a countrywide scheme which carried certain privileges, involved new methods of farming, and was an outright individual ownership of land. The Ndunda scheme carries no privileges, has been confined to the Lilongwe Land Development Project area, involves no new methods of farming, and is a family ownership of land. Therefore, to interpret the Ndunda scheme as a revival of the colonial "master farmer" scheme is to indulge in a gross misinterpretation of the scheme.

The "master farmer" scheme, as already stated, was country-wide among the small holders. This is the only similarity between it and the Achikumbe scheme. Otherwise, the scheme differs from the Achikumbe scheme in that it was an individual land ownership scheme involving new methods of farming and carrying certain privileges. The Achikumbe scheme has none of these features. It simply has been a certificate-of-award scheme.

The "master farmer" scheme, as already mentioned, was a countrywide individual land ownership scheme involving new methods of farming. In this sense, it was like the estate agriculture scheme of both the colonial times and the present times. The "master farm" was, indeed, a sort of small estate. However, the scheme differed from the estate farming in that the individual land ownership was on a small scale involving ten to twenty acres whereas an estate farming involves individual land ownership on a larger scale ranging from hundreds to even thousands of acres. The "master farmer" scheme also carried privileges while the new estate owners do not carry any privileges.

Finally, the new estate agriculture scheme is what is obviously similar to the past estate agriculture development scheme. Both schemes are commercial farming on a large scale. However, there are some important differences. The colonial estate farming was predominantly private land holding and covered all sorts of crops: tea, tobacco, citrus fruits, tung oil, sisal,

coffee, and even tree plantations. It was a means for supporting the newly-arrived European settlers in the country. The new estate agriculture scheme has been a mixture of state and private commercial farming and reflects the limited need for which it was undertaken: the diversification of the tobacco industry. Therefore, to regard it as a revival of the colonial estate agriculture scheme is to gloss over these important differences.

Therefore, the arguments by Humphrey, Thomas, and Mwakasungura are based on a confusion of these schemes. For example, some disparities in the numbers mentioned in a passage by Thomas illustrates the point. It reads:

"Though the programme itself was not popular, with only 260 Achikumbe being enrolled out of a target set at 3,000 and was allowed to lapse during 1972, the philosophy has still been continued especially on the large projects. Thus, during the six years of German development aid to the Salima Lakeshore project, a group of 570 privileged farmers has been established with annual incomes in excess of K350 while the poorest farmers (about 20,000) were still obtaining K20."⁴⁸

The first sentence in the passage states that only 260 small holders out of a large number of 3,000 qualified as Achikumbe. This is in a country-wide context as is made

explicit by the expression, "especially on the large projects". Up to this point, Thomas is correct.

The second sentence in the passage speaks of 570 "privileged farmers" as having been established in the Salima Lakeshore Project alone. These are regarded as Achikumbe by Thomas as can be seen from the passage. Assuming that the Achikumbe are "privileged farmers", which they are not, Thomas is here implying that the Salima Lakeshore Project alone put up 570 successful candidates for the Mchikumbe certificates. It is almost impossible, as Thomas himself would admit, for the Salima area to do this because it is small in relation to the rest of the country and is not the country's best agricultural area.

The figure K350 illustrates another disparity in the arguments of these writers. If this is the income of these "commercially successful farmers" as Humphrey says or "privileged farmers" as Thomas puts it, would they be in a position for each to "employ considerable numbers of labour"? To induce some small holders to give up their holdings in order to accept employment on the Achikumbe farms, each of the "privileged farmers" would have to pay each labourer at least K20 a year. This translates into 14 labourers assuming that each Mchikumbe would use all his annual income on wages, an assumption which is simply unrealistic.

These disparities in Thomas's figures arise because Thomas confuses these schemes as being one and the same scheme. The figures in themselves are correct. The problem is that the argument is incorrect. The 570 "privileged farmers" whom Thomas refers to are not Achikumbe, but members of the farmers' clubs in the Salima Project area. Their voluntary membership of the club changes each year. Those who fail to repay the loans which they incurred on farm inputs at the beginning of one farming season leave the clubs to join the 20,000, and new enterprising ones from the same 20,000 join the clubs at the beginning of another farming season and so on. The privileges go together with the obligations which they undertake to repay during the crop marketing seasons the loans on farm inputs.

The farmers clubs have nothing to do with the Achikumbe scheme. It is true that some Achikumbe are members of the farmers' clubs, but not all members of the farmers clubs are Achikumbe. The award of the Mchikumbe certificate has to do only with the excellence of one's performance regardless of how one went about it.

Thomas is right that only 260 small holders had by then obtained the Mchikumbe certificate. This number is, indeed, small not because of opposition from small holders but because not everyone of them could qualify for the certificate. Otherwise, it would cease to be a certificate of distinction. Moreover, this question of

opposition is the way by which Thomas confuses the Achikumbe scheme with the Ndunda scheme. As an award scheme, there is simply no basis on which the Achikumbe scheme could have been opposed by the small holders. Thomas is here referring to some opposition in connection with the Ndunda scheme for the reasons that have already been explained; that is, for the reasons that the small holders in the Lilongwe Land Project merely wanted to ensure that land ownership was bestowed upon the rightful owners of the land.

In short, evidence in terms of references to certain agricultural development schemes is based on a confusion of the Achikumbe, Ndunda, farmers' club, and estate farming schemes as being one and the same schemes. Such confusion is then used as grounds for regarding, or presenting, these schemes as a revival of the past colonial schemes of "master farmer" and estate farming schemes. Each of these schemes is a separate scheme different from all the others. The only scheme which is similar to one of the other schemes is the estate agriculture. However, this scheme has not been an important proportion of the Malawi Government's efforts toward improving the country's agriculture. It is the small holder agriculture which has taken the lion's share of the Government's efforts towards improving agriculture.

Malawi's Development Planning

Another piece of evidence which is also cited in support of the argument that the country's development strategy was decided upon by foreign experts is an absence of development planning in the country. Mwakasungura, it will be recalled, blames the British expatriates for the lack of development planning in the country and specifically accuses them of abandoning a 1962-65 Development Plan which he describes as a people's plan on the grounds that it puts emphasis on peasant agriculture.⁴⁹ The basis on which he makes the accusation is that the British expatriates dominated the country's civil service.

On the contrary, Malawi does development planning. For example, the Government has a Department of Economic Planning and Development which is responsible for development planning. So what critics like Mwakasungura are saying is that the type of development planning which Malawi follows is not development planning at all, because it is not the sort of planning which other developing countries follow. This will receive further attention at a later stage. The point for consideration at the moment is the argument that the British expatriates are the ones who decided that there should be no development planning in Malawi in the sense that critics like Mwakasungura understand.

The British expatriates, indeed, dominated the country's civil service during the early years of independence. These expatriate officials also did not have a tradition of economic planning either during the country's colonial days (the 1962/65 Development Plan having been formulated under the guidance of African elected officials who had entered the government in 1961) or in their home country, Britain (except the brief period of the Labour Government economic plan of the mid-1960s). Nonetheless, critics like Mwakasungura distort what happened. It is true that a Development Plan was abandoned not because the expatriates decided that the plan be abandoned but because circumstances arose which made such an approach to development unattainable in Malawi.

Moreover, Mwakasungura is even inaccurate in his accusation of the British expatriates. The 1962/65 Development Plan was not abandoned. It was seen through up to the end of its period. Indeed, the country adopted a new Development Plan covering the years 1965 to 1969, the preparation of which was done by the same British expatriates. This was the Development Plan, not the 1962/65 one, which was abandoned midstream.⁵⁰ Therefore, the absence of development planning in the country cannot be explained in terms of the British expatriates wanting to abandon a "people's Plan". It has to be explained in terms of the reasons for which the 1965/69 Development Plan was abandoned.

The official explanation for the abandonment of the 1965/69 Development Plan was that it lacked the "essential prerequisites" which were listed as macro-economic statistics and the realization that development in Malawi would involve fundamental structural changes in the economy.⁵¹ Of the two "prerequisites", that of the macro-economic statistics, though correct, was obviously less important. For example, economic planning continued in many other African countries where macro-economic statistics were equally lacking since national censuses were, as in Malawi, taken several years after the countries attained independence. The second "prerequisite" was the more important one and deserves more attention since it summarizes the reasons for which the Development Plan was abandoned.

The Development Plan was abandoned because of a new rationale for development planning. The wishes of the electorate had to be taken into consideration when planning for development. The attainment of independence created unprecedented consciousness for development among the electorate who now felt that they had a say in the development of the country. For example, demands arose for a school here and clinic there, a dipping tank here and a telephone there, a road here and bridge there and a post office here and telephone there. This meant that the Government had to set up projects all over the country, many of which had indeed to be justified on the basis of the Government's own best judgment.⁵²

One of the criticisms which are often made against the Malawi Government is that it sets up development projects, not on the basis of economic criteria, sometimes described as "objective criteria", but on the basis of political criteria. For example, Hodder Williams wrote:

"Furthermore, their objective attitudes towards economic development often run counter to Dr. Banda's appreciation of his own political need."⁵³

The "attitudes" referred to in the passage are those of the expatriates. These are said to be "objective" towards the country's economic development. The expression, "his own political need", refers to the President's determination to take into consideration the demands of the ordinary people all over the country for development projects, a fact which is acknowledged by a very important expatriate. "The second principle has been that the Government respects the needs of the electorate more than the needs of anybody else," attested Bryan Roberts, former Secretary to the President and Cabinet. He went on:

"Everything has been subordinated to the necessity in the Government's mind to serve the needs of the people. External and minority interests have, sometimes, had to be subordinated to the essential principle of putting the interests of the electorate first, advancing their living standards, the raising

of their educational standards, the provision of health services."⁵⁴

To the countrywide demand for development projects has to be added the vision which the President had about the future of the country before the attainment of independence. This is known as the Gwelo Plan which the President thought of while in detention in Gwelo (now Gweru), Zimbabwe, in 1958 and early 1960. This consisted of a move of the country's capital from where it was to a more centrally-located place in the country and the construction of a new major road along the country's entire lakeshore. Both projects met harsh criticisms from abroad and muted criticisms among some of the expatriates.

The merits and demerits of the two projects are not the point of concern here. The point of interest is the implications of these projects for development planning. For example, the move of the capital created the prospect of establishing a major new economic growth point for the country while the new road created the prospect of opening up many areas which had hitherto remained almost inaccessible. Therefore, the two projects meant that some fundamental structural changes in the country's economy were in the offing. Under those circumstances, the Development Plan had to be abandoned because the economic implications of the two major projects could not be assessed accurately in advance for incorporation in the development plan.

There were also other reasons which are implicit in the Government's second argument for abandoning the development plan. This becomes clear when one looks at the differences between Malawi's operational approach to development and the operational approach to development followed by many other African countries. Let the latter approach, for want of better term, be called conventional development planning. Its hallmark is a development plan which has a parliamentary approval and a time span, usually, five years. The plan also consists of a set of overall objectives, a set of priorities which are identified according to the objectives, and a set of targets in each priority area. The formulation of targets necessitates the use of macro-economic statistics and their realization serves as an indication of the successful implementation of the plan. The other equally important feature of the plan is consistence or coherence. Every part of the plan has to be made consistent with every other part of the plan. The plan is complete and ready for submission to parliament if it has a clearly defined set of objectives, priorities, and targets, and is coherent.

Preparation of the plan is largely the task of the bureaucrats, or civil servants, to use the popular term in Malawi. In those countries where conventional development planning is followed, the Government starts the process by defining the objectives and issuing instructions for the preparation of the plan to start in accordance with the

objectives it has defined. However, it is the civil servants, or experts, who refine the objectives, identify areas of priority according to available data about the country, set the targets, and go through a process of adjustment to reach coherence in the plan. Then the plan is submitted to parliament for approval. This is the other stage during which the decision makers again get directly involved in the formulation of a country's development plan. However, after the Parliamentary approval, the implementation of the plan is left to the bureaucrats. This sort of planning is called central or rigid planning and is the type which critics like Mwakasungura have in mind when they say that Malawi has no development planning.

There is development planning in Malawi. This is confined to the public sector of the country's economy. It simply involves the setting up of development projects in accordance with Government-defined development objectives which include improving the living standard of the people of the country and correcting regionally unbalanced economic structures inherited from the colonial era. Each year, projects are submitted to Parliament for approval. The Civil Servants formulate the projects and implement them after Parliamentary approval has been obtained. Let this, for want of a better term, be called "Project Planning".

Comparing the two types of development planning, the conventional planning would have presented several difficulties. The first difficulty is that development work would have been left almost entirely to the bureaucrats. The bureaucrats would have been the ones to define development priorities, and formulate and implement the development plans. This is the normal practice with the conventional development planning. However, in Malawi, the Government has gone further than mere Parliamentary approval of the project. It has initiated some of the projects which have been implemented in the country, has decided on where each project should be located and on whether a modification in the project should be effected. This has been possible because projects have been presented one at a time for consideration by the Government. This is not possible with the conventional development planning because the development plan is a package and has to be considered in total.

A British-funded leprosy project illustrates how directly the Malawi Government has been involved in the development work of the country. This is aimed at eradicating leprosy, or at least controlling the disease, through the administration of a leprosy vaccine. The project began with some pilot (experimental) schemes which were based in Blantyre and covered some nearby rural areas in the south of the country. When Government approval was sought for the implementation of the project to start, in

accordance with the laid procedure, the Government directed that it be implemented in another district where the project has indeed been implemented some 600 miles away from the areas of its pilot schemes.⁵⁵

This is the extent to which the Malawi Government has gone in exercising control over development. "The country's leader," commented a Times correspondent, "is the fountain head of all power and decision-making." "Virtually nothing takes place in Malawi without his direct knowledge and consent," he went on, "be it approval for a new agricultural project or the terms of a lease for a private house in a nation's new capital, Lilongwe."⁵⁶ This mode of operation would not have been possible with the conventional development planning.

The second difficulty is that projects would have been allocated on the basis of what are called economic, or objective, criteria. On paper, these can look sound or, indeed, objective, but in practice, they can turn out to be nothing more than subtle manoeuvres to foil the Government's stated development objectives. This is because the economic criteria assume some level of economic development to be already in place.

Morton mentions a project which illustrates this point very well. This was the Blantyre/Zomba road project covering a distance of about 37 miles. She says approvingly that this "project at least was considered to

be fully justified by all the parties concerned, including a USAID advisory mission.⁵⁷ Because it was said to be "economically sound", that is, it met "objective criteria", the project was funded by the O.D.A. (O.D.M.). The Malawi Government had to seek World Bank funding for another road project, the Zomba/Lilongwe road project which started off just where the Blantyre/Zomba road ended and covered nearly 180 miles. Despite its obvious importance to the country's national development, it was not seen as being "economically sound", and was, therefore, not funded by the ODA or USAID.

The Blantyre/Zomba road project was appraised more or less in the same way that a road project in a developed country is appraised. The key concept in the appraisal was volume of traffic and an expected rate of increase in the volume of traffic. This appraisal method was suitable because there was, by Malawi standards, a lot of traffic between Zomba, which was then the country's capital, and Blantyre, which is still the country's largest commercial city. The volume of traffic was also large because the two towns shared Government offices so that there were many Government vehicles moving to and from each of the two places.

The other road project could not be similarly appraised because the volume of traffic, even by Malawi standards, was very low for three reasons. Part of the road competed with another for traffic bound to Blantyre

from Lilongwe. The second reason was that a good part of the road was in worse shape than that of the Blantyre/Zomba road. It was a gravel road which was windy in many parts. The third reason was that Lilongwe was then a smaller centre than Zomba to say nothing of Blantyre. Therefore, the project could not meet the demanding "objective criteria." At the same time, the importance of the project was a matter of common sense.

This shows that the economic, or objective, criteria presupposes some sort of development already in place. No doubt, the O.D.A. and the USAID genuinely wanted to fund projects which were "economically sound", but by insisting that projects should meet what they believed were objective criteria, they were inadvertently asking an African Government not to tamper with regionally-imbalanced economic structures inherited from the colonial period. Seen in that way, the criteria were not, in fact, objective, but political.

Morton goes on to argue that many other road projects had similarly been fully justified.⁵⁸ This is simplistic and misleading. The technique which was used for appraising the Blantyre/Zomba road project was, in fact, abandoned. It soon became clear that many other roads could not be similarly justified. The appraisal activities resumed only after the O.D.A. fashioned out new techniques, one of which is called the cost/benefit analysis, for appraising projects in developing countries.

In a sense, this was an admission that the Agency's earlier "objective criteria" argument was wrong. Very few roads in many of the developing countries could by then be justified in terms of the traffic flow concept because the roads had, in the first place, to be constructed in order to attract traffic.

With conventional planning, donor countries would have easily imposed these "objective" criteria on Malawi. This, in turn, would have meant a development which would put emphasis on building upon the economic structures which were inherited from the colonial past. The Government wanted to achieve a more balanced economic development of the country. The move of the capital and the lakeshore road projects were some of the projects with which the Government wanted to realize this objective. This would not have been possible with conventional planning. Development in Malawi would largely have been gradual improvement in the existing economic structures of a colonial era.

The third difficulty which would have arisen with conventional planning is its inflexibility. According to the experts, donor countries and organizations influence the development strategies of aid recipient countries by means of project-tying of their aid. For example, they can change the development strategy of a recipient country from industrialization to agricultural development simply by offering to fund only the agricultural development

projects. The effectiveness of the technique is even enhanced by the recipient country's common sense to proceed on the basis of the known motto: better something than nothing. In the end, the recipient country is imperceptibly forced to abandon its cherished industrial development strategy.

The technique described in the foregoing paragraph is more disruptive to conventional development planning than to Malawi's project planning. This is because coherence is an important aspect of a conventional five-year development plan which if disrupted makes the plan fall apart. On the other hand, Malawi's project planning is flexible and can take almost any beating, as it were, without feeling a disruption. This explains why development has proceeded more or less as the Government envisaged. The construction of the new capital and the lakeshore road are a case in point. Conventional development planning would not have made this possible.

These days, the talk is not about project-tying, but about proliferation. This is in two senses: proliferation of the donors and proliferation of the projects. The former is supposed to lead to a disruption of a recipient country's development strategy as a result of conflict among the many donors while the latter is supposed to cause severe strains in the aid-handling machinery of the recipient country. Elliot Morss thinks that Malawi is a good example of the victims of this new foreign aid

phenomenon. "Indeed, it appears more likely that donor and project proliferation," he wrote, "have diverted the attention of the Malawi authorities from attempting to determine their own policies to simply trying to please their donors."⁵⁹ This is based on a UNDP annual report which stated that "Malawi was benefiting from 188 projects supported by 50 different donors."⁶⁰

The objectivity of Morss's article is a little bit suspect. It is disproportionately longer on Malawi than on Lesotho and Zambia. Yet Lesotho was presented in the same UNDP report as benefiting from 324 projects supported by 61 donors while Zambia was presented in the same UNDP report as benefiting from 614 projects supported by 69 donors. Clearly, it is Zambia and Lesotho, each of which has a population smaller than that of Malawi, which ought to experience more the problem of donor and project proliferation. However, these two countries are treated almost in passing by Morss.

On the question of donor proliferation, Morss was simply uncritical of the UNDP report. This will be shown later in the thesis. For the moment, it is enough to just state, as Hewitt and Kydd do, that Malawi has had only a handful of donors.⁶¹ The problem of donor proliferation simply does not arise with regards to Malawi.

As for project proliferation, Morss's argument raises the question of the optimal number of projects which a

recipient country has to implement in a year. Again, the UNDP report has to be read with a pinch of salt. It lists 188 projects while Hewitt and Kydd have calculated that Malawi, on the average, has been implementing something like 100 projects a year.⁶² If these projects constituted proliferation, project failure rate would have been high. On the contrary, Malawi has a high reputation of project implementation. No project in Malawi has been abandoned after the start of its implementation.

However, what is important is not so much that Malawi has a good record of project implementation but that Malawi's type of development planning protects Malawi from the problem of project proliferation. This is because each project has to be approved by the Government before the start of its implementation. No bureaucrat would start implementing a sugar project anywhere in the country without the Government authorizing whether such a project should be executed and where it should be implemented. Moreover, no Malawi bureaucrat would wish to secure the Government's authority for the start of the implementation of a project without, in the first place, making sure that he is able to do so. Otherwise, he would risk a dismissal or demotion. In other words, Malawi takes in only what it can digest. This has a bearing on what is called aid "absorptive capacity" of the country, that is, the country's ability to use all the aid which is offered to it. Morss's focus should have been on absorptive capacity rather than on project proliferation.

In short, conventional planning had to be abandoned because of the manner in which Malawi was to approach development. This was made clear by the move of the capital and the lakeshore road project. In time, it became also clear that the President was determined to exercise control over project choice and allocation. It would have been impossible to accommodate his direct involvement in development by means of conventional five-year development plans. Therefore, Malawi had to adopt its own style of development planning. Conventional development planning was out of touch with new political reality in the country. Its absence is in itself evidence that the country's development strategy was not decided upon by the expatriates.

Development Planning Documents

Finally, still other evidence which is also cited in support of the argument that the country's development strategy was decided upon by foreign experts is a reference to some development planning documents. What is to be considered here is simply the opposite implication of what Kydd and Hewitt intended to do: to deny that the country's economic policies were made by the British expatriates. They argue for example:

"Although U.K. supplemented staff were involved in developing the statement of development policies, it was very much an autonomous document embodying the

views of Malawi's political leadership and was produced without close consultation with the donor agencies."⁶³

The passage, as can be seen, raises more doubts than it clears. For example, what is this statement of development policies and how autonomous is the document? How can it be taken that the document was indeed produced "without close consultation with donor agencies"? In the end, the passage enforces the claim that Malawi's economic policy was the work of foreign experts. However, an account of the evolution of the project planning approach explains what the documents really are: an official record of the implementation of Malawi's economic policies.

While the documents are part of the "project planning" approach, the approach itself was not something which was consciously formulated. Rather, this is a term which is given to the way Malawi has been going about its development. It is largely the result of efforts by the civil servants to accommodate the Malawi Government's determination not to leave development in their hands.

The approach began to evolve following the announcement of the move of the capital and the lakeshore road project.⁶⁴ The first development in its evolution was the production of a document called Estimates of Expenditure on Development Account. This was produced to meet the need for keeping track of all the projects

implemented in the country. It itemizes all the projects being implemented and the expenditure to date on each project and is approved each year by Parliament as part of the country's national budget. The second development was the production of a document called, Three-year Rolling Development Programme, which was produced to meet the need for longer term preparation and implementation of projects. The third was the production of a document called, Statement of Development Policies (DEVEPOL), the first of which covered the years 1971 to 1980. This was produced to meet the need for clear guidelines to all the development activities. It had a set of national development objectives and some indicative planning figures.

DEVEPOL was the most controversial among the three documents because it looks like a development plan. For this reason, the Government went out of its way to explain that it was not a development plan. It was simply what its title said: a statement of development policies. Humphrey quotes the Government's explanation, saying:

"The Statement of Development Policies 1971-1980 is essentially an indicative planning document that sets out in some detail sectoral projection and the policies it is thought necessary to meet the stated aims."⁶⁵

A point which the country's Chief Economist elaborated as:

"It will be clear from the foregoing that DEVOPOL is not a conventional development plan. In fact, it is not a plan at all but, as its title clearly indicates, a statement of the Government's policies for economic development. To illustrate the effects of these policies, quantitative projections of their expected results have been made for the principal sectors of the economy, but these are not to be confused with the usual plan targets."⁶⁶

Indeed, DEVEPOL was not a development plan. For example, the document covered too long a period, ten years, for it to be a plan. A development plan normally covers half the period, five years. A paragraph on the last page of the document is in itself proof that the document was not a development plan. It reads:

"It must be emphasized that all these projections are illustrative only even though every effort has been made to make them internally consistent and empirically realistic. They do not constitute a development plan in the conventional sense, nor a specific commitment by the Government."⁶⁷

The strangeness of the last part of the last sentence of the passage is the proof that DEVEPOL was not a development plan because a development plan, after parliamentary approval, is a law, or at least a commitment of the government concerned. If DEVEPOL was not a "specific

commitment by the Government", then it was clearly not a development plan. DEVEPOL was not also a plan because in practice, it did not serve as a guideline during the period which it covered. Far more than anything it envisaged was done in the development field by 1980. For this reason, its second production was temporarily abandoned between 1980 and 1985 by the now highly localized bureaucracy without incurring the slightest Government displeasure.

Therefore, the argument by Hewitt and Kydd needs correction. DEVEPOL was, indeed, the work of the British expatriates. While containing some minimal contribution from local personnel in the Ministry of Labour, Trade and Industry, Natural Resources, and Transport and Communications, which were localized by then, the document was largely the work of British expatriates. Hewitt and Kydd are right when they say that DEVEPOL contained the Government's views. It could not have been otherwise as far as the operation of the Malawi Government is concerned. However, this is not an important point. What is important is that DEVEPOL did not embody the country's economic policy and its contents, for example, were largely an interpretation of the implication of a number of projects which the Government had embarked upon long before the document was produced. Rather, the document was a record and an interpretation of the policy as it was already being implemented.

Expatriates' Economic Policies

That the expatriates did not decide on Malawi's development strategy can, perhaps, be illustrated by contrasting the Malawi Government's economic policy and the sort of economic policy which the expatriates, at least some of them, appear to favour. This is not to indulge in comparing what has happened with what might have happened. Information on the sort of economic policy which the expatriates favoured is available. One has only to go by the sort of development projects which they favoured, or the sort of development projects which they opposed, to see what they intended to do or believed should have been done. Therefore, it is reasonable to present an overall impression of what might have been their development policy for the country.

The objectives of the Malawi Government economic policies, as earlier stated, are raising the living standards of the ordinary people of the country as much as possible, and rectifying regionally unbalanced economic structures which were inherited from the colonial era.⁶⁸ To this end, Government's efforts have also centred on major infrastructural development, particularly the construction of national roads to bitumenized standards so as to make every part of the country accessible to modern economic activity. In addition, Government's efforts have also concentrated on the implementation of large integrated rural development

projects designed to attack mass poverty. In short, the government economic policies have involved a large-scale approach to infrastructural and agricultural development.

The term, "large-scale approach to agricultural development", should not be confused with "large-scale agricultural development." The latter means estate agriculture or the promotion of estate agriculture. The Malawi Government are said, by Kydd, Christiansen, and others, to have pursued large scale agricultural development which is said to have had adverse effects on the small holder agriculture.⁶⁹ By that is meant that the Malawi Government has concentrated on the development of estate agriculture at the expense of small holder agriculture. That is not what is meant here by large scale approach to agricultural development and there is no intention to look into the "neglect arguments" by Kydd and others because facts simply fly into the face of their arguments. The large scale approach to agricultural development is intended to reflect the large integrated rural developments projects which have characterized the Malawi Government's development policies. These are the very same projects the planning and execution of which are based on promoting small holder agriculture as opposed to estate agriculture. In terms of the heavy capital outlay involved in the implementation of these projects, nothing, perhaps, has received as much attention as the small holder agriculture in the country.

In short, the Malawi Government's economic policies have been characterized by large scale approach to infrastructural and agricultural development. In concrete and specific terms, this has meant construction of new railway lines, new national roads, bridges, schools and colleges, the move of the capital to a new site and the implementation of large integrated rural development projects.

What might have been the expatriate's economic policies can easily be construed from the content of the Hill Commission Report which was, no doubt, based on information gathered from the expatriates.⁷⁰ As already stated, it opposed the Government's decision to move the country's capital to a new site and to construct the lakeshore road. Instead, the report recommended the construction and maintenance of feeder roads for the extraction of small holder crops. In fact, this was the country's infrastructural development policy in the closing days of colonialism.

The expatriates similarly favoured small agricultural schemes. Some of these have been implemented with funding from the O.D.A. which has tended to favour such schemes ostensibly for their "economic soundness" but covertly for their low capital outlay because funding the integrated rural development projects would have led to doubling of O.D.A. allocation of aid to Malawi. In a sense, this is a paradox. Both the expatriates and the

O.D.A. are directly connected with the advent of the integrated rural development project which in Malawi was borne out of the results of some agricultural pilot schemes all of which were funded by the O.D.A. and implemented by the expatriates. Instead, the O.D.A. has mainly funded the small agricultural schemes. Only belatedly did it decide to fund one integrated rural development project, the Phalombe rural Development Project.

The small agricultural schemes illustrate two philosophies which have been followed in Malawi. The first is the philosophy that "big is beautiful". This has characterized the large integrated rural development projects which make it possible to spread development to every part of a country and are among the first comprehensive and organized efforts against poverty in a newly independent state. Its emphasis is on coverage of thousands of families and acres. However, it has two disadvantages. The first is the implied heavy capital outlay which has indeed run into tens of millions of Kwacha or dollars. The second is that the economic impact of projects based on such a philosophy is problematic. It is not easy to tell if the results of projects based on such a philosophy can last forever.

On the other hand, the expatriates, or at least some expatriates, favoured the "small is beautiful" philosophy. The country's oldest small agricultural

development scheme is the one called Kasungu Flue-cured Tobacco Authority. This started during the colonial days and was almost wound up because of financial difficulties during the closing days of colonialism. The scheme has survived because the President initiated some changes in its mode of operation. The first small agricultural development scheme after the country attained independence owes its origin to the personal initiative of the President. This is called the Small Holder Tea Authority Scheme, which began on the directive of the President who had seen a similar scheme during his visit to Kenya. Other small holder agricultural schemes include the Small Holders Coffee Authority in the North of the country and Dwangwa Small Holders Sugar Scheme, funded by O.D.A. and the Commonwealth Development Corporation, and Chinese Rice Development Schemes in several parts of the country.

The purpose of these schemes, like the large integrated rural development schemes, has been to promote the production of tea, coffee, flue-cured tobacco, and sugar by the small holders. They are the most capitalistic of the country's development schemes because emphasis in them is on imparting skills to the individual in the growing of say, flue-cured tobacco, tea, or coffee. For example, Kasungu Flue-cured Tobacco Authority involves the training of each tenant on the scheme in the growing and handling of flue-cured tobacco. Their advantage is that they involve small capital outlay for funds. The amounts involved range from a mere £100,000 to £ 00 a

year. Their other advantage is that their economic impact is not problematic and can be ascertained in terms of the individual's ability to grow coffee, tea, or flue-cured tobacco on his own.

"Small is beautiful", too, has its own shortcomings. Part of Malawi's experience is evidence that "small" is not "beautiful". It is true that the production of flue-cured tobacco has experienced a phenomenal increase since the country attained independence. However, the increase is, not because of the small holder production of the crop, but because of the production of the crop on new estate agriculture development scheme. The experience of the Small Holder Coffee Authority Scheme is perhaps more concrete evidence that "small" is not "beautiful". The scheme did, indeed, lead to a revival of coffee production which was abandoned by the country during the 1920's following Brazil's growth into prominence in the coffee business. However, its coffee output between 1980 and 1982 was so small that it had to be sold as part of the Tanzanian coffee. Yet the country has the potential to be among the major coffee exporters in Africa. Indeed, it began to change when the crop began to be grown on the estates. The O.D.A. probably learned from this experience and decided, though belatedly, to fund at least one integrated rural development project, the Phalombe Rural Development Project, in which the idea of promoting Women's Role in Development has received some emphasis. "Small" is simply not "beautiful". It makes one remain small.

In short, the economic policy which the expatriates favoured for the country was that of construction and maintenance of feeder roads for the extraction of small holder crops and of the implementation of small holder agricultural schemes. Its purpose, according to the terms of reference of the Hill Commission, was to promote economic development so as to enable the country to do away with its reliance on the budgetary subsidy from Britain. To this end, emphasis would have been on implementing "economically sound" development projects. There is no intention here to go into the question of whether such a policy would have, indeed, best promoted the country's economic development. Suffice it to say that the development which was envisaged in terms of this policy would have been largely that of a mere graduate improvement in the economical structures inherited from the colonial period.

