

The London School of Economics and Political Science

*Conspiracy, coup d'état and civil war in Seville (1936-1939):
History and myth in Francoist Spain*

Rúben Emanuel Leitão Prazeres Serém

A thesis submitted to the Department of International History of the
London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
London, November 2012

Declaration

I, Ruben Emanuel Leitão Prazeres Serém, hereby declare that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I declare that my thesis consists of 105,340 words.

Abstract

This thesis deconstructs the bases of enduring Francoist myth that General Queipo de Llano heroically conquered Seville with a handful of soldiers. Having established the full ramifications of that conquest, it goes on to assess the political, social, economic and cultural implications of the Spanish Civil War in Seville, the largest urban centre to fall to the military rebels at the beginning of the conflict.

Chapter I examines the nature and infrastructure of the military conspiracy against the democratic Republic developed in response to the Popular Front electoral victory of February 1936. Chapter II scrutinises the career of General Queipo, in particular his metamorphosis from a marginal figure in the conspiracy into a rebel secular saint.

Chapter III dismantles the legend that Queipo directed a small group of soldiers that miraculously conquered Seville and examines how the myth was exploited to legitimise political repression. Chapter IV demonstrates how the bloody pacification of Seville by nearer to 6,000 men exemplified the conspirators' determination to eliminate the Republic by extreme violence. It shows how the use of the most brutal methods of colonial war was employed against civilians all over rebel-controlled territory.

Chapter V analyses the painful transition from insurrection to civil war from a novel perspective: fundraising campaigns. It quantifies the devastating consequences of Nationalist economic repression. Finally, Chapter VI demystifies the legend of a Catholic Church persecuted by a 'Judeo-Masonic' conspiracy. It concludes that anticlericalism was a popular form of protest that pre-dated the establishment of the II Republic by analysing/quantifying patterns of religiosity, revealing that only 1.44% of the local population regularly attended Church in 1930s Seville; and investigating the development of the Catholic Church into the main cultural institution in Nationalist Spain that sanctified the transformation of myth into History.

Conspiracy, coup d'état and civil war in Seville (1936-1939): History and myth in Francoist Spain: Contents page

Chapter I: From *coup de main* to *coup d'état*: the conspiracy against the II Spanish Republic (February-July 1936)

5-41

Chapter II: Constructing the myth: General Queipo de Llano and the conspiracy in Seville (February-July 1936)

42-77

Chapter III: Deconstructing the myth: the legend of General Queipo de Llano and his *soldaditos*
78-128

Chapter IV: Institutionalising Terror in Rebel Spain: the pacification of the working-class
districts of Seville (19-23 July 1936)

129-61

Chapter V: The forging of a Kleptocratic State: economic repression in Nationalist Seville (1936-1937)

162-206

Chapter VI: The “apostasy of the masses”: cultural repression and the Catholic Church during
the II Republic and the Spanish Civil War (1931-39)

207-58

Conclusion

259-67

Tables

268-78

Bibliography

279-93

Chapter I

From *coup de main* to *coup d'état*: the conspiracy against the II Spanish Republic (February-July 1936)

Introduction: the 16 February general elections and events of 17-19 February 1936

The 17-18 July 1936 military *coup d'état*, which degenerated into the bloody Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, was the single most defining event in XX-Century Spanish History.¹ It was the most traumatic too, so much so that the country is still trying to come to terms with its painful legacy. Ironically, the rebellion that shaped modern Spain was never supposed to have taken place. Precisely six months before the outbreak of the insurgency - 17 February 1936 - some of its key figures attempted to quietly put the II Spanish Republic to death.

Following the narrow victory of the leftist Popular Front in the hotly-contested 16 February 1936 general elections, the different factions of the right might have disagreed with regard to the future political outlook of Spain, but were unanimous in their opposition to the new government.² Indeed, had the insurrectionary wishes of General Francisco Franco Bahamonde and José María Gil Robles (the leader of the strongest party of the political right, the CEDA³) been endorsed by the interim Prime-Minister, the conservative Manuel Portela Valladares, there would have been no need for the July rebellion. So determined were Franco and Gil Robles to annul the vote that at 3:15am of the night of 16-17 February Gil Robles woke up Portela (who had concluded his workday at 1:00am) and insisted on a meeting with him. The CEDA leader was hoping to pressure the Prime-Minister into declaring martial law and postponing his planned resignation. This would in turn allow the army, under the overall command of General Franco, to seize power and annul the elections (all under a veneer of legality). Portela rejected both of Gil Robles' demands, but agreed to decree a state of alert

¹ 17 July in Spanish Morocco; 18 July in mainland Spain.

² Electoral results in Seville (capital): Popular Front: 61,5%; Right: 35,8%; Falange 0,7% (total: 97,4%). Electoral results in the province of Seville: Popular Front: 32,7%; Centre-right: 26,5% (total: 59,2%). Gómez Salvago, José, *La Segunda República*, pages 222-23. Electoral results in Spain: *Electores: 13,553,710; Votantes: 9,864,783 (72%)*. Popular Front (Popular Front + Centre in Lugo): 4,555,401 + 98,715 (34,3%). Centre-Right: 2,636,524 (33,2%). Tusell, Javier, *Las elecciones del Frente Popular en España*, vol. 2, pages 13 and 24-28. For electoral fraud in Granada see pages 123-91.

³ *Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas*. See: Montero, José Ramón, *La CEDA, 2 vols.*; Robinson, Richard, *The origins of Franco's Spain*. For the memoirs of its leader see: Gil Robles, José María, *No fué posible la paz*.

(*estado de alarma*). Another even more dramatic meeting was imposed on the Prime-Minister by Gil Robles at 8:30am on 19 February under a pine tree on the outskirts of Madrid, just before Portela tendered his resignation. Moreover, General Franco twice met Portela and twice was shunned by the Prime-Minister.

Franco had already failed to convince the Director-General of the Civil Guard, General Sebastián Pozas Perea, to join forces with himself and Gil Robles. On the night of 17 February, the Chief of the General Staff of the Spanish Army met with Portela to offer his services to restore public order in Spain. The offer was rejected and, during the cabinet meeting of that same day (just a few hours after the first Gil Robles-Portela Valladares meeting), the Prime-Minister persuaded President Niceto Alcalá-Zamora into signing an order proclaiming martial law, which was to be put in use only in case of emergency. Not one to take rejection lightly, General Franco took matters into his own hands and persuaded several military garrisons into declaring martial law, which amounted to a *coup de main*. To complete the circle of right-wing forces attempting to suffocate the yet-to-be inaugurated Popular Front government, on the night of 18 February José Calvo Sotelo, representing the monarchist party *Bloque Nacional*, also paid a visit to the Prime-Minister. The following morning, a fatigued Portela Valladares tendered his resignation and handed power to Manuel Azaña Díaz, leader of the moderate left-wing *Izquierda Republicana* (IR) party.⁴

Not everyone was willing to concede defeat just yet. When General Manuel Goded Llopis heard of Azaña's ascension to power, he headed straight to the Montaña Barracks in Madrid and attempted to organise an impromptu rebellion against the Republic. The impulsive general

⁴ For the events that followed the 16 February elections, including photographic evidence of the declaration of martial law in Zaragoza see: *ABC* (Madrid), 19 February 1936 (as far as *ABC* was concerned, the new government would seek to "legitimar la revolución"). Its edition of 20 February edition fronted a photograph of Portela Valladares with the comment "crisis total" (in reference to the Prime-Minister's resignation). However, Portela Valladares clarified the situation regarding a possible declaration of martial law: "quedó autorizado el presidente para declarar el *estado de guerra* donde sea necesario", *ABC* (Madrid) 17 February 1936. For the failed *coup de main* see: Gil Robles, José María, *No fué posible la paz*, pages 492-98; Alcalá-Zamora y Torres, Niceto, *Memorias*, page 347; Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España*, page 37; Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano*, page 82; Portela Valladares, Manuel, *Memorias*, pages 175-85; Preston, Paul, *The coming of Spanish Civil War*, pages 242-44; Preston, Paul, *Franco*, pages 115-119.

failed to persuade the local officers into accepting his bizarre proposal and eventually abandoned the garrison, in his own words, “asqueado y rabioso”.⁵

The political right learned several invaluable lessons from the 16-19 February events: a) that the Republic would not surrender without a fight; b) that the army was divided in its sympathies, which compromised the possibility of a swift *coup d'état*; and c) that the battle-hardened Civil Guard would play a key role in any subversive enterprise. Indeed, the Director-General of the Civil Guard had almost single-handedly dismantled Franco's attempt to seize power surreptitiously by strategically stationing civil guard units outside army barracks; an action that dissuaded many officers from siding with the Chief of the General Staff. Finally, the CEDA had at last – by abandoning its tepid democratic commitment - harmonised tactics and purpose and aligned itself with the rest of the political right. Up until the February elections, Gil Robles' ultimate goal had been to dismantle the Republic from within, via the ballot box. The CEDA's strategy was enthusiastically endorsed by the right-wing press which, by either hyperbolising or simply fabricating public disorder stories, presented Spain as a failed state and therefore created a propitious atmosphere for a rebellion.⁶ In other words, the February crisis crudely exposed, a full six months before the 18 July rising, the absence of a democratic right in Spain. Unlike its political adversaries, the Republic did not dwell on the crisis. So much so that General Franco's open act of sedition went unpunished.

The usual suspects

After failing to sabotage the Popular Front government even before its inauguration, a group of high-ranking army officers met secretly in Madrid on 8 March 1936. Among those present were recurrent plotters Generals Goded and José Enrique Varela Iglesias and other military heavyweights such as Generals Franco and Emilio Mola Vidal and Colonel Valentín Galarza

⁵ Goded, Manuel, *Un “faccioso” cien por cien*, page 27. For Goded's 'rebellion' in Madrid see pages 15-21 and 26-27. Regarding his reactionary past and his actions during General Sanjurjo's failed coup of 10 August 1932 (*Sanjurjada*): “en Sevilla funcionaban activamente a nuestro lado el Comandante Acedo [Colunga], el Teniente Coronel Delgado y otros varios decididamente nuestros” (page 18). On the night of 16-17 February 1936, Goded asked Portela to remain neutral in the event of a rebellion (page 26) and when power was handed to Azaña, the general became so desperate that he attempted to stage a one-map coup with the support of the Falange (pages 26-27). For the ideological thinking of Felipe Acedo Colunga see Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *Contra el olvido*, pages 79-92. In 1957, Colunga wrote a biography of Calvo Sotelo: Acedo Colunga, Felipe, *José Calvo Sotelo*.

⁶ For an example see **ABC** (Madrid), 17-20 February 1936.

Morante.⁷ They all agreed to set up a subversive network and overthrow the government should the present administration show signs of radicalisation or in the event of Francisco Largo Caballero, the ageing leader of the Socialist trade-union UGT⁸, ever becoming Prime-Minister. The extremist faction within the military pressed for immediate action, but was momentarily overruled by a pragmatic majority. A few days later, most of those present at the meeting left Madrid to assume command of new military posts assigned by the Popular Front government. The recently-inaugurated administration was distrustful of the loyalty of many high-ranking officers. Subsequent events would prove it right.⁹

Pro-Francoist historiography has since claimed, with much rhetoric but little substance, that the July rebellion had consisted of a pre-emptive strike to save Spain from an impending Communist coup.¹⁰ President Manuel Azaña described this “propaganda” as an “arma de

⁷ Lieutenant-Colonel Galarza was a key figure in the conspiracy: “y todos los hilos de los enlaces y contraenlaces pasaban por las manos del teniente coronel de Estado Mayor don Valentín Galarza, residente en Madrid.” Aznar, Manuel, *Historia militar de la guerra de España*, page 85. Of similar importance were Lieutenant-Colonel Alberto Álvarez-Rementería and Major Bartolomé Barba Hernández (page 88).

⁸ *Unión General de Trabajadores*.

⁹ Rodríguez del Barrio was supposed to act as a liaison officer but fell seriously ill with cancer. Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días*, page 302; Preston, Paul, *Franco*, page 122; Preston, Paul, *The coming of Spanish Civil War*, pages 247-48; Payne, Stanley G., *The collapse of the Spanish Republic*, page 200.

¹⁰ Reports of an imminent Communist coup in Spain alarmed several foreign correspondents, such as Captain Francis McCullagh. McCullagh, Captain Francis, *In Franco's Spain. Being the experiences of an Irish war-correspondent during the Great Civil War which began in 1936*. Another correspondent - Arthur Loveday - was deceived by a number of documents produced by the Nationalists, including a report on a planned Communist rebellion scheduled to erupt in Lora del Río. Loveday, Arthur, *World War in Spain*, pages XX, 179-83 and appendix II. Cecil Gerahty also presented a ‘document’ found in a flower-pot in Triana. Gerahty, Cecil, *The road to Madrid*, pages 214-18. For flower-pot story see page 41. Also, the rebels doctored photographic evidence of Nationalist violence and presented it as Republican violence. Arrarás Iribarren, Joaquín, *Historia de la Cruzada Española*, vol 3, Tomo XI; Salas, Nicolás, *Sevilla fue la clave*. Salas’ manipulation of photographic evidence has been exposed by Espinosa Maestre. Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *La columna de la muerte*, pages 434-37. On 29 August 1936, General Franco released a decree tightening censorship for photographers working in the Nationalist zone (in reply to the release of photographic evidence of the massacre of Badajoz. That very same day Franco sent a telegram to General Queipo informing him that: “Algunos periodistas han obtenido fotografías de algún material de guerra y como este debe evitarse a toda costa ruego V.E. reitere debe tenerse muy presente la prohibición absoluta que ninguna persona ni periodistas nacionales ni extranjeros obtengan fotografías de cualquier clase de material de guerra para lo cual debe ejercerse constantemente muy activa vigilancia”. **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zonal Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 6, Carpeta 2. Historian Herbert Southworth has dismantled several major Francoist myths, most notably the legend of the impending Communist coup. See Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, *Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War*. The revolutionary nature of Southworth’s work compelled the Franco regime to set-up in 1963 a special department (*Sección de Estudios sobre la Guerra de España*) to wage an intellectual war against Southworth (more specifically against his ground-breaking work *El mito de la cruzada de Franco*) and recycle several Nationalist myths of the 1930/1940s. See also: Preston, Paul, *We saw Spain die*, pages 413-28.

guerra equivalente a los gases tóxicos".¹¹ According to the rebel rationale, the hiatus between February-July had consisted of a probationary period during which the would-be rebels had magnanimously conceded an opportunity for the Popular Front to prove its political moderation. In reality, the plotters never willingly allowed the government to govern the country; rather, the 18 July coup represented the personal failures of both Franco and Gil Robles to dismantle the Republic from within. Indeed, on 17 February Major Eduardo Álvarez-Rementería took so seriously the rumour of a mutiny organised by the anti-Republican UME¹², that he waited until dawn at the Infantry barracks Granada nº6 (which he was assigned to take over) in Seville for the arrival of a general from Madrid who never made an appearance. It was the day after the electoral victory of the Popular Front. As far as the political right was concerned, the Republic had signed its death sentence on 16 February 1936.¹³

The prominence of a Praetorian army

In the midst of all the uncertainty surrounding the anti-Republican conspiracy, two factors became clear to the political right: a) that the coup would necessarily need to be extremely violent and b) that the army would have to assume the leading role in the entire affair. The different factions of the right were much quicker - and eager - to accept the need for violence than recognise the prominence of the army.

The era of *pronunciamientos*, in which the military would simply 'pronounce' against a government, leading to its rapid and bloodless collapse, had come to a conclusion after the downfall of the dictatorship of Miguel Primo de Rivera of 1923-30.¹⁴ The enfranchisement of

¹¹ Azaña, Manuel, *Causas de la guerra de España*, page 22.

¹² *Unión Militar Española*. The UME was a secret military society formed in 1933 by Falangist Lieutenant-Colonel Emilio Rodríguez Tarduchy and Captain Bartolomé Barba Hernández. UME cells were established in military garrisons all over Spain. The UME functioned as a liaison organisation bringing together rebel officers of different political persuasions. For example: the aristocratic aviator Juan Antonio Ansaldi y Vejerano (also a monarchist and – paradoxically – a Falangist), who was trusted with flying General Sanjurjo from his exile in Estoril (Portugal) to Spain; was a member of the UME. Ansaldi was also part of the *Africanista* generation and obtained the *Cruz Laureada de San Fernando* in 1924 (Spain's highest military decoration for bravery). Preston, Paul, *Franco*, pages 151-52.

¹³ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla!*, pages 34-35. Shortly before the 16 February elections, the UME sent a courier to Seville to inform the local subversive cell that a rebellion would break out should the Popular Front win the vote. Guzmán de Alfarache was the pseudonym used by Enrique Villa, journalist of the ultra-conservative *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville). Villa also collaborated with *FE* (Seville). See also: Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano*, pages 82-83.

¹⁴ For the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera see: Ben-Ami, Shlomo, *Fascism from above: the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930*.

large segments of the population had created a vast reservoir of support towards the Republic, which would not stand idle in the event of an attempt to overthrow the government.

Furthermore, the anti-Republican extreme-left, especially the aggressive Anarchist organisations CNT and FAI¹⁵, would never tolerate the imposition of a reactionary regime without a fight.

The issue of military supremacy was a sensitive one. The right feared that if it assigned the leading role in the uprising to the army, the latter would inevitably have the ultimate say in the future political outlook of Spain or worse, usurp power for itself. On the other hand, only a section of the military was disloyal to the Republic, mostly concentrated around the officer caste that had experienced the savage colonial war of 1920-27 in Morocco. This group, known as the *Africanistas*, had forged a unique *esprit de corps*, detached from the remainder of the army, which revolved around abstract notions of extreme nationalism and messianic violence. The *Africanistas* believed themselves to be the maximum exponent of patriotism and were willing to oppose, preferably by violence, any perceived attack against the *Patria*. Its most prominent members were Generals Sanjurjo, Franco, Mola, Goded and Varela. The *Africanista* mind-set re-awoke the military's longstanding Praetorian tradition of using its self-appointed right to veto any government.¹⁶ During a subversive meeting in February in Seville, Lieutenant-Colonel Francisco Bohórquez Vecina (*auditor de Guerra*) exposed with brutal sincerity the *Africanista*'s political messianism:

“y esta situación, señores, no puede liquidarla más que el Ejército, que tiene por misión la defensa exterior; pero también la interior, de la Patria, contra sus enemigos de todas clases; y el que se sienta dentro del Ejército con verdadero espíritu militar, no puede prestar acatamiento a esta gentuza, que, adueñada del mando, llevará de manera evidente a la nación a un estado desastroso y caótico.”¹⁷

The CEDA and the *Bloque Nacional*

¹⁵ Confederación Nacional de Trabajo. See Peirats Vall, José (edited by Ealham, Chris), *The CNT in the Spanish Revolution. Federación Anarquista Ibérica*. See Stuart, Christie, *We, the anarchists!*.

¹⁶ For the *Africanistas* and the colonial war in Morocco see: Balfour, Sebastian, *Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the road to the Spanish Civil War*.

¹⁷ Guzmán de Alfarache, *18 de julio en Sevilla!*, page 36. Following the meeting, Captain Carrillo was sent to Madrid, Zaragoza and Navarra to check on the development of the conspiracy in those provinces, page 37.

The first political groups to resign themselves to accepting the supremacy of the army were Gil Robles' CEDA and José Calvo Sotelo's *Bloque Nacional*, for two very different reasons: the mass-based CEDA had placed all its bets on an electoral victory and failed; whereas the *Bloque Nacional* still revolved around a small clique of wealthy aristocrats and viewed military intervention as the only route to monarchical restoration in Spain. It was a question of same purpose, different motivations. In the end, both men used parliament as a platform for incitement to sedition.

The CEDA entered a profound existential crisis immediately after its electoral defeat.¹⁸ Gil Robles was fatally wounded politically. No longer able to defend the interests of its supporters by legal means, the CEDA leader took his party's descent into oblivion with stoicism and accepted that the legal road to a corporative state was blocked. Defeat at the February elections had a double-negative effect for the CEDA leader: it discredited him in the eyes of his supporters, while at the same time the extreme-right could never forgive him for his failure to dismantle the Republic from within. Calvo Sotelo now became the new darling of right-wing politics and the vast social network of the monarchist *élites* both in Spain and abroad would prove useful for the plotters.¹⁹

Still, Gil Robles' role in politics was not yet exhausted. He contrived a final temporising tactic: to reveal that democratic coexistence was no longer possible in Spain. The CEDA leader used his parliamentary interventions to destabilise the Republic. The climax of this campaign was Gil Robles' 16 June parliamentary address in which the CEDA leader read out a list of murders, church-burnings, strikes and various other public disorder cases and placed the blame entirely on the shoulders of the government.²⁰ Prime-Minister Santiago Casares Quiroga was the first political figure to denounce Gil Robles' speech and Calvo Sotelo's repeated incitements to rebellion. He addressed parliament that same day, explaining his reasons for contravening protocol and anticipating his scheduled intervention: "el Sr. Calvo Sotelo ha pronunciado esta

¹⁸ Tusell Gómez, Javier, *Las elecciones del Frente Popular en España*, vol. 1, pages 316-25.

¹⁹ Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, *Antifalange: estudio crítico de "Falange en la guerra de España, la unificación y Hedilla" de Maximiano García Venero*, page 101. Alfonsine monarchists lacked a mass party and were military irrelevant, but central in foreign relations. They also financially supported the rebels (for instance, they financed both Sanjurjo and Franco's flights to mainland Spain). Franco and Mola's emissaries to Fascist Italy were all, with the exception of Luis Zunzunegui, Alfonsine monarchists. They were: Luis Bolín and Luca de Tena (Franco); Goichoechea, Sáinz Rodríguez and Luis Zunzunegui (Mola). Escobar, José Ignacio, *Así empezó*, pages 55-146. Escobar later stated that General Queipo's 'miracle' in Seville inspired him during his meeting with the German ambassador in Paris (page 70).

²⁰ Preston, Paul, *The Coming of the Spanish Civil War*, pages 255-57.

tarde, aquí, palabras tan graves.”²¹ Casares Quiroga made Calvo Sotelo accountable for any future political turmoil in Spain. He concluded his speech by speaking directly to the *Bloque Nacional* leader:

“No basta por lo visto que determinadas personas, que yo no sé si son amigas de S.S., pero tengo ya derecho a empezar a suponerlo, vayan a procurar levantar el espíritu de aquellos que puede creerse que serían fáciles a la sublevación, recibiendo a veces por contestación el empellón que los arroja por la escalera; no basta que algunas personas amigas de S.S. vayan haciendo folletos, formulando inducciones, realizando una propaganda para conseguir que el Ejército, que está al servicio de España y de la República, pese a todos vosotros y a todos vuestros manejos, se subleve (*Aplausos*); no basta que después de habernos gustar las ‘dulzuras’ de la Dictadura de los siete años, S.S. pretenda ahora apoyarse de nuevo en un Ejército, cuyo el espíritu y año es el mismo, para volvemos a hacer pasar por las mismas amarguras.”²²

As for Gil Robles’ inflammatory speech, the Prime-Minister was equally clear. He saw the CEDA leader’s infamous list as part of a wider campaign aimed at presenting Spain as a failed state. As far as the moderate left was concerned, Gil Robles and Calvo Sotelo formed a pincer movement against the Republic.²³ Indeed, as early as May, Gil Robles had told Associated Press reporter Edward Knoblaugh that “something big” was about to happen in Spain.²⁴

As the time for the coup drew nearer, the CEDA grew bolder in its collaboration with the rebels. Gil Robles donated party funds to General Mola and ordered CEDA members unconditionally to throw in their lot with the military. He even paid a visit to Manuel Fal Conde in Navarre to try to persuade the Carlist leader into adopting a more conciliatory approach in his negotiations with General Mola. Later, during his exile in Lisbon, the CEDA leader organised the purchase of arms and provided financial assistance to the insurgents.²⁵

²¹ Casares Quiroga, Santiago (edited by Grandío Seoane, Emilio), *Discursos políticos (1931-1936)*, page 268.

²² Ibid, page 269.

²³ Ibid, page 271.

²⁴ When Knoblaugh asked Gil Robles whether he should go on vacation or stay in Spain, Gil Robles advised him to postpone his holidays. Knoblaugh deduced that the rebellion would break out sometime around mid-August. Knoblaugh, Edward, *Correspondent in Spain*, pages 2 and 20-23.

²⁵ Gil Robles, José María, *No fué posible la paz*, pages 728-33 and 801-2 (Gil Robles later tried to present himself as a moderate, pages 500-07); Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, *Mi vida junto a Franco*, pages 202-03; Koestler, Arthur, *Spanish testament*, pages 22-25; Preston, Paul, *The Coming of the Spanish*

Falange Española de las J.O.N.S.

The more militant factions of the political right, the *Falange Española de las J.O.N.S.*²⁶ - Spain's version of a fascist party - and the neo-medievalist *Comunión Tradicionalista* (also known as the Carlist Party or Traditionalist Party), were in no better position to direct a rebellion. The Falange had benefitted immensely from the collapse of the CEDA's temporising tactics and experienced an explosion in membership to the point that its leadership lost control over the lower echelons of the party, now structurally unrecognisable. Nonetheless, the Falange still remained numerically irrelevant. It had collected a mere 0.7% of the vote at the February elections (Primo de Rivera gathered 942 and Sancho Dávila 857 ballots in Seville).²⁷ As a terrorist organisation, however, the Falange reigned supreme. As far as the paramilitary group was concerned, politics had never been a question of votes: it considered parliamentarism a symptom of the wider social degeneracy of Spain. The electoral defeat of the right only served to confirm this theory. Even before the implantation of the Republic, the aristocratic lawyer and party founder and leader José Antonio Primo de Rivera y Sáenz de Heredia (the son of the late dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera), had emitted his final verdict on democracy:

“Pero si la *democracia como forma* ha fracasado, es más que nada porque no nos ha sabido proporcionar una vida verdaderamente democrática en *su contenido*. No caigamos en las exageraciones extremas, que traducen su odio por la superstición sufragista, en desprecio hacia todo lo democrático. La aspiración a una vida democrática libre y apacible será siempre el punto de mira de la ciencia política por encima de toda moda.”²⁸

Civil War, pages 265-66. Arrarás confirmed that Gil Robles handed 500,000 to Mola for “gastos de la conspiración.” Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la Segunda República Española* vol. 2, page 317.

²⁶ *Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista*.

²⁷ For the electoral results of the Falange in Seville see: Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, *Señoritos, jornaleros y falangistas*, page 85. For electoral results in Spain see Payne, Stanley G., *Fascism in Spain 1923-1977*, page 183. In *La Falange en la Sierra Norte de Sevilla (1934-1956)*, Parejo Fernández concluded that the majority of new party members following the outbreak of the civil war joined the *Primera Línea* (meaning they would be sent to the war front, pages 96-106); that the bulk of new affiliates between February-July 1936 did not join the Falange from the rapidly-disintegrating CEDA (pages 55-57); and that Andalucía possessed around 9,000 Falangists on the eve of the rebellion (page 47), a majority of which originated from the lower-classes (pages 48-55). In *Señoritos, jornaleros y falangistas*, Parejo Fernández revealed that between 1933-January 1936 most Falangists in the capital of Andalucía were students (31,4%), and day-labourers (20,9%) in the province of Seville (pages 76-81); the vast majority (70,8%) of which were previously unaffiliated to any political party (pages 87-88).

²⁸ **ABC** (Madrid), 17 January 1931. See also: Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, *Textos inéditos y epistolario*, page 63. For a short biography of José Antonio see: Preston, Paul, *Comrades! Portraits from the Spanish Civil War*, pages 75-108.

A decapitated structure

On 14 March 1936, José Antonio was arrested for the illegal possession of firearms. It was the most serious of an endless list of indictments against the leader of the Falange, including one for defamation against the *Director-General de Seguridad*, Alonso Mallol, whom he accused of being a cuckold - possessing “cuernos”.²⁹ Upon hearing his sentence, José Antonio threw a tantrum. He insulted the judge, ripped his toga and threw a few punches and an inkpot at a court-official’s head. His fame as a seducer preceded the good-looking *Jefe*: during the courtroom fracas, Primo de Rivera was joined by his supporters and from a total of 9 arrested, 8 were females.³⁰ Primo de Rivera’s incarceration was a terrible blow for his organisation, heavily-centred on the party leader and his family. The *Jefe*’s cousin, the equally aristocratic Sancho Dávila Fernández de Celis, extended the Falange to Seville on 13 February 1934. The local organisation was embroiled in controversy as early as 14 April, during the celebrations of the 3rd anniversary of the Republic. In the middle of the military parade, Falangists greeted the Civil Guard by performing the fascist salute and shouting anti-Republican slogans. The provocation did not pass unnoticed. Enraged Republican sympathisers reacted, triggering a riot in which a crowd attempted to assault the Falange’s headquarters while an excited Dávila, gun in hand, told a police officer that his men would disperse the protesters within five minutes. The police detained over a hundred people and closed the offices of the newly-founded party.³¹ In July of that same year, the local Falange was again involved in a violent incident after an exalted group of party members met with the civil governor of Seville to demand the re-opening of their organisation’s headquarters. According to Dávila, “El gobernador que se sintió cogido perdió la serenidad y gritó: *Esto es una chulería que no estoy dispuesto a tolerar*. A lo que yo hube de responder: *Aquí el único chulo es Vd., que se esconde tras el cargo de gobernador civil para insultarnos*. Y como el poncio pálido y ya del todo desconcertado volviese a gritar y no llamase *verduleras*, Martín Ruiz adelantó unos pasos y el pobre gobernador derribando en su huída una carpeta llena de papeles se refugió detrás de la robusta mesa y de una timbrada llenó el despacho de guardias de Seguridad.”³²

²⁹ “pide Primo de Rivera la presencia de testigos a fin de que éstos sean partícipes de su declaración, en la que habrá de manifestar quién o quiénes rompieron los sellos. En la Dirección General de Seguridad, en presencia del Director General y de los testigos llamados a tal fin, manifiesta el detenido que los sellos fueron quebrantados por “el señor Director General de Seguridad de la República con sus cuernos.” Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días*, page 300.

³⁰ Primo de Rivera occupied the recently-vacated cell of Largo Caballero. Payne, Stanley G., *Fascism in Spain 1923-1977*, pages 190 and 193; Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días*, page 301.

³¹ Dávila, Sancho; Pemartín, Julián, *Hacia la historia de la Falange: primera contribución de Sevilla*, pages 66-70.

³² Ibid, pages 76-77.

Just over a year later (August-September 1935), the distressed mother of Sancho Dávila, the Countess of Villafuente Bermeja, contacted José Antonio to demand her son's transfer to Madrid on the grounds of a possible attempt on his life. Dávila, who was unaware of his mother's request, was moved to the capital following the disastrous performance of the Sevillian Falange at the February elections and was not involved in the conspiracy against the Republic. Joaquín Miranda was eventually appointed *Jefe Territorial* for Andalucía as a replacement for Dávila, who in turn was promoted to the *Junta Central*. However, Miranda spent most of his time in and out of jail. Hence, the main problem affecting the Falange – a decapitated structure – was replicated at a regional level.³³ Furthermore, the party only enjoyed residual support in the south of Spain. On the eve of the rebellion, the Falange possessed around 9,000 affiliates in Andalucía (1,200 in Seville).³⁴ Starved of popular support, Spain's version of a fascist party imposed itself in the political scene by means of violence.

The dialectics of violence

Following his trial and imprisonment, José Antonio Primo de Rivera was left with no other option but to direct his party from his cell, first in Madrid and from 5 June in Alicante penitentiary. Under such circumstances, it was impossible for the party to emancipate itself from its military overlords. For instance, the Sevillian branch of the Falange's Military Committee (headed by Major Álvarez-Rementería) dominated the civilian structure and acted independently from official party policy.³⁵

The devastating political consequences of Primo de Rivera's incarceration were palliated by lax prison security, to the extent that weapons were smuggled inside his cell and the *Jefe* managed to communicate with the outside world with ease. It was precisely during his sojourn in prison that Primo de Rivera released his famous *Carta a los militares Españoles* of 4 May 1936. This letter, an explicit incitement to rebellion, reaffirmed Falangist propaganda myths

³³ García Venero, Maximiano, *Testimonio de Manuel Hedilla*, page 85; García Venero, Maximiano *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, pages 112-13.

³⁴ Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, "Nuevos datos sobre la afiliación Falangista en Andalucía" in Arias Castañón, Eloy (ed.), *Comunicación, historia y sociedad. Homenaje a Alfonso Braojos*.

³⁵ García Venero, Maximiano, *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, pages 112-113. Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 203: "en la parte militar funcionaba con cierta independencia el Comité." Comité Militar presided by Major Alvarez Rementería and Captains Aguilera and Pérez Blázquez. To ensure the army's ascendancy, retired Carlist army officer Luis Redondo functioned as the UME representative in Seville (page 200).

and exposed the party's elitist roots: it denounced both the external danger posed by the Soviet Union and the internal threat of Basque and Catalan regionalisms. Primo de Rivera also established a bizarre parallel between free love and the collective prostitution of working-class females. Shortly afterwards (19 May), the *Jefe* sent Rafael Garcerán Sánchez to establish contact with General Mola.³⁶ A month later (24 June Circular), José Antonio desperately attempted to enforce party discipline and avoid its complete subordination to the military. He threatened with expulsion all party members that participated in the conspiracy without prior approval from the central command structure. Only provincial leaders were allowed to negotiate with regional military commanders (29 June Circular). In addition, the *Jefe* ordered that no more than one-third of *Primera Línea* militants be put at the disposal of the rebel army. The remainder of the Falange would act autonomously and still only under the condition that regional military commanders would not hand power back to a civilian government for at least three days following the outbreak of the rebellion. This order was set to expire on 10 July.³⁷ Unsurprisingly, the rebel leadership was not distressed by the successive circulars released by Primo de Rivera. General Mola calmly informed another of José Antonio's envoys, Manuel Hedilla Larrey, that he accepted the conditions presented by the *Jefe*.³⁸

José Antonio Primo de Rivera briefly entertained the idea of a joint uprising with the Traditionalists, but this venture came to nothing. The wishful thinking of José Antonio possessed very realistic foundations: the fear that the army would use the Falange as a shock unit without taking into consideration any of its political aspirations. However, there was little Primo de Rivera could do to extract further concessions from the military rebels. The minuscule numerical strength of the Falange was aggravated by the growing difficulty of its

³⁶ Primo de Rivera was moved to Alicante prison during the night of 5-6 June. The local prison director was later arrested because of his leniency. On 14 July, two pistols were smuggled inside José Antonio's cell. The *Jefe* was also able to pass an intimidating message to General Mola declaring that if the rebellion did not break out in the near future, the Falange of Alicante would stage its own coup. Payne, Stanley G., *Fascism in Spain 1923-1977*, pages 198-199 and 205. Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 129; García Venero, Maximiano, *Testimonio de Manuel Hedilla*, pages 125-26.

³⁷ The plan was to assemble Falangists and initiate the rebellion in Toledo. The Falange was hoping to persuade the local army cadets into siding with the party. An alternative strategy was to mass up to 5,000 militants in Portuguese border and march towards Madrid. Aznar, Manuel, *Historia militar de la guerra de España*, pages 36-37. See also: Payne, Stanley G., *Fascism in Spain 1923-1977*, pages 198-199 and 205.

³⁸ García Venero, Maximiano, *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, page 134.

leader in controlling his own subordinates.³⁹ Events in Seville exposed the subaltern role of the Falange *vis-à-vis* the army:

“El Comité de Sevilla mantuvo en todo momento el criterio de que el movimiento habría de ser, para su mayor éxito, exclusivamente militar, contando con el apoyo de Falange, para evitar precisamente que los oficiales que no figurasen en esta organización se consideraran apartados del mismo, con evidente peligro de ir a un fracaso.”⁴⁰

In the end, Primo de Rivera became a victim to his own schizophrenic discourse: on the one hand the Falange presented itself as an apolitical, proletarian-oriented movement; while on the other, it was dominated by the cream of Spanish society and was immersed in a vicious underground war against the leftist trade-unions (what Dávila termed “maniobras punitivas”).⁴¹ Whether by frequently engaging in fistfights, calling for direct action or even throwing inkpots at court-officials, the *Jefe* led by example. But for José Antonio’s politics had never been a question of numbers, but of violence; what he termed during the Falange’s first public meeting at the *La Comedia* theatre on 29 October 1933: “the dialectics of fists and pistols.”⁴² The comedy was over and the *Jefe* was now losing control over his own rank-and-file, especially among those enrolled in the Falange’s frontline organisation, the ominously-named *Falange de la Sangre*; always eager to draw first blood.

The *Comunión Tradicionalista*

The *Comunión Tradicionalista* was infinitely more resourceful than his extremist rival, the Falange. For a start, it possessed its own militia - the *Requeté* – which dated back to the first Carlist War of 1833-40. The *Requeté* was a potent paramilitary organisation that had been expertly restructured by the hyperactive Andalusian General Varela, who had travelled incognito around Navarre disguised as a Catholic priest. Varela wrote the *Ordenanza del*

³⁹ While in prison “el jefe nacional conoció todos los resultados de la acción revolucionaria de la Falange, acometida y desarrollada por sus inspiraciones y consignas. Mas era imposible que él y la Junta Política estuvieran presentes en todo el proceso, del que conocían las peripecias y los resultados con posterioridad.” García Venero, Maximiano, *Historia de la Unificación (Falange y Requeté 1937)*, page 63. Several members of the *Junta Política* were opposed to joining Mola’s rebellion out of fear that the Falange would be absorbed by the military (testimony of Manuel Valdés Larrañaga, page 66). See also pages 67-69 and Payne, Stanley G., *Fascism in Spain 1923-1977*, page 185.

⁴⁰ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 39.

⁴¹ Dávila, Sancho; Pemartín, Julián, *Hacia la historia de la Falange: primera contribución de Sevilla*, page 92.

⁴² For his speech see: Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, *Discursos y escritos. Obras completas (1922-1936)*, pages 189-195.

Requeté (1934), which reorganised the Carlist army into a modern fighting force divided in *Tercios* (battalions). Furthermore, in March 1934 a joint Carlist/Monarchist delegation signed a pact with Mussolini in which the Fascist leader pledged to provide financial and material assistance to both organisations. As a result, *Requeté* officers began receiving military training in Italy.⁴³ When the rebellion erupted, a report filed in Seville's Military Archive described the *Requeté* as a paramilitary organisation “sometida a una disciplina férrea y voluntaria”, used as “fuerzas de choque” and “poseídas del mayor entusiasmo y patriotismo [...] voluntarios que se baten por un ideal.”⁴⁴

The *Comunión Tradicionalista* possessed a robust organisational structure centred on a charismatic leader, would-be priest turned lawyer Manuel Fal Conde. Fal Conde's decision to abandon ecclesiastic studies and embrace politics (the May 1931 church burnings in Seville made a deep impression on him) could have only been regarded as divine by the deeply-religious Carlist rank-and-file, elated by the sudden resurgence of the movement.⁴⁵ The Traditionalist credo was founded on a theocratic conception of politics and encapsulated in the party's motto: *Dios, Patria, Fueros y Ley*. Moreover, the *Comunión Tradicionalista* advocated a rival claim to the Spanish throne and abhorred the values of the Enlightenment, which it had combated repeatedly on the battlefield throughout the XIX-Century. Thrice it challenged the Spanish state (1833-40, 1846-49 and 1872-76) and thrice it was defeated. By 1931 Carlism, plagued by internal feuds, was a movement on the verge of extinction. It was an historic relic, deeply embedded in the cultural fabric of one particular province of Spain: Navarre. The advent of the II Republic, its anticlerical legislation and the tireless labour of Fal Conde achieved nothing short of a miracle. Nonetheless, ideological inconsistencies persisted; in particular, the question of dynastic succession and how to put into practice a theocratic regime in Spain. But this was a minor concern for the Traditionalist rank-and-file, impatient to fight a modern-day crusade.⁴⁶

A fanatical minority

⁴³ *La Unión* (Seville), 18 July 1937; Gil Robles, José María, *No fué posible la paz*, pages 713-15.

⁴⁴ *Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur* (Seville), Legajo 5356, carpeta 46.

⁴⁵ Marín Fidalgo, Ana; Martín Burgueño, Manuel, *In memoriam. Manuel J. Fal Conde*, page 24.

⁴⁶ For Carlism see: Blinkhorn, Martin, *Carlism and crisis in Spain 1931-1939*; Blinkhorn, Martin (ed), *Fascists and conservatives the radical right and the establishment in twentieth-century Europe*, Chapter 7.

Manuel Fal Conde reorganised the Carlist party in such spectacular fashion that he even managed to lead it into virgin territory: Andalucía. This process culminated on 15 April 1934 with a military parade in Quintillo, on the outskirts of Seville. Shortly afterwards, Fal Conde was appointed Secretary-General of the *Comunión Tradicionalista*. Fal Conde's 'miracle' must nevertheless be put in perspective. In February 1936, Traditionalist membership in Andalucía stood at an unimpressive 1,210, disproportionately concentrated on the more affluent strata of society.⁴⁷ Fal Conde's rise to his party's leadership was meteoric; however, Carlism remained an influential political force only in Navarre, Álava and parts of the Basque Country. Still, the Secretary-General managed to conjure yet another miracle. With membership outside Navarre centred on the economic élites, Fal Conde turned disadvantage into strength by mustering strong financial support to back his party's initiatives, including plans for a fourth armed uprising.⁴⁸ The Traditionalist leader was not one to shy away from a challenge and throughout the spring of 1936 Major Luis Redondo could be found in the sierras of Huelva making arrangements for (yet) another Carlist rebellion. Fal Conde's plan was to rebel simultaneously in Navarre, the Sierra de Gata (Cáceres) and another unspecified location near the Portuguese border. This venture enjoyed the backing of several high-ranking military officers, including Generals Sanjurjo and Varela.⁴⁹ However, it proved to be a bridge too far for the *Comunión Tradicionalista*. In the end, the Traditionalists were left with no option but to recognise their own limitations and negotiate with the military rebels. A paradox prevailed: that of a numerically weak party outside Navarre, but nevertheless boasting a fanatical and extremely professional militia that could prove decisive in the event of a coup. Fal Conde would prove to be every bit as inflexible as the ideology of the party whose interests he passionately sought to defend. This led to protracted negotiations between the military and the Traditionalist leaderships that pushed General Mola to the brink of despair, even contemplating suicide.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Ortiz Villalba, Juan, *Del golpe militar a la guerra civil: Sevilla 1936*, page 72.

⁴⁸ Fal Conde was clearly aware of the need for propaganda. In Seville, the Traditionalists controlled newspaper *La Unión* (another periodical - *El Correo de Andalucía* - was also ideologically close to the Carlist party). The *Comunión Tradicionalista* was dominated by the local oligarchy: in 1934 Seville, only 2,1% of party members were "obreros". In 1937 Cádiz, the proportion was even lower: 1%. Álvarez Rey, Leandro, "El Carlismo en Andalucía durante la II^a República (1931-1936)" in Braojos Garrido, Alfonso; Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *Sevilla, 36: Sublevación fascista y represión*.

⁴⁹ *La Unión* (Seville), 18 July 1937; García Venero, Maximiano, *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, page 123.

⁵⁰ García Venero, Maximiano, *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, page 130; Del Burgo, Jaime, *Conspiración y guerra civil*, pages 532-35 and 538-39; Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 150.

General Emilio Mola Vidal

On 14 March, General Mola assumed command over both the *Gobierno Militar* (Military Government) and the 12th Infantry Brigade in the most reactionary provincial capital in Spain: Pamplona (Navarre).⁵¹ He also became the *Director* of the conspiracy. Mola was an introvert, enigmatic character who adopted a structured approach to work with obsessive attention to detail. Félix Maíz, who worked as the *Director's chauffeur* during the conspiracy, described him as: “un hombre muy alto, muy serio”, a man of few words “que le agradaban las contestaciones cortas y claras” and who interrupted Maíz whenever a conversation deviated minimally from the point. Maíz added that “El General Mola es minucioso en detalles cuando le es interesante la seguridad que trata de obtener por medio de ellos. [...] Da pocas explicaciones, pero es verdad que tampoco pide muchas.” In conclusion, and despite spending weeks in Mola’s company, Maíz knew very little about the general’s private life: “Es difícil penetrar en la vida, siempre reservada, del General Mola y llegar a un sondeo que descubra con claridad sus intenciones a toda persona que no cultive de cerca la confianza con que puede ser correspondido.”⁵² Mola’s neurotic approach to work bore fruit. He planted a spy inside the *Dirección-General de Seguridad* that kept him informed of any governmental action against the conspiracy. On 3 June, the *Dirección-General de Seguridad* raided Pamplona but found no evidence linking Mola with an alleged plot against the regime. Worse, the Republic ignored the extent of the conspiracy or even who was *El Director*.⁵³

The date of Mola’s nomination as leader of the conspiracy remains a mystery, partly because of subsequent efforts on the part of pro-Francoist historiography directed at minimising the figure of the *Director* in order to inflate the importance of Franco. Falangist militant and historian Maximiano García Venero suggested that Mola had been placed in charge of the rebellion as early as March. He added that the *Director* used the UME to help him establish a subversive network and used Lieutenant-Colonel Alberto Álvarez-Rementería of the Engineer Corps (brother of Major Eduardo Álvarez-Rementería) as his collaborator in Madrid.⁵⁴ On the

⁵¹ “Navarra, valerosa, ofrecía el núcleo principal para iniciar el Movimiento, y en la seguridad de su acción Mola pudo moverse con desembarazo en la gestión de otras asistencias y colaboraciones no menos interesantes.” Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 84.

⁵² Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 187.

⁵³ Ibid, pages 55 and 60-61; Escobar, José Ignacio, *Así empezó*, pages 200-206; Payne, Stanley G., *The collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933-36: origins of the Civil War*, pages 316-17.

⁵⁴ García Venero, Maximiano, *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, pages 119-120 and 131-32.

other hand, Socialist leader Indalecio Prieto put forward the date of 29 May.⁵⁵ However, Mola signed his first Secret Instruction as *Director* in April and it is almost certain that he assumed command of the conspiracy sometime between March and April. As for General Franco, the recently-appointed military commander of the Canary Islands did not join the conspiracy until the very last minute. Franco's dilatory tactics enraged the rebels, who bestowed on him the nickname "Miss Canary Islands 1936".⁵⁶

The extremist element within the military

Ironically, the single greatest challenge to Mola's authority originated from within the army. Impatient monarchists, with little preparation but much vitriol, made arrangements for a rising planned for the spring/summer of 1936, the amateurish nature of which could not - and did not - pass unnoticed. When news of the plot reached the cabinet in April, Generals Varela and Luis Orgaz Yoldi were incarcerated in San Fernando (Cádiz) and the Canary Islands respectively. They were both inveterate conspirators, as were Generals Villegas, Goded and Fanjul.⁵⁷ The primary targets of this and other puerile ventures directed at overthrowing the Republic were the garrisons of Madrid and Valencia; whereas Mola astutely focused his attention on the more reactionary garrisons of the north.⁵⁸ The arrests of uncontrollable generals came as a blessing in disguise to Mola, since it eliminated the possibility of a premature rebellion along the lines of the *Sanjurjada* of 10 August 1932, named after its leader, General José Sanjurjo Sacanell. Sanjurjo was king for a day before the government managed to suffocate his coup a day after it erupted in Seville. The rising was so badly prepared that it turned into a farce. For instance, General Goded, a key figure of the *Sanjurjada* in Madrid, was found taking a nap as events unfolded in the capital.⁵⁹ In deep contrast, General Mola was of a different temperament altogether from the *bon vivant* Sanjurjo who, according to reporter Henry

⁵⁵ Indalecio Prieto wrote: "Al propio general le oí más de una vez referirse a esta fecha." Prieto, Indalecio, *Convulsiones de España: pequeños detalles de grandes sucesos*, vol. 1, page 168.

⁵⁶ Preston, Paul, *Franco: a biography*, pages 136-40. See also: Bolín, Luis, *Spain: the vital years*, pages 9-54. For the Miss Canary Islands incident see Payne, Stanley G., *Fascism in Spain 1923-1977*, page 204.

⁵⁷ Goded insisted in rising Barcelona and rejected Mola's assignment, Valencia. According to Escobar, Mola had to concentrate his efforts in keeping the extremists under control. Escobar, José Ignacio, *Así empezó*, pages 13-20. Maíz, B. Félix, *Mola, aquel hombre: diario de la conspiración, 1936*, page 132; Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 85; Preston, Paul, *Franco: a biography*, page 82; Goded, Manuel, *Un "faccioso" cien por cien*, page 29.

⁵⁸ Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 195.

⁵⁹ For the *Sanjurjada* see: Esteban Infantes, Emilio, *La sublevación del general Sanjurjo. Relato de su ayudante*; Goded, Manuel, *Un "faccioso" cien por cien*, pages 18-21. Goded fell asleep during the *Sanjurjada* in Madrid (page 20), then fell in disgrace and was eventually rehabilitated by Gil Robles.

Buckley, was “a hard-drinking, woman-loving officer with bravery and few brains” that embarked on “an improvised rising decided over a few dinner tables.”⁶⁰

Africanismo and Africanistas

The Spanish army was an antiquated and inefficient fighting force that was crushed by the US military in the brief yet traumatic Spanish-American War of 1898, in which Spain lost the remnants of her colonial empire: Cuba, Puerto Rico, Philippines and Guam. Extremist elements within the army proposed to correct this humiliation by recreating a new empire, starting in Morocco, while at the same time crushing internal dissent.⁶¹ The military had therefore aligned themselves with the political right, which claimed that the dilapidation of the Spanish Empire was an external manifestation of the country’s interior degeneracy and identified the left as the ‘traitor’ within. This was a convenient excuse that exonerated the army from any responsibility in the 1898 debacle. For the proponents of this view, the political left had, via its importing of degenerate, un-Spanish foreign ideologies (namely Democracy and Socialism); brought about the decadence of the *Patria*. Hence, the true essence of Spain was to be found in a return to its medieval past. A vicious cycle ensued: the military became increasingly detached from civil society and developed a siege mentality. Mental seclusion was complemented by physical segregation when a generation of newly-graduated officers went to Morocco in search for action, rapid promotion and redemption from the 1898 defeat. They were the *Africanistas*.

General Mola, like Sanjurjo, was part of the officer caste that served in Morocco. He might have been less effusive in displaying his aversion to the Republic than the extrovert Sanjurjo, but was equally determined to exterminate it. In his first meeting with Félix Maíz, Mola could not have been more direct: “Vamos contra un enemigo que no es español y que ya está incrustado en la mayor parte de los organismos vitales de nuestra Patria.”⁶² Mola’s Manichean conception of society – going to the extreme of regarding Republicans as foreigners (“no es

⁶⁰ Buckley, Henry, *Life and Death of the Spanish Republic*, page 88.

⁶¹ “Se hablaba mucho de una gran empresa que de prosperar volvería al Ejército español sobre sendas de sacrificio, lo que habría de traer nuevamente para la colectividad el respeto y la paz de espíritu tan injustamente vulnerados. Éste era el lema: misión en Marruecos.” Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 35. Upon his return to mainland Spain, General Queipo de Llano became profoundly nostalgic of the colonial war (pages 51-62).

⁶² Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 54.

español") - was shocking, but unsurprising if taking into account that the *Director* was an *Africanista*.

The Moroccan war had an enormous impact on General Mola. It was a key formative period in his life, central in shaping both the man and the general. When José Ignacio Escobar, Marqués de Valdeiglesias and director of right-wing newspaper *La Época*, met Mola in 1936, he noted that the *Director* "Nos habló [...] de su actuación en África y de la suma de pequeños detalles de los que podía depender el éxito o el fracaso de una operación."⁶³ While reminiscing on his time in Africa, Mola's discourse often descended into an unintelligible monologue, which Escobar labelled as "esotérico."⁶⁴ However, what Escobar dismissed as "esotérico", the *Africanistas* viewed as paramount: abstract conceptions of *Patria* and moral superiority, replacing rationality with emotion; all congealed in a vision of the army as fulfilling a messianic duty of saving Spain from imaginary internal enemies and eventually restoring the *Patria* to its long-lost medieval splendour.⁶⁵

Nostalgia for the Moroccan war and difficulty in readapting to a nonviolent reality not only aggravated the collective trauma of a generation of army officers, but also allowed the importing of the *Africanista* mind-set to mainland Spain. The *Africanistas* regarded society as its own enemy and cherished their own role as a Praetorian force. At the same time, corporatism bred a macrocephalic officer corps at the same time as endogamy ensured that the military became the single most destabilising force in Spain. When Franco first arrived in Morocco in the 1910s, the army's 80,000 soldiers were commanded by 24,000 officers of whom 471 were generals.⁶⁶

⁶³ "Nos habló [...] de su actuación en África y de la suma de pequeños detalles de los que podía depender el éxito o el fracaso de una operación.
-Yo siempre los he cuidado todos, concluyó, y quizá por eso nunca me ha salido mal ninguna." Mola added: "he hecho mi carrera en África y nunca me ha salido mal una operación." Escobar, José Ignacio, *Así empezó*, page 131.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, page 19.

⁶⁵ The author declared that Popular Front government laboured incessantly to weaken the army in anticipation of the forthcoming civil war. According to Lojendio, the main goals of the political left were to arm extremist groups, win the war and establish a Communist regime in Spain. Lojendio, Luis María de, *Operaciones militares de la guerra de España, 1936-1939*, page 22. See also pages 24-25: "el Ejército ha representado la gran reserva del espíritu y la mística patriótica, tan en crisis en el resto de los grupos españoles".

⁶⁶ Preston, Paul, *Franco: a biography*, page 14. See also the example of General Franco's rapid ascension through the military ranks, pages 9-49.

Since it regarded itself as the embodiment of Spanish values, any perceived attack against the army would be regarded as direct assault on Spain; a useful pretext for protecting corporate privileges. Hence, when the Republic tried to tackle one of Spain's structural problems - the military – it created a lifelong enemy. The new regime re-opened a taboo subject: the 'responsibilities' issue in Africa, pertaining to the disastrous military policy pursued in Morocco in the early 1920s. This was complemented by a decree reviewing promotions during the Moroccan conflict (3 June 1931). At the same time, the Republic arrested a number of officers for their role in the repression of the failed Republican coup of December 1930. Among those detained was General Mola (arrested on 21 April 1931). The *Africanistas* were mortified. Military reform was a sensitive topic and the issue of responsibilities over the Rif campaign had already brought about a military dictatorship in Spain: just as the Picasso report concerning the Moroccan war was about to be dissected in parliament, General Miguel Primo de Rivera seized power in a bloodless coup on 13 September 1923.⁶⁷

General Franco was, alongside Sanjurjo and Millán-Astray, the most celebrated officer of the *Africanista* generation.⁶⁸ In 1934, Franco declared that the Asturias campaign – waged in the only Spanish region to resist the Moorish invasions of the VIII-Century – was a "frontier war" and denounced Socialism as the enemy within.⁶⁹ The traumatised *Africanistas* tended to establish parallels between their own experience in Morocco and events in Spain. In December 1931, a general strike in the impoverished village of Castilblanco (Badajoz) resulted in the shooting of a demonstrator and the brutal lynching of four civil guards. The Director-General of the Civil Guard, General Sanjurjo, upset that the incident had made him miss a big society banquet in Zaragoza, compared the locals to the Moroccan rebels of the 1920s: "Yo no sabía que quedaban en España pueblos salvajes."⁷⁰ Later, at the funeral of the murdered civil guards,

⁶⁷ Mola Vidal, Emilio, *Obras Completas*, pages 879-80. Preston, Paul, *Franco: a biography*, pages 83-85 and 92 for Franco and Goded's *revisión de ascensos*. See also: Cardona, Gabriel, *El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la Guerra Civil*, pages 143 and 165.

⁶⁸ Franco's love for the Foreign Legion was such that he was overwhelmed with emotion ("tears fell from his eyes") when Bolín told him a story involving a dying legionnaire during the Spanish Civil War. Bolín, Luis, *Spain: the vital years*, page 90. See also: Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, *Mis Conversaciones privadas con Franco*, pages 184-85; Preston, Paul, *Franco: a biography*, pages 15-68.

⁶⁹ Predictably, the *Africanistas* blamed the political class for the Annual disaster. Preston, Paul, *Franco: a biography*, page 105. See also: Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 60.

⁷⁰ Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *La Primavera del Frente Popular: Los campesinos de Badajoz y el origen de la guerra civil (marzo-julio de 1936)*, page 33 (see also pages 34-36); ABC (Seville), 1 and 2 January 1932; Preston, Paul, *Doves of War. Four Women of Spain*, pages 323-26.

he also declared that “la Guardia Civil está siempre al lado del gobierno de la República.”⁷¹ A few months later, Sanjurjo attempted to overthrow the government.

Crossing the Rubicon: Asturias 1934

The reasons for the deployment of the Army of Africa in Asturias were not based on abstract or even ‘esoteric’ notions of *Patria*. The colonial troops were the only truly professional fighting force in the Spanish military, mainly formed by badly-trained conscripts led by poorly-paid officers. However, the Army of Africa – composed by the Foreign Legion and the Moroccan *Regulares* – was not a just an *élite* military force. In fact, it was anything but standard. Luis Bolín, Franco’s chief of press during the civil war and an avid admirer of the Legion, described its soldiers as:

“misfits, gaol-birds, old soldiers [...] They were a noisy rabble, panting for adventure, and they landed in Morocco with the force of a hurricane, scattering everything before them. Some were idealists, eager to fight for a worthy cause, some wished to atone for past misdeeds, others were hungry. A few had been crossed in love.”⁷²

The Army of Africa first crossed the Spanish Rubicon – the straits of Gibraltar - in October 1934, when it was employed by the Radical-CEDA coalition government to crush the Asturias rising. Predictably, the affair resulted in a bloodbath. General Franco, informally placed in command by Minister of War Diego Hidalgo (Radical Party), swiftly removed ‘problematic’ officers from positions of authority. One of them, Lieutenant-Colonel López-Bravo, was deemed untrustworthy because he expressed hesitation at firing at civilians. President Alcalá-Zamora and his acolyte, General Queipo de Llano, opposed this *modus operandi*.⁷³ Regardless, López-Bravo was replaced by a *protégé* of Franco, *Africanista* Colonel Juan Yagüe Blanco. Yagüe’s actions during the 1934 rising earned him the nickname the ‘Hyena of the Asturias’. For the duration of the military campaign, the Army of Africa shelled residential districts and indulged in looting, torture, rape and murder. These were not novel tactics; they had already

⁷¹ **ABC** (Seville), 5 January 1932.

⁷² Bolín, Luis, **Spain: the vital years**, page 86.

⁷³ Gil Robles, José María, **No fué posible la paz**, page 235.

been employed in Morocco for the best part of the 1920s (the leader of the Asturian mineworkers spoke of the “odio africano” of the colonial army).⁷⁴

Elated by their recent success in drowning the Asturias revolution in blood, a group of army officers entertained the idea of following it up with a *coup d'état*. Gil Robles consulted Generals Franco, Fanjul, Varela and Goded; however, all were intimidated by the real prospect of nationwide working-class unrest and Civil and Assault Guard resistance.⁷⁵

One of the central tragedies of 1930s Spain was the importation of the *Africanista* mentality to mainland Spain; in other words, the concept of a civilising mission, of educating ‘primitive’ cultures by military means. Indeed, during one of his very first statements following the outbreak of the rebellion, General Mola declared that the rebellion “hemos de iniciarla exclusivamente los militares: nos corresponde por derecho propio, porque ese es el anhelo nacional, porque tenemos un concepto exacto de nuestro poder.”⁷⁶ By 1936, the ‘barbarians’ had metamorphosed from Moroccan natives to Spanish workers; in the same way as military priorities shifted away from the remaking of the Spanish Empire to the interior colonisation of the motherland.⁷⁷

General Queipo de Llano

General Mola’s appointment to Navarre was part of a wider policy of reshuffling military posts in the hope of placing loyalist officers in positions of power and posting suspect ones where it was hoped they could do little damage. As a complementary measure, the government established close surveillance on those officers it deemed politically dangerous. As a result, planning the rebellion turned into a hazardous and protracted affair, full of unexpected twists and turns. But not even the meticulous Mola could have foreseen the outcome of his

⁷⁴ Preston, Paul, *Franco: a biography*, page 25. For Asturias see: Shubert, Adrian, *The road to revolution in Spain: the coal miners of Asturias 1860-1934*; Preston, *Franco: a biography*, pages 99-106; Graham, Helen, *The Spanish Republic at war, 1936-1939*, pages 57-61. In Catalonia, the leader of the IV División Orgánica - General Batet -, refused to employ gratuitous violence. Franco never forgave him and plotted his execution in 1936. See **Raguer, Hilari, *El general Batet. Franco contra Batet: crónica de una venganza***.

⁷⁵ Impunity was the hallmark of the entire campaign. Preston, Paul, *The politics of revenge: fascism and the military in twentieth-century Spain*, pages 112-13.

⁷⁶ Gonzalo Soto, Julio, *Esbozo de una síntesis del ideario de Mola en relación con el Movimiento Nacional*, page 53.

⁷⁷ As Pemán put it at the microphones of Radio Jerez on 24 July: “enemigo interior de la Patria”. Pemán y Pemartín, José María, *Arengas y Crónicas de Guerra*, page 12.

unwanted meeting in Pamplona in the *Comandancia de Carabineros*, with the flamboyant Inspector-General of Border Guards (*Carabineros*), General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano.

After much pressure and calling in of favours, and thanks to a reference from the Barcelona branch of UME, General Queipo managed to schedule a meeting with Mola for April.⁷⁸ To Mola's astonishment, Queipo, a known Republican who had conspired incessantly against King Alfonso XIII, now offered his services to the *Director*. Mola remained impenetrable, possibly fearing a trap. According to Maíz: "En estos últimos días, la relación entre el General Mola con el General Queipo de Llano no dejaba ver claridad en cuanto a confianza. Y no creo que la desconfianza naciese por parte del General Queipo."⁷⁹ In his usual forceful manner, Queipo attempted to extract information from the *Director*, but it was not until their second meeting that Mola first disclosed his plans; a sensible option, given Queipo's track-record of ever-shifting loyalties. Furthermore, relations between both men were strained ever since Mola occupied the post of *Director-General de Seguridad* during the Monarchy of Alfonso XIII and Queipo presided over a Military Committee entrusted with organising a Republican coup that resulted in a monumental fiasco (the 1930 *Cuatro Vientos* affair in Madrid).⁸⁰ This was but one of many feuds that General Queipo de Llano maintained with fellow high-ranking officers.

When both generals met for the second time (1-2 June), Mola had already given much thought to the sincerity of Queipo's proposal to join the conspiracy (Colonel Francisco García Escámez was also present at the meeting). The *Director* proposed to Queipo de Llano that he lead the coup in Seville. This conflicts with General Queipo's personal testimony, in which he presented Mola as an insecure and defeatist leader, only willing to pursue the conspiracy should the *Carabineros* leader obtain the adhesion of Republican General Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer (leader of the V Division, based in Zaragoza). In addition, General Queipo also claimed that he

⁷⁸ Cardona, Gabriel, *El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la Guerra Civil*, page 235.

⁷⁹ Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 100. Queipo later wrote to Arrarás presenting his version of the meeting: "Yo insistía [...] en establecer contacto por todos los recursos con mis camaradas de armas; pero notaba en sus actitudes un cierto desvío, una atmósfera de recelo. En abril tuve informes de que Mola urdía un complot en Navarra, y me fui a Pamplona (15 de abril), pretextando una inspección oficial impuesta por mi cargo." Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la segunda república española*, vol. 4, page 299.

⁸⁰ Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *El movimiento reivindicativo de Cuatro Vientos*, pages 21-22; Maíz, B. Félix, *Mola, aquel hombre: diario de la conspiración, 1936*, pages 79-81; Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, pages 101-102; Cardona, Gabriel, *El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la Guerra Civil*, page 108; Quevedo y Queipo de Llano, Ana, *Queipo de Llano. Gloria e infiernos de un general*, page 253.

had travelled around 25,000 km during the spring/summer of 1936 after being ordered by General Fanjul to liaise with the subversive network in Andalucía.⁸¹ In reality, Fanjul and Mola did not select Queipo because of his endurance to long journeys, but rather because of his military position as Inspector-General of Border Guards, which allowed him to travel unsuspected around Spain. Furthermore, Queipo's vast network of contacts (he befriended many loyalist officers during his Republican days), represented a new window of opportunity for the conspirators' proselytising efforts at targeting high-ranking officers.⁸² Mola had in mind not only Cabanellas, but also General Villa-Abrille (leader of the II Division, based in Seville). However, Queipo's incorporation into the conspiracy was problematic, not least because of his political notoriety. Indeed, when the *Carabineros* leader visited Cádiz, he received a cold greeting from General Varela. General López-Pinto was more agreeable. He had recently arrived in Cádiz after being transferred away from Cartagena due to his conflictive relationship with the local Popular Front administration and his commitment to the rebellion was beyond doubt. However, Queipo's visit was of little consequence: López-Pinto had already pledged his allegiance to the conspiracy to Major Cuesta and Captain Escribano. General Queipo also visited Córdoba, where the local Military Commander (*Comandante Militar de la Plaza*), Colonel Ciriaco Cascajo, enthusiastically embraced the insurrectionary cause. In Málaga, both Generals Patxot and Llanos agreed to take up arms against the regime but feared the loyalist inclinations of the local garrison. In Seville, all military leaders, with the exception of Colonel Santos Rodríguez Cerezo of the Artillery Corps, refused to meet with the Inspector-General of Border Guards. Lastly, and to Queipo's chagrin, the leader of the II Division, General Villa-Abrille, declined his offer to join the conspiracy.⁸³

⁸¹ **Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia** (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, Legajo 11-8923, *Gonzalo Queipo de Llano "Relación jurada de servicios prestados"* (31 May 1940): Queipo later claimed that he was "el iniciador de movimiento salvador", since he persuaded Mola to continue directing the conspiracy and convinced Cabanellas to throw his lot with the rebels. See also: Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, **General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia**, page 84; Maíz, B. Félix, **Mola, aquel hombre: diario de la conspiración, 1936**, pages 133-34; Arrarás, Joaquín, **Historia de la segunda república española**, vol. 4, pages 305 and 450.

⁸² "Sin embargo, Queipo sobre el papel era valioso para un Alzamiento por sus mismos antecedentes antimonárquicos. Dos acusaciones serían dirigidas contra quienes se levantarán: la de fascismo y la de monarquismo. Los militares que tuvieran antecedentes republicanos, y las organizaciones que no postulaban un sistema político monárquico, podían contribuir a que el impacto de aquellas acusaciones resultara más leve." García Venero, Maximiano, **La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla**, page 130.

⁸³ Pinto was persuaded by Cuesta and Escribano: "el General Lopez Pinto acababa de comer con su Ayudante en el Hotel de Inglaterra y se encontraba tomando café en el hall del mismo. Eran las dos y media de la tarde y acababan de salir de la División el Comandante Cuesta y Capitán Escribano, de Estado Mayor y el Capitán Jover de Artillería, en prácticas de la Escuela de Guerra. Los tres se presentaron al general. El Comandante Cuesta sabía bien, pues le había conocido en Cartagena, que el General Lopez Pinto se sentiría amargado por tanta vergüenza como ocurría en España. Al no poder

Mola vs. Queipo

On 23 June, Queipo de Llano met Mola to report on his tour of south-western Spain. An impatient Queipo complained about the lack of preparation of the Andalucian conspiratorial cells. His uncharacteristic pessimism was explicable: the emotional general yearned to lead the coup in his native province of Valladolid, a reactionary stronghold.⁸⁴ It was at this point that Mola insisted on Queipo leading the uprising in Seville, an act for which the latter would never forgive the former. However, on 23 June Queipo did not argue with Mola; rather, he simply replied: "Está bien. No lo discuto. A Sevilla."⁸⁵

According to Queipo's official biographer José Cuesta Monereo, General Mola initially acquiesced in the *Carabineros* leader's wish to lead the rebellion in Valladolid in early June only to change his mind later that month.⁸⁶ General Queipo not only claimed that he had been

poner los ojos en el General Villa-Abrille (todavía no había hecho su aparición en Sevilla en General Queipo) aquellos tres Jefes y Oficiales, que representaban en suma la opinión de la Oficialidad digna y decente, cansada de tanto oprobio, fijaron su mirada en el General López Pinto." **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 8; **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5352, Carpeta 1. See also: Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, **General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia**, pages 86-87; Maíz, B. Félix, **Mola, aquel hombre: diario de la conspiración, 1936**, pages 134-36 and 225-28.

⁸⁴ Queipo wanted to rise Valladolid for sentimental reasons: "Era su tierra natal". García Venero, Maximiano, **Madrid, Julio 1936**, page 302.

⁸⁵ Maíz, B. Félix, **Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración**, page 192. This this contrasts with Queipo's version of events presented in Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, **General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia**, page 84. See also: Maíz, B. Félix, **Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración**, pages 232-33: "Sevilla, mal. Ni siquiera entre «Pinto y Valdemoro». Perdida completamente la esperanza en una posible decisión hacia nuestro lado de los Generales Villa-Abrille y López Viota, los dos con mando.

En el aeródromo, sitio muy trabajado por la conspiración, las dificultades crecen por la posición cada día más «roja» de los mandos de Esteve y Rexach.

Sin embargo, la postura de los Capitanes Carrillo, Aguilera y Vara del Rey es formidable. Asimismo contamos con los Comandantes Núñez y Figueroa, y con los Capitanes de Estado Mayor Fuster y Pumariño.

Un buen grupo de Oficiales también secundan con todo espíritu nuestros planes, como son Fernández de Córdoba, Correther, Parlade, Lapatra, Rodríguez Trasella, Fuentes, etcétera, etc., y Redondo.

Pepe Algabeño es el enlace civil de la región.

¡Vaya papeleta la del General Queipo de Llano! Sin embargo, su Ayudante, Comandante César López Guerrero, en su última visita al General Mola, ha dado las impresiones optimistas de su General respecto al logro de sus deseos para hacerse cargo de la situación en Sevilla, CONTRA VIENTO Y MAREA, como él dice. Un puntal firme le ayudará: el Comandante de Estado Mayor señor Cuesta."

⁸⁶ "fue grande su sorpresa cuando a los dos o tres días volvió Fanjul a verle, comunicándole "por encargo del Comité" que no se ocupase más de Valladolid, de la que se encargaría Saliquet y que él se hiciera cargo de sublevar Andalucía." Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, **General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia**, page 87. See also: Maíz, B. Félix, **Mola, aquel hombre: diario de la conspiración, 1936**, pages 199-201.

initially posted to Valladolid, but also provided a profoundly-narcissistic account of the entire affair: “Galarza me contestó con los que Dios me diese a entender; pero que el comité juzgaba que el único general capaz de sublevar a Andalucía y ponerla a nuestro favor era yo.”⁸⁷ General Queipo de Llano just came short of openly accusing the *Director* of plotting his death by posting him to Seville, when in reality Mola had rescued Queipo from the political wilderness. In truth, Queipo de Llano rewrote History for three reasons: a) cement the myth of the taking of Seville⁸⁸, b) claim a central role in the conspiracy, and lastly, c) settle old scores with General Mola.

What Queipo ‘forgot’ to mention in his memoirs was that his reputation was at such a low point in early 1936 that he had become the object of ridicule among his fellow officers. His extravagant behaviour did little to improve his standing. Immediately after earning Mola’s trust, the *Carabineros* leader decided to embark on a proselytising tour of northern Spain that astonished his colleagues. Queipo not only decided to embark on this venture on his own initiative (without even consulting Mola), but he also did it in his usually exuberant style, which did not bode well for a plot that was supposed to be secret. Needless to say, all officers rejected the general’s proposal that they join the conspiracy. Queipo later claimed that he had been the victim of a “campaña calumniosa.”⁸⁹ General Mola tried to minimise the damage by ordering Manuel Hedilla to follow Queipo and reassure the unsettled garrisons of the subversive commitment of the *Carabineros* leader:

“Recayó en Hedilla otra misión, más delicada y significativa. El general don Gonzalo Queipo de Llano participaba en el Alzamiento. Se ofreció con su característica vehemencia e impulsado por ésta, antes de que se le dieran tarea y puesto concretos, se dedicó a hacer propaganda por su cuenta, lo cual no dejaba de suscitar riesgos. Por otra parte, los oficiales jóvenes y algunos jefes que conocían, sobradamente, la actitud de Queipo en los años anteriores, no parecían dispuestos a escucharle y mucho menos a creerle. El general había conspirado contra la Dictadura; se sublevó, sin ninguna forma, en Madrid el mes de diciembre de 1930; más tarde fue jefe de la Casa Militar del presidente de la República [...] Su inesperada decisión de alzarse contra el mismo régimen que él había servido, podía promover sospechas.[...] Hedilla recibió el encargo de visitar las guarniciones por las que pasaba Queipo, en su viaje por el norte de

⁸⁷ **Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia** (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, Legajo 11-8923, *Gonzalo Queipo de Llano “Relación jurada de servicios prestados”* (31 May 1940).

⁸⁸ See Chapter II and III.

⁸⁹ **Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia** (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, Legajo 11-8923, *Gonzalo Queipo de Llano “Relación jurada de servicios prestados”* (31 May 1940).

España; tenía que informar a los enlaces militares de que el general estaba ya de acuerdo con Mola.”⁹⁰

General Mola was not only unimpressed with Queipo’s tour of northern Spain, but also remained suspicious about the eccentric general’s pessimistic report on the development of the conspiracy in Andalucía. He requested a second opinion from the more reliable García Escámez.⁹¹ In the meantime, and courtesy of the indiscretions of several rebel officers (including Queipo), on 14 July the rumour broke out in Madrid that Mola had been arrested. Three days later, the Army of Africa mutinied against the Republic.⁹²

A question of violence

One of the key issues troubling Mola was the need to include as many officers as possible in the conspiracy while at the same time not leaking out any information. This was simply unattainable, given the appetite of many officers – including Queipo – for gossip and panache. One of the official historians of the Francoist regime, Manuel Aznar, exposed with disarming sincerity the conundrum faced by Mola: “Toda España sabía, con más o menos seriedad y exactitud, que determinados jefes muy prestigiosos de nuestro Ejército venía preparando un Alzamiento general, y que esos jefes mantenían estrechas conexiones con los delegados y representantes de algunos partidos políticos.”⁹³ Since “toda España” knew of the conspiracy, it is evident that the Popular Front administration was also aware of the existence of a plot to overthrow the Republic; nonetheless, the government was unaware of its extent, of its bellicosity and even of the identity of the *Director*.⁹⁴ Another consequence of General Mola’s need to accommodate multiple, often conflicting, interests in his project was a vague post-rebellion political project. On 5 June, he wrote that “Tan pronto tenga éxito el Movimiento Nacional, se constituirá un Directorio, que lo integrarán un presidente y cuatro vocales militares.” The coup’s main objectives were clearly outlined: the suspension of the 1931 Constitution, the dissolution of the *Cortes* (parliament) and its replacement by a reactionary Republican dictatorship. Mola maintained the principle of the separation of Church and State,

⁹⁰ García Venero, Maximiano, *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, page 130.

⁹¹ Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, pages 199-200.

⁹² However, Prime-Minister Casares Quiroga (Izquierda Republicana) believed Mola’s protestations of loyalty to the Republic. Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días*, page 356.

⁹³ Aznar, Manuel, *Historia militar de la guerra de España*, page 65.

⁹⁴ Indeed, Aznar also added: “Con todo – sea dicho en honor de la seriedad de los militares -, no llegaron a difundirse, y en general ni siquiera a transparentarse, los planes auténticos de la sublevación.” Ibid, pages 65-66.

a policy that infuriated the Carlists. Moreover, the Military Directorate would be headed by General Sanjurjo and civilian input restricted to an advisory role (*Consejeros técnicos*).⁹⁵ The worst fears of the political right materialised: the military had just announced its intentions to seize the state apparatus.

On 9 July, the would-be leader of the Military Directorate wrote a letter to General Mola in which he openly acknowledged the lack of a political program (“Comprendo que no desarrollo toda una política a seguir”). Still, Sanjurjo shared Mola’s belief that the army should hijack power (“El Gobierno tiene que constituirse en sentido puramente apolítico, por militares”).⁹⁶ Uncertainty over the ideological framework of rebel Spain was caused by the existence of deep rifts within the conspiratorial alliance, including disagreements over which flag to adopt (the choice being between the Republican tricolour and the monarchist bicolour). However, there was unanimity over one key topic: the need to dismantle democracy in Spain. In other words, the different rebel factions agreed on what they rejected, but failed to find common-ground on the ideological foundations of the future regime. For that reason, the rebellion was fundamentally based on negativist principles: it was anti-leftist, anti-liberal and anti-parliamentarian.

Political disunion was compensated by the outlining of a very precise *modus operandi*, clearly explained in the *Director*’s first Secret Instruction (*Instrucción Reservada nº1*), released in April: “Las circunstancias gravísimas por que atraviesa la Nación, debido a un Pacto electoral que ha tenido como consecuencia inmediata que el Gobierno sea hecho prisionero de las organizaciones revolucionarias, lleva fatalmente a España a una situación caótica, que no existe otro medio de evitar más que mediante la acción violenta.”⁹⁷

Mola optimistically put forward a 20-day deadline for sedition to explode in Spain.⁹⁸ The most important section of Mola’s First Reserved Instruction was his over-quoted but under-analysed directive:

⁹⁵ Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la segunda república española*, page 499. Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días*, page 328.

⁹⁶ Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la segunda república española*, page 499; Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días*, page 328.

⁹⁷ Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la segunda república española*, vol. 3, pages 444-45.

⁹⁸ Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, pages 57-60 and 72.

“la acción ha de ser en extremo violenta para reducir lo antes posible el enemigo, que es fuerte y bien organizado. Desde luego serán encarcelados todos los directivos de los partidos políticos, sociedades o sindicatos no afectos al movimiento, aplicándose castigos ejemplares a dichos individuos para estrangular los movimientos de rebeldía o huelgas.”⁹⁹

Put in their original context, these shocking orders gain even greater significance. By the end of April 1936, plans for a rebellion were still in embryonic stage. The scheme of action was still vague: General Mola proposed a temporary military dictatorship followed by a civilian regime whose political outlook he fails to specify. Nevertheless, he harboured few doubts concerning the need for extreme violence, euphemistically described as “exemplary punishments” (*castigos ejemplares*). Throughout the civil war, with Spain already divided between the rebel (Nationalist) and Republican factions, the Nationalist high-command would repeatedly describe the massacres perpetrated by the rebel columns *en route* to Madrid as “castigos ejemplares”.¹⁰⁰ Mola reaffirmed the rebel’s military method in his *Instrucción Reservada nº3*:

“Se tendrá en cuenta que la acción ha de ser en extremo rápida, para apoderarse lo más pronto posible de los puntos clave y reducir al enemigo, que es fuerte y bien organizado, deteniendo desde el primer momento a todos aquellos que pudieran constituir un peligro para el triunfo de nuestro movimiento, estrangulando desde primera hora, los intentos de huelga y los movimientos de rebeldía.”¹⁰¹

Yet again, Mola recognised the potency of left-wing trade-unions and stressed the need to “suffocate” brutally both strikers and all forms of “movimientos de rebeldía”. In other words, the *Director* regarded as rebels anyone who opposed the rebellion. Hence, the concept of *justicia al revés* (“reverse justice”) or as Suero Serrano put it: “monstruosidad jurídica”, one of the founding pillars of Francoism, was not developed by General Franco and his sinecures, but by Mola.¹⁰² The same goes for the *Pacto de Sangre* (Pact or Fellowship of Blood), established by the *Director* in his *Instrucción Reservada nº5* of 20 June, in which Mola abolished the concept of neutrality:

⁹⁹ Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la segunda república española*, vol. 3, pages 444-45.

¹⁰⁰ See Chapter IV.

¹⁰¹ Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 275.

¹⁰² Suero Serrano, Luciano, *Memorias de un campesino andaluz en la Revolución Española*, page 130.

“Ha de advertirse a los tímidos y vacilantes que aquel que no está con nosotros, está contra nosotros, y que como enemigo será tratado. Para los compañeros que no sean compañeros, el movimiento triunfante será inexorable.”¹⁰³

The *modus operandi* of the rebellion was clear: extreme violence to paralyse the enemy, followed by the extermination of the political left. On 24 June, the *Director* released his instructions for Morocco. He was crystal-clear regarding the strategic use of violence: “El movimiento ha de ser simultáneo en todas las guarniciones comprometidas; y, desde luego, de una gran violencia. Las vacilaciones no conducen más que al fracaso.”¹⁰⁴ For the *Africanistas*, the rebellion was to be modelled on the Moroccan war: a fight to the death with complete disregard for human life. Confirmation of this came during the *Director’s* emotional goodbye to his younger brother – Ramón Mola -, which took place a mere two days (15 July) before the outbreak of rebellion. Mola told his sibling: “Esta noche, en el rápido, vuelve a tu puesto, Ramón. No dudo que sabrás defenderlo hasta morir, como un caballero.”¹⁰⁵ Infantry Captain Ramón Mola was posted in Barcelona, a Republican bastion.¹⁰⁶ He committed suicide when the rising failed and General Emilio Mola reacted to his brother’s death with typical *Africanista* brutality, an obsessive desire for revenge revealed by his advocacy of a level of violence never seen before in Spain.¹⁰⁷

Absolute belief in the impossibility of reaching a political *modus vivendi* in Spain was accepted as axiomatic by the *Africanistas*. For instance, on 25 July 1936 Queipo ridiculed a hypothetical offer from Azaña to end all hostilities and form a centre-right government with General Mola as Minister of War.¹⁰⁸ A few days later (31 July), General Mola declared during a radio speech at the microphones of *Radio Castilla*:

¹⁰³ Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 155-56.

¹⁰⁴ Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días*, page 305.

¹⁰⁵ Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 232.

¹⁰⁶ Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días*, page 435.

¹⁰⁷ “Una guerra de esta naturaleza ha de acabar por el dominio de uno de los bandos, y por el exterminio absoluto y total del vencido. A mí me han matado un hermano, pero me lo van a pagar.” Gibson, Ian, *Queipo de Llano: Sevilla, verano de 1936*, page 80.

¹⁰⁸ *ABC* (Seville), 26 July 1936. See also: Martínez Barrio, Diego, *Memorias*, page 304. For a biography of the leader of *Unión Republicana* (the most influential politician in Republican Seville) see: Álvarez Rey, Leandro, *Diego Martínez Barrio: palabra de republicano*.

“Yo podría aprovechar nuestras circunstancias favorable para ofrecer una transacción a los enemigos; pero no quiero. Quiero derrotarlos para imponerles mi voluntad y para aniquilarlos”.¹⁰⁹

Mola vs. Fal Conde

The greatest thorn in Mola’s side was – ironically - the *Comunión Tradicionalista*, a group that was as keen to destroy the Popular Front government as the *Director*. Mola confided to Maíz that striking a deal with the political parties “Es la gran dificultad.”¹¹⁰ To the *Director*’s chagrin, both the Falange and the Carlists were initially adamant to pursue their own subversive agendas and negotiations with the Traditionalists proved particularly testing to Mola’s patience. The first meeting with Fal Conde did not occur until very late into the conspiracy, on 15 June, at the Monastery of Irache. Predictably, both men failed to reach an agreement. According to the testimony of the *Delegado Nacional de Requetés*, José Luis Zamanillo, a heated argument erupted over the question of the flag. Fal Conde demanded the use of the Monarchist bicolour whereas Mola wanted to keep the Republican tricolour. A storm had been gathering ever since the Carlist leader presented, via an envoy, a list of unreasonable demands to the *Director* on 11 June. At Irache, Fal Conde replied icily to Mola’s refusal to accede to his requests: “Mire usted, general; a nosotros nos siguen los carlistas porque sostenemos tres o cuatro principios esenciales. De lo contrario, no dejarán solos. Si usted quiere, nos pronunciamos usted y yo, pero nos quedaremos solos.”¹¹¹ Mola remained silent during the entire return journey to Pamplona and succumbed to a bout of depression during the following days, considered abandoning the leadership of the rebellion and even contemplated suicide.¹¹² It was precisely at this time that Queipo met Mola to deliver his negative report on Andalucía. Hence, the *Carabineros* leader subsequently manipulated a temporary state of affairs – the Mola vs. Fal Conde standoff – to magnify his marginal role in the conspiracy.¹¹³

¹⁰⁹ Gonzalo Soto, Julio, *Esbozo de una síntesis del ideario de Mola en relación con el Movimiento Nacional*, pages 31-32.

¹¹⁰ Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 98.

¹¹¹ García Venero, Maximiano, *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, page 129.

¹¹² Ibid, page 130; Del Burgo, Jaime, *Conspiración y guerra civil*, pages 532-35 and 538-39; Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 150.

¹¹³ Lizarza Iribarren, Antonio de, *Memorias de la conspiración (1931-1936)*, pages 110-42. Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 151. Maíz wrote that “Probablemente la conversación de Mola con Fal Conde ha dejado cabos sin atar.” See also pages 207-08.

The sagacious Fal Conde was acutely aware that the military potential of the *Requeté*, which had gone as far as assembling its own bomb factories in Navarre, provided him with exceptional leverage power during negotiations.¹¹⁴ To make matters worse, Mola was a public relations disaster. His blunt rejection of the offer of Don Juan de Borbón (the heir to the Spanish throne) to fight on the rebel side epitomised his proverbial lack of tact. Don Juan was so enthusiastic about the rebellion that he abandoned his exile in Cannes and headed for Spain on 31 July - the very same day that his wife gave birth to the Infanta Pilar. Upon entering the rebel zone, he was unceremoniously escorted back to the French border on Mola's orders. The Alfonsine Monarchists were not amused.¹¹⁵

Incapable of bridging his differences with Fal Conde, Mola decided to appeal directly to the would-be rebel head of state, General Sanjurjo, for mediation. The *Director*'s choleric reaction to Sanjurjo's reply (11 July), provoked the breakdown of negotiations with the Traditionalists and, a mere three days before the outbreak of the rebellion, "Las relaciones entre el General Mola y la Jefatura superior del Partido Tradicionalista están en punto muerto."¹¹⁶ The uncompromising Mola was exasperated by Sanjurjo's Solomon-like decision to allow the Carlists to use the bicolour flag, while the army would keep the Republican tricolour. The *Director* claimed that the letter was a forgery, an accusation that deeply offended the Traditionalist leadership. Luckily for Mola, he could count on the radicalism of the Carlist Navarrese *Junta*, now entering on a direct collision course with Fal Conde. Shortly after reading Sanjurjo's reply, the Carlist leader entered into a heated argument with the Inspector-General of the *Requeté*, retired Lieutenant-Colonel Ricardo Rada, who was eager to join the rebellion. Fal Conde skilfully cut short a sterile discussion by claiming that he could not take a definite decision without consulting first with the Carlist regent to the throne, Prince Javier de Borbón-Parma. Rada's explosive reaction was to be expected: he was an *Africanista* who had served in the Foreign Legion during the Rif campaign.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁴ García Venero, Maximiano, *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, pages 163-64.

¹¹⁵ Manuel Hedilla described Mola's orders as "secas y estreitas, pero paternales". *Ibid*, page 221.

¹¹⁶ Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 278. For the protracted negotiations between Mola and Fal Conde see also: Lizarza Iribarren, Antonio de, *Memorias de la conspiración (1931-1936)*. The man entrusted with delivering Sanjurjo's reply was Antonio Lizarza Iribarren, *Delegado Regional del Requeté*. On 9 July, the *Requeté* leader left the upscale seaside resort of Estoril (Portugal), where General Sanjurjo was exiled.

¹¹⁷ Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, pages 252-56.

The warmongering predisposition of the Navarrese *Junta* pushed Manuel Fal Conde to the verge of a nervous breakdown. Already on 2 July, Carlist militant Esteban Ezcurra told Jaime Del Burgo “-Si no convencemos mañana al general saco las bombas yo solo.”¹¹⁸ Fal Conde was eventually overruled by the Navarrese *Junta*, no longer in the mood for restraint, which sided with the *Director* in exchange for minimal political concessions.¹¹⁹ The Carlist leader was also pressured by Gil Robles. On 16 July, Fal Conde informed Mola that he had received the visit of the CEDA leader, who urged him to strike a deal with the *Director*.¹²⁰ Increasingly isolated and fearing a schism, Fal Conde succumbed to pressure and signed a pact with General Mola.

A divided Left

While the political right conspired, the left was consumed by Byzantine internal rivalries. The most destructive feud pitted Largo Caballero against Indalecio Prieto for the control of the Socialist Party (PSOE). Prieto was a passionate advocate of cooperation with the Republican left in the hope of forming a solid democratic structure in Spain; whereas Caballero proposed a revolution *sine die* along populist lines. The UGT leader suffered a minor humiliation when his bluff was called by a genuinely extremist movement, the CNT. During its May 1936 Congress in Zaragoza, the CNT proposed a conditional revolutionary pact to Caballero that included a full rejection of parliamentarism. As expected, the UGT leader declined the offer; nevertheless, Caballero’s irresponsible rhetoric sowed panic among the political right. Ultimately, Largo Caballero’s puerile recklessness did irreparable damage not only to the Republic, but also to his own party. At the same time as Mola perfected the final details of his master plan, Caballero felt so overconfident about the combative power of the leftist trade-unions that he

¹¹⁸ Del Burgo, Jaime, *Conspiración y guerra civil*, page 537.

¹¹⁹ A native of Higuera de la Sierra (Huelva), Fal Conde never managed to earn the full respect of the Navarrese *Junta*, in particular of its leader, the Count of Rodezno. On 9 July, the Count of Rodezno met with General Mola and pledged the Navarrese *Requeté* to the rebellion. In exchange, all the *Junta* demanded was, besides the right to use the bicolour flag, that all town halls in Navarre were administered by the Carlist Party. Mola accepted. The Count of Rodezno then sent on 12 July a diplomatic mission to Saint-Jean-de-Luz to blackmail both Javier de Borbón-Parma and Fal Conde into ratifying the deal. Javier de Borbón-Parma was sanguine enough to devise a clever subterfuge: he told the impatient Navarrese envoys that he had to consult first with the Carlist pretender to the Spanish throne, the elderly Alfonso Carlos de Borbón y Austria-Este (who resided in Viena). However, Fal Conde was tormented by the possibility of an internal split within Carlism and eventually succumbed to pressure. On 15 July, he accepted to sign a pact with Mola should the *Director* recognise the validity of Sanjurjo’s letter of 9 July. Mola complied. Del Burgo, Jaime, *Conspiración y guerra civil*, pages 523-59; Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, pages 279-84.

¹²⁰ Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días*, page 353.

headed a UGT representation to the Congress of the International Federation of Trade Unions in London. Caballero did not return to Spain until the eve of the rebellion (16 July).¹²¹

The nadir of the intestine struggle destroying the PSOE occurred in May 1936, during a Socialist rally held at Écija's bullring (Seville) that Prieto was scheduled to address. A crowd of Caballero supporters (*Caballeristas*) disrupted the event, which degenerated into a mass brawl. Shots were fired as the PSOE leader fled the scene under a hail of "pedradas y botellazos". The obese PSOE leader managed miraculously to squeeze himself between two bodyguards in the backseat of a car. A policeman was stabbed in the head. Prieto later described the entire affair as a "cacería" and a "brutal agresión".¹²² This was the second time that the PSOE leader had defied physics: in 1934 he fled Spain in the boot of a Renault. In the end, Indalecio Prieto might have escaped unhurt, but his party did not. When Largo Caballero threatened to veto Prieto's ascension to the premiership that same month, the latter refused to challenge the UGT leader. Party Secretary Juan-Simeón Vidarte repeatedly urged Prieto to call Caballero's bluff, but his exhausted mentor dismissed his request violently: "Que se vaya Caballero a la mierda."¹²³

The Caballero-Prieto rivalry was only matched by Manuel Azaña's acerbic relationship with Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, Prime-Minister and President respectively. In May, Azaña carefully plotted both the impeachment of Alcalá-Zamora and his own ascension to the presidency. General Queipo de Llano was with Alcalá-Zamora on the night of his impeachment (10 May).¹²⁴ Azaña's ultimate goal was to persuade Prieto to take over the premiership in order to create a strong Republican-Socialist coalition that would bring about much-needed structural reform to Spain. However, the Azaña's timing could not have been worse. On 16 May, Largo Caballero was elected president of the PSOE parliamentary minority and blocked his nemesis' rise to

¹²¹ See **ABC** (Seville), 2 and 3 July 1936. On 3 July, *ABC* reported on "La ruptura de los socialistas, cada vez más ancha y más agria." For the Prieto-Caballero feud see: Preston, Paul, ***The coming of Spanish Civil War: reform, reaction and revolution in the Second Republic***, pages 268-76; Graham, Helen, ***The Spanish Republic at war, 1936-1939***, pages 43-57. For a short biography of Prieto see: Preston, Paul, ***Comrades! Portraits from the Spanish Civil War***, pages 235-275. For the Socialist Party in Seville during the II Republic see: Álvarez Rey, Leandro (editor), ***Los socialistas en Sevilla duranta la Segunda República***.

¹²² **ABC** (Madrid) 2 June 1936.

¹²³ Alcalá-Zamora y Torres, Niceto, ***Memorias***, page 299; Graham, Helen, ***Socialism and War: The Spanish Socialist Party in Power and Crisis, 1936-1939***, pages 62-77; Heywood, Paul, ***Marxism and the Failure of Organised Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936***, pages 174-76.

¹²⁴ Arrarás, Joaquín, ***Historia de la segunda república española***, vol. 4, page 109.

power. Azaña was forced to improvise. He invited the seriously ill Santiago Casares Quiroga (*Izquierda Republicana*) to assume the post of Prime-Minister, which he did on 19 May.¹²⁵

The political agony of Santiago Casares Quiroga

Following the outbreak of the 17-18 July coup, Casares Quiroga was ridiculed and vilified in equal measure by the political left. The leader of the Communist Party (PCE) Dolores Ibarrurí labelled his tenure as Prime-Minister as “una prueba de la inconsciencia e irresponsabilidad de los dirigentes de la República.”¹²⁶ Also, the Socialist Deputy and prominent *Priestista* Julián Zugazagoitia dedicated three chapters of his monumental *Guerra y vicisitudes de los españoles* to the character assassination of Casares Quiroga: “Para los que buscaban ser justos con él era un frívolo que había disimulado, con bromas y chanzas, la debilidad de su carácter, merecedor, en un Estado de exigencias elementales, de un castigo ejemplar” ... “Aquel Ministerio [...] es una casa de locos, y el más furioso de todos es el ministro. No duerme, no come. Grita y vocifera como un poseído. Su aspecto da miedo, y no me sorprendería que en uno de los muchos accesos de furor se cayese muerto con el rostro crispado por una última rabia no manifestada. No quiere oír nada en relación con el armamento del pueblo y ha dicho, en los términos más enérgicos, que quien se propase a armarlo por su cuenta será fusilado”.¹²⁷

Casares himself, his body undermined by tuberculosis, had not relished the task set before him. He however could never refuse a request coming from his party's leader: his admiration for Azaña bordered on the obsessive.¹²⁸ The volatility described by Zugazagoitia was visible in the fact that he repeatedly denounced those plotting against the Republic, declaring that “contra el fascismo el Gobierno es beligerante”, yet doing little to restrain the plotters.¹²⁹ The Prime-Minister made repeated and vain invitations for the extreme-left to embrace democracy. Casares Quiroga warned the parliamentary parties that he would remain in power only for as long as he enjoyed the full backing of the Popular Front coalition. Lastly, the Prime-

¹²⁵ Preston, Paul, *The coming of Spanish Civil War: reform, reaction and revolution in the Second Republic*, page 251-54 and 263-65.

¹²⁶ Ibarrurí, Dolores, *El único camino*, page 253. Ibarrurí lambasted Quiroga for refusing to hand weapons to workers: “Una representación del Frente Popular fue a pedir al Gobierno que armase a las milicias obreras para defender la República. Casares Quiroga afirmó que no lo creía conveniente, porque el Gobierno era lo suficientemente fuerte para dominar la situación”, page 254.

¹²⁷ Zugazagoitia, Julián, *Guerra y vicisitudes de los españoles*, vol. 1, pages 38-65, especially pages 57-8.

¹²⁸ In his first parliamentary speech after assuming the premiership, Casares Quiroga declared: “Llego a este cargo sin solicitarlo, sin ambicionarlo, sin apetecerlo siquiera, y aceptándolo solo porque me doy cuenta de que éstos son momentos en que ejercer el Poder es hacer un sacrificio, y cuando a mí se me ha requerido en cualquier ocasión para hacer un sacrificio por la República no lo he dudado jamás.” Casares Quiroga, Santiago (edited by Grandío Seoane, Emilio), *Discursos políticos (1931-1936)*, page 257. For his admiration of Azaña see page 260.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, page 263.

Minister also ridiculed the solutions to the law and order issue proposed by both Gil Robles and Calvo Sotelo: “es que esto iba a corregirse en dos días y a testarazos?”¹³⁰

Casares Quiroga’s comments were inevitably ignored by the conspirators. Still, the Prime-Minister attempted to forestall the rebellion by extending an olive branch to the army. This conciliatory approach alienated most of his political allies, including Indalecio Prieto, who paid constant visits to the Prime-Minister to alert him about the impending military coup. The inexperienced Casares Quiroga genuinely believed that he could placate the aggressive *Africanistas*. For instance, he told parliament on 16 June that the military would not rise “mientras esté yo al frente de él.”¹³¹ However, both the political left and the *Africanistas* perceived Casares Quiroga’s appeasing policy as a sign of weakness. When on 12 June the Prime-Minister was confronted with irrefutable evidence that Colonel Yagüe was conspiring against the Republic, he summoned the *Africanista* to Madrid, dismissed him from the command of the *Segunda Legión*, and offered a transfer to a desirable post in mainland Spain or as a military *attaché* abroad. Rather than feeling relieved at escaping a court-martial, Yagüe told Quiroga that he could never leave the Legion and would rather burn his uniform than accept a transfer. The Prime-Minister yielded and returned Yagüe to his post. Last but not least, Casares Quiroga brushed aside rumours that General Queipo de Llano was involved in a plot against the Republic by dismissing him as an “imbécil.”¹³²

Ultimately, the intolerable pressure faced by the Popular Front alliance led to the straining of both personal and political relations. The most notable disagreement occurred between Casares Quiroga and Indalecio Prieto whose constant warnings about an imminent military coup irritated the Prime-Minister. In a moment of exasperation, Casares Quiroga told the PSOE leader that his anxiety was the “producto de la menopausia”. Prieto exploded. Deeply offended by the perceived insult to his manhood, the PSOE leader would not speak with the Prime-Minister again until after the outbreak of the rebellion.¹³³

¹³⁰ Ibid, page 271. See also pages 255-71.