A number of small holder agricultural schemes have been implemented as already stated. The feeder roads for the extraction of small holder crops are now receiving attention in the form of a programme called DRIMP, Development of Rural Roads Improvement and Maintenance Programme. These have been accommodated because of the flexible nature of the Malawi Government's operational approach to development; that is, it has also been possible to implement some of the schemes which the expatriates favoured without distracting the Government's attention to its priorities. This is why the country's development has proceeded in accordance with the Government's economic

policies outlined earlier. Institutional building, major new roads construction programme, a new capital, and large integrated rural development projects are evident to any casual observer in the country. Therefore, it is not true that the country's development strategy was decided upon by the expatriates.

Conclusion

The evidence which is often cited in support of the argument that the country's economic policies were adopted in order to make Malawi attractive to donor countries and organizations are quotations made from some of the President's speeches. These are partial and in fact distort the President's thoughts as expressed in the speeches quoted. The President expressed a preference for a mixed economy which is, indeed, what has emerged in Malawi for the past twenty years or so. If attracting foreign aid were indeed the main objective of the country's economic policies, then the President would have been hesitant to set up public enterprises which led to the emergence of a mixed economy in the country. A more market-oriented economy would have been the choice consistent with such an objective.

Finally, the evidence in support of the argument that the development strategy was decided upon by foreign experts cites references to certain development schemes, certain development documents, and to

an absence of conventional planning in Malawi. The reference to certain development schemes is based on a sheer misunderstanding of the Achikumbe, Ndunda, and farmers' clubs schemes, none of which is a revival of the colonial "master farmer" and estate farming schemes. Similarly, the reference to certain development planning documents is based on a misunderstanding which assumes that they embody a policy which was formulated by the expatriates. Actually, the documents have largely been a record and a guide for policy implementation. Finally, Malawi's development strategy evolved out of efforts to accommodate the President's direct involvement in matters of development.

NOTES

1. See Page 52 of the thesis.
2. See Page 34 of the thesis.
3. See Hewitt, A. and Kydd, J. A Study of the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid to Malawi; First Draft (unpublished) 9th July, 1985.
4. The Times, Monday, 7th October, 1985.
5. Mwakasungura, A.K., The Rural Economy of Malawi: A Critical Analysis, A309, Bergen, Norway, March, 1979, p. 37.
6. Ross, A., "White Africa's Black Ally", New Left Review No. 45, September, 1967, p. 86.
7. These are made explicit in the President's Opening speech to the Malawi Congress Party Political Education Conference in May, 1968, pages 3 and 4 of the text issued by the Department of Information.
8. President's closing speech to the Malawi Congress Party Education Conference, 15th May, 1968, p. 4 of the Issued Text.

9. President's Opening speech, Op Cit. p. 9.
10. Ibid. p. 9.
11. President's Closing speech to the Malawi Congress Party Conference, September, 1968.
12. Prime Minister's speech to Zomba debating club, April, 1964, p. 18 of issued text by Ministry of Information.
13. President's statement published in World Development, Vol. I. No. 3 and 4, "Focus on Malawi", p. 14.
14. President's speech, Hansard, 22nd January, 1965, p. 414.
15. Mkandawire, T., "Economic Crisis In Malawi", in Recession In Africa, by Carlson Jr., ed, Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, UPSLA, 1983, page 29.
16. Mwakasungura, Op Cit. p. 71.
17. Acharya, S.N., "Perspectives and Problems of Development in Sub-Saharan Africa", World Development, Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 118.
18. See page 52 of the thesis.

19. Statement by an I.M.F. Representative to a 2nd World Bank sponsored Consultative Meeting On Malawi, Paris, France, 22nd to 23rd June 1988, page 4 of issued text.
20. Meldrum, A., "Malawi", Africa Report, May-June, 1987, p. 17.
21. Thomas S. "Economic Development in Malawi Since Independence" Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, October, 1975, p. 33.
22. Williams H.R., "Malawi's Decade Under Dr. Banda: The Revival of Politics", Round Table (1973), The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs, London, p. 98.
23. Kydd J. and Christiansen R., "Structural Change in Malawi Since Independence: Consequences of a Development Strategy based on Large-Scale Agriculture", World Development, Vol. 10, No. 5, 1982, p. 356.
24. Mkandawire, Op Cit, p. 32.
25. Humphrey, D., "Malawi's Economic Progress and Prospects", Eastern Africa Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, December, 1973, p. 72.

26. The writer has worked out this on his own. However, no originality is claimed here. The formula can be found in many of the standard macro-economic textbooks. The authoritative one is Economics by Samuelson P., the oldest edition of which was published by McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York 1940, pp. 232-234.
27. The expression "cold utilitarian calculations", was often used by Latin American delegates in the United Nations General Assembly sessions. The writer was then Second Secretary in the Malawi Mission to the U.N.
28. Financial and Economic Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 4., 1986, p. 92, Reserve Bank of Malawi.
29. Malawi and the World Bank, Information and Public Affairs Department, Washington, D.C., January, 1986, p. 2.
30. Mwakasungura, Op Cit, p. 68.
31. This is also referred to by the Brandt Commission papers, IBID. Geneva, and The Hague, 1978-1979, p. 40, and by Mwakasungura, Op Cit, p. 26.
32. North-South Dialogue: A Programme for Survival, Pan Books, Ltd., London, 1980, page 49.

33. Rodney W., How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Bogle-Louverture Publications, London, 1983, p. 23.

34. North-South Dialogue, p. 48.

35. Rodney, Op Cit, p. 23.

36. Ibid, p. 23.

37. Definitions of development proliferated following the rejection of the per capita product definition. Lauchlin Currie, after complaining about the collapse of the consensus on the latter definition offered his, which reads: "the ability to manage, control or dominate the environment", which is even vaguer than the Brandt Commission's "transformation of entire social structure". Currie's definition is on page 8 of his book, The Role of Economic Advisers in Developing Countries, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, 1981.

38. See page 57 of the thesis.

39. Thomas, Op Cit, p. 39.

40. Mwakasungura, Op Cit, p. 36.

41. Humphrey Op Cit, p. 91.

42. Mwakasungura, Op Cit, p. 23.

43. Ibid, p. 50.

44. See page 57 of the thesis.

45. The writer is arguing here not only from the vantage point of coming from the area where some, if not all, of these schemes have been implemented but also from the point of view of having been one of the enumerators who were recruited to conduct in the Lilongwe Land Development Project Area a socio-economic survey prepared and organized by lectures in the Sociology Department at Chancellor College, University of Malawi, 1971. The writer was then a student of economics and sociology.

46. The term, "native", was abused in the colonial period in Central and Southern Africa. As a result, the term acquired a pejorative meaning, "primitive" or "backward".

47. Thomas, Op Cit, p. 40.

48. Ibid, p. 30.

49. See Chapter One, p. 57.

50. Pearson, D.S., "The Development Plan", World Development, Vol. I, Nos. 3 and 4, March, April, 1973, p. 26.
51. Ibid, p. 26.
52. The Malawi Hansard on any Parliamentary sessions, for example, contains a question and answer session section. The questions in most cases do not seek clarification on issues. They are, rather, inquiries about when the Government would construct a bridge in one area, a post office in another, a police post in another, a health clinic in another, and so on.
53. Williams, R.H., The Round Table, p. 466.
54. Roberts, B., "Malawi: Its Progress and Problems Since Independence", Commonwealth Journal, October, 1969, Vol. XII, No. 5, p. 178.
55. This information was supplied to the writer verbally in London by the British Project Officials in May, 1986, at a meeting during which the launching of the Leprosy Vaccine Campaign was announced.
56. The Times, 4th July, 1978.
57. Morton, K., Aid and Dependence, British Aid to Malawi, Croom Helm, Ltd., London, 1975, p. 127.

58. Ibid. p. 127.
59. Morss E., "Institutional Destruction Resulting from Donor and Project Proliferations in Sub-Saharan Africa", World Development, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1984, p.467.
60. Ibid, p. 469.
61. Hewitt and Kydd, Op. Cit., pages 197-198.
62. Ibid, p. 200.
63. Ibid, p. 212.
64. Pearson, Op Cit, pp. 25-26.
65. Humphrey, Op Cit, p. 92.
66. Pearson, Op Cit, p. 26.
67. Statement of Development Policies, DEVEPOL, 1971 to 1980, the Abridged version, Government Printer, Zomba, Malawi, December, 1971, p. 62.
68. See page 200 of the thesis and DEVEPOL 1971 to 1980 pp. 3-4.

69. Kydd and Christiansen, Op Cit., pp. 355-375,
Chilibvumbo, A., "On Rural Development: A Note on
Malawi's Programmes of Development for Exploitation",
African Development, (Dakar) Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 40-65.

70. Morton, Op Cit., p. 114.

Chapter Four

Alleged Impact of Malawi's Policies

Introduction

The last chapter examined the evidence which is often cited in support of the alleged link between foreign aid and Malawi's economic policies. This chapter looks at the impact which Malawi's policies apparently have had on the donor countries and organizations. To that end, it examines some misconceptions about Malawi as a recipient of foreign aid. These are examined in the context of Malawi's aid relations with its donors.

The discussion is divided into four parts. The first part is a consideration of Malawi's aid relations with the donors in general. The second part is a consideration of Malawi's relations with South Africa, a topic which has attracted considerable attention among scholars of foreign policy. The third part is a consideration of Malawi's aid relations with Britain while the fourth part is a consideration of British budgetary assistance to Malawi.

Aid Relations With Donors

Apparently, Malawi's policies have, over the years, led to a realization of their alleged main objective; that is endearing Malawi to donor countries and organizations.

Accordingly, they are often described as "pro-western", "capitalist", and "anti-communist". Malawi's "pragmatic, pro-Western foreign policy", claimed the Guardian, has been rewarded with generous amounts of aid.¹ The word, "rewarded", is clearly a reminder that donors give aid to Malawi, not on account of its needs, but on account of its allegedly "pro-western" and "capitalist" policies. MacManus elaborated the point. He wrote:

"The steady production and export of tea, tobacco, and cotton fuels the economy. This coupled with the President's insistence on timely repayment of loans and incorrupt implementation of aid programmes has made his nation a favourite son of Africa for donor countries and banking community.²

Out of this apparent success of the allegedly foreign aid-oriented policies have arisen several misconceptions about Malawi in relation to its donors. The first one is that donors have been generous towards Malawi and that Malawi receives foreign aid from many donors. Indeed Elliot Morss cited Malawi as the typical victim of "donor proliferation", meaning that Malawi receives aid from too many donors.³

The second misconception is that the mere fact that Malawi receives Western aid means that Malawi is aligned with the Western countries. The "pro-western" and "anti-communist" labels are a case in point. "The Malawi

Government", claimed Richardson, "aligns itself squarely with capitalism, United States, Western Europe, and increasingly the foreign policy of South Africa."⁴ Malawi, also argued Short, never "seriously attempted to play off East and West in the scramble for aid, an argument which depicts developing countries as being in a fierce competition with each other for aid."⁵ Apparently the point is that to appear genuinely nonaligned, an aid recipient country must accept aid from both the East and West.

The third misconception has it that Malawi is the largest per capita recipient of aid in Africa. "Perhaps not surprisingly", claimed Dorrell, "this Wester-oriented open economy is clearly favoured by the international financial institution; indeed it is said to be the largest per capita recipient of aid in Africa."⁶

The notion of "per capita aid" is, in the view of the writer, inappropriate. This is because the concept is supposed to indicate the amount of aid which each person in a recipient country would get in a given year if the aid received were to be shared equally among people of the recipient country. It gained currency during the foreign aid boom in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which created a need for equitable distribution of aid particularly the U.N.D.P. resources, among the recipient countries. It implies a directly proportional relationship between the need for aid and the size of a recipient country's population.

The per capita aid though useful as an approximation, omits the factors of geography and size and can, therefore, be misleading. It can be misleading because it presupposes that all foreign aid is for sharing purposes among the people of a recipient country. Such presupposition is correct only if one considers relief and emergency aid. This is the type of foreign aid which is indeed for distribution to the needy, say those facing starvation. However, the concept is not a sound one with regard to some other categories of foreign aid.

A greater proportion of foreign aid is not for distribution to the needy. It is for the creation of production units and social services like the establishment of a fertilizer plant and the construction of new roads and hospitals. Such activities have much to do with a recipient country's level of economic development rather than with the size of a recipient country's population. For example, to construct a road along its entire length, Malawi would need as much aid for this sort of project as, say the Côte d'Ivoire although its population is less than that of the latter. However, the concept has gained wide acceptance because it is seen as appropriate for comparison purposes. So Malawi is said to be the largest per capita recipient of aid in Africa meaning that in relative terms, it gets more aid than any other African country.

Finally, another misconception is that Malawi does not have difficulties in obtaining foreign aid. "So efficient and diligent", reported Ashford, "has Malawi proved itself to be developing its own resources that aid

bodies such as the World Bank, Commonwealth Development Corporation and European Development Fund almost fall over each other in the rush to give Malawi loans and grants", a point which he repeated on another occasion.⁷ He reported:

"At present Malawi is seeking £50 million in foreign aid to pay for national rural development schemes. On its record it is unlikely to have difficulty in raising the money".⁸

In short, the popular claims are that Malawi receives generous amounts of aid, that Malawi receives aid from too many donors, that in relative terms, Malawi receives more aid than any other country in Africa, and that Malawi has no difficulties in getting aid. All these are actually misconceptions about Malawi as a recipient of foreign aid and hardly stand closer examination.

To begin with, the claim that Malawi is given generous amounts of aid is ambiguous. It implies several things about Malawi vis-a-vis the west. One possible meaning is that the western donors have provided substantial aid to Malawi. Table II on the next page shows the aid which Malawi has received from 1964 to 1985. The figures are certainly proof of Western generosity to Malawi. Another possible meaning is that it has been the West and not the East, which has been willing

TABLE II

LIST OF MALTA'S FOREIGN AID LENDERS: IN \$ MILLIONS

TABLE II

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Canada	0.02	0.02	0.4	0.40	0.1	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.9	1.8	13.3	10.4	14.8	47.0	13.3	9.0	10.0	6.6	7.8	3.3	4.3
Iceland	0.02	0.21	0.9	1.2	1.2	0.8	1.4	2.6	4.5	5.0	4.4	4.4	7.0	17.9	6.0	1.6	3.3	0.9	3.0	5.1	
France																0.4	3.9	0.6	3.3	3.0	3.2
Japan			0.01							0.6				0.7	1.1	2.7	6.9	11.6	9.9	5.7	5.1
Netherlands						0.1	0.2	0.4	0.9	1.2	1.2	3.3	2.8	2.2	4.5	7.0	2.5	2.5	2.3	1.3	7.1
United Kingdom	30.2	30.4	24.7	23.1	17.2	18.5	24.5	20.5	16.9	18.9	23.8	24.7	22.2	22.5	37.4	29.3	30.3	23.6	18.1	17.0	16.5
United States	2.0	3.37	3.0	3.0	2.0	4.0	3.0	3.0		4.0	4.0	5.0	4.0	5.0	3.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	7.0	6.0	7.0
West Germany	0.10	0.47	2.3	1.7	2.3	3.2	4.8	2.6	3.0	2.4	2.3	1.7	8.8	12.3	57.2	13.2	29.9	21.7	14.5	14.7	11.9
A.D.B.							1.5	0.9	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.6	1.4	2.0	10.9	6.3	5.9	5.7	3.3	2.1
I.D. A.			0.10	0.24	4.8	9.6	7.3	7.8	4.7	7.5	11.4	11.9	10.9	18.2	14.5	15.1	20.7	26.9	30.4	76.9	34.0
U.N.	0.22	0.9	0.64	0.64	1.1	1.4	1.4	1.8	2.9	3.7	5.2	4.7	4.4	5.2	7.4	13.5	15.4	13.1	20.2	14.9	12.6
E.E.C.									1.0				5.2	8.9	12.7	20.6	14.0	10.8	5.8	14.5	10.9
I.B.R.D													0.1	2.3	2.5	7.4	4.2	0.6			
I.M.F													5.8	6.0	5.0	0.1					

Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Annual Reports of Financial Flows to Developing countries. The reports are those of each year from 1965-1986 inclusive.

Gap: Figures for 1968 not available in the OECD Reports. 29/....

Abbreviations: ADB: African Development Bank; IDA: International Development Association; UN: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); United Nations Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF); etc.; EEC: European Economic Communities; IBRD: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and IMF: International Monetary Fund.

to give aid to Malawi. Table II also confirms this. Malawi has not received any aid from the East.

However, one other possible meaning is that the generous amounts have been something special to Malawi; that is the western countries have been willing to give aid more to Malawi than to any other developing country in Africa. Probably this is the intended meaning of the claim. In this third sense, the claim is a misconception about Malawi's relations with the donors. As can be calculated from Table II, Malawi received nearly \$1,785.74 million of foreign aid from 1964 to 1985. On its own, the amount is substantial. However, the figure is just a little more than what Sudan got in 1985 alone. Therefore, in relative terms, the west has not been so exceptionally generous towards Malawi.

Table II also shows that Canada, the Netherlands, Japan, and France had for many years been giving Malawi almost no aid at all until the late 1970s. This was true too, to some extent, of the United States, the West's largest donor, as the small amounts of its aid to Malawi show. Absent from the table are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden, a list which includes some of the most generous donors. Malawi's donors are the World Bank, West Germany, Britain, U.N.D.P., Denmark, A.D.B., and the United States of America. Now the list includes Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, and the European Communities (E.E.C.). In

short, contrary to Morss's claim, the country has only a handful of donors.⁹

Further, the claim that Malawi is aligned with the West just because it receives aid only from the West implies a direct relationship between acceptance of aid and alignment. The mere acceptance of aid is seen as itself proof of a recipient's alignment with the donor of the aid. Such an assumption overlooks the asymmetrical situation which the developing countries face with regard to sources of foreign aid. As is well known, the Eastern bloc countries have not been a major source of foreign aid. Moreover, a good deal of their aid has been military which is quite unsuitable for Malawi with its very small army. Therefore, Malawi has not received any aid from the Eastern bloc countries, not because it cannot accept aid from those countries, but because the Eastern bloc countries do not have the aid which Malawi needs.

The United States has now got a handy official definition of alignment. This is based on the voting practices in the United Nations General Assembly. "Because a general Assembly acts on so many diverse issues, the voting record of a U.N. members during a General Assembly", reads an introductory statement to the United States Official Report, "tell us a good deal about a country's orientation in World arenas: where it stands, with whom it stands and for what purpose".¹⁰ No doubt this is debatable. However, this is one of the ways by

which the United States has chosen to define another country's alignment with it. Since the United States is the leading member of the Western bloc countries, the definition constitutes a reasonable basis for testing the validity of the claim that the mere acceptance of aid from a donor means a recipient country's alignment with the aid donor.

Table III on the next page shows Malawi's voting practice in the United Nations General Assembly and the United States aid to Malawi. It has some shortcomings. For example, it may be disputed on the ground that it covers too short a period, 1984 to 1987. While this is, indeed, a very short period, the Table, nonetheless, provides some useful insights. Among other things, it shows Malawi's alignment with the United States. Its voting percentage in line with that of the United States is among the highest in the African group of countries in the United Nations. However, the alignment seems to have nothing to do with aid. The relationship between it and Malawi's receipts of American aid is a poor one. For example, the 1984 lowest voting percentage figure was rewarded with a relatively larger amount of aid than the 1983 higher voting percentage figure. Their relationship is even worse if Malawi's receipts of American aid are compared with those of some other African countries.¹¹

Moreover, the alignment as depicted by the Table is highly relative. These voting percentages are indeed high

TABLE III

TABLE III

VOTING PERCENTAGES IN THE U.N.

	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986</u>	<u>1987</u>
Malawi Voting % Coinciding w/ U.S. Position:	24.7	14.3	26.9	36.8	17.9
Position Among African Countries:	7th	14th	2nd	1st	9th
American Aid Commitments to Malawi in Million of Dollars	4.0	6.0	7.0	3.4	7.3

Sources: 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988 Reports to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations. The aid figures for 1983, 1984, and 1985, are from O.E.C.D. Reports. The 1986 and 1987 figures were obtained from a Malawi Government official records.

Key: The percentage figure is the number of Malawian votes which coincided with the United States "yes" or "no" votes in a hundred. The United Kingdom has throughout the period scored over 90 per cent according to the U.S. official reports. The figures are calculated on the basis of a selected number of issues.

in comparison with those of other African countries. For example, the 1986 high percentage of 36.8 is even less than half of the United Kingdom rating of over 90 per cent. If anything, the Table shows that Malawi's voting percentage figures are very much within the overall pattern of the voting practices of African states. In other words, acceptance of aid from a donor is probably an unreliable guide to an aid recipient country's alignment.

Furthermore, the claim that Malawi is the largest per capita recipient of aid in Africa is simply not true. Table IV on the next page lists per capita aid figures for a number of African countries chosen at random. As can be seen from it, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are the largest per capita recipients of foreign aid. Per capita aid figures for Senegal, which has almost the same population as Malawi, are also far higher than those of Malawi. Even the per capita aid figures for countries like Côte d'Ivoire and Tanzania, each with a population larger than that of Malawi, are, on average, higher than those for Malawi. Therefore, quite the contrary of what people like Dorrell say, Malawi is simply not the largest per capita recipient of aid in Africa.

In absolute terms, Malawi's position is even lower. For example Table V on page 244 lists a number of African aid recipient countries chosen at random. As can be seen from it, Zaire, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania, and Kenya are the countries which almost constantly received

TABLE IV

PER CAPITA FOREIGN AID OF SOME AFRICAN RECIPIENT COUNTRIES IN \$

	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
Botswana	24.81	31.71	44.49	52.7	60.58	67.25	69.86	75.35	124.0	130.7	114.3	112.5
Côte d'Ivoire	11.23	11.43	11.92	13.55	16.98	19.73	21.16	15.92	29.0	30.4	38.2	36.5
Ethiopia	1.91	1.78	2.06	2.79	3.5	4.87	4.66	4.42	5.4	6.4	6.0	7.6
Kenya	6.45	5.60	6.48	7.58	8.70	10.10	10.96	13.20	25.1	27.1	30.7	25.9
Lesotho	13.75	14.76	14.62	16.13	19.57	26.35	30.94	31.26	52.1	63.4	65.0	70.2
Madagascar	7.22	7.49	7.08	7.79	8.65	8.75	8.59	8.83	15.4	18.3	26.0	19.8
Malawi	7.24	7.64	6.88	7.42	9.07	11.25	13.07	14.58	24.7	27.3	22.3	18.0
Mali	5.05.	5.92	8.68	13.06	16.81	18.56	17.36	18.34	30.0	30.7	23.4	24.1
Senegal	13.29	12.07	14.47	17.78	24.41	28.45	24.85	28.43	50.0	56.8	46.5	48.3
Somalia	10.99	9.50	10.15	9.98	14.80	19.20	23.87	23.54	47.6	572	59.0	58.5
Sudan	0.73	0.82	1.88	2.68	4.49	7.47	8.08	10.00	19.3	23.3	28.7	29.22
Swaziland	15.80	13.33	15.91	24.15	31.79	37.10	40.40	16.14	113.2	116.5	72.4	78.9
Tanzania	4.23	4.17	5.11	7.12	12.18	15.94	19.19	21.20	32.8	36.3	34.3	29.6
Uganda	3.13	3.15	2.37	1.68	1.27	1.61	1.57	1.45	4.6	7.6	9.8	9.7
Zaire	4.90	4.81	5.37	6.24	7.11	7.82	8.40	9.64	14.5	15.6	11.2	10.1
Zambia	5.02	4.33	6.68	8.79	12.75	14.21	16.30	22.5	50.5	49.8	43.1	34.6

Source: Statistical Yearbook Of The United Nations, 1972 to 1983 inclusive.

The figures start with the year 1971. This is because the concept of per capita foreign aid had not come into currency prior to 1970.

TABLE V

TABLE V

SOME AFRICAN RECEIPT COUNTRYES

POPULATION IN 000: FOREIGN AID IN MILLION OF UNITED STATES DOLLARS

	1974	1972	1964	1965	1966	1967	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Botswana	696	873					14.0	14.3	17.8	70.8	134.5	36.9	81.8	57.8	39.8	21.4	140.4	53.4	110.7	118.6	129.6	105.4	100.7
Cote d'Ivoire	6480	8859	39.85	30.82	43.46	34.64	67.9	115.5	103.6	84.9	158.2	164.0	193.8	303.4	508.0	617.2	551.8	918.4	260.6	848.2	448.5	135.6	136.2
Ethiopia	28076	34140	17.00	26.73	40.69	29.41	48.1	49.8	69.3	49.0	59.0	107.8	115.8	135.3	107.1	130.8	220.9	215.6	256.0	221.1	294.4	372.7	719.0
Kenya	12558	17390	55.18	71.24	65.77	56.55	67.9	94.6	108.5	116.9	199.8	177.2	190.7	354.4	550.9	462.2	654.5	557.3	577.4	575.3	478.6	429.6	462.7
Lesotho	1169	1407					13.2	9.9	16.7	14.1	14.2	20.9	27.5	30.1	39.1	51.9	62.1	90.7	103.2	93.6	103.3	101.1	95.6
Madagascar	7426	9142	47.59	50.82	42.35	43.34	46.1	47.5	56.8	60.1	54.9	65.4	91.7	61.7	54.0	115.2	229.3	394.2	409.0	369.9	236.6	169.8	200.5
Malawi	5009	6355	32.56	34.53	31.41	29.82	31.4	42.9	35.2	54.2	33.8	48.0	84.9	77.7	114.3	112.2	210.4	189.3	193.2	135.4	105.4	165.1	122.8
Mali	6151	7260	17.17	.61	20.86	17.76	20.9	20.8	36.6	40.6	69.7	106.5	114.9	85.1	113.6	176.7	210.1	254.0	236.4	205.2	214.8	323.5	390.1
Senegal	4861	5203	57.31	47.52	44.10	48.70	49.4	41.2	62.2	57.3	99.8	129.6	136.7	161.9	169.8	294.7	350.3	448.1	483.1	486.2	455.8	380.2	303.3
Somalia	3052	3963	21.68	28.67	17.94	15.04	34.5	30.0	34.4	31.3	31.7	20.7	84.6	72.1	396.3	275.3	229.7	553.0	369.1	618.0	411.8	368.1	368.3
Sudan	1540	19450	24.90	30.16	17.10	18.89	20.2	16.7	18.7	46.2	90.8	104.3	382.7	258.3	388.3	478.1	643.2	705.8	721.1	809.8	1019.4	630.2	1136.0
Swaziland	470	580					11.2	11.0	1.8	12.4	10.6	15.0	17.4	18.7	37.6	54.4	78.8	79.1	56.9	48.1	53.0	31.8	27.9
Tanzania	15464	19831	46.81	38.34	38.52	36.45	61.0	59.0	79.5	102.5	127.9	162.2	317.2	317.9	420.4	576.3	744.4	857.5	850.4	759.6	610.0	565.7	494.7
Uganda	11060	13675	22.87	21.63	25.06	20.78	44.0	40.3	37.3	32.4	8.6	1.9	7.5	45.5	30.0	129.2	42.8	137.2	153.9	170.2	190.8	169.3	188.5
Zaire	24021	29960	121.09	149.31	89.66	94.13	154.7	132.9	285.9	218.6	518.5	467.1	610.7	494.1	512.3	707.1	732.5	756.3	630.2	433.2	111.1	347.7	331.0
Zambia	4668	6006	20.67	13.6	33.72	68.39	40.6	27.0	36.6	68.4	158.5	183.5	311.1	133.1	205.7	315.6	449.7	353.1	419.8	346.7	216.1	240.9	331.7

Source: O.E.C.D. Annual Report On Financial Flows To Developing Countries.

Base Year: 1964 is chosen as the base year for the figures because it is Malawi's independence year. 1968 figures are not included because they were not recorded in the O.E.C.D. Report. The 1964 to 1967 figures for Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland are not included because these countries got independence between 1966 and 1968.

the largest amounts of foreign aid each year for the past twenty or so years. Sudan, Somalia, and Zambia joined, as it were, the list of the aid high fliers later. Malawi has been roughly in the third category, competing mainly with Madagascar and Mali both of which gained the upper hand of the competition as the 1970s drew to a close. Malawi has not been the largest recipient of foreign aid in Africa. Indeed Hewitt and Kydd have calculated that the country "ranks 52 among all third world countries with a 0.5% share of total aid".¹²

Finally the impression that Malawi does not have difficulties in getting aid is simply misleading. Not all Malawi's development schemes have met full cooperation from the aid donors. For example, the country's rural development schemes which Ashford mentioned were initially shunned by some of the Western aid donor governments including the British Government, despite their popularity in international development circles as the sort of schemes which enable aid to reach the rural poor in the recipient countries.¹³ Perhaps the best known project which initially met almost total opposition from the Western aid donors is the country's new capital. Progress on its construction was made in the teeth of donor opposition and the project was described harshly by Richard Gott as "Brazilian delusion of grandeur" and by a Representative of France as "dubious public investment".¹⁴

No doubt, other developing countries have had similar frustrations with the aid donors. It matters less if Malawi had less of such frustrations than the other developing countries. The frustrations which Malawi has also experienced on some of its development schemes show, at least, that all has not been bread and butter for Malawi on the question of foreign aid.

Recipient Of South African Aid

Malawi's acceptance of some foreign aid from South Africa has been a subject of wild speculations or exaggerations. Almost anything which Malawi has done successfully is attributed to South African help. After describing Malawi as one of Africa's remarkable economic success stories, Girardet, claimed:

"Over two decades later, Western development officials argued that Malawi's conservative...and controversial Life President...has achieved more for his country than many other African leaders have for theirs. Many feel that his success...as well as his controversiality...stem from the fact that he established diplomatic and trade links with South Africa in 1967";¹⁵

a point which also appeared in an article in the Economist in which it was claimed that "the relative efficiency of Malawi's industry is to some extent a

consequence of access to the spare parts and service skills in Johannesburg area".¹⁶

It is by no means clear how the trade links with South Africa, especially the "access to spare parts and service skills in Johannesburg area", have helped Malawi to succeed to the exclusion of South Africa's other neighbours. For example, Joseph Hanlon says that in 1982 Zambia imported from South Africa goods including vital mining spare parts worth 92 million Zambian Kwacha; and Zimbabwe imported from South Africa goods worth 239 Zimbabwean dollars.¹⁷ How these trade links have not helped these other countries is hard to say. Though debatable, the argument has created the impression that Malawi is a preserve of South African consumer goods. "We were surprised", reported Brigadier Lewis, "to find, contrary to our expectation with which we left London, a limited range of South African consumer goods in Malawi."¹⁸

It is not the intention here to explore all the economic questions concerning Malawi and South Africa in this thesis. The subject of concern is aid. Therefore, attention is centred only on the aid relationship between Malawi and South Africa. With it, too, an impression is often created that South Africa is a donor of aid to Malawi or that Malawi gets aid from South Africa. The Life President of Malawi, claimed an article in the Times, "maintains trade, aid, labour and diplomatic ties with

South Africa".¹⁹ "In 1980 South African loans accounted for 27 per cent of all bilateral loans made to Malawi, second behind the U.K.", claims Sparks who goes on to say; "it must be remembered that South African aid, as limited as it has been, has a very high present value component of about \$700 million, the highest of any particular linkage Malawi has with the Republic".²⁰ Why the South African aid alone should have a "very high present value component" is by no means made clear.