¹³¹ Ibid, page 270.

¹³² Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 153; Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. 2, page 523. For Casares Quiroga’s opinion on Queipo see: Cabanellas, Guillermo, *Cuatro Generales*, vol. 1, page 422.

¹³³ On 7 April 1949, Prieto still recalled with visible anger the “menopausal” episode: “Notaba yo el enojo que le producían mis advertencias, pero me sentía obligado a soportarlo. Sólo les puse término una tarde, cuando, en el despacho de ministros del Congreso, el presidente del Consejo, no pudiendo contener su enfado, me dijo con desabrimiento: “Deje de fastidiarme. Lo que usted se imagina es

A birth

Unfortunately for Casares Quiroga, the main threat to the Republic was not Prieto's 'menopause', but a 'birth'. On 16 July the *Director*, now adopting the *nom de plume* of "Juan", passed a coded message to General Goded: "El pasado día 15 dió a luz Elena un hermoso niño, a las cuatro de la madrugada." It meant that the rebellion was scheduled to initiate at 4:00am of 19 July.¹³⁴

Two days before the expected 'delivery', 17 July, the impatient *Africanistas* rose up in arms against the government in Spanish Morocco and initiated the interior colonisation of Spain. On the projected date of 19 July, General Mola rebelled in Pamplona. The usually composed *Director* was overwhelmed with joy.¹³⁵ That same day, General Franco landed in Morocco to assume command of his beloved Army of Africa, while the unpredictable Goded flew to his defeat and eventual death in Barcelona. The following day (20 July), a small aircraft transporting the would-be leader of the rebellion, General Sanjurjo, crashed during take-off at a rocky inlet named A Boca do Inferno ("The Mouth of Hell") in Cascais (Portugal), where Sanjurjo's body was carbonised after the plane caught fire.¹³⁶ Lastly, Seville also witnessed a birth on 18 July 1936: that of a legend named General Queipo de Llano.

producto de la menopausia." No volví a visitarle hasta el 17 de julio, iniciada ya en Marruecos la sublevación." Prieto, Indalecio, *Convulsiones de España: pequeños detalles de grandes sucesos*, vol. 1, page 163. Prieto mentioned again the incident on 25 July 1956: "La incredulidad llegó al extremo de considerar que mis anuncios tenían origen menopáusico – así me lo dijo con crudeza el presidente del Consejo de ministros", pages 182-83. See also page 186: "Fui al palacio de Buenavista para examinar la situación con Santiago Casares Quiroga, jefe del Gobierno y ministro de la Guerra. Yo le profesaba gran cariño, pero, para no enojarle ni enojarme, procuré no sostener conversaciones con él desde que me echó con cajas destempladas al decir que mis temores sobre un sublevamiento era producto de la menopausia."

¹³⁴ Goded, Manuel, *Un "faccioso" cien por cien*, page 34.

¹³⁵ Escobar, José Ignacio, *Así empezó*, page 49. Escobar told the *Director*: "-Mi general, sigue sin salirle mal ninguna operación de guerra". General Mola, "jubiloso como un chiquillo", shouted back: "- Nunca, nunca"

¹³⁶ For Sanjurjo's death see: *O Século* (Lisboa) 21, 22 and 23 July 1936.

Chapter II

Constructing the myth: General Queipo de Llano and the conspiracy in Seville (February-July 1936)

Introduction

From 18 July 1936 onwards, the history of Seville became inextricably entangled with Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra, courtesy of the legend that was constructed around the figure of the dissident general. In reality, the tale that the city was irremediably lost for the rebels was the brainchild of Queipo and his panegyrists. However, a contradiction emerged within the general's narcissistic discourse: on the one hand, the capital of Andalucía was certain to remain loyal to the Republic; while on the other, it was also vital for the success of the coup. Indeed, General Mola trusted Seville with the most critical assignment of the rebellion: the deployment of the Army of Africa in mainland Spain. In the gap between truth and fabrication, a myth was erected: the legend of General Queipo de Llano and his *soldaditos*.

A rebel without a cause

Queipo de Llano's rebellious temperament, as well as his infatuation with violence, manifested itself early in his life. He staged his first mutiny while still a teenager training for the priesthood. *Juez de Villa* Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sánchez and his wife Mercedes Sierra y Vázquez de Novoa hoped that their son would embrace a prestigious ecclesiastical career, especially since young Gonzalo had abandoned school prematurely. Nonetheless, the austerity of seminary life was not to Queipo de Llano's liking and he was often subjected to disciplinary action, with no tangible results.¹³⁷ Aged fourteen, he abandoned religious training in spectacular fashion, jumping the seminary wall and stoning the persecuting priests during his escape. Mercedes Sierra was devastated by her son's antics, but Gonzalo's father took the news pragmatically and concluded that his son was simply too "arrogante" to ever become a priest. The unruly adolescent was eventually admitted to the Cavalry Academy at Valladolid, but struggled whenever his intellect was put to the test. He twice failed his Physics exam, but

¹³⁷ Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, **General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia**, page 10. See also page 32: "Su natural rebelde se manifiesta constantemente y los castigos le abruman y exasperan."

luckily for him there was a shortage of Cavalry officers in the colony of Cuba.¹³⁸ Hence, the one lesson that Queipo absorbed during his time as a cadet was that all shortcomings could be compensated with aggression, or what his first biography euphemistically termed “raza”.¹³⁹ This was a concept that he put into practice until the very end of his life. On 24 October 1948, aged 73, Queipo wrote a violent letter to Franco’s brother-in-law, Ramón Serrano Súñer:

“Cuando hablamos de las víboras, en general, lo hacemos con indiferencia y repugnancia; pero, si nos encontramos frente a una de éstas, sentimos, instintivamente, el deseo de aplastarla. Por eso ha sido una suerte que este diálogo se haya desarrollado por escrito, porque, frente a Vd., el instinto me hubiera impelido a pretender aplastarlo.”¹⁴⁰

Formative and confirmative years: Cuba and Morocco

Queipo de Llano found himself embroiled in controversy even before setting foot in Cuba, on 26 May 1896. During the boat journey to the Caribbean island, the recently-graduated Lieutenant was taunted by a fellow officer about his well-known aversion to study. Queipo did not hesitate to respond: “El rostro del chistoso probó la fortaleza de los puños de Queipo. Total, una ceja partida. La intervención de los compañeros evitó que la cosa pasara a mayores.”¹⁴¹ Once in Cuba and following a heavy-drinking session, he again became violent and threw a fellow passenger out of his horse-carriage while at full speed. Believing that his victim was dead, Queipo went into hiding as an infuriated crowd attempted to exact revenge. While on duty, the fiery Lieutenant showed a penchant for antiquated and bloody cavalry charges. This married perfectly with the Spanish army’s veneration of its medieval heritage. As a result, Queipo amassed war decorations, compensating for his intellectual limitations in the process, which were constantly exposed by a chronic inability to grasp modern war tactics. As a result, the young officer developed an obsession for aggressive action as the only route to feeding his insatiable ambition. Any hiatus in military activity invariably spelled trouble for both himself and the institution he was supposed to serve. In 1898, during a lull in the Cuban war, the recently-promoted Captain decided to combat his tedium by sniping at bulls and

¹³⁸ Ibid, page 13. See also pages 11-12. The runaway teenager ended up joining the army at the tender age of fifteen (28 July 1891).

¹³⁹ “la certeza de encontrar en este singular oficial, en su alma enérgica y sencilla, en su espíritu castizo y zumbón, en su flexibilidad y valor, en su postura compleja, el «estilo» de un soldado de raza.” Armiñán Odriozola, Luis de, *Excmo. Sr. General D. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Jefe del Ejército del Sur*, page 3.

¹⁴⁰ *Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia* (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, *Queipo de Llano, Carta de 24 de octubre de 1948.*

¹⁴¹ Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 18.

almost got himself killed by one, but was saved thanks the intervention of an attentive friend. His boredom was eventually put to an abrupt end when the United States entered the Cuban conflict on 18 April 1898 and crushed the Spanish army.¹⁴²

The Cuban War of Independence held immense significance for Queipo: it represented his personal crossing of the Rubicon. It was during Queipo's sojourn in the Caribbean island that the hyperactive captain embarked on his first open act of sedition, as Spain attempted to bring the conflict to a dignified conclusion. The dissident Captain was neutralised, but the fact that his actions went unpunished spurred him on to further outbursts of violence.¹⁴³ Not even marriage, to Genoveva Martí in October 1901, mellowed Queipo's bellicose nature and when the opportunity to return to war arrived, he grabbed it with both hands. He landed in the recently-created Spanish protectorate of Morocco on 6 October 1909.¹⁴⁴

Morocco might have represented a key formative period for an entire generation of army officers (including Franco), but for Queipo de Llano it held an entirely different connotation: the Moroccan war was not formative but confirmative.¹⁴⁵ In other words, it represented the consolidation of his Cuban experience. To Queipo's jaundiced eyes, the Rif rebellion corroborated (via his amassing of war decorations) that violence was the natural conduct of an army officer. This was a feeling shared by many junior officers. For instance, even Queipo was shocked by the satisfaction with which Franco presided over the cruel beatings of Moorish soldiers punished for minor infractions.¹⁴⁶ In addition, Morocco also served to strengthen Queipo's belief that military interests stood above politics, meaning that he fervently supported the army's self-appointed role as a Praetorian force protecting Spain from both external and internal enemies. Above all, the Moroccan war also consolidated Queipo de Llano's profound narcissism, elevating it to a pathological level. He once told a war

¹⁴² Spain was entangled its third and final war (1868-70, 1879-80 and 1895-98) against locals fighting for independence. For the political and social consequences of the 1898 loss of empire see: Balfour, Sebastian, *The end of the Spanish empire, 1898-1923*; Balfour, Sebastian, "Spain and the Great Powers in the aftermath of the Disaster of 1898" in Balfour, Sebastian; Preston, Paul, *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century*. See also: Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, pages 19-23, 27 and 35.

¹⁴³ Queipo de Llano was a member of the extremist faction within the military that plotted against General Weyler after he assumed the post of Minister of War in 1905. Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, pages 28 and 95.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid, pages 37-38. His courage was also evident. For instance, he saved a drowning soldier on 8 May 1908 and was decorated for his act of bravery.

¹⁴⁵ See Preston, Paul, *Franco: a biography*, pages 16-34.

¹⁴⁶ Saínz Rodríguez, Pedro, *Testimonio y recuerdos*, page 272.

correspondent that his greatest fear was to die prematurely in the battlefield, for the sole reason that it would take away from him the opportunity of attaining military glory.¹⁴⁷ As Queipo ascended through the ranks, his ego became increasingly difficult to control. His ambition reached such unrealistic heights that he came to regard the denial of even the most insignificant of his caprices as veiled attempts aimed at sabotaging his predestined rise to fame. In the meantime, the volatile officer forced his way into military history by means of violence. In 1913, Queipo led one of the last cavalry charges in the history of the Spanish army at Alcazarquivir, a location of great symbolic significance where in 1578 the Portuguese Empire lost not only a decisive battle, but also its King Sebastião I. Queipo de Llano commanded a sable-led charge which degenerated into an “infernal” hand-to-hand combat.¹⁴⁸ Violent action only further stimulated Queipo’s craving for recognition, most notably for Spain’s greatest military honour, the *Cruz Laureada de San Fernando*, which would become a life-long obsession.¹⁴⁹

Queipism

Queipo de Llano’s infatuation with the brutal Moroccan campaign, led him to establish the *Revista de Tropas Coloniales* in January 1924. Queipo authored the first editorial, where he revealed that his entire thinking revolved around the belief that the military should function as a Praetorian force protecting Spain from itself. He indulged in a bizarre historical proposition: “Tras de haber llegado al más alto grado de su esplendor en época en que «el Sol no se ponía en sus dominios», España empezó su marcha decadente, como obedeciendo a una ley fatal que parece regir los destinos de los pueblos.”

Queipo de Llano harboured few doubts about the causes for Spain’ decline, and blamed the “legislación de legisladores”, “caciquismo”, “políticos a veces más atentos al desarrollo de intereses personales que a los de la Patria”, “elementos anárquicos” that triggered the “marcha decadente, hasta tal punto que España se encontraba al borde de un abismo de anarquía”. Simultaneously, Spain was being regenerated by “unos cuántos hombres de corazón que, arriesgándose todo, afrontaron la ardua tarea de hacer resurgir el espíritu

¹⁴⁷ Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 33.

¹⁴⁸ “se luchó con furia infernal” Ibid, page 47. See also page 46: “un grupo de moros, no muy numeroso, que fue aniquilado a sablazos”.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, pages 44-51. Queipo failed to obtain the *Laureada* but was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel in 1914 (with retroactive effect since 1913, the date of the battle of Alcazarquivir).

español”; and reserved special praise for both King Alfonso XIII and the “Directorio” headed by Miguel Primo de Rivera. Queipo clearly regarded himself as part of this selected *élite* of messianic “hombres de corazón”, even if only a few years later he would turn against both King and Dictator.¹⁵⁰

Despite actively participating in the Moroccan war, Queipo was not really a typical *Africanista*. He was old enough to have taken part in the Cuban War of Independence of 1895-98 and was therefore inextricably linked to the traumatic loss of the Spanish Empire. For this reason, he did not identify with the *Africanista* generation, too young to have fought in Cuba but old enough to be obsessed with restoring the dignity of the *Patria*. Rather, Queipo was part of a more experienced and pragmatic group of army officers that included General Cabanellas. He therefore lacked the idealistic verve of the new cohort of officers and, as his career progressed, became increasingly cynical. Queipo’s tortuous political career, from Monarchism to Republicanism to anti-Republicanism, revealed that the General had become a pragmatist focused exclusively on his own self-advancement.¹⁵¹ He was, above all, a ‘Queipist’.

The rebel finds a cause: the Republic

When in 1923 Queipo de Llano was promoted to the rank of brigadier general, his newfound status endowed him with a level of influence that could be potentially used for destructive ends. The promotion of a figure such as Queipo - intellectually inept and uncontrollably violent - exposed the structural problems affecting the army. These included an inflated officer corps supported by an inadequate promotion system and poor training at all levels. To make matters worse, General Queipo’s volatile personality started sending shockwaves across the political arena, courtesy of the symbiotic relationship between army and politics. This deadly embrace was tightened during the interwar period, a process that culminated in the temporary-turned-permanent dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera of 1923-30. Queipo de Llano clearly considered himself an equal to the dictator and the enmity between both men rapidly degenerated into open confrontation. Queipo’s damaged ego triggered a second suicidal feud with another senior military figure - General Riquelme - and the unruly general eventually

¹⁵⁰ Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, “Nuestro Propósito” in *Revista de Tropas Coloniales*, Año 1, Número 1, Ceuta, January 1924. Queipo de Llano ended his collaboration in June 1924 (nº6) after being posted away from Ceuta.

¹⁵¹ Martínez Barrio, Diego, *Memorias*, page 322.

earned himself a month-long arrest for his recurrent acts of indiscipline.¹⁵² Still, Primo de Rivera showed leniency towards his subordinate, declaring that “Queipo es enemigo de sí mismo”.¹⁵³ However, the insubordinate general perceived the dictator’s tolerance as a sign of weakness and began developing a fixation with vengeance. His definite fall from grace occurred in July 1924 under bizarre circumstances. Queipo decided to make a vulgar joke, in the form of a wordplay, associating Primo de Rivera’s political party *Unión Patriótica* (UP) with *Urinario Público* (Public Toilet) and was unceremoniously forced into premature retirement. However, Primo de Rivera was unaware of the danger posed by an idle Queipo, who became a full-time conspirator against the Monarchy of Alfonso XIII. Not even the downfall, exile and eventual death of Primo de Rivera in 1930, appeased the general. Later that same year, he published the egotistic *El General Queipo de Llano perseguido por la dictadura*, where he delivered a vitriolic attack against several fellow high-ranking army officers and accused Primo de Rivera of “suponerse elegido de Dios para salvar a España.”¹⁵⁴ In reality, Queipo was simply unable to accept authority. In 1954, General Franco told his cousin: “Yo siempre noté la poca gracia que le hacía a éste que yo mandara.”¹⁵⁵

Obsessed with vengeance, General Queipo became a key figure in the 1930 conspiracy against the Monarchy, where his deficient organisational skills were once again exposed. The general was trusted with leading the rebellion at the Cuatro Vientos military airfield in Madrid, an affair that ended in a monumental fiasco. In 1933, he would publish yet another self-exonerating book entitled *El movimiento reivindicativo de Cuatro Vientos*.¹⁵⁶ Still, both Queipo’s defeat and literary career proved to be only temporary. He fled to a short-lived exile only to be lavishly rewarded for his ‘loyalty’ less than a year later, following the proclamation of the II Republic. Queipo was promoted to the rank of Major General with retroactive effect

¹⁵² In his radio speech of 30 July 1936, General Queipo verbally assaulted General Riquelme with such violence that *ABC* was forced to censor part of his speech: “Aquí el general Queipo de Llano hace unos interesantes comentarios que ponen de manifiesto de un modo palpable la categoría moral del general Riquelme”, *ABC* (Seville), 31 July 1936. See also: *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 31 July 1936.

¹⁵³ Cabanellas, Guillermo, *Cuatro Generales*, vol. 1, page 132. Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 69: “hasta hubo un momento en que todo pudo quedar satisfactoriamente zanjado, pues en el Marqués de Estella llegó a ser ostensible una emoción propicia al arreglo. Pero Queipo no quiso doblegarse lo más mínimo, porque en su fuero interno se consideraba asistido de toda razón y derecho.” See also pages 65-66 and 71-72.

¹⁵⁴ Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *El General Queipo de Llano perseguido por la dictadura*, page 222.

¹⁵⁵ Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, *Mis Conversaciones privadas con Franco*, page 64. Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, pages 86-88.

¹⁵⁶ Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *El movimiento reivindicativo de Cuatro Vientos*.

(dating back to 31 March 1928).¹⁵⁷ The new regime regarded the general as an invaluable asset (a liberal within a largely reactionary caste), and for that same reason granted Queipo all he had ever craved for: revenge and recognition.

General Queipo was thankful to the Republic and demonstrated his gratitude through successive public, and populist, protestations of loyalty to the new regime. The general even failed to adopt adequate measures to prevent the anticlerical riots of May 1931 so to endear himself to the masses.¹⁵⁸ The most flagrant episode took place during an official ceremony to pay tribute to several individuals responsible for frustrating the *Sanjurjada*. In the middle of the event, Queipo contravened protocol and led an ovation to the mayor of Seville, González y Fernández Labandera, followed by an enthusiastic crowd. Very few high-ranking officers were reckless to the point of publicly condemning Spain's most decorated general (José Sanjurjo).¹⁵⁹ On the fourth anniversary of the *Sanjurjada* (10-11 August 1936), Labandera was executed on the orders of the now anti-Republican General Queipo de Llano.¹⁶⁰

In December 1931, Queipo was promoted yet again and appointed *Jefe del Cuarto Militar* of the President, courtesy of his close friendship with Alcalá-Zamora (Alcalá-Zamora's son married Queipo's daughter in 1935), who came to his *protégé*'s rescue whenever his incompetence was exposed.¹⁶¹ Notwithstanding, the Republic's patience was rapidly exhausted. Prime-minister Manuel Azaña was frequently taken aback by Queipo's extravagant behaviour, which he narrated in his diary with customary irony:

¹⁵⁷ Queipo became a hate figure among Monarchist army officers. Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, pages 73 and 79-80.

¹⁵⁸ Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la Segunda República Española*, vol. 1, pages 109-110.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, page 483. See also page 227: "El homenaje a la fuerzas que intervinieron en la defensa del Ministerio de la Guerra y del Palacio de Comunicaciones se celebró en la mañana del día 13 en el parque del Retiro, con asistencia del jefe de Estado y del Gobierno en pleno. Cinco guardias de Asalto, heridos durante la refriega, ocuparon lugar preferente. A su lado se situaron los dos guardias civiles que prestaban servicio en el Palacio de Comunicaciones, los guardias de Seguridad de la Comandancia de Huelva que intervinieron en la detención de Sanjurjo y cinco oficiales de Telégrafos de Sevilla, que mientras ocurrían los sucesos consiguieron mantener comunicación secreta con la Central de Madrid. El director general de Seguridad, Menéndez, fué condecorado con la Gran Orden de la República; el comandante Saravia y los capitanes Fernández Navarro y Tourné ingresaron en la misma Orden. Los guardias fueron ascendidos. El general Queipo de Llano, como jefe militar de la casa del Presidente de la República, se adelantó a la tribuna presidencial y entre grandes ovaciones presentó al público al alcalde radical de Sevilla, señor González y Fernández Labandera."

¹⁶⁰ Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *La Justicia de Queipo*, pages 59-62.

¹⁶¹ ABC (Madrid), 8 December 1931.

“De este general de dos metros comienzan a decir también que se propone hacer esto y otro; me lo dicen de la Dirección General de Seguridad. Pero yo no lo creo. Lo que hará sin duda será proferir necesidades, que las produce naturalmente. En el ejército nadie le hace caso. Y al él se debe, por su torpeza, uno de los mayores disgustos que tuvimos al comienzo de la República, cuando se decretó el cambio de mandos de la guarnición de Madrid, y él lo realizó brutalmente.”¹⁶²

According to the Prime-Minister, the Republic was willing to turn a blind eye to General Queipo’s “necesidades” and compulsive lying, which were at the root of his marginalisation within army circles. Nonetheless, Queipo’s proverbial lack of tact (“torpeza”) and his tendency to carry out orders with unnecessary violence (“brutalmente”) had been undermining the Republic ever since its inception. Still, such setbacks did not appear to dispirit the general, who went as far as declaring “yo podría ser dictador, soy el más indicado.”¹⁶³ Manuel Azaña was once more lost for words when Queipo approached him for advice on running for elections; however, what astonished the Prime-Minister most were not Queipo’s intellectual limitations, but his detachment from reality. Predictably, Queipo’s constant meddling in political affairs brought about his removal as *Jefe del Cuarto Militar* on 8 March 1933.¹⁶⁴ In September, he was appointed Director-General of Border Guards, dismissed from his post the following year and later reinstated as Inspector-General.¹⁶⁵ The position was still a senior one, with equivalent financial remuneration; however, it did not match Queipo’s ambitions. In the end, the Republic’s gravest mistake *vis-à-vis* its capricious *protégé* was to confuse opportunism with loyalism.

Queipo de Llano started looking for better options from the moment Alcalá-Zamora was impeached in April 1936.¹⁶⁶ Visibly anxious about the prospect of being dismissed from his post as Inspector-General of Border Guards, he went to see the acting President Diego Martínez Barrio and, quite gratuitously, went to great lengths to reaffirm his Republicanism, asserting that he was a “hombre de honor y republicano de la cabeza a los pies.” In late June, the

¹⁶² Azaña, Manuel, *Memorias políticas y de guerra*, vol. 1, page 609. Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la Segunda República Española*, vol. 1, pages 498-99.

¹⁶³ Azaña, Manuel, *Memorias políticas y de guerra*, vol. 1, page 20.

¹⁶⁴ ABC (Madrid), 9 March 1933: “Cesa en su cargo el jefe del Cuarto Militar del presidente de la República, general Queipo de Llano”.

¹⁶⁵ ABC (Madrid), 10 May 1934.

¹⁶⁶ Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la segunda república española*, vol. 4, page 109.

general saw no moral conflict in asking Martínez Barrio to appoint one of his nephews, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Buitrón, as a municipal judge (*juez municipal*) in Málaga on the same day he met Mola to discuss the development conspiracy.¹⁶⁷ In 1950, the capricious general contradicted himself in a letter to General Franco:

“No fui nunca antimonárquico, aunque llegué a ser enemigo irreconciliable de D. Alfonso. Yo le profesaba un cariño, una adhesión tales, que siempre estuve dispuesto a jugarme la vida en su defensa, pero correspondió a esa adhesión y a mi lealtad, con la burla más sangrienta. Después de esto, ya no tenía por qué serle leal. Entonces juré [...] que si antes me hubiera jugado la vida por defenderlo, desde entonces me la jugaría para arrojarlo del trono [...] Busqué contactos por todas partes, con toda clase de elementos y conseguí al fin ver satisfechos mis deseos [...] poco después comencé a conspirar contra la República para restaurar la monarquía.”¹⁶⁸

The rebel finds a cause, part II: the anti-Republican conspiracy in Seville

Queipo de Llano's incorporation into the conspiracy was not pacific. The general's ideological pragmatism was at the root of his turbulent relationship with the conspiratorial leadership in Andalucía. His *realpolitik* clashed with the profoundly reactionary convictions of the local subversive cells. Thus, when General Mola assigned Queipo to Seville, the *Director's* decision was greeted with anxiety on all sides. On the one hand, the General Queipo continued to pressure Mola to post him to Valladolid; while on the other hand, no conspiratorial cell was willing to accept such a volatile personality – until then a high-profile Republican – as its leader. So much so, that during his one of his visits to Seville, Queipo had to endure the humiliation of presenting a letter of recommendation written by Lieutenant-Colonel (Engineers) Alberto Álvarez-Rementería (of the *Batallón de Zapadores* nº1 Madrid and a UME member), and addressed to his brother Eduardo. After examining Queipo's credentials, Major Eduardo Álvarez-Rementería Martínez introduced the general to Major Cuesta Monereo of the *Estado Mayor*, the 'Director' of the local conspiracy. Their conference was of little consequence.¹⁶⁹ The seeds of sedition had already been planted: Mola's first envoy to

¹⁶⁷ Martínez Barrio, Diego, *Memorias*, page 322.

¹⁶⁸ Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, *Queipo de Llano, Carta de 18 de junio de 1950*.

¹⁶⁹ The local leader of the UME in Seville was Lieutenant-Colonel (Infantry) Antonio González Espinosa (*Jefe de la Caja de Recluta*), who was appointed as the first rebel President of the *Diputación Provincial*. Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla (Seville), Legajo 345 (acta de 21 de julio de 1936). For Antonio González Espinosa see also: Ortiz Villalba, Juan, *Del golpe militar a la guerra civil: Sevilla 1936*, page 53. For the Queipo-Cuesta Monereo meeting see: Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo,

Andalucía, Colonel García Escámez, had contacted Major Rementería in late April, a full month before Queipo's trip. García Escámez's subversive activities were complemented by a series of local meetings that took place in bars, restaurants, the *Casino Militar*, and even the homes of Captains Aguilera and Pérez Blázquez. Unsurprisingly, the rebel leadership assembled once again after Queipo's departure, at an up-market restaurant in the Parque María Luisa.¹⁷⁰ The prospect of having to incorporate such a capricious personality in the local conspiracy unnerved the local cell. So much so, that all military leaders, with the exception of Artillery Colonel Santos Rodríguez Cerezo, refused to meet Queipo. In any case, a shoring-up of Republican loyalty among the higher echelons of the army – what Cuesta Monereo termed the “virus marxista”¹⁷¹ – was to be expected in face of the recent military reforms enacted by the Popular Front administration. The Republic attempted to circumvent army encroachment in the political sphere by appointing loyal officers to positions of power, hopefully prescribing a political analgesic to a structural problem.¹⁷² In fact, when the rising erupted, only one out of eight Divisional Generals (Miguel Cabanellas of the V Division) sided with the rebels. For that reason, the adhesions of high-ranking officers in Cádiz, Málaga and Córdoba could only have been regarded as unexpected successes. Queipo de Llano cynically omitted this fact from his memoirs.¹⁷³

The main objective of Queipo's visit to Seville was to gain the adherence of General José Fernández Villa-Abrille y Calivara, leader of the II Division and an old *compagnon de route* from Cuba, Morocco and anti-Monarchist conspiracies. Villa-Abrille rejected Queipo's proposal but refused to denounce his friend to the Republican authorities.¹⁷⁴ Queipo de Llano's trip thus revealed two very important features of the rebellion in Andalucía: a) the general's failure to attain his primary objective – to persuade Villa-Abrille to join the insurrection (after this fiasco, Queipo would only play a peripheral role in the local conspiracy); and b) the predicament faced

José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 86. Queipo wanted Valladolid for sentimental reasons “Era su tierra natal” García Venero, Maximiano, *Madrid, Julio 1936*, page 302.

¹⁷⁰ Guzmán de Alfarache, *18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 41-42.

¹⁷¹ Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 88.

¹⁷² For military encroachment in the political sphere see: Alpert, Michael, “The Spanish army and the Popular Front” in Alexander, Martin S.; Graham, Helen (eds), *The French and Spanish Popular Fronts: Comparative Perspectives*.

¹⁷³ Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, “Cómo dominamos Sevilla” in *Estampas de la guerra, tomo 5, Frentes de Andalucía y Extremadura*.

¹⁷⁴ Guzmán de Alfarache, *18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 42; Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 86.

by the leader of the II Division, which was paradigmatic of the fortunes of newly-appointed Republican authorities, both military and civilian. When the 18 July rising erupted in Seville, Villa-Abrille had occupied his post for only five months. Republican administrators felt often isolated and intimidated by the anti-governmental fanaticism displayed by their immediate subordinates, to the point that many retreated into apathy. This was the case of General Villa-Abrille, an alien element in a city dominated by an overwhelmingly reactionary garrison. Local journalist Enrique Vila could not help but to classify the entire affair as “extraordinario”:

“en realidad era extraordinario el de militares de graduaciones superiores que conocían los manejos de la oficialidad y que la dejaban actuar ni más ni menos que si no se dieran cuenta de ello.”¹⁷⁵

General Queipo’s minuscule input in the gestation of the rebellion in Seville was an inevitable consequence of his late incorporation into the conspiracy. Firstly, the *Carabineros* commander experienced serious difficulties in acquiring Mola’s trust. Nor did Queipo help his cause when he openly expressed reservations about assuming command of the II Division. After listening to Queipo’s pessimistic report of 23 June, Mola politely brushed aside the general’s anxieties and insisted in posting him to Seville. Indeed, Queipo’s conclusions failed to make an impression on the *Director*: the following day (24 June), Mola released an *Instrucción Reservada* in which he revealed a conceptual shift from his original plan, which focused exclusively on the garrisons of the north. The *Director* created mixed military columns and decided to employ the Army of Africa (which was expected to disembark in Málaga and Algeciras) to spearhead the rebel military advance towards Madrid. According to the new plan of action, Andalucía became critical for the success of the coup.¹⁷⁶ As a preventative measure, the ever-cautious *Director* sent García Escaméz one last time to Seville and Huelva to corroborate Queipo’s report. Mola’s emissary verified the Republican loyalty of most military commanders, but also the subversive

¹⁷⁵ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 40-41.

¹⁷⁶ Maíz, Félix B., *Mola, aquel hombre: diario de la conspiración, 1936*, pages 133-36 and 225-28. Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, Legajo 11-8923, *Gonzalo Queipo de Llano “Relación jurada de servicios prestados”* (31 May 1940): Queipo presented General Mola as a defeatist leader only willing to continue directing the conspiracy should Queipo assure the adhesion of General Cabanellas. See also: Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la segunda república española*, vol. 4, page 305. Mola’s original plan focused solely on the northern garrisons and assigned a passive role to the II Division. Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. 3, page 454.

eagerness of their subordinates in the coded message: “Las niñas bien, las encargadas pésimas.”¹⁷⁷

General Queipo de Llano’s atypical pessimism stemmed largely from his aspirations to lead the uprising in his native Valladolid and his negative experience in Andalucía, where the local rebel leadership had greeted him with deep suspicion. Furthermore, Queipo could expect little sympathy from the paramilitary groups. The general’s relationship with the Falange was non-existent ever since he became involved in a fracas with José Antonio Primo de Rivera at the chic café Lyon d’Or in Madrid. A *mêlée* erupted, described by reporter Jay Allen as a “lovely fight”, after Queipo offended an elderly uncle of Primo de Rivera.¹⁷⁸ The scandal concluded with José Antonio’s expulsion from the army, where he held the rank of second lieutenant (*alférez de complemento*). It was highly unlikely that the Sevillian Falange would greet Queipo’s appointment with open arms, especially since it was controlled by Primo de Rivera’s hot-headed cousin, Sancho Dávila.¹⁷⁹ To make matters worse, retired Falangist bullfighter José García Carranza - aka Pepe el “Algabéño” - , an essential cog in the local conspiracy and Queipo’s future “ayudante civil”, remained sceptical about the general’s newfound anti-Republicanism.¹⁸⁰ Major Cuesta revealed that Queipo’s meetings with the local subversive network “aumentaron en calidad más que en número.”¹⁸¹ Indeed, General Queipo de Llano’s incorporation in the conspiracy was a tense affair resolved only by the professionalism of Cuesta Monereo.¹⁸²

Major José Cuesta Monereo

The subversive hierarchy in Seville took the form of a triumvirate formed by Major Cuesta Monereo and Captains Gutiérrez Flores and Escribano. This triumvirate, based at the Divisional

¹⁷⁷ Gil Robles, José María, *No fué posible la paz*, page 727.

¹⁷⁸ Preston, Paul, *We Saw Spain Die: Foreign Correspondents in the Spanish Civil War*, page 344.

¹⁷⁹ Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la Segunda República Española* vol. 2, page 150. Payne, Stanley G., *Fascism in Spain 1923-1977*, page 73.

¹⁸⁰ “-Queipo! A Republican, a man who had conspired against the King, who had fought José Antonio Primo de Rivera, founder of the Falange to which I had belonged since the Popular Front victory at the recent elections. What shape would the coup take under his leadership? I didn’t like the sound of it, nor did Pepe...” Fraser, Ronald, *Blood of Spain: the experience of Civil War, 1936-1939*, page 50. According to the testimony of Marcelino Pardo Maestre, Algabéño “había sido nombrado ayudante civil del general Queipo de Llano”. García Venero, Maximiano *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, page 177.

¹⁸¹ Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 88.

¹⁸² Maíz, Félix B., *Mola, aquel hombre: diario de la conspiración, 1936*, pages 199-201.

Headquarters, effectively neutralised General Villa-Abrille. Escribano was later proposed for promotion “por méritos de guerra” on the basis of his role as:

“Promotor del Glorioso Movimiento Nacional, constituye el 18 de Julio de 1,936 uno de los más firmes pilares en que se asentó el Mando para sacar adelante tan magna empresa, con el más elevado espíritu y firme resolución de vencer actúa con verdadera admiración de todos sus Jefes y subordinados resolviendo con sus oportunas intervenciones situaciones críticas y decisivas, empleándose en un principio en las calles y plazas de Sevilla con las armas en la mano.”¹⁸³

Major Rementería (UME member and President of the Falange’s *Comité Militar*) and Colonel Francisco Bohórquez Vecina (*Coronel jefe de la Auditoría de Guerra*) were other key figures in the plot, while Captain Francisco Carrillo functioned as a liaison officer linking the rebel high-command in Navarre with the local seditious cell in Seville. Artillery Major Francisco Carmona Perez de Vera revealed, in a written statement, how the *entire* garrison of Seville was mined by sedition:

“Que respondiendo al llamamiento que por iniciativa del entonces Comandante de Infantería Don Eduardo Alvarez Rementería y por conducto del Capitán de Artillería Don Juan Macías Esquivel, se le hiciera en Marzo de 1.936, para sumarse a la Oficialidad del Ejército que anhelaba el Alzamiento Nacional como único medio de salvar a la Patria de las vergüenzas pasadas, se ofreció al primer requerimiento a los de la Guarnición de Sevilla que laboraban por él, entre los que se contaban, a más de los dichos, los Capitanes de Aviación Don Modesto Aguilera y Don Alfonso Carrillo, los de Infantería Perez Blazquez, (muerto en campaña) y Fernández de Córdoba, los de Artillería Villa Baena y Puerta Tamayo, el Teniente de Ingenieros Don Carlos Jack Caruncho (muerto en campaña) y otros, que agrupados al Comandante Don Eduardo Alvarez Rementería reconocían en éste el enlace de la Guarnición de Sevilla con otros Mandos Superiores, el que asignó al que suscribe el número 4586 en la organización militar anterior al Glorioso Movimiento Nacional.”¹⁸⁴

¹⁸³ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 3, Carpeta 15.

¹⁸⁴ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 18.

Major Cuesta, the true brains behind the local conspiracy, weaved a network encompassing not only Seville, but the entire II Division and stretching even outside the army.¹⁸⁵ As early as May, Cuesta persuaded Major Garrigós of the Civil Guard (*Segundo Jefe de la Comandancia Exterior*) to join the insurgent cause. Both men met again in June and July. By then, Garrigós had already made arrangements for the mutiny of all civil guard posts in the province.¹⁸⁶ Furthermore, Majors Cuesta and Rementería met Carlist Major Redondo on almost a daily basis throughout the spring/summer of 1936.¹⁸⁷ The anti-Republican fervour of the *Comunión Tradicionalista* was underlined time and again with depressing regularity. On 20 April 1936, its sole representative in the Town Hall of Seville, Tomás García, was detained for illegal weapons trafficking after four guns and large amounts of ammunition were found concealed inside a bed in the office of Traditionalist MP Ginés Martínez Rubio at the *Círculo Tradicionalista*. The building was raided by a joint police and Assault Guard force on the orders of the Civil Governor of Seville.¹⁸⁸ A storm was gathering in the capital of Andalucía with the paramilitary organisations in its epicentre.

The organisational skills of the introvert Cuesta matched, if not surpassed, those of Mola. Cuesta Monereo drew important conclusions from the *Sanjurjada*, including the *modus operandi* and how to incorporate a capricious leader in the entire project.¹⁸⁹ Journalist Sánchez del Arco described Cuesta as the “alma de la conspiración, cuya actividad hizo prodigios, y la energía de Queipo de Llano halló magnífico cauce.”¹⁹⁰ Indeed, if Major Cuesta had managed to work alongside the disorganised Sanjurjo in 1932, he could certainly deal with the mercurial Queipo in 1936. The local *Director* left no detail to chance, including the myth of Queipo de Llano and his *soldaditos*, of which he would become the second greatest promoter,

¹⁸⁵ “el grupo del estado Mayor, que presidía el comandante Cuesta e integraban como vocales los capitanes de este mismo Cuerpo señores Gutiérrez Flores y Escribano. La labor de estos tres militares, en orden a la centralización de las actividades de todos, es sencillamente maravillosa; nos consta de una manera fehaciente, que el plan de ocupación y militarización de Sevilla, preparado para el movimiento de día 10 de Julio, abarcaba de tal manera todos los aspectos de la vida de la capital y de la provincia, que no quedaba en el mismo ni un cabo por atar; hasta los más mínimos detalles estaban previstos y resueltos.” Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 201.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, pages 141-45. See also page 143: Garrigós assured Cuesta that he controlled the Civil Guard: “- No importa lo que piensen los primeros jefes; es asunto de poca importancia.”

¹⁸⁷ Luis Redondo was also the UME representative in Seville. García Venero, Maximiano, *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, page 113.

¹⁸⁸ Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid), FC, Tribunal Supremo, Recursos, Legajo 413, Expediente nº49.

¹⁸⁹ Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *La Justicia de Queipo. Violencia selectiva y terror fascista en la II División en 1936: Sevilla, Huelva, Cádiz, Córdoba, Málaga y Badajoz*, pages 22-29.

¹⁹⁰ Sánchez del Arco, Manuel, *El sur de España en la reconquista de Madrid (diario de operaciones glosado por un testigo)*, page 27.

after the rebel general himself.¹⁹¹ Cuesta wrote over 3,000 pages of notes on the civil war in Andalucía and Extremadura, including the exact dates of the occupation of each town in the II Division and a personal memoir of the rebellion in Seville.¹⁹² He also kept tight control over events up until the very last minute: on the eve of the coup (17 July), Cuesta met Garrigós to ultimate details regarding the participation of the Civil Guard in the rebellion.¹⁹³ His leadership was beyond dispute:

“de todas las actuaciones, el capitán Aguilera daba cuenta al comandante Cuesta, porque era deseo expreso del Comité que las órdenes del alzamiento partieran en su día del Estado Mayor de la División.”¹⁹⁴

The reasons for Major Cuesta’s obsessive devotion to the conspiracy (and subsequently to the promotion of the myth of Queipo and his *soldaditos*) can be traced to traumatic events in his private life. In 1934, his eldest son José died at the tender age of nine. Later that year, his wife died of pneumonia. Cuesta was so traumatised by this double tragedy that he abandoned his house with his three remaining children. From that date onwards, “El Comandante Cuesta guardó su doble pena muy dentro de sí mismo y dedicó su vida a la familia y al Ejército.”¹⁹⁵

General Villa-Abrille

Throughout the summer of 1936, General Villa-Abrille found himself in a conundrum: he was the Divisional General in a city known for the potency of its labour movement; however, it was the right that had been rising the political temperature ever since his arrival in Seville. To make matters worse, Villa-Abrille could not handle stress. During the failed 1930 Republican *putsch*, the general was entrusted with leading the uprising in the province of Logroño (15 December), where “su actitud vacilante pareció demostrar falta de valor personal.”¹⁹⁶ Three years later, Villa-Abrille reaffirmed his political convictions when he declined to join an anti-Republican plot, but also refused to denounce his personal friend and prominent conspirator, Manuel

¹⁹¹ Bolín, Luis, *Spain: the vital years*, page 183.

¹⁹² **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, “Papeles de Cuesta”, Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 22.

¹⁹³ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 145-47.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, page 40. Civilian members of the Falange were also present during the meetings.

¹⁹⁵ Major Cuesta Monereo’s wife died on 14 November 1934. Salas, Nicolás, *Morir en Sevilla*, page 137.

¹⁹⁶ Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días*, page 394.

González Jonte.¹⁹⁷ In 1936, the Divisional Commander's political ally – Civil Governor José María Varela Rendueles – was also a recent arrival in Seville (April 1936).¹⁹⁸

Varela Rendueles would never forgive Villa-Abrille for his complicit silence over Queipo de Llano's presence in Seville, especially in view of the fact that both men had forged a friendship ever since their professional careers first converged in 1931, when Varela Rendueles served as Civil Governor of Guipúzcoa and Villa-Abrille as the Military Commander of Bilbao. Animosity between both men erupted when Major Francisco Núñez Martínez de Velasco was accused by a subordinate of illegally stockpiling weapons at the *Intendencia* (Paymaster/Quartermaster Corps) barracks. The Divisional General excused Núñez, but Varela Rendueles decided to appeal directly to the Prime-minister and demand the transfer of several officers away from Seville. Casares Quiroga replied negatively after being swayed by the assurances given to him by Villa-Abrille. The Divisional General would, to the bitter end, deny the existence of sedition within his garrison. In denial, he organised several innocuous displays of loyalty to the Republic, such as during the occasion of the visit of Minister of Agriculture Mariano Ruiz-Funes to Seville. On 7 June, Villa-Abrille paid a visit to both Ruiz-Funes and Varela Rendueles, accompanied by all corps leaders who swore - one by one – an oath of allegiance to the government. This was an entirely counter-productive exercise, since it produced a false sense of security among the Republican authorities.¹⁹⁹ Despite the theatrical nature of such displays of loyalty, several corps leaders, such as Colonel José María Solis, failed to maintain appearances. Solis was swiftly replaced by Colonel Manuel Allanegui Lusarreta as leader of the Infantry Regiment Granada nº6. Allanegui was, like Villa-Abrille, a recent arrival in a garrison mired by sedition. In reality, links between the army and reactionary politics had reached such extremes that, for instance, several Artillery officers were providing military training to Falangist militants in the months prior to the rebellion. Prominent Falangists in the garrison of Seville implicated in the rebellion included: Major Rementería, Captains Gutiérrez Flores, Carlos Fernández de Córdoba, Alfonso Ortí Meléndez-Valdés, Modesto Aguilera Morente, Francisco Carrillo, Pérez Blázquez, de la Puerta Tamayo, Lieutenants Sack Carunho, García del Moral and Lieutenant-Chaplain Ruiz-Zorrilla.²⁰⁰ The Civil Guard had also been corrupted by the

¹⁹⁷ Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica (Salamanca), PS-Madrid, 447.

¹⁹⁸ The Republic had reshuffled commands and increased surveillance. However, the regime ignored the ramifications of the conspiracy, its objectives, *modus operandi* and even the identity of the *Director*.

Payne, Stanley G., *The collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933-36: origins of the Civil War*, pages 316-17.

¹⁹⁹ Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, page 76.

²⁰⁰ According to Dávila: "la labor personal de Modesto Aguilera, atrajo a nuestras filas un grupo de jóvenes oficiales: el capitán Eduardo Álvarez Rementería, el de Ingenieros Alonso Ortí, el teniente-

Falange. The battle-hardened police force was arguably even more influential than the military. Indeed, it was the *blasé* attitude of Director-General Sanjurjo that sentenced the Monarchy of Alfonso XIII to death in April 1931.²⁰¹ In short, General Villa-Abrille was the leader of the II Division in name only.

The extremism of the political right

On 18 July 1937, General Queipo de Llano used the first anniversary of the rebellion in Seville to deliver a scathing verdict on Villa-Abrilles' character:

“El general Villa-Abrille no tenía otra aspiración que ser grato a los obreros, fingiéndoles una camaradería que no sentía y permitiéndoles – lo deducía de cosas que me contaba – que se mofasen de él y le dirigiesen amenazas y groserías que a él le hacían gracia. En una palabra: era el trabajo conducente a tenerlos propicios para, en el caso de que llegase lo que todos temíamos, tener probabilidades de salvar la piel [...], cubierta en envoltura de indignidad.”²⁰²

Much more than a personal attack on his former friend, Queipo's statement was part of wider propaganda manoeuvre aimed at hyperbolising the power of the political left in Seville, while at the same time ignoring the extremism of the right.

Throughout the II Republic, the capital of Andalucía was known as “Sevilla la roja” (or “red Seville”), mainly because of the numerical strength of the extreme-left: Seville was the only major city in Spain where the PCE was an influential political force, rivalling the CNT for control over the local labour movement. Despite the combative nature of the trade-unions, Seville's political institutions were dominated by the moderate left: the PSOE, *Izquierda Republicana* (IR) and *Unión Republicana* (UR). Indeed, the capital of Andalucía was the political fiefdom of UR leader Diego Martínez Barrio, who hailed from the city and reviled both poles of the political spectrum in equal measure. UR militant Augusto Sánchez Regueiro exposed his party's

capellán D. Angel Ruiz Zorrilla”, Captains Collado, Caruncho, Fernández de Córdoba, and Lieutenants Moral y Romera and retired Major Eduardo Jiménez Carlés. Dávila, Sancho; Pemartín, Julián, *Hacia la historia de la Falange: primera contribución de Sevilla*, page 90. Gutiérrez-Ravé, José, *¿Como se libero usted?*, page 28; Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 177.

²⁰¹ Preston, Paul, *Franco: a biography*, pages 69-70.

²⁰² Queipo was particularly incensed that Villa-Abrille brushed aside his proposal to join the rebellion with the excuse of “Cumplimiento del deber”. Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, “Cómo dominamos Sevilla” in *Estampas de la guerra, tomo 5, Frentes de Andalucía y Extremadura*, page 29.

fears of the far-left in a prophetic letter to Diego Martínez Barrio written a mere three days before the outbreak of the rebellion in Seville (15 July):

“La gravedad de los momentos por que atraviesa la vida de la política republicana requieren una urgente depuración en las comisiones Gestoras y demás cargos gubernativos, pues es indispensable limpiarlas de todo elemento anárquico-sindicalista y anárquico-comunista, tenga la seguridad y no vacile que son los causantes de que el fascismo en un día menos pensado nos sorprenda y nos arrolle.”²⁰³

The power of the trade-unions, largely measured by the impressive number of their affiliates and the violent actions of its radical wing, was elusive. Even the *bête noir* of the right, the PCE, had moderated its stance after managing to secure membership of the Popular Front electoral pact with the Republican left in 1936.²⁰⁴ In reality, the numerically-weak extreme-right successfully resisted leftist pressure for socio-economic reform. These local dynamics were stimulated by a culture of impunity, which in turn allowed the *élites* to feel secure in face of the growing radicalisation of the masses. In Seville, whenever the left raised the political stakes, the right surpassed them: the capital of Andalucía featured prominently in all key anti-Republican episodes, namely in July 1931 (the bloody suppression a CNT strike) and August 1932 (*Sanjurjada*). Indeed, the long tentacles of the oligarchy ensured the immediate, albeit short-lived, success of General Sanjurjo’s coup in Seville, only for it to be betrayed by events elsewhere in Spain (especially Madrid).²⁰⁵ Among those arrested in the wake of the *Sanjurjada* were retired Lieutenant-Colonel (Cavalry) and future Nationalist Civil Governor of Seville Pedro Parias González, his son Gonzalo Parias, retired army officer Manuel Díaz Criado, bullfighters Algabeño and Joaquín Miranda, judge Eugenio Eizaguirre Pozzi and his son, Sevilla FC goalkeeper Guillermo Euizaguirre – aka the “flying angel” – famed for his reflexes as a

²⁰³ Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica (Salamanca), PS-Madrid 177.

²⁰⁴ For the political left in Seville see: Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *La utopía revolucionaria: Sevilla en la Segunda República* (for statistics on trade-unions see pages 45-66); Macarro Vera, José Manuel, “Sindicatos y organizaciones obreras en la segunda república in Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Lemus López, Encarnación (ed.), *Sindicatos y trabajadores en Sevilla: una aproximación a la memoria del siglo XX*; Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *La Sevilla Republicana*.

²⁰⁵ For the Sanjurjada in Seville see: Álvarez Rey, Leandro, *La derecha en la II República: Sevilla, 1931-1936, pages 241-75*; Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *La utopía revolucionaria: Sevilla en la Segunda República*, pages 253-266; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *La Justicia de Queipo. Violencia selectiva y terror fascista en la II División en 1936: Sevilla, Huelva, Cádiz, Córdoba, Málaga y Badajoz*, pages 22-26.

goalkeeper and his fierceness in battle as an officer of the Foreign Legion.²⁰⁶ The fate of Andalucía rested in the hands of a selected *élite*.

In Seville, the local political right went as far as to purge the more moderate voices from within its ranks. The most spectacular example was the personal vendetta carried out by the landowner from Carmona, Luis Alarcón de la Lastra, against fellow CEDA member Manuel Giménez Fernández in 1934.²⁰⁷ It was no mere coincidence that Alarcón de la Lastra was part of the group affected by Agrarian Reform.²⁰⁸ Minister of Agriculture Giménez Fernández, who advocated a conciliatory solution to the issue of land reform, was at the receiving end of the full wrath of the Andalucían landed *élites*. Not even his status as the rising star of Spain's largest right-wing party could avert his political assassination. By April 1935, Giménez Fernández was a spent political force and out of a job.²⁰⁹

The influence of the local oligarchy was so crushing that it even provoked the development of inferiority complexes among non-elitist members of the political right. For instance, Joaquín Miranda's working-class background was at the root of a "complejo que era humano, en Sevilla".²¹⁰ The caste system of Andalucía, immutable since medieval times, prevented the Falangist leader from being taken seriously by the local *élites*. Critically, the oligarchy's refusal to alleviate the unbearable economic condition of the lower-classes perpetuated one of Spain's structural problems: the asymmetric distribution of land.²¹¹ In addition, the Republic was regarded as an intolerable insult to oligarchy's feudalistic conception of social relations. In this worldview, the lower-classes were regarded as a subhuman species and, as far as the *élites* were concerned, "un republicano era un ser execrable".²¹² Fanatical belief in these tenets, limitless economical resources and an extensive corruption network (that encompassed the

²⁰⁶ Sánchez del Arco, Manuel, *Horas y figuras de la Guerra en España*, pages 16-20.

²⁰⁷ For Giménez Fernández see: Álvarez Rey, Leandro, *Manuel Giménez Fernández (1896-1968). Epistolario Político*.

²⁰⁸ Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica (Salamanca), PS Madrid, 1727/3.

²⁰⁹ Álvarez Rey, Leandro, *La derecha en la II República: Sevilla, 1931-1936*, pages 350-426.

²¹⁰ "Actuó sobre Miranda un complejo que era humano, en Sevilla, y en hombre que había tenido profesión para la que se necesita valor, más que tenía nula consideración social si no intervenía el éxito: la de torero. Fue banderillero, lo cual ya le imposibilitaba para sobresalir de tal modo que la Andalucía quinteriana le considerase socialmente. [...] La honradez personal de Miranda era indudable y acreditada." García Venero, Maximiano *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, page 178.

²¹¹ For *caciquismo* and the asymmetric distribution of land in the province of Seville see: Florencio Puntas, Antonio, *Empresariado agrícola y cambio económico, 1880-1936. Organización y estrategia de la patronal sevillana en los inicios de la modernización*.

²¹² García Venero, Maximiano *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, page 178.

Civil Guard) triggered “the greatest imaginable hatred among classes, a complete rupture between those who called themselves right and left-wing”, pushing Andalucía to “the brink of class war”.²¹³ Already on 15 May, the dockworkers of Seville wrote an angry letter to the *Ministro de Trabajo* denouncing the “capataces reaccionarios que buscan la forma de encender la guerra civil en los trabajos diarios en el Puerto.”²¹⁴ This was the war that the oligarchy had been pressing for ever since the proclamation of the II Republic.²¹⁵

By 1936, the notion that the political system no longer guaranteed the economic interests of the middle/upper-classes had crystallised within all right-wing political families in Spain. The landed élites started lending credence to right-wing propaganda of an impending Communist coup.²¹⁶ Consequently, rightist violence was both legitimised and rationalised as a pre-emptive reaction against a Soviet-sponsored Trojan horse. According to this rationale, criminals of the calibre of Manuel Díaz Criado were but “sevillanos [...] amantes del orden e incondicionales de la autoridad.”²¹⁷ In 1931, Captain Díaz Criado, accompanied by his friend Pepe el Algabeño, greeted the recent implantation of the Republic by murdering four workers in cold blood

²¹³ “Those on top, the landowners, had failed to understand; they had refused to follow his father’s example in setting up village industries, in distributing land among the village labourers. Those on the bottom were filled with envy, understandably. The result was the greatest imaginable hatred among classes, a complete rupture between those who called themselves right and left-wing. Nowhere were the social differences greater than here, in Andalusia. The left was preparing a revolution, foreign communist leaders were entering the country, he believed; while those with means on the other side were leaving. It was the brink of class war.” Fraser, Ronald, *Blood of Spain: the experience of Civil War, 1936-1939*, pages 49-50.

²¹⁴ Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica (Salamanca), PS Madrid, 385(2)/37

²¹⁵ Anarchist doctor Pedro Vallina noted that “Sevilla me pareció siempre una ciudad extremadamente peligrosa, que albergaba los peores elementos de la reacción”. Vallina, Pedro, *Mis memorias*, page 316.

²¹⁶ “Madrid was tense on May 3, the day scheduled by rumor for the movement to be launched.[...] “July 29” began to be discussed across café tables as “the day”. Typewritten sheets announcing this date as “they day for the Red Revolution’s launching” had been circulated throughout Madrid and had been mailed anonymously to various Spanish embassies and legations abroad”. Knoblaugh, Edward, *Correspondent in Spain*, pages 28-29.

²¹⁷ Vila, Enrique, *Un año de República en Sevilla. Jornadas de un periodista*, page 160. Right-wing reported Manuel Sánchez del Arco wrote that Algabeño possessed an acute sense of “justicia social”. He added that: “le conocimos en magníficas reacciones contra el terror rojo en aquellas huelgas revolucionarias que eran sentencias de muerte para la ciudad y los ciudadanos. Reaccionó como ciudadano ejemplar que era en aquellos días de 1931, en los que la recién nacida República mostraba en los sucesos de Julio en Sevilla lo que había de ser durante cinco años. Bien supo jugarse la vida en 1931 Joselito el Algabeño, atendiendo con su prestación personal al funcionamiento de servicios públicos tan humanos como era el abastecimiento de los centros benéficos. Por su viril actitud, aquellos días de universal encogimiento, le señaló el rencor rojo. Aún no se hablaba de Fascio, y en vanguardia de ciudadanía el Algabeño luchaba civilmente en las calles de Sevilla.” Sánchez del Arco, Manuel, *Horas y figuras de la Guerra en España*, page 248.

(while supposedly escorting them to prison) on the night of 22-23 July.²¹⁸ Antonio Bahamonde described Algabeño as “un tigre vestido de azul”²¹⁹ and Barbero as a “personalidad destacadísima de Falange y señor de vidas y haciendas”.²²⁰ The far-left never forgave Díaz Criado and his entourage, all of whom came to embody the radicalism of the right. In the aftermath of the *Sanjurjada*, a crowd of workers set fire to the retired bullfighter’s house and in 1934 Algabeño was seriously wounded after being shot four times by left-wing extremists.²²¹

Following the electoral victory of the Popular Front, events in Seville began unravelling at a vertiginous speed. The Falange started plotting the downfall of the Republic immediately after the February elections.²²² In May, the sinister Díaz Criado was (again) arrested for being involved in a conspiracy to murder President Azaña.²²³ Two days later (28 April), the PCE-affiliated workers of the Tablada Military Airfield filed a written protest against Falangist worker Gonzalo García, whom they accused of being a “monárquico-fascista hasta la medulla de los huesos”. García was protected by Captain Modesto Aguilera Morente, one of the leaders of the conspiracy: “Preso el 10 de Agosto por haber contribuido a la Sanjurjada, distinguido perseguidor de los trabajadores a los que cuando ha visto en el poder a la reacción y al fascismo que son su norte y guía, no se ha recatado de manifestar su desprecio [...] diciendo con gran jactancia que odia a los comunistas [...] Es preciso que te ocupes de este tipo o con sus provocaciones va dar lugar a que lo destrocemos”. The situation became so tense that, on 19 May, the Communist parliamentary deputy Vicente Uribe passed the complaint to the Ministry of War “en evitación de un conflicto de orden público que pudiera surgir en estas Fabricas Militares”.²²⁴

²¹⁸ Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *La Justicia de Queipo*, pages 19-22; Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *La utopía revolucionaria*, pages 147-56; Tuñón de Lara, Manuel, *Luchas obreras y campesinas en la Andalucía del siglo XX*, pages 190-203; Vila, Enrique, *Un año de República en Sevilla. Jornadas de un periodista*, pages 160-61.

²¹⁹ Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano*, page 167.

²²⁰ Barbero, Edmundo, *El infierno azul*, page 357. Algabeño often boasted of his “crueldades” (page 358) and justified them with the following statement (page 359): “-Nosotros – dice – somos España; ellos, la anti-España. Nosotros hemos fusilado a muchos, es verdad, pero confesándolos y comulgándolos, y ellos, no. Ya ven ustedes la diferencia.”

²²¹ He was hospitalised for eight months. *FE* (Seville), 2 November 1936.

²²² Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 198-99: “En Sevilla, la obra de Falange, encaminada al alzamiento nacional, puede decirse que comenzó en los días inmediatamente posteriores a las elecciones de Febrero”.

²²³ *ABC* (Madrid), 3 May 1936.

²²⁴ Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica (Salamanca), PS-Madrid, 385(2)/21.

Right-wing extremism infected all army units within the garrison of Seville. In the Artillery Corps, *Brigada Fernando Aranda* Marcelo kept a political log of all soldiers of 1^a *Batería del Regimiento de Artillería Ligera*.²²⁵ Just a few days before the outbreak of the rebellion, a group of soldiers had begun singing the *International* when Sergeant Fernández, with a gun in one hand and a grenade in the other, broke into the dormitory and imposed silence. On 15 July, following the conclusion of a Mass in honour of the recently-murdered Calvo-Sotelo, a crowd of right-wing *señoritas* asked a group of artillery officers gathered outside the Cathedral of Seville: “Qué espera el Ejército?”, to which Major Martín de Oliva calmly replied: “No tardaremos en actuar.” Meanwhile, the officership of the *Zapadores-Minadores* (Engineers) battalion was so eager to turn against the Republic that “No poco esfuerzos costó [...] convencer a los exaltados” to keep their *sang-froid*.²²⁶ At Civil Guard headquarters in Seville, rousing thanks to God were shouted out immediately after outbreak of the rebellion.²²⁷

Queipo returns

In early July, General Queipo returned to Seville and installed himself in the centrally-located Hotel Simón. Shortly after, he received the visit of Major Rementería, who escorted him to a meeting attended by Major Cuesta and Captains (Aviation) Francisco Carrillo and Modesto Aguilera, both part of the Falange’s *Comité Militar* presided by Rementería. After being informed of Queipo’s presence in Seville, General Villa-Abrille opted to make a quick escape to Huelva under the pretext of a military inspection. The resourceful Cuesta was not willing to concede defeat just yet and phoned Villa-Abrille’s *aide-de-camp* to arrange a meeting between both generals. When the Divisional General became conscious of what was being concocted, he panicked. Villa-Abrille knew that he too was under governmental surveillance and that, should he meet Queipo, he would be left with no other option but to denounce his friend. Villa-Abrille’s refusal provoked a heated discussion with Cuesta Monereo and Gutiérrez Flores. In fact, Cuesta had actually travelled to Huelva with both Captain Carrillo and Queipo whom they had left waiting on the outskirts of the city. Falangist reporter Enrique Villa added an important detail, deliberately overlooked by Queipo in his memoirs: rather than dismissing the conspirators’ proposal, Villa-Abrille attempted to negotiate: “-¿Pero tiene que ser ahora

²²⁵ In addition, Lieutenant Antonio Navarro Carmona was active in breaking an anarchist strike in 1931 and participated in the *Sanjurjada*; while Lieutenant Juan de Dios Porras y Ruiz de Pedrosa was a “derechista fanatico”. “18 de Julio de 1936 en Sevilla” in *Archivo Hispalense*, Sevilla, nº132-133, 1965, page 178.

²²⁶ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 125; “18 de Julio de 1936 en Sevilla” in *Archivo Hispalense*, Sevilla, nº132-133, 1965, pages 179-80.

²²⁷ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 149.

mismo? ¿El general Queipo no puede verme mañana en mi despacho oficial?”²²⁸ The entire affair laid bare Villa-Abrille’s total lack of control over his own garrison, to the extent that he openly attempted to reach an understanding with the conspirators. Meanwhile, General Queipo was tormented by the possibility of a denunciation that failed to materialise.²²⁹

The details of General Queipo’s final trip to Seville prior to the outbreak of the rebellion are already enshrouded in Nationalist mythology. On 16 July, Queipo had just arrived in Madrid following an exhausting journey to Málaga when Lieutenant-Colonel Galarza asked the general to return immediately to the capital of Andalucía.²³⁰ Queipo left Madrid at 23:00 in the company of his *aide-de-camp*, César López-Guerrero, for what appeared to be – according to the *Carabineros* leader - a suicidal mission. Queipo arrived in Seville at 8:00am and checked into the Hotel Simón, but did not stay long there. He travelled to Huelva that same afternoon, but not before paying a visit to both General Villa-Abrille and the conspiratorial leadership. However, Queipo committed a major *gaffe*: he overlooked official protocol and failed to inform Civil Governor Varela Rendueles of his presence in the capital of Andalucía. According to his official biography, Queipo’s trip “no tenía más objeto que entretener la impaciencia de la espera.” Yet, as soon as the general arrived in Huelva on 18 July, Lieutenant Cano (*Oficinas Militares*), who functioned as Cuesta’s courier, met Queipo at the local cinema and urged him to return to Seville immediately.²³¹ The general ignored Cano and decided to continue with his scheduled trip to Isla Cristina and Ayamonte. Before that, he visited local Civil Governor Jiménez Castellanos, to whom he loudly proclaimed his loyalty to the Republic. Jiménez Castellanos was impressed by Queipo’s pledge and telephoned Varela Rendueles to let him know. At this point, since the military uprising had begun on the previous evening, Casares Quiroga had ordered that any officer found travelling outside the area where he was posted should be arrested. The Civil Guard Commander of Sanlúcar la Mayor to the west of Seville telephoned Varela Rendueles and asked whether he should detain Queipo who was en route to Seville. On the basis of the earlier assurances from Jiménez Castellanos, Varela Rendueles ordered that Queipo be allowed to continue his journey.²³² The naivety of Jiménez Castellanos

²²⁸ Ibid, page 48.

²²⁹ Olmedo Delgado, Antonio & Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 89; Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla* pages 43-48; Prieto, Tomás, *Héroes y gestas de la Cruzada. Datos para la Historia*, page 47.

²³⁰ Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, *Queipo de Llano, Carta de 18 de junio de 1950*.

²³¹ Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 94-95.

²³² Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, page 105.

was excusable: he had arrived in Huelva only on 8 July. Less than a month later (3 August), Queipo de Llano showed no mercy when he signed Jiménez Castellanos' death sentence, carried out the following day.²³³

An absent leader

There was another contradiction regarding Queipo's subsequent legend. After bidding farewell to Castellanos, and just as he was about to depart for Isla Cristina, Lieutenant Cano intercepted Queipo and begged him to return to Seville. This proved to be a key event in the rebellion in Seville.²³⁴ Queipo de Llano would retrospectively provide an incoherent excuse to justify his absence from Seville between the afternoon of the 17th and the morning of 18 July. He claimed that, since he heard no news of the outbreak of the rebellion, he opted to go to Huelva in order to evade governmental surveillance. The crux of Queipo's argument was that he had already abandoned Seville when Gutiérrez Flores received news of the mutiny in Morocco at 16:00 on 17 July. Yet, when the general left Madrid on 16 July, he was informed that the coup was expected to erupt at any moment and was therefore expected to stay put in Seville.²³⁵ Even if Queipo arrived in Huelva unaware of events in Morocco, Lieutenant Cano must have surely updated him. There are two different accounts on what happened next: according to Cuesta Monereo, Queipo was still adamant about pursuing his planned trip to Isla Cristina and Ayamonte and returned to Seville only after being confronted a second time by Lieutenant Cano.²³⁶ Queipo presented a different version of events in his radio speech of 29 July. He declared that he first encountered Lieutenant Cano after his meeting the Civil Governor of Huelva on the morning of 18 July. He also claimed, implausibly, that the plan to visit Isla Cristina had only occurred to him a few minutes before his appointment with Jiménez Castellanos.²³⁷ Queipo's far-fetched account was supported by his panegyrists, who also transformed the moderate Civil Governor of Huelva into a radical leftist.²³⁸ Also, Varela

²³³ ABC (Madrid) 9 July 1936; ABC (Seville), 5 August 1936. For the courtmartial of Jiménez Castellanos see: Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *La Justicia de Queipo. Violencia selectiva y terror fascista en la II División en 1936: Sevilla, Huelva, Cádiz, Córdoba, Málaga y Badajoz*, pages 105-114.

²³⁴ Major Cuesta was crystal regarding the importance of Cano's persistence: "Suerte fue que Cuesta lograse rápida comunicación con Cano, evitando la salida del General en dirección a Ayamonte". Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 101. See also: Bolín, Luis, *Spain: the vital years*, page 179.

²³⁵ Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, *Queipo de Llano, Carta de 18 de junio de 1950*.

²³⁶ Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 101.

²³⁷ *La Unión* (Seville), 30 July 1936.

²³⁸ "El general jugaba con fuego y en cualquier momento podía quemarse" Armiñán Odriozola, Luis de, *Excmo. Sr. General D. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Jefe del Ejército del Sur*, page 18.

Rendueles stated in his memoirs that Queipo told Castellanos that he planned to return to Seville and fly from Tablada to Madrid to put himself under the authority of the Popular Front government.²³⁹ A fourth source dismantled Queipo's alibi. Reporter Enrique Villa revealed that Queipo first met Castellanos on the evening of the 17th, was informed that same evening of the mutiny in Morocco, and met the Civil Governor of Huelva for a second time on the morning of 18 July.²⁴⁰ On 18 July 1937, Queipo attempted to minimise the negative impact of this revelation by writing an editorial in Vila's newspaper, *Falange Española*, in which he reaffirmed that he first became aware of events in Morocco on the morning of 18 July.²⁴¹ Queipo continued to attempt to justify his absence from Seville until the very end of his life. On 18 June 1950, he wrote to Franco: "marché hacia Huelva con el pretexto de visitar las fuerzas de Carabineros allí existentes, con objeto de que mi presencia en Sevilla no infundiese sospecha."²⁴²

In all probability, General Queipo considered the possibility of escaping to Portugal should the rebellion end in failure. After all, the general had already fled once to Portugal following the *Cuatro Vientos* mutiny of 1930. In Seville, both Cuesta's plan and the naivety of the recently-appointed Republican authorities guaranteed the success of the coup; even if its nominal leader was nowhere to be found.

The Republic implodes

At precisely 16:00 on 17 July, Gutiérrez Flores received a telegram from Algeciras reporting that a mutiny had erupted in Spanish Morocco. Flores passed the news to Villa-Abrille, but only after notifying first fellow conspirators Major Cuesta and Captain Escribano. The Divisional General immediately asked for a second confirmation from Algeciras and phoned all garrisons under his command to determine if sedition had spread to mainland Spain. All of them reported normality. It was at this point that Villa-Abrille ordered Gutiérrez Flores to assume command of the Divisional Headquarters for the night. The general was about to leave the Headquarters when he received a distressed call from Varela Rendueles. The Civil Governor

²³⁹ Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, page 105. "Tanto Jiménez Castellanos como yo nos felicitamos de aquella postura de Queipo que, pese a su poca o ninguna simpatía por los hombres de izquierda, llegado aquel momento en que la República era objeto de una agresión, despertando en él su antiguo entusiasmo republicano, se aprestaba a defenderla."

²⁴⁰ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 49.

²⁴¹ *FE* (Seville), 18 July 1937.

²⁴² **Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia** (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, *Queipo de Llano, Carta de 18 de junio de 1950*.

had just been informed of events in Morocco by the Ministry of the Interior; and of Queipo's presence in Seville by both the PCE and Assault Guard Captain José Álvarez Moreno (*Jefe de la Brigada Social*). The Divisional General played down the entire affair by claiming that the *Carabineros* leader was in a rush to reach Isla Cristina and Ayamonte, where professional commitments awaited him.²⁴³ After receiving confirmation of the outbreak of the rebellion, Villa-Abrille decided to phone again all garrisons, giving them specific instructions to obey only orders given directly by him. Gutiérrez Flores lost his temper:

“¿Ha pensado usted, mi general, en que puede quedarse solo en la actitud que ha adoptado respecto al movimiento iniciado en África?... Piense mi general, en la situación ridícula de un general a quien no obedecen sus oficiales... Es que cuando mañana desembarquen en los puertos de Andalucía nuestras tropas coloniales, no habrá quien las detenga.”

“Si se produjera el desembarco”, contestó en tonos nerviosos el general, “la guarnición de Granada...” “¿Y si usted ordenase a la guarnición de Granada y ésta no le obedeciese?”²⁴⁴

Gutiérrez Flores was merely stating the obvious: Villa-Abrille had lost all authority and found himself trapped in a “situación ridícula”. Still, he was expected to do more than just turning a blind eye to the conspiracy. Yet this was precisely what Villa-Abrille did: he chose to ignore Gutiérrez Flores' open act of insubordination and ordered him to phone all garrisons and instruct them to report back immediately should any abnormal activity occur. Gutiérrez Flores also suggested informing Cuesta of events in Morocco, but Villa-Abrille refused and ordered him to stay put at the Divisional Headquarters and wait for further instructions from the Ministry of War. In short, Villa-Abrille had entrusted a leading conspirator to act as the first channel of communication between the government and the garrison of Seville.

²⁴³ Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, **General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia**, pages 94-95. The *Estación Radio Telegrafica Militar* was also mined by sedition: “En la madrugada del 17 al 18 a la una veinticinco, se recibió la alocución del Sr. Coronel Jefe de la Circunscripción de Melilla, que se levantaba en Armas contra el Gobierno opresor. Con gran entusiasmo fue comunicada esta alocución por el Oficial que suscribe, al de igual clase de guardia del Batallón de Zapadores Minadores nº2, para que a su vez le pusiera en conocimiento de los Srs. Jefes y Oficiales del referido Batallón, y seguidamente me trasladó a la División dando cuenta de ello al Exmo. Sr. General Villabril, y Capitán de E.M. de servicio D. Manuel Gutiérrez Flores”. The unit, headed by *Alférez* Manuel Tuset Tamayo, continued intercepting and passing information to the rebel leadership on 18 July. **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 2, Carpeta 3.

²⁴⁴ Guzmán de Alfarache, ***i18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla***, pages 55-56.

From that moment onwards, events started unfolding at a vertiginous pace. Air Force General Núñez del Prado phoned Villa-Abrille and ordered him to load with bombs three planes that were already on their way to Tablada. Surprisingly, Villa-Abrille trusted this mission to another member of the subversive triumvirate, Captain Escribano. When Gutiérrez Flores was informed of governmental plans to bomb the insurgents in Morocco, he snapped again. Once more, Villa-Abrille attempted to defuse the situation; but Gutiérrez Flores would have none of it. Still, the temperamental conspirator remained lucid enough to ask Villa-Abrille if he would accept holding a meeting with all corps leaders. He replied positively and the meeting was scheduled for the following morning.²⁴⁵

While Villa-Abrille procrastinated in Seville and Queipo weighed up his options in Huelva; Major Cuesta Monereo worked on the final details of his master plan. He was absent during most of the afternoon of the 17th in a meeting with Civil Guard Majors Santiago Garrigós (*Comandancia Exterior*) and Ramón Rodríguez Díaz (*Comandancia Interior*) held at Garrigós's house. The *Comandancia Interior* Major assured Cuesta that he possessed the influence to seize power from his superiors should they decide to side with the Republic. They were: Lieutenant-Colonel Jenaro Conde Bujons, *Jefe Comandancia Interior*; and overall commander Colonel Arturo Blanco, who was on sick leave. The contribution of the Civil Guard was critical for the success of the conspiracy. For instance, when General Pozas ordered the arrest of all officers found travelling outside their respective garrisons, Garrigós overruled this directive. As a result, dissident officers enjoying summer leave began pouring into the capital of Andalucía.²⁴⁶

A succession of events sealed the fate of the Republic even before a shot was fired in anger. Firstly, Captain Escribano and Lieutenant (Artillery) Pedrosa both agreed to contravene governmental instructions to load the three planes destined to bomb the insurrectionary

²⁴⁵ Ibid, page 57. Flores replied: “¿Qué Gobierno? No hay Gobierno que pueda dar una orden así para ametrallar al Ejército, que es una institución fundamental para la vida del Estado. Los Gobiernos y la política son una cosa que acaban; el Ejército es permanente. ¡Mi general, no obedezca usted esta orden!” See also pages 53-58.

²⁴⁶ Ibid, page 148. One of them was Lieutenant-Colonel Pereira Vela (*Jefe Comandancia Exterior*), who was on holiday in Badajoz when he was informed of the mutiny in Morocco. He encountered no trouble during the return journey to Seville (page 149). Upon his arrival, Varela told Garrigós: “-Cuenten ustedes conmigo para todo; precisamente llevo ya mucho tiempo suspirando por este momento” (page 150). See also pages 145-51.

forces in Morocco.²⁴⁷ Equally ignored was Varela Rendueles' order for the printing of leaflets calling for the surrender of the Army of Africa, as instructed by the Popular Front government. The directive was obeyed only after PCE leader Manuel Delicado intimidated the director of newspaper *El Liberal*. At the same time, Delicado persuaded Varela to accept his suggestion of creating mixed patrols of workers and assault guards to keep military barracks under surveillance. This proved to be an ephemeral strategy, for General Villa-Abrille decided once more to aid the rebel cause. The Divisional General phoned Casares Quiroga to request the immediate withdrawal of all mixed brigades on the grounds that their mere presence might be read as a provocation. Last but not least, the PCE also unearthed a Falangist plot to attack the open-air cinema (*cine de verano*) located in Seville's main square, the Plaza Nueva, followed by an assault on the *Casa del pueblo* in calle Cuna. Manuel Delicado managed to alert Assault Guard Captain José Álvarez Moreno, who prevented a massacre by ordering the arrests of several armed Falangists. The ones that managed to escape vented their frustration by sniping at pigeons in the Parque María Luisa.²⁴⁸ Critically, both Delicado and fellow Communist trade-union leader Saturnino Barneto could not manage to extract from the Civil Governor weapons for leftist militias. In reality, Varela Rendueles feared left and right-wing extremism in equal measure, a view shared by the Mayor of Seville, Horacio Hermoso Araújo.²⁴⁹

Tablada

On the night of 17-18 July, three planes (two Fockers and a Douglas of the LAPE, *Líneas Aéreas Postales Españolas*) landed at Tablada, but the bombs requested by the government were nowhere to be found. The combined efforts of Escribano and Pedrosa had ensured that the only explosives available were those carried by the planes themselves. While the loyalists combed Seville for bombs, Captain Carlos Martínez Vara del Rey became agitated and took a taxi to the city-centre to update the subversive high-command and request further instructions. He met Captain Escribano, who sent him together with Lieutenant Medina to visit a number of army barracks, incite treason, return to Tablada, and disable the planes in the way

²⁴⁷ Declarations of Enrique Pedrosa Barraca (15 October 1937): "Que a las 3 de la madrugada del citado día 18 este Oficial recibió orden telefónica del E.M. de la División dada por uno de los Oficiales que decía "De orden del General Villa Abrille carga bombas de Aviación en camiones y llevarlas a Tablada"; este Oficial le aclaró que eran para cargar los trimotores que iban a bombardear las fuerzas de África y al terminar de comunicarle esta orden el mismo Oficial de E.M. muy veladamente pero en forma que fue comprendida por el que suscribe le dio a entender que retrasase el cumplimiento de lo que le comunicaba lo más posible". **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 1, Carpeta 68.

²⁴⁸ Testimony of Manuel Delicado in Barrios, Manuel, *El último virrey. Queipo de Llano*, page 54.

²⁴⁹ Ortiz Villalba, Juan, *Del golpe militar a la guerra civil: Sevilla 1936*, page 95.

they best saw fit. Captain Alfonso Ortí agreed with Escribano, but advised Vara del Rey “que no haga nada sin consultar antes al comandante Cuesta”, which he did.²⁵⁰ Major Cuesta allowed the fiery Captain to pursue with what was, to all intents and purposes, a suicide mission.²⁵¹ Vara del Rey was not isolated in his extremism. When Lieutenant-Colonel Iturzaeta (second-in-command at the Pineda Artillery barracks) was informed of events in Tablada, he entertained the idea of ordering the shelling of Seville’s military airfield.²⁵² The impatience of the local rebels almost provoked the premature outbreak of the rebellion (not to mention the bombing of Seville’s only airfield and the subsequent impossibility of airlifting the Army of Africa to the capital of Andalucía).²⁵³ The sophistication of Cuesta’s scheme subdued the more radical impulses of Iturzaeta but not those of Vara del Rey who, as soon as he returned to Tablada and armed with a rifle, headed straight to the Douglas and fired at it, damaging the plane. The workers reacted immediately. A brief gun-battle ensued in which the rebel captain was shot and slightly injured. Lieutenant Medina and number of other officers attempted to protect Vara del Rey, but it was the leader of the airbase, loyalist Major Rafael Martínez Estévez who prevented a certain lynching. Estévez ordered the immediate arrests of Vara del Rey, Major Azaola and Captain Carrillo. Lieutenant Medina was placed under house arrest and Captain Aguilera, who arrived at Tablada when the incident had already concluded, was bizarrely ordered to place *himself* under house arrest.²⁵⁴ Major Estévez managed to control the situation partly thanks to the intervention of the pilots from Madrid, in particular Major (Aviation) Rexach. One of the three planes, a Focker, eventually left for Morocco at 11:00am; however, the bombs it carried originated from Madrid since the local ones, when they finally arrived at Tablada, were sabotaged. Eventually, despite the serious nature of Vara del Rey’s actions, Estévez excused them to Villa-Abrille by claiming that the captain was drunk at the time of the incident. The Divisional General, in turn, played down the entire affair to Varela

²⁵⁰ For the actions of Vara del Rey see: **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5361. Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 123-26 and 158-61. See also: Sánchez del Arco, Manuel, *El sur de España en la reconquista de Madrid*, page 27.

²⁵¹ Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, **General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia**, page 99.

²⁵² Iturzaeta was later rewarded for his extremism: on 8 August 1936, he was appointed leader of a new artillery unit that was incorporated into the *Columna Madrid* on 11 August. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5352, Carpeta 1.

²⁵³ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5356, Carpeta 6. Already in late July, the rebels were making plans for: “con toda rapidez en secreto y reservado posible, para establecer un Aeródromo provisional” in Jerez de la Frontera (“esta misión debe correr a cargo del Aero Club de Sevilla”).

²⁵⁴ A few hours later, Queipo authorised Aguilera to end his peculiar incarceration, “transladándose entonces Aguilera a la División, en la que desde aquel momento presta sus meritísimos servicios.” Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 165.

Rendueles.²⁵⁵ Meanwhile, Queipo arrived in Seville oblivious to the series of events that had just occurred at Tablada. Regardless, Air Force General Alfredo Kindelán, would later present an alternative version of the Tablada incident so to include the General Queipo de Llano in the narrative: “El aérodromo de Sevilla no había sido nuestro desde el principio; pero la decisión de Queipo de Llano, valientemente secundado por Azaola, Carrillo, Vara del Rey, Aguilera y otros, lo hizo pasar a nuestras mano sin deterioros.”²⁵⁶

Queipo de Llano in Seville

General Queipo de Llano arrived in Seville on the morning of 18 July. Shortly afterwards, Algabeño paid a brief visit to the general before leaving to inform the Falange of the imminent outbreak of the rebellion.²⁵⁷ A year later, Queipo de Llano embellished the episode by affirming that both he and Algabeño were deeply-concerned about the Republicanism of the garrison of Seville. The ever-faithful López-Guerrero corroborated Queipo’s story by stating that Seville “se contaba perdida”.²⁵⁸ Meanwhile, Garrigós manipulated a *bando* (edict) released by Varela Rendueles on 16 July in the same way as he had previously distorted General Pozas’ orders. Civil and assault guards patrolled the working-class districts of Seville whilst leaving army barracks unchecked. Oblivious to all this, the Civil Governor gave a press conference in which he declared that: “La normalidad en la provincia de Sevilla es reflejo exacto de la que

²⁵⁵ Declarations of Enrique Pedrosa Barraca on 15 October 1937: “Como queda dicho esta orden le fue comunicada a las 3 de la madrugada del día 18, orden que de haber querido pudiera haberse cumplimentado en hora y media dado el carácter urgentísimo que tenía.” [...] “Aun era las 9 de la mañana y por estos inconvenientes que voluntariamente interponía en el cumplimiento de la referida orden y no habían salido del Parque los camiones que habían de conducir las bombas ordenadas, efectuándolo poco después al mando del que suscribe pero llevando las bombas premeditadamente sin el multiplicador colocado con objeto de retardar aun más la posibilidad de que estas bombas pudieran ser empleadas con eficacia.” **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 1, Carpeta 68. See also: Varela Rendueles, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, pages 98-100; Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 161-75.

²⁵⁶ Kindelán, Alfredo, *La verdad de mis relaciones con Franco*, page 174. On 28 July, Queipo visited Tablada and paid homage to Vara del Rey. **ABC** (Seville), 29 July 1936. Captain Escribano declared to Seville’s Military Tribunal that the Tablada incident hastened the arrest of General Villa-Abrille: “la irreductible posición adoptada por el General Villa-Abrille, que no quería darse cuenta de la tragedia que todos presentíamos y que precipitaba, autorizando la salida de dichos aviones a bombardear a nuestros hermanos de armas, no hubo mas remedio que tomar la memorable resolución de destituirlo encargándose del mando de la División el General Queipo de Llano.” **Archivo del Tribunal Militar Territorial Segundo** (Seville), SUM 239/1938.

²⁵⁷ Algabeño was informed of Queipo’s presence in Seville by his brother Antonio. **FE** (Seville), 2 November 1936. See also: Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, pages 101-102.

²⁵⁸ **FE** (Seville), 18 July 1937.

existe en toda la Península".²⁵⁹ At the same time, the local Republican authorities reasserted its democratic commitment against both poles of the political spectrum, especially after Municipal Guard Agustín Carmet was murdered by left-wing radicals on the night of 17-18 July. The following morning, UR councillor Ángel Casal presented a motion of protest denouncing the assassination, backed by all political parties represented in the Town Hall. Communist councillor González Lora was particularly incensed by the killing. The session ended at 13:25, while the meeting at the nearby *Diputación Provincial* concluded earlier, at around noon. Afterwards, most provincial councillors, including President José María Puelles, went to the nearby Hotel Majestic to celebrate the birthday of right-wing provincial secretary Federico Villanova. The local representatives of the Republic might have been vaguely aware of the conspiracy, but remained ignorant of Mola's repressive project, which called for "castigos ejemplares" against the Republican political class.²⁶⁰ For instance, Mayor Horacio Hermoso rejected an offer from his PCE-affiliated *chauffer* to drive him away to safety. Both Puelles and Hermoso were later executed by the victorious rebels.²⁶¹

The myth of General Queipo de Llano

At around noon of 18 July, all corps leaders and high-ranking army officers in Seville gathered at the Divisional Headquarters to swear an oath of allegiance to the Republic.²⁶² General López-Viota, Colonels Allanegui and Mateos, and Major Estévez were isolated in their genuine support for the government. All other military leaders were happy to swear an empty vow. For that same reason, Major Estévez was not reassured by Villa-Abrille's guarantees that the II Division remained loyal to the Republic. Devoid of arguments, the Divisional General abruptly decided to conclude the meeting. Villa-Abrille's delusional optimism was shattered only a few minutes later. The general became apprehensive after noticing the unauthorised presence of several right-wing extremists at the Divisional Headquarters, including Manuel Díaz Criado.²⁶³ The general lost his composure and entered into a heated argument with Major Cuesta. The

²⁵⁹ Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla*, page 107.

²⁶⁰ Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la segunda república española*, vol. 3, pages 444-45.

²⁶¹ *Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla* (Seville), Legajo 345. See also: Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 92; Pérez Calero, Alberto Máximo, *Aire de libertad*, pages 404 and 441-45 (pages 412-36 contains Puelles' private correspondence with his family while in prison). For Nationalist repression in the *Diputación* see: Ponce Alberca, Julio, *Política, instituciones y provincias: la Diputación de Sevilla durante la dictadura de Primo de Rivera y la II República, 1923-1936*.

²⁶² Other people present at the meeting were: *Gobernador Militar* General López-Viota, Colonel (Engineers) Marqueré, Colonel (Artillery) Cerezo and Major (*Intendencia*) Núñez. Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 61.

²⁶³ *Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur* (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 1.

events that followed were hijacked by Nationalist historiography, which turned History into myth: Queipo claimed that he single-handedly arrested Generals Villa-Abrille and Julián López-Viota, their respective *aide-de-camps*, and Major (*Estado Mayor*) Hidalgo following a brief confrontation in which the Divisional General's cowardice – a symbol of the wider cowardice of the Republic – was exposed.²⁶⁴ In 1967, the retired Nationalist Chief of Press stated in his memoirs that General Villa-Abrille and Colonel Allanegui “could have overpowered him [Queipo], but they lacked the moral courage to do this.”²⁶⁵ The central proposition was that the Republic's moral inferiority, a direct consequence of its ideological degeneracy, permitted Queipo to capture Seville. This hypothesis was supported by a wealth of ‘evidence’, including ‘proof’ of divine intervention in favour of the rebels.²⁶⁶ General Queipo was the greatest promoter of his legend, going as far as ridiculing the Archbishop of Seville. The rebel general claimed that when he informed Cardinal Ilundáin of his plans to capture the capital of Andalucía with a few *soldaditos* and the help of God, Ilundáin tried to persuade him to abandon the suicide mission. Queipo later joked that the Archbishop of Seville was an atheist.²⁶⁷

In reality, neither was Cardinal Ilundáin an atheist, nor did Queipo enter into a heated confrontation with Villa-Abrille. The rebel general met his old friend just before the meeting that took place at around noon of 18 July at the Divisional Headquarters.²⁶⁸ Queipo later denied the existence of this encounter only for Cuesta Monereo to refresh his memory in a private letter in which he wrote that “Su memoria en este asunto no le es totalmente fiel.”²⁶⁹ General Queipo's selective amnesia was understandable: acknowledging that he had met Villa-Abrille just a few hours before the outbreak of the rebellion would undermine his own legend.

²⁶⁴ *ABC* (Seville) 18 July 1937; *La Unión* (Seville), 18 July 1937; *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 18 July 1937; *FE* (Seville), 18 July 1937.

²⁶⁵ Bolín, Luis, *Spain: the vital years*, page 179.

²⁶⁶ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 63.

²⁶⁷ Álvarez Rey, Leandro, “Del rojo al azul: los inicios de la guerra civil en Sevilla” in Álvarez Rey, Leandro (ed.), *Andalucía y la guerra civil: estudios y perspectivas*, page 161.

²⁶⁸ “Sobre las doce de la mañana, el general Queipo de Llano, que acababa de llegar de Huelva, vestido de paisano, se presentó en la División y después de entrevistarse rápidamente con el comandante Cuesta y con el capitán Escribano, pasó al despacho del general Villa-Abrille, con el que sostuvo una entrevista, en la que éste mantuvo su criterio de no resignar el mando.” Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 62.

²⁶⁹ “En más de una ocasión le he oído decir que no fue a ver a Villa-Abrille en la mañana del 18 de julio. Su memoria en este asunto no le es totalmente fiel. Usted, mi General, estuvo en la mañana de dicho día, al venir de Huelva, viendo al General Villa-Abrille, y me vio usted al entrar y al salir de su despacho. A cuantos he preguntado sobre este punto concreto me lo confirman y yo, mi General, lo recuerdo también perfectamente”. Fernández-Coppel, Jorge, *Queipo de Llano: Memorias de la Guerra Civil*, page 38.

Eventually, the general's desperation reached such proportions that he eventually claimed to have punched Villa-Abrille during the Divisional General's arrest.²⁷⁰ Reality differed considerably from propaganda: Colonel Hornillos provided a very different version of events, corroborated by Major Allende. He told the Military Tribunal in Seville that Queipo did not punch but embraced his friend, followed by a friendly discussion:

"General Queipo de Llano, quien abrazando al General y manteniendo con él una conversación más bien amistosa y seguidos de los demás oficiales entraron en el despacho quedándose el dicente fuera sin poder oír la conversación que dentro se mantuvo si comprendió que ambos Generales trataban de convencerse mutuamente".²⁷¹

General Viota also refused to denounce Queipo de Llano and adopted a neutral stance when sedition exploded in Seville. As a result, he only received a light sentence in a time of court-martials and summary executions. A secret report from the Divisional Headquarters marked "MUY RESERVADO" read:

"Excmo Sr.- Dispuesto por Decreto fecha 23 del mes actual, pase a situación de segunda reserva el Excmo. Sr. General de Brigada DON JULIAN LOPEZ VIOTA; de orden de S.E. el Generalísimo de los Ejércitos Nacionales, comunicará V.E. a dicho General que el motivo fundamental en virtud del cual ha adoptado la Junta Superior del Ejército, con respecto a él, la determinación indicada, ha sido la de haber observado, en los momentos graves, por que ha atravesado la Patria, una notoria falta de celo.- Igualmente notificará V.E. a dicho General que oportunamente le será señalado por esta Secretaría de Guerra el haber pasivo que pueda corresponderle, así como que, a la mayor brevedad, traslade su residencia a Estella (Navarra).- Del cumplimiento de esta orden espero me de V.E. el debido conocimiento.-

Se traslada a ese Negociado para conocimiento y efectos.

Sevilla 1º Enero de 1.937."²⁷²

Villa-Abrille's apathy was equally comprehensible: he was aware of Queipo's violent personality and was intimidated by the extremism of the local garrison. On the one hand, Villa-Abrille's Republicanism prevented him from joining the conspiracy; while on the other he

²⁷⁰ Ibid, page 38.

²⁷¹ **Archivo del Tribunal Militar Territorial Segundo** (Seville), SUM 239/1938.

²⁷² **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 8154, Carpeta 2.

hoped that his silence would spare him from execution. A prisoner in a gilded cage, all that was left for the Divisional General to do was hope for the defeat of the coup in the rest of Spain.

Victory by magic

If the account of the arrest of General Villa-Abrille strikes one as questionable, the seizing of the Infantry barracks and the capture of Colonel Allanegui can only be regarded as magical. According to Nationalist historiography, General Queipo disregarded his own safety and went to the nearby Infantry barracks (Granada nº6) accompanied only by his *aide-de-camp*, and Captains Gutiérrez Flores and Lapatza, to try to persuade Republican Colonel Manuel Allanegui Lusarreta to throw his lot with the insurgents. Queipo attempted to trick Allanegui by pretending to assume that the colonel had already adhered to the rebellion. Having failed to surprise Allanegui with his clever subterfuge, Queipo then attempted to negotiate a deal, but the Colonel refused to listen to his proposal. It is alleged that it was at this precise moment that Queipo de Llano, in a truly legendary demonstration of bravery, instructed López-Guerrero to return to the Divisional Headquarters and bring Major Cuesta to mediate the dispute. The rebel general was then left alone in the Granada nº6 barracks, surrounded by a crowd of hostile officers. Miraculously, nobody dared to arrest him. Nationalist historiography claimed that most officers implicitly recognised the legitimacy of General Queipo's actions. Meanwhile, the rebel general considered solving the stalemate "a tiros"; in other words, to fight the entire Granada nº6 regiment on his own.²⁷³ Queipo claimed that he arrested Allanegui and all loyalist officers after threatening to resort to violence. Just before that, he offered command of the Infantry Corps to both Lieutenant-Colonel Berzosa and Major Gutiérrez Pérez, who declined the proposal. Both men cited fears of possible repeat of the *Sanjurjada* to justify their negative reply. Command was then briefly assumed by Falangist Captain Fernández de Córdoba before a contrite Gutiérrez Pérez was reinstated and placed in charge of the regiment. Fernández de Córdoba did not appear to have taken offense over his abrupt demotion and would soon give free reign to his visceral anti-Republicanism in Seville's city-centre.²⁷⁴

²⁷³ Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, pages 104.

²⁷⁴ Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, "Cómo dominamos Sevilla", page 29; Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. 3, page 174; Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 66; Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, pages 103-10.

Yet again, reality differed considerably from Nationalist propaganda. According to the statements of both Colonel Hornillos and Lieutenant-Colonel Berzosa to the Military Tribunal in Seville, Queipo was not left alone in the Granada nº6 barracks. Furthermore, a number of 'loyalist' officers urged Colonel Allanegui to join the rebellion, most notably Captain Fernández de Córdoba. When the colonel reaffirmed his Republicanism, Queipo suggested that they should consult General Villa-Abrille to solve the impasse. The objective was to lure the leader of the Infantry Corps to the Divisional Headquarters. The colonel fell into the trap: when both Allanegui and Berzosa arrived at the Divisional Headquarters, they were instructed to hand over their weapons and placed under arrest.²⁷⁵

Queipo and the magical victory

According to Nationalist mythology, the legendary capture of the Granada nº6 barracks legitimised the *coup d'état*. Bravery sufficed to justify the violent dismantling of the Republic in the capital of Andalucía. Furthermore, the incomprehensible passivity demonstrated by loyalist officers – especially General Villa-Abrille and Colonel Allanegui – was rationalised as a manifestation of the ideological inferiority of the Republic *vis-à-vis* the Nationalist cause. In deep contrast, General Queipo was motivated by the superior nature of his ideal – the rescuing of the *Patria* –, which allowed him to achieve a military feat of legendary proportions. Lastly, Nationalist mythology metamorphosed General Queipo from a Republican into a reactionary military icon. Queipo grabbed the opportunity to rewrite History with both hands and rapidly became the fiercest guardian of his own myth. For instance, he declared in 1940 that General Fanjul told him that "Como le indicase que en Andalucía no podía hacer nada, puesto que no se contaba con elementos de ninguna clase, me contestó que todos estaban de acuerdo en que yo era el único que podía acometer aquella empresa."²⁷⁶ As a consequence, General Queipo's recent past of ever-shifting political loyalties was bizarrely reinterpreted as a life "limpia hasta en sus errores".²⁷⁷ However, the past would continue to haunt the self-proclaimed 'saviour of Seville'. On 20 July 1936, an article in Portuguese daily *O Século* read:

²⁷⁵ **Archivo del Tribunal Militar Territorial Segundo** (Seville), 243/1938.

²⁷⁶ **Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia** (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, Legajo 11-8923, *Gonzalo Queipo de Llano "Relación jurada de servicios prestados"* (31 May 1940).

²⁷⁷ Armiñán Odriozola, Luis de, *Excmo. Sr. General D. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Jefe del Ejército del Sur*, page 9.

“O general Queipo de Llano que aparece no movimento de revolta do Exercito espanhol como comandante das forças de Sevilha, tem o seu nome estreitamente ligado às varias tentativas para a implantação da Republica no país vizinho, como o tem à campanha de Marrocos, onde ganhou, pelos seus méritos e energia, um alto prestigio.

A sua carreira militar, esmaltada por serviços brilhantes, tanto em África como na metrópole, foi para os republicanos uma garantia de que lhe podia ser confiado um alto posto no movimento que havia de derrubar o trono. Foi assim que Queipo de Llano se refugiou um dia em Portugal, fracassado o movimento da aviação de Cuatro Vientos, poucos meses antes da implantação da Republica. Daquela vez, acompanhava-o o capitão aviador Ramón Franco, que mais tarde, o censurou num livro, a propósito daquele movimento.