Table VI on the next page gives figures of South African loans to Malawi over the years 1964 to 1984. As can be seen, Malawi received loans from South Africa only in 1968, 1972, 1979 and 1983 worth K50.2 million. Sparks gets the \$700 million figure by recalculating the K50.2 million into what it would amount to in the present value. This is simply misleading. The 1979 figure in the Table includes a loan of K1.87 million (roughly £935,000) with a 3 per cent interest and K642,000 (roughly £321,000) with 2 per cent interest. These two loans are what can properly be called aid. The others are regarded as aid by the Malawi Government only in the sense that they were badly needed funds which only South Africa willingly offered. Otherwise, they were the most expensive loans which Malawi obtained then. The interest on some of them was as high as 8 per cent which was one of the highest even on a commercial loan by the standards of 1968. Sparks ignores all this whereas he ought actually to recalculate what the high interest rates of the loans

TABLE VI

TABLE VISouth African Loans to Malawi In Million Of Kwacha:

1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
-	-	-	-	23.5	-	-	-	8.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	13.3	-	-	-	5.0

Source: Republic of Malawi: The Appropriation Accounts Revenue Statements and other Public Accounts for the Year ended 31st March, 1983. Government Printer, Zomba, Malawi, 1984, Page 148.

would mean today in keeping with the prevailing conviction that high interest and short repayment period reduces the value of aid to a recipient country.²¹

As stated earlier, Table VI shows mostly what is called loans to Malawi; that is South African loans to Malawi. These add up to a quite a substantial figure which needs to be interpreted with care if one is to avoid creating a misleading impression. For example, Sparks claims that in 1980, these loans accounted for "27 per cent of all the bilateral loans made to Malawi."²² This is misleading in that it overlooks cancelled debts to Malawi by Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, and to some extent Britain. Otherwise, these constitute a very small percentage of all the bilateral aid, let alone all the foreign aid to Malawi.

In short, South Africa has not been an important source of aid for Malawi. This is simply because, as everyone knows, South Africa is not, strictly speaking, an aid donor.

Perhaps the most misinterpreted South African loans to Malawi are the 1968 (K11.44 million) and 1972 (K8.36 million) loans. By the 1968 standards, each of these carried a high interest rate of 4 per cent. On the basis of these two loans, South Africa is often said to have financed the construction of the country's new capital in the central part of the country. "Lilongwe, the new

Capital City", claimed an article in a magazine on Africa, "was built with South African money, and development aid has continued to flow into Malawi",²³ a view more or less held by Meredith who says:

"The South Africans were duly grateful, providing him (the Malawi leader) with finance for the construction of a new capital city at Lilongwe and an additional rail link to the coast in Mozambique."²⁴

Gwendolen Carter also made the same point, saying:

"While other sources of international financing provided unwilling to underwrite the costs of building Lilongwe, a new capital, in the centre of Malawi...he (the Malawi leader) willingly accepted South African financing (though on strictly business basis) and construction. Economic ties then forged have been continued."²⁵

Such views exaggerate the importance of the two loans. It is, indeed, the two loans which made it possible for Malawi to move its capital from Zomba, the capital inherited from the colonial past, to a new site near Lilongwe. The loans were used on the production of a structure plan for the new capital, construction of some roads at the new site for the capital, and the building of some office blocks, stages which are indeed appreciated and often acknowledged by the Malawi Government as having been crucial to

making the move of the capital possible. However this is not the same as saying that South Africa financed the construction of the new capital. The project involved a host of other projects which were not financed with South African loans. Perhaps Kydd's letter to the Economist explained the funding of the project better.

It read:

"Sir, Your correspondent writes (April 13th) that South Africa underwrote the costs of Malawi's new capital, Lilongwe. This is a myth which anti-South African commentators repeat as often as supporters of the South African regime, much to the satisfaction of the latter.

"South African aid over 1969-72 financed the construction of a second rail link to the coast, the structure plan for the capital city and some of Lilongwe's initial roads and public buildings. Most of the construction took place over 1971-1981, and almost none of it during this time was South African financed.

"The expensive water and electricity infrastructure was financed by multilateral development agencies, and bilateral agencies were also involved. The creation of the commercial infrastructure was mainly implemented by local companies in which the Government was usually a shareholder, but which were required to

raise the bulk of their finance in private markets. Some of this was from Euro-currency market but a surprisingly high proportion was domestically financed. In the 1970s, Malawi displayed a very high savings rate for such a poor country, peaking at 21% of G.D.P. in 1978. During 1973-78 between 59% and 70% of investment was domestically financed".²⁶

Recipient Of British Aid

As a recipient of British foreign aid, Malawi has similarly been a subject of some misconceptions. One of them has it that Britain accords "exceptional treatment" to Malawi. What this means is by no means made clear. Perhaps it means that Malawi is the largest recipient of British foreign aid or that Britain is the largest donor of foreign aid to Malawi. For example, Morton argues:

"But so far as the role of aid in development is concerned, one of the major factors making Malawi a special case was the exceptional, if not unique, treatment it received from Britain. At the same time, it has received substantial inflows of foreign aid, most notably from Britain. Indeed aid receipts from Britain have exceeded Malawi's aid from all other sources, and in the initial years financed roughly half all government spending";²⁷

a point which was also made by Bryan Roberts who said:

"We will have received by the end of this year something like £50 million in aid over the last five years from overseas governments. By the end of 1970, the total will be £60 million. Of that, no less than £50 million will have been provided by one country alone - Great Britain".²⁸

Taken at face value, this is indeed the impression which figures for British aid to Malawi give. The figures for British foreign aid to Malawi in Table III indeed show Britain as the largest aid donor to Malawi.

However, the United Kingdom figures include a large element of technical aid which consists of funds kept and spent in Britain as training fellowships for Malawians and as supplementary salaries for British Nationals recruited to work for the Malawi Government.²⁹ This is quite substantial. For example Hewitt and Kydd wrote:

"Some 55% of the total U.K. aid programme worth £13 million annually is now supplied in the form of manpower support and the U.K. has consistently devoted at least half of its aid to technical assistance since independence although the programme has become increasingly focused and less random gap filling nature".³⁰

The United Kingdom figures also include commercial loans which amounted to £12.3 million in 1972. The figures for the other donors such as West Germany, Canada, and Denmark do not include commercial loans and contain a very minimal element of technical aid. Therefore the real British concessionary transfers to Malawi are thus lower than what Table III shows.

Moreover, a comparison with other recipients of British foreign aid in Africa tells a different story. Nothing comes up which might even be construed as an exceptional or "unique" treatment of Malawi by Britain. For example Table VII on the next page lists a number of recipients of British foreign aid. With the exception of Pakistan, the recipients are the Commonwealth countries in Africa and Asia. As can be seen from it, India and Kenya are really the major recipients of British foreign aid. The figures for Malawi are even below those of Pakistan. Malawi's position is low even in per capita terms. For example, Jones shows that it is Botswana, Gambia, Lesotho, and Swaziland which are, in fact, the countries which are the largest per capita recipients of British foreign aid.³¹ Malawi has indeed received considerable amounts of aid from Britain. However, the country has not been an "exceptionally treated recipient of British aid."

Perhaps the most misinterpreted British aid to Malawi was the British budgetary aid which Malawi used to receive during the years 1964 to 1973. This is part of the United

TABLE VII

TABLE VII

SOME RECIPIENTS OF BRITISH FOREIGN AID: IN £ MILLIONS

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Botswana					11.9	6.7	10.7	8.4	7.0	8.4	9.3	8.5	8.0	10.4	16.9	20.6	16.6	11.2	15.1	12.6	7.9
Gambia	2.45	3.90	2.34	2.44	2.22	1.0	1.4	3.1	2.3	2.7	3.4	3.1	5.8	7.0	5.1	5.3	5.0	6.0	3.6	4.9	4.0
India	94.60	75.83	89.44	74.26	81.5	107.5	157.0	139.6	121.0	176.5	157.2	197.5	139.4	228.2	325.3	200.2	341.8	94.9	193.6	107.8	138.0
Kenya	47.96	53.26	31.14	20.61	25.8	26.6	23.9	61.1	28.2	32.5	21.0	38.1	22.6	48.5	56.3	49.3	74.6	56.3	46.0	47.2	40.5
Lesotho					8.9	1.6	7.4	7.3	4.6	5.9	8.7	3.8	3.8	10.0	14.1	16.0	25.0	25.0	7.1	7.0	3.0
Malawi	30.22	30.43	24.66	23.07	17.2	18.5	24.5	20.5	16.9	18.9	23.8	24.0	21.5	22.5	37.4	29.3	30.3	26.3	18.1	17.0	16.5
Pakistan	28.01	28.26	24.04	27.22	26.8	25.5	20.1	30.7	10.8	20.3	14.6	38.8	45.1	34.0	58.9	51.8	49.9	32.8	25.2	24.1	21.5
Sierra Leone	5.52	2.68	3.30	2.00	2.3	2.2	2.7	2.0	2.5	1.0	1.2	1.6	3.1	2.6	6.4	2.0	8.0	2.0	1.3	4.7	
Sri Lanka	1.38	0.49	6.58	11.02	10.9	10.9	14.5	9.2	5.1	3.6	6.0	9.9	7.0	16.0	30.0	76.4	53.3	58.0	44.7	30.5	14.3
Sudan	3.30	4.56	4.26	1.76	2.2	1.7	1.7	2.5	2.7	3.5	6.8	13.9	8.8	13.6	29.5	50.8	66.4	68.7	48.8	36.4	54.8
Swaziland					10.5	5.4	3.6	10.9	8.4	8.3	7.6	3.7	15.7	13.1	13.8	15.0	9.4	6.4	4.5	3.7	2.7
Tanzania	24.69	17.77	11.75	2.75	4.2	4.9	5.2	4.3	3.7	3.5	9.0	10.4	11.7	19.8	16.5	74.5	56.0	41.2	43.9	29.7	23.0
Uganda	16.81	13.22	12.14	13.24	9.7	11.9	9.8	25.0	4.4	1.0	0.5	0.2	0.8	2.2	4.7	6.7	30.7	18.6	9.3	9.5	10.4
Zambia	20.56	12.07	26.75	40.13	13.6	6.2	13.2	10.5	21.6	19.6	22.0	16.9	19.4	25.6	60.8	44.2	38.7	22.5	21.1	20.1	21.9

Source: O.E.C.D. Report on annual financial flows to the developing countries.

These figures were compiled from O.E.C.D. Annual Reports 1965-1986 inclusive.

Kingdom figures in Table II and IV and amounted to £7.2 million in 1964. Less and less of it was drawn by Malawi until 1973 during which Malawi stopped to draw it all together. The aid is said to have played a developmental role and its acceptance by Malawi is said to be evidence for Malawi's alleged neo-colonialist status. Both those interpretations of the aid were made by Kathryn Morton who examined British aid to Malawi in terms of dependence.³² They are really a misinterpretation of the aid.

Morton made the developmental role interpretation after comparing what has happened in Malawi with the aid, with what might have happened in Malawi without the aid. She justified the consideration of the latter possibility on the ground that Malawi's lack of strategic importance to the great powers and attraction to foreign investment would have made it very difficult, if not well nigh impossible, for the aid to come from sources other than the country's former colonial power. At the end of the exercise, she argued that the maintenance of a modern administrative machinery for which the aid was used was crucial to the economic development which had taken place in Malawi. Thus, she placed the budgetary aid into the same category with developmental aid.³³

Morton made her allegation that Malawi has neo-colonial status on two grounds. The first was that Malawi was in 1964 the first newly independent former British colony to receive budgetary aid which in the past

used to be given only to territories, or people, still under British colonial control. The second was that Britain, to be specific, the O.D.M., scrutinized Malawi's annual national budgets prior to granting the required amounts of the aid. The argument was that the right of scrutiny exercised by O.D.M. constituted an inroad into Malawi's sovereignty.

These arguments are probably among the most precise and persuasive arguments for the dependency theory. They are, in fact, an attempt to provide irrefutable evidence for the contention that foreign aid establishes a dependence relationship. On their basis, Morton could list as neo-colonialist states a host of other countries including Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland which also received British budgetary aid for a number of years.³⁴ These days the list would include Ghana, Liberia, and Uganda which are said lately to be receiving British budgetary aid.³⁵

The argument need not be accepted, however. To begin with, the developmental role interpretation is based on a fallacy. The argument that the existence of a modern administrative machinery is a pre-condition for economic development is fallacious. It is like saying that the possession of guns by private individuals is a pre-condition for the crime of murder in a society. That is not necessarily the case in real life. The national bureaucracy, or civil service, like the gun, is a neutral

instrument which is maintained for a variety of purposes. Economic development is, indeed, one such purpose. The budgetary aid was used to maintain the national administrative machinery. That in itself was an important function. However, for the national administrative machinery to undertake development activities it must be directed to do so. Otherwise, there can be no economic development regardless of its existence.

Economic development is a product of a consciously formulated and implemented policy. For it to take place, a government must be conscious of the need for development. For example, the budgetary aid was used on the support for an administrative machinery which was more or less inherited from the colonial past during which a greater part of the country was hardly developed. That the bureaucracy has played a developmental role during the independence period of the country is due not to the mere fact of its existence but to the fact that it has been directed to undertake development activities. Therefore, it is incorrect to attribute a developmental role to the budgetary aid.

Further, the neo-colonialist status interpretation is implausible if the aid is placed into its historical context. Malawi began to receive the budgetary aid at the time that its Civil Service was dominated by British expatriate officers whose salaries were supplemented by the O.D.A. These were the ones who drafted the country's

annual national budgets. It made no difference that the budgets were each year scrutinized by the officials at the O.D.A. in London. Therefore, the argument about the erosion of Malawi's sovereignty did not arise at that time.

Furthermore, these interpretations are at odds with the attitude which the British and the Malawi Governments had towards the aid. Both Governments were anxious to have the aid phased out. Such an attitude raises several questions if Morton's interpretations are accepted. Why, one might ask, were both Governments anxious to phase out the aid if it also played a developmental role and why was the British Government anxious to phase it out if it were a leverage over Malawi? Morton's explanation of this attitude of both Governments was in terms of Malawi's dislike for the humiliating neo-colonialist status and Britain's dislike for its interference in Malawian affairs. This not only inadequately explained the attitude but also begged further questions. For example, why did Britain not simply give up its right to scrutinize the Malawi national budget in say 1967, 1968 or 1969 if it, indeed, felt that it did not like its interference in the Malawian affairs?

Finally, the O.D.A. scrutiny of the budget was part and parcel of the arrangement for the budgetary aid to Malawi. So long as Malawi had prior consent to it, the O.D.A. scrutiny exercise did not constitute an inroad into Malawi's sovereignty. In other words, this question is

similar to the one in international politics about how states can be sovereign at the same time that they are subject to international law. Similarly Morton's argument is about how Malawi could be sovereign at the same time that its national budget was subject to O.D.A. scrutiny. The answer is that so long as Malawi freely consented in the first place to the O.D.A. scrutiny of its national budget, Malawi's sovereignty was not eroded or impaired.

The Root of the Deficit Problem

The budgetary aid was actually part of the arrangement for ending colonial rule in Malawi. This was because Malawi's recurrent account deficit problem had its root deep in the country's colonial history. Therefore, a brief account of the country's colonial history is necessary for a correct understanding of the budgetary aid.

The reasons for British colonization of the country which was called Nyasaland in the colonial era are still shrouded in controversies. The popular point, popular in the sense that it is expounded by many writers, is that Britain never wanted to colonize the country. Britain instead, is said to have colonized the country by accident. "British colonization of Nyasaland", Griff-Jones wrote, "was done at the time that the desire to rule more foreign lands was not fashionable in Britain".³⁶ This point was first made by Duff, almost a mere decade after the British colonization of Nyasaland. He wrote:

"In assuming direct control over Nyasaland, the Imperial Government was primarily influenced not by considerations of mere territorial aggrandizement or political expediency but by a simple determination to protect, at all reasonable cost, the right of the handful of British subjects who had been the first to attempt its development".³⁷

It is true that the passage does not exclude colonial motives; that is "territorial aggrandizement, or political expediency". However, it is clear that emphasis in it is on humanitarian considerations; that is the protection of the work in the country of a "handful of British subjects" who included missionaries and traders.

As the country's independence approached, the emphasis on humanitarian motives, shifted to mere accident of history. "The birth of Nyasaland", Jones also argued, "depended not on these human endeavours but on the flukes and uncomfortable quirk of history",³⁸ a point which has been emulated by Short saying:

"By a quirk of colonial history, Nyasaland had been carved out of Africa by the Great Powers in such a fashion that its southern half protruded deep into Portugal's East African Province of Mozambique".³⁹

Robinson and Gallagher elaborate the point, saying that the British colonization of Nyasaland was the result

of local circumstances such as tribal wars and the Arab slave trade.⁴⁰

So the British colonization of Nyasaland is said to have been an accident which arose out of local circumstances. This view is supported with evidence from Whitehall official records. In addition, both Duff and Jones served in the country's colonial Civil Service. Therefore, they had an inside knowledge of the country's colonial history. This also adds force to their argument.

Though forceful, the argument raises two problems. The first is how to explain the opposition from a number of local Chiefs to British colonial rule when it was established in the country. For example, Johnston, who actually accomplished the colonization of the country, had to carry out what he called pacification campaigns in several parts of the country. Therefore, if Robinson and Gallagher are correct in saying that colonial rule came to the country because of Arab slave trade and tribal wars, why did a number of local chiefs some of whom were victims of slave trade or tribal wars, oppose the colonial rule? Why did they not simply welcome it?

The other problem is how to define the entity called, "Britain". What is Britain? Is it the British Government or the British public? If it is the former, Jones and Robinson are probably correct. The Whitehall official sources, at least as cited by Jones, point to British

Government reluctance to colonize the country. If it is the latter or both, Jones, Robinson, and others are simply wrong. In his book, Magomero, Landeg White makes it clear that the major nationalities in Britain, the English and the Scots, were both involved in the colonization of Nyasaland.⁴¹ This is a major departure from past practice whereby the advent of British rule to the country was attributed only to Scotland in recognition of the efforts of a handful of Scottish missionaries who saved the country from being swallowed up by the Portuguese and the Germans in East Africa.

Whatever Jones, Duff, and others say, the man who started the scheme, Dr. David Livingstone, clearly had colonial motives in mind. His description of the country meant, to all intents and purposes, British colonization. For example, a young English visitor to Malawi had this to say:

"I was rather disappointed. It seems there wasn't just the missionary in him. He discovered the country and the way he described it was not how beautiful it was but how good it would be for growing cotton, tobacco, and keeping sheep."⁴²

Livingstone's description of the country clearly meant European settlement, since the local people knew very little of such activities then. In any case. Livingstone's motives about the country are now known.

"....but what I can tell to none but such as you, in whom I have confidence, is this, I hope it may result in an English colony in the healthy high lands of Central Africa".⁴³

The letter was written at the outset of his Zambezi expedition in 1841 which was financed by the Foreign Office. The expression in the passage, "it may result in", refers to the expedition. Therefore, Livingstone was going to look for a suitable country for English colonization in South Central Africa.

The sequence of the events was as follows: Livingstone reached on 17th September, 1859, the part of Africa between latitude 9 45' and 17 16' south of the Equator. Part of this is what is today Malawi. In response to his appeal about this country which appears now to have been the part of Africa which impressed him most, a number of Universities in England and Ireland set up a body called, the Universities Mission to Central Africa (U.M.C.A.), ostensibly to evangelize the people of Central Africa. Financed by the Foreign Office and guided by Livingstone himself, the Mission led by Bishop Charles Fredrick Mackenzie from York, settled at a place in what is today Malawi, known as Magomero, in 1861.

The Magomero settlement was abandoned a year later for a number of reasons which need not be mentioned here. The point is that for years, this settlement was referred

to in passing in many scholarly works on Malawi simply as the abortive U.M.C.A. settlement at "Magomero". White's book, Magomero, corrects this impression and explains the connections which were there between it and the subsequent successful Scottish missionary and traders' settlements in the country.

The first Scottish Missionary body from the Free Church of Scotland arrived in the country in 1875. This was followed a year later by that of the Established Church of Scotland which called its settlement, Blantyre in memory of Livingstone's birth place in Glasgow. The latter was later joined by two Scottish traders, John and Fredrick Moir. These Christian and Trade Missions were undertaken in memory of Livingstone who died while exploring the area in 1875. The people involved in these Missionary and Trading bodies were those who influenced the British government, through the public in Scotland, to take a direct interest in the country which was then facing threats from the Portuguese and the Germans in East Africa. Without their efforts, Malawi would have been colonized by the Germans and the Portuguese.

The efforts of these missionaries and traders culminated in the declaration in 1891 of a British Protectorate called British Central Africa, which was renamed Nyasaland Protectorate in 1903. The funds for this scheme came from Cecil Rhodes who also funded the country's colonial administration for a number of years.

The author of Magomero summarizes the history of the period as: "conceived by Missionaries and delivered by Cecil Rhodes was British Central Africa born".⁴⁴ It is true that this was colonization of the country by a handful of British missionaries and traders. However, it was British colonization of the country all the same.

What has the foregoing to do with the recurrent account deficit problem? The answer is: it is the root of the problem. Jones and the others quoted earlier, though wrong about the reasons for the British colonization of the country, point to the root of the problem. This was the difference in opinion about the country between the British Government and a portion of British public. The former was not keen to fund the administration of the country and had to be persuaded by the British Central Africa Administration in 1898 to take over from Cecil Rhodes the financial responsibility for the administration of the Protectorate. Therefore, the root of the problem was the British Government's reluctant involvement which coupled with the lack of valuable minerals in the country for exploitation meant that the country could not count on investment from abroad and that its economic development would have to depend on agriculture. The result was, indeed, a very slow economic progress and a seemingly interminable dependence on Imperial subsidy.

The problem would not have been all that bad had thought been given to the potential of African agriculture

right from the start. This is because Malawi actually has a good climate, annual rainfall, and fertile soil and is capable of supporting a reasonably large national bureaucracy. However, the logic of colonialism obviously prevented that. For example, the growing of tobacco by Africans began by accident in the early 1920s.⁴⁵ Yet the development of African agriculture was the only way by which the need for Imperial subsidy could have swiftly been brought to an end.

Development of African agriculture began to receive some government's attention only after the end of the first world war during which there was, in Britain, a more liberal attitude towards the colonies. For example, cotton began to be grown by the Africans in the early 1920s under Government supervision. This was followed by the African grown tobacco which began to receive Government's attention in the late 1920s. Progress was a first steady and picked up again after the interruption of the second world war. This development was a promising solution to the deficit problem since acquisition of some purchasing power by more and more Africans created a potentially large tax base.

However, the British Government, which was itself grappling with its own postwar economic problems, insisted on financial self-sufficiency for each colony. In accordance with this new policy, it decided to solve the Nyasaland recurrent account deficit problem by forcing the

European settlers in its two other nearby colonial territories, generously endowed with valuable minerals, to accept the country's inclusion into their federal scheme for South-Central Africa in 1949. The paradox of it all was that the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as the scheme eventually came to be called, was imposed on the Africans of the country at the time that the few European settlers in the country felt confident that the country was, on its own, making quite encouraging economic progress.⁴⁶

Opinion still differs on whether the now defunct Federation promoted economic development in Malawi. The country's Africans believe that the scheme retarded the country's economic progress, a position which is amply supported by the Federal economic statistics. On the other hand, some country's expatriate community believes the opposite. For example, David T. Williams argues that there would have been economic growth during the period were it not for the advent of what he calls "politically inspired downswing" a notion which by implication attributes the lack of economic development to the African opposition to the Federation.⁴⁷ This is based on a paper written by David Humphrey which, among other things, computed figures indicating what economic growth might have occurred in the country during the Federation. Apparently, the point is that economic growth would have occurred if the Africans accepted the Federal scheme. The White settlers manipulation of the scheme for their

benefit in Southern Rhodesia is hardly given any attention. Whatever might have occurred, the Federation indisputably aggravated the country's recurrent account deficit problem because it destroyed most of the country's indirect tax base through the removal of import duties on the Southern Rhodesian goods.

The deficit problem assumed political importance when the Africans stepped up their demands for independence. In response to African demands for independence, white settlers in Central and Southern Africa began to present the deficit problem as evidence that the country was inherently poor or seriously deficient in natural endowment. The problem, however, had actually to do with the nature of British colonization of the country. "No doubt", Mayson wrote, for example, "the newspapers tend to regard Malawi as unimportant country congenitally poor and unlikely ever to become self-supporting."⁴⁸

The issue later came to be the grounds on which the white settlers in Central and Southern Africa fiercely opposed the country's independence. The argument was that the country was too poor to be on its own. Malawi's President recalled their arguments in 1966:

"When we became independent on July 6, 1964, noone, friend or foe, expected us to survive politically and economically. Our enemies wrote us off completely; and there were those of our enemies who sniggered at

the very idea of a country, then Nyasaland, as an independent sovereign state."⁴⁹

The provision of the British budgetary aid to the country was how the problem was solved.

In short, the budgetary aid was to the British Government something which they had to honour. The aid was to the Malawi Government a reminder of the struggle for independence. Its phasing out in 1973 was, to the Malawi Government, a vindication of the African demand for the country's independence. This is why both Governments were anxious to phase it out. In other words, Morton misinterprets what was in itself a part of the very mechanism for ending colonial rule to be evidence of neo-colonialism.

Conclusion

Malawi's foreign and domestic policies are said to have had the effect of making Malawi attractive to donor countries and organizations. For example, Malawi is often presented as the "favourite son" of donor countries and organizations, as the largest per capita recipient of aid in Africa, as a regular recipient of aid from South Africa, and as a "uniquely treated" recipient of British aid. In other words, the country's allegedly foreign aid oriented foreign and domestic policies are said to have achieved their objective.

However, such views are sheer misconceptions about Malawi. It is true that Malawi has over the years received substantial amounts of aid particularly from the World Bank, West Germany, and several other Western donors. However, no ground exists on which Malawi can objectively be said to be the largest per capita recipient of aid in Africa or the "favourite son" of donor countries and organizations.

As has been pointed out in this discussion, Malawi received nearly \$1,785.74 of aid from 1964 to 1985. For a country which used to have a national budget of less than a million dollars during its colonial days, this is quite substantial indeed. However, the figure is less than what Sudan received in 1985 alone or less than what Zaire received in three years (1978, 1979, and 1980). Moreover, this figure is the sum of amounts of aid which the country received from only a handful of donors. Those who regard Malawi as a "neo-colonialist state" on the grounds that it is the largest per capita recipient of aid or the favourite recipient of aid from many donors are simply mistaken.

It is probable that Malawi's foreign and domestic policies have been received very well by donor countries and organizations. However, this is not proof that the policies were adopted for foreign aid reasons. Such an impact, if any, has been incidental to the objectives of these policies.

NOTES

1. The Guardian of 25th August, 1986.
2. MacManus, J., "Malawi Remains a Favourite For Aid", The Guardian, 12th July, 1978.
3. See page 205 of the thesis.
4. Richardson, H.S., "Malawi! Between Black and White", Africa Report, February, 1970, Page 2.
5. Short, P., Banda, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 1975, page 230.
6. Dorrell, J., "Malawi, Discipline and Industry = Prosperity", Commerce International, October, 1985.
7. Ashford, N., "The Adoration of President Banda", The Times, 4th July, 1989.
8. Ashford, N., "Malawi Shows How Foreign Aid Should Be Used", The Times, 27th September, 1978.
9. Australia, Austria, Finland, Italy, Israel, New Zealand, Switzerland, South Korea, and the Republic of China (Taiwan) sometimes give some aid to Malawi ranging from \$10,000 to \$100,000. Such aid consists

mainly of scholarships. This is why they have not been included in Table II.

10. Introductory note to the first Report to Congress On Voting Percentage Practices In the United Nations 1984, United States Department of State.
11. Information for such a comparison can be obtained from Congressional Research Service (C.R.S.) Report for Congress, April, 1989, Page 7. For example, all U.S. aid totaled \$1,216.4 million to Zaire, \$330.1 million to Zambia, \$623.9 million to Sudan, \$247.9 million to Kenya, \$222.4 million to Somalia, \$144.6 million to Tanzania, \$70.0 million to Madagascar, and \$31.6 million to Malawi. These amounts represent the debts which these countries owed to the United States.
12. Hewitt, A., and Kydd, J., A Study of Effectiveness of Aid To Malawi: First Draft (unpublished) 28th July, 1984, page 61.
13. The Federal Republic of Germany was the only bilateral donor which supported the projects right from the start. Britain came in later and has so far funded only one integrated rural development project.
14. New Statesman, 28th of January 1972, and the writer is also quoting a member of the French Delegation who made the statement during a World Bank sponsored

consultative meeting on Malawi held in Paris from 21st to 22nd January, 1986. The writer attended the meeting.

15. Girardet, E., "The Switzerland of Africa the best kept secret called Malawi", Christian Science Monitor, April, 19-25, 1986, page 2.
16. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1987 - 88, Country Profile, Malawi, page 6.
17. Hanlon, J., Beggar Your Neighbours, Catholic Institute For International Relation (CIIIR), London, 1986, pages 290, 250, and 303.
18. Statement made by P. Lewis, Member of a London Chamber of Commerce and Industry Trade Mission to Malawi and Mauritius at a meeting held at 69 Cannon Street, London ECA on 10th April, 1985. The Writer attended the meeting together with members from other African diplomatic missions in London.
19. An Article, "Neutral Malawi Seeks to Become The Switzerland of Africa", The Times of 7th November, 1977.
20. Sparks, D.L., South Africa's Economic Relations With Africa: A Case Study of Malawi, PH.D. Thesis, University of London 1985, pages 235 and 339.

21. This refers to the definition of aid. What distinguishes aid from loan, it may be recalled, are the low interest rate and the longer repayment period. The higher the interest rate and the shorter the repayment period, the more commercial the loan is regarded.
22. Sparks, Op Cit, page 235.
23. "Malawi: Pretenders Flexing Their Muscles", Africa Now, February, 1987, page 15.
24. Meredith, M., The First Dance of Freedom, Black Africa In The Postwar Era: Harper and Raw Publishers, Inc., New York, 1984, page 337.
25. Carter G., Forward to T.D. William's Malawi: The Politics of Despair.
26. Kydd, J., "Malawi Development", Letter to the Economist, 27th April, 1985 Vol. 295, Number 7391.
27. Morton K., Aid And Dependence; British Aid to Malawi Croom Helm Ltd., London, 1975, page 1.
28. Roberts, B., "Malawi - Its Progress and Problems Since Independence", Commonwealth Journal, Vo. XII, No. 5 October, 1969, page 177.

29. O.E.C.D., Annual Report On Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1972 Tables for Malawi.
20. Hewitt and Kydd, Op Cit Page 200.
30. Jones, D., Aid and Development In Southern Africa, Croom Helm Ltd., London, 1977, page 62.
31. Morton, Op Cit, pages 89 to 102.
32. Several terms about aid are now in currency. These include programme aid, project aid, budgetary aid, food aid, and development aid. Developmental aid or assistance (D.A.) is that which is used on development activities such as road construction, and small farmers credit facilities to mention a few.
33. Jones, Op Cit, Pages 38 to 39.
34. Eberstadt N., "What Africa Does Need" ' Modern Africa, February, 1987.
35. Jones G., Britain and Nyasaland, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1964, page 31.
36. Duff, H. L., Nyasaland Under the Foreign Office, George Bell and Sons, London 1903, page 4.
37. Jones G., Op Cit, page 50.

38. Short P., Op Cit, Page 179.
39. Robinson R.E., Gallagher J., and Others, Africa and The Victorian, The MacMillan Press Ltd., Paperback Edition, Hong Kong, 1981, pages 223 to 227.
40. White L., Magomero, Portrait of An African Village, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987.
41. Mann A., "Explores Car Gets A Pump Start From Elephant" Lincoln, Rutland, and Stamford Mercury Weekly 30th October, 1986. (Andrew Mann was reacting to Dr. David Livingstone's Letters which he read at Livingstonia, Malawi).
43. Moorehouse G., The Missionaries, Eyre Methuen, London, 1973 page 135.
44. White L., Op Cit, page 81.
44. Chanock M., "The New Men Revisited", in From Nyasaland to Malawi, Edited Macdonal R.J., East African Publishing House Nairobi, 1975, page 241.
46. This is what a Nyasaland Report of 1957 said at least as quoted by Clutton-Brock in his book, Dawn In Nyasaland, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1959, page 30.