“Agora, tem a seu lado o general Franco, irmão daquele aviador.”²⁷⁸

General Mola’s plot succeeded in Seville: he placed General Queipo de Llano nominally in command of a rebellion that had already been planned by its local *Director*, Major Cuesta Monereo. This effectively prevented a repeat of the Cuatro Vientos fiasco of 1930. As for Queipo, he was happy to be placed symbolically in charge of a coup that would allow him to rewrite his own personal history. However, Mola had very different plans for his former foe-turned-ally: Queipo’s mission in Seville was not to gain the capital of Andalucía for the rebellion, already secured by Major Cuesta; but to enforce the *Director*’s repressive project. As early as June 1936, Mola had confided to Queipo that “Andalucía necesita un hombre de arranque y de empuje”.²⁷⁹

The *Director* therefore exploited the only constant in General Queipo’s military career – violence – and trusted the volatile general with the truly monumental task of exterminating the Republic in one of the strongholds of the Popular Front.²⁸⁰ At the same time, the insurgents had erected a structure with clay feet. The legitimacy of the rebellion in the south was based on the unstable foundation that was the unpredictable personality of General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra.

²⁷⁸ *O Século* (Lisboa), 20 July 1936.

²⁷⁹ Maíz, Félix B., *Mola, aquel hombre: diario de la conspiración, 1936*, page 200.

²⁸⁰ The Popular Front collected 61,5% of the vote in the capital of Andalucía at the February 1936 elections. Gómez Salvago, José, *La Segunda República: elecciones y partidos políticos en Sevilla y provincia*, pages 222-23.

Chapter III

Deconstructing the myth: the legend of General Queipo de Llano and his *soldaditos*

Introduction

The episode of the taking of ‘red Seville’, the first and also the most enduring of Nationalist myths, persists to the very present. The first version of the legend of Queipo de Llano and his *soldaditos* was presented by the rebel general himself during his triumphant radio speech (*charla*) of 23 July 1936, immediately after the pacification of the working-class districts of Seville. Ironically, the tale of the *soldaditos*, which started out as just another of Queipo’s frequent verbal outbursts, was progressively embellished, rapidly growing out of all proportion. It gained a life of its own and developed into a myth for three reasons: a) to underpin the legend that a Communist coup had been prevented; b) to legitimise the 18 July rising; and c) to metamorphose Queipo from a Republican into an anti-Republican icon (his past actions now excused as “actuación equivocada”).²⁸¹ However, on 23 July 1936, the rebel general’s initial objective was simply to magnify his role in the local rebellion. The details of the story were truly spectacular, as befitted Queipo’s eccentric personality.

In a nutshell, Queipo de Llano claimed that on 18 July his 180 rebel soldiers defeated the 600 Republican assault guards defending the Civil Government: “La situación fue resuelta en Sevilla por un puñado de soldaditos que marcharon contra las autoridades rojas que en aquellas horas disponía de medios de combate muy superiores.”²⁸² The foundation of the myth was the *casus belli* for the July coup: a pre-emptive strike against an imminent Soviet-sponsored revolution, spearheaded by native ‘Marxist hordes’. Queipo de Llano’s imagination armed and expanded their number, while at the same time handing himself all the credit for the success of the rising in Seville. As the legend gained substance, courtesy of Queipo’s solipsistic behaviour, the Nationalist leadership came to regard it as the panacea for the rebel crisis of legitimacy. A year later (29 September 1937), the tale of the *soldaditos* was elevated to the

²⁸¹ “Falleció por esta época el teniente general laureado don Gonzalo Queipo de Llano. Se le puede perdonar su actuación equivocada, al contribuir al triunfo de la República, si se tiene en cuenta su conducta heroica conquistando Sevilla y casi toda Andalucía para el Movimiento nacional.” Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, *Mi vida junto a Franco*, page 330.

²⁸² ABC (Seville), 24 July 1936.

pantheon of official Nationalist History when the *Medalla Militar Colectiva* was bestowed on the garrison of Seville (*Boletín Oficial de Estado* nº351). In order to transform myth into History, the rebel high-command decreed that:

“sólo tendrían derecho a ostentar el distintivo correspondiente por que lucharon en la calle con las armas en la mano, y como fuerzas militarmente organizadas, desde las 15 horas, en que se declaró el Estado de guerra, hasta las 19,30, hora de rendición del Gobierno Civil, a partir de cuyo momento se consideró triunfante el Movimiento en la Capital.”²⁸³

The eligibility conditions for recipients of the honour were as restrictive as they were bizarre: they excluded anyone who was not part of an official military/paramilitary group on 18 July 1936; anyone who being part of such a group did not fight, literally, in the streets (for instance, a soldier firing from a building would not qualify as having participated in the coup); anyone who did fight but only after 19:30. Moreover, the list (and number) of recipients was never made public. The episode of the *Medalla Militar* is therefore as confusing and enshrouded in mystery as is the taking of the capital of Andalucía. Ironically, the first crack in the myth was provoked by the rebels themselves, more specifically by the same soldiers that participated in the ‘miracle’ of Seville.²⁸⁴ Only a few weeks after the announcement of the *Medalla Militar*, the offices of the II Division were flooded by a torrent of written complaints from individuals that felt unjustly excluded from the decoration.

Part I: The coup d'état

A three-man rebellion

Nationalist secrecy concerning the *Medalla Militar* contrasted deeply with Queipo’s shameless self-promotion campaign, which reached its climax during the first anniversary of the rebellion. At the same time as the stream of formal protests was quietly archived, the rebel general

²⁸³ “S.E. el Generalísimo de los Ejércitos Nacionales se ha dignado resolver que la Orden de 29 de septiembre último (B.O. núm. 351), por la que se concedió la Medalla Militar Colectiva a la guarnición de Sevilla por su actuación el día 18 de julio de 1936, se estaba aclarado en el sentido de que sólo tendrían derecho a ostentar el distintivo correspondiente por que lucharon en la calle con las armas en la mano, y como fuerzas militarmente organizadas, desde las 15 horas, en que se declaró el Estado de guerra, hasta las 19,30, hora de rendición del Gobierno Civil, a partir de cuyo momento se consideró triunfante el Movimiento en la Capital.” Letter of 19 January 1938. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5363, Carpeta 1.

²⁸⁴ The capture of Seville was perceived as a “milagro” by the Nationalists. For instance, Manuel Aznar claimed that: “General Queipo de Llano [...] hizo el milagro de alcanzar una victoria decisiva para la marcha futura de la guerra nacional.” Aznar, Manuel, **Historia militar de la guerra de España**, page 97.

provided a profoundly narcissistic – and fictional - account of the coup: he stated that at 13:45 on 18 July only himself, his *aide-de-camp* (López-Guerrero) and Major Cuesta Monereo had mutinied in the capital of Andalucía. Queipo added that a mere fifteen minutes later the three insurgents had ‘miraculously’ arrested two generals, two colonels, one lieutenant-colonel and two majors.²⁸⁵ He was therefore reinforcing the first part of the myth: the legend of Queipo de Llano.

Reality differed considerably from Queipo’s colourful tale. In truth, victory for the insurgents had been assured long before the rebel general made his ‘miraculous’ intervention in Seville. The Republic had already been defeated locally once in August 1932 and was now starved of weapons from the moment Captain (Engineer) Corretger and Lieutenant Sack Caruncho (“militar y falangista cien por cien”²⁸⁶) surreptitiously seized the *Parque de Artillería*.²⁸⁷ Heavy machine-guns had already been set up in defensive positions during the night of 17-18 July.²⁸⁸ Moreover, all key communication lines fell rapidly under rebel control. For instance, retired Major (Engineer) Fontán de la Orden and Major Cuesta Monereo made arrangements for the swift capture of *Unión Radio* by a mixed unit of civil guards (Miraflores post), Cavalry and Infantry soldiers.²⁸⁹ The leader of the *Jefatura de Transportes Militares*, *Intendencia* Major Jose Garcia Fuentes, subsequently submitted a written complaint denouncing the fact that his unit was not awarded the *Medalla Militar* despite contributing to the coup by “requisando toda clase de vehículos y surtidores de gasolina”.²⁹⁰ 22 soldiers stationed at the *Pirotecnia* on 18 July were also overlooked for the decoration, including Lieutenant-Colonel José Sánchez Garcia and Majors Manuel Carmona Pérez de Vera and Pedro Fernández Palomino.²⁹¹ Both reports revealed that General Queipo’s ‘miracle’ was but an expertly-planned mutiny that included the participation of all military corps in the garrison of Seville.

²⁸⁵ **ABC** (Seville), 18 July 1937.

²⁸⁶ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 125.

²⁸⁷ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5363 (Cavalry); Legajo 5375, Carpeta 20.

²⁸⁸ Saturday workday at the *Pirotecnia* in July 1936 concluded at 13:45. Viguera, Enrique de la Vega, *La Pirotecnia Militar de Sevilla*, page 79.

²⁸⁹ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5363 (Cavalry); Legajo 5375, Carpeta 5 and 14 (Infantry). See also: Barrios, Manuel, *El último virrey. Queipo de Llano*, pages 145-174.

²⁹⁰ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 2, Carpeta 3. The *Pirotecnia* was also protected by a group of Civil Guards manning a heavy machine-gun. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 11.

²⁹¹ Report dated 11 January 1938. **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 2, Carpeta 15. See also: *La Unión* (Seville), 21 July 1936.

The myth of the *soldaditos*

Captain Corrales and Lieutenant Antonio Álvarez-Rementería (brother of Eduardo Álvarez-Rementería) did not witness the 'miraculous' (or magical) arrests of General Villa-Abrille and Colonel Allanegui, but arrived at the Infantry barracks just in time to observe the birth of the myth of the *soldaditos*. Both men listened attentively to General Queipo's harangue to a meagre crowd of 130 soldiers (journalist Enrique Villa mentions 160), all of whom were induced into believing that they were being sent to save - and not destroy - the Republic. At around 15:00, Captain Rodríguez Trasellas and Falangist Lieutenant García del Moral left the Cuartel San Hermenegildo with the 130 *soldaditos* to declare the state of war in both the Plaza del Duque and Plaza Nueva. As the unit progressed towards its objective, it placed detachments of troops in the narrow streets leading to Seville's main square (Plaza Nueva), where the key institutions of political power were located: Town Hall and Civil Government. Both officers received explicit instructions to carry out their mission as quietly as possible so not to arouse any suspicion. The confused bystanders could never predict that the military edict (*bando*) informally read out to them would become the backbone of Seville's judicial system for the subsequent three years.²⁹²

Mystified by the unusual movement of troops, Civil Governor Varela Rendueles ordered an Assault Guard patrol to intercept the rebels. However, the paramilitary unit fell victim to the deceitful tactics of Captain Trasellas, who instructed his men to shout Republican slogans during the short trip from the Divisional Headquarters to the Plaza Nueva in what would prove to be a recurrent tactic adopted by the Nationalists.²⁹³ Varela Rendueles was perplexed as he saw insurgent Infantry soldiers and loyalist assault guards proclaiming the *bando* side-by-side (the same *bando* was later used to justify the extra-judicial execution of Assault Guard leader Major José Loureiro). In despair, the civil governor was left with no option but to risk the life of

²⁹² The soldiers believed that they were ordered to overthrow the Popular Front government, but preserve the Republican regime. On 1 May 1938, soldier Angel Moreno Mestre stated that Lieutenant Villa Salgado addressed his unit of 45 soldiers between 14:00-15:00 declaring: "El General Franco se ha levantado en África contra el Gobierno y en Sevilla el General Queipo de Llano uniéndose a él ha tomado el mando de la División. ¿Estais dispuestos á defender a España?", y todos sin excepción contestamos con un ¡SI!" **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 5 (see also Carpeta 2 and 6). Álvarez-Rementeria wrote: "quince horas del glorioso 18 de Julio de 1936, momento en que se declaró el Estado de guerra". See also: Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, "Cómo dominamos Sevilla" in *Estampas de la guerra, tomo 5, Frentes de Andalucía y Extremadura*, page 29; Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. 3, page 174; Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 66, 69 and 92; Bolín, Luis, *Spain: the vital years*, page 180; Montán, Luis, "Cómo conquistó Sevilla el General Queipo de Llano" in *Episodios de la Guerra Civil nº5*, page 17.

²⁹³ **FE** (Seville), 19 October 1936.

his own brother, Joaquín, whom he sent to clarify the situation. Following Joaquín Varela Rendueles' dramatic intervention, heavy gunfire broke out in and around the Plaza Nueva. The rebellion had officially erupted in Seville with the Republic already on the defensive, its leadership confused by the cunning of Major Cuesta Monereo, the exhausted Assault Guard either dispersed or resting (between the hours of 14:00-17:00, as instructed by the Civil Governor), and the rebels exactly where they wanted to be: in the Plaza Nueva.²⁹⁴

Official Francoist historiography later claimed that 180 (or 130 or 160, depending on the source) *soldaditos* achieved a 'miraculous' military victory that revealed the moral superiority of the rebel cause, confirmed by the protective influence of a higher power (God): the myth of the *soldaditos*.²⁹⁵ Ironically, Ignacio Rodríguez Trasellas never lived to witness the complete metamorphosis of the coup into a legend. On 20 August 1936, he died of a heart attack while attending Mass in Aracena (Huelva) the day after the occupation of the town.²⁹⁶

The Assault Guard

The Assault Guard reacted immediately to Varela Rendueles' order and barricaded itself in the high-rise telephone company building (*Telefónica*), the nearby Hotel Inglaterra (located in front of the Civil Government, thus functioning as a protective barrier), and the Civil Government. The attacking troops were forced into a tactical retreat. An Infantry unit armed with mortars and heavy machine-guns headed by Captain Carlos Fernández de Córdoba was scrambled to relieve the struggling insurgent soldiers only to be surprised by the tenacity of the assault guards, who captured a heavy machine-gun and injured the rebel captain in the face. Fernández de Córdoba eventually managed to escape inside the Town Hall, but was immediately placed under arrest on the orders of Mayor Horacio Hermoso, who prevented a certain lynching. The Mayor of Seville also instructed for first aid to be given to his prisoner.

²⁹⁴ Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, page 123. The leftist trade-unions were equally confused: "Léon Martin, a mechanic, heard it in the garage where he was at work. The atmosphere had been tense for weeks; everyone knew something was going to happen. 'But when it did, it happened so fast it took everyone by surprise.' He tried to get the ninety members of his local CNT section, of which he was the secretary, together; only a dozen or so turned up. Together they set off for the assault guard barracks in the Alameda." Fraser, Ronald, *Blood of Spain: the experience of Civil War, 1936-1939*, page 51.

²⁹⁵ Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, "Cómo dominamos Sevilla" in *Estampas de la guerra, tomo 5, Frentes de Andalucía y Extremadura*, page 29; Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. 3, page 174; Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 66, 69 and 92; Bolín, Luis, *Spain: the vital years*, page 180; Montán, Luis, "Cómo conquistó Sevilla el General Queipo de Llano" in *Episodios de la Guerra Civil, nº5*, page 17.

²⁹⁶ Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *La Guerra Civil en Huelva*, page 196.

Meanwhile, a group of heavily-armed young Falangists driving a car burst into the Plaza Nueva firing at random. Their recklessness proved fatal: the aristocratic José Ignacio Benjumea was shot and mortally wounded. He was later ‘canonised’ as the the first Nationalist ‘martyr’ of Seville; his death cynically exploited to consecrate the myth of General Queipo de Llano.²⁹⁷

The defensive grit of the Assault Guard delayed, but could never prevent, the inevitable collapse of the pro-Republican forces. The transient nature of the government’s military superiority was crudely exposed when the Assault Guard realised its inability to mount an effective counter-attack after initially forcing the rebels to retreat back to both the Cuartel de San Hermenegildo and the Divisional Headquarters.²⁹⁸ The paramilitary group not only failed to seize both buildings, but was overpowered by an artillery unit that also captured one of the Assault Guard’s three armoured vehicles.²⁹⁹ To make matters worse, around 150 assault guards were arrested and later coerced into fighting on the insurgent side.³⁰⁰ By then, it was already evident that the Assault Guard was isolated in its loyalty to the Republic.

Queipo de Llano subsequently demonised the Assault Guard; however, a secret document from Seville’s Military Tribunal revealed that on the afternoon of 18 July the paramilitary unit saved a small party of captured Civil Guards at the La Alameda Headquarters from execution at the hands of leftist militants enraged by the earlier massacre of several residents of La Macarena:

“Mi Capitán, dos o tres comunistas que están hablando ahí con un grupo de Asalto les están diciendo, que yo acabo de oírlo, que qué esperan para asesinarlos, pues la Guardia Civil son

²⁹⁷ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 211. See also pages 92-93. Other young oligarchs present in the city-center: Leopoldo, Fernando and Gonzalo Parias, Ignacio Cañal, Alfonso and José Medina and Carlos Llorente. They wondered around the streets attempting to galvanise the local political right while at the same time supporting the rebel Infantry’s assault on the city-centre.

²⁹⁸ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 1 and 3.

²⁹⁹ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 1.

³⁰⁰ Manuel Aznar mentioned the capture of two armoured vehicles and the arrest of 150 assault guards. The second armoured vehicle was seized in calle Tetuán. Both vehicles were then employed against their former proprietors, now under the possession of a single armoured car that was also captured shortly afterwards. Aznar, Manuel, *Historia militar de la guerra de España*, page 97. Infantry Soldier Antonio Moro González was part of the Lieutenant Villa’s unit. In a written statement submitted on 7 April 1938, González declared that his squadron was in the Plaza del Duque: “donde sustuvieron intenso tiroteo contra los Guardias de Asalto que les atacaron con carros y camiones blindados, y con un grupo de soldados entre los que figuraba el declarante, fueron conducidos un buen número de dicho Guardias de asalto al Cuartel antes mencionado, saliendo poco después a ocupar la azotea del edificio de la VINICOLA, inmediato al Cuartel”. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 6.

unos canallas y ahora mismo hemos pasado nosotros por el Cuartel de la Macarena y nos han tiroteado desde el Cuartel.”³⁰¹

The victory of deceit, part I

While Captain Fernández de Córdoba struggled to contain the Assault Guard in the city-centre, Captain Escribano ordered Major Núñez of the *Intendencia* Corps to strike directly at the heart of the Republic: the Civil Government.³⁰² Núñez woke up his soldiers in the middle of the *siesta* and headed straight to the administrative center of Seville; but not before organising both the defence of the *Intendencia* Headquarters and the patrolling of nearby streets.³⁰³ Núñez’s mission was consistent with Cuesta’s plan to capture Seville by way of deception: the *Intendencia* Major had cultivated an artificial friendship with Varela Rendueles during the previous months in order to keep a watchful eye over the Republican authorities. Núñez made the most of his duplicity: he mimicked Captain Trasellas and also ordered the 76 men under his command (General Queipo later reduced the number to 40 to safeguard *his* myth³⁰⁴) to shout Republican slogans during the short trip from the Puerta de la Carne barracks the Civil Government.³⁰⁵ At the same time, the 53 soldiers of the *Sección de Destinos* were instructed to protect the *Intendencia* headquarters, which they did, “cooperando á la defensa del Cuartel de Intendencia, así como en las inmediaciones del mismo a restablecer el orden deteniendo y cacheando al personal paisano y sosteniendo tiroteo con los sediciosos en las calles de ésta Ciudad y conducción de presos.”³⁰⁶

Another group of 78 *Intendencia* soldiers was also ordered to defend the barracks, “respondiendo en todo momento al fuego que se le hacía desde bocacalles y azoteas”. After securing the area, the insurgents organised patrols to sweep the entire northern sector of

³⁰¹ **Archivo de Tribunal Militar Territorial Segundo** (Seville), SS DP 248/1937. The leader of the Civil Guard detachment, Captain Francisco Viguera de la Vega, was later awarded the *Medalla Militar*.

Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 1.

³⁰² **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 13 and 20. The courier trusted with delivering Escribano’s order was retired Lieutenant Parladé. Cavalry Captain Juan Benjumea Vazquez functioned as the liaison officer between the Divisional Headquarters and Lieutenant Parladé. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 1.

³⁰³ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, carpeta 20

³⁰⁴ See Núñez’s declarations in **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 25; corroborated by reporter Sánchez del Arco. Sánchez del Arco, Manuel, *El sur de España en la reconquista de Madrid (diario de operaciones glosado por un testigo)*, page 29. For Queipo’s version see: **ABC** (Seville), 18 July 1937.

³⁰⁵ **El Correo de Andalucía** (Seville), 18 July 1937.

³⁰⁶ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 2.

Seville.³⁰⁷ Simultaneously, the *Sanidad* Corps under the command of Major Altube helped establish a protective cordon that sealed-off the working-class district of the Gran Plaza from the city-centre. All three military units were excluded from the *Medalla Militar*, since acknowledging the presence of an extra 207 soldiers in Seville would suffice to dismantle the fragile myth of the *soldaditos*. Still, their contribution proved vital for the success of the rebellion: they not only prevented left-wing militias from reaching the city-centre, but also tightened the noose that would eventually asphyxiate the Republic.

Meanwhile, Major Núñez accomplished in minutes what Captains Trasellas and Fernández de Córdoba could not achieve in hours: to penetrate the Civil Government. The local guards recognised the *Intendencia* Major from his frequent gatherings with the Civil Governor and granted him access into the building, but not – critically - to the men under his command. Núñez believed that perhaps he would be capable of arresting his ‘friend’ on his own; however, he was visibly unnerved by the presence of a large group of armed men, including Major José Loureiro (accompanied by a number of Assault Guard officers) and trade-union leader Saturnino Barneto (also flanked by several PCE militants). Núñez exploited the reigning confusion to make a timely escape and head straight to the Divisional Headquarters where he passed key information to General Queipo, including news of Varela’s ignorance of Villa-Abrille’s arrest. Ultimately, the *Intendencia* Major might have failed in his mission to capture the Civil Government, but the Republic remained paralysed by doubt.³⁰⁸

After listening attentively to Núñez’s report, the rebel leadership ordered the *Intendencia* Major to direct the assault against the *Telefónica*. In order to avoid a certain confrontation with the Assault Guard before reaching the Plaza Nueva, Núñez opted to take an alternative route back to the city-centre. In doing so, his unit would have forcibly to pass in front the *Casa del Pueblo*, the hub of left-wing trade-unionism in Seville. Yet again, Núñez tricked the local workers, who hailed the insurgents as saviours. In the Plaza Nueva, the *Intendencia* group

³⁰⁷ Also, during the night of 18-19 July: “al ser atacado el Cuartel por los marxistas, ocuparon los puestos estratégicos del Cuartel, defendiéndolo y haciendo que resultara frustrado el ataque, teniendo en el mismo, un muerto y dos heridos.” Report of 10 November 1937. **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 2, Carpeta 3. See also: *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 18 July 1937.

³⁰⁸ On the first anniversary of the rebellion *El Correo de Andalucía* interviewed an anonymous *Intendencia* soldier that provided a detailed account of the actions of his Corps during the taking of the city-center. *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 18 July 1937. See also: Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, page 109.

teamed-up with Infantry and Engineer soldiers already laying siege to the *Telefónica*.³⁰⁹ Nationalist historiography remained mute regarding the involvement of the Engineers and the *Requeté*, confirmed by Núñez's statement.³¹⁰ Núñez also declared that his group of six men captured the Town Hall and arrested 50 or 60 municipal guards (including its leader, Major Rafael Lora).³¹¹ The *Intendencia* Major freed Captain Fernández de Córdoba, who arrested both Mayor Horacio Hermoso and Councillor Ángel Casal. Meanwhile, rebel sympathisers started massing at the gates of the insurrectionary barracks demanding weapons. Captain Eduardo Álvarez-Rementería handed to each a rifle, ammunition and identification cards. Carlist Captain Benítez Tatay separately armed the *Requeté*. Unlike Varela Rendueles, who feared the growing influence of the radical-left; the insurgents stockpiled weapons reserved for far-right extremists. Sensing that the balance of power had tilted decisively in his favour, General Queipo sent a letter to Varela Rendueles via a captured assault guard in which he intimidated the Civil Governor into accepting an unconditional surrender or else be made responsible for all the bloodshed in Seville. Varela called Queipo's bluff. He made an appeal for a general strike via the radio and raised the Republican flag in the Civil Government. The civil governor also ordered the printing of leaflets at the *El Liberal* offices to be dropped by planes on both the city-centre and the working-class districts of Seville (to elucidate the population as to the true nature of the rebellion). Queipo partly mimicked the Varela Rendueles ploy by also raising the Republican flag in the Divisional Headquarters, but his intentions could not have been more antipodal: to disorient the militant left.³¹²

³⁰⁹ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 100-01. The *Intendencia* unit was divided in three groups: the first, headed by Lieutenant Antonio Santa Ana de la Rosa (20 men), seized a building directly overlooking the *Telefónica*; the second, leaded by Sergeant José Elorza Martínez (20 men), cut off access to all streets leading to the Plaza de San Francisco; and the third, under the command of Major Núñez, captured the Town Hall. **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 25.

³¹⁰ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 102. For the report confirming the presence of *Requeté* see: **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 1.

³¹¹ "Marché con 6 hombres al Ayuntamiento, donde no nos querían abrir la puerta; pero ante la intimación de que la echaríamos abajo decidieron abrirla, entrando nosotros y ocupando los balcones del mismo para disparar sobre la telefónica.- En el referido Ayuntamiento, existían unos 50 o 60 guardias municipales, todos ellos armados y como desconocíamos sus intenciones, procedí a su desarme, a lo cuál no opusieron ninguna resistencia." **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 25. **ABC** (Seville), 20 August 1936 confirmed that Núñez met Varela Rendueles at around 15:00, arrested between 60 to 70 municipal guards with 6 men, and dominated the city-centre with 76 men.

³¹² **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 25. See also: "18 de Julio de 1936 en Sevilla" in **Archivo Hispalense**, Sevilla, nº132-133, 1965, page 183; Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 103. For the *Requeté* see: **La Unión** (Seville), 18 July 1937.

The Civil Guard

At around 17:00, a tiny detachment of twelve civil guards arrived at the Civil Government and placed themselves under the authority of Varela Rendueles, who was unaware that the group functioned as mere decoys. Shortly afterwards, genuine reinforcements in the shape of Lieutenant-Colonel Genaro Conde Bujons (*Jefe del Interior*), Major Rodríguez and Lieutenant Juan Masse Esquivel arrived at the Plaza de San Francisco to support Núñez's assault on the *Telefónica*. Both men had earlier assured Varela Rendueles of their loyalty to the Republic and produced a series of excuses for not making an appearance in the Civil Government. They were nevertheless impeded from reaching the Divisional Headquarters by an assault guard patrol. However, that did not deter the Civil Guard from mobilising *en masse* against the government.³¹³ At around 16:00-16:30, the majority of effectives assembled at their headquarters, the Cuartel de San Felipe (calle Gerona). The unusual movement of troops, as well as the illegal stockpiling of weapons and ammunition, alerted the trade-unions and the headquarters came under attack by a group of around forty militiamen, resulting in a "nutrido tiroteo":

"fue atacada la casa-Cuartel de San Felipe por elementos marxistas con propósito de asaltarla, quizás por conocer se encontraba en ella depositadas centenares de armas largas rayadas y cortas, bombas de mano y miles de cartuchos almacenados en el repuesto de ambas Comandancias de Sevilla Interior y Exterior".³¹⁴

The heavily-armed Civil Guard not only repelled the assault, but also gained control over all key streets connecting the working-class districts to the city-centre. Furthermore, Major Garrigós ordered a group of four civil guards to function as couriers, driving to the Divisional Headquarters, Infantry barracks, *Telefónica*, *Casa de Correos* "y otros sectores de la capital siendo agredidos durante el trayecto y teniendo que repeler las continuas agresiones continuando en servicio durante todo el día y sucesivos". All were excluded from the *Medalla*

³¹³ Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, pages 114-15. The deposed Civil Governor of Seville also wrote: "Además de los efectivos de éstas había en la provincia concentrada mucha fuerza de otras Comandancias que yo había solicitado y me fue concedida porque el estado social de la provincia y la peligrosidad de la actuación extremista en el campo lo justificaba sobradamente." Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, page 113. For the presence of the Civil Guard in the city-centre see also: **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 1 and 20.

³¹⁴ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 20.

*Militar.*³¹⁵ Another group of six left the *Parque Movil* in a truck to collect 36 civil guards from the Burgos *Comandancia* (headed by Corporal Don Victorino Gonzalez) trapped in the San Jerónimo train station. The same unit also transported loyalist detainees to the Provincial Prison under intense gunfire. Later that day, the rebels ordered the Burgos civil guards to disperse a loyalist crowd in calle Reyes Católicos. Lastly, the unit also participated in the battle of the Plaza Nueva, “luchando con las armas en la mano y repeliendo las agresiones de que eran objeto por parte de los marxistas”.³¹⁶

Queipo de Llano attempted to silence the involvement of the Civil Guard in the insurgency and the only source to provide a figure (much to the exasperation of the rebel general) was reporter Enrique Vila, who claimed that 90 civil guards participated in the taking of Seville.³¹⁷ This was a particularly cruel omission, since the Civil Guard suffered a considerable casualty rate, including two dead during a brief gun-battle after a group of leftist militants driving a car stormed at full-speed into the Plaza de San Francisco.³¹⁸ Needless to say, the contribution of the battle-hardened paramilitary corps proved decisive for the success of the rebellion.

The Republic versus the garrison of Seville

The fate of the Republic became clear when Cavalry Colonel Santiago Mateo was arrested by both Major Figuerola (his second-in-command) and Captain Rojas. Captain Francisco Parlade y Ibarra, a radical rightist who had served a 12 year prison sentence for his involvement in several anti-Republican plots; also participated in Mateo’s detention.³¹⁹ In a crude inversion of responsibilities, Colonel Mateo was subsequently court-martialled, sentenced to death for

³¹⁵ Por estos servicios recibió de la Comisión de donativos del Ejercito la cantidad de cien pesetas por conducto reglamentario como gratificación especial; pero no figurando entre los individuos a quienes les fue concedida la Medalla Militar Colectiva.” **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 20.

³¹⁶ The 36 civil guards from Burgos were also involved “en operaciones en dirección a Triana hasta llegar a la Idraulica del Guadalquivir, donde fueron atacados por todas partes, rechazando los ataques enemigos y causando gran número de bajas vistosas, regresando a la Telefónica sin novedad, formó parte de las fuerzas que tomaron el Gobierno Civil”. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 20.

³¹⁷ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 146.

³¹⁸ *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 18 July 1937; “18 de Julio de 1936 en Sevilla” in **Archivo Hispalense**, Sevilla, nº132-133, 1965, page 183.

³¹⁹ A report dated 20 May 1939 proposing the *Cruz de Guerra* for Parlade read: “Este Oficial perseguido y procesado por amor a su Patria, condenado a doce años y un dia, al enterarse del Movimiento Salvador se presenta a las quince horas del dia 18 al Jefe de Estado Mayor de la División para ofrecerle sus servicios y ponerse a sus órdenes, siendo inmediatamente empleado en servicios de armas, detención de la Gestora de la Diputación Provincial y la del Coronel del Regimiento de Caballería nº7.” **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5363, Carpeta 13.

military rebellion for organising a Cavalry party headed by Lieutenant Rincón to protect the civil government; and executed on 18 September 1936.³²⁰ In other words, Mateo had rebelled against the rebellion; an example of ‘reverse justice’.

At the same time, Varela Rendueles ordered Lieutenant Rincón to secure the Puente de Triana and instructed working-class militants to abstain from attacking the cavalry unit. It was precisely at this point that Rincón decided to head straight to the Divisional Headquarters and put himself under the authority of General Queipo de Llano. Meanwhile, Artillery Colonel Santos Rodríguez Cerezo, who harboured deep reservations about joining the rebellion, was intimidated by extremist Lieutenant-Colonel Iturzaeta (his second-in-command) and the remainder of his reactionary officer caste and threw his lot with the insurgents.³²¹ Indeed, the Artillery Corps was dominated by a reactionary officer caste poisoned by extremist propaganda.³²²

At around 16:30, two artillery batteries under the command of Captain Pérez de Sevilla (totalling 127 soldiers³²³) left the Pineda barracks to deliver the *coup de grace* to the Republic. However, it took nearly two hours for the military column to reach the city-centre; a delay caused by the presence of a group of assault guards barricaded in a nearby hotel. General Queipo ordered the shelling of the building, demonstrating a blatant disregard for civilian life.³²⁴ Fortunately, Pérez de Sevilla’s group was met by a Cavalry unit headed by Captain Figuerola who, like Rincón, joined the rebellion after contravening Varela Rendueles’ order to intercept and disarm the insurgents. Figuerola’s party overpowered the assault guards stationed in La Palmera, seized their heavy machine-guns and freed Lieutenant (Artillery) Alfonso Alarcón de la Lastra. After successfully concluding its defensive duties, the Cavalry group then headed north to reinforce the security perimeter set up by Major Altube and violently dispersed a large crowd of workers from Amate and Cerro del Águila attempting to

³²⁰ Santiago Mateo was informally defended by his own son, Juan Mateo Marcos. Both of Mateo’s sons fought on the Nationalist side during the civil war. Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *La Justicia de Queipo. Violencia selectiva y terror fascista en la II División en 1936: Sevilla, Huelva, Cádiz, Córdoba, Málaga y Badajoz*, pages 65-70.

³²¹ Vega Viguera, Enrique, *Sevilla y la artillería*, pages 225-28.

³²² “Estábamos sublevados y la vida ya no tenía valor para nosotros salvo para entregarla a la Patria, cumpliendo así el imperativo de «defenderá a la Nación contra todo enemigo del exterior e interior».”

“18 de Julio de 1936 en Sevilla” in *Archivo Hispalense*, Sevilla, nº132-133, 1965, page 182.

³²³ *Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur* (Seville), Legajo 5363.

³²⁴ Quevedo y Queipo de Llano, Ana, *Queipo de Llano. Gloria e infortunio de un general*, page 371.

reach the city-centre.³²⁵ Artillery Captain Rafael Esquivias Salcedo, who offered his services to Lieutenant-Colonel Iturzaeta at 14:30, functioned as a liaison officer.³²⁶

The Nationalist high-command subsequently used Colonel Santiago Mateo's actions as a pretext to exclude the entire Cavalry Corps from both the *Medalla Militar* and the myth of the *soldaditos*. In doing so, it successfully concealed the key fact that the Republic faced the rebellion of the entire garrison of Seville.

The victory of deceit, part II

There was one final twist to the story. As the Artillery column approached the Plaza Nueva, it was intercepted by an Assault Guard patrol at the Avenida de la Libertad. Once more, the assault guards were fooled by Pérez de Sevilla's insincere protestations of loyalty to the Republic (the artillery captain told the guards that he was going to "ponerse a disposición del gobernador civil").³²⁷ Shortly afterwards, leaflets alerting the local population about the outbreak of an anti-Republican rebellion showered from the sky, dropped by planes from Tablada. It was already too little too late for the Republic: the Artillery column entered Seville's main square at 18:30.³²⁸ At around the same time (18:15-18:30), an Infantry squadron headed by Lieutenant Villa and equipped with a cannon and heavy mortars also arrived the Plaza Nueva. The presence of Lieutenant Villa's Infantry group, of Lieutenant Pedro de Rueda's *Zapadores-Minadores* and the *Requeté*; all became victims of Queipo de Llano's selective amnesia.³²⁹

³²⁵ "18 de Julio de 1936 en Sevilla" in *Archivo Hispalense*, Sevilla, nº132-133, 1965, pages 182-84; Ortiz Villalba, Juan, *Del golpe militar a la guerra civil: Sevilla 1936*, page 120.

³²⁶ "armonizando la salida de la batería con el escuadrón que le dio escolta.- Mas tarde de órdenes del mismo Tte. Coronel pasé a Sevilla a recoger noticias de la marcha del Movimiento, en lo que se refería a las dos baterías (a caballo y pié a tierra) que habían salido del Cuartel, regresando a las veinte horas, constituyéndome en retén hasta el dia 19". *Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur* (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 14.

³²⁷ "18 de Julio de 1936 en Sevilla" in *Archivo Hispalense*, Sevilla, nº132-133, 1965, page 184.

³²⁸ The artillery column was flanked by a *Requeté* squadron headed by Luis Redondo and Enrique Salado. For the *Requeté* see: *Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur* (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 9.

³²⁹ Several written depositions confirmed the participation of a *Requeté* squadron headed by Enrique Barrau Salado "en las primeras horas de la tarde del día 18 de julio de 1936, en cumplimiento de órdenes del que suscribe, protegiendo la batería que hacía fuego sobre el Gobierno Civil, en cuyo edificio quedó a las órdenes del Comandante Sr. Núñez tan pronto fue rendido dicho Edificio Oficial." Report dated 30 April 1938. *Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur* (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 9. *ABC* stated that the group arrived at 18:15. *ABC* (Seville), 20 August 1936. According to *La Unión*, Redondo's squadron was "atacado cobardemente por un grupo de marxistas." *La Unión* (Seville), 18 July 1937. For the *Zapadores-Minadores*: "Indudablemente, el único regimiento de nuestra guarnición que estaba

The superiority of the canon and mortar fire rapidly settled a deeply-asymmetrical battle. Captain Pérez de Sevilla ordered the shelling of the *Telefónica*, killing an undetermined number of civilians. In 1937, Enrique Vila wrote that only one civilian died during the bombardment; however, Major Núñez's earlier report of 3 August 1936 mentioned ten civilian deaths.³³⁰ Assault Guard resistance collapsed after Lieutenant Ignacio Alonso Alonso was killed during the artillery barrage. Alonso's death was followed by Major Núñez's storming of the *Telefónica*. A new Director was immediately installed and all personnel (including the deposed Director) received explicit instructions from General Queipo to obey all orders coming from the Divisional Headquarters. He also instructed Enrique Pedrosa Barraca to execute anyone who refused to comply: "si viera U. alguna vacilación en el cumplimiento de esta orden que le doy, saque U. al Director y al persona que no acate y U. mismo lo fusila en la Plaza Nueva."³³¹

The Republic collapses

The fall of the *Telefónica* triggered an irreversible domino effect. The last Assault Guard armoured vehicle was bombed out of action and the nearby Hotel Inglaterra - ferociously protected by Barneto's dockworkers union - shelled into submission.³³² Only a narrow street now separated the rebel-controlled Hotel Inglaterra from the loyalist Civil Government and the Republic from total defeat. Varela Rendueles' last hope was shattered when Major Rafael

colectivamente dispuesto y preparado para el movimiento militar iniciado en Sevilla el día 18 de Julio era el batallón de Zapadores-Minadores que se aloja en el hermoso cuartel de la Avenida de Borbolla." Guzmán de Alfarache, *i18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 117. See also pages 104-09 and 128-30.

³³⁰ According to Enrique Vila, only one officer and one civilian died during the siege of the *Telefónica*, five civilians were killed in Plaza de San Fernando and another during the shelling of Hotel Inglaterra. Furthermore, two rebel soldiers died during the battle of the Plaza Nueva (one civil guard and an *Intendencia* soldier named Fermín Quijano). Enrique Villa's version clashes with Núñez written declaration of 3 August 1936. Guzmán de Alfarache, *i18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 104-09. For Núñez's declarations see: **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 25: "según noticias, en el Hotel Inglaterra se habían refugiado unos 300 extremistas, traté de ocuparle con el menor destrozo posible, pero en vista de que no abrían la puerta y de la resistencia que hacían, mandé disparar la artillería sobre dicho Hotel y al cabo de 4 o 5 disparos, abrieron la puerta, ocupando entonces dicha casa y colocando las piezas en disposición de atacar el Gobierno civil". All narratives agreed that rebel casualties were slim. Reporter Manuel Sanchez del Arco counted nine. Sánchez del Arco, Manuel, *El sur de España en la reconquista de Madrid (diario de operaciones glosado por un testigo)*, page 31.

³³¹ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 1, Carpeta 68. A group of Engineer soldiers was stationed at the *Telefónica* to impose martial discipline. *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 18 July 1937; Guzmán de Alfarache, *i18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 104-09.

³³² The dockworkers possessed one of the most radical trade-unions in Republican Seville: the *Sindicato Portuario Sevillano*, headed by Saturnino Barneto. "18 de Julio de 1936 en Sevilla" in **Archivo Hispalense**, Sevilla, nº132-133, 1965, page 185. See also: Barneto, Saturnino, *Cómo luchan bajo la bandera de la I.S.R. los obreros del puerto de Sevilla*.

Martínez Estévez of the Air Force refused to bomb the rebel forces clustered in and around the city-centre out of fear of provoking extensive civilian casualties. Immediately after his brief telephone conversation with Major Estévez, the Civil Governor found himself completely isolated from the outside world when the rebels disabled all communication lines. PCE leader Saturnino Barneto offered Varela Rendueles an escape to safety, which the Republican leader politely declined. The Civil Governor naively believed that the insurgents would respect political moderates. He ordered the raising of the white flag and negotiated the terms of surrender with General Queipo de Llano. The deposed civil governor later accused the rebel general of breaking his word after initially pledging to respect the lives of anyone found inside the building. According to Varela Rendueles, during their first meeting General Queipo de Llano granted him a preview of the future Nationalist judicial system: the rebel general inverted responsibilities and personally blamed the civil governor for all the bloodshed in Seville. Varela Rendueles reminded Queipo that it had been the general who had mutinied against the government. The reply infuriated Queipo, who angrily asked the Civil Governor if he held any military rank. Varela replied negatively and Queipo cut short a sterile discussion by stating that, had the answer been positive, he would have had the civil governor executed on the spot.³³³

Predictably, Queipo de Llano's version of events differed considerably from Varela Rendueles' account: he affirmed that the Civil Governor accepted an unconditional surrender; however, it is highly unlikely that Varela Rendueles would agree to capitulate without conditions, especially since both his brother and several close friends were trapped inside the Civil Government.³³⁴ Also, Queipo's past record of compulsive lying further discredits his claim. In any case, at around 20:00 a group of 60 soldiers headed by Major Núñez detained Varela Rendueles, Major Loureiro, around 150 assault guards (including two captains and two lieutenants) and 100 civilians.³³⁵ Major Núñez's arrest of Varela Rendueles, a man he had artificially befriended for months with the sole purpose of aiding Major Cuesta's sedition;

³³³ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 6, Carpeta 2. Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, pages 119-23.

³³⁴ **ABC** (Seville), 18 July 1937.

³³⁵ At 20:00, Núñez also seized around 300 rifles and two armoured vehicles. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 20. According to Núñez, the rebels captured two armoured vehicles, one heavy-machine gun, 250 rifles and two transport vehicles. **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 25. See also: Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 104-09. For the contribution of the Artillery Corps see: "18 de Julio de 1936 en Sevilla" in **Archivo Hispalense**, Sevilla, nº132-133, 1965, pages 184-87. The anonymous author tried to remain faithful to the myth by claiming that only 12 artillery and 25 *Intendencia* soldiers, and 20 *Requetés* participated in the assault and 'miraculously' arrested 500 loyalists.

stands as a fitting epilogue to what was, to all intents and purposes, the victory of deceit. By then, General Queipo de Llano's 130 *soldaditos* had mutated into an army with explicit orders to employ extreme violence.³³⁶

The victory of the oligarchy

The success of the coup also represented the victory of the local oligarchy, which mobilised *en masse* to overthrow the Republic. For instance, the son of Nationalist Civil Governor Pedro Parias, Fernando Parias, was present at the Divisional Headquarters in the early hours of the rebellion.³³⁷ Furthermore, retired bullfighter Pepe El Algabeño informed Falangist *Jefe Provincial* Rafael Carmona of the outbreak of the rebellion immediately after capture of the artillery depot.³³⁸ Algabeño participated in all major battles, including the taking of the Plaza Nueva.³³⁹ That same night, at around 1:00am on 19 July, Joaquín Miranda and several prominent Falangists were freed from the Seville's Provincial Prison, where Director Siro López Alonso collaborated with the rebels out of fear.³⁴⁰ As for the *Requeté*, at around 14:00 of 18 July Major Redondo ordered all Carlist militants to assemble at the house of Second-Lieutenant Enrique Barrau Salado. Two hours later, an excited group of Traditionalist aristocrats fuelled by religious ecstasy joined the insurrectionary forces besieging the Civil Government.³⁴¹

³³⁶ Moreover, the deposed civil governor was escorted to the Divisional Headquarters by the same Civil Guard unit that had been earlier sent to 'protect' him. Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la cruzada española*, vol. 3, page 185.

³³⁷ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5381, Carpeta 9.

³³⁸ Also present were some of the 'ruling' families of Seville (Medina, Lafuente, Parias, Benjumea, Cañal, Mac Lean). Falangist Antonio Ibañez Rangel declared that he fought in the streets of Seville alongside Algabeño, Benjumea and Manuel Parias. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 1. *Secretario Provincial* Antonio García de Lacalle declared that he was with Algabeño, Marcelino Pardo and Mac Lean and other Falangists on 18 July 1936. **FE** (Seville), 12 October 1936.

³³⁹ **FE** (Seville), 2 November 1936.

³⁴⁰ **ABC** (Seville), 27 July 1936.

³⁴¹ According to the testimony of Joaquin Sierra Fernandez Trabanco (20 March 1938): "a las catorce horas del dia diez y ocho de Julio de mil novecientos treinta y seis recibió órdenes del Sr. Coronel Redondo – en aquella fecha Comandante – para que en unión de otros requetés se concentrase en el domicilio del Alférez de complemento Don Enrique Barrau Salado – hoy Capitán – calle Muñoz Olivé número cinco, a las órdenes del que salieron a las diez y seis horas, próximamente, hacia el Cuartel de Soria, donde por el Capitán Sr. Benitez Tatay se les facilitó armamento, dirigiéndose seguidamente a la Plaza Nueva, desde cuya inmediaciones protegieron la batería que hacia sobre el Gobierno Civil mandada por el Comandante Sr. Pérez Sevilla, hasta que rendido dicho Centro Oficial pasaron a guarnecer el mismo a las órdenes del Comandante Sr. Núñez." This report was corroborated by the written statements presented by Carlists Juan Padilla Rodríguez, Fernando Cañaveral Valdes and Juan Pérez Gonzalez. All three arrived at Barrau's house between 14:00-15:00, were armed at the Soria barracks at 16:00, and collaborated with Núñez and protected Perez de Sevilla's Artillery squadron during the capture of the Civil Government. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375,

The *élites* not only were instrumental to the success of the coup, but also filled the political void triggered by the collapse of the Republic. Varela Rendueles had barely vacated his post when landowner Pedro Parias, who fought in the city-centre alongside his four Falangist sons - Leopoldo, Pedro, Luis and Gonzalo - was installed as the new Civil Governor of Seville and Leopoldo Parias appointed as his father's *secretario particular*.³⁴² Simultaneously, the trigger-happy Ramón de Carranza was appointed Mayor of Seville. In fact, the military leadership adopted a policy of promoting prominent members of the oligarchy to positions of authority.

The local oligarchy wasted no time in reclaiming what it perceived to be its inalienable right: political power. The *élites* were equally eager to chastise their traditional class enemies for the affront that represented five years of Republican rule in Seville. Already on 18 July, influential landowner and retired Artillery Captain Luis Alarcón de la Lastra offered his services to Queipo and was instructed to protect the Pasarela Bridge, where he installed a heavy machine-gun with the intention of mowing-down any working-class attempt to reach the city-centre.³⁴³

For the oligarchy, the rebellion represented but the opening stage of a grand class war. Eventually, this proto-alliance headed by the rebel military and formed by the economic *élites* and the political far-right (and later joined by the Catholic Church) would coalesce into the *pact of blood*; a coalition established on the blood its victims.

Constructing the myth: the legend of the 'red army'

Carpeta 9. See also: Redondo, Luis; Zavala, Juan de, *El requeté (la tradición no muere)*, pages 461-69; Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, pages 120-23; Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 243.

³⁴² **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Asuntos Especiales, 1938, nº4: an emotional Ramón de Carranza informed the Town Hall on 2 February 1938 that: "Pedro Parias González, Gobernador Civil que fue de ésta provincia, destacando en términos emocionados la ímproba labor que se había impuesto el señor Parias en holocausto del Glorioso Movimiento Nacional, desde su primer momento, luchando en la calle y seguidamente al frente del Gobierno Civil, a los que se entregó sin preocuparse de su salud quebrantada".

³⁴³ Luis Alarcón de la Lastra was awarded the *Medalla Militar Colectiva*. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5379. The Cavalry Corps was also employed to disperse crowds attempting to cross the San Bernardo bridge and reach the city-centre. Moreover, the Cavalry protected the artillery depot, the *Intendencia* barracks and seized *Unión Radio*. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 11, 18 and 20.

The working-class population refused to accept the victory of the oligarchy without a fight; however, it was powerless in face of the onslaught of the entire garrison of Seville. In the popular district of La Macarena, local residents massed in front of the Assault Guard headquarters in the Alameda de Hércules demanding weapons to defend the Republic. The Assault Guard hesitated between obeying Varela Rendueles' orders not hand any weapons to the workers and probably witness the slow agony of the government; or overrule the Civil Governor in the hope that the masses would contain the rebellion. Pressured by Communist leader Manuel Delicado, Captain José Álvarez handed 80 rifles (with 50 cartridges per weapon) to the crowd.³⁴⁴ Against this improvised militia, stood an entire army consisting of civil guards, Infantry, Engineers, *Intendencia* and *Sanidad* soldiers. The military was strategically stationed at La Alameda, La Campana, Avenida de Borolla, Parque María Luisa, Avenida de Portugal, Prado San Sebastián, Jardines de Murillo, Puerta de la Carne and Parque María Luisa. The objective was to isolate the city-centre from the working class districts of Seville. A second security cordon was set-up, stretching from the Pasarela Bridge to Puerta Jerez.³⁴⁵ To make matters worse, bitter ideological differences (in particular, between Communists and Anarchists) further fragmented the trade-union movement. Nationalist historiography interpreted the intestine struggle within the political left as symptomatic of its ideological degeneracy; a poor argument to deflect attention away from the fact that the so-called 'Miracle of Seville' was actually an uneven battle between civilians and a professional army that resulted in a massacre.³⁴⁶

A 'battle' (or massacre) took place before the rebels managed to set up the defensive perimeter around the city-centre. According to the personal testimony of Francisco Cabrera, the PCE issued orders "for all militants to come to Seville"; however, "the republican

³⁴⁴ Delicado, Manuel, "Cómo se luchó en Sevilla", *Discurso pronunciado en el Pleno ampliado del C. C. del Partido Comunista de España, celebrado en Valencia los días 5, 6, 7 y 8 de Marzo de 1937*, page 5.

³⁴⁵ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 1, 2, 3, 4 and 17. Zapadores-Minadores captured the Central de Teléfonos, but were excluded from the Medalla Militar: **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 14 and 20.

³⁴⁶ For instance, Major Núñez's stated on 3 August 1936 that: "A las 17 aproximadamente, se presentó en la Plaza de San Francisco un coche con lazos rojos e varios individuos extremistas en su interior, rompiendo fuego sobre el referido coche, quedando inutilizado y muertos sus ocupantes." **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 25. The bodies of all five dead occupants were left to rot for days under the scorching Andalucían sun; standing as both an example and a warning for Republicans. General Queipo rejoiced at the killings, claiming that they were vital for the success of the rebellion. *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 18 July 1937; "18 de Julio de 1936 en Sevilla" in **Archivo Hispalense**, Sevilla, nº132-133, 1965, page 183; Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 103-04.

authorities were more frightened of the working-class than of the military.”³⁴⁷ A second crowd – mostly residents from Triana - assembled in front of the Civil Government calling for weapons. Varela Rendueles refused to arm the masses out of fear that the extreme-left would gain the ascendancy. A tense impasse ensued until, according to worker Juan Campos, “A cry went up calling on people to make for the artillery depot in the Paseo de Colón”. As many as two thousand people rushed there, where several desperate workers attempted to climb the windows of the building only to be mercilessly mowed-down by machine-gun fire.³⁴⁸ Fourteen people were killed and their bodies left to rot for days under the scorching Andalucían sun. A secret Nationalist report confirmed that the failed assault commenced at 15:00:

“A las 15 horas aproximadamente comenzaron a circular por sus alrededores grupos armados a pie y en camiones con intención marcada de asaltar el parque y otros individuos, saliendo de diferentes casas de la calle Dos de Mayo empezaron a trepar por las ventanas del edificio, en cuyo momento, simultáneamente, se abrió el fuego por dichos grupos y desde los balcones y azoteas de las referidas casa y la defensa del Establecimiento, en la que distinguió las ametralladoras, que con sus ráfagas contribuyeron notablemente a disolver los grupos e alejarlos del cuartel, muchos de sus componentes, al no poder seguir por el fuego que se les hacía, se cobijaron en los portales de las casa, desde las cuales continuó el fuego de los atacantes durante toda la tarde y noche.”³⁴⁹

More attempts to seize the artillery depot followed, all with similar results.³⁵⁰ The following day, another twelve bodies were found and over one hundred loyalists arrested. The rebels sustained a mere three wounded, and 96 soldiers were later proposed for the *Medalla Militar* (an action that further damaged the credibility of the myth of the *soldaditos*). Also, the group of eighteen *Zapadores-Minadores nº2* that had earlier helped capture the *Parque* now brought food supplies to the rebels “efectuándolo bajo el intenso tiroteo enemigo”; but were all were excluded from the *Medalla Militar*.³⁵¹ The *Parque*’s Commanding Officer, Artillery Major (Artillery) José Mendez de San Julián, led by example. He wore the overalls of a civilian worker of the *Parque* and brought ammunition to the *Intendencia* soldiers fighting in the Plaza Nueva.

³⁴⁷ Personal testimony of PCE militant Francisco Cabrera in Fraser, Ronald, *Blood of Spain: the experience of Civil War, 1936-1939*, page 51.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid*, page 51.

³⁴⁹ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 1, Carpeta 68.

³⁵⁰ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 128-30.

³⁵¹ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 14.

So effective was San Julián's stratagem that he was almost killed by his own soldiers in a friendly-fire incident.³⁵²

Unable to challenge the rebel military and infuriated by successive massacres, the weapon-starved loyalists turned against their traditional enemies: the oligarchy, the political right and the Catholic Church. Nationalist historiography explained working-class violence as the impulses of a "horda" poisoned by the "virus marxista".³⁵³ On 12 August 1936, Carranza wrote to the *Comisión Gestora*, proposing the title of "hijo adoptivo de Sevilla" for General Queipo, and in the process cementing the tale of a 'red army':

"Toda Sevilla ha podido apreciar la admirable gestión del Excmo. Sr. General de esta División, Don Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, que con un valor ejemplar libró a la Ciudad del poder anárquico del marxismo, restableciendo el imperio de la Ley y la tranquilidad pública con los gloriosos soldados del Ejército a sus órdenes y demás fuerzas armadas, así como las Milicias Cívicas que cooperaron a la restauración de la independencia de la Patria, castigando al mismo tiempo los hechos criminales y vandálicos perpetrados por hordas al servicio del marxismo."³⁵⁴

Two weeks later (25 August), the *Comisión Gestora de la Diputación* bestowed on Queipo the title of "Hijo adoptivo de la provincia" for having "librado a España del dominio marxista" and "la tiranía de los rojos."³⁵⁵ Moreover, one of the most celebrated Nationalist war

³⁵² "su regreso al Parque se hizo bajo el fuego de las fuerzas del Ejército y de los Guardias de Asalto, logrando llegar al Parque con las dificultades que son de suponer, en cuya entrada aumentaron estas al no ser reconocido por las fuerzas de Ingenieros que ocupaban el Sector del edificio que da a la Calle Dos de Mayo y estar generalizado el fuego con los que desde las casas inmediatas y grupos apostados en las boca-calles lo sostenían contra el Establecimiento.- Hecho cargo nuevamente del mando de este, y organizada su defensa permaneció en su interior con las Fuerzas que le custodiaban, manteniendo constante tiroteo con los elementos que barrian el Edificio desde las casas inmediatas, ordenando el dia 19 una salida con el fin de efectuar registros y reconocimiento en los mismos, dando como resultado la detención de mas de 100 individuos, muchos de los cuales que no supieron justificar su permanencia en estos lugares y marcadamente sospechosos por la documentación recogida, fueron puestos a disposición de las Autoridades, con asimismo fueron hallados en una casa de la calle Dos de Mayo varios mosquetones y mas de 100 cargadores de fusil completo.- En esta descubierta se encontraron 7 muertos paisanos en la calle dos de Mayo y 5 en el Paseo de Colón y resultaron heridos leves de bala dos Artilleros y un soldado de Ingenieros." Report signed by San Julian. **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 1, Carpeta 68.

³⁵³ *La Unión* (Seville), 11 August 1936.

³⁵⁴ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), *Asuntos Especiales*, 1936, nº34.

³⁵⁵ "considerando, muy especialmente, su actuación al iniciarse el movimiento militar que ha librado a España del dominio marxista, imponiendo el orden en nuestra Capital con los escasos elementos de que disponía y por lo que respecta a la provincia, conquistando uno a uno sus pueblos juzgados bajo la tiranía de los rojos, ejercitando la justicia conculcada por tantos actos de barbarie, y llevando así a todo el territorio de la provincia la tranquilidad y el orden, y estimando que tan inteligente y patriótica labor

correspondents, Manuel Sánchez del Arco, reached the bizarre conclusion that: “El pillaje y los incendios de templos y mansiones patricias entretuvieron al populacho.[...] Fueron las víctimas propiciatorias, cuyo sacrificio contribuyó acaso decisivamente, al triunfo del general Queipo de Llano.”³⁵⁶ Sánchez del Arco not only presented the masses as an irrational, semi-human horde, but also – critically – provided substance to the myth of the *soldaditos*. Enrique Vila even put a number on the ‘red army’, claiming that “puede calcularse que sobre las dos de la tarde había en Sevilla más de 7.000 personas que se disponían a hacer armas contra los soldados de la guarnición”³⁵⁷ At the same time, the Nationalists quietly archived rebel reports revealing that both the Civil Guard and the *Centro de Movilización y Reserva nº3* prevented the masses from reaching the city-centre, attacking leftist militants in the calle Reyes Católicos (Civil Guard squadron headed by Lieutenant Juan Masse Esquivel) and La Macarena (*Centro de Movilización y Reserva nº3*).³⁵⁸

In reality, Sánchez del Arco’s report was fabricated, but the central argument remained intact and has been repeated (with minor variations) *ad nauseam* by pro-Francoist historians up until the end of the XX-Century. According to Nicolas Salas, the working-class indulged in an orgy of violence while leaving the city-centre unprotected. Salas also confirmed the myth of the *soldaditos*, overlooked the massacres of 18 July and dismissed Nationalist reports confirming that rebel patrols successfully prevented that “las patrullas marxistas se acercaran al Centro de la Capital”. Incidentally, the contribution of the *Centro de Movilización y Reserva nº3* was erased from Nationalist historiography so as to harmonise it with legend of the ‘red army’. Salas concluded his argument by stating, without irony: “Fue el comienzo de una leyenda.”³⁵⁹

es acreedora al agradecimiento de la Diputación provincial, Corporación en quién recae la representación de la provincia” *Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla* (Seville), Legajo 418.

³⁵⁶ Sánchez del Arco, Manuel, *El sur de España en la reconquista de Madrid (diario de operaciones glosado por un testigo)*, page 28.

³⁵⁷ Guzmán de Alfarache, *18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 69.

³⁵⁸ *Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur* (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 20 (Civil Guard); *Archivo General Militar* (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 2, Carpeta 9 (*Centro de Movilización y Reserva nº3*).

³⁵⁹ “las masas no apoyaron a los guardias de asalto y milicianos que luchaban en la plaza Nueva y el hotel Inglaterra contra las tropas del general Queipo de Llano. Hubiera bastado la presencia, aún sin armas, de varios miles de personas avanzando hacia el centro, por las diversas calles que comunicaban con los barrios rojos, para que el panorama hubiera cambiado radicalmente. El general Queipo de Llano contaba con un centenar de hombres, soldados bisoños, más una treintena de requetés y falangistas. Con sólo estas fuerzas, ganó Sevilla para el alzamiento.” Salas, Nicolás, *El Moscú Sevillano. Sevilla la roja, feudo del comunismo español durante la República y símbolo triunfal del frente popular en 1936*, page 247. For the Nationalist report see: *Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur* (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 1 (quote) and 20.

Anticlericalism

Enraged by the massacre of the *Parque*, an infuriated crowd from Triana decided to vent its anger at the properties of the rich. The loyalists ransacked a number of houses in the upscale calle Reyes Católicos, including the properties of Falangist leaders Sancho Dávila and Joaquín Miranda. Miranda's house was protected by a tiny group of party militants that was not attacked by the mob.³⁶⁰ However, the greatest target of popular fury was the Catholic Church. For the masses, the Church was the enemy within, and the first religious building consumed by the flames of anticlericalism (18:00) - *Omnium Sanctorum* - was located deep inside the working-class district of La Macarena.³⁶¹ Anticlericalism ran deep among the urban poor of Seville, who viewed the attacks with a mixture of joy and derision. As the fire devoured several religious buildings, a resident in San Luis joked: "¿Y ahora las monjitas, donde oirán misa?"³⁶² One of the most symbolically-charged attacks was the sacking of the Salesian's *Escuela Social Obrera*; a testament to the failure of the Church's social policy.³⁶³ A total of fifteen religious buildings were either damaged or destroyed in the capital of Andalucía, one of the oldest dioceses in Christendom:

1. Santa Ana (Triana)
2. San Bernardo (Gran Plaza)
3. San Gil Abad (La Macarena)
4. Inmaculada Concepción (Nervión)

³⁶⁰ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, pages 103-04.

³⁶¹ Letter from priest of *Omnium Sanctorum* to the Archbishop of Seville dated 21 July 1936. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 592.

³⁶² **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 8155, Carpeta 2.

³⁶³ A number of religious buildings were saved thanks to the providential intervention of retired Infantry Second-Lieutenant Carlos Lucenilla Blanco: "al iniciarse el Glorioso Movimiento Nacional en esta capital, prestó sus servicios con las armas a favor del citado Movimiento, contribuyendo a la salvación de religiosos del Convento de Capuchinos en ésta capital, amenazado por las turbas que intentaron incendiárselo, lo que impidió haciendo fuego sobre ellos, y permaneció defendiéndolo hasta la madrugada del dia 19 que marchó a presentarse en el Regimiento de Infantería Granada nº6, en el que quedó incorporado y tomó parte en los distintos hechos de armas a que asistió el mismo, hasta la completa liberación de ésta capital". Blanco also prevented that further damage be done to the Convent of Las Salesas "al que los rebeldes le habían prendido fuego". Unfortunately for Blanco, he was not incorporated into an official rebel military unit until 19 July and was therefore excluded from the *Medalla Militar*, despite "participando en la pacificación de los barrios de esta ciudad los cuales se encontraban en rebeldía, sosteniendo intenso tiroteo con los marxistas, especialmente en los barrios de Triana, San Julian y San Marcos, formó parte en la conducción de los presos mineros de Rio Tinto desde el Cuartel del Duque a la cárcel de esta capital. Al mando de fuerzas de este Cuerpo evitó el saqueo del convento de Las Salesas al que los rebeldes le habían prendido fuego, haciendo huir a los mismos y poniendo a salvo algunos objetos de gran valor de la propiedad de dicho convento, dejando de prestar sus servicios en este Cuartel en la mañana del dia veintitrés". **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 16.

5. San Juan de la Palma (La Macarena)
6. San Marcos (La Macarena)
7. Santa Marina (La Macarena)
8. Nuestra Señora de la O (Triana)
9. Omnim Sanctorum (La Macarena)
10. San Román (La Macarena)
11. San Roque (close to La Macarena)
12. Capilla de Nuestra Señora de los Dolores (Cerro del Águila)
13. Capilla de Monte-Sión (La Macarena)
14. Convento de San José (close to La Macarena)
15. Monasterio de la Visitación de Santa María (close to La Macarena)³⁶⁴

The reality of violence against individuals also differed considerably from the official version expounded by Nationalist propaganda. The most publicised case was the assassination of the parish priest of San Jerónimo, José Vigil Cabrerizo. The rebels presented the murder as evidence of the existence of a plan to annihilate the clergy in Seville when in reality there was an element of tragic casualty in Cabrerizo's death. After witnessing the sacking of his church in May 1936, the priest moved with his family (parents and two younger sisters) to the upscale calle Conde De Ybarra where, on the afternoon of 18 July one of his neighbours, a hot-tempered right-wing adolescent aged only 17 (the son of a military officer), opened fire at a leftist crowd. One worker was killed and the enraged mob headed straight to the aggressor's house. The teenager panicked and fired again, killing a second person. The crowd then forced its way into the adjacent house where they found Cabrerizo. The priest was immediately identified by a militant who denounced Cabrerizo as a fascist and repeatedly insulted and shot him in his left shoulder in front of his desperate family. The mob eventually decided to abandon the house only for the unlucky priest to be recognised by a second group of militants and shot again in his injured shoulder. As the party was about to leave, an exalted militant shouted "No lo dejéis que este es el Cura de San Jerónimo" and shot Cabrerizo in the abdomen. In desperation, his sister threw herself in front of the fatally wounded priest. The scene moved a militant who declared: "A las mujeres no hay que tirarles", but then proceeded to torture Cabrerizo by shooting again in his wounded shoulder. An argument ensued and the

³⁶⁴ The report included the San Julián church, attacked during the Republican era, but included in the book for propaganda purposes Hernández Díaz, José; Sancho Corbacho, Antonio, *Estudio de los edificios religiosos y objetos de culto de la ciudad de Sevilla, saqueados y destruidos por los marxistas*, pages 187-93.

militants eventually decided against delivering the *coup de grâce*. Cabrerizo was eventually rushed to the Cinco Llagas Hospital while his house was torched. He died the following day, but not before repeatedly declaring that he forgave his aggressors and forcing his father to promise that he would not seek revenge for his murder. He also prayed fervently for the Virgin Mary to deliver Spain from Communism.³⁶⁵

Father Vigil Cabrerizo was not the only religious victim of leftist extremism. On the afternoon of 18 July, a mob broke into the house of the elderly priest of San Bernardo, José Álvarez Díaz. The priest fainted never to regain consciousness and died the following day. Also, Salesian monk Antonio Fernández Camacho and Falangist *Patricante* Francisco Fuentes Manfredi were both spotted and lynched in the San Marcos neighbourhood of La Macarena and their bodies dumped inside the local church, which was then set ablaze. Lastly, a number of clergymen escaped the anticlerical fury in extreme circumstances, such as the *Coadjutor* of Santa Marina, who saved himself by hiding under the deathbed of an elderly parishioner.³⁶⁶

On a political level, the most high-profile victim of radical-left was Falangist industrialist Luis Mensaque Arana, murdered on 18 July.³⁶⁷ Mensaque initially managed to flee to safety, but decided to return to his house to reassure his anxious wife. The property was rapidly surrounded by a hostile crowd that arrested Mensaque as he attempted to escape through the roof. The Falangist militant was then dragged to the local PCE headquarters in calle Fabié, sentenced to death by an illegal revolutionary tribunal and executed by firing squad against the walls of calle Pagés del Corro. His distressed wife tried to embrace him and was shot in the legs. Mensaque died shortly after in the local *casa de Socorro*.³⁶⁸ Another political victim of extremism was anarchist-turned-Falangist Joaquín Julio Fernández, also known as *El Libertario*. Fernández, who collaborated regularly with Carlist newspaper *La Unión*, was marked for death by his former friends who regarded his political apostasy as an unforgivable insult. He was lynched in the calle San Luis (La Macarena) on 19 July and his body dumped inside the burning

³⁶⁵ Cabrerizo's death certificate states that he died as a result of "Heridas por arma de fuego". **Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla** (Seville), Sangre, Libro 133. See also: Sebastián y Bandarán, José; Tineo Lara, Antonio, *La persecución religiosa en la Archidiócesis de Sevilla*, pages 137-38.

³⁶⁶ *Ibid*, pages 137-40.

³⁶⁷ For Mensaque ("Industrial de cerámica de Triana[...] director de las patronales de la UC y FEDA") see: Dávila, Sancho; Pemartín, Julián, *Hacia la historia de la Falange: primera contribución de Sevilla*, pages 58-59. See also: Salas, Nicolás, *Sevilla fue la clave*, vol 2, pages 495-500; El Tebib Arrumi, *Así se conquistó Sevilla*, page 44; Arrarás Iribarren, Joaquín, *Historia de la Cruzada Española*, vol. 5, Tomo XI, page 214.

³⁶⁸ *FE* (Seville), 26 November 1936.

church of San Marcos alongside those of Fernández Campos and Francisco Fuentes Manfredi.³⁶⁹

Another four unexplained deaths might be attributed to leftist extremists. They were: Capuchin monk Fray José (of the Convent of San José), shot on 19 July while inspecting a rooftop between calles Tetuán and Sierpes; Manuel Díaz Ramos, shot at from a bar in calle San Jacinto; Manuel Anguado Guerra, victim of “disparos a la entrada de una casa”; and Raimundo Álvarez Vigil, brother-in-law of Luis Mensaque, also murdered in Triana.³⁷⁰ Ultimately, leftist violence did not translate into the homicidal rage publicised by Nationalist propaganda, which also accused the Republic of complicity in the murders. In reality, the moderate left was simply impotent to curb extremism for the simple reason that it ceased to exist on the afternoon of 18 July 1936, a victim of its ignorance over the true objectives of the rebellion, which extended even to the Assault Guard. Indeed, without encountering resistance, Major Loureiro complied with General Queipo’s order to call for the immediate surrender of the Assault Guard headquarters in La Alameda. Loureiro’s cooperation did not spare him from execution, which took place on the night of 22-23 July.³⁷¹ Only one man among Varela Rendueles’ prisoner group appeared to grasp the wanton nature of Nationalist violence: Lieutenant-Colonel Caballero of the *Regulares*. As an *Africanista*, Caballero could foresee the full implications of rebel victory and, in visible despair, attempted to offer his services to General Queipo on 18 July, who shunned his proposal. Caballero’s fears proved correct: Tablada surrendered that same night, the *V Bandera* of the Foreign Legion was airlifted to Seville the following day and Juan Caballero López was executed on 31 July.³⁷²

PART II: The myth of the *soldaditos*

Constructing the myth: Queipo and the rebellion

³⁶⁹ *ABC* (Seville), 25 July 1936; *FE* (Seville), 21 October 1936.

³⁷⁰ *ABC* (Seville), 25 July 1936; *FE* (Seville), 21 October 1936.

³⁷¹ See Queipo’s *charla* in *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville) 23 July 1936: “y ahora una noticia dolorosa. Cumpliendo lo establecido en el Bando, han sido fusilados esta mañana el comandante Loureiro, jefe que fue de los guardias de Asalto de Sevilla, porque entregó 200 fusiles de España a los pistoleros comunistas y una gran cantidad de pistolas para que dispararan contra los soldados españoles que están salvando la Patria”. Loureiro was executed alongside Captain Justo Pérez and Lieutenant Cangas (who drove one of the armoured vehicles) and the president of the *Pirotecnia* trade-union. See also: Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, pages 120-23.

³⁷² Sánchez del Arco, Manuel, *El sur de España en la reconquista de Madrid (diario de operaciones glosado por un testigo)*, page 23-24; Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 165-67. For Caballero see: Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, pages 120-21.

The myth of the *soldaditos* was, like most Nationalist propaganda tales, straightforward: it consisted of a synthesis of an edited version of Queipo's 23 July *charla* (the soldiers that seized the Civil Government had now captured the entire city-centre) with the tale of the impending Communist coup. Accordingly, the few *soldaditos* at the disposal of General Queipo de Llano 'miraculously' defeated thousands of Marxist militiamen about to usher a Communist revolution in the capital of Andalucía, which would then function as a bridgehead for the implantation of a Soviet-style regime in Spain. At the same time, the 'miracle' of Seville revealed the *moral* superiority of the Nationalist cause over the 'degenerate' Republic, thus legitimising the rebellion. Also, the myth elevated the rebel general to the status of a semi-deity in Nationalist Seville, which effectively 'sanctified' his rule. A similar process (the myth of the Alcázar of Toledo) institutionalised the cult of personality of General Franco.³⁷³ In retrospect, the longevity of the myth of Queipo de Llano and his *soldaditos* is remarkable, especially when compared with the relative ephemerality other of major Nationalist legends: Guernica, Alcázar de Toledo and of the Soviet conspiracy to take over Spain; all of which have long been discredited.³⁷⁴

The first and most formidable challenge to the consolidation of the 'Miracle of Seville' was, ironically, General Queipo de Llano, more specifically his egotism. The volatile general committed his first major *gaffe* on 18 July 1937 when he opened his memoirs of the rebellion with a shocking revelation: "quizás haya omitido algunos detalles involuntariamente y otros con propósito deliberado."³⁷⁵ The Nationalist propaganda juggernaut, expertly directed by Major Cuesta Monereo, attempted to minimise the negative impact of Queipo's recurrent verbal outbursts by devising a campaign aimed exclusively at transforming the capricious general into a secular Nationalist saint. A few months later, even Queipo de Llano's *Delegado de Prensa y Propaganda*, Antonio Bahamonde, was astonished by the number of photos, posters, mirrors and even ashtrays bearing the portrait of the general that circulated in Seville. Many were autographed by Queipo, who turned into an overnight celebrity. *Acción Española*

³⁷³ For the official version of the myth, presented by Queipo see: Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, "Cómo dominamos Sevilla" in *Estampas de la guerra, tomo 5, Frentes de Andalucía y Extremadura; ABC* (Seville), 18 July 1937. For the siege of the Alcázar see: Knickerbocker, Hubert Renfro, *The siege of Alcazar. A war-log of the Spanish Revolution.*

³⁷⁴ See the works of Southworth: Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, *Guernica! Guernica! a study of journalism, diplomacy, propaganda, and history*; Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, *Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War: the brainwashing of Francisco Franco*; Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, *El mito de la cruzada de Franco*.

³⁷⁵ ABC (Seville), 18 July 1937.

leader Eugenio Vegas Latapié corroborated Bahamonde's account.³⁷⁶ In contrast, the image of the true leader of the Nationalist faction, General Franco, was notoriously absent from the capital of Andalucía, a scandal that would eventually degenerate into a destructive clash of egos.

The legend of Queipo de Llano was not the exclusive product of the general's delirious egotism; it became a political priority for the Nationalist leadership from the moment all 'evidence' pertaining to a Soviet-sponsored *putsch* in Spain was greeted with scepticism by the international press. On a national level, there was an urgent need to maintain morale following the failure of the coup in most of Spain. Ultimately, by venerating Queipo as a secular saint, the rebels were indirectly sanctifying the rebellion.

The legend of General Queipo

General Franco constantly reaffirmed Nationalist orthodoxy, defending it against all threats of 'heresy'. For instance, the *Generalísimo* declared to *La Revue Belge* on 15 August 1937:

"Así, en Sevilla, el General Queipo de Llano logró dominar la situación con un simple puñado de hombres – 180 exactamente –, a pesar de que de 40 a 50.000 rojos, animados por el furor y la desesperación se le opusieron en esta ciudad."³⁷⁷

General Franco's apparent endorsement of a rival consisted but of a skilful propaganda manoeuvre. The *Generalísimo* realised that, by lending support to the myth of Queipo, he was also legitimising the rebellion and cementing his own authority. In fact, Franco's ascension to the leadership of the Nationalist faction on 1 October 1936 was equally based on a legend:

³⁷⁶ Bahamonde also revealed that the families of executed loyalists were also coerced to purchase Nationalist propaganda paraphernalia. According to the Nationalist Manichean worldview, the sanctification of the rebellion would only be complete with the parallel demonisation of the Republic. As a result, the insurgents embarked on an intense propaganda campaign aimed at exposing Republican war crimes that eventually gave birth in 1940 to *Causa General*, a catalogue of Republican violence, both real and imagined. Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, pages 88 and 90. "Lo que pudimos comprobar fue la inmensa popularidad de que gozaba Queipo en Andalucía. Por todas partes se veía su retrato, colocado hasta en los lugares más insólitos y al parecer de manera espontánea." Vegas Latapie, Eugenio, *Memorias políticas 1936-1938. Los caminos del desengaño*, vol. 2, Page 61.

³⁷⁷ Franco, Francisco, *Palabras del Caudillo : 19 abril 1937-31 diciembre 1938*, page 181.

that the liberation of the Alcázar of Toledo.³⁷⁸ As far as the insurgents were concerned, the proliferation of ‘miracles’ served as ‘evidence’ of the moral superiority of the rebel cause over the Spanish Republic.

Franco’s insincere declarations were complemented by a number of works that simply echoed Queipo’s memoirs.³⁷⁹ For instance, Nationalist military historian Luis María de Lojendio wrote in 1940:

“En su visita a la División y al Cuartel del Regimiento de Granada, el general Queipo de Llano fue únicamente acompañado de los comandantes Cuesta y López Guerrero. Y allí, ante un cuadro de generales y jefes hostiles al Movimiento, ganó en realidad la batalla de Sevilla.”³⁸⁰

Furthermore, the recognised Francoist authority on military history, former Basque Nationalist playboy Manuel Aznar Zubigaray, focused on the “milagro” in his monumental four-volume *Historia Militar de la Guerra de España*:

“Sevilla, escenario de una inimaginable proeza llevada a cabo por el General Queipo de Llano, el cual, prácticamente solo, frente a unos mandos hostiles y en medio de una población integrada en arte por bravas masas comunistas y anarquistas, hizo el milagro de alcanzar una victoria decisiva para la marcha futura de la guerra nacional.”³⁸¹

³⁷⁸ Moss, Geoffrey MacNeill, *The Siege of the Alcázar: A History of the Siege of the Toledo Alcázar, 1936*

³⁷⁹ *ABC* (Seville), 18 July 1937.

³⁸⁰ Lojendio, Luis María de, *Operaciones militares de la guerra de España, 1936-1939*, page 26. Among the author’s most flamboyant statements was the claim that Guernica had been dynamited by “Marxistas” (Lojendio hailed from a prominent Basque family). During the civil war, María de Lojendio served as a Nationalist military press officer. He later retired to become the Mitterred Abbot of Franco’s mausoleum, the Valley of the Fallen. See: Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, *Guernica! Guernica! : A study of journalism, diplomacy, propaganda, and history*, pages 240 and 396.

³⁸¹ Aznar, Manuel, *Historia militar de la guerra de España*, page 97. Manuel Aznar Zubigaray was the grandfather of former prime-minister José María Aznar. His early political trajectory as a Basque Nationalist and his reputation as a womanizer did not initially endear him to the Nationalist leadership. Aznar earned the respect of General Franco by working as a Nationalist war correspondent and was awarded the first *Premio Nacional de Periodismo Francisco Franco* for an article published in *Heraldo de Aragón* (26 April 1938). He was eventually appointed as Franco’s ambassador to the United Nations. See preface to volume I of Aznar, Manuel, *Historia militar de la guerra de España*, 3rd edition (Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1958-63), pages 11-15; García Venero, Maximiano *La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla*, 242-43; Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, *Antifalange: estudio crítico de "Falange en la guerra de España, la unificación y Hedilla" de Maximiano García Venero*, page 159. Subsequent works simply plagiarised both Lojendio and Aznar’s books. For instance: “En Sevilla, Queipo de Llano empleó el ardido de simular disponer de más medios de los que realmente tenía, acudiendo a la propaganda radiada, mientras que personalmente recorría los cuarteles acompañado tan sólo de su Jefe de Estado Mayor y de su Ayudante.” Martínez Bande, José Manuel, *La Campaña de Andalucía*, page 59.

A few selected works embellished Queipo's role in the already legendary capture of Seville at the expense of the tale of the *soldaditos*, relegated to background narrative. For instance, the general's first biographer – Luis de Armiñán Odriozola³⁸² – wrote:

“él [Queipo] solo se presenta ante el general de la Plaza”, adding: “Quizá en esa exposición clara, sencilla, esté mejor dada la nota de peligro, de amargura y de decisivo valor, que el general puso en sus actos para lograr el efecto deseado: la salvación de Andalucía.”³⁸³

Armiñán Odriozola interviewed the rebel general on the same day as Franco was officially anointed as dictator of Nationalist Spain. Queipo opted to ignore the historic event, preferring instead to indulge on a lengthy monologue on the ‘Miracle of Seville’; a silence that spoke volumes. Seduced by Queipo’s oratory, Armiñán Odriozola concluded his argument by comparing the general’s role in the coup with the exploits of the XV-Century Catholic Monarchs that completed the *Reconquista*, sponsored Christopher Columbus’ voyage to the American continent and founded the Spanish Empire.³⁸⁴ Reporter Enrique Vila went even further, claiming that the ongoing civil war was “cien veces más importante” than the military achievements of Kings Isabella of Castille and Ferdinand of Aragón:

“La guarnición de Sevilla escribió en los días 18, 19 y 20 de Julio, una de las páginas más gloriosas de la historia militar de España: los hombres de esta generación que hemos vivido en toda su trágica intensidad estas fechas memorables, estamos en cierto modo incapacitados para comprender en su verdadero valor, la maravillosa importancia de esta empresa, inicio feliz de una guerra de reconquista, cien veces más importante que la llevada a cabo en la Edad

³⁸² Luis de Armiñán Odriozola, a former member of the Radical Party, “no era ciertamente una persona que despertara simpatías entre la clase política situada más a la izquierda, que lo veían como un arribista, en particular Manuel Azaña quién tenía de él un concepto más bien desolador” Pettenghi Lachambre, José Aquiles, *Detrás del silencio: el trágico destino de los gobernadores civiles de Cádiz en la II República*, page 166. See also pages 167-78: a duodenal ulcer spared Armiñán Odriozola from conscription. He went on to become one of the most respected Nationalist war correspondents, covering both the Spanish Civil War and World War II. Armiñán Odriozola nevertheless became a victim of the repressive hysteria of the victorious Francoist regime when he came under the scrutiny of the *Tribunal de Responsabilidades Políticas* in 1944.

³⁸³ Armiñán Odriozola, Luis de, *Excmo. Sr. General D. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Jefe del Ejército del Sur*, page 31. See also pages: 29-30.

³⁸⁴ “Aquel soldado de audacia que llega a Sevilla sólo con su valor, hubo de realizar cosas bien extraordinarias, que por sí solas bastaban para dar a su personalidad toda la importancia que tiene. Pero aún había algo más que hacer, la reconquista de Andalucía y, sobre Málaga, Queipo, como un día Fernando el Católico y la Reina Isabel, ha completado la gesta. Aquellos gloriosos Reyes españoles fueron detenidos largo tiempo por sus valientes y indómitos enemigos, que no disponían ni muchísimo menos de los enormes elementos de que han dispuesto los siervos de Rusia.” Ibid, pages 47-48. See also page 21.

Media, y que será juzgada por las generaciones venideras, o como algo sobrenatural, o como empresa de titanes: la historia de Europa contará como figuras beneméritas a estos militares sevillanos.”³⁸⁵

“Providentialism”

The mystical claims present in the ‘Miracle of Seville’ triggered a heated theological debate in Nationalist Spain. For instance, Enrique Vila described the insurgency as “sobrenatural”, marked by “fatalismo religioso” and “providencialismo”.³⁸⁶ The proponents of this rationale called themselves “providentialists”:

“Los providencialistas tenemos la firme convicción de que está marcado el dedo de Dios. ¿Cómo si no explicarnos el suceso?

Un hombre, por grande que sea su voluntad, por enorme que sea su deseo de vencer, no puede arrollar los obstáculos infranqueables, cuando éstos son de tal naturaleza que no se presten a ser doblegados por sólo la voluntad.”³⁸⁷

“Providentialism” was rooted in the belief that the July 1936 *coup d'état* was destined to replace the *Reconquista* as the central epic of Spanish history. Nationalist intellectual José María Pemán expounded this theory in a speech delivered on 15 August 1936 where he asked Queipo:

“¿Verdad que en aquellas primeras veinticuatro horas, había algo superior a lo humano, detrás de ti? ¿Verdad que tu sentiste en el hombre, aconsejándote y animándote, el rostro de niña de la Virgen de los Reyes?”³⁸⁸

Pemán eventually reached the conclusion that “aquellos primeros episodios milagrosos de la Sevilla de Queipo” confirmed that the civil war was but “la España [...] venciendo a la anti-

³⁸⁵ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 26.

³⁸⁶ “Hemos hecho siempre gala de un providencialismo honda y sinceramente sentido, que más de una persona sensata, con no poco asombro por nuestra parte, calificó en ocasiones, de fatalismo religioso. A fuer de providencialista no quiero entrar en mi relato sin dejar de consignar este trozo de leyenda, que el buen pueblo de Sevilla ha tejido ya sobre los sucesos de nuestra ciudad con la misma fe, con la misma espiritualidad, que si se tratase de algo sobrenatural.” *Ibid*, page 27.

³⁸⁷ Armiñán Odriozola, Luis de, *Excmo. Sr. General D. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Jefe del Ejército del Sur*, pages 21-22.

³⁸⁸ Pemán y Pemartín, José María, *Arengas y Crónicas de Guerra*, page 23.

España".³⁸⁹ Moreover, on the first anniversary of the coup Catholic periodical *El Correo de Andalucía* described General Queipo as "un hombre providencial que Dios envió a Sevilla para la salvación de España", adding (without irony) that the rebel general functioned as an "instrumento de Dios para vencer a la mentira, arma favorita de los marxistas".³⁹⁰

In short, General Queipo de Llano was the enforcer of God's will on Earth.³⁹¹ This conviction eventually evolved into the dogmatic belief that the capture of Seville was but the opening battle of a modern-day crusade. Already on 31 July 1936, flyers containing a poem entitled "¡Detente, enemigo! El Corazón de Jesús está conmigo", circulated in Seville.³⁹² A year later, Nationalist writer Ramiro de Alconchel dedicated a poem entirely to the 'miraculous' taking of the capital of Andalucía entitled "La Novena Cruzada. Poema de la guerra contra los monstruos"³⁹³; while the Town Hall of Seville proposed the creation of a "Museo Nacional del Movimiento Salvador de España" to perpetuate the 'Miracle of Seville' and hosted an exclusive party in the *salón de fiestas de la Casa Consistorial* "en homenaje al ilustre e invicto General D. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano" to celebrate the first anniversary of the "Movimiento Salvador de España".³⁹⁴ At the same time, the campaign of 'deification' of Nationalist war heroes climaxed with the elevation of Generals Franco and Moscardó to legendary status: if Queipo was a modern-day prophet who captured Seville to clarify the working-class; General Moscardó was compared to God for having sacrificed his son during the siege of the Alcázar.³⁹⁵ Seduced by constant blandishment, General Queipo de Llano rapidly converted to this new 'faith', going as far as telling, tearfully, reporter Jean Alloucherie that the Holy Ghost had inspired him to seize Seville and save "civilización occidental."³⁹⁶

³⁸⁹ *Ibid*, page 123.

³⁹⁰ *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 18 July 1937.

³⁹¹ "Sin duda Dios quiso guardar a este hombre, para una mayor Gloria, porque lo tenía destinado a ser uno de los salvadores de España." Armiñán Odriozola, Luis de, *Excmo. Sr. General D. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Jefe del Ejército del Sur*, page 3.

³⁹² *Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia* (Madrid), Fondo Diego Angulo, L-11/8990.

³⁹³ Alconchel, Ramiro de, *La Novena Cruzada. Poema de la guerra contra los monstruos*, pages 4-5.

³⁹⁴ *Archivo Municipal de Sevilla* (Seville), *Asuntos especiales*, 1937, nº16; *Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia* (Madrid), Fondo Diego Angulo, 11/8990.

³⁹⁵ Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, *El mito de la cruzada de Franco*, page 264. See also pages 259-82: Southworth demolished the work of the author of this claim, fascist poet Roy Campbell (and his book *Flowering rifle*).

³⁹⁶ "Lo mejor, la famosa escena del tercer acto, era evidentemente la noble revolución española, la revuelta moral de toda una nación, y especialmente cuando él, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, milagrosamente inspirado por el Espíritu Santo, se había apoderado de Sevilla con 150 soldados" Alloucherie, Jean, *Noches de Sevilla*, page 247. See also page 248: "Y él, Gonzalo, había salvado a Sevilla, aplastado a los «soviéticos»- Y él, Gonzalo, había salvado a la civilización occidental". See also: *Carta colectiva de los obispos españoles con motivo de la guerra en España*. On 1 July 1937, the Catholic

The myth becomes international

General Queipo de Llano eagerly embraced his role as a Nationalist saint and courted the international press (Bolín confirmed that “Queipo liked talking to journalists”³⁹⁷) to promote the ‘Miracle of Seville’. For instance, after initially cancelling his scheduled interview with Jean Alloucherie, General Queipo suddenly found time to meet the reporter after being informed of his imminent departure for the Marbella front. To Alloucherie’s astonishment, what was supposed to be a short, informal chat turned into an hour-long monologue focused on the life of Queipo, starting as early as his “infancia estudiosa”. Alloucherie noted sarcastically that:

“Apenas tuve tiempo de abrir la boca y de pedir a Gonzalo que me hablara de España, cuando ya él me hablaba de sí mismo [...] Hay que admitir que se encontraba interesante, Gonzalo, que se amaba con pasión, se admiraba y creía que cada minuto que pasaba le daba ocasión de admirarse aún más.” However, Alloucherie also conceded that “no era desagradable escucharle, cuando uno se había resignado a seguir su verborrea sin poderla digerir. Tenía la palabra sonora, el gesto variado, un juego de ojos especial.”³⁹⁸

Indeed, the general also made a strong first impression on Antonio Bahamonde.³⁹⁹ During the autumn of 1936, Queipo de Llano reached the peak of his popularity, even attaining international celebrity status. The reasons for this were twofold. Firstly, correspondents from all over the world poured into the capital of Andalucía to cover the Nationalist advance on Madrid. Secondly, the ‘Miracle of Seville’ was simply too good of a story to be ignored, as was the General’s eccentric character. Indeed, Queipo often became emotional and overwhelmed by patriotic fervor during interviews, clutching the Nationalist flag as he tearfully reminisced over the legendary taking of Seville. The relationship between the impulsive general and the pro-Nationalist foreign press was one of intense mutual admiration. Queipo was seduced by the constant appeals to his personal vanity and retold his story time and again to an ever-growing body of foreign reporters, who listened in awe. The general’s magnetic personality mesmerised even the most experienced of reporters, such as Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist Hubert Knickerbocker, who had previously covered the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.

Church officially accepted Queipo’s blasphemy as religious dogma by sanctifying the Spanish Civil War as a religious crusade.

³⁹⁷ Bolín, Luis, *Spain: the vital years*, page 187.

³⁹⁸ Alloucherie, Jean, *Noches de Sevilla*, page 247.

³⁹⁹ “El General me causó una excelente impresión.” Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, page 56.

Knickerbocker was particularly fascinated by Queipo's informal presentation (the general was dressed in a "palm beach suit crinkled pretty badly" when both men first met), markedly distinct from the ceremonial rigidity of most of his fellow generals. According to the correspondent, "The saviour of Seville was most hospitable. He had an air of dignity and gravity which completely belied the previous descriptions I had heard of him."⁴⁰⁰ After listening attentively to Queipo's story, Knickerbocker concluded that:

"this redoubtable figure is one of the most colourful talkers on the White side[...] But he is just as colourful a fighter. If Madrid had possessed a White general with the guts and quickfire decision of de Llano, the capital would have fallen on the day after Franco raised the banner of revolt in Morocco."⁴⁰¹

Eventually, General Queipo's "colourful" talking threw into question the entire credibility of the myth. Unable to keep his emotions under control during his regular chats with foreign reporters, the general frequently contradicted his official account of the 'Miracle of Seville'. As a result, several conflicting versions appeared in the international press, including fluctuations in the number of *soldaditos*. For instance, Arthur Loveday stated: "General Queipo de Llano had captured Seville with his 183 men. How he did this by pure bluff is now a matter of history"⁴⁰²; whereas Francis Rogers described the taking of Seville as in the following terms: "This is the most fantastic story of the Civil War in Spain. It is the unbelievable tale of the capture of Seville, one of the largest cities of Spain, by a lone general, the radio, 8 Moors and 123 soldiers. Their capture of a city of nearly half a million people, is an epic – and something of a comedy, too."⁴⁰³ However, Queipo provided a different figure to Alloucherie, stating that the number of soldiers that participated in the coup was 150⁴⁰⁴; while his retired Chief of Press, Luis Bolín, raised the figure to 200 *soldaditos*.⁴⁰⁵ Finally, Knickerbocker wrote: "He [Queipo] took it [Seville] by sheer audacity. It was a Red city with tens of thousands of Frente Popular supporters ready to go out in the streets and shoot the military. But General de Llano beat them to it. With only one hundred and eighty soldiers, he knew he could do nothing but

⁴⁰⁰ Knickerbocker, Hubert Renfro, *The siege of Alcazar. A war-log of the Spanish Revolution*, page 29.

⁴⁰¹ Ibid, page 27.

⁴⁰² Loveday, Arthur, *World War in Spain*, page 62. Pro-Nationalist correspondent Arthur Loveday gained international notoriety for a series of bizarre statements, including his claim that the Army of Africa enjoyed widespread popular support during its bloody march to Madrid: "The explanation is that the populace of the country through which they advanced was entirely on their side", page 66.

⁴⁰³ Rogers, Francis Theobald, *Spain: a tragic journey*, page 143. The reporter then proceeded to give a colourful account of the capture of Seville's Divisional Headquarters (pages 145-47).

⁴⁰⁴ Alloucherie, Jean, *Noches de Sevilla*, page 247.

⁴⁰⁵ Bolín, Luis, *Spain: the vital years*, page 179.

die if he took the defensive." The correspondent added that "the de Llano army by nightfall numbered thousands", a detail that went unexplained.⁴⁰⁶

Dismantling the myth: early historiography

Certain sections of the international press were far from impressed with Queipo de Llano's oratory, in particular the 'providentialist' argument. Henry Buckley defined him as an "excitable and irascible officer", while Captain Francis McCullagh doubted the sincerity of his 'epiphany': "In his past life, General Queipo de Llano did not distinguish himself, as he does at present by public attendance and religious functions in Seville Cathedral as a member of a religious confraternity."⁴⁰⁷ However, it was not until 1948 that the authenticity of the legend of Queipo and his *soldaditos* was first questioned by the foreign press, more specifically by Associated Press correspondent Charles Foltz in *Masquerade in Spain*:

"The man who held Sevilla for the Army was General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano. He was in command of two thousand troops, but felt he could count on only a few hundred among them. Most of these were kept busy trying to crush the resistance of Socialists in the workers' quarter of the city."⁴⁰⁸

Foltz based his claim on Enrique Vila's polemical book *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, first published in 1937 under the pseudonym of Guzmán de Alfarache. In a nutshell, Vila dismantled the legend of the *soldaditos* by providing a list of participants in the rebellion, while at the same time reaffirming the tale that Queipo 'miraculously' captured both the Divisional Headquarters and the Infantry barracks on the early afternoon of 18 July 1936. Enrique Vila's motivations for writing *¡18 de julio en Sevilla!* remains a mystery. The author might have wished to pay homage to the insurgents by means of eternalising their names in a book. However, Vila was also aware of the irreparable damage that such an explosive revelation would do to the credibility of the 'Miracle of Seville'. In any

⁴⁰⁶ Knickerbocker, Hubert Renfro, *The siege of Alcazar. A war-log of the Spanish Revolution*, pages 28 (first quote) and 29 (second quote).

⁴⁰⁷ Buckley, Henry W., *Life and death of the Spanish republic*, page 30. "In his past life, General Queipo de Llano did not distinguish himself, as he does at present by public attendance and religious functions in Seville Cathedral as a member of a religious confraternity but who am I that I should doubt his good faith? Even if this rough, outspoken soldier pretends to be holier than he is, that very pretence is a tribute to the strength of the religious revival in Spain." McCullagh, Captain Francis, *In Franco's Spain. Being the experiences of an Irish war-correspondent during the Great Civil War which began in 1936*, page XX (Preface).

⁴⁰⁸ Foltz, Charles, *The Masquerade in Spain*, page 45.

case, *i18 de julio en Sevilla!* was certain to provoke a violent reaction from Queipo. The ‘saviour of Seville’ reached the bizarre conclusion that the best approach to combating Vila’s heresy was to write an acerbic preface to *i18 de Julio en Sevilla!*.

For General Queipo de Llano, who admitted only to flicking through the book (therefore confirming his well-known aversion to reading), the “verdad real, la verdad absoluta sobre los hechos ocurridos con anterioridad al 18 de Julio, en dicho día y en los sucesivos” could be reduced to a few bullet points: first, Enrique Vila’s lists did not correspond to the actual number of soldiers involved in the taking of the city-centre. Visibly unnerved by Vila’s work, Queipo once more contradicted his official account of the coup by reducing the number of *soldaditos* from 180 to 100. The general also denied meeting Villa-Abrille before the outbreak of the rebellion, reduced both Núñez and Corretger’s squadrons to a mere 40 soldiers each, stated that only 30 troops were scrambled to support Trasella’s assault on the city-centre, and overlooked the contribution of both the Civil Guard and the Artillery Corps. Lastly, the ‘saviour of Seville’ failed to explain how the defenceless insurgent barracks managed to repel a loyalist counter-attack and capture a large number of assault guards.⁴⁰⁹ Eventually, both Vila and Charles Foltz’s works slipped into oblivion, crushed by a sea of historiographical conformity.

Hubris

General Queipo exploited both his elevation to legendary status and the internationalisation of the myth as a platform to achieve political power. During an interview with Portuguese correspondent Artur Portela, Queipo coolly declared that Spain required “por 25 años lo menos” of military dictatorship before returning to civilian rule, of which ten would be entirely devoted to the extirpation of “semientes marxistas”:

“Cuando se organizó el movimiento, ninguno pensó en República o Monarquía; apenas en salvar a España. Transcurridos esos 25 años, cuando hayamos formado una generación, cuando haya – de hecho – libertad en la aceptación más genuina de la palabra, entonces, sí, España decidirá si quiere ser República o Monarquía.”⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁹ In ADVERTENCIAS, Enrique Vila wrote: “En el prólogo con que el Excmo. Sr. General D. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, se dignó honrar a este modesto trabajo, se consignan algunas rectificaciones, que dan al mismo, el único valor que tiene: el valor histórico” and dedicated the book “Al general Queipo, figura gigantesca de la epopeya de Sevilla que salvó a España”. See also Queipo’s preface. Guzmán de Alfarache, *i18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*.

⁴¹⁰ Portela, Artur, *Nas trincheiras de Espanha*, page 98.

During that same interview, Queipo denied rumours that he harboured any political ambitions (“¡No tengo ambiciones!”⁴¹¹); a statement that conflicted with the memoirs of General Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo (Pacón), the *Generalísimo*’s cousin. Salgado-Araujo was informed by a foreign diplomat, prior to the military conclave that would appoint the future dictator of Nationalist Spain, that General Queipo expressed his confidence that he would be selected for the post: “Queipo cree que será él porque es más antiguo que su primo.”⁴¹² Upon the predictable promotion of Franco to the leadership of the rebel faction, Pacón predicted future difficulties in dealing with the hot-tempered general: “al general Queipo no le agradaría ser mandado por un general de menor antigüedad.”⁴¹³ Enraged by General Franco’s promotion, Queipo de Llano continued to exploit his newfound status to denigrate the reputation of his many rivals, including the already-deceased Generals Mola and Fanjul. For instance, he claimed that the *Director* had decided to flee Spain on the night of 19 July, but then decided stay put once he heard of Queipo’s ‘miraculous’ capture of Seville. The general also attacked Franco’s brother-in-law and right-hand man, the physically feeble but political powerful Ramón Serrano Súñer; and even the *Generalísimo* himself. Ultimately, Queipo’s suicidal feud with Franco proved to be his undoing.⁴¹⁴

The elevation of the ‘Miracle of Seville’ to the pantheon of Nationalist mythology pleased all elements within the *pact of blood*, with the notable exception of General Queipo; it did not satisfy his ambitions. Indeed, the myth legitimised the class war waged by the *élites* against the masses; the annihilation of the political left masterminded by both the Falange and the *Requeté*; and sanctioned the Church’s monopoly over the cultural sphere. Also, Seville became the *de facto* capital of rebel-controlled Spain. On 15 August 1936, the city was selected to host the ceremony of the changing of the flag in Nationalist territory (the Monarchist bicolour replaced the Republican tricolour). Generals Franco, Queipo and Millan-Astray were invited as guests of honour; with Queipo delivering a bizarre lecture on Ancient Egypt and Millan-Astray concluding his speech with hysterical cries of “¡Viva la muerte!”⁴¹⁵

⁴¹¹ *Ibid*, page 98.

⁴¹² Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, *Mi vida junto a Franco*, page 196.

⁴¹³ *Ibid*, page 207.

⁴¹⁴ Rogers, Francis Theobald, *Spain: a tragic journey*, page 144; Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días: nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República Española*, page 1105; Preston, Paul, *Franco: a biography*, page 336.

⁴¹⁵ Speech of Franco: “Ésta es, como os digo, la insignia de una raza, de unos ideales, de una dignidad, de una Religión, de todo lo que estaba en peligro de desaparecer por el avance de las hordas marxistas y de

Queipo was not disheartened by his successive *gaffes* and continued shamelessly to exploit the myth to wage a proxy war against Franco, who had arrived in the capital of Andalucía on 7 August and installed himself in the luxurious palace of the Marquésa de Yanduri. In Seville, the future *Generalísimo* had the opportunity to experience first-hand the irascible nature of Queipo. The mercurial general declined to greet Franco upon his arrival and gave him an icy salute when both men met for the ceremony of the changing of the flag. Queipo de Llano was visibly unnerved by news that mixed crowds of Falangists, *Requetés*, soldiers and civilians were gathering daily at Franco's residence, singing patriotic songs and hailing him as the saviour of Spain.⁴¹⁶ It soon became evident that cooperation between both men would be impossible. Exhausted by Queipo's war of attrition, Franco abandoned the capital of Andalucía on 26 August. It was a pyrrhic victory for Queipo de Llano. Following his elevation to the leadership of rebel faction on 1 October 1936, the *Generalísimo* settled in Salamanca, which replaced Seville as the new centre of Nationalist Spain. Consequently, Seville's political decline was inextricably linked with Queipo's hubris.⁴¹⁷

Dismantling the myth: the *Medalla Militar Colectiva*

The Nationalist military high-command closed ranks around Queipo and continued excusing his eccentric behaviour in the hope of legitimising the rebellion, going as far as supporting the general's most outrageous claims. For instance, the eligibility conditions for the *Medalla Militar Colectiva* were based on Queipo's assertion that only the hours of 12:00-15:00 of 18 July were relevant for the success of a *coup d'état* that did not conclude until 23 July. Critically, those same hours coincided with Queipo de Llano's cameo appearance in the rebellion. In other words, the erratic general was handed *carte blanche* to protect the myth by all means necessary. And this was exactly what Queipo de Llano did, going as far as ridiculing his closest allies, including El Algabéño. The Falangist bullfighter had initially pledged 1,500 Falangists to the rebellion when in reality only 15 made an appearance in the city-centre. The 'saviour of Seville' decided to cynically exploit Algabéño's excessive optimism to cement the myth of the *soldaditos*. At the same time, Queipo conveniently 'forgot' the one hundred Falangists that

la propaganda de Moscú; es el oro de Castilla y la sangre de Aragón y nuestra gesta gloriosa en América y los triunfos de los barcos españoles a través de la Historia." *La Unión* (Seville), 15 August 1936; *ABC* (Seville), 16 August 1936.

⁴¹⁶ Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, *Mi vida junto a Franco*, page 184.

⁴¹⁷ *Ibid*, page 72.

swelled the ranks of the insurgent army after being released from the provincial prison during the night of 18-19 July.⁴¹⁸

Ultimately, the number of officers awarded the *Medalla Militar* revealed that rebellion was not a suicidal mutiny headed by Queipo de Llano who, with the help of God, miraculously seized the Divisional Headquarters, the Infantry barracks and galvanized a handful of *soldaditos* to overthrow the Republic; but an expertly-planned *coup d'état*, devised and matured inside the Divisional Headquarters, which encompassed the leadership of all military corps in capital of Andalucía.⁴¹⁹ As a result, all reports and lists of participants in the rebellion were quietly archived in both the *Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur* in Seville and the *Archivo General Militar* in Madrid.⁴²⁰

List of officers/soldiers based at the Divisional Headquarters on 18 July 1936 awarded with the *Medalla Militar*:

- General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra
- Major (Infantry) Pedro López Guerrero Portocarrero
- Major (*Estado Mayor*) José Cuesta Monereo
- Major (Infantry) Eduardo Álvarez-Rementería
- Major (Infantry *Diplomado*) Simón Lapatza Valenzuela
- Captain (*Estado Mayor*) Manuel Escribano Aguirre
- Captain (*Estado Mayor*) Manuel Gutiérrez Flores
- Captain (Infantry *Diplomado*) Julián García Pumarino y Méndez
- Captain (Artillery) Ricardo Arjona Brieva
- Captain (Infantry) Miguel Pérez Blázquez
- Captain (Engineer) José Fijo Castrillo

⁴¹⁸ Aznar, Manuel, *Historia militar de la guerra de España*, pages 69-70.

⁴¹⁹ "Gutiérrez Flores sabía de antemano que los jefes, unidos la mayoría al movimiento, eran en su opinión, lo único que ya podía hacer desistir al Divisionario de su insensato proceder." Montán, Luis, *Cómo conquistó Sevilla el General Queipo de Llano*, page 7.

⁴²⁰ All lists and reports from *Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur* (Seville), Legajo 5364, Carpeta 1 and 2; Legajo 5375, Carpeta 1 to 20 (especially 1 and 14); Legajo 5376, Carpeta 12; Legajo 5381, Carpeta 9; *Archivo General Militar* (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 2, Carpeta 9; Legajo 6, Carpeta 2. Also, a report in the *Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur* specified that the conspiratorial network weaved by Majors Cuesta Monereo and Eduardo Álvarez Rementería was directed by Captains Modesto Aguilera, Alfonso Carrillo, Pérez Blázquez, Fernández de Córdoba, Villa Baena and Puerta Tamayo, and Lieutenant Carlos Jack Caruncho. *Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur* (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 12.

- Captain (*Aviación*) Modesto Aguilera Morente
- Captain (*Infantry*) Manuel Díaz Criado
- Lieutenant (*Cavalry*) Francisco Parladé Ybarra
- Lieutenant (*Invalidos*) Enrique Parladé Vazquez
- Lieutenant (*Intendencia*) Antonio Díaz Criado
- *Oficial 1º Equitación* Gabriel Fuentes Ferrer
- *Oficial 3º O.M.* Vicente Celis y Sánchez de la Campa
- *Oficial 3º O.M.* Higinio Acero Gonzalez
- *Auxiliar Administrativo C.A.S.E* Juan Pons Ribot
- Brigadier (*Artillery*) Joaquín Flores Gaviño
- Sergeant (*Artillery*) José Almonte Cruzado
- Sergeant (*Cavalry*) Luis Cueto Ortega
- Sergeant (*Infantry*) Paulino M. González Gil
- Sergeant (*Infantry*) José Chavez González
- Sergeant (*Infantry*) Candido Barrena Valle
- Sergeant (*Infantry*) Manuel Gonzalez Castellano
- Sergeant (*Infantry*) Manuel Moreno Jurado
- Sergeant (*Infantry*) Enrique Villanueva Guerrero
- Corporal (*Infantry*) Serafin Sama Ricardo
- Corporal (*Infantry*) José Fuentes Cabrera
- Corporal (*Infantry*) Angel Sanchez Garcia
- Corporal (*Infantry*) Ramón Diaz Román
- Corporal (*Infantry*) Francisco Ortega Bellido
- Second-Lieutenant (*Cavalry*) José Maria Escribano Aguirre
- Soldier (*Engineer*) Pablo Nizo Chaparro
- *Alumno* (*Cavalry*) Marcelino del Rio Bandera

The list revealed that Queipo de Llano, his *aide-de-camp* and Major Cuesta were not the only rebels at the Divisional Headquarters in the early afternoon of 18 July 1936.

List of officers (rank general to lieutenant) proposed for the *Medalla Militar Colectiva*:

Infantry (*Granada nº6*):

- Major Antonio Álvarez-Rementería
- Major Rafael Corrales Romero
- Major José Gutierrez Perez
- Captain (Medic) Victor Hornillos Escribano
- Captain Angel Medina Serrano
- Captain Fernando Ponce de León
- Captain Pedro de Castro de Lasarte
- Captain Carlos Gomez Cobian
- Captain José Delgado y García de la Torre
- Captain Ignacio Rodriguez Trasellas
- Captain Obdulio Cancio Gomez
- Captain Carlos Fernández de Cordoba
- Lieutenant Nicolas Fernandez de Cordoba
- Lieutenant Aurelio Gonzalez Lepe
- Lieutenant Victor Garcia del Mora
- Lieutenant Manuel Hidalgo Romero
- Lieutenant Juan Gonzalez Fernandez
- Lieutenant Francisco Villa Salgado
- Lieutenant Jose Castelló Alvarez
- Lieutenant José Tormos Lobera
- Lieutenant Francisco Rivero Moliné

According to a report of 2 December 1936, a total of 115 Infantry officers/soldiers declared the state of war and participated in the capture of the *Telefónica* (Corporal Francisco Díaz López died during the assault), Town Hall and Civil Government.

Artillery (*Regimiento de Artilleria Ligera nº3*):

- Colonel Santos Rodríguez Cerezo
- Lieutenant-Colonel Francisco Iturzaeta Gonzalez
- Major Miguel Martin de Oliva y Enjuto
- Captain Fernando Barón y Mora Figueroa
- Captain Vicente Pérez de Sevilla

- Captain Antonio Villa Baena
- Captain Eduardo de la Torre de Dios
- Captain Juan Cortes Mateo
- Captain Manuel de la Fuente Castelló
- Captain Antonio de la Puerta Tamayo
- Captain Rafael Esquivias Salcedo
- Lieutenant Manuel Arjona Brieva
- Lieutenant Luis Valle Colmenares
- Lieutenant José García Castro
- Lieutenant Juan de Dios Porras Ruiz Pedrosa
- Lieutenant Antonio Navarro Carmona
- Lieutenant Andrés García Rodríguez
- Lieutenant Luis González de la Vega

A series of reports (dated 23 August 1937) listed 127 Artillery officers/soldiers (under the command of Captains Vicente Pérez and Mora Figueroa and Lieutenant González de la Vega) that operated at the Avenida de la Libertad, *Casa Correos, Telefónica*, Hotel Inglaterra and the Civil Government. The reports specified that all soldiers that joined the rebellion outside the 'mythical' hours of 15:00-19:30 were not included in the list.

Cavalry (*Regimiento Cazadores de Taxdir 7º*):

- Major Gerardo Figuerola y Garcia de Echave
- Captain Antonio Fernandez Heredia
- Captain Jose Ramos Salas
- Lieutenant Emilio Lopez Rincon
- Lieutenant Ramon Serrano Martin
- Lieutenant Miguel Soto Garcia
- Lieutenant Ricardo Rojas Solis
- Lieutenant Francisco Mora Figueroa

A total of 208 men (divided in two squadrons of 104 soldiers each) operated in Miraflores (capture of the local radio station "efectuando algunos servicios desalojando casas que se

estaban saqueando é incendiando por los elementos revoltosos"), La Palmera, Civil Government, Divisional Headquarters and the *Intendencia* Headquarters (protecting it from a joint attack by assault and *seguridad* guards).

Batallón Zapadores-Minadores nº2:

- Lieutenant-Colonel Eduardo Marquerié y Ruiz Delgado
- Major Antonio Escofet Alonso
- Captain Adolfo Corretjer Duimovich
- Captain Evaristo Ramirez Moreno
- Captain José Sicre Marassi
- Captain Alfonso Ortí Melendez-Valdez
- Captain Francisco Bravo Simon
- Captain (Medic) Antonio Alvarez Gonzalez
- Lieutenant Carlos Jack Caruncho
- Lieutenant José Oliver Sagrera
- Lieutenant Pedro de Rueda y Ureta
- Lieutenant Cayetano Ramirez Lozano
- Lieutenant Alfonso Chamorro Cascos
- Lieutenant Luis Iglesias Carrasco
- Lieutenant (Veterinarian) Bernardino Moreno Cañadas

Two reports (23 September 1936 and 2 April 1937) listed 119 officers/soldiers that contributed to the "aplastamiento del elemento marxista hasta la hora en que se rindió el Gobierno Civil". The *Zapadores-Minadores nº2* also participated in the "defensa del Cuartel, sosteniendo tiroteo con los marxistas apostados en las ventanas del Edificio de la Plaza de España", occupied the Telephone Company at the Parque María Luisa, protected a number strategic buildings and clashed with leftist militiamen in the calle Reyes Católicos.

Segundo Grupo Divisionario de Intendencia:

- Major Francisco Núñez Fernandez de Velasco
- Teniente Antonio Santa Ana de la Rosa

A total of 82 officers/soldiers were involved in the capture of the *Telefónica*, Hotel Inglaterra, Town Hall and Civil Government.

Sección Destinos:

- Captain (Infantry): José de la Herran Viniegra

A report of 1 April 1937 listed 53 officers/soldiers that participated in the rebellion.

2º Grupo de Sanidad Militar:

- Lieutenant José Selma Martínez

A total of 91 officers/soldiers patrolled the Jardines de Murillo, Puerta de la Carne and Parque María Luisa. The report specified that the list only included individuals that “prestó servicios en la calle”.

Border-Guards (12º Comandancia de Carabineros):

- Teniente Manuel Martínez Espinosa

In a report dated 10 August 1936, Espinosa claimed to have joined the rebellion at 16:00. He was unable to reach the *Carabineros* headquarters, so decided instead to head to the Granada nº6 Infantry barracks with retired Infantry Capitan César Collado García, “atravesando por entre varias camionetas de comunistas que marchaban a armarse hacia la Alameda de Hércules con los Guardias de Asalto”. He met Major Rementería, who organised the defence of the barracks with a handful of soldiers against two separate Assault Guard attacks. Espinosa also participated in the capture of the Plaza Nueva and combated “los numerosos pistoleros que desde azoteas y balcones de la Campana, calle Tetuán y afluentes nos hostilizaron durante toda la noche del sábado al domingo y cuya eliminación hubimos de dedicarnos durante toda aquella noche y parte del domingo 19”. Lastly, Espinosa was also part of the group that

escorted Varela Rendueles, his secretary and five councilors from the Town Hall to the Divisional Headquarters.

Civil Guard (17º Tercio, *Comandancia Sevilla Interior*):

- Captain Antonio Galan Hidalgo
- Lieutenant Angel Cuña Camacho
- Lieutenant Juan Domínguez Serrano
- Lieutenant Francisco González Narbona
- Lieutenant David Castelló Bruna
- Lieutenant Jose Fernandez Muñoz

Civil Guard (17º Tercio, *Comandancia Sevilla Exterior*):

- Lieutenant-Colonel Genaro Conde Bujons
- Major Santiago Garrigós Bernabeu
- Major Ramon Rodriguez Diaz
- Lieutenant Juan Marquez Perez
- Lieutenant Juan Masse Esquivel

Civil Guard (Triana):

- Captain Antonio Galan Hidalgo

Falange:

- Antonio Garcia Lacalle
- Leopoldo Parias y Calvo de Leon
- Pedro Parias Corrales
- Luis Parias y Calvo de Leon
- Gonzalo Parias y Calvo de León
- Alfonso Medina Benjumea
- Manuel Vazquez Alcaide
- Antonio Garcia Carranza (Pepe El Algabéño)

- Ignacio Cañal y Gomez Imaz
- Marcelino Pardo Maestre
- Ignacio Romero y Gomez Rull
- Alberto Perez y Ruiz Brincau
- Rafael Carmona Roldan
- Carlos Llorente Gordillo
- Francisco Arboleya Martinez

A final report (June 1937) proposed a total of 886 officers/soldiers for the *Medalla Militar Colectiva*. The list was controversial, mainly because of its stated objective: to reduce the number of participants in the rebellion to an absolute minimum so to harmonise the award with the myth of Queipo de Llano and his *soldaditos*.⁴²¹ Indeed, the Nationalist leadership mercilessly excluded any individual that did not meet the restrictive eligibility conditions detailed in the *Boletín Oficial de Estado* nº351. The case of the *Centro de Movilización y Reserva nº3* (based at the Cuartel de los Terceros) is exemplary. On 18 July 1936, Engineer Captain Carlos Lemus Martinez presented himself at Divisional Headquarters and was ordered to proceed with the “requisa de Automoviles sufriendo varios tiroteos en distintos sectores de esta Capital cuando efectuaba dicho servicio.” Simultaneously, Second-Lieutenant Lorenzo Rodriguez Rosado organised the defence of the Cuartel de los Terceros “siendo hostilizado dia y noche por los marxistas con fuego de arma larga por la Plaza de Ponce de Leon y con fuego de arma larga y ametralladora por la fachada de la calle Sol”; frustrating all working-class attempts to reach the city-centre from that area. A total of 15 officers/soldiers submitted a written protest demanding their inclusion in the *Medalla Militar*. The request was ignored and the unit erased from official Nationalist History.⁴²²

⁴²¹Other officers included in the report were: Major Ramos Toral Paredes, Captains Luis Alarcón de la Lastra, Ramón Carranza, Joaquin Vigueras Fernández and Vara del Rey. Several *Requetés* also protested: Manuel Alvarez, Juan Pérez Gonzalez, Joaquín Sierra Fernandez-Trabanco, Juan Padilla Rodríguez, Fernando Cañaveral Valdes. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 9. See also **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 1 and 14.

⁴²²Second-Lieutenant Lorenzo Rodríguez Rosado declared that the Cuartel de los Terceros “siendo hostilizado dia y noche por los marxistas con fuego de arma larga por la Plaza de Ponce de León y con fuego de arma larga y ametralladora por la fachada de la calle Sol desde las azoteas, por lo que pudo ser causa su actuación de evitar que los marxistas pasaran de la Plaza de San Román y con ellos el saqueo y quema de la Iglesia de los P.P. Escolapios colindante con el Cuartel.” **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 2, Carpeta 9.

One of the many individual victims of the bureaucratic trap set-up by General Queipo de Llano was Lieutenant Arturo Fabregas Martinez, who came under fire while protecting the *Sanidad Militar* Headquarters. Unfortunately for him, the bullets fired in the suburbs were not of the same value as those shot in the city-centre. His petition was rejected.⁴²³ Others were excluded from the *Medalla Militar* for no reason other than the need to reduce the number of recipients, such as Lieutenant Andres Portavell Serda, who was at the Divisional Headquarters during the early hours of the insurgency. The Nationalist leadership was forced to reverse its original verdict after Serda presented a reference signed by the all-powerful Major Cuesta.⁴²⁴

Ironically, the group most affected by the painful metamorphosis of the myth into History was the Infantry Corps (the *soldaditos*). The rebels were obsessed about ensuring that the number of soldiers awarded with the *Medalla Militar* did not deviate significantly from the figure presented by Queipo in his memoirs of the rebellion. The Infantry soldiers refused to concede defeat and submitted a torrent of written protests, most notably those that served under the orders of Major Antonio Álvarez-Rementería, Captain Trasellas and Lieutenant Villa.⁴²⁵ Regrettably, the Nationalist leadership was more preoccupied with the preservation of the myth of the *soldaditos* than awarding those same *soldaditos*, dismissing dozens of petitions in the process. For instance, Provisional Second-Lieutenant José Alvarez Sotomayor's appeal was rejected on the grounds that he was not included in the group that went to declare the state of war, despite actively participating in the coup from 17:00 of 18 July.⁴²⁶ Another soldier, Miguel José Romero Serrano, left the Infantry barracks at 14:30 as part of the unit ordered to protect the *pabellones militares* in calle Monsalves. Serrano was involved in a gun-battle against an Assault Guard armoured vehicle in the Plaza del Duque and, according to his own personal testimony: "Más tarde, por habérseme estropeado el fusil, me defendí a culatazos de varios guardias de Asalto". Lastly, Serrano was also ordered by Major Álvarez-Rementería to defend a rooftop in calle Jesús del Gran Poder.

Miguel Serrano was not the only soldier to go beyond the call of duty passed for the decoration. Pedro Martínez García was recovering from his wounds when he decided to

⁴²³ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 17.

⁴²⁴ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 14.

⁴²⁵ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 18.

⁴²⁶ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 14.

abandon his hospital bed to swell the rebel ranks.⁴²⁷ Lastly, and to Queipo's chagrin, Francisco López Valle presented his inclusion "en el libro 18 de Julio" as evidence of his participation in the coup, where he fought alongside Captain Trasellas (and Lieutenants Francisco Rivera and Victor García del Moral), helped capture an Assault Guard armoured vehicle in calle Sierpes and was involved in several gun-battles until the surrender of *Telefónica*.⁴²⁸

General Queipo de Llano's plan to use the *Medalla Militar* to rewrite History resulted in a monumental failure. Not only did the June 1937 report disprove the tale of the *soldaditos*, but also enraged hundreds of officers and soldiers, all of whom felt unjustly excluded from the decoration. In despair, the Nationalist leadership attempted to intimidate its former heroes-turned-villains; however, not even the threat of court-martials could prevent a flood of written complaints from reaching the offices of the Divisional Headquarters in Seville. The rebel high-command panicked and resorted to imposing a veil of silence over an affair that had been originally orchestrated to sanctify the 'Miracle of Seville'.

The exact number of rebel troops on 18 July 1936 remains unknown, courtesy of Queipo's efforts to preserve *his* myth. Moreover, the general attempted to discredit Enrique Vila's work, which listed a total of 2,550 participants in the insurgency, by declaring that a majority of soldiers were enjoying summer leave on the day of the coup. However, Nationalist reports disproved the general's claim. Not only were the military rebels informed of the development of the conspiracy, but were joined on 18 July by the Falange, *Requeté* and 187 civilian volunteers.⁴²⁹ Ultimately, the 2,550 soldiers and civil guards numbered in *¡18 de julio en Sevilla!* are closer to the real number of participants in the rebellion than the 886 that met the Kafkian eligibility conditions of the *Medalla Militar Colectiva*. As for General Queipo de Llano's 180 *soldaditos*, they were exactly what pro-Francoist historiography labelled them: a "leyenda".⁴³⁰

The battle for the Laureada

⁴²⁷ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 16.

⁴²⁸ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 11.

⁴²⁹ For civilian volunteers see: Medina Villalonga, Rafael de, *Tiempo Pasado*, pages 36-37.

⁴³⁰ Salas, Nicolás, *El Moscú Sevillano. Sevilla la roja, feudo del comunismo español durante la República y símbolo triunfal del frente popular en 1936*, page 247.

For General Queipo de Llano, the *Medalla Militar Colectiva* represented but a stepping stone to total power. His obsession was Spain's highest military honour - the *Cruz Laureada de San Fernando* – which would grant him a status similar to that enjoyed by General Franco. In order to attain his objective, Queipo used Seville's political institutions to pressure Franco into awarding him the decoration. On 25 August 1937, the president of the *Diputación*, Joaquin Benjumea Burín, joined a petition initiated by the Town Halls of Pamplona and Málaga requesting the *Laureada* for Queipo de Llano for his actions during both the 18 July 1936 coup in Seville and the conquest of Málaga in February 1937.⁴³¹ Two years later (June 1939), the Town Hall of Seville increased the pressure by writing an open letter to the *Generalísimo*:

“Fiel intérprete del sentir popular, el Excmo. Ayuntamiento ha tomado el acuerdo de organizar el próximo día 18 de Julio un acto de homenaje en su honor donde todo el pueblo de Sevilla haga patente su deseo de que nuestro General luzca sobre su pecho tan merecida y preciada recompensa.”⁴³²

Biographer Armiñán Odriozola developed an original argument to support Queipo's propaganda campaign. He compared the 'saviour of Seville' to King Fernando III, who had actually reconquered Seville from the Moors in 1248 and was subsequently canonised as a saint by the Catholic Church.⁴³³ However, Queipo's ultimate ambition – total power – was unattainable primarily because of his ever-shifting political loyalties, military incompetence and conflictive personality. At the same time, General Franco was trapped in a conundrum: on the one hand, the *Laureada* would grant immense prestige and political leverage to the elder statesman of military conspiracies in Spain; while on the other, the *Generalísimo* was aware that he could not employ his usual bullish methods against his insubordinate general or risk creating a martyr and provoking a crisis of faith in the Nationalist zone. Franco deal brilliantly with Queipo. Perhaps drawing conclusions from Primo de Rivera's flawed decision to force Queipo into premature retirement in 1924, the *Generalísimo* decided that an idle Queipo would be potentially more dangerous than a 'saviour of Seville' immersed in administrative work, where he would find himself out of his intellectual depth. Thus, instead of going down

⁴³¹ *Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla* (Seville), Legajo 418.

⁴³² *Archivo Municipal de Sevilla* (Seville), Asuntos Especiales, 1939, nº24.

⁴³³ “Nosotros, sin más espíritu que el de la justicia, movidos por un sentimiento de admiración y de gratitud, creemos, y así lo escribimos, y signamos, que sobre el pecho del general Queipo de Llano, mejor que la banda de esa Gran Cruz de Agricultura, que en estos momentos piden para él los andaluces, lucirá, con plena razón aquella otra Gran Cruz que lleva el nombre del conquistador de Sevilla, el gran Rey San Fernando.” Armiñán Odriozola, Luis de, *Excmo. Sr. General D. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Jefe del Ejército del Sur*, page 45-46.

the traditional route of disciplinary action, Franco opted to limit Queipo's military responsibilities. As a result, eyewitness accounts of civil war Seville gradually shifted from the myth of Queipo and his *soldaditos* to the administration of the capital of Andalucía.⁴³⁴ Ironically, Franco greatly appreciated the work of Queipo's bureaucrats, so much so that he appointed the mayor of Seville, Joaquín Benjumea Burín, to several ministerial posts between 1939 and 1942.⁴³⁵

After successfully mutating the conquering hero of Seville into a civil servant; Franco's next step was to politically isolate Queipo while leaving the myth untouched for his own personal benefit. Consequently, the legendary general was unceremoniously silenced on 1 February 1938 after delivering his final radio speech. A prisoner in the gilded cage that was the capital of Andalucía, Queipo de Llano could do little more but vent his frustration by throwing insults at Franco (his personal favourite was to call Franco "Paca la culona").⁴³⁶ Queipo developed such an extreme hatred of the *Generalísimo* that it eventually eroded his mental health.⁴³⁷ Queipo's cronies attempted to excuse, with little success, his volatile personality:

"El general Queipo de Llano siempre lo arriesgó todo al luchar en la avanzada, su lugar de costumbre, contra cosas y hombres. Siempre inspiraron sus actos imperiosos requerimiento del honor."⁴³⁸

In fact, Queipo "arriesgó todo" on 18 July 1939 and lost. The impulsive general lost his final gamble against Franco after using the third anniversary of the outbreak of the rebellion to publicly protest at the fact that the *Cruz Laureada de San Fernando* was awarded to Valladolid, but not Seville. In the capital of Andalucía, celebrations were marked by a series of religious

⁴³⁴ "El alejamiento de la zona Sur del teatro, unido a la gran personalidad de su general, acrecentada por su heroica defensa de Sevilla y sus populares charlas por la radio, contribuyeron a establecer en la región bajo su mando una relativa autonomía en el orden administrativo inspirada en principios de la mayor sencillez en el procedimiento y rapidez en la ejecución." Escobar, José Ignacio, *Así empezó*, page 153.

⁴³⁵ Ministro de Agricultura y Trabajo (10/08/1939 to 16/10/1940 and 16/10/1940 to 19/05/1941, Ministro de Hacienda (20/05/1941 to 03/09/1942). Salas, Nicolás, *Joaquín Benjumea Burín: 1878-1963*.

⁴³⁶ Saínz Rodríguez, Pedro, *Testimonio y recuerdos*, page 272.

⁴³⁷ "Vegeta jaleado todavía por un grupo de incondicionales y esperando la hora, que no habría de llegar, de recobrar mandos, repitiendo hasta el cansancio expresiones injuriosas contra Franco e incluso componiendo pésimos versos, que sólo sus más encarnizados enemigos reproducirían para destruir para siempre su figura." Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días: nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República Española*, page 1107.

⁴³⁸ Armiñán Odriozola, Luis de, *Excmo. Sr. General D. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Jefe del Ejército del Sur*, page 10.

services (at the Virgen de la Victoria, the Cruz de los Caídos and the Virgen de la Macarena) and a bullfight, with all proceedings going for the reconstruction of the shrine of Santa María de la Cabeza, destroyed by Republican forces. The festival climaxed at the Plaza de San Fernando, where a hysterical Queipo made his polemic demand. His outburst was sure to elicit a response from the *Generalísimo*. A few weeks later, Franco effectively banished Queipo to Italy under the pretext of inaugurating a military legation, but not before Serrano Súñer warned Mussolini's son-in-law, Foreign Minister Galleazo Ciano, that the fiery general was "loco".⁴³⁹

During his Italian sojourn, Queipo de Llano confirmed that he could truly bear a grudge. In Rome, the general rejected an offer of rapprochement with King Alfonso XIII, delivered by a representative of the deposed monarch. He later narrated the episode to General Franco: "Me negué diciendo que no me engañaría más. Y cuando hizo decirme que quería darme unas explicaciones, contesté que no tenía gusto en escucharlas."⁴⁴⁰ When Queipo de Llano returned from his Italian exile in 1942, the 'saviour of Seville' was, ironically, more of a mythical relic of the past than an influential general. He was quietly passed to the reserve on 19 February 1943. However, Queipo continued to battle incessantly for the *Laureada*. A month before his retirement, the general petitioned again for Spain's greatest military honour. His request was backed by dozens of Andalucian Town Halls and a small but influential clique of cronies (including the ever-faithful Cuesta Monereo).⁴⁴¹ Seville led by example by bestowing the city's Gold Medal on the ageing general in front of a large, ecstatic crowd that assembled at the Town Hall on 12 October to catch a glimpse of its fading hero. Aware that Queipo no longer possessed any threat to his leadership, Franco gladly yielded to pressure and presented the *Laureada* to his former rival in February 1944. The *Generalísimo* made it a point of honour to be present at the award ceremony. On 6 May, Franco personally decorated the chastened 'saviour of Seville'.⁴⁴²

A legend dies

⁴³⁹ Ciano, Galeazzo, *Ciano's Diary 1939-43*, page 117.

⁴⁴⁰ Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, *Queipo de Llano, Carta de 18 de junio de 1950*.

⁴⁴¹ Cuesta Monereo later used his biography of Queipo to justify the awarding of the *Laureada*. Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 321.

⁴⁴² Franco also made Queipo a Marquis. Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días: nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República Española*, page 1106.

The *Cruz Laureada de San Fernando* failed to mellow General Queipo, a man described as a “sadist” by Gerald Brenan⁴⁴³ and “brutal y sentimental” by Ian Gibson.⁴⁴⁴ Aged 73, he wrote a vitriolic letter to Serrano Súñer, complaining at the revelations contained in the latter’s recently-published memoirs. Franco’s brother-in-law wrote a mordant reply on 6 October 1948. Súñer mentioned the “carácter excitable, violento y agresivo que, desde siempre, había prestado singularidad a la figura de usted”, and concluded his letter sarcastically by declaring his open admiration for Queipo’s ‘miraculous’ intervention in Seville on 18 July 1936. The general lost his composure and wrote a second letter on 24 October 1948. Queipo did not mince his words. He referred to Súñer as a “víbora” that triggered feelings of “indiferencia y repugnancia”, going as far as threatening to “aplastarlo.”⁴⁴⁵ Lastly, the irascible general turned his attention to his nemesis, who he continued to defy (with little success) until the bitter end. Less than a year before his death (18 June 1950), Queipo wrote a letter to the *Generalísimo*, in which the ‘saviour of Seville’ showed worrying signs of a growing detachment from reality. By then, Queipo de Llano had actually convinced himself that he had organised the conspiracy against the Republic and persuaded General Mola to become its *Director*. Like General Franco, it appears that the ‘saviour of Seville’ was brainwashed by decades of unilateral propaganda.⁴⁴⁶ Moreover, Queipo de Llano also informed the *Generalísimo* of his discontentment at not being adequately rewarded for his contribution to the success of the rebellion in Seville. Queipo concluded his letter with a final show of defiance: he declared himself a “ferviente monárquico”, anathematising Francoism.⁴⁴⁷

Franco never graced Queipo with a reply. The forgotten ‘saviour of Seville’ died a bitter man on 9 March 1951. According to newspaper *ABC*, minor seismic activity was felt in the capital of Andalucía on the exact moment of his death; nothing compared to the three-year socio-political earthquake that shook Seville to its very foundations during Queipo’s rule, claiming thousands of lives and whose reverberations are still felt, and debated, today.⁴⁴⁸

⁴⁴³ Brenan, Gerald, *Personal record, 1920-1972*, page 298.

⁴⁴⁴ Gibson, Ian, *Queipo de Llano: Sevilla, verano de 1936*, page 12.

⁴⁴⁵ **Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia** (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, *Queipo de Llano, Carta de 24 de octubre de 1948*.

⁴⁴⁶ For the brainwashing of General Franco see: Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, *Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War: the brainwashing of Francisco Franco*.

⁴⁴⁷ **Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia** (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, *Queipo de Llano, Carta de 18 de junio de 1950*.

⁴⁴⁸ On 9 March 1951, the *Diputación* mourned Queipo de Llano’s death: “personalidad histórica va unida al hecho insigne de la salvación de Sevilla y su Provincia por su heroica participación en el glorioso Alzamiento nacional que restituyó a España su prestigio y la liberó del yugo extraño que hoy tratan de

Chapter IV

Institutionalising Terror in Rebel Spain: the pacification of the working-class districts of Seville (19-23 July 1936)

Introduction

Violent opposition to the 18 July *coup d'état* in Seville was deliberately exaggerated by the Rebels either to conceal or excuse the massacres of 19-23 July, rationalised as mere “punishments” (or *castigos*). The same justification was applied to Badajoz and all other towns that resisted the rebels during the bloody march of the Army of Africa from Seville to Madrid in the summer/autumn of 1936.⁴⁴⁹ The insurgents rewrote History for two main reasons, because acknowledging reality would imply both: a) the admission that the Rebels employed the most brutal colonial war tactics to crush civilian opposition to the coup and; b) the dismantling the myth of the *soldaditos*. At the same time as it institutionalised terror the rebel leadership was terrified by the possibility of provoking any questioning of their methods within Rebel Spain.

The fact that the majority of the local population rejected the so-called *Alzamiento Nacional* was dismissed as detail of minor importance. The rebels openly despised universal suffrage since they believed that the capital of Andalucía had been infected by the “virus marxista”.⁴⁵⁰

In his memoirs, Major Cuesta Cuesta Monereo described Republican Seville as living in an

eludir los pueblos dignos de la tierra.” The *Diputación* also promised to adopt policies “para perpetuar su memoria” **Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla** (Seville), Legajo 418. For the earthquake report see: **ABC** (Seville), 10 March 1951. See also the article written by Major Cuesta Monereo’s, in which he refreshed the collective memory of Spain: “Sería difícil explicar el dolor de España entera. Y aún más difícil el de Sevilla. Es natural. ¡Es tanto lo que Sevilla le debe!”

⁴⁴⁹ Martínez Bande, José Manuel, **La Marcha sobre Madrid**. For Badajoz see: Chaves Palacio, Julián, **La guerra civil en Extremadura. Operaciones militares**; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, **La columna de la muerte. El avance del ejército franquista de Sevilla a Badajoz**; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, **El fenómeno revisionista o los fantasmas de la derecha española [Sobre la Matanza de Badajoz y la lucha en torno a la interpretación del pasado]**; Neves, Mário, **A chacina de Badajoz. Relato de uma testemunha de um dos episódios mais trágicos da Guerra Civil de Espanha (Agosto de 1936)**. For the impact of the massacre of Badajoz in Portuguese border towns (especially Barrancos) see: Simões, Maria Dulce Antunes, **Barrancos na encruzilhada da Guerra Civil de Espanha. Memórias e Testemunhos, 1936**. See also: Delgado, Iva, **Portugal e a guerra civil de Espanha**; Chaves Palacio, Julián, **La represión en la provincia de Cáceres durante la guerra civil (1936-1939)**.

⁴⁵⁰ **La Unión** reported on 11 August that El Pedroso (Seville) was one of the towns where the “virus marxista hizo mayores estragos.” **La Unión** (Seville), 11 August 1936. Ironically, Republican violence claimed no lives in the *pueblo* (material damage was restricted to the Town Hall). **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), FC, Causa General, 1040, Expediente 12. On the other hand, the Rebels executed 105 residents. **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), Expedientes Policiales, H-754.

“ambiente totalmente hostil y con una masa obrera de miles y miles de hombres, envenenados y armados”; whereas General Queipo de Llano’s first biographer claimed in 1937 that one in every three residents was affiliated to extreme-left paramilitary organisations (around 100,000 out of a total population of 267,192).⁴⁵¹ That same year General Queipo inexplicably reduced the figure to between 50-60,000 and by 1990 pro-Francoist historiography revised the number down to 30,000.⁴⁵² Numerical discrepancies apart, all accounts converge on the crucial point that Seville was under siege by an internal enemy and that the rebellion consisted of a pre-emptive strike against an impending Communist coup. Furthermore, the Rebels bizarrely equated trade-unionism with affiliation to a militia; a rationale that went in line with the *Bando de guerra* of 18 July, which called for the execution of all strikers.⁴⁵³ Arminán Odriozola and Queipo de Llano went even further: they simply militarised the entire population - including women and children - of the working-class districts of Seville (or *barrios*); all treated as legitimate military targets between the days of 18-23 July 1936.

The constant references to the ‘Marxist hordes’ created the perception of a city dominated by left-wing extremism and where the recourse to violence was inevitable; a view exported to the rest of Spain. Conversely, the Republican authorities were dismissed as cowardly and incapable of defeating a spontaneous rebellion headed by a small group of patriotic army officers. In fact, the legend of Queipo made it almost impossible to challenge the puritanical motivations of the insurgents, while simultaneously creating a parallel tale: the ‘myth of the red army’. All this was demolished by a secret rebel report dated 12 August 1936, passed to the Rebel columns

⁴⁵¹ See Major Cuesta Monereo’s report in **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 24; Arminán Odriozola, Luis de, **Excmo. Sr. General D. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Jefe del Ejército del Sur**, pages 28-31. See also the version presented by pro-Rebel military historian Manuel Aznar: “Solamente los guardias de Asalto eran muy superiores en número y medios de combate a los soldados de que en los primeros momentos se pudo disponer – sin tener en la calle Caballería y Artillería – y las Milicias populares eran numerosísimas y temibles en la guerrilla urbana y en la emboscada de azoteas y callejuelas.” Aznar, Manuel, **Historia militar de la guerra de España**, page 97. For the population of Seville in 1936 see: Macarro Vera, José Manuel, **La utopía revolucionaria: Sevilla en la Segunda República**, page 22.

⁴⁵² ABC (Seville), 18 July 1937. Salas, Nicolás, **El Moscú Sevillano. Sevilla la roja, feudo del comunismo español durante la República y símbolo triunfal del frente popular en 1936**, page 243.

⁴⁵³ See the works of Nicolás Salas: Salas, Nicolás, **Morir en Sevilla**; Salas, Nicolás, **El Moscú Sevillano. Sevilla la roja, feudo del comunismo español durante la República y símbolo triunfal del frente popular en 1936**; Salas, Nicolás, **Sevilla fue la clave. República, Alzamiento, Guerra Civil (1931-39)**, 2 vols.; Salas, Nicolás, **Bienvenido a Sevilla, camarada Alexis!**; Salas, Nicolás, **Sevilla en tiempos de los anti-Dios**; Salas, Nicolás, **La otra memoria histórica. 500 testimonios gráficos y documentales de la represión marxista en España (1931-1939)**; Salas, Nicolás, **La Guerra Civil en Sevilla: antecedentes, frente popular y 18 de julio del 36, las represiones de ambos bandos (1931-1959)**.

advancing towards Madrid, which described in very crude terms the military weakness of the loyalists. The Rebel high-command revealed: “La calidad del enemigo que tenemos delante, sin disciplina ni preparación militar, carente de mandos ilustrados y escasos de armamento y municiones en general por falta de Estados Mayores y organización de servicios, hace que los combates que nos veamos obligados a sostener las resistencias sean generalmente débiles y que confíen solo a la fortaleza de las posiciones y a la acción de la Aviación y concentración de artillería el batir a las Columnas.” Other important sections read: “Nuestra superioridad en armamento y hábil utilización del mismo nos permite el alcanzar con contadas bajas los objetivos; la influencia moral del cañón mortero o tiro ajustado de ametralladoras es enorme sobre el que no lo posee o sabe sacarle rendimiento. [...] muchas veces basta la intimidación y un cañonazo en puertas o ventanas para que cesen las resistencias. [...] si el enemigo se defiende aislarlo y la labor metódica de bombardeo, quema, agujeros en las paredes, etc., darán resuelto el problema sin apenas bajas. Al enemigo no conviene acorralarlo sino dejarle abierta una salida para batirle en ella con armas automáticas emboscadas. Puede asegurarse también que la falta de disciplina del enemigo y carencia de servicios hará que ninguna concentración pueda sostener dos días de combate por falta de municiones.”⁴⁵⁴

The myth of the ‘red army’

General Queipo’s argument that the Rebels defeated an immense ‘red army’ proved to be as hollow as the myth of the *soldaditos*. His former Chief of Press, Luís Bolín, claimed that “Russian ships had landed arms and ammunition along the Guadalquivir River; a Communist *putsch* had been set for the end of July or beginning of August”.⁴⁵⁵ In reality, there was no organised large-scale militia, no Russian ships, and no Communist *putsch* in Seville; but merely a spontaneous mobilisation of the working-class districts against the rebellion. However, mobilisation did not imply unity of action and existing tensions within the local labour movement (especially between Communists and Anarchists) were further strained by Cuesta Monereo’s deceitful tactics.⁴⁵⁶ So effective was Cuesta’s stratagem that it even tricked the

⁴⁵⁴ The document was entitled: “INSTRUCCIONES PARA LAS COLUMNAS EN OPERACIONES”. **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 29.

⁴⁵⁵ Bolín simultaneously denied the existence of an anti-Republican conspiracy in Seville: “No concerted action had been prepared in Seville to combat the Communist menace which was subjecting the city and its inhabitants to revolutionary strikes, arson and murder.” Bolín, Luis, *Spain: the vital years*, page 177.

⁴⁵⁶ According to the testimony of Manuel Delgado, the CNT’s Secretary of the *Confederación Regional de Extremadura y Andalucía* shunned a joint UGT-PCE offer to form a united front against the rebellion under the pretext that only the local federation possessed sufficient authority to accept the proposal. Delgado, Manuel, “Cómo se luchó en Sevilla”, *Discurso pronunciado en el Pleno ampliado del C. C. del*

Archbishop of Seville. General Franco later told his cousin Pacón: "Seguramente el retraso en presentarse no sería por falta de cortesía del cardenal, y sí por el concepto que de Queipo se tenía como republicano [...] El general era considerado de izquierdas y tal vez por ello el cardinal demoró todo lo posible visitarle."⁴⁵⁷

In the midst of the reigning confusion, PCE leader Manuel Delicado lost his voice while unsuccessfully attempting to harangue a confused loyalist crowd at the Alameda de Hércules on the afternoon of 18 July, urging it to form a united front against the insurgency. Predictably, the few armed workers ignored Delicado and rapidly dispersed into the labyrinth of streets of La Macarena. To make matters worse, the improvised militia possessed a mere eighty rifles (plus fifty shells per weapon) handed out by the Assault Guard. Delicado was left with hundreds of desperate, unarmed workers, distressed by the brutality of the rebellion. He embarrassingly urged them to defend the Republic by all means possible.⁴⁵⁸ The scarcity of weapons was such that Anarchist leader Julián Arcas patrolled San Luis with an antique sabre.⁴⁵⁹ A few weeks later (8 September), Communist militant Helios Gómez explained the chaotic situation in an interview to Republican newspaper *Informaciones*: "los obreros fueron víctimas de un movimiento envolvente, pues la militarada fascista les cogió desarmados."⁴⁶⁰

Major Cuesta Monereo shrewdly exploited Queipo de Llano's Republican past to present the coup as a movement in the defence of the government. Hence, during the first days of the insurgency, Queipo's radio broadcasts were followed by the Republican anthem at the same

Partido Comunista de España, celebrado en Valencia los días 5, 6, 7 y 8 de Marzo de 1937, pages 4-5.

See also Delicado's written statement in Barrios, Manuel, *El último virrey*, pages 53-58.

⁴⁵⁷ Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, *Mis Conversaciones privadas con Franco*, page 476.

⁴⁵⁸ Delicado, Manuel, "Cómo se luchó en Sevilla", *Discurso pronunciado en el Pleno ampliado del C. C. del Partido Comunista de España, celebrado en Valencia los días 5, 6, 7 y 8 de Marzo de 1937*, page 5.

⁴⁵⁹ Manuel Delicado stated in his memoirs that both he and Saturnino Barneto managed to persuade Varela Rendueles to hand an extra 300 rifles to working-class militias; a version vehemently denied by Varela Rendueles. Indeed, Delicado allocated large part of the blame for the defeat of the Republic in Seville to the civil governor, going as far as to suggest that the Varela Rendueles might have been implicated in the conspiracy. Delicado, Manuel, "Cómo se luchó en Sevilla", *Discurso pronunciado en el Pleno ampliado del C. C. del Partido Comunista de España, celebrado en Valencia los días 5, 6, 7 y 8 de Marzo de 1937*. See also Delicado's written testimony in Barrios, Manuel, *El último virrey. Queipo de Llano*, pages 56-58. Varela Rendueles justified his decision not to arm the masses in the form of a question: "¿Qué clase de República hubiera sobrevivido si los anarcosindicalistas sevillanos, con disfraz comunista, hubieran conseguido hacerse con los veinticinco mil fusiles que se guardaban en el Parque de Artillería?" Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, pages 115-116 (quote), 116-22 and 135-199. For Julián Arcas see: Ortiz Villalba, Juan, *Sevilla 1936 del golpe militar a la guerra civil*, page 148.

⁴⁶⁰ *Informaciones* (Madrid), 8 September 1936.

time as the working-class neighbourhoods of Seville were pacified one-by-one.⁴⁶¹ On the same day of the capture of La Macarena, the rebel general declared in an interview to newspaper *ABC* that the coup was “netamente republicano” and that “El Ejército, como Institución, huye de la política”.⁴⁶² Still, the few loyalists that were aware of the true nature of the rebellion could never predict the full implications of rebel victory. Most believed that the 1936 coup was a replica of the *Sanjurjada* of 10 August 1932. All doubts were violently dispelled on 19 July following the arrival of the first shock troops of the Army of Africa, formed by the Foreign Legion and the Moroccan mercenaries of the *Regulares Indígenas*.

A new political landscape

Despite Queipo’s constant reassurances that the coup was apolitical and that the rebels were under attack by an elusive Communist army, the rebels felt secure enough to start imposing their political programme as early as the morning of 19 July, when a *Comisión Gestora* (Town Hall Management Committee) was sworn in. The Committee was presided by the aristocratic Ramón de Carranza y Gómez-Aramburu (Marquis de Sotohermoso). Its other members were: Alberto Gallego y Burín, *Secretario General*; Antonio González y González Nicolás, *Interventor de los Fondos Municipales* and Fernando Camacho Baños, *Asesor Jurídico Municipal*.

The first measure adopted by the new mayor (*alcalde*) of Seville on 19 July was to dismiss all the municipal councillors: “atendiendo a las circunstancias presentes he tenido a bien destituir

⁴⁶¹ Regarding the exploitation of Queipo de Llano’s Republican past (later erased from Francoist historiography), the Rebels distributed leaflets on 18 July that read: “**OBREROS SEVILLANOS : Viva la República :**

Un General que se jugó la vida para implantar la República en España y que se siente más republicano que nunca se dirige a vosotros deseoso de ahorrar vuestra sangre.
De Cádiz han salido ya para Sevilla, los Regulares de Ceuta. En cuanto lleguen empezaremos a combatirlos con la máxima energía y ¡ay! de aquéllos que no se hayan sometido.
Entregar las armas, que nunca lo podríais hacer a un General más amigo del pueblo.
GONZALO QUEIPO DE LLANO”

García Márquez, José María, “La represión franquista en la provincial de Sevilla. Estado de la cuestión”, in *Ebre 38. Revista Internacional de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939)*, nº2, Barcelona, Publicacions I Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 2004, page 87. See also: Bahamonde y Sánchez de Castro, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano: memorias de un nacionalista*, pages 78-79.

⁴⁶² “Ante todo diga usted que el movimiento es netamente republicano, de lealtad absoluta y decidida al régimen, que un movimiento de opinión legalmente expresado en unas elecciones generales que fueron sinceras, dió al país el año 31.” *ABC* (Seville), 22 July 1936. The stratagem worked. According to Associated Press reporter Charles Foltz: “So well did Queipo talk that the field and factory workers around Seville found it difficult to decide whether Queipo was holding Seville for the Republic, for the Army, or for himself.” Foltz, Charles, *The Masquerade in Spain*, page 346.

de los cargos todos los Concejales".⁴⁶³ Later that same day, Ramón de Carranza released a public note marked "URGENTE":

"El Sr. Alcalde ordena a todos los individuos de la Guardia Municipal que mañana Lunes día Veinte se presenten a las diez de la mañana en el Ayuntamiento vistiendo de uniforme. Los que no lo hagan quedan cesantes en su empleo y serán juzgados severísimamente."⁴⁶⁴

All decisions of the *Comisión Gestora* were passed unanimously, a direct consequence of its partisan nature, since it was exclusively composed by members of the local oligarchy. Indeed, the first non-military action of the rebels was to restore the *élites* to a position of pre-Republican political power. The father of the new mayor of Seville, Ramón de Carranza y Fernández de la Reguera (Marquis de Villapesadilla) was, notwithstanding his advanced age and precarious health (he died the following year), appointed both civil governor of the adjacent province of Cádiz and mayor of the provincial capital.⁴⁶⁵ The elitist *El Correo de Andalucía* showered praise on the new *Comisión Gestora* of Seville, stating that the former Popular Front administration "muy lejos de una reunión de personas, parecía una junta de beduinos" and that the "Gobierno civil llegó a convertirse en una verdadera cueva de bandidos"; while Enrique Vila wrote in *FE* (8 September) that the new organisation contributed to the "salvación de la Patria."⁴⁶⁶ Political pluralism was eradicated overnight and all state

⁴⁶³ Also present at the meeting was the new Civil Governor of Seville, Pedro Parias. **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Actas de la Comisión Gestora del Ayuntamiento, 19 July 1936.

⁴⁶⁴ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 6, Carpeta 1.

⁴⁶⁵ On 27 July, the Marquis de Villapesadilla landed in Cádiz in a small plane from Seville: "Saludamos al señor Carranza y fué entonces cuando escuchamos de sus labios que había sido nombrado gobernador civil de esta provincia y alcalde de la capital", **ABC** (Seville), 29 July 1936. Carranza was a fierce opponent of regional devolution, including plans to create a Statute for Andalucía. **ABC** (Seville), 7 July 1936. See also: Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, page 98-99; Caro Cancela, Diego, *La Segunda República en Cádiz. Elecciones y partidos políticos*; Domínguez Pérez, Alicia, *El verano que trajo un largo invierno: la represión político-social durante el primer franquismo en Cádiz, 1936-1945*. Carranza died on 13 September 1937: "Noticiosa esta Alcaldía de haber fallecido en el dia de hoy en Cadiz el Excmo. Sr. Don Ramon de Carranza y Fernandez-Reguera, Alcalde que fue de aquella Ciudad y padre del Excmo. Sr. Don Ramón de Carranza y Gomez, Marques de Soto Hermoso, Alcalde Presidente de éste Excmo. Ayuntamiento". The funeral took place at 17:00 of the following day. **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Asuntos Especiales, 1937, nº27. For regional devolution, Blas Infante and the Andalucian Statute see: Infante Pérez, Blas, *El ideal Andaluz. Varios estudios acerca del renacimiento de Andalucía*; Infante Pérez, Blas, *La verdad sobre el complot de Tablada y el Estado libre de Andalucía*; Hijano del Río, Manuel, Ruiz Romero, Manuel, *El ideal andaluz en la Segunda República. La Asamblea Regional Andaluza de 1.933*.

⁴⁶⁶ *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 30 July 1936. Reporter Enrique Vila wrote an editorial in *FE* entitled: "Cómo funciona el Ayuntamiento de Sevilla sin concejales y sin política de ninguna clase". Vila revealed that the new *Comisión Gestora* only met sporadically: "Los gestores por su condición de técnicos, necesitan, en realidad, poco tiempo para el estudio de los asuntos remitidos por los Negociados. [...] los expedientes siguen una tramitación rapidísima." **FE** (Seville), 8 September 1936.

institutions purged of “Bedouins” (Republicans) that were subsequently placed at the “disposición de la Autoridad Militar”, the equivalent of a death sentence. Predictably, on 31 July the Town Hall produced its first list of “obreros represaliados” (134 workers), followed by another, more comprehensive list, on 10 September (156 workers).⁴⁶⁷ On 3 August, the president of the new *Comisión Gestora de la Bolsa Municipal de Trabajo* explicitly admitted that all its deposed Republican members would be executed if arrested.⁴⁶⁸

The meteoric ascension of Ramón de Carranza and Pedro Parias to the highest positions of political power in Seville not only represented the victory of the *élites* over the democratic challenge posed by the Republic, but also revealed that the rebels adopted a policy of promoting extremists in order to maximise repression. By then, it was already becoming evident that the *Bando* was used as a pretext to justify political violence. Promoted and protected by the rebel military leadership, the new mayor of Seville surpassed all expectations. Ramón de Carranza organised and assumed the leadership of a military column formed mainly by fanatical monarchists and named after himself - *Columna Carranza* - that proceeded to subdue large swathes of the provinces of Seville and Huelva. The mayor of Seville saw no moral contradiction in massacring the same population he was supposed to administer. So much so, that he enthusiastically joined the Army of Africa during its murderous drive to Madrid until 2 October 1936, when the Rebel high-command ordered his return to Seville to assume his administrative post on a full-time basis.⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁷ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), *Actas de la Comisión Gestora del Ayuntamiento*, 31 July and 10 September 1936. For repression in the Town Hall see: Díaz Arriaza, José, “La represión de Queipo de Llano sobre la administración local sevillana” in Ortiz Villalba, Juan, *Andalucía: guerra y exilio*. For repression in the *Diputación* see: Ponce Alberca, Julio, *Política, instituciones y provincias: la Diputación de Sevilla durante la dictadura de Primo de Rivera y la II República, 1923-1936*. Ponce Alberca claims that the new administration merely functioned “como una correa de transmisión entre el entonces supremo administrador (Queipo) y sus administrados (la población de Sevilla).” Ponce Alberca, Julio, “Política y administración local en la Sevilla de Queipo (julio-diciembre 1936) in *Archivo Hispalense*, Tomo 84, nº 256-57, Sevilla, 2001, page 35. Organisations affiliated to the *Diputación* were also targeted, including the *Casa Cuna: Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla* (Seville), Casa Cuna, Legajo 39.

⁴⁶⁸ For instance, *Secretario-Contador* Estrada Parra fell under the murderous clauses of the *Bando*: “Así cuenta después por el Sr. Presidente de que el Secretario-Contador Sr. Estrada Parra había hecho dejación absoluta de sus funciones á partir del 19 del citado mes de Julio, por lo que en ejecución del bando y disposiciones de la Autoridad Militar y por estar incurso en los mismos.” Also, “Se acuerda después hacer constar que dada la representación marxista del otro vocal obrero Sr. Rebollo Capela, designado al igual que el Sr. Estrada Parra por Sindicatos.” **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), *Actas de la Comisión Gestora de la Bolsa Municipal de Trabajo*, 3 August 1936.

⁴⁶⁹ Major Fernando Alarcón replaced Carranza as leader of the 1º Bon Milicias de Talavera de la Reina. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5352, Carpeta 1.

The fall of the Gran Plaza (19 July 1936)

The baptism of fire of the *Columna Carranza* took place in a cluster of working-class neighbourhoods - Amate, Cerro del Águila, Ciudad Jardín and Nervión – that formed the Gran Plaza district. The *barrio* was one of the most economically depressed areas of Seville: its residents suffered from chronic unemployment, lacked basic housing conditions (including sanitation) and only around 8% of the local population aged between 15-24 in Cerro del Águila enjoyed primary education.⁴⁷⁰ On 18 July, a general strike was declared, paralysing all public transportation and leaving Brigada Antonio Flores Patrocinio (Granada nº6 regiment) in a difficult situation: “siendo lo más probable caer en poder de las turbas por haber salido a la calle vestido de militar y armado de dos pistolas.” Patrocinio took the sensible option of retiring to the security of his home and wait patiently for the arrival of the rebel army.⁴⁷¹

The Gran Plaza was the first *barrio* to fall to the insurgents and its pacification was achieved with relative ease: its wide avenues favoured the attacking forces and the unfinished barricades were mercilessly bombarded by mortar fire that sowed panic among the residents. The weapon-starved defenders were incapable of seizing the small Civil Guard post of Ciudad Jardín on 18 July. Two local civil guards – Manuel Sanchez Garcia and Andrés Durán Marquez – later reported:

“Que el día 18 de julio de 1936 fecha en que se inició el Glorioso Movimiento Salvador de España, sobre las 18 30 horas [...] un elevado grupo de marxistas, sobre la ya citada hora, pretendió asaltar el cuartel establecido en la Ciudad Jardín, contribuyó, en unión de la fuerza del mismo, y a las órdenes de su Comandante de puesto, a dispersar al enemigo después de un nutrido tiroteo.”⁴⁷²

Despite the low level of resistance, “Ramón Carranza, mandó las fuerzas que cayeron sobre los revoltosos de Amate, Ciudad Jardín, infligiéndoles un durísimo castigo que disolvió sus concentraciones.”⁴⁷³ The disproportionate use of force, euphemistically described as a

⁴⁷⁰ Almuedo Palma, José, *Al este del edén. Estudio demográfico del crecimiento urbano en el sector oriental de Sevilla: Nervión, Ciudad Jardín, Cerro del Águila y Amate (1922-1935)*, page 92; Ortiz Villalba, Juan, *Sevilla 1936*, page 134. For a study on the demographic development of the Gran Plaza district: Lobo Manzano, Luis, *Un barrio de sevilla: El Cerro de Águila*.

⁴⁷¹ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 2.

⁴⁷² **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 12.

⁴⁷³ Montán Luis, “Cómo conquistó Sevilla el General Queipo de Llano” in *Episodios de la Guerra Civil nº5*, page 31.

"durísimo castigo", was immediately followed by the imposition of the *Bando*, which ordered the execution of all strikers, anyone bearing weapons and "cuantos por cualquier medio perturben la vida del territorio de esta División."⁴⁷⁴ The wording was deliberately vague so to encourage an indiscriminate massacre. The radio, used as a weapon of psychological terror by Queipo de Llano, explained the military edict in more explicit terms:

"Toda persona que posea armas ha de entregarlas inmediatamente en la Jefatura de la División, en las Comandancias de la Guardia Civil, Puestos de dicho Instituto o Cuartel de la Alameda. Se hace la advertencia formal de que el que sea portador de una arma sin permiso de la Autoridad militar podrá ser fusilado si infundiera sospecha de utilizarla en agresiones."⁴⁷⁵

The *Columna Carranza* carried out meticulous house-to-house searches. The aristocratic Rafael de Medina (future Duke de Medinaceli), an influential member of the military unit, narrated in his memoirs how an excited mayor of Seville, after breaking the loyalist siege on the Civil Guard post in Nervión, instructed the corporal and his five subordinates to enforce the *Bando*. When the corporal refused to execute a man found with a rifle, Carranza immediately ordered that both men be shot on the spot only for Medina to save the corporal's life.⁴⁷⁶ The episode revealed that extreme violence was always employed irrespective of the level of resistance put up by the loyalists; a rationale that was yet to be grasped by the civil guard corporal. Medina also exposed a key feature of the Rebel military *modus operandi*: political repression began immediately after a battle and the elimination of Republicans was a military objective of equal (if not greater) importance as the capture of a *barrio*.

The myth of the *soldaditos*, part II

Shortly after the capture of the Gran Plaza, the 475 Moroccan soldiers of the 1st *Tabor de Regulares de Ceuta* nº3 headed by Major Oliver arrived in Seville after completing the

⁴⁷⁴ Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *Bandos y órdenes dictados por Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra, General Jefe de la Segunda División Orgánica y del Ejército del Sur desde la declaración del estado de guerra, 18 de julio de 1936, hasta fin de febrero de 1937, etc.*, pages 5-6.

⁴⁷⁵ Undated document almost certainly released on the morning of 19 July (since the Assault Guard headquarters in the Alameda de Hércules surrendered on the evening of the 18 July and the Gran Plaza was captured on the afternoon of 19 July). **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 6, Carpeta 1.

⁴⁷⁶ Medina Vilallonga, Rafael de, *Tiempo pasado*, pages 38-40. Medina was lavishly rewarded for his loyalty: in 1945, the Duke was desperate to sell a portion of his estates. The state stepped in, handing him one million dollars for his property. Foltz, Charles, *The Masquerade in Spain*, pages 107-08.

"limpieza" of Cádiz.⁴⁷⁷ Another group of 140 *Regulares* reached Seville before the end of the month following an epic crossing of the straits of Gibraltar organised by Major Arsenio Martínez Campos and Falangist *Jefe de Milicias* for Cádiz Manuel Mora-Figueroa. Yet again, the rebels claimed that they were 'providentially' protected by the Virgin Mary.⁴⁷⁸ The presence of the *Regulares* in peninsular Spain was controversial, not least because of the evident moral contradiction about employing foreign Muslim mercenaries in a war that was – according to the rebels – partly waged in the defence of Catholic values.⁴⁷⁹ Rebel intellectual José María Pemán provided the most colourful justification for the use of the *Regulares*. He argued that the Moors arrived to "defender la civilización occidental" as an altruistic gesture in gratitude for Spain's 'civilising mission' in Morocco.⁴⁸⁰ On 21 July, General Queipo released a statement to the radio:

"A la una treinta horas de hoy han llegado en varios camiones el grupo de *Regulares* de Ceuta que viene poseído del mayor espíritu y de enorme entusiasmo. Durante su itinerario han

⁴⁷⁷ Aznar, Manuel, *Historia Militar de la Guerra de España*, pages 158 and 164. The 1st *Tabor de Regulares de Ceuta nº3* crossed the strait of Gibraltar in the destroyer Churruga and landed in Cádiz on 19 July; followed by another unit headed by Captain San Juan: "ya este día – el 19 – las fuerzas tuvieron ocasión de hacer limpieza, y los mismos *Regulares* hubieron de sostener algún tiroteo, hasta sofocar por completo los últimos focos de resistencia". Mora-Figueroa, José de, *Datos para la Historia de la Falange gaditana 1934-1939*, page 54. See also page 105. In Cádiz, the 1st *Tabor de Regulares de Ceuta nº3* was immediately dispatched to Seville by General Varela. Another *Tabor* under the command of Major Amador de los Ríos arrived in Algeciras (landed in Punta Mayorga). Aznar, Manuel, *Historia militar de la guerra de España*, pages 112 and 163-64. See also: Lojendio, Luis María de, *Operaciones militares de la guerra de España, 1936-1939*, pages 39-40 and 43-44.

⁴⁷⁸ On the night on 21 July, Major Arsenio Martínez Campos and Falangist *Jefe de Milicias* for Cádiz - Manuel Mora Figueroa - seized two small boats (*faluchos*) and set sail from Tarifa to Ceuta. The aristocratic Manuel Mora Figueroa, the son of the Marqueses de Tamarón, was a militia leader since April 1936 (he joined the Falange in 1934). Mora Figueroa was one of the most spirited officers in the rebel faction: he was injured in the head in gun-battle during the early hours of the rebellion in Cádiz, recovered from his wounds and went on to command a rebel military column during the civil war. Figueroa's brother – José - was the Falange's *Jefe Provincial* for Cádiz and a close friend of Queipo de Llano. The odyssey of Navy Lieutenant Manuel Mora Figueroa and Cavalry Major Martínez Campos almost concluded in tragedy. Figueroa's small group of Falangists was greeted by gunfire after being mistakenly identified as Republican soldiers. The trigger-happy Army of Africa killed a Falangist and injured Martínez Campos in the legs. Mora Figueroa then assumed overall command of the operation and, at 6:30am of 25 July, the Falangist militia leader somehow managed to pack – "como verdaderas sardinas" – in both boats 140 *Regulares* and their *cantinera* – Lola –, who apparently weighted an impressive 140kg. On the return journey, the two small boats evaded a Republican blockade, a 'miracle' attributed to the Virgin Mary. Patrón de Sopranis, Alfonso, *Burlando el bloqueo rojo: el primer salto del estrecho (julio del 1936)*, pages 49-77 and 92-120; Mora-Figueroa, José de, *Datos para la Historia de la Falange gaditana 1934-1939*, pages 54 and 105; Martínez Bande, José Manuel, *La Campaña de Andalucía*, page 134.

⁴⁷⁹ ABC claimed that the *Regulares* viewed the civil war as a holy war, since it was a conflict pitting religion (irrespective of creed) against atheism. *ABC* (Seville), 18 July 1937.

⁴⁸⁰ "¡Los moros colaborando a la salvación de España...! Claro, los moros en camino de madurez y mayoría de edad, volviendo a España a agradecer y defender la civilización occidental. La eterna formula de la colonización española." Pemán y Pemartín, José María, *Arengas y Crónicas de Guerra*, page 126.

desarmado y sometido totalmente varios pueblos y especialmente Los Palacios del que las fuerzas marxistas estaban totalmente enseñoreada.⁴⁸¹

According to *La Unión*, Los Palacios had already experienced the consequences of this 'debt of gratitude', suffering a "dura represión".⁴⁸² The insurgents also waited impatiently for the arrival of the Foreign Legion. On the first anniversary of the rebellion, Queipo de Llano's *aide-de-camp* revealed that, throughout the night of 18-19 July 1936, insurgent soldiers were given instructions to fire continuously into the air in the hope of discouraging loyalists from attacking the city-centre before the airlifting of the Legion from Spanish Morocco to Tablada military airfield.⁴⁸³ Soon, the number of legionaries and *Regulares* was such that the fourth-largest city in Spain was unable to accommodate them. On 13 August, the Town Hall ordered the slaughter of a 203kg cow to feed the Melilla *Tabor* of *Regulares* that had arrived in Seville to fight the "hordas marxistas" and "librar España de la ominosa dictadura roja".⁴⁸⁴ Another group of *Regulares* decided to install themselves in the luxurious gardens of the Parque María Luisa, where they tore down the local vegetation to make fires for cooking and converted the ornamental ponds into showers where they bathed naked in broad daylight. The Moroccan mercenaries caused a scandal for turning the park into the centre of prostitution and homosexuality in Seville.⁴⁸⁵ The local authorities remained unperturbed by the apparent paradox between their self-proclaimed moral crusade and the events taking place at the Parque María Luisa.

When the tale of the *soldaditos* was absorbed into official history, Queipo de Llano was forced to conceal the presence of the Army of Africa in Seville or risk the dismantling of *his* myth. Thus, in 1937 General Queipo rewrote History and claimed that only a dozen *Regulares* arrived

⁴⁸¹ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 6, Carpeta 1.

⁴⁸² *La Unión* also confirmed the arrival of the *Regulares* at 1:30AM of 21 July: "A la una y media de la madrugada llegó el tabor de *Regulares* de Ceuta, que había embarcado en Cádiz, trasladándose a nuestra ciudad ocupando varios camiones." *La Unión* (Seville), 22 July 1936. See also: *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville) 22 July 1936.

⁴⁸³ López-Guerrero also declared that the presence of the Foreign Legion in Seville was required since "era preciso a toda costa reducir la insurrección en los barrios" *FE* (Seville), 18 July 1937.

⁴⁸⁴ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Actas Capitulares de la Comisión Gestora del Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 13 August 1936. On 20 August, more cows were slaughtered to feed the *Regulares*. The minute book read: "dichas carnes que fueron consumidas por fuerzas que luchan con el Ejército de la Patria por su liberación del imperio del marxismo."

⁴⁸⁵ Bahamonde y Sánchez de Castro, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano*, page 81. Also, the Foreign Legion damaged the *Bellas Artes* pavilion in the Plaza de America with repair costs rising to the considerable sum of 23,000 pesetas. **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Secretaría Municipal de Sevilla, Negociado de obras publicas, 1937, nº35.

in Seville on 19 July and that the Rebels deliberately created an optical illusion (by repeatedly parading the soldiers around the city in open trucks) so to trick the locals into believing that an entire army had actually made an entrance in the capital of Andalucía.⁴⁸⁶ Hence, the radio note was nothing more than a bluff aimed at demoralising Republicans. As for the Foreign Legion, Joaquín Arrarás, the official historian of the Franco regime (and a personal friend of the *Generalíssimo*), claimed that a total of 21 legionaries headed by Lieutenant Francisco Gassols arrived in Seville and were immediately thrown into the battle of Triana. Arrarás also affirmed that the locals (inexplicably) failed to notice that the paraded soldiers were merely being driven in circles around the city. The story is implausible, not least because the route included some of the largest streets in the capital of Andalucía (including calle O'Donnel).⁴⁸⁷ Major Castejón partially contradicted Arrarás' *official* version: he declared to reporter Ortiz de Villajos that a group of 30 legionaries (including himself) arrived in the morning and not the evening of 20 July.⁴⁸⁸ An alternative version of the legend asserts that another group of twenty legionaries enjoying summer leave in Seville also joined the parade; while Antonio Olmedo wrote that the *Regulares* were in fact Spanish soldiers disguised as Moroccan mercenaries.⁴⁸⁹ Despite its many variations, the story of the parading of the Army of Africa around Seville served as the basis for the second part of the myth of the *soldaditos*: after claiming that he had captured the

⁴⁸⁶ The tale endures to the very present: historian Blázquez Miguel wrote in 2003: “esa misma tarde, el general Queipo de Llano pone en marcha la famosa estratagema, consistente en llenar varios camiones de soldados, disfrazados de moros, y hacerles pasear ininterrumpidamente por las calles de la ciudad, dando la impresión poco menos de que de nuevo las tropas musulmanas han vuelto a invadir Sevilla, 1.225 años después”, Blázquez Miguel, Juan, *Historia Militar de la Guerra Civil Española*, vol. 1, page 96.

⁴⁸⁷ Joaquín Arrarás narrated the conversation between General Queipo and an spectator during the famous parade: “Pero cuántos legionarios han venido?...” ... “Muchos” responde Queipo, “¡20 y un teniente!” ... “¿21 sólo?” ... “¡Si parecen dos mil!” ... “En efecto... Usted, por lo visto”, añade el General, “ignora la técnica de las compañías de zarzuela pobres. El cartel anuncia: «En el tercer acto, desfile del ejército de Napoleón», y claro, como los coristas son una decena y el Ejército de Napoleón fue muy numeroso, se coge a los coristas y a toda velocidad se les hace entrar y salir incesantemente por el foro, hasta que el público se convence de que han desfilado en sus narices mil, dos mil, tres mil hombres... ¡todo el Ejército de Napoleón!” Arrarás Iribarren, Joaquin, *Historia de la Cruzada Española*, vol. 3, Tomo XI, page 213. According to Francoist historiography, on the morning of the 20 July, 11 legionaries headed by Lieutenant Francisco Gassols (after suffering a friendly-fire incident while landing in Tablada), later joined by another group of 10 soldiers; were all sent to Triana. That same evening, Major Castejón arrived in Seville with 20 legionaries. The Army of Africa could also count on air support provided by a squadron of captured Republican warplanes that had mistakenly landed in Tablada following a bombing raid on Tetuán. The pilots ignored that the airbase had already been captured by the rebels. Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, General José, *General Queipo de Llano (Aventura y audacia)*, page 114. See also: Romero, Luis, *Tres días de Julio. (18, 19 y 20 de 1936)*, pages 499-501.

⁴⁸⁸ “Fué mi bandera la que primeramente pisó tierras de España. Con los treinta primeros legionarios me puse en Sevilla a las órdenes de Queipo, que me mandó pacificar Triana.” Ortiz de Villajos, Cándido, *De Sevilla a Madrid*, page 27. See also: “Papeles de Cuesta” in *Archivo General Militar* (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 23.

⁴⁸⁹ El Tebib Arrumi, *Así se conquistó Sevilla*, page 46; Olmedo, Antonio, *La flecha en blanco (diario de la Guerra)*, pages 113-121.

city-centre with 130 men, General Queipo de Llano now affirmed that he pacified the *barrios* (and its tens of thousands of armed militiamen) with 250 soldiers, thus achieving a military victory of truly epic proportions.⁴⁹⁰

The numbers game

The second stage of the myth of the *soldaditos* possessed a clear political (and even spiritual) purpose: to deify General Queipo de Llano and legitimise *a posteriori* both the *coup d'état* and his dictatorship. For that same reason, the rebel general laboured tirelessly to conceal the participation of the entire garrison of Seville (including the Air Force), elements of the Army of Africa, Civil and Assault Guard, *Requeté*, Falange and 187 unaffiliated civilian volunteers. In reality, Queipo de Llano possessed an entire army at his disposal:

- 2,250 soldiers (Garrison of Seville)
- 300 civil guards
- 600 assault guards
- 140 civil and assault guards from Huelva, headed by Major Haro Lumbresas
- 100 militiamen (50 Falangists and 50 *Requetés*)
- 187 civilian volunteers
- 475 *Regulares* (3rd Ceuta Tabor)
- 2,073 legionaries were airlifted in Seville between 19-31 July⁴⁹¹

⁴⁹⁰ See Queipo's last *charla* of 1 February 1938 in **ABC** (Seville), 2 February 1938. Ortiz de Villajos also contributed to the formation of the legend by claiming that only 170 men were involved in the submission of Triana (20 legionaries, 50 *Requetés*, 50 Falangists and 50 civil guards). Ortiz de Villajos, Cándido, *De Sevilla a Madrid*, page 27.

⁴⁹¹ By 31 December 1936, a total of 23,000 legionaries had crossed the straits of Gibraltar into mainland Spain. To Queipo's despair, Enrique Vila presented a list of 2,550 soldiers and civil guards that participated in the rebellion. Regarding the number of rebel troops present in Seville between 18-22 July see: **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 1, Carpeta 68; Arrarás Iribarren, Joaquín, *Historia de la Cruzada Española*, vol.3, Tomo XI, pages 202-09; Aznar, Manuel, *Historia Militar de la Guerra de España*, pages 158-64; Martín Fidalgo, Ana; Roldán González, Enrique; Martín Burgueño, Manuel, *El Requeté de Sevilla: orígenes, causas e historia*, page 50; Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio!*; Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, General José, **General Queipo de Llano**, page 112; Medina Villalonga, Rafael de, *Tiempo Pasado*, pages 36-37; Redondo, Luis; Zavala, Juan de, *El requeté (la tradición no muere)*, pages 461-69.

The exact number of legionaries present in Seville at the time of the pacification of the working-class districts remains a mystery. What is clear is that the overall number of both soldiers and militiamen must have been considerably higher than on 18 July, since Queipo ordered the militarisation of the entire city in a note released to *Unión Radio* the following day:

“¡Sevillanos!: El Ejército Español, fiel depositario de las virtudes de la raza ha triunfado rotundamente. Mas la victoria no ha de detener la labor depuradora que el país necesita, y por ello el General Queipo de Llano dicta el siguiente BANDO ADICIONAL

1º.- Toda persona que posea armas ha de entregarlas inmediatamente a la Jefatura de la División, en las Comandancias de la Guardia civil, Puestos de dicho Instituto o Cuartel de la Alameda. Se hace la advertencia formal de que el que sea portador de un arma sin permiso de la Autoridad militar podrá ser fusilado si infundiera sospecha de utilizarla en agresiones.

2º.- Para poder distinguir a las personas de orden y amantes de la verdadera justicia, todos los que tal se tengan deben presentarse al Gobierno civil o Jefatura de la División a ofrecer el concurso que su conciencia le dicte.

3º.- Para facilitar la labor del Ejercito se previene a todo el vecindario levante las persianas de los balcones a fin de no dar sospecha a que de tal forma puedan encubrirse los agresores, advirtiéndosele que de no observarse esta indicación pueden sufrirse consecuencias desagradables.”⁴⁹²

The *Bando adicional* eliminated the concept of neutrality and forced the civilian population to take sides in the conflict. Those who failed to present themselves at either the Civil Government or the Division Headquarters would be treated as legitimate military targets in the “labor depuradora que el país necesita”. Queipo de Llano also cancelled all military summer leaves and ordered the mobilisation of all males that had served in the army between the years of 1931-35.⁴⁹³ In parallel, on 23 July he created the:

“Fuerzas Cívicas al Servicio de España - Todas las personas a las cuales se les ha facilitado armamento en la División, que no pertenezcan a FALANGE Y REQUETES y todas las particulares voluntarias a las que no se le facilitó armamento quedan desde este momento agrupadas a las FUERZAS CÍVICAS DE ESPAÑA debiendo hacer su presentación a las oficinas de las antedichas

⁴⁹² **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 6, Carpeta 1.

⁴⁹³ **La Unión** (Seville), 21 July 1936.

agrupación tiene establecidas en la calle Jesús del Gran Poder nº48 al 52 (Escuela Normal) en donde recibirán instrucciones (horas de 9 a 1 y de 3 a 6). (Sevilla 23 de Julio de 1936)"⁴⁹⁴

Soon, Seville was covered in 'patriotic' posters coercing civilians to enlist in either a military or paramilitary organisation. One such poster read: "«Alístate en cualquier milicia antes que sea demasiado tarde»."⁴⁹⁵ The results of this intimidation campaign were truly spectacular. On 18 October 1936, the Falange's *Jefe Provincial de Milicias* – Ignacio Giménez Gómez Rull – informed Queipo that his paramilitary organisation already possessed 4,000 men.⁴⁹⁶ In only few weeks, General Queipo boasted, he had enough soldiers to form his Army of the South.

The fall of Triana (20-21 July 1936)

Firmly in command of Seville's city-centre and backed by an ever-expanding army, the insurgents now set their sights on the district of Triana and the Seville-Huelva road. The ultimate objective was to capture Huelva and link rebel Spain with Portugal, governed by a right-wing dictatorship sympathetic to the Rebel cause.⁴⁹⁷ The occupation of Triana required a carefully-planned military operation: restricted access (three bridges from the rebel-controlled city-centre) and a maze of narrow, densely-populated streets were certain to prove a sterner challenge than the wide avenues of the Gran Plaza. On the other hand, the local residents hoped to resist long enough until the arrival of Republican reinforcements. Their situation was truly desperate: there was a ratio of one rifle per 20 militants and a severe shortage of ammunition. During the fighting, a militia man would have to wait for a comrade-in-arms to be shot before obtaining a weapon. The military weakness of the loyalists was such that – like the defenders of the Gran Plaza – they even failed to capture the local Civil Guard post

⁴⁹⁴ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5356, Carpeta 45.

⁴⁹⁵ Even Antonio Bahamonde was 'advised' to enlist in a militia. Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, pages 56-57. See also page 71: "Todos los que habitan en la zona de la segunda División pertenecen a alguna de estas organizaciones, ya que el hecho de no militar en ninguna resulta peligrosísimo." Seville was covered in posters intimidating local residents into joining a militia (page 89): "«El que no vista uniforme no es digno de ser español». «La patria exigirá cuentas a os que le han negado su ayuda». «Alístate en cualquier milicia antes que sea demasiado tarde»." The story was corroborated by Gonzálbez Ruiz, who was 'advised' to join the *Guardia Cívica* because: "Es lo que menos que debes hacer. A no ser que prefieras ingresar en Falange o en el Requeté. De lo contrario serás candidato para las tapias" Golzález Ruiz, Francisco, *Yo he creído en Franco. Proceso de una gran desilusión (Dos meses en la cárcel de Sevilla)*, page 25.

⁴⁹⁶ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5356, carpeta 46.

⁴⁹⁷ The military plan was explained by Cuesta Monereo with painstaking detail in his "Historia del levantamiento en Andalucía". **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), "Papeles de Cuesta", Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 24, sub-carpeta 1.

(located in calle Pagés del Corro), defended by seven soldiers that barricaded themselves in the building at 19:00 on 18 July.⁴⁹⁸ The radicalised local Civil Guard illegally collaborated with the Falange even before the February 1936 elections.⁴⁹⁹ Also, women performed a number of support duties: some risked their lives by venturing into the rebel-controlled city-centre to look for food for the starving militia; while others brought water to loyalist fighters under intense gunfire. Republican wounded were denied medical treatment and several were even executed inside the municipal hospital.⁵⁰⁰ The locals were already accustomed to enduring severe hardships, including recurrent famines (the upper-classes were derogatorily labelled as “steak-eaters”).⁵⁰¹ General Queipo de Llano subsequently mocked the entire *barrio* by labelling Triana as “el reducto rojo inexpugnable”.⁵⁰²

The first failed offensive (20 July 1936)

On 20 July, the insurgents failed twice to capture Triana. The press did not release any news of the embarrassing double defeat. Equally silenced was the indiscriminate shelling of the *barrio*, (“bombardeo de castigo sobre Triana”) that commenced at around 19:30 of 19 July and resulted, in the words of Colonel Cerezo, in a “duro castigo a las turbas marxistas”.⁵⁰³ The report of the first failed assault, which took place on the morning of 20 July, was later quietly archived in the *Archivo General Militar* in Madrid.⁵⁰⁴ Newspaper *El Liberal* (Madrid) later

⁴⁹⁸ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5376, carpeta 12. Ortiz de Villajos, Cándido, *De Sevilla a Madrid*, page 46; Medina Villalonga, Rafael, *Tiempo Pasado*, page 42-43.

⁴⁹⁹ “El teniente, que mandaba el Cuartel de la Guardia Civil de Triana, transmitía a Martín todos los informes que de las células comunistas de aquel barrio le suministraban los traidores confidentes; y las reuniones convocadas en aquéllas, próximas a cualquier agresión o provocación roja, Martín y los suyos irrumpían en la taberna trianera de turno y apaleaban a los líderes empavorecidos que en alguna ocasión salieron de cabeza por las ventanas.” Dávila, Sancho; Pemartín, Julián, *Hacia la historia de la Falange: primera contribución de Sevilla*, page 92.

⁵⁰⁰ Delicado, “Cómo se luchó en Sevilla”, *Discurso pronunciado en el Pleno ampliado del C. C. del Partido Comunista de España, celebrado en Valencia los días 5, 6, 7 y 8 de Marzo de 1937*, page 7. See also Delicado’s declarations in *El Liberal* (Madrid), 4 August 1936.

⁵⁰¹ Burgos, Antonio, *Guía secreta de Sevilla*, pages 258-69.

⁵⁰² *La Unión* (Seville), 18 July 1937.

⁵⁰³ Written declaration submitted by Artillery Captain Rafael Esquivias Salcedo on 11 April 1938 (part of his petition for the *Medalla Militar*). See also the reference written by Colonel Santos Rodríguez Cerezo: “pasando aproximadamente a las 19 horas con sus piezas al barrio de Triana imponiendo con el fuego de las mismas duro castigo a las turbas marxistas”. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 14. See also Carpeta 20.

⁵⁰⁴ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 18, Documento 1. The *Harca* Berenguer also participated in a mopping-up operation in Cerro de Águila and a “razzia” targeting refugees from Amate, Cerro del Águila and several nearby *pueblos* (29 July). Berenguer wrote: “Toma de Cantillana y Tocina en este ultimo pueblo Harca castigó bien previa identificación de un guarda civil del puesto”. The “castigo” resulted in 125 executions. **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), Expedientes Policiales, H-754.

revealed that the rebel soldiers deceived the locals by posing as Republicans (by shouting leftist slogans) until crossing the San Telmo Bridge and subsequently initiating the assault.⁵⁰⁵ The insurgents were nevertheless surprised by the tenacity of the loyalist snipers. In the middle of the chaotic offensive, the leader of the *Harca Berenguer*, Juan Berenguer, was ordered by Lieutenant Castelló of the Foreign Legion to return to the Divisional Headquarters and request a tank. Queipo complied and the tank ultimately saved Castelló and his men, trapped in the Plaza de Altozano. Captain Lindo was fatally injured, while the slightly injured Sergeant Maestre was dragged out of the battlefield by Berenguer himself.⁵⁰⁶

The second failed offensive (20 July 1936)

The second assault took place on the afternoon of the same day. It was spearheaded by Major Castejón and a company of his *V Bandera* of the Foreign Legion. Castejón was accompanied by an Infantry unit, a Falangist *Centuria* and the notorious *Harca Bereguer* and *Columna Carranza* (including Algabeño, Rafael de Medina and footballer Guillermo Eizaguirre, who was eager to avenge a failed assassination attempt on his father's life by Anarchist extremists).⁵⁰⁷ The Rebels destroyed several barricades and penetrated deep inside Triana before being forced into a tactical retreat due to the rapid approach of nightfall and, according to Gutiérrez Flores, because the "enemigo era fuerte".⁵⁰⁸

Ideological imperatives forced the insurgents to impose a veil of silence over both episodes, which were expunged from Rebel historiography. The Rebels were unable to acknowledge military defeats for the simple reason that doing so implied the dismantling of a series of myths erected around the persona of General Queipo de Llano. According to the Rebels, the success of the rebellion was a natural consequence of the moral (and not military) superiority

⁵⁰⁵ "Con engaño, utilizando barcas para atravesar el río y gritando la consigna U.H.P., los elementos fascistas pudieron llegar a las inmediaciones del puente de San Telmo, y, parapetados en las pilas del puente, cortaron los cables, viniendo éste abajo por donde iniciaron la entrada a la barriada. La lucha varió. Los obreros tomaron las azoteas, manteniendo a raya al enemigo durante dos días más." *El Liberal* (Madrid), 4 August 1936.

⁵⁰⁶ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 18, Documento 1.

⁵⁰⁷ Eugenio Eizaguirre Pozzi was a judge and a member of *Comunión Tradicionalista* who had earned himself a notorious reputation as president of the *Audiencia Territorial de Sevilla* for passing harsh sentences against leftist militants. Pozzi recovered from his wounds and returned to his post on 25 August. *ABC* (Seville), 25 August 1936. See also Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *La utopía revolucionaria: Sevilla en la segunda República*, page 416-450.

⁵⁰⁸ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 23. Report signed by Gutiérrez Flores (11 October 1940).

of the rebels – guided by Queipo de Llano - over the "hordas marxistas".⁵⁰⁹ Therefore, the "hordes" were doomed to suffer successive military defeats until their ultimate annihilation. In a few hours, the residents of Triana dismantled the ideological foundation of the Queipo regime.

The capture of Triana (21 July 1936)

The third and final offensive on Triana occurred in the early morning of 21 July. The insurgents left nothing to chance. An artillery salvo signalled the start of the operation followed by another blanket shelling of the district. The rebel advance was protected by sniper and artillery fire from the Paseo de Colón. Rebel historiography attempted to minimise the role played by the Army of Africa; however, Gutiérrez Flores, in a report to Cuesta Monereo dated 11 October 1940, revealed that both the Assault Guard and the already complete ("por completo") V *Bandera* were involved in the offensive.⁵¹⁰ Shortly before the attack, the rebels released the following instructions to the local residents:

"Dentro de un cuarto de hora, a partir de esta orden, deberán todos los vecinos de Triana abrir sus puertas, a fin de que pueda hacerse el rápido servicio de captura de los pocos que aún disparan de las azoteas para producir la alarma. Los hombres deberán estar en la calle, levantando los brazos en cuanto se presenten las fuerzas de vigilancia para dar la sensación de tranquilidad y coadyuvar al mejor servicio."⁵¹¹

The Rebel army was divided in three columns. The first, headed by Major Castejón, entered Triana from the Puente de San Telmo. He was accompanied by his V *Bandera*, the *Columna Carranza*, an artillery battery and an armoured vehicle.⁵¹² The second column, commanded by Lieutenant Gassols of the Foreign Legion, assaulted the Puente de Triana. The column was formed by legionaries, assault guards, Falangists and volunteers not (yet) affiliated to any paramilitary organisation. Joaquín Arrarás erroneously claimed that the already-deceased Captain Lindo was placed in command of the second column (probably in an attempt to mask

⁵⁰⁹ This was the official label bestowed on loyalists by the *Comisión Gestora. Archivo Municipal de Sevilla* (Seville), Actas de la Comisión Gestora del Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 13 August 1936.

⁵¹⁰ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 23.

⁵¹¹ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional Armario 18, Legajo 6, Carpeta 1. See also: *La Unión* (Seville) 21 July 1936: "Llamamos la atención del público sobre el peligro de permanecer en las azoteas, ya que patrullas de tiradores tienen la misión de cazar a los pistoleros que [...] se dedican a disparar de las azoteas."

⁵¹² **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 30.

the failed attack of 20 July). The third column, headed by Civil Guard Major Haro Lumbreras, attacked the Puente del Cachorro and was formed by an Infantry company, the civil and assault guards of Huelva, a group of *Requetés* and two Falangist *Centurias*.⁵¹³ The 3rd Ceuta *Tabor of Regulares* also probably joined the assault since the insurgents silenced the participation of several military/paramilitary units, including *Sanidad Militar* and a group of civil guards from Burgos.⁵¹⁴

The Rebels were eager to avenge the humiliating defeat of the previous day and were particularly obsessed about capturing the Plaza de Altozano (the location where Captain Lindo was fatally wounded). The three rebel columns entered Triana protected by a barrage of artillery fire before splitting into smaller groups that encircled the entire district. The *modus operandi* was typically Africanist. Major Castejón explained it to Ortiz de Villajos while narrating the capture of Morón de la Frontera (25 July 1936):

"Sin embargo, yo accioné a base de un estrecho movimiento envolvente que me permitiese castigar con dureza a los rojos. Todo resultó de acuerdo con mis prevenciones, pues cuando los tuve entretenidos con las fuerzas que tenían por misión principal la de amagar caí sobre ellos por el lado izquierdo con el núcleo más importante de mis efectivos, cuyo mando personal me reservé. Su derrota fue desastrosa. Y el castigo, durísimo."⁵¹⁵

The tactic consisted in enveloping the enemy and then "castigar con dureza". The method proved to be both effective and bloody: in Morón, 26 people had died as a result of leftist violence, whereas 238 were killed by the Rebels. Queipo rejoiced at the operation, declaring that "la justicia se ha cumplido de manera dura y terrible, como es consiguiente, para acabar con la canalla marxista."⁵¹⁶ In Triana, Castejón exploited the military inexperience of the

⁵¹³ For the composition of the three columns see: **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 23; Arrarás Iribarren, Joaquín, *Historia de la Cruzada Española*, vol. 3, Tomo XI, page 214; Medina Villalonga, Rafael, *Tiempo Pasado*, pages 42-43; El Tebib Arrumi, *Así se conquistó Sevilla*, page 59.

⁵¹⁴ Written declaration of Joaquín de Castro Gonzalez ("tomando parte en la liberación de Triana") **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 17. 36 civil guards from the Burgos *Comandancia* participated in the capture of the city-centre, Triana and La Macarena. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 20.

⁵¹⁵ Ortiz de Villajos, Cándido, *De Sevilla a Madrid*, page 55.

⁵¹⁶ Queipo affirmed on 25 July: "Morón ha sido dominado por las fuerzas, y la justicia se ha cumplido de manera dura y terrible, como es consiguiente, para acabar con la canalla marxista." *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 25 July 1936. García Márquez, José María, "La represión franquista en la provincial de Sevilla. Estado de la cuestión" in *Ebre 38. Revista Internacional de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939)*, nº2, Barcelona, Publicacions I Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 2004, page 94.

“canalla marxista” to encircle them, close any escape route and finally proceed with a “castigo” where the Army of Africa used knives to carry out a massacre.⁵¹⁷ The death of Captain Lindo, like that of Simón Lapatza (a key figure in the conspiracy in Seville) during the first assault on Morón (24 July 1936); merely served as a pretext for the rebels to indulge in indiscriminate slaughter.⁵¹⁸ Consequently, the “esfuerzo de los bravos legionarios, leales a la causa de España” turned the *barrio* into a war zone covered in white flags, which was read as a symbol of “la actitud pacifista de sus obreros, libertados de la tiranía marxista.”⁵¹⁹

The ultimate objective of the operation was to initiate the process of repression by means of an exemplary crushing of an entire social group (the working-class). The shelling of a residential area and the use of the Army of Africa revealed the purpose of the mission: it was a punitive action. In the aftermath of the battle of Triana, mixed patrols of soldiers and Falangists performed house searches and murdered anyone affiliated to a trade-union, even if no weapons were found during the search.⁵²⁰ At the same time, Ramón de Carranza stamped his authority as mayor of Seville and gave a 10-minute ultimatum for all residents to remove all pro-leftist graffiti from the walls of the *barrio*. Rafael de Medina noted with unequivocal joy that the residents slavishly completed the task before the deadline. Republicanism was – literally – wiped out from Triana.⁵²¹

The fall of La Macarena (21-22 July 1936)

The last major military objective of the rebels was the district of La Macarena (which encompassed all working-class neighbourhoods in the north-western sector of the city). The *barrio* had been isolated from the rest of Seville since 18 July, when the Rebels captured both

⁵¹⁷ Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, page 80.

⁵¹⁸ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 23.

⁵¹⁹ **ABC** (Seville), 24 July 1936: “El esfuerzo de los bravos legionarios, leales a la causa de España venció la resistencia de los rojos y libertó a Triana fácilmente [...] En las casas ondean banderas blancas que dicen la actitud pacifista de sus obreros, libertados de la tiranía marxista.”

⁵²⁰ Bahamonde y Sánchez de Castro, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano*, page 151.

⁵²¹ Less than a month later, the walls were again covered with political slogans, this time supporting the rebellion. Medina Villalonga, Rafael de, *Tiempo Pasado*, pages 42-43; Barbero, Edmundo, *El Infierno*

Azul (Seis meses en el feudo de Queipo), page 369. The Rebels would later attempt to justify the use of disproportionate force by exaggerating previous leftist violence (some claimed that as many as 20 rebel supporters were murdered in Triana). El Tebib Arrumi, *Así se conquistó Sevilla*, page 44; Arrarás Iribarren, Joaquín, *Historia de la Cruzada Española*, vol. 5, Tomo XI, page 214; Salas, Nicolás, *Sevilla fue la clave*, vol. 2, pages 495-500.

the city-centre and the adjacent ring road.⁵²² The central problems faced by the weapon-starved defenders were the fragility of the barricades and the wide perimeter of defence, as explained by Arrarás: "La línea de fortificación, muy rudimentaria por cierto, formada por adoquines y colchones, va por las calles de Sol, San Julián, Arco de la Macarena, calle de Castellar, Ronda de Capuchinos, calle de la Feria y plaza de San Marcos y Santa Marina."⁵²³ The ancient walls of La Macarena also functioned as a protective barrier. The epicentre of loyalist resistance, which was headed by Andrés Palatín, was the calle San Luis and its orphanage, converted into an improvised military headquarters, hospital and refugee camp. According to newspaper *ABC*, Palatín protected the nuns trapped inside the orphanage.⁵²⁴

On the morning of 21 July, an initial rebel attack spearheaded by the Cavalry Corps resulted in an unexpected rout. The cavalry assault pierced the first line of barricades but the advance stalled in the labyrinth of narrow streets of La Macarena. The leader of the unit trusted with reaching the Plaza de San Marcos via calle Castellar was killed with a pickaxe.⁵²⁵ The streets were littered with dead horses (one horse was later found dying inside a church) and the abandoned weapons of the rebels. At least seven horses, seven rifles and large stocks of ammunition were captured. A heavy-machine gun was also seized (but without ammunition).⁵²⁶ General Queipo forced a veil of silence over the episode and diverted attention from the embarrassing defeat by focusing his nightly *charla* of 21 July on a "saneamiento" among the pro-Republican telegraphists of Seville.⁵²⁷

The capture of La Macarena (22 July 1936)

The insurgents did not carry out any other offensive on La Macarena on 21 July. General Queipo decided to wait patiently for the return of the Army of Africa (busy subduing a number of nearby *pueblos*) to impose an 'exemplary punishment' on the district. The scale of the assault was such that it threatened the very existence of the myth of the *soldaditos*. On 23 July *El Correo de Andalucía*, despite accepting the existence of only two columns (Arco de la

⁵²² Delicado, Manuel, "Cómo se luchó en Sevilla", *Discurso pronunciado en el Pleno ampliado del C. C. del Partido Comunista de España, celebrado en Valencia los días 5, 6, 7 y 8 de Marzo de 1937*, page 6.