47. Williams, T.D., Malawi: The Politics of Despair, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1978, pages 260-268.

48. Mayson, B., "Internal Communications In Malawi", African World, August, 1966, page 4.

49. One of the excerpts of Life President's speeches published on page 39 of This Is Malawi, vol. 19 no.7, July, 1989.

Chapter FiveThe Alleged Role of Foreign ExpertsIntroduction

The last chapter examined the effects which Malawi's foreign and domestic policies apparently have had on donor countries and organizations. This chapter looks at the effects which foreign aid, particularly technical aid, is said to have had on Malawi. To this end, attention is centred on the argument that foreign experts, particularly the British expatriate officers, have been de facto decision-makers of the country.¹

Often no clear evidence is offered for the foregoing argument. For example, some of the evidence for it appears to be the mere presence of foreign experts in the country's civil service and the positions which they hold in it. Apparently the point is that because these foreign experts hold, or have held, senior positions in the country's civil service they must have decided on policy for the country. Therefore, the discussion in this chapter is concerned mainly with the implicit evidence for the argument that foreign experts have been de facto decision makers in Malawi.

The discussion is in three parts. The first part is the consideration of the presence and the positions of

foreign experts, including those from South Africa, in Malawi's civil service. The second part is the consideration of the bureaucracy in relation to decision making. This assumption is crucial to the argument under consideration because the expatriates, not being the elected officials of the country, can be thought to have influenced decisions in Malawi only as bureaucrats or civil servants. Finally, the third part is the consideration of some suggestions of how the bureaucrats are said to exercise influence on decision making.

The Presence of Expatriates

Part of the evidence for the argument that the expatriates were, or have been de facto decision-makers in Malawi is apparently the mere presence of foreign experts in the country's civil service. This is construed as itself proof that the localization of the country's civil service is incomplete. Apparently localization should mean complete replacement of foreign experts in the country's civil service. Almost any statistics showing the contrary is seen as evidence of uncompleted localization of the country's civil service. "Even after more than two decades of independence and availability of educated Malawians", Keith Sommerville reported, "many important civil service positions, particularly in the Ministries such as those of Justice and Finance are still held by the British expatriates".² "Some 550 expatriates

most of them British", Edward Girardet also wrote, "still hold positions in the government".³

This is the belief among many writers. Miller, an American expert who worked in Malawi claimed that "many of the British expatriates would remain in Malawi as long as the President pursued his present policy of staffing ----."⁴ Gordenker similarly wrote that "a contingent of British colonial servants expected to stay in Malawi for considerable time".⁵ Morton also argued that Malawi's localization policy had made the Malawi Government "somewhat slow in formulating detailed manpower plans ---".⁶ In other words, the Malawi civil service would remain unlocalized.

The foregoing means that the other former British colonial territories in Africa performed differently. Apparently, they quickly dispensed with the British expatriates as soon as they became independent. "In other countries, most of the expatriates serving in the civil service did so as advisers on fixed-term contract service", wrote Gordenker who went on to say:

"Moreover expatriate officials came from countries other than the former colonial country".⁷

The other countries which Gordenker referred to are Tanzania and Zambia. Apparently these two were among those former British colonial territories which swiftly

dispensed with the British expatriates as soon as they attained independence.

The foreign experts who are in Malawi, apparently include those from South Africa. These are also talked about as if they are still working in the Malawi civil service. "Official South African Personnel", says Sparks, "have been seconded or otherwise loaned to various Malawi Government and parastatal organizations including the Department of Information, the Post Office, Malawi Broadcasting Company, Department of Planning, the office of Tourism, the Capital City, the Development Corporation, the Medical Office, and the Dog Trainers".⁸

The expressions, "have been seconded" and "otherwise loaned to", create the impression that the South African experts are still working in the Malawi Government today. This may be disputed as a misinterpretation of Spark's literary style. However, Mwakasungura made the same point and explicitly stated:

"The South Africans have remained in Malawi ever since and have dug in rather deeply".⁹

In short, part of the evidence for the argument under consideration is that Malawi, unlike other former British colonial territories has up to now not only retained most of the former British colonial civil servants but also employed and retained, in its civil service, experts from

South Africa. Their mere presence in the civil service is apparently proof that they decide for the country.

The question about foreign experts in Malawi is largely the question about the British expatriates. Therefore more attention will have to centre on them in this chapter. For the moment, the less important or significant question about the presence of South African experts in the Malawi civil service will be briefly dealt with first.

The claim that some experts from South Africa are still working in the Malawi civil service is simply not true. The Police dog trainers whom Sparks refers to were in Malawi only for a short while. This was because the Police dog training programme was not an ongoing one. It was a short duration training programme and the experts returned to South Africa soon after the programme. In addition, terms like, "Office of Tourism", "Medical Office", and "Malawi Broadcasting Company" are even inaccurate. There are no such offices nor such a company in Malawi. The correct terms are, the Department of Tourism, Ministry of Health, and Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (M.B.C.) in none of which, incidentally, has a South African official ever served.

This may appear as an obsession with the accuracy of details, but the distortions which these details create is amazing. They create a misleading picture of South

African experts as still running important offices in Malawi. For example, the term, "Department of Planning" gives the impression that some South African experts still serve in one of the highest policy making institutions in Malawi. Yet there is no South African expert who is serving in such an institution in Malawi. For example, planning in Malawi is decentralized so that the country has a town and country planning, agricultural planning, health planning, manpower planning, and educational planning units, to mention a few. To avoid a misleading impression, one has to specify the unit in which a foreign expert works.

The largest planning unit of the country is the Department of Economic Planning and Development. This was created in 1986 out of two separate development planning units, the Economic Planning Division (E.P.D.) and the Development Division in none of which had a South African expert ever served. The only Department which was headed by a South African expert was the Department of Information, now Department of Media and Public Affairs. This was from 1970 to the end of 1972. Since then the Department has been headed by a local officer.

The South African experts were in Malawi's civil service only for a brief period. They numbered 22 in all during the heyday of their presence in Malawi and came to Malawi largely in connection with two projects: Nacala Railway Project and Capital City Projects. The former

project was financed with a loan from South Africa while the start of the latter project was made possible by some loans which were also from South Africa. Most of them left Malawi soon after the completion of the Nacala Project and of the first phase of the Capital City Project during the early 1970s.

With regard to the British expatriates, one has to make an important distinction between them and foreign experts. The mere presence of foreign experts is construed as evidence that the localization of the country's civil service is still incomplete because of failure to make this important distinction. It is true that in common usage in Malawi, the term "expatriate", is used in reference to almost every foreign expert. However, for serious purposes, the distinction is important. The term "expatriate", reflects something which has to do with the country's history.

The term "expatriates", refers to British nationals, especially those of European origin. These number about 8,000 according to the country's 1977 census. Other British nationals in Malawi include those of Asian origin. These number about 11,000, according to the country's 1977 national census, and dominate the country's commerce. However, the term, "expatriate", is used mostly in reference to the other group of British nationals. These others are simply referred to as Asians.

The British expatriates as defined here fall into two groups. The first group is made up of businessmen, estate owners, company managers, and Christian missionaries. Many of them came to Malawi during the colonial days with the intention of settling in the country.¹⁰ Others included those who came after the country became independent to establish, or run, commercial companies. The other group is made up of administrators, professionals, and technicians many of whom were recruited as young graduates to work in the territory's colonial Government on a permanent basis. Some of them decided to leave the country prior to the country's independence while others decided to stay on after the country attained independence. Still others in this group included those who were recruited after the country became independent to work for the Malawi civil service and statutory bodies. The term "expatriate", refers, strictly speaking, only to those British nationals in both groups who worked in the country before independence and decided to stay on after independence.

On the other hand, foreign experts are those people from various countries who are seconded to the Malawi Government by donor countries and organizations. These have no connection with the country's past history and are recruited for their special skills to work for the Malawi Government for a specified period, usually, 36 months. Common practice has it that these are also expatriates.

As already stated, this is all right so long as it is a matter of common practice.

Of relevance to the discussion here are those British nationals who worked in the Nyasaland Government and decided to stay on to work for the Malawi Government. These were the expatriate civil servants in the early days of the country's independence. They were not recruited by the Malawi Government for their special skills although many of them had such skills to warrant calling them experts. Many of them held important and responsible positions in the country's civil service for the simple reason that independence found them in such positions. In other words, the expatriates were retained to provide a smooth transition from the colonial bureaucracy, called the Secretariat, to the Malawi civil service.

Most of these expatriate civil servants are no longer in Malawi now because they retired from the country's civil service by the beginning of 1970s. The expatriates who are referred to by Keith Sommerville and the others are, strictly speaking, British experts or foreign experts. These have nothing to do with the problem of Africanization of the country's civil service.

Further, the problem of Africanization had nothing to do with the mere presence of foreign experts in the country. Africanization, or localization, had to do with the important positions which the expatriates as defined

here occupied in the country's civil service especially soon after the country's attainment of independence.

The term "Africanization", reflects the fact that colonialism in most parts of Africa was Western European. One of its concrete manifestations was the European domination of the colonial bureaucracies. This was the case, at least in East, Central, and Southern Africa. It was definitely the case in Malawi where attempts were made at direct rule, no doubt, in keeping with Livingstone's dream of establishing an English colony in that part of Africa.¹¹ Although lack of European settlers was responsible for the failure of the direct rule scheme, all the same, Europeans dominated the territory's bureaucracy, particularly its upper echelons. The Africans were allowed to serve only in the lower echelons of the bureaucracy.

The country's colonial bureaucracy was divided into A and B sections. Section A consisted of all the important posts. These included executive and technical posts, and officers who held them were known variously as customs officer or laboratory technician. This was at the lowest strata of the section. The senior posts in the section began with those of administrative and professional posts and officers who held them were known as assistant secretary or medical officer. The most famous of them was the District Commissioner (D.C.) in charge of a district in the country. The top posts of the section were those

of director such as the Director of Agriculture or the Director of "Native" Education. The topmost post in the section was that of Chief Secretary. A handful of African graduates were given some posts in this section, particularly the post of Assistant District Commissioner (A.D.C.), but the Africans were by and large confined to section B of the bureaucracy.

Section B consisted of mainly minor posts such as clerical officer, assistant motor mechanic, assistant laboratory technician, or agricultural instructor. The well known posts were messengers, drivers, cooks, and copy typists. Senior posts included Senior Clerk or Chief Clerical Officer, or Senior Laboratory Technician. These had to be earned after years of service. The section had no head and existed largely to provide supportive services to section A.

The foregoing is a rough description of the Nyasaland colonial bureaucracy. Some of the details mentioned may be inaccurate, but the overall picture is correct. It illustrates, at least, how the Africans were simply excluded from the country's colonial bureaucracy. Therefore, the Africanization problem which arose when the country attained independence was that of how the Africans could best take up the senior posts in the country's national bureaucracy. This was the Africanization problem. It was not about the mere presence of foreign experts in the country's civil service, but about the

domination of the senior posts of the service by the expatriates.

Furthermore, the figures about the expatriates are quoted in a misleading manner. The 550, or 620, figure is indeed quite significant if seen on its own. However, the figure pales into insignificance if it is placed in its proper context. The Malawi civil service, excluding the Police and the Army, stood at 30,787 strong in 1979. Clearly the 620 figure is nothing in relation to the overall size of the civil service. It is more so since not all the foreign experts work in the civil service. Some work in the statutory bodies such as the University of Malawi, M.D.C., and ADMARC. The total number of those working in the civil service proper is pretty much smaller than the 620 figure. Therefore, their mere presence is not evidence that Africanization of the country's civil service is still incomplete.

Finally, the impression, or claim, that it was only Malawi which continued to employ former British colonial civil servants after the country became independent is simply false. Indeed, the puzzle is the basis on which some observers such as Gordenker came to have such an impression about Malawi. For any civil servant is by definition an adviser to the government. Table VIII on the next page shows some statistics for British expatriates in East, Central, and Southern Africa. As can be seen from it, Zambia had the largest number of

TABLE VIII

BRITISH EXPATRIATES IN EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN COUNTRIES

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
BOTSWANA					237	255	200	301	294	327	287	396	446	379	470	479	504	356
KENYA	1563	1716	1468	1441	1563	1376	1167	1400	1215	1083	940	897	767	639	712	668	549	435
LESOTHO					90	83	63	74	94	84	68	57	67	63	98	93	82	70
MALAWI	916	668	693	937	916	890	890	836	776	710	663	696	578	493	636	579	542	434
UGANDA	1214	1253	1275	1211	1214	1236	1244	1064	551	253	93	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SWAZILAND					154	174	174	192	198	167	163	175	176	157	204	191	190	155
TANZANIA	543	774	922	749	543	250	105	27	8	50	81	50	47	40	77	101	82	66
ZAMBIA	3268	1972	2683	3182	3288	2948	3049	2831	1941	1814	1530	1251	1176	1008	1108	1014	985	793

SOURCE: British Aid Statistics, Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO) 1964 to 1983.

expatriates followed by Kenya and Uganda. Malawi was fourth. For example, Gordenker covered Malawi, Zambia, and Tanzania in his study. How he came to the conclusion that even Zambia did not employ British expatriates after it attained independence is by no means clear. With Tanzania, it is understandable because, as it can be seen from the Table, that country did not have many British expatriates.

As can also be seen from the Table, Zambia throughout the 1960's had on average no less than 2,000 British expatriates. Can it seriously be taken that all of them were employed exclusively as advisers in Gordenker's sense? This number is too large for Gordenker's claim to be correct. He is probably wrong on this point as well. This is most probable because quite contrary to Gordenker's arguments, these expatriates were retained on the same three-year contract terms in all these countries and their salaries and pensions were supplemented in one form and another by the British Government. There is no record that the British Government supplemented the salary or salaries of those expatriates who were retained exclusively as advisers to the Government of these countries.

On the more general question of Africanization, the Table shows that Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, and Malawi were the countries which really faced the problem of Africanization in acute form. Barring the distinction

between foreign expert and expatriate, the figures show that Africanization was slow in all the four countries in the 1960's but rapid in the 1970's. The 1970's was the decade of Africanization in all the four countries. The number of expatriates began to decline in most of these countries and Uganda is obviously the country which achieved the most spectacular, indeed drastic, Africanization, if it can be properly called so.

This demonstrates the importance of making the distinction between British expatriates and British experts. The figures for Zambia, for example, show a drop from 3,268 in 1964 to 1,972 in 1965 and a rise almost by the same number to 3,182 in 1967. They remained steady until 1971 when they started to decline again. The most spectacular figures, in this case, are those for Botswana. Botswana started independence with only 237 British expatriates working in its civil service. Then on, the numbers kept increasing until 1980 when they reached a record high of 504. This does not mean that the civil service in Zambia and Botswana became less and less Africanized over the years. The increase in numbers has to do with development activities which necessitated the recruitment of British experts.

The figures for Malawi similarly show a strange pattern. The figures dropped by about 200 in 1965 and were up again in 1967 almost by the same number after which they remained steady until 1972 after which they

began to decline steadily. The drop reflects the pace of Africanization which continued until the beginning of the 1970's when the number of expatriates became insignificant. However, the decline of the expatriates was more than compensated for by the arrival of the newly recruited British nationals to work mainly in the development projects.

That the increase in numbers in the Table after 1966 was due to development activities is borne out by the fact that 1967 and 1968 were the years when Malawi began the implementation of some of its large development projects. These included the start of the construction of the lakeshore road project, the start of the move of the capital, the Lilongwe Land Development Project, the Lower Shire Valley Development Project, and Salima Lakeshore Development Project. The last three projects were the first large integrated rural development projects elsewhere in the developing world.¹² The World Bank funded the first two projects while the Federal Republic of Germany funded the third one. Each of these projects involved, among other things, heavy intake of foreign technical personnel. These coupled with the expansion of secondary and tertiary education which also took place more or less at the same time accounted for the increase in the figures for 1967 and 1968 and for the fact that these figures remained steady after 1968 up to 1972. So while more expatriates were leaving the civil service, more British nationals were at the same time arriving to

join the country's civil service. The figures for Botswana which has experienced the fastest economic growth in the region can similarly be accounted for.

In short, the mere presence of foreign experts is construed as evidence that foreign experts still dominate the country's civil service. This, in turn, is used as evidence for the claim that foreign experts have been de facto decision-makers in Malawi. Such a claim is false. Foreign experts ceased to dominate the country's civil service over a decade ago. Those who are still in the service occupy technical posts. Most of the senior posts in the service have been in the hands of local officers for well over a decade. The exception has been the Ministry of Works which indeed still has an expatriate as its principal secretary.

The Posts Held By Expatriates

The evidence for the argument under consideration is that the expatriates have been holding senior positions in the country's civil service. Apparently, the point is that because they have been holding such positions, the expatriates must have been de facto decision-makers of the country. This touches on the much bigger question concerning the role of bureaucracy in decision-making which will be considered later.

For the moment, the point of concern is the claim that the expatriates still hold senior positions in the country's civil service. "In fact, in 1983", Hewitt and Kydd wrote, "there are a total of 600 expatriates in middle and high-level positions of whom half were British supplemented personnel".¹³ "In 1984", Tony Tembo echoed them, "there were 620 expatriates in the middle and high-level positions of whom half were British".¹⁴ "One of the three, Malawi, the smallest in area and the most densely populated continued to employ British civil servants in the most senior line positions and professional posts of its civil service",¹⁵ said Gordenker who years later is echoed by Elliot Morss. "Recognising that it cannot effectively manage such a number of projects", says Morss, "Malawi allows expatriates to take line positions in government at all levels".¹⁶ The expression, "line positions", means management or policy positions. So the point in all these statements is that the expatriates still occupy policy making positions in Malawi's civil service.

Apparently the foreign experts who held the most important positions in Malawi's civil service were those from South Africa. "Further, the few positions that the South Africans hold", says Sparks, "are key, and are from which the course of Malawi's future policies are shaped".¹⁷ This statement is almost a word for word quotation from McMaster's book.¹⁸ The expressions, "are key" and "from which the course of Malawi's future

policies are shaped" are self-explanatory. Indeed Mwakasungura goes so far as to claim that the Malawi President "recruited a racist propagandist from South Africa as his Minister of Information."¹⁹

So the popular claim is that the expatriates hold senior posts in the country's civil service "from which the course of Malawi's future policies are shaped". Apparently the point is that because they hold such positions, they must be deciding on policy for the country.

To begin with, the claim that the positions which the South African experts hold are senior positions in Malawi is simply a myth. The most important positions in the Malawi civil service are those of Principal Secretaries, or Permanent Secretaries as they were originally titled. These are the equivalent of Permanent Under-Secretaries in White Hall. All except one were localized over a decade ago. Before that, these posts were held by the British expatriates. The highest ranking South African expert in the Malawi civil service was Dan Van der Spuy who was the Director of the Department of Information for three years. He was in this case two ranks below that of Principal Secretary because in between the Director of Department and the Principal Secretary of a Ministry, there is the Deputy Secretary.

It is true that the general-managerships of M.D.C. and Air Malawi which two South African experts held are

important posts. It is also true that the M.D.C. is an important statutory body in the area of industrial development. However, as a statutory body the M.D.C. does not formulate the country's industrial development policy. The latter is the responsibility of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. In short, the claim that the posts which the South African experts held in Malawi "are key" and from which the course of Malawi's future policies are shaped is a myth which was started by McMaster and is now perpetuated by Sparks.

Further, some of the foreign experts do not hold "middle and high level positions". Many have been technical officers which occupy quite junior ranks. In fact, the 620 figure mentioned by Tony Tembo includes British, American, Canadian, and Japanese volunteers workers such as members of the British Volunteers Service Overseas (V.S.O), Japanese International Cooperation Agency (J.I.C.A), American Peace Corps, and the Canadian University Service Overseas (C.U.S.O.). Most of these take up teaching posts in teacher training colleges and secondary schools. The number of foreign experts in middle positions to say nothing of high level ones is actually smaller than the 620 figure.

In 1980/81, the Malawi civil service had a total of 1053 super scale posts or "middle and high-level posts". If Tony Tembo were correct in saying that all the 620 foreign experts were in the middle and high-level posts,

local officers would then hold only 433 or less than half of the middle and high-level posts. This is obviously incorrect because it would mean that the foreign experts would be seen running more than half of the Government Ministries and Departments, if that were indeed the case. That is simply not the case at Malawi's Capital Hill (Centre of Government Offices).

Finally, that the domination of the Malawi civil service by the expatriates came to an end years ago is, perhaps, better explained by Colin Baker's article written as far back as 1972. Baker, himself an expatriate in charge of the localization (Africanization) training programme of the country's civil service wrote:

"At the beginning of 1972, out of a total of 158, only 25 officers or 15 per cent were expatriates".²⁰

Baker is here referring to senior officers in the country's civil service. He went on:

"The Administrative Service of Malawi is now 85 per cent Africanized; and this figure is likely to increase significantly. The number of departures of expatriates was greater during 1971 than during any other year since independence and there are signs that this will be maintained during 1972".²¹

How is the disparity between Baker's figures and argument on the one hand, and the figures and arguments quoted earlier by Girardet, Hewitt and Kydd, and Tony Tembo on the other, to be explained? The answer is simple. In the first place, Baker is concerned with expatriates and not with foreign experts. The latter did not matter as far as the problem of Africanization was concerned. No doubt Malawi will continue almost indefinitely to recruit foreign experts to work in its civil service. However, that will not mean re-emergence of the Africanization problem because such experts will not dominate the country's civil service in the same way that the expatriates did.

In the second place, Baker is concerned with senior posts in the country's civil service. These include administrative officer, under-secretary, deputy secretary, principal secretary or permanent secretary as it was called originally. He is also concerned with senior professional posts such as chief medical officer, chief education officer, chief information officer, and chief geologist to mention a few because the occupants of such posts, though basically professionals, are involved in policy implementation. He is concerned with these senior posts because almost all of them were indeed occupied by the British expatriates during the early days of the country's independence.

On the other hand, Baker is not concerned with the basic professional and technical posts such as technical officer, medical officer, project manager, surveyor, geologist, architect and economist, some of which posts are occupied by foreign experts. It is true that these are middle level sort of posts, but their occupants are not involved in policy matters. In fact, the gist of Baker's article is a denial of the arguments, some of which were quoted earlier, that Africanization was, or has been, slow in Malawi. Contrary to Morton's argument, the article makes it clear that the localization training programme began prior to Malawi's independence and went on uninterrupted.

The current situation with regard to the civil service is as follows. All except two principal secretaryship posts were Africanized or localized by the turn of the 1970's. The exceptions were the Chief Justice post which was localized in 1985 and the Principal Secretary post in the Ministry of Works and Supplies. The latter has three senior professional officers, the Chief Mechanical Engineer, the Chief Building Designer, and the Chief Civil Engineer, all of which were localized in 1987. In between the Principal Secretary and these senior professional officers are Deputy Secretary and Under-Secretary both of which were localized over a decade ago.

As Africanization was about replacing expatriates in such posts by local officers, the Ministry of Works and Supplies was the only section of the country's bureaucracy which has indeed taken very long to be localized. Sommerville must have had the Chief Justice in mind when he made the claim that expatriates still hold senior posts in the Ministry of Justice. In that case, he was referring to the Judicial Department which is separate from the Ministry of Justice. The latter is headed by the Attorney-General and Secretary for Justice who since the 1970s has been a local lawyer. However, even with regard to the Judiciary Department, Sommerville's claim is misleading. It is true that the Chief Justice was an expatriate at the time that he made the claim. However, all the judges in the magistrate courts and the senior judges in the High Court of Malawi were local lawyers by then. Moreover, the Chief Justice himself retired in 1985 and has been replaced by a local lawyer since then. In short, localization of the country's civil service ceased to be an issue over a decade ago.

Bureaucracy In Policy Making

While no longer in senior positions now, the expatriates did, indeed, dominate the country's civil service during the early years of the country's independence. They occupied almost all the senior positions in the civil service soon after the country attained independence. The question then arises: did

they not decide on policy for the country at least during the early days of the country's independence?

The strength of the argument of those who say that they did lies in the assumption that bureaucrats, and not the elected officials, are the ones who really make decisions for a country. So if bureaucrats decide on policy in every country, did the expatriates do the same in Malawi? Is there no evidence that they did this in Malawi? Some writers think that they did. "Bryan Roberts, for example, until his retirement in 1972," Hodder Williams wrote, "was, as Secretary to the President, a closer adviser to Dr. Banda and exercised a wide range of arbitrary powers delegated to him."²²

The claim raises three questions as far as the thinking in foreign policy analysis is concerned. The first is the question of whether the bureaucrats are indeed important in decision-making. The second question is whether Malawi has a bureaucracy and the third is whether the bureaucrats of a country like Malawi are indeed important in decision-making. To scholars of the history of African nationalism, the second is simply nonsense, but to scholars of foreign policy analysis, it is an important question. Each of the three questions is controversial in foreign policy analysis.

With regard to the first question, opinion still differs among the experts in foreign policy analysis.

Graham Allison is one of those scholars who believe in the importance of bureaucracy in decision-making. One of his conceptual models for analyzing foreign policy issues called the governmental policies model, drew attention to the importance of bureaucracy in decision-making.²³ Since then, the question of whether the bureaucrats are the ones who really make policy for a country is still important in foreign policy analysis. The argument that the expatriates have been de facto decision-makers in Malawi is a case in point.

Allison's governmental politics model attracted many critics. Krasner thought that Allison attached undue importance to bureaucracy in decision-making while Lawrence Freedman thought that Allison took a narrow view of politics.²⁴ "The point," Brian White concluded after analyzing the views of yet another critic of Allison's model, "is that Allison's models disaggregate governments in ways that seem, on reflection, both arbitrary and culture-bound."²⁵ These are some of the criticisms against Allison's conceptual models. Essentially they say that bureaucracy is not important in decision-making.

Despite the criticisms, Allison's conceptual models, especially in a combined sense of two of his models called, governmental politics model and organizational process model, remain influential in foreign policy analysis.²⁶ The argument is not so much that decisions are the outcome of a "pulling and hauling game," but that the bureaucrats are the real decision-makers in

governments. "Recipient government," Gordenker attested, "retains all powers of final decisions, but in practice they take in advice proffered by the international personnel."²⁷

The latest study which reflects this view about the importance of bureaucracy in decision-making is a book edited by Scilla Maclean.²⁸ This contains articles on nuclear weapons states which include the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France, and China. Almost each article is evidence that nuclear weapons decisions in each of these big states are made by the bureaucrats. For example, a paragraph in the postscript section of the book reads:

"The sixth theme which recurs in these chapters is the power of the permanent bureaucracies. The development lifespan of a nuclear delivery system and its warheads is now fifteen or twenty years: because of the extreme sophistication of its components, dogged coordination is necessary through the feasibility studies, evaluation, prototype building, testing and production stages. These stages are in the hands of permanent bureaucracies, while government ministers in Western nations, are usually in office for a period of no more than two or three years; the pressures on them to maintain consistency with their predecessors' decisions are very great. Since technology is so complex, the formal decision

taken in cabinet or politburo depends, to a large extent, on the options presented by their permanent secretariats. The parameters of these options do not normally include consideration of alternative defence policies. Fundamental question of the assumptions do not normally form part of the debate."²⁹

To critics, this book no doubt raises the question of demarcation between policy and implementation. For example, one might ask if policy is also about whether China should be armed with a particular system of nuclear weapons. If a decision is taken that a country should be armed with nuclear weapons, does the question about different weapons systems not fall within policy implementation? In other words, critics might say that the book deals with issues, not of policy making, but of policy implementation. Nonetheless, the book clearly demonstrates a continued interest among scholars in the role of bureaucracy in decision-making.

Thus, there is a difference of opinion among scholars on whether bureaucracy is important in decision making. Critics such as Krasner, White and Freedman, to mention a few, do not believe that bureaucracy is important in decision making while Allison and the contributors to Maclean's book believe that bureaucracy is important in decision making. This means that the argument that the expatriates were, or have been, de facto decision-makers in Malawi rests on an assumption which is itself

controversial. No one as yet knows for certain that bureaucrats are the real decision-makers in governments.

With regard to the second question, opinion also differs among the experts in the foreign policy analysis. The existence of bureaucracy in countries like Malawi is doubted, if not disputed, by some foreign policy analysts. "A low degree of institutionalization, characteristic of many third world states," Joel Migdal wrote, for example, "is often associated with political instability."³⁰ This portrays bureaucracy in new states as being almost nonexistent. It is a bureaucracy which is nascent, or in its infancy, or at a rudimentary stage. Accordingly Migdal suggested:

"Because the bureaucracy of the third world states is not as complex, autonomous, and coherent as in the world's powers and superpowers, researchers of foreign policy making in these states would do best to focus directly on the top leadership."³¹

This means that the argument that the expatriates were, or have been, de facto decision-makers of Malawi is simply wrong or at least implausible. As a nascent bureaucracy which is not "coherent and autonomous," the expatriates could not have played such a role.

However, one can legitimately raise the question: has Malawi no bureaucracy or is the Malawi bureaucracy

indeed nascent and incoherent? A response from Africa rejects this view held by Migdal and others concerning bureaucracy in African states. "I disagree with such arguments," Olajide Aluko wrote, "given the contemporary situation in Africa in general and in Nigeria in particular," inadvertently implying that bureaucracies have just sprung up in Africa.³² However, Aluko is by and large expressing a view which is held by many scholars of the history of African nationalism. "All the powers," Thomas Hodgkin wrote, "have carried a good deal further the process of equipping their territories with the panopoly of modern states - infrastructure as the French term it: internal and international airlines, road networks; telephone systems; urban electricity schemes; and the like," an argument which implies at least the existence of bureaucracies in all the former European colonies in Africa.³³ This reads like evidence of the existence of bureaucracy in African countries. For there must be a body of local as well as foreign experts looking after such an infrastructure.

The quotation in the foregoing paragraph covers things which are available in Malawi. There are indeed roads, telephones, telexes, hospitals, schools and colleges, and research centres all of which need the services of the bureaucrats. Robert Rotberg described the country's bureaucracy as it was almost a hundred years ago as follows:

"In Nyasaland, the growth of a central government was rapid. An accountant joined Johnston in 1892; by 1986 a small secretariat has been established in Zomba, the Protectorate's Capital that Johnston had artificially created. An embryo judicial department was begun in the same year. A principal medical officer was appointed: a superintendent of public works, a superintendent of road making and a first surveyor all had their departments."³⁴

Obviously Migdal would regard this as evidence of a nascent and incoherent bureaucracy in Malawi. However, one has to bear in mind that this was the beginning of the bureaucracy some ninety years ago. Now it is much bigger and more complex. For example, excluding the police and the army, it stood at 44,622 in 1981. This was almost three times as large as the United Nations bureaucracy at its headquarters in New York. This seems by any standard to be a bureaucracy. Views implying the non-existence of bureaucracy in new states like those of Midgal raise quite puzzling issues. Probably they are a sad regression on a subject long trodden by scholars of African nationalism like Hodgkin and Rotberg.

However puzzling they may be, the views are evidence of doubts among the foreign policy analysis experts about the existence of a bureaucracy in a country like Malawi. This means that the argument that the expatriates were, or have been, de facto decision-makers in Malawi is based on an assumption which

is also controversial. For example, it is not easy to tell whether the Malawi civil service, though larger and more complex than the United Nations bureaucracy in New York, is a bureaucracy in the sense understood by experts like Migdal.