⁵²³ Arrarás Iribarren, Joaquín, *Historia de la Cruzada Española*, vol. 3, Tomo X, page 193.

⁵²⁴ *ABC* (Seville) 24 July 1936.

⁵²⁵ Testimony of Francisco Ponce Barneto in Ortiz Villalba, *Sevilla 1936*, pages 151-52.

⁵²⁶ *La Unión* (Seville), 23 July 1936. See also Delicado, Manuel, "Cómo se luchó en Sevilla", *Discurso pronunciado en el Pleno ampliado del C. C. del Partido Comunista de España, celebrado en Valencia los días 5, 6, 7 y 8 de Marzo de 1937*, page 6. *El Liberal* (Madrid), 4 August 1936.

⁵²⁷ *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 22 July 1936.

Macarena and Puerta de Córdoba), reported three separate military manoeuvres: the first in calle San Luis; a second in San Julián; and a third that crossed several unnamed streets until reaching calle Bustos Travera and the Plaza de San Marcos.⁵²⁸ Both Arrarás and Ortiz de Villajos exploited the confusing post-battle report of *El Correo de Andalucía* to support Queipo's extravagant *charla* of 1 February 1938 claim that only 250 soldiers divided in two columns participated in the attack. Gutiérrez Flores finally conceded in 1940 that the number of columns was in fact three, while at the same time declaring that "no recuerdo ni la composición de las tres columnas ni los mandos de ellas; desde luego, eran muy pequeñas".⁵²⁹ Furthermore, Francoist historiography omitted the presence of the *Regulares* in a frustrated attempt at masking the fact that an entire army was employed to pacify the working-class-districts of Seville. Ironically, it was General Queipo who acknowledged the participation of the Moroccan mercenaries in one of his recurrent verbal outburst in his *charla* of 22 July; a few hours after the capture of La Macarena and a few minutes before losing his voice and cutting short his speech.⁵³⁰

The three columns were formed by the Foreign Legion, *Regulares*, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineering and Paymaster/Quartermaster Corps, Civil and Assault Guard, *Requeté*, Falange, *Harca Berenguer* and *Columna Carranza*.⁵³¹ The main column, trusted with the critical mission of penetrating the *barrio* from the Arco de La Macarena and securing the calle San Luis, was spearheaded by Major Castejón and his *V Bandera*. Both this and a second column included civil guards, *Requetés* and the Artillery and Engineering Corps. The second column attacked La Macarena from the Puerta de Córdoba and its primary objective was to secure calle Hiniesta and calle San Julián. The third column entered the district from calle Sol, at the junction between the Ronda de Capuchinos and calle María Auxiliadora, and was formed by civil guards, Falangists, apolitical volunteers (with the *Harca Berenguer* "a la cabeza"), three

⁵²⁸ *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 23 July 1936.

⁵²⁹ Ortiz de Villajos, Cándido, *De Sevilla a Madrid*, pages 27 and 46-48. Arrarás Iribarren, Joaquín, *Historia de la Cruzada Española*, vol. 3, Tomo XI, page 219; *Archivo General Militar* (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 23. According to both Arrarás and Ortiz de Villajos, the alleged composition of the forces was as follows: 100 legionaries, 100 *Requetés*/Falangists and 50 civil guards. For Queipo's *charla* see *ABC* (Seville), 2 February 1938. Queipo ordered the mobilisation of civilian volunteers to capture Triana on 21 July 1936:

"Aviso a los voluntarios militares y civiles"

Los afiliados a Falange Española, Tradicionalistas, Acción Popular y todos aquellos quienes sin pertenecer a ninguna de dichas organizaciones se les hayan entregado armas, deberá reunirse esta tarde, a las cuatro en la Plaza de la Gavidia." *La Unión* (Seville), 21 July 1936.

⁵³⁰ *La Unión* (Seville), 23 July 1936.

⁵³¹ *Archivo General Militar* (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 18. *Historia de la Cruzada Española*, vol.3, Tomo XI, page 219; Ortiz de Villajos, *De Sevilla a Madrid*, pages 27 and 45-50.

Requeté squadrons and the Engineering, Paymaster/Quartermaster and Artillery Corps. All three columns were instructed to converge at the Plaza de San Marcos.⁵³² An entire army, numbering not 250 soldiers as subsequently claimed by Queipo and his panegyrists, but thousands; left the city-centre at 14:00 and headed towards La Macarena while the radio released, according to the testimony of Gutiérrez Flores, "instrucciones muy severas a los vecinos."⁵³³ The battle concluded at 20:00.⁵³⁴

The tactic employed by the Rebels was a replica of the one used during the capture of Triana, with equally destructive results. Several artillery batteries stationed along a number of strategic locations (and which had been 'softening' the area for at least two days) were now ordered by Castejón to intensify the shelling of the *barrio*, badly damaging the Arco de La Macarena (a symbol of Seville) in the process and provoking several friendly-fire incidents.⁵³⁵ The majority of houses located in the frontline were obliterated.⁵³⁶ In San Julián, the barricades set up in front of the Capuchin Convent were also destroyed and Edmundo Barbero, who also paid a visit to the damaged Arco de la Macarena, stated in his memoirs that all houses in the area bore the scars of bullet impact.⁵³⁷ The artillery barrage was followed by a brutal offensive. According to the personal testimony of Manuel Delicado: "Los obreros que caían en poder de los facciosos eran fusilados inmediatamente" and "El bombardeo cada día era más intenso. Las fuerza facciosas comenzaron a desalojar las viviendas obreras más próximas. Al salir las mujeres y los niños aterrorizados por el bombardeo, la Guardia civil y los fascistas hacían descargas cerradas contra ellas. Los hombres que estaban refugiados en estas viviendas eran apartados de las mujeres y conducidos a la muralla del barrio de la Macarena, donde eran fusilados."⁵³⁸

⁵³² **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 18; ***La Unión*** (Seville), 23 July 1936 and ***El Correo de Andalucía*** (Seville), 23 July 1936.

⁵³³ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 23.

⁵³⁴ ***El Correo de Andalucía*** (Seville), 23 July 1936. **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 23.

⁵³⁵ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Actas Capitulares de la Comisión Gestora del Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 17 September. Repair costs ascended to 398.75 pesetas. See also: **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Secretaría Municipal de Sevilla, Negociado de obras públicas, 1936, nº208.

⁵³⁶ **ABC** (Seville), 24 July 1936.

⁵³⁷ Testimony of Juan Fernández Badillo in Domingo, Alfonso, ***Retaguardia. La Guerra Civil tras los frentes***, page 91. Barbero, Edmundo, ***El Infierno Azul***, page 371.

⁵³⁸ ***El Liberal*** (Madrid), 4 August 1936. Curiously, Delicado also contributed to the consolidation of the myth of the *soldaditos* by declaring that no Moroccan mercenaries set foot in Seville but rather that General Queipo disguised "fascistas" as *Regulares*.

The Rebels also instructed the air force to bomb La Macarena with complete disregard for human life.⁵³⁹ On 18 July, Major Rafael Martínez Estévez had already contravened orders from Varela Rendueles to shell the rebel forces clustered in and around the city-centre on the grounds that it would cause large numbers of non-military casualties.⁵⁴⁰ The participation of the air force was omitted from Francoist historiography; however, on 22 July *El Correo de Andalucía* printed an edict released by Queipo directed at the residents of the densely-populated district:

"Por esta orden general se comunica a los pequeños focos que aún existen que depongan su actitud arrojando las armas por la calle, colocando distintivos blancos en las puertas y ventanas en evitación los daños que pudiesen ocasionar la Aviación y las fuerzas del Ejército."⁵⁴¹

The column that penetrated La Macarena from calle Sol temporarily seized both the Plaza de los Terceros and calle Bustos Travera only to be forced to retreat twice. As in Triana, the rebels relied on the support of an armoured vehicle that pushed the advance to the Plaza San Marcos, bombarded the square and destroyed the barricades. Foot soldiers also used hand grenades. Already in the Plaza de San Marcos, a Carlist priest provided spiritual support to the advancing rebel troops.⁵⁴²

The Army of Africa suffered its highest number of casualties in the triangle calle San Luis-Plaza de Pumarejo-calle Santa María.⁵⁴³ The Foreign Legion put its nihilistic ethos into practice: a

⁵³⁹ Indiscriminate air bombardment was standard-practice in Rebel military operations in Western Andalucía. For instance, on 10 August in Aznalcóllar (Seville) the loyalist committee released Falangists leaders Matías Barrera Borrero and Diego Rodríguez Sánchez and placed a car at their disposal so that both men could travel to Seville and request that the Rebel high-command halt its bombardment of the *pueblo*. Instead of delivering the request, Borrero and Sánchez joined the Rebel column that captured Aznalcóllar. Diego Rodríguez Sánchez was later appointed mayor of Aznalcóllar. Martínez Gálvez, José Carlos, "La represión en el primer franquismo sevillano y su reconstrucción desde los archivos" in **20 años con el Archivo Histórico Provincial de Sevilla, Ciclo de Conferencias**, pages 154-55.

⁵⁴⁰ Varela Rendueles, *Rebelión en Sevilla*, pages 112-13.

⁵⁴¹ *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 22 July 1936. In 1967, Luis Bolín desperately attempted to minimise the role played by the air force. He covered himself with ridicule by claiming that Queipo's Army of the South possessed a mere three armoured vehicles and six planes that, due to the scarcity of war material, had to resort to bombing enemy positions with paving blocks. Bolín, Luis, *Spain: the vital years*, page 183.

⁵⁴² *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 22 July 1936. On 8 September, Cardinal Ilundáin made public his support for the rebel cause. *Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla*, Año LXXIX, Núm. 1.290.

⁵⁴³ During the battle, one legionnaire was shot in the head only for the one behind him to jump over the dead body, shout *¡Viva la muerte!* and resume the attack with renewed ferocity. Medina Villalonga, Rafael de, *Tiempo Pasado*, pages 43-44.

number of eye-witnesses confirmed that the legionaries forced their way through the wrecked barricades with hand grenades and used women and children as human shields.⁵⁴⁴ The files of the *Diputación Provincial* revealed that at least three children were killed during the offensive.⁵⁴⁵ Already deep inside the *barrio*, the legionaries randomly tossed hand grenades inside houses and stabbed residents to death in an operation termed by Ortiz de Villajos as "la limpieza de la Macarena".⁵⁴⁶ The final assault on the orphanage was described by the *La Unión* reporter as an "apocalipsis".⁵⁴⁷ Converted into a makeshift refugee camp, the orphanage sheltered entire families (including pregnant women, children and elderly people), in addition to the resident orphans. It was mercilessly assaulted with hand grenades and heavy machine-gun fire. Andrés Palatín, who according to the Rebel press fought with exceptional bravery, evaded the siege and hid in a nearby house until being spotted and executed. Resistance was particularly stubborn in San Julián. So much so, that the insurgents were forced to dispatch a column to mop-up the entire area the following morning. Queipo provided an alternative version of events in a flagrant attempt at denigrating Palatín's reputation: "Tenían el puesto de mando en el Hospicio, que fué tomado por las fuerzas del comandante Castejón, poniendo en fuga a las muchas docenas de criminales que pudieron escapar, en su mayoría, por la puerta trasera del edificio. Sin embargo, dejaron en el interior del edificio bastantes muertos, entre los que estaba el del señor Palatín".⁵⁴⁸

After attaining their primary military objective, the rebels divided the columns into smaller units that combed the streets in search for Republicans, killing anyone found with a weapon. A bystander witnessed the desperate efforts of a man attempting to dispose of his gun, noting

⁵⁴⁴ Declarations of UGT leader Antonio Salado, who escaped Seville and reached Madrid on 13 August in *Heraldo de Madrid* (Madrid), 25 August 1936. In the interview, Salado mentioned the Comisaría de Jáuregui, where both Rebollo and Díaz Criado established a joint reign of terror. He also denounced the execution of the trade-union leadership of Seville (and of strikers returning to work out of fear). Regarding the taking of *barrios*, Salado declared that an entire army (including the Cavalry and Artillery Corps) was employed to take La Macarena, that women and children were used as human shields and the legionaries "pasaron a cuchillo a cuantos elementos de izquierdas encontraron." On 7 August, Saturnino Barneto, who escaped Seville on 3 August, also confirmed that women and children were used as human shields and added that in a single day 42 "obreros" were executed in Seville. *Informaciones* (Madrid), 7 August 1936. See also: Barbero, Edmundo, *El Infierno Azul*, page 372; testimony of J. Gallego del Pino, in Espinosa Maestre, Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, "Sevilla, 1936. Sublevación y Represión" in Braojos Garrido, Alfonso; Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *Sevilla, 36: Sublevación fascista y represión*, page 216.

⁵⁴⁵ *Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla* (Seville), Sangre, Libro 133.

⁵⁴⁶ Ortiz de Villajos, Cándido, *De Sevilla a Madrid*, page 21.

⁵⁴⁷ *La Unión* (Seville), 1 August 1936.

⁵⁴⁸ *La Unión* (Seville), 23 July 1936. See also: *ABC* (Seville), 24 July and 25 July 1936; *La Unión* (Seville), 1 August 1936.

"si le cogen con la pistola está perdido."⁵⁴⁹ The Africanist *modus operandi* was evident: the subdivision of the columns in smaller units that encircled the area and blocked all escape routes so to maximise casualties.⁵⁵⁰ 300 captured loyalists were later paraded around the city-centre as war trophies, but not before the Rebels forced the local residents to tear down the barricades with their bare hands.⁵⁵¹ That same night, a triumphant General Queipo declared that "el castigo ha sido ejemplar"⁵⁵²; while an eye-witness confirmed to *La Unión* that "la lucha ha sido cruenta; las paredes llenas de impactos; regueros de sangre."⁵⁵³ The following day (23 July), the *ABC* reporter was sickened by the stench of putrefying bodies in Santa Marina⁵⁵⁴; whereas Queipo's *Delegado de Presa y Propaganda* wrote: "En San Julián la matanza fue tremenda. Obligaron a todos los hombres que encontraban en las casas a salir a la calle, sin averiguar si habían tomado parte en la lucha, y allí mismo los mataban."⁵⁵⁵ Antonio Bahamonde was so emotionally overwhelmed by the massacre that it triggered a crisis of conscience that led to his eventual defection.

Rationalising repression

The central problem faced by the rebels was moral and not martial. The capture of the capital of Andalucía became a matter of time following the occupation of the city-centre on 18 July; however, the insurgents needed urgently to justify the military methods employed, including

⁵⁴⁹ *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 3 August 1936.

⁵⁵⁰ *La Unión* (Seville), 23 July 1936 and 1 August; *ABC* (Seville), 24 July and 25 July 1936.

⁵⁵¹ *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 22 July 1936. The returning military unit was greeted by rebel sympathisers in what *La Unión* termed "la demostración palmaria de que el noble pueblo sevillano se confundía con la misión patriótica de las fuerzas libertadoras." *La Unión* (Seville), 22 July 1936.

⁵⁵² *La Unión* (Seville), 23 July 1936.

⁵⁵³ *La Unión* (Seville), 31 July 1936.

⁵⁵⁴ On 24 July, the *ABC* reporter wrote: "En Santa Marina quedan uno cuantos cadáveres. El hedor es insoportable." *ABC* (Seville), 24 July 1936. Equally unbearable was daily life during the subsequent months. Decades later, locals living in exile told reporter Antonio Burgos that during the following nights "el camino del cementerio por el Arco adelante, junto a los muros del hospital, parecía un feria. Eran los faroles de los carros en que llevaban los muertos al cementerio". Burgos, Antonio, *Guía secreta de Sevilla*, pages 289-90. See also the testimony of Juan Gallego del Pino in Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, "Sevilla, 1936. Sublevación y represión" in Braojos Garrido, Alfonso; Alvarez Rey, Leandro; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *Sevilla, 36: Sublevación fascista y represión*, pages 238-39.

⁵⁵⁵ Bahamonde y Sánchez de Castro, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano*, pages 79-80. The last loyalist stronghold of San Bernardo was captured during the afternoon of 23 July (immediately upon completion of the mopping-up operations in San Julián and the Gran Plaza). The attack on San Bernardo was spearheaded by the Cavalry Corps and supported by a tank. There was no resistance of note. Unsurprisingly, Arrarás claimed that the Rebels tricked the locals into believing that the entire Cavalry Corps invaded the district when in reality only a detachment of soldiers was used. The *Harca Berenguer* was also unleashed on Cerro de Águila (Gran Plaza sector). Again, the exhausted and demoralised loyalists could only put up token resistance. Arrarás Iribarren, Joaquín, *Historia de la Cruzada Española*, vol. 3, Tomo XI, page 220. *Archivo General Militar* (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 18.

the use of the Army of Africa against residential districts. The rebel leadership, the majority of which served in Spanish Morocco, was clearly aware of the inevitable bloody consequences of unleashing the African units in mainland Spain, which only aggravated their crisis of legitimacy.⁵⁵⁶ To counter this, two different approaches were adopted: either a) the cover-up of specific episodes (Gran Plaza) or b) exaggeration of leftist violence and the dehumanisation of the enemy (Triana and La Macarena). For instance, on 22 July General Queipo cynically stated that twenty rebel sympathisers were murdered in the San Marcos neighbourhood alone in what consisted of a typically *Africanista* propaganda coup aimed at deflecting attention away from Rebel violence.⁵⁵⁷ In July 1937 General Franco employed the same tactic when he calmly declared to a Belgian reporter that only 4,500 people had been executed by the rebels during the first year of the rebellion.⁵⁵⁸ In contrast, only 14 anti-Republicans were murdered in Seville between 18-23 July.⁵⁵⁹ Moreover, rebel casualties were slim. The military unit trusted with spearheading the offensives against the *barrios* – the Foreign Legion – sustained a remarkably low number of losses: 4 dead and 7 injured. In addition, the column that penetrated La Macarena from Puerta de Córdoba suffered a mere two casualties (a seriously wounded soldier and a slightly injured Falangist) and only one *Requeté* was injured during the pacification of San Julián, a clear indication of the military inexperience of its civilian defenders.⁵⁶⁰ Ultimately, the insurgents refused to release full casualty figures for fear of exposing the military asymmetry between the opposing forces and demolishing the argument that the taking of the *barrios* was part of a wider struggle pitting the “Ejército de la Patria”

⁵⁵⁶ Most importantly, the *Bando* paved the way for the use of the elite corps of the Spanish army to “punish” the civilian population of Seville for its opposition to the rebellion. The nihilistic ethos of the Foreign Legion was encapsulated in the battle cry “¡Viva la Muerte!” and its philosophy structured around the exaltation of suicidal courage, the use of brutality and the belief in redemption through a courageous death. The Legion’s founder, the maniac General Millán-Astray, led by example: he lost an eye, an arm, a leg and had most of his teeth shattered by stray bullet that crossed his face. For a biography of Millán-Astray see: Preston, Paul, *Comrades! Portraits from the Spanish Civil War*, pages 11-42.

⁵⁵⁷ *La Unión* (Seville), 22 July 1936. Major Castejón later declared: “Yo me limité a dejar sobre el cuerpo de cada asesinado el cadáver de un asesino en forma de cruz”. Ortiz de Villajos, Cándido, *De Sevilla a Madrid, ruta libertadora de la columna Castejón*, page 44.

⁵⁵⁸ Franco, Francisco, *Palabras del Caudillo: 19 abril 1937-31 diciembre 1938*, page 147-48.

⁵⁵⁹ For victims of Republican violence see Salas, Nicolás, *Sevilla fue la clave*, vol. 2, pages 495-500.

⁵⁶⁰ Copado, Bernabé, *Con la columna Redondo. Combates y conquistas. Crónica de guerra*, page 33; Marín Fidalgo, Ana; Roldán González, Enrique; Martín Burgueño, Manuel, *El Requeté de Sevilla: orígenes, causas e historia*, page 50; *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 22 July 1936; *La Unión* (Seville), 23 July 1936. In his *charla* of 1 August 1936, Queipo de Llano declared that the Legion had suffered between 6 -8 casualties. *ABC* (Seville), 2 August 1936. The Army of Africa was employed as frontline cannon-fodder during the march to Madrid. So much so that on 22 August Franco informed Queipo that: “Bajas producidas en unidades Regulares se ha pedido a Marruecos sean abiertas y las del Tercio lo será con los que aquí se van reclutando.” *Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur* (Seville), Legajo 5357, Carpeta 3.

against the “imperio del marxismo.”⁵⁶¹ Lastly, the pacification of La Macarena was followed by an intense propaganda campaign aimed at presenting the massacre as mere retributive justice or a “castigo” for the *barrio*’s past Republican-era crimes. Pro-Francoist historiography officially labelled the district as “el terrible barrio rojo sevillano, sede del comunismo”.⁵⁶²

The dehumanisation of Republicans was a natural extension of the fabrication that a Soviet-sponsored Communist coup was being concocted in Spain. The rebels justified massacres with the argument that they were compelled to adopt extreme force so to ensure the success of the rebellion, under threat by thousands of militiamen both inside Seville and in the surrounding countryside. According to such rationale, repression was merely a reflexive tactic to guarantee the triumph of a defensive, apolitical coup aimed at preserving national sovereignty. It was therefore justifiable in the context of a city under both internal and external siege.⁵⁶³ Already on 22 July 1936 *ABC* excused the bloody taking of Triana and the imminent capture of La Macarena with the following title: “POR LA SALVACION DE LA PATRIA. GUERRA A MUERTE ENTRE LA RUSIA ROJA Y LA ESPAÑA SAGRADA”.⁵⁶⁴

The Rebels claimed to be fighting a “war to the death” against a foreign enemy (Spaniards who had *de facto* abjured their nationality and swore allegiance to the Soviet Union); or, as historian Herbert Southworth sarcastically put it: “Los trabajadores de Sevilla hacían de pieles rojas para estos modernos conquistadores.”⁵⁶⁵ The insurgent leadership closed ranks and

⁵⁶¹ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Actas Capitulares de la Comisión Gestora del Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 20 August. For the ideological foundations of Francoism see: Richards, Michael, *A time of silence: civil war and the culture of repression in Franco’s Spain, 1936-1945*, pages 7-66.

⁵⁶² Espinosa de los Monteros, Narciso; Gómez-Moreno, Manuel (eds.), *139 fotografías del Movimiento Nacional en Sevilla*. Already on 22 July, Queipo insulted all loyalists by calling them a “banda de criminales.” *La Unión* (Seville), 23 July 1936. As late as 1990, La Macarena was still labelled “el Moscú sevillano”: “Y cajas de munición de pistola hay en San Julián y San Marcos para aguantar un mes en las barricadas. Ten seguridad en nuestros hombres allí. Al menor indicio se cerrarán los barrios y el Moscú sevillano será una Fortaleza. Andrés Palatín, desde el Hospicio, tiene bien controlada la situación. No fallarán. Luego están la gente de Triana y San Roque y San Bernardo, el Cerro del Aguilal [...] Meteremos en el centro más de treinta mil personas.” Salas, Nicolás, *El Moscú Sevillano. Sevilla la roja, feudo del comunismo español durante la República y símbolo triunfal del frente popular en 1936*, page 243.

⁵⁶³ Ramón-Laca claimed that the initial months of Queipo de Llano’s rule could only be judged in relation to the existence of a powerful Communist movement within the city supported by an openly revolutionary countryside. Ramón-Laca, Julio de, *Bajo la férula de Queipo: como fue gobernada Andalucía*.

⁵⁶⁴ General Franco in *ABC* (Seville) 22 July 1936; Queipo de Llano in *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville) 22 July 1936.

⁵⁶⁵ Southworth ridiculed the work of Claude Farrère who compared Queipo with Pizarro and Cortés. Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, *El mito de la cruzada de Franco*, page 208. Rebel intellectual José María

repeated the argument *ad nauseam*. That very same day, General Franco stated that "Todos tenemos el deber de cooperar en esta lucha contra Rusia."⁵⁶⁶ A year later, Queipo reiterated the *casus belli* for the rebellion with renewed vitriol: "El bolchevismo tenía elegida Sevilla para hacerla blanco de sus horrores, que son vergüenza de la sociedad. Todos, los ateos, los judíos, los masones, los rojos en general, se habían conciliado contra nuestra Patria".⁵⁶⁷ The Falange also contributed to the demonisation of the Republic by handing out flyers to the very same workers it repressed. The tone was apocalyptic:

"Habéis sido testigos horrorizados de la catástrofe preparada por los sicarios de Moscú. España vivía entregada al espíritu asiático de Rusia, Judaísmo, Masonería, Marxismo: he ahí los tres enemigos de nuestra redención. Respirábamos un aire pestilente de cloaca, de charca infecta, donde se revolvían detritus negativos de vileza y destrucción, que alegres vientos de justicia han logrado purificar."⁵⁶⁸

After 'cleansing' the working-class districts of Seville, the Falange now proposed to wipe out the "detritus negativos" that continued endangering the *Patria*. At the same time, the rebels laboured intensely to conceal the events of 18-23 July in Seville. Their efforts were initially undermined by the naivety of the press. Immediately after the occupation of La Macarena (24 July), *ABC* reported:

"La resistencia de San Marcos, el Pumarejo y San Julián, fué más aparatoso que eficaz. No tenía el foco la menor importancia militar. Un sentimiento humanitario hizo al general Queipo demorar en lo posible la ocupación de este sector, que pudo ser barrido a cañonazos; pero el deseo de evitar corriera de sangre de los obreros engañados dilató la ocupación."⁵⁶⁹

By revealing that loyalist resistance in La Macarena was "más aparatoso que eficaz", *ABC* dismantled the Rebel's key argument that the rebellion was a pre-emptive strike against a Communist *putsch*. Reporter Sánchez del Arco also confirmed the military asymmetry between

Pemán shouted at the microphones of *Radio Club Portugués* (September 1936) that Republicans "No tienen Patria ni ascendencia. Son los hospicianos del mundo!" Pemán y Pemartín, José María, *Arengas y Crónicas de Guerra*, page 36. Lastly, Ramón-Laca provided a bizarre explanation for the employment of the Army of Africa. He concluded that the obstinate resistance of the residents of Triana "hizo necesario adoptar precauciones extraordinarias [...] [and] una operación militar". Ramón-Laca, *Bajo la férula de Queipo*, page 18.

⁵⁶⁶ *ABC* (Seville) 22 July 1936.

⁵⁶⁷ *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 18 July 1937.

⁵⁶⁸ *Archivo de la Real Academia de la Historia* (Madrid), Fondo Diego Angulo, 11/8990.

⁵⁶⁹ *La Unión* (Seville), 24 July 1936.

insurgent and loyalist forces, a constant throughout both the pacification of western Andalucía and the march of the Army of Africa from Seville to Madrid.⁵⁷⁰ The rebels replied by tightening their grip on the press.⁵⁷¹ The need to exaggerate leftist violence compelled the rebels to rewrite History in just a matter of days. Precisely one week after *ABC* (24 July) reported that Andrés Palatín had protected the nuns residing in the orphanage of San Luis; *La Unión* (1 August) provided an entirely different perspective on the Anarchist leader: "Quien convierte un centro benéfico en cuartel general de unas hordas peores que salvajes [...] no puede menos que merecer los más duros calificativos. Pero [...] murió fusilado como un caballero; Dios acoja su alma con más benevolencia que la que él tuvo con sus semejantes."⁵⁷²

In order to attain this objective and avoid a repeat of the public relations disaster that was the massacre of Badajoz of 14 August 1936, Major Cuesta Monereo released - on 7 September 1936 - strict instructions for press censorship. Its 14 points included specific orders (1º and 2º) for newspapers to present edited versions of the macabre radio speeches of General Queipo de Llano⁵⁷³; and the imposition of a code of silence over both the number of Rebel casualties, "defeatist" (*derrotista*) reports (4º) and the foreign origin of rebel aircraft (8º). Other instructions included a general prohibition on the publishing of any news that might threaten the unity of the rebel alliance (10º). The single most important order was number 9: "9º- En las

⁵⁷⁰ Sánchez del Arco, Manuel, *El sur de España en la reconquista de Madrid (diario de operaciones glosado por un testigo)*, pages 32-34.

⁵⁷¹ On 9 August, Franco established a *Gabinete de Propaganda* that evolved into the *Oficina de Prensa y Propaganda* on 24 August, headed by Juan Pujol Martínez. Luis Bolín ran the foreign press office and treated foreign correspondents harshly (often threatening them with execution) and imposed strict censorship. Only 13 days after the Badajoz massacre (27 August), Bolín published a report entitled "Folleto sobre crímenes marxistas en Andalucía", the first document of the future *Causa General*. It read: "Por orden del Alto mando se ha empezado a reunir datos para la publicación de un folleto, que eventualmente será traducido a diferentes idiomas, y en el que de un modo sucinto, se informará a la opinión mundial sobre los crímenes perpetrados por los rojos en los pueblos andaluces. Este folleto se limitará a dar cuenta de las principales atrocidades, por lo cuyo motivo solo hará referencia aquellos pueblos donde estas se hayan cometido en mayor número y con mayor残酷, y es por tanto enteramente independiente de otra encuesta más amplia y detallada de acuerdo con normas distintas deberá verificarse en cada uno de los pueblos de España donde los rojos han cometido desmanes."

Archivo General Militar (Madrid), Documentación Nacional, Rollo 32, Legajo 6, Carpeta 2.

⁵⁷² *La Unión* (Seville), 1 August 1936. In 1940, a children's book added another twist to the story: it revealed that Palatín had attempted to deceive Castejón by greeting the advancing Rebel soldiers and kissing the Foreign Legion major in the cheek before being eventually identified and executed. El Tebib Arrumi, *Así se conquistó Sevilla*, pages 56-57.

⁵⁷³ "En las charlas radiadas del General, suprimir todo concepto, frase o dicterio que, aun cuando ciertos, debido, sin duda, a una vehemencia y exaltada manifestación patriótica, no son apropiadas ni convenientes para su publicación, por razones bien conocidas de la discreción e inteligencia de nuestros periodistas que tantas pruebas vienen dando de ello al aplicar su criterio con una prudencia y tacto dignos de encomio." Nº2: "Las galeras relativas a dichas charlas no deben dejar de remitirse a la censura por ningún concepto." **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 6, Carpeta 5.

medidas represivas se procurará no revestirlas de frases o términos aterradores, expresando solamente "se cumplió la justicia", "le llevaron al castigo merecido", "se cumplió la ley", etc., etc.⁵⁷⁴

Major Cuesta's instructions were critical for the moral survival of the insurgency. The press was instructed to describe violence euphemistically. And so, "repression" became "justicia", "ley" or "castigo"; and the "castigo ejemplar" of La Macarena a synonym for "massacre".

Bellum iustum

The Rebels militarised ("fuerzas marxistas"), politicised ("tiranía marxista") and dehumanised ("hordas marxistas") the Republican 'other'. This rationalisation permitted the rebels to convert residential districts into legitimate military targets, metamorphose loyalists into Soviet agents and perceive themselves as modern-day "conquistadores"; while at the same time excusing the use of the most brutal Africanist war tactics to achieve specific non-military goals. The ultimate objective was to enforce a new political order. As a result, the *castigo* of Seville did not conclude with the occupation of the city, but with the eradication of Republicanism. Only a few days later (27 July), Queipo de Llano personally oversaw the organisation of "unas guardias cívicas, que tendrán por objeto vigilar toda la población de Sevilla[...] Ayer abrí las listas y hoy ya hay más de mil; la organización será por barrios, distritos y calles, y con tal rapidez, que antes de 24 horas no podrán circular por las calles más que aquellos que pueden hacerlo con la frente muy alta."⁵⁷⁵

The primary objective of the coup was not to conquer and administer; but rather to conquer and 'punish' the local population for its loyalty towards the Republic. Hence, the new sectarian *Comisión Gestora* presided by part-time mayor, part-time militia leader Ramón de Carranza was simply implementing its very first decision – "auxiliar oficialmente al Excmo. Sr. General de la División" – when it released a series of murderous decrees under the 'legal' protection of the *Bando*.⁵⁷⁶ This *modus operandi* was replicated all over rebel-controlled Andalucía. For

⁵⁷⁴ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 6, Carpeta 5.

⁵⁷⁵ **El Correo de Andalucía** (Seville), 27 July 1936.

⁵⁷⁶ "Se deja constancia de que el primer acto de la Comisión Gestora[...] fue auxiliar oficialmente al Exmo. Sr. General de la División, Don Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y con posterioridad al Exmo. Gobernador Civil de la Provincia, don Pedro Parias y González al objeto de ofrecerse para todo cuanto

instance, the self-appointed *Comandante Militar* of Sanlúcar de Barrameda, Antonio de León y Manjón, gave a 24 hour deadline on 5 August for: “Todos los Sanluqueños ó que vivan habitualmente en esta ciudad vendrán a esta Comandancia Militar donde después de serle leída la fórmula de la promesa que consiste en síntesis en sacrificar la última gota de nuestra sangre y nuestra última peseta hasta conseguir el triunfo de nuestros ideales, se adherirán en su firma hasta a ella.” León y Manjón also warned that anyone who contravened the *Bando* that “lo consideraré como enemigo de España y Sanlúcar”; dividing loyalists into two distinct categories: “los elementos leales a sus ideas” and “la de los cobardes y egoístas [...] sobre los cuales caerá el desprecio de España y Sanlúcar, y a los que aniquilaré sin piedad.”⁵⁷⁷

The tactics adopted by the rebels revealed that the *Bando* was not just a military edict designed to impose public order, but the first step towards the institutionalisation of terror in Spain. In Seville, the *Bando* ‘legalised’ a carefully planned repressive process based on the power usurped by Queipo de Llano on 18 July, which in turn was legitimised by the myth of the *soldaditos*. In reality, repression was not a defensive tactic aimed at pre-emptively aborting a Soviet-sponsored coup, but a political tool to purge Seville of Republicans, ‘Bedouins’ or ‘Marxist hordes’ (depending on the version). Consequently, the capture of the suburbs did not represent the conclusion, but merely the opening stage of the Rebel repressive project. So much so, that the *modus operandi* employed in the taking of the *barrios* served as a model, repeated over and again during the pacification of western Andalucía and the march to Madrid.⁵⁷⁸ For instance, leftist militiamen were savagely murdered in both the hospitals of

pudiese [...] en beneficia de España.” **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Actas de la Comisión Gestora del Ayuntamiento, 30 July 1936.

⁵⁷⁷ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 6.

⁵⁷⁸ See the parallels between the *modus operandi* employed in the capture of the *barrios* and the: “INSTRUCCIONES A LOS JEFES DE COLUMNA

1. Destituir al Ayuntamiento y nombrar una Comisión Gestora que se encargará de la administración municipal.
2. Se efectuará un minucioso registro en los domicilios de todos los dirigentes y afiliados al Frente Popular, aplicando el Bando de Guerra al que se le encuentren armas.
3. Poner en libertad a todos los elementos de derecha y de orden que estén detenidos, facilitándoles las armas recogidas a los elementos del Frente Popular, así como las que se encuentren depositadas en los Cuarteles de la Guardia Civil.
4. Todas las columnas llevarán fusiles y municiones para armar a la gente de orden, con objeto de que estas personas se pongan al lado de la fuerza pública y coadyuven a la defensa de la población. Los Jefes de Columna deberán hacer presente la obligación que tienen todas las personas de orden, de contribuir a la defensa de la Patria, en la inteligencia de que todo aquel que por cobardía o por otros móviles no lo haga será detenido y encerrado en la cárcel con todos los extremistas.
5. Los Jefes de Columna dispondrán queden abastecidos de víveres las casas Cuarteles de la Guardia Civil si preciso fuera, haciendo la extracción de víveres de cualquier almacén o depósito inmediato, con el correspondiente recibo.

Seville and Toledo.⁵⁷⁹ The massacre of Badajoz represented but the bloody climax of a strategy that can be traced back to the capture of the working-class districts of Seville.

Rebel-controlled Andalucía served as a testing ground for the *Africanistas'* ambitious project of inverting the results of the February 1936 elections by means of violence. General Queipo enforced this policy with *gusto*. On 25 July 1936, he declared: "La canalla marxista hay que extirparla de España, hasta sus raíces".⁵⁸⁰ This was precisely what the insurgents did, 'extirpating' the Republic from all but one town in the province of Seville; whereas loyalist violence affected only 33 out of a total of 101 *pueblos*.⁵⁸¹ In effect, the interior colonisation of Spain envisaged by the *Africanista* military caste began with the 'colonisation' of the working-class districts of Seville on 19-23 July. The capital of Andalucía never experienced a civil war; however, the mass killings that claimed at least 3,028 lives between July 1936-January 1937 continued at a frantic pace in a city living *officially* in peace.⁵⁸²

6. Se extenderá la energía en la represión, sobre todo en aquellos individuos que se consideren peligrosos de acción, los que hayan empuñado las armas contra la fuerza pública, o los que hayan cometido desmanes.

7. Se procurará que en cada pueblo de tránsito queden restablecidas las comunicaciones telegráficas y telefónicas con el Cuartel General, dando cuenta al mismo del resultado de la operación en cada pueblo, a ser posible desde éste.

8. Todo Jefe de columna, a su regreso, dará cuenta por escrito del resultado de la misión encomendada, indicando las incidencias y consideraciones que juzgue convenientes.

Sevilla 31 de Julio de 1936
EL GENERAL DE DIVISIÓN, GONZALO QUEIPO DE LLANO" **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 7, Rollo 54, Legajo 363, Carpeta 41.

⁵⁷⁹ On 28 and 29 July, *ABC* reported that the rebels combed Seville's main hospital in search for suspects, allegedly detaining a man in the possession of a blacklist containing names of medical staff marked for death. Another suspect panicked and attempted to commit suicide. *ABC* (Seville), 28 and 29 July 1936. In Toledo, United Press correspondent Web Miller saw the decapitated corpses of militiamen, who kept Colonel Yague's promise to "make Toledo the whitest town in Spain". For Toledo see: Knickerbocker, Hubert Renfro, *The siege of the Alcazar: a war-log of the Spanish Revolution*, pages 172-73. For the murder of Republicans in the hospitals of Seville see: Delicado, Manuel, "Cómo se luchó en Sevilla", *Discurso pronunciado en el Pleno ampliado del C. C. del Partido Comunista de España, celebrado en Valencia los días 5, 6, 7 y 8 de Marzo de 1937*, page 7. See also Delicado's testimony in *El Liberal* (Madrid), 4 August 1936.

⁵⁸⁰ *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 25 July 1936.

⁵⁸¹ **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), FC, Causa General, Legajo 1040; García Márquez, José María, "La represión franquista en la provincial de Sevilla. Estado de la cuestión", in *Ebre 38. Revista Internacional de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939)*, nº2, Barcelona, Publicacions I Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 2004, pages 92-95.

⁵⁸² **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), "Papeles de Cuesta", Armario 18, Legajo 35, Carpeta 22. For statistical data on Rebel repression see: **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), Expedientes Policiales, H-753 and H-754; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, "Sevilla, 1936. Sublevación y represión" in Braojos Garrido, Alfonso; Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *Sevilla, 36: Sublevación fascista y represión*, pages 252-57; García Márquez, José María, "La represión franquista en la provincial de Sevilla. Estado de la cuestión" in *Ebre 38. Revista Internacional de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939)*, nº2, pages 92-95.

Chapter V

The forging of a Kleptocratic State: economic repression in Nationalist Seville (1936-1937)

Introduction

During the initial weeks of the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, Nationalist propaganda claimed that Seville was one of the provinces least affected by the conflict. The argument was both simple and logical: the capital of Andalucía fell under rebel control during the first days of the rebellion and (despite its violent pacification) was therefore otherwise spared from the ravages of war. This brainwashing campaign was carefully orchestrated to coincide with the most virulent phase of Nationalist repression, which occurred *after* and not *during* the pacification of the city of Seville. Indeed, the bloodiest month in the capital of Andalucía during the conflict – September 1936, with a daily average of over 26 executions (totalling 785) – occurred in a city removed from the frontline but where peace was but a hopeful mirage.⁵⁸³

A second concept remains largely unchallenged to the very present: that the process of political transition from democracy to autocracy was both quick and relatively painless. According to Nationalist propaganda, life in rebel Spain rapidly returned to a pre-Republican normality no longer threatened by the social chaos promoted by the Popular Front government. In reality, the overthrow of the Republic was quick (courtesy of a conspiracy that had been planned for months), but certainly not painless. Moreover, the intense level of violence did not imply that the rebels possessed a defined political program (which they clearly lacked).⁵⁸⁴ Above all, the rebellion failed in most of Spain and there was a sudden demand for money to finance an unanticipated war of attrition. Already on 24 July 1936, Nationalist intellectual José María Pemán acknowledged the failure of the July coup and welcomed its

⁵⁸³ Moreover, and with 11,087 people executed in the province during the civil war, Seville clearly fell under the normative of Nationalist repression, with the aggravation that nearly all victims were killed in a province living *officially* at peace. **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), Expedientes Policiales, H-753 and H-754; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, "Sevilla, 1936. Sublevación y represión" in Braojos Garrido, Alfonso; Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, **Sevilla, 36: Sublevación fascista y represión**, pages 252-57; García Márquez, José María, "La represión franquista en la provincial de Sevilla. Estado de la cuestión" in **Ebre 38. Revista Internacional de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939)**, nº2, pages 92-95.

⁵⁸⁴ See Chapter I.

mutation into a bloody civil war which he regarded as both “*necessario*” and “*conveniente*”.

According to Pemán, the Spanish Civil War was actually a gift from God:

“Dios nos ha mandado la suprema lección de una guerra, que por eso digo que era *conveniente*; conveniente para que en su transcurso nos purifiquemos; para que en sus caminos nos dejemos atrás nuestros errores y pecados, y lleguemos al final puros y limpios, dignos de recibir en nuestras manos, lavadas de sudor, la España que se nos prepara.”⁵⁸⁵

When the advance of General Mola’s Navarrese columns stalled in the mountain passes of Madrid, the onus of the Nationalist war effort fell overwhelmingly on Seville; as did the economic strain. The capital of Andalucía was the only fully-operational industrial centre in rebel Spain (Zaragoza was besieged by the Republican army) and also functioned as the peninsular hub of the Army of Africa.⁵⁸⁶ Hence, the early capture of Seville not only did not result in any major saving of life (a consequence of physical repression), but also caused the financial exhaustion of the province. This process was supported by the absence of legislation to keep in check ‘patriotic subscriptions’ and other instruments of extortion devised by the *Pact of blood*.⁵⁸⁷ Furthermore, physical violence represented merely the opening phase of General Mola’s repressive project, coexisting with other parallel (and complementary) forms of repression: economic and cultural. Indeed, the plundering of defeated Republicans was promoted and directed from above: Colonel Yagüe led by example when he stole the car of Luis Pla in the aftermath of the massacre of Badajoz. Shortly afterwards, the Nationalist high-command legalized the looting of towns and villages.⁵⁸⁸ This married perfectly with the notion of the material punishment of political opponents as a complement to physical violence. As a result, the Army of Africa not only spearheaded the rebel advance towards Madrid, but also,

⁵⁸⁵ *Charla* in Radio Jerez, 24 July 1936. Pemán y Pemartín, José María, *Arengas y Crónicas de Guerra*, pages 11. See also page 13: “era demasiada la podredumbre de la vida oficial española, para que se regenerase sin dolor. Un golpe feliz y rápido era un precio demasiado barato para un tesoro tan espléndido como es esta España grande y resurgida que queremos y soñamos. Su precio tenía que ser más caro. Teníamos que pagar por ella, porque bien lo vale, todo el dolor de una guerra. Una guerra, que por dura que sea, yo os digo que era *necesario* y era *conveniente*.” Felix Olmedo also claimed: “esta guerra es un verdadero sacrificio de expiación”. Olmedo, Felix G., *El sentido de la guerra española*, page 70.

⁵⁸⁶ For civil war Zaragoza see: Ledesma, José Luis, *Los días de llamas de la revolución. Violencia y política en la retaguardia republicana de Zaragoza durante la guerra civil*; Casanova, Juliá, *Anarquismo y revolución en la sociedad rural aragonesa, 1936-38*; Cifuentes Chueca, Julia, *El asalto a la República. Los orígenes de franquismo en Zaragoza, 1936-39*.

⁵⁸⁷ For a brief explanation of the *Pact of Blood* see: Richards, Michael, *A time of silence: civil war and the culture of repression in Franco’s Spain, 1936-1945*, pages 7-66.

⁵⁸⁸ Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, “Julio de 1936. Golpe militar plan de exterminio” in Casanova, Julián (ed.); Espinosa Maestre, Francisco; Mir, Conxita; Moreno Gómez, Francisco, *Morir, matar, sobrevivir. La violencia en la dictadura de Franco*, page 74.

according to General Queipo's former *Delegado de Prensa y Propaganda*: "El pillaje y el saqueo fue consustancial con la columna. Pueblo en que entraban, pueblo que devastaban. En todos ellos se ven las huellas de su paso. Los moros y el Tercio, cuando iban a Sevilla, llegaban cargados de objetos de todas clases. Vendían, sin el menor recato, aparatos de radio, relojes, joyas, etc."⁵⁸⁹

Repressive actors: Army, Falange, *Requeté*, Catholic Church and oligarchy

In Nationalist Spain, repressive pluralism replaced Republican political pluralism. The immediate consequence of this process was that the torment of Seville was multiplied; not only different forms of repression emerged, but they were also enforced by a multitude of groups – Falange, *Requeté*, Catholic Church and the oligarchy - all under the aegis of the rebel army. Indeed, economic repression was central to the establishment of the *Pact of blood*, the process by which all segments of society were coerced into collaborating in the forging of the new state. All aspects of daily life were regimented by the new regime. In doing so, the rebels ensured the loyalty of the local population, for now all had played a role in the extermination of the Republic. At the same time as it concentrated power on itself, the Nationalist state shared responsibility for its crimes collectively. The forging of a Kleptocratic State was not a collateral consequence of the civil war. Daily life in rebel territory was conditioned by the dual fear of violence and starvation.

State-sponsored extortion achieved its most refined level of sophistication in Seville under the tutelage of General Queipo de Llano and the symbiotic relationship Army-Falange. Both the Carlists and the Falange were initially regarded as valuable allies in the militarization of civil society; however, the indisputable victor in the battle for popular support was the Falange. Its totalitarian project was far more appealing and inclusive than the theocratic utopia proposed by the *Comunión Tradicionalista*. On the eve of the rebellion, the Seville branch of the Falange possessed around 1,200 members (9,000 in Andalucía). By November 1940, membership had exploded to 88,632 in the province of Seville and 190,123 in Andalucía. By 1942, the Falange possessed 13,262 affiliates in the city of Seville alone.⁵⁹⁰ Thus, while the rebel army desperately attempted to gather resources to finance its military campaign; the Falange (and

⁵⁸⁹ Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, page 147. For the pillaging of Seville see also pages 128-29.

⁵⁹⁰ Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, "Nuevos datos sobre la afiliación Falangista en Andalucía" in Arias Castañón, Eloy (ed.), *Comunicación, historia y sociedad. Homenaje a Alfonso Braojos*.

to a lesser extent the *Requeté*) had also materially to support its ever-expanding organisation. The Falange employed all means at its disposal to attain its objectives, including extortion. According to Bahamonde, a simple yet effective tactic consisted of confiscating properties by placing a sign that read “Incautado por Falange”. This was the case with newspaper *El Liberal*.⁵⁹¹ On the very first day of the rebellion in Seville, the offices of *El Liberal* were ransacked by Falangist militants, who then proceeded to use the premises to print their newly-established newspaper, *FE* (from 1 September 1936). General Queipo narrated the event in his *charla* of 21 July:

“He tenido que tomar una determinación severa con “El Liberal”. A mis noticias había llegado, y se extendió por todo el Ejército civil y militar de Sevilla la especie de que ciertas hojas clandestinas que han circulado en Sevilla, llenas de infundios propagados por los marxistas, habían sido confeccionados en la imprenta “El Liberal”. Esto produjo la natural indignación en estos valientes soldados sevillanos, y esta tarde han asaltado la imprenta del citado periódico, destruyendo los muebles.”⁵⁹²

The alliance between the rebel army and the Falange was mutually profitable; both repressive agents sustained each other economically. For instance, the military regularly donated state property (such as the *Pabellón de Brasil* in Seville)⁵⁹³ to the Falange and sanctioned the paramilitary group’s fundraising campaigns. In exchange, the Falange would lend a helping hand or contribute directly to military ‘patriotic subscriptions’. On 11 September, a Falangist Children’s Commission (*Comisión de muchachos*) from Jerez de la Frontera (Cádiz) handed Queipo an impressive 61kg of gold, of which 37.251kg were collected directly by the Falange.⁵⁹⁴ Four days later, the Falange of Cantillana (Seville) donated 1.480kg of gold and an undisclosed number of gold watches to the Treasury Department (*Tesoro*) and 4,177 pesetas to the Army Fund. However, the granting of a wide degree of autonomy did not imply that the military would not suffer from any form of competition; the rebel army occupied the highest rank in the repressive hierarchy. On the other hand, the local population now had to prove its

⁵⁹¹ Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, page 128. See also: Barbero, Edmundo, *El infierno azul*, page 375.

⁵⁹² *ABC* (Seville) 22 July 1936. See also: *La Unión* (Seville) 22 July 1936.

⁵⁹³ The only surviving copy of *FE* can be found at the **Archivo de la Hemeroteca Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville). *FE* (Seville), 8 September 1936.

⁵⁹⁴ *FE* (Seville), 11 September 1936. In its efforts to duplicate the Nationalist state, the Falange formed its own committees and opened bank accounts to cope with its ever-expanding extortion racket. All new Falangist enterprises were funded directly by the population of Nationalist Spain. For instance, when the Falange decided to create its private Air Force, it immediately opened a subscription with its respective account in the *Banco de España*. *FE* (Seville), 12 December 1936.

patriotic zeal not to one, but to several repressive agents. For example: on the same day that the Falange of Cantillana visited Queipo, Seville's tram company (*compañía de tranvías*) pledged 3,748.05 pesetas to the Army Fund and another 1,000 pesetas (equivalent of one day of work) to the Falange.⁵⁹⁵ The multitude of subscriptions eroded the fragile economic health of Seville in a process that represented the apex of repressive pluralism in the II Division.⁵⁹⁶

Economic repression was divided into two main categories: a) that directed against the perceived enemies of the regime and b) against the wider population. The notion that repression was exclusively directed at the enemies of the new state was a Nationalist fabrication. Indeed, the main distinction between economic violence directed against Republicans and fundraising campaigns targeting the wider population was simply a question of method and degree. Common citizens were coerced into contributing financially to the point of exhaustion; whereas political opponents, after being stripped of all rights and therefore reduced to the status of social non-entities, would simply see all their possessions confiscated. According to Bahamonde, the victims were: "condenadas a la más absoluta miseria. Miseria que nadie se atreve a remediar, por temor a ser tildado de marxista."⁵⁹⁷

This was the politics of exclusion. Plunder was 'legalised' in rebel Andalucía by three military edicts released by General Queipo de Llano: *bando* nº 13 of 18 August 1936 (*Confiscación de bienes de inductores a la violencia, propagandistas y rebeldes*), *bando* nº 23 of 2 September (*Inductores de la rebelión. Inmovilización de cuentas y valores*) and nº 29 of 11 September (*Confiscación de bienes. Y adiciones y aclaraciones al bando nº 13*).⁵⁹⁸ Economic repression was formally institutionalised at a national level only after the publication of the *Ley de Responsabilidades Políticas* of 9 February 1939. Reduced to the status of non-persons, the

⁵⁹⁵ *FE* (Seville), 15 September 1936.

⁵⁹⁶ For instance, in the nearby province of Córdoba, the *Delegación de Hacienda* opened the following subscriptions only a few weeks after the outbreak of the rebellion: *Para la Aviación (en oro, en el Bando de España), Patriótica (en la Delegación de Hacienda), Cocina Económica, Batallón de Voluntarios, Para las víctimas de los bombardeos aéreos, Falange Española, Requetés, Hogar y Clínica San Rafael, Para las andas de plata de la Virgen de los Dolores, Para candelabros de plata de San Rafael y reparación del templo, Viudas y huérfanos de la Guardia Civil, Chalet para el coronel Cascajo, para los defensores del Santuario de la Virgen de la Cabeza, Para los locutores de Radio Club Portugés, para homenaje al coronel Cascajo, para homenaje al Regimiento de Artillería Pesada, para Aguinaldo del combatientes, para socorro de Málaga, para socorro de Madrid. Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días: nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República Española*, page 878.*

⁵⁹⁷ Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, page 125.

⁵⁹⁸ Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *Bandos y órdenes dictados por Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra, General Jefe de la Segunda División Orgánica y del Ejército del Sur desde la declaración del estado de guerra, 18 de julio de 1936, hasta fin de febrero de 1937, etc.*, pages 23-30.

ostracised loyalist middle-classes were the ghosts of a Republican past in the new Nationalist Spain.

The genesis of the Kleptocratic State: fundraising campaigns

Both the rebel military and the Falange resorted to the rudimentary tactic of equating collaboration with patriotism in order to promote fundraising campaigns. In the deeply intoxicating political atmosphere of Nationalist Spain, this seemly puerile approach proved irresistible. Refusal to cooperate amounted to treason. Punishments varied according to circumstances: political allies could expect a severe financial penalty. Exemplary fines served a purely educational purpose and the local population rapidly internalised the message (the press failed to identify a single re-offender. Conversely, traditional inimical groups, most notably the working-class, could not afford the luxury of transgression. Punishment would almost certainly follow with, at the very least, incarceration and, in 1936 Seville with its constant purging of prisons, the possibility of extra-judicial execution. Other punishments included slander campaigns (via the press), job loss, social ostracism or even public corporal punishment (shaving of head, forced ingestion of castor oil, etc).⁵⁹⁹

A second parallel tactic, devised by the Falange and rapidly copied by Queipo de Llano, emerged in Seville. It was specifically aimed at the conservative middle-classes and toyed with the conceptualisation of the rebellion as a pre-emptive strike against an imminent Communist coup:

“CAPITALISTA: El día 18 de Julio lo tenías TODO perdido: vida y hacienda. Hacienda y vida que has salvado gracias al esfuerzo de todos; sobre todo aquellos que precisamente NADA tienen. No lo olvides nunca. La memoria es flaca; vendrán días de sosiego y de paz; y es preciso que no se te olvide AQUELLO!”⁶⁰⁰

⁵⁹⁹ Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, pages 129-31.

⁶⁰⁰ *FE* (Seville), 13 September 1936. Later, Major Cuesta would revise History by claiming that: “Promovió el General subediciones que pusieron de manifiesto la generosidad del pueblo andaluz, expresada en infinidad de rasgos ciertamente ejemplares. Sin embargo, hechos notoriamente contrarios al bien común, que algunas veces se produjeron, fueron condenados en público y corregidos con la mayor severidad.” Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, page 147.

The text concluded in typical intimidating fashion: “¡Que nunca te lo tengamos de recordar!” The Falange exposed the reality of daily life in Seville less than two months (13 September) after the outbreak of the rebellion: a city increasingly remote from the frontline, where the new regime felt already compelled to refresh the collective memory of its inhabitants in order to maintain patriotic fervour. Propaganda was insufficient and the only way to preserve the polarised political atmosphere (and fund the military rebellion) was to resort to intimidation and exploit the myth of the imminent Communist coup. Physical and economic repression, the pillars of the new state, mutually sustained each other.

The inevitable reference to the working-class (“Aquellos que precisamente NADA tienen”) went in harmony with the Falange’s perception of itself as a movement cutting across the social divide. However, the editorial also exposed the party’s schizophrenic relationship with the popular classes. The Falange strived to develop into a truly fascist organisation by incorporating the masses into its ranks, while at the same time participating in the military’s repressive project.⁶⁰¹ At the same time, General Queipo de Llano’s relationship with the working-class was equally full of contradictions, even if devoid of ideological constraints. Queipo cynically appropriated the Falange’s discourse of reintegrating a working-class ‘deceived’ by the Republican élites, while simultaneously supporting the oligarchy’s class war. In truth, Queipo deeply resented popular resistance to his rule and regularly demonstrated contempt for workers in his *charlas*. On 4 September, he declared:

“Y, por último, he recibido un telegrama de la Sociedad de metalúrgicos de Zafra en el que decía haber acordado la disolución de su Sindicato y que ponía a mi disposición la suma de 5,946 pesetas, que constituían en fondos del mismo. Es curioso observar cómo en tan poco tiempo hemos logrado hacer cambiar de manera de pensar a una cantidad enorme de obreros.”⁶⁰²

General Queipo de Llano’s speech was supported by Falangist rhetoric. The next day (5 September), *FE* reported that in the province of Seville “la tranquilidad es absoluta” and “la clase trabajadora, convencida del engaño y la traición de sus jefes marxistas, reanudó sus

⁶⁰¹ For Falangist repression see: Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *La Justicia de Queipo. Violencia selectiva y terror fascista en la II División en 1936: Sevilla, Huelva, Cádiz, Córdoba, Málaga y Badajoz*, pages 175-219.

⁶⁰² *FE* (Seville), 5 September 1936.

trabajos a su debido tiempo.”⁶⁰³ Queipo de Llano’s sarcastic remark, at the same time as physical repression climaxed in the capital of Andalucía (26 daily executions), corresponded perfectly with the Falange’s idyllic portrayal of life in the province. For the metallurgical workers of Zafra (Badajoz), the dissolution of their trade-union and the transfer of its funds to the Army Fund represented the only realistic hope of avoiding execution. A similar situation affected the working-class *Sociedad Minera y Metalúrgica de Peñarroya*, which on 14 September 1937 submitted its 18th donation (totalling 17,491.70 pesetas).⁶⁰⁴ Lastly, Nationalist obsession with working-class donations, publicised *ad nauseam* in the press, also served another vital purpose: to create an impression of national unity.

The apparently spectacular ideological shift of the masses simply reflected survival tactics. Indeed, the extraordinarily high level of ‘contributions’ merely exposed the scope and intensity of economic repression. Examples are plentiful, even if fragmented. For instance, between 9-10 September 1936 members of the *Comandancia Militar* of Algeciras (Cádiz) visited Queipo to hand him in person an impressive 8kg of gold, while representatives of the recently-defunct *Unión Fosforero* trade-union donated 2,154 pesetas. Furthermore, the *Comisión Gestora* of La Carlota (Córdoba) contributed 7,656 pesetas to the subscription for the rebel army, the *Comisión Gestora* of Guadalcanal (Seville) donated 11,650 pesetas and 1.7kg of gold and the recently-disbanded *Sociedad Nicot* handed 300 pesetas (second donation).⁶⁰⁵ In his *charla* of 10 September, Queipo announced that the *Cruz del Campo* beer factory had pledged 1,525 pesetas, the employees of the *Pirotecnía Militar* 5,960 pesetas, Paradas (Seville) residents 7,800 pesetas, Rute (Córdoba) residents 42,201.25 pesetas, 218 gold coins and 7.185kg of gold, and a Ladies Commission (*Comisión de Señoritas*) from Jerez 50.895kg of gold.⁶⁰⁶ In addition, on 15 September Queipo read a letter from the *Coronel-Jefe de la Pirotecnia* declaring that the local workers, who had only recently “contribuido generosamente”, would now further increase their efforts and donate the equivalent of one extra hour of daily work to the Aviation Fund. Queipo noted that “Ese reconocimiento es demostrativo de que se liberaron ya de la infamia de los marxistas.”⁶⁰⁷ This was the ‘recognition’ that the working-class strived for, since it implied some relaxation of the repression. In Nationalist Spain, expiation came via extortion (donations, forced labour, starvation wages). Ultimately, the resounding success of ‘patriotic

⁶⁰³ *FE* (Seville), 5 September 1936.

⁶⁰⁴ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5382, Carpeta 14.

⁶⁰⁵ *FE* (Seville), 10 September 1936.

⁶⁰⁶ *FE* (Seville), 11 September 1936.

⁶⁰⁷ *FE* (Seville), 16 September 1936.

fundraising campaigns' and 'spontaneous' private contributions in Andalucía was replicated all over Nationalist Spain. Hence, Seville functioned as the testing ground for the future Francoist Kleptocratic State.⁶⁰⁸

As the repressive process intensified, so did the desperation of the masses. In an attempt to escape retributive violence, workers parroted military/Falangist discourse and justified recent opposition to the coup by claiming that they were either deceived or intimidated by the trade-union and Republican leadership. In his *charla* of 11 September, Queipo read a letter from the dockworkers of Seville, in which they declared their willingness to work for free because: "por dicho Ejército nos hemos emancipado para siempre de la pistola, que, manejada por los marxistas, se había impuesto en estos muelles." The dockworkers not only were expected to humiliate themselves, but also justify an apparent delay in producing the letter. They excused themselves by citing the temporary absence of many fellow co-workers (many had gone underground to escape repression). The letter concluded with a crude *exposé* of the economic condition of the working-class: "ya que no podemos cooperar con dinero o especies a las necesidades que requieren las circunstancias actuales, ofrecemos gustosos y gratis nuestro trabajo cuantas veces lo necesite la Superioridad."⁶⁰⁹ Stripped of all material possessions, the dockworkers offered their last remaining possession to General Queipo de Llano: their labour.

The episode of the dockworkers of Seville was by no means exceptional. Instances of workers offering free labour as a replacement for monetary contributions multiplied all over Andalucía. According to the Military Commander of Casariche (Seville), Rafael Martínez, such sacrifices were necessary if the masses were to be regarded as "buenos españoles" and "sienten las necesidades de su pueblo y su corazón vibra al unísono de la regeneración del país que lleva a cabo el glorioso Ejército."⁶¹⁰ Ironically, and according to a 1938 Civil Guard report, leftist

⁶⁰⁸ "En Sevilla donde estas suscripciones alcanzan su mayor desarrollo". Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días: nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República Española*, page 879

⁶⁰⁹ Letter signed by *obreros técnicos* Antonio Romero y Fernando Juan and *obreros de cuadrilla* José Palacios Percio and Adolfo González. *FE* (Seville), 12 September 1936. The dockworkers possessed one of the most radical trade-unions in Republican Seville: the *Sindicato Portuario Sevillano*. Its leader, Saturnino Barneto, was a leading member of the PCE. Furthermore, the dockworkers union defended the Hotel Inglaterra against the rebels on 18 July. "18 de Julio de 1936 en Sevilla" in *Archivo Hispalense*, Sevilla, nº132-133, 1965, page 185. See also: Barneto, Saturnino, *Cómo luchan bajo la bandera de la I.S.R. los obreros del puerto de Sevilla*.

⁶¹⁰ *FE* (Seville), 17 September 1936.

violence caused no victims in Casariche; whereas the Nationalists executed eleven residents.⁶¹¹ In private, some poked fun at Queipo through jokes: "Ya sabe usted que hay quien saluda cerrando el puño; otros con la mano extendida... Pues nuestro general saluda con la mano extendida, pero con la palma mirando arriba... siempre esperando que le echen algo."⁶¹²

The omnipresent threat of physical violence revolutionised class relations in Andalucía. Inter-class tensions were replaced by internal class conflicts. Worker groups became engulfed in a bitter competition between each other to prove their loyalty to the new regime. On the other hand, the victors presented the imposition of starvation wages and extra working hours as patriotic sacrifices. The ultimate objective of the rebels was to attain complete social unity, largely through the cult of personality of Queipo de Llano. The volatile general was eventually brainwashed by their own propaganda. In November, Queipo was overwhelmed with emotion during a visit to Ubrique (Cádiz), where he was welcomed with adulation and showered with gifts. The general later declared that he was particularly impressed by the local workers and "su encendido amor a la Patria".⁶¹³ This sudden wave of 'patriotic fervour' was in fact triggered by the mass execution of local residents by the Nationalists. More than one hundred people had been killed following the capture of the *pueblo* by a column of *Regulares* on 27 July 1936.⁶¹⁴

Recently-pacified *pueblos*, in particular those that had resisted the coup, had everything to prove to the rebel alliance. Financial demands regularly reached truly extravagant levels. On 17 November, the town of Constantina (Seville), where left-wing violence had been intense and Nationalist retribution particularly savage (92 killed by the loyalists, 990 by the rebels), raised 41,000 pesetas for the Nationalist army.⁶¹⁵ One of the most extraordinary cases was that of

⁶¹¹ For Republican violence see: **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), FC, Causa General, 1040, Expediente 20. For Nationalist repression see: **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), Expedientes Policiales, H-754.

⁶¹² Golzález Ruiz, Francisco, *Yo he creído en Franco. Proceso de una gran desilusión (Dos meses en la cárcel de Sevilla)*, Page 101.

⁶¹³ **FE** (Seville), 8 November 1936.

⁶¹⁴ Only three rightists were murdered in Ubrique between 18-27 July 1936. For Republican repression see: **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), FC, Causa General, 1061, Expediente 4. For Nationalist violence see: Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *Contra el olvido. Historia y memoria de la guerra civil*, pages 51-61.

⁶¹⁵ In 1938, the Civil Guard reported that around 3,000 people were still missing from the *pueblo*, living as refugees (*Huidos*), **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), Expedientes Policiales, H-754. For Republican violence see: **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), FC, Causa General, 1040, Expediente 9. For Nationalist repression see: García Márquez, José María, "La represión franquista en la provincial de

recently-pacified Mérida (Badajoz). Just before he marched northwards to the Toledo front, the local military commander telegraphed Queipo that the rebel army had so far collected 795,225.000 pesetas plus an undisclosed amount in gold. He added that the local rail-workers donated 6,881.77 pesetas (the equivalent of one day's pay).⁶¹⁶ The industrious Falange had separately raised 700,000 pesetas. General Queipo claimed that working-class contributions: "demuestra que España ha de llegar pronto al esplendor que todos deseamos, porque cuando los obreros se expresan en esa forma [...] es prueba de que ese patriotismo que parecía adormecido merced a las canalescas pistolas de los comunistas, despierta, y con ello los hijos amantes de España."⁶¹⁷

In Mérida, like all recently-pacified towns where a list of donors was not made public, it is impossible to distinguish organised extortion from outright plunder. Regardless of the method, the process whereby financial assets were transferred to the rebel army constituted an important social ritual in Nationalist Spain. Huge military processions headed by high-ranking officers and flanked by civilian authorities descended upon the Divisional Headquarters in Seville to hand in the product of 'patriotic contributions'. The ceremony was carefully choreographed so to impress the local population. For instance, the Military Governor of Cádiz, General López-Pinto, travelled to Seville on 21 October to hand over 2,642 gold coins, 51.307kg of gold and an undisclosed amount in foreign banknotes to General Queipo de Llano.⁶¹⁸ Competition between *pueblos* was intense, since loyalty to the rebellion was measured by the level of generosity to fundraising campaigns. Hence, on the same day López-Pinto visited Queipo, the town of Zufre (Badajoz) donated 2kg of gold and an undisclosed number of gold coins to the Army Fund.⁶¹⁹ The case of Fregenal de la Sierra (Badajoz) is symptomatic. A new *Comisión Gestora* (presided by the local *Jefe* of the Falange) was appointed and the *pueblo* adhered immediately to existing fundraising campaigns. At the same time, *FE* reported the inauguration of a soup kitchen that would provide 300 daily meals to alleviate famine in Fregenal; where one person was killed by the left and 66 executed by the

Sevilla. Estado de la cuestión", in *Ebre 38. Revista Internacional de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939)*, nº2, page 93. See also: *FE* (Seville), 17 November 1936. On that same day, the employees of the *Fábrica de Artillería de Sevilla* pledged 4,655 pesetas, the bread-makers of Alcalá de Guadaira (Seville) 3,775 pesetas, and the Military Commander of Puebla del Río (Seville) collected 2,552 pesetas via a public subscription.

⁶¹⁶ *FE* (Seville), 2 October 1936.

⁶¹⁷ *FE* (Seville), 12 September 1936.

⁶¹⁸ *FE* (Seville), 21 October 1936.

⁶¹⁹ *FE* (Seville), 21 October 1936.

Nationalists.⁶²⁰ In Alcalá de Guadaira, a comedor of *Auxilio Social* of the Falange was opened to feed around 100 children orphaned as a consequence of Nationalist repression (loyalists did not commit any murder in the *pueblo*).⁶²¹ A humanitarian catastrophe – a direct consequence of the rebellion – was starting to take shape in the II Division.

The number of contributions remained high throughout the civil war, regardless of the amount of the donated sum (at times pitiful, a consequence of the extreme poverty of the working-class).⁶²² The principle was that *nobody* was exempt. The masses rapidly recognised the difference between a reactionary and a totalitarian state: not only were they expected to accept the new regime, but also actively participate in its projects. In the end, the success of the Kleptocratic State was only possible under a totalitarian society.

The Kleptocratic State and the middle-classes

On 13 September (the same day of the *Capitalista* article), *FE* published a letter from the President of *Unión Industrial y Comercial S.A.* - Antonio de la Fuente García -, in reply to an earlier denunciation from the Falange:

“La forma anómala y violenta que revista la carta abierta que han publicado en el diario «F.E.», me obliga, como presidente de la Unión Industrial y Comercial, S.A., a contestarle, para que la opinión pública no se desvíe en tan delicado asunto y quede bien claro y patente la actitud de cada uno. [...] Con anterioridad a la fecha de esa reunión ya habíamos aportado nuestro primer donativo a tal fin, sin prejuicio de los efectuados en especie, que con el unánime acuerdo del consejo se han hecho y se vienen haciendo. Son ustedes los que no tienen derecho a hacer caer en esta hora crítica, sobre la entidad que represento, la sombra de una resistencia a la contribución, cuyaantidad todos reconocemos; pero que pierde mucho de aquélla cuando con fines que no he de calificar se hace público en la forma de tan desconsiderada que ustedes lo hacen.”⁶²³

⁶²⁰ For Republican violence see: *Archivo Histórico Nacional* (Madrid), FC, Causa General, 1040, Expediente 9. For Nationalist repression see: Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *La Columna de la Muerte*, pages 24-25 and 190-91 and 432.

⁶²¹ For Republican violence see: *Archivo Histórico Nacional* (Madrid), FC, Causa General, 1040, Expediente 97. Jiménez Rodríguez, Javier, “La represión franquista en Alcalá de Guadaira” in *Archivo Hispalense*, Sevilla, Tomo 75, nº 229, 1992, page 76. See also: *FE* (Seville), 18 November 1936.

⁶²² For example: on 14 September workers repairing Calle Valencia 61, donated the meagre fee of 42 pesetas (equivalent of 1 hour work) to the Army Fund. *FE* (Seville), 15 September 1936.

⁶²³ *FE* (Seville), 13 September 1936.

In other words, the myriad of fundraising campaigns had induced the Falange into an error. The rage of Antonio García was understandable, especially in view of the current political climate (“en esta hora crítica”, a veiled allusion to repression). An unfounded accusation could have easily brought about his personal economic ruin, as well as that of the institution over which he presided. Ultimately, Antonio García’s written protest confirmed the resounding success of Nationalist economic repression, to the point that state action was no longer required. Indeed, García stated that *Unión Comercial* had already contributed generously to existing fundraising campaigns without being overtly pressed to do so. During the first weeks of the rebellion, the new regime intervened frantically to impose its authority. By September 1936, the local population had already internalised the message: governmental intervention implied punitive action. Therefore, the mere opening of a subscription would suffice to provoke a torrent of ‘voluntary’ donations.

Despite its momentary setback, the accusatory tone of Falangist reports continued unabated. On 28 November, the Falange proclaimed triumphantly that “bastó un artículo en «F.E.» para que vibrara el espíritu en la ofrenda guerrera” in Estepa (Seville), where in a matter of days 15,000 pesetas had already been collected. The motivations for the “generosidad de nuestro pueblo” were evident, as were the reasons for social unity (“el empuje del alma española está llevando a la Patria a una de sus más grandes realizaciones: su unidad”). The economic rape of Estepa was supervised by local Military Commander Bonifacio Fernández and enforced by both the Falange and the Civil Guard. Of particular notoriety was the “fecunda actividad” of Civil Guard Sergeant José López Fernández, who embarked on “incasables gestiones para que cada ciudadano aparte del acuerdo con sus posibilidades económicas.” The text concluded with a threat: “con mucho gusto publicará nuestro diario la lista de donantes.”⁶²⁴ This statement sufficed to trigger a flood of donations in a town still traumatised by Nationalist repression, which claimed 58 lives.⁶²⁵

The 28 November article was a follow-up to an earlier article/denunciation published on 7 November that confirmed the coercive nature of subscriptions: “la cuantía de las aportaciones

⁶²⁴ *FE* (Seville), 28 November 1936.

⁶²⁵ Only two people were murdered by the loyalists. For Republican violence see: **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), FC, Causa General, 1040, Expediente 9. For Nationalist repression see: **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), Expedientes Policiales, H-754.

estepeñas a las suscripciones patrióticas es tan irrisoria, mísera y desproporcionada, que nos moverá a poner los puntos sobre las «íes».”⁶²⁶ In other words, donations were voluntary insofar as they met Falangist monetary demands. Indeed, Queipo’s former *Delegado de Prensa y Propaganda* revealed that the amount of money collected from each *pueblo* was previously fixed and the locals were left with no choice but to fulfil their respective quota.⁶²⁷ And Estepa had been clearly found wanting. The 7 November editorial opened with an aggressive statement:

“El rico que todo había perdido y todo lo ha ganado; el propietario que ve triplicada la fortuna de sus tierras con la «plus valía» de un Gobierno estable, permanente y de orden, no ha despertado aún de su apático egoísmo. Estamos esperando aún, apellidos de las grandes fortunas estepeñas en el grueso de las suscripciones patrióticas en una ofrenda generosa a la Patria. Recordamos con pena, aquella pobre mujer que desprendió gozosa los zarcillos de su único adorno en contraste con la señorona que regateó y lagrimeó unos aretes no más allá de ocho duros.”

The reference to “el rico que todo había perdido y todo lo ha ganado” was merely a continuation of the campaign initiated by the ‘Capitalista’ article. The novel element (and a particularly disturbing one), was the detailed nature of the accusation, which revealed the full scope of the Falangist surveillance apparatus (“Estepa es pueblo de grandes contingentes de fortuna: tres propietarios superan los cuatro millones; más de diez se acercan a los dos y mucho más, muchísimos más, oscilan en el círculo de los grandes ricos”). The editorial reached the simplistic conclusion that there was no excuse for failing to contribute to ‘patriotic subscriptions’ (“no queremos esfuerzos ruinosos; pero sí el sacrificio patriótico de todos”). Anyone who refused to collaborate could expect to have their name shamed in the local press, followed by an exemplary fine imposed by the local authorities (when not directly by the Falange). Predictably, the landowners of Estepa closed ranks to protect their corporate interests. Local Falangist José Marquéz clarified the incident in an open letter: he revealed that the subscription had only opened a few days earlier and already over 50,000 pesetas had been raised. He concluded the letter by revealing that the landowners of Estepa had been financially supporting the local Falange for several months.⁶²⁸

⁶²⁶ *FE* (Seville), 7 November 1936.

⁶²⁷ Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, page 137.

⁶²⁸ *FE* (Seville), 13 November 1936.

What a fringe group within the *élites* failed to grasp, however, was that a totalitarian state would no longer tolerate the carving of separate spheres of influence. The military leadership suppressed dissent aggressively. General Queipo de Llano imposed exemplary fines. For instance, on 14 November, Queipo announced that he had sentenced Antonio Gaviño, a landowner from Bormujos (Seville), to pay 1,000 pesetas plus the illegal profit Gaviño had amassed from imposing lower wages than stipulated in the Nationalist *bases de trabajo*.⁶²⁹ The example made of Antonio Gaviño served as a warning to other landowners. Already on 10 August 1936, the Falangist-dominated Town Hall of Lebrija (Seville) ordered a local wealthy landowner to “ingresar en las Arcas Municipales, de cuatro a seis de la tarde del día de hoy la cantidad de CIEN PESETAS, apercibiéndose que de no verificarlo será puesto a disposición del Excmo. Sr. General Jefe de la División.”⁶³⁰ In Seville, General Queipo punished the local taxi drivers for not contributing sufficiently to patriotic subscriptions by ordering that all taxi fares be cut in half. According to Bahamonde, “El General, por radio, dijo que la medida que había tomado con los taxistas, les serviría a todos de lección.”⁶³¹ Such actions consisted of a public display of force on the part of a regime that delivered sentences with absolute disregard for formal judicial procedure. General Queipo exposed the full scope of Nationalist repression on 3 November, during a public rebuke of affluent Spaniards living in exile:

“A éstos les digo que para vivir en el extranjero es necesario que sepan que todas esas pesetas que gastan en el extranjero son necesarias en España. Que vengan a España, sobre todo aquellas que supieron burlar la vigilancia llevándose cantidades importantes de pesetas. Que se den cuenta de que eso lo deben gastar aquí. Es preciso que acudan a cumplir su deber, en la inteligencia de que si no lo hacen con la mayor prontitud, siguiendo órdenes de la Junta de Burgos, estoy dispuesto a incautarme de lo que tengan en España. Ya saben que el que avisa no engaña, y que el que avisa desde Sevilla cumple lo que promete.”⁶³²

Queipo de Llano’s latest verbal outburst concluded with a warning. It was revealing of the lengths the regime was willing to go in order to retrieve what it perceived as its rightful property. Indeed, the omnipresent threat of physical violence provoked a permanent state of anxiety within the population of Seville. A simple command from General Queipo sufficed to

⁶²⁹ *FE* (Seville), 15 November 1936.

⁶³⁰ Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, *Señoritos, jornaleros y falangistas*, page 125.

⁶³¹ Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, page 93.

⁶³² *FE* (Seville), 3 November 1936.

subtract the only means of livelihood of a sizeable segment of the population.⁶³³ A note, released on 21 November, exposed the regime of economic terror inaugurated by Queipo:

“El conflicto del cambio de moneda se va solucionando la noticia que anoche ofreció en su charla por Radio Sevilla, el ilustre general señor Queipo de Llano, dando cuenta de la intervención de plata y sanciones a sus tenedores, de dos industriales sevillanos, ha servido de saludable medida, hasta tal punto, que en el de hoy se ha notado su eficacia, porque se ha visto mucha mayor facilidad en el cambio de papel de moneda por plata y calderilla.

¡Y hasta en la puerta del Banco de España, se ha visto el efecto, pues la cola de quienes aceden a cambiar papel por moneda, ha sido menos nutrida que en anteriores días! Antes de la una de la tarde, ya no había nadie en la puerta del Banco de España, la cual prueba de una manera evidente, que el cambio se ha hecho más fácil, como así se hará en lo sucesivo cuando se vaya conociendo la aplicación de sanciones contra los acaparadores de la plata, verdaderos antipatriotas.”⁶³⁴

The exemplary punishment of two middle-class individuals was sufficient to intimidate a population already attempting to make ends meet amid the extortionate frenzy of the Kleptocratic State. For the *Pact of blood*, it was imperative occasionally to adopt what the latter termed a “saludable medida” to shore-up loyalty. The media played a vital role in this process: they functioned as the regime’s mouthpiece. For instance, *FE* published on 24 November a report on the summary court-martial of Ignacio Cuesta Fernández. Accused and sentenced the same day, the offender was handed a 12 year prison sentence plus a 5,000 pesetas fine. In other words, he was condemned to socio-economic ruin.⁶³⁵ The collective fear that paralysed local society was not the product of empty rhetoric. Extra-judicial killings were complemented by draconian verdicts for minor economic offenses. In 1936, Nationalist court-martials possessed a unique function: to provide maximum publicity to exemplary

⁶³³ On 18 November, *FE* published a note from the Town Hall: “Clausura de establecimientos El Ayuntamiento de esta capital, debidamente autorizado por el excelentísimo señor gobernador civil, ha comenzado la notificación de clausura de aquellos cafés, bares y tabernas que no han satisfecho el arbitrio sobre consumiciones establecido por dicha corporación, previo decreto del excelentísimo señor general don Gonzalo Queipo de Llano. Dicha medida está justificada por ser el público quien paga el correspondiente aumento, cuyo importe debe quedar reservado para el Ayuntamiento, que lo destinará a atenciones de carácter benéfico.” **FE** (Seville), 18 November 1936. On 22 October, the new regime imposed a violent 11% royalty tax on all bars, coffee shops, restaurants and pubs in Seville. **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Hacienda, expedientes generales, 1936, nº72.

⁶³⁴ **FE** (Seville), 21 November 1936.

⁶³⁵ **FE** (Seville), 24 November 1936.

punishments.⁶³⁶ By December 1936, the *bourgeoisie* had already internalised the message. So much so, that the rebels felt confident enough to release a *bando* (9 December) instructing all “clases endineradas” to organise “comisiones de hombres honrados y solventes” from “la parte más sana y honrada de los pueblos” to aid those living in abject poverty. These demands were justified by the ‘Miracle of Seville’: the middle-class was forever indebted to the rebels for saving it from certain extermination at the hands of the extreme-left. The Nationalists transformed this political ‘debt’ into a financial one. In the event of lack of “patriotismo”, the regime threatened to adopt “procedimientos coercitivos, imposición de multas o otras medidas más rigurosas.”⁶³⁷ A day earlier (8 December), and in order to ensure the success of the *bando*, the Nationalists distributed flyers in Seville reminding the local population of its eternal ‘debt of gratitude’ to the rebels for saving the capital of Andalucía from the spectre of Communism.⁶³⁸

The impact of the new state over the conservative middle-classes was devastating. The bourgeoisie was transformed into a mere tool at the service of a totalitarian regime looking to fund a total war. The bourgeoisie’s collective response to the demands of the *Pact of blood* became increasingly reflexive. The middle-classes realised that action, rather than reaction, was what was expected from them. For example, during preparations for the celebration of the presumed imminent capture of Madrid, *Unión Comercial* ‘spontaneously’ decided to organise a convoy to deliver goods to the capital and announced the opening of a subscription to that end in newspaper *FE* (3 November). Despite the impromptu nature of the petition (“se

⁶³⁶ For the impact of Francoist court-martials on a regional level see: Anderson, Peter Philip. *The Francoist Military Trials. Terror and complicity (1939-1945)*.

⁶³⁷ *FE* (Seville), 9 December 1936. In Nationalist Spain, fundraising capacity was correlated to political prestige. The failure of a particular subscription would inexorably damage the credibility of its promoter(s). The case of the patriotic subscription for hospitals in Seville is exemplary. On 11 December, the Committee administering Seville’s hospitals released a statement in which it revealed - in very explicit terms - its exasperation in face of the steady decline in the number donations. This was but to be expected, since the bulk of contributions went to military subscriptions (Infantry, Aviation, Falange, etc.). Nonetheless, the Committee ignored all signs of economic fatigue in the province and perceived the absence of donations as a symptom of anti-patriotism. The letter concluded with a threatening question: “¿Será porque no publicamos en la Prensa la lista de los donantes?” *FE* (Seville), 11 December 1936.

⁶³⁸ **¡SEVILLANOS!**

Un momento de pausa. Un poquito de reflexión.
España arde en una guerra fratricida y se consume.
Sevilla... se divierte.

Os parece bien que, mientras tantos hermanos nuestros, tantos sevillanos, pelean en el frente y pasan toda suerte de penalidades, y sufren heridas, y derraman la sangre, y mueren en el combate, los sevillanos que aquí quedan tengan humor para llenar los cines, los cabarets y otros sitios detestables? Los que vuelven del frente y contemplan tal espectáculo se quedan asombrados y indignados.” **Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia** (Madrid), Fondo Diego Angulo, L-11/8990.

hace público el presente aviso, ya que dada la rapidez con que hay que organizar esta expedición, no hay tiempo material de que la comisión organizadora pueda hacer visitas individuales”), the volume of donations was extraordinarily high.⁶³⁹ So much so, that the campaign headquarters had to be moved to a larger warehouse in calle Rioja, nº 6. The motives for the subscription, opened shortly after *Unión Comercial* had attracted the unwanted attention of the Falange, were evident. Furthermore, the *ad hoc* fundraising campaign organised by *Unión Comercial* was part of a chain reaction provoked by the unchecked enthusiasm of General Queipo de Llano, who time and again announced the imminent conquest of Madrid. A few days later, the flour traders (*harineros*) and bakers (*panaderos*) of both Seville and Alcalá de Guadaira (Seville) offered to supply bread to Madrid free of charge once the capital was liberated.⁶⁴⁰ Belief that the conflict was nearing its end triggered a new wave of state-sponsored kleptocratic hysteria. Every *pueblo* in the II Division dressed up to commemorate Nationalist victory. Special religious ceremonies and military parades were held and new fundraising campaigns created to fund the *fêtes*. Embarrassingly for Queipo, the ‘imminent’ capture of Madrid did not materialise until 28 March 1939.

Falange and famine

Whereas the rebel leaders envisaged economic repression in terms of military imperatives (punitive action against enemies, funding of the military rising), the situation was rather more complex for the paramilitary groups: they not only aspired to play a central role in the disintegration of the Republic, but also needed to subsidise their respective social projects. The Falange took aid work very seriously. Party leaders made it a point of honour to be present at inaugurations and special celebrations. For instance, the opening of the *Asistencia Social* soup kitchens in Seville (calle Joaquín Guichot; capacity for 200 people) was attended by the Falangist, military and civilian authorities of the capital of Andalucía.⁶⁴¹ Therefore, the phenomenon of the *cocinas económicas* also served to solidify the alliance between different repressive agents, including the Catholic Church.⁶⁴²

⁶³⁹ **FE** (Seville), 3 November 1936.

⁶⁴⁰ **FE** (Seville), 7 November 1936.

⁶⁴¹ **FE** (Seville), 18 December 1936.

⁶⁴² New soup kitchens were always blessed by a priest and in the case of Higuera de la Real (Badajoz), the blessing of the local Falangist children’s soup kitchen was followed by an open-air Mass. **FE** (Seville), 13 December 1936.

The poor and ostracised rapidly became reliant on the Falange for survival. Examples are plentiful: in Fregenal de la Sierra (Badajoz), a town with a population of just over 10,000, the local Falangist *cocina económica* was feeding 340 people on a daily basis by November 1936.⁶⁴³ In Ubrique (Cádiz), 600 out of a total population of around 7,000 people were dependant on meals provided by Falangist soup kitchens.⁶⁴⁴ In Carmona (Seville), the *comedor infantil* (children's soup kitchen) was inaugurated by the local *Comisión Gestora* but run by the Falange and named after Pilar Primo de Rivera, the sister of José Antonio Primo de Rivera and head of the Falange's Women's Section (*Sección Femenina*). Located in the Plazuela del Saltillo, the kitchen catered for the daily needs of 100 children, most of whom were the orphans of the 381 leftists executed by the Nationalists.⁶⁴⁵ In Villamartín (Cádiz), a town of around 8,000 people, 150 children depended on Falangist charity meals for survival. In this *pueblo*, Nationalist repression claimed 111 lives; whereas the left had killed only one person. The crisis was so acute in Villamartín that in December 1936 the Falange expanded its kitchen in order to feed a total of 600 starving children.⁶⁴⁶ Famine was endemic in the Nationalist-controlled *pueblos*. A Falangist report on the opening of a *comedor infantil* for 100 children in Coria del Río (Seville) provided a very graphic description of parental despair in the small towns and villages of Andalucía:

"Al asistir al acto inaugural se sentía la emoción profunda de contemplar cómo desde las puertas de los comedores varias madres pobres veían comer con fruición y alegría a sus pequeños, y observar cómo las lágrimas brillaban en los ojos amorosos de esas madres pensando quizás en las necesidades pasadas. Por ello es necesario que no haya un coriano que deje de contribuir al sostenimiento de los comedores."⁶⁴⁷

The scale of the humanitarian crisis that affected the II Division required a degree of financial and organisational flexibility that married perfectly with the Falange's proselytising fervour, as well as its adroitness in devising new forms of extortion. The Falange followed the cardinal rules of the Kleptocratic State: a skilful balance of propaganda and intimidation. The paramilitary organisation was sincere concerning its source of funding: "es necesario que no

⁶⁴³ *FE* (Seville), 22 November 1936.

⁶⁴⁴ *FE* (Seville), 20 November 1936.

⁶⁴⁵ **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), Expedientes Policiales, H-754; García Márquez, José María, "La represión franquista en la provincial de Sevilla. For Republican repression see: **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), FC, Causa General, 1040, Expediente 9.

⁶⁴⁶ For Nationalist violence in Villamartín see: Romero Romero, Fernando, *Guerra Civil y represión en Villamartín (1931-1946)*, pages 232-89. *FE* (Seville), 3 December 1936.

⁶⁴⁷ *FE* (Seville), 11 December 1936.

haya un coriano que deje de contribuir al sostenimiento de los comedores". Also, the article on Coria del Río concluded with a veiled threat: "Otro día daremos cuentos de los donativos para tal fin." Ultimately, extortion represented the cruel culmination of a repressive project that in the case of Coria del Río could be described as gratuitous violence: loyalist repression claimed no lives, whereas the Nationalists murdered 152 people in the *pueblo*.⁶⁴⁸

The *modus operandi* of the Falange was simple. The organisation would establish a humanitarian agency in a *pueblo*, which would then be funded by local residents regardless of their economic condition. It was accepted as a *fait accompli* that the target population would contribute, voluntarily or otherwise. The end result was impressive: in Almonte (Huelva), the Falange published an editorial eulogising the industriousness of the local *Sección Femenina* (which provided 500 daily meals to the local poor), followed the next day by an article adding that all meals were funded by a monthly tax imposed on the local population.⁶⁴⁹ Furthermore, when it was revealed that the *Flechas* (youth section of the Falange) soup kitchen in Seville (calle Rioja, nº 16) did not possess enough financial liquidity to support itself; the organisation decided to expand its social project and ensure that no "flecha [...] queda sin comer" by demanding that: "todo buen falangista está obligado a engrosar, en la medida de sus fuerzas, la cantidad que precisamos."⁶⁵⁰

The "Pro-Sevilla" Stamp

One of the greatest absurdities of Nationalist Spain was the fact that the kleptocratic policies enforced by Queipo de Llano – the economic equivalent of the military scorched earth policy adopted by the Army of Africa – were destroying social cohesion right before the very eyes of the all-powerful military leadership. In a time when the rebel war machine was in full offensive mode, the socio-economic crisis represented a greater threat to the survival of the new regime than the prospect of a Republican military victory. Indeed, when Joaquín Benjumea y Burín was sworn in as the new President of the *Diputación Provincial* (14 December), he declared during his inaugural speech that all chronic problems affecting Sevillian society prior to the outbreak of the July 1936 rebellion remained unsolved. Worse, Benjumea acknowledged the

⁶⁴⁸ For leftist violence see: **Archivo Histórico Nacional** (Madrid), FC, Causa General, 1040, Expediente 74. For Nationalist repression see: García Márquez, José María, "La represión franquista en la provincial de Sevilla. Estado de la cuestión" in *Ebre 38. Revista Internacional de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939)*, nº2, pages 93.

⁶⁴⁹ *FE* (Seville), 6 and 7 December 1936.

⁶⁵⁰ *FE* (Seville), 23 December 1936.

emergence of a new problem: orphans.⁶⁵¹ The situation was so grave that on 7 August General Queipo released *orden nº13* establishing a special stamp (“Pro-Sevilla”) to provide humanitarian assistance to the many orphans of Seville:

“Honda preocupación produce al Mando del Ejército Salvador de España, la situación precaria de las clases menesterosas agravada en los momentos actuales, aunque originada por el desvío de los dirigentes políticos y sociales de estos últimos años. Urgen remediar las miserias de nuestros hermanos y principalmente de los niños, huérfanos, abandonados y a veces explotados por profesionales de la mendicidad.”⁶⁵²

The rebels officially blamed the Republic (“dirigentes políticos y sociales de estos últimos años”); but the truth was that the orphans were a direct consequence of the brutal pacification of the province of Seville.⁶⁵³ The rebels secretly recognised this fact in letter from Mayor Ramón de Carranza to the *Comisión Gestora* (20 August): “Con motivo de los pasados sucesos el barrio de San Julián último baluarte de las hordas marxistas ha sufrido las consecuencias de la obcecación de sus morados quedando gran número de niños, seres inocentes ajenos a la contienda en el mayor desamparo”.⁶⁵⁴ As a result, the local orphanage (*Asilo de San Cayetano*): “Por las causas aludidas hay actualmente gran número de criaturas desvalidas que supera la capacidad económica de aquel benéfico establecimiento, pero como la Caridad cristiana nos obliga a acudir en socorro del necesitado”.

In order to palliate the consequences of its own repressive project, partly enforced by the new mayor of Seville, the Town Hall decided give a subvention of 40 pesetas daily to the *Asilo de San Cayetano* (20 August). On 31 August, the grant was increased to 60 pesetas daily to be funded by the local population of Seville via the special “pro-Sevilla” tax. At the same, Mayor Carranza proposed the fusion of the *Asilo* with the *Institución Municipal de Puericultura* in order to cut costs.⁶⁵⁵

⁶⁵¹ *FE* (Seville), 15 December 1936.

⁶⁵² Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *Bandos y órdenes dictados por Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra, General Jefe de la Segunda División Orgánica y del Ejército del Sur desde la declaración del estado de guerra, 18 de julio*, pages 12-13.

⁶⁵³ On 17 August, the Town Hall ordered the printing of 46,000 stamps followed by the release the next day of an “EDICTO” signed by Mayor Carranza announcing the official launching (on 21 August) of the “Pro-Sevilla” stamp. *Archivo Municipal de Sevilla* (Seville), Hacienda, Expedientes generales, 1936, nº71.

⁶⁵⁴ *Archivo Municipal de Sevilla* (Seville), Hacienda, Expedientes generales, 1936, nº71.

⁶⁵⁵ The *Institución Municipal de Puericultura* had successfully reduced child mortality rate in the institution to 4,65%, “siendo la general de Sevilla en esa misma edad de un 10%, resultando un beneficio

The “Pro-Sevilla” stamp went on to become one of the most profitable enterprises in Nationalist Spain. A report of 16 December 1936 revealed that the Town Hall of Seville was collecting a daily average of 676.20 pesetas from stamp sales, with a total of 69,153.02 pesetas raised since 21 August. The problem of the orphans, however, remained unsolved. On 14 February 1938, another report recommended the Town Hall of Seville to continue providing economic support to the *Asilo* because “aun existe una verdadera necesidad de dar de comer a estos niños”.⁶⁵⁶ Already on 14 October 1937, the Director of the *Casa Cuna* recognised, in letter to the *Comisión Gestora*, “el problema grave que plantea tanto niño huérfano y desvalido.”⁶⁵⁷ By January 1939, infants were still being abandoned in orphanages, such as the *Casa Cuna*, by starving mothers.⁶⁵⁸ The Nationalists had successfully ‘purified’ Spain from Marxism, but struggled to construct a viable society from the ashes of the Republic.

Case study I. The victory of the Totalitarian State: the *Plato Único*

In October 1936, General Queipo announced the creation of the *Plato Único* fundraising campaign. One day a month, all food establishments in Seville were to serve single course meals to its customers while still charging for a full meal. The monetary difference was collected by the Nationalist authorities.⁶⁵⁹ The *Plato Único* campaign (literal translation: “single course meal”), was one of the defining social events in rebel Spain during the civil war. The *Plato Único* represented the victory of totalitarianism over civil society, the establishment of the Kleptocratic State. First and foremost, a fundraising campaign of such magnitude required an established repressive network capable of monitoring every single citizen without the need to resort to large-scale punitive action. According to Nationalist logic, blanket violence against the masses was no longer required: they had internalised the educative message conveyed

a nuestro favor a 5,35%” (report of 28 February 1937). On 15 July 1937, and because of the imminent opening (scheduled for December 1937) of the Grupo Escolar Santa Marina (expected to feed 500 children); the Town Hall decided to cut the budget for orphans, starting from 1 August 1937: *Asilo San Cayetano*, from 1,800 to 612 pesetas; *escuela Gran Madre*, from 780 to 250 pesetas, *Cocina Pumarejo*, from 900 to 500 pesetas; and *Protectorado de la Infancia* (calle Fabiola), from 780 to 500 pesetas.

Archivo Municipal de Sevilla (Seville), Hacienda, Expedientes generales, 1936, nº71.

⁶⁵⁶ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Hacienda, Expedientes generales, 1936, nº71.

⁶⁵⁷ **Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla** (Seville), Casa Cuna, Legajo 39.

⁶⁵⁸ For instance, on 26 January 1939 a woman was forced to abandon her child “por ser viuda y tener cuatro hijos, y no tener recursos suficientes para mantenerlos” and for that reason “Con mucho dolor de mi corazon entrego mi hijo que mucho lo quiero, pero la necesidad me obliga”. **Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla** (Seville), Casa Cuna, Legajo 519.

⁶⁵⁹ Guillermo Cabanellas sarcastically termed it “una forma hipócrita de establecer un nuevo impuesto” Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días: nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República Española*, page 877.

during the savage pacification of the popular districts of Seville (on-going repression functioned as a continuous *aide memoire*). On the other hand, the acquiescence of the local population revealed that the rebels had successfully paralysed society by means of terror. Lastly, the *Plato Único* was originally a Nazi German fundraising campaign; nevertheless, its wholehearted adoption by the Nationalist regime revealed: a) the growing ideological symbiosis between rebel Spain and Nazi Germany, and b) the totalitarian ambitions of the rebels who, a mere three months after seizing power, already attempted to emulate the most totalitarian regime in Europe.

Once more, Seville functioned as the testing ground for a kleptocratic project that rapidly expanded to a national level and contributed decisively to the economic collapse of Nationalist Spain.⁶⁶⁰ The *Plato Único* was scheduled to take place every first Friday of the month and specialist committees were appointed to monitor its correct functioning. On 24 October, *FE* published an open letter from María Luisa de Carlos of the Organizing Committee, exhorting the local population to adhere to the campaign:

“¡Por España! El día del plato único.

La estupenda idea de nuestro general, lanzada por la radio, proponiendo el «plato único», ha sido acogida con entusiasmo por todos, siendo las señoritas sevillanas de Acción Católica las que se han ofrecido a organizarlo y llevarlo a la práctica cuando antes.

En más de una ocasión hemos comentado acerca de la iniciativa del Führer alemán, que tan excelentes resultado dio en su país y que debiera de haber sido católica y española, doliéndonos de que no hubiera nacido en nuestro suelo; así que ahora, con verdadero júbilo, acogemos, repito, la idea, que por ser del general ya es católica, española y sevillana.

No podía ser más oportuna; en estos momentos en que una ola de angustia y amargura envuelve a España, oprimiéndonos el corazón con el dolor no sólo propio sino de todos nuestros hermanos. Es la hora del sacrificio, del renunciamiento, de la generosidad; hemos dado el oro al Ejército, la plata para los Sagrarios, damascos y encajas para ornamentos de las Iglesias saqueadas, ropas de abrigo para los soldados que combaten en el frente, y ahora compartiremos nuestro alimento con los que no lo tienen, y si faltase de momento alojamiento a tantísimo huérfano como quedó abandonado, vacilaríamos en abrirles las

⁶⁶⁰ “obra nacional que resolverá graves problemas sociales, cabiéndole a Sevilla la honra de haber sido una vez más propulsora de grandes empresas.” *FE* (Seville) 24 October 1936.

puertas de nuestros hogares, que la caridad de los sevillanos es capaz de remediar cuantos estragos causan los malvados.

La caridad fundida con el sentimiento patriótico que culmina ahora en España es doblemente hermosa y sublime. Por Dios y por España en estos momentos estamos dispuestos a todo, sin que nos pese ni duele el sacrificio.

No vacilamos en asegurar que esta nueva manifestación de generosidad, impulsada por el excelentísimo señor general Queipo de Llano, constituirá un éxito completo, llegando a ser obra nacional que resolverá graves problemas sociales, cabiéndole a Sevilla la honra de haber sido una vez más propulsora de grandes empresas.

Por la Comisión organizadora, María Luisa de Carlos.”⁶⁶¹

The acknowledgement of the foreign origin of the campaign (“del Führer alemán”) - a rare admission in Nationalist Spain – revealed the rebels’ profound admiration for Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, the Organising Committee compensated for this apparent lack of ‘Spanishness’ by praising the “estupenda idea de nuestro general” and making an allusion to the cultural discrepancies between Spain and Germany. María Luisa de Carlos also declared that the *Plato Único* campaign was “acogida con entusiasmo por todos” and even afforded the luxury of forecasting its “éxito completo”. The capital of Andalucía was, literally, paying the price for falling under rebel control on 18 July: Seville was coerced into financing a long war of attrition and at the same time supporting the economic consequences of Nationalist repression that claimed over 3,000 lives in six months. There was a direct correlation between the number of orphans (tantísimo) and physical repression. Furthermore, the aristocratic composition of the Organising Committee belied General Queipo’s rhetoric of a popular uprising directed against an extremist government. The board, presided by the General’s wife, was dominated by the local oligarchy (“las señoras sevillanas de Acción Católica”): the Marquesa de Arancena, Concepción Murube, Regla Dávila, Marquesa de Valencina, Baronesa de la Vega de la Hoz, Juana Turmo de Cámara, Marquesa de Gómez de Baneda, María Luisa de Carlos, and the Marquesa de los Ríos.

The *Plato Único* introduced a new rationalisation for the extortionate activities of the Nationalist state. The original argument that Spain was saved *in extremis* from a Soviet-

⁶⁶¹ *FE* (Seville), 24 October 1936.

sponsored *coup d'état* was now complemented by the conceptualisation of the rebellion as a modern-day religious crusade. According to official discourse, the Nationalists rose up in arms “Por Dios y por España” and, similarly, the *Plato Único* campaign was “católica, española y sevillana”. The Catholic hierarchy immediately embraced the project and devised an ambitious plan for the re-Catholicisation of Andalucía, which included the religious indoctrination of the orphaned children of Seville (“todos, todos, han de tener cabida, todos alimento, abrigo, cariño, alegría... y catecismo donde aprendan a conocer a Cristo”). Thus, the local population was not only forced to support the extortionate activities of a kleptocratic state, but also those of its allies. As far as the Church was concerned, the sacrificial collaboration of the masses would be repaid in blessings: “el Señor os los devolverá con creces.”⁶⁶² On the other hand, the Nationalist regime enthusiastically endorsed the cultural projects of the Catholic Church, since its vision for a totalitarian society envisaged the active participation of all segments of society, including the children of its executed enemies. For the new regime, the dual objective of palliating the humanitarian catastrophe and indoctrinating the orphans of Seville was indivisible. In short, the Nationalists put into practice the words of María Luisa de Carlos: “por Dios y por España en estos momentos estamos dispuestos a todo, sin que nos pese ni duele el sacrificio.”⁶⁶³

The aggressive announcement of the *Plato Único* campaign was followed by a more appeasing editorial published the following day (25 October), reminding the local population that collaboration “está al alcance de todos, pues no se trata de un donativo más ni de una nueva subscripción que venga a atacar el ya sacudido bolsillo, que en este caso no se toca, puesto que ya el gasto está previsto y hecho; aquí el sacrificado es el estómago, ó más bien, el paladar, pues para el primero, según opinión médica, es muy sana esta medida.”

For the first time, the Nationalist regime conceded (even if only implicitly) that Seville was on the brink of economic exhaustion. At the same time, the Organising Committee announced the establishment of a complex network of committees, divided by parishes, to monitor the development of the campaign.⁶⁶⁴ Lastly, police patrols ensured that the local population observed Day of the *Plato Único*.⁶⁶⁵

⁶⁶² *FE* (Seville), 1 November 1936.

⁶⁶³ *FE* (Seville), 4 November 1936.

⁶⁶⁴ *FE* (Seville), 25 October 1936.

⁶⁶⁵ Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, page 95.

On a cultural level, the *Plato Único* defined the role of women in Nationalist Spain. On the one hand, it was inconceivable to allow females to hold executive posts in 1936 Seville; while on the other, a totalitarian regime demanded the participation of all segments of society in its projects, including women. Hence, females were expected to enlist in one of the paramilitary organisations (in a non-combatant role) and contribute to the forging of a Kleptocratic State. This became evident following the formation of a female-only Organising Committee for the *Plato Único*. Middle-class women were particularly active, regularly taking to the streets to pressure the local male population into contributing to fundraising campaigns. Female militants also included both *flechas* and *pelayos* (the youth sections of the Falange and the *Requeté* respectively) in their projects; a tactic extended to militia recruiting campaigns.⁶⁶⁶

On a political level, the *Plato Único* confirmed the deification of General Queipo de Llano in Seville and consolidated the *Pact of blood*. Queipo invested his reputation in the fundraising campaign, to the point that he presented the *Plato Único* as his brainchild, despite the evident plagiarism. Fearful of the political implications of General Franco's recent elevation to the leadership of the Nationalist faction (1 October 1936), Queipo de Llano was determined to remain an influential figure in rebel Spain, even if the price to pay was the economic ruin of Seville. On 28 October, *FE* published a vitriolic editorial:

“Más sobre el “Plato único”. Ya se está cociendo el «Plato único» con entusiasmo e interés por parte de todos, ya que se trata de algo nacional y patriótico. Pero [...] no olvidemos de echarle la sal [...] Quien quiera cumplir aportando un tanto a guisa de contribución o de impuesto y no privándose ni suprimiendo ese día nada en la comida, se equivoca. O no lo ha entendido bien [...], o es un perfecto egoísta [...] ¡Muchos de los nuestros están en España padeciendo verdadera hambre: los prisioneros, los sitiados, huérfanos, viudas; muchos, son muchos! Sevilla tuvo la suerte de ser preservada de estos y otros horrores gracias a la Providencia y al general que fue su instrumento; luego nuestra nobleza nos obliga, en agradecimiento, a participar de ese ayuno [...]”

⁶⁶⁶ “Su misión principal es recaudar fondos para las múltiples suscripciones que constantemente se efectúan, y prestar sus servicios en los comedores de asistencia social, que distribuyen una comida al día al enorme número de mujeres y niños, viudas y huérfanos, en su mayor parte de fusilados. A esto le llaman ellos mantener a los hijos marxistas.” Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, page 72.

En otros países en que está impuesto el «Plato único» se lleva con un rigor extremo y hay inspectores que van a las casas a sorprender a quienes no lo cumplen, detenerle e imponerle sanciones muy duras. Esto no pega aquí, donde todo lo hacemos «por las buenas». No hay necesidad de estos rigores, que serán contraproducentes. En España sabremos imprimir a esta obra el sello de espiritualidad y elegancia moral que lleva todo lo nuestro.”⁶⁶⁷

The message was clear: anyone unable to collaborate would be immediately labelled as unpatriotic, regarded as an enemy of the state and punished accordingly. *FE* also ‘reminded’ the local population of its moral obligation to support all fundraising campaigns. Seville was forever-indebted to both “Providencia” and General Queipo for ‘miraculously’ saving the city from the abyss of Marxism. The *FE* article concluded with a threatening note: “en otros países en que está impuesto el «Plato único» se lleva con un rigor extremo”. In other words, the regime warned the local population that it was willing to resort to large-scale violence should Seville fail to adhere *en masse* to the *Plato Único*.⁶⁶⁸

Ultimately, the mere threat of violence proved sufficient to galvanise a society already exhausted by an endless succession of fundraising campaigns. On the day of the inauguration of the *Plato Único*, the Regimiento de Granada (headed by Colonel Solís) donated 1,140.45 pesetas to the campaign.⁶⁶⁹ The contribution of the Granada barracks was carefully orchestrated to turn on the pressure on the local population, already living under an atmosphere of constant intimidation. Inevitably, the *Plato Único* was a tremendous success. On 21 November, *FE* triumphantly announced that the *Plato Único* campaign had raised a total 65,029.40 pesetas (“con inclusión de las entregas hechas por hoteles, restaurantes, fondas, bares, cervecerías, cafés, pescaderías, regimientos, hospitales, escuelas y tripulaciones de buques”).⁶⁷⁰ The success of the *Plato Único* was so resounding that, on 11 November 1936 it was expanded to all of Nationalist Spain. Furthermore, on the eve of the first anniversary of

⁶⁶⁷ *FE* (Seville), 28 October 1936.

⁶⁶⁸ For instance, a Falangist from Granada was temporarily expelled from the party for not contributing generously enough to fundraising campaigns. It later transpired that he had donated a total of 25,410 pesetas to 15 different ‘patriotic subscriptions’. Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, *Señoritos, jornaleros y falangistas*, pages 126-28. Also, on 11 December a restaurant in Pasaje del Duque was fined 1,000 pesetas for not observing the Day of the *Plato Único*. *FE* (Seville), 11 December 1936.

⁶⁶⁹ *FE* (Seville), 10 November 1936.

⁶⁷⁰ *FE* (Seville), 21 November 1936. The influence of the *Plato Único* extended to neighbouring provinces. On 15 December, the *Sección Feminina* of the small town of Ayamonte (Huelva) raised 1,243.05 pesetas. *FE* (Seville), 15 December 1936.

the rebellion (16 July 1937), the *Día del Plato Único* was made into a weekly event.⁶⁷¹ Lastly, a report from the *Diputación Provincial de Sevilla* revealed that the fundraising campaign had raised the astronomical sum of 229,548.87 pesetas in 1937 and 212,341.51 pesetas between January-August 1938 in the province of Seville.⁶⁷² All money collected during the campaign was later reinvested in the *Auxilio de Invierno*, a Nationalist relief organisation modelled on the Nazi *Winterhilfe*.⁶⁷³

Case study II. Clinching the *Pact of Blood*: The *Aguinaldo del Soldado*

On 15 November 1936, at the same time as the Nationalist offensive on Madrid ground to a halt, *FE* announced the creation of the *Aguinaldo del Soldado* (literal translation: "Soldiers' Christmas gift") fundraising campaign, presented as a spontaneous manifestation of social unity in rebel Spain. The timing was no mere coincidence. The *Aguinaldo* was created during one of the greatest existential crises of the Nationalist regime: all over rebel territory, scheduled celebrations for the much-anticipated final rout of the Republic were quietly postponed *sine die* (street decorations, public banquets, music festivals, etc.). The organisation of a massive fundraising event at a time of both military and ideological uncertainty confirmed the perception that these campaigns possessed far greater significance than that of a mere instrument of extortion at the service of a Kleptocratic State. Thus, a sense of political urgency pervaded the organisation of the fundraising day of the *Fiesta del Aguinaldo* in Seville, where pins sponsoring the colours of the Nationalist flag were given in exchange for a donation. Female members of the local oligarchy were particularly active, setting up parallel *Aguinaldo* committees all over Nationalist territory.⁶⁷⁴ An aggressive propaganda campaign was organised in the press and leaflets promoting the *Aguinaldo* distributed all over Seville. They read:

"!ESPAÑOLES! Los soldaditos están a la intemperie, nieve, frío, ¡mucho frío!... ¡No lo olvidarlos
Españoles! Los que gozamos el calor del hogar hemos de desprendernos por ellos de todo lo

⁶⁷¹ **Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla** (Seville), Legajo 418. When the *Plato Único* expanded to the rest of Nationalist Spain, the population of Seville decided to poke fun at the event: "Un día – cuenta otro – se le ocurrió copiar a los alemanes en eso del plato único «!Un día al mes de plato único!». «!Dos!», responde Franco. «!He dicho que uno!». Al poco tiempo uno decreto en el Diario Oficial: «!Cuatro días de plato único!»" Gonzálbez Ruiz, Francisco, *Yo he creído en Franco. Proceso de una gran desilusión: dos meses en la cárcel de Sevilla*, page 100.

⁶⁷² **Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla** (Seville), Legajo 56.

⁶⁷³ For the *Auxilio Social* see: Cenarro Lagunas, Angela, *La sonrisa de Falange. Auxilio Social en la guerra y la posguerra*. For the internal disputes within the Women's Section of the Falange, especially the rivalry between Pilar Primo de Rivera and Mercedes Sanz Bachiller, see pages 93-100. See also: Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, *Antifalange: estudio crítico de "Falange en la guerra de España, la unificación y Hedilla" de Maximiano García Venero*, pages 171-72.

⁶⁷⁴ **FE** (Seville), 14, 15 and 21 November 1936.

superfluo, de todo lo innecesario. En todos los Bancos y en todas las Sucursales, hay una ventanilla para recoger el cariñoso donativo con el título de “AGUINALDO DEL SOLDADO” ¡No olvidarlo españoles!-”⁶⁷⁵

In short, the rebel leadership (in close alliance with the local *élites*) strove to form a Nationalist identity precisely as the rebel assault on Madrid entered an uncertain phase. The centrality of Seville and the pivotal role played by the *élites* in the forging of a Kleptocratic State was again reconfirmed during the *Aguinaldo del Soldado* campaign. The *Aguinaldo* committee – presided by General Queipo’s wife - was exclusively dominated by the local oligarchy (a recurrent pattern in Nationalist relief agencies). Its leadership included the viuda de Parladé, Condesa viuda de Aguiar, Condesa de las Torres de Guadiamar, viuda de Arjona, Emilia Ybarra Gamero Cívico, Marquesa de Villafranca del Pítamo, and the Marquesa de Gómez de Barreda. General Queipo de Llano attempted to excuse the elitist composition of the committee by claiming that the “iniciativa” had originated from a group of local workers.⁶⁷⁶ On 29 November, the appropriately-named “donation committee” declared that “ni uno que se precie de ser español debe quedarse sin adquirir el distintivo.”⁶⁷⁷ In other words, to refuse collaboration amounted to treason. Predictably, the *Fiesta* was a tremendous success. *FE* published a comprehensive coverage of the event that inadvertently revealed the *modus operandi* of the “donation committee”:

“EL AGUINALDO DEL SOLDADO

[...] se ha celebrado hoy la fiesta del Aguinaldo del Soldado, a cuya hermosura ha contribuido la hermosura del día, Margaritas y falangistas, con patriotismo y entusiasmo, se han dedicado durante el día a la no fácil conquista de pechos y bolsillos masculinos. Para llenar aquéllos de banderitas de nuestros gloriosos colores tradicionales, mientras éstos se iban vaciando. Buena recaudación. Y satisfacción íntima de todos. Que satisfacción grande es poder volver a ver nuestros pechos llenos de nuestra Santa insignia y nuestros bolsillos vacíos para tan santo fin. Españoles de retaguardia: que este espectáculo de hoy se repita muchas, muchas veces. Cuanto somos, cuanto tenemos, los debemos exclusivamente a esos soldaditos, caballeros de esta gran cruzada, que luchan por Dios y por España. [...] Esta es nuestra misión. Un día y otro, y siempre, vacían nuestros bolsillos para nuestros soldados. Alegremente. Con sana alegría de quiero no realiza un sacrificio, sino que cumple con su deber. Cristiana y patrióticamente. Con

⁶⁷⁵ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5382, Carpeta 16.

⁶⁷⁶ **FE** (Seville), 15 November 1936.

⁶⁷⁷ **FE** (Seville), 28 November 1936.

la vista puesta en Dios y en la Patria, que está ya nos ha premiado al otorgarnos el título de hijos suyos y Áquel bien sabéis que nos premiará mañana.”⁶⁷⁸

The political atmosphere in Seville was claustrophobic. Donation tables were set in key areas of the city and female militants affiliated to either the Carlist Party or the Falange joined forces and took to the streets to pressure the local population to contribute. Donations could also be handed directly to a number of institutions, including local banks. Ironically, the military branch expected to benefit most from the *Fiesta del Aguinaldo* was the Army of Africa, whose destructive actions in Seville still remained fresh in the collective memory of local residents. The corollary was a “buena recaudación”, since to display patriotism was only possible through “bolsillos vacíos para tan santo fin”. Lastly, the “satisfacción íntima de todos” represented a collective reaffirmation of unity in a time of military and ideological uncertainty. Still, *FE* warned that the *Fiesta del Aguinaldo* was not an isolated occurrence and that more similar events would follow: “que este espectáculo de hoy se repita muchas, muchas veces.” As expected, another *Fiesta* was held on 6 December. General Queipo’s wife personally headed the donation table set up in front of the Town Hall. Her group of “simpáticas «asaltantes»” collected a respectable 450 pesetas.⁶⁷⁹ One of the victims of this ‘robbery’ was pro-Francoist correspondent Theo Rogers who noted: “as we stepped down, two pretty girls rushed up to pin a strip of paper on our coat lapels, the old flag of monarchist Spain. They were a pair of thousands who were collecting funds for the “Aguinaldo” for the soldiers (their Christmas gift) for Christmas was not far away. I was to find later men with their coats literally covered with these flags, so many times they had contributed to the fund.”⁶⁸⁰

The *Aguinaldo* ‘fever’ rapidly infected the rest of the II Division. Neighbouring provinces attempted to contest the hegemonic position of Seville in fundraising campaigns. By 15 December, Cádiz had raised over 20,000 pesetas.⁶⁸¹ A year later (22 January 1938), the local Civil Governor reported to the Divisional Headquarters that the province had amassed a total of 261,014.81 pesetas (137,503 collected by the *Jefe del Estado Mayor del Gobierno Militar*; 105,000 by the *Jefe Provincial de Falange*).⁶⁸² Overall, the profit yielded by the *Aguinaldo del Soldado* campaign was impressive, especially in view of the fact that the ostensible primary

⁶⁷⁸ *FE* (Seville), 4 December 1936.

⁶⁷⁹ *FE* (Seville), 7 December 1936.

⁶⁸⁰ Rogers, Francis Theobald, *Spain: a tragic journey*, 139

⁶⁸¹ *FE* (Seville), 15 December 1936.

⁶⁸² Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur (Seville), Legajo 5382, Carpeta 16.

objective of the *Aguinaldo* was to collect commodities for the frontline. In Valverde del Camino (Huelva), the volume of donated material was such that the *Fe* correspondent failed to quantify it.⁶⁸³ In fact, the press could only keep track of the most generous contributions.⁶⁸⁴ Nearby Manzanilla (Huelva) collected 1,202.80 pesetas on 9 December 1936.⁶⁸⁵ On 8 December, General Queipo proudly announced that Guadalcanal (Seville) had raised 5,000 pesetas (3 December).⁶⁸⁶ In addition, La Campana (Seville) donated 1,815 pesetas (and a large amount of commodities), Cazalla de la Sierra (Seville) collected 7,000 pesetas worth in goods⁶⁸⁷, and the tiny village of Benacazón (Seville) raised 852 pesetas.⁶⁸⁸ On 6 December, Osuna (Seville) held its own *Fiesta del Aguinaldo*: “desde bien temprano el domingo, día 6, presentó la bella fisionomía de las muchachas osuneses postulando y «asaltando» a los transeúntes [...] Todos contribuyeron a la medida de sus fuerzas y la recaudación fue crecidísima, calculándose en más de cinco mil pesetas.”⁶⁸⁹

In Alcalá de Guadaira, the local ‘assault’ also bore a healthy profit: on 14 December, three trucks decorated with the Nationalist flag and overflowing with donated goods left for Seville. They were escorted by the local Falangist band and 80 female militants, who personally delivered 2,655 pesetas to General Queipo. Special media attention fell on the 800 pesetas raised among the local working-class (“todos han contribuido en la medida de sus fuerzas, y de una manera especial las familias pobres”).⁶⁹⁰ For the Falange, the contribution of the workers of Alcalá de Guadaira was but evidence of the success of the party’s proselytising efforts. The success of the *Aguinaldo* campaign was cynically manipulated in order to provide legitimacy for the rebellion; however, donations were anything but voluntary. Failure to contribute adequately to a fundraising campaign was regarded as crime against the state. For instance, on

⁶⁸³ *FE* (Seville), 2 December 1936.

⁶⁸⁴ *FE* (Seville), 20 December 1936.

⁶⁸⁵ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5382, Carpeta 16.

⁶⁸⁶ *FE* (Seville), 9 December 1936.

⁶⁸⁷ *FE* (Seville), 18 December 1936.

⁶⁸⁸ *FE* (Seville), 17 December 1936.

⁶⁸⁹ *FE* (Seville), 12 December 1936.

⁶⁹⁰ “con un entusiasmo digno del mayor elogio ha respondido el pueblo alcareño al llamamiento que nuestras autoridades ha hecho a todos los buenos españoles para que de alguna forma contribuyan a obsequiar a nuestros bravos soldaditos que luchan en el frente sacrificándolo todo para defender a la Patria y recuperar ese trozo de nuestra España que la canalla moscovita nos ha querido robar y que todavía tiene en su poder.” *FE* (Seville), 16 December 1936.

17 December *FE* violently denounced the “cantdades ridículas” donated by Los Palacios (Seville).⁶⁹¹

Intoxicated by its own propaganda, the Falange claimed that all the possessions of the wealthy were in fact the joint property of the “juventud falangista” and the “glorioso Ejército español”, for the reason that both had embarked on a ‘crusade’ to save Spain from Marxism. The capital of Andalucía had to set an example in fundraising campaigns because of this ‘debt’. For that reason, *FE* urged General Queipo to punish anyone who failed to grasp “esta cristiana y justa comprensión de las cosas”. This tactic proved fruitful: in Seville, the *Aguinaldo* moneyboxes (*huchas*) still collected an average of 25 pesetas per day (some raised 100 pesetas) on 17 December 1936. Furthermore, the main *Aguinaldo* warehouse (located in calle Alemenes, nº9 and leased free of cost by the Conde de Bustillo) had reached full capacity (“los citados locales están ya abarrotados de mercancías para su reparto a la tropa”).⁶⁹² The following day (18 December), donated goods (including livestock) were already being stockpiled in the adjacent streets.⁶⁹³ Indeed, the *Aguinaldo* Committee was overwhelmed by the sheer volume of contributions, which included 400 trucks of ‘donated’ goods from neighbouring Portugal.⁶⁹⁴

On an ideological level, the *Aguinaldo del Soldado* contributed decisively to the forging of a Nationalist identity. The campaign promoted political bipolarisation and congealed the *Pact of blood* at the same time as the Nationalist siege of Madrid concluded in an unexpected, embarrassing defeat. Nearly a year after the creation of the *Aguinaldo del Soldado* (8 November 1937), the closing sentence of a letter addressed to General Queipo from the elitist *Círculo Mercantil de Sevilla* summarised Nationalist dogma:

⁶⁹¹ “Siempre, y en todos los lugares, se dan los casos aislados de personas pudentes que contribuyen con cantidades ridículas. Son personas sumamente egoístas, que no piensan más que en «sus dineros», y en cuya contemplación cifran los mayores goces de su vida. Son seres que no se han dado cuenta, ó no se la quieren dar, de que ese dinero, esa paz, ese bienestar que disfrutan actualmente no es suyo, no les pertenece en la mayoría de los casos, porque no lo han adquirido legítimamente; ha sido cedido generosamente por esa juventud falangista que unida fuertemente al glorioso Ejército español, dio el pecho, la sangre y la vida, una riqueza y una paz que tenían inevitablemente perdida. Es lamentable que aun, no se hayan asimilado esta cristiana y justa comprensión de las cosas; pero yo tengo el consuelo y la esperanza de que nuestro general irá dando caza a estos «gazapos emboscados», para darles su merecido.” *FE* (Seville), 17 December 1936.

⁶⁹² *FE* (Seville), 17 December 1936.

⁶⁹³ *FE* (Seville), 18 December 1936.

⁶⁹⁴ On 18 December, 27 trucks left from both Seville and Huelva to the Madrid front. *FE* (Seville), 17, 18 and 20 December 1936.

The 'miracle' of Seville, the myth of a Soviet-sponsored coup, the dehumanisation of the Republican 'other' and the perception of the rebellion as a religious crusade coalesced into a single conceptualisation of the civil war. All these notions were omnipresent in the many letters sent to General Queipo. The concept of crusade was evident in a letter (19 December 1936) written by a group of orphans of the *Escuela Noviciales del Parque* in Palma del Río (Córdoba). The children adhered to the *Aguinaldo* "pensando que a los soldados, valientes hermanos nuestros les debemos la salvación de España" and "Que el Niño Jesus a quien hemos de pedir mucho en Su Nacimiento de a nuestros soldados fuerzas para conseguir el triunfo definitivo."⁶⁹⁶ On 14 December, 17 year-old Juan Nicolás Márquez Domínguez from Paymogo (Huelva) reaffirmed the myth of Queipo when he declared that he was present in Seville when Queipo "con desprecio de su preciada vida, supo librar a esa bellísima Ciudad de los terrores, crímenes y sinsabores marxistas." A week later (20 December), José Brenes thanked Queipo de Llano for "saving" ("salvar") Spain "de las garas de Moscú" and donated his meagre savings to the *Aguinaldo* campaign.⁶⁹⁷ The vast majority of letters revealed the shattering social consequences of the daily *charlas* of Queipo, which encouraged violence against Republicans and culminated in the brainwashing of an entire generation of impressionable youths. On 22 December, Fernando Pizarro Niebla, a child enrolled in the *Flechas* of Puebla de Cazalla (Seville), wrote a letter apologising for his modest contribution (25 pesetas), which he nevertheless hoped would be channelled to those defending "mi Dios y mi Patria". He also revealed his impatience to reach military age, participate in the war and sacrifice his life in the fight against the "canalla marxista" (he quoted Queipo *verbatim*). Another letter from the Spanish protectorate of Morocco (Cape Juby), dated 15 November 1936, exposed the ideological impact of the violent *Aguinaldo* campaign. 12 year-old Pablo Morlán Fernández insulted both "la canalla de las hordas rojas" and the Republican leadership and philosophised if leftists "tienen corazón", proudly quoting Queipo in the process: "la madre y el padre de

⁶⁹⁵ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5382, carpeta 16. The letter also exposed the concept of a religious crusade by making a reference to the Nationalist soldiers sacrificing "su vida por Dios y por la Patria".

⁶⁹⁶ They also apologised for "Muy pobre el obsequio pero tenga en cuenta que todas somos muy pobres y la mayoría no tenemos padre". **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5382, Carpeta 16.

⁶⁹⁷ José Brenes also thanked Queipo for: "sus simpáticas y patrióticas charlas, el Español que no le quiera es porque no es Español de pura cepa." **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5382, Carpeta 16.

"Yo nací Español y Español quiero morir, pues creo, que para todo aquel que se precie de ser Español no hay en el globo [...] Nación más Sublime, más Heroica ni más Noble que nuestra inmortal España."

Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur (Seville), Legajo 5382, Carpeta 16.

“todos ellos”. All this was rooted in his eagerness to witness the rebirth of Spain, defended by “verdaderos españoles”. Fernández also revealed his frustration at being too young to enlist in the Nationalist army. He nevertheless prayed fervently for “el justo castigo de la Canalla Marxista”. Lastly, Fernández openly acknowledged the influence of General Queipo’s speeches in his own thinking and cited one as being particularly inspirational: the general’s *charla* of 23 November, followed by a speech delivered by “Manuel Sinún”. According to Fernández, a euphoric “Sinún” claimed that Jesus Christ had anointed Franco as the saviour of Spain.⁶⁹⁸ “Sinún” was in fact Manuel Siuot Rodríguez, a lawyer acclaimed by the reactionary right for his pedagogical work with underprivileged youths in Andalucía. His speech of 23 November 1936 must have been so inflammable that *ABC* opted against printing it.⁶⁹⁹

The politics of hate promoted by General Queipo forged an entire generation of extremists. These youths were clearly influenced by three factors: a) the incendiary *charlas* of Queipo de Llano, which encouraged and justified Nationalist repression; b) the myth of Seville (and other Nationalist legends), which provided legitimacy to rebellion; and c) the successive fundraising campaigns, which not only funded the civil war, but also served as an invaluable propaganda tool for the Francoist regime.

Palliating the humanitarian catastrophe: introduction

The setting up of charitable events to palliate the economic crisis triggered by the civil war was customary practice in Nationalist Seville. All expenses were covered by the local population, in particular the middle-classes. Non-attendance was equated with treason and punished accordingly. As a consequence, charity events would inevitably turn out to be resounding financial successes. Organisational costs were asphyxiating and the profit, when not directly channelled to the war effort, was handed to Nationalist relief agencies (also maintained by the local population). The II Division pioneered such initiatives: on 24 October, Queipo de Llano announced that a “patriotic bullfight” (*corrida patriótica*) held in Seville had raised 102,556.10 pesetas; however, the organising committee, presided by Pepe El Algabéño, handed civil governor Pedro Parias a clean profit of 111,726.25 pesetas.⁷⁰⁰ Events continued to be organised at a frantic pace. On 8 December, a dog-racing track (*canódromo*) was inaugurated in Seville. The winners of the first race donated all their earnings to the *Aguinaldo del Soldado*.

⁶⁹⁸ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5382, Carpeta 16.

⁶⁹⁹ **ABC** (Seville), 24 November 1936. See also: Siuot, Manuel, *Mis charlas en el micrófono del General*.

⁷⁰⁰ **FE** (Seville), 25 October 1936.

Present as guests of honour in a stand decorated with the flags of Portugal, Italy, Germany and the *Majdén*, were Queipo de Llano and his wife.⁷⁰¹ Furthermore, these initiatives were replicated in the *pueblos*. For example, in Aguilar de la Frontera (Córdoba) a local theatre play raised the respectable sum of 2,702.50 pesetas for the Army Fund.⁷⁰² Indeed, the mere use of the term ‘patriotic’ was sufficient to ensure the success of a fundraising campaign, for between the words ‘patriotic’ and ‘unpatriotic’ stood the thin line that separated economic and physical repression. For the state, the situation could not have been more clear-cut: all offenders were “verdaderos antipatriotas” undermining the new regime. While Seville plunged into the depths that Cabanellas termed an “orgía económica”, on 31 October 1936 the Army Fund (Infantry branch alone) had amassed the astronomical sum of 3,489,558.93 pesetas.⁷⁰³

Palliating the humanitarian catastrophe: the *Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados*

The kleptocratic policies adopted by the rebels were economically unsustainable. They were first and foremost a reflexive response to the failure of the coup in most of Spain. The plunder of the popular districts of Seville was part of the initial Nationalist repressive project; however, the insurgents failed to draw up any contingency plans for the possible defeat of the rebellion. Thus, what was primarily an extension of physical repression gained a status of its own: as the coup degenerated into a long war of attrition, so did plunder evolve into organised extortion. Economic and physical violence complemented each other, forming an all-encompassing repressive network. The kleptocratic policies of the regime funded the civil war, punished ideological enemies, consolidated the *Pact of blood* and paved the way for the establishment of a totalitarian state. The target population was subjected to all forms of extortion, including the pro-Nationalist middle-classes, who felt unjustly treated by the new regime. Nevertheless, if bourgeois cooperation implied a drastic reduction in living standards, the situation of the masses was far more delicate: donation equalled starvation.

The Nationalists gave two options to the population living in rebel-controlled Spain: either accept the economic demands of the rebels or be included in the policy of extermination reserved for the Republican political class. Ultimately, the state might have successfully

⁷⁰¹ *FE* (Seville), 9 December 1936. A few days later, a “patriotic concert” to raise money for the Aviation Fund was scheduled for 13 December at *Coliseo España*. The organisers were exempt from paying rent, electricity, or even printing costs for the programs. *FE* (Seville), 11 December 1936.

⁷⁰² *FE* (Seville), 16 December 1936.

⁷⁰³ Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días: nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República Española*, page 879; *FE* (Seville), 3 November 1936.

terrorised its citizens into submission to the point of accepting starvation; however, it was now faced with the consequences of that same policy. By the end of the summer of 1936, rebel-controlled territory was on the verge of social and economic collapse. Ironically, the regime was then left with no alternative but to attempt to contain a humanitarian catastrophe of its own making.

The Nationalist leadership became aware of the potentially devastating consequences of its repressive project as early as 2 August, when the *Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados* was created following an emergency meeting of the *Comisión Gestora* presided by Mayor Ramón de Carranza.⁷⁰⁴ Ironically, Carranza had contributed decisively to the economic ruin of Seville by leading a military column that brutally subdued large parts of the province.⁷⁰⁵ Also present at the meeting was the president of the *Asociación Sevillana de Caridad*, Antonio Gamero Martín (and a number of other members from this organisation). However, it was not until 17 August that the *Junta* was formally established via *bando nº12*; thus revealing that humanitarian relief was not a priority for the new regime.⁷⁰⁶ Furthermore, the *Junta* followed the traditional Nationalist formula of concentrating power on a reduced number of individuals: the Mayor of Seville was duly appointed as its president, notwithstanding his evident unsuitability for the job. The board reached the unanimous decision that the *Junta*'s main goal was to provide charity meals for the unemployed, which would be produced by existing *cocinas económicas*, already unable to cope with the needs of a society on the brink of mass starvation. The board's single greatest concern, however, was "la tributación y forma de llevarla a cabo, para obtener efectivo metálico con que atender a los gastos que han de originarse." To this end, it was agreed that the *Junta* would be financed by a universal tax imposed on the local population via the issuing of a special stamp (*sello especial*). Constrained by a kleptocratic economic policy, the *Junta* could never succeed as a traditional humanitarian organisation. Nor was this its *raison d'être*. For example, eligibility conditions for charity meals were extremely restrictive. Only individuals in possession of a special permit (issued by the

⁷⁰⁴ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficiencia, Actas de la Junta de Auxilios a los Necesitados, 2 August 1936: "El Sr. Alcalde hizo presente que el objeto de la reunion era el de llevar a la practica una iniciativa del Excmo. Sr. Don Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, General Jefe de la Segunda División Orgánica de constituir una Junta para auxiliar a los necesitados por paro forzoso u otras circunstancias. Despues de un cambio de impresiones se acordó constituir un organismo con la denominación de "Junta de Auxilio a Necesitados."

⁷⁰⁵ For the actions of the Carranza column in the province of Seville see: Medina Vilallonga, Rafael de, *Tiempo pasado*.

⁷⁰⁶ Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *Bandos y órdenes dictados por Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra, General Jefe de la Segunda División Orgánica y del Ejército del Sur desde la declaración del estado de guerra, 18 de julio de 1936, hasta fin de febrero de 1937, etc.*, pages 13-15.

government) and whose loyalty to the new regime had been previously confirmed (via a positive reference from the parish priest) could apply.⁷⁰⁷ Accordingly, on 2 September the *Junta* released the following decree:

“Se previne a todos los que actualmente están recibiendo raciones de comida de esta Junta, que a partir de primeros de Noviembre próximo, será requisito indispensable que todos los varones de 18 a 60 años de edad que figuren en los carnets, exhiban también el de estar inscripto en la oficina de colocación obrera.”⁷⁰⁸

The number of applicants was intentionally kept to an absolute minimum. Only adult males aged 18-60, unemployed and registered as active jobseekers were eligible to apply. It was taken for granted that all females, as well as males outside the established age bracket, would be supported in full by their respective families. Former Republican sympathisers were automatically disqualified; nor would it be advisable to make such a public admission of ‘guilt’ in a time when physical repression climaxed in Seville. Indeed, anyone found wanting a positive reference from the local priest automatically became a social non-entity; as far as the government was concerned, the individual did not exist. Whether his death came as a result of extra-judicial execution or starvation was irrelevant.⁷⁰⁹

The guiding principles of the *Junta* were clearly outlined in its statutes.⁷¹⁰ Section one confirmed the growing symbiosis Church-State, via the creation of an “organización, netamente cristiana”, where the government delegated to priests indirect power of life and death over the local population:

⁷⁰⁷ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficiencia, Actas de la Junta de Auxilios a los Necesitados, 2 August 1936.

⁷⁰⁸ **FE** (Seville), 27 September 1936.

⁷⁰⁹ Restrictive eligibility conditions extended to the *Casa Cuna*. A letter from the *Comisión de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla* to the Madre Superiora dated 21 January 1938 read: “de que convendría procurar, por todos los medios posibles un criterio estrecho para decretar las admisiones de niños y madres lactantes que estimaba debían quedar limitadas a los que verdaderamente se encontrasen en situación de desvalimiento, por observarse se daba con frecuencia el caso de encontrarse allí madres lactantes que no hallaban verdaderamente necesitadas y niños que podrían ser mantenidos por sus padres; contestándole la Presidencia que no venía inconveniente ninguno en que por la señora Superiora se procediera a examinar con detenimiento en cada caso las circunstancias de las personas solicitantes, y no se autorizara el ingreso, sino en el caso de que aquélla informara que procedía así, por la situación económica deplorable de los peticionarios, a cuyo efecto oficiaría al Establecimiento.”

Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla (Seville), Casa Cuna, Legajo 39.

⁷¹⁰ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficiencia, Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados.

“Con la denominación de “Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados”, se crea una organización, netamente cristiana, auxiliar de la Asociación Sevillana de Caridad, dedicada a facilitar alimentos a todas aquellas personas que se encuentren imposibilitadas de atender a su sustento y al de su familia, por carecer de recursos para ello a causa de paro forzoso, enfermedad, etc.”

Concerning funding, section two read:

“Para atender al cumplimiento de sus fines, esta Junta dispondrá de los siguientes recursos: Las aportaciones voluntarias de los vecinos de Sevilla que contribuyan a la suscripción abierta con carácter permanente para el expresado objeto en las oficinas de la 2^a División. A) El producto de la recaudación que se obtenga con la imposición que se declara obligatoria, de unos sellos que pondrá en circulación la expresada Junta.”

Section three revealed the form of taxation. The *Junta* established an ambitious VAT-type tax only possible under a totalitarian regime, since it required a surveillance network capable of monitoring every single economic transaction in Seville. Last but not least (section eight), the *Junta* adverted that transgression would be “castigada severamente” and “enérgicamente” and encouraged denunciations:

“Será castigada severamente la tenencia de vales por las personas distintas de las que los hayan solicitado, así como también se sancionará enérgicamente a las que soliciten y obtengan estos vales mediante falsedades y a cuyos individuos se demuestre cuentan con medios para su sostenimiento. Toda persona que tenga conocimiento de algún abuso de esta índole, vendrá obligada a denunciarlo para favorecer así a los verdaderamente necesitados.”

In spite of the restrictive eligibility conditions (section six)⁷¹¹, the number of applicants continued to grow at an alarming rate. On 18 September, the *Junta* decided to increase the

⁷¹¹ “Para obtener raciones alimenticios en las expresadas cocinas es indispensable que el interesado cabeza de familia lo solicite mediante impreso que al efecto se le facilitará en las oficinas establecidas para este servicio en las Tenencias de Alcaldía de la Ronda de Capuchinos, calle Bazán y Mercados de la Puerta de la Carne, Postigo y Triana o en las que en lo sucesivo se habiliten con dicho fin. Estas solicitudes deberán ser avaladas por el Sr. Cura párroco o persona solvente del distrito municipal en que el peticionario habite, garantizando que éste carece de recursos para el sostenimiento de su familia. Una vez admitida la solicitud con el requisito anteriormente expresado se expedirá al solicitante en la misma oficina una ficha de identidad, que exhibirá diariamente en la Tenencia de Alcaldía del distrito respectivo para que, previa la anotación correspondiente, le sean entregados los vales necesarios para

number of meals: “Se cambiaron impresiones sobre el constante aumento de solicitudes interesando socorros y se acordó hacer lo posible para forzar la producción actual de las cocinas en mil raciones más”. However, the board also agreed to schedule a meeting with General Queipo to discuss possible measures both to increase revenue and discourage further applications.⁷¹²

In short, the board concluded that it would only continue to function as long as it remained a lucrative enterprise. As a typical business (and not a relief organisation), the *Junta* explored new avenues to maximise profits and reward (political) loyalty. Large companies were given the option between paying a tax calculated in advance (and save money in the process) or following standard procedure. The majority settled for the first option, a compromise that pleased both sides. In deep contrast, the situation of the working-class remained truly desperate. Long queues of people gathered daily at the gates of the Infantry barracks (calle Jesús del Gran Poder) and also calle Baños to collect food leftovers. The spectacle was so shocking that the head of the Municipal Guard wrote a letter to the *Junta* requesting it to issue a decree ordering crowds to disperse immediately once all food had been distributed.⁷¹³

Punishing ideological enemies: Amate

The Nationalist leadership remained indifferent to the plight of the masses. It still perceived events primarily in political terms and the post-18 July famine was regarded as an adequate punishment for working-class Republicanism. The case of the popular district of Amate was exemplary. Amate was arguably the most notorious shantytown suburb of the Andalusian capital, where poverty, crime, unemployment, and extreme-left politics all converged to form

recoger la ración o raciones alimenticias en la cocina económica a que haya sido asignado. De los vales expedidos por cada Tenencia de Alcadía, se enviará relación diaria y circunstanciada la Oficina central de la Junta.” **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficencia, Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados.

⁷¹² “publicar una nota en la prensa dando a conocer las responsabilidades en que incurrirían los que estando trabajando solicitaran carnets o no entregaran los ya concedidos, sirviéndose de ellos y que el Sr. Vice-Presidente visite al Excmo. Sr. General Jefe de la Segunda División para darle a conocerle el aumento constante de peticiones de socorros, y que el gasto actual es superior a lo que se recauda por venta de sellos, lo que en plazo relativamente breve, dará motivo a que se agoten los fondos de reserva procedentes de la suscripción pública, a fin de buscar los medios precisos para evitar tener que suspender o disminuir notablemente el reparto de comidas.” **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficencia, Actas de la Junta de Auxilios a los necesitados, 18 September 1936.

⁷¹³ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficencia, Actas de la Junta de Auxilios a los necesitados, 18 September 1936.

the social powder keg of Seville.⁷¹⁴ Three months after its violent pacification, the *Junta* released on 22 October 1936 a crude study that would sentence the neighbourhood to starvation. It was clear that the Nationalists were still chastising the neighbourhood for siding with the Republic during the coup; this despite the “durísimo castigo” inflicted by Mayor Carranza on 19 July 1936.⁷¹⁵ According to the *Junta*’s own estimates, 5,504 people resided in shacks (by multiplying the 1,366 shacks per 4; the number 4 standing for the average nuclear family). Rather than conduct a census, the board opted for guesswork and ignored the prevalence of higher birth rates among the urban poor. The *Junta* also noted that of all 5,504 residents living in extreme poverty, only 260 people were registered in the *padrón de obreros parados de Sevilla* (unemployed census), of which all but 8 had found employment. In conclusion, the ‘study’ reached the figure of 1,400 (260 x 4) residents “que no tienen medios de manutención”. Another report from the Municipal Guard declared that by 20 October 1936, 2,500 daily meals were being handed out in Amate. Since the unemployment census revealed that only 1,024 people “no tienen medios de vida, según confesión propia”, the *Junta* reached the bizarre conclusion that it should immediately cancel the distribution of 1,476 daily meals in the neighbourhood: “suponemos que de los mil cuatrocientos setenta y seis individuos restantes hay muchos que o tienen otros medios de vida o no quieren trabajar, por no haberlo hecho nunca[...] Proponemos, en su visita, que no se socorra a ninguna familia perteneciente al barrio de Amate, cuyo cabeza no esté inscrito en el censo de obreros parados.”⁷¹⁶

The Nationalists were so pleased by the financial outcome of this measure that they considered applying it to all working-class districts of Seville: “si esta medida la aplicáramos a los distintos barrios, podríamos introducir una enorme economía en el reparto de comidas que hoy se hace en Sevilla.” By 18 September, one hundred vouchers had already been confiscated from individuals found guilty of misuse.⁷¹⁷ Thus, the *Junta*’s goal was to provide aid to a minimum number of people (and contain a humanitarian crisis that would compromise the Nationalist war effort), while at the same time punishing ideological enemies by means of starvation. Hence, rather than a humanitarian agency, the *Junta* functioned as a repressive

⁷¹⁴ For Amate see: Almuedo Palma, José, *Al este del edén: estudio demográfico del crecimiento urbano en el sector oriental de Sevilla : Nervión, Ciudad Jardín, Cerro del Águila y Amate (1922-1935)*.

⁷¹⁵ Montán Luis, “Cómo conquistó Sevilla el General Queipo de Llano” in *Episodios de la Guerra Civil*, nº5, page 31.

⁷¹⁶ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficiencia, Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados.

⁷¹⁷ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficiencia, Actas de la Junta de Auxilios a los necesitados, 18 September 1936.

tool to keep the local poor in check by using food rationing as an instrument for social control. The collective punishment of the residents of Amate would only conclude a year later, when General Queipo ordered the razing of the entire shantytown of under the pretext that it was a “barriada peligrosa”, leaving 6,000 people homeless.⁷¹⁸

Palliating the humanitarian catastrophe

The transition from *coup d'état* to civil war aggravated the already fragile economic condition of the working-class of Seville. Nationalist repression, the failure of the rebellion in most of Spain and the establishment of a Kleptocratic State; all were at the root of a humanitarian crisis that threatened the very survival of the Nationalist regime.⁷¹⁹ Unsurprisingly, a fifth soup kitchen was inaugurated in Seville on 19 September, increasing the number of charity meals being handed out daily in the capital of Andalucía to an impressive 14,000. Less than a week later, the figure had risen to 14,726. In order to cut costs, the *Junta* called on its allies for assistance, most notably the Catholic Church. As a result, the nuns of the *Hermanas de la Caridad* were reduced to *de facto* slave labour and worked for free in the soup kitchens. Regardless, on the day of the inauguration of the new kitchen, the *Junta* released a note aimed at discouraging further applications:

“Queremos hacer público para que llegue a conocimiento de cuantos están recibiendo este auxilio, que a pesar de las severas advertencias de la Autoridad Militar y las medidas adoptadas por esta Junta, han logrado obtener comidas algunos desaprensivos que no son tales necesitados, a los que, una vez descubiertos, se les ha retirado la ficha de auxilio.

Pero, en delante, no será esto solo lo que se haga, pues aquello no es solo un abuso, sino un verdadero robo que tales indeseables hacen a necesitados auténticos; sino que, una vez esté terminada de organizar la inspección (cuestión de brevísimos días) será denunciado inexorablemente a la Autoridad Militar cualquiera otro caso que se descubra, y ni que decir tiene que la sanción será adecuada al grave delito de robar el alimento al necesitado, ya que

⁷¹⁸ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Actas de la Comisión Gestora del Ayuntamiento, September 1936 – July 1937.

⁷¹⁹ The military costs of pursuing the civil war were, after Nationalist repression (both physical and economic), the second greatest cause for the humanitarian catastrophe that erupted in Seville. For instance, the failure of the coup in most of Spain compelled the rebels to enforce conscription. However, the rebels did so without taking into consideration the economic reality of Seville. Working-class conscripts were often the sole source of income of their respective household. The Falange attempted to palliate starvation by releasing a circular entitled “No se puede permitir que las familias de los que luchan pasen hambre y necesidad.” **FE** (Seville), 9 December 1936.

no pudiendo producir más las cocinas, se encuentran pendientes de despachos numerosas nuevas solicitudes.

Los auténticos necesitados que conozcan algún caso de abuso, harán bien y cumplirán un deber de ciudadanía denunciándolo a la Junta o en la Tenencia de Alcaldía donde recojan sus bonos. Esto será su beneficio y en el de otros necesitados que aguardan el momento de ver satisfecha su necesidad. Que se den por avisados del peligro que corren los que traten de llevarse lo que no es suyo: nos consta que el castigo será ejemplar... Y, como dice nuestro insigne General “quien avisa, no engaña.”⁷²⁰

Ironically, the Kleptocratic State was now accusing its own population of “robbery” (“robo”). The concluding paragraphs encouraged denunciations, reaffirmed that all transgression would be met with “castigo [...] ejemplar” and quoted General Queipo de Llano *verbatim*. By 4 October, a surveillance network formed by 19 inspection centres, under the overall leadership of Daniel Puch Aguilar, was already working with clockwork precision. It monitored the five kitchens in Calle Bazán, Capuchinos, Triana, Postigo and Puerta de la Carne; all located in the most economically depressed areas of Seville.⁷²¹ Nevertheless, both restriction and repression failed to eradicate transgression in Seville, much to the dismay of General Queipo. The desperate economic condition of the working-class explained the recourse to risk tactics, such as falsely claiming eligibility for charity meals. On 3 November, a visibly exasperated Queipo de Llano declared:

“tengo noticias de que hay bastantes desalmados que, a pesar de haber obtenido colocación recientemente, han seguido yendo a recoger la comida que roban a esos pobres seres a quienes todavía no les ha correspondido el carnet. Claro que he ordenado que se tomen las medidas convenientes para descubrir a los autores de esa villanía y tengan la seguridad los que tal hacen – ya deben saber que soy hombre que cumple lo que anuncia – que al que se coja en un renuncio de esos, en primer lugar perderá el destino que tenga, que será abierto por otro obrero sin trabajo, y ese obrero que cometiese esa infamia se pasará seis meses en la cárcel y después de salir de la cárcel y aun cuando no obtenga trabajo, perderá el derecho a obtener el carnet. Me han dicho también que hay algunos tan canallas que van a recoger el plato de comida con el sólo objeto de hacer gasto, y que después hacen alarde de tirar esa comida al

⁷²⁰ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficiencia, Actas de la Junta de Auxilios a los necesitados, 18 September 1936.

⁷²¹ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficiencia, Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados.

río. Tengan mucho cuidado los que cometan esa infamia, pues he dado órdenes severísimas para que al que se coja cometiendo esa canallada siga el mismo camino que la comida.”⁷²²

General Queipo unintentionally exposed the full extent of the humanitarian crisis in Seville. He revealed that a remarkable 16,600 charity meals were being handed daily in the Andalusian capital and “que hay dos ó tres mil instancias pidiendo alimentación, solicitudes a las que no se ha podido atender porque no hay locales ni elementos para hacer más comidas ni medios económicos para ello.” The 3,000 individuals deprived of charity meals were, in Queipo’s own words, “pobres seres” without any apparent means of survival. The general acquitted his administration from any responsibility by citing Seville’s overstretched resources and claiming that the *Junta* lacked the economic capacity to accept more applications. Subsequent events disproved Queipo’s discourse: a mere twelve days after the General’s 3 November *charla*, the rebels mobilised sufficient resources to organise the *Aguinaldo del Soldado* fundraising campaign. Still, Queipo used his self-exonerating speech to turn the pressure on the local population. On 6 November, the rebel general made an unequivocal statement concerning the source of funding for the 17,000 meals being handed out daily in Seville: “se sufraga con el importe que voluntariamente aceptaron sobre sus sueldos y jornales, por mi iniciativa, todos los sevillanos.”⁷²³ Ironically, the omnipotent General Queipo, who claimed to have performed a ‘miracle’ on 18 July 1936 after being inspired by the Holy Ghost, now conceded that he was powerless to solve the feeding of 3,000 people.⁷²⁴

By 30 September 1936, the *Asociación Sevillana de Caridad* was providing assistance to 47,784 people in Seville, out of a total population of 267,192.⁷²⁵ During that same month, the *Junta de Auxilios a los necesitados* handed out a total of 411,752 meals that cost the organisation 205,876 pesetas. By October, the number of meals had risen to an astonishing 502,033 (with costs ascending to 251,016.50 pesetas). The November report revealed the success of the board’s cost-cutting policy: only 220,482 pesetas were spent in charity meals. No official figures for meals were released for November; however, General Queipo stated in his *charla* of 6 November that 17,000 meals were being distributed daily, which would amount to a total of

⁷²² *FE* (Seville), 4 November 1936.

⁷²³ *FE* (Seville), 7 November 1936.

⁷²⁴ Alloucherie, Jean, *Noches de Sevilla*, page 247.

⁷²⁵ For the *Asociación Sevillana de Caridad* see: **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficiencia, Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados. For the population of Seville in 1936 see: Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *La utopía revolucionaria: Sevilla en la Segunda República*, page 22.

510,000 pesetas. By December, the *Junta* had also succeeded in reducing the number of meals: 452,649 (total cost: 226,324.50 pesetas). Lastly, the board's much-publicised fears of financial insolvency proved to be nothing more than a clever subterfuge to pressure the local population into financially supporting the organisation. A report compiled by *Junta*'s treasurer revealed that by 30 November 539,090.70 pesetas had been collected from the special tax imposed by General Queipo and a further 512,756.80 pesetas from 'voluntary' donations; adding up to an impressive total of 1,051,847.50 pesetas. The revenue from private contributions almost equalled that of a tax imposed on all commercial transactions in Seville; an indication of the coercive power of the state. On the other hand, expenditure stood at 786,207.50 pesetas (including expenses associated with the instalment of a new soup kitchen and the upgrading the existing four).⁷²⁶ The end result was a straight profit of 265,640 pesetas, a figure that refuted Queipo de Llano's speech of 3 November, in which the general sentenced 3,000 people to starvation after proclaiming the *Junta*'s financial impotence to expand the number of daily meals given to the local poor.

A profitable business

The *Junta de Auxilios a los necesitados* was designed to appear to be a relief agency, but never to function as one. In fact, the *Junta* was a profit-oriented business with five clear objectives: 1) to return a profit, 2) avert the imminent humanitarian catastrophe, 3) punish ideological enemies (by means of starvation), 4) cement the *pact of Blood* (by promoting cooperation between its different members) and 5) lay the foundations for the establishment of a totalitarian regime (via the creation of a surveillance network). Ultimately, the *Junta* failed to attain all but one of its goals: to preclude the humanitarian crisis. Strict eligibility rules, the imposition of a universal tax and, above all, the exclusion of former Republicans, all failed to prevent mass famine. As a result, the board decided to reformulate its objectives: the *Junta* now concentrated its efforts on palliating the humanitarian crisis, while still anathematising Republicans. Indeed, the creation of the *Pact of blood* led to the parallel formation of a 'Pact of Hunger', based on the punishment of ideological enemies by means of starvation.⁷²⁷ After fulfilling its primary function, the *Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados* officially

⁷²⁶ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficencia, Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados. Also, a report in *FE* (22 October) revealed that the *Junta* had spent around 775,000 pesetas and estimated that the soup kitchens would have handed a total of 1,150,000 meals by the end of October; all covered by 'voluntary' donations. *FE* (Seville), 22 October 1936.

⁷²⁷ Richards, Michael, *A time of silence: civil war and the culture of repression in Franco's Spain, 1936-1945*, pages 7-66. For the 'Pact of Hunger' see page 37.

disbanded on 15 January 1937, transferring all its funds to the *Asociación Sevillana de Caridad*. However, the ‘Pact of Hunger’ prevailed, leading to the so-called ‘Years of Hunger’ of the 1940s. Moreover, economic repression did not end with Queipo de Llano’s unceremonious banishment from the capital of Andalucía. On 4 March 1944, the *Diputación* ‘invited’ all *pueblos* in the province of Seville to adhere to a public subscription to buy the insignia of the *Gran Cruz Laureada de San Fernando* for General Queipo. On 20 March, the ‘saviour of Seville’ expressed his “emocionada gratitud” at the gesture.⁷²⁸

As for the capital of Andalucía, it was living officially in peace and removed from the frontline, but functioning as a laboratory to test the economic policies of the nascent Nationalist regime. General Queipo de Llano’s Kafkaian social experiments transformed his administration into one giant extortion racket that amassed, for the Army Fund alone, 16,625,825.25 pesetas during the civil war.⁷²⁹ In the process, it triggered a humanitarian catastrophe of unimaginable proportions: in late 1936, almost one in every five residents in the unofficial capital of Nationalist Spain depended directly on aid for survival.⁷³⁰

⁷²⁸ **Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla** (Seville), Legajo 418.

⁷²⁹ 1936: 5,370,598.03 pesetas; 1937: 4,888,570.08 pesetas; 1938: 5,769,711.23 pesetas; 1939: 594,972.91 pesetas. Total: 16,623,852.25 pesetas. **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5382, Carpeta 13.

⁷³⁰ By 30 September 1936, the *Asociación Sevillana de Caridad* was providing assistance to 47,784 people in Seville out of a total population of 267,192. **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficiencia, Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados. For the population of Seville in 1936 see: Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *La utopía revolucionaria: Sevilla en la Segunda República*, page 22.

Chapter VI

The “apostasy of the masses”: cultural repression and the Catholic Church during the II Republic and the Spanish Civil War (1931-39)

Introduction

The days of 17-18 July hold great symbolic significance for the Spanish Catholic Church, far beyond the traumatic events of 1936 that signalled the start of the bloodiest anticlerical persecution in its History. The Spanish Civil War resulted in the deaths of 6,832 members of the clergy, including 283 nuns and 4,184 parish priests (out of a total of 29,902).⁷³¹ Exactly 102 years before the outbreak of the rebellion (17-18 July 1834), the first major anticlerical riot in Spain erupted in Madrid, triggered by the rumour that the local clergy had caused a cholera epidemic by poisoning the public water supply. Almost a hundred priests were lynched in the streets of the capital. Ultimately, the 1834 riots confirmed not only that the Church had become a divisive force in Spain, but also that the working-class was violently opposed to it. Hence, when the first Anarchist and Socialist missionaries arrived in the Iberian Peninsula in the late XIX Century, they found themselves preaching to the converted, but nevertheless provided an ideological structure to anticlericalism. In panic, the Catholic hierarchy developed a siege mentality, becoming increasingly (and decisively) politicised; thus crystallising its status as a polarising cultural force in XX-Century Spain.⁷³²

The “apostasy of the masses”

⁷³¹ The breakdown is as follows: 13 bishops, 283 nuns, 2,365 members of male religious orders and 4,184 parish priests. Montero Moreno, Antonio, *Historia de la persecución religiosa en España, 1936-1939*. See also: Rager Suñer, Hilario, *Gunpowder and incense: the Catholic Church and Spanish Civil War*. For a conservative perspective on anticlericalism in Seville see: Salas, Nicolás, *Sevilla en tiempos de los anti-Dios*. For the historiography of the Catholic Church in western Andalucía see: Martín Riego; Manuel; Ruiz Sánchez, José-Leonardo, “Historiografía de la Edad Moderna y Contemporánea de la Iglesia en la Andalucía Occidental (1965-2007)” in *Anuario de la Historia de la Iglesia Andaluza*, vol. I, año 2008, Sevilla, C.E.T., Cátedra “Beato Marcelo Spínola”, 2008.

⁷³² For Anticlericalism in XIX-Century Spain see: Callahan, William James, *Church, politics and society in Spain, 1750-1874*. In 1884, priest Félix Sarda, the editor of *La Revista Popular*, published a controversial book in which he claimed that “Liberalism is a sin”. Sardá y Salvany, Félix, *El Liberalismo es Pecado. Cuestiones candentes*. The concept found continuity in contemporary Spain. In 1990, priest and historian Vicente Cárcel Ortí wrote: “el ideal religioso es infinitamente superior al ideal político.” Cárcel Ortí, Vicente, *La persecución religiosa en España durante la Segunda República: 1931-1939*, page 394.

The identification of the Catholic Church with sectarian politics belied its claim that it was the highest representative of Spanish identity. For instance, the Vírgen del Pilar was the patron saint of the Civil Guard, which was in the frontline of a bitter class war pitting the landed aristocracy against the landless peasantry. Precisely thirty-six years prior to the outbreak of the 1936 rebellion (17 July 1900), the Basilica of the Vírgen del Pilar was stoned during political clashes in Zaragoza.⁷³³ By the turn of the century, the Vírgen del Pilar had become a symbol of social and political division in the country. However, the Church hierarchy kept insisting in equating Spanishness with adherence to Catholicism.⁷³⁴ The paradox between the Church's universal claims and its alignment with the political right was skilfully exploited by its detractors. The masses were particularly incensed by the apparent lack of morality of its representatives; a fact observed by Marxist sociologist/journalist Franz Borkenau in civil war Barcelona: "they are making fun at the expense of the church and of the clergy. The conversation is in Catalan, yet I am able to grasp its general trend. There are two main themes which call forth that special kind of laughter that expresses both hatred and contempt. The one is the greediness of the clergy: the church of the poor, the church whose realm is not of this world, has proved very clever in securing the best of the pleasures of this world. The second, proffered, of course, with still more laughter, is the alleged objectionable conduct of the priests, who if you are to believe them, are professionals of chastity."⁷³⁵

The same "hatred and contempt" had been present during the *Tragic Week (Semana Trágica)*, which erupted 27 years prior to the outbreak of the civil war in mainland Spain (18 July 1909). Mass demonstrations flared up in Barcelona after a group of aristocratic Catholic women tried to present religious objects to working-class conscripts about to set sail for Spanish Morocco. In Morocco, Spain was entangled in a deeply unpopular colonial war in which the lower-classes

⁷³³ Three years later (11 October 1903), a leftist crowd returning from a workers' rally in Bilbao assaulted a pilgrimage procession celebrating the recently proclaimed patronage of Our Lady of Begoña over Vizcaya. One Catholic was killed, the local residence of the Jesuits stoned and religious images dumped into a nearby river. Christian, William A., *Moving crucifixes in modern Spain*, page 17.

⁷³⁴ In 1903, a Jesuit priest wrote in *Razón y Fe* that Spain "has Catholicism inscribed in its heart with letters of fire. Even more, Catholicism is so incorporated and connaturalized within its very being, that it cannot cease to be Catholic, without ceasing, first of all, to be a nation." Lannon, Frances, "Ideological tensions, The Social Praxis and Cultural Politics of Spanish Catholicism in Graham, Helen, and Labanyi, Jo (eds), *Spanish Cultural Studies. An Introduction. The Struggle for Modernity*, page 42.

⁷³⁵ Conversation between militiamen and a group of women in *Las Ramblas*. Borkenau, Franz, *The Spanish cockpit*, page 82. Moreover, disciplinary problems severely damaged the reputation of the Spanish Catholic Church. Antonio Ruiz Vilaplana reported a case in Estépar (Burgos) where the local priest sexually molested several young girls before being eventually sentenced to 12 years in prison. The Church hierarchy attempted to silence the episode. Ruiz Vilaplana, Antonio, *Burgo's justice: a year's experience of nationalist Spain*, pages 107-113.

were used as cannon-fodder by a brutal military caste, the *Africanistas*, obsessed with rebuilding the country's recently-lost empire. When news of the massacre of the unit that left Barcelona on 18 July reached Catalonia, rage turned into violence. The Anarchist union, the *Confederación Nacional del Trabajo*, was in the vanguard of the protests, during which over a hundred religious buildings were sacked and burned. For nearly a week, columns of dark smoke clouded the skyline of Barcelona before military units from other regions of Spain were rushed to Catalonia to put a bloody end to the *Tragic Week* (and thus turning an anti-war riot into a regionalist *cause célèbre*).⁷³⁶

Events such as the *Tragic Week* alerted the Church to the escalation of anticlericalism in Spain. In order to counter this trend, the Catholic hierarchy devised a proselytization campaign aimed at re-Catholicising the country inspired by the Papal Encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (16 May 1891). Public spaces were consecrated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus and a network of confessional trade-unions and Catholic missions established all over Spain (301 missions in the Dioceses of Seville alone between 1908-21; as opposed to 213 between 1922-37).⁷³⁷ In 1915, the Church published a manual in which it introduced missionaries as modern-day apostles. Missionary fervour was followed by a series of controversial miraculous visions that invariably took place in times of great political turmoil. For instance, the visions of Gandía (8 June 1918) and Limpias (19 March 1919), occurred during the *Trienio Bolchevique* (Bolshevik triennium) of 1918-20. As expected, Gandía was consecrated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus on 20 May 1920. However, the Church's plan to re-hegemonise Spanish culture ended in failure, largely because of its unconditional support of property rights. Another major source of friction was the neo-medieval moral code promoted by the Catholic hierarchy. That same year, Jesuit priest and Catholic trade-unionist Sisino Nevares reported to the Vatican that the masses were "like pagans who know neither God nor the Church."⁷³⁸

⁷³⁶ For the *Tragic Week* see: Ullman, Joan Connelly, *The tragic week: a study of anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912*; Ealham, Chris, ***Class, culture, and conflict in Barcelona, 1898-1937***.

⁷³⁷ Ruiz Sánchez, José Leonardo, "Cien años de propaganda católica: las misiones parroquiales en al archidiócesis hispalense (1848-1952)" in ***Hispania Sacra***, vol. L, Madrid, CSIC, 1998, pages 316-19. This policy culminated in 1919 when the Cerro de los Ángeles – the geographic centre of Spain – was consecrated to the Sacred Heart of Jesus. King Alfonso XIII was present at the ceremony, flanked by his entire government. Vincent, Mary, "Spain" in Buchanan, Tom, Conway, Martin, ***Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-1965***, pages 97-98.

⁷³⁸ Other visions occurred in Navarre (1920) and Melilla (1922). The Catholic hierarchy was determined to create a Spanish Lourdes and attempted to transform the shrine of the Virgen del Pilar in Zaragoza into a national pilgrimage site. The phenomenon of visions also served to combat aggressive secularism and attract unbelievers. Catholic missions focused on communion, renewal of vows, processions and the teaching of basic religious rituals. They also possessed a political agenda, including militant songs against

The phenomenon of the “apostasy of the masses” became a matter of serious concern for the Catholic hierarchy only after the establishment of the II Republic in April 1931.⁷³⁹ Until then, the Church’s claim that it was the highest representative of Spanish identity was legally enshrined in the Constitution.⁷⁴⁰ The symbiotic relationship Church-Monarchy provoked an anticlerical backlash immediately after the departure of the King. The Vatican instructed the Spanish Catholic hierarchy to respect the Republic, which it did; but it was a question of too little too late.⁷⁴¹ On 10 May 1931, an altercation in front of a Monarchist club in Madrid resulted in two deaths and degenerated into a major anticlerical riot that rapidly spread to the apostate south of Spain. The following day, six religious buildings were set ablaze in Seville. The protesters went as far as to try to burn the Archbishop’s palace, but were stopped by both the police and passers-by. On 12 May, martial law was proclaimed in the capital of Andalucía, but failed to prevent further incidents in the province. The moderate political left repudiated the attacks, but more extremist organisations openly supported the demonstrators, going as

the impious, calls for God to be brought into the public life and even the condemnation of Freemasonry. Moreover, religious hymns served as instruments for the replication of ideas and were often followed by terrifying sermons focusing on eternal damnation. Missionaries called not only for a Catholic revival, but also for deliverance from the ‘internal’ enemy inspired by apostate Russia and France. Christian, William A., *Moving crucifixes in modern Spain*, pages 3, 20-26 and 38-41.

⁷³⁹ Arboleya Martínez, Maximiliano, *La apostasía de las masas*. Arboleya Martínez was an Asturian priest and sociologist. His theology crystallised during his residency in Rome in the 1890s, where he obtained his doctorate and was strongly influenced by the papacy of Leo XIII (especially the encyclical *Rerum Novarum*). Arboleya was a critic of the Spanish Church’s doctrinal inflexibility and a tireless promoter of Social-Catholicism and confessional trade-unions. Arboleya’s progressive perspective on labour relations clashed with the Integrist faction within the Church (most notably the Jesuits) and was the primary cause for his ostracism during the dictatorship of Franco. See his biography: Benavides Gómez, Domingo, *Maximiliano Arboleya (1870-1951). Un luchador social entre las dos Españas*.

⁷⁴⁰ Catholicism was the official state religion in Spain during the Monarchy of Alfonso XIII. The government subsidised Catholic worship, paid stipends to priests and only canonical marriage was legal. In addition, the Monarchy financially supported the Church hierarchy’s campaign to re-Catholicise Spain. Montero, Enrique, “Intellectual and Power. Reform Idealized: The intellectual and Ideological Origins of the Second Republic” in Graham, Helen, and Labanyi, Jo (eds.), *Spanish Cultural Studies. An Introduction. The Struggle for Modernity*, page 128.

⁷⁴¹ On 24 April 1931, the Apostolic Nunciature in Spain wrote to the Archbishop of Seville instructing him to respect the newly-established Republic. On 27 April, Cardinal Ilundáin replied: “dije al Cabildo Metropolitano que nuestra actitud debía ser la de acatar los nuevos poderes constituidos y prestar dentro de nuestra esfera la cooperación a cuanto conduzca al mantenimiento del orden y a las disposiciones conducentes al bienestar publico que los actuales gobernantes dispongan y fomenten. Les dije también que era mi deseo que a cuantos sacerdotes las consulten sobre este punto digan estas manifestaciones de su Prelado.- Asimismo: los mismos consejos he dado a multitud de personas calificadas que me han visitado en estos días, así como en varias cartas a sacerdotes de mi diócesis durante estos últimos días. Tenga pues V.E. la seguridad de que secundaré gustoso los deseos de la S.Sede.” **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126. See also: Rosado, Antonio, *Tierra y libertad. memorias de un campesino anarcosindicalista andaluz*, page 59: according to Antonio Rosado, the new Republican authorities in an unnamed *pueblo* telegraphed Madrid on 15 April 1931 asking: “¿qué hacemos ahora con el cura?”

far as claiming that priests were firing at protesters from inside the churches of Madrid.⁷⁴² As in 1834, a mere rumour served as the spark that ignited the flames of anticlericalism. A few days later (15 May), the Apostolic Nunciature in Spain wrote to the Archbishop of Seville requesting an official report on the incidents. Cardinal Ilundáin replied on 22 May - "Lleno de dolor y de amargura" -, stating that the anticlerical riots had erupted even before the downfall of the Monarchy (during the municipal elections of April 1931):

"Nada digo a V.E. de los desacatos cometidos contra mi persona después del día 12 de Abril último ya con clamores de la plebe, ya con pasquines difundidos en la ciudad, sumamente injuriosos y aun provocando las iras del pueblo contra mí, ya con rótulos puestos en mi Palacio Arzobispal con frases soeces y asquerosas. Tengo que advertir que la Autoridad Militar puso guardia en mi Palacio el día 12 de Mayo corriente y en Seminario para protegerlos y continúa todavía, por lo que estoy agradecido al Sr. Capitán General de Sevilla."⁷⁴³

The Archbishop concluded his report by providing a list of assaulted religious buildings in the Dioceses of Seville:

- Jesuit college, San José church, residence of PP. Paules, church and convent of PP. Carmelitas Calzadas in Seville
- Franciscan church, Reparadoras church, church of PP. Carmelitas Calzadas, church and residence of Jesuits, church and convent of Mínimas in Jerez de la Frontera (Cádiz)
- Parish church and two chapels in Coria del Río (Seville)
- Parish church and church of Monjas Mercedarias in Lora del Río (Seville)
- Salesian church and college in Arcos de la Frontera (Cádiz)
- Two churches in Ardales (Málaga)

⁷⁴² The radical left viewed the anticlerical riots with an element of romanticism. Ramón Franco, General Franco's brother and the *enfant terrible* of the Bahamonde family, declared: "I contemplated with joy those magnificent flames as the expression of a people which wanted to free itself from clerical obscurantism." Preston, Paul, *Franco: a biography*, page 79. See also: Jiménez Guerrero, José, *Quema de conventos en Málaga, mayo de 1931* (Málaga, Editorial Arguval, 2006).

⁷⁴³ Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126. See also: Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *La utopía revolucionaria: Sevilla en la Segunda República*, pages 111-47; Pascual Cevallos, Fernando, *Luchas agrarias en Sevilla durante la Segunda República*. The conservative but politically moderate Cardinal Eustaquio Ilundáin Esteban was born in Pamplona (Navarre) in 1862. He had previously served as bishop of Orense (1905-21) before being appointed Archbishop of Seville in 1921. In Orense, Ilundáin was an enthusiastic promoter of Catholic missions. In 1921, the local authorities requested that the government award the *Cruz de Beneficiencia* to the bishop for his role in combating a flu pandemic in the province. Vilaplana Montes, Manuel, "Nota biográfica sobre monsenhor Ilundain. Actividad y magisterio hasta su nombramiento como arzobispo de Sevilla" in *Archivo Hispalense*, Tomo 72, nº 219, Sevilla, 1989, pages 70, 72-74 and 78-79.

- Residence of PP. Capuchinos in Sanlúcar de Barrameda (Cádiz)
- Parish church of San Nicolás del Puerto (Seville)
- Sacristy of the parish church of San Juan de Aznalfarache (Seville)

In addition, the priests of Gerena (Seville), San Nicolás del Puerto, Prado del Rey (Cádiz), Sagrado Corazón (Huelva), the Superior of the Jesuits of Jerez de la Frontera, the PP. Paules of Ayamonte (Huelva); were all forced temporarily to abandon their appointments. To make matters worse, many representatives of the new regime were aggressively opposed to the Catholic Church. The PP. Salesianos of Morón, PP. Redentoristas of Carmona and PP. Mercedarios of Marchena “fueron expulsados urgentemente” by the local authorities and “en algunas poblaciones se prohíbe por los Socialistas todo entierro religioso y se coacciona a los fieles para que no asista el Clero y para que no sean bautizados los niños.” At the same time, the right exploited the riots for its own political benefit; therefore polarising the already strained political atmosphere. On 28 July, a parliamentary deputy from Toledo wrote to Cardinal Ilundáin requesting a report to be presented in the *Cortes* aimed at exposing the passivity of the local Republican administration, including a full list of destroyed works of religious art, closed educational/cultural Catholic centres and the number of students affected by the tumults.⁷⁴⁴

The divorce between the Catholic Church and the new regime became evident when on 3 June the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo – Pedro Segura – ignored Vatican calls for moderation and addressed a pastoral letter to all the bishops and the faithful of Spain, calling for the mass mobilization of all in a crusade of prayers to unite “de manera seria y eficaz para conseguir que sean elegidos para las Cortes Constituyentes candidatos que ofrezcan garantías de que defenderán los derechos de la Iglesia y del orden social”. In irresponsibly provocative language, in a context of popular enthusiasm for the Republic, he went on to praise the monarchy and its links to the Church. This led to his expulsion by the deeply Catholic Minister of the Interior, Miguel Maura.⁷⁴⁵

⁷⁴⁴ *Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla* (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126.

⁷⁴⁵ Merr Lecha-Marzo, Fernando de, *La cuestión religiosa en las Cortes constituyentes de la II República Española*, pages 39-51; Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Ruiz Sánchez, José-Leonardo, “La II República: laicismo y movilización religiosa (1931-1936)” in *Historia de la Iglesia de Sevilla*, pages 753-98. For a biography of Cardinal Segura see: Gil Delgado, Francisco, *Pedro Segura: un cardenal sin fronteras*. For Cardinal Segura’s pastorals as Archbishop of Seville see: Segura y Sáenz, Pedro, *Por la unidad católica de España: cartas pastorales del Emmo. y Rvdmo. Señor Pedro, Cardenal Segura y Sáenz, Arzobispo de Sevilla, en*

Anticlericalism and the “apostasy of the masses” were both problems that plagued the Spanish Catholic Church for at least a century prior to the advent of the II Republic. However, instead of embracing reform, the Catholic hierarchy retreated into a movement of defensive dogmatism and political reaction that only exacerbated existing tensions, barely contained by the Monarchy. Devoid of governmental support following the establishment of the Republic, the Church now entered a period of uncertainty and anxiety.

The Church census on the Dioceses of Seville (1928-1932)⁷⁴⁶

The chaotic condition of Catholic Church in southern Spain pre-dated the establishment of the II Republic. Indeed, between 1928 and 1932, average Sunday Mass attendance rate in the capital of Andalucía stood at a shocking 2.69%. The situation was even more scandalous in the province, where the number of regular churchgoers failed to reach the 1% milestone (0.98%). The total average for Seville (city and province) was 1.44%.⁷⁴⁷ In short, organised religion had all but disappeared from Seville; the most striking example of the phenomenon of the “apostasy of the masses”.⁷⁴⁸

By the 1930s, the Catholic Church was on the verge of losing its last remaining link with Seville: popular religion. In Andalucía, the tradition of heterodox forms of worship, often syncretised with pre-Christian pagan rituals and folklore, was deeply embedded in local culture. Seville was famed for its elaborate Easter processions which served, under the cloak of a religious festival, as a collective reaffirmation of local identity. Indeed, the American Ambassador to Republican Spain (1933-39), Claude Bowers, described Holy Week in 1935 Seville as “the strange mingling of the sacred and profane” where: “in other times, far back, there was a more reverential attitude of the crowd, I am told, and men and women dropped more easily to their knees when the images went by. The religious phase was then predominant, but now one gets the

defensa del tesoro de la fe. See also: Núñez Beltrán, Miguel Angel, “El Cardenal Segura y su acción sinódico-conciliar en Sevilla” in *Anuario de la Historia de la Iglesia Andaluza*, vol. 2, año 2009.

⁷⁴⁶ The official title of the census was: *Relación quinquenal (1928-32). Encuesta sobre el estado religioso y moral del Arzobispado. Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla* (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559.

⁷⁴⁷ For all statistical data see Table I and IV. For a socio/geographic breakdown of parishes see Table II.

⁷⁴⁸ The 1928-1932 Church census on the Dioceses of Seville led to the publishing of a book on the “apostasy of the masses” in the adjacent province of Huelva. Ordóñez Márquez, Juan, *La apostasía de las masas y la persecución religiosa en la provincia de Huelva, 1931-1936*.

feeling of being a spectator at a magnificent pageant, a splendid artistic drama, with thousands of actors on a huge stage.”⁷⁴⁹

Catholic feast days had long been transformed into secular celebrations of local identity, superseding their original religious significance. Bowers was fascinated by a series of paradoxical events, such as locals singing flamenco songs to religious icons or the fact that “the burden bearers are recruited mostly from amongst the workers of the wharfs, and many of these are syndicalists, enemies of the church. Religion, borne on backs of unbelievers!”⁷⁵⁰ In reality, the Church played a peripheral role during Easter celebrations, where the object of collective worship was the statue of the patron saint. *Manchester Guardian* correspondent Frank Jellinek was equally captivated by the fanatical devotion displayed by the residents of Seville towards their local saints: “During the Holy Week festival at Seville in 1936, Communists in full uniform of blue shirt and red scarf paraded a famous Virgin, shouting: “We are Communists. Our knives for anyone who touches her!”⁷⁵¹

However, the growing politicisation of the Catholic Church in Spain threatened the very survival of popular religion in Andalucía, a trend clearly exposed in the 1928-1932 Church census on the Dioceses of Seville. For instance, eleven out of a total of nineteen parishes (one did not reply to the question⁷⁵²) in the capital of Andalucía failed to attract half of their flock to Easter Mass. The situation was particularly worrying in predominantly working-class districts: 20% attendance rate in San Gil, 20% in Nuestra Señora de la O, 15% in El Sagrario, 10% in Santa Ana, 10% in Omníum Sanctorum (the first church attacked on 18 July 1936) and 5% in San Julián. The percentage of those receiving Holy Communion on Easter Sunday was even lower, with an additional parish failing to reach the 50% mark. The least religious were: San Roque

⁷⁴⁹ Bowers, Claude Gernade, *My mission to Spain: watching the rehearsal for World War II*, page 144.

⁷⁵⁰ Ibid, page 137.

⁷⁵¹ Jellinek also reported that in October 1934 in Mieres (Asturias) the local miners erected a huge placard reading “Long live the Red Christ, he is one of us!” Jellinek, Frank, *The Civil War in Spain*, page 42. Ambassador Bowers was equally mesmerised by the cult of local saints, so much so that he narrated one episode in his memoirs: “When not so long ago, it was found that a fine old painting in a village church was seriously in need of a restoration, arrangements were made to remove it for the purpose to the Prado in Madrid. But when the strangers from the capital appeared, peasants with clubs and pitchforks met them, prepared to defend their picture with their lives. No reasoning or persuading could reconcile them to its removal, but they agreed to the retouching by an expert from Madrid in the village.” Bowers, Claude Gernade, *My mission to Spain: watching the rehearsal for World War II*, page 125.

⁷⁵² San Ildefonso y Santiago. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559.

(5%), La Concepción Inmaculada (5%), and San Roman (0.6%). In deep contrast, the hold of popular religion remained strong in Santa María Magdalena (80%) and San Nicolás (96.5%). However, adherence to popular religion did not imply acceptance of Catholic orthodoxy. Any optimism felt by the Church hierarchy was tempered by Sunday Mass attendance rates of 7.84% in Santa María Magdalena and 2.22% in San Nicolás. Still, Santa María Magdalena was one of the most devout parishes in the capital of Andalucía, only surpassed in piety by San Vicente Mártir (9.52%) and San Andrés (10%); an achievement if taking into account that nine parishes failed to attract as little as 2% of their parishioners to regular Sunday Mass.⁷⁵³ Moreover, in a region where Easter celebrations were regarded as an integral part of local folklore, an average Easter Sunday Mass attendance rate of 26% could only have been interpreted as disastrous by the Catholic hierarchy. The figure confirmed that the vast majority of residents in the capital of Andalucía preferred to abstain from participating in an important cultural ritual than being affiliated (even if only nominally) to an institution they viewed as sectarian. Hence, Easter Sunday represented a time of renewal of communal identities only for a segment of the local population. The Catholic Church was perceived primarily as a political (and not a religious) institution. The social consequences of the Church's alliance with both the Monarchy and the political right were, in the long-term, devastating.

The discrepancy in attendance figures for Easter (26%) and regular Sunday Mass (2.69%) confirmed that religious feast days were primarily regarded as cultural events and that Catholic orthodoxy had all but lost its influence over the local population. In the parish of San Gil, only 60 out of 10,500 parishioners were regular churchgoers; in San Bartolomé, between 25-30 out of 6,811; in Santa Ana, 90 out of 20,000; in Omnium Sanctorum, 34 out of 10,900; and in San Roman, between 10-12 out of a total of 9,700 parishioners. Also, the 1928-1932 census revealed that the Church had long been anathematised by the lower-classes of Andalucía. For example, the five most irreligious parishes of Seville – with a shocking 0.39% average church attendance rate were all located in working-class districts.⁷⁵⁴ Moreover, the five least devout parishes at Easter (the combined average Mass attendance rate stood at 7%) were also located in predominantly popular neighbourhoods.⁷⁵⁵ The priest of San Vicente Mártir was explicit

⁷⁵³ Out of a total of nineteen parishes where data is available.

⁷⁵⁴ See Table I and II. In ascendant order (by level of absence): San Gil, San Bartolomé y San Esteban, Santa Ana, Omnium Sanctorum, San Roman y Santa Catalina.

⁷⁵⁵ See Table I and II. In ascendant order (by level of absence): San Roque y San Benito/Santa Ana, Omnium Sanctorum, La Concepción Inmaculada, San Julián, Santa Marina y San Marcos and San Roman y Santa Catalina. The five most faithful parishes at Easter attracted over half of their flock (the lowest percentage was 60%) to Easter Sunday Mass. In ascendant order (by level of observance): San

regarding the existence class divisions in his parish. On the topic of adherence to Catholic morality he wrote: "en las clases altas y media bueno; en las bajas malo". The parish priest of San Bernardo reached similar conclusions: "la clase media regular, la clase alta deja que desear, y la obrera deplorable." In similar deplorable state was the working-class parish of Nuestra Señora de la O, whereas the priest of La Concepción Inmaculada noted that "la masa popular está demoralizada." Even in the predominantly bourgeois parish of Santa Cruz, where morality was found to be in a general healthy state, it invariably remained "defectiva en las clases obreras". Working-class districts produced devastating reports. In San Gil "abunda el alcoholismo y disolución de constumbres", whereas the last vestiges of popular religion were being openly discarded in San Julián: "en muchas casas hay desaparecido las imágenes de los santos". In Santa Ana, only a tiny fraction of parishioners followed Catholic morality, while the priest of San Roque wrote: "Son muy contadas, contadísimas, las familias que por su conducta pública y privada merezcan ser tenidas verdaderamente por familias cristianas."⁷⁵⁶

The lower-classes perceived the Church's fixation with morality as insulting; especially if compared with the Catholic hierarchy's indifference towards key social and economic issues, such as chronic unemployment and endemic poverty.⁷⁵⁷ Already in 1878, a Catholic missionary in Seville wrote that the local population regularly skipped Mass in order to "no perder los *jornales de los Domingos y fiestas*" and "desde pequeñuelos se habituaban a esta vida indiferente, llegando a los veinte años de edad sin saber siquiera hacer un acto de contrición." As a result, "ni ven sacerdote alguno ni se da culto" and "la impiedad en sus doctrinas ominosas, valiéndose de la novela y del periódico irreligioso, había hecho entender a los pueblos que los Frailes eran monstruos de vicios y maldad".⁷⁵⁸ Half a century later, the

Isidoro/San Vicente Mártir, El Salvador/Santa María Magdalena y San Miguel and Santa María la Blanca. The only predominantly working-class parish to reach the 50% mark was San Bernardo y San Sebastián; however, the local priest noted that a majority of working-class residents did not attend Easter Mass. ⁷⁵⁶ Only five parishes (out of a total of twenty) replied positively: San Andrés y San Martín, San Isidoro, Santa María Magdalena y San Miguel, El Sagrario, El Salvador and Santa Cruz. The majority of parishes reported indifference.

⁷⁵⁷ For unemployment in Republican Seville see: Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *La utopía revolucionaria: Sevilla en la Segunda República*, pages 21-31. For a case-study of the socio-political consequences of poverty in the province of Seville see: Cabello Núñez, José, "Persecución religiosa y conflictividad social en la Sierra Sur de Sevilla durante la Segunda República: El caso de la Puebla de Cazalla" in *Archivo Hispalense*, Sevilla, nº267.272, 2005/2006.

⁷⁵⁸ Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla (1878) in Ruiz Sánchez, José Leonardo, "Cien años de propaganda católica: las misiones parroquiales en la archidiócesis hispalense (1848-1952)" in *Hispania Sacra*, vol. L, Madrid, CSIC, 1998, pages 293-94. Claude Bowers noted during his visit to the Cathedral of Seville in 1933 that: "At the door was a congestion of beggars, and their whining pleas mingled with the chant of the priests inside the church." Bowers, Claude Gernade, *My mission to Spain: watching the rehearsal for World War II*, page 23.

imposition of a “moral” dress code “con el máximo rigor” in San Roque y San Benito continued to discourage potential churchgoers from attending Mass (1.75% attendance rate). In the more affluent parish of El Salvador, people who did not observe the dress code were barred from entering the local church. The Catholic hierarchy was equally obsessed with what it termed “inmoral” theatres/cinemas and the tiny Protestant community (labelled as ‘heretic’).⁷⁵⁹ Regarding observance of Easter fasting and sexual abstinence, only the parishes of El Salvador and San Isidoro followed Catholic doctrine. Class divisions surfaced again in the more affluent parish of San Vicente Mártir: “una gran parte de la feligresía muy bien, el pueblo bajo majo”. Again, working-class districts produced negative reports. In San Román, the parish priest stated that only 300 out of a total of 9,700 parishioners observed Church dogma and in San Roque: “son contadísimos los fieles que se preocupan del cumplimiento de estos preceptos”. As for baptism, the priest of Nuestra Señora de la O was clear: “rarísimo el que se bautece dentro de los ocho días”. Only in the predominantly bourgeois parish of Santa Cruz did a majority of families baptise children, but even so with the notable exception of the lower-classes. Furthermore, the population of Seville found ways to circumvent laws that bonded them (even if nominally) to the Church, such as canonical marriage. Up until the legalisation of civil marriage in 1931, a substantial number of residents opted for unmarried unions, which the Catholic hierarchy derogatorily labelled as “concubinatos públicos”. Unmarried partnerships were prevalent among the urban poor of Santa Ana (the vast majority of the population), and comprised up to 30% of unions in Nuestra Señora de la O.⁷⁶⁰ This represented a bitter defeat for an institution that was deeply committed to regulating sexuality.

⁷⁵⁹ The Church was also obsessed with the ‘subversive’ press (left-wing periodicals), widely read in all parishes, except for San Isidoro (San Andrés y San Martín, Santa Cruz and El Salvador failed to reply to the question). Class divisions were again evident in San Nicolás y Santa María la Blanca (“bastante y sobretodo la clase pobre”) and in San Roque y San Benito (“la máxima, sobretodo en la clase baja”). The more inquisitive priest of San Pedro y San Juan de la Palma wrote: “se leen bastantes periódicos extremistas y algunas novelas y folletos eróticos”. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559.

⁷⁶⁰ The majority of unmarried partnerships went unreported, since the census only focused on ‘public’ cases: 1 ‘public’ unmarried union in San Pedro and San Juan de Palma, 3 in the parishes of Santa Cruz and San Isidoro, 6 in San Nicolás and Santa María la Blanca, 30 in San Román y Santa Catalina, 31 in San Roque y San Benito (the priest reported that the number of non-public unmarried partnerships was much higher), 80 in San Andrés y San Martín, 150 in San Gil and 405 in the San Ildefonso neighbourhood of the San Ildefonso y Santiago parish. The priests of San Vicente Mártir (“Ni muchos ni pocos”) and La Inmaculada Concepción provided vague answers. The priest of El Sagrario warned of difficult times ahead for the Church (by making an allusion to the recent legalisation of divorce): “muy pocos, mas tarde serán mas numerosos”. The census also focused on adultery and onanism, both of which were rife in San Roque: “de una manera que espanta, más en la clase alta y media que en la baja”.

By 1932, the self-proclaimed guardian of Spanishness was an institution alien to Andalucían society. Fifteen of Seville's twenty parish priests reported that they were treated by the population either with "respecto" or "indiferencia".⁷⁶¹ In both La Concepcion Inmaculada and El Sagrario, reverence towards the clergy could only be found among the small Christian minority and the priest of San Gil reported a growing trend of contempt ("menosprecio"). However, only in San Bernardo did contempt degenerate into open hatred ("actualmente poca, y menos la clase obrera, a veces con odio"). San Pedro reported a single case of hostility towards the clergy (from non-residents) and a growing minority mocked and even insulted the priest of San Nicolas y Santa Maria la Blanca. Still, violence against the Catholic Church was primarily directed against its property, a physical symbol of political sectarianism in Republican Seville. In short, the census provided a depressing portrait of the condition of the diocesan clergy in the capital of Andalucía: that of an isolated group living in an overwhelmingly apostate society. Most priests felt lonely, ostracised and were profoundly ignorant of their immediate socio-political surroundings (to the extreme that only a few were able to accurately inform their superiors about the existence of left-wing trade-unions in their parishes).⁷⁶² Most importantly, there were no reports of physical attacks against the clergy between 1928 and 1932.

According to the 1928-1932 Church census, the average churchgoer in 1930s Seville was predominantly female and middle/upper-class. The gender-biased nature of religiosity was most pronounced in working-class parishes, where virtually no males could be found attending Sunday Mass. In a time when the political sphere was almost exclusively dominated by men (women remained disenfranchised until 1933), this trend exposed the growing ideological divorce between the Church and the working-class, both of which came to espouse mutually-exclusive political views. The census also revealed the Church's failure to adapt to urbanisation and industrialisation. For instance, the priest of the least religious parish in Seville, San Román, regarded modernity as sinful. In Santa Ana and Nuestra Señora de la O, two priests were trusted with the impossible task of providing spiritual support to a combined total of 40,000 parishioners. Unsurprisingly, weekly church attendance rates stood at a shocking 0.45% (Santa

⁷⁶¹ No reply from Santa Cruz, San Bernardo y San Sebastián, San Isidoro, El Salvador, San Nicolás y Santa María la Blanca, Nuestra Señora de la O, Omnium Sanctorum and San Pedro y San Juan de la Palma.

⁷⁶² Santa Ana: "al exterior, parece guardar reverencia." San Nicolás y Santa María la Blanca: "algunos los respetan, la generalidad le son indiferentes, y hoy muchos los hacen objeto de burla o insulto." San Gil: "hasta hace poco ha guardado respeto, ahora va encontrándose la indiferencia e iniciándose el menosprecio." San Pedro: "guarda el debido respeto; excepto en un caso lamentable, no realizado por feligreses de esta Parroquia."

Ana) and 1.5% (Nuestra Señora de la O) respectively. This, in turn, provoked serious economic problems for the Church. The priest of San Roque was explicit: “el ingreso de misas es [...] insignificante, por lo casi nulo.” The financial condition of all Catholic schools in Seville (except San Vicente Mártir) and the Brotherhoods of San Andrés, San Bartolomé, San Vicente Mártir and Nuestra Señora de la O; was equally precarious. As a result, the Church relied on state subsidies, the economic activities of religious orders and the benevolence of private benefactors for survival. This unhealthy financial dependency positioned the Catholic Church dangerously close to the economic *élites*, an alliance that often spilled over into the political sphere. On an ideological level, the Church’s strident anti-modernism was enthusiastically embraced by the oligarchy, which regarded industrialisation as a threat to the economic *status quo*. This, in turn, only further antagonised the masses, who swelled the ranks of left-wing trade-unions.⁷⁶³ In Seville, the only parish to report the existence of a confessional trade-union was Omníum Sanctorum (however, the union functioned as a *de facto* charity). The failure of confessional syndicalism in Andalucía meant that the Church had lost all realistic hope of (re)converting the masses.⁷⁶⁴ In despair, the Catholic hierarchy turned attention towards the youth of Andalucía.

⁷⁶³ “Everyone who knows Spain knows that the psychological relationship between people and clergy, and the resentment of the former towards the latter, is the great wound in Spanish history.[...] But the tragedy was that since for centuries in Spain religion had been confused with clerical power, and the external show of spiritual authority had become the chief thing in religious matters, the clergy, to find support amongst the privileged classes, appeared too often as the pastors of these rather than of the masses. It might almost be said that many of these poor priests, drawn most from the peasant class, took the patronage of the rich as hereditary. A people, hard and terrible, more than any other naturally akin to violence and death, which they neither fear nor respect, had thus the feeling of having been abandoned to their terrestrial damnation.” Mendizábal Villalba, Alfredo, *The martyrdom of Spain: origins of a Civil War*, page 12. For a quantitative study of left-wing trade-unionism in Seville see: Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *La utopía revolucionaria: Sevilla en la Segunda República*, pages 45-66. Republican Seville was a stronghold of left-wing syndicalism. In San Andrés y San Martín, the growth of leftist trade-unions generated even greater indifference towards the Church. In San Roque y San Benito the negative impact was “mucho en la gente ignorante”, in San Gil “el daño es muy grave”, in San Vicente Mártir “muy graves”, in San Román y Santa Catalina “intensos”, El Sagrario “mucho”, while in Santa Ana the local trade-unions had the effect of “el de ir agrupando a poco a poco todos los pobres”. *Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla* (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559.

⁷⁶⁴ The confessional trade-union network promoted by the Church resulted in a monumental fiasco (except in the pious north of Spain), largely because of its Integrist ideology. Catholic unions were anti-liberal, unconditional in their defence of private property and rejected the principle of class struggle. For the Integrist, pluralism implied heterodoxy and the denial of Catholic supremacy. Vincent, Mary, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: religion and politics in Salamanca, 1930-1936*, pages 99-110. For the failure of confessional trade-unions in Seville (and consequent socio-political tensions) see: Álvarez Rey, Leandro, ““Obreros honrados”: las derechas y el sindicalismo católico en la segunda república” in Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Lemus López, Encarnación (ed.), *Sindicatos y trabajadores en Sevilla: una aproximación a la memoria del siglo XX*.

Re-Catholicising Republican Seville⁷⁶⁵

Condemned to certain extinction by an irreligious society, the Catholic hierarchy reached the highly optimistic conclusion that the key to the re-Catholicisation of Seville rested on the indoctrination of the local youth. The Church seized the opportunity presented by the absence of an adequate state school system to establish a monopoly. It was not until the advent of the Republic that a secular education system was created. In 1932, only 15% of parishes reported a majority of children attending state institutions (Santa Ana, La Concepción Inmaculada and San Roque y San Benito). In addition, there was a wide disparity between the number of children attending Catholic and state schools (for instance, in San Andrés 700 children attended Catholic institutions, while only 50 frequented state schools).⁷⁶⁶ Moreover, religious education was still taught (albeit unofficially) in several secular institutions: in San Andrés y San Martín, the children attending the local state school were educated by a devout Catholic teacher ("la enseñanza laica oficialmente, la maestra muy piadosa"). However, Church monopoly over the education system did not translate into increased piety. Only a fraction of children receiving religious education were also enrolled in Catholic associations (despite being actively encouraged to do so).⁷⁶⁷ Ultimately, parental opposition undermined Church plans to re-Catholicise Seville: only in three predominantly bourgeois parishes did a majority of parents regard the Catholic upbringing of their children as a priority (El Salvador, San Vicente Mártir and San Pedro). In San Andrés, the local priest reported that "las familias acomodadas se preocupan de esto, los pobres muy peor", whereas in Santa Cruz "hay bastantes defectos en las clases populares". In San Julián, the priest noted that "sólo se preocupan [...] de llevarlos a colegios católicos. Muchos ni aún esto." Lastly, the parish priest San Nicolás y Santa María la Blanca summarised the failure of the Church's quixotic plan to re-Catholicise the poor via the indoctrination of the local children: "Muy mal; sobre todo la clase pobre que ni quiere, ni quiere tener conciencia de tan grave obligación."