Finally, with regard to the third question, opinion also differs among the experts in the field of foreign policy analysis. Aluko believes not only in the existence of bureaucracy in African states but also in the importance of bureaucracy in the policy making of African states. He wrote:

"So it is the main thesis of this chapter to assert that in foreign policy decision-making in Nigeria the bureaucrats have played a more critical role than any other individual or organization in the country since independence."³⁵

The chapter referred to in the quotation is the article which he contributed to the book which he helped to edit.

Some scholars in foreign policy analysis like Aluko do not doubt the existence of bureaucracy in African states. However, unlike the African foreign policy analyst, such scholars do not believe that the bureaucracy is important in decision-making in African states. Perhaps this is not surprising since Allison himself warned that he did not expect his model to be applicable to the

less industrialized states. "If we begin with those factors likely to be less prominent in the policies of new states than in the countries like Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union," Christopher Hill wrote, "it takes little sophistication to see that bureaucracy will be among the first of them."³⁶ "As in most African states," James Mayall also wrote, "the political system is highly personalized, foreign policy in particular being regarded as a special preserve of the head of state."³⁷ The existence of bureaucracy in new states like Malawi, is here accepted. What is doubted in the role of the bureaucracy in decision-making.

In short, although the existence of the Malawi bureaucracy is accepted, some scholars do not believe that it has been important in the decision-making of the country. So the argument that the expatriates have been de facto decision-makers in Malawi also rests on another assumption which is itself controversial. Bureaucracy in African states is believed to be simply unimportant in decision-making.

In conclusion, the assumption which underlies the argument that because the expatriates occupied senior positions in the country's civil service they are important in the decision-making process, raises three questions, each of which is controversial, at least in foreign policy analysis. This means that the validity of the argument under consideration is questionable. If the Malawi bureaucracy is nascent, incoherent, and less

important in the country's policy making, then it is incorrect to claim that the expatriates decided on policy just because they occupied senior positions in the country's civil service. In other words, the claim touches on a bigger issue which is controversial at the moment.

Instruments Of Decision-Making

To say that the expatriates were, or have been, de facto decision-makers in Malawi because they occupied important positions in the country's civil service is one thing. It is another thing all together to tell exactly how the expatriates really played the alleged de facto decision-making role in Malawi. Many of those who make this argument often offer no convincing explanation. They just make the claim. To the extent that the President "has relied upon the loyalty and support of his expatriate civil servants both for his efficient administration of government departments and to enforce the comprehensive security measures with which he buttressed his position," McMaster suggested, for example, "their views must be considered a relevant factor in the President's calculations."³⁸ How exactly one might do so is often left unsaid.

However, Gordenker suggested how one might go about assessing how foreign experts play their alleged de facto decision making role in the aid recipient countries. "To

make recommendations about the organization of an education system, to arm a minister of transport with arguments for extending a road network that competes for capital funds with a weapons seeking defense ministry, to urge population control on people who for the first time in the memory of the oldest man enjoy a reasonably good health," he wrote, "is to become involved in politics."³⁹ It is true that this is part of Gordenker's argument that the work of international organizations touches on "delicate national issues in less developed countries."⁴⁰ However, the argument is a good hint on how one might go about assessing how the expatriates played their alleged de facto decision making role in Malawi.

According to the foregoing suggestion foreign experts exercise influence on the decision-making of a less developed country like Malawi in three ways. These are, "to make recommendations," "to arm a minister with arguments" and "to urge population control.", Gordenker calls the first, a "specialized report." The second suggestion refers obviously to policy speeches or statements while the third refers to policy making and implementation. The latter is often contained in a memorandum.

Both the specialized report and the memorandum contain recommendations, but the memorandum differs from the specialized report in that it is briefer and usually contains fewer recommendations, three at the maximum while

the specialized report is tens of pages thick and contains not only a host of recommendations but also a host of implementation measures. These three are what may be called instruments of decision-making, if one is neutral about them, or instruments with which bureaucrats, as Gordenker at least implies, influence decision-making in developing countries. These are the three ways, as suggested by Gordenker, by which one can assess the influence which the expatriates are said to have exercised in Malawi.

To the three, one would add verbal advice as a fourth instrument. In fact, Gordenker also mentions this. The point is that some decision makers do have advisers with whom they discuss matters in confidence. However, this will not receive further attention here for two reasons. The first is that there had been only one person who briefly served exclusively as an economic adviser in Malawi. Since his departure, his post was retitled, Chief Economist, who, to all intents and purposes, serves under Malawi's head of the Civil Service. In other words, Malawi hardly has had a Presidential adviser. The second reason is that because advisers are said to proffer advice verbally, a great deal can be claimed in the name of advisers, which cannot easily be ascertained. It is a device the use of which implies an absence of records. Therefore, the instruments which will receive further attention here are the specialized report, the policy speech, and the memorandum.

The specialized report is produced by a variety of bodies. These sometimes include a single consultant or a group of consultants, sometimes a committee of officials or parliamentarians, and sometimes a review commission or commission of inquiry. The latter body sometimes presents its findings in the form of a declaration. By and large, consultants are hired to look into the feasibility of something like a manufacturing plant while the many other bodies referred to here are often set up to review, or to investigate a specific, usually, political situation. For example, one of the famous works by commission or committees of inquiry is the Balfour Declaration which recommended the partition of the then British mandated territory of Palestine and is still one of the most important documents in the Middle East Conflict. However, Commissions and Committees of Enquiry have been rare since Malawi became independent. They are also often made up of non-bureaucrats. Therefore, attention will centre on the specialized report which has, indeed, been produced quite frequently for the consideration by the Malawi Government.

Speeches or statements are written for a variety of purposes. They are sometimes written for ceremonial occasions, or written as congratulatory or condolence messages. They are also sometimes written to express gratitude or thanks, to praise or appeal for help. Such speeches or statements do not enable the writer to exercise influence on policy because they really contain no policy issues. The speeches or statements which place

the writer in a position to exercise influence are those that announce intention or commitment, restate intention and commitment, or defend intention and commitment. Writers of such speeches do, indeed, influence decisions because they contain the language with which policy is conveyed to the public. The moment a policy speech is endorsed by the decision-makers, the writer's ideas become policy. Therefore, policy speech writing is a potent instrument with which bureaucrats can influence policy making.

Policy formulation and implementation are conveyed to decision-makers in a variety of ways. They include a memorandum, a cabinet paper, a position paper, a background brief, or an official report. The memorandum is the most frequent of them all and can appropriately be used as a representative of them all. Like the speech, it is written for a variety of purposes. These include conveying information to decision-makers, seeking clearance of something from decision makers, and recommending a particular course of action on something. Each of these purposes can lead to influence being exercised on policy by the bureaucrats. Moreover the type of information which is drawn to the attention of decision makers is largely a matter of choice by the bureaucrats. Therefore, the potency of the memorandum as an instrument with which bureaucrats can influence policy making is, in theory, very considerable.

The use of each instrument is sometimes in isolation of the others. In some cases all the three are used at the same time. For example, the specialized report is almost always submitted with an accompanying memorandum which may recommend against, or in favour of, the specialized report or a particular recommendation in the specialized report. The policy speech, too, is sometimes submitted with an explanatory memorandum. In other words, the memorandum is the basic instrument and, perhaps, the most potent of them all.

Gordenker observed the use of the three instruments in connection with three projects. These were Luangwa Project in Zambia, Wami-Pangani Valley Project in Tanzania, and Lower Shire Valley Project in Malawi. According to Gordenker, each of these projects involved initiating a request for consideration by the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.), compiling into a report results of an F.A.O.-sponsored survey of the area to be covered by each project, and drafting a plan of operation for funding by the World Bank. International personnel were involved in all the three stages so that what was implemented in the end was partly the product of the thinking of the international personnel and partly the thinking of the recipient government. Indeed Gordenker says that the UNDP Office in Lusaka was the one which drafted the plan of operation for the Luangwa Project for funding by the Zambian Government and the U.N.D.P.

The use of the three instruments may not be apparent from the foregoing account. However, a good deal of it must have taken place. For example, initiating a request must have involved the use of the memorandum to facilitate an exchange of views between the recipient government's civil servants and the international field personnel particularly members of the UNDP Resident Representative Office. When the request was drafted, the civil servants must have submitted it with a memorandum to the decision-makers for consideration and approval. The approved version of the request was then submitted to the F.A.O. for consideration. This stage in the formulation of the project necessitated the recipient government to dispatch its minister of agriculture, who had to be "armed with argument", to Rome, the F.A.O. headquarters, to present and defend the request (actually application for financial assistance). The same process occurred in connection with the preparation of the plan of operation. So to determine the influence of the international personnel one simply has to find out if they were the ones who drafted the request or the plan of operation.

On paper this looks to be the most reliable and easiest way of assessing the influence of foreign experts on a recipient country. However, a closer examination shows that use of these instruments is fraught with shortcomings. One of them is the well known problem of the interaction of cause and effect. The others have to do with how and whether each instrument applied to

Malawi. The former has to do with the assumption which underlies Gordenker's suggestion; that is the assumption that an endorsed recommendation, policy speech, or specialized report is evidence that influence has been exercised by a bureaucrat. "Evidence of such influence", Gordenker wrote, "may be found in the manner in which governments and their personnel react to recommendations and policies emanating from international institutions and to possibilities of achieving direct benefit in programmatic form".⁴² Similarly, to see whether the expatriates made Malawi's domestic and foreign policies, one has simply to check how the Malawi decision-makers reacted to the recommendation, or draft speeches, made by the expatriates. If in so doing, one discovers that the Malawi decision-makers simply endorsed recommendation after recommendation, or draft policy speech after draft policy speech submitted by the expatriates, one would then conclude that the expatriates made the country's domestic and foreign policies.

It follows from the foregoing that if one discovers that the expatriates wrote no policy speeches, one would conclude that the expatriates did not make the policies. This must be tempting to scholars of international politics in that it says, in effect, that the relative importance of an external factor to decision-making can be determined even in a post hoc situation. It is a view which rests on the seemingly solid, or sound, ground that a recommendation is by definition an input of a decision

because it is made with the expectation that it would at least be considered by the decision makers.

However, the assumption raises two problems. The first is the stage at which decision making starts. For example, one can enquire whether decision is made only at the stage at which recommendation is considered by the decision-makers or at the stage at which a recommendation is first thought about? If it is at the latter stage, then the recommendation ceases to be an input. If it is at the former stage, then the recommendation is turned into an input of decision and an endorsed recommendation is almost by definition evidence that influence has been exercised by a bureaucrat, an interpretation which would probably be endorsed by Gordenker. However, this ties up with the second flaw in the assumption. By taking an endorsed recommendation as being evidence that a bureaucrat has exercised influence, the contribution which the decision-makers may have made indirectly to the making of the recommendation itself is, thus, ultimately excluded from consideration.

The context of a recommendation is important. An endorsed recommendation would, indeed, be evidence that influence has been exercised by a bureaucrat only if each bureaucrat is independent of any rules and of the decision-makers. However, bureaucrats operate within certain stipulated rules and regulations some of which give powers to the decision-makers. For example the power to appoint

someone to a certain important post is a powerful weapon with which decision makers can control the bureaucrats. The implication of this is that the bureaucrats can not only be controlled but also conditioned to act according to the wishes of the decision makers. Bernard Brodie dealt with this point in detail. He wrote:

"Thus one outstanding characteristic of the bureaucratic mind is that it can take on, usually with no difficulty visible to the outsider, the entire set of attitudes favoured by the organization with which it identifies itself, including the biases and predispositions known to be held at the top. The good bureaucrat is rarely in conflict with his superiors on basic policies or related principles, not simply because he is timid but because it comes naturally to him to absorb those policies and make them his own. Otherwise he would not choose that kind of life, or having done so would look desperately for alternatives. He wants to be known as, a good officer - foreign service, military or other - and this means "fitting in" with a set of concepts about which his training has left him in no doubt. As an individual, he may have considerable ability, and therefore be qualified to prepare for his superiors position papers that often include shrewd operational advice. That advice, however, will nearly always be confined to the best tactics

for carrying forward the policy that he knows to be the accepted one."

"If we add to this mental quality the element of rewards and punishments, which vary from subtle to quite overt, another important dimension becomes operative. If, for example, the top command in the military wants high enemy body counts, then high body counts is what it will get, for commendations, decorations and promotions will come of fulfilling that desire and not otherwise. The same is likely to be true of all kinds of information. If the top command wants favourable and optimistic information, that is mostly what it will get.

"The degree to which it will be taken for granted in such organizations may reach incredible lengths - incredible, that is for those who retained some detachment in their thinking. Thus when Hoopes and others talk about the monitoring that Walter Rostow was practising at the very top concerning items reaching the desk of the President, they are talking only about the last link in a long chain in which the same process has operated over and over again. It was upon such thoroughly doctored information, generally optimistic and often quickly proved such by events, that our entire Vietnam policy was based for at least the decade following 1961."⁴³

This passage is only a part of Brodie's elaborate criticism against the view that bureaucrats are important in decision-making. Though not often recognized, it is, perhaps, the most incisive and devastating criticism against the bureaucratic politics model. Here it is quoted because it also explains very well the extent to which bureaucrats can indeed be conditioned or manipulated by the decision makers. For example, the selective recommendations which President Johnston endorsed could on paper look indisputable evidence that Rostow exercised decisive influence on President Johnston while in actual fact they were evidence of President Johnston's influence on Rostow who, in the first place, made the recommendations with the President very much in his mind.

This point is inadvertently given supporting evidence by Gordenker himself. For example, he wrote that the Malawi Prime Minister did, in the end, sign a plan of operation drafted by the F.A.O. personnel for the Lower Shire Valley Project which was referred to earlier. However, he also makes it clear that the F.A.O. drafted the plan largely to meet the Prime Minister's wishes. "The thin theoretical content of the approach used by the Malawi Government", he wrote, for example, "formally had little in common with the policies of the F.A.O. or the I.B.R.D.". ⁴⁴ Thus, by overlooking the context in which a decision is made an endorsed recommendation can be mistaken as evidence that a bureaucrat has exercised influence on decision-making.

The second shortcoming has to do with application of each instrument to decision-making in Malawi. The potency of the policy speech as an instrument for influencing decisions, to begin with, has limitations. One of them is that a policy speech is drafted only as and when it is required. This means that the initiative lies with the decision-maker. The other is that some guidelines are normally issued along which a policy speech has to be drafted. This limits the scope of the writer's initiative.

Civil servants in Malawi have, indeed, been drafting some policy speeches for delivery by the country's ministers. However, it is an established procedure in the country's civil service that any policy speech written has to be cleared with the President before delivery. This procedure has ensured that speeches are drafted in line with Government policy.

By and large, the President makes most of the policy speeches. Although he does so, the President has made most of the policy speeches without reading from written texts. For example the President addressed the United Nations General Assembly in October, 1964 without reading from a text. It is true that he has sometimes read a policy speech from a written text, but the text had been written by himself. In other words, the President has had no policy speech writer. He has been his own policy speech writer. Therefore, the drafting of the policy

speech as an instrument with which to influence decision-making was not available to the expatriates in Malawi.

With regard to the specialized report, certain limits of its potency as an instrument with which the expatriates might have influenced decision making in Malawi have also to be kept in mind. One of them is that the specialized report is normally on an issue on which the government, which invites those who produce it, (the consultants), has a special interest. The Government normally has an idea of what it wants to do on an issue on which it commissions a specialized study. The other limitation is that the consultants have to carry out a study within certain terms of reference defined by the host government or at least approved by the host government. The situation is worse if the host government also finances the study. The consultants, in that case, become temporary employees of the host government. It is true that this is not much of a problem since most of the specialized studies in developing countries are funded from external sources particularly the World Bank and the U.N.D.P. This indeed increases the independence of the consultants. However, the prospect of conducting another study in future dampens this spirit of independence.

As a general rule, any specialized report which recommends in favour of what the host government wishes to do stands a very good chance of being accepted and implemented while any specialized report which recommends

against the wishes of the host government stands the risk of being ignored. The consultants influence on a decision is clearer if their negative recommendations, negative in the sense of being against the wishes of the host government, are accepted and acted upon by the host government. Such situations are rare in that governments invite consultants on an issue on which they have set ideas. In fact, the consultants are often invited to tell, not whether something should be done, but how something is done or can best be done. In other words, the specialized report is largely an instrument of policy implementation.

Hypothetically it may be said that the specialized report instrument was available to the expatriates in a negative sense; that is, in the sense of using it as a cover for their unwillingness to implement Government decisions. For example, the expatriates were, indeed, the ones who drafted the terms of reference for a specialized study and possibly took advantage of this. They might have often recommended the conduct of a specialized study ostensibly for establishing the feasibility of what they were directed to do while in actual fact it was intended covertly to foil, or delay, the implementation of what the Government wanted to be done. It is possible they might have done that on several occasions. However, this is not entertained here because it is an allegation for which this thesis has no supporting evidence. On the contrary, the British expatriates left the country with a very good record of project implementation.

In practice, the specialized report instrument was not available to the expatriates because as civil servants they were not appointed to constitute a consultants team. This is because the idea of inviting consultants from outside presupposes a lack of expertise on an issue in a country or government. This is not to say that Malawi has not hired any consultant from Britain. On the contrary, many of the consultants came from Britain. The point is that there was an important difference in terms of the availability of this instrument between the expatriates on one hand and the foreign experts on the other. The former were full time civil servants and could not be appointed or hired as consultants while the latter included the consultants. Therefore the specialized report as an instrument for influencing decision-making was not available to the expatriates except possibly in the hypothetically negative sense described earlier.

With regard to foreign experts, the instrument was available. Specialized reports which have been drawn to the attention of the Malawi Government have been numerous. One of them was a report produced by a United Nations consultants' team which was invited to look into the industrial situation in the country.⁴⁵ Among other things, this recommended the setting up of a development agency to act as an engine of industrial growth, a recommendation which was not only accepted but also implemented. This is how the M.D.C., which was referred to in third chapter, came into being.

However, one should not say much about the potency of this instrument. If anything, the Malawian experience amply demonstrates the serious limits to its potency. By and large, the use of this instrument has been confined to the area of infrastructural development, particularly the national roads construction programme. The provision of the new project appraisal techniques mentioned in the third chapter made it possible to have a feasibility study almost on every road construction project in the country. However, there is no evidence that it has been important in other areas.

In addition to being confined to the area of infrastructural development, the special study does not deal with policy questions. It does not ask whether something should be done. That is a policy question. It asks that question only in an indirect way by recommending that something should not be done or demonstrating that something is not feasible. The question which the specialized study asks is how something which is wanted, can be done or best be done. No doubt the many feasibility studies which the Malawi authorities have accepted and implemented have affected road design and construction in the country. However, they have not affected the Malawi Government's commitment to infrastructural development. Almost all the planned new major roads in the country have now been constructed. In this regard the studies have contributed in no small measure towards a successful implementation of the road

development programme. In other words, specialized reports often do not influence policy but enhance policy implementation.

That the foreign experts did not usurp the decision-making role in Malawi by means of specialized reporting is, perhaps, best demonstrated by the fate of some specialized reports which attempted to influence policy by recommending against some of the Malawi Government's important decisions. The President has on several occasions told the public that he was advised on economic grounds that certain projects should not be implemented.⁴⁶ These projects included the establishment of the University of Malawi, the High Court of Malawi, and the Reserve Bank of Malawi. These were said to be economically unviable. However, all three have been successfully implemented and are among the country's important institutions. To these three have to be added the new capital city project and the lakeshore road project. Opposition from foreign experts to those two projects is public knowledge. For example, the Hill Commission, which was sent by the O.D.A. to Malawi, recommended, among other things, against the two projects.⁴⁷ As a result progress on the implementation of the two projects has been made in the teeth of donor opposition. Therefore, the President has not been a passive recipient of the specialized report.

Finally, the memorandum was indeed available to the expatriates because it is the most frequently used

instrument of decision making. Almost nothing goes to the decision makers without an accompanying memorandum. However, its availability is not in itself enough. It all depends on whether the expatriates intended to use it for influencing decisions and succeeded in doing so.

The potency of this instrument is also limited. In the first place, the memorandum is a record of government business. It ensures that nothing takes place, or is done by the bureaucrats, without first of all being placed on record. This makes it possible for the decision-makers to check what the bureaucrats are doing. This in itself is a limitation on the ability of the civil servants to influence decisions. For example, decision-makers can call for an old memorandum to check the activities of a bureaucrat if they feel that a bureaucrat is doing something improper or funny. The possibility that one might be checked in that way reduces the potency of the memorandum as an instrument for influencing decision-makers.

Perhaps the second most important limitation is that the content of the memorandum is in itself a reflection upon the writer himself. One's written work, as is well known, is a reflection upon one's personality. This is particularly the case with memorandum writing because a recommendation is itself a revelation of one's feelings or attitude. As a result, decision-makers do easily know the feelings of their closest bureaucrats. It is true that

bureaucrats can make one or two recommendations against government policy, and get away with them. However, the practice carries with it the risk of provoking a reaction from decision makers. If caught red-handed like that, the punishment could be loss of the decision-makers' confidence in the bureaucrat, closure to the bureaucrat of access to the decision-makers, a humiliating transfer of the bureaucrat from his favourite post to another post, demotion, premature retirement, or, in the extreme, dismissal. These are consequences all of which no bureaucrat would want to contemplate.

The technique of denying decision-makers alternative policy options in a memorandum probably works when the decision-makers have no interest in a subject and have, therefore, to rely on the initiative of the bureaucrat, or when the one-sided recommendations are always in line with government policy. All this means that the memorandum is a double-edged sword. It is also the very instrument with which decision makers do effectively control the bureaucracy.

That the expatriates did not usurp the decision-making role in Malawi is perhaps demonstrated by the acknowledgement among some foreign policy analysts that the President has been the country's important decision-maker. "In looking at the foreign policy making process in Malawi", Christopher Clapham argues, for example, "one is effectively looking at President Banda". This is a

"personalized foreign policy" view which is popular among some foreign policy analysts.⁴⁸ Although its validity is debatable in that it is arbitrarily used only in reference to foreign policies of African states, leaving out some of the French, American, and Soviet Union foreign policies which have been, or were, equally "personalized" such as at the time of Charles de Gaulle's Presidency in the case of France and Kissinger's Detente in the case of the United States, the view is in part a recognition that at least the President has been the country's decision maker. "All major decisions", argues McMaster "are either initiated or approved by him, and fear of his legendary temper permeates the civil service".⁴⁹

That the expatriates did not succeed in reducing the Malawi authorities to mere passive recipients of official recommendations is also shown by the admiration and muted protest which the President's control of the civil service earned among some of the expatriates. "Dr. Banda", wrote Richardson, who served as Permanent Secretary for the country's Ministry of External Affairs, "possesses a sharp intelligence, an extra-ordinary memory, vast reserves of energy for a man in his sixties, and capacity to make decisions and enforce them".⁵⁰ This is an admiration as well as a recognition of the President's ability to make and enforce decisions by an expatriate who worked closely with the President. There are also statements of protests, displeasure or disapproval. "At the same time", Gordenker also wrote, "an observer could not overlook the

paramount position of the President in all the matters of government expenditure and his willingness to put aside reasoned bureaucratic papers in order to conduct personal policies".⁵¹

Gordenker's is a statement of disapproval by someone who was not among the expatriates. However, his views about the President's role in decision making are shared by some of the former expatriates or by some of the newly recruited British nationals who worked among the expatriates in the Malawi Government. Simon Thomas, who has been frequently referred to in the thesis and who worked in the country's civil service as a Government Economist, says, for example:

"While much detailed policy making has been left to the civil service, Banda has insisted upon laying down the overall framework and of making the final decisions even on the most trivial matters. Once made, decisions cannot be altered except by Banda himself, though attempts are sometimes made to reinterpret his decisions. When expert advice has clashed with Banda's own opinions, the advice is rejected and the expert vilified, and if from within the civil service often dismissed. To considerable extent Malawi's economic policies are those of Banda himself".⁵²

This passage is not a contradiction of the view that Thomas is one of those who attribute a de facto decision-making role to the expatriates. Thomas inadvertently attributes a de facto decision-making role to the expatriates because of his mistaken belief that the Achikumbe scheme is the same as the former colonial "master farmer" scheme whereas he is in this passage consciously acknowledging that the President, and not the expatriates, has been the decision-maker of the country.

With such complaints by even some of the expatriates themselves, it is puzzling that the expatriates are at the same time portrayed as having been de facto decision-makers of the country. If the President made decisions, or had been making decisions even on "the most trivial matters", it is hard to see how the expatriates at the same time could be de facto decision-makers of the country. This is why these complaints or statements of displeasure or disapproval are themselves taken here as evidence that the expatriates did not decide on policy in Malawi.

Conclusion

The argument that foreign experts, particularly the British expatriates, were, or have been, de facto decision makers in Malawi is based on three grounds. The first one is the presence of foreign experts in the country's civil service. This is construed as evidence that foreign

experts still dominate Malawi's civil service. The second one are the posts which the foreign experts occupy in the country's civil service. These are said to be senior, or "line", positions. The point is that because they occupied such positions they must have decided on policy for the country. The third ground is the assumption that bureaucrats are the real decision-makers in every country.

However, it is simply a mistake to interpret the mere presence of foreign experts as evidence that they dominate the Malawi civil service. It was the British expatriates who indeed dominated the country's civil service during the early years of the country's independence. Their domination of the service arose because independence found them already in such position and ended during the early 1970s. Therefore foreign experts no longer dominate the country's civil service.

Further, many foreign experts have not been holding senior positions. Only some of the British expatriates did indeed hold senior positions during the early years of the country's independence. They did so simply because independence found them already in those positions. The question of whether they decided on policy simply because they occupied such positions is a matter which raises the much bigger question of whether bureaucrats are the ones who really make decisions in any country.

The views of the experts in the field of foreign policy analysis on this question are conflicting. Some of them say that bureaucrats are indeed important in decision making while others say the opposite. Still others do even doubt the existence of a bureaucracy in countries like Malawi. By and large the experts in the field of foreign policy analysis do not think that bureaucracy is important in policy making in new states. For this reason, some of them think that it has been the President who has dominated policy making in Malawi, a point which is indeed, supported by some expatriates who worked in Malawi's civil service.

This means that the mere fact that the expatriates occupied senior positions in the country's civil service is not evidence that the expatriates were, or have been, de facto decision-makers in Malawi. No one knows for sure that bureaucrats are the ones who really decide on policy in any country.

NOTES

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3. Girardet, E., "Africa Journey", Christian Science Monitor, May, 1986 page 2.
4. Miller, R.A., "District Development Committees In Malawi: A Case Study In Rural Development", Journal Of Administration Overseas, vol. IX no. 2, April, 1970, page 141.
5. Gordenker, L., International Aid And National Decisions, Development Programs In Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1976, page 112.
6. Morton, K., Aid and Dependence, British Aid To Malawi Croom Helm Ltd., London, 1975, page 168.
7. Gordenker, Op Cit, page 35.
8. Sparks, D.L., South Africa's Economic Relations With Africa: Ph. D. Thesis, University of London, 1985, page 238.

9. Mwakasungura, A.K., The Rural Economy of Malawi: A Critical Analysis, A309, Bergen, Norway, March, 1979, Unpublished Paper, page 34.
10. According to Robert Palmer, none of the European settlers intended to live the rest of their lives in the country. However, some had lived in the country for twenty years as missionaries, estate owners and businessmen. See Palmer, R., European Resistance To African Majority Rule, The Settlers' and Residents' Association of Nyasaland (SARAN) 1960-63, African Affairs, Vol. 72 No. 288, July, 1973, pages 256 to 271.
11. British colonial motives for the colonization of the country were so carefully concealed in the humanitarian and religious language which is still accepted by many even in Malawi. Geoffrey Moorhouse's book contains a surprising revelation about Livingstone's true motives about the country. See Moorhouse, G., The Missionaries, Eyre Matthew, London, 1973.
12. The first integrated rural development projects in Africa and elsewhere in the developing countries were the Lilongwe Land Development Project and another in Ethiopia. The former was funded by the World Bank while the latter was funded by Sweden. See Mercer, A., OPTIMA, page 8.

13. Hewitt, A., and Kydd J., A Study of the Effectiveness of Aid To Malawi, First Draft, 26th July, 1984, Unpublished, page 201.
14. Tony Tembo, "Stopping The Health Care Gap", African Business, February, 1985.
15. Gordenker, Op Cit, page 35.
16. Morss, E.R., "Institutional Destruction Resulting From Donor and Project Proliferation In Sub-Saharan Africa", World Development, Vol. 12, No. 4, 1984, page 467.
17. Sparks, Op Cit, page 339.
18. McMaster, C., Malawi: Foreign Policy and Development, Julian Freedman Publishers Ltd., London, 1971, page 104.
19. Mwakasungara, Op Cit, page 73.
20. Baker, C., "The Administrative Service of Malawi-- A Case Study In Africanization", Journal of African Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1972, page 546.
21. Ibid, page 560.

22. Williams, H.R., "Dr. Banda's Malawi", Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. XII, No.1, March, 1974, page 95.
23. Allison, G.T. and Halperin, M.H., "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implication", in Theory and Policy In International Relations, by Tanter R., and Ullman R.H., Editors, Princeton University Press, 1972, pages 40-79; and Allison, G.T., The Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis; Little, Brown and Company; Boston, 1971, pages 144-244.
24. Krasner S.D., "Are Bureaucratic Politics Important or (Allison Wonderland): Foreign Policy, No. 7, Summer 1972, pages 159-79 and Freedman, L., "Logic Politics and Foreign Policy: A Critique of the Bureaucratic Politics Model", International Affairs, Vol. 53 No.3, July, 1976, pages 434-49.
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model into one in their article referred to earlier at footnote 23, pages 40-79.

27. Gordenker, Op Cit, page 12.
28. Maclean, S., Editor, How Nuclear Weapons Decisions Are Made, The Oxford Research Group, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1986.
29. Ibid, page 256.
30. Migdal, J., "International Structure and External Behaviour, Explaining the Foreign Policies of Third World States", International Relations, London, May, 1974, page 524.
31. Ibid, 524.
32. Aluko, O. "Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy Decision Making In Nigeria", Nigerian Foreign Policy, Shaw T.M., and Aluko O., Editors, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1983, page 77.
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38. McMaster, Op Cit, page 87.
39. Gordenker, Op Cit, page 12.
40. Ibid, page 11.
41. Ibid, pages 1-123.
42. Ibid, page 8.
43. Brodie, B., War and Politics, Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., New York, 1973, pages 212-213.
44. Gordenker, Op Cit, page 117.
45. President's Speech on the occasion of the opening of Development House, Blantyre, Malawi, on 26th November, 1966, page 7-8 of a text issued by the Department of Information.

46. President's Speech on the opening of a New Reserve Bank Headquarters in Lilongwe on 25th November, 1981, notes taken by the writer.
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49. McMaster, Op Cit, page 169.
50. Richardson III, H.J., "Malawi: Between Black and White Africa", Africa Report, February, 1970, page 18.
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Chapter SixDevelopment And Aid InfluenceIntroduction

The last chapter looked at the effect which foreign aid is said to have had on Malawi. This was the argument that foreign experts have been de facto decision-makers in Malawi. Underlying this argument are several assumptions which were not examined in the last chapter. These assumptions are that development is the "stuff of politics" in developing countries, and that foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy is effective. That is apparently illustrated by the operations of certain multilateral organizations which are seen to constitute inroads into the sovereignty of the aid recipient countries.

This chapter looks at these assumptions. The discussion is divided into four parts. The first part is the consideration of the assumption that development is the kernel of crucial decisions in developing countries. The second part is the consideration of the operations of certain multilateral aid organizations while the third part is the consideration of the political effectiveness of foreign aid. Finally, the fourth part is the consideration of some instances of foreign aid influence in Malawi.