⁷⁶⁵ See Table III.

⁷⁶⁶ Only San Roque y San Benito showed a wide disparity in favour of state schools: 1,610 children attended state institutions (with a further 200 enrolled in a protestant school), whereas only 455 children frequented the local Catholic school. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559.

⁷⁶⁷ Percentage of children attending Church schools also enrolled in Catholic institutions: 43% in La Concepción Inmaculada; 43% in San Pedro; 38% in Santa Cruz; 15% in San Roque; 14% in Nuestra Señora de la O; 11% in San Isidoro; 1% in Omníum Sanctorum. The priests of El Salvador ("algunas") and San Vicente Mártir ("mediana") provided vague replies. The priest of Nuestra Señora de la O wrote: "en cuanto a la enseñanza grande; en los demás aspectos; exígido." In San Gil, only a small minority among the 900 students attending the local Catholic school were also enrolled in *Juventud Católica*. At its peak, *Juventud Católica* possessed only 50 members in the parish; by 1932, it had all but disappeared.

Waiting for a miracle: General Queipo de Llano

The 1928-1932 Church census recognised the existence of an irreversible trend towards total apostasy in the Dioceses of Seville. The tiny Catholic minority was a marginalised social group that followed the most strident precepts of Church doctrine, with the notable exceptions of the working-class parishes of San Gil, San Julián, Nuestra Señora de la O, Omnium Sanctorum and San Nicolás. In fact, the only lower-class Catholic community to remain steadfast in its adherence to Catholic dogma was that of Santa Ana.⁷⁶⁸ Increased piety, however, failed to reverse the fortunes of the minuscule Catholic minority. In San Ildefonso, the proselytization campaign devised by the minuscule Catholic community was nullified by the activities of the local trade-unions and in San Pedro “los que pertenecen a partidos políticos extremistas, propagan sus ideas.” At the same time, the clergy was impotent to curb the growing influence of the left-wing press. The priests of San Andrés and La Concepción Inmaculada attempted to distribute religious periodicals, but were unable to gather the necessary financial resources to publish their own newspaper. Also, the parish priest of San Vicente Mártir laboured tirelessly to “propagar la buena prensa, que no la quieren por mucho que se les insiste”. The majority of parish priests resorted to traditional methods such as catechism, preaching from the pulpit, personal example and the occasional private chat; without any tangible results. Only the priest of San Andrés offered a more pragmatic solution by proposing the construction of a night-school for working-class adults. In the end, the diocesan clergy of Seville resigned itself to the fact that it was impossible to regain Seville for Catholicism. The priest of San Román wrote that the 10-12 people that attended church regularly (out of a total of 9,700 parishioners): “procuran atender en medida de sus fuerzas”. The priest of San Nicolás had also abandoned all hope “porque no hay forma de atraerlos al templo”, and even the more resourceful priest of San Andrés conceded defeat: “ahora difícilmente se puede hacer algo”. Lastly, the priest of El Sagrario openly recognised that the only option left was to pray for a miracle (“pedir a Dios que ponga remedio a tanto mal”)⁷⁶⁹ According to Nationalist mythology, a miracle did occur on

⁷⁶⁸ 13 positive replies, 6 negative and 1 unclear (San Pedro y San Juan de la Palma: “hoy en general [...] pero también abundan los de verdadera piedad”). The priest of La Concepción Inmaculada wrote: “las personas religiosas, lo son de verdaderú espíritu.” Only the priest of San Ildefonso reported that a majority of churchgoers attended “inmoral” cinemas/theatres. In San Nicolás y Santa María la Blanca, the faithful few even attempted to ameliorate the precarious economic condition of the parish. The census also enquired whether Catholics indirectly favoured the spread of irreligion. 14 priests (out of a total of 18 replies) reconfirmed the piety of the local Catholic minority.

⁷⁶⁹ San Julián: “con todos los medios que le sugiere un buen deseo, entre ellos los cultos modestos que puede celebrar [...] hasta ahora poco eficaces.” Santa Ana: “el que puede hacer un pobre cura con su trabajo.” San Nicolás y Santa María la Blanca: “poco dadas las circunstancias”. San Ildefonso y Santiago: “lo posible in mi situación actual.” The priest of San Gil also attempted – without much success – to persuade unmarried couples to baptise their children and sanctify their unions in the local church.

18 July 1936, when that most unlikely protector of Catholicism, General Queipo de Llano (who in 1931 had allowed the anticlerical masses to assault the churches of Madrid), initiated a crusade to save Spain from atheism.⁷⁷⁰

Church and Republic (1931-1936)

The census of 1928-1932 in the Dioceses of Seville revealed that the Catholic Church's efforts to evangelise beyond its historical boundaries resulted in a monumental failure. Matters took a turn for the worse following the de-confessionalisation of Spain during the II Republic, which established a secular society, ended state subventions to the clergy, dissolved the Society of Jesus and prohibited all other religious orders from engaging in industry, commerce and education.⁷⁷¹ The end of all economic privileges threatened the very existence of the Catholic Church. This was particularly true in regions of low religiosity, such as Seville.⁷⁷²

The passing of article 26 of the 1931 Constitution represented an immense blow for the Catholic Church, in particular to the religious orders. In 1930, Spain possessed around 20,000 monks and 60,000 nuns that dominated both the education and health sectors and used this privilege as a platform to combat secularism.⁷⁷³ Radical anti-clericals, such as Luis Jiménez de

⁷⁷⁰ Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la Segunda República Española*, vol. 1, pages 109-110.

⁷⁷¹ The Catholic hierarchy was particularly incensed by the Law on Religious Congregations; however, the clause that barred all religious orders from teaching (to be applied between June-October 1933) was never enforced by the new right-wing government that won the 1933 elections: "Declaración del Episcopado con motivo de la ley de Confesiones y Congregaciones Religiosas [...] el hondo sentir de la Iglesia ante los excesos del Estado violadores de la conciencia católica y de los derechos confesionales, elevó a los gobernantes serenos ruegos y pacificadores advertencias, que debieran haber enfrenado toda tendencia de sectaria persecución, y dictó normas prácticas a los católicos, a fin de responder a una legislación injusta con acción eficaz de pura religiosidad y actitudes rectas de acendrado patriotismo." Also, "hemos de lamentar, en cambio, que aquel laicismo agresivo inspirador de la Constitución, en frase de comentadores ajenos a un criterio confesional, no sólo no ha remitido, sino que se ha agravado y ha seguido proyectándose con animadversión mayor en la aplicación de los preceptos constitucionales, en las leyes y reglamentaciones posteriores y en los actos mismos del poder ejecutivo, que con la conculcación sucesiva de los derechos eclesiásticos vienen a confirmar el espíritu y ánimo decidido de hostilidad en que las Cortes se inspiran con evidente injusticia y sin provecho el bien general de la Nación." **Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla**, 3 June 1933.

⁷⁷² "Exigencias inexcusables de previsión Pastoral Nos impelen a hacer hoy un llamamiento a la reflexión y una excitación al celo de nuestro muy amado Clero parroquial en relación con la situación económica y los modos de hacer frente a las necesidades materiales de la vida del Clero y de las necesidades y gastos que origina el culto y la conservación de los templos." This "AVISO PASTORAL" was in reply to the cancellation of all state subventions to the Dioceses of Seville on 1 January 1933. **Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla**, 7 February 1933.

⁷⁷³ For instance, a Catholic school textbook in 1934 described the "law of majority rule, a savage law of the strongest, the germ of ruin and death in its hankering after liberty." RR del Sagrado Corazón, *Manual de la clase 4* (Barcelona, 1934) in Lannon, Frances, *Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy: The Catholic*

Asúa, wanted to abolish all religious orders, but were publicly rebuked by Manuel Azaña in a speech delivered in Parliament on 13 October 1931.⁷⁷⁴ Prime-Minister Alcalá-Zamora had already addressed the *Cortes* three days earlier (10 October) declaring that, as a political moderate and a Catholic, he felt ideologically trapped between the antidemocratic Catholic right and the anticlerical left. Predictably, the passing of article 26 triggered the immediate resignations of Alcalá-Zamora and Interior Minister Miguel Maura.⁷⁷⁵ As for Integrist Catholics, the removal of crucifixes from public buildings, the banning of processions, the legalisation of civil marriage and divorce, and the secularisation of cemeteries was all but evidence of the anti-religious nature of the II Republic.⁷⁷⁶ Priest Antonio Pildain openly declared in the *Cortes* that, according to Catholic doctrine, resistance to unjust law could be expressed by armed rebellion. Also, in 1934 the canon of Salamanca Cathedral, Aniceto Castro Albarrán, had provided a theological justification for a *coup d'état*. In doing so, Albarrán revealed that the Church's hostility towards the Republic was not merely a reaction to the latter's anticlericalism but essentially ideological: the Church was anti-modernist, anti-democratic and anti-liberal.⁷⁷⁷

Church in Spain, 1875-1975, page 82. For statistical data see: *Anuario Estadístico de España 1930*, pages 672-73 in Lannon, Frances, **Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1975**, page 61.

⁷⁷⁴ Ibid, pages 183-87. See also page 184: Manuel Azaña, based on his own personal experience of being educated by Augustinian monks, viewed religious schools as an ideological threat to the Republic. He earned a place in Catholic demonology when he declared "that Spain had ceased to be Catholic" in October 1931.

⁷⁷⁵ "El Gobierno, que sabe los inconvenientes de estar flanqueado por dos fuerzas enemigas, conoce también la táctica para seguir adelante y para desbaratar los planes de una y de otra." Alcalá-Zamora, Niceto, **Discursos**, pages 535. See also pages 347-71 and 534-37. Alfredo Mendizábal, a professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Oviedo, also felt ideologically trapped between Integrist and anticlericals. He stated that the Church had been hijacked by the oligarchy, which equated Catholicism with anti-Marxism, defence of property, autocracy "and, in short, all the values which characterize a conservative regime with Fascist methods, too many Catholics rendered a great disservice to the Church, the results of which were quickly evident." Mendizábal Villalba, Alfredo, **The martyrdom of Spain: origins of a Civil War**, page 271.

⁷⁷⁶ Republican anticlericalism alienated the moderate faction within the Catholic Church, including Cardinal Vidal i Barraquer who in December 1931 made public his opposition to the new Constitution. Still, the Integrist faction was more influential. For instance, Cardinal Gomá, who replaced Segura as Primate of Spain, was an Integrist. On 10 January 1937, he wrote *Respuesta obligada*, an open letter to the President of the pro-Republican Basque autonomous government, in which he rejected all Basque claims for autonomy, denied that economic asymmetries were at the root of social conflict in Spain or even that General Franco was supported by the financial élites. Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, **Pastorales de la Guerra de España**, pages 73-93; Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, **Por Dios y por España. Pastorales, instrucciones pastorales y artículos, discursos, mensajes, apéndice, 1936-1939**; Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, **Respuesta obligada: carta abierta al Sr. D. José Antonio Aguirre**.

⁷⁷⁷ Castro Albarrán, Aniceto, **El derecho a la rebeldía**. In 1940, Albarrán also provided a theological justification for the July 1936 rebellion. Castro Albarrán, Aniceto, **El derecho al Alzamiento**.

Republican anticlericalism created an enmity that would eventually prove fatal. The political left gravely underestimated the mobilising power of a victimised Church. Indeed, anticlericalism helped to mobilise Catholics across categories of socio-economic class and in 1933 the Church functioned as the element that agglutinated a myriad of right-wing groups into the CEDA, the largest party of the political right. The pre-eminence of the CEDA – which based its ideology exclusively on the protection of religion, family, property and patriotism – polarised Spain. The CEDA appropriated Catholic rhetoric and manipulated it to create a mass party and become the political vehicle of Catholic values and agenda. Furthermore, the CEDA promoted a binary conception of society that also dismissed moderate Catholics (including Catholic Republicans) as heterodox. Most importantly, the party regularly classified its policies as ‘Catholic’ and used the Catholic label to oppose all attempts at political reform. In a nutshell, the Church represented Spain; its opponents (including the Republic) were anti-Spain.⁷⁷⁸

The umbilical nature of the conservative alliance implied that whenever one of the members of the pact came under attack the tide could easily turn against its weakest link: the Church.⁷⁷⁹ This became clear when both an anti-war demonstration (Tragic Week) and a political protest (May 1931) both degenerated into anticlerical riots.⁷⁸⁰ The Catholic Church was the most vulnerable element of the coalition because it was *physically* in the frontline of the political war being waged in the streets of Spain: churches and other religious building were often located in the central square of a *pueblo* or deep-inside urban working-class districts. In addition, Catholic schools and trade-unions brought the Church dangerously close to the masses, not as an ally, but as an unwelcome guest. Tensions reached boiling-point in May 1936, when the unfounded rumour that nuns were handing poisoned sweets to children

⁷⁷⁸ Montero, José Ramón, *La CEDA, 2 vols.*; Gil Robles, José María, *No fué posible la paz*.

⁷⁷⁹ “The best that can be said about the riots that took place during the months following the General Election is that they seem nearly all to have been spontaneous, unorganized acts of hooliganism, due to the return of exiled extremists and to the ebullition of feeling at the return of power of the Left after a period of eclipse.

It was fortunate that the first targets of popular violence should have been churches, for the inactivity of the forces of law and order in suppressing the outbreaks was interpreted, at least by implication, as pointing to a new period of official anti-clerical policy. As a matter of fact, it seems to have been due rather to a desire not to excite mob feeling and to the hope that, if left alone, it would in the course of a few weeks die a normal death.” Peers, Allison, *The Spanish Tragedy 1930-1936. Dictatorship, Republic, Chaos*, page 194. “The bloodiest blows and the greatest refinements of cruelty were, however, nearly always reserved for Catholics.” Blaye, Edouard de, *Franco and the politics of Spain*, page 94. See also: Robinson, Richard, *The origins of Franco’s Spain*, page 258.

⁷⁸⁰ Ullman, Joan Connelly, *The tragic week: a study of anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912*; Ealham, Chris, *Class, culture, and conflict in Barcelona, 1898-1937*.

sufficed to provoke a major anticlerical riot in Madrid. Prime-Minister Casares Quiroga was visited by several women (some of whom were pregnant) desperately pleading for help; a desperation that rapidly turned into “reacciones fieras” and “enloquecimiento de la multitud”. Casares Quiroga condemned the disturbances in a speech delivered to the *Cortes*:

“Se produjo un estado de excitación, de histerismo, perfectamente enfermizo, que dio lugar en los primeros momentos a actos que yo repreobo, que el Gobierno repreuba, y que estoy seguro que no hay nadie en la Cámara que no repreube.”⁷⁸¹

The Prime-Minister accused the right of spreading false rumours in an attempt to truly poison the political atmosphere. Once again, the Catholic Church was in the frontline of a political confrontation. In reality, the Church had long ceased to be regarded primarily as a religious institution. For the political right, it was an invaluable ideological ally; for the left, it was a key member of a coalition that threatened the very existence of the Republic. This alliance would gradually mature into the Francoist *Pact of blood*.

Church and Popular Front in Seville (February-July 1936)

The triumph of the Popular Front in the February 1936 elections triggered a new wave of anticlericalism in Andalucía. On 14 April, a crowd in Marinaleda (Seville) decided to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the Republic by assaulting the parish church and was about to burn religious icons in the main square when the Civil Guard intervened and dispersed the group. Later that same night, the local chapel was sacked. The parish priest suffered a nervous

⁷⁸¹ Quiroga spoke of “hechos dolorosos, incalificables, execrables, que el Gobierno es el primero en condenar y en execrar (*Muy bien*)” and declared: “tengo vehementísimas sospechas de que aquellos que han lanzado la miserable idea, para enloquecer la multitud, de que se estaban repartiendo en Madrid caramelos envenenados no han podido ser, ciertamente, los hombres que a las tres de la tarde se lanzaron a la calle a parar y detener aquellas locuras, mientras vosotros (*Dirigiéndose a las derechas*) estabais en vuestras casas. (*Aplausos.- El Sr. Bermúdez Cañete: ¡Si oyen esto en el extranjero, Sr. Ministro de la Gobernación! – Ruidosas protestas*).

El Sr. Presidente: ¡Orden, orden! Dejen hablar al Sr. Ministro de la Gobernación.

*El Sr. Ministro de la Gobernación: Una noticia, no sólo falsa, sino ruinmente inventada, ha levantado un momento a determinados barrios en Madrid, los barrios donde vive gente popular, que tiene reacciones fieras porque tiene corazón (*Rumores*), gente a la que se ha dicho sus hijos estaban siendo envenenados por tales o cuales personas. A mi despacho venían mujeres, algunas de las cuales estaban en vías de ser madres, a pedir socorro para sus hijos, creyendo ver en cada mano que alargaba un caramelo un asesino, provocando así en enloquecimiento de la multitud.” Quiroga believed that the right fabricated the story because it was frustrated by the peaceful nature of May Day demonstrations in Madrid. He also revealed that a retired army officer had been arrested on 2 May for firing against a leftist crowd. Grandío Seoane, Emilio (ed), *Casares Quiroga: Discursos Parlamentarios (1931-1936)*, pages 251-52. See also pages 253-54.*

breakdown, abandoned the *pueblo* and wrote two days later to the Archbishop of Seville begging: “todo menos volver á Mariana de la Frontera”.⁷⁸² On 18 April, another crowd attacked seven convents and monasteries in Jerez de la Frontera (Cádiz), while the resident monks fled the buildings in panic.⁷⁸³ The following day, the priests of El Cuervo (Seville) and Algar (Cádiz) were forced to abandon their parishes after receiving death threats; whereas in Lebrija (Seville), successive attempts to burn down several religious buildings forced the local nuns to temporarily renounce their closure vows. According to the religious authorities, this was because “ser los frailes objeto de malquerencia”.⁷⁸⁴ The anticlerical wave that followed the February 1936 elections resulted in a total of 66 damaged/destroyed religious buildings in Andalucía.⁷⁸⁵

Violence against the Church did not explode abruptly in 1936, but rather remained a constant throughout the II Republic in Seville, peaking in May 1931, the summer-autumn of 1932 and the summer of 1933.⁷⁸⁶ Two years of right-wing government (1934-35) did not help defuse the

⁷⁸² On 18 April, Ilundáin ordered the priest of Mariana de la Frontera to return to his parish. Other attacks were aborted *in extremis* thanks to prompt intervention of the Civil Guard, such as in Castillo de las Guardas (Seville) on 16 April 1936. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591.

⁷⁸³ Convento de las Mínimas, Reparadoras, Espíritu Santo, Madre de Dios, Compañía de María, Frailes Franciscanos, Carmelitas (most nuns had already abandoned *clausura* on 14 April). **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126.

⁷⁸⁴ In Algar: “El Parroco ha tenido que huir en vista de que el elemento obrero amenaza con ensañarse con él.” **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126.

⁷⁸⁵ 12 damaged/destroyed churches in Seville, 17 in Cádiz, 16 in Málaga, 7 in Córdoba, 7 in Granada, 5 in Huelva, 1 in Almería and 1 in Jaén. Caro Cancela, Diego, “La primavera de 1936 en Andalucía: conflictividad social y violencia política” in Alvarez Rey, Leandro (ed.), **Andalucía y la guerra civil: estudios y perspectivas**, page 21.

⁷⁸⁶ **1931:** Seville: San José, Villasis, Carmelitas, San Julián.

1932: Seville: Santa Catalina, San Ildefonso, San Martín, San Leandro. Jerez de la Frontera: Carmelitas, Jesuits, Minimas. Lora del Rio: parish church, Mercedarias. Sanlúcar la Barrameda: parish church, Capuchinos. Arcos de la Frontera: Salesianos. Marchena: San Sebastián. Écija: Carmelitas, San Gil, Iglesia de las Marroquies. Dos Hermanas: San Sebastián (chapel). Also, parish churches assaulted in San Juan de Aznalfarache, Coria del Rio, Ardales, El Rubio, Mairena del Alcor, Real de la Jara, Aznalcollar, Sanlúcar la Mayor, Marchena, Nerva, Aznalcázar, Gerena, Badolatosa, Real de la Jara.

1933: Santa Olalla: parish church; Nerva: parish church; temporary closure of the Colegio de las Hermanas de la Caridad. Castaño del Robledo: confiscation of Catholic cemetery. Pilas: confiscation of Catholic cemetery. Cabezas Rubias: parish priest arrested. Pruna: parish priest arrested. Camas: parish priest fined and restrictions imposed on bell-ringing. Villamartin: town hall imposed fee for bell-ringing. Valencina: destruction of religious icons in the streets of the *pueblo*. Villarasa: destruction of a wall in the atrium of the parish church. Coripe: removal of two religious plaques, one of Sacred Heart of Jesus and another attached to the rectory. Galaroza: confiscation of Catholic cemetery. Cantillana: the local mayor prohibited the priest from delivering a sermon during a religious feast day. Cortegana: a *Padre Redentorista* was forced to cancel a *novena* and ordered to leave the *pueblo* “para evitar males mayores” (the mayor also forbade him from preaching again in the village). El Madroño: priest detained for distributing leaflets condemning civil marriage. Aroche: confiscation and conversion of the chapel of San Sebastian into a public market. Algodonales: confiscation and conversion of a chapel into a “escuela

situation; instead, it merely repressed it. The religious problem surfaced again in 1936 with such violence that the Vatican Embassy in Spain wrote to the Dioceses of Seville requesting an official report on the anticlerical riots. Cardinal Ilundáin – “con gran dolor y pesadumbre” - delivered two separate documents on 24 March and 6 June respectively.⁷⁸⁷

The number of attacks revealed that anticlericalism was a collective manifestation of hatred towards the Catholic Church that could be traced back to before the establishment of the Republic. Church reports attempted to obscure this fact by derogatorily labelling the crowds as “turbas”, implying that the emergence of the ‘mob’ was somehow related to the creation of the Second Republic. Therefore, in El Almendro (Huelva), the chapel of Nuestra Señora de Piedras Albas was burned (including the statue of the patron saint) by a “turba numerosa en actitud violenta” that also sacked the rectory “en actitud amenazadora contra el Párroco que tuvo que huir para salvar su vida.” On 23 April, the parish church of El Gastor (Cádiz) was attacked “por las turbas”, while “El cura ha huido amedrantado”. That same day, the priest of La Roda de Andalucía (Seville) informed Ilundáin that he had been given a five-day deadline to abandon the *pueblo*. On 26 April, the Archbishop of Seville ordered him to remain in the *pueblo*, not leave his house alone at night, and counselled him: “Ponga en Dios la confianza”.⁷⁸⁸ A similar situation occurred on 7 May in Guillena (Seville), where the “turbas amotinadas” destroyed religious objects belonging to the parish church and the priest was forced to flee the *pueblo*. His sister suffered a seizure and was left traumatised by the incident. On 26 May, the priest was granted a four-month leave of absence after receiving death threats.⁷⁸⁹ There were further anticlerical incidents in Tocina (Seville), Herrera (Seville), El Saucejo (Seville), Corcoya (Seville) and Galaroza (Huelva). Indeed, the atmosphere in the nearby province of Huelva was equally volatile. In Niebla, the parish church reported an “Incendio monumental del templo parroquial”; whereas in Palos de la Frontera, the local cleric escaped to nearby Moguer.⁷⁹⁰ In

laica”. Attacks against clergy in: Teba, Gerena, Coria del Río, Peñaflor, Aguadulce, Prado del Rey, Peñarrubia, Arcos de la Frontera, Marchena, Carmona, Morón de la Frontera and Ayamonte. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla**, Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126.

⁷⁸⁷ The original request from the *Nuncio Apostólico* was dated 19 March 1936. For the anticlerical incidents of 1936 and the 24 March and 6 June reports see: **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126 and 05097 (592).

⁷⁸⁸ On 15 July, the priest requested a month-long leave of absence to “descansar atendiendo a su salud”. The request was accepted the following day.

⁷⁸⁹ In Guillena: “Las turbas amotinadas han destrozado cuanto han querido de los objetos sagrados del templo parroquial – El Parroco viéndose amenazado de muerte me ha rogado le autorice ausentarse con gran sentimiento suyo y mio”.

⁷⁹⁰ A similar situation occurred in Villanueva de las Minas (Seville): “El parroco temeroso de un atentado contra su vida se ausenta a Constantina”. In Espera (Cádiz), the local Catholic community advised the priest to abandon the *pueblo*.

Las Delgadas, it was the *Jefe del cuerpo de Seguridad* for Rio Tinto himself who urged the priest to flee, “en vista del peligro que corria su seguridad personal”.⁷⁹¹

By February 1936, the general trend of “indiferencia” towards parish priests reported in the 1928-1932 Church census had turned into open hatred. The situation took its emotional toll on the clergy. The priest of Santa María Magdalena y San Miguel (Seville) was repeatedly insulted by construction workers over a pay dispute that provoked “un ataque congestivo y de hecho notable agravación de mi enfermedad que se fomenta con las impresiones de disgustos”.⁷⁹² Moreover, the priests of Breñas (2 May), Guillena (26 May), Almadén de la Plata (10 June), San Sebastián (Alcalá de Guadaira, 30 June), San Gil Abad (Seville, 1 July), San Blás (Carmona, 6 July) and La Roda de Andalucía (15 July); all requested leaves of absence.⁷⁹³ The most extreme case occurred a week before the outbreak of the rebellion (11 July) in Cañete la Real (Málaga), where the local priest became suicidal after his initial petition for special dispensation for health reasons (2 July) was turned down by the Archbishop of Seville:

“tengo el sentimiento de poner en conocimiento de Vstra. E. Rvma. que dicho Sr. Cura desde el día cinco de los corrientes padece una depresión de aspecto endógeno con impulsión al suicidio, aconsejando los facultativos que le han reconocido su reclusión en una casa de salud, por lo que desde dicha fecha ha tenido que dejar su residencia parroquial y está con su citado hermano mientras este gestiona su ingreso en el Sanatorio de San José de la ciudad de Málaga.”⁷⁹⁴

The number and spontaneous nature of anticlerical riots disproved Catholic claims that the attacks were caused by irrational “turbas”. The timing of the disturbances (during and after the February 1936 elections) revealed that the anticlericalism was politically motivated. For instance, on 26 April a crowd interrupted Mass in Gelves (Seville) and forced the priest to perform the Communist salute.⁷⁹⁵ Moreover, left-wing groups regularly attempted to convert

⁷⁹¹ All reports in: **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126 and 05097 (592).

⁷⁹² On 7 May, the priest requested to abandon his parish, which was accepted the following day by Cardinal Ilundáin.

⁷⁹³ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591 and 05097 (592).

⁷⁹⁴ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05097 (592).

⁷⁹⁵ Another report re Gelves read: “Durante la celebración de la Misa forzaron al Párroco para que marchase a votar el día 26 de Abril – Suspendería el Párroco la Misa; y forzándole para que les acompañase fue al Colegio electoral”. A few days earlier (21 February) in Corcoya (Seville), the priest denounced a failed attempt to burn the parish church and declared that “con todo será muy difícil

religious buildings into *Casas del Pueblo* and/or other worker associations, such as in Cantillana (Seville), San Juan de Aznalfarache (Seville), Puebla del Río (Seville), Mairena del Alcor (Seville) and Almensilla (Seville). Tensions flared-up again in the politically-charged holiday of 1 May, most notably in the working-class districts of Seville. Also, in the Barriada de la Azucarera in La Rinconada (Seville), the *Sindicato de Azucareros* went as far as to prohibit its members from engaging in any sort of religious rituals. The local priest was stoned and warned not to celebrate Mass in the local chapel, which was eventually closed in order to prevent arson.⁷⁹⁶ Lastly, on 2 May in Breñas (Seville), a crowd burned several religious objects and attempted to convert the parish church into a *Casa del Pueblo*. The priest was forced to flee and all religious services temporarily suspended. The situation was so tense that the Civil Governor dispatched an Assault Guard unit from Seville to impose the rule of law. The assault guards collected all religious objects, placed them inside the church (which was then locked from the inside) and patrolled the streets to protect the building from further attacks. That same night, a crowd desecrated a local chapel and burned religious icons in the streets of the *pueblo*, while a group of youths “En medio de tanta algarabía y por divertirse mas, tocaban las campanas.” The Civil Guard did not find the situation amusing and decided to open fire, seriously injuring one rioter. The following day, the mood in Breñas had altered considerably. The fearful local priest reported to Cardinal Ilundáin that “se han exaltado sobremanera los ánimos llegando a decir

esclarecer nada, porque el alcalde de Badolatosa es el jefe de la sociedad obrerista de Corcoya que es la que se cree ha realizado el atropello, y procurará que todo quede en la impunidad.” The anticlerical attitude of the mayor found echo in the “izquierdismo irreligioso de casi toda la masa.” **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591 and 05097 (592).

⁷⁹⁶ In the parish of San Jerónimo (Seville), priest José Vigil Cabrerizo reported that the local church was first occupied on 1 May after the chaplain refused to hand in the keys to “una turba de jóvenes”. After breaking into the temple, the youths handed all religious objects to the chaplain, destroyed the altarpiece and proceeded to convert the church into a *Casa del Pueblo*. The adjacent rectory was not attacked. On 6 May, a patrol of assault guards dislodged the occupiers, however: “La actitud de los vecinos es sea como fuera volver al asalto porque pretenden instalar la casa del pueblo”. As a result, the Civil Governor decided to keep a permanent civil guard patrol. In Cantillana (24 April): “Los Socialistas se apoderaron de la Capilla del Rosario después de sacar los objetos religiosos por personas piadosas”. Puebla del Río: “El Párroco medroso, quizá excesivamente, por haberle pedido unos jóvenes la llave de una Capilla de S. Sebastián, accediendo a requerimientos posteriores de personas piadosas entregó a estas la llave para que sacasen los objetos sagrados de la Capilla y entregasen después la llave a aquella Comisión del pueblo que la pedía para casa del pueblo – Posteriormente y por orden superior gubernativa ha sido devuelta.” Mairena del Alcor: a “mchedumbre” demanded that the priest hand over the key of the chapel of San Sebastián so to convert it into a *Centro Obrero de Mujeres*. The fearful priest complied only for the key to be returned four days later. Almensilla: “La juventud Marxista se apodera de los almacenes dependencia de la parroquia en los cuales establecen su centro.” Another group of adolescents forced the priest to hand over the keys of the local chapel and converted it into a *Casa del Pueblo*. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591 and 05097 (592).

que ya no queda nada de la Iglesia más que las campanas y el cura y que es necesario hacerles desaparecer.”⁷⁹⁷

Several representatives of the newly-elected Popular Front were so eager to curb the influence of the Catholic Church that they also often resorted to illegal tactics. In La Palma del Condado (Huelva), the *Comisión Gestora* ordered the razing of the local monument to the Sacred Heart of Jesus, forbade both bell-ringing and public religious services, and imposed an illegal tax of 200 pesetas on all religious funerals. In Los Corrales (Seville), the priest was fined for praying in the spot where a demolished iron cross used to stand, threatened with the confiscation of his rectory and prohibited from celebrating religious funerals. In Moguer (Huelva) and Bollullos del Condado (Huelva), the local Catholic cemeteries were taken over by the municipal authorities; whereas in Valdelarco (Huelva)⁷⁹⁸, El Madroño (Seville) and El Cerro Del Andevalo (Huelva)⁷⁹⁹, the local authorities decreed a ban on all religious funerals and church bell-ringing. In addition, a number of mayors gratuitously humiliated the clergy. For instance, the mayors of El Madroño⁸⁰⁰ and Sanlúcar de Barrameda (Cádiz) ordered the local priests to inform their respective town halls of all planned religious services in advance for approval. In Calañas (Huelva), the local administration ordered a search on the parish church that found an obsolete hunting rifle, which was then used as a pretext to detain the priest for four days. The church Los Milagros in El Puerto de Santa María (Cádiz) was also searched on the basis of the false denunciation that the parish priest was hiding “personas enemigas del régimen”. The situation became so tense that several members of the religious orders temporarily renounced their vows without even seeking prior approval from the Archbishop of Seville. Other abuses of authority took place in Rota (Cádiz), Río Tinto (Huelva), Fuentes de Andalucía (Seville), Lora del Río (Seville), Marchena (Seville), Arahal (Seville), and Coria del Río (Seville).⁸⁰¹ At the same

⁷⁹⁷ That same day, the priest abandoned the *pueblo* after being given a leave of absence by Cardinal Ilundáin. On 1 July, the priest requested another 20-day leave citing health reasons. His petition was rejected by the Archbishop of Seville. All reports in: **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591 and 05097 (592).

⁷⁹⁸ Also in Valdelarco: “Por acuerdo del Alcalde se ha prohibido a las señoritas catequistas enseñar el catecismo en la parroquia.” Catholic schools were also closed in Moguer, Coria del Río and Galaroza.

⁷⁹⁹ A small chapel was also confiscated in the *pueblo*.

⁸⁰⁰ The local mayor also prohibited the celebration of religious rituals after 20:00.

⁸⁰¹ Lora del Río: the abandoned La Merced Convent was demolished under the pretext that both its rooftop and a lateral wall were at risk of collapse. “Es de notar que el peligro de ruina provino especialmente porque las turbas – o alguna persona intencionada – abrió brecha en el muro.” Marchena: representatives of the local *Casa del Pueblo* tried to confiscate the Church of Santo Domingo. Río Tinto: failed attempt to convert the Chapel of La Dehesa into a public library. Arahal: the local mayor attempted to confiscate the Ermita of San Antonio. Rota: on 17 April, the Chapel of La Caridad and Chapel of San Roque were both attacked and several religious images burned in the main square of the

time, the moderate political left attempted to curb the excesses of the extremists. A month later, normality had already been restored thanks to the timely intervention of the Civil Governor of Seville. At the same time, Cardinal Ilundáin adopted a moderate stance, using official channels (for instance, filing complaints with the Civil Government) to combat anticlericalism.⁸⁰² The joint strategy adopted by both the Civil Governor and the Archbishop of Seville displeased political extremists. For instance, on 28 April 1936 the *Comité de Radio de Arahal* wrote a letter to the PCE parliamentary representation denouncing the fact that "los patronos no cumplen nada de lo que se comprometieron", at the same time as the Civil Governor "desautoriza a los alcaldes a que hagan nada sin que se lo comunique", while the masses languish "muertos de hambre".⁸⁰³

The shocking findings of the 29 March and 6 June reports compelled the Apostolic Nunciature to request (29 June) a list of priestless parishes in the Dioceses of Seville.⁸⁰⁴ Cardinal Ilundáin attempted to mask the situation in his reply of on 6 July by stating that there were no abandoned parishes, arguing instead that several priests were temporarily forced – for security

pueblo. The assistant priest (*coadjutor*) was arrested for five days without even being informed of the reasons for his detention. Fuentes de Andalucía: the parish priest was detained for a day. Coria del Rio: on 25 April, a town hall councillor and a commission from the *Casa del Pueblo* requested the keys of the Chapel of la Soledad from the local priest. The priest complied and several religious objects were destroyed. Cardinal Ilundáin later phoned the priest, informing that he held him personally responsible for all damages since he did not hand the keys under the threat of violence. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126, 591 and 05097 (592). See also: Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *Socialismo, república y revolución en Andalucía (1931-1936)*, page 411.

⁸⁰² Normality returned to Seville mostly thanks to the intervention of the Civil Governor. In Valencina del Alcor (Seville), when both the priest and the entire *Junta* of a religious Brotherhood (*Confradía*) were arrested for holding a meeting in the local church (subsequently searched); the Civil Governor ordered their immediate release. He also overruled an order from the mayor of Alanís (Seville) instructing the local priest to suspend all public religious services in the *pueblo*. A demonstration against the priest was held following the revocation of the mayor's original order. Varela Rendueles also ensured that Holy Week in Seville passed without incidents. Legal channels were also employed to separate Church and State. In Seville, Huelva and Ayamonte, the local authorities rescinded their contracts with the Hermanas de la Caridad working in state institutions (Seville: Asilo de San Fernando; Huelva: Hospital Provincial; Ayamonte: Asilo y Casa Cuna). In Huelva, the *Diputación* also decided to confiscate the church contiguous to its building. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126 and 05097 (592). For the actions of Civil Governor Varela Rendueles see: Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde*, pages 29-71. See also: Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *Socialismo, república y revolución en Andalucía (1931-1936)*, page 397.

⁸⁰³ **Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica** (Salamanca), PS Madrid, 385(2)/37.

⁸⁰⁴ For all documents see: **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05099, 05100 and 05102.

reasons - to abandon their posts.⁸⁰⁵ By July, only six parishes remained 'officially' vacant. These were:

In Cádiz:

- Prado del Rey (4,900 residents)
- Algar (2,890 residents)

In Huelva:

- Almendro (1,372 residents)
- Las Delgadas (1,314 residents)

In Seville:

- Gelves (1325 residents)
- Guillena (4,335 residents)

An additional twelve parishes remained *de facto* priestless "Desde muchos años". Also, the Archbishop of Seville ordered priests residing in adjacent *pueblos* with the administration of sacraments to Catholics in 'temporarily' vacant parishes.⁸⁰⁶

Economic troubles

The withdrawal of the Church's economic privileges decreed by new Republican government threatened the very survival of the Catholicism in Seville. On 30 December 1931, the priest of Montellano (Seville) wrote to Cardinal Ilundáin, stating:

"Que en las difíciles circunstancias porque atraviesa esta parroquia como consecuencia de la desenfrenada campaña laizante, tenazmente sostenida por los directivo de la actual situación a la que se debe haya desaparecido en absoluto la parte funeral, que constituía el principal

⁸⁰⁵ "Existen desgraciadamente algunas parroquias cuyos párrocos se han visto en el lamentable caso de ausentarse a consecuencia de la situación peligrosa que se les creó desde el mes de Febrero, o desde Mayo ultimo, por elementos desafectos a la Iglesia y al Clero católico." **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05102.

⁸⁰⁶ Reasons put forward by Cardinal Ilundáin to explain the existence of priestless parishes: "La hostilidad de una parte del vecindario" and "Además: los párrocos han sido objeto de amenazas que hacen temer graves agresiones a su persona, o, la expulsión violenta." He concluded: "Hay finalmente dos parroquias, a saber, S. Nicolás del Puerto y Corcoya que desde hace algún tiempo están servidas por el párroco inmediato, por no haber tenido sacerdote disponible para ser nombrado Vicario Ecónomo. Actualmente sería muy aventurado exponerse al riesgo de que no fuese recibido si se nombrase ex proffesso; pues la efervescencia sectaria en estas regiones es muy acentuada desgraciadamente." **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05102. See also: Legajo 05126 and 05097 (592).

ingreso de Curato y Fábrica y los casamientos se están celebrando civilmente (diez y seis se han celebrado civilmente en los tres días de Pascua)".

Furthermore, and as a direct consequence of the anticlerical legislation promulgated by the government, the parish had lost two-thirds of its income since May 1931. To make matters worse, the wealthiest Catholic families in Montellano decided to abandon the *pueblo* for security reasons.⁸⁰⁷

In January 1932, Cardinal Ilundáin attempted to preclude the economic impact of Article 26 of the Republican Constitution. He sent a Circular letter to all 260 parish priests in his dioceses, instructing them to set-up committees to raise money for the maintenance of the clergy. The conditions were few and clear: all members had to be male adults, practicing Catholics, of acceptable morality and influential in their local community. Twenty-three parishes reported that they were unable to meet the requisites, whereas others simply opted to ignore them altogether and set-up committees that included non-practising Catholics. To the great exasperation of the conservative Ilundáin, the priest of El Berrocal (Huelva) suggested that the local committee should include women. Four years later, the Dioceses of Seville was on the verge of financial bankruptcy. On 5 March 1936, the priest of Puerto Serrano (Cádiz) confided to the Archbishop of Seville that "es evidente que no se puede vivir, no se me oculta que esta mi situación es la de muchos compañeros."⁸⁰⁸ Indeed, several parishes relied on direct funding from the Dioceses for survival, including San Sebastián (heavily indebted and unable to maintain its Catholic school)⁸⁰⁹ and Santa María la Blanca (unable to fund repair works in its rectory).⁸¹⁰ Financial troubles in the capital of Andalucía extended even to the Archbishop's

⁸⁰⁷ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05104.

⁸⁰⁸ On 8 May, the priest spoke of "casi nulos ingresos" that did not even allow the parish to financially support the sexton who had since tendered his resignation. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05097 (592).

⁸⁰⁹ On 4 May 1935, the priest of San Sebastián (Seville) revealed that his parish still owned 1,315.38 pesetas in debts dating back to 1934 (which Ilundáin accepted to cover on 5 May). On the eve of the rebellion in Seville (17 July 1936), the priest also requested a subsidy of 500 pesetas. Cardinal Ilundáin acceded to all requests on 27 November. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05097 (592).

⁸¹⁰ On 10 July, the priest *coadjutor* of Santa María la Blanca - Lorenzo Pérez Fernández - informed the Archbishop of Seville that the rectory was in need of urgent repairs (part of it had already collapsed). Ilundáin replied that the same day, authorising repair works but instructing the parish to fund it. Three days later, the priest wrote back declaring that the parish possessed "recursos [...] nulos" and that "La Iglesia filia de Santa María la Blanca no cuenta con recursos ni ordinarios procedentes de fábrica que son nulos y menos extraordinarios que puedan destinarse a la urgente y necesaria reparación de la casa habitación del Coadjutor." He added: "son poco en número los que habitualmente contribuyen y los

Library, the *Biblioteca Colombina*, reliant on donations to expand its book collection.⁸¹¹ On 19 June, Cardinal Ilundáin refused to provide financial aid to the parish of Sanlúcar la Mayor on the grounds that “la situación económica actual solicita Nuestra preocupación para que no falte al personal de párrocos y coadjutores el subsidio mensual.”⁸¹² A majority of priests blamed low levels of religiosity for the precarious economic condition of their parishes. For instance, the priest of Santa María (Estepa) denounced the “enorme negligencia de la inmensa mayoría de los fieles en aportar medios con suscripciones y limosnas o colectas.”⁸¹³

Church and civil war in Seville (1936-1939)

The 18 July 1936 rebellion signalled a radical rupture with the recent past in rebel-controlled Spain: anticlericalism evaporated overnight and the Catholic Church was restored to an idealised past of medieval glory. A year later (July 1937), General Franco declared to a German reporter that:

“En España no hay problema religioso, pues la totalidad del país es católico, y nuestro Episcopado, en general, es ejemplo de virtudes y de apartamiento de las cosas temporales.”⁸¹⁴

Nationalist historiography explained the ‘miracle’ of the re-Catholicisation of southern Spain with another one: it was the result of a collective catharsis triggered by the legendary capture of Seville by General Queipo de Llano and his *soldaditos*. As a result, local priests saw their churches packed with new ‘converts’ for Sunday (and even daily) Mass. However, the reason for the sudden revival of Catholicism in rebel-controlled Andalucía appears to be more mundane. Religious harmony was achieved by the same method that brought about political unity: repression. The fact that the rebels accomplished their objective in such a short space of time only confirmed the exceptionally violent nature of the new regime.

mismos sobre quienes pesa no solo la suscripción de CULTO Y CLERO, sino también todas las demás colectas extraordinarios y cultos que son de rigor hacer en la Iglesias de la Archidiocesis.” **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05097 (592).

⁸¹¹ “Continuando agravada y déficit, cada dia mas, la situación económica de nuestra Biblioteca, tampoco en estos dos semestres se han podido efectuar trabajos de catalogación, y en los de encuadernación.” **Archivo Catedral de Sevilla**, Archivo Histórico Capitular, Libro de Autos Capitulares, nº234, 1931-1938, 3 July 1936.

⁸¹² **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05097 (592).

⁸¹³ On 17 June, the priest of Sanlúcar la Mayor requested 1,000 pesetas to repair the local church and revealed that the parish possessed a mere 150 pesetas and “los feligreses poco dan para el Culto y Clero”. On 24 July, the priest of Santa María (Estepa) requested a subsidy to perform urgent repair works in the rectory, which was in danger of collapse. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591.

⁸¹⁴ Franco, Francisco, *Palabras del Caudillo: 19 abril 1937-31 diciembre 1938*, page 156.

However, the re-Catholicisation of Seville was only achieved after one last brief, but extremely violent, anticlerical explosion. Exactly one month after the outbreak of the rebellion in Andalucía, Cardinal Ilundáin dispatched to the Vatican a pessimistic report on anticlerical violence in his Dioceses:

“Emmo. Sr. Cardenal: Con profundo dolor he de manifestar a V.Emna. la condición afflictiva a que ha sido reducida esta diócesis de Sevilla por la persecución que los Marxistas han declarado en España contra la religión y la Iglesia católica y sus sagrados ministros e instituciones.

Desde el día 18 de Julio en que se inició la guerra civil en España la diócesis de Sevilla ha sufrido mucho. Actualmente la máxima parte del territorio amplísimo de la diócesis Hispalense está tranquilo; pero los desastres causados y los desmanes perpetrados durante este mes han sido innumerables y gravísimos.”

The Archbishop of Seville revealed that thirty religious buildings (nine in the city of Seville) were burned and over a hundred sacked and/or damaged (the vast majority of which were parish churches). There was also a “sin número” of desecrations, including destroyed religious objects and parish archives of incalculable artistic/historic value. Cardinal Ilundáin also confirmed the murder of ten priests and two Salesian monks, and speculated that the number of assassinations might ascend to twenty.⁸¹⁵ In reality, a total of 27 priests and seminarians were murdered in his Dioceses; eleven of which (nine priests and two seminarians) in the province of Seville, all in *pueblos* of extremely low religious observance. They were:

1. Jose Vigil Cabrerizo (chaplain of San Jerónimo in Seville, murdered in Seville on 19 July).⁸¹⁶
2. Francisco Arias Rivas (priest of Lora del Río, murdered in Lora del Río on 1 August).
3. Juan Coca y González Saavedra (*coadjutor* of Lora del Río, murdered in Lora del Río on 1 August). Both Rivas and Saavedra were insulted and forced to perform menial jobs (such as cleaning toilets) during their brief incarceration. Average church attendance rate in Lora del Río in 1932: 0.44% (50 regular worshippers out of a total population of 11,373).

⁸¹⁵ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla**, Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126.

⁸¹⁶ For Cabrerizo's murder see Chapter IV.

4. Pedro Carballo Corrales (priest of Guadalcanal, murdered in Guadalcanal on 6 August). Average church attendance rate in Guadalcanal in 1932: 1.33% (100 regular worshippers out of a total population of 7,523)

5. Antonio Jesús Díaz Ramos (*ecónomo* of Cazalla de la Sierra, murdered in Cazalla de la Sierra on 5 August). At 15:00 on 18 July, Ramos was informed of the outbreak of the rebellion in Seville by local rightists who also urged the priest to flee the *pueblo* and take with him the statue of the patron saint. However, Ramos believed that political moderation would prevail in Cazalla and refused to abandon his parish. His optimism proved unfounded. The priest was detained, interrogated and tortured by the local revolutionary committee, who accused Ramos of concealing a machine-gun in his church. On 5 August, just as a Nationalist column approached the outskirts of Cazalla, the committee decided to release a number of prisoners. A second group of detainees, including Ramos and seminarian Enrique Palacios Monraba, was selected for execution. Members of the committee returned later to the prison to finish-off survivors with hand grenades. The building was set ablaze and anyone who attempted to escape shot dead.

6. Enrique Palacios Monraba (seminarian from Cazalla de la Sierra, murdered in Cazalla de la Sierra on 5 August). Average church attendance rate in Cazalla de la Sierra in 1932: 0.55% (60 regular worshippers out of a total population of 11,000).

7. Salvador Lobato Pérez (*ecónomo* of El Saucejo, murdered in El Saucejo on 21 August). Pérez was arrested on 23 July and spared from execution thanks to the timely intervention of the Civil Guard. Pérez's family (mother and brother) was forced to move residence and placed under house arrest. On 21 August, the local militia was about to flee El Saucejo (the Nationalist army was already in the suburbs of the *pueblo*) when two enraged women challenged the militiamen to murder the priest. The Pérez brothers bid farewell to their mother before being taken to their execution. Both men were still breathing when their killers stole their shoes, sitting on the victims' stomachs. The average rate of church attendance in El Saucejo in 1932: 0.10% (6 regular worshippers out of a total population of 5,990).

8. Miguel Borrero Picón (*coadjutor* of Santa María de Utrera, murdered in Utrera on 26 July). Picón said Mass on 18 July but was prohibited from holding further religious services in Utrera. That same night, the priest went to the town hall to demand the release of several prisoners, but was instead detained. Picón continued performing his priestly duties during his brief incarceration. On 26 August, just as the Nationalist column approached the outskirts of Utrera, a group of militiamen opened the local jail. Picón was the first detainee to step out and was immediately shot dead; followed by a massacre of prisoners. Average church attendance

rate in the parish of Santa María de Utrera in 1932: 0.83% (100 regular worshippers out of a total population of 12,000).

9. Manuel González-Serna y Rodríguez (priest of Constantina and Archpriest of Cazalla de la Sierra, murdered in Constantina on 23 July). Rodríguez was arrested in Constantina on 19 July. While in prison, the guards demanded that the Archpriest hand over his crucifix, but Rodríguez not only refused to comply, but also continued performing his priestly duties. On 23 July, the Archpriest was dragged to the main square of the *pueblo*, forced to witness the sacking of his church, taken to the sacristy and shot in the mouth and head. The following morning, Rodríguez's body was dumped in the local cemetery.

10. Manuel Heredia Torres (priest in Jaén, murdered in Constantina on 3 August).

11. Juan Heredia Torres (priest in Jaén, murdered in Constantina on 3 August). Average church attendance rate in Constantina in 1932: 1.36% (200 regular worshippers out of a total population of 14,740).⁸¹⁷

As for the female religious orders, many nuns were forced temporarily to renounce their vows, "pero ningún daño personal se les causó, y fueron respetadas por los Marxistas". Moreover, thirteen religious buildings were assaulted before the rebels seized full control of the capital of Andalucía.⁸¹⁸ The brutal state of affairs during the early days of the civil war was summarised

⁸¹⁷ Priests serving in Seville murdered outside the province: Rafael Galan Escalante (*ecónomo* of San Bartolomé y San Esteban in Seville), murdered in Teba on 1 August; Rafael Machuca y Juarez de Negron (*coadjutor* of Santa María de Estepa), murdered in Malaga on 31 August. Sebastián y Bandarán, José; Tineo Lara, Antonio, *La persecución religiosa en la Archidiócesis de Sevilla*, pages 86-145. For Church attendance rates see: **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559.

⁸¹⁸ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126. For anticlericalism in the city of Seville in July 1936 see: Hernández Díaz, José; Sancho Corbacho, Antonio, *Estudio de los edificios religiosos y objetos de culto de la ciudad de Sevilla, saqueados y destruidos por los marxistas*, pages 187-93; Sebastián y Bandarán, José; Tineo Lara, Antonio, *La persecución religiosa en la Archidiócesis de Sevilla*, pages 21-31. Both works included the Church of San Julián (destroyed in 1932). Sebastián y Bandarán and Tineo Lara justified the inclusion of San Julián in their study on civil war anticlericalism with the following statement: "fue el primer templo de esta ciudad víctima de las doctrinas marxistas", page 24. A similar situation occurred in the *pueblos*. See the reports presented by several town halls (for example: Brena) to the *Causa General. Archivo Histórico Nacional* (Madrid), FC, Causa General, L-1041-1, Expedientes 1, 12 and 18. In the province of Seville, Church property was either damaged or destroyed in: Aguadulce, Alanis (three buildings), Alcalá de Guadaira (five buildings), Alcolea del Río, Algamarita, El Arahal (five buildings), Aznalcázar, Aznalcollar, Badolatosa, Cantillana (two buildings), Carmona, Casariche, Castillo de las Guardas, Cazalla de la Sierra (eight buildings), Constantina (six buildings), Coria del Río (three buildings), Los Corrales, Dos Hermanas, Gerena, Guadalcánal (five buildings), Herrera (two buildings), Lora del Río (three buildings), La Luisiana, El Madroñal, Mairena del Alcor (three buildings), Mariana, Martín de la Jara, Los Molares, Montellano, Morón de la Frontera (five buildings), Las Navas de la Concepción, Paradas (three buildings), Pruna, Puebla de Cazalla (two buildings), Puebla de los Infantes, La Roda de Andalucía, El Rubio, San Nicolás del Puerto, El Saucejo, Tocina (two buildings), Utrera (two buildings), Villanueva del Río, Villanueva de las Minas, Villanueva de la

by Andrés Nin, leader of the POUM (*Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista*), in a speech delivered at a rally in Barcelona on 6 September 1936: “El problema de la Iglesia ya sabéis cómo se ha resuelto: no queda ni una iglesia en toda España.”⁸¹⁹

The number of anticlerical incidents confirmed that hatred of the Catholic Church ran deep among significant segments of the local population, a fact openly recognised by Cardinal Ilundáin.⁸²⁰ His position was subsequently revised by the new Archbishop of Seville, Cardinal Pedro Segura who was appointed following the death of Ilundáin and took up the post on 12 October 1937.⁸²¹ In 1938, Segura made the remarkable declaration that, despite the domination of the Republican political arena by anticlericals, “la mayor y más sana parte del pueblo se conservaba firmemente adherida a la santa fe católica, apostólica y romana”.⁸²² Clearly, Segura’s declaration was meaningful only as a piece of delusional propaganda or as a reflection of the success of the terror in stimulating religious practice, real or simulated.

The brutal murder of eleven priests in the province of Seville listed in Ilundaín’s report to the Vatican, had been successfully exploited by Nationalist propaganda to promote tales of “nuns exposed naked in the shop windows, and afterwards forced to run naked through streets lined on both sides by the Red militia, who spat insults at them and stoned them. Other refugees told of priests who, still living, had had their stomachs cut open and filled with quick-lime.”⁸²³ Most of the stories were promoted by General Queipo de Llano. Arthur Koestler listened to one of the general’s *charlas* where, “For some ten minutes he described in a steady flood of words, which now and then became extremely racy, how the Marxists slit open the stomachs

San Juan, El Viso del Alcor (two buildings). For anticlericalism in the province of Seville during the civil war see: Hernández Díaz, José; Sancho Corbacho, Antonio, *Estudio de los edificios religiosos y objetos de culto saqueados y destruidos por los marxistas en los pueblos de la provincia de Sevilla*; Sebastián y Bandarán, José; Tineo Lara, Antonio, *La persecución religiosa en la Archidiócesis de Sevilla*, pages 31-50.

⁸¹⁹ Nin, Andrés, *Los problemas de la revolución española (1931-1937)*, page, 176. The PCE rejected this position. In a speech entitled “Por la unidad, hacia la victoria”, delivered in Valencia in March 1937, PCE Secretary-General José Díaz declared: “Bien entendido que combatir a la Iglesia en su estructura económica y política semifeudal no equivale a combatir la religión, sino al contrario, pues sólo un España republicana y democrática, liberal y progresista, podrá asegurar la libertad de cultos en nuestro país.” Díaz, José, *La guerra y el Frente Popular*, page 50.

⁸²⁰ Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126 and 05097 (592).

⁸²¹ Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla, 12 October 1937.

⁸²² Sebastián y Bandarán, José; Tineo Lara, Antonio, *La persecución religiosa en la Archidiócesis de Sevilla*, page 158.

⁸²³ Nicholson, Helen, *Death in the morning* , page 73

of pregnant women and speared the foetuses; how they had tied two eight-year-old girls on their father's knees, violated them, poured petrol on them and set them on fire. This went on and on, unceasingly, one story following another – a perfect clinical demonstration in sexual psychopathology.”⁸²⁴ However, Ilundáin's report confirmed that violence against the Catholic Church was primarily directed against its property. Still, a number of priests were saved *in extremis* and their stories would later form the backbone of (yet) another Nationalist myth aimed at justifying repression: that the rapid conquest of the province of Seville frustrated Republican plans to exterminate the personnel as well as the property of the Catholic Church.⁸²⁵

The Catholic Church, a full member of the *Pact of blood*

The military rebels exploited anticlerical violence to consolidate the nascent Nationalist alliance, the *Pact of blood*, in the same way as the CEDA had previously capitalised on the victimisation of the Church to win the 1933 general elections. However, the incorporation of the Catholic Church into the *Pact of blood* was not immediate. General Queipo de Llano first approached the Church hierarchy nearly a month after the rebellion (8 August) by issuing an edict creating the *Junta Conservadora del Tesoro Artístico*. However, Cardinal Ilundáin remained deeply suspicious of the rebel general (in particular his past Republicanism) and did not pay him a visit until mid-August.⁸²⁶ On paper, the official objective of the *Junta* was the preservation/restoration of all buildings of artistic/historical value either damaged or destroyed by the “turbas”. However, its real *raison d'être* was twofold: a) to provide material assistance to the Catholic Church in the hope of obtaining the latter's support so to b) exploit antireligious violence for its own political benefit. The *Junta*'s ‘philanthropic’ work spawned two propaganda books (published in 1936 and 1937) on anticlericalism in Seville (volume I: capital; volume II: province) translated into English, French, German and Italian. Their objective was clearly outlined in the preface to the second volume: “la necesidad de mostrar al mundo

⁸²⁴ Koestler, Arthur, *Spanish testament*, page 34.

⁸²⁵ Sebastián y Bandarán, José; Tineo Lara, Antonio, *La persecución religiosa en la Archidiócesis de Sevilla*, page 85. Regarding parish priests: “Los Párocos continúan residiendo en sus parroquias en mi diócesis sirviendo espiritualmente a los fieles, cuyo fervor religioso se ha acrecentado en estas circunstancias.- Muchos de estos párocos fueron encarcelados y algunos de ellos han salvado la vida providencialmente, pues estaban amenazados de ser fusilados.- En los templos parroquiales se hicieron investigaciones policiacas minuciosas para investigar si, como falsamente se les imputaba, había depositadas armas o pertrechos militares en los templos o en sus dependencias.- Gracias a Dios, pudieron convencerse de la falsedad de estas acusaciones los que las inventaron. Algunos párocos se ausentaron por lo peligro de muerte: Son pocos los que se ausentaron.” **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126.

⁸²⁶ Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, *Mis Conversaciones privadas con Franco*, page 476.

hasta qué extremo llega el afán de anular el nombre de España [...] por parte de esos degenerados". The English version read:

"The artistic treasures in the Province of Seville have suffered heavy losses during the communistic revolution. The red mob, in its eagerness to destroy whatever stood for religious principles, and historical and traditional sentiments, inflicted a heavy damage upon European culture."⁸²⁷

Under pressure from the rebel authorities, and perhaps brainwashed by their propaganda, the Archbishop of Seville soon publicised his support for the insurgent cause in the first post-coup issue of the *Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla* (8 September 1936).⁸²⁸ Ilundáin's statement came two days after the Primate of Spain, Cardinal Gomá, announced his support for the rebellion in a pastoral letter addressed to Basque Catholics.⁸²⁹ A year later, the Archbishop of Seville used the first anniversary of the civil war to bless the rebellion, regurgitating a series of Nationalist myths in the process:

"En el aniversario del Movimiento Nacional para la liberación de España de la anarquía, situación en la que se veía sumida, el gravísimo peligro del comunismo y del inminente riesgo de completa ruina de todos los valores éticos, religiosos y sociales fundamentales de nuestra Patria, debemos los corazones cristianos elevar a Dios fervorosas acciones de gracias por la visible y extraordinaria Providencia que ha otorgado a los heroicos esfuerzos del Ejército y de Pueblo español, realizados en la defensa de nuestra Patria, para salvar con ellos los bienes de la civilización cristiana y procurar el engrandecimiento de España, que es, suma, lo que en la presente contienda se pretende conseguir, pues por Dios y por la Patria fue promovida. Procuremos hacernos dignos de que Dios, en cuya omnipotentes manos está el porvenir de las Naciones, continúe amparándonos y bendiciéndonos hasta obtener el triunfo de los ideales supremos de Dios y Patria, Religión y orden, Justicia y paz social, conservación y florecimiento

⁸²⁷ Hernández Díaz, José; Sancho Corbacho, Antonio, *Estudio de los edificios religiosos y objetos de culto saqueados y destruídos por los marxistas en los pueblos de la provincia de Sevilla*, pages 5 (first quote) and 227 (second quote). See also: Hernández Díaz, José; Sancho Corbacho, Antonio, *Estudio de los edificios religiosos y objetos de culto de la ciudad de Sevilla, saqueados y destruídos por los marxistas*, pages 3-9.

⁸²⁸ "se implora de Nuestra Señora la protección de Dios y la suya a favor de la santa Religión católica injustamente perseguida, y el restablecimiento de la justicia, del orden y la paz en España; pidiendo la protección del cielo para cuantos luchan por el bienestar de España católica y la defensa de la civilización cristiana en Nuestra amada Patria." *Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla*, 8 September 1936.

⁸²⁹ Tuñón de Lara, Manuel, *La España del Siglo XX*, page 460.

de nuestra civilización cristiana y española, convivencia cordial de la Iglesia católica y el Estado.”⁸³⁰

The Catholic Church was soon making itself felt both as a political and a social force. The rebel military leadership welcomed this development, for it was in desperate need of the collaboration of the myriad of competing anti-Republican forces in the Nationalist zone, whose sole common denominator was their Catholicism. This was a mutually beneficial alliance. On the one hand, the Church hierarchy regained its long-lost cultural hegemony; while on the other, the Nationalists obtained the allegiance of Catholics both in Spain and abroad and an ideological structure that legitimised the rebellion.⁸³¹ As a result, the boundary between Church and state became increasingly (and dangerously) blurred.⁸³² For instance, the Town Hall of Huelva wrote to General Franco on 23 November 1937, requesting a military decoration (*Medalla Militar de Sufrimientos por la Patria*) for the Archbishop of Seville.⁸³³ Already on 13 August 1936, the Nationalist mayor of Casariche (Seville) informed Cardinal Ilundáin that both the Town Hall and the Falange “han creído oportuno iniciar una campaña de resurgimiento de nuestras tradicionales costumbres cristianas”, and for that same reason requested authorisation to organise an open-air Mass at the Plaza Primo de Rivera on 15 August.⁸³⁴ Nine

⁸³⁰ **FE** (Seville), 18 July 1937. That same month, the Catholic hierarchy collectively endorsed the rebellion. Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, *The Spanish bishops speak: joint pastoral letter to the Bishops of the whole world on the war in Spain*. Francoist propaganda regularly censored Vatican documents. For instance, the encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge* (addressing the situation of the Catholic Church in the German Reich) was censored in Spain. At the same time, the Vatican attempted to remain neutral in the conflict and the Pastoral of July 1937 was not published in *L’Osservatore romano*. Furthermore, the Vatican’s Secretary of State, Cardinal Pacelli, took 9 months (5 March 1938) to reply to the Pastoral. When he did, he opted to condemn all violence, both Nationalist and Republican. The rebels were mortified. Lastly, the Church showed open reservations about the use and abuse of the term “crusade”. Raguer I Suñer, Hilari, “La prensa vaticana en la Guerra Civil” in Tuñón de Lara, Manuel (ed), *Comunicación, Cultura y Política durante la II República y la Guerra Civil*, vol. II, pages 302-11. The Nationalist leadership was relieved once its rebellion was blessed as a crusade by the Spanish clergy. For instance, the Catholic General Kindelan wrote: “nuestra pasada lucha, llamada con justicia *Cruzada*, fue una contienda a vida o muerte entre los conceptos materialista y espiritualista, entre la civilización marxista y la cristiana” Kindelán, Alfredo, *Mis cuadernos de guerra*, page 10. See also: Sánchez, José Mariano, *The Spanish Civil War as a religious tragedy*, page 126-27; Rodríguez Aisa, María Luisa, *El Cardenal Gomá y la Guerra de España. Aspectos de la gestión pública del Primado 1936-1939*, pages 233-69, 411-18 and 442-43. In Spain, the July 1937 was incorporated in the Catechism of the Catholic Church. González Menéndez-Reigada, Albino, *Catecismo patriótico español*, page 56.

⁸³¹ The Spanish Church’s position influenced a number of foreign reporters. For instance, Rotvand wrote: “The gratitude of Christendom will be given to General Franco because he stood for the old traditions at a crisis of the world.” Rotvand, Georges, *Franco means business*, page xvii

⁸³² Cardinal Ilundáin declared to *El Correo de Andalucía* on the first anniversary of the rebellion: “el verdadero espíritu nacional histórico está plasmado en la alianza de la religión católica y los legítimos intereses de la vida nacional.” *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 18 July 1937.

⁸³³ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados (1938), Legajo 622.

⁸³⁴ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05097 (592).

days later (26 August), the Falange of Espartinas (Seville) asked permission to transfer the Virgen de Loreto to its sanctuary on 8 September. The request was accepted and the procession followed by an open-air Mass attended by the Falange, Civil Guard, Aviation Corps, and residents from both Espartinas and a number of nearby villages.⁸³⁵ The rebel army also cultivated close relations with the Church. On 10 March 1938, the Archpriest of Écija (Seville) informed the Dioceses that the local garrison had received regular visits by Catholic clergy since 18 July 1936. The priest of Alcalá de Guadaira also reported that all military forces stationed in the *pueblo* attended Sunday Mass.⁸³⁶ That same year (1938), all newspapers in Huelva voluntarily submitted themselves to “censura eclesiástica”.⁸³⁷ As a gesture of gratitude, the Church hierarchy used religious services to ‘sanctify’ the rebellion. On 24 October 1936, the mayor of Villalba del Alcor (Huelva) requested permission to celebrate an open air Mass in the main square of the *pueblo*, scheduled to take place immediately after the much-anticipated capture of Madrid by the Nationalists. The usually cautious Ilundáin enthusiastically accepted the petition.⁸³⁸

The Catholic hierarchy also blessed the other members of the *Pact of blood*. On 19 November 1938, Cardinal Segura accepted a request from the Falange to hold a special Mass at the Cathedral of Seville in memory of its late leader José Antonio Primo de Rivera.⁸³⁹ The long-term consequences of this policy proved disastrous. For the moment, however, the Catholic hierarchy basked in glory. The *Pact of blood* revolutionised the role of the Church in Nationalist

⁸³⁵ Also, on 6 August 1936 the priest of Fuentes de Andalucía (Seville) reported that the local military commander proposed the celebration of an open-air Mass that would be attended by all troops and militarised civilians (numbering around 400) in the *pueblo*. The Archbishop accepted the request on 8 August. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591.

⁸³⁶ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados (1938), Legajo 617. For Alcalá de Guadaira see: Legajo 591.

⁸³⁷ Also, on 16 July 1938 a last-minute request to celebrate an open-air Mass in Huelva was approved the same day by the Vicar-General of Seville. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados (1938), Legajo 622.

⁸³⁸ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05097 (592). Already, on 2 October 1936 the *Cabildo* reached the following agreement: “Se acude a la petición de la imagen de San Fernando y objetos para la celebración de la Sta. Misa en Madrid, hecha por el Comité de los Requetés de Sevilla, para cuando se tome por las tropas nacionalistas.” **Archivo Catedral de Sevilla** (Seville), Archivo Histórico Capitular, Libro de Autos Capitulares, nº234, 1931-1938.

⁸³⁹ Letter of the *Cabildo de la Catedral de Sevilla* dated 19 November 1938: “Contestando al oficio de V.E. Rvdma. En que pide al Excmo Cabildo que le manifieste si tiene algun inconveniente para que se celebre en esta Sta. Iglesia Catedral el Lunes próximo a las once en punto de la mañana un solemne funeral con asistencia de autoridades y fuerzas militares, en sufragio por el alma de D. José Antonio Primo de Rivera (q.s.g.g.), y que se haga el doble de campanas, según costumbre, en la tarde del Domingo anterior, y durante la celebración del antedicho funeral, tengo la honra de comunicarle que, este Cabildo no tiene en ello inconveniente alguno.” **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados (1938), Legajo 617.

Spain, metamorphosing it from the marginalised institution it had been under the Republic into a key socio-political actor once more. For instance, membership of a religious Brotherhood became a position of immense social prestige (and political power). By 1938, the usual troubles in finding devout Catholics to form confessional associations in an overwhelmingly irreligious society had miraculously disappeared. All thirty-seven files concerning membership of religious Brotherhoods in Seville were approved by Cardinal Segura (all high-ranking affiliates were regular churchgoers and received Communion during both Lent and Easter). Moreover, a considerable number of *Hermanos Mayores* were also members of the Nationalist military leadership. For instance, Queipo's eminence grise, Major José Cuesta Monereo was elected *Censor 2º* of the *Hermandad y Cofradía de Nazarenos de nuestro padre Jesús del Gran Poder*.⁸⁴⁰

Friction within the *Pact of blood*

The relationship Church-State was an uneven one from its inception. General Mola excluded the Catholic hierarchy from the conspiracy and the latter's subsequent inclusion into the rebel coalition took place only after the insurgent leadership came to appreciate the benefits it could extract from such a partnership. As a junior member of the coalition, the Church would always have to submit to the new regime, which it did. On several occasions, however, the relationship turned sour. This tended to occur whenever one of the parties encroached into the other's sphere of influence. In Seville, tensions flared-up on 3 February 1938, when the Archbishop of Seville received a letter notifying him of the call-up for military service of priests Manuel Perea Villegas, José Rincón Perea, Luciano Fernández Barba, Domingo Fernández Muñoz, Salvador Díaz Luque and Francisco Cruces Martín. Cardinal Segura wrote a caustic reply on 10 February. He declared that he could not find any substitutes for three of the priests, for which reason they were instructed to ignore the order "mientras no reciban orden expresa suya". Segura's reply amounted to treason; nevertheless, the Archbishop of Seville concluded his letter with a veiled threat: he warned the military of the importance of maintaining harmony between the different factions of the coalition.⁸⁴¹

⁸⁴⁰ Other prominent Brotherhood members: Francisco Bohorquez Vecina, Tomas Ibarra y Lasso de la Vega, Eduardo Ybarra Osborne, Ignacio Ibarra Menchacatorre, Nicolás Ibarra Gomez, Ignacio Ibarra Menchacatorre, Sancho Dávila y Fernandez de Celis, Modesto Aguilera Morente, Eduardo Alvarez de Rementeria, José María Domenech, Tomas de A. Garcia y Garcia, Angel Camacho Baños, Manuel de Jesús López Guerrero, and the Conde de Rodezno. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados (1938), Legajo 618.

⁸⁴¹ The letter notified the Dioceses about the contents of *Boletín Oficial del Estado* nº 465 (29 January). The three priests were: Manuel Perea Villegas (*regente* of Burguillos), Francisco Cruces Martín (*ecónomo*

The most acerbic relationship was that between Church and Falange, both of whom vied for control over the cultural sphere in Nationalist Spain. Ironically, both institutions had enjoyed only residual support in Republican Seville. Conflict was inevitable. As early as 1 September 1936, the newspaper *FE* refuted accusations that the Falange was a laic organisation.⁸⁴² A year later (27 October 1937), the newspaper clarified the party's position:

“No se debe confundir el interés clerical, o eclesiástico, con el interés católico que se funde con el interés nacional. Los prelados no deben olvidar jamás que además de obispos católicos son prelados ciudadanos cuya colaboración leal al engrandecimiento de la Patria, amén de un deber, es seguir la tradición de obispos, como Gelmírez, Mendonza o Cisneros.”⁸⁴³

In other words, the Falange supported the establishment of a confessional state where the Church would be subordinate to the government; whereas the Catholic hierarchy yearned for a return to a medieval theocracy. Both world views were totalitarian and mutually-exclusive, leading to an inevitable ideological clash.⁸⁴⁴ On 20 February 1937, Cardinal Ilundáin wrote a protest letter addressed to the Falange of Cádiz denouncing “vejámes y persecuciones que le vienen haciendo objeto elementos de la Falange” against the priest of Trebujena (Cádiz). Tensions erupted after party militants decided to pin Falangist newspapers on the walls of the parish church. The parish priest, a known Carlist sympathiser, demanded their immediate removal. The Falange replied by initiating a slander campaign against the priest and covering the walls of both the parish church and the rectory with fascist slogans painted in tar. The *Subjefe provincial de Falange* also warned the local residents: “si alguno lo quitaba le pegaba un tiro”.⁸⁴⁵

of Villanueva de San Juan), and Salvador Díaz Luque (*ecónomo* de Almargen). Segura concluded his reply with an aggressive request: “Por lo cual suplico a V.S. tenga la bondad de significarlo así a la superioridad para que puedan quedar debidamente armonizados los intereses espirituales de la diócesis y los del Ejército.” **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 622.

⁸⁴² *FE* (Seville), 1 September 1936.

⁸⁴³ *FE* (Seville), 27 October 1937.

⁸⁴⁴ For the ideological battle between the Catholic Church and the Falange in Nationalist Seville see: Lazo, Alfonso, “El imaginario católico de un fascismo provinciano” in Arias Castañón, Eloy (ed.), **Comunicación, historia y sociedad. Homenaje a Alfonso Braojos**. Lazo claims that the Church eventually emerged victorious from this confrontation.

⁸⁴⁵ Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, **Señoritos, jornaleros y falangistas**, pages 106-09.

The most serious confrontation occurred in the villages of El Cerro de Andévalo and Calañas, after the Falange attempted to solve an identity crisis triggered by its forced fusion with the Carlist Party by means of expansion. On 29 April 1937, the exasperated *Jefe Local* of Cerro de Andévalo and *Jefe Provincial* of Huelva wrote a joint formal complaint addressed to the Dioceses of Seville.⁸⁴⁶ According to the Falange, all attempts to establish a *Sección Femenina* in the *pueblo* were met with the “resistencia tenaz” of chaplain Nicasio Blanco, who accused the party of “falta de catolicismo”. Blanco was equally anxious at the “pérdida de moral y dignidad de todas las jóvenes que pertenecen a la Sección Femenina”, and prohibited local Catholics from joining the organisation. Conversely, the Falange blamed the priest of the adjacent *pueblo* of Calañas, José González Marín, of both “materialismo” and influencing Blanco. Indeed, the relationship between the parish priest and the Falange of Calañas was equally strained ever since Marín decided to flex his political muscles by refusing to baptise twenty orphans sponsored by the party. The Falange made several attempts at mediation, all of which failed. On one such occasion, a *Sección Femenina* delegate visited chaplain Blanco to attempt to persuade him of her religiosity only to be insulted and told that female Falangists “no eran católicas ni tenían moralidad”. The chaplain also threatened to complain directly to General Franco.⁸⁴⁷

The Falange did eventually establish a *Sección Femenina* in El Cerro de Andévalo, but only managed to enrol nine members. Blanco sabotaged all expansion efforts: the chaplain not only expelled all female Falangists from the *Hijas de María*, but also threatened local females employed by the parish with job loss should they join the Falange. The chaplain was clearly in no mood for compromise. On 11 May, he delivered a scathing report to Cardinal Ilundáin, where he accused the Falange of stirring tensions with both the Catholic Church and the Carlist Party and of encouraging immoral behaviour in his *pueblo*. However, what angered both the

⁸⁴⁶ The 19 April 1937 Decree of Unification signalled the start of the slow ideological agony of the Falange. For the ideological death of the Falange in Seville see: Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, *La Falange en la Sierra Norte de Sevilla (1934-1956)*, pages 157-201. On 29 April 1937, Luis María Pardo denounced the actions of both chaplain Nicasio Blanco (chaplain of the Convento de Hermanas de la Cruz of El Cerro de Andévalo) and the parish priest of Calañas, José González Marín. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 616.

⁸⁴⁷ On 21 April 1937, the *Jefe Local* of El Cerro de Andévalo wrote to the *Jefe Provincial* reporting an “ambiente enrarecido que encontré en el pueblo a la vuelta de ésa, sobre todo en la Falange Femenina por la pertinaz conducta del Capellán de H. de la Cruz, que se ha colocado en un terreno francamente hostil entorpeciendo con todas sus fuerzas la labor de F.E. sobre todo en aquella sección, siendo verdaderamente triste que en estos momentos en que Nuestro Generalísimo Franco, nos ordena y da ejemplo para llegar a la fusión de todos los nacionales, venga a suscitar odios y rencillas un Sr. Sacerdote que por sus hábitos respetabilísimos está más obligado que nadie a evitarlas.” **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 616.

chaplain and the Archbishop of Seville most were successive Falangist attempts at asserting the superiority of the party *vis-à-vis* the Catholic Church. For instance, the *Jefe Local* stated that the local patron saint was a Falangist and that attendance at Sunday Mass should not be regarded as compulsory. In his report of 21 April, the *Jefe Local* also reached the intriguing conclusion that the confrontation: “parece indicar la existencia de una incompatibilidad entre el Catolicismo y Falange.”⁸⁴⁸

Similar incidents continued to destabilise the rebel coalition. A year later (May 1938), Cardinal Segura prohibited the *Hermandad de la Soledad de San Buenaventura* from adding the Falangist symbol to its membership cards.⁸⁴⁹ The Segura-Falange feud climaxed in 1940, when a group of Falangists painted the party's symbol, the words “JOSE ANTONIO”, and the names of Falangist war dead in the walls of the archbishop's palace. Ultimately, the Catholic Church emerged victorious from this particular confrontation and conflict between Segura and the Franco regime would continue until his death in 1957.⁸⁵⁰

Rationalising Anticlericalism

On 3 January 1937, the private secretary of the Bishop of Salamanca, José María Bulart y Ferrandiz, Franco's chaplain, requested from the Dioceses of Seville a report containing “elementos destinados a propaganda [...] relativos a la Cruzada Nacional contra el comunismo, que se está librando en nuestra España”.⁸⁵¹ The original request came directly from the *Cuartel del Generalísimo*. In other words, General Franco was seeking to exploit the murder of priests to reinforce the *casus belli* for the rebellion. The Church hierarchy acquiesced and seized the

⁸⁴⁸ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 616.

⁸⁴⁹ A similar situation occurred in Castilblanco (Badajoz) on 29 September 1936. Sancho Dávila apologised personally to the Archbishop of Seville. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 618.

⁸⁵⁰ For the Segura-Falange feud see: Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, *La Falange en la Sierra Norte de Sevilla (1934-1956)*, page 173; Lazo, Alfonso, *Retrato del Fascismo Rural en Sevilla*, page 113. See also: Hurtado Sánchez, José, “Curas y obreros contra la dictadura franquista” in *Anuario de la Historia de la Iglesia Andaluza*, vol. 2, año 2009, Sevilla, C.E.T., Cátedra “Beato Marcelo Spínola”; Barrios, Manuel, *La Sevilla del Cardenal Segura*; Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, *Señoritos, jornaleros y falangistas*, pages 145-224.

⁸⁵¹ “A fin de cumplimentar un honroso encargo del Cuartel general del Generalísimo para reunir elementos destinados a propaganda, le agradeceré vivamente se sirva fácilmente documentos pastorales: Alocuciones y Circulares de su Excmo. Sr. Arzobispo etc., relativos a la Cruzada Nacional contra el comunismo, que se está librando en nuestra España, por lo que me permite suplicar a V. el envío de los correspondientes números de los BOLETINES ECLESIÁSTICOS de esta Archidiócesis.” **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126.

opportunity to rewrite History. Later that year, a Nationalist study on antireligious violence in the Dioceses of Seville reached the bizarre conclusion that:

“Sólo son veintisiete las víctimas hispalenses entre sacerdotes seculares y seminaristas; la rapidez del glorioso Ejército salvador en ocupar la región no permitió al feroz marxismo llevar más adelante entre nosotros la espantosa consigna: aniquilar totalmente a los ministros del Evangelio.”⁸⁵²

According to this rationale, the July rebellion forestalled Republican plans to exterminate the Catholic Church in Andalucía. The Catholic hierarchy enthusiastically accepted rebel propaganda as fact and brushed aside the embarrassing conclusions of the 1928-1932 census. Hence, what was a collective manifestation of hatred towards the Church had now become, according to Cardinal Segura, a “cruel e inaudita persecución judío-masónica”.⁸⁵³

Furthermore, the Catholic Church laboured tirelessly to transform propaganda into official History. The Catholic hierarchy organised commemorative funerals for its martyrs, climaxing in a series of religious services held at the Cathedral of Seville between 27 and 30 January 1938.⁸⁵⁴ All ceremonies were attended by high-ranking religious and political authorities, as well as the families of murdered priests and seminarians. On 28 January, Cardinal Segura addressed the overcrowded Cathedral of Seville: “Que uno de los motivos principales de la revolución contra España ha sido el odio contra la fe católica es un hecho indiscutible y, hoy,

⁸⁵² Sebastián y Bandarán, José; Tineo Lara, Antonio, *La persecución religiosa en la Archidiócesis de Sevilla*, page 85.

⁸⁵³ Ibid, page 18. See also page 13: on 15 December 1937, Cardinal Segura wrote in a pastoral: “Es un hecho completamente demostrado que una de las consignas recibidas en España por los revolucionarios fue la de destruir completamente el sacerdocio católico para acabar totalmente con el santo sacrificio en nuestra Patria”. Cardinal Segura also affirmed that the Spanish clergy was apolitical and established a parallel between persecuted Catholics in Spain and the early Christian martyrs.

⁸⁵⁴ Commemorative gravestones perpetuated the Church-State alliance: the gravestone of Juan Ruiz Candil read: “ASESINADO POR LOS ENEMIGOS DE DIOS Y ESPAÑA”; Francisco Arias Rivas and Juan Coca y González de Saavedra: “INMOLADOS POR LAS HORDAS MARXISTAS”; Ramón García y Ruiz and Cecilio Sánchez y Molina: “CRUELMENTE SACRIFICADOS POR LOS IMPIOS”; Manuel González Serna y Rodríguez: “CRUELMENTE INMOLADO POR LOS MARXISTAS”; Pedro Carballo y Corrales: “VICTIMA DE LOS ENEMIGOS DE DIOS Y DE LA PATRIA”; Antonio Heredia y Bazo “SACRIFICADO POR LOS ENEMIGOS DE DIOS Y DE LA PATRIA”; Joaquín Cantalejo Ortiz: “SACRIFICADO POR LOS ENEMIGOS DE DIOS Y DE LA PATRIA”; Antonio Jesús Díaz y Ramos and Enrique Palacios y Monraba: “MARTIRIZADOS POR LOS IMPIOS”; Salvador Lobato y Pérez: “SACRIFICADO POR LOS ENEMIGOS DE DIOS Y DE LA PATRIA”; Miguel Borrego Picón: “SACRIFICADO POR LOS MARXISTAS”; Mariano Caballero Rubio: “ASESINADO EN LOS DIAS ROJOS”; Rafael Machuca y Juárez: “MURIENDO INMOLADO POR LAS HORDAS ROJAS”; José Páez Fernández: “VILMENTE ASESINADO POR LA REVOLUCION MARXISTA”; Andrés Pabón Torres and Francisco Torres Torres: “SACRIFICADOS POR LAS HORDAS MARXISTAS”. Ibid, pages 208-19.

documentalmente probado. Se odiaba a España, precisamente porque era la nación católica pro excelencia.”⁸⁵⁵

The Archbishop of Seville formally blamed a mysterious international alliance against the Catholic Church (“impiedad internacional”) for the “decadencia” of the *Patria*. Lastly, Cardinal Segura delighted his audience when he regurgitated Nationalist propaganda and affirmed that the ‘Communist revolution’ had in fact erupted on the very moment that the II Republic was proclaimed in April 1931.⁸⁵⁶ There was a strong element of retaliation in Segura’s inflammatory speech for the Republic’s decision to exile him in 1931.

The ‘miracle’ of Seville, part II

On 10 January 1938, the Mayor of Algamitas wrote the following letter to the Archbishop of Seville:

“Reverendísimo Señor

Los vecinos de esta villa, fervientes cristianos y entusiastas creyentes en su Santo Patrón de este pueblo el Dulce nombre de Jesús, celebran anualmente la tradicional fiesta del mismo, y este año tienen proyectada de acuerdo con estas autoridades celebrarla con el mayor esplendor posible en agradecimiento del amparo protector y fe que tienen en el Santo que velo porque los hijos de esta población salgan victorioso y salvo de la contienda que se desarrolla en nuestra Nación como cruzada contra las hordas salvajes que intentaron destruir a nuestra Patria, a nuestra Religión, a nuestras tradiciones, a la familia y a la Sociedad honrada.

Tiene ofrecido en homenaje al Santo Patrón, con asistencias del mayor número de combatientes de este pueblo y por este motivo, a instancia de los vecinos de esta me permito

⁸⁵⁵ Ibid, page 156.

⁸⁵⁶ Ibid, page 158. For Cardinal Segura’s full speech see pages 156-60. Two days later (*Sesión Necrológica*), the *Vicario General del Arzobispado* - Jerónimo Armario y Rosado - solemnly declared that his two greatest loves were “amor a Dios, el amor a la Patria: para nosotros, amor a Dios, amor a España”. Consequently, the victims of the “horas marxistas, lo han sido por odio a Dios y por odio a España Católica[...] estos sin Dios y sin Patria, en su afán satánico de destrucción se ponen al lado de Moscú”. The priest of *Omnium Sanctorum* - Antonio Tineo Lara - was more realistic: “poco importa que la Iglesia se acerque al pueblo, si éste por falta de amor hacia Ella cierra su corazón a toda influencia que de la Iglesia pueda derivarse.” Still, he also revealed that he yearned for a return to a medieval theocracy. Lara concluded his speech by declaring that: “Nuestro pueblo tiene todavía de la Iglesia el concepto de una oficina más. Por eso no suele tener aparte de la curiosidad, otro móvil para visitarla que la obligada necesidad de buscar unos simples trámites burocráticos[...] Asombra cuando se ve de cerca, el desconocimiento, la ignorancia que reina en torno al concepto de la Madre Iglesia.” Ibid, pages 147-219 (Armario’s speech in pages 165-72; Lara’s speech in pages 173-81).

rogarle a V. Reverendísima Ilma, tenga a bien cooperar con su valiosa ayuda cerca de las Autoridades Militares que seguramente lo verán con agrado, para conseguir puedan asistir a tan simpática fiesta en honor del Patrón de Algamitas el mayor número de combatientes hijos de esta, a cuyo efectos tengo el honor de acompañarle listas de los mismos.”⁸⁵⁷

The sudden re-Catholicisation of Algamitas amounted to nothing short of a miracle. The parish priest had reported in 1932 that there were no regular churchgoers in the *pueblo*. Furthermore, the local church had been assaulted twice before the Nationalists captured Algamitas. On 12 May 1936, the *ecónomo* of Vilanueva de San Juan (Seville) wrote to Cardinal Ilundáin enquiring whether he should continue holding religious services in Algamitas after receiving a letter containing “insultos y palabras groseras para el sacerdocio y de considerarnos culpables de los males que sufre nuestra Patria, me dice si vuelvo más por el pueblo, donde me encuentro y que si no ha hecho ya, es porque quiere que sepa por qué me mata”. The Archbishop of Seville took the death threats seriously and on 16 May allowed the priest to suspend all religious services in the *pueblo*.⁸⁵⁸ The case of Algamitas was by no means exceptional. In 1932 in the province of Seville, there were no regular worshippers in La Algaba, Almadén de la Plata, Bormujos, El Madroño, Mairena del Aljarafe, Martín de la Jara, La Muela/Coripe, Navas de la Concepción, Palomares and San Nicolás del Puerto. Moreover, both Guillena and Santiponce possessed a single regular churchgoer. Catholicism was also on the verge of extinction in many other localities.⁸⁵⁹

Astonishingly, by 1938 the residents of Algamitas were all “fervientes cristianos y entusiastas creyentes” that no longer perceived the clergy as “culpables de los males que sufre nuestra Patria” and enthusiastically endorsed the “cruzada contra las hordas salvajes”. A similar process occurred in other *pueblos* in the province of Seville. In 1932, average church

⁸⁵⁷ The event was scheduled for 23 January and required the demobilisation of 81 soldiers/Falangists from the frontline. Cardinal Segura (letter dated 17 January) rejected the petition out of fear of setting a precedent for other *pueblos*. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 614.

⁸⁵⁸ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05097 (592). The mayor of Alcalá de Guadaira offered to financially support the reconstruction of churches, whereas on 24 August the parish priest reported a dramatic increase in the number of people of “mayor piedad”. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591.

⁸⁵⁹ Los Corrales (2 regular worshippers), Marinaleda (2), Ronquillo (2), Villanueva del Río (2), Villanueva de San Juan (2), Puebla de los Infantes (3), Aguadulce (4), Lentejuela (4), El Villar (4), Huévar (5), Real de la Jara (5), Castilleja del Campo (between 5-8) Benacazón (6), Pruna (6), El Saucejo (6), Burguillos (6-8), Lora de Estepa (6-8), Alcalá del Río (8-10), Los Molares (8-10) and El Rubio (8-10) **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559. See also Table IV.

attendance in Constantina and Morón de la Frontera stood at 1.36% and 1.12% respectively. By October 1936, the *ecónomo* of Constantina was so overwhelmed by the flood of new converts that he wrote to Cardinal Ilundáin requesting permission to hold extra religious services in the *pueblo*.⁸⁶⁰ In Morón de la Frontera, the *ecónomo* of the parish of San Miguel also requested permission (10 November) to hold an open-air Mass “por ser insuficiente los templos que existen para contener a las multitudes”.⁸⁶¹ This represented a social shift of miraculous proportions in a province where in 1932 the most faithful *pueblo*, Estepa, possessed an average Sunday Mass attendance rate of 6.35%.

Apparent religious fervour also infected the adjacent province of Huelva. For instance, the former “coto cerrado del marxismo y del ateísmo” of Nerva (Huelva) was by 1938 “desechando rápidamente tan nefastos errores y recuperando su amor a Dios Nuestro Señor y a su Iglesia”. The Catholic Church had apparently succeeded in (re)converting one of the most anticlerical regions of Spain: the mining district of Huelva. In March of that same year, the local Town Hall unanimously approved the placing of an image of the Sacred Heart of Jesus in the city hall. The ceremony (13 March 1938) served as a collective reaffirmation of political unity and was attended by the entire *Comisión Gestora*, the local Military Commander, the municipal judge, the leadership of the FET de las JONS and the representatives of several other influential organisations (including Catholic associations). The Falange formed a guard of honour and the city hall was flooded with local residents who prayed “fervientes preces por los caídos y por el pronto triunfo de nuestra Cruzada, entonaron sinceros Vivas a Cristo Rey”.⁸⁶²

⁸⁶⁰ Request accepted on 12 October. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591.

⁸⁶¹ Request accepted on 12 November. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591.

⁸⁶² The report concluded with a summary of the ‘miraculous’ shift in the attitude of the *pueblo* vis-à-vis the Catholic Church: “El que suscribe, al dar cuenta a V.E.R. de este testimonio de fe Cristiana del Pueblo de Nerva, antes coto cerrado del marxismo y del ateísmo y que hoy va desecharo rápidamente tan nefastos errores y recuperando su amor a Dios Nuestro Señor y a su Iglesia, se complace en elevar rendidamente a nuestro dignísimo y preclaro Cardenal la expresión más sincera del respeto y filial afecto, del vecindario y de este su modesto representante que besa su anillo.” **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 622. In addition, and according to the parish priest of San Bartolomé in Carmona (Seville), the Church had also successfully proselytised among the traditionally irreligious day-labourers. On 15 November 1938, the priest requested authorisation to celebrate Mass to around one hundred day-labourers and landowners in the “La Plata” Estate (property of local oligarch Pedro Solís) during the olive-picking season. On 29 November, a delighted Cardinal Segura not only accepted the request, but also granted permission for the priest to celebrate Mass in the estate for a period of three years. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 617.

The Catholic hierarchy presented the explosion in religiosity as a collective catharsis triggered by the July 1936 rebellion; however, General Queipo's former *Delegado de Prensa y Propaganda* provided a more rational explanation for the sudden resurgence of Catholicism in rebel-controlled Andalucía:

“Si el viajero recorre Sevilla, verá el terror, la desolación y el luto, en lo que fueron alegres y típicos barrios de Triana y La Macarena. Si es creyente, por poco psicólogo que sea, en las iglesias atestadas de fieles, se dará perfecta cuenta que el fervor religioso, demasiado unánime para ser sentido, es un *marcamo* necesario para poder vivir.”⁸⁶³

The education system

The Nationalist leadership rewarded the Catholic hierarchy for its political loyalty by allowing the Church to regain its monopoly over the education system. The Catholic Church swiftly resumed its project to re-Catholicise Seville via the indoctrination of the local youth. On 11 October 1937, the *Comisión Gestora Local de Primera Enseñanza* of Seville reached the following agreement:

“La Gestora acordó interesar de los Sres. Maestros y Maestras Nacionales procuren por todos los medios la asistencia colectiva de los alumnos de sus respectivas escuelas a la Santa Misa, todos los domingos y fiestas de precepto y que se dedique la última hora de la tarde, todos los sábados laborables al rezo también colectivamente del Santo Rosario y a cantos patrióticos de los que más contribuyan a la formación de los alumnos en estos aspectos e Himnos de igual carácter.”⁸⁶⁴

⁸⁶³ Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, page 94.

⁸⁶⁴ On 16 November, a schoolmaster replied to the Circular. He stated that on Saturdays all students in his school recited the rosary, sang religious hymns and said special prayers to both the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the Vírgen del Pilar “rogando por España”. On Sundays, the students attended 7AM Mass and: “En cuanto a las cuestiones religiosas y patrióticas dedicamos aquí un interés marcadísimo, aprovechando cuantas ocasiones depara el actual momento para sembrar en los corazones de estos niños el amor a Cristo y a nuestra amada España, convencido firmemente de que, cuando forjemos una España creyente, seremos grandes”. Also, on 18 November the schoolmaster of schools nº13 and nº36 wrote: “todos los niños son Flechas y Pelayos, y por tal motivo, cumplen sus deberes religiosos de asistencia a Misa todos los domingos y fiestas”. Church attendance was compulsory. The schoolmaster was also the leader of a group of *Flechas* that heard Mass at the Church of San Vicente Martir “debidamente ordenados y uniformados con banderas y banda”. **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Consejo local de 1^a enseñanza, 1937, Expediente 105.

In short, the local government functioned as the enforcer of the Church's educational policy.⁸⁶⁵ Already on 6 March 1937, the *Comisión* released a Circular letter instructing all schools to implement an extra hour of religious classes during the "semana pró-santificación de las Fiestas". The directive also ordered the distribution of propaganda among schoolchildren that read: "NO SE PUEDE SER BUEN PATRIOTA, si no se es buen católico" and "OBEDECE A LA IGLESIA".⁸⁶⁶ The *Comisión* led by example by acceding to all of Cardinal Ilundáin's many requests. For instance, on 22 May 1937 the Archbishop of Seville presented the following petition:

"Deseándonos celebrar el Domingo 30 de Mayo un día de oración con los niños de la Ciudad por el triunfo de las armas españolas contra los enemigos de la Religión y de la Patria; y conociendo los nobilísimos sentimientos de esa Comisión Gestora de 1^a. Enseñanza que V. tan dignamente preside espero, y a si se lo suplico, su decidida cooperación para que dando las oportunas instrucciones los niños de las escuelas nacionales asistan a la hora santa mariana a las siete y media de la tarde en S.I. Catedral el Domingo 30 Mayo."

The proposal was endorsed two days later. The *Comisión* made arrangements for all primary schools to visit the Cathedral of Seville between the hours of 11:30-14:30, culminating in a grand ceremony scheduled for 19:30 of 20 May 1937 attended by all schoolchildren in Seville. As expected, the brainwashed students prayed fervently "por el triunfo de las armas españolas contra los enemigos de la Religión y de la Patria".⁸⁶⁷

Despite the huge investment in the education system on the part of the Catholic hierarchy, piety only increased modestly in Seville. On 13 May 1938, the priest of San Bartolomé y San Esteban (Sunday Mass attendance rate of 0.52% in 1932) reported that the number of people regularly taking Communion had increased by 500% from the previous year; however, only 12% of parishioners attended Mass on feast days (8% Easter Sunday attendance rate). Regarding the number of people accepting last rites, the parish priest acknowledged the existence of "grandes resistencias por parte de las familias de deficiente formación". The priest nevertheless remained sanguine as he reported an overall increase in the number of young people attending Mass; an optimism justified by the Church's absolute monopoly over the education system. All schools in San Bartolomé y San Esteban were visited by the priest on a

⁸⁶⁵ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Consejo local de 1^a enseñanza, 1937, nº32.

⁸⁶⁶ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Consejo local de 1^a enseñanza, 1937, nº22.

⁸⁶⁷ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Consejo local de 1^a enseñanza, 1937, nº41.

weekly basis. *Acción Católica* was also active in the parish.⁸⁶⁸ Furthermore, on 12 May 1938 the priest of the former leftist bastion of San Bernardo (church attendance rate of 1.25% in 1932) reported that only 20% of parishioners received Communion at Easter and 30% accepted last rites (with another 30% “rehusándolos explícitamente”). Still, all schools promoted religious education and a multitude of confessional organisations operated in the parish: “En la Parroquia se han erigido: Acción Católica Femenina; Marias Sagrario; Juventud Católica Femenina; Corte Eucarística; y Conferencias de San Vicente Paul tanto de Señoras como de Caballeros.” Indeed, Catholic associations were at the vanguard of the battle for the re-Catholicisation of Seville. The *Damas Catequistas* attempted to eradicate “matrimonios civiles” that “van desapareciendo” in the working-class neighbourhoods of Amate and Cerro del Águila. Also, confessional organisations opened several night-schools to provide basic religious education to the local poor. A number of conversions occurred under the threat of violence: the euphoric priest of San Bernardo reported that two former masons had publicly recanted and embraced the Catholic faith during Easter.⁸⁶⁹ As it lost the battle to (re)convert Seville, the Catholic Church developed a siege mentality and slowly retreated into the shell of medieval dogmatism.