Place of Development Among Government's Activities

The reason why foreign aid is believed to have the power to reduce a recipient country to a dependency, or neo-colonialist state, as it is said to have done to Malawi, is that development is believed to be the most important, indeed overriding, activity of a developing country's government. Gordenker calls development the "stuff of politics", or the "kernel of crucial decisions", in developing countries.¹ No doubt this is made on the ground that there is abject poverty in the developing countries. For example, Williams book, Malawi: The Politics of Despair, has the theme that "Malawi is still desperately poor," a theme which reflects the belief that development is the "stuff of politics" in Malawi.² Obviously Malawians find such a theme strange because, though aware of the wealth in other countries, they are not desperate about their country.

Since a greater proportion of foreign aid is used on financing development, it follows that decisions on foreign aid are crucial to developing countries or are the "stuff of politics" in developing countries. However, this belief is an error. It is a misunderstanding about the relative place of development among government activities or responsibilities.

Malawi's attainment of independence in 1964 indeed exposed the country's underdevelopment. Malawi is a small

narrow country enclosing within its borders meagre natural resources. Its economy is basically agricultural and exports the less lucrative agricultural commodities. It has one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world and has no coastal area of its own, which means that it is land-locked. Apparently this is what has given the impression that development must be an overriding priority of the Malawi Government.

However, the Malawi Government has many responsibilities, some of which override development in importance. Political stability is one such responsibility and the defence of the country is another. Even the administration of justice overrides development in importance. Moreover, development has many aspects; economic, social, political, and technological to mention a few. The development which is popular and which requires foreign aid funding is economic development. This is largely a programme of activities which are undertaken with the intention of bringing about economic growth.

For countries like Malawi, there is also political development. This refers to activities which are geared towards promoting national unity. Such activities could simply be the abolition of a multi-party political system or the adoption of one local language as the national language for the whole country. Such activities do not require foreign aid funding and in fact constitute the top

priority of a new state. Indeed the President of Malawi explained the point:

"While development in Malawi means agricultural progress above all things, this country is doing just that; but the term "National Development" is all embracing. It must be thought of in terms of political, economic, and social advancement. Politically, national development must mean development of national conscience among the people of the country. There is no national progress where there is a sense of division based on tribal, district, or regional differences."³

This makes it clear that the overriding priority of the Malawi Government is not economic development but unity and political stability of the country.

The national accounting procedures of some developing countries, certainly those of Malawi, do not place economic development as a priority. Instead, they place on priority the traditional functions of governments such as security, law and order, justice, and education to mention a few.

For example, the Malawi national budget is divided into two parts. The first part is called recurrent account which consists of revenues and expenditure. This is the more important part of the national budget of any

developing country. In simpler terms, it means money for, and expenditure on, the maintenance of the army for the defence of the country, of the police to keep law and order, of the civil servants to provide medical services, to keep government records, and to implement government policies, and of judges to administer justice or interpret law. It is the maintenance of such social services which is indispensable to the existence of a modern state.

The second part of the country's national budget is called development account. This consists mainly of loans and grants (or foreign aid) on one hand and expenditure on the other. The expression, "mainly of", is intended to indicate that the revenue side of the development account is not entirely made up of foreign aid. It also consists of what is called counterpart local resources. This will receive further attention later. In simpler terms, the development account means the money for and expenditure on activities such as the construction of a major new hospital or the execution of an agricultural development project, or, in short, money for and expenditure on development.

It is true that this division of the country's national budget into recurrent and development accounts is a matter of accounting convenience. Many items from the recurrent account such as the salaries of certain civil servants can easily be transferred to the development account and vice versa. For example, an expenditure on

the construction of an office building can be treated as an item on the recurrent account or development account depending on the preference of the accounting officer. However, the division is by and large maintained. The implication of this with regard to the place of development among the government activities should be obvious. Development is indeed an important option but not an overriding priority.

According to this accounting procedure, it is normal for a developing country to have a deficit on its national development account; that is to say, expenditure on development activities such as the construction of bridges, new roads, and clinics always outstrips the revenue which a developing country can provide on its own.⁴ This is the resource gap which is bridged by means of foreign aid. For example, Malawi's own development revenues form a small proportion of the development account budget and has to get foreign aid to wipe out the resource gap. However, Malawi could also wipe out the gap simply by drastically scaling down development activities.

However, Malawi was one of those worst cases in that it also had a deficit on its national recurrent account. In simpler terms, this meant that the country could not, on its own, pay the salaries of its public employees and the running costs of its public vehicles, schools, roads, and hospitals. In the jargon of the economists, the country faced a serious problem of economic inviability.

Any foreign aid which is used to bridge this sort of resource gap is called budgetary aid or subsidy. This was what the British budgetary aid to Malawi, which was considered in the fourth chapter was all about.

The deficit on the recurrent account is a serious matter compared to the one on the development account. It means that a country is indeed unable to pay its own way and lack of support from donors could indeed mean political instability if not the collapse of the state itself. On the other hand, the deficit on the development account is not a matter of life and death for any developing country. It is an option. Were the donors to withhold aid, Malawi would not necessarily experience political instability. It would continue to exist and even to undertake some development activity. The difference would be that development would drastically slow down to about say three rural clinics a year. Table VI shows that Uganda experienced more or less such a situation. Foreign aid to that country declined dramatically from \$30 million to just under \$8 million a year for nearly three years. Yet Uganda as a state at least continued to exist.

In other words, the Malawi national accounting practice makes it clear that the activities which are a priority of the Malawi Government are those of the defence of the country, law and order in the country, administration of justice, maintenance of transport infrastructure,

health services, education, and immigration to mention a few. These are the priority activities of any modern government. Development is not among them. This is why it is treated in a separate section of the national budget.

In short, the assumption that development is "the very stuff of politics - the kernel of crucial decisions - in many developing countries" is simply an error. Development is an option. It is carried out only when there is adequate provision of the more important services such as the security of the state and the administration of justice.

Operations of Certain Multilateral Aid Organizations

The power of foreign aid to reduce a recipient to a dependent state is apparently evident in the operations of certain multilateral organizations. Foremost among them are the operations of the European Economic Communities (E.E.C.) Aid Fund and the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.). The operations of both organizations vis-a-vis the developing countries are seen to constitute an inroad into the sovereignty of the aid recipient states.

The neo-colonialist implications of the E.E.C. operations are advanced on three grounds.⁵ The first is that eligibility for the E.E.C. aid is conditional upon the acceptance of the Berlin Special Clause. This

involves taking sides on the question of the status of West Berlin. Many developing countries in Africa including Malawi, in the Caribbean, and in the Pacific, the A.C.P. countries as they are called, are eligible for the E.E.C. aid partly because they have accepted the Berlin Special Clause. Mozambique was for a while denied of the E.E.C. aid because of its refusal to sign the Clause. Things changed only after Mozambique changed its mind and signed the Berlin Special Clause.

The neo-colonialist implications of the E.E.C. operations are also advanced on the ground that the Lomé Convention, which governs the relations between the A.C.P. countries and the E.E.C. countries brings the A.C.P. countries back into a legally binding relationship of these countries with their former imperial powers: Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and the Netherlands. What, indeed, prompted many of these countries into seeking the Lomé Convention was the British entry into the E.E.C. which meant that many of them, including Malawi, would lose the preferential treatment which they had hitherto enjoyed on their exports to Britain.

Finally the neo-colonialist implications of the E.E.C. operations are also advanced on the ground that the relationship between the A.C.P. countries and the E.E.C. countries is based not on the principle of reciprocity but on the principle of mutual advantage. The former prin-

ciple was abandoned in the course of the negotiations of the first Lomé Convention in favour of the latter principle which really masks an unequal relationship between the A.C.P. countries and the EEC countries. For example, each A.C.P. country is permitted under the Lomé Convention to impose protective tariffs against the imports which would constitute a threat to its fledgling industries. Such tariffs can be imposed without expecting retaliation from the E.E.C. country concerned. In legal terms, this is how unequal the relationship between the A.C.P. countries on one hand and the E.E.C. countries on the other is.

The relationship is also unequal in practice. The day to day interpretation, or implementation, of the Lomé Convention is a one-sided affair since many of the A.C.P. countries do not have the requisite expertise for handling the operations of a complex multilateral trade agreement like the Lome Convention. For example, the interpretation of the operations of the STABEX scheme of the Convention is largely a matter for the E.E.C. bureaucrats in Brussels. Therefore, the EEC aid is seen to have neo-colonialist implications. It is aid which comes from an unequal relationship, from a relationship which legally binds, though indirectly, the recipients to the former colonial powers, and from a relationship which forces the recipients to align with the West on the question of the status of West Berlin.

However, the neo-colonialist implication of the E.E.C. aid to the A.C.P. countries in general and to Malawi in particular can be overstated. In the first place, Malawi did not seek the agreement with the E.E.C. in order to gain access to the E.E.C. aid. Malawi sought the agreement for reasons of trade or for reasons of its exports to Europe. The E.E.C. aid to Malawi, though quite substantial now, has been an incidental development to the Lomé Convention. Further, the Lomé Convention is not a comprehensive trade agreement between A.C.P. and the E.E.C. countries. It is actually a mere regularization of trade in certain commodities which had long been in place - the A.C.P. countries' exports of certain tropical products to Europe. For example, the convention excludes, from its STABEX scheme, tobacco which is Malawi's largest and most important export.

Moreover, the Convention is a matter of free choice. Malawi can, at least in principle, choose to withdraw from it, an option which was not available to a colonial territory. Colonialism was something which was imposed regardless of the wishes of local people. The Lomé Convention, despite its faults, is an agreement which is freely entered into between the ACP countries and the E.E.C. countries.

Finally, the implications of the I.M.F. operations are similarly seen as inroads into the sovereignty of the I.M.F. member states. These are said to arise first and foremost from the conditionality of the Fund's loans. The

conditionality is the demand that the use of the Fund's loan be accompanied with the implementation of some prescribed structural adjustment measures in the recipient's economy. Often these include large currency devaluations or price decontrols, or both at the same time plus other measures such as removal of subsidies on food, reduction in the number of civil servants, and privatization of statutory bodies. Accordingly, the Fund's loan is called a structural adjustment loan (SAL) and its conditionality is prescribed because the Fund is supposed to help a member state which finds itself in structural balance of payment difficulties.

Malawi did not for a long time seek I.M.F. assistance and has so far implemented only two SALs, the first one of which was obtained in 1982. Hewitt and Kydd have examined in detail the implications of the two SALs, including those arising from price decontrols, and the devaluation of the country's currency, the Kwacha(K).⁶

The Fund does not give foreign aid as such. It gives permission for a member state to use its allocated quota of the Fund's currency called special drawing rights (SDRs). The question of foreign aid in the Fund's operations comes in for two reasons. The first is that the Fund's loan is partly paid in the debtor country's own currency. This makes the Fund's loans almost as soft as foreign aid. They are easy to repay. The second reason is that SALs to developing countries are supplemented, in

fact augmented, with multilateral (World Bank) and bilateral foreign aid. This is because developing countries are allocated SDR quotas which are small in relation to their developmental needs, a matter which is itself an unresolved issue in the United Nations economic sectoral fora.

The neo-colonialist implications of the Fund's operations are further seen to arise from the Fund's technical assistance to developing countries. For example, Malawi has some of the Fund's experts currently working in its Treasury and Reserve Bank. The secondment of such experts to developing countries is interpreted as neo-colonialism. Referring to a similar World Bank technical aid programme, Anatoly Keletsky wrote, for example:

"This 'something' according to the new orthodox among the donors require cherished institutions and class privileges built in since independence to be swept away. In a sense, we're talking about a kind of recolonization - about sending smart white boys to tell them how to run their countries," admits one official (of the World Bank)."⁷

Finally, the neo-colonialist implications of the Fund's operations arise from the Fund's "policy dialogue." This refers to a donor's conference which the World Bank sponsors for each SAL recipient. This involves laying

down on the table the SAL recipient country's economic policies for scrutiny by the donor countries and organizations. Every detail of the proceedings of the "policy dialogue" is recorded on tapes by the World Bank which has sponsored two such meetings on Malawi held in Paris.

The expression, "policy dialogue", is, according to the critics of the World Bank, a euphemism. It is "most frequently used in the Bank," Theresa Hayter and her colleague argue, "to describe its attempts to change the government's economic policies especially their macroeconomic policies."⁸ In other words, SAL is seen as a neo-colonialist instrument. The practice by some donor countries of using SAL as a precondition for providing their aid to recipients has added fuel to the neo-colonialist charges against the Fund's operations.

Like those of the E.E.C., the neo-colonialist implications of the Fund's operations can be overstated. Some of the extreme views on this matter are really nothing but a yearning for "the good old days of colonialism." It seems that some people would like colonialism to come back in one form or another in some parts of the world. The use of the term "recolonization," in reference to the Fund's operations which are hardly like colonialism is a case in point. May be the World Bank official who was Keletsky's informant needs to be reminded that the predecessors of his "smart white boys,"

the Harry Johnstons, the Cecil John Rhodes, the Brazzas, the Lord Lugards and Delameres did not go to Africa to tell the Africans how best to run their affairs. They went there to conquer, to rule, and to exploit.

Further, the Fund's conditionality really falls into the same category as the decisions of the United Nations Security Council and the International Court of Justice because it applies, at least in theory, to every member of the Fund, developed or developing, which finds itself in structural balance of payment difficulties. It is possible that the Fund has been more strict with developing countries than with developed countries in the application of its rules. However, that is a matter of judgment. The fact is that the conditionality is applicable to any country seeking the Fund's assistance.

Finally, though it is indeed an inroad into state sovereignty, the "policy dialogue" operates in an area where international cooperation is possible. The Fund's attempts to change the economic policies of its recipient countries need not be regarded as a serious inroad into sovereignty unless one shares Gordenker's contention that development is the "kernel of crucial decisions" in the developing countries. As already stated, development is an option and states are free to seek the Fund's assistance. So long as there is this free choice, the neo-colonialist interpretations of the Fund's operations need not be entertained.

Some Difficulties In Assessing Aid Political Effectiveness

Finally, the discussion has so far assumed that foreign aid is politically effective. However, it is high time to look into this question a little closer. Is foreign aid politically effective? To many, the answer to this question is: Yes! The belief is reflected in the adage that "he who pays the piper calls the tune." However, the answer to the question is not an easy one.

The assessment of foreign aid is actually fraught with several difficulties. One of them is the lack of information on the political objectives for which foreign aid is said to be provided.⁹ This is due to the fact that some of the aid is disbursed as a matter of routine or habit, and that political objectives are kept secret as a matter of prudence.

Another difficulty in assessing foreign aid effectiveness is also lack of information on the initial situation which foreign aid is meant to change. This arises because the initiative to seek aid is, in most cases, with the recipient. Without such information it is not easy to tell whether, after providing aid, a given situation is indeed the one which foreign aid was meant to bring about. The information on initial situation which is intended to be changed is called, "baseline study." Such studies are in many cases not available to facilitate the assessment of foreign aid effectiveness.

Finally, the other difficulty in assessing foreign aid political effectiveness is the question of time span. In development economics, this is easy to establish. For example, economic effectiveness of a given amount of aid can be assessed at the end of the second, third, or fourth year of a project such as a new hospital. In foreign policy analysis, this is not easy to establish. For example, if a donor's political objective for giving aid to a recipient is to prevent the recipient from falling to communism, for how long is foreign aid expected to do so and at what point in time can its effectiveness be assessed? Such questions arise because many of the political objectives for which aid is said to be provided do not have a time span.

These are some of the difficulties which render foreign aid effectiveness not easy to assess. They may not be insurmountable, but they are all the same difficulties which call into question the over-optimistic assumptions about foreign aid political effectiveness. They certainly account for the current practice whereby the assessment of foreign aid political effectiveness is largely a matter of one's best judgment or impression.

In assessing aid political effectiveness, attention is usually centred on aid strings: project-tying and procurement-tying. Project-tying refers to a donor's demands that its aid be used only on projects which are acceptable to it. This is the most common of the aid

strings. In fact it is often taken for granted because most of the developmental aid is provided in connection with specified projects. As explained in the third chapter, project-tying can be used deliberately to distort the development strategy of a recipient country.¹⁰ In that case, foreign aid political effectiveness is assessed in terms of whether the recipient country has been unable to implement its chosen strategy.

Procurement-tying refers to a donor's demands that its aid be used only on capital goods from the donor country. This type of aid-strings has now gained importance because many developing countries are in need of what is called, "programme aid" as opposed to "project aid." The latter is that aid which is provided for specific projects. The term is in itself evidence that a good part of aid has had project-tying or project strings.

Programme aid is that aid which is provided without reference to any specific project. It is in great demand because of the balance of payment problems which many developing countries are facing. Its purpose is to enable a recipient country to import the necessary capital goods for the execution of development projects. It can be used by a donor to change the pattern of external trade of a recipient country.

Programme aid requires no further attention here because it is a new development. For example Malawi began

to receive it in 1985. Of interest at the moment are what might be described as traditional procurement strings. These have not been part and parcel of project aid. In other words, donors have also often demanded that the capital goods which are to be used in a project should be purchased from them. In this case, foreign aid political effectiveness is assessed in terms of whether the donor's trade to the recipient country has indeed increased as a result of the aid.

The analysis is largely impressionistic. It involves no systematic efforts. The determination of the changes, if any, in the recipient country's development strategy and pattern of external trade is largely a matter of an individual's judgment. There are no guiding concepts and there is no way of knowing whether the changes have really been brought about by foreign aid. Moreover, the potential of these strings to distort either the development strategy or the pattern of external trade is not as high as it might appear. For example, the procurement-tying is almost meaningless if the donor and the recipient are traditional trading partners like Malawi and Britain. Similarly, project tying may not bring about changes in a recipient country's development strategy because project formulation remains the initiative of the recipient country.

In contrast, foreign aid economic effectiveness is systematically assessed. The method includes a wealth of analytical concepts such as "aid effectiveness" which is

distinguished from "aid efficiency", and "project appraisal" which is distinguished from "project evaluation", to mention a few.¹¹ It also includes the concepts of "internal rate of return" and "cost-benefit analysis." The result is a rational assessment of foreign aid economic effectiveness.

It is true that the analysis has its own shortcoming. For example, the outcome of the analysis can be misleading because of a failure to distinguish between political and economic effectiveness of foreign aid. The talk is often simply that of aid effectiveness or aid efficiency. Perhaps it is often assumed that the context of the analysis makes it clear that the assessment is about foreign aid economic effectiveness. However, to the uncritical mind, the results of the exercise can be understood also to mean political effectiveness of foreign aid. Therefore, the results of the economic analysis of foreign aid effectiveness have to be interpreted with care.

Project evaluation, for example, implicitly assumes the humanitarian character of foreign aid. The analysis, in fact, makes nonsense of the claim that foreign aid is political, or commercial such as Guy Arnold's claim that foreign aid is "big business."¹² It is not used in assessing the effects of foreign aid in relation to the political objectives of the donor countries and organizations. For example, the exercise does not enquire into whether the implementation of a project has enabled,

or is going to enable, a donor country to realize its goal of promoting capitalism in a recipient country. Instead, project evaluation enquires into whether a hospital which was funded with foreign aid is benefiting the local people of the area in which the hospital is established.

The practical results of the analysis, too, have not been encouraging. Despite Cassen's findings, no one is yet certain if indeed foreign aid is economically effective. For example, even the U.S.A.I.D. which has been consistent in carrying out project appraisal and evaluation has admitted that its aid programme has been a failure despite the tens of billions of dollars which it has spent for the past twenty years on helping developing nations stem poverty.¹³

Despite the shortcoming, the analysis has the merit of using a tangible economic activity - project - as a reference point such as a road construction or a leprosy vaccination campaign in an area. It also makes the distinction between a project with commercial return such a hydro-electric power project and a project without a commercial return such as a rural hospital. The former is appraised by using the internal rate of return while the latter is appraised by using the cost-benefit analysis technique.

The internal rate of return is calculated by computing the revenues (returns) which the project is expected to earn each year up to the last year of the expected life-span of the project. The computed revenues are then compared to the cost of constructing the project and of maintaining the project each year up to the last year of the expected life-span of the project. The difference between the revenue and the cost of the project each year is what is called internal rate of return. A project is said to be viable, or economically sound, if the internal rate of return is positive and a project is said to be economically unsound if the internal rate of return is negative.

Project appraisal establishes the feasibility of a project or the economic viability of a project. It does not establish the economic effectiveness of a project. The latter is assessed by means of project evaluation. The two methods are the same. The difference is that project appraisal is done before the start of the implementation of a project while project evaluation is done after the implementation of the project. It looks at the real returns and costs of a project as opposed to the computed (expected) returns and costs of a project. A project is said to be economically effective if the internal rate of return is positive and vice versa.

The cost-benefit analysis is the more complicated technique. It involves computing the expected benefits

each year of a project up to the last year of the expected life-span of the project. The computed benefits are then compared to the costs of constructing a project (if it is a rural hospital) and of maintaining the project each year up to the last year of the expected life-span of the project. The difference between the computed benefits and the computed costs of each year are not called internal rate of return. They are simply the positive or negative values of benefits. A project is said to be beneficial, or socially sound, if the computed benefits are consistently higher than the computed costs of the project.

As with projects which have commercial returns, project appraisal uses the cost-benefit technique to establish the soundness of a project and is also done prior to the implementation of a project. The effectiveness of the project is also established by means of project evaluation which also uses the cost-benefit technique. This is also done after the implementation of a project.

With projects which have no commercial return, project evaluation is a more complicated matter. This is because the benefits still have to be computed after the implementation of a project. The real costs become known but not the benefits. The process actually involves comparing a new situation with an old one; that is comparing an area without a hospital and the same area with a hospital. To facilitate the process, a study of

the area is done prior to the implementation of a project. This is called a baseline study which provides a basis for the evaluation of the project after its implementation.

Of the two techniques, the internal rate of return is the more reliable technique. For example, the estimated costs of the projects with commercial returns are reliable because they are reasonably well known in advance in terms of the cost of construction, the cost of imported material, the cost of labour and wear and tear during the life time of the project. The revenues, too, are often estimated on the basis of the imports of the same product which the project is designed to produce. Its only major weakness is that it assumes some sort of development already in place. The cost-benefit analysis is less reliable because the benefits are computed on the basis of one's impression of a given local situation. The benefit figures are always rough estimates and one can never be certain about their accuracy. Nevertheless, the use of the technique is a considerable advance on the impressionistic analysis of the political effectiveness of foreign aid.

In short, the assessment of economic effectiveness of foreign aid is fairly systematic and rational. This has been made possible for two reasons. One of them is that the assessment is based on a tangible unit of economic activity - the project. The other one is the cooperation of both the donor and the recipient on the matter. On the

other hand, a systematic and rational assessment of political effectiveness of foreign aid has yet to be done.

Instances Of Foreign Aid Influence

Although foreign aid political effectiveness is still unknown, an attempt will now be made at identifying some influences in Malawi which can reasonably be attributed to foreign aid. Influence in this case is here understood to mean the same as impact or something brought about by foreign aid regardless of one's wishes. This is intended to show that arguments like the ones which have been examined here are to a large extent a misinterpretation of the impact of foreign aid in the recipient countries including Malawi.

It has to be made clear at the outset that no instance of foreign aid political effectiveness can be dealt with here. This is because the political objectives of the donor countries have merely been assumed. There has been no effort to identify them because the thesis is written from the perspective of a recipient country. In addition, the objectives for which the Malawi Government seeks and accepts foreign aid are largely economic. Malawi accepts foreign aid in order to achieve economic development. Indeed, it is probably correct to say that foreign aid political effectiveness cannot be examined from a recipient country's perspective because recipient countries receive foreign aid mainly for economic reasons.

Instances of foreign aid influence will be identified by focusing on a tangible economic activity - project. The exercise is a matter largely of indicating the initiator of this or that project. This is because initiating a project is indeed a good indication of foreign aid influence. In addition, the exercise will involve an examination of the impact which a project, or a group of projects, has had in Malawi. The result is a number of instances of influence most of which were most probably not intended by the donors.

Since 1964, Malawi has implemented hundreds of development projects. It would be almost impossible to deal with each one of them as a basis for assessing a specific instance of foreign aid influence. To make matters easier, instances of foreign aid influence are examined in reference to a specific donor country, or organization in connection with the type of projects which it has funded or is funding in Malawi. However, a few instances of foreign aid influence are examined without reference to a specific donor.

The donors to be considered include the World Bank, Britain, West Germany, and the United Nations. This leaves out the United States, Canada, African Development Bank (A.D.B.), Denmark, and Japan, which will be mentioned only in passing. This is not because their funded projects have not been important but because it is not easy to pinpoint a specific influence arising from their funded projects in

Malawi. Therefore, attention will centre on the first four donor organizations and countries of Malawi.

With regard to the World Bank, a distinction is made here between SAL and the World Bank loans. This is done because the name World Bank is used also in reference to the International Development Association (I.D.A.). The latter is actually the aid-giving arm of a cluster of organizations now commonly referred to as "World Bank", though the term came into use largely as a shorthand for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (I.B.R.D.). The I.B.R.D. itself has also given to Malawi loans some of which were part of SAL one and two referred to earlier. These were loans and not aid. Therefore, the "World Bank," will be used mainly in reference to the I.D.A.

The World Bank, as explained here, has funded a host of projects which include secondary and tertiary educational expansion projects, the Zomba/Lilongwe road project which was referred to in the fourth chapter, piped-water schemes, and several hydro-electric power projects. The Bank's new major funded project include the Wood Energy Development Project, and District Road Improvement and Maintenance Project (DRIMP) which was referred to in the third chapter. However, its best known funded projects have been the large integrated rural development projects which include Lower Shire Valley Development Project, Lilongwe Land Development Project,

and Karonga Rural Development Project. These are large projects each covering thousands of acres and families. For example, the Lilongwe Land Development Project covered almost half a million acres. The Wood Energy Project and DRIMP are from birth to implementation stage, the brain-child of the World Bank. In terms of Gordenker's project-initiating criterion, they are instances of influence by the World Bank in Malawi. The rest of the projects listed were not initiated by the World Bank. However, Gordenker portrayed the Lower Shire Valley Development Project and the Lilongwe Land Development Project as if they were the brain-child of the World Bank. "In contrast to the role it played in the Tanzanian and Zambian projects, however, the World Bank," Gordenker said, "exerted direct influence on the plans."¹⁴ How did the World Bank come to be associated with the two projects?

To answer the foregoing question, it is necessary to look at the way the operational activities of three relevant international organizations are differentiated. These are the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (U.N.D.P.) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.). The World Bank and U.N.D.P. are both funding organizations. However, their operational activities are differentiated on the basis of the level at which investment is to be made. The Bank is supposed to fund investment activities, or simply project implementation, while the U.N.D.P. is supposed to fund

pre-investment activities or simply project formulation. The F.A.O. is concerned with food and agricultural activities and collaborates with both the U.N.D.P. and the Bank on any food or agricultural development project.

A procedure, in keeping with this demarcation of responsibilities, was instituted whereby an agricultural development project had to be submitted through the F.A.O. and U.N.D.P. before it could be considered for funding by the World Bank. The Bank would consider funding such a project only if it were put together and recommended by the F.A.O. The U.N.D.P. came in when the F.A.O. decided that a pre-investment feasibility study of some sort be conducted before the project could be recommended for World Bank funding. During the 1960s, this meant recommending a pre-investment study to one of the U.N.D.P. predecessor bodies, United Nations Technical Assistance Board (UNTAB) and the United Nations Special Fund. The latter was the body which was responsible for providing the necessary funds for a proposed pre-investment feasibility study while the former was the body which was responsible for providing technical experts for a proposed pre-investment feasibility study. The U.N.D.P. now does both. The procedure was instituted largely to justify what in reality was a proliferation of inter-governmental organizations.

The procedure was incredibly bureaucratic and served as a source of inter-agency conflict. The agencies

themselves sometimes by-passed each other. Moreover the procedure proved to be a source of conflict between the F.A.O. and the developing countries. This was because it blurred the distinction between project proposal and project submission. The Lower Shire Valley Project illustrated the point which is rather distorted in Gordenker's account. As stated in the last chapter, the project was compiled out of the results of some agricultural pilot schemes conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture and funded by the British Government. The first stage of the implementation of the project was a survey of the whole valley because the pilot schemes covered only a small portion of the area. This was the stage at which the Malawi Government, in accordance with the laid down procedure, approached the F.A.O. for World Bank funding of the project and the stage at which Gordenker incorrectly thought the project originated.

The F.A.O. apparently saw Malawi's request as a mere project proposal and responded to it, not by offering to conduct a survey of the valley as the Malawi Government expected, but by demanding that it be allowed to re-conduct the pilot schemes. In effect, this amounted to telling the Malawi Government that the pilot schemes which it had conducted were wrong and useless. This F.A.O. response naturally met a stiff opposition from the country's leader, then the Prime Minister, and from the British expatriates who had themselves conducted the pilot schemes. As a result, a conflict arose among the Malawi

Government, the F.A.O., U.N.D.P., and the World Bank, which Gordenker covered in his book.¹⁵ Relations between Malawi and the F.A.O. are now back on a sound footing. The F.A.O. has of late had a resident representative in Malawi and the organization is now increasingly getting involved in the country's agricultural development projects. However, the result of the conflict was that the Malawi Government and the World Bank left the F.A.O. on the wayside in relation to the Lower Shire Development Project and to many other agricultural development projects in Malawi.

In a sense, the conflict marked a watershed in inter-agency relations. Since the start of the implementation of the Lower Shire Valley Development Project, the excessive intergovernmental bureaucratic red tape was drastically curtailed. The World Bank broke free and has since then, at least in Malawi, funded agricultural development projects without being fussy about F.A.O. participation. This is how the World Bank came to be exclusively associated with the Lower Shire Valley Development Project.

Of all the World Bank funded projects listed earlier, the Lilongwe Land Development Project has been the most famous and the one which passes as the paragon of World Bank influence in Malawi. The start of its implementation formed part of the saga which Gordenker covered in detail among the F.A.O., the World Bank, the U.N.D.P., and the

Malawi Government in relation to the Lower Shire Valley Development Project.¹⁶ A look at its origin is also necessary so that the World Bank influence in Malawi is placed in its correct perspective. The point which has to be made clear is that the project, like the Lower Shire Valley Development Project, was not fashioned in Washington, D.C. and brought as a blue-print to Malawi. It was formulated in Malawi.

Versions about its origin vary. One version attributes its origin to an initiative by local agricultural experts, or agricultural instructors as they are known in the country, who are said to have thought about a project which could embody soil conservation measures on a large scale.¹⁷ The implementation of the project did, indeed, include the construction of large drainages called migula, in the local language, intended to protect the soil from water erosion. However, it is inconceivable that the local agricultural experts thought out in detail the complex shape and content of the project. Therefore, much need not be made of this version.

Another version attributes the origin of the project to an initiative by Mr. Bruno Barnister, a British expatriate, on the ground that he was the Permanent Secretary for the Country's Ministry of Agriculture at the time that some agricultural pilot schemes, which preceded the implementation of the project, were conducted.¹⁸ The version amounts to saying that because he was the

Permanent Secretary, he must have initiated the pilot schemes. However, the conduct of the pilot schemes implies doubts about, rather than enthusiasm for, the project. Therefore, the version is probably incorrect.

A third version attributes the origin of the project to an initiative by a local chief, Chief Tsabango, who is said to have approached the Government to look into the state of agriculture in his area.¹⁹ The pilot schemes, Tsabango Agricultural Pilot Schemes, were, indeed, conducted in his area, the results of which were compiled into a project which later came to be known as Lilongwe Land Development Project. This version implies that the project evolved out of the Government's attempt at finding a response to Chief Tsabango's request. It sounds a more plausible version; that is, the project evolved out of some tentative steps about how to improve the country's small holder agriculture.

The three versions, though varied, all attribute the origin of the project to local initiative. So it seems probable that the project was formulated on the basis of the Tsabango Agricultural Pilot Schemes. No doubt, the World Bank provided, at a later stage, the intellectual concepts for the project such as the term "integrated rural development projects," which were later reflected in the retitling of the project from Lilongwe Land Development Project to Lilongwe Rural Development Project. The

Project, however, was something from which the Bank itself learnt a lot.

Therefore, the integrated rural development projects, particularly the Lilongwe and Lower Shire Valley Projects, cannot be interpreted, in terms of the project-initiating criterion, as World Bank influence. They were not initiated by the World Bank. However, these projects are in another sense evidence for World Bank influence in Malawi. For one thing, they are, or were, large and involved heavy capital outlay. Without the World Bank, Malawi would not have implemented many of them. Therefore, they are examples of World Bank influence in the sense that they are evidence of a large-scale approach to promoting small holder agricultural development which Malawi would not have sustained without the World Bank funding.

With regard to Britain, several distinctions have to be made. The first distinction is that between Britain as a donor country and Britain as the former colonial power. Instances of influence arising from the latter will not receive attention here because they are part and parcel of the country's colonial legacy. It would be incorrect to regard the continued and widespread use of English in the country as an instance of foreign aid influence. Use of English would continue even if Malawi were to be cut off from British foreign aid. The Guineans in West Africa continued with the use of French language despite the

unceremonious and drastic break which France made with them at the time that they demanded independence.

Some neo-colonialist, or dependency, arguments make no distinction between the colonial legacy and great power attempts at subverting the sovereignty of the developing countries. Everything to do with the former colonial powers is apparently neo-colonialism or dependence. For example, Borger explains Lesotho's dependence in terms of Lesotho's trade flows, largely Lesotho's imports from South Africa.²⁰ The arguments have produced some of the most bizarre and puerile nationalist reactions in Africa including an abandonment of the term "Mr." in favour of authentic African cultural identity. Apparently the point is that a country must have a complete break with everything to do with its former colonial power for it to be genuinely independent.

However, probably no country can make a complete break with its past. Even the mighty America did not do away with everything British. Trade between Britain and America continued long after the American War of Independence, or the American Revolution, as the Americans call it. The use of English and even the colonial term, "governor" has been preserved to the present day. In short, neo-colonialist or dependency arguments commit an error by failing to distinguish between the colonial legacy and great power subversive activities against developing countries.

One of the foreign aid influences in Malawi which Morton refers to illustrates the importance of making the distinction between colonial legacy and foreign aid influence. The influence in question is the Malawi Government's operational rules and procedures. These are referred to as an example of influence on Malawi by Britain as a donor country.²¹ Apparently everything British ceased on the day that Malawi became independent. This is another example of some of the problems which the dependency scholars create. It is true that many of the Malawi Government's operational rules and procedures are British. However, a large proportion of them were those of the predecessor Nyasaland Government and not of Britain as a donor country. Therefore, it is important to make the distinction between Britain as an aid donor and Britain as a former colonial power.

The second distinction to be made is between Britain as an aid donor and Britain as the home country of the expatriates. Instances of influence arising from both will receive attention here. The point is that such instances of influence are better treated separately. This is done here on the ground that a good deal of influence arising from the latter, from Britain as the home country of the expatriates, was quite unintended. It was not the result of any attempt by the expatriates at implementing O.D.A. political objectives.

The third distinction to be made is between British expatriates who were supported by Britain and British experts who were supported by international organizations. Instances of influence arising from the latter is here attributed to international organizations. Andrew Mercer, who was the Manager of the Lilongwe Land Development Project was a British expert working for the World Bank. Therefore, he was not one of the British expatriates. The distinction may look absurd, but it is important to maintain it so as to make it possible to separate instances of influence by international organizations from instances of influence by donor countries.

Britain as a donor country funded the agricultural pilot schemes, the results of which gave rise to the large integrated rural development projects. However, Britain has, as already stated, so far funded only the Phalombe Rural Development Project. Its taste as donor country has been for funding small development projects which included the Blantyre/Zomba road project which was referred to in the third chapter, a district hospital, an afforestation project, a fisheries research project, and a number of small agricultural development schemes some of which were referred to in the third chapter.²² Apart from the Phalombe Rural Development Project and the afforestation project, most of its funded projects have been small, requiring small capital outlay. Therefore, the influence of Britain as a donor country has been the promotion of a small-scale approach to agricultural development.

Several other instances of influence by Britain as a donor country also exist in terms of the project initiating criterion. One of them is the establishment of a Government department. The department in question was what for a long time had been the country's Economic Planning Division (E.P.D.), now part of Department of Economic Planning and Development. The E.P.D. was, at least according to Morton, set up at the suggestion of the O.D.A. and had been an important planning section of the Government.²³ Another instance of influence are the O.D.A. manuals on project appraisal, or evaluation, in developing countries which were referred to in the third chapter.²⁴ Incidentally, these were resented by some of the expatriates who regarded the use of them as an academic exercise.²⁵

Since their introduction, the manuals have influenced project formulation in Malawi. Almost any project formulated in the country incorporates results of a feasibility study of some sort in which either the internal rate of return or the cost-benefit analysis technique is used. One of the criticisms against the Malawi Government which was referred to in the third chapter was that it selected projects "on the basis of its political needs." Projects are normally initiated, in the first place, on the basis of intuition. However, the use of these appraisal techniques has meant that most of the projects are implemented only after some sort of a feasibility study has been conducted.

Still another instance of influence by Britain as a donor country has also to do with initiation of projects. Morton expressed a feeling that Britain probably had not initiated any project.²⁶ Such a feeling is incorrect. Britain as a donor country has initiated some of the projects which have been implemented in Malawi. The Leprosy Control Project, which was dealt with in detail in the third chapter, is a good example. This was directly initiated in Britain and is a sister project to the one which Britain has also implemented in India.

Instances of influence by Britain as the home country of the expatriates are many, but some of these are not easy to separate from the country's colonial legacy. The formulation of the integrated rural development projects is an example of the work of the expatriates which cannot be separated from colonial legacy. Nonetheless instances of influence by the expatriates in the post-independence period exist. One of them consists of the three documents on operational development which were covered in detail in the third chapter.²⁷ These are the Estimates of Government Expenditure on Development, the Three-year Rolling Development Programme, and the Statement of Development Policies (DEVEPOL). These were not the only documents which the expatriates introduced. Others were the normal government operational documents such as the Annual Statement of External Trade, Annual Economic Report, a Compendium of National Statistics, and various Departmental Annual Reports. However, the three documents

are special because they were introduced in response to Malawi's type of operational approach to development.

The publication of the first two documents has continued up to now uninterrupted. A second DEVEPOL should have been produced by 1982. However, nothing happened for a period of nearly six years. A new DEVEPOL has now been published. This covers the period 1987 to 1996, and differs from its predecessor in two ways. The first is that it has an appendix which is a broad summary of how sectoral projections spelt out in the new DEVEPOL are to be realised, an innovation which brings Malawi closer to economic development planning in a conventional sense. The second is that it does not contain the statement which made it clear that the earlier DEVEPOL was not a Government's commitment. The new DEVEPOL in this case should be a Government's commitment to action.

However, the new DEVEPOL is very much like its predecessor. In the first place, it covers too long a period to be a development plan in the conventional sense although provision is made to have it reviewed if not rewritten at the end of the 5th year. In the second place, it is also described as being not "a detailed and quantified blueprint for action."²⁸ The expression in the open and closed inverted commas reflects continued Government reluctance to adopt conventional development planning. The new DEVEPOL is also essentially a mere statement of Government's development policies.

Therefore, the three documents still remain a distinct contribution of the British expatriates in the post-independence period of the country.

Another instance of influence by the expatriates is the extension and deepening of the British way of doing things which is readily noticeable in Malawi. Development in the colonial era was confined to a small area in the south of the country. Independence brought a national dimension to it. The objective is now to spread development to every part of the country. Since project implementation was largely in the hands of the British expatriates, this has meant the spread of British influence in the form of architecture, engineering tradition, road design and construction, and town and country planning, almost everywhere in the country. No doubt a different group of expatriates would have brought about a different way of doing things. This is not to endorse arguments for neo-colonialism. It is simply to pinpoint an instance of influence which was quite unintended by the expatriates who had, for example, to design a road the way they knew a road had to be designed.

Perhaps the most important contribution by the British expatriates to Malawi is an excellent record of project implementation. Malawi enjoys, at the moment, a high reputation of successful implementation of projects. Comparison is not easy to make, but no project for which external funding was obtained has failed to take shape.

Every project planned and funded has been implemented except those that have lacked funding.

Certainly this good record of project implementation is a legacy of the expatriates. As Permanent Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, Under Secretaries, Chief Education or Building Officers, the expatriates had the implementation of projects wholly in their hands. Therefore, they were the ones who set the country's excellent record of project implementation. The problem is how to maintain it now that most of the country's bureaucracy has been localized. The exorbitant claims that the expatriates made the country's economic and foreign policies do no justice to this equally honourable and proud record of the British expatriates.

The expatriates also made some other important innovations in the field of clean water development. Some British expatriates working for Malawi's Department of Lands, Valuation and Water produced a pump for pumping water from the ground called MALDEV, an innovation which was made in connection with the country's shallow wells water development scheme. This may sound an insignificant invention but, in the developing world, it is an important innovation which has attracted the attention of other developing countries. For example, the pump is currently competing for adoption, or recognition, among other such pumps invented in India and Kenya. Therefore, MALDEV is

also a distinct contribution by the expatriates to the country's economic development.

Finally, the expatriates, as explained in the last chapter, are not only those who worked or are working for the Malawi Government. Some are businessmen, missionaries, and farmers. Some of these expatriates have also made a significant contribution to the country's economic development. The Christian Churches, in particular, joined hands and formed the Christian Service Committee of the Churches of Malawi (C.S.C.). This took place soon after the country attained independence. This is now the country's largest unofficial aid-receiving agency supplementing the work of the Government. It solicits and gets a lot of aid in money and kind from charity organizations in Britain, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, and Switzerland. In comparison the amount of foreign aid which is channelled through the Government it is indeed, nothing. However, on its own terms, it is important. It spends sometimes as much as \$1 million on development projects such as boreholes or school-roofing materials throughout the country in any year and is one of the most highly organized Christian aid institutions in independent Africa. Its work is a distinct contribution by the expatriate missionaries to the country's economic development.

The Federal Republic of Germany is in this regard easier to handle because it has had fewer experts of its

own in the country. Its aid to Malawi has been mainly financial, a good part, if not the most, of which has been given to Malawi on a grant basis. The country has also funded many projects including a road in the northern part of the country which was the beginning of the lake shore road referred to several times in the previous chapters, radio equipment for the country's Broadcasting Corporation, a sewage plant and public markets in the country's main towns of Blantyre and Lilongwe, another section of the lake shore road in the centre of the country, a steamer for transport service on the lake, and the country's first two new district hospitals in the north and centre of the country. The Federal Republic of Germany was also the first bilateral donor to fund an integrated rural development project in the country, the Salima Lake Shore Development Project which was referred to several times in the third chapter, and is currently financing a second one called Liwonde Rural Development Project.

The Germans have also initiated some projects. One of its foreign aid officials is said to have suggested the adoption of a National Rural Development Programme (N.R.D.P.). Indeed Malawi is currently implementing such a programme. This has involved the implementation of an integrated rural development project in almost every part of the country.

Hewitt and Kydd attribute the origin of N.R.D.P. to a World Bank basic economic report on Malawi of 1973.²⁹ They say that the Malawi Government and the World Bank jointly developed the framework of the programme. This appears to be a reference to the World Bank endorsement of the Malawi Government's proposals rather than to a formulation of the N.R.D.P. For example, the two British experts on foreign aid reckon that this was the same time that the World Bank was critical of the integrated rural development project and demanded modification in it so as to reduce the heavy capital outlay involved in its implementation. The N.R.D.P. was, indeed, endorsed by the World Bank on condition that subsequent integrated rural development projects, which are the main feature of the programme, would involve less intensive input.

Distinct German initiative is also apparent in the type of projects which the country has funded. A look at the projects reveals an approach to project funding which is quite distinct from that of Britain. While Britain, as a donor country, has insisted on funding only projects which have economic returns or "the economically sound project," the Federal Republic of Germany has, in contrast, gone for projects which have social benefits, "or the socially sound projects." The Germans, it seems have often posed the question: "economically sound" for what? In response to this apparent question, they have funded some of the most popular development projects in the the country.

A project which is socially sound and represents a distinct influence of German foreign aid is one which was initially called, "rural growth centre," now retitled, "rural growth area," on the ground that the term, "growth centre," was restrictive. The reasoning is that these projects are to serve as growth points in the rural areas. According to Hewitt and Kydd, the idea was first implemented in some peripheral areas of Germany and has, therefore, been transferred wholesale to Malawi.³⁰ The two British foreign aid experts have subjected the idea to some incisive criticisms reflecting in part British pre-occupation with the economic soundness criterion for judging a development project.

The framework of the project is the Government policy on labour migration to urban areas. This was prompted by a low industrial base which the country inherited at the attainment of its independence. Its purpose has been to induce people to stay in the rural areas rather than to migrate to the urban areas where there are no jobs. To some extent, the policy has been successful so that Malawi is free of squatter settlement problems in its urban areas, unlike many other African countries. Despite the success, the urban areas have still attracted people from the rural areas, particularly young people, who are easily fascinated with modern urban amenities. Therefore, the Germans came up with the idea of a rural growth centre in an effort to help the Government to enforce its policy on labour migration to urban areas.

The project consists of the construction of public facilities which include a primary school, a clinic, a post office, a public market, butchery, and a public hall, a sort of prototype municipal centre. The idea is to bring such facilities as a post office or community centre hall, which are available in towns, to the rural communities. The Germans initially funded only two of the projects on a grant basis. One of them is situated in what was really virgin bush at the time of its construction in the centre of the country. As a result, doubts initially arose about the extent to which the rural community would make use of the growth areas. These have now disappeared. The project has proved so popular that there has been a public demand for similar facilities in every district of the country. Indeed, the Federal Republic of Germany had to be persuaded to fund more growth areas in the rest of the country.

Two projects give a good comparison between the "economically sound" approach to funding projects and the "socially sound" approach to funding projects. The former is illustrated by a small holder Sugar Scheme called, Dwangwa Small Holder Sugar Scheme. This is situated in the centre of the country and is funded by the O.D.A. It is part of a second sugar project in the country and is itself a successful scheme. It consists of small growers who are guided in growing sugar cane and sell their cane sugar to a refinery plant nearby. It is a scheme which is, indeed, "economically sound." For example, the

growers now earn a much higher income a year while Malawi, as a state, also benefits from the scheme in the form of foreign exchange which is earned by exporting part of the sugar produced. Its shortcoming is that its beneficiaries are limited in number since not everybody can participate in such a scheme. As a result, the scheme is surrounded by onlookers who cannot directly benefit from it.

In contrast, the rural growth centre exists for use by everybody in an area and has no distinct beneficiaries. Everybody can go and sell his produce at the market or go and buy anything from the market. It is, indeed a scheme which is socially sound. This is because the project is infrastructural and its shortcoming is that its maintenance could very soon pose problems. However, the project is another distinct influence of German foreign aid in Malawi.

The United Nations has also funded a number of projects in Malawi. By United Nations is meant here the United Nations Development Programme (U.N.D.P.), United Nations Children's Emergency Fund (U.N.I.C.E.F.), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (U.N.I.D.O.) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (I.F.A.D.). The exceptions are the United Nations specialized agencies such as the World Health Organization (W.H.O.) and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). They are excluded from consideration partly because some of them have not

actively participated in Malawi's Economic development and partly because some of them, particularly the World Bank, have already received attention in their own right. The term, "United Nations," will, therefore, be used in reference to its specialized agencies proper; that is the U.N.D.P., U.N.I.C.E.F., I.F.A.D., U.N.I.D.O., and others.

Projects with the United Nations involvement are not easy to pinpoint. This is due to the supplementary role which the organization has played in relation to the World Bank and the donor countries. The organization is required to confine itself to pre-investment operations. However, the United Nations has funded the implementation of some projects in its own right. For example, I.F.A.D. is currently funding a modified version of the integrated rural development project in the central part of the country while the United Nations Fund for Population Activities funded the first two national censuses of the country.

The newest project which is funded by the United Nations is a low-cost rural housing scheme. This involves teaching people how to construct in stages a modern house using local materials. According to Hewitt and Kydd, the idea originated at a U.N.D.P. meeting.³¹ The implementation of the scheme has gone on very well partly because Malawi has fine building material resources. Indeed, the scheme is already seen as a model to other countries to

the extent that Malawi was awarded in 1987 a certificate of distinction by the United Nations.

Other United Nations initiatives include the country's Export Promotion Council which was initiated by an expert from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva, and another project called, Small-Scale Enterprise Development of Malawi (SELOM) which was initiated by a U.N.I.D.O. official. Perhaps the most important innovative idea of the United Nations is a scheme on the development of a clean water supply. The project, as listed earlier, is funded by the World Bank and the Federal Republic of Germany, but it was initiated by a British expert working for UNICEF.

Malawi is ideal for such a project because it has some of the finest water resources in Africa. Its major lake, the third largest in Africa and the tenth largest in the world, contains fresh water. Its rainfall can in some parts be as high as 44 ins. a year. As a result, the country has mountains and plateaux from which streams and rivers with fresh clean water flow down to low lying areas. The scheme involves tapping the water from such streams and rivers as they flow down the mountains and plateaux by means of pipes installed on the basis of self-help by the local people. The scheme now covers vast areas in the country and has been supplemented by shallow wells schemes in areas where the gravity water is not available. Malawi is the one developing country which

should achieve the United Nations goal of clean water for everybody by the year 2000.

Understandably, the significance of such a scheme is hard to appreciate in the developed world where the supply of clean water is taken for granted. However, the scheme is of great significance in the developing world where the supply of clean water is a major problem. It has made Malawi to be a class apart among the developing countries since it covers a greater proportion of its population. It is clearly a distinct contribution by the United Nations to Malawi's economic development.

The danger of assessing foreign aid influence on the basis of funded projects is that the assessment can easily degenerate into a mere list of projects funded by each donor country or organization. Therefore, suffice it to say that Denmark has funded some of the country's major hospitals while the Netherlands started to fund some important projects late. Canada has funded a major railway project, a dairy project, and a Natural Resources College, but the pattern of its foreign aid to Malawi has been somewhat erratic so that apart from these projects there is not yet anything which one might regard as Canadian foreign aid influence. The African Development Bank (A.D.B.), too, has funded, or helped to fund, some of the country's major projects including the country's international airport and hydro-electric power plants. However, its aid has consisted of soft commercial loans more or less like those

of the I.B.R.D. They have not been aid in the strict sense except some new loans which have been earmarked for agricultural development projects.

The United States is perhaps, a good example of a major donor country which has so far left no trace of its influence in Malawi in spite of the fact that it has funded some of the country's major institutional and infrastructural development projects. The projects which it has funded include the country's Polytechnic and Agricultural Colleges and several new major roads. However, apart from these project nothing can really be interpreted as influence of its foreign aid to Malawi. This is obviously due to the irregular manner in which the United States has provided aid to Malawi.

Japan is now among Malawi's major donors. In terms of initiating projects, there is nothing much which can be said of it. However, its aid is probably a good example of a foreign aid which has also promoted a donor country's trade to a recipient country. For example, at independence, almost all the Malawi Government vehicles were European, mainly British. It was almost unthinkable then that a Government vehicle could be any model other than British Leyland and Ford models. These were associated with quality, reliability, and durability. That myth in Malawi has now gone. Today, almost half of the Government vehicles are Japanese. It is true that this is, in part, a reflection of the world-wide Japanese success as an

industrial power. However, Japanese donations of fleets of vehicles to the Malawi Government have no doubt contributed to the current popularity of Japanese cars in the country.³²

The other country whose foreign aid has, to some extent, served the purpose of promoting its trade is probably South Africa. Table IX on the next page shows Malawi's imports from Britain, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Imports from Britain have steadily increased over the years 1964 to 1986 while imports from Zimbabwe remained steady during the rest of 1960s, sharply increased in 1974 and 1975 and then fell sharply after 1975, and started to pick up in 1981. In other words, trade between Britain and Malawi has remained normal while trade between Zimbabwe and Malawi had been erratic. The reasons for this are the economic sanctions against Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the establishment of import-substitution industries in Malawi.

Compared to Zimbabwe and Britain, South Africa was the smaller trading partner. The imports from it doubled in 1968 and have hence been on the increase. It will be observed from the Table that the increases are in 1968, 1972, and 1978. Imports from Zimbabwe remained constant from 1968 to 1972, but those from South Africa were on the increase. The increase in the latter has to be attributed to the two South African loans for the construction of Nacala Railway and the start of the infrastructure work at

TABLE IX

MALAWI'S IMPORTS AND EXPORTS IN MILLION OF KWACHA

	1964	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85
BRITAIN	IMPORTS	6.7	10.3	16.8	14.5	17.9	18.2	19.0	25.2	31.0	28.5	36.5	52.9	42.4	39.4	56.8	60.9	67.2	44.2	49.8	48.9	49.5
	EXPORTS	11.0	12.8	13.3	18.2	17.0	16.8	19.5	21.6	23.7	26.7	32.5	42.3	66.6	77.0	70.7	74.0	63.9	54.6	68.2	73.1	137.5
ZIMBABWE	IMPORTS	11.2	14.9	12.3	10.6	10.5	10.4	15.5	13.2	16.8	17.1	20.1	25.7	9.3	5.7	6.0	4.8	12.7	19.2	19.3	20.0	23.4
	EXPORTS	3.2	2.8	1.6	1.3	1.6	2.4	3.1	3.4	3.4	4.5	7.2	7.4	3.0	2.1	1.3	1.3	12.3	20.0	16.2	16.7	16.6
S. AFRICA	IMPORTS	1.7	2.2	3.9	3.9	6.4	8.8	9.0	9.4	13.0	20.6	36.5	52.8	55.2	77.8	109.0	134.5	131.5	103.0	116.5	141.1	154.2
	EXPORTS	1.2	1.1	1.0	0.9	1.5	1.2	1.7	2.4	3.1	3.1	3.7	5.6	7.3	12.1	6.7	8.6	7.5	12.1	11.9	22.0	32.3
JAPAN	IMPORTS	1.3	2.7	2.7	4.3	2.8	3.2	3.8	6.8	7.5	7.4	8.6	16.5	14.5	18.4	20.8	30.8	25.0	19.6	16.7	24.9	31.4
	EXPORTS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
U.S.A.	IMPORTS	0.6	1.1	1.7	1.4	3.2	2.4	3.7	3.6	1.9	2.6	4.8	7.6	6.4	10.5	13.2	10.5	12.1	13.4	9.6	11.0	15.0
	EXPORTS	0.7	0.7	0.8	1.1	1.6	2.3	1.2	2.3	3.0	5.3	8.6	8.6	18.5	16.5	8.3	12.3	39.1	57.9	17.8	15.6	38.6
NETHERLANDS	IMPORTS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	EXPORTS	0.7	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.4	1.4	1.8	2.4	2.9	3.8	7.6	7.6	9.2	15.1	13.6	18.1	20.6	15.4	15.4	15.9	28.7
W. GERMANY	IMPORTS	0.6	1.2	1.3	1.4	2.1	2.2	2.7	3.7	3.1	3.8	7.2	8.7	7.0	8.1	9.1	17.1	18.1	24.2	23.4	28.8	14.5
	EXPORTS	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.7	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.3	1.8	1.4	4.3	4.6	8.4	9.4	16.7	17.1	16.7	23.5	17.1	40.3
IRELAND	IMPORTS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	EXPORTS	0.2	0.9	1.1	0.9	1.5	1.0	1.1	2.3	2.6	3.2	3.7	4.0	2.6	2.1	2.1	4.9	3.4	1.7	3.3	1.9	6.2
ZAMBIA	IMPORTS	0.9	0.7	5.2	3.5	2.3	2.6	2.5	3.1	3.6	5.3	5.0	4.6	5.0	2.4	2.1	6.6	7.7	4.6	7.4	14.6	17.1
	EXPORTS	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.8	0.8	3.1	1.5	2.3	1.8	3.1	4.0	3.5	3.3	4.5	4.4	4.8	5.3	3.7	2.5	4.9	12.0
ALL OTHER COUNTRIES	IMPORTS	5.5	7.8	10.2	11.8	12.8	13.8	15.2	24.9	26.0	29.3	39.2	49.7	40.7	47.5	59.8	54.9	82.0	64.5	78.4	75.5	76.4
	EXPORTS	5.6	7.0	7.3	7.6	7.1	7.4	9.2	11.9	13.4	17.3	20.8	23.0	25.9	33.8	32.3	35.6	55.0	50.3	74.6	97.8	124.3

Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Financial and Economic Review, Volume XVIII - Number 4, 1986, pages 87 and 89

the new capital site in Lilongwe. While imports from Zimbabwe sharply declined after 1975, those from South Africa continued to rise. South Africa by then had proven to be an alternative source of imports. The latter sharp increase in the imports from South Africa is due to the Civil War in Mozambique which cut off Malawi's traditional shorter routes to the sea thereby making South Africa a more convenient source of imports for the country.

The foregoing does not mean that all the increase in imports from South Africa is the result of South African foreign aid to Malawi. It does not mean that. What it means is that the increase in imports from South Africa during the years 1968 to 1972 was, indeed, the result of the South African loans to Malawi for the construction of the Nacala Railway Project and for the start of the infrastructure work at the new capital site in Lilongwe. Both loans had procurement strings. The rest of the big increase was probably due to the other factors which included sanctions against Rhodesia and the political instability in Mozambique.

Therefore, South African foreign aid has probably promoted South African exports to Malawi in two ways. The first was the increase in imports for the years 1968 to 1972 as a result of the two loans. The second is that the two loans clearly served to introduce South Africa as an alternative source of imports to Malawi. Without that, Britain would probably have completely taken over the

share of the Malawi market lost by Zimbabwe since its trade with Malawi has also been on the increase.

However, those attributable to Japan and South Africa are minor instances of foreign aid influence. The major ones are those which are attributable to the World Bank, Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Nations.

Other Instances of Aid Influence

The following are some other instances of foreign aid. These cannot be attributed to any one donor country or organization. One of them is institutional building. This is not to endorse the familiar argument that foreign aid leads to bureaucratic expansion but merely to mention a specific instance. The Malawian experience is in fact, a mixed bag. What leads to bureaucratic expansion is not foreign aid per se but the fact of development which, as often stated in this thesis, is an extra-governmental activity.

When development began, the Malawi Government had to set up planning units in a number of its Ministries. In that case, foreign aid led to bureaucratic expansion. That foreign aid does not necessarily lead to bureaucratic expansion is also amply demonstrated by the size of the country's Ministry of Works and Supplies. This is one of the key operational Ministries of the Government and

has been instrumental in successful implementation of most of the country's infrastructural development projects. It has been responsible for the construction of major new roads, hospitals, the country's new capital city, and its international airport to mention a few. However, its expansion as a bureaucracy has been modest because most of the projects which it is supposed to execute, are tendered to private companies.

On the other hand, foreign aid has in other areas of the Government undoubtedly contributed significantly to a remarkable expansion of bureaucracy. The Ministry of Agriculture is a good example. It is true that even in the most this was one of the large departments of the Government. It consisted of a head office with various sections including an extension aid branch and several research stations. However, foreign aid has contributed to its unprecedented expansion. Today, it also includes what are called agricultural development divisions (A.D.D.) which are clearly the result of foreign aid.

The bureaucratic expansion seems to arise, in part, out of the nature of agricultural activities. Unlike road of building construction projects, for which the Ministry of Works and Supplies has been responsible, the agricultural development projects are partly infrastructural and partly innovative or transformatory. The latter has been an important element in the integrated rural development projects and has necessitated direct Government involve-

ment in the execution of the projects. The larger the project, the greater the expansion which a Government Ministry responsible for the implementation of such a project experiences.

The advent of the integrated rural development project led to the creation of the A.D.D.s in the country. Each A.D.D. is responsible for the implementation of several integrated rural development projects. As a result, the Ministry now consists of a headquarters, the research stations, a Natural Resources College, and about eight A.D.D.s each of which is almost as large as some of the Government's small ministries. That each A.D.D. has come into being as a result of foreign aid is borne out by the fact that the A.D.D.s were originally integrated rural development projects. These are Lilongwe, Ngabu, and Karonga A.D.D.s reflecting the Lilongwe Land Development Project, Lower Shire Valley Project, and Karonga Rural Development Project respectively. In this case, foreign aid clearly led to significant institutional building.

Another instance of influence of foreign aid is a little difficult to explain. This has to do with the increase in Government expenditure. Development necessarily leads to a substantial increase in Government expenditure. This is normal and is not what is referred to here. What is referred to is something peculiar to foreign aid. Hewitt and Kydd have also referred to it in passing.³³ Here it will receive a little more attention.

Each item of foreign aid is often matched with what is called, counterpart, or local, contributions. The latter is made by the recipient country and often includes free housing and transport and a local salary for the experts of the donor country or organization who are to serve as technical advisers or managers of the projects on which the foreign aid is to be used. The housing and local salary aspects are understandable and often present no problems. The problem is the provision of free transport which often involves providing a foreign expert with a free new saloon car, or land rover, and free fuel. The fuel in the case of a country like Malawi is expensive because it is imported and scarce. The spare parts for the motor vehicle are expensive, too, because they are imported and scarce. Moreover, the use of the transport is not restricted so that it is not uncommon to see the experts use it during their leisure time. No doubt, this is a significant proportion of the country's new deficit on the recurrent account although the Government is yet to pay attention to it.

Still another instance of foreign aid influence is the exposure of the recipient country to various foreign influences including those that have already been covered here. This is simply the fact of foreign aid and is probably the most valuable aspect of foreign aid from the point of view of the donor countries and organizations. The provision of any foreign aid is often followed by the recruitment and dispatch of experts who have to take up

posts of technical advisers or managers of the projects on which the foreign aid is to be spent. India, with a huge reservoir of its own expertise is one of the exceptions to this rule. However, many of the developing countries, including Malawi, have to accept experts from the donor country or organization from which the financial assistance for a project is obtained.

The exposure is now taken advantage of in the forms of resident representation of donor organizations. Almost all the donor organizations have now resident representation in the recipient countries. The E.E.C., the U.N.D.P., U.N.I.C.E.F., W.H.O., and the World Bank all have resident representatives in Malawi. The exceptions are the African Development Bank and I.F.A.D. The U.N.D.P. was the first donor organization to have resident representation. It has even emulated the practice of sovereign states of running a diplomatic bag service between its resident representation office in a recipient country and its head office in New York. No doubt the other donor organizations have a similar service. This is a new aspect of international politics which has come about as a result of foreign aid.

The exposure has also led to the rise of organized volunteer technical assistance service. Britain has the Volunteer Service Overseas (V.S.O.) while Japan has the Japanese International Cooperation Agency. (J.I.C.A.). The United States has the famous Peace Corps while Canada has the less known Canadian University Service

Overseas (C.U.S.O.). Each of these technical services or programmes has its experts working in Malawi at the moment because foreign aid made their presence in the country possible.

Finally, another "general instance" of influence of foreign aid is the excessive belief in the efficacy of the government which it fosters among the ordinary people of a recipient country. This is not to endorse Bauer's argument that "unconditional aid supports or underwrites harmful policies" or the argument that foreign aid buys public support for a recipient government.³⁴ Such an argument, as already stated, is held here invalid or unsound because it overlooks the problem of illiteracy in many of the developing countries. What is referred to here is the belief in the efficacy of the government as such or of the government as an institution and not of a group of persons who may constitute the government of the day of a country.