Economic chaos

Repression and financial aid initially palliated but ultimately failed to solve the deep economic crisis that threatened the very survival of the Dioceses of Seville. Indeed, the spectacular re-Catholicisation of Seville during the early months of the rebellion temporarily masked the structural problems affecting the Catholic Church. By 1937, religious fervour had all but evaporated. As a result, the Church’s fundraising capacity returned to normality. For instance, the *Día de la Buena Prensa* of 29 July 1937 only managed to raise 10,336.75 pesetas in the Dioceses of Seville; a slight increase from the 9,586.69 pesetas collected in 1936.⁸⁷⁰ A few days

⁸⁶⁸ “Cuestionario previo á la santa visita pastoral de la Parroquia de San Bartolomé y San Esteban”. Population: San Bartolomé, 3,854; San Esteban, 1,953 (around 40% of parishioners did not receive last rites). Regarding Catholic associations: “Existen las cuatro ramas de A.C. funcionando bastante bien con buen número de miembros y con inmejorables frutos.” **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 614. For *Acción Católica* in Seville see: Ruiz Sánchez, José Leonardo, “Del movimiento Católico a la Acción Católica en el Arzobispado de Sevilla” in Montero, Feliciano (ed.), **La Acción Católica en la II República**.

⁸⁶⁹ The priest reported that all his 24,000 parishioners (with the exception of around 30 German and British Protestant families) were Catholic but that “La obligación de oír Misa, abstenerse de obras serviles y Comunión Pascual se cumple mal: En la A. de P. cumplen un cincuenta por ciento: En la Parroquia solo un veinte por ciento”. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 614.

⁸⁷⁰ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 619.

later (2 August), the Dioceses acknowledged a worrying “escasez de medios económicos.”⁸⁷¹ To make matters worse, a flood of urgent requests for material support from parishes that had suffered anticlerical attacks in 1936 further strained the already fragile financial health of the Dioceses. For instance, the Church of San Juan de Palma in Seville suffered an estimated 150,000 pesetas worth of damage as a result of its sacking by an anticlerical crowd on 18 July 1936.⁸⁷² Consequently, the Archbishop of Seville was regularly forced to turn to the *Junta de Cultura Histórica y del Tesoro Artístico* for financial help.⁸⁷³ By 1938, the Catholic Church was on the brink of economic collapse.⁸⁷⁴ On 9 January 1938, the priest of San Vicente Mártir reported that “ha quedado suprimida la Escuela Parroquial por no existir medios económicos para ella” since 1 October of the previous year.⁸⁷⁵ The same priest wrote again on three different occasions, petitioning an urgent subsidy of 650 pesetas to perform repair works in the sexton’s house.⁸⁷⁶ A few weeks later (20 January), the priest of Santa Cruz requested a grant of 10,000 pesetas to renovate the local church; while the Santa Clara Convent (Seville) reported an “enorme deuda de más de veinte mil pesetas” and asked (1 October) permission to sell a XVII-Century gold rosary for the sum of 7,000 pesetas.⁸⁷⁷ The parish of San Bernardo was also in need of urgent funding to restore both its church and rectory and applied for a subsidy of 30,000 pesetas.⁸⁷⁸ Finally, on 27 April 1938, a distressed Cardinal Segura forwarded a report to the president of the *Asociación Sevillana de Caridad* that listed all the convents in

⁸⁷¹ **Archivo Catedral de Sevilla** (Seville), Archivo Histórico Capitular, Libro de Autos Capitulares, nº234, 1931-1938.

⁸⁷² **FE** (Seville), 27 September 1936.

⁸⁷³ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 614.

⁸⁷⁴ By 1938, the Catholic Church was dependent of state subventions for survival. On 16 December 1938, the Town Hall of Sanlúcar la Mayor (Seville) agreed to provide a year-long monthly stipend of 100 pesetas for the maintenance of the local clergy (in reply to a written request for economic help from the Archbishop of Seville). **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 622. Also, on 31 December 1937 the *Comisión Gestora* of the *Diputación* of Huelva approved a budget of 20,000 pesetas for scholarships, a quarter of which (5,000 pesetas) was allocated to the Seminary of Seville and handed directly to Cardinal Segura. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 618.

⁸⁷⁵ The priest of San Vicente Mártir also requested a monthly subsidy of 200 pesetas to fund the establishment of a school proposed by the *Damas Apostólicas* (the parish had already agreed to provide a monthly stipend of 150 pesetas plus school material). The project was approved on 28 February 1938. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 614.

⁸⁷⁶ On 4 October 1938, the *Vicario-General* agreed to provide a subsidy of 700 pesetas. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 614.

⁸⁷⁷ On 27 October, Segura accepted the request on the condition that the rosary was sold for the sum of 7,100 pesetas. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 617.

⁸⁷⁸ The priest of San Bernardo reported that the parish church was currently undergoing repair works with costs already ascending to 21,000 pesetas. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 614.

Seville in need of urgent financial aid. The shocking report concluded that 361 nuns were living in abject poverty in the capital of Andalucía.⁸⁷⁹

The re-apostasy of the masses

Despite emerging victorious from the ruins of a fratricidal civil war as a member of the *Pact of blood*, the Church ultimately failed to re-Catholicise Andalucía. By the early 1950s, Cardinal Segura was deeply frustrated by the prevalence of high-level of religious apathy in his Dioceses.⁸⁸⁰ A decade later, only 13% of the population of the province of Seville were regular churchgoers; a sharp increase from a 1.44% average in 1928-32, but nevertheless a bitter defeat for an institution that was handed an absolute monopoly over the cultural sphere and operated under the aegis of a confessional dictatorship.⁸⁸¹ Above all, it contradicted the Catholic hierarchy's claim that the Church was the highest representative of Spanish identity.

Relapse into apostasy started as early as 1937, when Cardinal Segura publicly lamented the chronic lack of seminarians in his Dioceses.⁸⁸² In truth, the reasons for the failure of the Church's proselytizing campaign were twofold: firstly, because evangelism was based on coercion; and secondly, because the Catholic hierarchy rejected all calls for doctrinal reform and political moderation. In fact, the Church interpreted Nationalist victory in the civil war as a

⁸⁷⁹ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 617. See also Legajo 620 and 622. On 16 April, the Archbishop of Seville requested a report on impoverished convents in Seville. The study was entitled *Relacion de los conventos necesitados para el reparto de bonos de comida* and forwarded to the *Presidente de Asociación Sevillana de Caridad* on 27 April 1938.

⁸⁸⁰ Ruiz Sánchez, José Leonardo, "Cien años de propaganda católica: las misiones parroquiales en al archidiócesis hispalense (1848-1952)" in *Hispania Sacra*, vol. L, Madrid, CSIC, 1998, page 323.

⁸⁸¹ Lannon, Frances, *Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1975*, page 10.

⁸⁸² At the same time, the capital of Andalucía was flooded with priests fleeing anticlerical violence in the Republican zone. Segura rejected several petitions from priests looking to be transferred to Seville. On 30 November 1937, the *Canónigo maestrescuela de la Catedral de Segovia* wrote to Cardinal Segura, requesting to be moved to Seville. He cited as reasons to support his request a current surplus of priests in Segovia (over 100 for a total population of 20,000) and a speech delivered by Segura in Huelva where the Archbishop of Seville declared that there was a current lack of priests in his Dioceses. The *Secretaría de la Cámara del Arzobispado de Sevilla* clarified the situation in a letter dated 28 January 1938: "en ésta Diócesis no hacen falta sacerdotes, la escasez es de vocaciones eclesiásticas." **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 617. On 21 January 1938, priest Eutimio Blanco (Colegio de Santo Tomás in Ávila) requested to be moved to Seville so that he could be closer to his sick mother. On 6 February, Blanco wrote a second letter where he mentioned the "escasez de clero" in the Dioceses of Seville. Cardinal Segura replied on 28 February: "que lo siente mucho, y aún reconociendo las razones que V. tiene para solicitar, no puede admitirlo en ésta Diócesis en donde sí hay escasez de vocaciones eclesiásticas, pero no de sacerdotes que hay en la actualidad los suficientes para cubrir todas las necesidades de la Diócesis". **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 622.

sign of divine endorsement of its Integrist theology. For instance, the parish priest of Cazalla de la Sierra, Remigio Vilariño, claimed that the civil war was a form of divine retribution for the “apostasy of the masses”. On 8 December 1937, Vilariño wrote:

“LO PRIMERO en el mundo es la Iglesia, el altar, el sacrificio. Sin esto no puede haber religión. Sin religión no puede haber moral. Sin moral no puede haber sociedad. Sin iglesias no puede haber nada bueno sólido. [...] Si queréis evitar catástrofes como las que hemos sufrido y mayores; si queréis no volver a ver esos demonios y esas denias, esas patuleas inmundas de canallas, que de repente aparecieron entre nosotros formando esa infernal cabalgata del Frente Popular, tenéis que edificar iglesias.”⁸⁸³

Moreover, shortly after the outbreak of the rebellion, Catholics distributed flyers in Seville’s city-centre that read:

“Respuesta de muchos

- Nunca he ido a Misa el día festivo.
- Pues por eso ha ocurrido esta tragedia que todos padecemos, porque han sido muchos los que, como tú, no se han preocupado de cumplir ese mandamiento de Dios.

Y si tu deseo es que todos rectifiquen...

¿Por qué no comienzas por rectificar tú?

¡Santifica el Día del Señor!”⁸⁸⁴

In other words, the Catholic Church persisted in following the exact same policy that provoked the “apostasy of the masses”; a recipe for disaster. Predictably, the strategy failed again following a brief interregnum of artificial religiosity in 1936. In despair, the Spanish Church retreated into medieval orthodoxy. As late as 1938, the Seminary of Seville still practised corporal punishment.⁸⁸⁵ Also, Cardinal Segura was obsessed with the minuscule Protestant community in Seville, while at the same time ignoring the humanitarian catastrophe that

⁸⁸³ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 610. According to José María Pemán (*charla* of 15 August): “al luchar contra ellos, no luchamos por esto o por aquello; luchamos íntegramente por España y por la civilización. No luchamos solos: veinte siglos de civilización occidental y cristiana están movilizados detrás de nosotros. Peleamos por Dios, por nuestra tierra y por nuestros muertos.” Pemán y Pemartín, José María, *Arengas y Crónicas de Guerra*, page 19.

⁸⁸⁴ **Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia** (Madrid), Fondo Diego Angulo, L-11/8990.

⁸⁸⁵ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, 1938, legajo 619.

afflicted one in every five inhabitants of the capital of Andalucía.⁸⁸⁶ Catholic relief organisations also focused on strict adherence to orthodoxy: the *Apostolado de Enfermos del Sagrado Corazón* harassed the dying in the working-class districts of Seville to ensure that all received last rites. The polemic nature of the *Apostolado*'s work eventually led to the murder of its leader, Rafael Galán Escalante, "vilmente asesinado por los marxistas".⁸⁸⁷ Moreover, the chaplain of Seville's Provincial Prison laboured tirelessly to ensure that no mother would abandon jail without first baptising her children.⁸⁸⁸ In March 1938, the priest reported that all 955 inmates received Easter Communion in an overcrowded prison designed to accommodate a maximum of 400 inmates.⁸⁸⁹ At the same time as it desperately attempted to re-evangelise the local population through forced penitence, the Catholic leadership, according to Antonio Bahamonde, "Han abierto un abismo, imposible de franquear, entre el clero y el pueblo".⁸⁹⁰

⁸⁸⁶ On 22 September 1938, the *coadjutor* of San Sebastián (Seville) enquired Cardinal Segura about the possibility of providing religious education to Catholic students enrolled in a German school located in the parish. Segura replied with a question: "Si se hace alguna propaganda directa o indirectamente de religión protestante entre los alumnos, y si por algún medio mediato o inmediato se trata de hacer prosélitos del protestantismo entre los católicos." **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 614.

⁸⁸⁷ In 1936, the *Apostolado* provided material assistance to 127 people (handing medicine and milk vouchers worth a total of 1,219.02 pesetas). In 1937, the number was reduced to 112 people (totalling 1,016.96 pesetas). Report dated 19 February 1938. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 614.

⁸⁸⁸ On 18 September 1938, the chaplain of Seville's Provincial Prison presented the following written request, accepted two days later, to Cardinal Segura: "Que por las muchas mujeres que pasan ahora detenidas por esta Prisión, ocurren algunos nacimientos en la misma á más de otras madres que traen ya los niños sin bautizar y deseoso el que suscribe de que antes de salir las madres del Establecimiento queden bautizados y no hayan dilaciones que puedan perjudicar a estos niños si les viniera la muerte, quisiera también orillar las dificultades que estas madres pueden encontrar por el régimen á que están sometidas, para poderse comunicar con el exterior y que no sufran dilaciones el Bautismo de sus hijos. Al efecto ha convenido, por iniciativa del Parroco de la Concepción á cuya feligresía corresponde este Establecimiento." **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 614.

⁸⁸⁹ "Tengo el alto honor de poner en conocimiento de su Eminencia que durante los cuatro domingos del presente mes de Marzo, se ha venido celebrando por la población reclusa de este Establecimiento, previamente preparados por el S. Capellán del mismo y varios sacerdotes de esta Capital, el Cumplimiento Pascual, habiéndose administrado el Santo Sacramento de la Comunión a 955 reclusos." Letter dated 29 March 1938. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126. Between July-December 1936 around 3,000 people passed through the Provincial Prison. For statistical data see: Ponce Alberca, Julio, "La represión de las organizaciones obreras durante la guerra civil y la posguerra" in Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Lemus López, Encarnación (ed.), *Sindicatos y trabajadores en Sevilla: una aproximación a la memoria del siglo XX*, pages 166-67. A secret report from Major Cuesta Monereo to Franco dated 8 June 1937 revealed that the prison population in the II Division rose to an astonishing 12,683 convicts. **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Cuartel General del Generalísimo, Rolo, 158, Legajo 145, Carpeta 35.

⁸⁹⁰ Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, page 122. See also pages 109-112 and 156-58. In reality, the Church's greatest obsession was to obtain the confession of all individuals awaiting execution. See: Barbero, Edmundo, *El infierno azul*, page 377; Copado, Bernabé, *Con la columna Redondo. Combates y conquistas. Crónica de guerra*, page 48; Gonzálbez Ruiz, Francisco, *Yo he creído en Franco. Proceso de una gran desilusión (Dos meses en la cárcel de Sevilla)*, pages 128-35.

The Archbishop of Seville showed little, if any, interest in bridging the ‘abyss’ separating the Church from its parishioners. Worse, the Church’s ideological retreat into medieval dogmatism extended to politics, with the Catholic hierarchy espousing an inquisitorial policy towards the Republican defeated, rejecting forgiveness and sanctioning forced penitence. The Integrists’ apocalyptic interpretation of the civil war exasperated Catholic moderates, who believed that the Church should function as a mediator to help bring about a diplomatic conclusion to the civil war.⁸⁹¹ On 28 January 1938, Cardinal Segura rejected all attempts at reconciliation in a violent sermon delivered at the packed Cathedral of Seville: “no es espíritu cristiano el espíritu de los que hoy se compadecen del tirano”.⁸⁹² Segura was backed by the Primate of Spain, Cardinal Gomá, who not only worked frantically to have Franco recognised by the Vatican, but also dismissed a peaceful resolution to the conflict at the Budapest *Congreso Eucarístico* of May 1938.⁸⁹³ Hence, both former and current Primate of Spain joined forces to ensure that the civil war concluded with the annihilation of the Republic.

As the main cultural institution in Nationalist Spain, the Church sanctified an unholy trinity of falsities to support the rebels’ bizarre concept of *jus ad bellum*: a) the myth of the impending Communist coup, b) the legend of General Queipo de Llano and his *soldaditos*, and c) the tale of the miraculous re-Catholicisation of Andalucía. At the same time as the Catholic Church legitimised the *casus belli* for the rebellion, it simultaneously de-legitimised its claim that it was the highest representative of Spanish identity, cementing its status as a polarising political (and not religious) institution.

⁸⁹¹ “Yo que he visto la tragedia en toda su intensidad, aseguro que no puede haber más paz que la que proporcione la verdadera Iglesia, con su mediación, o el exterminio total de uno de los contendientes” Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, page 63. For the clash between moderates and Integrists (especially between Gomá and Vidal i Barraquer) see: Comas, Ramón, *Isidro Gomá, Francesc Vidal i Barraquer: dos visiones antagónicas de la Iglesia española de 1939*. Vidal i Barraquer was a pragmatist who saw the advent of secular state as inevitability See also: Preston, Paul, *Comrades! Portraits from the Spanish Civil War*, page 324.

⁸⁹² Sebastián y Bandarán, José; Tineo Lara, Antonio, *La persecución religiosa en la Archidiócesis de Sevilla*, page 158.

⁸⁹³ Raguer, Hilari, *El general Batet. Franco contra Batet: crónica de una venganza* page 294; Preston, Paul, *Franco*, pages 213-14; Preston, Paul, *The politics of revenge: fascism and the military in twentieth-century Spain*, page 32: as a result of Gomá’s lobbying, the Vatican eventually sided with Franco and blessed his victory in the civil war in April 1939. See also: Southworth, Herbert, *Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War. The Brainwashing of Francisco Franco*, page 25: “The Cardinal’s [Gomá] demonstrably false declarations remain among the most unjust falsehoods of the many uttered by the supporters of Franco”.

Conclusion

The coup d'état that both shaped and traumatised contemporary Spain represented the violent culmination of the combined efforts of the reactionary anti-democratic forces in Spanish political society to destroy the II Republic. Indeed, on the very same day of the electoral victory of the Popular Front (16 February 1936), CEDA leader José María Gil Robles and the would-be head of the Nationalist faction, General Franco, jointly orchestrated a botched *coup de main*.⁸⁹⁴ The government resisted; however, the failure of Gil Robles' tactic to dismantle the Republic via the ballot box opened a political void filled by both the extreme-right – the fascist Falange and the theocratic Carlist Party – and the *Africanistas*, a reactionary military caste brutalised by Spain's colonial war in Morocco of 1920-27. Unsurprisingly, the *Director* of this politically heterogeneous alliance, General Emilio Mola Vidal, was an *Africanista*. Both groups ensured that the demise of democracy in Spain would conclude amid a torrent of blood.

The fragmented Rebel coalition lacked a clear political project, which was compensated by a very precise *modus operandi*. In his First Secret Instruction released in April 1936, General Mola stated that "la acción ha de ser en extremo violenta" and called for "castigos ejemplares [...] para estrangular los movimientos de rebeldía o huelgas."⁸⁹⁵ Mola also established two of the founding pillars of Francoism: *justicia al revés* ("reverse justice") and the *Pacto de Sangre* (Pact of Blood), the process by which all segments of society were coerced into collaborating in the forging of the new state, outlined in his Secret Instruction nº 5 of 20 June, in which the *Director* abolished the concept of neutrality.⁸⁹⁶ The uprising was to be modelled on the Moroccan war: a fight to the death that would conclude, in Mola's own words, with "el exterminio absoluto y total del vencido."⁸⁹⁷

It was precisely with this ultimate objective in mind – the "extermination" of the Republic – that General Mola handpicked the pathologically violent and military inept Inspector-General

⁸⁹⁴ ABC (Madrid), 17, 19 and 20 February 1936; Alcalá-Zamora y Torres, Niceto, *Memorias*, page 347; Gil Robles, José María, *No fué posible la paz*, pages 492-98; Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España*, page 37; Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano*, page 82; Portela Valladares, Manuel, *Memorias*, pages 175-85; Preston, Paul, *The coming of Spanish Civil War*, pages 242-44; Preston, Paul, *Franco*, pages 115-119.

⁸⁹⁵ Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la segunda república española*, vol. 3, pages 444-45.

⁸⁹⁶ Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración*, page 155-56.

⁸⁹⁷ Gibson, Ian, *Queipo de Llano: Sevilla, verano de 1936*, page 80.

of Border Guards, General Queipo de Llano, to govern Seville, the capital and largest city of the vast southern region of Andalucía. Queipo de Llano's military career was marked by egocentrism, intellectual shortcomings, several failed military plots and, above all, violence. Moreover, his equally tortuous political career, from Monarchism to Republicanism to anti-Republicanism, revealed that the general was a cynic focused exclusively on his own self-advancement.⁸⁹⁸ Aware of all this, the sagacious Mola decided to restrain Queipo by placing him nominally in command of an uprising that had already been organised by Major Cuesta Monereo.⁸⁹⁹

The *coup d'état* of 18 July 1936 in Seville was immediately hijacked by Nationalist propaganda, which metamorphosed History into a trilogy of myths that formed the so-called 'Miracle of Seville', an edifice of lies erected to legitimise the rebellion.⁹⁰⁰ The first tale, the Legend of Queipo de Llano, was symbolically charged: Queipo claimed that at 13:45 on 18 July only himself, his *aide-de-camp* and Major Cuesta Monereo had mutinied in the capital of Andalucía. The general added that a mere fifteen minutes later he had single-handedly arrested two generals, two colonels, one lieutenant-colonel and two majors. According to Rebel propaganda, the cowardice demonstrated by both General Villa-Abrille and Colonel Allanegui was symbolic of the wider cowardice of the Republic. The stage was set for a military victory of 'miraculous' proportions: Seville, a political stronghold of the Popular Front, was captured by a tiny group of patriotic army officers.⁹⁰¹ At the same time, the insurgents failed to clarify why the meticulous General Mola, who had recognised the centrality of Andalucía in his Secret Instruction of 24 June, decided to gamble the success of *his* uprising on a lost cause.⁹⁰² In truth, the entire garrison of Seville was undermined by sedition.

The second part of the myth was the tale of the *soldaditos*, first presented by Queipo de Llano only a few days after the outbreak of the rebellion. In short, the general declared that on 18

⁸⁹⁸ Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia (Madrid), Archivo Natalio Rivas, *Queipo de Llano, Carta de 18 de junio de 1950*; Azaña, Manuel, *Memorias políticas y de guerra*, vol. 1, page 20 and 609; Arrarás, Joaquín, *Historia de la Segunda República Española*, vol. 1, pages 109-110, 227 and 483; Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia*, pages 10-80. See also: Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *El movimiento reivindicativo de Cuatro Vientos*; Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *El General Queipo de Llano perseguido por la dictadura*.

⁸⁹⁹ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla*, page 201.

⁹⁰⁰ Aznar, Manuel, *Historia militar de la guerra de España*, page 97.

⁹⁰¹ ABC (Seville), 18 July 1937.

⁹⁰² Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días*, page 305.

July his 180 *soldaditos* defeated 600 loyalist assault guards.⁹⁰³ The insurgents explained this ‘miracle’ with the bizarre claim that their victory was a result of the moral and ideological (and not military) superiority of the Rebels over the Republic. On 29 September 1937, the tale of the *soldaditos* was transformed into official Nationalist History when the *Medalla Militar Colectiva* was bestowed on the garrison of Seville.⁹⁰⁴ However, the eligibility conditions for the receipt of the award were extremely restrictive, which triggered a flood of written protests by the very same *soldaditos* that participated in the ‘Miracle of Seville’.

The third and final part of the ‘Miracle of Seville’ consisted of the legend of the ‘red army’, complemented by the concluding section of the tale of the *soldaditos*. In a nutshell, and after initially claiming that he had captured the city-centre with a handful of *soldaditos*, General Queipo de Llano now affirmed that he pacified the working-class districts of Seville with 250 soldiers, defeating a mysterious Marxist militia in the process.⁹⁰⁵ Queipo’s former Chief of Press, Luís Bolín, let his imagination run riot, claiming that “Russian ships had landed arms and ammunition along the Guadalquivir River” in preparation for “a Communist *putsch*”.⁹⁰⁶

Reality differed considerably from Nationalist propaganda. The “Miracle of Seville” was a carefully-planned *coup d'état* that involved the participation of the entire garrison of Seville and the Civil Guard (numbering 2,550 effectives), the Falange, *Requeté* and 187 civilian volunteers.⁹⁰⁷ Also, in just a few days Queipo’s *soldaditos* metamorphosed into an army of around 6,000 soldiers that included the élite corps of the Spanish Military, the sadistic Army of Africa.⁹⁰⁸ In despair, the insurgents only awarded the *Medalla Militar Colectiva* to 886 individuals, which nevertheless sufficed to demolish Queipo’s colourful tale.⁹⁰⁹ In addition, the

⁹⁰³ **ABC** (Seville), 24 July 1936.

⁹⁰⁴ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5363, Carpeta 1.

⁹⁰⁵ **ABC** (Seville), 2 February 1938.

⁹⁰⁶ Bolín, Luis, *Spain: the vital years*, page 177.

⁹⁰⁷ Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla!*. For the 187 civilian volunteers see: Medina Villalonga, Rafael de, *Tiempo Pasado*, pages 36-37.

⁹⁰⁸ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Zona Nacional, Armario 18, Legajo 1, Carpeta 68; Arrarás Iribarren, Joaquín, *Historia de la Cruzada Española*, vol.3, Tomo XI, pages 202-09; Aznar, Manuel, *Historia Militar de la Guerra de España*, pages 158-64; Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio!*; Martín Fidalgo, Ana; Roldán González, Enrique; Martín Burgueño, Manuel, *El Requeté de Sevilla: orígenes, causas e historia*, page 50; Medina Villalonga, Rafael de, *Tiempo Pasado*, pages 36-37; Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, General José, *General Queipo de Llano*, page 112; Redondo, Luis; Zavala, Juan de, *El requeté (la tradición no muere)*, pages 461-69.

⁹⁰⁹ **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5364, Carpeta 1 and 2; Legajo 5375, Carpeta 1 to 20; Legajo 5376, Carpeta 12; Legajo 5381, Carpeta 9. **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 2, Carpeta 9; Armario 18, Legajo 6, Carpeta 2.

legend of ‘red army’ was dismantled by a secret report (dated 12 August 1936), in which the Rebels concluded that “Nuestra superioridad en armamento y hábil utilización del mismo nos permite el alcanzar con contadas bajas los objetivos; la influencia moral del cañón mortero o tiro ajustado de ametralladoras es enorme sobre el que no lo poseé o sabe sacarle rendimiento. [...] muchas veces basta la intimidación y un cañonazo en puertas o ventanas para que cesen las resistencias. [...] si el enemigo se defiende aislarlo y la labor metódica de bombardeo, quena, agujeros en las paredes, etc., darán resuelto el problema sin apenas bajas. Al enemigo no conviene acorralarlo sino dejarle abierta una salida para batirle en ella con armas automáticas emboscadas. Puede asegurarse también que la falta de disciplina del enemigo y carencia de servicios hará que ninguna concentración pueda sostener dos días de combate por falta de municiones.”⁹¹⁰ The report was released only weeks after the brutal pacification of Seville and two days before the massacre of Badajoz (14 August), carried out by the ominously named ‘Column of Death’.⁹¹¹

Unsurprisingly, violent opposition to the uprising in Seville was deliberately exaggerated by the Nationalists in order to create the perception of a city besieged by a ‘red army’ and where the recourse to extreme violence was justified. Queipo de Llano went ever further: the entire working-class population of Seville, including women and children, were treated as legitimate military targets.⁹¹² Furthermore, he institutionalised terror via the release of a series of murderous military edicts and the promotion of extremists to position of political power. For instance, the first Nationalist Mayor of Seville, the aristocratic Ramón de Carranza, organised a military column named after himself that saw no moral contradiction in slaughtering the very same population its leader was supposed to govern.⁹¹³ Also, on the same day (19 July) as the *Columna Carranza* imposed a “durísimo castigo” on the working-class district of the Gran Plaza, the Artillery Corps carried out a “bombardeo de castigo sobre Triana”.⁹¹⁴ Three days later (22 July), Queipo de Llano unleashed the Army of Africa on the residential neighbourhood

⁹¹⁰ **Archivo General Militar** (Madrid), Armario 18, Legajo 18, Carpeta 29.

⁹¹¹ Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *La columna de la muerte. El avance del ejército franquista de Sevilla a Badajoz*.

⁹¹² **ABC** (Seville), 18 July 1937.

⁹¹³ For the *Columna Carranza* see: Medina Vilallonga, Rafael de, *Tiempo pasado*.

⁹¹⁴ Montán Luis, “Cómo conquistó Sevilla el General Queipo de Llano” in *Episodios de la Guerra Civil nº5*, page 31; **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5375, Carpeta 14.

of La Macarena, where the Foreign Legion used women and children as human shields, stabbed residents to death and randomly tossed grenades inside houses.⁹¹⁵

Nationalist violence in Seville was by no means exceptional. The insurgents were merely enforcing General Mola's First Secret Instruction, which called for "castigos ejemplares". Furthermore, the primary objective of Rebel repression was political and not military. Consequently, the "castigo" of Seville did not conclude with the military occupation of the city, but with the extermination of Republicanism. The success of Cuesta Monereo's plot meant that the capital of Andalucía never experienced a civil war; however, the mass killing of loyalists continued until January 1937, claiming at least 3,028 lives in a city living *officially* in peace.⁹¹⁶

Physical violence represented merely the opening phase of the Nationalists' grand repressive project, coexisting with other parallel forms of repression: economic and cultural. Hence, the early capture of Seville not only did not result in any major saving of life, but was followed by the economic rape of the capital of Andalucía, where Queipo de Llano replaced Republican democracy with a Kleptocratic regime. The insurgents cynically exploited the myth of the imminent Communist *putsch* to extort the local population, now forever indebted to the Rebels, via the establishment of a series of 'patriotic' fundraising campaigns.⁹¹⁷ The Nationalist leadership transformed this political 'debt' into a financial one and the population of Seville into a mere tool at the service of a totalitarian regime attempting to fund a total war.

Fundraising campaigns also possessed political significance. For instance, the resounding success of the *Plato Único* campaign revealed that the Rebels had effectively paralysed the local population by means of terror, which represented the triumph of totalitarianism over civil

⁹¹⁵ *El Correo de Andalucía* (Seville), 22 July 1936; *La Unión* (Seville), 1 August 1936; *El Liberal* (Madrid), 4 August 1936; *Informaciones* (Madrid), 7 August 1936; *Heraldo de Madrid* (Madrid), 25 August 1936; Barbero, Edmundo, *El Infierno Azul*, page 372; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, "Sevilla, 1936. Sublevación y Represión" in Braojos Garrido, Alfonso; Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *Sevilla, 36: Sublevación fascista y represión*, page 216; Medina Villalonga, Rafael de, *Tiempo Pasado*, pages 43-44; Ortiz de Villajos, Cándido, *De Sevilla a Madrid*, page 21.

⁹¹⁶ Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, "Sevilla, 1936. Sublevación y represión" in Braojos Garrido, Alfonso; Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, *Sevilla, 36: Sublevación fascista y represión*, pages 252-57.

⁹¹⁷ *Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia* (Madrid), Fondo Diego Angulo, L-11/8990; *FE* (Seville), 13 September, 7 November and 9 December 1936; Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano*, page 147.

society. Moreover, the *Plato Único* was originally a Nazi German fundraising campaign copied by Queipo de Llano in Seville, an example of the growing ideological symbiosis between both regimes.⁹¹⁸ Unsurprisingly, all money collected was later transferred to the *Auxilio de Invierno*, a Nationalist relief organisation modelled on the Nazi *Winterhilfe*.⁹¹⁹

Physical and economic violence triggered a humanitarian catastrophe in the capital of Andalucía. A few weeks after the capture of Seville (7 August 1936), General Queipo released *orden nº 13* establishing a special stamp to provide humanitarian assistance to the many orphans of Seville, a direct consequence of the savage pacification of the working-class districts, a fact recognised by Mayor Ramón de Carranza.⁹²⁰ Ironically, the humanitarian crisis that plagued Nationalist Spain represented a graver threat to the survival of the new regime than the prospect of a Republican military victory. Consequently, the Rebel leadership was left with no option but to attempt to contain a catastrophe of its own making, which it reluctantly did by establishing on 2 August the *Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados*. The stated objective of the *Junta* was to prevent mass starvation by providing charity meals for the unemployed; however, the eligibility conditions were extremely restrictive and the local population was intimidated into funding the organisation. Furthermore, on 3 November Queipo de Llano publicly sentenced 3,000 people to starvation after announcing the *Junta*'s financial inability to expand the number of daily meals given to the local poor. However, a report presented by the *Junta*'s treasurer on 30 November concluded that the organisation had amassed a clean profit of 265,640 pesetas, thus revealing that the *Junta* functioned as both a profit-oriented business and an instrument to punish the working-class population of Seville for its past Republicanism by means of starvation.⁹²¹

⁹¹⁸ **Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla** (Seville), Legajo 56 and 418; **FE** (Seville) 24, 25 28 October, 1, 4, 10, 21 November, 11 and 15 December 1936; Bahamonde, Antonio, *Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista*, pages 72 and 95; Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días*, page 877.

⁹¹⁹ For the *Auxilio Social* see: Cenarro Lagunas, Angela, *La sonrisa de Falange. Auxilio Social en la guerra y la posguerra*.

⁹²⁰ Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *Bandos y órdenes dictados por Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra, General Jefe de la Segunda División Orgánica y del Ejército del Sur desde la declaración del estado de guerra, 18 de julio*, pages 12-13. For Carranza see: **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Hacienda, Expedientes generales, 1936, nº71.

⁹²¹ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficencia, Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados; Actas de la Junta de Auxilios a los Necesitados, 2 August and 18 September 1936. Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *Bandos y órdenes dictados por Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra, General Jefe de la Segunda División Orgánica y del Ejército del Sur desde la declaración del estado de guerra, 18 de julio de 1936, hasta fin de febrero de 1937, etc.*, pages 13-15.

The Rebel leadership transformed the capital of Andalucía into a giant social laboratory to test the economic policies of the nascent Nationalist regime, amassing astronomical profits in the process. For instance, the Army Fund collected an astonishing 16,625,825.25 pesetas in Seville during the civil war.⁹²² Simultaneously, Queipo's kleptocratic policies triggered a humanitarian catastrophe of unimaginable proportions. By 30 September 1936, the *Asociación Sevillana de Caridad* was providing assistance to 47,784 people (out of a total population of 267,192) in the capital of Andalucía. Almost one in every five residents depended directly on aid for survival.⁹²³

At the same time, the Nationalist leadership used the Catholic Church to enforce cultural repression and clinch the *Pact of blood*, in the same way as the CEDA had formerly capitalised on the victimisation of the Church to win the 1933 elections. The insurgents welcomed the Catholic Church into the Rebel coalition by granting it absolute control over the cultural sphere, for it was in desperate need of the cooperation of the myriad of competing anti-Republican forces in the Nationalist zone, whose sole common denominator was their Catholicism. Above all, the Church provided an ideological framework that legitimised the rebellion.⁹²⁴

The Catholic hierarchy justified the violent regaining of its long-lost cultural hegemony by claiming that it was the highest representative of Spanish identity.⁹²⁵ Nevertheless, the Church census on the Dioceses of Seville of 1928-1932 revealed that average Sunday Mass attendance stood at a shockingly low 1.44% in the province of Seville. The figure not only demolished the Catholic hierarchy's claim, but also revealed that the Church was a source of social, political and cultural division condemned to certain extinction in Seville.⁹²⁶ In panic, the Catholic hierarchy became increasingly politicised, aligning itself with the reactionary right. The umbilical nature of the conservative coalition meant that whenever one of its members came

⁹²² **Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur** (Seville), Legajo 5382, Carpeta 13.

⁹²³ **Archivo Municipal de Sevilla** (Seville), Sanidad y Beneficiencia, Junta de Auxilios alimenticios a los necesitados. For the population of Seville in 1936 see: Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *La utopía revolucionaria: Sevilla en la Segunda República*, page 22.

⁹²⁴ The Spanish Church's position influenced a number of foreign reporters. Rotvand, Georges, *Franco means business*, page xvii. For a theological justification for a military rebellion see: Castro Albarrán, Aniceto, *El derecho a la rebeldía*. In 1940, Albarrán also provided a theological justification for the July 1936 rebellion. Castro Albarrán, Aniceto, *El derecho al Alzamiento*.

⁹²⁵ Lannon, Frances, "Ideological tensions, The Social Praxis and Cultural Politics of Spanish Catholicism in Graham, Helen, and Labanyi, Jo (eds), *Spanish Cultural Studies. An Introduction. The Struggle for Modernity*, page 42.

⁹²⁶ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559.

under attack the tide could easily turn against its weakest link: the Church.⁹²⁷ Predictably, the electoral victory of the Popular Front in the February 1936 elections triggered a wave of anticlericalism in southern Spain that resulted in a total of 66 damaged/destroyed religious buildings.⁹²⁸ The number of attacks revealed that anticlericalism was a collective manifestation of hatred towards the Catholic Church that pre-dated the establishment of the Republic, a fact openly recognised by the Archbishop of Seville, Cardinal Ilundáin.⁹²⁹ Already in 1932, the parish priest of El Sagrario informed Cardinal Ilundáin that all that was left to do was to pray for a miracle.⁹³⁰ According to Nationalist mythology, this was precisely what happened on 18 July 1936.

The *coup d'état* signalled a cultural rupture with the past in Nationalist Spain. Anticlericalism evaporated overnight and the empty churches were packed with new 'converts'. Still, a total of eleven clergymen were murdered in the province of Seville. Their stories were manipulated in order to justify repression: the insurgents now claimed that the lightning conquest of the province of Seville thwarted Republican plans to exterminate the personnel as well as the property of the Catholic Church.⁹³¹ Furthermore, the Rebels explained the abnormal explosion in religiosity in southern Spain with a 'miracle' - the 'Miracle of Seville' - which triggered a collective catharsis that compelled the local population to embrace Catholicism. As a gesture of gratitude, the Catholic Church sanctified the Nationalist war effort.⁹³²

The Catholic hierarchy accepted rebel propaganda as fact and ignored the embarrassing conclusions of the 1928-1932 census. Ilundáin's position was revised by the new Archbishop of

⁹²⁷ Examples are plentiful. Blaye, Edouard de, *Franco and the politics of Spain*, page 94; Peers, Allison, *The Spanish Tragedy 1930-1936. Dictatorship, Republic, Chaos*, page 194; Robinson, Richard, *The origins of Franco's Spain*, page 258; Ullman, Joan Connelly, *The tragic week: a study of anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912*.

⁹²⁸ Caro Cancela, Diego, "La primavera de 1936 en Andalucía: conflictividad social y violencia política" in Alvarez Rey, Leandro (ed.), *Andalucía y la guerra civil: estudios y perspectivas*, page 21.

⁹²⁹ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126 and 05097 (592).

⁹³⁰ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559.

⁹³¹ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 05126; Sebastián y Bandarán, José; Tineo Lara, Antonio, *La persecución religiosa en la Archidiócesis de Sevilla*, pages 85-145.

⁹³² Examples are plentiful. **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 591, 05097 (592), 617 and 622; **Archivo Catedral de Sevilla** (Seville), Archivo Histórico Capitular, Libro de Autos Capitulares, nº234, 1931-1938; **Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla**, 8 September 1936; Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, *The Spanish bishops speak: joint pastoral letter to the Bishops of the whole world on the war in Spain*.

Seville, the outspoken Cardinal Pedro Segura, who took up the post on 12 October 1937.⁹³³ According to Cardinal Segura, anticlericalism was now the consequence of a “cruel e inaudita persecución judío-masónica”.⁹³⁴ Clearly, Segura’s declaration was meaningful only as a piece of delusional propaganda or as a reflection of the success of the terror in stimulating religious practice, real or simulated. The case of Algamitas (Seville) was symptomatic: In 1932, the local priest reported that his parish did not possess a single regular churchgoer. Moreover, on 16 May of that same year the *ecónomo* of Vilanueva de San Juan (Seville) suspended all religious services in Algamitas after receiving a letter containing death threats.⁹³⁵ Miraculously, in 1938 the local Mayor reported that all residents were now “fervientes cristianos y entusiastas creyentes”.⁹³⁶ Once more, reality differed from Nationalist propaganda. Religious harmony was achieved by the same method that brought about political unity: repression. The fact that the insurgents succeeded in imposing an alien organisation as the main cultural institution in rebel-controlled Andalucía only confirmed the exceptionally violent nature of the new regime. The Catholic Church ultimately failed to re-convert Seville and truly become the highest representative of Spanish identity, but refused to relinquish its monopoly over the cultural sphere.⁹³⁷ In doing so, it played an essential role in Francoist cultural repression, cementing its status as a divisive force in Spanish society.

The legitimacy of Francoism was based on a series of myths that were progressively transformed into History. The gradual dismantling of these legends exposed the very foundations of regime: a totalitarian project encompassing physical, economic and cultural repression, and based on a multitude of lies. In the capital of Andalucía, the intricate triangle of deceit that was the ‘Miracle of Seville’ was founded on the murder of over 3,000 people, the economic misery of one fifth of its residents, and ideologically supported by an institution that mustered the support of only around 1% of the population.

⁹³³ **Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla**, 12 October 1937.

⁹³⁴ Sebastián y Bandarán, José; Tineo Lara, Antonio, *La persecución religiosa en la Archidiócesis de Sevilla*, page 18.

⁹³⁵ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559 and 591.

⁹³⁶ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 614.

⁹³⁷ By the 1960s, only 13% of the population of the province of Seville regularly attended Sunday Mass. Lannon, Frances, *Privilege, Persecution and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1975*, page 10.

Table I: Church attendance in the city of Seville (1928-1932)⁹³⁸

Parish	Population	Weekly church attendance	Weekly church attendance (%)	% of people attending Mass on Easter Sunday and other feast days
Santa Ana	20,000	90	0.45%	10%
San Andrés y San Martín	5,000	500	10.00%	56% (minimum estimate) ⁹³⁹
San Bartolomé y San Esteban	5,811	25-30	0.52%	33% ⁹⁴⁰
San Bernardo y San Sebastián	16,000	200	1.25%	50% (estimate) ⁹⁴¹
La Concepción Inmaculada de la Ssma Virgen María	7,000	80	1.14%	10% ⁹⁴²
Santa Cruz	2,720	160-170	6.25%	50% ⁹⁴³
San Gil	10,500	60	0.57%	20%
San Ildefonso y Santiago	6,100	180 ⁹⁴⁴	2.95%	-
San Isidoro	2,900	100	3.45%	60% ⁹⁴⁵
San Julián; Santa Marina y San Marcos	18,537	400	2.16%	5% (estimate) ⁹⁴⁶
Santa María Magdalena y San Miguel	5,100	400	7.84%	80%

⁹³⁸ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559.

⁹³⁹ Priest reported that a higher percentage of people attended Mass on Easter Sunday (as opposed to other Catholic feast days), but failed to provide a figure.

⁹⁴⁰ 25% received Easter Sunday Communion.

⁹⁴¹ 60% female; 40% male. Majority of working-class residents did not attend Easter Sunday Mass.

⁹⁴² 5% received Easter Sunday Communion.

⁹⁴³ 33% received Easter Sunday Communion.

⁹⁴⁴ 150 in San Ildefonso; 30 in Santiago.

⁹⁴⁵ 50% received Easter Sunday Communion.

⁹⁴⁶ 10% of female residents attended Church on feast days. Regarding male attendance: “es casi insignificante el número de los que cumplen.”

San Nicolás y Santa María la Blanca	4,500	100	2.22%	96.5% (estimate) ⁹⁴⁷
Nuestra Señora de la O	20,000	300	1.50%	20% (estimate) ⁹⁴⁸
Omnium Sanctorum	10,900	34	0.31%	10%
San Pedro Y San Juan de la Palma	6,863	150	2.19%	48% (estimate) ⁹⁴⁹
San Román y Santa Catalina	9,700	10-12	0,12%	1% ⁹⁵⁰
San Roque y San Benito	14,300	250	1.75%	10% ⁹⁵¹
El Sagrario	17,000	1,200	7.06%	15% (minimum estimate) ⁹⁵²
El Salvador	4,102	- ⁹⁵³	-	80%
San Vicente Mártir	10,500	1,000	9.52%	60% ⁹⁵⁴
SEVILLE (Capital)	197,533	5,256	2.69%	

⁹⁴⁷ 97% female; 96% male.

⁹⁴⁸ 30% female; 10% male.

⁹⁴⁹ Parish priest wrote: "El 52% y el 80%", probably referring to a 52% and 80% absence rate for Easter Sunday Mass and Easter Sunday Communion respectively.

⁹⁵⁰ 0.6% received Easter Sunday Communion.

⁹⁵¹ A maximum of 5% of residents received Easter Sunday Communion.

⁹⁵² Parish priest only provided numbers for Easter Sunday Communion (substantially lower than Easter Sunday Mass attendance): "La cumplen próximamente 2,500, la comunión pascual la cumplen mucho más de los que cumplen con el precepto de oír misa."

⁹⁵³ "Muchas." An irritated Cardinal Ilundáin demanded a more detailed report on 15 October 1932.

⁹⁵⁴ 20% received Easter Sunday Communion.

Table II: socio-geographic breakdown of parishes⁹⁵⁵

Parish	Location/predominant social class
Santa Ana	Periphery (Triana); working-class
San Andrés ⁹⁵⁶ y San Martín ⁹⁵⁷	West-central; mixed
San Bartolomé ⁹⁵⁸ y San Esteban ⁹⁵⁹	Northwest-central; working-class
San Bernardo y San Sebastián	Periphery (San Bernardo); working-class
La Concepción Inmaculada de la Ssma Virgen María	Periphery (Gran Plaza); working-class
Santa Cruz	City-centre; middle/upper-class
San Gil	Periphery (La Macarena); working-class
San Ildefonso ⁹⁶⁰ y Santiago ⁹⁶¹	West-central (close to La Macarena); mixed
San Isidoro ⁹⁶²	West-central; mixed
San Julián, Santa Marina y San Marcos	Periphery (La Macarena); working-class
Santa María Magdalena ⁹⁶³ y San Miguel	Southwest-central; middle/upper-class
San Nicolás ⁹⁶⁴ y Santa María la Blanca ⁹⁶⁵	North-central; mixed
Nuestra Señora de la O	Periphery (Triana); working-class
Omnium Sanctorum	Periphery (La Macarena); working-class
San Pedro ⁹⁶⁶ y San Juan de la Palma ⁹⁶⁷	Northwest-central (partly in La Macarena); working-class
San Román y Santa Catalina	Periphery (La Macarena); working-class
San Roque y San Benito	Periphery (north-west); working-class
El Sagrario	City-centre; mixed
El Salvador	City-centre; middle/upper-class
San Vicente Mártir	City-centre; middle/upper-class

⁹⁵⁵ **Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla** (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559.

⁹⁵⁶ Calle Daoíz

⁹⁵⁷ Plaza de San Martín

⁹⁵⁸ Calle Virgen de la Alegría

⁹⁵⁹ Calle San Esteban

⁹⁶⁰ Calle Rodríguez Marín

⁹⁶¹ Plaza Jesús de la Redención

⁹⁶² Calle Augusto Plasencia

⁹⁶³ Calle San Eloy

⁹⁶⁴ Calle Muñoz y Pabón

⁹⁶⁵ Calle Santa María la Blanca

⁹⁶⁶ Doña María Coronel

⁹⁶⁷ Calle Feria

Table III: Catholic education in Seville (1928-1932)⁹⁶⁸

Parish	Does a majority of children receive Catholic education at home?	Number of children attending Catholic schools	Number of children attending Catholic associations	Number of children attending state schools
Santa Ana	No	⁹⁶⁹ -	80	"Casi todos"
San Andrés y San Martín	No ⁹⁷⁰	700	-	50 ⁹⁷¹
San Bartolomé y San Esteban	No	166	-	75-80
La Concepción Inmaculada de la SSma. Virgen María	No	70	30	"La mayoría"
Santa Cruz	No ⁹⁷²	210	80	210
San Gil	No	900	⁹⁷³ -	500
San Ildefonso y Santiago	No ⁹⁷⁴	Almost all children in parish	-	"Muy pocos"
San Isidoro	No	450	50	-
San Julián; Santa Marina and San Marcos	No ⁹⁷⁵	400 (minimum estimate)	40 (minimum estimate) ⁹⁷⁶	240
Santa María Magdalena y San Miguel	No	400	500	-
San Nicolás y Santa María la Blanca	No	500	500 (minimum estimate) ⁹⁷⁷	-
Nuestra Señora de la O	No	750	102	350
Omnium				

⁹⁶⁸ Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559.

⁹⁶⁹ No reply, but in question 10(^a) the priest mentioned the existence of a Catholic school in his parish.

⁹⁷⁰ Only middle/upper class families.

⁹⁷¹ In the state school; however: "la enseñanza laica oficialmente, la maestra muy piadosa."

⁹⁷² Only middle/upper class families.

⁹⁷³ Priest declared that *Juventud Católica* formerly possessed up to 50 members that had since left abandoned organisation.

⁹⁷⁴ "Existe un número de familias que lo cumplen muy bien, si bien en menor número."

⁹⁷⁵ "Sólo se preocupan [...] de llevarlos a colegios católicos. Muchos ni aún esto."

⁹⁷⁶ "40 en el Templo Parroquial. Mucho mayor numero en la Iglesia de los Salesianos."

⁹⁷⁷ "Los alumnos y pocos más."

Sanctorum	No	800	8	300
San Pedro y San Juan de la Palma	Yes ⁹⁷⁸	700	300	Small minority ⁹⁷⁹
San Román y Santa Catalina	No	200	-	100
San Roque y San Benito	No	455	70 (maximum estimate)	1.810 ⁹⁸⁰
El Sagrario	No ⁹⁸¹	-	Majority ⁹⁸²	"Numerosos"
El Salvador	Yes	Majority	-	No state school in parish
San Vicente Mártir	Yes	450	-	150

⁹⁷⁸ "Hoy algunos lamentables descuidos en la instrucción religiosa y en la moral."

⁹⁷⁹ "Niños pocos; y niñas mucho menos."

⁹⁸⁰ Includes 200 children enrolled in a local Protestant school.

⁹⁸¹ With the exception of the Catholic minority.

⁹⁸² "Ordinariamente, sí."

Table IV: Church attendance in the province of Seville (1928-1932)⁹⁸³

Pueblo	Population	Weekly church attendance (nº of people)	Weekly church attendance (%)
Aguadulce	3,800	4	0,11%
Alanís	4,450	25-30	0,67%
Albaida de Aljarafe	1,014	30-35	3,45%
Alcalá de Guadaira (Santiago)	6,080	150	2,47%
Alcalá de Guadaira (San Sebastián)	7,000	30	0,43%
Alcalá del Río	3,800	8-10	0,26%
Alcolea del Río	2,750	-	-
Algaba (La)	5,120	25	0,49%
Algamitas (Las)	1,650	0	0,00%
Almadén de la Plata	4,000	0	0,00%
Almensilla	1,200	20	1,67%
Arahal (El)	14,603	24	0,16%
Aznalcázar (and Quema)	2,177	32	1,47%
Aznalcóllar	5,200	15	0,29%
Badolatosa	3,200	14	0,44%
Benacazón	3,378	6	0,18%
Bollullos de la Mitación	3,079	10-12	0,39%
Brenes	3,900	40	1,03%

⁹⁸³ Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville), Gobierno, Asuntos Despachados, Legajo 559.

Bormujos	1,500	0	0,00%
Burguillos	1,000	6-8	0,80%
Cabezas de San Juan (Las)	8,000	10	0,13%
Camas	5,307	10	0,19%
Campana (La)	4,600	30	0,65%
Cantillana	5,900	100	1,69%
Carmona (San Bartolomé; San Blas and San Felipe)	5,900	50	0,85%
Carmona (Santa María; El Salvador and Santiago)	9,200	150	1,63%
Carmona (San Pedro)	6,783	20-25	0,37%
Carrión de los Céspedes	5,319	30-40	0,75%
Casariche	4,761	17	0,36%
Castilbanco de los Arroyos	3,800	25-30	0,79%
Castilleja del Campo	589	5-8	1,36%
Castilleja de la Cuesta	2,500	30	1,20%
Castillo de las Guardas	4,469	23	0,51%
Cazalla de la Sierra	11,000	60	0,55%
Constantina	14,740	200	1,36%
Coria del Rio	10,500	60	0,57%
Coripe	3,120	25	0,80%
El Coronil	8,000	40	0,50%
Corrales (Los)	1,000	2	0,20%

Dos Hermanas	11,500	100-125	1,09%
Écija (San Gil and San Juan)	4,236		
Écija (Santa María and Santa Bárbara)	4,250	500 (both parishes)	5,89%
Écija (Santiago)	8,000	10-12 ⁹⁸⁴	0,15%
Espartina	1,500	80 ⁹⁸⁵	5,33%
Estepa (Santa María)	3,900		
Estepa (San Sebastián)	3,980	500 (both parishes)	6,35%
Fuentes de Andalucía	8,513	205	2,41%
Garrobo (El)	752	10	1,33%
Gelves	1,329	12	0,90%
Gerena	4,700	40	0,85%
Gilena	1,972	30	1,52%
Gines	1,450	30	2,07%
Guadalcanal	7,523	100	1,33%
Guillena	4,335	1	0,02%
Herrera	8,000	30	0,38%
Huévar	1,728	5	0,29%
Lentejuela	2,159	4	0,19%
Lebrija	18,000	30	0,17%
Lora de Estepa	1,100	6-8	0,73%

⁹⁸⁴ All were female.

⁹⁸⁵ Figure for daily Mass attendance.

Lora del Rio	11,373	50	0,44%
Madroño (El)	1,230	0	0,00%
Mairena del Alcor	7,750	50-70	0,90%
Mairena del Aljarafe	1,400	0	0,00%
Marchena (San Juan)	10,526	200	1,90%
Marchena (San Sebastián)	7,400	60	0,81%
Marinaleda	2,500	2	0,08%
Martin de la Jara	500	0	0,00%
Molares (Los)	2,300	8-10	0,43%
Montellano	8,983	80	0,89%
Morón de la Frontera (San Miguel)	11,500	129	1,12%
Morón de la Frontera La Victoria)	10,000	200	2,00%
Muela (La) (and Coripe)	300	0	0,00%
Navas de la Concepción	4,200	0	0,00%
Olivares	4,295	40	0,93%
Los Palacios	8,000	20	0,25%
Palomares (and Mairena del Aljarafe)	600	0	0,00%
Paradas	2,325	50	2,15%
Pedreda	3,000	30	1,00%
Pedroso (El)	4,800	50	1,04%
Peñaflor	4,000	40	1,00%

Pilas	6,000	200	3,33%
Pruna	4,100	6	0,15%
Puebla de Cazalla	9,300	100	1,08%
Puebla de los Infantes	5,500	3	0,05%
Puebla del Rio	2,900	15-20	0,69%
Real de la Jara	3,425	5	0,15%
Rinconada (La)	2,000	12	0,60%
Roda de Andalucía (La)	4,210	14-15	0,36%
Ronquillo	2,020	2	0,10%
Rubio (El)	5,000	8-10	0,20%
Salteras	1,100	30	2,73%
San Juan de Aznalfarache	3,700	50	1,35%
Sanlúcar la Mayor	5,000	60	1,20%
San Nicolás del Puerto	1,960	0	0,00%
Santiponce	2,926	1	0,03%
Saucejo (El)	5,990	6 ⁹⁸⁶	0,10%
Tocina	5,075	24-26	0,51%
Tomares	1,600	20	1,25%
Umbrete	2,521	70	2,78%
Utrera (Santa María)	12,000	100	0,83%

⁹⁸⁶ Figure for daily Mass attendance.

Utrera (Santiago)	9,000	50-60	0,67%
Villanueva del Ariscal	2,541	100	3,94%
Villanueva de las Minas	10,000	20	0,20%
Villanueva del Rio	1,200	2 ⁹⁸⁷	0,17%
Villanueva de San Juan	2,870	2	0,07%
Villar (El)	232	4	1,72%
Villaverde del Rio	2,225	30	1,35%
Viso del Alcor (El)	8,438	20	0,24%
SEVILLE (Province)	521.481	5.092	0,98%

⁹⁸⁷ Figure for daily Mass attendance.

Bibliography

Primary sources

Archives

- Archivo Arzobispal de Sevilla (Seville)
- Archivo Catedral de Sevilla (Seville)
- Archivo de la Diputación Provincial de Sevilla (Seville)
- Archivo de la Hemeroteca Municipal de Sevilla (Seville)
- Archivo de la Real Academia de Historia (Madrid)
- Archivo del Tribunal Militar Territorial Segundo (Seville)
- Archivo General Militar (Madrid)
- Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid)
- Archivo Intermedio Militar Sur (Seville)
- Archivo Municipal de Sevilla (Seville)
- Centro Documental de la Memoria Histórica (Salamanca)
- Fototeca Municipal de Sevilla (Seville)

Newspapers and contemporary journals

- ABC (Madrid), 1931-1936
- ABC (Seville), 1931-1951
- Archivo Hispalense (Seville), 1965-2001
- Boletín Oficial Eclesiástico del Arzobispado de Sevilla (Seville), 1931-1939
- El Correo de Andalucía (Seville), 1936-37
- El Liberal (Madrid), 1936
- El Liberal (Seville), 1936
- FE (Seville), 1936-37
- Heraldo de Madrid (Madrid), 1936
- Informaciones (Madrid), 1936
- La Unión (Seville), 1936-37
- La Vanguardia (Barcelona), 1964
- O Século (Lisbon), 1936
- Revista de Tropas Coloniales (Ceuta), 1924

Diaries, memoirs, speeches, collections of documents and other contemporary or eyewitness accounts

- Alcalá-Zamora y Torres, Niceto, *Memorias* (Barcelona, Planeta, 1977)

Alcalá-Zamora, Niceto, **Discursos** (Editorial Tecnos, Madrid, 1979)

Alconchel, Ramiro de, **La Novena Cruzada. Poema de la guerra contra los monstruos** (Sevilla, Imprenta Bergali, 1937)

Alloucherie, Jean, **Noches de Sevilla** (Sevilla, Espuela de Plata, 2005)

Arboleya Martínez, Maximiliano, **La apostasía de las masas** (Barcelona, Salvatella, 1934)

Armiñán Odriozola, Luis de, **Excmo. Sr. General D. Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Jefe del Ejército del Sur** (Avila, 1937)

Azaña, Manuel, **Memorias políticas y de guerra**, 2 vols. (Barcelona, Crítica, 1978)

Azaña, Manuel, **Causas de la guerra de España** (Barcelona, Crítica, 2002)

Bahamonde, Antonio, **Un año con Queipo de Llano. Memorias de un nacionalista** (Sevilla, Espuela de Plata, 2005)

Barbero, Edmundo, **El Infierno Azul (Seis meses en el feudo de Queipo)** (Sevilla, Espuela de Plata, 2005)

Barneto, Saturnino, **Cómo luchan bajo la bandera de la I.S.R. los obreros del puerto de Sevilla** (n.p., n.d.)

Bolín, Luis, **Spain: the vital years** (London, Cassell, 1967)

Borkenau, Franz, **The Spanish cockpit** (London, Faber & Faber, 1937)

Bowers, Claude Gernade, **My mission to Spain: watching the rehearsal for World War II** (London, Victor Gollancz, 1954)

Brenan, Gerald, **The Spanish Labyrinth. An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War** (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1943)

Brenan, Gerald, **Personal record, 1920-1972** (London, Cape, 1974)

Buckley, Henry, **Life and death of the Spanish republic** (London, H. Hamilton, 1940)

Carta colectiva de los obispos españoles con motivo de la guerra en España (Pamplona, 1937)

Casares Quiroga, Santiago (edited by Grandío Seoane, Emilio), **Discursos políticos (1931-1936)** (Sada, A Coruña Ediciós do Castro, 2006)

Castro Albarrán, Aniceto, **El derecho a la rebeldía** (Madrid, Imp. Gráfica Universal, 1934)

Castro Albarrán, Aniceto, **El derecho al Alzamiento** (Salamanca, Cervantes, 1940)

Copado, Bernabé, **Con la columna Redondo. Combates y conquistas. Crónica de guerra** (Sevilla, Imprenta de la Gavidia, 1937)

Cuesta Monereo, José, **Una figura para la historia : "el General Queipo de Llano, primer locutor de radio en la guerra de liberación"** (Sevilla, Jefatura Provincial del Movimiento, 1969)

Ciano, Galeazzo, **Ciano's Diary 1939-43** (London, Heinemann, 1947)

Dávila, Sancho & Pemartín, Julián, **Hacia la historia de la Falange: primera contribución de Sevilla** (Jerez, Jerez Industrial, 1938)

Delicado, Manuel, "Cómo se luchó en Sevilla" in **Discurso pronunciado en el Pleno ampliado del C. C. del Partido Comunista de España, celebrado en Valencia los días 5, 6, 7 y 8 de Marzo de 1937** (Ediciones del Partido Comunista de España)

Díaz, José, *La guerra y el Frente Popular* (Madrid, Ediciones Vanguardia Obrera S.A., 1990)

El Tebib Arrumi, *Así se conquistó Sevilla* (Madrid, Ediciones España, 1940)

Escobar, José Ignacio, *Así empezó* (Madrid, G. del Toro, 1974)

Espinosa de los Monteros, Narciso; Gómez-Moreno, Manuel (eds.), *139 fotografías del Movimiento Nacional en Sevilla* (Sevilla, Imp. FE, 1937)

Esteban Infantes, Emilio, *La sublevación del general Sanjurjo. Relato de su ayudante* (Madrid, Imprenta Sánchez Ocaña, 1933)

Foltz, Charles, *The Masquerade in Spain* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co, 1948)

Franco, Francisco, *Palabras del Caudillo: 19 abril 1937-31 diciembre 1938* (Barcelona, FE, 1939)

Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, *Mis Conversaciones privadas con Franco* (Barcelona, Planeta, 1976)

Franco Salgado-Araujo, Francisco, *Mi vida junto a Franco* (Barcelona, Planeta, 1977)

Gerahty, Cecil, *The road to Madrid* (London, Hutchinson & Co., 1937)

Gil Robles, José María, *No fué posible la paz* (Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 1968)

Goded, Manuel, *Un "faccioso" cien por cien* (Zaragoza, Heraldo de Aragón, 1938)

Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, *Respuesta obligada: carta abierta al Sr. D. José Antonio Aguirre* (Pamplona, Gráf. Bescansa, 1937)

Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, *The Spanish bishops Speak: Joint Pastoral Letter To The Bishops Of The Whole World On The War In Spain* (New York, America Press, 1937)

Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, *Por Dios y por España. Pastorales, instrucciones pastorales y artículos, discursos, mensajes, apéndice, 1936-1939* (Barcelona, Rafael Casulleras, 1940)

Gomá y Tomás, Isidro, *Pastorales de la Guerra de España* (Madrid, Rialp, 1955)

Gonzálbez Ruiz, Francisco, *Yo he creído en Franco. Proceso de una gran desilusión: dos meses en la cárcel de Sevilla* (Paris, Ediciones Imprimerie, Coopérative Etoile, 1938)

González Menéndez-Reigada, Albino, *Catecismo patriótico español* (Barcelona, Península, 2003)

Gonzalo Soto, Julio, *Esbozo de una síntesis del ideario de Mola en relación con el Movimiento Nacional* (Burgos, Hijos de Santiago Rodríguez, 1937)

Guzmán de Alfarache, *¡18 de julio en Sevilla! Historia del alzamiento glorioso en Sevilla* (Sevilla, FE, 1937)

Hernández Díaz, José; Sancho Corbacho, Antonio, *Estudio de los edificios religiosos y objetos de culto de la ciudad de Sevilla, saqueados y destruidos por los marxistas* (Sevilla, Imprenta de la Gavidia, 1936)

Hernández Díaz, José; Sancho Corbacho, Antonio, *Estudio de los edificios religiosos y objetos de culto saqueados y destruidos por los marxistas en los pueblos de la provincia de Sevilla* (Sevilla, Imprenta de la Gavidia, 1937)

Ibárruri, Dolores, *El único camino* (Editorial Sendero, Buenos Aires, 1963)

Infante Pérez, Blas, *El ideal Andaluz. Varios estudios acerca del renacimiento de Andalucía* (Sevilla, Imp. de Joaquín L. Arévalo, 1915)

Infante Pérez, Blas, *La verdad sobre el complot de Tablada y el Estado libre de Andalucía* (Sevilla, Imp. de Alvarez y Zambrano, 1931)

Jellinek, Frank, *The Civil War in Spain* (London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1938)

Kindelán, Alfredo, *La verdad de mis relaciones con Franco* (Barcelona, Planeta, 1981)

Kindelán, Alfredo, *Mis cuadernos de guerra* (Barcelona, Planeta, 1982)

Knickerbocker, Hubert Renfro, *The siege of Alcazar. A war-log of the Spanish Revolution* (London, Hutchinson & Co., 1937)

Knoblaugh, Edward, *Correspondent in Spain* (London, Sheed and Ward, 1937)

Koestler, Arthur, *Spanish testament* (London, V. Gollancz Ltd, 1937)

Lizarza Iribarren, Antonio de, *Memorias de la conspiración (1931-1936)* (Pamplona, Gómez, 1969)

Lojendio, Luis María de, *Operaciones militares de la guerra de España, 1936-1939* (Barcelona, Montaner y Simon, s. a., 1940)

Loveday, Arthur, *World War in Spain* (London, Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1939)

Maíz, B. Félix, *Alzamiento en España: de un diario de la conspiración* (Pamplona, Gómez, 1952)

Maíz, Félix B., *Mola, aquel hombre: diario de la conspiración, 1936* (Barcelona, Planeta, 1976)

Martínez Barrio, Diego, *Memorias* (Barcelona, Planeta, 1983)

McCullagh, Captain Francis, *In Franco's Spain. Being the Experiences of an Irish War- Correspondent During the Great Civil War Which Began in 1936* (London, Burns Oats & Washbourne, 1937)

Medina Vilallonga, Rafael de, *Tiempo pasado* (Sevilla, Gráfica Sevillana, 1971)

Mendizábal Villalba, Alfredo, *The Martyrdom of Spain: Origins of a Civil War* (London, G. Bles, The Centenary Press, 1938)

Mola Vidal, Emilio, *Obras Completas* (Valladolid, Librería Santarén, 1940)

Montán Luis, "Cómo conquistó Sevilla el General Queipo de Llano" in *Episodios de la Guerra Civil, nº5* (Valladolid, edit. Santaren, 1939)

Mora-Figueroa, José de, *Datos para la Historia de la Falange gaditana 1934-1939* (Jerez de la Frontera, Talleres de Gráficas del Exportador, 1974)

Moss, Geoffrey MacNeill, *The Siege of the Alcázar: A History of the Siege of the Toledo Alcázar, 1936* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1937)

Nicholson, Helen, *Death in the morning* (London, Lovat Dickson Limited Publishers, 1937)

Neves, Mário, *A chacina de Badajoz. Relato de uma testemunha de um dos episódios mais trágicos da Guerra Civil de Espanha (Agosto de 1936)* (Lisboa, O Jornal, 1985)

Nin, Andrés, *Los problemas de la revolución española (1931-1937)* (Ruedo Ibérico, 1971)

Olmedo, Antonio, *La flecha en blanco (diario de la Guerra)* (Cádiz, Cerón, 1937)

Olmedo, Felix G., *El sentido de la guerra española* (Bilbao, 1938)

Ortiz de Villajos, Cándido, *De Sevilla a Madrid, ruta libertadora de la columna Castejón* (Granada, Librería Prieto, 1937)

Patrón de Sopranis, Alfonso, *Burlando el bloqueo rojo: el primer salto del estrecho (julio del 1936)* (Jerez de la Frontera, Tip. Lit. Jerez Industrial, 1940)

Peers, Allison, *The Spanish Tragedy 1930-1936. Dictatorship, Republic, Chaos* (London, Methuen & Co., 1936)

Pemán y Pemartín, José María, *Arengas y Crónicas de Guerra* (Cádiz, Establecimientos Cerón, Cádiz, 1937)

Portela, Artur, *Nas trincheiras de Espanha* (Lisboa, Parceria António Maria Pereira, 1937)

Portela Valladares, Manuel, *Memorias: dentro del drama español* (Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1988)

Prieto, Indalecio, *Convulsiones de España: pequeños detalles de grandes sucesos*, vol. 1 (Mexico, Oasis, 1967)

Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, *Textos inéditos y epistolario* (Madrid, Ediciones del Movimiento, 1956)

Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, *Discursos y escritos. Obras completas (1922-1936)* (Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Políticos, 1976)

Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *El General Queipo de Llano perseguido por la dictadura* (Madrid, Morata, 1930)

Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *El movimiento reivindicativo de Cuatro Vientos* (Madrid, Tip. Yagües, 1933)

Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *Bandos y órdenes dictados por Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra, General Jefe de la Segunda División Orgánica y del Ejército del Sur desde la declaración del estado de guerra, 18 de julio de 1936, hasta fin de febrero de 1937, etc.* (Sevilla, Imprenta Municipal, 1937)

Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, *Apéndice II. Comprende de 1.º de marzo a 31 de diciembre de 1937, etc. Bandos y órdenes dictados por Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra, General Jefe de la Segunda División Orgánica y del Ejército del Sur desde la declaración del estado de guerra, 18 de julio de 1936, hasta fin de febrero de 1937, etc.* (Sevilla, Imprenta Municipal, 1937)

Queipo de Llano, Gonzalo, "Cómo dominamos Sevilla" in *Estampas de la guerra, tomo 5, Frentes de Andalucía y Extremadura* (San Sebastián, 1938)

Ramón-Laca, Julio de, *Bajo la férula de Queipo: como fue gobernada Andalucía* (Sevilla, Imprenta Comercial del Diario FE, 1939)

Rogers, Francis Theobald, *Spain: a tragic journey* (New York, Macaulay, 1937)

Rosado, Antonio, *Tierra y libertad. memorias de un campesino anarcosindicalista andaluz* (Barcelona, Crítica, 1979)

Rotvand, Georges, *Franco means business* (London, The Paladin Press, 1939)

Ruiz Vilaplana, Antonio, *Burgo's justice: a year's experience of nationalist Spain* (London, Constable & Co, 1938)

Sánchez del Arco, Manuel, *El sur de España en la reconquista de Madrid (diario de operaciones glosado por un testigo)* (Sevilla, Editorial Sevillana, 1937)

Sánchez del Arco, Manuel, *Horas y figuras de la Guerra en España* (Madrid, Ediciones Españolas, 1939)

Saínz Rodríguez, Pedro, *Testimonio y recuerdos* (Barcelona, Planeta, 1978)

Sardá y Salvany, Félix, *El Liberalismo es Pecado. Cuestiones candentes* (Barcelona, 1884)

Sebastián y Bandarán, José; Tineo Lara, Antonio, *La persecución religiosa en la Archidiócesis de Sevilla (1936-1938)* (Sevilla, Editorial Sevillana, 1938)

Segura y Sáenz, Pedro, *Por la unidad católica de España: cartas pastorales del Embo. y Rvdmo. Señor Pedro, Cardenal Segura y Sáenz, Arzobispo de Sevilla, en defensa del tesoro de la fe* (Sevilla, Editorial Edelce, 1952)

Serrano Súñer, Ramón, *Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar. Noticia y reflexión, frente a una leyenda, sobre nuestra política en dos guerras* (Madrid, Ediciones y Publicaciones Españolas, 1947)

Siurot, Manuel, *Mis charlas en el micrófono del General*, vol. 1 (Cádiz, Establecimientos Cerón, 1937)

Suero Serrano, Luciano, *Memorias de un campesino andaluz en la Revolución Española* (Madrid, Queimada, 1982)

Vallina, Pedro, *Mis memorias* (Sevilla, Centro Andaluz del Libro, Libre Pensamiento, 2000)

Varela Rendueles, José María, *Rebelión en Sevilla: memorias de su Gobernador rebelde* (Sevilla, Servicio de Publicaciones del Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1982)

Vegas Latapie, *Memórias políticas. El suicidio de la Monarquía y la Segunda República*, vol. 1 (Barcelona, Planeta, 1983)

Vegas Latapie, Eugenio, *Memorias políticas 1936-1938. Los caminos del desengaño*, vol. 2 (Madrid, Tebas, 1987)

Vila, Enrique, *Un año de República en Sevilla. Jornadas de un periodista* (Sevilla, Editorial Sevillana, 1932)

Zugazagoitia, Julián, *Guerra y vicisitudes de los españoles*, 2 vols. (París, Librería Española, 1968)

Secondary sources

Articles, chapters, contributions, books and monographs

“18 de Julio de 1936 en Sevilla” in *Archivo Hispalense*, Sevilla, nº132-133, 1965

Acedo Colunga, Felipe, *José Calvo Sotelo. La verdad de una muerte* (Barcelona, AHR, 1957)

Alexander, Martin S.; Graham, Helen (editors), *The French and Spanish Popular Fronts: Comparative Perspectives* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989)

Almuedo Palma, José, *Al este del edén. Estudio demográfico del crecimiento urbano en el sector oriental de Sevilla: Nervión, Ciudad Jardín, Cerro del Águila Águila y Amate (1922-1935)* (Sevilla, Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, Patronato del Real Alcázar, 2009)

Álvarez Rey, Leandro, "El Carlismo en Andalucía durante la II República (1931-1936)" in Braojos Garrido, Alfonso; Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, **Sevilla, 36: Sublevación fascista y represión** (Brenes, Sevilla, Muñoz, Moya y Montraveta, 1990)

Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Ruiz Sánchez, José-Leonardo, "La II República: laicismo y movilización religiosa (1931-1936)" in **Historia de la Iglesia de Sevilla** (Sevilla, Editorial Castillejo, 1992)

Álvarez Rey, Leandro, **Sevilla durante la dictadura de Primo de Rivera, la Unión Patriótica (1923-1930)** (Sevilla, Diputación Provincial, 1987)

Álvarez Rey, Leandro, **La derecha en la II República: Sevilla, 1931-1936** (Sevilla, Secretariado de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Sevilla : Servicio de Publicaciones del Excmo. Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1993)

Álvarez Rey, Leandro, "“Obreros honrados”: las derechas y el sindicalismo católico en la segunda república" in Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Lemus López, Encarnación (ed.), **Sindicatos y trabajadores en Sevilla: una aproximación a la memoria del siglo XX** (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 2000)

Álvarez Rey, Leandro, **Manuel Giménez Fernández (1896-1968). Epistolario Político** (Sevilla, Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 2000)

Álvarez Rey, Leandro, "Del rojo al azul: los inicios de la guerra civil en Sevilla" in Álvarez Rey, Leandro (ed.), **Andalucía y la guerra civil: estudios y perspectivas** (Sevilla, Diputación de Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 2006)

Álvarez Rey, Leandro, **Diego Martínez Barrio: palabra de republicano** (Sevilla, ICAS, 2007)

Álvarez Rey, Leandro (ed.), **Los socialistas en Sevilla durante la Segunda República** (Sevilla, Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, Patronato del Real Alcázar, 2009)

Anderson, Peter Philip. **The Francoist Military Trials. Terror and complicity (1939-1945)** (London, Routledge, 2010)

Arenas Posadas, Carlos (ed.), **La Segunda República en Sevilla** (Sevilla, Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, Patronato del Real Alcázar de Sevilla, 2004)

Arrarás, Joaquín, **Historia de la Segunda República Española**, 4 vols. (Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1956-68)

Arrarás, Joaquín, **Historia de la cruzada española**, 8 vols. (Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1939-43)

Aznar, Manuel, **Historia militar de la guerra de España**, 4 vols., 3rd ed. (Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1958-63)

Aznar, Manuel, **Historia militar de la guerra de España**, 4th ed. (Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1969)

Balfour, Sebastian, **The end of the Spanish empire, 1898-1923** (Oxford, Clarendon, 1987)

Balfour, Sebastian, "Spain and the Great Powers in the aftermath of the Disaster of 1898" in Balfour, Sebastian, & Preston, Paul, **Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century** (London, New York, Routledge, 1999)

Balfour, Sebastian, **Deadly Embrace: Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War** (Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, 2002)

Barrios, Manuel, **El último virrey. Queipo de Llano** (Sevilla, J. Rodríguez Castillejo, 1990)

Barrios, Manuel, *La Sevilla del Cardenal Segura* (Sevilla, Espuela de Plata, 2004)

Benavides Gómez, Domingo, **Maximiliano Arboleya (1870-1951). Un luchador social entre las dos Españas** (Madrid, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2003)

Ben-Ami, Shlomo, *Fascism from above: the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983).

Blaye, Edouard de, *Franco and the Politics of Spain* (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976)

Blázquez Miguel, Juan, *Historia Militar de la Guerra Civil Española*, vol. 1 (Villanueva del Pardillo, María Dolores Tomás, 2003)

Blinkhorn, Martin (ed), *Fascists and Conservatives the Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe* (London, Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1990)

Blinkhorn, Martin, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931-1939* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008)

Burgos, Antonio, *Guía secreta de Sevilla* (Madrid, Al-Borak, 1974)

Cabanellas, Guillermo, *La guerra de los mil días: nacimiento, vida y muerte de la II República Española* (Buenos Aires, Helliasta, 1975)

Cabanellas, Guillermo, *Cuatro Generales*, vol. 1 (Barcelona, Planeta, 1977)

Cabello Núñez, José, "Persecución religiosa y conflictividad social en la Sierra Sur de Sevilla durante la Segunda República: El caso de la Puebla de Cazalla" in *Archivo Hispalense*, Sevilla, nº267-272, 2005/2006

Callahan, William James, *Church, Politics and Society in Spain, 1750-1874* (Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1984)

Cárcel Ortí, Vicente, *La persecución religiosa en España durante la Segunda República: 1931-1939* (Madrid, Ediciones Rialp, 1990)

Cardona, Gabriel, *El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la Guerra Civil* (Madrid, Biblioteca Historia 16, 1990)

Caro Cancela, Diego, *La Segunda República en Cádiz. Elecciones y partidos políticos* (Cádiz, Editorial Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1987)

Caro Cancela, Diego, "La primavera de 1936 en Andalucía: conflictividad social y violencia política" in Alvarez Rey, Leandro (ed.), *Andalucía y la guerra civil: estudios y perspectivas* (Sevilla, Diputación de Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 2006)

Chaves Palacio, Julián, *La represión en la provincia de Cáceres durante la guerra civil (1936-1939)* (Cáceres, Universidad de Extremadura, 1995)

Chaves Palacio, Julián, *La guerra civil en Extremadura. Operaciones militares* (Mérida, Editora regional de Extremadura, 1997)

Casanova, Juliá, *Anarquismo y revolución en la sociedad rural aragonesa, 1936-38* (Barcelona, Crítica, 2006)

Cenarro Lagunas, Angela, *La sonrisa de Falange. Auxilio Social en la guerra y la posguerra* (Barcelona, Crítica, 2005)

Christian, William A., ***Moving crucifixes in modern Spain*** (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992)

Cifuentes Chueca, Julia, ***El asalto a la República. Los orígenes de franquismo en Zaragoza, 1936-39*** (Zaragoza, Institución Fernando el Católico, 2006)

Comas, Ramón, ***Isidro Gomá, Francesc Vidal i Barraquer: dos visiones antagónicas de la Iglesia española de 1939*** (Salamanca: Sígueme, 1977)

Delgado, Iva, ***Portugal e a guerra civil de Espanha*** (Lisboa, Publicações Europa-América, 1980)

Díaz Arriaza, José, "La represión de Queipo de Llano sobre la administración local sevillana" in Ortiz Villalba, Juan, ***Andalucía: guerra y exilio*** (Sevilla, Universidad Pablo Olavide, 2005)

Díaz Arriaza, José; Castejón Fernández, Javier; ***Utrera 1936: Ocupación militar y represión*** (Brenes, Muñoz Moya, 2007)

Domingo, Alfonso, ***Retaguardia. La Guerra Civil tras los frentes*** (Madrid, Oberon, 2004)

Domínguez Pérez, Alicia, ***El verano que trajo un largo invierno. La represión político social durante el primer franquismo en Cádiz (1936-1945)*** (Cádiz, Quórum Editores, 2005)

Ealham, Chris, ***Class, Culture, and Conflict in Barcelona, 1898-1937*** (London, Routledge, 2004)

Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, "Sevilla, 1936. Sublevación y represión" in Braojos Garrido, Alfonso; Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, ***Sevilla, 36: Sublevación fascista y represión*** (Brenes, Sevilla, Muñoz, Moya y Montraveta, 1990)

Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, ***La columna de la muerte. El avance del ejército franquista de Sevilla a Badajoz*** (Barcelona, Editorial Crítica, 2003)

Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, "Julio de 1936. Golpe militar plan de exterminio" in Casanova, Julián (ed.); Espinosa Maestre, Francisco; Mir, Conxita; Moreno Gómez, Francisco, ***Morir, matar, sobrevivir. La violencia en la dictadura de Franco*** (Barcelona, Crítica, 2004)

Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, ***El fenómeno revisionista o los fantasmas de la derecha española [Sobre la Matanza de Badajoz y la lucha en torno a la interpretación del pasado]*** (Badajoz, Los Libros del Oeste, 2005)

Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, ***La Guerra Civil en Huelva*** (Huelva, Diputación Provincial, 2005)

Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, ***La Justicia de Queipo. Violencia selectiva y terror fascista en la II División en 1936: Sevilla, Huelva, Cádiz, Córdoba, Málaga y Badajoz*** (Barcelona, Crítica, 2006)

Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, ***Contra el olvido. Historia memoria de la guerra civil*** (Barcelona, Crítica, 2006)

Espinosa Maestre, Francisco, ***La Primavera del Frente Popular: Los campesinos de Badajoz y el origen de la guerra civil (marzo-julio de 1936)*** (Barcelona, Crítica, 2007)

Fernández-Coppel, Jorge, ***Queipo de Llano: Memorias de la Guerra Civil*** (Madrid, La Esfera de los Libros, 2008)

Florencio Puntas, Antonio, ***Empresariado agrícola y cambio económico, 1880-1936. Organización y estrategia de la patronal sevillana en los inicios de la modernización*** (Sevilla, Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1994)

Fraser, Ronald, **Blood of Spain: the Experience of Civil War, 1936-1939** (London, Allen Lane, 1979)

García Márquez, José María, "La represión franquista en la provincial de Sevilla. Estado de la cuestión" in **Ebre 38. Revista Internacional de la Guerra Civil (1936-1939)**, nº2 (Barcelona, Publicacions I Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 2004)

García Márquez, José María, **LA UGT de Sevilla. Golpe militar, resistencia y represión (1936-1950)** Córdoba, Fundación para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos de Andalucía, 2009)

García Venero, Maximiano, **La Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla** (Paris, Ruedo Ibérico, 1967)

García Venero, Maximiano, **Historia de la Unificación (Falange y Requeté 1937)** (Madrid, AGESA, 1970)

García Venero, Maximiano, **Madrid, Julio 1936** (Madrid, Tebas, 1973)

García Venero, Maximiano, **Testimonio de Manuel Hedilla** (Barcelona, Ediciones Acervo, 1976)

Gibson, Ian, **La represión nacionalista de Granada en 1936 y la muerte de Federico García Lorca** (Paris, Ruedo Ibérico, 1971).

Gibson, Ian, **Queipo de Llano: Sevilla, verano de 1936** (Barcelona, Ediciones Grijalbo, 1986)

Gil Delgado, Francisco, **Pedro Segura: un cardenal sin fronteras** (Madrid, Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2001)

Gómez Salvago, José, **La Segunda República: elecciones y partidos políticos en Sevilla y provincia** (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 1986)

Graham, Helen, **Socialism and War: The Spanish Socialist Party in Power and Crisis, 1936-1939** (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991)

Graham, Helen, **The Spanish Republic at war, 1936-1939** (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002)

Gutiérrez-Ravé, José, **¿Como se liberó usted?** (Madrid, Talleres Gráficos, 1942)

Heywood, Paul, **Marxism and the Failure of Organised Socialism in Spain, 1879-1936** (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990)

Hijano del Río, Manuel; Ruiz Romero, Manuel, **El ideal andaluz en la Segunda República. La Asamblea Regional Andaluza de 1.933** (Sevilla, Fundación Blas Infante, 1995)

Hurtado Sánchez, José, "Curas y obreros contra la dictadura franquista" in **Anuario de la Historia de la Iglesia Andaluza**, vol. II, año 2009 (Sevilla, C.E.T., Cátedra "Beato Marcelo Spínola", 2009)

Ibn Azzuz Hakim, Mohammad, **Actitud de los moros ante el alzamiento. Marruecos, 1936** (Málaga, Algazarra, 1997)

Iniesta Coullaut-Valera, Enrique, **Blas Infante. Toda su verdad** (Granada, Comares, 2000)

Jiménez Guerrero, José, **Quema de conventos en Málaga, mayo de 1931** (Málaga, Editorial Arguval, 2006)

Jiménez Rodríguez, Javier, "La represión franquista en Alcalá de Guadaira" in **Archivo Hispalense**, Sevilla, Tomo 75, nº 229, 1992

Lacomba Avellán, Juan Antonio, *Blas Infante. La forja de un ideal andaluz* (Sevilla, Fundación Blas Infante, 1983)

Lacomba Avellán, Juan Antonio; Ortiz de Lanzagorta, José Luis; Sanchez, Jose Acosta, *Blas Infante. Perfiles de un andaluz* (Málaga, Diputación Provincial de Málaga, 1985)

Lannon, Frances, *Priviledge, Persecution and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1975* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987)

Lannon, Frances, "Ideological tensions, The Social Praxis and Cultural Politics of Spanish Catholicism in Graham, Helen, and Labanyi, Jo (eds.), *Spanish Cultural Studies. An Introduction: The Struggle for Modernity* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995)

Lazo, Alfonso, *Retrato del Fascismo Rural en Sevilla* (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 1997)

Lazo, Alfonso; Parejo Fernández, *La Iglesia, la Falange, y el Fascismo (Un estudio sobre la prensa Española de Posguerra)* (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 1998)

Lazo, Alfonso, "El imaginario católico de un fascismo provinciano" in Arias Castañón, Eloy (ed.), *Comunicación, historia y sociedad. Homenaje a Alfonso Braojos* (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, Área de Cultura, 2001)

Lazo, Alfonso; Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, "La Militancia Falangista en el Suroeste Español" in *Ayer* (nº52, 2005)

Ledesma, José Luis, *Los días de llamas de la revolución. Violencia y política en la retaguardia republicana de Zaragoza durante la guerra civil* (Zaragoza, Institución Fernando el Católico, 2003)

Lobo Manzano, Luis, *Un barrio de sevilla: El Cerro de Aguilas* (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 1974)

Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *La utopía revolucionaria: Sevilla en la Segunda República* (Sevilla, Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Sevilla, 1985)

Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *Socialismo, república y revolución en Andalucía (1931-1936)* (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, Secretariado de Publicaciones, 2000)

Macarro Vera, José Manuel, *La Sevilla Republicana* (Madrid, Silex, 2003)

Marín Fidalgo, Ana; Martín Burgueño, Manuel, *In memoriam. Manuel J. Fal Conde* (Sevilla, Ecesa, 1980)

Martín Fidalgo, Ana; Roldán González, Enrique; Martín Burgueño, Manuel, *El Requeté de Sevilla: orígenes, causas e historia* (Sevilla, Ecesa, 1982)

Martín Riego; Manuel; Ruiz Sánchez, José-Leonardo, "Historiografía de la Edad Moderna y Contemporánea de la Iglesia en la Andalucía Occidental (1965-2007)" in *Anuario de la Historia de la Iglesia Andaluza*, vol. I, año 2008 (Sevilla, C.E.T., Cátedra "Beato Marcelo Spínola", 2008)

Martínez Bande, José Manuel, *La Marcha sobre Madrid* (Madrid, San Martín, 1968)

Martínez Bande, José Manuel, *La Campaña de Andalucía* (Madrid, San Martín, 1969)

Martínez Gálvez, José Carlos, "La represión en el primer franquismo sevillano y su reconstrucción desde los archivos" in *20 años con el Archivo Histórico Provincial de Sevilla, Ciclo de Conferencias* (Sevilla, Consejería de Cultura, 2008)

Merr Lecha-Marzo, Fernando de, *La cuestión religiosa en las Cortes constituyentes de la II República Española* (Pamplona, Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1975)

Montero, Enrique, "Intellectual and Power. Reform Idealized: The intellectual and Ideological Origins of the Second Republic" in Graham, Helen, and Labanyi, Jo (eds.), *Spanish Cultural Studies. An Introduction. The Struggle for Modernity* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995)

Montero, José Ramón, *La CEDA: el catolicismo social y político en la II República*, 2 vols., (Madrid, Ediciones de la Revista de Trabajo, 1977)

Montero Gómez, Félix, *Alcalá de Guadaira, 21 de julio de 1936. Historias de una venganza* (Alcalá de Guadaira, Ayuntamiento de Alcalá de Guadaira, 2006)

Montero Moreno, Antonio, *Historia de la persecución religiosa en España, 1936-1939* (Madrid, Biblioteca de autores cristianos, 1961)

Moreno Gómez, Francisco, *1936: el genocidio franquista en Córdoba* (Barcelona, Crítica, 2008)

Núñez Beltrán, Miguel Angel, "El Cardenal Segura y su acción sinódico-conciliar en Sevilla" in *Anuario de la Historia de la Iglesia Andaluza*, vol. II, año 2009 (Sevilla, C.E.T., Cátedra "Beato Marcelo Spínola", 2009)

Olmedo Delgado, Antonio; Cuesta Monereo, José, *General Queipo de Llano: aventura y audacia* (Barcelona, A.H.R., 1958)

Ordóñez Márquez, Juan, *La apostasía de las masas y la persecución religiosa en la provincia de Huelva, 1931-1936* (Madrid, CSIC, 1968)

Ortiz de Lanzagorta, José Luis, *Blas Infante. Vida y muerte de un hombre andaluz* (Sevilla, Fernández-Narbona, 1979)

Ortiz Villalba, Juan, *Del golpe militar a la guerra civil: Sevilla 1936* (Sevilla, RD Editores, 2006)

Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, "Nuevos datos sobre la afiliación Falangista en Andalucía" in Arias Castañón, Eloy (ed.), *Comunicación, historia y sociedad. Homenaje a Alfonso Braojos* (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, Área de Cultura, 2001)

Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, *La Falange en la Sierra Norte de Sevilla (1934-1956)* (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 2004)

Parejo Fernández, José Antonio, *Señoritos, jornaleros y falangistas* (Sevilla, Bosque de Palabras, 2008)

Pascual Ceballos, Fernando, *Luchas agrarias en Sevilla durante la Segunda República* (Sevilla, Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1983)

Payne, Stanley G., *Fascism in Spain 1923-1977* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1999)

Payne, Stanley G., *The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933-36: Origins of the Civil War* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2006)

Peirats, José (edited by Ealham, Chris), *The CNT in the Spanish Revolution* (Hastings, East Sussex, Meltzer Press, 2001)

Pérez Calero, Alberto Máximo, *Aire de Libertad* (Sevilla, Diputación de Sevilla, 1996)

Pettenghi Lachambre, José Aquiles, **Detrás del silencio: el trágico destino de los gobernadores civiles de Cádiz en la II República** (Jerez de la Frontera, Artepick TM, 2009)

Ponce Alberca, Julio, **Política, instituciones y provincias: la Diputación de Sevilla durante la dictadura de Primo de Rivera y la II República, 1923-1936** (Sevilla, Diputación de Sevilla, 1999)

Ponce Alberca, Julio, “La represión de las organizaciones obreras durante la guerra civil y la posguerra” in Álvarez Rey, Leandro; Lemus López, Encarnación (ed.), **Sindicatos y trabajadores en Sevilla: una aproximación a la memoria del siglo XX** (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 2000)

Ponce Alberca, Julio, **Cien Años de Socialismo. el PSOE en la Puebla de Cazalla (1899-1999)** (Sevilla, Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 2000)

Ponce Alberca, Julio, “Política y administración local en la Sevilla de Queipo (julio-diciembre 1936)” in **Archivo Hispalense**, Tomo 84, nº 256-57, Sevilla, 2001.

Preston, Paul, **Franco: A Biography** (London, Fontana, 1993)

Preston, Paul, **The Coming of the Spanish Civil War: Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic** (London, Routledge, 1994)

Preston, Paul, **The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in Twentieth-Century Spain** (London; New York, Routledge, 1995)

Preston, Paul, **Comrades! Portraits from the Spanish Civil War** (London, HarperCollins, 1999)

Preston, Paul, **Doves of War. Four Women of Spain** (London, HarperCollins, 2002)

Preston, Paul, **We Saw Spain Die: Foreign Correspondents in the Spanish Civil War** (London, Constable, 2008)

Prieto, Tomás, **Héroes y gestas de la Cruzada. Datos para la Historia** (Salamanca, Ediciones Tormes, 1966)

Quevedo y Queipo de Llano, Ana, **Queipo de Llano. Gloria e infortunio de un general** (Barcelona, Editorial Planeta, 2001)

Raguer I Suñer, Hilari, “La prensa vaticana en la Guerra Civil” in Tuñon de Lara, Manuel (ed), **Comunicación, Cultura y Política durante la II República y la Guerra Civil**, 2 vols. (Bilbao, Universidad del País Vasco, 1990)

Raguer, Hilari, **El general Batet. Franco contra Batet: crónica de una venganza** (Barcelona, Península, 1996)

Rager Suñer, Hilario, **Gunpowder and incense: the Catholic Church and Spanish Civil War** (London, Routledge, 2007)

Redondo, Luis; Zavala, Juan de, **El requeté (la tradición no muere)** (Barcelona, AHR, 1957)

Richards, Michael, **A Time of Silence: Civil War and the Culture of Repression in Franco's Spain, 1936-1945** (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998)

Robinson, Richard, **The Origins of Franco's Spain: The Right, the Republic and Revolution, 1931-36** (Newton Abbot, David & Charles, 1970)

Rodríguez Aisa, María Luisa, **El Cardenal Gomá y la Guerra de España. Aspectos de la gestión pública del Primado 1936-1939** (Madrid, Instituto Enrique Flórez, 1981)

Romero, Luis **Tres días de Julio. (18, 19 y 20 de 1936)** (Barcelona, Esplugues de Llobregat, 1968)

Romero Romero, Fernando, **Guerra Civil y represión en Villamartín (1931-1946)** (Cádiz, Diputación Provincial de Cádiz, 1999).

Ruiz Sánchez, José Leonardo, "Cien años de propaganda católica: las misiones parroquiales en al archidiócesis hispalense (1848-1952)" in **Hispania Sacra**, vol. L, Madrid, CSIC, 1998.

Ruiz Sánchez, José Leonardo, "Del movimiento Católico a la Acción Católica en el Arzobispado de Sevilla" in Montero, Feliciano (ed.), **La Acción Católica en la II República** (Alcalá de Henares, Universidad de Alcalá, 2008)

Salas, Nicolás, **Morir en Sevilla** (Barcelona, Planeta, 1986)

Salas, Nicolás, **Joaquín Benjumea Burín: 1878-1963** (Sevilla, Guadalquivir Ediciones, 1990)

Salas, Nicolás, **El Moscú Sevillano. Sevilla la roja, feudo del comunismo español durante la República y símbolo triunfal del frente popular en 1936** (Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 1990)

Salas, Nicolás, **Sevilla fue la clave. República, Alzamiento, Guerra Civil (1931-39)**, 2 vols. (Sevilla, Editorial Castillejo, 1992)

Salas, Nicolás, **Bienvenido a Sevilla, camarada Alexis!** (Sevilla, Editorial Castillejo, 1993)

Salas, Nicolás, **Sevilla en tiempos de los anti-Dios** (Sevilla, Castillejo, 1997)

Salas, Nicolás, **La otra memoria histórica. 500 testimonios gráficos y documentales de la represión marxista en España (1931-1939)** (Córdoba, Almuzara, 2006)

Salas, Nicolás, **La Guerra Civil en Sevilla: antecedentes, frente popular y 18 de julio del 36, las represiones de ambos bandos (1931-1959)** (Sevilla, Guadalturia, 2009)

Sánchez, José Mariano, **The Spanish Civil War as a religious tragedy** (Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1987)

Soria Medina, Enrique, **Sevilla: elecciones 1936 y 1977** (Sevilla, Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1978)

Shubert, Adrian, **The Road to Revolution in Spain: The Coal Miners of Asturias 1860-1934** (Urbana, Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1987)

Simões, Maria Dulce Antunes, **Barrancos na encruzilhada da Guerra Civil de Espanha. Memórias e Testemunhos, 1936** (Barrancos, Camara Municipal de Barrancos, 2007)

Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, **Antifalange: estudio crítico de "Falange en la guerra de España, la unificación y Hedilla" de Maximiano García Venero** (Paris, Ruedo Ibérico, 1967)

Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, **Guernica! Guernica!: a Study of Journalism, Diplomacy, Propaganda, and History** (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977)

Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, **Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War: The Brainwashing of Francisco Franco** (New York, Routledge, 2001)

Southworth, Herbert Rutledge, **El mito de la cruzada de Franco** (Barcelona, Debolsillo, 2008)

Stuart, Christie, **We, the Anarchists! A study of the Iberian Anarchist Federation (FAI) 1927-1937** (Hastings, Meltzer Press, 1996)

Tuñón de Lara, Manuel, **La España del Siglo XX** (Librería Española, Paris, 1973)

Tuñón de Lara, Manuel, *Luchas obreras y campesinas en la Andalucía del siglo XX: Jaén (1917-1920), Sevilla (1930-1932)* (Madrid, Siglo Veintiuno, 1978)

Tusell, Javier, *Las elecciones del Frente Popular en España*, 2 vols. (Madrid, Cuadernos para el Diálogo, 1971)

Ullman, Joan Connelly, *The Tragic Week : a Study of Anticlericalism in Spain, 1875-1912* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Pr., 1968)

Vega Viguera, Enrique, *Sevilla y la artillería (historia del regimiento militar número 14)* (Sevilla, Ayuntamiento de Sevilla, 1974)

Vega Viguera, Enrique, *Historia del Regimiento de Artillería* (Sevilla, 1981)

Vilaplana Montes, Manuel, "Nota biográfica sobre monsenhor Ilundain. Actividad y magistério hasta su nombramiento como arzobispo de Sevilla" in *Archivo Hispalense*, Tomo 72, nº 219, Seville, 1989

Vincent, Mary, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in Salamanca, 1930-1936* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996)

Vincent, Mary, "Spain" in Buchanan, Tom, Conway, Martin, *Political Catholicism in Europe 1918-1965* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996)