The belief in the government's ability to do anything required for its people is probably widespread these days. However, foreign aid has fostered an excess of this belief in the minds of the ordinary people in developing countries. Perhaps the health service in Malawi illustrates the point. This consists of Government's hospitals and clinics and non-Government hospitals and clinics. It began with hospitals and clinics which were first introduced and run by Scottish Missionaries. Today

various christian churches still run hospitals and clinics in the country. These come under an association called, Private Hospital Association of Malawi (P.H.A.M.), a term which is a misnomer. It is true that the patients in P.H.A.M. hospitals or clinics are charged for any treatment which they get, but in many of them the charge is minimal, largely designed to defray the cost of running the hospitals. Otherwise these hospitals are not run to make a profit and would accurately be referred to as non-governmental.

The main part of the service is made up of the Government hospitals and clinics in which service is offered by and large free of charge to patients. These include two central (or major) hospitals, one general hospital, some twenty-four district hospitals and a host of rural hospitals and clinics. Denmark has funded the construction of one Central Hospital and another major hospital while the Federal Republic of Germany, Britain, and the E.E.C. have funded a number of district hospitals. With foreign aid, the Government expects to rebuild every other remaining district hospital. This is what P.H.A.M. cannot easily do. As a result Government hospitals are better, larger, and even more modern.

The effect of this upon the ordinary person has been that the Government can provide not only the required services, but also provide them better. The argument among the ordinary people often is: "this clinic, bridge, or postal agency, will remain in a poor shape, or will not

get better, unless it is taken over by the Government." A good part of any parliamentary session in Malawi is often devoted to question and answer time. The Hansard reveals that the questions are actually requests for the Government to construct a bridge, a police station, a clinic, a post office or a veterinary deeping tank is this or that part of the country, or to instruct a bus company to introduce a bus service on a particular route or a wholesale company to open a wholesale depot or shop in a particular area. Almost no limit is thought to Government activities. The notion that things are done better through private enterprise will have to take root in future. It is simply not the case at the moment. Foreign aid has, no doubt, contributed considerably to this belief in the Government's ability to provide almost everything and better.

Conclusion

Foreign aid is believed to have the power to reduce recipient countries to dependent states for two reasons. The first one is that development is believed to be "the stuff of politics" in the developing countries. This means that donors' decisions are crucial for each aid recipient country since most of the developmental activities are financed with foreign aid. The second reason is that foreign aid itself is believed to have the power of enabling the donors to realise their political objectives in relation to the aid recipient countries.

This is really the usual belief that "money is power" or that "money can buy anything."

However, the belief in the power of foreign aid to reduce recipient countries to dependency state is probably mistaken. Certainly development is not the "stuff of politics" at least in Malawi where it is even dealt with in a separate section of the national budget. The foreign aid political effectiveness, too, is something which has not yet been systematically assessed so that no one as yet is certain about it. Perhaps the sort of influence in Malawi which can reasonably be attributed to foreign aid is proof that the belief in the potency of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy is probably mistaken. This is because the influences are unintended and are hardly evidence for the dependence argument.

NOTES

1. See page 58 of the thesis.
2. Williams, T. D., Malawi: The Politics of Despair, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1978, p. 323.
3. President's Statement quoted in New Commonwealth Annual Review, Nov. 12, 1969.
4. This was the point which was often made by Mr. Donald Pearson, former Chief Economist of Malawi during the early 1970s. The writer worked under him for five months as a newly-recruited government economist. The interpretation has not been checked against the accounting practices of other developing countries. However, there is no reason to doubt its accuracy.
5. James Mayall deals in detail with the "Implications for Africa of the enlarged European Economic Community" in "The Politics of Africa: Dependence and Development" by Shaw T.M. and Heard, K.A., eds., Longman's Group Limited, Dalhousie University Press, pp. 285-318.
6. Hewitt, A., and Kydd, K., A Study of the Effectiveness of Aid to Malawi, First Draft, 26th July, 1984, pp. 103-137.

7. Keletsky, A., "The Famine in Africa," Financial Times, 3rd April, 1985.
8. Hayter, T., and Watson, C., Aid, Rhetoric and Reality, Pluto, London, 1985, p. 97.
9. Donors often keep their political objectives for which they provide aid secret from the recipients. This, no doubt, is done out of prudence.
10. See Page 205 of the thesis.
11. Some of these concepts are found in: Evaluation of Aid Projects and Programmes, by Clacknell, B.E., ed., O.D.A. Eland House, London, 1983.
12. See page 16 of the thesis.
13. Washington Post of 21st February, 1989, Page A5.
15. Gordenker, L., International Aid and National Decisions, Development Programs in Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia: Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1976, page 112.
16. Ibid., pp. 114-118.
17. Ibid., p. 116.

18. Information supplied verbally by Mr. I. Upindi who was then Secretary for Economic Planning and Development in Malawi.
19. Information supplied verbally by His Excellency Mr. B. B. Mtawali, Malawi High Commissioner to London.
20. Borger J., "The Price of Dependence", New Africa No. 222, March, 1986.
21. Morton K., Aid and Dependence: Croom Helm Ltd., London, 1975, pp. 113-116.
22. See page 216 of the thesis.
23. Morton, Op Cit., p. 118.
24. See page 203 of the thesis.
25. The writer got this impression from his own boss, Mr. D. Pearson, a British expatriate, who was then the Government Chief Economist.
26. Morton, Op Cit., p. 118.
27. See p. 209 of the thesis.

28. Statement of Development Policies (DEVEPOL) 1987 to 1996, Government Printer, Zomba, Malawi, 1986, the Preface.
29. Hewitt and Kydd, Op Cit, p. 150.
30. Ibid. pp. 205-206.
31. Ibid. p. 206.
32. One such donation was made by the Japanese Government to the Malawi Government towards the end of 1983.
33. Hewitt and Kydd, Op Cit, pp. 19 and 191.
34. Bauer, P. T., Dissent on Development, Student Edition, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1976, p. 101.

Conclusion

The purpose of this thesis has been to challenge the prevailing conviction that foreign aid accounts for Malawi's behaviour in international relations. To that end, the thesis has examined the effects which the politics of foreign aid are said to have had on Malawi. Its conclusion is that the evidence is insufficient for the alleged link between foreign aid and the country's behaviour in international relations.

The conviction finds expression in three arguments. The first one is that Malawi's foreign and domestic policies were adopted for reasons of attracting foreign aid. The second argument is that Malawi's economic policy, particularly the development strategy, were decided upon by foreign experts. The third argument is that the British expatriates were de facto decision makers of the country. These arguments are advanced by Carolyn McMaster, Philip Short, Kathryn Morton, and anonymous authors of a pamphlet which is with the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) Library in London and are now emulated by a number of other writers.¹ They portray Malawi as a typical example of a new state which foreign aid has reduced to dependency or neo-colonialist status.²

The first argument is not extreme because it is confined to the question of perceptions. It leaves some room for a decision-making role by the Malawi authorities

who are seen to have, at least, made the decisions. Its point of contention is that the perceptions of the Malawi authorities, particularly those of the President, were influenced by the availability of foreign aid in South Africa and the Western countries, which was at the same time urgently needed for the country's development.

Underlying the argument is the assumption that foreign aid is politically effective: that is, it has the power to influence the perceptions of the decision-makers of a recipient country into the direction which is favoured by the donor countries and organizations. This assumption is enforced, or strengthened, by the belief that development is "the stuff of politics" in the developing countries. This means that donors' decisions are a powerful influence on the perceptions of the decision-makers of an aid recipient country since most of the development work in the developing countries is funded with foreign aid.

The second and third arguments are both more extreme. These go beyond the question of perceptions. They deny the Malawi authorities a decision-making role by portraying them as ineffective decision makers. Underlying the arguments in question is the assumption that it is the bureaucrats who are really the decision-makers of any country. With regard to Malawi, this belief is held on the ground that foreign experts, particularly the British expatriates, dominate or dominated, the country's civil service. Apparently, the point is that because they

dominate, or dominated, the country's civil service, the expatriates must be the ones who make, or made, the country's policies, particularly the development strategy.

The evidence which is often offered in support for these arguments varies considerably. It includes quotations from statements and speeches made by the President, and the nature of the country's economic system and development strategy.³ Apparently these demonstrate the direction into which the President's perceptions were, or have been, influenced by foreign aid. In addition, the evidence includes references to certain events which apparently are proof that Malawi's foreign and domestic policies were undertaken for reasons of attracting foreign aid, and the origin of the country's foreign policies which apparently demonstrates that the policies were Malawi's response to South Africa's outward looking policy which included offers of aid to African countries.⁴

Further, the evidence includes the country's geography which is seen to have dictated the country's foreign policies, a reference to some development schemes which apparently are proof that the Malawi decision-makers have not been effective rulers, and the mere presence of foreign experts which is taken to mean that the Malawi civil service has not yet been localized.⁵ In addition, Malawi's allegedly foreign aid-oriented policies apparently have had the desired results. As a result, Malawi is said to

be favoured by donor countries and organizations for aid and is seen as the largest per capita recipient of aid in Africa.⁶

In sharp contrast to these arguments is the President's attitude towards foreign aid. At no time has the President said, or implied, that the acquisition of foreign aid is the main objective of the country's foreign and domestic policies. On the contrary, the President separates foreign aid from politics. He treats the former strictly as a matter of debt every penny of which has to be repaid to the creditor. "The final factor", reported Michael Holman, for example, "involves the role of the President himself who, it is understood, found the need to reschedule a bitter pill to swallow."⁷

Also in sharp contrast to these arguments is the aid-handling process in Malawi. It is true that occasionally Malawi diplomats abroad get involved in negotiations on annual aid agreements. It is also true that occasionally Malawi's heads of diplomatic missions abroad are authorized to sign aid agreements on behalf of the country's Minister of Finance. However, the diplomats get involved in such negotiations only as members of a delegation of the Ministry of Finance which is responsible for aid negotiations. Otherwise the Ministry of External Affairs is not involved in them.

The aid-handling responsibilities in Malawi are indeed scattered among a number of government units. These include Parliament itself, Justice, Economic Planning & Development, Education, Agriculture, Works, and Health to mention a few. Compared to even any of these units, the Ministry of External Affairs is still the least involved in matters concerning foreign aid. It is hardly given any responsibility for project execution. Foreign aid is simply handled as if there were no politics to it.

Therefore, these arguments, though popular, are wide of the mark. What they say is almost the opposite of what really Malawi is as an aid recipient.

Examined in this thesis, neither of the major assumptions nor each piece of evidence cited is a sound ground for these arguments. One of the assumptions is even false while the other is still very much the unknown. The evidence is partial, controversial, and in some cases simply false. Acquisition of foreign aid has not been the main objective of Malawi's foreign and domestic policies and the country's behaviour in international relations has been wrongly interpreted in terms of its supposed quest for foreign aid.

The assumption that foreign aid is politically effective is largely a matter of faith. No doubt foreign aid is in some situations a potent instrument of foreign policy. One such situation which easily comes to mind is

that in which foreign aid is given for a clear political objective which is made known to a recipient. In that sort of situation, foreign aid is most probably politically effective because the terms on which it is provided are equivalent to almost a genuine commercial exchange. However, such situations are rare because many of the political objectives for which foreign aid is said to be disbursed are often kept secret from the aid recipients. As a result, it is not easy to assess foreign aid political effectiveness and the foreign aid literature hardly contains systematic efforts to assess it. Therefore, the arguments which have been considered in this thesis are based on an assumption which is still very much unknown.

The assumption that development is the "stuff of politics" in the developing countries is even false. The "stuff of politics" in the developing countries is not development but the traditional activities of government: defending the country, maintaining peace and calm in the country, administering justice, and collecting taxes to mention a few. Development is an option which is undertaken only when the provision of these other services is adequate.

That this assumption is an error is amply demonstrated at least by Malawi's national accounting procedures. These place the expenditure on development in a separate section of the country's national budget

called, development account, on which it is regarded as normal for a developing country to have a deficit. In contrast, the procedures place the expenditure on the traditional activities of government in another section called, recurrent account, on which it is regarded as a serious even for a developing country to have a deficit.⁸ This means that it is matters such as defending Malawi, maintaining peace and calm in the country, and administering justice which are actually on the overriding priority list of the responsibilities of the Malawi Government. Development is not.

With regard to the evidence, the quotations from the statements and speeches by the President are partial and in some cases sheer distortions of the statements and speeches. Moreover, the quotations are made without any reference to the circumstances to which the statements and speeches were addressed. Therefore, they are not proof that the President's perceptions were influenced by foreign aid when he decided on the country's foreign and domestic policies.

That foreign aid did not influence the President's perceptions then is clearly demonstrated by the pattern of foreign aid transfers to recipients in Africa of the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁹ It is a pattern which reflects a foreign aid boom. Its major beneficiaries in Southern and Eastern Africa have been those that espouse anti-South Africa rhetoric. If foreign aid did influence

the President's perceptions at the beginning of Malawi's independence, this foreign aid boom should have similarly influenced the President's perceptions at the end of the 1970s. That it has not so far swayed Malawi away from its current policies towards South Africa is proof that the President's perceptions were not in the first instance influenced by foreign aid.

The statements and speeches from which the quotations are often made actually make it clear that the President's perceptions have to do with the President's understanding of history. The President, himself a historian, intended to make the policies rest on hard, or down-to-earth analysis of international political issues. His speech before the United Nations General Assembly in 1964 and his speech before the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Cairo in 1964, tell a lot about the President's understanding of history. Therefore, it was the President's perceptions of history rather than foreign aid which indeed influenced Malawi's foreign and domestic policies.

The events which are referred to by some writers like Short and Ajala are not evidence that the country's policies were undertaken to attract foreign aid.¹⁰ The events are made to look like such evidence simply by juxtaposing them or quoting them out of their sequence. This is a familiar journalistic technique of marshalling unrelated events into producing an intended effect. David

Williams makes more or less the same point at the end of his book where he reviews briefly the book by Philip Short. No correlation emerges among these events when they are placed in their proper sequence.

Perhaps it is the country's geography which is seen as the strongest evidence that the country's foreign and domestic policies were undertaken for economic reasons. This is because it is seen as having left Malawi with no option but to adopt the sort of policies which Malawi has followed since independence. However, the country's geography is such evidence depending on how one interprets it. If human-like features, or motives, are attributed to it, the geography becomes strong and almost irrefutable evidence for the argument considered in this thesis.

The Malawian experience suggests otherwise. Differences arose among the country's leaders on how much importance should be attached to geography in the policy of the country. These are evidence, or at least an indication, that geography might have been overlooked, or down-played, in the policy making of the country. That the policy of "contact and dialogue" did indeed take account of the country's geography is not proof that geography dictated policy or constrained policy options. Rather it is evidence of the judgement which the country's leaders exercised in decision-making in relation to the country's geography.

It is no business of this thesis to prescribe policy. Therefore, it cannot tell about the best judgement which can be made of Malawi's geography. However, it disputes the claim that "contact and dialogue" was an easy option just because it took account of the country's geography.¹¹ The option was the more difficult to take from the decision-making point of view because it was opposed by many in Pan-Africanist circles. Therefore, its adoption required courage on the part of the leaders since they had to shoulder the consequences of such a policy option directly.

The nature of the country's economic system and development strategy are not evidence for the arguments examined in the thesis because they themselves have been a subject of conflicting interpretations.¹² Some writers say that the Malawian economy is open or market-oriented. Others say that it is under a good deal of state control. The conflict has arisen because of the tendency by each group of writers to emphasize only the partial features of the economy. Actually, the economy has been a mixed one in which public enterprise has thrived side by side with private enterprise. This is almost exactly the type of economic system for which the President expressed his preference at the beginning of the country's independence. Therefore, the nature of the country's economic system is not evidence that the country's economic policies were undertaken to attract foreign aid because such an economic

system is hardly an attraction to Malawi's donor countries and organizations.

The reference to some agricultural development schemes is evidence that Malawi's development policies were made by foreign experts only if the Achikumbe scheme were really identical to the country's past colonial schemes of "master farmer" and "estate agriculture".¹³ However, the identity, or similarity between the Achikumbe scheme on one hand and the past colonial schemes of "master farmer" and "estate agriculture", on the other, is a mistaken one. The scheme is identical neither to the "master farmer" scheme nor to the "estate agriculture" scheme because it is not a land ownership scheme. It has nothing to do with successful implementation of certain prescribed methods of farming as was the case with the "master farmer" scheme and its participants do not enjoy any privileges either by way of special treatment in the marketing of their crops or by way of access to credit facilities of farm inputs as did the "master farmers" enjoy. The Achikumbe is simply a certificate of distinction award scheme.

Malawi's operational approach to development is neither an effort to please the donor countries and organizations nor evidence that the expatriates decide, or decided, or policy for the country. On the contrary, the approach is itself evidence that the President has occupied an important opposition on matters concerning

development. This is because the President has not only initiated some of the country's major development projects but also retained control over allocation and modification of any development project. In fact, the approach evolved out of efforts to accommodate the President's determination to exercise such firm control over development.¹⁴

Finally, the mere presence of foreign experts in Malawi is clearly misinterpreted. This is taken wrongly to mean that the localization of the country's civil service is still incomplete. That is a misinterpretation of the presence of foreign experts in the country. Localization had to do not with mere presence of the expatriates in the country, but with the domination of the civil service by the expatriates. As such, it ceased to be a problem over a decade ago. Moreover, many of the foreign experts do not work in the civil service and even if all of them did, their number would still be insignificant in relation to the civil service as a whole which has expanded considerably since independence.

In addition, the domination of the civil service during the early days of the country's independence can be regarded as a sound ground for claiming that the expatriates were de facto decision-makers of the country only if it is the bureaucrats who really make policy in any country. However, the role of bureaucrats in decision-making is still a controversial question. It is not known

for certain yet whether the bureaucrats are the ones who really play such a role in any country.

With regard to Malawi, the role of the bureaucrats in decision-making is even more of a controversy for two reasons. The first is that the existence of bureaucracy in a new state like Malawi is itself doubted at least by some experts in the field of foreign policy analysis. The other one is that, in general, experts in the field of foreign policy analysis believe that bureaucracy in a new state like Malawi is less important in decision-making because it is said to be "incoherent and less autonomous".¹⁵ Therefore, the domination of the Malawi civil service by the expatriates during the early days of independence is not a sound ground for claiming that the expatriates were de facto decision-makers in Malawi. Such a claim only compounds the controversy in the field of foreign policy analysis about the role of bureaucrats in decision-making.

In short, the thesis has been critical of the popular argument that foreign aid accounts for Malawi's behaviour in international relations because the major assumptions on which it is based are either false or controversial. It has been critical of the argument also because almost all the evidence which is cited in support of it is incomplete, irrelevant, controversial, and in some cases plainly false. Foreign aid is simply too controversial a

premise for explaining the country's foreign and domestic policies.

By implication, the thesis has touched upon a number of wider issues. The first is the question of whether foreign aid is humanitarian. This is the oldest question in the foreign aid literature. It is still unresolved.¹⁶ By definition, foreign aid ought to be humanitarian since the word, "aid" or "assistance", refers to an element of help. However, the humanitarian character of foreign aid is hotly disputed. Indeed, the current fashion is to attribute a political character to foreign aid. The term, "politics of foreign aid", or "politics of food aid", is a case in point. The point is that donors provide foreign aid for their self-interest.

This thesis has not wholly endorsed this view for two reasons. The first is that the transactions called aid are so heterogeneous that it is incorrect to bundle all of them under one political label. The second is that even the official aid which has been considered here is not per se political. This aid is political only on the ground that it consists of transactions which take place in the government context. From time to time, such transactions do indeed take the political character of governments like when officials try to justify the provision of foreign aid in terms of some worthwhile political objectives. Therefore, it is only in this limited sense that the aid which

will be considered in this thesis will be regarded as political.

The second issue is the question of whether foreign aid is effective.¹⁷ This is a new issue concerning foreign aid which has arisen largely as result of poor economic performance on the part of the developing countries in recent years despite the millions of dollars which they have received as aid from donor countries and organizations. The current debate is unlikely to settle it because it is treated in a misleading manner. For example, the question which has been raised in connection with it is: "does aid work?"¹⁸ Left on its own, this is an ambiguous question in that it presupposes an economic, a political, or even a humanitarian character of foreign aid. Since it has been raised as result of the poor economic performance of the recipient countries, the question presupposes a humanitarian character of foreign aid which is itself still disputed.

It is true that some political objectives for which foreign aid might be provided are perfectly compatible with some humanitarian objectives.¹⁹ For example, there is no reason for not expecting the American aid to Egypt to promote economic development just because it is provided largely as a reward for Egypt's willingness to sign the Camp David Accord. However, some political objectives for which foreign aid might be provided to a recipient country are simply incompatible with

humanitarian objectives. If the political objective for which food aid is provided is to prevent the people of a recipient country from achieving self-sufficiency in food such aid should not be expected to be effective in eradicating hunger in a recipient country. Therefore, some political objectives are simply incompatible with economic or humanitarian objectives.

The foregoing means that it is important to specify the type of foreign aid effectiveness with which one is concerned. Otherwise, the issue is deceptive. Economists obviously deal with economic effectiveness of foreign aid. Similarly, foreign policy analysts ought to specify the type of foreign aid effectiveness which is of interest to them. Obviously, this ought to be the foreign aid political effectiveness. The mistake is to talk simply about "foreign aid effectiveness" because it is an expression which is meaningless on its own.

Though relevant, foreign aid political effectiveness has not been of central concern to this thesis and has been dealt with largely as one of the assumptions underlying the arguments considered in the thesis. The point is that this is still very much the unknown in the field of foreign policy analysis. The foreign aid literature hardly contains systematic or rational efforts to assess it so that it is simplistic, or indeed misleading, to claim that foreign aid has been politically effective in Malawi.

Perhaps the importance of a systematic assessment of foreign aid political effectiveness is well illustrated by the following events in Africa. The first one which easily comes to mind was the change of Government in Ethiopia over a decade ago. This took place in a country which up to the time of the change of Government was one of the major recipients, if not the major recipient, of American foreign aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, it used to be regarded as conservative and pro-Western.

After the change in government, Ethiopia steadily took the road to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Today it has a Marxist-Leninist regime. No doubt American aid is not meant to prevent all changes from occurring in the government of its recipient country. However, given the American commitment to eliminating communism, one of the political objective for the American aid to Ethiopia must have been to keep Ethiopia away from communism. Therefore, the emergence of the Marxist-Leninist regime in Ethiopia raises the question of whether foreign aid is indeed politically effective.

Finally, another event which also easily comes to mind was the expulsion of Soviet Union experts from Egypt after the 1973 Arab/Israeli war. This took place despite the fact that the Soviet Union had in the past provided much needed funds for the construction of the Aswan Dam in Egypt. No doubt the Soviet Union provides aid for a variety of reasons. However, given its commitment to eliminating

capitalism, the Soviet Union must have funded the construction of the Aswan Dam with a view to winning Egypt away from capitalism. Therefore, the ease with which President Sadat of Egypt expelled Soviet Union experts after the Arab/Israeli War raises the question of whether foreign aid is really politically effective.

The third issue which the thesis has also touched on is the question of whether geography is important in the foreign policy making of a country.²⁰ This is likely to remain a chronic problem in foreign policy analysis because it is not easy to avoid what the Sprouts have called, "deterministic rhetoric"; that is the habit of seeing geography as "pressurising" or "dictating policy". This is because geography provides an easy and readily available explanation for foreign policy making.

As repeatedly pointed out in this thesis, Malawian experience points to a possibility that the importance of geography might have been down-played in the policy making of the country. For this reason, it bears out the Sprouts' argument that it is not geography per se but ultimately human judgement which is important in policy making. However, this is a line of thought which is not easy to maintain. Probably some expressions have been used even in this thesis which present geography as "dictating policy" despite efforts to stick to the Sprouts' line of thought.

The fourth issue which has also been touched on by this thesis is the question of whether bureaucracy is important in policy making.²¹ The popular belief is that in a democratic system of government, it is the elected officials who make policy and the bureaucrats who implement policy. However, the bureaucratic politics school in foreign policy analysis says that it is the bureaucrats who actually make policy. In this regard, the elected officials merely endorse policy which is made by bureaucrats.

This is also an issue which is likely to keep cropping up in foreign policy analysis. This is because the demarcation between the responsibilities of the elected officials and those of the civil servants is not in practice clear-cut. Civil servants are part and parcel of the decision-making machinery in the executive branch of any modern government. Moreover, the dividing line between decision and implementation is not clear-cut. Implementation also involves making a series of decisions. Therefore, from time to time there are bound to be some scholars who will emphasize the importance of the bureaucrats in decision-making..

The Malawian experience at the moment is not in accord with the bureaucratic politics school of thought. The President has simply dominated the decision-making in the country. This is not a unique experience. The Nixon-Kissinger combination in the United States White

House is similarly acknowledged to have dominated decision-making in the United States²² Perhaps this means only that there are times when a country elects people who really make decisions for it.

Finally, the fifth issue which this thesis has also touched upon is the question of sovereignty, a concept which has undergone changes over the years.²³ Impermeability was in the past thought to be its important feature. Sovereignty was in that case meant not only supreme authority over a given territory and people but also immunity from foreign influences. However, sovereign states are today heavily penetrated by foreign cultures, ideologies, and multinational corporations. The latest inroad into sovereignty is the satellite television which will transmit programmes to many places regardless of national boundaries. Further, military technology has brought about wide disparities in military capabilities among states. In addition, some international treaties, particularly the United Nations Charter, are outright infringements of sovereignty. As a result, some experts think that the concept is no longer valid.²⁴

However, other experts think otherwise. These say that there is a hard core of responsibilities which each state, regardless of the disparities in military capability, carries out. The responsibilities include those of taxation, defense, maintenance of law and order, and administration of justice.²⁵ These have in fact

increased so that today the state is also responsible for health, education, postal services, administration of civil aviation, and even housing. Many of these new responsibilities have come about as a result of the emergence of the welfare state which has led to a deepening of state control over human lives.²⁶

The latest development which points into the direction of the survival of the sovereign state is the practice of debt rescheduling.²⁷ Many developing countries including Malawi have found it very difficult to repay their debts on schedule. In the past, failure to repay foreign debts was ground for depriving a weak state of its sovereignty. Today, debt-defaulting countries are not deprived for their sovereignty. Instead, the debts are either cancelled or rescheduled.

Accordingly, experts who hold this view define sovereignty in a manner which takes account of the realities of the modern world. Their emphasis is not on impermeability. Instead, they take the concept to mean simply supreme competence to make law within the frontiers of a state and a status of legal equality of a state with any other state in international law.²⁸ The latter feature is at the heart of Mayall's article on the implications of the enlarged EEC on the African States.²⁹ This is because the Lomé Convention did away with the principle of reciprocity and embraced instead the principle of mutual advantage. The latter does away even

with the legal equality between the EEC countries and the African countries.

With regard to the developing countries, sovereignty is more of a problem. This is because many of the developing countries are believed to have "neo-colonialist" or "dependency" status. This means that many developing countries are even "less sovereign" than the developed countries apparently because the constraints on their sovereignty are more than the constraints which are on the sovereignty of the developed states. One such extra-constraint on the sovereignty of the developing countries, so to speak, apparently is foreign aid. The mere fact of receiving it is said to be evidence of a "dependency" or "neo-colonialist" status because foreign aid allegedly establishes a dependency relationship.

This is a topical issue in Africa. It colours the vision which many scholars on the continent, including some former heads of state and government, have of international issues.³⁰ Apparently, the intention is to throw neo-colonialism into disrepute through frequent verbal attacks against it. It is a noble and achievable goal. For example, to be called the greatest imperialist of all the time was at one time in some countries in Europe an honour or a badge of respectability. Now it is no longer so.

However, the dependency argument has another side which should cause concern among its proponents in the developing countries. It can boomerang. This is because the argument enforces the already existing prejudice among the developed states against the developing states. Such prejudice is not new. Older states have had difficulties in the past in accepting newly emerged states as equals or as real states. This was the case in the 19th century when many countries in Central and South America emerged as sovereign states and the same was also true early in the 20th century when many countries in Eastern Europe emerged as sovereign states.³¹ The new states in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and South Pacific have not been immune from the prejudice of the older states.

The dependency argument has gained popularity at the time that older states are still adjusting to the reality of the existence of new states in Asia, Africa, the Caribbean, and the South Pacific; and are still questioning whether these countries should really be treated as sovereign states. For example, the national day celebrations of many developing countries in the capitals in Europe and North America are hardly attended by important elected officials of the host governments in these places. Therefore, the dependency argument is detrimental to the sovereignty of the developing countries because it enforces this prejudice of the older states against the new ones.

The argument actually obscures the true nature of colonialism which involved an unequal relationship between the conquerors and the conquered. Its highest expression is that which one sees, or reads about, in South Africa. It involved no freedom of choice on the part of the conquered. Everything depended on the conqueror. Nothing like it exists in many parts of the world today. For example, Ghana started independence with a per capita income equal to that of South Korea. The latter country has now achieved development. If there is neo-colonialism, why has it been particularly pernicious to Ghana and not to South Korea?

The thesis shares the view that dependency or neo-colonialism is a vague concept which is quite inappropriate for objective political analysis. For example, neo-colonialist charges against Malawi contrast sharply with Malawi's actual experience. Be it on project choice or foreign policy making, to say nothing of the political system of government the Malawian authorities have unquestionably exercised freedom of choice. They do not regard foreign aid as a constraint on decision-making.

NOTES

1. See pages 49 to 58 of the thesis.
2. See page 257 of the thesis.
3. See pages 86 to 89, 112 to 117, and 150 to 152 of the thesis.
4. See page 89 and 118 of the thesis.
5. Pages 281 to 282 of the thesis.
6. Pages 233 of the thesis.
7. Financial Times of 16th April, 1985, article by Michael Holman.
8. See footnote 4 on page 409 of the thesis.
9. See pages 137 to 138 and 244 to 245 of the thesis.
10. See pages 100 and 133 of the thesis.
11. See page 126 to 132 of the thesis.
12. See pages 161 and 194 of the thesis.

13. See pages 174 to 193 of the thesis
14. See page 222 of the thesis.
15. See pages 308 to 310 of the thesis.
16. See pages 16 to 19 of the thesis
17. See pages 20 to 23 and 360 to 369 of the thesis.
18. See footnote 14 on page 63 of the thesis.
19. See page 21 to 22 of the thesis.
20. See pages 120 to 121 of the thesis.
21. See pages 303 to 313 of the thesis.
22. The writer is here reflecting the view of Mr. Peter Rodman, Security Counselor, U.S. National Security Council, who addressed a group of diplomats, including the writer, in Washington D.C. on 4th May, 1989.
23. See pages 342 to 360 of the thesis.
24. This is in reference to Professor Herz's views which he latter revised: Herz J.H., "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on The Future of the Nation

State", International Politics and Foreign Policy, Rosenau, J.N., Revised Edition the Free Press, New York, 1969, page 76.

Also a number of articles in the book Conflict in World Society, by Banks, M., Editor, Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., London, 1984, at least imply that sovereignty has eroded to the extent that states are no longer the chief actors in international politics.

25. Waltz, K.N., Theory of International Politics; Addison - Wesley Publishing Company Inc. Philippines, 1979, page 96.
26. Hill, C., "Theories of Foreign Policy for Developing Countries", Foreign Policy Making In Developing States, by Clapham, C. and Wallace, W. Editors Saxon House 1977, pages 2 to 15.
27. Hill, C., Op Cit, page 12.
28. Northedge, F.S., The International Political System, Faber and Faber, London, 1976, pages 142 to 144.
29. See footnote 5 on page 409 of the thesis.
30. The scholars include Amin S., author of Neo-colonialism in West African, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1973, and Mazrui, A., author of many

books on African politics and history. His latest one is entitled: The Africans, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1986. The relevant pages are 213 to 239. Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, former President of the United Republic of Tanzania is one of those African leaders who embrace the concept of dependence or neo-colonialism. This can be seen at least from his speech which was quoted in extenso in Africa Now of February, 1987.

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